HEIDEGER’S LANGUAGE

Adrian J. Staples, B.A. (Hons)

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Abstract

In this dissertation I attempt to provide a cogent reading of Heidegger's fledgling account of the being of language. Emphasis is placed on the analysis of language in *Being and Time* in particular; for it is with respect to *Being and Time* that interpretations of Heidegger's fledgling account are developed, and against which his mature account is usually contrasted. Amongst these interpretations are the derivativist and instrumentalist accounts of language, which suppose that language is itself pre-figured by a pre- or non-linguistic grasp of phenomena. Against these accounts, the structure and arguments for which I lay bare, I contend that language is in each case already there, meaningfully articulating the world, affecting understanding *ab initio*; that language is not therefore prefigured by – and in the first instance absent from – the being-in-the-world which is our own. This, I claim, is also Heidegger's stance; a stance which, formed in *Being and Time* in essence, founds his subsequent, increasingly dedicated thinking about what language, as such, ‘is’.

In addition to my critique of instrumentalism and derivativism in this dissertation, I contest the contemporary pragmatist reading of *Being and Time* inasmuch as it is occasionally employed to champion a non-linguistic normative pragmatism with which to explain just how a non- or pre-linguistic grasp of phenomena might properly occur.

As such, this dissertation encourages the reorientation of the philosophy of language (as well as contemporary thinking about Heidegger's own account of the phenomenon) away from the temptation to think language ‘formally’ according to an hierarchical structure of being-in-the-world, and towards the role and function of language in the structural articulation of the world itself, human being-there, and the hermeneutic tradition in which we inevitably find ourselves to be. As such,

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1 In *Being and Time* Heidegger uses two verbs which are best translated into English as ‘to articulate’. These are *gliedern* and *artikulieren*. In German, the former, *gliedern*, means ‘to articulate’ in the sense of ‘to divide into’, ‘to separate’ or ‘to organise’ – the word *Glied* means ‘limb’ or ‘member’. On the other hand, *artikulieren* means ‘to articulate’ in the sense of ‘to highlight and distinguish’ or ‘to make distinct’. Blattner suggests that their common English translation, ‘to articulate’, be disambiguated by specifying that in the case of the word *gliedern* what is meant is *structural* articulation, and that in the case of *artikulieren* what is meant is *expressive* articulation (See Blattner, W. D., *Heidegger’s Being and Time*, Continuum, London, 2011 at 98-99). In this sense, *gliedern* means ‘to parse’, and *artikulieren* means ‘to put into words’. In their translation of *Being and Time*, Macquarrie and Robinson use ‘articulate’, with a lower-case ‘a’, for *gliedern*, and ‘Articulate’, with an upper-case ‘a’, for *artikulieren* (see Macquarrie and Robinson’s footnote 1 in Heidegger, M., *Being and Time* (trans. Macquarrie, J. & Robinson, E.), Blackwell Publishing, Oxford, 1962 at 195, H 154). Wherever it is relevant or necessary in this paper, these renderings are employed.
it outlines and suggests the possibility and preferability of a phenomenological – as opposed to a metaphysical – account of what language is, attempts to show the universality and ubiquitousness of language in human being, and illustrates the opening ‘way’ to language \textit{qua} language which Heidegger’s mature thinking was eventually to take.
I. INTRODUCTION

§.1: Heidegger’s fledgling account of language

Provisionally, in §33 of Being and Time in his description of the elements of assertion, Heidegger is led toward the twin phenomena of ‘saying’ and ‘speaking’. Here language [Sprache] becomes a matter for dedicated analysis for the first time in Being and Time. Immediately following this brief introduction to the phenomenon, in the neighbouring §34 in his account of discourse and its four constitutive elements, Heidegger offers a provisional discussion of the being of language ‘as’ it is in itself. Here Heidegger recognises that language manifests ontically – that it shows itself in the world – as a collection of entities or separable parts; but that ontologically, ‘as’ it is in itself, its being, role and function is far richer than this logical, traditional characterisation of language discloses. One of the tasks of this dissertation is to espouse this distinction in more detail that the ways in which it corresponds and conflicts with the exegetical accounts of language (as Heidegger thinks it) may be criticised.

At the conclusion of §34 Heidegger begs the investigation of language “in general”. He remarks that:

In the last resort, philosophical research must resolve to ask what kind of being goes with language in general. Is it a kind of equipment, or has it [the human being’s] kind of being, or is it neither of these? What kind of being does language have, if there can be such a thing as a ‘dead’ language? What do the ‘rise’ and ‘decline’ of a language mean ontologically? We possess a science of language, and the being of the entities which it has for its theme is obscure. Even the horizon for any investigative question about it is veiled.2

With these remarks having been made, and with a project having been begged, Heidegger next proffers a series of remarks which found his fledgling account of language. Because the predominant concern of Being and Time is how the human being ‘is’ itself in the world, Heidegger persistently confines these remarks to the

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study of human being-in-the-world, which is examined in its originary “average everydayness”. Thus, Heidegger iterates that his early remarks about language are:

... designed merely to point out the ontological ‘locus’ of this phenomenon in [the human being’s] state of being, and especially to prepare the way for [an] analysis, in which, taking as our clue a fundamental kind of being belonging to discourse, in connection with other phenomena, we shall try to bring [the human being’s] everydayness into a view in a manner which is ontologically ... primordial.  

From this beginning, as Heidegger’s thinking about language matures after Being and Time and his other early works, language itself becomes crucial to his philosophy and the attempt to radicalise the way that philosophy as such is performed.

Traditionally, the way the world is found to be, the way in which the human being ‘is’ in the world, is crucial to deciding how language ‘is’, as well as ‘what’ language is. Traditionally, for example, occidental philosophers of language have oriented themselves toward the self-subsisting subject as that which alone ‘speaks’: Language is repeatedly cast in the foregoing tradition as a talent, device, or resource available to the speaker to employ. By adopting Heidegger’s own ontology of human being-in-the-world, by orienting ourselves toward language with respect to it, three distinct characterisations of language emerge for circumspection.

§.2: The three exegetic accounts of language

In the first instance, in Heidegger and the Problem of Knowledge, Guignon identifies two distinct characterisations of language which emerge prima facie from Being and Time. Accordingly, Guignon decides that Heidegger characterises language alternatively as:

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3 Rede, Heidegger’s name for the ontological being of language.
5 See Guignon, C. B., Heidegger and the Problem of Knowledge, Indianapolis, Hackett, 1983 at 117-118
The first of these characterisations is typically called instrumentalism; the second, constitutivism. Whilst instrumentalism is most often associated with *Being and Time* and the early Heidegger, constitutivism, as will be shown below, is typically associated with the Heidegger of the post-1930s.

There is additionally, however, a third characterisation of language which *Being and Time* suggests, which characterisation is the subject of recent and contemporary Heidegger-scholarship: According to Blattner it is Dreyfus who first identifies this third account of language: one which Blattner champions, elaborates, and subsequently names:

(3) Derivativism. Derivativism holds that language is essentially derivative of a more basic aspect of the way the human being ‘is’ in the world – for example its understanding [*Verstehen*] – with which it seems that language is prefigured.

There are clear intimations of derivativism in *Being and Time*. In §34, for example, during the closest analysis of language which occurs in *Being and Time*, Heidegger claims that “to significations, words accrue”. Earlier still, he prepares the reader for this claim, espousing that:

[In the non-semantic structural articulation of the world, namely in] significance itself, with which Dasein is always familiar, there lurks the ontological condition which makes it possible for Dasein, as something which understands and interprets, to disclose such things as

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6 Guignon explains that according to instrumentalism “our ability to use language is grounded in some prior grasp of the non-semantic significance of the [world] in which we find ourselves.” See Guignon, C. B., *Heidegger and the Problem of Knowledge*, Indianapolis, Hackett, 1983 at 117


Amongst others, these two passages seemingly intimate that wherever – and however – one lives understandingly is ontologically prior to any statement, utterance, or linguistic disclosure which manifestly brings beings – or being – to bear. Accordingly, derivativism thinks language to ‘afterwards’ manifest the structural articulations available in the world implicitly which are always and already “by nature manifestable”. Under this construction language seems fundamentally posterior to a prior, silent, pre-linguistic grasp of the world.

Although he does not explicitly investigate derivativism, identifying instrumentalism and constitutivism only, Guignon concisely summarises its claim, explaining that for derivativism language seems “possible only against the background of an understanding that is non-linguistic.” A non- or pre-linguistic understanding is crucial to derivativism generally. Accordingly, just how living in the world might prefigure language – or predispose the human being towards it – is a topic this dissertation investigates devotedly. The criticism of derivativism is central to this dissertation.

Initially, therefore, it is important to realise that instrumentalism is essentially a form of derivativism. Instrumentalism, too, champions the priority of non-semantic worldly content; champions the priority of the silent structural articulation and grasp of worldly phenomena. Unlike instrumentalism, however, derivativism does not exclusively think language as a ‘tool’ for communication; for this is simply

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According to Blattner these remarks advance the interpretation that “significations are more basic than words, and [that] words are founded upon them” (See Blattner, W. D., *Heidegger’s Temporal Idealism*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1999 at 70); according to Dreyfus it seems accordingly that any given advent of language “requires a prior structural articulation ... [a] having [of] natural joints” (See Dreyfus, H. L., *Being-in-the-World: a commentary on Heidegger’s Being and Time, Division I*, MIT Press, Cambridge (Massachusetts), 1991 at 215). According to Guignon, “[t]here is clearly the intimation that there could be a fully articulated sense of the world derived from our ordinary participation in contexts of significance prior to or independent of the mastery of a language” (See Guignon, C. B., *Heidegger and the Problem of Knowledge*, Indianapolis, Hackett, 1983 at 118).


12 Blattner explains that “to work out a derivativism about language, it is necessary to sift out a non- or pre-linguistic understanding of the phenomena [in the world].” See: Blattner, W. D., *Heidegger’s Temporal Idealism*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1999 at 72
one of several interpretations of the language-phenomenon which are available to it.

§.3: Considerations with regard to derivativism: the structure of the dissertation

We will learn below that derivativism, like instrumentalism, can be oriented toward the speaking subject as the locus or primordial site of the advent of language. The subject, living in the first instance pre-linguistically, silently, is thought to somehow – somewhere – translate its being-in-the-world into words. Its community, its society, its company, is thought consequently to be in the first instance pre-linguistic.

As has already been intimated, however, both in Being and Time and in general, Heidegger attempts to overcome both subjectivist and transcendentalist philosophies of consciousness and the knowing subject. Fundamentally, such paradigms are anathema to Heidegger because they do not describe essentially—but instead translate into spurious or abstract ‘hypothetical’ phenomena – the bare facticity of the way that human being is always already according to Heidegger a being-in-the-world, which world is where it dwells, which world is where it lives with phenomena understandingly. To Heidegger, as will be shown, understanding does not refer to whichever way an isolated subject has had to transcend metaphysical or epistemic limitations to live in the world, to grasp phenomena – or, as will be contended below, to speak.

In Chapter Three of this dissertation the relationship of derivativism to subjectivism is discussed; in its subsequent chapters two distinct accounts of derivativism, neither of which relies expressly on subjectivism, receive investigation.

In Chapter Two it is shown that in Being and Time, in order to overcome subjectivism, Heidegger delineates a fundamental ontology of human being-in-the-world, his name for which being is “Dasein”, in order to show the way in which human being ‘is’ in the world ontologico-existentially. His project is hermeneutic. It does not concern the description of ‘observing’ subjects, essentially divorced

13 By ‘transcendentalist’ I here mean that mode of philosophising which attempts the transcendence of the particularity of the factual situation of being-in-the-world, which attempts to reach to ‘objective’ truth, as opposed to the ‘transcendental’ approach to being-in-the-world which seeks to ground enquiry and to limit it with especial respect to what is possible for understanding a priori – as is attempted, for example, by Kant. For more information with respect to this theme and the difference between ‘transcendental’ and ‘transcendental’ philosophy, see: Malpas, J., “The idea of the transcendental” in Malpas, J. (ed.), From Kant to Davidson: Philosophy and the idea of the transcendental, Routledge, London, 2003 at 1-6
from their habitat, the world of their intimate concerns, but concerns Dasein
inasmuch as it lives in the world, enthralled, involved, and engaged from the very
first instance. It is with respect to this account that Heidegger investigates language
in *Being and Time*, as has already been explained.

As we have learned, it is Blattner’s contention that in order “to work out a
derivativism about language, it is necessary to sift out a non-, or pre-linguistic
understanding of the phenomena” of the world.\(^{14}\) If this cannot be achieved then
derivativism, as an account of the being of language, will fail. Similarly, however, if
it can be shown that language is always already there in the world, originally and for
Dasein to inherit, disclosive of the world and something with which Dasein copes
*ab initio*, derivativism will be weakened as well. For these reasons alone we will
need to learn more about the link between language and the disclosedness of the
world as Heidegger describes it. This is the project of Chapter Two.

In Chapter Three, which investigates instrumentalism inasmuch as it is a form
of derivativism, what a non-linguistic understanding of the world might look like is
discussed. Specifically, Chapter Three investigates the ‘silent’ normative
pragmatism with which *Being and Time* is often associated. Subsequently, the
identification of language with a complex or system of tools is contested with
respect to the ontological difference Heidegger sees between how language
manifestly appears – which is ‘as’ entities for use – and how language ‘is’
ontologically with respect to its being, role, and function in disclosedness. In
Chapter Three I argue that it is misleading to identify language ‘as such’ with its
manifest ‘forms’ alone.

Subsequently, in Chapter Four, the derivativist association of language with a
complex or system of signs is criticised. I argue that the way in which the world is
articulated significantly, meaningfully, is not ontologically prior to the way that
language refers to entities; but instead that language, aboriginally present in ‘webs’
or ‘fields’ of significance, has an originary role in their articulation. With respect to
this contention I argue throughout this dissertation that although derivativism
might be valid in a peculiar sense inasmuch as ‘new’ expressions must always
already have an available sense or meaning to which to refer, it is misleading to
suppose that what is in this way ‘prior’ to utterance is essentially non- or pre-

linguistic; that it is misleading to posit an hierarchy between the ‘fields’ or ‘webs’ of significance with which the world is structurally articulated, ‘where’ being-in-the-world occurs, and the language which brings them to bear. This, my contention, is most closely espoused in Chapter Five, where I examine what Heidegger calls “derivative” forms of understanding. Prima facie, these forms of understanding seem to corroborate derivativism inasmuch as their utterances express the ‘subsequent’ interpretations of given phenomena grasped understandingly, and before the advent of any ‘new’ expression.

In addition, in Chapter Five I investigate the formalisation of language generally, the logical division of language into its ‘parts’, and its association with the ‘new’ – or ‘late’ – assertoric utterance of interpretations; which ‘form’ of utterance, in particular, has long been thought to typify language par excellence.

As a corollary of this investigation, by delving deeper into the ground of derivativism and the philosophy of language generally, I criticise the phenomenon of statements about Nature, the natural world, and discuss whether or not this ‘world’ is ‘in itself’ primordial. I investigate its relationship to language.

Abandoning Nature for the proximate ‘lived’ world in Chapter Six, I then examine Blattner’s own case for a “coherent” derivativism”, which derivativism relies on an argument for the ‘silent’ structural articulation of the world which seems to manifest in quotidian behaviour and custom, from which language seems manifestly absent. The primordiality of non-linguistic, non-conceptual content which this form of “coherent derivativism” implies is questioned accordingly.

In Chapter Six, in addition, the being of body-language as opposed to verbal-language is investigated – and precisely why the conflation of ‘communicative’ linguistic and non-linguistic phenomena is problematic is shown.

In Chapter Seven, Heidegger’s own account of the being of language is investigated in more detail. His return to the meaning of the Greek λόγος [logos] to explain language is traced with respect to his association of the λόγος with discourse [Rede], which is his name in Being and Time for the ontological being of language (as is discussed in Chapter Three). Subsequently, Heidegger’s association of the λόγος with disclosedness is discussed, and an argument for the primordiality and fundamentality of language in being-in-the-world is made. Constitutivism is then criticised with respect to its weaknesses: one of which (in particular) is the way it seems to beg an aggressive form of linguistic idealism.
In Chapter Eight, which is the final chapter of this dissertation (excepting its conclusion), the connexion of language to Dasein’s existential ‘modalities’ is discussed. So, too, is the temporality of language. It is shown consequently that language manifests differently *prima facie* depending on the ‘modality’ of Dasein towards which one orients one’s investigation – yet also that language is in no case absent from the world in which Dasein lives.
II. DISCOURSE AND DISCLOSEDNESS

§.4: Dasein

The professed task of Being and Time is to ask after being qua being; a quest, according to Heidegger, forgotten in our time, but which motivated the Greeks, most prominently Plato and Aristotle. “Being” refers not to beings but to the being of beings, to their way of being, conceived thus as a ‘transcendental’ horizon of intelligibility.\(^\text{15}\)

In his Metaphysics, having concluded that the individual entity – οὐσία – is the primary exemplar and instantiation of being qua being, Aristotle attempts to divine the essential governing causes and principles of individuation; to determine precisely what gives to beings their particularity and uniqueness.\(^\text{16}\) Like Aristotle, in order to interpret and describe being qua being, in Being and Time Heidegger attempts to make a proximate phenomenon transparent in its own being. To attempt to devise an ontology of existence, he selects to assay human-being in its most fundamental existentia, in its “average everydayness”.\(^\text{17}\) This is the ultimate ground of his enquiry, established with respect to his motivating question. Accordingly, Being and Time consists in the description of how human being exists in the world; of its existentia.\(^\text{18}\) It is with regard to its “average everydayness” that the relationship of language to human being is discussed in this dissertation.

Ultimately, Heidegger decides that Dasein, human-being, is a “being-in-the-world” [In-der-Welt-sein]. This is a unitary phenomenon, yet it incorporates three constitutive and equiprimordial elements by implication. These are:

1. The world [Welt], the ontological structure of which as well as what its ‘worldhood’ consists in requires investigation;
2. The being-in [In-sein] the world of Dasein as such; and
3. The beings [Seiende] in the world which Dasein discovers which do not have its way of being-in.


\(^{16}\) The meaning οὐσία is not ‘substance’, but ‘had’ or ‘owned being’.


\(^{18}\) Heidegger’s name for human being is Dasein, the English transliteration of which is ‘to-be there’: the infinitive verb sein means ‘to be’, Da means ‘there’, and the verbal substantive das Sein means ‘being’.
In point of interest, Heidegger does not specify whether or not Dasein refers to an individual person,\textsuperscript{19} the human way of life,\textsuperscript{20} a ‘living’ as opposed to a ‘ceased’ way of life,\textsuperscript{21} or to an amalgam of each of these possibilities. When, however, he discusses the worldly being of Dasein, whose being-in-the-world is its primary existential characteristic, he refers not to the private \textit{subiectum}, the axis upon which subjectivist philosophies have spun themselves, but to an altogether public entity, engaged with the world. To Heidegger, subjectivist interpretations of Dasein fundamentally miscommunicate its being ‘there’ [\textit{Da}], with which ‘there’ it is equiprimordial, within which it finds itself, and advance instead typically transcendentalist world-views. The claim that any given experience of entities is achieved by commuting the ‘distance’ between an ‘outer’ world and an ‘inner’ sphere is repeatedly criticised in \textit{Being and Time} and also in this dissertation, in which it is emphasised instead that any given discovery of phenomena in any given instance occurs within the familiar sphere of the world, within which Dasein always already lives: Dasein is in every case a being-in-the-world. The implications of this argument for the ‘hierarchical’ or broadly structuralist accounts of the relationship between Dasein, world, and language are outlined in ensuing chapters.

With these observations in mind, Heidegger claims that the worldly situation of Dasein, its being-in-the-world, can not be described ontologically accurately with reference to spatial extension or to \textit{res extensa} alone; for although it is usual in this respect to assert that ‘I’ Dasein am ‘here’ where I stand and that other entities are farther away, ‘there’ where I do not stand, this peculiarly ontic interpretation neglects fundamentally the ontological being of being-in-the-world, and of being-there amidst entities.\textsuperscript{22}

As is explained in more detail below, Heidegger does not conceive Dasein’s being-in [\textit{In-sein}] as an occurrent kind of locatedness, still less as the being of one object amidst other objects, but instead as an immersion in the world by way being engaged there; by way of having concerns, problems, possibilities, an inherited hermeneutic situation or tradition with which to deal and, as I will argue below, by

\textsuperscript{19} If Heidegger did indeed mean Dasein as an individual person, it would not be atomistic in the sense of the \textit{subiectum}. See Chapter Three.

\textsuperscript{20} For more information, see, for example, Haugeland, J., “Heidegger on Being a Person” in \textit{Noûs}, vol. 16, 1982 at 15-26.


\textsuperscript{22} This topic is discussed in more detail in Chapter Three.
way of hearing and speaking. Heidegger iterates in this regard that: “The ‘here’ of [Dasein’s] current factual situation never signifies a position in space, but signifies rather the leeway of the range of that … with which [Dasein] is most closely concerned.”

Alacrity, interest, company; the leeway of concern is more familiar and proximate than the ‘principle’ of extension and the categorising or schematising articulation of entities by it.

To reiterate the point most crucial to this dissertation: Being-in-the-world should always be thought as an unified whole, from what is most proximate and primordial; for what is decisive for ontology is according to Heidegger “to prevent the splitting of the [being-in-the-world] phenomenon” from the outset. For example, interpreting being-in with respect to spatial extension or the alien subiectum alone can cause this effect, for these constructions isolate phenomena from each other as a matter of standard, and so beg spurious re-constructions.

Heidegger iterates that Dasein is immersed in the world by its concerns, with respect to which it discovers it, such that it always already “is in such a way as to be its ‘there’”; Dasein, concerned, “is cleared in itself ... in such a way that it is itself the clearing.” ‘Being-in’ the world is therefore best understood as an already ‘being-there’. Dasein is ‘in’ the world; has always already stepped into it. Its situation is public rather than private: Dasein “carries in its ownmost being the character of not being closed off.”

In this dissertation I investigate just how Heidegger thinks language to be related to the world and to Dasein. The instrumentalist, derivativist, and constitutivist accounts of language, as well as the various accounts of being-in-the-world with which these theories are supported and associated, are criticised accordingly. Importantly, therefore, as I will now attempt to show in this chapter, if the equiprimordiality of Dasein and world can be demonstrated, if it can be shown consequently that being-in-the-world and language are not separate existentialia which require cohesion and connexion in Dasein ab initio, then any given hierarchical view of language and being-in-the-world will be weakened.

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24 Ibid at 170, H 131
25 Ibid at 171, H 133
26 Ibid at 171, H 132
consequently; and an altogether new way to language and its being will have been begged.

§.5: Lichtung

For the provisional reasons which have now been given, let us begin to investigate the situation of Dasein ‘in’ the world in more detail. The fundamental claim against which I oppose this dissertation, namely that Dasein understands the world in the first instance in a silent or non-linguistic way which essentially prefigures language, is now criticised with respect to the *Being and Time* account of how Dasein lives in the world; of how the world is disclosed to Dasein.

Heidegger describes the worldly site of Dasein with the German word *Lichtung*, which means literally a ‘glade’, ‘opening’, or ‘clearing’, as can be found in a forest.27 *Lichtung* denotes Dasein’s *Da*, its ‘there’ – by which it is in an ontologically and existentially crucial sense incorporated: *Dasein*, as we have learned, means literally ‘to-be there’. *Lichtung*, however, is also related to *Licht*, ‘light’. Heidegger intimates in this way that Dasein’s worldly situation involves an illumination in which phenomena – including Dasein itself – show themselves intelligibly for seeing, for circumspection, and ultimately for enquiry. The *Licht* of the *Lichtung* is equiprimordially intimate with the disclosive clearing-away of obfuscations and other obstacles to understanding. Dasein is ‘where’ it is, with ‘what’ is; with whatever it discovers, disclosed not darkling. It is the relationship of the originary disclosedness of being-in-the-world to language which begs investigation.

§.6: Derivativism and disclosedness

The fifth chapter of the First Division of *Being and Time* is intended to show the nature of Dasein’s being-in [*In-sein*] the world as such. Its aim is to explain the nature of the ‘there’ [*das ‘Da’*] of Dasein, as well as just how Dasein ‘is’ there.28

‘Disclosedness’ [*Erschlossenheit*] refers to the clearing-away of obstacles, *Lichtung*. In this way ‘to disclose’ and ‘disclosedness’ signify respectively ‘to lay

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28 As a corollary of this examination, in the fifth chapter of *Being and Time* Heidegger is led toward an understanding of the “primordial being of Dasein itself – namely, care [*Sorge*], in all its variations and degrees” (see *ibid* at 169, H 131). Thus, ‘disclosedness’ refers not merely to the ‘there’, but to the way that Dasein ‘is’, ‘there’, caring. For the purpose of this discussion, a detailed investigation of the phenomenon of care, as well as how Heidegger ultimately subsumes the constitutive elements of disclosedness ‘under it’ is not of pressing relevance: it is but briefly discussed.
open’ and ‘having been laid open’. The disclosedness of the world is the condition of the possibility of the discovery of entities in it by Dasein ‘as’ what they are and at all.

Although it seems that strong investigative emphasis is occasionally placed on the discoveries of the individual during the *Being and Time* discussion of disclosedness, it is important to realise that precisely how Dasein discovers the world to ‘be’ is influenced by the movements and coercions of the public, with which it lives in an hermeneutic situation, as it were, already. The public [das Man] is a discoursing, communing public, and has a role in disclosedness inasmuch as the public realm [die Öffentlichkeit], in the world, is where Dasein lives. The way the world is articulated intelligibly in public – and also by the public – irrupts into being-in-the-world and affects it: as such, Dasein’s way of being-in-the-world, as well as its discoveries, can not be completely determined without acknowledging the concerns, attunements, attitudes, as well as the cultural and historical influences of its society. We learn in 1925 in *History of the Concept of Time* that according to Heidegger “Dasein exhibits itself as an entity which is in its world but at the same time is by virtue of the [wider] world in which it is”. The discussion of disclosedness which now ensues will lead us toward an explicit investigation of precisely how discourse, and therefore language ‘in itself’, functions in public in the disclosedness of the world. The relationship of das Man to discourse is investigated accordingly.

§7: The disclosedness-structure

Included in the First Division of *Being and Time* are the following few statements about the disclosedness of the world (and being-in) and how it occurs to Dasein:

30 Dasein always already finds itself in the world with respect to, and against the ‘background’ of, das Man. This is discussed in more detail below.
The fundamental existentialia which constitute the being of the ‘there’, the disclosedness of being-in-the-world, are states-of-mind [Befindlichkeit] and understanding [Verstehen].

In understanding and state-of-mind, we shall see the two constitutive ways of the being of the ‘there’; and these are equiprimordial. If these are to be analysed, some phenomenal confirmation is necessary; in both cases this will be attained by Interpreting some concrete mode which is important for the subsequent problematic. State-of-mind and understanding are characterised equiprimordially by discourse [Rede].

…discourse is constitutive for the being of the ‘there’ (that is, for states of mind and understanding).

…the being of that disclosedness [which belongs to Dasein] is constituted by states-of-mind, understanding, and discourse.

Each of these elements – the existentialia that are state-of-mind, understanding, and discourse – will be discussed in more detail below. Provisionally, however, an ambiguity concerning the place of discourse in the structure of disclosedness must be addressed. This ambiguity first arises in the Second Division of Being and Time, which is entitled “Dasein and Temporality”, when, in §68(d) Heidegger offers this new remark about the being of the ‘there’ and its disclosedness:

When the ‘there’ has been completely disclosed, its disclosedness is constituted by understanding, state-of-mind, and falling [Verfallen]; and this disclosedness becomes [expressively] Articulated by discourse…

With these words, Heidegger seems to remove discourse from its place in the (original) disclosedness-structure of the First Division of Being and Time and to

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33 Ibid at 172, H 133
34 Ibid at 201, H 158
35 Ibid at 224, H 180
36 Ibid at 400, H 349
replace it in the Second Division with the phenomenon of falling. For this reason he seems to support a species of derivativism in essence, and subsequently causes Dreyfus to remark that discourse “is not on a par with the other two aspects of Dasein’s ‘openness’”. However, what seems prima facie to be a revision or rejection of the original tripartite structure of disclosedness is ultimately not one. What seems at first glance to be a radical modification is rather a reflection of Heidegger’s attempt in the Second Division of *Being and Time* to map the constitutive elements of the disclosedness-structure and Dasein’s being as care in general onto the ‘structure’ of Dasein’s temporality. The ambiguity that arises with regard to the constitution of disclosedness is merely coincidental. A short explanation of Heidegger’s project will assist our understanding of why this is.

§ 8: Disclosedness, care, and temporality

Heidegger iterates that the “primordial being” of Dasein is, fundamentally, care [*Sorge*]. Things matter to Dasein. In §41 of *Being and Time*, which is entitled “Dasein’s Being as Care”, Heidegger writes that:

... the fundamental ontological characteristics of [Dasein] are (1) existentiality, (2) facticity, and (3) being-fallen [*Verfallensein*]. These characteristics are not pieces belonging to something composite, one of which might sometimes be missing; but there is woven together in them a primordial context which makes up that totality of the structural whole. [It is in] the unity of [these] characteristics … [that Dasein’s being as care] becomes something which it is possible for us to grasp as such ontologically.\(^{38}\)

In the First Division of *Being and Time*, in §41, Heidegger maps the care-structure thus determined onto the structure of disclosedness:

(1) Dasein’s existentiality is disclosed proximally and for the most part in terms of its *understanding*, being the way that it conducts itself and its dealings.

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(2) Its facticity – the fact that it has been delivered over to itself and is faring one way or another – is disclosed proximally and for the most part in terms of its having states-of-mind.

(3) Its being-fallen refers to its being in a world wherein a way of life already dominates around it.39

In the same section Heidegger maps these three “fundamental ontological characteristics” of Dasein qua care onto Dasein’s temporality:40

(1) Dasein’s understanding, qua the way in which guides its day-to-day conduct, attends to the possibilities it discovers to ‘lie ahead’ of itself. In this way, Dasein is a “being-ahead-of-itself”.41

(2) Dasein’s being-ahead of itself is possible only if it is already familiar with where in the world and with what it is in the process of having been – the discovery of which belongs to Dasein’s having states-of-mind. Heidegger explains that Dasein’s “being-ahead-of-itself” means, if we grasp it more fully, “ahead-of-itself-in-already-being-in-a-world”.42

(3) Dasein lives in the present inasmuch as it is fallen [Verfallensein] into the world. (Like disclosedness and care, Dasein’s temporality is to be thought in terms of the unity of its elements: Heidegger explains that Dasein’s “temporality temporalises itself as a whole”).43

This translation is important to acknowledge because the Second Division of Being and Time is so frequently ignored in commentary concerning the existentialia of being-in-the-world, as well as how disclosedness occurs.

What is important to consider accordingly, as is also shown in the Second Division of Being and Time, is that discourse does not necessarily belong to any one

39 These phenomena are investigated in more detail below in Chapter Eight: We will learn that to Dasein’s being-fallen belong two species of discourse – the idle talk [Gerade] of its day and the ‘call’ [Ruf] or ‘voice of conscience’ [Stimme des Gewissens] that first alerts it to its immersion in das Man.
40 See also §§65 of Being and Time, which is entitled “Temporality as the ontological meaning of care [Sorge]”; and, in particular, the discussion of resoluteness [Entschlossenheit] that is contained within it. This discussion is, for the most part, outside the scope of this dissertation.
42 Ibid at 236, H 192
43 Ibid at 401, H 350
of the three essential elements of care or temporality in particular because it is not in itself specific to any one definite aspect of care, any one temporal ecstasis, or any single element of disclosedness alone. Instead, it belongs in its emergence, its irruptions, its being, to each. Discourse has a privileged ontological position in human being because it is able to range over the whole of being-in-the-world.\textsuperscript{44}

For this reason, what \textit{prima facie} seems to be a revision of the place and importance of discourse in the structure of disclosedness in the Second Division of \textit{Being and Time} is rather intended merely to intimate that discourse is interwoven with disclosedness as a whole, suffusing it, and is interwoven with each of its elements: This is precisely what Heidegger means when in the First Division of \textit{Being and Time} he already states that “[s]tate-of-mind and understanding are characterised equiprimordially by discourse [Rede],”\textsuperscript{45} and that “…discourse is constitutive for the being of the ‘there’ (that is, for states of mind and understanding)”\textsuperscript{46}.

If language is a species of discourse,\textsuperscript{47} resident in the world, ranging over disclosedness, then \textit{prima facie} these remarks seem fatal blows to derivativisms of all sorts.

With each of these foregoing remarks in mind, and taking language for the time-being to be an existential species of discourse (which conception Heidegger encourages), it is now incumbent upon us to investigate each of the first two elements of the disclosedness-structure in turn, and to do so with respect to the pre-linguistic grasp of the world extracted exegetically from \textit{Being and Time}, with which derivativism is supported.

In the first instance Dasein’s state-of-mind and the relationship of state-of-mind to language is discussed. In the second instance what understanding consists

\textsuperscript{44} For more information on the temporality of discourse, see the final chapter, below. See also §68(d) of \textit{Being and Time}
\textsuperscript{46} \textit{Ibid} at 201, H 158
\textsuperscript{47} This is probably Heidegger’s intimation: in \textit{ibid} at 204, H 161 Heidegger states that: “Discourse is existentially language, because that entity whose disclosedness it [expressively] articulates [namely Dasein] … has, as its kind of being, being-in-the-world – a being which has been thrown and submitted to the ‘world’.”

We will see below, however, in Chapter Six in particular, that alternatives to this theory are occasionally proposed. For example, Blattner decides that discourse is primordially, and in essence, a non-linguistic communicative activity upon which language is afterwards based, and to which and understanding thereof language afterwards appeals. See: Blattner, W. D., \textit{Heidegger’s Temporal Idealism}, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1999
in is investigated. How understanding relates to the interpretation of entities and the language interpretation employs is also examined.

§.9: State-of-mind

Accordingly, this section of Chapter Two, as well as being designed to show why state-of-mind [Befindlichkeit] is an integral element of disclosedness, is designed to illustrate an originary, manifest connexion between the moods Dasein has and language. It aims to make clear that linguistic phenomena are integral elements of the disclosedness of being-in-the-world; that they structurally and expressively articulate the intelligibility of phenomena; that language as such, in which Dasein finds itself, influences, spreads, and can beget the moods by which Dasein is, essentially, taken. I contend here consequently that the aboriginal exposure of Dasein to language contains, in itself, an aboriginal discovery of the world ‘as’ it is – ‘as’ it matters, ‘as’ it has mattered, or ‘as’ it should matter – anew. If this is the case then language can not be in every instance proximally posterior to the disclosedness of the world to Dasein, or to Dasein’s grasp of its content – it must, at worst, be interwoven with it.

Below, once what Heidegger means by state-of-mind [Befindlichkeit] has been elucidated briefly, a possible species of derivativism is examined. This species holds that language is in every case pre-figured by how one is faring at any given instance; that how one is faring, inasmuch the intelligibility of phenomena is articulated with respect to it, is prior to language.

State-of-mind is the loose translation of the German term Befindlichkeit which is used by Macquarrie and Robinson in their 1962 translation of Being and Time. Befindlichkeit is itself derived from the German expression **Wie befinden Sie sich?**, which means ‘How are you faring?’ or ‘How do you find yourself?’. While ‘of-mind’ has no literal counterpart in Befindlichkeit itself, Macquarrie and Robinson note that it should be read to imply having being aboriginally ‘thrown’ into a state of being in which things matter.48 It does not imply that what matters is an

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48 For more information, see footnote 2 in Heidegger, M., Being and Time (trans. Macquarrie, J. & Robinson, E.), Blackwell Publishing, Oxford, 1962 at 172, H 134
occurrence in the ‘mind’ of Dasein. *Befindlichkeit* does not denote an inner sphere or like other worldly ‘location’. 49

State-of-mind is what Dreyfus calls the “receptive aspect”50 of Dasein’s being-in-the-world, although this description can perhaps be further refined; state-of-mind is the *existential* by virtue of which the phenomena with which Dasein lives matter to it. It describes the ontological being of its ontically manifest moods, the fact of its organically having attitude, disposition.

With respect to how it manifests, Heidegger explains that “what we indicate ontologically by [the term] ‘state-of-mind’ is ontically the most familiar and everyday sort of thing; our mood [Stimmung], our being-attuned.”51 Happiness, sadness, peevishness and other moods are each ontical species of state-of-mind’s manifestation. Inasmuch as moods can be differentiated from the *existential* that is Dasein’s having a state-of-mind, they can be identified in simple terms as: “the sensibility of an age (such as romantic), the culture of a company (such as aggressive), the temper of the times (such as revolutionary), as well as the mood in a current situation (such as the eager mood in the classroom) and, of course, the mood of an individual” inasmuch as it can differ from a common background spirit.52

In this way Heidegger completely rejects the view of the traditional psychologists with which moods are thought as lingering private afflictions for Dasein to carry like marbles in a pouch, to project at the world like a difficult child. According to this picture Dasein, a simple axis for moods to spin upon, becomes in itself an empty, formless ego, a reliquary for feeling. As Bergson iterates:

[This construction, having made] the ego the place where the mental-states are lodged, is confronted with an empty space which we have no reason to limit here rather than there, which goes beyond each of the

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49 Some commentators prefer ‘affectivity’, ‘sensibility’, ‘disposition’ or even ‘attunement’ as a translation for *Befindlichkeit*. I will continue to use the generally accepted ‘state-of-mind’, however, simply so that the peculiarity of *Befindlichkeit* is preserved.


With respect to the originality of ‘group’ moods, think of the phrase ‘the mood takes us’.
successive boundaries that we try to assign to it, which tends to lose itself … in the infinite.53

Against the psychologists’ view, Heidegger remarks that state-of-mind, having a mood, does not belong to an inner sphere, but belongs to being-in-the-world; to the way in which Dasein’s there [Da] is, disclosed. This is consistent with his attempt to overcome traditional transcendentalist world-views with phenomenology. Dasein finds itself in the world, therefore: and it discovers its moods with respect to how it is ‘there’. Heidegger iterates that:

State-of-mind is [not at all like] ... coming across a psychical condition by the kind of apprehending which first turns round [to the world] and then back. Indeed it is so far from this, that only because the ‘there’ has already been disclosed in state-of-mind can immanent reflection come across ‘experiences’ at all.54

How the world matters to Dasein, how Dasein is ‘there’, enables it to afterwards ‘turn’ to an ego to find and to formalise its particular moods – its happiness, sadness, peevishness et cetera – and to do so thematically. However, proximally and in the first instance its moodedness occurs in its ‘there’, for this is ‘where’ it is; moodedness is disclosed by the way the world matters, is disclosed in being-in-the-world. From the very first instance Dasein discovers its ‘there’ with respect to its having a mood, and discovers its moods with respect to how it is ‘there’. In this way:

[Having a mood is] that basic mode of our Dasein by force of which and in accordance with which we are always already lifted beyond ourselves into being as a whole, which in this or that way matters to us or does not matter to us. Mood is never merely a way of being determined in our inner being for ourselves … mood is precisely the

basic way in which we are outside ourselves, [and] that is the way we are essentially and constantly.\(^\text{55}\)

To reiterate, Dasein never finds itself to have been in possession of an absolutely blank affect, a tabula rasa ripe and ready, in a situation for which it had ‘afterwards’ developed a taste. Rather, whichever the worldly situation in which Dasein finds itself, it finds it has always already been taken by a mood, as it were, in advance. Even reacting to a situation, a distinct possibility of Dasein as such, indicates merely that things must always already be mattering to it, however latent this fact may be – for why else would Dasein react?

Dasein finds itself “mooded”: it is alternatively at ease with its surrounds, aggravated by the machinations of its company, in want of satisfaction, bored by lethargy, and so on – it finds itself to have been mooded from the very beginning. When Dasein finds itself, when it reflects upon its being-in-the-world, when it identifies how it is faring, it finds itself occupied, finds that it has affairs which matter to it: if, for example, swayed by the temper of his time, a racist meets an alien, then, having a predilection for distaste, he will react distastefully; similarly, an economist will see the world for its economic chattel, and this will jade those without interests fiscal.

It is important to note, therefore, that even ‘values’ are in this way always already inherent in the phenomena Dasein discovers, and are not laid upon them by any means subsequent to their having been discovered in the world ‘as’ what they are.

Accordingly, Heidegger posits three essential characteristics of states-of-mind. These are:\(^\text{56}\)

(1) That states-of-mind show Dasein to have been given over to being as an entity that is or has been ‘thrown’ into existence; that, in other words, Dasein finds itself [sich befinde] in its thrownness [Geworfenheit];


(2) That states-of-mind disclose the facticity of being-in-the-world as a whole, meaning they disclose that the world is always already ‘there’ where Dasein is, and that Dasein is always already ‘there’ where the world is; and, thirdly,

(3) That Dasein encounters the world circumspectively, which means that the entities within the world show themselves to Dasein in the manner of striking it in a certain way, each according to how Dasein is faring or how it is attuned; to how it ‘is’ in its worldly situation. In other words, ‘how the world is’ is this way a possibility of Dasein’s state-of-mind.

In this respect the having of moods, Dasein’s state-of-mind as such, is an originary element of the disclosedness of its being-in-the-world to it.

§.10: Derivativism and mood

Dasein’s state-of-mind constitutes a basic means by which the world is encountered by it; for to it phenomena manifest ‘as’ what they are – as objectionable, loathsome, alluring, good, foul, et cetera. It happens occasionally however that certain sciences, by the adoption of certain methods, will attempt to resist what they suppose to be the corruptions of moodedness in order to see the world ‘as’ it is, occurrent ‘in itself’, free from influence, affectation or pretence. By supposing a ‘world in itself’, a primordial and essential ‘nature’ alien to humanity, language can seem manifestly posterior to whichever way phenomena, especially natural phenomena, occur ‘in themselves’, loaded as language is with moral feeling. If, however, it can be shown that state-of-mind is original to disclosedness, and that language has a role in Dasein’s discovery of phenomena ‘as’ they matter, ‘as’ they are manifest, then this particular species of derivativism will be weakened consequently.

Heidegger explains that in every case “Dasein’s openness to the world is constituted existentially by the attunement of a state-of-mind”.


have [already] outlined in advance … Existentially, a state-of-mind implies a
disclosive submission to the world, out of which we can encounter something that
matters to us.\textsuperscript{58}

According to Heidegger, this means insofar as worldly phenomena are concerned
that “from the ontological point of view we must as a general principle leave the primary
discovery of the world to ‘bare mood’.\textsuperscript{59} The ‘mooded’ discovery of entities is an
existential and is for this reason originary. Dasein’s moods dictate what phenomena
‘are’: it is by ‘fearing’ that Dasein encounters phenomena ‘fearsome’: its discovery
of what is resistant, objectionable, unserviceable, depressing, or indeed of any other
quality, belongs to ‘bare mood’:

\[\text{It is] precisely when we see the ‘world’ unsteadily and fitfully in}
\text{accordance with our moods, that worldly phenomena shows itself [sic]}
\text{in its specific worldhood.}\textsuperscript{60}

Opposed to this particular argument for the pervasion of state-of-mind in
disclosedness, a distinction between the experience of the world which occurs in
‘bare mood’ and the comparatively ‘pure’ or moodless, morally indifferent
observations of the world which occur in skilled theoretical ‘analysis’ has
occasionally been argued for. Whether it is intended to achieve it or not, the latter
treatment ultimately amounts to the ‘dimming-down’ of proximate phenomena ‘as’
they are in themselves; to, in other words, the abstract reduction of proximate
phenomena to the level of a bare uniformity – to mere occurrence – to “presence-
at-hand” [\textit{Vorhandenheit}] – to, because the result of a reduction, something
ontologically unoriginal.\textsuperscript{61} That this occurs in theoretical analysis in particular is
precisely because of its attempt to attain to dispassionate, moodless discovery; and
thus it denies to Dasein its originary familiarity with its being-in-the-world.
Ultimately, however, despite whichever dispassion, independence, integrity, or

\textsuperscript{58} \textit{Heidegger, M., Being and Time} (trans. Macquarrie, J. & Robinson, E.), Blackwell Publishing,
\textit{Oxford, 1962 at 176-177, H 137}
\textsuperscript{59} \textit{Ibid} at 177, H 138
\textsuperscript{60} \textit{Ibid} at 177, H 138
\textsuperscript{61} \textit{Ibid} at 177, H 138
affect to which it attempts to lay claim, no science, no discovery, indeed no disclosedness of being-in-the-world is free from Dasein’s being-mooded:

The mood has already disclosed, in every case, being-in-the-world as a whole, and [in this way] makes it possible first of all to direct oneself towards something.\footnote{Heidegger, M., \textit{Being and Time} (trans. Macquarrie, J. & Robinson, E.), Blackwell Publishing, Oxford, 1962 at 176, H 137}

... even the purest \textit{θεωρία} [‘scientific’ theory] has not left all moods behind it; even when we look theoretically at what [seems] just present-at-hand, it does not show itself ‘purely as it looks’ unless this \textit{θεωρία} lets it come towards us in a tranquil ‘tarrying alongside’ ... in [something like the organic equanimity of] comfort and recreation.\footnote{Ibid at 177, H 138}

Heidegger does not mean to advocate with these remarks that theoretical sciences are or should be reducible to mere feeling as a rule; nor does he mean to advocate that the scientific interpretation of the world should be abandoned altogether. Rather, what he attempts to make clear is that any process or technique whereby entities are determined to be of ‘this’ or ‘that’ character – even if this is in effect a complete paucity of character – still has its ontological ground in the \textit{existentialle} which is the inherent having of a state-of-mind; for Dasein’s mood brings it to its ‘there’.\footnote{Here “tranquil” means something more like ‘tranquilising’; it refers to a deliberate attempt of Dasein’s to ‘divorce’ itself from the world and look calmly and lucidly over what it finds there ‘in itself’.} Inasmuch as it requires a tranquilising attitude, a reattunement of the organic experience of being-in-the-world, the theoretical way of looking is always simply affected. That scientific investigations of phenomena are guided by precise methodologies – which implicate detached deliberation, procedural control, and specialised languages to follow – is crucial evidence in this respect.

\textit{§.11: State-of-mind and language}

As has already been identified, because theoretical ‘looking’ is an affected way of discovering the world, there is a sense in which it and the specialised languages of its investigations are derivative of a more organic experience of being. By

\footnote{Ibid at 173, H 134}
extension of the implications of this observation, language ‘as such’ can be thought prefigured by the primordial ‘silence’ of state-of-mind, the originary existential, alone. However, precisely how phenomena manifest to Dasein pertains to how and in which way they are disclosed to it; and, as we learned above in the introduction to this chapter, there are other elements of disclosedness than state-of-mind alone. Discourse, too, has a place in disclosedness: on the one hand phenomena are discussed in language, and so in it they show themselves; and on the other hand language excites attitudes towards its topics, and so it stimulates – it can inculcate moods or else it can share them, effecting ensuing discoveries. That theoretical looking and scientific language are – inasmuch as they belong to peculiar disciplines – derivative of a more organic quotidian being-in-the-world does not therefore mean that each is in turn derived from a proximate originary ‘silence’. Nor does it mean that language ‘as such’ is derived from or prefigured by an altogether ‘silent’ form of disclosedness.

According to Heidegger discourse is an originary element of Dasein’s being-in-the-world with others, which others are the original residents of the world in which Dasein finds itself to live. Inasmuch as the public is itself a Dasein and has its own peculiar way of being-in-the-world, it too is consumed by a mood or, at the very least, by a manifold of various attitudes, each of which is expressed in discourse – in communicative, articulative exchange. In this way it seems “as though [a mood] is in each case already there, so to speak, like an atmosphere in which we first immerse ourselves in each case and which then attunes us through and through.” The public, discoursing, is an opinion-bearing and influential body. Dasein discovers solicitous unity or unrest in it; discovers popular custom, political responsibility, even a moral or legislative code. It discovers a way in which things matter – and this way in which things matter is always already being discussed there. It is against or in terms of this background, this being-with-others, that Dasein discovers its own mood or attitude – and that it can thence ‘turn back’ toward itself. Whichever mood so happens to manifest ontically to Dasein arises in this way:

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65 Heidegger, M., The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude (trans. McNeill, W. & Walker, N.), Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1995 at 67. Heidegger continues, explaining that: “[i]t does not merely seem so, it is so; and, faced with this fact, we must dismiss the psychology of feelings, experiences, and consciousness.” In the first instance, ‘mood’ is a public phenomenon.

66 In Heidegger, M., Being and Time (trans. Macquarrie, J. & Robinson, E.), Blackwell Publishing, Oxford, 1962 at 167, H 129, Heidegger explains that: “[das Man] is an existentiale; and as a primordial phenomenon, it belongs to Dasein’s positive constitution.”
“neither from ‘outside’ nor from ‘inside’, but … out of being-in-the-world, as a way of such being”:\(^{67}\) Heidegger explains that:

The dominance of the public way in which things have been interpreted has already been decisive even for the possibilities of having a mood – that is, for the basic way in which Dasein lets the world ‘matter’ to it.\(^{68}\)

By *listening* Dasein can discover *how* things are – even how it is. State-of-mind, or (ontically) whichever mood Dasein discovers itself suffering, can be intimately connected to its place in the public; to the discourse Dasein is immersed in: consider, for example, the many declarations of war about the time of 1914 with which various peoples were given to various attitudes. For his part, Geertz explains in this respect that what matters, the issues and “webs of significance [that man] himself has spun” are, in the final analysis, cultural and therefore social.\(^{69}\)

Phenomenally, peculiar cultures seem to enjoy peculiar histories and ways of life, into which their participants are born and by which they are proximally and from the first instance subsumed. Accordingly, peculiar cultures seem to possess peculiar sentiments, beliefs, and sensibilities, an aggregate or manifold of which, as mood, seems to suffuse them like an *animus*. But, more importantly, those who live there seem to interpret and to *discuss* what matters, and to do so with respect to their way of life. In other words, their *animus* seems nourished, upheld, perpetuated and suffused by a given resident discourse, the president species of which is in each case the peculiar natural language saturating, binding, and swaying its speakers and their heirs.\(^{70}\) By listening carefully and solicitously to the discussions of others, Dasein discovers an abundance of absorbing moods, and each of these can affect it. It discovers, consequently, ways in which things matter.

Moods can be *roused* with the aid of discourse by way of an infusion from without: there is, for example, the way we absorb the pleas of our parents, the

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\(^{68}\) Ibid at 213, H 169-170

\(^{69}\) Geertz “take[s] culture to be those webs, and the analysis of it to be therefore not an experimental science in search of law but an interpretive one in search of meaning.” (See Geertz, C. J., “Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture” in Geertz, C. J., *The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays*, Basic Books, New York, 1973 at 5)

\(^{70}\) What Heidegger thinks this president species of discourse to be, idle talk [*Gerede*] is discussed below, in Chapter Eight

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tempered talks of solicitous speechifiers, the inciting opinions of political figures, the sensible sermons of priests, or the intimate words of the ones we love. Within each of these genres or forms (λέγειν [legein]) of discourse a way in which things matter is made available and given to be felt; and depending on the extent of emotive force and good sense they convey, these various ‘forms’ of discourse can each inspire us to appreciate matters in common – or to resist communal appreciation alternatively. In this way we find that language itself causes the manipulation of our moods; that our appreciation of the world can be altered fundamentally upon the encounter of any given discourse or discussion, whatever its appeal, and that this happens from the beginning of our being-in-the-world. In Being and Time, writing with respect to Aristotle and his work The Art of Rhetoric, Heidegger identifies that accomplished rhetoricians will always speak with regard to mood, that rhetoricians “must understand the possibilities of moods in order to rouse them and guide them aright”, and so that there is a fundamental connexion between state-of-mind and language which manifests existentially, and which can subsequently beget the clever manipulation of words and phrases.

In point of interest, although Heidegger does not explicitly make the connexion himself, it is possible to identify language with the λόγος μουσικός [logos mousikos] – the discourse of the muse Euterpe, the goddess of music – because language is shaped and sounded carefully according to principles of harmony and sentiment. With respect to this theme Rousseau submits that in their most primitive being “the first discourses were [probably] the first songs”; that “at first, there was no music but melody and no other melody than the varied sounds of speech”; and that ultimately “poetry was devised before prose [and that this] was

Aristotle’s examination of rhetoric is discussed in more detail below in Chapter Seven.
72 See Smith, F. J., The Experiencing of Musical Sound: A Prelude to a Phenomenology of Music (Musicology), Gordon and Breach, New York, 1979 at 33
The word μουσική had a far broader signification among the Greeks than the English word ‘music’ has today. In The Republic, Plato discusses the way in which a proper education in music, aimed at the cultivation of taste, is a requisite for recognition of the beautiful — that music is a primary means of beauty’s disclosure, and therefore an element of disclosedness. For more information, see Plato, The Republic, III, §1(d).
bound to be, since feelings speak before reason.”73 It is enlightening to note in this respect that Homeric verse, an early linguistic accomplishment, was first of all sung.

In written language, most palpably in poetry, sentiment is conveyed with the careful manipulation of stress, form, and meter.74 Similarly, in spoken language, one shouts when one is angry, one whispers to tell a secret, and so on. Precisely how one speaks is an important element of speech as such; its devices duly affect us. Rousseau identifies that: “A tongue which has only articulations and words has only half its riches ... [for] the expression of feelings and images it still needs rhythm and sounds, which is to say melody.”75 It is enlightening to note in this respect that the German word for ‘mood’, Stimmung, shares a close etymological heritage with the German word for ‘voice’, Stimme, thought especially with respect to this musical dimension.76 Language thus understood speaks musically to what Novalis calls the “acoustics of the soul”.77

That language speaks to the soul and not simply for it means that it is improper to reduce language to the inner resource or talent of the subiectum, to an effect or development of latent state-of-mind alone, or indeed to a language’s various lexical pieces as though each of these held, individually or together, the key to its success.78 It means rather that an originary existential bond subsists between state-of-mind, Dasein’s being-in-the-world as care [Sorge], and the language which finds, stirs, and

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In point of fact, as Goad claims, for every infant “the emotional cry or tune comes first; the articulation of the word, the definite idea, is the later development.” See: Goad, H. E., *Language in History*, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1958 at 12

74 For example, Fussel observes that “to translate a limerick into, say, iambic tetrameter, is to drain off the comedy: we must conclude that a great deal of the comedy [inheres] in the meter alone.” For more information, see Fussel, P., *Poetic Meter and Poetic Form*, Random House, New York, 1979 at 12-13


77 See *ibid* at 56

78 Rousseau asks us to: “Imagine a country in which no one has any idea of drawing, but where many people who spend their lives combining and mixing various shades of colour are considered to excel at painting. Those people would regard our painting precisely as we consider Greek music. If they heard of the emotions aroused in us by beautiful paintings, the spell of a pathetic scene, their scholars would rush into the ponderous investigation of the material, comparing their colours to ours, determining whether our green is more delicate or our red more brilliant. They would try to find out which colour combinations drew tears, which could arouse anger. [They would] ... examine just a few tattered scraps of our paintings. Then they would ask with surprise what is so remarkable about such colouring. ... [but, in the final analysis, music] is no more the art of combining sounds to please the ear than painting is the art of combining colours to please the eye.” See: Rousseau, J-J., *On the Origin of Language* (trans. Moran, J. H & Gode, A.), Frederick Ungar Publishing Co., New York, 1966 at 53-55
excites it to live. Dasein does not merely speak language: it also hears it, is immersed in it.79 In day-to-day life, what one hears discloses. Moreover, in the construction of poetry, one must first listen to language, must first hear it, that in it one may express oneself suitably.

In Being and Time Heidegger explains that musical, or “poetical” discourse [also] amounts to a disclosing of existence”.80 He intimates thereby that language does make manifest musically; that in “poetical” discourse matters are heard and moods roused.

For his part Carman criticises the association of music with language which I have here been championing, clarifying that according to the modern meanings of the words “language and music are mutually interpenetrating phenomena de facto, but music is not language”.81 Nonetheless, the sense in which the Greek μουσική, the expression of sentiment by pitch, tone, intonation, stress, or form has an important role in linguistic disclosure and exchange can be appreciated. It remains also that the Greeks thought speech to be a musical phenomenon; and also, in point of fact, that even in Germany today music [Musik] is called one of the talking arts [redende Künste].82

For the reasons which have now been discussed, the degree to which Dasein is steeped in language, the degree to which language incites action or inculcates opinion, weakens strongly derivativist accounts of experience; for the very suffusion of language in being-in-the-world, in its immersive character, suggests instead that language in particular exerts influence in disclosedness aboriginally; that in hearing language, and so that in hearing itself, lies the possibility of discovering the world in new ways – in these ways for the very first time – and that this is the gift of

82 For more information, Smith, F. J., The Experiencing of Musical Sound: A Prelude to a Phenomenology of Music (Musicology), Gordon and Breach, New York, 1979 at 35
This is the sense in which Hamann, for example, sees the oldest language as music. For a lengthier discussion of this point of interest in particular (and the identification of language as a primarily sensory, musical phenomenon), see Bowie, A., Aesthetics and Subjectivity: from Kant to Nietzsche, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1990 at 108
language as it is ‘in itself’.\textsuperscript{83} It seems phenomenally, moreover, that because a public way in which things have been interpreted always already dominates, that a way to sensible discourse is always already available to us; that language is there in advance providing to us, as it were, a topography with which to orient ourselves. If something is suspect, threatening, or pleasing, I can already say so. Inasmuch as I hear language, language seems to wait for me in the world. It seems to shape, to share, and to saturate the world in advance. Through it, phenomena seem to reveal themselves.

With respect to the connexion of derivativism to these observations, let us examine the connexion of the role and function of language to understanding and its place in disclosedness. The relationship of state-of-mind to language will continue to be criticised as this dissertation unfolds; for as has already been intimated it is a weakness of derivativism (as well as compatible theories of language generally) that this connexion is not as well-acknowledged as it otherwise might be.\textsuperscript{84}

\section*{12: Understanding}\textsuperscript{85}

In \textit{Heidegger’s Temporal Idealism} Blattner claims that in order “to work out a derivativism about language, it is necessary to sift out a non- or pre-linguistic understanding of … phenomena.”\textsuperscript{86} Derivativism depends on this very idea; namely that Dasein’s organic understanding [\textit{Verstehen}] of the world (and therefore its being-there) is aboriginally pre-linguistic and, as such, prefigures language. It implies that Dasein’s understanding, with which Dasein grasps the being of entities, with which it uses them, consists in the first instance in an altogether silent seizure of proximate phenomena, as well as what it is possible to do with them.\textsuperscript{87} This claim requires further scrutiny: In the first instance, precisely what Heidegger

\textsuperscript{83} In Chapter Eight of this dissertation, a way in which language provokes Dasein to live, as it were, authentically or for itself, in spite of the ordinary, humdrum, customary life into which it finds itself to have fallen, is examined.
\textsuperscript{84} For example, the relationship between understanding and \textit{μουσική}, or the inculcation of sentiment generally, is rarely discussed in the scholarly accounts of Heidegger’s conception of language.
\textsuperscript{85} Understanding [\textit{Verstehen}] is first treated systematically in Heidegger’s summer semester courses of 1925. For more information, see Kisiel, T., \textit{The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time}, University of California University Press, Berkeley, 1993 at 375-394
\textsuperscript{86} Blattner, W. D., \textit{Heidegger’s Temporal Idealism}, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1999 at 72
\textsuperscript{87} See, for example, Blattner, W. D., \textit{Heidegger’s Temporal Idealism}, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1999 at 71
means by “understanding” must be determined. In this way its connexion to
language can be examined.

As we have learned, the first two essential characteristics of states-of-mind
disclose the definition, per se, of Dasein as being-in-the-world as such. The third
essential characteristic, namely that Dasein encounters the world circumspectively,
describes the marriage of Dasein’s factic being-there to its encounter of phenomena
‘as’ what they are. That Dasein encounters the world circumspectively means, in
other words, that it understands.

Understanding and state-of-mind occur equiprimordially in disclosedness. In
Being and Time Heidegger explains that understanding [Verstehen], like state-of-mind,
is one of Dasein’s existentia. Like state-of-mind, it partly constitutes the there
[Da-] in which Dasein lives. Although it is equiprimordial with state-of-mind and
discourse, understanding is in itself constitutive of neither.

In Being and Time Heidegger differentiates between two different kinds of
understanding, describing it in the first instance as:

(1) A primordial existentiale; Dasein’s originary familiarity with and competence over
its situation; and, in the second instance, as
(2) The derivative kind of understanding Dasein develops from the former in the
critical, analytical, or theoretical thinking about phenomena as they occur
objectively or, as it were, ‘in themselves’.

In the first instance understanding [Verstehen] denotes the easy adeption with which
Dasein goes about its quotidian dealings, with which it interacts with others, with
which it engages equipment ready-to-hand. It denotes know-how, what Dreyfus
calls “coping”, namely the adroitness with which Dasein lives. When hungry, for
example, when I go unthinkingly to the fridge, open its door, and remove an egg
from it, this means that I have understood the fridge. Understanding, in this
instance, is a learned familiarity – it is not simply pure animal ‘instinct’ or blind
impulsiveness, against which it can be contrasted.

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88 See, for example, Dreyfus, H. L., Being-in-the-World: a commentary on Heidegger’s Being and Time,
Division I, MIT Press, Cambridge (Massachusetts), 1991 at 195
Dreyfus describes “coping” as preconceptual, prepropositional, and therefore prelinguistic, however,
with which claims I disagree, as will be shown.
In the second instance Dasein can develop derivative modes of understanding with which to analyse quotidian being-in-the-world thematically. Derivative understanding denotes the theoretical ‘attitude’, corresponding to which are the grossly interpretative studies which align being-in-the-world with categories and descriptive schemas. For the most part the members of this totality can be typified by their interpretative or investigative methods according to which they treat phenomena which have been grasped understandingly as ‘objects’ that occur environmentally, ‘in themselves’, independent of Dasein and its concerns. By so theorising entities, by putting their place and involvement in quotidian being-in-the-world aside, Dasein’s originary understanding undergoes transformation. There is a difference, then, in going to the fridge for an egg, and determining why the fridge keeps foodstuff fresh, why the fridge exists, or which material a fridge may be made from.

In Being-in-the-world Dreyfus identifies two modern examples of derivative understanding: namely the university-based sciences which study Dasein as a biological organism physical and frail, and the modern natural sciences which study the natural environment as something which surrounds and merely occurs. In this way derivative understanding does not penetrate to the everyday familiarity with which Dasein conducts its dealings; to the fundamental proximity of Dasein to the world’s entities. This is perhaps most evident in the forms of language which occur with it; for to Dasein’s derivative understanding belong specialised species’ of language. These commonly consist of analytical and propositional elements, as well as simple attestations as to how phenomena ‘are’, with respect to which they may be aligned with categories and laws. These forms can thus be contrasted with the ubiquitous or altogether ordinary language with which Dasein copes and convenes in day-to-day exchange.

Derivativist accounts of language suppose Dasein’s being-in-the-world, the way that Dasein conducts itself, is grounded in an understanding of an altogether silent structural articulation of its possibilities. Traditionally, this kind of originary understanding has been described as an isolated mental faculty or activity with

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90 Often, as we will learn below, the comparatively abstract phrases and expressions [Worte] of Dasein’s derivative understanding concern entities as they ‘occur’ in the environment ‘in themselves’, or else it causes them to seem to ‘be’ so.
which Dasein seizes the world, its contents, and the possibilities which inhere there. In it, in what amounts first to an ‘inner sphere’, a forum internum, Dasein is supposed to decipher a given manifold of phenomena, concerns, and behaviours. Derivativism, on the other hand, points to the primacy of Dasein’s praxes, its easy competence, in order to argue that understanding, mere “coping”, is pre-conceptual and pre-propositional, is in this way necessary for the making of propositions, and is therefore pre-linguistic. In this way language is supposed to be prefigured by non-linguistic phenomena: it is supposed to have its advent in the ‘subsequent’ expression of an interpretation of a pre-linguistic business, phenomenon, or possibility – or alternatively, in Dasein’s derivative understanding as the translation of its silent and organic quotidian counterpart. However, these ideas about understanding and language do not properly appreciate the role and function of language in its originary and proximate presence to Dasein inasmuch as it is a being-in-the-world-with-others. In the same way, the association of language ‘as such’ with derivative phenomena is not a good one; for thinking language’s advent with respect to derivative understanding alone pays inadequate attention to the way that everyday and ubiquitous instances of language, there in the world in public, can direct or affect Dasein ab initio and, on the other hand, are logically prior to it. Dasein’s originary quotidian understanding, the way that it lives understandingly, is under this construction equiprimordial with its familiarity with (and easy use of) the quotidian instances of language it has had from the first place to learn; with its grasp of the quotidian phrases and expressions which disclose the world with which it has had from the first place to deal. It is important that this is shown.

91 There are numerous investigations of this ‘understanding’ in the Western philosophical tradition. For example, Kant describes it in terms of the a priori forms of intuition and the categories (see Kant, I., Critique of Pure Reason (trans. Smith, N. K.), Revised Second Edition, Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). Searle describes it as a pre-intentional, pre-linguistic, “neuronal structure” (see Searle, J.R., Expression and Meaning: Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1979). On the other hand, as we will learn below, Dreyfus & Blattner liken it to a set of pre-linguistic practices, skills, and activities with which to be familiar, which do not yet require language in order to reveal the way the world is or to demonstrate specific aptitudes (see Dreyfus, H. L., Being-in-the-World: a commentary on Heidegger’s Being and Time, Division I, MIT Press, Cambridge (Massachusetts), 1991 & Blattner, W. D., Heidegger’s Temporal Idealism, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1999). For a further discussion of the latter two views of understanding in particular (and how they relate to Heidegger’s account of language), see Wrathall, M. A., “Background Practices, Capacities, and Heideggerian Disclosure” in Wrathall, M. A. & Malpas, J. (eds.), Heidegger, Coping, and Cognitive Science: Essays in Honour of Hubert L. Dreyfus (Volume 2), The MIT Press, Cambridge (Mass.), 2000. This is also discussed in more detail below in Chapter Six, once an argument for the connexion of language to understanding has been made in the current one. 92 See: Blattner, W. D., “Ontology, the A Priori, and the Primacy of Practice” in Crowell, S. & Malpas, J., Transcendental Heidegger, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2007 at 17
Principally, it seems that understanding must be based on something prior, for in order to understand anything, Dasein must have something to understand. In the same way, however, does it not also seem that in order to say something Dasein must already have something to say – or rather, two things – namely a topic or subject-matter and the language with which to express it? In order that this ‘twin’ something may be investigated in more detail, let us examine further precisely what Heidegger describes originary understanding to consist in. Heidegger writes that:

When we are talking ontically, we sometimes use the expression ‘understanding something’ with the signification of ‘being able to manage something’ [einer Sache vorstehen können], ‘being a match for it’ [ihr gewachsen sein], or ‘being competent to do something’ [etwas können] … [However,] in understanding as an existentiale, that which we have such competence over is not a ‘what’ [or ‘an entity in the world], but being as existing.93

Ontically Dasein shows itself to have competence over is its way of being-in-the-world – its activities, dealings [Umgang], engagements, concerns, attitudes, the entities it finds, as well as its possibilities. “Competence” shows phenomenologically that understanding, in its ontological being, is an understanding of the possibilities Dasein finds as well as how to deal with them; ontologically, therefore, understanding is an understanding of disclosed possibilities.

As has already been intimated, Dasein’s having-of-competence, the fact that it continually develops and adjusts to its environment with adroitness and natural familiarity, which comportment is an originary existentiale, does not denote or involve the ‘late’ or thematic objectification of entities. Nor does it implicate close deliberative thinking about phenomena so much as it implicates on the other hand the kind of learning from which the closed thinking which codifies and categorises schematically is entirely absent. Similarly, it does not involve attestations or assertions about the being of phenomena as they are thought to occur ‘in

Here, Heidegger links the verb *vorstehen* [to manage] with the verb *verstehen* [to understand]
themselves’ beyond their initial proximity to Dasein’s being-in-the-world with them.\textsuperscript{94} Competence, quotidian understanding, the \textit{existential}, denotes rather the way in which Dasein grasps organically or adopts the possibilities inherent in the worldly “background” where it lives; which possibilities it inherits.\textsuperscript{95} Its understanding is not an ability, capacity, or series of private faculties fit for description in categories;\textsuperscript{96} rather it is an \textit{existential}, an organic condition of being-in-the-world, being Dasein, which condition manifests existentially in the way Dasein lives.

\section*{§.13: Dasein’s potentiality-for-being\textsuperscript{97}}

Within the “background” world, in which Dasein is immersed, are available for interpretation, for reflection, for comportment, and for analysis, their topics.\textsuperscript{98} As Heidegger explains in \textit{Basic Problems of Phenomenology} it is Dasein’s immersion in this “background”, within which possibilities reside for seizure and circumspection, that is the underlying “condition of possibility for all kinds of comportment, not only practical but also cognitive.”\textsuperscript{99} By understanding, therefore, Dasein is freed for its possibilities, and equiprimordially:

\begin{quote}
... that which is within-the-world is itself freed … for its own possibilities. [For example,] that which is ready-to-hand [namely
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{94} These ‘developments’, as well as their relationship to language, are discussed in more detail below: they concern a breakdown in quotidian practice (see also §16 of \textit{Being and Time}).


\textsuperscript{96} For an argument against the supposition that ‘faculties’ are where understanding occurs, see Nietzsche, F., \textit{Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future} (trans. Hollingdale, R. J.), Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1972 at 23-24

\textsuperscript{97} “Potentiality-for-being” is Macquarrie and Robinson’s translation of the German term \textit{Seinkönnen}. A more literal translation is ‘can-be’ or even ‘ability-to-be’: \textit{Sein} means ‘being’ or ‘to-be’, and \textit{können} is the infinitive of ‘can’. It denotes the way that Dasein directs itself toward its future possibilities.

\textsuperscript{98} That understanding consists in Dasein’s \textit{familiarity} with its possibilities and, ultimately, its living-towards them, means that Searle’s objection that it does not provide sufficiently for the “intention in [any] action … the intentional part of the action” is weakened or made irrelevant. ‘Intention’, as we will learn below, is replaced in \textit{Being and Time} with what Heidegger calls “comportment”, which also requires an understanding of phenomena ‘as’ what they are. For more information concerning Searle’s interpretation of understanding, see Searle, J. R., “The Limits of Phenomenology” in Wrathall, M. A. & Malpas, J. (eds.), \textit{Heidegger, Coping, and Cognitive Science: Essays in Honour of Hubert L. Dreyfus (Volume 2)}, The MIT Press, Cambridge (Massachusetts), 2000, at 71-92

\textsuperscript{99} Heidegger, M., \textit{The Basic Problems of Phenomenology} (trans. Hofstadter, A.), Indiana University Press, Indianapolis, 1982 at 276

The condition of possibility of all kinds of comportment, either practical or cognitive, is the understanding of being-in-the-world – an \textit{existential} which always already ‘is’ in any kind of comportment, and, more broadly, in any kind of Dasein inasmuch as it lives ‘in’ the world.
complexes of entities] is discovered as such in its serviceability, its usability, and its detrimentality. [A possible] totality of involvements is revealed as the categorical whole of a possible interconnection of the ready-to-hand.\textsuperscript{100}

In the same way whatever is found to be of the natural world, even whatever seems in this way sublime or primeval, shows itself in respect of whichever possibility of Dasein’s being-in-the-world has been disclosed to it.\textsuperscript{101} Dasein’s grasp of its own being-in-the-world, its grasp of its place ‘there’, is equiprimordial with its grasp of the world and the beings which populate it.

Thus conceived, understanding is Dasein’s organic acquaintance with the possibilities it encounters, the phenomena it continues to find in the world, and, in addition, with its being-in-the-world-with-others and with what others are concerned with; with the possibilities thus disclosed by interaction.

Dasein lives with its possibilities ahead of itself. Its being-in-the-world is suffused with them. Even the fact of its ‘existing’ Dasein understands to be fated to culminate in its own ultimate possibility, death. Dasein comports itself toward the world understandingly in accordance with these possibilities. Its understanding – what it does, whatever it ventures in speech or negotiation, whatever it volunteers – is motivated accordingly:

[Understanding] is the existential being of Dasein’s own potentiality-for-being [Seinkönnen]; and it is so in such a way that [Dasein] discloses in itself what its being is capable of.\textsuperscript{102}

\textsuperscript{101} In point of interest, Heidegger continues: “…even the ‘unity’ of the manifold present-at-hand, of nature, can be discovered only if a possibility of it has been disclosed.” He then asks “Is it accidental that the question about the \textit{being} of nature aims at the ‘conditions of its possibility’? On what is such an enquiry based? When confronted with this enquiry, we cannot leave aside the question: \textit{why} are entities which are not of the character of Dasein [often] understood in \textit{their} being, if they are disclosed in accordance with the conditions of their possibility?” Heidegger’s question is a rhetorical one; these entities must be understood with regard to Dasein’s being-in-the-world; to the way it \textit{directs} itself \textit{concernfully}, towards which what matters to it (See \textit{ibid} at 184, H 145)
\textsuperscript{102} \textit{Ibid} at 184, H 144
Dasein’s potentiality-for-being “lies existentially in understanding”. As such, Dasein’s existential possibilities are to be strictly contradistinguished against both “empty logical possibility, and … the contingency of something present-at-hand, so far as with the present-at-hand this or that can ‘come to pass’”. Dasein’s being-possible is not equivalent to the way that a tree has the possibility of bearing fruit, or that gravity, a governing principle of matter, has the latent possibility to forcibly effect a fall. Rather, being-possible:

... as an existentiale, is the most primordial and ultimate positive way in which Dasein is characterised ontologically … Dasein is [not merely an occurrent actuality, but is] in every case what it can be, and in the way in which it is its possibility. … Dasein is a being-possible which has been delivered over to itself – thrown possibility through and through.

[In this way, Dasein’s being-possible,] an existentiale, does not signify a free-floating potentiality-for-being in the sense of the ‘liberty of indifference’ (libertas indifferentiae) … [but signifies that in] every case Dasein, as essentially having a state-of-mind, has already got itself into definite possibilities.

As factual Dasein, any Dasein has already diverted its potentiality-for-being [Seinkönnen] into a possibility of understanding.

These possibilities give Dasein, as it were, to itself.

Inasmuch as Dasein is also in a crucial sense a being-with-others, its possibilities pertain in turn to whichever way it lives with solicitude [Fürsorge] for its fellows. The exposure of Dasein to its possibilities owes itself to a very strong degree to Dasein’s originary immersion in the world with others – which means to its proximity to discourse and what is revealed there by it. This is why discourse is a structural element of disclosedness. We learned above that Dasein’s mood (and

104 Ibid at 183, H 143
105 Ibid at 183, H 144-145; italics mine
106 Ibid at 183, H 144
107 Ibid at 186, H 146
what matters) is influenced by the others with whom it lives. In the same way, others influence the disclosedness of whichever possibilities Dasein finds for itself.

This observation, which is in itself an argument against derivativism and, more generally, the reduction of originary understanding to a form of silent beholding, is investigated in more detail below. As we have learned, derivativism claims that the possibilities revealed by discourse must always already be prefigured or preceded in some way by an understanding which is free from language and its availability. For the time-being, however, it is important to show in more detail precisely why discourse ‘in itself’ participates in the disclosure of possibilities.

§.14: Projection

Heidegger explains that Dasein projects itself into the future in accord with whatever it discovers its possibilities to be. It projects toward its possibilities understandingly because it lives towards them. Its projection [Entwurf] is neither critical nor intentional (in the Scholastic, intellectualist sense):

(1) On the one hand, projection can be interpreted as Dasein’s projecting itself upon or toward the possibilities it has found, in the sense that it assigns itself to what it has discovered to be possible; and,

(2) On the other hand, it can be interpreted as Dasein’s projecting its own possibilities into the future, in the sense that it exerts its own influence by constructing or dictating whichever possibilities it, as it were, ‘desires’.110

In the first instance, the word ‘projection’ requires disambiguation; for prima facie the difference now described is an important one: if the latter case of projection remains a distinct originary possibility, then it follows that the world might ultimately originate as something Dasein, an isolated ‘self’, intentionally projects

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108 The English “projection” is a poor translation of the German Entwurf, the central sense of which is ‘plan’, ‘sketch’, or ‘blueprint’. As has been observed, ‘projection’ factually “has nothing to do with comporting oneself towards a thought-out plan”: It describes, instead, an existentielle, a permanent and constitutive condition whereby Dasein finds possibilities for itself, which it does understandingly. (See Heidegger, M., Being and Time (trans. Macquarrie, J. & Robinson, E.), Blackwell Publishing, Oxford, 1962 at 185, H 145)

109 “Projection” is Heidegger’s term to replace Husserl’s “intentionality”. Husserlian phenomenology is investigated below in Chapter Four.

from an inner sphere. This would conflict with the very fundamentals of Heidegger’s phenomenological ontology in *Being and Time*, effectively compromising the equiprimordiality of Dasein and world for which Heidegger argues, confusing the nature of being-amidst [Sein-bei] entities in the world, and instead suggesting a Dasein *qua* subjectum. Thus conceived, projection could feasibly motivate a derivativist theory of language founded on the primacy of Dasein’s silent judgements or private normative intentions – on an ideality organised by will-power or comparable inner faculties. It would ignore the possibility that language is itself involved in the structural articulation of the world – for which possibility I, at least, am given to argue.

In *Being and Time* Heidegger resolves the ambiguity of ‘projection’ by reminding us that Dasein’s projection of itself (toward its possibilities) is not the sole constitutive or founding element of the way it is ‘there’ in the world: for to the possibility of projection belongs the *prior discovery* of possibilities. These are not – indeed they cannot be – possibilities of Dasein’s creation. Instead, they must be external, worldly, and ‘there’ for Dasein to find disclosed. Heidegger reminds us that:

> By way of having a mood, Dasein ‘sees’ possibilities, in terms of which it is. In the projective disclosure of such possibilities, it already has a mood in every case. The projection of its ownmost potentiality-for-being has been delivered over to the fact of its thrownness into the ‘there’.  

It is important to recall in this respect that:

> The dominance of the public way in which things have been interpreted has already been decisive even for the [disclosedness of the] possibilities

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In this essay, Sallis provides a similar interpretation of projection to the interpretation given here.


of having a mood – that is, for the basic way in which Dasein lets the world ‘matter’ to it.\footnote{Heidegger, M., \textit{Being and Time} (trans. Macquarrie, J. & Robinson, E.), Blackwell Publishing, Oxford, 1962 at 213, H 169-170}

As we have learned, Dasein has always already been ‘thrown’ into the world. It has been thrown into a world with others. When one lives with others then a way in which things matter is discovered. It is within the public domain that Dasein’s possibilities can be “thrown ahead and allowed to rule” as possibilities.\footnote{This is Sallis’ phrase. See Sallis, J., “Language and reversal” in Macann, C. (ed.), \textit{Martin Heidegger: Critical Assessments, Volume III: Language}, Routledge, London, 1997 at 199} In this way its possibilities are never \textit{constructed}, but are always instead discovered by virtue of Dasein’s being-in-the-world already – they are in this \textit{way given}. What \textit{matters} is disclosed in the discourse of the world’s populace; and Dasein must owe its possibilities – at least in part – to the way it engages discursively with others: “The presenting of these possibilities … is made possible existentially through the fact that Dasein, as a being-with which understands, can \textit{listen} to others.”\footnote{Heidegger, M., \textit{Being and Time} (trans. Macquarrie, J. & Robinson, E.), Blackwell Publishing, Oxford, 1962 at 315, H 270} Heidegger identifies therefore that discourse ‘in itself’ can underlie Dasein’s projects and disclose its prospects to it: If, for example, an exceptionally desperate man hears an affluent drunk boasting about having won a bet on a horse, he may excite himself to rob him in view of its possibility. However, if he has heeded the advice of his friends, he will fear the consequences of being caught. As we have learned, the public way in which things have been interpreted is always already decisive for the basic way in which the world can matter to Dasein.\footnote{\textit{Ibid} at 213, H 169-170} By listening to others, to the discourse it lives amidst, to how things are interpreted, Dasein discovers how the world is. Even if it mistakes the substance of a discourse, its being-there will be altered subsequently. Through discourse the world is disclosed to it; in discourse Dasein’s possibilities are made available for discovery. Although it is not necessarily so that it will always be the case, Ott suggests by extension of this argument that it is in principle possible for each and every possibility at Dasein’s disposal to arise within the world-encompassing horizon of language. He writes that:
...the possibilities about which [Dasein] can decide are already disclosed to him as existential possibilities through language, through communication with his fellow men. The technical scientific conception of language – which, taking its significative function as a starting point, interprets language as an instrument, as a means toward an end, as a means for providing technically useful information – forgets or fails to notice that these possibilities are disclosed [to Dasein] through language.\textsuperscript{117}

Dasein’s moral and legislative codes, its scales of value, its weighing of justice, its ethical considerations, what matters in general in its being-in-the-world-with-others, can each in this way owe their importance and proliferation to the role and function of language in disclosedness, with which community is achieved. This is essentially the argument made for the primordiality of discourse by the Ancient Greeks when they describe human being as \( \zeta \, \varphi \, \lambda \, \gamma \, \omega \) or as \( \zeta \, \varphi \, \pi \, \o \, \mu \) accordingly.

By a further extension of this argument and in acknowledgement of the role of discourse in the disclosedness of Dasein’s possibilities, it is not too difficult to suppose subsequently that language might suffuse Dasein’s quotidian understanding and its derivative counterparts both proximally and from the first instance – in numerous cases at least. We live, in other words, in a world in which discourse about our dealings and being-there dominates. Discourse, articulated in the language in which we take part, brings us to others; it shares our labours, it discloses our place. When Dreyfus observes in \textit{Being-in-the-world} that “[a] surgeon does not have words for all the ways he cuts, or a chess master for all the patterns he can tell apart and the types of moves he makes in response”\textsuperscript{118} it is intimated that in each and every case one’s activities have always already been brought to language; for what his observation emphasises is not the primordial absence of language to understanding – to competence and alacrity – but rather the way in which language ‘in itself’ suffuses disclosedness, suffuses \textit{Lichtung} topographically, and enacts the clearing-away of obstacles. The lack of a language can frustrate disclosedness consequently.

As we have learned, the theoretical difference Sallis posits between the possibilities Dasein projects itself towards and the possibilities it constructs for projection does not therefore illustrate that there are two equiprimordial aspects of an original phenomenon. Rather, what Sallis’ difference shows is an original phenomenon and, in this respect, the misinterpretation of its nature.

Dasein discovers and lets-be the possibilities it has. As such:

... the character of [quotidian] understanding as projection is such that the understanding does not grasp thematically that upon which [Woraufhin] it projects … projection, in throwing, throws before itself the possibility as possibility, and lets it be as such.\(^{119}\)

The possibilities Dasein discovers are always already thrown ahead of itself—and thrown in such a way that Dasein lets them be what they are. If Dasein’s possibilities change from one moment to the next, this merely indicates that Dasein’s mood and circumstances undergo change accordingly; that Dasein’s possibilities ultimately depend on its way of being-in-the-world, and not on a complex of private machinations, unfolding internally.

§.15: Understanding, interpretation, and language

Above, I claimed that in order to say something Dasein must already have something to say – and that this must be a twin something: a topic and the language with which to express it. Let us now investigate this claim in more detail.

In *Being and Time* Heidegger investigates the specifically hermeneutic situation of being-in-the-world with respect to what he calls the “fore-structure” [Vorstruktur], which structure understanding seizes upon. Inasmuch as Dasein finds itself in the

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As Haugeland indicates, the compound transitive verb ‘to let be’ [seinlassen], the subject of which is Dasein’s world, does not mean ‘to bring something first into being by way of producing it’, but rather ‘to discover something in its availability and to let this essential way of being be’ (see Haugeland, J., “Letting Be”, in Crowell, S. & Malpas, J. (eds.), *Transcendental Heidegger*, Stanford University Press, California, 2007 at 93). Haugeland notes at page 93, in addition, that in *Being and Time* “Heidegger also uses a number of broadly related verbs, such as: ‘to let show up’ [begegnen lassen]; ‘to let have-a-role’ [bewenden lassen]; ‘to release’ [entlassen]; and ‘to set-free’ [freigeben] … [the active subject of which] is typically Dasein or its world.”
world, it finds itself to have inherited a way that things matter; which means a way that things have been interpreted.

Interpretation \([\textit{Auslegung}]\)\(^{120}\) occurs in any discipline or dealing which attempts to account for being-in-the-world and what pertains to it, which attempts to exhibit it explicitly. It does not consist in the further acquisition of information about phenomena with which Dasein copes already; nor indeed does it consist in the kind of theorising analytical endeavour which often follows on from originary understanding in derivative understanding (which takes the mere occurrence of entities ‘in themselves’ as its clue). In the first instance Heidegger explains that:

The projecting of the understanding has its own possibility – that of developing itself \([\textit{sich auszubilden}]\). This development of understanding we call ‘interpretation’ \([\textit{Auslegung}]\). In it the understanding appropriates understandingly that which is [already] understood by it. In interpretation, understanding does not become something different. It becomes itself.\(^{121}\)

Interpretation \([\textit{Auslegung}]\) is a development of understanding. It appropriates and accrues understanding. It brings the phenomena with which Dasein deals into an ‘explicit’ \([\textit{ausdrücklich}]\) survey; reconveying or repeating their being, describing them ‘as’ they are in the world. In interpretation Dasein takes ownership of the fact that the hammer is for hammering, that the plane is for planing, and so on. It places being-in-the-world together according to how its ‘pieces’ are disclosed to it:

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\(^{120}\) In this dissertation, in order to resolve any ambiguities with respect to the English word ‘interpretation’, it is important to recognise the two distinct German terms that it is used to translate. These are:

(1) ‘\textit{Interpretation}’, which refers to \textit{analysis}, being the ‘academic’ interpretation of texts and the theory of interpretation itself and is rendered here as ‘\textit{Interpretation}’ (with an upper-case ‘I’); and

(2) ‘\textit{Auslegung}’, which refers to the “working-out ... [of the] possibilities projected in understanding” and is rendered here, where necessary, as ‘\textit{interpretation}’ (with a lower-case ‘i’).


It is with ‘interpretation’ \([\textit{Auslegung}]\) that the following section is concerned.

[Whatever] has been circumspectively taken apart with regard to its ‘in-order-to…’, and taken apart as such – that which is explicitly understood – has the structure of something as something … [this] ‘as’ makes up the structure of the explicitness of something that is understood. It constitutes the interpretation.\textsuperscript{122}

Thus, interpretation merely amounts to making explicit, ‘as’ what it is, whatever Dasein understands:

As the appropriation of understanding, the interpretation operates in being towards a totality of involvements which is already understood – a being which understands.\textsuperscript{123}

Accordingly: “Any interpretation which is to contribute [to] understanding, must already have understood what is to be interpreted.”\textsuperscript{124}

According to derivativism, however, it seems possible in this respect that any given utterance or expression of an interpretation must be ontologically, factically, and necessarily posterior to any given Dasein’s quotidian understanding. But this is not strictly the case. Although any one particular interpretation might indeed seem to follow on from quotidian understanding inasmuch as interpretation always already takes something held in advance, it does not necessarily follow that language – as it is in the world or as such – is in itself posterior to the understanding or the interpretation it expresses. This is because language, in which the public interpretation of phenomena is always already being discussed, is there, as it were, in advance. Language, as the discourse to which Dasein is privy, always already has a role in directing Dasein towards its possibilities. For this reason it aids the interpretation of whatever Dasein grasps. This means, as it were, that language always already has a role in quotidian understanding, whether before interpretation or not.


\textsuperscript{123} \textit{Ibid} at 191, H 150

\textsuperscript{124} \textit{Ibid} at 194, H 152

This shows, incidentally, the priority of phenomenology over hermeneutics.
In §32 of *Being and Time*, Heidegger describes the ‘background’ in which the ‘as’ of any entity is always already available publically as the “fore-structure” [*Vorstruktur*]. He explains that in every case interpretation is grounded in, and that understanding occurs with respect to:

1. Something we have in advance – in a fore-having [*Vorhaben*];
2. Something we see in advance – in a fore-sight [*Vorsicht*]; and
3. Something we conceptualise in advance – in a fore-conception [*Vorgriff*].

Each of these elements describes the way in which Dasein is always already provisionally familiar with the phenomena it encounters in the world. Let us now investigate why language has an organic and original role in this encounter, as well as how this occurs.

Fore-having pertains to the way in which Dasein inherits an hermeneutic situation and orients itself towards the world in respect to it: to the way it finds itself in a world in which matters already have a place. As Heidegger explains in *Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy*, in 1924:

> Being-there as being-in-the-world is always a being in what is already familiar, what is already interpreted thus and so; being-there is already apprehended as thus and so. Coming into the world, one grows into a determinate tradition of speaking, seeing, interpreting. Being-in-the-world is an already-having-the-world-thus-and-so. This peculiar fact, that the world into which I enter, in which I awaken, is there for me in a determinate interpretedness, I designate terminologically as the *fore-having*.

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125 As Carman explains, these customary translations are factually rather clumsy: “‘*Vorhaben*’, ‘*Vorsicht*’, and ‘*Vorgriff*’ are fairly ordinary [German] words meaning something like ‘prior plan or intention’, ‘caution or circumspection’, and ‘anticipation’, respectively. Somewhat stilted renderings are necessary, [however,] since Heidegger is relying chiefly on the linguistically embedded metaphors of having, seeing, and grasping [conceiving].” For more information, see Carman, T., *Heidegger’s Analytic: Interpretation, Discourse, and Authenticity in Being and Time*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003 at 212-213.

Fore-sight pertains to the way that Dasein concernfully appropriates the affordances of this inheritance in understanding and in interpretation. It pertains to the way that Dasein directs its dealings circumspectively. It manifests, for example, in the way one understands that to build a table one needs a hammer; that to explain what a hammer is one must explain its connection with carpentry. The fore-sight with which Dasein engages phenomena settles its fore-having – a foregoing tradition – into the horizon of its own circumspective dealings, and in this way brings it ‘to ground’.

Fore-conception pertains to the specific way in which an understanding of phenomena – and interpretations, too – can be expressed meaningfully according to how its topic has already been expressively articulated in the world in the hermeneutic situation, the tradition, in which Dasein finds itself. For example, in the era of Victorian medicine, if one were to diagnose a bodily illness, one would do so with reference to the humours. Today, doctors diagnose illnesses according to modern medical advances. Fore-conception refers to the way that whatever Dasein conducts itself with respect to is already implicated or available in fore-going interpretations; to how it has already been implicated or made available in the language and tradition of its day. Dasein looks forward, as it were, from what is held in its past, reaching in this way from language, through language, and its suffusion. In language, it gains its world. The specific ‘as’ of any entity, circumscribed as it is in this way in advance, belongs at least partly to the inherited hermeneutic situation in which Dasein lives, in every case already. It owes itself to the circumspective tradition which is in every case handed down to Dasein – and especially to the language it hears. It is precisely in this way that language seems to manifestly offer to us the words with which we express ourselves; indeed, in so doing, expressions seem to lie dormant in it. In this way fore-conception recollects. Dasein’s interpretative endeavour is accordingly the expression of human being from itself, through itself, to itself.

In Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy Heidegger explains that the three elements of the fore-structure characterise in their unity the prevailing “interpretation of being-there, [the] being-transparent” of any given Dasein. He explains that “the being

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of this prevalence lies in λόγος”\textsuperscript{128} in the history and tradition – and, as such, the unity – of man’s rationalising enterprise; in the terms which suffuse the world and its traditions in advance of Dasein’s own personal concerns. The λόγος has in this sense the character of δόξα; of popular presidency, renown, power, or currency.\textsuperscript{129} Thus it articulates the world. The λόγος, within which the showing of Dasein’s being-in-the-world occurs, within which it is preserved in advance, “possesses the mastery of interpretedness.”\textsuperscript{130}

This account of the mastery of the λόγος over interpretedness shares striking similarities with Hamann’s contention that reason is historical, always already resides in language like an ‘object’ and resource, and, as such, is a precondition for any further rationalising thought.\textsuperscript{131} The potential language has to hold phenomena in salience, revealed, ‘as’ the phenomena they are, is what Heidegger later identifies in 1953 as language’s own “saving power”.\textsuperscript{132}

The λόγος thus conceived incorporates the language and traditions within which one lays-out one’s findings – or against which one contrasts them. When one repeats or reconveys the ‘as’ of any entity in interpretation, one always already adheres to what is there, in the λόγος, in this regard.\textsuperscript{133} For this reason alone language seems more original to the world than derivativism, having broken being-in-the-world asunder, can contend.

§.16: Meaning

As we have learned, interpretation does not consist in the imposition of interpretive schemas on present, merely occurring phenomena. Rather, what Dasein reconveys understandingly about its grasp of the world in interpretation is,

\textsuperscript{128} Heidegger, M., Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy (trans. Metcalf, R. D. & Tanzer, M. B.), Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 2009 at 242-243
\textsuperscript{129} Ibid at 242-243
\textsuperscript{130} Ibid at 187
\textsuperscript{131} For a further discussion of these contentions and the philosophy of Hamann in general, see O’Flaherty, J. C., Unity and Language: A Study in the Philosophy of Johann Georg Hamann, The University of North Carolina Studies in the Germanic Language and Literatures, Chapel Hill, 1952 (at 34-36 in particular), and Alexander, W. M., Johann Georg Hamann: Philosophy and Faith, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1966.
\textsuperscript{133} The twin subjects of λόγος and δόξα are returned to below, where they are discussed with respect to the hermeneutic circle, being the interpretative tradition within which Dasein lives and is found.
broadly, a ‘meaning’ [Sinn]: ‘meaning’ is what interpretation lays bare.\textsuperscript{134} Meaning, according to Heidegger, is always already available in the world. For example: upon entering a vineyard and attending to its operations, Dasein can discover the skill and craft of viticulture, find that the vineyard is profitable, or notice that its owner is an idiot, for this is what the vineyard will ‘mean’ to it. Heidegger explains that:

That which has been [structurally] articulated as such in interpretation and sketched out beforehand in the understanding in general as something [structurally] articulable, is the meaning.\textsuperscript{135}

Meaning refers to the way that Dasein lives; to how Dasein lives in articulated ‘webs’ of phenomena that are structured by significance; ‘meaning’ refers to how things matter.

In interpreting, we do not, so to speak, throw a ‘signification’ over some naked thing which is present-at-hand, we do not stick a value on it; but when something within-the-world is encountered as such, the thing in question already has an involvement which is disclosed in our understanding of the world, and this involvement is one which gets laid out by the interpretation.\textsuperscript{136}

Meaning, having been articulated as it were, in advance, is always already there in the world to be grasped. This means, too, that according to the fore-going interpretation of the fore-structure it must always already be there in the discourse about being-in-the-world to which Dasein, by way of its being-with-others, is exposed: Meaning is one of the residents of the \textit{λόγος} thus understood. Heidegger explains that:


On the same page, Heidegger describes meaning as an \textit{existential}, and states that only Dasein can be meaningful [\textit{sinnvoll}]. In other words, ‘meaning’ is something human.

\textsuperscript{135} \textit{Ibid} at 195, H 154

\textsuperscript{136} \textit{Ibid} at 190-191, H 150
Discourse is the [expressive] Articulation of intelligibility [i.e., of what can be understood]. Therefore it underlies both interpretation and assertion. That which can be [expressively] Articulated in interpretation, and thus even more primordially in discourse, is what we have called ‘meaning’.137

With the advent of each new interpretation, meaning can be expressed in a further act of disclosure. Often the re-expression of an old interpretation – what remains meaningful in this way – can be re-urbanised with respect to the resident discourse of the day, and further in-sight or hypo-thesis can follow subsequently. Each irruption of discourse will be meaningful with respect to what it evokes or what it enables to show itself. Accordingly, discourse lends itself (as any given language) to the fore-structure to Dasein’s fore-conception; it occurs both with and before Dasein’s quotidian understanding, both with and before its interpretative endeavours. For this reason Dasein’s being-in-the-world as a speaking being-with-others is presented in Being and Time as a possible ground for all shared conceptuality: Even Heidegger’s own investigation of being qua being owes its importance (and is ultimately indebted) to the tradition and genii which preceded him.

As we have learned, interpretation makes the being of phenomena explicit by reconveying, ‘as’ what they are, the phenomena Dasein has grasped understandingly in solicitous being-with-others. Interpretation does not from the first instance subject familiar phenomena to further treatment or analysis as the objects of additional, super-ratiocinations. (To see an entity as something ‘divorced’ from being-in-the-world requires according to Heidegger “a certain readjustment.”138) This particular species of interpretation – itself a derivative mode of understanding – and its relationship to language in general is discussed in more detail below. However, before this discussion is reached, an explanatory note concerning the role and function in interpretation of Dasein’s various interpretative traditions will be useful.

138 Ibid at 190, H 149
§.17: The hermeneutic circle

Interpretations dwell in the fore-structure. They cannot escape it. An interpretation, to be intelligible, must be grounded and expressed in what is already familiar – in the λόγος with respect to its meaning as δόξα – in the language that dominates any given instance or era of Dasein. According to Heidegger Dasein’s interpretation and understanding are bound by an ‘hermeneutic circle’, in which it finds itself. He states that:

…if we see this circle as a vicious one and look for ways of avoiding it, even if we just ‘sense’ it as an inevitable imperfection, then understanding has been misunderstood from the ground up. 139

For the most part derivativist theories of language seem completely untouched by contemplation of the hermeneutic circle and its pervasion; of the suffusion of discourse and communicative exchange in being-in-the-world. They do not treat of the tradition in which Dasein finds itself to reside. They do not criticise the contention that the hermeneutical experience of the world and the role of language in disclosedness, “in contrast with all other experience of the world … opens up … the profound dimension whence tradition comes down to those now living”. 140

According to Heidegger the task of interpretation necessarily involves a recognition and acknowledgement of the hermeneutic fore-structure – the tradition – by which Dasein is bound, for any interpretative explication is always already bound by where one dwells. Heidegger’s own analysis of Dasein is made from within the living facticity of the encircling hermeneutic situation of the Dasein of his age. A second case, the ontological difference between the verbal signification ‘being’ and the nominal signification ‘beings’, which is so important to Being and Time, is ultimately indebted to Parmenides and to the genius of the Greek language. 141

For its part the Being and Time analysis of language contemplates an assortment of proximate linguistic phenomena, which include quotidian talk, the

being of questioning, assertoric utterance, as well as the relation of each of these to
the various geneses and profusions of common concepts and concerns. Inasmuch
as these concern language, Ott indicates that the various ways of interpreting
language are themselves already “disclosed through language”. These, too, can be
discovered there. Interpretation grounds itself in every case in a familiar context.
The circumspective appropriation of this context in interpretation can subsequently
free it for thinking-about – even, for the same reason, for fantasy.

“[A]ccording to the most elementary rules of logic … [the hermeneutic circle]
is a circulus vitiosus”, a vicious circle – one from which Dasein cannot escape.
Whenever one afterwards proceeds to analyse what has been discovered in
everyday understanding and precipitate interpretations, one’s method must be
appropriate to one’s means: it must be prepared with consummate deference to the
fore-structure of one’s thrownness into being-in-the-world, as well as what is at
issue there. If this is not the case, then one’s findings will risk senselessness or
absurdity.

We learned above that in order to be intelligible an interpretation must be
grounded – and for this reason expressed – in what is familiar – in the λόγος with
respect to its meaning as δόξα. For this reason Heidegger explains that because
“the interpretedness of being-there is conveyed by λόγος … [being] ‘the way in
which one speaks about things’,” even the idle talk we hear from the television,
which we read in vulgar literature, and exploit in casual discussion, “is authoritative
for … world-conception itself.” The λόγος can in this way influence even the
most intimate ways we direct ourselves towards the world and in so doing discover
it to be: for in a certain sense, by coming to terms with it, it tells us what matters
and with what to be concerned. The meaning Dasein finds, what weighs down
upon it, whatever stirs or excites it, whatever it is cynical about, whatever it knows,

Heidegger and Language, Northwestern University Press, Evanston, 1972 at 170
143 Heidegger, M., Being and Time (trans. Macquarrie, J. & Robinson, E.), Blackwell Publishing,
Oxford, 1962 at 194, H 152
144 Heidegger’s own critique of method-driven enquiry as such can be found in Heidegger M.,
“Modern Science, Metaphysics, and Mathematics” in Krell, D. F. (ed.), Basic Writings, HarperCollins,
New York, 1993
145 Heidegger, M., Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy (trans. Metcalf, R. D. & Tanzer, M. B.),
Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 2009 at 192
Below, in Chapter Eight, we will investigate just how idle talk [Gerede], the president species of
everyday language, has a privileged role in disclosing the world to Dasein from the very first
instance.
is in this sense linked to the language it lives in. It is disclosed there to circumspection. For Baiasu this means that understanding is in every case preceded by proximate discourse.\textsuperscript{146} This quick statement must, however, be qualified. On the one hand, Baiasu identifies correctly that discourse and understanding are \textit{existentialia}, each belonging to the ontological structure of Dasein’s being. On the other hand, also correctly, he identifies that existentially, with respect to Dasein’s \textit{existentiell} understanding, discourse discloses possibilities. It is important to recall, however, that the disclosedness of possibilities would not be possible without understanding with which to recognise them – and so, inasmuch as understanding is a \textit{personal} phenomenon, discourse does not precede disclosedness any more than disclosedness precedes understanding, which is not at all. These \textit{existentialia} are in this sense equiprimordial.

Heidegger states with regard to the interpretation of disclosedness that:

Whatever the way of being it may have at the time, and thus with whatever understanding of being it may possess, Dasein has grown up both into and \textit{within} a traditional way of interpreting itself: in terms of this it understands itself proximally and, within a certain range, constantly. By this understanding, the possibilities of its being are disclosed and regulated. Its own past – and this always means the past of its ‘generation’ – is not something which \textit{follows along after} Dasein, but something which already goes ahead of it.\textsuperscript{147}

For this reason Heidegger contends that whenever one leaps into the hermeneutic circle one does not simply enter into the activity of interpreting from outside by way of transcending or transforming one’s being-in-the-world. If in this way “we ‘take our departure’ from a worldless ‘I’ in order to provide this ‘I’ with an object and an ontologically baseless relation to that object, then we have ‘presupposed’ not too much, but too little,”\textsuperscript{148} for ‘leaping into’ the hermeneutic circle means simply being at home with one’s situation. In the same way, by positing a non- or pre-

\textsuperscript{148} \textit{Ibid} at 363, H 315-316
linguistic way of being-in-the-world for Dasein without regard to the role of language in the hermeneutic situation within which Dasein lives, which situation it seizes understandingly, it seems to me that derivativism supposes not too much, but too little about the role and function of language in disclosedness.

§.18: Towards the being of language: Phenomenology and the hermeneutic circle

In the Second Division of Being and Time Heidegger specifies that disclosedness does not occur without understanding, state-of-mind, and falling. Being-fallen, like disclosedness, is an integral element of the ontological structure of being-in-the-world which Dasein discovers: Being-fallen is how Dasein discovers itself to be.

Dasein discovers itself to have fallen into discourse; discourse is there in its being-in-the-world. Inasmuch as it belongs to the ontological structure of Dasein’s being-in-the-world which is disclosed to Dasein, discourse cannot according to Heidegger precede or be preceded by understanding or state-of-mind. In the complete disclosedness of its being-in-the-world, Dasein discovers each equiprimordially – and discovers each ‘as’ equiprimordial. What this means in other words is that Dasein’s manner of discovering is also a manner of finding itself, disclosed, in a world.

For this reason it quickly dawns upon Dasein that the world might have already been there, established, before it came to be in it, disclosed. This finding is manifest to Dasein in the surrounding articulations of intelligibility – the discourse and the webs of significance – with which it discovers itself to be familiarised understandingly. It does not ‘by itself’ control them. Accordingly, inasmuch as these articulations seem to have been there in the first instance ‘objectively’, beyond the most intimate sphere of Dasein’s closest concerns, they reveal themselves to belong to the public; which public, das Man, is also Dasein, but no-one’s Dasein in particular (we will learn below that this is why discourse can take the form of idle talk). This is precisely why Baiasu and others propose that discourse precedes understanding – although they do not yet understand their proposition in the way it is described in this dissertation.

For these reasons the embeddedness of language in being-in-the-world must be attended to: Overly ‘formal’ investigations of language do not usually account for its place in the contexts of Dasein’s dealings.
The following chapters of this dissertation investigate the role and function (rather than the mere presence) of language in disclosedness in more detail. Below, the being of language, as well as the ontological ‘locus’ of its being in Dasein as Heidegger conceives it – both in his early work and in Being and Time in particular – is sought. With respect to Being and Time and to Heidegger’s work in general, therefore, Heidegger’s own phenomenological method is employed in pursuit of the being of language, with respect to which derivativism is criticised in turn.

Phenomenology concerns the study of the being of what is manifest; the being of phenomena. The post-Classical Latin word *phaenomenon* is derived from the Ancient Greek φαινόμενον, the neuter present medio-passive participle of φαινόμαι, which means ‘it appears’, from φαίνειν, ‘to show’. ‘Phenomena’ are the things that show themselves.\(^{149}\)

Heidegger’s phenomenological method concerns the description of ontic phenomena, ‘as’ they are, proximally manifest in their ontological being; it does not therefore attempt to determine the occurrent physical constitution of any given entity, to find the essential and hidden substrate or ὑποκείμενον [hypokeimenon] of any given individual, to describe the relationship of ‘matter’ to ‘form’, or to conclude that the subject-predicate structure is the ontogenetic foundation of all coherent experience, and so on. Rather, it attempts to circumvent these ‘forms’ of enquiry and the peculiar field of problems which emerge from them. For phenomenology these forms are each either secondary or spurious considerations; posterior to (and made possible by) the originary disclosedness of being-in-the-world to Dasein, with which Dasein is in every case always already familiar, as well as the discovery of entities, manifest beings, ‘as’ what they are. With respect to what phenomenology consists in, Blattner explains that:

> With Husserl, Heidegger takes the point of phenomenology to be to describe the ‘sense and ground’ of phenomena …. Phenomenology is

not the cataloguing and description of those phenomena that might happen to be relevant to some philosophical or theoretical interest.\textsuperscript{150}

As such, the phenomenological method is vested with the task of exhibiting phenomena ‘as’ they are, manifest, in their own peculiar way of being.\textsuperscript{151} In Hall’s words:

> What Heidegger shares with Husserl’s ‘philosophy as rigorous science’ is the desire to get at things as they really are, free of any philosophical or other assumptions that could distort our point of view. And, like Husserl, he believes that such access is to be found by paying very careful attention to our actual experience of the world and of ourselves. [Heidegger] uses the term ‘phenomenology’ to capture this getting things to reveal themselves to us in this way.\textsuperscript{152}

Heidegger’s advance over Husserl, however, is in his development of an hermeneutical phenomenology: for Heidegger, hermeneutical phenomenology is an interpretive, descriptive enterprise.\textsuperscript{153} For this reason, because Dasein is confined to an hermeneutic situation, its descriptions must be recognised in their temporality. Dasein lives in a world where discussion and interpretation reign. Ultimately, therefore, phenomenology consists in a study of factual life. In 1919 Heidegger already explains that:

> Phenomenology is the investigation of life in itself. Despite the appearance of a philosophy of life, it is really the opposite of a worldview. A worldview is an objectification and immobilising of life at a certain point in the life of a culture. In contrast, phenomenology is

\textsuperscript{150} Blattner, W. D., \textit{Heidegger’s Temporal Idealism}, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1999 at 22

\textsuperscript{151} The phrase “proximally and for the most part” recurs frequently in Heidegger. It refers to the way that Dasein encounters phenomena. For Heidegger, the immediate (the ‘ready-to-hand’ [\textit{Zuhanden}]) is the most concrete or proximate; abstractions occur in speculative theorising (which treats the ready-to-hand as something merely occurrent, or ‘present-at-hand’ [\textit{Vorhanden}]).


never closed off; it is always provisional in its absolute immersion in life as such. In it no theories are in dispute, but only genuine insights versus the unguenuine. The genuine ones can be obtained only by an honest and unreserved immersion in life itself in its genuineness, and this is ultimately possible only through the genuineness of a personal life.154

Accordingly, Heidegger observes in the First Division of *Being and Time* that our fundamental sense of phenomena is of familiar entities implicated in everyday dealings [*Umgang*]. Dasein is in every case “embedded in all sorts of meaningful comportment” in which phenomena show themselves ‘as’ what they are.155 This same finding applies to the study of language, which phenomenon shows itself ‘in itself’ with respect to being-in-the-world. What phenomenology interprets is the ‘facticity’ of being-in-the-world.

Whatever phenomena show themselves ‘as’ will be in each case indicative of the nature of the being-in-the-world of the relevant Dasein. Disclosedness and discovery are equiprimordially linked in being. Kiesiel explains that according to Heidegger: “The way in which factic life addresses and interprets itself lets its ways of seeing and speaking be given by worldly phenomena”.156

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For her part, Lafont reiterates Heidegger’s contention: “There is no way to step outside of our understanding of being in order to check its validity, to test whether our understanding of being coincides with the being of the things themselves. There is no being without an understanding of being. On the other hand, such understanding of being is not the (eternal) endowment of a transcendental ego (which would guarantee the objectivity of experience, and thereby the possibility of valid knowledge for all human beings), but is merely contingent, changes historically and cannot be put under control at will. It is thus a fate into which human beings are thrown. The crucial challenge to transcendental philosophy in *Being and Time*, therefore, is to be found in Heidegger’s thesis that our disclosedness is essentially factical.” (See Lafont, C., “Précis of Heidegger, Language, and World-disclosure” in *Inquiry*, vol. 45, 2002 at 186)


With respect to worldly phenomena Heidegger attempts to divine the ontological ‘locus’ of language in Dasein’s being-in-the-world. The nature of the ‘relationship’ of language to the world is investigated in Being and Time with respect to the dedication with which Dasein attends to its dealings, with respect to which phenomena show themselves ‘as’ the phenomena they are. Accordingly, this dissertation enquires about the being of language by employing Heidegger’s phenomenological method; it thinks language from the way that it manifests. Thus, it begins its criticism in every instance from Dasein’s proximity to language, and begins with the attempt to describe it.

III. INSTRUMENTALISM

§.19: The instrumentalist account of language: language and tools

As Lafont explains, language is conceived according to instrumentalism as “a mere instrument for the designation [or description] of entities independent of language”. Instrumentalism purports generally that words [Wörter], phrases and expressions [Worte], and tools are essentially the same kinds of entity.

It is generally recognised that the Being and Time account of language emerges from a philosophical tradition critical of instrumentalism that dates back to Hamann, Herder, and Humboldt. Importantly, in keeping with this tradition, Heidegger argues against thinking language first and foremost from the advent of one mental motivation or another as a system of tools for communicating one’s judgements about objects or for sharing private mental states. According to Heidegger such constructions risk reducing Dasein to an isolated subiectum, in every case alienated from the world, which must first meet the topics it ventures in utterance in the translation of an otherwise organic perception, sensory or otherwise, into close deliberative thinking. In general, as has now been shown with respect to disclosedness, Heidegger opposes subjectivism generally by taking an hermeneutic approach to the description of Dasein’s being-in-the-world. Dasein inherits discussions and interpretations: Dasein finds itself ‘where’ it is, which is outside and in the world. Accordingly, the subject-object paradigm, the philosophy of the primacy of ‘consciousness’ however conceived, does not suit the inherent equiprimordiality of Dasein, the world, and language – and for this reason language can not in itself be conceived from the advent of a subject’s speaking-forth into worldly silence – if, that is, we are to penetrate to language’s being, role, and function in the world and in the disclosedness of Dasein’s being-there. Language cannot be conceived as an addition to worldly phenomena, for such notions simply

159 See ibid at 2
160 Taylor reiterates that one of Heidegger’s projects in Being and Time is to escape the “monological bias” with which philosophy is traditionally performed (see Taylor, C. Human Agency and Language: Philosophical Papers, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1985 at 259). Heidegger’s doctoral thesis consists in a critique of psychology.
lead to its formalisation; to the breaking-asunder of interwoven phenomena, to
their subsequent re-construction into a ‘system’, or, more frequently, to mistaking
the proximate ‘invisibility’ of language for an originary absence of it.

With the subject-object paradigm in mind to be criticised, Heidegger remarks
that Dasein’s “‘substance’ is not spirit as a synthesis of soul and body; it is rather
existence” in the world as such. Heidegger intends his discussion of Dasein’s
being-in [In-sein] to depose the various philosophical treatments of Dasein which
isolate consciousness from phenomena or attempt to reify it, like as Descartes
champions with the subjectum as derived from the principle of the cogito. For
Heidegger there are no such dualisms of mental-physical, mind-world, subject-
object phenomena: To split Dasein’s being-in-the-world into separate pieces in
order to attain to an objective and exhaustive picture of each is to fundamentally
misconstrue its being-in-the-world or, at the very least, to sabotage the
phenomenological approach to it, for “[in the very procedure of] setting up
knowing as a ‘relation between subject and object’ …there lurks as much ‘truth’ as
vacuity.” Dasein is not an incarnate “view from nowhere”.

Knowledge is nothing external to Dasein; it does not reside in occurrent

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See also: Heidegger, M., *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology* (trans. Hofstadter, A.), Indiana University Press, Indianapolis, 1982 at 63, where Heidegger states that according to this model: “[An] ego or subject is supposed, to whose so-called sphere intentional experiences are then supposed to belong…. [However,] the idea of a subject which has intentional experiences merely inside its own sphere and is … encapsulated within itself is an absurdity which misconstrues the basic ontological structure of the being [in the world] that we ourselves are.”
164 This is Nagel’s phrase. See Nagel, T., *The View from Nowhere*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1983
165 Macquarrie and Robinson note that a ‘founded mode’ of being-in is “simply a mode which can subsist only when connected with something else”. (See footnote 1 in Heidegger, M., *Being and Time* (trans. Macquarrie, J. & Robinson, E.), Blackwell Publishing, Oxford, 1962 at 86, H 59). The very
entities as though it were secreted there, awaiting exposure. Nor does it inhere in an inner sphere awaiting exit. These determinations give rise to unnecessary epistemological and ontological problems concerning the role of consciousness and its place or site, particularly with regard to its connexion to language and the communication of ‘inner’ ideas generally. Any given ontology of knowing which posits verities beyond or apart from Dasein’s being-in-the-world merely achieves:

... a new status of being [Seinsstand] towards a world which has already been discovered. A commercium of the subject with a world does not get created [thereby] ... nor does it arise from some way in which the world acts upon a subject. [Rather,] knowing is [always] a mode of Dasein founded upon being-in-the-world.

As Rorty explains:

... from the point of view of ... Being and Time, the typical error of traditional philosophy is to imagine that there could be, indeed that there somehow must be, entities which are atomic in the sense of being what they are independent of their relation to any other entities.

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166 Heidegger explains that:

“[In accord with such incongruent paradigms of being-in-the-world as we have described, problems arise concerning just] how this knowing subject comes out of its inner ‘sphere’ into one which is ‘other and external’, of how knowing can have any object at all, and of how one must think of the object itself so that eventually the subject knows it without needing to venture a leap into another sphere.

“...[W]e are sometimes assured that we are certainly not to think of the subject’s ‘inside’ [Innen] and its ‘inner sphere’ as a sort of ‘box’ or ‘cabinet’,” but it remains that whenever “one asks for the positive signification of this ‘inside’ of immanence in which knowing is proximally enclosed, or when one enquires how this ‘being-inside’ [Innensein] ... has its own character of being grounded in the kind of being which belongs to the subject, then silence reigns.

“...[N]o matter how this inner sphere may get interpreted, if one does no more than ask how knowing makes its way ‘out of’ it and achieves ‘transcendence’, it becomes evident that the knowing which presents such enigmas will remain problematical unless one has previously clarified how it is and what it is.”


167 Ibid at 90, H 62

Plainly, instrumentalism leads to epistemological difficulties regarding the connexion of language to the speaker, and also regarding the connexion of the speaker to the world: If one asserts that one’s knowledge of phenomena is located in the first instance in an inner sphere, wherein it awaits expression in designative entities, words, then one’s knowledge – and the advent of language at least – will seem in essence independent of whatever it is first found to concern. If Dasein is always already in the world then it is misleading to say that its knowledge and its language are isolated from it. For Dasein, any given grasp of phenomena must belong to the way it addresses itself toward, and therefore discusses, what is familiar and proximate to it.

It seems therefore that the being of language (as it is described in *Being and Time* and also in general) is inaccurately, even incorrectly described if it is equated with the late expressive utterances of an isolated *subiectum* which merely reaches-out to the world. Language seems, contrarily, to have a role in being-in-the-world aboriginally; for the situation of Dasein, its being-there, is hermeneutically affected, touched by the fore-structure. Language seems thereby to inhabit disclosedness; and this, its nature, its inherence in the public sphere, is more indicative of its place and being with respect to Dasein. If in fact, therefore, Dasein and the world are equiprimordial, then it follows that it is unlikely that language can ‘in itself’ be in any way prefigured by an ontologically prior, pre-linguistic disclosedness of being-there from which the manifest world of entities and others is from the first instance entirely remote. At best one might merely suppose that there are various ‘forms’ of disclosedness – various ‘forms’ of worldly engagement – from which language can be abstracted and differentiated if one so wills it in thinking, and thus according to circumstance.

In *Being and Time* Heidegger holds language to be something worldly – yet something which is ontologically irreducible to a complex or system of equipment for learned manipulation or experiment. That language is ontically determinable as a totality of phrases and expressions [*Worte*] – of, say, words as they are found in a dictionary – which totality seems to be precisely ‘what’ inhabits conversation, does not ultimately compromise this position: The being of language, discourse, is not in itself reducible to an aggregate of tools, as it were, *for discourse*, as we will learn below.
With these preliminary remarks having been made, and these general contentions concerning the interpretation of language in *Being and Time* having been made clear, what now requires investigation is precisely what kind of tool – or system of tools – instrumentalism decides language, in essence, to be. In addition, precisely how this particular ‘form’ of tool causes instrumentalism to seem to be commensurate with Heidegger’s description of language in *Being and Time* requires examination. Heidegger’s own remarks about the being of equipment compel study.

According to Heidegger tools are in each case discovered with respect to the dealings with which Dasein concerns itself, for it is by an implicit reference to these dealings that entities show themselves ‘as’ they are. We will learn below that these dealings, that with which Dasein concerns itself, have in this way, compared to the tools that are used for them, ontological priority.

Demanding treatment, therefore, is the derivativist contention that Dasein’s being-in-the-world might be silent or non-linguistic in the first instance; for if language is simply a system of tools then it seems, under this construction, that it will be ontologically posterior to Dasein’s dealings: If, in the first instance, Dasein concerns itself with its dealings, then these dealings, inasmuch as they provide the content of which Dasein speaks, might, according to instrumentalism generally, ontologically prefigure language or at least be a condition of its possibility. We must learn more, therefore, about how Dasein *is* in the world. Only then can the claims and counter-claims concerning instrumentalism be addressed satisfactorily.

Careful regard must therefore be given to Dasein’s *existentiality*; to its moods, its interpretativeness, its behaviour, to “what it does, uses, expects, [and] avoids”\(^1\) in day-to-day life – to how it conducts itself understandingly – both with and without the explicit use of expressions. The following few sections of this chapter, in keeping with the common theme of this dissertation, discusses the possibility that Dasein’s dealings in the world (and therefore its being-there) are proximally and in the first instance silent, pre-, or non-linguistic. In the first instance the possibility of a silent “normative pragmatism”\(^2\) that prefigures language is examined and, in

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\(^2\) This is Brandom’s phrase. See Brandom, R., *Tales of the Mighty Dead: Historical Essays in the Metaphysics of Intentionality*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Massachusetts), 2002 at 324. As we will learn below, Brandom fashions an argument against derivativism.
the second, just what this prefigured language might look like for instrumentalism is
determined. In the course of this investigation it will be shown ‘what’, according to
Heidegger, a tool, in fact, is.

§.20: The instrumentalist account of language and the pragmatist reading of Being and Time

Inasmuch as it suggests derivativism, instrumentalism supposes the advent of
language possible only if Dasein already possesses something to communicate; only
if it has already obtained an understanding of the world. This prior grasp, this
organic familiarity, is what is according to derivativism afterwards translated into
utterance.

As we will now learn, numerous commentators emphasise the possibility of
an originary silent pragmatic encounter of the world and the entities in it.

The pragmatist reading of Being and Time purports generally that the disclosedness of
entities ‘as’ what they are belongs first of all to the way in which Dasein encounters
them as equipment in its day-to-day dealings – from which an explicitly linguistic
involvement with these entities may be differentiated. With respect to this
particular account of Dasein’s being-in-the-world, Guignon explains that:

There is clearly the intimation [in Being and Time] that there could be a
fully articulated sense of the world derived from our ordinary
participation in contexts of significance prior to or independent of the
mastery of a language …. [This picture] suggests that there is a prior
grasp of the non-semantic field of significance of the world which
becomes the basis for gaining mastery over a language.

Okrent agrees, contending that:

According to this alternative, pragmatist reading of Being and Time, the
early Heidegger is suggesting that the way in which the conceptual
structure of language serves to organise how we understand the entities

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171 See, for example, Dreyfus, H. L., Being-in-the-World: a commentary on Heidegger’s Being and Time,
Division I, MIT Press, Cambridge (Massachusetts), 1991; Blattner, W. D., Heidegger’s Temporal Idealism,
Cambridge University Press, New York, 1999; Carman, T., “Was Heidegger a Linguistic Idealist?” in
Inquiry, vol. 45, 2002; Haugeland, J., “Heidegger on Being a Person” in Nous, vol. 16, 1982; and
172 Guignon, C. B., Heidegger and the Problem of Knowledge, Indianapolis, Hackett, 1983 at 118
with which we interact … must be understood as resting on the way in which our teleologically appropriate dealings with the world implicitly involve treating entities as this or that.\(^\text{173}\)

As will be shown, the pragmatist account of the way Dasein discovers entities is not entirely incongruent with Heidegger's own description of Dasein’s being-there. Where it seems prima facie to be lacking, however, is in its failure to acknowledge how the history of Dasein’s dealings, handed down in language, with which it is interwoven, might influence Dasein’s grasp of the world in advance of any new venture it is given to attempt. It is unclear, in respect of such an inheritance, as to what degree the pragmatist-derivativist account of language can address the extent to which language discloses the world for each generation of Dasein, as it were, in advance; can address the extent to which this exposure to language gives Dasein, aboriginally, a ground upon which to live.

\section*{§.21: Concern and comportment}

Let us now consider what a silent normative pragmatism might look like. We have been treating with respect to Heidegger's investigation of Dasein the problems of subject-object paradigms for phenomenology and the ontology of being-in-the-world generally, and have been treating them with respect to the situation of Dasein, in the world, with the phenomena of which it is cognisant. We have learned accordingly that the space of Dasein's being-in-the-world, to borrow Hall's words, “is neither Euclidean nor perceptual in nature. Instead, it has dimensions of accessibility and interest.”\(^\text{174}\) Dasein is involved with the world: Mindful of the question as to where one has one’s residence, Heidegger intends the being-in [In-sein] of being-in-the-world to connote Dasein’s existential spatiality, and not any other species thereof, such as the spatiality of material extension.\(^\text{175}\) Dasein is always already ’there’: it is at home in the world.\(^\text{176}\)


\(^{175}\) Heidegger states that: “[Dasein is not] a spiritual Thing which has been misplaced ‘into’ space … it is not the case that man is, and then has, by way of an extra, a relationship of being-towards the world which he provides himself occasionally” (See: Heidegger, M., Being and Time (trans. Macquarrie, J. & Robinson, E.), Blackwell Publishing, Oxford, 1962 at 83-84, H 56-57). At 82, H 55, he states that: “[Whenever one speaks of] spatial 'side-by-sided-ness', of subject-object
In *Being and Time*, in order to specify precisely which kind of world is Dasein’s, Heidegger differentiates between four familiar significations of the noun “world” [Welt]. According to Heidegger, world is traditionally thought as:

1. An ontical concept designating the complete sum or totality of entities ‘within the world’;
2. An ontological term to signify the being of these entities: they constitute ‘world’;
3. That very ‘wherein’ factual Dasein dwells and is engaged in its dealings [Umgang] (‘World’ does not in this sense denote a collection of entities: “[it] has here a pre-ontological existentiell [existential] signification” and refers to the public world, to one’s domestic environment, to one’s workplace, one’s home, et cetera; to the ‘there’ where Dasein is; to the world of Nikolai Gogol, the world of Hans Castorp, et cetera); and, lastly, as
4. The “ontologico-existential concept of worldhood”; or the way in which Dasein’s ‘there’ constitutes something ‘worldly’.

The third signification is according to Heidegger the most genuine: The world is something familiar; somewhere Dasein is immersed; a place by which it is absorbed [aufgehen]. Heidegger discusses Dasein’s being-in-the-world with entities with the aid of two notions, namely concern [Besorgen] and comportment [Verhalten] which, in themselves, are intended to dispense of subjectivist – and, for that matter, any however conceived, “one must completely disregard – or just not see – the existential state of being-in.” He later criticises the *res extensa* of Cartesianism.

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176 ‘Throughout *Being and Time* Heidegger uses ‘being-in’ [Sein bei] to denote Dasein’s ‘being-amidst’ entities: *Sein bei* means ‘being at the home of’. It is while Dasein is engaged in its dealings – while it feels ‘at home’ – that it comes nearest to phenomena and captures them, as it were, ‘at home’. Macquarrie and Robinson note that ‘being-alongside’, which is their own translation of *Sein bei*, does not adequately capture the full meaning of the preposition *bei*. A better translation of *Sein bei*, in my opinion, is ‘being-amidst’, which I will use where appropriate, noting my alternation of Macquarrie and Robinson’s text with square brackets.


178 ‘Existentiell’ understanding refers to an individual’s familiarity with his or her own way to be, amidst his or her possibilities; it refers, for example, to a builder’s understanding of his role in the world. It is to be contrasted with ‘existential’ understanding, which refers to a worked-out interpretation of the ontological structures of existence as such; of what it is to be qua Dasein, which is not a case of quotidian understanding.
epistemically ‘objectivist’ – philosophies. Following a brief introduction to what is peculiar to concern and comportment, just how they are related to language by pragmatist, instrumentalist, and derivativist approaches to Being and Time will be addressed.

On the one hand, concern and comportment are frequently placed at the ground of ‘silent’ normative pragmatism: Dasein’s concernful comportment, characterised by its dealings \([\text{Umgang}]\) with entities, its \(\pi\rho\alpha\zeta\zeta\[\text{praxis}\]\), is in this instance thought as ontologically antecedent to its language.

With regard to what concern is Heidegger states that:

The term ‘concern’ has, in the first instance, its pre-scientific \([\text{vorwissenschaftliche}]\) signification, and can mean to carry out something, to get it done \([\text{erledigen}]\), to ‘straighten it out’ \([\text{to take care of it}]\). It can also mean to ‘provide oneself with something’ \([\text{to procure something}]\). We use the expression with still another characteristic turn of phrase when we say ‘I am concerned for the success of the undertaking’. Here ‘concern’ means something like apprehensiveness \([\text{I am worried}]\). In contrast to these colloquial ontical significations, \([\text{and for the purpose of Being and Time}]\) the expression ‘concern’ \([\text{Besorgen}]\) … \([\text{is and should be used}]\) as an ontological term for an \(\text{existentiae}\).

In its existential-ontological sense, concern refers to the mode of dealing or engaging with phenomena with which Dasein, having directed itself toward an end \([\tau\zeta\lambda\zeta\zeta]\) for which they are implicated, is consumed. It is with concern that Dasein sets itself about the world. In this way concern is synonymous with whichever design, bearing, direction, or focus Dasein has.

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179 In the Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, a lecture course given in 1928, Heidegger states that: “The central task in the ontology of Dasein is to go back behind … [Dasein’s] comportments [towards the world] to find their common root. [This, originary kind of] transcendence precedes every possible mode of activity in general, prior to νοσις \([\text{noesis}]\), belief, but also prior to ὀρεξις \([\text{orexis}]\), desire” (see Heidegger, M., Metaphysical Foundations of Logic (trans. Heim, M.), Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1984 at 183). In Being and Time, Heidegger performs this task by means of a rigorous analysis of concern and comportment; foregoing the language of Scholastic ‘intentionality’ and the \(\text{subjectum}\), and indicating at every point that Dasein and the world are equiprimordial.

Because Dasein’s being-concerned ultimately implicates the engagement of entities for an end that matters, a possibility of being towards-which it has projected itself, Dasein discovers entities with respect to what they are for. The carpenter finds hammers for hammering, screwdrivers for screwing, et cetera. In the same way, economists regard entities with respect to their value, ultimately with respect to their activities of trade.

For the most part, inasmuch as it consumes Dasein’s day-to-day life, concern is non-thematic. It does not consist in measuring, thematising, or the deliberative translation of otherwise original phenomena into systems or schemas. Nor does being-concerned necessarily involve critical reflection about being-in-the-world, although this is ultimately one of its possibilities. Concern, with which Dasein submits itself to its dealings, carries it along, as it were, organically: this does not mean that Dasein’s cognisant and understanding grasp of entities must afterwards be recovered within the framework of a thematising project; for it is concernfully that the being of entities is grasped proximally and in the first instance.

For derivativist theories of language, this originary form of quotidian understanding, prefiguring language, is thought to ground what language afterwards translates. In instrumentalism in particular, this translation, the advent of language, is thought to employ tools; is thought to be a translation of understanding into the linguistic tools already prevalent in common use. Let us continue to espouse the particulars of this construction with respect to its connexion to Dasein’s concern.

Dasein is concerned because its existence matters to it. It discovers phenomena with regard to their pertinence to its dealings. Its immersion in the world, namely its dealings there, are characterised by dedication. Accordingly, concern can be further qualified with respect to the existentiale of which it is a worldly mode, namely care [Sorge]. Care, “the primordial being of Dasein itself,”181 is what motivates its various enterprises; it is the cause of things’ mattering. It resides at the ground of human being; for, to Dasein, existence itself matters.

In §39 of Being and Time Heidegger explains that although there is no substantial ‘proof’ of Dasein’s fundamental being as care that can be discerned by observing it ‘objectively’, the description of Dasein as care is valid nonetheless because it explains precisely why Dasein performs activities at all: Dasein matters to

itself. In order to emphasise that care is in this way and persistently read from Dasein, Heidegger cites the *Fable of Cura*, no. 220 of the *Fables of Hyginus*. In it is contained an example of the way that Dasein interprets its being as care.\(^{182}\) In Latin (in Heidegger’s own transcription in *Being and Time*), the fable reads thus:

\[\text{Cura cum fluviwm transierit, vidit cetrosum lutum} \\
\text{sustulitque cogitabunda atque coepit fingere.} \\
\text{dum deliberat quid iam fecisset, Jovis intervenit.} \\
\text{rogat eum Cura ut det illi spiritum, et facile impetrat.} \\
\text{cui cum vellet Cura nomen ex sese ipsa imponere,} \\
\text{Jovis prohibuit suumque nomen ei dandum esse dictat.} \\
\text{dum Cura et Jovis disputant, Tellus surrexit simul} \\
\text{suumque nomen esse voluit cui corpus praebuerit suum.} \\
\text{sumpserunt Saturnum indicem, is sic accus indicat:} \\
\text{tu Jovis quia spiritum dedisti, in morte spiritum,} \\
\text{Tuque Tellus, quia dedisti corpus, corpus recipito,} \\
\text{Cura eum quia prima finxit, teneat quamdiu vixerit.} \\
\text{sed quae nunc de nomine eius vosis controversia est,} \\
\text{bomo vocetur, quia videtur esse factus ex humo.}\]

In English, thus:

Once when ‘Care’ was crossing a river, she saw some clay; she thoughtfully took up a piece and began to shape it. While she was meditating on what she had made, Jupiter came by. ‘Care’ asked him to give it spirit, and this he gladly granted. But when she wanted her name to be bestowed upon it,


As Macquarrie and Robinson note, their translation of the fable into English, which is given here, is a compromise between its translation into German by Burdach (See Burdach, K., “Faust und die Sorge” in *Deutsche Vierteljahrschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte*, vol. 1, 1923 at 41ff) and the original Latin (extracted by Heidegger for *Being and Time* from Bücheler, F., *Rheinisches Museum für Philologie*, vol. 41, 1886 at 5-6). They note that in both the earlier and later editions of *Being and Time* Heidegger uses *vidit* in the first line of the Latin version of the fable, whereas Bücheler uses *videt*, and that in the 12th line Heidegger uses *enim*, whereas Bücheler uses *eum*. The punctuation of the Latin version is Bücheler’s.
he forbade this, and demanded that it be given his name instead. While ‘Care’ and Jupiter were disputing, Earth arose and desired that her own name be conferred on the creature, since she had furnished it with part of her body. They asked Saturn to be their arbiter, and he made the following decision, which seemed a just one: ‘Since you, Jupiter, have given its spirit, you shall receive that spirit at its death; and since you, Earth, have given its body, you shall receive its body. But since ‘Care’ first shaped this creature, she shall possess it as long as it lives. And because there is now a dispute among you as to its name, let it be called ‘homo’, for it is made out of humus (earth).’

“Dasein, understood ontologically, is care. Because being-in-the-world belongs essentially to Dasein, its being-towards-the-world [Sein sur Welt] is essentially concern.”183 Concern is that with which Dasein, qua homo cura, acts; it acts concernfully: Heidegger iterates that Burdach “calls attention to a double meaning of the term cura according to which it signifies not only ‘anxious exertion’ but also ‘carefulness’ and ‘devotedness’ [Sorgfalt, Hingabe].”184 This describes in essence the provisional association of Dasein’s concern with dedication, which was made above. Care infuses Dasein’s way of being-in-the-world and manifests proximally, ontically, as the organic motivation for its various enterprises.

Heidegger pairs Dasein’s being-concerned with the way it comports itself towards the world. Comportment [Verhalten] describes the attentive way that Dasein, having directed itself toward the world concernfully, meets manifest phenomena. Concernfully, Dasein comports itself toward the world: it attends concernfully to manifest phenomena.

Heidegger later identifies Dasein’s temporality as the existential ground of its being as care [Sorge]; explaining that concern can thus be conceived explicitly either in terms of care or temporality (see, for example, §68 of Being and Time, or, specifically, page 384, H 355). This translation of the care-structure into Dasein’s temporality is, for the most part, outside the scope of this paper. As such, what is offered here about the phenomenon of care is intended merely to indicate the extent to which Dasein, incorporating it, is driven and consumed by it.

184 Ibid at 243, H 199
See Burdach, K., “Faust und die Sorge” in Deutsche Vierteljahrschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte, vol. 1, 1923 at 47
Comportments have the structure of directing-oneself-toward, of being-directed-toward… 185

In this way “comportment” is employed by Heidegger to avert the misleading subjectivist connotations of the Scholastic term “intentionality”. In Basic Problems of Phenomenology Heidegger explains that subjectivist connotations should be avoided:

Because … the distinction between an inner and an outer is constructive and continually gives occasion for further constructions … [Accordingly we should] no longer speak of a subject, of a subjective sphere, but [should instead] understand the being to whom intentional comportments belong as Dasein, and indeed [understand it] in such a way that it is precisely with the aid of intentional comportment, properly understood, that we [can] attempt to characterise suitably [its] being. 186

Dasein lives with entities, having concernfully comported itself toward the world. Its basic proximate sense of phenomena is not of foreign objects inhabiting a foreign sphere, but of familiar entities that can even be given to inconspicuousness because of their fundamental proximity. In the same way Dasein’s primary sense of its comportment towards the world is not of its being a passive observer of phenomena, but of its being an actively involved participant in the world: In 1924 in The Concept of Time, Heidegger already explains that “[t]he milieu [Umgebung] in which concerned engagement abides is characterised by familiarity [Vetrautheit]”: 187 Phenomena manifest in endeavour or activity, and not in the instance of transcendentalist study or scrutiny.

Concern and comportment are occasionally placed at the ground of various normative pragmatisms. However, the possibility of silent normative pragmatism in particular is nowhere discussed by Heidegger in Being and Time. For this reason it is unclear precisely what kind of relationship concern and comportment might have to language. This is partly why conflicting accounts of language have arisen with

186 Ibid at 64
regard to these phenomena. One possibility, discussed below, is that Dasein’s
dayto-day understanding is indebted, at least in part, to the role and presence of
language as it is in the world already: for if language is already in the world, and is
something with which Dasein’s understanding must develop, then it seems likely
that language will influence the origination of Dasein’s concerns and comportments
from the beginning. In order to criticise the normative pragmatist reading of Being
and Time in more detail, however, it is provisionally necessary to identify precisely
‘how’ Heidegger thinks entities in the world to manifest and therefore to be. In
order that the relationship of silent normative pragmatism to instrumentalism and
derivativism may be criticised, it is additionally necessary to describe Heidegger’s
understanding of the tool – of equipment as such. These issues, conflating, are
explored in more detail below with respect to Okrent’s defense of pragmatism.

§.22: The beings or entities ‘in the world’

As we have learned, Dasein’s day-to-day way of “being-in-the-world ...
amounts to a nonthematic circumspective absorption in [it].”188 Entities, beings
[Seiende], show themselves ‘as what they are’ with regard to its way of concernfully
comporting itself toward the world.189

The name given by Heidegger to the class of familiar entities with which
Dasein lives is “the ready-to-hand” [Zuhanden]: he explains in Being and Time that
“[r]eadiness-to-hand is the way in which entities as they are ‘in themselves’ are defined ontologico-
categorically” with respect to Dasein.190 Accordingly, “readiness-to-hand” is
employed by Heidegger to supplant the misleading term ‘objects’, as well as the
traditionally loaded ‘substance’ or οὐσία. Like ‘substance’, however, Zuhanden it is a
name that ultimately owes its origin and meaning to an older, Greek designation.

188 Heidegger, M., Being and Time (trans. Macquarrie, J. & Robinson, E.), Blackwell Publishing,
Oxford, 1962 at 107, H 76
189 The Being and Time account of phenomena gives priority to Dasein’s everyday dealings with the
entities it finds there. This remains a common theme in Heidegger’s philosophy generally. (See, for
190 Heidegger, M., Being and Time (trans. Macquarrie, J. & Robinson, E.), Blackwell Publishing,
Oxford, 1962 at 101, H 71
It is interesting that the ready-to-hand are ‘at hand’. The Latin for ‘hand’, manus, is the origin of the
English term ‘manual labour’: at-handness implies work; being-at-hand-for a purpose; it
emphasises concernful comportment.
Because being and Time first concerns the being of Dasein, the being of entities is understood with
respect to it, and not with respect to some kind of ‘metaphysical’ project.

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The Greeks called the proximate entities of their experience πράγματα [pragmata], which Heidegger interprets to mean ‘that with which one constantly has to do with in one’s concernful dealings or πραξις [praxis].’ However, the ontological nature and status of the πράγματα is left unexplored by them. According to Heidegger the Greeks were content to think the πράγματα simply and “proximally as ‘mere [occurring] things’” – as, in this sense, present or occurrent objects for observation, beholding. Mindful of the more original relation of πράγματα to concernful πραξις, however, Heidegger elects to re-interpret the nature of the πράγματα as “das Zeng”. Although the German das Zeng has no precise equivalent in the English language and cannot therefore be translated with ready ease or definitive clarity, its most literal English rendering is perhaps ‘stuff that can be used’. A collective noun, das Zeng is occasionally translated as ‘gear’, ‘paraphernalia’, ‘tools’, or ‘equipment’, which last rendering is perhaps its best. The ready-to-hand is not a class of occurrent objects in the first instance residing beyond or apart from any given domain of human endeavour; rather it is proximally and in the first instance within the domain of Dasein’s concerns that these entities, “the way in which entities as they are ‘in themselves’”, manifest and reside.

It is this definition of the tool that instrumentalist theories of language adopt and appraise positively for their readings of Being and Time. According to instrumentalism ready-to-hand words are engaged by Dasein when, having silently gained something to say, it afterwards wishes to speak. The ready-to-hand are encountered and engaged in its concern with effecting, performing, achieving, inducing, producing, et cetera. Readiness-to-hand reveals itself with respect to Dasein’s possibilities and, ultimately, its care [Sorge].

The necessary task of illustrating precisely what constitutes readiness-to-hand ‘in itself’ is somewhat difficult, for as Heidegger explains: “The peculiarity of what is proximally ready-to-hand is that, in its readiness-to-hand, it must, as it were,

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Heidegger was probably reluctant to use the term πραξις [praxis] in Being and Time, inasmuch as it belonged, during its writing and publication, to the Marxist political vernacular.
192 Ibid at 97, H 68
193 Ibid at 97, H 68
194 For Heidegger, the being of equipment can be explained in terms of what it is used ‘in order to…’ [etwas um-zu…] (See Ibid at 97, H 68)
This interpretation does not implicate the primordiality of the ‘final cause’. Heidegger states: “(r)eadiness-to-hand is the way in which entities as they are ‘in themselves’ are defined ontologico-categorically” (See Ibid at 101, H 71)
withdraw in order to be ready-to-hand quite authentically”.195 Consider with regard to this statement the medium upon which this text is written; it is equipmental inasmuch as it has been employed for the purpose of carrying these words, yet until attention had been drawn to it, was it not, in its own being, utterly inconspicuous?

The same inconspicuousness, according to instrumentalism, attaches itself to the language-tool in the way we speak it naturally and without effort in day-to-day life.

Drawing attention to the background existence of the ready-to-hand – albeit by overthrowing it in so doing – is perhaps the best way to illustrate the being of the ready-to-hand; that, equipmental, it is used without any explicit contemplative devotion or concentration. The ready-to-hand manifests in this way because according to Heidegger:

That with which our everyday dealings proximally dwell is not the tools themselves [die Werkzeuge selbst]. On the contrary, that with which we concern ourselves primarily is work.196

He explains that:

Taken strictly, there ‘is’ no such thing as an equipment. To the being of any [individual’ item of] equipment there always belongs a totality of equipment, in which [an ‘individual’ item of equipment] can be this equipment that it is.197

According to the instrumentalist model of language, therefore, Dasein’s encounter of entities ‘as’ the entities they are does not proximately seem to involve or to require language, but merely to need the work for which language is eligible or

196 Ibid at 99, H 69
197 Ibid at 97, H 68

While one can easily give examples of equipment ‘in isolation’ from a given context – a spoon or an empty box can be thought ‘in themselves’ – it remains that precisely ‘what’ they are is always already determinable with reference to their connexion to a context or use (the spoon is always already assigned to stirring or eating – to the kitchen environment; the box to transporting or storing – to the warehouse). To be thought in empty independence at all, the spoon and the box must first be ‘formally’ isolated from the contexts to which they belong. This context will in each case be prior to their being so thought; readiness-to-hand precedes presence-at-hand ontologically.
ineligible as the case may be. Under this construction any given instance of Dasein’s dealing \([\text{Ungang}]\) with entities can either make of use language or can set it aside as is desirable. Language does not thus seem original to being-in-the-world.

According to specifically pragmatist forms of derivativism, then, the being of language seems to rest upon the priority of normative activity which, in itself, seems silent. Accordingly, if language is conceived as a complex of available tools, it follows that its advent first occurs only when Dasein turns its mind to communicating in expressive utterance, and not before this singular occasion. Language, thought in this way as a totality of tools essentially set-aside for communication, for communing, seems ontologically inessential to being-in-the-world – and thus seems inessential to the discovery and knowing grasp of phenomena in concerned comportment.

§.23: Against a pragmatist derivativism

In \textit{Heidegger, Language, and World-disclosure} Lafont recognises the possibility of a pragmatist instrumentalist reading of \textit{Being and Time} but ultimately impugns such a view, believing instead that the Heidegger of \textit{Being and Time} is a fledgling linguistic idealist.\textsuperscript{198} The argument she levels against the pragmatist reading is complex. Not only does Lafont argue against the possibility (and the priority) of an originary silent pragmatism to which Dasein’s languages are ontologically posterior; she also argues against the instrumentalist interpretation of language with which it sympathises. Instrumentalism, according to Lafont, does not adequately account for the role or function of language in the way the world is disclosed in advance of any utterance or dealing Dasein might chance. As we will see below, these two issues conflate.

In the first instance Lafont understands Heidegger to be committed to the view that Dasein’s world has language both factically and originally; that Dasein \textit{per se} has language and, \textit{per se}, has had language historically. According to Lafont language, inherited, discloses the entities in the world ‘as’ they are, as it were, in advance of any new dealing: The ‘as’ of any entity is something Dasein can inherit in language, attend to in behaviour, and maintain by way of speaking with one another.

This possibility is investigated in more detail below in Chapter Seven.
Lafont’s second contention is more difficult to master but, in essence, it repeats her first: She contends that in *Being and Time* Heidegger draws attention to an ontological difference – namely the difference between the ontic phenomenon, language, and its ontological being, discourse. Lafont understands the difference between (1) language [*Sprache*] and (2) discourse [*Rede*] to be the difference between:

(1) The ontically manifest natural languages Dasein speaks such as French, German, Italian, *et cetera*, thought as the totality of their individual phrases and expressions; and

(2) Dasein’s ability to share or produce the structurally articulated structures of the world – namely discourse, which manifests ontičally in various forms, but most evidently language.

Heidegger explains in §34 of *Being and Time* that, inasmuch as language manifests ontičally, it can be found as “a totality of words [*Worte*]”. He remarks that “as an entity within-the-world, this totality thus becomes something which we may come across as ready-to-hand” – as something equipmental either *useful* or *in use*.

By orienting ourselves towards language in this way, however, as Lafont identifies, language is given to manifest in various diverse ‘forms’ – as, for example, the numerous regional vernaculars of the world – each of which can be conceived subsequently as individual totalities of lexical word-things [*Wörter-dinge*] or of meaningful phrases and expressions [*Wörte*]. Under this construction Dasein’s natural languages, if thought with respect to their ontičity, are liable to be reduced

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199 There is no proper English equivalent for *Rede*; perhaps “speech” is closest, but this does not describe the ontological being of language with sufficient aplomb. In this paper, as has already been made clear, I use “discourse”. In point of interest, Haugeland and Dreyfus suggest “telling” (see, for example, Haugeland, J., “Heidegger on Being a Person” in *Noûs*, vol. 16, 1982, at 15-26; and Dreyfus, H. L., *Being-in-the-World: a commentary on Heidegger’s Being and Time, Division I*, MIT Press, Cambridge (Massachusetts), 1991). Wrathall uses “conversance”. On page 203 of *Being and Time*, Macquarrie and Robinson note that throughout their translation they have rendered *Rede* either as “discourse” or “talk”, and occasionally as “discourse or talk”. They note, however that in some cases “discourse” is too formal, and that in others “talk” is too colloquial. (For Macquarrie and Robinson’s remarks concerning their translation of *Rede* see footnote 3 in Heidegger, M., *Being and Time* (trans. Macquarrie, J. & Robinson, E.), Blackwell Publishing, Oxford, 1962 at 47, H 25)


The German word *Worte*, although here rendered in English as “words”, refers not to particular, individual lexical ‘items’ [*Wörter*], but to meaningful phrases and expressions.

201 Ibid at 204, H 161
to groups of phrases and expressions, to complex systems of meaningful “signs-relations [ση]” or even, as we have learned, to systems of tools for occasional use in occasional speaking.\footnote{Lafont, C., \textit{Heidegger, Language, and World-disclosure} (trans. Harman, G.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000 at 43}

On the one hand, therefore, such totalities or collections seem ontologically posterior to Dasein’s comparatively silent and pragmatic encounter of entities; and, on the other hand, they seem to belong merely to speaking – to an activity altogether inessential to the otherwise original, seemingly privative discovery of entities ‘as’ they are available to the public as such.

What Lafont explains, however, is that these peculiar ways of thinking language are yet ways of dissecting its ontological being (as discourse) and of mistaking its ontic manifestations for its ontological being accordingly. Under this construction, to identify the \textit{being} of language as a system of tools is to confuse its its manifestation as a complex or system of \textit{beings} with its ontological \textit{being} as discourse; to confuse the aboriginal presence and prevalence of language \textit{qua} discourse in being-in-the-world with a spurious formalisation according to which discourse is reduced to a lexical totality, designed for peculiar kinds of dealing, with which Dasein may or may not be concerned.\footnote{In the following chapter the possibility that language is merely an available system of signs is discussed.}

Keeping these observations in mind, let us now consider some further remarks about discourse and its importance for the account of language which Heidegger offers in \textit{Being and Time}. With this having been done, the problems inherent in conceiving language as a totality of words, discovered in an activity which is ‘in itself’ ontologically posterior to Dasein’s other dealings in the world – namely speaking – will be examined.

§.24: Discourse

In \textit{Being and Time}, in §34, Heidegger explains that “language has its roots in the existential constitution of disclosedness”, and that “\textit{the existential-ontological foundation of language is discourse or talk}.”\footnote{Heidegger, M., \textit{Being and Time} (trans. Macquarrie, J. & Robinson, E.), Blackwell Publishing, Oxford, 1962 at 203, H 161} Discourse has a role in disclosedness. He remarks that:
... because that entity [i.e., Dasein] whose disclosedness it [expressively] Articulates according to significations has, as its kind of being, being-in-the-world – a being which has been thrown and submitted to the ‘world’ – …discourse is existentially language. …

The way in which discourse gets expressed is language.\textsuperscript{205}

Because discourse manifests ontically as various languages, as phrases and expressions \textit{[Worte]} and so on, Heidegger explains that discourse shows itself proximally and for the most part ontically as these forms: as “asserting or refusing, as demanding or warning, as pronouncing, consulting, or interceding, as ‘making assertions’, and as talking in the way of ‘giving a talk’ \textit{[Redenhaltens]}.”\textsuperscript{206} When we penetrate to the ontological being of these phenomena, however, what we find is not individual words but an \textit{existentiale}.

Discourse is the ontological being of language. Inasmuch as discourse \textit{[Rede]} stands for the being of language \textit{[Sprache]}, therefore, discourse consists in more than the mere amalgamation or aggregation of its ontic \textit{instances}. In §34, Heidegger names four elements that are constitutive of discourse.\textsuperscript{207} These elements are:

(1) The about-which of discourse, or that which the discourse is about \textit{[das Worüber der Rede, das Beredete]}, subject-matter;
(2) What is said in the talk as such \textit{[das Geredete als solches]};
(3) Communication \textit{[Mitteilung]}; and
(4) Making-known \textit{[Bekundung]}, which can be reticent.

These elements, together, form a \textit{unitary phenomenon}. Let us briefly examine each of them in turn.

‘That which the discourse is about’ \textit{[das Worüber der Rede, das Beredete]} is something of Dasein’s concern; something with which it is familiar, about which it has something to say.\textsuperscript{208} That which the discourse is about manifests with

\textsuperscript{206} \textit{Ibid} at 204, H 161
\textsuperscript{207} See \textit{ibid} at 204, H 161
\textsuperscript{208} \textit{Ibid} at 205, H 162
discourse, in it: in discourse phenomena come to the fore. Heidegger iterates: “In
discourse, insofar as it is genuine, what is said is drawn from what is talked about”:\textsuperscript{209}
“In any talk or discourse, there is [always] something said-in-the-talk as such [ein
Geredetes as solches] … something said as such whenever one wishes, asks, or
expresses oneself about something.”\textsuperscript{210} What discourse articulates is the way that
something matters – and for this reason, inasmuch as Dasein’s being is care, what is
ultimately articulated is being-in-the-world.

Concerning the third constitutive element of discourse, Heidegger explains
that: “In any talk or discourse, there is something said-in-the-talk as such [ein Geredetes
as solches] … [and that in] this ‘something said’, discourse communicates”.\textsuperscript{211} The
third and most important element of discourse is communication [Mitteilung]:
discourse communicates. Here, communication is not to be understood narrowly
as the transportation of information between individual agents, but is rather to be
understood with respect to communion [Teilnahme], the phatic function of discourse:
to what Taylor calls “rapport”.\textsuperscript{212} The meaning of Mitteilung can be grasped by
attending to the fact that the German verb mitteilen transliterates into English as ‘to
share with’. As Gadamer explains:

To reach an understanding with one’s partner in a dialogue is not
merely a matter of total self-expression and the successful assertion of
one’s own point of view, but a transformation into a communion.
…This is not an external matter of simply adjusting our tools, nor is it
even right to say that the partners adapt themselves to one another but,
rather, in the successful conversation they ... [become] bound to one another in a new community.\textsuperscript{213}

Importantly, Heidegger links communication, communion, sharing, with the fourth constitutive element of discourse – ‘making manifest’ or ‘making known’ \[Bekundung\].\textsuperscript{214} Discourse reveals a matter for view. It is even able to inculcate a concern in others. As we learned above:

[How we are faring in the world is] made known in discourse and indicated in language by intonation, modulation, the tempo of talk; by ‘the way of speaking’. In ‘poetical’ discourse,\textsuperscript{215} the communication of the existential possibilities of one’s state-of-mind can become an aim in itself, and this amounts to a disclosing of existence.\textsuperscript{216}

Even if any of discourse’s elements do not seem to receive ‘verbal’ expression or do not seem to manifest ontically, this does not mean that they are in themselves absent from its being. Instead, this specific occurrence, this apparent absence, is “merely an index of some definite kind of discourse which, in so far as it is discourse, must in every case [remain] within the totality of the structures mentioned”.\textsuperscript{217} As Heidegger explains, the designation discourse applies broadly to many kinds of ‘expression’, and even to keeping silent:\textsuperscript{218}

[T]o be able to keep silent, [one] must have something to say .... In [such a case], one’s reticence makes something manifest, and does away with idle talk \[Gerede\]. As a mode of discoursing, reticence [expressively] Articulates [a way of life] in so primordial a manner that it gives rise to a

\textsuperscript{215} Recall the \λόγος μουσικός
\textsuperscript{216} Heidegger, M., \emph{Being and Time} (trans. Macquarrie, J. & Robinson, E.), Blackwell Publishing, Oxford, 1962 at 205, H 162
\textsuperscript{217} \textit{Ibid} at 206, H 163
\textsuperscript{218} Heidegger recognises that reticence, keeping-silent \[Verschwiegenheit\], is itself a forcible and effective means of discoursing. The connexion of reticence to the ‘voice of conscience’ \[Stimme des Gewissens\], itself a silent mode of discourse which Heidegger identifies in \emph{Being and Time}, is discussed in more detail below in Chapter Eight.
potentiality-for-hearing [and for understanding] which is genuine, and
to a being-with-one-another which is transparent.\(^{219}\)

In this way reticence too can disclose something which too much talking might otherwise obscure; for reticence consists in \textit{meaningfully} and \textit{communicatively} keeping silent. It remains discursive.

In order to emphasise the connection between discourse, the disclosure of the world and human being, and to show that discourse is more than the aggregation of formal ‘parts’, Heidegger additionally examines “an existential possibility” of discourse – its ‘fifth’, receptive element, namely “hearing”, upon which the being of discourse depends.\(^{220}\)

What Heidegger means by “hearing” is not in essence equivalent to what scientists and psychologists identify today as the physical ability of fauna to sense vibrations or to interpret them. According to Heidegger, hearing is something ontologically more proximate and primordial: it means understanding.\(^{221}\) It brings Dasein to the world in which it lives, for it implies hearkening \textit{[Horchten]} – both to one’s surrounds and, in addition, to one’s conscience.\(^{222}\)

Because of Dasein’s immersion in the world of its concerns, it never hears anything like bare noises or complexes of sounds, but instead it encounters “the creaking wagon, the motor-cycle. [Dasein hears] the column on the march, the north wind, the woodpecker tapping, the fire crackling. ...it requires a very artificial and complicated frame of mind to ‘hear’ a ‘pure noise’.”\(^{223}\) Heidegger explains that “\textit{[w]hen we are with one another in public, our everyday concern … encounters ‘affairs’, undertakings, incidents, mishaps.}”\(^{224}\) Hearing reaches to ‘what’ is getting

\(^{220}\) Heidegger explains that: “Hearing is constitutive for discourse.” (See \textit{ibid} at 206, H 163)
\(^{221}\) Heidegger notes that “[i]f we have not heard ‘aright’, it is not by accident that we say we have not ‘understood’ … Dasein hears, because it understands.” (\textit{Ibid} at 206, H 163)
With this remark, Heidegger associates ‘hearing’ with ‘understanding’, which \textit{existentiale} is traditionally associated with ‘seeing’.
\(^{222}\) Heidegger states that “hearing constitutes the primary and authentic way in which [the human being] is open for its ownmost-potentiality-for-being – [by] hearing the voice of the friend whom every Dasein carries with it [i.e., the ‘voice’ of one’s conscience].” (\textit{Ibid} at 206, H 163)
How ‘the call of conscience’ is related to discourse is discussed below in the penultimate chapter of this dissertation.
\(^{223}\) \textit{Ibid} at 207, H 164
\(^{224}\) \textit{Ibid} at 439, H 387
done; to ‘what’ people are engaged in doing. We, Dasein, hear ‘where’ we are. We are “in thrall” to the world that surrounds us: we belong to it.\(^{225}\)

As we will see, numerous attempts to grasp the being of language – including instrumentalism – take their orientation from one or more of the four constitutive elements of discourse Heidegger identifies or, on the other hand, from language’s formalised parts – from assertion, symbols, the words as such, the subject, the object, the copula, the individual expression, or even grammar generally. It is my contention, however, in agreement with Lafont, that none of these phenomena, even if collated to produce a map or super-schema of language, reach in themselves to anything like the being of language – \textit{qua} discourse – as it is described in \textit{Being and Time}. Discourse, I argue below, again in agreement with Lafont, is an important element of the original disclosedness of being-in-the-world – and in discourse itself Dasein is able to discover its the world as well as how it itself ‘is’. I contend for this reason that neither formalised language-pieces nor their aggregation into any complex or system reach to the being of language ‘as’ it is; that instead they consist in abstractions from its being, peculiar to peculiar interpretations.

Under this construction Dasein’s discourse, ‘as’ it manifests and is therefore interpreted, must in the first instance – and in itself – be the ontological ground and condition of the possibility of its own reduction or division into derivative, elemental phenomena: The dividing of discourse into Dasein’s natural languages, and, subsequently, into their individual elements, amounts in this regard to the dividing of discourse, an existentiale which is itself a unitary, original phenomenon in the world.

For her part, Lafont implies that any confusion about the being of language properly consists in neglecting to think language according to the ontological difference which is so crucial to Heidegger in \textit{Being and Time}. Under this construction the ‘elements’ of language, with respect to which particular languages are distinguished and divided, are merely extracted from language ‘as such’ – from discourse such as it is \textit{qua} language. In essence, Lafont’s two claims can be summarised thus:

Language is factically always already there in the world historically, and for this reason the ‘silent’ pragmatist reading of \textit{Being and Time} is suspect; and Thinking language ‘as such’ as a collection of tools or as a complex system of “relations” is actually a way of mistaking language’s ontological being and foundation as the discourse inherent in Dasein’s being-in-the-world.

According to Heidegger, language \textit{qua} discourse is an \textit{existentiale}. It belongs to Dasein and to its being-in-the-world aboriginally. Dasein’s natural languages, ontic phenomena, thought specifically as their peculiar phrases or expressions or parts, always already refer themselves to their ontological being, discourse, inasmuch as discourse is always already enmeshed in the world and being-there with others. Instrumentalism deigns to ignore this originality, positing instead a spurious kind of being for language: it associates the being of language ‘as such’ with one of its derivative ‘forms’. It does not follow under this construction therefore that Dasein’s being in the world is at first pre-linguistic or entirely silent, or indeed that it is something over which language is afterwards, in every case, cast. Rather, under this construction, Dasein’s being-in-the-world as well as its very disclosedness always already occurs with language, discourse, with it.

In order to explain Lafont’s contentions in more detail, let us examine Okrent’s rejection of Lafont’s second thesis, upon which a rejection of her first thesis is subsequently based. This will better equip us to criticise the pragmatist reading of \textit{Being and Time} in general, especially with respect to its account of language.

\textbf{§.25: On behalf of pragmatism}

According to Okrent, Lafont’s dismissal of the silent pragmatist reading of \textit{Being and Time} ultimately rests on what he supposes to be a confused categorisation of Dasein’s ontic natural languages (French, German, Italian, \textit{et cetera}) both as tools and also as activities for which tools are used.\footnote{Okrent, M., “Equipment, World, and Language” in \textit{Inquiry}, vol. 45, 2002 at 199} For Okrent, this conflation is illogical and therefore problematic.

In other words, Okrent contends that if Dasein’s languages are complex systems or totalities of tools then they can not also be activities. In the first
instance Okrent recalls that tools, according to Heidegger, are simply items of equipment for an activity – either needed or not – and that they are therefore secondary to the activity itself. The tool is not therefore an activity in its own right: It is ultimately inessential to Dasein’s dealings. Thinking language as a system of tools and also as an activity is, according to Okrent, incoherent.

Okrent submits therefore that if Dasein’s concernful activities are teleologically motivated, and if language – a totality of meaningful phrases and expressions – is not an activity in its own right because its constitutive ‘parts’ are not activities, then language can still be thought as a system of tools for use; for the activity of communicating. Thus, language as such can be thought as a system of words, phrases and expressions logically posterior to any given grasp of the world. This construction, too, espouses a kind of pragmatist-derivativism. To Okrent, the ‘silent’ pragmatist reading of Being and Time retains the instrumentalist account of language as a coherent possibility.

Although Okrent does not dismiss the view that language is instrumental in nature and in application, nor indeed the possibility of a silent normative pragmatism upon which language is afterwards made to rest, he does not address sufficiently Heidegger’s discussion of language’s relationship to discourse – or, for that matter, Lafont’s discussion of the same.

For my part, I disagree that language as such is thought by Heidegger as a complex system of tools for use; I disagree that Heidegger thinks language ontologically in terms of whichever kind of urgent utility the ‘parts’ of a language have for someone beset by a singular circumstance. In my opinion, in agreement with Lafont, these classifications are but singular ways of thinking Dasein’s languages formally according to narrowly circumscriptive interpretations of how they manifest ontically and therefore occasionally. It is not always the case, for instance, that we struggle for words; that we seek them in the same way the carpenter searches for his hammer or the soldier for his gun. In this respect, I agree with Lafont’s interpretation of the language-discourse relationship: I agree that discourse is something more original than can be found in the ‘parts’ of language. The instrumentalist interpretation of language does not, under this construction, reflect the ontological ground and being of language. Instrumentalism is, under this construction, misleading.
For his part, Okrent also agrees that Heidegger does not explicitly conceive language as a system of instruments – but he seems to contend nonetheless that it is valid to conceive it thus. As has now been explained, he retains the pragmatist view that the world might be organised non- or pre-linguistically by Dasein’s dealings – and therefore organised silently – upon which theory an instrumentalist interpretation of language can be made to rest.\textsuperscript{227} Accordingly, Okrent rejects the originality of language in being-in-the-world, rejects the interpretation that there can be no world like as Dasein’s without language, and ultimately contends instead that a “non-linguistic world” could actually be possible.\textsuperscript{228} He argues for such a possible world by constructing a myth about Dasein’s “[possible] non-linguistic ancestors”; primitives whose way of being-in-the-world by engaging in πραξις alone is determinative for the being of proximate entities.\textsuperscript{229} He then contends that language must be, in every case, in Dasein’s world too, ontologically posterior to an pre-articulated pre-linguistic ‘world’ organised pragmatically by individuals living alone but, as it were, together. In this way Okrent reads Being and Time to purport that the way in which entities show themselves ‘as’ they are to πραξις is originally determinative of their being ‘what’ they are in themselves. From under this construction, as we have seen, there emerges the possibility of a simple kind of derivativism with which language – and particularly its expression – is supposed to be secondary or inessential. However, the question as to how influential language is in bequeathing the ‘as’ of any entity from ancestry – or indeed of bequeathing how the world in itself ‘is’ and continues to ‘be’ – remains unaddressed by him. Likewise, the degree to which Okrent’s possible mythical ‘world’ would be like as Dasein’s, in which world language is without fail being spoken, remains unclear. Just because the communicative exchanges of Dasein’s primitive ancestors, whether gesticulatory or musical, eventually evolved into the various languages of our modernity does not mean accordingly that language is in every case prefigured by non-linguistic phenomena today. Numerous commentators level these objections against Okrent. For example, it is Brandom’s opinion with respect to the

\textsuperscript{227} See Okrent, M., “Equipment, World, and Language” in Inquiry, vol. 45, 2002 at 198. Here, Okrent states that “…the fact that the later Heidegger thoroughly rejected anything that smacked of a pragmatic interpretation of his early magnum opus at most shows that he couldn’t accept such a reading of his work, not that that reading is wrong.”

\textsuperscript{228} Ibid at 202

\textsuperscript{229} Although, in point of fact, Okrent does not seem to address explicitly just how the communications of primitives thus thought might resemble a language or proto-language
disclosedness Heidegger describes that: “Heidegger is committed to the claim that there is no Dasein … without language … [that] a prelinguistic community [such as Okrent’s possible world] would not count as Dasein.”

Thus, let us investigate in more detail precisely why this might be; let us investigate precisely how language might conceivably suffuse Dasein’s being in the world ontologically.

§.26: Being-in-the-world as being-with-others as speaking-with-one-another

As we have learned, Lafont argues reading language as a system of tools ultimately pays inadequate attention to the way in which the world might be disclosed in discourse in Dasein’s languages, in phrases and expressions, in advance of any new undertaking which Dasein might choose to venture. I too suppose that thinking language with respect to its ontic ‘parts’ alone does not constitute an adequate treatment of its being in this regard; for if language is thought as a series of situated local totalities or parts then its aboriginal presence to being-in-the-world – its historical preponderance and what this preponderance means for how Dasein ‘is’ in the world – can be neglected. The fact that Heidegger himself describes language as “a totality of words” should always be thought with respect to his later, more significant attestation, also made in §34 of Being and Time, that language is the existential being of discourse [Rede].

How discourse discloses the world has now become a topic begging beseeching further discussion. Accordingly, this particular section of the dissertation investigates just how language might suffuse the world disclosed ontologically. The shortcomings of instrumentalism with respect to this suffusion are emphasised in it consequently.

It was intimated above that Dasein’s existence is essentially societal; for Dasein, human being, is essentially a being-in-the-world-with-others. Let us familiarise ourselves with a few of Heidegger’s remarks made in the years immediately preceding the publication of Being and Time, in which the relationship between Dasein’s being, world, and language is addressed by him with respect to this contention. Instrumentalism and the various species of derivativism which are pertinent to this discussion will also be criticised with respect to it.

Brandom, R. B., Tales of the Mighty Dead: Historical Essays in the Metaphysics of Intentionality, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Massachusetts), 2002 at 329
In *Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy* in 1924, but three years previous to *Being and Time*, Heidegger already describes the human situation in the terms of *Being and Time* as Dasein, and does so in respect of Aristotle’s description of the human being as ζῷον λόγον προσώπου, as the discoursing animal. Here, Heidegger describes Dasein as a being-in-the-world whose very way of being-there is grounded in a fundamental communality-with-others. This communality is described in terms of the unifying manifold of Dasein’s concerns which emerge in the world, with respect to which communality as such may be distinguished. Already, Heidegger criticises the association of Dasein with the Cartesian *subjectum*, and identifies Dasein in terms of its neighbours, as having concerns in common:

The basic assertion that I myself make about myself as a living human being in my world, the primary assertion: ‘I am’, is genuinely false. One must say: ‘I am one (ich bin man).’ ‘One’ is, ‘one’ undertakes this or that, ‘one’ sees things in such a way. This *One* is the genuine how of everydayness, of average, concrete being-with-one-another. From out of this *One*, arises the manner and mode in which human beings see the world initially and for the most part, in which the world matters to human beings, in which human beings address the world.\(^{231}\)

Most significantly, however, Heidegger submits that this way of being-in-the-world is both grounded by and maintained in language qua discourse. Already in 1924, language itself appears as a determinative element of the constitution, function, and disclosedness of the world in which Dasein ‘is’:

The One is the genuine how of the being of human beings in everydayness, and the genuine bearer of this One is language. 'The One maintains itself, has its genuine dominion, in language.'\(^{232}\)

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\(^{232}\) *Ibid* at 45
Heidegger expresses the same sentiment in the same year in *The Concept of Time*, which is commonly regarded as “the very first draft” of *Being and Time*. Here, he states that:

Dasein, which is dependent on sight on account of its discoverer [Entdecktheit], is being-together-with-one-another [Miteinandersein], which means speaking-with-one-another [Miteinander-sprechen].

As Gadamer explains in this respect, Dasein’s ek-sistence, thought with especial respect to its being-with-others, is also fundamentally an in-sistence – an existence in its society and therefore in language.

In *Being and Time* in 1927 the description of Dasein as a being-with-others recurs. Here Heidegger describes the world as a shared phenomenon – as a “with-world [Mitwelt]” – explaining that the life of any Dasein occurs amidst the others in its society. These others are never encountered as additional, occurrent things with which the individual exists spatially ‘side-by-side’. On the other hand entirely, it is from within the primary context of its being-with-others that Dasein turns towards the world and encounters phenomena in the first place: As Heidegger explains, the field through which we walk is a farmer’s; the ship by the shore is a fisherman’s; the dinner on the table is father’s.

Immersed in a world with others, entities manifest, each in their place. As Dasein in their own right, others are not simply

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Here, Gadamer wonders whether the tension produced between Dasein’s knowing itself as a society as the genus human being and its recognition of itself as an ‘individual’ in society as a particular human being might itself be the ground of the problems of all kinds of “disordering” modern metaphysical subjectivism.


237 Heidegger explains that “[w]hen, for example, we walk along the edge of a field but ‘outside it’, the field shows itself as belonging to such-and-such a person … [t]he boat anchored at the shore is assigned in its being-in-itself to an acquaintance who undertakes voyages with it … [e]ven a ‘boat which is strange to us’ is still indicative of others.” (Ibid at 153, H 118)
entities positioned to complement an isolated subjectum; for being-in-the-world is a being-with-others. Dasein is a public entity, and first finds itself immersed in the public sphere.

Being-with-others is typified by solicitude [Fürsorge], guided not by the circumspection that chases an end [τέλος], as is the case with Dasein’s own dealings with entities, but by considerateness [Rücksicht], forbearance [Nachsicht], and esteem. Even what can be identified (ontically and derivatively) as the loneliness of an individual, whether as a crippling isolation or ennui or otherwise, owes itself to this way of being. In a certain sense, therefore, others are the world’s original inhabitants, and even the ‘self’ Dasein finds to be its own is always discovered against – and within – a populated background, often subsequently to it. Not every ‘thought’ or discovery is founded on the teleology of individual actions, therefore; equal attendance must be given to the manifold existentialia – including discourse – with which the disclosedness of being-there, as a whole, is accomplished.

Others have the character of the ‘one’, of das Man, for which there is no exact English equivalent in meaning. In German the term is derived from the impersonal

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Heidegger states that: “By ‘others’ we do not mean everyone else but me – those over against whom the ‘I’ stands out. They are rather those from whom, for the most part, one does not distinguish oneself – those among whom one is too. This being-there-too [Auch-da-sein] with them does not have the ontological character of a being-present-at-hand-along-with them within a world [as merely ‘occurrent’]. This ‘with’ is [rather] something of the character of Dasein; … ‘with’ and ‘too’ are to be understood existentially, not categorically. [Thus,] …it is not the case that one’s own subject is proximally present-at-hand and that the rest of the subjects, which are likewise occurrent, get discriminated beforehand and then apprehended … [instead, these various descriptions of the ‘self’ can only ever be] encountered from out of the world…” (Ibid at 154-155, H 118-119)

239 Ibid at 167-168, H 129
Here, Heidegger explains that “In terms of das Man, and as das Man, I am ‘given’ proximally to ‘myself’ [mir ‘sich’].”

I agree with Christensen, then, contra Dreyfus (who claims that there is no intelligibility beyond the dicta of das Man, and thus that Heidegger’s account of Dasein’s authentic ‘mode’ of being is incoherent (see Chapter Eight)) and Olafsen (who does not seem to regard das Man as an essential existential), that: “the ‘I’ is most originally given to itself ... in the flux of ... social roles and relations.” See: Christensen, B., “Heidegger on das Man – Using Simmel to reconcile Dreyfus and Olafson”, 2009 at 11-12 (which unpublished paper was presented at the Department of Philosophy, De Paul University, Chicago, on January 16, 2009). See also: Dreyfus, H. L. 2000 “Could Anything be more Intelligible than everyday Intelligibility?” in Faulconer, J., and Wrathall, M. (eds.), Appropriating Heidegger, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000 at 155-174.

240 Okrent, espousing a pragmatist position to which I am slightly opposed, champions the notion that “the intentionality of thought is founded on the teleology of action” alone. See, for example, Okrent, M., “Heidegger in America or how transcendental philosophy becomes pragmatic” in Malpas, J. (ed.), From Kant to Davidson: Philosophy and the idea of the transcendental, Routledge, London, 2003 at 129
singular pronoun *man*, which in English means ‘one’ in the sense conveyed by the sentence “One’ should genuflect when it is appropriate to do so’. While this is perhaps the most literal rendering of *das Man*, it is also rendered occasionally as ‘the anyone’, ‘people’, or ‘the they’. The term is usually employed to refer to Dasein’s inauthentic mode of existence; in which mode it submits itself to ‘doing whatever one does’ according to custom or, in other words, to doing what is established socially as behaviour ‘proper’ to circumstance. Neutral in gender and indeterminate in number, *das Man* does not denote a measurable sum or collection of people; instead, its conceptual tangibility rests in its reference to the very *manifold* of established customs, conventions, and settings which always already govern ‘how one is to live’ in whichever society one keeps – or, more primordially, with whichever society one finds oneself first to be keeping.

It is with others, *das Man*, that Dasein finds itself: *das Man* is the “who” of Dasein at its most organic, the “subject” of its everydayness. Dasein finds itself *in* its society: with respect to ‘where’ it is, the ‘I’ is phenomenologically younger than its society, despite having always already been latent there. Existentially, according to Heidegger:

> [B]eing-one’s-self does not rest upon an exceptional condition of the subject, a condition that has been detached from *das Man*; it is rather an existentiell modification of *das Man* – of *das Man* as an essential existentiale.

To be ‘for itself’, Dasein must revolt against the dicta and life of *das Man*.

In *Being and Time*, like as in *The Concept of Time*, Heidegger iterates that for the most part: “Dasein is for the sake of *das Man* in an everyday manner, and *das Man* itself [expressively] Articulates the [world].” What first situates Dasein in the world with others is the society, societal practices, and social settings in which it is immersed and given to participate; namely *das Man* as such. Dasein is, in other words, “for the sake of *das Man*”. Under this construction the *manifold* of Dasein’s

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242 Heidegger explains that: “Proximally, factual Dasein is … not ‘I’ in the sense of my own self, that ‘am’, but rather the others, whose way is that of *das Man* . . . . Proximally Dasein is *das Man*, and for the most part it remains so. [If Dasein does discover the world] in its own way *eigen* … then this discovery of the ‘world’ and this disclosure of Dasein are always accomplished as a clearing-away of [*das Man*].” (See *ibid* at 168-169, H 130-131)

243 *Ibid* at 167, H 129
concerns and comportments, revolutionary or not, must emerge from a common and established place of origin; a place described essentially by care \([Sorge]\). This ‘place’, this being-with-others, is whence the primordial meaningfulness pervading Dasein’s being-in-the-world emerges. Inasmuch as it situates Dasein in community, this place must be grounded in or – at the very least – maintained by a common means of communion. Heidegger decides in\textit{ Being and Time} that meaningfulness, the way things matter, communion thus conceived, is proximally and for the most part shared in the everyday talking-with-one-another or “idle talk” \([Gerede]\) that dominates Dasein’s being-with-others.\footnote{See §35 of Heidegger, M., \textit{Being and Time} (trans. Macquarrie, J. & Robinson, E.), Blackwell Publishing, Oxford, 1962.} For this reason it is proper to associate \textit{community} with the communion \([Mitteilung]\) described by Heidegger as the third constitutive element of \textit{discourse}.\footnote{See Powell, J., “Heidegger and the Communicative World” in \textit{Research in Phenomenology}, vol. 40, 2010, at 55-71} Discourse shares what matters; and what matters is good incentive for concernful dealings, revolutionary or otherwise.

Under this construction discourse, inasmuch it pervades \textit{das Man}, may itself be associated with the primordial holding-open of Dasein’s world; with, in other words, the place of Dasein in disclosedness, in \textit{das Man}, and in its proximity to the being of beings.\footnote{How discourse is primordially ‘there’ with activities (in webs of significance) is investigated in more detail in Chapter Six, below, with respect to Blattner’s ‘coherent’ derivativism in particular.}

In consideration of instrumentalism and with regard to these observations, Blattner concludes that as a theory of language for \textit{Being and Time}: \footnote{Blattner, W. D., \textit{Heidegger’s Temporal Idealism}, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1999 at 69-70}

\begin{quote}
... instrumentalism takes itself out of contention by gratuitously specifying that words are tools, which wreaks ontological havoc .... Language (or discourse) is supposed to belong to the disclosedness-structure, or at least to be a factor in the analysis of Dasein [and its being-in-the-world], and so to understand language as a tool is ... ontologically confused!
\end{quote}

While language can be thought formally as an instrument in certain instances (as, for example, a tool for instruction), it is not ontologically sound to identify such an
ontic or occasional way language manifests with its concrete ontological being – or indeed with its role and function in disclosing what matters in *das Man*, in community, or in Dasein’s being-in-the-world *in general*. It is in this respect important to identify the possibility that language might itself be the genuine and primordial bearer of being-in-the-world – or at the very least of being-in-the-world with others, being the primordial placement of Dasein in *das Man*. Language, thought as a basic fundament of Dasein’s being-in-the-world *qua* being-with-others, inasmuch as it essentially succeeds in bringing Dasein to its ‘there’, might itself be a primary motivating cause not only of its pragmatic, but also of its deliberative activities generally; of the review and universalising of the things that matter, and the concomitant revelation of ways to be concerned. Being-with-others, being held in *das Man*, Dasein is held essentially in the sway of language *qua* discourse.

As we have learned, instrumentalist and like derivativist theories of language suppose that others, *das Man*, inasmuch as they are an original ‘component’ of Dasein’s being-in-the-world, must be silent proximally and for the most part; that there must be a primordial mode of being-in-the-world which prefigures language and linguistic expression, if not also communication and community in general. The alternative possibility – that language is an original phenomenon of Dasein’s being-in-the-world which is only afterwards formalised with regard to its ontic manifestations – is discredited consequently. This seems, *prima facie*, problematic.

With the issues that have now been raised in mind, let us now investigate in Chapter Four an alternative derivativist theory of language – namely the theory that language is a system of signs – to see if these same issues remain. In so doing a better understanding of the originary familiarity with the world that characterises Dasein’s being-there can be acquired; and the originary silent grasp of the world that derivativism champions can be criticised accordingly. The relationship between Dasein, world and language will be investigated in more detail as a result. With this having been done, we will be equipped (and able) to investigate the relationship of language-proper to disclosedness as Heidegger conceives each to be – and to do so in appropriately exhaustive detail.
IV. LANGUAGE AND SIGNIFICANCE

§.27: Language and signs: significance and derivativism

Derivativism supposes language derivative of a more basic or original aspect of being-in-the-world. One such derivativism conceives language as a system of tools. Another, however, holds that it is a system of signs indicative or representative of a world whose structure, inasmuch as it seems to have been organised ‘significantly’, prefigures language – and does so as a more original order or articulation of the world onto which language can be mapped subsequently. Under this construction, “significations”, to borrow Carman’s words, seem to “found the possible being of words and language”.248

Often, in this way, derivativist theories of language think language the late expression of more primordial or prefiguring phenomena. As such, as we have learned, they occasionally tie themselves to subjectivist accounts of being-in-the-world or attend to the individual’s own concernful dealings at the expense of considering solicitude, the public, and the wider context in which Dasein lives with others exposed to language from the very first instance. Accordingly, derivativisms about language seem generally to disguise or to neglect the possibility that Dasein’s dealings might derive their very attractiveness – not to mention the disclosedness of their possibility – from Dasein’s originary immersion in the public realm, in its being-with-others, in its listening to others, and in its speaking with them.

In the following Chapter of this dissertation, Heidegger’s Being and Time account of signs [Zeichen] and significance [Bedeutsamkeit] is examined. This account is important for any critique of the theory that language is derivative of an ontologically prior significance-structure – for it is with respect to this discussion that we may attempt to decide precisely how language is related to significance, as well as how language is related to the order and arrangement of entities ‘as’ they are in the world.

§.28: Signs and significance

Above we learned that by “world” [Welt] Heidegger means that very *wherein* in which factical Dasein lives and dwells, and not merely the sum totality of entities which surround us physically, spatially.249 We learned that the inherent equiprimordiality of Dasein and world manifests in Dasein’s dealings; in the way that entities are ready-to-hand with respect to Dasein’s concernful comportment and, ultimately, its care [Sorge]. In addition, we discovered the way Dasein’s environment is populated by equipmental totalities as well as others, *das Man*. We discovered that Dasein’s world consists in a complex web of interrelations between phenomena. Heidegger names these meaningful interrelations “significations” [Bedeutungen]: these are found in webs of significance [Bedeutsamkeit], and significance founds the ‘worldhood’ of Dasein’s world.

As Geertz explains, “man is suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun”; Dasein inherits a history, a world.250 According to Heidegger webs of significance, this “system of relations [Relationssystem] … provides the basis on which [entities in the world] can for the first time be discovered as they are ‘substantially’ ‘in themselves’”:251 Entities belong to totalities. These totalities are structurally articulated according to significance [Bedeutsamkeit].

A derivativist account of language can be extracted from Heidegger’s claim for the ontological primordiality of significance, however. One such theory holds that language is ultimately a system of indicative or designative signs; that the totality of words, phrases and expressions available to Dasein is merely ‘there’ for indicating the constellations of significance which comprise the worldhood of the world which, before them, are also buried beneath them. Under this construction it seems language is derivative of the prior, pre-linguistic, meaningful way in which the world’s webs of significance, thought as the totality of their participant entities and the self-evident relationships between them, are grasped understandingly ‘as’ they are.

In opposition to this account I will now argue that the indicative function of language – the ‘signifying’ signs perform – has its ground (and origin) in language’s

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always already belonging to the context or web of significance whence (and with reference to which) language can afterwards be isolated in thinking as a system of signs. Under this construction language can not be derivative of the context for which it is such a system, for factically it must always already reside there: At best, its formalisation as a system of signs is what will be derivative. Under this construction the context in which language ‘is’ is precisely where signs can be signs both proximately and at all. To this way of thinking language must already reside with the phenomena to which it refers.

Accordingly, it is my contention that in Being and Time Heidegger thinks language in its being as original to Dasein’s world; that he thinks it always already there in being-with-others; and, thus, that he thinks language is of a shared ground and not, as it were, grounded by one.

With respect, then, to the way it appears that the πράγματα with which Dasein deals seem proximately possible without language, I will now argue that manifest individual ‘items’ of πράγματα, of equipment [das Zeug], are always already discovered by Dasein ‘as’ something; and, inasmuch as language belongs to Dasein’s being in the world with these entities, that the degree to which this ‘as’ is there too, to others and at all, is always already determinable with regard to its availability in language. In this sense, however loosely, language always already circumscribes the place of whatever manifests in the world ‘as’ something, and it does so in advance of any new dealing which implicates entities ‘as’ what they are. The degree to which Dasein grasps phenomena ‘as’ the phenomena they are is under this construction interwoven with the way that language is already there, as it were, ‘about’ phenomena. I argue that the webs of significance Dasein lives in, which webs comprise the worldhood of the world, might themselves be structures Dasein is socialised-into by way of its being-with-others in the world, with language essentially and aboriginally. Its encounter of any given entity in the world might be mediated accordingly by the way in which it inherits constellations of significance – the way the world matters – in language.

With these contentions in mind, it is now incumbent upon us to ask what, according to Heidegger’s own account of the phenomena, is a sign, ontologically? How do signs relate to significance?

These questions will prepare us to ask in turn in which way a word can be a sign, and to ask consequently: can language ‘in itself’ be a system of signs?
§.29: Reference

Heidegger’s study of signs and significance is phenomenological and hermeneutic. It is not strictly logical or semiotic.

According to Heidegger, signs, like other equipmental entities, owe their being and manifestation ‘as’ what they are to the webs of significance whence they emerge in the first instance: signs owe their possibility to the places where they can be significant and are therefore able to signify, to indicate, or to represent. As we will learn, these various functions of the sign owe themselves in turn to the more original phenomenon of reference – to the sign’s belonging to a meaningful or significant context. As we learned above in our discussion of intentionality, significance – namely the webs of significance in which signs can be found – is an ontological feature of the world. Significance belongs to the world in its essential worldhood: Dasein has concern for worldly matters, for matters being-in-the-world, and so it discovers webs of significance ‘there’.

Amidst the everyday exigencies of being-in-the-world Dasein encounters many types of signs: street-signs, gravestones, posters, banners, advertisements, hand-signals, et cetera. Such signs seem prima facie to point out the essential relationships between phenomena. With this sense of the sign in mind, Heidegger thus contends that signs can be interpreted formally as a class of entities whose individuals merely indicate such relationships. Signs can be classified formally as such as entities for pointing-out, pointing-to, or for bringing-together. In Heidegger’s words: “being-a-sign-for can be formalised as a universal kind of relation.”\textsuperscript{252}

However, as will now be explained, isolating a phenomenon and thinking it merely to indicate or to show the relations between entities actually amounts in turn to the formalisation of reference. It amounts to the formalisation of the entity one has found, as well as the formalisation of ‘how’ it belongs to the other entities in the context whence it emerges ‘as’ what it is. When we isolate an ‘Exit’ sign in thinking, and identify that the word ‘Exit’ shows the location of an exit, we attend merely to the fact that the exit and the ‘Exit’ sign each manifestly refer themselves to the wider web of significance where they are – whence they stand-out to

circumspection – to begin with. Indication is in this way derived from reference; it is in this way the formalisation of a previous reference-relationship.

For this reason any clues for characterising entities that are derived from indication or the showing of relations alone must, because of the formally derivative characters of indication and the showing of relations (as opposed to the more primordial phenomenon of reference), necessarily have their source in reference; in the way that these entities each already belong to the context of significance whence they are isolated for further thinking. Under this construction, indication, in its ontic manifestations, is derivative of reference, and re-presents the ontological being of reference-relationships and, essentially, significance.

Heidegger explains therefore that referring is not simply another name for indicating. Instead, reference describes the way ‘items’ of equipment always already belong to equipmental totalities. Reference describes the originality of totalities – of webs of significance – in Dasein’s being-in-the-world. Heidegger explains therefore that referring “is not the ontological structure of the sign as equipment,” but that it is rather something which fuses together the totalities of equipment Dasein discovers in the world as such. Every ‘item’ of equipment ‘extracted’ from an equipmental totality in thinking (whether as something that indicates something or not) must always already have been referring itself to the common ground that any given totality originally is. Heidegger explains that:

Reference or assignment itself cannot be conceived as a sign if it is to serve ontologically as the foundation upon which signs are based. Reference is not an ontical characteristic of something ready-to-hand, when it is rather that by which readiness-to-hand itself is constituted.

Whichever entity is isolated from the world and subsequently identified as a sign that indicates must always already belong in the first instance to a wider and more original context or web of significance – to which context it will always already be referring itself, as it were, ‘back to’. The sign’s indicative function owes itself to

254 Ibid at 109, H 78
255 Ibid at 114, H 83
where the sign resides; to the structure of significance to which it refers itself, in which structure it has its original place. It is the sign’s already belonging where it is that makes its formal, indicative relationship to proximate phenomena derivable for further analysis.

We see, therefore, inasmuch as its ability to indicate is grounded in a more primordial reference-relationship, that the sign is a unique phenomenon which serves to *motivate* Dasein’s late orientation back to the context in which the sign *already* resides – and that it motivates Dasein’s return by making a proximate reference all the more *ostensive*. By following the sign, Dasein’s circumspection follows the interwoven paths of reference that structurally articulate webs of significance. The sign brings the environment in which it *already* resides into focus; it orients Dasein within it. In this way “…the sign addresses itself to a being-in-the-world”. 256 It speaks to Dasein:257

… a sign addresses itself to the circumspection of our concernful dealings, and it does so in such a way that the circumspection which goes along with it, following where it points, brings into an explicit ‘survey’ whatever aroundness the environment may have at the time. This circumspective survey [achieves] … an orientation within our environment. 258

Signs of the kind we have described let what is ready-to-hand be encountered; more precisely, they let some context of it become accessible in such a way that our concernful dealings take on an orientation and hold it secure. A sign is not a thing [or ‘object’] which stands to another thing in the relationship of indicating; it is rather an *item of equipment which explicitly raises a totality of equipment into our circumspection so that together with it the worldly character of the ready-to-hand announces itself* … signs always indicate primarily ‘wherein’ one lives,

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257 *Ibid* at 110, H 79
258 *Ibid* at 110, H 79; italics mine
where one’s concern dwells, what sort of involvement there is with something.”

This is the case even when we build, ‘take’ or establish a phenomenon, as a sign, to be indicative of another:

If, for instance, the south wind ‘is accepted’ ['gilt'] by the farmer as a sign of rain, then this ‘acceptance' ['Geltung'] – or the ‘value’ with which the entity is ‘invested’ – is not a sort of bonus over and above what is already present-at-hand in itself – viz the flow of air in a definite geographical direction. The south wind may be meteorologically accessible as something which just occurs; but it is never present-at-hand proximally in such a way as this, only occasionally taking over the function of a warning signal. On the contrary, only by the [concernful] circumspection with which one takes account of things in farming, is the south wind discovered [as a sign of rain].

Signs refer (and refer Dasein) to the wider web of significance in which they (and Dasein) have their place. Indication is ostensive reference. In other words, according to Heidegger, there are no signs and no ‘indication’ as it were ‘in themselves’; but rather, in each case, there is a reference made explicit that Dasein knowingly avails itself of. It is to webs of significance that Dasein orients itself ‘back to’, having had this web raised into its circumspection.

We learn, therefore, with regard to the species of derivativism that thinks language to be a system of signs for indicating, that if language is indeed to be thought as a system of signs then its ‘elements’ can not, at least according to Heidegger, be free-standing entities divorced from the world, but must always already reside with what they indicate in original, proximate reference-relationships. Under this construction, if the sign is always already in residence with what it indicates, it is mistaken to think that any given word is also derived from its ‘object’ so much as to think that the two bring each other to bear and are in this way
unified in their worldly being. Even the *establishment* of an entity as a sign owes its possibility in the first instance to the priority of its residence, in the world, already: Its establishment, its *manifestation*, its indicating is not derived from its object, but from where and how it resides. Even to create a sign, to manufacture an ‘Exit’ sign for an exit, is merely to extract a manifest reference-relationship; is to render explicit the relationship between the exit and the world-bound word ‘Exit’, which phenomena already refer to each other.

§.30: Reference is ontologically prior to the establishment of signs

Heidegger explains that referring must itself be grounded in a wider context of equipment and not just in any ‘item’ of equipment in itself.261 As an entity in its own right, the sign does not in the first instance constitute but rather refers itself to the worldhood of Dasein’s immediate surrounds; to a meaningful context of equipment. It is with respect to this context that it can manifest as a sign for indicating. Signs are not phenomena upon which the world’s webs of significance or its inherent meaningfulness are grounded, therefore. Rather, the opposite is the case: The very possibility of signs’ being is always already grounded in the meaningful contexts which Dasein circumspectively discovers itself to be living in, to which contexts signs refer. It is only with respect to a concernful consideration and the context thereby implicated that signs can possibly present themselves to circumspection; these contexts ensure the being of the sign as a sign, for reference ensures the possibility of indication.

Carman states:

If [we start to think that] the peculiarities of signs [themselves] … offer a single key with which to unlock the secret ontological constitution of entities in general, [then] we are in danger of ignoring the phenomena – the ‘things themselves’ – in favour of a prefabricated interpretive schema, precisely the sort of hermeneutical craving for generality and neatness that Heidegger is always at pains to resist and condemn.262

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It is not necessary to appeal to the being of signs and symbols in order to describe the being of entities ‘as’ they are proximally in the first instance, therefore – or indeed to discover how the world ‘is’. This kind of method can mislead: Heidegger states in History of the Concept of Time that:

... the universal scope of phenomena such as signs and symbols easily gives rise to using them as a clue for interpreting the totality of entities, the world as a whole. No less a figure than Leibniz sought in his *characteristica universalis* a systematisation of the totality of entities in terms of an orientation to the phenomenon of the sign. Recently Spengler, following the procedure of Lamprecht, has elaborated the idea of the symbol for the philosophy of history and metaphysics in general, without offering any properly scientific clarification of the range of phenomena thereby indicated. Finally, in his work, The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, Cassirer has tried to explain the various domains of life – language, knowledge, religion, myth – in a fundamental way as phenomena of the expression of spirit. He has likewise sought to broaden the critique of reason provided by Kant into a critique of culture. Here, too, the phenomenon of expression, of symbol in the widest sense, is taken as a clue for explaining henceforth all phenomena of spirit and of entities in general. The universal applicability of such formal clues as ‘figure’ [*Gestalt*], ‘sign’, ‘symbol’ in this way easily obscures the primordiality or nonprimordiality of the interpretation thereby achieved. [However,] what might be an appropriate approach for aesthetic phenomena can lead to precisely the opposite of an elucidation or interpretation in the case of other phenomena ... It is obvious that interpretive efforts of the kind described, taking up the clues of such universal phenomena, of which anything and everything can be made – for ultimately anything and everything can be interpreted

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For Cassirer, the symbolic representation (or replacement) of entities made possible in language in itself enables the conceptualisation and universalisation of higher or more sophisticated cultural ‘forms’: utopias, laws, necessities, *et cetera*. These are, of course, theoretical entities, abstracted from everydayness.
as a sign – pose a great danger for the development of the human sciences.\textsuperscript{264}

Here Heidegger makes it clear that thinking the being of phenomena with respect to the being of signs or symbols alone, which being any entity can be attributed or can ‘afterwards’ be thought to possess, can easily mislead phenomenological enquiries into being-in-the-world (as opposed to the ‘derivative’ enquiries of derivative understanding).

We should not necessarily think the primordial being of entities and the relationships between them to constitute a system of indicative or representative signs or symbols, therefore; for this is not how entities show themselves ‘as’ they are in themselves. We should not think significance or reference-relationships to be structurally articulated by signs as though these signs were themselves the world’s first entities: Signs, for example, are often established ‘afterwards’ in order to orient Dasein within an environment with which it has or others have already been familiar; to prevent, as it were, the walker from wandering from her path. Worldly phenomena do not subsist aboriginally ‘in themselves’ as signs to be read; nor do they necessarily or ‘in themselves’ present to Dasein or prefabricate for it a logic or order upon which Dasein can afterwards base a grammar or language.

To identify language \textit{qua} language to be thus in its being, to be the systematic repetition or representation of prior, occurrent, silent significations, a system of signs for a system of signs, is simply to risk eliding its being; for as Foucault identifies: “there is no pre-discursive fate disposing the word in our favour”, with respect to in its entities, in this way.\textsuperscript{265} It is not the case that “[t]hings murmur meanings our language has merely to extract; [and that] from its most primitive beginnings, this language was already whispering to us a being of which it forms the skeleton.”\textsuperscript{266} As Heidegger intimates in \textit{History of the Concept of Time}, there is no essential ‘world’ of signs or symbols which, prefiguring language, lies \textit{a priori} in wait

\textsuperscript{265} Foucault, M., \textit{The Archaeology of Knowledge & The Discourse on Language} (trans. Sheridan Smith, A. M.), Pantheon Books, New York, 1972 at 229
\textsuperscript{266} \textit{Ibid} at 228
or expectation of a language to be laid over it.\textsuperscript{267} On the other hand, systems of 
signs are projected onto the world, which world can be mathematised by them.

The construction against which I am arguing, in addition to offering the ‘world’ in the questionable sense I have now described, can lead also to the repositing of “the founding subject”\textsuperscript{268}, the ego or subiectum which, in order to express itself, is thought to ‘read’ phenomena ‘in themselves’ or alternatively to ‘translate’ them in thinking in each new instance as though they already offered a proto-language for Dasein to recognise.\textsuperscript{269} But this is equally problematic for the ontology of being-in-the-world.

According to Heidegger, signs are not constitutive of the intelligibility of the world as it is ontologico-phenomenologically; nor are they constitutive of the webs of significance which Dasein discovers to constitute worldhood. They are not essential to being-in-the-world. Accordingly, significance \textit{[Bedeutsamkeit]} does not originate in signs, nor less in significations; it is first found in the webs of practical dealings with which Dasein is involved, in which it discovers itself to be and to have concerns regarding. To these webs of significance signs refer Dasein, and signs refer themselves. Their indicative function is based on this more primordial connexion and being – out of which connexion and being entities can afterwards be established as signs.

Ultimately, then, it now seems, under the construction I have presented, that language \textit{qua} language, if an \textit{existentiale}, cannot simply be a system of signs or representative of one; that, just perhaps, language occurs equiprimordially in the world with significance and meaningfulness, and not after them. The formal system of meaningful signs with which language is occasionally identified must, under this novel construction, be altogether posterior to the more primordial being of language \textit{qua} discourse, in which Dasein lives; it must at the very least be a radical re-cognisance in thinking of the \textit{existentiale} by which Dasein, being-with-others, is incorporated. Under this construction discourse can not merely amount to an aggregate of reexpressions of what entities, signs, already ‘say’. It must instead

\textsuperscript{268} This is Foucault’s phrase. See Foucault, M., \textit{The Archaeology of Knowledge & The Discourse on Language} (trans. Sheridan Smith, A. M.), Pantheon Books, New York, 1972 at 228
\textsuperscript{269} Just as Heidegger champions the ‘worldliness’ of discourse \textit{qua} language, Foucault champions the “exteriority” of discourse: See \textit{Ibid} at 229
belong rather more essentially to the constitution of Dasein’s own being-in-the-world, being more originary to Dasein’s being-there.

When, circumspectively, Dasein interprets its life, when it interprets the whole in which discourse, with it, resides, it may verily be tempted initially to conceive, to posit, or to identify a system of signs which system seems at first glance to structurally articulate significance or, alternatively, to explain the being of language; but it will not in so doing find that these signs in themselves possess, dictate, or pre-fabricate what is meaningful to being-in-the-world ‘in themselves’, just as they do not determine or exhaust communicative possibilities or the various achievements of language and its role in disclosedness. What Dasein discovers in the first instance is a unified world incorporating language and itself. Perhaps, accordingly, language is more than a system of signs.

With these observations in mind it is now incumbent upon us to answer in more detail the question: How can it be conceived that language is a system of signs if it has been decided that language is not based on the being of occurrent signs or on the private experiences of a subject, an ego or subjectum? How does language, as such, relate to significance?

With this question in mind it will now be useful to contemplate Heidegger’s own brief observations concerning the relationship of language to significance as such; for it is from these observations that the theories of language this dissertation criticises are extracted and established in the first instance.

§3.1: Language and significance

In this section of the paper we meet for the first time in the context of Being and Time the strongest exegetical case for the theories of language that are criticised in this dissertation, including the theory that words are signs. Here, in a close reading of Heidegger’s text, we meet the textual source of this species of derivativism, and begin to speculate as to what Heidegger’s account of language [Sprache] properly consists in.

Heidegger’s discussion of the connexion of language to significance occurs towards the beginning of §34 of Being and Time as a precursor to his discussion of the four constitutive elements of discourse.\(^\text{270}\) In §34, in anticipation of his

\(^{270}\)§34 of Being and Time is entitled “Being-there and discourse. Language”
discussion of discourse, Heidegger intimates that language qua phrases and expressions \([\text{Worte}]\) has a peculiar relationship to being-in-the-world:

The intelligibility of being-in-the-world – an intelligibility which goes with a state-of-mind – \(\text{expresses itself as discourse}\). The totality-of-significations of intelligibility is \(\text{put into words} [\text{Worte}]\). To significations, words \([\text{Worte}]\) accrue. But word-Things \([\text{Wörter-dinge}]\) do not get supplied with significations.\(^{271}\)

We must dissect this paragraph closely. Let us begin with its first two sentences:

The intelligibility of being-in-the-world – an intelligibility which goes with a state-of-mind – \(\text{expresses itself as discourse}\). The totality-of-significations of intelligibility is \(\text{put into words} [\text{Worte}]\).

Employing one interpretation of this passage in particular, the phrase \(\text{"put into words"}\) suggests that with each ontic incidence or ‘advent’ of language the intelligibility of its topic has already been grasped beforehand. Language qua phrases and expressions seems logically posterior to the content it carries; which content seems prepared for expression, in every case, beforehand. Language and the world’s webs of significance, wherein Dasein lives, seem to be tiered entities.

In support of this derivativist impression Dreyfus refers in \(\text{Being-in-the-world}\) to an earlier passage of \(\text{Being and Time}\), in \(\S\)18, in which Heidegger states that:

... in significance itself, with which Dasein is always familiar, there lurks the ontological condition which makes it possible for Dasein, as something which understands and interprets, to disclose such things as ‘significations’; upon these, in turn, is founded the being of words and of language.\(^{272}\)

\(^{271}\) Heidegger, M., \(\text{Being and Time}\) (trans. Macquarrie, J. & Robinson, E.), Blackwell Publishing, Oxford, 1962 at 204, H 161

\(^{272}\) Ibid at 121, H 87

In a margin-note in his own copy of \(\text{Being and Time}\), Heidegger later writes that the impression that language is a secondary ‘tier’ to the world of significance is incorrect. According to Dreyfus, who does not discount the possibility that Heidegger intends derivativism for \(\text{Being and Time}\) in particular, it is nonetheless unclear as to whether or not this margin-note signifies that the early Heidegger
Dasein is ontologically and always a being-in-the-world, immersed in webs of significance. According to Dreyfus, this immersion in significance is (1) an element of the ontological structure of being-in-the-world, and (2) it prefigures language (and must do so factically and existentially).

However, Dreyfus' second claim is not entirely congruent with what Heidegger says almost immediately after the passage Dreyfus cites; for, following it, Heidegger explains that significance, significance disclosed, being in a world which is disclosed, is in itself ‘an existential state of Dasein – of its being-in-the-world; and as such it is the [worldly and] ontical condition for the possibility that a totality of involvements can be discovered’. What Heidegger means here is that (in an ontological sense) Dasein lives in webs of significance – but also and more importantly (and in a factual and an existential sense) that in disclosedness – and therefore in discourse – significance is disclosed. Disclosedness, disclosed significance, is an existentiale, so too is discourse, the existential being of which is language. The ontological condition of the disclosedness of significations (in words), which is significance ‘as such’, is implicitly attested-to and disclosed in discourse: Dasein discovers significance in its worldliness in and through discourse, and there, in discourse, it afterwards sees significance as a condition of its possibility.

In other words Dasein, ontologically, aboriginally immersed in proximate webs of significance, must be aboriginally familiar with significance ‘as such’. In addition, significance must be disclosed to Dasein because disclosedness is an existentiale. This means that significance is disclosed to Dasein in discourse, a possibility of which discourse is the disclosure of significations. Significance and significations, as well as discourse and disclosedness, must be existentially equiprimordial.

This means therefore that significance ‘as such’, the ontological condition of disclosedness, can not preclude Dasein’s being factically ‘where’ it is, its being-there; nor can it preclude disclosedness existentially as though significance were ‘there’ from the first instance in the world preceding it. Instead, significance and disclosedness co-exist. This is disclosed phenomenologically, for

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thought that it was one (See Dreyfus, H. L., Being-in-the-World: a commentary on Heidegger’s Being and Time, Division I, MIT Press, Cambridge (Massachusetts), 1991 at 216). Let us continue to investigate it.

phenomenologically there is no living priority of significance over disclosedness; of significations over discourse; of significance over language qua its manifest ‘forms’ or otherwise.

What Heidegger means in the passage Dreyfus cites therefore is that although without significance meaningful discourse would not be possible, significance is disclosed through discourse.

Under this construction discourse – and therefore language – can not be proximally and in the first instance absent in living being-in-the-world. That significance is an ontological condition of the possibility of disclosedness does not imply its aboriginal independence in worldly actuality, but implies instead its inevitable disclosedness in every living instance of discourse – for being-in-the-world does not precede or precipitate its own existentia, and the word “founded” should not be interpreted to have this implication.

Ontologically conceived, Dasein has submitted itself to the world. It lives in webs of significance. Ontically, existentially, and therefore factically, this is disclosed to Dasein by its being-in-the-world. This is why significance is discoverable; why its aboriginal familiarity can be felt. Discourse, an existentiale, an element of the ontological structure of being-in-the-world, is involved in disclosedness.

If we examine what Heidegger says above in the first two sentences about the connexion of intelligibility to discourse more closely, therefore, we do not now find an express statement of an ontologico-categorical hierarchy involving (1) significance and significations and (2) discourse and language as they are in the world. We do not discover an analytic attempt to scale and divide these phenomena into worldly tiers. We do not discover a fixed indication that being-in-the-world is in every case and originally an entity for language to reach to afterwards. Instead, we discover that the intelligibility of being-in-the-world expresses itself in discourse in the words, ontically identifiable, in which ‘where’ Dasein lives and is placed ab initio. We learned above that:

Discourse is the [expressive] Articulation of intelligibility. Therefore it underlies both interpretation and assertion. …That which gets [structurally] articulated as such in discursive Articulation, we call the ‘totality-of-significations’ [Bedeutungsganze]. …If discourse, as the
Articulation of the intelligibility of the ‘there’, is a primordial existentiale of disclosedness, and if disclosedness is primarily constituted by being-in-the-world, then discourse too must have essentially a kind of being which is specifically worldly.274

A derivativist picture of language is, nonetheless, often extracted from the two sentences to which we are attending; for if it is assumed that language – or language-use – is ontologically posterior to Dasein’s grasp of the world, and the matter of intelligibility being (afterwards) “put” into words [Worte] is interpreted congruently, then Heidegger’s phrasing does seem to suggest the possibility of an a priori hierarchy between the intelligibility of the world, its structures of significance, and the subsequent injection of this intelligibility into language.

As we have seen, one such derivativism supposes that words are tools; purporting that they are fundamentally equipmental in nature and are used to refer to one’s intuitions or to other referents (such as entities as they are ‘in themselves’). A second kind of derivativism describes words as signs – as entities whose being is grounded in wider contexts of significance, which signs indicate something about these contexts. For his part, as we will learn more about below, Blattner suggests a third kind of derivativism, supposing that language [Sprache] might be derivative of discourse [Rede], which he interprets as Dasein’s ‘primordial’ and ‘disclosive’ behaviour, but also as something ‘silent’.

Prima facie, however, as we have now learned, three potential problems with derivativism arise:

(1) If language is the existential being of discourse, and discourse is language proximally and for the most part, then it seems incoherent to describe language as a phenomenon logically ‘posterior’ to discourse, and therefore derivative of it.
(2) If discourse is in principle an element of disclosedness, being how the world ‘is’ to Dasein; and if, because language is the existential being of discourse it is incoherent to describe it as a phenomenon that is logically ‘posterior’ to disclosedness or derivative of it, then it seems incoherent to describe language as a derivative feature of disclosedness – of how the world ‘is’ to Dasein.

(3) Even if language is a system of signs or tools it must, according to Heidegger’s account of reference, always already belong to a totality or web of significance in one way or another; thus, language seems to always already be in the world.

In order to gain some further, preliminary insights for the direction of our overall investigation, let us continue our analysis of the passage concerning language and significance with which this section’s discussion commenced. In part, it reads thus:

To significations, words accrue \[wachsen\]. But word-Things do not get supplied with significations.\(^\text{275}\)

‘To accrue’ \[erwachsen\] has the meaning of ‘to grow’, as in ‘to grow to adulthood’. In the statement “to significations, words accrue \[wachsen\]”, ‘accrue’ denotes on the one hand the way that words find their maturity; the way that one can find significations in them. Phenomena show themselves in language. Phrases and expressions are meaningful and have places in the world inasmuch as they are ‘about’ something. On the other hand, ‘to accrue’ means ‘to accumulate’: in webs of significance, in Dasein’s dealings, words accumulate. They are “deposited” there.\(^\text{276}\)

Significations can be heard even in simple words. Hearing the word ‘mouse-pad’, we think of computing or computers; hearing the word ‘running’ we think of an athletic event or carnival, a tap, sink and bathroom, or a managed situation that a person is in charge of. Certain significations “accrue” words in this way because they refer to them: they share a reference-relationship in the web of significance in which they have accumulated and woven themselves together. That such is the case means that words, phrases and expressions are not originally independent entities that ‘lie in wait in the world’ for their meanings to be supplied to them. As we have learned, instead, inasmuch as they are words, phrases and expressions, they


\(^{276}\) Heidegger explains that: “The way things have been expressed or spoken out is such that in the totality of contexts of significations into which it has been [structurally] articulated, it preserves an understanding of the disclosed world.... The understanding which has thus been ‘deposited’ in the way things have been expressed, pertains just as much to any traditional discoveredness of entities which may have been reached, as it does to one’s current understanding of being and to whatever possibilities and horizons for fresh interpretation and conceptual [expressive] articulation may be available.” (See \textit{ibid} at 211, H 168)
always already ‘carry a meaning along with them’. This is indicative of their worldliness. As Heidegger states in 1925:

There is no language in general, as some kind of free-floating essence in which the various so-called particular existences could take part. Every language is – like Dasein [human being] itself – historical in its being. The seemingly uniform, free-floating [independent] being of a language, in which Dasein always first moves, is only its lack of pertinence to some particular Dasein.\(^{277}\)

In the same way language is not comprised of mere marks or noises that are afterwards given meaning.\(^{278}\) Words do not get supplied their meanings by a series of tragic Adams-in-the-world, ostensibly casting utterances over foreign objects. Inasmuch as they are public entities, words and significations belong to each other already, and do so in contexts of meaning, in webs of significance, with which Dasein understandingly familiarises itself.

Under this construction language belongs to Dasein, and Dasein belongs to language. Every possible meaningful expression that Dasein is capable of using or of attending to will always already belong to, or at least evoke a worldly circumstance or situation. If a ‘word’ has no meaning at all, then it will not be a word; it will have no relationship to being-in-the-world.

What this observation suggests is that language is not quite as foreign to the webs of significance or the reference relationships which flood them as derivativist accounts of language imply. On the contrary, it suggests that certain meaningful expressions will always already belong to certain webs of significance (of reference-relationships). The failure to adequately account for this possibility is one of the


\(^{278}\) See, for example, the way Dreyfus explains at Dreyfus, H. L., *Being-in-the-World: a commentary on Heidegger’s Being and Time, Division I*, MIT Press, Cambridge (Massachusetts), 1991 at 218 that: “Throughout his discussion of [discourse], Heidegger opposes the traditional account of language found in both Husserl and Searle – that language consists of occurrent noises or marks that are given meaning either by minds that are the source of what Searle calls intrinsic meaning, or, as in Husserl, by being paired with abstract entities similar to Fregean senses [i.e, for Husserl, ‘intuitions’].” Accordingly, “Heidegger would also oppose the idea that language can be rationally reconstructed as marks and noises given a [sic] holistic interpretation in relation to the speaker’s behaviour and the salient objects in the vicinity, as Davidson holds.” Under this construction, with which I agree, “all such accounts address a psuedoproblem because their starting point is ontologically inadequate.”
weaknesses of derivativism which I wish to emphasise; for the more likely it is that language and webs of significance belong-together aboriginally, then the less likely it is that an exhaustive, pre-linguistic understanding of the world can be unearthed, or can even be ontologically possible.

Blattner contends, nonetheless, that Heidegger's sentence “to significations, words accrue” does indeed suggest the legitimacy of derivativism: “[It suggests that] significations are more basic than words, and [that] words are founded upon them.”279 This derivativist theory of language purports that webs of significance (and therefore reference-relationships) are structurally articulated prior to language, in which language they are afterwards expressed. It is thus supposed that Dasein’s words ‘accrue’ to significations by means of arriving to them afterwards; that they do not reside with them in webs of significance as elements thereof. However, Being and Time is conspicuously silent as to the origin and possibility of the late arrival of words to significations which derivativism champions, as well as to how it might factically manifest or occur, excepting the passages that have been cited and criticised above.

§.32(a): Husserl, signs, and meaning; Heidegger, signs, and significance

In order to better encapsulate Heidegger's phenomenological, hermeneutic account of signs [Zeichen] and significance [Bedeutsamkeit] in Being and Time, as well as to examine how and why it is a unique one, it will now be useful to compare it to and contrast it with Husserl’s Logical Investigations account of signs [Zeichen] and meaning [Bedeutung]. Husserl’s account of signs and meaning is, in essence, formal and semiotic. Importantly, however, it also treats of the possibility that words are signs. The connexion of words and signs is one of its primary concerns. For this reason, the ensuing encapsulation and examination of Husserl’s account will leave us better equipped to show precisely why ‘representative’ theories of language in particular do not accurately reflect the way the situation of Dasein, being-in-the-world, is intimately and primordially interwoven with language.

Husserl’s Logical Investigations is designed to enquire into the nature of the connexions between thought and speech generally; and to settle how it is that the meanings of our pronouncements or expressions [die Ausdrücke] have their

grounding in “higher intellectual regions”. For Husserl, “meaning” [Bedeutung] ultimately refers to a mental or “ideal entity”, such as a judgement or finding about something, which can afterwards be realised in many different expressions. In other words, any given expression relates back to an “ideal entity” as its object. These “ideal” objects are what expressions refer to; they are what expressions mean. These are, in essence, the domain or territory of meaning; and meaning, so conceived, is intentional.

Ultimately, Husserl decides that the substance or meaning of our expressions is indebted in the very first instance to our intuition [Intuition] (our νοησις [noēsis]) of worldly phenomena generally. Our intuitions are then translated into ideal entities, and these meanings are subsequently able to be expressed. In Husserl’s words:

[That which we make expressions about,] in the first instance …, come before us embedded in concrete mental states which further function either as the meaning-intention or meaning-fulfilment of certain verbal expressions – in the latter case intuitively illustrating, or intuitively providing evidence for, our meaning [Bedeutung] – and forming a phenomenological unity with such expressions.

According to Husserl, whatever expressions can be taken to mean must ultimately be measured against our intuitions of the phenomena they concern. By extension, this means they must also be measured against our familiarity with the language our meanings are expressed in, and the degree to which these meanings are evoked in it. In hearing understandingly, we are directed to the contemplation of an ideal object; to an intuition.

Husserl, therefore, like Heidegger, is critical of psychologism. He states that whichever meaning [Bedeutung] an expression expresses, as well as whatever sense [Sinn] it intimates [kundgibt] or conveys, is not born of the private “normative ideality” of a subject alone, or of the private idealism of a subiectum ‘in itself’; that

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281 The phrase “ideal entity” is borrowed from Sokolowski, R., *Husserlian Meditations: How Words Present Things*, Northwestern University Press, Evanston, 1974 at 113
283 Ibid at 231

As Mohanty explains: “If by ‘psychologism’ is meant the thesis that the object of an act is identical with the act (sound heard = hearing of the sound, sense-datum = sensation), Husserl rejects it from
this kind of “psychologism can only be radically overcome by a pure phenomenology”; a taking account of phenomena and the contexts and meanings speakers share and comprehend.\(^{284}\) For Husserl it is ultimately our intuitions of phenomena that our expressions treat. The translation of intuitions into ideal entities is the source of meaning generally.\(^{285}\)

For these reasons, however, it is possible to construct a derivativist account of language from Husserl’s account of how utterance is intentionally pre-figured, for under Husserl’s construction language expresses ideal entities. Under this construction, for example, it is possible to reduce language to a complex of mere noises or marks for the speaker’s employ, which reduction, as we have learned, is anathema to Heidegger: In so doing it will seem that it is only “…in virtue of the mental act of meaning something with [these noises or marks] or of understanding something by it, [that] the physical ‘expression’ becomes a genuine expression” – that the mark or noise becomes something linguistic.\(^{286}\) This view of language, as we have seen, is problematic, for the reduction of language to its aggregate ‘matter’ neglects to consider the role and function of being-in-the-world for language, as well as how intimately it is tied to it.

Let us now examine Husserl’s study of the connexion of language to signs.

\(\S32(b):\) Signs

For Husserl, signs can either indicate or express. Husserl observes that the words ‘express’ and ‘indicate’ are often treated as though they were synonyms, but subsequently concludes that ‘expressions’ and ‘indications’ do not logically coincide.

For Husserl, on the one hand, signs are indications \([\text{Anzeichen}]\) of intuatable phenomena, such as, for example, the smoke that indicates the existence of a fire, or the south wind that indicates coming rain; whereas expressions \([\text{Ausdrücke}]\), such

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Husserl’s phenomenology is not investigated in this dissertation in great detail as, for the most part, it is beyond its scope.

\(^{285}\) It is important to notice that Husserl’s “pure phenomenology” treats of the present-at-hand – of intuitions of phenomena that are translated into ideal entities in “higher intellectual regions” (i.e., in the mind) – as original. Heidegger’s discovery of the ready-to-hand shows (with reference to Dasein’s always already being-concerned) that the simple ‘perception’ of phenomena consists fundamentally in an abstraction of entities from their encounter in Dasein’s basic way of being-in-the-world with them.

as a speech one gives about something in mind, convey a meaning – an ideal object, an intuition. In other words, although every sign has an indicative function and is properly an indication of something, it is not the case that every sign is also substantially an expression of a sense [Sinn] or meaning [Bedeutung] which has to do with something secured in the mind.\textsuperscript{287} In other words, as mere indications, signs do not indicate the way things matter; they do not disclose content or meaning. For Husserl, for example, a rising plume of smoke merely indicates the presence or existence of a fire, but does not mean or contain the meaning that may be intuited from it; whereas the expression “smoke!” charged, inasmuch as it is a fearful exclamation of the way something matters, not only indicates the presence of a fire but, inasmuch as it is also the expression of an ideal object, conveys something meaningful about it – that approaching fire is dangerous, and that its dangerousness matters. Under this construction, even individual words, if used appropriately and evocatively, can constitute expressions – inasmuch, that is, as each individual word will in each case express a meaning.\textsuperscript{288} In this way the ultimate reduction of words to indications, or the amalgamation of words and indications under the common genus ‘signs’, is not a project with which Husserl would sympathise; at the very least, even individual words, according to Husserl, can themselves be expressive – a view with which Heidegger is sympathetic. For Husserl, ‘signs’ but belong to the domain of phenomena to be intuited and do not in themselves amount to “genuine” expressions.

Like Heidegger, Husserl recognises that the possibility of sign’s indicating something relies on a way of life for which an indication can occur: he states that “[a] thing is only properly an indication if and where it in fact serves to indicate something to some thinking being.”\textsuperscript{289} One might postulate by extension that indications can occur to animals – to the bee, for example, inasmuch as its ‘dancing’ seems ostensibly to indicate the presence of nectar to other bees. In addition,

\textsuperscript{287} Husserl, E., \textit{Logical Investigations} (trans. Findlay, J. N.), Routledge, London, 2002 at 183
\textsuperscript{288} Conversely, Husserl would attest that an ‘exit’ sign merely indicates. The word ‘exit’ is not in this case an expression because it does not express an intuition. In point of interest, Husserl does not include facial expressions in the same category as ‘words’. These are merely ‘gestures’; indications. He contends that “they are not phenomenally one with the experiences made manifest in them in the consciousness of the man who manifests them, as is the case with speech.” (See Husserl, E., \textit{Logical Investigations} (trans. Findlay, J. N.), Routledge, London, 2002 at 188) Similarly, for Husserl, a word that is uttered but has neither an intended meaning nor a conveyed meaning is not properly an expression; it is, instead, merely a ‘heap’ of noise.
\textsuperscript{289} Husserl, E., \textit{Logical Investigations} (trans. Findlay, J. N.), Routledge, London, 2002 at 184
Husserl recognises that signs, in indicating, can motivate the recognition of a relation between two entities; but also that neither the indication nor the motivation causes the relation (recall Heidegger’s contention that reference is ontologically prior to the establishment of signs).^{290}

§.33: The problem of combining these accounts

Heidegger’s *Being and Time* account of signs and significance differs clearly from Husserl’s *Logical Investigations* account of signs and meaning in many small ways. On the one hand, Husserl treats signs [*Anzeichen*] as entities that are variously indicative, semiotic, and independent, whereas Heidegger does not, deciding that signs automatically direct Dasein to a meaningful context and must be established within it that they may do so. For Heidegger the sign is not ‘in itself’ meaningful; what is meaningful is the context in which it is. The relationship of a sign to the already-meaningful context or web of significance in which it ‘is’ is necessarily constituted in the first instance by a reference-relationship that is itself meaningful: the very discovery of a sign always already implicates Dasein’s familiarity with a wider, meaningful context wherein the sign belongs and whence it can emerge. In other words, signs do not merely ‘indicate’ but rather motivate the remembrance of where Dasein is and what matters to it – they *direct* Dasein by raising reference-relationships into its circumspection. The ‘indication’ which the sign performs is, for Heidegger, an ostensive reference:

A sign is not a thing which stands to another thing in the relationship of indicating; it is rather *an item of equipment which explicitly raises a totality of equipment into our circumspection* ... signs always indicate primarily ‘wherein’ one lives, where one’s concern dwells, what sort of involvement there is with something.^{291}

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If a word is being used as a sign this does not therefore mean that language is essentially equipmental; it indicates on the other hand that a word is being borrowed for the purpose of giving an indication, for making a reference-relationship ostensive.

Heidegger is not trying to erase the difference between indication and expression, for indication is ontologico-phenomenologically ‘later’ than reference, than the meaningful webs of significance with which language is always already interwoven in disclosedness: indication depends on reference-relationships. Finally, although a word can be an indication, language is not always merely indicative: language is not ‘in itself’ equipmental (see Chapter Three).
On the other hand, Heidegger’s account of signs and significance makes no
ostensive mention of language (or expression in the Husserlian sense), whereas
Husserl’s account of signs and meaning constantly refers to language, treating the
relationship of ‘expressions’ and ‘meanings’ to signs as a matter for the logical
investigation of language, thinking, and ideal entities. For Heidegger, the
interpretation of significance – and, of course, reference, – is not to be grounded in
the ‘formal’ phenomenon of ‘indication’, in the ‘pure logic’ or ‘science of
statements’ with which Husserl studies ‘expression’ – or indeed in exclusively ‘ideal’
phenomena. According to Heidegger neither meaning nor significance is to be
found in the relationship between a sign and a signifier: there is no origination of
significance in the relationship between language and Dasein so conceived. Rather,
the relationship of signs to significance is to be addressed by a more fundamental,
phenomenological ontology of being-in-the-world. In this way Heidegger intimates
that language need not be thought as ‘indication’ alone; for this is merely a way to
treat it formally.

Unlike Husserl, at no point does Heidegger test the equation of words and
signs unless in order to demonstrate a way in which the being of language as such
can be (mis)interpreted by thinking it in a too-narrow fashion formally as mere
words, mere assertions, or mere pronouncements – ontical characterisations of
language which belong to logical investigations, and not to the phenomenological
ontology of being with which Heidegger concerns himself. Thus Heidegger is
critical of the idea that words and signs can be thought as the same kind of entity,
just because thinking language as a system of signs is ultimately to concentrate on
but one of language’s possible ontic appearances, and not on the relationship of
language ‘in itself’, as discourse, to disclosedness generally. It is clear, nonetheless,
that Heidegger, like Husserl, does not think words [Worte] to be merely indicative.

§.34: Language as a system of signs

We learned above that in an ontological sense and according to Heidegger
the worldhood of the world is a product of how the world is articulated according
to significance. For his part, however, Heidegger explicitly rejects the possibility
that the world is structurally articulated according to the priority of signs and
significations: signs are to be properly understood in terms of significance, which is
logically prior, with respect to which they emerge. Significance is primordial; signs
refer themselves to it. Inasmuch as Dasein, a discoursing being, lives in webs of significance, words can always already be found there, disclosing the world, referring to a meaning or concern with which they are existentially interwoven. They do not in this way stand ‘by themselves’ for other, similarly independent phenomena.

For this reason Dasein’s natural languages must be thought in the first instance in terms of the broader being of discourse, an existentiale, and the link of discourse to disclosedness. Languages are originally interwoven-with and disclosive-of the world in which Dasein lives concernfully; words are meaningful because they belong to meaningful contexts and not merely to intuitions. Any given account of Dasein’s individual languages must address this more fundamental way of being if it is to be penetrating or perspicuous with regard to language as it is ‘in itself’. The contention that Dasein’s languages are simply systems of ontic signs can not achieve this task: That signs are a way that language manifests ontically does not mean that signs are also language in its most fundamental being.

Heidegger explains in Being and Time that his discussion of language is “designed merely to point out the ontological ‘locus’ of this phenomenon in Dasein’s state of being.” It is to this ‘locus’, the status of language as existentiale, its inherence in disclosedness, that due attention must be given. Heidegger appeals for the reorientation of the “science of language” away from ontic phenomena – and towards ontological being as such – on these grounds.

With this in mind, having decided to trace briefly the history of the study of language ‘in itself’, Heidegger iterates that in the beginning the Greeks had no word for language; that they thought instead of λόγος. While the λόγος is investigated below in more detail in Chapter Seven, it will suffice for the nonce to say that inasmuch as the Greeks thought about the λόγος with respect to its ‘linguistic’ dimension, they thought its essence in terms of the representative statement, proposition, or assertion. Already, in De Interpretatione, the second of his logical treatises, Aristotle states that “spoken sounds are symbols of affections in the soul”. Similarly, Plato’s doctrine of the Universal Forms supposes the Forms to

293 See ibid at 209, H 165
294 This is Heidegger’s own interpretation. See ibid at 209, H 165
295 Aristotle, De Interpretatione, 1, 16a3-16a8
ground the being of whichever worldly phenomena Dasein encounters and its language signifies. Often today the being of language is still thought with respect to these reflections: In essence, assertions and propositions are interpreted to consist in words, and words are interpreted to consist in direct representations, expressions, indications, significations, et cetera, of underlying concepts, universals, or entities.

For the most part the reflections on language typified thus today maintain the existence of an a priori ‘real’ world beneath language – or, at the very least, an a priori ‘experience’ of the world – whence are derived the meanings of words or whichever content they represent, whence the possibility of their being is thought to originate accordingly. Derivativism is but one such exemplar: The world as well as Dasein’s experience of being-there is thought to be logically prior to language. Ultimately, as Mohanty explains, “[the] so called Platonic theories of meaning … in effect reduce expressions to conventional signs for [entities]. …they cut off meaning from both the subjective life of persons and from the expressions that bear them”296 – which is not even to mention their severance from the public domain and discourse in which Dasein lives with others, in which meaning is articulated. Experience (νοεῖν) is prioritised over expression accordingly; the immersive quality of language is overlooked.

In the earliest days of the philosophy of language, the name and its object were thought to correspond so exactly that the name itself was considered to be a part of its object, if not to be a substitute for it. The Ancient Greek expression for ‘word’, ονομα [onoma], literally means ‘name’ – even ‘proper name’ – and reflects this stance. In time, however, once it began to be thought that the λόγος, the propositional expression in want of worldly substantiation, was not in itself identical with the belief concerning or the perception (νοεῖν) of the object of one’s statements, one’s statements began to be thought with respect to the degree to which they corresponded to their objects, and were in this way accurate

For more examples of how Aristotle thinks language to be related to underlying concepts, universals, and worldly substances in De Interpretatione in particular, see 1, 16a1-17a7, as well as chapters 2-4, generally.
By extension, the Platonic theories of meaning ‘cut words off’ from that to which they refer, causing them to be reducible to ‘bare noise’, signs, or other ‘forms’.
representations of them. Accordingly, it began to be thought that expressions were mere copies of corresponding ‘images’ (εἰκών) of objects until, upon Plato’s rejection of this thesis in his *Cratylus*, corresponding to which rejection is Plato’s doctrine that words recall the universal Forms, each word became the mere sign (σημείο) of a phenomenon – the ὀθέα – always already defined, and therefore pre-known. 297 Throughout the history of its treatment language is repeatedly thought with respect to its use as a representative entity, foreign to its topics. As Gadamer explains:

... from early on the Greek philosophers fought against the *onoma* as the source of the seduction and confusion of thought, and held instead to the ideality that is [expressed] in language. 298 This is true already of Parmenides, who conceived the truth of the object from the *logos*, and certainly after the Platonic turn to ‘discourse’, followed by Aristotle’s orientation of the forms of being to the forms of assertion (*schema ta eidos kategorias*). 299 Because here orientation to the *eidos* (εἰδος) was

297 Κρατύλος [*Cratylus*], an Athenian philosopher from the fifth century BC, was taught by Heraclitus. According to legend, Heraclitus, believing that the cosmos exists in a constant state of flux, once proclaimed that one can not step twice into the same stream (Plato, *Cratylus*, 402a). In reply, Cratylus proclaimed that one could not even step into it once (See Aristotle *Metaphysics* Gamma, 5, 1010a10-15). According to Cratylus, if the cosmos is in constant flux, if phenomena are impermanent, like as a stream of passing water, then the being and meaning of words, which according to Cratylus are also natural phenomena, must be in constant flux as well. Thus according to Cratylus words are too fluid to support logic or even to communicate ideas. Allegedly, Cratylus reduced himself accordingly to communicating without speech, making his wishes known by the careful manipulation of his index fingers.

In response to Cratylus’ claims, Plato posits the being of the Forms, the perfect and consistent realisations of phenomena, in which their substance inheres. According to Plato mortals live with the Forms before the advent of their mortality, and they to return to them at death. For this reason Plato associates our familiarity with worldly phenomena with our recollection of the perfect Forms, which, according to Plato, our words represent or recall.


298 This “ideality” is the “meaning” which Husserl refers to.

299 Heidegger recognises what Gadamer explains with respect to assertoric utterance, submitting that “[t]he basic stock of ‘categories of signification’, which passed over into the subsequent science of language, which in principle is still accepted as the standard today, is oriented towards discourse as assertion.” (See: Heidegger, M., *Being and Time* (trans. Macquarrie, J. & Robinson, E.), Blackwell Publishing, Oxford, 1962 at 209, H 165)
conceived as what determined the *logos*, that language should have a [primordial, natural] being of its own could only be regarded as a confusion, to banish and overcome which was the purpose of thought. Hence the critique of the correctness of names in the *Cratylus* is the first step in a direction at the end of which lies the modern instrumental theory of language [thought divorced from the ‘real’ world and merely expressive of proximate ideas] and the ideal of a sign system of reason. Wedged in between image and sign, the nature of language could only be reduced to the level of pure sign.\(^{301}\)

As intimated above, this way of interpreting language – as “pure sign” and therefore empty, spurious, or artificial – ultimately champions the existence of an *a priori* ‘real world’ or experience thereof, beneath language, represented in language, whence are derived the meanings of words. Language is thought as an entirely derivative phenomenon, significant of phenomena more proximate and primordial. However, as has already been intimated, there seems to be a problem with this way of thinking both with respect to Heidegger’s philosophy in particular, and also inasmuch as it champions the “sovereignty of the signifier”, subjectivism as such, realism as a possible consequence of this position, and, most importantly, an aversion to the possible aboriginality of discourse in its living worldliness in general. It seems to preserve what Foucault calls as a long-standing “logophobia” or reluctance to see the proximate aboriginality of language in being-*in*-the-world.\(^{302}\) The more there unfolds any distance between an underlying ‘true’ or ‘primordial world’ however conceived and our ability to grasp it, whether this be measured by the indeterminable ‘remoteness’ of human activity, ideality, or tongue, the more we

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are at risk of sacrificing the proximate world in which Dasein lives and speaks in the name of a neutral, \textit{a priori}, ‘real’ and independent primordial one.

For his part Nietzsche contends that just this sacrifice lies at the ground of “the history of an error”, from which, with lucidity and perspicuity, we will eventually liberate ourselves.\footnote{See Nietzsche, F., \textit{Twilight of the Idols or How one Philosophises with a Hammer} (trans. Kaufmann, W.), 1888, in Kaufmann, W., (ed.), \textit{The Portable Nietzsche}, The Viking Press, New York, 1982 at 485-486} In essence, Nietzsche’s history describes “how the ‘true world’ finally became a fable”, recounting a figurative genealogy according to which at the promised “highpoint of humanity” the ‘true’ and ‘apparent’ worlds will finally both be abolished. What Nietzsche’s description of the impending abolishment consists in is a call to investigate phenomena \textit{from themselves}, as they are, without relying on the opposition of our experience to a ‘real’ world, distant from the very first instance. It does not make sense to Nietzsche to abstract and to divide the world apart, as it were, from its residents. This is a project Nietzsche condemns, too, in \textit{On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense}. Here he iterates that “[only] through forgetfulness can man ever achieve the illusion of possessing a ‘truth’ in the sense just designated.”\footnote{Nietzsche, F., \textit{On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense} (trans. Kaufmann, W.), in Kaufmann, W., (ed.), \textit{The Portable Nietzsche}, The Viking Press, New York, 1982 at 45} With respect to language, therefore, he iterates that:

\begin{quote}
\ldots what matters with words is never the truth [so conceived], never an adequate expression; else there would not be so many languages. The ‘thing in itself’ (for that is what pure truth, without consequences, would be) is quite incomprehensible to the creators of language and not at all worth aiming for.\footnote{Ibid at 45}
\end{quote}

The retention of the ‘true’ and ‘apparent’ worlds in any reading of \textit{Being and Time} – or indeed the preservation in general of the dichotomy of the ‘primordial’ and ‘artificial linguistic’ worlds – would in fact revivify a metaphysical philosophy of
being-in-the-world within Heidegger’s phenomenological account of the phenomenon – precisely the opposite of what is intended in *Being and Time*. Just such a revivification would rent the unity of being-in-the-world and its equiprimordial existentialia asunder. Accordingly, if words are to be characterised as signs, then what is clear *ab initio* is that this characterisation must not serve to divorce them from the world in which Dasein lives, or serve to sever Dasein from its world in the name of a new, supposedly more organic one. To do so would create logical and epistemic problems for which we have no need. As we have learned, signs refer themselves to the world in which they and Dasein belong – and are – already. For this reason alone can entities be established as signs; and for this reason alone can signs be recognised and formalised as independent entities – to which other entities have degrees of ‘correspondence’. The plasticity of the meanings of words, phrases, and expressions, being both their capacity to denote all kinds of different phenomena and to be ambiguous for this reason, as well as the difficulties we have all experienced as children in learning what they refer to, is no indication of their separation from the world in which they occur: words are not celestial entities in want of earthly justification. Similarly, the phenomenal plasticity and ambiguity of words is not in itself an appeal to us from words to work in search of their ‘ground’ as though it were an earthly genus, ‘entity’, and were in this sense entirely objective or present-at-hand: there is no ‘realism’ about the world in this sense. The more universal a concept, the more flexible a word in its application and consequence, the more surely its being in being-in-the-world is exposed in its complex vagueness, impact, and considerable enormity. Ultimately, phenomenologically, the word expresses a unitary phenomenon. It is in this way a self-expression of being-in-the-world; an effusion, dynamic. Only the particular word, thought formally and steadily ‘in itself’, abstracted from being-in-the-world, raised to the sky as an objectively occurring entity, is distanced from its immersion in being-in-the-world and can seem groundless for this reason. Only then does the question of a ground ‘as such’ present itself. If we are to think signs ontically, formally, and in terms of their indicative function alone, then we must first admit

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306 The comparatively modern tension between realism and anti-realism is close to retaining this dichotomy in spirit. Malpas, in agreement with the arguments I have advanced here with respect to the ‘true’ and ‘apparent’ worlds and *Being and Time* generally, suggests that the dichotomy of the ‘true’ and ‘apparent’ worlds is “largely a problem to be overcome than resolved”. See Malpas, J., *Donald Davidson and the Mirror of Meaning: Holism, truth, interpretation*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992 at 274. Heidegger’s conception of the true is discussed in more detail below.
that we have withdrawn them or seek to withdraw them from the world and Dasein’s being-there (with language) by which they were proximately absorbed in the first instance. By positing ‘signs’, independent, and identifying these entities with language ‘as such’, we divorce language from its originary inherence in disclosedness.

In 1959 in The Way to Language Heidegger reiterates this position: Here he claims that although:

> What unfolds essentially in language is saying as pointing \([\text{showing, disclosing, } \text{die Zeige}]\) ... Its showing does not culminate in a system of signs. Rather, all signs arise from a showing [disclosedness] in whose realm and for whose purposes they can be signs.\(^{307}\)

Signs refer themselves to the more originary connexion between language and disclosedness in being-in-the-world – which connexion they exemplify ontically by ‘pointing’ – because of their ontological being, which is the being of disclosedness. Language does not simply ‘stand’ for other, alien phenomena; on the other hand, language is interwoven with phenomena in disclosedness \(\text{ab initio}\).

It follows, then, that appeals to the notion that language is ‘in itself’ a system of signs, whether representative of an image \([\varepsilon\kappa\omega]\) or \(\varepsilon\text{idos}\) \(\varepsilon\delta\alpha\zeta\) of an object in particular, or indeed of an otherworldly idea \(\varepsilon\delta\epsilon\alpha\zeta\) or universal Form, are problematic in essence for Being and Time if Dasein is formally isolated from the world and language in which it finds itself. Such isolation is altogether incommensurate with the phenomenology of being-in-the-world, including the identification of Dasein as a speaking, discoursing being-with-others. Accordingly, any account of language built from Being and Time must proceed by paying heed to what being-in-the-world consists in, which means the embededdness of language in it, and the way that Dasein \text{resides} there discursively, privy to surrounding discourse: This must occur at the expense of the formalisation of language and the various logical enquiries which ensue from it –which enquiries persistently betoken its separation.

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On the one hand *Being and Time* presents itself accordingly in its refusal to engage the problems of the traditional study of language and its connexion to the world which precede and inform it. On the other hand, however, it uniquely behoves their critique, revealing new paths in ontology with which to circumnambulate such problems in order to discover language anew, in itself, in its existential role in disclosedness. In particular, *Being and Time* begins to show just why language has been thought to be sign-like, why it has long been reduced to the ability or activity of the ‘subject’, as well as why these particular interpretations of language are phenomenologically problematic and neglect language ‘in itself’.
§.35: The formalisation of language generally & μίμησις, concerning Nature

In the first instance discourse is ‘there’ in the world: when it is afterwards conceived ontically, fixedly, as the various languages Dasein speaks, it can be taken in turn as a system of individual entities – as signs or tools and so on. Once a totality of phenomena has been formalised and so posited in this way, the ontological being of discourse can be taken, in itself, to be an aggregation of constitutive formal elements. The attempt to divine how words, phrases, and expressions are related to webs of significance – to the world and what is in it – is for the most part one which occurs in the project of attempting to investigate formal characters of this kind. However it is rare if it is not impossible, inasmuch as words, phrases and expressions occur in the world, to find them divorced from a broader context of significance and in consequent need of reattachment to the world – unless, that is, they have been formally isolated for investigation, or isolated formally in critical interpretation. On the one hand this divorce occurs methodologically with the very project of derivative understanding with which formal characters are first assigned, but, on the other hand, this assignment does not always have to occur within the confines of specifically scientific or philosophical enterprise. The genesis of the formalisation of language and linguistic forms, or of the corresponding attitude that language is merely an entity for wielding, can be perfectly ordinary: It can be found fledgling in such simple situations as that of the student caught wondering what a word ‘means’, or that of the pedant stuck struggling to elect the right word for precisely ‘what’ he means to have it let manifest.

In general, what the formalisation of language signifies for the philosophy of language is the technical attempt to overcome the world and to attain to dominion over its phenomenal population in thinking. But the reduction of language to a representative calculus or schema, or to an entity which can be wielded which by its deficiencies confirms that there is more to know beyond its grasp or suggests alternatively that it just can not grasp the ‘real’ world and exactly ‘what’ one wants to say at all, ultimately replaces the living unity of world and language, the primordial, proximate place of language in Dasein’s webs of significance, with an abstract paradigm of Nature and Representation. Thus can
language swiftly start to be thought as a tool, sign-like or not, for dominion over what is extant – albeit as a tool which remains manifestly inefficient or incomplete. At the very least, it can become characterised as an independent super-structure, subjectable to independent analysis such as it is typified, for example, in structuralist philosophies.

It is true that in §34 of Being and Time Heidegger explains that language can be discovered ontically as “a totality of words [Worte] – a totality in which discourse has a ‘worldly’ being of its own”\(^\text{308}\). However, if thinking language as a totality of sorts is pursued to an oft-reached extremity then language can “be broken up into [that is, interpreted as] word-things [Wörter-dinge] which are present-at-hand”\(^\text{309}\) – it can be broken up into isolable, independent ingredients, each with a being of its own.

Here, however, Heidegger’s description of language as a “totality of words” should always be thought with respect to his immediately later attestation that language is the existential being of discourse [Rede]. Discourse is the being of language. Phrases, expressions, and word-things, independent entities, are not all there is to language as such; and if indeed the being of language is thought in the first instance with respect to disclosedness, to communion, to the way that Dasein ‘is’ in the world, to the way that discourse discloses Dasein as such, then these entities are shown, in their formal independence, to be secondary or derivative phenomena, designed merely for theoretical (or metaphysical) thinking. It follows therefore that any given account of language which holds it to be a mere a complex or collection of parts will have refrained from attempting a fuller investigation of its being with respect to its originary, worldly relationship to Dasein in disclosedness. Accordingly, the treatments of language as signs or tools or secondary as such – even broadly grammatical studies – do not in this sense treat language ‘as’ it is ontologically, factically, in the first instance in disclosedness; instead they transform discourse into series of entities, derived beings, and in so doing obscure the more original connexion between language, being-in-the-world, and being. As has been shown, this is particularly evident with respect to the pragmatist-derivativist reading of Being and Time, which reading treats language formally, ‘in itself’, as something


\(^{309}\) Ibid at 204, H 161
ontologically inessential or unnecessary in – and to – being-in-the-world, and as something for wielding.\textsuperscript{310}

This chapter investigates the dangers and complications of the formalisation of language in enquiry generally, and does so with especial regard to the phenomenon of Nature, the natural world, which can be posited with respect to it.

§.36: The possible genesis of the physicalist idea of ‘world’

As was intimated most recently, the ancient opinion that words are signs or tools or secondary as such – the idea that there is an underlying \textit{a priori} Nature or ‘reality’ – might be the birthplace not only of the derivativist theories of language – or indeed of the subjectivist theories of mind – but also of the modern physicalist accounts of the world that reduce its content to occurrent, reified matter, and in so doing distend themselves in pursuit of material substrates or essences. The idea that language is itself reducible to a mathematical formula, matrix, or being of this sort readily motivates the congruent impression that the universe is, in itself, an ordered or rigid cosmos whose \textit{a priori} functions are fit for capture or re-presentation. Language is no longer thought to mathematise phenomena, but rather to represent what is already mathematised \textit{a priori} and in spite of us. Entities are thought in abstraction from being-in-the-world, and thought in their physical independence.

Let us investigate this latent possibility of language-study in more detail.

§.37: Presence-at-hand and its relationship to readiness-to-hand

We learned above that according to Heidegger “\textit{readiness-to-hand} [\textit{Zuhandenheit}] is the way in which entities as they are ‘in themselves’ are defined ontologically categorically”\textsuperscript{311}. Conversely, the term presence-at-hand [\textit{Vorhandenheit}]\textsuperscript{312} refers to the way in which the empty \textit{a priori} occurrence of entities in the world is championed instead.

The presence-at-hand of entities is, however, an unoriginal and derivative manifestation of their being. In Heidegger’s words, if we simply ‘observe’ entities

\textsuperscript{310} One derivative ‘form’ of language, ‘assertion’ [\textit{Aussage}], is investigated below. It is often interpreted to stand for language \textit{par excellence}.


\textsuperscript{312} For a note on the translation of ‘presence-at-hand’ from the German \textit{Vorhandenheit}, see footnote 1 in \textit{Ibid} at 48, H 26
in the world as present-at-hand “then there must first be a deficiency in our having-to-do with the world concernfully”:313

The kind of being which belongs to entities is readiness-to-hand. …this characteristic is not to be understood as merely a way of taking them, as if we were talking such ‘aspects’ into the ‘entities’ which we proximally encounter, or as if some world-stuff which is proximally present-at-hand in itself were ‘given subjective colouring’ in this way. Such an Interpretation would overlook the fact that in this case these entities would have to be understood and discovered beforehand as something purely present-at-hand, and must have priority and take lead in the sequence of those dealings with the ‘world’ in which something is discovered and made one’s own …. [But we have seen that] readiness-to-hand is the way in which entities as they are ‘in themselves’ are defined ontologico-categorically … even if we [join the totality of present-at-hand entities] together, we still do not get anything like the ‘world’ as their sum.314

As we have learned, the isolation of entities in empty independence typically occurs when entities are abstracted from their worldly contexts in thinking; when they are treated as corporeal, occurrent, without an originary relation to Dasein. However, it is proximally and in the first instance with respect to Dasein’s concernfully comported being-in-the-world that they are discovered.

For example, although in the first instance the quotidian statement ‘this hammer is heavy’ shows a concernful consideration and identifies that the given hammer is not an easy one to manipulate, it can be interpreted in a different way to suggest that the hammer, in itself, has the ontologically determinative property or condition of weight. The being of the hammer as it is ‘in itself’ now seems to have to do primarily with its mass, with its organic subjection to the law of gravity. The hammer seems present-at-hand. In this way the quotidian phrases ‘too heavy’ and ‘too light’ “no longer [have] any ‘meaning’; that is to say, the entity in itself, as we now encounter it, gives nothing with relation to which it could be ‘found’ too heavy

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314 Ibid at 101-102, H 72
or too light.” Quotidian discourse has here been translated; originary understanding has been abandoned for derivative understanding:

In the ‘physical’ assertion that ‘the hammer is heavy’ we overlook not only the tool-character of the entity we encounter, but also something that belongs to any ready-to-hand equipment: its place. Its place becomes a matter of indifference.316

In every instance the present-at-hand is discovered thus:

... not because we are keeping our distance from manipulation, nor because we are just looking away [absehen] from the equipmental character of this entity, but rather because we are looking at [ansehen] the ready-to-hand thing which we encounter, and looking at it ‘in a new way’ as something present-at-hand.317

In this way, in theoretical endeavour, we derive the present-at-hand from the way we encounter the ready-to-hand. The hammer seems ‘in itself’ independent of the world of Dasein’s concerns, of its place in the local confinement [entschränkt] of an environment.

As we have learned, this is itself a problem inasmuch as certain sciences are concerned with fashioning an ontology of being yet are prone to ignoring the matter of Dasein’s existentiality, the domain of its being-in-the-world, and the implications of its situation for investigative pursuits:318 In the first instance what we swim in is a swimming-pool and not an ocean of molecules, a storm of

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316 Ibid at 413, H 361
317 Ibid at 412, H 361
318 Heidegger notes, nonetheless, that ‘the scientific attitude’ is not necessarily a prerequisite for the treatment of entities as present-at-hand: See, for example, Ibid at 413, H 361, where he states that “even that which is ready-to-hand can be made a theme for scientific investigation and determination, for instance when one studies someone’s environment – his milieu – in the context of a historiological biography. The context of equipment that is ready-to-hand in an everyday manner, its historical emergence and utilisation, and its factual role in Dasein – all these are objects for the science of economics. The ready-to-hand can become the ‘object’ of a science without having to lose its character as equipment. A modification of our understanding of being does not seem to be necessarily constitutive for the genesis of the theoretical attitude ‘towards Things’. Certainly not, if this ‘modification’ is to imply a change in the kind of being which, in understanding the entity before us, we understand it to possess.”
electricity, a firmament of magnetism, a body of temperature, and so on. If we were to adopt this ontologically spurious paradigm we would find, to employ Musil’s expression, that “[a]ll that finally remains is formulas … [and that] what they mean in human terms is hard to say”.\(^{319}\)

We speculated above as to the genesis of the physicalist idea of ‘world’. Because readiness-to-hand can be overlooked or ignored in interpretation, despite its primordial reality, our interpretations occasionally give rise to the notion that whenever we speak to one another about entities, having earlier developed opinions about them, we speak them in their original mode as present-at-hand objects. The perception-phenomenon so thought dominates the occidental philosophical tradition, as has already been shown.

On the other hand, the ‘realm’ of the present-at-hand is occasionally thought to belong to language; to be the creation of its dawn. In this way language is thought either to ‘represent’ or to ‘show’ phenomena to be present-at-hand.

The problems with each of these notions are now investigated in more detail with respect to derivativism’s contention that language is prefigured by a prior aspect or condition of being-in-the-world.

§.38: Language and derivative understanding

We learned above that the emergence of the present-at-hand in thinking belongs to the transformation of Dasein’s circumspective concern with regard to the ready-to-hand. In \textit{Being and Time} the ‘advent’ of the present-at-hand is investigated with regard to Dasein’s derivative understanding. Derivative understanding typifies the transformation of the concernful comportment of its quotidian counterpart, with which transformation the present-at-hand emerges. The genesis of the physicalist idea of world belongs, for this reason, to derivative understanding.

It was intimated above that the present-at-hand is related to language in some way. Having shown the way in which language participates in the inculcation of moods and in the fore-structure in quotidian understanding above, it is now incumbent upon us to investigate the role of language in derivative understanding. In so doing we will examine precisely how the various ‘derivativisms’ about

language occasionally associate language ‘in itself’ with the specialised language or languages of derivative understanding, as well as the appearance of the present-at-hand in it. With regard to understanding in general, Heidegger explains that:

If we Interpret understanding as a fundamental existentiale, this indicates that this phenomenon is conceived as a basic mode of Dasein’s being. On the other hand, ‘understanding’ in the sense of one possible kind of cognising among others ..., must, like explaining, be interpreted as an existential derivative of that primary understanding which is one of the constituents of the being of the ‘there’ in general.320

Above, two examples of what derivative understanding consists in were introduced: namely the sciences which concern the human being as physical organism, and the natural sciences which concern the natural world, Nature, and its ‘natural’ events. Each, according to Dreyfus, typifies what Heidegger describes as “one possible kind of [derivative] cognising among others”,321 for each seeks to investigate entities in their occurrence, as it were, ‘in themselves’.

Derivative understanding incorporates any investigative or interpretative enterprise which is concerned with the treatment or analysis of what Dasein has grasped previously in quotidian understanding. Accordingly, these sciences remain grounded in the practical context of the ready-to-hand with which Dasein ‘is’, but occasionally treat this context – and rather more importantly what is found there – as though it were present-at-hand. If the language of Dasein’s derivative understanding is thought to be derivative because it describes phenomena that have been derived from a prior context (the context of the ready-to-hand and its involvement in being-in-the-world), this does not accordingly demonstrate that language as such has a derivative being, nor that it is not already inherent in the world beforehand.

What is at once a familiar example of the language-phenomenon, assertoric utterance [Aussage], typifies the interpretative language of Dasein’s non-quotidian understanding par excellence. Heidegger remarks that: “occurrence ... is the specialty

of assertion”,322 that presence-at-hand emerges to be thought about in derivative understanding, in language, because assertoric utterance is concerned with expressing – which here means repeating – the being of entities in a peculiar way.

According to the being and dicta of derivative understanding, assertoric utterance must derive its content from a prior involvement with entities in which involvement their being has already been grasped: In order to say something about something, something about one’s topic must already be understood. For this reason assertoric utterance seems ontologically posterior to what is brought to expression with it: The speaking-forth of assertoric utterance – and therefore speaking generally – seems ontologically posterior to the content it addresses – and suddenly, too, language – conceived as speaking-forth – seems ontologically prefigured by the being-in-the-world or the beings it pertains to. Accordingly, whenever assertoric utterance is thought to stand for language as such, for the speaking which comprises it, these observations can be employed to champion a kind of derivativism.

However, as has already been intimated, the language of Dasein’s derivative understanding is not exhaustive of the quotidian and originary language-phenomenon. Dasein does not merely speak assertorically. Heidegger shows us in Being and Time that quite apart from its manifestation as assertoric utterance, language appears in more quotidian ‘forms’ – namely as interceding, demanding, warning, et cetera. The equation of assertoric utterance with language as such is not a balanced one. As Lafont emphasises (and as we learned above with respect to the fore-structure and hermeneutic situation of Dasein), “what lies prior to the statement is not anything pre-linguistic, but rather language itself.”323

For this reason, too, the being of language is not truly brought to account if thought with respect to the performance of “speaking-forth” alone. Thinking language from the vocal eruptions of various individuals conceals the role and function of language in disclosedness – both in general and in advance of any new utterance. Analytically separating language qua utterance from the world qua its

(phenomenal) content merely achieves the unnecessary divorce of the equiprimordial elements of being-in-the-world in thinking. The subject is always already ‘in’ the world; so too is its language proximally and in the first instance not merely the possession of the individual alone.

What is more, language has to do with more than mere presence-at-hand. In 1924 in *The Concept of Time* Heidegger already explains that: “Language is primarily a matter of articulating and expressing entities [das Seiende] rather than shedding light on the being [Sein] of such entities,” which “shedding light” is the aim of assertoric utterance. Language does not solely concern the appresentation of the present-at-hand, for it has a quotidian role. For this reason alone the assertoric utterances of derivative understanding are not fit phenomena for an ‘absolute’ derivativism to ground itself upon.

The emergence of the present-at-hand has its ground in Dasein’s proximate familiarity with its situation and the ready-to-hand; it is from this that presence-at-hand is derived in thinking. In the same way, the discovery of assertoric utterance as a phenomenon in its own right emerges from Dasein’s proximate familiarity with preponderant quotidian language, wherein assertoric utterance emerges ‘in itself’ for formalisation. The same occurs with speaking-forth: It is a way that language is interpreted to be. Neither phenomenon is a super-structure of being-in-the-world, but each is a single way, amidst others, that language is manifest, equiprimordially resident with other linguistic phenomena. Just as presence-at-hand can be found in readiness-to-hand, assertoric utterance can be found in language.

§.39: The three significations of ‘assertion’

According to Heidegger the earliest thinking about language takes assertoric utterance as its clue and primary exemplar of the language-phenomenon: he explains in *Being and Time* that, for example, Greek ontology first thinks the essence of language in terms of the statement:

... the analysis of assertion [*Aussage*] has a special position in the problematic of fundamental ontology, because in the decisive period when ontology was beginning, the [assertoric] λόγος [was established

and] functioned as the only clue for obtaining access to that which authentically is *[zum eigentliche Seienden]*, and for defining the being of such entities. Finally assertion has been accepted from ancient times as the primary and authentic ‘locus’ of *truth*.325

However, the originary language that saturates being-in-the-world is not absolutely assertoric or, for that matter, utterly scientific or analytical. For this reason, Heidegger’s observation in *The Concept of Time* that “Language is primarily a matter of [expressively] articulating and expressing entities *[das Seiende]* rather than shedding light on the being *[Sein]* of such entities”326 indicates an important difference between quotidian language and assertoric utterance inasmuch as the latter often belongs to derivative understanding: namely that assertion *circumscribes* the topics it treats whereas quotidian utterance simply shows and discloses concerns. In the instance of assertoric utterance, then, the being of its topic is circumscribed, and Dasein’s circumspection is narrowed consequently. The assertoric utterance is phenomenologically ‘farther’ from originary being-in-the-world, and the readiness-to-hand of entities is often disguised for this reason. Heidegger indicates in *Being and Time* that:

> For one thing, it can be demonstrated, by considering assertion, in what ways the structure of the ‘as’ [of any entity, ‘as’ what it is], which is constitutive for understanding and interpretation, can be modified.327

He differentiates accordingly between two types of ‘meaning’, explaining that:

(1) “That which has been articulated as such in interpretation and sketched out beforehand in the [everyday] understanding in general as something articulable, is the meaning”; and that

(2) “In so far as assertion (‘judgement’) is grounded on understanding and presents us with a derivative form in which an interpretation has been carried out, it too ‘has’ a meaning.”

The unitary phenomenon of assertion has, according to Heidegger, three elements. If these three individual significations are brought together, then assertion can be defined as a “pointing-out which gives something a definite character and which communicates.” Assertion is in this sense (and within the horizon of its circumscribed interpretative domain) revelatory. It exhibits phenomena explicitly, having been prepared to do so.

Often if not for the most part in quotidian discourse, an assertion will reach to the way that an entity is proximally ready-to-hand; to the primordial ‘meaning’ of the phenomenon. However, it is a peculiarity of assertion that it has the real possibility of causing whichever entity it describes to seem proximally and in the first instance present-at-hand instead. This possibility provokes the mistaken view that language as such treats merely and exclusively of the present-at-hand.

On the other hand, there are certain sciences whose very project is concerned with the restrictive treating of entities as present-at-hand for the purpose of performing their investigations. Assertion in this second instance is symptomatic of derivative understanding; which, as has already been intimated, it can typify par excellence: Dasein’s derivative understanding, inasmuch it concerns the making of analytical kinds of interpretation [Auslegung], will either misinterpret or misrepresent

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329 These are:
(1) “‘pointing out’ [aufzeigen]. ...[T]he pointing-out has in view the entity itself and not, let us say, a mere ‘representation’ [Vorstellung] ... what is discovered for sight is ... an entity in the way that it is ready-to-hand.”;
(2) “‘predication’. We ‘assert’ a ‘predicate’ of a ‘subject’, and the ‘subject’ is *given a definite character* [bestimmt] by the ‘predicate’. ... [The topic of assertion] has undergone a narrowing of content,” and
(3) “‘communication’ [Mitteilung], ‘speaking forth’ [Heraussage]. ... Letting someone see with us shares with [teil ... mit] the other that entity which has been pointed out in its definite character.”
330 Ibid at 199, H 156
331 Heidegger explains that: “Whenever a phenomenological concept is drawn from primordial sources [i.e., from whatever is ready-to-hand] there is a possibility that it may degenerate if communicated in the form of an assertion. It gets understood in an empty way and is thus passed on, losing its indigenous character ... Even in the concrete work of phenomenology itself there lurks the possibility that what has been primordially ‘within our grasp’ may become hardened so that we can no longer grasp it.” (See Ibid at 60-61, H 36)
the readiness-to-hand of the entities with which Dasein dwells proximally and in
the first instance.

Let us examine these possibilities of assertion and its relationship to
derivativism in more detail. With these examinations having been made we will
have been led towards an investigation of the way that the study of assertoric
utterance has continued to confuse the study of language since the time of the
Ancient Greeks.332

§.40: Assertio and derivative understanding: necessary propositions about the being of entities

Let us examine a way in which assertion suggests the primordiality of the
present-at-hand with respect to its occurrence in Nature, the natural world.

We learned above that: “The pointing-out which assertion does is performed
on the basis of what has already been disclosed in understanding or discovered
circumspectively”.333 Heidegger explains that:

Assertion is not a free-floating kind of behaviour which, in its own
right, might be capable of disclosing entities in general in a primary way:
on the contrary it always maintains itself on the basis of being-in-the-
world … Any assertion requires a fore-having [Vorhabe] of whatever has
been disclosed; and this [fore-having] is what it points out by way of
giving something a definite character.334

We should recall, therefore, that: “like any interpretation whatsoever, assertion
necessarily has a fore-having, a fore-sight, and a fore-conception as its existential
foundations.”335 Any given assertion is grounded in understanding, whether
quotidian or derivative. It belongs ‘in itself’ to a way in which Dasein understands.

As we have learned, there are certain investigative sciences whose project is
cconcerned with treating entities as present-at-hand. Their assertions are
symptomatic of derivative understanding.

332 See also Chapter Seven
333 Heidegger, M., Being and Time (trans. Macquarrie, J. & Robinson, E.), Blackwell Publishing,
Oxford, 1962 at 199, H 156
334 Ibid at 199, H 156
335 Ibid at 199, H 157
Traditionally, these sciences have attempted – and today they continue to attempt – to uncover a-temporal and a-historical truths about the world and the entities in it; they attempt to describe necessary, non-contingent, *a priori* truths about the being of beings; ‘natural facts’ about the natural world, Nature, as it is ‘in itself’. Typically, these sciences express their findings in necessary propositions, which propositions take the form of assertoric utterances such as, for example, ‘All matter is bound by the law of gravity’.\(^{336}\) ‘Proofs’ of these propositions are thought to confirm the *a priori* status of their subjects: if I drop an object and it falls, this seems to corroborate what I have said about gravity. However, in every case these utterances, to borrow Frege’s words, merely obtain “that [derivative] kind of truth … whose recognition is the goal of [such] sciences”.\(^{337}\) Derivative understanding does not disclose phenomenal peculiarities which are quite as primordial as those Dasein discovers in quotidian understanding, and its utterances do not necessarily acknowledge this fact.

According to Baker and Hacker, then, to suppose that the necessary propositions of the *derivative* sciences propound *a priori* facts about the being of entities (‘as’ they are in their closest phenomenal proximity to Dasein) is to engender philosophical confusion: they contend instead that whereas necessary propositions manifestly suppose non-contingency, in truth and in fact they merely pretend it.\(^{338}\) Derivative understanding is in every case contingent upon Dasein’s intimate, aboriginal familiarity with the worldly phenomena with which it lives. The proofs of derivative understanding are derivative of quotidian familiarity and understanding, which understanding finds entities ‘as’ they are in the first place.

In this respect it is useful to keep in mind Wittgenstein’s submission that any given necessary proposition of the derivative sciences must be presented simply:

... as what it is; as an object of comparison – as, so to speak, a measuring-rod; not as a preconceived idea to which reality must

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correspond (The dogmatism into which we fall so easily in doing philosophy).339

A necessary proposition of this sort does not show what factically, proximally is ‘as’ it is, nor does it show what Dasein resides with most closely; but shows instead what is consistent within the logic of a certain schema or model. It is only through a process of logical formalisation that what holds within the domain of any given interpretation can then be translated into something ‘necessary’ to the world: into a universal ‘law’ which was always already latent and awaiting discovery.

Wittgenstein, in this respect, is one of Heidegger’s allies.340

For the most part, the manner of conceiving the world in derivative understanding is consummated whenever one addresses oneself to something, conceptualises it ‘as’ something, and discusses it as such. It is consummated whenever one categorises something ‘as’ something in order to investigate the particulars of its being as an *occurrent*, independent entity. With regard to this treatment, Heidegger explains in 1935 in *Introduction to Metaphysics* that Dasein is given to treating the world in its derivative sciences as that “in which no world is world-ing anymore”;341 that Dasein’s proclivity to treat entities as present-at-hand portends the “act of making determinate, [which] may be expressed in propositions”.342 This is in turn compounded by the fact that “in writing (and therefore explanation), what is spoken comes to a stand.”343

Insofar as the method which investigates an object as such-and-such a ‘type’ of entity is concerned, Wittgenstein too provides some illuminating insights. In §308 of his *Philosophical Investigations* he explains that “the act of making

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340 Wittgenstein proposes that necessary propositions be treated merely as norms of representation which serve to fix concepts in particular interpretative paradigms, and not as statements of non-contingent *a priori* metaphysical verities – in the sense, Ambrose explains, that the law of causality can be used in physical science simply as a norm of explanation (see Ambrose, A. (ed.), *Wittgenstein’s Lectures, Cambridge 1932-35, from the notes of Alice Ambrose and Margaret MacDonald*, Blackwell, Oxford, 1979 at §15, cited in Baker, G.P. & Hacker. P. M. S., *Wittgenstein: Rules, Grammar and Necessity: Volume Two*, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1985 at 270): Wittgenstein does not claim that we should cease to use necessary propositions; merely that thinking them to describe non-contingent *a priori* metaphysical verities can be misleading.
determinate” resigns scientific enquiry to believing that it lacks a kind of knowledge about its object – that one day, having accomplished its aims, it will know more about it. However, this kind of ‘conceiving’ merely grants to Dasein a new status of being-towards a world with which it is already familiar.

As we have learned, the assertions of Dasein’s derivative understanding, necessary propositions, are legitimate insofar as they are norms of representation in particular praxeis or schemata. They are legitimate insofar as they belong to an hermeneutic situation or interpretation. As such, any praxis or schema, having adopted an explicit agenda, having acknowledged that it is insularising and that its concern is narrow, can employ them without trepidation: The law of causality can be employed to explain the occurrence of an avalanche, and Pythagoras’ theorem can be used to calculate the distance between two locations, but in neither case is the law of causality or Pythagoras’ theorem used to describe an a priori encounter of being or the way phenomena ‘are’ proximately and in the first instance.

As Heidegger explains, precisely because the assertions of derivative understanding operate with a definite way of conceiving, the webs of significance they implicate can remain hidden or inconspicuous:

In the ‘physical’ assertion that ‘the hammer is heavy’ we [often] overlook not only the tool-character of the entity we encounter, but also something that belongs to any ready-to-hand equipment: its place [in the world]. This does not mean that what is present-at-hand loses its ‘location’ altogether. But its place becomes a spatio-temporal position, a ‘world-point’, which is in no way distinguished from any other. This implies not only that the multiplicity of places of equipment ready-to-hand within the confines of the environment becomes modified to a pure multiplicity of [mere] positions, but that the entities of the environment are altogether released from such confinement.

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entschränkt]. The aggregate of the present-at-hand becomes the theme [instead].

By focusing attention on the use of necessary propositions, on what they concern, therefore, we can dispel the epistemological problems particular to the prescription of necessity to the assertions of derivative understanding – and note that language does not deal in the first instance with the present-at-hand, such as it is.

§.41: The insularisation of quotidian understanding in specialised science

As we have learned, one of the problems with derivative understanding and the sciences which employ pre-organised investigative heuristics is that it always already determines what it seeks as ‘such and such a type of being’ in advance. Ultimately, its findings and methods conflate; each seems to ratify the other. This can also occur in philosophical enquiry.

In specialised science Dasein’s quotidian understanding becomes directed, fixed, or insular. However, no specialisation has a claim to being any more penetrative or thorough in its pursuit of the being of entities than Dasein’s everyday understanding, which lives with them ‘as’ they are. Instead, they merely become “narrower”, and they are therefore derivative of Dasein’s originary way of seeing.

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348 The classic example of a philosophical method determining its findings, as it were, ‘in advance’, is found in Descartes’ reification of ‘thinking’, which leads to Cartesian dualism.


Here, precisely how Descartes proceeds methodologically from the “indubitable truth” of the “cogito ergo sum [I think therefore I am]” assertion to positing a reified subiectum divorced from the world is shown. In Heidegger’s words, “ontologically, every idea of a ‘subject’ – unless refined by a previous ontological determination of its basic character – ... posits the subjectum (ὑποκείμενον [hypokeimenon]) along with it” (see Heidegger, M., Being and Time (trans. Macquarrie, J. & Robinson, E.), Blackwell Publishing, Oxford, 1962 at 72, H 46).

349 See: Heidegger, M., Being and Time (trans. Macquarrie, J. & Robinson, E.), Blackwell Publishing, Oxford, 1962 at195, H 153. Here, Heidegger explains, as a case in point, that “[m]athematics is not more rigorous than historiology, but only narrower, because the existential foundations relevant for it lie within a narrower range.”
As we have seen, the narrowing of Dasein’s ‘point of view’ can be particularly problematic if it corrupts its enquiries into the being of entities. The purpose of this dissertation is to correct the thinking about language that restricts its being to an aggregation of formalised elements, and to redirect the pursuit of language towards its role, its function, and its place.

§4.2: The apophantical ‘as’ of assertion and the existential-hermeneutical ‘as’ of quotidian understanding

As we have learned, the utterances of Dasein’s derivative understanding remain grounded in the first instance in its originary familiarity with the context of the ‘things themselves’ – in the familiar spheres of significance in which Dasein lives. As we have learned, however, whenever the language of the derivative sciences concerns entities, their readiness-to-hand and primordial involvement in being-in-the-world is liable to be hidden behind whichever derivative or present-at-hand features seem to be brought forth by it.

In Being and Time Heidegger differentiates between the originary ‘as’ of quotidian understanding which is appropriated in interpretation, which refers to worldly entities ‘as’ they are found, and the narrower ‘as’ of assertoric utterance or the language of derivative understanding with which Dasein’s view of entities is restricted – and often directed accordingly – by outside hermeneutic influence. He names the former the existential-hermeneutical ‘as’ and the latter the apophantical ‘as’. It is the originary existential-hermeneutical ‘as’ that is occasionally disguised and even hidden by the apophantical ‘as’.

The distinction Heidegger draws between the existential-hermeneutical ‘as’ and the apophantical ‘as’ is made in order to indicate that there is a more primary grasp of the world and the entities in it, ‘as’ what they are, than that which is there in assertion or the derivative sciences alone. This more primary grasp is Dasein’s

350 The apophantical ‘as’ first appears in Heidegger’s work as a topic for discussion in the winter semester of 1923-4. (See: Kisiel, T., The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time, University of California University Press, Berkeley, 1993 at 277-279)
351 Apophansis means ‘pointing-out’, ‘asserting’ (See Heidegger, M., Being and Time (trans. Macquarrie, J. & Robinson, E.), Blackwell Publishing, Oxford, 1962 at 196, H 154) With respect to the relationship of language to Dasein’s treatment of entities in the world, it suggests, for example, that the meaning of a proper name is simply its direct referent in the world. See, for example, Mill, J. S., A System of Logic, University Press of the Pacific, Honolulu, 2002, particularly inasmuch as it deals with the “‘Fido’/Fido theory’. On the other hand, hermenuensis suggests (holistically and descriptively) the ‘background’ world and way of life that gives entities their character there, ‘as’ they are.
everyday understanding, in which everyday language always already participates: As we have learned, quotidian understanding involves a non-theoretical “[dealing with] something as something in the course of our activities.”\textsuperscript{352} As Heidegger explains:

\begin{quote}
\ldots the ‘as’ does not turn up for the first time [in assertion or the derivative sciences]; it just gets expressed for the first time, and this is possible only in that it lies before us as something expressible. The fact that when we look at something, the explicitness of assertion can be absent, does not justify our denying that there is any [expressive] Articulative interpretation in such mere seeing, and hence [justify our denying] that there is any as-structure in it.\textsuperscript{353}
\end{quote}

That language has a role in the fore-structure means that Dasein’s pre-scientific “pre-predicative seeing” – its quotidian understanding – already encounters entities on the basis of the way they are being spoken about and dealt-with.\textsuperscript{354}

Above, we noted that assertion is occasionally typical of derivative forms of understanding, such as certain kinds of specialised, insular, or (ontologically) negligent interpretative sciences. We reasoned that what assertion exhibits within their domain might, in a certain sense, be derived from Dasein’s originary engagement with the ready-to-hand. As has already been intimated, this kind of derivativism is to be sharply differentiated from the derivativist accounts of language as such; for it merely attends to the way the present-at-hand is derived from the ready-to-hand in certain sciences; to the way that the ready-to-hand is disguised by the utterances occurring there. In derivative understanding:

Something ready-to-hand with which we have to do or perform something, turns into something ‘about which’ the assertion that points it out is made. Our fore-sight is aimed at something present-at-hand in what is

\textsuperscript{352} Guignon, C. B., \textit{Heidegger and the Problem of Knowledge}, Indianapolis, Hackett, 1983 at 131
\textsuperscript{354} \textit{Ibid} at 189, H 149
ready-to-hand. Both by and for this way of looking at it [Hin-sicht], the ready-to-hand becomes veiled.\textsuperscript{355}

[In such instances,] the ‘as’ no longer reaches out into a totality of involvements … it has been cut off from that significance which, as such, constitutes environmentality.\textsuperscript{356}

§.43: A tiered world?

That it is merely a disguising of the ready-to-hand that occurs means that the ready-to-hand and the present-at-hand should not be understood as though they were altogether separate ‘layers’ of the world: we should not think that there could be a ‘realm’ of ready-to-hand entities inhabited by a silent ‘Dasein’ and, consequently, a second ‘tier’ of present-at-hand entities belonging to its language.\textsuperscript{357}

As Brandom illustrates, this species of model “invokes derivation in a sense implying the autonomy of the underlying layer of ‘circumspective’ (that is, practical) acknowledgements of … equipment”,\textsuperscript{358} and repeats the silent normative pragmatist reading of \textit{Being and Time}.

In the first instance this type of model does not adequately acknowledge the fact that assertions are always already cast from and through the web of ready-to-hand entities in which Dasein resides; that, in other words, they are cast where Dasein copes, no matter ‘where’ they are cast towards. That the different types of derivative understanding can neglect the primordiality of the ready-to-hand does not therefore mean that the world consists in two distinct realms.

That the existential-hermeneutical ‘as’ is more original than the apophantical ‘as’ does not mean that it is also pre-linguistic: the assertoric utterances of specialised or derivative ‘modes’ of understanding are merely to be differentiated from everyday kinds of speaking with one another; they are typical of the sciences in which they are found.\textsuperscript{359} As Heidegger explains:

\textsuperscript{356} Ibid at 200, H 158
\textsuperscript{357} Brandom calls this model the “layer-cake” model. See: Brandom, R. B., \textit{Tales of the Mighty Dead: Historical Essays in the Metaphysics of Intentionality}, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Massachusetts), 2002 at 328
\textsuperscript{358} See Ibid at 328
\textsuperscript{359} Guignon concurs. See: Guignon, C. B., \textit{Heidegger and the Problem of Knowledge}, Indianapolis, Hackett, 1983 at 131
Between the kind of interpretation which is still wholly wrapped up in concernful understanding and the extreme opposite case of a theoretical assertion about something present-at-hand, there are many intermediate gradations: assertions about the happenings in the environment, accounts of the ready-to-hand, ‘reports on the situation’, the recording and fixing of the ‘facts of the case’, the description of a state of affairs, the narration of something that has befallen.\textsuperscript{360}

Requesting, interceding, demanding, warning, and other instances of everyday speaking are given by Heidegger as additional examples.\textsuperscript{361} Inasmuch as these are not ‘theorising’ utterances, they each reside with the existential-hermeneutical ‘as’ of quotidian understanding.

Above, we learned the way in which interpretation has a fore-structure that discourse, linguistic commerce, accompanies. According to Heidegger discourse always already pervades the world within which Dasein lives, and it influences the way that Dasein understands and interprets it. Discourse affects Dasein’s mood, showing the world to it accordingly: more generally, it addresses itself to Dasein’s concerns, and, thus, it influences them. On the other hand, it gives to interpretation whatever ‘is’ in the world already, including the terms with which the various phenomena that Dasein encounters are always already being spoken about: it gives their ‘places’ in the world. In this way, as Heidegger explains, discourse “underlies both interpretation and assertion.”\textsuperscript{362} Heidegger explains that:

To any assertion as a communication which gives something a definite character there belongs, moreover, an [expressive] Articulation of what is pointed out…\textsuperscript{363}

Derivativist theories of language do not take account of this possibility – indeed, they do not take account of the very real probability that any given assertoric expression of an interpretation always already addresses the existential-
hermeneutical ‘as’, thus taking account of the discourse which is always already
being spoken in the hermeneutic situation in which Dasein resides. The assertoric
utterances of interpretation always already amount in this way to the simple
affirmation of how beings ‘are’ in the world and to how they are discussed there –
or, on the other hand, they oppose this.364

As we have learned, the ready-to-hand and the present-at-hand are, in an
ontologically crucial sense, merely and respectively the originary way of being and a
certain way of seeming of the very same entity. The latter is derived from the
former in misinterpreting or mishearing the more original context of the ready-to-
hand, a cause of which is that assertions are not then heeded with respect to the
context of their ‘content’.

In 1994, Brandom, who in 2002 eventually rejects the idea, actually endorses
the priority of ‘implicit’ practical norms over the capacity to make anything ‘explicit’
with assertions.365 In 2002 he decides that Heidegger rejects this view as well. He
contends instead that Dasein would not be Dasein unless it were equally capable of
treating entities as ready-to-hand and available as well as present-at-hand and
objectively occurrent.366 Brandom rests his claim on Dasein’s capacity for language,
but specifically on Dasein’s capacity for making and listening to assertions.367 Thus,
under this construction, if Dasein has the permanent possibility of language, one
constitutive element of which is assertoric utterance, then there can be no Dasein-
in-the-world with the ready-to-hand without the possibility of the present-at-hand
being seen there as well: this is a positive possibility of Dasein’s being which

364 Volpi characterises the difference between Dasein’s everyday encounter of the existential-
hermeneutical ‘as’ and its arrival to the apophantical ‘as’ in theorising with respect to Heidegger’s
early reading of Aristotle’s works. He discusses precisely how Heidegger decides that both πραξις
and θεωρία are ultimately motivated by Sorge, as well as how according to Heidegger θεωρία consists
in every case in the analysis of originary phenomena Dasein that discovers in πραξις.
See: Volpi, F., “Dasein as praxis: the Heideggerian assimilation and the radicalisation of the
27-66
365 See Brandom, R. B., Making it Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment,
Cambridge (Massachusetts), Harvard University Press, 1994
366 Brandom, R. B., Tales of the Mighty Dead: Historical Essays in the Metaphysics of Intentionality, Harvard
University Press, Cambridge (Massachusetts), 2002 at 329
367 See ibid at 331

Brandom argues that there can be no Dasein without discourse [Rede], no discourse without idle talk
[Gerede], no idle talk without language [Sprache], and no language without assertion [Aussage]; in other
words, he contends that there can be no Dasein without language, no language without assertion,
and no Dasein without the present-at-hand, which is assertion’s domain. According to Brandom,
each belongs to the other. His is not a derivativist’s argument; it identifies the ‘totality’ that is
Dasein’s being-in-the-world.
belongs under this construction to its careful way of communing with others – and so to the influence of assertoric utterance.

Above, we learned that when an entity is *presented* in – or brought-forth by – an assertion and undergoes a narrowing of content in order that a certain *way* in which it is ready-to-hand might be emphasised for viewing, its concrete readiness-to-hand, despite its primordiality, can be disguised or veiled. Thus, any entity can seem to be present-at-hand when assertoric utterance presents it. What is similarly striking is that whenever an entity is *prepared* for assertion the same result can occur: the ‘veiling’ or ‘disguising’ of the entity’s readiness-to-hand, whether by careless misinterpretation or rather more indolent negligence, can also affect the Dasein for whom an entity is most familiar. It is in this way that the ready-to-hand, in assertion, receives the ‘treatment’ which causes it to seem to be present-at-hand; and this is a permanent possibility of Dasein’s being-in-the-world inasmuch as it ‘owns’ assertion as a skill. (The same must ultimately be possible of ‘speaking’ generally.) As Brandom states: “[T]he capacity to treat things as extant or occurrent … is an *existentiale*, a permanent and constitutive possibility of Dasein.”

In fact, it might just be because of Dasein’s proclivity to treat familiar phenomena as extant or occurrent – a treatment typified by assertoric utterance in particular – that the derivativism which champions the separation of the present-at-hand from the underlying ‘layer’ of the ready-to-hand arises in the first instance.

§.44: Assertoric utterance and the being of language

The equation of language *as such* with assertoric utterance is problematic for the reasons that have now been discussed. When philosophies of language seek their ground in the elusive *logic* of assertoric utterance, then they are prone to posit ontologies of the present-at-hand and to conflate the being of language with schemas representative of this kind of entity. When language is considered to be a system of any kind and is investigated with respect to the elusive logic supposed to underlie it, what results is an abstract science that derives for itself an abstract sense of the being of entities. Concerning these developments, Heidegger explains that:

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The basic stock of ‘categories of signification’ [the ways of ‘saying’ being], which passed over into the subsequent science of language, and which in principle is still accepted as the standard today, is oriented towards discourse as assertion. But if on the contrary we take this phenomenon [i.e., discourse] to have in principle the primordiality and breadth of an existentiale, then there emerges the necessity of re-establishing the science of language on foundations which are ontologically more primordial.\(^{369}\)

Heidegger intends his discussion of language in *Being and Time* to emphasise that the science of assertoric utterance as well as the various logical philosophies of language each owe their ground to the role and being of discourse, the investigation of which belongs to the “existential analytic of Dasein” – to Dasein’s way of being-in-the-world.\(^{370}\) Under this construction assertoric utterance and language as such should be recognised as existentia belonging essentially to the human being. , According to Heidegger this very circumscription in fact reflects the genuine meaning of the ‘Greek’ description of the human being as \(\zeta \omicron \lambda \omicron \rho \omicron \nu \chi \omicron\),\(^{371}\) which means merely that man discourses: Language, as well as the communion it provides, saturates Dasein’s being-in-the-world. It is essential to it.

In 1931 in the lecture course which became *Aristotle’s Metaphysics Θ 1-3: On the Essence and Actuality of Force* Heidegger explains that: “[We have traditionally determined being] from the viewpoint of concept and assertion. For a long time the erroneous doctrine has existed that ‘being’ means the same as ‘is’, and that the ‘is’ is said first of all in judgement. It therefore follows that we [traditionally] understand being through judgement and assertion.”\(^{372}\)


According to Heidegger, “in the decisive period when ontology was beginning, the logos [qua assertoric utterance] functioned as the only clue for obtaining access to that which authentically is [zum eigentlichen Seienden], and for defining the being of such entities.” (See *Ibid* at 196, H 154)

“[T]his was the kind of logos which [thinkers] took as their clue for working out the basic structures of the forms of discourse and its components. Grammar sought its foundations in the ‘logic’ of this logos.” (See *Ibid* at 201, H 158)

\(^{370}\) *Ibid* at 203, H 160

\(^{371}\) *Ibid* at 201, H 158

Heidegger indicates, however, that language ‘as such’, as opposed to assertoric utterance, which presents entities just to be ‘looked at’, does not necessarily exhibit entities as ‘objects’ for perception.\(^{373}\) This alternative occurrence belongs instead, as we have seen, to the domains of its specialised usage in specialised fields of interpretation or even, in the odd case, to accident.

The logical sciences which take the *copula* as their clue provide the strongest historical evidence for the way in which the philosophy of language and being generally has been confused by thinking the essence of language in terms of assertoric utterance. Whenever assertoric utterance is thought as the primary locus of man’s access to the being of phenomena or to being itself, whenever investigation orients itself subsequently in terms of the present-at-hand, the *copula* can be taken to describe, to exhibit, or to house *de re* any or each of the essences of ‘existence’, ‘individuality’, ‘unity’, ‘synthesis’, ‘dieresis’, ‘truth’, ‘result’, ‘presence’, ‘duration’, ‘vitality’, *et cetera.*\(^{374}\) What Heidegger identifies in *Being and Time*, however, is that any given interpretation of the ‘is’, if we are to avoid being misguided by it, “[must inevitably lead us back] into the context of problems belonging to the existential analytic”,\(^{375}\) which means to Dasein as being-in-the-world, but also to Dasein as discoursing being-in-the-world: Enquiry can not so easily escape its ground. Thus, Heidegger criticises the view that being is said first of all in assertoric “judgement”; that Dasein’s originary experience of being is essentially a matter for the interpretative sciences of judicative statements.\(^{376}\) On the other hand, Heidegger thinks being to be something with which Dasein dwells and deals on an everyday basis.

Insofar as language belongs to Dasein and Dasein belongs to it, language must be treated in terms of its relation to Dasein’s *existentiality* as such: to its role and function in Dasein’s being as care, as well as in being-in-the-world as such. This is the fundamental tendency of Heidegger’s investigation of language both in

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\(^{374}\) For a detailed discussion of this issue, see Kahn, C. H., “The Greek Verb ‘To Be’ and the Concept of Being” in *Foundations of Language*, vol. 2, no. 3, 1966 at 245-265


\(^{376}\) In point of interest, even Aristotle, who has a philosophy of categories, insists that ‘categorical being’ addresses merely one way in which beings have their being. For more information about the ‘senses’ of being that Aristotle posits, see Brentano, F., *On the Several Senses of Being in Aristotle* (trans. George, R.), University of California Press, London, 1975
Being and Time and in general. It is a natural possibility of derivativism – and of like theories of language in general – that language be characterised ‘as’ something else entirely and so, consequently, remain undescribed in its being as a basic existentiale.

That historically and for the most part language has not been investigated as an existentiale but has been investigated instead with respect to its ontic manifestations alone is, according to Heidegger, perhaps due to the very way that we are given in the occidental world at least to orienting ourselves toward logical analysis and the subject-predicate structure, which structure is traditionally harmonious with the ongoing western obsession with the ‘I’, the ‘self’, the ‘signifier’, or the ‘soul’ thought as the axis upon which our acquaintance with being spins. The subject-predicate structure naturally suggests that the world is populated at its most basic level by foreign ‘objects’ with properties – by ‘material’ with qualities – which surround Dasein and yet are ‘in themselves’ essentially alien to its care.

In this way Heidegger decides that historically we have lacked “not only most of the words but, above all, the [requisite] ‘grammar’” for investigating being with respect to our proximity to it, to our immersion in it. It is decidedly possible that even today our most ‘organic’ investigations of being will be given to acquainting themselves with foreign ‘objects’ just because this is precisely how traditional “grammar” continues to wield its influence in enquiry. This is also a consequence of the hermeneutic circle, which was discussed above.

It is, however, Heidegger’s project in Being and Time – and it remains his project for the rest of his career – to overcome this traditionally transcendentalist way of thinking about Dasein, its existentia, its familiar world, its relationship to being, and therefore its relationship to language by radically re-directing it.

§.45: Nature, or the natural environment

It is important with respect to the observations that have been made concerning language and the present-at-hand to give a brief account of Heidegger’s analysis of the natural phenomena that do not ostensively seem to participate in the proximate domain of Dasein’s concernful comportment, namely Dasein’s ‘there’.

As has already been intimated, that Dasein lives proximally and in the first instance with the ready-to-hand does not preclude its discovery of a different nature, namely that of the natural environment; nor does it mean that such a nature underlies the ready-to-hand as an altogether more original element of the world with which Dasein has first to deal before establishing a sphere of practices with which to overcome it. Heidegger is not a realist in the sense described by Putnam and Rorty. Rather, in any dealing in which the ready-to-hand is encountered, there always already exists the possibility of discovering the natural environment, natural phenomena, in the world; which means, in addition, the possibility of addressing it. For example, in the kind of concernful comportment which makes use of tools, there is always already an extant reference to ‘raw materials’, to ‘physical’ phenomena. On the other hand, the natural ‘environment’ manifests at the horizons of human dealings as a foreign, sublime, or primeval being.

On the one hand, therefore, ‘nature’ always already means according to its ‘technological’ definition the wood as a forest of timber, the mountain as a quarry of rock, and the river as a reserve of fish. This is the nature Dasein discovers to have manifested as ready-to-hand in terms of what it can afford it or has afforded of its own ‘volition’. The natural environment is in this sense defined by the manifold of possibilities towards which Dasein directs its dealings, and it falls within an equipmental totality. There is also, however, on the other hand, an alternative way for Dasein to discover natural phenomena; for Dasein discovers a ‘world’ which assaults and affects it, a natural environment equally beguiling and astounding, suffused by foreign forces. A primordial flux emerges to

379 Heidegger asks us to consider a craftsman who uses leather: “Leather is produced from hides. These are taken from animals, which someone else has raised. Animals also occur in the world without having been raised at all: and, in a way, these entities still produce themselves even when they have been raised. So in the environment certain entities become accessible which are always ready-to-hand, but which, in themselves, do not need to be produced.” Hammer, tongs and needle refer in themselves to steel, iron, metal, mineral, wood et cetera, in that they consist of these. In equipment that is used, ‘nature’ is discovered along with it ... [this is] the ‘nature’ we find in natural products.” (See: Heidegger, M., Being and Time (trans. Macquarrie, J. & Robinson, E.), Blackwell Publishing, Oxford, 1962 at 100, H 70)
381 By the time of “The Origin of the Work of Art”, Heidegger’s interpretation of nature has changed: Now nature is interpreted as that which need not be ‘cared’ for; that need not rely on the priority of Dasein’s practical dealings to be that which it is, or even simply to be. See: Heidegger, M., ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’ in Heidegger, M., Poetry, Language, Thought (trans. Hofstadter, A.), HarperCollins Perennial Classics, New York, 2001
circumspection, a nature whence the world of proximate phenomena seems to arrive, which the intimate sphere of Dasein’s concernful dealings seems intended either to overcome by initiation or to supplant by skilful practice. Physical, elemental phenomena, upon which Dasein’s life-world, its habitat, seems to subsist, seem manifestly restless, strange, and threatening even to the most penetrative or cynical mode of thought. This is the nature of the natural disaster; of natural beauty; of the terrible and of the sublime. It manifests above cities as summer rain; as darkness beyond the light of lonely streetlamps; beyond scenic lookouts as landscapes inspiring; beneath ships as watery tempest, or above them as god-sent storms.

Surrounding Dasein as the natural environment as such, it manifests at the intimate horizons of humanity, forcing our mortality and fragility into salience, begging comprehension.

However, this phenomenon, like the phenomenon of the ‘natural resource’, only enters into Dasein’s presence and proximity, into its circumspection, against the original and familiar background of its everyday being-in-the-world, and in terms of the webs of significance with which it lives. It is only ever addressed thus; even when it seems, if addressed, to be present-at-hand.

In this way are natural phenomena encountered in respect of the wider context of the ready-to-hand; and it is in this way are they also constitutive and peculiar elements of Dasein’s ‘there’. The natural environment is always already ready to be comprehended in these terms:

…even the phenomenon of ‘Nature’, as it is conceived, for instance, in Romanticism, can be grasped ontologically only in terms of the concept of the world – that is to say, in terms of the analytic of Dasein.

Although the specifically physical and elemental ‘nature’, the primordial ‘flux’, is not itself ready-to-hand, it belongs primarily to this context, which is whence it emerges.

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384 *Ibid* at 94, H 65
– and it does so, depending on Dasein’s circumspection, as one ‘kind’ of nature or another:

[In every case,] our concernful absorption in whatever work-world likes closest to us has a function of discovering; and it is essential to this function that, depending on the way in which we are absorbed, those entities within-the-world which are brought along [beigebrachte] in the work and with it … remain discoverable in varying degrees of explicitness and with a varying circumspective penetration.385

In this way nature, in the sense of the occurrent underlying ‘Reality’ of the present-at-hand ‘world’, can not be the true or ultimate subject of language; for the natural environment is always initially discovered within the domain of the ready-to-hand with which Dasein lives, which environment is primary, local, and originary. Dasein can only ever address itself toward the natural environment so conceived from its more primordial ground, the world of its concerns, to which nature, in any case, belongs phenomenologically in its proximate manifestation.

§.46: Dasein, language, and world

This means, therefore, that the description of the being of entities that Heidegger gives in Being and Time is sympathetic to a more holistic view of the world and its phenomena than derivativism champions – although, in point of fact, ‘holistic’ is not a word that is used by Heidegger himself. For Heidegger the being of any one entity in particular is always ultimately determinable in terms of the totality of meaningful interconnections that exist between it, our being-engaged with it, and the world thus disclosed. There, is for this reason, no way to meaningfully describe a given entity without implicitly referring to the original totality in which – or to which – it already belongs. Pöggeler explains that:

[According to Heidegger] meaning is not a world to itself which must be grasped as static and resting in itself; meaning is much more what is inherent in factual life, and its structure must be conceived according to

life. [Life] is in its reality [lived in] a context of significance [Bedeutungszusammenhang]. Certainly significance can be levelled off through the human tendency towards reification or ‘objectifying,’ … but the objectifying must [itself] be comprehended as the ‘denial of life’ in life: through it life is deprived of its ‘living’, of its ‘tendentious’ structure, and of the relations of significance of its world.386

Heidegger’s view of being and beings owes its genesis to a tradition that began with the Eleatics: In opposition to the view typified by Aristotle’s Metaphysics or even his Categories, in which being is first thought in terms of particular, individual substances as the mysterious ‘substrates’ that cause them to perdure, this alternative view of being thinks being – or \( \varphi \sigma \mu \varphi \) as the case may be – to pertain in the first instance to the whole of the human life-world and to be determinable in terms of it, its history, its order, and so on; to be determinable in terms of its unity and meaningfulness. This way of thinking about being has an important place in the German philosophical tradition in particular. For example, it influences the metaphysics of Spinoza and Leibniz, as well as the comparatively modern philosophies of Hegel, Schopenhauer, Schelling, and Dilthey among others.

For his part Heidegger revives the view of the world as \( \kappa \sigma \mu \omicron \omicron \) or ordered totality; for it is with respect to a ‘background’ unity that individual beings may be discovered.387 Like as with the Being and Time term “world” [\( \text{Welt} \)], when Heidegger uses the word \( \kappa \sigma \mu \omicron \omicron \) he does not intend a totality of individual entities, but the nature – or way of being – of the beings which populate the world. In The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, which Heidegger first presented as a summer course

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For more information regarding Dilthey’s own discussion of \( \text{Leben} \), see Dilthey, W., Der Aufbau der geschichtlichen Welt in der Geisteswissenschaften in Groethuysen, B. (ed.), Gesammelte Schriften, Band 7, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen, 1992. First available in 1910, Heidegger had access to this work before the publication of Being and Time.

387 The Greek word \( \kappa \sigma \mu \omicron \omicron \) [\( \text{kosmos} \)] means ‘an harmonious and orderly whole’. (See Liddell, H. G. & Scott, R., A Greek-English Lexicon, Eighth Edition, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1897 at 836) In point of interest \( \kappa \sigma \mu \omicron \omicron \) originally meant ‘decoration’, as in ‘personal adornment’; namely necklaces or earrings. Subsequently the term was used to refer to the stars and planets – to the ‘jewels’ in the heavenly spheres, – and the heavens, a background, became something ‘cosmological’.

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in 1928, he iterates that the term κόσμος: “does not mean anything like all entities together; it does not mean entities themselves; it is not a name for them. Rather … κόσμος is the term for [a] mode of being". It is in terms of the κόσμος that Dasein discovers the ‘individual’ entities of its world and can formalise their respective beings.

It is worthwhile, at this point, to remind ourselves that with regard to the being of language and its place in the world, Heidegger decides that:

In the last resort, philosophical research must resolve to ask what kind of being goes with language in general. Is it a kind of equipment [ready-to-hand within-the-world], or has it Dasein’s kind of being, or is it neither of these? What kind of being does language have, if there can be such a thing as a ‘dead’ language? What do the ‘rise’ and ‘decline’ of a language mean ontologically? We possess a science of language, and the being of the entities which it has for its theme is obscure. Even the horizon for any investigative question about it is veiled. Is it an accident that proximally and for the most part significations are ‘worldly’, sketched out beforehand by the significance of the world, that they are indeed often predominantly ‘spatial’? Or does this ‘fact’ have existential-ontological necessity? And if it is necessary, why should it be so?

Heidegger remarks that the study of language in Being and Time is designed to point out “the ontological ‘locus’ of this phenomenon in Dasein’s state of being, and … taking as our clue a fundamental kind of being belonging to discourse, in connection with other phenomena, … to bring Dasein’s everydayness into a view in a manner which is ontologically more primordial” than foregoing interpretations of


Dasein, its being-in-the-world, and its relationship to language have otherwise allowed.  \(^\text{390}\)

With these observations in mind, let us now investigate in Chapter Six a third kind of derivativism: what Blattner calls a ‘coherent’ derivativism. With this having been done we will be able to investigate the role and function of language in the disclosedness of the world as Heidegger conceives it in *Being and Time* as such with respect to the meaning of the Greek λόγος, as well as to Dasein’s existential ‘modalities’.

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VI. ALTERNATIVE DISCOURSES

§47: Blattner’s ‘coherent’ derivativism

We learned above in our discussion of language [Sprache] and significance [Bedeutsamkeit] that quite apart from the general species of derivativism that have hitherto been discussed, Blattner proposes a third kind. Having rejected instrumentalism as an altogether illegitimate species of derivativism and having neglected to engage the theory that words are signs, Blattner suggests that a “coherent derivativism … will be a derivativism that holds language to be based upon what Heidegger calls ‘discourse’” – a discourse which he thinks manifest in silent or non-linguistic dealings. \(^{391}\) As Blattner understands it, discourse [Rede] in Being and Time is non-linguistic and, accordingly, it prefigures language: To Blattner discourse is translated into language, as it were, ‘afterwards’. This ‘coherent’ derivativism requires focussed investigation.

According to Blattner, the ‘coherent’ kind of derivativism with which he associates Being and Time is first recognised in the English-speaking tradition by Dreyfus in his commentary concerning Being and Time, namely Being-in-the-world. In Dreyfus’ words, derivativism identifies that in the first instance:

[Dasein] manifests the already articulated structure of the referential whole in the most basic way by telling things apart in using them. … In complex domains one does not have words for the subtle actions one performs and the subtle significations one [expressively] Articulates in performing them. A surgeon does not have words for all the ways he cuts, or a chess master for all the patterns he can tell apart and the types of moves he makes in response. \(^{392}\)

For Blattner, this is evidence of the priority of Dasein’s silent or non-linguistic dealings of its silent convernance with being-in-the-world.

As has already been intimated, derivativist accounts of language suppose language and its ontological foundation to be entirely separate or separable

\(^{391}\) Blattner, W. D., Heidegger’s Temporal Idealism, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1999 at 70

phenomena, each of which operates at its own distinct level (or tier) of Dasein’s being-in-the-world with intelligible phenomena. It is argued here however that this way of interpreting language does not quite reach to the treatment of its basic being or role in the world which Heidegger advances in *Being and Time*. It is argued below that discourse is not in any way a ‘ground’ upon which language ‘rests’, but instead describes the very way in which the structural articulation of world is distributed, in which distribution language is involved fundamentally. This is not a thesis with which Blattner’s ‘coherent’ derivativism agrees.

According to Blattner, a ‘coherent’ derivativism requires the “sifting-out” of a non- or pre-linguistic understanding of the world. For Blattner, a non- or pre-linguistic understanding of the world is essentially related by Dasein’s behaviour. Behaviour, thus understood ‘in itself’, has no explicit conceptual content: it is merely there to be deciphered, implicitly articulative of norms. Behaviour, according to Blattner, itself amounts in this way to discourse [Rede].

Blattner understands Heidegger’s claim that “the [speaking-out or] having-been-expressed-ness [Hinausgesprochenheit] of discourse is language” to corroborate his view; namely the view that discourse reaches to language only if it is afterwards “put into words”, discussed. Blattner decides therefore that discourse, Dasein’s concernful behaviour, must itself be the ground of the structural articulation of the webs of significance which constitute the worldhood of the world. According to Blattner, if entities manifest ‘as’ the entities they are, and they do so in respect of how Dasein is concerned, then they must manifest ‘as’ the entities they are with respect to how Dasein behaves, and this must be Dasein’s discourse. He submits that:

394 This is close, too, to Wrathall’s account. In *Heidegger and Unconcealment*, Wrathall uses “conversation” instead of “discourse” as a translation for Rede because “the English term [conversance] and its cognates still bear something of the original connotation of living with, having intercourse with, or being skilfully engaged with a person or thing. The Latin root, versor, has the sense of dwelling, living, or remaining in a place.” (See Wrathall, M. A., *Heidegger and Unconcealment: Truth, Language, and History*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2011 at 107-109). For Wrathall, discourse is conversance. Becoming adept in the use of an entity is the source of its intelligibility.

*Hinausgesprochenheit* means, literally, ‘to speak out’.
396 Blattner is not the only one to suggest this species of ‘coherent’ derivativism. Carman, too, believes that “Heidegger does in fact posit a form of expression and communication distinct from and more primordial than language, namely ‘discourse’ (Rede).” (See Carman, T., “Was Heidegger a Linguistic Idealist?” in *Inquiry*, vol. 45, 2002 at 210.) Blattner’s treatment of ‘coherent’ derivativism is, however, more exhaustive; for this reason, it is the sole species of ‘coherent’ derivativism criticised in this dissertation.
Discourse is the [structural] articulating of [fields of significance] ... language is the expressing, or putting into words, of this pre-linguistic articulation.\textsuperscript{397}

Discourse does not limp along after significations, but, rather, institutes them in the first place.\textsuperscript{398}

Language puts phenomena that were there before [it] into words … more specifically, language puts significations into words. … [L]anguage is, thus, a phenomenon that requires discourse, for its role is to put discourse into words … language explicates in words and, thus, requires discourse.\textsuperscript{399}

To articulate [gliedern] means to possess or produce a differentiated structure. For Blattner, Dasein’s “pre-linguistic” discourse is the “dimension of Dasein’s [concernful] comportment” that structurally articulates the world.\textsuperscript{400} Thus, Blattner shifts the usual emphasis of derivativist theories of language away from the webs or fields of significance which constitute worldhood and towards the agents of their constitution, fashioning in so doing a kind of silent behavioural idealism which is ultimately close to silent normative pragmatism. Language, under this construction, is posterior to Dasein’s originary way of being-in-the-world because it is an inessential or secondary way of engaging with phenomena, which engagement is in the first instance non-conceptual, and does not therefore participate in establishing phenomena ‘as’ they are primordially.

In order to elucidate his idea of original ‘non-linguistic’ discourse in more detail, Blattner presents two examples of what might properly constitute it. Both of Blattner’s examples depend on the exhibitive power of familiar behaviour, in which phenomena are supposed to be disclosed ‘as’ the phenomena they are. Both examples are close to the pragmatist derivativist reading of \textit{Being and Time} which has already been criticised.

\textsuperscript{397} Blattner, W. D., \textit{Heidegger's Temporal Idealism}, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1999 at 71
\textsuperscript{398} \textit{Ibid} at 73-74
\textsuperscript{399} \textit{Ibid} at 70
\textsuperscript{400} \textit{Ibid} at 71
Blattner calls discourse “communicatively differentiatory interrelation”.  (See \textit{Ibid} at 74)
Blattner’s first example is of a man, Smith, walking along a footpath [sidewalk]. According to Blattner, “[a]s Smith walks on the sidewalk, he [simultaneously] makes known that sidewalks are for walking on. He [simultaneously] differentiates sidewalks from roads and gardens, which may border the sidewalks on either side.”401 For Blattner, it is Smith’s behaviour – his comportment – toward the sidewalks, roads, and gardens in his environment that reveal them to be the entities they ‘are’ and that structurally articulates the totalities in which they belong. For Blattner, Smith’s behaviour constitutes a normative species of ‘non-linguistic’ discourse inasmuch as an observer might understand Smith’s behaviour to be simultaneously expressive of a differentiation between many different types of phenomena. As Blattner states:

The very act of walking along the sidewalk offers the differentiation publicly. Because Dasein is a conforming entity … Smith’s behaviour either sets up or sustains the normalised comportment of walking on sidewalks, or it gets corrected by other Daseins who object. Every act of walking on a sidewalk tends publicly to … make known that sidewalks are to be walked upon.402

Blattner’s second example presents a woman, Reiss, sitting alone in her secluded mountain retreat, writing a novel. For Blattner, despite her isolation from other people, Reiss still “makes known or manifest the workshop of the author. She writes with the computer; thus, as it were, stating publicly that computers are to be written with.”403 For Blattner, “[m]aking publicly known (i.e., communicating) does not require another person to receive the communication”; Reiss’ ‘discourse’, even if it is ‘factically’ private, “is in principle public.”404

Blattner’s ‘coherent’ derivativism ultimately relies on an argument for the strongly exhibitive power of our behaviours, which behaviours are grounded in the way we are concernfully comported towards the world. Blattner’s two examples are

402 Ibid at 72-73
403 Ibid at 73
404 Ibid at 74

He does not, however, attend to the fact that writing is an activity which involves language, and that language might therefore be original to discourse. In point of fact, it would be rather problematic for his position if he were here submitting that even language does not require language to be understood ‘as’ it is.
404 Ibid at 74
of fairly uncomplicated behaviours; their articulated ‘produce’ thus appears quite explicitly expressed by them. It is a distinct possibility, however, that this produce, like as the produce of any example a pragmatist reader of *Being and Time* might cause us to discern, does not attain to its explicitness for the reasons suggested by the consideration or observation of ‘behaviour’ alone. Perhaps, instead, the articulated ‘produce’ of examples of behaviour like those Blattner presents is explicit merely because of an already established familiarity with the webs of significance they describe, by merit of which familiarity we are already able to recognise it, as it were, ‘in advance’; and, perhaps more importantly, because the narrators of such examples resort to ‘telling’ us about it in writing, and we are already acquainted with the meanings of words. One wonders, therefore, whether it would be an entirely different matter were we to observe the behaviours Blattner describes occurring as a matter of accident; behaviours that for all their ‘silence’ did not ‘speak to us’ – whether clearly or at all. As Carman states, “it is hard to see how the solipsistic examples of communication Blattner describes (as he describes them) are genuinely communicative at all.”

Heidegger, similarly, elucidates that only “discourse which expresses itself is communication”; that genuine discourse “is aimed at bringing the hearer to participate in disclosed being towards what is talked about in the discourse.”

This is, however, a minor objection. What is more crucial is that derivativist accounts of language such as Blattner’s generally leave the degree to which one requires a language in order to master a web of significance and why it matters – particularly if why it matters is a rich and complicated issue – unclear, despite their silent appeal to the process of observation and mimicry we employ, especially as children, in order to become familiar with the world. They do not consider how language is always already there in the world, with Dasein, lingering as an historical inheritance, disclosing domains of meaning as it were ‘in advance’ of us. The advent of language can not occur ‘after’ Dasein’s dealings, for thus it could never arrive; rather, it is always already ‘about’ Dasein’s dealings in every sense of the word ‘about’. Dasein is not an automaton, soulless, flopping endlessly about; for it is engaged in the world; it cares. It is language which always already articulates

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meaning and therefore articulates intelligibility, for it is always already crucial to disclosedness and, more importantly, to community. If Dasein is to live in the world solicitously and therefore fully, it must not merely be an adept in the use of a manifold of equipment, but familiar, too, with why its dealings are socially important – which means that it must be familiar with language.

Above, Blattner stated that “…Smith’s [walking along the sidewalk] either sets up or sustains the normalised comportment of walking on sidewalks.” Prima facie it is clear that our behaviours do contribute to the maintenance and integrity of the way the world is structurally articulated; for Dasein makes use of its environment according to what the entities it encounters there are found to be for. However, it is unlikely that Dasein’s behaviour ‘in itself’ and as such can be solely responsible for – and can alone invent – its home.

While the analytic differentiation between the ‘setting-up’ or production of a structural articulation by behaviour and the ‘sustaining’ expression or distribution of a structural articulation in further behaviour (or in language) does cause it to seem as though Dasein’s silent activity, thought as discourse, is an originary phenomenon and therefore that language, thought as ‘further’ expression alone, is unoriginal, the question remains as to whether or not this differentiation is a fair one. We must ask, therefore, how – if at all – the disclosedness of the world was ever related to the spontaneous invention of its articulated structures in behaviour, and not merely to the unfolding furtherance and proliferation of its evolving articulation by any other means. There is, to this end, a discussion of body-language below.

It has already been argued that the structural articulation of the world is an historical one which we, Dasein, inherit; that ours is an inheritance disclosed and given to us by the behaviour and the language of others; that ours is an inheritance that we, too, share in our own language and behaviour.

Blattner’s ‘coherent’ derivativism relies for its coherence on the “sifting-out” of a pre- or non-linguistic understanding of the world. This project, however, can be revised: What is really at stake is whether Dasein’s being-in-the-world, which means its understanding, is in fact accompanied by language proximally and equiprimordially – or whether it is not. If it is, then derivativism will be weakened,

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408 Ibid at 72
and whichever ‘non-’ or ‘pre-linguistic’ understanding of the world it un-earths will ultimately show itself as an analytical abstraction inasmuch as it will have disavowed the original presence of language, as well as its aboriginal influence.

For his part Blattner weakens his ‘coherent’ derivativism almost as soon as he presents it: Criticising his own theory, he states that, like Dasein’s behaviour, “language does itself institute differentiations”. What we must understand Blattner to mean is that certain elements of the world’s articulated structure are originally peculiar to and distributed in Dasein’s languages in ways other than the means and ways of behaviour. By far Blattner’s best example of this occurrence concerns the way that certain legal distinctions are “inherently instituted by language”. He focuses in particular on the fact that “the difference between a civil and a criminal procedure requires language (centrally, the [relevant] legal code), in order to be” precisely that difference that it is.  

It seems then, at the very least, that certain norms require language – and that perhaps, more generally, language is crucial to the articulation of norms and to the forms of community norms structure generally.

Blattner’s concession enfeebles arguments for derivativism in general: Because the world is comprised of linguistic elements at least in part, or because these elements are themselves essential to the disclosedness of certain contexts, contexts invested with meaning, it follows that language is necessary for an explicit, concrete understanding of these contexts ab initio; which is to say that without language these contexts would be closed to Dasein and could not be completely understood. In keeping with this example, Dasein’s discourse, disclosive, would have to incorporate language, and the reduction of discourse to a pre-linguistic foreshadowing of the phenomenon would ultimately trivialise this point. In point of fact, towards the end of his discussion of ‘coherent’ derivativism and discourse in Heidegger's Temporal Idealism, Blattner admits to just this failing:

... derivativism is not exactly right ... sometimes the most basic form of discourse in the vicinity of a difference is itself linguistic. ... We can see ... that understanding our world requires language, that much of it indeed is linguistically instituted.  

409 Blattner, W. D., Heidegger’s Temporal Idealism, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1999 at 74-75  
410 Ibid at 75
In conclusion to his discussion of derivativism in *Heidegger’s Temporal Idealism*, Blattner then submits that: “language is a common and important form of discourse that institutes much of the world with which we are familiar today.”

Here, Blattner repeats in essence an argument made by Lafont; that language is an existential form of discourse.

Pragmatist accounts of *Being and Time* generally fail to take account of the semantic and illocutionary aspects of discourse to which Heidegger alludes – and even describes explicitly. For example, in §34 of *Being and Time*, a section which concerns discourse and language, Heidegger explicitly describes discourse “as assenting or refusing, as demanding or warning, as pronouncing, consulting, or interceding, as ‘making assertions’, and as talking in the way of ‘giving a talk’.”

On the very same page, he describes “discursive speech,” of which hearing and reticence are also described as possibilities of it.

In point of interest, in the year 2006 in *Heidegger’s Being and Time*, some seven years subsequent to the first publication of *Heidegger’s Temporal Idealism*, Blattner immediately equates language and discourse. In the section of *Heidegger’s Being and Time* which concerns language, he states that:

Language, or what Heidegger calls ‘discourse’, is … essential to our familiarity with the world. … Unfortunately, the text of *Being and Time* … [makes it] far from obvious that Heidegger is using the term ‘discourse’ to pick out language. … [I]t is important to understand that [Heidegger] means something rather broader by ‘discourse’ and ‘language’ than the sort of thing that we think of as ‘a language’, such as English or German.

This late equation of language and discourse suggests Heidegger’s own interpretation of the two phenomena as it has already been presented in this dissertation: namely that discourse is language’s ontological being, and that

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413 Ibid at 204, H 161
414 *Heidegger’s Temporal Idealism* is a transformation of Blattner’s doctoral dissertation of 1989 (See Blattner’s “Acknowledgements” in Blattner, W. D., *Heidegger’s Temporal Idealism*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1999 at xi)
language is the existential being of discourse. It suggests a program for which we have been arguing: namely the extension of the science and philosophy of language away from the analytical, logical-metaphysical study of its manifest ‘forms’, and toward the phenomenological, ontological study of its being and meaning. As Blattner indicates, by the being of language Heidegger means something far more complex than Dasein’s ontic ‘natural’ languages (English, German, et cetera) inasmuch as they can each be typified in terms of their distinct vocabularies and grammars. In fact, by drawing our attention away from ‘formal’ languages or the ‘formal’ manifestations of language and towards the ontological phenomenon of discourse, Heidegger intends to direct our thinking about language toward Dasein’s general discursive ability – the phenomenon of discourse as such – and toward language’s role and place in the structure of the world and its interpretation. In this way Heidegger emphasises that the ‘formal’ or ‘logical’ ways of thinking about language necessarily concern a derivative and spurious kind of philosophical study of it.\textsuperscript{416}

We will learn below, as has already been intimated, that discourse does take forms other than Dasein’s ‘ontic’ natural languages. One such form is the ‘call’ [Ruf] or ‘voice of conscience’ [Stimme des Gewissens], a disclosive feature of Dasein’s being-in-the-world which inspires Dasein to take ownership of its existence and to escape the lifestyle of das Man – the ‘public’ and ‘common’ way of being in the world with which ‘human being’ may be identified – which way of being dictates ‘what one does’ and thus describes ordinary social ‘norms’. We will learn, however, that the call of conscience responds also to language ‘as such’ inasmuch as it calls Dasein away from a background in which linguistic exchange predominates and already regiments Dasein’s thoughts and dealings to a significant degree. In this way, as discourse, the call of conscience belongs to language, inhering in the world, like as it belongs to Dasein’s being-in-the-world generally.

In general, discourse describes the ontological being of an intimate disclosure whereby something about the world is communicated for discovery. It manifests proximally and for the most part as Dasein’s language [Sprache]; the manifold of its meaningful phrases and expressions; and even as reticence. As we have learned, the

\textsuperscript{416} Such ways of thinking are generally anathema to Heidegger; for example, Heidegger insists in \textit{Being and Time} that being-in-the-world not be thought ‘formally’ in terms of a subject-object paradigm, but more originally in terms of Dasein.
error of pragmatism consists in identifying discourse with anything and everything Dasein does that does not involve language in its simple performance per se – with, for example, walking, painting, hammering, et cetera. But this is not an association Heidegger makes in his own hermeneutic.

Where Blattner’s thinking about discourse is more explicitly compatible with the view that I am espousing, he consistently indicates that our thinking about language should not be restricted to the mere contemplation of a complex of mere words alone. For example, in Heidegger’s Being and Time he states that: “To focus narrowly on the ‘symbol systems’ or ‘semantics’ of what we say and do is to miss the bulk of what goes on in communication: [which is] joint orientation towards the world”. Although Heidegger attests that: “When fully concrete, discoursing [Rede] (letting something be seen) has the character of speaking [Sprechens] [or] vocal proclamation in words”, it remains that no aggregate of formally isolated ‘words’ can alone be constitutive of language as such; nor indeed can mere utterance or vocalisation [φωνή] amount to language’s being ‘in themselves’.

§.48: Body-language

We decided above that it was incumbent upon us to examine further whether or not language accompanies Dasein’s understanding of the world aboriginally and proximally. Before this particular examination is commenced, however, let us examine a final argument of Blattner’s with respect to the possibility of ‘silent’ discourse.

For his part Blattner submits that even body-language, if it is thought as a discursive interaction or medium for interaction, can show itself to be a communicative accompaniment to being-in-the-world and can even, in itself, seem to be a primitive

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417 We learned above that Heidegger explicitly discourages this restriction. He explains in Being and Time that although language, “as an entity within-the-world, [can become] something which we may come across as ready-to-hand”, or, similarly, can “be broken up into word-Things [Wörter-dinge] which are present-at-hand”, these various formalisations do not reach to its ontological being – discourse. (See: Heidegger, M., Being and Time (trans. Macquarrie, J. & Robinson, E.), Blackwell Publishing, Oxford, 1962 at 204, H 161)

418 Blattner, W. D., Heidegger’s Being and Time, Continuum, London, 2011 at 103
In this way, by admitting a misinterpretation of what Heidegger means by ‘language’, Blattner excuses his statement in Heidegger’s Temporal Idealism that “discourse is not essentially language”. See: Blattner, W. D., Heidegger’s Temporal Idealism, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1999 at 75

kind of language ‘as such’.\textsuperscript{420} In this respect he opposes Husserl’s account of what constitutes expression, as we will see.

While it is true that the raising of fists or the parting of lips, as well as one’s posture in general can mean many things, the association of body-language with verbal-language under a common genus is not one which Heidegger himself makes; for in \textit{Being and Time} and throughout all his works Heidegger restricts his investigation of the being of language to what language is commonly thought to be; namely the complex domain of words, phrases, expressions, and their meaningful usage. For this reason, precisely how Heidegger thinks the relation of body-language to verbal-language ultimately remains unclear; although perhaps it is not so foolhardy to suppose that he might have ascribed to body-language and to verbal-language, inasmuch as both phenomena can be communicative and disclosive, the same ontological being, and to have done so with respect to their roles in human rather than animal ‘society’.

In \textit{Heidegger’s Temporal Idealism}, Blattner’s sole loose suggestion regarding the two phenomena is that the former might precede the latter in understanding as a ‘pre-linguistic’ element of discourse. Seven years later, in \textit{Heidegger’s Being and Time}, he speculates that body-language might itself be a species of ‘primitive’ or ‘deficient’ language. It has already been intimated that Dasein’s discourse takes various worldly forms.

For his part, in order to differentiate ‘phenomenologically’ between body-language and verbal-language, Husserl elucidates that bodily-movements “are not \textsuperscript{421} always\textsuperscript{421} phenomenally one with the experiences made manifest in them in the consciousness of the man who manifests them, as is the case with speech.” In other words, Husserl decides that with verbal-language one says what one means, or, more accurately, thinks that one has done so; for Husserl, a permanent structure of intentionality ultimately differentiates verbal-language from the complex of incidental physical gestures. The shared possibility of each to miscommunicate and to ‘give the wrong impression’ is discounted by the more original criterion of intention.

For his part, Heidegger does not refer to such a structure of meaning-intention or meaning-fulfilment in his investigation of the being of language; but

\textsuperscript{420} Blattner, W. D., \textit{Heidegger’s Being and Time}, Continuum, London, 2011 at 103
\textsuperscript{421} Husserl, E., \textit{Logical Investigations} (trans. Findlay, J. N.), Routledge, London, 2002 at 188
then, on the other hand, he does not refer to body-language or its relation to verbal-language at all; focussing instead on the ontological being of language and languages ‘as such’. What is more, inasmuch as in *Being and Time* Heidegger elects to contemplate the complex being that Dasein ‘is’, in *Being and Time* he concentrates on what is simply and distinctly human as opposed to what is merely ‘animal’. Inasmuch as body-language is an accidental consequence of the mobile animal condition and therefore ubiquitous in regard to fauna for the most part, it is not as unique to Dasein as Dasein’s written and spoken verbal-language is. For this reason verbal-language, inasmuch as it can be differentiated from down-to-earth animal racket and can be identified accordingly as the preserve of worldly Dasein, stands for the ‘language’ that is studied in *Being and Time*. We learned above that animals are not existential instantiations of Dasein because unlike human-kind they are “world-poor” or, as it were, care-poor;⁴²² theirs is a different existence to the human worldly circumstance. For example, inasmuch as animals do not have a verbal-language like Dasein’s, they are incapable of hypothesising or deliberating; they are incapable of science and philosophy generally. Body-language can not dissect the world as κόσμος; nor less can it espouse its own role there. It is, in other words, most close to indication; to the ostensive reference to situation alone. It is the more content-conveying verbal-language that enables circumscription, analysis, deliberation and, finally, definition.

Certain bodily gestures are significant; they can be interpreted in one way or another, much like a natural event can be read as a portent, to ostensively refer Dasein to a situation, circumstance, or predicament in which something matters; and certain bodily gestures are more explicit than others, especially if accompanied by words. However, even if body-language is interpreted as a unique (existential) manifestation of Dasein’s discourse with regard, for example, to its use as a greeting or instruction, Heidegger probably does not think it the dominant day-to-day or historical instantiation thereof: this seems to remain the preserve of verbal-language, which body-language either accompanies or does not as the case may be. Under this construction, although body-language wields its own influence, it can not in itself be said to constitute the dominant means of Dasein’s own meaningful day-to-day commerce, nor of its historical identity as a species. For example, no

Historically significant texts are written in ‘body-language’ or require ‘body-language’ in order to be read; and even the great works of art that capture bodily ‘movement’ have a measure of descriptive, disclosive, verbal-language ‘about’ them like as an environment.\(^{423}\) Body-language does not in itself evoke or refer to the peculiarity of the human circumstance \textit{qua} Dasein. Nonetheless, body-language, as an existential species of discourse, despite its severe impoverishments, can be communicative in its own right: and that is why it is called body-language.

§49: ‘Pre-linguistic’ encounters

Above, we made an implicit mention of the process of observation and mimicry we employ, especially as children, in order to become familiar with the world into which we are born. With respect to what we have since learned, the question with respect to human linguistic ‘development’ as to whether or not the pre-linguistic/linguistic division can be reasonably maintained outside derivativist accounts of language in general can now be asked anew: Could the ‘as’ of entities, the intelligibility that interpretation lays-bare (what Heidegger calls “the existential-hermeneutical ‘as’”), inasmuch as we learn language and seem to exist without it for some time, be a privative pre-linguistic articulation of phenomena which later gets filled-in by language?\(^{424}\)

In our asking of this question we must remind ourselves that it is in the first instance impossible, inasmuch as we are adults who have been exposed to various discourses, to escape absolutely the linguistic phenomena with which we are familiar and to formulate alternative conceptual schemas of the world with which to compare the role and influence of language in it. As beings living with language already, we cannot divorce the complex contexts of significance – or indeed the possibilities we find in the world – from the familiar language we have found to be ‘there’, about them, already.\(^{424}\) Accordingly, whichever possible account of

\(^{423}\) According to Ott, “these spheres of man’s being, too, [i.e., the artistic,] remain embedded in the encompassing horizon of language. It is only in language that one can lay hold of the fact that what is characteristic of the work of art affects us in a way that can no longer be said in words.” For this reason, according to Ott, “the experience of art … brings us to communication with our fellow men … and, thus, to language.” (See Ott, H., “Hermeneutic and Personal Structure of Language” in Kockelmanns, J. J. (ed.), \textit{On Heidegger and Language}, Northwestern University Press, Evanston, 1972 at171)

language and its connexion to being-in-the-world we might possibly posit risks incoherence if it attempts to step-outside the being-in-the-world and language with which we are familiar by considering each or either phenomenon from a transcendental ‘perspective’.

What this construction recognises prima facie is that as Dasein we live in the world with language; we live with a language around and in this way ‘about’ us. This fact does not immediately imply that the child yet to master a language must accordingly live before the ‘advent’ of a world to it – except, that is, in a very peculiar sense; for inasmuch as the child is born into a world it must master, it is also born into a language – and, phenomenologically at least, this is all we can say for such ‘befores’. Accordingly, it is reasonable to suppose that as the child grows-up in the world it experiences language and that its life, as it unfolds, perpetually undergoes linguistic enrichment; for we know from our own comparatively ‘mature’ experience of the world that our own experiences are enriched upon each and every discovery of a new word or phrase that seems to have been waiting for us, in the world, already.

Equally, however, the child’s grasp of language is every time enriched with the recognition of new events and new phenomena, the manifestation of which language seems to stimulate or to encourage; in foreign countries, for example, we often learn the connexion between the words we hear and what these words mean by observing how people react to them – which means how people are engaged by them. In the same way we are often and easily affected by hearkening to how words are spoken; for in this way, too, we learn something about them.

Under this construction the child’s mother and the word ‘mummy’ might ultimately inhere in the world equiprimordially, each intelligible to its own degree with respect to its degree of exposure, as well as the degree to which the child has a concern for them. In this way each might feasibly merge into the other ab initio, as disclosive and available, and each might do so as the emergence of world. To borrow Wittgenstein’s words, it seems accordingly under this construction that “light dawns gradually over the whole”, as there are simply degrees of familiarity with proximate, originary, exposed phenomena. Here the only tangible ‘distance’ to be found between words and their meaning is the ‘distance’ felt by the

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foreigner from a new way of life. Under this construction the words are always already 'there'; from the first instance they show themselves in their own terms, disclosive.

Whether or not from the child’s ‘perspective’ the ‘as’ of any entity, being the intelligibility of phenomena, is a privative pre-linguistic articulation which language later fills-in can therefore only be guessed at – we might equally wonder whether an 'empty' noise is later filled-in by an 'as' discovered in play, experiment, or observation, which 'empty' noise becomes an element of 'language' accordingly. In any case, each possibility suggests an all-too-extant phenomenological connection between language and the world; an interweaving of proximate beings.

‘Developmental’ theories of language occasionally advocate the possibility of pre-linguistic encounters; equally, on the other hand, they propose the originality of innate or ontogenetic ‘grammars’ and other comparable abilities, faculties, or inner homunculi. What they do not typically emphasise or investigate, however, is the more pertinent phenomenological possibility that language is itself original to Dasein’s hermeneutic situation and, accordingly, how a proximity like such as this one might be dealt with. That language bequeaths an ancestry, that it shows Dasein to its place, that it holds its humanity in trust – and that it is only afterwards dissolved into something separate, inner, or spurious – is plainly anathema (or perhaps too foreign) to its discipline.

§.50: The conflation of language and non-linguistic communication

Language, like discourse, is something worldly. However, in an attempt to circumvent confusions about the relationship of language to discourse – or indeed about the meaning of each term in particular – the two phenomena are occasionally conflated in thinking – and also, therefore, in name.

Occasionally the word “language” [Sprache], which in Being and Time denotes ontic phenomena like phrases and expressions [Worte] is re-thought with respect to its ontological being, and is transformed accordingly into yet another name for discourse [Rede]. Heidegger’s distinction between the two phenomena and the modern revival of Parmenides’ ontological difference, itself so crucial to Being and

426 As we have learned, Nietzsche submits that such ‘faculties’ are theoretical abstractions. See Nietzsche, F., Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future (trans. Hollingdale, R. J.), Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1972 at 23-24.
Time, is in this way put at risk; and the differences between the various manifest forms of discourse are in this way dissolved. This cannot have been Heidegger’s intention.

There are numerous variations on the theme of this conflation. Importantly, however, most propose the primordiality of a universal, mostly non-verbal form of communication in the name of which to unify language and discourse. Let us consider one.

In 1988 Stewart, too, identifies that Heidegger is not a realist in the sense recognised by Putnam and Rorty: 427 Heidegger does not posit an underlying a priori ‘world’ whence phenomena emerge for circumspection; for such a ‘world’ would be proximally independent of Dasein’s being-there, its being-in-the-world. Stewart decides therefore that an aspect or element of Dasein’s own being-in-the-world must itself articulate significance and disclose specifically which phenomenon each phenomenon is. With this in mind, because Dasein shares the world with others, Stewart decides that its articulation and disclosedness must be organised or effected socially, communally. He recalls that discourse is an existentiale. With an emphasis on Dasein’s dealings and behaviour, however, he now extends the definition of discourse [Rede] to incorporate each and all of Dasein’s activities inasmuch as they are conformant:

In very general terms, Rede is a social capacity to conform to pre-existing patterns for laying-out or making intelligible ourselves and our worlds of concerns. In a word, all Rede or concrete discourse is conventional or normalised behaviour. 428

Thus thought, discourse constitutes Dasein’s social being-in-the-world essentially:

Language itself [Sprache] is an academic abstraction from our concrete talking or intelligibility-making practices. When phenomenologically

clarified, language comes out to be a phenomenon more like what Dasein itself is than what is non Dasein.\textsuperscript{429}

Language, one ‘form’ of discourse among other possible forms, is now equated with discourse in its broadest sense, and the diversity of its various ontic manifestations, its linguistic ‘forms’, is forgotten; for instead language is reduced to an existentiale incorporating anything Dasein does with which a concern is illustrated – to a wink that shows affection, to a wipe on the brow that shows discomfort,\textsuperscript{430} to hastening, to cleaning, and so on:

[Under this construction] ‘language’ should now cover all forms of rule-following technical and practical intentionality (or, even, Weberian Sinn). For Heidegger, the revisionist, what we previously described as significant, non-linguistic practices are [now] only ‘non-linguistic’ in the ordinary (and presumably misleading) sense of the term ‘language’. In this broader sense (as Taylor helpfully notes, reminiscent of Cassirer’s use of ‘symbolic form’,) there can be no [manifest] human care or worldly intentionality without its ‘expression’ in some ongoing social practice. Thus, on the revised view, language is ill-conceived as some extra layer of practices added onto already existing ones. ‘Language’ comprises all human phenomena governed by social practices. And, in this extended sense, it makes sense to say (following Gadamer), that language is the medium of human experience and thereby ‘constitutive’ of it.\textsuperscript{431}

In this way Stewart decides to place “all social practices on a continuum (called ‘language’).”\textsuperscript{432} In so doing, however, and despite the obvious merits of this account, Stewart risks transforming Heidegger’s own ontological distinction between discourse and language into something unnecessary; risks sacrificing the difference between the ontically manifest ‘forms’ of language and its ontological

\textsuperscript{429} Ibid at 160
\textsuperscript{430} The latter is Taylor’s example. See Taylor, C. Human Agency and Language. Philosophical Papers, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1985 at 259
\textsuperscript{432} Ibid at 155
being, discourse. Furthermore, he risks the conflation of idle talk and quotidian utterance with the statements and assertions of derivative understanding. However, these distinctions are worthy of preservation with regard to the interpretation of language and linguistic phenomena which this dissertation performs. It is more consistent with *Being and Time* to repeat the contention for which we have been arguing – that language is the president existential ‘form’ and species of discourse; and that the distinction between linguistic ‘forms’ and language ‘as such’ is important. Hence, although interpreting language ontically as its phrases and expressions fails to reach to its ontological being, this does not in itself legitimise the sacrifice of discourse as it is ‘in itself’ to its ontic ‘forms’. The investigation of discourse ‘in itself’ is revelatory, determinative, and disclosive. Language (*qua* discourse) records, sways, confirms, and preserves; permits testimony, decree, and maxim. With language *qua* discourse, Dasein achieves what it would otherwise be incapable of achieving.

Below, Heidegger’s association of discourse [*Rede*] with an originary sense of the Greek word λόγος is examined. The purpose of this association is to show precisely how discourse saturates the disclosedness of the world. As this discussion unfolds, we will discover idle talk [*Gerede*], which Heidegger describes as fallen or inauthentic discourse: This is its primary and everyday mode. Its counterpart, authentic discourse, itself a response to inauthenticity, also emerges. By investigating these phenomena we will approach to language as Heidegger thinks it ‘in itself’.
VII. DISCOURSE AND ΛΟΓΟΣ

§.51: Language and λόγος

It is rather late in the preparatory analytic of Being and Time, in §33,\(^{433}\) that language first receives exclusive attention. Here Heidegger introduces it not as a systemised group of expressions, symbols, or phrases [Worte], but as simple speech [Sprache] – as, more specifically, assertion’s third constitutive element, communicative speaking-forth [Heraussage]. Having been implicated in assertoric utterance, therefore, language is introduced in §33 with respect to derivative understanding; for derivative understanding typifies the domain in which the assertoric occurs for the most part. The equation of language with assertoric utterance is not where Heidegger’s study of language ends in Being and Time, however: Immediately after §33, in §34,\(^{434}\) Heidegger describes language as the existential being of discourse [Rede], and begins to attend to its role in disclosedness generally. In point of fact, neither is §33 where his study of language begins; for already, in §7.b.,\(^{435}\) Heidegger equates discourse with the Greek λόγος. According to Aler this early equation means that language [Sprache] can not merely be a late, derivative, assertive speaking-forth, but must by implication be a late, ontological derivative of the λόγος itself; of an \textit{a priori} structure of disclosedness; namely Dasein’s familiarity with being generally.\(^{436}\)

Assertion, communicative speaking-forth, “the indication of a this-here”,\(^{437}\) presupposes something to say; it presupposes concerned being-in-the-world. Accordingly, Heidegger differentiates between the \textit{having} of something to assert, a topic, and the speaking-forth [Heraussage], the performance, of the assertion itself. As has now been identified, inasmuch as assertion expresses prior interpretations, this construction suggests a kind of derivativism \textit{prima facie}. For this reason, with this distinction seeming to have been made in §33, Aler contends that a twin distinction, now occurs in §34 between (1) linguistic phenomena generally – language as such – and (2) a pre-linguistic familiarity with being which need not in itself be “reduced to wording”, namely the λόγος thought as an \textit{a priori}, unifying

\(^{433}\) Which is entitled “Assertion as a derivative mode of interpretation”
\(^{434}\) Which is entitled “Being-there and discourse. Language”
\(^{435}\) Which is entitled “The phenomenological method of investigation: the concept of the \textit{logos}”
\(^{437}\) Ibid at 25
structure of Dasein’s being-in-the-world. To Aler, Heidegger makes this distinction in order to lead his readers away from Rede’s pronounced connotations of speech and language generally, and towards the ontological ‘position’ of Rede – as λόγος – as the ground of language’s possibility, as the ground of communicative speaking-forth or exchange.

Above, derivativism was established as a theory to be criticised. It is now an incumbent task to seek a full explication of discourse, with respect to the meaning of λόγος, that Aler’s contentions may be criticised, and that the relationship of λόγος to language may be clarified. It will become apparent as a consequence of this criticism that the modern word ‘language’ shares distinct similarities with the Greek λόγος, both in meaning and according to Heidegger’s account of both phenomena.

§.52: The literal meaning of the word λόγος, as well as its common and traditional characterisations

Liddell & Scott define λόγος as:

(1) That which is said, namely the word or that by which the inward thought is expressed (in Latin, vox [the voice of…] or oratio [prayer or speech]);
(2) The inward thought itself (in Latin, ratio ['opinion', 'reason', 'ground', 'account', 'consideration', 'relation', 'proportion', 'analogy']); and
(3) The Λόγος or Word, thus comprising both senses of Thought and Word that are found, for example, in the New Testament.

Λόγος, which concerns what is in being, is to be contradistinguished therefore from μύθος [mythos], which concerns essentially what is fictitious or pretended, which means:

(1) A speech, subject, or purpose; and, rather more frequently,
(2) A myth, story, or fable.

440 Ibid at 983
In English today λόγος is still typically translated as ‘reason’ [ratio]; to recognise this, one need merely recall that Aristotle’s description of the human being as ζῷον λόγον χῶν first became animal rationale in Latin, and then became, rather more clumsily, ‘the rational animal’ in English. It is important to recognise, however, that this vulgar translation is not a satisfactory indication of what Heidegger describes the λόγος to be in Being and Time, despite the etymological connection of this interpretation to the German Rede.

Grammatically, the Greek noun λόγος is derived from the same root as the noun λέξις [lexis] – which means ‘phrase or expression’, a ‘speaking’, ‘saying’, or ‘speech’, as well as ‘a way of speaking’, ‘diction’, or ‘style’ – and the verb λέγειν [legein] – which phenomenon has its own importance for enquiries into language and Greek thought, which verb means ‘to deliberate’, ‘to count’, ‘to consider’, ‘to collect’, ‘to read’, ‘to talk’, or ‘to hold discourse’. This common root is the verb λέγω [logō], of which the verb λέγειν is the present active infinitive. Λέγω can also be found in the adjective διαλεκτικός [dialektikos], which means ‘dialectical’.

For reasons of etymology and deference to Greek thought, as well as his own philosophical bias towards the novel study of Dasein (which etymology, thought, and bias will be discussed in more detail below), Heidegger thinks λόγος better rendered in German today not as Vernunft (recall the Latin ratio) or any of its near and synonymous equivalents, but as Rede, discourse. This, he attests, is its basic signification.

Provisionally, what is clear is that although Liddell & Scott’s definition of λόγος accurately captures many of the meanings commonly attributed to it, it does not perhaps penetrate to the issue of its ontological being with respect to Dasein – at least not as Heidegger thinks it – nor still to its role and function in being-in-the-world. Without recognising the importance of these phenomena it remains open to derivativism to interpret language as mere expression, late, and, as will be shown

441 For Aristotle’s discussion of the ‘rational principle’ in man, see Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics Alpha, 13, 1098a3-5. The definition of the human being as ζῷον λόγον χῶν is most often attributed to his Metaphysics. (The edition of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics that I used for this dissertation is: Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics (trans. Rackham, H.), Loeb Classical Library/Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Massachusetts), 1968)
below, posterior to pre-linguistic understanding. In the discussion which now ensues, this particular interpretation of language, as well as those interpretations of the λόγος which having been influenced by the historical course of philosophical inquiry are commonly attributed to it, will be traced back to an altogether more original, ontologically sounder encounter of the meaning and being of each. As a consequence, what Heidegger identifies as the meaning of λόγος will be investigated and, in addition, its connexion to Rede and to language – again, as Heidegger thinks each, – will be examined.

§.53: Λόγος as language as the fundamental determination of the being of the human being as such

In Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy in 1924 Heidegger marries various Aristotelian concepts to the project which will eventually become Being and Time. The provisional associations he makes here between λόγος and language recur in Being and Time and elsewhere.

Importantly, in Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy, Heidegger reads Aristotle’s determination of the human being in its fundamental being as such, as ζῶον λόγον ἐχον, to imply that “language is possessed, is spoken, in such a way that speaking belongs to the genuine drive of the being of the human being” as what it is. Heidegger understands Aristotle to identify the λόγος, as language, as the essential quality or feature of humankind that enables and maintains its situation in family, society, and community; above primitive animal existence.

In this respect the λόγος is contrasted by Aristotle and also by Heidegger with uncomplex vocal utterance; with mere animal noise, φωνη. In his Politics Aristotle expounds upon this difference. He explains that φωνη amounts merely to enticing or warning; to indication as, for example, Husserl thinks it. He likens it thus to the way in which animals indicate to one another the presence of what is pleasing or distressing, supporting or unsupporting of life, et cetera. Under this construction simple φωνη, indicative utterance, is altogether unsophisticated; it

445 See Aristotle, Politics, 2, 1253a9
(The edition of Aristotle’s Politics that I used for this dissertation is: Aristotle, Politics (trans. Rackham, H.), Loeb Classical Library/Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Massachusetts), 1967)
achieves no more or less than gesture, for this is what it amounts to essentially. On the other hand, the λόγος, inasmuch as it is ‘there’ for what is essentially human, amounts to the disclosedness of the beneficial and the harmful, the proper and the improper, what matters and does not matter, as well as what is just and unjust. It amounts to a space for debate, deliberation, and decision: to discussions concerning the good life: Ultimately, the λόγος is the space of theorising, science, and philosophy.

According to Aristotle, therefore, the λόγος makes for household and for πόλις [polis]; just as discourse, according to Heidegger, makes for solicitude [Fürsorge], considerateness [Rücksicht], forbearance [Nachsicht], and esteem. The λόγος itself causes human being to stand apart in the world as something human – as that which, qua homo cura, can articulate care. For the Greeks, living in the πόλις, being ζοὸν πολιτικὸν [zoon politikon], makes them human. Heidegger identifies this account of human life with Dasein’s own solicitous being-in-the-world-with-others – and thus with speaking-being. It is in this respect, having identified the λόγος with Dasein’s being-in-the-world, that in The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude in the winter semester of 1929-30, Heidegger describes the inhabitants of animal kingdoms as world-poor. This poverty, this paucity of world, is due at least in part to the lack of sophisticated language.

In Rahe’s words, therefore, for Aristotle the “λόγος is something [much] more refined than the capacity to make private feelings public: it enables the human being to perform as no other animal can; it makes it possible for him to perceive and make clear to others through reasoned discourse the difference between what is advantageous and what is harmful, between what is just and what is unjust, and between what is good and what is evil.”

447 The animal that lives in the πόλις, man
448 See, for example, Heidegger, M., Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy (trans. Metcalf, R. D. & Tanzer, M. B.), Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 2009 at 70-80
§.54: Discourse as λόγος in Being and Time

In *Being and Time* Heidegger raises the problem of the definition of the λόγος with respect to the various interpretations of it to which it has historically been subject. He begins, however, by defining the λόγος himself. According to Heidegger, λόγος means:

…the same as δηλοῦν: to make manifest what one is ‘talking about’ in one’s discourse.\(^{451}\)

This very passage seems to proffer textual proof that language, *talking*, is disclosive – that language, discourse, belongs to disclosedness and is original to the Dasein-world relationship. It is distinctly Aristotelian.

This definition of the λόγος is repeated by Heidegger elsewhere. In *History of the Concept of Time*, the main body of which was first given as a lecture course in 1925, Heidegger already claims that “Language makes manifest”; that it consists in the “appresentation of the [human] environment”.\(^ {452}\) By the 1940s, having been defined in *Being and Time* as the existential being of discourse, language becomes characterised by Heidegger as “saying” [Sage], and now he begins describe it as “the house of being” or as that in which being is sustained.\(^ {453}\) In each instance, therefore is language, *Rede, λόγος*, thought to make the world and worldly phenomena manifest; to be inseparable from being-in-the-world and what is found there. It is not thus restricted by Heidegger to propositional statements, to speaking-forth, to instances of logical or analytic operations, nor indeed to what is found in the dictionary as an amalgam individual lexemes. Rather, it is thought to belong to the very situating of Dasein in its world; to be an essential, linguistic fundament of being-in-the-world.

As Powell indicates, “the making manifest (offenbar machen) denoted by the Greek δηλοῦν is intimately woven together with”, or at least very similar to,

Heidegger’s interpretation of “the Greek φαινεσθαι. While φαινεσθαι is the, so to speak, self-manifestation of what shows itself, the making manifest of the λόγος is one through which something shows itself from itself – i.e., as φαινόμενον [phenomenon] – in the talking …. That is, the talking about something is one way in which the something talked about comes to show itself as itself, as self-showing.”

Powell describes the λόγος thus in its organic and quotidian existence as opposed to its occurrence in the assertions or propositions of specifically derivative understanding.

Ordinary quotidian discourse has the possibility to let entities show themselves ‘as’ they are; for it says the existential-hermeneutical ‘as’, which belongs to Dasein’s originary understanding. By talking, Dasein shows itself as what it is. On the other hand, apophantic and assertoric utterances often isolate phenomena from their genuine self-showing and award them alternative characterisations instead – such as, for example, presence-at-hand.

Having identified therefore that “the basic signification of λόγος is ‘discourse’ [Rede]”, Heidegger complains that the ordinary and “real signification of ‘discourse’, which is obvious enough, gets constantly covered up by the later history of the word ... and especially by the numerous and arbitrary Interpretations [of it] which subsequent philosophy has provided. Λόγος gets ‘translated’ (and this means that it is always getting interpreted) as ‘reason’ [Vernunft], ‘judgement’ [Urteil] [or assertion], ‘concept’ [Begriff], ‘definition’ [Definition], ‘ground’ [Grund], or ‘ratio’ [Verhältnis].”

Heidegger’s question with regard to each of these various interpretations, traditional or spurious, is this:

How can ‘discourse’ be so susceptible of modification [in meaning] that λόγος can signify all the things we have listed, and [can continue to do so] in good scholarly usage?

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Macquarrie and Robinson use “relationship” rather than “ratio”; but “ratio” is the more literal rendering of the German Verhältnis
456 Ibid at 55, H 32
In order to resolve this problem, to trace the history of this confusion, and ultimately to disambiguate the meaning of the Greek λόγος, Heidegger decides to return to the first appearance and study of the λόγος in Greek thought; in what he describes as “the ontology of the ancients”. It is in Greek “ontology”, in the works of Heraclitus in particular (which works were written roughly five-hundred years before Christ), that the λόγος first appears to philosophy as a technical term.

Heidegger’s interpretation of the Greek λόγος proceeds in *Being and Time* in two clear steps: First, Heidegger identifies that the fundamental concerns of Greek ontology (with respect to its study of being qua being) are the causes and principles of individual beings. He elucidates that: “In the ontology of the ancients, the entities we encounter within the world are taken as the basic examples for the interpretation of being” as such. Thus, being qua being is typically encountered in Greek thought in terms of the individual beings which exemplify it. The perception νοεîν of such entities is thought as the “locus” of access to them and to being. Second, Heidegger observes that Greek ontology typically restricts itself to a peculiar but by no means fruitless preserve of the λόγος in which the being of beings seems most clearly expressible. This is the λόγος άποφαντικός [logos apophantikos], the apophantic function of language, which involves explicitly the

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Although Heidegger uses the word ‘ontology’, it did not appear until the beginning of the eighteenth century (see Schürmann, R., “Modernity: The Last Epoch in a Closed History?”, *Independent Journal of Philosophy*, vol. 4, 1983, at 55)
458 What Heraclitus says about the λόγος is investigated in more detail below.
460 Two typical examples of this type of interpretation are Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* and Aristotle’s *Categories*. In the *Metaphysics*, Aristotle explains that: “… as the term ‘healthy’ always relates to health (either as preserving it or as producing it or as indicating it or as a receptive of it), and as ‘medical’ relates to the art of medicine (either as possessing it or as naturally adapted for it or as being a function of medicine) … so ‘being’ is used in various senses, but always with reference to one principle. For some things are said to ‘be’ because they are substances; others because they are modifications of substance; others because they are a process towards substance…” (see Aristotle, *Metaphysics* Gamma, 1,1003a35-1003b10); and that “[t]he term ‘being’ has several senses … [but] it denotes first the ‘what’ of a thing … (… when we describe what it is, we say not that it is ‘white’ or ‘hot’ or ‘five feet high’ but that it is ‘a man’ or ‘a god’), and all other things are said to ‘be’ because they are either quantities or qualities or affections…” (See Aristotle, *Metaphysics* Zeta, 1, 1028a10-2). Similarly, Aristotle’s *Categories* treats of primary substances (the beings that, essentially, ‘are’), and of secondary substances (whatever, accidentally, ‘are’ the qualities or properties ‘in’ and ‘of’ primary substance).
bringing of beings ‘to sight’. In this way Heidegger explains that the being of entities is always already destined in Greek thought to be found in the λόγος in a distinctive way, in a “distinctive kind of λέγειν (‘letting something be seen’), so that being becomes intelligible in advance as that which it is [naturally perceived to be] – and as that which it is already in every entity”. Accordingly, λόγος comes “into the Greeks’ philosophical reflection [Besinnung] primarily as assertion”. This is the simple, peculiar aspect of λόγος with respect to which the Greeks thought language’s relationship to the world; and for this reason early ‘science’ is typified according to Heidegger by the way it carries definite suppositions about the being of beings within itself, which suppositions its methods and management of language both reflect and encourage consequently. Heidegger explains that: “In any [ancient] discussion (λόγος) of entities, we have previously addressed ourselves to being; this addressing is a κατηγορεῖσθαι [kategoreisthai].” In early science the κατηγορήματα [kategoremata], the addressed things, the foci of enquiry metaphysical or otherwise, guide concept-formation.

In ordinary usage, κατηγορεῖν [kategorin] refers to the making of public accusations about someone or something in order to obtain to precise or definite facts about a being at issue. Ontologically, and for that matter methodologically, κατηγορεῖν refers to a distinct, specific λέγειν and denotes the categorising or fixing of something ‘as’ it is, as an object, such that something about it may be settled or shown: Κατηγορία [Kategoria] has the same meaning as “predicate”. In consummation “when one addresses oneself to something as something and discusses

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463 *Ibid* at 70, H 44
464 See *Ibid* at 209, H 165. The full quote reads: “The Greeks had no word for ‘language’; they understood this phenomenon ‘in the first instance’ as discourse. But because the λόγος came into their philosophical ken primarily as assertion, this was the kind of logos which they took as their clue for working out the basic structures of the forms of discourse and its components.”
466 See Aristotle, *Categories*, 8, 16b21
467 ‘Predicate’ is the rendering Ackrill employs in his translation. (See, for example, Aristotle, *Categories* (trans. Ackrill, J. L.), Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2002 at 29)
The ‘space’ of this discussion, like the ‘space’ of any given discourse, constitutes a distinctive kind of λόγος. Importantly, however, κατηγορεῖν is to be contrasted with ἀγορεύειν [agonphein]; for ἀγορεύειν refers to a more ordinary, everyday kind of speaking with one another – although both, and especially the latter, can participate in passing-along the dicta given to Dasein by das Man.

That the λόγος is interpreted ‘apophantically’ in Greek “ontology” does not mean that we should today confine ourselves to thinking it with respect to assertoric utterance and nothing else, however. Indeed, we do not today think Rede in this way. This assertoric, ‘apophtactic’ interpretation of the λόγος, whilst indicating what Heidegger thinks to be the primary manifestation of the λόγος as the Greek philosophers thought it, is actually too restrictive an account of the λόγος qua Rede as Heidegger understands it; for, as we have learned, assertion is but one of many ontic ‘forms’ of discourse resident in language. If the λόγος is to be thought with respect to discourse as such, therefore, it is important to recall that ‘assertion’ describes yet a single instance of its phenomenal being. Similarly, although according to the Greeks the “genuine function of the λόγος is the ἀποφαίνεσθαι, the ‘bringing of a matter to sight’, … [the] ‘showing [of] what is spoken about’,” the λόγος need not be associated with assertion alone; for the disclosedness of being-in-the-world also occurs in more mundane forms of language – in asking, praising, scolding, calling, interceding, et cetera.

That Aler and derivativists generally characterise language as communicative ‘speaking-forth’ – as a ‘moment’ which assertoric utterance typifies with its advent – need not mean that it should be thought entirely thus – either with regard to Being and Time or in general. The being of language, the unity of Dasein, its world and language, is far more intimate than mere asserting – than mere ‘speaking-forth’ – alone seems to advocate.

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469 Recall our discussion of the relationship of assertion to Dasein’s derivative understanding.

470 The term ἀγορεύειν refers rather roughly to market-discourse. The market-place, or ἀγορα, was the primary (and civic) centre of Ancient Greek life. (See Liddell, H. G. & Scott, R., *A Greek-English Lexicon*, Eighth Edition, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1897 at 12-13). A discussion of Gerede, Heidegger’s name for this kind of ‘idle talk’, as well as its relationship to Dasein, occurs in the following chapter.

§.55: \(\text{\textit{λόγος}}\) as account or treatment

Liddel & Scott suggest that the \(\text{\textit{λόγος}}\) can be understood as an account or treatment in which space, the precinct of an organised investigative heuristic or field of concern, a subject is freed for discussion – and freed such that it comes to the fore ‘as’ the being it is. Under this construction, the word ‘treatment’ can be understood with respect to the sense of ‘treatise’.

Treatises are precisely what Aristotle’s \textit{Metaphysics} consists in. Each book of the \textit{Metaphysics} contains at least one distinct, independent treatise, conceived and designed to form the basis of school instruction.\(^{472}\) According to Owens, these treatises, \(\text{\textit{λόγοι}}\), would have formed the basis as well as the groundwork of ancient school activity.\(^{473}\)

The association of the \(\text{\textit{λόγος}}\) with an account or treatment of a matter of concern seems further corroborated in Aristotle’s \textit{The Art of Rhetoric}. Here Aristotle describes the \(\text{\textit{λόγος}}\) as one of the three elements of the unitary phenomenon, rhetoric, which three elements are:\(^{474}\)

1. Persuasion by means of having emotional appeal to the hearer, or \(\pi\alpha\theta\omicron\omicron\) [\textit{pathos}];
2. Persuasion by means of comportment,\(^{475}\) or convincing one’s listeners of one’s trustworthiness and moral character, or \(\eta\theta\omicron\omicron\) [\textit{ethos}]; and


\(^{473}\) They might even have been written in some instances by students (See Owens, J. \textit{The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics: A Study in the Greek Background of Mediaeval Thought}, Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Toronto, 1963 at 75)

At 75-79, Owens explains that: “The ‘treatments’ would naturally trend to arrange themselves, over a long period of school activity, into groupings of varying extent. [Eventually,] [t]he interrelations of the subject-matter would require that this type of interrelation be exhibited in the metaphysical treatises, a result of which would invariably be something like the \textit{Metaphysics} as we have it today. ... There is danger, for these reasons, in hastily assuming that the Aristotelian Primary Philosophy can be looked upon as a ‘system’ of thought. Aristotle speaks of [the metaphysics merely] as ‘Wisdom’.” Ross, too, submits that Aristotle’s \textit{Metaphysics} is “no dogmatic system but a series of essays [\textit{λόγοι}]” (Ross, W. D., \textit{Aristotle}, Methuen & Co. Ltd., London, 1945 at 155)

\(^{474}\) See Aristotle, \textit{The Art of Rhetoric}, Iota, 2, 1356a1-5


\(^{475}\) ‘Comportment’ is Heidegger’s translation of \(\eta\theta\omicron\omicron\) at Heidegger, M., \textit{Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy} (trans. Metcalf, R. D. & Tanzer, M. B.), Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 2009 at 111
(3) Λόγος [logos], being “the speech itself, in so far as it proves or seems to prove.”

Aristotle decides therefore that rhetoric provides a good, ontic example of what the λόγος consists in, for rhetoric discloses something of the being of entities. Importantly, with respect to Rede and disclosedness, in rhetoric itself is contained the possibility of inculcating a common view of a matter. In the second book of The Art of Rhetoric Aristotle investigates the way that orators speak with regard to moods [πάθη]; according to Heidegger also, the rhetorician “must understand the possibilities of moods in order to rouse them and [to] guide them aright”. Good rhetoric discloses the being of its topic by allowing the limits of its domain to show. For this reason Aristotle describes it as a λόγος όρισμός [logos orismos]; a phenomenon which discloses the horizons of a matter’s influence; of the limitations and completeness of its being; of the sphere of its worldly circumstance. In so doing rhetoric reconveys the ground of everyday conceptuality – or, in the specific terms of Being and Time, it appeals to Dasein’s average understanding. It is not therefore ‘theoretical’ in being; it does not necessarily consist in the arguing and development of theoretical axioms or the ideas of derivative understanding; it consists rather in the deliberative, clever holding-forth of the basic opinions developed naturally in everyday life. Rhetoric inculcates by means of disclosing orderly, but it is not, however, sophistical; its aim and achievement is not ‘victory’ or ‘knowledge’, but communion.

In the sense that the Greeks understand it, therefore, rhetoric refers to the impassioned discourse spoken at meetings, celebrations, in courts of law, and in other such institutions or situations; it refers to the common, everyday instances of customary speaking which were occurring in the Greek world: Rhetoric is, for the Greeks, an everyday hermeneutic.

476 See Aristotle, The Art of Rhetoric, Iota, 2, 1356a1-5
This translation is Freese’s. Roberts, in his translation of this work, translates the same passage as “the proof, or apparent proof, provided by the words of the speech itself.” This is, however, misleading; it is the speech that is the issue.
For further critical discussion of this issue, see the critique of Aristotle’s The Art of Rhetoric in Matsen, P. P., Rollinson, P. B., & Sousa, M. (eds.), Readings from Classical Rhetoric, Southern Illinois University Press, Carbondale, 1990
477 Aristotle, The Art of Rhetoric Alpha, 2, 1355b25
It has, according to Aristotle, three main variations. These are:

1. Deliberative or political speech aiming to stir a popular body, συμβουλευτικός \[ \text{sumbouleutkos} \], which is futural;
2. Forensic or judicial speech before a court, δικανικός \[ \text{dikanikos} \], which is oriented toward the past; and
3. Festive speech, πιδεικτικός \[ \text{epideiktikos} \], which is concerned with exhibiting matters of the present.\[480\]

Kisiel explains that the logical analysis of rhetoric reveals in this way that the λόγος, discourse, is fundamentally a matter of “‘talking into’ [Über-reden], convincing, and … attunement [Abstimmung].” According to Kisiel therefore, “It is not in ‘reason’ but [rather] on this everyday level that we find the full measure of the Aristotelian definition of man as the speaking animal.”\[481\]

It is in precisely this respect that the logical analysis of rhetoric can stand for the logical analysis of discourse. The association of λόγος with scientific or theoretical ‘accounts’ or ‘treatments’, with pure θεωρία alone, can obscure this more original association; and this is precisely what Heidegger observes in Being and Time and his early work in particular.\[482\]

That discourse belongs to disclosedness means that we must also see beyond the way the λόγος manifests as the produce of a skilled speaker or craftsman \[ \tauεχνικόν \]; for if our aim is to locate the meaning of λόγος such as it is ‘in itself’, then we must attend assiduously to its role and function in disclosedness. We must identify that there are men called simpatici precisely because of the role and function of the λόγος; that their standing is owed in the first place to its being alone. For his part, Heidegger also identifies that Aristotle’s association of the λόγος with δύναμις

\[480\] Heidegger discusses each of these in 1924 at Heidegger, M., Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy (trans. Metcalf, R. D. & Tanzer, M. B.), Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 2009 at 84
Aristotle was to be the subject of the proposed, ultimately unpublished Third Division of Being and Time, which was to consider among other topics the temporality of discourse. For more information consult Elden, S., “Reading Logos as Speech: Heidegger, Aristotle and Rhetorical Politics” in Philosophy and Rhetoric, vol. 38, no. 4, 2005 at 292
\[481\] Kisiel, T., The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time, University of California University Press, Berkeley, 1993 at 284
\[482\] By the summer semester of 1934 Heidegger’s thinking has undergone a turn [Kehre] towards the question of language ‘in itself’; after which he began an explicit investigation of its being, which was continued until late in his career. The history of the logical analysis of language and the λόγος itself first guides him toward it: See Heidegger, M., Logic as the Question Concerning the Essence of Language (trans. Torres Gregory, W. & Unna, Y.), State University of New York Press, Albany, 2009
[dynamis] – with force, power, or possibility – as opposed to his association of the λόγος with τέχνη [technē] – with a skill, craft, or art – is the more “genuine” relation.483 Λόγος means more than mere τέχνη connotes; for this construction also obscures its genuine meaning with respect to the disclosedness of Dasein’s being.484

Importantly, on the one hand, the equation of λόγος with ‘account’ or ‘treatment’ is perhaps too restrictive. On the other hand, there are other discursive phenomena that also ‘make manifest’ but that do so “in a different way”.485 requesting [εύχη], interceding, demanding, calling et cetera also ‘make known’. Inasmuch as these other ‘types’ of discourse also make manifest or disclose matters and must therefore be interpreted as ‘modes’ of disclosedness, they also need accounting for.

§.56: Λόγος and σύνθεσις

Inasmuch as the λόγος can be characterised as a realm or ‘space’ for letting something be seen, namely as λέγειν, it has also been characterised in the past as a σύνθεσις [synthesis] or bringing-together of disparate elements with which to disclose matters anew. Σύνθεσις is typically and traditionally thought to combine (1) an original element – the matter described – and (2) either the idea – the intuition of a matter – or the means of describing it – language however conceived. Such a rendering does not, however, describe the originative phenomenon of the equiprimordiality of Dasein, the world and language, nor the essentially worldly being of language according to Heidegger.

To indicate why this is, Heidegger investigates σύνθεσις in Being and Time in terms of assertoric utterance, with which it is associated, as well as its place in derivative understanding.

As we have learned, explicitly “pointing out something about something”486 has the effect of bringing-together the “about-which of discourse” and “whatever is said to be about it in the talk as such”. Thought with respect to assertoric utterance, therefore, σύνθεσις seems to be a synthesis of judgement and object; to be a type of

484 Recall the rejection of instrumentalism, above.
486 This is Heidegger’s definition of assertoric utterance. See Chapter Four, above.
correspondence between a judgement and what is judged in it. Words, expressed judgements, seem posterior to the world. However, σύνθεσις need not be thought in terms of a purely ‘transcendental’ binding of ideas with more original and ‘objectively’ occurrent entities. Heidegger explains in Being and Time that:

Only because the function of the λόγος as ἀπόφασις lies in letting something be seen by pointing it out, can the λόγος have the structural form of σύνθεσις. Here ‘synthesis’ does not mean a binding and linking together of representations, a manipulation of psychical occurrences where the ‘problem’ arises of how these bindings, as something inside, agree with something physical outside. [Instead, here] the συν has a purely apophantical signification and means letting something be seen in its togetherness [Beisammen] with something – letting it be seen ‘as’ something.487

The λόγος, inasmuch as it makes manifest Dasein’s being-in-the-world, can be re-thought in accord with the originative meaning of σύνθεσις as placing, or setting-into-place [θέσις] with [συν-]; as Dasein’s display of the more originary phenomenon of language’s already being worldly, being with the topic of its address. The λόγος, under this construction, with respect to its synthetic role, refers to the display of the originative σύνθεσις of Dasein’s world and the inherence in it of language: as σύνθεσις, the λόγος displays what is the case from what is the case, and does not therefore require the kind of ‘transcendence’ implicated by foreign ‘judgement’.

In Homer’s Odyssey, for example, Agamemnon, encountering a group of slain suitors in the underworld, recognises them, and addresses them as follows:488

Amphimedon, by what disaster have you all been plunged down into the darkness of the earth, all of you prominent and of the same age; one

488 The quote employed for this example is employed in Heidegger, M., Introduction to Metaphysics (trans. Friend, G. & Polt, R.), Yale University Press, Yale University, 2000 at 131, H 95, to expound upon what is, according to Heidegger, the "originary meaning of λέγειν as 'gathering'". In Introduction to Metaphysics, Heidegger begins to interpret the λόγος with respect to 'gathering' (and especially 'gathering into presence') generally; which is a development of his thinking about the λόγος as the 'making manifest' of σύνθεσις in Being and Time.
could hardly bring together, in search throughout a polis, such noble men. 489

Here, from within it, from what is the case, the λόγος, as language, displays the σύνθεσις or co-being of Agamemnon, Amphimedon, their men, and the entities with them, including the disaster that supposedly precipitated their meeting. Here, ontically, we might be tempted to re-cognise the λόγος here as the species of the λέγειν that is Agamemnon’s outburst. Similarly, we might say that it is, in this instance, Epic verse. However, no matter how it is interpreted with respect to Agamemnon’s own being-in-the-world, what is important to realise here is that the λόγος and σύνθεσις like it can be differentiated from the spurious judgement-and-correspondence traditionally associated with copulative predication or assertoric utterance. Here, the λόγος and σύνθεσις can be identified instead as belonging to discourse, in its worldliness, in general. Under this construction the σύνθεσις phenomenon is more original to Dasein’s being-in-the-world than the schema of transcendental ‘representations’ which ‘bind’ and ‘link’ can suggest. 490 It belongs to a worldly λόγος.

§.57: Λόγος, assertion, and αλήθεια

As has been intimated and now warrants discussion, inasmuch as the λόγος has traditionally been thought according to its assertoric or apophantic being it has traditionally shown itself as that within which ‘truth’ and ‘untruth’ subsist par excellence.

In the kind of judgements [Urteile] which have now been described, correspondences between propositions and their objects are propounded, and truth is interpreted as the agreement of judicative observations, made by a subject with words, with the ‘object’ towards which these words are directed. Truth is interpreted thus with respect to the correctness [όρθότης] of any resultant correspondence: the truth of any given judgement is assessed on the grounds of its validity or appropriateness to precisely ‘what’ is judged. The twin phenomena of judgement and validity are not the primary loci of truth as Heidegger understands.

489 Homer, Odyssey, XXIV, 106
The edition of Homer’s Odyssey that I used for this dissertation is: Homer, Odyssey (trans. Murray, A. T.), Loeb Classical Library/Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Massachusetts), 1919
490 Consider, for example, the discussion of signs in Chapter Four.
it, however; nor indeed as he claims the Greeks to think it. According to Heidegger, judgement and validity, as well as accuracy and inaccuracy of correspondence, belong instead to a special, peculiar case of the λόγος.

In *Being and Time* Heidegger asserts that the originary Greek meaning of the word ‘truth’ is ‘unhiddenness’. He recalls that the Greek word for ‘truth’, ἀλήθεια – or ἀ-λήθεια – translates literally into English as ‘not-concealed’. He therefore translates ἀλήθεια into German not as *Wahrheit*, one of the meanings of which is ‘verity’, but as *Unverborgenheit*, which means ‘nonconcealment’, ‘unhiddenness’ or ‘revealedness’. Generally, unconcealment, ἀλήθεια, refers to the way that entities manifest to Dasein ‘as’ the entities they are. Throughout his career Heidegger differentiates between four possible interpretations of ἀλήθεια in which this meaning is implicated, which require disambiguation. These are:

1. Propositional truth or correctness [*Richtigkeit*].

This is the kind of ‘truth’ associated with assertoric utterance and the categorisation of beings usually found in the analytical sciences. However, it is not the originary being of truth. The correspondence of ‘representations’ with what they ‘represent’ is not as fundamental as the way phenomena come to the fore ‘in themselves’.

What is fundamental is Dasein’s being-there, in the first instance, with what its assertoric utterances repeat. It is its originary familiarity with its being-in-the-world amidst phenomena which enables its assertoric utterances to say something at all.


492 For the Greeks θὸδος is positive and ἀ-λήθεια is often privative because ‘truth’, ‘unconcealment’, is something one gains or extracts from the world with respect to one’s way of being-there.

493 Macquarrie and Robinson note that “[t]he Greek words for ‘truth’ (ἡ ἀλήθεια, τὸ ἀληθές) are compounded of the privative prefix ἀ- (‘not’) and the verbal stem -λαθ- (to escape notice, ‘to be concealed’). The truth may thus be looked upon as that which is un-concealed, that which gets discovered or uncovered [endeckt] ‘as it is’.” (See footnote 1 in Heidegger, M., *Being and Time* (trans. Macquarrie, J. & Robinson, E.), Blackwell Publishing, Oxford, 1962 at 57, H 33)

When Heidegger does use *Wahrheit*, he emphasises that the German *wahren*, meaning ‘to preserve, maintain, or protect’, is close to it. According to Heidegger, ‘truth’, thought properly, implies the stable unconcealment of entities.

494 This is the ‘considered’ list of Heidegger’s definition of ‘truth’ that Wrathall presents in Wrathall, M. A., *Heidegger and Unconcealment: Truth, Language, and History*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2011 at 12-15, as gleaned from his study of Heidegger’s works. Here, it is examined with respect to *Being and Time*. In *Being and Time*, ‘truth’ is discussed in most detail in §44, which is entitled “Dasein, disclosedness, and truth”
Propositional ‘truth’ is not an original species of ἀλήθεια, of the unconcealedness of entities ‘as’ entities are, as it were, ‘in themselves’.

(2) Discoveredness [Entdecktheit].
As has been shown in Chapter Two, ‘discoveredness’ concerns Dasein’s discovery of entities ‘as’ what they are: Dasein discovers entities with respect to its concernful comportment toward them; with respect to the possibilities towards which it projects itself, with respect to which entities are revealed in their possibilities. Discoveredness occurs thus with respect to Dasein’s dealings or praxis but, rather more importantly, with respect to the public fore-structure which influences the originary disclosure of what it is possible for Dasein to do. The association of ἀλήθεια, the unconcealedness of entities, with discoveredness reaches closer to its genuine being. However, it does not strictly address the genuine disclosedness of entities, the unconcealedness of entities ‘as’ they are, for Dasein’s discovery of entities (particularly ‘as’ they seem to be) can be corrupted from the first instance by the dicta of das Man; by the careless gossip about matters being-in-the-world which Dasein need not penetrate in order to lead a ‘life’, however inauthentic, ungrounded, or ‘superficial’ it be. ⁴⁹⁵

(3) Disclosedness [Erschlossenheit].
Disclosedness refers to the basic being of Dasein’s ‘there’ in the world; to how Dasein ‘is’ amidst entities. It refers to how the world shows itself, ‘as’ it is, to Dasein, namely the self-presentation of entities to Dasein’s three fundamental existentialia, state-of-mind, understanding, and discourse. In other words, it concerns the manifestation of the world ‘in itself’ with respect to ‘how’ Dasein is. For this reason the disclosedness of the world is, according to Heidegger, the originary locus of ἀλήθεια; the disclosedness of the world concerns, in an originary sense, how entities show themselves. Heidegger explains in this respect that Dasein, being-in-the-world, “is, [ontologically, that which has the possibility to live] in the truth”. ⁴⁹⁶ In Basic Problems of Phenomenology, he iterates that in this way “[t]ruth

⁴⁹⁵ The relationship between the dicta of das Man – what Heidegger calls idle talk [Gerede] – and truth is discussed in more detail below, particularly in Chapter Eight.
Throughout his career, Heidegger continues to use this phrase, which is originally borrowed from Lask. See Lask, E., Gesammelte Schriften (ed. Herrigel, E.), Tübingen, Mohr, 1923
belongs to the ontological constitution of ... Dasein itself." This is not to say that Dasein is always exposed to all truth 'as such', but rather that the true disclosedness of entities, \( \dot{\alpha}l\dot{h}e\breve{i}z \), belongs to disclosedness, belongs within the horizons of Dasein's care – that \( \dot{\alpha}l\dot{h}e\breve{i}z \) belongs to the world in which Dasein lives, and not to an independent, \textit{a priori}, 'real world' for Dasein to reach to.

(4) Clearing \([\text{Lichtung}]\).

Ontologically speaking, this is the 'clearing' or existential 'space' by which Dasein, being-in-the-world, is incorporated, in which being-in-the-world and the disclosedness of being-in-the-world occurs. It is, for this reason, non-thematic.\(^{498}\) \textit{Lichtung} is, as it were, the broader 'realm' in which both \( \dot{\alpha}l\dot{h}e\breve{i}z \) and being-in-the-world occur.

It is important to note that in \textit{Being and Time} Heidegger connects \( \dot{\alpha}l\dot{h}e\breve{i}z \) with discoveredness and disclosedness alone, but most predominantly with disclosedness.\(^{499}\) Disclosedness is how \( \dot{\alpha}l\dot{h}e\breve{i}z \), according to Heidegger, occurs. This association implies consequently that entities cannot exist 'as' they are outside the horizons between which they are disclosed to Dasein in its being-in-the-world. Phenomena are in every instance worldly, with Dasein. Consider, for example, two examples of the 'event' of \( \dot{\alpha}l\dot{h}e\breve{i}z \), namely the way that:

(1) Using a tool reveals what it is 'for' in an ontologically broad sense; and that
(2) For the faithful, seeing a cathedral brings into circumspection all that is important concerning their faith.

These two examples of unconcealedness, in which phenomena manifest 'as' they are, show the importance of Dasein's familiarity with the world for \( \dot{\alpha}l\dot{h}e\breve{i}z \) generally; for the genuine encounter of entities 'as' they are can only occur in being-in-the-world, within familiar horizons. It is here that entities come into salience, unconcealed, 'as' they are.

\(^{498}\) See Chapter Two.
We learned above that the originative function of the λόγος is making manifest, is letting something be seen, is bringing something into salience. We learned that in order for language to achieve this effect Dasein must understand its topic, but must also understand the words with which to express it. These words must reside locally, as it were, with Dasein. We learned, for example, that λόγος qua σύνθεσις involves letting something be seen in its togetherness with being-in-the-world. It is here and in this way that the λόγος qua language resides or is already 'placed-with' άλήθεια, the true. The λόγος qua language, however, can also obscure the true, can obscure άλήθεια. Inasmuch this dissertation attempts to show how language is related to the disclosedness of the world 'as' it is, it is important therefore to ask about the relationship of λόγος to ψεῦδος, falsity, as well as why, with respect to its exposure to language, Dasein is exposed to untruth.

For the Greeks, inasmuch as they predominantly think its being as assertoric or propositional, the λόγος brings each phenomenon forth in one of two ways:

1. As revealed and unhidden; as what it is, having been brought into salience with an honest agenda; or
2. As disguised and obscured – whether accidentally or to satisfy dishonest agenda.

With regard to how truth manifests in the λόγος thus thought, Heidegger explains that:

The ‘being-true’ of the λόγος as άληθεύειν means that in λέγειν as ἀποφαίνεσθαι [pointing-out] the entities of which one is talking must be taken out of their hiddenness; one must let them be seen as something unhidden (άληθές); that is, they must be discovered. Similarly, ‘being false’ (ψεῦδεσθαι) amounts to deceiving in the sense of covering up [verdecken]: putting something in front of someone (in such a way as to let it be seen) and thereby passing it off as something which it is not.500

Thus, Dasein can also obstruct its access to ἀλήθεια, or, similarly, its access can be obstructed by others. In point of fact, the Greeks did not actually think the assertoric λόγος to be truth’s primary locus, but instead to be an opening or sphere into which truth can be introduced or excluded. Derivative understanding, for example, can obstruct more genuine understanding; can corrupt Dasein’s view of entities ‘as’ they are in their genuine, originate being.

For their part, the Greeks associate the truth with pure νοεῖν [νοείν]; with the bare, basic perception of “the simplest determinate ways of being which entities as such may possess … [which ways of being are encountered] just by looking at them”. 501 As Kisiel explains, for the Greeks truth is more a matter of “attunement [Abstimmung] … than [the] judicative correspondence [Übereinstimmung]” of a representation with its object. 502 For the Greeks what is fundamentally ‘true’ of entities belongs to perception [νοείν], to what Husserl calls “intuition”. For this reason, although truth can emerge in assertoric utterance, it cannot also according to the Greeks originate in it: falsity [ψεύδος] cannot enter into νοεῖν – but it can and does enter into the linguistic λόγος. This simple rule governs all Greek thinking about discourse and language generally. 503

It is possible to construct with this interpretation a derivatist theory of language with which to champion pre-linguistic engagements with the ‘true’ being of entities – or, in other words, with worldly phenomena ‘as’ they ‘really’ are in themselves. It is important to recall however that although the Greek sense of


This should be contradiistinguished against Heidegger’s understanding of the ‘truth’, which is first encountered in ἀπάντησις – in coping.


503 Sheehan explains, for example, that “…the five treatises of [Aristotle’s] *Organon* appear to fall into three groups, each group corresponding to one of what medieval thinkers, Thomas Aquinas in particular, called the three acts of the intellect. The first act of the intellect is the simple act of apprehending the *eidos* of a thing in an idea expressible in a term, predicate, or category and concerning which there is no falsehood. Corresponding to this act of the intellect is Aristotle’s book *The Categories*. The second act of the intellect is the complex one of synthesizing a predicate with a subject in order to posit something about something. The resultant synthesis is expressible in a declarative sentence that may be either false or true. Corresponding to this second act of the intellect is Aristotle’s treatment of the forms of declarative sentences, *On Hermeneia*. The third act of the intellect is the act of discursive reasoning, the linking up of sentences with each other in syllogisms, whether deductive or inductive, in order to arrive at new opinions or beliefs. Deductive syllogisms are studied with regard to their form and with regard to their matter in, respectively, the *Prior Analytics* and the *Posterior Analytics*, and inductive reasoning is discussed in the *Topics* and in *Sophistical Refutations*.” (see Sheehan, T., “Hermeneia and Apophansis: The early Heidegger on Aristotle” in Volpi, F., et al., *Heidegger et idée de la phénoménologie*, Kluwer, Dordrecht, 1988 at 68
νοείν pertains to an encounter of what occurs ‘in itself’, it in fact pertains to the encounter of what Heidegger describes as mere presence-at-hand. Ultimately, it consists in mere beholding [Schauen]; in the kind of seeing which steps away from an involvement merely to observe phenomena as they occur. This kind of seeing, as has been shown, does not belong to an originary kind of understanding. On the other hand, it belongs to a derivative one, divorced from the readiness-to-hand of entities which precedes their presentness-at-hand ontologically and existentially. Accordingly, νοείν, perception, mere beholding, if it concerns solely presence-at-hand, can not in itself describe an originary encounter of proximate phenomena as they are ‘in themselves’; it must consist instead in an ironic detachment from phenomena. As has been shown, the being of proximate phenomena ‘as’ they are, their being “in the truth”, must belong to their place in a closer proximity to Dasein – and not, therefore, to the observations of derivative understanding.

Similarly, it is important to recall that the identification of Rede with the assertoric λόγος alone is misleading. The Greeks, for example, were always already talking to one another with more diverse means than assertions alone – much as we do today. Discourse, which has according to Heidegger “the primordiality and breadth of an existentiale,” does not merely implicate how the present-at-hand ‘appears’ or can be said. The public λόγος, contradistinguished against its assertoric offspring thus conceived, can and does obscure entities ‘as’ they are also, giving to Dasein a way to live and speak which is ultimately ungrounded in αλήθεια or, at the very least, a way in which the disguising of phenomena remains a possibility at issue. Heidegger explains that phenomena can have deteriorated in public talk; that “because the λόγος is a letting-something-be-seen, it can therefore be true or false.” There are numerous incidents of this occurrence throughout history: The suppression of evidence in the Dreyfus affair and its resultant effect on social and political opinion is but one example of the way in which αλήθεια, the being of matters ‘as’ they truly are, can be obscured in discourse, perpetual or finished, depending on the concern of the discoursers. It is in this sense that the function of

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504 Recall that Heidegger associates νοείν with the apophantic mode (λέγειν) of the λόγος which has this concern (see Heidegger, M., Being and Time (trans. Macquarrie, J. & Robinson, E.), Blackwell Publishing, Oxford, 1962 at 47-48, H 25).
505 Ibid at 209, H 166
506 Ibid at 56, H 33
the λόγος “lies in merely … letting entities be perceived [im Vernehmenlassen des Seienden],” that, strictly speaking, it has the sense of λέγειν as ἀποφαίνεσθαι.

Heidegger iterates that the task of phenomenology, which is hermeneutic, is to wrest the being of matters ‘as’ they are from their hiddenness in the clearing [Lichtung] of Dasein’s being-in-the-world: that “‘phenomenology’ means ἀποφαίνεσθαι τὰ φαινόμενα – to let that which shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself.” What is important to identify provisionally, therefore, before this observation and its connexion to the λόγος is discussed in more detail in the next chapter of this dissertation – which chapter concerns the public λόγος, namely quotidian discourse, as well as how Dasein encounters it – is that λόγος, discourse [Rede], means “making manifest” generally, which implicates ‘disclosiveness’. Thus and in general the λόγος is thought by Heidegger to dominate the clearing [Lichtung] in which phenomena are available and provided for circumspection. It is in this sense that the λόγος can be classified as the ‘locus’ of mortal access to beings; that the λόγος, as well as being a domain in which the being of entities can be obscured or disguised, can be identified as a domain in which entities show themselves ‘as’ they are. It is in this sense that Heidegger eventually describes language as the “house of being”. Because the λόγος, human, has this possibility, it can be thought as the ‘ground’ [Grund] of all seeing or understanding; as the extant incidence or expression of human ‘reason’ [Vernunft]; or as an originary sphere or ‘location’ of the relationship [Verhältnis] between man and being qua being itself. It is for this reason that ἀλήθεια is ‘there’, with the λόγος, to be discovered in disclosedness, however proximately obscured.

§.58: Being and Time and language: how language is in the world

As we have learned, λόγος refers to the essential articulation of phenomena in disclosedness. It does not mean ‘understanding’ or ‘reason’ alone; it does not refer to assertoric utterance in particular; it refers instead to the ordered unity which governs what is manifest and available to Dasein in the world.

The λόγος manifestly influences, enables, and motivates for Dasein the discovery of disclosed entities, whether as entities foreign, familiar, fearsome, trivial,
or otherwise: inasmuch as the λόγος itself essentially is an element of disclosedness, it holds sway over Dasein’s projection of itself toward its possibilities, the broader operations of its understanding, as well as its concerned or solicitous behaviours – including its daily appropriation of entities for use.

Under this construction language, inasmuch as it is a phenomenon within which phenomena are collected, grouped, distinguished, shared, et cetera, must make sense and communicate in respect of an established background of meaning – the λόγος as unity in this respect – and, inasmuch as it collects, groups, distinguishes, and shares phenomena, must itself be an element of this very background. On the one hand, the sense and impression of our own sayings and expressions is made possible – but on the other hand continues to make possible – the full, complex totality of the domain which is societal existence itself; a context in which things are always and without fail being said, in which language brings things predominantly to bear. It follows that Dasein is always already finding itself within a perpetuating, linguistic encirclement; and that from within this linguistic encirclement phenomena manifest to it.

If the λόγος is thought therefore as an essential element of Dasein’s being-in-the-world, as formally crucial to human being, then it follows that factically as well as historically, before the advent of any new interpretation, the world must already be organised into constellations of meaning by the λόγος and the interpretative traditions which continue to evolve in it. It is in this broad sense that the λόγος is the all-encompassing unity, ‘Word’, with respect to which the world is articulated, with respect to which utterances are made.

With this in mind Guignon asserts that others, historical das Man, must themselves be the source – but not the τέλος – of the contemporaneous λόγος and its perpetuation; that understanding, state-of-mind, and discourse, being the existentialia which constitute disclosedness, must ultimately be “structures of the social context” and its history itself, which context and history Dasein inherits.

510 Recall the meaning of λέγειν
511 Guignon concurs. See Guignon, C. B., Heidegger and the Problem of Knowledge, Indianapolis, Hackett, 1983 at 113
513 See Ibid at 115-116. The full quote reads: “When the concept ‘Dasein’ is understood as embracing not individuals but [das Man], the existentialia of being-in must be given an appropriate reading as structures of the social context itself. For this
The primordiality of the public sphere [die Öffentlichkeit] must be linked in this way to the primordiality of language, qua λόγος, and to its fundamentality.

According to Guignon, then, “the social context” so thought includes not solely the sum totality of the “regular practices, customs, and institutions that serve to organise the world into a comprehensible structure”, but also the “enduring texts, monuments ..., habitual responses, and fleeting gestures” that Dasein discovers to be its own; for Guignon the λόγος ultimately refers to the manifold of activities which, interwoven with foregoing interpretative traditions, release entities “within a common scaffolding so [that] they can punctuate our lives in certain ways”.514 The λόγος refers also, therefore, to the world of ‘what one does’ and to ‘how one lives’: to das Man and to Dasein’s situation.

The proposition that language is essentially akin to the λόγος is intended to discredit the derivativist theory that language as such is posterior to a prior aspect of being-in-the-world, or posterior to an objectively occurring self-ordering of being all too prior to the human being in which Dasein is not at all involved. It implores a way of thinking about language which recognises its existential originality; being the fact that it is always already ‘there’ before the advent of ‘new’ expressions, of ‘speaking-forth’, having invaded the worldly domain of gestures, monuments, customs, dealings, et cetera, and endowed them with unity and intelligibility beforehand. It is in this respect that the ‘self’ that speaks is not as old as its society.

Guignon’s sentiment is echoed by Sallis, who identifies that new expressions are indebted to an already-accomplished structural articulation of meaning.515 For Sallis, this already-accomplished articulation of meaning is something into which

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514 Guignon, C. B., Heidegger and the Problem of Knowledge, Indianapolis, Hackett, 1983 at 113
Dasein is being thrown perpetually, just because it is in each case thrown into a world which language dominates.

Sallis’ account of the relationship between expression and \( \lambda \omicron \gamma \omicron \omicron \omicron \) qua language shares strong similarities with Heidegger’s own account of the connexion between expressions, interpretations, and understanding: According to Heidegger interpretations are discovered and appropriated for expression from an articulation of meaning which is already available in the fore-structure; whichever words are used for new expressions seem always to already be there, for whenever one wishes to speak deliberately one looks for the ‘right’ words and one finds them waiting. If one does not find them, if one is therefore kept silently in the \( \lambda \omicron \gamma \omicron \omicron \omicron \) and prevented from speaking in this way, then one finds oneself at the edge of language darkling, at the edge of fore-going interpretations, or, at the very least, at the edge of one’s familiarity with them. Inasmuch as language always already dominates interpretation, the ‘right’ words are adopted from their residence in factual life and, as Barbusse says, new expressions simply “awaken what is alive”.

The Being and Time treatment of assertoric utterance, which investigates language predominately as communicative speaking-forth, also investigates the ‘prior’ articulation of intelligibility which assertion seems to recover in every case. Heidegger states that:

The intelligibility of something has always been [structurally] articulated even before there is an appropriative interpretation of it. … That which can be [structurally] articulated in interpretation, and thus even more primordially in discourse, is what we have called ‘meaning’.

This articulation, “meaning”, is what Dasein grasps in being-there the fore-structure, in fore-having [\( Vorbabe \)], fore-sight [\( Vorsicht \)], and fore-conception [\( Vorgriff \)]. Thus conceived, the (worldly) advent of language can not be found in the intentional speaking-forth of subjects alone; for the fore-structure is already accompanied by a prevailing discourse with respect to which novel utterances are afterwards made. In this way language \( qua \ \lambda \omicron \gamma \omicron \omicron \omicron \), always already there to be

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expressed, contains an order and assembly in which what can be expressed resides in advance. Phenomenologically it is there before us in this way: inasmuch as Dasein understands its possibilities, as well as its situation in an interpretative ‘school’ or hermeneutic tradition, it is already immersed in language.

Essentially, in the predominating language into which Dasein is thrown, there resides according to Heidegger a “developed way of conceiving”:\footnote{518}{Heidegger, M., \textit{Being and Time} (trans. Macquarrie, J. \& Robinson, E.), Blackwell Publishing, Oxford, 1962 at 199, H 157. The full quote reads: “[The fore-conception which is always implied in an assertion] remains for the most part inconspicuous, because language already conceals in itself a developed way of conceiving [\textit{eine ausgebildete Begrifflichkeit}].”} Λόγος is another name for the availability of the (structural and expressive) articulation of intelligibility found by Dasein in language. Language is unique in this respect because it has always already (and inadvertently) taken the λόγος over. As Sallis iterates:

Discourse is not, therefore, primarily an articulation of meaning which we perform, but rather an articulation which is always already performed for us, an articulation already taken over inadvertently, by virtue of our living in a language – by virtue of our having been thrown into a language with its concealed, yet already developed ways of conceiving.\footnote{519}{Sallis, “Language and reversal” in Macann, C. (ed.), \textit{Martin Heidegger: Critical Assessments, Volume III: Language}, Routledge, London, 1997 at 197. The italicisation of “perform” is mine.}

He states in addition that:

Discourse ... is, in the final analysis, that articulation of intelligibility which is already bound up and hidden away in language. ... [It] is always already in effect, delivered over to us insofar as we find ourselves in a language. ... [D]iscourse refers to a kind of finding-oneself-as-thrown [\textit{Befindlichkeit}] which, as involving us in a [structural] articulation of intelligibility [\textit{Verständlichkeit}], is inherently linked to interpretation and understanding [\textit{Verstehen}]. ... It is discourse which points back to the unitary, yet complex, ground from which the multiple constituents of the ‘there’ arise. [Discourse is] this ‘common root’ in which
understanding and [state-of-mind] meet – without, however, necessarily having their distinctive characters dissolved.\textsuperscript{520} This is why Heidegger iterates that: “In the language which is spoken when one expresses oneself, there lies [already] an average intelligibility.”\textsuperscript{521}

Sallis’ interpretation of Heidegger’s account of language is close to a constitutivist account of language – as well as to the later Heidegger’s account with which constitutivism is often associated – inasmuch as it supposes language contributes primordially to the original constitution of the world.

A stronger species of constitutivism is Gadamer’s account of the being of language, also developed from Heidegger’s own. For Gadamer, language articulates the universally available, ontological structure of experience; for the horizons of language form the very horizons of world.\textsuperscript{522} For Gadamer:

Language is not just one of man’s possessions in the world; but on it depends the fact that man has a world at all. For man the world exists as world in a way that no other being in the world experiences … [this is to say that, for man, the world] is linguistic in nature …. [L]anguages are views of the world. … [Thus,] language maintains a kind of independent life over against the individual member of a linguistic community and introduces him, as he grows into it, to a particular attitude and relationship to the world as well. But the ground of this statement is more important, namely that language has no independent life apart from the world that comes to language within it. Not only is the world ‘world’ only insofar as it comes into language, but language, too, has its real being only in the fact that the world is represented within it. Thus the original humanity of language means at the same time the fundamental linguistic quality of man’s being-in-the-world.\textsuperscript{523}

\textsuperscript{523} \textit{Ibid} at 401
Under Gadamer’s construction language is not merely a medium in which Dasein dwells, a structure which holds it in its place in the world, but is a background without which being-in-the-world would not be just ‘as’ it is. It is a background against which man is perpetually being thrown, which background articulates its world for it. Kotoh, in his criticism of the various subjectivist accounts of language, explains this kind of constitutivism to hold that: “language has invaded the transcendental domain as an a priori restriction [which] enables the world [as such] to emerge”.524

By 1959 in The Way to Language, which essay encapsulates Heidegger’s mature account of language, Heidegger advances the same idea in his own terms. Here he writes that: “we are within language, at home in language, prior to everything else”; that “language itself has woven us into its [own] speaking”; that “the essence of man consists in language”; and that, inasmuch as language says the statement “it is” for him, language brings Dasein to its being-in-the-world, and brings being qua being to circumspection.525 Dasein’s proximity to being qua being now seems intimately interwoven with the way in which language discloses. Here language is thought essentially as that which “brings things to appear”; as a saying [sagan] which in itself shows.526 Thus language has in every case appropriated Dasein, has taken Dasein under its wing, and gives to Dasein its way to thinking, owning, and being-in-the-world. The world is opened to Dasein in language:

The saying is a showing. In everything that appeals to us; in everything that strikes us by way of being spoken or spoken of; in everything that addresses us; in everything that awaits us as unspoken; but also in every speaking of ours – showing holds sway. It lets what is coming to presence shine forth, lets what is withdrawing into absence vanish. The saying is by no means the supplementary linguistic expression of what shines forth; rather, all shining and fading depend on the saying that shows. ... The saying joins and pervades the open space of the clearing

526 Krell notes that ‘saying’ [sagan], inasmuch as it is a letting things be seen and heard, is closest to the Latin verb dico, which means ‘to show through words’. (See editor’s footnote in Heidegger, M., “The Way to Language” in Krell, D. F. (ed.), Basic Writings, HarperCollins, New York, 1993 at 409)
which every shining must seek, every evanescence abandon ... The showing, for the most part, is multiple; everywhere it lets what is shown stand on its own.\textsuperscript{527}

In this way even nomination, the identification and naming of beings, occurs with respect to language, out of language, and through language. In \textit{The Origin of the Work of Art} in 1935, some fourteen years earlier, Heidegger already iterates that:

\begin{quote}
Language alone brings beings as beings into the open for the first time. Where there is no language, as in the being of the stone, plant, and animal, there is also no openness of beings, and consequently no openness of nonbeing and of the empty.\textsuperscript{528}
\end{quote}

It is easy to see how this sentiment is developed from Heidegger’s discourse on disclosedness and the ‘there’ \textit{(das ‘Da’)} which occurs in \textit{Being and Time}. By the 1930s Heidegger is already investigating language inasmuch as it dominates Dasein and pervades the human clearing \textit{(Lichtung)} in which it lives. Inasmuch as this is the case, the comparatively modern theory that derivativism is essentially a creation of Heidegger’s to be located exegetically in \textit{Being and Time} is weakened consequently.

If showing is the essence of saying, if disclosedness is what is essential to language, if disclosedness, the ‘bringing of phenomena into the open’ is its accomplishment, if with respect to language Dasein is a being-in-the-world, then language is much richer than its identification with the ontic ‘utterances’ of a subject or other formalised phenomena – ‘as’ which it is presented as an entity – can convey. Thus and so even the disclosure of ontic entities such as ‘utterances’ must ultimately be grounded in language inasmuch as it is essentially disclosive and propriative; such entities will simply amount to a way language shows itself to a certain purview; to a way that language can be tamed for specific schools of thought. If language shows itself ontically thus and so, then in the final account this can only mean that language is in the first instance disclosive and unitary; and even that it discloses itself.

§.59: Linguistic idealism

With these constitutivist observations in mind, Lafont identifies the possibility that the referential structure of the world, with respect to which its webs of significance are articulated, might first be determined in and by language, with respect to which the horizons of being and being-in-the-world are articulated. Accordingly, Lafont argues against the normativity of silent pragmatism and claims instead that Heidegger’s *Being and Time* account of language in particular attempts to propound a fledgling linguistic idealism, according to which the ways of interpreting entities ‘as’ this or that is ultimately determined by the resources of language, as it were, in advance. We learned above, for example, that whenever Dasein interprets entities it discovers language ‘there’ with them; it discovers language ‘there’ for them: for example, Heidegger explains that “in dealing with what is environmentally ready-to-hand by interpreting it circumspectively, we ‘see’ [the phenomenon] as a table, a door, a carriage, or a bridge”.

According to Lafont this account is, however, ultimately problematic in essence; for if the public structure of the relationships between phenomena – as well as what phenomena in themselves ‘are’ – is itself linguistic in nature, origin, and entirety, then Heidegger’s account of language will have confused “the obvious fact that our descriptions of [phenomena] (via the meanings of the words we use) express our de facto beliefs about them with the purported fact that our descriptions thereby determine to what things they refer.”

Lafont’s own conclusions are somewhat misleading, however. Inasmuch as phenomena enter into Dasein’s circumspection, and inasmuch as discourse is interwoven with the human condition, any manifest phenomenon can be interpreted in language; and aspects of its being can be (and probably have been) disclosed there already, for language is interwoven with phenomena: Dasein inherits an hermeneutic situation. However, for this reason alone Heidegger can not be a linguistic idealist in any strict sense; for Heidegger thinks the intelligibility of entities – namely ‘what’ they are and the way in which they matter – to be

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something *discussed* in language rather than something that is settled there. Discussion dominates publically about entities, accruing about them, begging further discussion.

The public interpretation of entities is always already available and necessarily influences Dasein’s encounter of the world; for the ‘as’-structure which pervades and grounds the intelligibility of entities is always already public, always already inherited – and, most importantly, the ‘as’ of any entity is always already *being discussed and being determined*. As Crowell iterates: “the meanings that belong to a natural language do not determine reference, since such meanings, like all meanings, are always only *at stake*”532 This is why the originary ‘as’ of entities is called the existential-hermeneutical ‘as’, for history and interpretation move, and thus does what matters move; and so to say that the being of entities is *determined* in language rather than to say that clear determinations are *sought* or *pursued* in it – and therefore that language is ever on its way to clarity – is somewhat misleading.533 As Heidegger himself remarks, “the appropriateness [of any given definition of the object] is absolutely *questionable*, and the definition must be understood precisely within this questionableness” or, better, its *questionability*.534 Dreyfus elaborates that although the task of definition “binds one to determine, in whatever way is appropriate to the domain, starting with whatever features one can find, which features of the referent, if any, are essential [to it,] such direct reference is provisional” rather than absolute.535 This is why today we say that things, topics, are ‘under discussion’ – why, problematically, a multitude of thinkers continue even today to search beneath language for the *evidence* for their statements, for the *essence* or *ὑποκείμενον* – literally ‘the underlying thing’ – of the entity, the being of which seems ‘in itself’ hostile to expression. ‘The thing in itself’, ultimately unsayable, having nothing to do ‘in itself’ with language, is liable to become fashionable in this

532 What it means to be a carpenter or a bridge or a nose is always at stake in what is being done or said. See: Crowell, S., “Being Answerable: Reason-Giving and the Ontological Meaning of Discourse”, 2012 at 32 (unpublished manuscript)

533 We will learn more about this below with respect to idle talk [*Gerade*]. In idle talk [*Gerade*], the primary form of discourse in Dasein’s ‘fallen’ mode, *in lieu* of a genuine proximate understanding of phenomena, the word is simply ‘passed along’ and starts to stand for understanding. In this way, with regard to what something ‘is’, Dasein simply ‘takes one’s word for it’; accepting the dicta of *das Man*. In idle talk, whatever something ‘is’ is always already *being discussed*; it never achieves concrete determination. See Chapter Eight, below.


535 Dreyfus, H. L., “Comments on Cristina Lafont’s Interpretation of *Being and Time*” in *Inquiry*, vol. 45, no. 2, 2002 at 193
respect – and so language becomes susceptible accordingly to being viewed as a super-structure, unoriginal to the ‘world’ in the sense the realist has it. Heidegger does not understand being-in-the-world in this way, however. In *History of the Concept of Time* he explains that we “see what one says about the matter”. Let us now attempt to clarify what this means.

Language articulates expressively with regard to the dynamism of how things are mattering, have mattered, can matter, or, for Dasein’s authentic circumspection in particular, ought to matter according to the potential to be-in-the-world differently. Interpretation and discussion generally occur especially with regard to Dasein’s possibilities, which are vital, primary, and vary. For this reason ambiguities occur in language because what matters changes, but also because, in a certain sense, the matters about which we maintain discussions are inexhaustible, for the more we speak the more being there is to discuss, and the more there is to clarify. The existential-hermeneutical ‘as’ of any given entity is, to differing degrees and at any given time, always already dynamic and ‘under-going’ interpretation in this ‘additional’ respect. Language influences unfolding interpretation, it is involved in it and drives it forward, but language does not ‘in itself’ settle things ‘once and for all’, does not itself end or complete discussions – or indeed the articulation of reference – much as it seems likely to be able to; for language, besides holding discussions, holding interpretations, stirs and excites them and can, moreover, deceive: The λόγος can disguise ἀλήθεια, it can obscure it. Being-there involves an immersion in language, in discourse, but to identify the situation of Dasein as well as its understanding with a normative, deterministic linguistic idealism alone is, in itself, misleading.

It seems more likely therefore that Heidegger is on his way in *Being and Time* to thinking the relationship of language to disclosedness in a proto-constitutivist way, but that he is not a linguistic idealist. In point of fact it is not even until his

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537 ‘Ambiguity’ has a role in idle talk [Gerede], in which matters are constantly under discussion, as well. See Chapter Eight, below.

538 Sallis agrees. For Sallis, it is discourse which “forms the bridge from the analytic of *Being and Time* to the insistence in the later writings that the ‘there’ takes place as language”, which thesis I agree. See: Sallis, “Language and reversal” in Macann, C. (ed.), *Martin Heidegger: Critical Assessments, Volume III: Language*, Routledge, London, 1997 at 199
later philosophy that Heidegger seems to illustrate the merits of constitutivist readings of language explicitly – however even here he identifies language merely, “according to the essence of the history of being, [as] the house of being”; as that which preserves and sustains the ‘there’ in itself, as that which grants Dasein its place and proximity to being, as that which grants it the λόγος to live in. In Being and Time it is language’s ontological being, discourse, as well as its connexion to disclosedness generally – to the existentialia state-of-mind, understanding, and falling – that Heidegger elects to emphasise in contrast to its various portrayals in idealistic philosophy generally.

How Heidegger’s Being and Time account of language translates into his later writings will now be briefly treated with respect to its connexion to the λόγος. How the λόγος appears to circumspection will be discussed consequently.

§.60: Heidegger’s later writings: on the λόγος-language equation

Λόγος, as we have learned, refers to the way in which phenomena are arranged and available in the world ‘as’ what they are; it refers to the salience into which phenomena are gathered. In Schürmann’s words, the λόγος ultimately means “the relation or proportion [ratio] among things which ascribes to each its rightful share”: For Schürmann, the originative Greek λόγος is also “a logos tou ontos, a self-ordering of being”. The λόγος is where the being of entities comes to the fore for Dasein, where Dasein encounters being.

It is important to recall, as we have learned, that originally – and despite the prevailing similarities between their meanings – the word λόγος did not mean to the Greeks what we mean today by “language”; for the Greeks had no word for language such as we do. In the first instance language (or something like it) was


541 Ibid at 55

limited to and described by the Greeks as mere vocalisation or vocal expression; as φωνή [phon]. Although language continues occasionally to be interpreted in this way today, this determination does not in fact reach to the ontological being of language (or its connexion to the λόγος) which has now been exposed, however, for it does not account for the relationship of language to significance, being-in-the-world, and the primordial articulations of disclosedness generally: language is not simply an ‘emission’. Inasmuch as the Greeks did think about language and being qua being concurrently, however, they did not think that ‘grammar’ and ‘philosophy’ could overlap: Bernardete identifies that in Plato’s *Sophist* it is one of the sophist’s delusions, soon discredited, that words coincide with the absolute and determinate being of beings.\(^{542}\) Consistently, the same ‘delusion’ in criticised in his *Cratylus*. Later, for his part, Aristotle contends that any given account of a substance just does not contain the substance itself, but is at best a means of reaching-out toward it.\(^{543}\) Earlier still, in the Epic tradition, neither λέγειν nor λόγος, the self-ordering of being, are interpreted as linguistic entities.

These are not facts which Heidegger fails to recognise. In *Introduction to Metaphysics* he observes that historically the “λόγος … has no immediate relation to language”.\(^{544}\) Heidegger does, however, fashion an argument in *Being and Time* to suggest that the λόγος and language, although temporally and historically distant phenomena, describe something rather similar, ontologically, in being. His argument suggests that language, thought not as φωνή but as the existential being of discourse [Rede], aboriginal to disclosedness, has a similar sense to λόγος as the Greeks thought it, and that Greek thinking does not deny this comparatively late equation. Although the Greeks did not think it for themselves, it is Heidegger’s argument that they dwelt in this equation, this connexion between language and λόγος; that they dwelt in language, thus described, just as we do today.

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\(^{542}\) See Plato, *Sophist*, 266a5-6

This is discussed in more detail in Bernardete, S., “The Grammar of Being” in *The Review of Metaphysics*, vol. 30, no. 3, 1977 at 486

(The edition of Plato’s *Sophist* that I used for this dissertation is: Plato, *Sophist* (trans. Fowler, H. N.), Loeb Classical Library/Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Massachusetts), 1928

\(^{543}\) See, for example, Aristotle, *Metaphysics* Zeta, 4, 1029b13, and Zeta, 4, 1030a25.

Ackrill suggests that Aristotle’s *Categories* are merely ‘answers’ to the question of ‘what can be asked about substances’. (See, for example, Ackrill’s “Notes” in Aristotle, *Categories* (trans. Ackrill, J. L.), Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2002 at 80)

As has already been intimated, the equation of language with λόγος continues to unfold from Heidegger’s thinking about discourse and λόγος in Being and Time into his thinking about language in his later writings.\(^{545}\) This can be seen in particular in Heidegger’s essay, *Logos*, of 1951, which essay is typical of Heidegger’s mature work concerning the λόγος.\(^{546}\) Thus, let us examine it. Its topic is the λόγος itself. It refers explicitly to *Being and Time* for clarification.\(^{547}\) This being the case, emphasis need not now be placed strictly on the projects or concerns of Heidegger’s later work alone; for attention can instead be given to his treatment of the λόγος inasmuch as it is still unfolding from *Being and Time* and is not therefore a departure from it, but is instead a development of it.

It should be emphasised additionally that although thinking Greek concepts from a comparatively modern perspective is potentially problematic inasmuch as it consists in a reading of modernity ‘onto’ history and is therefore bound to our modern way of thinking,\(^{548}\) our aim in this section yet remains in keeping with Heidegger’s adoption of the λόγος for philosophical enquiry, and does not therefore seek to alter the interpretation of it which he reaches therein.

As has already been noted, the word λόγος first appears as a technical term in philosophy in the fragments of Heraclitus of Ephesus, who lived approximately five-hundred years before Jesus Christ. Heidegger’s *Logos* essay examines a fragment of Heraclitus’ writings, categorised today as *Fragment B 50*, which reads:

άλλα τον Λόγος ἀκούσαντας

όμοιον σοφόν ἔστιν ἐν Πάντα.

In English, it reads:

\[\text{o} \text{δ} \text{κ} \text{εμ} \text{ο} \text{ι} \text{λλα το} \text{ν} \text{Logos} \text{ακοσπαντας}

\text{ομοιον σοφον εστιν Eν Παντα.}\]


For Sallis, it is discourse which “forms the bridge from the analytic of *Being and Time* to the insistence in the later writings that the ‘there’ takes place as language.”

\(^{546}\) See Heidegger, M., “Logos (Heraclitus, Fragment B 50)” in Heidegger, M., *Early Greek Thinking* (trans. Krell, D. F. & Capuzzi, F. A.), Harper & Row, New York, 1975. This essay was first presented as a lecture to the Bremen Club on May 4, 1951, but its content originates in an unpublished lecture course given in the summer semester of 1944, which was entitled “Logic”.

\(^{547}\) See, for example, Heidegger, M., “Logos (Heraclitus, Fragment B 50)” in Heidegger, M., *Early Greek Thinking* (trans. Krell, D. F. & Capuzzi, F. A.), Harper & Row, New York, 1975 at 64, where we are asked to refer to §17b of *Being and Time* for clarification.

\(^{548}\) We are bound, according to Heidegger, by an ‘hermeneutic circle’.
When you have listened not to me but to the Meaning [Λόγος],
It is wise within the same Meaning to say: One is All.\textsuperscript{549}

Here Heidegger understands Heraclitus to elucidate that the λόγος occurs as \(\epsilonν\) πάντα [\textit{ben panta}], as “the essence of unification which assembles everything in the totality of simple presencing”.\textsuperscript{550} Heidegger, too, thinks the λόγος a unifying, structural articulation of being-in-the-world. Accordingly, Heidegger understands Heraclitus to elucidate that the ‘true’ λέγειν, no matter its manifest phenomenal ‘form’, occurs as “the ‘letting-lie-before – which is gathered into itself – of that which comes together into presence’”; that the λέγειν is accordingly and in essence an unobtrusive, permissive means of Dasein’s letting the λόγος, in its unity, show itself.\textsuperscript{551}

With this determination of the λέγειν in mind, Heidegger contends that the linguistic ‘forms’ one can now identify in language – ‘acts’ such as speaking, writing, and hearing – must each be ultimately species of λέγειν: For Heidegger the linguistic ‘act’, inasmuch as it implicates and discloses a world with which we are already concerned and familiar, shows itself for the most part to have the nature of λέγειν.\textsuperscript{552}

In λέγειν, as in λόγος, entities show themselves ‘as’ they are, ‘as’ Dasein encounters them phenomenologically.

Heidegger offers an alternative translation in \textit{Introduction to Metaphysics}, which reads: “If you have heard not me, but λόγος, then it is wise to say accordingly: all is one”. Here, Heidegger investigates λέγειν with respect to ψήφις, ‘nature’. He says: that “ψήφις and λόγος are the same.” (See Heidegger, M., \textit{Introduction to Metaphysics} (trans. Friend, G. & Polt, R.), Yale University Press, Yale University, 2000 at 135, H 98)


\textsuperscript{550} See \textit{ibid} at 63

\textsuperscript{551} Λέγειν is the present active infinitive of the verb λέγω. I use it here in a nominal form, render ‘to speak’, ‘to write’ and ‘to hear’ similarly, and ask the reader’s forgiveness that I do so.
Heidegger states that “[w]e have heard when we belong to the matter addressed … [Hearing, in a sense, is] consequentially a λέγειν which lets lie before us whatever already lies together before us”. Recall that in hearing we do not hear ‘bare noise’. We hear phenomena ‘as’ what they are: we hear the ambulance rushing a sick man to hospital, the boy playing in the schoolyard: we hear contexts, roles, functions, \textit{et cetera}. See \textit{ibid} at 66.
Importantly, the aggregation of each ‘formal’ species of λέγειν does not amount to anything like the being of the λόγος: the λόγος is not thus brought into being. The aggregation of ‘asserting’, ‘declaiming’, ‘requesting’, et cetera, does not reach to the ontological being of language as discourse, as disclosive:

Mortal λέγειν lies secured in the λόγος’,553 but “[t]he λόγος by itself brings that which appears and comes forward in its lying before us to appearance – to its luminous self-showing.554

[The] λόγος [itself] lets-lie-together-before … the Laying that gathers has, as λόγος, laid down everything present in unconcealment …555

The λέγειν lets the λόγος be:556

… λέγειν, to lay … as letting-lie-together-before [bei-sammen-vorliegen-Lassen] is concerned with retaining whatever is laid down as lying before us [already].557

The being of the λόγος can not be found in the aggregation of separate ‘parts’ or incidences of λέγειν. Heidegger observes the same of language. Language’s

554 Ibid at 64
556 Husserl, on the other hand, would attest that the νόησις [the percieving] lets the νόημα [meaning] be.
present-at-hand ‘pieces’, its word-Things, its signifying, its phrases and expressions, its manifestation as mere φωνή, do not reach in their amalgamation to the ground of its being:

Expressing and signifying have long been accepted as manifestations which indubitably betray some characteristics of language. But they do not genuinely reach into the realm of the primordial, essential determination of language, nor are they at all capable of determining this realm in its primary characteristics.\(^{558}\)

What this series of observations intimates is that language is something like the originative λόγος itself; that the possible manifestations of language, including even distinct ‘natural’ languages like French, Japanese, or Italian, are ultimately indicative of language’s being of the λόγος. Language’s ‘forms’ – saying, speaking, hearing, writing, gesturing, signifying, et cetera – the cases of language qua λέγειν – are each secondary phenomena whose subsistence as ‘individuals’ is only intelligible because of the ‘unitary’ phenomenon of language as discourse, as disclosive, as λόγος, from which they have been extracted in thinking.

In his Logos essay, Heidegger explains that “λέγειν always means for the Greeks to lay before, to exhibit, to tell, to say”; according to which “‘O λόγος then would be the Greek name for speaking, saying, and language”.\(^{559}\) Under this construction:

‘O λόγος, thought as the Laying that gathers, would be the essence of saying [die Sage]…. [Language would be the λόγος] would be the gathering letting-lie-before of what is present in its presencing.\(^{560}\)

Λόγος means according to Heidegger ‘the Word’, ‘discourse’; λέγειν means more mundanely ‘to discourse’, ‘to talk’ – the ontic forms. They are the primary ontic


\(^{559}\) *Ibid* at 77

\(^{560}\) *Ibid* at 77

In point of fact, “‘O λόγος” is vocative.
exemplars of the λόγος inasmuch as this is how the λόγος shows itself. However, the λόγος has a richer ontological being than its ‘formalised’ derivatives denote.

We learn from Being and Time that by Rede, λόγος, Heidegger already means the “discussing ... [of] the ‘world’ [das Ansprechen ... von Welt],” which is “the primary mode of being-in-the-world, even though being-in-the-world does not as such get conceived”.561 By discourse (qua λόγος qua language), Heidegger means the power to preserve phenomena; but also means the power of what is thus preserved. By identifying language with λόγος in Being and Time, this is what he attests.

§.61: Λόγος, language, and metaphysics

A further clarification of Heidegger’s thinking about the λόγος must now be given with respect to a metaphysical approach to language in particular. The following discussion pertains to the contrast between ‘Nature’ and ‘Language’, occasionally proposed, which was investigated above in the fifth chapter of this dissertation.

When it is considered philosophically, traditionally and for the most part “the λόγος itself is [thought as] an entity, and, according to the orientation of ancient ontology, it is [thought as] something present-at-hand.”562 It is not traditionally thought as linguistic in nature. So writes Heidegger in Being and Time.

It follows, however, that if the λόγος is formalised in thinking as a present-at-hand entity, and language is formalised accordingly as the speaking, the expressing, or the words which subsequently translate the self-ordering of being into linguistic phenomena, then the λόγος, conceived now as non-linguistic and an a priori self-ordering of being, will seem to precede language ontologico-existentially. Thus thought, the λόγος transcends Dasein and language, and it seems to have its own a priori independence.563 With respect to this interpretation of the λόγος and (formalised) language (λέγειν) in particular, it follows that a question presents itself to the metaphysician to be asked. In his Logos essay, this is precisely what Heidegger recognises:

562 Ibid at 201, H 158
563 According to Foucault, the λόγος so thought constitutes “…the birth place, so to speak, of Western rationality”. (See Foucault, M., “La pensée du dehors” in Critique, vol. 229, 1966 at 525)
564 This is precisely what Aler investigates, for example. See Aler, J., “The conception of language in Being and Time” in Macann, C. (ed.), Martin Heidegger: Critical Assessments, Volume III: Language, Routledge, London, 1997. This is discussed in more detail below.
Is λόγος the overcoming of mortal λέγειν [mortal ways of speaking] … [that implies] the elevation and transfer of the mortal’s way-to-be to that of the unique One?

Does language transfer mortals into the λόγος qua κόσμος? Or:

Does mortal λέγειν ['formalised' language] remain only an image corresponding to the λόγος, which is itself the Fate in which presencing – both as such and for all present beings – rests?\(^{564}\)

Does language remain a shadowy reflection of the λόγος qua κόσμος; of ‘Nature’; of a foreign, independent, ineffable non-human entity?

In point of interest, the second question, designed especially for the metaphysician, ultimately underlies every possible derivativist account of language; indeed the very matter of its being asked – and that it matters enough to be asked at all – seems to suggest prima facie that derivativism or one of its variants is entirely legitimate.

For Heidegger, however, metaphysical speculations are ultimately unhelpful; for what he desires of Being and Time is a descriptive phenomenology of Dasein’s existence; a phenomenological, hermeneutical study of what pertains to being-in-the-world. The λόγος, manifest ‘in’ the world, is not a present-at-hand, occurrent, aboriginally independent entity: it is not essentially or fundamentally alienated from Dasein. Thinking the λόγος as present-at-hand belongs to derivative understanding. The λόγος is to be thought more originally in its proximity to Dasein; for it is, in essence, discourse. In it entities ready-to-hand show themselves ‘as’ they are, and entities present-at-hand show themselves dependent on and derived from originary understanding.

What Heidegger’s phenomenological method attempts to achieve in Being and Time is the avoidance of any such problems to do with speculations metaphysical. In the first instance it considers what is basically worldly and therefore concerns Dasein’s being-in-the-world. In the second instance it concerns derivative phenomena and how they relate to a more primordial disclosedness. Whenever

Heidegger describes the λόγος he does so in order to clarify the peculiar sense of language’s ontological being and to emphasise that language, inasmuch as it belongs to the fundamental constitution of Dasein’s ‘there’, is itself an original and disclosive feature of the world Dasein lives in, and therefore discovers. For example, whenever Heidegger treats the natural environment, ‘Nature’ as it is ‘in itself’, he emphasises that this ‘in itself’ is phenomenologically and formally derivative of Dasein’s proximate familiar environment, in which the natural environment manifests and is, in this sense, already. The λόγος conceived as a present-at-hand entity relies, as has already been said, on a derivative conception of it – it is ultimately an abstraction for theorising scientifically.

Thus and insofar as the being of language forms the primary subject of investigation for this paper, and insofar as its own being is already described by Heidegger in Being and Time and elsewhere as λόγος, it is not helpful to say that language is itself ‘derived’ from a λόγος ‘prior’ – at least according to Heidegger. It remains my own principle contention in this dissertation that, as a being-in-the-world-with-others, Dasein is always already in the world with language: Under this construction the metaphysician’s question does not directly describe phenomena proximate and primordial.
§.62: Derivativism, discourse, and Dasein’s existential modalities

In this chapter the interpretation of language now given is further supported with respect to the influence of Dasein’s various existential ‘modalities’ in its being-in-the-world.

It will be shown in this chapter that whichever account of language upon which one settles must rely on the degree to which one acknowledges the existential ‘modalities’ of Dasein in one’s account; for these, we will learn, are important to any interpretation of Being and Time. These modalities are:

1. Dasein’s inauthentic [uneigentlich] mode of being-in-the-world, being how it lives proximally and for the most part with others, in which mode it immerses itself in the world, is swept up by the distractions of the times, and lives as another participant in ubiquitous das Man;
2. Dasein’s authentic [eigentlich] mode of being-in-the-world, in which it attempts to resist the temptation to live ‘mindlessly’ in das Man in order to exert its own authority over its possibilities; and
3. Dasein’s undifferentiated mode or mode of indifference [Indifferenz]; in which Dasein is not yet faced with the choice to live inauthentically or authentically. This mode describes its average everydayness: it is the mode in which Heidegger attempts to describe Dasein in the First Division of Being and Time in terms of its formal ontological structure.

For the most part, the relationships of Dasein’s various existential modes to discourse, to λόγος, and to language are rarely discussed in Heidegger-commentaries. For example, just because the focus of Heidegger's Temporal Idealism is Dasein’s originary temporality, which Blattner believes to be a “modally indifferent” feature of the formal ontological structure of Dasein, Blattner excuses himself from just this type of discussion. It is important to realise however that the modal complexity of Dasein’s living being-in-the-world requires critical examination if a full explication of both ontically manifest language and its ontological being is to be

565 See Blattner, W. D., Heidegger’s Temporal Idealism, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1999 at 28
given; for different interpretations of discourse present themselves according to whether or not it is considered in respect of Dasein’s inauthentic \[\text{uneigentlich}\] mode, its authentic \[\text{eigentlich}\] mode, or with regard to an undifferentiated “modally indifferent” ontological being-structure. Accordingly, we will learn below that considered in respect of Dasein’s inauthentic mode of being-in-the-world, discourse manifests proximally and for the most part as a linguistic phenomenon as what Heidegger calls “idle talk” \[\text{Gerede}\]. In respect of Dasein’s authenticity, it manifests proximally and for the most part as the call \[\text{Ruf}\] or voice of conscience \[\text{Stimme des Gewissens}\], which although itself proximally ‘silent’ depends on a background palaver or idle talk from which to call Dasein away. Finally, considered with respect to modally indifferent Dasein, or interpreted in abstraction from living being-in-the-world in terms of Dasein’s formal ontological structure, discourse now seems ‘in itself’ a mere condition of the possibility of worldly language and communion generally.

These three accounts of discourse are discussed in more detail below. In the first instance, however, it will be useful to explain in more detail precisely how the interpretation of Dasein in its formal ontological structure (as modally indifferent, with contact with being and with the \(\lambda\text{όγος}\)) can possibly be reached to.

\section*{Analysis of the "neutrality" of Dasein in the context of discourse.}

For his part Heidegger discusses the possibility of Dasein’s ‘neutrality’ explicitly but once in \textit{Being and Time} – but not with respect to discourse or to the \(\lambda\text{όγος}\). This discussion occurs in §69(b),\footnote{Which is entitled “The temporality of Being-in-the-world and the problem of the transcendence of the world: The temporal meaning of the way in which circumspective concern becomes modified into the theoretical discovery of the present-at-hand within the world”} which section precedes Heidegger’s discussion of Dasein’s originary temporality (under which temporality Heidegger eventually subsumes Dasein’s being as care \[\text{Sorge}\], and with which temporality he ultimately intends to explain the very question of being \textit{qua} being in accord with the original design of \textit{Being and Time}). §69(b) discusses the possibility of Dasein’s undifferentiated modal ‘neutrality’ with respect to the thematising which occurs when Dasein pursues derivative understanding; when there is a change-over from quotidian discovery and the employment of the ready-to-hand to the analytic derivation of presence-at-hand from it. Here, Heidegger explains that:
If the thematising of the present-at-hand is to become possible, *Dasein must transcend* the entities thematised. Transcendence does not consist in objectifying, but is presupposed by it. If, however, the thematising of the present-at-hand within-the-world is a change-over from the concern which discovers by circumspection, then one’s ‘practical’ being-amidst the ready-to-hand is something which a transcendence of *Dasein* must already underlie.\(^{567}\)

The formal ontological structure of *Dasein* – as something which *exists* as such-and-such a type of entity – must always already underlie *Dasein*’s factical concerns and the discovery of entities, whether ready-to-hand or otherwise:

> If … thematising modifies and [expressively] Articulates the understanding of being, then, in so far as *Dasein*, the entity which thematises, exists [as such-and-such a type of entity], it must already understand something like being. Such understanding of being can remain neutral.\(^{568}\)

We must recall, however, that *Dasein*, ontologico-existentially, is a being-in-the-world. Precisely what Heidegger intends by *Dasein*’s “neutral” being-with-being, then, the *a priori* acquaintance with being which *Dasein* ‘transcends’ when it discovers entities, is the simple facticity of its own originary being; namely its originary temporality, which temporality it possesses (structurally) *as mortality* before the advent of any possible involvement, circumspection, disclosedness, discovery, theorising, or practice.\(^{569}\) *Dasein*’s temporality, that it exists and is familiar with this


\(^{568}\) *Ibid* at 415, H 363-364; italics mine

\(^{569}\) *Ibid* at 415, H 364

*Dasein*’s originary temporality, with which the majority of the second half of *Being and Time* is concerned, is for the most part outside the scope of this paper, the concern of which is the investigation of language. In point of interest I do not think it at all insightful to propose with reference to *Being and Time* a derivativism of language with *Dasein*’s originary temporality or *mortality* as the ground from which the possibility of language is derived; especially when *Dasein*’s originary temporality is already intended by Heidegger to underlie the structure of care and, for this reason, *Dasein*’s way of being-in-the-world as a whole. Below, when the existential modalities of *Dasein* are discussed in more detail with respect to the temporality of discourse especially, I will argue that discourse always already reigns in the world in *das Man* for modally indifferent *Dasein*, as well as the *Dasein* which lives authentically or inauthentically.
fact, circumscribes the being of any being in turn, and does so in terms of itself, in
the world.

Dasein’s “neutral” understanding of being, then, is just this familiarity; the
organic care with which Dasein turns to the world and sees and understands it. It is
something Dasein possesses as a being-in-the-world.

We will learn below that thinking the λόγος as a neutral, non-linguistic, a priori
structure of the world emerges from thinking Dasein without respect to
disclosedness or to its living being-in-the-world with others; which means without
reference to the way others sway it and disclose the world to it; and also without
reference to the way that being-with-others (in particular) weighs upon it. Even
Aler, who initially supposes Heidegger’s λόγος-Rede equation to suggest that
language is a late existential derivative of a formal and ontologically “neutral”
proximity to being, namely the λόγος thought as an a priori structure, ultimately
realises that thinking discourse thus, as untied from being-with-others and
whichever language factically suffuses Dasein’s existence in the world, is ultimately to
think it abstractly.570

Before we begin to explain Dasein’s existential modalities in more detail, it
will be enlightening to grapple with the argument Aler formulates for the possibility
of a neutral and a priori λόγος in greater detail, as it is extracted from the text of
Being and Time.

§.64: The neutral λόγος

Aler proposes that: “in the [descriptive] transition from existential to
linguistic phenomena” made by Heidegger in Being and Time, Heidegger might
possibly retain the λόγος as something ontologically prior to language.571 Under this
construction the linguistic “moment” of discourse, introduced later in the company
of Dasein’s existential modalities, must ultimately be derivative of Dasein’s
structural, formal, ontologically a priori proximity to being. The a priori λόγος, the

570 Aler, J., “The conception of language in Being and Time” in Macann, C. (ed.), Martin Heidegger:
The project of Aler’s essay is to examine this possibility.
571 Ibid at 29
pre-linguistic ‘order’ of being with which Dasein is inherently familiar, cannot according to Aler be in this way be “reduced to wording”.

As we have learned, Heidegger identifies four elements that are constitutive for discourse. These are:

(1) The about-which of discourse, or that which the discourse is about \([\text{das Worüber der Rede, das Beredete}]\), a matter of concern;

(2) What is said in the talk as such \([\text{das Geredete als solches}]\), or the device used to discourse;

(3) Communication \([\text{Mitteilung}]\) or communion; and

(4) Making-known or making-manifest \([\text{Bekundung}]\).

According to Heidegger, these four elements, as discourse, form the “existential-ontological foundation of language”. Aler translates these elements thus:

(1) I say;

(2) Something;

(3) To someone;

(4) Concerning certain events that happened.

Let us analyse this translation.

By way of supposing a silent and a priori λόγος Aler formally identifies that the first, third, and fourth elements of discourse (of his own account) are necessary, irreducible, independent elements thereof; that they need not be “reduced to wording”. Under this construction and inasmuch as Dasein is thought to possess the possibility of (1) ‘saying’ (3) and ‘communing’, it is not yet ‘with’ the medium or means of accomplishing either, namely (2) ‘language’, but merely ‘with’ (4) whatever can be shared, namely the ‘subject-matter’, the “certain events” it understands, and with these alone. Under this construction “there is no need to appeal to a lingual

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574 Ibid at 203, H 160
576 Ibid at 30
moment (das Geredete (2))” to explain discourse or Dasein’s familiarity with the λόγος qua the prior ‘self-ordering’ of being; the lingual moment of being-in-the-world is altogether dispensable to its possibility; the λόγος pre-figures language and exists before it as an ontological structure of Dasein’s being-in-the-world:

[Under this construction saying] (1) and [communing] (3) come to the fore most conspicuously extralingually and prelingually [without words] and in doing so possess the same relationship to language as the situation or event, the ‘subject matter’ (4). They found the possibility of language usage; but they do not form the correlate of language and certainly not its result. … [Under this construction,] the lingual element in [discourse, or the device used to discourse (2),] seems to become ontologically irrelevant.  

It is unlikely, however, that Heidegger thought the relationship of discourse to Dasein’s being-in-the-world in this way, for the ‘prior’ articulation of the intelligibility of the ‘there’ is linked to discourse qua language in the fore-structure; and language, as we have learned, is an integral element of disclosedness. It is also improbable that Heidegger thought language with respect to the ‘I’ which Aler posits: he is consistently careful to resist the reduction of any given element of discourse (in its formal structure) to the realm of the subiectum. Heidegger endeavors instead to think language ‘from itself’, in its own worldly being, in keeping with his phenomenological method. Furthermore, Aler’s separation of the four constitutive elements of discourse into independently self-sustaining phenomena seems incongruent with Heidegger’s own analysis of discourse as a unitary phenomenon to which each element belongs, in which each element already inheres. In point of fact, Aler eventually recalls that:

The opposite [account to the one proposed above] is found in Heidegger’s dealing with λόγος in the mode of inauthenticity…. Heidegger describes manifold variants of talk [Gerede] … [in which] the

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Ibid at 30
structural moment of ‘das Gerede [als solches]’ [what is said in the talk as such] has made itself independent and absolute…

Aler recognises therefore that by considering Dasein’s existential modalities – how it is the world with others – one is ultimately presented with a different account of the λόγος, which account attends to the originary existentiality of discourse, as language. We will learn below with respect to Dasein’s existential modalities that Heidegger does not think language to be derived from an essentially non-linguistic a priori encounter of being. Rather, according to Heidegger, the λόγος, discourse, is ‘there’ in the world existentially as language – and it is there proximally and in the first instance as the dominant language of any given instance of Dasein. Let us investigate how this is, therefore. How language influences the understanding and interpretation of being-there with respect to Dasein’s ‘modalities’ will be examined as a consequence.

§.65: Discourse in the mode of inauthenticity: idle talk

“Idle talk” [Gerede] is how discourse ‘is’ for the most part with respect to Dasein’s being-in-the-world-with-others, which is originary. Gerede is Heidegger’s term for the ‘chatter’ which constitutes the president binding commerce of a populace in day-to-day exchange. It is, in other words, how discourse has its existential being proximally and for the most part as language: “For the most part, discourse is expressed by being ‘spoken out’ [ausgesprochen], and has always been so expressed; it is language.”

Inasmuch as possibilities are revealed in it, idle talk constitutes a proximate phenomenal being of quotidian understanding. It regiments the hermeneutic situation in which Dasein finds itself, with respect to which Dasein conducts itself understandingly. Within language is always already hidden a developed way of conceiving; an extant understanding and interpretation of being-in-the-world into which Dasein is born. Factically, Heidegger explains, for the most part and

581 Ibid at 211, H 167
582 That Dasein is born into language weakens any argument against its aboriginal influence over Dasein’s being.
within certain limits it is language itself which “controls and distributes the possibilities of understanding and of the state-of-mind belonging to [Dasein].”

Language, commerce, constitutes the predominant place of the public experience; a place or situation that is settled, as it were, in advance:

Being-with-one-another takes place in talking with one another and in concern with what is said-in-the-talk. To this being-with-one-another, the fact that talking is going on is a matter of consequence.

Let us examine this in more detail. That language always already hides in itself a developed way of conceiving means that ‘in’ any given instance of language there resides an average understanding of whatever is under discussion in it, as well as which words are available about its topic. Because of this primitive linguistic communion ‘what is said in the talk as such’ [das Geredete als solches], “[t]he being-said, the dictum, the pronouncement [Ausspruch] ... [often] stand [as] surety for the genuineness of the discourse and of the understanding which belongs to it”. In other words, discourse perpetuates whichever ‘facts’ are addressed in it, no matter how penetrating, insightful, or true (in the Heideggerian sense). Whatever Dasein hears has the possibility to be accepted as the proper conceptualisation of – or appropriate opinion about – a topic without pause for further conjecture or speculation – and this is precisely what occurs in the mode of inauthenticity [Uneigentlichkeit]: Living inauthentically in das Man, Dasein accommodates itself in idle talk, which talk consists phenomenologically, ultimately, in just “gossiping and passing the word along”. The λόγος is not “neutral” in this respect. Rather, as idle

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584 Ibid at 212, H 168
585 Heidegger repeats this sentiment in *The Concept of Time*, where he states that: “Dasein, which is dependent on sight on account of its discoverer [Entdecktheit], is being-together-with-one-another [Miteinandersein], which means speaking-with-one-another [Miteinander-sprechen]”. (See Heidegger, M., *The Concept of Time* (trans Farin., I. with Skinner, A.), Continuum, London, 2001 at 56, H 67)
586 In *Being and Time* Heidegger repeats that: “being-with-one-another is discursive as assenting or refusing, as demanding of warning, as pronouncing, consulting, or interceding, as ‘making assertions’, and as talking in the way of ‘giving a talk’.” (See: Heidegger, M., *Being and Time* (trans. Macquarrie, J. & Robinson, E.), Blackwell Publishing, Oxford, 1962 at 204, H 162)
586 Ibid at 212, H 168
discourse, it consists in the acceptance and re-conveyance of a common and ubiquitous history, folklore, or attitude towards being-in-the-world as such.

In *History of the Concept of Time* Heidegger states that usually therefore: “we do not say what we see, but rather the reverse, we see what *das Man* says about the matter.”

Disclosedness occurs organically as a consequence of being-with-others: idle talk and the way things have been interpreted “constitute themselves in being-with-one-another.”

That Dasein sees what *das Man* says about the matter means that it has the originary possibility to live inauthentically albeit understandingly, that the “genuine” being of entities can be hidden from it in the idle talk it accepts and accommodates, in which entities are treated according to fashion or, equally, corrupted by communality, common feeling, and public interpretation.

A consequence of being in the mode of inauthenticity is that Dasein is not overtly challenged to question or to consider rigorously ‘what’ it encounters in public discourse; for having submitted itself to quotidian talk it need not care to, as a developed experience of being-in-the-world has always already been prepared for it. It is not challenged to take responsibility (or to care) for its own being-in-the-world, to take a stand for itself against an opined *das Man*. Instead, it defers to others to what is already accepted as right and proper. Thus, in a peculiar sense, whenever Dasein unquestioningly accepts the dicta of idle talk, it closes itself off from the mysteries, peculiarities, or novelties of its own being-in-the-world, settling instead for the easy, humdrum, common interpretation of the world to which it is provided.

This, too, is an argument against the aboriginality of non-linguistic understanding and non-linguistic being-there.

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588 The full quote reads: “Idle talk and the way things have been publicly interpreted … constitute themselves in being-with-one-another. Idle talk is not something present-at-hand for itself within the world, as a product detached from being-with-one-another. And it is just as far from letting itself be volatilised to something ‘universal’ which, because it belongs essentially to nobody, is ‘really’ nothing and occurs as ‘Real’ only in the individual Dasein which speaks. Idle talk is the kind of being that belongs to being-with-one-another itself; it does not first arise through certain circumstances which have effects upon Dasein ‘from outside’.” (See: Heidegger, M., *Being and Time* (trans. Macquarrie, J. & Robinson, E.), Blackwell Publishing, Oxford, 1962 at 221, H 177)

589 This is discussed in more detail below.

590 Consider, in this respect, the way in which in early twentieth-century pre-war Europe the attitudes of various peoples were influenced by the politicising and propaganda of their governments.

That idle talk functions thus does not mean that it is constituted by the wilful aim to deceive, by the conscious ‘passing-off’ of something as something else, however – although obscuring truth, ἀλήθεια, is indeed a possibility at its very inception.\footnote{Recall the gossip surrounding the Dreyfus affair.} Rather, Heidegger explains that:

The fact that something has been said groundlessly, and then gets passed along in further retelling, amounts to perverting the act of disclosing [Erkliessen] ... since to go back to the ground of what is talked about is something which idle talk leaves undone.\footnote{Heidegger, M., \textit{Being and Time} (trans. Macquarrie, J. & Robinson, E.), Blackwell Publishing, Oxford, 1962 at 213, H 169}

In this way, although Dasein lives understandingly when it accepts what is said in idle talk, it also lives groundlessly, adopting the dicta of \textit{das Man}. We will see below that when Dasein recognises this groundlessness (in the mode of authenticity) the apparent emptiness of idle talk can itself become a spur to a sceptical, questioning attitude – towards attempting to confront being-in-the-world ‘for itself’; to replying to what is ubiquitous and groundless in \textit{das Man} – and that authenticity opens to Dasein a way to be-in-the-world anew. Originally and for the most part, however, Dasein encounters a world in which idle talk presides, in which day-to-day life is cursory, perfunctory, and Dasein lives in or against this ‘background’:

In no case is Dasein, untouched and unseduced by this way in which things have been interpreted, set before the open country of a ‘world-in-itself’, so that it just beholds what it encounters. The dominance of the public way in which things have been interpreted has already been decisive...\footnote{Ibid at 213, H 169}

[The] way in which things have been interpreted in idle talk has already established itself in Dasein. There are many things with which we first become acquainted in this way, and there is not a little which never gets beyond such an average understanding. This everyday way in which things have been interpreted is one into which Dasein has grown in the
first instance, with never a possibility of extrication. In it, out of it, and against it, all genuine understanding, interpreting, and communicating, all re-discovering and appropriating anew, are performed.

§.66: Curiosity and ambiguity

Idle talk is stimulated and sustained by ‘curiosity’ [Neugier] and ‘ambiguity’ [Zweideutigkeit]. These three phenomena, as a totality, “characterise the way in which, in an everyday manner, Dasein is its ‘there’ – the disclosedness of being-in-the-world”. For this reason it is important to explain them.

Curiosity [Neugier] describes Dasein’s propensity to accept interestedly and solicitously what it hears in idle talk; it does not describe an inquisitive impetus to escape das Man or to rebel against it. It refers instead to Dasein’s solicitous simplicity and the fact that it need not confront being-in-the-world for itself. Curiosity is a tendency to which Dasein surrenders on account of its appetite for das Man, which tendency motivates its love for what is fashionable, for a brotherhood with which to identify itself, or for collective popular power over issues troubling – such as impending death, tragedy, or the profusion of vice. Curious, Dasein refuses to attempt an ironic and authentic attitude, instead submitting itself to the benevolence, authority, and ‘wisdom’ of das Man. Curiosity is characterised by Heidegger:

(1) By not tarrying immediately in the environment with which one concerns oneself;
(2) By distracting oneself with new possibilities; and, for this reason,
(3) By “the character of ‘never dwelling anywhere’ [Aufenthaltslosigkeit]”.

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That Dasein is capable of “re-discovering” and “appropriating anew” in the ‘mode’ of authenticity, which ‘mode’ is discussed in more detail below, is evidence against Dreyfus’ claim that there is no intelligibility beyond the initial dicta of das Man. See: Dreyfus, H. L., “Could Anything be more Intelligible than everyday Intelligibility?” in Faulconer, J., & Wrathall, M. (eds.), Appropriating Heidegger, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000, 155-174
This is investigated in more detail below.
597 See ibid at 217, H 172
Heidegger explains that: “Curiosity discloses everything and anything, yet in such a way that being-in is everywhere and nowhere” (See ibid at 221, H 177)
Hence, having influenced its gain, curiosity underlies Dasein’s average or superficial knowledge of phenomena. It carries Dasein heedlessly along, causing it to pursue the direction in which idle talk, “gossip”, unfolds. Curiosity and idle talk animate Dasein’s being-in-the-world:

Curiosity, for which nothing is closed off, and idle talk, for which there is nothing that is not understood, provide themselves (that is, the Dasein which is in this manner [dem so seienden Dasein]) with the guarantee of a ‘life’ which, supposedly, is genuinely ‘lively’.

Ambiguity [Zweideutigkeit] is a diversion for curiosity and talk to follow: If an entity or event is curious and under discussion, then its being is ambiguous, and begs further chatter. Ambiguity is a potentiality-for-being in terms of which the possibilities of being-in-the-world are being perpetually projected and discovered anew. It pretends that whatever Dasein had been saying or thinking ‘yesterday’ is already superficial ‘today’ – that it was cursory, preparatory, provisional or uninformed. It motivates further discussion, for matters of idle talk are never ‘put to rest’. On the other hand, it describes the way that the prevalent dicta of idle

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598 Heidegger explains that: “[In being curious, Dasein] concerns itself with seeing, not in order to understand what is seen (that is, to come into a being towards it), but just in order to see” along with everyone else. He continues, stating that: “[This curious kind of seeing] does not lie in grasping something and being knowingly in the truth; it lies rather in its possibilities of abandoning itself to the world. Therefore curiosity is characterised by a specific way of not tarrying [amidst] what is closest. Consequently, it does not seek the leisure of tarrying observantly, but rather seeks restlessness and the excitement of continual novelty and changing encounters. In not tarrying, curiosity is concerned with the constant possibility of distraction. Curiosity has nothing to do with observing entities and marvelling at them … [r]ather it concerns itself with a kind of knowing, but just in order to have known.” (See: Heidegger, M., *Being and Time* (trans. Macquarrie, J. & Robinson, E.), Blackwell Publishing, Oxford, 1962 at 216, H 172)

599 Ibid at 217, H 173; italics mine

600 Heidegger explains that “Dasein is always ambiguously ‘there’ – that is to say, in that public disclosedness of being-with-one-another where the loudest idle talk and the most ingenious curiosity keep ‘things moving’, where, to an everyday manner, everything (and at bottom nothing) is happening.” (See Ibid at 218-219, H 174)

601 In this way ambiguity can be a tool of the press. Heidegger explains that: “Being-with-one-another in *das Man* is by no means an indifferent side-by-side-ness in which everything has been settled, but rather an intent, ambiguous watching of one another, a secret and reciprocal listening-in. … [Ambiguity] is already implied in being with one another, as thrown being-with-one-another in a world. Publicly, however it is quite hidden; and *das Man* will always defend themselves against this Interpretation of the kind of being which belongs to the way things have been interpreted by *das Man*, lest it should prove correct.” (See Ibid at 219, H 174)
talk masquerades as genuine understanding. Living inauthentically in perpetuating idle talk, Dasein lives ‘groundlessly’ – but it does not live ‘neutrally’.

§.67: Falling and thrownness

We learned above that the disclosedness of the ‘there’ in average everydayness is constituted by understanding, state-of-mind, and falling [Verfallen]; which final element is characterised in average everydayness by “idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity” – by Dasein’s inauthentic everyday discourse. Discourse is not therefore the ontologically neutral structure which Aler proposes, but belongs instead to being-in-the-world, to ‘where’ Dasein is thrown from the very first instance. Discourse is in the first instance discourse into which Dasein has “fallen”; and as such it constitutes the proximate λόγος amidst which Dasein finds itself in the first instance. Aler eventually clarifies in this respect that:

When we are in the world with others and with things, we express our insights in mutual understanding. Language then appears as the expressedness of λόγος, and in this way λόγος is existentially language.

It is important to realise that Heidegger’s use of the term falling [Verfallen] is not intended to have negative or pejorative connotations; for falling merely describes the fact that proximally and in the first instance Dasein lives in a world amidst a public which already dominates. It describes a structural element of Dasein’s ontological being: that the world is ‘where’ Dasein finds itself when it finds itself

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602 Heidegger explains that: “When, in our everyday being-with-one-another, we encounter the sort of thing which is accessible to everyone, and about which anyone can say anything, it soon becomes impossible to decide what is disclosed in a genuine understanding, and what is not. This ambiguity [Zweideutigkeit] extends not only to the world, but just as much to being-with-one-another as such, and even to Dasein’s being towards itself.” (See: Heidegger, M., Being and Time (trans. Macquarrie, J. & Robinson, E.), Blackwell Publishing, Oxford, 1962 at 217, H 173)

603 Heidegger explains that: “Ambiguity hides nothing from Dasein’s understanding, but only in order that being-in-the-world should be suppressed in this uprooted ‘everywhere and nowhere’.” (See Ibid at 221, H 177)


605 Ibid at 224, H 180

“thrown”: that when it finds itself, Dasein finds itself falling or “in the throw”. Proximally therefore, in the first instance, in its average everydayness, Dasein, having been thrown into being, is characterised by its having been “whirled” [hineingewirbelt] into das Man; by its absorption in [Aufgehen bei] das Man, its attitudes, its solicitations, the average understanding it provides. It is therefore important to differentiate the existential that is falling from any motivated decision to live inauthentically as das Man by taking “flight” [Flucht] into it.

The specific kind of being which belongs to falling, the everyday being of which is characterised by idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity, can be characterised further with reference to the four phenomena that sustain it. These are:

(1) How ‘tempting’ [versucherisch] life amidst das Man is;
(2) How ‘tranquilising’ [beruhigend] an active life amidst das Man seems, what with its (false) promise of a full, genuine life without need for authentic understanding and the troubled state-of-mind which attends it,

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607 Heidegger explains that: “[t]hrownness is neither a ‘fact that is finished’ nor a Fact that is settled. Dasein’s facticity is such that as long as it is what it is, Dasein remains in the throw, and is sucked into the turbulence of [das Man’s] inauthenticity.” (See: Heidegger, M., Being and Time (trans. Macquarrie, J. & Robinson, E.), Blackwell Publishing, Oxford, 1962 at 223, H 179)

608 Heidegger explains that: “Dasein has, in the first instance, fallen away [abgefallen] from itself as an authentic potentiality for being itself, and has fallen into the ‘world’. ‘Fallenness’ into the ‘world’ means an absorption in being-with-one-another, in so far as the latter is guided by idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity.” (Ibid at 220, H 175)

In footnote 1 on the same page, Macquarrie and Robinson explain that they are following English idioms, but that the word ‘into’ does not accurately reflect Heidegger’s meaning. Rather, what is meant is a falling ‘at’ the world, or collapsing ‘against’ it.

609 See ibid at 229, H 184

In Dreyfus, H. L., Being-in-the-World: a commentary on Heidegger’s Being and Time, Division I, MIT Press, Cambridge (Massachusetts), 1991 at 333 Dreyfus accuses Heidegger’s account of inauthenticity of incoherence, contending that the description of fallenness in the First Division of Being and Time, where it is described as a necessary element of the ontological structure of Dasein, is altogether incompatible with its description in the Second Division of Being and Time, where it is described as a mode of being-in-the-world motivated by the temptation to flee. Against Dreyfus, I agree with Carman that although fleeing and falling are “formally distinct … from a practical and phenomenological point of view [they are] wholly continuous”. Falling is an existential, whereas fleeing is motivated by the deliberative choice to continue living in das Man. As Heidegger states, fleeing “aggravates the falling”. (See: Heidegger, M., Being and Time (trans. Macquarrie, J. & Robinson, E.), Blackwell Publishing, Oxford, 1962 at 222, H 178)

This difference is explored further in small detail below, but its analysis is for the most part beyond the scope of this thesis-dissertation. For more information, see Carman, T., “Must We Be Inauthentic?” in Wrathall, M. A. & Malpas, J. (eds.), Heidegger, Authenticity, and Modernity: Essays in Honour of Hubert L. Dreyfus, (Volume 1), The MIT Press, Cambridge (Massachusetts), 2000, at 13-28


611 Heidegger explains that: “Versatile curiosity and restlessly ‘knowing it all’ masquerade as a universal understanding of Dasein. But at bottom it remains indefinite what is really to be understood, and [really] the question has not even been asked.” (Ibid at 222, H 178)
(3) How, living amidst das Man, Dasein drifts through its community towards an “alienation” [Entfremdung] both from itself, by means of communing, as well as from the unsettling question as to how it should live its own life; and, finally,

(4) How Dasein, alienated amidst das Man, gets “entangled” [verfängt] in it.

§.68: Is meaning socially determined?

By being-fallen into idle talk, into average, everyday understanding, Dasein is always already privy to an accomplished articulation of meaning; to a way things matter; to a way that being is understood; and, ultimately, to the λόγος. Inasmuch as this is given inauthentically in das Man there occurs a debate, therefore, about whether or not the intelligibility of entities, the development of concepts, and the provision and profusion of ideas is essentially socially determined or, at the very least, determined by social bias. On the one hand, the degree to which something is meaningful or meaningless is occasionally thought to depend on the degree to which it conforms to a convention or established social norm. Lafont names the theory with which language is thought to house such norms the “social externalist” theory. She describes it thus:

Social externalism is usually understood as an anti-individualist thesis about conceptual contents, namely, the thesis that concepts are not individuated by the understanding of the individual speakers who use them, but are [at least] partly individuated by other speakers, (i.e., experts.) This thesis is usually justified [today] by appeal to a social fact

612 Heidegger submits that: “The intelligibility of something has always been [structurally] articulated even before there is an appropriated interpretation of it. … That which can be [structurally] articulated in interpretation, and thus even more primordially in discourse, is what we have called ‘meaning’.” (See: Heidegger, M., Being and Time (trans. Macquarrie, J. & Robinson, E.), Blackwell Publishing, Oxford, 1962 at 203-204, H 161)


614 Haugeland describes this theory of meaning as “left-wing” or socialist as opposed to “right-wing” or individualist. See: Haugeland, J., “Intentionality All-Stars” in Philosophical Perspectives, vol. 4, 1990 at 383-427
about language use, namely, what Putnam calls the division of linguistic
labour.\textsuperscript{615}

As we learned above, the existence of language in the world, in which matters are
always already being discussed, is equiprimordial with Dasein’s being-there
understandingly – whether its understanding is inauthentic or otherwise. The role
of language in the fore-structure of understanding – and in the hermeneutic
situation generally – shows that Dasein shares a world with others, and means
therefore that Dasein is privy to fore-going interpretations of being-in-the-world.
Inasmuch as the fore-structure of understanding implicates an intimate exposure to
language, these interpretations are for the most part given in idle talk. Discourse,
language, forms with its irruptions into the world a part of Dasein’s living ‘common
ground’, the λόγος with which Dasein actively accommodates itself. Inasmuch as it
is born into das Man, idle talk forms a possible ground for all understanding,
genuine or otherwise, and thus for all conceptuality as such. (It is important to
note that derivativism does not devote a lot of attention to this possibility, and this
is one of its failings.) The prior articulation of intelligibility of the world, which das
Man “passes along” because it is usual and popular to do so, is in this way a
resource for further discussion, and an exposure to idle talk allows Dasein to
ground its utterances in a modicum of ‘common sense’. However, this fact does
not preclude Dasein from making its own novel interpretations of being-in-the-
world – or from being in the mode of authenticity, from having an authentic
encounter of being-in-the-world, and discovering what is meaningful ‘for itself’ – as
will now be shown.

\textit{§.69: Authenticity and discourse: the call or voice of conscience}

Heidegger identifies the manifestation of authentic discourse with the voice
of conscience [Stimme des Gewissen]; with the call [Ruf] away from the world and

\textsuperscript{615} Lafont, C., “Was Heidegger an Externalist?” in \textit{Inquiry}, vol. 48, 2005 at 509
Analogous to Adam Smith’s division of economic labour, Putnam discusses the division of linguistic
labour, whereby experts in various fields are thought to determine the meaning of various terms.
See, for example, Putnam, H., “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’” in \textit{Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of
Science}, vol. 7, 1975 at 131-193

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cares of das Man to “the situation” of being itself, in which Dasein exists. The call, as authentic discourse, shows inauthenticity as what it is.

Importantly, Heidegger explains that Dasein’s conscience is not a “free-floating framework of psychical faculties or personal actions”. It is not the ontogenetic ‘site’ of moralising or deliberative thinking; a forum internum for an individual psyche occasionally quiet, occasionally passing pronouncements, to perform its experiments in. It is rather something native to being-in-the-world which manifests proximally to Dasein as the arrest of its way of life, as the arrest of its inauthenticity; and thus it is accompanied by the confrontation of Dasein with the alternative possibility of authenticity [Eigentlichkeit], the possibility to live for itself in spite of das Man – to re-investigate the world to re-interpret what is meaningful, and so to re-invigorate its being-in-the-world. As such, conscience is not something with which Dasein acts but something which shows how Dasein is acting, how it is participating in das Man, how it is performing a ‘role’ as a teacher, builder, bureaucrat or otherwise, principally doing ‘whatever it is one does’. As such, the call [Ruf] or appeal of conscience “reaches [to] the they-self of concernful [and ultimately solicitous] being with others”, and it reveals to Dasein that, having been thrown into the world, it has submitted itself to the common dicta, easy attitudes, and safe impersonality of inauthentic existence.

As Stimme, voice, the call speaks to Stimmung, mood. It articulates Angst to Dasein. Whenever Dasein feels Angst, guilt, it feels the weight of its inauthentic being amidst das Man; it sees itself ‘as’ merely performing a role there. Thus, the call individualises Dasein in terms of the “existential death” which will be its own lest it attempt for itself its own understanding of its being; lest it choose its own possibilities and seek its own reasons for being ‘what’ it is: “Angst individualises

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617 Ibid at 317, H 272
618 Ibid at 317, H 272
619 Ibid at 314, H 269
620 See: Agamben, G., Language and Death: The Place of Negativity (trans. Pinkus, K. E., with Hardt, M.), University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1991 at 56
In his analysis of existential death, Heidegger refers to Tolstoy’s The Death of Ivan Ilych in a footnote (Ibid at 298, H 254) in order to emphasise how the prospect of death shocks and individualises men. The second half of Tolstoy’s work treats of the title character’s contemplation of his own impending end. (See Tolstoy, L., The Death of Ivan Ilych and Other Stories (trans. Edmonds, R.), Penguin Books, London, 1960)
and thus discloses Dasein as ‘solus ipse’, as a being-in-the-world lost to das Man to be reclaimed. By showing Dasein to itself in the mode of inauthenticity in das Man, the call of conscience confronts it with the authentic possibility of radicalising or reclaiming its way of being-in-the-world, with the possibility of upsetting or endeavouring to end the inauthentic existentiell abandonment of itself to the authority of das Man.

Heidegger does not discuss what kind of morality or moral decisions this possibility might or could entail. His concern is rather with how the way Dasein ‘is’ in the world is shown. Importantly, conscience itself “does not give [Dasein] any information … [it is] not merely critical; it is positive”. Ontologically it is merely revelatory: Because it gives Dasein something to understand, the call belongs to the structure of disclosedness. It is a peculiar mode of discourse to which Dasein is given to hearing, which means understanding. ‘Value’ is in any case something worldly rather than subjective: in the foregoing discussion of state-of-mind we learned that ‘value’ inheres in entities and is not simply imposed from a ‘judgement’ or ‘observation’ cast by the soul from a private sphere.

The call of conscience is the call of Dasein’s very being as care [Sorge], qua homo cura, to itself. With respect to the inauthenticity it shows, one might like to say that it comes unanimously to das Man but that only a few of its participants actually hear it and therefore discover the all-too-frightening phenomenon of participation, of an idle life lived according to given social norms. When Carman contends that Heidegger’s account of authenticity is incomplete because the call of conscience does not articulate to Dasein the way “we understand ourselves as others understand us”, he omits to realise that the call of conscience has a ‘global’ nature

For more information about the relationship of inauthenticity to the possibility of “existential death”, in which “death” Dasein is beholden to the norms given to it by das Man without itself being able to be anything for itself, see Crowell, S., “Transcendental Life”, 2012 (unpublished manuscript)

622 Ibid at 334, H 288
623 All sources of value are worldly, and do not rely on the ‘immanence’ of a moral self in experience. Accounts of the immanent self, according to Heidegger, simply do “not see the phenomenon of world” (See ibid at 368, H 321, where Heidegger discusses Kant’s conception of the self)
624 The call sounds ethereally in idle talk, to which Dasein is always already listening solicitously, and there it asks Dasein to claim its own voice. In point of fact, Heidegger explains that Dasein, for the most part, having lost itself “in the publicness and idle talk of the ‘they’, fails to hear [überhört] its own ‘Self’ in [as much as it is already] listening to the they-Self.” (See ibid at 315, H 270)
625 The call of conscience reaches “only to him who wants to be brought back” (See ibid at 316, H 271)
in this way. Besides showing to Dasein that it is living in *das Man*, it shows to Dasein how it is living there.

As such, the exclusivity or seemingly proximate privacy of the call logically depends on *das Man*, in terms of which it may be discovered by Dasein to be for ‘itself’ alone. In this way the call of conscience sounds ethereally as the voice of an individualising ἀπορία [aporia], always already possible to Dasein, being-there, as such. According to Crowell, this moment, the moment of the call, is what first enables Dasein to gain a genuine understanding of its being; to distinguish ‘what’ it is for itself and to investigate why ‘what’ it is should or should not continue to be the case for it. ‘Meaning’, the teleologically-grounded intelligibility of entities (‘as’ entities which are *for* this or that end), is now available to genuine circumspection, to re-interpretation, and is no longer merely grounded in a form of social externalism, perfunctorily given and available inauthentically in idle talk, idle *praxes*, or idle otherwise. Dasein now sees further. It is important to recall however that the voice of conscience must always already have Dasein as a being-in-the-world thrown to *das Man* to which to disclose a being-in-the-world as *solus ipse* in terms of. It is in accord with this observation that Aler eventually agrees that Dasein’s mode of authenticity, and in particular the voice of conscience, actually “presupposes language”, predominating idle talk, as the background palaver from which Dasein is called. Wang conurs. For his part Carman also iterates that Dasein has no possible being beyond the concrete, living being-in-the-world in which it finds itself. He explains accordingly that Dasein’s authentic ‘mode’ is also worldly. Conscience is not supra-personal; it is not a metaphysically objective view of the self; it is always already in the world – which is where the ‘self’ is lived, and where it is ultimately found.

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630 Ibid at 300
Dasein bears the voice of conscience – but the call of conscience is silent: “the mode of [expressive] Articulative discourse which belongs to … [the call of] conscience, is one of reticence.” Heidegger discovers in Being and Time an entirely ‘new’ form of discourse divorced from language; for, as was learned above, reticence, too, speaks. In order to be reticent at all, one must have something to say: reticence is a positive mode of discourse. As a consequence of Dasein’s being-with-others whence it ‘speaks’, the reticence of conscience belongs to the noise of das Man: it is pronounced in it.

As we have learned, living authentically requires the accompanying existentiell resoluteness [Entschlossenheit] to resist the temptations of inauthenticity. When the call of conscience is heard, the power of das Man and inauthenticity as such implodes. This now leaves Dasein free to attain to an authentic mode of being-in-the-world; to be ‘its own’ being-in-the-world. It leaves Dasein free to say something overpowering, new, or profound. However, any freedom gained thereby does not imply the absolute surmounting of the world or tradition in which Dasein has now discovered itself to be free to contribute authentically. It does not transform Dasein into an übermensch in the Nietzschean sense. In the same way, its freedom is not derivative of inauthenticity, nor are its new utterances strictly derivative of foregoing talk. Rather, they are always already possibilities of being-in-the-world: However lofty or overcoming modal authenticity is, it does not amount to an ascension away from the world of fallenness, but amounts merely to the revitalising insight into being whereby Dasein becomes capable of standing-apart from das Man as a free-thinker and free-talker; whereby it becomes apparent to Dasein that the unexamined life is not worth living.

632 In Ontology – The Hermeneutics of Facticity in the summer semester of 1923, Heidegger already emphasises that ‘being one’s-own’ is not “an isolating revitalisation to … the individual (solas ipse), rather ‘ownness’ is a way of being”. It still refers to a way of being-in-the-world with others. (see Heidegger, M., Ontology – The Hermeneutics of Facticity (trans. van Buren, J.), Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1999 at 5)
633 “…authentic existence is not something which floats above falling everydayness; existentially, it is only a modified way in which such everydayness is seized upon.” (See Heidegger, M., Being and Time (trans. Macquarrie, J. & Robinson, E.), Blackwell Publishing, Oxford, 1962 at 224, H 179)
in-the-world: In other words, Dasein remains encircled by what it has learned and inherited, even in the mode of authenticity, and it is always at risk of inauthenticity. Whatever Dasein now says it contributes to this encirclement; and for this reason whatever it says may be – and often is – easily adopted back-into idle talk without pause. Inauthenticity and authenticity are but two modes of being-in-the-same-world, and the way of speaking which belongs to each is always and in every case a ‘worldly’ one which belongs to an hermeneutic situation, already ‘there’. Dasein’s interpretations typically owe their sense to the fore-structure and the hermeneutic circle of its consuming inheritance – for Dasein finds its words in the world, and not merely within a forum internum or localised ‘intuition’. It finds its words in the world – which remains where it hears them and also where it speaks them. In this respect, even in the mode of authenticity, Dasein cannot but contribute to the λόγος with which it first accommodated itself.

§.70: Dasein’s undifferentiated ‘mode’

The owned or authentic mode of being-in-the-world is one of the primary topics of the Second Division of Being and Time. Once it has heard the call, Dasein can choose its possibilities in such a way as to demonstrate that it owns its being for itself; else, having heard the call of conscience, it can persist in ignoring it, and give itself back to das Man, in which it first found itself. There is, however, a third ‘mode’ of being: for Dasein’s being, “as one which is in each case mine, is free either for authenticity or inauthenticity – or for a mode in which neither of these has [yet] been differentiated.”

Aboriginally, Dasein lives in das Man, having fallen into it in the very first instance. Having found itself in das Man, having then heard the call of conscience, it can flee ‘back to it’ or can resist it subsequently. There is in this sense, therefore, das Man (1) in which the modally undifferentiated “neutral” Dasein lives, in which it is yet to hear the call, by which it is carried and accommodated from the first instance, and das Man (2) in which it lives inauthentically – or against which it lives authentically – having chosen to do so as the case may be.

What Heidegger identifies as Dasein’s undifferentiated mode is not, however, a neutral mode in the sense that Aler thinks neutrality (without regard for the

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essential facticity of Dasein’s being-in-the-world-with-others and what this being-with-others consists in), but is instead “a positive phenomenal characteristic of [Dasein]”. It refers to a way that Dasein is in the world; to the specific way in which it lives in average everydayness without having yet been called to choose between inauthenticity and authenticity. Neutral and undifferentiated, it lives before the call of conscience, unconsciously, and therefore untempted. In its undifferentiated mode, as Dasein floats groundlessly along through its existence, distracted daily by the customs and talk of its times, “the uncanniness of [its] floating remains hidden from it”. In this way, according to Heidegger, when Dasein is confronted for the first time by the call of conscience and the uncanniness of its existence, it must decide either to give itself away to das Man, amidst which it realises it must now live in neglect of conscience, and thereby distract itself from its call, or to take ownership of its being-in-the-world for itself and to attempt to live authentically. In this way the possibility to live authentically is equiprimordial with the possibility to live inauthentically, and the possibility of each mode manifests with respect to the other.

§.71: The temporality of discourse: the fundamental equiprimordiality of discourse and being-in-the-world

What each preceding section of this paper has illustrated is that language belongs to Dasein’s being-in-the-world as an originary element of it. Dasein, human being, is essentially a discoursing, speaking being-with-others. Language is an essential element of the world in which Dasein dwells. It has the meaning of λόγος and opens the world to Dasein.

An important part of Dasein’s being-socialised into the world is its mastery of the language being spoken there. By becoming the master of the language it lives in, by learning to use it creatively, Dasein reaches closer to the authenticity and existentiell freedom from das Man to which conscience calls it.

Discourse, like Dasein, is temporal. Heidegger discusses the temporality of discourse in Being and Time in only two paragraphs, in §68(d). Here he states that: "discourse does not temporalise itself primarily in any definite ecstasis", but that

636 Ibid at 214, H 170
637 Ibid at 400, H 349
“discourse in itself is temporal, since all talking about ..., of ..., or to ..., is grounded in the ecstatical unity of [Dasein’s] temporality.”

Discourse is embedded in being-in-the-world in its entirety, and is embedded absolutely. With respect to Dasein’s existential modalities, it follows that in das Man (1), in which Dasein lives neutrally and undifferentiated, discourse occurs, articulating quotidian understanding. In das Man (2), in or against which Dasein lives inauthentically or authentically, it also has a role. The neutral or undifferentiated Dasein considered for its a priori ontological structure, as opposed to its factual or existential being-in-the-world, remains even now bound to language.

It follows, therefore, that by the “ecstatical unity of [Dasein’s] temporality” Heidegger means being-in-the-world as a whole in its temporality – he means the unity of understanding, state-of-mind, and falling in disclosedness. He explains consequently that each individual or particular element of disclosedness “temporalises” itself in a different way, but always with respect to the whole: Understanding temporalises itself with respect to the future; state-of-mind with respect to having-been; and falling with respect to the present, and each with respect to the whole. In Heidegger’s words:

Understanding is in every case a present which ‘is in the process of having been’ ... one’s state-of-mind temporalises itself as a future which is ‘making present’ ... [and, in falling, the] present ‘leaps away’ from a future that is in the process of having been, or else it is held on to by such a future.

Heidegger’s intention is to indicate the way in which the structure of Dasein’s temporality manifests as a whole in disclosedness: that the possible ‘future’ is impossible without the present and having-been, that the present is impossible without the future and having-been, and so on: that “in every ecstasis, [Dasein’s] temporality temporalises itself as a whole.”

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638 Heidegger matches the structure of disclosedness with Dasein’s primordial being as care (the care-structure) with reference to Dasein’s temporality.
640 Ibid at 401, H 350
Discourse, as that which discloses disclosedness, as that which does not
temporalise itself primarily in any one definite ecstasis – and “as language for the
most part” – in essence ranges over the ecstatical unity of Dasein’s temporality. It brings each element of Dasein’s temporality to bear – but it is also temporal like Dasein. This latter observation explains why verbs have tenses, why words have weight and penetrate to the core of matters important; it explains why languages are inherited, but also why they have died; it explains why peculiar cultures of peculiar times have had peculiar languages – why, as Gadamer writes, “you understand a language by living in it – a statement that is true, as we know, not only of living, but also of dead languages”, as well as why, according to Schopenhauer, “language … is the most valuable inheritance of a nation, and … is also an exceedingly complicated work of art, easily injured, and which cannot again be restored, therefore a noli me tangere.” In §68(d), by acknowledging the temporality of discourse, Heidegger acknowledges Dasein’s discursive being-with-others in terms of its fragility and historicality. He identifies that language, like Dasein, is subject to the exigencies of time and of history, just because it is Dasein’s.

By recalling §10 of Being and Time, where he already recognises that Dasein is “that living thing whose being is essentially determined by the potentiality for discourse”, Heidegger explains in §68(d) in addition that it is: “only in terms of the temporality of discourse – that is, of Dasein in general – can we clarify how ‘signification’ ‘arises’ and make the possibility of concept-formation ontologically intelligible.” Already in Being and Time Heidegger establishes language as a possible ground for all conceptuality, as well as a ground for the currency of concepts – of δόξα, – and he relates language in this way to the sense of λόγος.

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642 In its neutral and undifferentiated mode, it ranges over das Man (1)
645 In vol. 2, at 310, Schopenhauer complains (for example) that science’s loss of Latin has disadvantaged its scientists, indicating that “there is no longer an immediately common scientific literature for the whole of Europe, but rather a collection of national literatures”. Goad, too, contends that language and culture are essentially interdependent, arguing, for example, that modern English in particular carries “...not only the keys of an incomparable treasury of learning, romance, and wisdom, but also the distinctive features of humanity, freedom, and democracy.” See: Goad, H. E., Language in History, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1958 at 10
647 Ibid at 401, H 350
which was identified above; as that which shares and maintains the world in its
structural articulation in every instance, in advance, ‘as’ it is. The being of language
does not consist merely in the ‘advent’ of speaking-forth; in the simple expression
of private impressions or the thoughts of lonely subjects; or indeed in these
thoughts being-linked to external objects. Similarly, the being of language in itself
can not be reached by multiplying subjects into a manifold of language-users and
formalising language as a manifold of used expressions accordingly.

World and word are inextricably, equiprimordially interwoven with Dasein’s
being-in-the-world; with Dasein’s being-in-the-world-with-others; Dasein exists in a
world steeped in language.
For the most part Heidegger characterises the being of language with respect to Dasein’s quotidian understanding as the idle talk that typifies das Man. This is because Being and Time is designed to assay Dasein in its proximate average everydayness. For this reason even Heidegger’s discussion of Dasein in the mode of authenticity investigates language with respect to idle talk. The voice of conscience sounds within this ruling chatter.

Inasmuch as it dominates human being, language provides Dasein with a way of life to be lived. Simultaneously, it frees Dasein from existential isolation, and brings the maddening ubiquitousness of human being to bear. Language, dead or alive, provides Dasein with an articulated structure of significance, an order; and, alive, with the possibility of reordering and reorganising what matters. It is Dasein’s president species of social communion. It suffuses humanity, as part of the fabric into which it is sewn, touching everything. As Heidegger identifies, Dasein is associated with language from the beginning as ζον λόγον χον – as “that living thing whose being is essentially determined by the potentiality for discourse.”\textsuperscript{647}

Inasmuch as he examines Dasein in its average everydayness, Heidegger’s method and findings converge. As has already been intimated, inasmuch as Being and Time is designed to assay Dasein’s fallenness, discourse shows itself as idle talk:

Discourse is existentially language, because that entity whose disclosedness it [expressively] Articulates according to significations, has, as its kind of being, being-in-the-world – a being which has been thrown and submitted to the ‘world’. …The way in which discourse gets expressed is language.\textsuperscript{648}

Heidegger thinks language from its proximity with respect to how saturates being-in-the-world. In so doing he finds it impossible that Dasein, being-in-the-world, could precede it. He discovers consequently that any given modern language must

\textsuperscript{648} Ibid at 204, H 161
owe its currency (and the currency of its terms) to the way that the history of Dasein’s encounter with being unfolds into presence in it, ever in the face of the future: So too must any given interpretation ultimately owe its intelligibility to the tradition (and therefore the language) in or against which it is founded. Heidegger explains that:

Only in terms of the temporality of discourse – that is, of Dasein in general – can we clarify how ‘signification’ ‘arises’ and make the possibility of concept-formation ontologically intelligible.649

Discourse, communion, is already identified in Being and Time as a possible ground for all conceptuality. Now the early observation that words accrue to significations can be interpreted anew: language encircles, envelops, and evolves. Dasein’s being-in-the-world and its relationship with being shows itself with respect to Dasein’s societal, historical, speaking existence with others – with respect to where it finds itself.

In the world into which Dasein is born, words are always already meaningful. In this way, as they are, they need not be derived from anything. Dasein lives in an hermeneutic situation: when language is discovered, it is discovered to be always and already in effect. Even languages one cannot speak, read, or understand are manifestly entwined with a way of life. Learning a language depends on it.

As has been shown, observations to this effect are ultimately unobtainable for any species of “detached philosophical reflection” which grounds itself in the subject-language antinomy, or indeed in the various species of derivativism which have now been investigated.650 For this reason derivativism (in particular) must ultimately be foreign to the project of Being and Time.

Dreyfus remarks that “only dwelling in our linguistic practices reveals their sense”.651 Under this construction, then, one must not deny the originary unity of Dasein, the world, and language by splitting this phenomenon into its parts and assaying them individually – one can not attempt to reach-to or unearth the

651 Ibid at 219

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separate, particular being of any or each element in turn. On the other hand, one must assay the parts in terms of the whole from which they were divined. This can be shown with respect to understanding especially. Whenever Dasein’s derivative understanding is identified as something ontologically derivative of its quotidian counterpart or, similarly, as a narrowed, specialised version of it, this is simply because Dasein’s everyday circumspection has been insularised or restricted accordingly. By adopting a narrowly theoretical attitude, by attempting to investigate phenomena with regard to their mere presence-at-hand, Dasein is liable to divorce its circumspective being-in-the-world from the originary unity of the lifeworld as such. As Heidegger explains in *Introduction to Metaphysics* in 1935, the theoretical attitude causes Dasein to treat the world as though it were a place “in which no world is world-ing anymore”. In this way, for example, the logical and formalising sciences of Dasein’s derivative understanding (in particular) either deny language its worldliness, or deny the world its “world-ing” (and word-ing).

Heidegger does not suppose in *Being and Time* that he has determined, resolved, or rendered absolutely perspicuous the relationship of language to being-in-the-world. In point of fact, many of his later works still seek the being of language and have this matter in mind. However, what Heidegger does explore in *Being and Time* is the way that language brings Dasein to its ‘there’ – to its situatedness, *Lichtung*. He investigates, for example, the way in which words incite Dasein to certain attitudes or behaviours is significant; the way, for example, that the way words sound can affect us. At the same time, *Being and Time* explores the way words have weight because their history – their significance as articulated by Dasein over time – carries the past into the present to reveal what matters. Even classical literature can influence Dasein in this way; for any given expression is ultimately linked to Dasein’s state-of-mind as such. The way that language inculcates moods is important; for it is a possibility with which derivativism and like-theories of language struggle to grapple.

Heidegger explains that his *Being and Time* “[sketch or study] of language has been designed merely to point out the ontological ‘locus’ of this phenomenon in

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Dasein’s state of being.” His aim in *Being and Time* is merely to reveal the way in which language – and ultimately discourse, its ontological being, – is tied to Dasein’s existentiality and facticity.

He concedes, however, that its relationship to Dasein’s temporality is not as thoroughly investigated. In addition, he explains that the study of language which has commenced in *Being and Time* is incomplete, stating that:

> In the last resort, philosophical research must [still] resolve to ask what kind of being goes with language in general.... We possess a science of language, and the being of entities which it has for its theme is obscure. Even the horizon for any investigative question about it is veiled.  

While derivativism, instrumentalism, and the various theories of language which have now been investigated attempt the resolution of this project with respect to the assayment of Dasein in *Being and Time* in particular, it is the case, if the arguments I have presented are coherent, satisfactory, and just, that they are yet to succeed with respect to it.

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654 *Ibid* at 209, H 166
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