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Is Externalism Content Inconsistent with Internalism About Justification
Chase, J (2001) Is Externalism Content Inconsistent with Internalism About Justification. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 79 (2). pp. 227-246. ISSN 0004-8402
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Since Kripke, Putnam and Burge raised the subject in the 1970s, there has been a vigorous debate about the degree to which the content of contentful mental states is fixed by the social or physical environment of the subject. The debate obviously ramifies in the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of language: more recently, philosophers have begun to explore the consequences of the thesis of wide content (or content externalism) for epistemology.
|Journal or Publication Title:||Australasian Journal of Philosophy|
|Page Range:||pp. 227-246|
|Identification Number - DOI:||10.1080/713659224|
|Additional Information:||The definitive version is available online at http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/content? Copyright © 2001 Taylor & Francis|
|Date Deposited:||19 Aug 2009 04:09|
|Last Modified:||18 Nov 2014 04:04|
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