WHAT MIGHT COUNT AS ART IN SCHOOLS?

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FIG. 2. Railway Bridge, Firth of Forth, Scotland. Designed by Henry Bouch. Opened 1873. 90.
Art as a school subject embraces a broad epistemological domain. It is quite acceptable for an art teacher to include in a single art curriculum - in other words, to count as 'Art' - such diverse fields as art history and ceramics, drawing and metal casting, paper-making and basic design, furniture design and the making of videos, conceptual art and weaving, book-binding and body art, computer graphics and wood-carving, clay modelling and photography, painting and performance.

In the light of such a diverse range can it be reasonably assumed that an art teacher teaches a single discipline? For one may deduce from the forms listed that Art in schools may comprise not one form of knowledge, involving essentially one way of knowing, but that in fact there may exist instead several forms of knowledge involved in the subject called 'Art'. Is the art teacher therefore, not a teacher of one subject but a teacher of many? And what are the possible implications of the concept (and expectation) of diversity in school Art curriculum for what a student may actually learn in, and through the subject, including what he or she may learn about the nature and purpose of art in society?

To tackle these questions exclusively from the standpoint of art would be to deny significant educational considerations, for the questions are concerned not only with art but also with education. And conversely, failing to explore structural characteristics of art,
conceding (for instance) that normative conditions in schools should principally determine the content of art curriculum, would also be patently inadequate, however prevalent such practice may sometimes be in schools themselves.

The intent of this dissertation is to inquire into that apparent morass of diverse knowledge in art - into the educational potential of the various philosophies, ideologies, processes and techniques all of which can, it seems, legitimately constitute the content of school art curriculum. Behind this inquiry is a desire on the part of the writer to simply resolve, if only for himself, a long-held problem: the problem as to what should count as Art in schools.
Insofar as terminology is concerned, the word 'art' can pose problems. One such problem is whether and/or when the word should contain a capital 'A'. In this dissertation the word is used with a small 'a' in all contexts except those in which reference is made to art as a virtual world; that is, as a normative order containing elements which may possess no intrinsic relationship to art as such at all. Such instances may be seen to occur when reference is made to the school subject Art and to the 'World of Art'; both examples connote and indeed involve whole sets of relationships - material, social, organisational, political and so on - which combine to place artistic activity itself within a contextual milieu.

Whether or not it contains a capital letter, however, 'art' in the singular is used to refer exclusively to the so-called visual arts. Since the entire concern of the dissertation is to inquire into what should count as art, it may seem somewhat dismissive to simply assert this particular definition of art at the outset. However, the writer takes the view that in common usage it is accepted that the singular 'art' does, in fact, refer to the visual arts. It may have been more accurate, perhaps, to use the term 'visual arts' in preference to 'art' in the text, but 'art' has been preferred for reasons of economy and flow.

The plural 'arts' is also employed in the terms of common usage: that is, to denote that whole range of 'artistic' pursuits which are
collectively so labelled in everyday language. These are the arts of music, drama, dance, poetry and so on, as well as art itself.

A complication arises with the adjective ‘artistic’, for it can be used to specifically refer to a condition in respect of art alone, but it can, as well, generally describe something as broad as the disposition of a person who engages in a number of the arts or who simply behaves in a particular way. It is hoped that the specific contexts in the text in which the word ‘artistic’ is used will communicate the appropriate meaning in each instance.

A more arbitrary determination however, pertains to the terms ‘art forms’ or ‘art activities’ as compared with ‘arts forms’ or ‘arts activities’. In this discourse, the two former terms refer to different types of art (that is, ‘visual arts’) as defined, while the latter two terms refer to different disciplines in the broad field of the arts as defined.
It is an expectation of Art in many Tasmanian schools that the subject should provide a wide range of art experiences: indeed, according to this belief, the wider the range the better the programme.

Upon what could such a belief be based? Is it a belief derived from considerations as to the true nature of art? Is it a belief which reflects educational values? Is it a belief which expresses an ideology, serving as one of a myriad of connecting threads which somehow link a society's institutional manifestations with its deep-seated system of values and beliefs?

Is it a combination of all these and other factors? Are the first two - art and education - themselves derived from, and built upon the third-ideology? Why should a wide scope of activities, of itself, be considered important in art curriculum?

In a (hypothetical) year of high school Art, a child may experience such diverse activities as screen printing, pottery, film-making, drawing, photography, jewellery, weaving, painting, art history, product design, metal junk sculpture, etching, graphic design, puppetry, mask-making and numerous other forms. Now a so-called 'year' in high school Art may in actuality comprise a total of only some ninety to one hundred-and-sixty hours of actual class time, depending upon the child's grade. Given this relative brevity of overall time, such a wide scope of subject offerings would offer little in the way
of learning in any depth as distinct from superficially 'experiencing'.

As Dewey (1938) stated,

Each experience may be lively, vivid and 'interesting' and yet their disconnectedness may artificially generate dispersive, disintegrated, centrifugal habits. The consequence of formation of such habits is inability to control future experiences...some experiences may develop callousness, lack of sensitivity and automatic skills in a particular direction which land (a person) in a groove or rut.

(p.26).

Yet for many art educators, offering more and more scope in Art seems to be an almost irresistible drive. Variety seems to be an end in itself. Could this partly be because the very notion of variety taps the nerve-end of a particular deep-seated cultural value?

Variety is, after all, linked with the value of freedom of choice. Without abundant variety, the logic goes, freedom of choice cannot in turn be abundantly exercised, and freedom of choice is a right. Its existence, in fact, stands as testimony to the existence also of that wider principle: namely, freedom itself, the great tenet of Democracy.

As removed from metaphysics as the principle of merely offering a wide range of art experiences in a school may be, a quasi-spiritual rationale such as this may yet account for the educational irrationality of many conceptions and applications of the principle of curriculum variety. For in terms of this rationale, a denial of variety would constitute a denial of freedom, and this would be
considered undemocratic. Thus if an art curriculum progressively offered less rather than more scope it would be unacceptable even on moral grounds. On the other hand, it would seem, the greater the variety a curriculum provided, the more the ideal of freedom would be manifest and thus, in turn, could be realised by the curriculum.

Others would take a more cynical view of the promotion of variety as a value in itself. They would regard the internalisation of the value as a triumph in conditioning by the capitalist system. Within the ethos of consumerism, they would point out, variety is a pre-eminent value. If, as Illich (1971, p.51) asserts, the real purpose of schools is to 'educate for disciplined consumption,' then an important objective would surely be the edification of this principle of variety as a goal in itself.

Consumerism is the child of capitalism. Thus to educate for disciplined consumption would also be to support the survival of capitalism. According to Dale (1976), schools contribute to precisely this end. From his Marxist perspective he states,

> Schooling is not just one among many of the social institutions which contribute to the perpetuation of the capitalist mode of production, it is arguably the most important. (p.1).

Thus variety in art curriculum may constitute more than simply a means for the realisation of certain educational ends. Variety in curriculum may - albeit tacitly, and below the level of consciousness
A highly varied curriculum may detrimentally affect learning in another way. By constantly shifting from activity to activity, from process to process, from material to material, from a requirement for this way of thinking and behaving to that way of thinking and behaving, such a curriculum would never permit a child to reach beyond the most superficial contact in anything. This constant shifting and superficial contact would in itself also tend to produce behaviours and an approach to knowledge tailor-made for disciplined consumption, in relation to which constant change, titillating fleeting experience and surface image are essential conditions.

Obviously a curriculum which provides a plethora of one-off experiences in a variety of art techniques is simultaneously denying opportunities for learning in depth. In respect of learning techniques, a widely varied curriculum may never, as a consequence of its variety alone, allow a child to effect those critical transformations, described by Dewey (1934) and Eisner (1977), when inert raw substances such as clay or paint become the media for the representation of personal meanings. As Eisner states,

Without the skills necessary for making such a transformation, material never achieves the status of a medium and the ideas, images, and feelings of the child remain locked within the psyche, unable to take a public form. (p.2).
The virtual conspiracy theory which has been propounded - the idea that curriculum in Art is somehow intended to condition for consumerism and the preservation of the capitalist order - may be too far-fetched. After all, variety of experience is a basic human need. Indeed, as the old cliché reminds us, it is the spice of life. The great foe - boredom - is surely kept at bay by variety in human experience. And teachers hardly need reminding that variety is crucial in curriculum as a benefit to learning.

The issue raised should not be seen as a question of choosing between opposites, between unfettered variety in art experiences at one pole and absolutely no variety - for instance, a curriculum which consisted entirely of drawing bottles with a 2B pencil - at the other. As Dewey (1938) reminds us, to assume polarised positions on educational issues is as ludicrous and irrational as it is, unfortunately, prevalent.

It is a question of degree: of the degree of variety, of balance between breadth and depth in art curricula. At present, the principle of breadth has, in a large number of Tasmanian school art departments, assumed an inordinately and, it is felt, a dysfunctionally high emphasis in relation to the facilitation of depth.

Clearly in order to correct such imbalances something in the way of curriculum content in Art would have to go. Choices would have to be made between what should be included in, and what should be excluded from the Art curriculum. How might these choices be made?
One particular way of dealing with this problem derives from the fact that, broadly speaking, the multitude of activities which legitimately count as Art in schools may be seen to fall into three general categories. These are the categories of so-called fine art, so-called design and so-called craft.

In the extreme 'breadth' approach, an art teacher will incorporate all three categories into his or her curriculum. In many schools, however, Art consists largely, or even entirely of a single category. Thus what might count as Art in one school may be fine art, in another it may be design, in a third, craft.

So pervasive has the trend towards design become in Britain that the name of the subject has been expanded from 'Art' to 'Art and Design'. This new title itself implicitly makes the point that art and design are seen to differ one from the other. The fact that both are yet also seen to be properly locatable within the same curriculum slot has produced a problematic situation. The situation in schools is mirrored at other levels, particularly in tertiary art education, in which area, after all, those who will transmit the respective epistemologies in schools - art teachers - are trained.

Developments in the wider society, particularly in tertiary institutions, inevitably have a powerful influence upon what happens in schools. In art education, such developments have been strongly marked by the struggle - often reaching bitter proportions - between fine art and design, with the protagonists of each claiming sole
legitimacy as the rightful incumbent of the school's Art curriculum and, by extension, to be considered alone to be accepted as Art in the wider society.
Delivering the 1982 Power Lecture in Contemporary Art, the British art critic Peter Fuller pointed to perceived problems in art education generated by the wide range and the diverse nature of productive areas yet claimed as the legitimate property of art. According to Fuller, this catholic conception of art has had serious negative consequences for the nature and quality of art education and for the place of art and the role of the artist in society.

With regard to the question as to what should count as art, Fuller conceives of a selection of knowledge which is radically narrow. To him, painting and sculpture alone (though, one assumes, he would also include drawing in his selection), rightly constitute the discipline. He states (1982),

There are historical reasons why I stress painting and sculpture. Indeed, I believe that in an 'aesthetically healthy` society, the aesthetic dimension permeates throughout all work, and extends to every part of the social organism, regardless of class and condition. But we do not live in such a society: and painting and sculpture, alone, offer this promise of a new reality, realised with the existing one.

(p.12).

A major target for Fuller's attacks on contemporary art education has been the Royal College of Art in London. It is not difficult, given his strong support for painting and sculpture, to see why. In 1977-78, the RCA curriculum consisted of the following departments:

The above list itself suggests that painting and sculpture hardly enjoy a position of pre-eminence in the RCA. It is salient to note that the word 'Design', however, is incorporated in no less that seven subject labels in the list, suggesting that design prevails in the RCA as the dominant orientation. The import of this is considerably magnified when it is realised that the RCA, as an institution, functions as an important legitimating body in determining what counts as art, influencing not only other stages of education but also society at large with its determinations.

An analysis of the 1977-78 staffing situation at the RCA provides further evidence of the relatively lowly position of painting and sculpture in comparison with the design-oriented fields. Out of a total staff complement (full and part-time) of 119, painting and sculpture were served by a total of only twenty staff members between them, and most of these were part-timers. In fact, only one person out of five in the sculpture department was employed full-time. At the same time, the subject ubiquitously dubbed General Studies could boast thirteen staff members (eleven part-time), while Textile Design had seven (four part-time), Furniture Design six (four part-time), and Film and Television nine (including only one part-time). (C.U.)
If indeed, as Fuller claims, painting and sculpture alone offer the promise of an aesthetically healthy society, then the Royal College of Art - with its apparent low emphasis on painting and sculpture - would be contributing very little to society's good aesthetic health.

To the RCA itself, however, such an accusation would be preposterous. For its part, the RCA would claim that the good aesthetic health of society is indeed its major concern. Moreover, it would not merely make such a case on the basis of the cultural rub-off deriving from the College's traditional esteem and its presence in a large city. Rather, the RCA would claim that an aesthetically healthy society is a deliberate objective: that such an objective, in fact, constitutes the College's very raison d'être and is hence the dominant guiding principle in its curriculum determinations.

The college could point to the utility and relevance of the very labels of its subject offerings - Environmental Design, Film and Television, Furniture Design and Industrial Design, for instance - as evidence of its concern for the aesthetic health of the society. Such labels of themselves denote the existence of an educational philosophy which would apparently seek to plant the visual arts squarely within the wider social domain.

To a significant extent the word 'design' itself achieves social acceptability. Indeed the respectability attached to the word has not
gone unexploited. The word 'design' connotes order. Its 'image' (its rhetorical value) is the antithesis of one of unbridled, undisciplined emotional expressiveness by which terms detractors love to portray the character of fine art. Design stands for order, fine art for chaos; design means stability, fine art means revolution; design conjures up images of individuals harnessed to the common weal, fine art only images of anarchists. There are significant political dimensions of the design-versus-fine art issue.

In an article entitled 'Art's Last Stand?', (Times Educational Supplement, 29.7.83), Bernard Denvir describes how the British National Advisory Body on Art and Design Education's prescribed across-the-board ten percent cut in funding to colleges of art was effected in some institutions. He cites the case of the Ravensbourne College of Art and Design - a college controlled by the London borough of Bromley - which decided, in the face of the necessary ten percent cut, to close down its television technicians' training course, 'the functions of which could be carried out by the industry itself, and which had never had any integral relationships with the main college.' (p.28)

Denvir (1983) reports, however,

But Bromley Educational Committee decided otherwise. Fine Art would go completely, and the College would become a 'College of Design for Industry'. This monstrous decision now seems as though it is going to be implemented.

What is happening at Ravensbourne looks like
being repeated all over the country. The reasons are many and complex. Dominant is the attitude of the present Government, which in the field of art and design, as well as in the wider academic area, seems obsessively concerned with technology, in the narrower sense of the word, and instinctively opposed to any discipline which does not have an immediately obvious practical application.

Nor is this attitude peculiar to a handful of backwoods ideologists. Especially in local government circles of the more traditional kind, there is a deep feeling that art and anarchy are virtually synonymous, an attitude reinforced by memories of 1968 when Hornsey College of Art played a prominent part in the wave of student unrest.

According to this view, the emphasis on design and the demise of fine art in British art education is due not only to the British Government’s obsession with technology. It also relates to the notion of control.

Denvir implies that the British Government is able to determine what counts as Art in education simply because, as his examples clearly show, it holds the purse-strings.

One may speculate that the extent of such power would be considerably less if the overall economic climate in Britain was in a healthier state. If it were, then perhaps curriculum content in art would not be subjected to the same scrutiny, the same pressures, the same demands to account for diminishing funds and resources.

If there was more money made available to go round, it could be expected that the same insistence on cuts, and the pressure on
educational institutions of such cuts simply being in the air would be largely dissipated. Ravensbourne College of Art, for instance, would probably never have been forced to face the possibility, let alone experience the reality of losing its fine art department were it not for a 'necessary' ten percent cut in its funding.

Thus the current emergence of design and the accompanying demise of fine art in curriculum could perhaps be substantially explained as an outcome of the scramble for diminishing funds - a scramble which places obvious requirements on accountability, in which stakes design has a considerable advantage.

Historically in Britain, so-called design and so-called fine art have co-existed in school and college art curricula since the introduction in the 1830s of Art in general education. This relationship has traditionally ebbed and flowed, but in general terms a consensus has existed between them, a situation not difficult to maintain during relatively prosperous times.

Consensus, or co-existence, is not difficult to achieve when resources for all are perceived to be in relative abundance, for buoyant economic circumstances offer the hope of something for everybody. Depressed circumstances, on the other hand, produce a scramble for ever-dimishing resources.
As Partridge (1971) explains, consensus is the outcome of

... 'accommodations' between conflicting interests and demands, which the groups concerned are willing to accept for the time being as a base from which further demands can be projected. (p.94).

He goes on, however, to state:

It would scarcely be plausible to assert that agreement about the 'rules of the game' can co-exist with any sort and volume of economic and social conflict. (p.95).

Here Partridge provides not only a rationale for consensus but also a rationale for conflict. Applying his view to the issue of fine art versus design, it would mean that so long as the two camps could each perceive for itself a possible place in the sun, a limited degree of dissensus between them could easily be tolerated, even encouraged, for such encouragement could itself testify to the 'lively debate' in the field. However, with the erosion of faith in the system to provide such a place in the sun for both, any healthy dissent would soon be replaced by bitter conflict.

This notion may principally explain why fine art and design are today at loggerheads over the issue as to which should count as Art in education. They are at loggerheads because each perceives the effects of the wider socio-economic situation such that there is no longer room for both. It is a fight to the death.
Designers have gone onto the attack by asserting that design is socially useful, responsible and constructive. Fine art is portrayed by them in an opposite light - as being socially useless, irresponsible and destructive. Nor would such criticism necessarily offend fine artists, many of whom have long basked in seductive notoriety as society's 'enfants terrible', operating within a legacy of a traditional recalcitrance to collaborate with society at large.

Even Matthew Arnold (1880) described the function of poetry - close kin to painting and sculpture - in such terms. He saw poetry as being rightly concerned with criticism of, rather than subservience to society's prevailing panaceas:

> Our religion parading evidences such as those on which the popular mind relies now; our philosophy, pluming itself on its reasonings about the causation and finite and infinite being: what are they but the shadows and dreams and false show of knowledge? The day will come when we shall wonder at ourselves for having trusted to them, for having taken them seriously; and the more we perceive their hollowness, the more we shall prize the breadth and finer spirit of knowledge offered to us by poetry.... More and more mankind will discover that we have to turn to poetry to interpret life for us, to console us, to sustain us.

> ...The consolation and the story will be of power in proportion to the power of the criticism of life.
> (in Murray, 1917, p.78)

Herbert Marcuse is committed to a similar view as to the significance of what he terms the 'critical, negating function of art'. He states (1977),
The inner logic of the work of art terminates in the emergence of another reason, another sensibility, which defy the rationality and sensibility incorporated in the dominant social institutions. (p.7).

Art, according to Marcuse, constitutes

...an invalidation of dominant norms, needs and values. With all its affirmative-ideological features, art remains a dissenting force. (1977, p.8).

It is claimed by Shahn (1957) that the pre-eminent concern of fine art is with expressing essentially what is human about human beings. If this is so, however, the popular conception that the 'critical, negating function of art' represents total negation and abuse of humanity would be unfounded. It could in fact be claimed by many fine artists that their art portrays aspects of life which those who are likely to hold the misconception that artists are socially irresponsible have themselves dehumanised.

The beauty with which the artist is expected to ingratiate the philistine is of the saccharine kind. There is, however, another notion of beauty of art, and this is the notion which admits the intelligent, perceptive, autonomous artist who can rightly exist as a social critic. It is the notion expressed by Keats' famous lines:

Beauty is truth, truth beauty - that is all
Ye know on earth, and all ye need to know.
It is also the notion of beauty in art alluded to by Rodin:

As it is the power of character which makes for beauty in art, it often happens that something which is ugly in nature is beautiful in art.

Such blatantly non-utilitarian sentiments, however noble-sounding, serve no useful purpose for today’s Prosaic Man, to use George Morgan’s (1970) term. ‘Prosaic Man’ requires that all facets of life be fashioned into forms which are not only apprehendable by, but also serviceable to him.

It is clear where Prosaic Man would stand in relation to the fine art-versus-design conflict. To him, designers solve problems; artists create them. Designers make useful things; artists celebrate the uselessness of fine art. The products of design are easily comprehended; those of fine art are purposely incomprehensible. Design exists in order to please; the function of fine art is to shock. Whereas design is truly democratic because it takes unto itself concern for the welfare of the common person, fine art is anarchistic, even nihilistic, at the same time as it is fundamentally elitist.

Pitted against Prosaic Man - the ally of the designer - the battle for fine art has been a tough affair. It has become almost totally unwinnable for fine art when it has been fought in the public media - the homeground of Prosaic Man so championed by the designer but so ostracised by the fine artist. Fuller (1982) reports how ‘The
...scarce resources formerly offered
to scruffy painters and sculptors should be
switched to designers who might make some
concrete contribution to Britain’s export
drive.
(p.5).

In Australia, Melbourne’s ‘Sunday Observer’ (28.12.75) launched its own
virulent attack on the ‘scruffy’ fine artists, trumpeting,

Crack down on the Artful Dodgers. That
should be one of the first tasks of the
Fraser Government.

Under Labour we saw an immense waste of
taxpayer’s money in hand-outs to alleged
artists, writers, musicians and the like.
Most of them misused the money.

Recipients could be found day and night
in pubs around the town, grogging away the
money earned by productive workers.

The rather more prestigious ‘Times Educational Review’, (12.12.75) - in
an article written by the then-Head of General Studies at the Royal
College of Art, Professor Christopher Cornford - may well have
provided the ammunition for the Sunday Observer’s onslaught. (Note
the respective publication dates.) In somewhat more sophisticated
terms, Cornford yet deployed the same basic strategy as that of the
Observer in his own broadside on fine art, rhetorically titled ‘Art
for Society's Sake'. Cornford asserted,

I think they (art schools) are often grievously deficient in critical muscle, theoretical backbone, and awareness of their own social and cultural context.

As a result, particularly on the fine art side, immense amounts of time and materials are wasted on half-convinced regurgitations of current international styles culled from the art magazines. And on the part of all too many staff there is an unexamined consensus to the effect that something called 'self-expression' must be the sole and supreme value and objective in the process of art education. (p.17).

The isolation of the fine artist is the stuff of romantic saga. Art history abounds with examples of the struggling recluse which stir the imagination: Michelangelo, El Greco, Rembrandt, Goya, Lautrec, Van Gogh, Gauguin, Cezanne, Munch, Modigliani, Pollock among many others. How could such often self-styled social misfits possibly be equipped to fulfil Cornford's ideal of producing 'art for society's sake? 

The designer, on the other hand, identifies his or her role as one which can only be justified and validated if it is functioning within and for society. But the design mentality tends to press for more than a merely servile social role for itself. Clues to this may be found in the vocabulary of the designer: in such words as 'integrate', 'rationalise', 'systematic', 'co-ordinate', 'structure', 'inter-disciplinary' and 'solution'. The design mentality - or ideology - embraces the notion of control even to the point where, according to Denvir, for example, control itself appears to have priority over
Denvir (1983, p.29) describes how the Royal College of Art, responding to a 1981 government ultimatum that its grant would be cut 'unless it paid more attention to the needs of industry', appointed as its new rector Lionel March, a man with a background in mathematics before his becoming a Professor at the Open University. According to Denvir, March - 'a committed believer in the notion that computers take precedence over people in the creation of good design' promptly appointed a new dean, also from the Open University, 'who shared his belief in mechanistic perfectionism.'

Far from retreating from society in the manner of the archetypal fine artist, and as distinct from merely serving society's whims for new products, design as ideology involves the very orchestration of society. Consider how potentially far-reaching in this respect is Cornford's (1975) appeal for education in design, 'as distinct from either art or craft':

'Design' in this context doesn't mean scaled down imitations of, or excerpts from, current professional practice. It refers to every imaginable kind of planning and decision-making process that results in the man-made environment being what it is - not to mention the consideration of what it might become.

Inquiry might start with: 'How might we rearrange the seating in this classroom?' and end with: 'What are the pros and cons of the new housing estate at X or the proposed motorway through Y?'

It is not far-fetched to imagine that if such a curriculum became pervasive (and, rightly
seen, it is a core subject in the curriculum, having implications in art, craft, engineering, home economics, science, social studies, civics, geography, local history) there would come into being not only a substantial core of excellent recruits to all design, environmental and planning professions, but also a massive public both able and determined to assume an active role in grass-roots democracy. (p.17).

Cornford's Utopian scenario, if instituted in schools as the content for art curriculum, would, it is plain to see, constitute not merely alternative content for a curriculum in which selections of knowledge inevitably have to be made in any case. Rather it would appear to describe an entirely new subject, involving a vastly different discipline from that of Art as it has been conventionally identified in schools.

Certainly, 'Art for society's sake' in the terms outlined by Cornford, is a concept which Marcuse (1977) diametrically opposes. From Marcuse's Marxist perspective,

The concept of art as an essentially autonomous and negating productive force contradicts the notion which sees art as performing an essentially dependent, affirmative ideological function, that is to say, glorifying and absolving the existing society. (p.11).

Fuller, himself appearing to owe some debt to Marcuse, describes this general distinction between opposition to, and affirmation of society
in terms of what he sees as struggles

between those who are basically ‘collaborationist’ in outlook towards the existing culture, and those who perceive that the pursuit of the "aesthetic dimension" involves a rupture with, and refusal of, the means of production and reproduction peculiar to that culture. (1982, p.5).

Fuller relates how the fundamental ideological cleavage between fine art and design became open conflict at the Royal College of Art during the mid-seventies. The respective chief protagonists during this drawn-out battle were the then - Rector, Richard Guyatt, who, according to Fuller (1982, p.5), 'had a background in advertising and the graphic arts', and Peter de Francia, Professor of Painting.

But if fine artists and their advocates believe that design is a quite different thing from fine art, theirs is a view not shared with designers when it comes to the question of control. For designers (when it suits them) claim that art -indeed all the arts - fall within the aegis of design. The previously - cited key words from the designer’s vocabulary - words (concepts) which include 'control', 'integrate' and 'rationalise' - suggest that the notion of design as the umbrella discipline for all the arts is absolutely consistent with the whole design ethos of control.

Another RCA Professor - Bruce Archer, in 1980 Head of Design Research - has attempted to justify this all-encompassing rationale for design.
In a paper entitled 'The Arts in Education' - for which, presumably, his own professional background as a chartered mechanical engineer provided no hindrance to his knowledge on the subject - he vaguely refers to

...the field of Design, comprising the creative arts...and I could provide an etymological justification for the word 'design' if I had time. (Writer's emphasis, Archer, 1980, p.9.)

If, however, design were to prevail over fine art as the content of school curricula in Art, such a victory would not have come about simply as the result of an analysis of the original meanings of words, even if time were available to Archer to provide them. It would have largely, however, come about as the result of the systematic sustained bombardment with such rhetoric by designers such as Cornford, Archer and Petelin. The nature of their advocacy has been blatantly political.
Whatever has needed to be done in society at large has been transmitted to education and transmuted into responsibilities for our schools - and thus diffused as the rightful concerns and responsibilities of other social institutions and of politicians.

Education is hailed as the great Universal Cure-All. Whatever has needed to be done in western society - from waging wars on poverty to landing a man on the moon, from instilling respect for traditional values to imparting knowledge of the facts of life, from being prepared for work to being prepared for leisure - for all this and much more, not the least of which is somehow reconciling all these demands with getting Back to Basics, the school constitutes The Great White Hope. As former Michigan Governor Milliken (1972) put it,

We live in a time of multiple crises, and no approach to the solution of these crises is as promising as education.
(p.68).

The sense of urgency typically expressed in such statements is often intended to provide the platform for radical action of the most urgent import. In this way, massive intrusions into education by vested interests may be legitimated and accepted by a consenting but manipulated community which mistakenly believes that the intrusions represent, in fact, democratic actions taken on its behalf.
Recent attempts at introducing mandatory literacy-numeracy tests and external examinations at the end of compulsory schooling (grade 10) by a conservative government in Tasmania provide examples of this approach. In this instance, 'great concern' about 'lower standards' (despite educational surveys which have shown that standards have, in fact, been steadily improving) have preceded the merely inevitable imposition of the government's will. These attempts could be construed as straightforward expressions of the functionalist ideology of a government merely purporting to be responsibly meeting an 'urgent' need.

Clearly, educational changes of this magnitude and character produce a massive impact on the nature of schooling. At least one Hobart secondary school, in response to the possible imposition of the literacy-numeracy tests intended by the State Government to be conducted at the end of grade 10, has already (in 1984) approached its feeder primary schools with the notion that they (the feeder schools) operate a common core curriculum in mathematics which might prepare children for the particular high school's own first year mathematics curriculum.

To accede to this pressure would, according to one of the affected primary school Principals, be to deny important philosophical bases of, as well as stifle successful teaching methods in primary education. It is seen by him to constitute a virtual return to the long-abandoned Ability Tests (Eleven-Plus examinations) which once effectively served to stratify and classify children at the end of
their primary schooling for their subsequent educational experiences and allocate them for their various roles in life.

Perhaps the condition of consumerism is itself so all-consuming that the ethos of the market-place has become totally internalised within the collective psyche of the populace. If so it would mean that this ethos may have also become manifest as the set values and beliefs by which the entire spectrum of human affairs are judged, including education.

That this seems to be so is more than implicit in the words of Wildavsky (1970) who, it should be noted, is in this instance discussing education (not toothpaste on the supermarket shelf):

Consumers of government services are entitled to know what they are getting. Truth in packaging applies just as much to government as to private industry. (p.212).

The conception of education as a giant packaging industry, in which products must meet the prescribed needs of consumers is, of course, total anathema to that traditional bastion of the ethos of the autonomous individual and free thinking: the fine arts. It is little wonder that within the current hysteria of accountability, the position of fine art in art curriculum is under extreme pressure.

The position of design in relation to the values of accountability is, however, one of compatibility. For in a design curriculum consumers
of education are indeed able to know and determine what they are getting. Truth in packaging does not relate to design in purely metaphorical terms: it constitutes an inherent design principle. Above all, design is attractive to the consumer mentality because design is an integral part of the very production of material goods on which consumerism feeds.

The orientation toward design in art education may be seen as a response to the call for accountability in education generally. It is considerably easier for a school to justify a design curriculum than it is a fine art curriculum to a lay community which ultimately foots the bill for education. It is relatively easy for vested interest groups - including conservative politicians - to promote design by imploring the lay community that it should insist on getting value for money in art education. Precisely because the community of taxpayers is essentially a lay community, its notion of value for money tends to be based on the extent to which art education, like education in general, is able to deliver easily-perceived, short-term, utilitarian and material benefits - to itself. In their respective capacities to so deliver there is simply no contest between design and fine art. Design wins hands down.

In his paper, "A Rationale for Design Education in Australian Schools", George Petelin (1981) implies that whereas fine art is virtually irrelevant (as well as it is irreverent) to society at large, design - in complete contrast - offers nothing but improvements
for the lot of the common person. He states,

Unlike Fine Art which is not governed by any restrictions, Design cannot be stored away in museums to be looked at for occasional stimulus. We all have to constantly live with it. It is not an end in itself and it is a large part of our inescapable environment. Therefore, its ultimate rationale and criterion lies in its improvement of people's day-to-day existence. (p. 3).

To schools increasingly required within the prevailing climate to respond to the call for accountability, the appeal of design as the basis of art curriculum is obviously strong. One of the major dysfunctions of the present-day accountability scurry in education is that it is the capacity of a body of knowledge to be easily explained and justified to non-students - and done so not in terms which are intrinsic to the discipline but in terms of extrinsic needs - which largely determine its viability as curriculum content.

Yet to Wildavsky, one of the champions of the accountability movement, giving the taxpayers what they want in terms which they can readily comprehend is an essential requirement of education. To him,

The ability of ordinary citizens to appraise whether they are getting what they want is of critical importance in a system of democratic government. (1970, p. 212).
Key phrases here such as 'ordinary citizens...getting what they want' and 'a system of democratic government' typify the rhetoric of the crusaders of accountability. These crusaders rely upon the reflexive appeal to Prosaic Man of such phrases and of simplistic but appealing rationales designed to promote, above all, the cause of accountability itself, which is to say the ideology which underpins it. Thus one may deduce that Wildavsky, for one, seeks to ensure the perpetuation of conservative values in education and functionalist ideology in society at large in his calls for educational accountability.

Design is inherently supportive of such values. It gives ordinary people what they want, in terms they can understand, and it raises no potentially subversive social questions.

In education and society today, in which scientism reigns supreme, the dominant evaluative process involves empiricism and the quantification of results. Implicit in scientific method is objectivity; and objectivity, in turn, seeks to realise the truth in phenomena which are external to the perceiving subject. Thus contemporary evaluation systems are based on the notion that empirical method, producing quantifiable results, is therefore objective - which is to say truth-revealing.

Gilbert Murray's (1917) description of the nature of revelation in literature would appal the scientific evaluators in the
accountability movement. According to Murray,

...words of inspiration or revelation
...never are concerned with direct scientific fact or even with that part of experience which is capable of being expressed in exact statement.
...They are all in the nature of the guess that goes before scientific knowledge; the impassioned counsel of one who feels strongly but cannot in the nature of things, prove his case. (pp.101-102).

Statements of this kind are ripe for attack in an age which worships science. One could expect them to be regarded as decadent, subjective, romantic and, since their claims cannot be verified objectively (that is, scientifically, quantitatively), such statements could not be proven to be true. Because it is inherently antipathetic to scientific measurement — the teeth of accountability — fine art as a body of knowledge has become subjected to considerable pressure in contemporary education. Design, on the other hand, is eminently reconcilable with the prevailing ethos: hence the increasing momentum in schools to count design as Art.

Design tasks fit scientific evaluation because they involve pre-determined objective criteria (design briefs) against which results (design products) can be assessed. In fine art, however, the artist often begins with no concrete idea at all, but simply with a response or an impulse. Pollock alludes to this in his statement,

When I am 'in' my painting I'm not aware of what I'm doing. It's only after a sort of 'get-acquainted' period that I realise what I'm about.
At such a statement the scientific evaluator would be aghast. To him, Pollock’s art would represent the epitome of mindless self-indulgence. How would it be possible to empirically evaluate this artistic impulse and produce a quantified (that is, a truth-revealing) result? It could not be done. Would it, therefore, be true to conclude that there is no such thing as the artistic impulse? If this is so, however, it may also be true to say that other non-material manifestations of the human spirit such as love, religious experience and aesthetic experience - along with the human spirit itself - similarly do not exist in the lives of human beings.

There is surely a more than reasonable body of evidence from human history - if one needed to refer to anything outside one’s own sensibilities - which suggests that such manifestations have not simply existed, but may have even been the crucial determinants in the course of human affairs. Empiricism in the form of historical evidence at least shows us (if we required the affirmation) that something like the human spirit, and many distinctive facets of it, indeed exist.

In mocking the ineptitude of quantitative measurement to evaluate such essentially non-quantifiable dimensions of the human psyche, David Best (1980) relates a fictional tale of two lovers anxious to express their love for one another. ‘I’m dying to tell you how much I love you’, said one to the other, ‘but I forgot my pocket-calculator!’ (p.5).
Yet the somewhat infamous Michigan Education Assessment Program (MEAP) set out with the precise mission of quantifying the unquantifiable. In a 1976 address, Sir Alec Clegg cited some so-called performance criteria which he had encountered 'a short time before' in Michigan. Among Clegg's cited examples from MEAP documents were the following:

By the end of the pre-kindergarten experience, 90% of all children will demonstrate their recognition of at least three of the five basic emotions - fear, anger, sadness, joy, and love in self and others, as measured by a Michigan Educational Assessment Program, or MEAP.

By the end of the third grade (in Art), students will voluntarily choose linear media to interpret personal feelings as measured by a minimum criteria on an Objectives Reference Test.

By the end of the third grade (in Music), children will create vocal or instrumental accompaniments to songs using combinations of melodic, harmonic, or rhythmic patterns as measured by an Objectives Reference Test. ...(For example), while the class sings the chorus of Oh Susanna the child plays the tambourine any way he chooses. (Clegg, 1976, pp.10-11).

To Clegg, accountability in education is 'the scourge of the decade.' (p.11)

It is not the child at all upon whom such accountability programmes fundamentally focus, but performance itself. Considerations as to any intrinsic value of an art curriculum for the individual child are
therefore secondary. According to Eisner (1979),

...such approaches, and the methods of inquiry that are regarded as legitimate within their borders, fail to tell the whole story. As a result of the partial view that such methods provide, a biased, even distorted picture of the reality that we are attempting to understand and improve can occur. In some respects this result is paradoxical because the stringent canons of social science methodology are the product of a desire to reduce bias and diminish distortion: the claim that they may in fact contribute to bias and distortion is a severe critique, if true, and a paradox of their intention. (p.11)

One might question, however, whether in fact the Michigan performance criteria do constitute a paradox of their intention, if, as one assumes, Eisner is referring to an inherent educational intention in the statement above. Indeed the Michigan tests may have produced a highly successful realisation of their intention: that is, to condition rather than to educate in the fullest sense.

In his book, Education and the Cult of Efficiency, (cited in Bowers, 1972), Raymond Callahan alludes to such conditioning in education, drawing a close parallel between the accountability movement and the principles of so-called Scientific Management - that early twentieth century organisational system whose character was reflected in the label, Cult of Efficiency.

In describing how the old Cult of Efficiency ethos transferred from big business to education in the twenties, Callahan could mistakenly
be thought to be describing the situation in many schools and education systems today. He writes,

...educational decisions were subordinated to business considerations, ...administrators were produced who were not, in any true sense, educators, ...a scientific label was put on some very unscientific and dubious methods and practices; and an anti-intellectual climate already prevalent was strengthened. (in Bowers, 1972, p.30)

Nash and Agne (1972) also attack the pervading scientism which so distinguishes the posturing of the contemporary warlords of accountability, and maintain that there simply exist far too many variables in human behaviour to allow for reliable measurement:

The true scientist is aware of this, but not the human engineer. (p.365).

According to Nash and Agne, it is the human engineer who has been pressed into service in order to instil in the young 'the technocratic values of predictability, objectivity and efficiency.' (p.364) Bowers (1972) reports his perception of

...the greater move towards accountability and the transformation of education into a technology that will make the control of students more effective. (p.30)
The fundamentally dysfunctional character of accountability systems in the U.S., such as the Michigan system described by Clegg, largely derive from their attempts at pressing the disciplines of liberal education, including art, into the service of technocracy.

The two are irreconcilable. Liberal education, of its nature and indeed by literal definition, is the antithesis of a system which would seek to control, stereotype and condition individuals. The inclination, however, for the content of art curricula to retain overt identification with typical liberal content and principles at the same time as being subjected to quantifiable performance criteria of a behaviorist ilk may represent but an attempt to lay a veneer of liberalism over more sinister intentions. R.H.S. Crossman (1937) imagines that Plato would have viewed such a scenario thus:

> For the general education you so highly praise does not make the masses free, but inculcates only a false self esteem and pretentiousness, with the result that they are not less but more liable to be misled and deceived by the rogues and tricksters whose profession it is to sell Enlightenment and Culture to them. It is not the humble craftsman but the get-rich-quick merchants who thrive...The more educated your people become, the more easily they are swindled and deceived by the self-same trickery decked out in the trappings of science and culture and even religion. (p.107)

In these terms, art curricula which comprised purely design content or which imposed strict performance criteria on supposedly liberal fine art content would serve to deflect students' concerns away from the
otherwise potentially subversive and highly volatile inquiries and statements which are characteristic of fine art.

Attempts at conditioning are precisely what fine art diametrically, traditionally, perhaps instinctively opposes. Indeed, such opposition - in the view of Arnold (1880) and Marcuse (1977) - constitutes the raison d’être of fine art. It is an opposition which, according to McLuhan (1964), arises so vehemently because fine artists perceive the contradiction so clearly - ‘precisely because fine artists are experts in depth-perception’.

In contrast to the designer, the fine artist typically affronts Prosaic Man with his or her work. Far from seeking to woo the politician, the business person and the person in the street, the fine artist will often seek to insult them. How could fine art hope to win out over design in any head-to-head contest for which Prosaic Man is the judge? For it is the ordinary citizen who is increasingly determining the actual content of school curriculum. According to Wildavsky (1970), this is a principle and a function which must be rigorously exercised:

The ability of ordinary citizens to appraise whether they are getting what they want (in education) is of critical importance in a system of democratic government. (p.212).

In an age of accountability, then, design measures up, fine art does not.
However, can one seriously claim that the unique propensity of human beings to make meaningful images of themselves and their world - a propensity which has been abundantly demonstrated for virtually as many millennia as man has been treading the earth - has been a misguided, irrelevant, useless and socially-undesirable preoccupation after all? And is it also true that only now are we, with the gift of scientific evaluation, able to make such a judgement?

Of course such a claim is nonsense. Yet the ultimate logic of both the design ideology and the accountability movement would seem to lead to the conclusion that fine art, at least as it has existed this century, is a social misfit.

The picture so far has portrayed fine art - despite its promotion by some as the sole means of realising an aesthetically healthy society - as being under serious attack from both the world of design and forces of accountability. Two general paths have been taken by those who would seek to make art education more accountable to the 'consumers' of educational 'products.'

The mainly British direction has been to address the content of art curriculum, substituting a mainly design orientation for a largely fine art one. American accountability systems, on the other hand, have focussed more upon methodology, with traditional fine art content continuing to be pursued, but now in ways geared to the purportedly-objective measurement of student performance.
The British model reflects a concern to make art education more meaningful, more relevant, more accessible, and hence more accountable to all social groups. Here the radical revision of curriculum content is an apparent manifestation of the educational objective of equality of outcomes. This objective largely derives from conception of traditional curriculum as a selection of knowledge from high culture only and thereby strongly favouring children who already belong to that culture. Therefore, the rationale goes, in order to attain the objective of educational equality, the actual content of the curriculum should be rendered free of cultural specificity. Rather, the content of curriculum should be culturally neutral.

If a curriculum is to be culturally neutral, the knowledge which it contains would have to be essentially objective in character. And since the discipline of science is considered the epitome of cultural neutrality and objectivity, then the more seemingly scientific the content and methodology of a curriculum the better. In this way, the more seemingly scientific a curriculum, the more it could realise the objective of equality of outcomes and thus the objective of educational equality in general.

It is paradoxical that whilst science is regarded as the supreme repository for all that is objective and rational, notions such as 'equality of outcomes' and 'educational equality' are clear expressions of the subjective—the antithesis of science in the popular consciousness. Nevertheless, the content and, particularly, the methodology of design are far more akin to the scientific mode than is
the case with fine art. Thus it is perceived that design, as the content of Art curriculum, may contribute to achieving the objective of equal educational outcomes. For design itself is perceived as being culturally neutral. It is seen to neither alienate nor to confer advantage on any particular social group. It is therefore easily assumed that design constitutes objective knowledge, and this identifies it with science. Of greatest significance, however, is the fact that both design and science share a common relation: technology.
From its earliest days, art in British general education has been linked with technology - in other words, with the needs of industry. Efland (1982) explains that the sole objective of art education in the early nineteenth century was to socialise youth into a system of industrial education. Common school art was a response to the Industrial Revolution. (p.150).

The revolutionary new means of production in the last century - the division of labour and the creation of the factory - led to the demise of craftsman - training in design of the organic kind, which was inherent in the old tradition of workshop production.

Common-school art was an attempt to redress this loss, and to ultimately realise an improvement in the design of British manufactures. Thus in its statement on the National Art Training School, 'The Year's Art' of 1880 notes,

'The courses of instruction have for their object the systematic training of teachers, male and female, in the practice of Art and in the knowledge of its scientific principles,...(making them) competent to develop the application of Art to the common uses of life and to the requirements of trade and manufactures. (p.92).

And fifty-four years later, the 1934 edition, under the heading of
'Industry’s Need of Art', proclaimed,

'Vieux jeu!' the hardened cynic may exclaim, but at last the time has come when the British manufacturer has been forced to realise that, without the arts and crafts as his allies, he cannot compete any longer in the world’s markets. (The Year's Art, 1934, p.1)

When, therefore, the call goes up in Britain today for 'Art for Society’s Sake' it is the revival of an old theme. It is, in fact, a call to return Art in general education to the province of that industrial purpose which spawned it. Design thus possesses traditional cultural legitimacy as the content of curricula for Art in British schools. The same justification does not apply to Australian art education, which nevertheless, however, continues to be strongly influenced by British developments.

In British art education, design and fine art have historically co-existed in varying degrees of amicability at different times. The very union of the two has often constituted one of the most distinguishing features of art education in Britain. Edward Strange, in an article entitled 'Applied Art in 1899' (in The Year’s Art 1900) provides an insight into such an amicable relationship, referring to

...the enlarged recognition given to what may be called the finer handicrafts, by that very conservative institution, The Royal Academy (of Art). The enamels exhibited in 1899... were both interesting and important; and although Professor Herkomer’s large shield

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was not equal to the achievements of (others),
...the mere fact that a painter of his position
has thought it worth while to devote his attention
to the art is at least of considerable
significance.
(p.11)

The 30th Annual Report (1883) of the Science and Art Department of the
Committee of Council on Education, in outlining details of projected
expenditure for 1884, also linked fine art and design in its
deliberations and decisions:

The object of the vote for the Department is
to promote instruction in Drawing, Painting
and Modelling, and Designing for Architecture,
Manufactures, and Decorations, especially
among the industrial classes.
(The Year's Art, 1884, p.97)

And further on, the Report states,

The ramifications into which the Art
Department has spread in the thirty years
of its existence are divided into

1. The aid given towards the promotion of
instruction in Elementary Drawing as a
part of National Education, and in Fine
Art as applied to industry. (etc., etc.)
(p.99)

The historical unity between fine art and design in Britain is further
indicated by a survey of various fields in which students were able to
submit works in the National Competition of Schools of Art, 1883.
This competition offered prizes in
With ever-developing industrialisation, and with all the social implications attendant to it, the traditional union between fine art and design in art education has progressively diminished. Continuing close ties were, however, earlier perceived. For example, in 1918 the British Institute of Industrial Art was founded, a body which had as its object,

...raising and maintaining the standard of design and workmanship of works and of industrial art produced by British designers, craftsmen, and manufacturers, and of stimulating the demand for such work as reach a high standard of excellence.

The Institute will be incorporated under the joint auspices of the Board of Trade as the Department dealing with industry, and the Board of Education as the authority controlling the Victoria and Albert Museum...

(The Year's Art, 1919, p.49)
This Institute was itself subsequently followed, in 1933, by the Council for Art and Industry, which was

...representative of artists, designers, manufacturers, distributors, and interested Government departments..., formed in order to discover and develop the best designing talent, and induce industry to make use of it; and to examine the best methods of industrial art education in relation to mechanical and mass production.
(The Year's Art, 1934, p.1)

The conception in the nineteenth century of the role of art in education as one necessarily aligned to the purely utilitarian ends of industry was also a common theme across the Atlantic. A U.S. Bureau of Education Bulletin of 1874 stated:

In addition to the increased competition
arising from the steam-carriage, new and cheaper methods of manufacture, and increased productiveness, another element of value has radically pervaded all manufacturers, an element in which the United States has been and is woefully deficient - the art element. The element of beauty is found to have pecuniary as well as aesthetic value...The end sought (of the teaching of drawing in the public schools) is not to enable the scholar to draw a pretty picture, but to so train the hand and eye that he may be better fitted to become a bread-winner. (in Eisner & Ecker, 1966, p.12)

As Eisner and Ecker note,

...the justification for art as a subject to be taught in the school - especially in the industrial states in New England - was that it was necessary for the development and prosperity of American industry. (1966, p.13).
To this end, the Massachusetts authorities established a new educational priority — instruction in drawing — and in 1871 appointed Walter Smith, who formerly taught Industrial Drawing and Crafts at the South Kensington School (now the Royal College of Art), to a range of new posts: Director of Art for the State of Massachusetts, Supervisor of Art for the City of Boston and principal of the Art Normal School (a school for the training of art teachers).

Clarke, writing in 1885 (cited in Efland, 1983), described the impact of Smith thus:

In the coming of Professor Smith, the hour and the man happily met. The successful results of the efforts in Great Britain to improve the manufactures of that country by the definite training of large numbers of youth in drawing, which had been going on for some twenty years, was known to many citizens of Boston and its vicinity. The inferiority in artistic qualities of the products of the manufactories of New England at that time, was painfully apparent.

(Clarke, 1885, p.3 in Efland, 1983, p.156)

According to Efland:

...Smith laboured for industrial drawing, and not for the dreams of a beautiful and democratic art for a free people.

(1983, p.156)

Dewey had yet to make his mark on American education. In his essay, 'The Nature of Freedom' (1938), Dewey related the system of traditional education to that of mass industrialism. He described the 'enforced quiet and acquiescence' in the class-rooms of the traditional schools,
conditions which 'prevent pupils from disclosing their real natures.' He went on,

They (the schools) enforce artificial uniformity. They put seeming before being. They place a premium upon preserving the outward appearance of attention, decorum and obedience... Mechanical uniformity of studies and methods creates a kind of uniform immobility and this reacts to perpetuate uniformity...
(1938, p.62)

Within the U.S. traditional school of the nineteenth century, as in Britain, the nature of disciplines - or the content of curriculum - had to be reconciled with the nature, method and principles of schooling, the essential mission of which was to condition individuals for an industrial system.

It is a mission which present-day crusaders of accountability have revived.
The difficulty of publicly (that is, verbally) accounting for fine art in large part arises from the obtuse, oblique (that is non-verbal) nature of the meanings made within its various forms. Yet it is precisely this obtuseness and obliqueness which constitute the nature of meanings in fine art. Artistic meanings are often described as metaphoric meanings because it is considered that they allude to rather than specify. Such a view, however, implicitly places verbal meanings and linguistic knowledge in the position of pre-eminence; that is, as the knowledge against which other forms of knowledge are identified and defined. Artistic meanings may be described as metaphorical, but only in terms of linguistic knowledge. Artistic meanings are not metaphors of verbal meanings. Artistic meanings are meanings which are complete in themselves, in terms of art. It is not a painting which constitutes the metaphor of verbal meanings which may be put forward in order to interpret it, but rather it is the verbal interpretation which constitutes the metaphor of the artistic meaning. Nevertheless, the concept of the metaphor is an extremely useful one in the probing of meanings in art.

The great Rembrandt self-portraits are collectively more than a mere visual record of an artist’s physical appearance at various stages during his life-time. It is something of a cliché to state that these portraits - like Shakespeare’s immortal characters - are statements about humanity in general. They are about the universal human condition. Their significance lies in the capacity of their content
to transcend the immediate, the specific and the easily-grasped. It is perhaps a spectator's comprehension - tacit or overt - of their symbolic meanings - meanings with which he or she may be able to identify - which generates an aesthetic response. That is, the discovery of meaning in art could itself provide and constitute an aesthetic experience.

Here fine art may be seen to differ from design, for the aesthetic element in, say, an ordinary kitchen chair may be said to derive not from the discovery of some complex subtle meaning which is latent in the chair itself - its meaning is probably simple and straightforward - but from the chair's physical or formal properties: the colours and textures of material, its craftsmanship and finish, its shape and practical efficiency, and so on.

The nature of aesthetic response itself in respect of fine art may thus fundamentally differ from that pertaining to design. Fine art, it may be claimed, is concerned with the discovery, expression and communication of meanings; design with the beauty and functional efficiency of objects. The two fields may, therefore, embody fundamentally different criteria and focus on fundamentally different visual factors in determining what constitutes significant visual form in each. It may be, therefore, that each employs a particular way of thinking which fundamentally differs from that utilized by the other. Fine art and design, in other words, may each possess its own distinctive cognitive style.
Witkin et al (1977) describe the nature of cognitive style as

...a broad dimension of individual differences that extends across both perceptual and intellectual activities. Because what is at issue is the characteristic approach the person brings with him to a wide range of situations, we call it his 'style'—and because the approach encompasses both his perceptual and intellectual activities—we speak of it as his 'cognitive style.' (in Zimmerman, 1983, p.19)

Whilst much of the work in the area of cognitive style has, according to Zimmerman (1983), been concerned with so-called field-independency-dependency perceptual dispositions of individuals, other studies have been concerned with the question as to whether cognitive style is an innate or a learned characteristic. According to McFee (1957, 1970), cognitive style is a learned disposition—a product of socialization. This view differs from that offered by Lowenfeld (1964), whose theory that cognitive style is innate or constitutional has continued to provide a basis for art education theory in many educational settings today.

That cognitive style should be accorded sociological explanations, as distinct from purely psychological ones, is of relevance to the issue of fine art and design as fundamentally different ways of knowing. For as previous discussion would suggest, the fine art—versus—design
conflict is a largely ideological struggle. Sociological accounts of cognitive style explain depth of internalisation and reification of essentially normative perceptual and conceptual operations. Cognitive style acts as a conceptual framework, even as a conceptual screen determining how and what phenomena are perceived and interpreted by the individual.

Witkin et al (1977) explain that cognitive styles are

...concerned with form rather than the content of cognitive activity. They refer to individual differences in how we perceive, think, solve problems, learn, relate to others etc. The definition of cognitive styles is thus cast in process terms...
(p.15, in Zimmerman, 1983, p.20)

If cognitive style is related to ideology, then it is related to an individual’s or a culture’s set of values. Such values largely determine how the environment is actually perceived.

It may be considered, then, that any differences in the respective cognitive styles of the fine artist and the designer in contemporary culture are, despite the apparent depth of the differences, nevertheless normative products of the different normative worlds within which the fine artist and the designer respectively function.
Could it not also be claimed, however, that at the heart of the matter - where individuals are engaged in the development and the production of tangible works - the creative process engaged in by both designer and fine artist are virtually identical?

According to Suzanne Langer (1953) art is, at bottom, concerned with the import of visual form.

Could not this definition embrace both fine art and design?

Historical examples suggest that the two fields have not only managed to harmoniously co-exist in other cultures in place and time, but have been able to do so to a degree which has blurred any distinctions between them.

The fifth-century B.C. Chinese cross-bow support (fig.1.) is an example of this apparent unity between fine art and design. This object was obviously intended to perform a practical task, a task requiring considerable precision on the part of its user. Its purpose was to support the cross-bow and at the same time provide a target-sight for the archer using it. As a 'design brief' such exacting requirements for an article to be used in an important activity demanding the highest precision would seem to be demanding also a product conceived in the most severely utilitarian form.
FIGURE 1.

Yet the cross-bow support itself has been conceived in much broader terms, for in addition to adhering to the article’s functional requirements, its maker has also fashioned the object as an expressive image. It has been made into the form of a striking serpent.

In fact, the contemporary Western observer may regard the object primarily as a fine art (expressive) object, as distinct from a design (utilitarian) object. Such a view would not be surprising, for it would be encouraged by such factors as the context for viewing the object (not in action, as it were, but lying mute in a display case in a Western Art gallery); the contemporary Westerner’s passivity toward, or ignorance of the nature of the activity for which the object was intended (its function); and his or her association of the object’s form with modern Western aesthetic principles in sculpture, which it happens to evoke. Thus the contemporary Western viewer may perceive the cross-bow support not as a functional object at all, but interpret and evaluate it essentially as a non-utilitarian sculptural form intended to appeal exclusively on a sensual level, in the way that contemporary abstract sculpture of the West is addressed.

Surely this interpretation is, however, valid. It can be seen that the object’s maker has paid considerable attention to its elegance and grace: its ‘pure’ form. The incorporation within this utilitarian article of the stylised body and head of a serpent constitutes a most harmonious marriage of expressive content with functional design and pure aesthetic form. In addition, the piece has been embellished with surface decoration which enhances the curvilinear lines of the
form, and the flowing linear carved recesses have in turn been inlaid with silver, which further enhances its aesthetic appeal.

In the light of these apparent artistic intentions on the part of its maker, it does not seem unreasonable to regard the cross-bow support as a work of art rather than as a thing of utility. Diverse cultures the world over, often ignorant of the very existence of others, have yet demonstrated an identical inclination and propensity for bestowing mundane items of daily use with completely non-utilitarian decorative qualities and symbolic meanings, which we would call artistic.

Does this apparent universal tendency reveal a natural disposition - even an instinct - in human beings for artistic representation?

Dissanayake (1982, p.398) maintains that this is so:

There are...behaviours that seem unique to the human species. Among these is art. No human society has been discovered that does not display some examples of what we, in the modern West, are accustomed to call 'art'. It is worth investigating whether we can identify a universal 'behaviour of art' and, if we can, attempting to determine what its selective value has been in human evolution...One may argue...that regarding art as a fundamental manifestation of human nature with its roots in biological processes is not to reduce it to these roots, or to denigrate it, but rather to better appreciate its essential value.

(p.398)

Peter Fuller (1983) describes the work in the field of psychoanalysis of Donald Winnicott also as support for the
claim that the artistic disposition is a universal biological trait in humans.

According to Fuller, Winnicott based his theory of the universal disposition for the arts (and for other universal human dispositions) upon the particular unique nature of the mother-child relationship which exists within humans, as opposed to other animal species.

Conceiving of the simultaneous condition of ‘absolute independence and absolute dependence’ (in Fuller, p.237) of the human infant in relation to the mother, Winnicott described

...the way in which this primary state changes to one in which objective perception is possible for the individual. (p.237)

Here Winnicott saw the early development of the growing infant not in terms of a ‘one-body relationship’ becoming a ‘two-body object relationship’, but conceived instead that

...the unit is not the individual, the unit is an environment-individual set-up... (in which) the shell becomes gradually taken over and the kernel... can begin to be an individual. (in Fuller, p.237)

In this process of development, so-called ‘transitional objects’ and ‘transitional phenomena’ play a critical role,
occupying what Winnicott described as

...the third part of the life of a human being, a part that we cannot ignore: an intermediate area of experiencing, to which inner reality and external life both contribute. (in Fuller, p.238)

Proceeding from first contacts with external reality through 'moments of illusion' which the mother provides - for example, when the mother offers her breast at exactly the moment when the child wants it - the infant, according to Winnicott,

...acquires the illusion that there is an external reality that corresponds to his capacity to create. (in Fuller, p.238)

'Illusion' he defined as

...a bit of experience which the infant can take as either his hallucination or a thing belonging to external reality. (in Fuller, p.238)

Thus in the process of separation between infant and mother, transitional objects, transitional phenomena and the domain of illusion together constitute the means of acting within a 'potential space' which Winnicott saw as the 'arena of creative play' (p.239), itself a transitional phenomenon, and

...always on the theoretical line between the subjective and that which is objectively perceived. (in Fuller, p.239)
In this statement, Winnicott could be offering a definition of the artistic process; and indeed, according to Fuller (1983),

He (Winnicott) pointed out that the task of reality acceptance is never completed: 'no human being is free from the strain of relating inner and outer reality'. The relief from this strain, he maintained, is provided by the continuance of an intermediate area, which is not challenged.

(p.239)

Thus Winnicott wrote,

This intermediate area is in direct continuity with the play area of the small child who is 'lost' in play...(and is retained)...in the intense experiencing that belongs to the arts and to religion and to imaginative living, and to creative scientific work.

(in Fuller, 1983, p.240)

Winnicott pointed to the significance of 'transitional objects' for young children which, for them, occupy this 'intermediate area': things such as rags, blankets, cloths and teddy bears, to which children become particularly attached and which thus assume particular psychological importance.

Such things have a physical presence and a concrete identity which, however, to outsiders may constitute a merely bland existence; but their potential meaning for an individual child can be quite the antithesis of blandness. Indeed these objects can assume a virtual life-of-their-own
in the child's mind which can result in such objects transcending their mundane concrete existence and their bland utilitarian purposes and becoming instead something 'special'. Nor is this inclination lost with the passing of childhood.

In the same way, even objects of the most everyday utilitarian kind can have their meanings extended by adults such that these objects too can assume an infinitely more complex reality than one concerned with mere utility. Thus objects are described as status symbols or as possessing sentimental value. As such, they might serve as important transitional objects occupying the 'potential space' in the human psyche identified by Winnicott.

Thus the question as to whether the Chinese cross-bow support is a design object or a fine art object may itself be considered a spurious question.

Winnicott's ideas encourage an expanded concept as to what might constitute function in respect of man-made objects. Surely his ideas admit the notion of psychological as well as practical function. It is possible that such an expanded concept of function may be a basis for removing the distinction between fine art and design since both fields could be seen to be fulfilling particular
functions.

In respect of the Chinese cross-bow support, then, it could be suggested that the practical need for the object itself provided a context and an opportunity not only for its maker to exemplify and demonstrate human ingenuity in the making of tools - in this case, a serviceable weapon - but also it enabled him to indulge in another human behaviour: the making of art. In the object's creation, a completely unified, or singular cognitive style, therefore, has been brought to bear. The object testifies to the existence of unity between the human dispositions for design and for art-making which have been carried forward as one way of thinking and one way of realising, resulting in a concrete form which signifies and embodies the union.

Dissanayake (1982) conceives that what counts as art is simply any man-made object which is in some way rendered 'special':

If there is such a thing as a 'behaviour of art' we must assume that it developed in human evolution from an ability or proclivity that our pre-palaeolithic ancestors could have shown. I should like to suggest that this root proclivity is the ability to recognise or confer 'specialness', a level or order different from the everyday. ....In our ethological view, artistic behaviour shapes and/or embellishes everyday reality with the intention of constructing or manifesting (or recognizing) what is considered to be another level from quotidian practical life.

(p.401)
Kubler (1962) alludes to the same conception. To him, objects of art are simply any man-made 'things' which have been conferred with this quality of specialness. He states,

"Within the history of things we find the history of art. More than tools, works of art resemble a system of symbolic communication." (p.61).

Kubler's idea, then, is that objects assume the status of art when, in addition to any practical utility they may possess, they also possess the capacity to communicate something in symbolic form and as symbolic forms. Therefore, it would be their capacity for symbolic communication which constituted the 'specialness' of objects thus designated as art.

On this basis the Chinese cross-bow support could be more than a tool: it would also be a form of symbolic communication. What, however, could be the nature of this latter meaning? What might the object actually be communicating by symbolic means?

In responding to these questions, one could adopt an ethnographic perspective, within which at least two approaches could yield satisfactory answers. First one may take a contextual approach, in which the actual role of
archery and of warfare in general would be examined within the context of the culture in which the weapon was produced. Thus the object may be conceived in terms of Tainis' (1864) pioneering sociological criteria for the evaluation of the art of different cultures: that is, in terms of 'the race, the surroundings and the epoch (race, milieu, moment...)' (in Beardsley, p. 291) which produced it.

The second approach may be described as an aesthetic approach. It would be based on knowledge and 'feeling'. It would derive from knowledge of the nature of archery and consequent contemplation of its 'essence'. Using this approach one may consider the feelings and sensations of shooting arrows, of hitting targets (particularly live targets); one may imagine noble warriors engaged in battles designated as noble conflicts. One may then consider the extent to which such imaginative conceptions are somehow embodied within and represented by the physical form of the cross-bow support itself.

This ethnographic or anthropological perspective has far-reaching implications for determining what might count as art not only in respect of artefacts of other cultures but in respect of our own. As such, it has implications for what might count as Art in our schools.

Kaeppler (1976, in Chalmers, 1983) describes the nature of
other cultures.

In addition, however, the dominant values of consumerism which provide the motivation and context for much of this everyday bombardment also tend to impose themselves upon our very judgements of the meanings and values of images and forms. That is, the disciplined consumer regards things in terms of their potential value for himself. (An example familiar to art teachers is the judgement of a child's art by a parent based solely on its potential as interior decor for the family home.)

Rapid change in trend and in its obvious corollary - rapid obsolescence - are institutionalised as inherent structural necessities of a consumer society. Hence the values and attitudes attendant to such principles have become internalised such that they must be seen as constituting a dominant cognitive style, one which allows an easy and rapid classification of artefacts into 'meaningful' or 'meaningless' purely in terms of their perceived material value to the individual consumer. The criteria employed for making such judgements are entirely the criteria of self-gratification.

Thus an artefact from another culture (such as a Chinese cross-bow support) might appeal to a Western consumer on the basis of its current fashionability and status in
this anthropological perspective on art:

"The anthropological study of art is essentially an analysis of cultural forms and the social processes which produce them according to the aesthetic precepts of a specific group of people at a specific point in time. Discovering the structure and content of such forms, processes and philosophies from the indigenous point of view is pre-eminently an ethnographic task.

(p.21)

It is therefore an anthropological imperative that cultural artefacts be considered on the basis of their meanings for the cultures which have produced them. It is in marked contrast to those theories of Art which assume the universalism of aesthetic values.

The anthropological or ethnographic approach may not only enable art educators to come to terms with what might count as Art for, say, adolescents in high schools. Ethnography might also constitute a method to be employed by the same adolescents in studying Art themselves - particularly the art of other cultures. Perhaps the constant bombardment of visual images and the plethora of material objects which we encounter in our daily lives as a result of revolutionary means of reproduction and mass production have numbed our minds and our senses to the potential 'specialness' of some of these images and objects. Perhaps we are thus content to remain ignorant of any special meanings which reside not only in images and objects from our own, but also from
relation to the consumer's own social group. The appeal would not be necessarily due to the consumer's appreciation of any deeper indigenous or contextual meaning of the artefact.

Artefacts which possess no gratuitous value for the spectator - as - consumer are considered merely useless. This poses a dilemma for fine art, for within the fine art tradition, criteria for determining the quality of a work often reside in valuations of the subtlety, the complexity, the mystery, the ambiguity, the obliqueness of possible meanings, and with reconciling often literally 'shocking' formal means with consideration of the validity of the artistic intent. Indeed, the 'uselessness' of fine art has been hailed by some as one of its virtues. Oscar Wilde (1891), for example, wrote,

The only beautiful things, as somebody once said, are the things that do not concern us. As long as a thing is useful or necessary to us, or affects us in any way either for pain or for pleasure, or appeals strongly to our sympathies or is a vital part of the environment in which we live, it is outside the proper sphere of art. (in Ellman, 1982, p.299)

To the disciplined consumer of today, however, the intrinsic meanings of such artefacts of other cultures as Australian aboriginal cave paintings, Japanese rock gardens, Sikh turbans, Hindu dances, Sepik River sculptures, and even Chinese cross-bow supports would be missed.
Thus even though the cross-bow support may appeal to a Western consumer as a beautiful object in a decorative sense, its ethnographic significance may be completely missed.

Lasher, Carroll and Bever (1983) note that archery occupied an exalted position in fifth century Chinese culture. Indeed, with Zen Buddhism as the basis of the Chinese philosophical tradition, archery was regarded as an art form in its own right.

Thus the realm into which the idea of archery was projected in the popular consciousness of its day was one residing beyond ordinary experience. And within this Chinese philosophical tradition, art - including archery - was seen as

a discipline that can be studied and perfected.
- (and as)...a potential path toward a fuller understanding of what is true.
(Lasher et al, 1983. p.197)

Within this scenario, the 'specialness' of the cross-bow support - in other words, its existence as an art object - may be more fully appreciated. Whether it should be deemed a design object or a fine art object would now seem problematic. Some would suggest that the question of any such distinction was irrelevant. It leads one to consider whether the categorisations of design and fine art are valid after all.
Other cultures abound with countless similar examples of the organic unity between what we have learned to separately dub design and fine art. Surely, it would seem, there thus exists, on the basis of an anthropological conception of art, sufficient evidence to show that the contemporary division in Western society and art education between fine art and design is a false dichotomy.
THE SIGNIFICANCE FOR ART OF CHANGING MEANS OF PRODUCTION

To conclude that a division between fine art and design is a false dichotomy, however, fails to account for the revolutionary cultural impact - the impact on traditional cultural forms and structures - of changing means of production within a society.

Such changes which have occurred over the past two hundred years in Western society have had far greater impact upon people than simply providing them with cheaper, more varied products in greater abundance. According to the Marxist view, the means of production determine the nature of social relations. If this view is accepted, it would have to be conceived also that the massive changes which have occurred in respect of production would have brought about similarly massive reorientations (and disorientations) in the entire social structure, determining not only how people function at their place of work but how they live their whole lives.

Because of the nature of modern production, people have become alienated from the products of their own labour. In accord with the demands of progressively more refined techniques in mass production, work has progressively become more highly specialised. Each phase of the production process is separated from the others. Each phase becomes a virtual world in itself. Indeed (as in the case of motor vehicle manufacture for example), separate components for a single product may be manufactured on opposite sides of the globe.
As well as removing the individual worker from the final fruits of his or her labour, this state of affairs has brought about one's acceptance of ignorance in respect of matters which nevertheless shape one's own destiny. But industrial man has not looked to God to fill this void of ignorance, as his ancestors may have done. Faith is instead vested in the specialist, the expert here on earth.

A complex society's total achievement tends to be measured as the sum of the individual achievements of its various experts. A society as a whole may well present a rounded picture of itself and its achievements, but this rounded, 'civilized' conception would not simply constitute a projection of the lives of its individual members. Their social existence would, more likely, be characterised by alienation, narrowness in outlook, limited skills and high dependency on experts for life-sustenance.

Hence the ethos of specialisation - specialisation as a value in itself - is implanted within the 'conscience collective', becoming, for example, an educational principle and a doctrine for determining the nature and structure of cultural forms: for example the arts.

Accompanying the increasing specialisation in a field is a narrowing world-view which serves to further radicalise the insularity of the specialisation. Nineteenth century Romanticism, promoting the doctrine of Art for Art's Sake, constituted an example of this phenomenon. This was a philosophy (as will be seen) which arose out of (albeit as a reaction to) the changing means of production in the
nineteenth century.

The example of the fifth century Chinese cross-bow support has been put forward as support for the concept of unity, of fundamental 'oneness' between fine art and design. This example should now be examined in the light of the concept of changing means of production and their radical effect on traditional cultural forms.

The cross-bow support has been described as both a fine art object and a design object. It could be stated, therefore, that the object has been fashioned out of the integrated skills of the sculptor and the tool-maker (or weapon-maker), both sets of skills being possessed and practised, however, by a single individual and employed concurrently in the making of the object.

This traditional situation is in marked contrast to the relationship which exists between the world of sculpture and the world of tool-making today. To some, sculpture is seen to be fulfilling esoteric human needs, while tool-making is considered to be serving decidedly utilitarian ends. Out of this obvious contrast in their perceived purposes and in keeping with the principle of the division of labour in contemporary society, two totally separate, mutually-alien worlds exist - one for the sculptor and one for the tool-maker. And since they are now separate, the differences between the two are possibly irreconcilable. For caught up in the dominant ethos of ever-more-narrow specialisation, the sculptor on the one hand and the tool-maker on the other tend to become progressively more estranged one
from the other. Thus whole worlds are built up by each, within which
- so as to fulfil the human needs for social solidarity and group
identity - internally perceived values and beliefs and internally
generated attitudes and behaviours are formed and become
institutionalised. Hence each world develops its own ideology, which
is to say that each becomes virtually irremediably separated from the
other.

Thus the fact that knowledge of sculpture and knowledge of tool-
making may, in another time and place, have been brought together by a
single artesan in the production of a single product - the Chinese
cross-bow is an example - does not mean that a reunification of the
now quite distinct productive worlds of sculpture and toolmaking
would be a simple task, or even possible in the contemporary milieu.

Consequently, the fact that the designer and the fine artist may have
once functioned within, as it were, the mind and body of a single
individual should not be taken to mean that the two could so amenably
co-exist within the mind and body of the contemporary worker
thoroughly conditioned to the compartmentalised, highly-specialised
ways of modern means of production.

On this basis, to bring together design and fine art in a single art
curriculum is to bring together two different worlds. The resultant
clash of ideological values may render the overall art curriculum
incoherent.
A major factor emanating from changes in the means of production is the tendency for such changes to also bring about social class stratifications where these may not previously have existed. This strongly reinforces the mutually exclusive ideological intensities which distinguish the separate groups so formed. For if a production process is broken down into its numerous separate operations, it is quite likely that all the separate tasks would not require the same level of skills. Some tasks would be more difficult than others, and this is likely to mean that a greater demand would exist for the performance of the more difficult skills, leading to more extensive education for the potential practitioners of the more demanding skills, higher pay and thus higher social status for them.

Where the division of labour also splits the individuals involved in production into the two major categories of what may blandly be termed the 'brains' and the 'hands', the social class implications of the division of labour in modern manufacturing are clearly discernible.

Raymond Williams (1981) provides an example of this. Describing 'redistributions of role and authority within working professional companies', he gives the following account of changes he observed in one facet of the film and television industry:

The deepest changes came only with the development of the new productive technologies. They are most obvious in film and television. First, the new technology required a much more extensive professional specialization. Writers and actors, and then designers, were joined by cameramen, sound recordists, editors, and a whole range of people with ancillary skills.
At the simplest technical level, the role of a co-ordinating director became almost inevitable. But then, second, there was a further division of labour, in the installation, maintenance and some forms of operation of the technology itself: electricians, carpenters, logistical staff. These can be said to represent only a development from earlier kinds of craft support, but the general situation was qualitatively new, in that work in this area became indispensable, in the advanced technologies, even though there could still be doubt whether such workers were truly part of the cultural production. It is here that class lines became drawn, often with continuing argument about jobs at or near the point of division. (pp 114-115).

The impact upon art of changes in society's dominant means of production has been considerable. Every major development has forced artists and aestheticians to evaluate the continued purposes of particular artistic activities and to probe anew questions as to the essential nature of art and art-making.

The history of art abounds with instances where technological advances have been wholeheartedly embraced by artists, culminating not only in the utilisation of new artistic techniques and new art products, but - at a deeper level - they have led also to the establishment of new aesthetic values and whole new theories as to what constitutes art. Thus the development of printmaking processes has modified the aura of the one-off original as a crucial qualification for a work of art. The invention of photography stripped painting of the utilitarian necessity of representational skills, whereas four centuries earlier the invention of oil paint had led to the institutionalisation of these techniques as aesthetic values. The computer has further
removed from artistic production the necessity of many such skills, and images produced by the computer now comprise an accepted and (inevitably) a growing niche in the World of Art. And surely film is able to realise, in infinitely more complex, comprehensive ways, all that the narrative painter of the past sought to portray even in his episodic images (such as Giotto's Arena Chapel frescoes depicting the life of Christ).

It is interesting to note that in each instance reported above a common principle is apparent. All of the relatively new productive forms mentioned contain at their core the principle of reproducibility. They also all lend themselves (some more than others) to physical detachment of the 'creator' from production itself.

Two fundamental inter-related tenets of modern means of production are thus reflected by these examples in art: the reproduction of products and the division of labour.

As in virtually all spheres of human affairs, however, the World of Art comprises not only individuals eager to grasp new techniques and challenge existing aesthetic norms. There are also those who would staunchly defend the traditional ways and means, the traditional beliefs and values in the face of imminent change. And being polarised by the enormity of the perceived threat, these traditionalists tend to assume highly radical positions in defence of the status quo.
In the nineteenth century, it was the Romantic poets and artists who, confronted with the relentless march of industrialism and the new productive realities, escaped to and saturated themselves in an alternative spiritual world of their own making. They built a defence around Art by proclaiming that it (Art) could only derive from this spiritual inner world of the artist and be given form by the inspired vision of the artist himself. Thus it would be an impossibility for a machine-made product to ever assume the status of Art. The practical, utilitarian mind - the whole ideology of the new product 'designer' - was clearly anathema to the Romantic disposition. It is at this historical point that the current dichotomy of fine art and design took root.

Goethe (1831), in lauding the virtual divinity of Mozart, also inferred the abject mundanity of the new productive means of the day:

> How can one say, Mozart has composed Don Juan! Composition! As if it were a piece of cake or biscuit, which had been stirred together out of eggs, flour, and sugar! It is a spiritual creation, in which the details, as well as the whole, are pervaded by one spirit, and by the breath of one life; so that the producer did not make experiments, and patch together, and follow his own caprice, but was altogether in the power of the daemonic spirit of his genius, and acted according to his orders.

(in Beardsley, 1966, p.260)

Beardsley (1966) further relates how, in more direct vein, Schlegel also sought to distinguish between artistic creation and mechanical production. According to Beardsley, Schlegel
...had explicitly contrasted the form of a work of art with 'mechanical form'—the former 'unfolds itself from within', but the latter 'is implanted to a material merely as an accidental addition without relation to its nature'.

(p.258).

The romantic conception held that since Art manifested itself by divine means and upon a higher plane, the artist himself therefore existed— and justifiably so—outside, or rather above the world of the ordinary affairs of 'lesser' mortals. To even conceive of a social role for the artist was considered a travesty of Art. The artist had nothing in common with the real world and, because of the sublime nature of Art, it was only proper that this be so. He was after all (as Goethe described him) 'God's anointed'; and art, according to Victor Hugo, 'is what God creates through the mind of man' (in Beardsley, 1966,p.262). As for the relationship between art and life, Oscar Wilde (1889), through one of his characters in a dramatic dialogue, proclaims

So far from being the creation of its time, it (art) is usually in direct opposition to it, and the only history that it preserves for us is the history of its own progress. In no case does it reproduce its age. To pass from the art of a time to the time itself is the great mistake that all historians commit.

....All bad art comes from returning to Life and Nature and elevating them into ideals... Life goes faster than Realism, but Romanticism is always in front of Life.

(in Ellmann, Ed., 1982, pp.319-320)
Here is the doctrine of Art for Art’s Sake. Arnold Hauser (1962) points to what he regards as an irony in this doctrine: that whilst serving as

the bulwark of art against the danger of being swallowed up by industrialized and mechanized life, (the idea of) ‘L’art pour l’art’ ... is, in fact, partly the expression of the division of labour which advances hand in hand with industrialization.

(p.19)

The Romantic movement thus represented an ironic, albeit unconscious manifestation of the very principles against which it pitted its forces.

At the other extreme to the Romantic doctrine, however, existed a powerful body of nineteenth century opinion which perceived and encouraged a positive contribution by art and the artist to industry and industrial society. The artist would, according to this ideal, work in concert with, rather than reject and work in opposition to the new society and its ever-evolving means of production. Hence the creation in the early nineteenth century of the National Art Training School (later to become the Royal College of Art) in London, established with the

...object (of) the systematic training of teachers...in the practice of Art and in the knowledge of its scientific principles, with a view to qualifying them as teachers..., competent to develop the application of Art to the common uses of life and to the requirements of trade and manufactures.

(The Year’s Art, 1880, p.92). (writer’s emphasis).
Ruskin struggled with questions as to the role and nature of art in the face of the new industrialization, and attempted to reconcile the romantic neo-theology in which his own aesthetic sensibilities were essentially rooted with his profound social conscience and keen awareness of the real world. Thus in 1870 he extolled a positive conception of the dichotomy and crisis in art which he so clearly perceived. The crisis Ruskin perceived was the same as that perceived by Fuller a century later. This was the crisis brought about by the conflict between ideologies which, respectively, saw the role of art as being necessarily 'collaborationist' and necessarily 'subversive' to the dominant ideology. Ruskin attempted to resolve the issue thus:

...the entire vitality of art depends upon its being either full of truth, or full of use; and that, however pleasant, wonderful or impressive it may be in itself, it must yet be of inferior kind, and tend to deeper inferiority, unless it has clearly one of these main objects, - either to state a true thing, or to adorn a serviceable one. (In Beardsley, 1966, p.304)

From an etymological perspective, Ruskin's statement is completely valid. 'Art' - from the Latin root 'Ars', meaning 'to make' - could literally be used to refer to anything which has been made. But to merely attribute etymological validity to Ruskin's statement reconciles little. For so mutually exclusive are the two separate functions of art as he defines them that one may think that he is not referring to one form of knowledge at all, but to two quite
distinct forms. If this should, in fact, be so, then whilst Ruskin's use of the word 'art' to describe both forms ('use' and 'truth') may be etymologically valid, by so employing the word in an all-encompassing fashion he strips it of workable precision, for the concept it contains may be felt to lack the specificity required in this debate.

In fact, so succinctly are the distinctions between the two forms identified and articulated by Ruskin that one could surmise that his statement serves more to sever the ties between the two forms than forge a unity. It is as if Ruskin, perplexed at the fracturing of human operations and of social relations which had once functioned in organic unison, yet perceived also the irreversibility of the new dichotomy's momentum brought about by the new means of production of his day. Regarded in this light, his statement represents, perhaps, the final gasp of a now-dead order of things.

What Ruskin and his like-minded contemporaries were perhaps most confronted (and affronted) by in respect of the new industrial advances of the day was mass-production itself. For when applied to the manufacture of objects, the creation of which had hitherto been the task of the artist-craftsman, mass-production not only revolutionaryised the scale of production, but in the process it destroyed a fundamental characteristic of art. It shattered the aura of the unique work. In so doing, it exposed a perhaps hidden ethos that the aura of the unique work was the most jealously
defended artistic canon of all.

For the unique work stood for the uniqueness, the individuality of the artist himself. To deny the uniqueness of a work was therefore to deny the individual spirit and identity of the artist — to deny that, to quote Victor Hugo, '...the poet is a priest' (in Beardsley, p.262).

The organic and spiritual unity of art and nature, as conceived by the Romantic artists, was corrupted by the mechanical reproduction of things. According to their doctrine, the affinity of works of art with nature was not merely manifest on the superficial level wherein, for example, an artist might choose a theme from nature for his work. Indeed, as Wilde asserted, to merely render scenes was not to engage in Art at all. Rather the union with Nature was manifest in the artist's aesthetic sensibilities and indeed in the very method of artistic production: that which Paul Klee was later to describe as 'organic creation' in art. Thus Coleridge described Shakespeare plays as possessing 'a vitality which grows and evolves itself from within' (in Beardsley, p.258).

Mechanisation, even if its products should at times take the outward forms of nature (as, for example in Victorian cast-iron ware), nevertheless represented to the Romantics the antithesis of Art at the most fundamental level. For it was a logical and physical impossibility, on the basis of the organic creation conception of the artistic process, for the machine to create.
Hence the products of the machine could never attain the status of Art.

And whilst the underlying laws governing organic creation were permanent, the outward manifestations of Nature's workings were infinitely varied, indeed never duplicated. Thus the concept of organic creation in Art reinforced another principle of Romanticism: that of the uniqueness of the artistic spirit embodied within the treasured individuality of the artist himself.

According to Beardsley (1966),

> What now became of the highest importance and interest was not so much the work itself as the man behind it. (p.251)

Together, the two principles - organic creation and the artist's individuality - realised and extolled the absolute uniqueness of the work as the supreme signification of its status as Art. It would therefore be impossible to create Art by any other means. It was this uniqueness - especially since it had sprung from 'within' - which gave the work of art its aura. Thus to remove the principle of uniqueness from a product would also be to destroy or deny an aura - the critical defining characteristic of the work of Art. This was precisely what mechanised reproduction accomplished. Its ramifications were significant not only in respect of traditional crafts, but in particular insofar as it affected the pictorial arts through the invention of the camera. As Walter Benjamin (1970)
states,

One might subsume the eliminated element (from the art object, by means of mechanical reproduction) in the term 'aura' and go on to say: that which withers in the age of mechanical reproduction is the aura of the work of art. This is a symptomatic process whose significance points beyond the realm of art. One might generalise by saying: the technique of reproduction detaches the reproduced object from the domain of tradition. By making many reproductions it substitutes a plurality of copies for a unique existence.

(p.220)

An additional factor, however, attends to the principle of uniqueness of the work of art: namely, that of ownership. The traditional concept of ownership of works of art was radically altered by mass-production. The reproduction of objects and images provided far greater access to pictures and to decorative and sculptural forms to all classes, in this way making artistic knowledge and the possession of art works more widely distributed than ever before.

It may be seen from this that advances in mechanical reproduction had both a causal and a deterministic relationship with the great social changes of the nineteenth century. In the words of Benjamin (1970),

...in permitting the reproduction to meet the beholder or listener in his own particular situation, it reactivates the object reproduced. These two processes (elimination of the aura and greater access) lead to a tremendous shattering of tradition.

(p.220)
Factors such as elimination of the aura of an artefact, ambivalence toward the capacity of the artefact to assert its maker's personality and the manufacture of artefacts for a vast public rather than for an exclusive elite are inherent principles of so-called design. Benjamin (1970) in the spirit of Marxist historical determinism alludes to the concept that deep sub-structural social changes are effected by changes in a society's super-structure: that is, the deeper changes occur out of revolutionary changes at the level of day-to-day affairs and social institutions - for example, those of material production. He states,

> During long periods of history, the mode of human sense perception changes with humanity's entire mode of material production. How human sense perception is organised, the medium in which it is accomplished, is determined not only by nature but by historical circumstances as well.... (Thus) if changes in the medium of contemporary perception can be comprehended as decay of the aura (of the work of art) it is possible to show its social causes.

(p.221)

This suggests that the incursion of the designer into the domain once exclusively occupied by the artist or craftsman constituted an historical, revolutionary, super-structural re-orientation which affected social relations in the visual arts and art epistemology itself in the nineteenth century.

The designer thus replaced the artist in giving the new art market what it wanted. The artist was now frequently identified by the general public as a social anachronism - an opinion hardly alleviated
by the Romantics’ own somewhat extravagant behaviour. Perhaps, therefore, design as an artistic enterprise had, in general terms, similarly rendered fine art largely redundant.

But changes in society’s means of production have not ceased. Perhaps the rate of change has even accelerated in recent years. Today, the computer is in the process of transforming society in perhaps more revolutionary ways than have all the great technological advances of the past two hundred years.

If design is a product and an integral part of society’s dominant means of production at any given time (Fuller’s definition of design as collaborationist in respect of a society’s dominant ideology suggests that this is so), it follows that as society’s dominant means of production would continue to evolve, so too would the nature of design and the activity of designing also evolve. This could mean that the field of design will become more and more removed from fine art in terms of the working mode itself of the designer in comparison to that of the fine artist.
Once, the roles of artist, architect and engineer - for projects even on the largest scale - overlapped and indeed were often fulfilled by the same person. The Gothic cathedral and the Hindu temple are examples of sculptural buildings which work. And in the Italian Renaissance, single personages such as Giotto, Michelangelo, Ghiberti, Bernini, Brunelleschi and Piero Della Francesca each spread his prodigious talents across such fields as art, architecture and engineering. Leonardo, of course, was the epitome of Renaissance Man: the supreme example of the unity which existed between virtually all the visual arts in pre-industrial European society.

Changes in the means of production brought about by, and which identified the Industrial Revolution, however, systematically developed higher and higher degrees of specialisation. Thus no longer was it the architect who necessarily designed a bridge - let alone the architect-who-was-also-a-painter. It was the engineer, with his specialised knowledge of new materials (in particular of pre-stressed steel) and associated structural principles (for example, cantilever construction), working within a cost-efficiency ethos which was itself a major determinant as well as a product of the nature of production in the nineteenth century, who became the creative champion of the age.

The American architect Louis Sullivan was later to be identified as the father of functional design, as much by the resonance of such
pronouncements as "Form follows function" and "The line of strength and the line of beauty are one" as by his buildings. But the ethos of functional design in the modern age was surely born with the new engineers of the nineteenth century.

Henry Bouch's Firth of Forth bridge (1873) (Fig. 2) stands as a pinnacle of achievement in nineteenth century engineering. Constructed almost entirely out of steel and utilizing the cantilever method of construction, this bridge is seen as a climactic symbol of the Industrial Revolution.

In other words, the bridge serves as a vehicle for symbolic communication, to use Kubler's term. Thus the Firth of Forth bridge would, according to the anthropological rationale, count as a work of art. To be sure, it would constitute a 'totem' (as defined by Durkheim), and by ethnographic criteria this alone would qualify the bridge as art.

From another perspective, however, this identification raises problems. The branch of knowledge known as aesthetics is concerned with the philosophy of art. Yet many of the artefacts deemed to be works of art according to ethnographic criteria would have been produced by individuals with little or no affiliation with, or knowledge of aesthetics as epistemology. Indeed, merely conferring the status of art onto artefacts may bear no relationship whatever with their makers' intentions. It would seem to be irrelevant, according to the anthropological rationale, as to whether the maker of
Railway Bridge, Firth of Forth, Scotland.
Designed by Henry Bouch. Opened 1873.

Figure 2.
an artefact subsequently designated as an art object possessed any knowledge of aesthetics at all. Thus the aesthetic principle of intentionality - 'Art is the artist's intention', as Rothenstein (1967) put it - would seem to be of little or no account to the anthropologist.

The paradox here is that whilst intentionality and knowledge of art and aesthetic theory on the part of the artist so conceived is regarded as insignificant from an anthropological point of view, those who would propose ethnographic criteria as the paradigm are themselves proposing an aesthetic theory. Perhaps ethnographers would claim to be the legitimate arbiters on the question as to what should count as art.

It may appear to be an epistemological problem if the products of engineers and engineering should be counted as art objects, even when, in most cases perhaps, no consideration or knowledge of aesthetics as a branch of knowledge had been brought to bear in the design and development of engineering products. Engineers are surely in the business of functional design, but the doctrine of functional design has been incorporated into the history of art and promoted as an aesthetic doctrine. Has this placed engineering within the realm of art? The influence of the Bauhaus is of particular significance in bringing about this situation. From its establishment by the architect Walter Gropius in Weimar in 1919 to its closure by Hitler in Berlin in 1932, the Bauhaus practised and promoted the ideal of union between the visual arts. Thus painters, architects, sculptors and product designers were inspired by the ideals of a common 'soul' and a
common positive social purpose, and were cognizant of common underlying principles and modes which they considered unified their respective specialisations and overall missions. Such common denominators (universal values) included the perceived importance in all specialisations of colour theory, structural logic, creative thinking, utilisation of new materials, and the reduction of the visual language to its basic visual elements (shape, line, texture etc.).

Such universal elements and principles were considered as relevant to functional design as they were to fine art, and Bauhaus painting masters Klee, Kandinsky, Feininger, Albers, Itten and others taught and personally practised in their own work at the time the aesthetics of pure form. They also developed a curriculum and teaching methodologies which were to form the underlying reductionist philosophy and practice of Basic Design/Foundation courses in British and Australian art schools of the 1960s and 1970s and which, in turn, have continued to influence the nature of art education in primary and secondary schools to the present day. This is of particular significance to the current debate in that inherent to this enduring methodology and philosophy is the notion that design and fine art represent a single indivisible unity in art education.

As previously discussed, other cultures in time and place have produced utilitarian objects which have also served as expressive images, thus indeed establishing a unity between what may be described as a design object and a fine art object. But the Bauhaus design
aesthetic was the aesthetic of functional design. It was, in fact, the aesthetic of the machine. Under this aesthetic there exists little room for the extra dimension of fine art.

The ramifications of belief in the ultimate artistic criterion of functional design need to be considered. It may be asked: At what stage, if any, do objects designed according to purely functional criteria cease to become objects of art? The rationale of functional design surely means that the more successfully an artefact fulfils its intended function, the greater is its aesthetic quality and hence the higher would be its standing as art.

By this criterion, however, one could propose that a simple nut and bolt are art objects because they perform their intended (combined) task so effectively and because their design is absolutely devoid of anything which is superfluous to this function. Logically, the functional design aesthetic would indeed qualify a nut and bolt as art, as it would also have to so qualify countless other manufactured items. How ironic this is when the intentions of the designers of such utilitarian articles could not, in most cases, have been further removed from artistic intent.

Another approach may be to investigate whether it is possible to draw a line between successful functional objects which count and others which do not count as art. Bouch's Firth of Forth bridge is frequently pictured and written about in art text books despite the fact that it was not conceived as an art object in any conventional
sense at all. If, however, despite this lack of artistic intention Bouch's bridge is yet regarded as a work of art and, presumably, Bouch himself therefore considered an artist, then the original nut and bolt, along with its designer, would surely have to be similarly regarded.

On this basis, the ABC TV programme 'The Inventors' could be regarded as an art competition. For the criteria used on this programme for evaluating the merits of the various inventions submitted by members of the public are essentially the criteria of functional design. And this claim may not be as far-fetched as it may at first seem. For on the one hand, the inventor adheres to the principles of functional design: to Louis Sullivan's aesthetic doctrine that 'the line of strength and the line of beauty are one'. As such, the works of the inventor may therefore be seen in an aesthetic light. Does this also mean that they would be seen as works of art? Kubler's thesis, based on the ethnographic imperative that 'the history of art may be located in the history of things' - in other words, that such things as everyday tools can yet serve as vehicles of symbolic communication - surely ascribes to the business of the inventor (and hence 'The Inventors' programme) the extra dimension of artistic activity.

There is yet another criterion by which the successful iron, tap, clothes-line, car-engine, umbrella or brassiere could all be justified as objects of art: the criterion of creativity. For firmly entrenched in the folk-lore as to what counts as art, what constitutes artistic behaviour and even who can be identified as possessing an artistic
personality is the concept of creativity. Creativity is popularly conceived as a dynamic, spontaneous capacity and energy especially evident in artists. Indeed art is regarded as the special repository of creativity. If creativity is also central to invention - as would seem to be the case - then by this criterion invention itself could indeed be seen as artistic activity.

Thus the invention (the design) of objects may, by various criteria, be construed as art activity - and 'The Inventors' programme could indeed be considered an art competition. In fact, it has transpired that some winners of prizes on this programme have subsequently been awarded the Duke of Edinburgh Award for Outstanding Design and the Australian Design Council's Good Design Awards for their inventions. If, as many (for example, Cornford and Petelin) would claim, art curriculum should consist of the study and practice of design, then a school Art department could quite legitimately incorporate 'The Inventors' programme as one of its central learning resources.

The sceptic may well scoff at such a proposal, pointing to what may be considered, on the one hand, to be the trivial or banal nature of many inventions. However, to judge the field today denies history its critical selective function in sorting out those things of enduring cultural value from the mass of artefacts produced. With the veritable explosion of material productivity of our time, this sorting-out process would seem to require a more difficult (and ruthless) approach. However, the task would have been more complex due to the prevailing principle of pluralism which almost encourages
Notwithstanding such difficulties, it is fair to say that a sorting-out process will occur. Using a hypothetical scenario one might speculate that, from the entire stock of inventions featured on 'The Inventors' over many years, perhaps two items only might be regarded as special (in Dissanayake's terms) in fifty years' time. These two artefacts, in fact, might consequently become ensconced in a museum, where they would thus assume even greater specialness, for they would now be regarded with a new aura: where, indeed, they would now assume a new life and new meaning. They would now have become transformed into objects of symbolic communication. They would have become totems. That is to say - in ethnographic terms - these artefacts would have become art.

One need only consider the collections of utilitarian artefacts from different cultures which are housed in our museums and art galleries today for evidence to support this scenario.

In fine art too this historical process of selection has occurred, as John Berger (1970) reminds us,

...if one studies these works (by Rembrandt, El Greco, Giorgione, Vermeer, Turner, etc.) in relation to the oil painting tradition as a whole, one discovers that they were exceptions of a very special kind. The tradition consisted of many hundreds of thousands of canvases and easel pictures distributed throughout Europe. A great number have not survived. Of those which have survived only a small fraction are
seriously treated today as works of fine art, and of this fraction another small fraction comprises the actual pictures repeatedly reproduced and presented as the work of 'the master'.

(p.88)

Thus one may be acting too hastily in dismissing whole categories of contemporary artefacts as being far removed from art. As John Rothenstein (1967) stated in response to the question 'What is art today?','

...only time is the impeccable judge.
(in 'Time' magazine Nov 17th 1967)

From this it might be claimed that what counts as art are not simply certain categories of objects per se - for example, the categories of painting and sculpture, or pottery or film. Rather any artefact could be called art if, by virtue of its capacity to function as a vehicle of symbolic communication of and within a culture, it thus attained a status of specialness.

Specialness of this kind is, as Dissanayake (1983) states, conferred upon an object by a perceiving subject. The relative valuing of the artefact resides within the sensibilities of the individual who confronts it. The specialness of an artefact is therefore dependent upon the degree of affective response which is somehow induced within the mind and senses of the perceiving subject.
Where affective response of this kind is not restricted to the sensibilities of a single person but is a pan-cultural response, then the potential of art as a unifying force in culture is evident. The repeated acting out, or reproduction of these special artefacts will achieve the desired goals of social solidarity and cultural identity. When Dewey (1934) alluded to this culturally unifying function of art (art conceived as aesthetic experience), he also described the negative social consequences when art is removed from the common life. He stated,

When artistic objects are separated from both conditions or origin and operation in experience, a wall is built around them that renders almost opaque their general significance with which aesthetic theory deals. Art is remitted to a separate realm, where it is cut off from that association with the materials and aims of every other form of human effort, undergoing and achievement. A primary task is to reunite the fine arts. This task is to restore continuity between the refined and intensified forms of experience that are works of art and the everyday events, doings and sufferings that are universally recognised to constitute experience.

(p. 3)

This suggests that art possesses a ritualistic dimension and function. Indeed to Dewey, those cultural forms which did in fact involve ritual were, ipso facto, forms of art. One may speculate as to what rituals may be fulfilling the functions of art as defined by Dewey in our own culture. Perhaps these would include major sporting events, festivals, pageants and commemorative events. It is a conception of
art which admits a considerably broader range of artefacts than that which limits those forms which can be called art to traditional fine art areas. As ritualistic artefacts, such things could be described as totems - 'totem' meaning (to paraphrase the Collins Dictionary definition) an object, or a representation of an object which symbolizes a clan or culture - 'often having ritual associations.'

To the functionalist theory of Durkheim, totems so defined perform a crucial cohesive role in society. Describing Durkheim's conception of this role, Kottak (1979) states,

> When people worship their totem, a sacred emblem that symbolizes their common social identity, they are actually worshipping society - the moral and social order without which, according to Durkheim, individual life would be impossible. In Durkheim's argument such a moral and social order is too abstract to be worshipped in itself, and something less abstract must be substituted. Thus the totem. In totemic rites, people come together to worship their totem, which stands for their own social unity, and in so doing, they maintain that unity that the totem symbolizes.

(p.193)

Totems are those things which are somehow invested by a culture with significant meanings and which, as such, arouse strong affective response from the members of that culture. Such totems would therefore, according to the anthropological rationale, count as art. Now a society's particular totems are ideosyncratic: they are products of a particular culture as well as determinants of its solidarity and
maintenance. What may be attributed considerable significance - and thus function as a totem - in one culture may not even be known about, let alone valued in another. And this latter culture, in its turn, may well possess its own ideosyncratic totems, and so on.

If, therefore, totems are culture-bound and totems are what really constitute art, then it follows that art must similarly be an essentially culture-bound phenomenon. As Allison (1984) states,

\[
\text{Art is a fact of culture: it is not a fact of life.}
\]

Such a view may appear to compromise the concept of art as a universal biological trait in humans as proposed by Winnicott and Dissanayake. However, referring to the culture-bound forms of art does not deny the universal human disposition to make art.

What, then, might constitute the totems in contemporary Australian society? If we could identify these, then we could surely also discover what counts, or what should count as art in Australian schools.

In seeking out those cultural artefacts which might thus count as art, we must be searching for things which, for us, serve as 'systems of symbolic communication', to use Kubler's phrase. Things which possess the power to symbolically communicate something to and about a culture thus transcend their superficial functions and assume deeper symbolic
or totemic status. This now-transcendent significance of certain things may be more unconsciously felt than consciously known by the members of a culture. It is precisely because they work below the levels of consciousness, within the domain of what Jung called the ‘collective unconscious’, that their symbolic communications are rendered so potent.

In a 1922 paper entitled _On the Relation of Analytical Psychology to Poetic_ _Art_, Jung describes the power of the _collective unconscious_. In the words of _Beardsley_ (1966), Jung

...applied his theory of the ‘collective unconscious’ to literature. In a truly ‘symbolic art-work’, the source of the images are not to be found in the personal unconscious of the author, he argued (that would make the word ‘a symptomatic rather than a symbolical product’), but ‘in that sphere of unconscious mythology, the primordial contents of which are the common heritage of mankind’...In the mythologies of all cultures, and in their dreams and literary creations, there appear these ‘primordial images’ or ‘archetypes’, which belong not to individual or cultural minds, but to the vast unconscious mind underlying them all. (p.347)

Jung’s idea fits well with Kubler’s view of art being a system of symbolic communication, one which arises not as much out of an artist’s intentions nor out of acceptance of traditional forms of artistic representation but from the significance attached to things -
including things not intended to be art by members of a culture. This conception - that what may count as art objects are various things originally intended to play no such role - may appear paradoxical in the extreme.

Durkheim (1950), however, explains that the social function of something may well change without any change occurring at the physiognomic level.

There are cases where a practice or a social institution changes its function without thereby changing its nature...Thus, the same words may serve to express new ideas. It is, moreover, a proposition true in sociology, as in biology, that the organ is independent of the function - in other words, while remaining the same it can serve different ends. The causes of its existence are thus independent of the ends it serves. (pp80-81)

Anthropological rationales provide compelling justifications for catholic conceptions of art. Quite distinct from the fixed absolutist view as to what counts as art, the cultural anthropologist, from a relativist standpoint, would fully endorse contemporary mechanically-based and cybernetically-created image-making forms. For photographic, cinematic, video and computer-derived imagery may be seen to function in precisely the same ways in contemporary culture as oil painting, frescoes, stained glass windows, mosaics, drawings, and illuminated manuscripts worked in and for the cultures of former times.
It should be remembered that each of these traditional forms represented, at the time of its invention and early development, a breakthrough in visual representation of quite revolutionary dimensions. That not one image-making mode was ever a given fact of life is an obvious point yet lost, it seems, on many fine art traditionalists.

An historical view indicates that individual artists have always exploited, utilized and often extended the technologies available to them within their respective epochs for expressive representational ends. Even Palaeolithic man did so when he fashioned a crude chisel with which he could carve stone and a primitive brush with which to apply paint. But even more momentous than the development of these tools was the idea that such inherently inert substances like stone and coloured ochres could be transformed into media for the representation of meaningful images.

The unifying factor between the image-making discoveries made in the Palaeolithic age and those of today is that in each case image-making itself has derived from individuals' imaginative, specifically representation-intended exploitation of available technology. Technology to the artist has always thus constituted a potential vehicle for representation. Perhaps the apparent need for human beings to make images of themselves and their worlds constitutes a prior condition to the actual modes of image-making themselves. Behavioural conceptions of art would appear to subscribe to this notion, but not so institutional views in which (consistent with
Wittgenstein’s ideas on language as a determinant of knowledge) media of art are seen to be prior to its forms and hence to its meanings.

According to the anthropological rationale for art, painting and sculpture would be conceived as quite valid image-making forms, but their value and meaning would be considered to pertain only to particular cultures. That is, painting and sculpture are not universally-meaningful forms.

Yet Fuller (1982) asserts that painting and sculpture alone offer the promise of a new artistic reality. In making this assertion, Fuller also specifically denounces the claims to artistic standing of newer image-making forms and processes: the camera, the movie camera, the computer, video, neon lighting, the laser, the photo-copier and so on. In so doing, he denies the important historical evidence that artists, from palaeolithic times down to the present day, have exploited the technology available within their respective cultures for the making of images. Thus changes in the means of production have always been accompanied by changes in the forms of art. An important question is: Have the changes in the means of production also led to changes in the meaning of art? Or, put another way, if art is itself a normative, dynamic entity, have changes in the means of production also led to a diminution, or even an abandonment of the apparent human need and behaviour to make meaningful images which explore and represent the relationships between the individual and the world? Winnicott, Jung and Dissanayake would surely, in reply, answer ‘no’. Winnicott and Jung would argue that image-making is a human instinct. It is ironic
that it is Fuller himself who (1983) citing Winnicott's work, makes such a strident claim as to the biological basis of image-making.

It may be for ideological reasons that an apparent inconsistency has arisen in Fuller's writing. That is, his plea for painting and sculpture could be regarded in the light of the political context of his 1982 paper: the battle for supremacy between fine art and design in British art schools.

Otherwise, it may appear that Fuller is confusing means and ends in art. For surely, it may be argued, if art is a biological 'fact' in humans, its repression would not be effected except, perhaps, somehow by physical force. That is, in a culture within which individuals are able to exercise even limited free will, biological needs (at least) are likely to be met. Therefore art - if it is a human behaviour - would find its outlet within any such culture, and would do so through the means of production available. Further it may be proposed that the most powerful media used for the production of art at any time are likely to be those media which possessed current import as the most powerful media within a culture.

It may well have been that in the sixteenth century, for example, the oil painting provided the maximum potential for the making of images and the visualisation of the human imagination. That individuals would be sufficiently inspired by the potency of the medium that they would be prepared to trek across Europe simply to gaze at a single painting by Raffaello testifies to the validity of this notion.
In the 'age of mechanical reproduction' today, however, we are quite saturated by visual images of kinds which are not, in terms of the nature of their presentation to our senses, significantly dissimilar to oil painting. As a consequence, the power of the medium of oil paint itself has diminished: it has lost its inherent specialness as a medium. This is not to suggest that the aura of particular original works of art, which are oil paintings, has also diminished. Rather it is to suggest that oil paint itself is no longer the most powerful medium able to produce images which transcend real existence, hence its decline as a vehicle for the representation of images and cultural meanings and its relegation to a position outside the mainstream of culture.

It is film which now constitutes the most powerful image-making medium. It is perhaps film which, in large part, is able to satisfy any biological need for art in humans in western society today. Dewey (1934) implored a restoration of

...continuity between the refined and intensified forms of experience that are works of art and the everyday events, doings and sufferings that are universally recognised to constitute experience.
(p.3)

However, despite his promotion of everyday experience as the source and content of art, Dewey may not have readily accepted the new forms of popular culture, as is suggested by his statement,
Like Fuller, Dewey proposed remedial action through art education. He apparently did not conceive of the possibility that art could have been alive and well in the fabulous movie-palaces of the 1930s. Rather, Dewey perhaps saw in them the potential death-knell of art, not only because the cinema removed the individual from direct experience. Like Fuller's, his was a view based on the idea that whilst its content must stem from everyday experience, art is embodied only in certain traditional forms. McLuhan (1973) would probably regard traditional art forms as purely normative. This may be gleaned from his comments regarding the relative adaptability to change of two big corporations - IBM and GEC:

When IBM discovered that it was not in the business of making office equipment or business machines, but that it was in the business of processing information, then it began to navigate with clear vision. The General Electric Corporation makes a considerable portion of its profits from electric light bulbs and lighting systems. It has not yet discovered that it is in the business of moving information. (p.56)

Art educators may, like IBM in McLuhan's example, need to explore the essential functions of art. Like G.E.C., many may conceive that certain processes initially invented as means in art have, over time,
transcended their original purposes and have become institutionalised as ends.

Dewey's stance is that of the liberal reformist. This is the view which holds that education should provide equal opportunities for all to savour the fruits of culture. However, it is a view which takes for granted that these fruits are contained only within traditional, institutionalised, legitimate cultural forms.

Such a stance is, to Keddie (in Young, 1972), based on a 'cultural-deficiency' model of people. It assumes that certain people actually lack culture, a proposition which Keddie describes in terms of ontological impossibility.

Keddie points to the existence of a more expansive cultural pluralism than may be gleaned from consideration simply of different ethnic groups within a single society. Specifically, she identifies subcultures which are distinguishable not only on the basis of ethnicity but also on the bases of social class and age. She attaches equal value to the respective cultures of all such groups. Underpinning this equal valuing - this pluralism - is the relativist concept that common culture of whatever ilk is the crucial bonding agent for groups of human beings. Ironically, it is also the functionalist conception of culture.

As culture is embodied and represented in the form of its artefacts, it follows that those artefacts which possessed meaning for a group
must, according to the relativist rationale, be considered legitimate. Indeed such artefacts should, according to the relativist view, be regarded as forms of art. Relativism clearly derives its fundamental ethos from anthropology.

The anthropologist Arnold Rubin (1972) explains the difference between the traditional and the anthropological (or relativist) conceptions as to what counts as art:

A...tendency of art studies, according to the traditional approach, involves a predominant concern with objects rather than people...Anthropology, by virtue of its primary orientation toward analyzing and understanding human behaviour and emphasizing the relationship of art to the broader cultural matrix, from which it derives, seems to have offered a new perspective and an alternative framework for considering the arts. (pp 669-670)

Rubin's view is one which defines art primarily as human behaviour rather than primarily as man-made material objects. The material objects which may be born of this artistic behaviour give tangible form to, and expression and communication of the behaviour.

What are the discernible features of artistic behaviour which so distinguish it from other forms of human behaviour?

According to Dutch anthropologist A.A. Gerbrands, art possesses seven key functions in culture, which can all be conceived in behavioural
terms. As cited by Chalmers, these functions are...

...the religious and supernatural, the social prestige value, the play aspect, the aesthetic aspect, the linguistic or communicative function, the technological aspect, and the political function. (p.11).

According to this premise, any cultural artefact which fulfilled any or all of the functions listed would presumably count as art. Thus in our own culture a church service and the movie 'E.T.', a Rolls-Royce car and John Lennon's autograph, a B.M.X. bicycle and the V.F.L. Grand Final, three flying plaster ducks on a wall and bizarre scenes spray-painted on panel vans, the television programmes 'Dallas' and 'The Mike Walsh Show' and an anti-nuclear rally would all count as art. For all these manifestations - artefacts of our culture - surely fulfil one or more of the functions of art as defined by Gerbrands.

And Gerbrands is in eminent company: Read (1943) maintained that even the humble ditch-digger digging a hole in the ground can be regarded as engaging in artistic activity.

In the light of this the sceptic may ponder the value and significance of the word 'art' at all. And indeed it could be argued that the traditional concept of art - fashioned as it has been out of the unique circumstances pertaining to evolutionary phases in a particular culture's (the West's) idiosyncratic historical development - is outmoded and simply irrelevant today.
If knowledge is a socially constructed reality, then art, as a separate form of knowledge, may be seen as a particular construct of Western Society. Since the word 'art' had to be coined at all, it must have been conceived that a certain category of things in Western Society required special designation - hence this special label.

The word 'art', derived from the Latin base 'ars' - meaning to 'put together, join, fit' (Oxford Dictionary of Etymology p.52) - itself has a history. The word is reported to have simply meant in the thirteenth century, 'skill or its application' (in respect, presumably, of any human undertaking). By the seventeenth century, however, the word 'art' was used 'in relation to poetry, music, painting etc.' (p.52). By this time the word's usage had become restricted to refer only to those specialised forms with which we commonly associate the word today.

Williams (1958) also traces the historical evolution of the word (and concept) 'art' - along with four other key words ('class', 'culture', 'industry' and 'democracy') - in his book, Culture and Society 1780 - 1950. Far from discussing each of the five words separately and in isolation from each other, Williams' central thesis is that all five are structurally inseparable, all having been shaped in unison, as it were, by the same historical events. And it is the changes in Western culture and society brought about by new technology - the new means of production of the Industrial Revolution - which Williams highlights as
the crucial determining factor in this evolution.

Changes in the means of production coincided with changes in social relationships and the nature of society itself. Such changes included the emergence of capitalist owners who acquired great power and wealth whilst able to remain physically apart from the actual sources of their wealth; the rapid growth of huge urban enclaves of factory workers uprooted socially from their old rural locales and alienated psychologically even from the products of their own work; and growth of a prosperous middle class of bankers, merchants, shopkeepers, office workers and social service personnel.

In tune with the radical compartmentalisation and separation of functions which so characterised the new means of production, the wider society itself became similarly compartmentalised in respect of its social functions. Thus culture - like art and industry during the same period - became, according to Williams,

a separate rather than an inseparable part of life, (and was)
no longer conceived simply as a 'natural process' but as an entity or a goal external to normal social experience;
Before this period, it (culture) had meant, primarily, the 'tending of natural growth', and then, by analogy, a process of human training. But this latter use, which had been a culture of something, was changed, in the eighteenth and nineteenth century, to culture as such, a thing in itself.
(1952, p.17)
Williams shows that Culture was no longer something one was born with. Instead it became something for which the individual had to strive. Along with the word 'cultivated', to be cultured meant to be refined, to demonstrate certain manners. To show an interest in, indeed to claim as one's own province those artefacts and processes which, being not overtly concerned with monetary, vocational or production ends (in this context such ends were considered crass) but with inherent human values, was therefore a way of displaying one's level of culture. Art, in this way, became the property of the moneyed classes.

Just as culture, then, was concerned with becoming rather than with being, so the particular artefacts and processes considered by the cultured to be embodiments and expressions of mannered refinement were exulted as pinnacles of human achievement: as heights to be scaled. The comprehension and meaning of these pinnacles were never merely givens - as understandings common to all members of a culture - but were instead held as prizes for which individuals had to strive, using particular behaviour and knowledge as the means.

The concepts of cultural advantage and its natural corollary - cultural deprivation - were firmly established. In tracing the development of this idea of culture, Williams (1958) refers to the writings of Coleridge.

This idea of Cultivation, or Culture, was affirmed, by Coleridge, as a social idea, which should be capable of embodying true ideas of value.
...That man was so capable, that the pursuit of perfection was indeed his overriding business in life, was of course widely affirmed elsewhere, especially by Christian writers. But for Mill it was Coleridge who first attempted to define, in terms of his changing society, the social conditions of man's perfection. Coleridge's emphasis in his social writings is on institutions. The promptings to perfection came indeed from 'the cultivated heart' - that is to say, from man's inward consciousness - but, like Burke before him, Coleridge insisted upon man's need for institutions which should confirm and constitute his personal efforts.

(pp 77-78)

Institutions in this sense were therefore conceived as the repositories of the highest forms of knowledge and the edifices which determined standards within these forms.

Institutions in this way became the bastions of culture: realisations of the 'social conditions (necessary) for man's perfection.'

In these terms, the attainment of perfection could hardly be considered within the reach of the working classes, whose very designations as the 'lower order' or the 'common folk' implicitly precluded them from the possibility. Indeed the word 'perfection' in our language and culture fits the metaphor of ascent, of the scaling of heights. To thus describe a certain class as an 'upper class', its members belonging to a 'higher order' is, to continue with Coleridge's conception, to attribute to that class a closer realisation of human perfection. The artefacts of culture so conceived would serve important signifying functions for those who possessed the culture.
The artefacts would in this way also become identified as the property of the upper (the 'cultured') classes.

Art had, therefore, become a realm removed from ordinary life. As an extraordinary phenomenon, art by definition could not exist at a low level, wherein nothing extraordinary could be found. Those objects and images made and enjoyed in the domain of the common folk were, therefore, not designated as art at all but were conceived as something else: as vulgar knick-knacks, handiwork, trivial illustration, or machine-made junk. Being instead a vehicle for the attainment of human perfection, art was related more to metaphysics than with vulgar everyday affairs. The metaphysical domain of art could be realised both cognitively, through comprehension of the content of works, and spiritually, through sensory response to their formal qualities.

In order to derive the proper meanings, both cognitive and sensory, from works of art, it was necessary - since art was the property of an upper ('more perfect') class - to become initiated into that class, by which means one could thereby become cultured. In this way art became institutionalised. In fact, in this way certain productive and image-making processes such as painting, drawing and sculpture, became art. And these choices were not arbitrary. Apart from their designation being justified on the basis of their considerable traditions, painting, drawing and sculpture also represented, by virtue of their particular means of production, an antithesis of the perceived vulgarity of mechanised production. They were conceived as affirmations of humanity, being concerned with
...the harmonious development of those qualities and faculties that characterise our humanity. (Coleridge, in Williams (1952), p.77.)
Art thus stood, according to Williams, Against mechanism, the amassing of fortunes and the proposition of utility as the source of value (offering) a different and a superior social idea. (p.77)

Williams offers an explanation of the nature and origins of the Romantic view of art. It is this view which, having been perpetuated, also constitutes the popular conception of art today.

The traditional view of art cannot be merely dismissed as the view of a bygone age. It is an inevitable conception of those with residual reflexive conservatism who automatically react against anything new. Perhaps such a condition represents an ideological commitment.
Perhaps Coleridge's arguments were not concerned with old-versus-new forms per se, but with the means by which any forms - long established or novel - were actually produced. For to Coleridge, forms counted as art if they involved purely man-made as opposed to mechanised means of production. Perhaps Fuller's view of art is also a reaction to new technology, as Coleridge's may - with our advantageous historical perspective - be more clearly so perceived.

The opposition to mechanised forms of production was largely opposition to its ultimate off-shoot: mass production. A commitment to mechanised production on a huge scale, such as that which has characterised the deeds and utterances of capitalist - industrialists
of the past two hundred years, is a commitment which carries with it a whole set of concomitant values, attitudes, beliefs and an identifiable life-style: in short it represents a culture. And similarly, a commitment to purely manual production - often portrayed today as 'alternative life-style' - can also be interpreted as the expression of a culture. Thus the conflict between two cultures so identified is not one simply concerned with subtle degrees of difference between what may or may not, technically, be considered mechanised production (for even ancient wood-craftsmen used the lathe). The argument is really about conflicting world-views and belief-systems. The picture is one of conflicting ideologies.

In the nineteenth century, each side of this conflict maintained that its course alone provided the path to salvation. This is shown by the contradicting statements of two prominent figures of the nineteenth century who engaged in this debate: Prince Albert and William Morris. Opening the Great Exhibition in 1851, Prince Albert, for his part, extolled,

Nobody who has paid any attention to the particular features of the present era will doubt for a moment that we are living in a period of most wonderful transition, which tends rapidly to the accomplishment of that great end to which indeed all history points, the realisation of the unity of mankind. (In Pevsner, 1960, p.40)

Elsewhere in the same speech Prince Albert praised precisely that against which Morris was so trenchantly opposed. Prince Albert lauded
...the great principle of division of labour, which may be called the moving power of civilization. (p.40)

Morris had other ideas. He proclaimed,

Art will die out of civilization, if the system lasts. That in itself does to me carry with it the condemnation of the whole system. (in Pevsner, 1960, p.23)
Morris saw a causal unity between art, industry and society. To him, industrialisation, of which 'the great principle of division of labour' was a crucial component, sounded the death-knell of art. The corollary to this - and it was explicitly promoted by Morris - was that art would survive and flourish only if society based its means of production on individual handiwork rather than on mass machine production. Goods should, according to Morris, be

...made by the people and for the people, as a happiness for the maker and the user. (in Pevsner, p.23)

Such goods would, by this criterion, thereby count as art, for Morris saw art as '...the expression by man of his pleasure in labour' (p.23).

Thus art, a society's means of production and its cultural health were inextricably linked. Morris further stated,

That talk of inspiration (in art) is sheer nonsense; there is no such thing: it is a mere matter of craftsmanship. (p.22)

Art sprang not from some divine intervention but from simple hard work. Here he opposed not only mechanisation, but the Romantics'
prescription for art's salvation. According to Pevsner (1960)

It is obvious that such a definition of art removes the problem from aesthetics into the wider field of social science. In Morris's mind, 'it is not possible to dissociate art from morality, politics and religion.'

(p.23)

Since Morris' art was thus firmly conceived within the context of an ideology, it was consciously deployed to promote ideology. Morris was patently aware of a sociology of art.

The root of his concern and protest was that art in his time had been stripped of its true social function, namely "...the expression by man of his pleasure in labour." He eulogised the ethic of labour, the human productive process itself as the source of aesthetic satisfaction and as the central condition for the realisation of works of art. He heaped scorn on the assumption that art could be determined only by virtue of the contemplation, by the refined, of finished products made by often-unknown others. Morris simultaneously attacked 'The Machine', which he saw as his arch-enemy:

As a condition of life, production by machinery is altogether an evil.
(in Pevsner, p.25)

In opposition to The Machine, Morris and his followers in the Arts and Crafts Movement promoted its antithesis - 'handicraft' - which they saw
as the true basis of art. To Morris and his followers, handicraft signified a humanizing element in society. It constituted, of course, a distinctive means of production, and Morris was incisively aware that the means of production upon which a society was based determined the nature of social relations within it.

In thus locating handicraft (or simply 'crafts' as we now generally know it) squarely within the province of Art, Morris was laying the epistemological foundations, as well as providing the ideological rationale for what - despite the gap in time and space - has continued to count as Art even in many Australian schools today. Indeed many art curricula in Tasmanian schools comprise crafts alone: ceramics, thread and fibre, woodcraft, copper work and the like. And the overwhelming emphasis on craft in the work of some art teachers is sanctioned even by official art syllabuses devised for purposes of educational certification.

This concept of craft-as-art has continued to be supported by essentially the same ideological rationale as that put forward by Morris some one hundred years ago. It is based on a philosophy that engaging in craft work is asserting personal autonomy, and that it could, by extension, assure the mental health not only of the individual but of the whole society. A UNESCO publication (1972) echoes Morris' sentiments in relation to the dehumanizing effects of mass machine production in the 1970's:

...the division and rational specialization of labour results in making...work piecemeal,
cramping and repetitive, devoid of inventiveness and responsibility, and by breaking the bond between work and its product eliminates the joy there is in a job well done. Whereas culture traditionally arose from work that involved mastering nature, the worker in industry is bereft of every form of creativeness, of every means of shaping matter according to his fancy. (p.14)

The conception of virtual handicraft as the ideal nature of work parallels Dissanayake’s description of the nature of art. By conceiving that the work-model inherent to art is equally applicable, indeed highly appropriate to virtually all fields of human productiveness, and to attribute to this model the capacity to endow aesthetic experience for the worker so engaged, it could be concluded that any work which provided a sense of joy and fulfilment in the making would in essence qualify as art.

Such reasoning prompted Read’s (1943) previously cited declaration that even a man digging a ditch could be engaged in what was essentially an artistic act. Indeed, the actual title of Dewey’s work, ‘Art as Experience’, in itself clearly states the case. Dewey elaborated along such lines:

A piece of work is finished in a way that is satisfactory; ...whether the experience be that of eating a meal, playing a game of chess, carrying on a conversation, writing a book, or taking part in a political campaign, it is so rounded out that its close is a consummation and not a cessation. (p.35)
And,

In short, aesthetic experience cannot be sharply marked off from intellectual experience since the latter must bear an aesthetic stamp to be itself complete. The same statement holds good of a course of action that is dominantly practical.

(p.36).

That the meaning of work derives not only from viability of the products of works but, to a greater extent, from certain qualities felt to reside within actual processes - a sentiment expressed by Morris, Dewey and the UNESCO publication - is also a concept which is central to the commonly-conceived nature of art today. The painter Paul Klee, for example, stated,

The work of art is above all a process of creation, it is never experienced as a mere product.

And,

In working, the way is the essential thing, and becoming is more important than being.

(in Lynton 1975, p.52)

According to this rationale, an activity which itself induced an aesthetic experience would, ipso facto, seem to count as art.

Thus not only the product as an object of contemplation but the process itself possesses significant social meaning: in fact, it is the process which, according to this view, constitutes the art.
The corollary to this rationale is that any process which did not so completely involve the individual in a direct sense and which did not require his or her total participation in, nor even knowledge of all the various phases of production, constituted the antithesis of art.

Developed countries in the contemporary world are built upon systems of production and hence of living itself of the most complex, fragmented, highly specialised and technologically sophisticated kind. By the above definition of art the countless mass-produced articles produced by modern means of production could never thus count as objects of art.

Morris' doctrine became a virtual theism. He envisaged and sought to practise a full flow of aesthetic experience occurring in and out of even the most mundane tasks involved in day-to-day-living, which itself was thus conceived as a manifestation of art.

Since art was considered to reside essentially in the making process, Morris believed that items for use by humans should embody and communicate a sense of human-ness in their actual physical characters. This it was felt, was important for cultural identity; it would serve to bond people together; it would circumvent alienation and satisfy deep psychological needs.

Lewis F. Day was the author of a number of textbooks on the arts and crafts around the turn of the century. Among these volumes were such titles as Pattern Design, Nature in Ornament, Art in Needlework and
Ornament and Its Application. These works in themselves constitute historical artefacts. They contain insights into the philosophy of the Arts and Crafts movement and the ideological struggle it represented at the same time as they provide extremely comprehensive information on a vast range of art-craft forms, processes and techniques.

In addition, they reveal the origins of a particular orientation and its underlying ideology which have remained prominent in art education today: namely, art as craft. This may be gleaned from a brief examination of Day's *Ornament and Its Application* (1904), in which he makes the following statement:

> We talk of art teaching! Artists know that it is not Art which can be taught, but only the things that go to its successful pursuit - the way to use eyes, hand, and brains, the control of such artistic faculty as may be born in a man. What training does, and teaching should do is to make good workmen. Out of workmanliness art is most likely to develop itself. It is the source too, of all a workman's satisfaction in doing, and in the doing of others. (p.139).

Here Day embodies much of the philosophy of the Arts and Crafts movement.

His book is itself a testimony of the principles it promotes. It diligently covers a wide field of arts and crafts, including appliqué,
basket-work, blown glass, bookbinding and brassheaded nail work; stone carving, carpet making, cloisonné enamel and leatherwork; joinery, woodcarving, glazing, goldsmith's work and intaglio; lace, lacquering, lettering, mosaic and patchwork. The list goes on. Its purpose is to describe the principles and techniques of ornamentation pertaining to this extensive catalogue of forms.

In providing this, Day demonstrates his own extensive knowledge of the many diverse crafts. At the basis of his philosophy is the principle that the ornamentation of objects is determined by the tools and methods employed in their production: what Day calls the 'mechanism of the method' (p.84). Ornamentation is not superimposed, but it grows from within the form of the object produced.

Implicit in this principle is the requirement that the individual engaged in the ornamentation of objects is also heavily steeped in knowledge of their actual manufacture. Indeed, it virtually behoves that the manufacturer and the ornamentor are one and the same person.

Nor was this integration considered by Day to be in any way detrimental. Far from it; for one of the pre-eminent values of the Arts and Crafts movement was precisely such a union to be realized within the work of a single individual. It represented, in fact, the movement's ideological commitment, for it asserted that such a mode of work should prevail as society's dominant means of production, implicit in which - in turn - were ramifications as to the nature of social life itself (p.72). In short, it was a value which asserted
Man over Machine. It reviled the principle of the division of labour implicit in the latter.

Day prescribes the study of historical styles as part of the artist-craftsperson's preparation. The book itself contains copious illustrations of designs from many cultures in time and place: Egyptian, Mesopotamian, Byzantine, Japanese, Arabic, Etruscan, Persian, Italian, Spanish and German among them. Of special prominence, however, are examples derived from English Gothic, a circumstance which would be justified by Day in terms of his concern for ideosyncratic stylistic continuity in the arts and crafts as a way of cementing cultural and national identity (p.125). The desire to retain national identity in the arts and crafts may also be seen as a further means of undermining the goal of mass (uniform) production by machinery.

This adulation of the Gothic, which was most notably inspired in the nineteenth century by Ruskin and Morris, revealed also the fundamental romanticism of the arts and craft movement at the same time as it promoted its ideological commitment to non-mechanized labour as the basis for humane social existence. Thus the traditional styles of ornament themselves constituted statements of ideology, since such styles were inextricably linked to a mode of production — making by hand — which itself was regarded as being essentially humanizing.

Ornamentation produced under such ideal conditions spoke of the
integrity of its manufacture. It contained what Day called 'character':

"...ornament grows out of conditions of work, and the character resulting tells of them." (p.87)

By this criterion character could hardly exist at all in machine-made products. Yet Day appears to be a figure at the crossroads. His apparent knowledge of principles and techniques demonstrates his thorough grounding in the arts and crafts of his time but it appears that he also clearly accepted the inevitability of mechanical production's inundation of the market of manufactured goods. Thus he implores, albeit resignedly,

In design and workmanship alike we must go on, or give up the game. Our choice happily does not lie between the methods of medieval workmen following the lines of tradition and those of latter-day capitalists. We have yet to try what seems the obvious way out of the difficulty in which a sudden change of industrial conditions has landed us - the experiment not of returning to the rude or leisurely manner of old days, but of devoting ourselves to the solution of the industrial and artistic problem of the moment.

(p.137)

In this recurrent grappling with the issue of mechanical production's reconciliation with good design and workmanship, Day enters the arena of art-politics and, indeed, of political activity per se. He states,
in his concluding paragraph,

...we come back to the very nature of design. If it is true, as I began by saying, that, apart from its application, there is properly no such thing as ornament ("..ornament grows out of conditions of work.", p.87), it follows that, personal as may be the work of its designer, it is still the outcome of conditions, the solution of a problem, set by circumstances outside himself. (p.312)

It is largely this theme which ascribes to the book an historical significance which is separate from any which derives from its more ostensible function (and value) as a comprehensive exposition on principles and techniques pertaining to a multitude of arts and crafts of the late nineteenth century.

The tension of Day's position, and of the phase in art history of which his book is representative, is shown by the evidence of his own complete saturation in the values, principles and processes of the Arts and Crafts movement making it seemingly impossible for him to envisage comparable values and principles of a machine aesthetic, which he could yet foresee as necessary. As he states,

Manufacturers know too little about methods of beautiful or artistic making, even if they realise that there is such a thing. Artists know too little about the means of modern manufacture, which, by their aid, might be put to much more artistic use than unaided commercial or mechanical instinct can possibly make of them. (p.137)
Ironically, Day appears to deny mechanical manufacture the possibility of realising aesthetic forms through adherence to two of the very principles which Day himself promotes: namely, truth to material (e.g., p.15), and the idea that good design is determined also by the nature of tools and the production method itself, (e.g., p.76). Thus he deplores what were to become, a few years later, criteria for beauty in design when he asserts,

In the process of modern manufacture, everything gets planed down to a marvellous smoothness; the ideal of execution is mechanical precision; and design itself sinks into dull monotony. (p.132)

Day could here, ironically, be describing the look of modern design.

The ethos of the Arts and Crafts movement proposed that the made-by-hand process in itself denoted the status of art to a manufactured object. And except for permitting what Day described as a few legitimate 'partnerships' between 'allied processes', such as those which exist between mason and carver, joiner and inlayer, goldsmith and jeweller (Day, 1904, p.214), the ethos of craft-as-art also proposed that modes of production which did not, in their totality, involve a single individual could not realise objects which could count as art. Because of the inherent detachment and alienation from the ultimate product of one's labour which the principle of division of labour contains, the individual worker, according to the craft-as-art ethos, could not therefore enjoy the aesthetic experience of the making
process, wherein lay the virtual artistic content of an object.

Thus products which emanate from complex, labour-fragmented manufacturing processes could not count as art. By this criterion (and despite their massive proliferation) none of the myriad objects produced by mechanical means could count as objects of art. For not only does the hand crafted object provide aesthetic (and therefore artistic) satisfaction for its maker. Knowledge of this same inherent aestheticism - that is, an aestheticism which is, metaphorically, built into the object, thus becoming an actual element of the object - is implicitly transferred to the second party (client, relative etc.) for whose use the object may be destined. The sense of the aesthetic, derived merely from knowledge of an object's individualised, and therefore thoroughly humanised productive mode, is an important reason why an additional factor - namely, the uniqueness of the art object - emerges as a crucial criterion as to what, perhaps for the majority of people, should count as art.

It is at this point that the fundamental distinction between craft and design may be seen. For whilst both designer and craftsperson may be engaged in the production of utilitarian objects (in contrast to the fine artist) the craft ethos in contemporary art education is derived from, and it largely perpetuates the nineteenth century practices and ideology of handicrafts. The collaborationist ethos of design, on the other hand, is inextricably linked with current technology and hence with whatever productive modes technology spawns, whether these involve mechanical mass production or production by
computer. In fact, the designer in this sense designs for the means of production to a large extent.

A basic principle of craft manufacture is 'hands-on'; for many craftspeople, art is simply making. It is anathema, however, to the very means of production to which the designer is tied that he or she should physically manufacture the product designed. The principle of division of labour, of which the designer is an integral component, denies him or her a role of actual making.

The rationale for basing an art curriculum on craft activities is of the following order. First, it is held that art is concerned with the visual beauty of things. Second, since the individual constantly encounters objects (visual things) of all kinds in daily living, his or her daily life would be the richer if these could, in fact, be objects of beauty. Third (and by extension), since art is a great civilizing and humanizing agent, society as a whole would be the more civilized and humane if all people within it were to be concerned with, and able to enjoy the visual beauty of everyday things. Fourth, school is seen to provide the potential for the wide dissemination of aesthetic values through inculcation of the young. Fifth, craft provides activities in which all children can fruitfully engage and achieve personally satisfying rewards. Sixth, the aesthetic values acquired through making will be internalised by the child and brought to bear in all kinds of subsequent visual experiences. Seventh, craft activities have therapeutic value, of significance to the individual.
child in terms of learning a leisure-time pursuit for the future and also of relieving external pressures, including the pressure of apparently more exacting intellectual school subjects.

The craft rationale is, understandably, one with widespread appeal in education. It appeals to parents because they can identify with, and locate the good sense of traditional domestic products and processes. It appeals to accountability-minded school principals because of this appeal to parents and because, in the context of school-life, principals can see for themselves children in classrooms being busy and achieving concrete results. It appeals to art teachers because of principals' and parents' support and also because of the relatively relaxed, pressure-free, intellectually undemanding climate which craft activities can induce in otherwise volatile unstreamed classrooms. It appeals to children because they can relax, feel comfortable, learn socially-valued manual skills and produce concrete objects which are valued by themselves and others.

There are compelling reasons, it would seem, for the embattled comprehensive secondary school to develop a programme in crafts. However, that such a programme should be conceived as that which occupies the position of Art in the school's curriculum is another matter, however taken-for-granted this conception has been.

It has been shown that the place in present day art curriculum of craft has largely stemmed from the influence of the Arts and Crafts movement of the nineteenth century. This movement established the
rationale for its own position on a particular conception of art which it supported by a selective view of art history and a strong moral and social stance which grew out of contemporaneous conditions.

The rationale for craft-as-art mainly stems from a taken-for-granted assumption that art is concerned with the visual beauty of things. Morris himself proclaimed (1898) in precisely this vein,

As to my generalizations, I can only say, first, that, in order to have a living school of Art, the public in general must be interested in Art; it must be a part of their lives; something which they can no more do without than water or lighting. We must not be able to plead poverty or necessity, as we do now, as an excuse for ugliness or dirt. If we raise a building, whether it be palace, factory, or cottage, it must be a thing well understood that it must be sightly: if a railway has to be run from one place to another, it must be taken for granted that the minimum of destruction of natural beauty must be incurred, even if that should increase the expense of the line largely; disfiguring waste of coalpits or manufactories must be got rid of whatever the cost may be, and so on. And, mind you, all this need of real public convenience, which is the only possible foundation for Art in modern times, is quite possible to be done; and it will be done, as soon as people care about it. (pp.2-3)

Here is a classic extrapolation of the idea that it is the nature of art and hence the business of the artist to be concerned with the visual beauty of the world. Morris alludes to the ugliness and dirt of many buildings, railways, coalpits and the like and asserts that it is the role of the artist to bring his or her particularly refined sensibilities to bear in the remediation of such visual desecration.
Yet many of the world's (attributed) great works of art are concerned with portraying such ugly themes, and a good deal more present images of considerably greater ugliness and apparent human barbarity. There is Grünewald's 'Crucifixion', 'The Last Judgement' of Hieronymous Bosch and images in the lower half of Michelangelo's version of the same subject, Goya's 'Saturn Devouring One of His Sons', Van Gogh's painting of worn-out workmen's boots, Duchamp's 'Fountain' (a urinal), Picasso's 'Guernica', the powerful images of refugees' suffering by Kathe Kollwitz and of the industrial wasteland of England by Stanley Spencer, 'Campbell's Soup' by Andy Warhol and Lichtenstein's blown-up, comic strip-inspired 'Rat-a-tat-a-tat'.

Examples such as these raise the question: If art is concerned with visual beauty, how can images which portray visual ugliness be considered art?

A response to this question is that, irrespective of what it represents, a painting, drawing or piece of sculpture can be beautiful as a thing-in-itself. Clearly, however, the images in the particular examples above were intended to shock, to disturb. This indicates a fundamental dichotomy between what art and craft respectively stand for. The criteria which determine beauty in a work of art are different from those which define beauty in the general environment to which craft and design relate.

Notwithstanding the anthropological conception, advanced by Kubler, that the history of art may be found in the history of ordinary
things, the issue of intentionality is an important one, given the context. For the context of the artist is this: he or she self-consciously produces a piece of work which he or she intends to be located within a specific branch of human knowledge and endeavour which is known and labelled as art. That is, there is a `World of Art` within which there exists a body of shared meanings and conventions which, in contemporary Western society, is able to function perhaps independently of, perhaps alongside whatever broader conceptions of art happen to be described by anthropologists.

Indeed, however arbitrary this World of Art may be, its existence may be justified by the anthropological criteria, which are founded on acceptance of the ideosyncratic meanings and forms of different cultures.

What are the intentions of the craftsperson? Central to the craft ethos is the principle of making by hand. It is the valuing of process itself which forms the foundation of the craft aesthetic. When a craft object evokes the sense of the handmade process it becomes `humanized` and it is this evocation which, for many, provides the major source of aesthetic satisfaction. Thus the hand-crafted object even possesses a moral or spiritual dimension. If it is able to communicate a sense of the presence of its human maker in and through its own form, then a traditional craft object, however humble, is also able to forge a link between its owner and his or her possibly ancient forbears.
The principle of conservation is integral to the craft ethos. It is not merely that objects should be hand-made: it is important that they be produced by often ancient means and even realised in forms which echo ancient precursors. By thus projecting object, maker and owner alike into a tradition, the craft object may be serving as a bonding agent in culture, and realising in concrete form a fusion of identity between a living person and a distant past. Such an object would in this way function as a form of symbolic communication and, as such, may indeed be conceived as an object of art, fitting Kubler's thesis that the history of art is to be found in the history of things.

Describing 'the powerful revival of interest in the crafts which we have seen over the past few years', Lucie-Smith (1977) reports that,

...the craftsman himself (in the 1970s) came to be regarded as an ideal, even a heroic figure, living out in practice the values which most people could only half-heartedly aspire towards...It was the craftsman's way of life, even more than his product, which attracted attention. Craft, with its emphasis on traditional values, thus came full circle. (pp.29-30)

The contemporary revival in the crafts signifies the fact that the craft ethos has indeed come full circle. It is a revival of precisely the values and principles expounded by Morris one hundred years ago. Lucie-Smith's description of the perceived aesthetic value of the craftsman's way of life today echoes the Morris-inspired sentiments of Day (1904) which praised the virtues of 'workmanliness' in craft.
According to Day,

...a workman...looks for evidence
(of workmanliness)...and delights to
recognise behind the work a workman
with whom to claim fellowship.
(1904, p.139)

Lucie-Smith (1977) again describes the analogous situation in respect
of craft today in his reference to the term which has enjoyed currency
in craft circles: so-called process art. Process art has as one of
its basic tenets the aesthetic value which 'evidence of workmanliness'
is considered capable of bestowing to a craft object. He describes
process art as

...a label which is used to imply that the
main purpose of the finished work is to exist
as a comprehensible summary of all the processes
by which it has been brought into being...
(p.30).

Noting that the idea of process has been 'stealthily and perhaps even
unconsciously extended', Lucie-Smith observes that now

...every aspect of the maker's life
- eating, sleeping, even excreting -
is somehow magically encapsulated
in the finished result.
(1977, p.30)

With the integral relationship of much of the contemporary craft world
with such whole-of-life concerns as ecology, the environment and
communal living, the craft ethos today may be seen as a reaction to the antithesis of such concerns: mass industrialisation. In other words, the contemporary craft movement has been spawned by virtually identical social conditions to those which gave birth to the Arts and Crafts movement in Britain a hundred years ago. The ideological compatibility of the two movements in thus understandable; and as before, the resultant influence of craft in art education is powerful today.

The crafts can rest on their laurels in the school curriculum when emphasis is placed on process as a value in itself. However, 'process' often means simply keeping the child occupied rather than the cognitive and affective processes involved in a particular discipline being learned. That is, a child's making of a scarf with a two-colour dog-tooth pattern on a four-heddle table-top loom may not be valued in the school as much for the fact that the child would have learned a particular weaving process as for the fact that he or she would have been kept busy.

For in many schools craft is regarded as mere busywork. Children are pressed into mind-numbing, repetitive production tasks which are so undemanding that free conversation is possible and permissible with no detrimental effect to the work at hand. Clearly, the prescribing of such activities is intended to allow children - and teacher - to relax. Craft activity of this kind - undertaken within that part of the curriculum called Art - is therapeutic leisure activity. As a result of such programmes, however, Art in the school and art
education in general become easily undervalued.

The deliberate leisurely character of such craft activity stands in stark contrast to the relative rigor of the intellectual demands imposed on pupils and teachers alike by the 'real' subjects in the school. It is precisely this contrast, however, which explains the seemingly paradoxical acceptance by schools of activities for children which, to any reasonably perceptive layperson, would be clearly seen to contravene the schools' own positions on educational standards. For it is the nature and the demands of the 'real' subjects which implicitly and indirectly justify for educators the incorporation of mindless repetitive busywork - in other words, craft - in school curriculum. In short, craft so conceived can offer a welcome break. As such, craft is seen to possess no intrinsic educational value, let alone cultural value, but is acceptable only inasmuch as it might contribute to the child's readiness for 'real' learning by providing light relief.

Furthermore, craft so conceived represents to the primary classroom teacher, struggling to keep abreast of methods and knowledge in a wide range of subject fields, an easy solution to what, for some, is the constant problem of 'what to do in Art'.

Even art specialist teachers in secondary schools, however, often resort to the most banal craft activities, particularly for troublesome classes. Such moves usually find ready support from school Principals whose chief preoccupation is with control. Hence a
pressure, however subtle, is often imposed upon the school Art department to base its curriculum on craft, since craft conceived as repetitive manual activity is seen to provide a way of keeping children busy, and thus under reasonable control.

Lip service only is paid any educational rationale for this expedient. However, insofar as activity may be so interpreted as to mean process, and process, in turn, may be represented as creativity, the expedient is, nonetheless, justified and widely accepted on educational grounds.
Distinguishing Between Art and Craft.

Yet to what extent could craft, properly so-called, involve creativity? Is it not in the very nature of craft to carry on tradition rather than to break new ground; to make, by time-worn processes, products which, being desired or ordered by would-be clients, are thus predicted in advance?

According to Collingwood (1960), such characteristics distinguish craft from art. He describes a craft object as something in which

The result to be obtained is preconceived or thought out before being arrived at. The craftsman knows what he wants to make before he makes it. (pp. 15-16)

'Art proper' on the other hand, is defined by crucial characteristics which it does not share with craft. These, in the view of Collingwood, are 'expression' and 'imagination'. (Chapters vi and viii)

If 'art proper' differs so fundamentally from craft, the question arises as to what business has craft to be included at all in a school subject called Art, let alone dominate its curriculum offerings?

Clearly Collingwood's view is in stark contrast to that of William Morris. It would also be contested by the contemporary advocates of the crafts revival. In a section headed 'Craft Activities are
Creative Activities,' Mattil (1971) writes,

All Children possess a creative instinct.
Sound education provides the climate for
the fullest development of this instinct.
In crafts, each project must allow the child
to think originally and to learn to work
independently.
(p.11)

Here Mattil claims that working in crafts can mean working creatively.
In this way, crafts are compatible with the broader educational
principle of creativity. In fact, he implies that crafts could indeed
count as Art in the school curriculum. He states (1971),

Today's artist/craftsman has largely adopted
a position which is compatible with today's
art education. Dedicated to the idea of personal
freedom and in the midst of great varieties of old
and new materials, he has turned crafts into a
great creative adventure of the human spirit. Not
trapped by tradition, he has chosen to be
inventive, risk-taking and free to make mistakes.
(p.1)

Mattil appears anxious to shed the mantle of old-fashioned repetitive
handiwork associated with craft production and to dismiss the idea
that the crafts belong to a bygone age. His book itself, however,
appears to be strongly characteristic of its own time. To be capable
of positively responding to the call for relevance in respect of the
curriculum content of one's discipline was not an insignificant
attribute in the education scene of the late 'sixties and early
'seventies, when Mattil's book was published. Mattil reconciles craft
with the broad educational objective of creativity, but in other ways he also reflects the dominant ethos within both education and society in general in the 'sixties. His statement contains certain key words and phrases, the connotations of which may be seen to contain particular potency for the age of Vietnam and campus unrest. Examples are phrases such as 'personal freedom', 'great varieties of old and new materials', 'a great creative adventure of the human spirit', 'not trapped by tradition' and 'risk-taking and (being) free to make mistakes.'

Such phrases - familiar in their time - may be also seen in a context relevant to this discourse. They also implicitly promote the primacy of process over product. The disdain in the 'sixties for a product-oriented society and an education system in which, it was perceived, even people were regarded as products constituted an ideological position which permeated all facets of social life.

The contextual similarity of the recent craft revival and that of the Arts and Crafts movement of a hundred years ago is pointed out by Lucie-Smith (1977), who claims that, in the culture of the 1970s,

The crafts...could be thought of as being something which represented a practical form of resistance to the ills of industrialism and the evils of catering for the tastes and indeed the follies of the mass.
(p.29)

As in the age of Morris the fundamental principle pertaining to the
crafts movement of today is the principle of making-by-hand. The very assertion of craft is in itself a form of reaction and rebellion toward radically industrial means of production emergent in society at large.

Surely, it could be argued, if crafts are not, ipso facto, non-creative but possess, as Mattil asserts, great potential as creative activities which, as such, are 'compatible with today's art education' and that furthermore craft activity involves making by hand, then surely craft could well count as Art in school curriculum.

To Collingwood, the essential distinction between craft and art resides in the proposition that whereas in craft properly so-called both means and end are predetermined, craft being thus in large part predictable and non-exploratory by nature, art properly so-called is experimental, boundary-breaking activity within which outcomes cannot be predicted in advance. Again it may be seen that the criterion of creativity is fundamental for determining what counts as art.

Brook (1980), has elaborated Collingwood's proposition, claiming that the defining characteristic of art properly so-called is that it is experimental. By adhering to this characteristic of experimentation as the crucial criterion, Brook claims that much of what is accepted as Art should, in fact, be regarded as craft. Here he reiterates Collingwood. By this criterion, perhaps most of the celebrated artefacts in the history of Art, from Egyptian sculpture to Byzantine mosaics, from Florentine painting of the fifteenth century to hard-
edge painting of the 1960's, would have to be re-cast as craft objects. For it is not difficult to perceive that the makers of such artefacts have employed established techniques and media in representing prescribed subject matter in conventional ways. This, after all, describes the nature of style, and it is the history of style which largely constitutes the history of Art.

Martland (1974) also subscribes to the view that much of what has conventionally been labelled Art should instead be properly seen as craft. He draws the distinction between discovery and invention in order to explain this phenomenon, stating

"Discovery is that which makes an addition to man's knowledge or nature whereas invention is that which establishes a new operational principle which serves some previously acknowledged objective. Thus we could say that discovery, along with art, points out or creates what men have not seen yet and invention, along with craft, ingeniously turns known facts to an unexpected advantage." (p.234)

Martland illustrates this concept with Robert Browning's poetic criticism of the art of Andrea del Sarto and Roger Fry's explicit criticism of Breughel. In both instances, according to Martland, each artist has been seen by his particular critic essentially as a craftsman, since

"Before (each artist) began his 'action' he knew the end for which he worked and he had no need or room for the contribution of 'the thing wrought' other than bringing it into being." (1974, p.234)
Thus Martland explains how, in particular circumstances, conventionally so-called works of art - paintings, sculptures, drawings etc. - would more properly be seen and described as craft objects. In so doing, he may be accounting for the bulk of conventionally so-called works of art, for works which one could claim were truly original, devoid of derivation of some order, are surely rare commodities. Nevertheless Martland states,

In so far as certain activities serve the past, in so far as they draw men's attention, even their authors' own attention, to preconceived plans or ends, they are crafts. They are prejudged. They themselves crystallise prejudices into stereotypes. In effect they transform the empirical to the a priori. Canned reaction replaces open responses... If (a work) pleases, it pleases not qua object but qua that which it helps us to recognise i.e. the quality of the scene, memory or incident it illustrates. (1974, pp. 234-235)

In common with Collingwood and Brook, and along with his own cited examples of Browning and Fry, Martland has implicitly built his case upon the taken-for-granted notion that originality constitutes the essential defining characteristic of art. In this line he states,

Though (artists) begin with what they have gained from their particular hour and from their particular place, they quickly move on to bring into focus, to manifest, a new understanding, a new relationship. (1974, p.236)

By this conception, only a small proportion of the vast productive
output of all kinds by humans would count as art. Art would indeed be the preserve of the gifted, initiated few.

The irony of this conception of art 'properly so-called' is that the same word- 'art' - which is used to signify the rarefied nature of achievement and experience, itself once described so broad a domain of human productiveness.

With regard to art in schools, it is obvious that to apply the criteria of Martland and company, precious little could be expected to constitute art 'properly so-called'. Should the subject, therefore, be called Craft? For according to their criteria it is craft which would more accurately describe the nature of activity even in the so-called fine art fields such as painting and sculpture.

Such an exclusive notion of art is in complete contrast to the anthropological conception as advanced, for example, by Kubler and Dissanayake. For them, virtually any artefact, whether prescribed in advance as art or not would yet count as art if it was conferred by its own culture with specialness. In the anthropological conception, art is determined by the capacity of an artefact to somehow function as symbolic communication within a culture: as a virtual totem in the Durkheimian sense.

The anthropological conception of art exposes the ethos of creativity and the celebration and definition of art as creative process to be merely a normative order peculiar to Western culture - and perhaps to
contemporary Western culture at that.

If art 'properly so-called' can exist only under such tight conditions as those laid down by Martland and company, then art properly so-called must be seen to have enjoyed only the briefest of histories. And if art represents such a supreme order of things, as they imply, does this mean that human evolution itself has advanced by some dramatic stride only in the past few hundred years, and that this great step forward has occurred only in Western Society? For it has only been during this period and within this culture that the pre-eminent defining principle of art as creative process has become reified.

In other cultures, the making of forms and images has, historically, been powerfully determined by the very antithesis of this principle. That is, the nature of forms and objects has been determined by precedent and tradition, by the need to present the familiar rather than to over-ride it. For the common raison d'etre of Egyptian sculpture and Australian Aboriginal rock paintings, of Czech icons and North American Indian totem poles, of the smiling Buddha and Sepik River statuary was the need of a culture to embody and communicate its shared meanings. In such cultures, art has served to keep alive myths and traditions, to give tangible form to spiritual worlds, to perpetuate triumphs and to assert and preserve the fundamental order by which such cultures have been governed.

Seen against this perspective, the view of Martland and company may even be considered trite.
For what emerges from an anthropological perspective on a culture's images and forms is that the critical factor which will determine significance are the embedded meanings of the images and forms: what they embody and communicate as cultural symbols. As such, the principles of originality and creativity may constitute the antithesis of art; for the realisation of such principles may, by thus tending to obscure meanings and invent new ones, serve only to mystify meanings and alienate rather than communicate meanings and reinforce a culture's identity.
THE PRIMACY OF PROCESS IN ART EDUCATION.

The handicraft tradition places an emphasis on making and doing, on 'hands-on' activity: on process itself.

However, this belief in the primacy of process over product has stemmed also from the influence of other factors, the origins of which, like the Arts and Crafts movement, may also be located in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. There were the growing disciplines of psychology and psycho-analysis and the ascending philosophy of democratic liberalism. All drew attention to the significance of human experience - the 'process of living' - for determining the nature (the quality) of an individual's and, by extension, a society's life. All had profound effects upon theory and practice in both education and art - the twin pillars of art education.

Progressive education, with its emphasis on the concept of child-centred learning and the quality of the educational experience itself, was being developed at the same time as artists were also asserting the pre-eminence of such values as creativity and self-expression in art. To them, the intensity of personal experience was considered the necessary precondition for the realisation of insights and, ultimately, work of quality. A major concern was that individuality and personal freedom should always prevail over mass conformity and crass materialism - symbols of industrial man.
In this vein, Wheeler (1936) wrote, in respect, however, of education,

There is no human being, however insignificant, whose function it is to be a mere cog in the industrial machine. There is no individual, however insignificant, whose whole business in life is to acquire information. On this account, the majority of modern thinkers are not satisfied with narrow utilitarian views of education as a preparation for complete living. (p.23).

In a further statement, Wheeler draws attention to the importance in education of attending to process. To do so she suggests would be facilitate the evolution — the 'becoming' — of the human individual:

The recognition of the creativeness of each living individual, the realization of the deep-set social impulses within the human being, and the belief in man's fundamental urge to be in harmony with the process of creative evolution can only lead to one view of education, namely, that it is, or should be, a means of further human evolution and of the emergence of higher values than those so far achieved in human history. (1936, pp. 27-28)

Significantly, Wheeler here links the perceived value of the educational process to the factor of creativity. She states that in education nothing less than human evolution itself is involved, and that its fruitful realisation comes from recognising, harnessing and developing 'the creativeness of each living individual.' From a philosophical point of view, this educational theory directed attention to child development. It was a theory strongly supported,
indeed strongly influenced by developments in educational psychology in the early decades of this century which provided copious data on the phenomenon of the developing child, culminating in the work of Piaget.

With the dominant educational theory of the day promoting the twin values of process and creativity, a door was opened for art to enter (or re-enter) the school curriculum, under a new banner which loudly proclaimed those same key concepts, now linked as one in the term 'creative process.' Thus in the mid-thirties, Hobart High School, under the behest of its headmaster H.V. Biggins, introduced this new conception of the role of art in education into Tasmanian Schools.

The most influential individual to establish this relationship between the then-current values in art and education was Viktor Lowenfeld, most notably through his book, Creative and Mental Growth (1943). In this work, Lowenfeld asserted the value of art activity for the development of the overall creativity and the sound general mental disposition in the child. As well, however, he attached to the developmental stages - which approximated the Piagetian stages of cognitive development - various artistic behaviours, imagery forms and media preferences related to children. Central to his thesis was that the child grew from within. As such, it was considered not only unnecessary but positively harmful for an outsider - including the teacher - to interfere in the child's creative process, in particular when the child was making art.
In art, a similar orientation toward process was strongly evident. The difference between process and product was conceived by the Italian Futurists as being little less than the difference between life and death. In the first Futurist Manifesto of 1909, Marinetti described museums – the repository par excellence of art products – as 'cemeteries...public dormitories...aburb abattoirs' (in Appollonio, 1973, p.22). He announced instead the Futurists' intention 'to exalt aggressive action, a feverish insomnia, the racer's stride, the mortal leap.' (Ibid, p.21) and encapsulated the idea of the primacy of process over product in his famous statement, 'A roaring car...is more beautiful than the Victory of Samothrace' (ibid).

The German Expressionist August Macke also described the significance of the artistic process, stating that all great paintings (within which category he included paintings from so-called primitive cultures)

...are the expressions of (artists') inner lives; they are the forms of these artists' interior world in the medium of painting. (circa 1911-1912, in Lankheit, ed., 1974. p.87)

Macke alluded to the significance of process also in the art of children, demonstrating a knowledge and perception of principles, beliefs and values beginning to be more widely advanced in education. He stated,

To create forms means: to live. Are not children more creative in drawing directly from the secret of their sensations?
...Thunder, flower, any force expresses itself as form. So does man. He, too, is driven by something to find words for conceptions to find clearness in obscurity, consciousness in the unconscious. This is his life, his creation. As man changes, so do his forms change. (in Lankheit, p.85)

Macke perceived that which Lowenfeld (1943) was to later expound as the developmental stages in children's art.

Macke the artist is seen to be akin also to Dewey the philosopher/educationist. This is apparent in respective statements made by the two. First, Macke wrote (c.1912),

The joys, the sorrows of man, of nations, lie behind the inscriptions, paintings, temples, cathedrals, and masks, behind the musical compositions, stage spectacles, and dances. If they are not there, if form becomes empty and groundless then there is no art. (in Lankheit, p.89)

The title of Dewey's book, Art as Experience (1934), itself suggests the significance of process in art. In it, Dewey states,

In order to understand the meaning of artistic products, we have to forget them for a time, to turn aside from them and have recourse to the ordinary forces and conditions of experience that we do not usually regard as aesthetic...In order to understand the aesthetic in its ultimate and approved forms, one must begin with it in the raw; in the events and scenes that hold the attentive eye and ear of man, arousing his interest and affording him enjoyment as he looks and listens. (pp. 4-5)
However, Dewey himself did not go so far as to dismiss the art product as being of no significance, and nor did Macke or the Futurists.

The same could not be said for many of the zealous disciples of progressive education. The notion that process alone is all that counts in art and art education - in fact, in respect of education in all the arts - is a notion which is alive and well in many educational quarters today, not least in the so-called Related Arts movement.

Emphasis on the pre-eminence of process over product in art education may be traced also to three major influences from educational psychology which have manifested themselves in significant ways. First, there is the notion that art activity possesses particular therapeutic value and is therefore a contributor to the general mental health of the child. This notion derives from interpretations, most notably, of the work of Freud and Jung. Second, the art-making process is seen as a cognitive activity and thus an indicator of intelligence in children. Burt's Mental Scholastic Tests (1921) and Goodenough's Measurement of Intelligence by Drawings (c.1926) have been important influences here. Third, there is the panacea of creativity as an educational value in itself, in relation to which art is regarded as a special repository and a way of giving the elusive phenomena of creativity actual concrete form. If art objects may be conceived as creations - as products of creative thinking - then the artistic process must constitute a virtually pure embodiment of the creative process.
itself. As Lowenfeld and Brittain state,

Art activity cannot be imposed but must come as a spirit from within. This is not always an easy process, but the development of creative abilities is essential in our society, and the youngster's drawing reflects his creative growth, both in the drawing itself and in the process of making the art form.

...Art can bring ...a dimension that is concerned with the psychological processes that occur and are experienced and developed in the youngster as he is involved in learning.

...Through an understanding of the way a youngster draws and the methods he uses to portray his environment, we can gain insight into his behaviour and develop an appreciation of the complex and varied ways in which children grow and develop. (1972, 41-43)
At an earlier point in this discourse, the notion of Archer (1978) that all human making operations could be listed under design was discussed.

Archer's reductionist rationale is based on his own particular interpretation of the nature of process involved in human making, or form-giving operations: specifically, that all such activities involve the same creative process. Archer states that he could prove that all such operations logically constituted design by citing etymological definitions - if he had time! Notwithstanding the futility of providing (or, as in Archer's case, not providing) etymological 'evidence' to explain current meanings of words, to expand Archer's point by referring to etymological foundations may nevertheless be helpful in the present context. For to do so may partly explain the current confusion over what should count as Art in schools.

According to the Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology (1966), the word 'design' derives from the Latin 'designare', meaning to 'mark out, point out, delineate, depict, contrive.' It is not difficult to conceive from this definition that virtually all deliberate form-making operations would involve designing. Archer may be seen to be quite correct, therefore, in his global definition of design. For all those processes defined - marking out, pointing out, delineating, depicting, contriving - do, in fact, describe the processes pertaining
to fine art and craft as well as to so-called design in its narrower, discipline-based sense.

The problem of an (often persuasive) argument such as Archer's is revealed when it is applied to the school setting. For the global, all-embracing definition of design based on etymological 'evidence' and simplistic reductionist logic is characteristically advanced as the rationale for incorporating all the visual arts under the label (and in the department) of Design in schools. The problem is that once accomplished, the curriculum orientation of such a department may be shed of any global conception and be based instead on the philosophy, content, and methodologies of design in the specific, normative sense of the word - that is, as it refers to the contemporary world of design and the particular vocation of the designer. An art teacher with a fine art background reports that, in such a department, 'students produce oil paintings to design briefs'.

The situation described has emanated from belief in the primacy of process in art, from the claim that all human form-making processes are fundamentally one and the same, and from the consequent idea that design, fine art, craft (and any other visual forms for that matter) could all justifiably count as Art in education.

However, does the obvious fact that all concrete forms are brought into existence by some kind of process mean that all form-creating processes are identical? Specifically, can it be claimed that fine art, craft and design do, in fact, all involve one and the same
Robinson (1973) believes so. He distinguishes between the polarities of fine art and design, describing the former as being concerned with the expression of ideas, the latter with problem-solving. However, he presents the notion that these polarities actually exist at the two extreme ends of a single continuum, within the middle range of which distinctions between the two become blurred.

The implicit justification for this concept of locating both fine art and design on a single continuum is that each involves a common fundamental activity: the creative process. Thus Robinson asserts,

> Fundamental to my argument is the belief that, although differences exist between the work of the designer and artist, there is significant common ground in their modes of thinking in that they are both initially concerned with creative thinking. . . . in creative thinking, reason and intuition are mutually interdependent, and ... originality and innovation, flexibility, fluency and divergent thinking (he cites Guilford elsewhere) can occur in any discipline. Whether they are concerned with problem-solving or expression is completely irrelevant. (in Aylward, Ed., 1973, p. 97)

Aylward (1973) is of the same persuasion. He presents a rationale for the use of the title 'Design' to encompass a range of existing school subjects, including Art, which is remarkably Archeresque in its sweeping nature and in the taken-for-granted truths which it asserts as the very basis of the rationale.
Aylward seemingly takes for granted that all his readers would agree with him that educational change is a good thing in itself, that the pertinent school subjects in particular need to be reformed and that inter-disciplinary studies constitute a desirable model for curriculum. Thus he states,

> It is only too true that changes of title do not in themselves produce change. Yet, at worst, they do represent an attempt to look anew at ways of organising work in a better way. Particularly if one is concerned with setting up interdisciplinary studies, a new name for the work is essential. If teachers of art, handicraft and home economics are to be encouraged to co-operate in developing more valuable experiences for their pupils, the old titles must go.

Design has not been used as a subject title in secondary education, but a broad interpretation of its meaning is so relevant to the work done in all practical subjects that most teachers are willing to accept it. (1973, p.14).

In common with Archer and Robinson, Aylward bases his argument of the essential unity between all productive endeavour involved in the creation of visual form on the view that each involves the same process. He describes, for example, common intellectual qualities which are brought to bear in respect of each as including

> ...the ability to analyse a problem and synthesize a solution, and the knowledge of materials and processes by which the solution is produced.

(1973, p.15)
He also identifies common sensuous qualities:

...the ability to be aware of the needs of others, to use materials and processes in ways appropriate to their nature, and to evolve an elegant solution rather than one that is merely crudely functional.

(1973, p.15)

The unfettered adulation of the creative process has been largely responsible for the current confusion as to what should count as art in education. Ironically, this pre-occupation with creative process has, by circuitous means, led to the demise of fine art in art education, in terms of both fine art's identity (what it is) and its status (its perceived cultural value).

Nowhere has this been more fully demonstrated than by the phenomenon of so-called Basic Design courses in Art education. Fuller (1982) identifies Basic Design programmes in art schools as one of the chief destroyers of fine art in the last quarter of a century (p.7). He claims that,

...instead of providing an alternative to academicism, 'basic design' is itself a new academicism (and that)...from the beginning, it exerted a restrictive and finally 'collaborationist influence.

(p.8)

With its belief in the primacy of process over product, Basic Design
may be seen as an heir to a familiar tradition in art and education of this century. However, the fact that Basic Design courses aspired to fully facilitating the creative process did not, of course, mean that this objective was automatically achieved.

On the contrary, according to Fuller (1982),

...despite claiming to be concerned with individual creative development, 'basic design' type teaching just institutionalised the retardation of such development...

(p.9)

Hailed as a 'New Art for a New Age', Basic Design was pioneered by Victor Pasmore and Richard Hamilton at Newcastle University in the U.K. in the late 1950s. Influence spread rapidly, and the basic curriculum model - along with its underlying philosophy - has remained a powerful influence in British and Australian art education at all levels ever since. It remains to be seen, however, whether Basic Design, or Foundation Studies as it is often called, can withstand the radical re-assessment to which it is currently being subjected.

Basic Design owes a good deal to the Bauhaus in its conception of an essential unity existing between all forms realised by the creative process. It is little wonder that the teachings of Bauhaus masters - for example, of Itten in the sphere of colour - have been incorporated in the typical Basic Design curriculum.

The strategy for devising a Basic Design curriculum is a reductionist
one. This reductionist methodology has also been a significant contributor to the demise of fine art. For it is based on the Bauhaus notion that fine art, craft, design, architecture or dressmaking all involve the manipulation of the same visual elements of pure shape, pure colour, pure point, pure texture, pure line and so on. This, however, tends to deny the iconographic significance of works of art - and it is its concern with iconography which distinguishes fine art from other productive modes.

The Basic Design approach tends to lead students and artists more and more away from representational imagery. Abstraction reigned supreme during the sixties when Basic Design programmes were riding the crest of a wave. Painting and sculpture were the better the further they ranged from representation. The painting was a painting, so the logic went: it was a picture of nothing. It was pursued as an aesthetic form in its own right, as pure shape, pure colour, pure texture.

The production of paintings and sculptures involved, to a high degree, the cognitive mode of problem-solving. Thus a student might be set the problem of representing space on a flat surface with colour alone or of achieving the effect of rhythm purely with cut-out cardboard shapes. Being scornful toward iconography and being concerned with manipulating pure visual elements into aesthetically pleasing products through problem-solving approaches, painting and sculpture had thus become completely infiltrated by the ethos and the aesthetic principles of design - except for one crucial factor inherent to design: that of utility.
Fine art was thus vulnerable. It was presenting the public with objects which differed little, in appearance and apparent meanings, from such utilitarian contemporary artefacts as kitchen utensils, furniture and office products. The problem was, however, that the fine art objects were, unlike such other artefacts, literally useless. The problem was exacerbated because the relative cost of the fine art objects was unfortunately outrageous to a public which saw in them nothing more than well-designed features of interior design, if not pure status symbols.

By virtue of this interpretation of an identical creative process involved in all the visual arts, seduced by the paradigm of integration and by visions of what art should be in the New Age, artists and art educators stripped art of its own essential character, its autonomy and specialness.

It is the uniqueness of art as a special way of human knowing, feeling, responding and communicating which Fuller, for one, wishes to restore. Admonishing Basic Design for the crisis it has created in respect of art in education and, by extension, in society as a whole, he asserts the potential of painting and sculpture - fine art - to create an aesthetically healthy society. He conceives painting and sculpture as permitting

...the creation of a new and definite reality within the existing one, an illusory, re-constituted world within which the aesthetic dimension could survive, mature, and truly develop. (1982,p.9)
Hirst (1974) claims that art is a unique form of knowledge, "stating truths that cannot be communicated in any other way." (p.153). He conceives of art as an autonomous symbolic system within which meanings reside which are inseparable, and which cannot be precisely translated from the symbolic system itself. As such, artistic meanings are meanings which are peculiar to art.

Hirst draws a parallel between art and language, suggesting that studies in the field of language have shed light on the nature of knowledge in art. In this connection, he refers to Wittgenstein's studies of meaning and concept of language-games.

It is not simply that a symbolic system - in this case art - represents concepts already formed prior to their representation in terms of that symbolic system. Rather, the act of representing in terms of a symbolic system itself determines the precise nature of those concepts which emerge or become formed during the act.

Field (1970) provides an example of this in relation to art education:

When young children draw, aspects of their view of their world are being confirmed or modified in accordance with changing experience. In this recurrent process it is not merely that the child's drawing reflects his concepts: it plays a part in their formation. (p.8)
Robert Hughes (1963) also describes how precise meaning is bound by, and is unique to the particular symbolic system in which a concept or image is embedded. In this case, Hughes explains how even meaning within the visual arts cannot be transferred from one form of representation to another and remain quite the same. Referring to one of his own drawings (of a scarecrow), Hughes states,

The 'same' image as this scarecrow, in paint, is a different image altogether. One's medium is not a passive vehicle for making a form or an idea known. It helps determine the form, and it modifies the idea.
(in Lynn, 1963, p.35)

Thus meaning is inherently bound up in the symbolic system which represents it. To Hirst (1974), there exists no evidence - nor can it exist - to show that meanings reside anywhere else but within the symbolic systems used to organise human experience. As Wittgenstein has stated, 'The meaning is the use'; and elsewhere,

All we have are the achievements of the process (of thought) in symbolic occurrences.
(in Hirst, 1974, p.71)

Theories based on the notion that generalisations of reality - concepts - are inseparable from the symbolic system which represent them owe much to the work of Vygotsky. In his pioneering work of the 1930s, Vygotsky was concerned with the relationship between thought and language. He maintained that the very nature of verbal thought
was based upon word meaning: 'Thought is not merely expressed in words; it comes into existence through them.' (1966, p.125). He opposed the 'association theory' advanced by the 'old schools of psychology', for whom

The word was seen as the external concomitant of thought, its attire only, having no influence on its inner life.
(1966, p.122)

Vygotsky quotes the poet Mandelstam to make his point:

...'I have forgotten the Word I intended to say, and my thought, unembodied, returns to the realm of shadows.'
(in Vygotsky, 1966, p.119)

Vygotsky conceived that if thought and hence meaning were inseparable from language, then just as language has demonstrably evolved so must thought and meaning, albeit more surrogately, also have changed:

It is not merely the content of a word that changes, but the way in which reality is generalised and reflected in a word.
(1966, pp.121-122)

Vygotsky's conception of the essentially dynamic universe of thought and language extended to the more localised dialectical relationship between thought and word. Such a dialectic, repeated over and over,
may be identified as the basic mechanism for the broader evolution of language and hence thought. Thus Vygotsky explains,

The relation of thought to word is not a thing but a process, a continual movement back and forth from thought to word and from word to thought.

(p.125)

Britton (1972) applies the principle of dialectic to a somewhat more general domain, one that admits artistic, as well as verbal representation. He states,

Once we see man as creating a representation of his world so that he may operate in it, another order of activity is also open to him: he may operate directly upon the representation itself.

(p.121)

The dialectic interaction between thought and word as described by Vygotsky is here extended by Britton to apply to the relationship which exists between the individual and symbolic representation in general.

The dialectic principle is uppermost in marxist theories of art. The dialectic process is concerned with progressive penetration of a concept, with that concept becoming modified by virtue of its being represented in some form. The consequent externalised representation of the concept - its symbolic form - thus becomes the medium for the dialectic process. The purpose of this penetration - this dialectic -
is to facilitate knowing. Thus a particular characteristic of meaning is that, by being represented, it is also ever-unfolding. This dynamic dialectic process of concept/representation/new concept/new representation - a process which presumably may go on indefinitely - is a cognitive process.

This would mean that cognition itself is bound up in the symbol systems used for the representation of experience. Such systems do not simply represent existing concepts, existing knowledge. By deploying a particular symbolic system, the individual will, as Field has pointed out, discover a concept in elaborated form. He or she will arrive at knowledge by means of the symbol system used, but the particular nature of that knowledge will itself be exclusive to that system.

What are the implications of this for art? Essentially three propositions are being advanced. The first is that art is like language, in that it is a symbolic system utilized for the organisation and representation of experience. The second proposition is that, as such, the structure, function and nature of artistic representation parallel those pertaining to language, and work in this latter field has illuminated our knowledge of artistic knowing. The third proposition, however, by claiming that the particular nature of concepts or meanings is peculiar to the particular symbolic system used for its representation, thereby implicitly distinguishes between artistic and linguistic meanings and suggests that the nature of knowledge in art is unique.
If artistic representation, by means of the dynamic dialectic meaning-revealing process, is able to provide for greater knowing and if, at the same time, the particular nature of that knowledge is exclusive to artistic representation itself, it would seem that a case could be put for artistic knowledge to become significantly manifest in school curriculum, concerned as curriculum is with the overall cognitive development of the child.

Hirst builds his conception of curriculum comprising various unique forms of knowledge - or different ways of knowing - on such a rationale. He includes artistic knowing as one such unique way.

If it is accepted that all human symbolic systems constitute ways of organising and communicating experience, of apprehending the temporal and spiritual world, then it would seem to follow that the elements of those systems which carried these experiential meanings would have to actually refer in some way to the content itself of experience in order for meanings to be made known. Symbols must possess referents in order to be symbols. It is in the nature of the respective form of their referents that art and language fundamentally differ.

In a drawing, particular lines may refer to a cat, for example. That is, a line may stand for, or is an abstraction, a symbol of a visual phenomenon (a cat) which exists in the 'external' world. The ability to project the meaning of 'cat' into the line would depend upon one's knowledge of the nature and function of the symbolic system itself (in this case drawing) as well as, perhaps, a rudimentary knowledge of
four-footed furry animals.

The same may be said to be true if language were to be used to represent the same subject matter: that is, a cat. In order to understand the meaning of the word 'cat', one must, again, possess knowledge of the symbolic system itself which has been used (in this case the English language). As well, however, a considerably more elaborate, in fact, specific knowledge of cats would be necessary for the word 'cat' to have any meaning.

In differentiating between language and art, Hirst claims (1974) that 'the noises and marks' themselves of words are distinguishable from their meanings, but that in artistic images, on the other hand, '...meaning is not separable from those noises and marks' (p.156).

By this argument, an artistic image does more than simply refer to or signify a concept. In the very representation of a concept, the artistic image also presents character and meaning which are embedded within, and are inseparable from the form of representation itself. A work of art depicts not only knowledge about a subject, as do words: it also communicates knowledge of a subject.

Thus the artists who participated in the early French and English expeditions of discovery to Terra Australis would, through their pictorial representations of hitherto unknown creatures, be able to provide knowledge of how these creatures looked to people unaware of the existence of such creatures at home. In contrast, words alone -
such as 'kangaroo', 'koala', 'platypus' - would communicate only knowledge about the existence of such creatures; and even elaborated verbal descriptions of them would still rely on a string of conceptual associations between words and their referents. The 'noises and marks' of descriptive words would still not of themselves communicate the nature of their referents without a whole complex of abstract concepts existing in the minds of an audience.

To Hirst, therefore, works of art do not, in the strict sense, constitute a language. For unlike words, visual images are not 'statements about' but are instead 'expressions of' (1974, p.157). He quotes Louis Arnaud Reid's statement,

> The perceptuum does not 'symbolise' or 'mean' something else which is, aesthetically and in aesthetic experience, distinct from itself: aesthetic meaning is embodied. (in Hirst, 1974, p.157)

In this sense, art may be conceived in the terms proposed by Wittgenstein with regard to language: that art, like language, is a form of life. That is, artistic experience and artistic meaning cannot exist outside an artistic context, or outside artistic statements themselves.

Here the emphasis is placed upon the integral relationship which exists between art and artistic meanings. This is to direct attention to artistic products, or outcomes. Wollheim (1978) applies this principle of the inseparability of form and meaning in art also to the
artistic process, and to what may be considered the initial step in this process: the artistic impulse itself. He points to

The error...of thinking that there is an artistic impulse that can be identified independently of the institutions of art. It does not follow that there is no such thing as artistic impulse. On the contrary, there is, where this means the impulse to produce something as a work of art:...where this means the attitude of seeing something as a work of art.
(p.123)

According to this view, an artist's perception of the world would often tend to be in terms pertinent to art - that is, in terms of artistic products. Gombrich (1977) suggests that an artist's perception is more than simply affected, but is determined by his knowledge of the institutions of art, of artistic precedents, or products.

This Gombrich encapsulates in his statement,

The artist does not paint what he sees; he sees what he paints.
(1977, p.284)

The conclusions, from a psychological perspective, by M.D. Vernon (1971) verify this conception of the integral relationship between one's knowledge of a representational form and what is actually
perceived in one's world. She states,

We have frequently noted that the object perceived in a complex field, and the clarity and accuracy with which they are perceived, appear to be related to the observer's 'interest' in perceiving them. 'Interest' usually possesses the implication that there is some strong and persistent motive in the observer which has impelled him to observe, investigate, and acquire knowledge about some set of objects or ideas in the world around him. Thus when we say that an observer perceives something because he is interested in such things, we imply both that he is knowledgeable about them, and also that he is eager to perceive and learn more about them.

(p.180)

Langer (1953) maintains that each of the so-called expressive art forms is structured upon, and grows out of the dominance of a particular human sense. Thus art, to Langer, is unique in its overriding emphasis on the sense of vision.

Perhaps, therefore, a case could be put that education in art should principally involve the education of vision. Art education may thus be concerned with educating people how to 'see' and in ways which may lead to their developing capacity to understand and represent meanings in what they see. In short, art education would be principally concerned, as Eisner (1977) asserts, with the education of perception.

The linguists, aestheticians and psychologists cited in this section all point to a relationship existing between knowledge, impulse and expression: in other words, between cognition, perception and representation. The absolute interdependence of cognition and
perception constitutes the central thesis and is summed up in the
CONCLUSION: WHAT MIGHT COUNT AS ART IN SCHOOLS.

If perception - seeing - is so dependant upon cognition - knowing - then art educators who accept that they are primarily in the business of educating perception are thus provided with what amounts to a philosophical framework for determining the content of art curricula.

In essence, this is a framework of knowledge. Methodologically, this would imply that the teacher should ensure that knowledge is acquired, not that such acquisition be left to chance. This in turn would involve the teacher in specifying what may be considered appropriate knowledge and in imparting it. With regard to the latter, the teacher would need to devise appropriate ways for the knowledge to be imparted. Essentially, however, the over-arching focus of art curriculum would be on developing visual perception, on the capacity to 'see' - to be capable of penetrating, representing and deriving meaning from the world principally through the sense of vision.

Eisner (1977) asserts an active, determining role for the art teacher in this regard. He states,

What I think some people fail to realize is that the ability to perceive is a learned ability. We are not born with sight; we acquire it through experience, through trial and error. To see something is to have constructed intellectually a perceptual realisation.

...Art teachers have an enormous contribution to make to the growing child by helping him to keep his visual exploration going.

(PP. 1-2)
The notion of the educability of vision to which Eisner alludes is powerfully reinforced by anthropological studies. McFee (1980) cites a study by Turnbull on the visual perception of pygmies, in which a group of pygmies was taken out of the forest for the first time and into a plain. Elephants, though familiar to the pygmies, were perceived as insects when seen from a distance of about a mile. With their prior environmental knowledge having been gained always at relatively short focal distances in their dense jungle habitat, these pygmies simply never knew - and hence could not perceive - that things drastically reduce in apparent size as they become more distant. (McFee, 1980, pp. 48-49)

In another study, Forge (In Mayer, 1970) describes how the Abelan community in the Sepik District of Papua - New Guinea were incapable of perceiving the content of pictures - even of photographs of themselves. These people possessed no prior knowledge of the convention itself of pictorial representation (pp. 269-291). Again, the capacity to perceive was seen to depend upon the possession of knowledge.

Perception and cognition are inter-dependent. Arnheim (1969) maintains that it is not merely that knowing facilitates seeing, but that the deeper perception which the knowledge affords in turn effects deeper, or more comprehensive knowledge, and so on. The relationship between perception and cognition is a spiral one. It is a virtual dialectic, a closely similar manifestation to that described by Vygotsky in relation to thought and language.
How might the education of visual perception benefit representation in, and appreciation of art? It would be consistent with the above conclusions to claim that when a work of art is confronted, it is apprehended by the individual by means of that individual's complex perceptual apparatus, which in turn is built upon the individual's prior visual knowledge. The more expansive an individual's knowledge of words the more precise, subtle or sophisticated would be his or her ability to identify concepts and perceive meanings in verbal statements. Similarly, the more expansive an individual's knowledge of visual form, the more precise, subtle or sophisticated may be his or her ability to identify concepts and perceive meanings in visual statements.

How does one develop one's vocabulary of words? Surely this would occur through engaging in the use of words, which would be to engage also in the world which words both comprise and describe. The same, perhaps, holds true for art. Through practising art, and thereby entering into the world of forms out of which an expanding visual vocabulary, which includes technical knowledge, is constructed, it may be possible to develop a progressively greater capacity to both perceive and represent meaning in visual forms.

The study of art, therefore, essentially involves the study of visual forms, and since visual forms are there to see, as it were, in the visual world, it is the visual world which should, therefore, constitute the principal focus of study.
Klee insisted upon the necessity for the artist to continue to study and represent visual forms from the real world, particularly natural forms. However, Klee regarded such studies as means, not ends. He regarded such studies as essential, nevertheless, for they served to supply what he called the creative unconscious of the artist with an ever-expanding vocabulary of forms out of which the artist's own world of meaning could be created. He stated (in Lynton, 1961),

Nature, if we love her, will ultimately lead us into liberty. Of course the painter must study nature. You know it! Do it. It is more sensible than poetising or borrowing from the primitives. Follow the natural paths of creation, the genesis and functions of forms. That is the best school. Through nature you will perhaps achieve your own configurations and one day, be nature yourself, creating like nature. (p.66)

Advising art educators, Klee implored them,

When the demand arises, lead your pupils to nature, into nature. Let them experience how a bud forms, how a tree grows, how a butterfly opens its wings, so that they may become as rich, as wilful as nature. Contemplation is revelation; contemplation is insight into God's workshop. There, in the lap of nature, lies the secret of creation. (in Lynton, pp 73-74)

Here Klee describes the cognitive process of abstraction in art. He does not suggest that it is the end of art to faithfully represent, to create illusions of a particular bud, tree or butterfly. Rather, he explains the significance of developing knowledge of principles of visual forms, which, once these are known and internalised may be
creatively employed by the artist in the configuration of new images evoking (like dreams) new, albeit often subconsciously related meanings.

Rodgers (1970) describes this internalisation of general principles in the structure and character of visual forms as comprehension of the 'logic of form' of a particular subject. Though his concern is with 'sculptural thinking' as opposed to pictorial representation, Rodgers prescribes the same course as Klee. That is, the sculptor should, according to Rodgers, begin with and continue to produce analytical studies of subject-matter, particularly of natural forms. By such means, the particular logic of a natural object's form will become known and internalised.

After time - again in common with Klee's notion - the artist will become cognizant of various logical general principles in the nature of visual form. With this knowledge, according to Rodgers, a sculptor is able to operate at a level of phenomenology - apprehending which he describes as 'advanced thinking in three-dimensions'. Advanced thinking in 3-D is distinct from 'ordinary thinking in 3-D' by which he describes the level involved simply in the everyday practical negotiation of one's environment.

With this internalised knowledge of the logic of forms acquired through the study of actual forms, the sculptor is thereby able to represent, in terms of his or her own visual forms, new meanings. The meaning of an image may be communicated when an audience, however
unconsciously, 'read' the image through their own usually tacit ordinary knowledge of the universal principles of form which the sculptor has manipulated and which are alluded to in the work. Again it may be seen that perception is dependent upon knowledge.

As Forge (1970) and McFee (1980) show, however, the requisite knowledge amounts to more than knowledge of, and hence a capacity to perceive artists' subject-matter as it is known and experienced in the physical world (that is, knowledge of an image's referent). The perception of artistic images also requires knowledge of artistic imagery itself. That is, artists' meanings are represented in terms of the symbolic system which is art in precisely the same way that an individual's verbal representation of experience is expressed in language.

It is obvious that, notwithstanding the significance of expressional accompaniments to language, an understanding of the meanings expressed by an individual speaking a particular language require on the part of an audience that they too be cognizant of that same language. The same holds true for art.

Here a task for art education is clearly implied. That is, as well as acquiring knowledge of artistic principles through the practice of art, it would seem that a study of the history of art would provide a way of discovering the vast domain which constitutes the art language.
However, a great many overtly utilitarian artefacts of contemporary culture which do not purport to be art objects at all have yet intentionally been produced so as to play a role in culture which anthropologists identify as the role of art. They are forms which, like conventional art images, rely on the perception of meaning deriving from and imparted by the combination of visual elements of the artefacts themselves. An example is the automobile.

The design of cars has not involved purely functional or other practical criteria such as aerodynamics, structural integrity, safety, fuel efficiency and price. Cars have been designed in certain ways for other reasons, and these reasons essentially revolve round the concept of image.

Every car projects an image; but the image embodied in the car is the image not of the car itself but rather the image of its owner. In this way the car serves as a totem, embodying meanings which extend far deeper than those concerned purely with utility. Cars may project meanings about the owner's status, social class, age, personality, values and sex. They are affirmations of identity. Since they would thus constitute, in Kubler's terms, a system of symbolic communication they would also, by this criterion, also count as art.

Artefacts of this order may superficially be considered as objects of design, but their cultural meanings are essentially artistic meanings. As such, the study of such artefacts in terms of their import as visual forms in culture would constitute a legitimate curriculum
enterprise in art education. Art education is therefore concerned, as part of the education of vision, also with the study of semiotics.

Clearly, a high school art class could not be expected to actually make a real car; but this inability would not of itself diminish the potential of a semiotic orientation in the study of automobiles in culture for that class. Indeed, the actual manufacture of a car would be irrelevant and counter-productive in an art curriculum which adopted a semiotic approach.

At the same time, however, to involve children in drawing, photographing, filming or making ceramic forms, junk sculpture or collages which would represent their ideas about the embedded meanings which they perceived in cars, of the symbolic meaning of the car in contemporary culture, would be entirely compatible with the semiotic approach. To represent the car is to engage in art; to make a car is to engage in design and craft.

Making, then, is important to art, but it is not simply any kind of making which is important. The making proper to art is that which serves the purpose of representing.

Nor is the making alone the appropriate mode of learning in art. For when artistic meaning is conferred onto objects which have yet been produced outside the institutions of art - that is, with no artistic intent having been brought to bear in their making - the mode
by which these objects have been apprehended as meaningful art forms is usually (perhaps fundamentally) verbal.

As Field (1970) claims, talking about art is of equal importance to practising art. In talking about art, one may well be describing artistic processes, but a semiotic approach often ignores consideration of process. Its concern is with the symbolic meaning of products - with the import of visual forms - often irrespective of the processes which have brought these products into being.

While there exist certain processes, such as oil painting and bronze sculpture, involving the manipulation of materials which are peculiar to art, such processes of themselves do not define art. For art objects may be intended but they may also be attributed. In respect of the latter, another kind of representational process is involved: the verbal.

And just as realising artistic meaning in an intended art object through the manipulation of, say, oil paint may constitute a creative process, so realizing through discourse artistic meaning in artefacts not so intended may similarly constitute a creative process.

The problem with the panaceas of Art-as-Creative-Process lay not with the view that the fostering of creativity is important in education. To foster creativity is important. The problem with the panaceas is that its followers have conceived of creativity in such extremely narrow terms: specifically, that the making of art is the supreme
creative act. And further, they believe that, as such, to engage and support the child (unfettered) in art-making is the primary task of art educators.

Witkin (1974) describes as distinctive of art that it is concerned with the 'iconic' rather than the 'discursive' mode of representation. It is true that if art is about the import of visual form, its focus should be upon iconic meanings. However, the deliberate production of iconic meanings requires the ability to comprehend iconic meanings. This applies even at the earliest stages of infancy when the child first perceives iconic meanings.

Iconic meanings can be infinitely more subtly suggestible, more complex, than those perceived by the small infant. Yet even the small infant's apprehension of iconic meaning involves description: in this case, simply naming. With respect to the considerably more elaborated iconic meanings encountered by the adolescent, a proportionately more elaborated capacity for verbal description is demanded. And just as the simple naming of an image can constitute a major creative act on the part of a small infant, so can an elaborated description by an adolescent.

In each case, the individual concerned must possess the capacity for engaging in, and realising such meanings. In art education, therefore, it would seem that learning about the nature of description in art constitutes an important curriculum domain.
Thus the iconic and the discursive should not be regarded as mutually exclusive in art education, but mutually dependent. For it is largely by means of discourse that the nature of iconic meaning is comprehended.

This is not to suggest, however, that the particular iconic meanings in an individual's work of art can be precisely translated into verbal discourse: earlier discussion has attempted to show that this is not possible. For the particular meanings arrived at in a work of art are unique to that form, as is the particular sensory mode - the visual - by which experience is encountered also unique.

What verbal discourse is able to realise however, is knowledge of iconology itself - the very way of knowing within which the individual producing art is engaged.

It is not, therefore, the study of fine art alone, of design or craft so-called - or even integrated activities involving all three - which should count as Art in the school curriculum.

What counts as Art is not that which simply fits appropriate categories, but rather human-made visual forms of any kind which possess intended, unintended, immediate or latent iconic significance: that is, forms which represent meanings for an individual, a group or an entire culture.


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