Regional Security Complex Theory and Insulator States: The Case of Turkey

By Wayne McLean

Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Bachelor of Arts with Honours (International Relations)

School of Government
University of Tasmania
3rd of June, 2011
I declare that this dissertation contains no material which has been accepted for the award of any other higher degree or graduate diploma in any tertiary institution and that, to the best of my knowledge and belief, this dissertation contains no material previously published or written by another person, except where due reference is made in the text of the dissertation.

I declare that this dissertation is not more than 16,500 words in length, exclusive of bibliography, footnotes, appendices and any maps or other illustrative material.

Wayne McLean

3rd June, 2011
Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Dr. Matthew Sussex for his support and enthusiasm while acting as my supervisor for this project. Dr. Terry Narramore’s assistance has also been invaluable throughout my Honours year. Finally, I want to thank Sam, Oscar, and Edgar for their patience during the writing of this thesis.
Contents

Chapter 1: Introduction ................................................................................... 7
  Methodology .................................................................................................. 8
  Chapter Outline .......................................................................................... 10

Chapter 2: Security Discourses ...................................................................... 11
  Understanding Regions................................................................................ 12
  Policy Outputs ............................................................................................ 16
  Outliers in IR frameworks: The Buffer State ............................................. 17
  The Copenhagen School ............................................................................ 18
  Security Definitions .................................................................................... 20
  Sectoral Analysis ......................................................................................... 22
  Case Selection – Turkey ............................................................................. 23

Chapter 3: Turkey and the Middle East RSC .................................................... 25
  Polarity and Anarchic Structure ................................................................ 25
  The Political Sector: Neo-Ottoman Agenda .............................................. 27
  The Societal Sector: Champions of Islam versus Secularists .................. 30
  The Economic Sector: The New East ......................................................... 35
  Conclusions .................................................................................................. 37

Chapter 4: Turkey and the EU RSC ................................................................. 38
  Polarity and Anarchic Structure ................................................................ 39
  The Economic Sector: EU integration ....................................................... 41
  The Political Sector: Greco-Turkish Conflict ............................................ 43
  The Societal Sector: A Society Split ........................................................... 45
  Conclusions .................................................................................................. 48

Chapter 5: Analysis ......................................................................................... 49
  Insulators Elevate Certain Security Issues in Order to Securitise Them ........ 49
  Internal Forces Contribute to Insulation .................................................... 51
  Different Sectors Pushing in Different Directions Constrain Insulators ........ 52
  Many Turkish Actions Result from Structural Constraints ..................... 54
  RSCT is a Problematic Via Media ............................................................... 56
# Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AKP</td>
<td>Justice and Development Party (‘Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi’)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APEC</td>
<td>Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHP</td>
<td>Republican People’s Party (‘Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi’)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIS</td>
<td>Commonwealth of Independent States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECB</td>
<td>European Central Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEC</td>
<td>European Economic Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FP</td>
<td>Foreign Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross domestic product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP PPP</td>
<td>Gross domestic product at purchasing power parity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GFC</td>
<td>Global Financial Crisis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPE</td>
<td>International Political Economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPS</td>
<td>International Political System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IR</td>
<td>International Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEADS</td>
<td>Medium Extended Air Defence System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAFTA</td>
<td>North American Free Trade Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSC</td>
<td>Regional Security Complex</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSCT</td>
<td>Regional Security Complex Theory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEATO</td>
<td>South-East Asian Treaty Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Turkish names and terms are written using the alphabet introduced as part of Atatürk’s reforms in 1928. This extends the Latin alphabet, using the letters Ç (/ç/), Ğ (/ğ/), İ (/i/), Ö (/ö/), Ş (/ş/), and Ŭ (/ý/).
Chapter 1: Introduction

States that exist on the periphery of regions have a conspicuous role in the international system that has consistently challenged scholars. Here, minor states such as Afghanistan and Vietnam have shaped great power politics despite their relatively weak strength and positions in international affairs. Realist approaches have sidestepped these outlier states by calling them buffers or proxies, while neoliberalist perspectives have generally ignored states that paradoxically have had an impact on international relations that is disproportionate to their economic wealth and institutional engagement.

For this reason, Turkey represents an excellent case through which to examine these so-called ‘outlier’ states. Turkey has traditionally occupied a position at the periphery of both Europe and the Middle East, and until recently has shared the traits of many other outlier states by articulating a neutralist foreign policy. But over the past decade, Turkey, under the rule of the AKP (Justice and Development Party) has increasingly adopted an assertive foreign policy to leverage its new wealth, emphasise its geostrategic position, and highlight the positive aspects of its regional historical legacy.

With this in mind, this thesis evaluates whether Turkey fits neatly into the hybrid constructivist-structuralist framework of Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT). Here, I investigate if Turkey fits the category of an ‘insulator’—part of RSCTs taxonomy designed to fill the ‘outlier’ gap. RSCT is a relatively new approach in the IR canon, first introduced by Barry Buzan in 1983 in People, states, and fear,¹ and later presented as a grand theory in Buzan and Ole Wæver’s 2003 Regions and Powers² with the goal of creating a via media between structuralism and constructivism. Within RSCT, an insulator is a state that cannot create links (and hence properly join) the larger Regional Security Complexes (RSCs) that surround it. The term insulator seems at face value to have more analytical scope than a ‘buffer’ state, which according to RSCT describes states within RSCs rather than outside them.

A central tool within RSCT is sectoral analysis. This expands on the military-political view of international politics and adds economic, environmental, and societal sectors to the analytical tools available to the researcher with the purpose of potentially identifying unique interactions and relationships.\(^3\) For this research, I use the economic, societal and political sectors in an attempt to identify insulating behaviour which constrains Turkey’s relationships with the EU and Middle East. RSCT asserts that despite Turkey’s attempts to escape insulation through assertive foreign policy, it will ultimately be restrained. As a consequence, the central research question presented here is: does the concept of ‘insulation’ adequately explain the behaviour of Turkey?

To undertake this task, I use a single focussed case study that employs sectoral analysis to analyse Turkey’s position between two RSCs—the Middle East and EU. This should expose whether RSCT is a useful way of explaining Turkish behaviour. After analysing the two surrounding RSCs I demonstrate that insulating forces are indeed visible within the RSCT discourse. But at the same time, I also find that RSCT as an approach has significant flaws as a via media which prohibits it from functioning as a comprehensive framework in which to capture the actions of outlier states.

Despite this, there is potential for some aspects of RSCT to be developed further. This is demonstrated through a process identified within the case, which I have termed ‘sectoral divergence’. This occurs when different sectors of the state pull in different directions, affecting its ability to direct its security concerns in a unified direction, which leads to insulation. In Turkey’s case, the economic sector pushes west, while the societal sector pushes east. This externally directed insulating behaviour is accompanied by a domestic equivalent, where the political sector through the moderate Islamist AKP seeks a revisionist agenda, while the secular state ideology of Kemalism restricts it.

**Methodology**

This thesis uses theory-based process tracing in order to assist its conclusions. This approach, based on the work of Alexander George and Andrew Bennett, allows the identification of causal chains between independent variables.\(^4\) In other words, process

---


\(^4\) Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case studies and theory development in the social sciences (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2005).
tracing these cases using RSCT allows the revelation of causal processes through the use of a thematic sectoral-based narrative, rather than a quantitative approach.5

In terms of data sources, much of the recent research is sourced from translated news reports via major Western (English language) news outlets, as well the domestic Turkish press including Hürriyet (‘Liberty’), the pro-Kemalist paper, and Zaman (‘Time’), which takes a more Islamist and conservative position on political issues. There have been some difficulties in accessing Turkish primary sources.6 Nonetheless, these obstacles have not affected access to broad and accurate information in English, and in particular on Turkey’s stalled accession bid, which has been thoroughly documented under EU language conventions.7

For this research, I use the RSCT’s sectoral approach through the societal, political, and economic sectors. Although RSCT specifies five potential sectors, I de-emphasise the environmental sector for this thesis. This sector is the least theoretically rigid, being captured within political-military sectors up until the 1970s.8 Similarly, I do not address the military sector, as this sector does not differ substantially with standard structuralist interpretations and might not provide outputs unique to RSCT.9 Indeed, choosing and targeting specific sectors is commonplace in the RSCT literature, and has been championed in particular by Claire Wilkinson and Olav Knudsen.10

---


6 Domestic sources are hesitant to analyse the role of Kemalism thanks to Article 301/1 and Law 5816 of the Turkish Penal Code which makes it illegal to insult Turkey, its institutions, or the ‘legacy of Atatürk’. This has been frequently used against journalists reporting on Armenian, Kurdish, and Islamic issues. Türk Cezai Kanunu, 301, 2004, http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/kanunlar/k5237.html, (accessed May 26, 2011). Additionally, translations of key text are not readily accessible in English. For example, the Foreign minister Professor Ahmet Davutoğlu’s influential autobiography ‘Strategic Depth’ (Stratejik Derinlik) has no English translation. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Stratejik derinlik: Türkiye’nin uluslararası konumu (Vefa Yayınları, 2010). Unofficial translated excerpts are available at http://www.securityaffairs.org/issues/2010/18/walker.php

7 European conventions dictate that all documents in regards to the EU must be made available in each of the twenty-three member languages. See “EUROPA - Frequently asked questions on finding EU publications and documents”, n.d., http://europa.eu/documentation/faq/index_en.htm, (accessed May 9, 2011).

8 Buzan, Waever, and Wilde, Security, 71.

9 It is important to note that although I do discuss the military throughout this thesis, much of the context is in their role as guardian of social identity rather than the traditional role of the military in most other states.

Chapter Outline

This thesis consists of six chapters. Chapter two explains and contextualises RSCT in recent scholarship, contrasting it with other key debates with the purpose of revealing the gaps in existing IR frameworks that the thesis subsequently addresses. Chapter three explores Turkey’s relationship with the Middle East, using ‘neo-Ottomanism’ as the starting point. I then explore forces that constrain it from joining this RSC, including Kemalism, the Ottoman historical memory, and the political volatility of the Middle East before assessing the outputs for insulating behaviour. In the fourth chapter I switch to the EU RSC and explore why Turkey’s EU accession process has never had the sense of urgency that has accompanied bids by other candidates such as Romania and Bulgaria. While the goals of the Kemalist project have directed it west, towards the most visible economic advantages, the economic integration process has been ongoing for almost sixty years, and resistance from both domestic and EU actors over the past decade has increased. In doing so, I seek to determine whether these delays can be attributed to insulation. In chapter five, I assess the extent to which insulation is an appropriate way to understand Turkish behaviour, and highlight contributions from outside the RSCT discourse which arguably provide rationales that are just as useful. In closing the thesis in chapter six, I provide my summary, followed by a brief outline of avenues for future research in relation to how the concept of ‘sectoral divergence’ can be further examined.


11 Ahmet Davutoğlu is the key proponent of ‘neo-Ottomanism’, although he does not use this terminology himself. He has an international relations background, and has written extensively on the subject as a Professor at Mamara and Beykent Universities. His assertive philosophy is outlined in the book Strategic Depth (Stratejik Derinlik). Davutoğlu, Stratejik derinlik.

12 Turks are viewed by many Arabs with suspicion due to Ottoman suppression of the caliphate, Arabic language and cultural values, along with their alliance with the US since World War II. For example, the word ‘Ottoman’ is often used pejoratively in Arabic. See Ofra Bengio and Gencer Özcan, “Old Grievances, New Fears: Arab Perceptions of Turkey and Its Alignment with Israel,” Middle Eastern Studies 37, no. 2 (April 1, 2001): 51-52.
Chapter 2: Security Discourses

Mainstream IR has lacked a central framework for the analysis of regions. Instead it has tended to focus on great power politics, which have placed behaviouralism and economic discourses at the centre of the debate.\textsuperscript{13} Realists, in particular, have consistently viewed regions in terms of great power interest, using utility based measurements that position regions in the context of great power overlay.\textsuperscript{14} On the other side of the debate, neoliberal institutionalists such as Joseph Nye and Robert Keohane view economic and institutional entwinement at the heart of regionalism, with bodies such as the EU, APEC, and NAFTA used as the dominant vehicles for regional analysis.\textsuperscript{15} Some attempts have been made to analyse specific regions, but most often this occurs in isolation, and has been undertaken by area specialists such as Amitav Aycharya and David Kang in Asia\textsuperscript{16}, and André Frank in Latin America.\textsuperscript{17}

All these frameworks have troubling gaps, especially in relation to states that do not fit within a natural geographically congruent region, and whose positions often have influence on the international system disproportionate to their military and latent capabilities. For example, a weak state such as Afghanistan has challenged the objectives of great powers throughout history (including the Mongols, the Soviets, and most recently the US). Thus while most frameworks refer to Afghanistan as a buffer state,\textsuperscript{18} this is a relatively narrow definition that falls short of providing a comprehensive overview of more complex

\textsuperscript{13} For example, Waltz only briefly mentions regions in Theory of International Politics (Long Grove: Waveland Press, 2010). John J. Mearshimer uses regions extensively in The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2001), but only in the context of geographical areas in which an aspiring hegemon is trying to dominate. The region itself is not analysed, but viewed as simply a variable to be controlled.

\textsuperscript{14} Overlay is a term specific to RSCT. This is when great power interest ‘transcends mere penetration, and comes to dominate a region’. Buzan and Wæver, Regions and powers, 490.

\textsuperscript{15} Robert Owen Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and interdependence (Harrisonburg: Longman, 2001).


\textsuperscript{17} André Gunder Frank, Latin America: underdevelopment or revolution (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970).

mechanisms at play such as its geostrategic position which combines with a complex tribal societal structure and an historically important trade route.

For this reason, the following chapter presents a chronology of modern regionalist approaches, to identify how certain states have ‘fallen through the cracks’. I then show the potential for RSCT to address these gaps, before demonstrating that the case of Turkey exemplifies a theoretical void in the current literature. As a result I find that Turkey is well positioned to test RSCT and the role of the insulator state. I then set up two tests using Turkey, in order to appraise RSCT’s value in addressing the status of such buffer states.

**Understanding Regions**

During the 20th century theoretical approaches to the region were subsumed by two opposing concepts. Early in the century, liberal internationalism was dominant, with the earliest IR scholars such as Alfred Zimmern viewing the future global system in terms of a democratised Kantian ideal. This was typified by Woodrow Wilson and his fourteen points, which was subsequently encapsulated in the League of Nations. From this ideational perspective, any forms of regional exceptionality would be largely irrelevant in a democratised world built around common values. A single world body would enforce international law, and the universality of liberal ideas would help maintain collective order and security. But the savagery of World War II, combined with the tepid and ineffectual attempts at internationalism by many democratic governments resulted in the emergence of a more Hobbesian view of the international political system. Led by Hans Morgenthau and E.H. Carr, classical realism moved away from what pejoratively became known as ‘utopianism’. Instead, they refocussed their analysis to the state unit, with the idea of the national interest as paramount in all state interaction.

---


21 Here, the German parliament was particularly ineffectual with instability and parliamentary deadlocks thanks to its fractured nature.

Realists viewed regional institutions created after WWII with suspicion, as throughout the 1930s and 1940s security based regionalism had become synonymous with the German style alliances of the First and Second World Wars.23 World War II was particularly relevant in this respect, with Nazi aggression in Europe undertaken with the aim of creating a distinct regional security order.24 In response, the newly formed UN curtailed the power of regional security organisations to use force under Article 53 of the Charter, by requiring specific Security Council approval for such organisations to act.25 Overall, this resulted in an emphasis on the global order in statist terms, with regional alliances seen as potentially dangerous and destabilising. Moreover, the US, as a key architect of the new world order, was particularly threatened by regionalism. While states had little scope to challenge US hegemony on their own terms, unified security regions—in which the US did not have a hand—did have that potential.

The result was that the regional security arrangements that did exist, such as NATO and SEATO, were often sanctioned either by the US (or the USSR in the case of the Warsaw Pact). Thus, despite US political opposition to regionalism in political rhetoric, policy practitioners (and classical realists) such as George Kennan viewed the world in terms of zones of US interest. In Kennan’s framework, the world could be broken down into the US, UK, Europe, and Japan—with each region a strategic arena in need of protection from Communism.26 The tools used in the application of these policies included the Marshall Plan in Europe, while US external balancing and a military presence in Japan contained Soviet ambitions in the East. Overall, the links between policy practitioners and theoreticians during the Cold War period were extensive, with Kennan, Zbigniew Brzezinski and Henry Kissinger being influential scholars as well as high level members of US administrations.27

23 The Nazi’s used predatory economic policies as part of their regime, thus extending the scope of security beyond simple military measurements. See John Gerard Ruggie, “Multilateralism: the Anatomy of an Institution,” International Organization 46, no. 3 (July 1, 1992): 561-598.
24 The most famous of these is the idea of Lebensraum, or ‘living space’ Similarly, Neuordnung, or the ‘New Order’ was designed to impose a distinct regional hegemonic German order upon Europe.
Yet the problems of approaching analysis from only the global level and the real world effects of this policy-practice divide could be observed in South-East Asia during the 1960s and 70s, when significant errors were made in assessing the influence of Chinese communism on Vietnam. Altogether, few tools existed for policy makers to explore regions and their internal dynamics, which resulted in poor military responses from the US that are still felt today. In a similar manner, emerging security dynamics in areas such as the Middle East were misread in terms of simple power politics. For example, the Israel-Palestinian conflict is a relatively small conflict in human terms, with around fifteen thousand deaths over a sixty-year period, yet a 2010 poll found that eighty-eight percent of people in the Middle East viewed Israel as the biggest personal threat to their safety. This contrasted with only twelve percent who believe that Iran acquiring nuclear weapons would have a negative impact on their safety. Consequently, the Palestinian question has become a major undercurrent in all US engagement in the Middle East, and has been continually exploited by autocratic leaders and extremist groups. In this context, ‘less-than-great powers’ are influencing the global level system in a regional setting.

In spite of the dominance of the unitary actor model, research in the 1970s did expand into the area of ‘sub-systems’, with William R. Thompson asking whether sub-systems could be viewed as distinct regional theatres, or whether regions were simply objects to be viewed in terms of great power interest. For example, in his article The Regional Subsystem: A Conceptual Explication and a Propositional Inventory, he assembled the dominant views on regional sub-systems, compiling a set of twenty-one attributes identified by researchers (see appendix A). In concluding, he complained that there was no theoretical framework in

28 This discounts ‘total war’ conflicts such as the Suez War and Six Day War. This figure contrasts with the 4,000,000 who have died as a result of the Congo/Zaire Wars from 1967 to the present, yet is virtually unknown in US policy circles. “Twentieth Century Atlas - Death Tolls”, n.d., http://necrometrics.com/20c30k.htm#israel, (accessed May 1, 2011).


30 Ibid., 78.

31 Groups such as Al-Qaeda have leveraged the Palestinian question for their own cause. See Bruce Hoffman, “Al Qaeda, Trends in Terrorism, and Future Potentialities: An Assessment,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 26, no. 6 (2003): 432. Gaddafi also provided significant support for the PLO as part of his pan-Arabic agenda as described in Craig R. Black, Deterring Libya: the strategic culture of Muammar Qaddafi (USAF Counterproliferation Center, Maxwell: DIANE Publishing, 2000), 6-7.

which to place this inventory of results, and that future research might enable these to be used more fruitfully.  

Similarly, Louis Cantori and Steven Spiegel’s 1979 edited volume, *International Politics of Regions*, documented the emerging sub-system approach, recognizing the importance of formulating a framework applicable across regions, which would enable analysis from the perspective of regional powers. The research they presented analysed five sub-systems—Western Europe, West Africa, Southeast Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East—in order to explore these as alternative points for approaching the international system. In the process they identified four unique types of subordinate systems—coherent, consolidative, cohesive, and integrative—with each possessing a core and periphery. They also identified ‘intrusive systems’ where external powers have a great amount of weight in the internal matters of states within a region, as typified by US activities in Latin America and Western Europe. It is instructive to note that Cantori and Spiegel also found difficulties in finding a place for Burma and Afghanistan—similar states to Turkey—within their framework.

Unfortunately for Cantori and Spiegel, Kenneth Waltz released the seminal text in international relations—*Theory of International Politics*—in the same year. Regionalism played little part in Waltz’s text, which concentrated solely on the state as the central unit of analysis. The only concession made for regions was that ‘regional problems are part of their [the US and USSR’s] concerns.’ On top of this, for Waltz, smaller states only use regional issues because of a lack of power to manipulate the larger system. It might be unfair to criticise Waltz’s lack of work on regions because this was not his intention. Yet the point here is to demonstrate that emerging neorealist trends, which cared little for regional perspectives, came to dominate the IR discourse until the end of the Cold War.

---

33 Ibid., 102.
36 Ibid., 7.
38 Ibid., 198.
39 Ibid.
Policy Outputs

The sudden and unexpected end of the Cold War led to questions about the explanatory and predictive power of the realist project in the absence of superpower competition. Without regional tools within structuralism, literature on regions increasingly turned to institutions such as the EU and APEC through the neoliberal lens, using the economic arena for regional data. This economic emphasis throughout the 1990s led to a lack of research on regional security dynamics, which in turn contributed to poor regional security responses to conflicts in Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Here, the theory-practice link was now much weaker than in the Cold War, yet the primacy of global level analysis remained.\(^{40}\) For example, in Yugoslavia—which had previously been viewed as a buffer state between two regions—the new institutional architecture of the EU resulted in slow responses to the conflict (despite its geographical proximity), while the US provided military support despite lacking obvious national interest. Both of these outcomes were counter-intuitive to the outputs of both the neoliberal and neorealist debates.\(^{41}\) In all, these theoretical perspectives failed to adequately describe the dynamics at play in Yugoslavia, including deep societal cleavages, the securitisation of historical identities, and the role of existing political structures in fractured states, despite the fact Yugoslavia sat close to wealthy states such as Italy and Germany.\(^{42}\) In regards to this growing policy-practice divide, Joseph Nye recently lamented that IR scholars are much less likely to go on to produce actual useable policy than twenty-five years ago, and more often their research is detached from the real world.\(^{43}\)

Thus, while regional analysis may have made leeway since the end of the Cold War within the economic realm, the limitations of the structural frameworks persist today. For example, the poorly understood nature of the Middle East region and the influence of states such as Afghanistan and Iraq have resulted in substandard responses at the foreign policy level over


\(^{42}\) By this, I mean war was counter intuitive to the potential economic benefits located in proximity to two wealthy nations.

\(^{43}\) Nye, “Scholars on the Sidelines.”
the past decade. Similarly, the Arab revolutions of 2011, which started unexpectedly in Tunisia, were not described or predicted by mainstream IR scholars. While these have been reported in the Western media in terms of democratic uprisings, the core issues at play (such as food supply, tribalism, and unemployment) were regionally bounded, and contingent on a unique spectrum of Middle Eastern issues. Overall, the failure to adequately describe events lends some credence to Martin Wight’s claim that IR has ‘a tradition of speculation.’

Outliers in IR frameworks: The Buffer State

Many of these deficiencies can be attributed to the poor ontologies available for describing states that do not fit neatly into major theoretical frameworks. In the past, these ‘outlier’ states have often been termed ‘buffers’, and have been defined by their neutral foreign policies. This is generally attributed to pressures from the large powers surrounding them, where to favour one is to risk the wrath of the other. Within the little research that does focus on buffers, Michael Partem asserts that geography is the only precise variable in a state occupying such a role, but that foreign policy orientation and economic power also work on top of geography to shape state actions. This results in a


48 Some buffers of note with historical influence in the international system include Switzerland, Finland (throughout most of the 20th century), North Korea, and Tibet (as part of the British Expedition in 1903). In terms of neutrality, Switzerland is the most well-known, staying neutral through the two major wars of the 20th century and only joining the United Nations in 2002. It is not a member of the EU despite its geographical location at the centre of Europe.


50 Ibid.
strategy of neutrality, which is expressed by leaning to one side to leverage importance, while looking to a third power for support.\textsuperscript{51}

One premise that many authors make about the buffer position is that it is undesirable.\textsuperscript{52} While a state can often leverage such a position to its advantage, it is always vulnerable to a larger state’s ambitions. For example, Tibet was used as a buffer state by the British to protect its Indian interests from the Chinese\textsuperscript{53} and lost its independence as a result of the ensuing great power politics. Finland also became the object of great power competition when it was included in the Soviet sphere of influence, as part of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, leading to two Russo-Finish conflicts.\textsuperscript{54} At the same time, paradoxical behaviour is visible in how buffered states react to and use their unique positions. For instance, Liechtenstein and Andorra were established as buffer states, and both remained neutral and unaffected by WWII, despite their lack of military power. Similarly, North Korea, an artificially divided and poor ‘hermit’ state has managed to exert significant influence on the global stage. Overall, then, the historical survival and weight of many buffer states suggests an important role in the international system that has defied traditional approaches.

\textit{The Copenhagen School}

A potentially more satisfying explanation for buffer states in their regional context can be found within RSCT using the concept of insulation. RSCT has positioned itself as a theory that claims to account for both regions and these idiosyncratic ‘buffer’ states, while maintaining the structural foundations of a neorealist approach. According to RSCT, ‘the world in a sense consists of three things: RSCs, insulator states, and global level powers’.\textsuperscript{55} RSCs themselves are constructed using four variables: geography; the anarchic system; power polarity; and the social construction of security threats through patterns of amity and enmity (security interdependence).\textsuperscript{56} An insulator is not part of a RSC itself and is wedged in-between two or more RSCs. This differentiates it from a buffer, which only

\footnotesize
\textsuperscript{51} Ibid., 20.
\textsuperscript{52} For example, see Amry Vandenbosch, “The Small States in International Politics and Organization,” \textit{The Journal of Politics} 26, no. 2 (May 1, 1964): 293-312; Partem, “The Buffer System in International Relations.”
\textsuperscript{55} Buzan and Waever, \textit{Regions and powers}, 483.
\textsuperscript{56} Ibid., 53.
appears within an RSC containing strong security patterns.\textsuperscript{57} For example, East Germany and Yugoslavia buffered two strong ideological poles in the EU RSC throughout the Cold War. In contrast, Turkey’s position between three RSCs led to superpower overlay, but this lacked the security exigency of the Iron Curtain. This is caused by the ‘zone of relative indifference’\textsuperscript{58} that insulators inhabit, where ‘everything is connected to everything else but, relatively speaking, there are lines or zones with much less security interdependence than on either side’.\textsuperscript{59} In blunt strategic terms, insulators absorb the energies of a RSC’s periphery,\textsuperscript{60} which means that states such as Turkey should not be able to ‘bring together different RSCs to form one strategic arena’.\textsuperscript{61}

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{map.png}
\caption{Turkey, the EU RSC, and the Middle Eastern RSC}
\end{figure}

This is not to say that insulators are forever locked in this role. Indeed, they can become part of an RSC through evolution. According to RSCT, there are three evolutions that can occur.\textsuperscript{62} The first is when states act together to maintain the status quo. The second is internal reconfiguration, which could happen, for example, through an internal change from

\textsuperscript{57} Buzan and Waever, Regions and powers, 41.
\textsuperscript{58} Ibid., 484.
\textsuperscript{59} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{60} Ibid., 485.
\textsuperscript{61} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{62} Ibid., 53.
bipolarity to multipolarity. The third is external transformation. This involves a change in RSC membership, or alternatively a transformation of its essential structure. So, for instance, a change in essential structure for Turkey might consist of Syria, Russia and Greece acting strategically together against Turkey, which would form a new RSC.

**Security Definitions**

Given that in the RSCT discourse different actions and behaviours present different threats to different actors, a central question concerns the definition of security. Here, the Copenhagen School redefines security away from utility-based measurements to one that is a contested concept. This contrasts with realism, where Cold War-era security was one of the ‘least contested concepts’ in IR. The Copenhagen School challenges this, with David Lake viewing realist ideas about security as simple ‘military subservience’. To him, this does not equate to security per se, but rather ‘controlled insecurity’. In other words, security is not just physical authority, but the ability to efficiently coerce and dominate the structures behind securitisable objects, including the economy and environment, or even more abstract concepts such as ‘hearts and minds’.

Instead, Buzan explains that ‘the nature of security defies pursuit of an agreed definition’. Likewise, for Ken Booth, the challenge of defining security in this contested form is that it ‘is a condition, like health or status, which defies easy definition and analysis’, so, the provision of security might be described most simply as the ‘absence of threats’. Hence, security can be ‘life threatening’, but can also be ‘life altering’, and is consequently a relative concept. When using this meaning, the threat of something as seemingly trivial as a tax

---

63 Buzan and Waever, Regions and powers, 53
64 Ibid., 485.
65 Buzan, People, states, and fear, 10.
67 Lake and Morgan, Regional orders, 21.
68 Ibid.
71 Ibid., 100.
72 Ibid., 101.
increase in an affluent society can be defined in terms of security.\textsuperscript{73} This is both positive, because it allows a moving definition of security, but potentially negative in the sense that everything can be securitised, leading to an increasingly complex scope with little practical use.

As a consequence of this shifting definition, the Copenhagen School views the source of security in a socially constructed process, which occurs through a three-phase ‘securitisation’ process. These three phases are: an existential threat to a referent object (a \textit{speech act}); the initiation of emergency actions in order to secure the \textit{referent object}; and acceptance of the speech act by the relevant audience.\textsuperscript{74} Additionally, the referent object has three potential types. The first is non-political. This includes issues that require little or no state involvement, such as local governance. The second stage is politicised, which means that an issue is dealt with through policy implemented by government. Examples here include government legislation such as criminalising insider trading, or providing security from violence by prosecuting assaults. The final phase is when an object is securitised and politically expedient actions are justified by the securitisation act. Overall, securitisation to protect the referent object occurs when the policy-legislative process is too slow to deal with something that is perceived as an immediate danger.

A typical example of securitisation happened in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, where the US took extraordinary legal measures, such as labelling jihadists within sovereign states as stateless ‘enemy combatants’, in order to counter terrorism. Importantly, the audience—with some notable exceptions\textsuperscript{75}—accepted the speech act, resulting in terrorism becoming successfully securitised. This allowed controversial policy such as the Bybee memo and the Patriot Act to be enacted.\textsuperscript{76} It should be emphasised that securitisation is generally seen as

\textsuperscript{73} In this hypothetical example, the ‘rich’ would be the relevant audience, and their living standards the referent object, which is ‘threatened’ by increased taxation.  
\textsuperscript{75} Support for the occupation of Iraq was high initially in the US, and the UK, but supported decreased substantially after the premises for the war were found to be questionable. In the UK, the turn in public opinion was particularly sharp, with 1 million in London protesting the war in Hyde Park in 2003. “‘Million’ march against Iraq war,” \textit{BBC News Online}, February 16, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/2765041.stm, (accessed May 29, 2011). In this instance, it could be argued that Blair terrorism was ‘desecuritised’ as the public rejected the ‘speech act’.  
\textsuperscript{76} The Bybee memo allowed the president to possess ‘complete discretion in the exercise of his Commander-in-Chief authority and in conducting operations against hostile forces’ which enabled policy such as ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’ and the targeting of stateless ‘enemy combatants’ under Deputy Assistant Attorney John Yoo’s ‘unitary executive theory’ William E. Scheuerman, “Carl Schmitt and the Road to Abu Ghraib,” \textit{Constellations} 13, no. 1 (2006): 118. The Patriot Act also was anti-terrorist legislation that gives law enforcement and intelligence agencies the power to eavesdrop
a negative outcome, and that in order to ameliorate the potential for conflict, it is preferable for objects to be desecuritised, and dealt with through normal political processes.

Regional Security Complexes themselves are formed through strong patterns of amity and enmity as a consequence of securitisation/deseccuritisation processes. Away from the regional level, and in acceptance of its (partly) neorealist heritage, RSCT breaks down the international system into three tiers, consisting of states, regions, and the global. The global level is described as possessing a 1+4+regions\(^7\) structure of power. The US is at the apex, accompanied by the sub-global powers of the EU, Japan, China and Russia and then regions themselves. This is essentially a modified and updated version of a structuralist’s idea of bipolarity and multipolarism. Of the global regions, there are eleven security complexes, each of which feature one of three internal characteristics—centred, great power, or standard.\(^8\)

**Sectoral Analysis**

The third pillar of the Copenhagen School, following RSCs and securitisation, is the ability to analyse the international system using different ‘sectors’. These are interchangeable lenses through which the international system can be framed and analysed.\(^9\) This is not a new concept, but the way that Buzan and Waever codify sectors into a matrix which can be used at multiple analytical levels is unique. Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde clarify the sectoral model in ‘Security: A New Framework for Analysis’, identifying military, political, societal, economic and environmental areas as the key spaces

---

77 This consists of the sole US superpower, accompanied by the EU, China, Japan, and Russia. See appendix B for a complete chart of the RSCs. Buzan and Waever, *Regions and powers*, 46.

78 The EU, Russia and North America are examples of centred systems, which are unipolar RSCs, dominated by a major state. North-east Asia is the only Great Power RSC, and has a bipolar balance between China and Japan, which is for the large part stable. Finally, the remaining seven RSCs are ‘standard’, with no clear state hierarchy within them. As a consequence, these tend to be less stable, with parallels to a structuralist’s multipolar system. A breakdown of these RSCs is found in appendix A.

that interact to form security dynamics, with sectors a way of ‘ordering priorities’ and reducing ‘complexity to facilitate analysis’. For example, Turkey might be approached using the ‘nation’ as the referent object. Using sectoral discourse, we can frame the 1999 Izmit earthquake that killed 17,000 people by using the environmental sector, which was then transferred across to the political realm during an unexpected improvement in relations with Greece during aid cooperation. Thus, sectors are not atomistic lenses in the sense that the analyst is bound exclusively to that sector, but instead used to create a tighter focus on the issues at play within the securitised object.

**Case Selection – Turkey**

Turkey is an excellent case to assess whether RSCT is a useful way of describing outlier states using the category of insulator. First, it fits the outlier label described earlier. Second, Turkey sits at the nexus of many of the dilemmas presented in this chapter. Furthermore, while a ‘typical’ buffer state, Turkey has a central difference from many buffer states in that it is an assertive outlier. Using traditional power measurements, Turkey is strong in the military and economic sectors. It is a member of the G20, and possesses military personnel numbering over 500,000. The combination of economic, military and societal assertiveness means that unlike many insulators, Turkey has the capacity to try and escape the status quo. Indeed, its recent foreign policy has signalled a desire to do this. The last decade has accelerated this shift, where its position is more vulnerable to proximate threats, including instability in the Caucasus and the resurgence of political Islam. As it can no longer leverage its neutrality in the context of superpower competition, it must compete on its own terms. But in spite of this, RSCs predictive tools suggest that pressure from the peripheries of the EU and Middle East RSCs will constrain its ability to comprehensively link its security dynamics outside of its borders, and into other RSCs.

---


84 Buzan and Wæver, *Regions and powers*, 65-70.
An empirical expression of these insulating processes is found in Turkey through Kemalism. Menderes Cinar views Kemalism as a ‘shield against the outside in the aftermath of the Ottoman empire’s decline’, which can be interpreted through RSC as a policy resulting from insulating forces. This is supported by the fact that Turkish foreign policy had been neutral during the Cold War on many regional security issues (such as Israel) and until recently it distanced itself from the Middle East politically. As a consequence, sectoral analysis should allow a widening of analysis away from Kemalism, to explore how recent moves by the AKP have resulted in Turkish Foreign policy moving away from a neutral stance, towards a more assertive regional outlook. This is most notable in Davutoğlu’s foreign policy, which clearly views Turkey as a central power within a new international order. As such, these varied and competing security dynamics make for an excellent case on which to use the Copenhagen School’s security framework in an attempt to observe and analyse insulating behaviour.

---

85 Kemalism is the guiding ideology of the Turkish state which emerged from Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s reforms of the 1920s, were a modernisation project was undertaken to shift the state in a Western direction after the end of the Ottoman Empire. ‘Kemalism’s six pillars are: ‘secularism (removing the direct influence of religious leaders on political decisions and education); republicanism (organising the polity as a modern state, as opposed to the Ottoman Empire); populism (not accepting class divisions, but making the well-being of the people as a whole the central aim of politics); nationalism (establishing a single, unified Turkish nation beyond religious or ethnic allegiances); etatism (securing state influence in the economy); reformism (continuous adaptation of the state to new conditions)’ from Barry Buzan and Thomas Diez, “The European Union and Turkey,” Survival 41, no. 1 (1999): 41-57; Buzan and Waever, Regions and powers, 392. While Kemalism described the state ideology, it also encompasses a wide range of internal groups united by their rejection of foreign interventionism and imperialism, who having differing interpretations of Atatürk’s vision, including left, right, and ultranationalists groups such as the ‘Grey Wolves’ and the Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (the National Action Party).


Chapter 3: Turkey and the Middle East RSC

In the analysis of Turkey from the perspective of RSCT, I start with the Middle East RSC, where a central feature in the structure of the RSC is the diminished role of the state as referent object. The most immediate examples are the Kurdish and Palestinian issues, which revolve around ‘nations’ rather than states, while statist roles within the Arab world have consistently been challenged over the past century. The lack of Westphalian identification was demonstrated by a 2010 poll on identity which found that thirty-eight percent of people in the Middle East identified as Muslim, compared to thirty-three percent who viewed state citizenship as their core identity. Using RSCT, this lucidity in self-identity gives Turkey many more issues to potentially securitise and ‘escape’ insulation, but these carry a higher risk given the volatility of the region. I begin this process by looking at the so-called ‘neo-Ottoman agenda’ pursued by the AKP within the political sector. Next, I widen out to the societal sector, where the AKP has attempted to link together the political and societal sectors, with Turkey’s societal ‘brand’ under Kemalism a highly restrictive force. In ending, I briefly assess the future impact of the small, but growing, economic sector.

Middle East RSC Structure

Before moving to the sectoral discourse, I provide an overview of the Middle East using RSCTs structural tools. Using these, the Middle East RSC is a standard type with no great powers, although individual states have put themselves forward as contenders. At various points, Gaddafi, Nasser, and the Baathists in Iraq and Syria have attempted to lead

90 There are three structures within RSCs. These are: ‘centred’, in which there is a single powerful hegemon; ‘Great power’ where a balance of power exists. Only The North Asian complex has this structure at the present time; and ‘standard’, which is a complex possess multiple poles, and no clear regional order. Appendix B shows the complete structure of RSCs.
93 Early Baathist ideology was formulated by Michel Aflaq and had many parallels with Kemalism, except with a regional Arab reach. Its goals were to achieve Arab unity through modernity using
regional order through pan-regional expressions of power. Yet frequent low-level warfare and religious and tribal conflicts that blur ideas of state sovereignty, have combined with poor economic opportunities to prevent any aspirant hegemom emerging. In turn, this has left the RSC periphery open to external influence.

The Middle East RSC and sub complexes

This is shown in the RSCs internal structure, with the Gulf sub complex revolving around a ‘triangular rivalry’ featuring Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia, which has resulted in conflicts including the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-1988, and hostile Saudi-Iraqi relations as a result of the first Gulf War. To the West, in the Levant sub complex, the presence of Israel and its close military and political relationship with the US has helped contain Egypt, which defected to militarily ally with the US after the Camp David Accords in 1980. Similarly, the close US relationship with Saudi Arabia, combined with its oil wealth, has buffered potential rivals in Egypt and Iraq. This combination of issues makes the Middle East relatively ‘penetrable’ on soft issues, when compared to the EU.

In terms of Turkish engagement with the RSC, Buzan and Wæver map out the First Gulf War (1991) as a period which begins a new set of security dynamics of major importance to Turkey. A significant event was the suppression of the Kurds in northern Iraq by Saddam

94 Buzan and Wæver, Regions and powers, 191.
96 Buzan and Wæver, Regions and powers, 203.
Hussein, which acted to securitise Kurdish circumstances to a global audience. This put restraints on the Turkish elite’s ability to securitise the Kurdish question domestically. The decimation of Iraq’s military in the Gulf War over Kuwait further changed the balance of power in the region, which in the direct aftermath of the Cold War opened up new opportunities for Turkey to venture into the Middle East.

While useful information is gleaned from structural assessments, these cloak the complex political and societal nature of Middle Eastern politics. It is in this situation where the Copenhagen School’s sectoral approach can yield interesting results. Thus in the sectoral analysis that follows, I start with Turkish regional activism in the political sector and identify the key securitisation processes at work, before widening the analysis to look at the strategic pragmatism at play in Turkish politics. These show a desire to integrate more closely with the region, but the political moves towards the Middle East are constrained by societal barriers and the weight of Kemalism, which works to maintain Turkey’s insulated position. The economic sector which is so prominent in Western relationships is steadily growing, but still has little weight compared to the EU RSC and thus has little impact on insulating behaviour.

**The Political Sector: Neo-Ottoman Agenda**

A key unifying idea within the Middle East is solidarity with the Palestinian cause. Therefore, for Turkey, which has traditionally refrained from any post-Ottoman forms of regional activism, we can identify the events at Davos in 2009 as a critical ‘speech act’ by Prime Minister Recip Erdoğan. This acted to securitise the Palestinian question in an attempt to draw Turkey into the changing regional security environment. Here, in an angry speech, in front of the World Economic Forum (after which he stormed off stage), Erdoğan told the Israeli President:

‘My voice will not be that loud. You must know that. [...] when it comes to killing, you know killing very well. I know how you hit, kill children on the beach’.97

This speech had two purposes: a domestic purpose, which was demonstrated by the thousands who turned out at the airport cheering Erdoğan after the conference98; and an

international purpose, which sent a signal to the international system that Turkey was aligning its security concerns more closely with the Middle East. This was just one of numerous securitisation moves by the AKP following its 2007 election victory. For example, there was little ambiguity when Erdoğan stated in 2009 that ‘no political problem in the region can be resolved without [utilising] Ottoman archives’ in front of an assembled audience. All in all, such actions supported Buzan’s 2003 claim that the AKP has initiated the ‘reactivation of Turkey’.

The securitisation of the Palestinian question was followed by a surprise deal between Turkey and Brazil to support the Iranian nuclear fuel program. Here, Erdoğan came to the defence of Iran over attacks from the UN, led by the US, arguing that ‘countries that oppose Iran’s nuclear weapons should themselves not have nuclear weapons’. While this might have seemed counter-intuitive, given the benefits of its US alliance, it was compatible with the new Turkish strategic posture under the AKP. This is shown by the way Turkey courted Iran with the fuel deal while simultaneously undertaking Syrian rapprochement designed to move their support away from Iran. This is because strong Iran-Syrian relations contain (or insulate) Turkey on the northern front of the RSC. In contrast, a good relationship with Syria gives Turkey increased strategic depth and potential to penetrate the RSC to its south.


99 While the AKP was elected to power in 2002, the 2007 election was viewed as a litmus test for the party, who was subject to a challenge to their legality for violating Kemalist principles. The increasing vote, despite widespread pro-Kemalist protests, was perceived as giving the AKP a mandate to undertake reforms. See “Turkey’s court decides not to close AKP, urges unity and compromise,” Hürriyet, 2008, http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/english/home/9547882.asp?gid=244&sz=29614, (accessed May 18, 2011); Izgi Gungör, “From landmark success to closure: AKP’s journey,” Hürriyet, July 22, 2007, http://arama.hurriyet.com.tr/arsivnews.aspx?id=634073, (accessed May 18, 2011).


101 Buzan and Waever, Regions and powers, 450.


Overall, courting Iran and Syria allowed Turkey to soften the RSCs periphery and link its security dynamics in a positive, rather than negative manner to issues in the region.

The second, but equally critical regional strategic issue within Turkey’s immediate region is the NATO Missile System—the Medium Extended Air Defence System (MEADS)—funded by the US, Italy and Germany. Ostensibly designed to counter a potential Iranian missile threat, the system can also protect NATO countries from a Russian attack. For Turkey this is problematic, since Russia has acted aggressively on the issue of a missile shield towards NATO. The balancing act required of Turkey was demonstrated when the US did not want to name Iran as the specific threat, and Turkey protested because by not naming Iran specifically, the US risked antagonizing Russia. Here, worsening relations with Iran would occur, by overtly naming it as a threat, which would leave Turkey alone on the periphery of the EU. At the same time, this exacerbated the NATO-Russian relationship by not naming Iran, again leaving Turkey vulnerable to the north.

Turkey’s third major foreign policy shift has been a result of Davutoğlu’s ‘zero problems with neighbours’ doctrine. Here, the AKP has broken against traditional hard liners opposed to Kurdish and Armenian relations, by appealing to those groups in an effort to build a strategic region of influence in the east. In contrast to the MEADS and Palestinian issues, the ‘zero problems’ policy is a way of desecuritising issues that affect its ability to project more salient security dynamics into the Middle East region. Thus, in defiance of Kemalist tradition, the AKP has started engaging with Iraqi Kurdistan on security and economic issues, while taking a more conciliatory tone with Kurds within Turkey’s state borders. While the Kurdish issue revolves around a domestic ‘identity’ issue, its prominence in the larger global security debate throughout the 1990s acted to tarnish Turkey’s international reputation. Similarly, better relations with Armenia, with whom Turkey also has a


109 Abramowitz and Barkey, “Turkey’s Transformers,” 121.

110 Much of the recent historical animosity towards the Kurds stems for the Treaty of Sèvres where the European powers demanded the formation of an independent Kurdish state in the aftermath of World War I.
tempestuous history, opens up Azerbaijan to influence, whose shared Turkic heritage led Erdoğan to proclaim that Turkey and Azerbaijan were ‘one nation with two states’. This, in turn, increases the potential buffer region between Russia and Turkey, meaning engagement in the south does not expose it as much in the north and northeast. Indeed, Buzan speculates that an insulating ‘mini’ complex could appear in the Caucasus, which could move the insulating role further north leaving Turkey more to the centre of a new regional structure.

**The Societal Sector: Champions of Islam versus Secularists**

Pulling back against the Turkish political sector’s gravitation towards the Middle East is the Turkish military class. Importantly, the ‘military’ in Turkey not only occupies the military sector, but is such a broad force that it also dominates much of the societal sector. Therefore, in this analysis I apply the societal lens when approaching the military in order to demonstrate how RSCTs sectoral analysis can redirect traditional ideas across different arenas. In Turkey, a central role of the military is to shape and retain the identity (or ‘brand’) of the state through Kemalism. This is perpetuated through the concept known as *derin devlet* (or the ‘deep state’) which runs through many Turkish state institutions. Successive coups have demonstrated the power of the *derin devlet*, with the 1971 coup known as the ‘coup by memorandum’, while the 1997 coup became known as the ‘post-modern coup’. The later instance gained its name when generals submitted a list of issues to the government that were to be enforced, before demanding the Prime Minister resign in what became known as the ‘February 28th process’. The list contained liberal provisions, designed to prevent a shift towards political Islam and the Middle East, including enforcement of a headscarf ban, provisions for eight years of primary education, and the closing of Quranic schools. Problematically, for actions that ultimately have their basis in improving

---


112 Buzan and Waever, *Regions and powers*, 484.


‘Western’ relations, the derin devlet and the February 28th process has threatened potential Western stakeholders in Turkey, with a leaked US cable complaining that successive Turkish governments are ‘nothing but servants of the deep state’.115

Following the 1997 coup, the ruling Welfare Party was banned for violating Kemalist principles.116 The military justified the ban on the grounds that creeping Islamism within the party had the objective of making its way into schools and organisations with the ultimate goal of instituting Sharia law, which would move Turkey societally in the direction of its neighbour Iran.117 Recently, the AKP has attempted to counter the power of the military class through actions such as the September 2010 referendum, which aimed to weaken the military’s control on the judicial structure.118 Still, despite nearly a decade of AKP government, Kemalism continues to be a strong force, with Former Chief of General Staff General Kivrkoğlu—a staunch Kemalist representative of the military elites—stating that ‘if the tendency toward reactionarism [sic] lasts for 500 years, [...] then... February 28 will last for 500 years’.119 With a general election scheduled for the 12th of June 2011, and polls showing an increased majority for the AKP,120 Kemalist principles are likely to be further challenged.

Despite these insulating forces, issues such as the MEADS paradox have allowed a shift towards strategic pragmatism, allowing Turkey to attempt securitisation moves on contentious issues. The most obvious challenge to Kemalist principals is the AKPs eagerness to position itself as a regional champion for Islamic rights, which acts to explicitly link the political and societal sectors. At its most antagonistic, Turkey has offered to host a Taliban

117 Ibid.
office in Ankara in order to act as a moderator in its political engagement in the region.121
More prudently, Erdoğan toured Pakistan after the 2010 floods and offered support, while
making speeches critical of Israel.122 This demonstrates an active pursuit of the Davutoğlu
Doctrine, which views Turkey as both a conciliator and a ‘centre of gravity’ in the region.123
So far this approach has been relatively successful, with the Middle Eastern audience—at
least on the surface—accepting the societal securitisation act. This is shown by a 2010
Brookings institute survey a year after Erdoğan’s Davos walkout, where Erdoğan was
perceived as the most admired world leader in the Arab world.124

There is also a domestic agenda within the AKPs rhetoric whereby its new assertive foreign
policy is used for populist and political purposes, in order to align itself with the growing
conservative Anatolian middle class. These constituents are viewed as easily manipulated
given Turkey’s narrow media environment, and the AKP has taken aggressive steps to
restrict reporting that it views as distorting the domestic advantages of Turkey’s new
assertive foreign policy. For example, the AKP pressured Doğan Media Group—a major
Turkish media corporation and owner of the pro-Kemalist broadsheet Hürriyet—by
imposing US$2.5 billion in back taxes after Doğan linked the AKP to a charity scandal.125 This
pattern of media suppression under the AKP has led to Turkey dropping to 138th out of 178
countries in the latest Reporters without Borders Press Freedom index.126 Having control of
the media is critical in shaping Turkish societal identity, as ninety percent of Turks are
monolingual, meaning that their access to outside and Western information is filtered

121 “Report: Karzai open to Taliban setting up office in Turkey,” CNN International, December 25,
122 “Erdoğan pledges lasting support for flood-hit Pakistan,” Today’s Zaman, October 14, 2010,
http://www.todayszaman.com/news-224350-102-erdogan-pledges-lasting-support-for-flood-hit-
123 Alper Kaliber, “Re-imagining Cyprus: the Rise of Regionalism in Turkey’s security lexicon,” in
Cyprus: a Conflict at the Crossroads, ed. Thomas Diez and Nathalie Tocci (Manchester University
124 Telhami, “2010 Arab Public Opinion Poll: Results of Arab Opinion Survey Conducted June 29-July
20, 2010.”
125 Seda Sezer and Ben Holland, “Dogan Hit by $2.5 Billion Tax Fine in Erdogan Feud,” Bloomberg,
30, 2011).
(accessed May 24, 2011).
through a few central outlets.\textsuperscript{127} Low levels of Internet access outside of Istanbul, in combination with a strict Internet filtering system also contribute to the narrow dissemination of information.\textsuperscript{128} Through the lens of RSCT, this behaviour can be interpreted as an attempt by the AKP to remove Turkey from its insulated position through the linking of sectors.

This bisectorial political-societal approach by the AKP has had visible effects on popular culture. For example, the synthesis of political, society, populism and the media is apparent in Turkish films such as ‘Valley of the Wolves: Iraq’ (\textit{Kurtlar vadisi}), where an elite team of Turkish police rescue Turks in northern Iraq from Israeli and US illicit organ traders.\textsuperscript{129} Similarly, the most recent movie in the series (‘Valley of the Wolves: Palestine’) showed the ‘team’ exacting revenge on Israelis for the death of Turks during the 2010 Gaza flotilla blockade.\textsuperscript{130} Also, one of the top selling books in Turkey over the past decade was ‘Metal Storm’, a semi-fictional novel with some links to the 2003 ‘Hood Event’ (\textit{Çuval Hadisesi}).\textsuperscript{131} In the real-life incident, Turkish troops operating in Iraq were arrested, led away in hoods, and interrogated by US military personnel.\textsuperscript{132} Although it received scant coverage in the West, the impact in Turkey was substantial, damaging diplomatic relations between the US, and leading to Turkish threats to close its airspace to US planes operating in Iraq.\textsuperscript{133} This form of anti-American sentiment has acted to push parts of Turkey societally east, with a 2010 survey showing that sixty-seven percent of Turks had an unfavourable opinion of the


Furthermore, anti-Americanism was transferred to anti-EU sentiment by association thanks to European involvement in the occupation of Iraq, with the perception of the European Union as a positive institution dropping to thirty-seven percent today, compared to sixty-three percent at the time of the Hood Event in 2003.135

These societal shifts away from Kemalism have been made easier by the fact that many of Turkey’s secular institutions were founded on the older existing religious frameworks. For example, the Muslim brotherhoods and other religious groups were banned under the Young Turks, and their structures thereafter regulated by the Diyanet (or Department of Religious Affairs).136 Yet many of the organisations were informal, and based around patronage and loosely networked associations.137 As such, many religious societal structures have survived, albeit in modified forms and under different titles, meaning the switch back towards Islamic institutions over the past decade has been relatively seamless. This was demonstrated by a ten percent increase (to forty-five percent) of people who identify themselves as ‘Muslim’, as opposed to ‘secular’ between 1999 and 2006.138

These themes within Turkish society suggest that the ‘rebranding’ of Turkish identity from a Kemalist state to a suppressed regional champion has been fairly successful. Furthermore insulating forces from within the state (through Kemalism) have weakened now that Turkey has to operate on its ‘own’ without the superpower influence of the past. Indeed, much of modern Turkish identity has been about reimagining the state according to its political needs. In this context, Kemalism can be viewed as a rewriting of official history in the post WWI environment, by distancing and rebranding itself as distinct from the Ottoman Empire.139 In contrast, the post-Cold War environment can be viewed in terms of a loosening of domestic societal constraints. As a result, there is some evidence that the

135 The poll question asked was 'In general, does the European Union conjure up for you a very positive, fairly positive, neutral, fairly negative or very negative image? Results are based on tally of the ‘very positive’ and ‘positive’ categories. “Eurobarometer Interactive Search System,” European Commission, 2010, http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/cf/showchart_column.cfm?keyID=2202&nationID=30&startdate=2004.10&enddate=2010.06, (accessed May 18, 2011).
137 Ibid., 15.
revitalisation of Islam within Turkey can be linked to regionalist rhetoric, which has the grander purpose of linking security dynamics into the broader regional environment.

Though the recent successes of this ‘rebranding’ suggest that the Middle East may accept some of the Turkish securitisation moves, there are historical barriers which constrain and push back this attempt to escape insulation. The foremost issue is the Arab image of Ottomans as the entity that ended the caliphate, and suppressed Arabic language and cultural values. Much of modern Arab nationalism was born as a reaction to the failures of the Ottoman Empire. Here, the Ottomans became identified as the ‘betrayers of Islam’ due to their secular policies while acting as the ‘false’ defenders of Mecca and Jerusalem. At the same time, the British stoked Arab nationalism and promoted ideas such as Wahhabism and anti-Ottomanism as a way to ferment discontent within the Middle East in order to fracture any pan-Islamist movements. To the south and east, the Ottomans suppressed the use of the Arabic language in favour of Turkish, with these issues all catalysing to begin the ‘Great Arab Revolt’ of 1916-1918. More recently, some post Baathist sectarian violence in Iraq has been attributed to long time suppression of Shia under Sunni elites supported by first the Ottomans, and then the British. These factors combine to create considerable societal obstacles for Turkey to deeply securitise the idea that it is a champion of Islamic rights, which in turn constrains the wider goals of the AKPs agenda, leading to Turkey’s continued insulation at the periphery of the Middle East.

The Economic Sector: The New East

The economic sector offers an opportunity for Turkey to erase many of the Ottoman memories, since wealth is often a powerful motivator in international relations. Turkey now has the strongest economy in the region, possessing nearly double the nominal GDP of its nearest rival, Saudi Arabia, and three times more than Egypt. There have been some

140 See Bengio and Özcan, “Old Grievances, New Fears: Arab Perceptions of Turkey and Its Alignment with Israel.”
moves to exploit this. For example, Turkey’s exports to the EU are now less than fifty percent of its total, while Middle Eastern exports have doubled over the last decade to twenty percent overall.\textsuperscript{145} Furthermore, the Turkish political structure that oversees trade—though opaque in European terms—is one of the more transparent on the Middle Eastern front. As such, the recent upheavals during the Arab revolutions produced little anxiousness in the Turkish leadership, and indeed have been upheld as a potential model for the newly reformed states,\textsuperscript{146} which in turn can open up new markets.

Thus, behind the domestic and international politicking, Turkey has been emboldened by its political successes and can capitalise on these to link its security dynamics through economic entwinement. Regardless of Middle Eastern political memory, and despite obstacles to the EU accession process, the successes of the AKP that can be leveraged include; economic responsibility that resulted in stability in the face of the 2009 global financial crisis (GFC); G20 membership; and a temporary seat on the UN Security Council. Turkey is justifiably proud of these achievements, and has a legitimate case to promote them, especially in the new global environment.

These issues combine with a change in the balance between the economic sectors surrounding Turkey. Western Europe, for centuries the wealthiest part of the Eurasian and Middle Eastern hub is being challenged by the emerging resource wealth in areas such as Russia and the Gulf states. Thus while EU markets have been hit hard by the GFC, markets in the Middle East and developing world have been less affected.\textsuperscript{147} In this context, Ziya Meral and Jonathon Paris view the new strategic outlook as pragmatic economic decisions and vice-versa.\textsuperscript{148} The economy continues to place Turkey in a strong position, with growth of 6.1% predicted in 2011, compared to 1.8% in EU member states.\textsuperscript{149}

Conclusions

Within this case, the synthesis of sectors\(^{150}\) has allowed the incorporation of non-traditional discourse into the structural debate, particularly in regards to the role of the societal sector in Turkey. A particular behaviour that RSCT has revealed is how different sectors have conflicting agendas which contributes to the persistence of Turkey’s status quo—or insulation. Parts of the societal sector and the political domestic sector are pushing towards the Middle East RSC. This is most noticeable in speech acts on issues such as the Palestinian question which have a large symbolic purpose rather than practical end goals. The AKP has elevated and attempted to securitise this issue with the goal of linking the Turkish societal sector to that of the Middle East. But the military—when viewed through the societal lens—pulls back against this securitisation move, and therefore continues Turkey’s insulation. The economic sector, although growing, is still in its infancy, but has the potential to ‘tip the balance’ towards the Middle East in the future. With this in mind, I now turn to consider Turkey’s behaviour in the context of the EU RSC.

Chapter 4: Turkey and the EU RSC

The characteristics of the EU RSC are markedly different from those of the Middle East, as is the Turkish relationship with the members of that complex. While securitisation moves that aim at escaping insulation in the Middle East RSC were projected into a potentially volatile area, the EU RSC is a highly institutionalised and stable entity. Therefore Turkey should have clear and obvious advantages from EU engagement in terms of both security and wealth. A distinctive feature of the EU RSC is that, for the most part, RSC membership is indistinguishable from EU membership.\footnote{Only Norway and Switzerland have rejected EU membership outright. There are 27 member states, with five candidates (if we include Turkey), two applications (Serbia and Albania), and two potential candidates (Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo). The GDP PPP of the EU27 states is $11,800 billion, compared to $694 billion of European states outside of the union (not including Turkey). Tables, Graphs and Maps Interface (TGM) table,” Eurostat, 2009, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/refreshTableAction.do?tab=table&plugin=1&init=1&pcode=tec00001&language=en, (accessed May 31, 2011).} In sectoral terms, this is because one goal of the EU is for the economic sector to supersede the military sector, and create such intensive institutional overlay that conflict becomes unthinkable.\footnote{Karl Wolfgang Deutsch, \textit{Political community and the North Atlantic area: international organization in the light of historical experience} (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968).} Yet in practice, the Turkish accession process has been slow, and typified by indifference from Europe when compared to the accession processes of developmentally comparative states such as Poland, Lithuania, Bulgaria and Romania.

In order to investigate the extent of insulation of Turkey from the West, I start with the economic sector, which is often perceived to be the dominant sector in this region, given it contains the major securitisation processes. My analysis shows that this is not necessarily the case, and to demonstrate this I look at the central obstacle to EU accession—Greco-Turkish animosity—within the political sector before transferring across to the societal sector in order to assess the role of identity and historical memory. This approach demonstrates the ‘widening’ ability of RSCT, away from the most visible securitisation processes, with the aim of revealing insulating behaviour.
EU RSC Structure

In contrast to the Middle East RSC, the EU RSC is a centred type,\textsuperscript{153} but one that also possesses a set of unique structural qualities when compared to other regions. Here, Buzan asserts the EU is a hybrid power, in that it is a superpower in its own right.\textsuperscript{154} For him, the EU is a Kantian example of anarchic structure, where the constituent state units act as ‘friends’, following Alexander Wendt’s reading of the international structure.\textsuperscript{155} If we accept the idea of the EU as a superpower actor, then the EU RSC is highly cohesive. Here, only Iceland, Norway, Switzerland, and the former Yugoslav states remain outside the EU, with Iceland, Croatia, Montenegro and FYR Macedonia candidate states for accession.\textsuperscript{156} Potential for conflict between states in this RSC has been minimal, with the exception of Serbia and its former proxy—Republika Srpska—whom remain the only European targets of NATO military operations in Europe.\textsuperscript{157} If the EU RSC did become a unitary actor in its own right in the future, this would result in the RSC expanding, because according to Buzan and Wæver a RSC must consist of at least two autonomous units.\textsuperscript{158} In this instance, Turkey, but also Georgia and the Ukraine could become part of the EU through a default external enlargement.

In contrast with the Middle East RSC, the EU RSCs power resides at the centre, and becomes progressively weaker when moving away from the core. The centre consists of an industrial powerhouse (Germany), accompanied by France, Italy and the United Kingdom.\textsuperscript{159} At the periphery are weaker states, such as Romania, which has a current GDP PPP of $13,392 USD. Germany, at the centre, has a GDP PPP of $36,000.\textsuperscript{160} The recent global financial crisis revealed the ‘concentric circles’ structure of the EU RSC, with the core—France, Germany,

\textsuperscript{153} See appendix A for further information.
\textsuperscript{154} Buzan and Wæver, Regions and powers, 58.
\textsuperscript{155} Ibid., 56.
\textsuperscript{157} In this instance, two separate NATO campaigns were launched. The first was in 1995 against Republika Srpska during the Bosnian conflict, and the second in 1999, to restrain Serbian actions in Kosovo.
\textsuperscript{158} Buzan and Wæver, Regions and powers, 53.
\textsuperscript{159} Here the UK is somewhat unique in being politically part of Europe, but not geographically so. Despite this, in terms of the economic sector, the UK, and especially London, along with Frankfurt are the financial cores of the EU.
Switzerland and Austria—remaining fiscally strong, while the periphery countries Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Iceland\textsuperscript{161} and Spain were heavily exposed to the 2010 sovereign debt crisis.\textsuperscript{162} Overall, this regional order creates a strong central anchor, which when combined with the institutions of the EU results in a stable regional order.

As such, Turkish admission to the EU potentially threatens the centred nature of the RSC. It would change the RSC’s polarity from a strong centre-periphery model to a more multipolar one, leading to structural constraints on its attempts to join Europe. Karen Smith identifies this shifting anchor pulling the EU eastwards as a problematic issue, with the hard edges of the region creating strong cleavages between the ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’.\textsuperscript{163} The potential to destabilise the EU is demonstrated by the stronger patterns of amity and enmity that Turkey has with its Balkan neighbours than with the centre.\textsuperscript{164} In this circumstance, Turkish membership would risk a new subregional power for Balkan and weaker periphery states to turn to in the event of grievances. In fact, support for the Turkish accession process is highest in the Balkans, with 85% of Macedonians and 62% of Romanians showing support, compared to only 19% in France and 16% in Germany.\textsuperscript{165} Thus, even though Turkey is an emerging economy (its GDP PPP would be roughly the same as EU member Romania at $13,392\textsuperscript{166}) it would possess the second largest population, and the seventh largest nominal GDP in the EU.\textsuperscript{167} This would shift the polar axis of European power substantially eastward.

While the potential for decentralisation captures one aspect of the constraints against Turkish membership of the EU RSC, other more opaque factors must be investigated for insulating behaviour. This can be achieved by exposing it to RSCTs sectoral discourse. Here, I start with the economic sector, and then turn to the political sector, in which I explore the most visible obstacle in EU relations, which is the conflict over Cyprus. The final part then moves to the societal sector, which reveals paradoxical behaviours that curtail Turkish attempts to move west.

\textsuperscript{161} Iceland is not an EU member, but is part of the EU complex under RSCT.


\textsuperscript{164} Turkey and the Balkans share an Ottoman history, and part of the (Turkish) historical narrative is that the Turks bought relative stability to the region by ending the ‘millet’ system and introducing European like institutions.

\textsuperscript{165} “Eurobarometer Interactive Search System.”

\textsuperscript{166} “IMF World Economic Outlook database.”

\textsuperscript{167} Ibid.
The Economic Sector: EU integration

The origins of Turkish-European integration attempts date back to Turkey’s accession to NATO in 1952, which provided external military protection for the state and remains in place today, albeit in a modified form. This was driven not directly by specific European security dynamics, but instead by US external pressure, as a way to manage Soviet threats in the region. But while NATO provided military protection, EEC membership promised institutional and economic entwinement, which was a potentially stronger long-term security proposition. As a result, Turkey first submitted its application for membership in 1959. This was followed in 1963 by the Ankara agreement, in which Bülent Ecevit laid out integration in security terms through Turkey’s transition into the EEC, with Turkey accepted as an associate member.168 Later, in 1970, the Ankara agreement was extended to form a pseudo-free trade agreement with the EEC, and the US pressured Germany to support Ankara’s application in order to ‘anchor’ Turkey in the West.169 Additional international issues such as the Arab-Israeli conflict and radical leftist terrorism in the region created additional pressure on the US to assist Turkish entry into the region. In this regard, Turkey did manage to link its security concerns with the region through the military sector, but this was offset by the economic and political sectors.

Turkish domestic instability was a key factor militating against EU accession and full economic integration. In particular, military coups in 1960, 1971, 1980, and 1997 led to a perceived gap between EU and Turkish political standards. Because of this, after the initial EEC application being made in 1959, it was not until 1987 that Ankara again formally made an application for full EEC membership. But again the EEC deferred Turkey’s application on numerous grounds, including human rights, the unresolved nature of the Cyprus and Aegean Sea issues with Greece, and a lack of political and democratic reforms.170 In 1995, the EU-Turkey customs union was formed and allowed free trade between the two areas, and again EU accession looked more likely. However, the 1997 military coup and subsequent EU protests delayed this. Finally, in 1999, forty years after its initial submission, Turkey was

formally recognised as a candidate state for EU membership. Accession negotiations opened in 2002, with official talks starting in 2005.

Without the overlay of Cold War rivalry, the bar for membership was set higher for Turkey than for any past EU candidate states. In fact, the *acquis communautaire*, which enables a transition to a unified EU political, economic, and legal system, was extended to thirty-five chapters from thirty-one, for both the Turkish and Croatian accession processes. Since the official opening of the *acquis*, the enthusiasm for Turkish accession has again waned. As of 2011, of the thirty-five chapters Croatia has agreements on twenty-five while Turkey has an agreement on only one. Only two chapters—food safety and the environment—have been opened since 2009, with eight chapters frozen over Turkey’s refusal to allow Greece to use its ports or airspace.

An additional factor in the EU’s resistance stems from the fear of an excessive economic cost to align Turkey’s legal and political frameworks with European norms and standards. Thus, in cost-benefit terms, the lack of threats from Turkey over the past fifty years results in smaller security benefits to Europe from accession. This is not to say that Turkey is not wanted in the union. It is simply that the motivations to permit it to enter are not as serious or salient as they were during the Cold War, when dichotomous political thinking ruled. Indeed, economically, Turkey has performed better than many of the peripheral EU states without European Central Bank (ECB) supervision, especially Greece, Portugal, Spain, and Ireland. This independence has paradoxically reduced Turkey’s threat perception, making

---


172 Ibid.


177 While Turkey was hit hard by in 2009 by the GFC, in 2010 it experience GDP growth of 8.2% compared to -4.5% in Greece, -1% in Ireland, 0.1% in Spain and -2.4% in Portugal. “IMF World Economic Outlook database.”
EU accession less critical in the economic domain when compared to potential instability from popular protest movements against austerity measures in Greece\textsuperscript{178} and Spain\textsuperscript{179}.

**The Political Sector: Greco-Turkish Conflict**

The one issue that does keep Turkey pertinent to Brussels is its relationship with Greece. Thus by moving to the political sector (which is ultimately about state stability\textsuperscript{180}), we can gain a clearer picture of the processes of securitisation at work. Here, two separate behaviours can be observed. Firstly, Greece is using the EU accession process as a way for it to desecuritise Turkey on hard-line issues that affect its own security.\textsuperscript{181} Greece’s position on the periphery (but within the EU RSC) has some similarities with Turkey, in the sense that it needs to raise the profile of its security concerns with the centre of the RSC. In this instance, Greek accession support for Turkey is contingent on the removal of forces from northern Cyprus.\textsuperscript{182}

In contrast, continued use of the Cyprus issue by Turkey can be viewed as an attempt to persistently securitise an issue in the hope that it makes Turkey more pertinent to the EU RSC with the hope that it presents openings for Turkey to escape insulation. For Turkey, this is the only real pattern of amity and enmity that penetrates into the RSC, and is one of Turkey’s best hopes for RSC membership. But since Greece is a relatively weak state, this prevents these security dynamics from gaining traction. In regards to insulation we can see how these political manoeuvres at the periphery of the RSC have very little impact on the centre, leading to a continued inability to securitise issues of relevance to the EU. Overall, it means that the factors having substantial effects on the EU accession process can be viewed


as part of a smaller political game, being played by policy planners within both Greece and Turkey for their own state security objectives. Thus, the Cyprus issue, which is very narrow in an ethnic and geographical sense, is widened into affecting the dominant securitisation process (EU accession). To the EU elites in Brussels, the Greco-Turkish conflict possesses very little threat to the central actors in the RSC, while simultaneously confirming Turkey’s ‘outsider’ status in terms of European norms. At the same time, resolution of the conflict risks further insulating Turkey by diffusing existing Turkish-EU security pertinence.

Away from the Greco-Turkish issue, Turkish political relations with other EU RSC states are stable,\textsuperscript{183} which helps maintain a low Turkish threat perception to the members of the RSCs political sector. This contrasts with the admission of the former Eastern bloc states, where despite weaker economies and questionably opaque political structures, few obstacles were encountered.\textsuperscript{184} For example, Romania was formally admitted to the EU in 2007, along with Bulgaria after submitting official applications for membership in 1995, thirty-six years after Turkey’s initial submission. There are two key points to highlight here. First, these two states surround the volatile region of the Balkans, which has the potential to destabilise the EU RSC; and secondly, instability in this region could have led to a renewal of Russian overlay, as occurred in Serbia during and after the Yugoslav war. These factors have combined to create urgency in the EU political class to securitise the Romanian and Bulgarian states by institutionalising them within EU. Without this, issues emitting from them, including immigration, the black market, and economic instability might threaten to destabilise other states in the RSC. Consequently, these states were desecuritised through political and economic entwinement in the EU. This also had the effect of containing and encircling Serbia and other potentially troubling nations such as Albania and Kosovo. While a great deal of this fear stems from simple geographical factors, more subtle resistance stems from the fact that Serbia shares a Slavic ethic identity with Russia, and using RSCT we can assign this societal type of variable a great amount of weight.

\textsuperscript{183} Turkey has strong relations with all major EU countries apart from Greece, despite a poor image with domestic constituents, with diplomatic missions in every European state except for Iceland.

**The Societal Sector: A Society Split**

This is why the societal sector is one of the most resonant sectors, which potentially reveals the most about insulating activity outside of more traditional analysis. Because of this importance, I address two distinct referent objects for Turkey within this sector in regards to the EU RSC. The first is the domestic audience, and the second the international arena. For the domestic audience, the most pressing concept is the securitisation of its historical memory, and the strong societal identity that has been formed since the Young Turks initiated their reforms in the 1920s. Like many other states with strong historical memories, the Turks have constructed a victim narrative, in this case referred to as ‘Sèvres syndrome’, based on the partition of the Ottoman Empire at the hands of the Western powers. This was a humiliating end for an empire that once controlled most of the Balkans and Middle East. While the two major regions to the south and west of Turkey were partitioned without major repercussions, the handing of Turkish Thrace to Greece, and the clause stipulating the establishment of a Kurdish state, were viewed as an attempt to extinguish Turkish identity. As a consequence, the Turks rallied against the Treaty of Sèvres, and the treaty was not honoured by any of its signatories. Subsequently, the European powers withdrew from the region, leaving the Greek forces to fight on their own terms. The weakened Greek army was eventually defeated in Thrace, and Atatürk’s troops retook Thrace, displacing over one million Greeks.

This vulnerability at the hands of Europe was the catalyst for Kemalist identity, which was in part isolationist, but also partly aimed at socialisation and modernization, with the objective

---

185 The role of collective memory has been subject to extensive research in the sociological realm, most notably by Maurice Halbwachs in *On collective memory* (London: University of Chicago Press, 1992). Within IR, China has a particularly strong collective memory with issues such as the ‘unequal treaties’ such as the Treaty of Shimonoseki at the hands of the West still referenced in modern domestic and international politics. Alan M. Wachman, *Why Taiwan? Geostrategic Rationales for China’s Territorial Integrity* (Singapore: NUS Press, 2008), 87.


of proving that Islam could be compatible with the liberal democratic ideals of Europe. This would secure Turkey from European aggression through the alignment of norms. Historical memory has been worked into many aspects of the EU accession process, with the quick accession of Bulgaria and Romania over Turkey perceived domestically as a double standard. This evoked memories of Sèvres, and the memory of a European clique of states encircling Turkey, in an attempt to undermine its territorial integrity. It created a paradox: Turkey wants to be wanted by Europe, yet in doing so (through asserting its historical and societal independence) it drives Europe further away.

While we can attribute some of this to historical memory, shifts in societal identity are also attributable to changing demographics. Over the past decade the emerging middle class who have benefited from the economic reforms of the AKP are predominantly centre-right Anatolians. Furthermore, this group are antagonised by the Kemalist leaning military and political elites in Istanbul being more conservative and religious in nature. Given that it is the society—not the military—that is ultimately the key stakeholder in the EU accession process, we can assume that the securitisation act of bringing Turkish society into the EU has not been fully accepted by its intended audience. This results in a push away from Europe in societal perceptions within Turkey regarding Europe. Some 74% of Turks supported EU accession in 2004 while only 38% supported membership in 2010. Similarly, in a 2010 Transatlantic Trends report ‘55% of Turks [...] felt [...] Turkey has such different values from the West so as to make it non-Western’. Indeed, under the Copenhagen school reading, we can view this as the Turkish nation (as opposed to the state as referent object) securitising against EU attempts to strip its social identity through institutionalisation.

There are also securitisation processes in this sector travelling in the reverse direction. This is visible in the securitisation of terrorism and immigration by Silvio Berlusconi, who

---

190 Kemal Kirisci, “The Kurdish Question and Turkish Foreign Policy,” The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy (2004): 284.
193 Abramowitz and Barkey, “Turkey’s Transformers,” 120.
referred to the ‘human tsunami’ of immigration, while Nicolas Sarkozy recently discussed suspending the Schengen Agreement in relation to Tunisian (or ‘Islamic’) refugees. Within the EU, this has helped build barriers to Turkish efforts at integration where Islamic immigrants ‘threaten’ EU citizens, and led to well-publicised clashes of values, such as the Danish newspaper cartoon controversy, and the murder of Pim Fortuyn in the Netherlands. In practical terms this limits the chances of Turkish accession with France, Germany, Denmark, and Austria—the states most concerned about immigration—likely to reject any accession referendums. This is despite the fact the Turkey is a largely peaceful and secular country (with the exception of the Kurdish question in their far east). Yet for the European audience, the securitisation of immigration, along with the ‘macro-securitisation’ of terrorism by the US, using religion as the referent object, means that Turkey, as a predominantly Islamic country, is perceived as a threat by default.

Overall, the societal sector is full of conflicting identities and ideas that prevent security dynamics from forming strong focussed patterns. Thus, the oxymoronic nature of Turkey wanting to be part of Europe, while also being threatened by the loss of its identity, restricts the full weight of all sectors being pushed towards EU integration. Similarly, fears from the EU of immigration and religion are real enough to create barriers on the continent. These do not have a substantial basis in empirical reality, which has led to the political classes (especially in Europe) exploiting identity issues on the surface, rather than viewing them as imperative issues to thrust the EU accession process into action, which in turn splits the EU

201 A 2006 Buzan conference paper introduces the concept of terrorism as a macro-securitised object, although this concept has not yet been fully fleshed out by scholars. Barry Buzan, “The ‘War on Terrorism’ as the new Macro-Securitization,” in Oslo Workshop papers, Oslo, 2006.
RSC sectors that embrace Turkey. It is the combination of these processes that constrain Turkish behaviour, and keep Turkey *insulated* in its status quo position.

**Conclusions**

This case, through the lens of RSCT, has revealed that the economic sector, seemingly so dominant in many approaches to Turkish-EU relations, can be overplayed at the expense of other sectors. This is highlighted by the role of historical memory and suspicion, which diffuses the economic sector’s enthusiasm for Europe. Interestingly, this case, like the Middle East case, has revealed how Turkey has elevated certain security issues in order to increase their pertinence to the centre of the EU. In the Middle Eastern case it was Palestine. In the European case, it is Cyprus.

More importantly, the European case reveals insulating behaviour, with Europe constraining Turkey because of fears of shifting the anchor of this centred RSC east, given Turkey’s large population and emerging economy. For Europe, this is primarily a geopolitical consideration, which has been reinforced by societal differences, while Turkey has elevated the Cyprus issue in an attempt to circumvent the geographical realities of its position at the fringe of Europe with little success.
Chapter 5: Analysis

At the beginning of this thesis I noted that I aimed to assess the utility of RSCT’s category of insulators as a way to understand Turkish behaviour in a regional context. As the previous two chapters demonstrate, RSCT’s analytical framework seems revealing: that there are a number of factors that contribute to Turkey’s continued insulation. On the one hand, Turkey has elevated certain security issues (such as the Palestinian question and the Cyprus conflict) in order to securitise them, with the purpose of joining either the Middle East and EU RSCs, which in turn moves it away from insulation. But on the other hand, internal and external factors, across different sectors insulate Turkey from joining its security dynamics with surrounding RSCs. In this chapter, then, I demonstrate that RSCT reveals a phenomenon within insulators that I have termed ‘sectoral divergence’. This is where insulators, because of competing securitization moves, push sectors in different directions, restricting their ability to ‘escape’ their insulated position.

However, while these findings show a coherent and fluid framework in which to understand insulators, this does not absolve RSCT of some wider problems in the Copenhagen School’s attempt to create a via media for positivist and post-positivist scholarship. For example, I also find that a great deal of Turkish behaviour is the result of structural constraints, including EU resistance to decentralisation. Consequently, a great deal of information can be extracted from geographical factors, rather than revealed by the sometimes abstruse discourse on securitisation. This means the discourse has a tendency to fetishize behaviours aimed at appeasing domestic constituents at the expense of clear structural constrains. Despite this, I assert that sectoral divergence has future potential as a way to explain the behaviour of ‘outlier’ states. This chapter presents these findings, before closing with a summary of the main epistemological problems of RSCT—which if clarified—can provide useful avenues for future research.

**Insulators Elevate Certain Security Issues in Order to Securitise Them**

The most prominent behaviour identified in the two cases is how Turkey, as an insulator, has not attached urgency to the resolution of the Greco-Turkish conflict. Instead, it has elevated its status in the security relationship with the EU by not resolving this, in spite of
the apparent benefits of doing so. For example, the nine Acquis Communautaire chapters frozen because of Turkey’s stance on Cyprus include minor issues such as fisheries and transport policy, but also key chapters including ‘the Free Movement of Goods’.\textsuperscript{202} According to a 2006 report, resolution of the Cyprus conflict and the potential for quicker EU accession would result in an US$800 million economic yearly advantage for Turkey, compared to a current net loss of US$480 million per year to maintain its current military presence in northern Cyprus.\textsuperscript{203} An even more optimistic report found that Turkey would benefit by EUR$17 billion annually from resolution of the Cyprus issue.\textsuperscript{204} From this utilitarian perspective, the maintenance of the Turkish Cypriot population\textsuperscript{205} is a false economy, with a large economic cost to Turkey, which points to other instruments at work in Turkey’s foreign policy logic.

RSCT unlocks this puzzle. Using its lens, we can assert that resolution of the Cyprus issue would make Turkey’s security less pertinent to the centre of the EU. Therefore, the continued low-level conflict, which presents no major threat to the integrity of the state, results in Turkey being kept high on the list of potentially resolvable issues to the EU. The benefits from elevation of the issue outweigh the prospective resolution benefits. Additionally, from Turkey’s perspective, the resolution of the Cyprus question does not guarantee Turkish accession. In fact, it threatens to decrease its broader security prospects because it risks further isolation and vulnerability. So while both Bulgaria and Romania faced similar barriers to Turkey in EU accession, with high levels of corruption and organised crime, combined with substantial human rights and immigration concerns,\textsuperscript{206} both experienced quick accession processes due to their comparatively low proximate threat levels. In this instance, quick accession ameliorated the potential formation of Russo-Serbian amity patterns by geographically blocking them. But Turkey does not have this

\textsuperscript{203} P. Sulamaa and M. Widgrén, Turkish EU membership: a simulation study of economic effects (Aboa Centre for Economics, 2006).
\textsuperscript{204} Prio Cyprus Centre, “Turkey to gain EUR 17 billion a year from a Cyprus solution” (Peace Institute Oslo, July 21, 2010).
\textsuperscript{205} The current native Turkish Cypriot population is 132,635 according to a 2007 report by Mete Hatay. Mete Hatay, Is the Turkish Cypriot Population Shrinking? (Oslo: International Peace Research Institute, 2007), 47.
geographical propinquity, which means that as an insulator, it needs to emit both strong enmity and amity patterns in order to maintain relevance to the EU RSC. Geography is again a factor in foreign policy interaction where Ankara must now project its concerns via Brussels in order to address a security issue only seventy kilometres off its southern coast.

On the Middle Eastern side, similar phenomena can be observed. At the beginning of the 21st century, Turkey had few security links to the Middle East, with the exception of ties to the Kurdish question in Iraq and Syria. While Turkey was less exposed to this region during the Cold War, when superpower overlay made it strategically significant to the great powers, the changing power balance over the past twenty years has created a more vulnerable and isolated position. Using RSCT, we can link this vulnerability to the recent securitisation of the Palestinian question by the AKP, which allowed Turkey to link its security dynamics to a broader range of Arab actors, in a way that works favourably to its security position. By elevating this issue—which has little impact on its immediate security—it increases its relevance to the Middle East RSC, which helps to balance out any potential enmity patterns directed against Turkey, such as the historical memory of Ottoman suppression, and blowback from recent issues such as the MEADS system.

Internal Forces Contribute to Insulation

While RSCs have an aggregate influence comparable to great powers, insulators construct their own tools to deal with security issues found within their borders. In Turkey this is demonstrated by Kemalism, which has been challenged by the foreign policy of the AKP over the past decade. Here, domestic forces work against each other, helping maintain insulation. These internal forces also support a key structuralist argument, which is that states will always act in their own self-interest.

In this sense, we can view the struggle between Kemalists and Islamism as a balance between escaping insulation on positive or negative terms. While RSCT generally hypothesises that RSC membership makes a state less vulnerable than an insulator, escaping insulation on negative terms is not in the state interest. In this sense, EU accession and membership of the EU RSC is a positive move, which should increase the security of the state because of its inherent stability. In contrast, escaping insulation on negative terms, through—for example, a hypothetical conflict with Iran, Iraq and Syria—would risk the

---

207 See appendix A for a graphical overview of 1+4+x structure presented by Buzan and Wæver.
immediate state security, giving Turkey RSC membership, but outweighing the security disadvantages of insulator status. We can see balancing between negative and positive security occurring when Erdoğan made his speech acts in securitisation moves towards relatively ‘soft’ issues such as Palestine, which resonate loudly, but require little empirical action. While this antagonises hard-line Kemalists, the continuation of the Cyprus policy balances this out. We can also assume that given modern Turkish history, the AKP is aware that the force of Kemalism will constrain any actions on the ‘hard’ side of security, which can cause empirical damage to the state. In this sense, the AKP can be self-assured in its outward rhetoric, with the knowledge that the most aggressive actions will be contained by Kemalists. In this context, it can act assertively and feign innocence when Kemalism restrains them, which allows it to keep face with its domestic constituents.

**Different Sectors Pushing in Different Directions Constrain Insulators**

From these findings, we can build a premise that within Turkey different sectors push in different directions, as demonstrated by diagram A.

![Diagram A: ‘Sectoral divergence’ in Turkey](image)

Most notably, within Turkey, the economic sector pushes strongly towards the EU RSC, thanks to the institutional nature of the EU, which sees the majority of security threats as ameliorated through economic entwinement. In contrast, the societal sector, and particularly the emerging middle class, has a religious, historical and societal relationship with the Middle East, many of whom view European motives with suspicion. This is most visible in the Anatolian east of the country, where support for the AKP is strongest, as opposed to Istanbul and Turkey’s west, which is the wealthiest and most modernised
region. At the domestic level, the AKP has used this split as a wedge issue to drive popular support, resulting in a distinct difference in the directionality of the societal and economic sectors. It is the combination of these two opposing sectors, working in different directions, which contributes to continued insulation. From these findings we can suggest that without the full weight of sectors pressing in a single direction, it is hard for states to escape insulator status. It is worth contrasting how Turkey differs from Romania in this situation. For Romania, the societal sector is enthusiastic about the EU process, with most people identifying as European, and only 7% of people viewing the EU in a negative light. Again, this is despite a low GDP PPP and persistent concerns over issues such as corruption and human rights. In contrast, only 34% of Turkish citizens currently support the EU accession process, down from 78% in 2004. The contribution of sectoral divergence to insulating behaviour is further amplified by the split across the domestic/international divide in the political sector, through tension between the AKP and Kemalists where this sector is split and pushed in opposite directions.

This ability to analyse the direction in which sectors pull is one of the more powerful tools of RSCT, although it is not one explicitly recognised by Buzan and Wæver in their rather limited explanation of insulation in Regions and Powers. This could possess great value for future research on ‘outlier’ states and how they behave. In this sense, it allows for sectoral divergence to be developed as a tool in explaining how outlier states such as Turkey are constrained in their attempts to escape insulation. Further development of this point is of importance to RSCT, because it can potentially be tested against other insulators. For example, application to Afghanistan might reveal clues to why it has existed in a perpetual state of conflict for so long. As a preliminary hypothesis we could suggest that Afghanistan, as an insulator, uses enmity patterns that keep it relevant in international affairs, and has no real motivation to resolve its troubled status. This might also have prescriptive value in areas such as central Africa where Kenya, as another insulator state, struggles to deal with the highly volatile Horn proto-complex to the north and the Central African RSC to the west.

---


209 “Eurobarometer Interactive Search System.”

210 Çağaptay, “Turkey’s new ‘old Kemalists’.”

211 Insulation as a concept is only dealt with in depth on pages 483-488 under the title ‘problems applying RSCT’, despite being referred to within many case studies within the book. Buzan and Wæver, Regions and powers, 483-488.
Many Turkish Actions Result from Structural Constraints

However, as many Turkish actions result from structural constraints, other frameworks may better account for Turkish actions. The case studies have demonstrated that a substantial part of Turkey’s insulating behaviour stems from standard structural and geographical variables. For example, the natural position of Turkey at the fringe of a largely stable and wealthy economic area means that foreign policy engagement with the EU is common sense and the advantages self-evident without resorting to the securitisation discourse. Furthermore, the contrasting examples of Bulgarian and Romanian accession revealed geography as the dominant variable. So, while societal restraints and securitization moves are apparent, it is not entirely necessary for a mixed approach to exist. This prosaic explanation based in the structural elements of RSCT is a key criticism, where there is a tendency to fixate on securitisation as a social construct at the expense of more obvious conclusions. Thus overall, while patterns of insulation can be identified that are not found in other frameworks, this comes at the expense of other problems.

As a result, criticism can be made along the lines that many of the issues revealed by RSCT can be found in alternative discourses, which do not have the problems of RSCTs ‘via media’ and do not have the restriction of mutually exclusive regions on which RSCT insists, with its larger goal of creating a metanarrative. While RSCT is flexible and attempts to build on the neorealist project, its use of exclusivity within regions and rigid internal characteristics—such as ‘centred’, ‘standard’ and ‘balanced’, combined with the epistemologically capricious nature of securitization discourse—comes at the expense of other approaches.

For example, our initial identification of scholarly gaps regarding the buffer state can be answered in simpler terms by Randall Schweller, who views the impact of small states on great powers as somewhat analogous to the ‘butterfly effect’. Here, ‘small local disruptions quickly grow into large disruptions as their effects cascade and reverberate throughout the system’. 212 Similarly, Turkey’s shift to the Middle East can be seen as a form of hedging against the EU amid fears stemming from the Treaty of Sèvres. Hedging as a concept is not new, but has come back into favour as a way of describing the actions of smaller actors in Southeast Asia towards China. 213 Overall, Turkey is in an excellent hedging position, with a

recently leaked diplomatic cable describing Turkish foreign policy as having ‘Rolls Royce ambitions but Rover resources [...] to cut themselves in on the action the Turks have to “cheat” by finding an underdog’.\(^{214}\) Essentially, Turkey is playing the two regions off against each other, for its own strategic advantage.

While RSCT allows for the use of different referent objects, in the case of Turkey, the split between domestic and international political sectors becomes fuzzy. There is a tendency for RSCT to link each referent object within its own ‘world’ of issues, which creates problems when linking together two closely associated levels of analysis. In such instances, Turkey’s actions are potentially better explained by Robert Putnam’s two level games logic, without the need to resort to an entirely new analytical process.\(^{215}\) Here, Putnam likens the domestic-international split to two ‘images’ with a bargaining process linking the two, rather than RSCTs independent analysis of objects.\(^{216}\) Furthermore, to Putnam, the two-level approach is ubiquitous in state politics, and thus unlike RSCT is not an ‘added extra’. Applied to Turkey, this would result in a much greater analysis of the role of Kemalism and its interaction with external actors, rather than RSCs object-based approach. Here, RSCT reveals a broad spectrum of issues between these two object levels, but fails to adequately explain the immediate interdependence between them.\(^{217}\)

Part of this problem stems from the fact that RSCT has positioned itself as a via media and metanarrative, yet ultimately absolves itself of some of these criticisms by design. For example, while at one point, Buzan and Wæver claim that insulators are ‘durable and consistent’,\(^{218}\) they follow this with the claim that insulators are almost always candidates for external transformation.\(^{219}\) And while RSCT does have a predictive form\(^{220}\) they assert

---


\(^{216}\) Ibid., 460.

\(^{217}\) While Regions and Powers does talk about ‘constellations’ as way to link levels of analysis, this is not sufficient detail to emerge as a usable concept unto its own. See Buzan and Wæver, Regions and powers, 12-13,30,50,64,86.

\(^{218}\) Buzan and Wæver, Regions and powers, 487.

\(^{219}\) Ibid.

\(^{220}\) Ibid., 65-70.
that this is only a narrower of potential outcomes, rather than a causal predictor.221 These inconsistencies in the intent and position of the theory in scholarship clash with its rigidity in other areas, ultimately restricting its usefulness.

**RSCT is a Problematic Via Media**

It follows from this that a key criticism of RSCT lies in the *via media* where it mixes positivist and post-positivist concepts. This fetishizes the explanatory epistemology at the expense of critically evaluating its core precepts and allows securitisation processes, begun by political ‘speech acts’, to be open to selection bias. In this instance, a writer with a preconceived agenda can effectively build a case for securitisation of any potential issue on fringe or radical issues. At the same time, speech acts are often overly influenced by the media. For example, our illustration in this research of Erdoğan’s behaviour at Davos can be interpreted as a media stunt, performed for mainly domestic reasons, with analysis of this act rendering little more than character information around a sycophantic personality. Claudia Aradua demonstrates this malleability of securitisation by describing ‘pity’, ‘emotion’ and ‘passion’ as securitisable objects in the context of human trafficking and EU policy.222 This demonstrates the epistemological problems of the securitisation discourse, as while diversification and widening is welcome, pity and power are very different concepts in the context of international politics. This exaggerated widening of scope threatens to amplify and discredit outputs to serious policy practitioners.

Overall, these issues have consequences for the outputs of RSCT. If we return to the point made initially in this thesis regarding the usefulness of IR outputs to policy planners, then RSCT is open to distortion and bias, making its results susceptible to manipulation. Ultimately this stems from RSCT’s attempt to fuse the constructivist and structuralist domains, and this has been one of the key criticisms of the Copenhagen Project, creating what prominent Copenhagen School critic Bill McSweeney terms an ‘objectivist theory with relativist consequences’.223 In other words, neorealism is designed to emphasise the empirical side of political science, while the use of constructivism, whatever its form, will

---

221 Ibid., 70.
222 Aradua, “The perverse politics of four-letter words: risk and pity in the securitisation of human trafficking.”
‘taint’ the results. This usage could potentially aggravate the poor policy responses addressed earlier in this thesis, in areas such as Iraq, Vietnam, and Yugoslavia.

**RSCT Variations**

This is not to say that RSCT is without use, especially in regards to addressing the issue of outlier states within the international system. Indeed, many of the existing studies using RSCT and Turkey have used modified versions of RSCT. For example, Alper Kaliber uses RSCT to analyse Turkey’s regional security dynamics, but rejects the necessity for RSCs to be fixed geographical entities,” allowing a more flexible interpretation of Turkey’s position on the periphery of Europe. At the same time, André Barrinha uses RSCT to link the Kurdish issue and the war on terror via US overlay. In his piece, he de-emphasises the local structural elements of RSCT, preferring to rely primarily on securitisation discourse to demonstrate how Turkish insulation can be demonstrated by a lack of pertinence about the Kurdish issue to the US, despite its ‘terrorist’ nature.

In this vein, further research using the concept of sectoral divergence, removed from some of the restraints of the discourse has the potential to reveal valuable information about the behaviours and constraints on outlier states. This expansion would enable exploration of many states for insulating behaviour, and not just those few states that fit within RSCT’s metanarrative. In the concluding chapter that follows, I examine this in more detail.

---

Chapter 6: Conclusions

At the outset I asked whether RSCT can explain the behaviour of outlier or ‘insulator’ states. Turkey was chosen as a case as its behaviour has eluded many other frameworks, with a unique foreign policy and societal outlook that sits awkwardly between the East and West. RSCT was viewed as an excellent candidate through which to direct this research. The goals were clear, yet flexible, and I have extracted the following points of importance based on the initial criteria laid down to assess RSCT.

Main Findings

First, RSCT has the ability to expand and incorporate ‘non-traditional’ discourse into the structural debate. This is clearly demonstrated by the Middle Eastern-Turkish relationship. Here, the ambiguous nature of Turkish political, societal and economic activities has led to crude dyadic outputs from other frameworks. Instead, RSCTs sectoral tools were able to identify conflicting patterns between the societal and political sectors, with Turkish society having a natural affinity with the Middle Eastern region, while the political sector has numerous pragmatic security concerns.

Second, while the advantages of the EU-Turkish relationship appear clear, RSCT revealed insulating forces within the societal sector, which constrain Turkish actions as a consequence of historical memory and differing concepts of self-identity. While sociological and historicist ideas are rarely compatible with frameworks primarily concerned with power politics, RSCT has shown how society has a greater influence in the overall motives of the state than other utility focussed frameworks might suggest.

Third, RSCT also explains how domestic behaviour works to insulate Turkish actions, with a clear internal example. Here, insulation is expressed through Kemalism, which acts as a pulling force on attempts by domestic politicians to move Turkey beyond its neutral position. Kemalism is an especially potent force when securitisation moves emitted from domestic players are perceived as having a potentially negative impact on state security. This is because actions to escape insulation through the elevation of security issues come at the cost of conflict if not negotiated carefully, especially in the Middle East.
This internal regulation is important, with the tests showing that sectors will artificially elevate security concerns relevant to them with the purpose of increasing their relevance to the RSC of which they seek membership. As part of the analysis I demonstrated that these paradoxical actions provided evidence for what I term ‘sectoral divergence’. In Turkey’s case, sectors are split, with the economic sector pulling towards Europe, while the societal sector pulls towards the Middle East. These domestic amity and enmity pattern result in the dilution of the power of the referent object, which in turn constrains and continues the insulation of Turkey.

These findings, though, are at the expense of problems in RSCT. Most notably, many of the core findings within RSCT can be arrived at using structural variables rather than the securitisation discourse. For example, Romania and Bulgaria have an arguably lower institutional and economic capability than Turkey, yet both had short accession processes and few obstacles, which can be attributed to an EU need to create a geographically congruent entity to defend from threats directed at the only unstable part of Europe since the end of the Cold War—the Balkans. In terms of EU resistance to Turkey, much of this can be attributed to a simple fear of decentralisation. The need to encompass Turkey’s substantial population and strong emerging economy as part of the accession process, risks shifting the centre of Europe East and creating fractures in the region, creating a multipolar Europe. In the east, strategic pragmatism explains many of the AKPs recent moves, with good relationships with its Arab neighbours seen as a way of hedging against any potential aggression or isolation from Europe.

At the broadest level, RSCT is problematic as a via media for positivism and post-positivism, as the mix of relativism and objectivism opens it up to potential bias. This is problematic for a framework that wishes to address the theory-practice divide which has been growing in the aftermath of the Cold War. While this can be used to introduce variables to research that have traditionally been unreachable for the structuralist, it allows for the construction of threats about anything and everything.

However, there is value in a less rigid approach to RSCT that eschews the tendency to amplify minor securitization processes in favour of a sectoral based approach. This has been shown by sectoral divergence which reveals that sectors travelling in opposing directions place constraints on Turkey’s ability to exert influence outside of its borders. This makes it a tool with the potential to reveal important information about other misunderstood states.
Potential for Further Research

Sectoral divergence is a candidate for further research. Application of this concept to other outlier and insulator states such as Burma, North Korea and Afghanistan has the potential to reveal why weak states occupy the roles they do. Furthermore, understanding how sectorally diverged states sectors elevate particular security concerns could reveal information on why these states remain prominent in the international agenda, despite their lack of power and latent wealth.

In Buzan and Wæver’s defence, they finish Regions and Powers by saying that ‘this book opens up a research programme rather than completing one’. In this light RSCT shows some prospects as a new, much needed research project that captures the security dynamics of regions in the post-Cold War world. As this thesis has demonstrated, its identification of ‘insulators’, despite the ontological problems of its ‘via media’ approach, are a useful way to understand ‘outliers’ or buffer states. Moreover, as I have shown here, the pressures on an insulator such as Turkey from two different RSCs indicates that sectoral divergence can play a significant role in analysing states at the periphery of regions.

---

226 Buzan and Wæver, Regions and powers, 488.
Bibliography


———. “The ‘War on Terrorism’ as the new Macro-Securitization.” In Oslo Workshop papers, Oslo, 2006.


Özcan, M. *Harmonizing foreign policy: Turkey, the EU and the Middle East*. Hampshire: Ashgate, 2008.


Appendix A

Regional Subsystem Attribute List

William Thompson’s collection of attributes in The Regional Subsystem: A Conceptual Explication and a Propositional Inventory.227

1. Proximity or primary stress on a geographic region.
2. The actors pattern of relations or interactions exhibit a particular degree of regularity and intensity.
3. Intrarelatedness - a condition wherein a change at one point in the system affects other points.
4. Internal recognition as distinctive area.
5. External recognition as distinctive area.
6. One or more actors.
7. At least two actors.
8. At least three actors.
9. Small powers only.
10. Units of power are relatively inferior to units in the dominant system.
11. Subordination in the sense that a change in the dominant system will have a greater effect on the subsystem than the reverse and there is more intensive and influential penetration of the subsystem by the dominant system than the reverse.
13. Some degree of shared ethnic, linguistic, cultural, social, and historical bonds.
15. Some evidence of integration or a professed policy of achieving further economic, political, and social integration.
16. Functionally diffuse.
17. Explicit institutional relations or subsystem organization.
18. Autonomy-intrasytem actions and responses predominate over external influences.
19. A distinctive configuration of military forces.
20. A regional equilibrium of local forces.

227 Thompson, “The Regional Subsystem.”