Post-Colonial Citizenship Education: 
A Critical Study of the Production and Reproduction of the Indonesian Civic Ideal

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**Statement of Authorship**

This thesis contains no material which has been accepted for a degree or diploma by the University or any other institution. The material presented in this thesis is the product of the author’s own independent research under the supervision of Professor Barbara Hatley. No other person’s work has been used without due acknowledgement in the main text of this thesis.

Freddy K. Kalidjernih

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NOTES ON TRANSLATION AND SPELLINGS

I would like to draw readers’ attention to several problems inherent in the extracts from the student textbooks (Pendidikan Pancasila dan Kewarganegaraan or PPKn) that I make reference to in this thesis. I have tried to translate the texts from the textbooks as accurately and naturally as I can. However, I found that many of the original texts are not well-structured. For example, some sentences use verbs in the passive voice, where the unstated subject of the verb is clearly unrelated to the grammatical subject of the sentences that follow. The logic of some arguments is poorly developed, and there is frequent redundancy of expression. As a result, I have had some difficulty translating the texts. To native speakers of English, some of the translated passages may sound awkward. This reflects the conflict between the need for accurate translation, and the needs of natural, fluent English.

Secondly, it is seldom that a word in one language has a direct equivalent in another, and meanings more often overlap than coincide. Although the denotation may be approximately the same, the connotations carried may be quite different. This is particularly so with abstract concepts. For example, the words tanggung jawab and kewajiban have been used freely and interchangeably in the texts. In English, tanggung jawab is usually translated as ‘responsibility’ or ‘obligation’, and kewajiban as ‘duty’, but they may also be interpreted differently, particularly in the academic realm. To address this difficulty, discussion of these concepts in Chapters 5 and 6 is preceded by a short introductory ‘lead-in’. It should also be noted that the textbooks usually spell the word
negara (‘state’) with a lower case initial letter. In this thesis, I use a small initial letter for ‘state’, mostly referring to a particular state, i.e. Indonesia.

Thirdly, the original form of Indonesian and Javanese words expressing concepts, including some abbreviations, are in italics; thus Pancasila, Negara Integralistik, manunggaling kawula gusti, UUD 1945, MPR, DPR and DPRD. I have tried to include their English translation wherever possible. Proper names and non-conceptual Indonesian and Javanese words are not written in italics. To indicate the source from which a particular text is drawn, I note in brackets the level of study and page numbers in the PPKn textbooks, instead of the name of the writers or publisher, for example: (SLTA Class 2: 10-11). For official guidelines, books and curricular materials I note the original source in Indonesian, such as Departemen Pendidikan Nasional, Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan and BP-7. I use the contemporary spelling system in Indonesian, for example Sukarno, Suharto and Pancasila, but retain the original spellings - Soekarno, Soeharto, Pantjasila, etc. - in quoting texts published prior to 1972. The spellings of names which have consistently been used in the last few decades are also retained, such as Koentjaraningrat and Roeslan Abdul Gani. Similarly, the British (Australian) spelling system is adopted in this thesis. However, for direct quotations and citations from American sources, the original American spellings are retained.

Finally, each lesson in the textbooks claims to discuss one topic only, however many lessons digress widely and touch on different or unrelated issues. As a result, it is difficult to select a lesson entirely focusing on a single issue. I have tried to extract the most
relevant parts for my discussion. In short, to avoid any confusion over the foregoing ‘peculiarities’ of the texts in translation, it is hoped that readers will read them in context.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DPR</td>
<td>Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat</td>
<td>People’s Representative Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPRD</td>
<td>Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah</td>
<td>Regional People’s Representative Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ekaprasetia Pancakarsa</td>
<td></td>
<td>A Sanskrit-derived term for P4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KBK</td>
<td>Kurikulum Berbasis Kompetensi</td>
<td>Competency-Based Curriculum. A national curriculum introduced in 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPR</td>
<td>Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat</td>
<td>People’s Consultative Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKI</td>
<td>Partai Komunis Indonesia</td>
<td>Indonesian Communist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orde Baru</td>
<td></td>
<td>Old Order, i.e. a regime that ruled Indonesia from 1966 to 1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orde Lama</td>
<td></td>
<td>New Order, i.e. a regime that ruled Indonesia from 1945 to 1965/66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Penataran P4</td>
<td>Penataran Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengalaman Pancasila (also called Ekaprasetia Pancakarsa)</td>
<td>The Training Guidelines for the Implementation and Experiencing Pancasila.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMP</td>
<td>Pendidikan Moral Pancasila</td>
<td>Moral Pancasila Education.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPKn</td>
<td>Pendidikan Pancasila dan Kewarganegaraan</td>
<td>The school civics subject – Education in Pancasila and Citizenship.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLTA</td>
<td>Sekolah Lanjutan Tingkat Atas</td>
<td>Junior Secondary School or Junior High School (i.e. Years 7 – 9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLTP</td>
<td>Sekolah Lanjutan Tingkat Pertama</td>
<td>Senior Secondary School or Senior High School (i.e. Years 10 – 12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UUD 1945</td>
<td>Undang Undang Dasar 1945</td>
<td>The constitution of Indonesia</td>
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This project has been made possible by the assistance of various people. I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my supervisor Barbara Hatley. Without her initiative in organising for me to work and study in Tasmania, and her enthusiasm for my work and encouragement throughout the study, this thesis would never have come to fruition. I greatly appreciate her dedication in helping me to wrestle with ideas over many months of e-mail correspondence and long sessions in Jakarta hotel lobbies. I owe a special debt to Maria Flutsch, Mobo Gao and Kim Atkins for offering me insightful commentaries on a few sections of the draft of this thesis. I would like to express my whole-hearted thanks to Dave Henton for proof-reading the entire draft. Without his constructive suggestions to strengthen my ideas and his excellent editing skills, this thesis would have not been the same.

Abas Al-Jauhari provided me with journal articles on Islam and the names and contact numbers of a number of Muslim intellectuals. I am extremely grateful to him as well as to the government officials, academics, teachers, intellectuals and students who gave generously of their time to talk to me. I would like to express my whole-hearted thanks to University of Tasmania Document Delivery and Flexible Library Services team, who provided me with many journal articles that I could not obtain in Indonesia. Pam Allen and Mary Hoggett were very helpful to me when I was teaching at the University of Tasmania. I owe a special debt to them.
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Above all, I am deeply indebted to my mother and sisters. During the last three years in search of academic excellence, I survived because of them. They always care about my happiness. This thesis is dedicated to them.

F.K.K.
This study explores the inculcation of the civic ideal through the education system in Indonesia since its inception, and particularly during the New Order period. It seeks to show which factors, apart from the interests of successive regimes, have made the construction of the civic ideal possible.

Based on a critical approach to the analysis of texts, it argues that the role of Indonesian citizenship education, exemplified by the student textbooks produced in the last decade of New Order Indonesia, has been to regulate the moral reasoning and behaviour of Indonesian citizens on two dimensions: the relations between the state and Indonesian citizens, and the relations between citizens. Indonesia’s state ideology, National Constitution and the notion of ‘integral state’, coupled with the sociological approach of structural-functionalism, were employed as the guiding principles in narrating the nation. These instruments were used to legitimate the authoritarian rule of the former New Order regime. The strategy of overemphasizing the importance of macro-social ideology neglected micro-social interactions. In an attempt to forge national integration and identity, a conformist perspective was imposed to legitimate the suppression of cultural differences and individual rights.

This study argues that the structure and culture of post-colonial Indonesia made it possible for the regime to establish its ideological hegemony, and to reproduce the people’s culture through the textbooks. The regime was able to treat these post-colonial conditions as ‘resource’ that enabled it to legitimate its hegemony, and at the same time, reproduce ‘norms’ which the people were required to practice. Instead of empowering the
people, these norms constrained them to act as ‘good democratic citizens’ in their mutual interaction in the context of ‘modern society’. The situation was exacerbated by the incompatibility of many cultural values (particularly the Javanese world-view and ethics, and aspects of Islamic morality), and both the physical and economic structural conditions of post-colonial Indonesia. Moreover, contrary to the textbook writers’ assumptions that Indonesia’s national identity is fixed and stable, it is still undergoing a process of ‘becoming’. As a site of writing the nation, Indonesian citizenship education attempted to fix Indonesian students’ identity by enforcing obligations for collective welfare, and imposing a set of local (particularly Javanese) values, traditions and myths of historical continuity. This conceptual framework is now being fundamentally challenged by globalisation and democratic localism.

The demise of the authoritarian regime in mid-1998 stimulated the introduction of a new national curriculum for citizenship education, intended to encourage active and participatory learning and promote democratic values. The adoption of elements of democracy means that individuals should enjoy greater ‘freedom’. In the process of promoting democracy and human rights within the liberal tradition, the biggest question is the extent to which independent individuals are justified in choosing their own values.

In this context, the imposition of republicanism with an emphasis on duties in the name of social cohesion or national interests - something which Indonesian citizenship still needs to do - will be greatly challenged by the demand for greater individual rights and democratic localism. This constitutes the greatest dilemma in the reinvention of Indonesian citizenship. This study suggests that in the implementation of the new
citizenship education, post-colonial conditions should be taken into account, and citizenship should be viewed from the perspective of social exchange networks rather than a dyadic relation between state and citizen. If national and social identity based on the cultural and structural conditions of post-colonial Indonesia is not properly interpreted and discussed, and students are not encouraged to analyse the relationship between the ‘text’ and relevant social, political and economic contexts, it is likely that the mistakes of the past will be repeated.
CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION

Scope and Aims of the Thesis

Since Indonesia achieved independence in 1945, citizenship education within the modernist education project has been assigned a vital role in the process of nation building.¹ As one of the school subjects taught nationally it is designed to perform developmental functions which include social integration, character building and cultivation of national identity within a pluralist society.² However, the efficacy of past Indonesian citizenship education, particularly the last decade’s ‘Pancasila and Citizenship Education’ (Pendidikan Pancasila dan Kewarganegaraan, henceforth referred to as PPKn) has recently been questioned. There is concern that under the New Order regime (1966-1998), ‘appropriate’ dimensions of democratic citizenship were either insufficiently incorporated into citizenship education, or absent from it. A leading Indonesian scholar in this area (Purwadi 2001:3) has observed that:

    During the Suharto era, from 1966 to the end of the 20th century, citizenship education... was clearly used by the ruling power as a tool for political indoctrination. Human rights and democracy were two words that were close to taboo.

Moreover, Udin S. Winataputra (in Suryadi & Somardi 2000:2), argued that ‘Indonesian civic education has been... treated as a sort of government mandated socio-political
learning, rather than as educational medium for developing intelligent citizens within a democracy education framework.’

The demise of the authoritarian New Order regime in mid-1998 provided the impetus for a wide-ranging program of legal, social, economic and political reform. This included major reform of the national curriculum of primary and secondary education. In the wake of political change, there was a growing awareness of the need to develop the active and participatory democratic skills of the Indonesian people as an essential ingredient of post-authoritarian societal reform. Accordingly, the PPKn curriculum was heavily reviewed and rewritten. It was accepted that the quality of human resources in the Indonesia of tomorrow would be enhanced by educating today’s students in the democratic norms, values and roles of citizens in a well-functioning society. Education was seen as playing an important part in building a solid foundation for the evolution of a civil society, because it promotes citizen rights by preparing young people to actively participate in the public sphere.

Some Indonesians central to the process of official reform were tasked with designing a new model of citizenship education. The Curriculum Centre of the Indonesian Ministry of Education first published the new national citizenship curriculum in 2001, and in the same year it was trialed as pilot project within the newly reformed national Competency Based Curriculum (Kurikulum Berbasis Kompetensi, KBK). The material was re-drafted and re-introduced in 2002, before it was formally launched as Curriculum 2004: Citizenship Education (Kurikulum 2004: Mata Pelajaran Kewarganegaraan, henceforth referred to as PKn).
This thesis explores the constitution of the civic ideal during the final years of the New Order period through the medium of school-based education. It focuses on secondary school government *PPKn* textbooks (*Buku Paket*), which were introduced with the 1994 national curriculum (*Kurikulum 1994*), and replaced by the new *PKn* curriculum when it was fully implemented in early 2004. This thesis will analyse the nature of *PPKn* discourse via its textbooks rather than examining classroom and school practices, thus focusing on the curriculum’s written discourse rather than matters of practical pedagogy. This study necessarily engages with the broader political and philosophical dimensions of citizenship education, as a contribution to political and cultural debates about the future of Indonesia. It draws on a wide range of theoretical material in these areas. It also looks briefly at the new *PKn* citizenship education, with particular reference to current conditions in Indonesia and sociological perspectives and theory. The assessment of *PPKn* will be used at the end of this study for comparative purposes in relation to the new curriculum. This comparison will identify challenges to the new system, and examine if they are being adequately addressed. If not, the questions will be posed about how this might be done. The three key-objectives of this study are:

1. To examine the conditions under which the civic ideal has been constituted in the secondary school textbooks of *PPKn* which aim to regulate the social conduct of Indonesian students.
(2) To explore how the secondary school textbooks of *PPKn* have manipulated existing social issues and practices to order to regulate categories of thought and the meanings of civic knowledge, and to naturalise social order and control.

(3) To discuss the extent to which dominant cultural and structural issues and practices in Indonesia might affect the adoption of concepts of Western democratic citizenship into the new citizenship education.

**The Setting: Post-colonial Political Conditions and Structures**

The issues surrounding Indonesian citizenship and citizenship education involve not only the New Order regime’s education policy, but also the structural and cultural factors that together have influenced the new state’s citizenship education. As a new nation-state, post-colonial Indonesia inherited an environment that made the notion of democratic citizenship problematic. The regime’s political interest is only one of the variables that shape the Indonesian civic ideal. The other two salient features are social and cultural variables. The structural aspects include the social structures which help shape the economic and political character of the country. In turn, these economic and political factors influence the social and psychological aspects. Cultural variables include local cultural values, particularly the Javanese world-view and ethics, and Islamic perspectives of the self and social relations. Together with structural considerations, these have been employed by the regime to influence the idea of Indonesian democratic citizenship. These three variables form the determinants of the Indonesian civic ideal, and together influence the extent to which democratic citizenship is practised in the country. Their intersection is manifested by educational policy. In sum, democratic citizenship education is a result of
the interplay of these three variables, the authority of the state and its institutions, the structures of society, and the cultures of the post-colonial Indonesia.

Indonesia’s physical, economic and social character is very different from that of the older nation-states of Western European societies, in which the modern democratic citizenship evolved. With more than 17,000 islands scattered along a 3,500 mile arc stretching from the northern tip of Sumatra to Merauke in western Papua, the geographic extent of the Indonesian archipelago is wider than Western Europe and comparable to that of countries such as the U.S.A and Australia. Indonesia’s current population exceeds 200 million, making it the fourth most populous country in the world. With some 500 ethnic groups and 700 languages, it is also one of the most culturally diverse countries on this planet. Significant economic and structural problems have lingered since Indonesia achieved independence. For years Indonesia has been dependent on foreign loans and investment. Unemployment is currently estimated as high as 40 million. More than half of the population’s income is still below the international living standard. The unequal distribution of economic benefits vertically and horizontally across the diverse population, and a lack of access to many forms of physical infrastructure, including education and health facilities, communication technology and transportation, have seriously influenced nation building and integration. These structural conditions have been aggravated by social and cultural problems, including potentially explosive and easily politicised ethnic and religious tensions.
Historically, the county’s economy was substantially neglected in the Old Order period, due to urgency of post-independence struggles. Indonesia was preoccupied with fighting against the Dutch, who returned to the archipelago between 1945 and 1949 to reestablish its colonial power. The nation’s energy was also absorbed by mounting conflicts between factions in the new nation-state, particularly between communist and non-communist forces in the later years of Old Order rule. The new nation-state of Indonesia was affected by the two competing world ideologies of the Cold War period: capitalism/liberalism and socialism/communism. As a poor ex-colony eager for freedom, it was vulnerable to inclusion in the American global hegemony. It adopted a short-lived federal system of governance, imposed by the Dutch, and then a liberal system of governance. As a result, the United States began to influence this ‘powerless’ country, in part by using financial aid and grants. However, unstable political conditions and a stagnating economy pushed Sukarno towards socialism. The economic situation kept deteriorating. The United States became increasingly concerned about Indonesia’s moves towards communism, and intervened in the country politically, economically and culturally (Anderson 1998).\textsuperscript{11} In the latter years of the Old Order, Sukarno became increasingly authoritarian and isolated, until he lost control over the situation. In 1966, after an abortive coup, he was forced to transfer power to Suharto.\textsuperscript{12}

Suharto implemented a developmental model to fight the mounting economic problems left by the Old Order regime. He cultivated a closer relationship with Western powers and launched an anticommunist movement. He was successful in bringing sustained economic growth to the country in the first two decades of his rule. The political stability
of much of the New Order period was due to his authoritarian rule. In the name of national development and anticommunism, Suharto’s regime was authoritarian, repressive and increasingly marked by patronage and nepotism. Any alternative voices thought to endanger his position were suppressed. Although bringing economic growth, his developmentalist administration neglected ethical principles in the generation of wealth. Institutional and individual corruption was endemic, and disparities in income distribution became wider. His developmentalist regime can be seen to have violated the rights of the people of Indonesia. A distinctive feature of this strongly authoritarian regime was that for 32 years it forcefully imposed national integration on Indonesia from the top down, rather than nurturing it from the bottom up. Pluralist Indonesia’s veneer of forced social integration began to splinter with the fall of Sukarno and the New Order.

The social, political and economic conditions of both Old Order and New Order Indonesia greatly influenced the character of its citizenship education for over fifty years. To handle the challenges of state formation and national integration, successive regimes used citizenship education as a tool to unite and control the population. However, flaws in these efforts are evidenced by recent criticism of the failure of the education system, particularly PPKn, to contribute to the growth of democracy and civil society in Indonesia. Scholars such as Azis-Wahab (2002, 2001, 2000,1999) Suryadi and Somardi (2000), Winataputra (1999), Djiwandono (1998, 1995), Leigh (1991), Mulder (2000, 1999a, 1999b,1996), and Parker (2002,1992) have seen the political and economic interests of past regimes as driving the way school textbooks articulated the civic ideal. While the role of the regime in contributing to the weaknesses of the PPKn is obvious, it
is my contention that the political indoctrination and ideological hegemony of the regime should be contextualised in the environment of post-colonial Indonesia. They did not occur in vacuum. It is not enough to say that the weaknesses of PPKn (particularly its written discourse) have been caused by indoctrination. The more important question is how and under what conditions this indoctrination was made possible. By exploring these conditions we can better identify how the issues inherent in them were constructed from Western-derived social and political concepts, blended with local cultural and historical values, to shape the written discourse of the school textbooks. This may help avoid a repetition of the same mistakes when the new discourse of citizenship education is offered to students. As suggested above, this exploration needs to include the way citizenship is conceptualised, and how it fits into the educational process. This is necessary to permit adequate discussion of the civic ideal of PPKn, and how PKn can better reflect the challenges and opportunities of post-colonial Indonesia. This will be discussed in Chapter 2.

Through this study, I therefore explore the nature of citizenship and citizenship education in relation to the complexities of this post-colonial state. I will consider the state’s ideological hegemony, and the cultural and structural conditions which contextualised democratic citizenship and made the imposition of political indoctrination possible.

**Secondary School Textbooks**

The civic education textbooks for secondary school levels used in this study were written by two groups of ‘experienced’ Indonesian teachers in the field, commissioned by the
New Order regime in early 1990s and launched as textbooks to be nationally used within the *Kurikulum 1994*. One group wrote the junior-secondary level books (Classes 7 – 9), and a second group wrote those for senior-secondary (Classes 10 - 12). A group of Indonesian educationalists evaluated each of the textbooks. Some of these served as evaluators at several levels, while others were part of a higher body that supervised the overall production of the textbooks, including the head of the national training body of *Pancasila* or *BP-7* (*Badan Pembinaan Pendidikan Pelaksanaan Pedoman Pengahayatan dan Pengalaman Pancasila*) and the head of Book Centre of the Ministry of Education and Culture (now Ministry of Education). The supervising body or team comprised the head of *BP-7* and several directors in the Ministry of Education and Culture. The textbooks produced by the Government were distributed free to schools throughout Indonesia. A handful of alternative or supplementary books written by private individuals were also available, used by some private schools whose students could afford to purchase them.

This study uses the secondary school textbooks on citizenship education (*PPKn*) supplied by the Government for two main reasons. First, they represent the ‘authoritative sources’ of civic knowledge, or ‘official knowledge’. Secondly, they were national textbooks, used throughout the country. Textbooks for secondary level are used rather than primary level texts because they present richer information on how the New Order regime has constituted the civic ideal for Indonesian citizens.
Theoretical Approach

This thesis draws a wide range of perspectives from social scientists. Through an eclectic and critical analysis of discourse, I examine the way theoretical concepts and local cultural symbols have been employed to explain social reality, and how the social world has been reified by means of concepts and symbols.

Firstly, this study uses the principles of Critical Discourse Analysis or CDA in examining the language presented in the student-textbooks. Using CDA means that this study is intended to be not only interpretive, but also critical. It is critical because it keeps asking questions about the way the written discourse of PPKn has been employed in the production and reproduction of social dominance (Fairclough 1995, Van Dijk 1998). It serves to cover two dimensions of analysis: the micro-level of analysis of ‘language in use’ and the macro-level of analysis of power, dominance and inequality. CDA is employed to examine particularly the extent to which the civic ideal is ‘enacted, reproduced and restricted’ (Van Dijk 1998) in the PPKn textbooks. CDA serves as a broad orientation to the subject matter, supported by social theories in exploring particular issues of social and cultural conditions.

Secondly, I employ a ‘key-word approach’ (see, for example, Williams 1983; cf. Van Langenberg 1990, 1986) to examine how individuals are expected to have an understanding of their social roles. Since the rights and duties of citizenship and the principle of unity in diversity in Indonesian national identity have been the central focus of the development of civic knowledge in the textbooks, my examination will use key
political and sociological concepts, including identity, collectivity, participation, tolerance and justice.

Thirdly, because the role of the state in shaping the civic ideal has been conditioned by culture and social structure, as embodied in the policies of successive regimes, historical perspectives are required in order to gain a better understanding of these processes. To this end, a post-colonial approach is adopted, coupled (where appropriate) with post-structural, postmodern and feminist perspectives, and theories of structuration and reflexivity.16

Fourthly, this thesis has benefited from Niels Mulder’s (2000, 1999a, 1999b, 1996) analysis of the written discourse of Indonesia’s citizenship education, particularly PPKn. Magnis-Suseno’s analysis of Indonesian cultural values and social life, particularly Javanese ethics and worldview has greatly influenced my assessment on issues such as order, integration, participation, justice and rights (Magnis-Suseno 1997).

In approaching Indonesian citizenship education, Lynette Parker’s concept of ‘subjectification’ (of citizenship) has enabled me to extend my views beyond the monolithic concept of indoctrination. Her concept is close to Anthony Giddens’ concept of ‘double structure’ in which structures are both produced by social actors and are the medium of their social action (Giddens 1984,1979). Employing Giddens’ structuration, I have been able to extend the analysis of this thesis beyond modernist, structural-functionalist and Orientalist approaches to citizenship issues in post-colonial Indonesia.
This has allowed me to examine knowledgeable social actors in the constitution of the civic ideal through time and space, as well as the contingency of their actions. Giddens’s contribution to the analysis of modernity and self-identity (Giddens 1991) has also been influential in my assessment of the de-centring of modern subjects in the production and reproduction of Indonesian citizenship and its educational curriculum for the last five decades.

Finally, as the discussion of this thesis develops, I reach a point where I require a model capable of analysing contemporary power-relations in Indonesian citizenship. Apart from the perspectives of the foregoing scholars, I have benefited from perspectives drawn from social exchange theory. I have found that these are able to ‘fill the gap’ in discussing citizenship in post-colonial and post-authoritarian Indonesia, supplementing classical theories of social contract, republicanism or communitarianism and structural-functionalism. The work of social exchange theorists such as George C. Homan, Peter M. Blau, James S. Coleman, Richard M. Emerson, Karen S. Cook and Linda K. Molm, have been useful to me in analysing issues of power relations in state-citizen and citizen-citizen in Indonesia (see particularly Chapter 9).  

**Research Method and Analysis**

The core subject matter of this thesis consists of a critical analysis of passages from secondary school textbooks of *PPKn*, supported by an analysis of primary data collected from interviews with a number of:
• scholars involved in the design and development of *PPKn*,
• scholars in education policy, particularly those involved in the design and development of the new Indonesian citizenship education,
• scholars and educators in the humanities and social sciences,
• national opinion leaders or intellectuals (across ethnic, linguistic and religious groups), including those who have special interest and/or expertise in the principles of Indonesia’s ideology (*Pancasila*), citizenship studies, ethical and moral education, and
• users of the *PPKn* textbooks (teachers and students)

The material drawn from the interviews serves to verify the analysis of the secondary data (the texts), and to confirm and amplify certain parts of my arguments concerning Indonesian citizenship and citizenship education. Two chapters (Chapter 7 and Chapter 8) are devoted to reviewing various issues arising from the interviews. To conform with the regulations of the Human Research Ethics Committee of the University of Tasmania, the names of the informants will not be revealed.

**Units of Analysis**

In analysing the texts of *PPKn*, I will use the linguistically meaningful syntactical units (i.e. single words, strings of words, sentences or sets of sentences) which form a discourse (see Krippendorff 1980). However, this study assumes that ‘meaning of an expression cannot be fully understood without understanding the context in which the expression is used’ (Givon 1989: 2). To identify and analyse the extra-linguistic
messages contained in the texts, a set of concepts commonly discussed in social sciences and the humanities is employed to capture different political, economic and cultural dimensions. For example, the discussion of rights and duties in Chapters 5 and 6 will use ‘political’, ‘economic’, ‘social’ and ‘security’ rights and duties as guiding concepts. In exploring the issues of unity in diversity, the guiding concepts will be ‘collectivity’, ‘integration and conflict’, ‘tolerance’ and ‘justice.’ I do not pretend that these terms will be able to exhaustively capture the complexity of the civic issues. However, the discussion will give a general idea of the core issues surrounding the constitution of the civic ideal in Indonesian citizenship education textbooks.

Research Questions and Justification

As we pursue the objectives of this study, informed by the foregoing observations on the past problems of and challenges to Indonesian citizenship education, several major research questions arise concerning democratic citizenship and citizenship education. These are:

- What social, cultural and political forces shape the conception of the civic ideal in the school textbooks?
- What are the major political ideologies, supported by sociological concepts, employed in the interpretation of social reality in the texts, and what are the implications for citizenship education?
- What are the underlying causes of and patterns in the textbooks’ discourse of the civic ideal which may be considered as ‘undemocratic’?
What problems may the incompatibility of Western democratic ideas with the structural and cultural conditions of post-colonial Indonesia present in adopting democratic ideas into Indonesian citizenship education?

What are the major challenges to Indonesian citizenship education, particularly in the production and dissemination of civic knowledge, in promoting civil society in the political context of regional autonomy, and in the face of increasing globalisation?

**Thesis Argument**

This study argues that three inter-related major factors, namely social structure, culture and the authority of the state shape the conditions for democratic citizenship and democracy as a system of governance in post-colonial Indonesia. It is my contention that power relations are unbalanced because culture and social structures are relatively stable, while the interpretation of social meaning is monopolised by the state. This suggests that efforts to modify the curriculum of Indonesian citizenship education will have little social impact. My purpose therefore is to analyse the issue of power relations between the state and citizen in the discourse of Indonesian citizenship education, to see what grand ideologies and macro perspectives underpin the capacity of the successive regimes, particularly the New Order regime, to produce and reproduce norms in order to maintain or change the order of society.

This study differs from the approaches of both functionalists, who view social structures as determining what individuals do, and ethnomethodologists and/or phenomenologists
who consider that individuals create their own meaning of the world around them. This study adopts Giddens’ structuration theory, which considers the ‘duality of structure’. Structure is both the medium and the outcome of actions. Structure refers to ‘rules and resources, recursively implicated in the reproduction of social systems. It exists only as memory traces, the organic basis of human knowledgeability, and instantiated in action’ (Giddens 1984: 377). It encompasses codes and symbols as well as physical institutions or actual artifacts, such as buildings and the organisation of space, which have effects upon individual thought and behaviour, broadly taken as culture.

**Significance of the Study**

From a theoretical viewpoint, this thesis contributes to the development of Indonesian citizenship studies and citizenship education by considering complex issues from post-colonial perspectives. It gives meaningful insights into the interplay of state authority, culture and social structure in state formation and nation building, viewing power relations as an exchange rather than merely a contract in the sense of classical social theories in post-colonial Indonesia. From a practical point of view, the present work contributes to a better understanding of the nature of Indonesian citizenship and citizenship education in relation to democracy and human rights, autonomy, diversity and transparency and potential challenges in achieving the new citizenship education goals. First, it provides critical assessment of the democratic elements of Western modernism, which were supposedly adopted by Indonesian citizenship education developers. Since the discourse of democracy in relation to post-colonial conditions has not yet received sufficient attention in studies of citizenship education, the present work helps fill this gap.
Secondly, it enables curriculum developers, teachers and educators to identify certain social, cultural and political dimensions and/or concepts which should be carefully and meaningfully discussed with students, to empower them to establish connections between the text and talk and the contexts of their social life. Thirdly, it offers information which could assist textbook writers and teachers to implement a more coherent and meaningful text and talk, avoiding confused and confusing assumptions about social, cultural and political concepts.

Organisation of the Thesis

This thesis is organised into eleven chapters, including this introductory chapter. The second chapter briefly discusses various classical and contemporary theorists of citizenship. It discusses the implications of political, social and cultural perspectives on the model of citizenship education currently adopted, developed and implemented in Indonesia and elsewhere. It also looks for possible common elements of citizenship education in international perspectives. Chapter 3 recounts how the ideological basis of the post-colonial independent Indonesian state was formulated, how citizenship education programs were set up, and what concepts of the citizen were promulgated. Chapter 4 presents the views of two sets of scholars, namely the political analysts of the Indonesian post-colonial state and the New Order period, and the educationalists and social scientists who have looked at educational policy and practice. Chapters 5 and 6 explore the civic knowledge presented in the past citizenship education textbooks by extracting parts of the lessons in the books, to show how the civic ideal has been constructed and narrated to establish ideological hegemony, and to point out the contradictory issues resulting from the construction of such knowledge. Chapter 5 focuses on the discourse of rights and
Chapter 6 examines the discourse of unity in diversity, covering issues such as the primacy of collectivity, integration, conflict, tolerance and justice.

Chapters 7 and 8 provide the views of various people whom I interviewed on the nature of Indonesian citizenship and citizenship education. Chapter 7 includes officials who were involved in the planning, production and dissemination of PPKn textbooks, teachers and students who used to use the textbooks, and formulators of Indonesia’s new curriculum of citizenship education. Chapter 8 presents the views of intellectuals and national opinion-leaders, analysing and critiquing the constitution of Indonesian citizenship and citizenship education. These two chapters serve to confirm and amplify the issues raised in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6.

Chapter 9 provides a general assessment of the power relations resulting from the adoption of the grand ideologies, and reviews the micro-social functioning of the written discourse of PPKn. Chapter 10 briefly looks at the major components of Indonesia’s new curriculum of citizenship education and assesses various potential challenges to the new curriculum, such as the issues of values and norms, human rights, regional autonomy and the impact of the latest phase of globalisation. Chapter 11 presents a summary of the construction of PPKn written discourse, pointing out its general assumptions and characteristics. It also briefly sums up various challenges to the new curriculum of Indonesia’s citizenship education and social theories of citizenship.
Notes

1 In recent years some scholars have made a distinction between ‘citizenship education’ and ‘civic education’. For example, Kennedy (1997) considers ‘citizenship education’ as multiple ways in which citizens are encouraged to pursue their roles in a democratic society, and ‘civic education’ as largely formal programs of instruction. On the other hand, Torey-Purta (1985) and Davies (2000) regard the two as interchangeable terms. For example see Purwadi (2001). Regardless of the controversy, this thesis adopts the term ‘citizenship education’. In Indonesia, citizenship education has been historically given a variety of labels, as discussed in Chapter 3.

2 ‘Citizenship’ is normally translated as ‘kewarganegaraan’ and ‘citizenship education’ as ‘pendidikan kewarganegaraan’ (in which pendidikan means ‘education’) in Indonesian. Linguistically, kewarganegaraan is constructed from two ‘base forms’ and a circumfix, namely ‘warga’ which means ‘member of a community or state’ and ‘negara’ which means ‘community’ or ‘state’, and ‘ke- -an.’ In Indonesian legal context, ‘warganegara’ (citizen) and ‘kewarganegaraan’ (citizenship or nationality) refer to as the relationship between citizen (warga) and state (negara). Some writers use kewargaan, constructed from the base form ‘warga’ plus circumfix ‘ke- -an’ as an Indonesian word for ‘civic’ in the context of civic education. Thus, ‘pendidikan kewargaan’ refers to as ‘civic education’. It seems that they intend to give emphasis to the importance of the role of civil society, rather than on the role of the state in the promotion of democracy and human rights. See, for example, Pendidikan Kewargaan (Civic Education): Demokrasi, HAM & Masyarakat Madani, a textbook on ‘civic education’ for tertiary students published by Institut Agama Islam Negeri (Now: Universitas Islam Negeri), Syarif Hidayatullah, 2000. The concept of Kewarganegaraan in Indonesia does not refer to the original concept of citizenship, conceived in Western civilisation, such as polis and city. See Chapter 2 for the original concepts or traditions of citizenship. Also, see Chapter 3 on the adoption and contextualisation of the concept of citizenship by Indonesia’s founding fathers in the formulation of the state system and citizenship.

3 See, for example, Azis-Wahab (2002, 2001, 2000; 1999); Djahiri (1999); Somantri (2001); Suryadi and Somardi (2000). Winataputra (2001; 1999). Also, see Bendix (1964) on the experience of the older (European) nation-states

4 In the introduction to the draft of the new curriculum on Indonesian citizenship education, the head of the research and development agency of the Department of National Education, the Republic of Indonesia says that a curriculum that encompasses the nation’s cultural values is necessary and important. However, the approach will no longer rely on dogma and indoctrination (Kurikulum 2001: Pendidikan Kewarganegaraan (Citizenship), Departemen Pendidikan Nasional 2001a, 2001b, 2002c). These words indirectly imply that the past citizenship education was dogmatic and doctrinaire. Also, in the introductory section of the new edition of the curriculum, Kurikulum 2004, Mata Pelajaran Kewarganegaraan, it is stated that Indonesia will no longer subscribe to the authoritarianism which violated civic rights as in the past. (Departemen Pendidikan Nasional, 2003a, 2003b, 2003c). Also, see Azis-Wahab (2002, 2001, 2000, 1999)

5 The new curriculum of citizenship education has been written for Islamic as well as non-Islamic schools, covering kindergarten level (Taman Kanak-Kanak and Raudhatul Athfal), primary level (Sekolah Dasar and Madrasah Ibtidaiyah), junior secondary level (Sekolah Menengah Pertama and Madrasah Tsanawiyah) and senior secondary level (Sekolah Menengah Atas and Madrasah Aliyah). For primary level, the curriculum for citizenship education is integrated with social studies (pengetahuan sosial).

6 ‘Civic ideal’ in this study refers to the knowledge, values, and skills that an individual is expected to have in order to become a ‘good citizen’ of society or community and a world citizen. A recent movement in civic education tends to use ‘knowledge’, ‘skills’ and ‘values’ in citizenship education as separate
conceptual tools, such as ‘civic knowledge’, ‘civic virtues’ and ‘civic skills’ (Quigley, Buchanan Jr. and Bahmueller 1991). Since citizenship education deals with an individuals in relation to their social life, it will inevitably involve issues of values, belief, understanding and skills. For practical purposes, ‘knowledge’, ‘civic knowledge’ and ‘social knowledge’ will be used in a wider sense to cover the three aspects in this study. In simple terms, knowledge refers to what an individual knows such as information, facts, skills and understanding gained from learning and experience. Quigley (2000) suggests that civic knowledge is the fundamental ideas and information that an individual must know and use in order to become an effective and responsible citizen. Civic knowledge in this sense is close to the ‘practical knowledge’ suggested by Jürgen Habermas, which has to do with human social interaction or communicative action. It is governed by community consensus, and depends on the interpretation and expectation among individuals (Habermas 1987, 1984, 1971).

7 See Jackson (1978)

8 The exact number of the total ethnic groups is not clear. At a rough estimate, there are more than 300 ‘major’ sociolinguistic groups. Grimes (2000) suggests that 726 languages are spoken in the archipelago, including 265 in Irian Jaya.

9 See Statistik Indonesia 2002.

10 ‘Post-colonial’ instead of ‘postcolonial’ is used throughout this thesis, taking account of the recent debate over the implications of the presence or absence of a hyphen in ‘post(-)colonial’, post(-)coloniality’ and ‘post(-)colonialism’. See, for example, McClintock (1992); Ashcroft, Griffith and Tiffin (1989). It is not easy to define ‘post-colonialism’. Post-colonialism is often associated with a critique of colonial domination and legacy, or as a counter culture to modern-colonial politics. It ‘derives from the anti-humanism of poststructuralism and the “new humanities”, and a view of Western power as a symptom of Western epistemology and pedagogy’ (Gandhi 1998: 54). In his discussion of the effort to interpret Indonesian identity, Mudji Sutrisno (2004: 133-134) argues that the country should be seen as ‘a continuation of the Dutch East Indies’ (proses lanjutan Hindia Belandanisasi).

11 See Kalidjernih (2001)

12 See Kalidjernih (2001)

13 Pratte (1992) argues that any education involves some kind of indoctrination.

14 From a theoretical point of view, to show how the past regime established its ideological hegemony, an assessment can be carried out of the Indonesian government school textbooks which have served as the ‘site of the narration of nation’ (Bhabha 1990). The PPKn textbooks are one of authentic sources for an empirical study because education is part of the ideological state apparatus (Althusser 1971).

15 CDA is not a specific direction of research with a unitary framework (Van Dijk 1998). Its theoretical background and basic assumptions have been derived from the work of ‘Louis Althusser’s theory of ideology, Michael Bakhtin’s genre theory, and the philosophical traditions of Antonio Gramsci and the Frankfurt School. Michel Foucault has also been a major influence on some exponents, including Norman Fairclough.’ (Titscher et al 2000: 144). As Titscher et al (2000) noted, CDA is ‘critical’ because it bases its assumptions on the ideas of the Frankfurt School (particularly the works of Jürgen Habermas) and the shared tradition of critical linguistics. The authors also consider that CDA has two major approaches. The first centers in the work of Norman Fairclough which is related to systemic functional linguistics (Fairclough 1995, Halliday 1978) and the second was developed by Ruth Wodak (Wodak et al 1990) and Teun van Dijk (Van Dijk 1984, Van Dijk and Kintsch 1983), influenced by cognitive models of text planning. In this study, I do not intend to strictly differentiate the two. Rather, I will employ the ideas of each approach when they are suitable for my analysis. For a good mapping of the diversity of discourse
research and core meta-theoretical issues, see Wetherell (2001). Also, see the classification made by Phillips and Jørgensen (2002) of various theories and methods of discourse analysis.

16 In fact, as argued by Delanty (2000b), the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century Europe was not a change in human history but a continuation of the classic thought associated with skepticism, discursivity and reflexivity. Therefore, we cannot be postmodern yet. I will not enter the modern and postmodern debate in this section, but will point out how the postmodern thesis might be relevant in the democratic learning discourse in the later part of this study.


18 In this way, it is hoped that we may be able to deconstruct the PPKn discourse (i.e. by a ‘double reading’ strategy in deconstructionist sense).

19 Agency refers to the capacity to act and it implies individual power. Actor refers to a person who is rule-governed. ‘An agent refers to a person engaged in the exercise of power in the sense of the ability to bring about effects and to (re)constitute the world’ (Karp 1986, quoted in Ahearn 2001: 113).
CHAPTER 2
TRADITIONS OF CITIZENSHIP AND
CONCEPTS OF CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION

Introduction
This chapter summarises the historical development and current conceptions of citizenship and citizenship education internationally. It provides context to the ideological and practical choices that faced Indonesia's founding fathers, and continue to face Indonesia as its democracy develops. It looks at the way non-Western understandings of citizenship differ from those of the West. This will allow a better appreciation of democratic citizenship, particularly in relation to globalisation and postmodernity, as discussed in subsequent chapters. With an understanding of the Western political ideologies and the contemporary social theories that underlie notions of citizenship, we can better understand the issues of citizenship in post-colonial and post-authoritarian Indonesia; issues including unity, diversity, identity, opportunity, freedom, responsibility, anarchy and equality.

The first part of this chapter gives a summary of the historical development of concepts of citizenship, and a reviews contemporary theories of citizenship in Western advanced-democratic states. In the second part, I will look at how ideal structures of citizenship are
adopted and adapted in some developed and developing countries, through their models of education for citizenship. I will then review the contemporary perspectives of the essential elements of democratic citizenship education proposed by some scholars.

The Evolution of Democratic Citizenship

The idea of citizenship and formal citizenship education\(^1\) has its roots in the restricted democracy of the ancient Greeks, and in the republican governments of ancient Rome.\(^2\) Held (1993) identifies the features that Athenian democracy shared with republican Rome, principally that they were both face-to-face societies and oral cultures, they both had elements of popular participation in governmental affairs, and there was little centralised bureaucratic control. The major difference was that Greek citizenship was essentially a political concept with both moral and legal aspects, while Roman citizenship was a purely legal matter.\(^3\) Early Greek and Roman traditions inspired the concepts of common welfare and civic virtues that re-emerged in Europe in resistance to the autocratic power of monarchs, and with the growing power of the urban middle classes.\(^4\) These concepts fed and were fed by the Protestant Reformation of seventeenth century Europe, but it was the eighteenth-century Age of Enlightenment that gave effective shape to contemporary constitutional democracy, liberalism, republicanism, humanism and modernity.\(^5\)

Early Modern Democratic Citizenship

Gould and Kolb (1964:88) defined citizenship as a ‘relationship existing between a natural person and political society, known as a state, by which the former owes
allegiances and the latter protection.’ This definition derives from the notion of the ‘social contract’ and the thinking of Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, that sees human beings as fundamentally self rewarding and self interested, and human associations as necessary evils. Individual and group interests necessarily clash, but can, with effort, be civilly accommodated (Pratte 1988:27). Thomas Hobbes saw unified sovereignty as standing above civil society, and its self-interested subjects accepting the bonds of state for the peace and protection they brought (Ray 1999). John Locke’s Second Treatise on Civil Government (1681-3/1980) proposed a different version of the social contract, in which civil society was not subject to the sovereign state, but constrained it.

Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) looked to a more ‘natural’ form of the social contract that would nurture better people and liberate them from the undue bonds of government. His The Social Contract opens with the famous statement: ‘Man is born free, and yet we see him everywhere in chains’ (Rousseau 1762/1947:5). While Rousseau placed his trust in human nature, James Madison’s Federalist (1788) was critical of it. He considered that pure democracies in which a small numbers of citizens assemble and administer the government in person, ‘have always been intolerant, unjust and unstable.’ (Held 1996:89). Subsequently two advocates of English liberalism, John Stuart Mill and Jeremy Bentham proposed that natural right and the social contract ‘failed to explain the real basis of citizens’ interests, commitment and duty to the state’ Held (1996:94). In essence, ‘the values of liberalism focused on a privatised self and encouraged citizens to scramble to obtain the good and services of society first, before another individual or group seizes them.’ (Pratte 1988:51).
Citizenship in Democratic Socialism

The emergence of the socialist theory, with its emphasis on social justice, collective action, common property and social duty was primarily a reaction against the human suffering caused by the European industrial revolution and unfettered capitalism. The form it took varied with the political, economic and cultural conditions of different countries (Leach 1988). In industrialised Britain and Germany socialism had nationalist overtones, and grew from labour movements that looked to change through social consensus rather than revolution. Something like Rousseau’s ‘just society’, was believed to be attainable because people could be rational and benevolent (Leach 1988), and because socialist cooperation could achieve more than selfish capitalism or liberal individualism.

Liberal individualism stresses the abstract choice of the individual, where the state is only an agency for maximising satisfaction. The organic theory of society opposed this, denying that morality could be left to individual choice. According to Hegelian organic theory, as the product of natural historical evolution, the state has exclusive and unlimited coercive power to regulate individuals and enforce law. Without it, civil society would be chaotic.

In the second half of nineteenth century Marxism emerged as a powerful force for changing society and its class system. Its economic determinism and obsession with class structure and conflict meant that individual citizens, with rights and obligations, were less
significant than the class to which they belonged. Although Marxism was the dominant ideology of the East European countries, its influences were minimal in Western Europe where different strategies were adopted to tame the injustices of capitalism, principally union movements and the growth of the welfare state. These strategies encouraged (or at worst tolerated) citizen participation, whereas Marxist thinkers have always been suspicious of democratic citizenship. They preferred an organic conception of democracy, which tends to underestimate the rights of liberty, pluralism, and the rule of law. Citizenship rights were perceived instrumentally, as a gradual goal in themselves (Zolo 1993:258). With the collapse of communism in the last decade of the last century, many countries are moving towards new forms of democracy, requiring revised concepts of citizenship. Francis Fukuyama has tagged this collapse ‘the end of history’, signaling the triumph of Western political and economic liberalism (Fukuyama 1992).

**Contemporary Views of Citizenship**

This brief summary is necessary to define the terms used in this thesis, and as a background to discussion of contemporary issues in Indonesian citizenship, the political strategies of successive regimes to legitimise power relations in Indonesia, and thus the discursive structures of Indonesian citizenship education.

Political science recognises a primary divide between the political right and left, in Australia traditionally represented by the Liberal and Labor parties, but acknowledges the existence of a number of overlapping factions and political perspectives under these broad heads, whose taxonomic definition varies with different commentators. Similarly,
contemporary views of citizenship recognise broad categories, but differ in the way they divide, subdivide and categorise these. This discussion will adopt Voet’s (1998) framework, which encompasses social liberal and neo-liberal conceptions of citizenship, communitarianism and civic republicanism, and additionally describe the perspective that Isin and Turner (2002) identify as the radical-democratic citizenship.

**Liberal Theories**

Liberalism is characterised by its emphasis on the rights of citizens, while republicanism emphasises their duties (Heater 1999). The liberal tradition has been reworked by social-liberal theorists, such as T.H. Marshall (1992) and John Rawls (1971), although Delanty (2000a) sees Marshall and Rawls as liberal communitarians. Generally, social-liberal theorists are concerned with social inequality in societies, drawing particular examples from capitalist countries. Neo-liberal theory centres on the work of Friedrich Hayek (1960,1944) and Robert Nozick (1974), and is concerned to limit the political world as much as possible in order to allow the individual the maximum amount of freedom. Neo-liberals are particularly opposed to the welfare state and in favour of the free market (Voet 1998:10).

**Communitarianism**

morality which could provide a general endorsement of rights’ (Abercrombie, Hill and Turner 2000:64.) Etzioni (1996) considered that communities need to balance the centrifugal and centripetal forces within them. Centrifugal forces such as individualisation, self-expression and sub-group liberty may endanger social cohesion, and in the extreme produce social anarchy. Centripetal forces, such as national or community service, regulation and mobilisation foster social bonds and shared normative conceptions, but may lead to excessive collectivism.

**Contemporary Civic Republicanism**

Civic republicanism, the oldest form of communitarianism, considers participation in decision-making in the public life as the essence of the civic bond, not merely rights and duties. It places social responsibility on civil society rather than the state, believing that cultural traditions and not state institutions reinforce civil society. It is associated with the works of Hannah Arendt (1958), Benjamin Barber (1984) and John G.A. Pocock (1992). Pratte saw the deeply-rooted self-interest and individualism of liberalism as a critical deficiency, and argued ‘civic republicanism is a much-needed step toward bringing about a revitalized civic culture.’ (Pratte 1988:53-54).

**Radical-Democratic Citizenship**

Radical democratic citizenship is expressed through participation in grassroots or direct democracy. It should be located neither in the state nor in depoliticised civil society, but in collective action (Delanty 2000a). This perspective sees citizenship as consisting in more than a legal status based on rights and obligations, but also implying participation and

**Democratic Citizenship Education and its models**

Citizenship education has been described as ‘the contribution of education to the development of those characteristics of being a citizen’ (Cogan 1998:13), and the ‘process of teaching society’s rules, institutions, and organizations, and the role of citizens in the well-functioning of society’ (Villegas-Reimer 1997:235). This last commentator draws an important distinction between this and moral education, or ‘the process followed when individuals and/or social groups pass on to the younger generation their views about and values of what is right and what is wrong.’ (Villegas-Reimer 1997:234).

Citizenship training does not only occur at school. Parental and home influences and experiences outside the classroom also contribute to students’ learning. A wide range of formal, informal and non-formal training encourages and informs participation by citizens in community activities and public affairs (Civic Expert Group 1994). The aggregate of one’s citizenship acquisition depends on various factors (see, for example, Dynneson and Gross 1991, Dynnesson, Gross and Nickel 1989).
The practice of citizenship education varies from country to country, and most countries do not treat it as a separate school subject. Instead, citizenship has been locally contextualised and taught as an element of subjects such as history, geography, and moral and religious values. Almost all countries that have provided some kind of citizenship education have seen its nature change with time. For example, American Judeo-Christian, European influenced citizenship education was modified with the changes associated with colonisation and early settlement experiences (Dynneson and Gross 1991), undergoing ‘periods of highlighting and blurred shadowing, from 1700s to the present.’ (Field 1997:147).

The increasing migration, multiculturalism and cultural diversity of the last decades and the fall communist governments in East Europe have presented new challenges to citizenship educators. Sigel (1991:3) suggests that:

It becoming increasingly clear that hosts and newcomers alike have to learn what it means to live democratically in a multi world and, to accept diversity without fear and rancor.

In Australia, civics was an integral feature of the school curriculum from the turn of the last century until the 1960s (Print 1995). However, it did not receive a high profile as a national educational program until the Australian government commissioned a strategic plan for Australian citizenship education. The report, Whereas the People: Civics and Citizenship Education (Civics Expert Group 1994), reflected the growing multi-cultural status of Australia from the late 1980s. (see, for example, DEET 1989)
Since its inception, Indonesia’s *citizenship education* has been explicitly derived from Western concepts. Other non-Western states, such as Thailand and Malaysia, have developed their own domestic models. In Thailand, prior to the change from absolute to constitutional monarchy in 1932, citizenship was taught as part of social studies. Between 1932 and 1977 it went through a formative period when moral education began to incorporate the democratic outlook, emphasising responsibility for the country, society, family and to oneself (Pitiyanuwat and Ruksollmuang in Derricott 1998). Under the draft National Constitution, civics education is now integrated into social studies at primary levels, and is a compulsory core course at secondary level. As well as an emphasis on the paramount importance of harmonious family and social relationship, a religious definition of good citizenship is highly valued (Cogan 1998).

In Malaysia, citizenship education was formerly taught as part of the history curriculum (Haris 1997). Moral education, incorporating the seventeen values introduced by the 1983 educational reforms, is now offered to non-Muslim students. This subject aims to develop the individual’s ‘integrity and responsibility through inculcation, understanding and the practice of Malaysian values’ (Haris 1997:100). It is compulsory for Muslim students to take Islamic Religious Knowledge, which incorporates the seventeen values of 1983, and which includes moral values as sub-category of Islamic teaching. Citizenship education plays a role in shaping future Malaysian citizens by instilling patriotism and loyalty to the state and teaching Malaysian history and values.
Towards a Common Core of Democratic Citizenship Education?

In recent years some scholars have begun to map out the fundamental components of citizenship education. Cogan (1998) for example, suggested that there are five attributes of multidimensional citizenship which may vary according to the nature of the political system of which they are a part. They are: first, a sense of identity, second, the enjoyment of certain rights, third, the fulfillment of corresponding obligations, fourth, a degree of interest and involvement in public affairs, and fifth, an acceptance of basic social values. In another work on multidimensional citizenship model, Kubow, Grossman and Ninomiya (1998) argued that only a citizenship education that encompasses four interrelated dimensions, namely personal, spatial, social and temporal, will equip students to meet the challenges of the twenty-first century.

The Center for Citizenship Education of the United States of America proposed the three interrelated components of civic virtues, civic knowledge and civic skills as the aims and/or framework for citizenship education.(Quigley, Buchanan Jr., and Bahmueller 1991).

*Civic virtues* consists of the traits of character, disposition, and commitments necessary for the preservation and improvement of democratic governance and citizenship. Examples of civic virtues are individual responsibility, self-discipline, integrity, patriotism, toleration of diversity, patience and consistency, and compassion for others. Commitments include, a dedication to human rights, equality, the common good, and a rule of law.
Civic knowledge covers fundamental ideas and information that learners must know and use to become effective and responsible citizens of a democracy. Civic knowledge normally includes types and systems of government, politics, political institutions and processes and the role of citizens in relation to the governance.

Civic skills include the intellectual skills required to understand, compare, explain and evaluate various principles and practices of government and citizenship. They also include the participatory skills that enable citizens to monitor and influence public policies (Quiqley 2000).

In addition to this, the same institution has recently produced An International Framework for Education in Democracy intended to develop ‘a cross-cultural consensus on the central meanings and character of the ideas, values, and institutions of democracy’ (Branson 2001:22). The focus is on democracy: how it works, the characteristics of society that enhance and inhibit the successful promotion of democracy, and ‘how contemporary social and economic processes are affecting the character of democracy’ (Branson 2001:23).

Moreover, Patrick (1997) proposed nine global trends that have broad potential for influencing citizenship education in the constitutional democracies of the world. They are:
(1) Conceptualising of citizenship education in terms of the three interrelated components of civic knowledge, civic skills and civic virtue.

(2) Systematic teaching of core concepts about democratic governance and citizenship.

(3) Analysis of case studies by students to apply core concepts or principles.

(4) Development of decision-making skills.

(5) Comparative and international analysis of government and citizenship.

(6) Development of participatory skills and civic virtues through cooperative learning activities.

(7) The use of literature to teach civic virtues.

(8) Active learning of civic knowledge, skills and virtues.

(9) The connection of content and process in teaching and learning of civic knowledge, skills and virtues.

**Concluding Remarks**

This chapter has traced the evolution of concepts of citizenship conceived in the West and their adoption in the educational realm of various Western and non-Western countries. This has varied from country to country. While the two major traditions of citizenship, republicanism and liberalism, have been central to the development of the more democratically advanced countries, they seem not to be end-products which can be directly implemented in non-Western countries. Moreover, multiculturalism and globalisation have significant implications for citizenship education. One possible response to these is represented by ‘radical democratic citizenship’.
Many non-Western countries have just begun to think about the models of citizenship education practiced in the modern West. Unlike the West, in which citizenship education is placed in the ‘nation-state framework’, their education for citizenship gives clear emphasis to traditional cultures and religious values.

Two inter-related issues emerge. Firstly, as with the practice of democracy, a nation may learn from another nation’s framework of citizenship education, but cannot merely copy it without considering its own national conditions. Secondly, there is pronounced difference between the well-established model of citizenship education in the modern West, and the struggle of non-Western countries to design and implement democratic citizenship education appropriate to their needs. As part of post-colonial Indonesia’s search of a national identity, it is defining and redefining the meaning of Indonesian citizenship. This is reflected in its citizenship education. The attributes of multidimensional citizenship, such as the five proposed by Cogan (1998), need to be taken into consideration in the development of Indonesian citizenship education.

Notes

1 Lister (1991:131) asserts that ‘In modern society, citizenship education in schools has been used to overcome tribalism, localism, and transferred nationalism. In the United States - “the great experiment” - it was used to make Americans out of diverse Europeans. The theme of citizenship education for social cohesion runs through the works of John Dewey, Charles E. Merriam, and Morris Janowitz (all linked in their lives with that melting pot city—Chicago).’

2 Democracy is derived from the ancient Greek word which means rule by the citizens as a whole, and not by individual leaders or a particular section of society. In modern democracies, citizens do not rule directly but elect representatives who form a parliament. See, for example, Held (1996).

3 A legally codified set of relationships defined the rights and duties of the individual, connected with the rise of the distinction between state and society. In the eyes of the law, an individual was a legal being, a citizen. ‘With this came a firmer recognition of citizenship as question of formal equality in the public domain. Thus law and property now become the paramount indicators of citizenship, which can be termed
participation in the community of shared common law.’ (Delanty 2000a:11). For a long time, in the medieval period, the word ‘citizen’ meant simply the inhabitant of a town (Delanty 2000a). Delanty further points out ‘It was not a bond between the individual and the state or nation but a specifically urban relationship concerning rights and duties in a town. With the rise of the central bureaucratic state from the sixteenth century also came a discernable social domain, for state formation and the rise of a market society were closely connected and began to extend beyond the confines of the autonomous city. With these developments it thus becomes meaningful to speak of civil society. […] Civic society refers less to the general economic and social space than to the specially public sphere and is also distinct from the official organs of the state as such. […] The essentially legal conception of citizenship as the public representation of the individual has remained the basis of the entire modern liberal tradition of citizenship; it opened up into two principal paths in the eighteenth century, when civil society became consolidated, these being the tension between citizenship as defined by reference to the political or the economic.’ (Delanty 2000a:12)

4 See Pocock (1992) for a good account of the classical ideal of citizenship, particularly on the Aristotelian and Gaian formula of the political universe, which subsequently became the formula for a liberal politics and a liberal ideal of citizenship during the modern period.

5 For example, contemporary constitutional and/or liberal democracy in Western societies, particularly in North America, Western Europe, Australia and New Zealand has been shaped by these two traditions, namely the modern liberalism and republicanism which emerged in the seventeenth and eighteenth century Europe.

6 According to them as suggested by Held (1996:95-96): ‘the key to the understanding of human beings lies in the thesis that humans act to satisfy desire and avoid pain. Their argument, in brief, is as follows: the overriding motivation of human beings is to fulfil their desires, maximize their satisfaction or utility and minimize their suffering; society consists of individuals seeking as much utility as they can get from whatever it is they want; individuals’ interests always conflict with one another for ‘a grand governing law of human nature’ is, as Hobbes thought, to subordinate ‘the persons and properties of human beings to our pleasures’. […] For Bentham and Mill, liberal democracy was associated with a political apparatus that ensured the accountability of the governors to the governed. Only through democratic government would there be a satisfactory means for generating political decisions commensurate with the public interests, i.e. the interests of the mass of individuals.’

7 Cf. David Held who argued that the ‘…the celebratory view of liberal democracy neglects to explore whether there are any tensions, or even perhaps contradictions, between the “liberal” and “democratic” components of liberal democracy; for example, between the liberal preoccupation with individual rights or “frontier of freedom” which “nobody should permit to cross”, and the democratic concern for the regulation of individual and collective action; that is, for public accountability.’ (Held 1993:14) Also, see Francis Fukuyama’s article, Second Thoughts: The Last Man in a Bottle, in which he reasserts the position that ‘liberal democracy and markets today remain the only realistic alternatives for any society hoping to be part of the modern world.’ (Fukuyama 1999:33). Fukuyama also admits that the use of ‘History’ in his article ‘The End of History’ is fundamentally flawed because ‘history cannot come to an end as long as modern natural science has no end; we are on the brink of new developments in science that will, in essence, abolish what Alexandre Kojève called “mankind as such”’ (Fukuyama 1999:17). Fukuyama’s concern seems to be that the vanishing of History is not a result of liberal democracy, but our use of advances in science, notably biotechnology, to alter human behaviour. The struggle for recognition in a Hegelian sense, or ‘spiritedness’ (thymos) in a Platonic sense, the ‘disrespect that we face’ and ‘the dissatisfaction with our current situation’ coupled with the advancement in biotechnology, will have profound consequences for our political order (Fukuyama 1999:31). Also, see Fukuyama (2002).

8 A rather different way of categorising the theories of citizenship can be found in Janoski and Gran (2002). For example, in their reconstruction of the republicanism, Janoski and Gran focus on republicanism in terms of the nature of ‘consensual order’ and ‘participation’. Theories that focus on consensual order include communitarianism and civic republicanism. The former puts strong emphasis on community goals, the latter emphasises civil society and the ‘virtues of good citizens who act on behalf of others’ (Janoski
Theories focusing on participation include neo-republicanism and expansive democracy. Both intend to ‘combat alienation and aid self-transformation’. Expansive democracy puts emphasis on the ‘rights to empowerment and participation’ (Janoski and Gran 2002:20). Neo-republicanism put emphasis on three points: ‘that citizens (1) act publicly with other citizens in civil society (i.e. not as individuals), (2) enact an office with formal rights and duties, and (3) organize a plural (not a majority) to guide their community of fate.’ (Janoski and Gran 2002:20).
CHAPTER 3
THE FORMULATION OF THE STATE SYSTEM, CITIZENSHIP CONCEPTS
AND EDUCATIONAL PROGRAMS IN INDONESIA

Introduction
As a formerly colonised, rapidly modernising pluralist society, Indonesia has encountered many complex and contradictory issues in its effort to build a national identity through its citizenship education. This chapter addresses how the definition of a good Indonesian citizen has changed over time, from the revolutionary to socialist to developmentalist periods, and sketches the development of Indonesia’s concept of citizenship and citizenship education. This chapter is not a detailed historical study of Indonesian citizenship, but an examination of the various citizenship discourses that have been debated and attempted in the process of state formation and nation building. In doing this, it illustrates the dilemmas of post-colonial Indonesia in the search of a national identity. This will help us to understand the extent to which the ideological concepts of the founding fathers influenced the PPKn writers in reproducing the Indonesian civic ideal.

This chapter will be organised into two parts, followed by concluding remarks. The first part briefly reviews the foundations of Indonesian ideology on which citizenship education is based; Pancasila, the integral state system (Negara Integralistik), and the
The second part documents various changes in educational policy since Indonesia achieved independence.

The Ideological Basis of the Post-colonial Indonesian State

The three main concepts shaping the political perspectives of this new republic’s ruling elite are Pancasila, Negara Integralistik, and 1945 Constitution. These have shaped the practice of citizenship and have served as the guidelines of citizenship education in Indonesia over the decades. All three concepts were first proposed and discussed by The Investigating Committee for Preparatory Work for Indonesian Independence (Badan Penyelidik Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia or BPUPKI), which was appointed by the Japanese at the end of their occupation of the archipelago in mid 1945. This committee, which included some sixty prominent Indonesians and seven Japanese, planned the political and economic organisation of an independent Indonesia. As Kahin (1963:558) observed of this committee: ‘The Indonesians appear to have dominated these discussions, the Japanese members, for whatever reasons, taking relatively modest parts. The major role was played by Soekarno.’

Pancasila

As the key concept of Indonesian politics, Pancasila is the basis of unity of Indonesia’s culturally diverse population. Pancasila is claimed to derive from such traditional values of ‘gotong-royong’ (mutual co-operation), ‘musyawarah dalam mufakat’ (consensus), and ‘tenggang rasa’ (mutual-understanding), hence it is the people’s ‘Way of Life’.\(^1\) According to the Preamble of the Constitution, Pancasila reflects the ‘democracy’ to
which the Republic subscribes, hence the political system of the country was labelled ‘Pancasila Democracy’ in the period of New Order regime.

The modern formulation of Pancasila has its roots in the five principles set out by Sukarno in a speech delivered on 1 June 1946 (Yamin 1959:61-81).2 These were:

1. Kebangsaan or nationalism, citing the historical precedents of the kingdoms of Sriwijaya (circa 750 BCE – 900 AD) and Majapahit (circa 1294-1478 AD), and encompassing a nation from Sabang (NW Sumatra) to Merauke (SE Irian Jaya).

2. Internationalism or humanitarianism, required so that nationalism would not become chauvinistic, but be part of a world comprising ‘one family of all nations wherein each member would maintain his national identity’ (Kahin 1963:559).

3. Permusyarawatan perwakilan or representative government, which would sustain Islamic faith by incorporating the principle of consultation, but also allow adherents of other religions an equal chance to advance their own ideas (Kahin 1963:559).

4. Social welfare, which would eliminate poverty (Yamin 1959). He argued against the Western form of democracy in which capitalism prevails, and proposed political and economic democracy (politiek-economische democratie) that will provide social welfare (Yamin 1959:76).

5. Belief in one, Supreme God, whereby adherents of different monotheistic religions would show mutual respect (Zainu’ddin 1980).
This five principles were subsequently rearranged by a subcommittee of nine persons to form the *Piagam Jakarta* or Jakarta Charter, and the basis of the preamble to the 1945 Constitution (Notosusanto 1981:22-23). Opposition came from some Muslim leaders who wanted the principles to have a more strongly Islamic cast. Sukarno persuaded the subcommittee to adopt a compromise version of *Pancasila* in which the first principle of ‘Belief in God, with the duty to carry out the requirements of Islam for those who are Moslem’ was changed to a belief in ‘One and only God’. Although this suggests the Islamic concept of ‘God’s oneness’ or ‘*tauhid*’[^3], it was ‘vague and not fully acceptable to some nominally Islamic Western-educated Indonesians [and] prominent Islamic leaders...’ (Kahin 1963:558). Some scholars (Morfit 1981, Lev 1966) saw the first principle as designed to ‘both exclude an Islamic state and to include Javanese mystical belief.’ (Morfit 1981:144). From time to time adoption of the first, Islamic version is proposed, however this would be internally contradictory in that Indonesian Muslims would have to adhere to Islamic law instead of *Pancasila*. *Pancasila* remains intact as the supreme source of Indonesian constitution and laws, and has been used by both the New and Old Order regimes to attack or contain rival political ideologies. (Morfit 1981:144).

The five principles of today’s *Pancasila* are stated in the Preamble of the 1945 Constitution and confirmed in the President’s Instruction No. 12 of 1968 (*Instruksi Presiden No. 12 Tahun 1968*). They are:

1. Belief in the One and Only God.
2. A just and civilised humanity.
3. The unity of Indonesia.

4. Democracy guided by inner wisdom through deliberation/representation.

5. Social justice for all the people of Indonesia.

In 1983 Pancasila was proclaimed as the one and only ideological principle (azas tunggal), on which all Indonesian citizens, social and political organisations and the state itself are required to base their activities.

In 1978 Pancasila’s principles were ‘re-interpreted’ and adopted into Indonesian citizenship education by a decree of the People’s Consultative Council (Ketetapan MPR No. II/MPR/1978), which implemented ‘The Training Guidelines for the Implementation and Experiencing of Pancasila (Penataran Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengalaman Pancasila, also called Ekaprasetia Pancakarsa, or Penataran P4). Philosophically Pancasila is commonly described as a uniting ideology, a development ideology, and an open ideology which is adaptable and responsive to the changing environments (Poespowardojo 1996, Moerdiono 1996c). From a legal perspective, Pancasila is a ‘legal ideal’ (Rechtsidee or cita hukum) functioning as ‘guidance’ (Leitstern or bintang pemandu) in testing and orienting the law of the country (Attamimi 1996). From a theological point of view, Pancasila does not replace any religious beliefs subscribed by Indonesian people, but is the ideological basis of the state manifested from the ‘agreement’ of the diverse groups of people living in Indonesia (Wahid 1996, among others4).
Negara Integralistik

The second major influence has been the notion of Negara Integralistik. Although it did not receive much discussion in the Old Order period, we may assume that it was tacitly accepted. The New Order revived it in the Guidelines for the Implementation and Experiencing of Pancasila (Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengalaman Pancasila or P4), the ideas of which were subsequently adopted in the PPkn textbooks, particularly at secondary levels. The idea of the ‘Integral State’ was proposed by Supomo in his speech to the Investigating Committee on 31 May 1945. In this speech, he discussed three schools of thought about the state, and questioned which was to be adopted (Yamin 1959:109-121).

The first school of thought argues that a state is based on individualism, as proposed by Thomas Hobbes and John Locke in the seventeenth century, Jean J. Rousseau in the eighteenth century, Herbert Spencer in the nineteenth and H.J. Laski in the twentieth century. This theory views a state as a legal society based on a social contract among individuals in that society. Such a legal society which rests on individualism is found in Europe and North America.

The second school of thought derives from a theory of class conflict as proposed by Marx, Engels and Lenin. This theory views a state as a repressive apparatus used by the economically strong to dominate the weak, and a capitalistic state as an apparatus of the bourgeoisie to repress workers. Marxists advocate political revolution by the workers to capture the state power and suppress the bourgeoisie.
The third school of thought accepts teori integralistik as proposed by Baruch De Spinoza, Adam Muller, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, and other eighteenth and nineteenth century thinkers. According to this theory the function of a state is not to oversee an individual nor a group of people’s interest, but to look after the interests of the whole society as whole. Thus Negara Integralistik is an integral system of society in which all components, parts and members of the people are inter-connected, forming a unity or an organic society. The interests of the nation as a whole take priority over those of any individual. The state oversees the life and security of the whole and indivisible nation.

Supomo suggested that the Indonesian state should be viewed as a living organism, whose political development should conform to the people’s contemporary ‘visible’ social structure, and should be in accord with its historical context (...“sociale structuur” masyarakat Indonesia, jang njata pada sekarang, serta harus sesuai dengan panggilan zaman) (Yamin 1959:112). He rejected European individualism and the dictatorship of the proletariat in Russia, proposing that the principle of unity between the leaders and the people, and the principle of unity of the whole state is consistent with the Eastern culture. He also argued that individuals are inseparable from one another, in the same way that all living organism are interconnected. The Negara Integralistik model follows from this (Yamin 1959:113).

This is a totalitarian idea, an integral idea from the people of Indonesia, which is also manifest in their original organisation of the state system. [...] In the unity of the people and the leaders, between one group of people and another, all types of people are in mutual co-operation spirit, and familial spirit. Therefore, it is obvious, ladies and gentlemen, that if we intend to establish an Indonesian State that is in accordance with the special traits and characters of Indonesian society,
our country should be based on the notion (staatidee) of the ‘integral state’, a state which is united with the whole people, over all types of groups of people in any field.  

The Negara Integralistik shares fundamental elements with classical republicanism and the Javanese concept of ‘manunggaling kawula gusti’ (unity between master and servant, sovereign and subject). In republicanism, citizenship is viewed as a public thing (res publica), and ‘people will be likely to put the common interest ahead of their own …’ (Dagger 2002:155). This strong emphasis on a sense of community and duties, and on common interest rather than individual freedom, is what Sukarno and Supomo argued to be the most appropriate values for the new state. As proposed by Adam Muller, the Negara Integralistik should be considered as an organism whose component parts play their social roles and find their destinies in the corporatist state (Standestaat). Muller’s ideal of the state is strong central authority that can look after the common people in carrying out their duties (Magnis-Suseno 1992). This closely resembles the public enterprise of republicanism. Both the Javanese concept of Manunggaling kawula gusti and the Negara Integralistik stress the close relationship between the sovereign (the ruling elite or the state) and the common people, and focus on the supremacy of the state (God or the king as representation of God) that encompasses the universe and human beings as a unity.

During the Japanese occupation in Indonesia, Supomo held positions as a professor of law and a leading bureaucrat in the Justice Department, where he was involved in drafting the prototype of Indonesian constitution. In 1943 he was taken on four month tour of Japan. On his return to Indonesia he argued that ‘exposure to Japanese culture
with its “quintessential Eastern qualities” could provide Indonesia’s alienated, Western educated intellectuals with an awareness of their own national personality and culture at a higher level and in a wider context’ (quoted in Bourchier 1996:70). Other leaders were concerned that the *Negara Integralistik* proposed by Supomo as being consistent with these quintessential Eastern qualities may lead to a repressive state which stifles freedom of speech. On 15 July 1945 Hatta addressed the Investigating Committee for Preparatory Work for Indonesian Independence (Yamin 1959:299).

[...] However one thing that I am worried about is that, if there is no assurance or accountability to the people in the Constitution concerned with the freedom of speech, later in the Constitution that we are formulating right now, it may happen that the established state is the one we do not agree upon. 7

Supomo and Sukarno were more sanguine about individual rights, categorically denying individualism and equating collectivism with social justice. Yamin (1959:296), quotes Sukarno as advising the committee to:

[...] discard individualism, don’t put in our constitution what is called “rights of the citizen” as proposed in the Republic of France ….We have determined in the first meeting, that we agreed with the words social justice and preamble. This social justice is the expression of our immense protest to the principles of individualism. 8

The debate between proponents of individual rights and those supporting the *Negara Integralistik* was critical to formulating the principles of the 1945 Constitution, particularly in relation to the inclusion or otherwise of provisions for individual human rights. The result was that the notion of *Negara Integralistik* - suggesting an absolute power of the state over the people - does not appear in the 1945 Constitution. Instead,
Article 1, Section 2 of the Constitution states that ‘Sovereignty shall be vested in the people and shall be fully exercised by them through the medium of the people’s congress’ (Yamin 1959:49).

**Undang-Undang Dasar 1945**

This section briefly discusses the 1945 Constitution, with particular reference to its provisions for the rights and obligations of citizens. As it will be discussed in Chapter 5 the key concepts of Indonesian citizenship education have been derived from this Constitution.

The 1945 Constitution was enacted on 18 August 1945 and formally promulgated in the National Gazette of the Republic of Indonesia on 15 February 1946 (Yamin 1959). The Preparatory Committee for Indonesian Independence (Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia or PPKI) had previously appointed a commission of seven including the newly elected president, Sukarno and vice-president Hatta to make a final draft of a National Constitution based on the document already written during the last month of the Japanese occupation (Kahin 1963). Sukarno stated that the 1945 Constitution was written in a very short time. He believed it to be provisional, and entertained the possibility of writing a better one (‘Undang-undang Dasar Sementara’ or ‘Undang-undang Dasar Kilat’.... ‘Nanti kita membuat Undang-undang Dasar jang lebih sempurna dan lengkap’) (Yamin 1959:410, 140). The 1945 Constitution was in force from 18 August 1945 until 27 December 1949, and from 5 July 1959 until today. Between the end of 1949 and 1950 it was replaced by the Constitution of Federal Republic of Indonesia (Konstitusi Republik Indonesia).
Indonesia Serikat), and in 1950 by the Provisional Constitution (Undang-Undang Dasar Sementara 1950). The 1945 Constitution was re-adopted on 5 July 1959 by Presidential Decree, after the collapse of the democratic parliamentary system in 1957.

The body of the 1945 Constitution contains sixteen chapters consisting thirty-seven articles, with a preamble, an elucidation of each article, four sections of the provisions affecting the interregnum and two sections of the additional regulations (aturan peralihan dan aturan tambahan) (Yamin 1959, BP-7 Pusat 1990). The preamble declares that independence is the right of any nation and that colonialism should be eradicated. It states that the struggle for independence has brought the people of Indonesia to an era of a sovereign, independent, united, just and prosperous Indonesian state which protects the people and the motherland. Its ideal is social welfare and justice based on the sovereignty of the people, a ‘democratic parliamentary’ system, and belief in the One and Only God. The preamble also incorporates the principles of Pancasila. Its elucidation defines Indonesia as a state based on the rule of law (rechtsstaat). Its sixteen chapters are:

- Chapter I  Form of Government and Sovereignty of the State.
- Chapter II  The People’s Consultative Council.
- Chapter III  The Executive.
- Chapter IV  The Council of State.
- Chapter V  Ministries.
- Chapter VI  Local Government.
- Chapter VII  The People’s Representative Council.
- Chapter VIII  Finance.
- Chapter IX  The Judiciary.
- Chapter X  Citizenship.
- Chapter XI  Religion.
Chapter XII  Defense.
Chapter XIII  Education.
Chapter XIV  Social Welfare.
Chapter XV  Flag and Language.
Chapter XVI  Amendments.

As noted above, the 1945 Constitution was regarded by the founding fathers as ‘definitely provisional’ (Kahin 1963, also see Yamin 1959). However during the New Order period it was given the status of a ‘sacred document’ that could never changed and had to be preserved (BP–7 1990). After the demise of the New Order regime, the Constitution has been amended four times. It was most recently amended in August 2002, however, the three articles concerning citizenship which appear in Chapter X of the 1945 Constitution have remained the same since the constitution was first enacted. The three articles state that (Yamin 1959:53-54):

Article 26
(1) Citizens shall be native-born Indonesians, and those who take out naturalisation papers.
(2) Matters affecting citizenship shall be provided by law.

Article 27
(1) All citizens shall have the same status in law and in the government and shall, without exception, respect the law and government.
(2) Every citizen shall have the right to work and to respect a reasonable standard of living.

Article 28
Freedom of assembly and the right to form unions, freedom of speech and the press and similar freedoms shall be provided by law.

Although only three articles explicitly mentioning citizenship appear in the constitution, other sections are relevant to rights and duties of Indonesian citizens, such as Article 29 (on religion), Article 30 (on defense and security), Article 31 and Article 32 (on
education), as well as Article 33 and Article 34 (on social welfare). These will be
analysed in Chapters 5 and 6.

To sum up this part, theories of state and society, such as liberalism, republicanism
and/or communitarianism, socialism and communism (Marxism) were discussed and
compared before some fundamental aspects of them, notably republicanism, were
modified and adopted by the ruling elite. The resultant state ideology and national
constitution explicitly rejected individual liberalism and Marxist-Leninist communism,
but emphasised the theory of the organic state or *Negara Integralistik*. These key political
ideas were adopted as the basis for Indonesian citizenship education in the succeeding
decades. The following section briefly reviews the changing principles of education since
1946. It examines the extent which the concepts of citizenship embodied in *Pancasila*,
the 1945 Constitution and *Negara Integralistik* have been reflected by the national and
citizenship education systems, and evaluates the ways in which the political strategies
and tactics of successive ruling elites have influenced these systems.

**Changing Objectives of National and Citizenship Education in Post-colonial
Indonesia**

Indonesia’s national education system was formulated immediately after the
proclamation of independence, when the Ministry of Education and Teaching issued a
decree (dated 1 March 1946) to form an Investigating Committee for Teaching (*Panitia
Penyelidik Pengajaran*) under the leadership of Ki Hajar Dewantara (Mestoko *et al.*
1986). As the state ideology, *Pancasila* became and remains the philosophy (*landasan
idiil*) of national education. Since its independence, Indonesia has introduced one national
lesson plan, one national education plan and five national curricula. These are the *Rencana Pelajaran 1947* (1947 Lesson Plan), *Rencana Pendidikan 1964* (1964 Education Plan), the *Kurikulum* (Curricula) of 1968, 1975, 1984, 1994 (subsequently revised), and 2004. This section recounts the general objectives of the national and citizenship education from 1946 to 2004. For each period, the general objective will be discussed, followed by the general aim of citizenship education for school students of that period.

**1947 Lesson Plan**

The principles of Indonesian education in the period of 1945-1950 were directed to the preparation of a new community. The focus on individualism, inherited from the Dutch, was replaced by moralism and humanism under the Minister of Education and Teaching’s decree of 1946 (*Keputusan Menteri P.P. dan K. 16-12-1946, No. 1186/Bag A*). The aim of national education, confirmed by the 1947 Lesson Plan, was to prepare responsible or ‘true citizens’ (*warga negara sejati*), willing to contribute to the state and nation. The emphasis was on the building of patriotic spirit, because in that period Indonesia was at war with the Dutch who were intent on reestablishing their colonial power (*Mestoko et al. 1986:145-149*). In this period, citizenship education was not separated from the general objectives of the national education. Students at secondary levels were taught constitutional law emphasising the duties of citizens towards the government, community, family and oneself, not as scientific knowledge, but as the foundation for building good nationalist citizens.
Colonial citizenship education or civics still influenced the early stage of the Indonesian citizenship education. Until the mid 1950s, teachers at secondary level relied on two civics books written by Dutch scholars, namely *Indische Burgerschapkunde* by P. Tromps (published in 1934) and *Recht en Plicht (Indische Burgerschapkunde voor Iedereen)* by J.B. Vortman (published in 1940). Tromp’s book focused on social and economic issues, such as indigenous people, the Dutch East Indies and world economy, labour, agriculture, the middle class in trade and industry, constitutional law of the Dutch East Indies, change and development of establishment of People’s Council (*Volkstraad*), law and its application, education, health, taxation, and soldiers and naval forces. Vortman’s book discussed issues such as the society we live in, marriage and family, European civil law, the relationship between king and citizen in the Dutch East Indies, and the history of the Dutch East Indies government, laws, and instruments of payment and welfare (Kansil and Kansil 2003:8-9).

During the period of struggle between the new Republic of Indonesia and the returning Dutch colonisers, the Indonesian people were under a revolutionary government. In 1949 a Round Table Conference was held in The Hague where, ‘a settlement was reached which ended hostilities and provided for Indonesia’s full independence’ (Kahin 1963:563). In the wake of the political changes of post-revolutionary Indonesia and the period of Parliamentary Democracy (1950-1957), the main objective of national education shifted. Government Act No. 4/1950, Chapter II, section 3, had the stated aim of building capable individuals and democratic citizens of high moral character,
responsible for social justice and the motherland. Government Act 12 of 1954 implemented the 1950 law across all parts of the Republic of Indonesia.⁹

In 1957 the General Education Agency (Jawatan Pendidikan Umum) prepared a proposal to reform education based on Government Act No. 4/1950. However, before it could be implemented the 1945 Constitution was readopted. In 1960 the Minister of Education, Teaching and Culture (Menteri Pendidikan, Pengajaran dan Kebudayaan) developed another policy consistent with the readopted Constitution and Sukarno’s presidential speech, entitled ‘The Rediscovery of Our Revolution’ (Penemuan Kembali Revolusi Kita), delivered on 17 August 1959. The minister considered that the Government Act No. 4/1950 had been implemented in a liberal atmosphere, intended to accommodate the revolutionary ideals of the republic in education and the development of educational resources (Jasin 1987).

Prior to 1957, citizenship education was incorporated into other subjects, such as Constitutional Law, Law and National History and/or Geography (Somantri 2001). From 1957 citizenship education (Kewarganegaraan) was taught as part of ‘Constitutional Law’ and dealt with the acquisition and loss of citizenship. In 1955 the first book by Indonesians on citizenship was published, entitled Inti Pengetahuan Warga Negara (Essential Knowledge of Citizens) written by J.C.T. Simorangkir, Gusti Mayur and Sumintarjo. Its stated aim was to prepare conscious citizens who are responsible for themselves, the community and the country. The material included the topics: Our Motherland Indonesia, The Great Indonesia, the National Flag and Emblems, Citizens -
their rights and duties, Constitutional Law, State Finance, Tax, the Economy, and Cooperation (Kansil and Kansil 2003:9-10).

**1964 Education Plan**

In 1960, a decree of the Provisional People’s Consultative Council (*Ketetapan MPRS No.II/MPRS/1960*) was introduced, with the objective of building patriotism and developing the spirit of *Pancasila* and the 1945 revolution in citizens. The change from the previous ideology of citizenship was a reaction by the regime to the failure of Constitutional Democracy in 1957, after which Sukarno turned to socialist ideas and introduced his ‘Guided Democracy’. The President’s Decree of 1965 (*Keputusan Presiden Republik Indonesia No. 145 Tahun 1965; Penetapan Presiden No. 19 Tahun 1965 tentang Pokok-Pokok Sistem Pendidikan Nasional Pancasila*) stated that the objective of national education is to build morally good socialist Indonesian citizens who are responsible for the implementation of a just and prosperous Indonesian socialist society, and who possess the spirit of *Pancasila*, spiritually and materially. The interests of individual life were to be considered secondary (Mestoko *et al* 1986:173). The 1964 Education Plan included the well-known Seven Components of Indoctrination (*Tujuh Bahan Pokok Indoktrinasi* or *TUBAPI*), introduced by the Supreme Advisory Council of Indonesia, These consisted of:

1. The Genesis of *Pancasila*, principally Sukarno’s speech at the meeting of The Investigating Committee for Preparatory Work for Indonesian Independence on 1 June 1945;

2. The 1945 Constitution and its Elucidation;
(3) The Political Manifesto of the Republic of Indonesia (Manipol) together with the commentary by the Supreme Advisory Council;

(4) Sukarno’s presidential speech entitled ‘Our Revolutionary Way’ (Jalan Revolusi Kita or Jarek), delivered on 17 August 1960, together with its commentary by the Supreme Advisory Council;

(5) Sukarno’s speech entitled ‘Rebuilding the World’ (Membangun Dunia Kembali), delivered at the General Assembly of the United Nations on 30 September 1960, together with its commentary by the Supreme Advisory Council;

(6) The Elucidation of Manipol and USDEK, an acronym for:

    Undang-Undang Dasar 1945 (the 1945 Constitution),

    Sosialisme Indonesia (Indonesian Socialism),

    Demokrasi Terpimpin (Guided Democracy),

    Ekonomi Terpimpin (Guided Economy) and

    Kepribadian Indonesia (Indonesian Identity),

from a series of speeches on the radio by H. Roeslan Abdul Gani, Head of the Steering Committee of the Construction of Revolutionary Soul (Ketua Panitia Pembina Jiwa Revolusi), and

(7) The Developmental Speech of the President (Amanat Pembangunan Presiden) at the National Planning Council (Dewan Perancang Nasional or Depernas) on 25 August 1959, together with the summary of the book on Universal Development (Pembangunan Semesta).
At the end of 1960, a prescribed civics textbook entitled *Manusia dan Masyarakat Baru Indonesia* (The New Peoples and Communities of Indonesia) by Soepardo *et al.* was commissioned and introduced by the Ministry of Education, Teaching and Culture (*Kementerian Pendidikan, Pengajaran dan Kebudayaan*) with an emphasis on nation and character building. The material includes the History of National Awakening, Sukarno’s Speeches and Manifestos, Pancasila and 1945 Constitution, Guided Democracy and Economy, Rights and Duties of Citizen, the Declaration of Human Rights, the Asia-Africa Conference, etc. This book was banned in 1966 after the demise of Old Order regime.

The political upheavals of 1965-1966 had a major impact on the educational system. The following discussion reveals how political change affected the educational systems of subsequent periods, particularly during the New Order and post-New Order Indonesia.

**1968 Curriculum**

On 11 March 1966, after the alleged abortive communist *coup d’état* (*Gerakan Tiga Puluh September Partai Komunis Indonesia* or *G30S PKI*: The Movement of the Indonesian Communist Party, 30th September), Sukarno transferred the formal executive power to Suharto (through the document *Surat Perintah Sebelas Maret* or *Supersemar*: Document of Command, 11 March), thus ending the era of the Old Order. Suharto launched an anti-communist movement and introduced a developmental program in the economy.
In 1966, the objective of the national education was set in the Provisional People’s Consultative Council’s decree (*Ketetapan M.P.R.S. No. XXII/M.P.R.S./1966*) as that of constructing a true *Pancasila*-ist based on the provisions in the Preamble of the 1945 Constitution. The government instructed that the material for citizenship education would cover: *Pancasila*, the 1945 Constitution, the Provisional People’s Consultative Council’s decrees, and the United Nations. Material covering the history of the New Order and the history and geography of Indonesia was introduced later. In 1968, a new curriculum was launched, replacing the Old Order’s 1964 Educational Plan. The stated aim of its citizenship component was to develop and nurture good citizens who live in accordance with *Pancasila* and the 1945 Constitution. The topics of the education, known as *Pendidikan Kewargaan Negara* (State Civics Education), included among other topics: nationalism, patriotism, state and state ideology, ethics and culture (Somantri 2001)\(^{11}\).

**1975 Curriculum**

After the General Election in 1973, the a decree of the newly appointed People’s Consultative Council (*Ketetapan MPR No. IV/MPR 1974*) formulated a new objective of national education through its decree known as Broad Outlines of National Direction (*Garis-garis Besar Haluan Negara*). This emphasised the construction of developmentalists who have the character of *Pancasila* (*membentuk manusia-manusia pembangunan yang ber-Pancasila*). The aim of citizenship education (*Pendidikan Moral Pancasila*) in this period was to construct and cultivate a *Pancasila*-ist.\(^{12}\)
Three years after the 1975 curriculum was introduced, the objective of national education was reformulated by the New Order regime, through the People’s Consultative Council’s decree of 1978 (Ketetapan IV/MPR/1978MPR), stressing piety towards the one and only God, knowledge, skills, morals, personality, and the enhancement of national spirit required to produce developmentalists who can nurture themselves, and who are collectively responsible for the national development. On 16 August 1975, in his speech to the People’s Representative Council, Suharto called for the Pancasila to be spelled out in a simple and clear formula as guidelines for the conduct of Pancasila people. (Sekretariat Negara Republik Indonesia n.d.:16) In another speech in April 1976 he named the program Ekaprasetia Pancakarsa (a phrase derived from Sanskrit meaning ‘a single intent to implement five determined wills’), and declared it would be enacted by the People’s Consultative Assembly (Sekretariat Negara Republik Indonesia n.d.:17). This has been seen as a strategy by the regime to counter potentially contesting ideologies such as Islam and communism, by making Pancasila the core principle of the nation’s philosophy.¹³

In 1978, by means of the People’s Consultative Council’s decree (Ketetapan M.P.R. No. IV/MPR/1978), the regime implemented a new program: ‘The Training in the Guidelines for the Implementation and Experience of Pancasila’ (Penataran Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengalaman Pancasila or Penataran P4). These guidelines consisted of thirty-six values (Tiga Puluh Enam Butir P4) developed from the five principles of Pancasila. The program was employed as an instrument to assess civil servants’ and private individuals’ understanding and conformity with the official ideology. Promotions in the Government
sector were in part based on achievements in this program. The program was also employed as the main source of Indonesian’s citizenship education, known as *Pendidikan Moral Pancasila* or *PMP* within the 1975 and 1984 curriculums, and were later incorporated into *Pendidikan Pancasila dan Kewarganegaraan* or *PPKn* within the 1994 curriculum.

**1984 Curriculum**

In 1984 the regime introduced Curriculum 1984, the broad objectives of which followed those of the People’s Consultative Council of 1973 and 1978. The 1978 decree required that *Pancasila* Education including *P4*, *PMP*, and other topics to instill the soul, spirit and values of 1945 in the Young Generation, should be enhanced in school curriculum from kindergarten to higher education in both private and state-owned institutions. To instill the soul, spirit and values of 1945 in the young generation; therefore, privately or state-owned schools should provide Education in the History of Nation’s Struggle (*Pendidikan Sejarah Perjuangan Bangsa*) (Nasution and Librata 1978). It was in this period that the material developed from the thirty-six points of the *P4* were fully integrated with citizenship education. The textbooks were written by a group of people commissioned by the government, and were used by students throughout the country. Students and most teachers of *PMP* also used a book containing material for training in *P4*, the 1945 Constitution and the Broad Outlines of National Direction (entitled ‘*Bahan Penataran: Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengalaman Pancasila, Undang-Undang Dasar 1945, Garis-Garis Besar Haluan Negara*’), published by the office of the Secretary of State, or a privately published copy derived from it. Also, in this period, a new method of
learning called Student Active-Learning Method (*Cara Belajar Siswa Aktif*) was introduced. In this method, apart from textbooks, different teaching aids such as pictures and captions were used in class-room interactions. Students were expected to be more active in and outside the classroom. However, this method did not last long, as the regime began to introduce another education act, which was followed by another new curriculum.

**1994 Curriculum**

The 1989 National Education Act (*Undang-Undang No. 2 Tahun 1989 tentang Sistem Pendidikan Nasional*) had the stated objective of developing the intellectual life of the people and building well-rounded individuals who are faithful to the One and Only God, possessing knowledge and skills, good character and body, fine personality and a sense of responsibility for the community and nation. As already noted, the 1994 curriculum which followed the 1989 Education Act included the citizenship education subject *Pendidikan Pancasila dan Kewarganegaraan (PPKn)*. The aim of this citizenship education was to develop the moral values of Indonesians, to be practiced in everyday life, reflecting piety and faith in God in a society of diverse religious beliefs. Students were to be trained as self-conscious members of society, active in the full range of community activities. In order to achieve social justice, their behaviour should reflect high tolerance and dedication to the common good rather than individual and group interests. The introductory pages of *PPKn* textbooks state that ‘Citizenship Education is an effort to imbue students with basic knowledge and competence in regard to relationships between citizens and the State, and as preliminary education in national
awareness for dependable citizens, committed to the state and nation.’ The material included a wide range of topics and moral values developed from *Pancasila*, primarily *P4* and the 1945 Constitution, national history and local cultures, and various legal topics, particularly the Broad Outlines of the Nation’s Direction (*GBHN*).

**2004 Curriculum**

In late 1997 the monetary crisis hit Indonesia and the economy of the country began to fail. Many people blamed the collapse on corruption, collusion and nepotism (*Korupsi, Kolusi, Nepotisme* or *KKN*), largely centred on Suharto’s family, relatives and sometimes shady associates. When Suharto was overseas in early May 1998, a series of students-led demonstrations demanding greater democracy was followed by riots and civil unrest in major cities. On returning to Jakarta, the President soon found that many of his ministers and the elite had turned against him. In late May 1998 Suharto abdicated his presidency to vice-president Bachruddin Jusuf Habibie, marking the beginning of the era of reform (*Era Reformasi*). The demise of the 32 year-old New Order regime in May 1998 opened the way for the Indonesian government to introduce a new National Education Act. 14

The objectives of this new Act (*Undang-Undang No. 20 Tahun 2003 tentang Sistem Pendidikan Nasional*) did not seem very different from those of the one it replaced. Its emphasised developing the ability of Indonesian citizens, and the enhancement of their quality of life and dignity in order to achieve national goals. Like the 1989 National Education, its goal was to develop Indonesian students’ potential so that they would
become faithful and pious to the One and Only God, possess good character and healthy bodies, be knowledgeable, creative, independent, ethical and democratic, and possess a sense of social and national responsibility. Following this new Act, Curriculum 2004 was recently launched formally\(^{15}\). While the four consecutive curricula of citizenship in the New Order period were directed at developing ‘a well-rounded human being’ \((pembangunan manusia seutuhnya)\) (Azis-Wahab 2002) or a ‘Pancasilaist’ \((manusia Pancasilaist)\) (Azis-Wahab 1999), the aim of the new citizenship education is to provide students with competencies to think critically, rationally and creatively in response to various dimensions of citizenship; to participate in a responsible way and to act intelligently in community and national activities; to develop positively and democratically in an Indonesia society characterised by its ability to live alongside other nations; and to directly and indirectly interact with people of other nations, by means of information and communication technology. The materials is arranged under eight major headings: national unity; values and norms; human rights; citizens needs; Pancasila and state constitution; power and politics; democratic society and globalisation. (Also see Chapter 10).

To recap this section, the shifts of emphasis in Indonesian education policy show how it has accommodated itself to the political and social changes of each period.\(^{16}\) A review of the texts shows how liberalism was rejected by Sukarno in favour of an emphasis on civic nationalism. The New Order government also rejected liberalism, and imposed a state-controlled development based on a centralised bureaucracy, seemingly secular rationalist philosophy and the traditional values of hierarchy, discipline and patriotic duty. The
political discourses of successive regimes seem comparable to classical republicanism (emphasising order and duties), French Functionalism (stressing the function or usefulness of social groups in larger society) and German Romanticism (emphasising conformity and the voluntary internalisation of moral codes in individuals). In each era, state ideologies beneficial to ruling elites were reflected in educational policies.

The central problem of Indonesian citizenship education is contextualising the social theories and perspectives of citizenship education (discussed in Chapter 2) in the post-colonial state. Rather than directly mimicking the strategy and tactics taken by some older democratic states, it needs to adjust social theories to local conditions and interests. Philosophical orientations and social theories of citizenship provide cultural and structural principles. These principles determine the dimensions and practice of citizenship within a democratic, diverse and complex society. They contribute to shaping the ideological basis of the state, rather than supplanting it. Citizenship education is concerned with the elements of democratic citizenship and the ways good citizens are formed. Chapter 4 will review these two issues.

**Concluding Remarks**

This chapter has shown that since the inception of Indonesia in 1945, civic knowledge has been constituted and narrated as a strategy of cultural identification in the name of national interests. The constitution and development of citizenship education in this new post-colonial nation-state did not appear in a void, but has been influenced by the
political and sociological theories of older nation states in Europe and North America.\textsuperscript{18}

We have seen how the state ideology shifted its emphasis in different political periods in independent Indonesia. Likewise, citizenship education objectives changed in response to socio-economic pressures and the political interests of successive regimes.

The Old Order placed a strong emphasis on national integration, which Sukarno often referred to as ‘nation building’. The civic nationalism of this period encouraged the people to be patriotic and to defend the newly established state at all costs. Suharto’s New Order continued the strategy of forging national identity strategy, however unlike the Old Order, it emphasised national economic development and political stability supported by the concept of national resilience (ketahanan nasional). This concept was later strengthened by an ideological tool known as P-4, and the re-adoption of the theory of the organic state.

For five decades of authoritarian rule, Indonesian citizenship education has relied on classical republicanism, constitutionalism and social contract. Pancasila, Undang Undang Dasar 1945 and Negara Integralistik have served as moral and behavioural guidelines for Indonesian students and Indonesian people at large. In the transition towards democracy, it remains to be seen which of the concepts imposed by the Old Order and New Order regimes continue to influence the citizenship and citizenship education policies. How do the newer regimes practise the civic virtues proclaimed by their predecessors, such as patriotism, duty, obedience and conformity? To what extent will successive regimes retain or dismantle the framework of authoritarian citizenship,
and how do they perceive issues of citizenship in relation to the unprecedented local and global changes in all aspects of life?

Notes

1 In his speech in the meeting of the Investigating Committee for the Preparatory Work for the Indonesian Independence on 1 June 1945, Sukarno said that he had consulted a linguist friend about the name Pancasila, in which ‘panca’ means five, and ‘sila’ means ‘basis’ or ‘principle’ (Yamin 1959). Historically the name of ‘panca sila’ derives from the five precepts set out in one of Buddhism’s three sacred books (Tri Pitaka). The ideas of one of these, the Vinaya Pitaka, were adopted during the reign of King Hayam Wuruk of Majapahit (1350-1389). These ideas appear in the old Javanese text Nāgarakṛtīgama, written by Empu Prapanca, and in Sutasoma written by Empu Tantular, and are known as ‘Pancasila Krama’ or five moral codes that prohibit: killing; stealing, sexual misbehaviour; harmful language and telling lies; and the use of intoxicants or drugs and alcoholic drinks.

2 Although in his speech he cited the concepts of nation proposed by Ernest Renan and Otto Bauer, Sukarno emphasised Indonesia’s geopolitical problems, which include its many ethnic groups, and the need for a unity of the people and the land (‘persatuan manusia dan tempatnya’) (Yamin 1959:70).

3 See, for example, Hefner (1997:27-28).

4 In Michael Morfit’s view, the P4 training course ‘failed to project a future that is clearly defined and likely to be realized …’ (Morfit 1981:851). Considering several incidents in early 1980s, such as the Petition of Fifty, anti-Chinese riots in Central Java and the hijacking of a Garuda airliner, he further noted that ‘the decision to pursue a nationwide program of political indoctrination may be viewed in this light as a symptom of growing insecurity on the part of the present regime and of the attempt to rekindle a sense of its own purpose….The failure, if it occurs, may be one of imagination because the New Order government has been unable to develop within the doctrine of Pancasila development strategies capable of addressing the inevitability of profound social change or of generating a new, ideological vision for Indonesia’ (Morfit 1981:851)

5 ‘Inilah idee totaliter, idee integralistik dari bangsa Indonesia, yang berwujud djuga dalam susunan tatanegarannya yang asli. […] Dalam susasana persatuan antara rakyat dan pemimpinnya, antara golongan-golongan rakyat satu sama lain, segala golongan diliputi oleh semangat gotong rojong, semangat kekeluargaan. Maka teranglah tuan-tuan yang terhormat, jika kita hendak mendirikan Negara Indonesia yang sesuai dengan keistimewaan sifat dan tjorak masjarakat Indonesia, maka negara kita harus berdasar atas aliran pikiran (staatidee) negara yang integralistik, negara yang bersatu dengan seluruh – rakjatnya, yang mengatasi seluruh golongan-golonganannya dalam lapangan apapun.’

Organicist political thought originated from Hegel, Muller and Spinoza’s work and its development in the Dutch East Indies were brought by Dutch scholars, particularly Cornelius van Vollenhalen and his disciples. Van Vollenhoven was Supomo’s teacher in Leiden University (Bourchier 1996). As David Bourchier (1996) has persuasively demonstrated, Van Vollenhoven’s great interest in the East Indies customary laws was not a coincidence. Bourchier indicates that van Vollenhoven’s idea of the ‘discovery of law emerging from the people’ (volksrecht) was influenced by the German Romanticist movement intending to search for primordial elements in Germanic indigenous customs and laws (i.e. placing the collectivity of the people, the state to be exact, over individual and liberal ideas). This romanticist juridical movement in Germany and the Netherlands in nineteenth century was primarily to shy away from the so-called ‘corruptive’ and ‘alien’ (Roman) legal traditions, namely Juristenrecht (lawyer’s law). Bourchier also has admirably shown the similarity between the Japanese cultural nationalism (which was influenced
by the German Romanticism and the anti-Enlightenment movement) and that of Indonesian conservative nationalism. As he argues ‘There was a remarkable congruence between the image of Indonesian culture and identity generated by the Leiden school and its Indonesian students, and the discourse about “Eastern culture” promoted by the Japanese cultural nationalist.’ (Bourchier 1996:70).

6See Magnis-Suseno (1994) who argued that Supomo’s concept of Negara Integralistik is actually in contradiction to manunggaling kawula gusti (that he intended to embrace), because it distances the relationship between the state and the people by rejecting individual rights.

7‘[…] Tetapi satu hal saja kuatirkan, kalau tidak ada satu kejakinan atau satu pertanggungan kepada rakyat dalam Undang-undang Dasar yang mengenai hak untuk mengeluarkan suara, jaitu bahwa nanti di atas Undang-undang Dasar yang kita susun sekarang ini, mungkin terjadi bentukan suatu negara yang tidak kita setujui.’

8‘[…] buanglah sama sekali paham individualisme itu, djanganlah dimasukkan ke dalam undang-undang dasar kita yang dinamakan ‘rights of citizens’ sebagai jang diandjurkan oleh Republik Prancis itu adanja … Kita telah menentukan dalam sidang jang pertama, bahwa kita menjetudjui kata keadilan sosial dan preambule. Keadilan sosial inilah protes kita jang maha hebat kepada dasar individualisme’

9In this period, the system of national education was first established, consisting of three levels: pendidikan rendah or primary school (including kindergarten), pendidikan menengah or secondary school (junior and senior secondary) and pendidikan tinggi or higher education (university, institute of higher education (sekolah tinggi) and academy (akademi)).

10Joseph Fischer (1965:114) argues that ‘[…] 2. The curriculum of schools does not have any manifest political content and does not appear to significantly affect students until secondary and university levels have been reached. 3. The most formal aspects of political socialization (curriculum, etc.) appear to have most significance at middle and high school levels. […]’

11It is also worth noting that the contents or ‘body of knowledge’ of PPKn - as its name suggests - consists of Pancasila-based ‘moral or value education’, and civic knowledge based mainly on the 1945 Constitution. As Somantri (2001) noted, since the first formulation of Indonesia’s education objectives, religious values have been separated from citizenship education. Under the 1947 Teaching Plan, Didikan Budi Pekerti taught moral or value education (pendidikan budi-perkerti), based on ‘traditional ethics’ (particularly Javanese), while religious instruction was separately taught as Pendidikan Agama (Religious Education). The 1964 Education Plan consolidated these two subjects as Pendidikan Agama/Budi Pekerti. However, the Indonesian Department of Religious Affairs did not agree on the ‘merger’ (Jasin 1978). It was not until 1968 that Religious Education was taught as a separate subject, and moral values were embedded in the subject called Pendidikan Kewargaan Negara (Citizenship Education), used to construct students’ mental and moral in accordance to Pancasila in accordance with the 1968 Curriculum (Kurikulum 1968).

12The terminology ‘developing people or the development of people’ (membangun manusia or pembangunan manusia) by the New Order regime has been criticised by some intellectuals in Indonesia. In the early 1980s Franz Magnis-Suseno, for example, showed his concern and pointed out that what we develop are the resources that are needed for human beings to develop, not the people. The concept of “developing people” implicitly suggests an underestimation of human beings. […] “Developing people” is a typical way of expressing a pattern of thought that enables the understanding of human relations in terms of pattern of power: the powerful enforces their will, and the weak becomes their objects. The typical communicative behaviour, such as respecting, caring, greeting, sharing, in short, the recognition of human rights, are not expressed in the concept of “developing people”’ (Magnis-Suseno 2000:19).

13As Merle Ricklefs indicates ‘To encourage ideological homogeneity, in 1978 the government began a process of compulsory indoctrination for all citizens in the state ideology Pancasila. The central figure in
arranging this was Roeslan Abdulgani, formerly an active promoter of Sukarno’s guided democracy ideology.’ (Ricklefs 2001:373)

In fact, immediately after the fall of the New Order regime, the Curriculum Center of the Ministry of Education tried to revise the 1994 national curriculum which was called *Penyempurnaan Kurikulum 1994* (“Revised Version” of 1994 Curriculum). This includes a revision of the curriculum for PPKn, in which a comparative study of the Indonesian teaching of moral values was carried out with Singapore and South Korea. For example, see a report prepared by Nurlaili (1999) for a revision of the citizenship education for primary school. However, such revision did not seem to be able to accommodate the changing needs of post-authoritarian Indonesian people. Since the demise of New Order regime, there have been also some citizenship education textbooks written and published by the private sector available in the market. To gain wider acceptance from the public, normally these private publishers seek to have their books evaluated and approved by the Ministry of Education.

In October 1999, the Center for Indonesian Civic Education (CICED) in collaboration with the Center for Civic Education (CCE), Calabasas, U.S.A., conducted a workshop in Bandung on ‘The Development of Concepts and Content of Civic Education for Indonesian School’. This was followed by a national seminar on civic education (‘The Need for New Indonesian Civic Education’) in the same city in March 2000. A final report, being the ‘Needs-assessment for new Indonesian civic education: A national survey’ was later prepared by CICED (2000). It seems that these activities have contributed to the exploration of new perspectives of citizenship education in post-New Order Indonesia, and their inclusion in the new official citizenship curriculum (*Kurikulum 2004: Kewarganegaraan*).

It is important to note that the political strategies of the ruling elite had implications for the broad institutional objectives of Indonesian education. Since the 1940s, efforts to meet these objectives have led to debate about the objectives of citizenship education in the country. Key-words such as, such as ‘to construct’ (*membentuk*), ‘to conceive’ (*melahirkan*), ‘to grow’ (*menumbuhkan*), ‘to lead’ (*menuntun*), ‘to supervise’ (*mencerdaskan*), and ‘to educate’ (*mencerdaskan*) were debated in relation to teaching citizens their role in a well functioning society, and in the understanding of social institutions and organisations. (Jasin 1978). As Jasin points out, at a meeting to discuss the Education Act in 1950, the key-words advocated were ‘to lead’ (*menuntun*) or ‘to educate’ or ‘to supervise’ (*mencerdaskan*) and ‘to construct’ (*membentuk*). At that time there was some objection to the use of ‘construction’ (*membentuk*), because ‘to construct’ was viewed as carrying negative connotation. Anwar Jasin argues that there are several inconsistencies arising from the formulation as well as reformulation of the objectives of national education in the last decades. In the first place, there is an over emphasis on the desired Indonesian citizens. This is exemplified by the excessive use of the words, such as ‘to construct’ (*membentuk*), ‘to conceive’ (*melahirkan*) or ‘to grow’ (*menumbuhkan*) Indonesian people, and with their related characteristics, such as the Pancasila-ist, the developmentalist, the socialist, etc., and the use of ‘to increase’ or ‘to boost up’ the piety, intelligence and skills (*meningkatkan atau mempertinggi ketaqwaan, kecerdasan dan keterampilan*), to mention but a few (Jasin 1987). Apart from the inconsistency of the objectives set out by the governments - influenced by a particular historical context - Jasin also argued that the goal of education set out in Indonesia’s constitution, i.e. ‘to educate the people’ (*mencerdaskan kehidupan bangsa*), emphasised in the Old Order period, was transformed by the New Order regime to ‘skillful, development-oriented people’ (*manusia pembangunan yang terampil*) (Jasin 1987). Thus the focus of national education was not on intellectualism. As Jasin suspects, this may be caused by the fear that the focus on intellectualism would be translated as practising ‘colonial education’ with its over-emphasis on ‘rationality’, which was criticised by the late Ki Hajar Dewantara, Indonesia’s eminent educator. Such Western rationality was viewed as degrading ‘morality’ (*budi pekerti*) and championing individualism and materialism (Jasin 1987, Zainu’ddin 1970, McVey 1967).

For order and the problem of order and duties, see, for example, Wrong (1994). For French Functionalism and German Romanticism, see, for example, Gouldner (1970). Also see Magnis-Suseno (1994) on the Javanese concept of *manunggaling kawula gusti* in relation to Supomo’s concept of *Negara Integralistik*. 
David Bourchier, for example, concludes that integralism in Indonesia ‘cannot be regarded as a natural outgrowth of indigenous constitutional forms. It is best understood in the content of the organicists tradition of anti-Enlightenment thought in Europe’ (Bourchier 1996:287).
CHAPTER 4
STATE AND CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION IN NEW ORDER INDONESIA:
PERSPECTIVES OF TWO GROUPS OF ANALYSTS

Introduction

One of the difficulties of studying Indonesian contemporary politics is how to define the political system of this pluralist post-colonial state. Chapter 3 suggests that the concept of Indonesian state ideology and national constitution were derived from Western political concepts. However, they were re-interpreted and modified to suit the local context by the founding fathers, a fact that has influenced the conception of the civic ideal in Indonesia’s citizenship education. This chapter is intended to review the perspectives of two groups of scholars who have looked at the nature of the Indonesian state, its citizenship principles and their inculcation, to see how their views illuminate these issues. The first group comprises political scientists and sociologists, while the second group consists of educationalists and anthropologists who have examined both the written and non-written discourse of *PPKn* in Indonesian citizenship education policy and practice.

This chapter is divided into two parts. The first part explores the political interests, state structures and societal conditions of state formation in post-colonial Indonesia. It then moves to the debates surrounding state formation in the New Order period, issues of Islam as the dominant religious belief in relation to the promotion of civil society, and the
influence of regional cultures in the overall configuration of the Indonesian civic ideal. The second part of this chapter considers the existing literature on Indonesian citizenship education, particularly PPKn. It attempts to show how scholars have problematised the ways supposed democratic citizenship has been practised in the New Order regime, as well as the way the civic ideal has been structured or constituted through school textbooks. In this part, I will first briefly discuss the general nature of the analysis of Indonesian citizenship education in the last few decades. I will then look at the non-textbook and textbooks based analyses carried out by several scholars. Finally, I will briefly indicate my position by discussing the possibility of a new analysis of the complex and contradictory issues surrounding Indonesian citizenship education, seeing human rights as being the core value of democracy.

The Nature of Indonesian State

Whereas the older nation states in Western Europe developed over many centuries (Rokkan 1975)¹, Indonesia is the product of a deliberate and concerted effort to construct a new nation-state, an ‘imagined community’ within the frontiers established by the former colonial regime (Anderson 1991). Like the newer states in Asia and Africa, Indonesia had to cope with many issues simultaneously, in a short period of time. Rokkan (1975:574) argues that these states:

… have had to cope with issues of national-cultural identity, issues of participation, and with issues of economic inequality all in one: development left them with little or no time to reach even temporary institutional solutions to one set of challenges before they were forced to cope with the next set…[ ] they were left with only a minimum of time to build up their institutions before they were faced with disruptive pressures from outside as well as from inside.
Indonesia’s first two regimes concentrated power in the hands of the president and the executive. This occurred (in part) because the newly independent Indonesia was preoccupied with both external and internal conflict. As a result, social revolution and the replacement of colonial practices could not be achieved speedily. Initially at least, the national effort was dedicated to crushing the colonial power dominating the economy. As Magnis-Suseno (2000:57-58) observed:

After the political power of the coloniser was successfully crushed, the social structural changes were not felt as an urgency. Particularly because the structure was also related to the economic interests of the political elite. Furthermore, generally the structures of economic domination could not easily be changed. Political stability was a given priority, but that was only able to be achieved with the support of those who dominated the economic sector.

Then there began a stage of economic development which in most developing countries is characterised by the inflow of foreign capital, either from private or government sources. That this capital gave rise to various dependencies was not quickly noticed. Such dependency is usually labelled as economic colonialism or neocolonialism.  

On one hand the ruling elite claimed to be true nationalists, driving national development for the people, while on the other hand the same elite group was often actively involved and financially interested in that development. This became increasingly apparent under the New Order. To ensure that the country and its (their!) economy ran well, and citing real or imagined communist threats, ‘stability’ (often coupled with ‘unity and oneness’) was strictly imposed. Magnis-Suseno (2000:58) continued:

Only the power elite of developing countries can ensure these requirements. Meanwhile, these elite through foreign capital could enjoy a high degree of luxurious consumption and obtain the very expensive technical equipment needed to dominate the situation from civil and military administrative aspects. 
The New Order used this discourse of ‘stability’ to legitimise the repression of individual civic rights and cultural differences, through its military and police forces, through ideological state apparatuses, and through citizenship education. In this regard its practices differed little from those of the former colonial power, and became institutionalised in the organisations and bureaucracy of independent Indonesia.

_Understanding the State, and State-Citizen Relations_

There has been much debate over _Pancasila_ and the notion of the _Negara Integralistik_ as the ideological basis of Indonesia (see, for example, Oesman and Alfian 1996). Kahin (1970) considered _Pancasila_ as a synthesis of Western democratic elements, modernist Islamic perspectives, and Marxist and local villages’ communitarian ideas. Many scholars share the general perspectives of Kahin. They regard _Pancasila_ as a pragmatic mix of very general principles suitable to the heterogeneous nature of Indonesia. Considerable criticism has been directed, however, at the use of _Pancasila_ ideology for authoritarian ends by New Order officials, and the effects of this on political structures. Adam Schwartz, for example, has criticised the application of _Pancasila_ as a ‘blanket over political activity’ which ‘has left political structures still standing but only weak foundations’. He argued that although its five principles are well-meaning and have no doubt helped moderate communal tensions, some New Order leaders have used them to stifle meaningful communication between the rulers and the ruled. Moreover, the consensus decision making that is practical at village level comes to be seen as obligatory agreement with the powerholders at national level. (Schwartz 1999:47).
The New Order regime revived the concept of *Negara Integralistik* with the introduction of *P4* in the late seventies. It is apparent that the regime considered that the concept, which emphasises the primacy of the state over any individuals and groups, suited its political interests. *Negara Integralistik* may be seen as a constitutive practice intended to sustain the hierarchic structures of Indonesia’s post-colonial society.

Nugroho Notosusanto brought *Negara Integralistik* to public attention in 1981 with his paper entitled ‘The Contribution of Prof. Dr. Supomo to the Formulation Process of *Pancasila*, Ideological Basis of the State and the 1945 Constitution’, presented at the Seminar on National History in Jakarta in 1981. He suggested that Supomo’s conception of the relationship between the individual and society had been well-contained in the ‘staatidee’. Supomo was subsequently entrusted with formulating the official explication to the 1945 Constitution, enshrining *Pancasila* and *Negara Integralistik* as the ideological basis of the state (Notosusanto 1984:78).

In 1989 Marsillam Simanjuntak questioned the *Negara Integralistik* concept in an undergraduate thesis, and subsequently in his book *Pandangan Negara Integralistik: Sumber, Unsur, dan Riwayatnya dalam Persiapan UUD 1945* (The Negara Integralistik Perspective: Its Sources, Elements and History in Preparing the National Constitution) (Simanjuntak 1994). In his view, the idea of *Negara Integralistik* that places the primacy of the state over individuals was derived from European fascism and led to the practice of authoritarianism and totalitarianism. David Bourchier’s subsequent work demonstrated the influence on *Negara Integralistik* of European and Japanese organicist thought, and
concluded that ‘integralism cannot be regarded as a natural outgrowth of indigenous constitutional form’ (Bourchier 1996:287). In response to these criticisms, Moerdiono argued for *Negara Integralistik* as suited to the people’s collectivist nature, and supported the incorporation of ‘familial spirit’ (*semangat kekeluargaan*) in the framework of integral ideology, and manifested in *Pancasila* and 1945 Constitution purely and consequently since 1966.’ (Moerdiono 1996a, 1996b, 1996c).

Besides *Pancasila* and *Negara Integralistik*, the emphasis on administration and economic development rather than on politics by the New Order regime has been argued to resemble Dutch colonial rule in the 1930s, which emphasised ‘the state as efficient bureaucratic machine’ or the *Beamtenstaat* (McVey 1982:84). Many commentators have also suggested Javanese influence, through reproduction of a system of bureaucratic patronage. Donald K. Emmerson (1976), for example, concluded that Indonesian political culture in the first decade of New Order rule was very strongly characterised by patron-client relationships. Robison (1982) suggests that this patron-client politics was only one dimension of the power and conflict in New Order Indonesia. He argued that any analysis of the New Order politics should take the real socioeconomic dimension into account. The New Order, as Robison (1982:146) asserts, is ‘itself a microcosm of the struggle between the patrimonial forms of the old enclave production and peasant social formation and the new regularized authoritarian form of an industrializing Indonesia’.

Feith (1980) considers that the bureaucratic state of post-colonial Indonesia which stressed economic-development has subsequently become repressive. Repressive
developmentalist regimes in many Asian countries, including Indonesia, are characterised by the strengthening of ideological themes of moral obligation to the state, such as national discipline, national unity, stability for national development, and by political manipulation which weakens and divides alternate power groups. Nationalism is often marked by an encouragement to return to traditional values. Such repressive-developmentalist regimes stress the importance of hierarchies, administration and management. They are suspicious of any political enthusiasm (Feith 1980). Considering the notions of bureaucratic states and neopatrimonial states, Dwight Y. King (1982) prefers to call New Order Indonesia a ‘bureaucratic authoritarian regime’. Moreover, bureaucratic polity in the post-Sukarno era was characterised by three major features as identified by Crouch (1980): firstly, political institutions which were dominated by the bureaucrats; secondly, parliament, political parties and interest groups whose ability to balance and control bureaucratic power was relatively weak, and thirdly, politically, the masses outside the bureaucracy were passive, as the political parties and interest groups were weak.

Islam and Civil Society

Many scholars have identified Islam as one of the influences shaping the post-colonial character of the Indonesian state and society (for example, Benda 1958, Geertz 1968, 1960, Hefner 2000, 1998a, 1998b, 1997a, 1997b, Lev 1972, Samson 1978). Since the formulation Pancasila as the ideological basis of the state, Islamic perspectives and doctrine have influenced the political behaviour and social values of society (see, for example, Yamin 1959).
The last two decades have seen significant changes in the approach to applying Islamic doctrine by Muslim intellectuals in Indonesia. Hikam (2000:222-226) identifies three streams. The first is those intellectuals who consider Islam as an *alternative approach*. To them, Islam is seen as a complete value-system, which should be applied as an alternative to the existing (citizenship) system. This may require structural change, such as that taken by Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran and Zia-ul Haq in Pakistan, including the establishment of Islamic banks and legal systems, and the imposition of an Islamic lifestyle to purify social behaviour and reject non-Islamic influences. This tends to create exclusiveness and sectarianism. Hikam believes that emphasising formal and legalistic Islamic principles will endanger the heterogeneous nature of Indonesian society. In Indonesia some people advocate the implementation of Islamic principles to counteract selective or non-existant compliance with the law by both the elite and the proletariat. Among those who fall into this category are: Imaduddin A.R, A.M. Saefuddin and Amien Rais.⁹

The second stream comprises those who apply a *cultural approach* to the process of spreading Islamic values through modernity and enlightenment in the Islamic community (*umma*). The foundation of this approach is rationality and contextualisation of Islamic teaching across time and space. Modernity should be carried out in accordance with Islamic values (*bernapaskan Islam*), but a rigid approach to the application of Islamic standards should be rejected. This cultural approach appeals to those who are in favour of modern life in accordance with Islamic values, notably the middle and middle-upper-
class Muslims. For Hikam, this approach overlooks the need for structural change to accommodate justice and equality in an Islamic context. This approach is particularly centred on Nurcholish Madjid’s thoughts and activities.\(^\text{10}\)

A third group favours a **social-cultural transformation approach**. These intellectuals accept the necessity of Islam as a cultural approach, but not the sole alternative. Islam will develop better if it complements other religions and ideologies. It should bring about a transformation of values suitable with modern needs, particularly for the poor and uneducated. Islam should play a role in the structural change in the society by means of the development of democratic values (Syura), egalitarianism, freedom, etc. This approach aims to empower those who are ‘powerless’ (mustadh’afin) among Muslims and non-Muslims alike. Intellectuals who fall into this category, such as Abdurrahman Wahid, Moeslim Abdurrahman and Djohan Effendi, believe they should cooperate with any social forces which aim to improve social structure and conditions. Their main agenda includes grass-roots democracy, political empowerment, and economic and educational improvement.

Secularisation emphasises the supremacy of science and technology (ratio rather than religious faith) and is often seen as undermining religious faith. If, as Gellner (1994b:xi) wrote, the ‘secularisation thesis does not apply to Islam’, then the notion of nation-state is not consistent with Islam. The Islamic concept of *dawlah* (state) does not imply a nation-state and the separation of powers, rather it implies power vested in the dynasty of a monarch, in the Arabic tradition a *malik, sultan*, or *syah*. The dynastic state or kingdom
(raj) is a ‘Dawlah Islamiyyah’, and its legitimacy derives not from its constitution, but from the Islamic faith of its ruler (Schumann 1999). The concept of nation-state has always been problematic for Islamic leaders and intellectuals. Islam recognises ‘Islamic brotherhood’ or ‘Ukhuwwah Islamiyyah’,11 and rejects tribalism and western nationalism as divisive.

Indonesia’s constitution declares it to be a modern nation-state, which accommodates cultural diversity by preferring the ‘familial spirit’ (semangat kekeluargaan) over the individualism and liberalism of Western modernism. Many respected Indonesian Muslim scholars and leaders agree with Nurcholish Madjid, one of Indonesia’s most respected Muslim intellectuals, who asserts that ‘We are fully of the opinion that modernisation is rationalisation which is supported by moral dimensions, grounded in the principles of faith in the One and Only God’ (Madjid 1987:187).12

Discussion of an Indonesian civil society, suggesting a public sphere which is free from family and state influence,13 began in the late 1980s, but this was at Monash University in Australia rather than in Indonesia. The late Professor Herbert Feith, a respected Indonesianist, invited a number of Indonesian intellectuals to a seminar. The most eminent of these was Professor Arief Budiman. The seminar’s theme, and the title under which its papers were published, was ‘State and Civil Society in Indonesia’ (Budiman 1990). Although many papers addressed issues of New Order capitalism, corporatism and the totalitarian state, Arief Budiman’s article gave a general account of the issues of civil society (see, for example, Rahardjo 1999 and Budiman 1990).
Since then, Muslim scholars and intellectuals in Indonesia have begun to discuss the *masyarakat madani* (*masyarakat* – people, or society; *madinah* - civil). It should be noted that while many people use this term, some Muslim scholars in Indonesia prefer to retain the name ‘civil society’ as conceived in the Western tradition (for example, see Hikam 2000, 1999). According to Schumann (1999), generally *madinah* refers to the place where *din* (religion) is upheld, particularly in the period of Prophet Mohammed, therefore *mustama madani* or civilised society gives a place to sincere non-believers. When *masyarakat madani* is debated it is generally understood as a utopian, idealised society which is free from state intervention, and is expected to bring justice to Indonesian people at large. Civil society is required for democracy to succeed because it promotes voluntary association, tolerance, equality, openness and human rights (for the features of civil society, see for example, Hall 1995, Gellner 1994a, Selligman 1992, Cohen and Arato 1992).

**Regional Cultures**

In addition to structural conditions, political interests and religious allegiances, it is essential to consider the influence of regional cultures on democratic citizenship in Indonesia. Local cultural values and practices still have a great influence on formal and informal, as well as governmental and non-governmental daily activities (Emmerson 1974). Politicised tribalism may become a major stumbling block in the development of an Indonesian ‘national culture’ unless the people of different ethnic and religious backgrounds work hand in hand (Koentjaraningrat 1974). Local cultures and practices
may undermine social cohesion and national identity, and thus the spirit of modern democracy.

Citizenship education in which Western republicanism is re-interpreted and adapted to suit post-colonial ‘local needs’ generates contradictory issues and civic knowledge ambivalence. The effort to inculcate a national identity, with citizenship education as one of its key strategies, is challenged by the fact that Indonesia’s national identity is in a process of ‘becoming’, rather than ‘being’. Identities that were regarded as fixed and stable, notably the dimensions of civic knowledge, are in fact dynamic.

What are the connections between the variables discussed above and the formal citizenship education program as described in last chapter? The next section looks at the literature on the institutions, practices and texts of citizenship education, and examines the evaluations which have been produced. This will allow an evaluation of the extent to which notions of the nature of state and those of education concur, and the consequential implications of this.

**Previous Studies on the Indonesian Citizenship Education Program**

There are two types of works on *PPKn*, non-textbook-based analysis and analysis of the textbooks. The first of these concerns a range of issues in the educational process, while the second generally deals with the production of civic knowledge through textbooks.
A survey of library catalogues, together with interviews with a number of educators on PPKn and policy experts at governmental institutions, suggests that sociological studies of PPKn are rare. This is particularly true of textbook-based studies. During the New Order period, research on PPKn was primarily related to teaching and learning material, methods and evaluation, with a common focus on the acquisition and development of social values. The works often addressed the values and the ‘elaboration’ of the values taught at schools, and the gradation of topics and values presented to students of different levels. Research was often specific to a particular geographic area and period of time.

The works often dealt with the time devoted to teaching and learning activities, the number of participants in a classroom, the workload to be covered and teacher’s expertise and experience, school facilities and resources, and the influences of local culture and practices. Examples of this type of work can be found in minor theses written by undergraduate students and a handful of postgraduate students at some Indonesian tertiary institutions, particularly at Teacher’s Colleges (formerly Institut Keguruan dan Ilmu Pendidikan or IKIP, now ‘universities of education’ or universitas pendidikan). These have been written from a pedagogical rather than critical perspective. Prior to the demise of the New Order regime, works critical of the dominant discourse would not have been unacceptable. They therefore document rather than question the New Order regime’s interpretation of civic ideals, as expressed by the thirty-six values of Pancasila set out in P4. They confine themselves to reporting the way these values are presented, rather than addressing the real problems.
For example, a Master’s thesis written by Chotimah (1994) entitled ‘Values Development in the Teaching of Pancasila in PPKn at State-owned Senior Secondary Schools in Bandung’ (Chotimah 1994) looks at how Pancasila values have been implemented at senior secondary schools. It was based on research carried out in state-owned senior secondary schools between May and October 1994. It suggests that because the time devoted to teaching PPKn in schools is limited, some extra-curricular activities should be introduced. It does not critically address the key issues, such as whether the values of Pancasila Democracy have been properly interpreted. If students are required to be tolerant and just, what do tolerance and justice mean for society today in a cosmopolitan city such as Bandung? Should they follow the government’s text book interpretation, or the example of the ruling elite, or the everyday practices of the population? Should they follow their religious beliefs? Or are there certain modern, secular standards that they can rely on?

After the fall of the New Order some scholars have began to write on the problems of PPKn, particularly in the context of proposals for educational reform in the last few years. Critical perspectives on the problems of PPKn have started to emerge.  

Non-Textbook-based Analysis

Muhammad Somantri is one of a handful of scholars who has analysed the problems of education since the early 1970s. Through his various decisive writings - republished in Somantri (2001) - Somantri traced problems in the formulation of the objectives and implementation of citizenship education in Indonesia, from the 1968 curriculum
(Pendidikan Kewarganegaraan) until the 1994 PPKn. Firstly, compared with the definitions and approaches developed in advanced democratic societies, particularly the United States, he concluded that the objectives of Indonesia’s citizenship education in the 1968 curriculum were too wide and the language defining them was too vague. This led to difficulties in implementing the curriculum. Winataputra (2001) concurred that the vagueness of the objectives of citizenship education in Indonesia has lingered for nearly four decades (1962-1998), and considered it as a conceptual crisis which subsequently induced an operational crisis in curricular programs. This crisis or dislocation (Kuhn 1970) was compounded by ineffectual teaching methods, and the fact that school has been generally viewed as a ‘socio-political institution’ (Somantri 2001; Winataputra 2001).

Secondly, rote-learning was the main teaching technique. As Somantri observed, since education was generally perceived as political indoctrination, there was a tendency to implement the ‘method of authority’. The teacher acted as the sole authority in the classroom, being the person who knew best about the educational material. This restricted students’ opportunities to discuss and reflect on the material. The converse of this is the ‘authority of method’, where the teacher effectively facilitates students’ learning in a communicative way.

Thirdly, according to Somantri, Indonesian citizenship education encouraged students to become ‘good citizens’ by incorporating material on nationalisn, patriotism and ethics, as well as religious and cultural issues consistent with the state ideology, Pancasila and
the 1945 constitution. However, over-emphasised the political issues of the state, which he refers to the ‘Great Oughts’, hence neglecting the students’ personal needs (Somantri 2001). Somantri’s work generally focused on the strategic issues of Indonesian citizenship education and/or PPKn, such as the objectives and components of PPKn, and the relation of PPKn to other social science subjects.

Writing from a position intended to differentiate their newly proposed model of citizenship education from PPKn, Suryadi and Somardi (2000) and Winataputra (1999) argued that PPKn was used for political indoctrination or values inculcation, rather than serving as an educational medium for the development of intelligent citizens. Azis-Wahab (2001, 2000, 1999) maintained that PPKn was employed as one of the New Order regime’s strategies to preserve its power. For these scholars, PPKn was delivered in a ‘top-down’ model of education where the past regime was the sole interpreter of social meanings, including the principles of the nation’s philosophy, constitution, cultural values and history. Students had no freedom to interpret and reflect on their social life. Since the process of education was in the form of rote-learning, students had to swallow the civic knowledge constructed and dictated by the authority. As a result, there was a cognitive dissonance between students’ knowledge of their social life gained from the school subject, and the reality that they encountered outside school (Azis-Wahab 2002). Furthermore, fundamental social and political concepts were conflated in past citizenship education, such that ‘nation’, ‘state’ and ‘government’ were used interchangeably to serve the New Order’s political interests (Azis-Wahab 2002).
These studies of PPKn highlight two major issues. First, the political interests of the past regime were expressed through the education. Secondly, the problems of educational process were influenced by the policy of the regime. Political interests were not separated from the educational process. Djiwandono (1998) contends that the broad education policy was underpinned by the New Order’s political agenda, and that this hampered the entire national learning process. Most importantly, the objectives of citizenship education were not clear. Rather than its stated intent of enhancing the quality of human resources for national development, PPKn was constructed as a means to serve the regime in the name of national interests rather than the interests of individual.

Udin S. Winataputra is the author of the sole doctoral thesis on Indonesian citizenship education written to date, entitled ‘The Identity of Citizenship Education as a Systemic Vehicle of Democratic Education’ (Jatidiri Pendidikan Kewarganegaraan sebagai Wahana Sistemik Pendidikan Demokrasi) (Winataputra 2001). As the title suggests, Winataputra set out to map various aspects of citizenship issues, treating curricular programs and non-curricular programs as a unified system. He proposed that citizenship education in Indonesia should be viewed as an integrated knowledge system, rather than a school subject. It should systematically and coherently encompass scientific works, curricular programs, and social and cultural citizenship movements. Winataputra proposed ninety points of citizenship competency to be adopted in the development of a program of citizenship education for teachers (Winataputra 2001).
**Textbook-based Analysis**

Research on the production of civic knowledge in Indonesian government textbooks based on sociological and linguistic perspectives has been very limited. The three scholars who have written in this way on Indonesian school textbooks, namely Leigh (1991), Mulder (2000, 1999a, 1999b, 1996) and Parker (2002, 1992) are all non-Indonesian. Leigh and Parker’s writings were published in academic journals. Mulder’s 1996 and 2000 writings form part of his analyses of Indonesian and Javanese cultures published in the form of books, and his 1999 works are academic articles translated into Indonesian and published in a local educational journal.

**Leigh: Weak Classification, Strong Framing**

Applying Basil Bernstein’s theoretical framework of the ‘Classification and Framing of Educational Knowledge’ (Bernstein 1974), Leigh (1991) examined various secondary school textbooks, including the ones on citizenship education, used throughout Indonesia and published between 1975 and 1989. According to Bernstein, classification refers to the relationship between the various content items (subjects or courses) which are taught and learned at schools. Where classification is strong, contents are well insulated from each other by strong boundaries. Where classification is weak there is reduced insulation between contents. Classification is explicitly related to power and control components (Bernstein 1974). Framing relates to the boundary between the non-school, everyday community knowledge and the educational knowledge transmitted in the pedagogical relationship (Leigh 1991), and concerns the boundaries between what may and may not be transmitted. Where framing is strong, there is a sharp boundary, and when it is weak,
the boundary between what may and may not be transmitted is blurred. Framing also points to power and control components (Bernstein 1974).

Leigh found out that there was weak classification and strong framing within the content of the nationally oriented subjects in Indonesian school education. She argued that in Indonesia’s case, there was propagation of the dominant Pancasila Democracy ideology of the New Order regime. The overlap between subjects, leading to a situation of weak classification, was encouraged. The strong framing situation in Indonesian education system meant that the students had reduced power to determine what knowledge they received, and when and how they received it. Strong framing ‘increases the teacher’s and text’s power in the pedagogical relationship’ (Leigh 1991:21).16

**Mulder: Weak Theoretical Approach, Strong Symbolism**

Niels Mulder’s writings on *PPKn* are based on primary-level textbooks (Mulder 1999a, 1999b) and primary and secondary textbooks (Mulder 2000, 1996). He focused on the issues surrounding individual (selves), community or society and state, and the inter-relation of the three. Mulder found a number of weaknesses in the school textbooks, and concluded that they are not based on sound social theory. For example, in discussing the relationships between the individual and society, the writers fail to distinguish between the private and public spheres. Mulder also argued that symbolism, largely derived from Javanese culture, was widely used in the textbooks to regulate the conduct of students.
First, he showed that the written discourse enforces obligations for the sake of the collective in the name of national interests, through an emphasis on the primacy of orderliness, equilibrium and oneness over potential conflicts and differences (Mulder 2000, 1996). Conflict should not exist in society because it brings disharmony. As long as individuals submit, there will be no clash of interests (Mulder 2000, 1999b). Secondly, the life that an individual and a community leads has been constructed so that it emerges naturally. For example, social welfare, peace and prosperity flow from the individual’s conformity with public interests, i.e. supremacy of public interests over individual interests. The mistakes individuals make are attributed to their inappropriate values. These are a personal responsibility, and not the product of society (Mulder 2000, 1999b). Thirdly, symbols of the state and state institutions have a kind of self-fulfilling force and sacred status. When the concepts of ‘serasi’, ‘selaras’ and ‘seimbang’ (all with the sense of ‘harmony’) are invoked, then all issues are settled, and no further questions should be posed. Many formulaic words or mantras are so powerful that they legitimate ideology. Using these words automatically solves the problem (Mulder 2000, 1999b). As noted by Azis-Wahab (2002, 2001, 2000), Mulder (1999b) also reported a widespread overlapping of material from one topic or lesson to another, and an excessive repetition of the same words, concepts and discourse, making lessons very boring for students.

**Parker: Dominant Ideology and Subjectification**

Parker’s analysis was based on her observations in Balinese schools, and on analysis of primary school textbooks on citizenship education for Balinese students, mainly those produced by private writers (Parker 2002, 1992). Parker’s work, *The Subjectification of*
Citizenship: Student Interpretations of School Teachings in Bali’ (Parker 2002), can be viewed as a continuation of her article entitled ‘The Creation of Indonesian Citizens in Balinese Primary Schools’ (Parker 1992), in which some of the material (particularly citizenship education) is repeated. Parker (particularly 1992) saw the ‘meeting of state and society in the classroom’ (Parker 1992:43). She examined the ‘subjectification’ of citizenship. In Indonesia’s case, subjectification is the process of educating students in Indonesian citizenship not by a transmission of ‘facts’ and national values, but through an open-ended process, the end-product of which cannot be predicted. Parker (2002:5) explained that:

Subjectification assumes that individuals invent themselves through their inter-subjective experience with others. Through the subjective experience of social life, individuals constitute social groupings, in an historical process. Individuals are both the subjects and the objects of their own actions. Realising this helps us to understand how societies change. Subjectification implies both agency and reproduction. It implies many processes, perhaps as many processes as there are subject-children.

Parker proposed that the dominant discourse of citizenship education that portrays ‘Indonesia-ness’ has a transforming force on local students, although this does not mean resistance is non-existent. She noted that many aspects of education constitute ‘foreign innovation’ which is ‘beyond the control’ of the local students. Indonesian citizenship education emphasises the principles of the nation’s Pancasila philosophy, the primacy of national interests, and prioritises national development over local cultures and interests. This has created ‘two disjunctive worlds’ (Parker 1992:68). On one hand students must absorb the ‘hidden curriculum’ of schools taught in the national language which represents a ‘new and strange world’. On the other hand, in their every day life outside the classroom, they find their ‘familiar world’ where they speak in their own language.
She argued that citizenship education has successfully taught about both the Integral State (*Negara Integralistik*) and about authorised intolerance, whereby only five religions were officially recognised in the New Order period, despite the incompatibility of the two discourses (Parker 2002, 1992).

Like Mulder, Parker wrote that ‘student knowledge of the symbols, structures and form of the Indonesian state was considerable’ (Parker 2002:33). She identified the problems of paternalism; for example, in Suharto’s Indonesia, ‘citizens were not born, they had to be made, and schools existed for this purpose’ (Parker 2002:9, Parker 1992:42-43). Parker noted the repetition of certain words or expressions, rote-learning and drilling as the main techniques in the teaching and learning process. She also noted many ambiguities in the body of knowledge, including exercises using vague and confusing multiple-choice questions.

**Assessment of Textbook Analyses**

Of the three scholars who have analysed the school textbooks, Niels Mulder problematised the excessive use of cultural symbolism, norms and hierarchies, principally Javanese ethics and worldview, as a ‘civic identification’. Mulder has aptly pointed out the imposition of Javanese culture in the *PPKn* textbooks. For many Javanese, the texts might be read as ‘a natural thing’, but not for non-Javanese who do not share the same tradition. Mulder has rightly pointed to many other significant cultural aspects of *PPKn*. Parker has also raised many important issues surrounding the school citizenship textbooks. Her analysis (Parker 2002) of ‘subjectification’ has shown that the national
The works on Indonesian citizenship examined so far fall into three main categories: political, pedagogical and cultural. The three groups share the perspective that the failure of *PPKn* has been caused by the regime’s authoritarian policy, differing only in emphasis of analysis and critique. To a political scientist such as J. Soedjati Djiwandono, political decisions underlie the whole educational policy and process. The lack of vision, mission and objectives of educational policy have led to the failure of the country’s citizenship education and education at large. Educationalists like Abdul Azis-Wahab, Udin Winataputra and Ace Suryadi, expressed no doubt that the failure of *PPKn* is due to the New Order regime’s policy of indoctrination before education. However, this could be repaired by reformulating the objectives and pedagogical process of citizenship education (see Chapter 7 of this thesis). To anthropologists such as Niels Mulder, Lynn Parker and Barbara Leigh, *PPKn* is a cultural product of the New Order regime.

Analysts of citizenship education of both types, textbook based and non-textbook based, have focused on the exercise of political power by the state through education, and the premeditated, top-down creation of good citizen. Niels Mulder’s view of the influence of Javanese culture in the text concurs with the views of certain political analysts, such as Benedict Anderson and Donald K. Emmerson. Parker’s analysis of subjectification adds a new dimension to the authoritarian, developmental and bureaucratic models of the state argued by Herbert Feith and Ruth McVey. However this overlooks the issues reviewed at
the beginning of this chapter, including the type of state, the colonial history and its residue, and the place of religion. Parker, Mulder and Leigh have not considered the fact that citizenship values are not indigenous\textsuperscript{18}, nor have they considered the importance of Islamic perspectives in Indonesian politics, as noted by scholars such as Harry Benda, Clifford Geertz, Daniel Lev, Robert Hefner and Allan Samson. Islamic perspectives have had a significant impact on the construction of the civic ideal in post-colonial Indonesia. While the non-textbook analysts acknowledge the imposition of the concept of *Negara Integralistik, Pancasila* and the 1945 Constitution as the framework of New Order citizenship, the three textbook analysts have not taken these factors into account. Furthermore, none of the analysts has explored the complex interplay of factors at work in the way concepts are expressed the textbooks, and their reception and internalisation by students. All writers see an authoritarian regime controlling its citizens in its own interests rather than theirs.

By raising issues surrounding the constitution of the civic ideal in Indonesian school textbooks, Parker, Mulder and Leigh have contributed to the study of Indonesian citizenship and citizenship education. However there is also need for further critical research to explore what the regime has viewed as ‘a stock of knowledge’ or ‘resources’ (Giddens 1984) that can be used to legitimate its ideological hegemony. Imposed cultural and structural conditions have been reproduced as ‘norms’ which have chained students, rather empowering them to be ‘good democratic citizens’ in their interaction with others in modern society.
We have seen that theories of democratic citizenship such as liberalism, republicanism and communitarianism cannot be directly used as an analytic tool in a pluralist post-colonial society such as Indonesia. These theories, which were conceived and developed in advanced democratic and liberal societies, are of limited value under post-colonial conditions, where different cultural groups may have different views of the common good.

In his analysis of Indonesian citizenship education, Winataputra (2001) wrote of intraceptive and extraceptive knowledge. ‘Intraceptive knowledge’ is based on the objectives of the state and national education. It refers to both the agreed principles and plans for implementation. ‘Extraceptive knowledge’ is based on the structures of social sciences, and contextualised in the life of a particular society or nation-state (Winataputra 2001). While civic knowledge in citizenship education is primarily derived from the objectives of the state and national education, it is however contextualised. To relate this contextualisation of civic knowledge to the above discussion on the role of the past regime’s establishment of ideological hegemony, we can pose a question: what are the patterns of influence on the ‘contextualisation’ of the education?

The forces that shaped the PPKn writers’ thinking and knowledge have not been explored by any of the analysts cited above. A detailed critical analysis is needed of the PPKn textbooks to examine the forces that shaped the production of the texts, and the way these texts in turn represent a social reality that is likely to influence student thinking. This study will employ concepts of citizenship, including rights and duties, integration and
conflict, tolerance and justice, to analyse the New Order ideological hegemony manifested in the *PPKn*. It will examine the cultural and structural conditions under which the contextualisation of democratic citizenship and the establishment of political indoctrination have been made possible. It will also consider the discourse which has been employed in articulating the ideologies. To facilitate the analysis, extracts from various secondary school *PPKn* textbooks will be used to reveal how civic ideals have been constituted to regulate the social conduct of Indonesian students. This assessment of the issues and problems surrounding civic ideals in *PPKn* will allow discussion of the potential challenges to the new citizenship education.

Recent citizenship studies have taken human rights as their central focus (Turner 1999, Cogan 1998). My contention is that if we are to study democratic citizenship and citizenship education in Indonesia in relation to human rights, the first step is to consider the interplay of authority, structure and culture in post-colonial Indonesia. By studying the conditions under which the past regime has established its ideological hegemony and drawn upon the local cultures to maintain the status quo, we can identify the links between citizenship, civil rights and human rights. It is also my contention that democracy can be inculcated through formal education, such as citizenship education, however its social-cultural meanings should be thoroughly interpreted and discussed before they are presented as civic knowledge to be consumed by students.
Concluding Remarks

This chapter has shown how ambivalent civic knowledge has resulted both from political interests and the societal conditions of post-colonial Indonesia. Political analyses have proposed various ways in which the complex structural features of Indonesian state have influenced ideologies of citizenship. Studies of educational structures and material have linked their characteristics with the interests of political regimes, but have not considered the way structural conditions have impinged on educational processes and their reception.

This is the focus of the coming chapters.

Note

1 Also, see, for example, Greenfeld (1992).

2 ‘Sesudah penguasaan politik kaum penjajah berhasil dipatahkan, perubahan-perubahan struktur sosial tidak terasa mendesak lagi. Apalagi struktur itu juga berkaitan dengan kepentingan ekonomi elite politik. Dapat ditambahkan bahwa pada umumnya struktur-struktur kekuasaan ekonomis tidak mudah dapat diubah. Stabilisasi keadaan politik mendapat prioritas utama, padahal hal tersebut hanya dapat tercapai dengan dukungan golongan-golongan yang menguasai bidang ekonomi.

Kemudian mulailah suatu tahap pembangunan ekonomi yang dalam kebanyakan negara berkembang ditandai dengan pemasukan modal luar negeri, baik swasta maupun negara. Bahwa modal itu membangun pelbagai ketergantungan baru tidak cepat-cepat dilihat. Ketergantungan itu sering dijuluki sebagai kolonialisme ekonomis atau neokolonialisme.’

3 ‘Yang dapat menjamin syarat-syarat itu hanyalah elite-elite kekuasaan dalam negara-negara berkembang. Sedangkan elite-elite itu melalui modal asing itu sanggup untuk menikmati tingkat konsumsi mewah serta memperoleh peralatan teknis yang amat mahal yang diperlukan untuk menguasai situasi dari segi administrasi sipil dan militer.’

4 Some of the ideas contributing to the notion of Negara Integralistik are as follows (Simanjuntak 1994:130-187). First, the emphasis on ‘oneness’ in Spinoza’s works, Tractatus Theologico-Politicus and Ethics, namely there is only true substance in this universe (a sort of monism or pantheism) in which every thing is united, rather than the duality of mind and matter as suggested by René Descartes. Secondly, the natural rights of the individual are to be defended. They are not derived from reason, but determined and guided by desire and power. The rights and freedoms of an individual are not vested in the state, but they have been absorbed by it. Thus, sovereignty is vested in the state, and the individual seeks protection from it (which reminds us of Hobbesian state of nature as discussed in Chapter 2). Third, like Spinoza, Adam Muller’s Die Elemente der Staatskunst also suggests that the whole life of an individual is part of the state, and the dynamic of the state always influences the individual. He opposed the idea of individualism and rationalism as well as the liberalism of the European Enlightenment. Muller believed that the state is not mechanically constructed by human beings, but rather it grows naturally as an organism like human beings. As a romantic thinker, he also held that human beings are not equal, as argued by the libertarians. In the
inequality of their capabilities, individuals have the freedom to develop themselves according to their own diverse backgrounds.

Fourth, Hegel’s idea rests on his thesis of absolute idealism, the truth is the idea rather than fact. The state is the creation of the idea. It is the most sophisticated structure of society. The state is the manifestation of the absolute idea, which is the highest level in the development of human’s soul. In relation to Hegel’s famous dialectic, it is thus possible to consider rights as a thesis, morality as the anti-thesis, and social ethic as the synthesis. Or, family is regarded as a thesis, society (civil society) as the anti-thesis, and the state as the synthesis. In Hegel’s view, the state holds the right to determine the right or wrong about the nature of the state, morality and immorality, and good and evil. Fifth, rationality is judged by power.

Thus, Spinoza, Muller and Hegel assert the primacy of the state over the individual (individual rights). Individuals lose their rights to the state. This view of the nature of state in relation to individuals inspired fascism in Germany in the first part of last century. It was embraced by regimes in post-colonial Indonesia, which argued that it matches Indonesian cultural values. The practice of placing the primacy of the state over individuals has contributed to shaping the authoritarian state of Indonesia. (Also see Magnis-Suseno 1992).

The problem of the idea of ‘integral society’ derived from Hegel, Spinoza and Adam Muller, which gave rise to the practice of fascism in Germany, was also confirmed by one of the senior officers directly involved in P4 training, whom I interviewed on 30 October 2002, namely informant (A) (Also see Chapter 8). However, he categorically denied that authoritarianism and fascism were a deliberate construct of the New Order regime. Rather, as he asserted, it was an unintended consequences of the political process. He also argued that every regime has its interests.

King (1982:110) wrote about ‘a regime which deliberately cultivates a multiple legitimacy base - a calculated mixture of traditional, charismatic, legal and substantive-rational, and technical efficiency principles […] In the bureaucratic-authoritarian model, ultimate authority resides in an oligarchy or the military as an institution, rather than exclusively in an individual ruler. Where a group of military men or the military as an institution hold power, they adopt a technocratic, bureaucratic approach to policy making’

As Hamzah Alavi (1972) has pointed out, one of the distinctive features of the post-colonial state is that it is inclined to weaken any classes in the society, whether they are the peasants, the landlords or the bourgeoisie. The state does not belong to the bureaucrats. It is no longer the umpire of the struggle between the dominant class and the working class. Rather it becomes an expression of the specific formation of the processes of class struggles and general accumulation of capital (Alavi 1972).

Patrimonialism does not exclusively refer to Javanese culture, but it is often attributed to Islam. For example, Max Weber’s historical research on Islam shows that Islamic ancient cities were controlled by patrimonial rulers in the continuity of fissiparous clan and tribal organisations (Turner 1974).

In the Indonesian archipelago the four major schools of Sunni Islam are Syafeii, Maliki, Hambali and Hanafi. There are also other schools of thought. Each of the schools differs in its specific interpretations of Islamic teaching.

Other Muslim intellectuals who can be considered as belonging to this category are those who propose that Islamic law (Syari’ah) - either wholly or partly - should be applied in Indonesia, such as Yusril Ihza Mahendra of Crescent Moon Star Party (Partai Bulan Bintang), and Hidayat Nur Wahid and Tifatul Sembiring of the Justice Welfare Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera). Also see Hefner (1997b).

Komaruddin Hidayat of Pendidikan Madania who works closely with Nurcholish Madjid is an example of an intellectual who strongly supports the ideas.
In Turkey, for example, despite some resistance, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk established a secular state.

Kita sepenuhnya berpendapat bahwa modernisasi ialah rasionalisasi yang ditopang oleh dimensi-dimensi moral, dengan berpijak pada prinsip iman kepada Tuhan Yang Maha Esa’ (Madjid 1987:187)

Civil society has been described differently by different scholars. Cohen and Arato (1992:ix) proposed a definition of civil society as a ‘sphere of social interaction between economy and state, composed of above all the intimate sphere (especially the family), the sphere of associations (especially voluntary associations), social movements and forms of public communication.’ Another description of civil society is that of Ernest Gellner (1994a:32) who defined civil society as ‘that set of diverse non-governmental institutions, which is strong enough to counterbalance the state, and, whilst not preventing the state major interests, can nevertheless prevent the state from dominating and atomizing the rest of society.’ In his celebrated work Gellner (1994a:12) proposed that civil society is ‘a society in which polity and economy are distinct, where polity is instrumental but can and does check extremes of individual interest, but where the state is in turn checked by institutions with an economic base; it relies on economic growth which, by requiring cognitive growth which makes ideological monopoly impossible.’ These broad descriptions of civil society also encompass what some scholars refer to as the triplicate values of freedom, equality and tolerance in social interaction (see, for example, Hefner 1998b).

Teacher’s Comments on the Problems of PPKn, compiled recently by the Curriculum Center, Ministry of National Education (Unpublished Paper). For a range of problems in citizenship education for primary levels, see Nurlaili (1999). Many of the problems surrounding the educational process have repeated themselves over the last three decades. As early as the 1970s, Muhammad Somantir (Somantri 2001) pointed out various problems in the citizenship education within the Kurikulum 1968 that are also found in recent school texts. They include the vagueness of objectives, the ‘excessive’ or too complex materials to be covered, the method of teaching that emphasises drilling and memorisation. The vagueness of objectives - we might assume - was caused by the New Order regime’s desire to inculcate its interpretation of the state’s ideology and constitution. This was worsened by the overlap in the teaching of material already covered in subjects such as National History and Geography. The method of teaching which Somantri has suggested should be an ‘authority of method’, with the emphasis on discussion and problem solving as well as self-reflective activities, has eventuated as a ‘method of authority’ in which teachers became a sort of extreme propagandist, expecting students to swallow whatever is written or said, and to use their emotions rather than reason in absorbing the material.

Cf., for example, a thesis written by Endang Sumantri Nawawi (1988) entitled ‘Citizenship Training for Steady National Development: A Case Study of the P-4 Training Program for the Students of Higher Education in West Java’ (Unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Massachusetts, U.S.A.). Sumantri-Nawawi’s focus is the P-4 training program, while Udin Winataputra’s work is, in a strict sense: citizenship education

Partly quoting Bernstein’s statement, Leigh (1991:21) asserts that ‘It is this situation of strong framing which is present in the Indonesian education system. A centralized curriculum, national examinations with right and wrong answers in all subjects, and nationally recommended texts each contribute to the strength of the boundary between school knowledge and out-of-school knowledge. The degree to which framing occurs can therefore be seen as “the degree of control teacher and pupil possess over the selection, organization and pacing of the knowledge transmitted and received in a pedagogical relationship” (Bernstein 1974:50). Where there is little control by either teacher or taught, and options for deviation are limited, the frame is strong.’

Anderson is saying something like this in relation to the old colonials (the Dutch) rather than the neocolonials of today. Speaking about bilingual colonial subjects, Benedict Anderson observed that the leap from the language of the home into that of the coloniser means the development of two interacting or conflicting modes of consciousness, which required bilingual cultural middlemen to control two mental universes (Anderson 1966:90).
Citizenship is a new ‘instrument’ for most Indonesian people for making sense of their new social world, and the practices of ‘modernity’. The adoption of Western-derived concept of citizenship may be viewed as abrupt because many Indonesian who still hold their local cultural values (tradition) tightly have not undergone a long (and gradual) process like people in the older states. For example, Dayak Kenyah, Dani and Kubu, living in the remote parts of respectively: Kalimantan, Irian Jaya and Sumatera may have never thought about a national identity based on modern citizenship, vis-à-vis their individual or group identity in their communities. Such people may be considered ‘stateless’ in modern citizenship.
CHAPTER 5
THE DISCOURSE OF RIGHTS AND DUTIES
IN PANCASILA AND CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION (PPKn) TEXTBOOKS

Introduction
Chapter 3 discussed how the post-colonial ruling elite formulated the nation’s ideological basis, and thus the basis and nature of citizenship education programs. Although state ideological values have changed with changing political and social conditions, they have always been the primary determinant of the ideological values of education, and have consistently been employed by the successive regimes to construct the ideal citizen. This chapter and the next examine how the Indonesian civic ideal has been constituted and narrated in the student textbooks of citizenship education. First, I will briefly discuss the material to be used and how it is organised for analysis, and then I will provide a brief review of the international understanding of the concept of rights and duties. This will allow an illustration of the specific nature of the discourse of rights and duties in the PPKn textbooks. This critical analysis of PPKn texts will explore the extent to which the dominant civic ideal is enacted, reproduced and restricted in the written discourse. In will locate the texts within the social, cultural, economic and political context of the times in order to better understand how they were received by students.
Texts of PPKn for Use in the Analysis

The PPKn textbooks to be analysed here were used between 1994 and 2004. They consist of:

- Three books for junior secondary schools (Sekolah Lanjutan Tingkat Pertama or SLTP), to be used by students from Class 1 to Class 3 at junior secondary level.
- Three books for senior secondary schools (Sekolah Lanjutan Tingkat Atas or SLTA), to be used by students from Class 1 to Class 3 at senior secondary level.

The time devoted to the teaching of each topic (pokok bahasan) differs between levels and classes. The school year consists of three terms (caturwulan), each of about three months. The curriculum allocates two hours per week to each lesson, however in practice teachers may organise their classes according to the nature and material of each topic, its level of difficulty and importance, and the needs of the students.¹

As noted in Chapter 2, the constituent concepts of citizenship referred to in this chapter are drawn from the contemporary international discourse of citizenship education. They are external categories derived from political science and sociology, primarily the interrelated notions of rights and duties, responsibilities, entitlements, participation and identity. In the course of this analysis the related issues of order and integration or unity, conflict, disorder and change, and diversity, tolerance and justice, are also discussed.

In the textbooks, a single aspect of civic knowledge is often presented as only part of a lesson. Discussion of it is seldom exhaustive, and is spread across several lessons in
different classes and school levels. For example, issues of rights and duties are discussed at both junior and senior secondary levels, often as part of topics such as ‘Obedience’, ‘Awareness’, or ‘Public Interest’. They are not the sole focus of any single lesson. Consequently, I have extracted text from different lessons and books in order to analyse the PPKn discussion of rights and duties.

**Organisation of the Discussion**

Issues of civic ideals or citizenship are complex and inter-related. This chapter discusses the discourse of rights and duties of the Pancasila and PPKn textbooks, and the following chapter will address the discourse of unity in diversity. This division is based on PPKn’s objective of regulating two dimensions of citizenship, namely vertical relations, being the relationships between the state and its citizens, and horizontal relations, between citizen and citizen. These are overlapping rather than discrete areas.

The discussion of rights and duties in this chapter explores civil liberty issues, such as freedom of speech and equality before the law, and arguments derived from the 1945 Constitution. The next chapter (‘Unity in Diversity’), will discuss individualism and collectivism, universalism and particularism, conflict-change-disorder and consensus-cohesion-order, as well as cultural diversity, tolerance and justice. The issues of justice discussed in this chapter are also relevant to the issues of minorities and gender (or the distributive aspects of justice) discussed in Chapter 6, as an extension of this chapter’s analysis of social and cultural rights.
As noted, references to the rights and duties of citizens are scattered throughout different chapters of different PPKn textbooks at both junior and senior secondary level. The PPKn writers frequently digress from the topic suggested by the chapter title, resulting in unfocussed discussion. While many chapters contain only one or two sentences directly related to the issues at hand, focussed discussion of rights and duties is found in the textbook for Junior Secondary (SLTP) Class 3, Lesson 2 on ‘Awareness’ and, to a certain extent, Senior Secondary (SLTA) Class 2, lesson 9 on ‘Responsibility’. My discussion of rights and duties is drawn from these, and from references scattered through the texts listed below. These have been selected because they help to illustrate the distinctive features of the issues. The textbooks used are as follows:

- Junior Secondary (SLTP) Class 3, pages 6 – 16 on ‘Awareness.’ The text is taken from page 6 for a general overview of the issues of rights and duties;
- Junior Secondary (SLTP) Class 3, pages 6 – 16 on ‘Awareness.’ The text is taken from pages 7 - 8 for discussion of political rights;
- Senior Secondary (SLTA) Class 2, pages 61-75 on ‘Responsibility.’ The texts are taken from pages 64 – 67 for discussion of rights to vote;
- Junior Secondary (SLTP) Class 3, pages 6-22 on ‘Responsibility.’ The text is taken from page 64 for discussion of rights to political organisation;
- Junior Secondary (SLTP) Class 3, pages 6 – 16 on ‘Awareness.’ The text is taken from page 8 and page 10 for discussion of economic rights;
- Junior Secondary (SLTP) Class 3, pages 6 – 16 on ‘Awareness.’ The text is taken from page 12 for discussion of social rights;
As its name suggests, PPKn is a combination of citizenship education and moral education, dealing with the issues of social consciousness and individual morality as a member of a society. Because the main focus of this study is citizenship as a state-citizen relationship, and to some extent the relationship between citizens, the mechanics of building good character or daily civility will only be discussed in relation to the construction of the civic ideal and the regulation of the individual’s social behavior.

Rights and Duties
In order to bring out the specific nature of the discourse of rights and duties in the PPKn educational material, it is useful to review international understandings of the concepts involved. In what follows, I would like to briefly sketch the concept of obligations, duties, human rights, civil rights, liberties and contractual rights.

The concept of ‘obligations’ is often related to the discussion of rights and duties. In his Rights and Reason, Ethics in Theory and Practice, Austin Fagothey (1972) suggested that obligations are responsibilities resulting from human behavior. Human beings have individual choice or freedom, but are held morally responsible for their actions. Human actions are inherently associated with moral reasoning. However, individuals cannot be always held responsible for their behaviour. Responsibilities might be modified because of ignorance, fear, passion, force and habit. As with obligations, duties entail moral
necessities, but are additionally identified with legal obligations or responsibilities. As duties are legally enforceable, failure to carry out one’s duties may result in (legal) sanction. ‘Sanction means the promise of reward for keeping the laws or the threat of punishment for breaking the law, or both. It also means the reward or punishments themselves.’ (Fagothey 1972:136). Since the concept of ‘duties’ encompasses what is connoted by obligations, I make use of the term (as a dichotomous-pair concept of rights) in place of ‘obligations’ or ‘responsibilities’ throughout this thesis. In this thesis, rights are used to cover both legal and moral rights as discussed below.

Generally, rights refer to advantages to which an individual has a just moral or legal claim. Rights are usually concerned with issues of power, legitimacy and justice. As discussed in Chapter 2, there are two major perspectives regarding the issues of rights in the modernist project. Libertarians believe that individuals deserve rights and choices which are generally independent of their social environment, and in particular are free from state intervention. By contrast, republicans (largely including conservative communitarians) hold that an entitlement to individual rights does not diminish one’s duties towards the community. In this view, the state is expected to play a greater role in society to maintain social and moral order. In political theory, many types of rights are identified. Cranston (1973), for example, made a distinction between legal rights and moral rights. This positivist perspective holds that legal rights are established by reference to law and can only be enforced by a court. Conversely, moral rights cannot be set by the legal system, as their validity derives from social and cultural practices. In this context, human rights or natural rights arising out of modernist project are viewed as
moral rights, the validity of which does not depend on the enforcement of the legal system.

Since 1948 human rights have been outlined in the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights. This declaration is both morally and legally employed to protect and promote the attributes that allow people to function as true human beings. Alongside human rights, civil rights refer to the claims by individuals within a political community or a state, which are recognised and regulated by legal systems. One of the classic classifications of rights is Wesley Hohfeld’s work entitled *Fundamental Legal Conceptions* (1919/1964). Hohfeld considered there are four types of rights, namely liberties, claims, immunities and powers. Liberties are rights that do not impose specific duties on any one. A claim exists only when there is a duty on someone else. Immunity refers to an exemption granted to someone by law. Powers refers to the rights of political institutions to determine someone’s rights. Hart (1967) proposed two types of rights: special rights which exist because of agreements between individuals that justify the limitation of another’s freedom, and general rights which exist in the absence of specific rights, where individuals have the right not to be coerced. Other theories of and approaches to the concept of rights have been discussed and debated by scholars, particularly within the feminist and liberal as well as the communitarian tradition. Some of these will be touched on in my discussion in this chapter and the following one.
Sources and Conception of Indonesian Citizenship in PPKn Textbooks

Citizenship in Indonesia is legally based on the 1945 Constitution (Undang-Undang Dasar 1945). Chapter X, Article 26, section (1) of the Constitution states that ‘citizens shall be native-born Indonesians, and those who take out naturalisation papers.’ Section (2) of the article also states that ‘matters affecting citizenship shall be provided by law.’ Chapter 27, section (1) states that ‘all citizens shall have the same status in law and in the government and shall, without exception, respect the law and government.’ Section (2) states that ‘every citizen shall have the right to work and to expect a reasonable standard of living.’ Article 28, further states that ‘freedom of assembly and the right to form unions, freedom of speech and of the press and similar freedoms shall be provided by law.’ These rights and duties of citizens are stated from Chapter X to Chapter XIV (Article 26 – Article 34), a part specifically devoted to determining the relationship between the state and citizens of Indonesia. Rights are also mentioned in Chapter XI, Article 29 (on religious matters), Chapter XII, Article 30 (on security affairs), Chapter XIII, Article 31 and 32 (on educational issues) and Chapter XIV, Article 33 (on social welfare).

As indicated in these five chapters of the Constitution, the concept of Indonesian citizenship is first and foremost based on Hobbesian sovereignty and order, and Lockean or Rousseauan contract and consent in which the state, rather than nation, provides and guarantees the rights of citizens in various aspects of social life. The central concept of citizenship in the Indonesian constitution is derived from both the classical liberal and the communitarian or civic republican theories of citizenship. It does not seem to distinguish
between the state’s role as a provider and guarantor of rights as suggested by liberalism, and the nation as a focus of identity of citizens in the communitarian view. As Delanty (2000a) points out, citizenship and nationality are closely connected in a social democratic system such as communitarianism, while the state is relatively unimportant. This poses interesting questions in relation to citizenship in Indonesia, namely: to what extent are the two major traditions compatible with the practice of local cultural values? How are the elements of citizenship, such as rights, duties, participation and responsibility, constructed by means of linguistic instruments in citizenship education school textbooks?

Issues of Rights and Duties in PPKn Textbooks

Rights and duties are the key issues of citizenship in the PPKn textbooks. To clarify the basic concepts of rights and duties in the PPKn, I will draw examples from the lesson entitled ‘Awareness’ (Kepedulian - SLTP Class 3:6-16) which sets these out. A detailed analysis of this passage and the sources of its ideas will be followed by consideration of specific types of rights and duties in the subsequent sections in this chapter.

Text – 1  According to God’s will, a human being, as the noblest creature, is endowed with rights and duties in life. God has created human beings as his most perfect creature. God provides this universe for the benefit of human beings. In return, human beings are obliged to look after the universe. In order to use their rights and duties in a balanced and proper manner, human beings must be able to manage them by obeying the religion they subscribe to. By means of religion, one can distinguish what are one’s rights and duties.

The meaning of rights and duties differ. A right is the authority to do or not to do, to give or to have something. For example, every Indonesian citizen who has reached the age of 21 has the right to be stand for election, and those have reached the age of 17 have the right to vote for members of the People’s Representative Council. Conversely, a duty is anything that cannot be abandoned but must be carried out. For example, if we knew there was a catastrophe in the community, in this case our duty is to lend a hand. In essence, rights and duties are two things that must exist in a human being.
Generally speaking, one’s rights and duties in this world are equal. For example, every person has a right to protection by the state. They also have a duty to create harmony in their life. Being part of a nation and state, one’s rights and duties are stipulated in the National Constitution and laws.’ (SLTP Class 3:6)

The first three paragraphs of the lesson (Text-1) begin with a general discussion on rights and duties. They show that rights and duties are naturally endowed by God. Human beings inherit the universe (alam semesta) and are given the right to benefit from and manage it. They also have duties to maintain it. Human beings must exercise their rights and duties harmoniously and naturally (seimbang dan wajar), by obeying their religious beliefs (dengan mematuhi ajaran agama).

The subsequent paragraphs of this lesson discuss the various rights and duties set out in the articles of the 1945 Constitution. Paragraphs 5-9 focus on rights and duties in political affairs (hak dan kewajiban dalam bidang politik); paragraphs 10-13 on rights and duties in economic affairs (hak dan kewajiban dalam bidang ekonomi); paragraphs 14-17 on rights and duties in social and cultural affairs (hak dan kewajiban dalam bidang sosial budaya); and paragraphs 18-20 on rights and duties in defense and security (hak dan kewajiban dalam bidang pertahanan keamanan). The texts from this lesson dealing with these various rights and duties are presented in the later sections of this chapter, along with examples drawn from other sources.

The first paragraph of Text - 1 indicates that rights are endowed from God. The second paragraph addresses political rights by discussing such things as the right to vote and be voted for in a general election. The final few sentences in the paragraph emphasise the
duties of Indonesian citizens. Duties are anything that cannot be neglected, and must be
carried out (kewajiban ialah segala sesuatu yang tidak dapat ditinggalkan dan harus
dilakukan). The third paragraph discusses civil rights. It shows that citizens are protected
by the state. However, citizens are obliged to maintain social order. (…setiap manusia
berhak mendapat perlindungan negara. Ia juga berkewajiban menciptakan kerukunan
dalam hidupnya). Individual rights and duties within the nation-state (of Indonesia) are
provided by the National Constitution and other legislation. (Dalam kehidupan
berbangsa dan bernegara, hak dan kewajiban manusia itu diatur dalam undang-undang
dasar dan peraturan-peraturan lainnya). This statement shows that a citizen’s life is
strictly legally bound.

If human rights are the natural rights of freedom, equality, security, etc. which belong to
a person regardless of race, religion, sex, or colour, and not an inherited privilege, the
issues of rights discussed in Text-1 refer to political and legal rights. The writers do not
make a clear distinction between human rights and political rights (in a broad sense) or
between legality and morality. This reminds us of the classical concept of citizens,
existing under a very strict contract of juridical integration between the state and citizens.
Moreover, individual rights and duties are strictly legally bound. There is no indication of
individual rights other than the ones provided by legal systems. However, the example
given, namely the obligation to help other people in the community who suffer from
calamity, is open to a wide range of interpretations. One may pose the question whether
there is an option for not participating in relieving the sufferings of other people. Is
helping someone else an obligation (a must) in an Indonesian citizen’s political life? Is there a choice?

As shown in the above paragraphs, ‘rights’ have been identified as natural rights derived from the theological perspective acknowledging a God who gives rights to and demands duties from human beings (citizens). The state thus plays an intermediary and binding role between God and human beings. This Lockean idea of obeying God’s law (or the law of nature) has been implicitly extended, becoming the only way that one can differentiate between one’s rights and duties. The last sentence of the second paragraph argues that ‘With religion, human beings can differentiate whatever rights and duties that they have.’ (‘Dengan agama, manusia dapat membedakan apa saja yang menjadi hak dan kewajibannya’) (SLTP Class 3:6). However, no explanation has been given as to how religion can help do this. The inclusion of religious rationality in citizenship education poses problems in understanding citizenship rights and duties. Although Indonesian polity appears to have adopted the Western model of rights and duties, the intervention in the name of God (and often in the name of ‘national interest’) in the foregoing civic discourse permits the exercise of power by the Indonesian executive body. Human beings are not seen as free to make their own unique choices among various conflicting values, unless they are guided by religious perspectives. It is logical that human beings will never be able to demand rights from God the Almighty, but must comply with God’s revelations. Consequently, the logical implication of this paragraph is that duties and compliance are more important than rights given by God.
The employment of religious arguments to require the participation of Indonesian citizens in national development was widespread in the New Order period. (For issues of New Order national development policy, see, for example, Saringga 1997, van Langenberg 1990, Heryanto 1988, van Langenberg 1986, Feith 1980). Since religion is always a system of belief, whereby human beings submit to divine power, the state has been able to use religious arguments to legitimate its suppression of difference and dissident voices. As suggested by Fowler et al. (1979) there are two possible linguistic processes that construct ideology. First, directive practices that include explicitly manipulative speech acts, such as commands, requests, proclamations and interpersonal practices. Secondly, constitutive practices which give rise to the construction of social reality (Berger and Luckman 1967), such as the construction of institutions, roles and statuses ‘that preserve the hierarchic structures of the society’ (Fowler 1985:64). These practices enable the exploitation of the lower class by the ruling class. Thus, using Fowler (1985)’s concepts of constitutive practices, I would argue that the construction of citizenship rights and duties as God-given is an example of ensuring the voluntary and involuntary subservience of school students in the lower order.

Moreover, the tendency to regard rights and duties as maintaining ‘equilibrium’ (seimbang dan wajar), as indicated in the first paragraph of Text-1, contradicts the liberal view of human beings as self-interested individuals. It is hard to find a concept of seimbang (balance or equilibrium) and wajar (proper) in liberal democracy. This sort of conservative communitarian view has recently been debated. For example, in commenting on Amitai Etzioni’s argument concerning the need to maintain the
centrifugal forces and centripetal forces in a community (Etzioni 1996, 1995), Daniel A. Bell (Bell 1995) warned that the trade-off between individual liberties and the commitment to the community has resulted in deprivation of freedom, as in the cases of China and Singapore. According to Bell, the promotion and protection of individual rights is the best means to increase commitment to the common good, rather than emphasising balance between individual freedom and commitment to the community. The latter strategy has been employed by many authoritarian regimes in East Asia to legitimate their suppression of individual rights and cultural differences.

Sources of Concepts – Key Role of Balance

It is hard to find a traditional concept of seimbang and wajar which determines how rights and duties should be perceived and practiced in Indonesia. However, there is similarity between the expression in the text, namely seimbang and wajar, and the traditional Javanese linkage between harmony and political order. One example of this is the Javanese conception of oneness or completeness, kebulatan and keutuhan, and the combinations of selaras, serasi, seimbang, meaning that all things should be in harmony as discussed by Niels Mulder (1996). Mulder argued that the concept of oneness is culturally derived from two related sets of symbolic thought; kingship and mysticism. Benedict Anderson also discussed this in ‘The Idea of Power in Javanese Culture’ (Anderson 1972). The king has long been seen as having supernatural power, acting as the mediator between the supernatural power (God) and society of ordinary men. ‘He is the axis around which all revolved, his motionlessness proving his control. Guided by divine inspiration (wahyu, wangsit), he demonstrated his being perfectly in step with
supernatural purpose and volition, being at the same time the container and the content of wisdom, the unifier of the realm […]’ (Mulder 1996:53). The Javanese expressions of this paradox are *kodok kinemulan ing lèng* and *kodok angemuli lèngé* (the hole contains the toad and the hole is contained in the toad) (see Magnis-Suseno 1997:122). Mulder further argues that ‘the mystical quest aims to subdue the complexity of the material conditions of passions and desires, of corporal drives and planning, by overcoming it, by reducing it to irrelevance’ (Mulder 1996:53).

In the Javanese worldview of the relationship between natural events and the forces of the supernatural sphere, individuals should not collide with unobservable supernatural forces (Magnis-Suseno 1997). They should always be cautious (*waspadha eling*), so as not to disturb the harmonious balance of the cosmos. As Magnis-Suseno observes, ‘Leaving the right place in the cosmos brings one into danger and society into unrest. Within their world-view, Javanese have every interest that everyone take up their assigned place.’ (Magnis Suseno 1997:95) So, while individual rights are endowed by the supernatural power, in this context God, it is the duty of the individual to keep them in equilibrium, hence ‘*seimbang* and *wajar*’. Discussion of the concepts of *seimbang* and *wajar* in Javanese thought implies, at the interpersonal level, the inter-related concept of *rukun* (harmony). (See line four of the final paragraph of Text-1).

Timothy Lindsey’s view of the concept of rights and duties confirms the notion of interference with individual liberties. Lindsey argued that the Indonesian 1945 Constitution is ‘a document often described as based on duties, rather than rights’
(Lindsey 1999:16). He further observed that Article 27 of the Constitution gives a precise example, stating that ‘Without any exception, all citizens shall have equal positions in law and government and shall be obliged to uphold that law and government.’ In fact, the inclusion of divine power in the conception of citizen rights and duties is clearly problematic for a country such as Indonesia that wishes to adopt the so-called ‘democratic elements’. As already noted, the emergence of liberal ideas was a reaction to the role of the Church in political life. In addition, the emphasis of duties over rights may result in legal uncertainty. This has been one of the unresolved issues of Indonesia’s non-secular education. I will return to this issue in Chapter 9 and Chapter 11.

In what follows, I will illustrate the way particular types of rights and duties are described in PPKn textbooks for secondary levels. I will follow the classification of the issues covered in the textbooks using the overlapping themes of ‘political rights’, ‘economic rights’, ‘social-cultural rights’ and ‘security rights’. To facilitate discussion of these themes I have extracted several passages which are to a certain extent inter-related. They are presented in the beginning of each section and followed by a critical discussion.

**Political Rights**

To discuss various issues under the sub-topic ‘political rights’ in this chapter, I have extracted four texts from PPKn books, and will also make use of Text-1 wherever relevant.

**Text – 2** Rights and duties in the political domain are clearly set out in the 1945 Constitution, Article 27, Section (1), and (2). Article 27, Section (1), states that “All citizens shall have the same status in law and in the government and shall, without exception, respect the law and government.” This article suggests that every citizen of the Republic of Indonesia, without exception, who breaches the
law shall be liable to punitive action. In the court they shall have the right of advocacy. This article also encourages every citizen of the Republic of Indonesia to obey laws and regulations. For example, a motorist hits a child who is playing in the street. In this context, obviously the motorist has breached the law and/or traffic regulations. He is taken to the police. Taking the law into one’s own hands by actions such as an attack on the motorist by members of the community is not allowed.’ (SLTP Class 3:7-8)

Text - 3

[...] Pancasila Democracy is a democracy the principles of which are set out in:

1. The preamble to the 1945 Constitution: “…The people guided by inner wisdom through deliberation/representation”

2. The body of the 1945 Constitution:
   (a) Article 1 Section (1) “The Indonesian State shall be a unitary state with a republican form of government.” Section (2) “Sovereignty shall be vested in the people and shall be fully exercised by the People’s Consultative Assembly.”
   (b) The elucidation of the 1945 Constitution

The system of governance which is set out in the 1945 Constitution is:

1. Indonesia is a state based on the rule of law (Rechstaat) and not based on a mere power (Machstaat).
2. The government is based on a constitutional system (constitution), not based on absolutism (unlimited power).
3. The highest power of the state is vested in the People’s Consultative Assembly as the manifestation of the whole people of Indonesia.

From the foregoing explanation, it can be concluded that Pancasila Democracy actually:

1. rests on familial principles, because Indonesian people represent a big family whose life is led through mutual cooperation and deliberation;
2. rejects a world-view based on individualism, imperialism and colonialism;
3. rejects the class and group struggles of Karl Marx and Lenin, because they do not fit in with Indonesian people’s world-view;
4. rests on a theory of unity (integral), namely the state is not to guarantee interests of individuals or groups, but the interests of the community as a whole.

In Pancasila Democracy we appreciate the right to voice different opinions, because it is impossible for all opinions to be the same. Difference of opinion is a natural condition, which should be upheld. What is more important is a sense of responsibility and enthusiasm on the part of the administrators of the state. We have responsibilities to the One and Only God, and duties in carrying out development so that we can enjoy a better life.

Opinion should be expressed in accordance with the existing rules, namely through official or constitutional channels. For example, to elect people’s representatives in the DPR/MPR, a general election (Pemilu) is carried out. A general election is a means to implement democracy and a way of life in accordance with Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. To carry out the general election, an electoral law has been passed, namely Law No. 1 of 1985. According
to this law, a general elections must be carried out on a direct, general, free, and secret (Luber) basis […]

Basically, every citizen has the right to participate in general election. The right to participate in a general election is called the right to vote, which consists of the following rights:

1. An active right to vote is the right to vote for a member of the people’s representative body, which is given to a citizen who has met certain requirements which generally include:
   (a) residence in the country or abroad;
   (b) attainment a particular age, etc.

2. A passive right to vote is the right to become a member of the people’s representative body, which is given to every citizen who has met the requirements stipulated in the law of general election. The required age of one who has the right to be voted for is usually higher than that of one who has the right to vote.

The existence of the people’s representative bodies, such as MPR, DPR and DPRD demonstrates that Indonesia subscribes to democracy, that is Pancasila Democracy. People’s consultation must be carried out through the stipulated bodies (MPR, DPR and DPRD). In the decision-making process, deliberation is undertaken, and consensus is attempted. If the decision based on consensus is no longer possible and/or time is pressing, a decision is made based on the majority of voice. This is the principle of decision making applicable in Indonesia.’ (SLTA Class 2:64-66).

Text - 4 Indonesia does not subscribe to liberal democracy because history has shown that liberal democracy divided the unity of the Indonesian people and it is not compatible with the state ideology and way of life of the Indonesian people, whether it is the liberal democracy begun in November 1945, which was followed by the period of the Federal Republic of Indonesia (RIS) in 1949 and continued in the period 1950-1959, or the guided democracy which was implemented in the period 1959-1965.

In liberal democracy, political parties fight for a seat or position and pay more attention to their own parties’ interest than that of public or national interest. Liberal democracy also gave rise to the struggle between the central government and regional governments, which reached its climax with the revolt of PRRI and Permesta in 1957. History has also shown that guided democracy brought the Indonesian people to the abortive coup d’ état of G30S/PKI in 1965. (SLTA Class 2:66-67)

Text – 5 Political rights are also set out in Article 28 of the 1945 Constitution, which states that “Freedom of assembly and the right to form unions, freedom of speech and the press and similar freedoms shall be provided by law.” This article shows that our country guarantees the practice of democracy. It follows that every citizen shall have the right of assembly and to form unions in educating and advancing the people. On the other hand, every citizen shall have the freedom to express their opinion or feelings in accordance with the law. (SLTP Class 3:8-9)
The standard discussions of political rights, particularly in the Marshallian theory of social citizenship (Marshall 1992), cover two major aspects: rights to vote and rights to political organisation. Before discussing these two aspects, it may be useful to examine how the writers of the textbooks have approached the issue of political rights through their use and interpretation of the 1945 Constitution.

Political rights and duties are discussed in Text-2, which is a continuation of the lesson entitled ‘Awareness’ in the SLTP textbook (Text 1 above). It explains the discussion of political rights and duties, based on the 1945 Constitution Article 27 section (1) and (2). However, a rather crude example is given in the text, which digresses somewhat from the main discussion. The example is that of a motorist who hits a child in the street. He is presumed to have broken the law. (‘Dalam hal ini jelas pengendara motor telah melanggar hukum dan undang-undang lalu lintas.’) The motorist and not the child is held responsible for the accident, and he will have the right for legal protection. No one shall be allowed to take the law into one’s own hands, i.e. by ganging up on the motorist.

This discourse blames the motorist. But how can we be sure that the motorist has breached the law? The accident could have been caused by the child’s lack of care. If the child was playing in the street rather than a playground, then we should ask questions about the parents’ responsibility. We might conclude that they were at fault, for irresponsibly allowing their child to play in the street. The accident cannot automatically be blamed on the motorist. Syntactically, the role of motorist is the agent and the role of the child is the object (patient) of the sentence. However, the verb ‘to run into’ (menabrak) does not necessarily require that the agent is responsible for the action, or in
this case is the initiator of the accident. A person’s action may be a reaction, stimulated by someone or something else, and therefore something they cannot be held responsible for. This can be exemplified by the following two sentences. (a) ‘The girl pushed away the boy who was harassing her.’ In this sentence, although the girl is the doer of the action, she is not to be held responsible. Or, (b) ‘The girl smelled the rotten food.’ In sentence (b), the girl is an agent and the rotten food is the object. However it is not the rotten food that suffers from the action but the girl.

The inclusion of the ‘accident case’ in the text on rights and duties seems intended to show that Indonesia is a legal society (rechtstaat) in which every citizen is protected by the law. Its inclusion was presumably motivated by the wish to underline the illegitimacy of communal violence against perceived wrong doers, of the kind which still occurs in Indonesia. However, the proposition is flawed because the textbook writers have not properly considered the linguistic as well as extra-linguistic context. They make a sweeping statement and organise meaning of rights and wrongs based on their own assumptions and logic. As the writers are the representatives of the state, such discourse thus tends to be hegemonic. This is only one of many weak examples to be found in PPKn textbooks. The following section will look at how the issue of the right to vote has been presented, and how the issues have been further ‘narrowed’ or ‘deviated’ to discuss Indonesian polity in relation to democracy.⁴
The Right to Vote

The right to vote is discussed in the SLTA Class 2 textbook, pages 61-68, (Text-3), in a passage entitled ‘Responsibilities’ which is preceded by a long narration on the system of government subscribed to by Indonesia, and an explanation of general elections as the formal and constitutional channel of democratic government. The passage explains that every Indonesian citizen has the right to vote and to be voted for in accordance with the law. The first three paragraphs discuss the meaning of democracy. Paragraphs four to paragraph eight discuss the type of democracy that is suitable for Indonesia, with an emphasis on Pancasila Democracy (Demokrasi Pancasila) as a constitutional democracy, legally supported by the 1945 Constitution. The writers argue that as Indonesia has adopted the concept of Negara Integralistik, the state does not guarantee the interest of individuals, but rather oversees the interests of the whole society. They also argue that although opinions vary in Pancasila Democracy, this is less important than the responsibilities and aspirations of the ruling elite. Every one is responsible to the oneness of God in carrying out development in order to enjoy a better future. The next eight paragraphs discuss the constitutional ways to express one’s opinion. The writers point out that opinions should be expressed through formal channels. A general election, where people can choose their representatives, is the vehicle to democracy. It is also the way to apply the principles of the nation’s philosophy (Pancasila) and constitution (UUD 1945). The writers also argue that general elections in Indonesia are carried out democratically because they apply the principles of luber (langsung, umum, bebas dan rahasia or direct, public, free and secret). They set out who is eligible to vote and to be voted. As explained by the text, voting is not problematic. In reality things may be different.
As Text-3 indicates, the writers argue that Indonesia subscribes to a democratic system, namely *Pancasila* Democracy. It has a system of representatives. The voice of the Indonesian people should be constitutionally channeled through *Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat* (MPR) or People’s Consultative Assembly, *Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat* (DPR) or People’s Representative Council, and *Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah* (DPRD) or Regional People’s Representative Council. Citizens can participate in democratic governance through the general election. However there are several hidden issues in the *PPKm* model of democracy.

Some scholars have pointed out the ineffectiveness in practice of the Indonesian parliament in the New Order period. It has been seen as an ornament imported from the Western model to ‘decorate a much older and more influential culturally authoritarian bureaucratic system.’ (Emmerson 1976:26). For example, the description of parliamentary practice in the last paragraph of Text-3 appears to be different from our understanding of parliamentary voting procedures in Western democratic countries, such as the United State of America, Australia and the United Kingdom. Here the aim is to allow discussion from all viewpoints with a vote then taken. In this text, by contrast, the Indonesian practice is described as focusing on the attempt to create or enforce a consensus. Only if this fails are votes counted, and a decision taken on the basis of numbers.
Furthermore, the Indonesian parliament was not wholly elected, because many members were appointed, including delegates from regions and groups and military officers. Technically speaking, polling procedures were relatively honest. However, campaigning activities were restricted and sometimes non-government parties were harassed. Liddle (1999b) points out that ‘Pancasila Democracy’ is what the New Order rulers and propagandists called the regime, and that use of the word ‘democracy’ amounted to a deception. As Liddle (1999b:40) noted:

In fact the regime was a complex hierarchy of authoritarian institutions designed to curtail political participation and enable Suharto and the military to control society. One of the five principles of Pancasila is democracy, but only of a constrained kind, “guided” by the “wisdom” of “unanimity” arising from “deliberation among representatives.”

After 1973 there was only one functional group and two political parties, due to a forced fusion of the pre-existing parties intended to simplify the party system. Golkar was the ‘partisan political face of the state bureaucracy’ (Liddle 1999b:41). The two parties were the Development Unity Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan or PPP) and Indonesian Democracy Party (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia or PDI). During the New Order period, the ruling party Golkar held a substantial majority. PPP and PDI were relatively weak. When they became stronger they were suppressed by the regime, as, for example the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI) was in early 1990s, under the leadership of Megawati Soekarnoputri. Megawati was abruptly replaced as leader of the party by the regime’s favoured member in PDI. This Machiavellian attitude eventually produced a backlash for the regime, because for many people Megawati became a symbol of suppression, and her position as ‘the opposition leader’ became ever stronger. This kind of control by the
regime was overt in New Order Indonesia. These issues are crucial to the discourse of
democracy, however, again, they have been hidden in the PPKn texts. During the three
elections since the demise of the New Order, the prevalence of a different type of political
manipulation has been reported - money politics, or manipulation of the political system
by wealth and power. This is another challenge to Indonesian citizenship education if it is
to discuss the issue of ‘democratic participation’ and ‘luber’ procedures in the electoral
process described above. 5

The lesson in PPKn textbooks on voting rights also digresses from its main discussion by
stating that Indonesia has a system of representative democracy, but does not subscribe to
liberal democracy. Text-4 argued that liberal democracy has divided the Indonesian
people in the past, and it is not in accordance with the principles of nation’s philosophy.
Since the issue is important, I will briefly discuss it here.

The reasons given by the writers for Indonesia’s decision not to adopt liberal democracy
are questionable. If we look at the failure of so-called ‘democracy’ in Indonesia in the
first two decades of its independence, liberal democracy was not the sole factor that
divided the people. The system was not necessarily incompatible with the nation’s
philosophy, but I would argue that it was unsuited to the reality of post-colonial practices.
It was not ‘properly’ applied due to the prevailing local conditions, including age-old
cultural practices and entrenched power structures. The failure of the experiment with
parliamentary democracy was due to a variety of factors.
George McT Kahin has accurately described conditions under Soekarno’s Old Order. Political life was dominated by a tiny elite, whose ideas and educational background had developed under colonial and revolutionary conditioning. There was disunity due to fragmented ideologies, largely based on personalities and agendas detrimental to promoting national interests. Some were attracted to socialism and communism, and a small number of army officers leant towards different kinds of totalitarianism. Disharmony also occurred in the bureaucracy. There was an increase in competition between political parties, resulting in a growing politicisation in which appointments were frequently determined by political patronage than merit (Kahin 1970; 1963).

In his seminal work, *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia*, Herbert Feith spent 555 pages describing the progression of events toward the failure, and another 30 pages drawing conclusions (Feith 1962). Feith proposed that during the implementation of the constitutional democracy which eventually failed, two opposing forces in the parliament contributed to the deadlock: the ‘the problem solvers’ and ‘the solidarity makers’. A brief summary of the malfunctioning of the Constitutional Democracy may be found in Feith (1994). Drawing on the discussion from his book, I would argue that social and cultural as well as economic factors in post-colonial Indonesia influenced the functioning of its Constitutional Democracy.

The traditional values and Islamic perspectives which have influenced the attitudes towards liberal democracy of both the elite in the parliament and people in the street regarding cannot be taken lightly. As Feith observes ‘the great appeal of opposition to
“liberal democracy” was a reflection of the political public’s deep hostility toward the Netherlands in particular and the West generally.’ (Feith 1962:603). Feith (1994) further points out that Constitutional Democracy - translated as Western liberal democracy by PPKn writers - was abandoned by the New Order developmentalist regime because it was seen as historically premature in a country as poor as Indonesia. In similar vein, he shows that a discourse which positions the Constitutional Democracy of the 1950s as running ‘against the grain of Indonesian history and culture’ as argued by Harry J. Benda (1964) is characteristic of the New Order’s integralist elite, notably Nugroho Notosusanto, who was instrumental in the construction of P-4 as discussed in Chapter 3 of this thesis (Feith 1994:24). Feith’s arguments are confirmed and amplified by David Bourchier, who argued that Indonesian history textbooks’ negative portrayal of liberal political philosophies was intended to preserve the New Order regime’s power from ‘a rising tide of demands for political rights and freedom’ (Bourchier 1994:60).

Furthermore, if constitutional democracy is to function well, economic structures should be strong and the administrative system should be well-managed. This was not the case with post-colonial Indonesia, which could not catch up with rapid changes in its environment during the Cold-War period. The influence of colonialism and the attachment to pre-colonial culture were strong. Moreover, the military was a major factor in the democratic experiment, as argued by Kahin (1963) and Feith (1962). As suggested by Hamza Alavi (1972), one of the problems of the role of military and the bureaucracy in post-colonial states, as exemplified by Pakistan and Bangladesh, is that they tend to
display a Janus-face of nationalism (Also see Magnis-Suseno’s comment on this issue in Chapter 3). As Alavi (1972:64) observes:

Before independence members of the bureaucracy and the military were instruments of the colonial power. One of their principal functions was to subordinate the various native classes and to repress the nationalist movement on behalf of the colonial masters. During the freedom struggle, they were on opposite sides of the political barricades from the leadership of the nationalist movement. After independence, the same political leaders whom it was their task to repress were esconced in office, nominally in authority over them. A new relationship of mutual accommodation had to be established.

Legge (1964) argued that Indonesia’s post-colonial economic structure lacked a strong entrepreneurial class, an administrative system appropriate to a diverse, modern society (i.e. only suitable for agrarian society), and a reserve of trained administrators and technicians for a commercial age. All these weaknesses are the results of colonial policy. As a case in point, since the late nineteenth century the Dutch colonial power divided people of the East Indies into three political groups: the higher class European, the lower class Far East (except Japanese) and the indigenous (Coppel 1999). The Ethical Policy in the colony at the turn of the nineteenth century came rather late. The training received by Indonesians in basic clerical and technical knowledge, both to assist expansion of the colonial administration and directed towards private business activities, was clearly not sheer altruism but was spurred by Dutch self-interest. (Legge 1964) The marginalisation and conditioning by the Dutch did not encourage democratic participation in running the country (Kalidjernih 2001). Worst, colonial policy and practice have produced a strong state reproduction. For the local elite, the colonial model was adopted, either consciously or subconsciously, and its influence was in part strengthened by pre-colonial attachments and values. As a result, the exercise of leadership without prior consultation with the mass of the population was widespread (Kahin 1963).
Rights to Political Organisation

Rights to political organisation are defined by Article 28 of the 1945 Constitution, which says that ‘Freedom of assembly and the right to form unions, freedom of speech and of the press and similar freedom shall be provided by law.’ Only one section of the above lesson entitled ‘Awareness’ (Text-5) briefly discusses ‘rights to political organisation’. The entitlement of Indonesian citizens to rights of political organisation has been interpreted as a form of democratic spirit.

However, this short and seemingly convincing discourse does not reflect the actual practice of Suharto’s authoritarian regime. In addition to the banning of proscribed political organisations seen as endangering national security, particularly the Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia), the New Order regime also exerted political control and tight censorship of cultural expression, such as the media and performing arts (Hatley 1994) This contrasted with the spirit of Article 28, and the goals mentioned in the PPKn text, namely the right of organisations to advance and educate the people (‘setiap warga negara memiliki hak untuk berhimpun membentuk berbagai organisasi dalam memajukan dan mencerdaskan bangsa’). The banning of cultural and artistic works was generally based on legal mechanisms which many Indonesians found absurd, for example that a particular performing event had not been granted a permit.

The last sentence of the text, which indicates that citizens’ rights to expression should be exercised in accordance with law, is a another example of a weak attempt to balance
rights and duties in a political discourse. What laws and regulations limit the freedom of expression? The 1945 Constitution is silent on this point, allowing varying and divergent interpretations of rights to expression and rights to political organisation.

**Economic Rights**

To illustrate various issues under the sub-topic ‘economic rights’ I have extracted three texts from *PPKn* books.

**Text - 6**

(1) The economy shall be organised co-operatively based on familial principles.

(2) Branches of production which are important to the state and which affect the life of the people shall be controlled by the state.

(3) Land and water and the natural richness therein shall be controlled by the state and shall be used for the greatest welfare of the people. (*SLTP* Class 3:9)

**Text - 7**

[…] Accordingly, no private party shall be allowed to control sectors which affect the livelihood of public. Private individuals can assist the government in the sectors which do not affect the livelihood of the public.

In Article 34 of the 1945 Constitution, the poor and children without support shall be taken care by the state. For example, in executing Article 34, there have been various orphanages, old people’s homes and development activities in less-developed villages supported by the Government. (*SLTP* Class 3:10)

**Text - 8**

This article implies that every citizen shall be given the right to have employment with appropriate payment. For example, A, holder of a degree in education, shall have the right to be a teacher. Accordingly, the salary paid will be commensurate with the role and rank. However, the salary is different from that of other teachers with a lower or higher rank. […] (*SLTP* 3:8)

Economic rights and duties are discussed in the lesson entitled ‘Awareness’ in the Class 3 *PPKn* textbooks (Text-6). The first paragraph points out that economic rights and duties are based on Article 33, sections 1, 2 and 3 of the 1945 Constitution. However, neither the Constitution nor the textbooks gives a clear explanation of the economic rights of Indonesian citizens.
The writers of the textbooks argue that the most suitable economic system for Indonesia, (which derives from the elucidation of the 1945 Constitution and the material for P4) is co-operation (koperasi). Based on the ‘familial principle or spirit’ (kekeluargaan) of co-operation, economic activity is carried out for the prosperity of the whole community rather than for individuals. Thus public interest is given priority over individual rights. This view is bolstered by the arguments of Text-7, that the state has the control over means of production that affect the life of the people (faktor-faktor produksi yang menguasai hajat hidup orang banyak).

This argument has problems. Many means of production that affect the life of the people have been sub-contracted privately, and in recent years many state-owned companies have been privatised. Thus, the statement that ‘Private individuals can assist the government in the sectors which do not affect the livelihood of the public’ is compromised. The text does not indicate who these individuals might be, and this vagueness leaves citizen participation in the nation’s economic sectors open to interpretation. As a result, the Indonesian economy was effectively in the hands of a few powerful people, to the exclusion of all others. To ‘assist the government’, they borrowed huge amounts of money both locally and internationally, without hedging the funds. When the 1997-1998 financial crisis hit Indonesia, the Government had to bail out those private as well as state-owned companies. (see Booth 1999 for an account of the economy in the New Order regime).
The argument that Article 33 of the 1945 Constitution prioritises people’s interests and guarantees the protection of the state in using the wealth of the nation does not ensure that the Indonesian people will automatically benefit, because of this ‘top down’ policy of participation in the economy. ‘Modernisation theory’ emphasises the need to maximise growth through a handful of state and privately owned enterprises, and assumes that the benefits will eventually ‘trickle down’ to all levels of society (Rodan, Hewison and Robison 2001). In Indonesia this only produced a highly uneven distribution of wealth. In addition, the sweeping but unsupported statement that ‘the poor and neglected children are looked after by the state’ (See Text-7) says little about the economic rights of the Indonesian people.

Article 27 of the 1945 Constitution states that ‘Every citizen shall have the right to work (berhak atas pekerjaan) and to expect a reasonable standard of living’. Text-8 paraphrases this as ‘every citizen is given the right to get a job’ (‘[…] ‘diberikan hak untuk mendapatkan pekerjaan’), which is not the same thing. In this discourse there is no mention of employee rights. There is no assurance of minimal remuneration and other reasonable means of social protection, favourable conditions of work or protection against unemployment. There is no mention of the rights to form and join trade unions for the protection of employee’s interests. In the past, trade unions not sanctioned by the regime were suppressed.

Social and Cultural Rights

To discuss issues under the sub-topic ‘social and cultural rights’ I have extracted two texts from PPKn books.
Text - 9  Progress in social and cultural areas are integral parts of efforts utilise human resources. Paragraph four of the Preamble of the 1945 Constitution explains that the government has the responsibility to develop the intellectual capacity of the people. Article 31 and 32 of the 1945 Constitution are formulated in this regard.

Article 31, section (1) ‘Every citizen shall have the right to education.’ and section (2) ‘The government shall organise and implement a national education system that is prescribed by law’.

Article 32 ‘The government shall develop the national culture of Indonesia.’

The message of Article 31 is that every citizen shall enjoy educational services. Educational and training services are laid out in Law No. 2 of 1989 on the National Education System (UUSPN). In general, UUSPN related rights and duties are:

1. every citizen shall have the same right to obtain education;
2. every citizen shall be given the widest possible opportunity to have access to education;
3. any citizen who is physically-disabled or mentally ill shall have access to education in special schools and rehabilitation centres for disabled children;
4. Every citizen is obliged to support the 9 Year-Compulsory Education program (Program Wajib Belajar 9 Tahun). (SLTP Class 3:11)

Text - 10  The above-mentioned rights and duties, if properly carried out, have a great effect on the development of national culture. National culture should be preserved. This takes into account the influence on national culture of globalisation and advancement in technology. Therefore, Article 32 of the 1945 Constitution states that the government shall develop national education. National culture represents the highest synthesis of regional cultures in which our identity is grounded. Therefore we are obliged to ward off the infiltration of the negative influences from abroad which are destructive to our national culture. (SLTP Class 3:12)

The discourse on social and cultural rights is presented in the same lesson entitled ‘Awareness’ (SLTP: Class 3), from which several earlier-mentioned texts have been drawn. The writers address the social-cultural rights set forth in Article 31 and Article 32 of the 1945 Constitution. Article 31, section (1) states that ‘Every citizen shall have the right to education.’ and section (2) says that ‘Government shall organise and provide national education that is determined by law’. Article 32 provides that ‘Government shall develop national cultures of Indonesia.’ The explanation of the rights to education refers to Law No. 2, of 1989 on the National Education System, (Undang-Undang No. 2 Tahun
Text 9 does not seem to have anticipated the changing needs of education in the process of democratization. In New Order Indonesia, education was nationally controlled by the central government. Educators lacked academic freedom and institutional autonomy, and structural design and administration followed the education policy of the government. As a result, education providers, particularly state-owned schools, could not independently set and pursue their own objectives and programs according to their own resources. Schools were not innovative and responsive to changes in their environment. A mentality of dependence on the government often developed. So-called quality assurance was only applicable to independent schools, which were accredited as ‘registered’ (terdaftar), ‘recognised’ (diakui) or ‘equalised’ (disamakan). The quality of state-owned schools was rarely assessed. This is an example of the supposed ‘equity’ that the PPKn writers argued. Moreover, these rights to education not only mean that every citizen needs access to education, but that every citizen is entitled to the same standard of, on the basis of merit, regardless their sexual, racial, ethnic, religious and political background. In New Order Indonesia, for example, the children of bureaucrats and the political elite received priority admission to state-owned tertiary institutions, while children of the common people had to compete fiercely within the ‘cut-off’ system.

Text-10 is concerned with cultural rights, including the need to preserve national culture and to filter negative influences from abroad that may undermine the national culture,
which effectively restricts rights to consumption of information. This text is intended to show that the state or Government has the obligation to preserve regional cultures which form Indonesia’s national culture, without indicating how this is to be done. Under the New Order there was an effort to construct a national culture that reflected the nation’s identity. Regional forms of cultural expression, such as wayang and traditional dances were used to serve political purposes. They were show-cased in governmental activities from ‘welcoming guests’ programs (acara menyambut tamu) to ‘opening projects’ programs (acara pembukaan proyek). These programs also included many artificially constructed cultural expressions, particularly dances and music. For example, in many areas of the country ‘welcoming dances’ were non-existent, so new ‘traditional’ dances were constructed using selected and sanitised elements of local culture. More than this, as Hatley (1994) has shown, New Order commercial and political interference robbed many regional forms of their originality and identity. If the Government seriously valued preservation of local cultures, it could have been more proactive in preserving local cultures rather than co-opting them for political purposes, or encouraging them to surrender to the technology of the high modern era.

The statement about the obligation of Indonesian people filter the ‘information glut’ (Postman 1994) coming from abroad to prevent bad influences impacting on the national cultures (Text-10) is problematic in its vagueness. It does not make clear what is meant by bad influences. Such a statement may be used to condemn and prescribe all things regarded as threateningly egalitarian; for example ‘Western feminism’. What are the characteristics of bad influences? Since human life is dynamic, perceptions and cultural
needs evolve and change. The ability of Indonesian citizens to consume cultural products is compromised if what is good, bad, right and wrong is solely determined by the Government. With the growth of information technology, particularly through access to the internet, it is more difficult for the Government to control information now than it was in the past.

The New Order government attempted to restrict consumption of information for political reasons, and out of an exaggerated fear of cultural imperialism. It argued that Indonesia had struggled for liberation from high colonialism, and should not be undermined by the flows of information carrying old imperial values and ideology. Cultural imperialism has the means to define social reality and influence the way of life of the nation. As a result, mass media and telecommunication were highly regulated in Indonesia.7

While the government’s fear of ‘bad’ foreign influences was exaggerated, it ignored the effects of its own media on neighbouring countries. Indonesian television programmes were broadcast through the Palapa satellite, reaching millions of viewers in the South East Asia region. Indonesian local music and films are popular in Malaysia and Brunei Darussalam where the national language (Malay) closely resembles Bahasa Indonesia. Indonesia is not only the recipient of the flow of information created by technology, but also a donor in the age of information. Indonesian people are not just powerless consumers of foreign mass media and cultural programs.
Another example can be drawn from the establishment of private television stations in the last decade of the New Order rule. Why were so many private television stations allowed within a few years, when this would have been impossible in the past? There are many possible answers. It may have been the policy of the regime to counter the inflow of foreign media with domestic products. It might also have been a move designed to meet the audience demand for cheaper and better products than state-owned stations could supply. It forms part of the government’s economic rationalism policy, but is also a result of close relations between television station owners and the regime. Is it coincidence that the first two private stations were owned by Suharto’s children?

The Indonesian Government’s intervention in the media seems to have multiple purposes. It is clear that New Order arguments of media imperialism to justify suppression of the mass media were flawed. Moreover, technological advances have made the control of information almost impossible, and there are good arguments that some benefits accrue from international media flows (Katz and Weddell 1977, Tunstall 1977). As recipients, a developing country such as Indonesia could learn, borrow and adapt from other cultures. Cultural protectionism is thus self-defeating. The military-industrial complex (Schiller 1976) is not the only driver of media imperialism. Economies of scale, and demand and supply variables, may drive media expansion. Indonesia was not a passive consumer of foreign media, but also a participant in the international media flow. The globalisation of the media (as exemplified by television) has redefined the notion of ‘the one way street’ (Nordestreng and Varis 1974) from the core to peripheral nations.
Security Rights

For the discussion of issues under the sub-topic ‘security rights’, I have extracted one text from PPKn books.

Text -11

The preamble of the 1945 Constitution, the Fourth Article, states the importance of the defence of the state. There are two main points in the article, namely

(1) to protect the Indonesian people and the territories of Indonesia in their entirety;

(2) to participate in the founding of world order based on independence, eternal peace and social justice.

Thus, the Government should protect the people and the state from any internal or external threats. Moreover, Article 30 of the 1945 Constitution, Section (1) emphasises that, “All citizens may be called upon to participate in the defence of the state.” In this context, defending the country can be realised through the creation of an environment that guarantees national stability. Generally, the duty to defend the country is prescribed in Law No. 20 of 1982. The content of the law includes the principles of security and defence of the Republic of Indonesia.

If we look at Article 30, Section (1), it has a function to bind every citizen of the Republic of Indonesia. In other words, we have to understand and appreciate the importance of the maintenance of national stability. Indeed we have ABRI (the Armed Forces of the Republic Indonesia), but the responsibility of defending the country is not the duty of ABRI only. In everyday life in every Rukun Tetangga (RT) (neighborhood), the community always carries out the task of Siskamling (Sistem Keamanan Lingkungan) (neighborhood watch). This is useful to prevent from any threat to the security of environment. At school, we also have the responsibility to create a secure environment so that the teaching and learning activities can operate smoothly. […] (SLTP Class 3:12)

This text is again drawn from the lesson entitled ‘Awareness’ of PPKn textbook, Class 3.

The first paragraph suggests that the rights to security and defense in Indonesia are derived from two sources. First, paragraph four of the Preamble of the 1945 Constitution, which states that (1) the state shall protect all of the Indonesian people and the motherland, (2) the state shall participate in keeping the world at peace based on the principles of liberty, perennial peace and social justice. Secondly, Article 30, section 1 of the 1945 Constitution, which states that ‘every citizen shall have the rights and duties to participate in the effort to defend the country.’
While it is obvious that defending the nation is the obligation of all Indonesians, we should be cautious about the discourse often employed to justify the suppression of Indonesians’ voices in the name of national stability, as shown in the second paragraph of Text-11. In New Order Indonesia, the defense of the country and national stability was seen in terms of socially engineering the military character of society. The first strategy adopted was to give the Indonesian armed forces the dual functions (Dwifungsi or Dwifungsi ABRI), of a defense and security force as well as a social and political apparatus. To legitimate this dual function, ordinary citizens were involved in the militaristic and intelligence activities. People were mobilised to safeguard the so-called ‘collective goods’. Individual initiative and freedom were put under military command. Ordinary citizens were expected to contribute to the preservation of national stability and security through participation in activities such as the local Rukun Warga or R.W. (Citizens Associations) and Rukun Tetangga or R.T. (Neighbourhood Associations), civil defense corps (hansip or pertahan sipil), neighbourhood watch (siskamling), the military training program for university or college students (Resimen Mahasiswa or Menwa), and various youth training programs (gerakan pemuda) wearing military style uniforms. These activities were controlled by the state to support the armed forces, particularly the police for internal affairs. They could be mobilised by the regime to serve its various interests. The corollary of this was that independent, ‘bottom-up’ grass roots social activity not organised by the state was considered to be dangerous.
Secondly, national stability was viewed as a necessary condition for development. If the Government considered that a particular activity by an individual or a group had the potential to endanger national stability, development or ‘harmony’, it had the right to stop or suppress that activity. With arbitrary guidelines and the government as the sole judge, this concept resulted in ‘legal uncertainty’ for civilians wishing to hold any group activity, such as one related to cultural expression.

As a result of the dual function policy, the armed-forces were seen to deserve social and political privilege. Because the military had been successful in defending the country from various challenges and contributing to national stability (see, for example, Broad Guidelines of the National Direction, *Garis-Garis Besar Haluan Negara* (*Repelita IV*), *Sekretaris Negara Republik Indonesia*), they deserved the right of representation in the People’s Consultative Assembly and House of Representative (People’s Representative Council) or *MPR/DPR*. Military leaders were allocated seats in the *MPR/DPR*, but ordinary members of the armed forces were not allowed to vote in general elections. As members of the community, their human and political rights have never been discussed. This leaves a room for debate about the human rights of ordinary members of the armed forces. During the New Order regime the country was portrayed as being under continuous latent threat from the communist movement, particularly using the 1965 abortive coup, ‘Cold War’ arguments and a neo-imperialism thesis. By extending the military concepts of defense and security to include National Resilience, (see Department of Defense and Security, Institute for National Defense 1974), the regime invoked
national stability to justify repression of activities which might endanger its own power and political or pecuniary interests.

**Concluding Remarks**

This discussion of rights and duties has shown that some key parts of the discourse of Indonesian citizenship have been drawn from republican rather than liberal tradition. It appears that several variables have been instrumental in the construction of civil rights: local cultural values (particularly the Javanese culture), post-colonial conditions, democratic elements, and particularly the regime’s interpretation of and interests in citizenship issues. These four variables have shaped the ideas of rights and duties.

First, citizens are expected to balance their rights with their duties. Since an individual is a member of a wider society, social duties should be given priority over individual rights, so as not to disturb social harmony. The state is the ‘mediator’ between God the Almighty, who regulates rules, norms and values to be obeyed, and the individual who must obey them.

Secondly, the discussion of rights and duties by school textbooks seems to make no clear distinction between legality and morality. There is a tendency to conflate the two in an attempt to demand conformity from the students (citizens). The discourse of civic ideals in *PPKn* textbooks has emphasised the importance of shared consciousness and behaviour, rather than individual conscience and self-determination of individual rights.
and duties. The discourse demands subjugation of individual to society, or more precisely, to the state.

The Indonesian concept of civic ideals covers a wide range of rights and duties. First, it includes security rights in addition to a Marshallian tripartite analysis of citizenship: civil, political, and social-economic. Secondly, it privileges collective objectives above individual rights. Its over-emphasis on duties instead of rights has created problems for the understanding of rights. There is also a clear weakness of reciprocity the discourse of duties. For example, the demand for citizens to safeguard and defend their country should be balanced by the duty of the state to facilitate and support citizens in other spheres. If citizens have a duty to defend their country, they also have the right to a satisfactory quality of life. The state has direct and sole responsibility for many of the structural determinants which impinge on the social and economic environment of its citizens: how to control corruption in government sector; how to uphold law; how the police should better serve and protect all citizens, regardless of their backgrounds; how to fight pollution, and how to solve disputes and conflict. The failure of past regimes has shown that artificially constructed participation and conflict avoidance cannot maintain a forced cohesiveness in the country. Difficulties in solving the ever-increasing incidence of violence and the violation of human and civil rights are the legacy of the authoritarian New Order regime. The on-going effects of this regime’s over-emphasis of the primacy of collective over individual rights, the suppression of differences, and the practice of discrimination will be discussed in the next chapter.
Notes:

1 There were also variations in the number of the lessons and contact hours. Generally, in one term, the number of PPKn classes ranged from eight to twelve, and total contact hours ranged from sixteen to twenty-four hours.

2 On one hand, the writers of the PPKn textbooks emphasise the legal issues, seemingly driving their discourse from secular thought. Citizenship rights are treated as legally bound. On the other hand, they consider rights and duties as part of natural law by involving God and/or religious arguments. Moreover, they avoid drawing a clear distinction between human rights and civil rights. Civil rights are treated as an extension of human rights - natural rights to be exact. As a result, the adoption of the concept of ‘rights’ by the writers seems to imply that human beings are ‘partially’ self-rewarding individuals.


4 Theoretically, the ‘motorist case’ can be seen as a judgement, namely ‘the mental process of evaluating people, actions or events relative to personal or social norms or values’ (van Dijk 1996:6). The discourse of PPKn exemplified by this case can therefore be seen as an effort to establish opinion (i.e. the result of a judgement) rather than knowledge which is ‘relative to socioculturally shared commonsense or scientific truth or verification’ (van Dijk 1996:5).

5 On the controversy over the discourse and practice of democracy in New Order Indonesia, Magnis-Suseno argued that formal democracy is a necessary but not a sufficient condition. Without democratic institutions, there is no democracy. However, whether or not such institutions have functioned as they should is another issue. It is referred to as substantial democracy (Magnis-Suseno 1994).

6 David Bourchier (1994) considers that the role Notosusanto has played in constructing the history of Indonesia, particularly post-colonial Indonesia, can be seen from his writings. He was cherished by the Indonesian military in New Order period because was ‘willing to construct and sustain arguments which provided historical justification for their claim to a permanent role in government’ (Bourchier 1994:57). Also, see, for example, Adam (2005; 2004) who has recently revealed Nugroho Notosusanto’s role in the publication of the six volumes of school textbooks on Indonesian history and the construction Education of History of the Nation’s Struggle (Pendidikan Sejarah Perjuangan Bangsa or PSPB).

7 As a social institution - stated in the statute on the Indonesian Press (UU No. 11 Tahun 1966 tentang Ketentuan-ketentuan Pokok Pers and UU No. 11 Tahun 1982 tentang Perubahan Atas Undang-undang No. 11 Tahun 1966) – the Indonesian press, for example, is expected to act as social control mechanism of development, but the Government can define whether or not it is socially responsible.

8 As Mangunwijaja (1994) argued, militaristic practices such as the dual function of the armed-forces and various types of civil defense were greatly influenced by the Japanese occupation forces during the Second World War, and the toramy system developed by the Japanese to control the vast area of Indonesia with their limited troops.

9 For state functions, see, for example, Fukuyama (2004).
CHAPTER 6
THE DISCOURSE OF UNITY IN DIVERSITY IN
PANCASILA AND CIVIC EDUCATION (PPKn) TEXTBOOKS

Introduction
Various overarching concepts have been indispensable in our understanding of the civic
courtesy, knowledge and skills implicit in the concept of citizenship. These include the
broad concepts of identity and participation, as well as the rights, duties and obligations
already discussed. Identity and participation, including such inter-related issues as justice,
tolerance, recognition and entitlements, are integral parts of citizenship studies and
citizenship education (Cogan 1998, Delanty 2000a). These terms recognise the diverse
needs and aspirations of individuals and groups as an expression of their social
membership within and beyond the nation-state in an increasingly global world.

This chapter takes Indonesia’s national slogan ‘Unity in Diversity’ - Bhinneka Tunggal
Ika - as its title. Under this rubric it looks at issues of identity and participation using the
and ‘Justice’ in order to capture the various dimensions of diversity in Indonesia and test
the extent to which diversity has been accommodated in PPKn. It first reviews
international understandings of identity formation and participation, and then looks at the
way these concepts are addressed by PPKn writers. It examines the extent to which the
texts recognise and accommodate issues of difference, and how differences are constructed in the discourse of collectivity, integration and conflict, tolerance, and justice. Its objective is to determine the extent to which this discourse is congruent with the international understandings of identity and participation in the context of contemporary, post-colonial Indonesia. For each topic, the main points of the relevant texts will be summarised, then a critical analysis of the implications will be presented.

Discussion of identity and participation in PPKn textbooks is scattered across all levels under such lesson-headings as Obedience, Awareness, Consciousness, Tidiness, Rights, Obligations, Respect, Harmony, Cooperation, Love, Pride, Thriftiness, Justice, Compassion, Friendliness, Boldness, Discipline, Faithfulness and Honesty. These lessons are intended to construct a civic ideal by regulating students' behaviour through the inculcation of rules, norms and values.

For discussion of issues under the heading of 'The Primacy of Conscious Collectivity', the texts selected are:

- Junior Secondary (SLTP) Class 2, pages 81 - 92 on 'Willing to Sacrifice.' The text is taken from pages 81 and 82;
- Senior Secondary (SLTA) Class 3, pages 26 -34 on 'Adherence' The text is taken from page 30;
- Senior Secondary (SLTA) Class 2, pages 100 - 109 on 'Pancasila Democracy and Other State-Systems' The text is taken from page 104;
- Senior Secondary (SLTA) Class 2, pages 44 - 57 on 'Harmony.' The text is taken from page 48;
Senior Secondary (SLTA) Class 1, pages 33 - 41 on 'Devotion'. The text is taken from page 104;

Junior Secondary (SLTP) Class 3, pages 83 - 89 on 'Unity'. The text is taken from pages 83 and 84, and

Senior Secondary (SLTA) Class 2, pages 91 - 99 on 'Unity'. The text is taken from pages 97 and 98.

For the discussion of issues under the heading of 'Integration and Conflict'

Junior Secondary (SLTP) Class 2, pages 43 - 49 on 'Kinship'. The text is taken from pages 43 and 44;

Senior Secondary (SLTA) Class 3, pages 58 - 65 on 'Determination'. The text is taken from page 60;

For discussion on the issues under the heading of 'Tolerance'

Junior Secondary (SLTP) Class 1, pages 34 - 37 on 'Tolerance'. The text is taken from pages 34 and 35;

Senior Secondary (SLTA) Class 1, pages 1 - 8 on 'Tolerance'. The text is taken from pages 1 - 3;

For discussion of issues under the heading of 'Justice'

Junior Secondary (SLTP) Class 1, pages 91 - 98 on 'Justice'. The text is taken from page 91;

Senior Secondary (SLTA) Class 3, pages 9 - 18 on 'Justice and Truth'. The text is taken from pages 9 and 10.

Senior Secondary (SLTA) Class 3, pages 35 - 43 on 'Social Justice'. The text is taken from pages 35 and 36.
Identity and Participation

As social beings we do not live by ourselves, but with other individuals. Sociology concerns itself with the relationships between society and the individual, and the construction of ‘self’ within this relationship. Emile Durkheim proposed that social integration in modern industrial society is based on an organic solidarity, produced by the interdependence of economic ties arising out of differentiation and specialisation within the modern economy (Abercrombie, Hill and Turner 2000:106). Durkheim’s organically integrated society has an existence which is greater than and prior to the subordinate individuals which comprise it, in the same way that a living body is greater than its individual, mutually dependent organs. Like the organs of a living body, the individual has a functional role in society, and it is from this external society that concepts of identity and self derive.

Georg Simmel, a contemporary of Durkheim, took a similar view in relation to individual identity. He considered society as an interaction of individuals, in which a plurality becomes a unity (Simmel 1971).

The symbolic interactionist perspective contested the way these earlier sociologists privileged society above the individual, seemingly subordinating individual agency in the construction of self. George H. Mead contended that self-consciousness emerges out of an individual’s interaction with others, an interaction which is symbolically mediated. Individuals develop a unity of self in response to the ‘generalised other’, by seeing themselves as others see them (Broom and Selznick 1963:105-110). Although reason and self-awareness cannot be realised outside society, this society is the result of interaction between individuals. Society has an objective existence which is not prior to individuals
but created by them. Based on his concept of the 'generalised other', Mead made a
distinction between the unsocialised self, or "I" and the social self or "Me" (Ray
1999:160). Charles H. Cooley developed Mead's ideas, proposing that individuals
develop a sense of self by forming an image of how they appear to others. Cooley called
this entity 'the looking glass self'. Cooley seemed to contest the objective existence of
society, seeing it more as existing only in the subjective awareness of social actors

Insofar as the relationship between the self and society are concerned, some of the most
useful perspectives incorporate elements of psychology. Perhaps one of the most
influential of these is Lawrence Kohlberg's theory of the stages of moral development.
Kohlberg's theory, largely built upon that of Jean Piaget, assumes that individuals
progress through a series of levels of moral development. There are three levels, each
consisting of two stages. Each of the six stages corresponds to a different approach to
moral reasoning. At the first or preconventional level, a child is described as 'well­
behaved' and responsive to cultural labels of good and bad. The child interprets these
labels in terms of their physical consequences. Stage 1 of this level is punishment and
obedience orientation, in which the right action is to avoid punishment. Stage 2 is
instrumental relativist orientation, in which the reasons for doing right are to satisfy one's
own needs and occasionally the needs of others. The second or conventional level
involves conformist attitudes, in which a child maintains the expectations of its family,
group or nation, regardless of immediate and obvious consequences. At this level stage 3
is the 'good-boy/girl' orientation, where good behaviour is behaviour that wins approval
from others. At stage 4, involving law and order orientation, right behaviour is seen as
doing one’s social duty, showing respect for authority and maintaining social order. The final post-conventional or principled level is characterised by autonomous moral values and principles, which have validity and application apart from the authority of the groups or persons who hold them, and apart from individual’s own identification with those persons or groups. Stage 5 at this level is social contract orientation, where right action is determined by society’s rules. Stage 6 is universal ethical principle orientation, where right action is determined by an individual’s conscience or self-chosen ethical principles in accordance with the universal principles of justice, the equality of human rights and respect for the dignity of human beings as individual persons (Kohlberg 1971, 1980).

However modern identity is not understood simply as a unity of elements derived from social interaction with one’s immediate surroundings, and is more fragmented than suggested by the sociological theories of self discussed above. Identity may be constructed through various elements, such as family, gender, race, class, rank, profession, community and nation; elements which are also instrumental in the acquisition and development of the individual’s citizenship (Dynesson and Gross 1991). Anthony Giddens believes that in high modernity self-identity becomes a reflexively organised endeavour. The reflexive project of the self, as he puts it, ‘consists in the sustaining of coherent, yet continuously revised, biographical narratives’ (Giddens 1991:5).

There is unprecedented expansion of transnational processes, flexibility of population movement, capital and technology. National sovereignty is being eroded, national
identity is being pluralised and the participation of citizens can no longer be confined to
the conformist perspectives of the nation-state. As Manuel Castells argues in The Rise of
the Network Society, 'Our societies are increasingly structured around a bipolar
opposition between the Net and the Self ... In this process, social fragmentation spreads,
as identities become more specific and increasingly difficult to share' (Castells 1996:3).
In the past, geographical location and ethnicity as embedded in one's familial and local
values were major determinants in the construction of identity. However, in the era of
globalisation where individuals are more geographically mobile, they are not bound to
such exclusive sources of identity. As social activities are increasingly connected locally
and globally, 'individual are forced to negotiate lifestyle choices among a diversity of
options' (Giddens 1991:5).

Individuals can therefore be perceived as having multiple forms of identity rather than the
grand narrative of the modernist project of nation-state, stressing a sense of community,
the collective memory of traditions, and common but often unstated understandings of
obedience and duties. Anthony Giddens proposes that such 'emancipatory politics'
constrain exploitation and oppression by a reliance on the dogmatic imperatives of
tradition and religion, and obedience to the ethical imperatives of justice, equality and
participation. He believes these should be developed to include the emergence of 'life
politics'. 'Life politics', as he argues, is the politics of self-actualisation, not fixed by
hierarchy, tradition and custom, but flowing from freedom of choice and generative
power. These allow the creation of morally justifiable forms of life that promote self-
actualisation in the context of global interdependence, and development of ethics concerning the issue of 'how should we live?' (Giddens 1991:214-217).

The Primacy of Conscious Collectivity

To discuss various issues under the sub-topic ‘The Primacy of Conscious Collectivity’ in this chapter, I have extracted seven texts from PPKn books.

Text - 12

To achieve our purposes, willingness to sacrifice for humanity, community, nation and state is required. In the struggle for independence, many families lost their husbands, children, parents, brothers and sisters, etc. They were willing to do so for the sake of the nation’s struggle. […]

In essence, willingness to sacrifice means readiness to give anything that one has even though it causes suffering to oneself simply for the interest of the nation and state.

The love of motherland and nation encourages a person to be willing to sacrifice for the nation and state. The pride in being an Indonesian, having Indonesia as motherland, causes one to be willing to sacrifice for the interests of the nation and state. Without the readiness to sacrifice for the interest of nation and state, no parents will allow their child to defend its motherland. It follows that in one’s actions, one must place the primacy of the unity and interest as well as safety of the nation and state over individual and group interest. […]

The development which is currently being carried out will be continued. Obviously, it demands a great deal of sacrifice. Without willingness to sacrifice for the interest of the people and the state, there will be no teachers who are willing to be sent to isolated areas for the sake of the education of the future generations. Therefore, willingness to sacrifice in development is very important. For this reason, all citizens should have:

1. resilience;
2. the spirit to achieve a better life and to progress;
3. openness to absorb new ideas and to innovate, and
4. active participation in development […]

(SLTP Class 2:81-82)

Text - 13

Pancasila was born not in a void, but underwent a long process and has become mature through the history of the nation’s struggle… Consequently, it should be accepted as the state ideology by all groups. Several times Pancasila’s strength has been tested by rebellions, such as Darul Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia (DTII), PRRI/Fermesta, RMS, Pengkhianatan PKI Madiun and G-30-S/PKI. The failure of these rebellions has proved that Pancasila is always wanted by Indonesian people as their state ideology. This is the state ideology that can
The New Order is a system of nation and state which is stable, dynamic and democratic, be it in social, economic or political aspects, with its leadership based on a strong and wise institution, guaranteeing community movements that are neat and well-organised, progressive and accurate.

We are aware that the change of system of government and state was due to the obstacles, disturbances, challenges and threats to the newly-born Indonesia, both from inside and outside the country.

1. From inside
   a. Challenges from the communists through PKI rebellion on 18 September 1948, known as Madiun Affair led by Muso. PKI imposed its own will and tried to topple the legitimate government. The government which held firmly to Pancasila was able to handle the situation by taking firm action.
   b. Some politicians’ sense of nationality was not strong enough; evidenced by the failure of constitutional parliament in reformulating the national constitution. The President’s Decree of 5 July 1959, declared a return to the 1945 Constitution.
   c. There were some prominent figures who were not satisfied with the Government and carried out rebellions against it, such as Darul Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia (DITI), Pemerintahan Revolusioner Republik Indonesia/Pemberontakan Rakyat Semesta (PRRI/Permesta), Republik Maluku Selatan (RMS), etc.

2) From outside [...] (SLTA Class 2:97-98)

A state is the largest organisation serving as the container for a nation. In the state, law is required so that any activity can be carried out smoothly. Especially for development, what is required is a community that is disciplined and orderly, secure, peaceful and prosperous. Every member of the community must adhere to, obey and show commitment to the rules that they have made. One of the most important conditions for development to proceed smoothly is stability, stability that allows room for well-directed dynamism. Dynamic stability has clearly showed the results that we are beginning to enjoy. [...] (SLTA Class 3:30)

Pancasila Democracy is always attentive to the collective interest, puts primacy on deliberation, and appreciates a strong familial spirit. Unlike other countries that subscribe to government system of oligarchy, anarchy, mobocracy, and dictatorship, Pancasila Democracy does not share a single aspect with the foregoing systems of government. [...] Anarchy is a government in which the power structure is unclear, with no rules
that can be conformed to. Each individual can act freely according to their own will. In Pancasila Democracy, individual freedom is restrained by collective interest. Collective interest is above individual and group interest. [...] (SLTA Class 2:104)

**Text - 17** The existence of collectivity in the community means that human beings sacrifice part of their individual freedom and interest for the wider interest, namely the interest of other individuals, community, and nation, without losing their own identity. Therefore, there should always be a harmony and balance between the desire to achieve one's own interest and the effort to fulfill public interest. The effort to create this equilibrium will eventually benefit the public interest and at the same time be beneficial to individual interests in the community (SLTA Class 2:48).

**Text - 18** Collectivity is a characteristic of the life of the Indonesian people which has been maintained until today. This reality can be seen more clearly in rural communities, although this type of life also exists in urban areas. People in the rural areas live harmoniously and peacefully; all the citizens are socially and traditionally bound. If one of the people in a village builds a house, the neighbours participate in building the house. In Kalimantan, there is a custom that if someone wants to make a boat, all the people in the village help to make it. Even now Indonesian people still maintain the custom, namely if someone dies, all the people from the kampong or village collect a fund to help lighten the burden of the stricken family (SLTA Class 1:33).

Text-12 is taken from the first three short paragraphs of a lesson entitled 'willing to sacrifice' (*rela berkurban*), SLTP Class 3 textbook, and deals with sacrifice for the benefit of others by saying that an individual’s willingness to sacrifice for the community or country is mandatory. In the struggle for the independence of Indonesia, many Indonesians showed this attitude, without considering their own interests or expecting reward for their sacrifice. The passage then continues by explaining the need to participate in the current development in the country. In order to participate in development, one should have a resilience, a spirit to achieve a better life, an openness to learn and to change, and willingness to actively participate in national development.
An individual’s relations with society should be governed by the practice of collectivity rather than self-orientation. Students are urged to be part of their functioning community, in which they should not compete or do better than others. It suggests that people should be willing to give unconditionally anything they have to the nation or state, even if this causes them suffering. If collective goals are fulfilled, individual goals will automatically be achieved (Mulder 1996). Collective goals are merged with individual goals. This emphasis on collective goals over individual independence and initiative overlooks the fact that as human beings the students have their own interests, wants and needs. This discourse works to suppress individual identity, liberty and potential.

The writers’ concern for the oneness of the nation can be seen in their emphasis on the need for unity (persatuan dan kesatuan serta kepentingan dan keselamatan bangsa). This also appears in Text - 13 and Text - 14, which portray the unity of the nation as vulnerable to threat. Because of the separatist movements before the New Order period, the Indonesian people should be constantly alert to current and future threats. While stressing the need for unity, the text does not explain why separatism should be rejected, and more importantly, does not address past and present demands for greater autonomy or separation from Indonesia. The two texts do not suggest any fundamental social, cultural, economic or political differences to explain the separatist demands of groups such as PRRI/Permesta, Darul Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia (DI/TII), Republik Maluku Selatan (RMS), Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM) and Organisasi Papua Merdeka (OPM).
This text exemplifies the demands of the New Order for civil obedience. People’s behavior should conform to community interests. Society will determine what is ‘right’ and ‘wrong’. Moreover, the discourse of ‘the willingness to sacrifice’ suggests that people are expected to be martyrs to their country, rather than simply loyalists or patriots. Many of the ‘revolutions’ and ‘struggles for independence’ in pre-independent Indonesia were spontaneous, unplanned reactions towards the colonial powers. Many of those who fought in these wars had little thought of complying with social norms, rules and laws, or of upholding national unity. They were reacting against externally imposed authority. The argument put forward by the PPKn texts seems to locate the state as an external authority, mandating loyalty, sacrifice, patriotism and the primacy of collective ideals rather than appealing to the individual’s principles and conscience to give meaning to these principles. However in this context we need to ask whether the construct and primacy of collective ideals manifested in PPKn texts may have been influenced by local cultures in Indonesia. An example can be drawn from the emphasis on rukun and social order in Javanese culture.

In discussing the Javanese ethics in relation to Kohlberg’s stages of moral development, Magnis-Suseno (1997) argues that the Javanese ethics of social harmony and conflict avoidance are similar to Kohlberg’s third stage of moral consciousness. Javanese ethics of the sacrifice of self in favour of the group (sepi ing pamrih), and the readiness to do one’s duty (rame ing gawe), show that ‘Javanese society does not approve if somebody lives for the fulfilment of his own individual needs and interests.’ (Magnis-Suseno 1997:231). Furthermore, according to Magnis-Suseno, in social communication this
moral reasoning is supported by the feeling of shame (isin) and embarrassment (sungkan), and thus a Javanese who does not conform to community expectations will feel ashamed.

However, this might not always be the case. The high incidence of corruption and collusion in contemporary Indonesia shows that the isin and sungkan do not constrain these social problems. What we might expect from a shame-culture in Javanese society does not always come true. In a shame culture, individuals feel ashamed rather than guilty when they do something wrong. The culprit, family members, relatives and friends are expected to hide the misdeed, otherwise the wrongdoer will lose status. Rather than feeling guilt because of the misdeed, the culprit feels shame when it is exposed. If the misdeed can be hidden there is no feeling of shame. Despite a shame culture, corruption and collusion still exists, i.e. it should not exist but it does, and this is a mystery.

Parallel to the shame culture is the ascription of status according to birth (heredity), kinship, gender, age and educational record (Parsons 1951). A strong attachment to the conceptual principle of hierarchy in Javanese culture, coupled with large power distance (Hofstede 1991, 1980), means that individuals are extremely reluctant to expose the misdeeds of members of their family or group, particularly those of 'higher rank'. A Javanese saying that alludes to this 'hiding of truth' to protect a senior was popular in the last decade of Suharto's reign, namely mikul dhuvur mendhem jero (respecting the contribution of your predecessor).
If we relate these cultural conceptions to the current situation in Indonesia, it is difficult to bring to justice those people who committed corruption and suppression in the New Order period. The law-enforcers can bring them to the court, but rarely can they prove their crimes, let alone punish them. Bribery is one factor that contributes to the ineffectiveness of law-enforcement, another is the Javanese concept of 'ewu pakewu'. This is the concept that law enforcers feel uneasy prosecuting their former superiors, and because of this ewu pakewu or uneasyness, those suspected to have committed a crime are not brought to justice. I would suggest that there is another crucial factor at work here as well. The collectivity oriented value or norm (rather than reason) may in fact be more prevalent than the ewu pakewu value. It is the problem of the collectivity that makes individuals in the group unable to use their individual conscience, to free themselves from collective guilt. In a closely integrated society, if one person's misdeed is exposed the entire group feels vicarious guilt and shame. The crime of one person is the crime of the entire group, and therefore the entire group has an interest in concealing the offence.

This practice contradicts the principles of democracy and civil society. Norms of trust and support among networks of family members, siblings, relatives and friends can constitute social capital, but they can also promote the selfish ends of individuals and groups. As Francis Fukuyama has pointed out; 'Both the Ku Klux Klan and Mafia achieve cooperative ends on the basis of shared norms, thus therefore have social capital, but they also produce abundant negative externalities for the larger society in which they are embedded.' (Fukuyama 2001:8). I am not suggesting here that all types of group norms are bad or wrong, rather I wish to argue that democracy and civil society in
Indonesia can only be promoted if a public good is not undermined by a private good, namely an excessive focus on the primacy and thus privileging of members of the family and siblings. The extension of this is an excessive focus on the primacy of the state, justified in the name of national interest, and the corresponding suppression individual rights, resulting in an authoritarian state and forced social cohesion.\textsuperscript{5}

If moral behaviour is determined by moral reasoning, then the foregoing discourse intended to regulate individual behaviour and actions may explain problems of the demand for collective conformity. In the discourse of \textit{PPKn}, collective conformity is not only imposed in the equivalent of stage three of Kohlberg's moral reasoning (Kohlberg 1971), namely good boy/girl orientation, but also impacts on stage four (authority orientation) and stage five (social contract orientation). Since collectivity orientation is so strong, the personal values and opinions integral to an individual's group identification in stage five fail to develop. The emphasis on the social contract underlying the discourse (exemplified by the discussion on rights and duties in Chapter 5) precludes changes to the law 'in terms of rational consideration of social utility [...]’ (Kohlberg 1971:88). As a result of the emphasis on the 'legal point of view' and 'official morality', it is clear that students are expected not only to conform to their society's rules and roles, but to be totally subjugated by the state. This is indicated by the repeated words in Text - 12. \textit{Tunduk} (submit), \textit{patuh} (comply/bow down), \textit{ketaatan} (obedience) and \textit{berkorban} (sacrifice) all emphasise subservience and subjugation.
Text - 15, taken from the last paragraph of a lesson entitled 'Obedience' (*Ketaatan*), also shows that school students have not been encouraged to reach stage six (individual conscience principles). The passage is intended to argue that Indonesians should obey rules and law. Different ideas should be ‘deliberated on’ (*musyawarahkan*) because this is required by the fourth principle of *Pancasila* and article 28 of the 1945 Constitution. It argues that democracy is not something new in Indonesia, because people in the archipelago have practised ‘deliberation’ (*musyawarah*) for centuries.

Text - 15 argues that national development brings peace and prosperity, but can only take place effectively in an orderly and stable society where law enforcement is effective. In such a society people should prioritise shared feelings, norms, and expectations over individual interests, which recalls stage three of Kohlberg’s stages of moral reasoning. However, in the case of the *PPKn* discourse it is also clear that a person is considered to belong to a system from which there is no escape. Individuals should adopt the viewpoints of the system, the authority. Authority is society’s rules and laws, which one should uphold. The discourse has been constructed in such a way that it tries to shape students’ reasoning as well as regulate their behaviour, following a similar pattern in many respects to stages four and five of Kohlberg’s stages of moral reasoning. In fact, by emphasising ‘values’ in stages four (‘law and order’ orientation) and five (‘social contract and legalistic orientation’) it demands even greater submission from students. Since the texts were constructed as civic discourses to regulate relations between individuals and the state, individuals are assumed to uphold not only societal values, but also the legal contracts of their society. In the school textbooks, it is made clear that the Indonesian
constitution, laws and regulations constitute the sources of the legal contracts of Indonesian society. And, most importantly, they are presented as the soul of all moral reasoning and the moral behaviour of the Indonesian people. Consequently, individuals are not viewed as a self-governing political community.

It is apparent that PPKn discourse does not distinguish between stages four and five of Kohlberg's model. In Kohlberg's stage four, law and order should be upheld and obeyed rigidly (Weiten 2001). In stage five, a sense of obligation to law develops because of the social contract for the protection of one's personal rights and those of the whole community. At the same time an awareness of personal values and rights begins to develop alongside the corporate norms and rules of society, and other members of society come to be understood in terms of this less personalised system of corporate norms and rules. The right to uphold personal values and rights begins to conflict with the tacit and overt rules of the group. Thus, society's rules and laws are viewed as fallible rather than absolute (Weiten 2001). In PPKn discourse, however, there is no room for conflict between individual values and rights and society's rules and law (see also Mulder 1999b).

One important implication of this discourse of collectivity is that individualism is viewed as anarchy. A 'free individual' is seen as clashing with common good.

The discourse that over-emphasises collectivity in order to change students' behaviour and judgment may contain a hidden agenda, in that what is argued to be the primacy of collective and national interests over individual interests was a strategy of the past regime to ensure that citizens remained obedient. One possible reason for the New Order regime
to demand obedience was to make it easier for it to control the people. Education is a
more effective state apparatus of social control than armed force. Citizenship education
emphasising obedience, submission and collectivity was employed as tool, because it is
more amenable to manipulation and less violent than physical or military action. Social
control was thus cultivated by stressing group discipline through respect for rules and by
fostering an attachment of the individual to the group as a social body greater than the

However, demanding that all members of a community should conform to the society’s
rules and norms encourages ‘a tendency to resist exceptions that might weaken that rule.’
(Trompenaars 1993:31). Resisting exceptions leads to the dichotomy of binary
oppositions; either ‘the good guys’ or ‘the axis of evil’, either the faithful or the infidel,
either absolute compliance or culpable deviance. There can be middle road, no
alternatives and no exceptions. For example, in arguing that *Pancasila* democracy is the
most suitable state system for Indonesia, and comparing it with systems such as
oligarchy, mobocracy, dictatorship (à la Nazi), Marxism/communism and anarchy, the
writers of *PPKn* textbooks suggest that for Indonesia at least, the only alternatives to
*Pancasila* democracy are dictatorship or anarchy. They then equate individual freedom
with anarchy. This occurs in Text - 16.

The ‘anarchy argument’ presupposes that individual freedom will always produce
absolute egoism, which in turn brings anarchy to society. Since individual freedom is
inimical to social integration, it must be restrained. The state uses the discourse of
collective interests to restrain individual freedom, ensure submission of the individual to society, and dominate citizens.

The cultural values of Indonesia have been regarded as representative of a particularistic rather than universalistic culture (Soemardjan 2000). We can therefore question how the ideology of collectivity and conformity fits with this particularistic tendency. Which should be protected, family interests or those of the state? Which of the state’s interests should be given priority? For example, should one go to a war in another country ‘in the national interest’, or should one have the right to reject the demand as a conscientious objector? In a specific situation, will a person be considered a deviant by society for trying to protect family or personal interests?

In a particular situation, conformity (social control) might infringe individual rights. If someone who has to go to a war is very much needed by their family, and that person’s death in the war would only create suffering for the whole family, then whose interests take priority? While the individual’s liberty of choice is constrained by law, this law cannot be absolute and inflexible. The argument that the state and national interest should take priority over individual interests leaves room for exceptions and therefore debate. This needs to be clearly explained, and contextualised by case study.

The thesis of ‘enforceable rational freedom’ put forward by scholars such as Baruch De Spinoza and G.W.F. Hegel (Cranston 1967) considers freedom should be linked politically to a social ethic. Unlike the notion of ‘rational freedom’, which stresses self-
discipline, the 'enforceable rational freedom' thesis emphasises external discipline. The
danger of over-emphasis on such a Hegelian and Durkhemian model of moral obligation
(Durkheim 1961) is that the national interest can be manipulated to serve elite individual
and group interests, as exemplified by the discussion on economic rights. Since such
collective rigidity does not permit individual freedom and responsibility ('rational
freedom'), in the absence or deficiency of controlling forces, deviance will occur.

Another problem of the discourse of the primacy of collectivity imposed by the PPKn
writers is that individual differences are ignored. Rather, every one is treated uniformly in
his or her social life. This is exemplified in the way PPKn writers have argued about
'harmony' (keserasian) in the textbook of SLTA Class 2. Part of the relevant passage has
been extracted as Text - 17. In the first two paragraphs of the reading passage, it is stated
that the second principle of Pancasila ('Social justice for all Indonesian people') has
given an orientation and guidance to social life which places major importance on
collective interests. As a human beings, individuals want to achieve their own goals.
However, in the attempt to meet their needs, they have to consider other people’s rights.
The writers then argue that individuals should surrender part of their rights to the society,
as in Text - 17, and discuss the types of norms underpinning an individual’s social
behaviour.

Although Text - 17 suggests that sacrificing to the community does not mean a loss of
identity (tanpa kehilangan jati dirinya), the excessive emphasis on placing community
interests above individual interests neglects the reality that, as human beings, every
individual has a self-concept. This shapes how individuals think about themselves, vis-a-
vis what others may think about them, perhaps in terms of their economic, social, psychological, biological or physical backgrounds. Assuming a uniformly homogenous society treats people as if they do not have feelings, thoughts, emotions and perceptions. The *PPKn* writers assert that societal goals should be achieved at the expense of individual psychological conditions.

The discourse of *PPKn*, which argues that an individual’s self grows out of his or her social relationship, presupposes that human beings are passive individuals, rather than active agents who can transform their individual and social conditions. Individuals are shaped by forces external to them. Their decisions and actions are determined by their social environment. This argument does not encourage individuals to see themselves as autonomous self-sufficient human beings, active agents rather than passive subjects. It ignores the fact that as a human being, each individual has emotion and experience. The emphasis on social norms and expectations rather than individual interests sacrifices individual creativity.

History shows that most creative works and discoveries were not made by a social groups of people. Rather, they were the products of independent individuals who dared to think and acted differently, individuals who stood out from the crowd. In New Order thinking society is portrayed as static and always stable, reminding us of a ‘true’ socialist communities where every one is identical and treated identically.
The problem of the over-emphasis on primacy of collectivity can also be found in the lesson entitled ‘Sacrifice’ (Pengabdian) in the SLTA Class 1 textbook, one paragraph of which has been extracted to form Text - 18. The text quoted here is preceded by a section which asserts that every citizen in the country should be proud of being Indonesian since Pancasila has proved to the world that it has created national stability and handled differences among the diverse population. To realise social justice requires sacrifice from every citizen. This echoes the emphasis on sacrifice in Text - 12, above. Every member of the society has the responsibility to maintain the equilibrium and harmony of rights and obligations by respecting human rights, loving one another as human beings and being tolerant. This is consistent with the portrayal in Text - 18 of Indonesia as a collective society.

The argument that people in Indonesia’s rural areas live peacefully and in a harmonious way, and more importantly help one another spontaneously, recalls Ferdinand Tonnies’s concept of Gemeinschaft or ‘community’, while the assertion that people in the urban areas are less socially cohesive is similar to his Gessellschaft or ‘association’. It may be that people in villages feel closer to each other, but whether they really help one another in the way described in the text is open to question. The argument that people in the villages invariably live in a harmonious and peaceful way, hidup rukun dan damai, seems to be exaggerated. While it is true that social change may be slower in rural areas than in urban areas, it does not automatically follow that life in villages was or is always harmonious. Since life is dynamic, we need to accept that conflict is inevitable in social interaction. The example is also unrealistic, especially in the contemporary situation
where villages face problems of poverty, land shortage, communal unrest, lack of services, and the loss of young people to cities. The selected text presents a golden ideal as reality.

**Integration and Conflict**

To discuss various issues under the sub-topic ‘Integration and Conflicts’ I have extracted three texts from *PPK*n books.

**Text - 19**

Indonesia consists of about seventeen thousand islands lying between the Indian Ocean and Pacific Ocean and between the continents of Asia and Australia.

The Indonesian people, who consist of a variety of ethnic tribes that inhabit these islands, possess different cultural backgrounds, customs and ways of life. The geographical conditions of Indonesia have resulted in a lack of opportunities to interact with one another.

The Indonesian people originated from members of a big inter-related family. Their spread through marriage and adaptation to the local conditions has resulted in a diversity of tribes, languages, customs, and cultures. This condition causes every region or island to develop according to its own environment. Each regional culture develops in harmony with its local conditions. [...] Although Indonesian people have diverse ethnic tribes and cultures, this is not a problem for the unity of nation. The question arises as to why the diversity of the Indonesian people has not caused division. Indonesian people have realised that diversity is a rich asset that must serve as the foundation of the unity of nation. With the slogan *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* which means unity in diversity, Indonesian people have established an independent, sovereign and united country. *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* is the character of Indonesia people which should be preserved in our land. Every Indonesian feels that they belong to one family, one ideal which reflects solidarity and love of a happy life ... If one member of the family suffers, the family as a whole feels it too. Such united system grounded in kinship can be seen in the rural community life. Because individuals feel that they live in collectivity, what has become the social duties should be carried out together ... (*SLTP* Class 2:43-44)

**Text - 20**

Nevertheless, if Pancasila does not touch real life, if we do not feel its shape in everyday life, gradually its meaning will turn vague, and our loyalty to Pancasila will fade. Pancasila may become a mere state document written in Indonesian history books. If this happened, all the sins and stains would be upon us who are alive today, considering the generation who has sacrificed so much to uphold and defend Pancasila (*SLTP* Class 2:58).
In Text - 19, taken from the lesson entitled ‘Kinship’ (*Kekerabatan*), the writers argue that the ‘unity in diversity’ of people in Indonesia originated from a big family or clan. However, due to marriages and adaptation to the local environment during their migrations, differences in ethnicity, languages, customs and cultural values occurred. People in the regions developed in different ways according to their environments. In developing the argument of the quoted passage, the writers describe the cohesiveness of Indonesian people as similar to that of a family. If one member of the family suffers, the whole of the family will feel the same.\(^6\)

The statement that the Indonesian people originated from one ‘big family’ is technically correct but both simplistic and misleading. The ‘big family’ is that of the Austronesian language group, which extends from Madagascar to the islands of Polynesia (Bellwood 1991, Bellwood Fox & Trynon 1995, Diamond 1998). This hardly constitutes a basis for nationhood. An additional problem is that many ethnic groups in the Republic of Indonesia do not belong to this family, including most of the population of the Papua Province. While the origins of Austronesian people are still debated, many scholars believe that their ancestral homeland was the island of Formosa (today’s Taiwan), and that their migrations south and east first started some 3,500 years ago. This thesis is supported by robust archaeological and linguistic evidence (Bellwood 1991, Diamond 1998:336-353). It has been suggested that the Formosan forefathers originated in southern China, which, according to the ‘big family’ argument, would mean that the ancestors of the Indonesians were Chinese – a hypothesis that many Indonesians today (and in the past) would find unpalatable.
Secondly, if Anderson’s thesis of imagined community (Anderson 1991) is applied to the people of different linguistic and ethnic backgrounds in the archipelago, it is clear that they came together to form a country, namely Indonesia, not because they were once of a big family, but rather because of they shared a common experience, particularly in reacting against the Dutch colonial power in the regions. Indonesia’s ethnic and regional differences were subsumed beneath what Ernest Gellner (1983) calls the ‘political roof’ of the new nation-state, like that of the older European nation-states.

As shown in Text - 19, the writers also argue that the diversity of the Indonesian people does not result in dissension or disintegration because of the system of voluntary integration that the people consciously subscribe to. This echoes the previous section on individual and social identity, where the writers of PPKn proposed that people in the archipelago came together through voluntary integration. Because they share certain values and spirit, they form a functional association based on general consensus. Such discourse stresses that the process of social order, integration and stability has been motivated by a normative structure, but understates the concomitant loss of individual rights and interests. Societal interests are served by public norms and values that presuppose the sacrifice of individual interests. In fact, values and interests are two sides of the same coin. The argument that voluntary integration of individual is a social norm is in fact the other side of domination and subjection.7
Text - 20 is extracted from a lesson about ‘Determination or Unity of Will’ (Kebulatan Tekad) which addresses the importance of compliance from students. This is a good example of the exercise of coercive power. It is coercive because it involves the threat of sanction if one does not obey. The full lesson begins with a paragraph arguing that the Indonesian nation was not formed through similarities of ethnicity, race, religion or group interests, but through the same faiths and ideals. These faiths and ideals become the social capital of Indonesians of otherwise diverse backgrounds, allowing them to unite (bhinneka tunggal ika). This unity has only been forged by long historical struggle. Apart from this, Indonesians are people who always seek ‘harmony’ (keserasian and keselarasan) in their life. The lesson then goes on with a long explanation of the importance of Indonesia’s constitution and Pancasila, and how they rest on the unity and achievements of the people. Thus, even if Pancasila does not touch real life it should not be forgotten, otherwise it will lose its meaning and the Indonesian people will lose their faith in it. If this happens, it will be a ‘sin’ (dosa) and ‘stain’ (noda) upon the Indonesian people for forgetting the sacrifices of those who fought to uphold Pancasila.

Several problems arise from the exercise of power in the above discourse. First, the argument that Indonesia was not formed out of the similarity of ethnicity, race, religion and groups of interests, but because of the same faith and ideals clearly contradicts Text - 19 on the origin of Indonesian people, which depicts them as a big family. Secondly, the use of ‘sin’ and ‘stain’ positions the writers as authority figures giving a judgement (Kalidjemih 2002). The pre-assumed judgement is followed by a threat of sanction. If they do not comply with their obligations as interpreted by the writers, the readers (in this
context, Indonesian students or citizens) have defied the norm. In turn, they will receive sanctions. Individuals are not allowed to have a different opinions or to act differently from a so-called ‘shared values or norm’. If they do, they are likely to be expelled from their group or community. Individuals do not have freedom of speech or opinion. Independence of speech or thought will be considered as rebellion.

Moreover, the words or concepts of ‘sin’ and ‘stain’ are symbols used by human beings in relation to moral offences against the Supreme Being or God. The concept of ‘sin’ first appears in the Old Testament, when Adam violated God’s law by eating the fruit of the Tree of Knowledge. Because Adam disobeyed, he felt guilty. He was expelled from Eden by God. God shamed him and punished him, and he ran away naked, hence the original sin of human being. The use of ‘sin’ and ‘stain’ in the context of PPKn discourse is a reflection of the excessive use of power, a domination of the writers (the state) over the readers (the students or citizens). It recalls the right of a father to punish his disobedient child, and reflects the use of parental as well as political power.

The use of parental power - where the controlled subject cannot demand accountability of the controller - is justified during the learning period in which the child’s power of reasoning is still developing. All people are born with natural rights, but parental power is needed because children lack the reasoning skills of adults. Children are necessarily the controlled subjects of others. Parental power is legitimate without consent, but political power requires consent from the governed. These two concepts were introduced by John Locke in his Two Treatise of Government, as pointed by Hindess (1996). Many would
question whether political power should disguise itself as parental power, and whether it should be exercised through school textbooks.\textsuperscript{10}

The threat of force as exemplified above suggests that a legitimation crisis occurred in the Indonesia's New Order period when the authoritative (official) knowledge or social control turned out to be misplaced and inadequate (Habermas 1976). If students disobeyed rational authority, such as ignoring the threat of being stigmatised as a sinner, clearly it is not because they wanted to be a deviant. In state and citizen relations, I would argue that it is due to the failure of the state in promoting true moral reasoning in the process of differentiation. In the socialisation (the civilising process) the symbolic communication employed lacked sophistication. This is a result of the imposition of instrumental rationality, which sees a punishment-oriented approach as being the preferred way to make individuals recognise their rights and social values.\textsuperscript{11}

It is apparent that the \textit{PPKn} discourse employed to demand compliance from students was influenced by a long colonial history of the violation of civil rights, political indoctrination and the inculcation of values. The conscious or unconscious reproduction of the political discourse and practice of the colonising power, and the desire of the nationalist elite to mimic Western democratic countries, have not produced deep-seated social and political transformation. The 'sin' case demonstrates how the past regime mimicked their former colonial master who morally stigmatised so-called 'primitive' colonial subjects to transform them into 'civilised subjects'.\textsuperscript{12} However in this civilising process there was an ambivalence on the part of the colonial power. Rather than
'civilising' the subject peoples, the real aim was to exploit, influence and dominate them, using punishment to enforce discipline and control. Control through shame, humiliation and punishment dominated the process of bringing up and forming the primitive child.\textsuperscript{13}

The people of the Dutch East Indies were constantly reminded of their inferiority by being located at the lowest level (\textit{Inlander}) of the official, racially determined hierarchy. They had the fewest rights and privileges, consistent with their child-like status. Above them were other 'foreign orientals' (\textit{Vreemde Oosterlingen}), while the highest level was reserved exclusively for Europeans.\textsuperscript{14} In a similar way the post-colonial governments abrogated the right to label behaviour as either appropriate and right, or inappropriate and wrong, as a tool of social control. Catchwords and catchphrases were the most common instruments. Ruth McVey (1982) observes that such slogans were first employed in the de-Soekarnoisation period, for example \textit{rechtstaat}, to invoke the restoration of the rule of law. The legalist emphasis of New Order regime shares that of the late colonial regime. She comments (McVey 1982:87):

This may seem a curious catchword for a leadership that sponsoring large-scale massacres and had probably the largest number of political prisoners in the world; it is therefore the more interesting that that particular slogan was put forward ... We might suggest that constitutionalism was symbolically important for both because they were run by conservative elites whose members were sufficiently acculturated to modern Western values to accept representative democracy as ultimately the proper form of government.

Under New Order rule, a variety of labels was employed to stigmatise differences as deviant. These included 'pengkhianat bangsa' (traitor to the nation), 'komunis' or 'cara-cara komunis' (communists or communist ways), 'orang-orang frustrasi' (the frustrated), 'subversi' (subversion), 'non-pribumi' or 'pendatang' (non-indigenous) and 'menghina
Bapak Presiden’ (insulting the President), to mention but a few. While arbitrary in singling out a person to be deviant, interpellation (Althusser 1971) became a systematic way for the state to marginalise and scapegoat ‘deviant’ groups. Once branded as deviant they could be terrorised, kidnapped, jailed, strait-jacketed, tortured and killed, be they ordinary people, activists, students, intellectuals or ex-generals. This made non-conformists to think twice before embarking on a ‘deviant career’. The effects of this cultural fabrication of caste and class, in-group and out-group, majority and minority and indigenous and non-indigenous in the archipelago still impinge on Indonesia’s pluralist society. Even today many regulations that marginalise minorities, women and ‘deviants’ have not been lifted.

**Tolerance**

To discuss various issues under the sub-heading ‘Tolerance’, I have extracted three texts from PPKn books.

**Text - 21** Tolerance is an attitude which appreciates and respects another person’s feelings, and the ability to imagine oneself in the position of another person so that we can understand their feelings.

In the process of appreciating and implementing religious values, tolerance is required to realise and develop mutual respect and co-operation between adherents of different religions. Tolerance can take the form of, among other things, self control so as not to criticise other religions or adherents of other religions. We should give the opportunity to other people to carry out their religious activity according to their religions. By the same token, if one day we carry out our religious activity, adherents of other religions should not disturb our us. This is one of the forms of tolerance in religious life (SLTP Class 1:34).

**Text - 22** Our ethnicity and customs may differ from other people’s. However in the establishment of friendship we can be close to each other. This is made possible because of the following.

Firstly, respect other people’s ethnicity and customs; don’t look down on them.
Secondly, accept difference as something that enriches our knowledge; the more we get together with people of different ethnicity and customs, the more knowledge we can obtain. For example, learning about their customs, speech-acts, language, etc. Thirdly, take an astute approach towards difference. For example, when we are invited to a friend’s house, follow their way. Perhaps, by sitting on a plaited mat or sitting cross-legged. Follow the ways of your friend who invites you and express your appreciation, as long as it is not against the basic values of Pancasila (SLTP Class 1:35).

Text - 23 Indonesia is a pluralist society. Its diversity has many faces. Diversity in regional cultures, ethnic groups, political allegiances, religions, etc. Such diversity can affect the life of Indonesian people both positively and negatively. As a nation that places high values on unity, naturally we do not want diversity to affect positive things. […]

One of the efforts of Indonesian people in handling this diversity is by promoting the habit of mutual-respect, called tolerance. Tolerance can be defined as an attitude of respect towards the opinions and beliefs of other people in respect of their religion, custom, ethnicity, culture, etc. This means that Indonesia recognises the existence of other people with all its consequences. What is important is that we do not intervene in others’ affairs; and we do not breach the prescribed principles of the state ideology.

Tolerance in religious life is carried out based on the appreciation of other people’s religious interest. All the religions formally recognised by the state (Islam, Catholic, Christian, Hinduism, and Budhism) teach their followers to respect adherents of other religions, without mixing the religious teachings of one religion with another. Leading a harmonious life through social intercourse among adherents of different religious communities relates to the values of Pancasila which indeed looks highly on harmony among religious communities. Through living in harmony there is created among the adherents of religions a life which is harmonious, compatible, balanced, and full of tolerance. Indonesian people want harmony between human beings and their God, other human beings, and the environment. In addition, Indonesian people always try to create harmony among nations and a harmony of ideals in the world to achieve happiness in the after-life (SLTA Class 1:1-3).

The first two texts have been selected because both can be considered as giving a general idea of the typical issues of tolerance encountered in a pluralist society such as Indonesia. The first text (Text - 21) begins by presenting a brief definition of tolerance, which stresses mutual-respect and empathy. It then goes with an example of how we should respect another person or group of people whose religious belief is different from ours. The second text (Text - 22) discusses the diverse backgrounds of Indonesian people,
highlighting ethnicity and customs (beliefs). It suggests that students should accept and respect these differences. Differences should be viewed as enriching our knowledge. Understanding differences in our society will broaden our horizons. We should also be able to behave ourselves in the presence of people of different backgrounds. These two texts point out the importance of tolerance towards other people by showing sympathy and empathy. They place a strong emphasis on the primacy of collectivity over individuality. The writers argue that as long as we accept differences, particularly by showing respect to people of different ethnic or religious background, everything will be fine.

The statements over-generalise and over-simplify issues of difference and tolerance. They discuss only group differences, and not individual variations, as well as suggesting that social relationships, either between individuals or groups, are unproblematic. Rather than acknowledging that conflict is an important and latent issue that exists in a pluralist society, the concept of tolerance in the textbooks of *PPKn* becomes a discourse of conflict avoidance. Such a concept of 'pure tolerance' (Wolff, Moore and Marcuse 1969) poses problems for the relationship between individuals and society, and among groups of people. Diversity always involves differences, not only of opinion but also of interest. Conflict should therefore be considered as natural, and it should not be concluded that it is always destructive (see discussion on the micro-social functioning in Chapter 9).

While tolerance has been defined as 'the readiness to respect the inviolability of the private sphere of the individual's existence' (Wolff 1969:25), Text- 21 and Text - 22
emphasise the importance of tolerance toward a person as group member, rather than as a unique individual. Even though the *orang lain* of the first paragraph in Text – 21 may be translated as ‘another person’ or ‘other persons’, it is evident from the context of the second paragraph that ‘orang lain’ refers to an ‘individual as a member of a group’, or ‘the generalised other’, to use George H. Mead’s term. The liberal philosophy that the private sphere of an individual should not be interfered with or constrained by society does not seem to be accommodated by the *PPKn* discourse of tolerance. The concept of classical liberty, for example that of John Stuart Mill, accepts that individuals have social responsibilities, however these do not require them to completely sacrifice their private interests for those of society; social individuals also have the right to pursue their private goals (Wolff 1969). Thus, the first and foremost tolerance in the liberal sense is the acknowledgement that a person’s private rights are free from social interference.

In a multi-ethnic society such as Indonesia, issues of tolerance do not only concern the recognition of a group of people, as the writers suggest, but also recognition of individuals. My argument is that tolerance should begin with a full recognition of individual rights. If we are to practice modern citizenship, we need to consider the dignity of individuals of all ethnic, economic, social, cultural and political backgrounds. If we stress social position and cultural background too strongly, we may revert to the pre-modern conception of citizenship, where individual identity was ascribed and the rights and obligations of individuals were divinely ordained. Individuals were not seen as endowed with a moral sense allowing them to know what is right and wrong (Taylor 1992).
The discourse of tolerance of *PPKn* presupposes that any differences in our social life can be resolved by tolerance. As long as we respect other people’s beliefs and practices, a harmonious life will prevail. This conservative philosophy of rational discourse and social shared values fails to see that tolerance toward one party may be detrimental to another. It overlooks the fact that our social lives are dominated by exchanges of interest. Tolerance in this sense lacks any dialectical proposition, but rather implies the submissive behavior of forced social cohesion. When tolerance means conflict avoidance rather than conflict management or resolution, the differences this tolerance suppresses must eventually break out. The public disturbances late in the New Order regime exemplify this.

To use an everyday hypothetical example, if Group A creates a lot of noise in a community and disrupts the peaceful environment that Group B values highly, tolerance of their behaviour will only result in latent enmity. In a Freudian model of personality, Group B’s *id* or pleasure principle may feel an urge to attack Group A which constantly irritates them. However, Group B’s *ego* or social norms and values coupled with its superego or moral imperatives - in the name of tolerance - make them to check their behaviour. The emotion that is forcibly suppressed in the name of tolerance has the potential to vent itself later as aggressive behaviour. Restraint mechanisms eventually fail, and the subconscious anxiety or discontent that has lingered for months or perhaps years breaks out. Less hypothetically, there have recently been mass killings of the Madurese by the Dayak of West and Central Kalimantan. Reports that these resulted from
the simmering discontent of the Dayak suggest that the notion of pure tolerance as urged by the past regimes in Indonesia has failed to uphold the discourse of unity in diversity.15

Text - 21 is another discourse of pluralism adopted by the state to control social diversity. As the writers argue, we might be of different ethnic, cultural or religious backgrounds, but we can establish good relationship with one another. What we need to do is to respect others and accept the differences (hormatilah suku atau adat istiadat orang lain, jangan merendahkannya ...terimalah perbedaan itu sebagai hal yang memperkaya pengetahuan kita...). Also, when we are invited to eat at a friend’s house we should follow their ways (...kita diundang makan di rumah teman: ikutilah caranya).

It is undeniable that we need to accept that different people might think and act differently, particularly those of a different ethnic and religious background. It is also true that we need to respect our host when we visit someone’s house. However, the issues of tolerance are not as simple as these examples suggest. In practice, tolerance is little help in solving many potentially conflicting issues. The form of tolerance preached by the PPKn texts positions the state as a mediator in the transactions of power in society, urging the parties to be mutually tolerant without addressing the cause of the conflict. This presents problems in understanding issues of conflict, and fails to recognise the potential 'obstacles and limits to tolerance.' (Ricoer 1996:161).

Three paragraphs from the PPKn textbook of SLTA, Class 1 have been extracted as Text-23. The passage starts with a discussion of the pluralistic nature of Indonesian society. The writers argue that in the diversity of the society, unity is strengthened by practicing
the first and second principles of *Pancasila*, and by commitment to the 1928 Youth Pledge (*Sumpah Pemuda 1928*). The lesson then continues with a discussion emphasising religious tolerance.

It is curious that the state preaches religious tolerance, yet by law and according to the constitution, only five religions are tolerated. Every person’s identity card (*Kartu Tanda Penduduk or KTP*) must show the holder’s religion, but this can only be one of the five allowed by the state - Islam, Christian-Protestant, Christian-Catholic, Hinduism and Budhism. Despite the recent amendment of the constitution where ‘other religious beliefs’, most notably Confucianism, are recognised by the state, in practice its followers still face discrimination in enjoying their rights. They still have difficulty obtaining a certificate of marriage from Indonesian government. The religious tolerance of the state does not extend to intermarriage between followers of different religions; ‘mixed marriages’ are not recognised by the state. Nor does it extend to people who profess no religion. By law, everyone in Indonesia must have a religion in order to considered as a citizen. A person without religion cannot, among other things, obtain a certificate of marriage.

The *PPKn* discussion of tolerance concentrates on differences arising from membership of a religious or ethnic group, as opposed to other forms of group difference or any understanding of individual difference. If, as I have argued, absolute tolerance leads to conflict, then the picture of tolerance in *PPKn* is unrealistic. It will not bring about the oft repeated *keselarasan, keserasian, dan keseimbangan*, or accord, harmony and balance in
the life of the nation. The *PPKn* version of tolerance does not recognise the functional role of conflict in a dynamic society, it shows no understanding of conflicting values or claims, and it gives no guidance in dealing with them. Tolerance is restricted to particular circumstances in a limited range of contexts, and often seems to depend on who is involved in the social interaction.

In a similar way social justice is treated unrealistically, in that there is no recognition of the glaring inequalities that uneven economic development has produced, and no mention of some basic categories of difference, of which gender is a key example.

**Justice**

To discuss various issues under the sub-topic ‘Justice’ I have extracted three texts from *PPKn* books.

**Text - 24** Every one who has met a particular requirement or who has carried out their duties in accordance with the law in effect shall receive an equal repayment in accordance with the rules. Likewise, those who have breached a particular prohibition or rule shall receive equal punishment. This is called legal justice.

Social justice means, among other things, that every one is treated in accordance with their function, role and responsibility. For example, because of a greater responsibility, a school principal will receive a bigger salary than a school-teacher (*SLTP* Class 1:91).

**Text - 25** Basically, human beings wish to act freely according to their will and desire. However, in reality they are constrained by limitations and responsibilities, either towards their environment, community or country. This can be seen from the desire to form associations/organisations, to obtain education, to enjoy equality in the law, etc.

A decision taken in a deliberation has to to be firmly based on values of justice and truth so that it can be justified in front of the One and Only God, nation and state, community and to oneself.

What do justice (*keadilan*) and truth (*kebenaran*) mean? The word *adil* is derived from Arabic, which means “middle.” To be just (*bersikap adil*) means
standing in the middle, or not favouring any one party. To fight for justice (memperjuangkan keadilan) means to put an issue in the middle position, not to the left or to the right, or deviating from the prescribed line. Justice (keadilan) can be interpreted as action that is not based on arbitrariness. In other words, justice (keadilan) is basically treats individuals or a party in accordance with their rights. In line with these guidelines, all individuals have the right to recognition and treatment which is in accordance with their dignity and self-esteem, to be regarded as of equal rank, of equal basic rights and duties regardless of their ethnicity, ascription, etc. So, a just person does not violate another person's rights, and positively allows others the rights that belong to them. Apart from this, justice (keadilan) can be interpreted as an action based on particular norms, whether they are religious norms or legal norms. Therefore, we are obliged to uphold justice (keadilan) (SLTA Class 3:9-10). NOTE: The Indonesian words in brackets are from the original PPKn text.

Text - 26 If we talk about social justice, we should refer to the Preamble of 1945 Constitution, in which the fourth paragraph states, "... by realising social justice for the whole Indonesian people." The central idea of the Preamble of 1945 Constitution is that the state wishes to realise social justice for whole Indonesian people based on the understanding that Indonesian people have equal rights and duties to create social justice the community life.

Social justice is interpreted as a condition which shows that the results of development can be enjoyed by the whole Indonesian people. The aim of the whole Indonesian people in realising shared progress and social justice, is to exert their collective effort to increase and develop better conditions so that the natural resources and results of national development encompassing all aspects of development can be enjoyed by the whole Indonesian people.

The effort to achieve social justice for the whole Indonesian people is implemented, among other ways, through the growth of national development and its results for the creation of a just prosperity for the whole Indonesian people, in an economic system designed on the basis of cooperative principles.

Development is the effort to create prosperity and welfare of the people. Therefore, the results of development should be enjoyed by the whole Indonesian people in the form of the improvement of physical and spiritual welfare. One of the Three Principles of Development is the allocation of equitable development and its results towards the creation of social justice for the whole Indonesian people. In other words, effort towards equitable development are carried out in the whole territory of the nation and its results should be able to be enjoyed by the whole people (SLTA Class 3:35-36).

Justice is discussed in SLTP Class 1 (pages 91-98) and SLTA Class 3 (pages 9-18) textbooks, from which Text - 24 and Text - 25 are drawn. The first of these, entitled 'Justice' (Keadilan), opens with two paragraphs giving a general illustration of justice. This is followed by examples of the meanings of justice in accordance to the five
principles of *Pancasila* and articles 27 – 33 of the 1945 Constitution. It ends with the two practical examples of justice extracted as Text-24 in this section.

The second reading is entitled ‘Justice and Truth’ (*Keadilan dan Kebenaran*). The first three paragraphs introduce the issues of justice, and paragraph three provides the etymology of the word ‘justice’ in Indonesian. The next few paragraphs give several categories of Aristotelean justice (distributive justice; commutative justice; natural justice and conventional justice) as well as ‘legal justice’ as described by Notonagoro, an eminent professor of law in Indonesia. It goes on to discuss the importance of moral justice, such as ‘telling the truth nothing, and but the truth’ (*mampu melihat setiap kebenaran dan keliruan sebagai kesalahan dan kekeliruan*), for which one can be held responsible before God, as well as the importance of rational, balanced decisions that preserve your own personal justice and truth, and that of the community, nation and state. The remaining paragraphs digress from the issues of ‘justice and truth.’ They discuss the basic concepts of national awareness (*wawasan nusantara*) and national resilience (*ketahanan nasional*).

As shown in Text - 24 and Text - 25, justice is probably one of the most difficult concepts to define. It is open to a wide array of interpretations depending on the theories that serve as the bases of discussion. According to John Rawls, ‘justice is the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is of systems of thought’ (Rawls 1971:3). Rawls maintained that the role of the state is as the agent of change. In this context, it is argued that ‘the legitimacy of governments and their functions must then satisfy the aspirations of its
citizens for justice (however defined)' (Clark and Dear 1984:191). However, the state has also its own objectives, thus it cannot be fully ‘autonomous’ from its clientele and elite relationships. While the role of the state is integral to social justice, it is not always easy for a post-colonial state such as Indonesia to achieve much of what it aspires to. Because of the cultural and structural conditions and the structure of power in the pluralist post-colonial society, many of the state’s efforts fall short, resulting in the reproduction of inequality.

In Text - 24 the concept of justice is further elaborated to cover its legal and social dimensions, particularly social justice. The reading emphasises the legal-political aspects of social justice. It refers to legal justice (*keadilan hukum*) as a reward (*imbalan*) which individuals receive for adherence to legal duties, namely the laws in effect. The social justice of the subsequent paragraph is understood as ‘the treatment of everyone in accordance with their function, role and responsibility.’

The arguments of Text - 26 appear to be based on *Pancasila* and 1945 Constitution as sources of political legitimacy. In this lesson, social justice is linked with national development. The first paragraph states that social justice is referred to in the preamble of the 1945 Constitution, and the next four paragraphs discuss the meaning of social justice in relation to national development. Social justice is realised through economic development by means of familial principles (*azas kekeluargaan*). Development is the effort to create prosperity and welfare of the Indonesian people, both in a material and a spiritual sense. Foreign investment is important to promote the transfer of technology,
provide employment, boost exports, etc. To promote a democratic economy, a symbiotic relationship between the government and private sectors is critical. Small and medium scale businesses need to be supported through a ‘patronage program’ (*program bapak angkat*). To realise consistent development (*pemerataan pembangunan*) in Indonesia, development in the eastern parts of the country is being enhanced. The last five paragraphs of the lesson from which Text - 26 has been extracted reiterate that national development is directed towards promoting social justice, and has been discussed in the Broad Outlines of the State Direction (*Garis-Garis Besar Haluan Negara*). These say that Indonesia has achieved economic progress, but faces the many challenges of rapid development in science and technology, as well as globalisation.

These texts still conflate the issues of law and morality. This is particularly obvious from Text - 24, which attempts to show the difference between legal and social justice, and where the writers describe the distribution of justice or equality in terms of one’s function, role and responsibility. However, we may argue that in reality what is called ‘the distribution of justice’ is often socially constructed based on preferences, or likes and dislikes. It is more complex than the writers have argued in the text. Text - 24 thus gives an idealised picture of justice, without proper regard for the real issues or problems.

The issues of social justice discussed in Text - 26 are in fact greatly shaped by ‘structures of power’ (Magnis-Suseno 2000). The power can be in the political, economic, social or cultural realms. ‘Thus, to build social justice means creating the structures that enable the exercise of justice’ (Magnis-Suseno 2000:51). In a country which is increasingly driven
by the market economy, social justice cannot be equated with economic development per se, a strategy used by the New Order regime. The developmentalist approach subscribed to by the regime has created economic inequality, with stark contrasts between the rich and the poor. There are millions of people in Indonesia living below the international standard of income, but there are also many people who live luxuriously at the expense of others, having become rich through corruption and collusion. This is what Indonesia is now struggling to fight after a long period of neglect by successive authoritarian regimes. But it is not always easy.

If we follow the PPKn texts and measure social justice only by instrumental rationality based on legislation, we overlook inequality arising from diversity of knowledge, skills, capabilities, health, experience, resources and opportunities. By the same token, as Alain Tourine points out, 'if we base equality on common beliefs, we can easily find minorities or even majorities who do not share those beliefs, and whom we may therefore consider as inferior' (Tourine 1998:171). Thus definitions of justice based on conformity to procedural rules (see, for example, Barry 1965, Hayek 1960) is clearly untenable, because rules themselves can be unjust.

In post-colonial Indonesia, issues of individual identity, and minority and gender rights have been ignored for decades, primarily because of the dominant discourse of national consensus. First, the tendency towards the primacy of collectivity has led the writers to assume that justice and equality can be attained in the future if today's individuals and groups sacrifice their own interests for the sake of the national good. Whether distribution
of justice can be attained is still uncertain, but the reality is that inequality abounds in
Indonesia. How can we expect an individual who has experienced injustice to accept the
'promise' that today's sacrifice will be repaid tomorrow? The failure of the economic
'trickle down effect' implemented in New Order Indonesia reflects that this 'distributive
justice' argument is untenable. The PPKn writers seem to assume that justice can be
attained without conflict, that if life is conducted mechanically according to rules of
Pancasila and UUD 1945, there is no possibility of manipulation, and that if every
individual submits to society, justice will be eventually attained. One of the marked
problems is that individual and local interests are seen as synonymous with communal
and national interests. In a society where everyone behaves the same way there is no
room for differences that confer individual identity. Similarly, problems of justice arise
when the central government monopolizes power and 'national wealth' rather than
distributing to local governments. This is particularly problematic for a unitary republic
where there is no clear division of power.

The PPKn texts present an ideal of equality. The goal of national development, progress
which is socially even and just (merata dan berkeadilan sosial) and can be enjoyed by all
people of Indonesia, was very difficult for the centralist New Order government to
achieve. The inherited problems of uneven regional development and of rural and urban
inequalities still haunt Indonesia, despite Reformasi's concession of 'regional autonomy'.
Even with an emerging middle-class estimated at 30 million, Indonesia still is
characterised by a huge disparity of wealth between the little people (orang kecil or
The issue of justice in Indonesia also impacts on equality of opportunity, particularly for minorities, be they ethnic, religious, racial, biological, or defined by sexual orientation. Although a strong economy is needed to fund social justice as repeatedly stressed by the writers of *PPKn* textbooks, non-economic aspects, such as political rights are neither costly nor unimportant. One of the essential issues is the role of the legislature in promoting equality in Indonesia. Government legislation impacts heavily on minorities. How the government treats its minorities affects their opportunity to participate and access resources in the socio-political arena. Georgina Waylen (1998), for example, argued that there has been a great deal of literature which considers how women are seen as the objects of the state policy. She believes that, ‘Radical feminists have seen the state as inherently patriarchal, simply reflecting the male dominated nature of society, and therefore the state acts to uphold and defend male interests at the expense of women’ (Waylen 1998:5). The following is a brief illustration of the extent to which Indonesia, institutionalises male interests through citizenship education.

The classical proposition of ‘natural rights’, that ‘all men are created equal’, underlies the *PPKn* texts cited. The *SLTA* Class 3 textbook states that ‘...all Indonesian people have the same rights and duties to create social justice in the life of the people ‘ (‘...manusia Indonesia mempunyai hak dan kewajiban yang sama untuk menciptakan keadilan sosial dalam kehidupan masyarakat’ (SLTA Class 3:35). This statement probably alludes to responsibilities of Indonesians to the uniform, homogenised *Negara Integralistik* of the
New Order period. However, it can also be argued that the intent is to create a less unequal society rather than a more uniform one, a society in which the gap between the ‘haves’ and ‘have nots’ is reduced, and where minority groups are able to participate in the social and political domains. This needs to be carefully balanced against a culture of meritocracy, where those who are seen to deserve preferential treatment (by whatever criteria) are rewarded, to the detriment of less educated minorities who lack economic, social, and political influence.

While the texts discuss the need for ethnic and religious groups to receive just treatment, the PPKn texts totally neglect the largest issue of difference in society, that of gender. This omission may arise from modernist political discourse, along with the weight of patriarchal and traditional cultures. Although the PPKn textbooks highlight ethnic and religious issues in the discussion of tolerance, unity and togetherness, the writers ignore the role of women in nation building. One authority (see informant (B), Chapter 7) who oversaw the production of PPKn textbooks argued that neither the writers nor the Ministry of Education deliberately intended this. He maintained that PPKn took all the people of Indonesia into account, without consciously discriminating against any sector of society. He did agree that its apparent male bias may be attributable to patriarchal elements in Indonesian culture. Despite this, it is odd that gender issues are not mentioned in PPKn, given the prominence of the azas kekeluargaan (family base) of state ideology and its explicit emphasis on women’s roles, dharma wanita, etc. On the other hand, it is consistent with the exclusion of women from the domain of citizenship. The role of citizen is the last of the five roles of women promulgated in official gender
ideology in the New Order period, and reinforced through the activities of women’s organisations.

In this context, we assume that the (male) writers have unthinkingly accepted the traditional Indonesian view that women are subordinate to men. This patriarchal approach is also prevalent in modernist thinking, particularly the European Enlightenment ideas, and has been criticised by feminist theorists for several decades. For example, Carole Pateman (1988) in *The Sexual Contract* has pointed out of the essentialism inherent in the misrepresentation of women in the modern civil society. Pateman’s reinterpration of modern political theory shows that the social contract theory only tells half the story, overlooking the half which concerns marriage contracts, slave contracts, prostitution contracts, employment contracts and surrogacy contracts. As she puts it (Pateman 1988:6)

The classic pictures of the state of nature also contain an order of subjection – between men and women. With the exception of Hobbes, the classic theorists claim that women naturally lack the attributes and capacities of “individual”. Sexual difference is political difference; sexual difference is the difference between freedom and subjection. Women are not party to the original contract through which men transform their natural freedom into the security of civil freedom. Women are the subject of the contract. The (sexual) contract is the vehicle through which men transform their natural right over women into the security of civil patriarchal right.

Some feminist theorists have also questioned the modernists’ treatment of women in relation to the issues of citizenship (see, for example, Lister 2002, 1997; Voet 1998; Yuval-Davis 1997). Many social theorists still hold ‘traditional views’ that women belong to the private sphere, and their rights and duties are equal but different from those of men, in accordance with their endowed and essentialist nature. 18
The reality which PPKn ignores is that Indonesian women still have to struggle for recognition of their rights. Many traditional values and practices need to be reconsidered if women are to be allowed their basic human rights.\textsuperscript{19} For example, as Ong Aihwa (1999b) contends, popular Islamic belief holds that men are constructed as more rational beings than women, and have certain God-given rights. ‘Morally, women are second class who derive their status through men’ (Ong 1999b:358). It is thus my argument that discussion of legal and social justice cannot be based solely on a traditional social construct of ‘natural rights’, which are ‘endowed’ (kodrat) to men and women. The discussion should reflect the political will to correct injustice by active intervention. Women still struggle to liberate themselves from suppression by dominant groups, be they men, the state, traditional cultural values, or even women themselves. Charles Taylor’s comment (1992:25-26) is relevant in this context.

\ldots feminists theorists have argued that women in patriarchal societies have been induced to adopt a depreciatory image of themselves. They have internalised a picture of their own inferiority, so that even when some of the objective obstacles to their advancement fall away, they may be incapable of taking advantage of the new opportunities. And beyond this, they are condemned to suffer the pain of low self-esteem\ldots Their first own self-depreciation, in this view, becomes one of the most potent instruments of their own oppression. Their first task ought to be to purge themselves of this imposed and destructive identity.

In the economic, cultural and educational domains, in Indonesia there are still many women who are bound by traditional values which violate human rights. Some women accept gender difference as ‘natural’, thus perpetuating their own subjugation (cf. humanist feminism. See, for example, Young 1990). For economic reasons, reinforced by cultural values and myth, many girls are married very young. Some are treated as
commodities to be sold to the rich, the labour market, or for prostitution. The practice of 'contract marriage' (kawin kontrak) is also fashionable in some parts of Indonesia, where a marriage of convenience allows a non-Indonesian to obtain an Indonesian work-permit or even citizenship. Sexual violence against women has not been properly addressed, and legislation on the abuse of women and children is weak. There are stark differences between women in urban and rural Indonesia. More educated, urban-middle class women in Indonesia have better access to civil rights and political life than less-educated, rural lower-class women. Although in some regions of the country there have been changes, compared to their urban sisters rural women have remained 'passive citizens'.

If social reality is a construct and citizenship a human invention, justice is something devised. If justice is devised by man it can be improved by man. Since the state's political legitimacy is determined by its provision of justice, the state should act as an agent of change. In the pursuit of democracy and civil society, citizenship education should be employed to promote true participation of Indonesian citizens in their community. Members of the community should be empowered to act for their common good, exercise their rights as citizens, and discharge their civic responsibilities. Unity in diversity will become an empty slogan if equality and differences are not upheld.

**Concluding Remarks**

While the discourse of rights and obligations discussed in Chapter 5 is intended to regulate the relations between the state and the people of Indonesia, the focus of the texts discussed in this chapter has been the relations between Indonesian citizens. Both
chapters have also shown that PPKn is a political motivated approach to Indonesian citizenship education. This chapter has canvassed a wide range of issues of identity, participation and diversity.

Using the arguments put forward by the founding fathers that Indonesian civil rights are not to be equated with individualism, the writers of PPKn have heavily emphasised the importance of a sense of community, the collective memory of traditions and a deeply embedded understanding of obedience and duties. However, the discourse does not fit well with the conditions of post-colonial Indonesia, or the contemporary understanding of identity and participation which permits individuals to have multiple forms of identity, and allows these to be continuously revised.

Justification of order and integration by appeals to tradition and religion has been unable to accommodate a common understanding of individual rights, or encourage an understanding of the civil society. The discourse of the ‘familial spirit’, possibly influenced by the Islamic brotherhood concept of Ukhuwwah Islamiyyah, emphasises harmony among the members of the national family, under a paternalistic leadership of the state but personified by the rulers. This denies the fact that individuals need to negotiate lifestyle choices among the diverse options of modern Indonesia and the network society.  

The PPKn discourse of tolerance presents an overgeneralisation and oversimplication of the complexities of a pluralist society. It fails to distinguish between individual and group
differences. While they proclaim that the principles of social and legal justice apply to all rights of citizenship, in practice the PPKn texts deal almost exclusively with ethnic and religious rights. A total omission of gender issues is obvious in the PPKn texts. Their promotion of national and universal rights fails to include various categories of rights of particular individuals and groups, such as women’s rights, aboriginal rights, immigrant rights, and other sectoral rights dealing with demographic and geographic conditions and mobility (see, for example, Janoski and Gran 2002). It is apparent that PPKn writers have not been able to view participation in post-colonial Indonesia beyond traditional and modernist discourses of collective identity. As a result, PPKn which presents itself as an educational instrument to promote ‘unity in diversity’, more accurately fosters ‘fear of diversity’.

This chapter and the preceding one show how the discourse of nationalism and civic ideal has been constructed by means of various local cultural and historical values, the modernist concepts of social contract, civic republicanism and structural-functionalism. Three aspects of nationalism have been adopted by PPKn writers, namely primordialism, perennialism and familial spirit as the grand perspectives of Indonesian nationalism. The unrealistic adoption of the grand concepts of Western modernist discourse, without attention to their fit or otherwise with local values, is problematic in the complex social situation of post-colonial and post-authoritarian Indonesia. The three aspects of nationalism embedded and assumed in the PPKn discourse are at odds with the real conditions of contemporary Indonesia. This discourse helps to explain the regional resentment of Javanese dominance, the incongruity of applying a family model to
contemporary Indonesia, and the negative effects of primordial sentiments in the promotion of democratic society. The overriding focus on the republican social contract and structural-functionalist notions of the organic state are macro-level perspectives which ignore the micro-level cultural and psycho-social realities, and the social networks of socio-cultural groups. Chapter 9 will look at the issues that result from overlooking the micro-levels of social functioning.

Notes

1 If we look at the concept of modern citizen and citizenship as exemplified by the social theories such as the ones put forward by Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau in the seventeenth century pre-enlightenment and eighteenth century enlightenment period, human beings are projected as autonomous individuals who are self-determined and self-rewarding in relation to other entities such as the church, the state and the king or queen. Only in the political sense, it is argued that there is a contract between citizens and the state.

2 Durkheim (1975) argues that suicide as a result of normlessness will be more likely if mechanical forms of social integration break down.

3 It is often maintained that gender, race and ethnic identity is acquired by an individual during childhood, and goes through periods of change and reinforcement as one enters adulthood. This process occurs through such channels as formal education, religious attachment and workplace.

4 For example, a business-person, who was born in Indonesia and reached adulthood in the country can migrate to another country and adopt local cultural values. The identity of children raised in the new country is likely to be much influenced by the local cultures of that country.

5 One of the negative results of this orthodox communitarian view is that the shared values or commitment to the public good has provided a channel to reproduce widespread and systematic corruption. Commitment to one’s group or community means that one is obliged not to expose negative aspects of the group or community. If a member of the group took a bribe, other members of the group should not talk about the bribery. Thus in the absence of a control mechanism, every member of the group might take bribes. This is particularly aggravated by the deprivation the right of the individual to publicly voice criticism in the New Order period. No one was allowed to report about corruption and the reported case was put on ice, in Indonesian ‘hidden in the ice-box’ (dipetieskan). Because the freedom of the press was weakened and suppressed as discussed above, corruption flourished. In addition, a short-cut mentality (i.e. the desire for a quick yield without starting from scratch and working hard) is still prevalent among many people in post-colonial Indonesia, as described by Koentjaraningrat (1974). This mentality is indirectly reproduced by the absence of control mechanisms which might also prevent the regime from sustaining its power.

6 It seems that the discourse has been influenced by Islamic concept of Ukhawwah Islamiyyah. The analogy often drawn by Muslims in Indonesia is that if one part of your body is hurt, the rest of your body will feel it.
In Text - 19 the writers of the \textit{PPKn} textbooks argue that Indonesian society can exist only in a stable equilibrium. Conflict will endanger and undermine the social harmony because it is portrayed as an absolute negative force, with implications of hate, aggression, rage, revenge, and antipathy. Such discourse over-emphasises the nature of social cohesion and cooperation in Indonesia. It is true that it requires a substantial degree of integration, stability and equilibrium for any social organism to be sustainable. It is also true that a society is more characterised by order than conflict because human beings depend on one another to fulfill their social needs. However, it should be noted that the structure of a social organism does not only consist of cooperative elements, but also socially interacting and necessary competing elements (Coser 1956). It is the competing elements that encourage solidarity among individuals and groups of individuals, rather than the 'spontaneous consensus of parts' (Durkheim 1895/1958) in a society. There is no social organisation in which every member has the same function. It is individuals' specialisation and differentiation that enable the provision of the dynamic of social order. As Dahrendorf (1959) points out, while structural functionalists view every society as a stable structure of elements, well integrated, functional, and based on a consensus of values, it is evident that every society is at every point subject to processes of change, disensus and conflict. He further suggests that a society contributes to its own change by the coercion of some of its members by others. Thus, we need to look at these twin dialectics of stability and change, integration and conflict, function and motive force, as well as consensus and coercion (Dahrendorf 1959).

The discourse of voluntary integration imposed by the \textit{PPKn} textbook writers can be seen as an exercise of the writers' power as representatives of the state in attempting to deny the fact of potential or latent conflict between individual and group interests. This denial of the potential for conflict is tacit, and the consequences of not complying with social integration are indirect. However individuals should be aware of the tacit laws of social integration, and obey them.

8 See, for example, Ricoeur (1967)

9 Also see \textit{Al Quran}, 20:123 (\textit{Ta ha}) about this issue.

10 As a human being, one can do something wrong, intentionally or unintentionally. One may ask for forgiveness from God. 'Sin' and 'stain' are judged by human beings. The use of these concepts is inappropriate because they do not encourage students' true moral reasoning. In the context of parental power and political power, we have seen that the issues of morality, namely obedience as instrument of normalisation and control, is both the social norm and a non-negotiable public value. Normal human beings can use their common sense and reason. Even though they need guidance to reach a developed stage so that their convictions will not clash with collective expectation of their community, it does not follow that the state (through the writers) should intervene in their ways of thinking and beliefs. Unlike laws that are drawn and enacted by government, moral standards grow and develop in society as a convention among members of a community (Kalidjernih 2002). Also see Magnis-Suseno (2000).

11 In fact, the use of concrete sanction on individuals, as in the case of 'sin' and 'stain', contradicts the ideas put forward by Herbert Mead's symbolic interactionist 'the generalised other', and the Durkheimian 'collective conscience', which propose that internalisation of norms for social integration does not entail authoritarian sanction.

12 Although sin may not be part of shame culture (an anthropological construct, not a self-definition of Indonesians) it is very much present in Islam. Also, see Ashcroft (2001) on the primitive colonial subject.

13 For the issues of shaming and humiliating in the civilising process, see Smith (2001).

14 See, for example, Coppel (1999).

15 See, for example, Heidhues (2001).
For example, a teacher who works hard enough may earn more than a school principal, perhaps teaching part-time in another place or becoming a tutor after the school-hours. A president or prime-minister’s salary is not always bigger than a top soccer player. This reality shows the problems of the idealised discourse of PPKn. Also, as will be discussed in the later part of this section, meritocracy carries some dangers in the attempt to promote social justice in a pluralist society such as Indonesia, because of the nature or background of various minorities groups. For example, a meritocracy which compares metropolitan Jakarta with Jayapura would be ludicrous, let alone comparison with some of the ‘outback’ regions in Indonesia.

Since achieving independence, the Indonesian people have witnessed wide inequalities in development and the distribution of economic wealth in the archipelago due to the past policies, including those of the colonial Dutch. Economic disparity - which now often causes tension between the central authority and outlying regions - occurs not only between Java and many outer and less inhabited islands, but also between densely populated urban areas and rural areas. Furthermore, income inequality is also very apparent between the rich upper-middle class and the poor lower class. This disparity is often seen as having the potential to inflame social prejudice.

The economic gap between Java and the outer less inhabited provinces has intensified separatist movements in some provinces, notably but not only in Irian Jaya and Aceh. Of the approximately 200 million people, nearly sixty percents live in Java. Java seems to benefit most of the ‘wealth of the nation’ much of which accrues from the exploitation of resources of provinces (Cribb and Brown 1995). Provinces, particularly those outside Java, are now demanding more powers of self-regulation rather than the historical strict control from Jakarta. Decentralization has become an important agenda of the central government, while up until now federalism has been considered to be not a suitable choice for the unity of this culturally diverse country.

The development in big cities as centres of economic, political and cultural activities has resulted in strong urban drift in the last few decades. Generally urban areas attract better educated workforce than rural areas, however a large number of the less educated workforce are attracted to urban areas. Among the many effects of this social mobility, high unemployment, crime, and environmental pollution have become the concern of many big cities.

There are two important issues here. First the low-income civil servants in various levels and departments have for many years been forced to make ends meet by taking extra jobs. As a result, they undermine their work for the government. This is coupled with the ineffectual social security scheme. Ineffectual social security and low pensions encouraged civil servants to enrich themselves before their retirement. Many who cannot take an extra job find illegal income a way out. They may accept bribes and take illegal extra fees from individuals and businesses, and may misuse of the state’s money. The late-capitalist world has intensified achievement aspirations and gradually undermined the accepted values of the Indonesian people. The effect of this is the desire for a life-style based on material values, and the symbols of progress and modernity. Urban workers and the rural population have been heavily influenced by the surge of global consumerism in the last decade.

For example, the women’s role is centered on child-rearing, family and household activities. Although it is not explicit in social studies, women are also considered to use intuition while men use reason. Whether women tend to use their feelings rather than their rationality can be debated. However, we cannot ignore the fact that women do have some characteristics which men do not have, such as caring and viewing dilemmas in a more caring manner. Traditionally, in practice, female’s rights have been denied due to their biological differences. Women are viewed as biologically weaker than men, hence men are considered to be superior to women. Women are second class citizens who deserve less than men in the private as well as public sphere, and particularly in the labour market.

Indonesian citizenship education still needs to accommodate gender issues. The head of the house in Indonesia is normally ‘the father’ rather than ‘the mother’. In carrying out certain activities, women still have to ask the permission from their husbands, but never the other way round. For example, if a woman is applying for a visa to travel to a foreign country, she must produce a letter from her husband giving his
consent. In Indonesia, it is men who divorce women, not the other way round. Polygamy is still practised in
the society, but polyandry is denied. In this context, it is clear that the so-called ‘natural rights’ of
individuals have served poorly as basis for the political rights of women. For discussion on the problems of
the discourse of human nature serving as basis of human rights, see Fox (2000/2001); Fukuyama (2002).

Recent women organisations, including Koalisi Kaum Perempuan, Gerakan Ibu-Ibu Peduli among
others, have shown that the ‘women's voice’ is now more diversely represented in the public domain than
during the New Order period. However in a more formal political domain, such as in the parliament,
cabinet and bureaucracy, their voices have not been proportionately represented. In the New Order period,
women were put into ‘lower status’ mass-based organisations by the regime, such as Dharma Wanita (the
wives of the state employees) and PKK (Family Welfare Movement) to serve the discourse of development
employed by the New Order have further transformed Indonesian women’s identity into two categories as
follows (Sen 2002:61).

First, that both for the market and for the government, women were increasingly being redefined as productive workers rather than
reproductive mothers, very much against the dominant construction of
the earlier years of the New Order. Secondly, that by the end of the
New Order, women were not represented as belonging only in the
private sphere but that women were seen in the public sphere both as
earning and as spending, in other words, as active members of the
capitalist market place. Thus, by the end of the New Order women
were no longer exclusively mothers and home-makers, they were also
(and increasingly frequently) producers and consumers.

As Sen (2002) further argues, implicit in the forgoing argument is that in some small sections of society,
men and women were increasingly becoming more equal at the end of New Order period. However, she
also admits that some other feminist writers have warned her for overstating her case. Most Indonesians
believe ‘the lip-service that the New Order government had been paying to gender equity’ (Sen 2002:62).

Edward Shils has warned about the use of Gemeinschaft as a single complex variable for many
heterogeneous elements that exist in a society (Shils 1957).

In his discussion of theories of nationalism, Anthony D. Smith (2000) maintains that modernists’ views
of the formation of modern nations fall into two categories: ‘primordialism’ and ‘perennialism’. A nation in
the first category is founded on primordial attachments, which can be genetic and cultural. In the genetic
case, ‘ethnic ties and nationalism are derived from individual reproductive drives which find their
expression in “nepotism” behaviour in order to maximize their “inclusive fitness”’ (Smith 2000:2). In the
cultural case, kinship, language, religion, race and territory which are considered to be ‘given’ provide
emotional security and ties.

Smith argues that some perennialists can also be primordialists, though many are not. He proposes that
perennialism can be of two forms. The first considers that nations as continuous. The second regards
nations as recurrent. He claims that he does not regard nations as ‘perennial’ either in the sense of
continuity or in the sense of necessary recurrence (Smith 2000:13). To him, ‘as a general paradigm,
perennialism is flawed’ (Smith 2000:3). For a good account of the models of nationalism, see Smith (2001,
2000).
CHAPTER 7
THE INDONESIAN CIVIC IDEAL - INSIDER PERSPECTIVES

Introduction

Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 have shown that the concepts of Indonesian citizenship or civic ideal constructed through the written discourse of civic education and school *PPKn* textbooks do not rest upon the single principle of Western democracy. Apart from communitarianism or republicanism, three other main variables have influenced the construction of the discourse of citizenship. These are post-colonial structures, local cultural values and practices, and the power and interests of the past regimes. These discourses and practices conflict in many ways with elements of Western democracy as the foundation of liberal tradition.

This chapter and the following one support and amplify the observations of the preceding chapters, by drawing on the perspectives of a number of Indonesian government officials, national opinion leaders, scholars, educators and students whom I interviewed. Some of these were actively involved in the formulation and inculcation of the previous citizenship education program, some were people working on the current revised program, and some were people specially qualified through their knowledge and position to provide critical analysis of the civic education program. Their observations of how the
program was developed and implemented and the factors that impinged upon this process will amplify the conjectures of earlier chapters. Coupled with critical evaluations of the content of the program and its implementation, their views will strengthen and extend our understanding of the problems involved in the construction of the Indonesian civic ideal.

I will identify each informant by a letter in brackets, namely informant (A), informant (B), informant (C), etc. A brief description of their position is given. I interviewed these people in their homes or offices between October 2002 and February 2003. These informants can be divided into five groups.

- The first group, informants (A), (B), (C), (D) and (E) comprises educators and intellectuals who were involved in the planning, design, production, evaluation and dissemination of the Indonesian Pancasila education (P-4) in general and PPKn textbooks in particular. Some of them were the national trainers of P-4 (manggala P-4) during the New Order period, and are still involved in the development of the new Competency Based curriculum.

- The second group consists of informants (F), (G) and (H), all of whom are teachers who used the PPKn textbooks. These teachers are currently teaching citizenship education at schools or universities.

- The third group consists of younger educators and/or intellectuals who were assigned to teach the subjects of the citizenship education, including PPKn textbooks at secondary and tertiary levels during the New Order period. They are now involved in the design, production and dissemination of the new curriculum for Indonesian citizenship education. They are informants (I), (J) and (K).
• The fourth group, informants (L) and (M), consists of two Indonesian students who have studied PPKn and used its textbooks from primary school until the end senior secondary school.

• The fifth group consists of independent intellectuals who are national opinion leaders and/or top national-commentators on social, cultural and political issues. They are informants (N), (O), (P), (Q) and (R).

The views of these informants will be organised under several headings according to the foci of their concerns and interests in relation to the issues of Indonesian citizenship and citizenship education. The speakers’ statements are summarised in English.

**Specific Objectives of this Chapter**

This chapter investigates the background to the production of curriculum of PPKn and its textbooks, and the views of those involved in their production and dissemination. It also includes the views of two students (the fourth group) who have used the PPKn textbooks. The fifth group, the ‘outside critics’ will be focus of Chapter 8. Here we examine the accounts of various groups of direct participants in the education process. What did the conceptualisers of PPKn and writers think they were doing? What did the teachers think about the material they taught and the general issues of Indonesian citizenship and citizenship education? What constraints did they encounter in their classrooms? What did the new curriculum developers think about PPKn and the new curriculum? What did the students think about PPKn?
FIRST GROUP OF INFORMANTS – KEY PLANNERS AND TRAINERS

Democratic Citizenship and Negara Integralistik

Informant (A) is a Javanese-Muslim, who was an instrumental figure in the extra-ministerial ideological planning body which oversaw the design, production and implementation of P-4 nationally in 1990s. He was directly involved in the production and evaluation of PPKn textbooks. This official spoke positively about the content of citizenship education and its appropriateness to Indonesian social conditions. He confirmed that the content of PPKn had been based on the notion of Pancasila, UUD 1945 and Negara Integralistik. First, he suggested that the issues of civic ideal could not strictly follow American democracy, but should be anchored in Pancasila. Indonesia needs to be selective in importing democracy from advanced democratic societies. Western democracy should be adopted and adapted. He related the citizenship issues to human rights issues, and believed that various interests have influenced human rights movements. He did not elaborate what he meant by various interests, however he argued that these movements were no longer focused purely on promoting human rights. In this context, the goal of PPKn was to promote justice in Indonesia. Pancasila gives orientation as to how democracy, i.e. freedom and equity, should be practised. Its implementation should suit the level of understanding of Indonesian people, many of whom are not yet aware of the issues of democratic rights and obligations. Thus he was concerned about how democracy and human rights could be implemented ‘correctly’ in Indonesia. To him, Pancasila should provide the guiding principles for the Indonesian people practice democracy.
Secondly, in his view, in *Negara Integralistik* every part of the society has its function. There are still many people who do not fully understand the integralist concept that harmony and disharmony always exist, but that disharmony is minimal. (*Dalam integralistik selalu terjadi harmoni yang ... minim disharmoni*). He argued that the concept was not static, but dynamic. He took the example of individuals who are born and nurtured until adulthood, when they perform their duties as head of the family. These individuals continually develop themselves in a form of spiral. He drew an analogy between a society and biological organisms, arguing that every component in a society is like a plant. Various plants can grow and live together without conflict. In the same way, the functional parts in society interact with one another within the system which further creates change. In *PPKn*, norms have been deliberately developed, because social interaction is based on norms. Social life is normative. He also suggested that the discourse of *PPKn* had been grounded in various social theories, ranging from the work of Aristotle, Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Voltaire, Montasqueue, Thomas Paine to Emile Durkheim and Talcott Parsons.

To him, both Parsonian perspectives and the Javanese world-view consider equilibrium of paramount importance, however each of these gives ‘equilibrium’ a different social meaning. He argued that social life was created for the welfare of all human beings. The individual responsibility ‘to make the world a better, a more beautiful place’ (*hamemayu hayuning bawono*, Mulder 1996:109)² is a deeply embedded Javanese concept of life, not to serve individual interests but in the collective interests of society.
Informant (A) further argued that if individuals as the component parts of society performed their functions in the proper way (‘memainkan peranannya secara tepat’), the result would resemble a gamelan (Javanese orchestra). There is a difference between the concept of harmony in Javanese society and Western societies. Many scholars in the West have talked about harmony since the period of Aristotle. However, in the West that harmony is somewhat rigid. In a Western symphony orchestra there is harmony if every player truly follows the pre-determined, prescribed musical notes of the score (‘partitur’). In Javanese gamelan there is no score, there are only basic principles (‘pokok-pokok’). There are certain points (‘titik-titik’) to follow, but around these there is great flexibility to maneuver and improvise. In the same piece of Javanese music, two persons may play gambang (one of the musical instruments in the Javanese orchestra) differently, but for both the results are nice (‘enak’) and harmonious (‘…dan dalam satu rangkaian jatuhnya’). Similarly there is much freedom for individual choice and action among Javanese people. The informant used this analogy as a concrete example of harmony in social life.

PPKn Textbooks: Where do the Original Ideas Come from?

Informant (B) is a high-ranking officer of the Ministry of Education who oversaw the production, dissemination and evaluation of PPKn textbooks. He explained how the content of the PMP introduced in 1984 was perpetuated in the 1989 Education Act and the resulting citizenship education texts, and how PPKn in its various reiterations came to focus so strongly on the Pancasila and 1945 Constitution, especially the thirty-six values
of P-4 (since 1978) (see Chapter 3 of this thesis). In the late 1980s the Head of Research and Development in the Ministry of Education (Professor Harsja W. Bachtiar) asked the former Head of the Centre of Curriculum (Kepala Pusat Kurikulum), Professor Conny Semiawan to look at the possibility of remodelling citizenship education and moral education. ‘Mrs. Conny handed the coordination to me so that I could make some changes to our thinking about it. It wasn’t to be like the 75 and 84 curricula… so I came up with some strategies to develop the 1994 Curriculum’.

He started the process by interviewing nationally distinguished leaders about the future direction of the nation in general. The results of the interviews were reported to Professor Harsja W. Bachtiar. He then coordinated the conceptualisation of the changes of the teaching and learning strategies. The concepts were discussed in seminars which involved national and community leaders who were concerned with moral education. In the seminars, most of these wanted the Ministry of Education to retain the political decisions which had been contained in the 1975 Curriculum and 1984 Curriculum. They wanted the thirty-six values of P-4 to be taught, ‘concretely and in detail’, from primary level to senior secondary level, and wanted historical events to be narrated sequentially and in detail to show the uninterrupted struggles of the people over centuries to achieve their independence. This linear historical account should also include religious values. On this basis they formulated and developed 1994 Curriculum to include detailed PPKn based on the 1989 Educational Act.
This process was confirmed by an officer in the Centre of Curriculum of the Ministry of Education who took part in the formulation and dissemination of citizenship education to schools around Indonesia. According to informant (C), seminars on the proposed PPKn were conducted in 1990 with various governmental institutions, such as Institute for National Defence and BP-7, the non-ministerial institution responsible for P4 program. BP-7 exerted strong pressure (‘campur tangan BP-7 sangat kuat’) for the inclusion of P4’s thirty-six values of Pancasila, but curriculum developers at the Ministry of Education felt that focusing on these from Class 1 of primary level through to Class 3 of senior secondary level would be ‘too narrow and dry’. They proposed as many as one hundred and eighty additional values, however BP-7 intervened and eventually agreement was reached to include eighty-eight values, some of which were overlapping.

Informant (C) has played and active role in designing the new 2004 Curriculum for Citizenship Education and disseminating it across Indonesia. According to her, a similar process was used to design this curriculum, with input from various ‘relevant’ institutions. However BP-7 no longer exists, and therefore could not intervene. The intervention in formulation of the national curriculum described by informants (B) and (C) shows that political groups closely associated with the New Order regime strove to impose their policy preferences on the national education system. They used their power to contain innovation and support the preservation of the status quo during the New Order Indonesia.
Textbook Content

Despite the political intervention informant (B) detailed, he nevertheless spoke positively about the content of the curriculum. In this regard he concurred with informant (D), one of the key government officials involved in the design, production and evaluation of the PPKn, during the New Order into the current period. Both these informants, however, blamed the writers of textbooks and teachers for imperfect delivery of the curriculum. Informant (B) asserted that the intention of PPKn was not only to provide moral education, but also to impart a knowledge of the rights, responsibilities and skills that students needed to function well in their community. The thirty-six values of P-4 were the guiding principles for the writing of the textbooks, which used a gradation approach (model spiral), with an emphasis on child-oriented development. The methodology made use of ‘Bloom’s taxonomy’ along with the educational psychological approaches of Jean Piaget and Jerome Bruner. Students were no longer expected to memorise the material, but to analyse problems. For example, PPKn was designed in such as way that it moves incrementally from issues of self and family, thence community and society, to concepts of the nation-state, world society and international relations. However, a gap emerged between what the curriculum developers intended and what the writers of the textbooks did. While the curriculum developers expected the writers to prepare a textbook that would help students to prepare themselves to function as good citizen, what was produced was criticized as a textbook on theory of the state (‘Si penulis tidak memahami yang diberikan...dia akan menulis teori tentang negara’). Informant (B) also warned that this problem might appear with the writers of textbooks for the new curriculum, Competency Based Curriculum (Kurikulum Berbasis Kompetensi). The problem of most
Indonesian writers of textbooks, such as texts on citizenship education, is a lack of understanding of the material, and thus a dependence on and tendency to replicate the existing curriculum.

According to informant (D), citizenship education of the last decade was a reaction to the problems of the previous PMP. PMP’s material was drawn from geography, history, sociology and constitutional law (tata negara) dealing wholly with the cognitive domain. Moral behavioral aspects were not included. When the 1989 Education Act was introduced, making Pancasila education, religious education and citizenship education mandatory, the Ministry of Education began to formulate PPKn to prepare the younger generation to become good citizens in this pluralist society. PPKn was intended to shift the emphasis from the cognitive to the affective domain, to produce morally good students who knew their rights and obligations as Indonesian citizens. The PPKn curriculum of was designed to equip students with practical moral reasoning and behaviour.¹

However, many of the goals could not be achieved because most teachers were not qualified. They did not change their techniques to teach PPKn, and persisted in using the rote-learning model. Moreover, the time devoted to teach PPKn was limited. As a result, teachers merely gave students material to prepare them for school and national exams. Teachers did not have the time to link the PPKn material with practical activities, such as visiting the museum, the court, parliament, etc. There was also a problem with many
teachers who considered their task was only teaching the ‘knowledge’ of PPKn, with little concern for the students’ behaviour.

Informant (D) also saw a problem between private and state-owned schools. As the repressive authoritarian regime exercised its power through education, many of the private schools were able to institute a more independent and creative moral education program while trying to accommodate the regime’s interests. Public schools, however, were passive in accepting the regime’s hegemony. Teachers at state-owned schools were nearly all civil servants. They were afraid they might lose their jobs if they dared to show different views from the government. As a result, some leading Christian and Islamic schools could serve as a role model for teachers. The discipline of these schools is high, and their students show better behaviour and attitudes in and outside school than state school students. In Indonesia the violation of law and morality has long been ignored. Despite teaching the thirty-six values of P-4, changing people’s behaviour is no easy task. Social control in rural areas is still good, but is becoming ‘thinner’ in urban areas.  

**Pluralism, Dutch Colonial Influence and Primordial Sentiment**

Informant (D) is a key-government official who also writes PPKn textbooks at primary level and the evaluates PPKn textbooks at secondary levels. He argued that citizenship education is important for a pluralist society like Indonesia. It can be employed to teach students how to view the issues of mutual-respect and tolerance. If there is no citizenship education (with a moral value component of as exemplified by PPKn), the younger generation will base their views on sentiments such as religion, ethnicity and race. The
experience of Dutch colonisation deeply divided people in the archipelago. The founding fathers of the Indonesian nation, particularly Sukarno, saw this problem and called for unity. In contemporary Indonesia, one of the ways to enhance nationalism is through citizenship education.

Informant (E) is the highest-ranking officer in the Centre of Curriculum of the Ministry of Education, and is currently involved in formulating citizenship education within the new Competency-Based Curriculum. While agreeing on the influence of Dutch colonialism and pluralism issues, he regarded Indonesia’s internal social problems as contributing to the ‘ill-informed state’ (‘tidak cerdas’) of the Indonesian people. He noted that the conflict-filled Javanese history cannot provide lessons to equip the people as good citizens, actively participating in the new nation-state. For the last five decades, Indonesian citizenship education has emphasised a citizenship based on state ideology, the national constitution, law, rules and regulations. This ideological perspective has overlooked the behavioral and moral dimensions of citizenship. On this point, he seemed to agree with informant (D) about PPKn’s domination by New Order ideology and propaganda. In informant (D)’s view, the writers consciously tried to accommodate the regime’s political interests, while also incorporating community aspirations. In fact, citizenship education should primarily address the interests of the community rather than the government. Informant (D) considered that the new citizenship curriculum may incorporate some elements of liberal democracy, but will not undergo a sea change because it only modifies the learning process.
Informant (E) disagreed with informant (D), and maintained that the new curriculum is different from the previous one. However he also pointed out that in the Ministry of Education (like other ministries), people who were involved in the development of the previous curriculum are always included. The components of the previous curriculum are reconsidered and reformulated to retain its productive ideas and relevant concepts. Introducing a new curriculum does not necessarily means nullifying the previous ‘knowledge’.

Informant (E) is concerned about how to put the civic knowledge provided by Indonesia’s new citizenship education into practice. How can we ensure that students’ knowledge of citizenship will be in agreement with their conduct? Educators have long failed to recognise that knowledge should be reflected in the student’s conduct. People regard a student highly because of the achievement index gained. PPKn encourages students only to ‘read about’ the texts. Like informant (B), informant (E) believed that students were not given the chance to truly practice citizenship, by doing things individually and collectively. In the past (i.e. when the 1975 Curriculum was being formulated) he suggested that Indonesian citizenship education served certain political ends. In the future, citizenship education should serve only educational ends, viz. to prepare a good citizen.

Many of these informants tacitly assumed a distinction between the interests of the government and those of the people. This dichotomy may have been engendered by the
rampant and officially sanctioned corruption of the New Order, where the de-facto ideology of the Government privileged the financial interests of the elite above the welfare of the people. The extremely limited form of democracy that prevailed, and the absence of political transparency, meant that the people did not identify with government and its interests. Educationalists could see government interests, community interests and the interests of education as separate things, competing for place within citizenship texts. Changing this perception (and perhaps reality) lies at the heart of the challenges faced by politicians, educationalists and citizenship education.

Returning to the new curriculum, informant (E) suggested that although it is designed centrally, its syllabi are developed locally by schools because decentralisation in educational management is part of the regional autonomy program. The intention is to give schools, educators and teachers greater freedom to determine their resources and pursue the objectives and programs. This ‘procedural autonomy’ includes patterns of teaching and learning, use of media, and evaluation within the Competency Based Curriculum. The Ministry provides supplementary material and general instructional guidelines. It does not expect schools and teachers to feel that they are being dictated to by this highest educational authority in the educational process. Informant (E) further pointed out that theoretically there should be a shift in the approaches to the new curriculum. ‘Traditional’ behavior, attitudes and values are now undergoing a change and are increasingly fragmented. The traditionally accepted civilising process, manifested through such things as ways of eating and dressing, may shift. These changes should also
be accommodated. In the past, citizenship education did not give sufficient attention to the diverse cultures of the region. Rather, conformity was imposed on the whole process.\textsuperscript{5}

**Western Values and Their Contextualisation in Indonesian Citizenship Education**

Informant (D) considered it was not easy to construct the civic ideal in a pluralist society such as Indonesia. What should be done is to employ the ‘general values’ that exist in the community. Theoretically, democratic values are ‘universal’, but they should be put into context. It is good for Indonesian people to practise democracy, however, at this stage, Indonesian citizenship education should also consider local cultures. Practising democracy is acceptable, but the ways to express it should be ‘translated’ by means of local cultures. Informant (D) also recognised the problem of primordial sentiments suggested by informant (E). As an Acehnese-Muslim he suggested that the writers of *PPKn* had drawn heavily on Javanese culture to interpret democratic values. Although they also tried to incorporate elements from some other local ethnic cultures, Javanese concepts were dominant, and he considered these to have been standardized nationally. For example, Ki Hadjar Dewantara’s concepts of character education (*pendidikan budi pekerti*) were recognised nationally and incorporated in the *PPKn*. Most writers of the *PPKn* textbooks who had taken *P-4* program were also Javanese. Javanese concepts or values such as harmony, equilibrium, mutual-cooperation, self-restraint were perpetuated, along with Dewantara’s famous Javanese catch-phrases *ingarso sung tulodo* (be a model if you are in front), *ing madya mangun karso* (be creative when you are in the middle), and *tut wuri handayani* (provide encouragement from behind). Informant (D) did not give a firm opinion whether the influence of Javanese values was positive or negative.
However, he was concerned about the legitimation of such discourse without considering other regional people’s values.

Informant (D) confirmed the conjecture of an earlier chapter, which suggested that the writers had been partially influenced by sociological structural-functionalism. Its key concepts of equilibrium (homeostasis) and voluntary action resemble those of the ideas of *Negara Integralistik* and Republicanism. Unconsciously, the writers might have been influenced by Indonesian leading sociologists, such as Harsja W. Bachtiar. He also reported that there had been some Indonesian studies of citizenship education in the United States, but the model eventually adopted in Indonesia was influenced by local cultures and ‘national’ interests. Not all of the ideas from the advanced democratic country were applied to *PPKn*, because they were not compatible with the local context. Thus there had been a sort of mixture. ‘Certainly comparative studies were made, but the thinking was different… our culture is not like theirs. We combined things, half-and-half. Not everything was put into practice during the time of the New Order… does democracy always have to be the same?’ This informant saw democratisation as a process. Indonesia should be careful in adopting the democratic values.

Like informant (D)’s view of contextualisation, informant (E) saw that despite central values of the Indonesian citizenship being anchored in *Pancasila* and the National Constitution, too many interpretations have been offered so far. For example, human rights (and their violations) in Indonesia are usually measured using the yardstick of contemporary Western advanced democratic societies. People usually forget that human
rights issues have been part of the struggles in the West for centuries. As a new nation-state, Indonesia is now learning how to practice democracy. It takes time to reach a democratic society. Academically, the new citizenship education views individuality as an important issue. The individual will be given a reward for personal achievements (meritocracy). The excessive stress on collectivity that was favored by the past regime will only lead to communality, and be further translated into communism. In the transition towards democracy, individuals have been given greater autonomy.

However, there is always the danger of regional authorities believing that they have the right to ignore national unity. Regional autonomy does not replace the need to uphold national interests. In the Indonesian context, informant (E) confirmed the point made by informants (B) and (D) about the importance of the ‘role model’ (keteladanan) in Indonesia. In a paternalistic culture where seniority prevails, the pattern of influences on the younger generation follow a hierarchy.

On the adoption of ‘foreign values’, informant (D) considered that Indonesia’s citizenship education should develop ideas that can meet the challenge of globalisation. He cited one of the Indonesian Catholic intellectuals, Soedjati Djiwandono, who had argued that not all cultures and practices from abroad were bad. There were also good things from abroad. On the contrary, not all practices in Indonesia are good. We should stop practising those values considered to be undemocratic. Indonesian people are citizens of Indonesia as well as citizens of the world. If they separate themselves from the world community, they would be left behind in the ever-increasing globalised world. In this
context, informant (E) considered the new citizenship education curriculum to be different from *PPKn* because it aims to equip students with competencies both to interact within the community, and to access resources to enhance their social mobility nationally and internationally. This new *KBK* curriculum introduces integrated education covering all types of values, civic knowledge, civic skills, and civic disposition (see the framework proposed by Civitas, USA in Chapter 2 of this thesis).

In sum, informant (D) spoke extensively about the key role of citizenship education in addressing the problems of Indonesia’s plural society, an issue also taken up by informant (E). Both spoke of the Dutch colonial influence on Indonesian citizenship education, primordial sentiments, pluralism and the changes of curriculum. While informant (D) saw only colonial influence, informant (E) considered local values and primordial sentiments have contributed to the citizenship problems. Surprisingly, as a Javanese, he made a self-critique on the problems posed by the influence of his own culture, as noted by informant (D). Informant (E) was also more optimistic about the new underlying structures of the new curriculum than informant (D) who viewed them was only surface changes. Both are concerned with the problem of contextualisation as well as the implementation of Indonesian citizenship education which has been constrained by such factors as local cultural and structural conditions, hence cognitive dissonance as well as a neglect of the affective domain. Both agreed on the increasingly significant impact of globalisation on education.6
SECOND GROUP OF INFORMANTS – TEACHERS

This section represents the views of three teachers, all of whom are critical of PPKn. Although their opinions of other issues differ, they seem to agree on the forced conformity of PPKn system, the lack of opportunity for active student participation and the interpretation of democratic values vis-à-vis local values as the reproduction of social dominance.

Democracy, Authoritarianism and Cultural Incompatibility

Informant (F) was a teacher of PPKn for many years at a senior secondary school in Jakarta. Currently he is a lecturer in the same subject at a university of education. He believed that the centralism of Indonesia’s education had influenced the process of teaching and learning. Centralism was translated to mean that the regions should conform to the expectations of the centre. In New Order Indonesia, PPKn was indoctrination rather than a subject that encouraged students to learn democratic values. Citing one of the leading Indonesian educators, Professor Conny Semiawan, informant (F) maintained that students were directed to conformist perspectives that suppress differences. Primary school students were often asked to complete a sentence requiring conformity to the dominant discourse, for example: ‘When my father is at work, my mother is …’ Students were expected to fill in the blank space of the sentence with ‘cooking’.

Informant (F) believed that democracy in education should allow students to give other possible answers. He hoped that the new Competency Based Curriculum would end
PPKn’s indoctrination at schools. He also cited the notion of *musyawarah untuk mufakat* (deliberation and consensus), which was translated as practising democracy. Because *musyawarah untuk mufakat* means everybody in a forum should reach a unanimous decision, there was no possibility for differences. Everyone was expected to conform to the dominant discourse, and therefore the outcome was known before the deliberation. This even applied to decisions made at the People’s Representative Council. In the parliament, members knew that if they expressed an independent viewpoint, they would be recalled by their party. This is not the democratic approach that students should follow. The informant believed that the democracy claimed by the New Order regime was ‘nonsense’ because it did not reflect any democratic spirit. The PPKn material resembled the topics of *P-4* program, and thus PPKn was no more than political education or indoctrination.

The problem of PPKn has arisen because it has based its philosophy of the 1945 Constitution, which was formulated ‘in haste’ and should be regarded as ‘provisional’. At that time the founding fathers were too pre-occupied with the thought that as a new state, the state should be given full power to look after the people. Consequently the power of the executive was too strong. In the New Order period, when some people began to feel the need to change the constitution, the regime introduced a law (*Ketetapan MPR No. 4/1983*) allowing for a referendum to decide whether the people wanted it to be amended. However, this was only a tactic to show that the regime would not block the people’s aspirations. The reality was that a referendum would never be held because it was too
difficult. Thus, in the midst of the shortcomings of the constitution, PPKn was produced in early 1990.

Informant (F) argued that in theory, democratic values should be useful for Indonesia. However, in the cultural context, there appeared to be some impediments to this. One problem is that many people in Indonesia have not properly understood democracy. People tend to translate democracy as Western liberalism, which they believe allows individuals to enjoy ‘unlimited’ freedom. In the Indonesian context, this would cause conflict. This informant used the example of a girl who claims the right to wear ‘see through’ clothing in the West, saying it would be difficult to apply in Indonesia. Although in some big cities of the country there have been some Indonesians who wear such clothing, he argued that it did not fit into Eastern cultures. In Islam, there was a saying, ‘cover your nakedness’ (‘tutuplah auratmu’). Indonesian cultures are greatly influenced by religious values. It is not appropriate for Indonesia to adopt democratic values which represent the cultural values of Western societies. Learning to practise democracy is a long process. Apart from formal education, such as through citizenship education, mass media has a heavy impact on the process of democracy. In the era of reformasi, many people have misinterpreted what democracy is. Because it was wrongly interpreted, many Indonesian people, particularly in the urban areas, began to forget about their ‘cultural roots.’ In the name of democracy, they have begun to practise their ‘unlimited’ new-found power.
Religious Values and Citizenship Principles

Informant (G) is a teacher of PPKn at an independent school in Jakarta. He talked about the dilemmas of Indonesia as a religious society wishing to include non-secular values in modern democratic citizenship, particularly in the era of globalisation. He pointed out how successive regimes employed the undemocratic dominant values of Javanese culture to assert its ideological hegemony. As a Christian, he also pointed out the marginalisation of minority groups in Indonesia in New Order Indonesia. To him, the discourse of rights and obligations of Indonesian citizens endowed by God in the PPKn textbooks creates a contradictory issue. He thought it would be difficult to exclude the issue of God in Indonesian citizenship education because it is always claimed that Indonesia is not a secular nor a religious country. (‘Kita bukan negara sekuler, juga bukan negara agama. Ini yang repot’). Although the issues of rights and obligations endowed by God are rarely debated in class, students are always critical of the policy of the New Order regime. He preferred to discuss the rule of law with his students. If they relied too heavily on theological perspectives, they might became irrational, ignoring many sociological issues. In the era of globalisation, there is a greater possibility of the penetration of secular values into non-secular society such as Indonesia. Globalisation does not only touch on the economy of the country. Like it or not, the advances of communication technology also carry embedded secular values. Indonesian citizenship education is anchored in Pancasila which has belief in one God as its first principle. If the Indonesian people are to practise democracy, namely Western secular values, it does not automatically follow that they must stop using Pancasila as their state ideology. However, we need to separate rights and obligations that rest on the notions of modern citizenship, and those based on
religious perspectives. Informant (G) believed that if there is no separation between the state and the church, the issues of Indonesian citizenship will be easily distorted by any interest groups to legitimate their ideological hegemony.

The second issue that informant (G) raised is the marginalisation of minority groups by the New Order regime, influenced by Dutch colonial practice that divided society for their political interests. He used the Chinese-Indonesian minority as an example. Students are aware that members of this group are marginalised by the onerous procedures they face to obtain an identity card (Kartu Tanda Penduduk). As a teacher, informant (G) has to be honest with his students. He connected the Chinese-Indonesian example with the cultural construct of the Dutch colonial power, a construct which the New Order has reproduced as a ‘history of revenge’ of the indigenous. Moreover, marginalisation is even easier when the Chinese-Indonesian minority does not subscribe to the majority’s religious belief. The continued use of a historical discourse to justify the suppression of the minority contradicts the concepts of civil rights of Pancasila and 1945 Constitution. In his view, the policy was employed by the regime to preserve its authoritarian power.

Informant (G), who claims to be a descendant of a Javanese-aristocrat, believed the problems of Indonesian citizenship issue stem from the 1945 Constitution. In its original version, it is a product of feudal leaders, such as Supomo. Supomo is a Javanese aristocrat (priyayi) who preferred that power should be vested in the state. Even though some articles of the constitution have been amended they are still open to interpretation, and in practice have rarely been employed to protect the interests of Indonesian citizens.
As a result, students are not interested in discussing social and political issues because what they learn at school is different from what they experience outside school. They prefer to discuss economic issues.

The pluralism of the 1945 Constitution was also interpreted differently by the New Order. In practice, uniformity was imposed on the pluralist society. Every one had to obey and follow the regime. The civic ideal of ‘unity in diversity’ was constructed and artificially imposed by the regime. The forced imposition of cohesion used the discourse of ‘mutual assistance’ (gotong-royong) to nullify individual rights, which it interpreted as destructive. Even though the gotong-royong concept has its positive aspects, such as caring and sharing, it came to be treated as a political commodity transacted by means of money. ‘Its spirit was fine… but its downside? Money culture started to come in… gotong-royong could be bought and made different by a sum of money’. The problem of the textbooks of PPKn is that they naturalise the discourse of gotong-royong as if it were still applicable in the urban areas. Even in the rural areas, gotong-royong has lost its meaning.

Questions of individualism and collectivism also exemplify the ambivalence of the discourse in the PPKn textbooks. For example, students are made aware that they have to do their test individually, but in certain cases they are encouraged to work collectively. Thus, the concepts of individualism and collectivism were merely imposed without properly considering the context. Individualism was rejected only to hide the regime’s fear of critical voices. The People’s Representative Council, for example, should be the
one and only constitutional channel. Unfortunately, what was deliberated in the Council had actually to be agreed upon before the issues were brought to the council.

Informant (G), who is Javanese, considered that Javanese culture does not encourage democracy, and that Javanese people are trained not to express their views directly. Javanese culture does not encourage people to be honest because it tends to hide the truth. He argued that context determines whether one should speak directly or indirectly. Javanese are usually regarded as impassive (‘tidak tegas’) in expressing their views, because they are worried about being considered to be ‘rough’ (‘kasar’). Javanese are taught to avoid conflict (‘mengalah’). They are not encouraged to understand the real meaning of difference, and must uniformly accept all differences even though they might not like them. Often this becomes a volcano that will erupt suddenly. In sum, Javanese culture does not recognise ‘dialectics’ in which conflicts will generate new discourse.

It is also said that in Javanese culture there is no democratic element. What is claimed to be democratic is not the same as Western democracy. For example, in the so-called ‘election of a village-head’, people express their views in a very indirect way. ‘Its not the same as in the West. In electing a leader we give our opinion in a circuitous way.’ Most importantly, members of the community ‘elect’ a senior, and not a junior member because of the principle of primus inter pares (‘urut kacang’). He also pointed out that the concept of pepe or berpanas-panas in Yogyakarta - claimed to be a ‘democratic medium’ for people wishing to express their views (‘berkeluh kesah’) - is not the same as Western democracy. Pepe is an activity where common people gather under the trees in
the field in front of the palace in Yogyakarta to attract the Sultan’s attention, so that he knows the people want to tell him about their problems.

Informant (H) is Javanese-Muslim, who taught citizenship education at government schools for many years. She is now teaching the subject at a popular independent Muslim school in which the new curriculum is being implemented as a pilot project. She was concerned about the implementation of the new curriculum, the issue of God and the marginalisation of females in citizenship education. She believed that despite the fact that students should be given a chance to explore a topic, the Competency Based Curriculum in fact limits the ‘freedom’ a student can enjoy. Although students are allowed to look for information from any sources, including the Internet, in class discussions and presentations they are required to reach common perceptions or perspectives. She also argued that in the teaching and learning process, a textbook that gives students practical guidelines should be made available. Students are often lost. They do not know what material to learn, particularly when they have to sit for a test. ‘They’re not used to learning without a book. They ask “Excuse me Miss, what are we supposed to learn? Where from?” It seems they are still confused.’

Informant (H) considers that assessments in citizenship education should be a balance between ‘performance’ and ‘project’, covering three domains: cognitive, affective and psycho-motor. There are two main types of test for cognitive domain: objective tests and essays. Objective tests (mainly ‘multiple-choice’) are used in PPKn. In the Competency Based-Curriculum, essay tests are preferred. Students’ behaviour and attitudes is assessed
through written assignment and class-discussion, known as ‘portfolio’ (*porto-folio*). The evaluation of their performances thus covers both the affective as well as the psychomotor domain. These kinds of activities were not encouraged in *PPKn* because the materials were derivatives of the principles of *Pancasila* and/or the thirty-six values of *P-4*.

While informant (G) saw a problem in the emphasis on religious perspectives in citizenship education aimed at preparing students to be good and capable democratic-citizens, informant (H) claimed that she had not found any difficulty in explaining to students that Indonesian people’s rights and duties are endowed by God. For her, the problem was that if rights and obligations are endowed by God, why do human beings often not respect the Almighty. There is a difference between theory and practice. Textually, the 1945 Constitution has many positive aspects, such as pluralism, unity in diversity, freedom of religious belief, tolerance and justice. However in reality there are many contradictions. For example, article 29 indicates that the state shall guarantee the freedom of the people to profess and to exercise their own religion. But, why are only five religious beliefs recognised by the state?

**Gender Issues in Citizenship Education**

Among the informants in first group and second group, informant (H) and informant (B) raised gender issues as a cultural rather political problem in the written discourse of *PPKn*. Informant (H) considered that people should not problematise the issues of gender in Indonesia. Even though she is aware of the argument that females have been treated as
second-class citizens, as a Muslim, she argued that God has created men and women to be different, with different rights and obligations. If men are created biologically stronger than women, they have to apply their strength to good purpose. In Javanese culture, for example, men have been assigned to earn a living in the outside world, while women stay at home to look after children and do their household duties. If there are cases when Javanese women go to the markets to earn a living, and men stay at home, these occur only rarely. She argues that even these days, unless there are economic reasons, women are expected to stay at home so they can look after and educate their own children. Research indicating that women go to work and men stay at home in Java is ‘limited to a particular area’

Responding to the criticism of some feminists about the treatment of gender issues in Indonesian textbooks, including *PPKn*, informant (B) categorically denied there was any deliberate intention to exclude women from the discourse. He did not see any educational regulation in Indonesia intended to discriminate against women. However, he did not rule out the possibility of cultural influences resulting in gender bias. ‘So if there are any shortcomings regarding women’s issues, it’s certainly not because of any regulation. But through motivations of… let’s say culture.’

Informant (K), one of the informants in the third group whose views on Indonesian citizenship education will be further discussed in the next section, shared attitudes towards gender issues with informants (H) and (B). As a Muslim, he considered that gender issues should not be a problem in Indonesian citizenship education, because the
dominant population of Indonesia is Muslim. It is a reality. Islam does not exclude women. ‘In the Al- Quran it is said that men earn what they do and women earn what they do. What they have done will be assessed on the Day of Judgment.’

THIRD GROUP OF INFORMANTS – DESIGNERS OF NEW CURRICULUM

New System of Citizenship Education and Democracy
Informant (I) is a policy expert in the Ministry of Education whose expertise is in citizenship education and educational economy. He is currently involved in preparing the new citizenship education in Indonesia. One of the most cited national-commentators on Indonesian education in the last few years, informant (I) considered PPKn represented political indoctrination. There have been too many arguments put forward to hide the undemocratic values in PPKn. He was adamant that democracy in a more liberal sense should be gradually introduced into Indonesian citizenship education, such as the new curriculum of citizenship education. To him modern democracy embraces positive universal values resembling those of Islam, such as the promotion of individual rights and social justice.

Informant (I) argued that the past regime was the sole authority in the interpretation of the state ideology. It promoted to citizens a civic ideal based on its own interpretation of the interests to citizens. Now and in the future, Indonesian citizenship education should develop and empower individuals as ‘autonomous citizens.’ The new education is intended to equip students with civic intelligence, civic attitudes, civic participation and
civic skills. Civic intelligence refers to students’ knowledge, understanding, insights (wawasan), reasoning and intelligence. Civic attitudes refer to students’ behaviour and attitudes. Civic participation refers to students’ chances to apply their knowledge and skills in the real world, such as in politics. The new educational model is totally different from the past. In the past PPKn was merely a political instrument. Now, the new citizenship education is both academically and intellectually reorganised as an educational instrument to prepare students to function as civilised and democratic citizens.

Informant (I) also pointed out some important attributes to be developed by the new citizenship education. The new education will develop students’ analytical skills. It should enable them to make their own decisions rather than merely memorising facts at school, or following their parents’ suggestions. (‘Kita tidak ingin anak itu hanya ingin menghafal atau menerima nasihat-nasihat dari orangtua’). They have to make sense of their own environment. They have to perceive and indigenise their own problems. For example, why drug-taking (narkoba) and brawls (tawuran) are bad. The classroom should be considered as a laboratory, a micro-world. This informant believed that to date Indonesian students have not been provided with ‘true’ democratic values. They were only taught how to be obedient in the New Order period. Thus they lack the initiative to pose questions and to solve problems. By contrast, the new education is intended to equip students with a better understanding and skills to practise democratic values.
He argued that *PPKn* taught only ‘pseudo democracy.’ Now, Indonesian citizenship has to embrace democratic values which are considered ‘universal’. Individual rights should be given priority. Indonesia might have to undergo a stage of what he called ‘social democracy’ before it can really practise ‘liberal democracy’ which upholds individual rights. In Japan, as he suggested, people have been practising ‘social democracy’ since Meiji Restoration. However, they are now moving toward more ‘liberal values’. He considered that liberal democracy might be the ultimate democracy in which every individual is taken into account, such as the one being practised in the United States, Australia and other Western democratic countries. The vast majority of Indonesian people are Muslims, but Islam is not against democracy. Islamic values are basically democratic. However, the implementation of democracy should undergo a gradual process, from structural democracy and social democracy to liberal democracy. Some of the democratic values are to be indigenised. He also argued that when individual rights are upheld in Indonesia, people will begin to lean to liberalism. Democracy does not only deal with politics but also all dimensions of life. Recently some scholars have argued that Indonesia would never practise democracy unless there was an ‘egalitarian economy.’ Thus, education for economic decisions is also important.

Informant (I) raised a few major issues of cultural reproduction by successive regimes. For him, the promotion and over-emphasis of collectivism and seniority at the expense of individual rights have blurred the objectives of the country’s citizenship education. First, while he did not reject the concept of mutual-assistance (*gotong royong*) as an element of the new citizenship education, he questioned whether a concept that places such emphasis
on collectivity can bring true democracy to Indonesia. Secondly, he looked at the problem of Javanese culture in the Indonesian bureaucracy. As cultivated by Suharto, concepts such as *mikul dhuwur mendhem jero* (see Chapter 5 of this thesis) and *budaya sowan* (paying a regular visit to a senior or superior to show one’s respect and loyalty) had been very undemocratic. ‘If we’re talking about the culture of Java or Sunda… there is no democracy… too often we have used the excuse that Indonesia’s local cultures are democratic.’

This informant believed that democratic values have become universal, and that the Indonesian people should embrace them and incorporate them in citizenship education. This education should not be employed by the government to serve its own interests. Citizenship education in Indonesia is a government program and it is centralised, however its orientation should be directed to specific local problems. It should include the understanding and development of science and technology as well as life-skills (*kecakapan hidup*). In this context, economics will become one of the compulsory subjects in the future. Students are expected to be economically literate. Thus there will be always two related concepts in Indonesian education in the future: a science and technology program and a life-skills program.

**Cognitive Dissonance and Competing Interests**

Informant (I) maintained that students should be encouraged to analyse problems in their own surroundings. They should be able to recognise if there is any ‘disjointed incrementalism’ between the school and the community environment. Currently, the
Ministry of Education is introducing a portfolio-instructional model to enable students to define and study their own community problems. They are given the chance to discuss their program or policy for handling these problems using an action-research model. Even though the government has introduced a new curriculum, it does not follow that they can immediately change people’s moral reasoning and moral behavior. This takes time. Changing the curriculum is also expensive because it will affect the whole process of teaching and learning. The efforts directed to introduce a new citizenship education should undergo a gradual process. It starts with the changing of curriculum. However, there have been many people who are interested in the project. Many groups of people are now competing with one another in promoting their ideas. It is hard to achieve a full agreement among them.

Informant (J) is an expert in citizenship education. He has been teaching citizenship in Indonesia for more than thirty years, both at secondary and tertiary levels. Currently he is involved in formulating the new Indonesian citizenship education. According to him, Indonesian citizenship education became political indoctrination under successive past regimes, without considering that the post-colonial republic grew from diverse cultural backgrounds and interests. ‘What was forgotten was that Indonesia was not a society devoid of culture.’ Cultural attachment is a very real phenomenon. In the meantime, successive regimes enforced a state ideology which assumed conformist perspectives. As a result PPKn (and the P-4 program) clashed with people’s aspirations. There was no interactive dialogue between the expectations of the programs and the realities of the
street. ‘The strength of the state allowed it to direct citizenship education in its own favour. PPKn became political indoctrination in pedagogical clothes.’

**Teacher’s Program for Citizenship Education**

Informant (K) is a professor of citizenship education at a university in Bandung. He is also currently involved in the development of the new curriculum of Indonesian citizenship education. In the new curriculum of citizenship education - currently being disseminated - *Pancasila* will be treated as the guiding principles for citizenship education. While the subject is no longer named after the state ideology, *Pancasila* will continue to serve as the foundation for the cultural values of Indonesian citizens. *Pancasila* is taught along with universal and democratic values which focus on such topics as solidarity, unity in diversity, the rule of law, social order and justice. In the context of regional autonomy, the central government is responsible for the national curriculum and the outlines of the education, but regional educational providers can manage their own teaching and learning material.

Informant (K) argued there should be no problem if the new education is called ‘civic education’ or ‘citizenship education’ in its English version. Scholars such as John Cogan have suggested that civic education is school-based education, while citizenship education includes education outside the school, or community education. This depends on how people give meanings to the educational process. However, the informant saw citizenship education in Indonesia as education about relations between the state and the citizens of the country. It is not merely education about the citizens or community, and it
should therefore cover both national as well as local needs, where national unity is still a crucial issue. Indonesia exists because there is unity. Regional or local educational providers should be able to interpret and proportionately balance the national curriculum and their local cultures. The essential issue of Indonesian education is not only its name and concepts, but most importantly its mission, namely ‘to educate Indonesian people who are ill-educated’.

The program for teachers of citizenship education is offered only at undergraduate level, to prepare teachers of citizenship education at the junior secondary level and senior secondary level. It was not until around 1993 that a Education for Primary School program was introduced to prepare teachers at primary level. For years, many citizenship teachers were not formally trained in the subject, particularly at primary level.\(^7\)

The teacher program is wide-ranging, covering the state ideology, the national constitution, the Broad Outline of National Orientation (*Garis-garis Besar Haluan Negara*), Law, Sociology and Methodology. The focus is on the theory as well as the practice of teaching and learning. The primary focus is on the pedagogical issues, and so theses produced by graduates of the program are from methodological rather than sociological perspectives.

Informant (K) identified several issues needing attention. First, there should be a redefinition of many of the concepts which are taught to students at all levels. Secondly, citizenship education should not have too many values, but only those essential for school
students. They should be taught in a logical sequence consistent with students’
development. Third, family and community should support schools in their provision of
citizenship education. What is taught at schools cannot be separated from ‘the real
world’. For example, in order to promote social order we have to discuss conflict in
schools, because conflict is part of the social life which students find in their community.
One of the problems of the past citizenship education, such as PPKn is that conflict was
avoided because of the dominant influence of Javanese culture. In the New Order period,
conflict was a political construct. It was not considered as something that appeared
naturally. As a result, when natural conflicts emerged, people did not know exactly how
to resolve them. In essence, we have to teach not only what is right and what is wrong;
but also what is better. The informant used the example of throwing garbage in the
streets. He argued that people will think twice before throwing rubbish if the streets are
well maintained, i.e. clean and tidy. What we need to do is to provide an environment
where moral consciousness can be developed. Again, it is a matter of role model.

FOURTH GROUP OF INFORMANTS – STUDENTS

Informant (L) is now a university student. She studied PPKn and used its textbooks from
primary school until she finished her secondary school. To her, PPKn was only about
memorising the principles of Indonesia’s state ideology, Pancasila and the articles of the
1945 Constitution. She believed that students should know the principles and articles of
these two state documents in relation to various aspects of life, such as economy,
education and people of Indonesia, and not only because they are the state regulations.
They should know their duties as citizens. At the same time, informant (L) considered that civics education does offer something to students, such as life-skills, how to behave socially, and tolerance towards others. She found that people in her neighbourhood are quite tolerant to one another, and concluded that the civics education was quite relevant.

However from what she has seen in the media about events in other parts of Indonesia, she considered that is too idealistic. It does not match with the reality. For example, she and her friends could implement the concept of tolerance and respect to other people, but it is difficult to know how the concept of ‘love one’s country’ or ‘patriotism’ (cinta tanah air) is to be practised. She believed that the success of PPKn depends very much on the person who studying it. Even though students may have been taught about the good things contained in Pancasila and the regulations, they might act differently. ‘It all depends on the person. There’s no point in teaching Pancasila if someone doesn’t want to follow the regulations they’ve been taught.’

Informant (M) had just finished her senior secondary schooling, and her experience of PPKn was similar to that of informant (L). In her view, the material in the PPKn textbooks is needlessly repeated throughout the secondary levels. All topics are the same. There is only a small difference in the contents, in that the material for senior secondary level is slightly more difficult than that of the junior secondary level. (‘Sama saja. Diulang-ulang. Mungkin cuma lebih susah untuk dimengerti’). For example, topics such as mutual co-operation (gotong-royong), deliberation (musyawarah), familial spirit (kekeluargaan) are repeated. When asked about the issue of deliberation (musyawarah),
she considered that although it is usually carried out by voting, it is not as democratic as it may appear, because the result has often been pre-arranged.

Like informant (L), informant (M) considered PPKn is not a difficult subject as long as students can memorise the material given. It is only a matter of memorisation because students have never been given the chance to link the concepts obtained from school with the practical things outside school. Students are only expected to learn about theories. They have to memorise the whole 1945 Constitution, both the preamble and the articles (batang tubuh). To informant (L) as well as (M), their understanding of Pancasila is related to the issues such as ‘acting in a familial spirit’ (kekeluargaan), ‘willingness to sacrifice’ (rela berkorban) and ‘ensuring the freedom of religious faith’ (menjamin kebebasan beragama). They considered that every citizen in Indonesia should subscribe to a religion, because PPKn (Pancasila) makes it their duty.

According to informant (L), democracy means that social activities should be based on the people’s will (sesuai kehendak rakyat), and that there should be freedom of opinion (kebebasan berpendapat). In her view, it was very difficult to say that Indonesia practises democracy. She thought that collectivism is needed in Indonesia, and found the notion of ‘mutual-co-operation’ (gotong-royong) acceptable. She gave examples of the good things that she took from PPKn textbooks, such as people cooperating to clean up their neighborhood. However, she believed that individualism is also needed. For example, every one should be responsible for their own work in an examination. Co-operation is not allowed in such situation.
In general, both informant (L) and informant (M) considered that PPKn excessively emphasises the importance of ‘familial spirit’ (kekeluargaan). They saw tolerance mainly in terms of religion. ‘Religious tolerance… if another person is worshipping, we shouldn’t disturb them. We mustn’t denigrate another person’s religion.’ According to informant (L), PPKn makes students aware of three types of relations; the relationship between the state and the people, the relationship between the people and the people, and the relationship between the people and God.

Both informant (L) and informant (M) argued that school students were not critical because they were not expected to be critical. They were expected to accept the material supplied to them. Students did not want to risk failing in the PPKn subject. PPKn is one of the three compulsory subjects. If they failed in PPKn, they would not be promoted to a higher level.

**Analytical Comments**

The perceptions of three groups of officials and one group students have been reviewed above. Their statements demonstrate a certain degree of agreement, but also differences of emphasis and concerns, perhaps attributable to their different roles and interests in the citizenship education process. This section reviews these official and student views about the concepts of ideal society and democratic values, and shows how their views confirm and amplify the analysis of the PPKn texts in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6. Also, it assesses the elements that need to be incorporated into citizenship education in post-colonial
Indonesia as argued by some officials, particularly those involved in the formulation of new citizenship education.

The first group of informants spoke positively about PPKn, being their own product. However, they were critical of its implementation. Informant (A) presented a normative argument concerning the ideal society for post-colonial Indonesia. His vision of the ideal society is based on his belief in rational-modern knowledge, particularly functional-structuralism, local cultural values, and the Javanese world-view and ethics. For informant (A) order comes from the obedience of the individual within a hierarchical, mechanical and holistic society. It is the social basis of solidarity for a pluralist society such as Indonesia. By employing the organic metaphor of living-plants and the functional metaphor of Javanese orchestra, he argued that the dynamics of difference can be analysed and understood, and that conflict can be avoided rather than resolved. He saw democracy as the way individuals maintain equilibrium without disturbing the pre-assumed harmonious world. He seemed to believe that Javanese culture provides symbols and ethics that are employable to guide Indonesian people. Cultural reproduction is a suitable vehicle for citizenship education, because the cultural analogy is something which is objective and universal.

Like informant (A), informant (B), who was responsible both at the normative and praxis level of the past citizenship education, also considered the employment of Javanese cultural values as something ‘natural’ in the PPKn discourse. His main concern was the inadequacy of the textbook writers in articulating the messages intended by the planning
body and the Ministry of Education, and the lack of knowledge and skills of teachers across the country in teaching the subject. He argued that the material was well designed but poorly executed and delivered. From the pedagogical perspective, for example, it was based on the concepts of child-developmental psychology and has also drawn perspectives from various established sociological and cultural theories which consider the individual’s roles in society. He did not seem to feel concern about the problems arising from the doctrinaire nature of PPKn, as argued by many people including the teachers, students and intellectuals in this chapter and Chapter 9.

Both informant (B) and informant (D) consider PPKn to have been well designed. They realised the intervention of the New Order regime was strong and had caused difficulties, but to protect their own interests they could only accept the influence of the regime in their production of PPKn. As a result, informant (B) blamed textbook writers, and informant (D) blamed teachers for falling short of the goals.

Implicit in these two informants’ arguments is the tradition in Indonesian educational policy that a new regime does reject the whole policy of regime it replaces, since these policies were clearly intended to preserve certain local traditional values. This strategy can be equated with the popular Javanese adage, namely ‘respecting the contribution of your predecessor, attacking without the help of others, winning without looking down on the one you have beaten’ (mikul dhuvur mendem jero, nglurung tanpa bala, menang tanpa ngasoralee). This behaviour also reflects a typical characteristic evident in Indonesian history, as argued by Malcolm Caldwell (quoted in Wilhelm (1980: 10). This
is ‘the ability to effect a synthesis of different ingredients, accepting the new without discarding the old, absorbing and blending rather than substituting’. It is my contention that such behaviour has made fundamental change difficult in Indonesian politics since independence. Because older values should be preserved without proper assessment of their usefulness, some of them inhibit moves towards new, modern democratic practice. Many of these older values were employed by successive regimes to preserve the undemocratic status quo.

Informants (C), (D) and (E) were involved in the formulation of Indonesian citizenship education throughout the New Order period, and are now still involved in the formulation of the new curriculum. They indicated that some of the essential material in PPKn will be maintained in the new curriculum. Like informant (D), informant (E) argued that the new curriculum is a re-modelling of PPKn. The difference is in the pedagogical processes, particularly the ways of teaching and learning. The new curriculum allows schools to manage their institutional objectives and provides students with greater chances to explore citizenship issues.

While informant (A) believed in the functional model, whereby the symbolic structure of Indonesian (Javanese) society can likened to the Javanese orchestra (gamelan), informant (D) was more concerned with the role of Javanese culture in the reification of the social processes of a pluralist society.
Against this background, informants (D) and (K) argued that institutional authority plays an important role as a mediator of culture and structure. Neither culture nor structure is autonomous from institutions in nation building and character building. In their view, in a paternalistic society, ‘role model’ is very important in influencing and nurturing the young generation positively or negatively. Even though informant (D) and (E) implied that civic meaning is a construct largely to reflect the interests of the elite, they shared the views of informant (A), (B) and (C) that the foundation of social structure is static. Implicit in their arguments is that political regimes play a vital role by shaping cultural preconditions to produce role models which become authoritative and unable to be questioned. Despite regime change, the underlying structure of the society remains intact. The old spirit and practices are merely reproduced in a different guise. Modification occurs only on the surface structure - a sort of simulacra.

Unlike the first group of informants, the second and third groups of informants, who were assigned to teach PPKn in the New Order Indonesia, considered the education no more than political indoctrination. For informant (I), informant (J) and informant (K) who are involved in the formulation of the new curriculum of Indonesian citizenship education, as well as informant (F) and informant (G), the core elements of the curriculum and the method of teaching and learning should be revamped. In their view, only education that promotes ‘individual rights’ can be called ‘democratic citizenship’ education. However, they have not successfully explained what they mean by ‘democratic citizenship’ since they do not fully engage with the fact that individual rights as universal values should not be constrained by any local cultural and religious perspectives. They themselves assert
the need for cultural contextualisation of the education in Indonesia. The following give some examples of the contradictions.

While informant (A) and informant (B) appear to treat Javanese cultural values as identical with the values of Indonesian people as a whole, with the exception of informant (G) who is Christian, these second and third groups of informants consider that Islam should serve as a sort of analytical tool, and provide moral guidelines toward a democratic society. The third group of informants generally rejects the Javanisation of Indonesia but embraces Islam as appropriate value system for local conditions in implementing Indonesian democracy. Informants (I), (J) and (K), who are non-Javanese, suggest that Javanese cultural values suppress differences and individual rights for the sake of conformity and thus do not encourage the promotion of democracy.

On democratic values, all informants in the second group and third group believe that citizenship education should be contextualised according to the local culture and structure. If it is to be contextualised, it would have to accommodate local and Islamic values which are basically ascriptive, patrimonial and hierarchical. These conditions obviously do not suit the ‘liberal’ democratic values which these informants proposed as the ideal of Indonesian citizenship. The second group of informants, namely informant (F), informant (G) and informant (H) in particular, are constantly critical of the term ‘liberal’, seen as implying excessive freedom. The key contradiction of the second and the third groups of informants is thus between universalism of democracy and human rights and local cultural and/or religious values.8
Like informants (B), (D) and (E) in the first group, the second and third groups of informants held that ‘cognitive dissonance’, i.e. the incongruity between students’ knowledge obtained from their schooling and the ‘real world’, is one of the most important issues of the Indonesian citizenship education. Secondly, they also considered that PPKn places too much emphasis on the cognitive domain, and ignores the affective and psycho-motor domain. Thus, post-PPKn education should give greater attention to the acquisition of behavioral and moral skills. Thirdly, all informants in these two later groups were aware of the influences of the Dutch colonisation in the nation building and character building of post-colonial Indonesia. However, only informant (E) openly argued that these influences have contributed to the past and present internal conflicts of the people of the archipelago, and to constraints in nation building and character building. Both informant (E) and informant (I) noted that the Indonesian people have been ill-educated for the last five decades, hence the majority of them do not know how to learn and practice democracy.

Among the three groups of informants, only informant (F) was critical of the weakness of the 1945 Constitution. Unlike the first group of informants, who assumed that the Constitution has been well-written and should be accepted and applied in order to become a good citizen, informant (F) considered that the weakness of the Constitution has resulted in the failure of Indonesian PPKn education. Because the Constitution states that power is vested in the state and not the people, the PPKn arguments drawn from the Constitution cannot be employed to protect the rights of the people.
The first, the second and the third groups of informants seemed to be aware that global interconnectedness has a major impact on the efforts to forge a national and cultural identity. However, none of them seemed to be concerned with the pressing issue of globalisation, and whether Indonesia as a nation-state will remain a viable and sustainable form of political community. Despite their awareness of the impact of globalisation, they - perhaps like most Indonesian people - considered internal forces such as the demand for greater regional autonomy to be more likely to bring about national disintegration. Most of them implied distinctions between the internal and the external, the domestic and foreign sphere of social, economic and political activities. In the citizenship education context, the significance of this internal force is thus anticipated by the new curriculum. The focus is on its ‘decentralised nature’, as argued by informants (D), (E), (I), (J) and (K). Unlike the centralism of the past, these informants saw the decentralisation of educational management as empowering schools, educators and teachers to have greater freedom to determine their resources and pursue their objectives and programs. The Competency Based Curriculum also means that students will have greater opportunities to explore issues of citizenship without feeling that they are being dictated to by their teachers.

Whatever pedagogical processes take place, the new curriculum developers argue that the new citizenship education allows the interpretation of social meanings to take place in a dialogical manner. Students should not be treated as passive learners, as implied by informants (L) and informant (M)’s arguments. Both informants in the fourth group
suggested they could not even distinguish whether or not their social reality was an elite construction. It was difficult for them to see collectivism and individualism as two sides of the same coin. They have been consciously inculcated with the belief that in almost all types of situations collectivism (in terms of ‘mutual-co-operation’ and ‘familial spirit’) is much better than individualism, without any good understanding of the two concepts.

One important point coming from informant (L)’s understanding of the relationship between the state and the people, the people and the people, and the people and God, is that there is no dimension that regulates the relationship between the state and God. Since the relationship between the state and God has never been clearly expressed, the ruler and elite usually consider themselves mediators between their people and God. They have a special mandate from God to rule the people, often as the representatives of God or even the embodiment of God in the world.⁹ Their relationship to God is only their own construction. This is perhaps one of the factors which makes corruption of the elite and bureaucrats more possible in a society such as Indonesia. According to informant (L), students were never given the chance to think about the relationship between the state and God, which is critical in the discourse of democracy in a so-called ‘religious society’ such as Indonesia.

In sum, the debates among the first, second, third and fourth groups of informants are related to the issues of the role of social actors (agency) in the fabrication of social meanings (citizenship) and the structure and culture (particularly Javanese cultural values) of the country. Apart from informants (L) and (M), who were less aware of the
role of social actors in the construction of social reality, other informants tried to give their arguments as best as they could. The first group of informants, particularly informant (A) saw Indonesian citizenship as shaped by Indonesian cultural conditions. Citizenship is thus a mere cultural product. The second group and the third group of informants, except informant (H), confined their critical focus to the formulation of citizenship education. Even though they were aware of the conditions of post-colonial Indonesia, they tended to view the role of culture and structure in nation-building as less influential than the role of authority, as exemplified by the founding fathers and the political elite, including Sukarno and Supomo, and particularly Suharto in the New Order period.

The difficulty of the first three groups of informants’ arguments is that they tend to ignore the interplay between structural authority, individual agency and culture. From a constructivist point of view, social actors tend to establish social and national identity by manipulating cultural codes and structural elements (Delanty 2001). In the past, students were treated as passive learners who showed little resistance to the citizenship discourse. They were subjected to the pedagogical processes of indoctrination. As the younger educators and teachers confirmed, conformist perspectives in the name of collective interests were legitimated to suppress individual rights. As they further argued, the shift of ‘ideological investment’ in the new curriculum is inevitable. They saw the modification of the components and pedagogical processes of the new curriculum as allowing students to explore and reflect on their social conditions. The second and third groups of informants also recognised the influence and negative impact of Negara
Integralistik ideology, supported by the ‘submissive’ Javanese values. This further confirms the analysis in Chapters 4 and 5 that social order has been imposed at the expense of ‘individual freedom’. They also accepted the importance of religious perspectives in PPKn, and thought that Islam should be influential in the interpretation of morality and the civic ideal in Indonesian citizenship education. While democracy is crucial, it is a Western-derived secular concept. Thus, democratic elements should be contextualised in accordance with the local conditions.

Note

1 Not all informants’ views could be presented this chapter or the next chapter, and some material is overlapping. I employ only the most relevant information. I start with more conceptual approaches to the issues of citizenship or the civic ideal before moving to the educational perspectives. The information drawn from the informants is organised under different headings, although some overlapping is inevitable given the complex and inter-related nature of the issues.

2 This concept posits that all components in this life have their own places (functions) which are determined from ‘above’ (ditentukan dari atas). (see, for example, Karkono K. Partokusumo’s comment (Akar Demokrasi dalam Kepeimpinan Jawa) in Wiwoho, Basri and Jatnika (1998: 57). Partokusumo argues that hamemayu hayuning bawono refers to ‘the king who has the ideal (ambition?) to oversee and protect the world.’ Gunawan Sumodiningrat in the same collection of articles (Yang Menanam, Yang Memetik) considers it is ‘the Queen’ (interpreted as ‘the King’) who is able to bring about a peaceful, long lasting world, both in the micro-cosmos and macro-cosmos (Wiwoho, Basri and Jatnika 1998: 37). He does not explain what he means by the ‘Queen’ and ‘the King’ in his article, but the concept can be interpreted as a reference to the self-discipline of a Javanese in the pure mystical (kebathinan) tradition.

3 This is a reflection of the wider problem that Indonesia has been facing since the New Order period. The authoritarian regime could not serve as a good model for the people to practise democracy. The elite and bureaucrats did not practise what they preached. The society thus lacked a role model (keteladanan). In a paternalistic society like Indonesia a role model is very important.

4PPKn or any citizenship education can be taught, but it should also be treated as an integral part of community education outside school system. The most crucial education occurs in the family, particularly during the formative period. Schools ‘systematisate’ and ‘develop’ what students have already learned from their family and community. There should be a synchronisation between what they experience at home and what they learn at school. If their school environment is democratic, they should find the same democratic atmosphere at home. There number of working parents has been a growing in the last few decades. Their children should have an ‘efficient and effective’ education.

5 According to informant (E), who is a Javanese Muslim, the 1945 Constitution that stresses religious piety (iman dan taqwa) reflects the cross-ethnic (‘nilai universal bangsa Indonesia’ - as argued by the late Koetjaraningrat) rather than mono-cultural roots of Indonesian education. This is different from the educational approach of other societies. Indonesia has chosen this, rather than blindly copying the
education systems of other nations, although naturally enough the formal framework of education is Western influenced. Prior to the coming of Western people to the archipelago, the so-called ‘formal education’ was pengajian (the rote learning of Islamic values) at pesantren where the participants wore sarung (sarongs) sitting cross-legged in circles. Modern science and rationality are the products of the West. There have also been some significant influences from Indian, Arabic and Chinese traditions which Indonesian people inherited. Along with the introduction of citizenship education, there was a debate in 1950s about whether religious education should be included in the curriculum. Religious education was eventually introduced as a separate subject. However, the non-secular perspectives of education (see Chapter 4 on ‘intraceptive’ education) are also incorporated in citizenship education because Indonesia people has made the primacy of the Supreme Being the first principle of Pancasila. Since Pancasila will still serve as the ‘guiding principles’ of the new citizenship, religious perspectives are maintained. (‘Sila pertama Pancasila kan Ketuhanana yang Maha Esa …itu tidak sama dengan Barat yaitu pendidikan yang sekuler’).

Like informant (D), informant (E) also considers that Indonesian citizenship has won admiration from experts of many countries that only recently have begun to introduce citizenship education. Indonesian citizenship education is unique and well-designed to cover the complex issues of this pluralist-post-colonial society. Indonesia is also been the first (and only) country in which citizenship education is enacted by law. (‘…Ternyata Indonesia yang paling bagus. Resmi …menjadi wajib diundangkan’).

Informant (K) also points out that the weakness of the university program that prepares school teachers of citizenship education is due to political influence. In 1954, the program consisted three components of studies: civics, law and economics, which later shifted to civics and law. It was not until 1975 that the program was named Pendidikan Moral Pancasila dan Kewarganegaraan (PMPKn) at university (formerly: teacher’s college or Institut Keguruan dan Ilmu Pendidikan (IKIP)). PMPKn was intended to prepare teachers to teach moral education, and in schools PMPKn teachers were generally blamed for all students’ misconduct. In fact, not only teachers of PMPKn but teachers of other subjects at school should be held responsible. Character education should be part of all teacher-student interaction. To help relieve the moral burden carried by PMPKn teachers, PPKn was introduced in accordance with Educational Law No. 2, Year 1989. The ‘moral’ element of education is ‘inclusive’, and thus the responsibility of all teachers. It is no longer explicitly used as a title for the citizenship education.

By the same token, the belief that Pancasila - with its first monotheistic religious principle - is the most suitable ideology only suggests that democracy will remain an ideal of the nation, rather than becoming a system of the state (Djiwandono 1995). Where people tend to resolve conflicts by means of religious rather than democratic perspectives, democracy becomes a mere ideal or catchword.

See, for example, Huntington (1993) in which he discusses the equation of Caesar as God and God as Caesar in the Western and Eastern traditions. In China Caesar is God; in Islam, God is Caesar. In the (modern?) West, God cannot be called Caesar, nor can Caesar (the ruler) be called God. To show that only in Christendom God and Caesar co-exist, Bernard Lewis argues that the authoritative Christian text is the passage in Matthew 22:21, in which Jesus Christ says ‘Render therefore unto Caesar the things which are Caesar’s, and unto God the things that are God’s.’ (Lewis 2002: 97)
CHAPTER 8
THE INDONESIAN CIVIC IDEAL – OUTSIDER CRITIQUES

Specific Objectives of this Chapter

This chapter examines the opinions of some critics of Indonesian citizenship and citizenship education who have not been directly involved in the formulation or teaching of the curriculum in the New Order period and after. They have been chosen as informants because they are opinion-leaders whose views represent a range of different constituencies of ethnicity, race, religion and political grouping. All of them have been internationally trained, and hold doctorate degrees. Of the five informants, three obtained their doctorate degrees from universities in the United States of America, one from Germany and one from Turkey. This chapter looks at how these scholars and opinion-leaders regard some of the major cultural and political concepts and issues that I have discussed so far. Once again, as with the ‘insider group’, we can see some connection between the affiliation of the individual and the view presented. The first part provides the critics’ views as they addressed the key topics of Negara Integralistik, Javanese culture, Islam and democracy, Pancasila and civil society, tolerance and pluralism. The second part gives some analytical comments on their views, assessing the implications for debates on issues of citizenship and rights.
FIFTH GROUP OF INFORMANTS - INTELLECTUALS AND OPINION LEADERS

_Negara Integralistik, Local (Javanese) Culture and Citizenship_

Informant (N), a Javanese-Muslim intellectual, and a former minister in the cabinet of President Abdurrachman Wahid, sees the concept of _Negara Integralistik_ as playing a very negative role in Indonesian society. He regards the deliberate control of citizens by the state in _Negara Integralistik_ as having inherently fascistic qualities. According to him, in the New Order period school students’ mindsets were shaped to accept the organicist notion of _Negara Integralistik_, in which citizens were merely the subjects that followed the state. If the _PPKn_ textbooks were read in a ‘hermeneutic way’, he argued, Indonesians from all walks of life were expected to follow the state. This sort of citizenship education is incompatible with the philosophy of a democratic citizenship.

Citizenship should provide Indonesian people with an understanding that they are individual citizens whose civil rights span the political, legal, social, cultural and economic domains. The new curriculum of citizenship education will not achieve democratic values if the underlying philosophy remains the same. In his opinion, citizenship is the ‘carrier’ of rights, and a system of citizenship education needs to be established which truly explains and promotes the independence of the individual. At the same time, it should inculcate in citizens a sense of responsibility for the state that they
have established, and for the harmonious life of the society. The state coordinates only those interests that cannot be handled by citizens, but the citizens should control the state.

He went on to say that *Negara Integralistik* - which was promoted by Supomo and Suharto - is fascist because of its political philosophy that the state is everything. With the rise of *reformasi* people began to lean towards Hatta’s view that the state should be subject to the control of the citizens. Despite this, the current Indonesian government is still dominated by the New Order ‘paradigm’, and its ‘new’ rhetoric of citizenship is only a revitalisation of *Negara Integralistik*. Culturally, a feudal state such as Indonesia tends to fascism. It is difficult to ‘liberalise’ the people to reach enlightenment because enlightenment should start from the elite, however Indonesia’s enlightened elite was suppressed in the latter years of the Old Order. There only remains a small number of intellectuals, residing in a few tertiary institutions and seminaries ‘at the periphery’. In this informant’s view, Gus Dur (the former fourth president of Indonesia, Abdurrahman Wahid) was a rare example of a non-government figure, and a promoter of human rights and democracy in the New Order period. If there are others, they do not yet form a viable force for change.

He rejected Niels Mulder’s views that static and undemocratic Javanese cultural perspectives have been adopted to develop Indonesia as a ‘familial state’. He sees Javanese culture as dynamic, and Mulder’s stance as Orientalist. Mulder’s Orientalism would suggest that Javanese people cannot drive a car because cars are not part of Javanese culture. ¹
He also asserts that like Islam, Javanese culture has been wrongly considered as homogenous. To him, culture always has its pluralistic aspects. Indonesian culture is in the process of becoming. Niels Mulder always sees Indonesian culture in terms of Javanese culture, and therefore dominated by mysticism (mistik-kebatinan).

He argued that the imposition of Negara Integralistik outside Java has caused discontent and crushed other cultures, such as the concept of nagari in West Sumatera. Suharto thought that all villages in Indonesia should be shaped like Javanese village (desa) so they would be easier to control. Because nagari is an ‘independent-collectivity’ Suharto did not like it, therefore it was Javanised. What matters is not the principles of nagari, desa or kampung, but that they should be used to support the implementation of democratic principles. Not only nagari, but also the family planning program (Keluarga Berencana or KB) was also Javanised. Family planning was introduced on densely populated Java to reduce fertility and control population growth. However it is inappropriate in many provinces, such as Irian Jaya where the birth-rate is much lower. Hegemonic policies such as these were not representative of Javanese culture in itself, but rather Javanese culture was used by Suharto to deploy power in the New Order period. This informant concluded by saying that the ‘foreignness’ of democracy and other accompanying values should not prevent their acceptance, since Islam, Christianity, Hinduism and Buddhism were also imported from other cultures in the past.
Informant (O), a Javanese-Muslim intellectual and professor at an eminent Islamic university in Indonesia, explained the importance of family spirit to Sukarno and Supomo, both of whom were Javanese and connected with the pesantren system. He admitted that he could not sense exactly what the ‘atmosphere’ was during the Indonesian constitutional debate, particularly concerning Pancasila, Negara Integralistik, citizenship and democracy, but believed it could be called one of ‘unity and family spirit’ (‘kesatuan dan kekeluargaan’). Among the founding-fathers, Hatta was more moderate and Western-educated. He was closer to liberalism, while leaders such as Sukarno and Supomo had a very close ties to the Javanese worldview (‘kental kultur Jawanya’). They regarded Indonesia as a national extended ‘family’ in the Javanese sense, which (like some German ideologies of the past) asserted the primacy of social harmony.

According to informant (O), if ‘familial ethics’ (‘etika kekeluargaan’) are adopted to run a modern state, there will be a clash. ‘Familial ethics’ underlies the social organisation of the pesantren, which views itself as a big family with the kiai (the leader and head teacher at pesantren) as ‘father’. Since Sukarno and Supomo’s power was located in the community, they had no experience in running a modern state. They adopted what they knew, and the focus on ‘family’ was dominant. They learned their statecraft on the job, much as Abdurrahman Wahid did during his short presidency.

He pointed out that the use of the familial notion is not only found in the East. In the West a sort of familial concept was adopted in ancient Rome, namely the family of God (‘keluarga Tuhan’). In Hindu/Javanese thought, however, the idea of power coming from
God has always been very strong. In this tradition, a ruler sees himself as the representative or mediator of God, a shepherd who takes care of the people. Such power is considered legitimate, because it is an integral part of God’s power. The state is the representative of God, the master, and the people are only the slaves (‘State itu wakil Tuhan atau aku ini kuli rakyat’). In Western democracies the power vested in the state is legitimised not by God, but by the people.

Informant (O) believed that there is a far greater focus on duties in Eastern cultures, than there is on either republican duties or liberal rights in Western political traditions. A heavy emphasis on duties without corresponding rights means that an Eastern state that claims to serve its people is often their oppressor. When duties are regarded as ‘sacred’ and dialogue is non-existent, despots may arise. The ruler who regards himself as a ‘father’ (bapak) who knows what is best for his children, feels justified in using coercion.

Informant (O)’s expertise is in the mysticism of the Sufist school of Islam. He argued that citizenship education invokes theology in its discussion of rights and obligations because Indonesians are close to religion and mysticism. Theological discourse accommodates the collective memory of the people and meets the demands of its constituents. Because the state was weak, the New Order needed to legitimise its ideologies by invoking theology and culture. Had it done otherwise, it would have lost its constituency. Religion and culture respond to emotion, not reason, and thus the state could appeal to the people’s emotions rather than reason.
Informant (P), a Catholic priest and professor of philosophy at an institute for philosophical studies in Jakarta, said that Supomo’s ideas of *Negara Integralistik* were not widely discussed in the Old Order period. It was Sukarno’s ideas that were more powerful and widely discussed. Supomo merely took the ideas of *Negara Integralistik* from G.W.F Hegel, Adam H. Muller and Baruch De Spinoza. He noted that *Negara Integralistik* was introduced into Indonesia at a time when fascism was in retreat elsewhere, following the defeat of Nazi Germany in Europe and Dai Nippon in the Asia-Pacific. In the 1980s, after he had presented critical views about the government at a seminar, informant (P) was invited by one of the top government figures to discuss the possibility of him assisting the regime. They wanted to highlight the achievements, ideals and integrity of the New Order, and were looking for a system or theory to give it legitimacy. *Negara Integralistik* was eventually chosen. Informant (P) rejected the invitation to join the project.

**Islam, Democracy and Citizenship**

Informant (O), the professor of Islamic studies quoted earlier, considers religion to be a positive influence. Religions, such as Islam, bring social cohesion and entrepreneurship. The Acehnese (on the northern tip of Sumatra) can communicate better with the Bugis from South Sulawesi because they share the same faith and language. The Acehnese have been suffering from oppression for a long time, but they still want to establish dialogue with the Indonesian central government. By contrast, the East Timorese did not have a common memory of ‘faith-sharing’. Although they were heavily subsidised by the Indonesian central government, they could easily secede. In his view, as the dominant...
religion of Indonesia, Islam plays an important role in national integration and promoting democracy. By means of the Malay language, trading activities spread Islam throughout Indonesia’s coastal cultures. It brought rationality, egalitarianism and democracy. It is more a matter of preserving and developing this positive heritage than deciding whether to ‘take it or leave it’.

Ontologically Islam and democracy are different: the former is God-made, and the latter is man-made. However, certain elements in Islam are compatible with democratic values. These are the principles of participation, such as the one exemplified in the Madinah period, pluralism, transparency, individual achievements, responsibilities and social responsibilities (‘amanah’). However, there are grey areas where Islamic and democratic values differ. Despite these, this informant believed that ‘Islam sees the democratic system as the truest and most rational’. Because Islam has many similarities with modernism, the Islamic community is not against the West. There are many Muslims who enjoy their education in the West, without any stigma being attached to it. Science, knowledge and ethics present no problems for Islam.²

He argued that the failed promotion of good citizenship in the past has produced the problems of law enforcement currently faced by Indonesian society. He sees these as matters of justice, where justice rests on social relations, and particularly the social contract. Taking Islam as an illustration, he indicated that in Al-Quran the command to uphold justice and keep promises is very important. A promise is a social product. In Islam, to uphold justice and commitment is obligatory. A failure to uphold justice is
destructive, and can be translated as an absence of law. *Al-Quran* tells us that if justice is not upheld, every one shall die. Without justice society is not sustainable. Any society, Islamic or otherwise, can be sustained if justice exists. Even Muslims are destructive if they do not practice justice (‘Walaupun orang Muslim, kalau tidak adil akan hancur’). Justice is to do with the universal natural law of the cosmos, social law and God’s law. Law should be upheld.

The problems of the New Order came not from the Islamic discourse of justice, but from its interpretation of local culture, mainly Javanese culture. The *Bapakism* (benign but coercive paternalism) of former rulers, who believed they held special status and power as representatives of God, is a real phenomenon. The informant quoted Nietzsche’s popular concept of the ‘will to power’. To him a strong ‘will to power’ was very clear in the successive regimes. If law and humanist ethics (as social control mechanisms) did not counter it, a despot would emerge. Everyone has the potential to become a despot. The difference between a despot and a good father (*bapak*) is very thin. A dictator will be considered to be a good leader if he is clean, strong and clever. However, if a ruler is strong and clever, but not clean, he will become a despot. He argued that Moses was an example of a good despot. The Jews needed a person like him to lead them back to Israel because he was strong and clean. However, in a more rational and pluralist community, we cannot expect a charismatic figure like that, therefore power should be vested in law.

He considered that when Niels Mulder characterises Javanese culture as undemocratic, he is using a modern yardstick to judge a traditional culture. In the not so distant past a
charismatic leader may have been needed to create a civilised state from a barbaric community. In the past, charismatic and often autocratic leaders were needed. However this form of leadership is not suited to a modern state. However problems arise because Javanese culture, with its militaristic overtones, is still dominant in Indonesia. There is no tradition of citizenship in the country. Even though everyone has a national identity card, there is still strong primordial identification with a particular group or section of the society. At a time when regional autonomy is being implemented, people are committing more fully to their ethnicity while at the same time condemning the state for becoming weaker. This is not at all rational.

Informant (N), the ex-minister quoted earlier, is now fully involved in a political party with support from the largest Islamic religious group in Indonesia. He offers a critique of religious fundamentalism and an explanation of its appeal. He maintains that although Islam does not accept secularisation, there should be no problem for Indonesia in adopting democracy. The real problem in Indonesia is that democracy has been superficially interpreted. As a result, Indonesian people have sought alternatives, such as communism and totalitarianism. A religious fundamentalism has emerged, which its followers believe to be more democratic than mainstream Islam. However fundamentalist values clash with universal values, because they are anti-freedom.

Fundamentalism always gives primacy to authority, which shows that it is not tolerant. Any fundamentalism, whether religious fundamentalism, gender fundamentalism, or environmental fundamentalism should be rejected. Taking religious fundamentalism as
an example, he argued that initially such fundamentalism seems to be attractive, because it offers ‘authenticity’, ‘a sense of community’ and an understanding of obedience. However its limits are reached when it comes to autonomy and individual rights; then the propositions of fundamentalism crumble. What is left is its repressive character.

To this informant, Islam is both a religion and statehood (‘Islam itu agama dan negara’). However, he argued that the state can be secularly managed. As long as Islam is the basis of its ethics it is not necessary that the state should be managed wholly by means of Islamic law. Because of this, Indonesia’s founding fathers and many kiyais could believe in nationalism and the nation-state. It is true that Islam might be interpreted as an ideology of religion and the state as one entity. Yet, it could also be interpreted differently. Islam need not be an obstacle as long as Indonesian people consistently hold that Indonesia is a pluralist society. Thus, ‘Islam should not be used as a sole determinant.’

Informant (N), who has also written several books on Islam, democracy, civil society and citizenship, considers that Islamic ethics could contribute to citizenship education in Indonesia. Like other religions, Islam emphasises the importance of human life. Because of this, the appreciation of human rights is very high. Only God can remove an individual’s rights, not the state nor any other force. To him a religion, such as Islam, cannot be reduced to science or political theory by which citizenship education should present exclusively Islamic views. If we reduce religion to our life in this world, it is no longer a religion. It is merely an ideology. Religion involves issues of the after-life. He
also touched on the opinion of some foreign observers that Islam in Indonesia is ‘moderate’ and ‘tolerant’, and its values are compatible with democratic elements. To him, this all depends on the person (‘tergantung kepada pelakunya’).

Informant (Q), a Javanese Christian priest and intellectual, argued that whether or not there is compatibility between Indonesian cultural values and democracy, in the context of the modern state, Indonesia has no other choice but to embrace democracy if it is to survive and stand tall together with other societies. For a pluralist society such as Indonesia there seems to be no alternative but to become a democratic country.

However there are contesting views and expectations among the people. There are some Islamic intellectuals who have worked hard for democracy with an understanding of ‘democracy for the majority’. In their mind, democracy is government by the majority, for the majority. They have been struggling for democracy, but were not motivated by its real spirit. Therefore, some people have thought that because Islam represents the majority, Indonesia will be a democratic country as long as Islam rules. This sort of view is popular among the younger generation. They are against any kind of establishment. The situation has become out of control (‘amuk massa’) among the radicals, and the discourse of democracy has turned to mobocracy, to use Plato’s concept. This is absolutely against democratic values. Democracy should guarantee the freedom of the minority despite the majority’s rule, as suggested by Cak Nur (Nurcholish Madjid). Both majority and minority rights are guaranteed.
This informant believed that we need to achieve more liberal democratic values. Democracy in a general sense will not be sufficient to explain the kind of democracy that Indonesia needs. The essential thing is that democracy should guarantee the people’s right to be different. Civil rights with an efficient and effective government and effective control of the government by the people are crucial. Democracy does not deny the existence of a government. In thirty-two years Suharto did not develop positive values in the community. Those who hate him also think and act like him. Members of the community have become uncivilized.

On the compatibility of Islamic values and democratic principles, informant (P), the Catholic intellectual quoted earlier, argued that at the level of the individual Islam has some similarities with Christianity. Both Muslims and Christians believe in individual salvation. Eventually, individuals are personally, not collectively responsible. In Islam and Christianity, a person who dies faces the Day of Judgment (‘menghadap pengadilan Allah’). They will be questioned about what they have done in the world individually, not collectively. It is also true that people go either to Heaven or Hell as individuals, not collectively. (‘Dia tidak akan ditanya mengenai kelompok, tetapi dia berbuat sendiri, juga masuk surga atau neraka secara individu’). In this context, Muslims also claim that they are individualists. In doing business, Muslims also work individually. Even though there is a so-called ‘agricultural group’ (kelompok tani), the farm is basically managed and owned by individuals.
If we analyse Islam in terms of its dogmatic values and democratic elements we will not find a solution. In Islam, there is always an extreme fundamentalist sector. However we have to be realistic. If we look at moderate Muslims (*Islam Moderat*) in Indonesia, such as the current heads of NU and Muhammadiyah, theologically they accept democracy, and reject *Syari’ah* in pluralist Indonesia, because Muslims also trade, and they are tolerant. In the past, the political party that was regarded most highly with regard to democracy was an Islamic party, Masjumi. It was, of course, different from the neo-Masjumi which is fundamentalist. (See also the section on pluralism and tolerance in this chapter).

**Pancasila, Javanese Culture, Civil Society and Citizenship**

Informant (Q), the Christian priest quoted earlier, who is an expert on *Pancasila* and who has written a number of books in the field, spoke at length about *Pancasila* as remaining the most suitable state ideology for a pluralist society such as Indonesia. He believed that *Pancasila* should continue to provide the guiding principles of Indonesian citizenship education. (Also, see the key-issues of his thesis in the last part of this section). If some people might doubt the efficacy of *Pancasila*, he maintained that: ‘it was not *Pancasila* that should be expected to do something, but the Indonesian people, particularly those who claim to be committed to this ideology.’

Informant (Q) believes that when the 1945 Constitution was formulated, there was a spirit of mutual cooperation which could be translated in modern terms as ‘civil’ or ‘civilised’. Everyone claimed to be committed, including Sukarno. But after this, during the time of
Guided Democracy, and particularly when Suharto’s rule purportedly practised *Pancasila* purely and consistently, *Pancasila* was employed only to legitimate authoritarian policy. The *Pancasila* spirit was apparently state-oriented.

At this point we started to see what had been going on, and think about *Pancasila*’s future. *Pancasila* depends on the people who practise it. Its practice is through ‘civil society’. For example, some Islamic intellectuals are adamant that *masyarakat madani* (Islamic civil society) can be realised in modern times, but with an old spirit drawn from the prophet Mohammad’s period in Medina. However it seems the idea was not well received and it has been phased out This informant could see no better choice for Indonesia than *Pancasila*. If one is to promote civil society, it should be based on the spirit of *Pancasila*.

Informant (Q), whose Ph.D. thesis is on the concept of *Pancasila* as a state ideology, said that he was not interested in the thirty-six values of *P-4*. He has never undertaken a *P-4* program. According to him, the thirty-six values reflect a dream that the ordinary Indonesian citizen could never realize. He noted that many other societies in the region do not have an *Pancasila*-equivalent ideology, cobbled together from supposedly historical and local cultural values. Malaysia, for example, does not have a ‘Malay ideology’. ‘In all honesty, *Pancasila* is something that in Western thinking is just impossible, it’s nonsense.’
His Ph.D. thesis contends that ‘Pancasila comprises remnants of local cultures, particularly that of Java, which (like it or not) is dominant in Indonesia, and which can accommodate the diversity of other cultures. For example, ideas of totality, harmony and balance. ‘The New Order regime used Pancasila to suppress dissent, arguing that dissent damaged harmony and balance. Why do we have to accept that kind of idea? This is because Javanese culture does not recognise conflict. Conflict is always avoided and never resolved. This is a weakness.’ This informant’s thesis poses a crucial question: if Pancasila is accepted, can Indonesian people meet the challenges of the modern age?

This informant said that Pancasila is usually considered to be the ‘middle way’ (jalan tengah), not leaning to the right or the left. Sukarno preferred to call it a synthesis, and saw it as higher than the Declaration of Independence of the U.S. – a political manifesto. Sukarno was more inclined than Suharto to seek compromise. His approach to Pancasila rejects dichotomous ‘either-or’ options. What is Pancasila Democracy then? It is not Western democracy, or people’s democracy, or communism. Informant (Q) sees Pancasila as a romantic idea to integrate local traditional values with modern concepts, a way of becoming a modern state without losing traditional identity. It is an Indonesian way which has its strong as well as its weak points.

Informant (R), a Muslim intellectual and a lecturer at a leading Islamic university in Indonesia, tried to put the issue of civil society, democracy and citizenship in perspective. He believes citizenship has not gone smoothly in Indonesia. Citizenship is not merely a theoretical or academic issue. It is a real issue that has two dimensions. The first one is
the relationship between citizens, as determined by the interacting influences of religion, ethnicity and economic status. For example, citizenship issues will emerge if economic power is concentrated in a particular ethnic or religious group. An uneven economic distribution may heightened oppositional ethnocentricity, which in turn challenges citizenship and citizenship education.

The second dimension is the relationship between the citizens and the state. A strong, undemocratic state may objectify the people it is meant to represent. With their subjectivity denied by the state, the people see their relationship with it as problematic. They then look to a framework based on structures and societies that do not exist in Indonesia, which they considered to have worked in advanced democratic societies. They call this ‘civil society’, and translate it to an Indonesian context.

Because this concept is not properly understood, despite the best of intentions every attempt to promote it has failed. The informant argues that in authoritarian countries, civil society is viewed as having only one function, namely as a counter-balancing force to the state. Taking Poland as an example, he argued that Lech Walensa developed such a civil society or solidarity movement to counter the authoritarian state so that he could step into the political arena. However, once he entered the arena and became the leader of the country, he was ‘at a loss’ (dia kebingungan). As a result, if need be, he might suppress anyone that opposed him. This is different from the civil societies of North America, Australia, New Zealand and many Western European countries. In Indonesia, NU (Nahdatul Ulama) seemed to be more advanced than Muhammadiyah in coming up with
the ideas of civil society. However, its understanding seems to resemble that of the Eastern European countries, and of civil society counter-balancing the state. When NU stepped into power and dominated the state between 1999 and 2000 they soon forgot about the ideas of civil society.

He stressed that people who want to promote civil society should first fully understand what it means. The relationship between citizens, ethnicity and religion cannot be viewed only by means of civil society perspectives. He felt people at NU had never been part of the state in the New Order period; they were systematically excluded. Because they felt that they had not been rewarded for their contribution by being the first group that committed to *Pancasila* as the core ideology (*azas tunggal*), they turned to ‘international ideas’, such as democracy and civil society. They were more concerned with countering state power than promoting democracy and civil society. With the demise of the authoritarian New Order regime, the counter-balancing concept of civil society is no longer relevant. As a result, the issue of civil society has wound down.

Niels Mulder and Dawam Rahardjo have proposed that civil society existed in Indonesia in the early years of the last century (see Mulder 1999b, and Rahardjo 1999). Informant (R) disagreed, suggesting that the non-government organisations and political parties of that time were only voluntary organisations. They may have had some functions seemingly compatible to the values of civil society, but they were not consciously aware of them. Before independence, nationalism and national struggle were reactions to colonial conditions; resistance developed, but not civil society.
Cak Nur (Nurcholish Madjid, one of the most-respected Muslim intellectuals in Indonesia, mentioned earlier) tried to link civil society with the type of community at the time of Prophet Muhammad. Although there might be some functional similarities, we should not be too carried away with these. Even when people began to talk about civility, we should be aware that there was no such thing as Islamic civil society. Civil society is a Western product, a Western dream, influenced by Western cultural values and structures. If democracy and civil society are to be adopted, they must undergo a process of adaptation, similar to what Abdurrahman Wahid called ‘pribumisasi’ in the context of Islam. Thus, there should be a contextualisation, because two concepts which were not conceived in Indonesia cannot be directly embedded in the local cultures.

‘Like Islam, democracy and civil society are ‘foreign’ notions.’ Islam was not conceived in Indonesia. We have to admit that. It has been able to develop in the archipelago because there has been a process of Islamisation of local cultures and structures. Likewise if Indonesian people are to adopt democracy and civil society, they have to place these concepts into an Indonesian context. It is impossible to talk about human rights issues unless local cultural values are also involved. (‘Kita letakkan HAM dalam konteks budaya Indonesia. Kalau tidak, tidak mungkin’).

When people argue that parts of the local cultures are compatible with democratic values, he argues that such views are put forward simply to reduce opposition to democracy in the country. A scholar such as Robert W. Hefner (see, for example, Hefner 2000) argued
that Islamic concepts that are compatible with democratic values include the principles of deliberation (*shura* or in Indonesian: *musyawarah*), community consensus (*ijma*), tolerance (for example, *dhimmi*, in reference to the protection of non-Muslims), voluntarism and justice, and egalitarianism. However Islam has more principles and values than these. As with Indonesian local cultures, there is much in Islam that would need to be neutralised before we can practise democracy. So far, we have not found any local culture in Indonesia with democratic traditions.

In the past, some used to argue that Javanese culture had a tradition of protest. They wanted to link it with democratic values. However, that was different. (Also see informant (G)’s comments on the Javanese culture and democracy in Chapter 7). Samuel P. Huntington (see for example, Huntington 1996, 1993) proposed that some Islamic values appear democratic, but he doubted whether they are truly compatible with democracy (cf. informant (O)’s views on the compatibility of Islam and democracy). Anyone can argue about the compatibility of the local cultural and religious beliefs with democracy. Nevertheless, it is very difficult to develop democratic behaviour and a democratic culture. For example, in Islam discussion of justice and deliberation (*musyawarah*) is shaped and constrained by Islamic law. It would be impossible to discuss ‘localisation of prostitutes’ by reference to of Islamic law; we would need to employ the discourse of democracy and discuss it through People’s Consultative Council.

He said that most Indonesianists seem to be overly keen to see Indonesia adopt the best that their own countries have to offer, because they are fond of Indonesia. In the United
States, for example, there is a saying that goes as ‘all good things go together.’ However, is this applicable in Indonesia? Indonesianists often misread situations in Indonesia (see, for example, Liddle 1994). For example, in the past, they praised the economic growth that occurred at the same time of authoritarianism. They associated democracy with economic growth, and assumed that one led automatically to the other. They called it the ‘Asian Miracle’, but when the economic crisis struck they renamed it the ‘bubble economy’. Some Asian countries are among those enjoying the highest economic growth in the current world economy. Does this necessarily mean they are politically democratic, liberal countries? Just because democracy has produced growth in Western countries, we cannot just import it without change and apply it in Indonesia.

Informant (P), the Catholic intellectual mentioned earlier who was born and educated in Germany, considered that Indonesia is moving towards democracy even though there are some threats to democratisation. He argued that the development of democracy in Europe in the eighteenth century and nineteenth century did not always go smoothly. The promotion of civil society in Indonesia requires multi-sectoral development. Priority should be given to the rule of law, which is closely linked to the fighting of corruption. Democracy will be in danger if the parliament of a country is controlled by ‘money politics’. Especially for Indonesia, it is crucial that the role of the armed forces should be in proportion with their functions. However he maintained that problems with the rule of law and corruption issues would remain if the economic conditions remained weak.
Civil society cannot be built simply as a social-cultural process. It also has economic dimensions. Civil society develops only where members of the community are able to take care of their daily necessities. It exists in all types of institutions; in education, sports, arts, the economy and politics. The development of civil society requires a surplus of energy, produced when an individual’s earnings sufficient to allow time for participation in other activities. It also requires freedom of speech and freedom to form organisations. If freedom of speech is threatened by radical groups, this will endanger the promotion of civil society. European societies have evolved rather differently from Indonesian society. It is not necessary that civil society should be developed like that of Europe. As long as the rule of law prevails and there is economic growth, the Indonesian people should not be pessimistic about democracy and civil society.

He believed that it was theoretically possible for regional autonomy to strengthen the regional economies. However, it has become a mess. In many provinces there is a lack of human resources, and corruption has become widespread in the regions where greater autonomy was given.

**Tolerance and Pluralism**

Informant (P), who is very much aware of what racism, discrimination and fascism meant in pre-World War Two Germany, believed that the concept of tolerance fits comfortably with most Indonesian local cultures, particularly the dominant Javanese culture. What is said to be tolerance in Indonesia is merely the preference of the people to avoid conflict. People tend to see an individual as part of a group rather than as an
individual, and individualism is seen negatively. Self development of the individual is seen as detrimental to group interests. People tend to identify themselves and others primarily in relation to the group they belong to, giving rise to primordial, religious and ethnic bias.

He was adamant that tolerance should include ways to resolve conflict, rather than just avoid it. Even though modern democracy and capitalism developed simultaneously in both Europe and the United States, it is not necessary to link democracy (in the pluralist sense) with capitalism. Democracy can succeed without neo-liberalism. The neo-liberal system of economy tends to create disparity. It allows some people to be exclusive and other people to be excluded. Those who are excluded take refuge in primordial and communal sentiments, because they feel they lag behind. Indonesia has to build an economic system in which the ‘small people’ (the lower and the lower-middle classes) can improve their welfare. Suharto could rule for years because people felt there was some progress. Small people accepted that. Later, however, they felt bitterness because they were the victims of his developmental project.

The question of pluralism was also raised by informant (Q), the Christian intellectual who was educated in the United States of America. Taking the United States as an example, he argued that historically democracy grew up in the United States quite differently from Indonesia, although both countries are pluralist societies. The American people realised that they had to live as a pluralist society. Their historical experience has brought them to a sort of self-consciousness that their future progress lies in a pluralist society. Therefore
they looked for a strategy that could bring them stability in the midst of diversity. They adopted the system of governance of congressional churches, and looked at how simple decision-making processes were made in the small puritan churches. They took those decision-making concepts and procedures and applied them in a wider and more formal context. It has been working for several hundred years. Of course, the system of governance was not an overnight panacea that could solve the problems of slavery, of the Black people, and of women’s rights. It was and is a process. However, they have gained the foundation of democracy and an American nation that is plural, united and liberal, and that gives equal opportunity to all.

Conditions are very different in Indonesia, which has just experienced decolonisation both from local kings and colonial powers. These are important factors that still influence the Indonesian people. Although there was a break when the people declared independence in 1945, the period of Guided Democracy and New Order Indonesia brought another type of colonisation by the local people. He also argued that the Dutch colonial power did not encourage local people to practise democracy. Unlike the British, who indirectly introduced basic democratic practices to the locals, the Dutch did not care about Indonesian people. (*Belanda memang sangat tidak peduli.*) Moreover, for their own economic interests, the Dutch colonial power suppressed local people, and assisted local powers, such as kings or sultans to do the same.
Analytical Comments

The comments made by the intellectuals interviewed for this chapter suggest that they had many views in common, albeit with variations in the emphasis they placed on topics such as state ideology, paternalism, fascism, democracy, civil society, Javanese worldview and ethics, religious values (particularly Islam), tolerance, pluralism, rights and justice. All seem to agree on a) the negative implications and effects of *Negara Integralistik* resulting in the enforcement of group conformity and state domination; b) the centrality of democracy for ensuring human rights; and c) the importance of defining the concept of civil society.

They differed on a) whether *Negara Integralistik* was culturally conditioned or pure fascism (this issue was particularly raised by informant (P)); b) whether Islamic values can serve as a basis of democracy; and c) whether civil society can be identified with Islamic *masyarakat madani*, or whether *Pancasila* is the best basis for democracy in Indonesia.

Both informant (N) and informant (O) saw citizenship and nationalism within the concept of *Negara Integralistik* as a product of the founding fathers of Indonesia. They suggested that among the founding fathers Sukarno and Supomo appeared to be obsessed by the myth of familial spirit that they believed to exist in the Indonesian, and particularly the Javanese community. Against this background, both saw Hatta’s view as more modern and democratic. Informant (P) believed Supomo, who proposed the idea of *Negara*...
*Integralistik* for the new nation-state, took this fascist concept from G.W.F. Hegel, Adam H. Muller and Baruch De Spinoza.

Whereas informant (N) and informant (O) did not suggest the possibility that authority (notably that the founding fathers) is autonomous of culture and structure in the constitution of post-colonial Indonesia, informant (P) tended to stress the role of governance by means of cultural symbols in the fabrication of the nation-state relations. Informant (N) and informant (O) saw *Negara Integralistik* as culturally rooted but manipulated by national leaders. Informant (P) stressed deliberate borrowing of fascist ideology and fabrication of cultural links. As an Islamic intellectual, informant (O), for example, tended to blame the interpretation and application of Javanese ethics for regulating modern Indonesian society. He also compared the ‘familial spirit’ adopted by the founding fathers and contemporary elite with the pre-modern West. However, he pointed out that, unlike in the West, rights and duties of citizenship embodied in the ‘paternalistic and familial spirit’ in Indonesia remain unchanged since the pre-modern times. On the other hand, informant (P) showed that both the authority of rulers like Suharto and the Javanese culture of paternalism, family spirit and conflict avoidance have contributed to fascism in New Order Indonesia. In this context, informant (N) clearly stressed how authoritarian leaders such as Suharto employed Javanese culture to consolidate, exert and extend their power in the New Order period. Informant (N) and informant (O) pointed out that the reification of social order is more plausible because authoritarian leaders cannot exploit cultural constructs without a pre-existing cultural tradition.
In this context, it is also true that leaders such as Sukarno, Supomo and Suharto set out to differentiate themselves from other older societies (see the first two leaders’ speeches in Chapter 3). Post-colonial Indonesia is thus a deliberate construction, and (as suggested by informant (N)) fascism is a deliberate consequence of the adoption of *Negara Intehralistik* by New Order Indonesia. As noted in Chapter 3, Indonesian scholars such as Franz Magnis-Suseno, Marsilam Simanjuntak and M. Mahfud MD have lamented the adoption of *Negara Integralistik* in the New Order period. Magnis-Suseno (1992:89-92), for example, points out that Supomo had an expectation (ideal) that Indonesia as a new independent country should have a state ideology consistent with Indonesian identity. However, he wonders how Supomo, a professor of law who was a well-trained intellectual and humanist, chose the fascist ideology of the recently defeated Germans and Japanese in World War Two.

From the above discussion, it has become obvious that the post-colonial leaders derived power from their ability to manipulate cultural symbols as if they were real. Reification of social process and order was made possible because of the post-colonial conditions. As informant (Q) maintained, Indonesia’s state ideology of *Pancasila* is a reflection of Sukarno’s compromise approach. *Pancasila* is not an ‘either-or’ approach, in which we have to choose between ideology X and ideology Y. Nor it is a ‘both-and’ approach, namely a synthesis of ideology X and ideology Y (cf. Kahin 1970). It is more a ‘neither-nor’ approach. It is neither X nor Y. *Pancasila* is not Western democracy. It is also not a socialist (or people’s) democracy. In the pre-independence days, when *Pancasila* was
proposed and imposed, conditions were such that people had little option but to accept it. However, later generations came to realise that the compromises it represents might impede the practice of Indonesian democracy.

All informants in the fifth group argued that democracy is crucial in nation-building. They believe that the discourse and practice of human rights and citizenship are only possible where there is democracy. However, the understanding of democracy varies among these informants. Informant (N), for example, seemed to rest his arguments on an ‘inclusive approach’ to democracy. He does not see any problems for the adoption of democratic values despite their secularist nature. Unlike informant (N), informant (O) believed that the state should be managed through a hybridisation of Islamic and democratic values. His key argument was based on the compatibility of Islamic values and democratic values. Informant (R)’s interpretation differed slightly from that of informant (O), in that he maintained that contextualisation of imported democratic values is essential if they are to be successfully applied in Indonesia.4

Importantly, all three Muslim intellectuals agreed that Islamic values, though imported, should prevail in the nation-building in Indonesia. Yet they were firmly opposed to fundamentalism, and rejected the imposition of Islamic law (Syari’ah) and its values in Indonesia. Apart from this, their views differed from that of informant (Q) and to some extent, informant (P). For informant (Q) democracy drawn from the ‘equation’ of Islamic values is often translated as democracy for the majority to the detriment of the minority. A democracy that is derived from Islamic perspectives would therefore
constrain the practice of real democracy. Like informant (Q) who was concerned about
the practice of ‘mobocracy’ (communalism) rather than democracy, informant (P) saw
the perception of individualism as incompatable with local culture as a problem that may
endanger individual rights.

Informants in this group gave varying emphases to the issues of civil society. Informant
(N) and informant (O) saw the values of masyarakat madani as parallel with democracy.
However, informant (R) refuted a simplistic equation of the Islamic values of masyarakat
madani with democratic values. He saw values in Islam that are inconsistent with
democratic values embodied in the Western concept of civil society. Informant (Q) was
concerned about the adoption of the concept of masyarakat madani as a practice of civil
society in Indonesia. Despite the inclusive nature of masyarakat madani, such as the
principles of deliberation (shura), community consensus (ijma), tolerance (dhimmi),
voluntarism, justice and egalitarianism, he did not believe it suits the contemporary
conditions of post-colonial Indonesia. His view on this was similar to that of informant
(R), who considered that it would be impossible to apply the practices of the Prophet
Muhammad’s era (circa 570 A.D. - 632 A.D.) to a contemporary pluralist society such as
Indonesia. However, informant (R)’s main concern was the practice of civil society in
New Order period. He believed that civil society had been translated as a mere counter-
balancing force to the authoritarian state. As a result, with the demise of authoritarian
regime, the civil society movements have disappeared.
Informant (O) was concerned that repression of individuals and groups critical of the former authoritarian regime means that there are now insufficient political and cultural critics able or willing to argue for the ‘project of enlightenment’ and a civil society. In the fragmented condition of post-New Order Indonesia, the state has been dominated by people claiming to be concerned about democracy. In fact, they are more concerned about their individual and group interests than the interests of the people. According to informant (Q), these people’s thoughts and actions are similar to, or even worse than, those of Suharto and his cronies. Informant (O) saw this as a resurrection of New Order practice. Apart the suppression of individual intellectuals and groups who opposed the authoritarian regime, and the crushing of any ‘enlightenment project’ in the New Order period, informant (P) argued convincingly that voluntary participation to promote civil society implies a surplus of economic energy of the social actors. If the lower-middle class faced economic and cultural constraints, it would be difficult for them form a strong civil society.

In sum, the debates among the intellectuals in the fifth group are related to the issues of inclusion and exclusion. Apart from questions of ethnicity, informants in the fifth group focused on the Islamic religion of nearly 90 per cent of Indonesian people. Informants (N), (O) and (R) appeared to believe that Islam as an inclusive religion can serve as the discourse of democracy in Indonesia. Islamic and democratic values are compatible because both are considered to carry ‘universal truths’. Islam can be a powerful force to forge the democratic identity of the nation, and enhance the cohesiveness of the society. Moreover, they saw Islam being able to play a greater role in promoting justice and
equality. Informant (P) and informant (Q), however, believed that Islam as the religion of
the majority should not be institutionalised, because it tends to be employed to enforce
conformist perspectives (in the name of equality and honouring the views of the majority)
and to suppress the minority, leading to the tyranny of the majority.

The arguments of the Muslim and non-Muslim intellectuals have given us an
understanding of the complex issues of secularism, pluralism, nationalism and democracy
in Indonesia. The Muslim intellectuals who saw religious and democratic values as
compatible were clearly looking for a pragmatic way to facilitate the practice of
democracy in Indonesia. Informant (N) was critical of any religious fundamentalism. His
argument that a modern state can be managed without employing religious values may be
regarded as radical thinking by mainstream Muslim intellectuals. Since democracy and
Islam have universal aspects, either of the two can be used to run Indonesian state. He
opted for democracy, and argued for employing Islamic ethics to support democratic
values. While informant (O) and informant (R) believed that democracy should be
contextualised to Indonesian conditions, informant (N) did not discuss this. However, no
example was given of how democracy should be contextualised. Informant (Q) saw
Pancasila as a workable democratic ideology for Indonesia, but overlooked the non-
secular nature of Pancasila as clearly indicated in its first principle, i.e. belief in one and
only God.

Even though these intellectuals did not provide common views on Indonesian citizenship
education, their comments tended to cluster around a common set of topics, which
confirms and amplifies the preceding analysis of the PPKn texts and state ideology. They saw the strong influence and negative impact of Negara Integralistik ideology, which has resulted in the passivity of the subject in past citizenship education. They considered that the imposition of conformist perspectives in the name of collective interests has worked to suppress individual rights. Muslim intellectuals highlighted the importance of Islam in contemporary ideas of citizenship, and its compatibility with Western-derived democratic and secular values. They also observed that tolerance has been translated as conflict avoidance. Most of them seemed to believe that social justice is a complex issue, with economic, political, social and cultural dimensions. It can only be achieved by the empowerment of individuals. The true participation of citizens in their community lays the foundation from which a civil society evolves. Civil society is not something that can be constructed, but should be promoted. Although democracy is seen to contain universal values, some elements should be ‘contextualised’ with the local post-colonial conditions.

Notes

1 Informant (N) knew Mulder’s views when they were mentioned to him. Also, see Said (1978) for issues of Orientalist and Orientalism.


3 Also see, for example, Lucian Pye’s review on Robert W. Hefner’s book, Civil Islam, that argues the compatibility of democracy and Islamic culture, exemplified by Indonesia’s ‘outstanding civil’ Islam. Pye casts doubts on whether Islamic and democratic values are compatible after the recent turmoil in the country (Pye 2001:185).

4 Although he seems skeptical about arguments for the existence of local Indonesian democratic elements, informant (R) points out that Islam has been well accepted in Java because it was in part spread through local practices such as Wali Songo. In this context, he implies that it is more possible for democracy to succeed if its elements are contextualised by means of local practices.
CHAPTER 9
MACRO-PERSPECTIVES AND MICRO-SOCIAL FUNCTIONING IN
PANCASILA AND CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION (PPKn) TEXTBOOKS

Introduction
The last four chapters have shown how successive regimes, particularly that of the New
Order, have manipulated the socio-cultural environment to reify the social system. The
interplay of authority, structure and culture has been a major factor in shaping the civic
ideal in citizenship education. We have seen how the meaning of social relations was
interpreted by the New Order regime, and subsequently narrated in the PPKn textbooks.
While social actors have played a significant role in the invention of Indonesian
citizenship, the processes of social exchange as portrayed in the discourse of PPKn are
problematic. They appear to make distinctions between the interests of state and those of
the people, and preferentially serve the interests of the former.

The perspectives of various educators, curriculum developers, teachers, students and
intellectuals in Chapter 7 and Chapter 8 have provided insights into the process of
production and promotion of citizenship education, confirming and extending our
previous conjectures. This chapter will further explore the reification of social process of
the new post-colonial state by using earlier observations as a point of departure for the
deconstruction of the PPKn texts. These include the overriding use of macro-level
perspectives, the focus on the social contract embodied in republicanism, and the notion of a structural-functionalist organic state, all which have ignored micro-level psychosocial and cultural networks and interaction, and the functional imbalance of power relations. My contention is that a better understanding of both the macro as well as microlevels of social functioning will enable educators and textbook writers to better serve the pedagogical processes, particularly in the interpretation of meaning of social relations. This chapter examines the implications of adopting the grand concepts of Western modernist discourse without attention to its fit or otherwise with local values. It also discusses the complex social situation in post-colonial and post-authoritarian Indonesia that transcends dyadic state-citizen relations.

**Single Domain of Social Exchange in *PPKn***

As indicated in Chapter 3, and reasserted by *PPKn* writers in Chapter 5, the formulation of the state model of unitary republic by the founding fathers, a few months prior to the independence of Indonesia, is argued as providing cohesion among people of diverse ethnic and religious backgrounds. The assumption is that in post-colonial conditions, the people of the former Dutch colony need a modern state to protect them, as is stated in paragraph four of the Preamble of the 1945 Constitution. In this context, the classical social contract theories embodied in the republicanism adopted to suit the pluralist society is expected to provide a sense of community, in which the state and citizens form a symbiotic relationship within an organic *Negara Intergralistik*. However, the other side of the coin is that it tends to create two difficulties. The first of these is a structural imbalance of power relations between the state and citizens, as supposed equal parties to the contract. This results particularly from the emphasis on republicanism, stressing
duties and patriotic attachment as integral part of civic virtue (Heater 1999). The second difficulty comes from a lack of attention to the psychological motivations of citizens, combined with the consequences of adopting Western discourses of equality and reciprocity without proper explanation.

The Imbalanced Structure of Power Relations in PPkn

The last five chapters have explored the construction of the civic ideal in Indonesia, which is principally based on the classical theories of social contract discussed in Chapter 2 of this thesis. Theories of social contract assume that individuals surrender their freedom to the state, in exchange for protection and guarantees of social order. By referring to the Preamble of 1945 Constitution PPkn writers imply that the proposition of this social contract can be realised because social justice has been guaranteed in the Preamble, which says ‘… the national Indonesian Government shall protect the Indonesian people and their territories, promote general welfare, [and] uplift the educational standard of the people, …’ (SLTA Class 3: 35).\(^1\) This direct exchange assumes that in the transaction there is more or less a balance of power between citizen and state. As the writers say in a lesson entitled ‘Cooperation’, ‘as good citizens, the Indonesian people should not only demand their rights, but also adhere to their duties.’ (SLTA Class 2:89).\(^2\)

The writers argue that as long as rights and duties have been provided by the national constitution and laws to regulate various aspects of life, and both parties adhere to the contract, the structural relations between the state and citizen within a single domain of
exchange will be in balance. They seem to believe that in this dyadic exchange between state and citizens the service rendered by the people is reciprocated by the state, and vice-versa. However, direct exchange does not automatically constitute the balance of power assumed by the *PPKn* writers. As Emerson (1981) points out there are three types of direct exchange relations: negotiated, reciprocal and productive transactions. Negotiated exchange assumes that in the transaction actors are involved in a joint-decision process, and they reach an agreement on the terms of the exchange. In reciprocal exchange, actors perform separately. Thus, their contributions to the exchange are not negotiated. This structural imbalance means that one party may incur higher costs in the process of mutual exchange. In productive exchange, all parties contribute to and benefit from the produced event. If one of the parties fails to contribute, none will benefit. Examples of this third type of exchange are among others, many team sports and coauthored books (Molm and Cook 1995).

As already indicated, in Indonesian citizenship power is vested in the state. Implicit in this *Negara Integralistik* ideology is that the exercise of power by the state may be viewed as inherently non-negotiated. The decision-making process of the state, notably the ruling elite, does not require the consent of the citizens. The individual and collective bargaining power of citizens is very weak, because negotiation is practically non-existent. This approach resulted in a structural imbalance of power relations between the state and the citizens, particularly in the New Order period. It has enabled the state to gain greater access to and control of the people.
The imbalance of power relations, as evidenced by issues of conflict and dependency, makes it difficult for *PPKn* writers to explain challenges to the unity of the nation, and threats of disintegration. As can be seen by Text-14 of Chapter 5, the writers argued that the potential for disintegration occurs because some individuals or sections in society are not loyal to the new republic. The loyalty of the members of any organisation (state or firm) is balanced by what Albert O. Hirschman (1969) called an *exit option* and a *voice option*. When people exercise either of these options, the organisation begins to deteriorate. Some members would leave an organisation (*exit*) if they could no longer express their dissatisfaction directly to the management or another subordinate authority, or through protest addressed to anyone who cares to listen (*voice*). Thus members of an organisation are assumed to have a moral and rational choice in social exchange. In the case of Indonesian citizenship, the state would face difficulty in demanding loyalty from a section or group in the society if there was a markedly imbalance of power relations resulting in, for example, a fiscal imbalance between the central government and local/regional governments, as noted in Chapter 6 (also see Chapter 10). If alternate voices are not properly entertained in decision-making process, it is likely that one or more participants in the exchange will eventually attempt to exit: this is the hidden or latent conflict (Lukes 1974). Since the relational structure between the Indonesian central and local governments can be regarded as a direct exchange, the dynamism of their relations requires that the structure is continuously maintained and re-developed.4

The difficulty of the *PPKn* writers in explaining potential disintegration in Indonesia is that they neglect the imbalance of power relations resulting from the classical contract,
which is weakened by the adoption of a Javanese centralistic world-view. The writers tend to overlook the poverty and lack of human resources and technologies in many outlying parts of the country, caused by the imbalance of power relations and making regional people feel that they have been exploited by the central government (the elite and business). For years, they have tried to demand fiscal balance through ‘constitutional channels’ in terms of greater autonomy. However, the post-colonial regime considered that people in the regions were not ready to rule themselves due to a lack of human resources. The central government was unwilling to share its power. Although it paid lip service to decentralisation, it argued that people needed to be prepared before a policy of regional autonomy could be introduced. This attitude resembles that of the Dutch colonial power (see, for example, Kahin 1994, Legge 1961).

The powerful state embodied in the central government appeared to be content with its policy and interests, and more concerned with securing business investments in regional areas than trying to meet local demand. The voices of protest in the New Order period were silenced. When the exit option was unavailable and voices attempting to change policies and practices were suppressed, the only possible option for frustrated people was violent disruption, as exemplified by independence movements in Papua and Aceh. In post-New Order Indonesia, negotiation to handle the ‘voice and exit’ issues has yet to succeed in these two regions. Successive regimes have preferred to take military action in order to crush the perceived trouble-makers, including the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka or GAM), and the Free Papua Organisation (Organisasi Papua Merdeka or OPM).
This suggests that integration in the name of loyalty has been fatally weakened by concentration of power in the state. While the state has been trying to secure its own interests and enrich particular sections of society (principally the government’s elite and business ‘cronies’), its policies have failed to meet the demands of the poor and the powerless. Paradoxically, it has constructed rebels or ‘groups of deviance,’ in Robert Merton’s conception, for its own benefit (Merton 1957). Thus, the strong state had not only the power to create forced national cohesion, but also the power to distort and weaken what its propaganda boasted, such as social justice and harmony, peace and stability in the New Order period.6

This brief example suggests that structural imbalances of power in state-citizen relations have resulted in suppression of the common people’s civil rights by local and global forces in post-colonial and post-authoritarian Indonesia. The economic disparities in Indonesian society are a consequence of state policy, often ‘reinforced by ethnic, religious and color barriers’ (Hirschman 1970:111). In the context of citizenship education, it has become apparent that the labelling of individuals and minority groups as deviants, the suppression of critical voices, and the crushing of the exit option are typical examples of the disciplinary practices of post-colonial regimes.7

The Construction of Unproblematic Psycho-social Aspects in PPKn

PPKn writers consider that social integration, order and justice can be established if students surrender their individual rights and conform to the normative values of their society. For example, Text-15 argues that ‘every member of the community must adhere
to regulations enacted by the society⁸, and Text-17 argues the need to ‘put primacy of public interest over individual interest. As long as the public interest is achieved, individual interests will automatically be satisfied’.⁹ Since the writers tend to regard the nature of social interaction as unproblematic, social actors are assumed to be organically integrated into their community. Every person has social duties in the public sphere, and every action carried out by an individual can be seen as a social exchange.

The stark problem of the written discourse of PPKn is that its writers assume that all conflict is bad, and should be avoided. They assume conflict will be avoided if people subjugate their own autonomy to the interests of the group. In fact, a wealth of sociological theory proposes that conflict is an essential and productive feature of a dynamic society. Social action, exchange theory, game theory and rational choice theory all propose that social interaction is informed by a complex set of external and internal variables. In preaching the avoidance of conflict and the subjugation of the individual, the PPKn writers are ignoring the societal realities. It is important to understand the different schools of sociological thought that impinge on citizenship and identity, because we tend to overlook at the micro-social functioning in our real life.

Social exchange is human social behaviour. Social actors participate in exchanges either on their own behalf and interests, or on behalf of other people, groups or institutions. This implies that the persons involved are not mechanically driven in the exchange, but are motivated by psychological motivations of attitude, thought, feeling and emotion.¹⁰ Individuals have their own interests and needs, and social groups of individuals have their
own ideologies. As communicative interaction, exchange also assumes inter-stimulation and response (Young 1942).

Social actors who become involved in exchanges might expect to obtain benefits from the contributions they make. Game Theory, for example, assumes that social actors involved in the exchange (game) will act rationally to promote their own interests or desired outcomes. Exchanges carried out by participants in the political arena can be viewed as inherently carrying forward interests, either in material form such as economic benefits, or non-material rewards, such as loyalty. Generosity and altruism found in other types of social interactions, intended to enhance status or build up karmic virtue (Parry 1986) by a social actor, are considered non-existent in political exchanges, except nepotistic altruism which can benefit the reproduction of family members (Axelrod and Hamilton 1981). It is important to note that the costs and benefits of exchange do not remain constant or static. They change, increase and diminish according to the intensity of the exchange, greatly influenced by temporal and spatial considerations (see, for example, Blau 1964 and Homans 1990/1958).  

In a similar way, the quality of exchange may change, cease to be effective, or it may be revitalised. In an exchange to pursue a common goal, the commitment and trust of the parties involved are required. Sympathy, sentiments, interests and dependence may serve as the impetus of exchange and cooperation. However, sometimes cooperation can breakdown. Human cooperation also entails constraints and controls over unitary acts, and cooperation implies principles or rules to which the participants must adhere. For example, Indonesian legal instruments that bind participants in an exchange do not only
smooth the exchange and communicative interaction between the state and citizens as the writers of *PPKn* have assumed, but may also create disharmony between the two parties. As argued in Chapter 6, law can be unjust and be manipulated to serve the interests of particular participants. Over-regulation of the private sphere can result in suppression and violation of citizen rights (see also Chapter 10).

Individuals cannot be viewed merely as creatures who will passively surrender their rights or interests to their environment. While exchange in human social life is cooperative rather than merely adaptive, we cannot take for granted that in the struggle for existence, individuals (and groups) are not involved in some kind of conflict and competition in the effort to claim scarce resources, status and power (Coser 1956). Taking the Darwinian perspective, Richard Dawkins (1976), in his book *The Selfish Gene*, for example, has asserted that even in the human body, our biological cells are fighting one another for survival. Our genes are selfish, as the title of his book suggests. The dependency and interdependency of individuals and groups required for their survival results in cooperation and the establishment of order. However, social interactions also allow oppositional processes, with the potential to generate emergent or dialectical phenomena.

Lewis A. Coser argued that conflict may contribute to the maintenance, adjustment or adaptation of social relationships and social structures. Internal conflict may result in the fostering and re-establishing of unity and cohesion when it is threatened by antagonistic feelings among members (Coser 1956:151). The struggle over scarce resources occurs
both between individuals in their group (in-group or internal conflict), and members of another group or other groups (out-group or external conflict). Conflict with out-groups tends to increase internal cohesion, but it does not necessarily mean that to promote internal cohesion we must seek common enemies.\textsuperscript{12} Conflict plays a positive role in a society. However, it is often created by powerful elite and social groups to achieve their political objectives, often exploiting religious, ethnic, class and colour differences, as we have witnessed in the last few years. The civil unrest in Maluku and Poso in recent years appears to be an engineered rather than a natural conflict. It is not a result of religious intolerance, but a politically engineered horizontal conflict to serve elites and social groups interests.

Sometimes, cooperation may be established driven by pragmatism or short-term gains, without calculation of potential loss. In the early stage of social contacts, everything seems fine and rosy. In the later stages, one party may feel that exploitation and cheating have occurred in the reciprocal arrangements. The exchange has been distorted and may result in the postponement of further activities, or even the total termination of the arrangement. Appearances are thus potentially deceptive in exchange. The presentation of self in our daily life is not only based on our social experience, as George H. Mead and Charles Horton Cooley proposed. Social role can also be seen as analogous to dramaturgical product, as demonstrated by Erving Goffman (1959). Human beings cannot be considered as mere authentic individualities. Analogous to an actor who has to please the audience, an individual is forced to put on different masks in different situations. This implies that in the ‘reified world’ in the Marxist sense (Mitchell 1978),
individuals are not only rational choice-making egoists, but also ironic creatures that conform to social institutions to justify their beliefs and actions.\textsuperscript{13} This last proposition is clearer if we look at its application in a society that subscribes to more primordial than liberal values, such as Indonesia, particularly the case of Javanese cultural ethics.

**The Construction of Unproblematic Ascription in Dominant Local Cultural Values**

Another important relational aspect in human interaction overlooked by PPKn writers is social ascription or status. In Indonesian society, the interaction of one person with another tends to be shaped by factors of relative status, gender, age, class, family background, education, religion, ideology, race and ethnicity.\textsuperscript{14} The PPKn writers over-generalise society as being homogenous and free of the status distinctions which in reality require differential and sometimes problematic forms of social interaction. Social stratification according to class and caste is strong in Javanese people and those influenced by Javanese culture.\textsuperscript{15} Social stratification is most clearly marked between the *priyayi* (intellectual class of officials) and *wong cilik* (little people, commoners). In contemporary Indonesia, *priyayi* refers to ‘the middle class’ or ‘upper-middle class’. Relative age is also an factor in interaction in Javanese society, and an individual should know the different forms of speech required to address and talk to older or younger people. In his research in ‘Modjokuto’ of east central Java, Clifford Geertz (1960) recorded the various levels of linguistic etiquette practiced by the *priyayi* and the *non-priyayi*. This linguistic system, reflecting the social stratification and differentiation, may be one of the reasons why a Javanese is often hesitant to greet or talk to another Javanese without knowing that person’s social background and group affiliations. The PPKn
writers seem to overlook this ‘power distance’ (Hofstede 1980) that is critical to social exchange in Java in particular and Indonesia in general.

**Culture and Reciprocity: Some Basic Assumptions and PPKn**

The underlying assumptions of social exchange and reciprocity subscribed to by members of a society can be traced from its cultural values, which differ between Indonesia and other Western societies. PPKn writers seem to apply Western discourses of reciprocity and equality without explanation of their fit in a very different society. For example, the *kula* system of gift-exchange of the Trobriand Islands of Papua New Guinea observed by Bronislaw Malinowski (1922) serves to ensure positive communication between its participants, expressing a social relationship. Marcell Mauss (1954) considers gift-giving for this purpose as *prestation*. It is not a voluntary and disinterested action, but carries the obligation to give, to receive and to repay. Mauss also points out that in archaic societies the practice of gift-exchange has simultaneous religious, moral, economic and legal connotations.

*Kula* exchange is a deeply embedded expression of Trobriand cultural values, expressing shared cultural assumptions about reciprocity. If we can recognise this of another culture, we can then pose questions about the basic assumptions that underlie social exchange in the Javanese culture which is so influential in the discourse of civic ideals of PPKn. Which Javanese concepts, if any, suggest the principles of reciprocity in the community? With a better understanding of the reciprocatory values of the dominant local culture, we may have more realistic expectations of students in carrying out their moral duties in the
public sphere. We may develop a better understanding of how to encourage students to develop a particular value, whether or not it is part of their culture.

**Reciprocity and the Contemporary Practices in Indonesian and Javanese Culture**

The Indonesian language recognises negative reciprocity, implying that that the party receiving the action is expected to suffer from it, by using the word *baku*, thus *baku-hantam* (to hit one other), *baku-tembak* (to shoot one other). Neutral or positive reciprocity, where the parties are unaffected by the exchange or benefit from it, can be expressed using words like ‘*tanggapan*’ (response) or ‘*balasan*’ (return), or most commonly *saling*\(^{17}\). This last word can be used negatively, as in *saling-berantam* (to hit one other), or positively as in, *saling menolong* (to help one other) and *saling-memberi* (to give something to each other). This lexicon of exchange transaction terminology suggests a cultural assumption of reciprocity.

The basic Javanese concepts of social life may explain something of Javanese cultural assumptions. These concepts include *rukun* (harmony or conflict avoidance), *mufakat* (deliberation) and *gotong royong* (community labour, or mutual assistance). This might lead to a conclusion that Javanese culture tends to promote cooperation rather than conflict in order to maintain social harmony. Other Javanese principles of social life, such as *sepi ing pamrih* (free from selfishness), *rame ing gawe* (earnest in carrying out one’s duties), *ikhlas* (willing to let go) and *nrima* (to accept what happens without protest) suggest that Javanese culture tends to promote altruism and conformity and encourage self-sacrifice, rather than envisaging ways of balancing interests. In essence, Javanese
culture seems to have plenty of principles that do not encourage ‘transactional’ activities. They are concerned with the *positioning* of the self in the presence of another person or other persons. Rather than on the exchange aspects, the focus is in on the self.

Javanese is rich in concepts of ‘self-awareness’ such as *tepa selira* (awareness of one’s own limitations) and *sing eling lang waspadha* (be aware and circumspect), and those referring to karmic principles, such as *takdir* (divine pre-destination) and *nasib* (fate). The opposite of this karmic aspect in Javanese are disruptive principles, such as *pamrih* (self-interest), *aji mumpung* (taking every opportunity for one’s own interest without considering others) and *dumeh* (believing that one has the privilege to act because of the merits of the past). These concepts also emphasise the self rather than power relations generated by an exchange. Javanese also has a few related concepts which suggest the value of ‘respect’ (*urmat, aji*) as noted by Geertz (1961), namely *wedi, isin* and *sungkan* which approximate the English ‘fearful’, ‘ashamed’ and ‘shy’ or ‘reluctant’. The three terms ‘denote three states of feeling that are considered appropriate to situations demanding respectful behavior… [and] form a sort of continuum of intensity and specificity, ranging from *wedi* which is most intense and diffuse, to *sungkan* which is least intense and specific’ (Geertz 1961:111).

These concepts of personal behaviour are used to govern social conduct and the way Javanese should make sense of their world. They are an integral part of the social knowledge that serves as disciplinary power in Javanese culture. They are employed to influence, manage and control individuals in their social relations on the authority of the
accepted ‘truth’ in this paternalistic and patriarchal culture. Their employment as disciplinary practices produces conceptions of infringement and crime. For example, there is an expectation that someone who violates the collective norms by practising ‘dumeh’, ‘pamrih’ or ‘mumpung’ will receive punishment. 18

These cultural values suggest that reciprocity is a tacit value in Javanese. 19 It has a hidden dimension that is not expressed in a particular word or concept like the Chinese pao 20. This appears to Edward T. Hall’s concept of High Context Culture, in which substantive information is not necessarily expressed in explicit codes, but internalised in the person (Hall 1976). The Javanese social conception of reciprocity is internalised in the subject, and is produced by the positioning the self through the system of meanings in Javanese culture. Since meanings are inherently unstable and constantly disrupted by power struggles and negotiation, people can seek to interpret and capture or stabilise meanings for their own interests (Hall 1992). Since reciprocity is tacit, ‘revenge’ is carried out in a more ’subtle’ way. 21 Informant G’s ‘history of revenge’ (in chapter 7) is a good example of this. To exercise its power, the New Order regime employed ‘gentle hints’ rather than direct orders (Antlov and Cederroth 1994). This symbolic construction of violence required its citizens to voluntarily or involuntarily accept the hegemony of the state. As discussed in Chapter 5, the banning of citizens from carrying out various cultural activities is a case in point.

These cultural assumptions underlying social exchange in contemporary Indonesia seem to have been neglected in the PPKn discourse. My contention is that in attempting to
encourage students to develop positive and democratic values in Indonesian citizenship education, we should have students observe positive and democratic moral values as ‘given universals’, and not because of reciprocity. The morality of relations between individuals should not be viewed merely from the concept of self, and the seemingly submissive or conformist attitudes of Indonesian, and particularly Javanese culture. Instead teaching texts should encourage individuals to make their own ethical choices, based on the dynamics of social exchange and exchange networks (microsocial functioning). Linguistic expressions in contemporary Indonesian and Javanese signifying reciprocity, either in the positive or negative sense, should be highlighted, rather than those signifying submission, acceptance and the suppression of self.

Exchange in Complex Social Structures and Legal Procedures in Citizenship Education

In state-citizen and citizen-citizen relations, state institutions and political parties exist within the formal institutional framework, and pressure groups (including business, labour-unions, the mass-media, professional and intellectual groups) form the non-formal institutional framework. Pressure groups may be considered to include international institutions, such the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and Amnesty International as well as foreign governments, particularly the superpower and more powerful countries. In their discussions of political decision-making, the *PPKn* writers consider only the existence of formal institutional organisations. The writers suggest, for example in Text-3 on political rights (see chapter 5), that only voices raised through the
formal electoral system and parliamentary elections are a legitimate constitutional mechanism in a democratic country. While a democratic system of representation is essential, we cannot deny that pressure groups exert considerable influence in the political process.

Contrary to the *PPKn* writers’ view, the distribution of power in Indonesian society is not limited to formal political institutions and processes guided by law. Non-formal social groups also influence the processes of democratic citizenship. This suggests that social interactions in the political arena should be viewed as both direct and indirect exchange. The simplistic assumption of an unproblematic dyadic relation between the state and citizen masks the real existence of a complex network and structure of exchange. Such complex networks exhibit multi-dimensional dependence, interdependence and reciprocal exchange between the social groups they contain.

*PPKn* writers tend to rely too heavily on the national constitution and laws to describe the civic ideal in Indonesia. There is a tendency to assume that a mechanical description of the roles of the state institutions and the hierarchical mechanism of their decision-making process will automatically bring about the practice of democracy and good governance, as exemplified by Text –3 of chapter 5. If democracy and good governance can be explained by means of such mechanical descriptions, why has resistance towards public policy been so high in the last few years? It seems difficult for mechanical description to capture the complex net-like nature of the state-citizen and citizen-citizen relations. Legalistic description and the exploitation of cultural symbols to gain public consent
tended to mask the power motives of the New Order regime. Citizenship education relies heavily on legalistic and procedural discourse, constraining students’ potential for active and participative learning. The required rote-learning of legal procedures, the articles of the National Constitution and laws is unlikely to lead to moral reasoning and behaviour.\textsuperscript{22} If textbook writers continue to adopt legalistic and procedural approaches to teaching citizenship, the result is more likely to be a legally enforceable treaty rather than a voluntary social contract.

Furthermore, relying solely on the Constitution’s rhetoric of the economic benefit that Indonesian people should enjoy (Undang-Undang Dasar 1945, Pasal 33, see Text-6) is unlikely to enhance the rights of the Indonesian people. Unrestrained capitalism combined with rampant corruption, collusion and nepotism may easily place the affluent elite between the people and their constitutional civic, economic and social rights.

**Concluding Remarks**

This chapter has demonstrated that social interactions in post-colonial Indonesia are more complicated and delicate than those described by the \textit{PPKn} writers. The neglect of the human psycho-social aspects which serve as the impetus of individual choice and action makes the discourse of citizenship education unrealistic.\textsuperscript{23} The promotion of an unrealistic discourse of human social behaviour, in which individuals are viewed as passive citizens, has proved to be an impediment to students developing positive characters.
Post-colonial Indonesia, particularly post-authoritarian Indonesia, has been marked by unprecedented resistance in political and non-political arenas. The concept of civil rights becomes blurred when different social and economic groups have an active interest in influencing state-citizen relations. The single domain of exchange portrayed by the PPKn writers and described in constitutional and legal terms does not recognise the de facto influence on power relations of non-formal movements. The PPKn discourse emphasising a single domain of exchange between the state and citizen, embodied in civic republicanism and Negara Integralistik, cannot explain the imbalance of power relations in post-colonial Indonesia. It has become apparent that the philosophical arguments of Negara Integralistik, underlying the social contract in Indonesia and coinciding with the Javanese traditional world view of state-citizen relations known as manunggaling kawula-gusti, depend on a form of direct dyadic exchange. It is argued that the organic Negara Integralistik allows the state excessive power and legitimates its domination and repressive control of post-colonial Indonesia. Organic arguments tend to justify the conformist perspectives which seek to suppress individual rights, preserve the status quo, and perpetuate the process of injustice.

Indonesian citizenship education has difficulty justifying its insistence on conformity and compliance in the name of national integration and the national interest. Its written discourse relies rather on a denial of individual and group aspirations and initiative. This discourse marginalises the citizens of a post-colonial society confronted by international capitalism and globalisation.
Notes

1 ‘...Pemerintah Indonesia yang melindungi segenap bangsa Indonesia dan seluruh tumpah darah Indonesia dan memajukan kesejahteraan umum, mencerdaskan kehidupan bangsa,...’

2 ‘...Akan tetapi bagi warga negara yang baik tidaklah sekedar menunut hak asasi manusia, ia juga memiliki kewajiban-kewajiban yang harus dipatuhi dalam kehidupan berbangsa dan bernegara.’

3 The dyadic exchange based on classical theories of social contract represents a binary system within structuralist thought. Such essentialist understanding tends to lead to the construction of a dominant discourse of collective representations which further neglect differences of gender, race, ethnicity and religion. As an example, the Javanese people represent some fifty percent of the total population of Indonesia. Most national policy-makers are Javanese. As a result, Javanese culture has become the dominant discourse in Indonesia since the proclamation of independence. In the New Order period, it was employed by Suharto to suppress differences, as argued by informant (N), a Javanese. In similar vein, female rights tend to be neglected in the dominant male-discourse, particularly in the patriarchal and paternalistic Indonesian society discussed in Chapter 5. This assumption of patriarchy in PPKn was acknowledged by informant (B), himself a coordinator of PPKn textbooks, who saw it as rooted in cultural structure.

4 As Linda D. Molm and James A. Wiggins have pointed out, ‘the structure of direct exchange relations is inherently fragile because of the potential for actors to receive value without reciprocation’ (quoted from Molm and Cook 1995: 220).

5 See, for example, Ricklefs 2001

6 A long history of suppression has prompted the regional elite, newly empowered by regional autonomy, to take the central government’s Machiavellian behaviour as their role-model. As a result, it has been reported that the corrupt money politics of local bureaucrats, such as the members of the Regional People’s Representatives Council, has become as brutal as that of the Central government. As Ricklefs further argues, this pattern of behaviour inherited from the past is indeed ‘not easily transformed’ (Ricklefs 2001: 421).

7 Employing Lehman (1969)’s conception of ‘macrosociology of power’, Liddle (1994:287) argued that either in democratic or authoritarian systems, a combination of three basic kinds of political resource is accumulated and deployed: coercive, normative and utilitarian.

8 ‘Setiap anggota masyarakat harus tunduk dan patuh serta memiliki ketaatan kepada peraturan yang dibuat mereka.’

9 ‘...manusia mengorbankan sebagian kebebasannya dan kepentingan pribadinya untuk kepentingan yang lebih luas ...pada akhirnya akan menguntungkan kepentingan umum dan sekaligus kepentingan setiap orang dalam masyarakat’

10 In his discussion of human nature, Francis Fukuyama employed a powerful word thymos, derived from Plato’s Republic, as one of the three parts of human soul. The other two are the desiring part (eros) and the rational part (nous). Thymos, according to Fukuyama, ‘is usually translated as “spiritedness”. Thymos is the prideful side of the human personality, the part that demands that other people recognize one’s worth or dignity’ (Fukuyama 2002: 44. Also see Fukuyama 1992). If we are to have a better picture of the social interaction in post-colonial Indonesia, this behavioral perspective, thymos and/or Hegelian struggle or desire for recognition, needs to be taken into account.
As Molm and Cook (1995: 211) suggest ‘All outcomes of value obey a principle of satiation (in psychological terms) or diminishing marginal utility (in economic terms). Food is more valuable to a hungry person than one who has just eaten… The rate of change in value varies for different classes of benefits. Some benefits, such as money, diminish in value more slowly than others because they can be used to obtain many other classes of benefits. (In economic terms, they have “exchange value,” not simply “use value”). This is only one of the four core assumptions, namely the classes of benefits exchanged suggested by Molm and Cook (1995). For the other three, see Molm and Cook (1995).

As Coser further points out ‘…not every type of conflict is likely to benefit group structure, nor that conflict can subserve such functions for all groups…Internal social conflicts which concern goals, values or interests that do not contradict the basic assumptions upon which the relationship is founded tend to be positively functional for the social structure Such conflicts tend to make possible the readjustment of norms and power relations within groups in accordance with the felt needs of its individual members or subgroups’ (Coser 1956: 151).

Richard Rorty (1989) argues that in such an ironist culture, individuals should reconcile themselves to their private-public split within their ‘final vocabularies’.

In her discussion of the Javanese kinship and socialisation, Hildred Geertz (1961: 5) identified six factors. ‘A Javanese sees each relative as a unique individual. How he will behave toward this relative is a function of at least six different factors: sex, relative age, class position, religio-ideological views, personal feelings, and kinship. Outside the circle of primarily relatives the kinship element is often the weakest of the six factors.’

See, for example, Benedict Anderson’s discussion on the idea of power in Javanese culture (Anderson 1972). Anderson has demonstrated how Javanese cultural perspectives have remained strong in the contemporary Indonesian political institutions and processes despite the Dutch colonialism, Japanese occupation, nationalist revolution, and socioeconomic changes in the last decades.

As Mauss (1954: 1) asserts ‘one important set of phenomena: namely, prestations which are in theory voluntary, disinterested and spontaneous, but are in fact obligatory and interested. The form usually taken is that of the gift generously offered; but the accompanying behaviour is formal pretence and social deception, while the transaction itself is based on obligation and self-interest.’

We have balas dendam (revenge) in Indonesian which is generally considered as carrying negative meaning. However, it can also be seen as having a neutral meaning of revenge. It can be a simple ‘tit-for-tat’ revenge, and does not always follow that someone has to kill or destroy someone else. If someone flattens the tire of your car, you can take revenge (balas dendam) by flattening the tire of their car, but no more. For example, balas dendam does not allow you to burn the car. We may assume that there is a balance of the power exerted in the action. In practice, of course, there are many cases where the people who take revenge (balas dendam) return more than they received.

For a good account on the ‘culture of gift (exchange)’ and ‘culture of exchanging (disguised) gift’ from an Indonesian (Javanese) perspective on bribery, see Verhezen (2003).

Linguistically, there are several ways to express the concept of reciprocity in contemporary Javanese. See, for example, Subroto (1999).

In comparison to Indonesian (Javanese) culture, Chinese culture, which is understood to promote social harmony as well, has a concept that espouses the values of reciprocity, notably pao. See, for example, Hsu (1971)
Perhaps, Javanese (-Hindu) concept of ‘rasa’ (‘feeling’) is closely associated with this phenomenon. For example, if you harmed me, I feel it, but I would not say a word to express my anger. Showing emotion would degrade my own respect or power (wibawa). If I felt it as a serious harm, i.e. when you badly hurt my feeling, I might take revenge in different way (and at different occasion). However, if it were not serious, I might forgive you, but never forget what you have done to me (It is ‘noted’. Javanese: niteni). As a member of the same cultural community you would expect to understand the consequences of your action. The idea of reciprocity is thus tacitly accepted, but not necessarily overtly acknowledged in Javanese communication. In this context of reciprocity, rasa seems to have a more rational and rule-like character, rather than a spontaneous or emotional response in making sense of the social world.

Martha Nussbaum, for example, points out how problems of religious intolerance remain despite the legal and constitutional norms. As she argues ‘Good laws are not enough to combat this fundamentally emotional and social problem… But, though, codification is essential, constitutions and laws do not implement themselves, and public norms are impotent without educational and cultural reinforcement…we need to think harder about how rhetoric (as well as poverty, music and art) support pluralism and toleration.’ Nussbaum (2004:45)

Quoting Aristotle, the ancient Greek philosopher, Francis Fukuyama (2000) points out that what we today call human rights, i.e. human notions of right and wrong, are ultimately based on human nature. He continues: ‘That is, without understanding how natural desires, purposes, traits, and behaviors fit into a human whole, we cannot understand human ends and make judgments about right and wrong, good and bad, just and unjust’ (Fukuyama 2002:12). Also, see Bandura (1977) in which he proposes four distinct processes governing observational learning: attentional processes, retention processes, reproduction processes and motivational processes.
CHAPTER 10
THE NEW CURRICULUM OF INDONESIAN CITIZENSHIP:
CHALLENGES TO THE NEW INTERPRETATION OF
INDONESIAN CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION

Introduction

Chapter 1 showed that some Indonesian institutions central to the process of official educational reform have responded to the problems of *PPK*n by looking for new approaches to Indonesian citizenship education. One of these institutions is the Curriculum Centre (*Pusat Kurikulum*) of the Ministry of National Education, which recently introduced primary and secondary school curricula for citizenship education (*Kurikulum 2004: Kewarganegaraan*) to replace *PPK*n, and to be taught in schools throughout the nation. Its aim is to prepare students to participate in national and international activities in accordance with the democratic potential and character of Indonesia and other states (*Departemen Pendidikan Nasional* 2003a, 2003b, 2003c 2002a, 2002b, 2002c, 2001a, 2001b, 2001c).1 At primary levels the curriculum of citizenship education, which is part of the national Competency Based Curriculum (*Kurikulum Berbasis Kompetensi* or *KBK*), is integrated with the curriculum for social science, and given the title *pengetahuan sosial* (social studies). At the secondary levels, citizenship is a separate subject.
To attempt a discussion of all the components and sub-components of this new material would result in only a sketchy overview. Therefore, I will isolate a few key parts of it for discussion to give a general idea of the construction and interpretation the new post-authoritarian curriculum. This chapter explores whether the shift from PPKn to the new curriculum is likely to lead to a deeper understanding of the civic ideal in post-authoritarian Indonesia. I will first sketch the three major components of the Competency Based Curriculum, the eight major parts of the new citizenship education, and the standard of competence prescribed for the new citizenship education for primary and secondary levels. I will look particularly at the areas of values and norms, human rights, globalisation and regional autonomy, and suggest that some fundamental problems in the contextualisation of citizenship in Indonesia still remain, despite the reformed curricula. Finally, I will re-consider the adoption of some modern concepts in the new Indonesian citizenship.

A Sketch of the New Curriculum of Indonesian Citizenship Education

Within the broad objectives of the new curriculum and the decentralisation of education, three core areas will be reviewed in order to identify potential challenges to the curriculum of citizenship education. These are central to the way the curriculum is organised at school level. They are: standards of competence, teaching-learning activities, and assessments. Figure - 1 shows the relationship between these in graphic form.
Table 1 is an example of the form of the new curriculum for primary and secondary levels, showing one field of study with its eight aspects or components.
Table - 1
Scope of the 2004 Curriculum of the Indonesian Citizenship Education
(Primary and Secondary Levels)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field of Study</th>
<th>Aspects (Components)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>System of Nation and State</td>
<td>1. National Unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Values and norms (religions, morals, manners, and law)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Human Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Citizens’ Needs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. Power and Politics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6.Democratic Society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7. Pancasila and State Constitution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8. Globalisation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table - 2
Standard competencies of the 2004 Curriculum of the
Indonesian Citizenship Education (Primary and Secondary Levels)

**Primary Levels**

**Class 1**
The ability to understand self-identity and family in order to interact at home.

**Class 2**
The ability to implement rights and obligations; attitudes of mutual respect; living in thriftiness in the family; and taking care of the environment.

**Class 3**
The ability to understand:

1. important events in the family chronologically;
2. positions and roles of family members;
3. rules and cooperation in the environment, and
4. satisfying rights and duties as individuals in the community;
5. land forms.
### Table - 2 Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class 4</th>
<th>The ability to understand:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1) ethnicity, cultural diversity and technological development;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2) the diversity of natural resources and social capital, and their transactional activities;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3) valuing different local-area heritages; and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4) heroic attitudes and patriotism, and the rights and duties of citizens.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class 5</th>
<th>To ability understand:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1) Diversity of natural, social and cultural resources, and economic activities related to land forms in Indonesia;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2) Indonesian people, from the Hindu-Buddhist and then Islamic kingdoms to period of independence; and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3) National-awareness (<em>Wawasan Nusantara</em>), people and governments, and the leaders in the struggle for national independence (<em>tokoh kemerdekaan</em>).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class 6</th>
<th>The ability to understand:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1) the role of community and its national potential in maintaining independence;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2) the economic activities of Indonesia and other countries;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3) land forms of the world; and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4) the position of community and its national potential in implementing human rights and <em>Pancasila</em> values.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Junior Secondary Levels

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class 1</th>
<th>(1) The ability to participate in the era of autonomy;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2) The ability to understand national laws;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3) The ability to understand national instruments of human rights;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4) The ability to understand freedom of speech;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(5) The ability to reconstruct the events of the proclamation of the independence and formulation of the first constitution.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Class 2
1. The ability to analyse the meaning of people’s sovereignty (*kedaulatan rakyat*) and the political system;
2. The ability to demonstrate democratic culture;
3. The ability to show the superiority of *Pancasila* over other state ideologies;
4. The ability to analyse the conflict of interests between nations and the role of international institutions.

### Class 3
1. The ability to defend the state;
2. The ability to analyse the legal system and national courts;
3. The ability to analyse instruments of human rights;
4. The ability to make use of legal protection;
5. The ability to analyse the constitutions already applied in Indonesia.

### Senior Secondary Levels

#### Class 1
The ability to familiarise oneself in looking for, absorbing, presenting and using information about the nature of nation and state; values and norms (religion, morals, manners and law); the promotion of human rights and its implications; political community; principles of democracy, and the basic relations between the state and the constitution.

#### Class 2
The ability to familiarise oneself in looking for, absorbing, presenting and using information about self-achievement; openness and legal protection; political systems; international relations; international laws and international courts; *Pancasila* and 1945 Constitution.

#### Class 3
The ability to familiarise oneself in looking for, absorbing, presenting and using information about government; the role of the press in democratic society, and the impact of globalisation on Indonesian nation and state.

Source: adapted from *Departemen Pendidikan Nasional* (2003a, 2003b, 2003c)
Approaches to Teaching - Learning and Assessment Methods

Pedagogically, the Competency-Based Curriculum, seven methods of contextual learning are to be used in the teaching-learning process:

1. cooperative,
2. discovery,
3. inquiry,
4. interactive,
5. explorative,
6. critical thinking, and
7. problem-solving.

In the teaching-learning process, teachers may adopt one or more of these methods. For assessments, it suggests a performance-assessment model, which may use any one or any combination of the following techniques (Departemen Pendidikan Nasional 2003a, 2003b, 2003c).

Table - 3
Possible Techniques for Performance-Assessments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(1) activity-record</th>
<th>(7) group assignment</th>
<th>(13) questionnaire</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(2) anecdotal record</td>
<td>(8) discussion</td>
<td>(14) sociometric measurements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) scales of attitudes</td>
<td>(9) interviews</td>
<td>(15) teacher-made test</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) action-record</td>
<td>(10) observation-record</td>
<td>(16) standard-achievement test</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) home-work</td>
<td>(11) attitudes map</td>
<td>(17) standard-psychological test</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6) individual assignment</td>
<td>(12) portfolio</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Learning process methods are organised according to the levels of study. For kindergarten and Classes 1, 2, and 3 of primary school, games and simulations are used to attract students’ interest, stimulate their thinking processes, and to develop positive habits and actions in their social environments. Students are also expected to write essays analysing an event or issue from the media provided by their teacher, and to submit a report of their analysis (Departemen Pendidikan Nasional 2003a). In Classes 1, 2, and 3 of junior secondary, students are expected to conduct a ‘action-research’. In Class 1, 2 and 3 of senior secondary, they are expected to apply scientific method to problem-solving and inquiry. The end product of this ‘action-research’ process is a portfolio which is to be delivered as presentation, and is periodically assessed. This assessment may take the form of interactive and argumentative competition in their classroom, or be organised at the levels of school, local community or national competition (Departemen Pendidikan Nasional 2003b, 2003c).

**General Assessment on the New Curriculum of Citizenship Education**

The new curriculum is ambitious in scope, attempting to re-orient students towards more democratic and inclusive ideas. It includes new and challenging topics such as regional autonomy, human rights and globalisation (see Table - 1 and the overview of the standards of competence) as well as the innovative-participatory classroom practices and assessment methods shown in Figure - 1 and Approaches to Teaching and Learning and Assessment Methods.
The Standards of Competence

The eight aspects in Table -1, together with the standards of competence for primary and secondary levels, map important and wide-ranging elements of citizenship to be attained by students in Indonesia (also see Chapter 2 of the curriculum on the general objectives for both primary and secondary levels, Departemen Pendidikan Nasional: 2003b, 2003c). It is intended to provide students with an understanding of the key forces that shape national unity, and to achieve a more democratic society by encouraging students to practice of the principles of the modern constitution and to maintain local values and those of Pancasila as the state ideology.3

For example, starting from primary levels, notably Class 1, 2 and 3 students are expected to understand the practical meaning of ‘social’, starting with the implementation of rules at school and at home. The focus is on students’ duties and participation at home, which is then extended to a wider discussion on living in harmony, and the meaning of democratic culture in their community. Since citizenship education is integrated with social knowledge at primary school, students are familiarised with various environmental and ecological issues. They are expected to understand the diversity and benefits of natural resources or land forms in relation to economic activities in different regions, as well as various of social and cultural issues (primary levels: Class 3 and Class 4). Students are expected to understand and implement democratic culture in electing political leaders, and to show positive attitudes towards the implementation of democracy in the community (primary level: Class 4; junior secondary level: Class 2). They are also expected to understand the technological development in economic production,
communication and transportation (primary level: Class 5). Students are expected to have an understanding and appreciation of historical and cultural heritage, including state ideology and the national constitution, the contribution of those who fought for independence, and to show patriotic attitudes and an understanding of national unity. In Class 6 of primary level, students are expected to have an awareness of social phenomena in Indonesia and neighbouring countries, as well as understanding of human rights and their implementation.

Students should be able to give examples of how citizens participate in public policy making, and analyse the consequences of non-participation in the formulation and implementation of the policy (Class 1 of junior secondary level). They should be aware of the importance of participation in the public policy decision-making process. They are encouraged to participate in promoting democracy, good governance and human rights. They should be able to appreciate principles of democracy in society as a universal concept, as well as its connection to Pancasila. Pancasila is to be seen as the most suitable state ideology for Indonesia (junior secondary level: Class 2). Students should be able to describe and analyse the meaning of national laws and how other legal instruments are developed and produced, both at regional and national levels (junior secondary level: Class 3). They are to analyse how democracy has been implemented over the last five decades in relation to human rights, law and local cultural values (senior secondary level: Class 1). Furthermore, they should understand that social-political conditions are not solely influenced by internal factors but also external factors such as globalisation. The curriculum suggests that a democratic society can be achieved through
understanding the instruments and institutions of human rights and how democracy works. For example, they are expected to understand the meaning of citizen participation in the forming of public policy, particularly in line with the issues of regional autonomy.

**The Components of Teaching and Learning, and of Assessment Methods**

The teaching and learning component of the new curriculum is designed to avoid both the centralistic, top-down approach and the vagueness of content associated with the 1994 curriculum by offering an active and participatory student-centred program which is also information and technology-based. The teaching and learning materials are contextualised. As suggested, the material for discussions is designed to encourage continuing, carefully graded learning in keeping with student development from primary level, Class 1 to senior secondary level, Class 3. For example, Class 1 and Class 2 of primary level offer thematic learning to students. As there is a wide range of modes of learning available for a particular topic or purpose, the new curriculum allows for flexible learning methods, and flexible allocation of time and resources. This flexibility comes from the ‘diversification of curriculum’ according to the capacity of the students, teachers and schools in a particular geographical area and their specific cultural, physical, emotional, social and intellectual needs. ‘Cross-Curriculum Competency’ (*Kompetensi Lintas Kurikulum* or *KLK*) enables a teacher to select suitable topics from the curriculum according to students’ needs (*Departemen Pendidikan Nasional, 2003d*).

The seventeen possible techniques of assessment listed above are organised into seven broad methods of data collection for assessment. The seven types of methods are
Objective (paper and pen) Assessments, Subjective (paper and pen) Assessments, and Oral, Performance, Product, Portfolio and Behaviour assessments (*Departemen Pendidikan Nasional* 2003d:36-48). Among the wide range of modes of learning, three major activities are recommended for assessments of citizenship education: a) paper and pen, b) performances and c) projects. One or more of these may comprise part of ‘portfolio’ assessments.\(^4\) The portfolio has two purposes in the assessment of student performance. It is used for formative/diagnostic assessment, and for summative assessment.\(^5\) Unlike the British approach, in which all of the work of a student can be used for portfolio presentation, or the Australian approach in which only of work with a passing grade of 6.0 or higher forms part of portfolio, Indonesia’s Competency-Based Curriculum recommends that only the student’s best work is used for the final assessment. This is similar to the American approach.\(^6\)

Based on these learning-teaching activities and methods of assessment, a report is then prepared about the readiness of the student to advance to a higher level (see Figure - 1). Since in the assessment the paper and pen approach is no longer dominant, it is expected that students’ attitudes and behaviour (affective domain) can be better assessed. Portfolio assessment is also seen as encouraging students to explore their potential through competing with one another, by showing their final product in front of their teacher(s), classmates and parents. In sum, the purpose of these assessments is to enable students to actively look for information outside classroom.
This is a significant change from the previous system. Apart from making the pedagogical processes dynamic by adopting active-participatory methods and techniques, the curriculum is able to promote pluralism in national education. However, there are also potential challenges to its delivery. The ambitious scope of the curriculum may present the students with more material than they can master in the time available. Classroom contact hours for the subject are limited to two lessons of forty-five minutes each per week. Some of the activities are costly in time and money. They demand that teachers are not only well-prepared, but also have a good understanding and knowledge of the topics to be discussed and material to be assessed. They should have a wide-range of reference material for the discussion topics. Furthermore, while the Cross-Curriculum Competency concept allows teachers to select topics from the eight components of the curriculum according to ‘their students’ needs’, it is difficult to introduce citizenship education across subjects within the 2004 Curriculum.

The Competency Based Curriculum aims to produce active students through the pedagogical and evaluation processes of a particular subject. Teachers of subjects other than ‘citizenship’ may have difficulty teaching certain citizenship education topics by means of the ‘cross-curricular themes’ method. So far, the new curriculum has introduced only a few topics of citizenship to be taught across subjects, at Primary levels 1 and 2. If cross-curricular themes are to be introduced at all levels of primary and secondary education, (as occurs in the Philippines, which implemented a competency based curriculum in 1993), it is important to ensure that teachers of different subjects have common perspectives and knowledge of citizenship education.
The competency based model is only the vehicle for the delivery, consumption and assessment of knowledge and is therefore only one side of the coin. The other side is the knowledge itself, and how meanings of the civic ideal are to be interpreted and defined; in other words, how ‘truth’ can be revealed. Although the standards of basic competence have been set, the meaning of the civic ideal may be interpreted differently by people of different backgrounds and interests. Furthermore, the curriculum assumes that both conventional educational media and modern information technology have significant roles in the teaching and learning activities. Students can collect any material they want, and interpret it by themselves. The curriculum seems to prioritize explicit knowledge that, given adequate time and resources, can easily be collected and decoded by students. Explicit knowledge, conveyed in formal language and symbols, can be transmitted and diffused widely, and is easily consumed by individuals. However tacit knowledge is not so easily encoded. This is personal knowledge, intangibly embedded in individual experience through factors such as personal belief, values, instinct and perspectives (Polanyi 1966). This raises questions about the proper understanding and interpretation of the meaning of the civic ideal, particularly in assessment activities, because the new curriculum considers the affective domain is much more important than the cognitive domain. How then can civic ideal be articulated and discussed?

The textbook remains one of the key classroom materials. The way the material in textbook is interpreted is critical to the teaching-learning process. As Apple and Christian-Smith (1991:1-2) explain:
texts are not simply “delivery systems” of “fact.” They are at once the results of political, economic, and cultural activities, battles, and compromises. They are conceived, designed, and authorized by real people with real interests. They are published within the political and economic constraints of markets, resources, and power. […] it is naïve to think of the school curriculum as neutral knowledge.

Figure - 1 was drawn to show the position of the textbook in the components of the curriculum. While a textbook is designed and written based on basic standards of competence, it also influences and is influenced by the demands of teaching and learning and by assessment methods and criteria. The way the textbook is used can be seen as ‘parallel to’ activities of the interpretation of civic ideal across the curriculum.

The implication is that the new competency based curriculum needs to consider carefully the importance of interpreting the meaning of the civic ideal in Indonesian citizenship education. It is important to note Apple and Christian-Smith’s argument (1991:2) that:

…it is naïve to think of the school curriculum as neutral knowledge. Rather, what counts as legitimate knowledge is the result of complex power relations and struggles among identifiable class, race, gender/sex, and religious groups. Thus, education and power are terms of an indissoluble couplet. It is at times of social upheaval that this relationship between education and power becomes most visible. Such a relationship was and continues to be made manifest in the struggles by women, people of color, and others to have their history and knowledge included in the curriculum.

It is clear that abstract concepts and issues of Indonesian citizenship should be properly interpreted and understood. Tacit knowledge should be brought out and be made explicit knowledge in the new citizenship education.Explicit knowledge should be converted into tacit knowledge. These two activities are not as easy as the new curriculum designers
may have thought. Attempts to cross-convert explicit and tacit knowledge without innovation may lead to the repetition of activities. In sum, despite the new teaching techniques, dependence on the ‘portfolio model’ to enhance student learning, and the over-reliance on abstract concepts for handling issues of citizenship still leave potential challenges to education.

**Examples of the Challenges to the Interpretation of the Standards of Competence**

This section will demonstrate the critical importance of interpretation of the civic ideal by examining four basic competencies drawn from the new curriculum: ‘values and norms’, ‘human rights’, ‘globalisation’ and ‘regional autonomy’.

**Values and Norms**

Values and norms are to be taught at primary levels, and also appear on the syllabus for senior secondary (class 1) as ‘Values and norms (religion, morals, manners and law)’.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table - 4</th>
<th>Competencies, Indicators and Material (Values and Norms)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Senior Secondary: Class 1</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic Competence:</td>
<td>The ability to analyse and implement values (religion, morals, manners and law)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicators:</td>
<td>• To define values and give various examples</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• To define norms and sanctions and give various examples</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• To infer the relationship between values and norms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• To formulate values as sources of norms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• To describe the definition and categories of law</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table – 4 Continued

- To show positive attitudes towards law (legal-awareness)
- To identify legal and illegal actions
- To implement values and various types of norms at school and in the community

Material: Values, various types of norms and their sanctions

The standards of competence for Class 1, 2, 3 and 5 suggest that the new curriculum designers have tended to repeat the use of concepts derived from modern social theory stressing social hierarchies, norms and status. These theories underpin topics such as living in harmony (rukun), order and conflict, responsibility and tolerance (Departemen Pendidikan Nasional 2003a). Values and norms that bind self and sociality are seen to be inter-related with religion, laws, manners and morals, as described in component one.

The indicators used suggest that social norms and laws are instrumental in maintaining order and building unity in diversity. However, the expectation that students will maintain good order by following social norms, rules and laws does not explain the nature of social norms and laws. Interchange between the two is possible, and has occurred widely in Indonesia in the last few decades, resulting in high levels of corruption. Analysis of PPKn in the preceding chapters shows that the treatment of concepts like values and norms, stressing functional and conformist perspectives, has been too abstract, general and ahistorical. The value and norms-based discourse used to ensure stability and equilibrium and avoid conflict overlooks the social function of conflict as something which generates dynamic creativity and innovation. PPKn texts had
difficulty explaining the complexity of contemporary social interaction, with its contesting, contingent and negotiable characteristics.

It is apparent that the new curriculum encourages almost formulaic student behaviour, based on the hierarchical functions of laws, norms and religions. We can see the strategy applied for students of Class 1 of senior secondary, who are expected to analyse the legal system and national courts. The curriculum requires students to identify various types of national laws. They are to describe the functions of legal institutions, and the hierarchy of public courts, as well as the process of criminal and civil laws in public courts. It is my contention that inculcating students with the formal definitions, hierarchy and procedures of Indonesian law is not sufficient, unless substantial issues related to laws and social norms are also properly discussed.

The relationship between social norms and laws should be discussed, and students should be informed that laws are not always needed where social order is self-maintaining. To a great extent our everyday behaviour is cooperative (Posner 2000). If individuals can look after themselves and maintain their common good, we do not need the law. Thus, we do not need the government to enact laws and intervene to regulate each and every social behavior. As Posner (2000) further maintains, even when a society is weak, order is still maintained. He believes that law can enhance non-legal forms of regulation, but it can also undermine them. The government does not necessarily know best about our social relations. The enactment of law should be seen as an enhancement of non-legal forms of regulation, not the basis of them. Familial and religious affairs, for example, are intimate
and complicated, and are sovereign institutions located in the private sphere. In an ethnically and religiously diverse society such as Indonesia, the government should trust non-legal forms of social regulation and organisation, and should facilitate the maintenance of order in diversity rather than intervening in it. The negative effect of government interference in the private sphere, such as regulation and over-regulation of religious beliefs, is that it may stir up resentments within and between social groups. Over-regulation of private and religious matters tends to weaken those institutions. The government should practise facilitation rather than intervention, and only take an active role if inequalities or injustice become apparent. In this context, a good government is that one governs less.

The Islamic religion is also relevant to discussion of values and norms. There needs to be a frank discussion of religious systems in relation to politics, particularly of the extent to which democratic ideas based on the secular-rationalist philosophy of Western modernism are compatible with contemporary Islamic Indonesia. Bernard Lewis (2002:101) suggested that: ‘In the Muslim perception, there is no human legislative power and there is only one law for the believers - the Holy Law of God, promulgated by revelation.’ On the other hand, Indonesia has adopted nationalist perspectives, which are evident in the national philosophy of Pancasila and in the 1945 Constitution. In fact, the majority of Muslims in Indonesia have shown a willingness to understand and learn from the modern-secular culture of the West, as have Muslims in many other countries (Armstrong 2001). Despite this, pronounced inconsistencies, such as the Islamic teaching that makes no distinction between political and religious power, need to be re-assessed.
carefully and meaningfully in the new citizenship education. This also implies that the effort to promote the Western concept of ‘civil society’ by equating it with the Islamic ‘masyarakat madani’ (Madjid 2004, Rahardjo 1999) practised in the time of Prophet Muhammad should be subject to a close critical scrutiny before it is adopted in the citizenship education.\textsuperscript{10}

In the past, the discourse of democracy was naturalised as if the notion and practice of democracy were part of the archipelago’s culture. For example, Mattulada (1986) argued that Indonesia’s local cultures as practised by various ethnic groups contained democratic values - notably the key ideas of Western modernity and the Enlightenment. Such essentialist and formalist perspectives convey an optimistic picture of democracy encoded in symbolic systems and cultural codes. In reality, the naturalisation of democracy does not fit well with the social conditions and cultural structures of the country. Moreover, the communitarian philosophy subscribed to by Indonesia consists of ‘generalised values that do not directly inform moral decision making’, to use Lechner’s expression (Lechner 1998:189). In the New Order Indonesia, for example, individuals were left to negotiate their own course through a complex structure. Since the people were superficially bound, the forced social cohesion began to splinter as Suharto left.

In the new citizenship education, democracy has been positioned from a somewhat deterministic perspective, as the practice of ‘universalistic values’ which recognise the truth of religious views. This is suggested by the standards of competence for Classes 1-3.\textsuperscript{11} In a pluralist society, however, the uniform imposition of homogenous religious
dogma and rigid ideological values will be counter-productive, because not all people will accept such values. The imposition of conformist moral perspectives by the state has undermined peaceful and tolerant interaction among diverse groups of people. Such moral universalism is likely to produce an empty, hegemonic formalism. Human rights and the rights of citizens in Indonesia need to be given more attention by the curriculum.

**Human Rights**

Human rights form part of the curriculum for junior secondary level (Class 1 and Class 3) and senior secondary level (Class 1).

**Table - 5**
Competencies, Indicators and Material (Human Rights)

**Junior secondary: Class 1**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Standard of Competence: The ability to understand national instruments of human rights</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Basic Competence: The ability to describe national instruments of human rights in Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicators:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• To identify various instruments of human rights in Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• To describe institutions for human rights protection and their roles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• To analyse several cases of human rights trials in Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic Competence: The ability to appreciate the effort to promote human rights, and institutions for human rights protection.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table – 5 Continued

| Indicators: | • To show positive attitudes towards efforts in the promotion of human rights by the institutions of human rights protection  
• To show positives attitudes towards the efforts of the Government and institutions for human rights protection |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Material: National instruments of human rights</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Junior Secondary: Class 3

**Standard of Competence:** The ability to analyse instruments of human rights

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Basic Competence:</th>
<th>The ability to appreciate the effort to promote human rights, and institutions for human rights protection.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Indicators: | • To explain the formulation of Universal Declaration of Human Rights  
• To identify various international instruments of human rights  
• To mention international institutions of human rights protection and their roles |
| Basic Competence: | The ability to show attitudes towards cases of the violation of human rights in a number of countries |
| Indicators: | • To determine a position towards several cases of human rights violation in other countries.  
• To be responsive towards cases of human rights violation and crimes in a number of countries. |
| Material: International instruments of human rights |

### Senior Secondary: Class 1

**Basic Competence:** The ability to analyse the promotion of human rights and its implications

| Indicators: | • To analyse the definition and various types of human rights |
To identify the constraints and challenges in the promotion of human rights in Indonesia

To identify violation and judicial process of international human rights

To predict the consequences for a country that does not promote human rights

To analyse international sanctions for violation of human rights

To demonstrate the promotion of human rights in Indonesia

To participate in the promotion of human rights in community, nation and state.

Material: The promotion of human rights and its implications

As in the component on values and norms, the designers of the new curriculum focus on formal and procedural aspects of human rights, emphasising an awareness of national and international instruments of human rights. This shows a shift away from the PPKn discourse, and towards the recognition of the instruments that protect universalistic human rights within and beyond the Indonesian state. The emphasis on the instruments of human rights replaces the conventional discussion of rights in the vocabulary of Indonesian citizenship. However, the shift does not address the substantial dimensions of citizen rights, such as their political, economic, social-cultural and security dimensions. Moreover, the emphasis on universalistic human rights may lead to the exclusion of particularistic rights belonging to individuals and groups, by virtue of their biological, sexual, racial, cultural, demographic, geographic and territorial backgrounds, and
including women, children, the disabled, pensioners, senior citizens, aborigines, tribal people, refugees and migrants.

Apart from emphasis on the procedural issues, such as understanding the instruments for promotion of human rights and the judicial consequences of violating these, several contesting issues of human rights and citizenship rights need to be mentioned. First, human rights should be clearly defined in relation to rights of citizenship. Discussing one without the other may lead students to blur fundamental distinctions between the two. Citizenship rights are specifically attached to members of a particular community or nation-state, whereas human rights are conferred on all human beings regardless of their national backgrounds. Human rights are based on ethical concepts of the individual, while citizenship rights are based on political and legal understandings (Delanty 2000). The concept of the individual is common to both. Citizenship rights form part of national legal system, while human rights are defined by international law. Even though human rights tend to presuppose ‘negative liberty’ (Berlin 1969), students should be informed that as citizens of a state, individuals are bound by the laws of that state. The sovereignty of the nation-state is increasingly eroded by ‘supranational legal and political institution’ (Turner 1993b:187), and human rights have begun to penetrate national legal systems. Universal rights increasingly override national law. Nevertheless, the promotion and protection of human rights depends largely on the ethical principles shaped by both national practices and international understanding of rights.12
While it is valid to expect students to show positive attitudes government and non-government efforts to promote and protect human rights, students should also be informed that organisations and institutional policy can become repressive, thus violating human rights. Conformist perspectives that seek to suppress difference, for example by limiting freedom of public expression or banning the marriage of people of different religions, violate rather than protect human rights. Furthermore, legal rights and moral rights are subject to various interpretations. First, since citizenship has always been associated with rights and duties, it is important to note that rights and duties are closely related. Cranston (1983:13) explains:

"It is not my duty to do what it is physically impossible for me to do. You cannot say it was duty to have jumped into the Charles River in Cambridge to rescue a drowning child if I was nowhere near Cambridge at the time the child was drowning. What is true of duties is equally true of rights. If it is impossible for a thing to be done, it is absurd to claim it as a right."

Secondly, a legally based account of right is not always the correct explanation of human rights. Legal rights should not be equated with human rights. People’s attitudes and beliefs play a role in establishing the custom-based rights of social institutions. These non-institutional rights are derived from rules, customs and conventions of a community. Sometimes legal rights require the consent of an external authority in order to be considered as legally-created moral rights (Raz 1984). In such a situation, we may then speak about ‘a right to do wrong’. As Raz (1984:17) illustrates,

"Some people believe that there is no moral right to use contraceptives, not even a moral right conditional on legal recognition. They recognize of course that Parliament in granting this legal right assumes otherwise. But they do not agree. Yet they think that Parliament’s authority carries such moral force as to entail that once the legal right is granted people"
are morally bound to respect it and not to stop others from using contraceptive. On my account, strictly speaking this is not a case of a moral right. One’s moral duty not to prevent the use of contraceptives which is the consequence of the law is not based on the interest of the right-holder, but on respect for the authority of Parliament. But, since this is respect for Parliament’s mistake about moral rights, and since its moral consequences are to give individuals all they would have had, had they a right to contraceptives, it is a natural extension of the concept to regard such legislation as conferring a (legal) rights. (Thought of course it is, in the eyes of the anti-contraceptionists, a right to do wrong, and therefore one which should not be exercised.)

It is also important to inform students that human rights and citizenship rights in Indonesia were forged at the end of the colonial period, when the newly independent Indonesia needed to establish itself as a nationally cohesive state. Indonesia’s need to bind together people of diverse backgrounds in this formative period overshadowed the commitment to human rights and citizenship rights in the subsequent periods. Discussion of the protection and promotion of human rights in Indonesia cannot be separated from the political processes of its national history. Cases of the violation of human rights, for example G30S, Aceh, East Timor (now: Timor Leste), the May 1998 riots, ethnic wars in Kalimantan, Poso and Maluku, and the ‘Bali Bombings’, ‘Marriott Hotel Bombing’ and ‘Kuningan Bombing’, help strengthen the significance of understanding human rights. The overemphasis on universalistic Western-based values of democracy in the new curriculum also suggests failure to address contradictions in people’s historical knowledge of democracy and human rights. Capitalism and Western modernism produced colonialism in many parts of the world. High colonialism, such as of the Dutch East Indies, has resulted in the perpetuation of primordial attachments in post-colonial Indonesia. These have paralysed human rights and civil society in the country, and have continue to impinge on its people.
Students should be encouraged to see the possible multiple interpretations of human rights issues. Students should carry out not only synchronic analysis, but also diachronic analysis of various human rights issues. While discussing a particular issue of human rights at a given moment in time, they should trace its roots and historical development. In this way, they would be able to analyse an instance of human rights violation, particularly one that is related to their immediate social experience. For example, they could analyse who and which institutions were involved in a particular event. Why did certain individuals or groups who have co-existed for many decades or centuries suddenly oppose each other? Why have some fundamentalists become terrorists? Analysis and discussion like this would help explain discrepancies between the ideals of human rights and socio-reality in Indonesia. It would assist students to comprehend, and bridge the gaps between classroom learning and social experience.

There is potential for new curriculum’s discourse of democracy to be misconstrued. Socio-cultural and psycho-historical factors may cause a misconception of the meaning of democracy. While democracy is conventionally seen as an instrument for upholding individual rights and promoting social cohesion, it could also be employed to legitimate egoistic individual and group spirit, producing inequality in the capitalist market, loosening social bonds and lessening respect for established forms of conduct13. Without effective monitoring and control mechanisms, this may result in different forms of the symbolic and physical violence that were practiced by the former authoritarian regime. Resources such as laws and regulations cannot maintain order between conflicting groups if state inefficiencies mean they can be manipulated by self-interested individuals and
cliques. Thus, democracy inherently carrying negative liberty in post-colonial Indonesia may turn to anarchy.\(^{14}\)

**Globalisation**

Globalisation is one of new foci in Indonesian citizenship education. The new curriculum expects students to describe globalisation’s processes and its positive and negative influences on Indonesian people and state, and to take a position regarding its implications. Issues of globalisation are set out in the curriculum for senior secondary level (Class 3).

| Table - 6 |
| Competencies, Indicators and Material (Globalisation) |

**Senior Secondary: Class 3**

Standard of Competence: The ability to seek, absorb, disseminate and use information on the influence of globalisation on the Indonesian nation and state.

Basic Competence: The ability to evaluate the influence of globalisation on the Indonesian nation and state

Indicators:  
- To explain the formulation of Universal Declaration of Human Rights  
- To identify various international instruments of human rights  
- To mention international institutions of human rights protection and their roles

Basic Competence: The ability to evaluate the influence of globalisation on the Indonesian nation and state

Indicators:  
- To describe the process of globalisation  
- To describe the influence of globalisation on the existence of nation and state  
- To identify positive and negative aspects of globalisation
Table – 6 continued

Indicators:

- To show selective attitudes towards the influence of globalisation
- To develop a position towards the implications of globalisation
- To show positive attitudes towards law (legal-awareness)
- To review writings on the influence of globalisation in daily life
- To talk about the review on the influence of globalisation

Material: Globalisation

While the curriculum aims to widen students’ horizon of issues beyond the nation-state, it is obvious that globalisation is understood as competing with nationalism. Like PPKn, the new curriculum assumes that a nation-state such as Indonesia is a unified cultural identity, and its underlying focus is therefore concerned with identity. This approach has some usefulness for strengthening national solidarity, but it also has limitations. The basic limitation is its tendency to focus on the externality of globalisation, assuming that nation-state and globalisation are essentially two separate entities. It thus assumes that demonstrating selective attitudes towards the influence of globalisation will save the existence of nation-state.

If they are to have proper understanding of the process of globalisation, students should be informed that both the nation-state and globalisation are part of the project of modernity (Giddens 1990). Globalisation is not new, but has been evolving for some five
hundred years (Wallernstein 2000). It emerged along with the modern nation-state and capitalism in Europe as integral parts of the modern world capitalist system (Wallerstein 1974). The latest phase of globalisation differs from previous ones through its intensity of time-space compression, due to technological, organisational, political and economic change (Harvey 1990). Modernity is inherently ambivalent (Bauman 1991). It is ambivalent because national identity, which was assumed to be coherent and central, and attainable by the superiority of reason, is being (re)pluralised by the process of globalisation. Likewise, nation states have never been as sovereign as they claimed to be, because modernity is inherently globalising (Giddens 1990). Globalisation ‘is changing everyday life, particularly in the developed countries, at the same time it is creating new transnational systems and forces’ (Giddens 1998:33),

It is important to understand that the process of globalisation is not based on a single discrete force, particularly capitalism (Wallerstein 1974), technology, information communication technology (ICT) (Castells 1996, Rosenau 1990) or power politics (Gilpin 1987), but it is an interplay of capitalism, militarism, the nation-state system and the international division of labour as proposed by Giddens (1990). Indeed, ICT has had a pervasive impact on the global economy, undermining the power of the nation-state. With ICT, smaller companies can leapfrog the limits of economies of scale by cooperating with multi-national corporations (MNCs), reducing their costs by cooperation. Also, MNCs are able to decentralise and integrate their activities around the world in immediacy. Through ICT, new knowledge created will in turn impact on the whole social life of a nation-state (Castells 1996). Although it alters the political economy of a nation-state,
globalisation does not make the power of politicians obsolete nor cause the nation-state to become a ‘fiction’, as argued by Kenichi Ohmae in *The End of the Nation State: The Rise of Regional Economies* (Ohmae 1995).

Giddens’ four dimensions of globalisation are important because they surpass the orthodox explanation based on the single logic of Indonesian citizenship. His concepts of the ‘push and pull’ between system of state and particular state, and ‘disembedding and reembedding’ of social relations, show that globalisation does not necessarily lead to homogenisation of global identity nor unification of the nation state systems. Giddens warns that we must recognise the dialectical character of globalisation and the influence of uneven development among nation-states caused by various types of wars, alliances and political and economic changes (Giddens 1990:67). Taking culture as an example, we can see there are two contesting views on the impact of globalisation. One view sees globalisation as a push to homogenisation or Americanisation of the consumption of knowledge, technologies, cultural products and lifestyle (Schiller 1976, 1969). Another holds that globalisation is a complex interplay of the global and the local forces (Giddens in particular). (See my discussion of cultural expression and media imperialism in Chapter 5). While it may be claimed that national identities are being eroded, resistance to globalisation stimulates the strengthening of particularistic identities. Indeed, globalisation retains some aspects of Western global domination, but national identities elsewhere are being relativised, generating new hybrid identities to take their place (Hall 1992). In this context, the demarcation line between the positive and negative influence of globalisation assumed in the new curriculum can be better explained or resolved.
Globalisation challenges the role of the nation-state, and the meanings given to the civic ideal in countries such as Indonesia. In the past, globalisation has been primarily associated with cultural imperialism. As a post-colonial state, Indonesia should be careful to avoid adopting foreign values. If necessary, Indonesia should filter and counter the so-called ‘negative effects’ of foreign and particularly Western values. It is important that the new curriculum of citizenship education should shift its perspective from that of the modern realists to that of post-structuralists and post-modernists of international relations. In this way a more systematic explanation of globalisation can be offered to students. For example, students could be encouraged to analyse the role of transnational organisations, such as the United Nations (UN) and European Union (EU), the bilateral and multilateral agreements between different countries; the rise of world finance markets and free-trades zones; the global exchange of goods and services; the rapid growth of transnational corporations; the flow of signs, symbols and information around the world, reaction to that flow (Waters 1995) and their impact on Indonesia. The new curriculum could offer better perspectives to students by pointing to the underlying issues of the process of modernisation. Democratic citizenship cannot be separated from the project of modernity and secular morality. Similarly, human rights cannot be separated from modernity and its essential elements of liberalism, individualism and rationality.

*Toward Regional Autonomy or the Return of Centralism?*

Issues of autonomy and regional autonomy are new dimensions for Indonesian citizenship education because they were non-existent in the New Order Indonesia. The
inclusion of these in the new citizenship curriculum differentiates it from *PPKn*. The concept of regional autonomy is not new, and was allowed for in Law No. 5 of 1974. In practice, however, the New Order regime applied centralism. However what is taught about autonomy in the new curriculum may differ from daily practices. What is argued to be regional autonomy may turn out to be centralism in a different guise. Furthermore, we note that regional autonomy involves a combination of centralised and decentralised authority. They are not dichotomies, but represent poles on a continuum that can be adjusted and manipulated by contingent interests (Turner and Hulme 1997). In Indonesia regional autonomy, power distributed from the central government to regional or local governments is not as clearly distributed as in a federal state. This is the biggest challenge to understanding the concept of regional autonomy in Indonesia.

Issues of regional autonomy are set out in the curriculum for junior secondary level (Class 1).

**Table - 7**

**Competencies, Indicators and Material (Regional Autonomy)**

**Junior Secondary: Class 1**

| Standard of Competence: The ability to participate in the era of autonomy |
|---|---|
| Basic Competence: The ability to understand the importance of participation in the era of autonomy |
| Indicators: To describe the nature of regional autonomy |
| • To describe the importance of community participation in the formulation of public policy in the regions |
| • To analyse the consequences for a community that is not active in the formulation and implementation of public policy in the regions. |
Table – 7 continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Basic Competence:</th>
<th>The ability to participate in the implementation of regional autonomy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indicators:</td>
<td>• To explain the implementation of regional autonomy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• To be active in solving problems related to the implementation of regional autonomy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Material: Participation of the community in the implementation of regional autonomy

**Centralism and Its Discontents**

As discussed in Chapter 5, centralisation of administrative authority and fiscal power has resulted in the significantly uneven development and distribution of economic wealth in the archipelago (Kahin 1970). Economic disparity occurs not only between Java and many less inhabited outer-islands, but also between densely populated urban areas and rural areas. Income inequality is also obvious between the upper-middle class and the lower class. This often sparks discontent of the regions towards the central government. The challenge to the discourse of regional autonomy in the new curriculum is its ability to explain the economic gap between Java and the outer islands. It is this gap which has intensified the issues of separatist movement in a few provinces. It is not merely a matter of loyalty or disloyalty as described in PPKn texts.

Tension between the promotion of regional autonomy (*otonomi daerah* or *otoda*) and the need to build unified cultures and national identity in order to avoid national disintegration is an important agenda of the central government in the era of globalisation. Potential inter-ethnic antagonism resulting from the pluralist background of
the country also brings implications for the implementation of regional autonomy currently underway. First, the increased autonomy offered so far has been followed by growth in the number of provinces. While East Timor is no longer part of Indonesia, since 1998 a number of new provinces have been formed, for example, Bangka-Belitung, Gorontalo and Banten. Secondly, issues of employing local people (putra daerah) rather than outsiders (i.e. of different linguistic and ethnic, not to mention religious backgrounds) have re-emerged in the last few years. On the other hand, problems of a lack of local human resources still linger in many provinces, particularly those outside Java. This kind of cultural issue also re-emerges from time to time when certain national and regional positions in the government and military are to be filled. Equal opportunity is certainly crucial. However, disparity of human capital and other resources among provinces will remain a stumbling-block for the decentralisation policy for many years to come.

While it is not often seen as a troublesome issue, the transmigration program to shift people from overpopulated islands, particularly from Java and Madura to less-populated islands in the archipelago, has had implications for the empowerment of the local populations. In the past when inter-ethnic tensions emerged, the argument that was put forward was usually an economic one. However, it is now difficult to assess whether transmigration immigrants were resented because their economic success was seen to impoverish the local people. Ethnic animosities and religious fervour seem to have become mixed with economic and political interests. In Suharto’s time, clashes such as
the ones which occurred in recent years in West Kalimantan, Central Kalimantan, Poso (Central Sulawesi) and Maluku, would seem to be far from possible.

In the past, although antagonism and tensions among ethnic and religious groups may have been simmering, they could be tamed by authoritarian rule. Voices of dissent found no outlet, and were silenced or directed to serve the so-called ‘national interest.’ Conformity was imposed to suppress pluralist reality and individual rights. Any individual or group that did not conform was soon subjugated and punished. Social cohesion was imposed by sanctioning anyone who threatened to disrupt it. This was tolerated by the people because of the relative economic stability and national security that accompanied it, and because of the role of the military both in ensuring compliance by the people and in the political arena. After Suharto’s departure, the military’s involvement in some troubled regions was criticised. Even though civilian leaders such as former President Abdurrahman Wahid had gradually curtailed the political power of the military, the past few years have seen outbreaks of violence, civil unrest, bombing, looting and ethnic skirmishes in which military personnel are widely believed to have been implicated.

**Whither Regional Autonomy?**

Any discussion of regional autonomy should note the introduction of Law No. 22 of 1999 (*UU No. 22 Tahun 1999*) on regional autonomy, and Law No. 25 of 1999 (*UU No. 25 Tahun 1999*) on fiscal balance. Students should be aware that the objective of the new policy is to free the central government from the burden of regional matters that can actually be handled by regional governments, a policy which Rasyid (2002:15) has called
the ‘returning of the dignity of the regions’ (*pengembalian harga diri daerah*). Theoretically it offers advantages to both the central government and the regional governments, allowing both levels to operate more efficiently and effectively in running the country. Political, economic, social and cultural responsibilities have been delegated, empowering regional governments to set their own institutional objectives and programs and determine their resources. This policy is expected to reduce the control and supervision of the central government, and to achieve cost effectiveness and better management of the regions. At the same time, the de-bureaucratisation is believed to enhance public accountability.

The optimistic rhetoric of regional autonomy aside, its non-federal deregulatory framework carries potential challenges to the power relations of all community stakeholders. As a consequence, they impact on human rights and citizenship. Despite the new curriculum’s fifth component of ‘power and politics’, it views regional autonomy as a transfer of authority from the central government to the regional governments. In fact, however, as the law on regional autonomy implies, decentralisation is essentially an initiative of the central government to protect its own interests, rather than a true empowerment of the regional governments. It is not unlike a ‘power game’, in which the central government has the bargaining power to control regional governments. For example, Jakarta can resume or reduce the authority that has been delegated to a region if it believes that the region is not acting in the national interest as defined by the state.

Reduction of authority can be translated as cutting of funding to the regional governments. Regional autonomy anticipates that regional governments will be able to
outsource funds to offset the decline in the central government support. The objective is to reduce the ‘dependency mentality’ of the relationship with the central government, exemplified by the deregulation of higher education. However decentralisation is likely to affect the conduct and standard of local governance and administration. In the absence of a unitary system, each regional government may introduce its own standards. Overlapping of activities and counter-productive duplication may occur in the two-tier policy. For example, excessive regional investment regulations may discourage new investment or reinvestment needed to advance the regions and the country.

In the name of diversity, for example, regional autonomy has been increasingly ‘commodified’ in the last few years. With the new-found power, some local members of the elite and bureaucrats see regional autonomy as an opportunity to improve their own well-being rather than that of the local people. Regional autonomy that is currently in the making in Indonesia, for example, is directed to economic and ethnic particularism. While the founding fathers saw diversity as a problem and promoted national unity as central responsibility, local powers are now demanding greater rights. As part of postmodern cultural politics we are seeing the fragmentation and blurring of the boundaries of private and public domains, the decentredness of the modern subject, a new simulation of order resulting in individuation, a lack of social cohesion and ‘universal judgment of morality, aesthetic and science’ (Wexler 1990:181). Along with issues of regional autonomy, human rights and globalisation, these phenomena should be discussed in Indonesian citizenship education (also, see discussion on the establishment of modern concepts in this chapter).
Issues of decentralisation and regional autonomy are more complex than the new curriculum suggests. Regional and provincial conflicts of interests are more likely in a loosely controlled system of management. As long as regional economic and cultural differences persist, the discontent of the provinces, particularly those outside Java, toward Jakarta’s paternalism will remain strong. Indonesian citizens should bear in mind that even though they are living in the era of globalisation, a borderless world, a network society or whatever it may be called, the nation is still a political community. As Gerard Delanty (2001) has suggested, a cultural community is difficult to translate into a political community.

If the above issues are not dealt with frankly, and if the curriculum continues to be delivered as the top down inculcation of knowledge, the gap between education and real-life experience, between school knowledge and lifeworld, is likely to alienate students, making the education ineffective. The topics of regional autonomy and globalisation which contain complex issues need a more nuanced and pluralistic approach than that suggested by the new curriculum. These issues are to be further discussed in Chapter 11.

The Meaning and Construction of Civic Identity in Postmodern Indonesia

The preceding discussion on values and norms, human rights, globalisation and regional autonomy, suggests that the major challenges to the new curriculum do not stem only from the issues of inclusion or exclusion of modern concepts of democracy, but more importantly, from the interpretation of these concepts. Interpretation of the civic ideal of
the 1994 curriculum was monopolised by the New Order regime. Uniformity was imposed to legitimate the process of injustice and preserve the status quo. Assorted values, norms and laws no longer congruent with the contemporary conditions were appropriated and imposed, creating a ‘surplus of meaning’ (Ricoeur 1976). One of the most distinct yet subtle strategies employed by the past citizenship education policy experts and textbook-writers is ‘naturalisation’ of discourse by means of linguistic devices. As a project of domination, the texts of citizenship education present themselves as the natural thing, ‘the self-evidence of the common-sense world’ which ‘goes without saying because it comes without saying’ (Bourdieu 1977:167). Students who were subjected by *PPKn* construed by them in the powerless situation of the past. However, this emphasis on domination neglects the fact that power may be contested.

In post-New Order rule, the identity structures which were reproduced and imposed by the regime are being pluralised, disintegrated and reasserted. This creates conflicts of interpretation and understanding of the meaning of the civic ideal. Theoretically, the modernist notion of social order (‘totality’ or ‘grand narrative’) and the structuralists concept of hierarchical binary opposition that we inherit and we may still hold have been challenged by the multiple forms of power and antagonism in the last few decades (Laclau and Mouffe 1985). The resurgence of logical positivistic ideas has implications for cultural reformation and citizenship rights. These ideas are centered on the work of the British philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein, and later on the post-structuralists, such as the French philosophers Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault, who suggest that meaning is unstable, but is often regulated and stabilised for pragmatic purposes (Barker and...
Galasinski 2001). The modernist project of unitary or collective dominant practices is facing the fragmentation of ideas - the multiple interpretations of meaning - in a more ambiguous and uncertain postmodern world.\textsuperscript{21}

At the praxis level, we have witnessed that after the fall of Suharto, domination is not necessarily a particular political project, or a class conflict as in classical Marxist sense. A case in point is the ‘tug of war’ between the effort to promote regional autonomy (\textit{otonomi daerah}) and the need to build unified cultures and national identity to avoid potential national disintegration and to face the challenges posed by globalisation. However the fragmentation of ideas has led to a shift from the instrumental rationality of domination by the strong state, to utility-maximisation by individual and group powers. In a sense, there is no difference between the former and the latter in achieving their goals. Despite the fall of the authoritarian regime, the production and reproduction of local traditional values is perpetuated in society. This occurs mainly as a result of flexibility and interchangeability in the treatment of traditional values or norms as laws. There has been a sort of ‘interchange’ of moral rules and legal rules, particularly in politics, bureaucracy and business\textsuperscript{22}. Modern-positivist knowledge is still held as truth and employed to legitimate actions in the name of human rights and civil rights.

In this context, the challenge to the new curriculum is how to re-interpret the meaning of the civic ideal. For example, in \textit{PPKn} nationalism is assumed as an absolute truth, derived from religious beliefs, primordialism and perennialism. This knowledge of citizenship seems to overlook the possible transmutability of consumer objects and
exchange commodities that represent our attitudes, expectations, motivations, needs and choice mediated by the recent development in science and technologies that have rendered obsolete our modern type of social relations (Knorr-Cetina 2001). In the implementation of the new curriculum, teachers can no longer rely as heavily on classical republicanism and ‘consensual order’ (Janoski and Gran 2001) as they did in the period of PPKn. This reliance neglected the ever-increasing uncertain, contingent and dynamic nature of human life related to the discourse of ‘freedom’, ‘loyalty’, ‘justice’ and ‘equality’, and did not promote participation and pluralism. This can be seen in the way the experience of immigration, flight or diaspora, whether due to war-displacement, dissatisfaction with homeland’s authoritarian regime, or simply economic calculation have forced people to become more flexible in opting for citizenship (Ong 1999a). Past citizenship textbooks have subscribed to modernist approaches, by assuming that meaning is fixed, and that their interpretation would produce an ‘absolute truth’ of the students’ social life. This approach may contribute to a further crisis of identity. ‘Identity only becomes an issue when it is in crisis, when something assumed to be fixed, coherent and stable is displaced by the experience of doubt and uncertainty’ (Kobina Mercer in Hall (1992: 275).

In an effort to forge a new citizenship identity, the linguistic manipulation practised by the New Order regime to control others should be avoided. Unless this is done, the new curriculum will achieve little more than a reproduction of PPKn. There are many issues that should be properly addressed in the implementation of the new curriculum. One of
the critical issues is the interpretation and understanding of modern concepts, which is to be discussed in the next section.

**Challenges to the Interpretation of Modernist Concepts in the New Curriculum**

In the discourses of *PPKn* discussed in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, apart from syntactic structures and figures of speech, certain keywords are employed by the *PPKn* writers as ideological messages to regulate the categories of thought and to legitimate the control of students. Niels Mulder has looked at the use and abuse of many keywords in relation to the constitution of civic ideal by the New Order regime, such as *serasi, selaras, seimbang* and *kerukunan*. (Mulder 2000, 1999b, 1996), but they are not modern concepts. In the literature of the political discourse in Indonesia, Michael van Langenberg (1986) pioneered analysis of New Order’s political discourse by means of a keyword approach.24 Van Langenberg argued that through his five major facets of power, accumulation, legitimacy, culture and dissent, in which his forty lexicon of keywords rest, one can derive ‘an internal, detailed and comprehensive understanding of the state’ (Van Langenberg 1986:1).25

Van Langenberg (1986) further argued that an analysis of the ‘indigenous discourse’ by means of Indonesia’s domestic language needs to be carried out to reveal the cultural identification of state-formation. However, it should also be noted that as a post-colonial state, Indonesia inherited many of the keywords and notions from foreign sources. Therefore, as well analysing the linguistic devices employed by the New Order regime, we need to consider that many of the concepts borrowed from Western modernist project
have undergone a sort of ‘hybridity’. Their meanings have been subjected to contextualisation, which may have skewed their original meanings.

If we look at the concepts highlighted by the new Indonesian citizenship education, many of them are from modernist thought. The modern concepts of ‘modernity’, ‘nation’, ‘state’, ‘nation-state’, ‘democracy’, ‘human rights’, ‘justice’, ‘capitalism’, and ‘globalisation’ among others, have been already discussed as part of the PPKn discourse in the previous chapters, and are given a strong emphasis in the new curriculum. Such terms need to be properly interpreted or defined. While the concepts are expected to ease the process of state formation and nation building, there are inherent ambiguities in their adoption. I suspect this has led to difficulty in carrying out the social transformation and democratisation of post-colonial Indonesia.²⁶ As with universalism, particularism, secular and non-secular morality mentioned earlier, this problem of modern concepts and their contextualisation will become one of the biggest challenges to the new citizenship education. In the Old Order period, it seemed hard to carry out social transformation due to the local social-political climates discussed in chapters one and three. In the New Order period, the problems seemed to rest on the over-emphasis on conformist discourse (also see comments made by informants (N) and (R) in Chapter 8). In the post-authoritarian period, it would appear that the legacy of the successive regimes is likely to be exacerbated by globalisation and technopolitics (Kellner 2003). The rapid technological, economic and ICT revolutions that have affected nearly all aspects of our social life, particularly in the urban areas, will become even more problematic for the prospects of democratisation in post-authoritarian Indonesia.
The optimistic view is that theoretical contextualisation may enrich the local culture and ‘modernise’ the people. In practice, this has proved difficult. Instead, modernist discourse tends to displace the local people, because it is generally practiced as mimicry, leaving its ‘real soul’ in the place from which it was imported. Moreover, history has shown that modernist discourse is easily employed by local power to legitimate its hegemony. In the New Order period it tended to serve political interests. Homi K. Bhabha talked about the ‘ambivalence of mimicry that (almost the same, but not quite) does not merely “rupture” the discourse, but becomes transformed into an uncertainty which fixes the colonial subject as a “partial” presence […] mimicry is at once resemblance and menace’ (Bhabha 1994:86). In a negative sense it has created a sort of confusion which hampers the social transformation toward a more democratic society. In spite of the emergence of new movements which strive to change conditions, such as the reformasi of the post-New Order regime, hybrid concepts and practices remain intact. Since their meanings and usage have not been re-interpreted, the concepts thus tend to create contradiction.

Taking India as an example, Dipesh Chakrabarty has argued that the nation-state drawn from a European secular model denied the subaltern communities’ distinctive practices, further displacing the people with opposing values, such as individual rights or abstract equality vis-à-vis communalism; public vis-à-vis private, and Indian vis-à-vis citizen (Chakrabarty 2000, 1992). I would argue many Indonesians are not really concerned with the precise meanings of the discourse of modernist project. Some may just ignore the important issues of modernity. Some may reject the modernist project because they may
perceive it as Westernisation or liberalism. Others may not really understand the meanings of modernity. For example, many Indonesian Muslims would have difficulty in defining themselves as primarily Muslim or Indonesian, Javanese or Indonesian, or Javanese or Muslim. Moreover, most ‘ordinary’ people in the informal sector would probably be more concerned with their daily economic and security necessities. They would probably be more concerned about how to live in peace, rather than bother about territorial disputes between the Indonesian central government and local liberation movements, such as the ones in Aceh and Irian Jaya. As long as they can live and carry out their daily activities in peace, they may not be too worried about whether they are the citizens of the Unitary Republic of Indonesia, members of Acehenese or Papuan community, or any names that we may label to their areas.

It is not easy to interpret the concepts contained in the discourse of modernity and the nation-state. But it is dangerous to let them be improperly interpreted and defined by the ruling elite, or simply to ignore them. In this context, James S. Coleman has identified the ambiguity of post-colonial subjects in practicing modernity and citizenship. In his discussion of nationalism in Nigeria, Coleman considered Nigerians as displaying five kinds of nationalism at once, ‘Nigerian’, ‘African’, ‘Regional’, ‘Group’ and ‘Cultural’ (Geertz 1963). Tensions between primordial loyalties and national community have loomed in many new states. Clifford Geertz considers that the ambiguity of the term ‘nation’ (larger society) allows a shift to the term ‘loyalty’ (lesser community), and that this leaves the question of whether countries such as Indonesia, Nigeria and India are nations ‘…to the determination of some future, unspecified historical crisis’ (Geertz
1963:108). The tensions between modern concepts of citizenship and primordial attachments cannot be taken lightly in the process of nation building. In the case of Indonesia, we have seen many problems of ethnic animosity and religious bigotry that are easily politicised, despite the effort to force a national cohesion on this pluralist country. To avoid the pitfall of interpreting modern concepts in relation to the local interests, it would appear that both new curriculum developers and teachers of citizenship education should be aware of the conceptual and linguistic issues discussed above.

The changes in the way the new citizenship curriculum understands and explains civic knowledge do not necessarily offset the dangers inherent in any interpretation of the meaning of civic ideal. Whether it is in the form of text or talk (Van Dijk 1998), the new citizenship education is both a formal educational project and a discursive practice for the construction and transmission of knowledge, skills and values. As official knowledge, citizenship education is expected to play a social and political role in nation building. It creates political subjects, through the internalisation of discipline and moral responsibility. This process is very much influenced by the views, interpretations and interests of the perceived authorities, especially textbook writers and teachers. Since language can be used to transmit moral principles (Henderson 1972) or in this context, civic knowledge that leads to new beliefs, it is apparent that the new citizenship education is intended to change and control students’ behaviour. Linguistic devices or codes may be employed to influence different social groups generally, and school students particularly. In the new curriculum’s efforts to serve its pedagogical purposes, some distortion may occur. The discussion in Chapters 5 and 6 has shown how ethical
propositions have been structured in the written discourse by means of a set of sociological and political notions, intended to serve as a normative guide for the regulation of individual behaviour. If teachers do not have an adequate understanding and interpretation of the civic ideal of the post-authoritarian period, it is likely that using the new curriculum, they will repeat the enactment of power differentials, restricting, marginalising and excluding individual rights and differences, and perpetuating the ideological hegemony.

**Concluding Remarks**

This chapter has shown a variety of challenges to the construction of civic identity in the new curriculum, which attempts to promote unity in diversity in the daily life of Indonesia. The main challenge seems come from the meanings given to citizenship and the civic ideal, resulting from both internal factors and global influences. Internal factors include the primordial and perennial sentiments which cause tension between the adoption of the modern knowledge and contextualisation of its concepts, between the need to practice democracy and the desire to preserve local identity, between the desire to promote nationalism based on a secular-rational philosophy, and the struggle to return to religious authenticity, and between the reliance on modern legal standards and the attachments to traditional norms.31

Firstly, the new curriculum introduces human rights, globalisation and regional autonomy into its discussion of Indonesian citizenship. This does not render obsolete the issues of
participation, rights and duties, which have relied on the reproduction of local traditional
cultures and past authoritarian policy.

Secondly, the emergence of democratic localism, such as regional autonomy, raises
questions about whether Indonesian citizenship education can meet the challenges of an
interpretation of democratic citizenship that is not based on primordial sentiments or
economic and political power. For example, the colonial discourse that regional
(subaltern) subjects are ‘not yet’ able to rule themselves, and that autonomy should
always consider the unity of the nation and its historical development, is no longer
fashionable. This is a challenge to the shift in ideological investment of the new
curriculum. There appears to be a tension between the effort to revitalize national identity
in the post-authoritarian period and the accommodation of regional voices for greater
autonomy. There is also a need for this pluralist society to strengthen its cohesiveness in
response to the impacts of globalisation. While its designers may argue that they have
reformulated the curriculum by incorporating ‘democratic values’ that can be considered
as ‘universal’, it is my contention that national and regional identities represent local or
particular histories and symbols. The resultant tension between universalistic and
particularistic identifications will be a serious challenge to the pedagogical processes,
both in and outside schools, in a society like Indonesia where the attachment to
primordial sentiments and traditional values is still strong. Moreover, insofar as post-
social world is concerned, traditional social ordering and symbols of integration are
increasingly dismantled by post-social human forms (Knorr-Cetina 2001). Globalisation,
which can be translated as ‘neo-nationalism’ or ‘post-nationalism’, will force us to re-think the issues of citizenship and nationalism.

Despite the shift from the old to the new curriculum, the power relations of the participants in the political arena need to be taken into account. The modification of the body of knowledge and pedagogical strategies of the education does not automatically constitute a replacement of the existing assumptions of power relations held by the post-colonial state. Instead, the new curriculum could be more appropriately viewed as a progression of shifts of power relations. This is particularly evidenced by the disjunction between the civic knowledge of the curriculum developers, and the students’ social world.\textsuperscript{32}

Notes

\textsuperscript{1} One project on Indonesian citizenship education which has drawn on both national and international expertise was carried out by the Center for Indonesian Citizenship Education (CICED), Bandung. Its objective was to develop a new scientific approach to building a new democratic citizenship curriculum for new Indonesian civil society (CICED 2000). This project included research and consultancy works on citizenship education carried out by Indonesian educational institutions and individuals in collaboration with their foreign counterparts, particularly Center for Civic Education (CCE) Calabasas, USA. CICED’s curriculum (adopted and adapted from CCE, USA model) was tried out in six provinces in the period of 1998-2002. According to informant (C) who has been involved in the design and implementation of the 2004 Curriculum for Citizenship Education, CICED proposed that their curriculum be adopted as the national one. However, it was rejected by the Curriculum Centre of the Ministry of National Education. Instead, some of the material from CICED was ‘adopted’ to enrich the Centre’s Competency-Based Curriculum. Another project, Center for Citizenship Education, Indonesia (CCEI) developed and implemented two specific programs: the practice of citizenship entitled ‘Kami Bangsa Indonesia’ for junior secondary students and foundations of democracy for senior secondary students in twelve provinces across Indonesia since 2002. It seems that the two projects did not compete with the one introduced by the Ministry of National Education (\textit{Kurikulum 2004: Kewarganegaraan}), because the non-ministerial projects eventually served to support the official one.

Several collaborations were also conducted, such as Universitas Negeri Padang (UNP) and University of Tasmania, Australia, Universitas Negeri Padang (UNP) and Indiana University, USA; The Curriculum Centre of the Ministry of Education and Indiana University, Bloomington, USA. However, theirs were confined to small-scale research projects rather than a nationally unified curriculum development.

\textsuperscript{2} 2004 Curriculum for Primary and Secondary levels.
Table 1 shows that civic virtue, civic knowledge and civic skills within the framework proposed by the Center for Civic Education (Quigley and Bahmueller 1991) mentioned in Chapter 2 have been organised into eight aspects in the Indonesian new curriculum for citizenship education. However, the new curriculum does not seem to follow the American model exactly. It incorporates local needs such as Pancasila, local cultural orientations related to issues of social integration and national identities, and their relations to international and global dimensions. According to the Center for Civic Education’s categories, all the eight sub-aspects cover civic knowledge. Civic virtues are primarily emphasised in ‘values and norms’, ‘human rights’, and ‘democratic society’ and ‘Pancasila and State Constitution’. Civic skills, including participatory skills, are expected to be implemented across the components during the teaching-learning process.

This information is derived from my interview with informant (C) indicated in Chapter 7.

Based on Michael Polanyi’s notions of tacit knowledge and explicit knowledge, Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) postulate four modes of knowledge conversion. They are: (1) from tacit knowledge to tacit knowledge (socialization); (2) from tacit knowledge to explicit knowledge (externalisation); (3) from explicit knowledge to explicit knowledge (combination), and (4) from explicit knowledge to explicit knowledge (internalisation).

On the other hand, it is my contention that the flexible treatment of the law and social norms, namely by substituting one for the other, can be as destructive as the interference of government by means of laws in private life. In a society such as Indonesia, legal forms of regulation are often put in contest with traditional values and norms that people still hold. On occasions people are inclined to apply traditional norms, where the law should be in force. They do not treat the law as a ‘stock of knowledge’ (Giddens 1984) that can govern their social actions in a more rational way. Instead they employ their traditional norms to solve problems or conflicts, either for expediency, for the sake of the norm itself or for their vested interests. A case in point is often seen in Jakarta, when a policeman who is supposed to direct the traffic by means of traffic lights intervenes in traffic regulation by opening the traffic controlling machine and operating the traffic lights manually. The policeman thinks that this way he can better handle heavy traffic jams; deciding himself whether the light should be red or green. In his mind, traffic regulation is just like a traditional norm, or at least they can be interchanged. In fact, he has breached the traffic regulation by substituting it with his own rule.

Another anecdotal example is the common statement made by the government officials at the time of Jakarta’s annual flooding. This is a regular event, every rainy season. The Bureau of Meteorology and Geophysics has forecast it and people in Jakarta should be aware of it. There is no way to escape from the flood. People accept floods in Jakarta as natural – it is the norm. It is clear that the officials also see the floods this way, and do not want to change their thinking. For example, instead of seeing the floods as a norm, they could enact a law and treat it as a stock of knowledge that the people should apply. If they could introduce a better law of town planning, and implement it to regulate the conversion of lands into building sites, to require well-planned drains and sewers, to conserve the resources such as land, plants and rivers, and at the same time provide better facilities to anticipate the possibility of the overflow of water in certain areas in the city, the situation would have been different.

Islamic values are normally seen as contributing to social solidarity, or civil Islam as Robert Hefner (2000) names it. However, in Turkey, since the 1920s secularisation has been adopted to initiate changes in
the country. As Bryan S. Turner (1974:164) points out, Turkish secularisation ‘was not to eliminate Islam, but to give it a social function which would be appropriate in a democracy, namely to permit Islam to function as at least one source of national culture and social integration.’

11 The third group of informants (namely informants I, J and K) whom I interviewed - who were involved in the formulation of the new curriculum - were adamant there should be no problem in implementing Western democratic citizenship elements as long as they are universal values. Democracy seems to have been understood as universal value. Cf. Amartya Sen (1999). Sen argues that democracy is a universal value because ‘the value of democracy includes its intrinsic importance in human life, its instrumental role in generating political incentives, and its constructive function in the formation of values, and in understanding the force and feasibility of claims of needs, rights and duties. These merits are not regional in character. Nor the advocacy of discipline or order. Heterogeneity of values seems to characterize most, perhaps all, major cultures’ (Sen 1999:16).

12 To date, the United Nation Declaration of Human Rights has served as an ‘universalistic assumption of a normative order based on the autonomy of the human being’ (Delanty 2000). However, there lies tension between the morality of rights and the morality of duties. This can be seen to parallel ‘human or universal rights’ (universalist view) and ‘national law as well as religious imperatives’ (particularist view). These two conflicting doctrines are inherent in the ‘positive law’ to which a country such as Indonesia subscribes. The validity of claims to law is not by reference to any moral standard, but by reference to observable phenomena, such as the constitution, constitutional court (mahkamah konstitusi) and parliament. These are vulnerable to the influence of religious views in a ‘religious society’. Insofar as universal morality is concerned, many controversial legal decisions based on rational models of natural law or positivism will emerge from time to time in Indonesia. A teacher of citizenship education needs to have a good understanding of the distinctions and relations between law (legal matters) and morality (moral issues). They should also have an adequate understanding of both local and general principles of justice in relation to the moral legitimacy of nation-state and beyond in this post-colonial society. In this way, they would be able to better facilitate students’ learning, i.e. how should issues of the collective pursuit of virtue (communitarianism) and individual rights (liberalism) be properly interpreted?

13 These teething troubles have been pointed out by Alexis de Tocqueville in his celebrated work, *Democracy in America* (de Tocqueville 1969). See, for example, Broom and Selznick (1963).

14 Human rights are indeed complex issues. The inclusion of human rights in the curriculum is an ambitious effort. While it may be able to build awareness of the people and encourage them to file complaints to authorities or take legal action, in an inefficient state these efforts seem to be wasted, because cases may not be prosecuted. It remains to be seen whether the discourse of the promotion of human rights is a transient product of the euphoria of ‘era reformasi’, or it is a true movement leading to sustainable empowerment of the people to uphold rights, that will eventually become their ‘way of life.’

15 According to Audrey R. Kahin (1994:208), ‘The competition for power between the President and the military ended with the October 1965 coup and the purge which followed it. The advent of President Suharto and the domination of the military over the government meant the centre eventually was able to develop the force necessary to destroy any real opposition potential in the regions and undercut any threats posed by movements for regional autonomy.’

16 Java seems to have benefited most of the wealth of the nation deriving from the exploitation of the outer-Java provinces’ major products. As a result, many of the provinces, particularly those outside Java Island, have begun to demand self-regulating areas.

17 See Kalidjernih (2000)
According to Article 7, Law No. 22 Year 1999, Regional Authority (Kewenangan Daerah), includes authority in all sectors of governance, except authority in, among others: foreign policy, defence, security, monetary, fiscal, religion, national planning and national development control.

See, for example, the problems of regional autonomy described in Jakarta Post, 14 November 2003, ‘Regional autonomy has not lived up to expectations’.

Castells further argues that globalisation has precipitated the decline of the nation state because all national economies are dependent on the fluctuations in financial markets. National economies are not only globally integrated, but have also lost control over monetary policies and interest rates. Globalisation has impacted on the social welfare system. It affects the labour markets, minimum wage legislation and the system of industrial relations, and undermines the social safety net providing health and other social benefits. Globalisation also has resulted in the rise of flexible and non-formal as well as self-employed labour. Castells is adamant that globalisation has a new working class consciousness diluted by a consensus-seeking industrial relations system. With the emergence of this system, workers are no longer dependent on the protection of the state. Their organisation of work is becoming more and more individualised and diversified. These social processes have thus far made the state lost its legitimacy.

As Stuart Hall points out ‘A distinctive type of structural change is transforming modern societies. This is fragmenting the cultural landscapes of class, gender, sexuality, ethnicity, race and nationality which gave us firm locations as social individuals. These transformations are also shifting our personal identities, undermining our sense of ourselves as integrated subjects. This loss of a stable ‘sense of self’ is sometimes called the dislocation or de-centring of the subject. This set of double displacements - de-centring individuals both from their place in the social and cultural world, and from themselves - constitutes a ‘crisis of identity’ for the individual’ (Hall 1992:275).

This phenomenon seems to bear some resemblance to what Francis Fukuyama identifies as the conflation of rights and interests. In discussing issues of human rights, Fukuyama points out that we cannot abandon rights and simply speak of human needs and interests. ‘Americans more than most peoples have tended to conflate rights and interests. By transforming every individual desire into a right unconstrained by community interests, one increases the inflexibility of political discourse. The debates in the United States over pornography and gun control would appear much less Manichean if we spoke of the interests of pornographers rather than fundamental First Amendment right to free speech, or the needs of owners of assault weapons rather than their sacred Second Amendment right to bear arms’ (Fukuyama 2002:108).

It is obvious that an Indonesian girl who likes eating McDonald’s beef-burger and listening to American R & B music does not automatically dislike her country’s local food and traditional music, and is not automatically disloyal to her country. She might be driven only by the ‘attractiveness’ and ‘taste’ of the foreign food and music.

See Williams (1983) who has influenced Van Langenberg on ‘keywords approach’.

In his article entitled ‘The Development of Development’, Ariel Heryanto (1990) has also contributed to the analysis of the lexical items of ‘develop’ (bangun), including ‘to develop’ (membangun) and ‘development’ (pembangunan) in relation to the New Order regime’s political discourse. There are three other works on the language and politics in Indonesia that have debated the problems of the language employed by the successive regimes. First, Benedict Anderson’s, ‘The Language of Indonesian Politics’ (1990, first published in 1966), Michael Langenberg’s article ‘The New Order State: Language, Ideology, Hegemony’ (Van Langenberg 1990) and Riga Suprapto’s article ‘Politik Bahasa dan Bahasa Politik’ (Suprapto 2001). Anderson’s writing is of an explorative style dates back to the pre New Order power. Similar to Anderson’s explorative work is Suprapto’s comparison of the speeches of the last five presidents of Indonesia. Her work focuses on the use of the ‘personal identification’ of the speakers (the successive presidents) when they were addressing themselves to the populace (Suprapto 2001). Van Langenberg’s
article is explorative in nature, mainly based on his 1986’s work on the New Order state’s keywords in relation to the state and state-system and civil society.

26 In her discussion of the Indonesian New Order state as an efficient bureaucratic machine or Beamtenstaat in Indonesia (a concept popularised by the American historian Harry J. Benda) Ruth McVey points out that, “[... ] in spite of the dramatic and drastic reversal of Indonesia’s political and economic orientation, there has not been a significant change in the bureaucratic, economic, social, and even much of the political elite” (McVey 1982:86). It is my contention that a significant change will not occur unless the underlying practices as indicated above can be gradually lifted. The problems of cultural representation, exemplified by the political culture of post-colonial Indonesia, underpinning the whole problems of social structures, notably both the individual or institutional discourse and practice are the impediment for a change. This implies that neglecting the post-colonial thesis may lead the citizenship education curriculum developers to the reproduction of a new ‘orthodoxy’ which is potentially hegemonic. Eventually students will have to absorb the ‘new civic knowledge’. Unless there is room for them to productively and creatively reflect their own social roles, the discourse of democracy and civil society will turn out to be ‘hegemonic power’ in different guise rather than a contribution for a true social transformation.

27 One of the Muslim scholars whom I interviewed on 21 December 2002 - who is not one of the informants indicated in Chapter 7 and Chapter 8 - has confirmed my observation that most Indonesian Muslims will have difficulty in determining whether they are a Muslim or an Indonesian, a Javanese or an Indonesian, or a Javanese or a Muslim, due to their political allegiance and primordial attachments. Looking at British society as an example, Michael Ignatieff, also points out the difficulty of drawing a demarcation line between ‘civic nationalist societies’ which depend on certain “ethnic” identifications to sustain nationalist commitment, and ‘ethnic nationalist societies’ which ostensibly safeguard a host of “civic” principles. (Ignatieff 1999:145). He continues: ‘In the case of Britain, for example, most British people might be surprised to think of themselves as a case of the “civic nationalist” paradigm. Asked why they love their country, they would be more likely to respond with “ethnic” than “civic” answers, citing the “English way of life”, Shakespeare, the separate island destiny, the food and the weather, rather than parliamentary democracy, an independent judiciary and the rule of law. …So the distinction between “civic” and “ethnic” is muddy. Most allegiance fuses the two… On such an account nationalism is always a mixture of the two: it is folly to disentangle them’ (Ignatieff 1999:145).

28 As in his visionary statement, Geertz (1963:157) further says ‘In any case, the success of the efforts to find a formula for balance in the midst of change now taking place in the new states is nowhere assured. A high degree of governmental mobilism resulting from the attempt to reconcile divergent primordial groups is everywhere apparent. The mere prejudices that must be tolerated in order to effect such reconciliations are often repugnant. But as the alternatives to such attempts as these to construct a civil politics of primordial compromise would seem to be either Balkanization, Herrenvolk fanaticism, or the forcible suppression of ethnic assertion by a leviathan state, can they be viewed, especially by members of a society that has notably failed to resolve its own most troublesome primordial problem, with either indifference or contempt?’

29 There are many methods of linguistic discourse analysis, depending on the purposes of the researchers (Seidel 1985). Fowler (1985), for example, propose a linguistic checklist to examine the issues of power which include: lexical processes, transitivity, syntax, deletion, modality, speech acts, implicature, turn taking, phonology, address, naming and personal reference. In an analysis of parliamentary discourse on ethnic affairs, Van Dijk (1993) shows there are many possible ways to examine the parliament debate, such as access; setting; genre; communicative acts and social meanings, participant positions and roles; speech acts, macrosemantic topic; superstructure text schemata; local meaning and coherence, variation of syntax, lexicon and sound, and rhetoric.

30 Generally, educational teaching and learning material of the can be in the form of verbal instruction in or out of the classroom, audio-visual recording, and written, such as textbooks, magazines, newspapers and portfolio. For issues of discursive practices, see Foucault (1989, 1990, 1991).
The ambivalence of Indonesia’s concept of citizenship and citizenship education can be considered as the typical of post-colonial identity. The subaltern is characterised by ‘lacking autonomy, subjected to the influence or hegemony of another social group, not possessing one’s own hegemonic position’ (Bhabha 1994:59).

It seems that in all aspects of social life there is historical continuity and discontinuity. The discussion on the formation of modern-states, particularly of contemporary Indonesia, suggests that the preservation of traditional values does not automatically nullify the project of modernity, and vice-versa. In late modernity it can be argued that we have just begun moving away from the meta-narratives of the modern project. It would become apparent that the modern project is a process rather than an end product. However, in this process both traditional and modern values have been preserved and reproduced. Since not all of the values (foundations) are fundamentally modified, there appear ‘simulacrum’ or ‘simulation’. There is only a surface modification (such as ‘pastiche’ in the postmodern architectural design), but the structure remains intact. In this context, the reformulation of Indonesian citizenship education tends to accommodate the particular regime’s political agenda, by offering the discourse of democracy in a different guise or reproduce a new orthodoxy in the name of democracy or democratic citizenship. For good account of knowledge production, see Foucault (1972).
CHAPTER 11
SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS

Shadowy Past and Present Troubles

Many educators and scholars have argued that PPKn was merely political indoctrination, because it was delivered as a one-way communication process.¹ Students were not taught to be creative and critical, or to be able to think independently, because they were not equipped with choices. As passive participants, they were consumers without a voice. PPKn can be certainly seen as political indoctrination functionally embedded in the domination of New Order regime. However, from the discussions in previous chapters, it has become apparent that PPKn also represented a cultural product through which students were expected to absorb and accept civic knowledge based on the culture presented in the classroom. The civic knowledge students were exposed to structure their consciousness. In turn, the knowledge was employed to define their social reality and shape their purposes and actions, something which Lynette Parker has named the ‘subjectification of citizenship’. As a result, PPKn, which has served the site of writing the nation, has made students the immanent subjects of a range of social and literary narratives (Bhabha 1990). This confirms the hypothesis that this study set out in Chapter 1, that the three major inter-related factors of authority, culture and structure play an important role in post-colonial Indonesia in shaping the conditions for (democratic) citizenship and democracy as a system of governance.
**PPKn and the Reification of Social Process**

*PPKn* strives to tell Indonesian students how to make sense of their world. This citizenship education is instrumental in determining the extent to which they are able to experience modernity and democracy in the complex interplay of agency, structure and culture. The theoretical assumptions underpinning *PPKn*’s concepts of state-citizen relations are classical social contract theory, the republicanism of rights and duties as embodied in the nation’s core philosophy of *Pancasila* and the National Constitution, and the notion of *Negara Integralistik*. These serve as the broad orientations on which the constitutional, legal and moral arguments of Indonesian citizenship are based. In order to strengthen this civic ideal, in the last decade of its citizenship education the New Order regime developed its arguments by means of a variety of local cultural values and norms. However the culture and structure of post-colonial Indonesia did not seem to concern itself with the characteristic attributes of democratic citizenship; individualism, liberalism and secular morality. In this regard, it is apparent that critics of *PPKn* have given insufficient attention to problems arising from the ideological basis of Indonesian citizenship and citizenship education. Although a critic like J. Soedjati Djiwandono (1995) accepts *Pancasila* as shaping the nature of Indonesian politics, he has not questioned whether the synthesis of Western modernism with Indonesian cultural values contributes to the fundamental problems of Indonesian citizenship education. While other critics discussed in Chapter 4 analysed Indonesian citizenship education from various perspectives, they seemed to have not recognised the relevance of post-colonial conditions (whether cultural, economic or physical), or the contesting political ideas.
either in the early and later periods of the state formation. Moreover, the complexity of citizenship concepts, models and (meta-) theories reworked in the last few decades - indicated in Chapter 2- were left unexplained in Indonesian citizenship studies. At best, they are regarded as analytical tools in the study of political ideologies. As a result, Indonesian civic ideal institutionalised strictly based legal-formal rationalisation and calculation, at the same time neglecting the dynamics of citizenship, particularly the evolution of new claims and new ways of belonging in post-authoritarian Indonesia.

**The Influence of Structural-Functionalism**

In contrast to Niels Mulder’s argument that PPKn textbooks have been written without adequate reference to social theories (Mulder 1999a), the discussion in the preceding chapters has demonstrated that the writers relied heavily on certain political and sociological models to support their arguments for the domination of the state over its citizens. This was made clear by informants (A) and (D), who spoke of the influence of structural-functionalism (see Chapter 8). Consensus structuralism concurs and combines with the doctrines of *Negara Integralistik* and republicanism, which serve to provide both an analytical tool and a set of moral guidelines for Indonesian society. Several of the most influential people involved in the construction of social meanings of the post-colonial Indonesia were educated in the United States in the fifties, sixties and seventies (Alfian 1975; Koentjaraningrat 1975). It would appear that structural-functionalism, drawing on the works of Emile Durkheim, Robert K. Merton and particularly Talcott Parsons, has been adopted by the Indonesian state as the theoretical basis of its civic ideal. The adoption of structural-functionalism is not a coincidence. Structural-
functionalism is a synthesis of French Functionalism and German Romanticism (Gouldner 1970). Structural-functionalism was seen as suiting the framework of national integration and nation building that the newly post-colonial state so urgently desired. As discussed in Chapter 3, this grand social theory runs parallel with classical republicanism and German Romanticism favoured by the founding fathers and successive regimes.

Using the concepts of the classical social contract combined with republicanism to this sociological model, the PPKn writers imply that their discourse of citizenship education is consistent with post-colonial conditions and local cultural values, particularly those of Java. However, the problem of consensus structuralism is that it views society as a totality which is naturally unified and unitary and homogenous. This is idealistic and at the same time conservative. In the discourse of social order, the tradition of consensus structuralism is one side of the coin, and social order is the other. Structural-functionalism also implies that the foundation of our society is static, hence social transformation is less dynamic (Dodd 1999, Smith 1973). This is particularly true when we look at power relations between the state and citizen. The citizen is dependent on the state, which holds what is effectively ‘non-negotiated power’ in an authoritarian system. Functionalism also helps to preserve primordial and perennial attachments, because in analysing the function of a social unit, we must show the role that each of the parts play in the continued existence of society (Giddens 1997). Primordialism and perennialism, exemplified by the emphasis on familial spirit and historical continuity, may be regarded as products of functionalist thought.
The resurrection and adoption and of Durkheim’s collective conscience by the PPKn writers - by which individuals are expected to sacrifice their own interests and rights to their group - may lead to over-integration. Imbalanced power relations tend to create a master-slave paradigm. For example, the poor are kept poor, because their function is to serve the rich and the powerful state. Structurally, the state is the master of the citizens, and rich citizens are the masters of poor citizens. The small people – the wong cilik in Java - are thus the victims of pseudo-collective conscience, as argued by informant (P) in Chapter 9. As a ‘functional consequence’, participation by minority and marginal groups is likely do be denied in a ‘functional society.’ Functionalists who consider that the natural allocation of specific functions or roles to every element in society is the sine qua non of that society’s survival have no difficulty in denying ‘subordinate’ members, for example women, the right to participate in the public domain.4

Similarly, if the dominant discourse is determined and manipulated by a powerful minority, the dominated majority will be required to surrender their rights in the name of the ‘national interest’ that this discourse dictates. The danger of organic metaphors that legitimate the dominant discourse is that they tend to create racism (Arendt 1970). While Hannah Arendt focused on the state-violence that resulted in racism, I would argue that the organic metaphor of national interest also helps preserve religious bigotry. This raises concerns that a national discourse of citizenship education which gives too much prominence to religious perspectives may encourage values which are not consistent with democracy. It is difficult for a pluralist society to achieve true democracy if a conformist
discourse is adopted, which requires the sacrifice of difference and minority interests and identity in the name of collectivity and uniformity.\textsuperscript{5}

The assumption that official knowledge presented in a ‘top-down’ model will enhance cohesiveness of people of diverse backgrounds by stressing of conscious collectivity, obedience and pure tolerance, fails to recognise true individual rights and differences. The discussion on rights and obligations, for example, demonstrated that \textit{PPKn}’s arguments have been derived from both pre-modernist thinking and modernist rationality. The rights and obligations of individuals are derived from God’s will (pre-modernist thought), but are legally established by the 1945 Constitution (modern constitutional model). The rights and obligations established by the constitution are accepted, because the same constitution guarantees social justice and justice for the individual. This sort of discourse, based on traditional norms and legalistic morality, disregards the individual’s potential and ambition; in short, what that individual wants to be, or \textit{telos}. Although legal instruments like the constitution prescribe forms of conduct and are thus technically normative, they are not necessarily moral. An individual’s moral behaviour cannot be judged without considering the narrative order of that individual’s life (MacIntyre 1981), and thus cannot be judged solely by religious and legal standards. Moral tradition and the intention of individuals are instrumental in shaping their moral behaviour. The discourse of rights and obligations in the \textit{PPKn} textbooks becomes problematic, because it denies the narrative unity of the individual’s life.
**The Over-emphasis of System over Lifeworld**

By failing to draw a demarcation line between the private domain and public domain, PPKn discourse over-emphasises on the system or society at the expense of the (individual) lifeworld. The imposition of social integration on a social system by an authority represents an intervention into the individual’s moral reasoning, and is an example of the Habermasian ‘internal colonisation of the lifeworld’. Civic knowledge produced by the New Order regime, socialised and institutionalised to ensure that the social system is properly integrated and values and beliefs are sustained, can be seen as instrumental rationality. It is employed to dominate societal decision-making at the expense of communicative rationality (Habermas 1979, 1984, 1987). As a result of the distortion, civil society under the New Order was effectively non-existent. Existing voluntary association were destabilised and marginalised. Social organisations were systematically created to serve the regime. PPKn can be seen as consolidating the interests of the state in establishing its ideological hegemony.

**Summary of the Assumptions and Characteristics of the Indonesian Civic Ideal in PPKn**

Previous chapters have examined the assumptions made about the Indonesian civic ideal, and the characteristics of it. These can be summarised in eight parts.

1. The state is regarded as the manifestation of the Supreme Being or Will of Deity. Thus, power is vested in the state. The relationship between the state and citizen is seen as a natural connection; theoretically as a social contract. Society is the meeting point between the Supreme Being (Macro-cosmos) and the people (Micro-cosmos) mediated
by the state, which holds the mandate from the Supreme Being to rule the world or the universe. Symbolically, the state is seen as the father and the citizen is viewed as the child. The father’s responsibility is to take care of the child. The father and child relationship is thus seen as a direct exchange and power is mutually reciprocated, implying that there is an equal exchange of power. In fact, the father has more power than the child. The power relation is uneven and unequal.

2. In the organic state or *Negara Integralistik* both the father and the child undergo a process of economic and non-economic development. Part of this development process is the formation of the state, seen as a civilising process (Elias 1971). In the civilising process, knowledge accumulates through formal and non-formal instruments. Citizenship education is perceived as a formal instrument, or a ‘Ideological State Apparatus or ISA’ (Althusser 1971). Part of the civilising process is the maintenance of social order and national interests, and for this the state seeks consent to legitimate its policies and actions. The state needs to safeguard the process of its ideological hegemony. Therefore, it needs to symbolically coerce by demanding obedience and conformity, justified by religious rationality and/or the law of nature. It creates a dependency strategy to constantly subordinate citizens. For example, rights and duties are endowed from God. Since the state is the representative of the deity, it has the power to dictate what is ‘right’ and ‘wrong’. It has the power to create deviants, because those who do not conform are considered deviants or traitors to the nation. Deviants are subject to sanctions, and may be outcast from their society.
3. To establish and maintain its ideological hegemony, the state, through the PPKn writers, has drawn on the cultural and structural conditions of post-colonial Indonesia. It has also employed systematic linguistic instruments, particularly ‘political metaphors’ to naturalise social order and fabricate new social knowledge. The discourses of these were influenced by modern rationality and colonial practice. They were used to enforce obligations and conformist attitudes on Indonesian students, for the sake of collective good and in the name of the national interest. Issues of cultural diversity and individual rights were ignored. One strategy among many was the repetitive use of certain words or sentences to establish a collective memory as a system of mind control. Many of these words were derived from Javanese concepts of social life, including serasi, seimbang, selaras, kesatuan, persatuan, stabilitas, pembangunan, musyawarah, gotong royong, kerukunan and kemakmuran, and have become mantras that have self-fulfilling effects (Mulder 1996).

4. Nationalism and social solidarity mean submission to the dominant discourse and practice. To legitimate nationalist discourse and practice, arguments are sought through primordialism and perennialism as well as millennialism.

5. The structure of Indonesian society is conceived as static. Social change implies social upheaval. Upheaval is portrayed negatively as a disturbance of social order and harmony, engendering anarchy. Individuals and groups in the society can distort social order and harmony if they do not conform to the prescribed laws and rules of the state or
regime. The state or regime is seen as infallible, and its policy must therefore be ideal for the whole nation.

6. The state structure and legal procedures are seen as the ultimate mechanism, because they enable every state institution to function in accordance with the state system. Similarly, the decision-making process, known as *musyawarah untuk mufakat* (deliberation), supported by the pre-assumed values of local people, such as *gotong-royong* and *rukn*, is perceived to guarantee the political rights of individuals and to be immune from any possible distortion or manipulation. The National Constitution, laws and regulations are considered to have power as moral and behavioral precepts. Justice will be achieved if the state applies its legal procedures.

7. *Pancasila* is seen as the ideal state philosophy, as its values are an integral part of the local people’s cultural values. Anything not embodied in *Pancasila*, such as liberalism and individualism (liberal democracy) should be rejected. Liberalism, individualism and capitalism are seen as detrimental to social cohesion and the sovereignty of the state. Following the founding fathers and the elite of New Order regime, *PPKn* writers have equated liberalism with Western colonialism and imperialism. Individualism practiced in Western societies is viewed as freedom without control, particularly control by the state. Liberal democracy is thus not suitable for post-colonial Indonesia. Capitalism is seen as in competition with the interests of Indonesian society.
The Indonesian people are portrayed as passive citizens, possessing submissive, friendly, non-aggressive and non-violent attitudes and behaviour. They are peaceful individuals playing their functional roles in their society. Tolerance can be achieved as long as individuals voluntarily surrender their rights to their community. As long as the collective goal is achieved, individual goals will be automatically achieved (Mulder 1996). Individuals thus should surrender their rights in order to serve their community, to be a patriot or martyr of the nation. These arguments remind us of the Durkheimian ‘collective conscience’ and Parsonian teleological perspectives, in which the task of all parts of society is to serve the well-functioning of social order. A unified, integrated and harmonious social order is thus possible because human beings (Indonesian citizens) are attributed with built-in values or pattern variables (or Kantian universal concepts and categories) by which citizens can make sense of their world. As a result, the psychosocial, cultural and economic motivations of citizens as social actors neglected.

**The Limits of the New Citizenship Education**

The replacement of *PPKn* and introduction of the Competency Based Curriculum for Citizenship (*PKn*) by the Indonesian Ministry of Education presents inherent challenges in the transition to democracy and civil society. The planning and implementation of a new national citizenship education with the intent of defending universal democratic values seems to be constrained by the very discourse of the new curriculum. The challenges presented have many dimensions. Probably the most fundamental is the system of political ideology that regulates state-citizen relations. This ideological system is the basis of a worldview, within which curriculum design and pedagogical methods
and materials are located. This worldview envisages three dimensions or layers of citizenship, linked with the with internal forces of post-colonial and post-authoritarian conditions, and the external forces of globalisation. While PPKn paid little attention to globalisation, PKn devotes one of its eight components to its impact on the relationship between the state and its citizens. In what follows, I would like to show how this three-layered construct of Indonesian citizenship challenges citizenship education, and relate this to the problematics of the transition towards democracy.

**Three Layer-Structures of Indonesian Citizenship**

Firstly, the classical social contract assumptions should be extended to include social exchange and exchange networks. The social contract, which views the relation between the state and the citizen as an unproblematic dyadic exchange in which power is assumed to be constantly balanced, can no longer capture the reality of rapidly growing, complex networks among participants in Indonesia’s political arena. These networks have come to characterise post-colonial and post-authoritarian relationships between state and citizen. Irrespective of its basis, be it Pancasila, republicanism, communitarianism or liberal democracy, citizenship education should recognize social exchange and exchange networks which entail actor-institution linkages that go beyond the two parties (Mouzelis 1992. Also see Giddens 1984).

Secondly, PKn should go beyond social traits and dynamics, and recognise the psychosocial drivers of social action, both in actor-actor and in actor-institution interdependencies. Social actors should be viewed as rational individuals with
preferences, interests and needs, rather than individuals who are willing to unconditionally surrender their rights by integrating voluntarily into their wider community to serve its ‘greater good’. In this context, the National Constitution, state institutions and the legal system should be seen as broad normative guidelines, rather than precepts for moral conduct. Such normative guidelines may influence the individual’s morality, because abiding by the law affects one’s behaviour and attitudes, but laws and regulations should not be used to over-regulate the conduct of individuals and groups in the society. From early infancy, social norms are internalised as major determinants of personal morality. They serve to maintain the common good without intervention by the state. Students should be made aware that government intervention in matters of individual or community ethics and morality is vulnerable to distortion and manipulation by specific groups, prepared to condone or pervert injustice in order to preserve the status quo and the supposed inviolable stability of society. For example, in the past the rule of law has depended heavily on the attitudes and behaviour of legal officers and law-enforcers, some of whom have confused their informal version of morality with the formal laws of the land. In post-colonial Indonesia, perhaps the most crucial issue is the ability to prepare students with a good understanding of the different roles of law and social norms. Law and social norms may complement each other, but they should not be interchangeable.

Thirdly, the new curriculum with its decentralised management system and pedagogical processes should be informed by Indonesia’s post-authoritarian conditions. Unless this happens, the new curriculum may create a disjuncture between its modernist assumptions
and the reality of social experience, which is likely to lead to cognitive dissonance and alienation among students. Arguably, the new curriculum may turn out as a meaningless shell imposed by educators and politicians, as was its predecessor, *PPKn*. What is needed is a multifaceted, pluralist concept of nation and of citizenship, based on the complex relations and networks among citizens rather than simply a contract between the state and citizen.

In Derek Heater’s conception of citizenship, the new citizenship education within the Competency Based Curriculum may be seen as an attempt to shift from citizenship education ‘producing participant and patriotic citizens’ within its republican tradition, to ‘the preparation of capable and good citizens to support democracy’ within a more liberal tradition. Methodologically, its purpose is to shift from indoctrination aimed at producing robotic patriots, to training students to become democratic citizens. At a geographical level, it attempts to move from ‘an inward-looking education based solely on national interest’ to ‘out-ward looking education, embracing peace, citizen and human rights, and environmental sustainability within regional and world scales’ (Heater 1999:164-168).

The shift from *PPKn* to *PKn* suggests a move to the absorption of neo-liberal ideas in the name of ‘freedom’, despite the absence of openness and enduring weakness of social control mechanisms in the post-authoritarian period. The conditions required to make democracy work include an openness which values freedom of speech, the right to fair trial, equal access to the legal system, transparency in the economy, democratic general elections, and an independent judicial system, to mention only a few. These should be
accompanied by ‘checks and balances’, including the control mechanisms of a free press, and the independence of intellectuals and non-government organisations. The liberty that democracy brings is not unfettered, but must be balanced by the negative liberty that Berlin (1969) identified. Individual freedom is subject to check in terms of the potentially damaging nature of individual or group interaction. Without this openness, with its inbuilt control mechanisms and checks and balances, the proclaimed building of a democratic state is likely to remain an ideal, while the reality remains the preservation of the corporatist state.

On the other hand, the fragmented ideas of globalisation are not necessarily inconsistent with upholding pluralism and national integration. The state-citizen power relation is indeed influenced by the flexible movement of finance, population, technologies and particularly ideas and information, resulting in social, cultural, political, economic and environmental change. These regional and global forces should be viewed in a positive sense, as producing a ‘network society’ within which Indonesia as a state as well as nation is part of the wider configuration. It is thus crucial for students to be able to understand and reflect on the effects of the functional consequences of globalisation. They should also be informed about the dilemmas of interpreting modernist concepts and increasingly liberal practices in the ethnically and religiously diverse post-colonial Indonesia. Democracy should be perceived as a mechanism for empowering individuals to participate meaningfully in their social life, express their constructive voices, and access wider or better choices. However, our freedom or right to choose should not jeopardise stability and association in the community. Our choices are our
responsibilities, governed by a set of criteria by which our actions are to be justified. In the post-authoritarian period, \( PKn \) can be seen as an attempt to embrace Habermas’s communicative rationality, through a process assuming inter-subjective relations via negotiation and bargaining based on ‘universally’ accepted and undistorted moral principles. Considering the characteristics of \( PPKn \) and \( PKn \) examined above, a discursive structure of Indonesian citizenship can be summarised as follows (Table - 8).

### Table - 8
**Discursive Structure of Indonesian Citizenship Education**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authoritarian</th>
<th>Post-authoritarian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ideational Impetus</strong></td>
<td><strong>Ideational impetus</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pancasila with an emphasis on</td>
<td>Pancasila with an emphasis on</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negara Integralistik and Procedural</td>
<td>Participatory Republicanism (Communitarianism)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republicanism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sovereignty</strong></td>
<td><strong>Sovereignty</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The State is the mediator of the</td>
<td>The State is the servant of the citizens, promoting and bringing a humane, free,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supreme Being.</td>
<td>equal and just pluralist society to citizens of diverse backgrounds.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A guardian of social order, savior of</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and model</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Power</strong></td>
<td><strong>Power</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centralised and hierarchical,</td>
<td>Decentralised and plural, attempting to promote democratic individuals and community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>attempting to preserve tradition</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Socio-political Purpose</strong></td>
<td><strong>Socio-political Purpose</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Producing robotic and patriotic</td>
<td>Producing citizens who support democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>citizens</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Role of Citizenship (Geographically)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Role of Citizenship (Geographically)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enforcing national identity; nation</td>
<td>Promoting national identity, creating a sense of membership of regional and world</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>building</td>
<td>society; combating xenophobia, war, ecological degradation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rights and Duties</strong></td>
<td><strong>Rights and Duties</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duties representing the ‘general will’</td>
<td>Universalistic rights and duties are in a complex balance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>are portrayed as universal rights</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Groups</strong></td>
<td><strong>Groups</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The ‘general will’ in society as a</td>
<td>Individuals must respect groups, and vice versa; Individuals may find their</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>whole and its constitutive groups is</td>
<td>expression in social movements, but they are to follow certain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>more important than self-interest</td>
<td>communicative procedures</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table - 8 Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Individual and Consensus</th>
<th>Individual and Consensus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Consensus is highly desirable and the main goal</td>
<td>Consensus gives way to participation and procedure</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Methodological Focus</th>
<th>Methodological Focus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indoctrination; subjectification through post-colonial conditions and cultures</td>
<td>Subjectification through post-colonial conditions and cultures and global interconnected cultures</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: adapted from Heater (1999); Janoski and Gran (2002); Parker (2002)

Although Indonesian citizenship appears to have some elements in common with communitarian or republican thought, it does not match any of the varieties of communitarianism or republicanism discussed by scholars such as Burcher (2002), Dagger (2002), Delanty (2002, 2000), Heater (1999), Janoski and Thomas (2002). As the previous chapters have demonstrated, it is a synthesis of republicanism, the modernist project, and eighteenth century German organic state philosophy, further strengthened by a perceived similarity with structural-functionalist ideas about social order and integration. *PPKn* puts emphasis on the dutiful and patriotic passive citizen, rather than the ‘self-determining civic activist’ (Burchell 2002:92). Following Janoski and Thomas’ classifications, it can be said that this ‘Pancasila Citizenship’ focuses on consensual order in which the ‘obligations representing the “general will” are more important than individual rights. The state as a moral entity has the duty to enforce the obligations’ (Janoski and Thomas 2002:18-19). The new curriculum highlights the universalist discourse of democracy, but this does not automatically mean that the established substance and practice of citizenship will be abandoned. It is likely that some centralistic,
feudalistic, primordial and communal aspects of citizenship will continue in post-colonial, post-authoritarian Indonesia, with citizenship education addressing legalistic and formalistic dimensions rather than the substantial needs of the people of diverse backgrounds.

The Implications of Globalisation and Democratic Localism for Citizenship Education

In post-authoritarian Indonesia, the old structure of national identity is now being fragmented by the forces of globalisation and democratic localism. Anthony Giddens (1999, 1998) gives a comprehensive and cogent account of the many effects of globalisation. The emergence of the global cosmopolitan society, for example, has diminished the roles of nation-states, ruptured traditional values, and increased ecological disaster and individual anxiety. Globalisation forces nation-states to embrace the market economy. It also tends to create greater economic disparity in individual societies. In these unsatisfactory conditions, it further pushes social actors towards short-term instrumental reasoning and pragmatism. Indonesia thus risks the tendency of some people to translate democracy, good governance, human rights and rule of law as capitalism, laissez-faire, individualism and law favouring the rulers (the rich and powerful).

Compared with the PPKn curriculum, there are positive differences in the way PKn treats globalisation and regionalism. PKn offers an open and outward-looking approach. However, there are difficulties in this program’s approach to addressing post-colonial conditions. The political, social and economical conditions of Indonesia in recent decades
have produced a tendency to translate democracy as an instrument to maximise the economic gains and socio-political domination of advantaged individuals and groups, without proper consideration of wider community interests. In New Order Indonesia, conformist perspectives were imposed to suppress individual rights. This ‘closed system’ interpretation of society resulted in a monopoly of information-flow, and the preservation of the interests of the dominant classes and groups. This domination privileges the powerful male over the weaker female, the bourgeoisie over the poorer people (wong cilik), the powerful rulers over the less powerful citizens and privileged majority groups over less privileged minority groups. The era of reformasi opens opportunities for the reinterpretation of society. However, the discourse and practice of openness and autonomy seem to lack monitoring and control, with the result that individual and group actions tend towards excess.

Many of the people involved in the national discourse are motivated by commercial and ethnic interests. The external forces of globalisation, with its attendant universalisation of capitalism and neo-liberalism, will also affect the system of governance and the meaning of the civic ideal of Indonesia. Capitalism may be seen as the handmaiden of democracy, but it can be an impediment to it (Kivisto 1998). The inclusion of the discourse of democracy in PKn citizenship education, with its related concepts of good governance, human rights and the rule of law, is not sufficient unless students are made aware of the other side of the coin.
Economic factors have always had an influence on the Indonesian construct of citizenship, however in post-New Order Indonesia they have contributed to the internal and external diaspora of the people, further affecting the meaning of nationalism. The nationalism of post-colonial and post-authoritarian Indonesia is no longer mainly shaped by primordial, religious and historical values. It is increasingly shaped by globalisation and democratic localism. Students should be made aware that globalisation enables greater access to information, knowledge, ideas and consumer products, but it does not automatically make conventional issues of recognition, protection, rights, and participation obsolete. Post-colonial citizenship in states such as Indonesia has also been affected by democratic localism, and is increasingly influenced and challenged by claims for recognition based on ‘identity and difference’ (Isin and Turner 2002:2). Thus citizenship is about how society promotes human rights, democracy and justice, while at the same time responding to the global forces that are instrumental in shaping the future of citizenship and civil society in Indonesia. How members of society reflect on the complexities of their social world will determine the extent to which they can control their own destinies, and achieve the goals to which they aspire.10

**The Future of Indonesian Citizenship Education and Theories of Citizenship**

The unprecedented social, cultural and political changes of post-New Order Indonesia have forced a rethinking of the model of citizenship education. The latest phase of world capitalist or neo-liberalist discourse and practice makes this rethinking particularly important for Indonesia’s pluralist society. Citizenship theories, such as those based on Lockean authenticity (contractual) and Kantian autonomy (universal) ethics, are being
challenged. Lockean modernist and essentialist epistemology, which treats meaning as fixed and stable, finds the diverse issues of citizenship in post-colonial Indonesia difficult to explain. Similarly, Kantian universalistic perspectives on rights need to be reconsidered in terms of the particularistic, contingent and special needs of the country. Due to the uneven influences of modern life and development, some groups of people in the country may claim special rights to such things as education, social security and health services. Others may claim the right to freedom of religion, or participation in politics.\textsuperscript{11}

Western theories of modern citizenship have difficulty in analysing Indonesian citizenship. As \textit{PPKn} textbooks have demonstrated, citizenship in post-colonial and post-authoritarian Indonesia cannot be understood purely in terms of Western secular and democratic conceptual terms. As a site of writing the nation, the textbooks have been designed to dramatise the ruling obsessions and privileged status of Javanese culture and the Islamic discourse of social equality.\textsuperscript{12} Official textbooks are powerful instruments, enabling the analysis of ceremonial and symbolic processes and the role of authority in the colonisation and exploitation of local cultures. They have shown the ambivalence of the ‘\textit{Pancasila Citizenship}’ discourse in supposedly preserving local traditions while practicing modernity, and enforcing obedience for the public good while supporting the universalistic rights of individuals.\textsuperscript{13} Moreover, in contemporary Indonesia the effort to promote democracy, arguably containing some liberal values, has not been well supported by legal and religious discourse and practice. On one hand, the new citizenship education tends to emphasise a discourse of radical pluralism and multiculturalism. On
the other, both the legal and religious frameworks have yet to provide a strong foundation for citizens to participate in a tolerant community, or for civil society to evolve. Some religious, ethnic, minority and gender rights are still constrained by the interpretation of National Constitution, legal rulings and religious dogma, which may in reality serve ceremonial purposes only, or be deceptive and corruptive to the real issues. The acceptance they are given is sometimes superficial. Students may pretend to be obedient, and to conform with religious doctrines and legal and moral precepts in the presence of authorities, such as teachers and parents. However, in the absence of the authorities, they behave differently, resulting in the break-down of social mechanisms. My contention is that the ambivalence of the nationalist discourse of the civic ideal in post-colonial Indonesia will prevent it from serving as a rigorous model for developing democracy and a civil society (cf. Hann 1996). Even if the new curriculum of citizenship education were replaced by another one in the future, a possible scenario is the continued perpetuation of post-coloniality.

It would be beneficial for Indonesian citizenship education to embrace the perspectives developed in Anthony Giddens’s theory of structuration and reflexive modernisation (Giddens 1984). First and foremost, students should be encouraged to see that the relationship between the individual and society is not simply mediated by norms, which tend to ‘constrain or push them to act in a particular ways.’ (Dodd 1999:187) They should regard the systemic properties of society as enabling resources, which Giddens calls rules, namely the stock of knowledge needed to enter into social interaction and to respond to various social circumstances. The concept of reflexivity is important 'because
the use of rules as resources enables individuals to monitor, and thereby reproduce over time, patterns of social action. In this way, the structural properties of society are not consequences of social relations. They are the medium by which those relations are possible’ (Dodd 1998:187).

Citizenship education - supported by other school subjects in the whole pedagogical process - that allows students to think about their social world and strengthen their intrinsic values is thus essential. It would serve to remedy the deficiencies posed by the contemporary ‘erratic’ conditions of post-authoritarian Indonesia. Reflexivity reduces the risk of viewing modern conditions from a single angle and being governed by external social forces, such as globalisation. Students should be encouraged to participate in their social life, establish social relationships and gain new knowledge without having to be colonised by internal instrumental rationality and external pragmatic influences. As well as being made aware of the failures of the past authoritarian regime and the challenges of the on-going crisis in Indonesia, students should be encouraged to transform their view of their place in an increasingly interactive world. Freedom can be achieved without having to sacrifice social order, and social order can be sustained without a return to the authoritarian and feudalistic past.

The changing faces of Indonesian citizenship education show that the nation-state is in the process of becoming, rather than being. Unfortunately, it is at the time when scholars have begun talking about post-nation-state and post-social citizenship. Western democratic societies have experienced three periods of citizenship, city-state, nation-state
and welfare-state, within the model of citizenship proposed by Bryan S. Turner (1997), and are coping with the period of global capitalism in which members of communities have shifted from being social citizens to becoming aware human beings who increasingly recognise the universality of human rights. Indonesia’s concept of citizenship is still swinging between the issues of denizen and citizen, in which legal and political rights are still being formulated and reformulated in society and through the National Constitutions and laws, and where social and civil rights are much neglected.

As demonstrated by this thesis, the last half century’s state-formation in post-colonial Indonesia has been aimed at the pacification of individuals, through the medium of moral control and constraints. The greatest concern for post-authoritarian Indonesia is the potential for the civilising process to be carried out through the continuation of actual and symbolic violence, and an all-pervasive state control. Even though social transformation and the reinvention of post-colonial citizenship may be led by the state, post-authoritarian Indonesia should be viewed as consisting of more fluid forms of association, because of its inherently pluralistic nature. This brings to mind some wise thoughts from Clifford Geertz on Indonesia’s rich plurality – his view that ‘archipelagic in geography, eclectic in civilization, and heterogeneous in culture, the country flourishes when it accepts and capitalizes on its diversity and disintegrates when it denies and suppresses it’ (Geertz 1971:19).
Note

1 The procedural, functional and judicial education model of PPKn that obscures and constrains the possibilities of giving individuals their proper due may be considered as ‘the overwhelmingly monological bent of mainstream modern philosophy’ (Taylor 1992) which ignores the fundamentally dialogical character of human being. It may be argued that it is impossible to talk about multiculturalism in Indonesia’s new citizenship curriculum before individual rights are recognised in the dialogical process in their social interactions.

2 It is not surprising that structural-functionalism is influential in the social studies of post-colonial Indonesia, because the country has placed an important emphasis on national integration since its inception in 1945. This strategy was reaffirmed when the New Order regime began to launch its developmental economy and politics. See, for example, Koentjaraningrat (1975). In citizenship education, a conceptual framework of integration, harmony and equilibrium seems to have been over-emphasised. As a result, it overlooks the fact that individual and group conflicts are part of social interaction.

3 We can draw an example from an article written by Harsja W. Bachtiar, entitled *Masyarakat, Bangsa dan Umat di Indonesia: Teori Sosiologi dan Kenyataan Sosial* (Bachtiar 1996). Bachtiar was a professor of sociology at an eminent university in Indonesia, and served several key-positions in the Ministry of Education and Culture in the New Order period. In this article he uses a structural functionalist perspective to analyse Indonesian pluralist society. He praises highly the contribution of structural functionalists for using rationality to throw light on seemingly ‘vague’ problems in society. As he argues (Bachtiar 1996:11) ‘The ideas of the theory of social integration, commonly known as structural functionalism in Europe and the United States of America in 1960s and early 1970s, have received much criticism, particularly by radical sociologists. It is associated with conservative ideology, reflecting a naïve political thought, and its orientation is on values of the bourgeoisie or capitalism. Since the mid 1970s, the theory of integration, especially the one developed by T. Parsons, has regained its position as a respected theory.’ Also see Anderson (1982).

4 In their review of S.N. Eisenstadt’s work as a revision of Parson’s theory, Alexander and Colomy (1985), point out that Eisenstadt has reconsidered the issue of conflict over three kinds of organisational indeterminacies, namely (1) the indeterminacy of solidarity relationship namely ‘the lack of specification of the range of actors who are admitted to a situation—that is, of the boundaries of interaction and of criteria of participation [i.e. membership] in it’, (2) the indeterminacy of power, i.e. ‘the lack of genetic specification of universal or general human goals and goals that can or should be sought by participants in any particular situation, and (3) the indeterminacy of wealth, that is ‘the lack of fixed specification of the range of access of different actors to the major resources which are being produced, exchanged, and distributed.’ (Alexander and Colomy 1985:14). If we look at these three contingencies, to a certain extent, they seem to concur with the issues that I have argued in Chapter 9, namely the treatment of unproblematic actors from psychosocial and cultural viewpoints, the overlooking at imbalance of power structure and the potential complex networks surrounding actors in their social exchanges by PPKn writers.

5 The influence of symbolic-interactionalism in PPKn in regulating the individual’s identity and social role is also apparent. However, social role seems to have been re-conceptualised differently from the theoretical model. Symbolic-interactionists, such as G.H. Mead (1934) theorises that individuals develop themselves symbolically and voluntarily with their social environment, through a process between the ‘I’ and the ‘me’. From childhood an individual can only develop his or her interactions with other people (socialisation) through the internalisation of norms. This concept of ‘the generalized other’ presupposes moral integration through symbolic communication between children and their society. Despite this integration, an individual is not a mere product of his or her society. As a social self, individuals give meanings to their environment. However, this picture of social interaction is not suggested in the PPKn discourse. Instead, individuals are treated as being of the same kind. Everyone’s social role is expected to be the same. Every one is viewed as having the same motivation, emotion, feeling and intention to serve society. Therefore, every one should
act in the same way regardless their social position. Secondly, Indonesia, a huge social unit, is considered as being analogous with a small social unit, namely a family, as discussed earlier. The complexity of the relations and interactions of the nation is reduced to a familial unit. The conflation of ‘life of the family with the public domain of civil society as a constitutional-legal state (Rechtsstaat)’ in the Hegelian thought of the Negara Integralistik can be seen as ‘a justification for status quo’ (Ray 1999:60-61).

In this context, not all symbols can be translated into human beings’ real life. Legitimating something unreal by means of symbols and metaphors as if it existed, such as attributing social cohesiveness to Indonesian people that they do not possess, creates false-consciousness. Moreover, inculcating individuals with something they do not need may lead them to become a sort of ‘one-dimensional man’, to use Herbert Marcuse’s term. The political life that individuals lead is but an illusion, which they voluntarily seek to meet their false need (Marcuse 1972). Indonesian citizenship is not only shaped by the modern capitalistic system, particularly the culture industries pointed out by Marcuse, but also by the authoritarian culture of the authoritarian regimes. Also see Gellner (1970) on the issues of concepts and society.

6See, for example, a communitarian critique of contemporary liberalism by Michael Walzer (1990).

7A good account on the effects of globalisation, including the role of international organisations such as International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank and World Trade Organisation (WTO) can be found in Stiglitz (2001).

8Samuel P. Huntington is right when he maintains that ‘National interests usually combine security and material concerns, on one hand, and moral and ethical concerns, on the other.’ (Huntington 1997:345).

It is also interesting to note that Indonesian nationalism which was supposed to be defined as non-aggressive one or volksgeist (see, for example, Berlin 1991) has turned to be rather aggressive exemplified by Sukarno’s confrontation towards Malaysia in 1960s and Suharto’s invasion into Timor Leste in 1970s.

9In such conditions, democracy in post-authoritarian Indonesia may be seen as caught between ‘feudalism’ and ‘citizenship’, in Derek Heater’s evolutionary conception of liberal citizenship. Indonesian citizenship may be perceived as stuck in ‘individual initiative’, between ‘individual subservience’ and ‘individual rights’. It is stuck in the ‘permeable class structure,’ between ‘hierarchy society’ and ‘civic equality’, and it is stuck in ‘open access to market’, between ‘provincially fragmented economy’ and ‘national identity’ (Heater 1999).

10Considering the enormous oppression, injustice and marginalisation in democratic and democratising states, Engin Isin and Bryan S. Turner argue that ‘Citizenship studies is ultimately not about books and articles but about addressing injustices suffered by many people around the world, making this injustices appear in the public sphere, enabling these groups to articulate these injustices as claims for recognition and enacting them in national as well as transnational laws and practices, and thus bringing about fundamental changes.’ (Isin and Turner 2002:2-3)

11One of the phenomena relating to the Indonesian civic ideal is that human needs and motivation are seen as embracing not only physiological needs or physical safety, and security needs (Cf. Maslow 1970), but also ‘religious security needs’, i.e. the prospect of salvation and/or divine retribution. Religious security derived from the Islamic perspective assumes that individual rights are endowed from God. However, the individual’s moral duties in this world are understood as ‘to serve God’ which will be rewarded in the after-life. This conformist discourse serving as a system of control of individual and social morality has long been an integral part of Indonesian civic ideal and citizenship education.

12A nearly similar issue was noted by Clifford Geertz in terms of ‘Balinese theatre state’ (Geertz 1980).

13Structural-functionalist discourse tends to produce social order at the expense of individual rights, and produce freedom at the expense of social order. See Dennis Smith (2001).
The experiment of democracy in post-authoritarian Indonesia is still greatly influenced by some forms of oligarchy based on the economic-rational choice model (pointed out in Chapter 9 of this thesis). Since no single party has ever received a majority of votes, i.e. more than 50 per cent of the valid votes, members of some political parties dominate legislative and executive. The worrying thing is that their policies are much more influenced by their group and/or individual interests than national interests. On the other hand, although they are outspoken, many special interest groups have yet to be able to influence many specific government decisions. As a result, despite the progress made, exemplified by the recent (2004) direct presidential elections, the deliberative process of making decisions at local, regional and national levels lacks the involvement of the citizenry, particularly from the grassroots.
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APPENDIX A

The topics in each of the PPKn textbooks are as follows:

Primary school (Sekolah Dasar)

Class 1:

- Kerapian (tidiness)
- Kasih Sayang (love)
- Kebanggaan (pride)
- Ketertiban (orderliness)
- Tolong-menolong (mutual-assistance)
- Kerukunan (harmony)
- Keberanian (bravery)
- Kebersihan dan Kesehatan (cleanliness and health)
- Hidup Hemat (thriftiness)
- Keadilan (justice)
- Ketaatan (piety)
- Belas Kasih (compassion)
- Setia Kawan (solidarity)
- Kepatuhan (obedience)
- Hormat-menghormati (mutual-respect)

Class 2

- Berbuat Baik itu Mulia (to do good is glorious)/ Keyakinan (confidence)
- Kasih Sayang (love)
- Suka Berterus Terang (openess)/Berterus Terang (openess)
- Kepuasan Hati (satisfaction)
- Hidup Tertib (orderly life)/Ketertiban (orderliness)
- Beriman (faith)/Keimanan (faith)
- Hidup Sederhana (leading a simple life)/Kesederhanaan (simple life)
- Rela Berkorban (willingness to sacrifice)
- Berdisiplin (discipline)/Kedisiplinan (discipline)
- Kekeluargaan (in a familial manner)
- Menghargai Pemeluk Agama Lain (tolerance of other religious followers)/Ketaatan (devotion to one’s religion)
- Bersikap Murah Hati (generosity)/Kemurahan Hati (generosity)
- Hidup Rukun (living in harmony)/Kerukunan (living in harmony)
- Mematuhi Peraturan (adherence to law)/Kepatuhan (law/rule adherence)
- Gotong Royong (cooperation)
Class 3

- *Berbuat Baik dengan Penuh Keyakinan* (doing good with confidence)/**Keyakinan** (confidence)
- *Tenggang Rasa* (mutual-respect)
- *Rela Berkorban* (willingness to sacrifice)
- *Ketertiban* (orderliness)
- *Ketekunan* (industriousness)
- *Kerja Sama* (cooperation)
- *Persamaan Derajat* (equality)
- *Berterus Terang* (openness)
- *Musyawarah* (consensus)
- *Kekeluargaan* (in a familial manner)
- *Tenggang Rasa* (mutual respect)
- *Keikhlasan* (sincerity)
- *Keberanian* (bravery)
- *Pengabdian* (devotion)
- *Kecermatan* (meticulousness)

Class 4

- *Hidup Serasi* (living in harmony)/**Keserasian** (harmony)
- *Tenggang Rasa* (mutual respect)
- *Percaya Diri* (self-confidence)
- *Kebebasan* (freedom)
- *Hidup Disiplin* (discipline)/**Kedisiplinan** (discipline)
- *Saling Menghormati* (mutual-respect)
- *Rasa Kemanusiaan* (sense of humanity)/**Kemanusian** (humanity)
- *Kepuasan Hati* (satisfaction)
- *Tanggung Jawab* (responsibility)
- *Kepentingan Umum* (public interest)
- *Rasa Keindahan* (sense of beauty)/**Keindahan** (beauty)
- *Rasa Ingin Tahu* (curiosity)/**Keingintahuan** (curiosity)
- *Kesiapsiagaan* (awareness)
- *Kejujuran* (honesty)
- *Ketekunan* (diligence)

Class 5

- *Taat Beribadah Kepada Tuhan Yang Maha Esa* (faithful to one and only God)/**Ketaatan** (Faithfulness to God)
- *Persamaan Hak dan Kewajiban* (equal rights and responsibility)
- *Keteguhan Hati* (perseverance)
• Kebebasan yang Bertanggung Jawab (freedom with responsibility)
• Tata Krama dalam Masyarakat (courtesy in a community)
• Tenggang Rasa Antar Umat Beragama (tolerance among different religious groups)
• Rasa Percaya Diri (self-confidence)/Percaya Diri (self-confidence)
• Ketahanan Sekolah (school resilience)/Ketahanan (Resilience)
• Tata Tertib dalam Masyarakat (order in society)/ketertiban (orderliness)
• Rajin Belajar dan Bekerja (diligence in study and work)/Kerajinan (Diligence)
• Hidup dengan Hati Bersih dan Jujur (living honestly and cleanly)/Kebersihan (cleanliness)
• Ketulusan (integrity)
• Cita-cita Pahlawan (heroic ideals)/Kepahlawanan (heroism)
• Pengendalian Diri dalam Pergaulan (self-control in social interaction)/Pengendalian diri (self-control)
• Kebiasaan Menolong Orang Lain (helping others)/Tolong menolong (Helping each other)

Class 6

• Keindahan (beauty)
• Lapang Dada (ready to consider and accept other’s opinion or advice)
• Persatuan dan Kesatuan (unity)
• Kebijaksanaan (wisdom)
• Ketekunan (diligence)
• Keserasian (harmony)
• Tenggang Rasa (tolerance)
• Berjiwa Besar (willingness to help others)
• Pengendalian Diri (self-control)
• Pengabdian (devotion)
• Kerukunan (living in harmony)
• Kepedulian (concern)
• Cinta Tanah Air (love for the motherland)
• Tanggung Jawab (responsibility)
• Harga – menghargai (mutual respect)

Junior Secondary (Sekolah Lanjutan Tingkat Pertama)

Class 1

• Ketaqwaan terhadap Tuhan Yang Maha Esa (faithful to one and only God)
• Persamaan Derajat, Hak dan Kewajiban (equality of rank, rights and responsibilities)
• Cinta Tanah Air (1) (love for motherland 1)
- Musyawarah (consensus)
- Kerja Keras (hard work)
- Tenggang Rasa (mutual respect)
- Kesadaran (consciousness)
- Cinta Tanah Air (2) (love for the mother land)
- Musyawarah (consensus)
- Gotong Royong (cooperation)
- Keyakinan (faith)
- Persamaan Derajat (equality)
- Persatuan dan Kesatuan (unity)
- Rela Berkorban (willing to sacrifice)
- Keadilan (justice)

Class 2

- Keyakinan (confidence)
- Kesadaran (consciousness)
- Persatuan dan Kesatuan (unity)
- Musyawarah (consensus)
- Kesederhanaan (1) (simplicity (1))
- Kerjasama (cooperation)
- Kekerabatan (kinship)
- Kesetiaan (faithfulness)
- Tanggung Jawab (responsibility)
- Kesederhanaan (2) (simplicity (2))
- Kebersihan (cleanliness)
- Harga diri (dignity)
- Rela berkorban (willingness to sacrifice)
- Kedisiplinan (discipline)
- Pengendalian diri (self-control)

Class 3

- Ketaatan (1) (faithfulness (1))
- Kependulian (concern)
- Kesadaran (1) (consciousness (1))
- Kepatuhan (obedience)
- Keadilan (justice)
- Kerukunan (harmony)
- Persamaan Derajat (equality)
- Kedaulatan (sovereignty)
- Kesadaran (2) (consciousness (2))
- Kesanggupan (capability)
- Ketaatan (2) (loyalty)
- Kesadaran (3) (consciousness (3))
- Kesatuan (unity)
- Pengaturan (control)
- Hormat Menghormati (mutual-respect)

**Senior Secondary (Sekolah Menengah Lanjutan Atas)**

**Class 1**

- Toleransi (tolerance)
- Menghargai (appreciation)
- Cinta Tanah Air (love for the mother land)
- Kebijaksanaan (wisdom)
- Pengabdian (devotion)
- Kerukunan (harmony)
- Persamaan Derajat dan Martabat (equal rank and status)
- Patriotisme (patriotism)
- Musyawarah (consensus)
- Kegotongroyongan (cooperation)
- Keselarasan (harmony)
- Kasih Sayang (love)
- Kesetiaan (faithfulness)
- Ketertiban (orderliness)
- Kesederhanaan (simplicity)
- Kerja Sama (cooperation)
- Martabat dan Harga Diri (dignity)
- Kesatuan dan Persatuan (unity)

**Class 2**

- Ketaqwaan (piety)
- Keramah tamahan (friendliness/hospitality)
- Kesatuan (unity)
- Keikhlasan dan Kejujuran (willingness and honesty)
- Kedisiplinan (discipline)
- Saling Menghormati (mutual-respect)
- Keserasian (harmony)
- Kesetiaan (faithfulness)
- Tanggung Jawab (responsibility)
- Kesederhanaan (simplicity)
- Kerja Sama (cooperation)
- Martabat dan Harga Diri (dignity)
- Kesatuan dan Persatuan (unity)
• *Demokrasi Pancasila dan Sistem Pemerintahan Lainnya* (Pancasila democracy and other systems of governance)
• *Hidup Hemat dan Pembangunan Nasional* (thriftiness and national development)

**Class 3**

• *Kerukunan* (1) (harmony (1))
• *Keadilan dan Kebenaran* (justice and truth)
• *Kebanggaan* (pride)
• *Ketaatan* (piety)
• *Keadilan Sosial* (social justice)
• *Kerukunan* (2) (harmony (2))
• *Kecintaan* (love)
• *Kebulatan Tekad* (determination)
• *Keikhlasan* (willingness)
• *Kerjasama* (cooperation)
• *Keyakinan* (confidence)
• *Tenggang Rasa* (tolerance)
• *Kesetiaan* (faitfulness)
• *Pengendalian Diri* (self-control)
• *Tolong Menolong* (mutual-assistance)
APPENDIX B

The original texts in Indonesian extracted from PPKn textbooks for discussion in chapters five and six are as follows.

Text –1


Pengertian hak dan kewajiban itu berbeda. Hak ialah kewenangan untuk melakukan atau tidak melakukan sesuatu, memberikan atau memiliki sesuatu. Misalnya, setiap warga negara Indonesia yang telah berumur 21 tahun mempunyai hak untuk dipilih dan yang berumur 17 tahun berhak memilih. Sebaliknya, kewajiban ialah segala sesuatu yang tidak dapat ditinggalkan dan harus dilakukan. Misalnya, kita melihat atau mendengar khabar tentang terjadinya bencana alam yang menimpa masyarakat. Kewajiban kita adalah harus memberi pertolongan. Dengan demikian, hak dan kewajiban merupakan dua hal yang harus hadir dalam diri manusia.

Secara umum, hak dan kewajiban manusia di dunia sama. Misalnya saja, setiap manusia berhak mendapat perlindungan dari negara. Ia juga berkewajiban menciptakan kerukunan dalam hidupnya. Dalam kehidupan berbangsa dan bernegara, hak dan kewajiban manusia itu diatur dalam undang-undang dasar dan peraturan-peraturan lainnya. (PPKn, SLTP, Kelas 3: 6)
Text - 2


Text – 3

[...]

Demokrasi Pancasila adalah demokrasi yang prinsip pokoknya tertuang pada:

1. Pembukaan UUD 1945: “…Kerakyatan yang dipimpin oleh hikmat kebijaksanaan dalam permusyarahtan/perwakilan.”

2. Batang Tubuh UUD 1945:
   (a) Pasal 1 Ayat (1) “Negara Indonesia ialah negara kesatuan yang berbentuk Republik”. Ayat (2) “Kedaulatan adalah di tangan rakyat, dan dilakukan sepenuhnya oleh Majelis Permusyarahtan Rakyat.”
   (b) Penjelasan UUD 1945: Sistem pemerintahan negara yang diatur dalam UUD 1945 ialah:
      1) Indonesia ialah negara yang berdasarkan atas hukum (Rechstaat) dan tidak berdasarkan kekuasaan belaka (Machtstaat).
      2) Pemerintah berdasar atas sistem konstitusi (hukum dasar) tidak bersifat absolutisme (kekuasaan yang tidak terbatas).
      3) Kekuasaan negara yang tertinggi berada di tangan Majelis Permusyarahtan Rakyat, sebagai penjelmaan seluruh rakyat Indonesia.
Dari uraian tersebut dapat disimpulkan, bahwa demokrasi Pancasila itu pada hakikatnya:

1. mendasarkan pada asas-asas kekeluargaan karena bangsa Indonesia merupakan keluarga besar yang kehidupannya dilakukan secara gotong royong dengan musyawarah dan mufakat;
2. menolak pandangan hidup yang berdasarkan perorangan (individualisme) dan juga menolak imperialisme dan kolonialisme;
3. menolak pertentangan kelas atau golongan yang diajarkan oleh Karl Marx dan Lenin, karena tidak sesuai dengan pandangan hidup bangsa Indonesia;
4. mendasarkan teori persatuan dan kesatuan (integralistik), yaitu negara tidak untuk menjamin kepentingan seorang atau golongan akan tetapi untuk menjamin kepentingan masyarakat seluruhnya sebagai satu kesatuan.


Suatu pendapat harus disampaikan sesuai aturan yang ada, yaitu melalui saluran resmi atau konstitutional. Misalnya, untuk memilih wakil rakyat yang akan duduk dalam DPR/MPR, dilaksanakanlah pemilihan umum (Pemilu). Pemilu adalah sarana pelaksanaan demokrasi dan merupakan sarana dalam mewujudkan tata cara kehidupan yang sesuai dengan Pancasila dan UUD 1945. Untuk melaksanakan Pemilu, telah dikeluarkan Undang-Undang Pemilu, yaitu Undang-Undang No. 1 tahun 1985. Menurut undang-undang tersebut Pemilu harus dilaksanakan dengan asas langsung, umum, bebas, dan rahasia (Luber). […]

Pada dasarnya, setiap warga negara berhak ikut serta dalam pemilihan umum. Hak ikut serta dalam pemilihan umum itu disebut hak pilih, yang terdiri dari hak-hak berikut:

1) Hak pilih aktif, ialah hak memilih anggota badan perwakilan rakyat yang diberikan kepada warga negara yang memenuhi syarat-syarat tertentu, yang pada umumnya:
   a. bertempat tinggal dalam daerah negara yang bersangkutan atau berada di luar negeri;
b. telah mencapai usia tertentu, dan lain-lain.

2) Hak pilih pasif ialah hak pilih menjadi anggota badan perwakilan rakyat yang diberikan kepada setiap warga negara yang telah memenuhi syarat-syarat yang ditentukan dalam undang-undang pemilihan umum. Syarat umur bagi yang berhak dipilih biasanya lebih tinggi daripada syarat umur bagi seorang pemilih.

Adanya badan-badan perwakilan rakyat seperti MPR, DPR, dan DPRD menunjukkan Indonesia menganut paham demokrasi, dalam hal ini adalah demokrasi Pancasila. Permusyawaratan rakyat harus melalui badan-badan yang telah ditetapkan (MPR, DPR, dan DPRD). Dalam pengambilan keputusan diadakan musyawarah dan diusahakan tercapainya mufakat. Apabila putusan berdasarkan mufakat sudah tidak mungkin lagi dan/atau karena waktu yang mendesak, putusan diambil berdasarkan suara terbanyak. Itulah prinsip dasar pengambilan keputusan yang berlaku di Indonesia. (SLTA Class 2: 64-66)

Text – 4

Indonesia tidak menggunakan demokrasi liberal karena sejarah telah menunjukkan bahwa demokrasi liberal telah memecah belah perstuan dan kesatuan bangsa Indonesia dan tidak sesuai dengan dasar negara dan pandangan hidup bangsa Indonesia, baik demokrasi liberal yang dimulai dari bulan Nopember 1945 yang disusul dengan periode Republik Indonesia Serikat (RIS) pada tahun 1949 dan dilanjutkan dengan periode 1950-1959, maupun demokrasi terpimpin yang dilaksanakan pada tahun 1959-1965.


Lahirnya Orde Baru yang ingin melaksanakan Pancasila dan UUD 1945 secara murni dan konsekuen merupakan koreksi mendasar terhadap praktik politik yang menyimpang daro asas kekeluargaan dan musyawarah untuk mufakat. Dalam rangka pengalaman Pancasila dan UUD 1945 secara murni dan konsekuen inilah, demokrasi Pancasila dinyatakan
berlaku. Karena sumbernya adalah Pancasila, demokrasinya dinamakan demokrasi Pancasila. [...] (SLTA Class 2: 66-67)

Text - 5

Hak dalam bidang politik juga tertuang dalam Pasal 28 UUD 1945, yang berbunyi, “Kemerdekaan berserikat dan berkumpul, mengeluarkan pikiran dengan lisan dan tulisan dan sebagainya ditetapkan dengan undang-undang.” Pasal ini menggambarkan bahwa negara kita menjamin kehidupan berdemokrasi. Ini berarti bahwa setiap warga negara memiliki hak untuk berhimpun membentuk berbagai organisasi dalam memajukan dan mencerdaskan bangsa. Di sisi lain, setiap warga negara berhak mengeluarkan pendapat atau isi hatinya sesuai dengan undang-undang. (SLTP Class 3: 8-9)

Text - 6

(1) Perekonomian disusun sebagai usaha bersama berdasarkan atas asas kekeluargaan.
(2) Cabang-cabang produksi yang penting bagi negara dan yang menguasai hajat hidup orang banyak dikuasai oleh negara.
(3) Bumi dan air dan kekayaan alam yang terkandung dalamnya dikuasai oleh negara dan dipergunakan untuk sebesar-besar kemakmuran rakyat. (SLTP Class 3: 9)

Text – 7

[…] Dengan demikian, tidak dibenarkan adanya pihak swasta menguasai dunia usaha yang berhubungan dengan hajat hidup orang banyak. Pihak swasta boleh membantu pemerintah pemerintah dalam usaha yang bukan menguasai hajat hidup orang banyak.

[…] Dalam Pasal 34 UUD 1945, fakir miskin dan anak-anak yang terlantar dipelihara oleh negara. Sebagai contoh, dalam melaksanakan Pasal 34 ini terdapat berbagai panti asuhan, panti jompo, dan pembangunan desa-desa tertinggal mendapat dukungan Pemerintah. (SLTP Class 3: 10)
Text - 8

[...] Pasal ini mengandung pengertian bahwa setiap warga negara diberikan hak untuk mendapatkan pekerjaan dengan imbalan yang sesuai. Misalnya, A seorang Sarjana Pendidikan, dan berhak menjadi guru. Tentunya gajinya disesuaikan dengan jabatan dan golongan. Akan tetapi, gajinya itu berbeda dengan guru lain yang golongannya lebih rendah atau lebih tinggi. [...] (SLTP 3: 8)

Text – 9


Amanat yang terkandung dalam Pasal 31 di atas adalah bahwa setiap warga negara berhak memperoleh pelajaranan pendidikan. Pelaksanaan pendidikan dan pengajaran ini selanjutnya dijabarkan dalam Undang-Undang No. 2, Tahun 1989, tentang Sistem Pendidikan Nasional (UUSPN). Secara umum, UUSPN yang berkaitan dengan hak dan kewajiban adalah:

(1) setiap warga negara memiliki hak yang sama dalam memperoleh pendidikan;
(2) setiap warga negara diberi kesempatan yang seluas-luasnya untuk mengikuti pendidikan;
(3) warga negara yang cacat fisik dan atau mental mendapat kesempatan pendidikan di sekolah-sekolah luar biasa dan pusat-pusat rehabilitasi anak-anak cacat;
(4) setiap warga negara berkewajiban mendukung Program Wajib Belajar 9 Tahun dan Program Orang Tua Asuh. (SLTP Class 3: 11)

Pembukaan UUD 1945, Alinea Keempat, mengungkapkan pentingnya pertahanan keamanan negara. Ada dua pokok isi yang terkandung di dalamnya, yaitu:

1. melindungi segenap bangsa Indonesia dan seluruh tumpah darah Indonesia;
2. ikut melaksanakan ketertiban dunia yang berdasarkan kemerdekaan, perdamaian abadi dan keadilan sosial.


Bila kita cermati, isi Pasal 30, Ayat (1) memiliki fungsi yang mengikat setiap warga negara RI. Tegasnya, kita harus tanggap dan peduli betapa pentingnya pemeliharaan stabilitas nasional. Memang, kita memiliki ABRI, tetapi tanggung jawab dalam bela negara bukan semata-mata menjadi tanggung jawab dalam bela negara bukan semata-mata menjadi tanggung jawab ABRI. Dalam kehidupan sehari-hari di setiap Rukun Tetangga (RT), masyarakat selalu menerapkan tugas Siskamling (Sistem Keamanan Lingkungan). Ini berguna untuk menangkal adanya ancaman keamanan lingkungan. Di sekolah pun kita wajib menciptakan
keamanan sekolah, guna memperlancar kegiatan pembelajaran. [...] (SLTP Class 3: 12)

**Text - 12**

Untuk mencapai suatu cita-cita diperlukan sikap rela berkorban demi kepentingan sesama manusia, masyarakat, bangsa dan negara. Pada masa perjuangan merebut kemerdekaan, banyak keluarga yang kehilangan suami, anak, orang tua, saudara, dan sebagainya. Semua ini mereka relakan, demi perjuangan bangsa. [...] Dengan demikian rela berkorban artinya kesediaan dengan ikhlas untuk memberikan segala sesuatu yang dimilikinya, sekalipun menimbulkan penderitaan bagi dirinya demi kepentingan bangsa dan negara.


1. memiliki ketahanan diri yang tangguh;
2. semangat untuk mencapai taraf hidup lebih baik dan maju;
3. keterbukaan menyerap dan mengembangkan pembaruan;
4. berpartisipasi aktif dalam pembangunan. [...] (SLTP Class 2: 81-82)

**Text -13**

Pancasila lahir tidak secara mendadak melainkan melalui proses yang panjang dan dimatangkan oleh sejarah perjuangan bangsa. Oleh karena itu, dapat diterima sebagai dasar negara oleh semua golongan

**Text-14**

[…] Orde Baru itu merupakan suatu susunan masyarakat dan negara yang stabil, dinamis, dan demokratis baik di bidang sosial, ekonomi maupun politik dengan kepemimpinan berdasarkan kelembagaan yang kuat dan bijaksana, menjamin gerak masyarakat yang tertib, teratur, maju dan tepat.

Kita menyadari dan memahami terjadinya perubahan bentuk pemerintahan atau bentuk negara tersebut karena bangsa Indonesia yang baru lahir itu mengalami hambatan, rintangan, rongrongan dan segala bentuk ancaman, baik yang datang dari dalam maupun dari luar. Adapun rongrongan, rintangan, dan ancaman itu berasal dari dalam dan luar.

1) Dari dalam

   a) Rongrongan kaum komunis melalui pemberontakan PKI pada tanggal 18 September 1948, yang dikenal dengan peristiwa Madiun dan dipimpin oleh Muso. PKI memaksakan kehendaknya dan berusaha menjatuhkan pemerintah yang sah. Pemerintah yang berpegang teguh pada Pancasila, dapat mengatasinya dengan mengambil tindakan secara tegas.

   b) Sebagian para politisi masih belum tinggi kesadaran nasionalnya terbukti dengan gagalnya lembaga parlemen konstituante menyusun UUD. Dengan dikeluarkannya Dekrit Presiden tanggal 5 Juli 1959, dinyatakan berlakunya UUD 1945.

   c) Ada beberapa tokoh yang tidak puas terhadap Pemerintah, kemudian melakukan perlawanan dan pemberontakan seperti Darul Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia (DI/TII), Pemerintahan Revolusioner Republik Indonesia/Pemberontakan Rakyat Semesta), Republik Maluku Selatan (RMS) dan sebagainya.

2) Dari luar […] *(SLTA Class 2: 97-98)*
Text - 15

Negara adalah suatu organisasi yang terbesar sebagai wadah suatu bangsa. Dalam negara diperlukan peraturan supaya setiap usaha dapat berjalan dengan lancar. Apalagi, dalam pembangunan yang menghendaki adanya masyarakat yang tertib dan teratur, aman, damai serta sejahtera. Setiap anggota masyarakat harus tunduk dan patuh serta memiliki ketaatan kepada peraturan yang dibuat mereka. Salah satu kondisi yang sangat penting agar pembangunan dapat berjalan dengan lancar ialah adanya stabilitas, yaitu stabilitas yang mampu memberikan ruang gerak bagi dinamika yang terarah, stabilitas yang dinamis dengan nyata telah membuktikan kepada kita hasil-hasil yang mulai dapat dinikmati. […] (SLTA Class 3: 30)

Text - 16

Demokrasi Pancasila senantiasa memperhatikan kepentingan bersama, mengutamakan musyawarah, dan lebih menghayati dengan rasa kekeluargaan yang tinggi. Berbeda dengan negara-negara lain yang menganut system pemerintahan oligarki, anaki, mobokrasi, dan dictator, prinsip demokrasi Pancasila tidak satu pun memiliki kesamaan bahkan bertentangan dengan prinsip-prinsip system pemerintahan tersebut. […] Anarki ialah pemerintahan yang kekuasaannya tidak jelas, tidak ada peraturan yang benar-benar dapat dipatuhi. Setiap individu bebas melakukan apa saja sesuai dengan kehendaknya. Pada demokrasi Pancasila kebebasan individu dibatasi oleh kepentingan bersama. Kepentingan bersama lebih diutamakan dari pada kepentingan individu dan kepentingan golongan. (SLTA Class 2: 104) […]

Text - 17

Dengan adanya kehidupan bersama dalam masyarakat berarti manusia mengorbankan sebagian kebebasannya dan kepentingan pribadinya untuk kepentingan yang lebih luas, yaitu orang lain, masyarakatnya, dan bangsanya, tanpa kehilangan jati dirinya. Dengan demikian, harus selalu ada keserasian dan keseimbangan antara hasrat untuk mengejar kepentingan pribadi dan upaya memenuhi kepentingan
umum. Upaya menciptakan keseimbangan ini pada akhirnya akan menguntungkan kepentingan umum dan sekaligus menguntungkan kepentingan setiap orang dalam masyarakat. (*SLTA Class 2: 48*)

**Text - 18**


**Text - 19**

Indonesia terdiri atas tidak kurang dari tujuh belas ribu pulau yang terletak antara Samudra Hindia dan Samudra Pasifik dan antara Benua Asia dan Benua Australia.

Bangsa Indonesia yang terdiri atas berbagai suku bangsa yang mendiami pulau-pulau tersebut memiliki latar belakang kebudayaan, adat istiadat dan kehidupan yang berbeda-beda. Situasi atau keadaan geografis Indonesia yang demikian menyebabkan mereka kurang berkesempatan untuk berhubungan satu dengan lainnya.

Penduduk Indonesia berawal dari suatu kekerabatan keluarga besar yang kemudian dalam penyebarannya melalui perkawinan dan adaptasi dengan berbagai keadaan setempat terjadilah perbedaan suku, bahasa, adat istiadat, dan kebudayaan. Kenyataan ini mengakibatkan setiap daerah atau pulau berkembang sesuai dengan keadaan lingkungan masing-masing. Setiap budaya daerah berkembang selaras dengan kondisi daerah masing-masing. […]

Demikian pula bangsa Indonesia mempunyai keanekaragaman suku dan budaya, hal itu tidak menjadi masalah bagi persatuan dan kesatuan bangsa. Timbul suatu pertanyaan mengapa keanekaragaman yang ada pada bangsa Indonesia itu tidak menyebabkan perpecahan? Hal ini disebabkan, bangsa Indonesia menyadari bahwa keanekaragaman tersebut merupakan kekayaan bangsa yang harus menjadi dasar bagi persatuan dan kesatuan bangsa. Dengan semboyan *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* yang artinya
berbeda-beda namun satu jua, bangsa Indonesia membangun negara merdeka yang berdaulat dan bersatu. Bhinneka Tunggal Ika itu merupakan ciri bangsa Indonesia yang harus dilestarikan di bumi kita ini. Setiap orang Indonesia merasa bahwa dia termasuk dalam satu keluarga, satu cita-cita hidup yang penuh solidaritas dan kasih sayang dalam kehidupan yang bahagia….Apabila salah satu anggota keluarga menderita, seluruh keluarga juga merasakannya. Adanya satu kesatuan dalam sistem kekerabatan seperti ini akan jelas terlihat dalam kehidupan bermasyarakat seperti di desa. Karena orang merasa hidup dalam kesatuan, apa saja yang menjadi kewajiban sosial harus dipenuhi dan dikerjakan bersama. […] (SLTP Class 2: 43-44)

Text – 20

Meskipun demikian, apabila Pancasila tidak menyentuh kehidupan nyata, tidak kita rasakan wujudnya dalam kehidupan sehari-hari, lambat laun pengertiannya akan kabur, dan kesetiaan kita kepada Pancasila akan luntur. Mungkin Pancasila akan hanya merupakan dokumen kenegaraan yang tertulis dalam buku-buku sejarah Indonesia. Jika ini yang terjadi, segala dosa dan noda akan melekat pada kita yang hidup pada masa kini, pada generasi yang telah begitu banyak berkorban untuk menegakkan dan membela Pancasila. (SLTA Class 3: 60)

Text - 21

Tenggang rasa adalah sikap menghargai dan menghormati perasaan orang lain serta dapat menempatkan diri pada situasi yang dialami orang lain sehingga dapat ikut merasakannya.

Dalam menghayati dan mengamalkan nilai keagamaan diperlukan sikap tenggang rasa untuk mewujudkan dan mengembangkan sikap hormat menghormati dan kerja sama antar pemeluk agama yang berbeda-beda. Wujud sikap tenggang rasa ini, antara lain, dapat berupa pengendalian diri untuk tidak mencela agama atau pemeluk agama lain. Kita hendaknya memberi kesempatan kepada orang lain untuk menjalankan ibadah sesuai dengan agamanya. Sebaliknya, apabila suatu waktu kita yang menjalankan ibadah, orang yang beragama lain tidak mengganggu jalannya ibadah kita. Ini adalah salah satu bentuk tenggang rasa dalam kehidupan beragama. (SLTP Class 1: 34)

Text – 22
Kita mungkin berbeda suku dan adat istiadat dengan orang lain. Namun dalam kita menjalin persahabatan masih tetap dapat akrab. Hal ini dapat terwujud karena hal-hal berikut.

Pertama, hormatilah suku atau istiadat orang lain, jangan merendahkannya. Kedua, terimalah perbedaan itu sebagai hal yang memperkaya pengetahuan kita; makin banyak kita bergaul dengan orang lain yang berbeda suku atau adat, makin banyak juga pengetahuan yang kita peroleh; misalnya, mengetahui kebiasaan-kebiasaan, tutur sapaanya, bahasanya, dan lain-lainnya.

Ketiga, pandai menempatkan diri dalam menghadapi perbedaan itu. Misalnya, kita diundang makan di rumah teman: ikutilah caranya. Mungkin dengan cara duduk di lantai di atas tikar, atau duduk bersila. Ikutilah cara teman yang mengundang itu dan ungkapkan rasa senang kita, selama hal tersebut tidak bertentangan dengan nilai dasar Pancasila. (SLTP Class 1: 35)

Text – 23

Bangsa Indonesia merupakan bangsa yang majemuk. Kemajemukan ini meliputi banyak aspek. Majemuk dalam budaya daerah, suku bangsa, golongan politik, agama, dan lain-lain. Kemajemukan ini dapat mempengaruhi kehidupan bangsa Indonesia baik secara positif maupun negatif. Sebagai bangsa yang mementingkan persatuan dan kesatuan, sudah barang tentu kita menginginkan kemajemukan itu tidak mempengaruhi hal-hal yang positif […]

Salah satu usaha bangsa Indonesia dalam mengatasi bentuk di atas adalah membina sikap hidup untuk saling menghormati, yang disebut toleransi. Toleransi diartikan sebagai sikap untuk menghormati pendirian atau keyakinan orang lain yang bertindak sesuai dengan ajaran agamanya, adat-istiadatnya, sukunya, budayanya, dan sebagainya. Ini berarti bahwa bangsa Indonesia mengakui keberadaan orang lain dengan segala akibatnya. Yang penting kita tidak saling mengganggu; dan semuanya itu tidak menyalahi aturan-aturan dasar negara yang telah ditetapkan.

Sikap toleransi dalam hidup beragama dilakukan atas dasar penghargaan terhadap kepentingan orang lain dalam beragama. Semua agama yang diakui resmi oleh negara (Islam, Katholik, Kristen, Kristen Protestan, Hindu, dan Budha) mengajarkan setiap umatnya untuk menghormati penganut agama lain, tidak mencampuradukkan ajaran agama yang satu dengan agama lain. Hidup rukun melalui pergaulan sosial antarsesama umat beragama, apalagi jika kita kaitkan dengan nilai-nilai Pancasila yang memang sangat menunjung tinggi kerukunan hidup antarumat beragama. Melalui hidup rukun, terwujudlah kehidupan
antarumat beragama yang serasi, selaras, seimbang, dan penuh toleransi. Bangsa Indonesia menghendaki keselarasan antara manusia dan Tuhannya, antara sesama manusia dan lingkungan alam sekitarnya. Di samping itu, bangsa Indonesia selalu berusaha menciptakan keserasian hubungan antara bangsa-bangsa dan keselarasan antara cita-cita hidup di dunia dan mengejar kebahagiaan di akhirat. (*SLTA Class 1: 1-3*)

**Text - 24**

Setiap orang yang memenuhi suatu aturan tertentu atau melaksanakan kewajibannya sesuai dengan aturan yang berlaku akan mendapatkan imbalan yang sebanding sesuai dengan aturan yang berlaku tersebut. Demikian pula, bagi mereka yang melanggar dari suatu larangan atau aturan tertentu, mereka yang melanggar aturan tersebut dan akan mendapatkan hukuman yang setimpal. Hal tersebut dinamakan keadilan hukum.

Keadilan sosial mengandung pengertian antara lain, bahwa setiap orang diperlakukan sesuai dengan fungsi, peranan, dan tanggung jawabnya, misalnya, kepala sekolah karena tanggung jawabnya lebih besar akan mendapat penghasilan yang lebih jika dibandingkan dengan guru. (*SLTP Class 1: 91*)

**Text – 25**


Keputusan yang diambil dalam suatu musyawarah harus benar-benar mengandung nilai keadilan dan kebenaran sehingga dapat dipertanggungjawabkan kepada Tuhan Yang Maha Esa, kepada busa dan bangsa, kepada masyarakat, dan kepada diri sendiri.

dengan harkat dan martabatnya, yang sama derajatnya, yang sama hak dan kewajiban asasinya tanpa membedakan suku, keturunan, dan sebagainya. Jadi, orang bersikap dan bertindak adil kalau ia tidak melanggar hak orang lain, atau secara positif memberikan kepada orang lain apa yang merupakan haknya. Selain itu *keadilan* dapat pula diartikan sebagai tindakan yang didasarkan kepada norma-norma tertentu, baik norma agama maupun norma hukup. Oleh karena itu, kita wajib menegakkan keadilan. (*SLTA Class 3: 9-10*)

**Text – 26**

Jika membicarakan keadilan sosial, kita hendaknya mengacu kepada Pembukaan UUD 1945 Alinea Keempat yang menyebutkan, “… dengan mewujudkan suatu keadilan sosial bagi seluruh rakyat Indonesia.” Pokok pikiran yang terkandung dalam Pembukaan UUD 1945 itu adalah bahwa negara hendak mewujudkan keadilan sosial bagi seluruh rakyat didasarkan kepada kesadaran bahwa manusia Indonesia mempunyai hak dan kewajiban yang sama untuk menciptakan keadilan sosial dalam kehidupan masyarakat.

Keadilan sosial diartikan sebagai suatu keadaan yang menggambarkan bahwa hasil pembangunan dapat dinikmati oleh seluruh rakyat Indonesia. Tujuan seluruh rakyat Indonesia mempunyai kewajiban mewujudkan kemajuan yang merata dan berkeadilan sosial, adalah berusaha secara bersama-sama untuk meningkatkan dan mengembangkan keadaan menjadi lebih baik untuk mencapai tujuan agar kekayaan alam dan hasil pembangunan nasional yang meliputi segala aspek pembangunan dapat dinikmati oleh seluruh rakyat Indonesia.

Usaha untuk mencapai keadilan sosial bagi seluruh rakyat Indonesia tersebut, antara lain, dilakukan melalui upaya mengembangkan pertumbuhan pembangunan nasional dan hasil-hasil-nya menuju kepada terciptanya kemakmuran yang berkeadilan bagi seluruh rakyat Indonesia dalam sistem ekonomi yang disusun sebagai usaha berdasarkan asas kekeluargaan.

APPENDIX C

INTERVIEW GUIDE

Group 1 - Informants (A), (B), (C), (D) and (E)

• Describe how PPKn was first devised.
• Explain what ideological and theoretical bases of PPKn.
• Explain how local cultures and political interests influence the content of PPKn.
• Explain why PPKn textbooks were considered appropriate for the promotion of democracy.
• Illustrate the difficulties the curriculum planners and textbooks writers faced in preparing the curriculum and the textbooks.

Group 2 – Informants (F), (G) and (H)

• Illustrate the general issues addressed by Indonesian citizenship and citizenship education.
• Explain why PPKn textbooks were considered appropriate or inappropriate for the promotion of democracy.
• Discuss how PPKn material might constraint the teaching and learning process.
• Explain how local cultures and political interests influenced the content of PPKn.
• Explain how PKn (Indonesia’s new citizenship education) should address issues of rights, identity and participation in contemporary Indonesia.

Group 3 - Informants (I), (J) and (K)

• Explain why PPKn should be replaced by PKn
• Explain how PKn addresses issues of rights, identity and participation.
• Explain how PKn promotes democracy.
• Describe the delivery of PKn.
• Explain how local cultures and political interests influence the content of PKn.

Group 4 - Informants (L) and (M)

• Describe and illustrate how PPKn helps students in understanding citizenship
• Describe the positive and negative implications of PPKn.
• Illustrate how PPKn material might constrain learning of citizenship.

Group 5 - Informants (N), (O), (P), (Q) and (R)

• Explain how issues such as tolerance, pluralism, rights and justice should be addressed in Indonesian citizenship and citizenship education.
• Explain why state ideologies, such as Pancasila and Negara Integralistik should serve as basis for democracy in Indonesia.
• Infer on the effects of Negara Integralistik as possible results of the enforcement of group conformity and state domination.
• Explain how local cultural values, particularly Javanese worldview and ethics, and dominant religious values (i.e. Islam) might have influenced Indonesian citizenship, particularly PPKn.
• Explain if Pancasila can be considered as democracy.
• Explain whether civil society can be identified with Islamic masyarakat madani,
• Explain whether Islamic values can serve as a basis of democracy.
• Describe how democracy can be employed to ensure human rights.