

EXPANSIVE GLOBALISATION: RESCUING THE ENVIRONMENT?¹

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ABSTRACT

Globalisation is a contrary process with both creative and destructive capabilities. This paper argues that globalisation needs to be considered within an expanded definitional context if its capacity for environmental good is to be realised. This is because there is an automatic, well-justified conflation typically made between economic globalisation and global ecological decline. It is all too easy in these circumstances to dismiss globalisation and look solely to a strengthened nation state as its antidote. However to do so denies the creative capacities of globalisation, for instance, in facilitating the growth of transnational environmentalism, in fostering a sense of global environmental community and prompting the emergence of efforts at least towards global environmental governance. This paper searches within globalisation itself for positive counter trends to the ecological disaster scenarios that are invariably linked to globalising forces. It argues that these counter trends are to be found in globalisation in its political, cultural and social entirety and in transformations of the globalising era beyond economic globalisation.

1) Introduction

With some justification, environmentalists tend to think of globalisation in negative terms as economic rationalism of nightmare proportions chewing up the earth's resources and spitting out increasing social and ecological injustices (Karliner 1997). Indeed it is difficult to pause and consider what environmental positives there may be given the global trends in species extinctions, atmospheric contamination, biodiversity loss, pollution and resource depletion linked to economic globalisation. Global ecological damage is economic globalisation gone mad, environmentalists warn. It is the free market at work on a global scale, unrestrained by the weakened nations states of the developed world, and embraced by the developing nations that are rushing to catch up in the industrialisation stakes. The prospects of checking the social and ecological impacts of corporate capitalism in the interests of pursuing global sustainability seem remote. Hence the repeated warnings from the world's scientists that we, the human race, are on a dangerous collision course with the natural world

If not checked, many of our current practices put at serious risk the future that we wish for human society and the plant and animal kingdoms, and may so alter the living world that it will be unable to sustain life in the manner that we know (Suzuki 1996).

This paper argues that any ecological upsides to globalisation are easily eclipsed by the harsh realities of economic globalisation, and that the term itself needs revisiting in all its complexity if the positives are to be realised. It assumes a critical approach whereby nothing about globalisation is taken for granted, except that, in Giddens' terms, it is not a purposeful, unitary process tending in a single direction, but a contingent, complex set of changes with mixed and often contradictory outcomes (Giddens 1994, 81).

¹ A paper first delivered at "Different GlobalisationS:" Governance, Dissent and the Politics of Globalisation Friday December 7th 2001 at Flinders University, Adelaide.

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This is not to deny that, if globalisation is what globalisation does, then economic globalisation may be its most powerful element, and that economic globalisation is purposefully in pursuit of economic growth at great cost to human and non-human nature. It is instead a search for counter trends to the ecological disaster scenarios that are commonly linked to globalising forces. These counter trends are to be found in globalisation in its political, cultural and social entirety and in transformations of the globalising era beyond economic globalisation.

The paper proceeds in three parts beginning with i) a consideration of globalisation's ecological downside, before ii) revisiting the generic literature on globalisation and placing economic globalisation in an expanded definitional context, and, lastly, iii) identifying counter trends to ecological disaster. These counter trends include the growth of transnational environmentalism and moves towards deliberative global environmental governance, and have their roots in new technology, global communication, localisation, sustainability principles and the possibility of global citizenry, values, polity and governance. Such counter trends are not, however, recipes for global ecological restoration for several reasons. Firstly, economic globalisation is not solely to blame for global ecological decline, so remedying its environmental harm will only partially improve the state of the global environment. Secondly, globalisation is itself a process rather than an outcome, and so are the environmentally beneficial counter trends to economic globalisation. And finally, positive counter trends alone cannot guarantee sufficient political will to ameliorate global ecological decline.

2) Globalisation's Ecological Downside

Although it is relatively common in environmental circles to attribute global ecological ills to contemporary globalisation, there is often no causal link established between the two phenomena. The disintegration of the world's ecosystems is simply assumed to be one of globalisation's harsh realities (Giddens 1994, 253). Of those at least attempting to forge a causal link, Cox argues that economic globalisation was tolerable for as long as it did not destabilise nature. It could be tolerated, then, until the advent of the hole in the ozone layer, global warming, deforestation, soil erosion, the depletion of fish stocks, and the loss of biodiversity (Cox 1996, 29). The global nature of catastrophes such as these is taken to constitute the current environmental crisis. For Gare (1995, 6) the link is the accentuation and therefore the acceleration of the environmental crisis, which incidentally he calls the ultimate source of disorientation, by the globalisation of economic and cultural processes.

Others commonly link the diminished capacity of the nation state, in the face of globalising forces, with the failure to arrest global ecological decline (Zarsky 1999). Saurin, for instance, notes that if the state were to attempt to mediate or temper globalisation in order to offset global environmental degradation, it would be engaging against itself and would need to devise an alternative to the globalisation schema (Saurin 1993, 59). Held *et al* do not explain the link between globalisation and global environmental decline so much as argue that industrialisation over the last fifty years has seen the globalisation of environmental degradation which will exponentially worsen as the South follows suit (1999, 494).

If catastrophes such as resource scarcity, toxic waste, global warming, ozone depletion, rain forest destruction, desertification, and uncertainty about both water quality and availability are conditions of modernity and our risk society, as Giddens (1994, 207) argues, how then is this globalisation's fault? Of those who do attempt to causally link globalisation and environmental degradation, Chung and Gillespie (1998, 7) firstly explain that economic globalisation has seen 'the structures of economic markets, technologies and communication patterns become progressively more international over time'. For the environment, this has meant that there has been an overall increase in resource consumption and pollution trends as production and export outputs have exponentially increased and as industries have globalised.

More specifically, French (2000) sees the surge in the global movements of goods, money, species and pollution across international borders over the last several decades as placing unprecedented strains upon the planet as the world economy pushes up against its ecological limits. Again the trend is toward exponential change. Forests are shrinking as the value of global trade in forest production climbs, from \$US47 billion in 1970 to \$US139 billion in 1998. Chemical use is rising, subsistence farming declining and nontraditional exports are climbing with the doubling of world agricultural trade from \$US224 billion

in 1972 to \$US457 billion in 1997. Fisheries are collapsing as fish exports have risen, growing nearly fivefold in value since 1970 to reach \$US52 billion in 1997. And human health is also endangered, in part from pesticide exports increasing nearly ninefold since 1961 to \$US11.4 billion in 1998 (French 2000, 86-87). It is this accelerating degradation of the global commons that so alarms ecologists.

Given the state of the planet today, ecologists simply do not see a place for accelerated ecological decline. Suzuki warns that we, the 'super species', have used the brute force of new technology to alter our already overpopulated and degraded planet's atmosphere, oceans, forests, aquifers and soil, without regard, not even for our own life support systems (Suzuki 1996, 106). Indeed human contamination and domination over the non-human world is now seen by some to extend from the biosphere to the atmosphere and beyond, which for McKibben (1990) at least signals the death of nature. The United Nations Environment Program (UNEP 1999) reports that the world is undergoing accelerating change, with internationally coordinated environmental stewardship lagging behind economic and social development. In the late 1990s, for example, annual emissions of carbon dioxide were nearly four times the 1950 level and atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide had reached their highest levels in 160,000 years. And this is far from an isolated trend.

Excessive global use of nitrogen for agricultural fertilisation is exacerbating acidification, modifying ecosystems, contaminating freshwater, stimulating coastal algal blooms and causing emissions that contribute to global warming. Hazardous waste, pesticide usage, forest, woodland and grassland destruction and degradation, freshwater shortages and contamination, coastal and marine degradation, atmospheric contamination and urbanisation pressures are all exacerbated by the pressures of globalisation (UNEP 2000, 24-52). But ecologists are not solely concerned for the non-human casualties of rampant global economics and the excessive consumption patterns of industrialised nations that is fuelled by globalising forces (Beck 2000, 39; Karlner 1997, 21-29). As Kothari (1996, 154) suggests, they are just as concerned that the natural resource extractive developmentalist regimes of recent decades have flattened biological and cultural diversity to the benefit of a very privileged few.

Ecologists are all the more concerned with the current, accelerating state of both global ecological decline and global poverty given the fact that their warnings about the state of the planet were first broadcast decades ago in the controversial *Limits to Growth* (Meadows et al 1972) and *Blueprint for Survival* (Goldsmith et al 1972). The former warned of the dire need to check exponential growth in world population, industrialisation, pollution, food production and resource depletion, or else face reaching the planetary limits to growth some time within the next hundred years. The latter advocated an ecocentric retreat from the modern industrial state, in essence a return to the human scale and community self reliance of pre-industrialism, as the best means of recapturing corporate power and wealth and thus averting ecological crisis.

Both scenarios were heavily criticised, in particular for their appeals to authoritarian solutions, with the *Limits to Growth* additionally controversial for the computer modeling upon which it relied, and the *Blueprint for Survival* for its inherent conservatism. The notion of planetary limits itself was subject to controversy that raged throughout the 1970s, into the 1980s, and persists today, the rhetoric of sustainability notwithstanding. Even so, a reworked *Limits to Growth* study is again warning that the exponential growth of human population and economic production threatens to exceed natural limits, and that, without redress, ecological collapse is inevitable sometime in the 21st century. But for all the controversy about its accuracy, the limits to growth message remains essentially unchanged, namely that humankind must restrain economic growth (Leeson 1979).

Enter the global environmental movement. Neither modern environmentalism nor globalisation itself are entirely new phenomena, however both were lent a crisis driven growth momentum in the 1970s, ecological and economic respectively, that was to map out two competing, and as yet irreconciled, global trajectories. If we date modern environmentalism to around the time of the publication of Rachael Carson's 1962 book *Silent Spring* (Fox 1990, 4), then it is contemporaneous with the beginnings of modern globalisation if we date that from the arrival of television and the first satellite transmissions (Scholte 1997). Indeed it was these transmissions that partly inspired modern environmentalism as the

first photographs of earth were transmitted from outer space, visually conveying its finite boundaries and inspiring a sense of globalism with images of a life sustaining planet in infinite space.

Since that time, environmentalism and globalisation have had a paradoxically synergistic relationship. Whilst both emerged more or less contemporaneously (Cox 1996, 24), environmentalism, which built its global reach early by politicising Carson's message of nature's interconnectivity and the limits to growth message, has increasingly found globalisation's communications revolution a boon to its advocacy. It has built global momentum from the declining state of the planet, facilitated by global communications technology, and, ironically, as Held (1997, 259) explains, has fostered a positive globalisation itself in inspiring transnational cultural, scientific and intellectual networks, movements institutions and conventions. Global ecological trends show that it has failed, nevertheless, to deter the juggernaut of economic globalisation as it has built its upon own momentum in lifting the world political economy out of the recessive years of the 1970s (Cox 1996).

Despite recent contestation about the actual state of global ecological decline, the United Nations Environment Program report alone would be sufficient to confirm for some environmentalists the negative planetary consequences of unrestrained, escalating economic globalisation (ENS 1999). Indeed it is understandable in these circumstances that any upside to the broader notion of globalisation may well be lost, even though I would argue that the term itself needs revisiting in all its complexity if the positives are to be realised. This is not to deny that, if globalisation is what globalisation does, then economic globalisation may be its most powerful element, and that economic globalisation is purposefully in pursuit of economic growth at great cost to human and non-human nature. It is instead a search for counter trends to the ecological disaster scenarios that are commonly linked to globalising forces.

3) Expansive Globalisation

It is worth revisiting the generic literature on globalisation and placing economic globalisation in an expanded context, if globalisation is to be prised away from an automatic conflation with ecological decline. By doing so we discover both the multidimensionality of the term, with various authors offering various differing typologies of meaning (e.g. Held 1997; Lipschutz 2000; Viola 1998; Waters 1995), and, as a consequence, that globalisation is not a unitary process proceeding in a single direction (Giddens 1990, 80). The various typologies of globalisation cover various transformative notions, for example of changed space, culture, society, politics, territorialism, warfare, economies, environment and governance (Held *et al* 1999). That said, there is no agreed conception of globalisation amongst theorists, nor indeed any 'definitive or fixed lines of contestation', but instead 'multiple conversations' about its meaning which 'do not readily afford a coherent or simple characterisation' (Held & McGrew 2000, 1-2).

The literature essentially portrays globalisation as a process of integration with a global reach that is transforming international organisations, states, economies, societies, local communities, NGOs and corporations. It is also generally agreed that globalisation feeds off technical, political and social innovations and change, in particular the communications revolution and the speed and broadened access that it has created. It is also typically seen as the transformative phenomenon that has come to dominate, if not to define, the post cold war era. Held describes it as the 'big idea', or the leitmotif, of our time that attempts to capture the increasing interconnectivity between the world's major regions and across its many domains of activity (Held 1999, 483-4). Part of the transformation is from a bounded to an unbounded world, in the very broadest sense - from personal to technological to spatial to political and so forth. Nevertheless, in political and policy terms the claims made about globalisation remain contested.

On the one hand globalisation describes a process of global integration fuelled by advances in virtual communication and information technology with the potential to undermine nation states. On the other, it is described not only as a fad of the 1990s, but as an overblown accounting of the traditional interdependence of nations and money markets, and a flawed accounting of the failing sovereignty of the nation state (Waltz 1999). Much of this latter, critical literature generated by political science mounts a strong defence of the nation state as capable of defying the strength of economic integration and thus the key threat of globalisation (Weiss 1998) offering a way ahead for increased environmental protection.

Held *et al* (1999, 495) see it as a 'distortion' to say simply that states have lost power when the reality is much more complex, with power shifting rather than diminishing, and requiring a rethinking of politics.

Although much of the globalisation literature focuses upon economic globalisation and nation state capacity, this is by no means solely the context in which it arose. Looking more broadly at what has been meant by globalisation, it is useful to consider the term in both its contemporary and historical contexts. To take the latter first, writers often point out that whilst debate about globalisation has dominated the 1990s, its beginnings were recognisable decades, if not a century, before. If we take globalisation to refer to 'processes whereby social relations acquire relatively distanceless and borderless qualities, so that human lives are increasingly played out in the world as a single place' then it begins at least as early as telegraphic communication in the 1840s (Scholte 1997). More commonly, writers refer to milestone events such as the arrival of domestic television, the first satellite broadcast transmission of the early 1960s, and the global communications and computerisation revolution that followed, as ushering in globalisation.

Perhaps it is truer to say that rather than beginning in the 1960s, globalisation has had an intensifying influence since then, characterised, as many authors note, by a shedding of spatial restrictions on a global scale (Saurin 1993, 56; Held 1997, 253). This is not primarily an economic phenomenon, as many environmental authors take it to be in discussing contemporary globalisation. It is equally a political, a socio-cultural and increasingly a personal consideration. Nor does the shedding of spacial restrictions equate automatically to global intergration as much of the economic globalisation literature implies. It does, however, suggest a previously unimagined global interconnectedness that now has become more commonplace:

A globalized world is one in which political, economic, cultural and social events become more and more interconnected, and also one in which they have more impact. In other words, societies are affected more and more extensively and more and more deeply by events of other societies..... the world seems to be 'shrinking' and people are increasingly aware of this (Baylis and Smith 1997, 7).

Economic globalisation is nevertheless perhaps the most recognised consequence of global interconnectedness, along with the spread of capitalism, Western imperialism and to some, before the recent upsurge in international terrorism, the *end of history*. The latter refers to Fukuyama's thesis that the demise of communist regimes over recent decades has heralded a worldwide triumph of liberal democracy over all rival forms of governance (Gare 1995, 6; Scholte 1997, 20). With liberal democracy on the ascendancy, so too has the liberalisation of economic activity broadened and deepened across the globe. This has seen an increased level of competition with the dismantling of barriers to free trade and investment on the international front, and a trend towards regulatory reforms and economic rationalisation at 'home' (Jones 1998, 17).

There is a tension between globalisation enthusiasts on the one hand and globalisation sceptics on the other about the extent to which nation states may be beholden to global economics and trade liberalising forces as we have seen. The blame for global environmental degradation on an accelerating scale is nevertheless typically sheeted home to the transnational beneficiaries of economic liberalisation who are now seen as beyond the reach of the nation state. Indeed the increased competition between nation states for international investment dollars in the current deregulatory climate is invariably blamed for the demise of environmental standards and the threat to non renewable natural resources. The disintegration of the world's ecosystem is, according to such critiques, simply a disaster scenario generated by contemporary globalisation (Giddens 1994, 253).

Many of the 'negatives' associated with globalisation stem not only from the perceived pressures of the globalising of economic liberalism upon nation state capacity, but equally upon the experience of every day life. In this sense, Giddens argues that globalisation is both 'out there' linking experiences across the globe and 'in here' bound up with our local lives. There are both global and local consequences of the state appearing less in control of its economic life, of national sovereignty appearing under threat, and of

transnational business corporations appearing to act with scant regard for local impact (Giddens 1994). Beck (2000, 139) argues that corporations, especially the globally active ones, have assumed a key role in shaping not only the economy but society as a whole - if only because they have it in their power to withdraw their material resources (capital, taxes, jobs).

This has several implications. Firstly there is the threat of capital flight, which is all too familiar to environmentalists. Then there is the export of jobs that attempts to minimise costs and obligations. Thirdly, there is the 'global horse trading' that attempts to achieve the cheapest location. And finally, there is an ability to variously locate investment, production, tax and residence all at the whim of the corporation (Beck 2000). The key issue here for many is the escape of the corporation from the regulatory domain of the nation state and the weakening of institutionalism that environmentalists see as exacerbating ecological decline. But as Capling *et al* (1998, 4) explain, globalised market forces (free trade, investment attraction and global competition) have had an impact well beyond the market upon our political institutions with direct consequences for how we live our daily lives:

This has entailed the restructure of many of our most fundamental political institutions including the public service, the industrial relations and arbitration system, the welfare system, the institutions of national economic management, citizenship, and of course, responsible government itself. And in turn, these changes have given shape to (and been shaped by) a new political culture.

Globalisation is perversely bound up with both positive and negative change scenarios that are readily apparent when economic globalisation is considered within an expanded definitional context. Indeed, the integrative, communicative and transformative capacity of globalising forces themselves may be seen to facilitate the necessary remedies to globalisation's ecological ills. Counter trends to global ecological disaster can be seen to have roots at least in new technology, global communication, transnational environmentalism, localisation, and the globalisation of both the sustainability principle and the ethic of planetary care. But the fundamental changes that economic globalisation in particular has wrought have thus far only worsened ecological decline so that the lack of faith by environmentalists in the ecological credentials of the nation state has itself globalised to a lack of faith in international political will as well.

4) Rescuing the Environment?

There is certainly greater consensus on the ecological downside of globalisation than there is any sense of the opportunities for positive change, given the accelerating characteristics of globalizing forces. Nevertheless any counter trends to the ecological disaster scenarios that are linked to such forces are to be found in globalisation itself in its political, social and cultural entirety and in embracing the transformations of the globalising era beyond economic globalisation. This is most obviously so in the case of transnational political environmentalism and moves towards deliberative global environmental governance. It is equally so in the social phenomenon of 'localisation', or the local response to globalisation by communities that are seeking to enhance their 'sense of place' difference in a world that Giddens (1994) describes as increasingly homogenised and detraditionalised. Similarly, globalisation has inspired the emergence of global culture and the possibility of global citizenry, values, polity and governance.

So what will it take to rescue the global environment? If globalisation is a process of global integration then integration itself is partly the key. Global integration has seen sophisticated mapping of the state of the planet by institutions with global environmental charters such as the United Nations Environment Program, the World Resources Institute, the Worldwatch Institute, the World Bank and the World Conservation Monitoring Centre. Global integration has facilitated new forms of media spreading environmental messages about the state of the planet, as well as new forms of technology aimed at preventing global environmental harm, and new environmental planning and management tools for achieving sustainability. Global integration has also heightened the pressure upon nation states to remedy

ecological decline, upon transnational corporations to assume their environmental responsibilities, and upon international communities of nations to invent and exercise global environmental governance.

As an integrative process, globalisation could indeed facilitate the global diffusion of environmentally sound products and technology on an unimagined scale. Chung and Gillispie (1998, 8) believe that globalisation has the potential to uncouple economic growth from pollution generation and resource consumption if such diffusion were achieved, as well as alleviate poverty and its associated adverse environmental effects. On the other hand, they concede that the opposite is equally likely. Increased economic activity could result in overall resource consumption and pollution trends rising, as it has, whilst the distribution of environmental pressures may be uneven, resulting in 'winners' and 'losers' within and between countries as indeed it has. Much of the outcome rests upon whether nation states 'race to the bottom' in terms of environmental standards and whether improved environmental standards themselves converge, as they are beginning to with ISO 14000 and 14001 standards and Environmental Management Systems, and thus are globalised.

Critical to the rescuing of the planet has been the emergence of transnational environmentalism, the political and institutional responses to ecological crisis and decline, and the global push in particular by environmentalists for the creation of deliberative democratic spaces and global environmental governance.

Environmentalism itself is a complex phenomenon. Although there has been no one typical response to global ecological crisis by environmentalists two key strands are readily apparent, the global and the local. Firstly, Cox (1996, 24) observes that contemporary political environmentalism is innately globalist. This is a consequence of environmental problems themselves, including the sharing of the global commons, the interlinked challenges of demographic expansion and resource consumption, and transboundary pollution, presenting possibly 'the clearest and starkest examples of the global shift in human organisation and activity' (Held 1997, 258-9). Further evidence of this global significance is the fact that the very first global issue conference ever held by the international community was the 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (Scholte 1997, 17). International NGOs have flourished from several thousand groups in 1972 to over 23,000 today. However, by 1993 environmental groups had grown to comprise over 14% of that total, including the better known Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace, the World Wildlife Fund for Nature and the Climate Action Network (French 2000, 164; Held 1997, 259).

On the other hand, the conservative *Blueprint for Survival* response mentioned above to global ecological crisis has persisted in the strand of environmentalism that advocates an anti-statist, anti-globalist retreat to communitarianism as the antidote to globalisation. Ironically though, globalisation has itself facilitated the rapid proliferation and sharing of eco-communitarian concepts such as local sustainability, homegrown economies, community-contract organic agriculture, local currencies and barter systems, micro credit and new indicators beyond the GNP (Henderson 1999, 4). Beck also talks of 'green protectionism' that is innately anti-globalist, although possibly not so eco-communitarian, and that rushes to the defence of the nation state for its capacity to defend environmental standards from world market attack. Of globalisation's many contradictions, he argues, is the fact that such anti-globalism, indeed such 'light minded anti-modernism', fails to recognise that the Greens are the big intellectual winners from globalisation since ecological questions must be addressed and answered as global issues (Beck 2000, 126-7).

The 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment saw the first ever agreement on principles to strengthen the framework for future international environmental cooperation, and led to the creation of the United Nations Environment Program (Greene 1997, 317). Following publication of the 1987 Brundtland Commission's report *Our Common Future* and its advocacy of sustainable development, the UN General Assembly called in 1989 for the convening of the 1992 Rio Earth Summit. This was to be the largest summit meeting ever held, involving over 150 nation states and over 45,000 people, including the participation of non-government organisations which is atypical at such intergovernmental meetings. Amongst the eventual achievements of the Earth Summit were: the Rio Declaration of principles to guide action on environment and development; the Agenda 21 action program for sustainable development; the Framework Convention on Climate Change; the Convention on Biological Diversity, and the Convention

to Combat Desertification. There was a failure to negotiate a Forests Convention (Greene 1997, 331; Viola 1998, 48).

Whilst these conventions certainly do not prescribe bold actions to rescue the environment from the adverse ecological impacts of globalisation, they are nevertheless innovative acts of global environmental governance and are of enormous significance. Furthermore, the Earth Summit saw the establishment of the Commission for Sustainable Development (CSD) which reviews progress on Agenda 21, and the Global Environment Facility (GEF) which funds plans that promote sustainability. The state of the global environment has however continued to decline since the Earth Summit, with disappointing progress reported to the June 1997 UN General Assembly Special Session (Rio+5) on a variety of indicators (UNEP 1997). If the global sustainable development agenda is to survive, Chung and Gillespie (1998, 10) argue that solid achievements - to reduce consumption, to reduce hazardous waste, and to address natural resource consumption - will need to be shown at the September 2002 UNGASS Rio+10 in Johannesburg.

If economic globalisation is critically linked to global ecological decline, then clearly there has been a failure, (by nation states as they globalise, and by the instruments of both global environmental governance and global trade and commerce as they emerge), to ensure its environmental sustainability. 'Creating a global economy that protects rather than destroys natural wealth' says French (2000, 33) 'is both a moral imperative and a practical necessity as we enter the new century'.

What is needed, Henderson (1999, 23) suggests, is 'more accurate indicators; global monitoring and feedback; higher standards; criteria; better rules; regulations, codes of conduct and principles embracing human rights, equity and Earth Ethics'. In economic terms, global pollution, species extinction, hazardous products, harm to human health, climate change and atmospheric pollution, could be seen as the negative externalities of globalised trade. Henderson (1999, 29-30) argues that these externalities are caused by market failure and less-than-full cost pricing, and that the remedy to such externalities, as with all public goods, is prevention via global cooperation on standards, rules and regulations. In other words, globalisation of economic opportunity needs to be followed by globalisation of responsibility in terms of trade, investment, industry subsidisation, technology transfer, support for undervalued environmental projects, the development of sustainability standards and dialogues, and the promotion of best environmental practice in industry (Chung and Gillespie 1998, 15).

The environment presents perhaps the clearest instance of Held's (2001, 397) 'overlapping communities of fate' that in part characterise contemporary globalisation and require new styles of decisionmaking. It is clear that governments acting alone can no longer adequately manage transboundary environmental issues, climate change for instance, and that their response must be globalised (WBG 2000, 7). Environmentalists in particular worry over the shifting balance of power, from democratically elected governments to sources of unelected and unrepresentative economic power (Held 1997, 257), that again characterises globalisation. It is clear that the rescuing of the environment will require the enhancement of democracy at all levels, local, national and global. It will require a reframing of corporate accountability as well to extend it beyond the shareholder and worker to include a broader responsibility 'to the laws and democratic processes of communities, governments and the global framework' in which a company operates (Karlner 1997, 217). Held and McGrew (1999, 495) argue that globalisation has left nation states sandwiched between global forces and local demands, but still quite capable of reinventing their roles and functions and reforming territorially defined democratic institutions and practices, as they must to rescue the environment.

5) Conclusions

The antidote to globalisation's ecological downside, I have argued, is globalisation itself, although the term must be revisited in all its complexities and with all its contradictions for the positives to be realised. By this expanded accounting, economic globalisation, the cause of so much ecological devastation and so much of the anti-globalisation backlash, is recognised as a partial phenomenon of a broader experience. As theorists have argued, globalisation is not just economic, it is not a single process, it is a contradictory, complex mix, a seamless web of connectedness, a transformation of multiple dimensions and meanings.

The complexities and contradictions of globalisation are all too clear in environmental terms. The globalisation of industry has been damaging in the ecological sense, but environmentally sound products and green industries have greater global reach than ever before. Similarly, transnational capital and power that is beyond the nation state is now matched by transnational, technologically adept environmentalism.

There is furthermore, a natural synergy between environmentalism and globalisation. As I have argued, both were lent a crisis driven growth momentum in the 1970s, ecological and economic respectively, that was to map out two competing, and as yet irreconciled, global trajectories. Modern environmentalists have worked hard to develop a popular global discourse of ecological responsibility, the 'think global act local' catchcry, ironically from the very first satellite transmissions that heralded in modern globalisation. Indeed communication advances that have become the hallmark of globalisation have proved a boon to environmental advocacy, to messages of local and global sustainability, and to capacity building in information sharing and transnational campaigning. Moreover, the vanishing borders that characterise globalisation in the social, political and economic senses do so physically in terms of transboundary ecosystems and many environmental concerns.

Environmental issues have indeed commanded global attention, making local concerns global, prompting international regime building and cooperation, and inspiring global ecological citizenry. But it is still difficult if not impossible to prise globalisation away from an automatic conflation with ecological decline, and with good reason. As French (2000) argues, economic globalisation is purposefully in pursuit of economic gain at great cost to human and non-human nature with the world economy pushing up against its social and ecological limits. There have been successes such as the globalisation of public concern, voluntary industry actions and Local Agenda 21 initiatives, reductions in air pollution globally and in deforestation in Europe and North America, and the international cooperation that has achieved a recovering ozone layer. But the state of the global environment continues to deteriorate (UNEP 1999, 363) so that the globalisation of economic opportunity must now be followed by the globalisation of social and ecological responsibility.

One of the positive consequences of globalisation is the pressure for democratisation (Giddens 1994, 110). As Held (1997, 264) argues, globalisation requires a reinvention of democratic processes, specifically to develop administrative capacity and independent political resources at regional and global levels as a necessary complement to those in local and national polities. Giddens (1994, 110-113) would call this a multi-levelled, post-traditional democracy in which there are multiple democratic reference points and thus better reflexively informed decision makers and more deliberative, dialogic democracy. Globally generative democracy is thus a key counter trend, to the seemingly inevitable ecological disaster scenarios that are associated with globalisation, with enormous potential for achieving global cooperation by nation states on environmental standards, rules and regulations. Neither Held nor Giddens are implying the abrogation of nation state responsibility for the environment here but rather its reconception as potentially situated in the context of deliberative global environmental governance.

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