Strengthening the rule of law or serving as a tool of war? : a critical analysis of United Nations sanctions

This thesis explores the relationship between United Nations sanctions and the rule of law. Its primary contention is that sanctions have been applied in such a way that they have undermined the rule of law, thus weakening the authority and legitimacy of the U.N. Security Council and the U.N. sanctions system. As a consequence, States are less likely to comply with their sanctions obligations to the extent necessary to ensure that sanctions are effective. The challenge is therefore how to modify the Security Council's sanctions practice so that sanctions command such respect and inspire such confidence that States both desire and feel compelled to implement sanctions fully and effectively. The thesis proceeds in four Parts. Part I sets the stage for analysis, introducing U.N. sanctions and proposing a basic accountability-based model of the rule of law, according to which the central aim of the rule of law is to prevent the abuse of power. Part II explores the origins of the Security Council's sanctions powers, tracing the path leading to the enshrinement of the Security Council's sanctions powers in the U.N. Charter and describing the legal basis for the application of sanctions. Part III illustrates how the Security Council has acted upon its sanctions powers in practice, charting the manner in which the Council's sanctions-related decisions have shaped the contours of the U.N. sanctions system. Part IV then operationalises the theoretical framework for analysis developed in Part I, critically evaluating the extent to which sanctions have strengthened the rule of law. It concludes that the U.N. sanctions system exhibits shortcomings in respect of each of the key elements of the rule of law and makes proposals for reforming the Security Council's sanctions practice so that sanctions can strengthen, rather than undermine, the rule of law.