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Innovation contracts with leakage through licensing
Evans, SB (2010) Innovation contracts with leakage through licensing. Discussion Paper. School of Economics and Finance, University of Tasmania, Hobart, Tasmania. (Unpublished)
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Available under University of Tasmania Standard License.
In this paper a Developer contracts with a Researcher for the production of a non-drastic innovation. Since effort is non-contractible, the Developer offers an incentive contract dependent on the observed magnitude of the innovation. It is shown that the distribution of intellectual property rights (IPR) ownership does not affect the level of effort exerted for innovations where the Developer would choose to license the innovation to its competitors. This is because the possibility of leakage of the innovation through licensing subsidies the Developer's payment when IPR is delegated to the Researcher, while at the same time eroding its profit.
|Item Type:||Report (Discussion Paper)|
|Keywords:||Innovation, Intellectual Property Rights, Licensing|
|Publisher:||School of Economics and Finance, University of Tasmania|
|Additional Information:||© 2010 University of Tasmania and the author|
|Date Deposited:||28 Oct 2010 23:18|
|Last Modified:||27 Nov 2012 01:17|
|Item Statistics:||View statistics for this item|
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