Structure and Ideology in the Tasmanian Labor Party:
Postmaterialism and Party change

By

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This thesis contains no material which has been accepted for a degree or diploma by the University or any other institution, except by way of background information and duly acknowledged in the thesis, and to the best of my knowledge and belief no material previously published or written by another person except where due acknowledgment is made in the text of the thesis.

Peter Patmore

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ABSTRACT

The Tasmanian Labor Party has found itself, like many western social democratic parties, recently subject to challenge; not from its traditional enemy, the economic right, but from a new postmaterialist left. This thesis considers the concept of postmaterialism, its rise and role in the formation of new ecocentric political parties, and its impact on the structure, ideology and electoral strategy of the Tasmanian Labor Party.

Maurice Duverger’s typology of political parties has been used to elucidate and consider the characteristics and formation of political parties and the importance of electoral systems – particularly proportional representation – in achieving representational success. This typology, coupled with Ronald Inglehart’s concept of postmaterialism shows how a conflict of values and a new ecocentric ideology has given rise to new environmental movements and green political parties.

This thesis finds that, in a Tasmanian context, both the Labor Party’s history and the impact of Tasmania’s peculiar electoral system contributed to the emergence of environmental parties in Tasmania. Further, it finds that the strength of their emergence and the significance of postmaterialism’s ecocentric ideology necessitated a serious response from Tasmanian Labor. National and Labor Party surveys, confirmed the existence and persistence of postmaterialism – both in the broader Tasmanian community and the Tasmanian ALP.

As a result of this research, it is argued that some options in meeting the postmaterialist challenge could not be utilised by the Tasmanian Labor Party. Major structural reform would not be effective and ideological renewal would have only limited effect. Thus, the Party has pursued a strategy of retaining party unity while attempting to attract sufficient postmaterialist support to gain majority government.
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I would also like to record my appreciation to Dr. Richard Herr of the Department of Government at the University of Tasmania who supervised this project. Richard’s guidance was essential for my completion, for it soon became obvious that I had both underestimated the work required and overestimated my abilities. His enthusiasm and advice kept me going.
The danger for any author is finding a suitable point at which to conclude. I had chosen the leadership change from Michael Field to Jim Bacon for it seemed, at that stage, major changes prior to an election were unlikely. However, just as the final draft had been written, legislation was introduced which altered the electoral system to the advantage of both the major parties. Anyone reading this work should be aware of these changed circumstances.

The new Leader of the Labor Opposition, Jim Bacon, introduced the *Parliamentary Reform Bill 1998* into the House of Assembly in May 1998. Its main provision was to cut the numbers of the House of Assembly from 35 to 25 and the Legislative Council from 19 to 15. The members of the House of Assembly were to be elected from the existing five electoral divisions, thus raising the quota necessary for election from 12.5 percent to over 16 percent. The second reading of the Bill was defeated by the Government on the 22nd of May 1998.

But the Premier, Tony Rundle, under public and party pressure recalled Parliament on the 22nd of July 1998 for the express purpose of legislating to cut the size of the House of Assembly from 35 to 25; effectively accepting the model preferred by the Labor Party.

In each vote taken during the passage of the *Parliamentary reform Bill 1998* the Government and the Labor opposition voted together. Despite intense and heated opposition by the Greens, the Bill passed rapidly through both the House of Assembly and the Legislative Council, commencing operation on the 28th of July 1998. In the election which followed in August 1998 Labor was returned with 14 seats, the Liberals were reduced to 10 and only one Green in the division of Franklin, Mrs Putt, overcame the increased quota to retain her seat.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

There is a crisis of confidence in the established political parties, which has been engendered by massive societal change. These parties have been perceived by voters as failing to respond to either the national or international problems that face society. Commentators such as Jack Dennis (1975) and E. J. Dionne Jnr. (1991), believe that the established parties frame the political issues as a series of false choices whereby the parties, racked by contradictions, are responsive to the needs of their constituents rather than to the state or country. The parties are seen as preventing nations from settling the questions that trouble society and more often “create conflicts where none really exist” (Dennis 1975, 200).

Disillusionment with the established political parties has contributed to people’s suspicions of public life, politicians and government and to their perception that government can no longer improve their life, either materially or through improving a community ethos – nor indeed does it wish to do so.

Tasmania, in common with other industrialised societies, now includes many people who confront the established party dogma by questioning the “traditional” materialist ethos of continual development and consumption. Others feel that there is little value in participating in democratic structures. Party membership has declined while public criticism has increased. The result is a crisis of confidence at the very time governments face their most critical tests.

New cleavages have arisen in a society seeking to come to grips with rapid and constant change, a cleavage where new political parties are driven by an alternative world view that refutes the main paradigm of industrial society and the centrality of humans in the natural world; an alternative paradigm that advocates a sustainable approach to the resources of the planet and a redefinition of the role of humans in an embracing ecosystem.
But it is not only the constituents in western democracies who are having difficulty comprehending the effects of far-reaching social change. The established political parties, after decades of relative stability, have been forced to face new challenges from emerging political parties and the new cleavage in society that does not correspond to the old left/right dimension. The established parties have undergone major bouts of self-analysis as they struggle to deal with the limitations of their old structures and the relevance of their ideologies.

The parties’ traditional structures and ideologies have restricted their attempts to remain relevant in the current turbulent political environment. For example, Tasmania recently had two periods of minority government (in 1989 and 1996) when, in turn, both of the established political parties had to deal with the relatively new Tasmanian Greens Party. Whether such dealings prove to be a long term or transitory phenomenon is a matter for speculation, but it is certainly clear that the issue is much broader, encompassing international events and theories relating to party types and change. This thesis deals with these and related issues confronting Tasmania and citizens across all contemporary liberal democracies.

The nature of parties
To consider change it is first necessary to consider the entity that is changing – in this instance the political party. Parties can be most readily defined by their structure and purpose. Epstein (1968, 9) regards this purpose to be elected and thereby achieve ideological goals. To do this, a party needs a structure that acts within the political environment (Panebianco 1982, 6). Because parties are discrete entities, their performance will be affected by the interrelationship of their own structure and purpose. This helps to explain why some parties adopt less than optimum positions in their power seeking. Because some seek different goals, be they adaptive or expressive, it follows that they will have different structures at different times and circumstances.

The differences in the structure and purpose of parties becomes clear when the parties are divided into types. Maurice Duverger’s (1951) ideal party types have proved to be an enduring base, even though parties will evolve and new types
appear. In describing and understanding the new party types, structure – as a catalyst for change or an anchor for inertia – is just as useful a tool as for the established parties. Although developed in Europe, party typologies will be shown to be relevant in Tasmania where the Liberal, Labor and Greens display such clear differences in structure and purpose that categorisation is relatively simple.

After decades of stability, with the established Liberal and Labor parties both accepting the goals of economic development, the 1960s brought in an era of radical change in society. As Kay Lawson (1976, 27) points out, political parties do not operate in a vacuum. They can either passively adapt or aggressively seek to dominate and transform the environment in which they operate (Panebianco 1982, 11). As such, parties are in a dynamic relationship with their environment. As the social environment in which they are embedded changes, parties, if they are to remain viable, must adapt whenever they cannot change their environment. As their objectives change so too do their structures (Kirchheimer 1966, 190, Kitschelt 1996, 283).

Depending on the times and individual opinions, different parties can therefore be regarded as having either a diminishing or an exaggerated importance as parties with a future. Whatever one’s prejudices, it must be agreed that parties exist in a dynamic environment, modifying their ideology and structure over time in response to internal and external pressures.

**Pressures for fundamental change**

One of the fundamental pressures for change is the significant social transformation that western societies has undergone in the past 20-30 years. Over these years Tasmania has moved from an insular, agriculturally based, society to one which – if not integrally part of – is at least aware of national and international value changes. The economic security of the post-war generations, together with greater education, has led to the rise of new values. These values repudiate the pro-capitalist, economic growth ethos of the established parties and instead embrace what their adherents perceive to be fundamental values rather than material goals.
Ronald Inglehart (1971, 1977, 1987, 1990) explains such value change as a fundamental transition from materialism to postmaterialism. His work provides a useful basis for analysing the changes in values and behaviour post-war democracies have experienced. To Inglehart the post-war generations grew up in relative security, allowing them to place greater value on non-material benefits such as a stronger emphasis on belonging, self-expression and quality of life issues. These postmaterialist values have been essentially driven by a tertiary-educated and professionally employed middle-class subgroup (Dalton 1984, 273, Maier 1990, 25, Hay 1993, 12). As with any developed society, Tasmania contains such a subgroup, which has often had a disproportionate influence, due to their members' education and positions of influence.

Debate on the values the subgroup holds, and the issues that arise as a consequence has not been restricted to its members. In terms of general public concern, for example, nearly half of the European Community said they might vote for an ecology party (Inglehart and Rabier (1986, 467). From such a base has come environmental social movements (such as the Tasmanian Wilderness Society) and the development of a new ideology that has been the basis of environmental parties such as the United Tasmania Group and the Tasmanian Greens. These new political parties, like their international counterparts, challenge society's dominant paradigm of growth and materialism.

The dominant paradigm also encompasses the belief that the problems arising from industrialisation can be solved by legislation and technology. This is highlighted in Tasmania by the established parties previously abrogating power to the Hydro Electric Corporation and granting almost untrammelled powers to destroy wilderness areas for dams and industrial development. Postmaterialists, and through them the Greens, claim that such an approach ultimately compounds environmental problems and limits individual freedoms. The established parties' faith in economic growth and technology as unfailing instruments for the rational control of nature and society, are seen as the heart of the problem. The areas of conflict and pressure for change therefore clearly concentrate around the clash of values and ideologies of the established materialist parties and the new postmaterialist parties.
Relationship of the two key themes
Cultural changes and conflicts of values created internal dislocations in the Labor Party, and its make-up changed in response. Previous theories on the emergence of industrial welfare capitalism saw the working-class as the natural constituency for social democratic parties of the left, while the white-collar classes supported the conservative parties of the right (Lipset and Rokkan 1967, Lipset 1983). But the cultural changes of the 1960s saw the middle-class, the well educated and the young realign themselves with a social democrat tradition of reform, represented mainly by the Labor Party (Papadakis 1993, 178).

In the 1960s such people joined the Labor Party, but when the party did not change its values they were willing to join other reformist parties. The irony is that the established parties, by their hostile response to new values, and their rigid and hierarchical structure, actually provided some of the stimulus for these new opposing parties. The established parties were seen to work together, in what was perceived to be an agreed economic interest, while the postmaterialists were marginalised and excluded from political participation (Jahn 1992, 385). It was these very people - postmaterialists and reformist on values - who would, when another reformist party arose that could more clearly enunciate their values, be willing to change their allegiance.

Because the Tasmanian Labor Party, like other socialist parties, was founded as a reformist party with clearly expressed values, when another party arose that could better express a new reformist value, Labor suffered more than the reactive and defensive conservative parties. Not only were postmaterialist supporters likely to desert the party, but those who stayed supported sides of issues that were counter to the values held by traditional, socially conservative Labor members. This caused turmoil within the party as it tried to deal with opposing values. Geared to growth-oriented economic strategies, the traditional parties could not adapt without risking the alienation of their traditional supporters. The Democrat Party in the 1972 United States presidential elections, the British Labour Party in the 1981 split and the Tasmanian Labor Party in the Franklin River controversy are all examples of the damages such conflict can cause.
In a study of ten West European democracies, Herbert Kitschelt (1990) claims that relatively recent conditions have been generally conducive to the growth of “new politics” parties, with their growth contributing to the stagnation or weakening of the traditional left. In his study of long-term trends, he did not find a single case in which the conventional left parties have won back votes from the new parties. Some commentators go so far as to draw parallels between the rise of the Greens in the last quarter of this century and the rise of the Labor Party in the nineteenth century:

... this vacuum in the politics of social justice and equal opportunity was always likely to draw a new entity into the political arena, one that would replace a Labor Party that had lost its aspirations, just as, a century earlier, a young and vigorous Labor Party had replaced a weaker party of reform (Brown and Singer 1996, 64).

In the Tasmanian context, this thesis explores how real and permanent the postmaterialist challenge is. In doing so, it examines the structure and agenda of the Tasmanian Labor Party; both before and after the rise of new politics. It analyses the ideology and structure of the Tasmanian Greens, and changes made as a result of their involvement in the parliamentary system. It also examines advantages the Hare-Clarke electoral system gives to new parties.

The history of the Tasmanian parties is reviewed to identify the structures they evolved. For example, Labor’s history of representing the masses, its trade union affiliations and the ethos that its parliamentary members are but representatives of the rank-and-file, all combine to give it strength and a rigid, hierarchical structure.

Such a structure served it well in the decades of political stability, underpinned by electoral support for economic development and industrialisation. But Labor’s strength also became its weakness when the postmaterialist challenge emerged in Tasmania – partly as a backlash against unbridled development and the continual destruction of wilderness. In Tasmania the concept of wilderness became symbolic and emotion-laden due to the sophisticated and shrewd highlighting and media
manipulation by environmentalists. The Labor Party was challenged by a new agenda for reform – in tackling this challenge it had to examine its structure and the process it could adopt to meet the challenge.

Postmaterialists rebelled against rigid, hierarchical structures, which they saw as inappropriate to express their values and ideology. This mistrust of political parties in general was well understood by the Greens; their delays in formalising their structure allowed them to exploit Labor’s weaknesses in this and other areas. But the formalisation of the Greens as a political party was also be shown to be a weakness, for it went against the beliefs of many of its members who opposed hierarchical structures. Despite this, the Greens succeeded in gaining a balance of power with two different parties – a reality that also leads to an examination of their structure and ideology.

To consider the relevance of Labor’s structure and ideology, this thesis examines the values held by its members and those of the broader community. For example, surveys of Labor Party members and the community allow comparisons of the levels of postmaterialists, party attitudes and values and how other parties are regarded. These values also enable a consideration of the relevance of traditional Labor objectives.

Just as the postmaterialists have an importance far beyond their numbers, so too is their importance as a voting block. Both Labor and the Greens need a proportion of these voters – the Greens to remain a political force, and Labor to gain majority government. The structure and ideology behind the mating dance of both parties as they seek to woo these voters, and the implications both in Tasmania and elsewhere of the new forces are all evaluated.

It will be shown that the traditional Labor objectives still enjoy sufficient currency for it to be a dominant party or player in any new structure and agenda of value reforms. Despite the high hopes of the Greens, and their strongly held belief that Labor is withering as a political force, the game is far from over. Labor, by careful strategies, can still remain a dominant expressive party of reform.
The Structure of the Thesis

In pursuing this argument the following approach has been taken: the thesis falls into three parts. The first part examines the literature and concepts relating to party structure and ideology in western democracies. The second, focussing on Tasmania, reviews party structure and ideology in an historical context, analysing the development of the various relationships between ideology and structure over time. It also shows how the impetus for new postmaterialist parties grew from a series of environmental conflicts to the establishment of the Greens as a political party, forcing Labor to adapt to meet the postmaterialist challenge. The third part considers the empirical evidence of changes in values both in Labor and the broader community. This, in turn, leads to a statement of the implications for Labor in any attempts at restructuring and developing an effective electoral strategy. The broader implications of postmaterialism in Tasmania and elsewhere are then addressed.

Chapters two and three review the literature on party types and ideology. Chapter two discusses the typing of parties by their structure and purpose, using Duverger’s work as a starting point from which other party developments can be placed in context. The importance of electoral systems are noted, with a consideration of whether they are barriers or frontiers to new parties. It is shown that proportional representation does not prevent party formation, and also makes it easier for new parties to gain representation in parliament.

Chapter three examines the literature on ideology and its relationship to societal change. In particular, it addresses the issues of postmaterialism and its new values. It looks at the role of Inglehart and his theory that postmaterialism and generational change led to the new ecocentric ideology, relevant to the development of new environmental parties.

Chapters four to seven deal with the Tasmanian parties. Chapter four reviews the history of the traditional Tasmanian Liberal and Labor parties. Labor’s lengthy terms in government are shown to have given rise to structural rigidity and dogmatism, a factor in encouraging new parties. The relevance of the Hare-Clark
system is also shown as it assists minor parties to gain parliamentary representation and with it the possibility of a balance of power.

Chapter five deals with the emergence of postmaterialism in Tasmania. It plots the growth of postmaterialism and environmentalism by way of series of environmental conflicts. In doing so it analyses the concept of wilderness as sacred and the charismatic nature of the environmental movement. This chapter ends with Labor’s accommodation with the Greens and examines the tensions that led to its inevitable disintegration.

Chapter six deals with the effect of the Accord with the Greens on the Labor Party. It shows how failure forced the socialists to reconsider and develop a new strategy towards the Greens, which meant it also had to deal with its traditional supporters and internal dissent. This chapter explains how it dealt with its traditional supporters, such as the unions, while at the same time seeking to attract a proportion of the postmaterialists from the Greens.

Chapter seven compares Tasmania’s three parties after the advent of new politics. It examines how the Greens evolved into a charismatic framework party and, taking advantage of momentary stability on the political scene, and makes ideological and structural comparisons. The ecocentric, wilderness-focussed ideology of Greens is considered as it relates to the established ideology of Labor and Liberal parties and also how it relates to the Greens European counterparts.

Chapters eight and nine consider the empirical evidence of postmaterialism. Chapter eight examines the empirical evidence from both Labor and community surveys, dealing with their respective sociological and ideological make-up. It graphically displays the extent of postmaterialist infiltration and the lines of conflict within the Labor Party. Comparison is made with the general population’s attitudes and values through other published surveys.

Chapter nine deals with the implications of the empirical findings of the surveys. The option of alliances is discussed before drawing a conclusion on how Labor could best achieve majority government. The tensions within Labor and the Greens
are disclosed by considering the differing values and characteristics of their members. This chapter sets the dimensions of the problem for Labor as it attempts a dual strategy of attracting postmaterialist and materialist voters while freezing out the Greens as potential alliance partners.

Ancillary Methodological considerations
Tasmania, for reasons noted, was an excellent case study in its own right (as an interesting example of how an established party confronted challenges from the new politics). But it has broader application, for Tasmania was the first arena in which postmaterialist parties arose and gained credibility (Walker 1986, 1). As a result it has a longer case history than any other part of the world.

In constructing the argument a number of ancillary methodological considerations had to be addressed. These included sources and constraints, such as biased information and views, which are inherent in any such undertaking. The primary sources come from a broad range and include the following: administrative files, membership records and correspondence of the Tasmanian branch of the Labor Party. Personal interviews with Labor members were arranged where possible and supported with notes of meetings, which include cabinet papers and strategy documents. I was fortunate to be able to work from these party sources and, where possible, these have been acknowledged.

The Labor Party survey and Australian Election Study surveys were of value in determining values and characteristics of the respondents. Hansard, press releases and media coverage, despite the last’s occasional superficiality, were used to recollect events and provide insight into the atmosphere at the time. Some material, particularly from Liberal sources, came from individuals who insisted on confidentiality.

Limitations of study
Information sources are a significant issue because so many of the sources are not on the public record; for example, key strategic decisions are not. As a participant I am not at liberty to source some of this confidential information, even though it has coloured my work – throughout this work I have tried to recognise this, for the
nature of politics invariably leads to people attempting to paint their own view of history in the most favourable light. Wherever possible, personal views, particularly interviews, are clearly labelled and separated from analysis of the factual material.

The Labor Party gave approval relatively easily for access to information; but it was difficult to obtain primary information from the Greens. Personal animosity and political competition meant information on membership, ideology and tactics could only be gleaned from either public documents or media reports – this leads to the danger of bias, particularly when considering media reports from all parties. The membership survey of Labor members should ideally be compared to Greens membership, but a request for such information was not made. If this data and assessment are considered worthwhile, it may be a study for future writers.

In dealing with membership levels and issues at a State level it was also necessary to deal with federal party issues. I recognise that some elements have a federal relationship but I have attempted to discount them. In doing so I am not denying the importance of the party at a federal level, but I am looking only at one of the two faces of a Janus-headed organisation.

Thus, this thesis considers party change in the context of a perceived postmaterialist challenge. Due to its historical role in the emergence of postmaterialist parties, Tasmania provides an excellent choice for a case study into these issues. What this thesis explores is how the ALP in Tasmania devised a strategy to tackle this challenge – Labor first had to recognise and understand the challenge, then assess the problem it faced, and consider the best course of action. As will be shown, this was to be a slow and tortuous operation, but one that ultimately has the potential to restore Labor's electoral stocks for the first time since its devastating defeat in 1982.
CHAPTER 2

STRUCTURE AND PARTY CATEGORISATION

Introduction
Anyone interested in political parties will eventually be drawn to consider how a party’s structure – for example, its level of bureaucracy, the make-up of its membership and the degree of autonomy of its leaders – is related to its purpose. One key to a party’s effectiveness is how well it achieves its purpose within the constraints of its structure. This chapter’s objective is to show that parties can be usefully described by assessing the relationship between structure and purpose. How the different party types react ideologically and strategically to new challenges depends on the interaction of the internal dynamics of the party, its purpose (whether it be ideological or pragmatic power-seeking) and its environment. For a party to succeed the interaction must be constructive.

This chapter reviews the literature on party types that attempts to relate purpose and structure and particularly attempts to resolve the tension between structure and purpose. The first part of this chapter will therefore consider the definition of a party. Sartori’s (1976) rules of relevance are then briefly examined to determine the threshold at which a political party should be considered for further analysis. If we accept that change is occurring, and will thus affect the relevance of broad institutional solutions, it is also of value to examine how easily change can be accommodated or thwarted by the electoral systems in which the parties must operate. It is the electoral systems that regulate the speed and manner of change.

The tension between structure and purpose will be used to group parties into categories, that is, to construct “ideal types” or a typology of how parties attempt to resolve this tension. Although political analysts recognise a party’s structures and purpose must both be understood they have typically focused on one aspect to the detriment of the other. While such an uneven approach may be adequate to describe parties in a stable environment, this fairly static view is not useful with parties in the process of transformation. Although Maurice Duverger’s Political Parties (1951)
takes this static view, it was the first study to develop a coherent typology. Later analysts have merely modified his model rather than develop their own typology. 

Once these basics are established, it is possible to install a typology of parties ranging from the older established party types using Duverger’s (1951) work as a starting point (although I will refer back to Max Weber’s (1947) charismatic parties). A key weaknesses in his typology is that it is static, for he accepted the purposes of parties as relatively fixed. The tumultuous past decades have shown that this is no longer true. For this reason this chapter examines how his typology has weathered these decades and how others have suggested it be modified. Recent additions with Kirchheimer’s (1966) “catch-all” and Kitschelt’s (1990; 1994) “left-libertarian” framework party are shown to be relevant. Eighty years after Michels (1911) and forty years after Duverger (1951) dealt with organisational aspects of political parties later writers (Epstein 1968, Eliassen & Svaasand 1975, Panebianco 1988, Kitschelt 1994) have provided a guide to the structure of new parties with a different ideology.

This chapter ends with a consideration of the structural differences that determine whether a party can change both its structure and purpose, in response to the challenges of different ideologies and opposing parties. Histories of the parties show that over time the types of party activists (including ideologues and pragmatists) will vary. This is particularly so in mass parties where bureaucracies are entrenched and the autonomy of the leader restricted. Such changes may not have been of importance 30 years ago but, with the advent of different issues and ideologies from new parties, a rigid bureaucracy and formal patterns of leadership accountability may impede a party modifying its position. The nature and extent of a party’s organisational structure therefore has consequences for its activities. Duverger (1951, 4) held that organisation “constitutes the general setting for the activities of members, ... it determines the machinery for the selection of leaders, and decides their powers. It often explains the strength and efficiency of certain parties, the weakness and inefficiency of others.”

As Duverger’s previous quote illustrates, it is important to come to grips with the effects of party structure on party performance (or goal achievement) on several
counts: an improved understanding of ideal party types, party dynamics and the pressures for change and transformation of parties. Factors that have advanced or inhibited change in the old party types and the emergence of the new can then be identified. This chapter concludes that the structure of a party and its basics as an ideal type will vary over time and that different party structures will come under pressure from different forces for change; as the objectives of the party change so too does its structure. With changes in ideological levels, the ratios of types of members and the levels of institutionalisation and leadership autonomy will all confer different advantages and disadvantages on each party type at its particular stage of development. Structure determines whether a party can succeed or fail in its transformation.

Nature and definition of political parties
Because we are dealing with aspects of a specific organisational formation and structure, we need to distinguish a political party from similar entities such as social movements or other political bureaucracies. Changes such as greater access to education, higher standards of living and shifts from blue-collar industries have swept the industrialised nations, profoundly affecting society and creating new cleavages and concepts. Nonetheless, parties remain the principal means by which the community organises itself to contest for public office. The effect of these changes on political parties, both established and new, must therefore be assessed. For the purpose of this thesis, I will focus on definitions that refer to both structure and purpose to better analyse this relationship.

Edmund Burke in 1770 (Langford 1981, 319) defined a political party as, “a body of men united, for promoting by their joint endeavours the national interest upon some particular principle in which they are united.” This definition relates to a time before parties in democratic systems as we now know them existed yet, stripped of its normative content, can still be used today. To Burke, structure was less important than purpose, but even at this early stage, his description contains two elements: a description of the structure and a normative concept of the ‘national interest.’ The national interest was a desirable objective that had its own independent reality, which it was the duty of the elected representatives to pursue.
The concept of the national interest as a purpose for seeking public power still defines the tension that continues to exist in political parties two hundred years later.

Many more recent definitions of parties refer to purpose, almost paraphrasing Burke’s definition. For example, Lenin (1929) stated that the political structure exists to both educate and mobilise the masses, and “the more widely the masses are drawn into the struggle and form the basis of the movement, the more necessary it is to have such an organisation and the more stable it must be ” (Lenin 1929, 116).

Decades later, the different definitions still refer to aspects of structure, purpose and environment. Duverger (1951, XV) defines a party as “a community with a particular structure”. Others (eg. Epstein 1968, Panebianco 1982, Krieger 1993, 722) are more explicit: parties are the only organisations that nominate candidates for public office, operate in the electoral arena and compete for votes. Epstein (1968, 9) also introduces the political context with his descriptive definition of “any group, however loosely organised, seeking to elect governmental office holders under a given label.” In contrast is Perrow’s (1972, 14) view:

Most important, however, organisations [parties] are tools for shaping the world as one wants it to be shaped. They provide the means for imposing ones’ definition of the proper affairs of man upon other men (Perrow 1972, 14).

Generally definitions of political parties fall into two types: those that believe the purpose of a party is to win power, and those that believe it is a way to articulate and achieve particular views, a striving for power to accomplish the ostensible goals of the party. These definitions place emphasis on different attributes of parties. A sociological prejudice, by definition, shows parties as nothing other than manifestations of social divisions in the political arena (eg. Eldersveld 1964, 2), while an instrumental interpretation inserts a teleological prejudice, attributing a priori ‘goals’ to parties that, in the observers mind, represent the raison d’etre of the party in question.
The instrumental model can take two forms: the first declares that parties are groups that pursue goals and that a party’s ideology is a good indicator of its goals (Shell 1962, Gross 1967, Rose 1974, Hagopian 1978); the second contains a minimal definition of power seeking (Downs 1957, Schlesinger 1965, Jupp 1968, Perrow 1972, Epstein 1975). Analysts who focus on structure tend to emphasise those aspects that refer to the attainment of power and de-emphasise the overt normative content. This is exemplified by Downs (1957, 27-28), with his basic hypothesis that “parties formulate policies in order to win elections, rather than win elections in order to formulate policies.” The former definition has electoral victory as a means to the realisation of ideological goals whilst the latter has ideology as a means to electoral victory. However, these definitions do not explain, as Michels (1927) observed (and as will be shown in the Tasmanian context), why parties often adopt actions that do not assist themselves electorally. Such definitions ignore the environment within which the parties operate, which may limit their ability to manoeuvre, maximise votes and win an election.

For the purposes of this thesis, a party is defined as an organisation that presents itself in the political environment and puts forward its candidates for election. Whatever their structure or ideology, political parties present themselves as discrete entities to achieve their goals; they are thus capable of being categorised. The question of purpose, be it winning power or achieving an ideological goal, will vary with the type of party, so is best considered on a case by case basis.

Party relevance and Sartori – a threshold issue

At what point does a political party which meets our technical criteria become sufficiently relevant to be investigated? This question is valid both for a new party and a party that is under pressure for radical change caused by changes in society. We have to consider at what point does one start taking notice of new parties and societal changes. If the electoral system allows a party to become easily relevant, then one would expect minor changes to manifest themselves speedily; but if the system suppresses relevance, then change, when it comes, may be overwhelming and confronting.
Sartori (1976, 12) noted that not all parties should be considered, for there is a survival threshold they must cross to become relevant either in the electorate or the parliamentary arena. A party’s relevance is influenced by such factors as how power is distributed among the parliamentary groups and what types of parties are represented. A party may have a large membership, but if it fails to gain parliamentary representation or be sufficiently active, other parties may be able to ignore it, changing neither their policies nor their attitudes.

Although some parties may obtain parliamentary representation, unless they are ‘relevant’ they may not become successful and able to cross the survival threshold. A basic equation remains: the number of parliamentary seats attained depends on the number of votes obtained, and this in turn depends in part whether the electorate sees the party as relevant.

To ascertain this threshold within a multiparty system, Sartori drafted two rules:

Rule 1
A minor party can be discounted as irrelevant whenever it remains over time superfluous, in the sense that it is never needed or put to use for any feasible coalition majority. Conversely, a minor party must be counted, no matter how small it is, if it finds itself in a position to determine over time, and at some point in time, at least one of the possible governmental majorities.

Rule 2
A party qualifies for relevance whenever its existence, or appearance, affects the tactics of party competition and particularly when it alters the direction of the competition – by determining a switch from centripetal to centrifugal competition either leftward, rightward, or in both directions – of the governing-oriented parties (Sartori 1976, 12).

Therefore if a party lacks either a ‘coalition’ potential or a ‘blackmail’ potential, being unable to condition the other parties’ strategies or parliamentary tactics, it will remain irrelevant. A party may gain parliamentary representation, but unless the seats can be used to negotiate with the other parties it will remain irrelevant.
Consequently many active members will leave, its size will drop and it will lack the necessary resources to institutionalise. Without sufficient membership an organisation cannot, in a hostile environment, compete for votes from established parties.

Sartori’s two rules assist this analysis by helping to determine whether particular parties have sufficient impact on the parliamentary system to be included in further discussion. The coalition potential, as well as the number of parties represented in parliament is likely to improve the success of ‘ideological’ parties – parties that see electoral victory as a means to the realisation of their ideological goals (Harmel and Janda 1982, 31). Schlesinger (1968, 434) argues that “where the governing responsibility is shared or obscure, parties can govern and retain a doctrine which has little relevance to the governing experience.” We may therefore count all the parties (who may also be highly ideological) that have either a role in forming a coalition or who have competitive relevance to the opposition parties. Conversely, we must discount the parties that have neither coalition potential nor blackmail potential. These distinctions are of particular significance for, to gain relevance, a party must enter the parliamentary arena.

**Electoral systems – barrier or frontier?**

The electoral system is a key factor in the difficulty of change: capable of being regarded as either a defended barrier or an open frontier, it is one of the primary regulators of the speed of change. The challenge to the established parties gathered momentum in the 1960s’ when the new political parties attempted to enter the parliamentary arena. Duverger (1986, 73) referred to a country’s electoral system acting as either a brake or an accelerator. He regarded the system of proportional representation as akin to an accelerator, making ideological voting more commonplace than in a majority system. Muller-Rommel (1990, 225) observed that the Greens “electoral success is not so much dependant upon the strength of new movements in a given country as upon the type of party system in which they operate”. The impact of electoral laws on new parties and the constraints these laws place upon their success in the parliamentary arena therefore becomes relevant.
Western democracies have different electoral laws, but social factors, rather than electoral laws, give rise to new parties; These laws influence only the growth or otherwise of the “new politics” parties once they have formed. Cox (1997, 29) refers to this process as pre-entry versus post-entry politics. In the pre-entry period the central issue is the processes that deter entry – such as nomination procedures and expectations of failure of the party. In the post-entry period the issues are such matters as strategic voting and electoral laws. In essence electoral laws cannot stop a party developing but they can be a critical factor in their ultimate success.

The potential electorate of newer parties may be larger than the actual voters for such parties. In the European community as a whole, 47 percent of the electorate surveyed in 1984 said they might vote for ecology parties (Inglehart and Rabier 1986, 467); but when the opportunity arose in the 1989 European elections, the highest support for the Greens was 15 percent in Britain, with substantially less support in the rest of the European community. In 1990 this new parliamentary group consisted of Greens and Green-related members of parliament elected on 12 different lists from 7 countries: Portugal, Spain, France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands (Maier 1993, 27). In the June 1994 European Parliamentary elections the size of the Green group in the European Parliament dropped from 28 to 22 members, but the Greens have obviously established a stable electorate well above the five percent threshold (Carter 1994, 497).

It is believed that many supporters of “new politics” parties do not vote for their preferred candidates because they believe that the electoral system does not favour their election (Downs 1957). Before considering the actual electoral laws regard should be had to this important psychological factor. Downs describes these voters – called “sophisticated” or “strategic” by Cox (1997, 30) – in the following manner.

A rational voter first decides what party he believes will benefit him most; then he tries to estimate whether this party has any chance of winning. He does this because his vote should be expended as part of a selection process, not as an expression of preference. Hence even if he prefers party A, he is ‘wasting’ his vote on A if it has no chance of winning because very few other voters prefer it to B or C. The relevant choice in this case is between B and C.
Since a vote for A is not useful in the actual process of selection, casting it is irrational (Downs 1957, 48).

How a voter views a party’s chance of success is intertwined with the electoral system. It appears that when the system is perceived as discriminating against smaller parties, voters, as well as political activists and donors, will favour the larger parties (Gunther 1989, Lijphart 1990, 493, Cox 1997, 6-7). Riker (1986), by reference to Britain, Canada, Germany and the United States and Cox (1997, 80-85), by reference to Germany and Britain, show that the large amount of sophisticated voting that occurs can disadvantage third parties nationally. On this basis, if a voter regards the electoral system as conducive to a third party’s success he or she is more likely to support the party.

The perception of the importance of success (or failure) of a party in gaining seats, which can be described a ‘bandwagon effect,’ is illustrated by the Ecology Party in Britain and the Values Party in New Zealand. Both found the electoral system too high an obstacle and were unable to win seats, leaving activists disillusioned and willing to put their energies elsewhere. After the 1975 New Zealand election the Values Party mounted a strong nationwide campaign. In 1978 it stood a candidate in every constituency, but received only 2.4 percent of the votes. This failure “came as a tremendous blow, from which the Party never recovered [it subsequently] dissolved into major internal disputes” (Parkin 1989, 269). It was to be nearly two decades in New Zealand before conservation or Green politics again became a force. In contrast, success of the German Green party (Die Grunen) in winning seats was a major factor in holding it together (Parkin 1989, 121., Davidson 1992, 69., Frankland 1995); with factions cooperating and voters seeing their vote having a result.

Whereas the new movements in New Zealand and Britain were unable to translate their support base into parliamentary representation, in Germany they were. Though there might not have been more Green supporters the institutional obstacles in the countries that have winner take all systems or do not have proportional representation are formidable to conquer.
The effect of electoral laws – defined by Rae (1971, 14) as “... those which govern the process by which electoral preferences are articulated as votes and by which these votes are translated into distributions of governmental authority (typically parliamentary seats) among the competing political parties” – have long been noted (Hermens 1938, 25). But it was Duverger (1951, 239), with his formulation that the plurality system favours a two party parliament (referred to as ‘Duverger’s law’) while the proportional representation system favours multipartyism (referred to as Duverger’s ‘hypothesis’), who focused on the issue. The belief that proportional representation would affect the two-party system was not new (e.g., Ashworths 1900,vii-viii) but Duverger’s use of the word ‘law’ when dealing with plurality was met with criticism. Duverger (1986, 70) later said that his original remark (that this was “the closest to a sociological law among all the generalisations suggested in this book”) did not have the significance that was later attributed to it. Nonetheless, political commentators have found, if not a sociological law, at least a “strong association” between the system and the number of parties in parliament (Rae 1971, 88).

Riker (1986, 30) notes Duverger’s uneasiness about his hypothesis and agrees with Rae that the hypothesis, as it relates to proportional representation, cannot be more than a “fairly strong” probabilistic association. Rae (1971, 149) showed that proportional representation is neither a necessary condition nor a sufficient condition for the development of a new party. Riker (1986, 27-28) pointed out that Australia, Germany, Austria and Ireland had not, at that time, a huge proliferation of parties. However, Duverger’s hypothesis does not require that the number of parties must increase over time; it merely implies that, under proportional representation, it is easier to have more than two parties.

Sartori (1986), accepting a probabilistic rather than deterministic association, believes that the introduction of proportional representation in some countries removed obstacles for new parties; it did not “cause multiplication”.

The correct argument is, thus, that whenever the introduction of PR happens to be followed by the surge of new relevant parties, we are not really pointing to
the effects of PR but at the side effects resulting from the removal of pre-existing obstacles (Sartori 1986, 58).

Sartori also referred to the removal of obstacles that proportional representation brings and highlighted other social or cultural factors that have an equally important role in the formation or withering of new parties, a point with which Duverger agreed:

Remember that my 1955 formulation of the sociological laws specified that they "define merely basic tendencies that interact with national and social factors", that a country's party system is first of all a reflection of the latter, and that the electoral system is usually only an accelerator or a brake (Duverger 1986, 73).

How much of an accelerator or brake the electoral system is depends to some degree on the purity of proportional representation: the greater the impurity of proportional representation, the higher the entry costs for smaller parties, and the lesser the impurity the feebler the reductive effect (Sartori 1986, 63). Leaving social and national conditions aside, small parties in Germany where 5 percent of the vote is necessary before seats can be won face less of an obstruction than in Ireland. Because the Irish districts are very small (with only 3 to 5 seats each), parties need 20-25 percent of the vote to be represented; that is, the magnitude of the district affects the proportionality of a proportional representation system. In Britain, which has a plurality system, Duverger's Law may have acted as a brake, but nonetheless other parties have formed. The Social Democrats and Ecology parties, for example, serve as an outlet for dissatisfied voters. But as Rudig and Lowe (1986) note:

Different political systems impose different conditions on the establishment of political parties and the fielding of candidates in elections. The British system makes it relatively easy to form a political party . . . the first-past-the-post system makes it very difficult for new parties to achieve any representation (Rudig and Lowe 1986, 277).
Social and cultural conditions unique to each society, particularly the number and depth of cleavages, have an effect on whether parties will be formed (Taagepera and Grofman 1985, 341); structural variables have no effect on their formation. However, once formed, the type of electoral system relates strongly to their chances of success. In an analysis of the relationship between the main electoral system variables and electoral outcomes in 20 western democracies between 1945 and 1985 Lijphart (1990) found that the influence of the variables on the number of parties participating in elections was weak. His later work also confirms that disproportionality does not automatically lead to fewer elective parties (Lijphart 1994, 98). The final position is summarised by Harmel and Robertson:

Our analyses provide support for the conclusion that although structural factors (i.e., the nature of the electoral system) may affect the electoral success of new parties (as such systems have sometimes been designed to do), the presence of an electoral apparatus that might inhibit new party success need not inhibit new party formation (Harmel and Robertson 1985, 516-17).

The electoral system also affects how much ideology a party can successfully display. Mayer (1972, 227) argues that principled parties thrive best in a multiparty system where they can appeal to an ideologically homogenous electorate. Sartori (1966, 159) stated that: “The rule of thumb appears to be that the more numerous the party, the less they can afford a pragmatic lack of distinctiveness.” In a survey of 233 new parties formed between 1960 and 1980, Harmel and Robertson (1985) confirm this assertion. They found that higher proportions of ecology parties had been formed in plurality/majority systems than proportional representation systems. Higher proportions were also in systems in which fewer cleavage dimensions had already been addressed by the existing parties.

Parties may therefore be formed but, to attain relevance, they have to deal successfully with the electoral system of their own society. This clearly regulates the speed of change. Having formed and gained representation their ability to become relevant is determined by elements such as their relative structural advantages and limitations. These advantages and limitations are highlighted by each party’s type.
Party Structures – Towards a Typology of Ideal Types

Duverger's (1951) development of a party typology was the first serious attempt to comprehensively relate structure and purpose; to show that parties with the same purpose have similar political structures. When the ideal party types are examined clustering becomes apparent. Scholars have generally grouped parties at the focus or resolution of the tension between structure and purpose. Duverger's typology focuses on which structures best represent the purposes or objectives that parties seek to achieve. Although his original classification has been broadened it has stood the test of time. The key structural issues that Duverger dealt with include the elements of membership, finance and leadership autonomy. This led to a three category typology: the ideal types of cadre, mass and devotee.

The different emphasis that parties place on issues such as membership and leadership autonomy illustrates their different purposes and, ultimately, their differences in structure. For example, to Duverger (1951, 20) the concept of caucus is essentially a middle-class organ of political expression, for this class is not fond of collective action. The structure of caucus lends itself to the pursuit of power in defence of its ideological position; it feels that its political education is complete. The branch, by contrast, was and remains a Socialist invention to organise the masses and give them a political education. Likewise the militia is a fascist creation, an instrument of the middle-class to dominate the working-class.

In all cases structure varies to assist the different parties to achieve their goals. Duverger's (1951) classic ideal types do not fully describe the changes that have occurred in the decades since the formation of these parties and the formulation of his typology. One must also take into account the increasing pragmatism and the declining centrality of ideology in the so-called 'catch-all parties'; and the emergence of new values and expectations of what structure is best suited to its needs and ideology in the so-called 'framework parties'. In these more modern classifications the need for the structure of the party to relate to its stated purpose holds true as much as it did in Duverger’s day. Typologies serve not only the purpose of categorising but also show how theorists have dealt with structure and its relationship to ideology.
Type 1: cadre party
The interplay of membership, finance, leadership autonomy and the goals of a party are illustrated in Duverger's three party types. To Duverger the cadre party consisted of;

Influential persons, in the first place, whose name, prestige or connections can provide a backing for the candidate and secure him votes; experts in the second place, who know how to handle the electors and how to organise a campaign; last of all financiers, who can bring the sinews of war. Quality is the most important factor: extent of prestige, skill in technique, size of fortune (Duverger 1951, 64).

In electoral systems based on a property qualification (which was the norm in the nineteenth century) parties took the form of cadre parties, with groups of notables preparing for elections and conducting campaigns. The policy was laissez faire. The disenfranchised masses had no part to play, while the propertied middle-class took a paternalistic view. Parties are either 'internally' created by pre-existing parliamentary groups or 'externally' created by extra-parliamentary groups. Their structures can be related to the differing expectations of their members for the former was the typical bourgeois cadre party: a party that initially saw no need for further development of its structure or an expansion of membership. The cadre party was the first step in the evolution of parties.

The cadre party members were neither required nor expected to formulate policy or guide the parliamentary leadership. In a British context, those with conservative attitudes and party organisations had adapted Tory conceptions of hierarchy to the conditions of democracy and mass politics (Beer 1974, 173). Although the middle-class expected their interests to be protected by their representatives, their task was to provide support, winning votes for the leaders rather than telling them what to do. Although contemporary cadre parties now insist on a formal mechanism for enrolment and the payment of annual subscription, their emphasis on political education remains slight. People in prosperous private enterprise often regard political involvement as neither compatible with their primary role nor an attractive
alternative. Crisp (1973, 231) summarise this position in quoting a businessman who stated; “I take no interest in politics, as long as Labor doesn’t get in.” It is this attitude to political education, and the unwillingness to organise, that distinguishes cadre parties from the rest.

McKenzie’s description of the British Conservative Party in the nineteenth century shows just how accurate Duverger’s description is in relation to membership and funding.

Until well into the nineteenth century, the Conservative Party was no more than a grouping of a few hundred Members of Parliament and Peers who were associated together for sustaining (whenever it proved feasible) a Conservative Cabinet. They had neither a professional staff of any size nor a mass organisation of voluntary supporters in the country; nor did they need them. They were able to rely for the most part on the allegiance and authority of the squirearchy and the generous financial contributions of a section of the business community to provide the very considerable financial resources which were required to win elections in the days of great political corruption (McKenzie 1955, 583).

Until fifty years ago cadre parties had little need for the general public’s funds. Finance, which is indispensable to the functioning of any party, can, at one extreme, come from a single external sponsor and at the other from a multitude of small contributors. Most parties occupy a position between these two extremes, with the cadre parties relying on fewer but more generous sponsors and the mass parties relying more upon membership fees. It was not until 1947 that the British Conservative Party was forced, for the first time, to launch an appeal for a fighting fund; in the past that it had relied on only a few hundred people (McKenzie 1955, 594).

Even with the continued support of business, the cadre party now relies to a much greater extent on the fees of its members and their ability to raise finances for elections. But the paying of a subscription has less psychological significance to cadre party members, who still believe that any shortfall in funding will be made up
by financial backers. The cadre party essentially sees itself as self-contained, with access to finances and elites for support and candidates. As the middle-class believed its own political education complete, policy remained in the hands of the elite, who saw no reason—and were under no pressure—submit to a central or party control.

The rise of the mass party and adult suffrage forced changes on the cadre party. However, as Jupp (1968) points out cadre parties did not simply adopt or copy the structure of the mass parties. Because the newer mass parties were associated with the left, the cadre parties developed their own party structures to combat the new threat or ‘contagion’ as Duverger noted. In the 1940s' the newly formed Australian Liberal Party referred to the ‘world-wide drift towards the left in politics’ and the need to arrest that drift (Simms 1982, 26). Just as the mass party was to change in response to new threats, so too did the cadre party by contagion from the left.

Contagion from the left posed such a threat that the cadre parties adopted mass membership with funding from the fees of members. This resulted in structural changes to its bureaucracy when electoral committees were set up and linked to the parliamentary groups. Although the party was to become subject to bureaucratic structures, necessary for any large organisation, control was to remain hierarchical. The rank-and-file still had little strategic capacity, without influence on the decisions of the party elites. The functions of policy formulation and the ability to direct the parliamentary representatives has remained unachievable despite attempts at change both in this century and the last. Leadership autonomy has never been seriously questioned. Although the concept of contagion from the left appears to be accurate, the contagion led the cadre parties to selectively respond rather than seek to be structural clones.

Although others believe that the Australian parties of capital do not stand for the full laissez faire philosophy (Crisp 1973, 227., Simms 1982, 9) it is the Liberal Party that bears the closest resemblance to the cadre party, particularly in its early years. Henderson (1994, 30) claims that Australia (although Tiver 1978, 3-29) disagrees), does not have a consistent and coherent conservative political tradition. Until the formation of the new Liberal Party in 1944, the two main non-Labor groups in the
Commonwealth Parliament had little in common except their objections to the principles of the Labor Party (Starr 1980, 1-3). Menzies, the founder of the Australian Liberal Party, said in his speech at a meeting to establish the party; “This Conference has been convened in an endeavour to produce unity of organisation among those who do not support Socialism as the solution of Australia’s political and economic problems” (Menzies 1944 quoted in Crisp 1973, 226).

Today the Australian Liberal Party is still regarded by some as a loose association of groups and individuals who come together on a national basis principally whenever there is an election (O’Brien 1985, 1). The Constitutions of the State parties guarantee each one autonomy. To Crisp (1973, 227) the Liberal and Country (now National) parties are the political instruments of the owners and controllers of urban and rural capital; united in their opposition to socialism.

The Liberals approach to finance also illustrates the party’s affinity with the cadre type. When it was formed in 1944, the Liberal Party presented itself as a non-sectional party without connections to big business, a party whose main source of income would be from membership subscriptions. Nonetheless the party did not entirely jettison its old methods of financing by making approaches to business (Simms 1982, 13), arguing that funding the Liberal Party was insurance against the Labor Party gaining office. This close coordination with business continued with the campaigns around the threats to banking in the 1940s’ and attacks on insurance and mining in the 1970s’.

**Type 2: mass party**

In contrast the strength of the bonds between member and party is the main difference between mass and cadre parties. The birth of the mass party coincides with universal suffrage replacing limited franchise, according to Duverger. Using the example of the French Socialist Party, he affirms that recruitment is the fundamental activity, as it aims to identify an elite to govern (Duverger 1951, 63). To him, the mass party was the final evolutionary point: it gives strength and support to the masses and is as a vehicle for education and enlightenment. Through the mass party the masses were empowered, educated and able to advance the struggle for equality. Members were to have a genuine input into policy formulation; the
decisive will and main thrust of ideas were to come from the rank-and-file. By way of policy and conferences, the masses would influence the actions of their elected elites. During the class struggles of the early and mid-twentieth century, the intensity of ideology was high and devotion to a party essential to success. Epstein (1968) refers to the formation of mass parties in the following terms;

... mass membership appears to be an organisational necessity for any movement seeking to effect drastic change in the economic order by democratic means... a large party of this type emerged in every Western Nation outside of North America... where successful socialist development began at an early stage of industrialisation when conditions included pre-modern class consciousness, and delayed mass voting franchise and widespread economic deprivation (Epstein 1968, 165).

The cadre party did not view membership as a necessity until the mass parties developed, and even then did not view it with enthusiasm.

The cadre party simply attempted to make their organisations more flexible by pretending to open their ranks to the masses. The problem was how to give the masses some scope for political activity and how to confer on the notables comprising the caucus the air of having been popularly invested (Duverger 1951, 66).

Prior to universal suffrage, the working-class was able to combat the political and financial might of the cadre parties and capital only through organising trade unions. The organisation of mass parties followed. The formative process started outside the parliamentary framework, with the social, economic and cultural needs of the workers the main motivation. For example, before World War 1, British Labour was little more than a coalition of trade unions acting as a pressure group (Beer 1974, 168). In order to gain influence, and to counter the influence of industry and manufacturers, the British trade unions moved from sponsoring members of parliament to the establishing and maintaining of the Labour Party.
When political and electoral evolution permitted the development of the mass party the trade union organisation provided the new Labour Party with a ready-made framework (Jaensch 1989a, 15). As a result of the external generation of the party, unions were seen as a natural adjunct to a party that was regarded as the political wing of the labour movement. Michels (1959, 25) described the mass party as “the weapon of the weak in their struggle with the strong.” They needed to organise because;

Hard experience taught Labour men and women that, however apparently replete with constitutional gadgetry and safeguards the machinery of political democracy, men with wealth and social position markedly above their own had disproportionate power to influence policy and the conduct of affairs (Crisp 1973, 179).

The mass party described by Duverger characteristically controls its financial resources through membership. It relies on a system of affiliation fees from unions and individual subscriptions from rank and file members to finance its infrastructure and, in the absence of public funding, to fight elections. Once organised, the members of the mass party through their subscriptions, could compete with the other parties funded by capitalists. The mass party, of necessity, spread the burden over the largest possible number of members.

However, to Duverger, becoming a member of a mass party is more than merely helping to fund it. Completing and signing a membership application gives material form to the act of membership. It places a psychological value on the member’s signature and the undertakings given. Paying a subscription becomes a psychologically significant act.

To pay your subscription regularly, to pay a high rate of contributions that entails some sacrifice, such acts bear witness to the strength of the bonds that unite the member to the party. But they also reinforce the bonds: one’s devotion to a community, like one’s devotion to a fellow creature, is proportional to the sacrifices one makes for it (Duverger 1951, 63).
The Australian Labor Party, as in Britain, was founded to be the champion of 'the masses' against 'the classes' (Crisp 1973, 178., McKinlay 1981., McMullin 1991); most of its members joined because they felt that the existing order of society did not sufficiently serve their interests. The ways in which the Australian Labor Party dealt with finances, membership and leadership autonomy was typical of a mass party. Although the Australian Labour movement was further advanced at the turn of the century than its British counterparts - it had status and it had formed a party that held the balance of power in the 1891 New South Wales election (McKinlay 1981, 8) and in the first Commonwealth Parliament (Crisp 1973, 190) - its purpose to organise the masses remained the same.

In all Australian colonies the labour movement had to deal with entrenched privilege and an electoral system that disadvantaged workers. Plural voting entitled property owners to a number of votes, while itinerant workers were denied votes because of onerous residency requirements (McMullin 1991, 4). The depression of the 1890s' swept across a society without even the most elementary social security provisions. It highlighted class distinctions and inequalities, and removed any doubts within the labour movement of the need for political involvement, particularly when governments were clearly on the side of employers (McKinlay 1981, 7). The Labor Party therefore bears the imprint of its early formation: the stress on solidarity from its trade union origins and early parliamentary experiences, and the belief that all members should have an equal voice (Crisp 1978, 4-5).

An external 'sponsor' organisation, in this case the unions, leaves a genetic imprint on the externally generated mass party. As the party was originally conceived as the political wing of the organisation, it affects the legitimation of parliamentary leadership. In Europe and Australia, the mass parties have been transformed into mixed parties with individual as well as affiliated members. This change can influence the autonomy of the parliamentary leader, particularly when making decisions that may be unpalatable to the original sponsoring organisation. The mass parties, especially the democratic socialist parties, which have had a rich history reflecting the ideologies and cleavages of society at the time of their formation and
for decades after, are now having to face the prospect of competing and opposing political parties that express a new, very different, ideology.

**Type 3: devotee/charismatic party**

Duverger's devotee party considers itself an elite that does not need to mirror society in its make-up, though some members are closer to the 'inner circle' and entrusted with greater loyalty and activity. This category however, is not as clearly delineated as the cadre and mass parties. Duverger believes it may reflect the process of a gradual evolution to a new concept: a party more open than cadre parties yet more closed than mass parties. Duverger's examples are the communists and fascists:

In the Leninist conception the party should not include the whole of the working-class; it is only the advance guard, the fighting wing, the 'most enlightened' section of the working-class. This represents a change from the conception of the party as class, it is a party conceived as the elite. Fascist doctrines are even more definite on this point, anti-egalitarian and Neitzschean, fundamentally aristocratic, they view the party as 'order' made up of the best, the most faithful, the most brave, the most suitable. The age of the masses is gone; we are in the age of elites (Duverger 1951, 70).

Duverger states that communists and fascists sought initially to be devotee parties but that 'old age' made them less exacting about the members they recruited. In the beginning they tend to exercise strict supervision of recruitment, and form a reliable and permanent 'inner circle' around which other members group. Members were expected to show a strong commitment to the party, an almost religious fervour or belief. With the communists Marxism was reduced to a few rigid elementary principles intended to engender obedience. The fascists experienced an even greater intellectual poverty, where discipline became doctrine (Duverger 1951, 175-7). A lessening of fervour or weakening of vigilance over recruitment resulted in periodic 'purges' to reinvigorate the party; maintaining the theme that membership was to be prized, with the party seeking out people who would be suitable as members.

Duverger's difficulty in this categorisation arose when he had to lump together both the fascists – in effect a mass conservative party – and communists. His main
criterion for categorising this party type is the level of commitment that its members show, where party life takes over from private life (Duverger 1951, 117). Fascism in its crudeness and violence could not be easily compared to the sophistication of Marxism in its ideological heyday; nor were the social and institutional bases comparable. Duverger seems more comfortable when he focuses on the post-ideological phase of fascism and communism. It is in this phase that the devotee finds that there is an impoverished ideology, as obedience has taken priority. Without devotion to a doctrine or ideology, the follower is left with the cult of the leader such as Stalin, Mussolini and Hitler. These leaders become part of the deification of power, portrayed as infallible with their every wish becoming party law; in the end they become an institution, not a person (Duverger 1951, 179-182).

It is at this stage that the party’s cult of leader or movement begins to blur into that of charismatic leadership or charismatic party. For this reason I am emphasising charismatic parties by expanding Duverger’s devotee party concept to include Max Webers (1947) category of charismatic leaders and parties. This is due to the similarities of members attitudes and leadership approaches. Weber’s considerations are pertinent to the new political parties, which will be seen to have a secular charismatic nature.

Weber (1947, 358) believed a charismatic leader is recognised at least as having specifically exceptional powers or qualities. ‘Charisma’ is often misused as a synonym for prestige or authority but it is much more than that. Weber broadened the category of charismatic leadership to include such secular definitions, using ‘charisma’ in a value neutral way. Friedrich (1971, 299-305) objects to such secular views, believing charismatic leadership should be grounded in a faith in God. But Friedrich, while he focuses on religion in its traditional forms, ignores charisma’s importance, particularly in revolutionary movements, which may have strong, although non-traditional, religious overtones.
Panebianco (1982, chapter 8) states that charisma involves three elements;

1. ‘Revolutionary’ or ‘extra-economic’ nature, the antithesis of traditional power. Whatever the social setting, charismatic leadership rejects old rules and demands change.

2. The organisation is founded on exclusively personal ties – these ties are not traditional ties but are loyalties to a ‘mission’ to which the leader is called; in turn it instils missionary zeal in his disciples. Followers can accept the leader as the supreme authority without necessarily agreeing with him on all occasions (Tucker 1970, 74), but the response of followers is the crucial test of charisma: to be a charismatic leader, he or she must be perceived as such (Weber 1947, 359), and must enforce this by continual demonstrations of faith in his or her subordinates.

3. Charisma is intrinsically unstable, and sooner or later disappears. When this occurs, the organisation can either dissolve or overcome the crisis by transforming personal charisma into official charisma. At this stage the organisation replaces personal charisma with internal regulations and becomes a bureaucracy. To Weber, charisma can undergo a transformation from a purely personal relationship into an established authority structure that is no longer necessarily dependent upon the charisma of the incumbent leader. Although new leaders may not be charismatic themselves, they can refer to the charismatic nature of the party or movement they have ‘inherited’.

The fixed characteristics of charismatic parties are: firstly a cohesive dominant coalition or leadership group held together by loyalty to the leader; secondly the charismatic party does not have bureaucratic characteristics; thirdly a charismatic party is a very highly centralised organisation with the leader having the same effect as a powerful extensive bureaucracy. The charismatic party is also often the focus of groups or organisation that cluster around it and, whatever the charismatic party’s ideological orientation may be, it always present itself as an alternative to existing parties.
The presence of charisma leads to an organisation with certain fixed characteristics. The movement may be inspired by a charismatic leader who heads it, such as the July 26 Cuban revolutionary movement created by Castro, or the German Nationalist Socialists under Hitler. In the case of communism and Lenin, the movement was in existence before the rise of the charismatic leader, who transformed it into a charismatic movement. In either case, the presence of charisma will leave its mark on the party if it is able to continue after the charismatic leader departs, or the crisis to which situational charisma focuses loses its significance (Panebianco 1982, 161-162).

Tucker (1970) identifies “distress” as a pre-condition from which the charismatic leader, through his or her unique personal qualities, can offer the promise of salvation and deliverance. Distress may include physical and material distress caused by, for example floods or famines, or economic distress caused by a depression, or anxiety and spiritual distress caused by environmental destruction. In such cases of identified distress, a person may exercise “situational charisma,” his leadership is perceived as a source of salvation, for example Winston Churchill in World War II.

Charismatic movements for change arise and spread at times when painful forms of distress are prevalent in a society or in some particular stratum of society. The unique personal authority of the leader and the rapturous response of many of the followers grow out of their feelings that he, by virtue of his special powers as a leader, embodies the movements’ salvational promise, hence that which may be of supreme significance to them (Tucker 1970, 85).

Whatever its causes or whoever is the focus, charismatic parties are a continual part of the political landscape. Charisma may be embodied in a leader for either a long time (as with De Gaulle and the Union Pour la Nouvelle Republique), or for the duration of a crisis (as with Churchill), or it may be embodied in a movement or a party. Charisma helps to explain much, particularly when the party is bureaucratised and is able to continue after the demise of the leader; taking upon itself the mantle of saviour.
Within Australia the communist movement comes closest to fitting such a category of devotee/charismatic parties. Davidson (1969) and Brown (1986) refer often to the Australian communist party as being in the vanguard of economic and social issues; an advanced political form where the members (with a sense of moral superiority) are involved in dedicated struggles and battles to fight the forces of capitalism and fascism. Davidson (1969, 176) refers to Leninism as “more than a mystical inspiration: it was a body of teachings, a guide to action.” It is the members devotion that clearly establishes this party within this category. For a contemporary example, the Green Party also puts forward an almost evangelical message of the need to save the environment (Brown and Singer 1996).

**Criticisms of typology – the impact of societal change on ideal types**

Duverger’s ideal types cannot be considered in isolation (Blondel 1969, 125; Harmel and Janda 1982), for parties do not act without reference to their surrounds. It is by the aspects of organisation and structure that a party is distinguished from the general community. Most definitions implicitly or explicitly assume an organisational structure, with rules that separate it from its environment, so that it is possible to distinguish between those who belong and those who do not (Lapalombara and Weiner 1968, 6; Eliassen and Svassand 1975, 98). As Lawson (1976, 27) states “no political institution operates in a vacuum, political parties least of all.” Every party has a myriad of relationships with its environment in the electoral arena; forcing the party to either adapt passively to the environment or seek to ‘dominate’; transforming it to its own needs (Panebianco 1982, 11).

The authors cited in the previous paragraph highlight a critical shortcoming in Duverger’s typology: it is placed in an artificially static situation. In Duverger’s time the cleavages in society were relatively stable: the parties existed in a placid environment. Changes to the cadre party by contagion from the left were resolved by the time of Duverger’s writings. However Duverger did accept that the structure of his ideal types could change (as he relates the cadre party adapted to changing circumstances).
Parties are, today in a constant dynamic relationship with their environment, which can be placid or threatening. This helps to explain later modifications of ideal types.

Every organisation will thus be pushed by its relations with the external world in two different directions at the same time: it will be tempted both to colonise its environment through domination, and to "reach a pact" with it through adaptation. Whether one or the other of these strategies prevails and to what extent . . . depends on how the organization has resolved or resolves in each case its other organizational dilemmas (Panebianco 1982, 13).

Some of Duverger's critics believed that his work was wrong at the time that he wrote it; others feel that his work is no longer relevant because the times, as mirrored in society and the party structures, have changed. The first group is critical of Duverger's idea that the mass type of party represented the future of all parties. It is true that Duverger fell victim to both a cultural bias and a theoretical fallacy. Culturally the experience in France after the Second World War led him to overestimate both the role and future of mass parties, for France's first experience of a mass party was at the beginning of the Fourth Republic when mass parties won over 70 percent of the vote. The second group of critics attack Duverger's view that the mass party was a product of enfranchisement and industrialisation. They (Pizzorno 1964 and Bartolini 1983, 213) believe its rise was more a reaction to the crisis of industrialisation and the extension of suffrage which, once passed, led the development of mass parties to be determined by factors different from those prominent in their formation.

Epstein (1968) suggests Duverger's classifications should be seen as incomplete. Changing circumstances have limited Duverger's relevance. Epstein uses the example of American parties to take issue with Duverger's projection of the organisational contagion of left wing parties as a dominant form; that the characteristics of this type of party would be manifest in modern competing parties. Clearly in the USA this is not the case. Epstein's caution has become increasingly relevant, as party structures have evolved since the 1960s' with the emergence of new political parties and the responses of the established parties. American parties
are clearly no less modern than Western European ones. In aspects of party development they may be more advanced, as they have a more purely electoral organisation (as opposed to membership), an absence of strong opposition to the existing social structure and lesser class consciousness. "These aspects, fostered partly by technological change in mass communication, now increasingly characterise European parties too" (Epstein 1968, 356).

Other authors (Kirchheimer 1966, Epstein 1968 and Kitschelt 1990) identify organic changes in political parties where, as the objectives of the party change (measured in part by ideological intensities and ideological differences) so too does its structure. They suggest that, just as the original purposes of a party have come under pressure, so too have party structures, leading to new categories. This capacity for transformation depends in part on changing societal values and the applicable electoral system. These authors recognise that societal changes will affect Duverger's classifications, but acknowledge that his original classifications are the starting point of any discussion or analysis.

In regarding the continuing relevance of Duverger's types it is essential to consider the pressures for change and what new proposals for 'ideal types' have been proposed: Kirchheimer's (1966) 'catch-all' and Kitschelt's (1990) 'framework'. These are considered as having evolved from the older parties. The former evolved from the convergence of the cadre and mass parties and the latter from the transformation of the devotee/charismatic party.

**Catch - all party type**

At the beginning of the 1950s' Duverger showed how the mass party was becoming the dominant form of political organisation: fifteen years later Otto Kirchheimer (1966) rejected this in his 'catch-all' thesis. To Kirchheimer the mass party was just a step in the organisational development of political parties becoming more akin to American parties. Rather than being a focus of political evolution leading to a permanent change, the 'catch-all' party is best described as merely an adjustment or necessary deviation before the electorate returns to a more permanent category of parties that offer ideological substance. In essence the catch-all category is an integral stage in the life cycle of ideologically driven parties. The completion of the
cycle may not mean the mass party returns to its earlier structure but instead refocusses upon values and issues important to defined sectors of the community.

This ideal type should be seen in the light of both Michels’ (1911) theory of the ‘substitution of ends’ and Lowi’s (1971) ‘articulation of ends’. In Michels’ theory, well-established organisations abandon their official aim of being the instrument for the realisation of certain goals to one where the survival of the party becomes the real end. Lowi’s ‘articulation of ends’ occurs when the official aims of the party become conditional; to be pursued as long as their pursuit doesn’t jeopardise the organisation itself. In these circumstances both the cadre and mass parties converge in an attempt to gain support from the unaligned middle sector of the community. In doing so the ideological characteristics that may in the past have clearly separated the parties are either down-played or ignored. The original goals are evoked in an attempt to keep support while at the same time the party embarks on an increasingly pragmatic course of action.

Ideology – which in this instance can be defined as a coherent, explicitly constructed system of concepts and beliefs that directly influences political action (Krieger 1993, 409) – fractures as the party tries to broaden its appeal with issues that may not present as a coherent whole. By doing so, the stress once placed on ideology is lessened, the ties with the old class alliances such as unions are weakened and the party opens itself up to new social groups. The changing membership contains fewer ideologues, becoming dominated by pragmatists reluctant to change the status quo. This does not mean that the party embraces all components of society – Kirchheimer was aware that no party could do that without losing its identity – but that it focuses on issues as much as ideology as it attempts to broaden its base. Kirchheimer (1966) referred to the historical process of transformations of political parties when he wrote;

The mass integration party, product of an age with harder class lines and more sharply protruding denominational structures, is transforming itself into a catch-all ‘people’s party’. Abandoning attempts at the intellectual and moral encadrement of the masses, it is turning more fully to the electoral
scene, trying to exchange effectiveness in depth for a wider audience and
more immediate electoral success (Kirchheimer 1966, 184).

Kirchheimer’s essentially pragmatic view of the transformation of the mass parties is
that it is based on the lessening of the importance of ideology; instead the party
attempts to attract the most voters on election day. Ideology becomes only one of
the many motivational forces that determine a voter’s choice.

Panebianco (1982, chapter 14) extends Kirchheimer’s theory, focussing on the
professionalisation of party organisation. In the mass parties described by Michels
and Duverger, the party bureaucracy acts as a conduit for leaders and members and,
through them, their constituents. In the new type of party described by Panebianco,
professionals hired for their specialised knowledge (especially of the media) usurp
the role of the bureaucrats, shifting the party’s focus from members to the electorate.
Panebianco describes this party as an ‘electoral-professional’ party -- in essence a
‘catch-all’ party. Once television and special interest groups become more
important links to the electorate than the membership, the bureaucracy of a party is
under immense pressure to change its structure. It must attempt to de-institutionalise
and become weaker (in a bureaucratic sense) than it once was.

However, Kirchheimer’s hypothesis is not universally accepted (Sartori 1976,
Dittrich 1983); nor has it been found that catch-all parties actually win votes
(Wolinetz 1979). In western democracies the advent of new ideological parties has
mitigated against such a transformation. The hypothesis ignores the loyalty
members feel for parties that have a clearly expressed strong ideological foundation
that reflects their beliefs. As one author warns;

... many are still satisfied with the politics of affluence, playing it like a
football supporters club in terms of winning or losing a game ... . This kind
of incentive to achieve support is not satisfying to those who saw the parties
as secular religions. They will remain doggedly with ideological
movements, as millions of Frenchmen and Italians have done, or will search
around for substitutes for the converging and bureaucratised parties. Thus a
reaction against the consumer approach to politics sets in. The bargaining
for votes among a satisfied affluent electorate become unattractive and calls for a return to fundamentals (Jupp 1968, 61).

As the emphasis on ideology in a party lessens the links between citizens and State are weakened; the issue-based party becomes open to usurpation by others. The electorate react, wanting more substance from the parties which, unless given, will lead them to look elsewhere (Lawson 1988). Neither Kirchheimer nor Panebianco can say whether the ‘catch-all’ or ‘electoral-professional’ party will be long-lived. The growing strength of the ‘new right’, ‘new left’ and environmental parties show that an ideological backlash can force the established mass parties to refocus on ideology and their expressive nature.

In an age of a better educated electorate, and mass communications, social democratic parties cannot hope to become permanent catch-all parties. Instead they must appeal to more sophisticated, but limited, sectors of voters. To do so they must change their organisational structures and their programmatic appeal to attract more than traditional voters. Kitschelt (1994, 300) believes that increasingly confused and complex consumer demands, and occupational and sectoral stratification promote the demise of the catch-all party in favour of parties with more precisely defined target constituencies. But this cannot be at the expense of ideology, for parties must be seen to take concrete steps towards its fulfilment if they are to retain core voters.

**Framework party type**

The forces of the new politics, which have rejected the goal of material growth, have added another category of political party: one with a new structural focus. Kitschelt (1990, 179-180) refers to these as post-industrial framework parties and as being ‘left-libertarian’. They are ‘left’ because they share with traditional socialism a mistrust of the market place and are ‘libertarian’ because they reject both private and public bureaucracies. While they accept some of the issues on the socialist agenda, they oppose both institutional structures and the primacy of economic growth over ‘intangible’ social gratifications’. These parties, due to their large turnover of membership, the social background of activists and their unwillingness to assume organisational responsibility, are much less organised than conventional parties.

“Even though formal statutory provisions in left-libertarian parties are often similar
to those of conventional parties, they have become empty shells not filled with the life of the mass party” (Kitschelt, 1990, 186).

The framework party is also called ‘New-Left,’ ‘ecology,’ ‘environmental,’ and may even be regarded as another manifestation of the devotee/charismatic party. Although widely used, the term ‘Green Party’ for this type is imprecise. Green parties and the New Left have comprehensive ideological agendas with environmental concerns as only one of a variety of items. But not all Greens may be considered left-libertarians, nor can all left-libertarians be considered green (O’Neill 1997, 449): for the sake of clarity I will use the term ‘New Politics Parties’ or ‘left-libertarian’, unless referring to a particular party that calls itself ‘Green.’

The West German Green Party is typical of green parties of Western Europe. It views Michels’ ‘Iron Law’ as still relevant in their attempt to realise their ideals of Basisdemokratie (grass roots democracy). They believe individual party members should have every opportunity to participate and lower-level organisational units should be able to participate directly in higher-level decisions. They reject centralised bureaucratic organisation, preferring participatory, decentralised and horizontally coordinated structures. This system was to have been a countermodel to the dominant organisational mode of the established parties. However, Poguntke (1992b; 1994) found that, although many democratic elements have been maintained – and the Greens created a democratic party organisation that differs considerably from that of the established German parties – there are inherent inadequacies in the system. For it to work well a less purist approach to their party organisation will have to be taken.

The difficulty of reflecting the real composition of the party is exemplified by the ‘rotation principle’, whereby Green members of parliament were to remain in parliament for only a limited period. This had to be modified when the original two-year period was found to be unworkable because the informal power of permanently employed parliamentary assistants resulted in functional oligarchies replacing democratically legitimised power centres. Nor were conferences of delegates necessarily a guarantee that all members were represented – factors such as time and money were likely to determine members’ decision to participate. Criticisms by the
Greens of the German Social Democratic Party (SPD) have highlighted the problems of their own narrow social base. Described as a party of middle-class professionals and civil servants, this is even more true of the Greens (Papadakis 1986, 451).

A common tool for considering how closely a party mirrors society in its own make-up is the membership ratio: that is, the membership as a percentage of the electors who vote for a particular party. This measure was used extensively by Duverger (1951, 114-20) and is a valuable tool for comparison within countries. But its use for comparative purposes across countries is questionable (Bartolini 1983, 186) because it is not sensitive to differences between parties and countries.

A more useful tool as a cross-national index is membership as a percentage of the total electorate. Left-Libertarian parties based on movement issues such as nuclear disarmament and ecological care often enjoy over 60 percent of public support (Inglehart 1990a) but as Muller-Rommel (1990, 219) shows, the declared support, by way of consideration of membership, for movement actions can be as low as 20 percent. When it comes to formal membership, such parties attract an even smaller percentage of their electorate as party members. Kitschelt (1990, 189) estimated no more than 2 percent of the voters in Belgium and Germany were members, with a turnover of in the Green members of between 15 and 25 percent each year. Poguntke (1993, 156) found that the West German Greens had, by far, the lowest voter/member ratio of all the Bundestag parties: in 1987 it was 94:1.

Kitschelt (1994, 221) also uses membership as a measure of the strength of an organisation. He claims that the higher the member/voter ratio the more entrenched a party has become. As the main traditional link between mass parties and society, party membership is a measure of the deterioration or transformation of this relationship. Kitschelt's claim is that parties with less than 5 percent enrolment approximate a type of 'framework party' with a low level of entrenchment and reflection of society.

Such member/voter ratios do not measure the more important figures: the number of activists in the party and the turnover rates, which determine the strategic influence of old groups leaving and new groups joining. Kitschelt estimates that no more than
10 - 20 percent of a socialist party's members regularly participate in its meetings and debates. Poguntke (1993, 155) finds that the rate of participation for framework parties is not significantly higher than that of the established parties: about 30 percent of members are actively involved.

Insufficient mobilisation of Green supporters for active participation inside the party is a serious threat to the ideals of grass roots democracy. Political control of higher party levels can only be guaranteed by local branches that are large and active. The greater potential for participation within Green subcultures is not channelled because green supporters tend to be oriented toward unconventional modes of participation (Kaase 1989, 62). To make the model work, the Greens need either more members, or members who are far more active. This may be difficult to achieve because Green voters – who are well educated and interested in politics – develop loyalties to policies but only relatively weak bonds to political parties (Poguntke 1992b).

Obviously no one party will fall completely within a single ideal typology, but their basic structures, when overlaid with a new ideology or its influence, will determine how they will respond. The newer categories of catch-all and framework, when added to Duverger's types give a reference point for considering current political parties. The elements of membership, finance and leadership autonomy will all vary as they face change. These elements also combine to determine the level of bureaucracy inherent in a party, and hence its flexibility.

**Indicators of Institutionalisation and its Effect**

A highly institutionalised party drastically limits its members' manoeuvrability and therefore it changes slowly. When society is stable this may not be a disadvantage, but when volatility enters the environment, a highly institutionalised party may be too slow to respond or be so rigid that it risks splitting if it responds immediately.

The inevitable bureaucratisation of parties was, in Michels (1911) view fundamentally subversive of democracy. Michels, a socialist before World War I, became disillusioned with his party's apparent abandonment of its radical program,
leading him to develop his "iron law of oligarchy." He thought organisations inevitably tended to come under the control of a closed and conservative leadership. In pursuing the goal of victory, parties inevitably developed the characteristics of bureaucracy: becoming hierarchical and further limiting democracy within the organisation. As will be seen, Michels' concerns are still relevant today; particularly in the criticisms of the structure of the established parties by the new political parties.

Several indicators of the strength of a party bureaucracy have been proposed. Kitschelt (1994, 212) finds that mass membership, formalisation of internal interactions among members and the emergence of a specialised bureaucratic staff are indicators of an entrenched organisation. Panebianco (1982, 58-59) lists five indicators of different degrees of institutionalisation, four of which are relevant to this discussion.

1. A highly institutionalised party possesses a developed central bureaucracy.
2. The more highly institutionalised the more probable it has a revenue system based on contributions from many sources.
3. Relations with external collateral organisations. A highly institutionalised party dominates its external organisations.
4. The degree of correspondence between a party's statutory norms and its actual power structure; that is the people in dominant party positions are there because their authority is formally recognised.

Panebianco (1982, 58) and Kitschelt (1994, 207-208) agree that a party with an entrenched organisational structure makes it extremely difficult for small groups of new entrants, and small shifts in the convictions of existing members, to bring about a significant change in the party's strategic orientation. The organisation confers little power on individual members or small groups. The party's sensitivity to new inputs from society and public opinion is limited. The result is that individual members whose views do not conform to the party's dominant strategy will leave the party. A highly institutionalised party also limits the ability of a person who holds an elite position outside, to join the party and automatically take a leading role.
Conversely, a weakly institutionalised organisation allows people to enter the party at high levels from outside environments. A loosely institutionalised organisation can also act to the detriment of the party. Unrepresentative groups of members may be able – as in the case of the British Labour party in the 1970s – to cause significant policy shifts based on an ideology not shared by other party members or the electorate.

“New politics” parties have rejected hierarchical and formal party organisation. Instead they call for decentralised and broad participation of all activists in collective decision-making. Kitschelt and Hellemans (1992, 164) found that, although the ecology parties of Belgium exhibited considerable stratification of internal power, they could not be described as oligarchies in Michels’ strong sense. The activist’s ideology constituted an additional source of resistance against the formation of immutable oligarchies and was likely to restrain the adoption of a hierarchical mass party model. The Australian Greens, for example, make a criticism that the older parties are stuck in a hierarchical model, in contrast to “flexible, alliance-building, networking styles of politics” (Brown 1996, 116). Kitschelt (1990, 193) points out that the disadvantage of the kind of system praised by Brown is that it becomes a loose “stratarchical” organisation, relying on small cores of activists and informal elites who have great personal commitment but also tend to dominate the party. On the issue of bureaucracy then, there appears to be a difference between the older established parties and the newer categories.

**Party Development and Structural Limitations**

The five party types evolved at different times and under different environmental pressures. Since then there have been far-reaching changes that, to varying degrees, have promoted or inhibited the breakdown of the old types and the emergence of the new. The age of a party, its members ideological levels and leadership autonomy all help determine whether a party will fail or succeed, particularly when faced with an ideological shift from the traditional left-right economic conflict that dominated ideological perspectives’ until the 1960s’.
In discussing party structure, I shall use Gross’s (1974, 78) value-neutral definition of ideology as "a general value structure and immediate political goals," and Converse’s (1964, 207) definition of an ideological belief system as "a configuration of ideas and attitudes in which the elements are bound together by some form of constraint or functional interdependence." The notions of ‘constraint’ and ‘functional interdependence’ suggest that if activists supports a certain position on one issue, their preferences on others, can be predicted with some probability. These definitions are sufficiently broad to encompass both traditional economic left-right arguments and the new left-libertarian non economic ideologies, which are defined and discussed in the next chapter.

Parties pass through three phases: genesis, institutionalisation and maturity (Panebianco 1982, 19). As the parties age, so the membership make-up, structure and leadership aims and powers also evolve. Over time, the expressive fervour of parties subsides because of the difficulty of maintaining the intellectual and emotional demands of ideological commitment. Table 2.1 illustrates the changes that parties undergo.
Table 2.1 Phases of evolution of political parties (Panebianco 1982, 20).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase 1</th>
<th>Phase 2</th>
<th>Phase 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>System of solidarity</strong></td>
<td><strong>System of interests</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. rational model: the goal is the realisation of the common cause.</td>
<td>1. natural systems model: the goal is survival and the counter-balancing of particular interest.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology is manifest</td>
<td>Ideology is latent</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2. collective incentives prevail (participation of the “social movement” type)</td>
<td>2. Selective incentives prevail (professional participation)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. broad freedom of movement for the leaders</td>
<td>3. restricted freedom of movement for the leaders</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. strategy: domination of the environment</td>
<td>4. strategy: adaptation to the environment</td>
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</table>

Institutionalisation implies the consolidation of a structurally fluid organisation – which has to fight to overcome a hostile environment and attain a survival threshold – to one that develops stable survival interests and organisational loyalties. Duverger (1951, 152) had also noted that the ‘faith’ or strength of ideology of a party’s members varies from weak in old parties to stronger in the younger parties. The significance of the strength of membership ideology, both from an individual and a party perspective, varies from party to party depending on the stage of its evolution.

Ideological intensity is difficult to sustain with the passage of time and success in battles. Michels’ ‘substitution of ends’ is as relevant today as it was at the turn of the century. The cadre party has never been highly ideological. It has remained over the years an adjustive party, not having to suffer a process of de-ideologisation. In contrast in socialist mass parties with lengthy periods of government ideology steadily lessened as a response to unavoidable situations that require pragmatic
responses (Jupp 1968, 55-60) or as class cleavages diminished (Epstein 1968, 358) with the number of ideologues decreasing in proportion to pragmatists.

**Pragmatists, ideologues and lobbyists**

The effect on ideological levels of changes to membership is another important factor in structural change. Duverger (1951, 90) uses the image of concentric circles of electors, supporters and members to identify the make-up of electorates. As the make-up of the electorate varies so does the make-up of the party. It is not useful to treat rank and file members as a uniform mass committed to the same political objective: there is a significant spread of opinions between members who are either content to just belong to the party (and who contribute little actively besides paying dues), and activists who may wish to implement structural change. Activists may be further divided into ideal types of ideologists, pragmatists and lobbyists (Kitschelt 1989).

It is the relative percentages of the different types of members that determine how a party responds to challenges. Because parties are formed at times of strong cleavages and hostilities, it is logical that new parties attract a greater proportion of ideologues, whereas pragmatists advocating moderation and compromise remain marginal. Ideologues are likely to call for radical, uncompromising electoral strategies that do not sacrifice policy in order to gain marginal voters. If they obtain control they can lead parties to extreme and unpopular positions for forceful adherence to ideology does bring dangers. People recruited into a political party for ideological reasons may be unrepresentative of voters in general, or even of their own party’s mass base. This leads to tension between the goal of winning elections and that of achieving preferred ideological goals. For example, a group of radical leftists was able to force cataclysmic changes on the British Labour Party in 1979, with the result that membership and public support plummeted. There followed a series of disastrous electoral performances for the party until it was able to recover the balance necessary to again compete within the electorate (Kogan and Kogan 1982).

In contrast pragmatists are activists who advocate moderate policies and strategies. They prefer a productive, mutually reinforcing relationship to a trade-off.
Pragmatists prefer a balanced policy of incremental change through selective 'goods', such as assistance to specific groups and overall social transformation. By definition ideologues are change-seeking activists. Where, over time, a party places less emphasis on change and more on adaptation to the environment and on survival, the number of pragmatists may comparatively rise (Kitschelt 1989, 195).

Pragmatists prefer a moderate stance lest the party isolate itself from the values and beliefs of its potential electorate. Pragmatists also seek changes to their traditional mass party, but prefer to do so by increasing the autonomy of the parliamentary representatives and devolving more authority to hired policy experts.

Both ideologues and pragmatists are opposed by the traditionalists, who seek to preserve the bureaucracy and considerable leadership accountability to the rank and file (over which they have a major input). They are primarily interested in selective incentives. In the socialists' parties traditionalists can be most clearly identified with unions. They may ally themselves with either the ideologues or pragmatists depending on the advantages that can accrue to their membership. They claim that catering to the needs of a clearly delineated loyal core electorate is the key to success with marginal swinging voters.

**The different preferred roles and structures of parties**

Of equal importance within parties are the different activists' views on how a party should be structured, both to meet their perceived ends and to respond to challenges from the new left-libertarian parties. Kitschelt (1994, 219) claims that ideologues in most contemporary socialist parties are no longer orthodox Marxist intellectuals and workers, but supporters of ecology and quality of life movements. The ideologues are willing to respond vigorously to the left-libertarian challenge, but are in conflict with pragmatists who prefer to compete for votes elsewhere and want to create a party structure that reconciles their grass roots democratic ideals with the necessary structures for efficient policy making (Poguntke 1994, 13). These left-libertarians wish to abandon what they see as an inflexible mass party, with local branch membership, in favour of more flexible groups arranged around political issues and the concerns of specific target groups.
Such debates are not limited to the socialists. Within the German Greens there is a divide between those who favour organisational adaptation (the pragmatists or 'realos') and those who want to keep faith with all the ideals of Basisdemokratie (the ideologues or 'fundis'). This disruptive conflict on how far they can conform to a conventional party model has been a persistent source of friction within Green parties. It is a conflict between two distinct philosophies of party organisation; a conflict not a single Green party has been able to avoid over the past decade (O'Neill 1997, 20-23). The effect of this civil war “has damaged or delayed the opportunities of the Greens and, in some cases, dissipated electoral support” (O'Neill 1997, 41).

As the parties develop and face new challenges, the make-up of the membership, and hence the organisational structure, is a significant factor in the ability of a party to respond. This explains why internal conflicts and factionalism intensified when the left-libertarian cleavage became relevant in the 1960s’. Just how far and fast a party can respond strategically therefore depends on its organisational structure: it influences how successfully the different activists can lobby for their own view of party strategy.

The organisation, program and strategy of change-oriented parties, such as socialists, can be explained by the internal micropolitics of interaction between ideologues, lobbyists, and pragmatists, which is related to the external political environment (cleavage, institutional representation, competitiveness) as well as the past history of the parties’ policies and strategies (Kitschelt 1990b, 195).

Strategic choice, influenced in part by membership characteristics, becomes a matter of both internal structure and political debate. A party’s flexibility or inertia in its response to environmental challenge is shaped by at least two organisational features; firstly, its degree of institutionalisation determines how easily members can influence decisions and how quickly the party as a whole can respond to either policy change or strategic imperatives; secondly, leadership autonomy gives elites the ability to position the party to respond quickly to new political parties and cleavages (Kitschelt 1994, 212-221).
Leadership autonomy and its benefits

Although socio-economic and cultural changes are valuable in explaining long-term change, short-term change is better explained by the attitudes and behaviour of the leader. Aside from innovation from below by members, parties can institute innovation by the leadership, which may be necessary when strategic choices have to be made quickly. Leaders need to respond to changing environments – their perception of the needs of their party, their choice of tactics and strategies, and their ability to persuade the party to respond are crucial. Wilson (1994), in a review of the responses of four social democratic parties, concludes that party change is heavily dependent on the choices and abilities of the party leaders. Either a highly entrenched membership decision-making process or a high level of accountability of the leader would obviously inhibit such a process.

Within the cadre party the question of policy formulation and control over elected members is never seriously in question. Although sporadic attempts have been made over the years to impose policy control over the elected members, they have never been successful in either Britain or Australia. The question of the control of the party by the elected members arose as early as 1870 in Britain when Lord Randolph Churchill sought unsuccessfully to give greater control to the National Union and to change the assumption that because it was the popular organisation of the Conservative Party outside parliament, it was the creation and creature of the Conservative Party in Parliament (McKenzie 1955, 9). Although the conservative parties have been transformed since that date, taking on mass membership to raise finances and work on its behalf between and during elections, the power of the parliamentary party has been little affected. In Australia,

The Liberal Party, originally a cadre-type party, took on some mass party characteristics under Menzies. But it never adopted the mass mode to the same extent as Labor. The parliamentary party under Menzies inaugurated, and successive Liberal caucuses have continued to assert, a total independence of direction from the organisational wing (Jaensch 1989b, 17).

The mass party, in contrast, emphasises members’ control of policy and right to give direction to their parliamentary representatives. The mass party in Britain relies less
on private donations and personal local support than in the United States (Jupp 1968, 42). This is because the active members in Britain subscribe to the belief that they have some say in policy formulation. The Australian Labor Party also sought from the beginning to ensure the sovereignty of the labour movement over its members. To achieve this, the party organisation incorporated the pledge as a formal means of binding the Parliamentary Labor Party (PLP) to the movement, formalising the ethos that the PLP should be primarily delegates and were to be subject to the control and direction of the Labor movement outside Parliament. To Duverger (1951, 185) parliamentary domination coincides with weak structure and logically, in a more institutionalised mass party, there should be comparatively less leadership autonomy. But in practice the leadership is still able to exercise a dominant influence over the party – although its exercise has to be more subtle than in the cadre party.

Although the new left-libertarian framework parties adhere to the ideal that party members have strong input, party discipline is not usually enforced on legislative votes. Party executives have little opportunity to shape and control the parliamentarian’s agenda. For example, the Belgian ecology parties of Agalev and Ecolo both have shown that members of parliament have a clear power advantage over all other activists, particularly concerning party strategy (Kitschelt and Hellemans 1992, 149-52). In 1985 key figures in the Ecolo Party initiated negotiations to support the Christian Democrats and liberal parties without either the steering committee or the rank-and-file authorising them. Although rank-and-file militants censured the leadership for its lack of consultation at a later conference, the majority endorsed the actions of the leadership.

Theoretically the leadership of socialist and new politics parties are subject to control, but the reality is different. Technology, such as television, has radically altered the need for leaders to rely on the rank-and-file as a conduit to the electorate; at the same time it has multiplied their autonomy and the influence leaders can exert. Although structure can exert an influence, which will vary from party to party, factors such as the full-time positions held by the elected members with access to research and support staff, mean that unelected members of the party cannot rigorously harness the autonomy of the leadership.
Kitschelt (1994, 223) lists four factors that assist in determining membership autonomy. They can be used as indicators to enable comparisons between party types. These are:

1. Central control of recruitment. This gives the leader strategic autonomy in nominating candidates who may not have survived a selection process controlled by the rank and file.

2. Control of party conferences. Because conferences are one arena that constrains strategic choices leaders will wish to hold conferences infrequently, close to elections, or control the agenda.

3. Domination of the parliamentary leadership over the party executive.

4. Party autonomy from labour unions. Because labour unions are traditionalists who see advantage in limiting the autonomy of the leader – and in the case of the “new politics” parties are often unwilling to take up the challenge offered – they can be a significant factor for control. The configurations of union/socialist party linkages can range from domination of the party elite where autonomy is limited, to socialist parties that have all but cut their formal organisational links, thus giving greater autonomy to the leadership.

The greater the leader’s freedom of movement the greater the chances of stabilising the party’s organisational order in a changing environment, such as new ideological cleavages and competing parties. Internally it is the interaction between organisational entrenchment – or the degree of institutionalisation of which the ideological levels of members is a factor – and the level of leadership autonomy that determines how a party may respond to both internal and external challenges.

Kitschelt (1994, 215) cross-tabulates a party’s openness to demands from below (the absence of bureaucratic mass party entrenchment) and new ideas from above (elite autonomy and lack of accountability) to map four ideal-typical organisational alternatives (figure 2.2). This is of particular value in comparing social democratic parties and the “new politics” parties. In reality no one party will ever display all of the characteristics of one type, but when overlaid with ideological forces and related to specific parties in the next chapter Kitschelt’s classification is relevant.
VOLATILITY WITH STRATEGIC CAPACITY

ENVIRONMENT: heterogeneous, volatile electorates; changing cleavage mobilisation

HIGH LEADERS' STRATEGIC CAPACITY: centralisation of organisational control, little leadership accountability

1 “centralist clubs” leaders and rank and file have strategic capacity

2 “Leninist cadre party” leaders have strategic capacity, not rank and file: mass organisation as “transmission belt”

VOLATILITY WITHOUT STRATEGIC CAPACITY

SYSTEMIC ENVIRONMENT: high competitiveness of the party, electoral results depend on the strategic interaction among parties

LOW LEADERS' STRATEGIC CAPACITY: decentralisation of organisational control

SYSTEMIC ENVIRONMENT: weak party competitiveness, little strategic interaction among parties

STABILITY WITH STRATEGIC CAPACITY

STABILITY WITHOUT STRATEGIC CAPACITY

LITTLE ORGANISATIONAL ENTRENCHMENT: loosely coupled grassroots units

3 “decentralised clubs” ranks and file, but not leaders have strategic capacity

4 “decentralised mass party” neither rank and file nor leadership have strategic capacity

MUCH ORGANISATIONAL ENTRENCHMENT tightly coupled basic units

ENVIRONMENT: homogenous, stable, electorates, stable cleavage mobilisation

FIGURE 2.2 KITSCHELT'S IDEAL-TYPICAL ORGANISATIONAL ALTERNATIVES (1994, 215)
Conclusion
This chapter in giving basic definitions of party and relevance, has considered party types to show that a party's structure is related to its perceived purpose. It is this tension between structure and purpose that produces a categorisation of ideal party types at the time of their formation, which applies as much to Australia as to the other Western democracies. Pressure for change has meant that the older parties have varied from their ideal types and that the newer types may even be considered as adaptations rather than distinct forms.

Electoral thresholds are established as important regulators of change that may encourage the success of parties when formed. Once in the political arena, structural differences such as membership and leadership autonomy will then determine whether and how the party can manoeuvre, for this chapter has shown that a party's structure, environment and electoral fortunes are being constantly readjusted. Particularly in the last three decades, some parties have shown themselves capable of a quicker response than others, while some (such as cadre parties defending their traditional ideological position) have been under less pressure. The once-tranquil environment enjoyed by the established parties has vanished; how the traditional parties of reform react will have a direct bearing on their electoral fortunes.

Having identified the ideal party types and determined what factors will enable comparisons we now move in chapter three to consider ideology in detail and the question of whether the climate of today is one of ideological change. The stage has been set for the established parties to face their greatest challenge in decades. After decades of relative stability, the established parties have had to contend with new parties, for a new group within society arose, organised and jumped the hurdles to gain parliamentary representation. The next chapter shows how the types of parties have coped with societal changes, examines the new ideology and how it differs from the old enlightenment perspective accepted by both cadre and mass established parties, together with the challenge it presents them.
CHAPTER 3

IDEOLOGICAL CHANGE AND ITS INFLUENCE ON STRUCTURE

Introduction
The previous chapter reviewed the traditional types of parties – cadre, mass and devotee/charismatic – and showed how their structure was partly determined by their ideologies. In the old parties, ideology was related to the divisions in capitalist society and, in a relatively stable ideological climate, it served them well. The ideologies, based on economic considerations and the enlightenment perspective where the environment was valued by its usefulness to human beings, were – with minor variations – either left or right.

Since the 1960s’ a new ecocentric ideology – that stresses the intrinsic value of the environment and the dangers of industrial growth – has emerged. Huge societal changes, that included the increasing proportion of white-collar workers, greater access to education and increased environmental concerns, swept the industrialised western democracies. In recent decades these changes have given rise to cross-cutting cleavages, new political parties and a new ideology. The objective of this chapter is to explain the emergence of the new ideology and show that changes in ideology will have a related effect on a party’s structure: it resists, but ultimately modifies its structure in an attempt to remain relevant.

Parties of the second half of the twentieth century have tended to converge ideologically; for example, both democratic socialists and conservatives in industrialised western democracies have endorsed economic and industrial growth. A significant sector of the middle-class has adopted values that differ from the dominant enlightenment paradigm, embracing an ideological shift with far-reaching influence on political parties. These subgroups are a fertile ground for a new ideology and a new cleavage that is not aligned with the old left - right cleavage. This chapter examines this transition and identifies characteristics of the ‘new class’. It establishes the nature and context of postmaterialism, with specific reference to Ronald Inglehart and his ‘silent revolution’ (1971), showing how postmaterialism
has changed the political landscape by introducing a completely different set of values and priorities that have set postmaterialist voters apart from the supporters and policies of the ‘old’ parties. The ideological stance of ecocentric parties is a new watershed on the political landscape necessitating an examination of the ideological range of environmental politics. The effect of this ideology, particularly on established parties of the left, is illustrated with examples from industrialised western democracies.

The second part of this chapter discusses ideological change which inevitably resulted in conflicts in both the established and emerging parties, forcing them to change within the limitations of their structure. The chapter concludes with a consideration of how the structures of the old parties have handled the pressure of the new ideological force. For these parties the challenge of a new ecocentric ideology closely aligned with the cross cutting cleavage of the new politics poses a disturbing and difficult dilemma. The preceding chapter showed that structure resists change, while a new ideology, as an action-motivating set of ideas, dynamically promotes it. This chapter shows that ideology is a key to understanding why structures and structure-based typologies must be modified over time. It also establishes that the new ideology both challenges and repudiates the old structures.

**Changes to terminology**

The tumultuous changes in society since the 1960s have led to cleavages based, not on traditional class lines, but on new values and new paradigms. The definition of some terms has changed. For example, advanced industrial democracies have tended to see political conflict as structured along one dominant dimension, with left and right poles. But the polarity has in some instances been reversed. From the Communist Manifesto to the early 1980s, ‘left’ in most countries has meant advocating change by State intervention in the economy, while ‘right’ has been associated with non-intervention and thus the status quo. But new emphasis on economic rationalism, privatisation and deregulation has seen the ‘right’ associated with rapid change, while the 'left's' desire to retain hard-won gains has made the 'left' in economic matters a defender of the status quo (Huber and Inglehart 1995, 85).
In advanced industrial democracies, the salient issues of the left-right scale relate to economic and class conflict (see Burklin 1985 and Huber 1989). But a new dimension -- protection of the environment as opposed to economic growth -- has also emerged, particularly in Sweden and Switzerland where a high proportion of residents identify economic growth versus the environment as a second dimension of political conflict (Huber and Inglehart 1995, 82-83). Although this new dimension is much closer to the left than it is to the right, confusion is common (Cotgrove and Duff 1980). This confusion arises from the traditional left-right terminology being used to describe two lines of cleavage: one based on an economic and industrial development view, the other on value-based issues. As Inglehart and Rabier (1986, 470) note, “the left-right concept is used to describe both dimensions of political polarisation, despite the fact that they are distinct and even, in some respects, contradictory”. People still see political conflict as structured along one dimension, and to label this dimension as having left and right poles (Huber and Inglehart 1995), even though the terms are “moveable feasts” reflecting different and distinctive national experiences (O’Neill 1997, 13).

The issues of environmentalism, women's rights, participatory democracy and civil rights continue to be associated with the term ‘left’, which has come to mean support for socio-political change as much as class or economics. The terms now include the traditional economic and class cleavages as well as the value-based polarisation. It is therefore clearer to set aside left-right terminology and refer instead to ‘reformist’ and ‘conservative.’ As currently used the left-right ideological dimension tends to assimilate whatever issues or values are most salient on the basis of a reform/conservative dichotomy (Lipset 1983, 510, Dalton, Beck and Flanagan 1984).

Whatever definition political analysts prefer, they agree that a new political dimension has been added to politics. Moreover, they agree that it is not a short-term manifestation of cyclical protest but rather an indicator of an enduring social and political transformation (Inglehart 1971, Chandler and Siaroff 1986, Crepaz 1990, Papadakis 1991, Eckersley 1992, Hay 1992). An examination of how this transformation occurred highlights the upheavals that gave rise to new values and
ultimately a new ideology. It is within this context that the established political parties must operate as they struggle to respond.

Ideaology and Change

End of ideology
Differences in terminology and in ideological cleavages did not exist when the political landscape was relatively stable. The 1960s saw unprecedented economic growth and greater affluence in the advanced industrial societies of Europe, America and Australia (Inglehart and Rabier 1986, 457, Inglehart 1990a, 48). Income distribution became more equitable, with economic development, trade unions and mass political parties all contributing (Huntington 1974, 163, Poguntke 1987, Rawson 1991, 225). The main players in society – the workers and the owners of capital – had tacitly agreed on the goals of the game: economic expansion and material progress (Offe 1985, 822).

The goals would be achieved by industrial development and state economic growth allowing the creation of wealth, material advancement and a more equitable society. The traditional left-right dimension based on ownership and control of the means of production and the distribution of income has its basis here. Marxists argued that nationalisation of industry, state control of the economy and redistribution of income would solve other problems of society; the key question was support or opposition to social change in an egalitarian dimension (Inglehart 1990, 8, Dalton Beck & Flanagan 1984). Because people at the bottom of the heap were most likely to support change, the social classes tended to support different political parties. Typically the working-class endorsed change and supported the left while the middle-class supported the status quo, and the right.

Conflicts between the right and the left in the 1960s' were centred on which way the pendulum was seen to swing to distribute the fruits of capitalism and economic growth, but even these disputes were ritualised through trade unions and established political parties (Lane 1965, Lipset 1967). The impression that all players seemed to agree to the rules and that ideologies could not engender change led Daniel Bell
(1960, 402) to talk of the “end of ideology” where “for the radical intelligentsia, the old ideologies have lost their truth and their powers to persuade”. The end-of-ideology school concluded that growing prosperity would give rise to politics of consensus where violent class struggle declined when economic growth satisfied the working-class’s needs and the welfare state had curbed capitalism’s excesses.

However, by focussing on economic issues the end-of-ideology school in particular failed to anticipate new developments. Economic cleavages did become less intense, but student revolts in Europe and North America dashed predictions of stability. Within a decade, political analysts changed from explaining the persistence of stability to explaining instability. In 1967 Lipset and Rokkan had declared that party alignments had crystallised with the advent of universal mass suffrage and had remained frozen over the past 50 years. In 1983 Lipset (1983, Chapter 15) argued defensively that he had written only of a decline among mass-based social movements, explicitly exempting intellectuals and students from the generalisation.

Evidence suggests that at high levels of economic development, public support for the classic economic policies of the traditional left (redistribution of income, government control of the economy and nationalisation of industry) tends to diminish (Dalton Beck & Flanagan 1984, Abramson & Inglehart 1986, Inglehart 1987, 1292). The new protest movements, although initially adopting the political terminology of the left, were not Marxist at all: the issues that generated the new movements (anti-nuclear, anti-war, women's issues and the environment) had arisen almost unnoticed by the elite and established parties (Hay 1988, 26, Eckersley 1990, 1992, Huber & Inglehart 1995, 75). The cultural goals of young and newly affluent members of society had shifted: people who had experienced unprecedented stability and affluence had new concerns about society (Muller-Rommel 1985, 484, Crepaz 1990, Papadakis 1991, 240, Vincent 1992, 214). In the left, its economic policies lost support, while the issues of human rights, nuclear power and the environment coalesced into a new political agenda (Cotgrove & Duff 1980, 340, Muller-Rommel 1989, 17, Poguntke 1992, 338). A generation with different values began making its presence felt.
Transition to postmaterialism

The 1970s' was a transition period between the 'old paradigm' politics of the post-world war era (defined as a growth-security perspective) to the 'new paradigm' politics of the new social movements (Offe 1985, 820). The growing scepticism about the desirability and effectiveness of state planning and the continued focus on economic growth was the stimulus for the 'new politics'. Four elements emerged simultaneously: social issues such as environmental pollution; new modes of collective action such as protest; new nonmaterialist values such as quality of life; and new social actors who were young and highly educated (Jahn 1993, 177). The current industrial structures and the rationalities of industrialism were questioned; this questioning was the structural basis of the 'new values' (Andersen 1990a, 111).

This emphasis on value issues defines new politics, although some commentators (Offe 1985 and Anderson 1990a, 192) do not see this as a value change so much as a change in emphasis of values already in existence.

There is certainly nothing new in moral principles and demands such as the dignity and autonomy of the individual, the integrity of the physical conditions of life, equality and participation, and peaceful and solidaristic forms of social organisation. All these values and moral norms advocated by the proponents of the new political paradigm are firmly rooted in modern political philosophies (as well as aesthetic theories) of the last two centuries (Offe 1985, 849).

Other commentators (Feher and Heller 1984, 40, and Eckersley 1992, 154-155) draw a distinction between the focus of the 1960s social movements, described as the "Movements for Freedom", and those of the 1980s, described as "Movements for Life". The 1960s movements were anti-authoritarian and alienated from the mainstream. The value of freedom was central, as exampled by the civil rights movement in the United States and the sexual revolution in Western society. However, Feher and Heller believe this movement overlooked the concept of life as a value in itself. But this changed in the late 1970s, particularly in Western Europe, with the basing of nuclear weapons in Germany, the threat of mutual destruction and
survival of the biosphere (Muller-Rommel 1989, 6). Freedom was of little value if life was to cease.

The transition period was to be tumultuous for the established political parties. The unmet demands of a new group in society gave rise to social movements, and then to new political parties better able to reflect their demands. Ironically, as the standard of living rose in western democracies, so too did this distinct subset of society.

New politics and the characteristics of its supporters

The arrival of the 'new politics' was a distinctive feature of Western politics after the 1970's, bringing with it progressive social and political ideas (Inglehart and Rabier 1986, Eckersley 1989). Unlike the earlier base of support for change (the working-class), the leaders and active supporters of the new social movements were drawn from elsewhere. The term 'new class', originally used to describe the bureaucratic elite in the Communist party (Djilas 1957), has since been widely used in the West to refer to the supporters of the new politics: generally with tertiary educations and professional jobs, and earning moderately better than average incomes. They have superseded the working-class as a revolutionary force critical of the existing social order (Eckersley 1992, 152).

Four variables – educational attainment, age, personal services, public sector employment – when combined, "get very close to the social category, that, according to all quantitative evidence, has the highest proportion of people with favourable attitudes toward the concerns and practices of new social movements" (Offe 1985, 851). Offe added that other groups in society are willing to support the new class: portions of the old middle-class, the unemployed, students and middle-class housewives. These peripheral or decommodified groups stand outside the labour market with its materialist focus and can be more flexible with how they use their time.

Inglehart (1990, 67) points out that although the value issues of these people arose through the student movements of the 1960s' they have now, due to their education, deeply penetrated the ranks of the professionals. They are also predominant in the service sectors of the community, such as academics, teachers, artists, actors and

A cultural mentality binds the 'new class'. Gouldner (1979, 28) refers to it as the "culture of critical discourse", which focuses on the assumptions and views of the local elites. In doing so it does not encompass either the traditional working-class or the middle-class owners of capital. 'Humanistic intellectuals' (whose interests are primarily critical) and the 'technical intelligentsia' (whose interests are essentially technical) form the main part of the new class.

It is the intellectual and value characteristics of the 'new class' that have such a profound effect on society. Such people no longer traditionally support conservative parties but when they become politically active tend to support reformist parties (Brint 1984, Inglehart & Rabier 1986 and Inglehart 1987). The increase in university graduates diffuses libertarian values (Offe 1985, Flanagan 1987, McAdams 1987, Inglehart 1990). This class is less concerned with material goals than with fundamental values; although its members live in societies that traditionally emphasise economic gains, they give a higher priority to quality of life than to standard of living. Eckersley (1992, 153) sees them as moving away from "materialist" political questions on production and distribution to issues of health and lifestyle, cultural identity and humanity's relationship to nature. The environmental movement, the peace movement and the women's movement are "manifestations of a dimension of polarisation that is only remotely related to conflict over ownership of the means of production and traditional social class conflict" (Inglehart and Rabier 1986, 458).

The old politics based on distribution of income to a particular class has no allure for the new class. The demands of such movements are universalistic. The goals they pursue are not necessarily predicated on furthering the interests of their own class; Offe (1985) described their actions as politics of a class but not on behalf of a class. It is these demands that cause the conflict with the orthodox political structure.

There appear to be relatively clear structural determinants of who is likely to support the causes and engage in the practices of "new politics"... but the
demands (and thus the beneficiaries of such demands) are highly class-
unspecific (Offe 1985, 833).

The new politics shifted their focus from personal freedoms to the intrinsic value of
life and environmental quality. The ‘new left’ agenda was overtaken by the
environmental agenda and the emergence of the Greens. The colour of protest
changed from red to green, the symbol of life and nature. “The ‘red’ language of the
60’s was the idiom of alienation and anti-authoritarianism, the ‘green’ language of
the 80’s talks about ‘pollution’ and ‘contamination’, the ‘natural’ and the ‘artificial
”(Feher & Heller 1984,42). Within society an influential group had arisen with
strong values and a critical attitude to traditional authority manifested in established
political parties.

An explanation of the new values - Postmaterialism
The values of the new social movements have been described as ‘postmaterialist’ by
Ronald Inglehart (1971). He describes their rise as a “silent revolution”; a process
of values changing from materialist to postmaterialist; from giving highest priority
to values that reflect a preoccupation with physical sustenance and safety to giving
highest priority to belonging, self expression, and quality of life (Inglehart 1971,
1977, 1987, 1990). In 1973 Inglehart used a set of goals to measure the value
priorities of a sample of citizens in nine nations of the European Community.
Respondents were asked to rank the goals in order of the greatest importance to
themselves.

A. * Maintain order in the nation.
B. Give people more say in the decisions of the government.
C. * Fight rising prices
D. Protect freedom of speech
E. * Maintain a high rate of economic growth
F. * Make sure this country has strong defence forces.
G. Give people more say in how things are decided at work and in their
community.
H. Try and make our cities and countryside more beautiful
I.* Maintain a stable economy.
J.* Fight crime.
K. Move toward a friendlier, less impersonal society.
L. Move toward a society where ideas count more than money.

The asterisked goals (A, C, E, F, I and J) which emphasised physical and economic security were “materialist” goals; the remainder were “postmaterialist” (Inglehart 1990, 74-75).

Inglehart’s theory is that people who feel insecure about their physiological needs have a fundamentally different outlook from those who feel secure about them. The former - the materialists - give top priorities to such goals as maintaining order in the nation, achieving a high rate of economic growth and a stable economy, and securing a high-paying job and working hard. Blue-collar workers are more likely to be materialist because their incomes are smaller and their skills are in greater danger of becoming obsolete, giving greater concerns about their livelihood (Flanagan 1987, 1315); according to Inglehart (1971, 1980), their socialisation in poorer households as children would make them materialist.

Postmaterialists in Inglehart’s survey gave top priority to giving people more say in the decisions of government, protecting freedom of speech and moving towards a friendlier, less impersonal society (Inglehart 1990, 74-75). Their intellectual or aesthetic satisfaction and sense of belonging to a community had high value. Postmaterialists are more likely to engage in protest behaviour than materialists are— even though they are often from the more secure and privileged strata of society. These strata have traditionally supported parties of the right, but the postmaterialists tend to support parties of the left.

Inglehart’s theory on the relationship between economic security and postmaterialism
Inglehart believed that economic and physical security shape people’s social and political outlook. His (1971) original work is based on Abraham Maslow’s (1970) theory of a needs hierarchy. Maslow theory of psychological development argues that an individual reared in an environment in which lower-level needs are satisfied
will, as an adult, be better able to cope with deprivation of lower-level needs and be protected from need regression (Maslow 1970). Inglehart’s work rests on two hypotheses: that “given individuals pursue various goals in hierarchical order – giving maximum attention to the things they sense to be the most unsatisfied needs in a given time” (Inglehart 1971, 991) and that early socialisation is more important and long lasting than post adolescent socialisation. “...that individuals have a tendency to retain a given value hierarchy throughout adult life, once a basic character has been formed during childhood and youth” (Inglehart 1971, 991).

Inglehart's first hypothesis, which by extension predicts that postmaterialist values will spread during periods of economic prosperity, is qualified by the second hypothesis, explains why, even in times of fluctuations of economic fortune in advanced industrial societies, postmaterialist values remain. Taken together, the two hypotheses attempt to explain the time-lag between value priorities adjusting to changes in the socio-economic environment: the adjustment is not immediate.

Inglehart also introduced the notion of “the diminishing marginal utility of economic determinism”. In this process “economic factors tend to play a decisive role under conditions of economic scarcity; but as scarcity diminishes, other factors shape society to an increasing degree” (Inglehart 1987, 1289). Inglehart (1990) later describes his scarcity hypothesis as similar to the principle of diminishing marginal utility in economic terms. However, it should be recognised that the diminishing marginal utility concept is something quite different from Inglehart’s original Maslowian early childhood socialisation concept based on individual or household deprivation. Under the later diminishing marginal utility concept the focus is more upon national affluence: whereby basic economic needs are met, causing economic issues to be less influential as household incomes rise above what is necessary to provide basic needs.

This diminishing marginal utility modification states that, all things being equal, the proportion of postmaterialists will increase as the average household income rises above the subsistence level. For example, Inglehart (1987, 1291) demonstrates that human life expectancy is closely linked to a nation’s level of economic development. The increase in life expectancy rises steeply, with relatively modest increases in
wealth, until the curve levels off to a point where income becomes less important than lifestyle choices such as smoking, diet and exercise. Economic concerns lose their priority to postmaterialist values. Flanagan agreed: “The notion that at some point a sufficient surplus should lower the priority attached to economic issues and further increasing one's income, not in every case but in the aggregate, is compelling” (Flanagan 1987, 1310).

**The spread of postmaterialism through generational change**

The process by which postmaterialist values spread is ascribed by Inglehart (1971, 1977, 1990) to generational replacement. The younger generation that grows up in a period of relative comfort is socialised to accept postmaterial values. On this basis the ratio of materialists to postmaterialists would decrease as the older generations died and were replaced by the younger. Inglehart's (1971) survey of value priorities in nine West European societies, discussed previously in this chapter, found a marked difference in generations. In later studies Abramson and Inglehart (1986, 1987) found that, between 1970 and 1984, the ratio changed as predicted: “even though there are year-to-year fluctuations, the overall distribution of values is continuously affected by generational replacement” (Abramson and Inglehart 1986, 5). They argued that, although the rate of change was likely to be slower during the remainder of the century, generational replacement would continue to increase the ratio in favour of postmaterialism.

Inglehart's hypothesis of marked generational effects was questioned by Gow (1990). He compared Inglehart's (1977) short version of the postmaterialist scale to responses to the 1990 Australian Election Study questionnaire. Although he found the presence of postmaterialist values in Australia in the 1990's comparable to the numbers in Europe in the 1970s, Gow (1990, 59) found little evidence to support generational replacement.

**Criticisms of Inglehart's theories**

On its own, Inglehart's theory is insufficiently broad to take into account either the variety of postmaterialist values or the role of education. For example, in a study of West German and United States secondary school students, Trump (1991) did not find evidence to support Inglehart's contention that materialist and postmaterialist
values are a direct reflection of the position of the individual on Maslow's needs hierarchy. The mixed nature of the findings suggest that this theoretical relationship between postmaterialism and early satisfaction of lower-level needs may not exist, or at least not develop during childhood, in all Western nations.

Trump (1991, 383) also remains unconvinced that Inglehart shows a substantial relationship between values, as represented by public policy goals and psychological needs. Kreuzer (1990) discovered inconsistencies between the postmaterialist model and some important cultural and historical features of the Austrian and Swiss Greens. Kitschelt (1988, 208) pointed out that Inglehart’s theory of postmaterialism does not use reliable or valid measures of value change and underrate the importance of changing cognitive capabilities, institutional opportunities and constraints.

Perhaps the major shortcoming of Inglehart’s theory was, in Savage’s (1985, 448) words, to see the postmaterialists as a “unified group marching to the beat of a single drummer.” By including non-economic issues, such as support for law and order and strong defence forces, within his materialist concept Inglehart linked materialist and authoritarian views under the rubric “old politics”. In contrast, new politics were a mixture of libertarian and postmaterialist views (figure 3.1). In identifying the new left Inglehart ignored the new right.

Figure 3.1 Inglehart’s view of cleavage structures in advanced industrial democracies

NEW POLITICS/NEW LEFT

OLD POLITICS

Materialist

Flanagan (1987) and Kitschelt (1990) believe Inglehart has been not only unduly rigid in this distinction between materialists and postmaterialists, but also that there
are two distinct kinds of value changes taking place: the materialist/postmaterialist (new politics - old politics) division and a libertarian/authoritarian (new left - new right) cleavage. As will be shown, new politics has not only created the new left; it has also spawned the new right. The more important of Flanagan’s (1987) criticism of Inglehart is not the view that one of the causal factors of postmaterialism has been modified — after all there is still the acceptance that postmaterialism is the end result — but that Inglehart’s hypothesis deals only with one instead of two value changes.

Flanagan (1987) (see figure 3.2) convincingly argues that Inglehart’s erred in including a second set of non-economic issues; they should instead be part of authoritarian value orientations (Items A, F & J). By labelling both materialist and authoritarian value orientations in his materialist concept as “old politics” Inglehart identifies new politics and the new left. But it also leads to his ignoring the new right and the phenomenon of support for the new right coming from members of the working-class on the basis of conservative and authoritarian values.

Unlike the old politics, where class loyalties and institutional ties generally linked the working-class with the left and the middle-class with the right, the social base of support for the new left comes from postmaterialist middle-class supporters. Both
the new left and the new right emphasise the importance of value concerns over economics. The new left also differs in its view of the role of government.

Flanagan (1987, 1306) and Kitschelt (1994) regard those with libertarian value preferences as supporting the new left agenda, which includes liberalising abortion, women’s lib, gay rights, protecting the environment and other quality of life issues. Since the 1960s the new left has also become increasingly critical of big government, viewing bureaucracy as dehumanising. Big government is seen as inherently dangerous because it tends to encroach upon individual autonomy and expression. The new left, with its educated and eloquent proponents, has helped crowd out economic issues but has also provoked the emergence of the new right, which sees its moral and religious views threatened. “In a sense, it could be said that the Greens and the new right are both a result of the New Politics. As the Greens comment the new right derives from a reaction to it, a sort of ‘silent counter revolution’” (Ignazi 1992, 6).

The new right are as much postmaterialists as the new left, being strongly value-issue driven. Flanagan (1987, 1313) claims authoritarians endorse the new right agenda, which includes right-to-life, anti-women’s lib, anti-pornography, support for traditional moral and religious values, and opposition to immigration and minority rights. Authoritarians respect authority, strong leaders and conformity and are intolerant of dissenters. In this they most closely resemble the Marxists of the old politics. Flanagan’s distinction between authoritarian and libertarian postmaterialists is persuasive. Unlike Inglehart’s (1971) grouping, it accounts for the appearance of the new right as well as the new left on the world stage.

**Criticisms based on the role of education**

Inglehart may have overstated the importance of childhood socialisation and not given sufficient import to educational experiences. In his view, the relative prosperity experienced during a person’s formative years, as indicated by the parents' socio-economic status, is decisive. He argues that there is nothing inherent in the educational structure of the new class that would encourage libertarian views: but education clearly stimulates development of the postmaterialist outlook. Boltgen and Jagodzinski (1985) suggest that, by overemphasising the socialisation
hypothesis, Inglehart has neglected change within a generation as a consequence of economic and social changes.

Empirical research in Nordic countries indicates that the material/postmaterial values orientation is not primarily attributable to childhood socialisation. In fact, William Lafferty (1976, 128) found the opposite: that postmaterialism “is more a result of the cognitive and socialising effects of education per se than it is as a result of education as an indicator of childhood affluence.” Knutsen (1990) found education to be more strongly correlated with materialist-postmaterialist indices than with social class and income. Experiences during the formative years are important, but in Andersen’s (1990a) view exposure to political struggles and early political mobilisation are a relevant intervening variable between values and generation. This exposure is linked to knowledge and therefore to education.

Inglehart (1990, 77) uses the term “cognitive mobilisation” to describe how people acquire the skills to understand and cope with the information provided in modern societies. He sees formal education as a measure of cognitive mobilisation, but claims that education is complementary to his theory. Habermas (1986) argues that the rise of postmaterialism is not due to the formative experiences of different generations but to exposure to certain world views by communication networks. A survey of the New Zealand Green Party found that the members were the best educated of all political parties, with two-thirds having a tertiary qualification (Miller 1991, 62). He reported a strong correlation between postmaterialist values and high education, as did Poguntke (1992) in a study of German Green voters. Brint (1984, 60) regards higher education as the key new-class variable.

Eckersley (1989, 219) criticised Inglehart’s thesis as providing only a partial explanation for the rise of certain values because it ignores the objective environment in which such values are formed. O’Neill (1997, 431) states that to rely on accumulated data about changing social and cultural dispositions is not a sufficient basis for the explanation of their causes. People with higher education are more likely to have learned cognitive skills that enable them to more clearly analyse environmental and societal problems, and that expose them to different
messages from those received by people with less education. Foremost among these, Eckersley (1989, 219) argues,

are the increasing degradation of the environment, the changing cultural milieux and the expansion and changing nature of higher education, which in turn has led to a general improvement in our understanding of the causes and ubiquity of environmental damage.

Andersen (1990b, 104) suggests that if taken to its logical conclusion, Inglehart’s model does not show a causal relationship between environmental problems and the environmental movement itself. There obviously is a causal link between the emergence of particular environmental issues and protest movements that become the catalyst for party formation.

Postmaterialists are, in Western industrialised nations, increasing their relative proportion in the population (Abramson and Inglehart 1987, 231). If economic and physical security are the overriding factors for the development of postmaterialism, recessions and periods of high unemployment could result in the number of postmaterialists declining within a given generation. But this is to ignore the pivotal role of education. In all Western industrial societies the wide reaching educational systems provide opportunities for high education. As environmental and social issues continue to grow in public awareness, and the public increases its cognitive skills to analyse them, the number of postmaterialists will continue to increase. The influence is pervasive partly because its supporters are mainly middle-class. The values the ‘new class’ propounds has given rise to a new ideology that has formed the basis of environmental politics, clearly identifying the supporters as a new political force.

**Environmental parties and green politics**
The new politics gains reflect two countervailing trends: stagnation and decline of new left parties in the sixties and the early seventies, and a spectacular growth of environmental parties, having a distinct ideology and an alternative new paradigm based on the intrinsic value of all life. To Feher and Heller (1984, 42) the new social movements of the environmentalists operate in a space different from that of the
sixties. To Capra and Spretnak (1984, xx) “Green Politics, in short, is the political manifestation of the cultural shift to the new paradigm.” The new left was abandoned in favour of a new ecologically inspired political philosophy that moved away from what environmentalists saw as a preoccupation with overcoming human oppression at the expense of the non-human world. To supporters, old politics has no further positive role and must be replaced with a paradigm that clearly places humankind within an ecological framework.

The ‘ecological paradigm’ is the basis of Green politics. It is posited on the belief that the environmental crisis has been caused by humankind’s continuing focus on economic and industrial growth and the entrenched belief that humans are the centre of all value; somehow separate from the rest of life on earth, with the environment being no more than a resource base for their use. If carried through to its logical conclusion, humankind has the potential to destroy itself by destroying its environment (Dunlap 1980, 8).

Political struggles that seek liberation through the human conquest of nature by means of the continued expansion of materialist production (e.g., most Western Labour struggles) are seen as self-defeating when viewed from the perspective of the ecological paradigm because such action threatens to undermine our own life-support system in the long run (Eckersley 1987, 10).

On this basis environmental or Green politics can be seen as a 20th Century reaction and alternative to the ‘old’ politics of both liberalism and socialism.

While the starting point for Green politics was the industrial revolution of the late 18th Century, where technological change sparked economic growth and industrial expansion, the green movement as a political force today dates from the late Sixties. Three books in particular stimulated awareness of environmental dangers and contributed to the development of green social movements: Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring (1962) shook public apathy about the ecological and health implications of the rapidly accelerating rate of use of synthetic pesticides; Paul Ehrlich’s The Population Bomb (1968) and Donella Meadow’s controversial The Limits to Growth.
(1972) delivered the central message that indefinite economic growth is a physical impossibility in a world whose natural resources, including the absorptive capacity of the environment, are limited.

The environmental movement responded to scientists’ fears that the environment of the earth was under attack and urgent action was needed to stop its destruction. Both the new libertarian social movements and the environmental movement were essentially popular movements. It was in the 1960s’ that scientists began alerting the public to the harmful effects of modern industrialised and technologically advanced society. For example, opponents of civil nuclear power relied on scientists to provide information which gave them both legitimacy and support. Hay (1988, 1993) regards the scientists who surrendered the leadership of the movement to people educated in humanities and social sciences as politically naive. Hay overstates the leadership of scientists – for example, Carson was not a scientist and Ehrlich was dismissed by scientists as a popularist – but by providing an intellectual support, science enabled environmental activism to:

open[ed] out into a new social movement, cross-fertilising with other thriving social movements of the time, in particular the peace and anti-nuclear movements, where cross-pollination was most effective in Western Europe, and the women's movement (Hay 1993, 155).

**Green continuum**

The evolution of the Green movement to one offering a new ideology has confused many commentators. Offe (1985, 187) expressly denies such ideologies and argues that, “Postindustrial society has theorists but not ideologists, or at least the postindustrial Marx has yet to make his appearance on the world stage.” Offe, by this assertion, has applied new social movement typology to the Green movement and has located it within the humanist tradition; losing sight of the radical ecocentric component of Green ideology.

Although some (Muller-Rommel 1982, O’Neill 1997, 441-445) do not take it for granted that the Greens are a politically or ideologically coherent movement, others (Hay 1988b, 27, Poguntke 1989, 193) claim that the Greens, as an expressive party,
have a clear ideology, most appropriately seen as a new and separate ideological stream—a “famille spirituelle” (Von Beyme 1985, 3)—in competition with the older contenders; “Green is thus an ideological position. It is a fully fledged competition with Liberalism, Socialism and Conservatism. Any observer not seeing it thus is fundamentally misconstruing the nature of the beast” (Hay 1990, 55).

Within the ecology movement there are widely differing views on, for example, the attitude to nature, definitions of ‘ecology’ and ways of changing society (compare Naess 1973, Pepper 1984, Bookchin 1987, Ryle 1988, Eckersley 1992).

However, the movement can be broadly described as being bound by the two different perspectives of anthropocentrism and ecocentrism. These are at each end of a spectrum; in between are the many orientations toward nature, which merge subtly into each other (Fox 1990, Vincent 1992, 1993, Barry 1994).

Not all orientations are acceptable to all members of the movement (Ryle 1988, 12). Deep ecology is one such example (Bookchin (1987, 230) described deep ecology as ‘Eco-La-La’). Nonetheless, all views have as their underlying unity the rejection of the narrowly anthropocentric and utilitarian world views of industrial society (Dryzek 1990, 195). Vincent (1993, 270) concludes that four themes are common to the Green movement: the interdependence of species and environment; a positive attitude to nature; scepticism about the supreme position of humans on the planet; and anxiety about what modern industrial society is doing to this planet.

In order to explore the Green ideology and because of the broad and different perspectives’ I have chosen to describe a simplified spectrum; excluding such concepts as eco-feminism, eco-fascism and bio-regionalism. Because the number and shades of this spectrum expand or shrink with individual authors I have chosen to deal with broad characteristics that are relevant to this thesis (figure 3.3).
Anthropocentrism

Within the ecological paradigm lie a range of ecological perspectives. Old politics is firmly anthropocentric, but that does not necessarily mean it has an environmentally destructive approach. Anthropocentrism can also include environmental perspectives of a 'light' or 'shallow' green, with anthropocentric proponents arguing for environmental protection purely on human-centred grounds; for example a healthy ecosystem enhances human safety and well being. Fox (1990, 2) defines anthropocentrism as the proposition that the non-human world should be conserved or preserved because of its value to humans rather than for its own sake or for its value to non-humans. Within this category we find most traditional conservation and recreation groups (Vincent 1993, 263). Here lie the positions of resource conservation, human welfare ecology and preservationism. These positions represent a gradual movement from a purely instrumental and economic approach to nature to a more holistic environment ethic, whereby nature is of importance for human welfare and survival.

Fox (1990, 2) also lists an example of the old politics approach; a greater extreme of unrestrained exploitation and expansionism. This is the approach that characterised the frontier or settler ethic whereby nature was to be exploited for its economic
gains, with no thought given to long term effects. The environmental legacy of Queenstown’s copper mine development of the 19th century and the resultant pollution of the King River in Tasmania is one such example.

Supporters of resource conservation take the view that nature is wasted if it is merely conserved and not used (Fox 1990, 4, Rodman 1978, 45 - 56). It does, however, recognise the need for longer perspectives’ so it encourages the concept of sustainable yields. The philosophy of the Forestry Commission of Tasmania and the Tasmanian Hydro Electric Commission would encompass such a perspective, as both organisations believe that to use resources inefficiently, or not at all, is to waste them.

Human welfare ecology was described by Eckersley (1992, 36 - 38) as a movement for a clean, safe and pleasant human environment. This peculiarly 20th century phenomenon has been attributed to the escalating urban and agricultural environmental problems. It moves from economic considerations to human welfare considerations. Under this banner ‘sustainable development’ means not merely sustaining a natural base for continued economic benefits but for the protection of the biological support systems for humans in general. It recognises that we are dependent on healthy ecosystems but remains firmly anthropocentrically based.

The resource preservation position stresses the instrumental values that humans can enjoy if they allow the natural world to exist without development. Unlike Eckersley (1992), Fox (1990) lists resource human welfare ecology in a sub-heading of a life support system argument. Nature, then, has values from physical, informational and experiential, to psychological nourishment. Fox (1990, 5 - 6) lists nine arguments for the preservation of the non-human world: life-support systems, early warning system, laboratory, silo, gymnasium, art gallery, cathedral, monument and psychogenetic. Although these represent progressively more sensitive approaches to nature, all have an anthropocentric framework.

Eco-capitalism and eco-socialism

On an intermediate range Vincent (1993, 267-268) lists eco-capitalism and eco-socialism (although it could be argued that these concepts should be in the
anthropocentric end of the scale). Vincent places them there because of their broad ranging theories of the nature of society and the economy and the genuinely non-anthropocentric edge to the arguments.

Eco-capitalists view the market as the best way to control environmental problems. They argue that consumers will be forced to choose between sustainable and unsustainable growth and in turn will force the market to adjust through recycling, cleaner technology and alternative energy. The emergence of a new breed of 'green' capitalists, and 'environmental entrepreneurs' is, to eco-capitalists, a hopeful trend (Elkington & Burke 1989, 15 - 23).

Eco-socialists recognise that industrialised State-dominated societies are part of the environmental problem. Instead of denouncing this reality as Bahro (1984) does, eco-socialists believe ecology needs a strong State to challenge the strength of multinational companies and deal effectively with pollution. They believe that an ecological transformation of the economy could help renew the legitimacy of political interventions in the market (Ryle 1988, 66). But if radical ecology is to mean anything to people, it must conceptualise and represent ecological issues in a way the working-class can understand. To Pepper (1993, 429) eco-socialism can by this course meet human and material needs without destroying non-human nature.

Ecocentrism
It is the ecocentric approach which is the underlying ideology of the Green movement (Hay 1988, Eckersley 1992). Eco-socialists such as Pepper (1993) promulgates a humanist perspective within environmentalism and Weston (1986a) claims that the elements of green politics are essentially the same as those that have occurred throughout the long history of populist movements; being far from a 'new paradigm'. There is strong evidence they are incorrect. Ecocentrism denies the moral pre-eminence among the species claiming that wilderness areas and species should be protected for their own sake; their own intrinsic value. It is this ecocentric perspective that is in a revolutionary way reinterpreting Homo sapiens relationship with nature. This 'transpersonal' or 'deep ecological' perspective views humans as one aspect of the interconnected web of life. Hay (1988) and Eckersley (1992)
believe that to misunderstand or ignore this view is to be unable to fully understand the Green movement.

The result is a theoretical understanding that either misses or underplays the significance of the contribution of the radical ecocentric stream within the environmental movement which, in turn, has fed into the Green movement (Eckersley 1992, 160).

Eckersley (1992) argues that the ecocentric perspective is the most novel and distinctive current within the Green movement, cutting directly across old politics cleavages. Ecocentrism gives special prominence to the need to protect wilderness and threatened species for their own sake. Rather than define their value by their use to humans the ecocentric approach stresses their intrinsic value. Transpersonal or 'deep / dark' green ecologists go further: to the transpersonal or cosmological view that all entities are but different manifestations of life (Fox 1990, 12).

Ecocentrism is located at the other end of the spectrum from anthropocentrism (See figure 3.3). Here there is no morally relevant dividing line between humankind and the rest of nature for ecocentrism denies that humankind is the only or even the principal source of value and meaning in the world. The concept of 'us' and 'them' or 'us' and 'it' has no meaning once people recognise the web of relationships and dependencies between all living organisms. Humankind is not, therefore, more worthy but merely different from other life forms. From this recognition it follows that there is a need to be more protective of ecosystems and nature in general.

Although the anthropocentric resource conservation and human welfare ecology streams of environmentalism adopt a general ethic of prudence and caution based on an ecologically enlightened self-interest, they differ from an ecocentric perspective in that they see the ecological tragedy as essentially a human one. Those belonging to the ecocentric stream, on the other hand, see the tragedy as both human and non human (Eckersley 1992, 52).

Within this ecocentric aspect lie the concepts of intrinsic value and transpersonal or deep ecology. Intrinsic value can be defined as something that is valuable in itself,
independently of its use value to humans. Fox (1990, 8) lists three criteria for
distinguishing intrinsically valuable entities from those that are merely
instrumentally valuable to humans: sentience, life, and autopoiesis (or self renewal).

The sentience criterion is championed by the animal liberation movement of which
Peter Singer (1975) has been a strong advocate. It rests on the view that organisms
are worthy of moral consideration if they can experience pain; therefore we should
avoid inflicting pain or suffering on any sentient organism. Fox (1990), Vincent
(1993) and Eckersley (1992) have difficulty in placing this approach in the spectrum.
Although clearly not anthropocentric, it is humans who must draw the line between
sentient and non-sentient organisms. The life criterion denies sentience as a criterion
of moral consideration. Instead, whether an organism is alive decides whether it has
intrinsic value.

Self renewal, which is referred to as autopoiesis by Fox (1990) and Eckersley
(1992), is the third criterion. It sees living systems as being self-regenerating or self-
renewing; being ends in themselves and therefore intrinsically valuable. Such an
approach recognises not only the value of an individual organism but also of whole
species and ecosystems.

All of the three criteria of an intrinsic value take both an axiological approach and an
atomistic approach that values living beings. Intrinsic value theorists argue that if
another organism is sentient, alive or self-regenerating, people are morally bound to
act towards those organisms in a certain way, irrespective of their personal feelings.

Transpersonal, or deep, ecology goes a step further. It draws on psychology to
emphasise the realisation of a sense of self that goes beyond the sense of ego or
personal sense of self to become a “... Rejection of the man-environment image in
favour of the relational, total-field image. Organisms as knots in the biospherical
net or field of intrinsic relations” (Naess 1973, 95). The transpersonal adherent
recognises all other beings as merely extensions of the ‘self’. Therefore one
naturally acts appropriately and empathically because of the expanded sense of self.
A tree, for example, is seen as a part of the web of life of which the human is also an
integral part. To destroy organisms is to diminish one’s own self.
Care flows naturally if the ‘self’ is widened and deepened so that protection of free nature is felt and conceived as protection of ourselves ... just as we do not need words to make us breathe ... if your ‘self’ in the wide sense embraces another being, you need no moral exhortation to show care ... you care for yourself without feeling any moral pressure to do it (Naess 1987, 39 - 40).

For Naess and others the only way to tackle the many ecological problems facing society is to make radical economic and social changes away from multinational corporations, centralised governments and technology. Instead people should follow Schumacher’s (1974) ‘small is beautiful’ approach toward decentralisation and sustainable use of resources and energy. Naess and other deep ecologists, such as Devall and Sessions (1985), have been criticised by, for example, Bookchin (1987, 223). He raises highly critical questions about the meaning of ‘deep’, and how such concepts can be achieved in practice.

From such ecological frameworks follow consequences for society and political parties. The development or preservation of the environment is traditionally based on either economic or social considerations; the world is viewed in instrumental values. People may therefore interfere with little justification and without moral consequences. But an ecocentric view sees nature as having intrinsic value and when viewed in these terms a person must then justify why they should interfere with it at all. The ecocentric approach therefore gains importance and has become a central underpinning of the environmental movement (Young 1992, 23). Until the established political parties understand this ideology, and its adherent’s perspectives, the new politics of the Green movement will continue to raise tensions in and split those parties.

It is the ties of the traditional parties to economic power structures that dictate their failure to respond adequately (Chandler and Siaroff 1986, 311). Even when they are able to argue for environmental protection, they do so from a purely anthropocentric ground. For example, in a major policy statement in 1995 on the direction of
Australia's forests and forest industries, Prime Minister Paul Keating described the forests, apart from being economically significant, as being 'vital repositories of biological diversity', 'water catchments', 'carbon sinks to limit the greenhouse effect' and 'aesthetically and spiritually important to us.' The speech was entirely anthropocentric; ecocentric intrinsic value was ignored.

But, the elites of traditional parties', whether they like to or not, can no longer ignore postmaterialist issues. Dalton Beck and Flanagan (1984) point out in the West European example that although

... political elites still tend to describe Left-Right political polarisation primarily in terms of the classic issues of state ownership and control of the means of production, the evidence suggests that the electorates select their party more on the basis of the new issues than the old . . . in so far as issues do influence party preferences, the new issues seem to have at least as much impact as the old (Dalton, Beck and Flanagan 1984, 53).

Society, values and ideologies have all changed. These changes are reflected in the new meanings given to old terms, as illustrated in the following diagram. It is necessarily an oversimplification, but the definitions of concepts dealt with so far that have broad agreement and are applicable to current political parties are given (figure 3.4).
The traditional political parties have misjudged ideological positions. They have been unable, or reticent, to resolve the tensions caused by new value cleavages cut across traditional party alignments. This, and the inability of some politicians to even comprehend the existence of new cleavages, have given the parties promoting the 'new politics' and environmental and ecocentric ideologies an opportunity to grow. The structural flexibility of all parties involved has been tested.
The Effect of Ideological Change on Structure

Opportunities and constraints for formation of ‘new politics’ parties

Poguntke (1987) and Kitschelt (1988) claim the overall political situation has an independent effect on the strength of the new parties and their formation. Poguntke (1987, 77) refers to the salience of environmental problems while Kitschelt (1988, 209) notes the conditions which can shape the opportunities and constraints of party formation; a strong labor corporatism and participation of left parties in government; highly visible conflicts on policy issues such as the environment and welfare State provisions. These provide a subjective sense of security which increase financial resources and motivational dispositions to important groups, allowing them to shift their focus from economic to postmaterial issues.

The formation of new political parties, particularly over the last three decades with the growth of postmaterialism, may also be examined from the perspective of ‘rational actors’. The socio-political terrain, particularly the ideology, can have a critical effect on whether a movement makes the transition to political party and whether that new party can succeed. People will use most effective strategy to place their concerns on the agenda. Because forming new parties requires more effort than using the existing channels of established political parties, rational people will only move to form a new political party if the traditional parties fail to respond to their concerns or, because of inflexible structures, fail to marginalise the new political movements.

If the existing parties are sufficiently flexible they can marginalise new movements and retain potential moderate supporters. However if they have an inherently inflexible structure, they cannot respond quickly or vigorously – which gives the new politics parties a chance to recruit and manoeuvre. Similarly, if the existing parties have a strong ideology they will not change overnight, especially if the elites of the parties value the ideology more than the electorate does. If that ideology is based on a view of society that a significant proportion of the electorate no longer accepts parties with a new or changed ideology can attract the voters.
In 1990 two-thirds of the population in the European Community supported activities such as peace, environmental and anti-nuclear power movements (Inglehart 1990, 264-273). When this large pool of potential support is combined with the lack of partisan alignment of new politics supporters, then the socio-political environment of the old parties, (including how accommodating they can be with their existing internal structure) becomes critical to the growth of new political parties. The persistence and very existence of new movements are, in Offe’s view (1990, 233), testimony to the “shrinking absorption and political processing capacity of established political actors and the procedures of ‘normal politics.”’

It is clear that how – or whether – established political parties can accommodate issues has a significant effect on the success of new movements. For example, Britain had a political process that was able to deal with environmental demands of the 1970s’. It could both suppress issues and integrate middle-class protest movements into the established decision-making structures (Rudig and Lowe 1982, 278). Similarly the Labour Government in New Zealand, after its election in 1972, created a Commission for the Environment, thus opening channels with existing conservation organisations. By doing so it gave the appearance of gradual reform, thereby removing a source of support for the New Zealand Values Party (Davidson 1992, 71).

In a comparison of the Swedish and German Greens, Jahn (1993) found that the political process in Sweden made it difficult for the Swedish Greens to capitalise on their initial success. “Assimilative strategies such as lobbying, petitioning government bodies and influencing public opinion through referendum campaigns dominate in Sweden” (Jahn 1993, 181). The Swedish parties and the Government were able to incorporate the environment movement at an early stage, which did not give the new political movement much space in which to articulate its demands; for example, in the early 1970s’ the Center Party and the Communist Party both took an anti-nuclear stand. Such reorientation, which has to be substantial and not just symbolic, has already occurred in response to feminist, anti-nuclear energy, conservation and peace movements. As a result, each of the movements has been, at least temporally, put in the position of becoming a “victim of its own partial
success, thus weakening the forces striving for more ambitious and far reaching goals” (Offe 1990, 238 - 239).

In contrast, Germany had no institutionalised channels to articulate protest and to transfer it into established parties. Consequently a more confrontational, and clearly identified, alternative party developed (Jahn 1992, 405). Jahn argues that a closed political system that is unable or unwilling to integrate new demands ultimately leads to a stronger alternative and ultimately greater structural change. To Jahn, the German political system marginalised political alternatives, allowing them to mature and develop a political niche beyond established politics.

Although the actions of established parties can limit the success of a new politics party, they are limited in their responses by both their structures and the composition of their electorates. Because of the dangers of splitting the electorate (the attempts to gain the new left votes might lead to the loss of old left votes), their only viable strategy is to attempt some reconciliation between old politics and a moderate version of new politics. Muller-Rommel (1990, 230) thought a radical realisation of new politics issues was beyond the scope of socialist parties. Instead, the new politics parties can offer radical solutions and take radical positions that the larger socialist parties are not able to fully embrace. The established parties, particularly the socialists, sometimes manage to react to the new movements but lack an effective mechanism to encompass them because their interpretation of environmentalism is anthropocentric; it does not acknowledge the key importance of ecocentrism.

Because of the hierarchical, bureaucratic organisational structure of most socialist parties, it is almost impossible for a new political movement to make any major policy change from within the party in a short period of time.

The negative experiences of the followers of new political movements with the established left-wing parties, as well as the perceived lack of responsiveness of other political institutions in coming to grips with a fundamentally different policy approach, became the major reasons for both the growth of green parties and electoral success of all small parties that
represent the demands of new political movements (Muller-Rommel 1990, 211).

Burklin (1987, 118) argues that the success of Green Parties is a function of the failure of Social Democratic parties to integrate their Green electorate. Such is the case of Die Grünen in Germany. In the early 1980s the new political movements looked towards the Social Democrats; particularly to act against unlimited economic growth, the destruction of the environment and the stationing of nuclear weapons (after failing to influence the nuclear strategy). But the Social Democrats were unable to respond adequately because of their trade union affiliations, which endorsed economic growth, and their bureaucratic nature. Thus materialist/postmaterialist splits within the German Social Democrat Party led to the formation of a Green party, which in 1983 won seats in six of the eleven West German State Parliaments (Muller-Rommel 1990, 210-11). The larger parties could not, or would not, respond thus allowing the Greens to occupy a political niche which is composed of a left and ecological alternative to the established parties. This distinctive ideological profile was essential for their success. On the other hand, the Swedish Greens found the left (ecological) space already occupied by other parties (Muller-Rommel 1990, Jahn 1993, 181).

The Green parties are a reaction to the inability of the traditional parties to address the need for a form of politics which reflects their values and aspirations (Rainbow 1989, 184). The politics of the Greens threaten the socialist parties with their coalition of working-class and progressive middle-class support. Nor do they have sufficient flexibility to deal with the value issues that confront and question the anthropocentric, technocratic and pro-industrialisation ethic they retain.

A party’s misjudgment of the electorate or its adherence to an ideology that does not attract the electorate, surrenders space to other parties. This can be fatal for electoral success. An example was the Liberal Party prior to the 1993 Australian Federal election, of which Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser wrote:

Through 1991 and 1992 it [The Australian Liberal Party] tried to force Australians in directions they did not want to go. The party made the classical
mistake of the Labor Party of earlier years when Labor was closely wed to its socialist and centralist philosophy, it tried by legislation and by referendum to force Australians to accept their agenda. It failed dismally.

Since 1983, the Labor Party has escaped that ideological trap. It is a tragedy that as Labor moved to the centre, the Liberal Party felt the necessity to move further to the right (Fraser. The Australian., Feb 26 1994).

Although the elites of all three Australian federal parties became more postmaterialist in their views between 1990 and 1993, as McAllister and Boldiston (1994, 55) suggest, they still did not share the ideological position of their electorate. Several studies have confirmed that this was not a unique experience. Converse (1975) and Dalton Beck and Flanagan (1984) showed that the elites of political parties often take a more purist position than that of their electorate. Australian studies (Higley, Deacon and Smart 1979, Graetz and McAllister 1988a and McAllister 1991) also establish that Australia is no different from other Western democracies. The elites can not only lose contact on the humanist and economically based old politics dimension – they often also ignore the impact of postmaterialist issues on the electorate. When this occurs, and the electoral system is relatively sympathetic, new parties can spring up; leaving the elites who lagged behind social change and belatedly recognise the problem to reorient themselves.

The conflict of values

As with any major change in society some sectors gain in influence and others lose, and changes are never without conflict (Galtung 1986, 80-81). The transition from an agrarian to industrial society, for example, resulted in the decline of the landowning elite and peasantry and the rise of the urban bourgeoisie and industrial proletariat (Huntington 1974, 177-178). The conflict arose between all the players – the rural landowners and peasants, industrial workers and peasants. With the shift from industrial to post-industrial society, cleavage theory predicts that the most virulent forms of conflict are likely to emerge during this transition between the winners and losers in the social dislocations associated with post-industrial development (Flanagan and Dalton 1985).
In the two decades after World War II the industrial societies crossed the threshold from industrial to service economies. As early as 1950, the USA had more than half its labour force in service industries (Huntington 1974, 169) and by 1956 there were more white-collar workers than blue-collar workers. Similar trends are apparent in Australia. In 1966, 46 percent of the workforce was employed in non-service industries (ABS 6204.0), but by 1993 only 29.3 percent were so employed (March 1994 Australian Economic Indicators ABS 1350.0). In postindustrial societies, then, the white-collar worker and the service sector are dominant. The reaction of the materialists arose from sectors of the working-class, together with the traditional middle-class, in opposition to social change (Dalton Flanagan and Beck 1984, 21, Inglehart and Rabier 1986). Conflict was inevitable, because as the postmaterialists were more apt to respond to new issues rather than the old labour versus management issues, the materialists were bound to react.

The new non-economic issues and support for change from the new middle-class placed the established parties under chronic stress. The existing parties were established when economic issues were the main determinant and class, notably the working-class, was the driving force for socio-political change. The new politics parties thus tended to compete initially with the larger socialist parties. While both are committed to changing the political system they differ in their approach to that system, with the new politics seeking a fundamental change to the economic growth theory. The rank and file membership of the socialists in most European countries is split into two camps: those with a traditional materialist outlook who accept economic growth and emphasise the working-class and those with a postmaterialist outlook who emphasise the quality of life (Muller-Rommel 1990, 229).

The goals of the two camps differ; the postmaterialists pursue collectivist goals such as an undamaged environment, while the materialists pursue individual goals of maintaining a standard of living and employment, leaving others to worry about collective goals (Olson 1965). This difference is particularly marked when the achievement of collective goals may involve costs to those individuals; for example, a loss of employment with an end to logging certain sections of forest. While only a
minority of the electorate are postmaterialist, the socialists are trapped between these two cultures.

Institutional ties and long established party loyalties have traditionally bound the working-class to the parties of reform and the middle-class to the conservatives. However, the ‘new class’, with its tendency to support the reformists, is disproportionately middle-class. When the new class supports issues the traditional supporters believe are inimical to their values and interests, the traditional parties are liable to be split. Such turbulence means the old politics parties struggle to respond to the new issues. Geared to traditional, growth-oriented economic strategies and with economic growth given high priority, the traditional parties cannot adapt to the new postmaterialist politics without risking the alienation of their traditional supporters. These problems surface in intra-party factionalism and programmatic and strategic paralysis (Poguntke 1987; Muller-Rommel 1989, 1990; Kitschelt 1990, 202).

Problems experienced by the American Democrats and the British Labour party show the dangers of alienating traditional support. In 1972 George McGovern won the presidential nomination after a push by a new movement within the Democrat Party. To win, the Democrats would have to emphasise economics and finesse the social issues. The Republican candidate, Richard Nixon, aware that traditional Democrat supporters were economically progressive but socially conservative, preempted the social issue to put the Democrats on the defensive. He emphasised law and order and traditional values, opposing drugs and abortion. Nixon wrote “... the Republican counter-strategy was clear: we should pre-empt the social issue in order to get the Democrats on the defensive .... We should aim our strategy primarily at disaffected Democrats, and blue collar workers, and at working-class white ethnics” (Nixon 1990, 491).

Although McGovern won the postmaterialist vote, Nixon’s tactics were successful: with working-class voters who historically were Democrat voting Republican. Nearly half of the Democrat party identifiers voted Republican, splitting the Democrats. McGovern was the first Democratic presidential nominee since the
1920s’ not to receive the support of the labour movement (ALF-CIO) (Nixon 1990, 673).

In 1981 the British Labour Party split after it was captured by a neo-marxist and neutralist left wing. As well as giving constituency committees the power to block the pre-selection of sitting members its substantial shifts in policy alienated many traditional supporters. Its alternative economic strategies and calls for unilateral nuclear disarmament resulted in the formation of a Social Democrat Party which won over many of the party's traditional constituency (Kogan and Kogan 1982). These changes and policies were to keep the Labour Party out of power for decades until 1997.

The Green parties must also deal with the tensions raised by ecocentric and anthropocentric supporters and their different views as to how problems are to be addressed. Muller-Rommel (1985, 491-492) classifies two different types of Green constituents and parties: the pure green reformist parties do not reject free economic enterprise and the social welfare state; the alternative green radical parties seek fundamental change, arguing that the only solution to ecological problems is the complete reorganisation of the socio-economic and political structures of industrialised societies.

An examination of the German Die Grunen party highlights the different approaches between the fundamentalists (“fundis”) and the realistic reformers (“realos”). The “fundis” assert that change must come from outside the system, while the “realos” argue for change from within through conventional parliamentary politics. The fundamentalists argue that the apparent advantages of being part of the political system will be paid for by a significant loss of identity and autonomy (Offe 1990, 242). A similar split between the centralists and decentralists of the British Green Party saw a destructive internal feud in 1992, which left divisions “... as much personal, almost psychologically-driven, as merely political or ideological” (Evans 1993, 332). Davidson (1992, 65 - 66) claims that there are other overlapping yet analytically distinct layers of conflict; including the left - right political currents and special interest groups, where such disputes between factions tore the New Zealand Values Party apart in the late 1970s’.
The different approaches of factions can produce conflict and continued debate on how a party should proceed both structurally and ideologically at a parliamentary level. For example, statements by members of parliament that focus on the anthropocentric paradigm and ignore the ecocentric alternative will be seen by fundamentalists as not supporting change sufficiently or as failing to educate the public to achieve a paradigm shift. The relevance of the new ideological position to party structure means that, even though the postmaterialists would rather not deal with the question of a political party as a bureaucracy, inevitably they must if their party is to compete in the parliamentary arena.

**Conservative response**

When faced with conflicts of values it is not only to the “left” reformists that the electorate may turn; they can also embrace the extreme conservatives. Inglehart and Rabier (1986, 468) report that 14 percent of the West European electorate indicated they might vote for a party of the extreme right. Events in France in 1993, with the rise of Jean Marie Le Pen, show that a party that stresses law and order, restricting immigration, opposing abortion and communism can be a political force. In June of 1995 the National Front won the towns of Toulon, Marignare and Orange in the municipal elections and a former National Front member won Nice (*The Age* 20 June 1995). Similarly the 1993 Italian election saw the National Alliance, with its historic roots in Italian Fascism, join the right wing Freedom Alliance to gain entry to the Italian government for the first time since World War II.

The formation of the new right (Flanagan 1987, Savage 1985) shows that postmaterialist politics has a conservative dimension to its cross-cutting cleavage of traditional political alignments.

The emergence of the National Front reflects a broader phenomenon that already has given rise to Ecologist and New Left parties, on the one hand, but can also encourage the emergence of Nationalist and extreme Right parties on the other hand. For the polarisation between postmaterialist and traditional values is incongruent with the axis along which the major established political parties have been aligned for many decades (Inglehart and Rabier 1986, 468).
As the number of libertarians or reformists reach a critical mass – and begin to achieve success with such issues as liberalising abortion, gay rights and protecting the environment – a backlash builds among authoritarians or conservatives who feel their basic values and way of life being threatened. Hence issues such as right-to-life, anti-pornography and support for traditional moral and religious values gain prominence, leading to support for reactionary and conservative parties.

The challenge of new ideology

The existence of opposing or competing parties and the ideological cross-cutting cleavage of new politics shape the external environment within which a party must exist. Concurrently the structural issues of membership entrenchment, as shown by the degree of institutionalisation and leadership autonomy, defines the level of tactical and strategic flexibility necessary for the survival of the organisation as it responds to the dynamic of ideological change. These tensions determine the limits of a party’s flexibility: complete flexibility is not possible without either a trade-off in loss of electoral support or a build-up of potentially damaging tensions within the party.

Until the 1960s Social Democratic parties existed in an environment of stable electoral patterns and a single established cleavage. Discussions invariably revolved around the transfer of ownership of public utilities and the economic standards of workers. To use one of the most quoted sentences in political science; “… the party systems of the 1960’s reflect, with few but significant exceptions, the cleavage structures of the 1920s” (Lipset and Rokkan 1967, 50). These structures handicap the traditional mass parties’ ability to face new challenges, for they tend to represent only those interests that led to their initial formulation. They are unable to move with impunity in response to new ideology, as figure 3.5 illustrates.
If the new line of cleavage is placed over the traditional left/right cleavage depicting the capitalist/socialist dichotomy, the problem becomes apparent. Logic dictates that because parties strive to maximise their electoral support they will locate their strategic appeals within the ideological range covered by the main area of voter distribution. The social democratic party (‘A’) if it hopes to attract the new politics voter will move closer to (‘B’) which is more capitalistic and more libertarian. While such a move may result in policies that are attractive to such supporters, it also risks alienating the traditional blue-collar worker, who may see the move as a threat to his conservative and authoritarian value system and a weakening of the traditional ‘left’ position. Equally limiting would be an attempt by new politics parties to broaden their vote base by moving closer to the traditional left/right axis. Their supporters would be concerned about a less libertarian stance. Any movement of the Green parties away from an ecocentric perspective would be resisted.

The socialist dilemma – a structural response to new ideology

The introduction of a new cleavage presented socialist parties with a challenge that most were unable to overcome. In contrast, the new politics parties had arisen with little organisational entrenchment and, apart from early attempts by the European
Ecology parties to control the authority of their leaders, their fluid structure allowed them to respond to the new cleavage. Their antipathy to a structured bureaucracy repelled them from the bureaucratic party typified by the socialists. New politics parties try to set themselves apart from conventional mass or cadre parties by implementing open, participatory decision-making that, in principle, allows all party members to be involved.

Vigorous rank-and-file participation, so it is argued, will shift the power of decision making from the top of the party to the bottom and limit the tasks of the formal leadership to the implementation of important collective decisions concerning the parties' policy programs, strategies, and selection of public representatives (Kitschelt & Hellemans 1990, 131).

The socialist parties of the Sixties had two main groups of members: the traditional working-class and the postmaterialist or libertarian middle-class. With the advent of the new parties, many middle-class supporters left the socialist parties to join what were competing parties. Previously the socialists' opposition were the conservative parties. Although there was a slight overlap of electorate, the party's share of the electorate could not be captured by the conservatives.

The introduction of the new politics parties meant, for the first time, that the socialists had competitors for the middle-class vote. Although working-class voters were unlikely to vote for the new parties, the socialists could not rely on them to attain a parliamentary majority. They were therefore forced to consider strategies to compete. Just as the relationship between the socialists and communists had been acrimonious, so too the socialists adopted a hostile and aggressive stance to the new parties' whom they saw as competing rather than opposing. Socialist parties throughout Western democracies – Belgium, Denmark, Netherlands, Germany, Switzerland, Austria and Finland – have suffered electoral losses as a result of the challenge of new politics parties. At the same time moderate socialist supporters have not accepted the new political agenda and have been dissuaded by the ensuing internal struggles in the parties (Kitschelt 1990, 202).
The socialist parties were faced with a mismatch between the political environment, with its new ideological cleavage mobilisation and electoral competitiveness, and the retention of much of their original structure. This led many socialist parties in Western Europe to adopt seeming non-rational responses. Their traditional reliance on the hierarchical structure of mass parties, which they have retained despite their inability to expand in the past thirty years, means that when faced with the conflicting demands of left-libertarians and conservatives they either assume an ambiguous position or attempt to ignore the obvious. In Germany, the Socialist Democratic Party (SPD) did not accept that its defeat in 1983 was largely attributable to the challenge of the Greens; instead it claimed it was a normal shift away from a party that had held office for fourteen years (Wilson 1994, 270). It was also loath to respond for fear of alienating its traditional working-class vote, thus the party’s entrenched party organisation remained at odds with the strong left-libertarian mobilisation.

In Britain organisational entrenchment was not strong enough to stop the left-wing militants, who opposed changes in the party’s doctrine, from gaining control. Leadership autonomy was constrained and unable to take strategic opportunities, thus disposing the party to a highly volatile strategy in response to the militants, from which the party did not recover until the late 1980s'. Kitschelt argues that;

\[\ldots\text{parties identify systemically advantageous strategies only if there is a match between environmental conditions and party organisation. Left libertarian demands are articulated inside socialist parties most effectively if the parties lack an entrenched organisation and mass membership (Kitschelt 1994, 253).}\]

The structure of Duverger’s mass party therefore appears to have outlived its usefulness if it is to remain the vehicle for responding to the new challenges, particularly at a time of high volatility in the electorate and new cleavages. The structural changes the socialist mass parties must consider are increasing leadership autonomy, weakening their ties with the unions (particularly those wedded to the discourse on the redistribution of economic property rights and incomes) and deinstitutionalising their structure. By doing so the party can become more efficient
and also attractive to new members because they will have an opportunity for greater input. Open democratic participation of ordinary members goes against the grain of a political style that relies heavily on peak-level negotiations among the party elites and a hierarchical party with considerable control over policy. However, supporters of the new politics demand that hierarchical, centralised power be dismantled and replaced by decentralised, participatory institutions.

Age has had an affect on both the ideology and party structure of the programmatic parties. The cadre party appears to be the only type, after its early changes as a response to mass parties, that has remained relatively unchanged. Because its role is essentially to protect the status quo, it has evaded the internal ideological splits of the mass party. The real struggle at ideological and structural levels is happening in both the mass party and the new framework political parties. Just how their structure can accommodate both ideology and the parliamentary arena will be a major determinant of their future success.

The relative positions of the parties: Ideological and structural changes
The new politics parties, having arisen at a time of new cleavages, still retain a high level of concern with ideology. Having only just established themselves they must fight to remain relevant and achieve a paradigm shift in the electorate. But after only a few decades, debate is already surfacing between the 'realists,' who want to adopt a less confronting ideological position to achieve more incremental advances, and the 'fundamentalists', who are opposed to a hierarchical structure and leadership autonomy.

On the evidence, if the Greens are to proceed down the path to party politics, they will need to change their structure to relate to the realities of the environment. O’Neill (1997, 14-15) notes a propensity for activists, who began their political lives as ‘fundamentalists’, impelled by the experience of electoral success to move to a more moderate or ‘realist’ stance.

The detailed evidence across the Green party universe also points to a trend in these parties, rather than any inexorable political law, towards a gradual
accommodation to a realist rather than a fundamentalist position on this critical issue (O'Neill 1997, 31-32).

For the socialists to be able to respond to the Green challenge, given the importance of ideology, it would seem that they must retain ideologues and give them the opportunity for input; otherwise they will lose them to the competing parties and lapse into a 'catch-all' party or become unrepresentative. The socialists and new political parties, both being programmatic and ideological, must retain more ideologues than the cadre party. This places them in the following positions (Figure 3.6), based on their relative levels of party institutionalisation and ratio of ideologues.

**Figure 3.6** General current position of cadre, mass socialist and framework new politics parties.

The cadre party, under no pressure to change its position on either ideology or complexity of party structure, remains hierarchical and advisory to the leadership.
The mass party, which is highly institutionalised, must attempt to deinstitutionalise in the direction of point ‘a’ to give ideological activists greater input. Conversely if the realists within the new parties are successful, the framework party will institutionalise further in the direction of point ‘b’. Ideology is like rocket fuel: the greatest amount is required to launch the party, but once in orbit less is needed to keep it there, although occasionally the rockets must be fired up again to avoid losing orbit. Ideology, like a fuel, appears to be necessary to continue the course of the party.

The positions of the parties can also be mapped by relating a party’s relative age and its structure. Figure 3.7 maps such dimensions.

Figure 3.7. Position of parties as a factor of age and level of institutionalisation.

Once again the cadre party, whose structure was designed more to raise funds and to campaign than to educate members, is under little pressure to change. It is the socialist mass party that over the decades, has become hierarchical and structured. This process has levelled out in the past few decades, but now with the challenge of
the new politics parties the mass socialist party must move to a less hierarchical and more unstructured form. The new politics parties, having strongly opposed the hierarchical/bureaucratic structure, have a much looser organisation, with decentralised, more democratic procedures and collective decision making processes. However, this structure is inherently difficult to make efficient for electoral competition. Again, the two programmatic parties appear to converge towards a level of institutionalisation closer to the cadre system. The new political parties should, with age move towards greater institutionalisation (point ‘x’) while the mass party, having reached the limit of institutionalisation, moves back (point ‘y’). It seems likely that there are time limits on how hierarchical/institutionalised and ideological a party can remain.

Difficulties of accommodation and alliance potential
The resulting continual stress can be resolved in three ways: firstly, de-alignment with a decline in party identification; secondly, realignment from existing political parties; thirdly, assimilation of materialist and postmaterialist values. Inglehart (1990) found that a large proportion of the population remains either materialist or has mixed views; it is unlikely that there will ever be a complete acceptance of postmaterialist ideals. How a synthesis of materialist and postmaterialist values can be achieved is difficult to picture.

Offe (1985, 859-866) considers three possible alliances where the parties could design policies specifically for any one of the constituent segments of the movements. After warning that there is no natural tendency for the new social movements to align with the left, he considers the following possible alliances:

- Conservative-liberal right plus new movements;
- Conservative-liberal right plus social democratic left;
- Social democratic left plus new movements.

The first and third alternatives have been attempted. The third is the most commonly attempted, probably because the libertarian views of the Greens are capable of alignment with the social justice traditions of the social democratic left (Andersen 1990, Pepper 1993). Thus these parties might agree on policy, if not ideology. The
Greens “prefer at most to consider an affair of convenience rather than a complete marriage with the parties of the established left” (O’Neill 1997, 36-37). But the ecocentric ideology of the Green parties has meant they also view both social democrats and conservatives as adherents to an outdated ideology and therefore not widely differentiated.

The first to attempt this alliance were the West German Social Democratic Party and the Greens in the early 1980s. They had always had similar views on traditional left-wing policies (Poguntke 1990a, 340), but in 1994 the German Greens accepted the position of deputy speaker with the conservative Christian Democratic Union (CDU) (Jesinghausen 1995, 112-113). In 1989 in Australia, the Tasmanian Labor Party entered into a short-lived accord with the Tasmanian Greens, but by 1996 the Greens were supporting a minority conservative government. Neither of the previous arrangements with the socialists were successful because the ideological conflict within the traditional electoral base (the working-class) of each socialist party led to electoral defeat.

In New Zealand the Green Parties of New Zealand/Aotearoa participated in a coalition of five minor parties known as “the alliance”: the Liberals, a breakaway groups of ‘wets’ from the National Party, the Democrats, a Maori nationalist party, and New Labour (a party formed by dissident Labour Party members). The alliance’s aim was to contest the New Zealand elections in late 1996. Although united in their opposition to free-market economic policies, strains and conflicts arose (Rainbow 1995, 477-478).

The difficulties of such alignments have long been understood. Offe (1985) describes them particularly from the perspective of the social democratic parties.

... such an electoral realignment is not easy to accomplish unless very basic changes in the strategic priorities of social democratic parties are adopted, changes which would reconcile the interest of the industrial working-class and unions, on the one side, and, on the other, the concerns of the new middle-class movements (including parts of the "peripheral clientele" of new middle-
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... such an electoral realignment is not easy to accomplish unless very basic changes in the strategic priorities of social democratic parties are adopted, changes which would reconcile the interest of the industrial working-class and unions, on the one side, and, on the other, the concerns of the new middle-class movements (including parts of the "peripheral clientele" of new middle-
class human service professions) on a strategic (rather than tactical, electoral, and ad hoc) level (Offe 1985, 865).

In referring to the Australian Federal context, Rawson (1991, 236) believes that the "old" parties have adjusted to environmental parties to some extent and may well adjust further, seeing the maximum extent in parliamentary representation of 'green' politics. Others (Burklin 1987, 124, Alber 1989) question the permanence of the Greens and cast doubt on their detachment from the political mainstream. The challenge for the old parties is to encompass much of the basic principles of Green politics (ecology, social justice, grassroots democracy and non-violence [Muller-Rommel 1985, 496]) without alienating their traditional base. The challenge for the Greens is to change the dominant social paradigm – which promotes economic growth as an unquestioned good and the preferred means to reduce poverty and inequality – to a new paradigm that gives, amongst others, priority to sustainability and protection of the ecosystem (Milbrath, Downes and Miller 1994, 437-442). The process so far has been an evolutionary rather than a dialectical progression. For the older parties, particularly the Labor Party, social justice and grass roots democracy have long been at the heart of their ideology. Ecological concerns have been included wherever possible, provided they did not spark conflict with the traditional working-class base. The dilemma for the Labor Party is that, in broad terms, it still favours an anthropocentric ideology with continued economic growth and a rising standard of living in a relationship based upon the continued exploitation of the environment.

The yet-to-be-completed task for the Green movement might appear to be to develop an understanding and some form of dialogue with the working-class while developing strategic plans to broaden Green support. However, the internal conflict is that the movement’s ideological basis is ecocentric, with deep ecologists arguing that the only way to tackle the environmental problems is to reform society fundamentally. At the same time the political wing must operate within the context of problems facing governments now. Consequently, some Greens feel that continuing to act within the current system will compromise principles. Although supporters with an ecocentric philosophy will remain faithful to the movement, Green supporters with an anthropocentric philosophy could be tempted to realign
with an 'old' party if it adopted different strategic positions on the environment and also highlighted its positive stance on social justice, grass roots democracy and non-violence. Similarly, the structure of the Greens must be such that it is capable of responding successfully in a parliamentary environment. The Greens must find a balance between an efficient structure and an acceptable level of ideology if they are to continue to compete and engender a paradigm shift within society.

Conclusion
This chapter has shown the established party structures converged as the democratic socialist mass and conservative cadre parties with a humanist perspective accepted economic growth as the provider of social benefits. However, a new postmaterialist group, the product of greater economic security and education, challenged the dominant paradigm with a new ideology. This ideology, as a powerful dynamic promoting change, became a pressure for modifying the established structures, for there is a clear relationship between the structure of all parties and the ideological positions they take. In the early stages of the development of the postmaterialist parties it was the socialists who had to reconsider both their ideology and their structure. But as the Greens become established, their supporters have questioned both the level of ideology and the type of structure necessary to achieve their ideological goals.

As the next chapter will show this debate has raged in Tasmania; Tasmania has become a microcosm of the issues raised so far. It had for many years a pro-development socialist government which, when it lost power, was replaced by an equally aggressive growth-oriented conservative government. It retains large tracts of wilderness areas that have for decades been threatened by an aggressive approach to industrialisation and its political system has for decades been dominated by environmental controversies (Hay 1988a). This in turn has spawned the world's first Green party (Walker 1989, 164) that placed stress on the established Tasmanian Labor party. How Tasmania has tried to deal with these problems is an indication of how other parties elsewhere are likely to deal with the balance of ideological change and structure.
CHAPTER 4

ESTABLISHED TASMANIAN PARTIES - INFLUENCES AND HISTORY

Introduction
The last two chapters have sketched in the global picture, focussing on the large Western democracies of Europe and the United States and on how the structure of their parties reflects both their history and purpose. This chapter relates these general lessons to the island of Tasmania and shows why parties in this Australian State reflect the same processes. It shows how the rigid structure and developmental ethos of the two major parties made them so vulnerable when challenged by the new politics.

Initially, brief consideration will be given to the Tasmanian character, which is broadly similar to other Australians, yet different in many subtle ways. These idiosyncratic features will be identified; its parochialism, history and pragmatic politics are all relevant to the formation of its parties, their views of their place in society and their ability to cope with new challenges. Tasmania, although a founding State in the Australian Federation, has a clear and distinct identity, which has coloured political developments since 1856 and beyond with the formation of the two established parties.

The broad typology of party is applied to Tasmania. The political scene encompasses a trilogy of party types with the Liberal, Labor and Green parties; they are similar yet subtly different to their European counterparts. Although the broad societal parameters have moulded the parties, local circumstances have conspired to give them uniquely Tasmanian characteristics.

This chapter will place the Tasmanian political parties in a general framework so they can be compared with the ideal types discussed earlier. This chapter will deal only with the formation of the two main parties and their history up to the 1980 Denison by-election when a member of a minor party, which challenged the established political orthodoxy, was elected. The growth and development of the
Labor (and to a lesser extent) the anti-Labor parties up to this time are discussed, as are their characteristics that echo the historical trends noted elsewhere; special attention is given to the pervasive influence of the Hydro Electric Commission, which had a huge influence not only in the economic life of Tasmania but also in engendering a strong development ethos in the Labor Party. The structural elements of membership, funding and leadership autonomy are different in each party. These differences will be related to ideal party types, placing Duverger’s (1951) and Kirchheimer’s (1972) work in a Tasmanian context.

After tracing the development of the two parties, this chapter shows how their evolution, particularly that of the Labor party, led to a structural rigidity and dogmatism that not only made the party incapable of meeting new challenges but, through narrow and hostile attitudes to being questioned by others assisted, encouraged – and indeed gave no alternative – to their questioners than to form their own political party. The looming challenge of a different ideology was caused as much by these negative attitudes as by any environmental threats.

Finally, consideration will be given to the Hare-Clark electoral system of proportional representation, used in Tasmania since the turn of the century, and to how a two-party system found such a stable footing in the early decades of the 20th century. Conversely, it will be shown that this electoral system uniquely assists the success of parties that would in other systems be of minor importance. The Hare-Clark system will be shown to encourage moderate and parochial politics. Such encouragement, and the ensuing minimisation of ideology and pursuit of short-term interests, provided fertile soil for the growth of new politics. The effect of the system was to open the door to new parties; the door was always there but until social and cultural factors conspired, in the form of high-profile environmental disputes, to challenge the established political order, it had remained closed. Once open it was to prove exceedingly difficult for the established parties to close it.

**Tasmania**

Tasmania, Australia’s smallest state, was an original member of Federation. While its residents are much like those of the rest of Australia, they have some idiosyncrasies that help to explain the configurations of the local political landscape.
It has been compared to other islands such as Ireland and Nova Scotia; to Nova Scotia because it is relatively isolated and has a strong sense of regional identity, and to Ireland because it is of similar size and also has a history of its inhabitants having to leave to find work. Although proudly Australian, Tasmania’s sense of identity and difference cannot be ignored. This is at once a factor of its history and geography.

White settlement began in 1803 as a penal colony in which most of the population were convicts or government officials. At the census of 1847 just over 50 percent of the population of 70,000 were, or had been, convicts. Less than 20 percent were free immigrants. This unique population balance set the early sociological scene. By 1850 the character of Tasmania had been delineated by a large part of the available land being taken by a few families, and by the establishment of the two cities of Hobart and Launceston by free settlers and convicts from the mother land. The strong links to England continued into the 20th century. Most immigrants were from Britain and Ireland, but the number of migrants to older settlers never reached the proportion of the other states nor were there, as in Victoria, large influxes of non-English speaking people. Tasmanian society was therefore modified less than other states by the impact of European habits (Townsley 1976, 7). Tasmania’s isolation reinforced its historic loyalty to England. Until the 1960s’ Tasmanians had a sentimental and economic attachment to England – strengthened by its apple exports to the UK, its British immigration and history.

The island’s growth was intermittent. In the 1850’s the population declined when transportation ended and many Tasmanians emigrated to the newly discovered goldfields in Victoria. This began the pattern of emigration by young Tasmanians looking for work elsewhere; The mainland states were more prosperous. Again, this trend continued. For example; the proportion of the total Australian population living in Tasmania decreased from 3.4% in 1945 to 2.7% in 1992 (Tasmanian Year Book 1996).

The geographical contours of this mountainous island have determined the principal areas of population: the north, south and north-west, particularly the location of Hobart and Launceston, which developed a rivalry during the 19th century.
Parochialism was again reinforced by the three daily newspapers -- each with a virtual monopoly in its own region. Inevitably, the common image of Tasmanians on the mainland was that they had developed ‘hillbilly proclivities’. Tasmanians have continued to feel different from other Australians, with a slightly defensive pride in coming from Tasmania (Robson 1997, 113-133).

Tasmania was, by and large, an agricultural community until after World War Two, when it rapidly developed hydro-electric power. By 1980 it had industrialised, with the production of metals using large amounts of power and employing significant sectors of the community. Relatively cheap power enabled some industries to overcome the disadvantages of a small local market and the costs of transportation off the island. It brought progress to the rural areas with continued construction and changed Tasmania from a rural and agricultural society to an industrialised one -- it amounted to a social and economic revolution in the state, transforming living standards.

Intermittent growth, periods of depression, and the mountainous terrain meant that, despite the rush to build dams in the highlands, large tracts of Tasmania remained untouched. This allowed over 20 percent of Tasmania to be listed as World Heritage by 1989 (Hay 1994, 1), but also meant that divisive and highly public controversies over proposals for further hydro-electric development would inevitably arise. Wilderness and hydro-electric development are two issues that have become ingrained in the consciousness of residents.

Tasmania became a founding member of the Federation in 1901. The financial crisis of the 1890s' assisted the federation movement in Tasmania, where it was believed that closer cooperation with the other colonies would help the economy. This was not the panacea expected and the state continued to experience financial difficulties until the establishment of the Grants Commission in 1933. This amounted to an acceptance by the Federal Government that grants should be available to allow states to function at the same level. This is now regarded as permanent policy, but while it strengthened the state it also bred a mendicant attitude.
Government and The Growth of Traditional Parties in Tasmania

By 1850, colonists rebelling against transportation forced the British Government to end convict transportation and allow the colonists to frame their own constitution. In 1854 a select committee of the colonial Legislative Council suggested two chambers be formed. The upper house was to be largely for landholders, while voting for the lower house was to be open to adult males. A bicameral parliament with limited franchise was established in 1856: the House of Assembly and the Legislative Council. The Legislative Council was established as a conservative body to put a check on hasty and ill-considered legislation (Green 1956, 3). The two chambers were to differ:

The instincts of the Assembly would be movement – progress – innovation; . . . . The instincts of the more conservative body will be caution – deliberation – resistance to change if not fairly and fully proved to be beneficial (Select Committee of Legislative Council 1854, 5).

The upper house consists of 19 members, while the House of Assembly consists of 35. The state is divided into five electoral divisions based on the Commonwealth electoral divisions (Bass, Braddon, Lyons, Denison and Franklin). Under the multi-member electoral system each division returns seven members, using the Hare-Clark electoral system. This has not always been the case: for seventeen elections from 1909 to 1956 each division returned 6 members (Mackerras 1995, 171).

Tasmanian politics until the 1980s' was characterised by two factors: the presence of two major moderate parties and a period of rule for over thirty-five years by one of these parties – the Labor Party. Demography provides a clue to both the moderate nature and stability of this arrangement. The population was evenly distributed, with no sharp contrasts between urban and rural interests, no clear-cut distinctions in the distribution of wealth, and no tradition of industrial conflict. Inter-woven with this was the nature of the parties. Little time was spent on doctrine, for both parties were inclusive and, because of the Hare-Clark system, neither party was able to win a large majority. The result was pragmatic and moderate politics.
This, therefore, was Tasmanian society until the 1980s — broadly reflective of Western democracies, similar yet different from the mainland; geographically isolated, socially conservative and governed by two moderate established parties. The parties grew in much the same way as in other democracies, but the seeds of conflict and internal strife were sown at an early stage ready, for when the basic foundations of the parties were challenged.

The historical trends noted in chapters two and three find an echo in Tasmania, but the community is both similar to and different from European democracies. This is shown most clearly in the history and development of the Tasmanian parties. As in Europe, parties with distinctive styles and attributes arose, melted by the same broad historical forces and possessing characteristics of ideal types. A brief discussion of the parties' individual histories will highlight the relevant attributes.

Duverger believed that two of the factors that help to distinguish or categorise the parties are membership and the question of the autonomy of parliamentary members. Panebianco (1982, 59) suggested that revenue and its source give valuable indications of the level of institutionalisation of a party. These structural aspects are a factor of the party's history and growth, capable of being compared to the ideal party types in Tasmania. We turn first to the emergence and development of the cadre party type.

**Anti-Labor and Liberal parties**

The cadre party has claim to being the oldest type in Tasmania. Full adult suffrage was granted in Tasmania only in 1903, so it was impossible for any other type to form before that date. Because Labor Governments have had long incumbencies in Tasmania, it is often overlooked that non-Labor parties dominated politics for most of the first three decades of the 20th century. The cadre party system in Tasmania, composed of these non-Labor parties, was described thus:

> Before 1903, politics were based on factions and personal alliances. With small electorates, a limited franchise and no major issues, electoral organisations were unnecessary and ineffective. Personal contacts, family
traditions and social deference were often sufficient to win elections, particularly in country areas (Weller 1971, 137).

Adult suffrage forced a change in the cadre parties when the mass party appeared. Before this, candidates were elected without any formal party structure. It was not until 1904 and 1907 that the National Association and Progressive League, respectively, were formed to support anti-socialist candidates, partly as a result of the election of Labor party members to State and Federal government. The National Association was backed by both the Chamber of Commerce and Sir Neil Lewis, an ex-Premier. Neither organisation sought to influence members of parliament by way of direction; indeed one specific reason for the National Association was “to secure for our representatives in Parliament the exercise of their independent judgment, unhampered by the orders of any body of men” (Mercury, 19 April 1904).

The next organisation formed after the failure of the Association and League was the Tasmanian Liberal League in 1909. It also did not attempt to gain influence, believing in a policy of total non-interference with the parliamentary party, although it did endorse Liberal candidates and campaign against the Labor party. Weller concludes (1971, 145) that these parties were formed originally as a reaction to Labor and that, although the parties were not directly formed by Members of the House of Assembly (MHA’s) they were led by notables who were generally aspiring or ex-MHA’s.

Jupp (1968, 24) agrees with Duverger that the formation of a mass party forces a change in the organisation of the right or cadre party. The Liberal Party’s history supports this theory. Although the party developed a mass membership, they remained electorally orientated and were concerned with policy only in general terms.

It was not until 1944 that the Tasmanian branch of the United Australia Party was invited to attend a Canberra conference with the aim of amalgamating the existing non-Labor groups into one (Lucadou-Wells 1994, 2). From this conference the Tasmanian branch of the Liberal Party was formed under the presidency of a Tasmanian barrister, Sir Reginald Wright, but many years were to pass before the
new party was to take government; until 1969, most Tasmanians thought the Liberal Party made no sense except as an opposition (Townsley 1976,54). Townsley believes this was partly due to the negative attitude of the Liberals and the moderate approach of the Labor Party. Despite a flurry of excitement during the years of Premier Albert Ogilvie (1934-1939) there was no socialism to react against. The Labor Party followed a policy of moderation that did not offend conservatives or Labor supporters. Despite a short period of minority government from 1969 to 1972, the Liberal Party was unable to break the balancing act of Labor until the election of Robin Gray in 1982. By the time of Gray’s Premiership (1982-1989) the basic characteristics of the Liberal Party as cadre, which are still relevant (and contentious) today, were evident.

Liberal control over policy/leadership autonomy
The relationship between the organisational and parliamentary wings of the Liberal Party show a distinct philosophical difference to the Labor Party. The Liberal Party has a policy advisory committee, which may offer advice to the State leader only on matters of State Policy (Constitution and General Standing Orders for Meetings of the Liberal Party Tasmanian Division 1991, Part XII). The constitution gives little idea of the actual site of power within the extra-parliamentary wing. The State Executive Committee controls the day-to-day management while the extra-parliamentary wing has real power only in the selection of parliamentary candidates (West 1965, 189).

The cadre party’s main task was to secure the election of a parliamentary majority and no more. The legacy of such cadre parties is reflected in the current Liberal Party and its structure:

First – and above all – the leader. Then cabinet, outer ministry, backbench, senior staff and so on. Then there is the party machine – State divisions and local branches. As a rule they, too, have their own hierarchy although in some States in recent years this has been loosened up somewhat (Henderson 1994, 12).
A Federal Liberal Treasurer, Peter Costello, stated, "... leadership is of the essence for the Liberal Party; more than most organisations, it is orientated by leadership" (Costello 1993, 21). The importance of this to the Liberal Party is shown by Robin Gray, who became a Liberal member of the House of Assembly in 1976 and Leader of the Opposition five years later. After the Liberal Party won the election in 1982 he became Premier and moved quickly to exercise his authority over the party. He expanded the personal office of the premier, requiring that all future ministerial staff appointments were to have his direct approval. As regards the State Liberal Party he was equally as dismissive in his intervention on behalf of the National Party in Queensland in the 1983 election. After being informed by the Tasmanian Liberal Party State president that such support of the National Party may require automatic expulsion under the party’s constitution, he denied that such rules could be binding on him (Herr 1984, 12-13).

In effect, the Liberal Party in Tasmania asserts a Burkean concept of separation between the organisation in parliament and the public. The public face of the Liberal Party, through its parliamentary leader, allows it to be a responsive party, identifying and reflecting changes in the popular mood, establishing the ‘public interest’ as it perceives it (Jaensch 1989b, 17). The Tasmanian Liberals do not regard this as a role for the organisation; they believe the executive of the party should not make political statements during the life of the government (Bass Liberal Conference 1993, workshops 4 and 5).

The lack of policy input by branches has, as with other parties, been a constant issue. After the 1993 Federal election, the Tasmanian Young Liberals issued a discussion paper (entitled Heart and Soul) in which they roundly criticised the lack of real input from grass-roots members and branches to decision-making. The Young Liberals asserted, “Policy was dominated by right-wing ideologies whose rational economic policies lead to the evolution of conservatives discovering solace within our organisation. Yet we were heading in the wrong direction with the wrong policies” (Heart and Soul 1993). In the absence of changes giving greater power to the rank-and-file leadership, the parliamentary arm of the Liberals remains largely autonomous.
Revenue / fees
Within the Liberals, membership is considered as important for revenue as it is for any direction. The more highly institutionalised an organisation the more probable that it has at its disposal revenue based on a regular flow of contributions from a plurality of sources. The less institutionalised an organisation the less continuous and regular its flow of funds (Panebianco 1982, 59). A basic method of attracting revenue is party membership; all parties impose a membership fee usually based on income. The Liberal party changed its flat fee of $20 in 1994 to $45 with a concession fee of $15 (Constitution and General Standing Orders of Liberal Party of Australia (Tasmanian Division, June 1995, 4).

State donations have always provided the bulk of the Liberal Party's income; the largest are from local business and large businesses headquartered on the mainland but with State-wide interests (West 1965, 190). It falls to the party secretary or treasurer to solicit these donations from the companies as well as seek donors from those who have attended business lunches sponsored by the party.

All parties have benefited from the introduction of public funding of campaigns, though they still attempt to gain additional funding. In the early years of the Liberal party in Tasmania, the finance committee's role included compiling a roll of companies, firms, businesses and organisations that could be approached for finance (Lucadou-Wells 1994, 22). The Liberal Party in Tasmania continues to display its links with business by accepting donations from a wide range of sources, including large corporations and banks. For example, donors to the Liberal Party in the 1996 State election included Gold Mines of Australia, Aberfoyle, Coca Cola Amatil and the ANZ, National Australia Bank and Westpac, who gave in total over $56,000 (Political Party Annual Return 1995/96, Australian Electoral Commission).

Membership
All applicants must agree to be bound by the party's objectives and sign a declaration to this effect. The constitution and rules of the Liberal Party contain objectives that spell out its ethos and ideology, such as, the maintenance of a constitutional monarchy. All the parties in Tasmania recruit members for pragmatic
reasons and, in some instances, so that political education can occur. Although the emphasis varies, all parties recognise the importance of membership.

The established parties have all suffered a drop in membership in the past decades, for example, in 1975 the Liberal Party of Australia had 135,000 members; by 1983 it had 100,000. In 1994 it was about 70,000, with the median age above 50 and quite possibly over 60 (Warby 1994, 27). The complaints of party officials are remarkably similar: an increase in the age of members and an unstimulating environment. “The party makes no systematic attempt to recruit new members. Such new members as do arrive under their own steam are often rapidly alienated by boring, pointless meetings and the poor quality of internal discussion and debate” (Warby 1994, 29). Every State appears to be afflicted: the Liberal Party membership in NSW, for example, has fallen by 47 percent since 1975 (Prasser and Neylan 1994, 120).

Fewer members mean that not only has a traditional source of talent diminished but also that the party has lost an important “conduit” to the wider community. In Tasmania in July 1993 the Liberal Party organised a Bass Liberal Conference that produced a report entitled A Branch Members’ View. This document purported to represent the views of the branch membership in the Bass electorate. It stressed the value of membership: “Increased membership would improve State electoral success and would assist in the contact process of elected and preselected members with the grass-roots. Increased membership numbers will also improve input to policy” (Bass Liberal Conference 1993 Workshop No. 6). But the conference also included the following rather despairing view of its current membership:

Our supporters are:
Few at present
No young people
1/3rd business people who give money and nothing else
1/3rd “active business people”
More women than men – women go to meetings
It concluded with “Minimum membership number. We are at it now” (Bass Liberal Conference 1993 Workshop 2). The Tasmanian Young Liberal Movement claimed that people had left the party ‘in droves’ and the Liberal hierarchy had failed to develop any effective new membership programs (Heart and Soul 1993).

By March of 1994 the situation had not improved. The financial report of the Treasurer of the Tasmanian Liberal Party, Mr J Bowler, stated that membership was only a third of what it was in 1993 (Minutes of the State Executive Committee of the Tasmanian Division of the Liberal Party, 12 March 1994) – although publicly the party president claimed that membership was rising (Examiner 21 June 1994). It was alleged in July 1994 that the party treasurer had been referring to those who had failed to renew their membership and that the real figures were 1075 financial members, down from 1560 the previous year (Anonymous letter to State Labor Party Secretary July 1994).

Liberal Party as cadre

On the basis that the parliamentary wing is not directed by the organisational wing and its view that membership is a campaign tool rather than an integral part of a coherent whole, the Liberal Party retains key elements of the cadre party embodied in early anti-Labor associations. It “is based on the parliamentary number and membership, with the party and its members as a supporting mechanism only, and only within the bounds set by the parliamentary membership” (Jaensch 1989b, 8).

Nevertheless, the Liberal Party has also adopted some of the mass party characteristics, with membership and fees, and catch-all aspects with its strongly pragmatic attitude. Nor can the Tasmanian party rely solely on financial backers: it too is forced to place emphasis upon the fund-raising activities of its members. On balance it has moved from a cadre party to one with some mass party and strong catch-all characteristics. The autonomy of the parliamentary party allows it to be responsive to the community, relatively unhindered by ideology. Its responsive nature ensures that it retains its conservative nature, which was particularly noticeable during the Premiership of Robin Gray, when almost no heed was paid to ideology but considerable focus was placed on pragmatic politics. It was this
pragmatism and social conservatism that saw many conservative working class voters move from the Labor Party to support Robin Gray.

**Labor history**

The Labor Party is the oldest party in Tasmania, for the anti-Labor parties of the turn of the century do not have continuity as a single organisation. Epstein refers to the formation of mass parties in the following terms:

> Mass membership appears to be an organisational necessity for any movement seeking to effect drastic change in the economic order by democratic means... a large party of this type emerged in every Western Nation outside of North America... where successful socialist development began at an early stage of industrialisation when conditions included pre-modern class consciousness, and delayed mass voting franchise and widespread economic deprivation (Epstein 1968, 165).

Epstein had to consider the difficulty that there was no local pre-modern class consciousness in the Australian and New Zealand context. In Europe the socialist mass parties arose in a class-conscious environment. That such a party arose nonetheless in Tasmania can been explained in two ways: First, that Tasmania had an essentially transplanted British society in which the old class consciousness remained. This was particularly so in the extreme class division between convicts and free settlers or officials (Davis 1984, 1). Second, the theory that new societies founded as colonies do not inherit Europe’s historic conflicts. Instead they become set in a narrower indigenous tradition that develops out of their founding populations and peculiar circumstances (Rosecrance 1964, ch. 8) which, in this instance, still contained class distinctions.

It was from the unions that the political wings of the Labor movement were formed. Although there were unions already in existence – such as the Shipwrights formed in 1874, and the Bootmakers and Printers formed in 1875 – the Tasmanian genesis of the Labor movement is with the Amalgamated Miners Association which formed in 1889 (R. Davis 1983b, 2). Robson (1990, 217) regarded unions as much as benefit organisations as trade associations with implicit political overtones, for Tasmanian
unions were, with the exception of the AMA, small and poorly organised. The more politically aware Australian Workers Union assisted the labour movement when the Tasmanian Workers Political League held its first formal conference in Hobart in June 1903 (Mercury 6 June 1903).

The Tasmanian Labor Party was initially an indirect party made up of union members which later developed into a mixed party. It was not until 1913 that the political and industrial organisations were fully amalgamated under the name of the Tasmanian Labor Party, giving it essentially the mass structure it has to date. To use Duverger's definitions, it was a semi-mass party where individual members and affiliated unions formed the policy-making body. This arrangement has been retained to date, and although the ratio of union to rank-and-file member has varied over the years, a degree of union control has been lost on the way.

The newly constituted party was soon to gain government when John Earle took power (1914-1916) with the support of an anti-Labor MHA who was disgruntled with the Liberals. Although new, the Labor Party fielded a creditable team. There was another Labor government between 1923 and 1928, but the remarkably long reign of Labor governments began in 1934 with the election of Albert Ogilvie as Premier, and continued almost unbroken, until 1982.

**Control over policy / leadership autonomy**

The history of the Labor Party, at both a State and Federal level, is characterised by the view that the parliamentary wing members are but representatives of the movement. The ALP rules state that, 'Every member of the State Parliamentary Labor Party (SPLP) shall be bound by the Platform and Rules of the Party' (ALP Branch Rules 1993, Rule 16.2). All endorsed candidates must also sign in their application for endorsement the following pledge, which determines policy decisions from the state council of the Labor Party are binding:

I pledge myself . . . if elected to record my vote in my elected capacity, or any matter dealt with by the Platform of the Australian Labor Party (Tasmanian Branch), as shall be decided by a majority at a duly convened meeting of
Australian Labor Party members of the body to which I am so elected (ALP Branch Rules 1993, Schedule F).

The Labor party, in theory, would appear to have full control over the Parliamentary wing, being

...committed to democracy, full participation and equality within its own organisation. Its organisational structure is an elaborate system of representation and responsibility, with every level of the party, in theory, accountable to a wider level below it, with the final authority in the party conferences, elected by the mass membership (Jaensch 1989a, 111).

In practice this control and authority by the party is not strict – the parliamentary representatives concluding that for electorally sensitive reasons a degree of autonomy is essential. The turning point federally for the ALP was in March 1963. A photograph was taken of Arthur Calwell and Gough Whitlam being briefed outside a hotel while the ALP’s special conference, made up of 36 virtually unknown men, met inside to decide policy on the North West Cape Communications Station. The photograph, published by the Daily Telegraph, came to represent the myth of “the faceless men” who supposedly determined Labor Policy. Whitlam’s denunciation of the “witless men” at the Federal Executive on 15 February 1966, and the inclusion of the issue of “Parliamentary Leadership” in the Federal forums in 1967, were seen as necessary steps towards the election of a Federal Labor Government in 1972 and enhancing the parliamentary party (Loosely 1994, 8-9, Warhurst 1996, 245).

In Tasmania the members of the parliamentary wing are usually influential within their own factions and are often able to ‘direct’ both policy and the meetings of the State Administrative committee, of which the parliamentary leader is of right a member. State conferences, which set policy, meet only once a year while the Parliamentary Labor Party (PLP) meets every week when parliament sits, and each month when it is in recess. Although State conferences have the ability to ‘surprise’ on issues, usually a consensus has been forged before the conference, which can (if things are working smoothly) formally approve policy or motions.
Although it is commonplace for some sections of the party to complain about lack of action in implementing policy, the pragmatism of most parliamentary members ensures the less politically acceptable aspects of policy are ignored. Such tensions are a symptom of the dynamics of a heterogenous group such as the Labor Party. In the past, parliamentary members disregarded policy and platform, believing that much was irrelevant, unnecessary or politically and financially naive. For example, in 1981 Premier Doug Lowe adopted a Liberal Opposition move to have multiple copies of election ballot papers so that candidates on a party ticket would be rotated to the top of the ticket. The system put an end to factions using their numbers to have their preferred candidates pre-selected at the top of the party ticket where they were almost assured of a big vote. Despite repeated moves by the Labor Party Conference to scrap the system, the parliamentary members have ignored such calls.

Revenue / Fees

The close links between the parliamentary representatives and the party is also shown in Labor’s attitude to revenue. Debate within the party as to the appropriate level of fees has been perennial. Some within the Labor Party have argued for a low flat fee, but have been unsuccessful against the argument that those who earn more should pay more. As Duverger pointed out, just to take into account its financial significance is to miss the main point of the psychological factor of paying fees to reinforce bonds and re-affirm commitment. He remarks on the ‘strange paradox’ that the parties based upon the poorest classes adopt the highest subscriptions. However, it can be argued that membership fees are proportionate to income and therefore more equitable. Nor is the concept of a fee scale new: Duverger points out that European parties such as the Belgian Socialist Party and the German Socialist Party at one stage had 12 rates of contribution (Duverger 1967, 73-4).

The Labor Party has had four rates ranging from $8 for students and pensioners to $50 if the member’s annual income exceeded $52,000 (Tasmanian Labor Party Rules, June 1994, 26) It also receives funding by levying a membership fee of 3 percent of the wages of members of the House of Assembly and House of Representatives and 5 percent on Senators. On 1 October 1993 this levy was increased to 4 percent for Members of the House of Assembly and House of
Representatives and 7 percent for Senators. The Administration Committee decided that the amount gained from the increased levy would be set aside for spending in both State and Federal elections.

Additional funds accrue to the Labor party from its affiliated trade unions, who are levied an affiliation fee. Such a level of guaranteed funding has long been of advantage to socialist parties with union membership both in Australia and in Britain. As Duverger notes,

> Viewed from the angle of whole-heartedness in participation the system of individual contributions, which obtains in the direct parties has definite advantages . . . from the point of view of its purely financial return the Trade Union system of collective finance that is the rule in some indirect parties – notably the British Labour Party – has undeniably greater advantages (Duverger 1967, 74).

ALP rules state that ‘membership of an affiliated union shall be determined by the union providing to the administrative committee a statement of its financial members’. In June 1994 the affiliation fee stood at $2.20 per financial member (Tasmanian Labor Party Rules 1994, 26).

The system of levies on parliamentary members and affiliated unions gives distinct advantages, especially at a time when party membership in some parties seems to be dropping. For example, in 1992, 69 percent of the party’s income came from union fees and parliamentary members’ levies. The unions affiliated to the Tasmanian Labor Party were:

- Australian Railways Union
- Australian Tramway and Motor Omnibus Employees Association
- Confectionery Workers Union
- Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union
- Electrical Trades Union
- Federation of Industrial, Manufacturing and Engineering Employees
Panebianco (1982, 58-9) regarded a plurality of revenue sources as essential for a party to be free from external control. The significant revenue base of the Labor Party contributed by the unions leads to the question of control by the union movement. This problem is of greater concern when the make-up of the unions is considered. The unions that are affiliated are not even broadly representative of the union movement as a whole, being almost exclusively ‘blue collar’ in nature – a phenomenon not confined to Tasmania (Warhurst 1983, 259). Other unions, such as the Australian Education Union, the Australian Nurses Federation and the Tasmanian Public Services Union, refuse to affiliate. The non-affiliated unions may be described as members of the Labor movement, but it cannot be said they are truly participating in the party’s affairs. Affiliation brings the right to vote at State Council, but members of the affiliated union who exercise those votes must also be individual members of the party, and the voting rights of the unions were further restricted by rule changes in 1993 (Tasmanian Labor Party Rules 1993, Schedule D, E). In this manner funds are obtained, but not with a loss of autonomy or with direction coming from outside the party.

**Strong leadership – Ogilvie to Reece**

At first glance, on the issues of leadership and revenue, the Tasmanian Labor Party could be expected to be little different from mass parties elsewhere. But this is not the case, for the party allowed a series of premiers to have almost dictatorial control. Comment has already been made that the character of Tasmania lends itself to moderate and parochial governments. The almost unbroken reign of Labor, and the leadership style it engendered, are best studied in the context of a series of strong leaders who formulated and followed a vision of industrial development for their
State. These developments brought with them rural employment and a pride that Tasmania could attract large industries. In doing so the Labor Premiers were able to forge for themselves a more autonomous role than would otherwise be expected from traditional mass parties.

Ogilvie’s Labor administration from 1934 until 1939, first set in place a forward development strategy. Its aim was to deal with the effects of the depression; the central aim was to expand the hydro-electric programme. Ogilvie’s plans were brought to fruition by the Commonwealth Grants Commission, which had been established in 1927. Ogilvie used these grants to finance jobs through hydro-electric expansion, which saw the power grid tripled in capacity.

On Ogilvie’s death, Robert Cosgrove adopted his vision and pushed ahead with further power schemes. In 1944 Cosgrove’s government allowed the HEC, through the Hydro-electric Commission Act 1944, to become an autonomous statutory authority. The HEC became almost completely responsible for its own affairs, with the sole right to generate, distribute and sell electricity in the State. The Act did not place limitations on the extent of these activities. The HEC was neither directed by nor responsible to the Minister, other than the stipulation that the Commission must deem its activities “desirable in the interests of the State” (Section 15(2)(a)). Under Section 16 of the Act the commission required the authorisation of parliament before it started new power developments, but with the government, unions and business all in agreement with hydro-industrialisation this requirement became a mere formality.

When Eric Reece became Premier in 1959 he took the two portfolios of Treasury and Minister administering the HEC, while his Deputy Premier, Roy Fagan, took the portfolio of Minister for Industrial Development. Both men firmly believed in continuing hydro-industrialisation, with Reece ensuring that he had Cabinet support (Lowe 1984,23). When new members were elected to parliament they were inculcated with the unquestioned ethos of both parties: that Tasmania’s economic well-being was based on heavy industrialisation attracted by cheap hydro-electric power. The HEC and parliament shared an ideology of Tasmania as the hydro-state (Thompson 1981, 31). As Neil Batt, a previous Labor Treasurer, said,
the traditional concern of Tasmania, the obsession of Tasmania, in fact, has been that we have got to develop the place. And since this has been the logic, the doctrine, it is not surprising that politicians have the doctrine (Batt 1972, 68).

Under Eric Reece particularly, the power of senior bureaucrats increased, to such a level that executive decision-making was the norm, with some bureaucrats gaining a disproportionate influence in the shaping of public policy (B. Davis 1972, 42). He 'inherited' from Cosgrove Under-Treasurer Binns (who was appointed in 1950) and Commissioner Allan Knight (who was Hydro Electric Commissioner from 1946 to 1977). Knight was the principal architect of the HEC's policies for more than thirty years, with Eric Reece the public power broker. "It was a splendid combination, Knight the eminence grise and Reece a talented political populist" (Thompson 1981, 31). So strong was their influence that,

By 1964 the influence of Binns and Knight on the Cabinet through Eric Reece and Roy Fagan had led to unabated concentration of large scale, resource based industries with secure export potential and significant consumption of hydro electric power from the State's grid (Lowe 1984, 23).

Commentators (Thompson 1981, Lowe 1984, 1997 and Herr 1984) refer to the influence and power these men wielded: for example, during Reece's premiership there was no budget subcommittee to discuss how funds were allocated to portfolios; instead it was widely circulated that Binns and Reece met to determine priorities. The Ministers were then called in individually to discuss their budget priorities for the forthcoming financial year (Lowe 1997).

Because of the success of the developments, and the pervading political culture, the Liberal opposition accepted the state of affairs; neither opposing nor questioning, and rarely seeking public accountability for the HEC. In 1954 Angus Bethune in opposition stated: "Parliament has already abrogated its proper power to the HEC. In time it will get into the hands of a Commission which will be responsible to no-one" (Thompson 1981, 18). Yet when Angus Bethune became Premier in 1969,
both Knight and Binns were retained as advisers, with no change in economic development and economic policy. In 1971, when the HEC presented its ‘Report on the Proposed Pieman River Power Development,’ it was Angus Bethune’s Liberal Government that approved it with neither a parliamentary nor public inquiry.

Hydro-industrialisation
The political history of Tasmania, and more significantly the Labor Party, from the 1930s’ to the 1980s’ has therefore been closely linked with hydro-electric development. Hydro development and the major parties’ vision of large-scale industry based on exploiting Tasmania’s primary resources are central to the phenomenal success of the Labor Party which held office from 1934 to 1969 and from 1972 to 1982 to its virtual demise from 1982 to 1992 (R. Davis 1995, 253). The series of strong Labor leaders in Ogilvie, Cosgrove and Reece not only kept the party in office, but ultimately sowed the seeds for its losses when the influence of postmaterialists became felt in Tasmania. Similarly, the Liberal Party’s success under Robin Gray from 1982 to 1989 owes as much to that party adopting a pro-development stance as to Gray’s own presidential style of leadership.

It is often difficult for outsiders to understand the depth of feeling for the concept of hydro-industrialisation. The philosophy had built up over decades as a proven tactic that not only provided employment to rural areas, but also served the political interests of successive Labor governments. It provided highly visible examples of employment generation to sectors of the state that may not have been naturally inclined to vote for the labor party. After decades of such policy it had evolved to become sheer dogma (B. Davis 1972, 47). Hydro-industrialisation, government, unions and business became intertwined.

In Tasmania the dominant materialist views were to find expression in the deep-rooted ideology of hydro-industrialisation, which had remained unquestioned for decades. The ideology and values of the majority of the population and both political parties were to develop the supply of cheap and abundant hydro-electric power to attract industries to the state and thereby maintain employment and develop the economy. Postmaterialists who questioned that view in such a narrowly based society and political system were to attain the epithet of ‘heretics’. Why hostility
was generated towards any organisation or individual who dared to question the value of this ideology becomes apparent when its history is briefly reviewed.

The growth of the influence of the Hydro Electric Commission (HEC) and the strength of the Labor Party mirror each other. In 1895 Launceston, in the north of Tasmania, was the first municipality in the southern hemisphere to introduce hydro-electric power, which generated considerable interest about its potential. There was no ready market for bulk supplies of power until 1908, when an electrolytic zinc refining plant, which would require large amounts of energy was proposed. The concept of hydro industrialisation was born: big industry relies on large amounts of power, so hydro-electric expansion would deliver economies of scale to both. In these early stages the state had not yet decided to develop and own the schemes. But supporters of public enterprise, particularly the Labor economist L. F. Giblin, were instrumental in inserting a clause in the legislation (which allowed the developer to harness the power himself) to give the Government the right to acquire the hydro-electric part of the scheme in twenty-one years (Gillies 1984, 16). As early as 1909, therefore the essential blocks of hydro-industrialisation and Labor Party support had been put in place by Giblin’s forceful endorsement of the legislation. This relationship was to last for a further seventy years and be a major factor for decades of Labor government in Tasmania.

By 1912 the Hydro-Electric Power and Metallurgical Company, which was to develop the hydro-electric scheme using the waters of the Great Lake to process zinc, was in financial difficulties. By 1914, despite initial opposition by the Legislative Council, parliament passed legislation to buy the company’s hydro-electric assets and to form the new Hydro-Electric Department (HED). From the outset the HED actively encouraged bulk consumers, linking hydro-electric development with large-scale industry (Tighe 1992, 129). Although power generation continued in 1916, with the Shannon and Waddamana ‘A’ power stations, progress was slow. It was not until 1929 that comprehensive legislation

was considered to provide state-wide coordination. In the following year, in January 1930, the Hydro Electric Commission was established as the sole authority for electric power generation, construction and distribution. Under Labor's leaders it was to go from strength to strength.

Tasmania has traditionally played an active role in promoting industrial development – so much so that the question of technocratic rule (that is, technocrats causing outcomes that would not otherwise result) never seriously arose. The Tasmanian scene was a convergence of the interests of technocrats, industry and politicians (Kellow 1986, 2). Each of the players had a role: the government sanctioned each new scheme and promoted it to the electorate, the HEC (rather than parliament) monopolised the building of the schemes. Once the schemes were approved, the HEC decided which industries received the power, thus effectively controlling the rate and direction of industrial development in Tasmania. The unions, especially the Electrical Trades Union, had vested interests in maintaining employment through the development of new schemes and the access this gave to union leaders interested in a parliamentary career in the Labor party (R. Davis 1995, 254). At the same time industry received large blocks of power at cheap prices – and justified the existence of the HEC (Tighe 1992, 151).

The complexity of hydro technology placed undue power in the hands of the technical specialists in the HEC. Eric Reece's almost blind support of the HEC in the 1960s' allowed it to implement a plan of dam building on the basis of unspecified industrial expansion. His strong support, and the strict discipline he maintained over his Government, discouraged Government members from voicing doubts or criticisms (Lowe 1997). The core agenda for the government was firmly entrenched in the old paradigm of economic growth, distribution and security, while both capital and labour accepted the underlying view that growth was both continuously possible and desirable. In such circumstances the introduction of the new political paradigm, best understood as the modern critique of further modernisation (Offe 1985, 856), would inevitably lead to conflict.
Labor after Reece – membership fluctuations and internal divisions

Reece continued to ignore criticism by members concerned with Labor’s unquestioning attitude to development, remaining Premier until 1975. In that year Young Labor activists and his Cabinet rivals (partly fuelled by revenge for Reece’s failing to honour a commitment he was alleged to have made to Mervyn Everett to resign to allow him to become Premier (Holgate 1996)), successfully passed a resolution at the State Conference. The resolution declared that no member would be eligible for pre-selection if he or she were to exceed the age of 65 during the term of office for which he or she was being endorsed (Townsley 1994, 333). Reece, being older than 65, resigned, but his leaving left the Labor Party facing problems it was barely equipped to deal with. After his resignation, leadership styles changed, reverting to a more typical mass party leadership.

The stresses within the ALP under Reece’s leadership were lessened somewhat by the election of Bill Neilson, but the parliamentary party, used to Reece’s authoritarianism, reacted and now complained of weak leadership (R. Davis 1983b, 85). In 1976 the Labor Party won another election under Neilson, but he was to be a short-term Premier. In 1977 he resigned to take the post of Tasmanian Agent General in London, leaving Doug Lowe to become Premier. It is from this date that the Labor Party’s structural problems and its conversion towards a catch-all party (with disastrous results) can be plotted. Lowe’s attempts to appeal to both materialist and postmaterialist were doomed to failure. Instead of being able to broaden its vote base, Labor lost support while the other parties were able to broadcast a clearer and stronger message to their supporters. Lacking a strong leader, and a clear understanding of the challenge of new politics, the structure of the party meant that internal struggles diverted it from determining a clear course. At the same time its challengers were able to take advantage of two clear emotional messages: save the environment from the Greens, and job security through development through the Liberal Party.

In the mid 1970s the Labor Party increased its membership rapidly from 2502 in 1975 to 3732 members in 1976 (ALP membership records 1975-1976). Thereafter membership steadily declined until in February 1992 there were only 400 financial
members (Figure 4.1; this figure optimistically includes members who had not yet renewed their dues).

Figure 4.1 ALP membership 1975-1996

The rapid rise can be partly explained by the events of November 1975. The sacking of Labor Prime Minister Whitlam by the Governor-General, Sir John Kerr, had a galvanising effect on many, encouraging them to join the Labor Party. Those who joined at this time were the younger and better educated.

The subsequent decline can be partly explained by the party changing the multiple-branch membership rule in 1976. Under the old rules, members could join more than one branch, with each branch membership entitling them to a vote. People were signed up at several branches by factions purely to obtain extra votes when deciding delegates.

For example, Eric Barnard MHA between 1961 and 1971 was a member of 19 branches and in 1965 alone was a member of 10 branches and therefore entitled to 10 votes for delegates to state conference. Premier Eric Reece between 1961 and 1971 was a member of 13 branches and in 1965 was a member of 8 separate branches, while his wife was a member of 5 branches (ALP membership records 1961-1971).
The rule changes came about because of the threat of federal intervention after the disastrous 1975 federal election, in which Labor lost all five federal seats in Tasmania. Multiple-branch membership, by manipulating the membership figures, had helped Reece and his supporters to maintain control over the party, entrenching the conservative and pragmatic right wing. Once the rules had changed, there was less opportunity to stack branches.

As union membership declines, so too do affiliation fees paid. Like the Liberal Party and the unions, Labor has for years struggled with declining membership as people fail to become formally involved. Despite the decline, the Labor Party continues to have more rigorous membership criteria than the other parties. An application can be refused if the applicant has been a member of a proscribed organisation within the past two years; if the applicant supported another candidate against a Labor candidate within the preceding two years; and if the applicant's occupation is covered by a union and the applicant is not a member of that union (Labor Party Branch Rules 1992). An applicant must also have read and agreed to the charter of the Party and sign the following pledge: “While a member I agree to be bound by the Rules and pledge myself to uphold the Platform and to support endorsed Australian Labor Party candidates for public office” (Application for membership ALP 1996).

The rule changes enabled the left faction to challenge the right, with its ideologically pragmatic and brokerage style of politics, but it also set the scene for dissent within the party, fostering at last some ideological debate and calls for greater control of the party by the rank-and-file. The 1975 changes were driven by the members of the Standing Constitution and Rules Committee, who included Mervyn Everett, John Coates, Michael Clarke and David Llewellyn. Llewellyn (personal conversation 7 July 1998) regarded these changes as one of the defining moments in a party’s life. He claims that all committee members were united in their concern for the continuing viability of the party. But when the rule changes were debated in February 1976 opposition was evident from members of the PLP and some right wing unions, such as the Federated Ironworkers Association and the Federated Clerks Union, who saw the changes as an attack on their power base.
The composition of the State Council was successfully amended to give the unions a two-thirds representation, thus gaining greater say in the affairs of the Labor Party. At the same time elected members were again reminded that they were bound by the platform of the party, although many continued to believe the PLP still had too much autonomy. To the broad left, the electoral laws, which effectively stifled the ability of the party to issue how-to-vote tickets, were symbolic of the excessive freedom from rank-and-file control that successive Labor Governments had secured for themselves (Bennett 1983, 85).

The factional brawling within the ALP and the expulsion by the National Executive of the right-wing secretary of the Tasmanian Trades and Labour Council, Brian Harradine, led to some right unions disaffiliating and gave the left an opportunity to flex its muscles. By 1977 the left had sufficient power to expel two of Harradine’s colleagues, Peter Imlach and Robert Watling, for involvement in the National Civic Council (a proscribed organisation), which the left saw as opposed to Labor ideals. Unknown to many, the expulsion of Harradine nearly led to a split in the party when it appeared an independent Tasmanian Labor Party might be established. Three formal meetings – attended by, among others, the Premier Bill Nielson, Kath Venn the State Secretary, Brian Harradine, Neil Batt the State President, Peter Imlach and Bob Watling – were held to discuss the formation of another party.

Michael Clarke (personal conversation 7 July 1998), who was Batt’s executive officer, was present at the meetings. He believes the prime movers were Harradine, Imlach, Watling and Venn (Venn was upset over moves to remove her from the position of State Secretary). Lowe (personal conversation 8 July 1998) thought she was heavily involved in the pro-National Civic Council group within the party. He regarded Batts’ involvement as opportunistic, and Nielson’s as a reaction to what Nielson saw as a growing loss of control within the party and his reliance, to a large degree, upon the Harradine-controlled unions (Lowe 8 July 1998).

By 1976 members of the Labor Party had been elected who were willing to question the entrenched development ethos. They were Michael Field, Julian Amos and Terry Aulich – all middle-class university graduates and all viewed as deeply
threatening by the ‘old guard’ within the Parliamentary Labor Party (Field 1997a). The threat was amplified in 1979 when all three were put into cabinet above others. Lowe manipulated the cabinet election, by having a series of votes for positions rather than a straight Hare-Clark vote, to achieve this result (R. Davis 1983b, 104., Field 1997a). Within the Parliamentary Labor Party, there was resentment arising from the mix of personalities, resentment of Lowe by those overlooked for cabinet, and resentment from members unable to deal with ‘quality of life’ or conservation issues. A party structure that had in the past been carried along by strong and successful leaders now had a succession of weak leaders in Neilson and Lowe. This set the scene for the disintegration of the Labor Party.

Labor, which began life as a semi-mass party achieved a clear identity as a mass party. It was however a party, under the early leaders, that did not pursue a strong socialist agenda, taking advantage of its incumbency to deliver pragmatic politics based on personality and region that had served it well for decades. In Reece’s authoritarian reign it started to de-emphasise union participation in its structure, but still relied on membership and the organisation for its operation. This was the party Lowe inherited from Neilson, established and staid, yet about to face turbulent decades coming to grips with new challenges and conflict.

**The structural rigidity and ideological dogmatism of the ALP**

A bare description of the Labor Party that Lowe led in 1979 as a mass type does not do justice to the complexities of the Tasmanian political landscape. An analysis of the party’s attitudes and structure, ossified by the time of Reece’s Premiership, is perhaps more enlightening. It gives some insight into how a party could almost self-destruct and allow another lean and hungry competitor to enter the parliamentary domain. Yet again, the role of the HEC and the influence of a succession of autocratic premiers cannot be ignored. Kitschelt (1994, 208) believes that the configuration of party systems, the internal organisation of a bureaucratic mass party and the patterns of leadership accountability impede their movement to new and electorally beneficial positions. This explains why socialist parties such as the ALP may not be able to take advantage of new configurations when they arise, particularly when they are faced with new competitive challenges. Over its decades in Government, the Tasmanian ALP arguably became intellectually bankrupt in its
ability to consider other views and its unwillingness, through Eric Reece, to be guided. Within the Labor Party there was little debate on ideology; the right wing or pro-parliamentary group of the party was firmly entrenched by Reece, who regarded input and consultation with progressive members of the party as a threat (Lowe 1997). “In keeping with an ideology of centralised technocratic decision making the focus of state political power became a small coterie of skilled bureaucrats and ALP strongmen (Premiers and holders of development portfolios)” (Hay 1987, 5).

As a result of the decades of an intense focus on industrial development and strong leadership, the ALP inherited an organisational structure that was all-encompassing, entrenched and bureaucratic, a structure that emphasised stability but undercut strategic flexibility. It became in effect a technocratic organisation relying heavily on the skills of its bureaucrats such as the Under Treasurer Ken Binns and the Commissioner of the HEC Russel Ashton, giving little weight to innovative new participants.

The reliance on a single ideology and the acquiescence of members of parliament to bureaucrats permeated other areas, with ministers seeking counsel not from the party, but from their advisers. Doug Lowe (1997) talks of his attendance at a Labor Party conference in 1965 as State Secretary. He saw the conference as playing a superficial role, with motions from branches being stood aside while ministers moved recommendations prepared for them by advisers. Conference had become a mere safety valve to preserve party stability.

The process for my first State Conference in 1965 was to actually make sure that the agenda was forwarded to the ministers so they could forward them on to their departmental heads for response. In other words the vehicle for the ministers was not via any branch or Labor Party policy basis; it was from their bureaucratic heads (Lowe 1997).

As a result, what some may describe as stability in Tasmanian politics was regarded by others as ideologically moribund politics with no pronounced value cleavage. It has been suggested that there was not a functioning democracy in Tasmania in Reece’s time; instead it was a government run by the executive and an ossified
parliament with a front bench that had abrogated its responsibility to a small mandarinate (Hay 1994, 1-5). Tasmania's government was led by a man whose ruthless leadership contributed to the problems to come by ensuring that parliament was not a training ground for the next generation of leadership (Herr 1984, 5).

By the early 1970s', despite the ALP's seeming omnipotence, the organisation and party was seen by many to be effectively an atrophied shell (Flanagan 1989). When compared with the Labor Party in other states it was pragmatic, conservative and parochial (Holmes and Sharman 1975, 112). The government bureaucrats fed their advice through to the Premier Eric Reece, who directed a quiescent and equally unquestioning government. Power development in the decades around the depression was never queried but, over time, fewer and fewer dam sites became available, which led inevitably to conflict over the damming of some areas. Against a background of continuous development, it is not an exaggeration to suggest that Eric Reece was incapable of understanding why some people in the community would be opposed to the damming of a lake or river, let alone question the future direction of Tasmania's economy and society. When asked if he thought there was a change in perception and a growing appreciation of natural wilderness for its own sake, Reece replied:

Well, why don't they make a noise the other way and get rid of some of the large groups of unemployed that we’ve got round this state now by having sensible resource development, instead of continually clouting over some items of history? Why don’t they do that? Surely there is enough common sense and intelligence in the community to see their future welfare lies in it (ABC radio interview with Eric Reece 10 January 1992).

Attitudes of established parties and their role in the creation of new parties
The New Zealand Labor government shared the same pro-development views as Tasmania's and also believed its electoral prospects would be enhanced by pursuing a pro-development policy (Rainbow 1992, 335). But times were changing and, like Tasmania, New Zealand society was to suffer the same stresses when its government proposed to flood Lake Manapouri for hydro-electric development. From this debate arose the Values Party formed in May 1972, just two months after
Tasmania’s United Tasmania Group (UTG), which was created as a response to the proposal to flood Lake Pedder in the wilderness area of Tasmania’s South-West.

The Values Party, like the UTG, was ultimately to fail (if one defines failure as the inability to attain a seat in Parliament), but one major difference was the way in which the existing political structure dealt with conflicting views. Both Davidson (1992, 71) and Rainbow (1989, 182) point out that governments can influence the success or otherwise of new political movements by the way in which they allow public input into decision-making. Often how a government deals with the concerns of others is just as important as the environmental issue that stimulated the conflict. The negative experiences of postmaterialists in dealing with the established parties, as well as the perceived inability of these parties to devise a fundamentally different policy approach, become important stimuli for the growth of new alternatives (Muller-Rommel 1985, 484).

A contrast can be made between the historical links or traditions of England and New Zealand, which allowed conservationists access to government, and the political structures in Tasmania and West Germany, which effectively denied them any input. Rudig and Lowe (1986) maintain that one of the main difficulties the ‘People Party’ (later to be renamed the Ecology Party) had in gathering support from British environmental groups was the tradition, going back to the nineteenth century, of such groups working within the system and pursuing environmental reforms through traditional channels. As a result, these groups saw association with an environmental political party as ‘counterproductive’ (Rudig and Lowe 1985, 271).

In England the new left did not play a big role in the rise of the British Green Party because people with left leanings and an interest in environmental issues were drawn into the Labor Party. Unlike Tasmania, the predominance and ubiquity of industrial relations conflicts in Britain provided the opportunity for left-wing political activity. In Tasmania similar conflict did not arise until massive industrial unrest and strike action at the Associated Pulp and Paper Makers dispute at Burnie in 1992 – far too late to interrupt the seemingly endless succession of decades of high-profile environmental flashpoints.
By contrast, neither Germany or Tasmania had such an accommodating political structure. The problems of environmental destruction and the threat created by nuclear energy and nuclear weapons were strong stimuli and radicalising factors in Germany. The converging concerns of environmentalists and anti-nuclear campaigners were met with belligerence by the existing parties; when faced with ignorance and arrogance, the campaigners became an opposition themselves (Poguntke 1992a, 338). “Now let’s vote for ourselves” became one of the slogans of the Greens (Maier 1990, 24).

The Tasmanian conservationists fared no better, being met with “deep-rooted paternalist antagonism” (Hay 1993b, 14). Members of conservation groups within the Labor Party who displayed such an attitude would, Lowe (1997) believes, have faced antagonism from their own party colleagues.

It didn’t really matter whether they were within or outside the Labor Party, if they conflicted with the specific views of, particularly, the conservative establishment of either the right or left, then they were likely to receive hostility (Lowe 1997).

By 1970 the rank-and-file of the Tasmanian Labor Party had effectively been disenfranchised. Branch motions that managed to be placed on the agenda at state conferences were adjourned while carefully sanitised motions prepared by ministers on the advice of their advisers were put in their stead. The very people who in other States were the ideological backbone of the Labor Party were ignored. The founder of the New Zealand Values Party, Tony Brunt, said in words equally applicable to Tasmania, that he was a person “lying under the tap marked Labor, waiting for a drop of moral leadership” (Brunt 1973, 83). With members of the Labor Party who were sympathetic to conservation issues demonstrably not being able to achieve within the party, the Tasmanian conservationists had to go outside the party structure and construct a new political culture and movement from scratch. “Of necessity this was oppositional and confrontationist” (Flanagan 1989, 37).
The emergence of the conservation movement as a political force in Tasmania is one of gradual evolution; from conservative organisations such as bushwalking clubs and the South West Committee of the early 1960s’ through to the sophisticated and militant Wilderness Society. The process culminated with the election of the Wilderness Society’s former head, Bob Brown, to the House of Assembly as a result of the Franklin River dispute. Lake Pedder and the Franklin River should not be regarded as separate incidents in the history of New Political movements in Tasmania. They are on a continuum of increasing political sophistication of environmental activism and the reaction of the then dominant ALP, locked into support for conventional Keynesian welfare state policies to the exclusion of the new left issues, exemplified by political enmity and unwillingness or inability to either understand or come to grips with new issues.

Opportunities for, and constraints on, forming new parties in Tasmania

The conditions Kitschelt (1988) described as shaping and constraining new party formation were present in Tasmania. The most comprehensive welfare states are associated with strong, centralised unions and long periods with a Labor party in office. Under the premierships of Cosgrove and Ogilvie, successive Labor Governments had introduced long-lasting and broad welfare support; with a well-developed public health and education system supported by a large public service. By their very nature these governments were not radical, acting within the constraints of the Hare-Clark voting system (O’Connell 1983, 46-7) and further limited by an extremely conservative Legislative Council (R. Davis 1983a,186). They were also linked with conservative trade unions. These unions were interested in the areas of social policy, employment and the benefits to both the unions and their members that came with supporting a pro-development government. This labor corporatism increased the rigidity of the party and the unresponsiveness of the Tasmanian political system from demands that were to come from the New Politics policies and issues.

Secondly, the party’s right-wing faction had been in power for a long time, which dampened the hopes of the traditional left that it could incorporate the new demands of the conservationists into its policies while at the same time catering to its
traditional working-class constituency. This was particularly so when its vision was
the fixed orthodoxy of industrial development through hydro-industrialisation.

Kitschelt’s third condition (1988, 209) – highly visible conflicts about postindustrial
policy issues such as nuclear power – appear to be of no relevance to Tasmania, with
its history of hydro-electric development. But when one considers how the anti-
nuclear activists in Europe initially attempted to work through the traditional
channels, only to find such strong hostility from the established political parties that
they were forced to resort to forming their own organisations to advance their own
agenda, similarities become apparent. As in Tasmania, although the initial
opposition was to building of particular power stations and deploying missiles,

nuclear power rapidly became a symbol for the technocratic domination of
society by government agencies, private enterprise, and unions who defend
economic growth and bureaucratic welfare states against the left-libertarian
challenge (Kitschelt 1988, 220).

The early anti-hydro development conflicts in Tasmania rapidly became polarising
conflicts of great symbolic importance. They created the conditions that established
a consensus among the new protagonists: that new political options were essential if
the issues and values that were important to themselves were to be protected and
expanded.

Changes in Tasmanian society significantly affected the emergence of green politics
in the 1970s’. Greater affluence, better access to education and a steady increase in
tertiary education, led sectors of the Tasmanian community to develop different
values. These were in marked contrast to the values of the preceding generations.
Under Ingelhart’s (1981) definition these societal values were postmaterialist rather
than materialist values.

However, although Ingelhart’s views help explain how such views generate, they do
not show a causal relationship between environmental problems and the Green
movement itself. The causal factors in Tasmania were the flooding of Lake Pedder
and the structure of the dominant party, the ALP. As Rudig and Lowe commented:
The development of green parties cannot be understood without consideration of the emergence of particular issues and protest movements, and the concrete circumstances of party formation (Rudig and Lowe 1986, 265).

The Labor Party, surrounded by a rigid structure, unwilling and unable to respond to the catalyst of environmental conflict, therefore held a stick of dynamite, which was to destroy its political dominance. The only missing ingredient was a fuse, and this was to be found in Tasmania's unique electoral system – the ramifications of which had remained dormant for decades.

**The first election of an environmentalist**

Doug Lowe's succession to the premiership was without outward dissent, as he was thought to have a consensus approach, which made him acceptable to most party members (Herr 1984, 6). But his premiership clearly falls into two parts: an uncontroversial period before the 1979 election, and a turbulent post-election period. In the space of three years from 1979 the Labor Party was to go from a party in Government with 20 seats – with a Premier who gained 51.2 percent of first preferences in his own electorate, which was the highest individual vote since the Hare-Clark system was introduced in 1907 (Bennett 1983, 80) – to an Opposition with 14 seats. It was yet another environmental battle, that exposed the inability of the structure and leadership of the Labor Party to adapt and set the scene for the coming decades of Opposition. But before this battle the Labor Party again, through its internal divisions, handed an opportunity for others to gain a parliamentary foothold.

The tensions within the Labor Party led, in 1980, to the amazing scenario of a failed and disgruntled Labor candidate, Bill McKinnon, petitioning against a successful Franklin Labor rival, Michael Aird, for exceeding the then $1,500 spending limit. This limit had not been carefully adhered to by either major party and had, until that time, remained free from legal challenge. The issue escalated to a point where all 35 members seemed in doubt. Eventually all petitions were withdrawn except by one candidate in the electorate of Denison. As a result the Government had to introduce a Bill that provided that if the seat of one member was voided then the seats of all
other members were also vacant. This produced a by-election in February 1980 in the electorate of Denison (Bennett 1983, 81). In doing so the government initiated a sequence of events that would lead to its defeat at the next election. In the by-election Dr Norm Sanders, a green activist Australian Democrat and former director of the Tasmanian Wilderness Society, was elected to the House of Assembly, taking the place of a Labor member, John Green. The irony of this result was that it was Green who encouraged McKinnon to petition against Aird because Green knew Aird would not support him for a cabinet position. Green had hoped to have his supporter, McKinnon, in place of Aird, but instead lost his seat (Conversation M. Aird 6 May 1998).

Sanders, openly contemptuous of the current elected members, was the first elected person to openly challenge the concept of hydro-industrialisation from within parliament:

    Look at our average local politicians. Insurance salesmen, a farm accountant from Victoria, our Premier. Small people from small towns and they are impressed with expertise, like the Hydro claims to have. They say, 'The Hydro must know.' And besides it's easier, they don't have to think (Sanders 1981, 154).

In the 1982 election, Sanders was re-elected and Brown, the former head of the Tasmanian Wilderness Society (TWS), stood as an environmentalist independent. Brown narrowly missed election, but together he and Sanders polled 22.3 percent of the vote in Denison. When Sanders resigned to contest the Senate elections, Brown was elected on a re-count, but only after Brown contested the recount. It is alleged that, before Sanders resigned, he contacted Brown to ascertain whether he intended to stand. Sanders wanted to be sure that his preferences would flow to his Democrat running mate and ensure his election. Brown was reported to have said he was not interested, but later 'changed his mind', capturing part of Sanders' preferences and gaining a quota before the Democrat candidate (Walker quoted in Crowley 1994, 182). Yet again, it was the Hare-Clark electoral system that allowed the changing of the guard.
Tasmanian Electoral System

Hare-Clark*

The relative stability of Tasmanian politics before the 1980s has been partly attributed to the Hare-Clark electoral system (Sharman 1977, 21-22). It encouraged a style of government that down-played class loyalties and ideology, instead drawing its strength from social networks and regional loyalties. As will be shown, it also led to the success of a new party, but in the 1970s' the following description of how the two major parties approached the electoral system is apt:

Ideological issues have little meaning in such a context since the prime goal of both parties is to amass a bundle of candidates and policies that can be cobbled together to guarantee an electoral majority (Sharman 1977, 22).

Proportional representation in Tasmania, termed the Hare-Clark system, is embodied in the Electoral Act of 1907. In the drafting of the Act the Hare quota was abandoned and the Droop quota (named after Henry Droop) inserted; the name Hare-Clark to describe the rules embodied in the Electoral Act 1907 is a misnomer (Green 1956, 76., Newman 1992, 2).

The Hare-Clark system can be defined as:

A refinement of the system of proportional representation, involving the single transferable vote, whereby the surplus votes of any successful candidate are transferred to the as yet unelected candidates in such a way that each unelected candidate marked as the voter's next preference on the successful candidate's papers receives a proportionate share of the surplus (The Penguin Macquarie Dictionary of Australian Politics 1988, 163).

Tasmania therefore has a preferential system of a single transferable vote in multi-member electorates (Newman 1992, 43). Under the Electoral Act a candidate, in any

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of the five Tasmanian electorates, is elected upon obtaining a quota of votes. The magnitude of the district or electorate (the number of seats assigned to it), is currently seven. The quota is ascertained by the following (Droop) formula:

\[
\text{Number of Valid Ballot Papers} + 1 = \text{Quota}
\]

Therefore, by dividing eight into the number of ballot papers plus 1 vote, sets a target for each candidate of 12.5% of the vote before that candidate can be elected. Papadakis and Bean (1995) discuss the futility of attempting to design a perfectly 'fair' electoral system. The problem is to balance the values of such principles as formal egalitarianism on the one hand and policy making and stability on the other. They also comment on the tendency of major parties to engage in extensive manipulation of boundaries and electoral laws because they have a vested interest in the rules (or changes to them) to either secure or enhance their current position. One Electoral Commissioner concluded:

The rules of the game do matter. Some of the more basic rules, such as those determining how electoral boundaries are drawn or how voters' preferences are counted, can have an immediate and substantial impact on outcomes: who wins and by how much (Hughes 1990, 154).

Any candidate who receives a number of votes equal to or exceeding the quota is declared elected. Any surplus votes are transferred in a proportionate value and distributed in order of the voter's preferences until the next candidate receives a quota and is elected. The higher the number of seats assigned to a district the lower the threshold at which parties first win their seats (and vice versa). With Hare-Clark in place proportional representation is relatively pure, with relatively lower entry costs for smaller parties – although the magnitude will have an effect (Rae 1971, 19 - 21).

The system does not today incorporate by-elections to fill casual vacancies arising from the death or resignation of an elected member. Instead, the ballot papers that had elected the vacating member (as was the case with the resignation of Sanders)
are recounted. Mackerras (1995, 172) regards the theory behind this procedure as wholly democratic, for the voters who elected the vacating member are asked who they wish to replace the member with. It also saves the expense of a by-election of the whole electorate to replace a candidate who needed only 12.5 percent of the vote to be elected.

The significance of the Hare-Clark system, which never delivers large majorities to the parties, becomes apparent where election results are compared with the results that could occur with a majoritarian system in Tasmania (Hawkey 1993). In the 1989 elections, the Greens would have won two seats (instead of five), while in the 1992 election they would have gained only one seat in the Division of Denison (instead of one in each electorate). The results for Labor in 1992 would have been just as starkly contrasted: Labor would have returned with only five seats in two divisions instead of the eleven seats it managed to retain (Hawkey 1993, 27).

That the magnitude of an electoral district will vary the percentage of votes necessary to reach a quota has not been lost on the Tasmanian parties. Until changes to the Constitution Act in 1958, each electorate returned only six members; since the election in May 1959, seven members per division have been returned, requiring a lower percentage of votes (Newman 1992, 92). Having to obtain just over twelve percent of the vote makes it easier for a minority party to get at least one seat and, given the configuration of the main parties, obtain the balance of power. Such a situation would not have perturbed the originator of the system, Andrew Clark, who shared Bagehot's view that one of the key roles played by parliament was that of electoral college. Clark desired diversity of opinion, for he felt that it was in parliament that the community would make up its collective mind (Herr 1995, 183).

But Clark's views were superseded by the emergence of strong political parties and a change in public opinion whereby the Tasmanian community came to see elections more as a public referendum. By such a referendum, through an election, a single party was expected to be chosen to occupy the treasury benches. With such a rationale, minor parties and independent members came to be seen more as an irritant to the body politic than as a vibrant expression of community diversity. This problem is not new: the first Earle Labor Government relied on the support of a
maverick, while the Liberal Bethune Government of 1969 relied on Kevin Lyons of the Centre Party (Newman 1994, 97). The frustration that the main parties feel is summed up by previous Labor Premier Michael Field:

I don’t object to minority groups having power, having members in Parliament. What I do object to is that government is blackmailed by a combination of opposition and the minority party using the balance as a bargaining chip to put a gun to the head of the government. Therefore it causes instability and it is more difficult now without the same polarisation of politics that there has been in terms of the two [established] parties (Field 1997a).

This frustration led the Labor Party in 1991 to discuss a proposal to reduce the size of the Tasmanian Parliament by reducing the House of Assembly from 35 to 25 members and the Legislative Council from 19 to 13 members. The cabinet paper put forward by the then Premier Field admitted this proposal would weaken the Hare-Clark electoral system by increasing the quota needed to 16.7 percent*. Although not spelt out in the cabinet submission, one of the main reasons for proposing it was to attempt to make it more difficult for minor parties to be elected. This was obliquely referred to under the heading of ‘public impact’.

As the likely effect of any reduction in the size of the House of Assembly is that one or more Green Independents would lose his/her seat they are also likely to be hostile to this proposal. Ironically, this may make the proposal acceptable to the Legislative Council (1991 Cabinet Submission No 104, 9).

The smaller parties have had varying success under this system. The first environmentalist party, the United Tasmania Group (UTG), in the election of 1972 did not pass the threshold when it recorded 3.9 percent of the State primary vote, although in Denison it recorded 9.6 percent. It was not until 1980 in the Denison by-

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* In 1995 Field again attempted to change the system with the introduction of the Parliamentary Reform Referendum Bill. This Bill would have allowed a referendum on whether there should be 25 members of the House of Assembly. But parliament was prorogued before it was debated.
election that a Democrat, Norm Sanders, took a seat in parliament. By 1982 Sanders and Independent candidate Brown obtained a total of 18.9 percent of the vote, which allowed Sanders to be elected with a full quota of votes. Since that date the number of candidates who can be described as postmaterialist, or green, has steadily expanded. Clearly the Tasmanian electoral threshold could be reached. Equally importantly, it demonstrated to potential voters that their vote would have an effect by electing their chosen candidate.

Success is believed to affect both the party and the individual elector. As one minor-party campaigner wrote:

The Greens owe a substantial part of their electoral success to the unique combination of Tasmania's natural assets, geography and isolation, plus the sheer good luck that, at the time of Federation, a couple of Irishmen were charged with the responsibility of devising the state's political structures and voting system. The result was the fair but complicated, typically Irish, Hare-Clark electoral system. Tasmania is the only state with such a system, so the Greens' success is unlikely to be repeated on the mainland, where state electoral systems inherently favour major parties (Harries 1990, 16).

Down's rational voter model (1957) is relevant here for, under the Hare-Clark system, a candidate can be elected without having to gain over 50 percent of the vote. Riker's belief (1986) that Britain and Canada have sophisticated voting may also be true of Tasmania. Here electors recognise that just over 12 percent of the total valid vote can elect their candidate, which makes them more likely to vote for a minor party or independent candidate than if the electoral system were different (like those on the mainland). A review of voting statistics in polling booths for both State and Federal elections confirms this possibility (Senate results have not been considered because I have sought to compare a multi-member system with a majoritarian system). Electoral returns from the electorate of Bass can be used as an example. In the 1992 State Election, 19.1 percent of voters at Trevallyn polling booths gave their first preference vote to the Greens. The next year in the Federal election only 10.6 percent gave their first preference to the Green candidate. Similarly, in the booth of West Launceston, the proportion of first preference votes

Even if the Green and Democrat first preferences are combined there is still a significant decrease. This phenomenon is not confined to Bass: it is consistent across nearly all polling booths in all electorates. The electors are clearly making the distinction between the way in which the two electoral systems operate. In the Federal elections many voters recognise that their influence is negligible, because a candidate must win a majority of votes to be elected and that this system operates to the disadvantage of the minor parties. In the State elections, the minor parties have a greater possibility of being elected.

In the absence of any new conflicting ideologies Hare-Clark permitted some diversity within the ALP to exist without excessive tension. For example, the relative tolerance between factions was one of the reasons that the Tasmanian ALP avoided the damaging split of the 1950s' that was disastrous for its mainland counterparts. Because the system provided for multi-member electorates, battles for pre-selection never reached mainland intensity (Herr 1995, 187). Indeed it can be argued that the Hare-Clark system provided fertile ground for the new political parties to emerge because it encouraged the established parties to minimise ideology and focus on short-term issues. "This process can best be described as the politics of brokerage. This implies that state-wide and long-term policies are subordinate to the immediate political needs of this region or that industry "(Sharman 1977, 22).

The accuracy of Duverger's (1963) hypothesis, that proportional representation systems favour multipartyism, could not be tested in a Tasmanian context until the rise of the postmaterialists*. Previously the wishes and ideology of Tasmanians were served by the brokerage-style of politics of the two main parties, typified by pragmatism (O'Connell 1981, 61). When the needs of the electorate were no longer being served proportional representation, in the form of the uniquely Tasmanian

* Duverger's hypothesis probably could not have been tested prior to this time with other minor parties for they were ideologically close to the major parties.
Hare-Clark system, allowed (that is, it was not a disincentive) new parties with different ideologies to rise. It allowed Democrat, Norm Sanders, to challenge the underlying beliefs of the established parties and lead the way for the election of more minor-party members.

**Tasmania's system and multipartyism**

Duverger's (1963) hypothesis is particularly relevant to the Tasmanian context. But does Tasmania have a multiparty or two-party system of government? Sartori (1986) does not believe a two-party system is defined solely by its format (the sheer number of parties). Instead:

A two-party system may be characterised by three traits: (1) over time two parties recurrently and largely out distance all the others, in such a way that (2) each of them is in a position to compete for the absolute majority of seats and may thus reasonably expect to alternate in power, and (3) each of them governs, when in government, alone (Sartori 1986, 57).

The federal Australian government does not come within this definition, because the National party is in permanent coalition with the Liberal Party. Federal Australia, with its single-member district preferential system, is less like a two-party system than Tasmania.

An 'index of bipartyism' developed by Wright (1986, 133) and Sharman (1990) highlights Tasmania's position. The index moves from 100 for a State Parliament with a monopoly of only two parties to 0 if it has many party groups. Tasmania's index figure is 91.4 "confirming that Tasmania's electoral politics has been consistently a choice between two parties" (Sharman 1990, 91). A later analysis gave confirmation:

The Tasmanian party system appears to be characterised by the existence of a dominant party and a subordinate one, these two parties accounting for over 90 percent of the first preference vote (from 1946-1989).
The Election of 1982 marked a reversal of roles between the ALP and the LP as a result of a major realignment of political support, but a similar system of dominant/subordinate parties has continued (Sharman, Smith and Moon 1991, 417-418).

Such a system seems at odds with Duverger's original hypothesis that "The single majority system with second ballot and proportional representation favour multipartyism" (Duverger 1963, 239). However, he later modified his hypothesis to emphasise that it was not invariable. He stated that; "Each states merely that a particular electoral system 'tends' to lead to a particular party system, thus emphasising that the former does not necessarily produce the latter" (Duverger 1986, 70).

In a Tasmanian context Sartori is correct when he placed Duverger's propositions in terms of 'tendency laws' that are not necessarily disconcerted by exceptions; that "PR formulas facilitate multipartyism and are, conversely, hardly conducive to two-partyism" (Sartori 1986, 64). On this basis Hare-Clark in Tasmania does not act as a brake to the formation of new parties, but equally is not a determinant. Other factors, either social or cultural, explain why the two-party system held sway for so long and then triggered the formation of another party, which was free to grow with few institutional constraints. The Hare-Clark system made multipartyism more achievable than other systems, but it was not the only reason for the rise of other parties – the social and environmental factors unique to Tasmania combined to allow their formation and electoral success.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has examined the broad types of the Tasmanian parties and shown their similarity to other parties in industrialised democracies, particularly England. The Liberal party, in its early days, was the creature of the propertied middle-class who felt little need for involvement in the day-to-day political process. Leadership remained of importance as did the independence of the parliamentary wing and the finances still retain their links with business. For its part, the ALP shows its mass party characteristics with union assistance in its formation, broad based fees and the ethos of the parliamentary member being a delegate of the broader membership.
Like its British counterpart, it also shows a rigidity of structure that is partly a factor of its age.

As with parties elsewhere, their structure is constantly changing as a result of changes to society, new ideologies and new political parties. The combination of a distinct Tasmanian attitude, arising from isolation and a weak economy, the power of the institution of the Hydro-electric Commission, and moderate, rigid and insular established parties meant that by the mid 1970s, change was inevitable and for the Labor party painful.

This was the Tasmanian political scene before it was challenged by new politics and an ideology foreign to the old power brokers. The Labor Party was attempting to adjust structurally but was unprepared to deal with an ideological challenge. With the election of an environmentalist, the scene was set for decades of upheaval; every issue that arose in the next three decades can be seen as part of the dynamic of an established party responding to the ideological challenge of new politics. The next chapter will place these struggles in an historical context as it details the emergence of postmaterialism and the challenge of the Greens.
CHAPTER 5

EMERGENCE OF POSTMATERIALISM AND A NEW IDEOLOGY IN TASMANIA

Introduction
Chapter three described the generation of new movements in Western Europe – anti-nuclear, anti-war and pro-environment. Inglehart (1971) showed that the cultural goals of the young and educated were shifting; economic policies had lost support and the new issues had coalesced into a new political agenda. Countries such as Germany and France experienced a transition to issue-based politics. Just as the structure of the established Tasmanian parties echoed global trends, Tasmania as a microcosm of Europe, also experienced changes in society with the emergence of postmaterialists and the growth of a clear ecocentric ideology. The issues previously raised in a European context have a clear and remarkably similar resonance in Tasmania; although the established parties were not aware of it, Tasmania had joined a global phenomenon.

To understand the rise of the Greens as a political force in Tasmania it is first necessary to understand the dominant paradigm of society at that time. Tasmania, unlike other States, was more intensely devoted to the concept of industrialisation through continued development of hydro-electric power. It also had a greater proportion of wilderness areas than other States. This chapter traces, through a series of divisive environmental disputes, the growth of postmaterialism, environmentalism, a clear ecocentric ideology and a viable political alternative in the form of green politics. In doing so it mirrors clearly, but with regional variations, the events in Europe.

The attitude of the established political parties and how this contributed to the rise of the Greens as a political force is also considered. The environmental crises and debates that raged in the community caused unresolvable tensions within the Labor Party, to such a degree that it lost Government in its own right and alienated a significant part of its electoral base. The Labor Party could respond to the challenge
by either attempting to capture and incorporate this new movement and ideology, or by fighting it. This chapter shows Labor’s vacillation as it tries to choose its response, and ends with the party’s loss of government after its failed attempt to cooperate with the Greens, in a minority government.

This chapter analyses both the concept of wilderness as sacred and the charismatic nature of the environmental movement and its leader Dr Bob Brown; particularly during the debate over the Franklin River. The environmental debates encompassing the elections of 1982, 1986, 1989 and 1992 are considered from the aspect of how they affected the Labor Party and the internal tensions they engendered.

Environmental issues were central to all these elections, which gave greater impetus to environmental and Green candidates. The signing of the 1989 Parliamentary Accord with the Greens became a catalyst for upheaval within the Labor Party and a searching for a real understanding of the Green phenomenon.

This chapter’s significance lies in its explanation of how the Greens became a political force both in the community and in Parliament. It also shows that the attitude and structure of the established parties, and of the Labor Party in particular, helped make this process inevitable. By the 1989 election a clear alternative, in the form of the Greens had emerged to challenge the anthropocentric, pro-development parties.

**Lake Pedder – the first conflict**

The South West area of Tasmania, almost a quarter of the State, is now largely World Heritage Area, but in the 1960s’ it was vacant Crown land. In the early 1950s’ the Hobart Walking Club suggested that Lake Pedder, in the very centre of the South West, be declared a national park. Although the lake was considered by many to be of great scenic significance, the Government merely established a scenic reserve of 24,000 hectares in March 1955. Despite numerous submissions by a small lobby group of conservationists (called the South West Committee), that the area be declared a national park, the Labor Government of the day ignored them.

In 1963 the Tasmanian Government received £2.5 million to build a road from Maydena to the Middle Gordon River. Construction began in January 1964. Clearly
the road would intrude catastrophically into the wilderness area, and would almost certainly encourage HEC development. Despite conservationists' concerns the Government, and its Premier Eric Reece, refused to give details of the proposals. Faced with such government intransigence a more militant conservation group, the Save Lake Pedder Committee, was formed in 1967 and a battle became inevitable.

Both Eckersley (1989) and Andersen (1990b) refer to the need for a causal link between postmaterialists, environmental movements and party formation; in Tasmania this was Lake Pedder. Lake Pedder's significance is on two levels: for the first time it identified a sector of the community as postmaterialists with non-class-specific demands, promulgating the intrinsic value of life and environmental quality; equally important it led to the formation of a social movement and then to Tasmania's first Green Party, which formed the core of environmental politics.

It was Lake Pedder, Tasmania's first environmental battle, that questioned the comfortable and closed nature of Tasmanian politics - in particular the shared views of the Liberal and Labor parties, the power of the HEC, and the autocratic power of Premier Reece. Lake Pedder signified, for the first time in Tasmania, the rejection by an alternative party of materialism and pro-development views. The Labor Party had become a successful mass party, headed by an authoritarian leader with almost complete autonomy from the party. Reece felt no need to be accommodating to challenges; he had the complete support of the affiliated unions and no one within the parliamentary party to challenge his views of how Tasmania should continue to develop. But Labor, if it had looked to Europe, would have found it had greater affinity with Germany than with Great Britain or Sweden; it was technocratic and anthropocentric with no history of an inclusive political process. As previously shown, Britain and Sweden, through a more open process, were able to incorporate environmental concerns and forestall the successful formation of environmental parties. As in Germany, Tasmanian Labor only hastened their formation.

* For a more detailed description of the events surrounding Lake Pedder see McHenry, K (1974) "A history and critical analysis of the controversy concerning the Gordon River Power Scheme."
In hindsight it is difficult to see how Reece and the Labor Party, either structurally or ideologically, could have made any other decision in relation to Lake Pedder. The controversy does, however, show the dangers of ignoring a small but significant section of the community. Some had been members of the Labor Party, but its structure did not encourage alternative views to be heard. Lake Pedder was to become the focus for postmaterialists who, rejected by an anthropocentric mass party, were forced to seek their own representation.

At a meeting of the HEC’s Power Committee in November 1966, a formal decision was taken to recommend to parliament that Lake Pedder be flooded for the Middle Gordon power development. No details of this decision were made public until the HEC’s *Report on the Gordon River Power Development stage One* was tabled in Parliament in May 1967. However, once the report was tabled, public protest was noisy – but merely confirmed the Premier’s view that many conservationists were opposed to the development and improvement of the Tasmanian economy. In the next month, Reece introduced a Bill to authorise the Gordon River Power Development (Stage 1). When this Bill was passed, five days after its introduction, Reece announced that a $47 million loan for bridging finance had been approved by the Loan Council a year earlier.

There was to be no formal environmental impact statement, but in June the Legislative Council set up a Select Committee to examine the issue of the flooding of Lake Pedder. Late in August 1967 it reported that it saw no satisfactory alternative, and two days later the Gordon River Power Development Bill was passed. Parliament had taken just over two months to authorise the flooding of Lake Pedder. Once the legislation was passed, the campaign to save Lake Pedder, rather than dying down, changed up a gear. The initial protests had given the area publicity; with people being encouraged to visit the area and become active protesters.

Fortuitously for the Hydro supporters a severe drought in 1967 and 1968 led to power rationing. In the 1969 elections, Liberal opposition leader Angus Bethune sought to blame the Labor Party for this rationing. At the same time he put forward, for the first time in a major party, a conservation policy (even though it was to be
firmly based on a human perspective). In the Liberal Party policy speech Bethune said:

Properly managed, scenery and wildlife are renewable resources capable of yielding ‘crops’ of tourist revenue, recreational benefits and game for field sports (Policy Speech Hon W A Bethune May 1969, 15).

By contrast the Labor Party, keen to sell its record of development, offered one paragraph on conservation but ten pages on mining, industrial development and the HEC. As Lowe (1997) commented later: “It just spells it out at that stage, and that’s why the Labor Party was heading for opposition in a significant way, because the Liberal Party itself was more attuned to the influence of these rising single issue pro-conservation groups.” The new Liberal Government elected in 1969 was helped by a platform of conservation policies. These policies heartened many who were beginning to doubt the wisdom of pursuing a policy of unlimited hydro-industrialisation with its attendant disregard for environmental deterioration. This awakening concern for the environment contributed to a dissatisfaction with the Labor Government, which had held office for thirty-five years. In comparing the two parties, people with environmental concerns chose to vote for the Liberal Party, but they were soon to learn that there was little difference in policy.

The Liberal’s election promises about the environment were vague. There was no real intention to put the environment first, and the government was unwilling to be involved in such conflicts. Consequently, it vigorously pursued similar tactics to the previous government. Conservationists as never before earned government disapproval as “ratbags”, “crackpots” and “irresponsibles” (Jones 1972, xi). A third conservation group, the Lake Pedder Action Committee, was formed in 1971 and joined the Australian Conservation Foundation (ACF) in calling for a moratorium on the flooding of the lake. This pressure group was to be the basis of the United Tasmania Group (UTG), which was formed to fight the 1972 State election in an attempt to influence the government to reverse its decision.

By late 1972 the Lake Pedder issue was of national significance, with intense lobbying to the Federal Labor opposition headed by Gough Whitlam. The Federal
party agreed to an independent inquiry if it gained office. When it did so in 1972, it set about honouring that commitment. The Whitlam Government set up the Lake Pedder Committee of Inquiry, which in its interim report in June 1973 (Interim Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the Future of Lake Pedder. June 1973) recommended a moratorium on the flooding of the lake and Commonwealth compensation to Tasmania for modifying of the Middle Gordon power scheme. This would have saved Lake Pedder without affecting the main features of the scheme. The Final Report of the Lake Pedder Committee of Inquiry on the Flooding of Lake Pedder 1974 confirmed and expanded the initial recommendations.

However, Premier Reece rejected the offer, stating that the construction of the scheme would continue. His rejection was not, in B. Davis’s (1980) view, on the basis of economic rationality “but [on] the narrow perceptions of a bureaucratic juggernaut and the obstinacy of a politician whose pride had been hurt” (B. Davis 1980, 162). Although Reece may have been obstinate, he also clearly knew where his support base was and how it would regard the meddling of Canberra – his actions retained working class support throughout this debate.

Despite the outcry over Lake Pedder, in the 1972 election in Tasmania, Labor won with 21 seats. Although the UTG had fielded previous Labor minister and agent general Sir Alfred White, it did not win a seat. Denison Labor candidate John Green, who campaigned against the flooding of the lake, lost his deposit. To Reece the result was a vindication of the technocratic policies of the Labor Party, but the decision to reject the Federal Government’s offer outraged conservationists both within and outside the Labor Party. For the first time, rank and file members of the Labor Party openly questioned the policy of the Parliamentary Labor Party, and in June 1972 State Conference passed a resolution for the moratorium on the flooding of Lake Pedder (R. Davis 1983b, 78). Reece ignored the resolution. He was to remain Premier until 1975 by which time the party had lost a substantial number of members to the UTG largely because they regarded quality of life as important and did not support the dominant ALP ethos of development (Jones 1981, 55).

**United Tasmania Group – the first environmental and postmaterialist party**

The United Tasmania Group Party (UTG) was formed in March 1972 at a public meeting in Hobart. It was the political expression of the Lake Pedder Action
Committee formed the previous year to fight the flooding of Lake Pedder. It was also the first political manifestation of an alternative party with a new paradigm. The Party had a clearly enunciated ideology that was either ignored or misunderstood by the established Tasmanian parties. Like its European counterparts, it questioned economic and industrial growth and highlighted the intrinsic value of nature and wilderness; its message (to those who were interested) would have been understood just as clearly in Germany or France.

The Hare-Clark system posed no obstacle to its formation but it gave a new and small party the chance to acquire sufficient political clout to vary policy if it could obtain a balance of power. The UTG was firmly convinced that it could win enough seats to gain the balance of power (which had been previously held by Centre Party member Kevin Lyons) and therefore influence decisions (Walker 1986, 26). In April 1972, it stated that ‘all candidates have taken the pledge to sit on the cross-benches if elected’ (UTG Extra April 1972, 3).

The parliamentary wings of both the Labor and Liberal parties were firmly of the view that economic growth was essential and that the damming of Lake Pedder must proceed. Both were hostile to any outside criticism. The LPAC and later the UTG soon realised that the older parties were concerned with economic and technical matters to the almost complete exclusion of cultural, environmental and aesthetic considerations. To question what had been such a recipe for electoral success seemed unthinkable in an industrialised society. Many people (Muller-Rommel 1985, Poguntke 1992 and Jahn 1992, 1993) argue that the emergence of the German Greens was primarily because the established parties were unresponsive to the followers of the new social movement. The position in Tasmania was similar.

As the Australian Labor Party had been the original sponsor of, and vehicle for, hydro-industrialisation generally, and the HEC particularly, it was able to take advantage of the formidable electoral asset of being viewed as the ‘natural’ party of hydro-industrialisation hyper development, while the Liberal Party, unable to stand against the entrenched hegemonic faith in hydro-industrialisation, had little option but to adopt the meek and ineffectual stance of ‘me-too’ (Hay 1994, 3).
By the time of the 1972 election the debate had broadened. The UTG was challenging the established political orthodoxy of Tasmanian politics and the policy of 'hydro-industrialisation'. Faced with hostility and opposition from both the Liberal and Labor Parties, the conservationists “had to get outside the established political forms and construct a new movement from scratch” (Lynch 1990, 152). The UTG put forward an extensive policy platform based on a philosophy of ecological concern and humanitarian principles, questioning the concept of unfettered economic growth.

> Our struggle to preserve Lake Pedder pushed us into the political arena. Our values were so threatened that we were forced to seek political power. Along the way, we rapidly gained knowledge about society and the condition of the community which had become hung up on material well-being (UTG Newsletter No.5 1973).

Led by Dr Richard Jones, who organised the political campaign, the UTG fielded 12 candidates in four electorates, but concentrated on the electorates of Denison and Franklin where its main support was. In the 1972 election the results ranged from 0.55 percent in Wilmot (later renamed Lyons) to 9.6 percent of the total vote in Denison. It was a respectable total, but not enough to gain a seat. This was to be the party's best result, even though it went on to contest later State and Federal Elections. The party's strongest period was between 1974 and 1976, but contesting elections during its four years of existence weakened the party.

After 1977 the UTG faded away, unable to give tangible benefits by way of electoral success to its members. With the flooding of Lake Pedder even some foundation members withdrew their support, feeling they would be wasting their vote if they continued to vote for the UTG (Walker 1986, 46).

> Compared with the orchestrated resistance later displayed towards the proposed Gordon below Franklin dam, conservation forces in the Lake Pedder days were uncoordinated, disorganised and ill-prepared to meet the fierce determination
shown by premier “Electric” Eric Reece and his government to press ahead with more hydro schemes in the South West (Bates 1983, 7).

Although in the electoral sense the UTG was not a success, in other areas it was. It had, for the first time in Tasmanian political history, challenged the accepted doctrine of hydro-industrialisation while mobilising previously unpoliticised sections of the community. It was the first political vehicle through which environmental issues, which have dominated Tasmanian politics ever since, were presented to the public. It also provided the initial political socialisation for at least one-third of the conservation activists operating in Tasmania some ten years later (Hinton 1984, 81). When the Tasmanian Wilderness Society was formed in 1976, 19 of the 23 members who attended its inaugural meeting were UTG members (Rainbow 1992, 328). The UTG also served as the base for the formation of the South-West Tasmania Action Committee and ultimately the Wilderness Society, which led the conservationist movement to a new sense of purpose with the Franklin River debate.

Tasmania’s earlier conservationist organisations – walking clubs, naturalist groups and conservation societies – were essentially passive and social rather than proactive and political. They were also essentially conservative, and questioned the radical behaviour of the LPAC. Few activists in the LPAC or UTG came from such groups as the National Trust or Field Naturalists. The two largest conservation groups – the Tasmanian Conservation Trust (TCT) and the Australian Conservation Foundation (ACF) – were not on the whole sympathetic to activists; instead they wanted to be respected and respectable (Jones 1981, 60). The ACF was reluctant, when requested, to publicly support the UTG battle to save Lake Pedder. Richard Jones felt that the UTG should have been the political wing of these groups, but he found ACF councillors were

executives from ICI and top public servants from Victoria and university professors. So the ACF was run by people who were upper middle class, who had feet in other camps, who were very unlikely ever to have an activist view of conservation (Jones 1981, 61).
The Lake Pedder battle and its subsequent loss left conservationists with the view that the members of the ACF and TCT were more concerned with their own political interests than with 'saving' the lake; therefore they were of no value as a mechanism to put conservation views to government. Consequently, the UTG organised a 'coup' in 1973, replacing the ACF executive with five councillors elected from Tasmania. The TCT was to take longer to change, but the Tasmanian Wilderness Society (TWS), established to offer an alternative organisation for conservation members in Tasmania, ultimately gained the ascendancy (Holloway 1986, Walker 1986). If either the ACF or TCT had been a more responsible organisation and the Labor Party a more democratic party, open to another perspective, the growth of the conservation movement through the UTG and later the TWS might have been slower.

**Franklin River debate – a postmaterialist challenge to Labor**

In October 1979 the HEC released its *Report on the Gordon River Power Development Stage Two,* which recommended damming the Gordon River below its junction with the Franklin River. It also referred to the option of damming the Gordon River above the Olga River, which would have saved the Franklin. The 1979 report, although demonstrating bias in favour of its preferred option, for the first time considered alternative sites. This was as a result of a warning by its Minister, Doug Lowe, that parliamentary approval of the Gordon below Franklin was not a foregone conclusion (Lowe 1997). This was not only typical of Lowe's style, in attempting to achieve consensus and open public debate, but also indicates his attitude that the days of unquestioning hydro-electric development were drawing to a close; Tasmania's future development would rely as much on its wilderness environment as it did on attempting to attract developments reliant on cheap power (*For a detailed examination see Lowe 1984*) and was therefore willing to seek alternatives.
The Franklin River Controversy is important for several reasons: it identified clearly, that a significant proportion of the Tasmanian population, like the Europeans, supported environmental issues; it allowed the environmental movement build on the lessons of Lake Pedder: and it led to the development of the first clear ecocentric ideology in Tasmania. The Green continuum, described in chapter three, which ranged from anthropocentric to ecocentric, is clearly evident. Its power was enhanced by having a charismatic leader, Bob Brown. To an extent greater than in Europe, wilderness became almost ‘sacred’ and the focus of Tasmania’s strongly ecocentric ideology. The Franklin consolidated and strengthened environmental politics, which led to the virtual electoral destruction of the Labor Party as a successful mass party.

The Franklin controversy was the first time that the dominant pro-hydro industrialisation dogma and power of the Hydro Electric Commission were effectively challenged. It led to an unprecedented struggle between the ALP and its own bureaucratic creation. A mass party, it was torn apart by the internal struggles of the affiliated unions and some postmaterialist branches. It was during this conflict that the Labor Party experimented, for the first time, with attempts to include postmaterialists and consider a change to the attitudes of development at any cost. The new paradigm that arose found the party unprepared: the attempts at inclusion were halting, divisive and ultimately unsuccessful, for the party at that stage did not fully understand the global changes that were to affect Tasmanian society. The Liberal Party, much more catch-all than Labor, was able to adopt a pragmatic and populist policy under the strong leadership of Robin Gray. If the Legislative Council had accepted the alternatives put forward by Lowe perhaps the damage would have been less, but the council’s make-up (being pro-HEC and conservative) made that unlikely. The ensuing brawl showed electors a split mass party, so they looked elsewhere: the materialists to the Liberals and the postmaterialists to the Greens.

* The Franklin River controversy and the events surrounding is one of the best known conservation battles in Australian history with several authors describing it in detail. Much of this section is based on the following; Thompson (1981), Bates (1983), and Lowe (1984). A summary of events can be found with Simpson and Crawford (1983).
The release of the 1979 HEC report created a storm of outrage by conservationists, and for the first time also the government of the day refused to accept the HEC's option immediately. Instead a coordination committee, headed by the Director of Energy, was created to receive public comment on the report. When the Liberal Party refused to be part of a Joint House Parliamentary Select Committee to evaluate the report, the role of the committee was extended to advise the government on which option it should accept. At the end of May 1980, the committee recommended the Gordon above Olga scheme (which was not the HEC's preferred option) and the incorporation of the Franklin into a Wild Rivers National Park.

In Cabinet meetings between the 8 and 10 July 1980 the options came down to either the Gordon below Franklin or the Gordon above Olga. In his recollections of the Cabinet meeting, Lowe does not say which option he preferred, although he does intimate that he preferred the Gordon above Olga scheme (Lowe 1984, 118-9). Later Lowe (1997) said that at no stage did he deliver a presentation for the Gordon below Franklin but moved for the Gordon above Olga scheme to be the preferred option. However Field (1997a) claims that Lowe had supported the Franklin option at an Institute of Engineers meeting the evening before Cabinet at which Field's father-in-law was present. Harry Holgate (1996), who was also in Cabinet, claims that Lowe moved and voted for the HEC's preferred option, supported by Cabinet members Brian Miller and Darrell Baldock. Only after Lowe was defeated did he adopt the Gordon above Olga Scheme, voting for it at the Parliamentary Labor Party meeting on 11 July. At that meeting six members of the party voted against the Olga proposal, feeling that it was a mistake to shift away from the traditional emphasis of the HEC setting the power schemes (Holgate 1996).

Lowe's attempted compromise to adopt the HEC's alternative scheme of the Gordon above Olga pleased no one. The conservationists were opposed to any scheme that would intrude into wilderness areas (Thompson 1981, 142) and the HEC had, for the first time, had its recommendations ignored (Lowe 1984, 89). Members of the PLP also began to question Lowe's leadership abilities and his loyalties to individual members. The Liberal Party, in contrast, was able to seize the initiative and declare
itself in favour of the Gordon below Franklin scheme, positioning itself to win crucial traditional Labor votes from the West Coast and blue-collar workers.

Throughout the entire proceedings the HEC lobbied the Legislative Council and put pressure on individual members of the Labor Party. Russel Ashton, for example, personally lobbied the then Minister for Main Roads, Michael Field, to vote for the Gordon below Franklin option (Conversation with Michael Field 30 May 1994).

However, in November 1980, the Gordon above Olga Bill passed the House of Assembly and was sent to the Legislative Council (which never as a whole had to answer for its decisions at the ballot box). The council delayed the Bill until its own Select Committee brought down a ‘progress report’ in December 1980 that favoured the HEC option. The Legislative Council then caused a parliamentary deadlock by amending the bill to read ‘Gordon below Franklin’ instead of ‘Gordon above Olga’ and recommending an immediate start on the project (Simpson and Crawford 1983).

The pressures on Labor began to increase once it became apparent that Lowe’s compromise position was not acceptable. The conflict created, for the first time, open divisions within the party. Traditional members identified the success of the party with an acceptance of hydro-industrialisation, while new members, many of whom were public sector employees, believed that new policies were necessary to adapt to the changes in society.

The dilemma for the party was that the vast majority of its union base, such as the Electrical Trades Union and the Australian Workers Union, had close links with the HEC. Motivated by their desire to maintain the existing pattern of employment and membership, these unions were firmly of the view that the Franklin proposal as directed by the HEC was the appropriate one; not to proceed was an attack on the workers and their jobs. The Federal president of the Federated Engine Drivers and Firemen's Association and a hydro-worker, Kelvin McCoy, was quoted as saying, when he promised to work against Labor unless it changed its position on the dam; “... and don't any of you trendy democratic socialists dare call us traitors.” To McCoy the parliamentarians “... are the bloody traitors – they are the ones who pandered to the demands of the affluent middle class ministers” (R. Davis 1983b,
Inexplicably these unions opposed the Gordon above Olga development, even though it would have provided equal employment. Only one major construction union, the Amalgamated Metal Workers and Shipwrights Union, consistently opposed the Franklin project because it doubted the potential for employment to flow from the project (Tighe & Taplin 1985, 350-1).

While the members were being pressured, the HEC, through the Hydro Employees Action Team (HEAT) formed in 1980, used its union affiliations to bring the machine wing into the contest. The power of the HEC becomes apparent, for this group first approached the HEC Commissioner before it began its campaign. No Commonwealth or State Government had ever previously tolerated a political lobby group by public servants (Thompson 1981, 94). Lowe believes that the formation of HEAT was a calculated move by those in authority within the HEC, particularly within the engineering division, to work to reverse the Government’s policy. He clearly recollects Ashton’s attitude;

> He [Ashton] spelt out to me right from the beginning, under the power and authority vested in him through the Hydro Electric Commission Act he believed that he was entitled to press quite independently of Government to get the Hydro’s way (Lowe 1997).

Lowe was even at one stage forced, after watching its spokesman Brian Hoyle publicly attack the Government on television, to complain to the HEC commissioner, which resulted in an apology and modification of Hoyle’s comments (Lowe 1984, 142-3).

Not only HEAT epitomised the tensions within Labor: another pro-HEC group was formed, calling itself the Association of Consumers of Electricity (ACE), of which Eric Reece and his old deputy Roy Fagan became members. That these members would publicly criticise and campaign against their own party on this issue was indicative of a party under siege from within. The pressures upon members is further illustrated by Lowe’s opinion that one of his members, Bill McKinnon, was directly informing HEAT of PLP discussions while at the same time Andrew
Lohrey, Minister the Minister for Parks and Wildlife, was passing on department submissions to the Wilderness Society.

I mean, it got to the point where you literally could not engage the Parliamentary Labor Party with a confidence without it leaking to that element. If it did leak to the Wilderness Society they at least kept it to themselves. That wasn't the case with HEAT, they used it then as part of the undermining process (Lowe 1997).

During this time a group of businessmen commissioned an independent report by energy consultant Shann Turnbull. In his report, released in 1981, Turnbull attacked the Gordon below Franklin scheme as being both economically and environmentally disastrous to Tasmania. Lohrey's support of this report led to his resignation from Cabinet (Bates 1983,11) after he was given the option of either publicly retracting his statement or resigning (Lowe 1984, 154). In a letter to the ALP State Secretary, explaining the resignation, his views on the justice of the demand were obvious:

The phrase 'government solidarity' was used continually in the press. Under the Westminster system there is no such convention. Party solidarity is another matter and undoubtedly necessary for the general good of the party. However, there are times when, if the demand for party unity is pushed too far, undemocratic and authoritarian situations will develop. This is particularly the case in the controversial power debate where a reasonable tolerance of differing views is essential if Tasmanians are to arrive at an informed decision (Lohrey. letter to secretary ALP. 20 October 1981).

Throughout 1981 pressures continued to build in the Labor Party. Political survival became a priority when many longstanding members of the party, many with HEC connections, resigned from the party. By July 1981 the State Council, although stopping short of rejecting the Gordon above Olga scheme, called for a referendum on the issue. In September the PLP narrowly voted (12:10) to continue to press for the Gordon above Olga scheme and to have a referendum. To this day there remains contention about the referendum. Lowe maintains that he would have supported a 'no dams' option but was overruled by Caucus (Lowe 1884, 152), while Field
(1997a) maintains that Lowe spoke in the Party room against a ‘no dams’ option being included. But time ran out for Lowe when he lost the leadership to Harry Holgate on 11 November 1981. Deputy Premier to both Lowe and Holgate, Michael Barnard, while claiming that he had the votes necessary to become Premier, was convinced that Labor could not win the next election and that, “It was going to be a short-lived reign. I didn’t want to lead the party to an inglorious defeat” (Conversation with Michael Barnard, 22 January 1997).

To many who voted against Lowe the issue was his vacillation and lack of leadership as much as the power debate. At one stage he had seemed to favour the HEC plan only to support the Olga scheme; he opposed and then promoted a referendum proposal, and then reneged on the inclusion of a ‘no dams’ option. (Bennett 1983, 87). His then deputy Barnard describes Lowe as “shifting ground every day – it got to the stage of being absolutely embarrassing” (Conversation with Michael Barnard, 22 January 1997), while his challenger Harry Holgate said:

Let’s say that, conservatively, that when you have the Premier of that day over that period changing his mind and vacillating backwards and forwards, and backwards and forwards, it’s no surprise that we got ourselves in such a bloody deep mess, and deep conflict over the issue, because we had no leadership (Holgate 1996).

This somewhat harsh judgement is perhaps best placed in context by Lowe’s own assessment:

The major deficiency in my handling of those issues was my own inexperience. The problem was that I was elected to Parliament at twenty-nine and was Premier at thirty-five. I had been less than ten years in the Parliament when I was dealing with the most complex issue that any Premier had had to deal with in probably the twentieth century. In relation to the conflict that I had with the Legislative Council, within my own party, particularly within my own bureaucracy, I must confess I simply didn’t have the wisdom and the experience to be able to pull it through (Lowe 1997).
When Lowe was defeated, he resigned from the party and, followed by the Labor Whip Mary Willey, sat on the cross-bench. In Willey’s explanation to parliament as to why she resigned from the party, she paints a different view of events but also confirms the process of the collapse of the party:

The present Premier and his friends hounded the former Premier, Doug Lowe, out of office . . . aided and abetted by some members of the Government and dominated by an extreme element of the Tasmanian union movement.

For two years I have witnessed the disintegration of the once great Labor Party in Tasmania. I have tried unsuccessfully to convince senior Federal and State members of the party to fully involve themselves in what was happening. Federal intervention has been called for, but nothing has stopped the rot (Mercury 18 November 1981).

Holgate prorogued parliament and continued with the referendum but refused to have a ‘no dams’ option. The referendum returned 47 percent in favour of the Franklin River scheme while only 8 percent favoured the Gordon above Olga option. But the result that exposed the deep community concerns was the 33.25 percent who wrote ‘no dams’ on their ballot paper (Newman 1984, 33). The referendum results show clearly the extent of community polarisation. For most Tasmanians it was impossible to be neutral on the question:

[the] referendum results provide the hardest possible evidence of the extent to which environmentalists sympathy (though not necessarily explicit environmentalist values), coalescing around this catalytic issue, has penetrated the Tasmanian electorate (Hay and Haward 1988, 443).

Lowe (1997) had privately told Holgate on the day Lowe was removed as leader that he would continue to give the Government full support as long as it did not reverse the policy on the Gordon above Olga. Holgate never thought that Lowe and Willey would vote for the no-confidence motion, instead hoping to last until the Federal election and negotiate with a new Labor government for compensation (Holgate 1996). In January 1982 the Tasmanian Labor Party officially changed its stance to
support the flooding of the Franklin, causing Australian Democrat Sanders to promise he would move a no-confidence motion as soon as possible on the resumption of parliament on 26 March. When parliament resumed, the Labor Government was defeated in a no-confidence motion moved by Sanders and supported by Lowe and Willey.

The prorogation of parliament and the January 1982 change of stance by the ALP to one of support for the flooding of the Franklin was not enough for it to recover from the electoral damage it had suffered. The election in May 1982 saw the Party without a firm stance, claiming it was pro-dam, yet at the same time allowing anti-dam candidates to say they would seek to change the party’s view if elected. The tactic gave mixed messages to the electorate. The electorate of Bass had the former Premier Holgate, who was pro-dam, on the same ticket as another candidate, Peter Patmore, who had highlighted his membership of the Wilderness Society and promised to move for a reconsideration of the dam issue if elected.

The results were disastrous for Labor. It gained only 14 seats, with a State-wide vote of 36.9 percent, the lowest since 1931. One observer (Kellow 1983, 263) interpreted this result as a malfunction in the process of government in Tasmania. In contrast, the Liberal Party under the leadership of Robin Gray, a firm supporter of the HEC, gaining 19 seats. Both Sanders and Lowe were returned. Continuing environmental debate was to keep the Labor Party in opposition and to prove wrong the prediction of one commentator who said: “The ALP in Tasmania has apparently reached a nadir . . . where proportional representation will prevent its relative numbers from declining further” (Herr 1984, 13).

In June of 1982 the Gordon below Franklin legislation passed the House of Assembly with only Lowe and Sanders opposed. But in April 1981 Lowe had proclaimed a Wild Rivers National Park, which contained the Franklin, and nominated the area for World Heritage listing; the battle thus entered the federal sphere. The conservation movement had placed considerable pressure on the Liberal Federal Government, led by Malcom Fraser who opposed the flooding of the Franklin but refused to become involved on the basis of state rights. This reticence did not, however, stop him from forwarding to the World Heritage Committee a
nomination to place South West Tasmania on the Register of World Heritage Properties, where it was to remain despite requests by the Liberal Premier Gray (Bates 1983, 4).

As part of the strategy to put pressure on the federal parties, the Wilderness Society began a blockade of the Franklin River in December 1982. With a federal election soon to be called, Fraser offered Premier Gray 500 million dollars in compensation to save the Franklin but, just as Reece had refused to accept money to save Lake Pedder, Gray refused this offer. The federal Labor Party had already, in July 1982, voted to save the Franklin, so in the February 1983 election, conservation groups supported the Labor Party. Once in power, the new Prime Minister Bob Hawke, after attempting unsuccessfully to negotiate with Gray, introduced regulations under the *Commonwealth National Parks and Wildlife Conservation Act* to protect the World Heritage Area. After a High Court challenge by the Tasmanian government was unsuccessful, plans to flood the Franklin River came to a halt, leaving Gray at a later stage having to accept $350 million dollars in compensation.

**The rise of the Greens**

The Franklin River dispute was significant to the conservationist movement on several levels: it led to the formation of a highly successful social movement, the Tasmanian Wilderness society (TWS); it promoted Bob Brown as the charismatic leader of the conservation movement; and it heralded, for the first time, the success of postmaterialists and the establishment of a base for the New Politics. Through skilful manipulation of images in the media, the TWS challenged the whole concept and paradigm of Tasmanian society, providing the basis for the formation of a highly individual wilderness-based ecocentric philosophy for Green members of parliament.

In the aftermath of Lake Pedder concerns had continued about the future of the South West. The South West Tasmanian Action Committee (SWTAC) was formed in 1974 to fill the need for an organisation with an ecocentric approach, focussing on the intrinsic values of the South West wilderness. But its approach was soon seen by the media as non-representative. Consequently, in 1976, the Tasmanian Wilderness
Society (TWS) was formed as a more publicly acceptable face of the conservation movement as it would present a less radical perspective:

one with a conservative, ‘up-market’ facade which retained South West Tasmania Action Committee’s radical policies (such as biocentrism, claims for the whole of the South West as a National Park, and ecological boundaries for National Parks) (Holloway 1986, 5).

The founding meeting of the TWS was largely attended by old UTG members (Easthope and Holloway 1989,191) which had failed as a political organisation. The TWS was set up to be a social movement by way of transition rather than a complete new start. Its first director, Kevin Kiernan, was also past secretary of LPAC and chairman of SWTAC (Holloway 1986, 2). The founding members had the experience to orchestrate the political campaign that became necessary in 1979 with the announcement of the HEC plans for the Franklin River.

The members knew that they had the skill and experience to run a campaign that would gain considerable public attention, but they also knew that they required a crisis and a general value that would unite the disparate conservation groups. The value they were to promote was that of ‘wilderness’, and the crisis was to be the damming of the Franklin (Easthope and Holloway 1989, 192). The Tasmanian Wilderness Society, recognising the need for funds and members to pursue this goal, began a membership drive. With the membership augmented from Melbourne and Sydney, Tasmanian Wilderness Society membership rose from 2000 in July 1980 to 5700 by the end of 1982 (Bates 1983, 8). With additional funding, the Tasmanian Wilderness Society was able to sponsor rallies and advertising material. This led to film producers making documentaries, which in turn increased donations.

Wilderness as sacred

From the outset, the TWS’s aim was to create an awareness of wilderness by using the media, and particularly when referring to its intrinsic value, by using imagery that would motivate people to help the campaign. Because of the difficulty in articulating the intrinsic aspects of wilderness in an anthropocentric culture, the TWS focussed on the spiritual nature of the wilderness and the Franklin River in
particular as an icon. The TWS “through accident, previous experience or design, stumbled upon the use of the sacred as a means of criticising society.” This “provided a baseline from which it could criticise and attack the HEC” (Easthope and Holloway 1989, 195). The strength of feeling was such that for some TWS members it “reached the proportions of prosecuting a holy war: saving Tasmanians from dams, bureaucracy and even from themselves” (Thompson 1984, 109). The campaign from the outset had an evangelical feel to it, with those who would defile the Franklin almost guilty of sacrilege. The Tasmanian Council of Churches held that the natural world was God’s creation, declaring the HEC’s plans as “profoundly sinful . . . amounting to an attack against the natural world, and so against God who is creator” (Tasmanian Council of Churches, Church and Society Commission as quoted in Tighe and Taplin, 1985, 353).

Some commentators (Easthope and Holloway 1989) believe that the Tasmanian Wilderness Society, and through them the Green members of parliament, have attempted to place a transcendent value on parts of the wilderness, elevating it to the level of ‘sacred’, thereby mobilising its committed followers. Hay (1992, 91) states that the “quasi-messianic nature of the movement has made the mobilisation of masses of supporters comparatively easy”. Ironically this reverent mystification of nature by seeking to preserve it in order to acknowledge humankind’s ‘oneness’ with it, not only made converts to the cause, but also led some authors (Bookchin 1987, Pepper 1993) to suggest such worship actually places humanity far apart from it.

It is this strength of ideology with its almost religious strand in the Green movement that provides a moral righteousness even when carrying out actions “against the wishes of those it is trying to save” (Jupp 1968, 31). North (1995), a long-time environment correspondent of The Independent and The Sunday Times, regards ecologism as a faith, with some environmental groups like Greenpeace cast as the crusaders and the industrialist cast as the infidel. He quotes Bill Lee, a sociologist at the University of Washington, who in an American context believes that anti-logging campaigners feel no need to compromise in their defence of the spotted owl because they are activists of the green religion of suburban America, in which the purity of wilderness is sacred. Callick (Australian Financial Review 30 March 1990) echoed these sentiments, comparing environmentalists to religious
fundamentalists, with Bob Brown, David Suzuki and Paul Ehrlich comprising a priesthood “keenly evangelical, seeking to press its views on society as a whole.”

Through the medium of film and television, the TWS sought to control the images with films such as *The Last Wild River*, *The Franklin: Wild River* and *Franklin River Journey* and television documentaries such as *Voices of the Rivers* and *South-West Tasmania: A Wilderness in Question*, as well as numerous books and pictorials. The sacred images of the wilderness relied almost exclusively on such visual media to present the ‘message’ to the thousands of Australians who would never directly experience the wilderness or raft the Franklin. These Australians wished to be vicariously part of such nature, and some would be either untouched or disinclined to read the arguments for the preservation of wilderness in their technical form. The journalist, Peter Thompson, did not underestimate such power:

Films played a decisive role in shaping the public mind on the rivers issue. The arguments of the pro-development lobby could never match the grandeur of the wild river. The actions and aesthetics of the wilderness films were the stuff of visual entertainment. As any television executive would admit, it is not a word account which is effective, it is moving images. Arguments and counter-arguments, economic forecasts and statistics, energy scenarios and projections all become a relative sideshow to the dominating role of the film (Thompson 1981a, 102).

**Bob Brown and charisma**

The conservation movement also required a public figure to lead the campaign: this person was to be Bob Brown. In 1979 a journalist and Australian Conservation Foundation officer, Peter Thompson, came to Tasmania as part of the campaign. Thompson met Brown, who had taken the position of Director of the TWS after Norm Sanders had resigned. Thompson recognised both the importance of image and of being taken seriously in the media. He was impressed with Brown and soon formed a close friendship; it was he who worked to promote Brown as a spokesman for the TWS.
With television it was our ability to present the issue well that was important. Just to come across as credible and in a sense conservative people – people with whom the community could feel comfortable. It was projection of the middle-class environmental front. A lot of environmental issues have been presented by people from whom the community feels separate. Bob Brown’s occupation was good – a sort of status surrounds a doctor of medicine. And his country roots came across well in Tasmania. He appeared to be a simple ordinary fellow. I had an advantage with my experience in radio and television (Thompson 1981b, 139-40).

Thompson, who was media trained, saw the value of promoting Brown’s image and did so with his concurrence; “He is a phenomenon, whether he was made a phenomenon or not” (Jones 1981, 67). Brown’s status was not to remain that of ‘ordinary bloke’ for long, as he soon personified the campaign, taking on the mantle of charismatic leader. There is little doubt that his charismatic image was largely induced by Thompson’s initially skilful manipulation of the media. But Brown’s attributes existed before the Franklin campaign – when his ‘calling’ had been ensured by the experiences of the wilderness while rafting the river:

For a time the grandeur of this monumental place flooded my mind. I lost awareness of all else – my raft, my friend, my obligations, myself. The process of thirty years which had made me a mystified and detached observer of the universe was reversed and I fused into the inexplicable mystery of nature (Brown and Dombrovskis 1983, 20).

The media, happy to have a focus, portrayed Brown as a charismatic leader dedicated to a mission. One journalist described him as almost a messianic prophet whose role was to save the earth (Time 14 August 1989). Such images have been carefully cultivated by some Greens. Although Brown has insisted he is not the ‘leader’ of the Tasmanian Greens, that the Greens did not have a hierarchy like the ‘old parties’, he has shown little discomfort when he was been turned to for leadership.
Although the cult of leader is decried in all Green organisations – for some the media, by portraying the leader as possessing extraordinary virtues and being personally responsible for Green victories, empties the Green movement of its enormous political significance (Flanagan 1989) – the reality once again is different. Petra Kelly in Die Grunen, Tony Brunt in the foundation of the New Zealand Values Party, Jonathan Porrit with the British Greens, and Bob Brown in Tasmania were all leaders with which their parties were clearly identified. Brown gave up his profession as a doctor to work full time on the campaign, relying mostly on the charity of friends (Bates 1983,8). In this he fitted Weber’s (1978) definition of the attributes of a charismatic leader with a mission: “Those who possess charisma in order to fulfil their mission keep themselves free of all worldly ties, free from everyday occupations as well as from everyday family responsibilities” (Weber 1978 as quoted in Easthope and Holloway 1989, 197-8).

Willner (1984), commenting on the characteristics of a charismatic relationship, said that the responses of the followers show whether such a relationship is established. Followers believe their leader to possess to an extraordinary degree the qualities highly esteemed in their culture (Willner 1984, 6). As Weber (1978, 242) emphasised, “It is recognition on the part of those subject to authority which is decisive for the validity of charisma”. Nearly all supporters of Brown refer to his sincerity and dedication in almost religious tones. “Brown was revered. It is not too far-fetched to say that people wanted to be touched by his presence” (Thompson 1984,165), and, “People are attracted to the Wilderness Society because it is a goal. It is a religion. They are religious freaks. Not Jesus-freaks. But wilderness - freaks. Bob Brown is God” (Sanders 1981, 164). It was the sacredness of the wilderness matched with this charismatic nature that proved to be such a potent combination.

Bob Brown was also a consummate politician, who lobbied hard for a position and then quickly moved on to the next objective, as shown by the following example. On 4 July 1980 Brown met with several Labor MHAs’, including Minister for Tourism Michael Barnard and Bass MHA Gillian James to discuss the power options before they were decided by the Labor Party. Barnard was a strong supporter of the Gordon above Olga scheme. When Brown was asked whether he
would accept that scheme Brown said it seemed an appropriate compromise (Conversation with Gillian James 22 January 1997).

Brown was also asked to address the Labor Cabinet when it was debating the options. Holgate (1996) claimed that Brown argued for the Gordon above Olga scheme because his focus was on saving the Franklin. Lowe (1997) has a different recollection: he recalls Brown arguing against both proposals, but more vehemently against the Gordon below Franklin. Brown agrees with Lowe stating that he was opposed to the Olga scheme as well; after the decision was made he stated the Olga scheme was a disaster and had to be fought (Thompson 1981b, 142; 1984, 117).

With a potent symbol such as the Franklin, and the skilful manner in which the campaign promoted the wilderness, the TWS successfully encountered the HEC and maintained pressure on the Labor government. But the campaigners had not forgotten the lessons of Lake Pedder and broadened the attack to include debate on the economic rationality of the plans of the HEC. They were assisted by people who had begun to entertain serious doubts about the HEC's forecasts of power demand, the economic implications of further dam construction and the effect on employment.

The decision of the ALP to hold a referendum appeared to give the conservationists an opportunity to gauge the depth of support to save the Franklin. Lowe planned to hold a referendum because he recognised that, without the support of the HEC, the Legislative Council or conservationists, the Gordon above Olga option would fail. But the Government refused to allow Lowe to have a 'no dams' option on the paper; the State President of the party wrote to parliamentary members pressuring them to withdraw the 'no dams' choice (Field 1997a). Ironically it was Liberal senator Peter Rae, later to be appointed to the position of HEC commissioner, who suggested to Brown that he organise a 'no dams' write-in on the ballot papers, following the success of similar campaigns in American elections (Thompson 1984, 135). The result was a 47 percent vote for the Gordon below Franklin, 8 percent for the Olga scheme, 45 percent informal. 33.25 percent marked 'no dams' on the ballot paper (Newman 1984, 33).
The Tasmanian Wilderness Society, having watched the defeat of a Premier they felt was open to persuasion and the election of a hard-line Liberal government intent on flooding the Franklin, turned to the federal sphere and the Federal Government. With the Federal Labor Party and Democrats already opposed to the dam they began to pressure the Federal Liberal Party. Conservationists campaigned for voters to write ‘no dams’ on their ballot papers in the Flinders by-election in Melbourne; 42 percent of the voters did so.

In December 1982, after 18 months of planning, the Tasmanian Wilderness Society began its blockade of the Gordon River, focussing national and international attention on the issue. Between 13 and 22 December 1982, 202 protesters had been arrested, of those 162 were imprisoned for refusing to accept bail conditions. By February 1983, 1000 people had been arrested. Rallies and street marches were held in Hobart and Launceston as well as Melbourne, Sydney. In February 1983, the day on which the Federal election was announced, an estimated 20,000 people rallied in Hobart (Bates 1983, 9). Such rallies showed for the first time the depth of support for the environment in Tasmania. An earlier opinion poll commissioned by the Tasmanian Wilderness Society in 1980 showed 49 percent support for saving the Franklin.

**Post-1982 – the environment dilemma for the Labor Party**

After the 1982 electoral defeat, a former Federal Minister in the Whitlam Labor government, Ken Wreidt, became State leader. But the party was in an untenable position, with its continued support of the Franklin dam, while many of its members opposed the dam. The traditional workers and supporters who agreed with the party’s stance were suspicious when the federal Labor Party adopted the unequivocal policy to oppose construction of a scheme that would flood the rivers (Davis 1983, 114). The Federal party (not for the first time) was pragmatically content to look after its interests to the detriment of its State colleagues.

Labor was repeating the problems of other Social Democratic mass parties who found themselves caught between two disparate groups, both with clear positions. Like McGovern and the American Democrats, Labor was unable to reject
postmaterialists, but also unable to fully embrace them for fear of alienating their traditional support base. The Liberal Party, with its predominantly catch-all characteristics and a pragmatic leader, Robin Gray, benefited from the vacillation of the Labor Party. Gray, noting the high level of Labor voters who switched to the Liberals, adopted a particularly aggressive stance to development, openly expressing his admiration for Eric Reece.

The Liberals unambiguously committed themselves to hydro development and large-scale industry. The Greens were just as clearly opposed, happy to take advantage of the Labor Party’s impotence and attract Labor postmaterialists to establish their own vote base. The community was polarised and the State Labor Party had nowhere to go. Labor found itself in competition, rather than opposition, with both the Liberal and Greens, exacerbated by continuing environmental conflict throughout the State. It was to be a position that repeated itself in the years to come as the party tried desperately to resolve the tensions and establish a clear stance that would allow it to retrieve the lost votes.

Gray’s economic plans turned to attempts to attract large-scale development. These included the building of an international hotel on Hobart’s waterfront and, significantly for the conservation movement, the reopening of an electorally sensitive silicon production project (Electrona) near the town of Snug south of Hobart (Smith 1986a, 285). The local community and the Wilderness Society were opposed to the project, but this opposition was used by the Premier to further polarise the community by his labelling opponents as ‘greenies’ and ‘anti-Tasmanian’ (Mercury 21 April 1986). Over 300 objections to the Snug licence application were received by the Department of the Environment; these too, were labelled as ‘anti-Tasmanian’ (Crowley 1994, 187).

The furore continued for months into late 1985, with the Premier determined to push ahead with the development. The Labor Party, although complaining about issues such as the licence appeal process, did not raise issues of an environmental nature, concerned that to do so would further alienate Labor from its working-class base, which still remembered bitterly the Franklin River debate (Crowley 1989, 52). During this time a lecturer in environmental law at the University of Tasmania, Dr
Gerry Bates, became the advocate for the appellants in the appeal hearings. He gained a consistent and high environmental profile, which was of great value when he contested the February 1986 election as a running mate with Brown.

1986 election – another defeat for Labor
Gray took advantage of Labor’s impotence; the high level of environmental conflict suited both the Liberal Party and the conservationists. Brown launched his campaign with the claim that the Premier would attempt to manufacture a confrontation with conservationists by sending bulldozers into Tasmania’s forests, while the Premier campaigned heavily on industrial development and requests to the community not to vote for independent candidates (Smith 1986b, 475). The Australian Democrats fielded candidates in the electorates of Braddon and Bass, but gave support to Brown in Denison and Bates in Franklin. The Liberals were returned with 19 seats, Brown was re-elected comfortably with 1.25 quotas, while Bates, with 10.2 percent of the vote, was elected after distribution of preferences. The Labor Party retained 14 seats.

The continuing dilemma for the Labor Party was again voiced by its new leader, Neil Batt, at the State Council in May of that year: “We achieved over the past five or six years the remarkable feat of losing support from both the traditional working-class Labor voters and from the progressive groups concerned with quality of life issues” (Australian, 19 May 1986). There is no doubt that the continuing high-profile environmental disputes helped both the Liberal and Greens: Gray captured a significant section of the materialist voters who saw postmaterialist values as a threat to their livelihood, while the Greens provided a clear alternative to postmaterialists who opposed the ‘develop-at-all-costs mentality’ and supported the environment. Labor was faced with the same problems as its European counterparts: the German Social Democratic party at first refused to accept its defeat was attributable to the Greens and then assumed an ambiguous position. Tasmanian Labor went through an identical process. The party was unable to take clear steps to rectify the problem because environmental conflict refused to die down, but merely shifted focus to the Lemonythe and Southern forests regions of Tasmania.
The Commonwealth government had, in 1987, established an inquiry (the Helsham Inquiry) into the values of the forests and management of the resource. The conservation movement had argued that the Lemanthyme and Southern forests should be listed as World Heritage, with Brown successfully lobbying the International Union for the Conservation of Nature to recommend their listing. But Justice Helsham’s report rejected the claims of world heritage value, while a minority report argued for protection of large areas of the Lemanthyme and Southern forests. The inquiry did not therefore have a calming influence. Instead it increased the tensions between the environmental movement and the timber industry, whose major union, the Australian Timber Workers Union, was affiliated with the Labor Party.

The environment movement argued that the Commonwealth should reject the majority report, while the State Liberal Government urged its implementation. Yet again the State Labor Party was caught in the middle, awaiting the decision of the Hawke Government. The Wilderness Society could claim that a large proportion of the Tasmanian population supported protection of the forests, while the State Labor party was frozen at the wheel, coming under increasing pressure from the union movement.

The conflict was raging with the State Labor Party determinedly sitting on the fence, awaiting the decision by the Commonwealth. The lack of immediate commitment to the majority Helsham report by the State Parliamentary Labor Party was criticised by the Tasmanian Branch of the Australian Timber Workers Union (Haward 1989a, 428).

The problem was exacerbated by the Federal Government using Tasmania as a means to appeal to postmaterialist voters on mainland Australia by intervening over forestry matters. Hawke’s Environment Minister, Graham Richardson, had convinced Hawke of the need for a political strategy to gain the support of the environment movement; Brown and Helsham were to be one of the mechanisms. Richardson managed to discredit the majority report and secure protection for 70 percent of the forest (Kelly 1992, 527). In doing so he ignored the plight of the State Labor Party, which could not use the same strategy under the Hare-Clark system,
leaving it in a position where it was loath to criticise its federal counterpart. But resentment was evident: as Neil Batt’s successor Labor Leader Michael Field, was later to say,

I have seen my own party, during the period, crippled and diminished by the debate... In fact Graham Richardson in a conversation with me at the 1986 National Conference of the Labor Party, said: “Fieldy, you have to realise that trees are the sexiest issue of the 80’s.” And let’s face it, Graham Richardson was prepared to take every position in the Karma Sutra to make the decision on a political level alone (Field 1995, 9).

The forest debate was not resolved until late 1988 when agreement was gained on the protection of 80 percent of the original inquiry area (226,000 hectares). After acrimonious debate this was increased to 270,000 hectares, nominated by both State and Federal Governments for World Heritage Listing; other areas were protected under Tasmanian legislation; and a $50 million compensation package was accepted by the state (Haward 1989, 269). Despite this, the State Labor Party was not able to manoeuvre in the lead-up to the next election – even if it had been able to do so, it is doubtful if it would have helped, for the Party still lacked a clear policy to attract both materialist and postmaterialist voters.

As this forests battle wound down, another struggle over environmental and resource policy arose. It was over a proposed multimillion dollar pulp mill at Wesley Vale in Tasmania’s north-west. This struggle would see development politics in Tasmania lose dominance (Kelly 1992, 531) and yet again the Labor Party would lose votes to conservationist candidates.

**Wesley Vale – a final rebuttal of development politics**

In March 1988, Australian Pulp and Paper Mills released an environmental report on a proposed pulp mill. In May 1988 North Broken Hill and a Canadian-based company, Noranda Forest Inc, agreed to jointly invest in and build a $1 billion pulp mill, which would be the world’s largest bleached kraft pulp mill. The chosen site was on 16 hectares at Wesley Vale near Devonport, sited on the basis that it was
close to the centre of supply for hardwood timber suitable for processing into woodchips and then pulp for export.

Like the Electrona dispute, Wesley Vale was not based on wilderness but on the concept of the natural environment being threatened by industrial development and of the power of large corporations to pressure a state government, intent on attracting large-scale development, to show its ‘success’ by doing their bidding. It was equally related to the implicitly understood development norm held by both the government and the company, in which economic growth was the overriding aim. The party failed to justify the proposals to those in the community who had other norms (Chapman 1992, 15), giving yet another opportunity for environmentalists to react to these concerns. Unfortunately for Labor it was still unable to regain its lost support, for it could not find a position that was attractive to either materialist or postmaterialists.

Opposition came initially from people living near the site, but soon came from people concerned with the forest resources and the overall environmental impact. Conservationists viewed the proposal with alarm, claiming that it would use two million tonnes of logs each year, place great pressure on old growth forests within the National Estate, and affect the forests of the Great Western Tiers and Douglas Apsley (Wayte 1988, 6). Local residents who were concerned with the environmental aspects of such a large-scale plant, which would discharge huge amounts of gases into the atmosphere and effluent into Bass Strait, quickly formed an organisation with broad-based support called Concerned Residents Opposing the Pulpmill Siting (CROPS). Its spokesperson was Christine Milne, whose parents owned a farm at Wesley Vale. Milne was to gain national exposure as an articulate opponent to the proposal, becoming a major asset to the campaign, and was reported in some media as a “female Bob Brown” (Haward 1989, 269). CROPS became highly successful, attracting supporters such as local farmers and small business operators who had not been involved before in environmental conflicts (Milne 1990, 57).

The Premier, Robin Gray, was determined to press ahead with the proposal, having in the early stages the support of both the State and Federal Labor parties and the
ACTU. On 17 October 1988, the government signed an agreement with North Broken Hill and Noranda Inc. (Chapman 1992, 50), and in November 1988 passed the Northern Pulp Mill (Agreement) Bill. Gray was so intent on having the proposal started that he attempted to rule out appeals to the Environmental Protection Appeals Board and to fast-track the legislation. This led the former state president of the Liberal Party and member of the Legislative Council, Don Wing, to label the legislation as “democratically offensive” (Mercury 13 December 1988).

The legislation was followed by the companies releasing an environmental impact statement. This was immediately criticised by opponents: one group of scientists, the United Scientists for Environmental Responsibility, labelled it as inadequate. Public concern, far from abating, grew commensurate with the profile of CROPS (Crowley 1994, 203). The Environment Department sought further details, while documents relating to the impact statement and leaked from the Inland Fisheries Commission referred to ‘lack of detail,’ ‘motherhood statements’ and its being ‘an insult to the intelligence’. The Department of Sea Fisheries criticised it as ‘superficial’ and ‘unsubstantiated’ (Murphy 1989, 30-1). Within parliament Brown and Bates, who had originally supported the proposal for value-adding to Tasmanian forest products, opposed the project on the environmental grounds that effluent containing organochlorines would be damaging to the waters of Bass Strait.

The Labor Party was caught in the middle: the Liberal Party continued to strongly support the proposal, while the Greens within parliament and CROPS in the community vehemently opposed it. The State Labor Party supported the concept on the basis of employment and value-adding to Tasmania’s raw resources by downstream processing, provided it was environmentally safe. Related organisations such as the Australian Timber Workers Union and the Devonport Trades and Labour Council backed the Wesley Vale site for employment reasons (Chapman 1992, 24).

Labor’s position was completely overshadowed in the intense and continuing debate – particularly when there was strong support for the mill from the construction and forestry sectors of the union movement. As early as May 1988, Labor’s Opposition spokesman on environmental matters, Peter Patmore, had raised the issues of solid waste disposal and dioxin emissions. Patmore was critical of fellow politicians who
were fearful of voicing their concerns in case they found themselves being labelled either anti-development or anti-environment (Chapman 1992, 31). He was even criticised by some of his colleagues for being unnecessarily aggressive during his questioning of APPM at a briefing on environmental impact aspects.

Belatedly recognising the community’s concern and the strength of feeling, the Premier accepted the political realities and the success of the CROPS campaign relating to the pollution concerns. He undertook to ensure the project would only proceed if the guideline made the mill the ‘cleanest in the world’, issuing revised guidelines in January 1989 (Economou 1990, 57). Field (1997a) believes that the changes to the guidelines were an inept attempt by Gray to contrive conflict with the company in order to improve his green credentials, an attempt that got out of control. The pulp mill proponents refused to accept the guidelines, claiming that they were technically impossible to meet, and threatened to withdraw (Mercury, 26 January 1989). This left the government no option but to weaken the previous ‘non-negotiable’ environmental guidelines.

In an incredibly politically damaging manner, the Government recalled parliament on North Broken Hill’s letterhead after private negotiations with North Broken Hill executives so that the proposal could proceed with legislative backing (Economou 1990, 57-8). In March 1989 the parliament passed the Northern Pulp Mill (Doubts Removal) Bill, which significantly weakened the guidelines. Up to 6,000 people opposed to the Bill marched in Hobart (Kelly 1992, 531). This conflict showed up the government’s concerns for the environment as an afterthought, a clear example of policy “tokenism”, brought about by an effective environmentalist campaign (Economou 1990, 53).

The Federal Labor government, including Prime Minister Hawke, Treasurer Keating and Industrial Development Minister Kerin, wanted the pulp mill to proceed but not without regard to the environmental consequences. Gray’s ineptitude, shoddy guidelines and the public campaign against it had made the Federal Environment Minister, Graham Richardson, a strong critic. The mill depended on foreign investment approval and the CSIRO environmental assessment of the proposal was not supportive. John Kerin, a strongly pro-development minister, was moved to say
"The EIS is ratshit and the guidelines are a joke" (Kelly 1992, 531). Federal Cabinet therefore insisted upon tougher environmental conditions, which the company refused to accept. Noranda announced in mid-March that it was pulling out of the project and North Broken Hill announced that they would also not be pursuing the proposal (Haward 1989c, 464). The opponents and Milne were delivered a resounding victory.

1989 Election - the balance of power

The 1989 election campaign by the Greens, and particularly Milne, was aimed at protecting the reputation of Tasmania for clean produce. The fear of organochlorine contamination from the pulp mill provided a potent weapon. The Greens were also careful to run a pragmatic campaign as it related to environmental issues. As one commentator noted; "In the 1989 state elections the Greens campaigned on a strongly instrumentalist platform and one heard little of the deep ecologists or 'wilderness as the cathedral of the soul school'" (Lohrey 1990, 98). Hay and Haward’s theory that, with a favourable electoral system and high and ongoing visibility for environmental issues, the green vote can make substantial inroads into traditional Labor Party support, was accurate (Hay and Haward 1988, 444). The Greens gained seats in every electorate, to the cost of structurally and ideologically confused opponents.

The ‘Green’ Independents, Brown and Bates, had announced in 1988 that they would field teams of candidates in every electorate. When the election was called, the team campaigned under the banner of ‘The Independents’, providing a focus for an alternative to the two established parties. Each electorate had a team of running mates to enable the group to retain a separate position on the ballot paper and to retain votes within the group in the distribution of preferences under the Hare-Clark system (Haward 1989b, 460).

The 1989 election saw both the Labor and Liberal parties lose votes to the Greens. Referring to Milne’s campaign, Lohrey points to the shift away from the Liberals among small farmers. “These people heavily supported Christine Milne who, dressed to look every inch the suburban matron, had office-bearing members of the Liberal Party working on her campaign” (Lohrey 1990, 98). The Labor Party’s
state-wide share of the vote had changed little since the 1986 result, dropping by only 0.4 percent state-wide. It improved its performance in Denison and Franklin, was stable in Bass, but lost votes in Lyons and Braddon where Milne and Dianne Hollister were elected. The Greens polled consistently high in every electorate, with 17.1 percent of the vote. The Liberals suffered a 7.3 percent swing against them state-wide, with a 11.5 percent swing in Franklin.

The results indicated a major shift in partisan support, reflecting a broad-based concern with environmental and social issues neither of the major parties was seen to be able to articulate (Haward and Smith 1990, 197). The Independents, as they were then called, gained a substantial protest or anti-party vote reflecting widespread dissatisfaction with the confrontationist style of Robin Gray (Haward 1989b). A style of leadership perhaps successful in Reece’s time was no longer appropriate, with community outrage over Gray’s relationship with large corporations and his ‘develop-at-any-cost’ attitude creating significant electoral backlash.

Eric Reece was the epitome of his advanced paternalism; and Liberal strongman Robin Gray inherited his mantle, although political godfatherism had, by the 1980’s, all but had its day, and Gray’s right-populist style was increasingly anathema to the more enlightened and sophisticated sections of the electorate, especially in southern Tasmania (Hay 1994, 3).

The May 1989 election resulted in the Liberals losing power and the Greens gaining a seat in every electorate. The final result was 17 seats for the Liberals, 5 seats for the Green Independents and 13 seats for Labor. Crowley (1994, 205) sees this result as directly related to the prominence of the environmentalists and the failure of the State Labor Party to achieve any profile in the dispute. Field, who succeeded Neil Batt as leader of the Labor Party just before the election agrees, describing Labor’s coming to power with only 13 members as an accident of history. Field regarded the Liberal Party defeat as a combination of the arrogance of the incumbent Premier and the inability of the Labor Party to deal with the Greens as a political entity (M Field 1994).
The Tasmanian Parliamentary Accord

Once the election results were finalised and it was obvious that the Liberals lacked a majority, the Greens began negotiating for a power-sharing arrangement. The Premier Gray held discussions with the Greens but, faced with a backbench revolt, quickly ceased talks, leaving an opening for the Labor Party (Hay & Eckersley 1993, 12). Gray refused to resign, blaming his defeat on the controversy over Wesley Vale, Commonwealth funding cuts and the campaign of the Greens (Mercury 15 May 1989). He further stated that the Government should be determined by the numbers on the floor of the parliament and that he would recommend his government be recommissioned (Haward and Smith 1990, 207).

Field called upon Gray to resign and for the Independents (as the Greens were called at that time) to support a minority Labor Government. Field argued that, because 80 percent of the Independents’ preferences went to Labor, it had achieved a significant swing (Mercury 15 May 1989). If the Greens were to support a minority government, it could be with Labor because of the similarities in policies in some areas and the intense antagonism between the Greens and the Liberals. The Greens also recognised the importance of supporting the Labor Party, as a Gray Government could have avoided parliament to press for projects similar to Wesley Vale, log in proposed National Estate parks and ensure the loss of World Heritage nominations (Lynch 1990, 147); the only thing lacking was a mechanism to achieve this.

The Accord between Labor and the Green Independents was a ground-breaking formal agreement between a anthropocentric mass party and an ecocentric New Politics party. It forced changes on both parties: for Labor its vacillation on how it would deal with the Greens ended with its decision to cooperate. It made this decision before it proposed a strategy to reconcile the two opposing ideologies with its union base and its remaining postmaterialist supporters. For the Greens it heralded a clear ascendancy by the realos through the parliamentary process. It was an attempt to effect an ideological change in the broader electorate while protecting forests and the environment. Although neither party had much choice, the accord heralded a clear change to the political landscape that had, since the inception of the House of Assembly, been dominated by pro-development parties.
The socialist parties of Europe, for example, in Belgium, Denmark, Germany and Finland, had all suffered losses to the Greens. Germany had dealt with the Greens, so why not Tasmania? But behind the initial excitement problems remained: the overlapping of old and new cleavages (figure 3.5) illustrates that movement by either party from the cross-cutting cleavage will be resisted by party members and supporters. Tasmania was to prove no different from the rest of the world.

Although ushering a period of reform into Tasmania, the accord created continuing tensions both within and without the Labor Party. As it was played out, the accord transformed from a naive euphoric agreement to be cooperative to bitter disillusionment and competition, resulting in losses for both parties.

Without doubt the Greens were significantly misunderstood by the Labor Party; equally certainly, the Labor Party was viewed with contempt by many Green members and supporters who saw it as a pragmatic catch-all party with fluid commitments and a willingness to compromise to gain and retain power. The misunderstandings on both sides were to prove electorally damaging to both. While, with the benefit of hindsight, many within the Labor Party would never again enter into such an agreement, at the time of the accord, Labor and the Greens both focussed on what they saw as a conservative, and later corrupt, Government. With such views and agreement on many policy issues, it is not surprising that an accord was reached.

**Accord negotiations**

The negotiations to achieve an agreement clearly highlight the parties’ different ideologies, although differences that are now clear were not then. As previously shown, ecocentrism is the underlying ideology of the Green movement (Hay 1988), the significance of which is often misunderstood (Eckersley 1992, 160). This was the case with Labor: it could grasp the concept of an anti-development ethos but did not, at the time, understand the concepts of intrinsic values for nature, nor ecocentrism. Labor was limited by this lack – it is hard to reach a clear agreement without a comprehension of the starting point of the others. The Greens also failed to grasp the importance to Labor of its anthropocentric heritage, where the economic
well-being of its members and supporters had to be protected. This gulf becomes apparent as the negotiations and the subsequent Accord are considered.

To find some grounds of agreement, former Labor leader Doug Lowe was initially used as a mediator to establish negotiations. On 23 May 1989 Michael Field wrote to all the Greens setting forth the basis of discussions which "reflects our willingness to enter into discussions with you and your colleagues on the creation of a more open and community responsive style of government and improved parliamentary democracy" (Letter Michael Field to Doctor Bob Brown 23 May 1989). He included proposals to create the Douglas-Apsley and Denison Spires national parks, but the issue of logging in National Estate forests was not mentioned. The Greens demands, tabled at the first meeting on 24 May 1989, included the nomination of all Western Tasmanian Wilderness region for inclusion on World Heritage Lists (The Independents Direction 24 May 1989).

On 24 May 1989 negotiations began between Labor, represented by Michael Field, his deputy Peter Patmore, senior Labor staffer Alistair Scott, and the five Greens. Negotiations continued for six days, with the main sticking point being the Greens demands to end logging in National Estate forests. As Brown said, "For us to support a government that saw no end to National Estate logging would be a sell-out of the people who voted for us", while Field was concerned over jobs of forestry workers and "would not wear a moratorium of north-east logging" (Notes of negotiations. Alistair Scott 24 May 1989). This position was formally restated the same day: "on the issue of logging in National Estate areas, our position remains unchanged. All available information suggests that a ban on logging in these areas would lead to unacceptable job losses" (Written statement by Michael Field to the Independents. 24 May 1989).

The negotiations had stalled on the traditional split of employment and the environment. Labor felt a need to protect forestry workers, who it saw as its traditional supporters, while the Greens sought to protect north-east forests and support electors who wanted an end to logging. Field was forced to state: "I can go no further without jeopardising jobs, compromising Labor policy and losing integrity ... it is my view that to accede to the Independent’s views on the north-east
would mean job losses and I am not prepared to jeopardise those jobs” (Advocate 29 May 1989). The negotiations were also proceeding under pressure from the Federal Labor government, which saw a Labor/Green deal as important in cementing relationships with Green voters on the mainland. Such a deal would guarantee Green preferences in the forthcoming Federal election, even though the Federal Minister for the Environment, Graham Richardson, knew of the tensions within the State party. An agreement was considered of such significance that Richardson secretly flew to Hobart to assist the Greens in negotiating with the State Labor Party, often with them present while he telephoned Field in attempts to have him agree (Wilkinson 1996, 312).

The competing demands could not be resolved and, in a Parliamentary Labor Party meeting, Field announced that negotiations would be called off. The Parliamentary Labor Party unanimously agreed not to enter into an arrangement with the Greens. That night the Greens, on being made aware of Labor’s position, relented and agreed that logging could continue in areas already being logged, but that a review process be immediately established into alternatives to logging in National Estate forest. The ALP agreed to stop logging scheduled for East Picton, Jackeys Marsh and Lake Ina. The next day, 29 May, an agreement was signed that allowed a minority Labor Government to govern.

The agreement was formally known as the ‘Tasmanian Parliamentary Accord’. The term ‘Accord’ was adopted from an arrangement in the Canadian province of Ontario, where a similar electoral outcome left no party with a majority in 1985. The Ontario Accord enabled the minority Liberal Party to gain government with the support of the New Democratic Party (Haward and Larmour 1993, 3). In the Tasmanian agreement the parties agreed to work together to give stable government but not to form a coalition. Labor Party rules forbid such an alliance – instead the Independents agreed to support the Labor Government’s Budget and Supply Bills and not to support any Opposition motion of no confidence. In return the Labor Party agreed that the State export woodchip quota would not exceed 2.889 million tonnes per annum, additional areas would be added to the World Heritage nominations, and it would establish a review process to investigate logging in National estate Areas.
The review was not expected by many people within Labor to find any alternatives but, because the review process was to last at least a year, it gave the party time to seek other ways of avoiding conflict.

I thought what it would do would enable both the Greens and the Labor Party to go into government without either compromising their relative positions. It put off the evil day. It showed that there were unresolved issues that were going to raise their ugly heads at a later date (Field 1997a).

**Union backlash against the Accord**

Throughout the negotiations with the Independents, Labor was strenuously trying to quell unrest within the right-wing unions who were opposed to any deals with the Independents. The Australian Timber Workers Union (TWU) and the Federated Iron Workers Association (FIA) boycotted the talks and threatened to disaffiliate from the party unless it removed the section of the accord that allowed another inquiry into the National Estate (Advocate 31 May 1989). The TWU was opposed to the accord, which it said would result in massive job losses and would cripple the States’ forestry industries (Advocate 2 June 1989). The Secretary of the FIA, Arthur Harper, claimed that the unions had been ignored during the negotiations, with Field neglecting his responsibilities to the union movement (Advocate 30 May 1989). He highlighted the concerns of the union movement that “we are of the view that the ALP is not a party representing the view of the workers and we may have to consider something else” (Advocate 31 May 1989).

The Secretary of the Tasmanian Trades and Labour Council (TTLC), Paul Lennon, claimed during the campaign that both Labor and the Liberals had “bent over backwards” to steal the Independent’s thunder and that the greening was poll-driven. He claimed Labor’s focus on the environment was not balanced by a proper regard for Tasmania’s need to maintain living standards and give unemployment top priority (Advocate 31 May 1989). The ALP lobbied hard to allay union fears and to win support, finally succeeding with the unanimous support of the accord agreement from the ALP’s Administrative Committee, which represented all factions within the party and the union movement (Mercury 3 June 1989). On 30 May 1989, Lennon
and other unionists, including the Electrical Trades Union and the Australian Workers Union, issued a statement welcoming the opportunity for the ALP to form government:

Whilst some elements of the trade union movement have expressed concern over Labor’s agreement with the Green Independents, it is our view that overall the agreement gives Tasmania the opportunity for significant reforms to be passed by the Tasmanian Parliament (Statement 30 May 1989 PLP and Trade Union Movement).

Negotiations with the union movement continued for months until an uneasy consensus was reached at the ALP State Convention in October 1989. Field acknowledged the World Heritage area debate encompassed disputes between the green and union sections of ALP, with the party resting uneasily between the two diametrically opposed positions of conservation and economic development. This inability to compromise had previously led to the demise of a Labor government. “Now we have to resolve these two strands and synthesise them into a common vision for Tasmania so that we can provide opportunities in the future” (Michael Field Advocate 30 October 1989).

With the Accord in place, and with Gray’s refusal to resign confirmed, the parties waited until the recall of Parliament on 28 June 1989. The no-confidence motion was move by Brown and seconded by Field. Labor and the Independents refused to allow the House to adjourn, aware that it may allow Gray to approach the Governor and claim he controlled the House. Debate continued until Labor member, Harry Holgate, using a forgotten 1887 precedent found by the Independent’s constitutional adviser Professor Crawford, closed debate and defeated the government (Haward and Smith 1990, 208). Holgate was chosen to move the end of the debate because it was Gray who had supported a previous no-confidence motion against Holgate when he was Labor Premier. On Thursday 29 June Gray announced that he had resigned his commission and advised the Governor to commission Field as Premier.
Accord tensions between the Greens and Labor

The Accord soon experienced conflict, not over environmental issues but as a result of a State financial crisis. The Government found that the gap between expenditure and revenue was projected to reach $279 million or 18 percent of projected budget revenue in 1990-91. If the debt-servicing ratio was to be stabilised, then the expenditure to revenue gap could not exceed $30 million, which meant $250 million had to be pruned from the budget (Felmingham 1993, 45). Field blamed the previous Government which, when faced with cuts from the Commonwealth payments to the State, refused to rein in expenditure. The Government embarked on a program of debt reduction, including cutting funding to the education budget, when it had promised under the accord to inject more funds into Tasmania’s education system and to pursue a reform agenda. Although the Greens accepted the budget position, “they found themselves committed to sustaining in office a government that had an ideal excuse to renege on the reform agenda” (Hay and Eckerseley 1993, 13). Labor claimed a significant proportion of the reform agenda was achieved despite the debt problem (Field 1997a).

More fundamental problems became apparent with conflicting and misunderstood ideological positions. The Greens recognised early the dangers of an accord, “For survival, the Green Independents need to keep their distance from the ALP. They have little in common ideologically and stand to lose an enormous amount” (Lynch 1990, 148). McCall (1993) regards the accord as a flawed document, neither flexible for public policy initiatives nor with a mechanism to facilitate compromise decision making; Warden (1993, 18) claims it left only a narrow space in which the Greens could operate, in policy terms promising more than it could deliver to them.

The Greens had been extremely suspicious of negotiating with the Labor Party, partly as a result of their past experiences with government. They set up a list of objectives to be incorporated into the accord, perceiving it as a guarantee of what they would get, while the Labor Party saw it more as a vehicle to obtain government and a document to build upon. The resulting accord became partly a list of demands that took priority over the long-term need for consultation, ignoring long-term survival (McCall 1993, 22).
The lack of consultation soon led to resentment. Christine Milne claimed the basic flaw was that, “Michael Field could never accept that he was the leader of a minority Government . . . Once the accord was signed, he basically wanted to act as a majority government without taking into account the fact he didn’t have the numbers” (Mercury 28 May 1994). From a Labor perspective, because of the lack of a coalition agreement, the Greens could not hold cabinet positions. Although they were invited to have input, Field showed little flexibility by ensuring that Cabinet made the final decisions: “Cabinet is ultimately responsible and the Greens wanted to direct Cabinet and veto its decisions – or else!” (Field Mercury 28 May 1990).

The Labor Party had gained Government but, while the Greens had several items delivered, the two groups had failed to achieve a process for proper consultation. The Greens came to see themselves in a invidious position, whereby they were effectively excluded from a share of the ‘positives’ yet were burdened by the perception of some sectors of the community (with sectors of Labor not contradicting them) that they were a ‘dead economic hand’ on the shoulder of Government (Wescombe 1990, 190-1).

The Greens therefore adopted an approach more competitive than cooperative, which resulted in further antagonism and recriminations on all sides. This led to a relationship of competition for short-term political gain, where the constant public bickering created an atmosphere of instability that seriously undermined the electoral credibility of both parties (Hay and Eckersley 1993, 14). “There were continuing demands which compromised the Labor Party, and the continuous distortion of what we were honestly try to resolve. . . . And the precarious nature of the government meant we could not get into a public argument with the Greens. They could say what they liked about us but we couldn’t respond” (M Field, Mercury 28 May 1994).

Of equal importance was the Labor Party’s basic misunderstanding of the Green ideology. To the Labor Party the environment was always an ‘issue’ that could be negotiated, whereas the Greens regarded the environment as something that could not be compartmentalised, merging into all economic and social aspects. Labor,
because of its ideological heritage and its constituency, was able to justify wilderness preservation only on the basis of its value to humans, never as an end to itself (Wescombe 1990, 186-7). The Labor Party failed to understand the importance the Greens placed on forestry. As one Labor adviser describes the issue during the negotiations for the Accord, “We realised we were a hell of a way apart but didn’t see any option... I think we regarded them as a bit loony - sort of out of our sphere of thinking” (Conversation with Alistair Scott 17 February 1997). For their part the Greens failed to understand the strength of the Labor Party’s commitment to its working-class base.

During the accord, both parties were forced to consider their own ideology and how far they could compromise without betraying their principles. Even entering into an accord had dangers for the Greens, particularly because to progress their ideology they needed first to change the dominant enlightenment paradigm. To Wescombe (1990, 191) the Labor Party was the antagonist, with a limit beyond which it could not be further ‘greened’, where the decision to enter into arrangements within the parliamentary arena created problems in itself.

To focus on the parliamentary path to change is to inevitably shape one’s politics to a politics of issues, not a politics aimed at a fundamental break from the assumptions of the enlightenment paradigm. Here is perhaps the key dilemma of the Green politics: the line must be held, and issues must be contested, but there is a real danger that, in the process, sight is lost of the larger game, or even that, in attaining a legitimacy at one level of debate, the primary goal of thoroughgoing change takes on an appearance of utter outlandishness (Hay 1992, 106).

Hay (1992, 97) believes that from this point the exultant, crusading character of the environmental movement suffered dilution and an uncertainty over identity, where the very act of accepting a share of power initially led to a loss of support and the disillusionment of their strongest supporters by the rate of change. Although forest policy is often cited as a major contributory factor to the collapse of the accord, underlying this was a conflict of ideas and competing demands. Labor and the
Greens had fundamentally different ideas about the way in which the accord would operate.

**Salamanca Agreement**

Under the terms of the Accord (Accord section (14C)) the partners agreed to establish a review process to investigate alternatives to logging in the National Estate, but even this document was open to conflict. The Independents would “continue to work for the complete protection of Tasmania’s National Estate areas” (Accord clause 14), but the review would also “ensure that the interests of timber-industry workers are protected”. It was to be these inherent contradictions, together with clause 9 of the Accord which stated that the State export woodchip quota would not exceed 2.889 million tonnes per annum, that were the formal reasons for its collapse.

Under the terms of the Accord on 31 August 1989, negotiations for a resolution (to be called the ‘Salamanca Agreement’) began. It was to be an attempt to break the deadlock in forest management and the near-continuous environmental conflict in the forests. It was signed by representatives of the Forest Industries Association of Tasmania (FIAT), the Wilderness Society and the Australian Conservation Foundation – later to combine as the Combined Environmental Group (CEG) – the Tasmanian Trades and Labour Council (TTLC), the Tasmanian Farmers and Graziers Association (TFGA), the Tasmanian Forestry Commission (TFC) and the Government (Sandford 1993, 129). The agreement bound all parties to work to develop a long-term strategy for forest management with a Forest and Forest Industry Strategy (FFIS) to be completed by 1 September 1990.

In February 1990 the Salamanca Agreement was institutionalised with the establishment of a ministerial council, the Forest and Forest Industry Council of Tasmania (FFIC) (which also included Commonwealth representatives), and funding of $10 million. In May 1990 the FFIC released its draft strategy *Key Issues and Principles Likely to Shape a Forests and Forests Industry Strategy for Tasmania*, which had been agreed and signed by all parties. The centrepiece was a transition to an industry based wholly on plantation and regrowth forests.
After extensive community consultation the draft was changed. The final document ‘Secure Futures for Forests and People’ (presented to the FFIC for ratification) was, according to the CEG, an industry document bearing little relationship to the draft (Hay and Eckersley 1993, 14). The move to plantation-based forestry was not to happen until after most unallocated uncut forests had been logged. It also contained a clause foreshadowing the lifting of the woodchip quota. The then Deputy Chair of the FFIC, Paul Lennon, claims that the representatives of the CEG were not all opposed to the findings and that it was Alistair Graham, on behalf of the environment groups, who first put forward the concept of wood-production zones as a way of a transition from native forest logging to plantation-based logging. Lennon claims that urging to reject the final document came from the parliamentary Greens, Brown and Milne in particular, because of pressure brought to bear on them by local environmental groups who may have been affected.

They had two choices during that time, that was to stay in the process and argue for a better outcome or withdraw which enabled them to take a very simplistic view politically in the wider public. There were a number of people in the combined environment group who argue that to get any further gain for the environment they had to stay in the process and continue to argue it out. But that was in conflict with the political imperatives of the Greens at the time who I believe were looking to get out of the Accord because the Accord was locking them into unpopular decisions in other areas totally divorced from forestry (Lennon 1997).

The Greens warned the Government that if it brought in legislation embodying the FFIC’s forest strategy it would end the accord which would result in a no-confidence motion (Dalwood 1992a, 256). But on 1 October 1990 Cabinet endorsed the recommendations in principle. This led to the de facto end of the accord when Field announced that “Cabinet would endorse FFIS to comply with the Accord provision for private ‘security of employment’” (Smith 1990, 336).
End of the Accord
The secretary of the Pulp and Paper Makers Union, who was a signatory to the strategy, and Labor Senator John Devereux called on Cabinet to defer the decision rather than break the accord and risk an election (Examiner 30 September 1990). The ALP’s Administrative Committee ignored these calls and passed a resolution congratulating the PLP for its decision (Examiner 9 October 1990), with the State Council in November of that year upholding the strategy. When Field explained to the Council why the PLP endorsed the forest strategy, he focussed heavily on job security and the need to represent involved workers. Although Brown attacked the decision as a threat to Labor’s electoral relationship with the conservationists, Field was firm. “I think Labor has become distracted from who it represents . . . . The work force in the forest could be forgiven for thinking we had forgotten them” (Field Examiner 12 November 1990).

Cabinet’s endorsement of the FFIS was informally the end of the accord, but it was to limp on until September 1991 when the government announced legislative plans that would have raised the export woodchip quota. By this time the PLP believed the end of the accord was inevitable. “It was getting very hot for the Greens politically and they had to distance themselves from an increasingly unpopular government, and they did” (Field 1997a).

In October 1991, the government introduced its ‘Resource Security’ legislation, which embodied the FFIS, knowing that it would lead to an election. Labor had gone as far as it could go in accommodating the green values – the limit beyond which the Labor Party felt it could be no further ‘greened’ had been reached and it could move no further from mainstream politics. Premier Field again restated the Labor dilemma of dealing with a community divided on environmental issues.

Eric Reece became the working class hero because those people identified with him as a leader who stood for their values. The style of politics captured by the [Liberal] opposition, which exploited the emotions genuinely held by a large percentage of the Tasmanian community, was again in the tradition I believe of Eric Reece. However, the exploitation of those
emotions divided this community and divided the Labor Party (Michael Field Examiner 18 November 1991).

He went on to say that, as Labor leader, he had tried to draw together the opposing threads of concern for the environment and concern for development of the economy. The State and Federal governments had backed the forest strategy in an attempt to develop a mechanism for ending the conservation versus development conflict, but had failed to recognise the centrality of environment in the Greens, ideology and its importance to their supports.

After Labor had introduced the Resource Security Bill, the Greens and the Liberals supported a motion of no-confidence, but its wording allowed the government to continue so long as it did not reintroduce the Bill during the life of Parliament. But industry pressure on the Liberal and Labor parties saw the Bill reintroduced under another name, the Forest Reform Bill (Mercury 8 November 1991). The Liberals and Labor united to pass the Bill in time for the Christmas adjournment – to the delight of the Greens, who had once again been given a clear political position. As Brown stated, “I feel very comfortable about that because it is at least a more accurate portrayal of the philosophical position of the respective political groups” (Office of Green Independents Media Release 12 November 1991).

Conclusion

In Tasmania, as elsewhere in Western democracies, postmaterialists rose to challenge the established parties with a clearly defined agenda based on issues and a strong, wilderness-based ecocentric ideology. Like its European counterparts, Labor was ill equipped to deal with this challenge. It slid from a party with a comfortable parliamentary majority to a disillusioned and confused parliamentary rump as it grappled with the internal difficulties the Greens presented – only gaining government in 1989 by a remarkable set of circumstances and the support of the Greens.

The Greens had now achieved the original goal of the United Tasmania Group – representation in parliament and the balance of power. They took full advantage of Labor’s impotence, transforming from an environmental social movement to a valid
parliamentary party. Through brilliant strategies, a charismatic leader and
movement they expanded from one member in 1980 to representatives in every
electorate by 1989, becoming part of a ground-breaking arrangement to support a
Labor government. Its ecocentric ideology and refutation of traditional
developmental politics had struck a chord with a significant section of the
population.

Although Labor did not recognise it at the time of the breaking of the accord it had
made some gains. It had been forced to accept the Greens as a viable political force
and not just a temporary aberration, it finally understood their ideology, and it
adopted a clear strategy. By entering the parliamentary arena, the Greens had also
exposed some weaknesses with its own internal disputes. For the first time in
decades Labor could be pro-active. The next chapter shows how Labor finally
restructured and developed a coherent response to the challenge of the Greens. It
also examines the current structures and ideologies of the Tasmanian parties.
CHAPTER 6

LABOR'S RESPONSE AND THE CURRENT STATE OF TASMANIAN PARTIES

Introduction
The signing of the Accord in 1989, and its demise in 1991, were watersheds for both the Labor and Greens parties. In 1989 Labor chose to pursue the path of cooperation with the Greens – it tried to capture the process but, as the previous chapter demonstrated, from a Labor perspective the process failed. The rest of the decade was then dominated by a movement, both in the structure of the party and in its ideological position, towards the other strategy of conflict.

This chapter begins by reviewing how the Labor Party restructured after the failure of the accord and a huge electoral backlash. It will be shown that Labor’s response was more than just an abstract deliberation of its position: it was a considered strategic response to its worst defeat and a recognition of the need for change. This strategic response occurred at three levels: membership, administration and the Parliamentary Labor Party. Although the response was to be a coordinated one, it is clear that the reasons for the impetus ranged from wanting to punish the Greens for what some people saw as their role in nearly destroying Labor to believing Labor had also failed to manage the accord arrangements competently.

In embarking on such a strategy the structural changes are as important as ideological considerations – without the necessary organisational changes Labor would not have been able to respond as effectively as it did. This chapter therefore examines the relationship of the unions with the Labor Party and its decision to adopt a strategy to regain the support of its traditional supporters. It also considers the role of environmentalists within the ALP and the inevitable disputes once it embarked upon a strategy to deny the Greens any further opportunity of governing with Labor.
The chapter concludes with the leadership change from Field to Jim Bacon with a discussion why the party remained so loyal to a leader who had failed in three elections to win majority government, even in 1992 sinking to its lowest electoral levels. Such loyalty is unusual, particularly when leaders are more often scapegoats for failure. This loyalty also explains the strength of unity and commitment that the PLP enjoyed, allowing individual members to control factional concerns and forestall public leadership doubts. When the leadership change finally did occur it will be shown to be more symbolic than signifying a change of direction, for structure and ideological course were firmly set by the time Bacon became leader.

**Labor’s Structural and Strategic Changes**

**Another defeat for Labor – the 1992 election**

After Parliament adjourned, Premier Field announced an election for 1 February 1992. In his letter to the Governor, Sir Phillip Bennett, Field spoke of the deep cleavage between the Government and the Green Independents:

> The position of the Government is indeed precarious and there continues to be, and will be into the future, serious and deep differences between the Green Independents and the Government and not just on environmental issues, but the very direction the economy of the State is moving in addressing the economic plight presently facing Tasmania (Letter Michael Field to Sir Phillip Bennett January 1992).

Field’s efforts to forge a link between the disparate groups of materialists and postmaterialists failed; the election was overwhelmingly fought on issues of ‘stability’ and ‘getting the stalled economy moving again’. Labor blamed the Greens for instability, directing their campaign attack as much against them as the Liberals. The Green’s position had become analogous to that of the Democratic Labor Party in the Senate during the 1950s, which had begun its parliamentary career with some affinity for Labor policies, but ended it with deep hostility (Maddox 1992, 22). The Labor Party’s structure was never sufficiently resilient to accommodate the Accord and the required continuing negotiations; even if it had
been, by the end the relationships were so poisonous that it is unlikely any headway could be made.

This election displayed the damage that a mass party such as Labor could suffer as it tried to weave together the disparate support groups. Belatedly, Labor had decided that it could not accommodate the postmaterialists and, in a desperate attempt to shore up its traditional support base, focussed clearly on employment within resource based industries. Labor had recognised that it could never survive without its traditional base, but it was too late to restructure to satisfy everyone. Traditional Labor voters deserted the party in droves, and the Labor vote fell to a record low (see table 6.1).

Table 6.1 Percentage of First Preference Votes by Electorate

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Bass</th>
<th>Braddon</th>
<th>Denison</th>
<th>Franklin</th>
<th>Lyons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LABOR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>37.4</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>36.9</td>
<td>38.28</td>
<td>31.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>20.75</td>
<td>33.6</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>26.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference</td>
<td>-7.9</td>
<td>-9.15</td>
<td>-3.3</td>
<td>-4.28</td>
<td>-4.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIBERAL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>47.3</td>
<td>57.5</td>
<td>38.4</td>
<td>40.1</td>
<td>51.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>56.5</td>
<td>65.75</td>
<td>44.0</td>
<td>46.25</td>
<td>58.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference</td>
<td>+9.2</td>
<td>+8.25</td>
<td>+5.6</td>
<td>+6.15</td>
<td>+6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GREEN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>16.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>11.37</td>
<td>8.75</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>15.87</td>
<td>12.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference</td>
<td>-3.93</td>
<td>-2.75</td>
<td>-5.4</td>
<td>-3.83</td>
<td>-4.65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It was in the traditional areas that Labor lost its votes – for example, in the industrial area of George Town the vote for Labor dropped from 56.7 percent in 1989 to 37.9 percent in 1992. Clearly the working-class saw the Accord as a failure, and acted accordingly. The message was that they saw the Accord as a threat to their jobs and value system – the politics of the environment showed its capacity to excite and drive a significant portion of the industrial working-class into the welcoming arms of the right (Hay 1994, 7). The ALP lost two seats, leaving it with only eleven in the House of Assembly and, although the Green vote dropped from 17.1 to 13.4 percent, all five Greens held their seats. The Liberals had by the election, gained a new
leader, Ray Groom, who was in stark contrast to the acerbic, populist Gray; it won a majority with 19 seats.

The election left the Labor Party bruised and antagonistic to the Greens. The experiment of the Accord had showed that, although there was some congruence of policy, there was a huge gulf in values, which the ALP had not been able to encompass without alienating its working-class support. For their part the Greens had not been able to engender a paradigm shift in the broader community that would lead to a greater acceptance of their beliefs and ultimately be transformed into electoral support.

Labor State Secretary, Eugene Alexander, predicted that Labor would not win back government in its own right for a long time while the party's concern with keeping a balance between the environment and development led it to being a party for neither side. He listed the alternatives:

- keep being balanced and sensible with little chance of gaining government for a long time
- go 'green' and try and win back the 'idealist' vote
- go pro-development at any cost and win back the 'worker' vote (Examiner 18 February 1991).

Alexander said that, in the long term the first option was the only real possibility, with the hope that over time the division within the community would heal.

**ALP restructuring**

The 1992 election result was the worst electoral defeat for Labor since 1910. It led to a period of introspection and discussion on how to rebuild the party. The first step was to review its structure. Membership was at historically low levels, with the broad membership having only a fading confidence in the PLP. Many party members believed that the PLP no longer cared about or expressed party policy through the parliamentary program or strategy, and that
the administrative structure of the party was tired, too preoccupied with factional battles and inappropriate for the task of rebuilding the Labor base, and that the Labor party faced a long period in opposition unless drastic action was taken to rebuild the party (Lennon 1996).

The opportunity to change course came at the 1992 Labor State Conference when the party met to determine the order of preselection for the Senate elections. The circumstances of the event are also of interest, for they clearly illustrate the differences in the structures of the Labor and Liberal parties.

In the lead-up to the 1993 Federal election, Liberal Member of the House of Representatives, Bruce Goodluck, announced his resignation from the seat of Franklin. Both the Federal leader and the State division wanted Peter Hodgman (a Minister in the State Liberal Government) to contest the seat (Examiner 16 December 1992). Hodgman nominated — but was rejected by the Franklin electorate committee in favour of Graeme Gilbert, a little known radio announcer. It was suggested the committee resented the assumption that Hodgman would be endorsed automatically (Examiner 19 December 1992). Gilbert won the endorsement but subsequently lost the election. The Liberal Party, although aghast at the turn of events, could not intervene because it was impossible under their constitution.

By contrast, the results of an endorsement dispute in the Labor Party had a different result. In 1992 Senator Michael Tate, Tasmania’s only Federal Labor Minister, was dumped as a result of factional brawling to the unwinnable fourth position on the ticket, an action described by the National President, Senator Loosely, as “intolerable folly” (Advocate 24 February 1992). Tate blamed the structure of the ALP. He said that the result reflected neither party opinion nor that of the Tasmanian community; he called this act “the last gasp of old-style Labor in Tasmania” (Mercury 24 February 1992). Tate’s comments were directed at the left faction for he felt that the left had conspired to drop him down the ticket so that the niece of an influential ‘old guard’ left leader could be placed above him. He thought that he had performed well as a Federal Minister and was concerned at the deliberate misuse of power to endorse another preferred person (personal conversation Michael Tate 20 July 1998).
However, Tate also admits that he was confident that the National Executive would not allow him to be passed over and deliberately heightened his language and rhetoric to gain media interest. He felt the left had made a miscalculation that would lead to their downfall, but he did not anticipate the full ramifications of these events (conversation Michael Tate 20 July 1998). The Federal organisation, recognising the problems the left’s action could cause, quickly intervened. The powerful National Executive, which has the power to intervene in State matters, placed Senator Tate in the number one position; thus assuring him of re-election (Mercury 7 March 1992). This decision to dump Tate had led to the National Executive intervening in the Tasmanian party’s affairs.

It soon became obvious that factional dealings were merely a symptom of a party in deep malaise. State leader Field spoke of the urgent need for reform to broaden the branch and give members a greater sense of participation (Advocate 24 February 1992). Field described the internal scene at that time:

The culture of the Labor Party was one of winner-take-all, knock them down and kick them out. When the Left was dominant with a small and narrow-based power group they used the Labor Party as a play thing for power games, and didn’t think beyond that – the game was enough in itself (Field 1997).

Assistant National Secretary, Ian Henderson, was appointed State administrator by the National Executive (Advocate 29 February 1992), with the task of restructuring the Tasmanian branch – such an action would have been impossible in the Liberal Party, where each State branch is autonomous. The mechanism for changing the rigid structure, giving more input to members and policy development, was instituted at the 1993 State Labor Conference. The State Conference endorsed a structure for policy development and established four broad policy committees: economic, social, environment and land management, and government. It adopted a process that would ensure comprehensive community consultation, the development of well-documented supporting information, research into the likely cost of policies and the attitudes of interest groups, and cooperation between policy committees. It
was hoped that such a broad process would lead to appropriate and achievable policy
and therefore be implemented by the Labor Party when in government.

The PLP actively supported the National Executive’s intervention in the Tasmanian
branch of the ALP. Labor had reached such a low level of support that it had
nothing to lose in restructuring and redeveloping a clear ideological and strategic
position. If there were to be major changes, the Party needed the structure to carry
them out. Federal intervention gave the impetus for an interim administrative and
review committee to focus on reform of the rules and processes of the Tasmanian
branch. Intervention, which was supported by the overwhelming majority of the
Party members, resulted in a complete rewrite of the party rules and to more formal
links being built between the PLP and the administration of the party. Central to this
was the appointment of Sue MacKay to the position of State Secretary. She had
previously worked on Michael Field’s staff, developing a strong bond between the
party office and the PLP. This relationship between the administration, party office
and the PLP proved crucial in winning back the confidence and trust of the broad
party membership. The Labor Party moved to lessen members’ concerns,
recognising that policy could not be implemented without broad agreement between
the party organisation and the Parliamentary Labor Party.

Labor’s moves to increase membership

Figure 6.2. ALP Membership 1992-1996.

The extremely low levels of 1992 could not continue if an effective organisation was
to be maintained. Dealing with this problem of the party’s declining numbers was
one of the tasks of the new caretaker of the party. In the State office’s review of the Labor Party, emphasis was placed on the need to recruit new members, retain existing members and find out what members expected from the party by way of education. A survey of members was presented to the Administration and Review Committee of the Labor Party in May 1993. Of the 79 responses over 75 percent believed education should be provided in the areas of ALP history and party structure, and training given on how to participate and how to run Local branches.

As a result of the survey the Administration and Review Committee agreed in June 1993 to develop a comprehensive program of training and education. In August 1993 it agreed on a new membership strategy to lift the level of skills and interest among existing members and to recruit new members. By September 1993 membership had risen to over 1000, of which 972 were financial; by July 1996 membership was relatively stable at just over 1,100 (see figure 6.2). The Labor Party, for the first time in decades, had established a formal membership strategy and membership targets (Labor News September 1993, 3).

A redefining of Labor ideology and a new party structure resulted in a resurgence of support. Members were again actively recruited and understood that they had an opportunity for greater involvement than in the past. The continued delivery of a clear ideological position and continued involvement of members appear to be the keys to increasing membership.

**Relationship with the unions**

The PLP's relationship with the trade unions was also identified as a major weakness in the election. Accordingly, the PLP resolved to re-establish strong links with the unions, and through them blue-collar workers. Two events in 1992 served as instruments in this process; both provided the PLP with the opportunity to publicly display its traditional links with the working-class.

**APPM dispute – Labor’s support of the strikers**

In March 1992 management at the Australian Pulp and Paper Makers (APPM) Burnie paper and pulp mills informed its workers that it intended to introduce a series of efficiency measures that would involve the removal of over-award
conditions. This decision had been made without consulting the unions, which resulted in workers walking out and establishing picket lines outside the mill (Dalwood 1992b, 458-9). The dispute became national and turned into the biggest industrial disruption in Tasmania for decades. The PLP donated $1000 to the workers' fighting fund and travelled to Burnie early in the dispute to support the striking workers. These actions, made when public support was divided between the company and its employees, gave the PLP renewed credibility. The company's decision to fly in martial-arts trained 'security guards' from Melbourne was the turning point in the public relations war.

The PLP's actions marked a thawing of its relationship with many unions and their shop floor representatives. It helped re-establish Labor's credentials with its traditional base, as the Parliamentary Labor Party came to be seen as genuinely supporting the workers. The fact that the PLP had publicly supported the striking workers well before the company brought in the guards benefited Labor, because many workers believed that the Premier Groom's support was contingent on public opinion and not on the strength of the relative cases of the company and the employees:

We weren't seen as a 'Johnny come lately' looking for political advantage ... that was important both from our point of view in re-establishing our own self esteem back with our traditional supporters as well as them seeing that we were the party that was genuinely on side with them (Lennon 1997)

Department of Construction redundancies
The second dispute arose in December 1992 when the Government used security guards to remove 127 workers from the Department of Construction work site after the Government had decided to issue redundancies. Consistent with the approach in the APPM dispute, the PLP had taken an early decision to back the employees. The Labor Party spokesman on Industrial Relations, Paul Lennon, personally handled the redundancy claims and related problems of hundreds of workers (Lennon 1997). By the time of the December action, Labor's credentials had been established. Lennon's attendance at the Lampton Avenue workshops on the morning of 2 December, when the security guards began removing the workers, was seen as a
genuine show of support for them rather than a publicity stunt by Labor. Both disputes gave union officials cause to question their previously held view that Labor had become ‘elitist’ and removed from its traditional support base.

**Trades and Labour Advisory Council**

Against this background of closer union links, the PLP began negotiations with the Tasmanian Trades and Labour Council to reach a joint agreement on industrial relations. One of the complaints of the union movement had been that there was no adequate consultation in the period of Government 1989-1992. The aim was to reach a formal agreement in the lead-up to the 1996 election and, by re-establishing credibility with the union movement, remove any remaining barrier to the unions openly supporting the Labor Party in the election campaign (Lennon 1997). As a result, the Trades and Labour Advisory Council (TLAC) was set up with representatives of the PLP and the TTLC. After 18 months of negotiations in May 1995, a document entitled *Working Future* was formally agreed to. It was endorsed by the Labor Party at the June 1995 State Conference; for the first time in years a working relationship had been established with both affiliated and unaffiliated unions.

The document’s purpose was to define a set of common understandings and commitments that would apply to both the union movement and the Labor Party when next in government. It also dealt with contentious issues such as repealing enterprise bargaining legislation (which the Liberals had introduced in 1992), thought by the unions to advantage employers at the expense of employees. With the ill feeling caused by the 1992 sackings of the Department of Construction employees still fresh, it also committed the Party not to retrench or make redundant any employee of the Tasmanian government against their will (*Working Future, Job Security with Labor*, June 1995, 3). With this document Labor’s strategic alliance with the unions not only negated employee ill-will but became an electoral advantage, as it gave the unions a reason to clearly support Labor at the election.

Despite obvious successes the PLP was suspicious of two unions: the Health and Community Services Union (HACSU) and the Australian Education Union (AEU). Although their officials had attended meetings and were signatories to the TLAC
agreement, they were seen as being closely linked with the Greens and unwilling to help Labor reach their members (Field 1997a). The suspicion was understandable, as many teachers were believed to support the Greens, and the Greens’ strongly supported education funding. But the PLP thought the leadership of HACSU was out of line with its membership, many of whom had low paid and relatively low-skilled jobs, which made its members more open to Labor approaches. In this instance the decision was made to ignore the leadership and focus on the members by making public statements on health issues and by personal contact.

In the same way as the union contacts had broken down during the period of the Accord, Labor believed it had also lost contact with, and the confidence of, many community groups. Shortly after the election Deputy Leader Patmore went to New South Wales to find out how its Labor Party had campaigned. As a result of this trip, the ALP began community consultations called ‘Labor Listens.’ The PLP made regular visits to regional Tasmania, where the initial reception by many groups was frosty and wary. However, with perseverance, the campaign became a success. While large numbers of the community did not come to the consultations, the Labor Party could argue it was closer to the grassroots of the community than the other political parties, and in touch with their views and aspirations.

ALP Strategy to Regain Traditional and ‘Soft Green’ Voters

Having turned its attention to rebuilding, the ALP finally had to consider its relationship with the Greens. The problems of the past were by now apparent to all members: Labor had had the support of voters with two distinct orientations. Field described them as the traditional labor or ‘fairness’ voter, oriented to economic issues, and the ‘quality-of-life voters’ who have never known economic hard times but whose priorities were the environment, individual freedom and education (Field 1994a). To win back this support a strategy was formulated to attract both types of voters.

The Party saw its first task as attracting back its base voters, many of whom had voted for the Liberal Party in 1992 because the environmental debates of the 1980s’ and the budget cuts and perceived instability during the Accord. Field believed they
were ready to return to the Labor Party, but were waiting to be convinced that there would not be a repeat of a Labor minority government dealing with the Greens.

The second part of the strategy was to convince the ‘quality-of-life’ or ‘soft green’ voters, by way of new environmental policies, that it was safe for to return to Labor. Labor released an option paper entitled ‘Tasmania’s Environment: The Best by 2000’ on environmental issues, addressing such issues as water quality, waste management, coastal management, marine protection, pesticides and endangered species (Sunday Tasmanian, 29 May 1994). Labor believed that, when faced with political instability or a conservative government, the ‘soft’ green voters would be more likely to vote Labor if it was seen to have valid environmental policies.

Labor also recognised that the Greens were electorally vulnerable in the electorates of Braddon, Bass and Lyons, where their primary vote was below a quota. A large percentage of their second preferences still went to Labor, even after the acrimonious disputes of the Accord. To survive, the Greens had to attack both Labor and Liberal parties or run the risk of some of its supporters switching over to Labor. Labor targeted Green voters by identifying and running candidates who would appeal to soft Green voters, as well as candidates who would appeal to the traditional voters. Its approach was to use direct mail to voters in areas that had a high level of Green support.

The nature of the Green voters is such they are more likely to respond to data base direct mail. The advantage of this technique is that it will not confuse the traditional Labor voters with mixed messages. Candidates become important in gathering data and being equipped to be able to give the right message to these ‘soft’ Green voters (Field 1994b).

The decision to rule out another minority government with Green support was a strategy designed to attract both traditional Labor and ‘light green’ voters:

The Labor Party is united over not governing in minority with the Green support except for a minority voice or two on the fringes. Our task is to convince the community that we have learnt the lesson of the Labor-Green
Accord, and that if we are genuine about renewing the Tasmanian community with a true agenda of reform, we have to do it as a majority Labor government.

At the same time, the Greens will be working overtime to convince the electorate of just the opposite, because their very survival depends on it (Field 1994a).

The hard line of no deals, no coalition and no minority government was seen as fundamental in determining the future shape of the ALP, but both the party members and the broader electorate had to be convinced. At the ALP State Conference in June 1993 the delegates endorsed the PLP’s position of no minority government. Significantly this was supported by the National Secretary, Gary Gray, who assured the State ALP that the National Executive would not try and force the State party to accept minority government (Mercury 13 June 1993) – a stance the Greens quickly branded as immature (Examiner 13 June 1993).

**Internal Labor Opposition to its Election Strategy**

The decision not to deal with the Greens was not unanimous; a group of members within the ALP took up the Green agenda under the banner of the Social Ecological Economic Cultural Alliance (SEECA). SEECA had been formed by ALP members who opposed the PLP’s introduction of Resource Security legislation and who supported the Accord. In February 1992 it was joined by Labor Senator Devereux, AustraMaddox (a past President of the TTLC), and Ros Harvey (Secretary of the Health and Community Services Union). In May 1992 the Tasmanian Greens became involved. Its aim was to work with the broader labour movement, members of the ALP and unions, but not the PLP after its initial advances had been rebuffed (Kohl 1994, 8).

SEECA had its origins in a group of people deeply disturbed by the circumstances in which the February 1992 State election was called. The election result highlighted the need to bring progressive people together to define common ground and achieve agreed objectives on economic and social justice issues . . . . The first essential step is to identify a shared vision for the State’s future. To this end SEECA aims to stimulate a dialogue
between Labor, Green and other progressive movements in order to . . .
formulate appropriate agenda, strategies and programs for action (SEECA 1992, 16).

This was not the first time Green groups had formed within the ALP. In 1990 the Green Network was established in Tasmania. Open to all members of the ALP, its aims included the promotion of conservation issues and the conservation movement. Its focus was on making the Accord work and closing the apparent gulf separating the Labor and Conservation movements (ALP Green Network Newsletter undated). Its newsletters were used as a forum for debate, predominantly against woodchipping and logging in the National Estate forests. Articles were written by ALP Huon Branch Member Peg Putt. She later resigned from the ALP and stand as a Green candidate in the 1992 election, gaining a seat in the House of Assembly when Dr Brown resigned to contest the Federal seat of Denison. The Green Network was not ultimately powerful enough to change Labor policy; it disappeared after the 1992 election, when SEECA took up its role.

SEECA’s aims of fostering an agreement with the Greens and ruling out minority government were at odds with the PLP’s strategy. SEECA soon was regarded as a ‘Green front’, and antagonisms developed. Some of the members, who were also ALP members, denied the Accord was unworkable and criticised the PLP for intransigence in ruling out minority government, stating they were considering their membership of the ALP (Letter to SEECA members 1 November 1994). The PLP’s response was swift. Field declared:

If people don’t like that decision then they can leave and that would be my advice to the ‘telephone box’ minority.
If they feel that way, the sooner they go off and join the Greens and get out the better.
They shouldn’t hang around trying to weaken the Labor Party by attacking it and then pretend they’ve got the interests of the Labor Party at heart (M Field quoted in Advocate 2 November 1994).
To underline the solidarity of purpose all members of the PLP signed a pledge reconfirming the decision that, although determined to work towards a majority government, in the event they were not successful, they would not form a minority government. They stated: “Labor’s reform agenda is broad and more progressive than that of the Green Party, or any other political party. Only the Labor Party is capable of delivery stable and progressive government to the people of Tasmania” (PLP letter 1 December 1994).

A Vindication of Labor Strategy – the 1996 Election

Despite intense pressure by the Greens and a minority of Labor members, such as Senator Devereux and Austra Maddox (both of whom resigned and unsuccessfully contested the 1996 election as environmental candidates), Labor’s position remained firm. Labor’s electoral strategy to the Green voters was summarised by the Deputy Leader: “The choice for Green supporters is clear – if you want a reformist and progressive government, then Labor is the only choice. Don’t vote Green and expect a deal because it will not happen” (Patmore letter to Editor Examiner 23 September 1995). The Greens responded by compiling a list of ‘bottom line’ demands at its annual conference in October 1994. The Greens said they would negotiate an arrangement ‘which suits us’, but if no arrangement can be negotiated with either major party then the Greens would allow the party that won the most seats at the election to govern (Examiner 17 October 1994). These arrangements were to be expanded to ministries if it held the balance of power (Mercury 24 January 1996).

The campaign for the election was similar in many ways to the 1989 and 1992 campaigns, with the leaders of both major parties focusing on the need for stable government. Throughout the campaign Field held the line that he wouldn’t govern in any circumstances in minority government, although the Liberal leader, Groom, appeared to waiver on this (Tanner 1996, 452).

Milne, shortly before the election date, reconfirmed that she was prepared to work with either major party and canvassed a number of options: a full partnership; a Charter of Stability and Good Government, under which the Greens would give up the right to move no-confidence motions except in specified circumstances; and the final option, to allow the party with the most seats to govern (Tanner 1996, 452).
The State election on 24 February 1996 saw an almost 13 percent swing away from the Liberals, and a decline in the Green vote for the second election in a row from nearly 14 percent to about 11 percent, while there was a swing towards the Labor Party of nearly 12 percent. Labor achieved a primary vote of over 40 percent for the first time since 1979. The Liberals lost 3 seats to retain 16, the Greens lost 1 seat to retain 4, the ALP gained 3 seats to reach 14 seats. One independent – disaffected Liberal Bruce Goodluck – was returned (See table 6.3).

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Immediately after the elections the Greens sought to deal with the Labor Party, refusing to bring down the Liberals in the absence of such a deal, stating that “he [Field] could have Government tomorrow by forming a partnership with the Greens” (Examiner 28 February 1996). The Labor Party refused their offers. It was intent on testing the Greens support of the Liberals, believing such support would upset Green voters. Labor’s promise not to deal with the Greens held; it probably had a large part in convincing voters who had deserted Labor in dismay over the Accord to return (Mercury Editorial 27 February 1996, Examiner Editorial, 28 February 1996).

The Liberal Leader, Groom, showed that he was prepared to negotiate with the Greens, but shortly after the election stood down as Premier, leaving Braddon MHA
Tony Rundle to take the position. At later meetings, and after Rundle agreed to double the Greens' funding to $196,000 and provide them with a new suite of offices, the Greens decided to support the Liberals (Tanner 1996, 454). The outcome for the Liberals was essentially a de facto government for as long as it had the confidence of the house, with Labor 'languishing' in opposition for as long as it refused to deal with the Greens (Crowley 1996, 530).

The Greens were forced to support the Liberal minority government. Their support included ruling out any amendments to the Liberal's first budget, resulting in criticism that they were giving the Liberals a 'dream run' (Mercury 7 September 1996). For example, during the Estimates Committee debate, the Environment and Land Management Minister, Peter Hodgman, told the committee that 89 jobs would be going from his department to overcome a Federal cut. Funding would not be given to establish of a threatened species unit; the $15 million promised in the election for cleaning up rivers would not be allocated, and the department was still considering tourist developments on the World Heritage Area fringes. The Greens spokesperson, Peg Putt, issued a press release defending the Government's job cuts and made no attempt to amend the budget (Mercury 7 September 1996). Field summarises his view of this situation:

I think that, given that the Greens have gone down from 17 percent in 1989 to 11.2 percent, the Greens are scared shitless of losing all their seats and therefore are very acquiescent to the Liberals. I don't think that was better illustrated than them voting for a budget that gave further expenditure on the so-called Tarkine road, which the year before the Greens were prepared to go to jail over (Field 1997a).

**ALP strategy post 1996**

The PLP, although disappointed at not winning a majority, never seriously considered a deal with the Greens, believing their strategy between 1992 and 1996 had been successful. The PLP believed that, if it had made a threshold issue of its stance on minority government, the party would have been fragmented; instead there was a strong swing back to Labor in its traditional areas (M Field 1996b). Although
the PLP never formally discussed the possibility of dealing with the Greens, Field and his deputy Patmore did consider it. Both recognised that such a hard-line position might not be sustainable indefinitely; particularly if Labor were to fall short in the 1996 election by one seat. In that event it was thought that Field could resign, leaving the ex-Secretary of the Tasmanian Trades and Labour Council, Jim Bacon, to become leader if he was elected to the House of Assembly. Both recognised that Field would lack the credibility to deal with the Greens, whereas Bacon was unencumbered from past dealings (personal conversation with M Field 13 July 1998). In any event these plans went no further, for Labor was returned with two fewer seats than the Liberals.

From a historically low base, the ALP had a record swing towards it. Furthermore, in spite of the large swing against the Liberal Party, the Greens did not benefit from it: their State-wide vote was down by 2 percent. The ALP vote was now almost level with the Liberals, and was close to another three seats – one each in Braddon, Denison and Franklin.

Labor’s aim for the next election would be to win seats in Braddon, Denison and Franklin and take another seat in either Lyons or Bass. With the Liberals well below a fourth quota in Bass, the ALP would need a swing to take it above the Green vote, and obtain the seventh seat in that electorate ahead of the Green candidate. The ALP also regarded Christine Milne as vulnerable to a swing against her. Labor’s task was therefore to achieve majority government as soon as possible after the 1996 budget.

To do so the ALP’s strategy was to

- Highlight the present ‘government by compromise’ arrangements whereby the Liberals depend on Green support for their survival and the Greens are forced to compromise their principles to avoid a second election.
- Develop Labor’s public profile as the party of principle and the party of genuine and responsible reform.
- Develop an expectation within the community about the inevitable election of a Labor government (Field 1996a).
The ALP believed that, given the Green’s commitment to a four-year term and their refusal to support another party’s no-confidence motion, it might well be the Liberals who would seek an election. Field thought the Greens would have a problem supporting a conservative government while maintaining their integrity; and also having to attack Labor because of their vulnerability in some seats. Brown believed otherwise because “the Liberals are at a greater distance in policy terms from the Greens than Labor Party... and that in some ways clears the air. The tension is also somewhat defrayed because the basic running of government doesn’t involve competition towards a common goal” (Brown 1998, 96). The Labor Party still regard any relationship with the Greens as inherently unstable for ideological as well as pragmatic reasons. The Greens could not afford to have Labor doing well or they would lose their vote base.

It is a hearts and minds game where we have to combine the quality of life voter and the fairness voter under the Labor umbrella. Now the Greens are fighting for a section of that vote, we have to get a reasonable amount of it back under the Hare-Clark system to take Green seats, and therefore because we are fighting over the territory it is a political civil war (Field 1997a).

Field’s views are supported by a Labor Party poll (UMR Research 1996, 48-51) that showed that, although Green voters overwhelmingly believed that Labor should have formed a government with the Greens (76 percent), and would have preferred the Greens to be in a minority government with Labor rather than Liberal (81 percent preferred Labor to Liberal), the majority of Labor voters opposed such a course (67 percent). When more detailed questions were asked, nearly half (48 percent) of Labor voters said they would be less likely to vote Labor if Labor was prepared to go into a minority government with the Greens. Of those who said they would be ‘a lot less likely’ to vote Labor, the highest percentages were in Labor’s heartland – voters who regarded themselves as working-class and earned less than $25,000 per year (UMR Research 1996, 49). The poll and Labor member’s discussions with voters gave the Labor Party a firm base on which to build the electoral strategy:
For us to say that we would govern in minority would be letting the potential Green voter off the hook because they then wouldn’t have to make the choice between a Labor or Liberal government. It would also have the effect of diminishing our vote in the traditional areas. What we had to achieve was a situation where progressive politics in Tasmania was united under one umbrella (M Field 1996 b, 9 - 10).

The aim was to give a stark choice. A Liberal-Green minority or a Labor majority. “Labor believes Green supporters would see themselves as being generally more radical than Labor, yet also see that their party is supporting ideologically right-wing budgets, and for this reason Labor bases its strategy on the Greens being unable to support the Liberals indefinitely” (Field 1996b, 11).

Faced with the reality of a minority government, both the Liberals and Greens have put the best possible argument forward to justify their actions to their supporters. The Greens publicly regard the arrangement as delivering stability, a highly productive and democratic parliament, cooperation between political parties and an accountable government (Milne 1996), while the Liberal Speaker of the House of Assembly, Dr Madill, claimed that a minority government overwhelmingly “makes for a far better Parliament” (Madill 1996, 3).

**Labor’s Leadership Change**

Throughout Field’s leadership the members of the PLP, in particular, developed strong loyalties. These loyalties can be appreciated by briefly reviewing Field’s leadership and the bitterness of deposed leader, Neil Batt. Field was elected after a midnight coup, of which he was not the prime instigator; in fact Field pleaded with Batt to react to leadership concerns before action was taken. Throughout the whole campaign to depose Batt, Field was a reluctant participant. He was convinced to stand only when a leadership spill became inevitable and Bass MHA Peter Patmore would have the required votes to become leader if Field failed to contest the vote. When Field, agreed Patmore stood aside and ran for the position of deputy leader.

Batt was deposed at a midnight meeting in December 1988. It left him with an abiding bitterness, which some people believed bordered on hatred, for those
responsible for his demise (personal conversation Fran Bladel 14 July 1998). This was exampled by Batt’s actions the next day when he entered the Labor Party meeting rooms in Parliament House and the framed photograph of Labor leaders was ripped from the wall. Batt smashed the frame and its glass on the arm of a sofa, threw the remains to the floor, trampled on the glass and tore out his own photograph. These actions, witnessed by MHAs Fran Bladel and John White, were carried out in a “cold rage” (personal conversation John White 14 July 1998). After this, Batt rarely spoke to any member of the PLP. In the February 1989 election Batt, much to the relief of his colleagues, was defeated. But no one doubted Batt’s feelings on the issue, particularly when he later precipitated a crisis for the Party after he had been appointed Ombudsman.

Although the vote to elect Field was not unanimous, any concerns about his abilities became irrelevant due to a speedy election in 1989 and the Accord that followed. Field’s leadership, with Patmore as deputy, was to span three elections: 1989, 1992 and 1996. In all these the party failed to obtain majority government, even sinking in 1989 to its historically lowest electoral levels. Yet the PLP remained loyal. The party had, in the past, treated leaders harshly, especially those whom it thought could not guarantee success. Most of the PLP members had years of experience in factional dealings and infighting before they had even been elected – so why was Field treated differently? In conversations with people who were Members at that time, they gave personal rather than pragmatic reasons. All comment upon his individual and party loyalty and his talent for melding together a coherent and focussed team. Former Administrative Services Minister, Fran Bladel, describes it as a process of personal loyalty overcoming factional loyalty, whereby she believed in Field’s genuineness and integrity (personal conversation Fran Bladel 14 July 1998).

To this must be added the turbulent events of the Accord, where the PLP members were increasingly forced to rely on each other for support. The period of the Accord was a time of intense emotions and tension for all of the PLP as each member came to grips with minority government and a near-bankrupt State. Electorally unpopular decisions had to be made, often after intense lobbying and pressure from the Greens. In all these situations Field strengthened the members’ support. The two and a half
years of the Accord can best be described by listing some of the events that occurred: firstly, the State faced bankruptcy unless harsh budgets were put in place, secondly, a Royal Commission was held into attempts to bribe a member of the Labor Party; thirdly, the Deputy Premier was forced to resign after Greens threatened a no-confidence motion over his administration of the Education portfolio. Finally, all members of the PLP were investigated by police after the Ombudsman, overthrown leader Neil Batt, alleged that he was only given the position as ombudsman if he agreed not to stand for Parliament again – this would have been a breach of the Criminal Code. Members of the PLP, most of whom had no ministerial experience, found themselves thrown into conflict and forced to give evidence in both a Royal commission and committal proceedings prior to Supreme Court hearings. It is therefore a combination of all these factors, together with Field’s personality, which guaranteed him such an unlikely period of leadership.

Field’s support could not last forever and could not allay concerns from elsewhere within the Party. The problem for Labor was to develop an expectation of a Labor government. Some believed that Field had lost the impetus to take Labor to that next stage. Public doubts were raised about his ability. An opinion poll showed support for Field as Premier at just 22.5 percent (Mercury 4 January 1997). These doubts were not new, having been raised by others members of the Party even before the election.

One of the strongest critics was the State Secretary, Sue McKay, who had an acrimonious dispute with Field over the question of leadership. Even throughout the 1996 campaign McKay sought to depose Field, going so far as to insert an extra question in a pre-election poll (without the knowledge of other party members). It asked people to say who they thought would be the best leader. Field believed this question was inserted to give leverage to those who sought to depose him (personal conversation with M Field 13 July 1998). Field regarded this as politically thoughtless, particularly when the question became a media story in the middle of the campaign after the polling agency polled one of the Liberal Premier’s staff.

McKay, accompanied by Senator Nick Sherry, approached the national secretary, Gary Gray, to try and enlist his support for pressuring Field to resign during the
campaign. They suggested that Jim Bacon be considered the leader-elect, even though he was not, at that stage, even a member of parliament. Informed of this by Gray, Field confronted both McKay and Sherry, forcing a stand-off for the duration of the campaign. Field thinks Sherry was reacting to electoral pressure from the electorate of Braddon, where Field was unpopular. Field is less understanding of McKay’s actions, branding them as the result of “megalomania” (personal conversation with M Field 13 July 1998).

After the election, concerns about Fields leadership continued to be raised. Shortly after the February 1996 election, a potential rival, Paul Lennon, was made Deputy Leader in the hope this would stop Lennon becoming discontented and challenging Field. The PLP strategists also considered offering the leadership to Jim Bacon, past secretary of the TTLC. In late April 1997, while Field was overseas, concerns boiled over into damaging stories in the press. Field returned, recognised the damage such controversy could do to the Labor party in any forthcoming elections, but also recognised the need to maintain the primacy of the PLP. He summed up these difficulties at a Parliamentary Labor Party meeting:

I intend to do the right thing by the party but the present circumstances are such that we have to hold the line or else the control of the PLP will be determined outside the PLP. Therefore we have to assert our integrity as a group. We will determine the direction of the PLP not anyone else (Field. Statement to Parliamentary Labor Party meeting 4 March 1997).

Field knew by this stage that he would be unlikely to take the Party to victory at the next election, being “fairly battle-scarred” (Field 1997a). Field waited for some time so that it could not be seen that anyone other than the PLP made leadership decisions, and then chose to resign, supporting Bacon as leader in the process. This bloodless leadership transition allowed Labor to position itself for the election with a more articulate leader, but one who also accepted the strategy of no deals with the Greens.

The leadership change gave no comfort to the other parties: the Liberal Premier Rundle had a 28.3 percent level of approval and Greens Leader Milne 9.9 percent
(Mercury 1 January 1997). After almost a year of minority government neither of the major parties had been able to break the deadlock; there was a 'perception of an overall sense of malaise in the State' (Dr Herr quoted in Mercury 4 January 1997). Only the next election would show whether Labor’s restructuring, new leadership and strategies were sufficient to combat the challenges from both the Greens and the Liberal Party and give it the winning edge.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has shown how Labor changed its strategy after its futile attempts at cooperation with the Greens had failed. The Party, having lost support under the pressure of the Accord, finally was forced to decide upon a firm strategy to regain its primacy. It took both the ideological and structural steps to make this a success, using to good effect the federal intervention in its affairs, restructuring to open up the party to greater debate and input from its membership. Thus Labor re-established its links with its traditional support base through the unions and by dealing in an appropriate fashion with the industrial disputes in Burnie and Hobart, finally seeking an accommodation with the union movement, which guaranteed their support in future elections.

At the same time Labor dealt unequivocally with the Greens and the question of minority government, sending a clear message to the electorate aimed at attracting both traditional materialist support and a proportion of postmaterialist support. By the time Field stepped down from the leadership, the structure and strategy to aim at electoral success were firmly locked into place. The die had been cast, with the positions of all parties, both ideological and structural, finally becoming clear.

It is therefore possible to compare both the parties and their support base; the next chapter will do so as it considers the implications for both Labor and the Greens. For any party to win in the present configuration, it is essential to be able to identify areas of support and the issues that are important to supporters. The previous elections have established that a large proportion of the population will not remain aligned to a particular party if it appears to be ignoring their interests. The Greens have achieved their aim of becoming a third political force in Tasmania (Bates
quoted in Newman 1992, 264), and have been part of the parliamentary process for sufficient time for both their ideology and the characteristics of their supporters to be understood.
CHAPTER 7

STRUCTURAL AND IDEOLOGICAL COMPARISONS

Introduction
Chapter four compared the established parties before the ideological onslaught of new politics and the Greens in Tasmania; this chapter compares the parties after the event. The 1980s were a period of upheaval as the Labor Party, in particular, strove to deal with the challenges. The Greens evolved into a political party holding the balance of power which affected their structure and pursuit of their ideological goals as they adjusted in turn competitively and cooperatively. But after the 1992 election there was a time of relative stability: there were no high-profile environmental disputes, the Greens were established in parliament with a defined ideology, and Labor had finally adopted a clear strategy for dealing with the Green challenge.

This chapter takes advantage of the relative calm to compare the structural and ideological characteristics of both the Greens and Labor. Duverger's broad classification and more specific Tasmanian criteria are used to clarify their placement. These elements will show that the real political conflict in Tasmania is not between the conservatives and the Labor party but between the two progressive parties, the ALP and Greens. The different structures (including leadership autonomy) interact to determine the opportunities and constraints within which the parties manoeuvre to attain political ascendancy.

The ideology and values of each party, and how they express them, are next reviewed. Attitudes to society, strength of ideology, and the commitment of members all illustrate that values and ideology are as important to supporters today as they were decades ago. In fact, with the changes to party structures wrought by society and technology, values become as important as structure in fully identifying party types in Tasmania. Ideology is shown to have a clear effect on the structure of the Tasmanian parties. This chapter identifies and considers the ecocentric, wilderness-based ideology of the Greens and its ramifications for the other parties. An analysis of booth returns to compare socio-economic differences confirms that
education is a determinant of voting behaviour and shows clear socio-economic distinctions between party supporters.

**Structural Comparisons**

**The Labor Party as a Mass Party**

It is just as well that Duverger (1967) lists criteria other than simply membership numbers to define a mass party, because none of the Tasmanian parties has a large membership, and none is likely to have one in the future. Parties with a member/voter ratio of less than 5 percent are regarded by Kitschelt (1994, 221) to approximate the type of framework party with a modest membership – in theory less rigid in structure. On the 1996 electoral returns, the Tasmanian Labor Party had a member/voter ratio of 1:108, based on 119,262 valid primary votes and 1100 members. The Greens had a higher member/voter ratio of 82:1, based on 32,813 valid primary votes and 400 members. On this basis the Labor Party is technically more akin to a framework party than the Greens, but to use only this criterion is to ignore the hierarchical structure of the Labor Party and its expressive nature.

Chapter four showed that the Labor Party is clearly a mass party. In recent years it de-emphasised union participation at its structural level, but it still relies on membership and the organisation for its operation. This link is particularly important during elections when unions provide valuable personnel to door-knock, facilitate access to work places and hand out election material at polling booths. Union membership, and the disciplined votes they bring, also continue to be of value to some factions at state conferences in ensuring the success (or failure) of motions. One impetus for limiting union power is that it can weaken non-union rank-and-file participation and obstruct the PLP agenda – which may often need the approval of the party as a whole. Union criticism and ensuing publicity are seen by some as an irritant to the parliamentary wing, which has to gain the approval of a greater proportion of the population than just the union movement – a matter of greater significance when Labor is in Government.
Like its Federal counterpart, Labor has moved from being a solely expressive party to adopting some of the more flexible aspects of a responsive party. As an "expressive" party it has a social base that expects the party to reflect the wishes and demands of that base. Therefore it has an organisational structure to develop the policies and ensure the party represents it. The changing face of society – with more people classifying themselves as middle-class, having less emphasis on ideology and religion – makes changes inevitable. During the authoritarian premiership of Reece in the 1960s and the years before 1989 the party moved strongly to a catch-all party. But the financial constraints of minority government in 1989 and the restructuring of the party in 1992 have injected greater commitment to ideology, reversing the trend and reaffirming Labor’s role as an expressive party. Historically, parliamentary members were essentially just servants of the party. In the current structure (whereby members of parliament are governed by a clear set of rules, which together constitute the ethos of the party) the parliamentary wing remains, in theory, subject to the members through State Council and the endorsement procedure. It is the ethos based on social justice that has continued in the Labor Party and halted the shift to catch-all tendencies.

For all our differences of opinion in the Labor movement there is a thread which runs through us all; there is a bond between us: we are bound by the common goal of social improvement and the realisation of a national aspirations. These things have bound us for a century, and the record of our progress towards them binds us tighter still (Keating 1993).

Although reformist on social issues, which attracts many middle-class supporters, the party still retains an anthropocentric ideology and a commitment to improving the standard of living for its working-class supporters. These dual aims place pressure on the party, as it strives to gain majority government by appealing to both groups of electors. In the Tasmanian context one can only draw cold comfort from Keating’s remarks: the Tasmanian Labor Party has, until recently, been characterised by irrelevant policies, loss of members and support, and the worst election result in its history. It continually struggles to come to grips with an environmental movement and Green politics.
Greens as a Charismatic Framework Party

The initial brilliant campaign for the Franklin River set the scene to underline the charismatic, almost religious, nature of the environment movement in Tasmania. The South-West area was portrayed as sacred, with those who died in the wilderness being accorded the qualities of martyrs (Easthope and Holloway 1989, 196). To protect the wilderness became almost a sacred mission, particularly when most of the population were uncaring and destructive. A similar sense of mission and urgency once drove the social movements at the turn of the century, leading to the establishment of the mass parties, but now it sets the Greens apart from the established parties.

The Greens cannot be categorised as merely a framework party: to do so would be to ignore the strong underlying charismatic nature of their ideology and the initial importance of Bob Brown as a personification of the charismatic nature of the environment movement. The way in which Brown led the Franklin River campaign shows that he possessed more than “situational charisma,” which Robert Tucker (1970, 81-2) describes as that quality where a person, in times of acute social stress, offers leadership that is perceived as a source and a means of salvation, Churchill and Roosevelt were such leaders. But Brown’s charisma did not diminish when the Franklin campaign ended. Therefore the Weberian (1978) characterisations are more appropriate in this case, particularly when Brown became the focal point of the election to parliament of additional Green members.

A focus on leadership creates tension in the section of a movement opposed to a traditional party structure. Greens leader Christine Milne was transformed into a Boadicea or saviour of Wesley Vale, but this increased internal pressure because Milne lacked Brown’s charisma; charisma is inherently unstable and was not passed to the new leader. Panebianco (1982, 144) believed that once the situation or person who produces the charisma passes, either the organisation will dissolve, or the charisma will be ‘objectified’ and the organisation will overcome the crisis and become institutionalised. Once the Greens decided to use the parliamentary route, it became difficult to show themselves as any different from other parties. Ideology, having played a crucial role in shaping the newly formed political party, poses a
difficulty: party identity was defined exclusively with the ideological aims of the charismatic leader, but this identity must be transferred to the organisation itself (Panebianco 1982, 53).

The Greens at first glance appear to have some of the attributes of a mass party: for example, paid membership, branch structures and recognition of a charter by its parliamentary members. The United Tasmania Group’s constitution of 1976 included the concept of a financial membership but, unlike the Greens constitution of 1992, it required a pledge and gave the rank and file members the ability to force a new ballot for Ministers if the party became the government. In reality both the UTG and the Greens, (before their formation of the Tasmanian Greens as a political party in 1991), were more akin to the charismatic / framework party: they had well-known candidates, no official membership and no power over policy by members. It was not until 1992 that the Greens adopted a formal constitution and a party structure of branches and State Councils. To this date the structure remains emergent.

Control Over Policy / Leadership Autonomy

In theory the organisational structure of most Green parties gives local party branches more autonomy in decision-making than other parties do (figure 7.1). It is supposed to give grassroots supporters a maximum chance to formulate policy (Poguntke 1987, Muller-Rommel 1989) and a larger measure of decision-making power (Brown and Singer 1996, 105).
Kitschelt's (1990) framework party has relevance in considering the Greens: although they can call on large numbers of activists for specific environmental campaigns, they are unable to draw these people into membership of the party, which leaves the running of the party to a dedicated group from within. The inner core has been described as 'dark' green and the outer core 'light' green (Blainey 1992).

Tasmania's first Green party, the United Tasmania Group, spawned the Wilderness Society, and their organisational skills and experience as seasoned campaigners have been retained (Walker 1986, 83). Members of the Tasmanian Wilderness Society have a core role in influencing other Green members and supporters. They assert its bio-centric ethic and the society's bureaucratic core continues to mobilise technical arguments. It retained a previous charismatic ideological input by a core group of committed members.
The ‘cadre’ is still represented by core activists who instigate ‘direct actions’, media work and general ‘campaigning’. The ‘mass movement’ remains as a resource to be drawn upon in times of crisis. At such a time the central value of the wilderness as a sacred place could once again be used to mobilise the committed (Easthope and Holloway 1989, 198).

The structure of the Greens points to a core of committed organisers with an ecocentric philosophy, around which are grouped supporters or members who may not share the ideological values of eco-centrism. The supporters have developed a loyalty to policies, but only relatively weak bonds to the party itself (Poguntke 1992b, 253). However, they constitute a resource to be called upon: the Greens claim 350 additional subscribers to their magazine and 3000 supporters on their mailing list (Examiner 23 October 1995).

By 1994, with 350 members, the Greens were still waiving the provisions of their constitution and did not hold ballots because too few members attended their annual conference. For example, at the 1994 conference, the rule that some office bearers, such as the convenor, can stay in the position for only two consecutive years was waived because the convenor for the last two years, Louise Crossley, was the only candidate to stand. The selection of people for other positions was on the basis that they would do the job if no one else offered (Sunday Tasmanian 23 October 1994). At the next conference there was still adverse comment about the small numbers of people drawing up policy; but no details of the proceedings are available because the Greens banned the media (Mercury 23 October 1995).

From an examination of the party structure, it appears the Greens have not yet become more democratic: the major decisions are still made by a self-elected oligarchy (as in the Tasmanian Wilderness Society). In the German Greens low membership figures were thought by Poguntke (1992a, 346) to have negative effects on the performance of the Green model of party organisation, because control of higher party levels is only possible with a numerous and active membership. The Greens in Tasmania display most of the characteristics that Poguntke (1987, 81) believes typifies a ‘new politics’ party: a new politics ideology, an unconventional
political style that approves of and is involved in protest action, and a membership and electorate profile clearly encompassing young, highly educated postmaterialists.

From these types the Greens can therefore best be described as a ‘charismatic framework’ party, although still in a state of flux as they deal with the demands of the parliamentary system and the sometimes conflicting demands of their membership. Such parties reject hierarchical and formal party organisation and embrace the concept of decentralised broad participation. Such participation is supposed to inhibit any tendency towards an oligarchy by exercising a strict political control of elected office holders. But in a party that does not have an egalitarian distribution of resources or capabilities, it can lead to the formation of notables or informal elites. This undermines the direct democracy so desired by members (Weber 1978, 949; Kitschelt 1990, 194): But the lack of a formal party structure may have been an electoral plus for the Greens. Sections of the Green movement in Tasmania have resisted, until recently, political formalisation “holding that bureaucratisation and the triumph of an unprincipled oligarchy is an inevitable consequence of such development” (Hay 1992a, 90).

At a parliamentary level the determination to avoid formalisation has struck an electorally productive chord – thus a small but possibly significant component of the Green vote is an expression of disenchantment with the perceived cynicism of party politics, channelled instead towards ‘principled independents’ (Hay 1992a, 91).

Although chapter 5 of the National Constitution of the Greens would seem to depict “grass roots” democracy, the Greens have room to manoeuvre. The parliamentary representatives are supposed to adhere to the policies of the Greens, yet their constitution states: ‘except that where, in the opinion of the elected member, their duty to the constituents is in conflict with the Greens national policy then elected members may vote according to their duty to their constituents’ (The Greens National Constitution 1992 Section 32.2.1). ‘Duty to their constituents’ is potentially subjective and cannot be described as strict control.
Holloway refers to the increasing pressure from both within and without to move to the more institutionalised and formalised structure of a mass-based political party. At the same time, the Green's prime orientation is to preserve its multi-model character of social movement, and its institutional mode, with emphasis on youth and self-appointed positions (Holloway 1994, 27-30). The dilemma for the Greens is how to broaden its appeal and formalise structures without alienating its core supporters.

**Catch-all**

The positioning of both the Labor and Liberal parties as moderate left and moderate right respectively means the ideological distances are not as great as in some countries (Castles and Mair 1984, 84), making it possible for both older parties to transform. Jaensch (1989b) believes that the Liberal party in Australia is a catch-all party, a further step in the revolutionary process from the mass party. Kirchheimer's catch-all theory points to a decrease in ideological commitment and a shallow broadening of a party's base into new areas of support. Jaensch also regards the Labor Party as going down the same path by ignoring its ideological objectives. He claims that in the future it will sever its links with the union movement, making the final transformation from a 'mass party' to a 'catch-all' party.

Both Singleton (1990) and Manning (1992) disagree with Jaensch's view. Singleton rejects the view that Labor has jettisoned its ideology, while Manning (1992, 27) regards the white-collar workers as a new working-class.

The political developments in Tasmania mitigate against such a transformation. Members still show loyalty to parties that have a clearly expressed, strong ideological foundation. For this reason Kirchheimer's definition (1966, 184-192) does not clearly apply. In Europe, Jupp (1968, 61) believes de-emphasis on ideology within a particular party produces a reaction from electorates who desire more substance from the parties - which, unless given, will lead them to cast their votes elsewhere. The Tasmanian Labor Party has had a similar experience.

In Tasmania, the transformation to a catch-all party, is more a process of adjustment rather than political evolution leading to a permanent change. A catch-all party
places much less emphasis on ideology, membership, organisation, solidarity and expression because the essential function of a catch-all party is to be responsive, not expressive. It is a deviation before the electorate returns to the other, more permanent, categories of Tasmanian parties that give them ideological substance.

Tasmanian society has not been isolated from the changes sweeping the rest of Australia. The Tasmanian Labor Party recognised the shifts in employment but, far from jettisoning the union links, moved to establish closer consultation with the Tasmanian Union movement through the Tasmanian Labor Advisory Council (TLAC). This move established the union movement as having a legitimate, and even privileged, role in the Tasmanian Labor Party.

At the same time, the party moved to grant greater input to rank-and-file members as it attempted to broaden its base. Changes to the party rules in late 1992 led to weakened union and factional roles in both endorsement and State Council but gave greater authority to individual rank-and-file members. As only union input to the formal process of policy change and endorsement has changed, it can be argued that the ideological components of the party have not been weakened.

A similar dilemma exists for the Greens. When Brown resigned from the Tasmanian Greens in 1993 to (unsuccessfully) contest a House of Representatives seat, the other parliamentary representatives were able to move to broaden their base and attempt to break their image as a one-issue party. They moved to emphasise such areas as development through tourism and to de-emphasise traditional green areas such as forestry and mining. New Greens leader, Christine Milne, stated:

"Unfortunately, we have been stereotyped as a single-issue group. In the past the issues had been about resource-based industry because they had been the focus of the major parties. They will not be the focus in the future" (Mercury 4 March 1993).

The difficulty for the Greens has been to convince the electorate that this is the case. For example, Braddon Green Di Hollister claimed that saving trees was fundamental to their philosophy but “not the whole story” (Advocate 28 July 1994), while Milne
later reaffirmed that the Greens was no longer a single-issue party (Sunday Examiner 9 April 1995).

Interestingly, Kirchheimer believed that only major parties could become catch-all parties, because the minor parties’ “raison d'être is the defence of a specific clientele or the lobbying for a limited reform clearly delineated to allow for a restricted appeal, perhaps intense, but excluding a wider impact or – once the original job is terminated – excluding a life saving transformation” (Kirchheimer 1972, 188).

The attempts by the Greens’ new Leader, Milne, to broaden the agenda and to formalise the Greens as a party have inherent dangers. There may be no other option: as Jurgen Maier, a member of the Federal Executive Committee of Die Grunen, said; “You simply can’t sit in parliament and say nothing on anything except environment and disarmament” (Maier 1990, 25). But by appearing to lessen the ideology in an attempt to broaden the Greens appeal, they face the danger that the more committed will see such actions as a betrayal of the Green cause. As Kirchheimer suggested, members may become disillusioned with the lessening of ideological content and search for fulfilment elsewhere.

The Tasmanian Greens must walk the tightrope between keeping the traditional parties under pressure while at the same time withstanding the pressure to join the established political structure. In the Tasmanian context both party formalisation and a broadening of appeal can be dangerous. The problem is that “an inherent tension exists between the goals of winning elections and achieving preferred public policy, paralleled by conflict between professional party leaders and ideological purists” (Pomper 1992, 63). As Brown describes it,

> There is a huge dilemma between Greens sticking absolutely to policy, losing seats and therefore not achieving, or making compromises which achieve some of the Green agenda, but at the expense of dropping or overlooking other parts of the Green agenda (Brown 1998, 94).

All the Tasmanian parties therefore contain elements of the ideal party types, but in different ratios. The changes to the Tasmanian political scene over the past decades
have meant that it is no longer possible to categorise the parties into ideal types; all
the parties display characteristics of other party types. However, many of the
traditional indicators of party type are present to varying degrees within the
Tasmanian parties, as is the degree of institutionalisation, partly as a factor of age
and the beliefs of the party members.

With party structures coming under increasing stress to accommodate the changes in
values of Western industrialised society, the question of which ideology and values a
party should promulgate has become more urgent. The structure is, after all, just a
mechanism to deliver change and to fulfil the aspirations of its members and
supporters. The value positions of the parties become as significant as their
structure. How the parties accommodate these values within their structural
framework now becomes relevant.

**Ideological Comparisons**

**Attitudes to society**
The manner in which the Tasmanian parties view society in either positive or
negative terms also shows clear distinctions. On this criterion one can make a
distinction between adjustive, programmatic and ideological parties which
encompasses, in order, Liberal, Labor and Green. The adjustive party relates
positively to society, being essentially conservative in the broad sense and
dominated by satisfied social groups – at least among the leadership: The
programmatic party tends to be “intermediate between a negative and a positive
relationship to society. It wants to change basic institutions and social arrangements
and caters for dissatisfied elements, labour, the poor and minorities. But it also
accepts the political framework in which it operates” (Jupp 1968, 30). The
ideological party has a negative relationship with society, with its strongly doctrinal
members seeking to reform society.

The ALP and the Greens in Tasmania remain expressive parties; expressing the
aspirations and demands of distinct sections of society. For example, the Labor
Party was formed to express the needs and aspirations of the working-class to
engender social change and bring about social justice goals of equity and equality. “We assert the need to raise the level of equality, increase opportunity, lift the standard of living and the life chances of all Australians” (Keating 1993, 2).

The Green Party was formed to express the needs and aspirations of those who felt the major parties were ignoring the environment and quality-of-life issues. Brown and Singer (1996) believe that this vacuum was always likely to draw a new entity into the political arena, with the Greens being a natural replacement for what they saw as a weakened party of reform, the ALP: “The global socio-ecological crisis meant that this new entity was Green” (Brown and Singer 1996, 64).

The established parties have noted this phenomenon, with Field observing; “I presume that we [the ALP] were in middle age and that the Liberals were old age and the Greens were youth; just a young political party on the block that was going to transform the whole scene” (House of Assembly Hansard May 1996, 94). The Labor Party also bitterly noted the challenge and the difficulty such attitudes gave rise to when the Labor Party later relied on the Greens for support after the 1989 State election:

The Greens historically were an emerging pressure group changing into a political party and had a big dose of hubris. Therefore we found it impossible to deal with people who – they actually believed that we were the old party, that they were going to take over the world, that the Labor Party was a thing of the past, and tactically thought that way, how they were going to do us over because we were the old party (M. Field, House of Assembly Hansard 15 May 1997).

**Ideological Levels**

The relative fervour with which the parties express their ideology and the commitment of their members allows a clear comparison to be made. The three parties in Tasmania can be placed on a scale from ideology not being considered significant (and the involvement and commitment of the members not being cohesively high) to the ideological commitment being central to the party’s activities.
The Liberal Party is placed low on both ideology and members commitment; as an adjustive or responsive party, with some catch-all tendencies, its role is to defend what already exists, leaving its leadership to develop and implement policy. Because little is expected of the membership, there is little need for active involvement or for an ideology that consciously attempts to change social values and goals.

The Labor Party is ranked higher; in earlier times it would have ranked higher still, but time, and the achievement of some of its goals, have moderated its ideological fervour. Even so, as a programmatic party, ideology retains importance and membership participation is expected.

The Greens, as an emerging party, have both high levels of ideology and membership commitment. Members can be mobilised by their high levels of commitment, which can be close to a secular religion, attracting supporters for the same reasons as messianic creeds (Jupp 1968, 31). Figure 7.2 sets out the relative position of the parties on the scale.

**Figure 7.2 Relative Ideological Levels of Tasmanian Parties**

**Ideology / values**

High ↑

- Greens
- Labor
- Liberal

Low

High ➞
Involvement/Commitment of Members

As with Duverger's classifications, it is not the number of members or supporters, but the values and structures, that dictate the relationships between ideology and commitment that provide a basis for analysis. With reference to figure 7.2, any movement by a party either horizontally or vertically is not sustainable unless the position on the other axis changes. For example, a lowering of ideological values by the Greens would cause disaffection of the more committed members.

The structure of the Liberal Party mitigates against ideology coming from the party itself – the clear division of authority between caucus and the party means that the parliamentary wing need not accept either policy or ideology developed by the broader party. In the Liberal Party, power emanates from the parliamentary wing. It is the parliamentarians who really make policy, select leaders and decide electoral strategy (Prasser and Neylan 1994, 119). Some commentators see this as a liability to recruitment because, even if members are attracted, they are told on entry that they will have scant influence on policy (West 1965, 265, Henderson 1994, 3).

While this modus operandi is workable in government, it is less so after the party has been in opposition for some time. Tensions then arise between the organisational and parliamentary wings when the former seeks a greater role in policy development and political strategy (Manne 1994, Prasser and Neylan 1994, 19). All parties suffer strains whenever there is tension or a shift in ideological focus. The structure of the parties come under varying degrees of pressure as they move to accommodate the changes. The structure of the Liberal Party allows a rapid ideological change because it does not have to rely on membership ratifying such changes. At the same time it runs the risk of embarking on electorally unpopular moves or isolating the rank-and-file members.

Labor's position, between the Liberal and Green parties, causes difficulties in both directions. What was seen as a lack of clear or appropriate strategy and unwillingness to deal with the clash of values between the concept of continued development and wilderness conservation led to sections of the party supporting the Green cause. However, the Labor-Green accord was seen as a betrayal by many...
working-class Labor supporters, who then felt their only option was to support the Liberal Party. Because of structural changes that lessened the impact of bureaucracy and gave greater input to members, any rapid changes in ideology would not be sustainable without the involvement of party members. Field noted:

Where there was rapid change, then political parties have struggled moving the emotional commitment to such rapid change. Therefore political instability results, whether you are talking about Germany in the twenties, or whether you are talking about Tasmania in the late eighties - early nineties (Field 1997a).

The structure of the Labor Party, as opposed to the Liberal Party, allows greater stability when ideological changes occur. Although the Labor party's structure prevented it from moving rapidly, when it does shift, the change is sustainable because both the party and caucus are involved. If the broad membership does not support such a move it cannot be sustained: for example, the rapid adoption of the Tasmanian Parliamentary Accord was unsuccessful because the membership was neither consulted nor supportive. But the 1993 decision to forswear minority government was sustainable because of the level of consultation and broad support by members. In summary, rapid ideological change will lead to instability in such parties unless members can be involved and be broadly supportive.

Unlike the two older parties, the Greens are narrower in ideological focus, displaying an almost religious fervour by its core members. Such a mixture of ideology, commitment and involvement by members places the Greens at the end of the ideological spectrum. The level of ideology is sustained by the greater involvement and commitment of the members of the party.

**Tasmanian Green Ideology**

The Tasmanian Greens bear similarities to the European counterparts, particularly as their cleavage relates to the traditional parties. But when ideologies are compared, Tasmania's distinctiveness becomes apparent. As in Europe, it is not appropriate to place the Greens on the traditional political scale (Brown and Singer 1996, 64), even though many of their policies are on the left side of any dimension, for they bring a

The Greens now occupy different territory on the conventional left–right political spectrum. Eckersley (1990) attempts to place them on the spectrum by inserting a cross-cutting cleavage on the left–right continuum (figure 7.3). At the top she places technocentric orientations, which reject limits to growth, and instead express an unrestrained development philosophy and a strong emphasis on material values—an anthropocentric, or human-centred, world view. At the bottom lies the ecocentric orientation which recognises social and ecological limits to growth, the importance of non-material or quality-of-life values and an ecocentric or ecology-centred orientation toward the world, exemplified by the Tasmanian Forest Network promulgating a global phase-out strategy of consumer-based industrial capitalism (Native Forests Network Letter, S Cadman 1995).

**Figure 7.3. Parties’ Positions on the Basis of Technocratic or Ecocentric Perspective** (Eckersley 1990, 3)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Technocentric</th>
<th>Neo-Conservative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Communist</td>
<td>Free Market Liberals (‘dries’)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Socialists</td>
<td>Social Democrats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>centrally Planned Economy</td>
<td>Welfare Liberals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planned Economy</td>
<td>Eco-Socialists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free Market Economy</td>
<td>GREENS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eco-Centric</td>
<td>Deep Ecologists</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
From this perspective the Greens reject both left and right positions: they are prepared to intervene in the economy, but are nevertheless critical of the operations of market forces that give rise to environmental degradation, unemployment and uneven distribution of wealth. Unlike the Labor movement, the Green movement does not see itself as representing the interests of any identifiable classes. They do not accept a class struggle in Marxist terms – although not denying the traditional capital/wage labour class struggle. Instead, they say that this struggle perpetuates a system that the Greens are seeking to transform: the working-classes are seen to be caught up in the treadmill of consumerism, utterly dependent on capitalist production to provide them with employment and hence purchasing power (Eckersley 1989, 20).

The Greens are an established phenomenon in Tasmania (Hay 1996, 264), with an educated and intelligent vote base that will not easily respond to the propaganda of the older parties. For these parties to deal with the Greens, they first have to fully understand its ideology. The Greens have developed fundamentally different assumptions and values from the main Tasmanian political parties. These assumptions and values continue to be misunderstood by many within both the Liberal and Labor Party. Their views of the Greens range from seeing them as an anti-development issue party with middle-class trendy followers; a ‘lost faction’ that will return when the Labor Party gets its policy mix right; to a group of ‘soft’ green voters who can be persuaded to vote for the Labor Party. Hay (1993b, 11) describes this as “a fine piece of self-delusion” and is right in so far as Green supporters with a strong ecocentric ideology will never embrace the Labor or Liberal parties.

Because Tasmania has been at the forefront of environmental debate for decades, it has developed a philosophy or ideology within postmaterialist politics that is uniquely Tasmanian, it is more wilderness-based than in Europe. The development of the Green movement in Tasmania shows the intertwining nature of this ideology.

The first major statement of an environmentalist philosophy, as distinct from a postmaterialist philosophy, was contained in the UTG’s ‘A New Ethic’. The UTG had an environmental orientation and value commitment that went beyond mere retention of wilderness. It also dealt with ecological problems in the context of
modern industrialisation and technology (Walker 1986, 33). Like other environmental movements, it had an antipathy to existing modes of technology and natural resource utilisation and instead aimed to retain the viability of ecosystems and to give attention to the quality of life (B. Davis 1981, 94). This focus on quality of life, placing it clearly in the realm of postmaterialist politics, is summarised thus:

Social justice would be possible through conservation as it never was through consumption. We would be able to measure satisfaction with our lives, our well-being – our success – with real live indicators such as health, cultural variety, clean air, safe water, unpoisoned food, secure and convivial neighbourhoods, even the number of species living with us, rather than by what we consume expressed in very non-real indicators such as Gross National Product (Parkin 1989, 24).

Even in the early stages of the public environmental movement’s development there were hints of things to come. The UTG’s ‘New Ethic’ was based on an ecological concern coupled with humanitarian principles. The UTG never articulated wilderness as a value in its own right, taking a less extreme line of concern for humanity and nature. The ‘New Ethic’ undertook “to husband and cherish Tasmania’s living resources so that we do minimum damage to the web of life of which we are part while preventing the extinction or serious depletion of any form of life by our individual group or communal actions” (UTG pamphlet 1976).

The UTG publicly questioned the dominant paradigm of unswerving faith in economic expansion and material progress. The Club of Rome’s publication of Limits of Growth (1972), although shown to be wrong in many of its predictions, described the larger and long-term problems associated with environmental destruction caused by governments’ environmental policies. It was an influential document. Not only was economic growth seen to cause as many problems as it solved, but the benefits of such growth were not seen to be distributed equitably. Many people began expressing disquiet about the role of large enterprises – especially multi-national corporations – and the pressures they placed on consumers and the environment. The relentless pursuit of profit and growth was destroying both the environment and the quality of life of the worker.
Although Lake Pedder was obviously an environmental issue, it symbolised a greater problem: the direction of development and the destruction it brings. From this came the Tasmanian environment movement’s deep and abiding distrust of large industry and industrialisation. “Industrialisation is more than simply a mode of production; it is a total culture representing a particular stage of social evolution. The hallmarks of the industrial era are bureaucracy and overbearing rationality” (Rainbow 1992, 325). From the UTG onwards, all postmaterialists groups questioned the role of large companies in Tasmania. The large companies signified the continuing dominant paradigm of hydo-industrialisation, economic expansion and the technocratic and anthropocentric view of the world; a view simplistically described by Liberal Premier Tony Rundle as a “pathological hatred of major resource projects” (Hansard of House of Assembly 26 March 1997, 6).

In the early 1980s, Democrat member of the House of Assembly, Norm Sanders, provoked outrage when he voiced the unthinkable: that Tasmania’s aluminium smelter, Comalco, might decide to leave Tasmania. By 1992 Comalco, in the course of intense negotiations for the renewal of its power contracts, had announced it would consider leaving Tasmania when its contracts for the use of bulk power elapsed. Such events reinforced distrust of multi-nationals and were to give vigour to the issues of woodchipping old-growth forests and the proposed establishment of a large pulp mill at Wesley Vale.

But the UTG’s unwillingness to publicly adopt an ecocentric stance was a source of frustration to many and a continuing irritant within environmental ranks: “The environmental movement’s unsatisfactory schizophrenic modus operandi involves it in a sleight of hand whereby its ecocentric goals are disguised behind acceptable homocentric political pitches” (Hay 1988a, 47). Its stance was to be echoed again in 1990 when Brown distanced himself from the ecocentric views of the Wilderness Society’s Bob Burton.

The UTG’s stance precipitated Kevin Kiernan, a key player in the LPAC and UTG, to form the South West Action Committee, which stressed the rights of wilderness itself. The South West Action Committee was later to form the basis of the
Tasmanian Wilderness Society, which also retained the ecocentric philosophies while maintaining a conservative 'up-market' facade (Holloway 1986, 5). The unwillingness of the Greens to espouse ecocentric views, especially by the parliamentary representatives, has often confused observers for,

The environment movement's agenda – and to some extent this is an obscure agenda, for the movement has not clearly articulated its ecocentric ethic – is not, as is often claimed, to preserve wilderness selfishly for the exclusive use of one group of recreationalists alone [bushwalkers] . . . . the push for World Heritage listing is really aimed at minimising human presence – so that other species may enjoy their own evolutionary space. That is what this debate is really about (Hay 1993a, 163).

Behind this aspect of the environmental debate stands the notion that wilderness and other species have intrinsic value. The strength and continuity of this stance owes much to the history of the environmental debate in Tasmania, where the members of the UTG – and the impetus for its formation – were essentially issue-driven on wilderness and environmental concerns. Their members did not spring from established conservation groups such as the ACF or Tasmanian Conservation Trust; in fact those organisations were seen as unsympathetic to Lake Pedder.

The almost continual prominence of environmental issues in Tasmania is in contrast to the formation of environmental movements and parties in Europe. The spectre of nuclear war by the deployment of Pershing nuclear missiles and the building of nuclear power stations were major issues in West Germany and Britain (Muller-Rommel 1989, 6). The environmental issues in Europe were, in the large, based on technocentric matters relating to large urban areas, divorced to a large extent from issues of wilderness. In this context influential books such as The Limits To Growth and Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring promoted the view that population and pollution problems had placed western society in a crisis, leading to formulation of an environmental ideology that was more relevant to Europe than to Tasmania. In contrast, “Green political concerns beyond Europe have tended to be less eclectic, enabling the focus on the moral standing of the non-human world to develop
unhindered by the variety of considerations that has necessarily characterised the political programmes of the European greens” (Hay and Hayward 1988, 437).

In Tasmania, wilderness and native forests issues were the main component, with the environmentalists’ reactions to wilderness’s imminent demise at the hands of one species as the catalyst. This constant focus has led to the development of a clear and strong ecocentric ideology – and is a major cause of tension within the Tasmanian community. Many perceive the wilderness focus as anti-urban with moralistic and puritanical overtones (Rainbow 1992, 337), unsympathetic to the lives of ‘ordinary’ Tasmanians, particularly when it relates to questions of economic growth and continued industrialisation.

The problem of economic growth (and, consequently, employment) is a critical problem in relation to working-class support for environmentalism, at least among unskilled workers (but it probably reflects a concern for employment rather than increasing consumption possibilities) (Andersen 1990a, 201).

A proportion of Green supporters, although sympathetic to environmental issues, are still anthropocentric in approach. Labor strategists planned to develop policies to attract these people, hoping they would vote for the Labor Party on the basis of a social justice and equity perspective. However, Hay (The Australian 23 February 1996) disagreed (incorrectly, with regard to recent slow but steady decline in Green votes), claiming that Green-leaning voters do not compartmentalise their greenness in this way, but subscribe to a value-set that makes their commitment essentially ideological, and thus permanent.

**Green Voter Profile/Membership**

Just as Green ideology can now be examined because of the length of time and relative permanence of the Greens as a political force in Tasmania, it is now possible to identify from which sectors of the community their support arises. Who these people are, and how the major parties approach them, will determine the relative success of the parties.
In Europe, the class composition of new social movements has been extensively examined (eg. Bell 1971, Offe 1985, Burklin 1987 and Poguntke 1989). The leaders and active supporters have predominantly been drawn from a subset of the middle-class: young, tertiary-educated, with a professional-level job and moderately above average income. For example, in Germany while only about a quarter of the voters for traditional parties were less than 35 years old, two-thirds of the Greens are in this age group and typically have a university education (Burklin 1987, 111).

This ‘new class’ has become a factor in Tasmanian society – the growth of the service sector, white-collar employment, the growth of the welfare state and the expansion of higher education are structural changes in post-industrial societies of which Tasmania is part. In Tasmania three factors appear to determine the typical Green voter: youth, tertiary education and employment that is not involved in the direct production of goods. Maier’s comments that the Greens are rather weak in the traditional blue-collar working-class and much stronger in the middle-class holds true for Tasmania. His claim that “teachers, lawyers, students, academics of all kind are the domain of the Greens” (Maier 1990, 25) probably also applies.

The subset of supporters of new social movements was described by Gouldner (1979) as the “humanistic intelligentsia – tertiary educated, urban, relatively affluent and employed in those parts of the public sector not engaged in the provision of the production infrastructure.” Waters and Volpato (1989) found a clear relationship between location in social structure and political preference. William’s (1988) analysed data from the 1987 Australian National University survey of more than 3000 people. Her analysis of support for, or opposition to, environmental values correlated direct production of goods to anti-environment views. She found this factor to be a more powerful indication than the traditional notion of ‘class’.

The relatively radical pro-environment stance tends to be more ‘female’ than ‘male’, and predominantly the domain of the well-educated, humanistic professionals – with the exception of the special interest workers in furniture manufacture. Conversely, the anti-environment supporters tend to be an alliance of the unemployed, professionals involved in production, (such as
architects, builders) blue collar trades and the wealthy – cutting across the
traditional notion of class to polarise the ranks of the middle-class into a pro-
or anti-environment stance (Williams 1988, 18-19).

Supporters of ecology and women’s movements figure largely in the Green
electorate. They are also found in the socialist Parties, but are in the majority in the
Greens. The party’s electoral performance may be contingent on the mobilisation
cycles of these new social movements (Poguntke 1992, 348).

The ability of the Greens to recruit may have an inbuilt limit: some studies suggest
only some social subclasses are susceptible (Holloway 1986, 1991, Hay and Haward
1988). Hay and Haward believe that green values hold little attraction for either the
affluent or the working-class, or for many in the middle-class.

Within the ranks of the professional middle-class, environmental support is
likely to be further concentrated, for overseas evidence suggests that it is
almost exclusively drawn from what Gouldner called the “humanistic

Hay (1990, 56) also believes that because the traditional economic interests of the
two great industrial classes appear to be directly threatened by such values, few
people in these more populous social categories are likely to support the Greens.

Despite these generalisations, it would be misleading to suggest that concern for the
environment is confined to the Greens. Inglehart and Rabier’s (1986, 467) findings
that large sectors of the community are sympathetic to the environment are echoed in
Australia. Numerous surveys have consistently rated the environment as a major
issue. A review of surveys from 1975 to 1994 (Lothian 1994) found a strong pro-
environmental preference in the Australian community. Although the level of
concern about economic issues fluctuates widely, and consistently rates higher, the
environment remains a significant issue of concern. In the period 1992 to 1996, the
percentage of people stating that they consider environmental protection to be as
important as economic growth has remained steady at around 70 percent (ABS 1997,
5). This concern is also evidenced by the pro-environment choices people are
willing to make when faced with a trade-off between environmental protection and economic development (Lothian 1994, 95). The consistency of the environment as an issue is significant. Although other issues may at times dominate environmental concerns (for example from 1992 to 1996 the number of people reporting that they had environmental concerns decreased from 75 percent to 68 percent [ABS 1996, 5]), they do not disappear, but are quickly triggered by publicity and media coverage.

Opinion polls on Tasmanians' concerns for the environment are not available, but other documents lead to the conclusion that Tasmania is not dissimilar from the other states of Australia. The December 1981 Franklin Dam referendum is a prime example of how Tasmanians give high priority to environmental issues. With the community polarised over a major environmental issue, and with the Tasmanian Wilderness Society running a 'no dams' campaign, 35 percent of the Tasmanian electorate endorsed their ballot paper with 'no dams' (Hay and Haward 1988, 443).

In a 1994 survey on attitudes to the forestry industry and the environment (Sweeney & Associates, 1994), Tasmanians ranked the issues of environmental concerns and the environment fourth. The ranking was different elsewhere in Australia, although the issue of logging and tree felling ranked higher in Tasmania than any other State (Sweeney & Associates 1994, 9). Similar surveys have found that environmental concerns in Tasmania always rank highly, albeit behind unemployment (Sweeney & Associates 1995, UMR Research 1995, UMR Research 1996).

Environmental considerations emerge as a substantial reason for intending to vote for the Greens (46 percent), but a minor reason for the other parties (4 percent for Labor, 1 percent for Liberal) (Sweeney & Associates 1995, 47). This confirms an earlier survey showing that the environment was an important issue in deciding the vote of electors not firmly aligned to a party (soft voters) (Australian Community Research 1989, 5).

Although a high proportion of people concerned with the environment were willing to show their support, they were unwilling to vote for environmentalist candidates in the 1982 election. Only the electorate of Denison gave sufficient votes to elect
environmental activist Democrat Norm Sanders; independent candidate Bob Brown did not receiving a quota (although the candidates together polled 1:78 quotas or 22.3 percent of the vote). It was not until 1986 that the adjoining electorate of Franklin returned Green independent candidate Dr. Gerry Bates. Booth returns from 1982 to 1996 record where the Green supporters live. In 1992 Denison was by far the strongest Green electorate, with Franklin, Lyons, Bass and Braddon in descending order (figure 7.4). In 1996, the ranking for Franklin and Lyons changed, possibly due to the Green member for Lyons Christine Milne becoming leader, and high-profile Franklin member Bates resigning.

Figure 7.4 Percentage of total valid primary vote for the greens in the House of Assembly

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DENISON</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>18.00</td>
<td>14.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRANKLIN</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>15.87</td>
<td>10.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LYONS</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>12.25</td>
<td>11.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BASS</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>11.37</td>
<td>10.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRADDOm</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>8.75</td>
<td>9.10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Hay and Haward (1988), in an early analysis of voting by subdivision, found differences in Green support within the urban subdivisions. Although Moonah and Glenorchy were overwhelmingly lower-income areas, so too was Hobart, but it had a high proportion of students. Brown polled well in Hobart, but badly in Moonah and Glenorchy; he also failed to poll well in areas of conspicuous affluence (Sandy Bay and Lower Sandy Bay). They speculate that “the green vote flourishes in areas where both blue-collar workers and the very affluent are comparatively under-represented” (Hay and Haward 1988, 445). Surveys commissioned by the Labor Party clearly showed that Green support is stronger among younger voters and increases with tertiary education. Those who define themselves as middle-class and upper middle-class are more likely to vote for the Greens than those who regard themselves as working-class (UMR Research 1995, 23-4).

A similar pattern appears for those Tasmanians who have a positive attitude to the Greens. When asked the question ‘Does the Green Party help or hurt Tasmania?’, of those who answered positively 46 percent were 18-29 years old, 55 percent were
upper middle-class and 58 percent earned $55,000 or more (UMR Research 1996, 46). Of those who answered negatively, 37 percent were 55 years plus, 54 percent were working-class and 65 percent were earning $15,000 or less. It would appear that the younger and better off are the more likely to have a positive assessment of the Greens, while the converse also holds true.

Eckersley (1989, 218) believed Inglehart did not give due regard to the importance of higher education as a determinant of postmaterialist attitudes and values. In Tasmania, tertiary education is a greater indicator of Green support than either income or occupation. Similarly there are high associations with managers, administrators and professionals, public administration and community services, and workers in tertiary industry. This pattern is almost the converse of that for workers in manufacturing, electricity, gas, water and construction.

An analysis of 1992 figures suggests the same conclusions (See figure 7.5). For example, the Hobart suburb of Ferntree has the highest level in Tasmania of tertiary-educated, government-employed residents in community service areas: 34.8 percent of its residents have tertiary qualifications of undergraduate diplomas or higher. Conversely, the suburbs of Roseneath and Elwick, situated in the Glenorchy and Goodwood area, have only 4.03 percent with similar qualifications and over 68 percent without qualifications (ABS Census Hobart Suburbs 1991 catalogue 2791.6.) The average for such tertiary qualifications in the electorate of Denison is 14.71 percent (Census of Population & Housing, Denison 1991, 6).

**Figure 7.5 Denison Electorate – selected booths showing valid primary vote at the 1992 House of Assembly election**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BOOTH</th>
<th>LIBERAL</th>
<th>ALP</th>
<th>GREEN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FERNTREE</td>
<td>19.12</td>
<td>29.72</td>
<td>46.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOBART</td>
<td>31.63</td>
<td>25.05</td>
<td>34.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROSENEATH</td>
<td>28.11</td>
<td>52.67</td>
<td>8.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELWICK</td>
<td>30.66</td>
<td>52.40</td>
<td>8.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOWER SANDY BAY</td>
<td>62.36</td>
<td>15.56</td>
<td>16.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WIAMEA HEIGHTS</td>
<td>58.76</td>
<td>17.22</td>
<td>19.25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The 1992 results for the electorate of Bass (figure 7.6) suggest the same conclusion. The top six booths for Green votes are all in areas with the highest concentration of people with tertiary qualifications; voters are almost entirely in the fourth quartile (Launceston Social Atlas 1996 Table 44.1). Booths such as Waverley and Ravenswood, which exhibit low returns for the Greens, have the highest proportion of persons with no qualifications and the lowest proportion of tertiary qualifications.

Figure 7.6 Bass Electorate – selected booths showing valid primary vote at the 1992 House of Assembly election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BOOTH</th>
<th>LIBERAL</th>
<th>ALP</th>
<th>GREEN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LAUNCESTON CENTRAL</td>
<td>49.18</td>
<td>20.21</td>
<td>23.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAUNCESTON</td>
<td>43.55</td>
<td>24.67</td>
<td>22.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WINDMILL HILL</td>
<td>60.32</td>
<td>15.99</td>
<td>19.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TREVALLYN</td>
<td>57.22</td>
<td>17.66</td>
<td>19.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GENERAL HOSPITAL</td>
<td>43.14</td>
<td>30.28</td>
<td>18.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAUNCESTON EAST</td>
<td>54.76</td>
<td>20.92</td>
<td>17.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WASTERLEY</td>
<td>39.24</td>
<td>43.01</td>
<td>7.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAVENSWOOD</td>
<td>39.72</td>
<td>42.22</td>
<td>5.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NORWOOD</td>
<td>65.44</td>
<td>17.68</td>
<td>8.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RIVERSIDE</td>
<td>62.1</td>
<td>20.63</td>
<td>10.33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The results from the General Hospital booth also paint a relatively clear picture of urban green votes. The General Hospital booth, which is within the hospital, would include a high proportion of health workers on duty on polling day. They come from the middle-class subset Gouldner (1979) described as the ‘humanistic intelligentsia’. Gouldner’s definition seems to fit easily with an analysis of urban booths, but once rural booths are included another clear group of Green supporters becomes apparent (figure 7.7).
Green support in non-urban areas falls into two categories. Support is high in many towns and areas within commuting distance of urban areas. These regions are, by Tasmanian standards, growing rapidly and changing equally rapidly. In recent years they have become dormitory suburbs, with many of these newer commuters being relatively affluent, tertiary-educated professionals. These areas include Kelso and Nunamara for Launceston, Woodbridge and Barnes Bay for Hobart.

Localities further from urban areas, such as Meander in the Deloraine area and Moorleah near Circular Head, are more difficult to explain. Few of these electors commute, but a proportion follow alternative lifestyles, focussed on ‘quality of life’ and other postmaterialist values. In New Zealand, Green party delegates found very little support within the traditional industrial working-class, but more support among manual workers involved in agriculture (for example producing yarn, part-time farmers, horticulturalists and apiarists) and the cottage handcraft industry (Miller (1991, 61). Green support in rural Tasmania therefore includes rural support, but not from ‘traditional’ rural workers. Rural areas that have not experienced a recent ‘immigration’ of newcomers to the district, such as Tunbridge, Whitemore in Lyons, and Winnaleah and Blessington in Bass, remain the areas of the lowest Green vote.

The Tasmanian Greens, then, mainly live in middle-class suburbs, are well educated and do not work in production. They have a clear and strong ideology, and believe that the established parties are doing society an injustice with their support of the old paradigm. Given that Green support is not attractive to the affluent, non-tertiary
educated, such as those who live in the Tasmanian suburbs of Sandy Bay, Norwood or Riverside, nor the traditional working-class who reside in Gagebrook, Waverley or Ravenswood, the possibility for future increases appears small. This is especially so when one compares the votes from 1989 to 1996, which show a steady reduction in primary Green votes across all booths, regardless of their socio-economic make-up. Although a detailed analysis of this decline has not been carried out it is a reasonable assumption that the decline is not from highly ideological Green voters but those who have in the past supported some aspects of the green agenda and have now changed their support to other parties.

**ALP Voter Profile**

The assessment of Labor as a mass party becomes apparent when its areas of strong support are considered. The socio-economic profile of booths that supported Labor are in contrast to those that returned above-average figures for the Greens. All are characterised by high proportions of residents without qualifications or jobs. If employed, they are working as labourers or in factories.

Booths on the west coast of Tasmania show that the ALP lost support between 1982 and 1992, not only to the Greens in middle-class urban areas, but also to the Liberals in blue-collar areas. The 1982 election saw the west coast vote swing heavily towards the Liberal Party. In the Franklin River issue, the Liberal Party supported hydro-industrialisation, while the Labor Party was split and was seen as being compromised by environmentalists. The blue-collar workers clearly saw their interests as being better served by the Liberal Party and its uncompromising leader Robin Gray. The environmental movement was portrayed as an enemy of the working-class.

The changing support base of Labor is not peculiar to Australia: European countries have also experienced a drop in class voting. For example, in the 1983 election in Britain, the Labour Party suffered a far greater drop in electoral support among labor union members and manual workers than among the professional and managerial occupations (Kitschelt 1994, 45). In Australia, Liberal Treasurer, Peter Costello identified a group of blue collar voters who would switch from Labor in protest at its becoming the preserve of academics, teachers, social workers "preoccupied with the
concerns of various ‘liberation’ movements – gay liberation, black liberation, women’s liberation, and environmentalism that will cost some of these supporters their jobs” (Costello 1993, 20). Just as the Tasmanian Liberal Party was able to focus on disaffected voters, Federal Liberal Leader, John Howard, and his Deputy, Peter Costello, attempted to broaden their appeal to those sectors of the lower-middle and working-classes that they believed were alienated from the “fashionable New Class agendas of women’s and gay liberation, environmentalism and radial multiculturalism” (Manne 1994, 36).

The 1989, 1992 and 1996 Tasmanian State elections showed the disaffection of blue-collar workers. The working-class’s distrust of the Greens was highlighted by the refusal of previous Labor supporters to vote Labor after the Labor/Green Accord. One result that the Labor Party regards as indicative of this rejection by traditional supporters are the Bass electoral returns for Gill James MHA. James has had strong support from the elderly and war veterans, but in 1989 she lost her seat to a newcomer, Jim Cox. James stood again in the 1992 election and gained the most primary votes for Labor in Bass, beating the Deputy Premier Peter Patmore and ex Premier Harry Holgate. It is the Labor Party’s view that Mrs James was seen in 1992 as a traditional Labor member, untainted by the Accord, which allowed Labor voters to still vote for the Labor Party while showing their disdain for the previous arrangements.

This contradict Flanagan’s (1989, 37) assertion that the Greens have been able to attract growing numbers of the urban working-class. Contrary to this wishful overestimation of the Green phenomenon, unless the definition of working-class can be expanded, working-class people do not constitute the majority of Green supporters. In fact the Labor Party’s losses in 1992 were much greater in traditional Labor areas such as Goodwood, and Ravenswood than in the more educated middle-class areas. Compared to the more affluent areas, Labor suffered over a 10 percent swing in its traditional base, while in other areas with an educated electorate, such as Ferntree or Trevallyn, the swing was marginal. The working-class did not accept the Labor-Green Accord.
Unlike the west coast, the pattern of Labor support elsewhere in Tasmania points to temporary de-alignment rather than permanent realignment, with the 1996 results showing a return to the Labor Party similar to the 1989 results (figure 7.8). The working-class booths listed in figure 7.8 show that, even after a solid rejection of the State Labor Party in February 1992, only a year later the same booths returned strong support for Federal Labor in March 1993. The same pattern is apparent in traditional Labor booths across Tasmania, and by 1996 the percentages on a State basis had returned to 1989 levels.

Figure 7.8 Top Labor booths – Bass valid primary vote

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<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INVERESK</td>
<td>54.03</td>
<td>44.93</td>
<td>56.74</td>
<td>52.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WAVERLEY</td>
<td>57.49</td>
<td>43.01</td>
<td>60.78</td>
<td>57.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAVENSWOOD</td>
<td>56.14</td>
<td>42.22</td>
<td>61.94</td>
<td>56.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROCHERLEA</td>
<td>50.48</td>
<td>39.76</td>
<td>61.55</td>
<td>49.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEORGE TOWN</td>
<td>56.72</td>
<td>37.96</td>
<td>55.80</td>
<td>51.60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The areas of Labor support have a clear socio-economic delineation. For example, booth returns from Launceston show a clear relationship with low levels of tertiary education, high unemployment, low earnings, low home ownership and such occupations as manufacturing. The booths of Inveresk, Invermay, Rocherlea, Waverley and Ravenswood (map 7.9) – which were the top booths in the Bass electorate for Labor in 1996 – are within the top quartile in almost all of these classifications (Launceston as at the 1996 Census. A Social Atlas. – maps 50, 54 and 42) in the Launceston urban area. This relationship holds for other booths across Tasmania with similar socio-economic factors.

With low levels of income and high unemployment, the inhabitants of these suburbs have been socialised in an atmosphere of relative material deprivation. On this basis economic factors would play a decisive role in formulating materialist values (Inglehart 1987, 1289). It is clear from these maps that a large proportion of Labor support comes from materialists. This claim is also strengthened by the high
proportion who left school under 16 years of age. Inglehart (1990, 77) sees formal education as a measure of cognitive mobilisation. It is this lack of cognitive mobilisation that quarantines many from postmaterialist values, for high education is strongly correlated with postmaterialist values (Miller 1991, 62., Poguntke 1992). With little formal education many are forced into low paying manual and manufacturing work, often in the forestry and building sectors.

This type of work is becoming increasingly harder to find and often has little long term stability. With few formal skills the workers are extremely insecure and react strongly to what may be perceived as threats to their livelihood – they remain firmly working class. It is therefore worth noting figure 7.8 in conjunction with the maps. Ravenswood, for example, voted over 56 percent for Labor in the 1989 State election. Yet only two and a half years later experienced a 14 percent swing away from Labor. The anecdotal evidence is too strong to be ignored – the Greens were seen as a threat to employment, and hence the workers livelihood; the Labor party had betrayed them by governing with the support of the Greens. Attempts by parliament to protect areas of forest in reserves was rejected as ‘locking up’ forests and limiting employment.

Clearly class does play a role in Labor votes, but this relationship no longer holds solid, as the violent fluctuation in 1992 proved. Only after a bitter period of opposition, in which it became obvious to all that Labor had revoked any dealings with the Greens, did Ravenswood return to the Labor camp. But no-one believes that Labor can unthinkingly rely on the working-class suburbs like it could decades ago. Unemployment levels (map 7.10), job classification (maps 7.11) and education (map 7.12) are clear determinants of Labor support, but this support must now be gauged in the political climate surrounding each and every election.
Map 7.9 Launceston. Suburbs with highest returns for Labor (49-57 percent) in 1996

Map 7.11 Launceston. Percent of people employed in manufacturing in 1996.
(Launceston Social Atlas 1996, map 54)

Map 7.12 Launceston. Percent of people who left school under 16 years of age.
(Launceston Social Atlas 1996, map 42)
Conclusion
The factors of structure, degrees of commitment and ideological levels now make it possible to define the Tasmanian parties with some clarity. Figure 7.13 summarises the character of the Tasmanian parties.

Figure 7.13 characteristics of Tasmanian parties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>LIBERAL</th>
<th>LABOR</th>
<th>GREEN</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Relationship with</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Society</td>
<td>Adjustive</td>
<td>Programmatic</td>
<td>Ideological</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>Expressive</td>
<td>Expressive</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>Reformist</td>
<td>Reformist</td>
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<td>Cadre/catch-all</td>
<td>Mass</td>
<td>Charismatic/</td>
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<td>Unified</td>
<td>Unified</td>
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<td>Ideology</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Doctrinal</td>
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<td>Anthropocentric</td>
<td>Ecocentric</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Class</td>
<td>Class/New class</td>
<td>New class</td>
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<tr>
<td>Policy/Ideology</td>
<td>ParliamentaryWing (Caucus)</td>
<td>Party and</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Branch</td>
<td>Caucus and</td>
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<td></td>
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The review in this chapter of recent Tasmanian elections (1989 to 1996) shows that the Greens caused more electoral damage to the Labor Party than the conservative Liberals. The challenge for Labor will be to respond in such a way that it can embrace many of the postmaterial values without alienating its working-class base.
The Labor Party has restructured and adopted a strategy, but to win it must remain united and able to campaign as a whole. One of the limits to a united strategy is that a diverse support base is necessary to gain a majority. The marked differences in the make-up of the party's supporters shows the difficulties the party faces in attracting broad support. Labor voters are different in major socio-economic aspects from Green voters. To win and remain successful the Labor Party must appeal not only to both materialists and postmaterialists, but it must also retain the support of the blue-collar traditional supporters. It must also ensure that the party members remain united as it balances its options. The next chapter investigates the make-up of these members, and in particular their attitudes to reform, religion and postmaterialism, which will either hinder or assist Labor in its search for electoral success. In doing so it identifies the problems that Labor faces to remain united, yet responsive to the Green's challenge.
CHAPTER 8

LABOR AND COMMUNITY SURVEYS

Introduction
As noted in the previous chapter, the Labor Party in Tasmania changed leaders without changing either its ideology or perceptions of the problem it faced. In changing leaders, Labor had the opportunity to change any number of elements to make itself more electorally attractive, for Bacon was confronted with low public support and the failure of Labor to win majority government in the past five elections. The party had two choices: to change its structure, drawing on its mass party origins in an attempt to attract more to the party; or to address the ideological challenge of the Greens and attract a share of the postmaterialist, or soft green, vote.

Labor considered the structure it had inherited from its mass party origins and decided there was little need to change the structural reforms of the 1970s' and the early 1990s'. It had previously discovered that any moves towards a catch-all structure would not be likely to increase votes. As chapter two illustrated, shifts in catch-all parties towards any greater de-institutionalisation does not necessarily attract more voters (Dittrich 1983, 265).

This left open the ideological avenue, - what prospects did Labor have for success in that direction? As Labor had already committed itself to recapturing majority government and to making structural changes in the political process (the electoral laws have been discussed in chapter three), the most serious avenue still open was to recapture the ‘soft green’ vote. This meant making judgments on how much ideological change was necessary and could be tolerated by the party - the battle was to be ideological rather than structural. Labor's challenge, at a time when 9-10 percent of the primary vote could give the Greens a seat, was to try and erode Green support while not neglecting or alienating its own membership, traditional supporters and potential Liberal defectors.

This chapter explores the empirical data on which the Tasmanian ALP assessed its own flexibility, and the extent to which this was governed by the interaction of
postmaterial and material values in Labor and the general electorate. It sets out the parameters by which the party determined such questions as how large an ideological shift its members would tolerate and, finally, how accepting might the community be of these shifts. This chapter therefore maps the relevant positions of postmaterialists, Labor and the general community to establish in which areas ideological shifts could be successful. The next chapter will describe how this empirical understanding was utilised by the party.

This chapter will substantively show that postmaterialist values are held by both the Australian community and the Labor Party; the values are clearly identifiable and of a libertarian nature. To establish this, the key indicators of postmaterialism identified in chapter three are used. The Australian Election Study survey material provides a benchmark of how widely postmaterialist values are held in the general Australian community, and a Tasmanian Labor Party survey is used to show its level of postmaterialism.

A Tasmanian ALP survey defined the general characteristics of Labor members that have a bearing on the structural and ideological options for the party are discussed next. These include left/right self placement, attitudes to other parties, educational standards and differences between electorates. These characteristics show who members are, what structures they expect within a party, and how their values and expectations define the future options of a political party. Clearly, there was a softening of the materialist position within Labor and, despite tensions with the Greens as a political party, a level of respect for soft green values. Labor's strategy was not to take over the green movement, but rather to erode its 'soft' green support. The question lurking in the background was always how far values could be changed, given the demographics of the Labor Party.

The chapter concludes with an examination of community attitudes for, even if Labor members thought it acceptable to entice soft green voters, would this strategy "sell" in the community? If the community values would not tolerate such actions, then a shift by Labor would not be rewarded at the ballot box; it is pointless to gain one Green voter while losing former Labor voters. This chapter shows that, in many key areas, Labor members hold different values from the electorate. This is
significant, for how the Party handles this problem, structurally and ideologically, by putting forward policies that will gain it majority support may well determine its electoral success.

**Community and Labor Party Surveys**

When making decisions relating to policy, Labor had access only to general texts and Australian Election Studies (AES) surveys made each Federal election. Even then the party had never studied the results to see what lessons it could learn.* Although the party also had access to general surveys made by business and forestry companies that dealt with the environment in terms specific to each company, it had little information specific to its own members. Labor had never investigated, in a coherent manner, any of the resources available. When Labor decided to seek majority government, it also decided to not only investigate the AES data but also to survey its own members.

The benchmark for the Australian electorate is the Australian Election Studies survey, while the benchmark for the Tasmanian Labor Party is a survey of its members made in August 1996. The AES surveys, which are modelled on the American National Election Study (NES) and the British Election Studies (BES), are designed to collect data during the Federal election for the purpose of research on electoral behaviour and public opinion. AES surveys have been conducted before each of the four most recent Federal elections: 1987, 1990, 1993 and 1996. Some of the questions on attitudes to politics and levels of political activism were asked in 1993 but not repeated in 1996. Because these questions would be useful for comparisons, they were included in the ALP survey.

The 1993 AES survey sampled 3,023 respondents. It was a weighted, stratified sample that over-sampled voters in the less populous States to permit State-by-State analyses. The 1996 AES survey involved 1,795 respondents drawn randomly from voter registration lists maintained by the Australian Electoral Commission. The data

*Elements of this chapter are based on the author’s personal knowledge and experience of the events described as a senior member of the Tasmanian ALP during the period from 1988 to the present.
are distributed by the Social Science Data Archives at the Australian National University.

The survey was prepared by the author after the Leader of the PLP and I had considered the need for a properly supported strategy to deal with the problem of the Greens and minority government and, in particular, calls by some within the party to again consider an arrangement with the Greens. The draft was prepared and forwarded to the Administrative Committee (of which I was not a member) prior to the 1996 State election. The committee considered the draft and deleted some questions, for example detailed questions relating to income and occupation, attitudes to nuclear energy and spouses political identification which were regarded as either too intrusive or not relevant. The committee also decided to delay the survey until after the State election in case it was leaked and used to embarrass the party.

The Administrative Committee of the Tasmanian Labor Party held on 28 July 1996 endorsed a proposal to survey all Tasmanian members.* So that the Labor members could be compared with the general population, the survey was partly based on the AES surveys. It was therefore open to the ALP, if it chose, to compare not only the attitudes of the party with those of the Australian population but, in the case of the 1993 survey, which used weighted samples from each State, State attitudes also. For the purposes of this chapter, unless otherwise noted, the comparisons on postmaterialism and general attitudes are based on the more recent 1996 AES data relating to the broad Australian population. This thesis has not used the 1993 AES data to compare State attitudes because there were only 335 responses from Tasmania – it was considered that there may have been too few responses to give a meaningful comparison. Although chapter four dealt with minor regional differences in the Tasmanian character, it is assumed when comparing the survey results that the Tasmanian responses are broadly comparable to the whole Australian population.

* The full Labor Party questionnaire is attached in the Appendix. Due to the nature of the survey the data has not been deposited with a data archive.
The survey was administered in the following manner. First, a letter from the party secretary was sent to all party members on 7 August 1996 informing them of the survey and encouraging their participation. A week later, members were mailed an envelope containing a covering letter (which explained the purposes of the survey and guaranteed confidentiality), the survey form, and a return postage paid-envelope.

At the end of August all members were sent a follow-up letter thanking those members who had completed the survey and asking those who had not done so to please do so. As a result of the follow-up letter, some members who had mislaid the survey requested another form, which they were sent. Of the 1136 members who were sent the forms, 511 responded – a response rate of 45 percent.

The purpose of the survey was to:
- assist in developing policy that would reflect the views of the Party as a whole;
- understand the Party’s views on a range of issues so the elected members would be better informed;
- compare the attitudes of the party with that of the broader population (Letter to ALP members from State Secretary, 7 August 1996).

The survey was divided into the following parts;
- Definitions of politics and attitudes to political parties.
- Attitudes to social issues
- Economic issues
- Social policy
- The environment
- Education and work
- Personal background
- Open questions on reasons for joining or leaving the Party.

The answers were entered into SPSS for windows V.6.135 by administrative staff, but quality and coding supervision was carried out by the author. The results were presented to the Administrative Committee, PLP and electoral forums of the Party throughout 1996 and 1997. The administrative committee did nor require a fuller
analysis, nor did it seek to exercise any censorship over it. This analysis and presentation was fairly utilitarian and limited to meeting the PLP objectives – by this time ensuring that the party members and the Administrative committee itself understood clearly that a future alliance with the greens would have meant a major split. It was also uppermost in the parties mind that the survey results, if leaked at that time, could have embarrassed the Party and compromised election strategies.

Survey Indicators of Materialists and Postmaterialists in Tasmania

The basic value priorities of citizens of Western, industrialised nations are, according to Inglehart (1977, 1990), shifting from a materialist emphasis, which assigns top priority to physical needs and safety, to postmaterialist values that reflect a concern with self-expression and quality of life. These values, which incorporate such issues as ecology and environmentalism, will now be considered in an Australian and Tasmanian context. Chapter two described the effect of postmaterialists on party structure while chapter three showed that the division between materialists and postmaterialists remains an important parameter of varying perceptions and values in Western democracies, including Australia in general and Tasmania in particular. Chapters three and six identified postmaterialists as supporters of both socialist and environmental parties. Thus the presence of postmaterialism and postmaterialists at both the theoretical and empirical levels in Australia has been broadly analysed to a degree that can serve as a benchmark for the following Tasmanian comparisons.

The AES and the Labor surveys were the main resources for the Tasmanian Labor Party's assessment of the extent of postmaterialism within the Party and in the electorate. However, the Party also needed to understand what “postmaterialism” entailed. Broadly, it relied on the key indicators noted in this thesis. Research discussed in chapter three points to postmaterialists being the core supporters of the New Politics and particular supporters of the Greens, having superseded the working class as a revolutionary force critical of the existing social order. The key indicators are: tertiary education, relative youth, public service employment and employment in the service sector such as academics, teachers and social workers (Gouldner 1979,
Kitschelt 1990 and Vincent 1992). Their education enabled them to join the ranks of the professions (Inglehart 1990, 67) and also to be willing to lobby actively for issues they regard as important (Eckersley 1992, 152., Hay 1993, 12). In other words, they generally have better access than most other groups to elites in society and are able to exert influence.

Postmaterialists are also libertarians, for a university education diffuses libertarian values (Brint 1984, Eckersley 1989, Knutsen 1990). This means that they have a different profile on social issues (although chapter three pointed out the warning given by Flanagan (1987) and Kitschelt (1990) that New Politics can also be authoritarian). Libertarians show support for the New Left agenda, including liberalisation of abortion, women's liberation and gay rights. Authoritarians, often materialist and less well educated, show support for traditional moral and religious values. Questions that identified postmaterialists appeared on both AES and Labor surveys, while questions relating to education, self-assessed social class and employment were included to establish the validity, in a Tasmanian context, of the key indicators put forward by European commentators. Questions such as attitudes to marijuana, the death penalty, migrants and Aborigines were all included to map the levels of libertarianism of the respondents.

**Materialist/postmaterialist questions**

On the basis of extensive cross-national surveys and intensive data analysis the main proponent of the postmaterialist thesis (Inglehart 1977) developed and validated a short version of the postmaterialist scale for use in surveys. The 1990, 1993 and 1996 AES questionnaires incorporated the same set of four items, and the Labor Party survey replicated the same scale. The postmaterialist scale requires respondents to select two items from the list of four items that reflect national goals. Participants were asked what they thought . . .

. . . . the aims of Australia should be for the next ten years. Here is a list of four aims that different people would give priority.
1. Maintain order in the nation.
2. Give people more say in important government decisions.
3. Fight rising prices.
4. Protect freedom of speech.

If you had to choose among these four aims, which would be your first choice? And which would be your second choice?

The first of these four items reflects a concern with physical safety and the third item reflects a concern about economic stability. Together these two items constitute a set of materialist value priorities. Conversely, the second and fourth item reflect postmaterialist values. Based on the two items respondents select, they are assigned to one of three categories. Respondents who select the materialist items constitute the materialists; respondents who select the postmaterialist items constitute the postmaterialists; and all other respondents, who selected one materialist and one postmaterialist item, form a “mixed” group whose values and views in general fall between those of the materialists and the postmaterialists.

AES surveys – postmaterialists in the Australian community

The 1990 figures in the AES study place about a quarter (26 percent) of the respondents as being materialists, while only 13 percent reflected postmaterialist values (Gow 1990, 58). The average figure for the 1987, 1990 and 1993 AES survey was 25 percent materialist and 15 percent postmaterialist (Bean and Papadakis, 1995, 117-119). In the 1996 AES survey, materialists had dropped to 18.5 percent and the postmaterialists risen to 17.7 percent. Although there has been no real attempt to explain the drop of materialists, the AES figures show a clear and consistent presence of postmaterialists from the 1987 survey to the present. Once postmaterialists are identified, it is then possible to gain further details of their characteristics. All of the figures below are based on cross-tabulations of various indicators from the 1996 AES survey.

Education and socio-economics

The Australian postmaterialists as a group display some of the expected characteristics. Of these education is the key determinant; postmaterialists are more likely to have tertiary qualifications (34.3 percent compared to 26.1 percent of
materialists), while materialists are more likely to have no qualifications (43.9 percent compared to 36.9 percent). A clear distinction appears in the importance the groups place on education: when asked to rate the importance of education, 57.4 percent of the postmaterialists and 47.2 percent of the materialists rated it as extremely important.

There is little to distinguish the groups on the basis of self-assessed social class and occupation. In relation to income, a slight difference appears in that materialists are more prevalent in the $12-20,000 income bracket (14.7 percent compared to 10.1 percent). In relation to religion, postmaterialists are rather more likely to profess no religion (20.2 percent compared to 12.9 percent).

Social issues
Postmaterialists are clearly more libertarian on social issues. In the answers to questions on the introduction of the death penalty for murder, stiffer sentences for those who break the law, and the decriminalisation of marijuana, postmaterialists are less likely to take an authoritarian approach (See figure 8.1).

![Figure 8.1 Materialist/postmaterialist support for libertarian/authoritarian issues](image)

These differences continue, with the materialists more likely to believe that too many migrants were coming into the country (36.1 percent compared to 26.9 percent) and that policies should be based on rational economic calculation (67.9 percent compared to 54.5 percent).
Environment
Attitudes to the environment naturally differ. The AES figures showed that postmaterialists were more likely to place greater importance on the environment in all questions. For example, postmaterialists are more likely to rate the environment as extremely important (57.3 percent compared to 35.4 percent), strongly agree with the need for stronger measures against pollution (57.4 percent compared to 39.1 percent) and likely to agree with the need to increase spending to protect the environment (29.2 percent compared to 14.6 percent).

These feelings are also relevant to the attitudes the groups displayed to environmental groups and the Greens as a political party. Postmaterialists are more likely to strongly approve of environmental groups (37.5 percent compared to 19.2 percent), be more likely to position themselves to the left on left/right self-placement, and be more likely to approve of the Greens as a political party. It is therefore clear that, in the Australian electorate, as in Europe and North America, a group of postmaterialists with distinct libertarian and pro-environment attitudes has emerged in recent years.

Labor's survey – postmaterialists in the ALP
The AES survey, while showing the level of postmaterialism in the community, was still of limited direct value to the Tasmanian Labor Party. No one knew how many postmaterialists and materialists there were in the Party, nor the depth of their feelings on social, economic and environmental issues in Tasmania. It was considered essential to find this ratio, and what values members held, if the Party was to be able to attract the soft green voters. To Labor, the key aspects of its proposed policy were also the key ideological aspects of postmaterialism; that is, the levels of education and libertarianism, economic values and attitudes to the environment. The ALP survey therefore sought to capture new and relevant data on the social and political attitudes of its members to establish whether or not they would accept a change in emphasis of ideology. If they refused to tolerate some postmaterialist values, any change was doomed to failure.
Chapters five and six explained how postmaterialism grew in Tasmania and became entrenched in environmental parties and progressive politics. In the past, conservationist groups within the Labor Party, such as the Green Network and SEECA, caused internal conflict, which pointed to the existence of postmaterialists but, until the 1996 survey, it was impossible to know precisely to what degree the party members were postmaterialists (figure 8.2).

The 1996 ALP survey found the following proportions of ALP members:

![Figure 8.2 Ratio of Labor materialists to postmaterialists]

The figures of 6 percent materialists and 38.4 percent postmaterialists is markedly different from the general Australian population – which in the 1996 AES survey showed materialists at 18.5 percent and postmaterialists at 17.7 percent. Although it can be expected that the values of the ALP vary from those of the general population, but this level of postmaterialism is surprising, with the ALP’s long history of links with the labour movement and the affiliation of many unions that rely on resource extraction and manufacturing for their membership base. One possible explanation is that nearly half (46.6 percent) of the ALP members listed as their first aim that of ‘giving people more say in important government decisions’ as opposed to only 31.7 percent of the general population in the 1996 AES survey. But for whatever reason, it becomes immediately clear that there are fewer materialists and more postmaterialists in the Labor Party than in the general public. If the Party is already more libertarian and to the left of the community on New Politics issues, this constrains how much further Labor can push without losing public support from materialist and mixed members.
Labor's survey indicators of postmaterialism

Economic and social attitudes support the results in the materialist/postmaterialist question, for postmaterialist Labor members place more importance on social than economic issues and are more libertarian than their material colleagues and the general electorate. As Flanagan (1987, 1305) has shown, Inglehart’s scale also taps aspects of authoritarian and libertarian values. The key indicators of postmaterialism clearly show a distinct group within the ALP. There are also clear and consistent differences in both personal attributes and attitudes between materialists and postmaterialists within the party. In all instances, the majority of the party members with mixed characteristics fall between these two in their values.

Education and socio-economics

Tasmanian Labor postmaterialists are more likely than materialists to be tertiary educated (45 percent compared to 32.1 percent), categorise themselves as middle-class (50 percent compared to 31 percent), be State public servants (35.7 percent compared to 24 percent), likely to profess no religion (50.3 percent compared to 30 percent) and earn a higher income. They are also more supportive of increasing opportunities for women.

In contrast, the materialists are more likely to have no qualifications since leaving school (32.1 percent compared to 17.2 percent), categorise themselves as working class (62.1 percent compared to 36.2 percent), be private employees (44 percent compared to 33 percent) or farmers (8 percent compared to 1.2 percent), more likely to be weekly church goers (10 percent compared to 4.3 percent) and be more likely to profess a religion (70 percent compared to 50 percent).

Social issues

In regard to social issues, postmaterialists are more libertarian. While 65 percent of the postmaterialists strongly disagree with the death penalty, only 20 percent of the materialists have the same view. Postmaterialists are more likely to strongly support legalising homosexual acts (58.4 percent compared to 30 percent) and support decriminalising marijuana (77.4 percent compared to 48.3 percent). They are less likely to favour stiffer penalties for offenders (36.5 percent compared to 76.7 percent) and are less likely to agree with the statement that government policies
should be based on rational economic calculation (18.9 percent compared to 46.7 percent). Similar splits are clear in relation to assistance for immigrants and help for Aborigines.

**Economics**
Economic matters show discernible differences in the Party on the basis of postmaterialism and education. Postmaterialists were less likely to strongly agree that high taxes make people less willing to work. When faced with the choice of higher taxes or more social services, a greater proportion of materialists than postmaterialists favoured less tax (17.8 percent as opposed to 4.8 percent), while postmaterialists strongly favoured more social services (61.7 percent as opposed to 14.3 percent).

**Political activism**
Although age and educational attainment are often regarded as determinants of political participation (Barnes et al 1979, McAllister 1992, chapter 3) the characteristics of Labor members who are politically active did not find any correlation with age or education. Differences only arose in those who were ‘very’ and ‘quite likely’ to be involved in the most unpopular forms of action; that is, disrupting meetings and blocking traffic. In both cases postmaterialists were more likely to be involved in the more radical methods of political activism. For example, 61.9 percent stated they were likely to attend an illegal march, as opposed to only 28.5 percent of the materialists, thus supporting Inglehart’s (1990, 316-318) view that postmaterialists are far more likely to become involved in political protest.

**Environment**
The responses to environmental issues in the ALP survey revealed the expected differences between materialists and postmaterialists in the Party. Postmaterialists were more strongly positive towards preserving nature than were materialists (35.1 percent compared to 23.3 percent), more likely to agree to increase spending to protect the environment (75.7 percent compared to 62 percent), and more likely to want to phase out logging (82.7 percent compared to 63.3 percent). They are more likely to be a member of an environment group, more likely to accept the need for
higher taxes to protect the environment, and less likely to believe that television is biased in favour of the Greens.

**Generational replacement**

An important feature of Inglehart's theory, described in chapter three, is his explanation of the way in which the proportion of the postmaterialists in the population increases through generational replacement. He concluded that the younger members are more likely to be postmaterialists, as they have been socialised in an atmosphere of relative comfort and security. When the older generation dies, the ratio of postmaterialists in the population would increase. Despite criticisms of this aspect of his hypothesis (Gow 1990), Inglehart (1990, chapter two) has remained firm.

Inglehart's hypothesis does not seem to be borne out in Labor by a cross-tabulation of age and postmaterialism (see figure 8.3).

![Figure 8.3 Ratio of materialists/postmaterialists on basis of age.](image)

There are two possible explanations for this result. First, as suggested by Gow (1990, 59), the results may be due to the passage of time when Inglehart's original study was conducted in 1971 and this survey. Second, and more likely, the results illustrate that economic conditions may set the scene for postmaterialist values to develop. Inglehart (1990, 87) recognised the impact of economic recessions on the rise of postmaterialists. It can be argued that the cohorts born after 1960 have experienced recessions and employment downturns and hence not socialised in a
period of relative security. This would explain why the postmaterialists peak in the 41-50 age group and then decline, while the 31-40 age group show an increase in materialists, having suffered from the harsher economic times that have affected all western nations.

However, it must be remembered that these mixed results relate not to the existence of postmaterialism, but to claims of its origins, the presence of postmaterialists in both the electorate and the ALP is clearly evident, showing clear differences in economic and social values.

Definitions of 'left' and 'right'
The left/right schema gives electors an orientation in a complex political world. To members of a political party, and to others, the meaning of this schema is defined by the basic conflicts within society – or more accurately the specific conflicts from which the respondents select their specific understanding. A threshold issue in examining the values of members was to find whether there was agreement on this conflict, for the left/right dichotomy can be interpreted by the individual in various ways (Huber and Inglehart 1995, 90). Two main components seem prevalent – a party and an issue/value component (Burklin 1985, 283).

This question also relates to the issue of catch-all parties discussed in chapter two. Kirchheimer (1966, 1840) claimed that ideology fractures as a party moves to broaden its appeal; the stress once placed on ideology is weakened, as are class and union alliances when the party opens itself up to new social groups. But Sartori’s (1976) and Dittrich’s (1983) findings that catch-all parties do not necessarily win votes are relevant at this point, for Labor’s programmatic change is only of value if it actually attracts new voters.

The following question investigated which components members used to define the concept of ‘left’ and ‘right’. Members were asked:

In politics people talk about the ‘left’ and ‘right’. Which of the following better describes this?
a. The struggle between the workers and owners over how the riches of the capitalist system are divided. The left would seek government intervention in economic matters to ensure distribution, while the right would support little intervention.

b. The struggle over changes to society on the basis of issues such as greater rights for women, protection of freedom of speech and civil liberties. The tension between progressive and conservative forces in society as they relate to social change. The left would seek to extend progressive reform on such issues, while the right would oppose change and support the status quo.

c. Both of the above.

d. Neither of the above.

The choices were on the basis of two cleavages. As chapter three showed, from the communist manifesto to the early 1980s’ ‘left’ meant advocating change by State intervention in the economy, with the salient issues relating to economic and class conflict (Burklin 1985, Huber 1989). The first choice incorporated elements of class conflict that determined the structure of the current traditional party systems in western industrial society (Lipset and Rokkan 1967, 45). The options given allowed members to interpret the definition in terms of this partisan or ‘traditional’ manner.

But a newer definition was also added on a reform/conservative dichotomy (Lipset 1983, Dalton, Beck and Flanagan 1984), allowing an interpretation on the basis of a value/issue component, or ‘new’ view based on a quality of life rather than a standard of living. The second cleavage focussed more on social change on the basis of issues expounded by Inglehart (1971, 1986), where class conflict is increasingly being replaced by the conflict over values reflected in the contrast between materialist and postmaterialist values (Inglehart and Rabier 1986). On this basis the left/right scheme will reflect old values but also increasingly be applied to new value issues (figure 8.4). Although it is impossible to discuss any rates of changes with a single question, clear differences are evident.
The findings confirm that members apply different meanings to the terms ‘left’ and ‘right’: 56.1 percent chose both definitions, but sizeable proportions chose the old (15.8 percent) and the new (19.4 percent). These findings do not support a catch-all model, for the new definition does not mean a lessening of ideology but a change of ideology that takes into account the new political dimension. The results do, however, show a weakening of the old Marxist ideology and materialist influence (Papadakis 1991, 246) and the inclusion of a new political dimension based on postmaterialism – referred to by some as an indicator of an enduring social and political transformation (Crepaz 1990, Eckersley 1992, 163).

Similar differences were shown on the basis of education and self-assessed social class and gender. Women were more likely to adopt the ‘new’ definition (20.8 percent) as opposed to the ‘old’ (12.6 percent), while males were more evenly split. Middle-class members were more likely to accept the new definition (20.6 percent compared to 14.3 percent), while working-class members were marginally more likely to accept the traditional definition (18 percent compared to 16.3 percent). Such a split was found strongest in a German survey of university-educated younger age cohorts where leftism was related to libertarian basic orientations (Burklin, 1985, 289-90). In Tasmania people with bachelor degrees were more accepting of the new (24.3 percent) than were those with no qualifications (14.6 percent).

Although a significant section of the party differed on these views, a majority in all educational groups believed that the term ‘left’ encompassed both the old and the new definition.
Left/right self-placement

The concepts of ‘left’ and ‘right’ as instruments for classifying and interpreting political positions have a rich symbolic meaning, with the vast majority of electors able to interpret individual policy preferences in terms of left and right (Huber and Inglehart 1995, 90). Fuchs and Klingemann (1990, 208) found that, while over 90 percent of voters use the left-right frame (although, as chapter three has shown, the understandings vary) the personal relevance for the individual voter seems much lower. This was not the case with the Labor respondents: only 22 out of 511 did not place themselves on such a scale.

Self-placement on a left/right scale becomes of importance when determining members attitudes. Those who emphasise the new political issues, such as Aboriginal assistance, migration and the environment, are likely to adopt a more radical approach and to place themselves to the left (figure 8.5).

![Figure 8.5 ALP left/right self-placement](image)

These results support European findings. Inglehart (1990, 275) found that the strongest indicators of whether one was on the left or the right were these New Politics issues, while Burkin (1985, 285) found that those who prefer non-material participatory goals over material goals place themselves significantly closer to the left.

Within the party there is a clear distinction between those concerned with social issues (postmaterialists) and those concerned with the traditional labour issues. Yet again, the factors of education and a willingness to see themselves as further to the
left, define this subgroup – setting up a tension with materialists in the party as it moves to attract ‘soft’ green voters who are concerned with these social issues.

**Labor Party Members Characteristics**

As well as postmaterialism, other attributes of members have the capacity to affect how the party in Tasmania will respond to issues. Not only are differences apparent between members residing in different electorates, but the issues of gender, age and attitudes to other political parties become important. Highly polarised values and characteristics could make ideological shifts impossible, or at the very least limit the Party’s manoeuvrability to what the Tasmanian members will tolerate.

**Occupation**

Party members have a higher level of retired people than the general population (23.3 percent compared to 15.6 percent), a lower level of people willing to classify themselves as ‘keeping house’, and marginally fewer full-time workers. The membership has marginally more unemployed people looking for work – although having regard to the traditionally higher levels of unemployment in Tasmania this cannot be seen as extraordinary.

The ALP has a very high number of public servants: 48 percent are employed by Federal, State or local governments. Males were more likely to be either self-employed or Federal public servants, while women were more likely to be State public servants. The profile of Gouldner’s (1979) tertiary-educated and public-sector employed “humanistic intelligentsia” and Williams’s (1988, 18) postmaterialists with a pro-environment stance who are humanistic professionals fits the ALP members.

**Age and length of membership**

Over 50 percent of the Party members have been members for less than 5 years, with a drop from 6-10 years. Figure 8.6 displays the length of membership.
Most of the party's members are middle aged, for over 40 percent are clustered in the 36-50 age group. Nor can the new members be classified differently, for they too are predominantly middle-aged (table 8.7). Of the 118 members who have been in the party for less than two years, only 6.8 percent were younger than 20. If European findings are relevant to Tasmania (Poguntke 1989), the Greens would appear to have a higher proportion of younger members, but also are likely to suffer from significant membership losses over time.

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<th>Table 8.7 Age and new membership</th>
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<tr>
<td>Age group</td>
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<td>Length of membership (percent.)</td>
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<td>0 - 2 years</td>
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</table>

**Women in the ALP**

The New Politics parties have been attractive to women, with large proportions being activists. In the Belgian Ecology Parties, a quarter of the activists in 1985 were women, while the figure rose to one third in the West German Greens (Kitschelt 1989, Chapter 4). In Australia, women hold a majority of the Green seats in Australian Parliaments and play a major role; a result the Greens claim of a mode of functioning that is not aggressive or combative and attempts to minimise hierarchy and competition (Brown & Singer 1996, 174).
Women are more likely to place themselves further to the left than men, be less unfavourable towards the Greens and more likely to believe it is acceptable to vote for small parties and independents. Tasmanian Labor women did not display the tendency towards political conservatism that Graetz and McAllister (1988b, 282) had noted in the general Australian population.

When asked to rate issues on levels of importance, women members of the Tasmanian ALP were more likely to list family, health, education and law-and-order as extremely important; for example 87 percent of women and 76 percent of men rated health as extremely important. On social issues women believed more money should be spent to reduce poverty, redistribute wealth and, when asked to choose between lower taxes or more social services, strongly supported more social services. Women believe there should be more government help for Aborigines, and were stronger in their support for legalising homosexual acts and banning semi-automatic guns. Women were more libertarian on almost all issues except sexual issues; in relation to censorship and the right to show nudity and sex in films and magazines, women were markedly more likely to support some censorship and to feel nudity and sex had gone too far (52 percent compared to 30.6 percent of men).

Electorates

An analysis of the attitudes of members living in different electorates show differences – particularly between the most urban electorate (Denison) and the largely rural electorates of Braddon and Lyons. Denison members are more likely to have a Bachelor degree and less likely to be unqualified, more likely to assess themselves as middle-class – 56.4 percent as opposed to 31.3 percent who regard themselves as working class. Denison and Franklin residents are more likely to be earning more than $26,000 (54 and 54.5 percent respectively). Braddon and Lyons have a higher proportion who have no qualifications (23 and 25.9 percent respectively), with Braddon (27.6 percent) having the highest level of trade qualifications. Lyons members are more likely to see themselves as working-class (54.2 percent as opposed to 31.3 percent in Denison) and have the highest proportion earning below $26,000 (82.8 percent as opposed to 35 percent in Franklin).
Apart from the fact that Lyons members are more worried about the environment (72.9 percent) than others, and that they strongly agree that TV is biased towards the Greens (24.6 percent as opposed to 12.7 percent in Denison), there are no real dissimilarities on environmental attitudes among the five electorates.

The differences become apparent with social issues. Braddon and Lyons members have a higher proportion who believe that the number of migrants coming into Australia and government help for Aborigines have gone much too far. They have a higher proportion with authoritarian views, strongly agreeing with stiffer penalties for offenders (32.8 percent in Lyons compared to 12.2 percent in Denison) and strongly disagreeing with the banning of semi-automatic guns (35.5 percent in Braddon compared to 73.5 percent in Denison), decriminalising marijuana and legalising homosexual acts (17 percent in Braddon compared to 1.8 percent in Denison). The rural electorates can be classified as more authoritarian and less libertarian than the more urban electorates. With higher proportions of postmaterialists in urban electorates, the rural members would be the most likely to be alienated by a shift to a libertarian issue-based strategy.

**Members' left/right placement of the Party**

They were able to interpret individual policy preferences in order to rank themselves, and others, on this dimension. Questions also allowed the members to not only place themselves but also the party organisation as a whole and the Parliamentary Labor Party on the left/right scale (figure 8.8).

![Figure 8.8 Left / right placement.](image)
The results show that the members place themselves to the left of the party organisation and even further to the left of the Parliamentary Labor Party, clearly regarding it as less radical than themselves. This leads to another source of tension when disputes arise over the speed of policy implementation by the PLP. A consistent response by the PLP has been that it is more aware of what rate of change the electorate will tolerate.

**Attitudes to other parties**

Members were asked to rank their level of approval and disapproval of the political parties in Tasmania on a scale of 0 (highest level of disapproval) to 10 (highest level of approval). Seventy percent of the respondents rated the Nationals, and 45 percent rated the Liberals, with the highest level of disapproval, while nearly 100 percent expressed some disapproval. Labor approval was also not total, ranging from mild to strong approval. The results for the Greens and the Democrats were more complex (figure 8.9) – again highlighting the internal tensions of the Tasmanian ALP.

![Figure 8.9 Members' approval/disapproval of parties.](image)

A significant proportion of the party gave the Greens their highest disapproval (24.2 percent) while another (34.8 percent) rated them neutral to mildly positive (see figure 8.10).
The Democrats, another party that could be described as postmaterialist, did not cause the same level of polarisation, with both a lower disapproval rating and a greater neutral or positive result.

Further analysis of the Labor survey gives an understanding of the characteristics of those within the party who approved of the Greens. Those who rated the Greens in neutral or favourable terms, that is a rating of 5 or more, were more likely to be postmaterialists, have a university degree and regard themselves as middle-class. Age or income levels did not appear to be a factor, nor was the type of employment of the respondent.

There is also a relationship between the perception of media bias and approval of the Greens. When a cross-tabulation is done, those members who show the highest levels of disapproval of the Greens are more inclined to view television as biased towards the Greens, while those who are favourable or neutral are less likely to see television as biased. For example, of all the members who regard the Greens most unfavourably 38.8 percent strongly agree that television is biased, while only 5 percent strongly disagree; of those who give an approval rating to the Greens, 50 percent disagree that the media is biased towards the Greens. Again, as with all of the survey, the values of the members vary in both perception and intensity.

The statement ‘It makes sense to vote for small parties or independent candidates sometimes’ had 28.2 percent of the members agreeing (figure 8.11) This result is
important, particularly with the Hare-Clark system in Tasmania, for it shows that over a quarter of Tasmanian members will not unfailingly be completely loyal to the Party on all occasions. It is these members who might vote for other New Politics parties if the ALP did not pursue what they saw as a progressive agenda.

Figure 8.11  It makes sense to vote for small parties sometimes

![Graph showing responses to voting for small parties]

Those members who strongly agreed were more likely to regard the Greens in a neutral to favourable light (71.4 percent) and were more likely to have a bachelor's degree than to have no qualification since school.

Approval of social movements
ALP members were more approving than the general population of environmental, anti-war and anti-uranium groups, in that order. Although approval of environmental groups by the ALP stood at 82.1 percent, it is difficult to establish just what members meant by ‘environment group,’ for such groups may range from relatively conservative organisations such as Landcare through to the radical ecocentric Wilderness Society. To the question of whether they have joined or considered joining an environment group, 9.3 percent claimed to be members already, while 37.4 percent had considered joining. But a large proportion (41.5 percent) stated they would never consider joining such a group (figure 8.12).

*This question was asked before changes to the electoral laws which increased the quota necessary for election*
Cross-tabulation shows that those who displayed greater disapproval of the Greens were more likely to say they would never join an environmental group. Of interest was that 31.6 percent of the members who were already members of an environmental group gave the Greens the highest level of disapproval. Those who were more favourable towards the Greens were either currently members of a group or had considered joining but, significantly, were unlikely to have had past affiliations.

Comparison of Characteristics of the ALP and the Electorate

The Tasmanian survey established that there are marked differences in outlook and beliefs within the Labor Party. Its membership shows a waning materialism and an apparent rise in postmaterial values. Even its materialist members have some sympathy for environmental and libertarian social issues. These findings give room to the Party to shift ideologically to become more attractive to the postmaterialist voter.

The next issue for the Tasmanian ALP to consider is how any such ideological shift would relate to general community attitudes. This is of vital importance, for Labor's strategy was to gain support from the 'soft' green voters. But given the nature of the general community, which has a lower percentage of postmaterialists than the ALP, the difficulty is in gaining those votes without losing more votes elsewhere from members of the broader, non-postmaterialist community. These differences clearly
constrain Labor's movements to either the left or the right. Unless the party can map
the differences it has with the community, it could, for example, offend the
traditional materialist Labor voter by some postmaterialist issues. Thus it was also
appropriate to compare the attitudes of the Labor Party with the electorate as a
whole. It would be expected that the attitudes of the ALP members would differ
from the public, for, as the analysis will show, they form an elite, and elites
generally do have different attitudes (for example, McAllister 1992, McAllister and
Boldiston 1994 and Norris 1995). The question that can now be answered is by how
much?

**Education**

The education profile of the Tasmanian ALP members differs from the electorate as
identified in the AES survey, with fewer members without qualifications, being
twice as likely to have both bachelor and postgraduate degrees (figure 8.13). The
importance of education in the formation of postmaterial values has been discussed
(Knutsen 1990 and Eckersley 1990). With the proportion of all people with formal
post-school qualifications projected to rise from 36.6 percent in 1994 to 42.4
percent in 2005 (*Australia's Workforce 2005: Jobs in the Future*, 1995, 74), there
appears little likelihood of the proportions of such people dropping in the Party.

![Figure 8.13 Highest qualifications](image-url)
Social class
On the basis of self-assessed social class, the members are more likely to regard themselves as middle-class and less likely to regard themselves as working class than the general population (figure 8.14).

Both Kemp (1977) and Aitken (1983) argued that class has a declining relevance to determining party identification. Jupp (1982, 140-141) argues that, until the 1960s, the ALP was dominated by unions and characterised by a marked “hostility to middle-class influence.” But the image of the Labor party as composed of, and representing, working-class interests has changed with the influx of tertiary-educated and postmaterialist members to the Party in the 1970s.

Religion
In late nineteenth century Australia, Roman Catholics were a minority in a political system dominated by the English. Jaensch (1992, 410-11) states that they were generally Irish, poor, and manual workers, so it is not surprising that the early Labor Party was strongly Catholic in its membership. In Tasmania Labor can no longer be considered a party dominated by Catholics, as those who specify a religion are more likely to be Anglicans (figure 8.15).
The party has proportionately fewer Catholics and Anglicans than the general population, in part because a higher proportion never attend any church (50 percent compared to 38.5 percent of the Tasmanian population). A majority of Catholic members define themselves as middle-class (51.1 percent), while those members who list no religion are mostly middle-class (55.8 percent). The old cleavages on which the mass party arose, including religion, have lost their importance. If anything, the new issue cleavages that correlate to lack of religion are now of greater importance within the party. Graetz and McAllister (1988b, 136) found a relationship between religion and moral issues, with most people who regard religion as important being more conservative. These findings are confirmed among ALP members: those who list a religion are less likely to agree with the decriminalisation of marijuana and homosexual acts. Religiosity is also a factor: those who are more regular church goers are also more conservative on issues of morality. The high levels of those without a religion and those who do not attend church point to a significant libertarian group within the Party.

Left/right self-placement

Another distinction is that of left/right self placement. Figure 8.16 shows that the general population, as identified in the 1996 AES survey, regards itself in the middle to slightly right, while the members regard themselves as clearly to the left, with very few describing themselves as to the right. The AES survey did not enable
respondents to identify themselves as 'old' materialist or 'new' postmaterialist left, although on the basis of the ALP survey there would obviously be differences in how the term 'left' was described.

**Figure 8.16 ALP and electorate self-placement.**

![Graph showing ALP and electorate self-placement.]

**Approval/disapproval of Greens**

The level of approval of the Greens by the electorate, when compared with that of the Party, confirm the polarisation of views (figure 8.17). The ALP members show stronger disapproval and few neutral feelings. Despite the central spike in community attitudes to the Greens, the graph is not a normal bell curve, being biased to the 'disapprove' end of the scale.

**Figure 8.17 Labor and electorate approval/disapproval of Greens**

![Graph showing approval/disapproval of Greens.]

![Graph showing approval/disapproval of Greens.](image-url)
Social policy
With the importance of progressive social values being held by many members with either mixed or postmaterial attitudes, it is not surprising that on issues of social policy Labor respondents are relatively progressive and libertarian. For example, in the areas of migrants (see figure 8.18) and Aborigines (figure 8.19), the party does not mirror the general views of society.

The differences on the question of Aborigines is even more extreme: 29.6 percent of the electorate and only 7.7 percent of the Party believe that Government help for Aborigines has gone much too far.
The progressive and libertarian differences continue: ALP members are also likely to believe that society has not gone far enough in providing equal opportunities for women and are more likely to believe that the right to show nudity and sex in films and magazines is ‘about right’.

Labor members are less authoritarian than the electorate, agreeing less strongly and disagreeing more strongly that people who break the law should be given stiffer sentences. Surprisingly, although the survey was carried out shortly after 35 people were shot and killed at Port Arthur, the members express strong feelings against capital punishment (figure 8.20).

![Figure 8.20 Reintroduce death penalty](image)

In relation to the decriminalisation of marijuana the members were more libertarian in their attitude than the general public (figure 8.21).

![Figure 8.21 Decriminalise marijuana](image)
Economic issues
These questions were included to determine whether economics was a salient issue for members. Members were asked, 'when you are deciding about how to vote at a State or Federal election, how important will each of these issues be to you personally?'

Figure 8.22 compares the issues of education, environment, health, inflation and unemployment. The ALP responses are the left group of two columns for each area of concern. This shows members not only have stronger views on the relative importance of issues, being far more likely to respond to an issue of concern as 'extremely important', but also place less significance on economic issues such as inflation.

Although Gow (1990, 65) claimed to establish, on a federal basis, the centrality of economic issues to voters decisions the results do not appear to be replicated in the answers given by the ALP respondents (figure 8.22). With the exception of unemployment, the responses by Labor members on economic issues such as inflation, are not in the 'extremely important category'. This is in the contrast to
education, health and the environment – thus establishing the centrality of quality-of-life issues. It is also arguable that unemployment can be described as much as a social problem as an economic issue, giving further weight to the argument that the respondents’ values are socially rather than economically based. However, when comparisons are made with the electorate, it becomes apparent that the ALP does not mirror the views of the broader electorate.

When asked to list the issue of most concern in the last 12 months (figure 8.23), unemployment and education emerge as the major concerns for the members, while the electorate places a greater importance on health.

![Figure 8.23 Issue of greatest concern.](image)

Not only was the party less focused on economic matters, but in all questions relating to economic and business issues the party differed from the views of the electorate. The members disagreed with stricter laws regulating trade unions, strongly agreed that big business had too much power, strongly agreed that wealth should be redistributed, and strongly agreed that we should spend more to reduce poverty. The members differed from the electorate also in relation to taxes: when asked whether they agreed with the statement that high taxes make people less
willing to work, the electorate was twice as likely to agree (74 percent compared to 35.2 percent).

Similar answers were given to other economic questions (figure 8.24). Not only are members less likely to believe that high taxes discourage work, they are also significantly likely, when asked to choose between reducing taxes or spending more on social services, to strongly favour social services – again contrary to the view of the electorate and showing clear limits as to how far the Tasmanian ALP could shift without losing public support.

Figure 8.24 shows that 40.8 percent of the electorate strongly favour lower taxes, while 53.4 percent of the ALP members strongly favour more social services. On all issues relating to economics, the members either place less significance on them or, if given a choice, prefer to focus on social issues. The members do not agree that government policies should, above all, be based on rational economic calculation – although within the Party, materialists are more likely to agree than postmaterialists (figure 8.25).
The environment

The environment as an election issue has been of significance to the Labor Party for decades. Chapters five and six have shown that in each election in which the Greens gained seats to the detriment of the Labor Party, an environmental issue has been central. In the 1982 election it was the Franklin River and in 1986 it was Electrona and forestry; in 1989 Wesley Vale and World Heritage; in 1992 the Labor Party suffered an electoral massacre in an election caused by forestry issues.

There is no doubt that the general level of public concern about environmental matters remains high, particularly when considered as a long-term issue. For example, in the 1993 AES survey, the respondents rated the environment as seventh as an issue of most concern in the last 12 months (see figure 8.23), but when asked to list the issues of most concern in the next 10 years the environment rose to fourth position. Within the Labor Party the environment ranked as a fourth issue of concern, both for the last 12 months and in the next 10 years. While other issues may dominate the headlines, environmental issues persist in the consciousness of both the ALP members and the general electorate.

Crook and Pakulski (1995) found that concerns about the environment are not homogeneous in Australia. They claim that the issues selected as 'the most important' allow a distinction to be made between 'brown' and 'green' clusters, with
distinct correlates for each. Those who list as their first and second concerns 'pollution' and 'waste disposal' are termed as 'brown-green', while those who list their concerns as 'logging of forests' and 'destruction of wildlife' are labelled 'green-green'. Crook and Pakulski (1995, 9) claim the 'greens' are likely to have above-average income and education and be liberal on social issues. The 'browns' are more conservative on social issues and be less well educated.

When asked to rate environmental concerns on the basis of urgency, a higher proportion of Tasmanian Labor members than the electorate as a whole rated the issues of soil degradation, destruction of wildlife and logging of forests as 'very urgent'; this is in accord with Crook and Pakulski's (1995, 9) assertions that strong environmental concerns are associated with strong pro-left sympathies. When education was considered, members with tertiary education gave a higher rating of urgency to nearly all the environmental concerns. When asked to list the environmental issue that has worried them the most in the last 12 months, Labor members listed 'pollution' (29.9 percent), while the general population, although listing pollution, gave it a higher rate (36.6 percent) (figure 8.26).
Members who chose ‘pollution’ as the most important issue were more likely to define themselves as working-class, have no qualifications and a lower income. Members who rated logging of forests as the most urgent concern were more likely to be tertiary-educated, and slightly more likely to define themselves as middle-class. These figures point to differences of opinion in matters environmental within the Party but, in the absence of a full correlation, cannot be taken to confirm Crook and Pakulski’s green and brown groups. All that can be said is that environmental concerns within the Labor Party, as in the public, are not homogeneous.

In matters of logging of forests, soil degradation and wildlife destruction the members show a greater level of concern, while in the areas of greenhouse, waste disposal and overpopulation, the general electorate has a higher concern. Just over 50 percent of the members disagree that Australia should mine its uranium, compared with 30.6 percent of the population.

When dealing with questions of choosing between paying higher prices for goods or damage to the environment, Tasmanian Labor members preferred an increase in prices (92.3 percent compared to 80.2 percent). When faced with the choice between lower taxes or protection of the environment and higher taxes ALP members chose the environment (figure 8.27).
Attitudes to government and politics

Membership of the Labor Party correlates with members' attitudes to government. Members were asked to agree or disagree with various statements relating to government. In all cases the members were more likely to strongly feel empowered, have a better understanding of the political process, and be less intimidated than the general population. A typical response was in relation to the statement that, 'Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what's going on' (figure 8.28).

![Figure 8.28 Politics is complicated.](image)

Political activism

Aitken (1982, chapter 18) divides Australians into three basic types of electors: the politically active, the spectators and the apathetic. In the general population the spectators and the apathetic make up the vast majority, with one national study in 1986 (Western 1991, 325) finding that 88 percent had never written to a newspaper and 81 percent would neither demonstrate nor publicly protest. Chaples (1993, 28) estimates that 4 percent of Australians are financial members of political parties, but only 2 percent are regularly active (which is higher than the 2 percent membership of German and Belgium parties estimated by Kitschelt [1990, 189]). The 1993 AES figures show that the number involved actively in politics has risen only marginally. The Party survey shows that the Labor members are more ready to be involved than others in all areas of political activism (figure 8.29).
Surprisingly, members were more willing to be physically active and attend a public meeting or attend a march than to write to a newspaper. The numbers who stated they were 'very' or 'quite' likely to try and block traffic or help others to disrupt a march or meeting to which they objected was small, although still larger than the general public.

**Conclusion**

Using both AES data and the recent Labor Party survey, this chapter has demonstrated the presence of postmaterialists in both the Tasmanian ALP and the State's electorate. Clear differences in attitudes and beliefs distinguish this group. The key indicators of education, self-assessed social class, employment and libertarian attitudes all point towards the existence of the 'new class' in Australian society. On the basis of one survey of the Labor Party, it is impossible to say how durable this phenomenon will be, but the current high level of postmaterialists is strategically significant to a Party attempting to gain government. The Labor survey gave strong evidence of a waning materialism and a rise of postmaterialist values within the Party. These results support a move towards 'soft' green issues.

This chapter has also shown clear differences between the attitudes and values of the ALP and the electorate. On economic, social and environmental issues the members are more libertarian, socially focussed and pro-environment. However, even if Labor were able to vary its ideological focus, it cannot do so without community support. Too great a shift towards postmaterialist values would create a problem.
with the general community, whose values are more materialistic (as shown by its attitudes to taxation and social services (figure 8.24), policies based on rational economic calculation (figure 8.25), inflation, health and unemployment (figure 8.22). The tensions engendered by disparate views within the Party and between the Party and the electorate are a reminder of the danger of appealing to one sector of the community only to lose more votes elsewhere. The community’s position on many issues is different from Labor Party members’.

Notwithstanding these differences, in looking at ideological repackaging, the general public and Tasmanian ALP surveys showed sufficient similarities for a careful strategy to gain postmaterialist votes without disenchancing the traditional blue-collar materialist voter. Just what these levels of postmaterialism mean to the Labor Party, and how it defines the options both structurally and ideologically, are considered in the next chapter, which illustrates how the ALP used the data from the surveys to make better-informed choices in formulating a coherent electorate strategy.
CHAPTER 9
LABORS’ RESPONSE TO POSTMATERIALISM

Introduction
The previous chapter analysed the attitudes and values of the electorate and the ALP revealed by the surveys. It highlighted internal differences along a cleavage line of materialists and postmaterialists. This chapter considers these implications, both electoral and ideological, and places the surveys in the context of the political landscape occupied by the Labor Party.

Following Labor’s own assessment of its internal survey, the Party defined certain strategic options. In assessing these options, the debate, to a large extent unwittingly, paralleled the course of much of the academic research on postmaterialism. Global and national trends with regard to postmaterialism were apparent in Tasmania. With the level of postmaterialism, its values and Labors’ experience in dealing with the Greens, the Tasmanian ALP had to respond to empirical reality. This chapter examines how the Tasmanian ALP has, and is, responding to the empirical realities identified in the previous chapter. It does so by reviewing the Party’s perceived options and assessing how the ALP weighed them up in the context of its own understanding of the consequences.

After years of meandering and responding to political events, the Labor Party finally — after exhausting all options — made a firm decision as to its electoral course. The other electoral options identified by the Tasmanian ALP are also described in this chapter. In brief, they were to make an alliance with one of the other parties: Greens or Liberals. Labor discarded these options and decided to go for majority government.

The survey results for Labor are then analysed. The ALP survey and the AES survey had established there were differences in attitudes and values between the two groups. Most strikingly, a high level of members have postmaterial values, and typically have postmaterialist characteristics: tertiary education, public sector
employment, libertarian attitudes and pro-environmental views. Because of this similarity, Australian and European literature are relevant to Tasmania.

The national literature, together with the surveys, tell of the challenge to the orthodox Labor position in three areas. First, the Labor Party is not a homogeneous organisation, but ranges from far left to right, creating an internal tension when the Party attempts to shift ideological ground. Secondly, the Labor Party has always been a broadly inclusive Party, with a wide variance in the values held by the members. These values, and the strength with which they are held, would determine the structure of the Party and how far it can manoeuvre to attract ‘soft’ green votes without repeating the damaging brawls of the past. Thirdly, the policy that it adopts must appeal to the public if they are to be persuaded to vote for the ALP. These policies are written by members through policy committees and adopted at State conferences. If the views of the Party members are not sufficiently representative of the broader community, there is a danger that they will not be electorally attractive, resulting in a loss of general community support.

The chapter finally considers the electoral implications for both the Labor Party and the Greens. Both parties have had to respond, structurally and ideologically, to these different values, Labor to the postmaterialists and the Greens to the materialists. Both have encountered problems coping with this. Labor has not had the luxury of responding to postmaterialism in a static environment, for the Greens have also sought to adapt. In the end, it had very little choice but to ignore any alliance options and to seek majority in its own right.

What Were the Options?

If Labor strategists had considered academic research from Europe, and the difficulties other socialist parties had already experienced dealing with postmaterialism and the emergence of New Politics parties, they might have been better prepared. Inglehart had, since 1971, clearly identified postmaterialists in developed societies, while Poguntke (1987) and Kitschelt (1988) had clearly identified the salience of environmental issues in the formation of new parties.
Burklin (1987) and Rainbow (1989) had pointed out that the success of Green Parties was partly a failure of Social Democratic Parties to reflect the values of the postmaterialists and integrate the green electorate. Muller-Rommel (1990) had warned that a radical realisation of New Politics issues was beyond the scope of the socialist parties. In effect, the course of the challenge to the Labor Party in Tasmania had already been plotted in detail in a European context. Labor was left to follow the same course its European counterparts had, and were, experiencing.

If Labor had only considered the debate raging in the academic world, it would not only have read of the conflict of values between the working-class and the postmaterialists, but also of the programmatic and strategic paralysis that came with such conflict (Poguntke 1987, Kitschelt 1990). Even the Green internal conflicts between the “fundis” and the “realos” (Muller-Rommel 1985, Evans 1993) were mirrored locally. Perhaps all that can be said is that even if Labor had been aware of these debates, by the time it had read them it would have been firmly caught up in its own battles and unable to benefit from the wisdom of others. With only a few minor differences, the political battles waged in Europe between the socialist parties and the emerging Greens was played out in Tasmania.

Possibly the greatest wish for the members of the Tasmanian Labor Party would be to ignore the Greens, that is impossible, for the Greens have established their relevance. Sartori’s (1976) rules of relevance, which were dealt with in chapter two, are applicable to the Tasmanian context. They are those of position value and change in the direction of competition. His first criterion is appropriate as a result of the 1989 election, where the Greens for the first time gained the balance of power in the House of Assembly and were able to determine a government majority until 1998. In relation to their effect on party competition there is little doubt that the Greens’ electoral success reflected a change in political consciousness. At the level of policy they helped the two major parties to make both symbolic modifications (reformulations of party programmes) and material changes (severe curtailment of proposals for further Hydro Electric Commission development). Later commentators all agree that the Greens’ 1989 arrangement with the minority Labor Government changed the policy and direction of the Government. For example:
The ALP and the Liberals were accustomed to being bound together in an historically arranged relationship of mutual satisfaction, but after the 1989 election they had to deal with Green Independents who occupied the cross-benches . . . . The presence of the Green Independents as a substantial parliamentary force altered the way that the parliament functioned during the Field Government (Warden 1993,18).

Sartori’s rules, when applied to Tasmania, show that the Greens cannot be ignored; Burklin (1987), mistakenly doubted the permanence of the Greens; one commentator now even claims the Green vote to be “simply the most stable component of Tasmania’s political landscape (Hay, *The Australian* 23 February 1996). A clear and determined strategy to either deal with or destroy the Greens had to be established by Labor.

**Alliance potential**

With the Greens being sufficiently relevant to possibly determine who governs, three alliance options – which have the common denominator of postmaterialism – become clear: Liberals and Greens; Labor and Greens. The fact that the Greens promulgate some left-wing issues, such as feminism and homosexual rights, does not preclude deals with the Liberal Party.

Sartori believed that a party’s relevance is based on not only its relative distribution of power but also its positioning along the left-right dimensions. It follows that a right-wing conservative party would be highly unlikely to enter into any arrangement with a left-wing party. But it is not appropriate to place the Greens on the traditional left-right scale, even though many of their policies are on the left side of any dimension (Heath et al 1990). Chapter three’s review of academic theories relating to environmental parties showed that a green ideological continuum existed. Chapter seven established that this ideology is manifested in the Tasmanian Greens, who have a clear and separate ideology that regards the Liberal and Labor parties as merely different sides of the same coin (Capra and Spretnak 1984; Eckersley, 1987, 1992; Hay 1993). They bring a cross-cutting cleavage to the traditional left-right dimension.
The emergence of new politics, particularly environmental politics through the Greens, raised an alternative paradigm based on a second ecocentric pillar. The Greens reject the industrial paradigm, arguing that the left is more concerned about the distribution of the spoils of industrialisation than the effects of the process of industrialisation itself. The left is seen to be infected with the same industrial disease as the right (Porritt 1984, Muller-Rommel 1989, 17).

As shown in Chapter three, Offe’s (1985) analysis of support for New Politics movements and the options for an alliance places the new middle-class in a central role. (I have used Offe’s model of Germany as a base. Although I prefer the term ‘postmaterialist’ to ‘new middle-class,’ I believe the terms to be interchangeable for the purpose of considering alliance potential). Offe (1985, 857) believes a linear model of the political universe is no longer appropriate (figure 9.1). He proposes a triangular model to show the forces of the traditional left, the conservative forces, and the new social movements (which include Green parliamentary politics). Papadakis (1989, 94), again using German examples, also considers alliance possibilities between the Green Party, the Conservative Christian Democrats (CDU) and the Social Democrats (SPD). He too focuses on the new middle-class; pointing out that neither party wants to risk losing their support, but because of the risk of alienating the other social groups, also does not want to be dominated by them.

Offe’s model is just as useful in Tasmania, for Tasmanian postmaterialists played a pivotal role in electing Green members of parliament and, just as importantly from a Labor perspective, keeping Labor in Opposition.
Offe’s Triangular Model of Political Changes and Political Alliances (1985, 858).

Offe believes that such an arrangement is unstable: the alternatives must be reduced to two, which implies the need for coalitions. The common denominator for each possible alliance is the new middle-class. In the case of the Tasmanian ALP, and in the context of its own response to the Green challenge, the issue was how to balance the gains and losses of an appeal to this group. Offe’s model is however, an academic assessment of what the options might have been politically; they did not, in Tasmania, seem to be in the long run practical.

The considerations of Sartori, Offe and Papadakis are all relevant to Tasmania for, if either party falls short of a majority, an alliance has to be considered to prevent another election. Historically, all three alliance configurations have already been tried, albeit the brief Labor/Liberal alliance was for mutual convenience.
Both parties regarded the alliance in 1989 as a necessity. But, as shown in chapter five’s description of the negotiations leading to the Accord and the comments made by both parties, the Accord was entered into without a clear understanding of each others’ ideological positions or a recognition that irreconcilable differences over forestry probably existed. It was also clear that the parties were competing for the postmaterialist vote; for the Greens it was their core constituency, while for the Labor Party it was the support they needed to gain majority government. This was bound to quickly sour any relationship, for if either party started to look successful on issues that could be electorally attractive, the other party had a vested interest in not allowing them to succeed.

Even though there appears to be no bridging of the ideological gap there does appear to be scope for a shared approach to policy. There can be a relationship between the organised labour movement and the Greens. Green programs do contain substantial details about more equitable sharing of management, control and the products of capital, and make positive reference to and draw upon some of the ideological traditions of socialist parties – although claiming that Labor’s commitment to social justice lies in the distant past, no longer able to act on it because of its corporate connections (Brown 1998, 96).

Other factors that could help an alliance include the presence of postmaterialists in both parties and the current economic crisis, which makes the idea of full employment and continued industrialisation sufficiently unrealistic to allow a questioning of the dominant paradigm. Only such an alliance could successfully challenge this paradigm. But perversely, the same economic climate places the highest premium on restoring economic growth at almost any price to provide employment for the centres of production and industrialisation.

If one focuses on the need to build a humane and sustainable future, it can be argued that the policies that could bring that about can be labelled ‘green’ or socialist’, but these policies must be achievable, with both capital and labour understanding their basis. Currently that understanding – agreement to a new paradigm or acquiescence – is not present.
If new alliances are to be forged, the central goal (as seen by proponents) must be to develop consensus among the diverse (socialist) movements (Falk 1986). The Labor Party in Tasmania, for many years having failed to understand even the existence of a separate ideology, let alone its meaning (Field 1997a), has now, at least within the parliamentary and administrative wings, accepted this reality. Once accepted it allowed the Labor Party to consider which policy areas could be mutually supported.

Democratic socialism has, through its commitment to social justice, long supported environmental causes which, along with education, health, employment and social welfare, add to the social good. Therefore there is some likeness between environmentalism and socialism. 'Eco-socialist' is a familiar label. It is at the eco-socialism point on the continuum in Green thought that the Labor Party has seen its greatest opportunity to win back support.

Even though eco-socialism is almost wistfully urged on the parties as a way to form an alliance or a merging of the two progressive groups (Falk 1986, Pepper 1993) the harsh realities of the Accord point to a less rosy arrangement. Among parliamentarians, the Accord left continuing bitterness and recriminations, while the electorate refuted it comprehensively at the 1992 election. Even after the Accord ended, problems continue for the Labor Party; it is extremely difficult to reconcile the interests and concerns of the industrialised working-class with those of the postmaterialists. When it comes to considering change, the dominant societal paradigm working-class organisations, such as affiliated unions, are least likely to abandon their traditional socialist aspirations on the basis of the logic of industrial development.

Any hopes the Labor Party had of balancing its losses from weakened working-class roots by closer postmaterialist links failed. The experience of the Accord meant it was a negative for both. The personal bitterness of Parliamentary members and continued statements by both Field (Examiner 27 February 1996) and Bacon (Examiner 15 April 1997) decrying any future deals have placed any arrangements out of the political equation.
Liberal / Green

Although the Greens would experience opposition to their support of a Liberal government on the basis of its social conservatism, they could theoretically support such a government because they do not consider themselves as part of the traditional left-right cleavage (Brown and Singer 1996). In fact, in some respects supporting the Liberal party would be a more comfortable arrangement for them than they experienced with Labor. The Greens clearly oppose rather than compete with the Liberals, so that, within reason, there is little chance of either party's constituents falling prey to the other. As Brown (1998, 96) admits: “The tension is also somewhat defrayed because the basic running of government doesn’t involve competition towards a common goal.”

In many respects the arrangement with the Liberals between 1996 and 1998 was uneasy and unwanted, rather than any genuine attempt at an alliance. The Greens requested on several occasions (Examiner 6 April 1996, Examiner 15 April 1997) that Labor take Government with their support, but when faced with repeated refusals had to choose between a Liberal minority government or another election. Any possibilities for agreement lay with the old middle-class of the Liberals, on the issues of anti-pornography, conservationism based on the aesthetic values of unspoilt nature, and fears of urbanisation and industrialisation. However on libertarian issues such as abortion and egalitarian treatment of women, there is little middle ground.

There was little doubt that, when there was disagreement, they would distance themselves from each other and appeal to their core constituencies. With minority government increasingly being seen as a negative by the electorate, the Liberals ran the same risks of electoral damage that befell the Labor Party.

Liberal / Labor

It is a strange, but accurate, assessment that in some ways the Liberal and Labor Parties have more in common with each other than with the Greens. As chapter four showed in reviewing the history of the ALP during its almost unbroken autocratic reign from Ogilvie to Reece, the lengthy periods of Labor government were based
on a conservative social policy, and an unquestioning belief in the values of hydroindustrialisation and heavy industry. The Liberal Party was forced to adopt this 'me too' attitude; in 1982, under the Premiership of Robin Gray, it even successfully took over this developmental mantle, taking with it a large section of the traditional Labor vote.

Neither Party understood, nor accepted, ecocentric ideology and was unwilling to modify its basic stance. To do so would have meant the loss of business support for the Liberals and loss of union support for Labor. Both continued to accept the dominant developmental paradigm and were content to argue how the spoils of industrialisation should be divided. For example, the end of the Accord came when the Liberal opposition in November 1991 supported the Labor minority government to pass the Forest Reform Bill, which dealt with allocations of forestry resources. The Liberals gave a specific commitment to support the legislation without amendment and not to do anything to topple the Government before the Bill got royal assent or parliament adjourned for Christmas (Mercury 8 November 1991). This was despite the fact that the Greens would have supported the Liberals in a motion of no confidence against Labor, for the Greens vehemently opposed the Bill. However, knowing an election was imminent, and under sustained pressure from industry groups who desired the legislation, the Liberal Party supported Labor until the Bill passed both houses of Parliament.

Despite this brief alliance, there is little chance of a more permanent one, although the Greens have predicted it might occur (Green Press Release 8 November 1991). Postmaterialists appear to find little attraction in the Liberal Party and, on libertarian issues, the rise of the new right has only widened this gap. At the same time the unions still regard the Liberals and business as the class enemy; the analyses of voting returns in chapter seven still show a remarkable (though volatile) working-class loyalty to Labor. Therefore, despite the hopes of the Greens that an alliance might form, giving them unrestricted access to the postmaterialist vote, there is little evidence it will happen.
Majority government
Although the Greens do not accept the traditional cleavages, many of the issues that concern them, such as human rights (especially homosexual law reform) and freedom of information, would seem to point to a more comfortable potential alignment on the left. Be that as it may, it was now clearly apparent to Labor strategists that further alliances were unacceptable to the broader electorate. Labor’s strategy shifted to recognising the strength of the postmaterialists and to gain as many of their votes as possible without an alliance. At the same time, the shift could not be so radical as to alienate Labor’s working-class materialist base vote.

The 1992 election results forced Labor to consider its goals, for it had been decimated in its traditional areas of support (see table 6.1). The time had come for Labor to make a firm pro-active decision to seek majority government, for logic dictated that alliances were not the answer, and Labor had little or no choice if was to be viable over the long term (Field 1997a). Labor’s strategy was therefore finalised and formally adopted by the PLP in mid-1992 – a strategy re-stated and re-endorsed immediately before and after the 1996 election.

Having determined its goal of majority government, the PLP won the endorsement of the broader Labor movement at its State Conference. In his speech to the conference in June 1993, Labor Leader, Michael Field pledged: “We won't go into a minority government even if it means a second election. We are out to win. It will be a majority government or nothing” (Mercury 13 June 1993). In February 1996, with neither major party obtaining a majority, the Labor Party refused to accept Green support; as a result, the Liberal minority government took power with Green support (Examiner 27 February 1996).

Labor formulated its policy of majority government to the exclusion of the Greens because it believed the electorate, having once rejected a minority arrangement, would do so in the future. As shown in chapter six, which details the course of Labor’s strategy, nearly half of Labor voters questioned in a poll (UMR Research 1996, 48-51) said they would be less likely to vote Labor if another minority government with the Greens was considered. Similarly, the ALP survey of members
showed that a large proportion would concur. With over half of the party expressing
disapproval of the Greens, and over 24 percent giving them the highest level of
disapproval (see figure 8.10), there could be no doubt that Labor would split if such
an attempt were made. The Labor Party's challenge, therefore, was to adapt its
reform agenda as far as possible to accommodate the new politics without alienating
its traditional support base. (Even with a the increased quota established in 1998,
Labor still needs such votes to forestall a Green come-back and retain its majority).
The AES and Labor Party surveys had clearly shown the ramifications of each
electoral option, giving support to the strategy of majority Government and a
spurning of Green overtures.

What the Surveys Disclose

The surveys* examined in the previous chapter revealed clear differences of opinion
within the ALP itself and between the ALP and the general community. The ALP
survey provided reliable information, rather than the hearsay and opinions on which
Labor had previously relied. The findings were significant, for they highlighted the
need for the ALP to deal with the community in promulgating policies that were
both electorally attractive and progressive; they also clearly show the difficulties it
will have in formulating its approach to other parties, its recruitment, structure and
ideology. The survey shows that all possible choices appear to have inbuilt
limitations formed by the make-up of the membership. In particular, members differ
in self-placement on the left/right scale and even on an issue as basic as how the
terms 'left' and 'right' are defined.

Left/right definition
For many ALP members, economic and class issues are not what defines the left (see
figure 8.5). This resultant position is described by Lipset;

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*At the time of the Labor members survey the author was part of the senior strategy
group to consider the data. As some of the details are confidential, they will not all
be discussed, even though they had a significant effect on Labor's strategy.
Thus, there are now two lefts, the 'materialist' and the 'postmaterialist', which are rooted in different classes. A conflict of interest has emerged between them with respect to the consequences of policies that affect economic growth. The materialist left wants an ever growing pie so that the less privileged can have more, while the postmaterialist are more interested in the quality of life . . . . Both lefts are often in the same party (Democratic, Social Democratic, even Communist, as in Italy), but they have different views and interests (Lipset 1983, 510).

This belief, that people who are 'left wing' on the old agenda may be of a different group and different social class from those who adopt the new agenda (Heath et al 1990, 32), finds resonance in the Labor survey. Further analysis shows an age-specific split: older members interpret these terms traditionally, while younger and better educated members interpret them in the new issues-based manner. For example, a greater proportion of members aged between 16 and 45 chose the new definition but, for members aged over 46 years, the ratio reversed with a greater proportion choosing the traditional definition.

Although a significant section of the party differed on these views, over 56 percent of the members believed that the term 'left' encompassed both the old and the new definition (see figure 8.4). This result shows a high level of agreement on the broad context of the party and, with generational change, the possibility of redefining the concept of 'left'.

The opportunity for change is significant, particularly having regard to Labor's history. As chapter two showed with its consideration of the typology of ideal party types and party development, the Labor Party began as a mass party with a strong ideology as it sought to empower the masses – but this ideology was clearly materialist based. The union movement of the time had fought to raise the standard of living of its members and to restructure capitalist society by the redistribution of wealth (McKinlay 1981, 4). The Labor Party continued the battle to provide a fair share of income and employment (McMullin 1991). Historically, the Party was anthropocentric and materialist, intent on increasing the 'standard of living' rather
than the ‘quality of life’ of the masses – any later ideological shifts have had to overcome the force of Labor history.

Although the left/right dichotomy can be interpreted by individual respondents in various ways, it appears from the answers given (figure 8.4) that two main components are prevalent: a traditional materialist economic component and a postmaterialist issue/value component. They imply a split between the old and new left, which is indicative of a traditional party attempting to deal with the new cross-cutting cleavage of new politics. The survey confirmed that the differences in values that tore the party apart in the past few decades were still present. On the other hand, it showed that not all of the members who were issue-based have adopted an ecocentric ideology.

One example of the split is the issue of logging. Members were asked whether they agreed or disagreed with the statement that 'Old growth logging in native forests should be phased out as soon as possible.' Nearly 74 percent agreed with the statement. However, if Labor introduced a policy of immediately phasing out logging, the policy would be an immediate source of tension between members and the affiliated forestry union (CFMEU). The Labor Party is intensely aware of the dangers of a brawl between the postmaterialists, who are not generally employed in areas of production, and the materialist forestry workers represented by their union. These dangers were not imaginary, for adoption of the policy would have caused a massive industrial campaign with rallies, blockades of Parliament with log trucks and excavators, storming of ALP conferences and meetings, and a united blue-collar workers campaign against the ALP (personal conversation with Mike Gray, Secretary CFMEU, 8 August 1998).

Attempts have been made to paper over the cracks of the division (although one senior PLP and left faction member argues that this is more a recognition of the need for Labor to understand the social cost of removing a source of income and activity from workers without providing an alternative [personal conversation with Fran Bladel MHA 14 July 1998]). For example, a balance has been sought through the Party State Platform to protect both jobs and the environment, claiming: ‘Labor rejects the myth that environmental protection and the maintenance of employment
in the forest industry are conflicting, rather than compatible, objectives' (ALP State Platform 1996, 94). But, in view of the members’ values concerning the environment and previous controversies over forestry, a major dispute over logging of old growth forests for veneer production would leave Labor vulnerable to severe upheaval unless alternative employment was available (personal conversation with Fran Bladel MHA 14 July 1988). Bladel’s comments are indicative of Labor’s problems, because the left has been traditionally receptive and supportive of environmental and civil liberty issues – yet it still recognises the imperatives of employment opportunities for blue-collar workers.

**Differences within the Party**

The Labor members surveyed clearly perceived different positions for themselves and the other organs of the party on the left/right scale. The position members placed themselves, the party and the PLP (see figure 8.8) also has importance in the electoral decision-making process. This variation in placement may be an accurate assessment, for many party officials intent on building a career, either within the organisation or as members of parliament, are unwilling to promote radical reformist policy, “subordinating their idealism to their ambition” (Field 1997a). Members who make up the PLP have to deal with the electoral results of unpopular policies, and often defer or ignore their implementation. Some members argue that the PLP is a brake on reform, constantly refusing to implement all of party policy when in Government. But those within the PLP argue that it has a greater understanding of the electorate, knowing how much it will tolerate before rejecting the Party – “a guide rather than a brake to reform, excluding policy that is too extreme, too sectarian to deal with the populations’ aspirations for social and economic improvement” (personal conversation with Fran Bladel MHA, 14 July 1988). Of all organs of the party, the PLP is closest to the electorate in terms of placement on the left/right scale.

This means that the PLP is less likely (if it has the choice) to misjudge the electorate and surrender space to other parties. For example, as discussed in chapter two, before the 1993 Federal election, the Liberal Party put forward an ideological programme that failed to appeal to the electorate – a mistake the federal ALP repeated in the 1996 election. If the Tasmanian ALP were to make a similar
miscalculation, it would lose more materialist working-class voters than it would
gain from postmaterialist voters attracted to a more radical policy. The dilemma for
Labor is not so much misjudging the electorate as finding itself in a situation
delineated by environmental conflict. In such an event, although it would
understand the position of the disparate groups, it could not respond because of its
trade union affiliations or for fear of losing its blue-collar support base. Clearly, if
the community becomes highly polarised over emotive and high-profile
environmental disputes, the Tasmanian ALP has the capacity to lose electoral space
to both the Greens and the Liberals.

Materialist / postmaterialist

Previous chapters have shown that the presence of postmaterialists has led to clashes
with the more traditional values of materialists. For this reason the relative make-up
of the party was important for Labor, for it identified potential areas of concern that
could affect its electoral performance; for example, policy development on mining
and forestry.

Therefore one important survey finding is the existence of easily identifiable levels
of postmaterialism within both the general community and the Labor Party. Like
their European and mainland Australian counterparts (as shown in chapter three
where the characteristics of New Politics supporters are discussed) they are, by the
nature of their education and employment status, often more influential than their
sheer numbers would perhaps indicate (Hay 1993b, 12). This presents a danger for
the Tasmanian ALP, previously manifested in the actions of the Green Network and
SEECA, not to be unduly swayed by more politically active and influential members
who may strongly promote their own postmaterialist agenda.

Unlike the British (Rudig and Lowe 1982) and Swedish (Jahn 1993) Socialist
Parties, the Tasmanian ALP has not yet developed an internal process that can both
suppress and assimilate pro-environment concerns into its own decision-making.
Until it achieves this, the Tasmanian ALP remains vulnerable to continuing internal
dissension.
These dangers were highlighted in chapter six by the internal disruption caused by the pro-environmental groups within Labor. First, by the Green Network and then by the Social Ecological Economic Cultural Alliance (SEECA). Although these groups did not have broad party support, they contributed to the reaction, particularly from the PLP, to pledge not to enter into minority government with the Greens. Other members of this group, such as Peg Putt, resigned from the ALP when unable to further advance her environmental agenda, and successfully stood as a Green candidate at the State elections. Similarly, the actions of Senator John Devereux before he resigned from the ALP caused severe internal tensions.

The importance of these groups within the party cannot be underestimated because the ALP survey established clear differences of income, education and attitudes to social and environmental issues. The Labor postmaterialists see themselves as further to the left (figure 8.5), are more likely to have favourable feelings towards the Greens, and are more likely to strongly agree that it sometimes makes sense to vote for independents or small parties.

The previous chapter showed, as expected, that the values of the Labor membership do not completely reflect those of the broader community. The surveys point to differences in the levels of postmaterialists in the community and the Party. This is to be expected from a reformist party that continues to keenly promote change, but to better promote such an agenda Labor would have to attain Government. The members have shown that they define themselves as further to the left than non-members, yet the leadership is also aware that, to obtain a majority, the Party must capture a proportion of the middle ground in the electorate. Field (1997a) believes that this middle ground is the key to lengthy periods of Labor government, with Labor having to work hard to combine the postmaterialists and the “dispossessed” materialists as part of a coherent electoral strategy. The political danger to Labor is that it may become increasingly isolated from its’ traditional support base unless it constantly reminds itself that its level of postmaterialism has the capacity to push values on a community that does not completely accept them. The balancing act remains constant: to promote change and attract the ‘soft’ green voter, yet also promote policies that are acceptable to a majority of the electorate.
Generational change

As discussed in chapter two's review of postmaterialism and the mechanisms for its dissemination throughout society, Inglehart believed that postmaterialism spread through generational change. Figure 8.3 indicates that younger people within the Tasmanian ALP are not as enticed by postmaterialism as Inglehart expected. The concept of generational change does not stand up to scrutiny in either the Tasmanian ALP or, as Gow (1990) found, the broader Australian context.

In figure 8.3 the highest proportion of postmaterialists is in the 41-50 age group, while in the 21-30 age group the postmaterialists are in the same proportions as the materialists. Although Inglehart factored in harsh economic times weakening the formation of postmaterialist values (as discussed in chapter three in the context of the effect of economic security during adolescence), greater access to education (Lafferty 1976, 128, Poguntke 1992) could be expected to counteract this decline. Clearly within the ranks of the Tasmanian ALP this is not the case.

Although the overall level of postmaterialism is comparatively high at the moment (figure 8.2), in the absence of a return to low levels of unemployment and a secure economy, as the peak moves through the party it is possible that the ratio of postmaterialists may drop (figure 8.3). This figure, however, is not proof that generational change is not at work in the Tasmanian population, but only that it is not evident within the ALP. Until further surveys are carried out, predictions are difficult— but what can be said is that postmaterialism is an important aspect in politics both in Tasmania and the rest of the Western industrialised world.

It is also possible that the Labor Party has lost its appeal to younger postmaterialists who, when they become politically active, now first consider joining the Greens. If this is the case, Labor would have to attempt to divert politically active young adults to its cause if it hopes to counteract the challenge of the Greens. But, with a smaller proportion of young postmaterialists, Labor should consider the need for balance and take care not to also alienate young materialist members. In any event, table 8.6 clearly shows that young people are not joining the ALP. Until strategists are able to
identify policies that are attractive to youth, the ALP’s middle-age status will remain.

**Education and social class**

Of the key indicators discussed, education appears to encourage critical thinking in tertiary-educated members (see chapter three, which considers criticisms of Inglehart’s theory based on the importance of education and its role in developing cognitive skills). They are more likely to ignore the ‘party line’ on candidates (see figure 8.11). Although they have declared their political allegiance, it is not blind as the literature suggests, the hold parties previously enjoyed over members has weakened (McAllister & Mughan 1987, Chaples 1992, 27). In the past, Labor could rely on its members to toe the party line and unquestioningly vote for it -- but now a significant sector might consider other voting options. Although SEECA no longer operates within the ALP, the presence of postmaterialists (figure 8.2) and highly educated members (figure 8.13) point to a high level of cognitive mobilisation. As chapter three showed, in discussing the role of education and the views of Eckersley (1989, 219) and O’Neill (1997, 431) relating to cognitive mobilisation, this gives an ability to better analyse political and environmental issues and imparts a willingness to consider in more detail party political requests for support. In times of crisis, Labor would have to consult more widely than it has in the past. A return to the autocratic days of Eric Reece, would appear on the results of the survey, to be political suicide for the internal cohesiveness of the ALP.

On the matter of social class, the survey shows that the Tasmanian party can be described as middle-class with working-class pretensions, for a large percentage of its members regard themselves as middle-class (nearly 49 percent). Studies of other States show that this is not just a Tasmanian phenomenon: there are substantial numbers of middle-class members in the Victorian branch (Ward 1987, 90); in NSW, over twenty years, the proportion of manual workers halved while the proportion of professionals nearly tripled (Scott 1991, 36-7). Not only is the party made up of more middle-class members, it also closely mirrors the class profile of the general population.
The survey points out a danger for Labor in deciding where most of its support comes from. Chapters six and seven, with their analysis of booth returns in recent elections and the profile of Labor voters, showed that Labor’s base support remains in the working-class areas – yet this class is now less evident within its ranks. The results from the working-class areas showed that they are no longer firmly aligned and nor do they still vote solely on the basis of class. The Franklin River debate (chapter five) allowed the Liberals to portray the ALP as a hostage of the middle-class; not caring about worker’s jobs and seen by some unionists as ‘traitors’ (Tighe and Taplin 1985, 350). This debacle for the ALP saw significant sections of the west coast, which had traditionally voted Labor, swing strongly to Robin Gray’s Liberals – in doing so keeping Labor in the electoral wilderness for years. The view that Labor was “anti-worker” was reconfirmed by the Accord years, forcing the Labor vote to an all-time low when it was firmly rebuffed in the 1992 State election. These dangers still lurk below the surface. The survey results show that Labor, if it is to retain working-class support, should be careful not to ignore the values of those electors in pandering to the issues that the middle-class members perceive to be of importance – pursuing policies that attract only one postmaterialist vote at the cost of two materialist votes would be self-defeating.

**Attitudes to other parties**

The difficulty for Labor strategists in achieving a balance both within and without the party is shown by Labor’s attitude to other parties. As shown in chapter six, where Labor’s post-1996 strategy was reviewed, Labor Party polling indicated that nearly half of its supporters would be less likely to vote Labor if a Green deal was contemplated. A section of the Australian population in the 1996 AES survey (figure 8.17) also gave their strongest disapproval to the Greens. Figure 8.17 also illustrates the difficulty for Labor in entering into an agreement with the Greens. While a proportion of the party is either neutral or positive towards the Greens, a significant section (over 24 percent) strongly gives the Greens their highest disapproval rating. On this basis, at best Labor would be involved in a major revolt or, at worst, a split if an arrangement with the Greens was contemplated. This conclusion is supported by answers to an open question at the end of the survey asking members whether there were any circumstances or issues that would make
them consider leaving the party. A consistent response from many respondents was that they would resign if there were any further arrangements with the Greens. Interestingly, the attitude towards the Democrats is less polarised (but currently irrelevant because Democrats have not been elected in recent elections).

**Differences with the electorate**

**Social policies**

The members' attitudes to social issues are clearly different from the electorate’s, flagging a warning that, unless care is taken, the values of the members may alienate a more conservative electorate; Labor must balance being socially progressive and becoming irrelevant with unacceptable policies. For example, party members' support for immigrants (figure 8.18), and their libertarian attitudes to the decriminalisation of marijuana (figure 8.21), although based on social justice principles, are highly unlikely to be electorally popular if these values were to be made a central plank of an election campaign. As shown in chapter three, in describing the effects of conflicts of values in the British and American context, Nixon's successful tactics against McGovern highlighted the materialist/authoritarian split with the postmaterialist/libertarians, which drew traditional support away from the Democrats. Similarly, the 1981 British Labour Party split meant that unattractive social policies were pursued (Kogan and Kogan 1982), with the result that Labor spent decades in opposition.

In Australia (see chapter seven with its review of the ALP voter profile and the effects of value conflicts), similar splits were exploited by the Federal Liberal Party as it took advantage of working-class dissatisfaction with items on Labor's postmaterialist agenda such as multiculturalism and environmentalism (Manne 1994, 36). This is not to say that an expressive, reformist party always has to play down major planks of its policy and attempt to become more populist – chapter two showed that catch-all parties do not necessarily win votes. But it does show that in all decisions the need for balance and a continual calculation of votes won or lost has to be maintained. Having seen the dangers elsewhere, the Labor Party finds itself confronted with a need to retain progressive policies while not highlighting unduly policies that populist competitors such as the Liberal Party can use to their
advantage; policies such as marijuana and perceived 'soft' approaches to crime and punishment.

**Economic issues**
The focus of the members on social, to the exclusion of economic matters, also sounds a warning to policy makers within the party: they need to balance social policy with relevant economic policies. On a State basis, the AES survey results show that taxation matters cannot be ignored, nor can the question of the economic growth of the State. When faced with a choice between lower taxes or more social services, the electorate firmly favours lower taxes (see figure 8.24). Because the electorate places such a high priority on economic issues it would appear Labor will be forced to do so as well.

The problems of both European and Australian materialist mass parties in accommodating and assimilating postmaterialist values were identified in chapter three. In a Tasmanian context, Labor has the same dilemma in pursuing a balance between the individual economic goals of materialists (such as employment), while not attacking the collectivist goals of the postmaterialists (such as an undamaged environment) (Olson 1965). Like its European counterparts, one of Labor's difficulties is minimising conflict between the individualist and collectivist goals. In doing so there is no reason why economic priorities would have to be portrayed as anti-environment, but more as a way to stimulate the economy so that all participants benefit. In this way a proportion of the extra money generated by economic growth could be allocated to the arts and environment – even if the environment is clearly regarded in anthropocentric terms as a tourist drawcard or an asset to be utilised by the public.

Even extractive or processing industries could be made more palatable to the public if strong environmental safeguards were guaranteed; seeking a balance to attract anthropocentric working-class and middle-class support while ameliorating ecocentric middle-class concerns – particularly if debate over such industries is on the basis of the protection of wilderness areas, thus denying the Greens a political weapon to attack the ALP as it has done so effectively in the past.
Not only would this strategy attract support, it would also enable Labor to show it had better credentials than the Greens, for the lack of credible economic policies has been, and remains, the Green’s Achilles heel. Chapter seven, in its consideration of how much the Tasmanian parties exhibit catch-all characteristics, showed that the Greens have recognised the problems they face in broadening their own vote base. Both Milne and Brown have attempted to broaden their party’s appeal, but so far without success, for many of the public regard the Greens as single-issue and wilderness-based (Mercury 4 March 1993). This strategic importance, for the Greens carry an anti-urban taint that working-class voters find hard to accept (Andersen 1990a, 201, Rainbow 1992, 337).

A Political Response to Postmaterialism

A static assessment of the Tasmanian political scene
The Labor survey, together with the Australian AES surveys, give a clear snapshot of the membership and the issues that affect them. As a planning tool for Labor strategists, it would be of value only so long as it was regarded as a snapshot, rather than a lengthy video, providing details from one period of time. If one went solely on such a static assessment, Labor would look at the level of postmaterialism in the community, consider the trends, and then look at likely support for value changes. The Party could then plot a winning course that would maximise community support and minimise internal disruption.

On the basis of the survey findings, it would appear that a delicate balancing act that would attract both the working-class core and the postmaterialist middle-class vote could be possible. Labor’s environmental credentials could be highlighted while it pursued a policy of economic development that would maximise the gains for both groups. The necessary changes in approach, recruitment and values could all be based on the figures set out by the literature and the surveys.

But the electoral realities in Tasmania are not static and, in considering the options available to it, Labor could not ignore the other players. The most significant player,
from the Labor perspective, remains the Greens. Chapter five, which identified the factors that assisted the emergence of postmaterialism in Tasmania, showed that from Lake Pedder on, through the Franklin River and Wesley Vale, the Greens were the beneficiaries of Labor’s miscalculations and difficulties in adjusting to postmaterialism and environmental issues. They were active in defeating Labor by attracting to them a share of the educated middle-class postmaterialist vote that had previously supported Labor on the basis of its reformist social agenda. Like Labor, they too saw the challenges and attempted to take counter-measures.

In the period reviewed by this thesis, the Greens formed a political party with clear policies and ideologies – adapting as they grew to the challenge posed to them by Labor. Labor, like its European counterparts, did not therefore have the luxury of a static situation. The adaptiveness of the Greens was, and remains, a major consideration for Labor strategists as they attempt to maximise their gains structurally and ideologically. For this reason, how the Greens respond – also structurally and ideologically – in this battle is of constant importance. Others also have either misjudged or misunderstood the Greens. Some (Offe 1985, Pepper 1993) deny the existence of a new ideology, still ignoring the importance of ecocentrism and placing them in the humanist tradition. Others such as Weston (1986, 24) claim that elements of Green politics are essentially the same as those that appear throughout the history of populist movements. But there can no longer be any doubt that the Greens do display a new and clear ideology.

**Greens’ adaptiveness as a factor**

**Structure**

Concerns over structure are not solely the province of the Labor Party. The future of the Greens will depend equally on their own strategic capabilities, for their choices are also dynamic. They too face a difficult task: they must retain their core militant vote while at the same time retaining the ‘soft’ green voter. Such a voter may not be ecocentric, but instead be more interested in value issues, to which the Labor Party can equally appeal. On the one hand the Greens must maintain a fluid and non-hierarchical structure while challenging the corporatist welfare state, yet become truly effective political players in terms of electoral appeal – such a goal presupposes a cohesive, disciplined party that can appeal to others than its core party militants.
The old problem still exists: how to effect a paradigm shift while using the structures of the obsolete paradigm. Remaining true to Green ideology is the problem with the near-impossibility of working within the system and the activism needed to change it. To effect such a change, the Greens must operate within the conventional political system with all its inherent dangers. To succeed, the Greens must have more democratic structures than the traditional parties or be labelled as no different.

Every Green Party or movement has experienced internal tensions; the divisions within Die Grunen having been closely analysed. Chapter two, in a comparison of the roles and structures of parties preferred by activists, discussed the differences within the Greens as to how far organisational and ideological adaptation should go. Tensions have arisen over how far the parties should be aligned with the left, or indeed whether the party should work within the ‘system’. From the beginnings, ideologically motivated tensions existed between the so-called green-greens (who wanted to avoid any identification with the left) and the so-called green-alternatives or red-greens (who saw themselves as addressing a social as well as ecological dimension) (Poguntke 1989, 191., Maier 1990, 27).

But it is the dispute over whether Die Grunen should play the role of a fundamental anti-party party or achieve reform from within the parliament that is the best known tension (Parkin 1989, 123). The “fundis” (fundamentalists) see the Greens as representatives of extra-parliamentary movements that believe there should be no alliances or coalitions, arguing that such compromises will be fatally corrupting. The “realos” argue for change from within, wishing to attain whatever reforms they can through the parliamentary process (O’Neill 1997, 41). This debate has, to some degree, been repeated in Tasmania (Wescombe 1990, Hay 1992).

The Tasmanian Greens have, since the demise of the UTG, had little apparent tension when seeking seats in Parliament. But, as identified in chapter five, internal tensions arose over the Labor/Green Accord, the formation of the Greens as a party and, in 1992, the formation of a National Green Party. This tension is partly due to the Green’s historical and continuing close links with its social movement equivalent, the Wilderness Society. Green activists regard their role as affecting the
political process by placing new and controversial issues on the political agenda –
this is their main task and criterion of success, arguing that these agenda extensions
are more important than capturing votes and getting political power (Holloway 1994,
29).

Each hurdle highlights the continuous tension. In describing the Greens as a
charismatic framework party, chapter seven disclosed that some Greens feared that
their parliamentary representatives became ensnared during the Accord in the
parliamentary process and became part of a process they should have been opposing.
The obvious lack of speed to formalise their political structure after 1989 was seen
as an advantage, by not bringing their internal debates into the open where tension
could develop into rival factions (Flanagan 1989, 38). Once the Greens formally
became a party, they then came under criticism for becoming the same as other
parties – undemocratic and conservative. Indeed its lack of formalisation could have
been an electoral advantage, with a small but possibly significant component of the
Green vote expressing disenchantment with a cynical and manipulative party system
and therefore channelled toward “principled independents” (Hay 1992, 91).

Decentralisation, increased participation and a commitment to grass-roots
democracy have been central tenets of Green Parties, yet the rhetoric often differs
from reality. Poguntke (1992, 346), referring to the German Greens, claims that the
informality of internal decision-making processes resulted in unintended side effects.
Chapter two showed that framework-type parties, of which the Greens possess some
characteristics, can display undemocratic facets. In Tasmania, as shown in chapter
seven where the issues of control over policy and leadership autonomy were
discussed, such facets include the emergence of informal power elites where the
organisational principles of grass roots-democracy inevitably lead to undemocratic
intra-party process. Realistically, however, the Greens have had to face the basic
problem of reconciling idealistic beliefs with pragmatic politics. They can never
fully succeed in practising non-hierarchical forms of decision-making within the
party context, for this inevitably leads to compromise and more traditional
organisational patterns.
These problems of structure, as opposed to a strong and well-developed ideology, lead to claims of organisational naivety (Parkin 1989, 26) and strategic ineptness (Hay 1992b, 223). Others (Barry 1994, 371) argue that so much energy is spent in criticising the humanocentric biases of the dominant social paradigm that their attention is diverted from the pressing needs of developing a coherent green political theory. Hay believes the Greens lack the structure that links theory to practice and results.

In the identification of first principles much has already been achieved. But until someone starts building bridges between our thinkers and doers this will remain of little real importance. It is no accident that socialism achieved success by keeping theory and practice in close tandem (Hay 1992b, 226).

**Inconsistent ideological statements**

Hay (1992b, 231) is correct when he comments that Marxists at least had theory and practice in tandem. Chapter seven clearly identified the Tasmanian Green’s ideology as ecocentric, but the inconsistency for the Greens is that the parliamentary wing is unwilling, or believes itself politically unable, to state the ecocentric basis of their ideology. A prime example was the call in 1989 from the Wilderness Society for the removal of roads, introduced fish and tracks, and an end of detailed maps in World Heritage areas. In the face of community criticism of such proposals, Brown did not support the Wilderness Society. An article (Mercury, 12 April 1990) entitled; “No boating’, No fishin’, No dams, No nothin’” stated that “Even Green Independent MHA for Denison, Dr. Bob Brown distanced himself from some of the policies, describing them as an ambit claim. ‘I don't agree with all the proposals put forward’ he said”.

The TWS statement was politically naive, but ideologically correct: yet the parliamentary Greens distanced themselves from it. This refusal to unambiguously express the basic ecocentric ideology was repeated in March 1993 when the Greens, after the resignation of Dr Brown, attempted to reform and broaden themselves. Peg Putt was given shadow portfolios of Wilderness, Heritage and Public Lands and Forestry: yet the Greens’ press release stated:
Mrs Peg Putt emphasised that Tasmanians have two choices. They can destroy the natural resource base of wilderness for short term economic gain, or they can nurture that wilderness in much the same context as the goose that laid the golden egg (Green Press Release 3 March 1993).

Thus Putt’s first opportunity to comment on the value of wilderness was firmly on the side of wilderness as a resource – a point of view in line with the anthropocentric views of the major parties.

The future for the Greens as a parliamentary force is, in the long run, dependant upon their closely aligning themselves with basic ecocentric philosophy and not to continue to be issue-based. To continue on a parliamentary path just on issues will not engender a paradigm shift away from enlightenment views to one where all of humanity understands its inter-relationship with nature. To continue as an issue party is to adopt a ‘light green’ position, at odds with the more fundamentalist sections of the movement. Such fundamentalists would regard the party as then having lost sight of the larger game and become disillusioned. To adopt a ‘light green’ position, which may be more understandable to the broader electorate, is to deny its ecocentric basis. If other parties adopted green issues in both rhetoric and action, light green supporters would have no clear reason to remain faithful to the Greens.

But not to change is to remain marginalised. The Greens under the leadership of Brown were predominantly seen as representing an anti-development pro-wilderness platform. The new leader, Milne, was quoted as saying at her press conference: “Unfortunately we have been stereotyped as a single-issue group, when green is a philosophy ranging right across the political spectrum” (Examiner 4 March 1993).

To broaden its appeal, the Greens must deal with the perceptions of many Tasmanians that they care only about wilderness. The constant conservation battles, based on wilderness in Tasmania, has given the Greens an anti-urban image, often perceived as moralistic and puritanical.
An anti-urbanism pervades the Greens, and rather than the ‘urban commons’ view – which suggests that cities are necessary, but that they must be in sympathy with the environment – a ‘rural commons’ view associated with a suspicion of city life and a rural romanticism grips large parts of the green movement (Rainbow 1992, 337).

This dominance of environment and anti-materialism has reduced the ability of the Greens to transcend its ‘greenie’ role as well as limiting its appeal to the relatively small group of supporters in the community. This difficulty means that, in the absence of high-profile environmental disputes that polarise the community, the Greens lack authority and credibility when they comment on the more mundane, but politically essential, day-to-day issues. Comments on the economy and business are easily painted by their opponents as anti-business and elitist. A picture can be painted of the comfortably and securely employed middle-class subset of Green supporters almost dismissive of the dignity of employment for the working-class, particularly when those jobs may be involved in resource-based or processing industries. The very environmental and wilderness focus that enabled the Greens to mobilise support can, in these times, act to their detriment.

Lack of a coherent strategy
To gain legitimacy in other areas, the Greens have had to address their greatest perceived weakness – the lack of a coherent and achievable economic and industrial policy. The Green vision, and development, of “a diverse and vibrant economic base firmly anchored on the maintenance of the environment and the quality of life already enjoyed in Tasmania” (Green Press Release 3 March 1993) may be attractive, but in Tasmania how is it to be achieved?

Nick Evers, a former Tasmanian Liberal Cabinet Minister, articulated the challenge.

The truth is, however, that until such time as they offer coherent strategies across the spectrum of major public policy issues – rather than rare and random assertions of the motherhood variety – they will lack credibility in a broader political context (Evers 1990, 21).
To effect a paradigm shift there would, of necessity, be social dislocations, as Eckersley warns. She sees a need to work towards a more compassionate strategy to deal with “the dislocating effects of the far-reaching social and economic transformations that are necessary in the move toward a more self-reliant, just and ecologically sustainable society” (Eckersley 1987, 26). Both she and Hay (1992) speak of the need to develop a theoretical understanding of resistance (whether in the form of apathy or hostility) to Green ideas.

It is this strategy for change that is currently lacking (Eckersley 1989, 233, Wescombe 1990, 192-3 and Hay 1992), for it holds back broader community acceptance of Green proposals. As chapter seven showed, with its consideration of the profile of Green voters, in general the industrial labour movement has not been a fertile ground for Green thoughts nor, outside of a subset, has the middle-class.

Flanagan’s assertion (1989, 37) that the Greens have been able to attract a growing number of the urban working-class is shown to be false. As a previous Secretary of the Tasmanian Trades and Labour Council said; “They [the workers] would like to help fix the damage that has been done already, but they are not prepared to be the sacrificial lambs who alone are impoverished by the cost of protecting the environment” (Bacon 1990, 50).

**Labor’s response**

**The dimension of the challenge for Labor**

Although some in the Labor Party may take some delight from the Greens’ difficulties, they should remain aware of Labor’s own challenges as it attempts to maximise advantages. In the period under review, the Greens did adapt and, as a result, Labor had to change its own values. The dilemma was therefore, how does a Democratic Socialist party such as the Tasmanian Labor Party deal with the New Politics? The New Politics parties, particularly Green/ecological parties competed and still compete with the old Social Democrat parties,

... weakening their support base, undermining their legitimacy and provoking internal schisms. The threat comes from within as activists undermine organisational coherence and discipline, and from outside in the
form of declining popularity and electoral support (Crook, Pakulski & Waters 1992, 161).

The Tasmanian survey results mirror the European context where the rise of the West German Green Party can be understood as an organisational manifestation of a growing split within the Social Democrat Party. Chapter three, in dealing with the opportunities and constraints of New Politics parties, demonstrated that although assimilative strategies could delay the development of environmental parties, those without such strategies inevitably faced internal conflict. A factional split pitched the traditional union-oriented working-class members against a growing number of better-educated new middle-class members, with both competing for the same socio-liberal segment of the population. Hence in Germany the Social Democratic Party was an almost unanimous second choice for Green voters (Kuechler & Dalton, 1990, 291). In a Tasmanian context, Green voters overwhelmingly (86 percent) prefer the Greens to be in a minority government with Labor rather than the Liberals (UMR Research 1996, 48-51).

But this luring of the postmaterialist vote cannot be done in isolation. The values of the New Politics, together with what is seen as a threat to employment by the blue-collar section of the ALP (many unions viewed the Franklin River campaign as a threat to its membership and employment), have created tensions and splits within the ALP and other socialist parties. The new morality has created a gulf between the new middle-class and those who favour social reform, yet live by a traditional moral code. The future of Labor will depend heavily on its ability to integrate the Green electorate – politically, economically and socially – and to reintegrate the old and the new left.

The Labor Party has been uncertain about what remedies it can offer without splitting its constituency even further apart. Courting one sector of the electorate may mean the loss of another source of support. The broad coalitions that make up the Liberals and the ALP have become so unstable that neither side can afford to risk very much because the ties that bind people to political parties are no longer strong. Therefore the chances of a rapid shift in the social and ideological bases that appear
to shape the party system are remote. But, in the absence of environmental conflict, Labor does have an opportunity for the first time in decades to respond positively.

The findings of the Labor survey clearly portray a picture of the membership, the structure they expect and the options for future alliances. The survey answers the question beyond doubt that the New Politics has had a significant effect on the party. On almost all criteria considered, a sizeable proportion of the party show greater similarities to the ‘new class’ than they do the traditional materialist Labor supporters, giving rise to an opportunity to reverse the previous exodus of such members. Although many of the issues on which members feel strongly matter less to the general public, the Labor Party is still regarded as a vehicle of social change. After all, if the members were the same as the general public, why be a member in the first place? It is these very characteristics that allow the party to attempt to shift ideological ground and seek postmaterialist votes.

In doing so the challenge for the ALP is to respond to overcome this cleavage between a materialist blue-collar sector and a postmaterialist white-collar sector. While the Labor Party was unable to do this in the disastrous minority government of 1989 to 1992, one advantage it had between 1992 and 1998 was that, as an opposition party, it had greater opportunities to blur the issues that separate the working-class and the middle-class supporters, showing itself as a politically effective representative of the new politics issues. Paul Lennon MHA claims this was achieved in part by helping to force a party of the left (the Greens) to deal with a party of the right (the Liberals). Lennon gives the example of the Greens supporting a Liberal budget – which could be portrayed as attacking the Department of the Environment – while at the same time the Liberals were forced to compromise on forestry policy – which could be portrayed as an attack on the job security of the working-class (personal conversation with Paul Lennon 8 December 1997).

This difficult balancing act by the Labor Party appears to be working in the middle to late 1990s, for all sectors of the party have given the party itself very high satisfaction and approval ratings (see figure 8.9). This state of affairs has as much to do with good luck as with good judgement, for highly divisive environmental issues have, so far, been avoided.
The survey identifies another danger for Labor; not only is the party composed of two disparate groups, but its ranks are not made up of those it has traditionally claimed to represent. In any strategic choice, internal differences of approach must be balanced so as to appeal to a broad section of the electorate. Labor should remember the lesson of the Federal Labor Party, which suffered defeat in the 1996 election, when the Australian public decisively rejected a 13-year-old Labor government. At a time when social insecurity was growing, the party that was supposed to represent the less privileged gave up its commitment to full employment and was seen to focus on what were seen as upper-middle-class follies – feminism, gay rights and environmentalism (Costello 1993, 20), follies that led to a feeling of betrayal and a backlash from the working and lower-middle-class (Manne 1994, 36).

These national events could serve as a reminder to party strategists in Tasmania to remember their support base – and not follow the values many of its postmaterialists deem important to the exclusion of basic employment and economic reform – for it too could suffer such a rejection. If any in the Party were to have doubts Labor need look no further back than the results of the 1992 State election.

Chapters four and five have shown that the Labor Party has been uncertain what remedies it can offer without splitting its constituency even further apart – for courting one sector of the electorate may mean the loss of another source of support. But the reality is that the ALP, being the most affected by the societal changes, had to find a balance; particularly in Tasmania with the Hare-Clark system that, until changes in July 1998, allowed a party with 12.5% of the vote to gain a seat. The difficulty remains that many of the environmental issues that confront capitalism cannot readily be accommodated within the established party system.

**Party Structure**

Not only do postmaterialists expect a certain approach to social and environmental issues, they also have expectations as to party structure (Kitschelt and Hellemans 1992, 164, Brown 1996, 116). Chapter two, in its consideration of ideal party types, showed that older parties, such as the Labor Party, have had traditional organisational patterns with a clear hierarchical structure from party members up to
the Parliamentary leadership. In the view of the New Politics, not only should new
goals be set, but the ways in which those goals are pursued must be changed as well.
Therefore the new parties are expected to practise direct democracy and are opposed
to a strict hierarchical framework (Kitschelt 1990, 193).

Structure is not only important in attracting and retaining members who value form
as much as function – seeking a party organisation that is encompassing, supportive
of equal opportunities and less hierarchical. It is also important in either facilitating
or limiting the ability of the party to deal with contentious policy issues. A party
that cannot adapt will continue to lose middle-class postmaterialist members who
may resent the entrenched power of other interest groups such as unions.

The 1960s and 1970s saw a change in the support base for Social Democrat parties,
which included the Australian Labor Party. Educated, middle-class postmaterialists
had joined a party they saw as socially progressive, willing to express the concepts
of equal opportunity, social reform and social justice, but when the blue-collar union
base opposed values that questioned the development ethos there was conflict, such
as Lake Pedder, the Franklin River and Wesley Vale. The existence of affiliated
unions within the Labor Party encouraged new politics proponents to look
elsewhere, for the unions protect not only their own and their member’s interests,
but also view issues from the point of view of class struggle, and accept a capitalist
economy. This internal tension resulted in many of the white-collar middle-class
leaving the ALP for the Greens – and these were the very people Labor had to attract
back to the fold.

Labor’s problem in Tasmania is complicated by the fact that, although it must rely
on working-class support for its base vote, it must also obtain a percentage of the
postmaterialist vote to win majority government. For this reason, the party’s basic
structure is important to postmaterialists. As Kitschelt (1994, 299) states; “A party’s
methods for organizing its internal life sends a message to potential constituents
about the kind of society and the kind of political practices the party is likely to
advocate for society at large.” The new politics supporters’ rejection of a centralised
bureaucratised organisation and their desire to engage in participatory decentralised
politics meant that, if the Labor Party were to be an attractive alternative, it had to modify its structure to increase participation.

To make structural changes, the Party had to deal with its affiliated unions. However, the union base was established on a dominant paradigm — supporting continued industrialisation and growth — as a way of both gaining members and retaining power. Until 1992, unions could control both policy and endorsements by their membership entitlements to the ALP State Council. The 1992 rule changes broke the dominance of the unions, allowing greater input by rank and file members and, equally importantly, giving the Party the flexibility to modify its agenda.

The Tasmanian Labor Party, in 1995, further modified its structure to allow greater flexibility and grassroots support. Previously, members of policy committees, whose role was to draft changes to the platform of the party to be ratified at State Conferences, had to be elected. Changes to the rules allowed members of the Party to nominate themselves without lobbying for votes, thereby bypassing factional control of the membership of such committees. Members were no longer forced to belong to a particular branch of the Party based on where they lived — a recognition that, unless people were ambitious, they would not continue to attend branch meetings (Field 1997a). Instead they were free to join any branch they chose and had the right to visit other branches and enter debate. Delegates were no longer elected solely from each branch but could be elected by receiving a quota of votes from members of their particular electorate. The result was a party structure more attractive to postmaterialist expectations.

**A new Labor strategy — majority government**

But, as with every move made by Labor, regard had to be had to maintaining a balance to ensure strategies to attract postmaterialists did not at the same time deter materialist support. Chapter five, with its examination of the Accord, and chapter seven with its review of Labor voting patterns, clearly establish that the Accord caused friction within the Tasmanian Labor movement and a desertion by traditional working-class supporters. Kitschelt (1994, 144), in his assessment of options available to Social Democratic parties, refers to oligopolistic competition, where a party attempts to take over the radical constituency or agenda of a competing party.
This strategy of long-term vote-seeking at the expense of short-term vote- or office-seeking brings the radicals to the party, with the aim that once the competing party loses its constituency the successful party can then move to a less radical stance and regain moderate voters. The Accord proved that oligopolistic strategies to gain ecocentric voters would fail – not only did ecocentric postmaterialists fail to be attracted, but materialist Labor voters became alarmed at what they saw as a betrayal of their beliefs.

This led the ALP to modifying its agenda in an attempt to attract ‘soft’ green supporters and libertarians who do not have an ecocentric ideology. Again, Labor believed that it had the necessary balance to attract some postmaterialists without deterring its traditional voters; following Kitschelt’s belief (1994, 204) that “On each relevant issue dimension, there are optimal positions sufficiently intense to motivate voter choice, yet not so radical as to deter voters who lean only mildly towards a party’s position.” To do so Labor had to find a balance.

The clearest example of the State ALP’s response is its change of focus from supporting the expansion of heavy industry and building of hydro-electric power dams to focus on tourism, small business, and products that can capitalise on Tasmania’s image as a clean and environmentally pure environment. The ALP offered a comprehensive platform of environmental issues that reflects the themes raised by environmental groups both in Tasmania and nationally to such a degree that Labor’s 1995 State platform included the guiding principle of: “The maintenance of bio-diversity to ensure a healthy environment through maintaining the variety and balance of species and ecosystems” and the principle that “... all life is inextricably linked and we have the responsibility to act in the interests of the whole environment” (ALP State Platform 1995, 52).

The values of the Labor members strongly embrace the environment, even at the expense of rising prices and taxation (see figure 8.27). From bitter experience, the environment cannot be ignored, for Labor’s own members will not allow it. Its salience as a major issue remains, ready to rise to prominence in a conflict. The members also appear to regard education and unemployment as important issues. With the exception of a core holding extreme views, members of the Labor Party
(and to some extent many Green supporters), while questioning the effects of industrialism and damages to the environment, do not hold or even understand ecocentric aspects (Inglehart 1990a, Kitschelt 1990). However, the Labor Party has been reshaped by the new political movements and has adapted to the challenge by recognising the significance of some aspects of the alternative paradigm – particularly that of the environment. This coalition of views has held together well so far, but has not yet been subjected to the strains of a highly polarising environmental debate.

Labor has therefore moved both structurally and electorally to encompass much of the new agenda, but without endorsing the alternative paradigm. Although it cannot be established yet that the alternative paradigm will succeed in the long term, there is little chance of the Tasmania population endorsing such a substantial change in the foreseeable future. The Labor Party has attempted to sell a vision that can set the Green policies in the context of broader social and political policies – in the long run giving them an appeal beyond a subset of the middle-class.

At present the ALP has no need to change the paradigm by encompassing new issues. Conversely, the Greens will face both structural and ideological difficulties. If they are to compete for parliamentary seats they will have to continue to adopt a hierarchical, traditional organisational structure and if they move to broaden their base from an ecocentric perspective and the environment to other issues of social change, they will be competing on the same ground as the ALP and could alienate ecocentric supporters.

Conclusion
This chapter has shown that the influence of postmaterialism is both far-reaching and, apparently, becoming an established feature of the Tasmanian political landscape. The options discussed all feature this new social group, which Labor must attempt to encompass. After decades of turmoil, Labor has been forced to deal with the challenge of postmaterialism without losing its traditional support base. The Labor survey confirmed what some Labor strategists had already surmised: that Labor’s members include both materialists and postmaterialists. It also holds out a hope to Labor that a careful strategy of seeking a balance between the opposing
concerns can enable it to attain majority government. The survey itself was not a pivotal document, for by the time of its analysis Labor had by default been forced to experiment with, and discard, an alliance with the Greens. The survey did, however, give confidence to strategists that they had made the correct decisions.

To move forward, the Tasmanian Labor Party in the 1990s has sought to go beyond the traditional parochialism of trade unionism and away from the old-fashioned ideas (still held by many socialists) of centralist political control and perpetual industrial expansion, yet offer support for the protection of employment already held. Eco-socialists such as Weston (1986a), claim a socialist-green alliance is not only necessary but crucial to have any impact on the powers of international capital and the problems it causes. But Labor is not only unwilling, but also unable, to enter into an alliance with the Greens. Instead, it has modified its policy and agenda to make the Party more attractive to Green voters.

The next challenge is to attain the majority of seats in the forthcoming election and ensure that the Greens do not regain sufficient seats to hold a balance of power. The change to the electoral laws has raised the bar for the Greens but has not, as yet, guaranteed their demise. How Labor deals with the conflicting values of materialists and postmaterialists in development proposals and the environment may be the key to future success or failure.
CHAPTER 10

CONCLUSION

Introduction
This thesis began by asking whether political parties were at a watershed; facing a crisis of identity and purpose. Many voters believe the main orientations of liberalism and socialism have virtually collapsed as adequate explanations of the world and of themselves. Many consider that industrial society, rather than being able to solve problems, is at the root of the problems that threaten the future of the planet. These problems, described in chapter three, are real – and the challenges they have set are still being felt by all political parties, both in the parties’ structures and their ideologies.

In considering this dilemma, two distinct sets of conclusions can be reached. The first concerns the generalities of the Tasmanian experience as viewed from a broader theoretical perspective. The Tasmanian experiences can be clearly placed in the context of 20th Century literature on political parties. The general and recurring issues of party typology, ideology, postmaterialism and environmental politics are reflected in the way, for example, that the Liberals “fit” the cadre model, while Labor aspires to retain the form of the mass party. Tasmania’s experience in this century mirrors the global changes in western industrialised democracies. These Tasmanian experiences are relevant to, and can be generalised back to, the broad sweep of literature dealing with party change.

Secondly, Tasmania, after decades of stability, has undergone – and is still undergoing – a profound political change. The established Liberal and Labor parties have been forced to deal with new issues promulgated by postmaterialists in Tasmanian society. The Tasmanian Labor Party, in particular, was forced to deal with the disenchantment of voters and develop strategies to deal with the postmaterialist challenge manifested in the Tasmanian Greens. As chapter six showed, the established parties’ failure to deal with the new issue and values cleavage heralded a painful period of change. Labor has had to modify its traditional
rigid structure, opening it up and making it more acceptable to the educated middle-
class; but more importantly, it has reconsidered its ideology and finally reconfirmed
its support for traditional materialist values – while at the same time trying to
encompass postmaterialist voters.

**General Findings**

This thesis sought to understand the broader relationships between ideology and
structure in a period of change or pressure. In the extensive literature, some of the
basic and recurring issues in party politics are usefully analysed by scholars such as
Michels (1911), Weber (1947), Duverger (1951) and Kirchheimer (1966). Although
the passing years have changed party structures, the aspects of membership, finance
and leadership autonomy can still be used to identify party types.

Some reservations are also necessary. If the findings in the Tasmanian response in
chapter nine are valid, Kirchheimer’s ‘catch-all’ hypothesis is more a phase through
which parties pass before they accept the continuing importance of ideology in
retaining party loyalty. It cannot be shown that catch-all parties actually win votes
(Wolinetz 1979), while a strong ideological foundation appears necessary to attract
the beliefs of supporters (Lawson 1998). These were deciding factors in discounting
this party type from further consideration – although catch-all tendencies remain an
identifiable aspect of many current parties. Duverger’s devotee/charismatic
typology was also discounted, for it can be seen as a precursor to Kitschelt’s
framework party. Duverger also had some difficulty in clearly identifying this party
type, and when Weber’s (1947) consideration of the effects of charisma on the
structural characteristics of a party are added the devotee/charismatic party can be
seen as a forerunner to the modern framework party.

As parties’ objectives change so too do their structures. In the historical context of
Europe and Tasmania, despite brief lulls (for example, the stability in societal
cleavages when Duverger dealt with party types and the brief lull in the 1960s that
led Bell (1960) to talk of “the end of ideology”), the true constant has been organic
change. The different threats posed by other parties and new ideologies have all
necessitated formulating electoral strategies that, in turn, change structure.
The importance of ideology as a key to understanding change is underlined by the concept of postmaterialism. Chapter three, in particular, demonstrated that the cultural goals of the young and newly affluent shifted during the 1960s (Gouldner 1979, Muller-Rommel 1985 and Papadakis 1991), while public support for the classic economic policies of the established parties, and particularly the socialist parties diminished (Dalton Beck and Flanagan 1984, Abramson and Inglehart 1986). This chapter was also influenced by the views of Hay (1988) and Eckersley (1992) in concluding that the issues that had generated the new movements had arisen almost unnoticed by the established parties.

As the work of chapter three demonstrated, Inglehart’s (1971) theory of postmaterialism, while not perfect, is still a solid base from which the transition to the new class can be explained. His process of value change through generational change is persuasive, particularly as amended and clarified by later writers. For example, the inclusion of authoritarian and libertarian postmaterialists (Flanagan 1987), the importance of education (Lafferty 1976 with his reference to cognitive skills) and the argument that learned cognitive skills enable people to more clearly analyse environmental and societal problems (Eckersley 1989, 219) are the most compelling.

The characteristics of the postmaterialists who have superseded the working-class as a revolutionary force, critical of the existing social order (Brint 1984), were noted in chapter three and established in a Tasmanian context in chapter seven. Gouldner (1979), Offe (1985) and Kitschelt (1990) claim that education, age and employment in the personal services and public sector are all factors that help to define this group; this is borne out in Tasmania. Chapter three showed, by reference to Feher and Heller (1984) and Eckersley (1987), that it was from this group that the new postmaterialist values, Green politics and an ecocentric ideology arose. Some critics, including Offe (1985, 849), fail to understand the ecocentric ideology, while others (Muller-Rommel 1982, O’Neill 1997) do not take it for granted that the Greens are an ideologically coherent movement. But it is this new ecocentric ideology that is the vital heart of the environment movement and the Green political parties. The literature on ecocentrism, for example, Hay (1988) and Eckersley
(1992), is now so extensive and detailed that its existence appears to have achieved a critical mass of acceptance. It is the imagery of a revival of ideology, through ecocentrism, that is an important element in the debate on postmaterialism. Once this is recognised it is then possible to examine how it has affected the established political parties (the European experience noted in chapter three, the Tasmanian experience in chapters five and six) remembering the points made by Offe (1990), Davidson (1992) and Evans (1993), that when the Greens became established political parties, their supporters also questioned the level of ideology and structure in the party.

The electoral system is another defining factor. Its importance was confirmed in chapter two, underlined by the logic of the 'rational' voter (Downs 1957) and the importance of proportional representation (Rae 1971, Duverger 1986, Riker 1986 and Cox 1997). This thesis demonstrated that a country's electoral system profoundly affects the electoral success of a new party – both in its ability to win seats and to carry forward a strong ideological message, as evidenced in chapter two's comparison of the magnitude of Ireland and Germany's electoral districts.

**The Tasmanian findings**

One of the most striking aspects of the Tasmanian political scene are the broad similarities to other developed western democracies. These similarities range from the history and development of the parties, the ideological divergences, to the way in which the parties have responded to develop effective electoral strategies. Chapters four to seven showed that the three Tasmanian parties all display clear elements of Duverger's ideal types. These differing structures and purposes enabled their members to express their different core ideological values and to pursue these as parties in the Tasmanian political sphere. The Liberal Party is clearly cadre-based with its history of middle-class support, pragmatic approach and subservience to its leaders. The Labor Party, like its European counterparts, evolved from a union base, formed to both empower and educate the masses in fighting for a fair share of the spoils of capitalism. The Greens show themselves as a charismatic framework party, built on the initial charismatic leadership of Brown, using wilderness as a rallying symbol in their goal to change society's dominant paradigm.
The development of postmaterialism can be traced from Lake Pedder through successive environmental debates to the stage where political representation through the Greens became a reality. As chapter seven showed, unlike Europe, Tasmania has a more wilderness-based ecocentric ideology, which developed almost unnoticed and misinterpreted by the established parties. The ideology of the Greens sets them apart from the Liberal and Labor parties with their traditional anthropocentric, pro-development ideologies.

The history of the parties also explains the disparate ideologies that create a gulf between the older established parties and the Greens. The Greens' ecocentric ideology was initially assisted by the Labor Party's unquestioning support of industrialisation through hydro-electric development. As chapter four explained, Labor's lengthy incumbency from 1934 to 1982 led to autocratic leadership and a structure so rigid that the party was unable to respond to the new demands of postmaterialist Tasmanians. These attributes almost guaranteed a confrontation with voters attracted to the new movements that supported wilderness and who felt disenfranchised by a hostile party.

Although Tasmanian literature has been integral in reaching such conclusions, it is patchy in some areas. The bulk of the sources were in three areas: the Tasmanian electoral system, and the Green and the Labor parties.

Chapter four considered the Hare-Clark system in two ways: firstly, it endorsed the views of such authors as Sharman (1977) and Herr (1995) that this system contributed to the early relative stability of the Tasmanian scene; secondly, it confirmed Sartori's (1986) and Duverger's (1986) assertions that proportional representation favours or facilitates multi-partyism while presenting lower entry costs for small parties (Rae 1971 and Newman 1992). Although Papadakis and Bean (1995) comment on the tendency of major parties to manipulate electoral laws to enhance their positions (comments which are particularly pertinent to the 1998 Tasmanian election), commentators have generally not considered the possibility of this occurring in Tasmania. Chapter four demonstrated that the Hare-Clark system allows parties with relatively low proportions of the vote to gain seats in parliament.
This electoral system, therefore, ensures the Tasmanian ALP cannot ignore the Greens. As in Germany, a sympathetic electoral system ensures that Labor's internal conflict between its working-class materialist and middle-class postmaterialist supporters cannot be glossed over.

In relation to the parties, the Tasmanian literature mirrors European material, particularly as it relates to the early history of the Liberal and Labor parties and the emergence of the Greens, through a social movement, to their formalisation as a political party. The history of the Greens is particularly well documented, with some omissions. Chapter four documents the general circumstances of new party formation; for example, Hay's (1994) support of Muller-Rommel (1985) and Jahn's (1993) view that the emergence of the Greens is partly based on the established parties' unresponsiveness to their concerns and values. It also accepts Eckersley's (1989) view that environmental conflict is a causal link between concerns and party formation.

The unique characteristics of the Tasmanian Greens were described in chapter seven, influenced by such authors as Holloway (1986) and Easthope and Holloway (1989), who refer to the Greens' distinct wilderness focus and its almost religious overtones, the distinctive ecocentric ideology (Eckersley 1990 and Hay 1993, 1996) and the role of charisma in the founding of the Greens (Bates 1983 and Thompson 1984).

The series of environmental disputes that enabled the Greens to become an important political force are detailed in chapters four to six: the Lake Pedder dispute (Walker 1986), the Franklin (Thompson 1981b), Electrona (Bates 1990) and Wesley Vale (Economou 1990 and Chapman 1992). These disputes were, at the start, wilderness-based, but towards the end became more a refutation of development and capitalistic politics. Chapter five showed the difficulties of the Green-Labor Accord to be a watershed for Labor's electoral strategies. For example, the different attitudes to the environment (Wescombe 1990) and the misinterpretations of both parties (McCall 1993). Finally, the profile of Green supporters and their social sub-classes was established in chapter seven, based on Holloway (1986), Hay (1988), Waters (1988) and Waters and Volpato (1989). Their
profile as vocal, educated postmaterialists established their importance to Labor’s
future.

The problems of the Greens mirror those of their European counterparts – but the
Tasmanian literature, although identifying the problems of membership, ideology
and structure, does not consider how to solve these problems. Much of the literature
reflects the strong environmental biases of the authors. As was noted in chapters
four, five and seven, most commentators assumed the Greens would continue to gain
in significance (Lynch 1990 and Brown and Singer 1996) and that the ecocentric
ideology was beyond reproach (Eckersley 1992b). Brown’s charisma is described in
chapter five (Jones 1981 and Thompson 1984). The effect on the Greens of his
leaving State parliament has not been generally examined. Some commentators
appear to have taken it for granted that the charisma was passed on to Milne, when
this clearly is not the case. With the exception of Hay (1992), no one considered the
ramifications of a limited support base, limited membership, an ideology not yet
accepted by the majority of the population, and the internal problems of leadership
and structure inevitably caused by party formalisation – far too much was taken for
granted.

The literature on the Labor Party is also inadequate; the early history of the party is
historically detailed in chapter four, drawing on the writings of Weller (1971),
Townsley (1976), R. Davis (1983b) and Robson (1997). This chapter also reviewed
Labor’s difficulties when the Greens became a force. The conservative and
parochial nature of Labor is described (Holmes and Sharman (1975), as is its
antagonism to the Greens (Hay (1994) – characteristics clearly identified in the
Tasmanian Labor Party survey. But when one looks for Tasmanian material on the
catch-all nature of the party and its changing vote base, only broader Australian
material is available. For example, Jaensch (1989) claims catch-all tendencies for
Labor, but Singleton (1990) and Manning (1992) convincingly disagree. Similarly,
Labor’s changing base is described by Scott (1991), while Costello (1993) and
Manne (1994) identify the Labor backlash, but not in a Tasmanian context. In these
instances the only reference points for Tasmania are interviews and newspaper
articles, leaving the empirical evidence of the surveys in chapters eight and nine to
fill in the gaps.
Labor’s recent history is often covered only from a Green perspective (for example, Wescombe 1990 and Crowley 1996), while the implications of Labor’s restructuring, renewed ideology and clear electoral strategy to deny the Greens legitimacy have been ignored, as has the possible effect of these changes on both the Liberal and Green parties. This thesis attempted to fill that gap. Commentators have also said little about the effects of change on Labor, its response and whether it can overcome the challenge for electoral support. The empirical work contained in this thesis has also shed some light on these issues.

Implications of postmaterialism and some consequences of party change

Tasmania

This study’s primary concern was to investigate the Tasmanian reaction to postmaterialism. Having first tried to resist elements of change, the Tasmanian Labor Party was forced to reform its structure to retain some attraction to postmaterialists, and to broaden its ideological focus in a balancing act between the materialist and postmaterialist camps. Given the apparent durability of the postmaterialist challenge, it is likely that further efforts will be needed to meet and accommodate it rather than leave the electoral playing field to its new ideological rivals, the Greens.

In a striking number of examples the empirical findings mirror the theoretical predictions of how a social democratic party under siege and a society undergoing change will behave. Labor, having attempted catch-all tactics, has reverted to an ideological commitment to its traditional working-class supporters while trying to attract the ‘soft green’ voter from the Greens. It has opened up its structures, giving more say to the rank-and-file, thereby hoping to make itself more attractive to the middle-class postmaterialists it so desperately needs to gain government. In part, this is because electoral gains appear more likely for Labor in wooing the ‘soft green’ postmaterialists.
This study has found, in chapter eight, that postmaterialists were at significant levels in all surveys, with education as a firm indicator. This group easily fits into the Tasmanian context— for Tasmania, and its educated middle-class, has equal access to information (and possibly a greater and longer exposure to wilderness issues) than its European counterparts. This thesis has clearly demonstrated that postmaterialists in Tasmania and the rest of Australia are more libertarian and pro-environment than the materialist or mixed groups. Because this group supports stronger measures against pollution, and is willing to increase government spending to protect the environment, it becomes an obvious constituency for Green politics. Even within the other materialist and mixed groups, environmental concerns rate highly, able to be heightened when environmental issues arise.

Although the postmaterialist levels within the Labor Party are higher than I expected, materialists are still a force, with strong adherence to traditional values and economics. The way in which Labor, in chapter eight, defines the terms “left” and “right” also substantiate the second cleavage on a value/issue component, supporting Inglehart and Rabier’s (1986) assertion that conflicts over values are replacing economic and class conflict. In stating their approval or disapproval of political parties, sections of both community and Labor respondents displayed strong disapproval of the Greens— although this disapproval was more marked in the Labor Party. Again, the level of education correlated with the level of support and the willingness of the respondents to vote on party lines. In Europe, the economic policies of the left have lost support (Muller-Rommel 1989, Poguntke 1992), but this transition is far from complete in Tasmania, where many still support the traditional economic policies of the left.

In spite of continuing support for traditional materialist policies, there is no doubt that postmaterialism, Green politics and a new ecocentric ideology have taken root in Tasmania. Many people argue that the Greens are the party of the future (Galtung 1986 and Brown and Singer 1996). Chapter three noted Galtung’s (1986) emphasis on this historical perspective and his argument that the emerging bourgeoisie of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries advanced liberal parties just as the rise of the working-class in the nineteenth century advanced the socialists and the communists. Both he and Brown and Singer (1996, 64) predict the Greens will continue to
increase their influence, with a concomitant decline of the socialists as the transition from industrial to post-industrial society is completed. But it is still too early to make such a claim with complete accuracy for there is — as yet — no evidence that the Greens will persist as a viable political party in Tasmania.

The element of ideology may not yet be as profound an issue as the Greens would want it to be — although the debate over ideology continues. The Greens are attempting to deal with the problems that come with a formal party structure and the difficulties of achieving ideological goals in a parliamentary system based on the traditional paradigm. Their inability to proclaim their ecocentric ideology upsets their more ideological supporters and leads to a contradiction: to attain a paradigm shift they need to convince society of the benefit, yet their attempt to portray themselves as other than single-issue prevents them from doing so.

The Greens’ strengths are also their weaknesses. Having achieved a parliamentary presence and formalised themselves into a party, they find that the very act of formalisation causes conflict with ideological members who oppose rigid structures and a leadership hierarchy. The importance of the charismatic Brown and his subsequent departure cannot be underestimated, nor can the Green’s strong wilderness-based ecocentric ideology. The Greens lack of members and the existence of a core group of supporters militate against an open structure. The wilderness base prevents them from broadening their appeal, and although high-profile environment conflicts galvanise membership and support, in the absence of such conflict the party struggles to find more mainstream issues. The battle for the Greens is to successfully broaden their appeal while maintaining their strong ideological base, for unless they succeed, those supporters who lack a strong ecocentric ideological commitment are potential voters for the Labor Party.

Labor’s history ties it to a strong anthropocentric ideology, still linked to issues of capital rather than quality of life. Similarly, its structure and purpose follow the theoretical expectations with its past rigid structure and its inability to encompass or deal with postmaterialist issues. The presence of materialists and postmaterialists emphasis splits within both the party and the broader community, highlighting the difficulties faced by social democratic parties in dealing with environmental issues.
Tasmania is not isolated from the broader European experiences and must be mindful of the lessons learnt by other socialist parties. There is a limit to changes it can make to its structure, accept the environment as an issue of concern for both its materialist and postmaterialist supporters, and develop an electoral strategy to attract the soft green voters. It cannot abandon its materialist history or its materialist working-class support.

The Tasmanian experience should not be considered as aberrant, but rather as part of the international experience of party change and growth. The surprise for many Tasmanians is not that Tasmania is so different from other political systems, but that it is so similar. Tasmania will follow or mirror international trends – postmaterialism, the environment and Green politics will remain factors to be dealt with by Labor, for the continued degradation of the environment will guarantee this.

For its part, Labor’s strategy has been set for better or worse. After a series of disastrous electoral strategies and the paralysis caused by attempting to accommodate the Green phenomenon, Labor must adhere to its majority government policy. Its strategy of appealing to both the working-class materialists and the middle-class postmaterialists relies to some degree on a lack of divisive environmental disputes – and this is its major weakness.

To attract the ‘soft green’ voters, Labor seeks to highlight its environmental credentials as far as possible without alienating its traditional working-class base. But in returning to its original ideology, it has recognised the need for a clear ideological position. The question, as yet unanswered, is how to find the balance so that both groups of supporters feel comfortable within the Labor Party. Highly divisive environmental conflict threatens the values of the materialists and limits the ability of Labor to take an optimum position. It must embrace environmental concerns, yet it cannot ignore either its anthropocentric ideology or history. The party recognises that it can never hope to attract the highly ideological ecocentric green supporters; this means that the defining group for the success of both Labor and the Greens is the ‘light green’ voter. Both parties need their support to gain those votes – the Greens to remain a parliamentary force, and Labor to gain majority government.
This thesis has examined the nature of party change; but whether the postmaterialist argument will ultimately emerge as a genuine paradigm shift is still to be shown. If postmaterialism is not a paradigm shift, then the Greens have got it wrong and are – like the Democratic Labor Party – destined to never be a major party. Should that happen, then Labor’s strategy will help it overcome the Greens’ temporary appeal as a reformist movement and subsume the Greens into the broad political framework. A Labor success could be the first step in the gentrification of the Green movement, that is, making it part of the establishment rather than a party confronting the political orthodoxy.

In this delicate equation, an important factor for Labor is the type of paradigm shift that occurs. A simple postmaterialist shift, although making electoral success more difficult for Labor, does not necessarily make it impossible. Postmaterialists can also be anthropocentric capitalists who accept – albeit with reservations – the concept of technology and developmental politics. The real difficulties arise if, with postmaterialism, the dominant ideology becomes ecocentrism, for those who accept that ideology would not be capable of subversion into the Labor camp. They would quite clearly strongly support the Greens, which would result in a shift from the established parties and Labor in particular. Such a shift would leave Labor firmly in the “wilderness”.

Whatever happens, it is clear that party structures inevitably have to effectively reflect an ideological perspective. This is not just true for Labor. If the Greens want to become a mass party capable of educating and empowering the masses to the environmental issues, they too will have to develop an effective mass party structure – something they have so far failed to do, partly because of a limited membership base and partly because of their opposition to hierarchical structures.

The challenge has been real enough for the Tasmanian A L P to re-examine some of its fundamentals. The party is no longer as overtly mass in its nature as it once aspired to be, but it still seeks to maintain the logic and structure of a mass party. It has made some accommodation to the postmaterialist ideology, but it still retains its materialist base. In all of its actions it has operated on the basis of meeting
challenges and preventing the challengers from gaining life-threatening credibility. In many ways this strategy is similar to what has been seen in Europe – with all its past failures, inherent weaknesses and dangers.

Tasmanian Labor faces its own structural and ideological choices – but it should be recognised that the actions it takes as a social democratic party dealing with postmaterialism and environmental politics is in the context of a broader movement. To a large extent, for the first time in decades, Tasmanian politics may be greatly influenced by global factors that are out of its control. The Tasmanian ALP must continue to look over its shoulder at these developments, but at the same time, it cannot abrogate its self-determination – for better or worse it has set its course and will not be deterred.

**Broader Implications**

Perhaps one of the more interesting and important findings of this thesis is the degree to which Tasmania is very much a part of the general experience of party change. Chapter three showed that, in all these considerations, Tasmania remains but a microcosm of international events. This raises a major question: can Labor in Tasmania defeat the Green’s challenge if environmentalism and postmaterialism turn out to produce a substantial shift elsewhere? This question cannot be answered yet, for there are too many imponderables. However, if there is a general shift elsewhere, the implications seem clear. It may be that the ALP can be successful in Tasmania for a time – but only if the Greens do not attain major gains elsewhere. Labor may succeed in successfully challenging the new orthodoxy at a local level – but it may have to re-assess its tactics in the context of Green politics elsewhere.

Postmaterialism, being global in its nature, has forced adjustments to parties elsewhere. Western Europe has had the highest concentration of interaction with this phenomenon; whether it be Sweden, Germany or Belgium, the challenges to established parties, and in particular social democratic parties, have been broadly the same. All have been forced to shift from a relatively comfortable opposition to conservative politics to a much more complex and challenging confrontation with postmaterialism and environmental politics that has changed – and will continue to change – their electoral fortunes.
It is this climate of change and evolution, in conjunction with each country's electoral system, that identifies which parties can best adapt. The older parties have changed their ratio of ideologues to pragmatists, and with it the members' expectations of which structures are appropriate. Their entrenched organisational structures make it difficult for new entrants to change the strategic orientation—thus aiding the formation of new alternative parties—and also make it extremely difficult for the party to adopt an optimum electoral strategy.

Although postmaterialism is not growing at a uniform rate, it is capable of erratic increases fuelled by environmental disputes and the excesses and failures of modern capitalist society. The social democratic parties, in the past proud standard bearers of reform, have refused to hand this role to the postmaterialist parties and the Greens. Having taken such a stand, they are forced to manoeuvre as best they can within the constraints of an ideology and structure that was set decades before. The only certainty in this equation is that postmaterialism is positioning itself to be a challenge to established political parties for the foreseeable future. How far the established parties can move will set the boundaries of their future success and determine whether a new ecocentric paradigm will become dominant.
APPENDIX 1

ATTITUDES TO POLICY

1. In politics people talk about the ‘left’ and ‘right’. Which of the following better describes this.
   a. The struggle between the workers and owners over how the riches of the capitalists system are divided. The left would seek government intervention in economic matters to ensure distribution whilst the right would support little intervention.
   b. The struggle over changes to society on the basis of issues such as greater rights for women, protection of freedom of speech and civil liberties. The tension between progressive and conservative forces in society as they relate to social change. The left would seek to extend progressive reform on such issues whilst the right would oppose change and support the status quo.
   c. Both of the above
   d. Neither of the above

2. In politics, people talk about the ‘left’ and the ‘right’. Generally speaking, where would you place your views on this left right scale? (Note this question relates to where you place yourself in the general population not factionally).

   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
   Left                    Right

3. Still thinking about the ‘left’ and ‘right’ generally speaking where would you place the Tasmanian Labor Party on the left - right scale?

   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
   Left                    Right

4. Where would you place the Tasmanian Parliamentary Labor Party on the left-right scale?

   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
   Left                    Right
5. Finally in this section, we would like to know your feeling about the State political parties. Please show how you feel about them by circling a number from 0 to 10.

10 is the highest rating, if you feel very favourable about a party, and 0 is the lowest rating, for parties you feel very unfavourable about. If you are neutral about a particular party or don't know much about them, you should give them a rating of 5.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Very Unfavourable</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Very Favourable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Party</td>
<td>0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor Party (ALP)</td>
<td>0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Party</td>
<td>0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australian democrats</td>
<td>0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greens</td>
<td>0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. Here is a list of important issues, when you are deciding about how to vote at a State or Federal Election, how important will each of these issues be to you personally?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issues</th>
<th>Extremely important</th>
<th>Quite important</th>
<th>Not very important</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Business taxes</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Child care</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Education</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Protecting the environment</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Enterprise bargaining</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Health</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Law and order</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Inflation</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. The Family</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Unemployment</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
7. Still thinking about the same issues, which of these issues has worried you and your family most in the last 12 months? And which next? PLEASE PUT THE NUMBER OF THE ISSUES IN THE APPROPRIATE BOX BELOW.

Issues of most concern □ Second issue of concern □

8. And thinking ahead to 10 years from now, which of these issues do you think will worry you and your family ‘most’ PLEASE PUT THE NUMBER OF THE ISSUES IN THE APPROPRIATE BOX BELOW

Issue of most concern □ Second issue of concern □

FINANCE / ECONOMICS

9. Here are some statements about economic issues. Please say whether you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree with each statement.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Neither agree nor disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High income tax makes people less willing to work hard</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More money should be spent on reducing poverty</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There should be stricter laws to regulate the activities of trade unions.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The trade unions in this country are important to protect the rights of workers</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Big business in this country has too much power</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income and wealth should be redistributed towards ordinary working people</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
10. If the government had a choice between reducing taxes or spending more on social services such as housing and hospitals, which do you think it should do?

- Strongly favour reducing taxes ........................................... 1
- Mildly favour reducing taxes ............................................. 2
- Depends ............................................................................. 3
- Mildly favour spending more on social services ........ 4
- Strongly favour spending more on social services .... 5

11. The statements below indicate some of the changes that have been happening in Australia over the years. For each one please say whether you think the change has gone too far, not gone far enough, or is it about right?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Change</th>
<th>Gone too far</th>
<th>Not gone far enough</th>
<th>About right</th>
<th>Not gone far enough</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Equal opportunities for migrants</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The right to show nudity and sex in films and magazines</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equal opportunities for women</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The number of migrants allowed into Australia at the present time</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government help for Aborigines</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

12. Do you think that there should be some censorship of books and films, or do you think that people should be able to read what they like?

- Some censorship ......................................................... 1
- Depends ............................................................................. 2
- Read and see what you like ......................................... 3

13. Would you say that job opportunities are, in general, better or worse for women than for men?

- Much better for women ................................................. 1
- Better for women .......................................................... 2
- No difference .............................................................. 3
- Better for men ............................................................. 4
- Much better for men ..................................................... 5
14. Here are some statements about general social concerns. Please say whether you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree with each of these statements.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Neither agree nor disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The death penalty should be reintroduced for murder</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The smoking of marijuana should NOT be a criminal offence</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government policies should, above all be based on rational economic calculation</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People who break the law should be given stiffer sentences</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women should be given preferential treatment when applying for jobs and promotions</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Australian society, anyone who is prepared to make the effort can succeed</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The government should increase opportunities for women in business and industry</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government policies should, above all be based on moral principles</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homosexual acts between consenting adults should not be a criminal offence</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi automatic rifles and pump action shotguns should be banned</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
15. Finally in this section, a question about what you think the aims of Australia should be for the next ten years. Here is a list of four aims that different people would give priority.

1. Maintain order in the nation.
2. Give people more say in important government decisions.
3. Fight rising prices.
4. Protect freedom of speech.

If you had to choose among these four aims, which would be your first choice? And which would be your second choice? **PUT THE NUMBER OF THE STATEMENT IN THE APPROPRIATE BOX.**

First Choice [ ] Second Choice [ ]

---

**THE ENVIRONMENT**

16. Here are some statements about general environmental concerns. Please say whether you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree with each of these statements.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Neither agree nor disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia should mine its uranium</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I cherish nature and preserve it as one of the most precious things in life</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Old growth logging in Native Forests should be phased out as soon as possible</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase government spending to protect the environment</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TV coverage on environmental issues is biased in favour of the greens</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stronger measures should be taken to protect the environment against pollution</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
17. In your opinion, how urgent are each of the following environmental concerns in this country?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Concern</th>
<th>Not Urgent</th>
<th>Fairly Urgent</th>
<th>Very Urgent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Pollution</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Overpopulation</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Waste disposal</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Uranium mining</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Logging of forests</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Destruction of wildlife</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Soil degradation</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. The Greenhouse effect (Global warming)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

18. Still thinking of the previous environmental concerns, which two of these environmental issues has worried you personally the most in the last 12 months? Which is the most urgent? And which is the second most urgent? **PLEASE PUT THE NUMBER OF EACH ISSUE IN THE BOX BELOW**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Most urgent</th>
<th>Second Most Urgent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

19. There are a number of environmental groups and movements seeking public support. For each of the following groups, please say whether you approve or disapprove of them.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Groups campaigning to protect the environment</th>
<th>Strongly approve</th>
<th>Approve</th>
<th>Neither approve nor disapprove</th>
<th>Disapprove</th>
<th>Strongly disapprove</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Groups concerned with stopping the mining and export of uranium</th>
<th>Strongly approve</th>
<th>Approve</th>
<th>Neither approve nor disapprove</th>
<th>Disapprove</th>
<th>Strongly disapprove</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Anti-war and anti-nuclear weapons movements</th>
<th>Strongly approve</th>
<th>Approve</th>
<th>Neither approve nor disapprove</th>
<th>Disapprove</th>
<th>Strongly disapprove</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
20. How likely are you to joining a group campaigning to protect the environment?

I am already a member .................................................... 1
Not a member, but have considered joining ..................... 2
Not a member, but was once a member ......................... 3
Not a member, and have not considered joining ............. 4
Would never consider joining ........................................... 5

21. Are you more worried or less worried about the environmental problems today than you were five years ago?

More worried ................................................................. 1
Less worried ................................................................. 2
About the same ............................................................ 3
Never worried .............................................................. 4

22. Which of these statements comes closest to your views?

Industry should be prevented from causing
damage to the environment, even if this sometimes
leads to higher prices ..................................................... 1

OR

Industry should keep prices down, even if this
sometimes causes damage to the environment .......... 2

Don’t know, haven’t thought much about it ............... 3

23. And which of these statement comes closest to your own views?

Government should do more to protect the
environment, even if this sometimes leads to
higher taxes for everyone ............................................. 1

OR

Governments should keep taxes low, even it this
sometimes means that they do less for the
environment ............................................................... 2

Don’t know, haven’t thought much about it ............. 3
Here are some statements about government at a state level. Please say whether you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree with each of these statements.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Neither agree nor disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I feel that I could do as good a job in public office as most other people.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can’t really understand what’s going on.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I feel that I have a pretty good understanding of the important political issues facing Australia.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I don’t think public officials care much what people like me think.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It makes sense to vote for small parties or independent candidates sometimes.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A person like me can’t make much of a difference by joining a political party.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I consider myself well-qualified to participate in politics.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People like me don’t have any say about what the government does.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I think I am better informed about politics and government than most people.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
25. If you felt strongly about something, how likely is it that you would do something to get the authorities to change their mind? How likely is it that you would:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Very Likely</th>
<th>Quite Likely</th>
<th>Might or might not</th>
<th>Unlikely</th>
<th>Very unlikely</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Write to a newspaper</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Go to a protest march, as long as it was legal</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Go on a protest march, even if it was banned</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attend a public meeting</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Try to block traffic</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Help to collect signatures for a petition</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Help others to disrupt a march or meeting to which you object</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

EDUCATION, WORKS & POLITICS

26. How old were you when you left school?

Age: ———

27. Have you obtained a trade qualification, a degree or a diploma, or any other qualification since leaving school? What is your highest qualification?

No qualifications since leaving school..............................1

Qualified - circle one code for highest qualification only

Higher degree - Master or PhD ........................................2
Postgraduate Diploma ..................................................3
Bachelor Degree .......................................................4
Undergraduate Diploma ..................................................5
Associate Diploma ......................................................6
Trade qualification .....................................................7
Non-trade qualification ................................................8
28. Now some questions about the work you are now doing. Last week, what were you doing?

   Working full-time for pay ............................................ 1
   Working part-time for pay ............................................... 2
   Unemployed - looking for full-time work ....................... 3
   Unemployed - looking for part-time work ....................... 4
   Retired from paid work ............................................ 5
   A full-time school or university student ....................... 6
   Keeping house ......................................................... 7
   Other (please specify) ............................................. 8

If you have never worked for pay, please skip the next question.

29. Whom do (or did) you work for?

   Self-employed in own business or farm ....................... 1
   Private company or business employee ....................... 2
   Federal Government employee .................................. 3
   State Government employee ...................................... 4
   Local Government employee ..................................... 5
   Family business or farm employee ............................ 6

PERSONAL BACKGROUND

This final section includes questions about yourself and your family background. These characteristics are very important to our research on how people in different circumstances feel about the issues covered earlier in the questionnaire.

1. Firstly, what is your sex?

   Male ........................................................................... 1

   Female ....................................................................... 2

2. When were you born? Just the year will do .................. Year 19 ___
3. Where were you born?

Country of birth

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Australia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Overseas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. [If born overseas only] In what year did you come to Australia?

Year 19 ___

5. What is your religion or faith?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Roman Catholic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Anglican/Church of England</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Uniting Church/Methodist</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Orthodox Church</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Presbyterian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Other (please specify)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No religion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. Apart from weddings, funerals and baptisms, about how often do you attend religious services?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>At least once a week</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>At least once a month</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Several times a year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>At least once a year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Less than once a year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Never</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. Which social class would you say you belong to?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Upper class</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Middle class</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Working class</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>None</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8. Do you have any children

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
9. Which membership fee do you pay?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ANNUAL INCOME</th>
<th>FEE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Concession</td>
<td>$8.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Up to $26,000</td>
<td>$20.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$26,000 - $52,000</td>
<td>$35.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than $52,000</td>
<td>$50.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

10. What electorate do you live in?

- Braddon
- Lyons
- Denison
- Franklin
- Bass

11. How long have you been a member of the party?

- 0 - 2 years
- 2 - 5 years
- 5 - 10 years
- 10 + years
- If 10 + years please specify

12. What was the main reason you joined the party? Please write on the back if insufficient space.

____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________

13. Are there any circumstances or issues which would make you consider leaving the Labor Party? What are they?

____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
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_____. (1995)  

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SEEECA


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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>Listing by R. L. Polk for ALP Tasmania - Surname sequence 14.04.77 pp 1 - 50 with additions 30.6.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>General Listing (XRLP) 30.03.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>ALP Tasmania - Members File System Branch alphabetic list 14.11.79 pp 001 - 126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>Summary of membership information as at 11 March 1982 signed W. Darby.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>ALP Tasmania - Members File System 10.5.84. North And South Members.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>ALP Branch Membership List as at 21 June 1990.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Membership Report 28 October 1991 Agenda Item</td>
</tr>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACF</td>
<td>Australian Conservation Foundation</td>
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<td>AEU</td>
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<td>Australian Labor Party</td>
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<td>Australian Pulp and Paper Mills</td>
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<td>CDU</td>
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<td>CEG</td>
<td>Combined Environment Group</td>
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<td>CROPS</td>
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<tr>
<td>FIA</td>
<td>Federated Iron Workers Association</td>
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<td>FIAT</td>
<td>Forest Industries Association of Tasmania</td>
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</table>
TWS  Tasmanian Wilderness Society
TWU  Timber Workers Union
USERP  United Scientists for Environmental Responsibility
UTG  United Tasmania Group