Chapter One

The Research Background

This thesis has its genesis in my school teaching experience and is part of a continuing journey of understanding about music, music teaching and the musical lives of students. This Chapter is presented as a 'narrative of personal experience' (Bochner, 1997, 2001) in order to show how my encounters with several music education issues in the field influenced the direction of the research. The story unfolds to a formulation of the purpose and nature of the study, its aims and objectives and the specific research questions that guide the investigation. I also connect 'my educational issues' to the experiences of others in the research literature and focus on the factors that have led to a narrative and phenomenological approach. The chapter also serves as a brief introduction to narrative and phenomenological ideas.

Music Teaching – Encountering 'Issues'

One of the first 'issues' I encountered as a schoolteacher centred on the function of music, its place and value in education and society. In my undergraduate life I had been warned that it would confront me as soon as I entered professional teaching. In a unit entitled The Philosophy of Music Education student colleagues and I had received the following advice from the lecturer,

The music educators of the future will constantly need to justify the value of music and its place in the curriculum. Therefore, in order to defend music, our self-worth and our profession, while
approach to composing individual musical 'portraits' of the participants and each
would be considered an intrinsic 'case' study (Stake, 1995, p. 3). By avoiding cross-
case analysis and comparison this procedure would allow me to foreground
individuality and uniqueness and to highlight what is musically personal,
perspectival and idiosyncratic.

To support the narrative principles suggested by Bruner (1986), I turned to
more recent contributors to narrative research. These include Polkinghorne (1988,
1995), Clandinin and Connelly (1990, 2000), Barone (2000, 2001a and 2001b) and
Smeyers and Verhesschen (2001). Importantly, I learned that narrative inquiry 'is
the study of the ways humans experience the world' and it recognises that 'humans
are storytelling organisms who individually and socially lead storied lives' (Connelly
and Clandinin, 1990, p. 2). Following this tenet, I planned to collect narrative
accounts in interviews and observations with the student participants, explicate
meanings from the data and then 're-story' (Ollerenshaw and Creswell, 2002) my
interpretations of their experiences. I planned to do this in a way that would
highlight the individual and idiosyncratic nature of their relationships with music
and also in a way that would avoid 'disaggregating' (Ezzy, 2002, p. 95) their musical
lifeworlds. Using narrative methods I would focus on each participant's story in
order to bring out 'significances' or 'potentialities of meaning' (Kvale, 1996, p. 4)
and 'everyday meanings' of their relationships with music. Also I would look for
meaningful episodes that would present knowledge and understanding of lifeworld
situations rather than knowledge and understanding of concepts and abstractions.
Illumination of important meaning structures would reveal the ways that musical
lives are 'lived' and the essential nature of each idiosyncratic and unique
relationship with music. Narrative principles recognise that lived meanings are
contained within storied accounts of experience and these meanings are available
for interpretation by the researcher. The new interpretations may then be subjected
to 'restorying' (Ollerenshaw and Creswell, 2002). Importantly, I would look for
'significances' in personal narratives of experience that would lead to insights into
the idiosyncratic formation of musical identities and ‘music’s role in the construction of the self’ (DeNora, 2000, p. xx).

In order to broaden the interpretative approach, I decided to incorporate phenomenological research procedures (Van Manen, 1990; Moustakas, 1994) into the overall design. Phenomenological principles recognise the primacy of the lived world and through interpretations of lived experience we may arrive at ‘lived meaning’, which is ‘the way that a person experiences and understands his or her world as real and meaningful’ (Van Manen, 1990, p. 183). I recognised that, as a researcher, interpreter and observer, by becoming sensitive to the phenomenological ‘lifeworld’ and ‘lived meaning’ I could be more attuned to the subjectivity of the ‘lived experience’ of both the participants and myself during field work observations and while working with the collected data. I recognised that phenomenological and narrative procedures, when combined together would compliment each other while forming a powerful research tool for looking into and investigating the meaning structures that accompany music relationships and life-world music experiences.

In Chapter Two I present my understanding of narrative and phenomenological principles in detail, explain the terminology of concepts (such as ‘essence’) and reveal how they are used and combined in order to ‘cross the street’ to the lifeworld of the participants in this study.

Moving into the present, my next step is to channel ideas of an initial conceptual structure into more clearly defined aims, objectives and research questions.

The Aims and Objectives of the Study

My first, broad aim seeks to contribute to our understanding of how dedicated senior secondary school music students use music and how they construct significant meanings within their musical lifeworlds. My area of interest has now narrowed to an investigation of the ways that ‘powerful’ individual
relationships with music are formed. I shall therefore target participants who have been captured by music, are committed to the practice of it and who can be described as musically enthusiastic and dedicated. Importantly, my aim is to avoid judging levels of musicianship, and categorisations such as gifted and talented simply in order to locate students with strong musical identities - who would be interested in participating in the study and sharing stories of their musical lifeworlds. With this objective, I shall purposefully target 'information-rich cases' and 'critical case samples' - what Hatch (2002) refers to as 'individuals selected to represent dramatic examples of or are of critical importance to the phenomenon of interest' (p. 98). I also plan to narrow the focus of the research to senior secondary school musicians. Teaching Year 11 and 12 students had been an area of personal educational interest.

While the first aim of the study will 'paint a broad picture' of musical lifeworlds and the way 'musical lives are lived', two further aims will have a more detailed and defined focus.

The second aim is to explicate structures of meaning from lived musical experiences described by the participants as deeply felt, formative, transformative or epiphanic. Interpretations of these experiences will provide insight into the meaningful ways that the participants had become attracted to music and the value and significance that they ascribe to it.

The third aim is to explicate the meaning structures of each participant's encounters with different types of music learning experiences. This particular foregrounding is designed to draw attention to music teaching and learning processes from the perspective of each student. My aim is that interpretation and analyses of the participant's perspectives will contribute to the ongoing dialogue and discussion of music's place in formal institutional settings and informal, student initiated communities of practice. With this educational focus I shall seek understanding of student relationships to both formal and informal types of learning and explore how these different areas have contributed to musical development and attitudes to music.
A further aim will be explored throughout the thesis. This is to construct an argument that sets out to promote and model narrative and phenomenological ‘ways of thinking’ about music, music experience and processes of inquiry. This reflexive component (as I have mentioned in the Prologue) will include monitoring of my own thought processes and ‘transformation’ while becoming a narrative and phenomenological thinker - through a pragmatic, embodied and situated experience with narrative and phenomenological ‘ways of thinking’. This process will be made visible by the insertion of vignettes, at strategic points in the text, that reflect my own situated, lived experiences and learning processes with being a narrative and phenomenological thinker. These ‘ways of thinking’ are also used to construct an argument that counters the dominant Western tradition of ‘objectifying music’ - where it is viewed as an autonomous object independent of any experiencer. This process of objectification includes the tendency of many inquirers into music function, meaning and behaviour who seek to assess whether or not their interpretations correspond to or mirror ‘objective constructs’ (see Mishler, 2000, p. 128) of the nature of music. By ‘constructs’ I mean categories that as generalisations are presumed to be common to all music practitioners. While countering the objectivist stance I shall highlight a constructivist approach that is concerned with subjective and social aspects of music and the features of the power and effects of music within individual musical lifeworlds.

The aims of the study seek the meaning structures of experience and are concerned with description and interpretation rather than explanation. They seek insight into ‘the what and how’ rather than the ‘why’ (Karlsson, 1993, pp. 14-15) and do not problem-solve but aim to generate or enhance meaning (Van Manen, 1991, p. 23).

Summarised, the aims of that study are

1. To investigate the musical lifeworlds of a sample of musically dedicated senior secondary school students in order to illuminate their ‘musical
ways of being' and the meaning and significance that they ascribe to these.

2. To identify and illuminate the meaningful experiences that led the participants to become attracted to music.

3. To gain insight into the meaning structures of each participant's encounters with different types of music learning experiences in order to draw attention to music teaching and learning processes from the perspective of each student.

4. To seek personal 'transformation' by becoming a narrative and phenomenological thinker and doer and gain experience with narrative and phenomenological 'ways of thinking' and embodied 'ways of being'.

The Research Questions

The aims of the thesis are now formulated into research questions in order to guide and focus the investigation. In the following research questions, I use the words meaning and meaningful as Dissanayake (2000) states - in an 'informal sense' in the way that 'most people use the words ...to express personal feelings about the seriousness or importance something holds for them' (p. 72). The first question guides the main aim of the thesis, which is to 'paint' a broad illuminated 'picture' of individual musical lifeworlds.

Question 1
How are the lives of a sample of musically dedicated senior secondary school students lived and what are the essential structures of their experiences?
The second question focuses the investigation toward meaningful experiences that the participants will describe as leading them to an attraction to music.

**Question 2**

What are the meaning structures of lived musical experiences that are described by the participants as deeply felt, formative, transformative or epiphanic?

The third research question seeks to uncover student relationships to both formal and informal types of learning and how these different areas have contributed to their musical development and attitudes to music.

**Question 3**

What are the meaning structures of each participant's encounters with different types of music learning experiences and what are their perceptions of their relationship between 'formal' and 'informal' music learning practices?

The fourth question will guide the reflexive component as I monitor and report my research relationship and understanding of narrative and phenomenological 'ways of thinking' and pragmatic, embodied 'ways of being'.

**Question 4**

Can narrative and phenomenological ways of thinking and ways of being lead to a transformed understanding of self and music, the participants in the study and their relationships to music?
My first aim in positioning myself into the research story is to avoid an objectivist 'view from nowhere' or a 'god's-eye-view' (Johnson, 1987) approach to research. On this point, Lather (1991) suggests that 'the author/researcher does not exist in a transcendental realm but is embodied, desiring, and invested in contradictory privileges and struggles' (quoted in Usher, 1997, p. 39). Embodied in the research, I have removed the imaginary cloak of neutrality, am 'not embarrassed by my own subjectivity' and include 'lived experience and the physical, political, and historical context of (my) experience' (Ellis and Flaherty, 1992, p. 1 and 5). My experiences show how the topic and aims of the research emerged from a practical teaching context (see Bresler, 1996, p. 12). Narratives of experience as a teacher, researcher and musician are included in order to support and ground my arguments in narrative, situational knowledge. These accounts provide a contrast and balance with the conceptual abstractions provided by paradigmatically formed discussions. Vignettes of personal experience, which are inserted at strategic points in the text, provide descriptions of impressions, realisations and emancipatory moments which reveal ideological biases and 'the structural and historical forces that inform the social construction under study' (Shacklock and Smyth, 1998, p. 6). Revelations of my own identity and experience also provide consideration for the reader who will have a clearer picture of what I 'have on my mind' and the 'forestructure of understandings that form the basis for interpretation' (Gergen, 1991, p. 104). Importantly, by including autobiographical and reflexive content in research, 'the subjective positioning of character' will reveal 'who we are in our research and our writing' (Goodall, 2000, pp. 131-136). Foley (1998, p. 110) sanctions 'research as a critically reflexive tale' and Denzin (1997) suggests that a reflexive approach will seek to ground the study in the process of self-formation and self-understanding (p. 267). I hold the view that this grounding is an important aim and acknowledge it as an underlying motivation within this thesis. Pinar (1988) has
supported this approach stating that 'understanding of self is not narcissism; it is a precondition and concomitant condition to the understanding of others' (p. 150).

Recently, academic writers have conducted research that includes 'self-as-subject' (for examples see, Ronai, 1992) and the inclusion of 'personal narrative voice' (Richardson, 1997, Barone, 2001a; Bochner, 1997, 2001). Bochner (1997) for example, believes that the inclusion of narratives of experience adds a personal voice to the academic 'voice of reason, objectivity, and rigor' (p. 433). In accepting a more personal narrative Bochner (2001) later challenges the paradigmatic regulations of social science that stress 'rigor over imagination, intellect over feeling, theories over stories, lectures over conversations, (and) abstract ideas over concrete events' (p. 134). Utilising this approach, I include vignettes at strategic points in order to allow narrative episodes of personal experience and voice to explore narrative thinking and to provide a balance, an alternative way of looking at the issue being discussed. In so doing I 'resonate' with the feelings of Bochner (1997) particularly when he states that

The desire to bring the personal self into conversation with the academic self was the major inspiration for my turn toward a personal narrative approach to inquiry

(p. 433)

The inclusion of episodes of personal voice assists the foregrounding of the contrasting operations between narrative and paradigmatic ways of looking and serves to demonstrate the different types of knowledge and understanding arrived at with their use. Importantly, my commitment to, and highlighting of narrative thinking is designed to explore the hypothesis that the narrative 'meaning generative process' provides a different perspective of music and music meaning.

As a design feature, I incorporate the use of changing fonts. Barone (2001) uses this technique to 'signal shifts across three distinct perspectives of events and sources of information.' (p. 70). The shift I use represents an operational movement between the paradigmatic and narrative modes in order to highlight 'distinctive ways of ordering experience, of construing reality' (Bruner, 1986, p. 11).
The first font (Garamond - presently in use) is the ‘paradigmatic text’ that presents ‘a seamless, denotative, linear discourse that rearranges the relationship among complex phenomena into propositional form’ (Barone, 2000, p. 147). In this mode, thinking is deliberate and ideas are constantly refined and presented ‘logically’ formed into arguments which where possible, are supported by reference to other research literature. The purpose is to present, in a traditional academic format, the theory, procedures and methods of the study with as much clarity and as little ambiguity as possible. The second font (Arial) presents a transition to the narrative mode, where personal voice and autobiographical ‘story’ act as an expressive complement to the issue being discussed. These transitional sections are placed strategically in order to reveal a narrative dimension of understanding and to support the text with ‘worldly knowledge’ based on ‘lived experience’.

A further motive for the study

Thus far I have revealed some of the personal issues and experiences that motivated me toward illuminating the musical lifeworlds of students. However, while looking reflectively (and narratively) at my own experience I ‘uncovered’ an additional personal reason why I had selected this course of action among many possibilities. (Coincidentally, while looking for meaningful connections within the life stories of others, during the course of research, I often found meaningful connections in my own life that ‘surfaced’ to clarify what could be called personal ‘blind spots’ in self-understanding.) The following vignette is an example, ‘a conscious revelation of the role of beliefs and values held by the researcher in the selection of a methodology’ (Shacklock and Smyth, 1998, p. 7). The story accounts for my focus on ‘the power of music’ within individual lives and perhaps a reason for some of the passion behind my ‘quest’.

I suddenly realised, with a kind of intuitive flash that my interest in the ‘singular worlds of people’ reflects some subjective driving forces or hidden motivations and beliefs that I have held about music. The particular ‘realisation’ I
mention here is related to how music and its significance in my own life are
grounded inextricably in my early history, my roots.

Born in Uganda, I grew up with African music and an immersion in its
cultural sensibilities. Some of my earliest memories are of lullabies being sung to
me, in Swahili and Batoro languages by Maria Nakaima, my gentle, nurturing
ayah (nursemaid). When I reflect on these memories they are accompanied by
strong feelings of warmth and also re-associated feelings of the protection of a
motherly encompassing love. I remember as a crying child, waking in the night.
Even now in my mind, is a distant picture of Maria, faintly lit by moonlight filtering
through the window. She is napping, seated in a chair. But she sings my name
gently, as a soft call to let me know she is there. “Da...vid” (two syllables as a
descending minor third). I calm down and sing back to her, copying the melody,
“Mari...a”. We repeat this several times and then with background noises of
cicadas, frogs and night birds, I drift off to sleep knowing Maria maintains her
vigil.

This I now believe, had been an important part of my enculturation into
‘music’ – where it was formatively a comforting communication echoing a
closeness and bond between self and other. Many years later and exiled ‘out of
Africa’ I became a musician and a teacher. I had remembered this past
experience but did not make meaningful connections to its significance in my life.
However, I found myself leaning towards particular ethnic music sensibilities and
I gravitated toward a feeling that a primary function of music was to nurture the
individual. Music experience, I concluded, not only contributes to an aesthetic
and creative life but also importantly is a human activity that nurtures and
sustains personal identity, being and the soul.

Later, entering academic life and research, I (theoretically) re-discovered
evidence of this musical function when reading a description by Catherine Ellis
(1985, p. 203). She acknowledges the developmental and nurturing function of
music evident within Australian Aboriginal and other ethnic cultures, and
suggests that it is a deprived value within Western music. Ellis continues by
stating that the ethnic position is to see the playing of music as simply the
‘reflection’ while the person is the ‘substance’. She argues for the teacher to
engage in a larger perspective of music where the focus is more to the
‘substance than the reflection’ - rather than the reverse, which has been largely
the case in Western music pedagogy.
I wondered why all this made sense, and 'resonated' with what I felt to be valuable about music – then with the intuitive moment, the meaningful connection was made. I saw Maria and her contribution to my life, which was communicated to me through music. And now I made the epiphanic connection to what had been driving my particular quest – to find inner meanings, values and significances of music within people’s lives – how it had nurtured them in their past experiences and how it continues to sustain them in their lives.

This life experience episode reveals an underlying motive for why I have gravitated to the research of individual perspectives and lived experiences of music. Importantly it is also included in order to serve as –

- A demonstration of my aim, which is to find ‘meaningful connections and hidden significances’ (Kvale, 1996, p. 193) embedded in life-stories and experience.
- A demonstration of a narrative way of knowing and its application to the exploration of idiosyncratic and personal musical meaning. Throughout the study I juxtapose further examples of this narrative approach to highlight differences with paradigmatic explanations which are suited to the discovery of objective, universal concepts of music meaning.
- Support for a story-telling approach to research that is embedded in an artistic rather than a scientific conception of method (‘Scientific work is not concerned with that cat, but with cats’ - Barone and Eisner, 1997, p. 84).
- A demonstration of my research interest in narratives of deeply felt lived experiences - because they ‘recall a life’s self-defining moments, decisions, or turning points’ (Goodall, 2000, p. 133).
- An opportunity to include content that has emotional significance. This serves as a challenge to my own paternalist heritage that has tended to ‘ privilege and separate the rational over the emotional’ (Foley, 1998, p. 123).
Summary

Stake (1995) has suggested that "issues' are foci for our study' (p. 17). He believes that 'issues are not simple and clean, but intricately wired to political, social, historical and especially personal contexts' and (when studying cases) 'issues draw us toward observing, even teasing out, the problems of the case, the conflictual outpourings, the complex backgrounds of human concern' (p. 17).

I opened this chapter with a discussion of music education 'issues' experienced as a schoolteacher. These issues had been foreshadowed theoretically during undergraduate training, and then 'faced' in the 'real world' of senior secondary school classroom teaching. These issues include:

- Conflict with a utilitarian rationale for music education and a questioning of the need to adapt a personal philosophy to 'the usefulness of music' - where it is practised simply to make students 'better at something else'.
- Observing the need for a contextually matched and culturally suitable music curriculum relevant to the needs of individuals in my classes - and experiencing tension while feeling unable to act upon observations.

I then described the move to research where I identified and related these issues to music education research. This led to planning decisions where I formulated an approach that would investigate the perspectives, experiences and musical lifeworlds of a sample of senior secondary school music students.

I justified the decision to focus on individual musical lifeworlds and presented the aims and objectives of the study. These aims, principally, are designed to generate understanding of the significance of music in individual lives and — as a contrasted reflexive component of the study — to generate understanding of narrative and paradigmatic 'ways of thinking'. I then formulated the aims into guiding research questions.

A rationale for the style of the research was then presented. I accounted for the inclusion of self into the story, the use of personal experience and also the reasons for writing a reflexive narrative text. The section 'planning decisions' was
included to orientate the reader to a specific research structuring process. It served as a preliminary introduction to narrative and phenomenological procedures. These are combined to create a constructivist, interpretative approach to inquiry.

Finally, a vignette was presented in order to demonstrate and illuminate the process of inquiry that seeks personal meaning within narratives of experience. The purpose was also to highlight the inclusion of autobiography and reflexivity in my specific approach.

In summary, the research seeks to gain insight into the meanings implicit in musical life-worlds and personal stories of music experience and music relationships. Concurrently, while conducting the study, a further aim of the research is to more fully understand the operations of narrative, paradigmatic and phenomenological 'ways of knowing'.

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Chapter Two

Narrative Inquiry and Phenomenology

Introduction

In this Chapter I discuss the theoretical perspectives that have guided the thesis. I focus on the principles of the phenomenon of 'narrative' (the narrative in *narrative inquiry*) and 'phenomenology'. Following the theories of Bruner (1986, p. 11) I consider narrative as a 'way of looking' or 'construing reality' and phenomenology as an 'attitude' to lived experience and a 'philosophy of action' (Van Manen, 1990, p. 154). This presentation of theoretical aspects is preparatory to Chapter Five where I show how the theoretical principles of both domains are strategically applied as methodologies or 'research strategies' (Crotty, 1998, p. 70).

I have combined the complimentary aspects of narrative and phenomenology to form a useful 'tool' for the exploration of *lived meaning and lived experience*. Importantly both are grounded within constructivism (Murray, 1995, p. 181 and Hatch, 2002, p. 30), which is the epistemological foundation of the thesis. My decision to form a personal research design is supported by Denzin and Lincoln (1998). They state that the qualitative researcher-as-*bricoleur* will deploy strategies and methods at hand, and 'if new tools have to be invented, or pieced together, then the researcher will do this' (p. 3).

This Chapter, in addition to presenting the theoretical principles that support the research procedures (in Chapter Five), is also an exploration of narrative and phenomenological applications to alternative 'ways of thinking'.
about music, music teaching and learning. A detailed discussion of Jerome Bruner's theory of 'narrative and paradigmatic ways of construing reality' and also the philosophical context of phenomenological theory is included. With this hybrid model I have developed a research design structure that seeks to develop an empathic approach to lived musical experience and the narrative musical identities of students.

Narrative may mean 'any spoken or written presentation' or 'the process of making a story using a particular scheme that includes plot' (Polkinghorne 1988, p. 13 and 18). In the context of social science research, with a more inclusive conception, narrative refers to 'the storied nature of human conduct' (Sarbin, 1986).

We make sense of our experience by connecting meanings and events into coherent stories. The corollary therefore holds that as 'stories make explicit the meaning that is implicit in life as it is lived' (Widdershoven, 1993, p. 9) we are able to understand the experience and reality of others in their narrative accounts. However, in constructing life stories we are doing more than just reflecting on past events. Ellis (1998) suggests that

The narrative accounts people generate should be understood, not as records of what happened but as current drafts of their own interpretative search for cause-and-effect or connections among self-relevant events. This reflective work is ongoing as, throughout their lives, people search for coherence, historical unity, and meaningful integration of their experiences.

(p. 44)

Importantly, narrative accounts provide more than the historical structure and descriptions of 'what happened'. The accounts provide 'current drafts' of the meaningful integration of experience and offer insights into the way that we view the world.

While 'integrating our experience' through the construction of stories we also enhance self-understanding for the act of interpretation, made in the present, contains a new, 'sharpened and changed' meaning of the value that we hold for our experience (Widdershoven, 1993, p. 12). The process of interpreting events offers
opportunities for the construction of new or expanded self-definitions in relationship to our lived experience.

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'Two Ways of Construing Reality'

There are two modes of knowing, through argument and experience. Argument brings conclusions and compels us to concede them, but does not cause certainty nor remove the doubts in order that the mind may remain at rest in truth, unless this is provided by experience.

(Roger Bacon, 1268, - quoted in Greenberg, 2002)

The idea that there are different 'modes of knowing' or 'meaning-making' has been with us for a long time. In the following section I explore recent variations of past themes. I demonstrate how the type of meaning generated using the narrative mode of thinking is of a different nature to that generated with the paradigmatic mode and that while the two modes are distinct, each can compliment the other.

The narrative and paradigmatic modes

Jerome Bruner (1986) identified two contrasting universal human cognitive modes, the logico-scientific or paradigmatic mode and the narrative mode. He described these as 'meaning-bearing forms of communication', 'modes of reasoning, knowing and understanding' and also as 'ways of construing reality'. He added that although the modes are contrasted and distinct, they are also 'complimentary but irreducible to one another' (p. 11).
While both the narrative and the paradigmatic are meaning-making modes, as processes of reasoning and inquiry they are functionally different. The paradigmatic mode produces knowledge of concepts while the narrative mode produces knowledge of particular situations (Polkinghorne, 1995, Smeyers and Verhesschen, 2001). While the paradigmatic mode is concerned with ‘truth-finding’ and is ‘the prerogative of science and logic’ (Bruner, 1996, p. 148), narrative reasoning is directed to the situated and contextual ways that humans experience the world. Paradigmatic reasoning is aligned with scientific explanation and inductivism while narrative thought ‘attempts to maintain a subjective perspective on the world it represents, incorporating aims and fears into the picture’ (Murray, 1995, p. 188).

Paradigmatic thinking, through its more abstract conceptual nature remains detached from emotion and subjective experience. Richardson (1997) highlights this position of detachment stating that ‘explanation in the narrative mode is contextually embedded, whereas logico-scientific explanation is abstracted from spatial and temporal contexts’ (p. 28). An example of this detachment is seen in paradigmatic, positivist and post-positivist research texts that take a pejorative view of subjectivity and are presented from a ‘hidden’ researcher or ‘gods-eye-view’ position (Johnson, 1987).

While in the paradigmatic mode, we think in constructed conceptual frameworks and search for concepts, categories and relationships between categories in order to explain ‘universal truth conditions’ (Bruner 1986, p. 12; also Smeyers and Verhesschen, 2001, p. 76). In this manner the paradigmatic is aligned with inductivism, formal logic and scientific explanation (Murray, 1995, p. 188), is used for ‘the realistic stuff of science’, and is suited for generating ‘the empiricist’s tested knowledge’ and ‘the rationalist’s self-evident truths’ (Bruner, 1996, p. 130). As a natural science tool its logical procedures are geared toward the reduction of uncertainty (Barone, 2001a, p. 152).

In contrast to the paradigmatic, the narrative mode is used by individuals to construct ‘cause-and-effect connections among self-relevant events’ and ‘search for coherence, historical unity, and meaningful integration of their experiences’
(Ellis, 1998, p. 44). This mode, Bruner explains, is the way in which 'ordinary people go about making sense of their experience' (1996, p. 130). We relate our experience by chaining together events and meanings in temporal sequence. This process – *storying*, is where 'something happens because of something else'. Importantly, rather than generating conceptually based meaning it is the 'connections between the events (which) constitutes meaning' (Richardson, 1997, p. 28). The importance of story as a major meaning making strategy has caused Connelly and Clandinin (1990) to refer to humans as 'storytelling organisms who, individually and socially, lead storied lives' (p. 2).

Gudmundsdóttir (2001) believes that the narration of experience comes naturally and is a process learnt in childhood while mastering language and thinking. She goes on to describe narrative as a ‘cultural scaffold’, a link between experience, language and thinking, and the ordering and sorting out of our social worlds (p. 231). Earlier, Bruner had declared the narrative mode to be a ‘wired in cognitive property’ and ‘a primitive category system in terms of which experience is organised’ (1986, p. 18).

The narrative process is also linked to memory function and Lyle (2000) assumes that ‘memory is narrative reconstruction’ (p. 52, my italics). Lyle notes how Bruner (1986) points to a constraining biological limit on immediate memory – humans cannot generally remember more than seven digits, plus or minus two. However when chains of meaningful events are linked together (for example in memorising vast passages of the Koran) it is a different operative process entirely.

The two cognitive forms, narrative and paradigmatic are modes of reasoning and representation. We both ‘apprehend’ the world and ‘tell’ about it narratively and paradigmatically. With narrative reasoning we attempt to understand ‘the whole by integration of its parts’, whilst with the paradigmatic we empirically or conceptually try to ‘prove statements’ (Richardson, 1997, p. 28). In this way the modes function differently, using contrasting types of causality to connect events. 'The paradigmatic mode searches for universal truth conditions,
whereas the narrative mode looks for particular connections between events' (Polkinghorne, 1988, p. 17).

Following this description narrative reasoning may be viewed more as a process of synthesis where meaningful events are linked while paradigmatic reasoning is a process of abstractive analysis that seeks to find the essential single units of conceptual meaning - the meaning that is relevant for all people at all times. With the more abstract nature of paradigmatic reasoning, events are interpreted as instances of generalised concepts and categories. With narrative reasoning, events are interpreted or structured as meaningful in a more personal relationship to the narrator. Using narrative, the narrator elicits connections between events and specifically how these events bring about changes that are meaningful in relation to the past and future (Nash, 1994, p. 55).

While segregating the modes for the purpose of discussion, it is also important to note that they are closely related. Paradigmatic explanations are often infused into narrative structures (Richardson, 1997, p. 28) and narrative structures are often incorporated into the logico-scientific mode (Berger, 1997, p. 10).

My interest in pursuing the contrast between the two modes is fuelled by the need to more deeply consider a narrative way of looking. I hypothesise that the narrative lens can help to ground music teaching and learning in a contextually embedded focus where music is not separated from the experiencing musician, his or her narrative identity and historical and social context. Later I shall argue that the 'objectivist' tendency in Western music education manifests in paradigmatic thinking and is limited, for its operational focus is conceptual and abstracted from the spatial and temporal nature of musical experience. The effect of a paradigmatically driven practice distances the teacher and the theory of music from student experience (I expand on this in Chapter Three in a discussion of 'the masking of musical experience').
A narrative 'way of knowing' about narrative

Murray (1995) critically observes that Bruner paradigmatically confirmed the importance of the narrative mode by returning 'to the laboratory to look for narrative inside the head of an individual, (he) thus rejoins the stream from which he seemed to be so creatively diverging' (p. 188). Despite this criticism - of using the paradigmatic to justify the narrative - Bruner did explain that while the two modes may be distinct, they are also complimentary and 'both can be used as means for convincing the other' (1986, p. 11).

A narrative 'telling' of narrative thinking

At the Australian Society for Music Education National Conference, in Adelaide, July 2001, I witness Bennett Reimer delivering the plenary address. From where I sit at the back, the expansive stage and the high ceiling dwarf him. On the huge stage there are two lecterns facing the audience – one on the far left, and the other on the far right. As Professor Reimer begins to talk his warmth and presence fill the room. His stature grows as we listen to Musical Disenchantment and Re-enchantment: The Challenge for Music Education (see Reimer, 2001). He begins his talk positioned at the lectern placed on the left side of the stage. We hear of the difficulties facing music educators and how “at this time in history, the notion that music, and all the arts, have anything to do with loving, meaning, joy, soulfulness, delight; in short, with enchantment, has been called seriously into question” (pp. 5-18). Two hundred music educators listen intently – he is talking about our personal experience. We strain – there is a problem with the sound system. He continues...

“Around the world music educators are becoming more and more cognisant that music and the arts exist on a different plane outside the schools from inside the schools. The disjunction between how we conceive an effective music education and what our students want from it, we are realising, has become – perhaps has always been – problematical” (p. 6).
These words strike directly at me. "Yes!" I think to myself. "The narrative and phenomenological direction is about helping to bridge the disjunction – to become more sensitive to student musical lifeworlds and narrative identities".

Reimer pauses, takes a sip from a glass of water and then calmly walks over to the other lectern on the right-hand side of the stage. As he speaks from this position and perspective, he talks about personal experience. "On a street corner in Brooklyn, New York, where my youth was spent or misspent, fighting, smoking, cursing, and endlessly talking, the conversation turned toward what instrument we were interested in taking up. I gave it a lot of thought..."

During the address he moves several times, back and forth between lecterns. Always the right-hand side presented a contrasting personal narrative, a story or the recitation of a poem.

Later, reflecting on the address, I recognise that Professor Reimer’s effective attention-gaining strategy was also a spatio-temporal representation of a shift between two different attitudinal and cognitive realms. The movement on stage was a representation, through the physical, bodily dimension, of Bruner’s ‘two distinctive ways of ordering experience’ (1986) and a reflection of Roger Bacon’s modes of argument and experience. The use of the two contrasted forms of knowing, with accompanying bodily movement had enhanced the presentation.

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There are cases of criticism of the dominance of paradigmatic thinking in education and social science research. For example, Clandinin and Connelly (2000) while avoiding any reference to Bruner’s theories, object to what they call the grand narrative of educational research. This, they suggest, is formalistic and reductionist (p. xxi and 34) as it is bounded by ‘technical rationality’ (see also Schön, 1983, 1987) and ‘objectivism’ (see also Johnson, 1987). Clandinin and Connelly then promote narrative thinking as an alternative to the exclusivity of the technically rational grand narrative of educational research that I suggest emerges from a paradigmatic ‘way of thinking’.
Narrative thinking has infiltrated and influenced the direction of ethnography and anthropology. For example, Foley (1998) criticises ‘classical scientific realist narratives’ (p. 110). He explains that in these ‘the positionality and tone of the author is designed to evoke an authoritative voice, the author must speak in the third person and be physically, psychologically, and ideologically absent from the text’. This ‘lends the text an aura of omniscience’ and ‘the all-knowing interpretive voice speaks from a distant, privileged vantage point in a detached, measured tone’ (p. 110). Foley sums up the paradigmatic nature of scientific realism when he states that ‘the extensive use of conceptual language helps create a common denominator people of social archetypes and roles rather than complex, idiosyncratic individuals’ (p. 110).

Others too have objected to the paradigmatic propensity to bypass the personal and contextual content that forms the basis of a narrative perspective. Traditionally the narrative voice had been kept separate from academic texts because avoiding it ‘helps us maintain the illusion that the academic self hasn’t been prejudiced by the interests of the ordinary, personal self’ (Bochner, 1997, p. 433). Bochner again is critical. He explains that our inquiry is rarely unconnected to our personal history, so we have had to learn how to ‘hide our personal self behind a veneer of academic and theoretical detachment, fostering the misconception that it has no influence, no place, no significance in our work’ (1997, p. 433).

The principles of narrative theory arise from within constructivist principles because ‘the objects of inquiry are individual perspectives or constructions of reality’ and the narrative inquirer assumes that ‘multiple realities exist that are inherently unique because they are constructed by individuals who experience the world from their own vantage point’ (Hatch, 2002, p. 15).

As a form of qualitative social science inquiry, the overarching aim of the narrative approach is the enhancement of meaning. In contrast, positivist and post-
positivist programs seek the reduction of uncertainty (see Barone, 2001a, pp. 152-3). With the former task, we integrate our experience meaningfully and with the latter we are more directed toward seeking ‘the truth’, ‘the facts’ and that which may be easily generalised. Barone (2000) states that the configuration of meanings into paradigmatic texts has ‘a paradigmatic mandate’ (which is) ‘to accumulate ‘objective’ knowledge and to use it for prediction and control’ (p. 149). On the other hand, narrative forms of knowledge serve a function with a ‘qualitative mandate’, which is ‘not necessarily to map and conquer the world but to sophisticate the beholding of it’ (Stake, 1995, p. 43).

Understanding individuals and their social worlds through the stories they construct while describing their experience has become a recognised form of qualitative research (Clandinin and Connelly, 1990, 2000; Lyle, 2000; Barone, 2001a; Hatch, 2002, p. 28). The process has provided ‘a distinctive contribution to the study of lives’ (Mishler, 1999, p. 50).

Narrative and ‘arts-based research’ - a foil for the paradigmatic mandate!

The poem in its own right can tell us much about the nature of mind, even if it fails to yield up the secret of its creation. 
Bruner, 1986, p. 3

Recently, forms of social science research have been influenced by design elements that are considered more ‘artistic than scientific’ (Barone, 2001b, p. 735; Barone and Eisner, 1997). The inclusion of aesthetic and literary forms of expression within narrative research texts has served to enhance the ‘re-creation of lived experience’ (see Richardson, 2000, p. 931; also Polkinghorne, 1988, p. 71, and Barone and Eisner, 1997). Rorty (1983) had sanctioned the blending of literary style into social science research. He stated that ‘if we get rid of traditional notions of ‘objectivity’ and ‘scientific method’ we shall be able to see the social sciences as continuous with literature – as interpreting other people to us, and thus enlarging
Richardson (2000 p. 926) gives a historical account of the introduction of literary forms into social science research. She describes how since the 17th century literary and scientific forms of writing were of two separate kinds. Scientific writing was unambiguous, about objectivity, truth and 'the real'. Literary writing was about subjectivity and when associated with fiction, was 'false' and ambiguous. The literary involved 'imaginary' writing, which produced a different telling about society. However, as the 20th century unfolded 'the relationship between social scientific writing and literary writing grew in complexity and the boundaries blurred particularly those between fact and fiction' (Richardson, 2000, p. 926). There was an 'increasingly greater acceptance of inquiry approaches with features that were more naturalistic, interpretive, personal, literary and artistic' (Barone, 2001b, p. 735). This transition grew from a broadening of epistemological and ontological perspectives, and the sanctioning and valorization of narrative, storied knowledge and different ways of construing reality. We have, according to Lincoln (1997) 'changed the kinds of texts we hope to have represent us to ourselves' (p. 37).

According to Barone and Eisner (1997), the infusion of aesthetic qualities into social science writing includes: the presence of expressive, contextualised, and vernacular forms of language; the creation of a virtual reality; the presence of the author's personal signature; the use of fiction; and a degree of textual ambiguity (Barone and Eisner, p. 73-78). The meanings within narrative texts (or literary text—see Barone, 2000, p. 138) are often ambiguous but are designed to invite reader response, 'raise fresh questions and deepen the conversation' (Barone 2001a, p. 170 and Eisner, 1991, p. 95). In this regard, literary and 'arts-based' forms of research seek to invite further interpretation and criticism.

'Arts-based' research texts, written in a literary style have, until recent times been considered outside the bounds of 'legitimate academic research'. However, support for the amalgamation of academic and literary reporting styles has warranted
the inclusion of the narrative knowledge that is embedded in stories and novels. This knowledge provides potentially different and valuable kinds of understanding and meanings to those generated by paradigmatic analysis (Polkinghorne, 1988, Barone, 2000 and Kilbourne, 2001).

In this thesis, I have woven arts-based design features into the writing protocol. This weaving process is part of the plan to explore and move between a factual and paradigmatic mode of description and explanation, while also placing important music educational issues within narratives of 'lived experience'.

*Phenomenology, Theory, Assumptions and Attitude*

Phenomenology does not problem solve... Phenomenological questions are meaning questions. They ask for the meaning and significance of certain phenomena.
Van Manen, 1990, p. 23

My aim in this section is to present a brief historical background of phenomenology and then explain how I 'use' it in the research of other lives.

The roots of phenomenology

Stewart and Mickunas, (1974) explain that the word *phenomenology* is derived from the Greek words *phainomenon* (an appearance) and *logos* (reason or word). The combination indicates a reasoned inquiry, which aims to discover the 'inherent essence of appearances' - an 'appearance' being anything of which one is conscious (p. 3). While Hegel (1770-1831) had used the word 'phenomenology' to describe 'the coming to absolute self-awareness of mind or spirit', Husserl (1859 - 1938) developed phenomenology as a new 'human science'. This science sought to solve
Cartesian dualism – the ‘unbridgeable ontological chasm between ‘objects,’ which are ‘out there’ and subjectivity which is “in here” (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999, p. 93). Also Husserl wished to dispel ‘Kant’s two world metaphysics that banished ‘true reality’ to some unknowable, ‘noumenal’ realm beyond the reach of consciousness’ (Kearney and Rainwater, 1996, p. 4). Husserl saw the solution as a need to re-establish connection to the lifeworld of direct experience. The life-world (Lebenswelt) is a combination of consciousness and experiential phenomena and constitutes the lived-experience of every person.

With the Cartesian ‘bifurcation of the mind and matter/body’, the ‘internal world and the natural world were forever separate and one could never be shown to be a form of the other’ (Kincheloe 1991, p. 27). The ontological bridge suggested by phenomenology was formed in Husserl’s central theory of intentionality. This maintains that, ‘the most basic character of consciousness is that it is always consciousness of something; it is always directed toward something, and in turn is determined by the intentional object whereof it is a consciousness’ (Schutz, 1970, p. 318). As consciousness is always a consciousness of something the theory of intentionality reminds us of the ‘inseparable connectedness of the human being to the world’ (Van Manen, 1991, p. 181 and 184 – also Crotty, 1998, p. 79). It suggests that mind is not empty or closed in on itself and points to ‘the absurdity of dividing up reality into such mutually exclusive categories as minds and bodies, subjects and objects, and so forth’ (Stewart and Mickunas, 1974, p. 9). Intentional objects or ‘phenomena’ as Husserl called them are not only ‘external objects’ for they include perceptual and cognitive objects - ‘for I may perceive a tiger, imagine a tiger, remember a tiger and so forth’ (Kearney and Rainwater, 1996, p. 4). With awareness of intentionality we are connected back to lived experience and ‘the things themselves’ and avoid the need to make a distinction ‘between the ‘objective’, material world and its manifestation in subjective experience’ (Bowman, 1998, p. 254). With this recognition, phenomenology ‘leaves the question of objective reality or of real content aside in order to turn its attention solely and simply on the reality in consciousness, on the objects insofar as they are intended by
and in consciousness, in short on what Husserl calls 'ideal essences' (Thévenaz, 1963, p. 43). Importantly, understanding the theory of intentionality means to grasp that the existential nature of Being is not opposed to the world but involved and connected meaningfully to it. Although I am a ‘being-in-the-world’ my meaningful relationship and interaction with the world means that I am not in it in the same way as ‘a stone is in a wall, a broom in a closet, or a vegetable in a freezer’ (van Kaam, 1969, p. 22). Bowman’s understanding is that from the phenomenological perspective, ‘there is no gulf that requires a metaphysical bridge, no mutually exclusive relationship between knower and known’ (1998, p. 255). To enter into the specific ‘phenomenological attitude’ we should disregard the dualistic notion of an opposition between phenomena in a ‘real objective world’ and the way they appear in consciousness for this classifies experience and perception as merely secondary subjective representation.

Phenomenology, due to its concern with consciousness and the experincer, has been accused of being overly subjective. However, in striving to cancel out issues of subjectivity versus objectivity, its original purpose was simply to show how the world is constituted and experienced through immediate consciousness and conscious acts before theoretical abstraction takes place. For Husserl and his successors, phenomenology came to mean the study of things as they appear directly to us in our immediate conscious attention (Stewart and Mickunas, 1974, p. 6).

While the foundations of phenomenology are attributed to Husserl early traces may be found in the existentialist thought of Søren Kierkegaard (1813 - 1855) and also in the ideas of William James (1842 - 1910). Both ‘emphasised the passionate immediacy of experience’ (May, 1969, p. 6) and both philosophers sought a humanistic version of psychology that would counter the analytical, positivist trend in the developing discipline. To explain this, May (1969, p. 2) uses the study of anxiety as an example. He describes how Freud wrote on a technical level, presenting formulations of the psychic mechanisms by which anxiety comes about, while on the other hand, Kierkegaard portrayed what is immediately
experienced. He wrote on an existential, ontological level about the experience of anxiety. May adds that Kierkegaard and Freud do not 'represent a value dichotomy; both approaches are obviously necessary' (p. 2) but Freud's concern is with the emphasis on technical and objectified explanations and this is different from a direct understanding of experience - 'the awareness of being' (1969, pp. 2 - 3). Kierkegaard chose to speak from his personal experience of anxiety rather than basing his knowledge on abstract, conceptual ideas of it.

While focussing on direct awareness of 'what is immediately presented to conscious experience' rather than conceptualisations of experience, Husserl placed a 'shift of attention away from the foundations of knowledge to the foundations of human action' and also 'philosophical attention upon the experiencing subject' (Solomon, 2001, p. 1). Husserl questioned the rationality and reason perpetuated by the Enlightenment thinking and saw the need for a return to experience and 'the things themselves', where life-world experience had been neglected. This neglect had come about through the domination of a science 'meta-narrative'.

**Phenomenology and the science 'meta-narrative'**

Sokolowski (2000) explains how the 'Galilean-Cartesian split' forced the denial of the experiential life world by a domination of reason and the application of natural science methods to the human sciences and psychology:

The highly mathematical form of science that was introduced by Galileo, Descartes, and Newton led people to think that the world in which we live, the world of colours, sounds, trees, rivers, and rocks, the world that came to be called 'secondary qualities', was not the real world; instead, the world described by the exact sciences was said to be the true one, and it was quite different from the world we directly experience. What looks like a table is really a conglomeration of atoms, fields of force, and empty spaces. Atoms and molecules, and the forces, fields and laws described by science, are said to be the true reality of things. The world we live in and directly perceive is only a construct made by our minds responding to the input from our senses. The world we live in is ultimately unreal as we
experience it, but the world reached by mathematical science, the world that causes this merely apparent world, is real

(p. 146)

From this Sokolowski suggests that we 'have two worlds, the world in which we live and the world described by the mathematical sciences' (p. 147). He goes on to explain that phenomenology tackles this apparent difference between the scientific viewpoint and the lived world by declaring that the mathematical sciences take their origin from and arise out of the lived world. He continues:

...the exact sciences merely increase the knowledge we have of the world in which we live; they provide a greater precision in our dealings with things, but they never abandon or discard the world that is their basis. Such sciences are nested within the life world; they do not enter into competition with it.

(p. 147)

The important point is that the 'real' world of direct experience is immediately perceived and the theoretical world derived by science follows. The mathematical sciences take their origin from the lived world so that lived experience may be metaphorically viewed as the frame and canvas for the theoretical constructs of science that are found within the picture. The overarching point is that the lived world of immediate personal experience of phenomena exists before abstraction takes place. However, this lived world has been reduced in importance and historically placed as secondary to the conceptual world that is constructed with paradigmatic thinking.

Phenomenological 'essence' and 'bracketing'

Essence is an important concept to phenomenology. My initial, uninformed understanding clashed with my constructivist perspectives. I assumed that in phenomenological terms, 'the essence of a phenomenon' indicated the existence of an objective universal principal. If that were the case, then with a correct process of
interpretation both you and I could arrive at the same answer – the correct essence. I later determined essence in a more constructivist light to mean ‘an internal meaning structure of phenomenon and lived experience’ or what Kvale (1996) refers to as a ‘significance’ or a ‘potentiality of meaning’ (p. 4 and p. 193). Moreover, as Van Manen (1990) states, essence is a meaning structure of a specific kind – one ‘that makes some ‘thing’ what it is - and without which it could not be what it is’ (p. 10). As an example, I may determine that love and compassion are the essence of parenthood – the meaning structures behind why people may wish to nurture a child. While you may determine a different essence, (for example ‘genetically encoded patterns that ensure the survival of the species’), what is important is that we each assume our meaning structures to make parenthood ‘what it is’.

When I state that my aim is to ‘explicate the significant meaning structures within ‘musical ways of being”, I am also referring to the phenomenological essence of musical lifeworlds. Discovering essence is the goal of phenomenological research. Van Manen (1990), when describing the centrality of essence to phenomenology in fact describes, what is for him, its essence. He states that

"Phenomenology is the systematic attempt to uncover and describe the structures, the internal meaning structures of lived experience." (p. 10)

Bracketing is also central to phenomenological research. It is a specific way of looking and inquiring where we suspend our everyday assumptions and associations in order to focus directly on experience as it is lived. Bowman (1998) describes the process stating that it ‘involves the temporary abstention from judgement in order to allow total attention to the objects and processes of consciousness as they exist in and of themselves’ (p. 257). If we consider that with bracketing one should ‘overcome one’s subjective or private feelings, preferences, inclinations, or expectations’ (Van Manen, 1990, p. 185) the process may seem

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3 I later discuss a further perspective of ‘essence’ by including Wittgenstein’s description (see Chapter Four). In *Philosophical Investigations* (1968) he describes it not as something existing in a ‘behind-the-world-reality’ and not something that analysis ‘digs out’. It already ‘lies open to view’ and becomes ‘surveyable by a rearrangement of our understanding’ (p. 43).
quite difficult to say the least. As an example I shall return to my interpretation of
the essence of parenthood as ‘love and compassion’. If while phenomenologically
researching the meaning of parenthood for another, in order to explicate the
essence of parenthood in the experience of that person – what it means to them - I
would have to bracket my notions of love and compassion in order to see their
experience more clearly. In a similar way, I must bracket my own assumptions and
judgements of what I consider music to be, whilst explicating the essence of the
lived experience of the participants in the study.

Interpretivism and Phenomenology

Interpretivism in the social sciences developed alongside phenomenology
as it too was also born from the need for a more qualitative form of human
science. The writings of Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911), Max Weber (1864-1920)
and Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) attacked the supremacy of the science meta­
narrative suggesting that human science required more than just the discovery of
laws by which the workings of the universe may be explained. Interpretivists
challenged the application of scientific methods to the qualitative aspects of the
human lifeworld and legitimised ‘ways to sophisticate the beholding’ of human
nature (Stake, 1995, p. 43). Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) then extended
phenomenological theory by adding an interpretivist or hermeneutic perspective to
Husserl’s phenomenological beginnings. The interpretivist version, hermeneutic
phenomenology, focuses on two parts. It is descriptive of phenomena because ‘it
wants to be attentive to how things appear, it wants to let things speak for
themselves’ and it is also interpretative ‘because it claims that there is no such thing
as uninterpreted phenomena’ (Van Manen, 1991, p. 180). The hermeneutic basis
states that meanings are not constructed at the moment of lived experience, but in
the process of reflection upon experience. Cohering with this point, van Kaam
(1969) has described how our primary awareness of ‘meaning-giving experience’ is
pre-reflective. Pre-reflective knowledge is a straightforward, familiar kind related to
spontaneous experience – like recognising a neighbour. Then a deeper ‘reflective knowledge arises from a consideration of, or bending-back upon, (my) experience’ (p. 46). Van Kaam continues stating, ‘in this reflection I become more fully present to the meaning of the reality which is revealed to me in my experience. Only now I am able to express to myself and to others the meaning which I unveiled in my meeting with reality’ (pp. 46-47).

Shusterman (1992) identifies as ‘hermeneutic universalists’ those who believe in ‘the ubiquity of interpretation’ (p. 115 and p. 129). Stake (1995) for example assumes that ‘all research is interpretation’ (p. 40). Denzin (1998) agrees that ‘in the social sciences, there is only interpretation’ (p. 313) and Van Manen (1990) believes that ‘there are no such things as uninterpreted phenomena’ (p. 180). However, interpretation is used in different forms. For example, positivist and quantitative paradigms place priority on the interpretation of measurement data while those of the qualitative paradigm prioritise the direct interpretation of events (Stake 1995, p. 40 – my italics). The Interpretivist movement is thus associated with a rise of the value placed on interpreting events and experiences, where we construct meaning by ‘seeking patterns of unanticipated as well as expected relationships’ (Stake, 1995, p. 40).

With the phenomenological approach to research my focus is directed to the ‘musical lived experience’ of the participants and how music is used within the ‘social ecology’ of their lifeworlds. This ‘social ecology’, Shepherd and Wicke (1997) explain is the interconnection between musical experience, subjectivity and social mediations (pp. 13-14). This interconnected field is where personal musical meanings, identities and relationships are constructed and it is this area that I seek to understand further.

Summary and reflection

Within a paradigmatic ‘attitude’ I operate from the standpoint of professional musical knowledge that is objective, conceptually based and a-
contextual. With this position, I focus on music as an objective and 'autonomous form' where the meanings may be discovered and viewed as immanent within it (see Bowman, 1998, p. 133 and further description in Chapter Three). However, incorporating a narrative and phenomenological attitude I operate from a feeling for music as 'experience' and notions of it as a socially and subjectively constructed text. I am concerned with 'music-as-experienced' (Bowman, 1998, p. 254), music as a 'social text' (Shepherd, 1991) and as a 'technology of self' (DeNora, 2000). With this attitude the meanings of music are seen as 'meaning-for-the-subject' and a group identity 'meaning-for-us' (Koopman and Davies, 2001). With these constructed meanings my perception is of music as a situational, intersubjective whole that is not autonomous but 'a consequence of an intense dialectical interaction between text, other adjacent texts (lyrics, images, movement) and social, cultural and biographical contexts' (Shepherd, 1991, p 175). In the following chapter, I shall explore these musical 'attitudes' in more detail.

Finally, the dominance of a paradigmatic approach has promoted what Dewey (1960) called a spectator theory of knowledge, which Bochner and Waugh (1995) maintain, has historically separated 'subject from object, observation from participation and reflection from direct experience' (p. 224). These authors also declare their hopes for the future. They suggest that with a change of attitude

The vocabulary of facts, objectivity, neutrality, detachment, and correspondence to reality would give way to a terminology that focuses on meanings, subjectivity, emotional involvement, and coping with reality.

(p. 224)

According to Bruner (1990), we have experienced a 'long cold winter of objectivism' (p. 1). While he was referring to psychology and the effects of a dehumanising 'wrong turn' in the new 'cognitive revolution', his statement has wider relevance concerning the effects of the objectivist rationality of the scientific paradigm. These effects have permeated all areas of the social sciences, the way we
view human behaviour and experience and as Small (1996) suggests, every facet of education and schooling.

I suggest that a narrative and a phenomenological stance will help the arrival of a 'new terminology' in music teaching. The objectivist, cerebral approach that incorporates a disembodied, contextually detached perspective will give way to an embodied, situational concern for meanings, subjectivity and the 'reality' of the musical lives of others.

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Chapter Three

Unmasking Dimensions of Music Experience

The prime concern of the thesis is with the lived musical worlds and experiences of students. In this chapter I account for the historical processes that have led to inattention to these realms. I focus on the idea that Western concepts of music and music education are based in a tradition of objectivism or ‘Cartesian understanding’ (Woodford, 2001, p. 80) and the result of this legacy is the suppression or ‘masking’ of dimensions of musical experience. I argue that despite the introduction of recent reform, the masking process contributes to the perpetuation of several current problematic issues in music education.

I begin by describing the epistemological and ontological foundations of objectivism in Western thought and then show how these have been the foundation of a generalised conception of music as an independent structure located within a mind-independent-reality, and separate from the experiencer. I equate the paradigmatic mode of thought with the objectivist viewpoint and then introduce a narrative perspective that includes a closer focus on ‘music as experience’.

The Foundations and Influence of Objectivism

Bernstein (1983) defines objectivism as follows:—
‘Objectivism’ has frequently been used to designate metaphysical realism — the claim that there is a world of objective reality that exists independently of us and that has a determinate nature or essence that we can know. In modern times objectivism has been closely linked with an acceptance of a basic metaphysical or epistemological distinction between the subject and the object. What is ‘out there’ (objective) is presumed to be independent of us (subjects), and knowledge is achieved when a subject correctly mirrors or represents objective reality.

(p. 9)

The foundation of these perspectives may be traced to the dualistic thinking of Plato and Parmenides (Bernstein, 1983, p. 8 and Barone, 2000, p.162). However, the dualistic position was first logically stated by Descartes (1596-1650) and the concept became the cornerstone of modern philosophy, a footnote and starting point to all subsequent theories of the nature of consciousness, knowledge and human freedom (Bernstein, 1983, p. 17 and Solomon, 2001, p. x).

Radical objectivism recognises not only a split between subjective and objective realities, but also a split between mind and body. Johnson (1987) explains this dualism stating that

The Cartesian picture of mind, body, and knowledge creates two fundamental gaps or splits in human experience, one ontological, the other epistemological. First, on a Cartesian account, the body does not play a crucial role in human reasoning — rationality is essentially disembodied. Rationality may make use of material presented by the senses, but it is not itself an attribute of bodily substance. This gives rise to a basic ontological gulf between mind and body, reason and sensation.

(p. xxxix)

It is important to consider that while there are degrees of objectivism, it has pervaded our lives. Johnson (1987) explains this point stating that the

Objectivist orientation is rooted deeply in the Western philosophical and cultural tradition, and it has recently been
elaborated in highly sophisticated ways by philosophers, linguists, psychologists, and computer scientists generally. But Objectivism is not merely an abstruse philosopher's project; it plays an important role in all our lives. In its nonsophisticated manifestation, as a set of shared commonplaces in our culture, it takes the following general form: The world consists of objects that have properties that stand in various relationships independent of human understanding. The world is as it is, no matter what any person happens to believe about it, and there is one correct 'God's-Eye-View' about what the world really is like. In other words, there is a rational structure to reality, independent of the beliefs of any particular people, and correct reason mirrors this rational structure.

This description reveals the Western legacy of objectivism — the belief in a reality with a mind-independent structure and that there must be a 'correct reason' with which to mirror it. This 'correct reason' has developed into a particular kind of rational, scientific thinking that seeks 'universal truths' locatable within a mind-independent reality. Kincheloe (1991) refers to it as a 'cause-effect, hypothetico-deductive system of reasoning' (p. 44). This system, I suggest is manifestly the same as Bruner's categorisation of the paradigmatic or logico-scientific 'mode of reasoning', or 'method of construing reality' (1986, p. 11) and Johnson's 'Objectivist view' where rationality is essentially disembodied from experience (1987, p. xxiv – xxv). Using this mode of cognition the knower and the known (experiencer and music) are separated and any sense of 'I' is masked from inquiry. Johnson (1987) refers to this as the 'God's-Eye-View' whilst in criticisms of the positivist approach to inquiry in the social sciences it has been referred to as the 'hidden researcher position' (Clandinin and Connolly, 2000, p. 36). The result of this form of reasoning and inquiry is a 'disembodied' form of knowledge where understanding, intuition and imagination are unacknowledged as having significant bearing on the nature of meaning and rationality (Johnson, 1987, p. x). In this way 'scientific' (paradigmatic) knowledge of the world has come to the forefront and it has effectively masked the immediacy of our phenomenological 'lived experience' of the world. The effect has been to ignore phenomena 'as they are experienced'
(i.e. music) in order to focus on a scientific and 'cerebral picture' of an 'objective reality'. In Chapter Two this point was viewed from the perspective of the 'science meta-narrative' and it was described as the task of phenomenology to return us to awareness of the immediacy of lived experience.

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I left a graduate Honours program full of enthusiasm after exploring new research paradigms, philosophies of music and a constructivist approach to teaching. Commencing in my first school I was determined to fulfil my vision of music classes filled with students who would be actively engaged in music making. I would include interesting musical tasks and performances that would assist the construction of personal understandings and meanings through exploration and reflection on musical experience. I would be a facilitator of quality experiences, and I would guide students forward through developing skills and conceptual knowledge. "Sound before symbol" - "Practical experience before abstract concepts", were my catch cries. I would help build musical imaginations and help enhance musical lives. I enthusiastically began constructing new classroom programs that would implement my 'new' strategies.

However, my resolve soon began to erode as my assumptions, ideologies and perspectives were challenged by a school system that was founded upon a reliance on examination and assessment of levels of music theory. Particularly with the Year 7 and 8 music classes, which were compulsory, I sought to 'entice' the students 'into' music primarily through enjoyment with courses that focussed on practical involvement. From a developing love for music, I assumed, the students would then make the personal choice and commitment to enter the more theoretical electives offered in Years 9, 10, 11 and 12. I was in conflict with the purpose of detailed theory exams in Years 7 and 8, but school curriculum policy demanded it. I wondered how widespread it might be for new teachers in schools to feel misunderstood - that their ideas, opinions and strategies may be shrugged off as "thoughtful but out-of-touch with the real world". Or they might simply be classed as "inexperienced" and "well-meaning". How often did this happen? I wondered how 'constructivist' teachers could ever 'make it' in those strong bastions of objectivism that they might be thrust into. In a so-called postmodern world, how much have things really
changed? Again I questioned whether this issue was just my problem, localised here in this school or ubiquitous? I searched for support in the wider community of researchers - or was it a defence?

The dichotomy I was engaged in is reflected by Small (1996).

The idea of knowledge as an independent entity, that is, as existing outside the knower and regardless of whether anyone knows it or not, pervades our entire system of schooling from beginning to end. We have seen always how such a notion was essential before western science could begin its task of colonising the physical universe; we now see that it determines the whole nature of the schooling process. Just as, in science, the experiential factor is ignored, so in schooling; the teacher is obliged to transmit to his pupils as much as he can of this abstract body of information, regardless of the quality of the experience which in so doing he inflicts on the pupil. This is not to say that teachers are not in the main thoroughly humane people who would not wantonly inflict unpleasant experiences on their pupils; it is simply that when obliged to choose between the quality of their pupils' present experience and the assimilation by those pupils of information which is believed to be necessary for their future benefit (i.e. their success in examinations), they will inevitably choose the latter, indeed, they have no option but to do so.

(p. 184)

I believed the approach in my school was a result of the objectivist views that as Small (1996) has suggested, 'pervades our entire schooling system'. I felt the pressure of being in the predicament of having little option or personal control in 'an overly theoretical approach'. The 'future benefit' of the pupils required achieving success in the set end-of-term theory examinations. My goals and the school's were divergent and blending and balancing the two together was a difficult task. I concluded that objectivist views would continue to clash with constructivist and postmodern 'ways of thinking' about teaching and until widespread
transformation occurs an epistemological dichotomy would confront new teachers as they enter professional practice.

I shall now discuss the conception in Western societies where music has been afforded an independent status and perceived as a structure located within a mind-independent-reality and one that is separate from the experiencer. The process of discounting music 'as experienced' in order to focus on a disembodied concept has been described historically as the 'objectification' of music in Western thought (Rowell, 1983, pp. 34-36).

The 'Objectification of Music'

There are many factors that have contributed to the 'gradual objectification' of music (Higgins, 1991, p. 21). According to Higgins (1991), some of the historical developments in Western music that led to the objectification process include the standardised use of notation from the time of Pope Gregory (AD 590-604); the development of printing in the Renaissance; the movement from an improvisatory tradition to a tradition based on composition, and the reification of pieces of music and 'musical works'. The development of notation assisted the shift from improvisation to composition and as composers could indicate intricate structures to performers, precision in the interpretation of musical scores became a feature of musical practice. The printing and dissemination of multiple copies of scores helped to associate 'music' with an objective perception of 'musical works' (Higgins, 1991, pp 21-28).

Bowman (1998) recognises that an objectivist understanding of music places it ontologically 'outside the mind' and epistemologically as having meaning existing independently of any consciousness. He recognises that the ontological and epistemological gulf between mind and body leads to a detachment from music as it is 'actually lived or experienced' (p. 300). Based on this rationality, music is then 'disembodied' or conceived as 'having a life of its own' and given an independent status. Conceptualised as an autonomous form it is then considered
unconnected to the experiencing subject and 'independent of any particular performance' (Higgins, 1991, p. 21). The perception of music as an 'independent structure' has been the dominant view within nineteenth and twentieth-century Western music aesthetics (Higgins, 1991, p. 20).

When objectified, 'musical meaning' becomes a property residing in the 'outer' sonorial dimension of music rather than within the performer or listener’s experience or as arising from any specific experiential context (Higgins, 1997, p. 85; Woodford, 2001, p. 73). Philosophers and analysts with objectivist perspectives choose to observe music as though it had laws that are discovered in an external 'mind-independent reality' separate from the knower and experiencer. This stance has formed the basis of inquiry where individual, idiosyncratic and subjective experience is discounted in order to focus on the objective features of music and musical phenomena that are 'scientifically' verifiable. Jorgensen (2003) for example, is critical of the 'image of music as experience' as it is 'difficult to observe and test reports of musical experience' (p. 89). She also states that, 'Phenomenological observations may be difficult to verify or refute because they are, by definition, inherently subjective' (p. 90). In the objectivist vein, positivist and post-positivist forms of research rely on experimental, survey and scientifically based methods such as sampling, measurement and scaling, in order to discover the ingredients of music that are universal to all (e.g. see Rainbow and Froehlich, 1987). They seek to create generalisations 'that presume to speak for everyone, everywhere, for all times' (Bowman, 1998, p. 295).

In the ethnographic realm, 'objectivist' researchers have entered 'the field' in order to see how indigenous peoples and cultures 'mirror' their own pre-conceived objective notion of what music is. Ethnomusicological objectivists 'have sought to understand and document musical systems and musical instruments as objects decontextualized from the social ecologies that sustain them' (Shepherd, 1991, p. 102). Many socio-musicologists have criticised popular and ethnic musical forms as inferior as they do not meet the criteria and standards expected of their own objectivist version of music (Frith, 1996, p. 123).
The de-personalisation of music

Paradigmatic (objectivist) reasoning, by its very conceptual and rational nature, has tended to de-personalise music by splitting knowledge from experience, reason from sensation, and the ‘meaning of music’ from the ‘experience of music’.

This de-personalising process has had many implications. For example, rather than focussing on ‘the activity’ we call music, Small (1998) states that scholars in the Western tradition have equated the word *music* with ‘works of music’ (p. 3). Higgins (1991) has commented that ‘It is the score, not the performance, and certainly not the listening, that represents the reality of music’ and she mentions the theorist Eduard Hanslick (1825-1904) who had been ‘forthright in denying that performance is essential to a work of music’ (p. 20). Hanslick had stated that ‘philosophically speaking, the composed piece, regardless of whether it is performed or not, is the completed artwork’ (1854/1986, p. 48). Goehr (1992) has also described in detail how Western cultural musical practices have placed an imaginary ontological status onto the concept of ‘the musical work’ (p. 2). So pervasive is this concept that it controls the ‘power relations’ in the tradition where performers are subservient to the composer and to ‘faithful performance and ‘correct interpretation’ (Goehr, 1992, p. 273 and p. 275).

Sustained by the concept of ‘the musical work’ the classical forms of Western music have developed an air of cultural elitism having become the ‘ideal and autonomous form with immanent meanings that are impervious to the influence of cultural and social processes’ (Shepherd, 2002, p. 3).

In addition, the separation of the knower from the known and the experiencer from the experience has forged a dominant formalist conception of music where its meaning is discovered solely in its structural properties. The ‘meaning’ of music is seen as being ‘encoded’ within music and it must be ‘decoded’ by the receptive listener (see Scruton, 1987, p. 171). Again it was Hanslick who argued for the importance of the formalist approach believing in ‘a
hierarchy of the intellectual and 'syntactic' appreciation of music above the sensuous/associative and the physical/emotional levels' (Higgins, 1997, p. 87). Hanslick rejected idiosyncratic and subjective responses to music and sought to 'emancipate the appreciation of music from what he considered its primitive, vague and subjective condition, and – much in accordance with the spirit of his time – to establish it on a proper scientific basis' (Martin, 1995, p. 43). Higgins (1997) describes how Hanslick assumed that 'idiosyncratic responses were aesthetically insignificant' and 'he was scornful of those who listened 'pathologically,' enjoying their own sensations in response to music without focussing their intellect on tonal forms' (p. 93). McClary (1990) has criticised this overly intellectual approach believing that it has resulted in a situation where 'our music theories and notational systems do everything possible to mask those dimensions of music that are related to physical human experience and focus instead on the orderly, the rational, the cerebral' (p. 14 – see also Shepherd, 2002, p. 6).

Reactions to musical objectivism

There has been opposition to musical objectivism and to the quest to locate absolute musical meaning in an objective 'real' world. Small (1998), for example, has attacked the objectification of music, referring to it as a process of 'reification' (p. 61). As Crotty (1998) explains, 'to reify, or engage in reification, is to take as a thing (in Latin res) what is not a thing' (p. 217). Small's (1998) attack is based on what he calls 'the trap of reification' which he states is 'a besetting fault of Western thinking' and he blames Plato as 'one of its earliest perpetrators' (p. 2). Small explains that we reify an abstract concept of 'music' and then 'we find ourselves coming to treat the abstractions as more real than the actions' (p. 61). Elaborating the reification process he states that

Music is not a thing at all but an activity, something that people do. The apparent thing 'music' is a figment, an abstraction of the action, whose reality vanishes as soon as we examine it
closely. This habit of thinking in abstractions, of taking from an action what appears to be its essence and of giving that essence a name, is probably as old as language; it is useful in the conceptualising of our world but it has its dangers. It is very easy to come to think of the abstraction as more real than the reality it represents, to think, for example, of those abstractions which we call love, hate, good and evil as having an existence apart from the acts of loving, hating, or performing good and evil deeds and even to think of them as being in some way more real than the acts themselves, a kind of universal or ideal lying behind and suffusing the actions.

The answer to this dilemma, Small proposes, is to return music to its rightful place in our thinking, where ‘music’, viewed as an activity is satisfied by the verb ‘to music’ or as he suggests – *musicking* (1998, p. 9). Elliott (1995) had also proposed the same idea stating that ‘fundamentally, music is something people do’ (p. 39) and his terminology recognises *musicing* and people who engage in *musicing* as *musicers* (p. 40). This perspective has also been supported by Määttänen and Westerlund (2001) who view music not as an object but as lived action and experience, as activity, process and as a verb rather than an autonomous object and a noun.

Concerns about musical objectivism have also come from constructivists who prefer a socially based conception of music and its place in people’s lives. Woodford (2001) questions the objectivist rationality that socially isolates music from our perspective. He asks whether music ‘is the product of, and should be judged according to, an abstract, objective, universal, and ahistorical conception of reason, or whether it is socially and culturally grounded and thus relative.’ (p. 73). From a constructivist perspective musical meanings are viewed as intersubjectively and socially constructed rather than existing inherently in objective phenomena and waiting to be uncovered. Shepherd and Wicke (1997) promote a constructivist, intersubjective view of music that takes into account the interconnection between subjectivity and the ‘social mediations’ that accompany musical processes and insights. They comment that:
Musical processes and processes of subjectivity speak meaningfully to one another because they are grounded in, informed by, and constituted through similar sets of social mediations. The substance and logic of the inner life flow from these mediations rather than from 'psychological constants' presumed innate in people.

(pp. 13-14)

From this perspective, the need to understand what 'music means' has led researchers to look at the functions and uses that people put it to. Studying music as 'relative', researchers have sought its subjective effects in experiential contexts. Ethnomusicology became not simply the studying, transcribing, and analysing of music as a separate object from the people who compose and perform it, but observation of how it functions in their lives. John Blacking (1974) after studying with the Venda of South Africa, stated that 'The Venda taught me that music can never be a thing in itself, and that all music is folk music in the sense that music cannot be transmitted or have meaning without associations between people' (p. x). He adds, 'I am convinced that an anthropological approach to all musical systems makes more sense of them than analyses of the patterns of sound as things in themselves' (x). Reinforcing the importance of the social aspect of music inquiry Blacking (1974) states that

In order to find out what music is and how musical man is, we need to ask who listens and who plays and who sings in any given society, and why. This is a sociological question, and situations in different societies can be compared without any reference to the surface forms of music because we are concerned only with its function in social life.

(p. 10)

Arguing for a social-constructivist perspective, Martin (1995) states that 'the meaning of music is neither inherent in it nor grasped intuitively by 'the' human mind; rather meaning is created in the process of social interaction which mediates all our experience of the world' (p. 63). DeNora's (2000) study of 'music
in everyday life’ (2000) also promotes a sociological perspective. She states that ‘it is probably impossible to speak of music’s ‘powers’ abstracted from their context of use’ and calls for the fostering of ‘more critical recognition of music’s potency in everyday life’ (p. x). She suggests that in the West there has been a lack of focus on and understanding about ‘socio-musical meaning’ or the way ‘real people actually press music into action in particular social spaces and temporal settings’ (p. x).

The ‘objectivist’ focus has had a great impact on particular cultural and social traditions of Western music education. These traditions have been manifested as a focus on the objectified products and outcomes of teaching and learning rather than on the experiences of students and hence, professional teacher knowledge and teacher training have generally been geared towards the achievement of those outcomes. The traditional, objectivist value-system has been accompanied by a dominating, powerful meta-narrative which is based upon a reverence for, and belief in the superiority of the Western musical canon, which is seen as the benchmark for musical knowledge (Woodford, 2001). This meta-narrative, Woodford (2001) explains, by assuming music to be absolute and autonomous rather than socially and culturally grounded and thus relative, has generated elite power relations in Western music traditions. He states:

Absolutists such as Samuel Lipman contend that the Western musical canon, because it represents the best that has been thought and known musically, functions as an Archimedean point for grounding and judging musical knowledge. To these scholars, culture consists of the masterpieces of intellectual and aesthetic activity made transmissible in written words or images possessing corporeal existence and not the vulgar expressions and lived experiences of the common man or woman.

(p. 73).

Standing against the position taken by the ‘absolutists’, it is a central argument of this thesis that to ignore ‘expressions of lived experience’ will be to
the future detriment of music education as these expressions are in need of further study and understanding. The argument is not with the 'masterpieces of intellectual and aesthetic activity' but with the limited vision of culture. This vision must be extended to include the important function and meaning of music at the 'common' level of 'the expressions and lived experiences of the common man or woman'.

Concerned with the effects of formal music education, Green (2001) studied the values, attitudes and opinions of fourteen 'popular' musicians. Through an investigation of their perspectives, she concluded that formal music education 'has tended to recognise and reward only certain aspects of musical ability, often in relation to certain styles of music, thus aiding the appearance that only a minority of human beings have musical ability' (p. 210). A broader conception of musical identity is needed in order to include the idiosyncratic nature of approaches to music.

Q. Explain how you conceptualise the guitar neck.

J. H. I've never really thought about it. Essentially, I keep it flat (on my lap), with all the six strings across, and I have my ideas of chord shapes, for the most part. When the hand lands on the neck, things go into action, and outside of that, take me away from the neck, and I really don't think about it too much.

Jeff Healy (blind blues guitarist in Guitar Player Magazine, August, 1989)

Jeff Healy thrills many people with his performances, embarks on world concert tours and sells thousands of CDs. His professional success is bound together with his musical success, which includes the achievement of a virtuosic and highly unique style and a deeply personal relationship with music. However,
evaluating his ability from within specific formal educational definitions of assessment, he only achieved ‘grade three’ in school, and his playing style may be described as ‘unorthodox’ and his theoretical knowledge, ‘un-academic’.

Important to note with this example is the point that while many talented and dedicated young musicians like Jeff Healy succeed musically, despite their formal education, many are bypassed or ‘put off music’ due to the narrow definitions of music ability that are imposed by formal curriculum and assessment models (Durrant, 2001; Green, 2001; Ross, 1995).

Paradigmatic and narrative approaches to music, teaching and learning

Western music teaching and learning theory have developed primarily from the paradigmatic code (which I relate to formalism, reductionism and objectivism).

To illustrate this point I now present contrasting textual examples of narrative and paradigmatic ways of looking at the meaning and significance of music in educational contexts. The first, a paradigmatic example is analytical, conceptual, technical, formalist, unemotional and context-free. The narrative example that follows includes the social context where meaning takes place and the relation of embedded, personal experiences of music. The paradigmatic example is a quote from the philosopher Stephen Davies (1994). He states that ‘If music is organised sound, to hear music as music is to hear it as displaying organisation. To hear music as such is to hear it in terms of the principles of order that give it its identity as the music it is’ (p. 325). Davies continues stating that

A person who listens to Balinese Gender Wayang, neither knowing or caring why the sounds follow each other in the order they do, is someone who interests herself not in the music, but in the noise it makes. Her pleasure is like that of the person who likes eating chocolate. If she is unable to anticipate what might or should be played next, feels no sense of closure on the completion of the piece, is incapable of identifying recurrences of material or of recognising similarities and differences between parts of a work or between different works,
then she does not appreciate the music qua music, though the music causes her enjoyment.

(pp. 325-326)

In this explanation of ‘how to listen’, Davies creates a context-free, conceptual, universal vision of music listening. He presents a theory of music in its cognitive aspect where he suggests that the specific meaning is found within an understanding and appreciation of, and the listening to, its formal construction. As we listen we should follow the unfolding form. However, this I suggest is simply one way of listening. For example, do the Javanese listen this way? Traditionally a lengthy gamelan concert is often an event where food is served, guests are free to socialise, or ‘drift in and out’ of the music and even sleep (Titon, 2001, p. 189). Davies on the other hand assumes and constructs an archetypal common denominator theory of music. Instead of seeking idiosyncrasy and diversity the explanation seeks to find the cognitive aspect that is relevant to all people, and all music everywhere.

In contrast to the Davies example, I present a narrative of lived musical experience that may ‘guide us back from theoretical abstractions to the reality of lived experiences – the lived experience of the child’s world, the lived experience of school, curricula etc’ (Van Manen, 1982, p. 296). The paradigmatic example by Davies constructs a general rule of the meaning and significance of music. On the other hand the following narrative of experience reveals an individual’s practical experience with it.

The story of Lenny

As I stood facing the new class of thirty year seven students, there was an air of excitement - it was their first day in high school, and first music class. As the fresh-faced boys, resplendent in new uniforms sat, well behaved, I was looking forward to getting to know the intricacies of character and personality of each. Over the next few weeks as I got to know the boys, Lenny stood out. He was a good six inches shorter than the others and seemed very frail. Shy and quiet, he was always at the back of the queue at the Tuck Shop and was on the outer
perimeter of the groups engaged in playground fun. Most of the boys had immediate friendships for many had come from the same local primary schools. But Lenny hadn’t for his family had just arrived from New Zealand. The others didn’t bully him for fortunately he had an elder brother, a senior who was good at sport and immediately popular. The brother would keep a protective eye on him in the playground. Later at a staff meeting Lenny’s medical condition was discussed. In confidence we learned from his parents that he had spent much of his life in hospital. A heart condition had meant many operations and he was living on ‘borrowed time’.

In a music classroom session we had been getting to know each other’s skills. The boys could take turns in the limelight performing songs they knew. The extroverts were first and eventually most of the class had performed. Finally we looked at Lenny. “Come on Lenny, do you know any songs?” He went red and shook his head. All the class turned to him shouting, “Yeah come on Lenny! Come on!” He seemed buoyed by the support. Quietly he said, “I know how to do the Maori Haka sir!” Lenny went to the front of the class. He suddenly appeared confident and assumed a ferocious pose. He performed the war dance - legs bent, slapping his thighs, his chest, clenching his fists, eyes wide and tongue protruding.

Ka mate! Ka mate! Ka_ora! Ka_ora!
Ka mate! Ka mate! Ka_ora!
Te ne-i-te ta-nga-ta, p’hu-ru – hu-ru!
Na-na nei ti-ki mai wha-ka whi-ti-te ra
Ka-u-pan! Ka-u-pan! Ka-u-pa-ne! U-pa-ne whi-ti te ra
Hee!

We were all transfixed. I glanced at the class. Most of the student’s mouths and eyes were wide in amazement.

While the Haka is designed to frighten the opponent it is also a challenge. The quality of performance, demonstrated through the dramatic gestures and intensity of emotion, is an indicator of the manhood of performers and a challenge to the manhood of the opponents. In recent years, away from the battlefront the Haka has become a powerful symbol of Maoridom, connecting men with pride to their heritage and to their warrior spirit. We were all moved at the rendition we had just witnessed. Before us Lenny became a powerful warrior.
From that day on, everyone approached him differently. There was an air of respect surrounding him and whenever I saw him in the playground, he was part of the 'cool' gang.

Accepting the paradigmatic construct by Davies music educators might include within curricula objectives, the goal of assisting students toward an appreciation and understanding of some of the formal concepts he suggests - contrast, variation, repetition and closure within music compositions. Directing to these properties in music class will provide opportunities for deepening personal constructs and individual meanings of music. Assuming the generalisation that 'human consciousness conceptualises sound patterns into forms' (Palmer, 2000, p. 105) music teachers will recognise the importance of formalist understanding. However, formalism is only a part of the diverse realm of musical meaning and placing formalism as the central point of focus or as the 'dominant reality' of musical understanding has tended to exclude experiential context and idiosyncratic response (see Higgins 1991, p. 16 and 1997, p. 93). We may operate more democratically if the quest for objectivity, which has led to the search for what is universal about musical experience, is balanced with a view that acknowledges the unique and the individual. Higgins (1997) cautions us stating that

Although the Enlightenment idealised universality and thus directed attention to those features of experience that would be standard for all individuals, the experience of music is diminished when its many resonances with the particularities of its listeners' lives are belittled and ignored

(p. 83)

In addition, it is important to recognise that young music students do not have the ‘voice’ that their teachers and administrators possess and in the spirit of democracy, they need representation. The quality of student experience is important and is in prime need for consideration. Reflecting this spirit Schubert
(1992) states that 'curriculum evolves from the experiences and concerns of students, not from 'authorities' in state departments or even central offices' (p. 62). Through a narrative and phenomenological reflection on the lived musical experience of my students (such as Lenny) I am more able to focus on 'meaning-for-the-subject' which Koopman and Davies, (2001) describe as 'the part music plays in the consciousness of the individual' (p. 268).

Narrative and 'lived musical experience'

An awareness of 'meaning-for-the-subject' creates an important pedagogical balance to the paradigmatic and technical focus of music teaching, which is often dominated by theory, planning and objectives. Van Manen (1982) when discussing a phenomenological approach to pedagogy states:

(Yet) in the field of curriculum we confidently talk about 'selecting, planning or organising learning experiences.' This confidence begs a question – the question whether we really know what it is like when a child 'has an experience' or when the child 'comes to understand something.' Husserl's phrase 'back to the things themselves' means that the phenomenological attitude is mindful of the ease with which we tend to rely on a reconstructed logic in our professional endeavours.

(p. 296)

While students are directed to the technical and formal properties and concepts of music, it is the quality of their lived musical experience that will lead to a more meaningful and deepening personal relationship with it. This indicates, for teachers, that recognition of and sensitivity to 'lived experience' and 'meaning-for-the-subject' will help put our 'reconstructed logic' into perspective, allowing a situational sensitivity to social context and the musical lifeworlds of students, to come to the foreground.
The bodily experience of the two modes in music practice

Reflecting on my own experience, the cognitive movement between modes mostly goes un-noticed. However, I can identify my engagement in music performance and listening as taking on seemingly narrative / paradigmatic shifts. While I am not always in control of the shifts, often they are conscious acts.

On occasions I have a bodily sense of flowing ‘narratively’ with sounds as they unfold as I listen and as I create ‘musical ideas’. Sounds flow - connected as related events and episodes. I am not thinking or stepping ‘outside the music’ to find representative meanings for I trust my bodily, intuitive grasp of sound relationships and interconnections. There is no thought or hint of ‘explaining the music’. In this ‘narrative mode’ I am aware of a natural flow of experience, and whether spontaneously improvising or playing memorised repertoire, there is a sense of unification of mind, body instrument and sound. I call it a ‘body experience’ because the body is included in the experience and I can move easily from sensations to thoughts. I may have the feeling of watching myself but it is with passive acceptance of passing events. I call this the ‘narrative mode’ because self-awareness does not include emotional detachment, self-criticism or the process of comparing my experience to wider concepts or issues. My improvisations are story-like.

On the other hand, I sometimes ‘lock into’ a paradigmatic cognitive musical mode. Operating within this mode I am more deliberate – thinking conceptually and logically. I’m ‘in my head’ (with a ‘disembodied mind’ - See Johnson, 1987). A certain amount of critical reflection accompanies the process as I try to find the ‘truth’, the ‘right way to do it’. How would Segovia, Joe Pass or my old teacher do it? In this mode I operate tentatively and in that respect, for spontaneous, improvisation-type performances, the processes are not productive. However I productively and consciously use this mode to engage in the more ‘cognitive’ activities of thoughtful practice. In this mode I can utilise a metacognitive process where I watch myself figuring-out technical problems, theorising, making connections, understanding harmonic relationships. I am critical, comparing and judging my performance. I classify sections of my playing into neat concepts as I monitor things like ‘tone-production’, ‘phrasing’ and ‘intonation’. Perhaps we use both modes to various extents but with individual
uniqueness we may have a dominant 'modality' that we naturally resort to when constructing meanings, both linguistic and musical, about the world.

A narrative perspective helps me to balance my conceptual and abstract knowledge of music, its universal value and significance - with a more direct observation and understanding of its operations in contextual and experiential use. With the narrative mode I look at music functioning within narrative identities and focus on its part in the life histories and stories of my students and my research participants. It also reflects the personal voice of my lived experience and it connects me to the personal voice of others. While Lenny knew little 'about' music, he used it to good effect in an important personal context. The worlds of musical identities exist outside any singular paradigmatic vision. The art of pedagogy requires that we become immersed in a much broader vision.

Even though Jorgensen (2003) calls for a 'transformation of music education', she believes that it must take place within an objectivist approach. While admitting to a 'bias toward Western classical music' and an acknowledgement that there are 'fuzzy edges' to our conceptions of what music is, she prefers to ignore Small's (1998, p. 2) claim that 'music is not a thing', dismissing it as 'philosophical nonsense' (p. 101). On the other hand, the pragmatist consideration of music and music meaning as verbs rather than nouns and as processes, actions and experiences rather than autonomous objects requires a transformation of one's conceptual views of phenomena. I regard it as a vital step so that in formal music education the dimensions of musical experience can become a central theme. Any shift from the objectivist perspective will require a philosophical self-transformation in order to 'bridge the ontological chasm' (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999, p. 93). This bridging process will be required to pedagogically 'cross the street' (Van Manen, 1991, p. 154) in order to be more empathically attuned to student subjectivity and experience. Concern for 'idiosyncratic and perspectival approaches to music' (Higgins, 1997), 'vernacular, informal learning processes' (Green, 2001) and 'musical-meaning-for-the-subject' (Koopman and
Davies, 2001) are just some of the ways that teachers can be drawn to empathic concern for musical lifeworlds. Exploring these dimensions can pave the way for a deeper understanding of the musical lifeworlds of students and also offer ways to adapt to the changing role of formal music education in the new cultural student 'landscape'.

I found it a liberating feeling to take the leap to a view of 'things' as fleeting, fluid, supple and temporal rather than fixed, hard, inflexible and outside time and space.

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Chapter Four

Epistemological and Ontological Foundations

In this chapter I discuss the epistemological and ontological foundations of the thesis. The discussion takes the form of an exploration of my understanding of 'constructivism' and also 'pragmatist' and 'postmodern' perspectives of ontology. The purpose is to reveal my philosophical stance regarding truth, reality and representation and will help to establish 'ontological authenticity' and clarification of 'research legitimacy'. This is a necessity and a hallmark of 'trustworthiness' in constructivist inquiry (Lincoln and Guba, 2000, p. 180). I have included the section "Validating the Research" in this Chapter as it is linked to and follows on from ontological matters of truth and representation.

In order to include my own lived experience in the process of research construction I present this chapter in the form of phenomenological reflections of the ontological and epistemological implications of what it means to 'cross the street to the participants' side' (Van Manen's (1991, p. 154). In the spirit of 'research story-sharing' the discussion maps a philosophical 'journey' and encounter with the 'Cartesian trap' (Bernstein, 1983).

In this discussion, ontology and epistemology overlap and merge to some degree, for I acknowledge Crotty's statement that, 'to talk of the construction of meaning is to talk of the construction of a meaningful reality' (1998, p. 10).
By rejecting 'detachment' and notions of 'a singular and universal version of truth' (Tierney, 1993), I acknowledge that social reality and truths are invented rather than discovered. With this perspective, 'what matters about our discourse is the degree to which we can reach intersubjective agreement about the world, rather than questions as to the way things really are, apart from our discourse about them' (Horne, 1995, p. 243).

I began the thesis with an acknowledgement of this 'intersubjective agreements' approach; I was sceptical about trying to discover the way things really are. I soon experienced an unresolved tension, a nagging doubt about philosophical counter attacks against objectivist ideals. By accepting one side of the coin philosophical perspectives do not escape the presence of the other (see Finch 1995, p. 14). For a more complete resolution, I wanted to step outside the dualism where one position was not a theoretical alternative or counter to the other. Quite simply, I wanted a new start – to discover new meanings based on new beginnings.

The problem stemmed from within an unresolved ideological position. I experienced first hand what Bernstein referred to as 'Cartesian Anxiety' (1983, p. 16). This was not just a simple theoretical tangle, an inability to solve a philosophical problem initiated by Descartes - or a 'textbook conundrum' (Rorty, 1983, p. 21). It crystallised into a mental and emotional state bought on through wrestling with a need to understand more clearly, self and its relationship to the world. Resolving this issue became a point of focus during my research journey. I recognised that - 'to speak of the Cartesian Anxiety is to speak of a construct, (but) one that is helpful for getting a grip on the primary issues' (Bernstein, 1983, p. 16). Importantly, getting a good 'grip' was important in order to clarify my position in relation to those that I would research and also to sanction my approach. I felt the need to settle my doubts in some form or other, for like Gordon (1998), I didn’t wish to be 'ideologically trapped' and needed to 'reflectively situate my ideologies' during the research process (p. 60). Like Gordon I began to question whether I would need 'some form of psychoanalysis to determine and articulate exactly the
way in which each of my ideologies and autobiography (would) influence my observations and analysis of the social world' (p. 59).

I recognised that the problem of trying to unravel the way things “really are” from within an objectivist /subjectivist argument means stepping on to a philosophical treadmill set in motion by the Cartesian dualistic trap. I agreed with Hornsby (1990) who says, ‘many of those who have fought against Cartesian dualism have failed to realise that the battles have always taken place on territory of the enemies making’ (p. 41). With this, I realised that freedom from dualistic positioning required an avoidance of the trap altogether. My excursions into this investigation sought to find new meanings and a personal understanding that did not have its basis ‘on the treadmill’.

In the following discussion of constructivism, pragmatism and postmodernism I attempt to unhook myself from the dualistic trap. However, the reader may note that in my discussion of these ideologies, a flavour of dualism is evident. This I believe is inescapable because they were founded as part of ‘the heavy artillery bought in to attack modernism and objectivism’ (see Crotty, 1998, p. 42). Later in the discussion I move to retreat from the ‘battlefield of the enemies making’ to forge another position.

Constructivism

Gergen (1991) explains the dualist Cartesian perspective of modernism stating that it ‘was deeply committed to the view that the facts of the world are essentially there for study. They exist independently of us as observers, and if we are rational we will come to know the facts as they are’ (p. 91). Schwandt (1998) relates this statement by Gergen and then counters the modernist position stating that ‘Constructivists are deeply committed to the contrary view that what we take to be objective knowledge and truth is the result of perspective. Knowledge and truth are created, not discovered by mind’ (p. 236). Constructivism is then an anti-objectivist paradigm that according to Denzin and Lincoln (1998) ‘assumes a
relativist ontology (there are multiple realities) and a subjectivist epistemology (knower and subject create understandings)' (p. 27). Constructivism links the knower and known by assuming meaning to be a personal, individual construct rather than external to the individual and part of a mind-independent reality (see Kincheloe, 1991, p. 27).

Historically, the Cartesian perspective, while dominant in Western thought, had not been totally exclusive for alternative ideas have run parallel with it. For example, Kincheloe (1991) points out that Giovanni Battista Vico (1668-1744) the Italian philosopher appears to have pre-empted constructivist thought by countering that humans were more than objects. He believed that 'different conceptual apparatus was necessary for the analysis of social and cultural phenomena from that which might be used to study the structure of the physical world' (p. 27). Vico's ideas pre-empted constructivism and interpretivism. These both shared concern for the development of a 'natural science of the social' and an 'emphasis on the world of experience as it is lived, felt, undergone by social actors' (Schwandt, 1998, p. 236). I also identify early forms of constructivist thought, hidden under the guise of artistic licence within literature. For example when Hamlet announces that "there is nothing either good nor bad but thinking makes it so" (Wells et al. p. 1136) Shakespeare makes the point that we take responsibility for constructing our values and judgements as they have nothing to do with objectivist notions of 'good' and 'evil'.

There are different types of constructivism but a social variant is often referred to as constructionism. As Crotty (1998) explains, constructionism is an epistemology founded upon knower and known relationships and it recognises that meanings are not subjective and personal but socially generated constructions within the interplay of consciousness and the object of experience (p. 42). This version of constructivism assumes that knowledge is not just created by the individual mind but is a process of social exchange. Lyle (2000) emphasises the nature of social constructivism pointing out that 'all learning is located in a social, cultural and historical context' and a social constructivist approach to research will
seek to avoid studying humans as though they were ‘isolated in a laboratory’ (p. 49). The link between the individual and society means that there are social patterns of meaning existing and shared within communities. My approach in this thesis takes into account the social version of constructivism by acknowledging the importance of considering the context of individual perspectives and how realities are specifically lived through (see Schwandt, 1998, p. 240). The ramifications are that the participants’ narratives and ‘lifeworld structures’ (Van Manen, 1990, p. 183) of experience are not seen as emerging from a social and cultural vacuum. On this point I make a connection, recognising the compatibility of research paradigms. When considered from an ontological perspective, social constructivism acknowledges the transcendence of ‘internal’ and ‘external’ worlds and in so doing mirrors the phenomenological theory of intentionality where human consciousness is seen as actively constituting the objects of experience. As Crotty (1998) states, constructivism ‘mirrors the concept of intentionality’ (p. 44).

If we accept that the ‘universe can be viewed from multiple perspectives which are constructions of the human mind’ (Kincheloe, 1991, p. 136), the individual perspective becomes an important source of data. The motivation that drives the constructivist approach to research is the belief that understanding social phenomena from the actor’s perspective is a worthwhile epistemological pursuit. In this thesis, the subject of investigation is each individual participant’s ‘musical reality’ or their ‘constructs’ of ‘what music is’ and its meaning in their own lives.

Again, on the social variant of constructivism, Crotty (1998) states that

Because of the essential relationship that human experience bears to its object, no object can be adequately described in isolation from the conscious being experiencing it, nor can any experience be adequately described in isolation from its object. Experiences do not constitute a sphere of subjective reality separate from, and in contrast to, the objective realm of the external world - as Descartes' famous ‘split’ between mind and body, and thereby between mind and world, would lead us to imagine.

(p. 45)
Considering Crotty's opening sentence and applying it to the experience of music - if we supplant the word 'object' with 'music', we get a social constructivist approach that assumes that 'music cannot be adequately described in isolation from the conscious being experiencing it'. In the present study, rather than holding to any extreme form of subjectivism, I acknowledge the expanded, social form of constructivism. I am concerned with individual relationships with music and how they are constructed within, and not isolated from social contexts. I recognise that individuals are the constructors of knowledge and the creators of their own musical worlds. Accepting this approach (wholeheartedly) has required a corresponding transformation of my own perspective. Rather than commencing with an objectified, autonomous concept of music and then examining how that 'object' manifests in the lives of the participants, I investigate their lifeworld structures of music.

Subjectivity, consciousness and ideas of self are personal, often private and idiosyncratic, but not closed off, contained within isolated spheres. As Cummings, (2000) has explained, viewed constructively, selfhood 'is not located in some 'inner' space, which is known through introspection alone' (but is) 'an intrinsically social, interactive, and mobile experience' (p. 10). With this perspective, constructivist understandings reveal how the selves of the participants are manifested through socially interactive expressions with musical experiences, processes and through the medium of musical meanings. In this way, social constructivism fends off a solipsistic and radical subjectivism that tends to build an imaginary barrier that walls off the interconnection between the 'inner' person and 'outer' manifestations of the social world.

**Pragmatism**

Pragmatist theory, like that of phenomenology, connects me to 'lived experience'. Shusterman (2000) also recognises the connection stating that
Pragmatism, as I practice it, is a philosophy of embodied, situated experience. Rather than relying on a priori principles or seeking necessary truths, the pragmatist works from experience, trying to clarify its meaning so that its present quality and its consequences for future experience might be improved.

(p. 97)

In this statement Shusterman questions the nature of ‘truth’ and the seeking of ‘necessary truths’ that are abstracted from experience. Adhering to this pragmatist view I recognise that the stories told by the five ‘participants in interview are accounts of ‘embodied situated experience’ and I interpret them in order to clarify or enhance the meaning of that experience. Similarly, the inclusion of narratives of my own experience and personal voice in the research is intended to be a pragmatic case of ‘working from embodied situated experience’ and a pragmatic use of my own subjectivity and life stories.

The neo-pragmatist perspective (like constructivism) suggests that the concept of ‘truth’ is not a ‘correspondence to reality’ (Rorty, 1982, p. 162) because ‘reality’ is not a single, solid object. Rather ‘reality’ is an ongoing meaningful interaction between environment, mind and sense perceptions and occurs not ‘in the external world nor within the subjective mind of the knower, but within dynamic transactions between the two’ (Barone, 2000, p. 168). According to James (1970, p. 133) and Dewey (1980, p. 54) ideas such as ‘truth’ and ‘meaning’ are best viewed as processes that are manifest in actions or experience rather than illusively thought of as autonomous objects. James (1970) suggests that the ‘truth of an idea is not a stagnant property inherent in it. Truth happens to an idea’ and ‘the great (misguided) assumption of the intellectualists is that truth means essentially an inert static relation’. Similarly, he suggests consciousness and knowledge also are not objects, material things or even ‘entities’ but knowing (p. 4). Polkinghorne (1988) also proposes the notion that verb forms rather than nouns may describe ideas and concepts. While discussing narrative theory, he says, ‘the realm of meaning is not a thing or a substance, but an activity’ (p. 4).

In addition to the writings of Small (1996, 1998) and Elliott (1995) the notion of music as an activity rather than an objective phenomenon has been
proposed from a pragmatist perspective. Määttänen and Westerlund (2001) have argued that to avoid an objectivist approach where knower and known are separated, music is best viewed not as an object but as lived action and experience, as activity, process and as a verb rather than an autonomous object and a noun.

Postmodern research - ‘representation and the truth’

Constructivists and pragmatists consider an obsession with ‘truth’ in the social sciences as an outmoded modernist agenda. However, Kvale (1996) suggests that qualitative researchers should continue to clarify their orientations to truth and knowledge claims in order to find a balance – ‘to get beyond the extremes of a subjective relativism where everything can mean everything, and an absolutist quest for the one and only true, objective meaning’ (p. 229). While this enterprise may keep us firmly on the Cartesian ‘treadmill’ it is important for the sake of ‘ontological authenticity’ for according to Bridges (1998), matters of ‘truth’, will not ‘go away’. Bridges raises a challenging issue claiming that questions of truth in research are unavoidable. He does not believe that researchers ever escape some sense of truth seeking or truth claim in their inquiries for as he says the very denial of any involvement with ‘the truth’ is in fact a truth assertion. Bridges goes on to suggest that researchers should acknowledge their complicity and ‘own up’ to the kinds of truth that they are associated with (p. 10). He gives an example of the authors Stronach and MacLure (1997) whose work he is dissecting for ‘truth claims’). He states that, ‘albeit that they are operating within a postmodernist mode, (they) are nevertheless attached to the kind of procedural principles… which operate in the service of establishing the warrant for and hence (as near as we shall ever get to) the truth of our proffered beliefs’ (p. 12). The conclusion that Bridges suggests is that only if we ‘sustain the speech forms of a mixture of command, invitation and question, can we escape without offering anything which resemble(s) a truth claim’ (p. 12). Bridges’ criticism is principally with researchers
who claim that they are not interested in proposing truths, but then proceed to make truth claims.

In answer, I believe the point overlooked by Bridges is that it is possible to accept the paradox of multiple vantage points and versions of ‘reality’ and truth. Importantly, postmodernists suspect and doubt all truth claims (Richardson, 1998). Barone (2001) explains the postmodern approach to research where some theorists no longer partake of the modernist belief that absolute knowledge of an objective reality can be achieved by researchers. These postmodernists even disagree that objectivity must stand as a kind of “regulative ideal” toward which social science must always strive.

(Barone, 2001, pp. 152-153)

Postmodern theories provide alternatives to traditional notions of ontology and epistemology. Usher (1997), for example, states that postmodernism actually displaces older, modernist conceptions of epistemology because of its scepticism about the traditional aim of distinguishing true and certain knowledge. He also criticises the metaphoric notion of the modernist social science researcher as a ‘detective’ who ‘seeks the truth usually in the form a quest for a missing or hidden item of knowledge and does not rest until the hidden item of knowledge is found and the truth discovered’ (p. 30). Like narrative research and phenomenology, postmodernists do not seek a universal version of ‘the truth’ of situations. Some postmodern theorists, as Barone (2001a) states, are content to abandon ‘an obsessive quest for certain and total knowledge that transcends a fallible, human perspective’. They ‘opt for an epistemology of ambiguity that seeks out and celebrates meanings that are partial, tentative, incomplete, sometimes even contradictory, and originating from multiple vantage points’ (p. 152).

Postmodern principles influenced my approach to interviewing. I found a poignant explanation by Kvale, (1996) who contrasts the postmodern approach with the positivist, objectivist stance that assumes that nuggets of knowledge or pre-existing categories lie waiting to be discovered and are buried within the interview data. He states:

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A postmodern approach forgoes the search of true fixed meanings and emphasises descriptive nuances, differences, and paradoxes. There is a change from a substantial to a relational concept of meaning, with a move from the modern search for the one true and real meaning to a relational unfolding of meanings. Different interpreters constructing different meanings of an interview story is then not a weakness, but a strength of the interview method. Meanings and numbers are constructions of social reality. The interview gives no direct access to unadulterated provinces of pure meanings, but is a social production of meanings through linguistic interaction. ... In this interrelational conception the interviewer does not uncover pre-existing meanings, but supports the interviewees in developing their meanings throughout the course of the interview.

Validating’ the Research

Scientific truth tests are as relevant to testing fictional truth as knowledge of chemistry is relevant to making soufflés

(Eisner, 1991, p. 50)

In this section I explore matters of research legitimacy, knowledge claims and ‘representation’ to arrive at the concepts of ‘believability’ (Eisner, 1991, p. 53), ‘authenticity’ and ‘trustworthiness’ (Lincoln and Guba, 2000, p. 180; Mishler, 2000, p. 112). These displace positivist and postpositivist claims where concepts of validity and representation arise from the reification of ‘truth’ and objectivity.

I begin this discussion by presenting statements by Denzin (1997) that problematise the process of research, its purpose and ‘credibility’. He states that - ‘Language and speech do not mirror experience’ (p. 5) and it is ‘no longer possible to represent a life as it is actually lived or experienced’ (p. 61). If this is the case - in
what way then are the portraits in this study ‘valid’ if they do not reflect ‘the truth’ of situations?

Questions raised by traditional notions of legitimacy pose problems when applied to narrative, postmodern, constructivist forms of research for the concept of ‘validity’ relates to positivist and post-positivist ideas of the nature of truth and what counts as valid knowledge. The criterion - that a research account should tell us the truth about some objectively described state of affairs does not address the concerns of postmodern constructivist research (Eisner and Peshkin, 1990, p. 97). The paradigm problem arises because, as Eisner (1991) states, ‘there are no operationally defined truth tests to apply to qualitative research and evaluation’ (p. 53). He adds that we need to explore the issue of legitimisation because there are ‘questions to ask and features to look for and appraise’ (p. 53).

Schön (1991) recognises three truth criteria as representing the ‘traditional tests of validity’ and that relate to three areas of research adequacy or rigor. He states that the tests of research have been viewed as a concern for - ‘correspondence (does it fit the facts?), coherence (does it hang together in an internally consistent and compelling way?), and pragmatism (does it work?)’ (p. 348). Wolcott (1994) has also identified similar tests but refers to them as ‘ontological validity, overall validity and practical validity’ (p. 344). Kvale (1996) agrees, identifying the ‘three classical criteria’ of truth. He states that

> The *correspondence* criterion of truth concerns whether a knowledge statement corresponds to the objective world. The *coherence* criterion refers to the consistency and internal logic of a statement. And the *pragmatic* criterion relates the truth of a knowledge statement to its practical consequences.

(p. 238)

Schön (1991) explains that these tests of validity are ‘vexing questions’ for

> “Fitting the facts” may mean nothing more than fitting the facts one chooses to notice, the facts ignored being those least...
compatible with the proposition in question. “Coherence” may be preferentially applied to the explanation most congenial to one’s already accepted theoretical framework. And the inquirer who can derive a more or less effective intervention from any one of several explanations may simply choose to make work the one he or she already prefers.

(p. 348)

Demonstration of the flawed nature of these tests of validity has been regarded by objectivists as the fallibility of subjectivity and the self-as-instrument. It has prompted them to strive for procedural objectivity that involves ‘method that eliminates or aspires to eliminate, the scope for personal judgement in the description and appraisal of a state of affairs’ (Eisner, 1991, p. 44). Eisner counters this need for objective scientific rigor by stating that it goes against the grain of qualitative research that ‘depends on personal insight and interpretation, not simply upon the following of a set of replicable procedures’ (1991, p. 50).

While all three tests of validity, as Schön has suggested, have limitations, the coherence and pragmatic tests are frequently retained in qualitative research. The first, the test of correspondence, is suited only to objectivist approaches that are intent on discovering undistorted facts about the ‘one reality’. Mishler (2000) finds the correspondence test inappropriate to interpretive research. He states -

I do not rely on a correspondence model of truth, where the earlier “objective” reality serves as a validity criterion for what is being told now. This is not a weakness, but rather a hallmark of interpretive research in which the key problem is understanding how individuals interpret events and experiences, rather than assessing whether or not their interpretations correspond to or mirror the researchers’ interpretive construct of “objective” reality.

(p. 128)

Difficulties stem from the contrast between paradigms. On one hand there is research that seeks to mirror an ‘objective reality’ in order to predict and control by discovering ‘the one real meaning’ (see Kvale, 1996, p. 225). Here the
correspondence test of validity determines scientific accuracy in experiment, testing and hypothesis deduction. It pertains to the domain of measurement when we ask ourselves if we have measured what we set out to measure (Polkinghorne, 1988, p. 175; Wolcott, 1994, p. 343). On the other hand there is research that generates understanding through interpreting and describing qualities, experience and ‘meaning events on their own lifeworld ground’ (Fuller, 1990, p. 59). These aim to describe qualities rather than seeking matters of fact. Mishler (2000) concurs stating that ‘the prevailing conception of and procedures for validation are based on an experimental model whereas our (qualitative) studies are designed explicitly as an alternative to that model, with features that differ markedly and in detail from those characteristic of experiments’ (p. 120). As qualitative studies may not utilise experiment-based criteria and methods they are often viewed as lacking in scientific rigor, and therefore have ‘failure built in from the start and (are) denied legitimacy’ (Mishler, 2000, p. 120).

The ‘vexing questions’ of validity have been a concern for Wolcott (1994, 1995) who is prepared to dismiss them (‘validity neither guides or informs my work’ – 1994, p. 356). However, he states that despite the dismissal, ‘it won’t go away’ (1995, p. 170). If we choose to confront the issue of validity, he says, it will be about ‘whether we are willing to accept the language of quantitative researchers as the language of all research, or whether different approaches, like different art forms, warrant different criteria for judging them’ (1995, p. 168). Recently, many theorists have refused to accept an ‘inappropriate language’ of validity and have set about re-formulating criteria for evaluating research.

Richardson (2000), for example, re-formulates the concept of validity as a process of ‘crystallization’ She is not content with the narrow assumption that in postmodern research there is a ‘fixed point’ that can be triangulated and develops, through metaphor, a more detailed understanding of the complexity of qualitative research. The triangle, a rigid, fixed, two-dimensional object is superseded by the more suitable metaphor of the crystal. This ‘combines symmetry and substance with an infinite variety of shapes, substances, transmutations, multidimensionalities, and
angles of approach' (p. 934). What we see through our inquiries depends 'on our angle of repose' and crystallisation allows us to 'reflect or refract' on the dimensions of the interpretations and create a 'deepened, complex, thoroughly partial, understanding of the topic' (p. 934).

In this study, phenomenology and narrative interpretive procedures, acting like 'the properties of the crystal-as-metaphor' have assisted different ways of 'reflecting and refracting multiple layers of meaning' (see Lincoln and Guba, 2000, pp. 181-182). By using a composite research approach and also by using and exploring different 'ways of knowing' I view the data from different angles. I 'metaphorically turn the crystal many ways (in order) to see the interweaving of processes in the research (the musical lifeworlds): discovery, seeing, telling, storying, re-presentation' (Lincoln and Guba, 2000, p. 182).

In this study data captured in the interviews are crystallised with meanings interpreted from close observations in the field and music performances.

'Validation' - through the discourse of the community

Eisner (1991), in rejecting the validity test of correspondence believes it to be problematic as it does not avoid 'the pitfalls of objectivity'. He assumes that 'mind and matter exist in a relationship of transaction' (p. 50) and 'ontological objectivity is not securable' (p. 51). He recognises that because knowledge is socially constructed research validation is a matter of consensus of agreement by 'competent others' (p. 112). Both Eisner and Barone (1997) have reiterated that validation is inevitably a social affair where the value of research is its acknowledgement by a 'competent critical community' (p. 86).

Kvale (1996) also relinquishes the correspondence test of rigor and adds that the quest for an 'absolute, certain knowledge is replaced by a conception of defensible knowledge claims' (p. 240). Placing validity within a constructivist context, he states that
a modern belief in knowledge as a mirror of reality recedes and a social construction of reality, with coherence and pragmatic criteria of truth, comes to the foreground. Method as a guarantee of truth dissolves; with a social construction of reality the emphasis is on the discourse of the community. (p. 240)

With this perspective qualitative research 'validation' is achieved not through correspondence with 'one objective reality', but by defending our knowledge claims through social discourse within the community. However, a degree of empathy and like-mindedness is necessary. For example, the academic legitimacy of a constructivist study would require an intersubjective and mutual recognition between the researcher/writer and the reader/critic, of the social construction of knowledge.

Authenticity, Believability and Trustworthiness

It is the responsibility of the researcher/writer to make the research methods and procedures of the study 'visible' so that the reader/critic may 'be able to make a reasoned and informed assessment about whether or not (the) validity claims are well warranted' (Mishler, 2000, p. 130). The 'visibility' of methods and procedures will enhance the authenticity of the research. With narrative and literary-based research, the researcher/writer will also strive for compellingness and believability and to create a text that 'like good art possesses the capacity to pull the person who experiences it into an alternative reality' (Barone and Eisner, 1997, p. 72). Correspondingly, the reader/critic must construct the reality of the text for it 'resides neither in the literary work as object-in-the-world nor in the subjective 'mind' of the reader, but within a continuous field of experience between the two' (Barone, 2000, p. 138).

Mishler (2000) sanctions the social construction of 'trustworthiness' in his view of research legitimacy. He states...
I do not propose that my methods and procedures "validate" my findings and interpretations. That would be counter to my basic thesis that validation is the social construction through which the results of a study come to be viewed as sufficiently trustworthy for other investigators to rely upon in their own work.

(p. 130)

Mishler sees trustworthiness arising not from 'methodological validity' but from the 'transferability' of his research. Polkinghorne (1988) on the other hand also holds to the notion of trustworthiness but believes it arises from the clarity of procedures and methods. He states that, 'narrative studies do not have formal proofs of reliability', they must rely instead 'on the details of their procedures to evoke an acceptance of the trustworthiness of the data' (p. 177).

Trustworthiness gained through the 'clarity of the details' relates to the coherence and 'visibility' of procedures. This is where it 'hang(s) together in an internally consistent and compelling way' (Schön, 1991 p. 348). Coherence will, according to Kvale (1996) depend on the quality of craftsmanship (p. 241).

According to Eisner (1991) structural corroboration is a criterion for assessing coherence. This is a qualitative alternative to 'triangulation'. It differs from positivist research where the traditional concept is the 'mustering of evidence' in order to arrive at a strict, non-refutable coherence or correspondence with an objective 'truth'. Within qualitative research, 'structural corroboration (is) when multiple types of data are related to each other to support or contradict the interpretation and evaluation of a state of affairs' (Eisner 1991, p. 110).

In this study I have used 'multiple forms of data' to 'structurally corroborate' interpretations. I did not 'muster evidence' to form an objective truth but sought to create a larger perspective through 'multidimensionalities and angles of approach'. An example here is where a 'story' of a participant experience is developed not only from interpretations of his or her (narrative) account of it, but by including into the 'story', interpretations of the perspectives of either parents, music teachers or my...
own observations of the experience. Often meaningful connections were made between my observations of participants in musical performance and the accounts they expressed about the performance during interviews. These corroborations assisted a broader interpretation of the musical lifeworld of each participant. On this issue, Eisner (1991) states that, ‘different kinds of data converge or support each other, the picture, like an image in a puzzle, becomes more distinct’ (p. 56). With this function multiple data sources are crystallised in order to help form interpretations from multiple viewpoints.

The usefulness of the research

Trust will be developed if the research is coherent and ‘usable’. Eisner (1991) declares that ‘the most important test of any (educational) qualitative study is its usefulness’ (p. 58) and that ultimately the test is the extent that it facilitates the formation of policy or improvement in practice (Barone and Eisner, 1997, p. 86). Instrumental utility or the pragmatics of the research is assisted with referential adequacy (Eisner, 1991, pp. 53-60 and pp. 110-114). On this point Eisner, while discussing the role of the researcher as critic states that,

Criticism is referentially adequate to the extent to which the reader is able to locate in its subject matter the qualities the critic addresses and the meanings he or she ascribes to them. In this sense criticism is utterly empirical; its referential adequacy is tested not in abstractions removed from qualities, but in the perception and interpretation of the qualities themselves

(p. 114)

This quote raises an important consideration. Research that explores the structures of meaning and the qualities of experience may be more akin to those works of literature that develop insight into the nature of human experience. Like works of art, these forms of research then warrant criticism or judgement from an aesthetic angle. The aesthetic qualities we evaluate may include whether the work is
compelling, plausible (Clandinin and Connelly, 2000, p. 185) having tight argument and
rightness of fit (Eisner, 1991, p. 53 and p. 111), is persuasive, or even provocative (see

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A philosophical ‘leap’

Wittgenstein, Heidegger and William James, although on quite different
philosophical pathways, made many similar observations and had ideas that on
closer examination are related (see Okrent, 1988, p. 280). All three proposed a new
direction for philosophy that would be achieved through a de-metaphysicalized view
of the ‘inner world’. In the case of Wittgenstein, and Heidegger, these were ideas
commenced in *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* and *Being and Time* respectively, and then
proposed in detail in subsequent ‘turn-abouts’ or *Kbere* in their later works. Finch
(1995) describes Wittgenstein’s contribution. He states that

Wittgenstein’s greatest achievement was that he overturned the
assumption of two millennia of Western thought that an “inner
world” of the subject has to be constructed on (and can be
justified by) the model of the metaphysicalized objective world.
An objectified “internality” has been taken for granted,
particularly since the time of Saint Augustine; we have the same
thing, merely secularised, in Descartes and, in another greatly
changed form in the presuppositional “transcendental
psychology” of Kant.

(p. 75)

While Husserl rejected the dualism between consciousness and nature, he
accepted another – the dualism between consciousness and its intentional objects
(On this issue, Gergen, 1991, p. 102, asks Why do we presume a real world on the one
hand and an experienced world on the other?). Husserl was unable to let go of the
Kantian notion of objects ‘in themselves’ (noumena) and objects, as they are
cognitively experienced (phenomena). Heidegger, on the other hand, reacted to
Husserl and rejected this secondary dualism. Like Wittgenstein he recognised a de-metaphysicalized or transcendent state believing that we begin with 'Being-in-the-world' - which is not separable into consciousness on one hand and objects on the other (Solomon, 2001, p. 34). As 'Being-in-the-world' I engage directly with the world, not with sensations of the world (Moran, 2000, p. 232). This argument is remarkably similar to that proposed by William James (1976) who believed in such a 'pure diaphaneity' of consciousness that he abandoned a notion of its existence altogether. We can only observe it, James stated, through its acts of 'pure experience' or the functioning of thinking by acts of knowing (p. 3).

In my philosophical journey I investigated (the surface) of Wittgensteinian 'new philosophy'. I followed leads that explored his approach to 'getting off the Cartesian treadmill or battleground'. Wittgenstein likened his earlier experience of the (Cartesian) dilemma to a man being trapped in a room facing a blank wall and imagining doors and windows through which he could try and escape. He then suddenly realises that all the time a door behind him had been open. We cannot escape through the abstracted, metaphysical doors supposedly in front of us but there is no more prison when we find the door behind us' (Finch, 1995, pp. 32-33). The illusion of a metaphysicalized inner being facing metaphysical 'escape' structures is the imprisoning factor.

According to Wittgenstein, the myth that the Self is private, isolated and opposed to an external world is dispelled with the acceptance of a de-metaphysicalized inner being. Many philosophers since Descartes remained unavoidably trapped by acknowledging the very existence of a metaphysical 'internal' that opposes the physical 'external'. From this position inside the 'metaphysical room' philosophy then becomes fixated on finding a way out. However, from the Wittgensteinian perspective, the 'bifurcation of mind' is not annulled by constructing an alternative to objectivism, a conceptual opposite, but by an ontological and epistemological 'leap'. Armed with this information we can acknowledge that the subject/object dyad is indeed dead. Barone (2000) confirms
this while discussing the dyad. He reveals how subjectivity, which is often taken as
the alternative to its dyadic partner objectivity, is now ‘a goner’ (see pp. 161-169).

Bernstein (1983) has suggested that the exorcising of Cartesian Anxiety is
not just a theoretical problem, but also a practical task (p. 230). How does one
proceed with an awareness of this exorcised position? Simply by acknowledging, in
the words of Wittgenstein, that the fly is let out of the fly-bottle (1968, p. 103). Or put
less metaphorically, to accept the situation where ‘the solipsistic subject is released
from the trap in the human being’ (Wittgenstein, 1953, p. 309 - also commentary
by Finch, 1995, pp. 24 and 84-88).

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How does this ‘new’ philosophical understanding change my perception and
approach to explicating the structures of meaning in lived experience? From a
Wittgensteinian perspective the search for ‘significances’ and ‘potentialities of
meaning’ in data (Kvale, 1996, p. 4 and p. 193) becomes a language game that
involves rearranging rather than a process of digging. Additionally the
phenomenological ‘essence’ of something is not hidden but ‘already lies open to
view’. Finch (1995) discusses Wittgenstein’s position and paraphrases the
description of essence found in Philosophical Investigations (1968, p. 43, n. 92)

(Essence is) something that already lies open to view and that becomes surveyable by a rearrangement, (not) something that lies beneath the surface. (Not) something that lies within, which we see when we look into the thing, and which an analysis digs out.

(p. 157)

Finch (1995) then goes on to elaborate this process. He states

The imagery of rearranging instead of digging is vivid and to the
point. The search for the “behind-the-world reality”, which
Nietzsche so brilliantly exposed at the end of his life as the
central idea in the history of Western metaphysics, here takes
the form of a “below-the-world” foundation. It is much more
plausible to believe that everything we need is already in plain view. As Nietzsche thought too, we have been chasing phantasms, chimeras, and illusions in trying to find the super-real, and it is time now to open our eyes and look around.

(p. 158)

When I first read the above quotes I had a startling feeling of recognition of something amazingly simple within what before, had been the complex ideas of Wittgenstein. With the concept of *rearranging* I grasp a new perspective. I have the feeling of making a leap and a new beginning.

- I am
- Being, *Dasein* – 'one who understands' (Okrent, 1988, p. 17), inquires – a phenomenological 'lived existence', a 'Being-in-the-world'.
- I recognise a 'non-self-conscious understanding' that simply allows understanding. Zen also recognises the de-metaphysicalized operation of the Unconscious or 'everyday mind' where 'there is no specific consciousness of its own workings' (Suzuki, 1969, p. 106). Believing there is something extra, a 'behind-the-world reality', is like, to quote a Zen parable, 'trying to add another head on the one I already have'.
- From the non-self conscious position I play *language games* in order to build up a picture of the world... and further pictures of the pictures.
- The construction of meaning is paradoxical. I see what Wittgenstein proposes – that there are two modes of thinking –using the first mode, abstraction piles up *picture upon picture of the world*. It feels as though knowledge grows as I dig into a 'behind-the-world-reality' in a process that is a kind of analysis of existence.
• This 'abstracting, analytical mode' reflects the picturing character of language. What is important about this mode is its purpose, which is to always look for the 'truth' of the world and my position in relation to it.

• What is wrong with this mode? According to Wittgenstein it is an Augustinian misuse of language, which illusively tries to solve the hidden issues of the world because language and philosophy are assumed to be representations of an external world. BUT, without the notion of an external world, words are simply components in 'language games'. In fact 'all the functional language we learn is learned in 'language games.' That is, words are used to make things happen. The child says "cookie" not to name the cookie, but to get a cookie' (Shawyer, 1996).

• Heidegger also acknowledged the 'abstracting mode' believing that it operates within a metaphysical ontology rather than from the primary position of 'Being-in-the-world'. From the metaphysical position it seeks knowledge of the being of being, rather than describing the meaning of being.

• However, from a position in the 'other' mode (Wittgenstein's new mode) meanings of experience are synthesised. In my inquiries I sift and sort in order to find the language constructions that satisfy the non-self conscious understanding or knowing. I am re-searching. Or as Wittgenstein says - rearranging what is already known for 'everything lies open to view' (1968, p. 50). The meaning constructions that resonate are retained. My search for meanings is in fact a searching for an erudite way (a suitable language game) of saying something that is already open to view

• This second, new Wittgensteinian mode represents the manifestational, expressive and performative character of language. Functionally, its task is not to seek 'truth of an external world'. Emancipated from a metaphysical illusion of a private self, with this second mode 'epistemology becomes redundant' – for as Finch (1995) states, 'we don't have to know the meaning, we have to do the meaning' (p. 12).

• Although Wittgenstein extracted himself, Finch (1995) states that we are mostly still under the spell of abstraction (p. 172). However, the postmodern process of 'languageing' to enhance meaning (Usher, 1997) is an epistemological alternative to an older epistemology of 'picturing' in order to pile up abstractions.
A new dimension - a 'rearranged' vantage point

The Wittgensteinian theory of 'two modes' now sits comfortably in my way of 'construing reality' and it compliments the Brunerian version (a new, rearranged structure of my understanding!) I identify the similarity that exists between, on one hand, the Wittgensteinian abstract, picture-upon-picture mode and the Brunerian paradigmatic mode. Similarity also exists on the other hand between the rearranging, descriptive mode, and the narrative.

The narrative and rearranging modes function similarly. In these modes we are not involved in discovering the real picture of a one, real world, but are involved in rearranging understandings and meanings of experience and events - into organised patterns, structures and plots. My own propensity to look for similarities between ideas and concepts, is an example of the case in point – it is an example of rearranging - to generate understanding in order to make sense of our experience.

In this thesis my paradigmatic thinking is represented by sections of text that build up 'picture upon picture' while I am engaged in the process of 'turning data into stories' in the portraits. These 'pictures' are used to 'to identify episodes as an instance of a general type, category or concept' (Polkinghorne, 1995, pp. 9-10). But from the other vantage-point I use the narrative/Wittgensteinian, 'newer' mode for its suited purpose, which is the enhancement of the meaning of particular situations through a process of rearranging to make meaning visible. The narrative sections of text in the portraits portray phenomenological 'essences' within 'lived experience material' recognising that they are 'open to view' through rearrangement.

Representation in the narrative portraits

The representative function of the portraits of musical lifeworlds is, to use the words of MacLure and Stronach (1993), not to 'tell it like it is' but to 'tell it as I
see it' or to 'tell it as it may possibly be' (p. 379). As Clough (1992) states, 'the world of real lived experience can still be captured, if only in the writer's memoirs, fictional experimentation, or dramatic readings (p. 136 – quoted in Denzin, 1997, p. 18). By including the narrative and rearranging 'modes of construing reality', the task of the portraits' is to 'represent' the participants in a double sense. The first is with an artistic meaning of 'represent', which is - to compose a new rearranged 'picture of understanding'. The second is to act as an agent for the subject – to 'represent his or her interests and to ensure that his or her “voice” is heard' (MacLure and Stronach, 1993, p. 379).

**Summary and reflection**

In this chapter the epistemological and ontological foundations of the thesis were presented. The discussion sought to 'make visible' my philosophical stance regarding truth, reality and representation while seeking to establish 'ontological authenticity' and 'research legitimacy' for the thesis. 'Writing' was used as the means and method of inquiry (Richardson, 2000, p. 923) as I explored, clarified and deepened my understanding of constructivism and also pragmatist and postmodern perspectives of ontology (I expand the topic of 'writing as research' in detail on p. 134).

From this exploration I have come to recognise that emancipation from the Cartesian treadmill offers a new contact where we operate from an understanding where (again to reiterate the point) 'we don't have to know the meaning, (of meaning) we have to do the meaning' (Finch 1995, p. 12). Also instead of questioning whether meanings are pre-existent and inherent in life's experiences and texts, or constructed in individual minds, we may recognise simply 'that everything already lies open to view and it becomes surveyable by a rearrangement' (Wittgenstein, 1968, p. 43, n. 92).