Transmigration, Transculturation, Tribulation: A Sociocultural Analysis of a Philippine Rural Resettlement

Peter A. F. Doelle
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School of Humanities
University of Tasmania
Hobart

November 2013
DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY

This thesis contains no material which has been accepted for a degree or diploma by the University or any other institution, except by way of background information and duly acknowledged in the thesis, and to the best of my knowledge and belief no material previously published or written by another person except where due acknowledgement is made in the text of the thesis, nor does the thesis contain any material that infringes copyright.

Peter A. F. Doelle
26 April 2013

AUTHORITY OF ACCESS

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This thesis is an examination of the sociocultural ramifications of the migration / resettlement phenomenon. A rapidly increasing population sharing an affluent disparity has contributed to an ever-increasing migrancy. A corollary of this migration, in an ethnically heterogeneous world, is that more people than ever find themselves living amid unfamiliar cultures. In consequence of this both settler and host communities are obliged to find modi vivendi with which to achieve harmonious coexistences. There appear to be three trajectories possible in such intercultural encounters: (1) the abandoning of ethnocultural lifeways by way of acculturation, (2) the reification of existing cultures, and (3) the exchanging of cultural values. To what degree individuals or groups are prepared to compromise their ethnic identities or cultural values in achieving modi vivendi is dependent on circumstance. Via an analysis of the sociocultural changes that have occurred in a specific Philippine zone of resettlement I demonstrate that integration into new societies is less fraught where mutual cultural exchange takes place.

In the course of the twentieth century the Philippines experienced a ten-fold increase in its population. The demographic imperative – coupled with the recognition by both colonial and independent administrations that an increase in land inventories was required to ensure food security, improve livelihoods, and ameliorate social unrest – created the conditions for the resettlement of millions of Filipinos to less populated regions. However, the Philippine’s polyethnicity dictated that this internal migration would have implications for intercultural accommodations, ones that state planners and bureaucrats had failed to anticipate. To comprehend the complex intercultural interactions that have taken place – and the requisite cultural compromises required in achieving modi vivendi – I have chosen the former state-sponsored resettlement scheme centred on Narra / Palawan\(^1\) as a representative model.

This thesis analyses the manner and degree of the sociocultural changes that have taken place in heterogeneous populations dislocated by Philippine rural resettlement programs – a process I term transmigration. For many, this internal, inter-island, inter-provincial, rural-to-rural population transfer experience has not

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1 The nomenclature ‘Narra / Palawan’ is used deliberately to indicate that both the Municipality of Narra and the Province of Palawan are coterminously linked as zones of transmigration. Furthermore the joint taxonomy is used to avoid confusion. Firstly, the Municipality has adopted the acronym of the former resettlement agency NARRA as a self-designation. Secondly, Narra (*Pterocarpus indicus*) also represents the national tree of the Philippines.
proved socially onerous – integration into new societies has been unproblematic. I chose the Narra / Palawan resettlement zone to test the hypothesis that interethnic harmony is contingent upon the degree to which individuals and groups are prepared to adapt their lifeways by means of a mutual exchange of cultural particularities – a process I term transculturation. Not all resettlement in the Philippines – as the tribulations of the Mindanao resettlement zone attest – have gone unchallenged. It is the contrary outcomes in intercultural encounters, in both Mindanao and the wider migrancy world, that were at once the catalyst for this study and a means for understanding the potential possible in such encounters.

While fieldwork for this thesis was confined to the Municipality of Narra in the Province of Palawan I draw on exemplars of resettlement in the wider world to help decode the observable sociocultural transformations that have occurred in Narra. As reference points the scholarship of others investigating a wide range of archipelagic resettlement scenarios has been drawn upon.

To comprehend and anchor the progression of cultural change in the Narra ‘contact zone’ I chose as a framing theory the Ortizian concept transculturation in conjunction with that of ethnic identity theory. To determine the trajectory, degree of interaction, rate of change and its ramifications for a wider resettlement world, the thesis poses two fundamental questions: (1) ‘What cultural changes take place among heterogeneous populations disrupted by resettlement?’ and (2) ‘Under which circumstances are transmigrant ethnocultural identities maintained, diminished or amplified during this process?’ Just as cultures are made of continuities and changes, in Narra I discerned that cultural exchange was an ongoing process, one from which observable inferences could be gleaned.

Individual interviews and engagement with key informants provided the data that determined Narra as a zone of transculturation. Although the requisite intercultural interaction necessary for harmonious interethnic coexistences has failed to replicate in all resettlement milieux, this thesis suggests that as a model for such coexistences Narra provides an exemplar that is paradigmatic for ongoing migration / resettlement scenarios.

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2 I use the term ‘archipelagic’ to represent the Malay Archipelago or insular Southeast Asia, especially Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines. While the Philippines and Indonesia in some minds constitute individual Archipelagos, they concomitantly form part of a grander archipelago – the Malay Archipelago. Context will dictate whether the Philippines, Indonesia, or the Malay Archipelago at large is being referred to. To avoid confusion I intend to capitalise the noun ‘Archipelago’ while employing the adjective ‘archipelagic’ in lower case.
NB. The South China Sea lies to the west of The Philippines. To the east of Palawan lies the Sulu Sea.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

That this thesis ever saw the light of day is a reflection on those who believed in its worth, and supported me academically, fiscally and emotionally. While the fieldwork for this thesis was undertaken in the Philippines, the genesis of the project occurred as a consequence of a broader regional understanding of the transmigration phenomenon. However, time and fiscal constraints precluded the inclusion of Indonesia and Malaysia in this project, though preliminary journeys to those countries, as well as interactions and communication with academics there, were of immeasurable importance. The project’s journey – punctuated by illness – has been long and arduous, and the forbearance of those associated with its progress and completion is appreciated. Across the academic world there are many individuals to thank, not all of whom I can personally acknowledge here, but who have none-the-less contributed to the thesis’ scope.

My Primary Supervisor, Pamela Allen is the person to whom I am most indebted. As well as guiding the research, critiquing the ideas, and scrutinising the writing, Pam’s role in reassuring me through the ‘dark times’ has been invaluable. Words cannot express enough my heartfelt feelings of gratitude for the countless hours she has spent in screening chapter versions, dealing with syntax, and that of general editing, and the advising of further reading. Thanks also go to two further members of my supervisory team, Taufiq Tanasaldy and Dirk Tomsa, whose support from afar was appreciated.

In the School of Asian Languages and Studies (SALS) I owe a debt of gratitude to various individuals: Barbara Hartley and Kaz Ross for their initial encouragement to embark on this project; Nicole Tarulevicz, Ayxem Eli and the wider academic staff for advising on a range of pertinent issues. I thank the SALS administrative staff for their extensive support. The collegiality of my SALS postgraduate colleagues is greatly appreciated, our similar journeys allowing for reciprocal reflection. Within UTAS I offer my appreciation to those who helped provide insight and stimulated thought: among whom I mention Mitchell Rolls and Terry Moore.

I am grateful to UTAS for having been chosen as a graduate research candidate and to be awarded the scholarship that has fiscally supported the candidature. I thank also the staff of the Morris Millar Library, especially Scott Wyllie and the Document Delivery team. For those who rendered technical
support, among them Frank Banks, Jim Hutton, Greg Lee, Paddy McLaughlan and Steve Williams, I am truly grateful.

The networking power of the Internet has enabled me to reach a dispersed academic cohort with disciplines relevant to the thesis. They have rendered immeasurable advice and were able to suggest connections with organisations and individuals that furthered the research process. In Australia I would like to thank among others: Colin Barlow, Ria Gondowarsito, Terrence Hull, Peter Krinks, Minako Sakai and Doracie Zoleta-Nantes for their help and insight.

In the wider world I would like to acknowledge, Gavin Jones, Celeste Lacuna-Richman, Colin MacAndrews, and Duncan McCargo. I owe a special debt of gratitude to Joan Hardjono who, as well being the first person to stir in me an interest in the transmigration (resettlement) phenomenon, opened her home to me whilst I was in Indonesia. In Indonesia also I extend a special thank you to Riwanto Tirtosudarmo at LIPI (Indonesian Institute of Sciences) who, as well as guiding my reading, introduced me to his cohort of academic contacts across the Archipelago. Among those who facilitated my archipelagic peregrinations were: Luqmanul Hakim, Achmad Soediro, Fachrurozie Sjarkowi, Suaidi Asyari, Ketut Sukiyono, Munafrizal Manan, Prof Hardinsyah, Jega Rengan, Abdul Rachman Embong, Azizah Kassim, Lee Boon Thong, Alex Ong, Aman Shah Alladin, Lily Yong, Bilson Kurus, Hairul Bin Ramlan and Juany B. Hj. Salleh.

In the Philippines the following interlocutors expanded my understanding of the country in general, and the resettlement / cultural interaction paradigm more specifically: Marla Asis (Scalabrini Migration Center), Melchor Bañas, Jowel Canuday, Andrea Campado (Mindanao State University – MSU), Patricio Diaz, Rolando Esteban (University of the Philippines-Diliman – UPD), Jorge Golle (Alternative Forum for Research in Mindanao – AFRIM), Rufa Guiam (MSU) Randolf Mariano (Lynch Library at the Philippine Social Science Council – PSSC), Domingo Non (MSU), Cecilia Medina, Consuelo Paz (UPD), Mary Racelis (Institute of Philippine Culture – IPC), Rudy Rodil, Eugene Tecson (Land Tenure Center), Macario Tiu (Ateneo de Davao University), and especially to Jorge Tigno (UPD) whose hospitality in Manila made that frenetic city appear a little less daunting.

In Palawan I would like to thank Palawan State University (PSU) for granting me a Visiting Research Associate status for the duration of my fieldwork in Narra / Palawan. The help and advice I received from academics at the Puerto
Princesa City (PPC) campus was crucial to an understanding of the resettlement process and Palawan’s role therein. I would especially wish to thank Ramon Docto, Oscar Evangelista, Carlos Fernandez and Jackie Abela, among the PSU interlocutors who helped fine-tune the research parameters. In Palawan also I would like to thank Conrado Guevarra of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) for inviting me to visit his bailiwick and introducing me to the DAR at the municipal level. I would like to thank the Katala Foundation, and especially Indira Lacerna-Widman for allowing me to engage with her Narra office and staff. In PPC I thank Noriam Carim for her time.

There are many people who contributed to the research outcomes in the Narra Municipality. Firstly I thank Mayor Clarito Demaala for countenancing my stay. Secondly I thank Edilberto Barrera and Juancho Belgado of the Municipal DAR for opening their office and the archives of the Narra resettlement history. Siegfred Diaz and Jewilyn Soquerata, the Narra face of the Katala Foundation, were ever helpful. I thank also Joel Gulane, Narra National High School (NNHS) Principal, and Supervisor Norma Padilla of the Narra Pilot School (NPS) for facilitating interviews of their respective staff. At the Narra Campus of PSU I am indebted to Director Amabel Liao who allowed access to her senior students at a fraught time of exams and pending vacations. For opening their homes to me I thank Gloria Dela Cruz as well as Demer and Lileth Pagobo. Peace Corps volunteer Will Shields introduced me to his NNHS colleagues, thereby expanding the vision of the project. At the Municipal Planning and Development Office (MPDO) Ervin Garcellano tolerated my endless enquiries for information.

On a more personal level I would like to thank Shirley Ang and her staff at the Gorayan Lodge for making my stay a comfortable one. As well I thank Dr. De Jesus at the Narra Municipal Hospital for her help.

In Narra the individual I need to thank most, and who is in so many ways responsible for the data-gathering component of this thesis is my mentor, guide, and translator – Marcial Dela Cruz. As a long-time resident of the Municipality he was familiar with every corner of this particular resettlement zone. His long association with Narra meant that he knew many of the pioneers, and continues to know their descendants, a factor which facilitated an easier entrée into the community. Thank you Marcial! I trust that all our tiring days are vindicated by this thesis.
I would like to thank all the respondents who made time to answer my questions and share their resettlement histories. The composite picture that emerged from their engagement altered my perception of this particular settlement program, and allowed a more nuanced view of the migration-cultural interaction nexus. Kudos Narrans!

Last but not least I would like to thank my partner Wendy for supporting me emotionally over these last years. She more than anyone is aware that there were times in which I was ready to ‘throw in the towel’; when illness stymied progress; when the future was unclear – yet she remained steadfast and travelled with me on this journey of discovery.

I dedicate this work to my late migrant-settler parents, who during their struggle to carve a farming livelihood out of the Australian bush, had neither the time or tools to reflect upon how much cultural exchange with their new society they should indulge in. As the ‘pioneer generation’ they only partially achieved integration. However, during the research for this thesis I have come to realise that when juxtaposed with the Filipino transmigration / resettlement reality, they didn’t fare too badly. It is ‘we’ the following generations that have reaped the sociocultural benefits of integration. Kudos Walter and Edith!

The support of all the above individuals and organisations notwithstanding, any shortcomings in this writing are mine and mine alone.
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### ABBREVIATIONS / ACRONYMS / TERMS

This glossary should be regarded as Philippine-specific unless otherwise indicated.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AD</td>
<td>Ancestral Domain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adat</td>
<td>Set of cultural norms, values and customs acting as a societal regulator in the Malay World</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADMU</td>
<td>Ateneo de Manila University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affluent World</td>
<td>Term used in lieu of ‘Developed World’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFRIM</td>
<td>Alternative Forum for Research in Mindanao</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFP</td>
<td>Armed Forces of the Philippines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aglipayan</td>
<td>Philippine Independent [Catholic] Church (Iglesia Filipina Independiente): established in 1902</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMEC</td>
<td>Agricultural Machinery and Equipment Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Animist</td>
<td>Believer in the power of inanimate objects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANU</td>
<td>Australian National University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Archipelago</td>
<td>Denotes the Malay Archipelago unless otherwise indicated: also represents The Philippines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aswang</td>
<td>In Philippine folklore, a mythical creature able to change form, at times feared as malevolent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austronesian</td>
<td>Language family of Southeast Asia, Madagascar, and Oceania: reputed to hail from SE China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahasa Indonesia</td>
<td>National language of Indonesia: premised on Bahasa Melayu (Malay language): archipelagic lingua franca</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangsa</td>
<td>Nation (Malay)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangsamoro</td>
<td>Historical and putative home of / for Philippine Muslims: ambit claim for secessionists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barangay</td>
<td>Local government unit answerable to municipal authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barangay Kagawad</td>
<td>Barangay Councillor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baturaja</td>
<td>Zone of resettlement in South Sumatra (Indonesia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bayanihan</td>
<td>Concept of voluntary reciprocal cooperative work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolo</td>
<td>Machete-type knife</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carabao</td>
<td>Water buffalo used for farm traction</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Beta Israel</strong></td>
<td>Ethiopian Jews</td>
</tr>
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<td>----------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>CARE</td>
<td>International humanitarian aid organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBMS</td>
<td>Community-Based Monitoring System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSSP</td>
<td>College of Social Science and Philosophy (UPD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNI</td>
<td>Commission of National Integration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dayak</td>
<td>Ethnic group indigenous to Kalimantan (Indonesia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DANR</td>
<td>Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAR</td>
<td>Department of Agrarian Reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFAT</td>
<td>Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (Australia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DILG</td>
<td>Department of Interior and Local Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DREC</td>
<td>Dictionary of Race, Ethnicity and Culture (2003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EB</td>
<td>Encyclopaedia Britannica</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EBYB</td>
<td>Encyclopaedia Britannica Book of the Year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDCOR</td>
<td>Economic Development Corps of the AFP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnologue (2009)</td>
<td>A publication of <em>SIL International</em> denoting the world’s languages, their extent, and prospects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agricultural Organization (UN Agency)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FELDA</td>
<td>Federal Land Development Authority (Malaysia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Filipino / Tagalog</td>
<td>Philippine national language based on Tagalog</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FYu</td>
<td>The Former Yugoslavia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEN</td>
<td>Generation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Halo-halo</td>
<td>Dessert consisting of fruits, shaved ice, etc. (also denoting a mixture of people – a melting pot)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUK</td>
<td><em>Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan</em> (People’s Liberation Army – genesis as the Anti-Japanese Army)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICC</td>
<td>Indigenous cultural communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally displaced person / internal refugee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indigene</td>
<td>An indigenous person – autochthonous, native to a region, already-resident (see Definition of Terms)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IP</td>
<td>Indigenous person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPC</td>
<td>Institute of Philippine Culture (located ADMU)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
ISO³  | The International Organization for Standardization  
--- | ---  
JICA  | Japan International Cooperation Agency  
*Kaingin*  | Swidden / slash and burn agriculture / shifting cultivation  
Kalimantan  | Indonesian nomenclature for Borneo  
Katala Foundation  | NGO dedicated to wildlife protection  
*Kagawad (Kgwd)*  | Councillor in a barangay  
KFR  | Kidnap For Ransom  
KK  | *Katipunan ng Kabataan* (Youth Federation)  
LA  | Land Authority  
LASEDECO  | Land Settlement Development Corporation  
LIPI  | *Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia* (Indonesian Institute of Sciences)  
Lumad  | *Lumadnong Alyansa Alang sa Demokrasya* (Indigenous Alliance for Democracy)  
*Lupon Tagapamayapa*  | Justice of the Peace  
Luzon  | The Philippines’ largest island – geographical region encompassing the northern part of the country  
Madurese  | Ethnic group indigenous to Madura Island (Indonesia)  
Malay Archipelago  | Insular Southeast Asia including Malay Peninsula  
Maluku  | Moluccas: province and geographical region of Indonesia  
*Mano po (Mano)*  | Display of respect involving the raising to the forehead of a proffered handshake – mostly inter-generational  
MARO  | Municipal Agrarian Reform Office(r)  
MCU  | Malaria Control Unit  
*Mestizaje*  | Theoretical concept referring to biological and cultural blending (Latin America)  
MILF  | Moro Islamic Liberation Front  
MIMAROPA  | Administrative region including the islands of Mindoro, Marindique, Romblon and Palawan  
Mindanao  | The Philippines’ second largest island – geographical region encompassing the country’s south  
MM  | Metro Manila

³ NB. This thesis uses the ISO-8601 dating convention, one which allows the date to be written with reduced precision. That is, a year-month-day format. For example, the 23rd of February 2009 would be displayed as 2009-02-23.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MNLF</td>
<td>Moro National Liberation Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moro</td>
<td>Spanish nomenclature for Muslims in the Philippines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPDO</td>
<td>Municipal Planning and Development Office (Narra)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPM</td>
<td>Mindanao, Palawan, Mindoro (geographical region)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSU</td>
<td>Mindanao State University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NARRA</td>
<td>National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Narra / Palawan</td>
<td>Denotes both the Municipality and urban centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIA</td>
<td>National Irrigation Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NNHS</td>
<td>Narra National High School</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NLSA</td>
<td>National Land Settlement Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPA</td>
<td>New People’s Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPS</td>
<td>Narra Pilot School</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSO</td>
<td>National Statistics Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OFW</td>
<td>Overseas Foreign Worker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orde Baru (New Order)</td>
<td>Period of rule under President Suharto (r. 1966-1998)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODS</td>
<td>Oxford Dictionary of Sociology (2005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pagan</td>
<td>Pejorative term denoting someone possessing non-monotheist belief structures (archaic) – Animist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palawan</td>
<td>Denotes both Palawan Province and Palawan Island</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pala’wan</td>
<td>Ethnic group indigenous to southern Palawan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palaweño</td>
<td>A person residing in Palawan / as well as an assumed regional affiliation or identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PARO</td>
<td>Provincial Agrarian Reform Office(r)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pengungsi</td>
<td>Refugee or IDP (Indonesia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pinakbet</td>
<td>A vegetable dish quintessential to the Ilocos region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippine Commonwealth</td>
<td>Pre-independence, interim Philippines govt. (1935-1946)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippine Insular Government</td>
<td>U.S. civil administration in The Philippines (1901-1935)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNP</td>
<td>Philippine National Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Población</td>
<td>Area representing the central part of a town</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPC</td>
<td>Puerto Princesa City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSSC</td>
<td>Philippine Social Science Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSSP</td>
<td>Pilot Special Settlement Project (Appendix D)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSU</td>
<td>Palawan State University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSU-CCRD</td>
<td>PSU-College of Community Resources and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTA</td>
<td>Parent-Teacher Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Punong Barangay</em></td>
<td>Barangay Captain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RA</td>
<td>Republic Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCPA</td>
<td>Rice and Corn Production Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Reconquista</em></td>
<td>Struggle by Christian kingdoms to conquer Muslim ones in Spain and Portugal (c. 722-1492)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Reducción</em></td>
<td>Concept of resettlement (concentration) of scattered populations during the Spanish colonial era</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regalian Doctrine</td>
<td>Concept delimiting lands as alienable by royal prerogative (Spanish colonial jurisprudence)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Rido</em></td>
<td>Concept of intra-ethnic clan blood feuding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SALS</td>
<td>School of Asian Languages and Studies (UTAS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sari-sari</td>
<td>Owner-operated neighbourhood general store</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sawah</td>
<td>Wet-rice cultivation as practiced across the Archipelago</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SB</td>
<td>Sangguniang Barangay (Village Council)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEP-2010</td>
<td>Socio-economic Profile 2010: Municipality of Narra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIL</td>
<td>Summer Institute of Linguistics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SK</td>
<td>Sangguniang Kabataan (Philippines Youth Council)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sulawesi</td>
<td>Celebes (Indonesia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tagbanua (Tagbanwa)</td>
<td>Ethnic group indigenous to central Palawan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tagalog</td>
<td>Ethnic group and language indigenous to central Luzon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Torrens titling</td>
<td>System of land titling premised on written deeds which – on transfer – reveals a continuing trajectory of ownership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transculturation</td>
<td>Concept denoting a process of mutual cultural exchange between peoples of different cultural traditions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Transmigrasi</em> (Transmigration)</td>
<td>Process of (and agency for) resettlement (Indonesia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transmigration</td>
<td>Concept denoting the internal, generally rural-to-rural migration, whether state-sponsored or spontaneous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tricycle</td>
<td>Public conveyance premised on a motorcycle with an attached sidecar – in widespread usage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN-DESA</td>
<td>UN – Department of Economic and Social Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Term</td>
<td>Definition/Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>UN – Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Usufruct</td>
<td>The right to use a given piece of someone’s land</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPD</td>
<td>University of the Philippines / Diliman Campus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UTAS</td>
<td>University of Tasmania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visayas</td>
<td>Geographical region located between Luzon and Mindanao – central region of The Philippines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Völkerwanderung</td>
<td>Migration of peoples in historic contexts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WAP</td>
<td>White Australia Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WASP</td>
<td>White Anglo-Saxon Protestant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WB</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organisation</td>
</tr>
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CHAPTER I – INTRODUCTION

The aim of this chapter is to set out the structure of the thesis. Before proceeding to the objective and focus of this study I provide a generalised background to the migrancy / ethnocultural interaction duality, a phenomenon not limited to the Philippines. As a sociocultural treatise dealing with ethnocultural and resettlement specificities, a Definition of Terms will precede their further explanation in subsequent and relevant chapters. The research design will include an initial outline of why Narra / Palawan was chosen as a case study to illumine the thesis contentions. An explanation of the research methodology employed to gather supporting data for the thesis will include an insight into the involvement of third parties in that process. The theoretical underpinning of the thesis, as well as the centrality of the demographic challenge as the raison-d’être – for both the resettlement phenomenon and the resultant ethnocultural interaction – will be canvassed to put the phenomena into perspective.

Setting the Scene

To understand the social and political outcomes of resettlement initiatives in the Narra / Palawan context requires an appreciation of the internal migration (transmigration) phenomenon and the factors driving that migration. Furthermore it requires an appreciation of the attendant cultural interactions that take place as a consequence of those migrations. Although the focus of this thesis continues to revolve around a specific Philippine zone of resettlement, a more universal contextualisation of the forces motivating the migrancy / ethnocultural interaction duality is required. While some of the issues I raise here (demographic stress, migrancy, and ethnocultural interaction) will be covered in depth when they become Philippine-specific or site-specific, their foregrounding here will afford them added significance. The population / migrancy / ethnocultural interaction trichotomy are interconnected phenomena that are not confined within national borders. They are of universal significance, albeit their grand scale is revealed via the prism of the Narra study.

The first issue I raise here is that of demography. Population growth rates and fertility rates in the twentieth century have conspired to increase the world’s population several-fold. It is estimated that in 1927 the planet supported 2 billion people. In 2011 the population was reputed to have reached 7 billion and by 2025 – if the fertility variable is maintained – a further one billion will be added to the
total (UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs). There are several points to stress here. At the turn of the twentieth century most of the world’s populace relied on agriculture, thus rural resettlement frontiers were the ‘safety-valve’ that absorbed the population increases. The Philippine rural-to-rural resettlement phenomenon began when the population of that country had not reached 10 million, or one-tenth of today’s population. The frontier however is a finite resource. It might be made more productive, but cannot be extended. As a result larger populations are required to seek non-agricultural livelihoods, increasingly in urban milieux.

This brings us to the second and third aspects of the population / migrancy / culture trichotomy. Because their regions-of-origin are unable to sustain them, people seek livelihoods in places unknown to them, and among people with whom they may not have had any exposure. However, it is not only the finiteness of the agricultural frontier that impels people to migrate. An array of factors: continuing high birth rates, the maldistribution of populations, disruptions to livelihoods caused by climate change, social and political upheaval, and the lure of opportunities imagined in the more ‘affluent world’, all contribute to an increased migrancy. This holds for both intranational and international population movements. While contemporary volumes of population movements may be unprecedented, the phenomenon of migration is not. Whether it is the migration out of Africa (as suggested by some human evolutionists), the Austronesian Völkerwanderung (migration of peoples) out of East Asia, or later migrations of Europeans to ‘new worlds’, people have always been on the move.

A corollary of migration is that it often puts migrants into the orbit of peoples who may be ethnically and culturally dissimilar to themselves. It is the ways in which individuals and groups cope with such dissimilarities that form the basis of this thesis. Simply stated there are three primary actions possible in such cultural encounters. Firstly, one party may acculturate to another group’s ways; secondly, both parties may reject each other’s ways and reify their cultures and thirdly both parties (at times more than two) may find modi vivendi in which cultural particularities are mutually exchanged via a process identified as

---

4 It is estimated that it took all of human history till 1804 to reach a world population of one billion. The 2 billion figure was reached 123 years later in 1927, and thereafter the gap narrowed as death rates decreased: 3 billion in 1960, 4 billion 1974, 5 billion 1987, 6 billion 1999, and 7 billion in 2011. This has implications for the migrancy / cultural exchange dynamic, given that one of the impetuses for an increased migrancy is provided by the uneven spread of the world’s resources and talents.
transculturation by the Cuban anthropologist Fernando Ortiz (1881-1969). While I posit that the third option is the more democratic, and better reflects what social and political outcomes have occurred in the Narra / Palawan zone of resettlement, it is not necessarily a majority outcome for intercultural encounters.

In theory it should not be difficult for migrating peoples to find modi vivendi with others, given that man’s commonalities far outweigh the differences delineating any ethnocultural groups. Or as Kwame Appiah (2006: 135) puts it, what is often subsumed “is the connection not through identity, but despite difference.” Yet, notwithstanding the many cultural values that groups share, it is often the valorisation of seemingly minor differences that provides the basis for group identity. Rather than the embrace of commonalities, ethnic groups, as would-be arbiters of cultural values, tend to reinforce the “countless mine-and-thine distinctions [despite] the inevitably mongrel, hybrid, nature of living cultures” (Appiah 2006: 129). Even in the absence of the migration / ethnocultural interaction duality, people living within a community exhibit differences – that is what makes us human. But it is in the migrancy milieu that differences are more likely to be valorised, and the threat of the undermining of a group’s identity by cultural contamination, imagined.

A rejection of the contamination incrimination is movingly illustrated by Salman Rushdie (1991) in Imaginary Homelands, where he states that the novel at the centre of his fatwa predicament is antithetical to the cultural purity contention. On the contrary, he suggests, it “celebrates hybridity, impurity, intermingling, and the transformation that comes of new and unexpected combinations of human beings, cultures, ideas, politics, movies, songs. It rejoices in mongrelism and fears the absolutism of the Pure. Mélange, hotchpotch, a bit of this or that is how newness enters the world” (p. 394). In the modern technological age the adoption or adaptation of another’s cultural particularities may be absorbed from a distance. They may be rejected or embraced. In the migrant / resettlement world that rejection and embrace can spawn unforeseen repercussions. Rushdie celebrates both the ‘newness’ associated with cultural transformation and the migrations that have speeded up the potential for those transformations, when he acknowledges: “It is the great possibility that mass migration gives the world, and I have tried to embrace it” (p. 394).

Having backgrounded the migrancy / cultural interaction duality I now turn to the Philippine setting which in many ways (polyethnicity, cultural
plurality, transmigration, and resettlement) allows an insight-in-microcosm into the wider migrancy world and its attendant cultural interaction ramifications. To test the hypothesis that mutual cultural exchange (transculturation) provides a positive model for interethnic coexistence in polyethnic milieux, the thesis examines what social and political transformation has taken place in the former state-sponsored resettlement initiative centred on Narra / Palawan. To anchor the Narra discourse I will from time to time refer to other migrant / resettlement scenarios both inside the Philippines, the wider Malay Archipelago, and the world at large which is witnessing increased population movements.

**Objective and Focus of the Study**

*Overview*

This dissertation is an analysis of the manner and degree to which ethnocultural adaptation and appropriation take place among heterogeneous populations dislocated by Philippine rural resettlement programs via a process that broadly speaking may be termed *transmigration*. In a polyethnic society such as the Philippines such dislocations have the potential to impact on social harmony, national unity and nation-building. Coexistence in polyethnic milieux, I suggest, is contingent upon the degree to which individuals and groups are prepared to compromise aspects of their ethnocultural identities via a process I term *transculturation*. To comprehend and anchor the progression of cultural exchange in the ‘contact zone’ I have chosen the concept of *transculturation* as a framing theory to identify the trajectory, degree, and impact of that cultural exchange. In addition, I apply *ethnic identity theory* to position and make sense of the complex social ramifications that take place when heterogeneous populations come into contact.

The thesis is prompted by the need to better understand why disparities in sociocultural integration have contributed to the *tribulation* of ethnic violence and displacement in some resettlement zones, while in others a smoother pluricultural transition has occurred. Previous migration / resettlement zone scholarship has tended to focus on the socio-economic outcomes, impacts on indigene populations, and environmental ramifications of resettlement initiatives. Inadequate attention has been paid to the sociocultural ramifications of the migration process and the way the transmigrant – and often the host community in which he settles – deals with the reality of intercultural interaction. In view of the
tribulation witnessed in several resettlement regions on the Philippine island of Mindanao it behoves social scientists, political decision-makers, and state bureaucrats to better grasp the social implications of migration / resettlement initiatives.\(^5\) Given the current focus of Philippine migration scholarship on the Overseas Foreign Workers (OFW) phenomenon (Tigno 2009, Asis 2011), a gap exists for a sociocultural study of the former, extensive, internal migration (transmigration) phenomenon. An internal migration study is further abetted by the knowledge that the pioneer generation of transmigrants is being augmented by descendant generations, among whom generational change is expected to influence the sociocultural environment.

I chose the former state-sponsored resettlement project centred on the Municipality of Narra in the Province of Palawan in the Philippines as a research site. As a zone of resettlement Narra has attracted transmigrants from across the Republic. Its polyethnicity made it an obvious choice for a study on intercultural relations. When compared with various other Philippine resettlement zones it appeared to be a harmonious model of interethnic, in effect intercultural, collaboration. In that sense its choice was vindicated, but with reservations. Based on fieldwork analysis, the perception, and rigidity of what it means to belong to an identity such as an ethnonlinguistic or ethnocultural group – when juxtaposed against settler experiences, their extended lifeworlds,\(^6\) and the attitudes attendant with generational change – was brought into stark relief.

A chance Internet encounter with a previous Philippines researcher, Celeste Lacuna-Richman in Finland, encouraged a preliminary visit to Narra / Palawan in mid-2010. Via the intercession of a local NGO, the Katala Foundation, I was introduced to the Municipal Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) with whom I was able to establish *bona fides* for a return visit. As the inheriting agency

\(^5\) Mindanao in the Philippines is not the only resettlement milieu in which interethnic tribulations have occurred. State-sponsored resettlement initiatives and auxiliary spontaneous transmigrations throughout the Malay Archipelago states (Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and Timor-Leste) have at times generated instances of ethnocultural disharmony, or at minimum a forced tolerance. At times throughout the thesis comparisons will be drawn with such migrancy / resettlement outcomes.

\(^6\) I use the term ‘lifeworld’ (*lebenswelt*) – as defined by Husserl and augmented by others including Habermas – to relate to the cultural baggage with which the transmigrants arrived in the contact zone. Edgar and Sedgwick (1999: 193-4) suggest that the lifeworld is composed of “stocks of knowledge… or skills and expectations that allow us to give meaning to (and indeed to construct) the social world within which we live.” In the resettlement context, migrants were called upon to engage with diverse groups whose lifeworlds (and attendant lifeways) were divergent from their own. Not all aspects of others’ lifeworlds were amenable to be accepted more universally, thus providing pretexts for distrust, confusion, misunderstanding, and antipathy – thereby inhibiting coexistence.
and current managing unit for some of the settler-beneficiaries of the former state resettlement project, engagement with the Municipal DAR office was central to engaging with pioneers and their descendants. Additionally their archives reflect the settlement history from its inception. During the preliminary visit I was also encouraged to gain institutional and academic support from Palawan State University (PSU), which was readily forthcoming. I returned to Palawan in March 2011 to conduct the interviews that form the basis of the findings to be discussed in this thesis.

The methodology adopted was one of triangulation: engagement with key informants, a questionnaire / interview of individuals, and participant observation. In juxtaposition to the Narra-as-resettlement-model I have employed as reference points diverse other resettlement models in both the Philippines, and those of its archipelagic neighbours Indonesia and Malaysia, which have experienced contemporaneous rural-to-rural population readjustments on a considerable and coterminous scale. As well I draw on the scholarship of others in the wider world who have delved into the migrancy / ethnocultural interaction phenomenon, to better situate the sociocultural transformation that has taken place in Narra.

Context
In the course of the twentieth century the Philippines – along with the Malay Archipelago in general – has witnessed both population growth and mobility of hitherto unimagined proportions. Simply stated, in a single century the Archipelago states experienced a several-fold increase in their populations – for Indonesia (the former Dutch East Indies) it has been a five-fold increase, while the Philippines at century’s end had ten times the population recorded at the first American-instigated census of 1903. The rapid rise in population has had social repercussions. Mid-century decolonisation saw the archipelagic states with little in the way of an industrial base – manufacturing having been the colonial preserve of the metropolitan power. Inherited, predominantly rural economies, in which a

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7 Malaysia and Indonesia were initially intended to form a part of this study, but time and fiscal constraints necessitated their excision. However, at times salient comparisons will be made to show how transmigration has not evolved uniformly in the various archipelagic models. As well the archipelagic comparisons allow the emerging of a picture that indicates the similarities in the problems faced by the various resettlement agencies.

8 While the momentum might have slowed the upward trend continues. Though population figures and projections between agencies (CIA Factbook) and texts (EBYB) differ, a trend of increasing population is evident. Results for the 2010 census indicate that the figures for the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia are 94, 28, 238 million respectively. Estimates for 2020 suggest continuing increases reflecting 111, 32, and 262 million respectively (after EBYB 2012: 774-779, NSO, UN).
rapidly increasing population continued to exert stress on existing land resources, necessitated the formation of strategies for increasing land inventories. Pressured by the spectre of an ever-increasing populace and ancillary economic and social objectives, archipelagic administrations deemed it necessary to resettle millions of their citizens in state-directed, rural-to-rural land settlement programs variously designated as: ‘resettlement’, ‘land colonization’ and ‘new settlements’ in the Philippines; ‘land colonization’ (during the Dutch era) and *transmigrasi* (transmigration) schemes in post-independence Indonesia (Bahrin 1988: 1). It is my intention to use the term *transmigration* to denote the process of rural-to-rural migration across, but within the nation-state, and the term *resettlement* to denote the result of this process.

In his seminal treatise *Pioneer Settlement in the Asiatic Tropics* Karl Pelzer (1945) stated as long ago as the last years of the colonial era that “(t)he population in all the countries of Southeastern Asia is distributed very unevenly” (p. 81). It is this population maldistribution that has formed the cornerstone of resettlement policy initiatives of both the colonial-era and post-independence administrations. This is aptly illustrated by the *Soal Transmigrasi adalah Soal Mati-Hidup Bangsa Indonesia* (The Issue of Transmigration is a Life and Death Matter for the Indonesian Nation) speech given by President Sukarno (1964). Indonesia, it was argued, could easily support 250 million people provided that they were more evenly distributed.

The notion of population maldistribution was not the only stimulus driving the transmigration / resettlement impulse. Archipelagic states facing a raft of social and economic problems (landlessness, hunger, insurrection) imagined that land resettlement programs would alleviate socio-economic stresses. Additionally the economies that newly independent states inherited were beset by several phenomena peculiar to the region. Late colonialism’s social uplift programs had decreased mortality rates. In essentially rural economies that meant more people exploiting a given land resource. Furthermore, the destruction and disruption wrought by the Asia-Pacific War (1941-1945) became a legacy with which the newly independent states – rather than the departing colonial regimes – had to contend. It was in this environment that population dispersal was mooted. The reasoning was that opening up more lands for settlement would act as a ‘safety-valve’ until social ills could be more generally addressed. Whatever the socially inspired resettlement objectives were, they all required the alienation of less
populated lands, which, given their existing occupancy, would have further, unimagined social repercussions.

**Rationale**

The rationale for this project was to understand the social and political outcomes of the Narra / Palawan resettlement initiatives and as a corollary determine why resettlement programs have impacted unevenly on settlers and their host communities in a range of settings. At the outset it appeared that the integration paradigm was contingent upon the degree of dilution or maintenance of a given ethnocultural identity. In her study of Balinese migration to Parigi (Central Sulawesi), Gloria Davis (1976) demonstrated that when settlers were few in number their propensity to acculturate facilitated their non-problematic integration into the host community. However, as the momentum of their transmigration increased and a critical mass was reached, Balinese identity was not only recovered by those locally assimilated, but an exclusivity developed among the now larger cohort of Balinese. On this basis it appears that the degree to which transmigrants (and their indigene hosts) maintain their collective identities is not necessarily predicated on the degree of transculturation experienced. The volume or concentration of resettlement, attitude, and degree of difference no doubt played their part in positive coexistence resettlement outcomes, but ethnocultural difference in itself need not be a barrier to coexistence.

Since the Cold War, international attention has increasingly altered its gaze to what is perceived as a new or increasing phenomenon but is in reality a continuity – that of ethnic resurgence. This may manifest benignly, but more than often reflects subsumed – but not forgotten – grievances. Recourse to ethnic revivalism has contributed to the disintegration of some states: the former Czechoslovakia, Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia, while at the same time Burma, Nigeria, and Zaire (among others) are attempting to avoid this fate. It is in this context that an understanding of what factors contribute to ethnic detachment is of value, and why this detachment occurs in some milieux and not others.

When there are systemic failures in the way nation-states manage to accommodate their ethnic heterogeneity, an understanding of why and how this impasse has manifested is of concern to a wider world. No nation-state can sustain itself if it is continually wracked by internal dissension, and in view of the increased migrancy rates witnessed in modern times, social upheavals have
implications for and are not confined to the nation-state affected. While there appears to be a correlation between recourse to ethnic identity and weak nation-states, as often exemplified in so-called ‘developing states’, this in my opinion is too simplistic an observation. Many societies in the affluent Euro-American world also face the spectre of ethnocultural discord. Witness the experience of Mexican immigrants in the United States\(^9\), the Flemish / Walloon division of Belgium, or the Québec issue in Canada.

Furthermore, cognisance of the fact that the world’s approximately 7,000 ethnolinguistic groups reside in approximately 200 nation-states demands the realisation that some ethnic overlap must occur; that many of these states be heterogeneous by definition. The Malay Archipelago (insular Southeast Asia) is more than illustrative of the fact that the coexistence of heterogeneous populations has at times been impossible to achieve. The Philippine state alone encompasses 171 living languages (Ethnologue 2009).\(^10\) In the absence of population mobility and resettlement, the issue of pluricultural accommodation would be a moot point. However, reality dictates that once begun the process of accommodation must continue. The thesis will show that accommodation is possible within diverse polyethnic situations if certain cultural compromises are entertained. That is, where individuals or groups in polyethnic communities adapt their own lifeways or are prepared to adopt facets of others’ lifeways (customs, language, religious practice) the potential for harmonious interethnic relations is improved. It is this process of adoption and / or adaptation of other’s customs and traditions – when experienced in a reciprocal manner – which I intend to call transculturation.

The Philippines is an example par excellence of ethnic plurality; all the more reason why sociocultural interdependence needs to be fostered and increased if it is to prosper economically as a nation-state, or even survive as a polity. Unlike traditional nation-state formation (Slovaks in Slovakia, Swedes in Sweden) the Malay Archipelago states, such as the Philippines, owe their genesis to the

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\(^9\) Their exploitation to provide cheaper food for all Americans is less decried than the fact that they are taking American jobs, and the fact that they are Mexican. This is both a socio-economic and a sociocultural conundrum.

\(^10\) Ethnologue (2009) suggests that Indonesia, which has been a further example of mass internal migration, supports 719 living languages. These range in size, from several hundred adherents (the Abinomn in Papua) to more than 85 million for the ethnic Javanese (2000 census). This has implications for ethnocultural coexistence in Indonesian resettlement milieux in which there is often a dominant ethnic group.
defining role played by colonialism in their construction. The extent of the Philippine state is predicated on the imperial, economic, and military reach of former Spanish and American hegemonies. Borders were arbitrarily determined and delineated spheres of influence that took no cognisance of ethnic diversity or local sensibilities. When the Americans departed the Philippines, local elites, imbued with a Eurocentric notion of the nation-state, did not question the premise on which their polities were conceived. By extrapolation, if a single colonial power had held sway over the Archipelago, there would have devolved a single inheriting polity. Whichever way this is viewed, nascent state national borders were blind to ethnocultural realities.

Mindanao, in the southern Philippines – exemplifying the tribulation component of the thesis title – has become a byword for interethnic violence. For more than four decades parts of the island have been wracked by what is often deemed to be communal violence, which has left tens of thousands dead and at times an IDP population of more than a million. The regions most afflicted have been in-migration areas that have absorbed many millions of essentially rural migrants, that is, those who have been uprooted from their original ethnocultural bases and lifeways, and moved – at times great distances – to live among others. This thesis presupposes that there exist underlying reasons – apart from the obvious one of a ‘struggle for scarce resources’ – that contribute to the mayhem faced by some (though not all) multiethnic societies. It might be asked why some transmigrant cohorts are better able to accommodate the diverse cultures among which they find themselves as a consequence of the resettlement process. Further, the thesis presupposes that spatial situations and individual agency exert a

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11 That said, ethnic Swedes also form a minority in Finland – with which Sweden has been historically associated, while the separating of Slovakia and the Czech Republic from the formerly conglomerated state in 1993 has left an overlap of ethnicities in each of the new polities.

12 While religious communalism is often touted as the factor most representative of promoting ethnocultural flashpoints in the indigene-settler Mindanao imbroglio, it needs to be acknowledged that stress points other than the religious difference between the ‘lowland Christian’ settler and ‘indigene Muslim’ host community play a role in ethnocultural disharmony. One factor that appears to have been underestimated is the role played by intra-ethnic or interethnic clan feuding known as ‘rido’. While Wilfredo Torre’s (2007) edited text *Rido: Clan Feuding and Conflict Management in Mindanao* provides background to this cultural practice, it was the November 2009 Maguindanao (also known as Ampatuan) Massacre of 57 people, including many journalists, that reverberated around the world. See Patricio Abinale’s (2010) *Orthodoxy and History in the Muslim-Mindanao Narrative* for a postscript to the Massacre. *Rido* and patronage exist in unison. The patronage issue was highlighted at the ANU Philippine Update Conference (11-12 Oct. 2012). It was suggested that only when the state can guarantee its citizen’s basic needs (health care, sufficient calories, and education) will the patronage of groups be undermined in favour of the state. Simons (1997) makes the case that a correlation exists between patronage – or charts of trustworthiness – and the existence of weak states.
bearing on how readily, and to what degree, this accommodation will occur. The research will show what cultural determinations take place among transmigrants uprooted from the familiarity of their ethnocultural heartlands. Germaine to this process, it will be shown that the uneven resettlement outcomes alluded to have at their core an ethnocultural dimension.

While it has become obvious that the neo-cultural imaginings of the archipelagic nation-states’ founding intelligentsias have not materialised – except possibly in the cities, among the educated and within individual diasporic communities – an understanding of why chauvinism, communal tension, ethnic antipathy, and enclavism afflict some regions (but not all) is called for. For instance, it is interesting to speculate why the nominally Christian Dayak in Kalimantan resent the ethnic Madurese transmigrants, but not necessarily the Muslim co-religionists of the Madurese, the ethnic Javanese. One might interpret this as involving cultural disengagement predicated on factors other than religion. While this study concerns itself primarily with the ethnocultural dimension of the transmigration phenomenon, the musings of observers such as Myrthena Fianza (2004) suggest – in the case of the Moro insurgency against the settlers in Mindanao – that what is deemed an ethnocultural conundrum may indeed have a subliminal economic dimension. Is it the Christianity of the settlers that the Mindanao Muslims and Lumads (Animists) are railing against or is it the land of which they have been dispossessed by the settlers that reinforces the reaction to the northern Christian migrants?

Using the Narra / Palawan state-sponsored resettlement project as a representation-in-microcosm of national ethnic diversity, the thesis will demonstrate and analyse why coexistence (in certain circumstances) is difficult to achieve in heterogeneous transmigrant settings. This insight, I suggest, is replicable on a society writ large. Understanding why, under certain circumstances, harmonious integration in settlement areas is thwarted, may help

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13 Jorge Tigno (pers. comm. 2010-10-04) suggests that Filipinos – many millions of whom work abroad – would identify as Filipinos whilst away from the Philippines, but revert to a regional or ethnomlinguistic self-identification on return. The neo-cultural imagining in which a civic nationalism replaces or minimises group loyalties, is oft a slow process. Polyethnic settler-nations such as Australia and the United States, representative in the modern era as bastions of civic nationalism, have in the past been riven by ethnic and communal chauvinism.

14 Mindanao, Palawan and Mindoro – comprising 40 percent of the national territory – supported approximately 7 percent of the population at the 1903 census. The scale of migration to Mindanao may be gauged by recent censuses that show that it alone now supports 25 percent of Philippines population. In the censuses 1918, 1939 and 1970 we see the Muslim percentage of the population fall from 60%, to 55% to 28%. During this period the Christian Filipino element rose from 3%, to 20% to 67% (after Rodil 2004).
enlighten state bureaucrats, political decision-makers, as well as adherents of individual ethnic groups themselves. Taking cognisance of the changed ethnocultural makeup of an individual resettlement community may allow a better understanding of the processes at work and the potential to view this process on the broader national canvas. The thwarting of harmonious nation-building or the promulgation of national unity, whether viewed through the prism of a resettlement program or a wider view, needs to be better understood if the potential for national disintegration is to be minimised or eliminated altogether. In a world in flux – in which few states mirror those in existence even two centuries ago – national cohesion is not a given.

Hypotheses
The Narra / Palawan resettlement project, in which a diversity of ethnocultural groups appears to coexist harmoniously, may be regarded as a successful model of a state-initiated resettlement scheme. To understand why this particular polyethnic resettlement has prospered – while others have failed – is central to why a sociocultural study of the settlement was undertaken. To test the hypothesis that interethnic harmony is contingent upon the degree to which individuals and groups are prepared to adapt their lifeworlds, two fundamental questions were canvassed: (1) ‘What cultural changes take place among heterogeneous populations disrupted by resettlement?’ and (2) ‘Under which circumstances are transmigrants’ ethnocultural identities maintained, diminished, or amplified during this process?’ The resultant data obtained from the Narra / Palawan field-visit is also juxtaposed against secondary material from other settlement projects in a comparative analysis, the aim being to determine what factors have contributed to a positive resettlement outcome in the Palawan model.

The major hypothesis of this study is:

- that ethnocultural identity in the resettlement zone – its accretion, reification, or diminution – is dependent upon the degree of transculturalional change that a given individual or group is prepared to accept and that this is further dependent upon: (1) the degree of cultural difference of those settled (religious practice, language, customs), (2) the numerical strength of a given settler cohort, (3) the diversity and numbers of settler cohorts, in which no dominant group exists, (4) access to education, the mass media and the world beyond the settlement area and
(5) the degree of ongoing mobility for individuals – both social and economic.

The following minor hypotheses help investigate the veracity of the claims of the major hypothesis:

- that the acculturative process has been influenced by political actors (politicians, religious figures, capitalists) exploiting the anxieties of ethnocultural groups who perceive their position marginalised vis-à-vis society at large.

- that the weakness or inability of the nation-state to minister to the socio-economic needs of its citizens contributes to recourse to the ‘familiar’. That is, recourse to relying on those one knows and trusts, thus enhancing group identity.

- that the very nature of rural-to-rural transmigration has militated against successful integrative outcomes for settler-settler and/or indigene-settler coexistence, and in some instances has contributed to a destabilised or less stable society.

**Theoretical Framework**

The premise that the uptake or rejection of mutual sociocultural exchange – which I deem to be represented by the term *transculturation* – is a process that has ramifications in the resettlement zone is possibly a converse way of unpacking the theoretical context of this thesis. If newfound identities: pluricultural, supraethnic, or cosmopolitanism have the potential for being the social end-product of resettlement, an understanding of what it is that the process of transculturation impacts upon is crucial. The simple answer is culture, which we may paraphrase as the customs, civilisation, capability, and achievements of a particular group of people (Tylor 1891). However, this definition does not exist in isolation, but rather as an adjunct to the ethnicity phenomenon – which in itself is not a static phenomenon. An ethnic identity (as will be demonstrated) is malleable, one that may be influenced by individual agency and group negotiation.

While I have chosen *transculturation* as a framing theory with which to examine the sociocultural processes that have taken place in Narra, I do so by contextualising those processes through the prism of *ethnic identity theory*. To better understand the social hurdles confronting the heterogeneous individuals and groups who have faced the transmigration experience, the differentiae associated
with belonging to an ethnic group is of some significance. Therefore, when investigating the resettlement zone integration of diverse ethnocultural groups, I choose the notion of ‘identity’ in the abstract, and ‘ethnic identity’ in the concrete as a foundation. It is the appreciation of the differences / similarities associated with any identity that allows for more transparent analyses of how these differences might impact on resettlement zone integrations.

But what is meant by the term ‘identity’ is open to conjecture. Amin Maalouf (2003: 9) is wary of the very label ‘identity’: “A lifetime spent writing has taught me to be wary of words. Those that seem clearest are often the most treacherous. ‘Identity’ is one of those false friends. We all think we know what the word means and go on trusting it, even when it’s slyly starting to say the opposite.” This anxiety notwithstanding, I acknowledge the need of some parameter for gauging the efficacy of sociocultural transformation in the wake of Philippine resettlement, and ‘ethnic identity’ is a starting point.

Maalouf goes on to suggest that all identities are complex and critiques those who would compartmentalise them: “It presupposes that ‘deep down inside’ everyone there is just one affiliation that really matters, a kind of ‘fundamental truth’ about each individual, an ‘essence’ determined once and for all at birth, never to change thereafter. As if the rest – a person’s whole journey through time as a free agent; his own individual tastes, sensibilities and affinities; in short his life itself – counted for nothing” (p. 2). The affiliation under scrutiny here is that of ethnic identity, although, as Maalouf points out, ethnicity is not the only identity an individual incorporates. Attachment to place, social class, or others with similar passions may transcend or complement that of attachment to ethnicity. However it is the difference between ethnic groups that is central to this thesis. I use both the term ‘ethnolinguistic’ and ‘ethnocultural’ in an understanding of that difference. There are times when ‘ethnocultural’ is more appropriate in view of the fact that not all ethnicities in a given society necessarily have a unique language that marks them as distinct. Additionally, identity need

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15 The Mindanao imbroglio is a case in point. The Bangsamoro claim for a separate state or at minimum some measure of autonomy is premised in part on a religious framework. This involves more than one ethnicity, just as the rejection of a bifurcated state is promoted by more than one ethnicity. The world abounds with examples of dissonances in which passions other than ethnic difference have impacted negatively on intercultural harmony – Northern Ireland, 1930s Spain, a religiously divided Netherlands, and France in the time of the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes, are ones that spring to mind.

16 If we look at the constituent parts of the British Isles for example we see that the ‘Celtic fringe’ (Irish, Manx, Scots and Welsh) have differing degrees of language maintenance. Less than 2% of
not always be sheltered by an ethnic umbrella. Societies of a single ethnicity may be riven by an issue as simple as religious non-conformity, vital enough to reinforce identity difference.\(^{17}\)

In land area the Philippines ranks 73\(^{rd}\) in the world (practically the size of Italy), while in population it ranks 12\(^{th}\). What is of more significance, however, is the country’s ethnic diversity; it supports 171 living languages. Why is this important? It reflects the notion that for a nation-state – such as the Philippines – to exist and survive, compromises between groups have had to occur. Unlike the classic nation-state model, encompassing one major ethnicity or identity group, there has never existed a dominant ethnic group in the Philippines.\(^{18}\) Had this been the case, the outcome may well have been the assimilation of minority groups into the body politic by a process of acculturation, as has occurred in many regions of the world.\(^{19}\) The accommodation of diverse immigrant groups in the U.S. might be said to fit this model. That is, a mythological sense of entitlement, ‘firstness’, and righteousness, as represented by the seventeenth century New England settlements is still resonant. While Filipino ethnicities may exude chauvinist tendencies, a sense of entitlement ensuing from a position of dominance is not inherent. Erosion of ‘sense of entitlement’ may be cause for angst in former dominant groups.\(^{20}\)

By contrast, Philippine resettlement zones, as exemplified by Narra / Palawan, allow us to witness in microcosm what the nation-building process in this polyethnic society entails, namely one of compromise and an ongoing re-conceptualisation. How otherwise could a second-generation settler identity at one and the same time feel strong attachment to a specific ethnolinguistic cohort, to a

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\(^{17}\) Prior to the secularisation of society in the last decades, the Catholic-Protestant divide in Australia is illustrative. Its divisiveness was reflected politically, in the realm of employment, attachment to the metropole, in the field of education and interpersonal relations such as marriage.

\(^{18}\) The designation of Tagalog to represent the national language Filipino should not be interpreted as the numerical dominance of Tagalog speakers within the Philippines. Rather it could be viewed as an ‘accident of history’, as it was the Tagalog region that became the political centre of the Spanish colonial project. Had they chosen Cebu as the centre it is conceivable – that Cebuano would have evolved to become the national language.

\(^{19}\) An example would be the British Isles. Millennium-long assimilation processes – and in some instances transculturation processes – have erased traces of the individual ethnicities that once peopled York, the Isle of Man or Dublin. Who in Dublin can trace their ethnic origins to the Vikings? The traces of Danelaw or the Anglo-Saxon south have been subsumed into what is now regarded as English – notwithstanding the Celtic, Roman (itself polyethnic), Angle, Viking, Saxon, and Norman ethnic heritages of former migrants, invaders or sojourners.

\(^{20}\) This is exemplified by Samuel Huntington’s (2005) critical assessment of a perceived Hispanic erosion of the former Anglo-Protestant cultural hegemony of the United States.
new regional loyalty (Palaweño) predicated on the settlement zone, to an overarching nation-state formation, to a religious persuasion and to other identity signifiers.

The Narra / Palawan model of resettlement and attendant sociocultural transformation might best be understood as a trajectory that has the potential to impact upon all but does not necessarily do so. Ethnic groups consist of individuals, and as Maalouf (2003: 10-11) attests, each individual’s identity is made up of a number of elements, some that dovetail with the group and some that have the potential to play a role in group identity bifurcation. In essence these may contribute to possible transcultural tendencies that may in turn lead to the formation of new ethnic identities or the rejection of allegiance to an ethnic identity altogether in what may be deemed a supraethnic or cosmopolitan condition. Whatever the trajectory, there will continue to exist an identity. In his paper ‘Towards a theory of ethnic identity and migration’ (1995) Tony Waters declares that the problem of explaining ethnicity in immigrant groups is a theoretical quagmire. In transmigration’s wake we might employ Waters’ hypothetical question: ‘When does an ethnic group stop being an ethnic group?’ to introduce the notion of ethnicity itself.

To put ethnic identity into perspective I draw on a range of theorists to demonstrate that the persistence of this identity is well documented. Ethnic identity is best viewed as a lived melange of cultural practices, which individuals and groups may have absorbed as part of an enculturation process, or have adopted in their ongoing identity growth. However as Fredrik Barth (1998) attests, a single degree of variation, which he terms a ‘boundary’ is sufficient to differentiate one identity group from another, which may at times engender friction between individuals and groups, whether those individuals and groups self-ascribe their difference or are ascribed it by others. Maalouf (2003: 14) contends that the “…identity a person lays claim to is often based, in reverse, on that of his enemy.” He illustrates this with the antagonism between the Irish and English. Dichotomies exemplified by Catholicism and Protestantism, and

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21 Water’s paper investigates six groups of ethnic Germans that had variously migrated to Russia and the North America in the time-frame of the thirteenth to nineteenth centuries, some of whom had assimilated while others had maintained ethnic distinctions.

22 ‘Enemy’ is too zealous a word in the context of this study, and might better be designated by adversary, economic competitor, or someone with a disparate ethnocultural identity not necessarily hostile to others in his orbit. A Swiss citizen represents such a situation. Whether he is ethnically French, German or Italian, he is more likely to feel a natural affinity with his fellow-citizens than he does for his co-ethnics across the frontier.
Republicanism and Monarchy have been used for centuries in a them-and-us struggle. Yet today, despite centuries of antagonism the Irish use the English language in lieu of Irish Gaelic. Where does that locate their ethnicity/identity? When one ethnic (or culture-bearing group) adopts the customs of another group (in this case language) do they cease being a part of their birth-heritage? Does an Ilocano settler’s son in Narra – unable to speak Ilocano – cease to be Ilocano ethnically?

An engagement with the complexities of ethnic identification is central to an understanding of whether the transmigrant experience in any given circumstance has been a positive or negative one. However, I suggest that this is possible only in the context of comprehending what sociocultural exchanges (transculturation) have taken place in a given migrancy/resettlement zone.

Key thinkers in the field of ethnicity, though not always agreeing on the weight to be attached to concepts such as primordialism, ethnic boundaries and the ‘melting pot’ theory, nevertheless help in an understanding of how and why archipelagic transmigrant integration or acculturation has been experienced irregularly. While Edward Shils (1957) and Clifford Geertz (2000) support the influence of primordialism on individual or group action, Eller and Coghlan (1996) detract from this view by speaking of the ‘poverty of primordialism’. Other thinkers such as Judith Nagata (1981) contribute to the ethnicity discourse by interpreting ‘circumstantial’, ‘situational’ and ‘instrumental’ variations of ethnic deployment. Glazer and Moynihan (1975), who helped popularise the term ‘ethnicity’, also grappled with the concept as they analysed the interaction of ethnicities (1970). In 1969 Barth (1998) proposed that ethnic identities are sustained by the maintenance of ‘boundaries’, however subtle, between groups, while Jamie Davidson (2008) and Abner Cohen (1996) more cynically view ethnicity as essentially a political phenomenon, to be exploited.

However, before venturing into any discourse that elucidates the scholarship of the key thinkers in the field of ethnicity, I consider a step back into the region’s prehistory is required. While it is accurate to depict a plethora of existing ethnocultural differences that separate archipelagic peoples, there are historically many shared backgrounds; which may have the capacity to influence the transculturation process. Peter Bellwood (2007: 1) suggests that “(t)he Indo-Malaysian Archipelago demonstrates a certain unity in human terms today, in the sense that all its indigenous populations (with the restricted exceptions in the
Malay Peninsula and the far east of Indonesia) belong to the same major Austronesian-speaking ethnolinguistic group of mankind.”

This observation notwithstanding, ‘a certain unity’ appears to be insufficient solace for many archipelagic transmigrants failing to integrate, by acculturating into or transculturating within their host communities. A concomitant observation might be that, assailed by the daily grind of survival, they have been ill-equipped to rationalise how or why their ‘differences’ are magnified at the expense of their ‘unities’.

‘Transculturation’, the term coined by the Cuban social scientist Fernando Ortiz circa 1939, may be a slippery concept to elucidate but in my opinion best serves the centrality of this thesis – that is to discover how sociocultural change underpins the renegotiation of identities, particularly ethnocultural identities. As a concept ‘transculturation’, or the mutual cultural exchanges that take place between heterogeneous groups and individuals, was promulgated by Ortiz (and encouraged by his mentor Bronislaw Malinowski) because it was felt that the term ‘acculturation’ did not adequately represent the mutuality inherent in the Ortizian imagining of how all cultures in a settler society like his Cuba, contributed to the cultural makeup of that society. Acculturation, Ortiz argued, presupposed that there was a hierarchy of cultures and that the dominant one (in the mid-twentieth century world that usually implied the European) would expect the other cultures to conform to the dominant reality. Transculturation, on the other hand, envisioned that the dominance, or cultural imperialist factor, would be undermined by the mutuality of cultural exchanges between ethnoculturally dissimilar cohorts.

While I will look at Ortiz and his term ‘transculturation’ more closely in Chapter 3, here I wish to make some observations that position the term in this thesis. In the years since its promulgation it has been maligned as being both an unnecessary neologism, and one that no better represents the terms in usage at the time Ortiz conceptualised it. The fact that it was ‘hijacked’ by Latin Americanists

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23 Bellwood’s monograph *The Prehistory of the Indo-Malaysian Archipelago* should be seen as representing the Archipelago (Insular Southeast Asia) in it broadest sense. Scholarship’s nomenclature at times does not make clear that the Philippines is an integral feature of the Malay Archipelago. It was a Filipino after all – Wenceslao Vinzons – who in 1932 (long before there was an inkling of a future ‘British-Malaya Malaysia’) “dreamed of a unified Malaysia extending from the northern extremity of the Malay Peninsula to the shores of the remotest islands of Polynesia” (Salazar 1998: 126). I mention this in passing merely to highlight that the Austronesian heritage, despite its approximately 800 languages, is nevertheless a starting point in viewing what has the potential to bind peoples as much as separate them.
as a tool to re-position, or valorise mestizaje studies, does not in my opinion negate the term’s relevance to the current migrancy / resettlement phenomenon. As I envision it, ‘transculturation’ best represents what is taking place in the Narra / Palawan resettlement zone – mutual cultural exchanges between a heterogeneous cohort of peoples in which there is no dominant group. The Narra phenomenon of sociocultural interaction cannot be better represented by concepts such as acculturation, multiculturalism, or cosmopolitanism – which may represent that which has taken place in other Philippine resettlement zones and is taking place in the wider world.24

To paraphrase, the theoretical underpinning of this study is premised on an understanding of ethnic identity as it is revealed in Narra / Palawan, a polyethnic society that is a microcosm of the Philippines writ large. To comprehend and anchor the progression of cultural change in the ‘contact zone’ I have chosen the theoretical framework of ethnic identity theory and the concept of transculturation as a framing theory to identify the trajectory, degree, and impact of cultural change.

**The Demographic Challenge**

The demographic imperative in the context of this thesis cannot be overstated. If archipelagic populations had remained stable, or risen at a more modest rate as experienced in Europe or other regions of Asia, the immediacy of developing more ‘rice-bowls’ would have required less urgency. To emphasise the point of demographic stress, and why more rice-bowls were needed as the twentieth century progressed, we need to reflect on the fact that were the Philippines and Indonesia one state they would be the third most populous nation on Earth after China and India. I mention this by way of making the point that this large population, living in a primarily pre-industrial age needed to bring ever-more agricultural land into play. Population-to-land ratios were such that many millions in both countries were essentially landless. Food security, social security and national security demanded the increase in the agricultural land inventory, and this

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24 Culture-dominant societies are variously represented by Australia, Bhutan, Chile, and Denmark. Each of them has a dominant cultural tradition – albeit ethnic-based, or communally-based. Migrants arriving in these nation-states are expected to acculturate to the norms of those states – reciprocity is minimal or absent. In affluent societies such as Australia a sense of ‘fair play’ has allowed the institution of multiculturalism, which in theory tolerates cultural diversity, but in practice expects an acculturation to the dominant host to occur. In weak states such as Bhutan, acculturation is more deterministic – those ethnicities unwilling to wear the national dress are expelled.
was the genesis of transmigration – moving people from densely populated areas to those deemed underpopulated – where the potential existed for agricultural development. This movement of population was complicated by both the logistics of resettlement and the polyethnic realities of the Philippines and its archipelagic neighbours. In essence it is the polyethnic nature of the Archipelago that underpins the raison-d’être for this thesis. The prime motivation for a study into ethnocultural interactions and transformations results from the reality of the Archipelago’s polyethnicity in the first place. In the absence of ethnocultural difference non-integration in the resettlement ‘contact zone’ would have been a moot point.

Population Redistribution

Intranational population movements, be it in the Philippines or the wider world, are not a new phenomenon. However, the trajectory and the numbers involved are unprecedented. The urbanward drift in search of livelihoods and opportunity, though a feature of the twentieth century, did not impact on all states evenly. In Europe for example, devoid of alienable frontiers, where lands were already heavily utilised, urbanisation or emigration were options open to those who had to leave the land behind.\textsuperscript{25} The archipelagic states, disadvantaged by colonialism and the agrarian nature of their economies, could not compete with a modernising, industrial North; nor could their citizens emigrate in numbers sufficient to ameliorate their socio-economic position. The apparent solution for both planners and politicians was to better exploit those lands under their dominion that were less densely populated. Thus intrastate migration (transmigration) appeared a potential solution to both the rapid population increase and its maldistribution.

In the Philippines the centre of population gravity hinged on central Luzon and parts of the Visayan Islands. From the vantage point of Manila the frontier zones encompassing especially the MPM (Mindanao, Palawan and Mindoro) islands appeared underutilised to both the Americans and the nascent independent Philippine’s politicians. The MPM, constituting some 40 percent of the country’s land area, supported at the beginning of the twentieth century an estimated 7 percent of the Philippine population. As such, the region offered the prospect of

\textsuperscript{25} This created a cyclical dilemma of sorts. Pressure on the land resource facilitated urbanization, which facilitated an increased industrialization, which provided opportunities that drew in more of the rural populace, which necessitated an increased mechanisation of rural pursuits, propelling more of the populace urbanward.
relieving population pressures in the more settled areas, and at one and the same
time the concomitant social instability occasioned by peasant unrest. In essence,
the less settled regions of the country were imagined to be a potential ‘safety-
valve’ able to address a range of society’s social tribulations. What bureaucrats
were less willing to acknowledge was the fact that those lands they deemed under-
utilised were nevertheless inhabited, that is, they were not *terra nullius.*

Furthermore, just as the transmigrant cohort hailing from the densely
settled zones was a heterogeneous one, so too was the indigene cohort around
whom resettlement took place. In an effort to address the country’s socio-
economic problems, decision-makers often failed to take cognisance of the
Philippine’s polyethnic reality, a fact that was to have sociopolitical repercussions
in some resettlement scenarios.

*Ethnocultural Redistribution*
The Philippines supports a diversity of ethnolinguistic groups, and particular
groups are over-represented in the resettlement statistics. While in the Netherlands
East Indies, Dutch rule gravitated to the region already productive and advantaged
– namely Java, the Spanish colonial project in the Philippines also determined
which region would be advantaged. Had Mindanao instead of Luzon become the
locus of Madrid’s rule, it is conceivable that the interethnic or communalist
tribulation faced in Mindanao during the last four decades would not have
developed. Unlike the Dutch, for whom commerce was the driving colonial
motivation, the Iberians (Spanish and Portuguese) augmented their commercial
imperatives with evangelising proclivities. The choice of Manila as capital
ensured that Luzon would have developmental advantages, including that of
agriculture, and thereby concomitant population expansion. It is Luzon and the
Visayas region that experienced agricultural and population increases under the
stable rule of Spain, and after 1898 that of the United States. The land: man ratio
deteriorated rapidly as the population increased. Public lands were opened and
state support for resettlement was introduced to assuage the peasant unrest
occasioned by landlessness and tenantification.

The Philippines (majority Christian), and Indonesia (majority Muslim)
have had similar tribulatory experiences in the wake of transmigration
experiences. While it cannot be claimed that religious difference alone has been
responsible for misunderstandings on the settlement frontier, it has been a
contributory factor in situations where Barth’s (1998) ethnic ‘boundaries’ are invoked in what might rather be ‘economic’ interethic struggles for resources. An example illustrates. As outlined above, both Javanese and Madurese transmigrants were resettled in Kalimantan. Though co-religionists, they have experienced dissimilar integrative outcomes while living in Dayak-dominant areas. In the Philippines, conversely, the interethic divide has been reinforced by a resort to communal attachments. In Mindanao, the transmigrant community was represented by various ethnicities: Cebuano, Ilocano, Ilonggo, among others, and the host areas encompassed among others Bagobo, Maguindanao, and Maranao. However, unlike in West Kalimantan, where Dayaks were prepared to coexist with Javanese but not necessarily with Madurese, ethnic divisions in Filipino resettlement areas were often subsumed under communal umbrellas. That is, whatever the actual ethnicity of the settler, he identified (and was identified) as a Christian. The recipient areas, at times resistant to the resettlement process, were identified as Muslim or Lumad (Animist), whatever the actual attributed ethnicity.

A further complication in the ethnicity reality has occurred in the Narra / Palawan context. Like most other lands in the Archipelago that were deemed to be lightly populated – and therefore amenable to being developed by closer settlement – Palawan was not ‘unpopulated’. What came to be euphemistically known as ‘public lands’ or the ‘public domain’ were in effect ‘traditional lands’ or the ‘ancestral domain’ that supported various groups of swidden agriculturalists, the ethnic Tagbanua and Pala’wan for example. (See below for an explication of the Palawan nomenclature). Because their agricultural practices did not coincide with what was considered to be world’s best practice – that of sedentary farm-lots – they were marginalised following the arrival of what are euphemistically called the ‘lowland Christian’ settler communities (Lopez 1986, Brown 1991, Veloro 1995, Dressler 2009). Swidden agricultural practices, Animist beliefs and a simpler, self-sufficient life-style all conspired against the indigene faced with a ‘more sophisticated’, yet equally poor settler cohort. Rather than resist incursion

26 As well as being nomenclatured as Pala’wan (current academic best-practice) this ethnic group has also been known as Palawanos, Palawan and Palawan. Within the thesis it will be made clear when the conventions of other authors are cited. The ethnic group ‘Pala’wan’ should not be confused with the term ‘Palawan’ designating both the Province of Palawan and Palawan Island.

27 By ‘more sophisticated’ I imply that the transmigrant generally hailed from the mainstream society, in which he had been politicised, formally educated, and imbued with values (dress codes, cultural practices and ways of thinking) that linked him to others in a modernising world. The ‘sophistication’ observation is in no way intended to signify the worth of any one ethnocultural
into their traditional lands, their economic weakness combined with their propensity to avoid confrontation, saw some indigenes vacate lands they regarded as traditionally theirs and move to more isolated regions of the Province, before the process repeated itself, leaving many landless – an irony, given that one of the objectives of resettlement was to ameliorate the condition of landlessness.

**Definition of Terms**

- Acculturation – the adaptation to or adoption of a different culture (AOD 2004: 9). The DREC (2003: 1-2) is rather more ambivalent as to the meaning; on the one hand it suggests that “the term ‘acculturation’ indicates that processes of transformation and adaptation which takes place when two or more groups…enter into relations with one another.” At a further level it suggests that ‘acculturation’ results from a conflict between different cultures, which may result from migrations, and / or the globalisation phenomena facilitated by mass communication. The acquisition of a new culture by an individual or group may occur asymmetrically or reciprocally. ‘Reciprocal acculturation’ refers to a bi-directional cultural transfer, rather in the vein of the concept ‘transculturation’ as coined by Ortiz. This give-and-take phenomenon contrasts with ‘asymmetrical acculturation’ a process in which a ‘superior’ and ‘inferior’ culture interact, rather in the manner of the dominant colonial / neo-colonial context.\(^{28}\)

- Assimilation – the acceptance by indigenous and immigrant minorities of prevailing cultural values and the integration of such minorities into a society (AOD: 73). How this is supposed to occur is fraught with contradictions. In the Palawan context, where several indigenous groups outnumbered the early settlers (themselves ethnically divided) who was going to assimilate to whom was a moot proposition.\(^{29}\) Assimilation identity, but does suggest the likelihood of a power imbalance in milieux where the sophisticated and the unsophisticated shared a contact zone.

\(^{28}\) For an in-depth analysis of both the ‘acculturation’ and ‘assimilation’ phenomena refer to Teske and Nelson (1974). In Palawan it is the indigenous Batak, Tagbanua and Pala’wan who are modifying their cultures and adopting the cultural traits of their transmigrant neighbours, despite their (at times) numerical superiority (Lopez 1986, Brown 1991, Eder 1992, Veloro 1995).

\(^{29}\) In the Palawan resettlement milieux, as it is throughout the Philippines, the Archipelago, and world at large, assimilation is a fraught proposition. Numerical dominance does not necessarily reflect ‘civilisational’ dominance. Just as the small numbers of Europeans who ventured to Africa, the Americas or Australasia did not assimilate into the numerically dominant societies they encountered, so too in the Philippines is assimilation generally a unidirectional process. Indigene
assumes a unidirectional process of inclusion into a dominant society. Assimilation has been described as “…a precise political strategy which intends to keep the national community as homogenous as possible by endeavouring to ensure that the same basic values are shared by the whole population” (DREC: 19). The term ‘assimilation’ has been much maligned in recent years, as a willingness developed to adopt reciprocal aspects of cultural difference, and the less value-charged concepts of ‘integration’, ‘multiculturalism’ and ‘cosmopolitanism’ have been adopted to refer to new realities.

- Cosmopolitanism – reflects several conditions. It may indicate “of or from or knowing many parts of the world… [or denote those] free from national limitations… [as well as representing] people from many parts of the world (AOD: 286). First theorised in the fourth century BC by the cynics who rejected the notion of the restrictiveness of individual states (DREC: 50), in the context of this thesis I suggest that cosmopolitanism might be regarded as the ultimate condition possible for individuals who transcend the constraints of an ethnic identity and its progeny, national identity. Only one respondent in the Narra / Palawan case study volunteered that they had transcended the constraints of both the ethnic / regional and national identities. I suggest this could only be possible if transcultural adjustments and modifications were experienced. Unlike acculturation and assimilation, which may be either an individual or group process (Teske and Nelson 1974), the progression to a status of cosmopolitanism appears to be an individual experience.

- Deculturation – in essence denotes the loss or abandonment of cultural practices, yet it intersects with the requirements of the transculturation process. For transculturation to occur a partial deculturation and associated neoculturation is required. Used pejoratively, ‘to deculturate’ connotes that one party is causing another party to lose or abandon cultural characteristics, yet in the give-and-take model of cultural exchange (transculturation) some aspect of a former lifeway will always be forfeit –

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groups in Palawan exposed to the migrant world, adopted first aspects of Muslim culture, when that culture was dominant and latterly Christian culture when the political power balance shifted, especially with the accession of American power, early in the twentieth century.
though this loss will be compensated by a neocultural accretion.\textsuperscript{30} Furthermore in some psychological contexts deculturation may imply that an absence of cultural anchors has resulted from the loss of some cultural particularity. However, Del Pilar and Udasco (2004) suggest that one cannot be cultureless. Even the marginalised, for example alienated youth, will be deemed to belong to at least a sub-culture. Likewise, whatever the cultural loss an individual experiences, his ethnocultural identity will continue to exist, albeit in an altered form.

- Enculturation – the gradual acquisition of the norms of a culture or group (AOD: 412). Individual agency or the ability to determine one’s own future or lifeway is constrained by the fact that from birth – whether in retrospect we like it or not – we mimic and adopt the cultural practices we see about us. Our religion, formative education, language and dress code are all determined by our accident of birth. Differing enculturation experiences continue to confront transmigrants once they come into contact with those ethnoculturally dissimilar to themselves. Some enculturation facets are easier to reconcile than others, and this has implications for the mutual or reciprocal cultural exchange that features so prominently in the Narra / Palawan milieu. Altering language use and diet, for example, appear to be less problematic than accepting the religious beliefs of others.

- Indigene – a term loaded with connotations in polyethnic milieux. The term is commonly substituted by ‘native’, ‘autochthon’ and ‘aborigine’, implying a sense of ‘firstness’ (DREC: 202). Within the meaning there is an implication that the ‘indigene’ is somehow ‘less sophisticated’, or ‘developed’, and thus – in the modern age – in need of protection or tutelage. In a wider sense ‘indigene / indigenous’ may be equated with the idea of being ‘already-resident’ in a given geographical space (native of Finland or France), that is, a condition differentiating an ‘already-resident’ group from those that may want to migrate and resettle among them. In

\textsuperscript{30} In On the Road to Tribal Extinction: the Depopulation, Deculturation and Adaptive Well-Being among the Batak of the Philippines, James Eder (1992) intimates that deculturation is synonymous with ethnic demise. However, looked at in a further context it might be suggested that if an indigenous Tagbanua (Palawan) swidden-agriculturalist turns to wet-rice cultivation, he is transforming an aspect of his culture. Nevertheless he can continue to ascribe to and no doubt continues to be ascribed by others as a Tagbanua despite his partial deculturation.
this gist there is no implication that there is a ‘civilisational’ difference between the two cohorts.

Using the term ‘indigene’ to characterise those originating in a given country, the innateness or naturalness of a group to a specific place, a recognition that they are the earliest known inhabitants of a given region, or that they constitute those resident before colonising took place, does not fully represent how I wish to employ the term ‘indigene’. The transmigration of settlers in the Philippine context usually meant that the migrant came into contact with those already-resident – the indigenes. The loaded-ness of the term ‘indigene’ comes about when the settler identifies those ‘already-resident’ in the resettlement zone as somehow inferior to himself – indigenous persons (IPs).\textsuperscript{31} In the absence of a less loaded term I utilise the term ‘indigene’ to represent the ‘already-resident’ in contradistinction to the transmigrant settler, but use it with reservation nevertheless. Despite the ambivalent interpretation and usage of the terms ‘indigene / indigenous’, context will make it clear how the term is being applied. In most instances it will infer the status of ‘already-resident’.

- Integration – the intermixing of persons previously segregated (AOD: 649). “The concept of integration indicates the sociological process by which divisions and heterogeneous factors within a society are overcome in order to create a new, balanced whole. Integration, therefore, is an essential dynamic factor in the creation of a society based on cooperation between individuals and groups” (DREC: 151). The process is dependent on regulation and interiorization of cultural and value models, which allows the fostering of social cohesion in the formation of national states.\textsuperscript{32} Existing in contradistinction to ‘assimilation’ where minorities have had to give way to majorities, early nationalists in the Archipelago were very conscious of the need to balance integrative needs with dominant

\textsuperscript{31} In the Philippines the settler is usually a ‘lowland Christian’ and, representing the majority culture, is able to view those who are either Animist or Muslim as indigenous. In that sense the term ‘indigene’ is used similarly to the term ‘ethnic’ in ‘ethnic minority’. That is, the Bicolano, Cebuano, or Ilocano settler does not regard himself as an IP of the Bicol, Ilocos, or Cebu region. He is neither indigene nor ethnic minority, that nomenclature being reserved for those he settles amongst.

\textsuperscript{32} The heterogeneity of the Philippines requires the formation of a model with which diverse groups can identify. In the transmigration context, the settler and the indigene or autochthon groups among whom they settle need to compare and exchange values and behavioural models, that is, a process of adaptation, for nation-state formation to occur, and be sustained.
impulses. Equilibrium eventually returns to altered social systems, where social cohesion has been disrupted (DREC: 151-3), but as witnessed in both the Philippines and Indonesia, not before separatist anxieties can be addressed.33

- Multiculturalism – a term that “refers to the coexistence of a range of different cultural experiences within a group or society” (DREC: 183-7). At times multiculturalism might be used interchangeably with the term pluraliculturalism or ‘cultural pluralism’ added to which the further terms ‘interculturalism’ and ‘transculturalism’ cloud the issue. In a political sense “multiculturalism may be [viewed as] the sociocultural manifestations of a multiethnicity” (DREC: 184). Again the term is encumbered. In much of the world ethnocultural groups have lived in proximity without political injunction. However, in recent years, in a more generous ‘affluent world’ the multiculturalism concept was introduced to acknowledge cultural diversity and diminish the pressure of cultural imperialism. In that sense multiculturalism imagines cultures living side-by-side in harmony. The tolerance entailed therewith, I suggest, ignores the premise that cultures are not static, and that their imagined stasis is an unrealistic time warp imagining.

- Pluriculturalism – might be “seen as a model of society where different cultural groups interact with each other and therefore create multiple cultural and religious points of reference” (DREC: 219). I suggest that this state more generally represents what has transpired in the Narra / Palawan model of sociocultural interaction. Rather than the coexistence of groups within society as implied by the ‘multicultural’ label, I feel that pluriculturalism provides competencies that facilitate transculturative processes.

33 Witness the pragmatic choice of Malay (Bahasa Melayu) as Indonesia’s national language despite the fact that Javanese speakers numerically constituted as many as the next fourteen ethnolinguistic cohorts combined. A further pragmatic act, in a country that was overwhelmingly Muslim, was to decline the adoption of a national religion, thereby allowing minority faith adherents to feel included in the new nation-state. The Philippines facing similar centrifugal tendencies has shown pragmatism in the area of language adoption. While the national language, Tagalog, is the home language of possibly a quarter of the population, the colonial language – English – has been retained as a link language.
Transculturation – is a possible product of the migrant experience. It encompasses a process in which ethnocultural or ethnolinguistic interactions contribute to altered worldviews or cultural transformations. The merging and converging (ethnoconvergence) of cultures in this paradigm, allows the possibility for altered identities to evolve. The harmonious integration into a new society is dependent upon how individuals engage with situational variables. Transculturation differs from the acculturation or assimilation model of integration into a host society in a number of ways. Unlike the latter it is not predicated on the subsuming of one’s identity within the dominant or majority culture in one’s midst. Transculturation encompasses the notion that all coexistence is predicated on a give-and-take model of cultural exchange.

That is, the attendant processes of partial deculturation and neoculturation need not be viewed from the standpoint that cultural change is a one-way street. The degree of transculturation may eventually reflect the degree of coexistence possible on the resettlement frontiers. It was to replace expressions such as ‘cultural exchange’, ‘diffusion’ and ‘osmosis of culture’ that Ortiz (1881-1969) coined the neologism ‘transculturation’ which he deemed better represented the reality of identity change than the term ‘acculturation’ which he viewed as having ethnocentric and moral connotations.

The neologism “transculturation”, coined by the Cuban social scientist Fernando Ortiz in Havana circa 1939, was given cachet after its acceptance by the ‘ethnic’ Polish anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski who penned an introduction and explanatory detail on the use of the term ‘transculturation’ for Ortiz’s 1940 text *Cuba Counterpoint: Tobacco and Sugar (Contrapunteo cubano del tabaco y el azúcar)*. Seeking a term that better described Cuba’s complex assimilatory history of indigene, European settler and African slave, Ortiz (1995) began to eschew the term ‘acculturation’ for ‘transculturation’ which he deemed better expressed the interaction and modification of cultural norms that various ethnicities had contributed to his country. “I am of the opinion that the word transculturation better expresses the different phases of the process of transition from one culture to another because this does not consist merely in acquiring another culture, which is what the English word acculturation really implies” (pp. 102-103).

The ‘transculturation’ concept is variously linked with the notion of ‘hybridity’ or ‘homogeneity’, which reflects the consequence of ethno-convergence. I suggest that ‘transculturation’ better reflects the processes of cultural exchange that this thesis investigates, in that it imagines an ongoing process, in contradistinction to the ‘hybridity’ / ‘homogeneity’ imagining which implies a completed or announced product.

Neoculturation encompasses the creation and establishment of new cultural forms, particularly as a consequence of the transculturation phenomenon. In the case of Narra / Palawan, an individual who identifies as a Palaweño, does so not because he spurns his Cebuano or Ilocano cultural heritage, but because via his interaction with other ethnocultural traditions in the settlement zone he has adopted or adapted cultural elements that differentiate him from the co-ethnics he left behind in the region-of-origin.
- Transmigration – an internal (inter-island / inter-provincial) rural-to-rural migration and resettlement of peoples as variously effected in the Philippines and its near neighbour, Indonesia. Various terms ‘land colonisation’ (not to be confused with Euro-American imperialist colonisation), ‘resettlement’, ‘land development’, the Indonesian term transmigrasi (transmigration) best epitomises the processes of resettlement involved. Initially conceived of as attempts to alleviate the negative social ramifications of densely populated regions of both polities, by both American and Dutch colonial regimes respectively, the newly independent states inherited extant programs and greatly expanded them to address the issue of landlessness in burgeoning agrarian economies. Several million families were relocated from densely populated to relatively thinly populated parts of their respective countries under the auspices of at first state-sponsored resettlement programs. State-initiated programs often acted as a catalyst for further spontaneous settlers to follow in the pioneer’s footsteps and in some regions came to outnumber those resettled by the state. Not only were the national aims and objectives of land resettlement programs varied and complex; their emphasis, as noted by Bahrin (1988: 1-2) differed from one country to another, from era to era, and within the same country. Simply stated motivations and priorities for resettlement might be categorised as developmental, redistributive, and economic.

**Research Design**

*Choice of Study Area*

The choice of study area was constrained by a variety of factors. Mindanao in the Philippines – where an ongoing separatist movement continues to create a fragile security environment – is the transmigrant / resettlement region *par excellence* in that country. However, the continuing insurgency, law-and-order issues such as the sporadic KFR (Kidnap for Ransom) issue and inter-clan political violence as witnessed by the 2009 Maguindanao Massacre, as well as being cause for anxiety, made the obtaining of institutional support for a field-study problematical. The Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) warnings that continue to delineate Mindanao as a Level 5 security risk also stymied that
region’s research potential. This is unfortunate as the earliest, and longest-standing state-sponsored resettlements projects, such as Glan (1917) in Sarangani Province, Dadiangas (1939) in South Cotabato, and Santo Tomas (1955) in Davao del Norte would make ideal research locations, given the longer time frame for the occurrence of any potential transculturation. A private visit in mid-2010 to the aforementioned region gleaned that – given the proposed theme of ethnic identity scrutiny – local institutional support and encouragement was forthcoming. However, given current conditions, research in these potential sites must needs wait.

An alternative choice of site in the Philippines (though no less significant as a model for the intended study) turned out to be the former state-sponsored resettlement project centred on the Municipality of Narra in Palawan Province. The Narra project was begun in 1949 under the auspices of the Rice and Corn Production Administration (RCPA), though greatly expanded (post-1956) under a new management agency, the National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA). Several thousand families from the Visayas and Luzon were resettled. Though previous studies (Fernandez 1975, James 1979, 1983) have dealt with the socio-economic and cost-benefit aspects of this particular resettlement project, a sociocultural analysis, to the best of my knowledge had not yet been attempted. A short, preliminary visit to Narra – where settlers are still being aided by the guidance of the current implementing authority, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) – showed that scope existed to further the thesis.

Fieldwork circumstances
Access to the settler cohorts in this study was contingent upon the good offices of several regional and local institutions and organisations. Although the Philippines did not – at the national level – demand validation before fieldwork could be undertaken, legitimacy and authority were given credence by affiliation and interaction with tertiary institutions, in the first instance Palawan State University whose primary campus is in Puerto Princesa, the provincial capital. Ancillary roles were provided by individuals at the University of the Philippines (Diliman)

37 While the security situation is of concern it should not be construed that research in the region is impossible. Lois Hall’s (2010) ethnographic study of Christian / Muslim social relations in General Santos City (Mindanao) is testament to the fact that despite the separatist upheavals and the so-called ‘War on Terror’ it is possible to conduct research, albeit within security parameters.
in the national capital Manila, as well as Ateneo de Manila University. While the original resettlement authorities that settled the Narra transmigrants are no longer extant, a national Ministry, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), charged with improving material living standards of those settled, continues to exercise oversight for some Narra farmer-beneficiaries.

In consequence of this, permission to proceed with fieldwork among their charges was sought prior to arrival in the Philippines. The DAR provincial office in Puerto Princesa and their municipal office in Narra extended me their support. At the local government level, the Municipality of Narra as well as the various Barangays (local government unit) within the Municipality provided both their imprimatur for my presence and statistical information as required. During the course of the fieldwork I decided – in light of the fact that migration to the settlement zone was not and continues not to be confined to farmer-settlers – that the thesis contentions would be better served by widening the scope of the study to include a wider cohort of respondents, one that better mirrored the social, employment, gender, and generational realities of past and continuing resettlement processes.

In a region where communication infrastructure is challenged by the ‘tyranny of distance’, frequent interruptions to power supply and a generally low level of connectivity, I was greatly assisted by the staff of a local conservation NGO – the Katala Foundation (KF). Not only did the KF provide local advice, their office was a ‘tech’ refuge when required. Whilst most research participants had some knowledge of English (it being a medium of instruction at university and high school) the occasional lack of nuance necessitated the support of a translator. As a retired former manager of the Narra resettlement project Marcial Dela Cruz was engaged to fill that role. As well having ready access to individuals and organisations within the study area, Marcial was an invaluable asset in the data-gathering process, playing a facilitating role, as well as being translator. Having arrived in the resettlement zone in the 1960s he was also a source of local knowledge and historical background.

38 In the Philippines a barangay is a local government unit subordinate to the municipality. The administrative structure is: national / provincial / municipal / barangay. They might be compared with that of a ward, district, or village. The approximately 42,000 barangays play a role in service-delivery that is more intimate, than that of the municipality. For example, the Barangay Health Volunteer (or Barangay Health Worker) is able to provide primary health care, nutrition advice, and may assist midwives.
Limitations in Research Design

The potential for skewed data gathering was ever-present, given the necessity to use local officials as intermediaries. For example, access to some farmer-beneficiaries was facilitated by the DAR. However, no restrictions or impediments were put in the way of information gathering. My inability to converse in the range of languages extant in the Narra resettlement zone meant that there were occasions when translations were not quite exact enough to convey a theme. In such instances rephrasing resolved the communication impasse. Furthermore, the hierarchal nature of a society in which there may be a perception that a ‘correct answer’ might be sought or solicited, required that vigilant evaluation of garnered data be undertaken.

A corollary of the above was the potential for the cooperating local officials to suggest interviews with those transmigrants that had achieved more success in the resettlement process. After all, self-congratulation is possible only in the shadow of a project’s success, not in its shortcomings. Viewed from this perspective socio-economic disadvantage had the potential to skew sociocultural data. Those less successful economically might be working off-farm and out of the Municipality – one of the respondents was about to leave for the Persian Gulf in an OFW capacity at time of interview. As interviews would occur with those participants residing in the settlement at the time of the fieldwork, it might appear that the community has an appearance of being more amenable to cultural change and interaction than was the reality.

A potential weakness might be perceived in the fact that the land for the settlement project was acquired by a state that deemed it ‘public domain’ despite indigene and ‘squatter’ occupancy. While lowland Christian squatters might have been included in the project many indigenes forsook the region for parts more isolated, though one Tagbanua group interviewed remained resident within the Municipality, living in communal proximity rather than on individual farmsteads.

For an understanding of transculturation in practice, as broad a cross-section of participants as possible needed to be included. The affirmative action nature of state-sponsored resettlement initiatives meant that the weakest economically, sometimes the least educated and the most marginalised were representative of those that forsook their regions-of-origin. Ignoring for the moment that the transmigration / resettlement experience had possible levelling effects, one needs to reflect on whether the weakest in society have more or less
capacity for coexistence. Might a cohort of more affluent or educated transmigrants have been better equipped and more amenable to a changing world and the resettlement reality? In theory, the educated world at large (health professionals for example) are able to resettle in milieux where their educated status is valorised more than their ethnic status.

This has implications for carrying out any sociocultural study in a site such as Narra. In an era of rapidly growing educational opportunities, the settler offspring might not be as well represented in the interview cohort, because their upward mobility might have removed them from the Municipality. A second or third generation son / daughter, whose altered circumstances see them employed as nurse or ship’s engineer in the provincial capital or distant shipping company respectively, have in theory a greater propensity to change their lifeways and degree of ethnic self-identification. In such circumstances the missing cohort has the possibility of skewing the participant responses by not being included in the sample.

**Research Methodology**

While this study was undertaken in a single setting – the Narra Municipality in Palawan, a Philippines zone of resettlement – the methodology envisaged was one of triangulation: the questionnaire / interview of individuals, engagement with key informants, and recourse to several focus groups. In reality the data was collected by way of individual questionnaire / interviews (Appendix A), as well as discussion with key informants and participant observation. Focus group discussions proved to be impractical, though several situations (religious fellowship and service club meetings) allowed interaction on a group basis. The processes necessitated the assistance of a translator and facilitator. While some interviews were possible in English, the multiplicity of languages used in heterogeneous settlement models precluded the acquisition of a working knowledge of them for the purposes of this research.

In the Narra / Palawan field context, liaison with a third party, the municipal office of DAR, was required to facilitate the interview of some of the farmer-beneficiaries. While the original settling authority for the majority of those residing in the Municipality, the former NARRA, is no longer extant, records of the early settlement are still maintained. To identify the ethnocultural heritage of potential research participants, recourse to DAR records was necessary. The
engagement of Marcial Dela Cruz (retired resettlement authority functionary as outlined above) to act as interpreter / research assistant greatly facilitated the fieldwork process. Not only was Dela Cruz central in acting as intermediary with the current DAR administration, he also knew personally many of the settlers – both farmer and non-farmer and their descendants. Data collection entailed a process of contacting potential informants either in their homes or workplaces to gauge if they were amenable to a questionnaire / interview. A total of ninety-one (91) individual interviews were conducted. The questioning was aimed at ascertaining the following:

- The transmigrants’ ethnocultural identity, core language, religion, and region-of-origin prior to resettlement; as well as their ethnocultural self-ascription
- The transmigrants’ ages and year of arrival in the Municipality; and for the second and third generations, their birth-year
- The transmigrants’ principal language use, notwithstanding their everyday interaction with other ethnolinguistic cohorts, and in view of national language dictates
- What links transmigrants maintained with their region-of-origin
- The extent to which transmigrants participated in cultural activities specific to their region-of-origin, and what aspects of other cultures they valorised
- Whether the degree of identification with the ethnocultural origin – when juxtaposed against the expectation of an expanded civic nationalism – has been diluted or reified
- The transmigrants’ perception of relations with other ethnocultural settler cohorts
- To what degree intercultural social interaction and / or intermarriage has impacted on the way transmigrants identify with their own ethnolinguistic / ethnocultural group
- Whether altered cultural practices (agricultural, religious, language and so forth) have impacted on sociocultural outlooks of the Other
- Whether changed socio-economic conditions have impacted on personal / community sociocultural adaptation
- Whether as a consequence of the resettlement process transmigrants have experienced feelings of cultural loss or gain.
Organisation of the Thesis

In its attempt to determine what sociocultural processes take place among heterogeneous populations disrupted by resettlement, and furthermore in which circumstances these cohorts modify their sociocultural behaviour to reflect altered ethnocultural identities, this thesis is arranged in a thematic way. The chapters reflect themes that aim to convey the background, the process, and interpretation of data gathered in such a way as to allow an understanding of the complexities of the resettlement process. The employ of Narra / Palawan as a model and entry point into the resettlement process writ large, allows for further juxtapositions with internal and external resettlement processes. It is next to this model that additional analysis and speculation, both in internal and increasingly external migrant-settler movements, are possible.

The present chapter begins with a scene-setting exercise that foregrounds the migrancy phenomenon as it exists in the contemporary world and the implications thereof – the necessity for interethnic and intercultural interaction. It then introduces the Philippine focus of the study and explains the background to the transmigration / resettlement experience, before suggesting the potential sociocultural ramifications of resettlement. Factors that contributed to the need for rural resettlement, such as the crucial demographic imperative, are outlined. The chapter introduces the theoretical framework that underpins the project, before defining several key thesis-specific terms. It also sets down the technical notes associated with the thesis progression, including research design, methodological approaches taken, and reasons for choosing Narra / Palawan as the study area. A brief survey of previous transmigration / resettlement research is canvassed. When making a point, reiteration of themes may overlap.

Chapter Two comprises a literature review that provides an overview of the texts that have contributed to the thesis formation. The first set of texts reflects the transmigration / resettlement phenomenon, dealing in turn with those texts that are Archipelago-specific, those that are Philippines-specific, and those that are site-specific, that is pertaining to Narra / Palawan. The second set of texts deals with the notion of identity, specifically ethnic identity. The third group of texts represents those that illumine the complex nature of cultural identity, a necessary precursor to making sense of the Ortizian theoretical concept ‘transculturation’, which represents the balance of the literature investigated.
Chapter Three presents the theoretical underpinnings of the thesis. Before proceeding to position the ‘transculturation’ concept the chapter investigates the salience of both ethnic identity and cultural identity for an understanding of that concept. As well as defining the term ‘ethnic’, the notions of ‘primordialism’ and ‘ethnic group boundaries’ are investigated. The cultural baggage inherent in an ethnic identity is unpacked to guide our understanding of what it is that individuals and groups are consciously or unconsciously expected to compromise in the transculturation process. To illuminate the trajectory of identity modification transcultural change as a normative outcome of sociocultural interaction will be canvassed. An analysis of the differing worldviews of key thinkers in the field of identity politics, ethnicity, and sociocultural paradigms is central to this thesis. Before it can be established what sociocultural divergences have occurred in resettlement areas, the chapter addresses the reasons these changes have manifested. After justifying the relevance of ‘transculturation-as-theory’ the theory is juxtaposed against several possible alternative models of cultural coexistence, namely those of acculturation, multiculturalism, and cosmopolitanism.

Chapter Four is an overview of transmigration as a concept and process. It introduces the resettlement phenomenon as a variable in the escalation of ethnocultural interactions. Aspects of rural resettlement (the demographic imperative, policy and organisation, resettlement objectives) are explicated in a general archipelagic sense before drilling down to the Philippine context. The historical background, rationale, and implementation of phases of Philippine resettlement programs are revealed. While most previous transmigration scholarship reflects on the socio-economic ramifications of resettlement, this thesis is concerned with the sociocultural implications of the process. Themes such as settler-settler and indigene-settler cultural coexistence are investigated. In defining the implications for intercultural interaction the chapter speculates on the contentious role that transmigration has played in national unity aspirations.

Chapter Five introduces Narra / Palawan as a case study of Philippine rural resettlement. While in reality Narra continues to be a magnet for spontaneous migrants from across the Philippine Archipelago, the historical antecedents of Narra as a state-sponsored resettlement project continue to influence contemporary perspectives of the community. The chapter begins with an overview of Palawan as a zone of resettlement and reveals the factors that have
impacted on the choice of that Province as a transmigrant destination. It next introduces the Municipality of Narra in which the data was gathered. As well as an historical overview of the state-sponsored genesis of Narra, the chapter introduces the ethnolinguistic diversity of the Municipality’s settlers. An additional section on ‘defining the methodology’ is inserted to clarify some of the difficulties encountered in delineating themes such as region-of-origin, identity triangulation parameters, and identity ascription.

Chapter Six begins the analysis of transculturation in practice. In the context of the Narra interviews the chapter forms the qualitative enquiry of the thesis by delving into the day-to-day social interactions of Narrans. It begins by identifying the ethnically diverse settler cohort by comparing self-ascriptions with ethnolinguistic heritages. Given the centrality of language in the construction of Philippine ethnic identity the chapter then investigates the migrant’s language use modification. Further issues to be investigated are those of educational status and identity maintenance, the generational change exposed by offspring conviction, and whether Narrans experience a sense of cultural loss and concomitant sense of ethnic dilution as a consequence of their transculturative exposure.

Chapter Seven probes the transculturative catalysts that impact upon Narrans as members of an ethnic cohort or as individuals. It demonstrates that correlations exist between the degree of cultural exchanges possible and / or probable among the transmigrants, and their ongoing links with the region-of-origin. A further catalyst investigated is that of intermarriage, a development that has the capacity to undermine ethnocultural particularities as interethnic compromises are accorded. The chapter also considers the importance of resettlement zone socialisation and cross-cultural cooperation in facilitating the mutual exchange of cultural practices and customs. After an analysis of the factors that facilitate transculturative developments, the chapter juxtaposes the ease with which Narrans appear to be able to adapt or adopt the cultural norms of ethnically diverse settlement-mates against the concept ‘primordialism of culture’, which suggests that such cultural exchanges should be less straightforward.

Chapter Eight represents the conclusion of the thesis. A brief interpretation of the findings posits why there have been disparities in resettlement program

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39 Nomenclatures including the suffix ‘mate’ are not limited to the Philippines – witness the wide use of words such as classmate, running mate, soulmate. In the Philippine context however it is not unusual for the suffix ‘mate’ to be appended to a wider range of terms to form collective nouns such as town-mates, province-mates, batch-mates, party-mates and the like.
outcomes. Given the finiteness of the land inventory in the Philippine settlement frontier the limited applicability for further resettlement is considered. Under the rubric of intercultural interaction a discussion of the alternatives to rural-to-rural resettlement (industrialisation, international labour arrangements, urbanisation, and permanent emigration) is mooted. The thesis concludes with the suggestion that whatever the initial rationale for transmigration, the lessons learned from a study of the Narra / Palawan transculturation model continues to be applicable in future and differing settings.
CHAPTER II – LITERATURE REVIEW

This review of literature is divided into three key sections: (1) transmigration / resettlement, (2) the notion of identity and (3) transculturation theory. Texts pertaining to transmigration and resettlement processes are discussed first, this being the starting point for the cultural interaction in the ‘contact zone’. In light of the polyethnicity of the archipelagic and resettlement world, the second group of texts deals with transmigrant identity, specifically ethnocultural identity. The third set of texts addresses the theoretical underpinning of the thesis, namely the concept of transculturation. Several subsets of texts (universal, archipelagic, and site-specific) will help flesh out the main themes.

The second half of the twentieth century was the heyday of archipelagic transmigration, the incidence of which spawned a proliferation of academic writing dealing with all aspects of the resettlement phenomenon. Agencies such as the Philippines’ National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Authority (NARRA), Indonesia’s Transmigration Ministry, or Malaysia’s Federal Land Development Authority (FELDA), despite differing modi operandi, faced similar scrutiny by academics and researchers. Much of the discourse, however, focused on the economic potential of programs, their administrative shortcomings, impacts on the environment, marginalisation of the indigene, and sociopolitical impacts.

Although research on the sociocultural impacts on host and settler communities was not neglected by academe, this area was given a low priority. A long-term assessment would have been premature in view of the time-delay required for social interaction to manifest. While an understanding of ethnocultural identity lies at the heart of this project, the focus of the investigation revolves around the degree of transculturational change that is possible (or required) for harmonious ‘resettlement frontier’ relations to exist. Recognising that degrees of ethnocultural reification, diminution, or rejection are possible, the selected texts reveal under what circumstances the processes, renegotiations, and reconstruction of identity takes place.

Transmigration / Resettlement Texts

This section reviews the range of transmigration / resettlement texts. To overview the transmigration phenomenon the texts are broad-based, looking at rural-to-rural resettlement on an Archipelago-wide basis: defining transmigration, highlighting its objectives, and salient issues such as demographic and ethnocultural
imperatives. The second group of texts is Philippines-specific, unpacking issues such as the rationale for resettlement, the process, the ethnocultural dimension, and the tribulation experienced in some resettlement zones. The third group will be site-specific, looking at Narra / Palawan as a zone of resettlement and what others have already contributed to the discourse.

Transmigration: Archipelago Specific

The seminal text contributing to any understanding of the transmigration phenomenon is Karl Pelzer’s (1945) monograph *Pioneer Settlements in the Asiatic Tropics: Studies in Land Utilization and Agricultural Colonization in Southeastern Asia*. This is a foundational work on which many others have built. Pelzer’s starting point was the maldistribution of populations and concomitant social repercussions. While providing an overview of pre-WW2 Philippine and Dutch East Indies state attempts at rural-to-rural population transfers, the text has wider resonance. Though his research (1940-1941) on the eve of the Japanese interregnum in the Archipelago was curtailed, we nevertheless have an opus that is at once a document detailing the *modus operandi* of the colonial administration’s resettlement initiatives, and a blueprint for what lay ahead for newly independent successor states.

*Agricultural Expansion and Pioneer Settlement in the Humid Tropics* edited by Walter Manshard and William Morgan (1988), in the vein of Pelzer (1945), is an attempt to make comparisons between the programs of individual countries. Contributors raise issues including the social ramifications of large-scale rural resettlement, such as the anthropological question of whether settler lives have been improved or whether they are merely the ‘new’ peasants. The emergence of social hierarchies among the settler cohort is also addressed, as well as the phenomenon of how settlers cope with new agricultural systems.\(^{40}\) *Rural Development and the State: Contradictions and Dilemmas in Developing Countries*, edited by Lea and Chaudhri (1983), profiles the involvement of the state in the arena of land development. It suggests that whatever the contrast in cultural, historical, or ideological backgrounds “…the state plays a necessary and vital role in stimulating or inhibiting rural development” (p. xv).

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\(^{40}\) How did agriculturalists steeped in sawah (wet-rice) cultivation learn to cope with alien farming concepts? The case of tidal irrigation as practised in several Indonesian regions is a case in point; the precision required to institute this form of agriculture relied heavily on local knowledge. Newly cleared areas often needed to be farmed in an interim fashion (with reversion to swidden agriculture) whilst irrigation infrastructure was implemented.
Amarjit Oberai’s (1988) edited text *Land Settlement Policies and Population Redistribution Policies in Developing Countries: Achievements, Problems, and Prospects* canvasses the similarities and differences in resettlement project implementations. In his introductory chapter, Oberai (1988a: 7-47) critiques in turn the performance of projects, their economic and social constraints, the factors impacting on success or failure, and whether rural resettlement is in fact an appropriate response to deal with the social dilemma of poverty and national development. Population redistribution, provision of land for the landless, promotion of regional development, agricultural development and improved welfare have all had mixed outcomes that appear to be dependent upon the vagaries of suitable planning and project implementation. The success of settlement programs can be measured by the degree of settler abandonment of projects, lack of off-farm employment, social tensions, land concentration, ecological problems, and the cost of resettlement.

In *Spontaneous and Planned Settlement in Southeast Asia*, Harald Uhlig (1984) suggests that, although the state-sponsored resettlement paradigm is well documented, the role played by spontaneous transmigration in the ASEAN states of Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand is less well defined. Uhlig begins by stating that the challenge faced by a rapidly growing population and concomitant landless or ‘underlanded’ element was to clear new land for food production, in essence to increase the availability of more ‘rice-bowls’. He broaches the disconnection between what state planners imagined for land development and resettlement, and what actually transpired on the settlement frontier. Existing technocratic bias favoured wet-rice cultivation. “…the published ‘textbook’ examples of neatly cleared, levelled and carefully tended wet-rice plains or irrigated terraces!” (p. 17) dominate the rural development discourse, without reflecting on the reality of what is possible on the frontier.

Other texts that highlight the complex social, economic, and political dimensions of the rural resettlement phenomenon in the Archipelago include Jones and Richter’s (1982) edited overview *Population Resettlement Programs in*

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41 Spontaneous migrants are those who through their own initiative, and at their own expense, relocate to the settlement frontier. In some instances they may be absorbed into state schemes, but often they buy land from indigenes or act as squatters until the state regularises their situation. In the Philippine scenario the numbers of those deemed spontaneous transmigrants came to exceed manyfold those that the state resettled.

42 The land-hunger that drove this ‘pioneer settlement’ momentum he suggests resembled the scale of land clearing that took place in medieval Central Europe and the later push west in North America (Uhlig 1984: xiii).
Southeast Asia. In their introductory chapter they raise an issue central to this thesis: the ramifications of resettling heterogeneous ethnoreligious transmigrants among culturally dissimilar autochthonous groups (pp. 5-6). The ramifications of resettlement are canvassed in Shamsul Bahrin’s (1988a) edited work Beyond Resettlement: A Comparative Study of the Impact of Resettlement Programmes in Southeast Asia. His chapter ‘Rural resettlement in the ASEAN region: An overview’ (1988b) raises the issue of the ‘methodological’ difficulties inherent in the settlement process, where political dictates may drive resettlement bureaucrats to make decisions on an ad-hoc and short-term basis (p: 26). In such political climates the implementation of pilot projects, sociological and economic studies, and settler-specific training was usually forfeit. Rural Migration Policies and Development edited by Paiva and Bahrin (1984) conflates the aims of rural resettlement with that of stemming the rural-urban flows that accelerated following Independence.43

Individual authors examining the parallels of the various archipelagic processes of resettlement are too numerous to mention; here I highlight several who have contributed to the discourse. Although some of the authors cited engage exclusively with their countries of expertise, their insights are of a wider relevance.

The first is Joan Hardjono. Having written extensively on the matter of Indonesia’s Transmigrasi (Transmigration) program, two texts have immediacy for the integration issues dealt with in this thesis. As an adjunct to Pelzer, Hardjono’s ground-breaking text Transmigration in Indonesia (1977), as well as being an overview, provides an insight into the integration issues faced in resettlement zones.

A further exposé on the sociocultural ramifications of resettlement is provided by Willem Wertheim (1959) in ‘Sociological aspects of inter-island migration in Indonesia’. He noted the difficulty involved in indigene-settler integration in situations where one cohort felt superior to the other. Gloria Davis’ (1976) study A Social History of the Balinese Movement to Central Sulawesi, 1907-1974 also deals with integrational issues. She demonstrated that integration is situationally dependent; that is, integration and the associated cultural

43 With the benefit of hindsight, it can now be seen that despite the resettlement of several millions of transmigrant families – specificity with actual numbers is difficult given the over-lap of statistics for state-sponsored and spontaneous migrants – a number to the magnitude of ten (10) has made the rural-urban move.
transformation is a hesitant process. The Balinese in her transmigration study area readily acculturated into their host community; however, when their numbers increased, acculturation halted, and was in some instances undone.

Heinz Arndt, writing from an economist’s perspective, was somewhat sceptical about the economic rationale for state-sponsored, rural-to-rural resettlement. In ‘Transmigration: Achievements, problems, prospects’ (1983) and ‘Transmigration in Indonesia’ (1988) Arndt critiques the spending of scarce resources by the newly-independent states on programs that, he suggests, could have been self-funded. In his view, integration was more likely in urban settings where intermarriage was a less fraught proposition than in rural ethnic enclaves. The enclave nature of resettlement is apparent in Ria Gondowarsito’s (1986) research Transmigrasi Bedol Desa: An Empirical Case Study of Inter-Island Village Resettlement in Indonesia, in which she investigates the social impact of resettlement as a consequence of displacement by a dam construction. The ‘plucking up’ of thousands of Javanese families and ‘replanting’ them in far-away Bengkulu, while comforting in a co-ethnic sense, nevertheless failed to realise state imaginings that transmigration would privilege a national character over an ethnic one.

Transmigration’s nation-building capacity was one theme that resonated in nation-states inheriting polyethnic populations. Brian Hoey’s (2003) paper ‘Nationalism in Indonesia: Building imagined and intentional communities through transmigration’, describes the process and critiques the ‘imagining’. Riwanto Tirtosudarmo’s (2001) essay ‘Demography and security: Transmigration policy in Indonesia’, posits that state resettlement objectives encompassed those of national security and national unity. The politico-social engineering aspects of resettlement should not, however, be over-emphasised; rapidly increasing populations in all the Malay Archipelago states dictated policy. It is this population pressure that de Koninck and Déry (1997) have in mind in their essay ‘Agricultural expansion as a tool of population redistribution in Southeast Asia’.

44 What I mean by ‘comforting’ is the security associated with group solidarity – one’s kin and ethnic group would be sharing in the unknown. For many folk, reluctant to separate from their families, regions-of-origin, and co-ethnics, sharing the new environment provided some psychological anchor with the past. The state and resettlement authorities were caught in a double-bind. While imagining the potential for smooth interethnic (or supraethnic) coexistences, they at the same time wanted to facilitate a smooth resettlement process. Redding (2002) demonstrates the lengths the state bureaucracy in Indonesia went to facilitate the resettlement of ethnic Balinese in far-flung transmigrant zones. These cohorts were provided with traditional gamelan musical instruments – either accompanying the migrants or being provided at a later time.
As Dutch and American resettlement initiatives had demonstrated, the dilemma of population pressure in the region was not confined to the postwar era. Clifford Geertz (1963) had already noted the ramifications of worsening land: man ratios in *Agricultural Involution: The Process of Ecological Change in Indonesia*.

The longevity of archipelagic rural resettlement initiatives and their social impacts in much of the twentieth century are best encompassed by two papers. In ‘From *emigratie* to *transmigrasi*: Continuity and change in migration policies in Indonesia’, Tirtosudarmo (1997) outlines the rationale for, and trajectory of, the resettlement project in his country. A decade later his ‘Population, ethnicity and violent conflict’ (2006) highlights the difficulties that are being faced in environments in which culturally diverse peoples have been compelled to reside. Notwithstanding the perception that resettlements constituted “a valuable multi-purpose instrument that have led to a belief that they are a panacea, a cure-all for many social and economic ills” (1997: 19), integration and coexistence engendered by resettlement is, in his view, an unfinished, a negotiable, an unfinishable phenomenon.

**Transmigration: Philippines Specific**

Pelzer’s (1945) *Pioneer Settlement in the Asiatic Tropics* is also the seminal text introducing the Philippine state’s role in rural-to-rural resettlement. He outlines the rationale for settlement, its objectives, achievements, and shortcomings up to the eve of the Asia-Pacific War (1941-1945). Academics have referred to his outline of the National Land Settlement Authority (NLSA) in Mindanao as a blueprint for subsequent studies. Wernstedt and Simkin’s (1965) article ‘Migrations and settlement of Mindanao’ describes the increased tempo of the postwar movement of settlers from densely populated areas of Luzon and the Visayas to Mindanao, the ‘Land of Promise’. For an understanding of the milieu in which the postwar scramble for land occurred, a close reading of Wernstedt and Spencer’s (1978) *The Philippine Island World: A Physical, Cultural, and Regional Geography* provides a starting point. Robert Huke’s (1963) *Shadows on the Land: An Economic Geography of the Philippines* adds to this discourse.

Cayetano Paderanga Jr., in *Land Settlements in the Philippines* (1988) and *A Review of Land Settlements in the Philippines* (1995) provides an overview of the resettlement phenomenon in the Philippines from an economist’s perspective. He canvasses the historical trajectory of resettlement in the twentieth century,
discusses the implementation of specific programs, and suggests policy recommendations. A further overview is Leticia Postrado’s (1984) *Migration and Rural Resettlement in the Philippines* in which she adds to an understanding of the different ways settlement programs impact on the socio-economic status of state-sponsored as compared with spontaneous migrants. Rey Crystal (1982: 102) in ‘Overview of land settlement schemes in the Philippines’ adds his observation that as the land inventory has diminished consequent to migration, plot sizes have been greatly reduced, so that livelihoods often mirror those of the donor areas, thereby undermining the ‘social uplift’ objectives of resettlement initiatives.

Whereas landlessness and tenant poverty were the catalyst for rural unrest, a key rationale for state-sponsored resettlement was to undermine peasant resistance. In *A Captive Land: The Politics of Agrarian Reform in the Philippines*, Putzel (1992) discusses the objective of improvement in living standards and raises the issue of rural poverty, tenancy and landlessness – all push factors for transmigrants. Andrea Campado (2005) in ‘Pioneering in the Cotabato frontier: The Koronadal Valley Project during the pre-war years’, demonstrates the national unity expectations of the earliest state resettlement programs where, as demonstrated by her study of the 1939 NLSA settlement in Mindanao, there was a perception that Visayan settlers and Muslim families could live side by side. The theme of national unity is continued by Putzel (1992) who discusses resettlement as a panacea for the peasant-HUK insurgency.

From the perspective of national security Benedict Kerkvliet’s (1990) *The Huk Rebellion: A Study of Peasant Revolt in the Philippines* illustrates how the state – under the auspices of the Economic Development Corps (EDCOR) – promised to address the landlessness grievance of the HUKs, and was able to win a psychological advantage in undermining the rebellion by resettling surrendered insurgents. Abinales (2004), in *Making Mindanao: Cotabato and Davao in the Formation of the Philippine Nation-State*, suggests that the pre-war Commonwealth administration of President Quezon was motivated to settle Mindanao with Northerners as a bulwark to the successful 1920s-1930s Japanese colonisation of the abacá (Manila hemp)-producing regions of Davao.

The Philippines settlement process was hampered by intermittent reorganisations of the state-funded resettlement agencies. When reflecting on the relatively small numbers (when compared with spontaneous settlers) that were resettled, Abinales points to the shortcomings of state resettlement agencies.
Spontaneous transmigration as a consequence came to dominate the resettlement process, though in the Philippines (just as in Indonesia) an intersection of the two paradigms was inevitable. In *Philippine Migration: The Settlement of the Digos-Padada Valley, Davao Province*, Simkins and Wernstedt (1971) demonstrate the dynamics of spontaneous migration with a case study. Central to their study is the role played in the settlement of the Valley by networking and the chain migration of kin and those of similar ethnic background.

The expected social uplift of improved living standards promised by resettlement soon evaporated. The struggle for resources in the donor areas was replicated in the settlement zone as the ‘land of promise’ (Mindanao) also became crowded. In ‘Peasant colonization in Mindanao’, Peter Krinks (1970) illumines the reality faced in the frontier as the land: man ratio declined from 6.7 hectares in 1939, 5.4 hectares in 1948, to 2.2 hectares in 1960. In ‘Old wine in a new bottle: Land settlement and agrarian problems in the Philippines’ Krinks (1974) suggests that the rationale and good intentions of resettlement for landless tenants was undermined by the replication in the settlement zones of agricultural systems and practices that reflected those of the donor regions, that is, land consolidation, tenancy and patronage. He adds to this discourse by suggesting in ‘Changing land use on a Philippine frontier’ (Krinks 1975) that cultural inertia was a contributing factor in this reversion to the understood *modi vivendi*. However, in ‘Rectifying inequality or favouring the few? Image and reality in Philippine development’ (1983) he alludes to the reality that increasing attention was paid to export-generating agriculture; advantaging agribusiness at the expense of individual settlers, who at worst were dispossessed of lands, or otherwise relegated to subsistence livelihoods.

William James’ (1983) essay ‘Settler selection and land settlement alternatives: New evidence from the Philippines’ points out that self-financed settlers are more successful than government-supported ones. He suggested that a central factor in this success was the progression to owning land afforded by agricultural contracts, that is, a spontaneous settler arrives on the frontier, works as a tenant for an already established settler, then progresses to own his own farm. Acknowledging the state’s ‘uplift’ motive for the weakest in society, James suggested that economically, spontaneous migration provided a greater net benefit and involved many more settlers, and was thereby more likely to ease peasant landlessness grievances.
Early twentieth century resettlement programs in the then sparsely populated Mindanao and Palawan fared reasonably well in integrating diverse ethnolinguistic elements, but the realisation by the indigenous peoples in Mindanao that their traditional lands were under threat induced a reaction as evidenced by Concepción et al. (2003) in *Breaking the Links Between Economics and Conflict in Mindanao*. Hayami et al. (1993) in *Toward an Alternative Land Reform Paradigm: A Philippine Perspective* suggest that social harmony was not achieved in the settler or donor areas – in the latter because too little could be achieved without systemic change and in the former because a reaction to domain loss was acute. In Tuazon’s (ed.) (2008) *The Moro Reader: History and Contemporary Struggles of the Bangsamoro People* various contributors have provided analyses for why indigene-settler relations deteriorated over time, a central theme being concerns over the diminution of ‘ancestral domain’. Gutierrez and Borras, Jr. (eds.) (2004) in *The Moro Conflict: Landlessness and Misdirected State Policies* add to this interpretation.

In ‘Migration and violent conflict in Mindanao’, Jorge Tigno (2006) views the indigene-settler imbroglio through a clearer lens, suggesting that the current insurgency among elements of the Muslim population in parts of Mindanao is symptomatic of an older anti-colonial struggle that has morphed into one of resistance to a state that has failed to provide adequately for – and indeed has discriminated against – a cohort of its citizens since their minoritisation as a result of resettlement, by both state-sponsored and spontaneous migrants. Myrthena Fianza (2004) in ‘Contesting land and identity in the periphery: The Moro indigenous people of southern Philippines’ agrees that the resistance is deeply rooted in colonial times, but adds that with the coming of the American, and then the Philippine state, an intersection of concepts such as traditional tenurial systems, the ‘Regalian Doctrine’ and ‘Torrens titling’ have conspired to undermine the nascent state’s equilibrium.

A text that synthesises many of the elements in the resettlement / coexistence paradigm is Rudy Rodil’s (2004) overview *The Minoritization of the Indigenous Communities of Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago*. The salience of this text is his introduction of the term ‘indigenous cultural communities’ (ICC). As a snapshot of the historical trajectory of the Mindanao imbroglio the text provides a model antithetical to what has transpired in the Narra resettlement model. Elements of the Philippine state, well aware of the fragmentary nature of
its geographical inheritance, made efforts to be more inclusive for cultural minorities, but as Eder and McKenna’s (2004) chapter ‘Minorities in the Philippines: Ancestral lands and autonomy in theory and practice’ demonstrates, policy was guided by contradictory forces. The polyethnicity of the Philippines, while not in itself a factor precluding coexistence, seems nevertheless via the ‘cultural conundrum’ to have stymied national cohesion; in Mindanao Austronesian-ness appears not to have been a sufficient bond to accommodate cultural particularisms, and thwart centrifugal tendencies.

Transmigration: Site Specific – Narra / Palawan

Narra and Palawan, despite their peripheral location vis-à-vis the Philippine body politic, have attracted considerable academic attention. Regarded as the country’s last ‘ecological frontier’, interest in Palawan has centred on concern for the environment; and as a consequence of extensive transmigration to the Province, the position of the autochthonous peoples. Several composite texts allow a broad entrée into the resettlement world and Palawan-as-place. First I mention the edited overview by James Eder and Janet Fernandez (1996) titled *Palawan at the Crossroads: Development and the Environment on a Philippine Frontier*, which uncovers the historical background, the migration phenomenon, and its impact on both the indigenous ethnic groups and the environment.

Further insight into a cross-section of Palawan’s migration history, economy, ethnography and environment is provided by edited versions of the Palawan State University *University Journal* (Evangelista 2008, Docto 2010). Oscar Evangelista’s (2008a) essay ‘Constructing Palawan as an immigrant province’, as well as outlining the diversity of ethnicities that the Island / Province now supports, also reveals that cultural interchange (language and conservation practices) continue to be experienced by both indigene Pala’wan and Ilonggo settlers (p. 38). The interchange is viewed by some observers to be one of asymmetrical acculturation, that is, one predicated on a dominant / dominated paradigm. In *On the Road to Tribal Extinction: Depopulation, Deculturation, and Adaptive Well-Being among the Batak of the Philippines* Eder (1992) makes the case that for some ethnic groups cultural interchange is no guarantee of survival for a given ethnocultural group, especially where the adoption or adaptation of new cultural values is problematic.
Elaine Brown’s (1991) *Tribal Peoples and Land Settlement: The Effects of Philippine Capitalist Development on the Palawan* [sic] explores the role of the transmigration phenomenon in altering the sociocultural landscape of southern Palawan.⁴⁵ She suggests that the state, by championing the progressive migrant whose industry leaves a grain surplus that supports the capitalist ethos, plays a role in the deculturation of the indigene Pala’wan. Brown makes the case that in this cultural interchange the Animist indigene, practising subsistence swidden agriculture (while a Filipino citizen), is disadvantaged, economically, socially and politically. The resettlement process, as it affects indigenous groups’ lifeways, is further addressed by Maria Lopez (1986) in *The Palawan* [sic]: *Land, Ethnic Relations and Political Process in a Philippine Frontier System*. The Pala’wan, Lopez posits, needed to negotiate their identity with former Muslim suzerains, the encroaching Philippine state, and the modernity project that introduced settlers to their world. Although numerically dominant, the indigenes deferred to a settler minority politically more powerful.

The perception of settler success on the resettlement frontier is canvassed by Carmelita Veloro (1995) in *Pioneering, Livelihood, and Everyday Success in Palawan*. The determinants of success vary, but the pioneer settler experience is shown to metamorphose into a folk construct in which the status of the migrant pioneer increases with the antiquity of his arrival. Loneliness, isolation, and deprivation contribute to a mythology that takes no account of the indigene. In her essay ‘Frontier colonization and legitimation in a Palawan coastal settlement’, Veloro (1996) makes the point that archipelagic nations such as the Philippines and Indonesia have the propensity to promote mobility, contact with other peoples and the concomitant exchange of ideas. However, this does not preclude the need for newcomers to a settlement area to construct a mythology of the pioneering experience and the seeking of solace among ethnic kin. Settler success comes at a price. In her study of migrant adaptation to a frontier settlement, Celeste Lacuna-Richman (2006) in *The use of non-wood forest products by migrants in a new settlement: Experiences of a Visayan community in Palawan, Philippines* suggests that lack of knowledge regarding their new environment forced a greater interaction between migrant and indigene (in this instance the Tagbanua); ill-

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⁴⁵ While Brown uses the spelling ‘Palawan’ for the ethnic group that she was studying, modern convention dictates the spelling for the group as ‘Pala’wan’. The term ‘Palawan’ is now generally confined to denote the Province of Palawan, or Palawan Island, the largest island of the Province.
equipped for frontier life the migrants gained from the indigene the knowledge essential for survival.

In many cases those ill-equipped to cope with pioneering were forced to seek livelihoods in unsustainable ways. In the absence of state support, individuals were pitted against the environment, a factor that has generated academic interest. While peripheral to this thesis, environmental issues are tied to the increasing population consequent to the transmigrant influx. Texts such as Wolfram Dressler’s (2009) study *Old Thoughts in New Ideas: State Conservation Measures, Development and Livelihood on Palawan Island*, and his collaborative work with Sarah Turner (2008) ‘The persistence of social differentiation in the Philippine Uplands’, show not only the pressure on the environment, but have as a starting point the population increase occasioned by resettlement. Eder’s (2009) *Migrants to the Coast: Livelihood, Resource Management and Global Change in the Philippines*, and his earlier *A Generation Later: Household Strategies and Economic Change in the Rural Philippines* (2000) both have as their starting point the effects of migration.

I turn now to the Narra Municipality, the site of the field-study for this thesis. An entry point is the comprehensive historical oversight of Leonardo Suyat and Pamela Tejada-Suyat’s (2005) text *Narra, Palawan: Its History and Success*. Their description of the development of Narra as a state resettlement initiative comes from the perspective of the individuals involved, giving a human dimension to both the privation encountered by the pioneers and the subsequent development of local institutions. The progression of pioneering is critiqued by Carlos Fernandez (1975) in ‘Adaptive processes and development policies in a frontier resettlement community’, in which he outlines the trajectory of the Narra resettlement project that had its genesis under the auspices of The Rice and Corn Production Administration (RCPA) in 1949. He outlines the resettlement ‘blueprint’ before juxtaposing the ensuing ‘reality’ of the project, and the vicissitudes encountered – for example, the high settler abandonment rate.

The economic efficacy of state-sponsored resettlement is undertaken by James’ (1979) thesis *An Economic Analysis of Public Land Settlement Alternatives in the Philippines*. His research was premised on Narra as a model of state initiative, and read in conjunction with texts already referred to in this section provides a fascinating overview of Narra-as-social-laboratory. Not all state
 initiatives had rural-to-rural resettlement as their rationale, however. America’s Legacy to Palawan: Culion Leper Colony and Iwahig Penal Colony edited by Evangelista (2005) highlights that the Province’s peripherality inadvertently put it on the resettlement radar. Many state functionaries associated with these institutions, and the inmates themselves, chose to remain in Palawan, adding to the ethnocultural diversity of the transmigrant cohort.

**Ethnic Identity**

The Archipelago is one of great ethnic diversity. When considered in the resettlement context this diversity has implications for harmonious migrant coexistences. Successful integration has in some instances (Mindanao for example) been stymied when *modi vivendi* have been slow to develop among settler cohorts, or between indigene and settler groups. By extrapolation it becomes apparent that in the absence of such ethnic diversity the sociocultural ramifications of the archipelagic transmigration phenomenon would be less fraught. Amin Maalouf (2003) posits in *In the Name of Identity: Violence and the Need to Belong* that identity is far more complex than alignment with this or other ethnic affiliation; however, a principle is required to differentiate groups of people, and for people to differentiate themselves, and this is most often premised on ethnicity. Ethnicity therefore, and the cultural baggage underpinning ethnicity, is central to this thesis.

Before being able to investigate how, whether, or what transcultural changes (and its concomitant potentiality for integration in the resettlement milieu) take place, it is necessary to understand how ethnocultural difference manifests, is created, and in what circumstances reification or diminution take place. A starting point in this process is the unpacking of what constitutes the ethnocultural reality. A range of ethnicity-specific texts has been drawn upon to decode the complexity of archipelagic diversity. They extend from overview anthologies dealing with an array of ethno-identity issues to texts dealing with specifics such as language and religion. They have formed a framework for further investigation into the role that ethnicity plays in underpinning individual and group existences, and in the factors that have the capacity to divide or unify heterogeneous societies.

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46 Two such state initiatives – the Culion Leper Colony and the Iwahig Penal Colony – pre-date the modern era of migration to Palawan. While both institutions were not inaugurated to facilitate rural-to-rural migration, patients and inmates were nonetheless drawn into agricultural pursuits.
A contemporary introductory text that unpacks the various discourses surrounding the concept of ethnicity and its theorists is Steve Fenton’s (2008) *Ethnicity*. He addresses the race / ethnicity divide, how and when ethnicity becomes important, when individuals or groups need to invoke their ethnic identity, how it is mobilised in the context of migration, and the role it plays in ‘precarious states’. Pre-dating Fenton’s overview was the edited work of Glazer and Moynihan (1975) *Ethnicity: Theory and Experience*. The text allows a representative cohort of theorists, by way of case studies, to illustrate an understanding of ethnicity’s diverse ramifications, be it in the realm of regional language demands, social stratification, or national security. In their ‘Introduction’ to the text they suggest that ethnicity seemed to be a ‘new’ term, and questioned how useful a marker this ‘new’ term was. In essence did it *mean* something new or was it simply a way of saying something old? Further, they question whether a single term has the capacity to describe the psychological differences of groups within the United States, Soviet Union, Belgium, Canada, China, Peru or parts of Africa, or whether the varied phenomena might not be better described as, “…linguistic, religious, tribal, racial…depending on their nature.” (Glazer and Moynihan 1975a: 2).

Two further texts are Hutchinson and Smith (eds.) (1996) *Ethnicity* and Guibernau and Rex (eds.) (1997) *The Ethnicity Reader: Nationalism, Multiculturalism, and Migration*. The first introduces the concept of ethnicity, unpacking the history of ethnicity, the majority / minority paradigm of ethnicities and the ethnicity, race, class and nation discourse. Subsequent sections deal with the theories of ethnicity, how ethnicity manifests in the modern world, the correlation between nationalism and ethnic conflict and whether / if / how ethnic identity might be transcended by notions of changed reality such as civic nationalism – an observation relevant to any study of transcultural change in an archipelagic resettlement setting. Guibernau and Rex introduce their text by unpacking the ‘concept of ethnicity’ beginning with Max Weber’s, ‘What is an ethnic group?’ (1997). Other sections examine the correlation between ethnicity and nationalism, ethnicity and violence, ethnicity and self-determination, the concept of multiculturalism, how increased migration converges with the realities of xenophobia and racism, which culminates in the notion of diasporas.

While primordiality (more of which later) attempts to explain why individuals and groups act in a certain way, the notion of what defines these
groups and individuals is addressed by Fredrik Barth (1998a) in his ‘Introduction’ to *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Culture Difference*. He posits that involvement in any ethnicity is premised on the notion that one is a member of a culture-bearing unit. One of the features that define ethnic groups is that it “has a membership which identifies itself, and is identified by others, as constituting a category distinguishable from other categories of the same order” (p. 11). However, ascription by others or self-ascription is not necessarily enough to maintain an ethnic boundary. In polyethnic states (as depicted in this study) the boundaries between ethnicities are the social boundaries that defines the ethnic group and it is the “ethnic ‘boundary’ that defines the group, not the cultural stuff that it encloses” (p.15). As Fenton (2008: 106) avers “ethnic identity is sustained by the maintenance of what [Barth] calls ‘boundaries’, the lines which mark off one group against another”.

As well as providing an entrée into the term ‘ethnicity’, Richard Schermerhorn (1970) in *Comparative Ethnic Relations: A Framework for Theory and Research* introduces the notion of how plural societies cope in the aftermath of migration. His exploration of models of integration is premised on what he interprets as the ‘sociology of intergroup relations’. Henri Tajfel’s (1981) text *Human Groups and Social Categories: Studies in Social Psychology* also raises the difficulties faced by the interaction of diverse groups of people. Especially pertinent is his chapter ‘The social psychology of minorities’. In his paper ‘Definitions and dimensions of ethnicity: A theoretical framework’, Wsevolod Isajiw (1993), speaking from a Canadian perspective of ethnoplurality, suggests that defining ethnicity is problematical, as a range of options (primordial, situational, and subjective) are open to interpretation.

Joshua Fishman’s edited (2001) *Handbook of Language and Ethnic Identity* introduces the role that language plays in ethnicity discourse. The thematic approach includes the education of minorities, second-language learning, and the salience of language to both ethnic and national identity, which has a particular resonance in the resettlement milieu. The decisions a transmigrant needs to make with regards to the juggling of his use of language – a birth language, a national language (or two in the case of the Philippines) or a dominant local language – necessitates a need for identity compromise in some cases. A further text dealing with aspects of language is *The Language, Ethnicity, and Race Reader*, edited by Roxy Harris and Ben Rampton (2003). Themes such as cross-
cultural communication, the destabilisation of ethnicity by youth, and the impact of nationalism on language planning were of particular salience. Language diminution among youth has also featured in Pamela Allen’s (2011) paper ‘Javanese cultural traditions in Suriname’, in which it is revealed that the descendants of Javanese migrants increasingly maintain an ethnic identity without recourse to a pre-migration language. A text useful to the diversity of language in the Philippines is *Ethnologue: Languages of the World* edited by Paul Lewis.

The role of religion in identity maintenance is a significant boundary marker; it is complicated by the fact that faiths may encompass various ethnicities. Several useful texts helped me to elucidate the identity / religion diarchy. Cynthia Enloe (1996) in ‘Religion and ethnicity’ suggests that, while there is no consensus on what constitutes ethnicity, religion may be a marker of ethnic identity; however, like language, it is not sufficient to sustain an ethnic group. She posits that the form of religion and the degree of devotion are important factors in determining an individual’s or group’s ability to withstand assimilation or the maintenance of ethnic solidarity. Craig Prentiss’ (2003) edited text *Religion and the Creation of Race and Ethnicity* illumines how identity is shaped by religion. Examples are provided in Michael Sells’ (2003) ‘Sacral ruins in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Mapping ethnoreligious nationalism’ and S. P. Harish’s (2006) ‘Ethnic or religious cleavage? Investigating the nature of the conflict in Southern Thailand’.

Religion aside, politics and the state also impact on the way ethnic identity is valorised, contained or repressed. The political dimension, suppression of difference, or marginalisation is addressed in Vered Amit-Talai and Caroline Knowles (1996) edited work *Re-Situating Identities: The Politics of Race, Ethnicity, and Culture*. Should the term race be used in a time when ethnicity is less value-laden? What role does the idea of home play in the production of identity? Anthony Synott and David Howes’ (1996) essay ‘Canada’s visible minorities: Identity and representation’ makes the case for questioning who is designated as ‘minority’ or indigenous may influence how specific groups are viewed or treated. In his essay ‘Ethnicity and politics’, Abner Cohen (1996: 83) suggests that “contemporary ethnicity is the result of intensive interaction between ethnic groupings and not the result of complete separation.” He further suggests that recourse to ethnic politics in the postcolonial period has resulted from the fact that during the colonial era some groups were included and were able to avail
themselves of privileges while others remained marginalised, leading to current realities of ethnic disharmony.

Benedict Anderson’s *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (2006) has as its rationale the formation of nationalism and the potential nation-state; many of his observations are also pertinent to an understanding of ethnic identity formation and contestation. Addressing themes such as ‘cultural roots’, ‘the angel of history’ and ‘memory and forgetting’ allows insights into how transitory ethnic identity may at times appear. Witness an imaginary Balinese slave taken to Melaka in the seventeenth century; what is he now? Most probably not Hindu and definitely not Indonesian as the descendants of his former Balinese co-ethnics will be. Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger’s (1992) text *The Invention of Tradition*, while Eurocentric, nevertheless provides a background for the discourse of identity by suggesting several features of the promulgation of identity tradition: legitimising institutions, establishing social cohesion or group membership, and the inculcation of beliefs, value systems and conventions of behaviour (p. 9). Stephen Cornell and Douglas Hartmann (1998) in *Ethnicity and Race: Making Identities in a Changing World* raise the issue of a constructionist approach to identity, one in which the problem of authenticity is raised.

Rethinking Ethnicity and Nation-Building: Malaysia, Sri Lanka and Fiji in Comparative Perspective edited by Abdul Rahman Embong (2007) raises the complexities of subsuming ethnic difference into that of race. How does the term ‘Malay’ sit as ethnic when it encompasses various groups, such as Minangkabau and Javanese as well as the ‘ethnic’ Malay? The Indian and Chinese likewise are ‘labelled’ as a group by institutions of the state, when clearly they encompass diverse ethnicities, languages, and religions. Anthony Milner (2004), in his ‘Afterword: A history of Malay ethnicity’, adds to this ethnic identity imagining discourse.

The process of ethnogenesis – a matter of some relevance in milieux where the coexistence of diverse ethnocultural groups is at stake – has been addressed by several scholars. Daniel Doeppers and Peter Xenos’ (2000) edited

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47 That is not to say that such an individual is necessarily proscribed from all former ethnocultural markers, but in the absence of a similar group, he will likely integrate into his host community via a process of acculturation. An example of group cohesion being maintained might be that of the Ladino (Judaeo-Spanish) – Jewish expellees from Spain after the fall of Granada in 1492. Though dispersed as far afield as Morocco, the Netherlands and the Ottoman Empire, they were able to maintain a separate identity – speaking Spanish, worshipping Judaism.
work Population and History: The Demographic Origins of the Modern Philippines and James Scott’s (2009) The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia both raise the prospect of ethnic formation as a ramification of the colonising and slaving process. Both those fleeing the state and those incorporated by the state were subject to interactions with heterogeneous others, unwittingly becoming the progenitors of new ethnocultural groups. Conversely, schisms in groups also contributed to the formation of new ethnicities. Two useful texts informing this process in the Philippines are Rolando Esteban’s (2002) The Kalibugans: Moros of Zamboanga Peninsula: An Enquiry into Social Fission, Hybridity and Ethnicity and Charles Macdonald’s (2001) paper ‘Concerning the identity of some ethnic categories in southern Palawan’.

The salience of intermarriage in the construction of new hybrid identities is evident in many studies of the migration world. The dichotomy between identity maintenance and ethnocultural ‘slippage’ might be of some importance in societies where, as Eriksen (1997) suggests, ethnicity is a very important criterion for ordering the social world of individuals. His case study ‘Mauritian society between the ethnic and the non-ethnic’ points to the difficulties encountered by cohorts attempting to straddle the ethnocultural divide. Lois Hall (2010) makes a similar observation for Mindanao in Gensan is Halu-Halo: A study of Muslim / Christian Social Relations in a Regional City of the Southern Philippines.

That not all migrations end with clear-cut identity paradigms is cause for concern in some circles. Saidatulakmal Mohd’s (2010) paper ‘Ethnic identity dilemma – A case study of the Indian Muslims in Penang, Malaysia’, raises the issue of the situational recourse to what matters ethnically. It appears that the interplay of group psychology and individual agency is required when coming to grips with what Saidatulakmal calls the ‘ethnic identity dilemma’. In a society where religion is supposed to neatly denote a racial / ethnic divide, the case of Indian Muslims is complicated by their adherence to a religion that is supposed to delineate Malaysia’s Malay population – hence an ethnic identity dilemma. Judith Nagata’s (1974) ‘What is a Malay? Situational selection of ethnic identity in a plural society’, also critiques the same identity paradigm, that of polyethnic George Town, Penang. She notes that ethnic self-identification often fails to correspond with bureaucratic or official ethnic delineation as practiced in
Malaysia. If an Indian Muslim can situationally identify as ‘Malay’ why cannot a Chinese Muslim?

Glazer and Moynihan’s (1970) *Beyond the Melting Pot: the Negroes, Puerto Ricans, Jews, Italians and Irish of New York City* was the quintessential text dealing with the challenges faced by groups maintaining ethnic identity in a multicultural milieu. When Glazer and Moynihan introduced their concept of ethnicity in 1963 the United States was in a state of flux. The term ‘ethnicity’ emerged as a corollary of an era in which the African-Americans (Negroes) began asserting themselves and demanding their constitutionally mandated rights. However, the ‘ethnic’ label came to differentiate various groups of European immigrants to the United States. Italians, Irish (nationalities) and Jews (religion) were viewed as separate ethnic identities, while the Negro was in essence ethnic-less.

Tony Waters (1995), in ‘Towards a theory of identity and migration: The formation of ethnic enclaves by migrant Germans in Russia and North America’, raises the issue of what it means to be a member of an ethnic cohort. He questions what it means to be ethnically German, and in what circumstance ethnic German-ness is maintained, diluted, or assimilated into a larger settler-nation amalgam. Peter Weinreich (1992) in ‘Social change, ethnic and national identity: Theory and practice’ conversely looks at the survival / revival of ethnic identities marginalised or suppressed during periods of authoritarian rule, in for example, the former Soviet Union.

Linda Soroff (1995), in *The Maintenance and Transmission of Ethnic Identity: A Study of Four Ethnic Groups of Religious Jews in Israel*, exposes a different conundrum faced by the immigrants to a settler-nation, in this case Israel. The integration of the *Beta Israel* Jews from Ethiopia (phenotypically African) has not gone unchallenged. The state may have been founded on the basis of religion, though cultural boundaries and political dominance of one ethnic cohort over another determined the state’s coherence. European Jews have assumed dominance, thereby blurring the boundaries about who is, or who is not, a potential member of any particular ethnic group.

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48 Waters’ case study mirrors the reality of ethnic identification during Indonesia’s *Orde Baru* (New Order – 1966-1998) when ethnocultural stereotypicalities could be theme-parked in *Taman Mini* (Jakarta) whilst meaningful discourses about religion and ethnic difference were suppressed by press censorship laws, only to resurface with a vengeance following the New Order’s collapse in 1998. Tanasaldy’s (2012) highlights this period of political and ethnic realignment – in his case the process of Dayak resurgence or reification.

Any analysis of the degree of identity maintenance in the archipelagic setting needs to take cognisance of how or why some groups have organised politically in recent times. Jamie Davidson (2008) in ‘The study of political ethnicity in Southeast Asia’ suggests that an unravelling of postcolonial inherited political realities has played a part in recourse to political ethnicity. Primordial sentiment was as likely as not to galvanise one constituent cohort or other to political activism where a perception of advantage / disadvantage was observed. Taufiq Tanasaldy (2012) in *Regime Change and Ethnic Politics in Indonesia: Dayak Politics of West Kalimantan* highlights how political actors and strategies manifested following the lifting of statist proscriptions in Indonesia. Anne Schiller’s (2007) article ‘Activism and identities in an East Kalimantan Dayak organization’ adds to this discourse. Tirtosudarmo (2006) in ‘Population, ethnicity, and violent conflict’, overviews the difficulties faced in polyethnic milieux. He suggests that one of the factors contributing to the ethnic violence that has transpired on the resettlement frontier was the short-sightedness of state planners when projecting the long-term nation-building expectations for transmigration.

Still being analysed is the imbroglio created by the movement south of Christian settlers to Muslim / Lumad Mindanao. Cultural exchange (transculturation) has not occurred at a sufficient rate to allow for ethnic coexistence. Jorge Tigno’s (2006) essay ‘Migration and violent conflict in Mindanao’ suggests that the ‘minoritisation’ of the Moros and Lumads occurred at a pace and in a manner that precluded accommodatable change. Patricio Diaz (2003) in *Understanding Mindanao Conflict* suggests that the Muslim south, before the arrival of the Spanish, had the superior culture and civilisation (p. 3) but resisting colonial subjection occurred in tandem with resistance to change and innovation. Concepción et al. (2003) in *Breaking the Links Between Economics and Conflict in Mindanao*, and Schiavo-Campo and Judd (2005) in ‘The
Mindanao conflict in the Philippines: Roots, costs and potential peace dividend’, attempt to rationalise why Mindanao was not able to peacefully accommodate an influx of outsiders.

Hardjono’s (2001) ILO paper ‘Ethnic identity and the utilization of land: A case study in Riau, Indonesia’, demonstrates the longevity of such issues as indigene-transmigrant ambivalence. She addresses the reality of ethnolinguistic detachment between migrants and an already domiciled population. Despite there not being a religious divide, intermarriage between groups failed to occur, which points to factors other than the faith ‘boundary’ as a stymie to integration. While the state’s best intentions are to uplift and provide for its citizens, Sandra Panel (1999) in ‘Did the earth move for you? The social seismology of a natural disaster in Maluku, Eastern Indonesia’, shows that factors such as attachment to a given lifeway and territory may preclude a successful relocation into the territory of another ethnic group.

Using Somalia as a model, Anna Simons (1997) in ‘Democratisation and ethnic conflict: The kin connection’, posits that weak states unable to provide social security for their citizens force citizens to rely on those they can trust, those who, outside their families are their ethnic kin. This then guarantees a reification of ethnicity. In their essay ‘The immigration dilemma: The role of perceived group competition, ethnic prejudice, and national identity’, Victoria Esses et al. (2001) provide an explanation of why groups feel anxiety about their position in society. Their study has resonance on the resettlement ‘frontier’; that of trying to understand how the competition for resources results in the negative stereotyping of migrants in relatively affluent countries like Australia, Canada, and the United States. Antipathies that are sometimes generated as a consequence of archipelagic transmigration is not adequately explained by ethnic difference per se, but may be better explained by recourse to ethnicity consciousness-raising if a perceived grievance or advantage is visible.

Agency is a further complication that impacts upon the decisions individuals make with regard to their ethnic affiliation. Donald Horowitz (2000) in Ethnic Groups in Conflict suggests that there exists a birth identity that runs parallel with a choice identity. Phenotype, religion, language can both advantage, and disadvantage the birth / choice continuum. While some transcend boundaries to adopt a new ethnocultural identity, these attempts may just as easily be thwarted. In his essay ‘The civil war in Yugoslavia: Do ostensibly high rates of
intermarriage obviate ethnic hatreds as a cause?” Andrei Simic (1994) posits that conservative rural patriarchal values meant that wives would generally support their husbands, even when the wives’ ethnoreligious cohort was being targeted.

The cultural dimension to ethnic conflict is further developed by Jack Eller’s (1999) text From Culture to Ethnicity to Conflict: An Anthropological Perspective on International Ethnic Conflict. He suggests that modern conflicts, rather than being ideological, are manifesting as interethnic ones. However, it is not the cultural difference that is the cause of interethnic misunderstanding, but the co-option and magnification of any difference where advantage of a given ethnic-political position perceived. Ernest Gellner (2008) in Nations and Nationalism adds to the ethnicity discourse by suggesting that the nation-state is more easily premised on homogeneity; which in the age of mobility and modernity is a rather moot premise.

Existing degrees of difference between ethnic groups, that is, what divides people (cultural practice, religion, language and so forth) rather than what groups have in common (historical links, lifestyles, cuisines and so forth), has implication for how the wider world is viewed. The amelioration of interethnic disagreements is often constrained by the valorisation of ethnocultural differences over a reflection of shared values. For this thesis a starting point in the imagining of similarities rather than difference is provided by Charles Robequain (1959). His text Malaya, Indonesia, Borneo, and the Philippines: A Geographical, Economic, and Political Description of Malaya, the East Indies and the Philippines allows for an envisioning of an archipelagic world in which cultural similarities provide interethnic linkages.

Before addressing the cultural differences or boundaries that might prevent or retard archipelagic peoples from interacting freely and be in a position to mutually exchange cultural norms, cognisance of the connaturality of an Austronesian cultural-linguistic heritage needs to be acknowledged. Several texts attest to this connaturality. Adelaar and Himmelmann’s (2005) edited work The Austronesian Languages of Asia and Madagascar, and Peter Bellwood’s (2006) The Austronesians: Historical and Comparative Perspectives, facilitate a broader understanding of a shared archipelagic heritage. Bellwood et al. (2007) in Prehistory of the Indo-Malaysian Archipelago continue with the theme of common origins and diverse transformations. Why did Austronesian expansion occur, Bellwood asks?
Once on the move, archipelagic people were caught up in the process of maintaining, modifying, or rejecting identities. Representative of this process is the corpus of texts that attempt to put in context what it means to belong to a specific ethnic group – mobility and intercultural relations notwithstanding. Timothy Barnard’s (2004) edited work *Contesting Malayness: Malay Identity Across Boundaries* is the first of these. However, the contributors are no more convinced than Nagata (1974) about what it means to be Malay in a modern context. The very term ‘Malay’ is contested by Zeus Salazar (1998) *The Malayan Connection: Ang Pilipinas sa Dunia Melayu*, in which he equates ‘Malay-ness’ with the broader Austronesian world, while Barnard et al. seem to confine ‘Malay-ness’ to the Muslim-dominant areas of the Archipelago.

Illustrative of ethnocultural adaptation in action is the case of the various settlers that have found their way to the Malay Peninsula. In a sense, state-sponsored population movements are not new phenomena. Pre-colonial and colonial migrants have been absorbed and are politically identified as majority Malay whether their origin be Javanese, Minangkabau, or Balinese. Koji Miyazaki (2000) raises this in ‘Javanese-Malay: Between adaptation and alienation’. Spaan et al. (2002) in ‘Re-Imagining borders: Malay identity and Indonesian migrants in Malaysia’, and Tunku Shamsul Bahrin’s (1967) ‘The growth and distribution of the Indonesian population in Malaya’ add to this discourse.

The modernity project, increased mobility, and resettlement have created new coexistence and integration paradigms. While ethnic identities are transportable to some extent, the greater the generational distance and time from region-of-origin, the greater the impact on the degree of ethnic affiliation maintained, or the rationale for maintaining one. That is not to suggest that ‘the rational’ is always involved in identity valorisation; witness the divergence in sentiment between the Ulster Orange parades and the maintenance of Irish dancing in the diaspora. Several texts have informed the questioning of the fixity of ethnic identity. The first I mention is Mary Waters’ (1990) *Ethnic Options: Choosing Identities in America*, in which she demonstrates that in the U.S. settler-nation, choices about ethnic affiliation (and degree of affiliation) are dependent on factors such as intermarriage, transmutable surnames, the viability of retaining vestiges of cultural practices in heterogeneous milieux, and the neighbourhood one chooses to live in, as well as socio-economic and class realities.
In a partial academic postscript to Glazer and Moynihan’s (1970) *Beyond the Melting Pot*, Stephen Steinberg’s (2001) *The Ethnic Myth: Race, Ethnicity, and Class in America*, makes the case that the ‘ethnic revival’ of the 1960’s among the ‘white ethnics’ was predicated on an emotional desire among some European-Americans to “affirm a right to a separate identity within the framework of a pluralist nation” (p. 3). Factors influencing the revival hinged on the myth of discrimination that new migrants had encountered; the discrimination was factual, but by the time the revival occurred class was obliterating ethnic particularities; the suburb was the new leveller.

Miri Song’s (2003) *Choosing Ethnic Identity* also questions in which circumstances individuals valorise their difference. Choices among descending generations, be it via the process of acculturation, or the increasing notion of intermarriage (which has the capacity to accelerate the choice principle), and the globalisation processes afforded by media-influenced cultural exchange, are all influenced by circumstance. Chinese in Amsterdam or ethnic Japanese Brazilians only able to speak Dutch and Portuguese respectively (while phenotypically conforming to type) may not be regarded as Chinese or Japanese when returning to region-of-origin. David Hollinger (2005), in *Postethnic America: Beyond Multiculturalism*, adds to the identity dilemma by suggesting that postethnic perspectives acknowledge “that most individuals live in many circles simultaneously…” (p. 106). The more circles one lives in (dentist, Rotarian, thespian, stamp-collector and so forth) the more likely it will be that ethnic identity will be transmuted for the cosmopolitan – a position in which the individual may juggle a diversity of cultural attributes (cuisines, dress, dance, speech and so forth).

Having outlined the complex nature of ethnic identity imagining, I now present a range of texts that are culture-specific, an awareness of which will provide a basis for an appreciation of what cultural exchange (transculturation) impacts upon. Although some overlap occurs between the themes identity, ethnicity and culture, this section will position some culture-specific texts informing this thesis’ claims.

**Culture**

Among texts useful for an understanding of culture’s complexity are Garrick Bailey and James Peoples’ (1999) *Introduction to Cultural Anthropology*, and
Eller’s (2009) *Cultural Anthropology: Global Forces, Local Lives*. Of particular salience for this thesis were chapters dealing with continuity and change, kinship and non-kin organisation, as well as individuals and identity. Edward Tylor’s (1891) *Primitive Culture: Researches into the Development, of Mythology, Philosophy, Religion, Language, Art, and Custom* introduced the notion of the development of culture, as well as the formation of mythology and the development of Animist practice. In *Race, Language and Culture*, Franz Boas’ chapters dealing with the diffusion and evolution of culture, and the questioning of social groupings as closed societies appeared relevant for the transmigration / transculturation discourse. Marvin Harris’ (1979) text *Cultural Materialism: The Struggle for a Science of Culture*, while deviating from the transculturation premise, nevertheless introduces several interesting phenomena for understanding the Filipino integration and coexistence trends – those relating to ‘varieties of pre-state village societies’ and ‘the emergence of the state’. In *The Location of Culture*, Homi Bhabha (1995) makes the point that the complexity of culture is that it cannot be easily defined or compartmentalised, which brings into question the validity of the ‘othering’ phenomena taking place in a polyethnic, transmigratory world.

The precursor to the concept ‘transculturation’ – acculturation – is a term often confused with assimilation. The text I found most useful in grounding the ‘acculturation’ dilemma was Raymond Teske and Bardin Nelson’s (1974) essay ‘Acculturation and assimilation: A clarification’. They make the case that a person can acculturate, that is, adopt the cultural mores of the ‘Other’ without necessarily being assimilated, a significant factor in view of the world’s increasing migrancy, and its corollary, the ethnocultural ‘contact zone’. Nikos Papastergiadis (2007), in *The Turbulence of Migration: Globalization, Deterritorialization and Hybridity*, addresses this conundrum by suggesting there is a limit to cultural translation. That is, should the deterritorialisation of culture be seen as contributing to the contamination of it, a transformation of it, or the construction of a third identity.

Any investigation of the transculturation tendency is confronted with the imagined stability of, and historic antecedence for, culture groups and their practices, a phenomenon regarded as ‘primordialism’ – a concept under strain given the subjectiveness of ethnocultural fixity. In his essay ‘Primordial, personal, sacred, and civil ties’, Edward Shils (1957) recounts how his study of prisoners-of-war led him to question how the concept of ‘esprit de corps’ was able to
transcend intersecting allegiances. His contention was that individuals had broader loyalties than the self, the family, and deeper loyalties than the state. Thus, the questioning of ‘what is the basis of social cohesion?’ led to a contested discourse about the concept of ‘primordialism’, that is, whether there is an inherent feeling of social obligation when seen and measured against a group attachment. Following on from Shils’ observations, Geertz (2000), recognising the potential for the disintegration of the polyethnic, postcolonial archipelagic nation-state suggests in *The Interpretation of Cultures*, that an inculcation of civic nationalism could only be a long-term project, and in the meantime recourse to the security of ethnicity, or as Geertz describes it ‘primary attachment’, would continue. People in new states may find it difficult to subordinate their known loyalties for a new imagined civil order and as a consequence the new state is “…abnormally susceptible to serious disaffection based on primordial attachments” (p. 259).

In their essay ‘The poverty of primordialism’ Eller and Coghlan (1996) attempt to dismiss the centrality of ‘primordiality’ by suggesting it to be “a bankrupt concept for the analysis and description of ethnicity” (p. 50). By way of explanation they contend that ethnicity is an ‘affect issue’ that is more readily explained by the social origins of ethnic attachments. If societal structures are being created and re-created through fission, hybridity, or transculturation, then the cultural accretions they absorb could hardly be regarded as primordial.

Jean-François Bayart’s (2005) *The Illusion of Cultural Identity* calls for a reappraisal of the late twentieth century phenomenon of the resurgence and re-identification with cultural identity – the ‘battle for identity’ (p. 252) as he terms it. His example of the Chinese in Indonesia, many of whom had become Muslim in the Javanese society between the thirteenth and eighteenth centuries (p. 93), is illustrative of his point. Their re-Sinification during the late Manchu / early Chinese Republic caused them to become an ethnic minority (p. 94).49 In other words, their cultural identity was far from stable. Kate Crehan, in her biography, *Gramsci, Culture and Anthropology* (2002: 52-67) raises the notions of ‘tradition’ as a cultural underpinning, and the reality of ‘hybridity’. Divergent traditions become the ‘socially learned’ cultural markers of ethnic identity that permit

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49 Bayart (2005) suggests (a sentiment supported by Anderson (2006: 163-170) that late colonial scientific ordering or classification also played a role in undermining former indigenised identities. In the Dutch case “…the application of Article 109 of the Fundamental Statute of the Dutch Indies (1854), which drew a distinction between ‘oriental foreigners’ (Vreemde Oosterlingen) and ‘natives’ (Inlanders)…” (p. 94) helped create divisions or exacerbate divisions that had previously been absent.
Filipinos, whatever their faith or ethnicity, to discount the commonalities of their ethnocultural Austronesian heritage.

In both *The Predicament of Culture: Twentieth Century Ethnography, Literature, and Art* (1988) and *Routes: Travel and Translation in the Late Twentieth Century*, James Clifford raises the issue of the changing nature of culture, which presages what I suggest is the outcome of transcultural change. He asks: Who has the authority to speak for a group’s identity and authenticity? (1988: 8). In his ‘Prologue’ to *Routes* Clifford illustrates how the migrancy / culture interplay has multifaceted outcomes. Cultural exposure may be rejected, embraced, or partly embraced but rarely are the migrants not influenced. Kwame Appiah concurs with this sentiment in *Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers* (2006). “Cultures are made of continuities and changes, and the identity of a society can survive through these changes” he suggests (p. 107).

Gerd Baumann’s (2003) *Contesting Culture: Discourses of Identity in Multiethnic London* epitomises well the cultural exchange that takes place in multicultural milieux; and the role played by generational change, environment and distance from region-of-origin. Stuart Hall and Paul du Gay’s (1996) edited work *Questions of Cultural Identity* also raises the interesting conundrum of culture in a rapidly interdependent world. The examples of Turkey, attempting to straddle two major cultural traditions, and the ‘partial cultures’ emerging as a consequence of the contemporary migrations are of relevance to the intercultural interactions this thesis investigates.

Whether the contemporary world is on a rollercoaster ride of acculturation, transculturation, multiculturation, or cosmopolitanation, there appear situations in which the discomfort of having to choose pathways manifests in a sentiment of ambivalence. Zygmunt Baumann (1991) addresses this phenomenon in *Modernity and Ambivalence*. He suggests that much modernity is concerned with “the effort to exterminate ambivalence: an effort to define precisely – and to suppress or eliminate everything that could not or would not be precisely defined” (pp. 7-8). Transculturation at least is creating sociocultural persona that are not easily definable. That a state of cultural ambivalence exists (and shows no sign of abating) is highlighted by the contributors in Mike Featherstone’s (1990) edited volume *Global Culture: Nationalism, Globalization and Modernity*. He asks: Is there a global culture or a globalisation of culture? He then goes on to suggest that “there may be emerging sets of ‘third cultures’…” (p. 1). Ulf Hannerz’s (1990)
essay ‘Cosmopolitans and locals in the world culture’ is more dogmatic on the question of a world culture – there is one. It is created “through the increasing interconnectedness of varied local cultures, as well as through the development of cultures without a clear anchorage in any one territory” (p. 235).

The notion of a rapidly changing sociocultural world has repercussions, however. For some the reaction is one of anxiety, for others that of accommodation. Samuel Huntington’s (2002) The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order puts him into the former category. He imagines a future where cultures rather than ideologies or imperial interests are arrayed against each other. Immanuel Wallerstein (1991) is much more sanguine. In Geopolitics and Geoculture: Essays on the Changing World-System he infers that whatever the shape of the nation-state or the political world, nothing stands in the way of cultural interactions; in fact they are essential for survival. Marshall Sahlins (1987) in Islands of History, stresses that while cultures may have their own logic or structure, the human “social experience is the appropriation of specific percepts by general concepts: an ordering of men and the objects of their existence according to a scheme of cultural categories which is never the only one possible…” (p. 145). That is, cultures, like ethnicities, are malleable, have finite lives, and are thus amenable to retooling or transculturation.

Texts informing the cultural underpinning of Filipino society include the following. The first is Fernando Zialcita’s (2006) Authentic Though not Exotic: Essays on Filipino Identity, which raises the issue of a community broader than the narrow base of one’s kin. He represents Southeast Asia as a collage on which are pasted many groupings of cultures with differing languages, ecosystems and traditions. The Philippines, through the Hispanisation process, was more culturally influenced by the colonial experience than were other zones of the Archipelago by their colonial experience. In Building the National Community: Problems and Prospects and Other Historical Essays, Evangelista (2002) adds to the diversity discourse by questioning the struggle between an imagined Filipino identity that tries to transcend ones of kinship, ethnic and regional identity and their attendant cultural particularities.

Belen Medina’s (2009) The Filipino Family touches on the cultural aspects impacting on family and the wider society. In the context of the considerable interethnic marriage that has taken place in the study area, Medina makes the point that in the Philippines “who marries whom is governed by the norms of each
society” (p. 98). Violations may range from subtle censure to expulsion from the group. A further informative text dealing with the cultural particularities of Filipinos is Yengoyan and Makil’s (2004) edited work *Philippine Society and the Individual: Selected Essays of Frank Lynch*, especially those sections dealing with belief systems and practice, and the essay suggesting that what appears authentic, quintessentially Filipino, may be something shared more widely, that is, today’s native cultural trait may have been yesterday’s visitor. *Cracks in the Parchment Curtain: and other Essays in Philippine History* by William Henry Scott (1998) and Francisco Sionil José’s (2005) *Termites in the Sala, Heroes in the Attic: Why we are Poor* also helped inform on aspects of Philippine cultural development.

**Transculturation**

Before outlining the texts that have shaped the theoretical underpinning of this thesis I briefly state what I mean by the term *transculturation*. The previous section dealt with the notion of *culture* “that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, customs, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of a society” (Tylor 1891: 1). Simply stated, transculturation is the mutual exchange of any features that are characteristic of a culture; a process that takes place when two or more ethnic groups meet and share the same geographical space.

A seminal text, indeed the key text on which this thesis is predicated, is Fernando Ortiz’s (1995) parabolic tale *Cuban Counterpoint: Tobacco and Sugar*. First published in 1940, Ortiz uses these two crops in allegory to describe both their domination of the Cuban economy and the sociocultural implications of their evolution. Midway through his treatise Ortiz introduces a passage ‘On the social phenomenon of *Transculturation* and its importance in Cuba’ (p. 95) in which he presents the term ‘transculturation’ and outlines its intended use. He imagines it as a replacement for the term ‘acculturation’ which he deems inadequate to explain the cultural exchanges that have taken place among the diverse cohorts of immigrants to Cuba.

As of much salience as Ortiz’s ruminations in *Cuban Counterpoint* is Bronislaw Malinowski’s 1940 ‘Introduction’ to Ortiz’s text, in which he explains Ortiz’s intention of conceiving the term. By giving it his imprimatur, Malinowski ensured the term’s survival. Fernando Coronil’s introductory essay ‘Transculturation and the politics of theory: Countering the centre, Cuban
counterpoint’, in the 1995 Duke University Press edition, is also of relevance. In it he provides a retrospective view on where Ortiz, multicultural Cuba, the realpolitik, and the term ‘transculturation’ fit into the ethnographic milieu of the twentieth century. Drawing many of the strands of Ortiz’s ethnographic work together is the Mauricio Font et al.’s (2005) edited work Cuban Counterpoints: The Legacy of Fernando Ortiz. Chapters titled ‘Transculturation and nationalism’, ‘Transcultural anthropology in the Américas’, and ‘Transculturation à la Ajiaco: A recipe for modernity’ all help flesh out the central message of culture flows and / or cultural exchange.50

An array of observers and social scientists has delved into the transculturation discourse and the concomitant cultural interface that mobility and migration afford. In Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation Mary Louise Pratt (1992) coined the term ‘contact zone’ to represent the social space where cultures meet, clash and grapple with each other. Her assumptions rely on asymmetrical cultural relations of domination and subordination that were inherent in former colonial milieux. However, as Michael Schudson (1994) suggests in ‘Culture and the integration of national societies’, current realities that reflect the intertwinings of local, regional, national, and global cultures have altered the pressures previously felt by immigrants to acculturate to a dominant interlocutor. Where they might previously have been subsumed, mobility allows for a continuance of connections and ethnic identity maintenances. Astrid Hamburger (2009) in ‘Immigrant integration: Acculturation and social integration’, when discussing the dimension of migrant integration, suggests that there are four aspects of the process: cultural, social, economic and political. To a greater or lesser degree transculturation forms part of this process.

Interpretations of the concept ‘transculturation’ have altered over time. It has functioned in turn as a tool of mestizaje studies and literary criticism. Negotiating this maze of alternating emphases, my aim is to return to what Ortiz and Malinowski imagined for transculturation – a process of mutual cultural exchange. These facts notwithstanding, those who have perceived, critiqued, and countered the efficacy of the term have influenced my thinking. One such is Mark Millington’s (2005) assessment ‘Transculturation: Taking stock’. In his opinion

50 Patricia Catoira (2005: 181) suggests that Ortiz often used as metaphor the well-known Cuban dish ajiaco to represent the cultural processes that had shaped Cuban society since colonisation. Ajiaco she explains is “a Creole stew that incorporates American, European, and African ingredients.”
both the prefix ‘trans-’ and the notion of a new term failed to represent the Ortiz / Malinowski premise that transculturation envisaged a reciprocal or mutual exchange of cultural practices. Millington suggests that later misrepresentation and misuse of the term ‘transculturation’ might have been precluded had Ortiz more fully developed a coherence for his neologism. After expounding on the term’s chequered history Millington does acknowledge its relevance in the field of migration studies.

Alberto Moreiras (2001) in *The Exhaustion of Difference: The Politics of Latin American Cultural Studies* also notes that the term ‘transculturation’ has been used to represent different sociocultural phenomena. In one sense it has been used to describe the transformation of society via a process of cultural mixing, while in another it was used as a tool to critique the status quo of intercultural flows, be it literary, architectural, musical or whatever. In ‘Freedom from transculturation: A response to Priscilla Archibald’, Moreiras (2007) demonstrates how far the use of the term has deviated from the Ortiz / Malinowski thought processes, and possibly why its cachet has been undermined en route.

Several papers demonstrate how transculturation theory is being interpreted. In ‘Reclaiming ‘roots’ for Cape Verde: Representation of Tabanka festivals as sites of cultural contestation’ Christina McMahon (2004) makes the case that indigenous cultures have the capacity to influence and alter the foreign, and vice-versa: cultural exchange is not a one-way process. In his essay ‘From cultural exchange to transculturation: A review and reconceptualization of cultural appropriation’, Richard Rogers (2006) begins by suggesting that a three-way pattern of cultural exchange: either one of cultural exploitation, one of cultural dominance, or one of reciprocal cultural exchange, is possible; the latter model he regards as transculturation’ and / or the creation of hybrid forms (p. 474).

Manju Jaidka (2010), in ‘India is my country but the world is my home: Transculturality through literature’, makes the case that while Ortiz’s worldview was premised on the validating of Afro-Cuban culture, an understanding of his transculturation concept (in the face of increased mobility and cultural interaction) is of increasing relevance. Cultural exchange is a composite act involving partial deculturation, enculturation, reinvention, redefinition, and so forth. A case study

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51 The notion of ‘indigenous’ and ‘foreign’ viewed in McMahon’s context is open to interpretation. In Cape Verde, I guess, the ‘foreign’ is anything that enters the Cape Verdian cultural sphere. Were ‘indigenous’ aspects of the Cape Verde culture to surface in Portugal or Poland they would be regarded as ‘foreign’ in those milieux.
of a migrant cohort influenced by cultural ambivalence is provided by Janet Naidu (2007) in ‘Retention and transculturation of Hinduism in the Caribbean’. Naidu suggests that as well as retaining much of their Indian culture, indentured migrant exposure to a diversity of existing cultures has resulted in a transculturation of Hindu religious beliefs and practices.

However, transculturation does not go unchallenged. In ‘Transculturating transculturation’, Diana Taylor (1991) suggests that cultural reciprocity is influenced by the dominant / subordinate paradigm. Those already socially and economically advantaged have fewer reasons to be open to change. Two texts illustrate this dilemma. In Who Are We?: The Challenges to America’s National Identity Huntington (2005) identifies an anxiety about encroaching cultures altering the existing status quo. In ‘Drain from the bottom: Individual ethnic identity change in southern Ecuador’, Linda and Jim Belote (1984) explain how the dominant / subordinate cultural paradigm is challenged by some subordinate groups in that country.

Transculturation theory has been analysed, critiqued, and in some cases dismissed. Abril Trigo (2000), in ‘Shifting paradigms: From transculturation to hybridity: A theoretical critique’, is of the opinion that ‘transculturation’ is a worn-out, nostalgic term, better replaced by concepts such as ‘hybridity’ or ‘heterogeneity’. Yet, in light of the Narra / Palawan fieldwork, I suggest – for reasons that will be elaborated on in the next chapter – that the Ortiz / Malinowski imaginings best represents the findings of this thesis.

**Summary**

In a world of increasing migrancy, more people than ever – both migrant and those already-resident – are called upon to interact with others with whom they have little or nothing in common. This lack of knowledge of the Other may be mediated by ignorance, yet in a more connected world is less excusable. Appiah (2006: xviii-xix) suggests that “(t)horoughgoing ignorance about the ways of others is largely a privilege of the powerful [yet nonetheless] we need to develop habits of coexistence: conversation in its older meaning, of living together, association.” The powerful or dominant party in any intercultural encounter may have reasons for displaying dominance (economic anxiety, feeling of cultural superiority or xenophobia) yet whether this stance can be sustained for all time is a moot point. As Appiah advocates: “A creed that disdains the partialities of
kinfolk and community may have a past, but it has no future” (p. xix). And it is with this sentiment in mind that the thesis investigates the potential for intercultural *modi vivendi* to occur; where disdain is suppressed and ethnocultural interactions result in cultural exchanges (transculturation) that facilitate the process of coexistence.

In light of the interaction with the above identity theory texts it is the intention of this thesis to use *transculturation* as the framing theory to make sense of the cultural changes – and cultural exchanges – that have taken place within a specific transmigrant cohort centred on Narra / Palawan. Though various strategies might have been employed to thwart a *modus vivendi* in the Narra resettlement – ethnic reification, enclavism, rejection of the Other – this appears not to have happened. While the thesis acknowledges that other options – acculturation to a dominant culture, or the coexistence of multiple cultures in the vein of multiculturalism – were possible in resettlement scenarios such as Narra, they did not ensue in this particular case. While I acknowledge that the Narra investigation investigates transmigrant cultural interaction, rather than transmigrant-indigene (or already-resident) interactions, *transculturation* is as valid a concept in either scenario.

Gaps in the literature, while not calculated, exist nevertheless. Although transculturation-as-theory had its genesis in the Ortiz / Malinowski deliberations of the 1930s, the subsequent limiting utilisation of the transculturation concept to sustain Latin American literary studies has thwarted its potential. In consequence of this a concept or tool capable of dealing with the sociocultural ramifications of intercultural encounters in a holistic manner was in effect sidelined. That is, the reciprocity implied in the Ortiz / Malinowski term, was eschewed in favour of a them-and-us interpretation of contact. In such scenarios the interpretation usually involves an exposé of what is lost when ethnocultural encounters occur, that is, a negative stance. If I have interpreted correctly the Ortiz / Malinowski intent for

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52 Appiah appears to envisage a rosy future for mankind. Many recent – and continuing – examples abound (Bhutan, Northern Ireland, Rwanda, and the former Yugoslavia, among others) attest to the fact that finding *modi vivendi* amongst diverse peoples is still a fraught proposition. Whatever the criteria are that best facilitate the notion of coexistence, the variables determining such outcomes are legion (religion, class, race, struggle for resources, and so forth). That is not to acknowledge that under certain circumstances man may overcome, manipulate, or suppress those criteria that divide him from others. Homi Bhabha in conversation with Jonathan Rutherford (1990: 210-211) suggests that a common ground (or third space) in which the “possibility of articulating different, even incommensurable cultural practices and priorities” is possible. But a rider hints that despite how rational man may be in certain situations “it is actually very difficult, even impossible and counterproductive, to try and fit together different forms of culture and to pretend that they can actually coexist” (p. 209). *Transculturation*, I suggest, is a window into what is possible.
the transculturation neologism— and I think I have— then the give-and-take of cultural exchange (mutually contracted) should not be cause for anxiety. Aspects of certain cultures may indeed be invalidated, but that does not need to be interpreted as a negative; what needs to be juxtaposed in such cases is what cultural gains have ensued.
CHAPTER III – TOWARDS A THEORY OF TRANSCULTURATION

This chapter aims to unpack the theoretical underpinnings contributing to this thesis’ rationale – that is, to understand the social and political outcomes that have transpired in the wake of the resettlement of several thousand families in Narra / Palawan following their transmigration from across the Philippines. That there have been uneven social and political outcomes as a consequence of the resettling of a heterogeneity of ethnocultural groups across the Archipelago is a given. By inference, among the millions of archipelagic transmigrants – and the host communities in which they have settled – there are groups and individuals who have been unable to establish modi vivendi that facilitate their coexistence and / or integration within new pluricultural settings.

As witnessed in several parts of the Archipelago, this has resulted in the breakdown of social harmony leading to ethnic / communal tension, and at times violence and the fleeing of many thousands from their homes. Conversely, a diversity of ethnic groups may achieve a modus vivendi if certain criteria are met. Foremost among these is the minimum position of cultural interaction between individuals and groups – a development that brings the possibility of altering perceptions of ‘fixed’ or limited ethnocultural worldviews. Cultural interaction has the capacity to promote mutual cultural exchanges – a process I deem to be represented by the concept ‘transculturation’ – the concept which I aim to employ as a framing theory to comprehend and reference the social outcomes possible in migrant-settler milieux.

After introducing the transculturation concept, the chapter will address the notion of ethnic identity; it is ethnicity after all (and the cultural attributes it supports) that is a primary marker of division among groups of people in polyethnic milieux. It will then attempt to analyse more closely the notion of how culture underpins ethnocultural realities; how its diminution, maintenance, or reification impacts on intercultural and interethnic relations. The relevance of cultures as systems, their boundedness, and transmissionability, is examined before progressing to the concept ‘transculturation’. Subsequent to that concept’s

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53 Acting independently of each other, the Archipelago nation-states, implementing a range of resettlement initiatives, experienced similar uneven outcomes for their pains. In consequence, issues such as integration, interethnic discord, and the attainment (or otherwise) of resettlement objectives resonate more widely than might be imagined.

54 As previously mentioned, Mindanao in the Philippines and several regions of post-New Order Indonesia have been wracked by ethnic violence, which has left tens of thousands dead and at times an IDP population of more than a million in each polity.
definition and etymology, an outline of its historical applicability, and an explication of what key theorists have brought to the transculturation-as-theory debate, the chapter will position transculturation by considering intercultural models (acculturation, multiculturalism, and cosmopolitanism) that are antithetical to it. The chapter concludes with an explanation of how and why I intend to apply the transculturation concept.

The term ‘transculturation’ – as envisaged by Ortiz circa 1940 – is at once a process (mutual cultural exchange), and the effect of that process. As such it might be paraphrased as the product of the compromises required for heterogeneous populations to find modi vivendi in the resettlement zone, and as such a precursor to positive integrational outcomes. Unlike the fraught processes of ‘asymmetrical acculturation’, with its attendant actual or perceived sense of cultural loss vis-à-vis dominant groups, transculturation envisages the creation of altered or new identities premised on a partial deculturation, and a concomitant neoculturation paradigm, which allows individuals and groups to adopt or adapt the cultural practices of those amongst whom they live (Ortiz 1995: 103). The term ‘transculturation’ has proved to be contentious in the sense that social theorists have both assailed and defended its worth. In the context of this thesis ‘transculturation’ as a framing theory will be applied to signify the trajectory and effect of cultural interaction in the resettlement zone.

Before proceeding with a fuller analysis of the ‘transculturation’ concept, that is, its critique and its relevance to the issue of cultural certainties in a globalised world, I shall outline other facets of the identity paradigm that will be raised in this chapter. Simply stated, a cyclical discourse is possible at this stage. Before being able to ground the potential inherent in transculturation-as-theory something must be made of that which is to be transculturated, or impacted upon – culture. Culture does not exist in a vacuum; it constitutes part and parcel of the makeup of every individual, family, sub-group, ethnolinguistic group, and nation-state. Even the cosmopolitan, who imagines they are free of national limitations or prejudices, is not free of culture (Hannerz 1990). While culture is an integral component of identity, what is central to this thesis is the way in which the cultural particularities are imbedded in ‘ethnic identity’. It is ethnic identity after

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55 What Hannerz (1990) has in mind is that whatever exposure the cosmopolitan has to cultures not his own, the way he interprets his interaction with other cultures, is dependent (to some extent) on how embedded he is in his own culture. “…the principle is that the more clearly the alien culture contrasts with the culture of origin, …the more conspicuously is surrender abroad a form of mastery at home” (p. 240).
all that has the capacity to be manipulated, it being ethnicity that can undergo reification, diminution, or modification. Reflecting on the reification model, Horowitz (2000: xvi) ponders on whether it is cultural difference, ignorance, or a realistic divergence of interest that drives ethnic groups into conflict. He posits that it is ethnic affiliations or the way individuals and groups manipulate these affiliations that are so potentially destructive, and are the sources for conflict or misapprehension.

A necessary starting point for any understanding of what it is that individuals and groups have to contend with in the resettlement frontier, when faced with an ethnically heterogeneous settler cohort, is the actuality of difference. Difference however, only becomes contentious on leaving the isolation of relatively homogeneous regions-of-origin. Ethnic identity (and its cultural baggage) gains salience only when two or more groups come into contact. Gregory Bateson (1979: 68) averred that “it takes at least two somethings to create a difference… Clearly each alone is – for the mind and perception – a non-entity, a non-being. Not different from being, and not different from non-being. An unknowable, a Ding an sich [a thing unto itself], a sound from one hand clapping.” That is, ethnocultural interaction, whether in the Narra / Philippine context (or the wider world) results only when the happenstance of ethnic diversity is juxtaposed with the migrancy phenomenon.

**Ethnic Identity**

In this section I engage with the scholarship of key thinkers who have contributed to my understanding of the complexity of the ethnic state-of-being. After defining what is meant by the term ethnicity, its salience will be discussed. The relevance of concepts such as ‘primordial’ and the ‘ethnic boundary’ will be included, though some overlap with the ‘culture’ section may be obvious. A further concept to be addressed is that of ‘ethnic identity dilemma’. It will be asked whether as a consequence of transmigration and interaction with ethnically diverse migrants in the resettlement zone, individuals and groups continue to see themselves (and be viewed by others) in the same way as they had been pre-migration. In a migration milieu, influenced by cultural interaction, socio-economic mobility, and the inquietude of generational change, ethnic identity self-ascription or ascription by others has the potential to be undermined.
Eriksen (2010: 5) suggests that as a starting point “ethnicity has something to do with the *classification of people* and *group relationships* …[and] refers to aspects of relationships between groups which consider themselves, and are regarded by others as being culturally distinctive.” However, ethnicity is more than a shared culture, it is a factor in negotiating identity, and is especially salient in plural societies emanating from the decolonisation process. In polyethnic (or pluricultural) states such as the Philippines ethnic affiliation is a basis for self-identification and the identification of others, irrespective of shared values and similar cultural practices. It is the differences between groups however – different histories, language, religion, customs, and traditions – that is a starting point for either the phenomenon of self-ascription, or the ascription of others. Anthony Smith (cited Eller 1999: 13) suggests the ethnic group is ‘a type of cultural collectivity’ though this fails to explain the overlapping of cultural values between groups.

Although positioning the terms ‘ethnic’ and ‘ethnicity’ is fraught with difficulty, an understanding of its fundamentals is required before labels such as ‘ethnolinguistic’, or ‘ethnocultural may be employed as identity markers. Fenton (2008: 25) suggests: “Just how ethnicity is discussed is very much contextual… [a starting point being the]… three milieux within which the terminology of ethnic (and race and nation) is used. These are the scholarly; the political, civic, and public; and the popular or ‘everyday’ discourse.” Broaching the term ‘ethnicity’ in some academic and political settings in the Philippines elicited responses indicating that the term referred only to the so-called indigenous or autochthonous groups, rather than Filipinos at large. Conversely, defining the ‘ethnicity’ term is similarly fraught in the wider world. In societies as diverse as Malaysia, United Kingdom, and the United States the concept ‘ethnicity’ is employed in a variety of contexts. ‘Ethnicity’ may be conflated with ‘race’; it might be employed to designate differences between races, or might be applied to one societal cohort, but not to others (Fenton 2008: 25-50).

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56 The existence of collectivities such as lowland Christian, Muslim, Animist or IP, does not preclude individuals and groups within those collectivities self-ascribing respectively (or being ascribed as such by others) as Ilocano, Maguindanao, Pala’wan or Batak, for example.

57 To paraphrase Fenton’s observations; in the case of the United States ‘race’ is employed to designate colour difference, while ethnicity is employed to differentiate between a conglomerations of white immigrants. Hence, the label African-American, but not European-American is employed. White Europeans (but not the Anglo-Saxons) are more finely distinguished: Germans, Irish, Italians, and Polish and so forth, while African-American does not distinguish between Hausa, Ibo, or Akan. Fenton suggests that the black-white certainties of the
Defining Ethnicity

The Oxford Dictionary of Sociology (ODS 2005: 226) defines ‘ethnicity’ – or the ethnic group – as representing “individuals who consider themselves, or are considered by others, to share common characteristics that differentiate them from the other collectivities in a society, and from which they develop their distinctive cultural behaviour… [and which should be viewed] in contradistinction to race which is often seen in biological terms… Ethnic groups are… fluid in composition and subject to changes in definition.” Edgar and Sedgwick (1999: 114) suggest that as well as denoting a self-awareness and cultural distinctiveness on the part of a particular group, the label ‘ethnic’ is prone to be used to define minority groups within larger polities. They further observe that “the assertion of ethnic identity can be unifying or divisive in equal measure – often depending on who is asserting it, of whom, and in which context” (p. 115).

Unlike ‘race’ which may differentiate people on the basis of physiognomy, ‘ethnicity’ in Ashcroft et al.’s (2007: 80-84) opinion “refers to a fusion of many traits that belong to the nature of any ethnic group: a composite of shared values, beliefs, norms, tastes, behaviours, experiences, consciousness of kind, memories and loyalties.” They add that so long as an individual chooses to identify as a member of an ethnic group, this identity cannot be taken away, rejected, or denied by others. In a migration or post-migration context ‘ethnicity’ is often evoked to distinguish minority groups from the existing, dominant majority. Schermerhorn

several centuries of statistics have been unbalanced by the recognition of further categories, for example – Hispanic and Asian. Lebanon is in Asia, as is Sri Lanka and Taiwan, so usage of the term ‘Asian’ is rather nebulous. The term ‘Hispanic’ refers to the language Spanish, but as a category it contradicts former certainties. Hispanics may be white, black, Amerindian, or any shading thereof – making an ethnic division à la Irish, or Italian moot. The United States I suggest – mirroring the world at large – will find it evermore difficult to label groups ethnically, racially, or linguistically, given an increasing level of intermarriage.

In the United Kingdom, Fenton (2008) suggests, the label ‘ethnic’ is sometimes used interchangeably with ‘race’, but is usually employed to designate minority groups, among recent immigrants, rather than the ethnic divisions of English, Irish, Manx, Scot, or Welsh. In Malaysia ‘race’ is used as a starting-point to differentiate Chinese, Indian, and Malay. ‘Ethnicity’ in the Malaysian context is complicated by the political status that belonging entails. Malay-as-ethnicity is often conflated as something more resonant, which creates a degree of opacity when juxtaposed against labels such as ras (race or racial), rakyat (the people or folk), warga (family or people), kaum (lineage group or community), orang (people), or bangsa (descent – in a primordial sense) (pp. 44-45).

Ashcroft et al. suggest that in settler-societies such as the Australia, Canada, and the United States, a self-constructed mythology of national identity absolves the (numerically and politically dominant) Anglo-Saxon group from identifying as an ethnicity. This worldview is not unique to settler-societies however; increased immigration from the ‘periphery’ to the postcolonial ‘metropole’ continues to view the minority arrivals as ethnic, while the extant population is ethnic-less. This is not to infer that ethnicity is the refuge of the weak; indeed if extant populations faced zeitgeist realities they would flaunt their ethnic particularities. To cite an example we might choose the case of the United Kingdom. In spite of centuries of close political and economic
(1970: 12) posits a more comprehensive definition, by suggesting that an ethnic group is:

a collectivity within a larger society having real or putative common ancestry, memories of a shared historical past, and a cultural focus on one or more symbolic elements defined as the epitome of their peoplehood... kinship patterns, physical contiguity, religious affiliation, language or dialect form, tribal affiliation, nationality, phenotypical features, or a combination of these. 59

I am less convinced than Schermerhorn (1970), Isajiw (1993), and others who claim that people movements (colonisation, immigration, invasion, or slavery) alone are facilitators of minority or ethnic status in a wider world or polity. Taking the Philippines or the Archipelago as a model, I suggest that ethnicity would still be of salience in the absence of the aforementioned events. It is not only that each island represented an ethnolinguistic grouping; mountain ranges on the one island could divide people who would identify with a contracted view of belonging. However, even when those mountain ranges are broached, or the islands colonised, invaded, or raided for slaves, the resulting sociocultural recalibration of a geographical space may yet allow for the coexisting of ethnic identities. Whether these ethnic groups share cultural indicia or not, so long as individuals or groups are regarded as ‘different’ or regard themselves as ‘different’, they are in essence ‘different’. While the indicia can be calibrated to suit an individual’s (or group’s) needs, the inherited (from birth) ethnic persona is less malleable. As evidenced by the Roma and Jews in a Europe, or the Sorbs and Wends in Germany, the tenacity of ethnic differentiation may be sustained for millennia. 60

60 The case of the Sorbs and Wends is instructive in a migration, colonisation and invasion sense. From before the 10th century there had been a West Slav / ethnic German interaction, and with the continuing eastward migration of Germans most of these Slavs acculturated and were assimilated into German society. However, the Sorb / Wend pocket of Slavs – due to their geographic isolation – were able to maintain enough traditions and customs to be able to survive and be considered as an ethnic enclave. They now exist within the UNESCO-inspired Spreewald Biosphere Reserve southeast of Berlin. As an example of the way in which the vagaries of history contribute to the formation or maintenance of identities such as ethnic identity, the case of the Spreewald Wends is enlightening. In the current Germany this cohort of West Slavs is able to identify ethnically as Wends. Had the 1945 postwar border been drawn a little further west this cohort would now be regarded ethnically as Poles.
The Relevance of Ethnicity

“Ethnicity and ethnic affiliations… were expected to decline and even disappear with the homogenization associated with modernization and the French model of civic nationalism” suggest Bennett et al. (2005: 112-114). They observe however, that the opposite has occurred. Ethnicities (or the manifestation thereof) have proliferated. Removing former repressive constraints has in some cases led to ethnic mobilisation, or ethnonationalism, which has produced a conundrum of sorts. While former relatively homogenous states; Denmark, Éire (Ireland) and Japan for example, are hosting an increasingly heterogeneous migrant arrival, there are other states in which little potential for ethnic pluralism (let alone transculturation) exists, and where conversely ethnic advantaging, purity, and in some cases ethnic cleansing have occurred (or continue to occur): Bhutan, Bosnia, and Burundi, being examples.

Bolaffi et al. in DREC (2003: 94-95) suggest that “the problem of ‘belonging’ is a constant in the modern world, where belonging to an ethnic group is no longer defined in religious and cultural terms, but is structured around political and economic factors… [or] an alternative form of social class organization…” That is, ethnicity in some situations is employed as an alternative to class-consciousness, while in others it is utilised for economic or political advantage (Nagata 1974, Saidatulakmal Mohd. 2010). While ‘belonging’ has more salience than providing political or economic advantage, these advantages may be subliminal.

However, for some groups – the ‘Negroes’ of Glazer and Moynihan’s (1970: xxxi-xlii) New York for example – economic and racial discrimination acting in tandem have had a complicating effect on how other societal groups now see themselves. They observe that the resurgence of ethnic identity in New York (replicable on a wider canvas) has come about because of affirmative action programs implemented to advantage African-Americans. The perception that those belonging to other groups would thereby be ‘less advantaged’ created some recourse for self-reflection, which resulted in reinvigorated self-assertions among hitherto waning ethnic identities.

In an archipelagic setting (and the wider world) ethnic identity, and its deployment, are only meaningful in geographical spaces in which more than one self-ascribed group exists. Without the other, the ‘ethnic’ reference point is
meaningless (Eriksen 2010: 41). Whether isolated on an island in the Archipelago (in a Philippine sense), or relegated to the periphery of an island (as is the case for the Welsh and Scottish), ethnic nomenclature is fraught with ambiguity. Bolaffi et al. (2003: 95) raise this issue of proximity as a precursor to ethnic identity ascription in this manner:

The modern debate focuses on the relational and dialogic aspects of ethnicity which lead to ethnic characteristics, that is, each ‘us’ is created in relation to a ‘them’. Membership of a group implies the designation of ‘others’ who are excluded from that group. Ethnicity asserts a collective ego to the exclusion of others (Comaroff 1987). Each ethnic group perceives the greatest differences in its nearest neighbours (Alber 1992) according to mobilizationists; separation and interaction are the building blocks of ethnicity, and competition and conflict between ethnic groups are of particular importance. Thus ethnicity is not a situation of isolation, but one of dynamic exchange and conflict with others…

The perception of ethnic groups as units sometimes obscures the position played by the individual. While the notion of individual agency in-theory exists for most, the reality of choosing not to belong is less fraught within the modernity project. Fear of being rejected or expelled from this or that group, has been a motivator for clinging to inclusiveness, whatever the motivation for group recourse to ethnic mobilisation. In essence, continued interaction and social inclusion may dampen the individual’s capacity to separate individual from group interest. Bolaffi et al. (2003: 95) add the claim:

These three basic theories [primordialist, modernist, and mobilizationist] have created two opposing camps; for some, ethnicity is a tool for the fulfilment of needs and the struggle for power, while others claim it is manifest in the continuous rebuilding – often symbolically – of social relationships. Barth does not see ethnic groups as developers of cultural structures, but as coolly calculating operators intent on promoting their own material interests. Common values are important not because they contribute to an ethnic identity, but because they necessitate the formation of roles and interactions.

The markers of identity are more complex than those of ethnicity alone, but ethnicity – alongside family, clan, community, religious community, and nation-state – is sometimes called upon to make sense of belonging to an entity larger than the self (Maalouf 2003). Why this is so is open to conjecture. One line

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61 Eriksen (2010: 41) states: “If a setting is wholly monoethnic, there is effectively no ethnicity, since there is nobody there to communicate cultural difference to.” In an age of increasing mobility, and the spread of technology, ethnocultural isolation is rapidly receding.

62 The case of the Welsh is instructive; in their language Cymraeg they know themselves as Cymru (fellow countrymen) which is a rather vague label. Historically their dominant neighbour the Anglo-Saxon referred to them as Waelisc (foreigner) and their country Weales (Wales – foreign land). The Welsh case might be juxtaposed with that of the Austronesian or Malay world. As members of a larger Celtic family they have things in common with other Celts, just as the Austronesian world shares commonalities that transcend the cultural baggage of individual ethnic groups.
of reasoning suggests that ethnic identity is innate, that is, hard-wired into a person’s persona, beyond one’s control and in essence ‘primordial’, while others are more circumspect regarding primordiality. What can be claimed is that enculturation – “the gradual acquisition of the norms of a culture or group” (AOD 2004: 412) – plays an important role in ethnic identity deliberations. In the face of this, agency – or the ability to influence one’s ethnic future – is constrained by the fact that from birth we mimic and adopt the cultural practices we see about us. One’s religion, formative education, language, dress code, agriculture, food culture are all determined by one’s accident of birth (one’s ethnicity), and play an important role in how one ascribes ethnically, or is ascribed by others.63

_Primordialism_

Often without analysing their place in a wider society, individuals continue to identify not with the big-picture obligations that bind them to the nation-state, but to non-civic ties which derive from their birthplace: family, community, religion, or language – the cultural baggage that binds them to some ethnic group or other. This continued recourse to the familiar or as Fenton (2008: 88-90) describes it “…the powerful influence of familiarity, and customariness of social life, and the diffuse sense of attachment that flows from circumstances of birth and socialisation, use of language and ingrained habits of thought and social practice…” are what we may deem to be recourse to primordial influences. An understanding of primordialism would thus seem an important precursor to any imagining of the Ortizian transcultural potential.

Whether there are inherent markers that define an individual’s trajectory to belonging to an ethnic group is open to scrutiny. To test the ‘primordiality’ thesis we might use a single ethnolinguistic marker (language) to show that reliance on primordiality as a basis for group difference and / or solidarity is fraught with conjecture. For example, the Proto-Celtic speaking people of two and a half millennia BP have been divided by various nation-state delineations. We might

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63 The DREC (2003: 87-88) states: “The term ‘enculturation’ derives from the world ‘culture’ and indicates the assimilation of the contents, practices and values of the cultural traditions of a group by the individuals belonging to the group.” That is not to say that the passed on cultural models are neatly replicated between generations. Margaret Mead (1970) defined this dissonance which is emphasised in industrial societies as the ‘generation gap’. Whether conscious or unconscious the enculturation process should be viewed as a lifetime project. Though as DREC sees it, broken into time-frames “…making it necessary to distinguish between the infancy stage (where enculturation is enforced and arbitrary), the adolescent stage (in which it is oriented toward social integration… and the adult stage (when it is an aware and critical form of acceptance or refusal of the values and choices of the person’s group)” (p. 88).
see a Celt (reference to Celt in this context is meant to delineate a former reality) in Wales speaking Welsh, a Celt in Anatolia speaking Turkish, or a Celt in Bavaria speaking German.64

Any analysis of the primordialism debate, suggests Fenton (2008: 73-90), needs to take cognisance of two questions: (1) ‘Are groups real (or socially constructed)?’ (2) ‘Are group attachments affective (guided by sentiment) or instrumental (guided by rational calculation)?’ There are voices; Tishkov, Weber, Eller and Coghlan states Fenton, who suggest that ethnicity is rationally ‘constructed’ or ‘instrumental’ in the sense that rather than the ‘blind loyalty’ of primordiality, ethnic attachments may be seen to be serving some individual or collective political or economic goal. Shils (1957) was less assertive. He surmised that primary and civil ties could exist in the same social order, but that the latter was acquired – an abstract called upon from time to time – while the former was essentially a given, had a sacredness about it and was acted out on a daily basis.

Concerned with the social and political stability of the 1960s postcolonial state, Clifford Geertz (2000) was another commentator on the primordialism debate. Ethnocultural subtleties had not been factored into the colonial project and consequently the archipelagic successor-states inherited a diversity of ethnicities, cultures, and languages. Acknowledging the potential for national disintegration, states attempted strong centralising policies and the inculcation of national values by promoting integrative markers as exemplified by the establishment of national languages: Filipino (based on Tagalog) in the Philippines, Bahasa Indonesia (based on Malay) in Indonesia. However, the infusing of a civic nationalism could only be a long-term project, and in the meantime recourse to the security of ethnicity or, as Geertz describes it, ‘primary attachment’ would continue. People in new states find it difficult to subordinate their known loyalties for a new imagined civil order and as a consequence the new state is “…abnormally susceptible to serious disaffection based on primordial attachments” (p. 259). Elaborating on Shils’ (1957) conception of ‘primordialism’, Geertz explains that:

64 To these examples we might add the Galicians of Spain, the Bretons of France the Irish of Ireland and the Scots of Scotland. It is difficult to extrapolate that there exists some Celtic ‘primordiality’ that transcends this ethnolinguistic marker? For the same groups, language might be substituted for religion, in which case Protestantism, Islam and, Catholicism would be a further defining marker. Whether each of these groups feels any primordial attachment to the other is unlikely given subsequent and recent histories and experiences. Illustrative might be the Turkic-speaking peoples of Asia. While linguistically there are connections that link the Uyghur of Xinjiang with Turkic cohorts in Russia and Turkey, there are great cultural differences between the Ottomans who besieged Vienna and the Uyghurs living in China’s west – between Istanbul in the west and Ürümqi in the east.
By a primordial attachment is meant one that stems from the ‘givens’ – or, more precisely, as culture is inevitably involved in such matters, the assumed ‘givens’ – of social existence: immediate contiguity and kin connection mainly, but beyond them the givenness that stems from being born into a particular religious community, speaking a particular language, or even a dialect of a language, and following particular social practices. These congruities of blood, speech, custom and so on, are seen to have an ineffable, and at times overpowering, coerciveness in and of themselves (p. 259).

As Geertz interpreted it, primordial attachment requires “…a sense of obligation to others which is rather taken for granted, and is not a matter of calculation, nor is it a kind of obligation upon which we reflect very much – it is a kind of given, just there” (Fenton 2008: 82). Yet, it would be difficult to assess to what degree a migrant in the resettlement (or wider) world accepts his difference as a primordial given. Davis’s (1976) study showing that Balinese ethnocultural identity could be recovered as readily as it had been shed would indicate that either Balinese primordial attachments are weak, or that primordiality might be more inclusive in ‘like-cultured’ peoples; here I suggest the Austronesian connection.

In contradistinction, in their essay ‘The poverty of primordialism’, Eller and Coghlan (1996: 45-51) advocated that Geertz had conceptualised ‘ethnic ties’ as almost pre-social, fixed, biological, purely ‘emotional’ and unreasoning. They posited that that the primordial component of ethnicity should be reviewed in favour of the notion that ethnic mobilisation occurred in either a ‘circumstantial’, ‘situational’, or ‘instrumental’ manner. Judith Nagata (1974) illustrates this in her paper ‘What is a Malay?: Situational selection of ethnic identity in a plural society’. She acknowledges that while primordiality (as a central element in ethnic identity) is in theory shaped by cultural attributes such as: language, place of

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65 Geertz (2000: 259) adds that “(o)ne is bound to one’s kinsman, one’s neighbour, one’s fellow believer, ipso facto; as the result not merely of personal affection, practical necessity, common interest, or incurred obligation, but at least in great part by virtue of some unaccountable absolute import attributed to the very tie itself.” In itself this all makes collective sense. However, in the absence of group solidarity – following migration for example – the aforementioned attributes would appear to be somewhat moot. Once removed from region-of-origin, which aspects of one’s ethnicity are sustained or sustainable is far from clear.

66 I posit that were a Balinese to settle in Finland ethno-reversion would be more problematic. In the absence of the mirrored similar lifeways – as was the case in Davis’s ethno-reversion observation among Balinese transmigrants in Central Sulawesi – the Finnish environment would require greater cultural adjustments that might be less easily reversed.

67 Fenton (2008: 84) paraphrases the options thus:

**Circumstantial:** that ethnic identity is important in some contexts and not others: the identity is constant but circumstances determine whether it matters;

**Situational:** that the actual identity deployed or made relevant changes according to the social situations of the individual: the situation changes, the relevant identity changes;

**Instrumental:** that the deployment of the identity can be seen to serve a material or political end and is calculated thus.
origin and ancestry, recourse to primordiality often hinges on the circumstantial, situational or instrumental application of ethnicity.\textsuperscript{68} Her example of Malay speakers illustrates how language is used in this process. In proximity to many non-Malays, Nagata suggests a Malay might feel significantly Malay. In other situations – unassailed by non-Malays – Malays might differentiate between those hailing from the Peninsula and Sumatra.

The notion of primordialism is fraught with incongruity. For migrants resisting ethnocultural diminution, harking back to an imagined primordial past may provide solace in periods of social uncertainty, but how realistic are those pasts? The Archipelago abounds with examples of disconnectedness between what is imagined as primordial and what might be more realistically regarded as primordial. Religion (Christianity and Islam) and languages (Tagalog and Malay) are regarded as primordial, yet this disregards both the primordiality of Animist and proto-Austronesian antecedents. Whether deeply inculcated or not, primordial markers (attachment, obligation, and given-ness) are not easily ignored; their exploitation in a polyethnic world has the potential for anarchic repercussions. Recourse to primordial vectors has, I suggest, the latency to influence or impede any acculturative or transculturative adaptations, but will fail to prevail over the longer term.\textsuperscript{69}

As a sociological concept ‘primordial’ has no exclusive connection to an understanding of the term ethnicity, but should rather be seen as (one) aspect of how we might interpret the impact and reach of ethnicity (Fenton 2008: 76). If we ask ‘What is the basis for social cohesion?’ we may elicit the concept of primordialism as providing an explanation of how or why ethnic ties and identities are maintained. Bellwood’s (2007) assertion that the peoples of the Archipelago ‘demonstrate a certain unity in human terms’ does not explicate how peoples view themselves when seen alongside others who appear culturally analogous. In this sense the degree of (or potential for) transculturational change needs to take cognisance of the cultural ‘boundaries’ that often subtly, but sometimes markedly, divide ethnic groups.\textsuperscript{70}

\textsuperscript{68} This might be reflected in the mental process of deciding that ‘I am a Malay speaker, I feel at home speaking Malay’, or ‘We Malay speakers must stick together…’, or ‘sometimes being a Malay is important, sometimes it is not’.

\textsuperscript{69} The disappearance of former primordial markers (religions, languages, and cultural practices) is legion. The disappearance of Baal, Zoroastrianism, Nordic and the Greek and Roman pantheon of gods, does not impinge on the descendants of those for whom the aforementioned were central.

\textsuperscript{70} Exemplars of a boundary include that of religion. 250 million ethnolinguistic Bengalis are separated ostensibly along religious lines that reflect Bengal’s division by colonial fiat at India’s
Ethnic Group Boundaries

In his ‘Introduction’ to *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries* Fredrik Barth (1998a) sets out to show the importance of what he terms ‘the boundaries of ethnic groups’. That is, ethnic identity is determined and maintained by systems of social boundaries (however tenuous) that differentiate peoples, whatever general similarities they may share (p. 15). Barth suggests that it is fallacy to claim that social and geographical isolation have been the central contributors to ethnic boundary maintenance. In an increasingly globalised and migratory world groups are no longer geographically isolated and yet may continue to maintain ethnic distinction in the face of mobility, contact, and information exposure (pp. 9-10). Yet ethnocultural distinctions can be modified. Central to identification with a particular ethnicity is the sense that ascription is by individuals themselves, that is, an individual has the capacity to alter his situation in society. However, ascription by others or self-ascription is not necessarily enough to maintain an ethnic boundary.

Barth (pp. 10-11) suggests that an ethnic group might be defined as such if in a given group of people the group:

1. is largely biologically self-perpetuating,
2. shares fundamental cultural values, realized in overt unity in cultural forms,
3. makes up a field of communication and interaction,
4. has a membership which identifies itself, and is identified by others, as constituting a category distinguishable from other categories of the same order.

Identification with a given ethnicity is premised on the notion that one is a member of a culture-bearing unit. Whether the cultural traits vary greatly from other group identities is not as relevant as the notion of self-ascription or ascription by others. Group A might share a language with Group B but differ in religion. Group C might share a religion and language with Group B but be ethnically distinct because their culture adheres to a matrilineal form of social organisation, and so forth (pp. 11-15). However, as Barth suggests “the features

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Independence (1948) into Muslim East Bengal (now Bangladesh) with the rump Hindu West Bengal remaining in India. They might just as well have been excised from the India project along linguistic lines. Religion need not be a boundary between peoples; Germans whether Catholic or Protestant, are nevertheless ethnically linked.

71 The status of former Balinese slaves in British Malaya is illustrative. Conversion to Islam and adoption of the Malay language would appear to meet the criterion for being regarded as ethnically Malay, whatever the former region-of-origin ethnic identity.

72 Referring again to the Bengali example, we see that they are illustrative of this point. Touted as the world’ second-largest ethnic group they are religiously divided: with approximately 170+ million Muslim adherents (residing principally in Bangladesh) and 70+ million Hindus (residing principally in India).
that are taken into account are not the sum of ‘objective’ differences, but only those which the actors regard as significant” (p. 14). A combination of overt signals / signs and basic value orientations may be drawn upon for a sense of belonging: dress, language, house-form, lifestyle, sense of morality e.g. hospitableness, and so forth.

In polyethnic states such as the Philippines the boundaries between ethnicities are the social boundaries that define the ethnic group or, as Barth sees it, it is the “ethnic ‘boundary’ that defines the group, not the cultural stuff that it encloses” (p. 15). Extrapolated on an archipelagic canvas Group A (the Ilocano for argument’s sake) might practice the same religion as Group B (Cebuano), but be distinguished by a linguistic boundary. Groups C and D might share a language (for argument’s sake Malay), yet C might be patriarchal while D leans to the matriarchal. The fact that A, B, C, and D share other cultural stuff (wet-rice culture, universal male circumcision, or codes of hospitality) does not mitigate each group’s self-ascription or ascription by others. Barth further suggests that ethnic boundaries have a tendency to ‘canalise social life’ and for internal harmony needs those self-ascribing ‘to play the same game’. Yet this ‘canalisation’ is not necessarily sacrosanct. Boundary maintenance in ethnic identity at times fails to conform strictly to cultural parameters. Not only does this allude to the difference between culture and ethnicity, it also takes cognisance of the fact that both concepts are in states of flux.

Barth posits that ethnic identity and tangible assets may play a co-dependent role (p. 25). That is, if there is an economic advantage, especially in pre-social safety-net societies where the struggle for resources is of paramount importance, then individuals will seize the opportunity to redefine themselves. The aforementioned notwithstanding, “…ethnic boundaries are maintained…by a limited set of cultural features. The persistence of the unit then depends on the

73 For example, the cultural practice in which Catholics consumed fish in lieu of meat has been greatly reduced. That does not mean that those claiming Catholicity have been compromised, it merely means that for many a cultural practice or ritual has been replaced or is less valued. Even members of one ethnicity may observe differing cultural practices. North and South Koreans are both ethnic Koreans, but male circumcision is a widespread cultural practice in the South, and less so in the North (WHO 2007).

74 Barth’s reference to the Fur and Baggara contestation of grazing land in the Darfur region of the Sudan could as easily be transferred to the Archipelago. The Philippine struggle for land resources is not dissimilar to the Fur / Baggara example. With the promulgation and expansion of the Ancestral Domain (AD) in which traditional lands were to be protected for the social and economic benefit of Indigenous Persons (IP), the number of Filipinos identifying as IP has increased. Whatever cultural traits a group might share, a perceived economic advantage, or disadvantage, has the potential to reinforce other minor differences that divide.
persistence of these cultural differentiae, while continuity can also be specified through the changes of the unit brought about by changes in boundary-defining cultural differentiae” (pp. 37-38). Ethnic group boundaries, it would appear, are not static, and a group’s continuity is dependent on the acceptance of altering and new realities.

The Dilemma of (Ethnic) Identity

Before concepts such as ‘culture boundaries’, ‘primordialism’, or ethnic ascription may be positioned, an understanding of how ethnicity is ‘imagined’, who is to be included or excluded, and what cultural markers will constitute a minimal position for ascription, will need to be understood. The ‘imagining’ and the ‘reality’ of ethnicity are fraught concepts. The salience of identifying (or labelling) appears to hinge on economic, political, and social mobility imperatives. Which is not to imply that ethnic identity once ascribed is fixed for all time. That is, in all societies there exists social fluidity, whether viewed from an individual or group level. Several illustrations might help demonstrate the magnitude and consequence of ‘labelling’; how ethnic identity is reinforced, negotiated, manipulated, or rejected to suit the imperatives listed above.

“Identity simultaneously includes and excludes. To define yourself as part of a group is to distance yourself from those who are outside it” suggest Hall and Gay (cited Zialcita 2006: 3-4). But from whom is one to be distanced? Although the ‘global village’ is supposed to be the new reality, the nation-state continues to be a great definer of identity. Zialcita suggests that while educated Filipinos have intensified their preoccupation with a national identity since independence in 1946, their perceived individualism – which manifests in an identification with kin-based loyalties – precludes some to think of a common good for their province, city, or nation. That is, choices are made putting ‘kin-based community’ before ‘community broader than kin’ (pp. 5, 19). There are reasons for continuing ‘kin’ attachments as I explain elsewhere, but the formation of kin identities in the first place, or subsequent larger ethnic identities, are more difficult to pin down, though geography (complicated by former isolation), economic opportunity, and the inability for one group to form a polity powerful enough to subdue others might be factors that contributed to the construction of a plethora of archipelagic ethnocultural realities.
Cultural Identity

Transculturalism – or the (re)negotiating of ascribed identities – presupposes that a cultural identity, or cultural difference between groups exists in the first place. Diana Taylor (1991: 90) suggests that “(t)ransculturation affects the entire culture; it involves the shifting of sociopolitical, not just aesthetic, borders; it modifies collective and individual identity…Therefore, before discussing transculturation, it is necessary to clarify what we mean by ‘culture’.” It is culture after all – its practice and complexity – that defines the ethnic group, and acts as a marker of group difference. Cultural particularities may be imbibed by youthful enculturation in the socialisation process, or by acculturation at a later date. However acquired, the cultural practices that define ethnic identity have the capacity to weld together members of a group, and provide its adherents with a solidarity and gravitas that is difficult to explain objectively.

At this point positioning culture in the identity paradigm might be abetted by a contrapuntal assessment of the terms ‘ethnicity and ‘culture’. Fenton (2008), while acknowledging that there are areas of overlap, warns against a superficial interchangeability of the two terms. Ethnic groups, he suggests:

have strong connotations of two attributes: ‘descent and culture’… [and as such] may be regarded as ‘descent and culture communities’… They are all forms of social identity, forms of inclusion and exclusion, forms of social classification, and modes of social interaction in which culture and descent are always implicated (p. 109).

However, these culture communities or groups should not be regarded as coterminous with a particular ethnicity given that such groups (whether religious or linguistic) might either be limited to a single ethnicity or encompass a multiplicity of ethnicities (p. 20). Yet the confusion remains. Danielle Conversi (cited Fenton 2008: 21) suggests: “In the literature… the terms ethnic and culture are often confused… By ethnicity we refer to a belief in putative descent… Culture is instead based on tradition and continuity; it is often confused with ethnicity.”

75 Adherence to Christianity, for example, might be a cultural practice for many groups in the Philippines, but that in no way implies they are a single identity group or ethnicity. In the matter of language it is obvious that a representative sample: Australia, Belize, Ireland, Liberia, Trinidad and Zimbabwe, indicates a linguistic culture community but having (English) as an official (or dominant) language fails to diminish ethnic difference.

76 The cultural practice of dog-eating may be relevant to both some Han Chinese and some Ilocanos of Northern Luzon, but this in no way implies an associated putative descent. That said I shall overlook in this instance, the supposed trajectory of the Austronesian migration out of mainland Asia as posited by Bellwood (2007) and others.
In this thesis I acknowledge the crucial interactive roles played by both culture and ethnicity. If the customs and traditions underpinning cultural identity help to define ethnic identity then a diminution or adaptation of those cultural practices would contribute to a (re)evaluation of ethnic certainties. In the face of the putative descent claim of ethnic groups, cultural adaptation (transculturation), I suggest, facilitates the undermining of ethnic particularities. I see this as a circular process. Cultural adaptation diminishes the prescriptiveness of cultural identity, which in turn questions the centrality of the ethnic group as a basis for identity. Thus, any discourse concerning the trajectory of transculturation needs an understanding of both the ethnic group as ‘culture-bearing unit’ and what constitutes the culture therein. Having clarified the culture / ethnicity dichotomy allows the following observations to be made on what is important about culture itself.77

Defining Culture

Raymond Williams (1983: 87) states that the term ‘culture’ is “one of the two or three most complicated words in the English language… because it has now come to be used for important concepts in several distinct intellectual disciplines and in several distinct and incompatible systems of thought.”78 Notwithstanding the difficulty in defining ‘culture’, a collage of interpretations may help to illuminate the concept’s elusiveness. Eller (2009: 25) opens his deliberations by suggesting that there is no single definition of culture. He goes on to posit a three-way analysis by suggesting culture as encompassing: (1) the ideas and beliefs of a group, (2) a set of real facts, albeit ‘social facts’, regarding observable behaviour, and (3) the material aspects – dress, housing, cuisine and so forth – that help

77 The culture / ethnicity dichotomy is well demonstrated in both a Philippine setting and the wider world. The cultural phenomenon ‘religion’ is a useful tool when viewing the disconnection. Using pre-unification Germany as a model, it is obvious that ethnolinguistically the people were one; culturally however, the population was separated by the Catholic / Protestant divide. In essence, there was one ethnicity and two cultures. In the Philippines the reality is more complex. Using Mindanao as a model, it appears that two religious traditions – Christianity and Islam – divide people. However, unlike a single German ethnolinguistic heritage, Mindanaoans (both Christian and Muslim) are divided into numerous ethnolinguistic groups. Thus, while some ethnic groups share some cultural values (religion for example), they may be divided linguistically and culturally in other ways.

78 An early positioning of the ‘culture’ concept was in juxtaposing it with the concept ‘civilisation’ a view consistent with a time when European tradition posited that they [Europeans] stood at the apogee of human development in a hierarchal system. This was challenged in the age of European Romanticism when Johann Herder’s (1744-1803) advanced the notion that rather than a single universal ‘culture’ that every human being would strive to be part of, disparate people’s ways of life should be seen as ‘cultures’ in plural. In this context of multiplicity – and whatever the culture – each was deemed to include the “knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of a society” (Crehan 2002: 39-41).
define groups. Peoples and Bailey (2009: 23) attempt a further definition: “The culture [sic] of a group consists of shared, socially learned knowledge and patterns of behaviour.”

Cultures as Systems
In Gramsci, Culture and Anthropology Kate Crehan (2002: 37) draws attention to certain assumptions about the nature of culture that have confounded its analysis. As she sees it, these assumptions are:

- firstly, that cultures are in some sense systems, not necessarily homogenous and conflict-free ones, but ones that nonetheless constitute patterned wholes of some kind; secondly, that ‘cultures’, again in some sense, constitute discrete and bounded entities; and thirdly that societies around whose studies anthropology emerged as a discipline (in modern parlance, societies of the South) are characterized by a fundamental opposition between ‘tradition’ and ‘modernity’.

Roger Keesing (cited Crehan 2002: 42) “argues that the many different, and often conflicting, recent thinkings of ‘culture’ can be seen as falling into four broad types: cultures as adaptive systems, cultures as cognitive systems, culture as structural systems, and cultures as symbolic systems… Marvin Harris, Claude Lévi-Strauss and Clifford Geertz, all apparently agree that cultures are in some sense systems.” However, while cultures may indeed be regarded as systems, they are at best porous systems that are easily penetrated and modified, despite their apparent boundedness, and this becomes evermore apparent in a globalised, connected, and mobile world.79 Marshall Sahlins (1985: 145) stresses that while cultures may have their own logic, or structure: “Human social experience is the appropriation of specific percepts by general concepts: an ordering of men and the objects of their existence according to a scheme of cultural categories which is never the only one possible…” That is, cultures, like ethnicities are malleable, have finite lives, and are thus amenable to retooling or transculturation.

Cultures as Bounded Entities?
The idea that culture(s) are bounded entities is a product of post-Enlightenment discourses. No longer was culture envisioned as a universal concept that all peoples could aspire to – as had previously been imagined. Rather a multiplicity of cultures, premised on geographical (and at times political) spaces was

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79 Individuals and groups do not need to leave their regions-of-origin to experience the penetration of ‘known’ cultures. For example much of the affluent world now embraces dance styles which did not originate in Europe; there is occurring a generational shift in musical tastes; clothing preferences are altering, despite conservatism in some quarters; the list is endless. Suffice to say that no place on earth is beyond the reach of cultural accretion.
recognised. Crehan (2002: 45-46) states: “A culture, like a nationality, tended for example, to be seen as referring to a specific people, often associated with a specific territory, and who were characterized by a particular worldview, expressed through a common language.” Congruent with this former limited worldview was the notion of cultural traits centred on ‘tradition’, aspects of culture that were seen as primordial, central to the essence of a cultural identity.

The AOD (2004: 1357) explains ‘tradition’ as “a custom, opinions, or belief handed down to posterity especially orally or by practice; or an established practice or custom.” This coinage fails to take cognisance of ‘invented traditions’ as revealed by Hobsbawn and Ranger (1992). However, whether ‘invented’ or ‘real’, traditions are tenuous. An example might be male circumcision; in the Austronesian world it would be regarded as a ‘real’ tradition, while in South Korea it is a phenomenon that appeared with the postwar infiltration of U.S. cultural influence and spread of Christianity (which does not demand circumcision). In South Korea therefore the practice has evolved into an ‘invented tradition’ or cultural practice.

This dovetails neatly with what Bailey and Peoples (1999: 16) suggest is a useful and popular way to define culture, being that “the culture of a group consists of shared, socially learned knowledge and patterns of behaviour.” They envision culture as a collective enterprise shared by a particular group of people, who may be few in number, or geographically dispersed and numerous. By ‘sharing culture’ is meant that people are able to interact and communicate without needing to be conscious of their actions and sensitive to those around them understanding their actions. A further contention is that those sharing a

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80 Crehan (2002: 53) makes a salient point regarding cultural traditions, one which has implications in a globalising world in which disparate groups are forced or choose to live in proximity. “It is worth noting how the notion that people have a ‘right’ to their culture draws on a universalist discourse of ‘rights’. The discourse of ‘tradition and culture’ emerged very much out of the shadows cast by its apparent opposite, the discourse of ‘rationalism, secularism and equality’, and the two discourses have always had an uneasy dependence on each other, with each being defined in part by reference to not being its opposite.” I mention this in the wider migrant-settler context; which I address in the concluding chapters.

81 In The Invention of Tradition, Hobsbawn and Ranger (1992) proffer further examples of ‘invented traditions’ which suggest the fickleness of cultural practices at large. The ritual associated with Boy Scout movement has evolved into a set of practices observed across much of the world, but were non-existent until invented by Baden-Powell (1857-1941) early in the twentieth century. National flags, anthems and emblems also allude to past imagined greatnesses, though given the recentness of most nation-state creations, the use of such symbols are predicated on invention.
common cultural identity become aware of the distinction between their own cultural traditions, when juxtaposed against those of others.

*Transmission of Culture*

The ‘socially learned’ aspect of culture precludes the notion of culture being transmitted between generations genetically (by biological reproduction), posit Bailey and Peoples (1999: 17-18). Those born into a group acquire their cultural particularities by way of enculturation, and the attendant knowledge and behaviour acquired is passed on to succeeding generations who may modify aspects of cultural practice, but generally continue to live by its dictates. Aside from the intra-group transmission of culture values, what is more salient for this thesis is the intergroup transmission – the sharing, borrowing, adaptation, and cultural asymmetry that informs a globalised world. Population movements and technological wizardry have an ever-greater capacity (when compared with the trading dhows of old) to influence, cajole, and proscribe cultural practices that once were bounded. The theorists above show that while culture is a complicated morass, varying influences and emphases emerge to position a meaningful discourse on cultural change or transformation – a process that I prefer to call transculturation – but which others, including Crehan (2002) prefer to denote as hybridity.82

In light of the changed realities occasioned by the impact of the modernity project (in which increased mobility is a corollary), the boundedness of culture and degree of its transmissibility is under scrutiny. In *Routes* Clifford (1997: 2-3) makes the case that his earlier perception that culture’s “propensity to assert holism and aesthetic form, its tendency to privilege value, hierarchy, and historical continuity in notions of ‘common life’” had included the repression of impure cultural accretions. He suggests that in a world riven by ethnic absolutism, identity claims needed to be coherent. There are those that reject cultural incursions, while others embrace it. Reaction for some may result in the “articulation of homelands, safe spaces where the traffic across [cultural] borders

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82 To check our understanding of how existent or bounded contemporary, globalised cultures are in actuality, Crehan (2002: 58-67) introduces several notions of innovative transcultural realities. How Kanak is a Kanak in New Caledonia when he worships a ‘hybrid’ form of Christianity? – the original form emanating from the coloniser? How Hutu is a Hutu in a refugee camp in Tanzania who has a hut full of texts including Stendhal’s *The Red and the Black* – a critique of the power structures of nineteenth-century France? And how Arabic is the Iraqi whose copy of Salinger’s *The Catcher in the Rye* was found in the rubble of a bombed out building in Baghdad?
can be controlled” (p. 7) but whether the reconfiguring of ethnic identities can realistically be thwarted is debatable.

In an age of international contract labour, overseas study and tourism, the capacity for human cultural systems to remain static is inconceivable. For the Philippines in particular (and the archipelagic Malay world in general) the notion of cultural holism has particular relevance. Cultural certainties and differences are in theory easier to maintain in geographical environments such as archipelagos or rugged mountain terrains, but in a century of mass mobility millions of archipelagic settlers have been exposed to both international and intranational migration, a process that has had the propensity to speed up ethnic identity re-evaluations.

I feel that a less doctrinaire attitude to culture / place than Clifford’s is warranted. Migration, for example, is one phenomenon that has the potential to both isolate and transform cultures. Crehan (2002: 61) states that “(w)hat Clifford appears anxious to deny is any assertion of absolute cultural difference, but he does, it seems, want to hold on to the notion of different cultures rooted in particular geographical locations.” The transnational or intranational migrant may retain an image of what he thinks his culture or identity stands for, but whether it is a realistic image is a moot point. That said, Clifford (1997: 7) does make a compelling point when he introduces (without expressly using that nomenclature) the notion of transculturation by stating:

The new paradigms begin with historical contact, with entanglements at intersecting regional, national, and transnational levels. Contact approaches presuppose not sociocultural wholes subsequently brought into relationship, but rather systems already constituted relationally, entering new relations through historical processes of displacement.

And yet as Jaidka (2010: 4) posits: “Societies today are neither monolithic nor static… There is cultural change going on at every moment, leading to new cultural formations.” This creates its own challenges, but what might be suggested is that liminal spaces have emerged in which reciprocal cultural exchange occurs, 83

83 Even in a more mobile world the migrant-settler may be caught up in a time warp. He has arrived in a new environment and continues cultural practices that may be subtly changing or being dispersed entirely in the region-of-origin. The German spoken by fifth-generation settlers in Puerto Montt (Chile), or the Barossa Valley (Australia) appears quaint to a modern German speaker, which indicates that language, like other cultural practices are impacted upon by outside stimuli. Greek migration to Australia in the 1960s affords a further time warp experience. While the worldview of dressing conservatively in black by elderly women was transferred in the migration process; the intervening two generations has seen that practice less prevalent in a Greece that is more connected to a wider Europe, via migration and media.
often without conscious deliberation being a part of the process. And as a consequence of new sociocultural realities occasioned by the technology / migration phenomenon, McMahon (2004) is able to observe that “globalization is quickly rendering the idea of asserting cultural ‘roots’ untenable, academics are inescapably entangled with the question of how to develop a vocabulary for discussing culture that avoids origins.”

The issue of cultural boundedness, origins, and transmissibility is challenged in a more dramatic way by Rogers’ (2006) article ‘From cultural exchange to transculturation’. “If the history of a cultural practice is traced far enough, its hybridity (impurity) will almost inevitably be demonstrated,” he suggests (p. 496). Using the Navajo tribe of the southwestern United States as a model, Rogers unravels the perceived cultural practice of intricate weaving for which the Navajo are renowned. He points out that this now quintessential Navajo practice was only made possible with the introduction of sheep by the Spanish. In this sense “(t)ransculturation [might be viewed as] an ‘always already’ of cultural existence” (p. 495). In other words that which is perceived to be a sacrosanct cultural practice, and defended as such, may be of recent provenance or may indeed be an invented tradition.84

Clifford (1988) makes the case for the capriciousness of cultural practice and tradition in the construction and maintenance of an identity, or rather group identity such as the ethnic. He posits that while internal diversity may be accommodated within culture communities, they may not survive sharp contradictions or mutations. “Groups negotiating their identity in contexts of domination and exchange persist, patch themselves together in ways different from a living organism” (p. 338). He adds:

A community, unlike a body, can lose a central ‘organ’ and not die. All the critical elements of identity are in specific conditions replaceable: language, land, blood, leadership, religion. Metaphors of continuity and ‘survival’ do not account for complex historical processes of appropriation, compromise, subversion, masking, invention, and revival (p. 338).

In view of Clifford’s pronouncement it would seem that identity groups have great scope for (re)invention given certain and favourable circumstances. If

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84 The Welsh eisteddfod neatly exemplifies this assessment. In ‘From a death to a view: The hunt for the Welsh past in the Romantic Period’, Prys Morgan (2010: 56-62) posits that although not a deliberate invention, the eisteddfod was nevertheless an aberration of its former self. However, it is this (re)-invention of tradition that has followed the colonial route to various English-speaking countries, with the result that the modern eisteddfodau are regarded as a quintessentially Welsh tradition.
we acknowledge Rogers (2006: 497) speculation that “(t)he view of culture embedded in transculturation also focuses on processes and relationships; culture is never fixed, never fully seen in its totality, and always changing because it is a network of relations, not an entity” then it should not be a wild revelation that transculturation has a role to play in an intercultural, interethnic world.  

I interpret culture to be those elements of the human condition – language, religion, and other customs and traditions – that are learned or inculcated via a process of enculturation, that is, passed on socially and not acquired biologically. While the diverse groups that have transmigrated to the resettlement frontier are defined ethnically, it is the cultural permutations of those groups that differentiate one from the other. Individual cultural traits are not exclusively the preserve of any one ethnic group, but in combination they define how a group’s ascription by others, or self-ascription is managed. By extrapolation, if cultural values are learned (rather than inherited), they also have the propensity to be unlearned, or renegotiated. This may occur by a process of force majeure as in the progression of asymmetrical acculturation, or by a more mutual course of cultural exchange as envisaged under transculturation rubric.

Furthermore I see culture traits not as isolated aspects of ethnocultural identifiers, but rather as qualities that have always had the propensity to change, given the coalescing of certain circumstances. Even the most isolated people have historically been far from atomistic, meaning that cultural exchanges have always been possible. The original concept of a universal culture that might be aspired to in pre-Enlightenment times has given way to a less dogmatic notion of cultural reality. In an increasingly mobile and modernising world, culture is an even less fixed, bounded and unchanging phenomenon. I suggest that, in theory, cultural exchange is a less fraught process than was once thought possible. Though I acknowledge that the individual infant cannot escape its enculturation in the first instance, once grown he will be better equipped than were his forbears to renegotiate his cultural identity.

85 The bounded (primordial) sense of culture, Eller (2009: 33-34) suggests, is produced, practiced and circulated and in this sense is less bounded, or primordial than some suggest. Humanity, as evidenced by indigenous groups such as the Australian Aborigines, has the capacity to adopt a cultural worldview by adapting to an environment, but without further ongoing cultural contact a stasis occurs which eventually disadvantages such isolated groups vis-à-vis groups that have been able to maintain ongoing cultural contacts.
Locating Transculturation

Just as defining the term ‘culture’ is fraught with ambiguity, so too is the concept ‘transculturation’ open to interpretation. Simply stated, ‘transculturation’ is a process in which an interchange of cultural practices occurs between peoples representing the values of diverse cultures, or rather ethnocultural groups. Unlike the concept ‘acculturation’ – which implies a trajectory to an assimilatory integration into one or other (usually a dominant) culture – ‘transculturation’ implies a process of reciprocity, one in which there is a mutual exchange, by way of adoption, adaptation or accretion of other’s cultural practices and customs. While theorised to involve a two-stream flow – core-periphery, colony-metropole, and north-south – I suggest, that in view of the polyethnicity of societies such as the Philippines, a broader conceptualisation of the term is warranted. Rather than a two-stream cultural flow, in polyethic milieux permutations of a greater complexity and magnitude are required.

Transculturation cannot occur in a vacuum, however. Its manifestation is dependent upon the interaction of diverse ethnocultural groups, occurring primarily in the context of population movements, or migrations, be they international, or intranational. In *The Turbulence of Migration* Papastergiadis (2007) acknowledges the cultural transformation and population movement juxtaposition. He goes on to assert that the salience of cultural identity in a globalising / migratory world (where identities are being renegotiated) is under increasing scrutiny (p. 5). Transculturation – where the potential exists for ethnocultural differences to be minimised, and new identities (re)imagined – is but one scenario resulting from migration and mingling. The space in which these intercultural exchanges take place has been deemed by Pratt (1992) as the ‘contact zone’ and it is such a space that is the focus of this thesis. In the next pages I will define in more detail the concept ‘transculturation’ before outlining its etymology and historical roots.

Defining Transculturation

The term ‘transculturation’ is a neologism coined in Havana circa 1939 by Fernando Ortiz (1881-1969). Seeking a term that better described Cuba’s complex...
history of indigene, European settler and African slave integration, Ortiz began to eschew the term ‘acculturation’ for ‘transculturation’ which he deemed better expressed the interaction and modification of cultural norms that various ethnicities had contributed to his country. “I am of the opinion that the word *transculturation* better expresses the different phases of the process of transition from one culture to another because this does not consist merely in acquiring another culture, which is what the English word *acculturation* really implies…” (Ortiz 1995: 102-103).

Moreiras (2001: 185) suggests that there are two main uses of the word ‘transculturation’ “…in a loosely anthropological sense, it is used to describe any kind of cultural mixing (some acquisition, some loss, and some creation are always ingredients in it). And then it is used to refer to a critical concept, that is, an active, self-conscious cultural combination that is a tool for aesthetic or critical production.” It is in a socio-anthropological sense that I intend to use the concept in this thesis although it is in literary criticism that the term ‘transculturation’ gained cachet, specifically in the field of *mestizaje* studies, by proponents including the literary critic Ángel Rama (1926-1983).

It is in the literary field also that Pratt (1992) locates ‘transculturation’. She posits that “(e)thnographers have used this term *transculturation* to describe how subordinated or marginal groups select and invent from materials transmitted to them by a dominant or metropolitan culture” (p. 6). Her popularisation of the notion of the ‘contact zone’ as “social spaces where cultures meet, clash, and grapple with each other, often in highly asymmetrical relations of domination and subordination – like colonialism, slavery, or their aftermaths as they are lived out across the globe today” (p. 4) presupposes a classic model of social interaction. While I concur with her observation that ‘transculturation’ is a phenomenon of the ‘contact zone’ I am less convinced that the asymmetrical, dominated, and subordinated model of transculturation is the only one possible. In view of this thesis’ fieldwork, I suggest that the process of transculturation is also possible in the absence of a dominant / subordinate dichotomy. That is, a transculturative process is possible in milieux where a heterogeneity of peoples co-reside – where the possibility of a broader (mutual) cultural exchange occurs in the absence of a dominant group.
History / Etymology

The term ‘transculturation’ was given standing after its acceptance by the ‘ethnic’ Polish anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski who in 1940 penned an introduction to Ortiz’s text *Contrapunteo cubano del tabaco y el azúcar* (*Cuban Counterpoint: Tobacco and Sugar*). It was in this text that Ortiz used Cuba’s two dominant exports (sugar and tobacco) to allegorise the complexities of the sociocultural exchanges that had occurred in the wake of the various Cuban immigrations.87 While it was *Cuban Counterpoint* that launched Ortiz’s ‘transculturation’ concept (1995: 97-103), it was Malinowski (1995: lvii-lxiv) who furnished the explanatory detail that helped flesh out the nuances of the term. It was he who made a succinct case for the term’s introduction by first suggesting that ‘transculturation’ might replace an alternate nomenclature then in use: cultural exchange, acculturation, diffusion, and migration or osmosis of culture.

Defending the need to replace the use of inappropriate terminology from scientific work, Malinowski suggested that the word ‘acculturation’ – one he deemed ethnocentric and loaded with moral connotation – be replaced by ‘transculturation’. “The immigrant has to *acculturate* himself; so do the natives, pagan or heathen, barbarian or savage, who enjoy the benefits of being under the sway of our great Western culture…it is he who must change and become converted into ‘one of us’” (p. lviii). Malinowski thus poses an important challenge.88 Any group of immigrants, he suggests “provokes a change in the [mould] of the culture that receives them…and when they transmigrate…something of their own culture, their own eating habits, their folk melodies, their musical taste, their language, superstitions, ideas and temperament [arrives with them]” (p. lviii). This ensuing change of culture, Malinowski intended to call (in the spirit of Ortiz’s ruminations) ‘transculturation’, a term eschewing any moral, normative, or evaluative concepts implied by the term ‘acculturation’. As imagined, the ‘transculturation’ process was to be one premised on a give and take model of cultural exchange, resulting in a modified cultural reality, one “that is

87 It should be noted that Malinowski’s ‘Introduction’ appeared in the original / first Spanish edition in 1940, *Contrapunteo cubano del tabaco y el azúcar*. The first English translation was published by A.A. Knopf Inc. in 1947, by which time Malinowski had already died.

88 Malinowski (1995: lix) makes the centrality of mutuality in the cultural exchange process very succinctly: “To describe this process the word trans-culturation, stemming from Latin roots, provides us with a term that does not contain the implication of one certain culture toward which the other must tend, but an exchange between two cultures, both of them active, both contributing their share, and both co-operating to bring about a new reality of civilisation.”
not a mechanical agglomeration of traits, nor even a mosaic, but a new phenomenon, original and independent” (p. lix).

There might indeed have been, as Malinowski suggests, an ethnocentric and moral connotation associated with the usage of the term ‘acculturation’; however, its replacement by the term ‘transculturation’ was no more likely to take cognisance of the role played by class, civilisational development (modernity), and intellectual capital, in determining the trajectory of sociocultural diversity. That said, one suspects that a reciprocal exchange of cultural practices might more readily occur in a milieu where the immigrant and host (or migrant and migrant) already shared some overarching cultural traits: monotheism, class, educational level, for example. This observation notwithstanding, what Ortiz / Malinowski imagined for the term ‘transculturation’ – that of reciprocal cultural exchange, which had the capacity to create new, transformed identities – was in principle a sound one to promulgate.

Mark Millington (2005: 223) is sceptical, however. In ‘Transculturation: Taking stock’, he suggests: “One aspect of the difficulties with Ortiz’s theory of transculturation is the etymology of the term itself.” The question is whether the prefix ‘trans’ – which may indicate movement across, beyond or through, is in any way an advantage over the prefix ‘a’ or ‘ad’ that precedes ‘culture’ to form the term ‘acculturation’. In Millington’s opinion “there is no clear relation with reciprocity or a movement back and forth” (pp. 223-224) implied by the ‘trans’ prefix as envisaged by Ortiz / Malinowski.89

Transculturation: Perceptions and Critiques

In her 2004 Cape Verde study, McMahon puts forward the notion that “(t)ransculturation theory seeks to replace diffusionism [mid-century term] with the concept of ‘mutual borrowing’, which recognizes that the ‘indigenous’ culture alters the ‘foreign’ just as the ‘foreign’ alters the ‘indigenous’.” She thereby makes the case that cultural exchange is not a one-way process. This theme is enhanced by Rogers (2006: 474) when he suggests that three models of cultural

89 Millington (2005) illustrates his difficulty with accepting the ‘trans’ prefix as a facilitator implying the notion of ‘mutual exchange’ or reciprocity in the cultural milieu, by undermining Malinowski’s critique that ‘ad’ or ‘ac’-culturation was an inadequate representation of the cultural processes that Ortiz imagined were taking place in Cuba. He adds: “One might look at other words which contain the same prefix… A ‘transition’ [my emphasis] is a passage from one place, state, stage, style, subject, or musical key to another… Ortiz himself uses the word ‘transmigrate’ to refer to the bringing into Cuba of a new population of Europeans and Africans… but makes no reference to return journeys… Even the word ‘translate’… is concerned with shifting from one language into another” (p. 224).
exchange are possible: cultural exploitation, cultural dominance, and reciprocal cultural exchange, the latter being the creation of hybrid forms and / or transculturation. Having made the point, he nevertheless remains ambivalent as to the trajectory, degree or provenance of any cultural appropriation. Rogers goes on to state that “(t)ransculturation involves cultural elements created through appropriations from and by multiple cultures such that identification of a single originating culture is problematic. Transculturation involves ongoing, circular appropriations of elements of multiple cultures, including elements that are themselves transcultural” (p. 491). That is, the permutations are endless and the process is open-ended. James Lull (cited Rogers 2006: 491) posits that transculturation represented:

a process whereby cultural forms literally move through time and space where they interact with other cultural forms and settings, influence each other, produce new forms, and change the cultural settings… Transculturation produces cultural hybrids – the fusing of cultural forms… but hybrids such as these never develop from ‘pure’ cultural forms in the first place.  

As Jaidka (2010) points out, although Ortiz was primarily concerned with Afro-Cuban culture, his concepts are just as relevant to intercultural interactions in a wider world. “What he meant by transculturation involved the need to change with the times, to give up obsolete ideas and seek new yardsticks more suited to the present. He argued, in the first place, in favour of the need for a de-culturation of the past, and second, a re-invention, or re-definition of fresh cultures based on the new realities of the world in flux” (p. 3). Given this assessment, the reality of cultural repositioning, be it in the transmigratory ‘contact zone’, or in the contact zones of the affluent world (France, Germany, the U.S.) should not be regarded as anything but an organic process. Rather than being able to remain anchored in time-defined ethnocultural certainties, exposure to the Other, technology, and a world on the move all conspire to transform identities. Jaidka adds: “Identity, according to [Ortiz] is not strictly one-dimensional [but] recognised in rapport with the Other. It is not singular but multiple. Each person is a mosaic… [around

90 The case of the Navajo, mentioned earlier, exemplifies this impurity sentiment, although the Archipelago abounds with examples in which the provenance of a cultural practice is difficult to isolate. The syncretic nature of both Christianity and Islam is indicative of the way in which elements of both have been appropriated, and fused with elements of pre-colonial belief structures. Speculation on why dog-eating was a practice on the Ilocos coast of Luzon, might suggest that as this region is the most proximate part of the Philippines to China, that this cultural appropriation was effected in that region, rather than another. Further examples abound. While maize culture from the Americas became widespread in the Archipelago, chilli culture did not. The area now represented by Indonesia embraced the chilli, while the Philippines did not, despite it being the conduit for its transmission to Indonesia from the Americas.
whom] transculturation takes place at all levels of geography, that is, national, local, and increasingly virtual” (p. 3).

What others in the section above have made of the term ‘transculturation’ – the complex and diverse ways it has been interpreted – is aptly summed up by Millington (2005).\textsuperscript{91} He questions the intent of Ortiz’s promulgation of the term ‘transculturation’, by suggesting that he [Ortiz] had thrown the term into the socio-anthropological cauldron without fully developing a coherence for it, which might have given rise to its misinterpretation or misuse by later proponents.\textsuperscript{92}

Millington begins by suggesting that the term ‘transculturation’ “has been bandied about a considerable amount in certain areas of Latin American studies in the last fifteen to twenty years” (p. 204). While it is true that Ortiz’s ethnography was grounded in the Cuba he knew, there is no sense that Latin America needed to be the sole focus for the ‘transculturation’ hypothesis. On the contrary, I suggest that the universality of sociocultural change precludes its attenuation to represent only Latin America. Millington states that despite Malinowski’s imprimatur, the term, rather than becoming de rigueur in the anthropological field, drifted to become representational for Latin American literary theorists. And this was accentuated following the theorisation of the concept ‘transculturation’ by the Uruguayan academician and literary critic Ángel Rama (p. 205).

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\textsuperscript{91} In this section I refer heavily to Millington. Not only does he critique the Ortiz / Malinowski transculturation concept, his critique introduces those in academe who have contributed to interpretations of the concept. While his article appears to undermine the legitimacy of the Ortiz / Malinowski imagining, in the process I feel that Millington is playing the role of devil’s advocate for the term’s interpretation.

\textsuperscript{92} To paraphrase Millington’s concern with the way in which others have exploited the term ‘transculturation’ I insert his ‘Abstract’ (2005: 204) which grounds the issues he raises about the (mis)representation of the term:

This essay considers the recent vogue for the term transculturation and critiques a selection of its numerous and divergent uses. That critique enables a return to and a reassessment of Ortiz’s theorisation and historical analyses in \textit{Contrapunteo cubano} [contraction of the original 1940 Spanish title for Ortiz’s work]. While it is important that the term continue to adapt to changing circumstances, many bland and gestural involvements of it have paid insufficient attention to the detail of Ortiz’s thinking, which illuminates the whole gamut of different stages and processes involved in cultural encounters and interaction. Without losing sight of Ortiz’s strong emphasis on historical analysis, the essay explores why a cultural phenomenon which is universal was theorised and named within Latin America. It also considers the extent to which transculturation can constitute a political position from which in the contemporary world to challenge the hold of global modernisation, which some recent readings have proposed. It concludes that, since the colonial era, in which transculturation already has a strong presence in one form or another, the idea that it might now bring about democratic interchanges between Latin America and other cultures seems overly optimistic. The kind of analysis which Ortiz brilliantly demonstrates in \textit{Contrapunteo cubano} may illuminate the imbalances and asymmetries of global (inter)exchanges but it is unlikely to do more than that.
Rama influenced a generation of followers who, in a self-asserting postcolonial world, wanted to empower the marginal majority in the Latin American milieu via the literary narrative. Millington (p. 209) adds that:

In line with the context to which Rama refers, the cultural elements and their dynamic are different from the ones with which Ortiz deals. Where Ortiz was concerned with the effects of multiple cultures all being introduced into Cuba more or less simultaneously without an established local culture, Rama is concerned with defined national situations in which there are well-established internal structures and divisions which come into contact with external practices...

Millington contends that rather than accept Ortiz’s limited ambit claim for the ‘transculturation’ concept, Rama was putting his own gloss on the term by inserting it in place of the notion of ‘transformation’, in this case the modernising process, which cultural theorists imagined was required to revolutionise their conservative, moribund, and divided societies.93

Alluding to Pratt’s (1992) *Imperial Eyes*, Millington (2005: 211-212) intimates that while highlighting the concept of ‘transculturation’ in its title, in reality Pratt does not invoke it substantially within the text. He further posits that Pratt’s assertion – wherein subordinated and marginal groups ‘in the periphery’ select and invent cultural phenomena from materials transmitted to them by a ‘dominant or metropolitan culture’ – is not exactly what Ortiz had in mind when he was raising the theme of transculturation. When Ortiz was envisioning transculturation in action, he was thinking of society at large; he was interested in the effects of ‘mutual exchange’ encounters on both sets of cultures – the metropolitan and the periphery. That mutuality can realistically occur where a power imbalance (such as dominant / subordinate cultures) exists appears problematic.94

In an attempt to disentangle Ortiz’s thinking on transculturation from later accretions Millington turns his gaze onto the Ortiz text itself.95 He observes that

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93 The difference in context is summed up thus: “All Ortiz refers to are ‘the process of transition’ and ‘the consequent creation of new cultural phenomena’ (neither of which necessarily implies transformation, that is, the mutation of already existing cultural forms or practices)” (Millington 2005: 210).

94 It is difficult to imagine – and the literature fails to take cognisance of the fact – what impact class-consciousness played in Ortiz’s conceptualisation of his ‘transculturation’ paradigm. The Cuba of the 1930s – interracial miscegenation notwithstanding – would have mirrored a wider world, one in which colour impacted on class. Cultural reciprocity, in such a class-based milieu, one suspects would have been stymied somewhat.

95 Millington (2005) references one edition of Ortiz’s work (1978), over others in the panoply. That is, he cites Ortiz as: Ortiz, Fernando (1978 [1940]) *Contrapunteo cubano del tabaco y del azúcar* (Caracas: Biblioteca Ayacucho). He goes on to reveal the further editions thus: “There are several notable editions of the work. The first was: Havana: J. Montero, 1940, with a preface by
despite its grand size *Contrapunteo cubano* (*Cuban Counterpoint*) gives less than ten pages to theorise the term ‘transculturation’ “but he [Ortiz] is also rather apologetic about his neologism, craving the reader’s indulgence and excusing his ‘daring’ in proposing this new term...in order to replace the well-established ‘acculturation’, which he defines as meaning the process of transit from one culture to another more powerful one and the social repercussions resulting from that movement” (p. 215). How mutuality is supposed to exist where there is ‘another more powerful culture’ is less easy to define. Ortiz, Millington adds, highlights the complex *trans*mutations that have resulted in “the evolution of a Cuban people in key areas of social life: the economic, institutional, juridical, ethical, religious, artistic, linguistic, psychological, sexual, and so on” (p. 215); yet when the case of Cuba’s indigenous Taíno is broached, it appears that rather than an intercultural ‘*trans*mutation’ occurring, the reality was one of cultural destruction.

Aside from challenging others’ interpretation of Ortiz’s ‘transculturation’ concept, Millington (pp. 215-222) also impugns the premise of Ortiz’s neologism; at least in the sense that it was originally intended to be used. Beginning with the notion that humans are culture-bearers, Ortiz depicts a Cuba in which both the Spanish and African cultures were *trans*planted, via the ‘sporadic waves’ and ‘continuous flows’ of population movement; and finishes his dialectic by summarising the cultural trajectories he has in mind. “…every immigrant [is] like one uprooted from their native land in a double, critical movement of disjunction and realignment, of *deculturation* or *exculturation* and of *acculturation* or *inculturation*, and in sum, of *transculturation*” (p. 217). While acknowledging Ortiz’s encapsulation of both the cultural processes involved and the human dimension thereof, Millington challenges the sentiments expressed by averring that the use of the prefix ‘trans’ to create a master-term under which to bunch other terms clouds the issue.

Additionally, Millington suggests, the use of a master-term to explain the processes of radical loss (de*culturation* or exc*culturation*) and movement to another
culture (acculturation or inculturation) appears to neglect “the vital, later ‘neoculturation’, a term that indicates the potentially creative aspect of cultural encounters” (p. 217). Viewed thus, the master-term gives the impression that it connotes nothing more than the movement into another culture, or acculturation, the term that Ortiz claimed should be eschewed, or, as Millington expresses it, “it seems that ‘transculturation’ does not so much replace ‘acculturation’ as subsume it” (p. 217).

While Millington appears to substantiate the subsuming of the ‘acculturation’ term by a ‘transculturation’ one, he suggests that in a later reflection Ortiz advocates “that ‘transculturation’ goes beyond the mere acquisition of a different culture to embrace other elements …the loss or uprooting of a previous culture, which could be called partial deculturation, and, in addition, it signifies the consequent creation of new cultural phenomena which could be called neoculturation” (p. 219). This revelation contradicts the subsumation analogy, but more importantly Millington suggests: “Ortiz sees acculturation as involving the complete loss of a previous culture and assimilation to another, already existing one (no creative, new phenomena here apparently)” (p. 219). Such a criticism notwithstanding, Millington adds that Ortiz, having pitched the ‘complete loss’ scenario, ends his definition of transculturation by introducing the rhetorical expression abrazo (embrace). The sense in which the term abrazo is to be understood is that of a reciprocal ‘cultural embrace’. What is imagined here is that just as individual offspring inherit something of both progenitors (yet remain distinct from them) so the interactees in any cultural embrace inherit or absorb characteristics of a given cultural embrace.

After summarising Ortiz’s shortcomings, Millington (2005: 223) concedes that the difficulties the author faced may have been taxonomic. “It is evident that there are problematic elements in Ortiz’s theorisation and his linking of the theory with historical realities: a certain lack of specificity, at times a sketchiness about the cultural processes and at others a less than clear fit between theory and circumstance.” And yet it appears that Millington’s scepticism and cynicism are

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The term ‘embrace’, as outlined by Millington (2005: 219-220), is best viewed in an ambivalent sense to avoid its misconstruction. That is, neither a positive or negative connotation is intended. It should be noted that it was the 1963 translation of the Ortiz text that Millington was deconstructing. In both the Harriet de Onís (1947) English translation and the 1995 Duke University edition the term ‘embrace’ (abrazo) has been substituted for the term ‘union’, which Millington suggests captures the idea a sexual union rather than a coming together, or the embracing of one culture by another.
tempered by his acknowledging that there might exist a space – outside the Latin American site of contestation – for the term ‘transculturation’, one where contemporary examples are able to demonstrate the likelihood or degree of reciprocity claims implied in the neoculturation assertion. Even where transculturation connotes cultural interaction, Millington concedes that interaction “may not imply equality and mutuality… Influences may operate back and forth between cultures but be asymmetrical in quantity and quality” (p. 230). As an aside he posits that whatever the claims made for transculturation, whatever impact it may aspire to, the arena in which this would appear to be relevant is in the field of migration (p. 227). It is under the transmigration rubric that I position the transculturation claim.

It would appear that perception and an interpretive zeitgeist play a role in the response to new ways of interpreting social phenomena. In his 1995 essay Coronil states: “…my sense is that, given the conditions shaping its international reception, Ortiz’s book has been read in ways that have overlooked aspects of its significance and have left its critical potential undeveloped” (p. x). Just as Marx (1977: 15) stated: “Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please,” so too does Coronil suggest that we necessarily read “not just as we please, but under circumstances not chosen by ourselves” (1995: x). Thereby hangs a conundrum. Millington’s (2005) discourse has challenged both the Ortiz / Malinowski etymological genesis of the ‘transculturation’ concept, as well as the interpretations and usage the term was subjected to by later Latin Americanists and their acolytes. Rather than quibble over the purity or usefulness of the term I suggest that in a globalising / migratory world, its application fits the parameters of the Ortiz / Malinowski imagining more than ever.

Despite an increasing globalising / migration reality however, the potential of reciprocal cultural exchange between groups (à la Ortiz) is at times stymied by

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97 Silvia Spitta (cited Millington 2005: 227) in raising the term ‘counterpoint’ used by Ortiz’s allegory, suggests that in the realm of music the term denotes equality between melodic lines, in which case she feels it is less than appropriate to use the term in the context of the cultural equality imagined. In hindsight of the thesis fieldwork I would caution a more hesitant view.

98 This thesis posits that an exchange of cultural phenomena in a ‘give and take’ reciprocal manner, without the pressure of a dominance factor, is consistent with the Ortiz / Malinowski intention that the term ‘acculturation’ be replaced by ‘transculturation’. Reflecting momentarily on the Marxian dilemma – Leninism, Trotskyism, Stalinism and Maoism all contain elements of Marxian theory. While possibly the application of the theory does not fit with what Marx had imagined, the above models are nevertheless regarded as Marxian. In the same vein, I suggest that whether used by ethnographer / anthropologists or Latin American literary critic / theorists, the fact remains that ‘transculturation’ is Ortizian. The rooting of the concept in Cuba and its Latin American neighbourhood appears to have constrained its potential, yet that does not preclude its applicability in contemporary times, and a wider world.
social impediments: cultural dominance, ethnic chauvinism, racism, nationalism, struggle for resources and so forth. In her 1991 essay, Taylor – reflecting on the asymmetry of dominant / subordinate relations – suggests that dominant groups have little interest in cultural exchange reciprocity; they fear the erosion of a sense of entitlement that reciprocity demands. Ignoring the sense of cultural loss that acculturating groups might feel, the dominant groups require the migrant to adjust while they themselves “resist losing what they see as their rightful place at the economic, historic and cultural centre of things” (p. 103).99 She adds that “our deepest generational emotion is that of loss… country, class, language, etc. [as well as our] ideological meta-horizons” (p. 102).100

That is why in the majority of ‘contact zones’ the acculturation and assimilation of immigrants is the norm – an ongoing though fraught process. To what degree a Kurd in Germany, a Guatemalan in the United States or a Lebanese in Australia can discard, or modify his ethnocultural baggage however, for whatever it means to become a German, an American, or an Australian, is subject to critique. Dominant cultures in the longer established nation-states, such as the United States (and many European countries) have the luxury of debating the worth or otherwise of promoting the integration of immigrants using the assimilatory tool of acculturation. Conversely, in polyethnic states such as the Philippines, where there is often no dominant ethnocultural group, the anxietal acculturation argument remains somewhat moot.101

Unlike acculturational integration, which is predicated on the subsuming of one’s identity to a majority culture, transculturation suggests the notion that coexistence be predicated on a give-and-take of cultural practices, be they linguistic, religious, agricultural, and so forth. That is, transculturation might be perceived as a process rejecting a unidirectional mode of cultural exchange.

99 These sentiments are voiced vociferously by Samuel Huntington (2005) in Who Are We?: The Challenges to America’s National Identity, in which he outlines his concern that immigration from the Hispanic world has the potential to undermine the dominance of Anglo-Protestant heritage and institutions. There is no perception in this discourse that Hispanic immigration could have positive or neutral implications.

100 Putting a U.S. context in perspective Taylor (1991: 102) states: “While most people may like jazz or so-called Mexican food, political struggles indicate how hostile the dominant culture is to the presence of ‘minorities’, especially when they seem to be competing for the same resources. The term used to discuss the interaction between, and among these cultures are not usually the celebratory ones used in hegemonic spheres to describe transculturation, that is, their acquisition, adoption and embrace of the foreign.”

101 In the Philippines, if we use the debatable indicator language as a marker of ethnicity, then the numerically largest cohort - the Tagalogs - would encompass at best 25% of the population. While the Javanese might be the most numerous ethnocultural group in Indonesia, they do not with 41.71% representation [2000 Census] form a national majority (Suryadinata et al. 2003: 6-11).
Furthermore, the degree of coexistence possible in some societies may eventually be reflected in the degree of possible transculture.

**The Relevance of Transculturation**

The importance of transculturation as a modifier of identity is of relevance on several levels. In an age of increased migrancy (both international and intranational) integrational dictates demand that locating *modi vivendi* for culturally diverse peoples becomes evermore pressing. “The twin processes of globalization and migration have shifted the question of cultural identity from the margins to the centre of contemporary debates” suggests Papastergiadis (2007: 5). These debates are occurring in an epoch where democratic demands undermine the former realities of immigrant integration; the acculturation and assimilation paradigm is no longer as acceptable as it once was. In such milieux, an exchange of cultural values and practices (transculturation) has the capacity to play a greater integrative role in post-migration scenarios. Migration on a global level (labour, political refugee, and ecological migration) creates, I suggest, similar uncertainties and anxieties as those of intrastate migrations in polyethnic, postcolonial states. The issue for the state is one of national unity or cohesion, and the concern for displaced people is one of integration.

Integration is a term that continues to be misconstrued, and is often represented as the acculturation and assimilation of a minority to majority norms. “The intermixing of persons previously segregated” (AOD 2004: 649) would appear to be a more reasonable explanation, as it does not imply identity diminution or accretion. Further clarification may be gleaned from the DREC (2003: 151) which states: “The concept of integration indicates the sociological process by which divisions and heterogeneous factors within a society are overcome in order to create a new, balanced whole. Integration, therefore, is an essential dynamic factor in the creation of a society based on cooperation between individuals and groups.” In light of this, the formation and sustaining of national states in polyethnic milieux is dependent to some extent on state regulation and the self-interiorisation of cultural values. The fostering of social cohesion in such circumstances is abetted by the transculturation process.

There appear to be several scenarios possible in the integration stakes: (1) situations in which there are difficulties in maintaining ethnocultural equilibrium – the Former Yugoslavia (FYu), Somalia, and Sri Lanka, (2) situations in which
regions of cultural dominance within states are maintained – Belgium, Canada, and Switzerland, (3) situations in which no ethnocultural group is numerically dominant, with each community maintaining its distinction in the national sphere – Israel, Malaysia, and Trinidad, (4) situations in which the ‘modernity project’ tolerates a plethora of cultural diversity under the rubric of ‘multiculturalism’, and often under the tutelage of a dominant ethnocultural group – Australia, France, and the United States, and (5) situations in which ethnocultural differences are diminished by a process of cultural interchange (transculturation) which imagines new conglomerate cultural identities – exemplified in Narra / Palawan and among some urban elites, and cosmopolitans.

No migrant has the capacity to imagine the challenges his culture will experience on leaving his region-of-origin. He may attempt to resist change, be equivocal about change or embrace change; though whatever decision he makes, he has no ultimate control over the cultural milieu he will live amongst, what further global changes will occur, or whether his progeny will embrace other identity realities. Papastergiadis (2007: 110) handily illustrates the notion of unpredictability, a scenario in which transculturation is as likely to play a role as not, when he states:

The idea that there can be a neat synthesis or equivalent translation between different cultures has been rejected in favour of views that stress the discrepancies, incommensurabilities and surpluses between cultures. This attention to slippage and non-correspondence between cultural codes does not suggest that the process of exchange is undermined by difference, but rather that the remainder of a difference stimulates reach towards unexpected horizons.

The ‘reach towards unexpected horizons’ becomes a significant factor in the interethnic or intercultural, post-migration milieu, and especially so in the context of the formation, continuance, and sustainability of the modern nation-state. I do not imply that the nation-state is necessarily the epitome of the way in which man must organise his political existence. Rather, I suggest that at this postcolonial point of time, the nation-state as conceived in the shadows of European Enlightenment and Romantic era discourses appears to be a model suitable for an interim organisational harmony.

In a polyethnic Archipelago supporting possibly one thousand cultural or ethnolinguistic identities the need to coexist is paramount if the nation-state – as
formulated – is to survive. In lieu of each ethnocultural group having the capacity to form their own individual nation-state (as parts of Europe formerly typified) it is imperative that a state of being in which all citizens feel at ease develops. For national union and unity to flourish in states supporting heterogeneous populations, the need to be amenable to difference, a willingness to coexist in a state of diversity, or undergo a process of transculturation – in which differences are eroded, minimised, or new composite identities (ethnogenesis) created – would appear to be of significance. While environments aiming to obviate intolerance and antipathy are the precursor to intercultural harmony, the unlevel playing field of cultural exchange needs to take cognisance of the fact that there is “no neat synthesis or equivalent translation between cultures” suggests Papastergiadis (2007: 110).

Yet the success or otherwise of the evermore diverse nation-state is dependent on more than a general coexistence, or state-legislated tolerance edicts. As a microcosm of the resettlement world at large I suggest that Narra / Palawan provides an alternate model to one premised on a general coexistence, but rather one premised on cultural transformation, or ‘transculturation’; that is, a model in which there is no sense that the migrant needs to acculturate to an existing or dominant resident population. Rather, via a process of give-and-take, a mutual *modus vivendi* materialises, resulting in the formation of a distinct new society, one in which most citizens feel they have a stake, resulting rather from an organic development than one mandated by any state.

Homi Bhabha alludes to the potential for this ‘organic development’ with his concept of the ‘third space’ (Rutherford 1990: 207-221). By this Bhabha means that there exists in the ethnocultural environment a liminal position in which alleged ethnocultural essentialism may be challenged or negotiated. The starting premise for this ‘third space’ hinges on the interpretation of what Bhabha refers to as the insecurity of the ‘originary’ – an imagined essentialist interpretation of a given cultural position. Whether an original can ever exist, or

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102 By nation-state I mean a geographical space with defined borders within which live citizens that accept the rules and regulations required to live with others, rather than an alternate definition which is predicated on the ‘nation’ as representing a specific group, or ethnicity. The AOD (2004: 852) suggests that the nation-state is “a sovereign state of which most of the citizens or subjects are united by factors such as language, common descent and suchlike which define a nation.” However it is Anderson’s (2006) *Imagined Communities*, and Gellner’s (2008) interpretation of the modern nation-state – resulting from the inculcation of ideas, mythologies, and customs – that I choose to valorise. This civic ideal of nation is a legally and constitutionally defined entity rather than an ethnic one (Fenton 2008: 109).
continue to exist, is a moot point. Because the original “can be simulated, copied, transferred, transformed, made into a simulacrum and so on: the ‘original’ is never finished or complete in itself” (Rutherford 1990: 210). Under this rubric, not only does culture evolve, but it also revolves, by which I mean that while two or more groups may claim to be observing a particular cultural practice, its to and fro exchange can make it more accessible, which would further undermine its essentialism. Bhabha affirms:

...then we see that all forms of culture are continually in a process of hybridity… But for me the importance of hybridity is not to be able to trace two original moments from which the third emerges, rather hybridity to me is the ‘third space’ which enables other positions to emerge (Rutherford 1990: 211).

Thus when two or more cultures find themselves in an integrative embrace, it is the trajectory of the ‘third space’ that determines how that embrace will evolve. In Bhabha’s opinion, what takes place is that the ‘third space’ “displaces the histories that constitute it, and sets up new structures of authority, new political initiatives, which are inadequately understood through received wisdom” (p. 211). What Bhabha (1994: 39) does concede for the ‘third space’ abstraction is that by any exploration of the ‘third space’ we “may elude the politics of polarity and emerge as the others of ourselves” – a position of some significance for understanding the sociocultural consequences of resettling diverse groups of people in new locales. Mutual cultural exchanges (transculturation) are facilitated where the notion of the ‘third space’ exists, because the ‘originary’ is under challenge or renegotiation.

Other Discourses of Cultural Exchange

While the Definition of Terms in Chapter 1 outlines the concepts presented below, a review and opening-out of the terms – as they relate to the above analysis of the concept ‘transculturation’– is warranted. Here I have demonstrated the reasons why the Ortiz / Malinowski cultural neologism is relevant in an understanding of the sociocultural changes that have occurred in various ‘contact zones’. I intend to

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103 What is important is Bhabha’s (1994: 37) contention that though the ‘third space’ is unrepresentable in itself it “constitutes the discursive conditions of enunciation that ensure that the meaning and symbols of culture have no primordial unity or fixity; that even the same signs can be appropriated, translated, rehistoricized and read anew.”

104 An example might be the use of the bowler hat. On the streets of London it was once a fashion accessory that has long been displaced from common usage. While true that some individuals wear it to define their status in the business or banking world, their behaviour could be regarded as aberrant. In the Andean states the bowler continues to be worn by Quechua and Aymara rural women. The same cultural practice (hat-wearing) has transcended ethnicity, class and gender – undermining the notion of primordial fixity alluded to in the previous footnote.
use the term despite some academic discouragement that raises, critiques, and in some cases dismisses ‘transculturation’ as less than relevant. As Trigo (2000: 85-86) bluntly puts it: “In a word, transculturation’s popularity is based on its caducity. Such a worn-out and nostalgic use is aided by the term’s rich allusiveness… transculturation continues to be a theory of the 70s… a surrogate hegemony” in the employ of mestizaje ideologies. Such criticism raises the spectre of misinterpretation of the concept ‘transculturation’ as I intend to use it; therefore it might be useful to proffer a counter-discourse – one that underscores why ‘transculturation’ better reflects the cultural changes that my fieldwork revealed.

The following are three concepts I shall use to illustrate what ‘transculturation’ is not. (1) The ‘acculturation’ (or ‘melting pot’) model – incorporating the twin concepts acculturation and assimilation – which while also being an integrative force akin to transculturation, differs from it in application. Transculturation envisages a mutual cultural exchange while acculturation involves an asymmetric cultural exchange. (2) ‘Multiculturalism’, a concept in which diverse others live separate, but tolerated existences in one another’s orbits, has the potential for cultural interchange, but also the potential for reification of ethnocultural identity. (3) ‘Postethnicity’ and / or an ancillary experience, namely ‘cosmopolitanism’, a state of being in which the limitations of ethnic identity are (in theory) able to be transcended.

The Acculturation Model

The metaphor ‘melting pot’ – coined to reflect an imagined homogenisation among a heterogeneous immigrant population in the United States – has been discredited in recent years, and especially so since the ‘ethnic revival’ of the 1960s and 1970s. Its demise transpired when the wishful thinking of some (Crèvecouer, Zangwill, Emerson, and Weber) that ethnic groups would diminish in importance or eventually disappear failed to materialise (Eriksen 2010: 25). An empirical flaw with the ‘melting pot’ model rested with the racist assumption that Native Americans, African-Americans and Asian-Americans were elided from the ‘melting pot’ imagination – it being consonant with white (European) America.

105 Glazer and Moynihan (1975: 288) suggest that the notion of the ‘melting pot’ is as old as the Republic itself. But in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, with an accelerated and diverse immigration, the term gained added salience. The fusion of a heterogeneous group of immigrants to create a ‘new American man’ “was an idea close to the heart of the American self-image,” and yet in reality this has not materialised. One reason for the failure to ‘melt’ is that the project was premised on a foundation of inequality. Nativist attitudes imagined that one group (the WASP) was to be the sociocultural model for the state.
Yet some ‘melting’ did occur. Most groups gave up their languages, for a national one, the values of the dominant group came to represent the values of the many, cuisines altered to reflect the immigrant diversity, and a sense of nationhood emerged from a heterogeneous (though skewed) immigration.

In an age of mass communication and the rapid expansion of diverse migration streams the discrediting of the ‘melting pot’ might appear to diminish its relevance to other aeons. Yet one has not far to look so see former ‘melting pot’ realities in a pre-globalisation / migration age (China, England, France, Germany). An Englishman cannot tell what part of his DNA reflects former immigrations from Saxony, Jutland, Norway, or Normandy. Similarly Germans rarely reflect on their Celtic, Slavic, or Huguenot (French) ethnic components. Thus former ethnocultural groups were subsumed, and disappeared, with the formation of new ethnocultural identities. The ‘melting pot’ nature of these societies may be attributed to two related processes – acculturation and assimilation – which are in effect premised on the will of the dominant group at any given time.

According to the AOD (2004: 9) ‘acculturation’ is “the adaptation to, or adoption of, a different culture.” The DREC (2003: 1-2) is rather ambivalent as to the meaning; on the one hand it suggests that “the term ‘acculturation’ indicates that processes of transformation and adaptation which takes place when two or more groups…enter into relations with one another.” At a further level it suggests that ‘acculturation’ results from a conflict between different cultures, which may result from migrations, and / or the globalisation phenomena facilitated by mass communication. The acquisition of a new culture or cultural traits by an individual or group may occur asymmetrically or reciprocally. ‘Reciprocal acculturation’ refers to a bi-directional cultural transfer, rather in the vein of ‘transculturation’ as imagined by Ortiz. This give-and-take phenomenon contrasts with ‘asymmetrical acculturation’ a process in which a ‘superior’ and ‘inferior’ culture interact, rather in the manner of the dominant / subordinate paradigm in the colonial context.

Teske and Nelson (1974) after raising the issue of ‘direction’ of cultural flows, once contact between two or more groups has been made, set great store by

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106 In this sense there is no cognisance that the process be one of mutuality as imagined in the transculturation process. In the case of the England and Germany, it is not that cultural features of various defeated, and incorporated peoples are absent from the body politic, but rather that it was the dominant group who decided to incorporate what.
the issue of ‘dominance’ in that contact milieu. They differentiate between the individual and group in the determining of degree and direction of acculturative processes. Political dominance, in which one cultural group is in a position of power, or normative dominance, in which a process of acquiescence places one group in a position of superiority, have similar outcomes – asymmetrical cultural exchanges. In the acquiescence exemplar, they suggest, the condition of dominance is not contingent upon a state of numerical superiority.\textsuperscript{107} The degree and direction of acculturation for the individual was also contingent upon which cultural group was the dominant group (pp. 354-355). In summary Teske and Nelson assert that several salient characteristics may be attributed to the acculturation phenomenon, the principal one being that it is a process, and not an end result. As well as the issue of dominance they also posit that acculturation is not necessarily contingent on positive orientations existing between ‘out-groups’ and the acculturating ‘in groups’ (p. 358).

Assimilation is “the acceptance by indigenous and immigrant minorities of prevailing cultural values” – of a dominant host or immigrant community one supposes – and / or “the integration of such minorities into a society” (AOD 2004: 73). How this is supposed to occur is fraught with contradictions. Assimilation assumes a unidirectional process of inclusion into a dominant society. I suggest that ‘dominant’ rather than ‘host’ society has more traction. For example, the weaker, though numerically superior Aboriginal Australian cultures did not assimilate the numerically inferior European settlers.\textsuperscript{108} Power relations rather than numerical realities dictated the assimilation process. Thus, ‘integration’, or ‘assimilation’ – the acceptance of prevailing cultural values – in the mode of the ‘melting pot’ would appear to be more dependent upon asymmetrical cultural exchanges, an antithesis of what the process of transculturation represents.

‘Assimilation’ and ‘acculturation’, suggest Teske and Nelson (1974), are distinctly separate processes. While acknowledging that these processes may be interrelated, they deny the interdependence of the two concepts. They also deny

\textsuperscript{107} The imperial project well illustrates both the political and acquiescence models of dominance. England, Holland, and Spain held onto most colonial possessions with token bureaucratic forces. Cultural dominance in the Philippines for example hinged on political domination in the first instance, followed by the acquiescence of those who felt that their best interests lay in further acculturation.

\textsuperscript{108} The reversal of the numerical dominance – as a consequence of the mid-nineteenth century Australian gold rushes – made no difference to the Aboriginal / European assimilation paradigm. Aboriginal, European and Asian ethnic groups essentially maintained separate multicultural existences, whatever their numerical strengths.
that assimilation can be conceived of as the end result of the acculturation process, although I take issue with this notion. In my opinion an acculturative process would need to take place for an individual to become assimilated into a new society, but let us hear Teske and Nelson’s testament.

The first stipulation they make is that assimilation needs to take cognisance of, and requires acceptance by the out-group. Whatever cultural baggage migrants continue to mind, to be assimilated they need to undergo “a process in which persons and groups acquire memories, sentiments, and attitudes of other persons or groups; and by sharing in their experience and history, are incorporated with them in a common cultural life” (p. 359). To have a role in a new community presupposes acceptance by that community, although interaction with a community may occur even without being accepted. Furthermore, exclusion from a community does not preclude the process of acculturation occurring (p. 359). To demonstrate the interdependence of acculturation and assimilation (as well as their dissimilarities) Teske and Nelson cite the example of the Eurasian Anglo-Indian community (p. 364). As a group they were highly acculturated in terms of British culture, yet were denied assimilation into the British community.

Assimilation has been further described as “…a precise political strategy which intends to keep the national community as homogenous as possible by endeavouring to ensure that the same basic values are shared by the whole population” (DREC 2003: 19). Whether the cultural homogeneity à la England, or Sweden that evolved in a past, more isolated world, is achievable in a globalised world is a moot point. The imagined ‘melding’ (or homogenisation) of ethnocultural differences in the United States was premised not on a reciprocal exchange of cultural values between ‘equals’ but at times in a climate of xenophobia (Waters 1990, Steinberg 2001). Those newly arrived would integrate into their new domicile by being assimilated (via an asymmetrical

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109 To give an example, Teske and Nelson (1974: 359) suggest that “in the United States an immigrant is considered assimilated as soon as he has acquired the language and social ritual of the native community and can participate, without encountering prejudice, in the common life, economic and political.”

110 Waters (1990) well illustrates how different waves of immigrants to the U.S. were despised. Italians, Poles, Slavs faced prejudice in employment and education, and following WW1 Asian immigration was halted. When Harvard President Lowell attempted to impose quotas to Jewish admissions in the 1920s, he used cultural particularism in his defence to deflect public reaction. “It is the duty of Harvard to receive just as many boys who have come... to this country without our [WASP] background as we can effectively educate; including in education the imparting, not only of book knowledge, but of the ideas and traditions of our people” Steinberg (2001: 241).
acculturation) into the WASP (white, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant) United States host culture; and this in spite of their Catholicism, Jewishness and / or Italian, Polish or German ethnic heritages.\footnote{111} Impacting upon the assimilational model were degrees of ethnocultural difference. For example, although Germans immigrants were white they were not monolithic, being divided by faith: Catholic, Protestant, Jewish. The English, Irish and Scottish might also be divided along confessional lines.

There is / was no blueprint to guide the imagined ‘melting pot’ process. The perceived differences in ‘civilisational development’ between peoples played an important role in determining what cultural interchange would take place in a diverse range of ‘contact zones’. The degree of change required to reach a ‘melting pot’ modus vivendi may be more traumatic for some than others. Economic and class disparities aside, it is in situations in which one party perceives they are ‘civilisationally dominant’ (for example the metropole colonialist, white Euro-American, and often the migrant-settler) where decisions can be made to excuse oneself from exchanging culture with those one deems inferior.\footnote{112} That is not to say that the indigene or migrant will forever be in an inferior cultural position vis-à-vis the dominant party. Yet it may take many generations, or centuries before race and class structures are modified enough for intercultural dialogue, and intermarriage to be validated.

\footnote{111} Becoming an American citizen meant the dilution or discarding of former cultural values and the acquiring of new ways, especially that of learning the English language, the primary, though not only, glue that held this ‘melting pot’ together. In essence it was imagined that this acculturation would be a one-way process, the new arrivals would adopt the ways of the already established ‘older’ European culture, that of the English-speaking. Whether the immigrants collectively outnumbered the dominant WASP culture was irrelevant; the single determinant, language, not only reinforced the status quo, but contributed greatly to the ‘melting pot’ mentality.  

\footnote{112} ‘Civilisationally dominant’ comes across as both a biased and manipulative concept. In a former age of racial hierarchy in which white Europeans saw themselves – and regarded their cultural achievements – as having reached a civilisational apogee, it might be imagined that any intercultural encounter would advantage those deeming themselves to have reached that state. In the twenty-first century – post-slavery, post-National Socialism, and postcolonial – it might be imagined that an attitudinal change would have occurred. And yet, I posit that while the reviled rhetoric that underpinned those former zeitgeists has been submerged in an environment of political correctness, the reality of ‘civilisational dominance’ remains. Thus, the lowland Christian settler in the Philippines, the Javanese transmigrant to Papua, and the Euro-American migrant to wherever will assume that it will be the Animist or ‘other’ – among whom he now resides – who will be expected to make the cultural sacrifices. The ‘Pilgrim Fathers’ in America, just as the Spanish in the Archipelago, did not integrate into the societies they encountered; the reverse was the reality. The modern transmigrant (or migrant-settler on the world stage) continues to be confronted with the difficulty of deciding how to integrate into his new society. It is possible that increased economic equality, educational opportunity, and ‘class unconsciousness’ will gradually diminish the gap between the ‘civilisationally dominant’ and those they perceive to be less so, but in the meantime, I suggest, the differences will impact negatively on the potential for a mutual cultural exchange, as imagined possible under an Ortizian transcultural paradigm.
In *Beyond the Melting Pot*, Glazer and Moynihan’s (1970) discourse on the continuance of ethnic diversity in New York City, the resilience of ethnic identities becomes evident. While acknowledging the non-materialisation of a ‘smelted’ American man, they add the rider that the national project has progressed despite manifest ethnic divisions. They suggest: “Religion and race define the next stage in the evolution of the American peoples. But the American nationality is still forming: its processes are mysterious, and its final form, if there is ever to be a final form is as yet unknown” (p. viii).

If the ‘melting pot’ acculturation model of integration is an antithesis of the ‘transculturation’ model, so too is that of ‘multiculturalism’.

**Multiculturalism**

The AOD (2004: 839) suggests that multiculturalism denotes both “the existence of many distinct groups within a society… [and / or] a theory or policy supporting this.” A multicultural society then is “characterised by cultural pluralism… As an ideal, multiculturalism celebrates cultural variety (for example linguistic and religious diversity), and may be contrasted with the assimilationist ideal assumed in many early studies of race, ethnicity and immigration” (Scott and Marshall 2005: 493). While the assimilationist model of society has been metaphorised as the ‘melting pot’, multiculturalism may be regarded as a ‘mosaic’ or ‘salad bowl’ version of society in which individuals and groups maintain their enculturated positions, in the face of others, and society at large (Jaidka 2010: 2). This does not reflect whether equality necessarily exists between groups – as imagined in Sweden or Switzerland (before recent immigrations) – or whether one group remains dominant as in Australia, England, and the United States.

As a corollary to an increasingly globalised and migratory world, multiculturalism is a term that has become established to address a sociocultural way forward; one that aims to encompass, rather than exclude the Other. That is not to say that past political structures were ever monocultural, rather the opposite was true. Modern nation-states, however, in the process of inculcating a ‘civic identity’, increasingly try to avoid treating citizens unequally, the result of which

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113 Austria, Britain, Canada, and France have historically been multicultural states, despite the recent protestations by right-wing groups to the contrary. For centuries France has accommodated the ethnic Bretons in the west and ethnic Germans in the east (Alsace), and the Basques in the south. Britain has encompassed the Irish, Manx, Scots, and Welsh among others. Austria-Hungary was possibly one of the most diverse polities prior to 1918, while Canada, aside from the First Nations, supported two European cultural traditions.
is a revaluation of dominance. The DREC (2003: 184) posits that the term multiculturalism is “generally used with reference to those societies, or segments of societies, in which – for political, economic, or social reasons – groups of different cultures, originally formed independently of each other owing to historical or geographical factors, have come to cohabit.” In essence then multiculturalism may be viewed as a possible sociocultural manifestation of polyethnicity.

In the sense that multicultural policies have been promulgated to create a less fraught integration into a wider society and create more level ethnocultural playing fields, the term multicultural might be viewed as value-free. However it is the implementation of policies that in theory aim to preserve and promote cultural diversity where some evolving multiethnic or rather multicultural societies have difficulty in juggling the theoretical with the practical aspects of multiculturalism. In some cases policies meant to advance tolerance and integration may not be discerned as such by all. The DREC (2003: 184) suggests that “there is a danger that such policies could in fact prove an obstacle to true multiculturalism and integration, as the cultural fabric may become woven in such a way that different groups and cultures do not truly interact with each other, possibly depriving some groups of social mobility.”

In theory, tolerating ethnocultural difference in society is assumed to advance social harmony, yet recent debates in locales as diverse as Australia, Egypt, and the United States demonstrate that the discourse of the imagined democracy of multiculturalism often fails to reflect the lived reality. Speaking for the United States, Eller (2009: 146) cites a single institution (education) as representing a zone of contention in which the democracy of difference is challenged. The multiculturalist charge that the educational curriculum reflected a Eurocentric bias has not yet been resolved. The anti-multiculturalists – fearing the diminution of Platonic and Shakespearian contributions to the educational canon – couch their reaction in tropes of angst: ‘the end of American civilisation’, or a ‘disuniting of America’. The ensuing ‘culture wars’, or as Huntington (2005) attests, the reaction to the perceived challenge to the core culture, draws attention to the fact that the multiculturalist rhetoric and imagining fails to resonate among many, especially among the core culture.114

114 In *Who Are We?: Challenges to America’s National Identity*, Huntington (2005) makes no secret of the fact that multiculturalism is something that should be feared and resisted. The
A further example of the disparagement of multiculturalism has occurred in Australia, where a former Minister for Immigration and Citizenship mandated a reduction in the arrivals of Sudanese refugees on the basis that they had not successfully embraced the Australian ‘way of life’ (Jacobs 2011: 47). He adds that the former Prime Minister of Australia had condemned multiculturalism for promoting a ‘federation of cultures’ – a reality that many nation-states in a postcolonial era need to take cognisance of. Jayasuriya (cited Jacobs 2011: 50) posits that one of the reasons for “the loss of confidence in multiculturalism stems from… the ‘paradox of pluralism’, wherein the expectation of treating people equally is incompatible with the demand of some groups to maintain separate forms of identity... the celebration of difference, of culture and ethnic identity, sits uneasily alongside the universalism promoted by common citizenship.”

I cite the above examples to demonstrate that multiculturalism is the antithesis of the Ortizian transculturation paradigm. Unlike transculturation, which Ortiz deemed was a process of converging cultures or ‘ethnoconvergence’, multiculturalism in essence reflects an imagined stasis that precludes an ethnogenesis as occasioned in, for example, a Malta, or an England (before the current wave of immigrants). And yet the intersecting processes of migration, modernity, and globalisation continue apace. While Papastergiadis (2007: 167) acknowledges that the process of modernity encompasses the moral dilemma of cultural difference, he also recognises that “the complexity of radical difference has also revealed that we lack a general theory of culture.” And it is in this context that Slavoj Zizek (cited Papastergiadis 2007: 157) makes the bold claim that “multiculturalism reduces the sign of cultural difference to a spectacle that satisfies the liberal gaze.”

Cosmopolitanism

Cosmopolitanism may be understood as “a concept which considers all human beings to be the citizens of one nation, implying a spirit of universal fellowship which goes beyond differences in nationality” (DREC 2003: 50); in essence imagining a transcendence of national limitations and prejudices. While in theory cosmopolitanism is a mitigator of what Paul Gilroy (2005: 11) terms ‘absolute American state in his eyes is premised on the arrival of the Pilgrim Fathers and those Anglo-Americans that followed. The Spaniards who had been in the region for a century previously (Florida), the First Nations, or fusions thereof (the Hispanic) are in Huntington’s opinion to be challenging the ‘natural order’ of things.
ethnicity’, it differs from transculturation in a holistic sense. Transculturation imagines an exchange of cultural baggage (possibly a precursor to the formation of a new ethnic identity – ethnogenesis), while cosmopolitanism imagines the maintenance of existing ethnocultural identities, albeit with the essentialist elements of those identities diffused. Whereas the cosmopolitan may imbibe aspects of other cultures, he nevertheless remains aloof from aligning strongly with any particular ethnic identity. The transculturant, whether he feels strongly about his ascribed ethnic identity or not, nonetheless subscribes to a particular identity, even if it is one that is evolving (ethnogenesis) from the one he once ascribed to.

In essence it is ‘degree of estrangement’ that is problematical for the cosmopolitanism-transculturation dichotomy. Unlike the transculturant who moves through and around cultural certainties, the cosmopolitan has the luxury to determine how much of his own culture and history he is willing to valorise. As a socially mobile and relatively affluent individual, he may also determine how tolerant he will be, and what aspects of other cultures he will acknowledge.

If as Max Boehm (cited Jaidka 2010: 5) suggests, cosmopolitanism is “a mental attitude prompting the individual to substitute for his attachments to his more immediate homeland an analogous relationship towards the whole world, which he comes to regard as a greater and higher fatherland” then he differs from the transculturant in the degree of agency that allows him to make that value-judgement. In that regard it could be argued that a cosmopolitan does not put high regard on the minutiae of what it means to belong to this or that ethnicity or culture group. Unlike the transcultural, who may feel strongly about aspects of his lived culture, the cosmopolitan is comfortable in various cultural milieux. Cosmopolitanism then is “a doctrine that advocates the transcendence of parochial and narrow nationalistic considerations for the sake of the larger interests of mankind” (p. 5).

Gilroy (2005: 67) makes a further suggestion that cosmopolitanism is an analogous, worthy alternative to the notion of the multiculturalism, though it could be argued that while the “cosmopolitan attachment finds civic and ethical value in the process of otherness”, the multiculturalism model was premised on the maintenance of flanking identities. Gilroy intimates that individual-agency induced cosmopolitanism has the potential to meet the expectations that multiculturalism failed to achieve. “Recalibrating approaches to culture and
identity so that they are less easily reified and consequently less amenable to these misappropriations seems a worthwhile short-term ambition that is compatible with the long-term aims of a reworked and politicized multiculturalism” (p. 5-6).

As Hannerz (1990: 240) observes:

The cosmopolitan’s surrender to the alien culture implies personal autonomy vis-à-vis the culture where he originated. He has his obvious competence with regard to it, but he can choose to disengage with it. He possesses it, it does not possess him. In the long term, this is likely to be the way a cosmopolitan constructs his own unique personal perspective out of an idiosyncratic collection of experiences.

The transculturant conversely is less likely to be able to disengage from his cultural surroundings. As a migrant he may be deterritorialised in the sense that he has left behind a familiar lifeworld. He may relocate his cultural baggage, but in the company of diverse ethnocultural neighbours he will/may not be in a position to unpack all that baggage, and thus his mutual exchange of cultural attributes (transculturation) – or in some instances where a dominant culture exists, his asymmetrical acculturation – will proceed.

**Transculturation in the Context of this Thesis**

My interpretation of transculturation is that it is a multifaceted concept whereby individuals and groups exchange, appropriate or reject the cultural practices and values of those amongst whom they live – groups belonging to ethnocultural cohorts dissimilar from themselves.

The process of cultural exchange may be deliberate (as in the case of language inculcation or religious conversion) or inadvertent (as in the case of dietary reorientation or altered musicality). Whether deliberate or inadvertent, some aspects of the process may be discernible within a lifetime, while others may rely on generational change. Some cultural aspects translate readily across cultures – witness the legacy of Portuguese musical influence in parts of the Archipelago (Indonesia and Malaysia) despite the several centuries that the Portuguese have been displaced – while others (such as the

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115 Gilroy (2005: 67) I sense, is not writing-off the state-supported notion of multiculturalism, but rather acknowledging its limitations in view of its politicisation when he states that “(t)he challenge of being in the same present, of synchronizing difference and articulating cosmopolitan hope upward from below rather than imposing it downward from on high provides some help in seeing how we might invent conceptions of humanity that allow for the presumption of equal value and go beyond the issue of tolerance into a more active engagement with the irreducible value of diversity within sameness.”

116 While I acknowledge that no ethnicity or culture remains in a state of stasis, the migrant experience has the effect of fast-tracking cultural change, which can be accommodated or rejected, depending on the perception or reality of those who feel they are being expected to modify their cultural lifeways.
failure of the chilli to gain wide appreciation in the Philippines) fail to make an impression.\textsuperscript{117} No matter what the momentum of cultural exchange, its outcome is never a completed project; its trajectory is uncertain, unknowable.

Although circumstances and the degree (and momentum) of change challenge existing ethnic identity certainties, the potential exists for everyone to modify some cultural practices without losing at least the symbolism of their ethnocultural identity. However, in situations where the perception (or reality) is that one party feels they are making all the compromises in the cultural exchange process, a reaction, involving the rejection of unlike cultural baggage may result. Reification of the known does not hinge on degree of difference per se, but may be complicated by economic or political advantageousness. What is of more salience to the reification paradigm, I suggest, is the degree of diversity in any given zone of cultural exchange, whether there are two or many groups, or whether one group is advantaged by being numerically dominant.

The diminution of a given ethnocultural identity need not be a moment for hand-wringing; after all, ethnocultural identities have always been amenable to change (albeit manageable change) – their stasis questionable.\textsuperscript{118} What has changed is the measure – as a consequence of migrancy in a globalised world – of necessary intercultural contact. Whether the diversity of ethnic identities is sustainable is questionable. While multiculturalism – as imagined by some – is an egalitarian attempt to cushion the disappointment of having to live among diverse ethnocultural groups, transculturation offers an alternative possibility for coexistence. Inherent in the transculturative process may be a sense of loss, but the contrapuntal notion of gain is often underestimated. In a globalised world it appears that the sense of loss seems to outweigh any sense of cultural gain. This, I suggest, hinges on the asymmetrical nature of cultural exchange in the ‘contact zone’, a development that may be typical, but not mandatory.

\textsuperscript{117} Zialcita (2006: 239-242) makes the case that although the Manila-Acapulco galleon trade introduced Asia to numerous American products and cultural practices, the uptake of these was sporadic. The chilli is one example of how there were regional variations in those uptakes. It transited the Philippines to become important in Indonesian and Korean cuisines, but remained peripheral to Filipino cuisines, and abhorred by the Japanese.

\textsuperscript{118} The development of Balinese dance is a case in point. While there may be elements of the arts steeped in antiquity, outside influences have been able to subtly or strongly influence such arts in many societies. The Balinese Kecak Dance exemplifies the cultural fusions that can occur when cultures collide. The Kecak is a symbiosis of what Europeans (such as Walter Spies) in the 1930s imagined dance might be, fused onto the Balinese lived reality. In this context it is difficult to separate those aspects of the arts of Bali that are purely Balinese, purely European or a transculturated form of both.
The alternative transculturation paradigm – one which may be perceived as a process of cultural compromise in which the migrant / transmigrant experiences changes to previous ethnocultural / ethnolinguistic certainties – offers a way forward that validates change as gain rather than loss. Transculturation that is, envisages the evolving of altered identities as a consequence of the intercultural interaction of diverse ethnocultural groups, with the proviso that such identities not be regarded negatively. As a facilitator of harmonious integration into new societies the embrace of other cultural worldviews is dependent upon situational variables (degree of difference, social and economic security, numerical dominance and so forth) and the resolve of individual agency. It is the Ortizian concept of transculturation, one incorporating the notion of mutual cultural exchange, which I choose to apply as a theoretical model to justify why some migrant / transmigrant experiences have had positive outcomes while others have engendered tribulation.
MAP 3 – THE PHILIPPINES: POPULATION DENSITY

Source: Google Image / <http://alturl.com/f3kyx>
CHAPTER IV – TRANSMIGRATION IN CONTEXT

The aim of this chapter is to foreground the concept of ‘transmigration’ and locate its relevance to the previous discussion of the concept of ‘transculturation’. Transculturation only becomes meaningful when people of diverse ethnocultural backgrounds come into contact as a consequence of migration. After defining what is meant by the term ‘transmigration’ I explain the rationale for its existence, the history and trajectory of its development, the objectives of various state-sponsored resettlement programs, and the social reality that ensued from the implementation of those schemes. To better position the Narra / Palawan resettlement experience I draw on the transmigration phenomenon as it has impacted on a national Filipino level and a broader archipelagic level. While state planners imagined the socio-economic benefits of transmigration, they were less able to foresee its sociocultural ramifications. The chapter will conclude with the contrasting of the apparent positive outcome of Narra as a zone of intercultural accommodation when juxtaposed with the ethnocultural violence that has ensued as a consequence of resettlement initiatives in Mindanao and other archipelagic locales.

Transmigration (or intrastate rural resettlement) became a phenomenon of some salience to Southeast Asia in the twentieth century.119 This migration process contributed to a reality in which a heterogeneity of ethnocultural groups – sharing the same spatial setting, facing similar resettlement experiences – have had to acknowledge the different lifeworlds of their neighbours. The extent of Filipino polyethnicity coalescing with the inclusive nature of the former state-sponsored resettlement projects, led to the development of liminal intercultural meeting-places. However, migration theory reveals to us that different social interaction trajectories are possible. At one end of the spectrum would be the rejection of interaction with others, and reification of lived cultures; at the other end an embrace of others’ cultures, by either the impacts of acculturation or transculturation. For the millions across the Archipelago who have experienced transmigration, the hurdle of interethnic coexistence in new domains has not proved insurmountable. However, not all resettlement has proceeded as

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119 Rural resettlement in Southeast Asia – in contrast to the general urbanisation taking place during the same period – has been a feature of states re-ordering their postcolonial socio-economic realities. While rural-to-rural population movements had been attempted during the late imperial period, the zenith of rural resettlement (transmigration) was achieved following independence. Including the Philippines, the process has involved many millions of migrants in Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam.
anticipated. The aspirations of state planners have not gone unchallenged in both the Philippines and the wider resettlement world.

**Defining Transmigration**

In this thesis transmigration is the inter-provincial, inter-island migration of people from more densely populated areas of the nation to areas of less density. The underlying rationale for this people transfer is the amelioration of socio-economic deprivation. Primarily the process envisioned the rural-to-rural resettlement of the landless (Huke 1963, Fernandez 1975, Hardjono 1978a, James 1979, Uhlig 1984a, Gondowarsito 1986, Tirtosudarmo 1997, Bahrin 1988b) though the vision has widened to include a general internal movement of peoples to less populated areas where socio-economic opportunities are premised on more than a general landlessness. This internal rural-to-rural migration should not be confused with a paralleling rural-to-urban migration and the increasing phenomenon of external migration.120

‘Migration theory,’ according to the DREC (2003: 178), is generally concerned with the political and economic push / pull factors that influence the movement of peoples. Meanwhile, the broader social ramifications of those movements: alienation, marginalisation, discrimination, social exclusion, and adaptation have the capacity to impact upon the identity of the individual. The DREC suggests that “the word ‘migration’ is derived from the Latin word *migratio*, which means to move, to wander… [and] pertains to individual mobility… is purposeful and instrumental” (p. 178). As well as taking place across state boundaries (external or international migration) migration also occurs within the boundaries of a state (internal migration), but whatever the model there are repercussions for individuals and societies:

Receiving regions will experience the establishment of ‘new’ ethnic minorities, ethnic tensions, and problems of social cohesion. On the individual level, moving from one’s home town or village means being cut off from social networks, associations and social structure… Changes of this kind occasioned by migration will inevitably affect migrant identities… (p. 178).

The AOD (2004: 1369) states that the prefix ‘trans’ may be employed to denote: (1) the notion of ‘across or beyond’, and (2) the circumstance ‘on or to the

120 The Philippines (and increasingly Indonesia) are cases in point. The resettlement across the Archipelago of millions of rural-to-rural transmigrants has not daunted two further migration patterns; that of the rural-to-urban migrant, and the outflow of international migrant-labour, which in combination have possibly encompassed numbers of the magnitude of 10-1 vis-à-vis the internal transmigrant movements.
other side of’. When juxtaposed with the term ‘migration’ the concept ‘trans-migration’—signifying a movement of peoples across or to the other side of a country, namely an internal migration—is forged. The term ‘transmigration’ (transmigrasi) gained cachet when used in the Indonesian resettlement context, and best represents what I deem to be analogous population movements in the Philippine context. The sense in which I use ‘trans-migration’ is to imply a general rural-to-rural movement of peoples across the country. Despite the abandonment of most state-sponsored resettlement initiatives, intrastate migration to settlement zones such as Palawan—albeit spontaneous in nature—continues.121 Increasingly, as the ‘frontier’ becomes more settled agriculturally, ongoing migration becomes less dependent on rural pursuits, and more dependent on tertiary pursuits: commerce, education and the bureaucracy.

Throughout the Archipelago and across time the nomenclature to denote like processes has varied between administrations (colonial and independent) and with the era. In the Philippines the process has been known as ‘land colonisation’, ‘new settlements’, and ‘resettlement’; in Malaysia as ‘land settlement’ and ‘land development’; in Indonesia as ‘land colonisation’ (during the Dutch era) and transmigrasi (transmigration) following Independence (Bahrin 1988a: 1). My intention to use the Indonesian term ‘transmigrasi / transmigration’ over alternatives is to avoid confusion.122 Though some interchangeable usage of the terms may occur, ‘transmigration’ is utilised to refer to the concept or overarching process of moving peoples across the nation-state, while the result of that process is the ‘resettlement’ of those people.123

In multiethnic societies such as the Philippines, the salience of internal migration is the role it plays in the necessary interaction between diverse ethnolinguistic, cultural, and religious groups, an interaction that necessitates a process of adjustment to new social realities. That is to say, transmigration is a

121 The population of Palawan in general and Narra in particular has increased many-fold in recent generations and yet Palawan Province—despite this influx—continues to be the 79th least densely populated province out of 80 in the Philippines. This is possibly a factor in the continuing attraction of Palawan as a migrant destination.

122 It should be noted that in Indonesia the term ‘transmigrasi / transmigration’, denotes more than the concept and process of resettlement. It is also the nomenclature used to represent the state’s resettlement agency. In its various guises it has been a single Ministry of Transmigration, or has formed parts of other ministries. Currently, with its role much reduced, it forms part of the Ministry of Manpower and Transmigration.

123 Pre-WW2 resettlements in the U.S. administered Philippines were also termed ‘agricultural colonies’, while in the Dutch Indies the term ‘emigration’ was used interchangeably with [land] colonisation, not to be confused with the general condition of ‘colonisation’ or colonialism (after Pelzer 1945).
facilitating agent contributing to new realities in which the identity of individuals and groups, following departure from the security of their ethnic region-of-origin, is challenged. Once in the resettlement zone, individuals and groups employ various strategies to manage the adjustment required to share geographical spaces with others of differing ethnocultural worldviews. Cursorily stated these are: (1) the tolerance of other’s lifeworlds (rather in the sense of multiculturalism), (2) the embrace of other’s lifeworlds (rather in the sense of acculturation), and (3) the mutual adoption or adaptation of others’ cultural baggage (via the process of transculturation). The trajectory adopted has implications for identity determinedness; or rather the way in which identities in the resettlement milieu are renegotiated. The ramifications of these deliberations impacts on the way the polyethnic nation-state will be able to view itself in posterity.

The contention of state bureaucrats that the resettlement of the landless in peripheral, pioneer areas would benefit the state in various ways (Bahrin 1988, Campado 2005, Lea and Chaudhri 1983a, Oberai 1988a, Paderanga Jr. 1988) often failed to take cognisance of three factors. Firstly, the peripheral lands were not *terra nullius* (land belonging to no-one). Secondly, when the land was already in occupation by others, those others and the transmigrants might be culturally incompatible. Thirdly, the ethnolinguistic or ethnocultural diversity of the transmigrants themselves might prove to be an obstacle to resettlement success and stability. Manila or Jakarta (in the case of Indonesia) initiated programs that also failed to be mindful of the disconnect between cosmopolitan and rural realities; rurality after all implies conservatism, fixed worldviews and in some instances mutual suspicion.\(^{124}\)

Transmigration – in both the colonial and postcolonial state (Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines) – began as a state-initiated enterprise. It was the state that encouraged and sponsored resettlement programs, dictating their location and scope. While in the intervening years the phenomenon of the spontaneous or self-funded migrant came to outnumber the state-funded migrant,

\(^{124}\) In his chapter ‘Toward a community broader than the kin’ Zialcita (2006) well illustrates that the rural reality – rather than being one in which the spirit of *bayanihan* (mutual cooperation) exudes to encompass a rural idyll – is often predicated on mutual suspicion. While interconnectedness with a wider world is eroding isolation “…suspiciousness toward outsiders, even of the same ethnicity and language…” is a widespread phenomenon. He states: When I would mention wanting to visit, say, another hamlet a few kilometres down the road, friends would warn me that it harboured sorcerers [*mannamay*]. However, in that hamlet-down-the-road, friends there would be concerned that I had been staying in that hamlet-up-the-road. They feared it for its sorcerers!” (p. 37).
the significance of the state schemes – which acted as catalysts for subsequent spontaneous migration – should not be overlooked. Spontaneous migration in some instances aggravated the integrative process on the resettlement frontier (Crystal 1982, Krinks 1975, Lopez 1986, Sage 1996, Wertheim 1959). In the absence of state supervision, amicable indigene-transmigrant relations at times deteriorated. Nonetheless, processes of integration and accommodation have taken place, though there have been differential degrees of success when viewed in an indigene-settler or settler-settler context.

Rather than focus on the state-funded / spontaneous dichotomy this thesis relies on an overarching concept of transmigration; that is, as a facilitator of intrastate movement of heterogeneous cohorts of people. In the resettlement ‘contact zone’ these ethnically diverse groups were faced with, and needed to address, the dilemma of how they viewed themselves in relation to a range of ethnocultural groups unlike themselves, and how they would manage their coexistence. If the resettlement ‘contact zone’ is perceived as the world-at-large in microcosm, then transmigration might be viewed as the catalyst that has hastened the process of intercultural exposure.

Transmigration: Archipelagic Overview

Since their mid-twentieth century decolonisation, the Malay Archipelago states – Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines – ramped up earlier colonial-initiated programs of transferring populations from densely populated to thinly populated parts of their domains. The motivation for intensifying previous resettlement initiatives stemmed partly from the reality of rapidly growing populations in essentially agrarian economies. That is, in the absence of secondary or tertiary industries – manufacturing having by and large been the preserve of the metropole of the imperial states – the ex-colonies were faced with accommodating and sustaining increased populations for whom land: man ratios were deteriorating. It was reasoned that the exploitation of peripheral or frontier lands would have the capacity to absorb rapidly increasing populations from areas of already high density and ameliorate the dilemma of landlessness and the attendant economic, social, and political disruption that stemmed therefrom.125

125 At the beginning of the twentieth century when the U.S. began to encourage Philippine land colonisation and homesteading projects the population of their colony supported less than 10 million (after Pelzer 1945), one-tenth of what it was a century on. Concomitantly, when the earliest Dutch East Indies emigration / colonisation programs were attempting to alleviate overcrowding in Java / Madura were initiated in 1905, the population of Java stood at 30 million
Using Indonesia’s Transmigration Program as representative it has been suggested that land settlement schemes have been “a valuable multi-purpose instrument that have led to a belief that they are a panacea, a cure-all for many social and economic ills” (Tirtosudarmo 1997: 19). (Oberai 1988: xiii) posits an alternative perspective stating that land settlement schemes:

have often been presented as potentially tidy solutions to a number of problems, including the need to increase agricultural production, correct spatial imbalances in the distribution of population, exploit frontier lands for reasons of national security, and defuse potentially serious political problems resulting from the existing agrarian structure, poverty, rising landlessness and unemployment.

Not only were the national aims and objectives of land resettlement programs varied and complex, their emphasis differed from one country to another and, from era to era, within the same country (Bahrin 1988a: 1-2). Elaborating further, Bahrin (cited Jones and Richter 1982: 3-4) suggests that generally speaking, state-directed land settlement program objectives may be classified as: (i) redistributive, that is moving people from heavily populated areas, (ii) economic, increasing rural opportunities, production and concomitant food security, (iii) social, alleviating poverty and addressing the mayhem caused by natural disasters such as volcanoes, dislocation due to infrastructure projects such as dam construction or homelessness as a result of regional insurgency, and (iv) political, to settle the ‘frontier’ for ‘pacification’ of minorities or to avoid land confiscation needs by states attempting rural land reform.

The postwar stimuli for new lands resulted from the push-pull factors of population pressure and the concomitant palliative, or ‘safety-valve’ theory of resettlement. However, a more nuanced understanding of the varying objectives of these transmigration initiatives helps pinpoint the success or otherwise of these movements in hindsight. Tirtosudarmo (2001: 214) states that Indonesia’s Presidential Transmigration Law of 1972 mandated seven policy goals: (1) improvements in living standards, (2) regional development, (3) balanced population distribution, (4) equitably distributed development throughout Indonesia, (5) utilization of human and natural resources, (6) national union and unity, and (7) strengthening of national defence and security. While these appear laudable goals, Uhlig (1984: xiii, 1984a: 11) posits that what drove resettlement initiatives was much more fundamental, that is, the need to find more ‘rice-bowls’

(after Wertheim 1962). A century on the Java / Madura population stands at approximately 140 million, despite the implementation of redistributive resettlement programs.
and concomitant *lebensraum* (room for development or expansion) for citizens of essentially agricultural economies with rapidly rising populations, beset with an increasing landless and ‘underlanded’ cohort.

*The Demographic Imperative*

Regardless of individual state or bureaucratic rationales for resettlement, the underlying factor that dictated the transmigration or resettlement phenomenon in the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia, was the continuance of relatively high birth rates occurring in tandem with decreasing mortalities. If archipelagic populations had remained stable – as happened in the affluent Euro-American world following World War 2 – much of the rationale for resettlement would have been moot. However, as alluded to in the ‘Introduction’, unprecedented population increases (consequent to sanitation and health initiatives) had doubled archipelagic populations several times over. The data (Table 4.1) bears repeating as it illustrates the population surge. And it is the surge that had implications for the decisions made to facilitate and implement transmigration from densely populated to less populated regions.

The Philippines at the time of the United States accession at the beginning of the twentieth century supported a population estimated to be 8 million, while the British Malay territories (now Malaysia) supported 3 million and Indonesia (then the Dutch East Indies) 43 million (after Pelzer 1945: 81, 185, 254). At century’s end those figures were 76 million, 23 million and 206 million respectively.\(^{126}\) The scale of the population increase – representing a historical aberration – should not be underestimated. In the absence of suitable alternatives, predominantly agricultural economies had little choice but to extend the territory under cultivation and this meant the alienation and exploitation of evermore peripheral areas of their respective states.

The island of Cebu is illustrative of the demographic imbalances that have occurred. In the period 1939-1960 Cebu had an out-migration of 475,356 persons (Wernstedt and Spencer 1978: 637). Notwithstanding Cebu’s status as the leading out-migration province, its population nevertheless increased from 1 million to 1.3 million in the period referred to. Today it supports nearly 4 million, the result of

\(^{126}\) Projections for the year 2020 are the Philippine population will have reached 111 million, Indonesia 262 million and Malaysia 32 million (EBYB 2012: 774-779). Statistics indicate that if fertility trends continue the Philippines will be supporting half as many people as Indonesia by mid-century, whereas at the beginning of the twentieth century Indonesia supported five times the population of the Philippines.
Philippine birth rates that outstrip its archipelagic neighbours. Put in perspective, Cebu, despite having contributed greatly to the transmigration flow, has witnessed a seven-fold increase in its population during the period 1930-2010.

Table 4.1 – Comparative Archipelagic Populations and Densities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1930</th>
<th>1950</th>
<th>1980</th>
<th>2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Java / Madura</td>
<td>42 million</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>137 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>316 km²</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1055 km²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>61 million</td>
<td>80 million</td>
<td>150 million</td>
<td>238 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>32 km²</td>
<td>41 km²</td>
<td>81 km²</td>
<td>124 km²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>4 million</td>
<td>6 million</td>
<td>14 million</td>
<td>28 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12 km²</td>
<td>18 km²</td>
<td>42 km²</td>
<td>85 km²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>13 million</td>
<td>20 million</td>
<td>50 million</td>
<td>92 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>43 km²</td>
<td>67 km²</td>
<td>167 km²</td>
<td>306 km²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cebu</td>
<td>0.6 million (1903)</td>
<td>1.2 million (1960)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4.2 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>121 km²</td>
<td>243 km²</td>
<td></td>
<td>810 km²</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: EBYB 2012 / NSO website / Wernstedt and Spencer 1978

The Ethnocultural Imperative

If archipelagic nation-state populations had been monoethnic, and all other factors in the transmigration imperative (population increase, landlessness, poverty, and social unrest) had remained extant, resettlement integration would have been less fraught. Notwithstanding the matter of religious difference, issues such as minoritisation, marginalisation, regionalism, and secession would not have become the dilemmas they have in resettlement zones as distant as Mindanao and the Moluccas (Ananta 2006a, 2006b, Tirtosudarmo 2006). In the absence of population increase transmigration would have been less likely, each ethnocultural group might have remained in its region-of-origin and not been confronted with the need for intercultural dialogue. Transmigration in a monoethnic milieu might have meant a struggle for resources at worst, but that struggle would not have been exacerbated by the additional complication resulting from the ethnocultural diversity of a plural society.

A single ethnicity, language and a shared set of cultural markers would have precluded the need for the individual or group to confront the identity choices that needed to be made in the resettlement zone of a polyethnic state;
issues such as ethnic reification, acculturation to another’s culture or the compromises associated with transculturation would have been moot. In some resettlement situations – especially in situations where only two or three ethnocultural cohorts were resettled, the identity dilemma was less fraught. Depending on the percentage size of the cohort, each group might either reify its identity or in instances where numbers were small, members of the smaller cohort might compromise their identity by acculturating into a larger or more dominant group. In this regard transmigration in Indonesia (for example) is at once less fraught and more fraught. It is less fraught in the sense that the transmigrant cohort consists of fewer ethnic groups (primarily Javanese, Madurese, and Balinese) and more fraught in the sense that wherever they are resettled these cohorts have a tendency to be the numerically dominant group within a particular project, thus inhibiting the potential for reciprocal cultural exchange.

Resettlement scenarios exhibiting greater ethnocultural diversity – exemplified by the Narra / Palawan model – have the potential for greater intercultural exchange, but this is not necessarily guaranteed. Diversity does not preclude there being a dominant group. Mindanao is a case in point on two levels. On one level the Cebuano language is illustrative. Migration to Mindanao from the north encompassed more than ethnic Cebuanos, yet the Cebuano language became lingua franca for many of the settlers and some indigenes. On a further level the Christian-Muslim cultural divide has thwarted a more broad-based intercultural exchange. The ethnic diversity in the Narra resettlement project has contributed to a situation in which no ethnic group is dominant. Potential chauvinism has been further stymied by the adoption and diffusion of the national language Filipino / Tagalog, the high incidence of intermarriage between ethnic groups and possibly the relative ethnoreligious homogeneity (lowland Christian) of the majority in the community.

An example of the acculturation model might be the initial Balinese resettlement in Parigi (Sulawesi) as outlined by Davis (1976). In this model, Balinese acculturation to the host community appeared unproblematic; it was neither coerced nor sanctioned, was asymmetrical rather than reciprocal, but seemingly randomly negotiated via individual agency. Examples of reification, or minimal positions of coexistence (hesitation), abound. An unofficial visit to the resettlement zone of Baturaja (Sumatra) revealed that the two migrant cohorts – Javanese and Balinese – continued to maintain separate identities; and along with the indigene Ogan in this particular project, each retained some geographical space within the overall project.

I am not suggesting that the divergence of religion or language per se is instrumental in determining whether interculturality will flourish or not. Examples abound (Hardjono 2001, Wertheim 1959) of instances in which indigene-settler antipathy manifested in spite of a faith in common.

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Transmigration: Philippine Overview

Analyses of Philippine land settlement policy and programs are not possible outside the framework of the country’s recurrent land reform agendas, the catalyst for which has been intermittent rural unrest and insurrection. Historically, land ownership has not necessarily been in the hands of those Filipinos who tilled the land.\(^\text{129}\) Spain’s sovereignty in the Archipelago differed markedly from her colonial rivals. In British Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies land tenure – apart from the plantation-system developed during the late colonial period – continued to be based on the pre-colonial traditional village, usufruct system of agriculture. Spain, however, usurped the traditional barangay (village-based) land tenure arrangements, based on communal ownership, and replaced them with the latifundia or hacienda system of landed estates (Kuhnen 1982, Putzel 1992, Zialcita 2006).\(^\text{130}\) The pervasiveness of this policy has been difficult to undermine, and contributes in part to continued rural poverty that is aggravated by ongoing landlessness and the conditionality of tenancy.\(^\text{131}\) It was in this context that the transmigration of landless Filipinos to less populated areas was mooted. However, the programs that have been variously promoted to ameliorate the condition of landlessness and its attendant social ills have been contingent upon the political climate.

When the United States replaced Spain as the colonial power, their administration – in an effort to cultivate collaboration among the Philippine elite – decided to respect the land ownership status quo by ignoring the radical land reform program that had been proposed by the nascent Philippine Republic’s

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\(^\text{129}\) This holds true for those areas of the Philippines that were dominated by Spanish colonial rule. Other regions of the Philippines retained traditional pre-colonial land tenure arrangements based on the usufruct dictates of the community, swidden agriculture, or a combination of both.

\(^\text{130}\) Kuhnen (1982: 26-27) suggests that the latifundia or hacienda “are overdimensional pieces of landed property similar to a small state [which as an] economic and social entity… tied together through labour relations… Cash is used as little as possible. The patron receives work from the labourers, tenants, management…” and rules his domain in an autarkic manner. Putzel (1992: 45) states that by 1612, much of the original land that had formed part of the grants to the conquistadores and early settlers had been reduced to 34 estancias, much of it controlled by the Friar Orders (Augustinians, Dominicans Jesuits, and Recollects). Zialcita (2006: 81-102) makes the case that in the pre-colonial Philippines the barangay (village which varied in size, and to some extent kin-based) land tenure was loosely defined, as it was still plentiful. The concept of communal ownership prevailed for land itself while labour to work a given piece of land was of more value, hence the concept of debt-bondage and slave-raids.

\(^\text{131}\) The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) in the late 1980s suggested that 20 percent of the population owned 80 percent of the land. However, the government’s land registration programme in 1988 demonstrated that not more than 5 percent of all families owned 83 percent of farmland: indicating the ‘rubbery’ nature of statistics in such a contentious environment (Putzel 1992: 27). Land concentration of this magnitude is a legacy of Spain’s three centuries of colonisation in the Archipelago, and the subsequent reluctance of U.S. administrators to effect any meaningful land reforms during their period of ‘tutelage’.
Malolos Constitution. Rather than effect agrarian reform by returning the land to the tiller, the Insular Government (early U.S. Administration) attempted amelioration of landlessness and peasant unrest by opening up for settlement ‘public lands’ in less populated areas, such as Mindanao and the Cagayan Valley in Luzon, for homesteading (McLennan 2001: 76). However, the historical anxieties of potential northern lowland Christian migrants, with regard to the Muslim and pagan south, thwarted resettlement expectations. In view of the reluctance to move south, the colonial administration aimed to encourage migration by inaugurating several state-sponsored resettlement programs. While the scope and effectiveness of these projects were limited, they presaged subsequent spontaneous migration into regions that had hitherto been regarded as inaccessible, and were thus a necessary precursor in generating interest in the south by giving official sanction to the region’s safety.

The ‘public lands’ however were not unsettled, and in this sense were ‘public’ only in the eyes of regimes that recognised land ownership premised on individual written title. The postcolonial Philippine state inherited from both Spain and the United States an antipathy to the usufruct system of land tenure that was common in the non-Christian Philippines. Both colonialisms had recognised the untitled lands as theoretically ‘unused’ and therefore open to alienation and exploitation. In this respect they were regarded as ‘crown lands’ during the Spanish era by the fiat of Regalian Doctrine, and as ‘public lands’ during the American era (Fianza 2004: 4). It was these public lands that were to play a central role in attracting the mass migration of spontaneous settlers post the Asia-Pacific War. Spontaneous transmigration in the Philippines however occurred only after the various state-sponsored land-settlement schemes, had demonstrated

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132 McLennan (2001: 76) suggests that with the passing of the Public Land Act (1903) the U.S. administration hoped to encourage the homesteading model of land alienation recently successfully implemented in a westward expanding America. The homestead model envisaged dispersed owner-operated farmsteads, but as McLennan observes: “The American homestead system had been developed among a people accustomed to a pattern of dispersed settlement, but lowland Christian Filipinos were more gregarious.”

133 The nomenclature ‘pagan’ is used with some reservation. While in use during colonial times it is in essence a pejorative that has been in some sense replaced by other epithets: native, indigene, Animist, Lumad, which while viewed as less pejorative do not necessarily address or alter these cohort’s power-relationships vis-à-vis the dominant lowland Christian and Muslim sociocultural groups in Philippine society.

134 Encouragement to move to the frontier was not limited to the publicity generated by the introduction of state-sponsored settlement projects. Campado (2005) affirms that early attempts at homesteading in Mindanao failed in part due to disorganisation. When General Pershing (1911) called for the relocation of peasants from congested areas of the Philippines to Mindanao “the government forthwith paraded around Cebu a corn stalk, thirteen feet tall… to convince the Cebuanos of the fertility of the soil in Cotabato (Mindanao)” (p. 8).
that security, health and logistics obstacles could be overcome. In essence state resettlement initiatives (even if unsuccessful) acted as a catalyst for the spontaneous migrations that followed.

*Resettlement Policy and Organisation*

While there were similarities in the objectives of the various archipelagic resettlement programs, the political imperatives driving the processes, and the state-sponsored versus spontaneous migration dichotomy varied from state to state. Types of land settlement, and the rationales for resettlement: disaster relief, poverty amelioration, regional development and the pacification of ‘minorities’ for example, impacted on what could reasonably be achieved. Whereas resettlement policy in Indonesia and Malaysia was by and large managed by a single major facilitator, the Transmigration Ministry and the Federal Land Development Authority (FELDA) respectively, Philippine land settlement policies and programs have not enjoyed the same continuities. Unlike its archipelagic neighbours, the Philippines appeared to alter policy, structure and acronym almost at the behest of each presidential election result. Thus, entities such as the National Land Settlement Administration (NLSA) were replaced by the Land Settlement Development Corporation (LASEDECO), the Economic Development Corps of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (EDCOR), which were in turn replaced by the National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA) and so forth.\(^{135}\) American colonial resettlement and land-use policy had also vacillated, with priorities dictated by whoever had the ear of the U.S. Congress at any given moment. Congressional Democrats were more amenable to acknowledging Filipino sensibilities whereas the more imperialist elements in Congress sided with the agribusiness lobby whose minimum position was the retention of Mindanao as their fiefdom. The agribusiness / imperialist lobby tried unsuccessfully to have Mindanao excised from the Philippines body politic, citing religious difference as a reason for the need for separation.\(^{136}\)

\(^{135}\) This list is not exhaustive, but is illustrative of the discontinuities inherent in the Filipino transmigration / resettlement paradigm. While Indonesia’s resettlement has been wound back, a limited resettlement program continues under the auspices of the now merged Ministry of Manpower and Transmigration. FELDA has metamorphosed into a successful agribusiness and vertically integrated corporation.

\(^{136}\) The Bacon Bill (1926) had as its backers those interests – including rubber planters – who were incensed that American investors were to have their landholdings limited to 1,024 hectares (Pelzer 1945: 129). As it transpired, the Bacon Bill failed, but the potential for separation continued to exist. Krinks (1983) reveals that the 1,024 hectare restrictions were subsequently able to be breached by creative accounting and political fiat.
The early American colonial administration had the power to dictate land policy in the Philippines and with the passing of the Public Land Act (1903) encouraged the introduction of the ‘homestead’ system of land alienation. This system of dispersed, isolated farmsteads was alien to the Filipino, who, even if landless, was reluctant to live away from the security of a village. Consequently the concept of homesteading failed to draw the expected numbers to Mindanao. Those who did arrive were often thwarted in their homesteading quest by ‘land-grabbers’ – usually influential folk who had been pre-informed about certain road constructions allowing access to alienable lands (Pelzer 1945: 104-114). The Philippines Insular Government, in an effort to bind Mindanao more firmly to the Christian north, aimed to increase the movement of settlers from the congested Visayan provinces. However, as mentioned previously, their attempts at promoting state-sponsored agricultural colonies in the period 1913-1917 proved to be less than successful. While some American interests thought that development lay in large estates, and even contemplated importing coolie labour if Filipinos could not be induced to move in sufficient numbers, the embryonic Philippines administration concentrated on the provision of land for smallholders, both in state-sponsored and spontaneous resettlements (Huke 1963: 205, Pelzer 1945, Krinks, 1983).137

Philippine rural policy and settlement programs had a further political, if not geo-strategic, dimension to them. At the close of the Asia-Pacific War – with the United States in the ascendancy – a window of opportunity existed for a meaningful restructuring of rural society in the Philippines. In Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan a coalescing of retribution against powerful landed interests and an increasing fear of communism came to dominate U.S. occupation policy towards rural restructuring. This anxiety caused action to be taken to effect land reform in those states. In their own colony (the Philippines) a tussle ensued between those U.S. interests promulgating reform, and those who were against rural redistributive policies. This inability to implement land reform ensured the ongoing mechanism of land resettlement policy as a central fallback position (Putzel 1992: 67-112). The timing of independence in 1946, before the gravity of Cold War rivalry had manifested itself, ‘saved’ the Philippines from restructuring

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137 While the focus of state rhetoric and action appears to have been (and continues to be) the well-being of owner-operated farms, the state has nevertheless facilitated the growth of agribusinesses that for economies of scale require large holdings. In tandem with this is the difficulty in matching state rhetoric and action (as represented by the DAR) with the continuance of some historically large personal land-holdings.
in the short-term, though with the benefit of hindsight only put off the inevitable reform and modernization of the rural sector, which Japan, Korea and Taiwan achieved in less traumatic circumstances.138

**Resettlement Objectives**

When viewed from a sociocultural perspective, some of the resettlement objectives have more salience than others for the contention of this thesis. One such is the issue of ‘national union and unity’. Because of the inability to locate an indigene-settler *modus vivendi* in the Mindanao contact zone for example, the national unity objective has been compromised. Increased transmigration might even be deemed to have exacerbated fragile coexistences. While some of the other objectives might more generally fall under the rubric of socio-economic expectations, I suggest that the overall need to fulfil the objectives had potential repercussions for intercultural *modi vivendi* in the resettlement contact zone. Failed expectations might undermine the intercultural trust hypothesis advanced by Simons (1997) as a prerequisite for further social interaction. A brief outline of the objectives that motivated resettlement initiatives will help in an understanding of why and how transmigration was advanced. Transmigrants were encouraged, cajoled and sometimes coerced to leave the security of their ethnocultural heartlands to live precarious existences (at least during the pioneering years) amongst a heterogeneity of ethnocultural neighbours.139

*Improvements in Living Standards*

In the absence of mass industrialization the Philippines was dependant on an agricultural sector that lagged in its ability to provide adequate livelihoods for many Filipinos. For a century the country struggled to implement a meaningful land reform that might address the chronic poverty with which a sizeable segment of the population was burdened. Economic factors such as “land-tenure systems,

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138 I am not suggesting that Japan, Korea and Taiwan were not assailed by political and military problems as a consequence of the fall-out from postwar ‘re-imaginings’, rather that in the Philippines, the fall-out of peasant insurrection occurred as a consequence of not effecting the reforms that had been impressed upon the aforementioned states. Had the lame-duck colonial government forced through appropriate reforms, it is debatable whether the HUK rebellion (Kerkvliet 1990), and subsequent rural-social insurrections would have gained traction.  
139 Guiam (cited Tigno 2006: 28) addresses the issue of coercion by suggesting that “…many of the volunteers to become the beneficiaries of government-sponsored migrations to Mindanao were the ‘undesirables’ and tough guys in some Luzon and Visayas communities… Mindanao is the promised land of the undesirables.” Veloro (1995, 1996) addresses the matter of the precariousness of frontier life, by relating reminiscences of isolation, homesickness, illness, and hunger among Palawan transmigrants.
widespread tenancy, usury, poverty combined with indebtedness, and uneconomical farm sizes” (Pelzer 1945: 86) contributed to poor living standards. The American colonial administration inherited a *latifundia* (landed estate) system of agriculture dominated by a coterie of wealthy families and the Church. The ‘Friar Lands’ – a source of great peasant grievance and deprivation – were alienated, but not to the tenants who worked the land. Putzel (1992: 20-23) suggests that while landed property and other rural assets remained in the hands of a small number of powerful families, landlessness would continue to plague those relying on agricultural livelihoods; those unable to meet the basic survival needs of their families. State-sponsored resettlement programs, as well as encouraging migration from densely populated areas to sparsely populated ones, had as one of its objectives the improving of living standards of the rural impoverished (Postrado 1984: 307, 314).

**Balanced Population Distribution**

As previously mentioned, Pelzer (1945: 81) had observed that “(t)he population in all the countries of Southeastern Asia is distributed very unevenly.” His observation – made in the last years of the colonial era – occurred at a time when archipelagic states were already cognisant of the ramifications of population maldistribution. High population densities exacerbated the occurrence of landlessness which both colonial-era and independent administrations recognised as contributing to social instability. It was reasoned by policy-makers that the addressing of the population maldistribution issue would help ameliorate wider societal ills such as poverty, class struggle, and insurrection. Population pressure, exacerbated by maldistribution therefore came to influence state resettlement policy.

Philippine land settlement often had multiple objectives, though a concern over an equitable distribution of population per se has not always been at the forefront of planners’ visions. “Development of the frontier areas […], growth of agricultural output, alleviation of agrarian problems in agricultural regions, pacification, and assimilation of minority groups, and decongestion of over crowded cities…” (Paderanga Jr. 1988: 142) are objectives that in some way were

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140 In *The Huk Rebellion*, Kerkvliet (1990) highlights complexities of one such insurrection faced by the state. The plight of the peasantry, millenarianism, political machinations and foreign interventions, are all factors that contributed to the scenario in which insurrections occurred. Transmigration was often seen as a response in diffusing and dispersing the threat, although the underlying conditions of increased populations and landlessness were not adequately addressed.
predicated on the grander notion of a more balanced population distribution. The American colonial administration and the nascent Filipino Republic, reflecting on the aforementioned anxieties, viewed the amelioration of the maldistribution of population not as a problem in itself, but as a potential solution to ancillary issues. For example, peasant unrest might be stymied by the ‘safety-valve’ of alienating less-populated frontier lands where unruly peasants might be resettled.

The potential for population redistribution must have appeared apparent. The 1903 Philippines census determined the population at 7.5 million. The MPM islands (Mindanao, Palawan, and Mindoro), encompassing nearly 40 percent of Philippine land area, supported – if we disregard Pelzer’s charge of under-enumeration – 7 percent of the population (Pelzer 1945: 81, Wernstedt and Spencer 1978: 600). The 1939 census revealed that the population of the MPM islands accounted for 12.5 percent of the nation’s total; revealing to state planners that the potential for a more balanced population continued to exist.141

Regional Development
If the heartland of Philippine agriculture has been Central Luzon, then the centre of industrial capacity and administration has been Metro Manila. At least one-third of Filipinos live within a 100km radius of Manila. Historically, Spanish rule emanated from Manila and as is the case with other colonial administrative centres, in a postcolonial era, these centres of power continued to act as administrative centres and population magnets once the post-independence move to urban areas accelerated. Some state planners had in mind that resettlement programs might stem the flow to urban areas in general and Metro Manila in particular (Laquian 1975: 242). The nature of the skewed regional development was apparent to both the American colonial administration and Filipino politicians in the early part of the century, although rationales for settling the less developed regions, such as Mindanao, diverged.

For Commonwealth President Quezon, the priority was to settle the frontier so that the Philippines might inherit the whole of the Spanish patrimony, at a time in which some American interests were intent on developing regions (in particular Mindanao) that might be exploited for agribusinesses. Sugar, rubber,

141 By 1960 MPM supported 22 percent of the Philippine population, with Mindanao the greatest recipient. The inter-census period 1903-1960 saw a ten-fold increase while 1960-2007 has seen a further four-fold increase. Data from the 2010 census suggests that transmigration toward the MPM continues; the region now supporting 29 percent of the country’s population. (after NSO)
abacá, coconuts and later pineapple and bananas had ready markets in the United States. Quezon’s anxiety was well-founded, given that moves existed to separate Mindanao from the rest of the colony (Abinales 2004: 17-44). Both dynamics – Commonwealth and American agribusiness interests – needed an influx of settlers to make them viable. The nationalists needed Filipino settlers to transmigrate to the regions to tie these to Manila, while the agribusiness / imperialist lobby needed an influx of settlers to work in the plantations. In later years regional development still had land resettlement in its mix of state initiatives. Having the least population density of any province, Palawan continued to be touted as a frontier.\footnote{The ‘last frontier’ mentality which was instrumental in attracting agricultural resettlement is being re-packaged to reflect the new realities of the Province’s tourist industry. The Provincial Government of Palawan’s website now touts the epithet ‘last ecological frontier’.

_Equitably Distributed Development_

While the majority of Filipinos worked in the rural sector it behoved the state to devote more resources to uplift a cohort who were not sharing equitably in the country’s development. Putzel (1992: 15-17) stated that poverty in the Philippines was endemic and most widespread in the rural areas. It was thought that providing land to the landless would be a proactive move likely to benefit those not sharing in development. Given that land is a finite resource and given that the Philippines continues to have one of the highest population growth rates in Asia, it appears that further strategies to ameliorate poverty and share in development (such as industrialization, progressive taxation and suchlike) need to be put in place. Whether or not resettlement can contribute to the objective of a more equitably distributed development throughout the Philippines remains to be seen. Because of the institutional continuities (tenancy, patron-client relationships) mentioned elsewhere, resettlement programs may not necessarily deliver the expected development for many in the rural sector. The increasing cohort of Filipinos working overseas – estimates vary from 10 percent of the working-age population to 10 percent of the overall population (Camroux 2009) – suggests the limitations of equitable development despite resettlement programs.

_Utilisation of Human and Natural Resources_

The potential of Mindanao, Palawan and other less exploited areas of the Philippines has always been in the forefront of the minds of entrepreneurs and
politicians (Gutierrez and Borras Jr. 2004, Hayami et al. 1993, Fianza 2004). Following the subjugation of those resisting the American occupation in the early 1900s, Mindanao in particular was deemed “the land of promise and unlimited opportunity” (Pelzer 1945: 127). A relatively small population, vast forested areas, undeveloped agricultural land and undiscovered minerals all demanded that settlement take place. In fact, in view of impending independence, one of the NLSA objectives had been “(t)o develop new money crops to take the place of the present export crops, which may suffer from the loss of preferences which they enjoy in the American market” (p. 138). Concomitant with the underlying anxiety of peasant unrest that stemmed from landlessness and associated poverty there existed a situation of great underemployment in the Philippine rural economy.

Better health delivery outcomes early in the twentieth century decreased mortality rates, which meant that in the old settled agricultural areas, the available land needed to be shared by more mouths. As a consequence, due to landlessness and usurious practices, poverty and tenancy increased. Putzel (1992: 55) suggests that during the American colonial period tenancy rates increased markedly. In the Province of Nueva Ecija for example tenancy rates were 38 percent in 1903 but had risen to 60 percent in 1948. Generally tenants have less interest in improving the land they farm than do landowner-farmers, the result being that agricultural productivity was one of the lowest in Southeast Asia. Underemployment, in conjunction with the vagaries of tenancy, contributed to this inefficiency and poor utilization of human resources. Resettlement programs or spontaneous movement to the frontier suggested an alternative.

National Union and Unity
One of the objectives of earlier state-sponsored resettlement was to foster national union and unity. Pelzer’s (1945) account of the Philippine Commonwealth’s NLSA settlement program just prior to the outbreak of the Asia-Pacific War, declared one of the state objectives thus: “To encourage migration to sparsely populated regions, and facilitate the amalgamation of the people in different sections of the Philippines” (p. 138). Campado (2005: 8-9) suggests that earlier American agricultural colonisation schemes had similar objectives in that “(t)he aim is the amalgamation of the Mohammedan and the Christian native population into a homogenous Filipino people.” While the Department of Mindanao and Sulu (a regional American-created administrative entity) could show that 427 Visayan
and 347 Muslim families could live side by side in harmony, the reality was that discrimination that favoured the newcomers slowly began to undermine the aim of national unity. Discrimination was not the only reason for Moro reluctance to accept the inevitable rule of Manila in the 1920s and 1930s. Some Muslims felt that their best interests would be served by a continuance of American rule in Mindanao. Hence when the Commonwealth administration headed by President Quezon hurriedly enacted legislation for the NLSA formation (1938) he was acting to strengthen Manila’s claim to all of the territory of the Spanish / American patrimony. By settling Mindanao he hoped to legitimise Manila’s claim in the face of Muslim and American objections.

Abinales (2004:17-23) suggests that Quezon and other Filipino nationalists had every reason to have anxieties about national unity. As the administration in Manila was being indigenized, Mindanao continued to be ruled as a separate fiefdom of the U.S. Army. As Abinales explains it, American rule in the south represented a ‘regime within a regime’. Ethnoreligious difference and ‘Moro backwardness’ were touted by the Americans as reasons for continuing the separate development of Mindanao. Quezon and Manila did everything in their power to increase their influence in the region. American resolve was not monolithic however; one faction wanted a unified Philippine state with minimal interference by the colonial ruler, while a further faction – supported by business interests, Washington lobbyists, and those buoyed by the mantra of the ‘white man’s burden’ – endeavoured to treat Mindanao as a potential separate state, to be settled by Europeans, supporting plantations that would augment the American economy.

The reality turned out somewhat differently, but Filipino anxiety about national unity in the context of (some) American intentions was well-founded. The plantation sector had mixed success; abacá (Manila hemp) production attracted several thousand Americans. Expertise in abacá production and

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143 In the nascent Filipino state, power (both economic and political) emanated from the Manila and the ‘Tagalog belt’. Power-brokers such as Quezon, imagining their decolonised patrimony as reflecting the entire Spanish / American bailiwick, took little cognisance of the aspirations of the silent majority who lived outside the ‘Tagalog belt’; a situation construed by some as a form of internal colonialism. In Internal Colonialism Hechter (1998), examining the British / Celtic divide, demonstrates how the psychology of power works between the centre and periphery. “[T]he argument holds that the lack of sovereignty characteristic of internal colonies fostered a dependent kind of development which limited their economic welfare and threatened their cultural integrity…” (p. xiv). It could be argued that the core / periphery theorisation in the Philippines has had a bearing on how the transmigration / social interaction philosophy has played out in the regions.
marketing saw the settlement of 20,000 Japanese in Mindanao by the eve of the Asia-Pacific War (Abinales 2004: 78-87). At the same time this community showed the economic potential of Mindanao, and (like the American separatists before them) highlighted to Quezon and others the spectre that Manila might lose control over one third of its imagined patrimony. As a facilitator of national union and unity the state-sponsored NLSA might thus be viewed as a response to Moro regionalism, American imperial intentions, and the uncertainty of hosting a growing Japanese community on Philippine soil.

**Strengthening of National Defence and Security**

National security objectives in land settlement programs have at times been implicit, at other times deliberate. It might be argued that all social reform stems from varying combinations of altruism and self-preservation. In a Philippine society in which land ownership was increasingly concentrated – resulting in an expansion of tenancy and landlessness – the mantra ‘land to the tiller’ came to dominate the debate on land reform. Land reform ‘intent’ could be blocked by legislators who were by and large the landowner class. State sponsored land settlement programs such as the NLSA were thus inaugurated as palliatives – in an effort to aid an increasingly landless peasantry – in lieu of meaningful land reform. Landlessness and the inequities of tenancy, in an essentially agrarian society with a rising population, contributed to peasant unrest and the threat of general rebellion in the 1930s, culminating in political and social upheaval during the Japanese interregnum (Putzel 1992: 58).

The return of the Americans to the Philippines and the onset of the Cold War saw a state reaction to the gains made during the Asia-Pacific War by peasant organizations that had at once combated the Japanese and the landlords, especially in Central Luzon. Where at the instigation of the HUKs (*Hukbalahap* – *Hukbong Bayan Laban sa mga Hapon* – People’s Army Against the Japanese – formed in 1942) estates had been broken up and land redistribution had taken place; at War’s end a return to the status quo was sought by the landlord, and supported by the U.S. Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) (Kerkvliet 1990). Peasant land redistribution was viewed as part of a general advance of communism in the region, and unlike American coercive land reform efforts in occupied Japan and Korea, the Philippines was allowed to return to the status quo of pre-war land ownership arrangements (Putzel 1992: 75). Landlordism actually increased its
power, with a combination of private armies and the support of the American-
backed administration imbued with anti-communist credentials. The HUKs
(which morphed into the *Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan* – People’s Liberation
Army in 1946) were not able to prevail against the odds and by 1954 were a spent
force.

The formation of EDCOR in 1950 was an ostensible attempt to woo
insurgents away from their power-base in Luzon. The promise to defecting HUK
activists of resettlement on their own land proved an effective psychological
warfare ploy, even if the numbers resettled were insignificant (Putzel 1992: 88-
91). Like previous state-sponsored resettlement programs, Mindanao was chosen
as a suitable (and distant) destination for resettlement. While national defence and
security objectives may have been achieved in the interim, the spectre of peasant
discontent did not disappear.

**Philippine Resettlement Histories**

Resettlement – as experienced in late colonial and independent Philippines –
should not be regarded as a radical innovation. Spanish rule, in spite of the
relatively small numbers of *Peninsulares* (Spanish-born) or *Criollos* (locally-born
Spaniards), was managed by the innovative system of *reducciones* (reduction).

The process entailed the closer settlement (or resettlement) of scattered
communities, so that they could be managed politically, taxed appropriately,
availed for corvée labour, and reprogrammed religiously – in effect, incorporated
into the economic orbit of colonial demands. Since missionaries were few, a more
concentrated population could be more effectively ministered to. Evangelista
(2002: 6) suggests that the *reducción* (resettlement) policy placed the natives
within hearing distance of the pealing of the church bells, a process that came to
be euphemistically termed as *bajo de la campaña* (under the bells).

A corollary of this policy was that of flight. To escape taxation, corvée and
other colonial impositions, many indigenes put themselves outside the reach of
Spanish rule, thereby contributing to the continuance of a greater ethnic diversity.
James Scott (2009) highlights how this flight from colonial subordination – in
essence a further migration, or resettlement – had the effect of creating new ethnic
identities. To stay out of the colonial orbit necessitated mobility and mobility
required the abandonment or altering of former lifeways, which in turn played a

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144 A closer understanding might be gleaned by the transitive use of the verb ‘reduce’: subdue; bring back to obedience (AOD 2004: 1082).
role in the ethnogenesis of new groups. Scott posits that “the cordillera of northern Luzon was populated almost entirely by lowland Filipinos fleeing Malay slave raids and the Spanish *reducciones*” (p. 25). Adaptation to new upland ecologies altered the lifeways of these groups; mobility necessitated a simplification of social structures and subsistence routines. Viewed in this context, the Philippine dichotomy that divides society into lowland Christian and ‘minoritised’ upland peoples loses some of its resonance.

*Resettlement: Pre-Independence*

The American colonial administration inherited a moribund land tenure system based on the Spanish duopoly of *latifundia* and religious caste system in which tenancy, indebtedness and usury prevailed. Changed colonial management failed to ameliorate these conditions directly. Following a compensation package of some $US 7 million (1903-1905), vast tracts of Friar and Church lands held by Dominicans, Augustinian and Recollects were relinquished (Pelzer 1945: 85-91). Yet despite these resumptions the United States felt unable to return these lands to those who had originally been deprived of their lands with the imposition of colonial control. The 165,000 hectares of appropriated ‘Friar Lands’ were to be redistributed to the 60,000 tenants, but in a commercial world the peasant-cultivators had no capacity to pay for the land they tilled. So, in order for the U.S. to recoup the $US 7 million Vatican recompense, the land ended up in the hands of the already-landed class. As a corollary it is estimated that in the period 1903-1940 tenancy among the rural population increased from 16 to 35 percent. A vicious cycle of debt, landlessness, usury, and excessive rents kept the peasantry in a state of debt peonage (Putzel 1992: 51-58).

Although the American administration largely left the Philippine land tenure system intact they acknowledged the needs of a growing population, and one beset by increased landlessness. Their answer was to exploit the so-called ‘public lands’, that is, lands that appeared to be unused or unowned. Imbued with

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145 The case of the escaped slave in the ‘New World’ colonial plantation milieux mirrors this trajectory. Allen (2011: 200) states that in the case of Suriname these escaped slaves (now identified as Maroon) “established an Afro-American culture with sociopolitical systems based on those of their original West African homelands.” Their ethnogenesis distinguishes the ‘Maroon’ from other Surinamese African-Americans.

146 This is not to single out Spain for criticism. The world at large at the turn of the twentieth century – even the majority rural populations in the coloniser nations – lived precariously. We need only reflect on the accelerated immigration to settler-nations such as Australia, Canada, and the United States; and the death toll of the tenantry in mid-century Ireland, to realise that the Filipino situation was not exceptional.
the recent success of the westward expansion and associated land settlement in the U.S., policy-makers imagined a similar role for ‘homesteading’ in the Philippines, especially in the south where the population was sparse. In the late 1930s – when Pelzer was researching *Pioneer Settlements in the Asiatic Tropics* – the southern Philippine Islands of Mindanao and Palawan, constituting nearly 36% of the national territory, still only supported 12% of the national population (Pelzer 1945: 81-85).

The Public Land Act of 1903 was the instrument that demonstrated the state’s ability to control and regulate land inventories. The Act allowed disposal of ‘public lands’ and these lands were to be exploited via a two-tier system – by individual owner-operated farms on the one hand, and corporations on the other. Individuals were limited to 16 ha. (although this varied from time to time), while corporations were allowed 1024 ha. Given the traditional propensity of Malay societies – be they Christian Filipino, Muslim, or Animist – to reside within the security of a village, the uptake of homestead lands was slower than expected by the American framers of the Act. Expectations were further undermined when the encroachment by state-sanctioned homesteaders onto traditional lands sometimes led to violent reactions, which slowed the further exploitation of ‘public lands’ (Pelzer 1945: 104-114).

As already observed, Mindanao, with 19 persons per square km., was sparsely populated when compared with the Visayan Islands of Cebu (214), Leyte (115), Panay (112) and Negros (95). To ameliorate congestion on these inner islands, and to address landlessness and agrarian unrest caused by suffering the negative impacts of the *inquilino* (tenancy) system, the Administration aimed to introduce large-scale settlement into Mindanao. At the same time, in an effort to thwart potential separatist tendencies, it was hoped that this movement south would facilitate the ‘Filipinization’ of the Moros and pagans (sic). To this end, in 1913, the government adopted a policy of actively encouraging migration south by establishing agricultural colonies (Pelzer 1945: 127-129). Lack of funding, ill choice of site and settler, lax administration and marketing and transport deficiencies precluded the success of these early attempts at colonisation. The attempts by provincial governments to establish colonies were even less successful than those of the Insular Government in Manila (Pelzer 1945: 132).
The NLSA Resettlement Model

While ultimately not living up to its expected potential (Abinales 2004: 119-123, Paderanga Jr. 1995: 1) the NLSA (National Land Settlement Administration) model nevertheless epitomises the imagined benefits expected by the implementation of state-initiated resettlement programs. Filipino politicians, state planners, and bureaucrats may have had diverging and intersecting expectations for furthering resettlement, but there was a general realisation that something needed to be done to ameliorate the plight of the tenants, exploit ‘empty’ lands, and advance the national interest. In spite of its inability to meet expectations the eventual liquidation of the NLSA did not diminish the enthusiasm for the transmigration concept.

The Quirino-Recto Colonization Act (1935) acknowledged previous shortcomings in state-sponsored agricultural colonisation attempts in Mindanao. The interim Commonwealth Government (1936) decided that infrastructure, especially road access, was needed before settlement would be viable. At the same time it was recognised that a more integrated colonisation procedure, as advanced by the advisors Hilarion Silayan and Frederico Howe, was warranted if settlement was to succeed. As a result of a report by Chair of the National Economic Council Manuel Roxas to President Quezon, a new entity, the National Land Settlement Administration (NLSA), was inaugurated. Pelzer (1945: 138) states that Roxas proposed the adoption of four key objectives; which when formulated into law read thus:

(a) To facilitate the acquisition, settlement and cultivation of lands whether acquired from the Government or from private parties;
(b) To afford opportunity to own farms to tenant farmers and small farmers from congested areas, and to trainees who have completed the prescribed military service;
(c) To encourage migration to sparsely populated regions, and facilitate the amalgamation of the people in different sections of the Philippines;
(d) To develop new money crops to take the place of the present export crops, which may suffer from the loss of preferences which they enjoy in the American market.

As with later Filipino land settlement programs the NLSA stipulated settler requirements based on age, health, agricultural experience, and number of dependents. A contract between the NLSA and settler was signed. The settler had to cultivate land allocated to him, plant prescribed crops, and deliver all surplus produce to Administration warehouses for sale. The obligation of the Administration was to assign 12 ha. (later amended to 6 ha.) of land, provide for
relocation to the settlement area, supply daily necessities until settlers were self-sufficient and market surplus produce. The latter was critical given the recognition that many settlers had experienced the ‘sharp business practices’ of predatory merchants and produce buyers (Pelzer 1945: 139-140).

Resettlement: Post-Independence

The Asia-Pacific War was a watershed for Philippine population mobility. While it initially halted the NLSA state-sponsored migration to Mindanao, it was disruptive enough to make the populace more mobile, thus when peace returned many more eyed the frontier lands as their salvation from landlessness and deprivation. While during the Commonwealth period there had been a reluctance to stray far from homes in the Visayas, Ilocos, and other regions, government propaganda and the dissemination by word-of-mouth information from relatives already in Mindanao promoted a rush south as shipping became available. It is estimated that in the twelve year period 1948-1960 Mindanao attracted 1.25 million migrants (Wernstedt and Simkins 1965: 92).

Independence in 1946 ended the interim Commonwealth period and ushered in a new optimism. A factor facilitating this new optimism was the previous success of the Japanese-developed abacá-growing industry in the Davao region. With the confiscation of their assets, and postwar repatriation to Okinawa and the Japanese mainland, their lands were available for further arrivals of Filipino settlers. The Japanese legacy was an encouragement to those who saw no reason not to replicate their success (Abinales 2004: 80-93, 99). As mentioned in the introduction, failure or inability to effect land reforms encouraged state leaders to use the fallback position of encouraging migration to the less developed lands, and especially to Mindanao, which between 1939 and 1948 still had a low population density. More succinctly put:

State leaders saw the chance to offer a discontented Filipino peasantry the opportunity to become owner-cultivators without changing existing tenancy arrangements. Migration to Mindanao was at once expected to accomplish peasant aspirations, dissipate the predilection to rebel, and ease population pressure in other parts of the Philippines (Abinales 2004: 96).

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147 The Japanese numbered 20,000 on the eve of World War 2. They had begun arriving in the Philippines to work on infrastructure projects at the beginning of the American occupation, and gradually drifted south to open up, and control the abacá-growing industry. As word of Japanese success spread beyond Davao, spontaneous Filipino migrants came south to labour on their plantations, and it was these pioneers whose relations followed them once the War was over.
While the NLSA (which managed to resettle about 8,300 families during its tenure) was resurrected at War’s end the government began expanding its settlement horizon with the introduction of mechanization in the resettlement projects. The entity charged with this initiative was the Agricultural Machinery and Equipment Corporation (AMEC). At this time the Rice and Corn Production Administration (RCPA) was, as its title suggests, entrusted to promote and stimulate the nation’s staples of rice and corn, as well as taking over NLSA’s role as the government’s official resettlement agency. In this capacity it settled about 3,000 families, but failed overall in its large-scale farming venture (Postrado 1984: 308-309).

In 1950 in an effort to re-energize resettlement efforts a single agency, the Land Settlement and Development Corporation (LASEDECO) was set up with a view to replacing the moribund existing agencies with a more effective administration able to improve the implementation and coordination of policy. While the flow of spontaneous migrants to Mindanao increased, the government effort was minimal, with a mere 1,530 farming families being resettled (Postrado 1984: 309). Contemporaneously with LASEDECO, but under military auspices, the state formed EDCOR (alluded to above) to address the continuing HUK insurgency. Unable to undermine the insurgency by effecting meaningful agrarian reform, the government opted to win ‘hearts and minds’ by resettling and rehabilitating surrendered rebels on the Mindanao frontier. On a larger scale, Abinales (2004: 122) states that a rat plague in the 1950s destroyed settlement crops and before the government gained control, starvation forced 11,000 families “with despair and disillusionment on their faces” to desert their lands.

In 1954 LASEDECO was replaced by a new entity, the National Rehabilitation and Resettlement Administration (NARRA). In the eight years of its existence it was able to resettle 30,640 families (Postrado 1984: 309). By the time it was replaced by the Land Authority (LA) in 1963 NARRA was administering more than half a million acres in six projects supporting 69,000 individuals in Mindanao alone. Wernstedt and Simkins (1965: 92) postulate that “(i)t is difficult to evaluate the degree to which NARRA and its predecessors stimulated the large postwar population migration to Mindanao.” Less than 10 percent of migrants can be said to have been settlers in state-sponsored projects, yet it cannot be overlooked that government publicity had effects on those determined or able to migrate spontaneously. State expenditure on roads greatly
facilitated settlement options, but it was in the area of health, especially in malaria control, that the greatest impetus to migration occurred. However, the rush to the ‘frontier’ was creating anxiety and hostility among both the already-resident indigenes – whether Muslims or Animist. As a result of ongoing land disputes, the military were increasingly called upon to defend the NARRA and EDCOR settlements. A decade later it was in the state-sponsored colonies that the most intense confrontation occurred between the settler-paramilitaries (supported by the Philippine Army) and the separatist Muslim rebels (Abinales 2004: 123).

A turnabout of resettlement objectives occurred when the LA replaced NARRA in 1963. The allocation of public lands for large scale production of export and domestic commercial crops increased. The previous priority of providing settlement lands for landless farmers and tenants being thus set aside, the LA in the period 1963-1971 only resettled 2,855 families. While President Macapagal (1961-1965) enacted the Republic Act (RA) No. 3844 (Agricultural Land Reform Code) foreshadowing the current organizational structure that deals with land settlement policy, it was President Marcos (1965-1986) who in 1971 gave teeth to the Land Reform Code, and inaugurated the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) an arm of which, the Bureau of Resettlement, continued the government’s resettlement policies. In the early 1980s an area of about 700,000 hectares in 43 resettlement projects supported an estimated 50,000 families (Postrado 1984: 309). These figures not only reflected a state inability to deliver relief to the landless at a fast enough pace, but when observed against the increased need – especially in view of the violence and destruction in Mindanao – objectives fell short of the mark (Uhlig 1984a: 69). Perspective needs to be kept however. Just as in Indonesia and Malaysia, the easiest lands had already been developed, in the case of Mindanao, the ‘frontier’ can be said to have been settled.

Transmigration: Sociocultural Implications

Whatever the objectives – developmental, redistributive, economic, or social – imagined by the instigators of transmigration or resettlement programs, one ramification of their deliberations was the meeting in the resettlement zone of a diverse cohort of ethnic groups, a diversity that encompassed linguistic, religious, cultural, and class difference. I suggest that while political and bureaucratic decision-makers were motivated to act by the above concerns they paid scant

148 At times known as the Ministry of Agrarian Reform (MAR).
attention to the sociocultural implications of their transmigration initiatives. With regard to the autochthonous residents, they imagined that the ‘pacification’ and assimilation of those minorities would ensue by settling the frontier (De Jesus 2001: 451, Paderanga Jr. 1995: 49). With regard to the heterogeneous settler cohort itself, they probably imagined a future coexistence, one in which ethnically diverse groups continued to maintain their ethnocultural particularities whilst living amidst their migrant neighbours – rather in the manner of a multicultural society. The sociocultural product of transmigration has been an inconsistent one, the outcome in large measure dependent upon circumstance. In the Philippines a propensity for transcending ethnocultural particularities has occurred in Narra / Palawan for example, while in Mindanao (and archipelagic resettlement regions such as Kalimantan, Moluccas, Papua, and Sulawesi) ethno-particularities have been reified, resulting in chauvinism and discord (Ananta 2006, 2006a, Gutierrez and Borras Jr. 2004, Tirtosudarmo 2006).

Two strands to the settler-integration dilemma might be discerned. Firstly it might be asked how the settlers themselves accommodate each others’ differences, whether among them there is a propensity for ethnic reification, ambivalence, or the transcending (transculturation) of ethnocultural identities. Secondly, it should be revealed whether (and how) the transmigrant and the indigene have reached a modus vivendi.\(^{149}\) Obviously, this ‘modus’ is complicated by the fact that the migrant is encroaching on the indigene’s former ancestral domain, a domain that has been deemed not sufficiently or effectively occupied. In the Philippine context the cultural boundary of belief structure / religion – be it Animism, Christianity, or Islam – has been touted as a factor influencing indigene-settler coexistence; however, archipelagic examples illustrating the limitations of the religious boundary in isolation abound.\(^{150}\) Complicating the integrative impulse has been the issue of the role played by the state. In state-initiated transmigration projects, even ‘weak states’ continue to exert some power

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\(^{149}\) I use the nomenclature ‘indigene’ and ‘indigenous’ with the full realisation that it is a value-laden term. In some instances it might be replaced by the ‘autochthonous’, but this is also problematic. How ‘native’ is the native? The settlers after all are indigenous to their region-of-origin – or are they? Discourse in the Philippines surrounding the rights of the IP (indigenous person), and relationships to the ancestral domain (AD) are complex. It appears that the lowland Christian is exempt from indigenous-ness and ‘ancestral domain-ness’, while those labels are more liable to apply to the Muslim or Animist, whether he be upland or lowland. Swidden agriculture appears to play a role in defining the indigenousness or otherwise of an individual’s identity. To appreciate the dilemma one needs only reverse the transmigration trajectory, in imagination.

\(^{150}\) Indigene and settler Muslims in Lampung (Sumatra), or indigene and settler Christians in Papua are two salient examples of how other cultural factors, class, or ‘civilisational’ development hamper the integration of the settler, or at least complicate coexistence.
among settler-beneficiaries to control disintegrative social forces. Conversely spontaneous transmigrants have proved less amenable to submit to the dictates of the state.

Transmigration: Planned v. Spontaneous

The Philippines – as did its neighbours Indonesia and Malaysia – faced great fiscal constraints when implementing its resettlement strategies.\textsuperscript{151} Given the increasing costs, which these recently independent states could ill afford, it might be asked why the state involved itself in funding resettlement in the first place, given the later increase in spontaneous migration. If spontaneous migrants were ready to follow in the wake of relatives already settled in a given area why did the state persist in its efforts? One explanation is that spontaneous or self-funded migrants possessed some resources. In contradistinction the state-sponsored migrant was resource poor and thus a beneficiary of affirmative action initiatives. Reacting to the charge that the ill-afforded funds sustaining Indonesia’s \textit{Transmigrasi} initiatives might be better used to fund infrastructure projects Hardjono (1978) argued that the transmigration program was instrumental in getting the ball rolling with regards to population mobility and relocation. It acted as a catalyst for the spontaneity that followed.

State-sponsored land settlement programs in Malaysia and Indonesia not only acted as catalyst for later spontaneous migration, but in terms of percentage of people relocated, essentially dominated the rural-to-rural resettlement demographic. This has not been the case in the Philippines. The stop-start nature of state-sponsored programs such as the NLSA and NARRA (as well as preceding and later programs) meant that Philippine state resettlement numbers never mirrored the percentages achieved in Malaysia and Indonesia. In the Philippines it was the spontaneous settler that was to vastly outnumber the sponsored migrant (Wernstedt and Simkins 1965: 91-93).\textsuperscript{152} Krinks’ 1974 study of land settlement in Mawab Municipality in Mindanao suggests that much of the land ‘settled’ by spontaneous movers was in fact occupied by squatting (p. 7). Whereas state-sponsored resettlement could be carried out in an orderly fashion, with regard for

\textsuperscript{151} At the time Indonesia was ramping up its transmigration program it had the ‘windfall’ of petrodollars to fund the expansion. Malaysia likewise had a strong plantation sector based on rubber and other tropical export crops to help fund its resettlement expansion.

\textsuperscript{152} Wernstedt and Simkins (1965: 91-93) suggest that all the state-sponsored programs combined contributed to at most 10 percent of the population inflow into Mindanao. The twelve-year period 1948-1960 witnessed the greatest net migration into Mindanao: 1,252,000 or some 100,000 per annum. The period 1903-1939 averaged 19,000 per annum and totalled 700,000.
indigene sensibilities, and infrastructure and service demands, spontaneous settlers often had little regard for indigene land-use arrangements. For many, the land appeared not to be cultivated and that meant it was empty and available to be exploited. As migration numbers increased, violence, especially violence over land resources, ensued.

**Indigene-Transmigrant Social Tensions**

Social tensions in the wake of migration is not confined to the Archipelago, but has gained salience as a result of the ethnic violence that has beset several regions of both the Philippines and Indonesia. There is no defined trajectory for the breakdown of community cohesion in resettlement areas, but it is possible to speculate which factors have contributed (or continue to contribute) to difficult coexistences, or worse still to the outbreak of violence and the associated phenomenon of ethnic cleansing. That said, it should be stated that tension may exist without recourse to violence; coexistence in some instances might be predicated on tolerance at best. In some instances – as exemplified by Palawan – where extant resettlement was scant, tension was minimised because the indigene could absent himself from the settlement zone by retreating into the hinterland, where swidden agriculture could continue to be practised (Lopez 1986, Brown 1991). Once the frontier was more densely settled, the withdrawal option disappeared, as was the case in Mindanao.

To illustrate the range of anxieties that contribute to social tension in the settlement zone I shall juxtapose the Philippine experience with that of Indonesia. No one experience fits all criteria but some themes that added to social tension were predicated on the loss of habitat and associated resources, inadequate compensation when it was offered, indigene disdain for the migrant (or vice-versa), a fear of being ‘swamped’, reaction to chauvinism, and so forth.

Social tensions in the principal Philippine resettlement zone, Mindanao, have been due to a litany of grievances: loss of ancestral domain, minoritisation, and discrimination, which have been magnified over the years. Received wisdom suggests that the religio-cultural boundary dividing the Muslim and Animist indigenes from a lowland Christian settler cohort underpins the social tension in the region (Diaz 2003, Eder and McKenna 2004, Liow 2006). Conversely, whilst often portrayed as an internecine Christian-Muslim struggle the Moro insurgency might more realistically be regarded as one in which recourse to religion masks the temporal concerns of the protagonists, or as Roy (1994: 212) asserts, the employment of transcendental symbols to act

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Campado (2005) suggests that the failure of the Commonwealth and subsequent Filipino administrations to protect indigenous land rights greatly contributed to regional tension. The appearance that there was minimal tension during early resettlement efforts may have had less to do with tolerance than it had with a relative abundance of land to be exploited – a socio-economic imperative.

In light of this socio-economic revelation, a note of caution needs to be tendered as regards to what explanation is proffered for any potential ethnocultural division. Following the American Administration’s ‘pacification’ of Mindanao in the first decade of the twentieth century, the U.S. advanced the concept of private property, which led to the commodification of lands that had hitherto been communally managed. For peoples practising swidden agriculture, or abiding by usufruct land tenure, this was an alien concept. The introduction of the concomitant Torrens system of land titling and delineation disadvantaged the indigene. Land grabbing by literate outsiders who availed themselves of Torrens titling legalities saw indigenous land usage usurped.\textsuperscript{154} Exploitation, attempted assimilation, and the driving of some into the jungle contributed to social tension (Crystal 1982: 101, Fianza 2004: 5-6).

Disdain of the Other was a further contributing aspect of interethnic tensions in the resettlement zone. This worked on a number of levels; disdain by the transmigrant for the indigene among whom he had been settled, disdain by the indigene for the settler, and disdain among migrants for each others’ cultures. Transmigrant disdain for the indigene is evidenced in the Palawan contact zone by the marginalisation of the indigene (Lopez 1986, Brown 1991). As they attest, the

\textsuperscript{154} The Torrens system of land titling was the brainchild of Robert Torrens (1814-1884), third governor of South Australia, who recognised the need to establish a register of lands that would preclude constant litigation over ownership. The Torrens system was introduced into the Philippines by the U.S. to replace less defensible systems that had evolved under the Spanish Crown. Iyer and Maurer (2009) from the Harvard Business School make a compelling case for the shortcomings of the land titling regime that the American colonial administration attempted to introduce. The expense of complying with the Torrens titling legalities was estimated at 10 % of the value of the land in question (p. 18). So onerous was the cost that the first two decades of American occupation witnessed an increase in squatting from 2.4 % to 7.5 %. Those most educated, already-landed, and better connected were able to avail themselves of the titling regime. Local irreverence for bureaucratic processes involved in the U.S. colonial developmental drive meant that many Mindanaoans forfeited their lands. The settlers, loggers, the literate and the corporations better understood the legal requirements and contributed to indigene dispossession.
lowland Christian immigrant often had general contempt for the primordial lifeways of the indigenous Pala’wan, for example. In this case the indigene’s swidden agriculture, Animist beliefs, and more equalitarian gender relations were at odds with the wet-rice agriculture, Christianity, and patriarchality of the transmigrant.\textsuperscript{155} Conversely, in some situations disdain for transmigrants was evidenced by their perceived lower social standing in society, given their general recruitment from society’s indigent (Arndt 1983: 64, Tigno 2006: 28).\textsuperscript{156}

There is a further level at which disdain works against intercultural harmony. Intermarriage, as will be demonstrated in the Narra / Palawan model of resettlement, is an important factor contributing to cultural accommodation (transculturation); that is, in breaking down barriers that impede sociocultural accommodation. However, there are instances where intermarriage is voluntarily restricted, thus precluding the potential for cultural exchange. The rural milieu, where everyone is ‘in view’, may be more of an impediment to intercultural relationships than would be the case in an urban setting. In her Riau (Sumatra) land-use study Hardjono (2001) demonstrates the salience of disdain. In her particular resettlement zone only four (4) men from the second generation were married to indigenous women, while one transmigrant woman was married to a local man. While in this instance exogamy was rare it was not premised on any sense of prohibitive injunction.

There is no vast cultural gulf between the Javanese migrants and the resident indigenes in Hardjono’s study. Both indigene and migrant are of the same faith, Islam. A potential issue impacting on indigene-settler relations in Riau might be the outward display of religious practice. The ‘outer island’ Muslim often regards himself as more devout and ‘pure’ than his Javanese fellow-Muslim who is regarded as partly religio-mystic (Tjondronegoro 1988: 43-44). In receiving societies such as the Minangkabau of Sumatra, where religion is more than mere faith but an extension of adat (superseding the individual), the degree of religiosity evidenced in the santri / abangan divide may impact on integration outcomes (Oey 1982: 47-48). However, not all intergroup disengagements are as overt as those between people of different faiths. The case of the Hindu Balinese

\[\textsuperscript{155}\text{ Brown (1991: 171) states: “In general, Palawan [sic] have more equalitarian [sic] relations between women and men than Christian and Muslim Filipinos. They do not perceive the house as the women’s domain and the farm as the man’s domain. Instead, they see the house and fields as one unit that is maintained by all household members.”}\]

\[\textsuperscript{156}\text{ This assertion pertains more to those recruited by state-sponsored programs, which had as their raisons d’être the affirmative action of uplifting the indigent and landless.}\]
transmigrant is clearly one predicated on differences in religion, custom, and culture. Likewise, the three-way disconnect between Animist, lowland Christian, and Muslim in the Philippines is complicated by other cultural markers: language, agricultural practice, and diet for example.

Despite the ostensible national union and unity objective of transmigration initiatives, which imagined a coalescing of diverse ethnocultural groups into an enhanced national identity, too little effort was made to promote integration between newcomers and the already-resident local people. The ideal of an indigene-settler rapprochement and coexistence could not realistically succeed without the implementation of equitable laws.\(^{157}\) Even in instances when ethnically diverse groups were included in a particular project the likelihood of intercultural adaptation was stymied by settling ethnicities apart. The ensuing enclave nature of resettlement allowed each cultural group to maintain its values intact and was a further instance of policy defeating the potential for ethnic dilution and the potential for re-identifications.\(^{158}\)

A further irritant to indigene-settler harmony (in both Philippines and Indonesia) hinged on the perception that the migrant, allocated several hectares of ‘free’ land, a house, and sustenance during a period of establishment, was perceived as economically advantaged.\(^{159}\)

The degree of social tension between migrant and the indigene was sometimes influenced by the magnitude of resettlement initiatives. The bigger the size of the transmigrant settlement, the greater was the propensity for in-group identification and the need not to go outside the settlement, except perhaps to trade in the market or visit nearby towns (Oey and Astika 1978: 135). The formation of ethnic enclaves had the propensity to isolate groups, thwarting both community integration and diminishing spaces for intercultural dialogue. Davis’ (1976) study of the Balinese migration to Sulawesi – alluded to above – candidly illustrates this position. During the period of intermittent migration from Bali, the

\(^{157}\) The inequitable treatment is neatly exemplified by the implementation of various Public Land Acts which allowed Christians larger land-holdings than Muslims. For example, Public Land Act 926 / 2874 limited Muslim land-holdings to 10 hectares at a time Christians could avail themselves of 24 hectares. Commonwealth Act 41 (1936) reduced this to 4 hectares for Muslims and Lumads, although Christians were entitled to claim 16 (Rodil 2004: 33).

\(^{158}\) A recent visit to a transmigrant settlement area in Baturaja (South Sumatra) allowed an insight into the continued enclave nature of settlement projects. While indigenous settlers – at the appropriate percentage – have been included in projects, each ethnicity lives among their own.

\(^{159}\) Given that a major aim of the resettlement phenomenon was that of social uplift and the concomitant stymieing of sociopolitical unrest, by not addressing the needs of the indigene, the state in effect was contributing to social unrest on the settlement frontier. The indigene was often just as indigent as the transmigrant who came into its orbit via social uplift programs.
small numbers involved were more amenable to interact socially, intermarry, and indeed be flexible in many aspects of their cultural practice. This attitude altered when Balinese transmigration was ramped up and enclavism ensued. Within an enlarged co-ethnic cohort individuals had the choice to re-identify with their region-of-origin.

A factor contributing to integrative difficulties was the inconsistency in indigene-migrant attitudes, which could be calibrated, depending on whether the migrants were spontaneous or state-funded migrants. The general position was that spontaneous migrants were more amenable to integrate to local conditions – in certain circumstances.\textsuperscript{160} Often self-funded, better educated and more highly motivated, they were less averse to learning local languages and living in a dispersed manner, which appeared less threatening to the local populace. Arndt (1988: 60) – speaking for the Indonesian resettlement model – envisioned future sociopolitical problems, because transmigration in the minds of local people was perceived as a ‘Javanization’ tool.\textsuperscript{161} In the Philippines, given the overwhelming preponderance of spontaneous migrants vis-à-vis the state-funded, the spontaneous-assisted settler dichotomy is somewhat moot. Whatever their disposition, it is evident by the example of the Mindanao imbroglio that the lowland Christian settler is no more amenable to compromise his cultural particularities than is his Lumad or Muslim indigene counterpart. It is this example of intercultural disharmony that I now address.

**Transmigration: Implications for National Unity**

In theory, transmigration has the capacity to bring together a heterogeneity of groups, who – once exposed to each other’s cultures – might overcome chauvinisms, anxieties and ambivalences to become functioning citizens of the polyethnic nation-state. In fact the architects of state-sponsored resettlement in nascent postcolonial nation-states factored in the possibilities for manipulating the sociocultural division of their societies. They imagined transmigration as a facilitator for exposing diverse cultural groups to each other, if not necessarily to merge these cultures (transculturation), then at least to stimulate social interaction

\textsuperscript{160} The spontaneous migrant, often with minimal state support, was thrown onto his own resources, and as such needed to develop *modi vivendi* with those among whom he had come to settle. Again no hard and fast rule can explain differing integrative successes, which were dependent on a range of factors: the degree of cultural difference, the rate of intermarriage, economic considerations (especially pressure on the available land resource) and suchlike.

\textsuperscript{161} Unfortunately, as it transpired, subsequent Dayak-Madurese violence in Kalimantan and elsewhere has vindicated Arndt’s predictions (Tanasaldy 2012, Tomsa 2009).
with the view to minimising overt ethnocultural differences and further the inculcation of new national identities. Central to this reasoning was the realisation that polyethnic postcolonial polities were premised on shaky imaginings. Their diversity mirrored the imperial reach of relinquishing colonial regimes, and withdrawal of those regimes opened up the spectre of diversity degenerating into disunity. The governing elite in each of the newly-independent archipelagic nation-states, inheriting a heterogeneity of languages, religions, ethnicities, cultures and classes, was anxious to minimise regionalism, insurrection and sectional identity.

Thus evolved the political environment in which the central tenet of national union and unity came to be a significant factor in deliberations involving archipelagic transmigration and land settlement policies. This was part of the rationale for the Philippines and its archipelagic neighbours to implement significant population relocations. Two of the seven stated policy goals of Indonesia’s Presidential Transmigration Law of 1972 – national union and unity, and the strengthening of national defence and security – illustrate state concerns (Tirtosudarmo 2001: 214). Part of this logic hinged on the minimising of difference rather than the celebrating of diversity.162 “…the first generation of Indonesian leaders moved toward a more transetnic nationalism – Indonesian civic nationalism…” adds Tirtosudarmo (2005: 16), one in which ethnic differences might be diluted.

The ‘assimilation’ and ‘pacification’ of minorities as a broader social objective has possibly been one of the most significant failures of Philippine land settlement policy. For the first four decades, as the resettlement of incoming Christian migrants increased, Mindanao was made more governable by the American colonizers initially, and early Philippine governments subsequently. As the frontier areas filled up, indigene-settler relations began to deteriorate. Logging roads into the hinterlands built in the 1950s and 1960s exacerbated the situation as they increased the flow of migrants to more remote areas. Indigenous land tenure arrangements (slash-and-burn) vied with settled farmsteads; indigenous Animist and Islam swidden agriculturalists competed with sedentary Christians (Paderanga

162 The founding fathers of the Indonesian Republic – well aware of the potential for national disintegration – devised that the national motto of the nascent Republic be ‘Unity in Diversity’ (Bhinneka Tunggal Ika). Article 36A of the Indonesian Constitution reflects the gravity of the deliberations. While these Javanese words hail from a poem promoting tolerance between fourteenth century Hindus and Buddhists, they continue to resonate in a post-transmigration era which has witnessed indigene-migrant intolerance.
More remote communities, such as the Bagobo and Ata in Davao Province for example, found themselves increasingly marginalised by settlers, squatters, corporations and timber operations. Their reaction was recourse to ‘outlaw’ retaliation, but without a unified response they were soon crushed (Abinales 2004: 96-101).

Far from effecting national unity aspirations, Philippine resettlement regions such as Mindanao have challenged the centrist notion that the minimising of overt ethnocultural particularities is possible. For complex sociocultural, economic and ethnic reasons, indigene and migrant have been unable to establish *modi vivendi*. The Philippines is not alone in witnessing the mayhem of post-transmigration violence; several regions of Indonesia (Kalimantan, the Moluccas, Papua, Sulawesi, and Timor) have experienced upheavals in which the reification of ethnic or communal identities has led to violence and the displacement of at times more than a million IDPs (Hugo 2002). An indigene-transmigrant disconnect couched in religious terms – but more realistically viewed in economic, ethnic and social terms – is also occurring in Southern Thailand, a resettlement zone in which the ethnic Malay (in this case also Muslim) majority regions of the Thai nation-state face an in-migration of northerners.163

Tirtosudarmo (2006), addressing the issue of migration and the potential for conflict in ‘communities of [resettlement] colonies’, acknowledges the role that both ethnicity and transmigration and non-cultural factors such as economic well-being play in the process of nation formation and state-building. “The process of nation-building in many postcolonial states in Asia is therefore always related to the problem of maintaining sustainable development in multiethnic societies” (p. 15). Accenting the relevance of the Mindanao conflict to the process of nation-building, he makes the case that “the ethnic-based conflicts that have broken out in the Asian region are minority group responses to the imposing centralistic and hegemonic policies from the major ethnic groups” (p. 15). In this context the Narra / Palawan resettlement zone is out of synch; its multiethnic

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163 The recent increase in insurgent violence in the three southern Thailand provinces: Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat – in which Malays have formed an 80 % majority – underscores the inconclusivity of the postcolonial condition (Brown 1988). In 1910 the Siamese government – in an effort to dilute Malay identity and Malay resistance – attempted to educate Pattani Malays in Thai. When the military regime of Marshal Phibul Songkhram (1938) naively attempted to assimilate Malays into the Thai nation-state, opposition to Thai authority increased; and this has been exacerbated by the resettlement of non-Malays in the south (Harish 2006).
settler cohort did not support a dominant or majority group. While group size matters in some circumstances, Tirtosudarmo (2006: 16) suggests it is the process of nation-building and modernisation that pits ethnic groups against each other as they “begin competing in larger economic and political systems in which, at any given point in time, groups differ in their numbers and their control of resources.” In the context of power relations and the new politics of identity it is ethnicity that comes to play a central role in the struggle for scarce resources. In these altered political circumstances:

people are forced into new social relationships and the logical place to begin to look for such relationships is to identify oneself as a member of a larger something based on those attributes that one carries around with oneself, namely one’s language, historical place, race, and religion. Ethnicity, in the broader sense, becomes a very important cultural marker that is played out within the context of power relations and the new politics of identity (p. 16).

The Philippine state was well aware that the ethnoreligious divide had the potential to be destabilising for the nation-state project. The Lumad population was too dispersed and culturally diverse to pose a challenge to the state, but the ethnic groups – for whom Islam was a Barthian boundary – could transcend their ethnic particularities and act collectively to defy the state; a position that ethnic groups acting individually may not have attempted. As land dispossession increased in the postwar period with the increase of transmigrant arrivals, a perceived intensification of Muslim ‘banditry’ prompted the state to investigate the causes of unrest (Eder and McKenna 2004: 70-71). Rather than acknowledge that economic grievances – influenced by rapid in-migration – were central to local disaffection for the state, the congressional report blamed Muslim culture for Muslim poverty. The Congress of the Philippines, House of Representatives (1955) went on to state: “In their ignorance and in their trend toward religious fanaticism, the Muslims are sadly wanting in the advantages of normal health and social factors and functions” (Glang cited Eder and McKenna 2004: 71).

Transmigration assumed an unforeseen disintegrative role in the Philippine nation-building process. The resettlement of culturally diverse groups failed in its

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164 I am cognisant of the fact that while a dominant / minority model of resettlement failed to materialise among the various Narran transmigrant ethnic groups, the potential minority, that of the indigene failed to challenge the altered realities of resettlement. Unlike their indigenous confrères in Mindanao, they either merged into the new community or retreated into less settled zones. This was possible as population density was relatively low in the Narra Municipality. As transmigration to Palawan continues, and the pressure for land increases, the future of indigene-migrant harmony might yet be tested, as it has been in other municipalities (Lopez 1986, Brown 1991).
‘pacification and integration of minorities’ role primarily because the two groups (Christian and Muslim) failed to engage as equals. The culture of the numerically dominant group (lowland Christian) came to dominate the imagined national consciousness, and it was in this climate that the ‘social development’ of the Muslim was mooted. As a consequence of the Special Committee’s deliberations, a Commission of National Integration (CNI) instituted a scholarship program that was hoped would ‘modernise’ the Muslim.\textsuperscript{165} Eder and McKenna (2004: 71) suggest that many of the more than 8,000 Muslim CNI students – during their Manila educational sojourn – experienced a politicisation that made them more aware of their marginal situation, thereby further radicalising them. The Christian cultural hegemony they observed made them cognisant of the fact that the same Christian-dominated state that provided their scholarships continued to marginalise them. Far from having an integrative effect, the CNI scholarship unintentionally created a politicised cadre that in 1971 led to the formation of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF).\textsuperscript{166}

An instructive addendum is in order. Simons (1997) contends that citizens have little or no faith in a state that cannot guarantee people’s social and economic security. It could be argued that the Philippine state is such an entity. In such milieux, identifying with those one can trust – kin, community, faith – provides a security frame of reference of sorts. Where the state fails society, the potential for particularist interpretations of societal reality can be problematic. This is applicable to Mindanao on several levels. Tribulation in Mindanao encompasses more than the indigene-settler divide. Santos (cited Tigno 2006: 25) suggests that a distinction needs to be made between the Moro (or Bangsamoro) problem and the Mindanao problem in general. What proportion of the conflict should be viewed in terms of intercultural discord, and what proportion should be viewed with reference to Simons’ ‘weak state’ scenario is unclear. In this context Tigno (2006: 25) observes that the Mindanao conflict has exceeded the bounds of a cultural or communal conflict in which faith is central:

\textsuperscript{165} Eder and McKenna (2004: 71) declare: “As the principal policy instrument to effect integration, the postcolonial Philippine government continued the practice first established during the American period of ‘developing’ Philippine Muslims not by providing them the material resources of the West, but by endeavouring to remove by the selective provision of university educations the perceived cultural disabilities that were thought to be impeding their advancement, and, indirectly that of the Philippine nation.”

\textsuperscript{166} The MNLF began its armed separatist insurgency following several religiously-perceived flashpoints and President Marcos’s declaration of martial law in 1972.
At present the principal armed groups involve the Philippine Government or more specifically the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and its adjunct, the Philippine National Police (PNP) on the one side, and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), and its splinter groups, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) on the other…

Given the diversity of protagonists that Tigno has outlined, and the multiplicity of their aspirations, it would seem that it will be some time before conflict-fatigue, and a rationalisation of the aspirations will coincide. In the interim the national unity implications of transmigration will need to be reappraised. It is unlikely that the course of history will be undone and that the migrants will return to whence they came. The accident of history determining one group of Austronesians adopting Islam, while another Christianity, also can’t be undone; as cannot other ramifications of the colonial era. What can however be demonstrated – in light of the Narra / Palawan model of resettlement – is that transmigration can be a positive facilitator of national unity aspirations.

**Summary**

The Philippines expected much from its land settlement policies and programs. The objectives outlined above have been partially achieved. For example, a more balanced population distribution, which in turn had implications for regional development, has taken place. It cannot be argued that these achievements would not have occurred in the absence of transmigration, although I suggest that state-sponsored and concomitant spontaneous migrations expedited the process. The utilization of human and natural resources (in this case land) have not met expectations, given that much underemployment continues to exist alongside low productivity in the rural sector vis-à-vis that of other Asian rural economies. The reasons for this state of affairs are complex but central to low productivity must be the systemic failure to alter conservative land tenure patterns and its consequent disincentives. The disparity between the wealthy and the 12.7 million (15 percent)

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167 Tigno (2006: 25) appends: “In addition to the MNLF, MILF, and ASG, there are also a number of other independent break-away groups and factions operating independently of (but sometimes in coordination with) the major combatant groups… Moreover, the communist New People’s Army (NPA) has always been active in… northern and western parts of Mindanao… Aside from the Moro-based groups, there are also Lumad-based as well as Christian-based groupings that have received military equipment and training from the AFP. These are also known as the ‘lost commands’.”

168 Thus, the MPM islands (Mindanao, Palawan, Mindoro) constituting approximately 40 % of the Philippines in area now support 27 % of the total population, whereas in 1903 that figure was approximately 8.9 %. Some perspective needs to be kept. At the same time as there has been a redistribution of population, the total population of the Philippines has increased, creating a situation where, despite emigration from densely populated zones, the population of those zones have nevertheless increased. Cebu is a case in point (Table 4.1).
of Filipinos unable to meet a minimum daily requirement of 1,750 calories (EBYB 2012: 699) indicates that improvements in living standards and equitably distributed development have not resulted from the millions of extra hectares put into production by resettlement programs.\footnote{Again perspective is required. Increased educational attainments, health outcomes, and consumption is proceeding apace, but compared with some neighbours, lags behind. The extent of the OFW cohort, and its necessity for existing Filipino standards of living, is again testament to the fact that transmigration has not fulfilled the role expected of it.}

The continued Bangsamoro insurgency, as well as sporadic socio-economic unrest, is testament to the conclusion that national union and unity has not been achieved by transmigratory policies; in fact it could be argued that far from strengthening the cohesion of the imagined Filipino state, rampant resettlement in zones such as Mindanao has contributed to security concerns and put the defence of the Republic under severe strain. The reasons for the insurgency are complex: the historical disconnect of much of Mindanao from the Spanish-American body politic, the economic marginalisation of the indigene vis-à-vis the migrants, the minoritisation of the indigene and concomitant perception of cultural assailment, and the struggle to feel part of a nation-state that views itself through the prism of the majority, i.e. the lowland Christian.

Unlike the Dutch and British, who for the most part minimized their interference in indigenous land tenure arrangements, the legacy of the Spanish \textit{latifundium} system of land tenure, in which many Filipinos were prevented from owning the land they tilled, continues to resonate in modern times. As mentioned above, land reform to ameliorate the inequities of land concentration has been on the political agenda since the time of the struggle for independence from Spain and the United States. However in a society where political power rests in the hands of landowner-legislators, change has been difficult to implement.

To undermine the agrarian unrest it was determined to make ‘public lands’ in less densely settled areas such as Mindanao, Palawan and parts of Luzon available for settlement. In theory this logic of resettlement had the potential of undermining resistance, but as has been shown, resettlement did not happen in a vacuum. An increasing population and a finite ‘public land’ resource determined that the logic was flawed, even though it may have had temporary ameliorative effects. The logic was further complicated where opinions differed on what constituted ‘public lands’. The swidden agriculturalists and usufruct land users of
the south saw nothing ‘public’ about the lands they deemed their patrimony or 
*pusaka* (heirloom) (Abreu 2008: 60-61).

When attempting to analyse the success or otherwise of Philippine land settlement programs and policies we cannot ignore the impact of rapid Filipino demographic change. When tentative resettlement programs were attempted at the beginning of the U.S. occupation, the colony’s population was less than 10 million. Had the population not increased from the time Philippine land settlement programs were first mooted it is possible that the programs would have delivered more. The outbreak of the Bangsamoro insurgency at the beginning of the 1970s might be gauged as the point when the empty ‘frontier’ lands had been settled, a time when the Philippine population was approximately 35 million. In a decade hence (2020) the Philippines will be expected to support 110 million or three times the population of 50 years ago. In the absence of meaningful industrialization, emigration, or birth control, it is difficult to see how current (DAR) land settlement policy and programs will have any appreciable impact on the objectives outlined above.

In summation, and before proceeding to an analysis of Palawan as transmigrant destination, I suggest that the cultural complexity of the Philippines – with its 171 living languages, panoply of cultural practice and traditions, and ethnocultural identifications – is in itself no impediment in forging a successful nation-state. This presupposes that the nation-state is a relevant and worthy goal. The alternative is a process of acculturation and eventual assimilation into a dominant culture *à la* Australia, France, and the United States, the maintenance of a multicultural state *à la* Belgium, Canada and Switzerland, or a process whereby diverse others un-reify their cultural particularities, adapt and adopt each other’s cultural practices (transculturation) to create a new composite identity, a progression in which the sense of loss is outweighed by a sense of gain. The Narra / Palawan study, I suggest, reveals that the latter trajectory is possible.

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170 Both Indonesia with 130 persons per km² and Malaysia with 80 per km² have national population densities far below that of the Philippine’s 300 per km². Given the Philippines’ higher birth rate, population pressure and concomitant land: man ratios will continue to impact more heavily on the Philippines than on its archipelagic neighbours.

171 While I have previously touted Australia, France, and the United States as multicultural polities, a rider is in order. Although these states have outwardly embraced the notion of multiculturalism (and in some cases enacted legislation to facilitate the coexistence of various cultures), the degree of permissible cultural equivalence is debateable. It might be more appropriate to discern these states as polyethnic, that is, environments in which many ethnicities reside, but in which there is an expectation that the cultural particularities of those ethnic groups continuing to arrive as immigrants will be subsumed into the dominant resident culture.
MAP 5 – PALAWAN PROVINCE / ISLAND: SHOWING MUNICIPALITIES

Source: Google Image / <http://alturl.com/xvva2>
MAP 6 – MUNICIPALITY OF NARRA: SHOWING BARANGAYS

Source: MPDO
CHAPTER V – CASE STUDY: NARRA / PALAWAN

This chapter introduces Narra / Palawan as a Philippines zone of resettlement.\(^{172}\) (I conflate the Municipality of Narra and the Province of Palawan to suggest that both are characteristic zones of resettlement). It addresses why the Narra Municipality was chosen as representative of both the transmigrant experience, and the concomitant sociocultural ramifications of the coming together of a heterogeneous settler cohort. To anchor the analysis of the transculturation that has taken place in this resettlement milieu, the chapter begins with an outline of the history of the resettlement project, the ethnic diversity of its settlers, and the reasons for their arrival. While Narra continues to be a magnet for spontaneous migrants from across the Philippine Archipelago, the historical antecedent of Narra as a state-sponsored resettlement project continues to influence contemporary perspectives of the community. Prior to locating the salience of Narra as illustrative of a successful model of resettlement, an outline of why and how the Island / Province of Palawan fits into the resettlement milieu will be given. The chapter concludes with a reflection on aspects of the methodology, including a critique of the Philippine-unique approach in defining identity in a broad-based sense (‘lowland Christian’ for example) and (ethnic) identity more particularly.\(^{173}\)

Palawan has been a relative latecomer to the Philippine transmigration phenomenon. In the first half of the twentieth century, during both the U.S. Insular Government and the Filipino Commonwealth administrations, Mindanao was the focus of state-sponsored and spontaneous resettlement initiatives. Mindanao might thus appear a more logical locale for a study investigating the transculturation phenomenon and its progenitor, the transmigration experience. However, the seeming inability of the indigene and transmigrant in Mindanao to find a *modus vivendi* suggested that this ‘contact zone’ has not proven to be a

\(^{172}\) Narra / Palawan (Municipality and Province) should not be confused with the resettlement authority NARRA (National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration) which had a presence in Palawan as well as the Philippines at large. Likewise, the Narra central to this thesis, should not be confused with Narra (*Pterocarpus indicus*) the Philippine national tree. Once the thesis stabilises, there will appear instances where Narra replaces Narra / Palawan, unless both Municipality and Province are being alluded to. Clarity will be dictated by context.

\(^{173}\) Identity ascription and self-ascription in the Philippines is complicated in several ways: (1) by the diversity of ethnolinguistic heritages, (2) by recourse to sweeping ethnocultural generalisations such as Animist, ‘lowland Christian’, or Muslim, (3) in regional loyalties occasioned by the archipelagic nature of the state, and (4) by the rapid increase in internal migration (transmigration) during the twentieth century.
successful model of intercultural coexistence. Concomitantly, due to ongoing security concerns, undertaking fieldwork in Mindanao for this thesis would have been both imprudent and impractical. Other regions of the Philippines (Mindoro, Negros Occidental, and the Cagayan Valley in Luzon) might have proved suitable alternative research sites, but the fortuitous choice of the Province of Palawan in general and the Municipality of Narra in particular, as both successful models of integration and continuing transmigrant destinations respectively, has proved to be justified.

Not only has the Narra model of resettlement shown the capacity for diverse ethnolinguistic groups to divine a *modus vivendi* for heterogeneous societies, but I suggest that it has also demonstrated that transculturation (mutual cultural exchange) has been a facilitator of integrational harmony, and has therefore played a central role in the success of Narra as a resettlement zone. In the absence of a blueprint for resettlement best-practice, it appears that a confluence of factors, including the non-dominance of any one ethnocultural group, intermarriage, education, the modernity project, and socio-economic security, has contributed to this success. When measured against the tribulation that has ensued in some Mindanao resettlement regions, the question that needs to be asked is why a heterogeneous transmigrant cohort in Palawan has managed to yield to transculturative effects, while this has proved less likely in Mindanao, and in analogous transmigration initiatives across the Malay Archipelago.

Transmigrants to Palawan have come from across the Philippines, from the Batanes Islands in the north to / and including settlers from Mindanao in the south. However, the vast majority of incomers have constituted ‘lowland Christian’ migrants from the more densely settled regions of Luzon and the Visayas. Their arrival is partly attributable to the perception that Palawan was an empty, undeveloped land. When measured against the demographic reality of disparities between sparsely and densely populated regions the Province did fall into the sparsely populated category. Viewed through the prism of the national

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174 While indigene-settler relations may have deteriorated in the decades following the ‘filling-up’ of the Mindanao ‘frontier’, this in no way suggests that sociocultural transformations have not occurred within transmigrant communities, or likewise within the indigenous communities, and to some extent between indigene and settler, but cognisance needs to be taken of the added difficulties inherent in any transculturative interactions in a zone of instability, where reification of extant ethnocultural certainties would be more likely.

175 The Batanes, lying mid-way between Luzon and Taiwan, constitute a province of the same name. Ironically, as the least densely populated province in the Republic, Batanes continues to be an out-migration region; some of its migrants have found their way to Narra Municipality – in the second least densely populated province – Palawan.
consciousness, this perceived emptiness and isolation caused Palawan to be given the epithet ‘the last frontier’ or ‘land of promise’ (Veloro 1996: 17). However, Ocampo (1996: 24) suggests a caveat needs to be inserted in relation to the Palawan-as-frontier image. “Frontier it was for the Spaniard, American, and Filipinos from other provinces, but it was home for a conger of local peoples (Batak-Tagbanua-Palawan-Cuyonon-Agutaynen-Cagayanen)…” Whichever the epithet proffered, the implication conjured up a land of plenty – in essence plenty of land – whose exploitation would help address the problems of landlessness faced in regions of the Philippines more densely populated.

**Palawan: ‘The Last Frontier’ and ‘Land of Promise’**

*Overview*

Located on the periphery of the ‘Spanish Philippines’, and beset for centuries by non-colonised people whom (because of their Muslim faith) the Spaniards collectively called Moros, Palawan has historically supported a relatively small population. This consciousness of Palawan as peripheral to the Philippine body politic continued into the American colonial period (1898-1946). Because of its relative isolation and small population the Province was chosen to house two institutions: the Culion Leper Colony (opened 1906) and the Iwahig Penal Colony (opened 1904), both of which reinforced the perception of the remoteness of the Province.\(^{176}\) A combination of factors – the island’s isolation, an ongoing traditional fear of southern Muslims by Hispanicised northerners, the depredations of tropical diseases such as malaria, and the machinations of political actors in Manila – coalesced to contribute to Palawan’s circumvention as a transmigration locale, in favour of Mindanao and the less densely populated areas of Luzon, such as the Cagayan Valley.

However, the improved health outcomes effected during the American colonial period, coalescing with a continuing high birth rate, contributed to a rapid increase in the Philippine population. The corollary of this was increased pressure on available agricultural resources, a factor that had socio-economic ramifications.

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\(^{176}\) The Culion Leper Colony – located in the Calamianes Island Group in the north of the Province – at its height supported almost 7,000 lepers as well as scientific, administrative, and nursing staffs. The implementation of the ‘Segregation Law on Leprosy’ meant that during the American colonial period the catchment zone comprised the entire Philippines. As such Culion became as heterogeneous as the Province at large. While Palawan had been designated a place of exile during the Spanish period, the American administration formalised the process by establishing the Iwahig Prison and Penal Farm (1904). Located west of the capital Puerto Princesa it supported / supports – like Culion did – a heterogeneous population, many of whom have exchanged their convict status for that of colonist. Refer Evangelista et al. (2005).
Decreasing land: man ratios reinforced the perennial agrarian issues of tenancy, landlessness, and accompanying insurgency. At the same time as these remained unresolved, an ongoing Filipino imagining that the further exploitation of ‘public lands’ would act as a palliative in addressing population-induced concerns demanded the location and alienation of new and relatively empty lands. The initial ameliorative impact of increased transmigration to Mindanao was negated by the continuing population increase and the ‘filling-up’ of that frontier, thus it was that the exploitation of Palawan gained momentum. Although a trickle of spontaneous migration to Palawan began in the interwar years, it was the inauguration of the state-sponsored resettlement program centred on the Panacan-Aborlan area of central Palawan (post the Asia-Pacific War) that provided the impetus for further spontaneous migration.

Increased migration notwithstanding, Palawan’s current population density is still one of the lowest in the nation. This conceals the fact that the Province’s population increased rapidly in the years following Philippine Independence in 1946 (Table 5.1), and especially so since Mindanao was deemed settled by the 1960s. From an admittedly small base, the data demonstrates that Palawan’s population increase has outstripped most other regions of the Republic, much of this attributable to in-migration.

**Geography**

Palawan represents both a province of the Philippines and the largest island of the approximately 1800 islands that constitute that Province. As a province, Palawan ranks as the largest in the country, while Palawan Island is the fifth largest in the Republic, encompassing 12,189 km².\(^\text{177}\) It is not the size of the Island / Province however, but rather its peripherality to other regions of the Philippines that has contributed to its relatively recent exploitation for resettlement. Lying athwart the South China and Sulu Sea littoral, it is far removed from the Philippines’ more populated regions to the north-east, east, and south-east. A cursory perusal of the map (Map 5) reveals that the northernmost region of the Province, the Calamianes

\(^\text{177}\) Statistical data on Palawan is imprecise. The Province of Palawan website states the Province’s area as 17,896 km², while the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) website states it as 17,453 km². Further confusion is generated by the inclusion or exclusion of data pertaining to Puerto Princesa City (PPC), which is at once the capital of the Province of Palawan, and one of 38 independent cities of the Philippines, and as such governed independently from the Province which surrounds it. Statistics are further complicated by the fact that PPC encompasses some 2,381 km² (2540 according to PPC website). That is, most of the ‘statistical city’ is in reality rural. Viewed in this context, PPC represents approximately one-fifth of Palawan Island’s area or one-seventh of the Province’s.
Group, lies less than 300km from Manila, while Balabac Island in the south, separated from Sabah by the Balabac Strait, is 900km distant from the capital. Isolation from historic administrative centres and centuries of geopolitical stalemate in the struggle between the Spanish-dominated (essentially Christian-dominated) settlements in the north and the non-colonised (essentially Muslim-dominated) regions to the south has defined Palawan as a ‘frontier region’.

While Palawan Province’s ancillary island groups, located closer to Manila (such as the Cuyo and the Calamianes) came under the orbit and protection of Spain and were Hispanicised, much of Palawan Island itself continued to be under the influence of the Muslim Sultanates to the south and south-east. The Sultanates / Spanish struggle for regional supremacy contributed to a mythology that viewed Palawan as remote and dangerous, a perception that was undermined only when the Pax Americana created the conditions for the Province to be deemed ‘safe’ in the early years of the twentieth century. Only after this had transpired could the peripheral – though more economically developed and crowded – islands (especially the Cuyos) play a pioneering role in the populating of Palawan Island (also referred to as the Mainland). It was pioneering Cuyonons who demonstrated the agricultural potential of the south and heralded the ramping up of the ‘transmigration age’.

Citing the 1939 census Eder and Fernandez (1996: 10-11) illustrate the limited economic role that the Mainland played vis-à-vis insular Palawan prior to the Asia-Pacific War. The peripheral island municipalities, encompassing 18 % of the Province’s area, supported 52 % of its population while the Mainland municipalities encompassing 82 % of the Province’s area supported 48% of the provincial population. This demographic imbalance helped indicate the potential for an enhanced exploitation of the south, a factor not lost on state planners and politicians charged with managing the ramifications of a rapidly growing population. The imbalance was a catalyst for postwar immigration, and the changed economic focus became apparent by the decennial 1980-1990, which showed an annual rate of population increase for the Mainland of 4.27 %, at a

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178 Lopez (1986: 22) suggests that the “collapse of Muslim domination in Palawan was completed in the first decade of the American colonial occupation.” American policy aimed to undermine long-standing sociocultural practices such as piracy, feuding, and debt-bondage; although the Spanish had initiated the loosening of the Sultanate’s hegemony over parts of Palawan with their destruction of Jolo and Balangingi between 1846-1852. A corollary of American power was the evacuation of Muslims from some coastal regions of southern Palawan to new domiciles such as Bonobono (present day Bataraza).
time when the island municipalities increased 2.26 % (1996: 10-11). While natural increase (as a consequence of improved health initiatives) played a role in this growth, to a great extent the population increase resulted from transmigratory trends. Before addressing the social and cultural ramifications of this migration to Palawan in general, and the study area of Narra Municipality in particular, I provide here an overview of the physical setting.179

Palawan Island, 425 kilometres in length, runs in a north-easterly direction from the Malaysian province of Sabah in Borneo toward Manila in Luzon from which it is shielded by several lesser island groups and the island of Mindoro. A long thin island, Palawan’s widest point does not exceed 40 kilometres. Rugged mountain chains, with peaks such as Mt Matalingahan (2,086 metres) and Victoria Peak (1709 metres), divide watersheds that terminate in the South China Sea to the west and the Sulu Sea to the east. A geologically stable zone, without volcanoes and earthquakes, Palawan has more in common with the Malay Archipelago region of Sunda than with other regions of the Philippines. Its fauna and flora mimic those of the Sundaic region (Eder and Fernandez 1996: 3-4). Where they are found, the coastal plains are conducive to wet-rice agricultural development and have become the focus for resettlement and exploitation. The Municipality of Narra is constituted on one such coastal plain.

Pre-history / History

Although Palawan might appear to have been peripheral to the more settled states in the Southeast Asian region, it was in no sense cut off from any sociocultural connection with the wider world. In the period 1962-66 Robert Fox and colleagues from the Philippine National Museum excavated the Tabon Caves in the vicinity of Quezon in southern Palawan, revealing a pre-Austronesian ethno-historical past for Palawan (and the region). Pushing man’s occupation back to 50,000 years BP to the Upper Pleistocene, in Ocampo’s opinion (1996: 24), puts the concept of ‘frontier’ in perspective and, as he suggests, constitutes one aspect of the ‘Southeast Asian Cradle’.180 Discovery of twelfth to fourteenth century Sung and Yuan Dynasty porcelain indicates connections with insular and

179 Palawan hereafter will be used to define both Palawan Island and Province – context will make it clear which is being referred to.
180 By this he proposes that the discovery of the Tabon Caves revealed a link between Palawan and the region. Rather than being considered as peripherally situated to the rest of Southeast / East Asia, when viewed as a long land-bridge or corridor dividing the Sulu and South China Seas, Palawan could be regarded as integral to the movements of early man across the region, and thus central to an understanding of the pre-Austronesian insular Southeast Asia.
mainland Asia before the time of European expansion into the region. It also indicates that rather than being peripheral to any particular regime, pre-colonial Palawan was part of the general trade and migration routes – a factor facilitating intercultural exchange. Nevertheless, to the first Europeans, the region appeared remote from the centres of commerce and power, and it is in this context that the Venetian scholar Antonio Pigafetta (Magellan’s chronicler, and one of the few survivors to return to Spain in 1522) is credited as labelling Palawan with the epithet ‘land of promise’ (Veloro 1996: 16).\textsuperscript{181}

While Spanish colonisation – in the geographical space that was to be considered the Philippines – began in earnest after 1565, much of Palawan remained outside of their jurisdiction. In the face of constant raids during the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries by seafarers owing allegiance to the Sulu and Brunei Sultanates, it was all Spain could do to hold onto the ‘Christianised’ northern Cuyo and Calamianes island groups. The zeal with which the Spaniards resisted the northward expansion of Sulu and Brunei was, as Ocampo (1996: 26) suggests, galvanised by a recall to the Reconquista.\textsuperscript{182} These exertions for political control of Palawan had the effect of keeping the population in a state of unresolved lethargy. Construction, destruction, slaving, and removal from harm’s way created in Palawan the conditions for a notion of tripartite division, or as noted by the Italian Careri in 1696 (cited Ocampo 1996: 28) “…Paragua [alternate name for Palawan] is divided between Borneo [read Brunei] and Spain but that in the interior there lived wild Indios recognizing no authority.”

In the late imperial era, Spain, fearing a repetition of the loss of its South American colonies, aimed to counter rival colonial powers by extending its influence toward the south, leading to the establishment of politico-military bases

\textsuperscript{181} Blair and Robertson (cited Veloro 1996: 16) state that Pigafetta (1519-1522) made the following journal entry “… we found a large island, where rice, ginger, swine, goats, fowls, figs, one-half braza long and as thick as the arm / i.e., bananas / (they are excellent; and certain others are one palmo and less in length, and are much better than all the others), coconuts, camotes / balate / sugar-cane, and roots resembling turnips in taste, are found… We called that land the land of promise, because we suffered great hunger before we found it… / It is called / Pulaosan.”

\textsuperscript{182} Ocampo (1996: 26-27) makes the case that Palawan was integral to an expanding sociocultural hegemony which he calls ‘Malayos Mohometanos’. Had it not been for the increasing Spanish intervention in the region during the seventeenth century, he suggests, it is likely that Manila and Luzon would have become increasingly Muslim. As it transpired trade and raids emanating from the Borneo and Sulu Sultanates had significant cultural impacts on the lifeways of those indigens accessible to their reach – the absence of direct rule notwithstanding. “A glimpse of Tagbanua, Pala’wan and Molbog society and culture reveals Muslim dominance and influence in material culture and social organization…” (p. 26). Notwithstanding the dominance of the trade / raid ethnic groups (such as the Tausug and Jama Mapun among others) hailing from the south, intermarriage played a role in cementing relations of some Palawan indigenous ethnic groups with their overlords.
that were justified by the need to protect the “docile natives against the tyranny of the Moro slave takers” (p. 29). Under the guise of this paternalist ruse a politico-military expedition arrived on March 4 1872 to found Puerto Princesa – today the capital and major urban area of the Province.\footnote{Spanish advances south against the Sulu Sultanate allowed a political reconfiguring of Palawan. Lopez (1986: 22) states that in 1858 present-day Palawan was divided into two provinces: that of Calimianes in the north and Paragua in the south. As well Balabac Island was designated as a military administrative unit. This division was negated in 1872 when the Province of Paragua replaced the former divisions. However, this was a short-lived arrangement as in 1905 the Province was renamed Palawan by the Philippine Commission Act 1363 (Ocampo 1996: 33).} The relocation of convicts and political detainees to Puerto Princesa, and further locales such as Balabac Island, contributed to the stereotyping of Paragua as a place of exile, thereby inhibiting general migration until, following the Asia-Pacific War, necessity dictated a reassessment of this attitude.

Subsequent to their success in the Spanish-American War (1898), and the destruction of a nascent Filipino Republic that followed, the American era in Palawan facilitated changes that would at once increase the diversity of immigrants to the Province and at the same time highlight its ‘frontierness’ – its ‘peripherality’ as Ocampo (1996: 34) puts it. While potential immigrants might have been deterred by the 1902 Act that established the Culion Leper Colony and the 1904 formation of the Iwahig Penal Colony, these two institutions facilitated the employment of many functionaries and inadvertently helped to foster an interest in the region. Those functionaries, together with the amnestied and released prisoners who chose to remain, added to the Province’s ethnocultural diversity.\footnote{One of the Narra informants was able to provide details about a family being drawn to Palawan in support of a relative incarcerated in Iwahig Penal Colony. Like penal colonies the world over (New Caledonia, Australia, and Siberia for example) their remoteness often inhibited return journeys, thereby contributing to the settler mix.} At the same time as this mandated migration to the Province, a spontaneous, seasonal migration presaging a more permanent resettlement by a group of farmer-fishers from the Cuyo Islands was taking place.

Beset by a decreasing land: man ratio, Cuyo was unable to provide enough food to augment a fishing culture. Following the imposition of American political stability, an arrangement evolved whereby an increasing flow of seasonal settlers from Cuyo arrived infrequently on the Mainland to plant a rice crop, or other staples, on lands not their own. Following the harvest they would return to their islands. These seasonal settlers – albeit hailing from within the Province – became the vanguard transmigrants that increasingly opted to stay on the Mainland, rather than return annually to Cuyo. For a time spontaneous Cuyonon settlers became
one of the largest ethnolinguistic groups on the Palawan Mainland, though their dominance in the intervening years has been muted by the arrival of a diversity of other ethnic groups.

The process of ethnic diversification was accelerated during the post-Independence period when the state initiated a 24,000-hectare land development program (Appendix C) centred on the area now encompassed by the Narra Municipality. While this ushered in a period of increased immigration to the Province, it also gave rise to economic and sociocultural losers, as the ‘traditional’ lands of autochthonous groups such as the Pala’wan and Tagbanua were increasingly forfeit.

*Indigeneity*

Palawan Province supports a diverse native population (Eder and Fernandez 1996: 5). On Balabac Island in the south live the Molbog, swidden-agriculturalists who today are predominantly Muslim. On Palawan Island itself there are three principal autochthonous ethnolinguistic groups: the swidden-agriculturalist Pala’wan of the south, the Tagbanua in the centre (including in the Narra study area), and the forest-foraging Batak people of the north. Insular Palawan supports several additional groups who because of their long association with the colonial mission were Hispanicised and are now deemed ‘lowland Christian’ rather than ‘indigenous’. These include the Cuyonon, Agutaynen, and Kagayanen, among others.

The stability of some indigenous ethnic groups in Palawan is a matter for conjecture. Historically, Palawan was a region assailed by the ramifications of slaving, by which I mean that as well as the abduction of some indigenous peoples, those remaining were exposed to cultural accretions emanating from the dominating group. James Warren’s 1982 study of the economic importance of slaving to the Sulu Sultanate in particular, and the greater Malay Archipelago in general, helps demonstrate the unreliability of ethnic fixity in the region. For Palawan’s indigenous groups, exposure to a wider world – be it the Sulu Sultanate, Spain, America, or extant religious proselytising – had / has the effect of altering existing worldviews. Few could maintain their distinct lifeways by withdrawing to the isolated security of the mountainous interior; the implication
being that they would experience deculturation (acculturation to some other lifeway), or in some instances ethnocide.\footnote{Brown (1991: 33) cautions that “the terms ‘deculturation’ and ‘ethnocide’ not be used interchangeably.” In her opinion ethnocide “should be limited to cases in which expanding states, populations, and / or missionaries have undertaken a systematic and aggressive movement to eradicate the lifeways and values of tribal peoples” (p. 33). In the context of those parameters, I suggest, that some overlap may occur. The expanding state, population (implicating the migrant), or missionaries may be extremely successful in some instances in destroying former lifeways: self-governing political units, non-patriarchal societal structures, swidden agriculture, or Animism, in some instances, aspects of these may survive by being embedded into new sociocultural realities.}

Groups claiming autochthonous status in Palawan (as elsewhere in the autochthonous world) continue to live in a state of flux. While the brief of this thesis is to unpack the transculturative potential for – and ramifications of – transmigrant resettlement in Palawan, it is nevertheless interesting to reflect for a moment on how fluid – even within autochthonous groups – ethnic and cultural identity is. Whereas Brown (1991) and Lopez (1986), in their studies of the ethnic Pala’wan, reveal how that group’s lifeways have altered as a consequence of the intrusion of lowland Christian transmigrants, Macdonald (2000) illustrates that a propensity exists for changed ethnic identity and lifeways to occur irrespective of the transmigrant intrusion. His study of the Pânimbusan is salutary to an understanding of what constitutes an ethnic identity. The Pânimbusan are coastal Pala’wan who are regarded by their inland co-linguists (and by self-ascription) as Muslim, indeed an ethnic group distinct from their inland cousins. Yet their claim to Muslimity is tenuous; in the absence of mosques, imams, or Hajis, the Muslimity claim appears to be justified by the abstinence of pork and turtle eating, and identification with a supralocal belief structure – Islam.\footnote{What Macdonald found interesting was the incongruousness with which the land-based Pala’wan regarded their coast-based co-linguists as Muslim, whereas the Muslims that had dominated their region prior to early twentieth century ‘pacification’ were known by their individual ethnic – rather than religious denotations – that is, Kagayan, Maranao, or Suluk. The Pânimbusan model of ethnogenesis is instructive, in that it demonstrates in theory, the transculturative potential for situations (such as migration contact zones). How much cultural adoption or adaptation is required for a nascent ethnic identity to be sustainable remains moot.} I cite this example of a ‘Barthian boundary’ to illustrate how modest a difference is needed to create a separate discernible ethnocultural identity, one that needs to be borne in mind when reflecting upon the product of transcultural change in the Narra model.

In an era when transmigration from other Philippine regions continues unabated, the proportion of Palawan’s population claiming indigeneity is decreasing. Were it not for the pro-active policies engendered by the concept of the Ancestral Domain\footnote{The concept of ‘Ancestral Domain’ (AD) – while not central to the contentions of this thesis – nevertheless plays a role in the influencing of whether transmigrants and indigenes are able to}, it is quite possible that those claiming indigenous status
(as a percentage of the Province’s overall demography) might have declined further still. The Philippine societal practice of classifying groups as: Animist / indigene, lowland Christian, or Muslim is an inadequate way to define complex heterogeneities in both Palawan and in the Philippines writ large. The transmigrants arriving in Palawan (who have been overwhelmingly lowland Christian) were after all themselves indigenous to their region-of-origin, yet they were not afforded the status of indigeneity and the hypothetical support that this suggests. Professing Christianity and being adept at wet-rice cultivation did not preclude their poverty being as acute as that of the marginalised indigenes they increasingly displaced. However, representing the Philippine majority and being acknowledged as progressive agriculturally – as Brown (1991) and Lopez (1986) demonstrate in their accounts of indigene-migrant relations on the Palawan settlement frontier – gave the incoming transmigrants economic and political advantages.

Demography
The crux of the push-pull factors influencing the transmigration phenomenon in the Philippines was a rapidly growing population. Concurrent with the ten-fold population increase sustained nation-wide during the twentieth century Palawan experienced a twenty-fold increase and now stands at approximately one million. Notwithstanding Pelzer’s (1945) charge of under-enumeration for the first U.S. census (1903), the trend of the decennial censuses depicts Palawan’s population growing at a faster rate than the country at large, reflecting the increased migration flows to the Province.188 A more convenient starting point might be the 1918 census. When compared with the 2010 census (90-year-period) the Philippines sustained a nine-fold increase, while Palawan experienced a fourteen-fold one. While the rapid rise in provincial population is partly explained by

achieve a modi vivendi in the zone of resettlement, thereby advantaging intercultural harmony. Simply stated AD claims hinge on perceived socio-economic injustices. If AD’s legal promulgation was in part to undo the depredations of the Regalian Doctrine or ‘pubic lands’ era, interpreting who is being disadvantaged is far from clear. In his article ‘Whose ancestral domain is Mindanao – Sulu and Palawan’ Rodil (1987) raises a challenge. Who is able to claim uninterrupted occupancy, and how far back must one look for justice to prevail? It might be argued that all lands – those under AD scrutiny and privately held – were once the lands of someone else. Neither pre-Spanish nor pre-Sultanate custodians of the soil appear to be advantaged by AD. Just as the U.S. failed to return the compensated ‘Friar Lands’ to the descendants of original occupiers, so too it seems will it be difficult for the Sultanate lands to be returned to previous Animist occupiers. 188 Pelzer (1945: 81) makes the case “that the census of 1903 was not so complete as that of 1939; so that the increase between 1903 and 1939 was probably not quite as large as the census figures indicate.” Nonetheless he acknowledges that the population had increased rapidly, putting extra strain on the ‘developed’ agricultural areas.
natural increase, the greater part of the increase is attributable to in-migration from across the Republic.

Unlike in Mindanao, where the accelerated 1948-1960 immigration attracted several dominant ethnolinguistic groups, exemplified by the Cebuanos, transmigration to Palawan has not been dominated by any one group, which I suggest has had a bearing on the potential for transculturation to flourish. In his study of the provincial capital Puerto Princesa, Evangelista (2008a: 48) suggests that the migration of people from other provinces has created a ‘melting pot’. Citing the 2000 census, he states that 114 ethnic origins are represented “with Tagalog as the lingua franca (37%), Cuyonon (20%), Hiligaynon / Ilonggo (8%), Cebuano (7%), Bisaya / Binisaya (6%) and the remaining 22% other ethnic origins and speaking other languages. The Puerto Princesa diversity is mirrored in Palawan at large and the Narra Municipality in particular, a major factor contributing to the choice of Narra for this study.

Table 5.1 – Population by Census: Philippines / Palawan 1903-2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Census</th>
<th>Population Philippines</th>
<th>% Rate of Increase</th>
<th>Population Palawan</th>
<th>% Rate of Increase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1903</td>
<td>7,635,426</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>35,369</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918</td>
<td>10,314,310</td>
<td>2.34 %</td>
<td>69,059</td>
<td>6.35 %</td>
</tr>
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<td>1939</td>
<td>16,000,303</td>
<td>2.63 %</td>
<td>93,673</td>
<td>1.70 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>19,234,182</td>
<td>2.25 %</td>
<td>106,269</td>
<td>1.49 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>27,087,685</td>
<td>3.40 %</td>
<td>162,669</td>
<td>4.42 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>36,684,486</td>
<td>3.54 %</td>
<td>236,635</td>
<td>4.55 %</td>
</tr>
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<td>1975</td>
<td>42,070,660</td>
<td>2.94 %</td>
<td>300,065</td>
<td>5.36 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>48,098,460</td>
<td>2.87 %</td>
<td>371,782</td>
<td>4.78 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>60,703,206</td>
<td>2.62 %</td>
<td>528,287</td>
<td>4.21 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>68,616,536</td>
<td>2.61 %</td>
<td>640,486</td>
<td>4.25 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>76,498,735</td>
<td>2.30 %</td>
<td>755,412</td>
<td>3.59 %</td>
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<td>2007</td>
<td>88,574,614</td>
<td>2.26 %</td>
<td>892,660</td>
<td>2.60 %</td>
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<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>92,337,852</td>
<td>1.42 %</td>
<td>994,340</td>
<td>3.80 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: after National Statistics Office / Eder 2000: 24-25 / Lahmeyer

189 As previously alluded to Puerto Princesa City (PPC) is at once an urban centre (and seat of government for the Province of Palawan) as well as a geographical space which is essentially rural. Designated an ‘independent city’, PPC encompasses 2,540 km², making it the largest local government unit in Palawan. The 2010 Census (NSO) states the population as 222,673 making it the least densely populated of Philippine cities, statistical aberration notwithstanding.

190 The ethnolinguistic classification percentages, gleaned from the 2007 City of Puerto Princesa ‘Socio-Economic and Physical Profile’ – as cited by Evangelista – requires a closer analysis. Language is not the only marker of ethnicity, and if we take the 37% speaking Tagalog, we might ask which groups this represents. An immigrant, who has forsaken his language for the lingua franca or the national language, may continue to identify with an ethnocultural heritage that is removed from the Tagalog one with which the statistics label him / her.
Economy

While Palawan, with its 1,700 islands, beaches and coral reefs, continues to promote itself as a tourist destination, the basis of the economy is still agriculture, be it production for surplus, as in Narra, or production for self-sufficiency as exemplified by the age-old kaingin (swidden) agriculture, still practiced in some quarters (Docto and Salva 2008). Rice is the major staple, while coconuts provide a valuable export crop. At the same time as the ‘seemingly unsettled’ spaces drew farmer-migrants into Palawan from across the Philippines, so too did the vast coastline attract fisher-migrants, especially from the Visayas (Veloro 1995). The historic trade in non-wood forest products such as almaciga, rattan, and bird-nests carried on by indigenous groups is still of local significance, but is in jeopardy by over-exploitation. Lacuna-Richman’s 2006 study of the non-wood forest economy illustrates that besides seeking lands for themselves in Palawan, transmigrants also entered the non-wood forest product economy to sustain their precarious economic positions. At a time when increasing populations are demanding additional farmlands, and the exploitation of forested areas for their timbers continues, the traditional forest-based industries are under threat.

The expansion of mineral exploration and exploitation in recent decades (Eder and Fernandez 1996: 15-17) has contributed to the influx of technicians and a more educated cohort, some of whom have seen the potential of Palawan and, better resourced, are able to contribute entrepreneurial capital for the Province’s development. Mining in itself has been a double-edged sword. The projects provide much-needed employment, yet at times have created an antagonistic situation with agriculturalists in their vicinity. On more than one occasion it was mentioned by Narra respondents how the nearby chromite mines were creating negative environmental impacts, such as siltation and poisoning of ricelands dependent on irrigation water into which mine-waste had seeped. A corollary of negative developmental outcomes in the field of mining, deforestation, and the non-sustainable dynamite-cyanide fishery practices, has been the incursion into the Province of an array of national and international environmental NGOs, whose mandates overlap, but who in general have the interests of the environment and the people, especially the indigenous people, as their purview.

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191 Docto and Salva’s article makes the case that without realising it the indigenous Pala’wans, by engaging in kaingin agriculture, are practising a sustainable form of agriculture, one not reliant on fertilisers and pesticides. In their study sample, 84.8 % of the Pala’wan practised kaingin.

192 Almaciga, or Manila copal, is a resin that is harvested from the tree (Agathis philippensis). It is used as an ingredient in products as diverse as varnish, paint and aromatherapy.
Future Prospects

Administratively Palawan formed part of the former Southern Tagalog Region (Region IV), which in 2002 was divided and, with Mindoro, Marinduque, Romblon, and Palawan (MIMAROPA) reconstituted as Region IVB. A further readjustment was proposed by Executive Order 429 in May 2005 in which it was proposed to remove Palawan from the Southern Tagalog sphere and join it with Western Visayas (Region VI). While the eclecticism of Palawan’s immigration includes both Tagalogs and Visayans, it encompasses more diversity than can be labelled neatly with any representative zone. Asked where he / she came from, a Narra transmigrant would not answer Region IVA or IX. Identification with the home province or indeed the ethnolinguistic heritage of the individual is a more salient marker of identity than any administrative assertion. A political backlash from within Palawan caused the issuance of Executive Order 129 in August 2005, which held in abeyance the proposed administrative realignment with Region VI, and maintained the administrative status quo. As the nation’s largest province in size, the division of Palawan into three separate entities has been mooted, though at the time of this study, this had not transpired.

I mention the above in order to suggest that the geographical isolation of Palawan continues to defy it neatly fitting into a regional grouping of any kind. Notwithstanding Palawan’s continuance as an in-migration area, and despite the population increases already alluded to, Palawan continues to rank 79th out of 80 provinces for population density. Given the burgeoning of the Philippine’s population, this relatively modest density would indicate the potential for further transmigratory flows into the Province. As the Narra survey revealed, migrants continue to arrive in Palawan, though their prospects need not always involve recourse to agriculture. Opportunities in the bureaucracy, increased commerce, perception of the Province as a ‘zone of peace’, and for some a retirement locale, all contribute to an increased population and its ethnic mix. The above profile of

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193 The interpretations of statistics in the Philippines are fraught with difficulties. This is partially attributable to the employ of estimates in interstitial census periods, and partly in response to the atypical ways in which statistical information is presented. Cebu well illustrates this conundrum. To determine the population of Cebu Island (in order to ascertain population density of Cebu relative to other islands) it becomes necessary to add the population of Cebu Province to that of the three independent cities: Cebu City, Lapu-Lapu City, and Mandaue City. The consequence of this is that while the population of Cebu for the 2010 census is tabulated as 2.6 million, when added to the aforementioned cities the population for Cebu Island should read 4.2 million, greatly altering the density figure. Likewise is the national population data questionable. The 2010 Philippine Census suggests that the country’s population is 93.3 million (NSO); while the EBYB (2012) suggests 95.9 million, and the CIA World Factbook (Online) estimates the mid-2012 population at 103.7 million.
Palawan as a resettlement zone allows a segue into the focus of this study, the Narra Municipality, which in many respects is a snapshot of the Province writ large.

**Narra: ‘Rice Granary of Palawan’**

*Overview*

Narra (Municipality and town) owe their nomenclature to the acronym NARRA (National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration), one of the recurring incarnations of resettlement agencies whose brief it was to help advance food security, ameliorate poverty, and aid Philippine development. The genesis of Narra as resettlement-zone hinged on the exploitability of a relatively flat plain, which in time came to be irrigated, thereby adding to the nation’s rice inventory. The economic development and success of Narra led to the Municipality being designated as the ‘Rice Granary of Palawan’ – an epithet still widely touted. While the rationale for the NARRA development – in the geographical area that was to become Narra Municipality (and town) – was multifaceted, its stimulus was predicated on the country’s rapidly growing population and concomitant food insecurity.

In spite of the dislocation caused by the Asia-Pacific War, the Philippine population increased rapidly (Table 5.1). In the twenty year period 1948-1970 there was almost a doubling of the population from 19.2 to 36.7 million. A decline in mortality as a result of colonially inspired health initiatives coalesced with continuing high fertility rates to create family sizes that could not be sustained on the given agricultural footprint. Adding to the population pressure were the socio-economic ramifications occasioned by political instability (as exemplified by the HUK rebellion), central to which was the issue of landlessness, an important factor contributing to agrarian unrest. Economic uncertainty following independence from the United States (1946) and the general issue of food insecurity became serious issues for state planners and politicians alike. Given the increased pressure on the land in more densely populated areas it was incumbent

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194 Suyat and Tejada-Suyat (2005: 14) proffer an alternative explanation. “Corpuz [a settlement functionary] observed that the uncleared area in the core of the settlement was a virgin forest of nara (*Pterocarpus indicus*) trees. Nara is the national tree because of its excellent quality. To identify the core of the settlement and to immortalize the Nara tree which would soon disappear, Corpuz called the place Nara. And the people called the place Nara as Corpuz had called it.” They add that by early 1955 the word had metamorphosed into NARRA (acronym for the new settlement authority).
upon the nascent Republic to increase the alienation of lands in less populated areas, such as Palawan, Mindanao, and the Cagayan Valley in Luzon.

The Narra Municipality lies on a broad plain situated approximately 100 kilometres south of the provincial capital, Puerto Princesa. It is hemmed in by the central mountain chain to the west, where Mt Victoria reaches 1709m; to the east lies the Sulu Sea. It is the extent of the plain, and its dissection by several rivers able to be tapped for irrigation, that sustains the Municipality as the ‘Rice Granary of Palawan’. Via the National Highway – for the most part hugging the coastal plain – it takes approximately two hours to reach Barangay Población from the capital. Población constitutes the urban centre of what is generally referred to as Narra (Town). It is at once an administrative, commercial, educational, and social centre. Reflecting the former influence of the resettlement authorities and the state, Población is a precisely planned urban area that is based on a grid pattern (Appendix H). Historically, on arrival in the settlement project, each settler-beneficiary was allocated a house-lot in the urban area and a farm-lot in the environs. In general the Austronesian mode of communal residence prevailed; settlers resided in town rather than on their farm-lot.

Prior to the resettlement of approximately three thousand families in the area now constituting the Municipality of Narra, the area formed part of the larger Municipality of Aborlan, from which it was excised by Republic Act No. 5642 (20 June, 1969) (Appendix E). In the intervening years it has grown to become one of the most populous municipalities in Palawan Province with approximately 70,000 inhabitants (SEP-2010: 6). The Municipality is divided into twenty-three barangays, four of which – Antipuluan, Panacan, Panacan 2 and Población – are deemed urban. Approximately two-thirds of the Municipality’s population might be deemed rural. (Appendix B).

Narr: Genesis / Formation History

The Philippine resettlement program had its roots in Commonwealth Act No. 441, signed on 3 January 1939 by Commonwealth President Manuel L. Quezon,

195 The designation of Población as urban appears questionable, in view of that Barangay’s population density. However, while a geographical corner of Barangay Población forms the nucleus of urban Narra, the majority of Barangay Población is rural. The project planners used the National Highway as a starting point, with most barangay’s running from the Highway to the mountains on one side, or the Sulu Sea on the other.

196 For a historical background, as well as the social and economic aspects of the settling of the Narra Municipality I am deeply indebted to Marcial Dela Cruz (former Project Manager of the Pilot Special Settlement Project), Carlos Fernandez (PSU academic, and former Ministerial incumbent), and Leonardo Suyat (local historian and former PSU academic).
creating the National Land Settlement Administration (NLSA – Chapter 4). Three major projects were established, namely the Allah Valley and Koronadal Valley (both in Mindanao) and the Ma-allig Plains of Isabella, in Luzon. 197

On 24 March 1949, the Rice and Corn Production Administration (RCPA) was established to promote and stimulate the production of staple crops in the Philippines. At the invitation of then Governor of the Province of Palawan – Alfredo Abeug Sr. – the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources (DANR) sent soil specialists to conduct surveys in the Province, particularly in the Municipalities: Taytay, Aborlan, and Bataraza. An evaluation of the results suggested that the Panacan sector of Aborlan be chosen as the most ideal site for rice and corn production. 198 From this beginning, notwithstanding the institutional changes brought about by succeeding political leaderships, development in the area gradually expanded. Presidential Proclamation No. 190 (June 24, 1950) signed by President Elpidio Quirino, reserved 25,380.7 hectares of the public domain of Aborlan / Palawan for resettlement purposes (Appendix C). Executive Order No. 355 (October 23, 1950) issued by Quirino, abolished the National Land Settlement Administration (NLSA), and in its place created the Land Settlement Development Corporation (LASEDECO). Its tenure was short-lived however, as via Republic Act No. 1160 (June 18, 1954) President Ramon Magsaysay abolished LASEDECO and replaced it by the National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA). 199

197 While the NLSA denotes the commencement of Philippine attempts at resettlement, it should be borne in mind that this program was following on from earlier American colonial attempts at land colonisation. While colonial and Commonwealth impetuses for resettlement differed in some regards, both administrations were motivated by economic development and the demands of growing populations and social inequities.
198 Aborlan is the ‘host’ municipality from which Narra Municipality was excised in 1969 (Appendix E). A pronounced American influence in the Aborlan area occurred with the establishment (1910) of a farm settlement school in order to “educate and civilize the cultural minorities…” (Suyat and Tejada-Suyat 2005: 9). In 2004 the farm settlement school metamorphosed to become the Western Philippines University (WPU). The ‘civilising’ mission among the indigenous Tagbanuas, Muslims and Pala’wans was less than benign, however. Suyat and Tejada-Suyat state that “(a)ll children of the cultural communities were forced to study and stay inside the reservation in two dormitories, one for males and one for females… no matter how bountiful the blessing the natives enjoyed, they felt they were prisoners…” (p. 9).
199 On August 8, 1963 President Diosdado Macapagal, signed Republic Act No. 3844, known as the Land Reform Code, creating the Land Authority (LA) and abolishing NARRA. On September 21, 1972, Republic Act No. 6389 was signed by the late President Ferdinand Marcos, creating the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) and the Land Authority was abolished. On June 18, 1988, Republic Act No. 6657 – known as the CARP [Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program] Law – was signed by the late President Corazon Aquino. Its obligations and functions were subsumed and implemented by the DAR.
The Settlement Process

Resettlement in the Narra context was an organised process under government auspices. That is, a state-sponsored program in which deserving landless citizens, farm workers, and displaced landless tenants from densely populated areas were brought to the settlement project to develop the ‘public domain’ lands distributed for their benefit. The settlers were allocated farm-lots to clear, develop and cultivate, and a home-lot that they could eventually call their own after complying with the requirements of the settlement agency, this being the basis for the issuance of titles to their lands.

In 1956, the Central Palawan Resettlement Project began its operation with the arrival of transmigrants from Central Luzon and the Visayan provinces. The process adopted by the NARRA main office was to create a screening committee to vet applicants – to determine if they were qualified in farming practices – in order to ensure the success of the resettlement program. Thus, the Settlement Management Committee, once entrusted with those selected, was duty-bound to service the needs of the settlers following their arrival in the Project. In a ‘frontier’ zone devoid of the necessities of life a paternal oversight was necessary. In the early resettlement period of the NARRA Administration, a hospital and attendant medical personnel including midwives were provided. By rotating the midwives, scheduled visits to nursing mothers and their babies in remote rural areas could be ensured. The most common disease affecting the settlers at this time was malaria. It was usually acquired by the settlers while clearing their forested farm-lots. Supporting NARRA was the Malaria Control Unit (MCU) whose brief it was to minimise the malaria scourge. The death rate was reduced with the help of blood canvassers, microscopists and the deployment of DDT spraying teams (Suyat and Tejada-Suyat 2005: 31-32).

Settlers were categorised under four headings:

(1) **Pioneer settlers** – those who were the de facto occupants in the area before it was proclaimed as a resettlement reservation;

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200 This section also relies heavily on the reflections of Marcial Dela Cruz, Leonardo Suyat, and Carlos Fernandez. Marcial, as a long-time Narra resident (arrived in 1961) has seen the region develop from a frontier settlement to what it is today. As an agriculturalist/technician he has been cognisant of the problems that the Narra resettlement project faced.

201 Fear of malaria as well as the historical fear of the Moros had constrained earlier settlement attempts in Palawan. While health and hygiene initiatives have greatly reduced the occurrence of malaria in recent decades, the incidence of malaria in Palawan continues to be one of the highest in the country.
(2) **Moved-in settlers** – those who were moved by the resettlement agency from their places of origin to the resettlement site;

(3) **Self-propelled settlers** – those settler applicants who arrived in the settlement area at their own expense;

(4) **Local settlers** – landless citizens in the settlement area and their dependants who inter-married with other ethnic and indigenous groups, who applied and were approved by the settlement agency.

Further change and revitalisation occurred when the Central Palawan Resettlement Project was converted into a ‘Pilot Special Settlement Project’ (PSSP) in February 1976 (Appendix D). The NARRA entity had been replaced by a new managing agency, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), which at the time of my field visit continued to address the needs of some settler-beneficiaries. The new PSSP Project Manager, Marcial Dela Cruz, after consulting with community leaders, realised that for the settlement to prosper irrigation was vital. With the help of the World Bank the two largest rivers traversing the Project were tapped, allowing 12,000 hectares to become more productive. In 1996, a further three irrigation projects (4,000ha) were funded by the Japanese government through the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) to irrigate areas above and beyond the area serviced by the World Bank-financed irrigation system. After their inauguration the schemes were turned over to the National Irrigation Authority-Philippine Medium Scale Irrigation Project (NIA-PMSIP) for ongoing management, a role maintained to this day.

**Probing the Process**

Many hardships had to be overcome in the creation of Narra as the ‘Rice Granary of Palawan’. Ill-equipped and unprepared for the pioneering life, many transmigrants became disillusioned and abandoned their goal of owning their own farmstead, though whether this impacted on the degree or level of ethnic diversity is moot. In his 1975 study of the Narra resettlement project during its formative years Fernandez (1975: 231) suggests that “(r)esettlement programs, viewed in the abstract, hold bright promise for the landless and the poor. A dream shared by both planners and beneficiaries is that once land is acquired, prosperity will follow.” The vision of distant planners was sometimes at odds with the desired outcome, and the reality and difficulty of pioneering was often underestimated. The settler-beneficiaries, at times ill-equipped educationally, technically and
managerially, were not necessarily able to fulfil their dreams of exchanging their status of tenant for landowner. As tenants in their region-of-origin they had not had to deal with management issues such as marketing, accounting and planning. Fernandez suggests that those least likely to succeed, that is, those who were landless – that being the deciding criteria for the settlement agency’s recruitment – often failed to prosper once they arrived in the frontier. Individual inabilities, lack of development capital, and sporadic assistance from the settlement agency contributed to an abandonment rate of approximately one-third (p. 226). A contributing factor was the difficulty involved in clearing virgin lands by people who in their regions-of-origin were attuned to wet-rice agriculture.202

Pioneering had several unforeseen transculturative impacts. Firstly, Fernandez (p. 224) observes: “A random allocation of lands finds its rationale in the agency’s attempt to ‘randomly integrate’ settlers of various ethnic origins.” While this process could be subverted, it nevertheless exposed diverse ethnic groups into each other’s orbit. Secondly, because the pioneers were steeped in the lowland (irrigated) wet-rice agriculture, they were ill-equipped to revert to kaingin (swidden) agriculture, which in the absence of irrigation in the early years they had to master to survive. Fernandez suggests that “both the settler and the agricultural extension workers in Narra… turned to the Tagbanua and Cuyonon to teach them how to gird and cut the trees” (p. 224). This intercultural exchange between indigene and settler might have been more tentative in altered circumstances, and no doubt contributed to the diminishment of interethnic anxieties. Not only could the settler question the ethnic stereotyping and antipathy sometimes felt for the indigene Other, the indigene also (in this reciprocal milieu) could reassess his apprehension for a settler cohort Other.

While the economic ramifications of resettlement are not central to this thesis, it should be acknowledged that economic success or otherwise has the potential to alienate groups struggling for the same resources. Brown (1991) and Lopez (1986) demonstrated in their studies how intercultural dissonance could

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202 *Sawah*, or wet-rice agriculture across archipelagic Southeast Asia continues to define progress, superiority, and civilisation. Using this criterion as a marker of social status however, failed to resonate among early Narra settlers. Fernandez (2011) suggests that the landless settlers arrived with ‘technological excess baggage’, that is, they were ‘*sawah-savvy*’, in an area without irrigation. When respondents were questioned as to whether they needed to make cultural compromises once arrived on the settlement frontier, some admitted that they had had to revert to swidden-agriculture to survive, skills for which they needed to glean from the ‘*less-civilised*’ indigenes in their midst, rather than the resettlement agency which also was too technologically advanced.
occur between indigenes and transmigrants competing for a given resource – land. James (1979), in *An Economic Analysis of Public Land Settlement Alternatives in the Philippines*, critiques the subsidising of inefficient landless settlers by suggesting that self-financed settlers would have a greater propensity to succeed. By extrapolation this would allow a larger number of settlers to participate, further reducing rural unrest, one of the criteria influencing state-sponsored resettlement at the outset. State-sponsored resettlement was not an efficient way to redistribute income, James advised, adding the rider that it possibly had the opposite effect. The role of government, he contended, should be as a provider of infrastructure and more efficient land alienation procedures, rather than as a settler managing agency (pp. 174-178).

In some cases the limitations and failures of individuals as farmers contributed to abandonment of their allocated farm-lots. Whatever the difficulties involved in the Narra land development project, those unwilling or unable to return to their regions-of-origin found a niche nevertheless in an expanding community. As well as a successful cohort of wet-rice cultivators such a community needed a floating population to service an expanding tertiary sector. As settlement land became fully alienated, ongoing transmigration into the Municipality came increasingly to reflect a diversity of entrepreneurship and skills. But who were these settlers? I now turn to reflect more closely on the diversity of groups that arrived in the Municipality.

*Ethnolinguistic Heritage*

Narra’s ethnocultural diversity is reflected in the Appendix F table.\(^{203}\) While this table is limited in scope it does provide an insight into the diverse groups that have transmigrated to the Municipality from across the Philippines. In percentage terms the languages listed are: Filipino / Tagalog (31%), Other (28%), Ilonggo / Hiligaynon (17%), Ilocano (12.5%), Cuyono [sic] (4%), Cagayanen (4%), Cebuano (1.5%), Muslim (1.2%) and Bicolano (0.6%). In light of these figures, however, two riders need mention. Firstly, viewed from a municipal-wide basis, the almost one-third denoted as ‘Filipino / Tagalog’ requires closer scrutiny. The interviews conducted for this study reflected that the delineation Tagalog did not

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\(^{203}\) While the differentiation nomenclature for this table is given as ‘dialect’, the term ‘language’ would have better reflected what the CBMS intended. The misreading of the two concepts is not unusual. In conversation with UP linguist Consuelo Paz (pers. comm. 2011-04-14), it was made clear that the misconception was a legacy of the colonial period.
reflect the actual ethnolinguistic heritage of the informant. Being identified or self-identifying as Filipino / Tagalog because one now speaks the national language and associates with that tag in no way precludes a more nuanced ethnic identity ascription or self-ascription.

The second point to be made is in regard to the column ‘Others’. Taking Barangay Bagong Sikat as illustrative we note that fully 58% of the population fall into the category ‘Other’. Anecdotal evidence indicates that the Ilonggo cohort at least in this particular Barangay is under-enumerated in this break-up. The almost one-third in the ‘Other’ column in itself skews the diversity canvas. In the same vein the column for ‘Muslim language’ is too general in determining which ethnolinguistic groups are being referred to. Again the interviews conducted for this study reflected that a more nuanced reality of ethnolinguistic heritages was required. While most informants professing Islam were indeed representative of a single ethnic group (Maranao), this did not necessarily reflect the reality of all Muslims in the Municipality. Furthermore among younger respondents, for whom region-of-origin language loss was more pronounced, ethnolinguistic or religio-linguistic delineation was fraught with ambiguity.

Unlike Indonesia’s Transmigration Program, which existed primarily to address the population imbalance of Java, Madura, and Bali, the Philippine resettlement scene encompassed a more varied settler cohort. In other words, Philippine transmigrants were sourced from a much broader ethnocultural pool. Unlike Java, which supports three major ethnic groupings (Javanese, Madurese and Sundanese), most Philippine islands support a wider array of ethnolinguistic groups, often without there being a dominant one. In some instances an ethnolinguistic cohort might fit neatly into a province or island, at others a group might straddle several provinces, given the province’s often recent political incarnation. The Province of Pangasinan (Luzon), for instance, suggests a predominance of those deemed ethnolinguistically Pangasinense, yet 44% of the

204 It was the Head of the Narra Pilot School that brought my attention to potential difficulties associated with the enumeration practice. While the Municipal ethnolinguistic table (Appendix F) is constrained by space, recourse to the ‘Other’ column has the capacity to numerically advantage some groups when viewed on a municipal-wide basis. That is, appearing in the Barangay statistics as ‘Other’ may not realistically reflect a municipal-wide picture of such and such an ethnic cohort. 205 It is unclear if the ‘Muslim language’ ambiguity is influenced by the issue of ‘enumeration space’, or a deeper psycho-sociological reckoning associated with the ‘othering’ of those professing Islam. Obviously there is no such a phenomenon as a ‘Muslim language’ so it is unclear why those professing Islam were not located in the ‘Other’ column when enumerated by language. The interviews and anecdotal evidence suggest that some of the recent immigrants professing Islam are ethnic Maranao, relatively urban and involved in commerce. This in no way illuminates the ethnicities of those professing Islam in the more distant, rural Barangay Aramaywan.
Province’s population at the 2000 census were ethnolinguistically Ilocano. Thus, when informants were questioned about region-of-origin, the short answer denoted a place of departure, but did not necessarily reflect the interlocutor’s ethnolinguistic or cultural heritage.

Narrans hailed from as far afield as the Batanes Islands in the north (located between Luzon and Taiwan), to Mindanao in the south. Briefly stated, their diversity and recruitment from across the country has been a factor influencing the non-dominance / dominance paradigm in this resettlement milieu. The push-pull factors that impelled migrants to the settlement frontier varied. Some made the move for political reasons, others for socio-economic ones. While landlessness and poverty was an important relocation motivator for many, there were those for whom security concerns were of more salience. The interviews showed that for those for whom political considerations were a factor, Palawan was attractive as a ‘zone of peace’, while for others it had been the end process of exile from regions of insurgency, exemplified by the HUK rebellion of Central Luzon. Whatever the motivating factors for their transmigration, Narra demonstrates that a diverse cohort of ethnic groups has managed to find a *modus vivendi* that has eluded transmigrant cohorts in some other archipelagic settings.

**Defining the Methodology**

*Overview*

In an age of instant communication, it would be easy to pass critical judgment on past sociological survey techniques, as advanced by Frank Lynch and Perla Makil in their essay ‘Sociological surveys in the rural Philippines: Some suggestions for interviewers’ (Yengoyan and Makil 2004). However, Lynch and Makil’s strictures concerning ‘introduction to the community’, and ‘establishing rapport with the community’ still stands. Values of respect, deference, religiosity, and social custom rooted in rural hospitality continue to impact on daily lives, and need a period of adjustment for the researcher. Given that the main thrust of the research for this thesis was to investigate social change in a rural transmigrant community, the arrangement of introducing oneself to the settlement agency, in this case the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), was prudent. This was achieved by approaches to the Provincial DAR in Puerto Princesa, who in turn prepared the Municipal DAR office in Narra to afford assistance.
Further assistance was afforded by Palawan State University (PSU), under whose auspice I was granted Visiting Research Associate status, allowing introduction to their Narra Campus, the PSU-CCRD (College of Community Resources and Development). This introduction was fortuitous as it contributed to a modification of the thesis as originally envisaged. It emerged that the student cohort (the second or third generation of settlers) had worldviews that differed markedly from their parents and grandparents. It was the revelation of apparent different worldviews among younger Narrans that helped coalesce a thought process suggesting that an acceleration of transcultural change was probable when witnessed through the prism of generational change.

It became obvious that interviews with respondents should not proceed before a rapport was established with the host community, and this was facilitated by a visit to the Municipal Offices to meet with the Mayor in the first instance. This acted as a polite imprimatur for subsequent visits to the Barangay (sub-municipal) Offices where meetings with the Punong Barangay (Barangay Captain) or one of the Barangay Kagawad (Councillors) would take place. While the choice of interviewees was random, each barangay was aware that research was taking place in their area. Presenting credentials to various local authorities – the local offices of provincial and national government departments, schools, health clinics, nutrition office, religious institutions, the police and NGOs – contributed to a more efficient access to respondents.

In a society where social standing as much as age counts for more than might be expected in more affluent or urbanised milieux, having Marcial Dela Cruz (former Manager of the resettlement authority) as guide, mentor and translator also smoothed the process. In cases when he didn’t know a respondent, he at least knew their parents or grandparents, who in many instances had been settler-beneficiaries. Access to proficient English speakers helped in developing more nuanced discussions when raising issues relevant to feelings and perceptions during respondent interviews. Whilst the English language is used to varying degrees within the educational system from primary to university level, everyday use is sometimes superficial, the corollary of which was the need for intermediary assistance.
Change in Scope

Initially I had planned to interview the farmer-migrants who had come to Narra under the auspices of the state-initiated resettlement program (and their descendants). However, after commencing the interviews it became clear that some of the original settlers – for whom the motivating force in their decision to transmigrate had been land acquisition – were facing land: man ratios not dissimilar to the areas from which they had left. That is, each successive generation needed to divide a finite plot of land, thereby negating the rationale for resettlement in the first place. Krinks (1974), while articulating a Mindanao settlement paradigm, had illustrated the likelihood of land: man ratios mirroring those of the home region within a generation. One of the respondents put the dilemma of land ownership on the Palawan frontier into perspective. His father had left Iloilo in the Visayas where the family had had a one-eleventh share of the rice harvest. The 6 hectares of land granted them in Narra seemed generous in the 1950s, but with five siblings, this respondent now has a one-sixth share (in effect the use of 1 hectare). If extrapolated further his three children could only expect to have one-third of a hectare as their patrimony if they intended to continue farming – a plot inadequate for survival without off-farm income.

I mention this notion of apparent socio-economic reversion in order to demonstrate that the Narra of 2011, by necessity and choice, needed to encompass more than farmer-beneficiaries. The agricultural carrying capacity of an increased population could not be sustained. Not only were many of the second and third generation settlers not involved in agriculture, they had been joined in the last half-century (and continue to be joined) by non-farmer transmigrants from across the Philippines. The arrival of civil servants, health professionals, teachers, and the like has been central to Narra’s success and expansion, and as Narra developed into a commercial, administrative, and service centre the balance between complementary rural and urban pursuits began to swing in favour of non-farmers. It was this realisation that prompted me to reassess the proposed respondent base. Transmigrants encompassed a settler cohort broader than that of farmer-settlers, and for any sociocultural study aiming to assess the ramifications of integrating into a new society, the study had to be more inclusive of the community’s socio-economic diversity. In essence the notion of ‘transmigrant’ needed to encompass more than farmer-settlers, and needed to reflect the inclusion of commercial, professional, artisan, and student cohorts.
Narra, becoming a regional centre as well as servicing a rural hinterland, added to the diversity of the continuing immigration pattern in the Municipality. The Narra campus of Palawan State University (PSU-CCRD), the Narra National High School, St Francis Javier College, and the many primary schools employ hundreds of staff. However, as an expanding regional centre, it is commerce that continues to have an impact on population growth and diversity. The Narra Market zone has in recent years attracted several ‘new’ ethnic groups, for example a Maranao cohort from Mindanao, not involved in rural pursuits.

While I quickly gleaned that each of the respondents (or their forebears) originated from somewhere other than Narra Municipality, it was the expansion of the study to include a younger cohort (second and third generation) that raised the prospect that the trajectory of transcultural change was greatly influenced by a generational shift. Inspirational in the decision to broaden the scope of the thesis to investigate how the dynamics of generation, gender and education impacted on the transcultural trajectory was Mary Racelis (pers. comm. 2011-03-02), an IPC (Institute of Philippine Culture) researcher.

When asked what they regarded as their identity or ethnicity younger respondents were more likely to identify themselves as Palaweño; that is, an imagined supraethnic identity denoting adherence to current location rather than recall to historical antecedents. In essence, they demonstrated that it was possible to supersede the ethnocultural baggage of their forbears, by ‘imagining’ and living new identities. Whether self-identification as Palaweño should be regarded as a process of ethnogenesis or a form of postethnicity exemplified by the notion of cosmopolitanism is open to closer scrutiny.206

Before proceeding with an analysis of the Narra findings it is necessary to explain the complexity and difficulty associated with the defining of ethnic identity in particular (and sociocultural identity in general) within the Filipino context.

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206 Identity ambivalence is not confined to Narrans, but is I suggest a product of the migration phenomenon. While individuals in the Narra might transcend the local allegiances of their forbears, and identify either as Palaweño (a quasi-regional adherence), Filipino, or people of a broader world (cosmopolitan), other migration scenarios are less complex. Nation-states which are premised on overwhelming immigration (Australia, Canada, and the United States) undermine or discourage (even if not overtly) continued identification with previous lived realities and ethnic identifications – multicultural utterances notwithstanding. They expect a transcendence of ethnolinguistic or ethnocultural loyalties, for one premised on a grander narrative, that of the ‘ethnic-less’ citizen.
Identity Ascription: The Limits of Labelling

From the outset of the fieldwork the very term ‘ethnicity’ proved to be problematic. In the eyes of some bureaucratic institutions, as well as in academic discourse, the term ‘ethnic’ was sometimes equated with ‘indigenous person’ (IP). A request to the Provincial Planning and Development Office for data on the migration into Palawan by ethnicity for example, was responded to with a printout designated ‘Ethnic Origin by Municipality’. On perusal it was obvious that all the groups on the printout were groups regarded as IP; that is, those regarded as ethnic minorities, or marginal groups. Within this parameter a T’boli from Mindanao or a Tagbanua from Palawan are regarded as ‘ethnic’ groups, though a Bicolano or Ilocano were not regarded as ethnic. It became obvious during the interview process that the label ‘ethnic’ was not one with which all individuals identified or ascribed to. A respondent who self-ascribed as Cebuano or Ilocano might not see themselves as ‘ethnic’ – that being a term reserved for those whom they deemed to be cultural minorities, or indigenous cultural communities (Rodil 2004).

Once I became cognisant of the confusion surrounding the interpretation of ‘ethnic’ ascription, I broadened the identity question in order to preclude any misunderstanding: “How would you describe your ethnicity / identity?” This however, did not eradicate the confusion entirely. The term ‘identity’ itself proved to be multifaceted. A Narran professing Islam might suggest his ‘identity’ as Muslim, when in actuality his ethnicity was Maranao (from Mindanao) or Jama Mapun (from Cagayan de Tawi-Tawi). Unlike these southern transmigrants, those from the north, while identifying themselves collectively as lowland Christian, would not answer ‘Christian’ to denote their identity. However, their self-ascription was complicated in other ways. Several respondents ascribed to a ‘Tagalog’ identity, despite the fact that they hailed from regions in which their pre-migration language had not been Tagalog, or a dialect thereof. It appeared that identification with the dominant culture – reinforced by the promulgation of Tagalog as the national language – carried kudos for some interviewees. Admittedly, for smooth interpersonal relations between disparate ethnolinguistic adherents on the settlement ‘frontier’ to take place, a link language was necessary, and Filipino / Tagalog (and in some settings English) filled that role. Yet I sensed that for some, identifying broadly as Tagalog was occurring in a supra-cultural context as well as a linguistic sense.
A broadening of the ‘identity’ parameter was occasioned by the realisation that ethnolinguistic heritage alone did not adequately describe how some individuals self-ascribed. Self-ascription as ‘Palaweño’ (of / or belonging to Palawan Province) began to be noticeable once the second and third generation, and a more educated cohort (straddling the generations), began to be interviewed.

Two issues presented themselves in this paradigmatic shift. In order to comprehend the implication of such a self-ascription, I resorted to the known. An immigrant to a settler-society such as Australia might identify as Australian, if not during the lifetime of the original migrant, then within a generation or two removed from arrival. His identification would be with the nation, rather than with the state in which he was residing in. In the Narra context, it materialised that self-ascription as Palaweño was occurring in spite of recourse to national integrative and educational processes. The second and third generation, influenced by the promulgation of the national language (Filipino / Tagalog) generally forfeited the languages of their parents and grandparents. The education system and social milieu of their surroundings put them at odds with the ‘settler generation’ and contributed to a new self-identification. When asked: “Do you think or identify primarily as a national citizen or as a member of an ethnicity?” the overwhelming (though not unanimous) response was “national citizen / Filipino.” The cohort that self-ascribed as Palaweño could nevertheless identify concomitantly as Filipino. It appeared that this complex competition for, and juggling of identifications, is something most Filipinos manage – whether consciously or not – as a matter of course.207

Region-of-Origin Identity
Self-ascription fails to fit neatly into ethnolinguistic, regional, or ethnoreligious casts. Illustrative of this were the respondents from the Batanes Islands lying between Luzon and Taiwan. They identified with their province-of-origin (Batanes) rather than the Ivatan (or Ibatan) language they spoke. Likewise, a respondent from Aklan Province (Panay Island) identified as Aklanon, it being unclear whether he was proffering Aklanon as his region-of-origin or his

207 Maalouf (2003) and Davies (2000) both illustrate that a complementarity of identities may be juggled at once. In his dedication to a text dealing with identity in the British Isles Davies penned “English by birth, Welsh by conviction, Lancastrian by choice, British by chance.” I suggest that in the Palawan context similar dichotomies are evident – influenced partly as a consequence of the transmigration experience, the nation-building program, the modernity project, and the occurrence of transculturation.
ethnolinguistic status; Aklanon being an alternate name for his language, Ina keanon (Ethnologue 2009). While most provinces in the Philippines support some ethnolinguistic majority, some provincial nomenclatures do not indicate the predominant ethnic group therein. For example, those identifying as Ilocano are majorities in nine provinces (Abra, Nueva Viscaya, and Isabella among them) other than Ilocos Sur and Ilocos Norte, their home region. A different taxonomy is required for the Visayas (Panay, Negros Cebu and so forth), the island group lying between Luzon and Mindanao. At interview some respondents simply identified as Visayan, that is a regional identity, rather than an ethnolinguistic one such as Hiligaynon, Cebuano or Kinaray-a.

The issue of ‘confused’ or mixed identity will be dealt with elsewhere but, simply stated, both region-of-origin and / or ethnolinguistic heritage appeared to underpin individual self-ascription. For example, one particular respondent, while raised in Manila, had Ilonggo and Pangasinan antecedents. Similarly, respondents hailing from the Tagalog heartland in Luzon neglected, at times, to identify with their dialectal realities, choosing Tagalog as identity rather than the variations thereof – Bulacan, Manileño, or Batangueño. While migrancy, the modernity project, and social mobility increasingly undermine former certainties in which ethnic groups are correlative with a given geographical space, individuals nevertheless continue to use historic certainties as a reference point in creating current self-ascriptive realities. For example, those hailing from Mindanao and the island chains to the south tended to identify with Mindanao in the first instance, until a more succinct explanation was warranted or demanded. In this context several respondents, on closer questioning, modified their self-identification from Mindanao, to Muslim, to Maranao.

Identity Triangulation Parameters

The Philippine-specific identity triangulation model, which conflates a heterogeneity of ethnic groups into three ‘super-identities’ – Animist (oft equated with IP or Lumad), lowland Christian, and Muslim – while much cited (cf. e.g. Rodil 2004, Eder and McKenna 2004, Tigno 2006), is in my opinion confusing and found wanting. If we are seeking to establish what intercultural compromises have contributed to Narra’s transculturation then we come up against the stereotypes that the triangulation model presupposes. Looking at the broader canvas it becomes obvious that whichever group an individual belongs to, or
identifies with; they are unlikely to pronounce themselves as belonging to one of the aforementioned super-identities. An individual professing Christianity will identify himself not as a Christian *per se*, but as an Ilocano, Bicolano, or Pampangan that they know they are. However, this same individual is likely to identify someone professing Islam, not necessarily as a Maranao, Tausug, or Jama Mapun, but as a Muslim (or the long-established pejorative, Moro). Extrapolating the example further, the cohort originating from the lowland Christian arena – whom we might deem Hispanicised Filipinos – also tend to view those considered indigenous groups (IP) in a collective manner, rather than by their individual ethnic identity – Tagbanua, Molbog, or Batak. This modelling may also be mirror-reversed to show how the lowland Filipino Christian might be viewed *en masse* by either of the other two cohorts.

A case could be made for a rejection of this societal division, as in itself it fails to distinguish cultural commonalities that overlap the three-way, Animist / indigene, Christian, Muslim division. Numerically, politically and economically the Hispanicised Filipinos have come to dominate the nation-state, a situation representing the country’s postcolonial legacy. This has implications for the investigation in this thesis of how sociocultural change in polyethnic resettlement milieux are negotiated. In short, the Narra transculturation paradigm, in determining whether power relationships are relevant influencers of individual or group action, needs to take cognisance of the dominance / non-dominance dichotomy inherent in the triangulation model of societal division. The question to be asked is what role the triangulation model plays in cultural exchange or rejection. Above it was demonstrated that wet-rice agriculture did not save the Narra pioneers from privation. It was recourse to the swidden-agriculturist skills,

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208 The ‘indigenous person’ (IP) nomenclature derives partly from a phase of political-correctness modernising. Older texts would have used terms such as ‘national minorities’,tribals, or pagans. It is worthy of note that in regions of Muslimity, the ethnic groups continue to labelled Muslim; IP status being reserved for those indigenous ethnic groups who are Animist, or have lately converted to Christianity, though the taxonomy is far from clear-cut.

209 By postcolonial legacy I mean that which has been legated by virtue of a colonial association between a colonised people and their coloniser. That is, the ‘lowland Christian’ is only such because Spain was able to effect dominion over a wide range of Malay Archipelago islands. Had the Dutch or English managed to add these islands to their domains, the notion of the lowland Christian / Hispanicised persons would have been moot. As the Dutch and English adopted a more *laissez-faire* approach to matters spiritual where their colonial subjects were concerned, it is probable that had they been colonial masters of the Philippine region that the Animist / Christian / Muslim cultural divide between the plethora of indigenous groups would have been of less significance. It could be argued that similar divides have occurred in Indonesia. To this I would say that the Dutch / English had less to do with this divide than the Portuguese, who mirroring Spain’s proselytising process, inculcated their faith, before they were ousted from the Archipelago.
as still practised by the indigenous Tagbanua and resident Cuyonon, which aided in the settler community’s salvation, thereby demonstrating that social and political dominance has its limitations.

The implied power imbalance inherent in the triangulation imagining is easily demonstrated. A case in point is the indigenous ethnic Pala’wan, and Tagbanua of Palawan Province. The settling of the Province by lowland Christian transmigrants was not resisted by those occupying the land. In general the indigene / Animist moved out of the way of the incomers and the state, to occupy more marginal (usually upland) ground that settlers and settlement authorities did not yet require or requisition. Notwithstanding any cultural overlap, the hierarchal structure appeared to advantage the Hispanicised, lowland Christian, wet-rice agriculturalist over the non-Hispanicised, upland indigene / Animist, swidden-agriculturalist. If culture is rarely in a state of stasis, especially in situations of interethnic contact, then what sense does it make to demarcate triangularly? If for example an upland ethnic Pala’wan, swidden-agriculturalist, Animist, chose to become a wet-rice agriculturalist, adopt Christianity, and send his children to college, it is moot whether he should continue to be designated as an IP.

I cite the above to demonstrate that imagining cultural certainties, or labelling the Other, fails to take cognisance of shared values that might exist in spite of ethnolinguistic divergences. Furthermore, the process, potential, and trajectory for transculturation in a polyethnic and multicultural transmigrant community depend, to some extent, on what psycho-cultural baggage the migrant arrives with. Of course, class, socio-economic security, the environment, education, and human agency all have roles to play and are ancillary factors that may influence transculturative outcomes.
CHAPTER VI – NARRA: TRANSCULTURATION IN PRACTICE

In this and the following chapter I introduce the findings of the participant interviews conducted in Narra / Palawan. Before any meaningful analysis of the ramifications of transmigration and its corollary transculturation is undertaken, the nature and degree of sociocultural change that has occurred in this resettlement exemplar will be examined. To determine what changes have occurred it is necessary to acknowledge what cultural baggage the Narra settlers arrived with. In Chapter 7 I raise some of the factors that I deem to be catalysts influencing transcultural change. However, to provide some background to the ethnocultural diversity of this resettlement zone, in this chapter I address aspects of the settler’s ethnocultural legacies and how these legacies have been – and continue to be – modified. Firstly, I raise the dichotomous relationship between the migrant’s ethnolinguistic heritages and their identity self-ascriptions. The nature and degree of sociocultural change that has taken place is elicited by examining: (1) the settler region-of-origin languages and what the settlement linguistic landscape currently looks like, (2) religious adaptation, (3) the correlation between the maintenance of ethnic identity and educational attainment, (4) the degree of conviction that settler descendants feel for region-of-origin identities and (5) what role generational change has played in the portrayal of supraethnic (regional, national, and cosmopolitan) convictions.

As generational change has played – and continues to play – a significant role in many aspects of transcultural change in Narra, it was necessary to devise a method for testing this change. I divided the Narra interview participants into three generational (GEN) cohorts. GEN 1 comprises the pioneer settlers who were fully functioning adults on arrival in the settlement. I designated the non-adult children of pioneer or continuing migrants as GEN 2, with the supposition that this cohort, through the education process and socialisation, might convey different worldviews than their parents. The local-born I designated to be GEN 3. While these designations are not without their complexities, in view of the gathered data I suggest that it represents a practicable model of differentiation for investigating Narran transcultural change.210

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210 As a tool to facilitate an understanding of why interethnic coexistences have in some instances been stymied I draw upon the scholarship of academics who have studied other resettlement programs in both the Philippines and the wider Archipelago.
Participant Interviews

The aim of this chapter is to illumine what cultural changes have taken place in the Narra resettlement zone. A starting point was the arrival of a heterogeneous cohort of ethnolinguistic groups into the Municipality. Disparate ethnic groups found themselves living alongside people with whom they had previously not had contact, and depending on their degree of cultural difference, judged each other hostilely, ambivalently or hospitably. The cultural baggage accompanying the settler to the frontier – acquired primarily as a consequence of enculturation, and augmented by life-experiences – was a starting point for investigation.

Before proceeding with the investigation of cultural change in the Narra milieu an understanding of culture in the context of this chapter is important. While addressed previously (Chapter 3), a capsule account of the term ‘culture’ will be a useful entrée into what follows; that is, a description and analysis of the participant responses to the cultural questions posed to them.

The social anthropologist Edward Tylor (1891: 1) described the concept ‘culture’ as “that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society.” I suggest that keeping elements of this description (customs, habits and acquired language) in the forefront of our consciousness helps in an understanding of what is required in defining the degree of cultural differentiae separating one ethnic group from another. Additionally, understanding aspects of the transmigrants’ cultural baggage, allows for a questioning of what cultural markers are integral to individual or group identity, and which are manipulable. That is, before the degree and trajectory of cultural metamorphosis (transculturation) in the resettlement zone can be appreciated, an understanding of the convictions or certainties felt for ethnocultural attachments is necessary. Only then will it be possible to investigate the liminal spaces in which ethnocultural certainties (whether they are deliberately or subliminally held) are valorised, and how these valorisations are renegotiated in the transculturative process.

The cultural baggage with which the settlers arrived is a necessary starting point for an analysis of what changes have taken place. The first sociocultural issue that I address is that of identity (in particular ethnic identity), which in a polyethnic society such as the Philippines is a significant marker of difference, and a basis for any analysis of transculturation and its implications. Barth (1998a: 11) sees ethnic groups as ‘culture bearing units’, although a circular contention
might suggest that cultural practices contribute to the formation of ethnic groups in the first place (Macdonald 2001, Esteban 2002). In whichever way it is viewed, ethnic identity or ethnolinguistic identity is a major marker of how individuals in the resettlement zone are identified and how they self-identify. In the context of research undertaken for this thesis I gleaned that distinctions needed to be made between the certainties of an individual’s ethnolinguistic heritage (Cebuano, Ilocano, Maranao) and that individual’s identity self-ascription as defined in the context of resettlement. Of course other factors played a contributory role: isolation from region-of-origin, shared resettlement zone experiences, the diverse ethnic backgrounds of the local-born, and a more mobile, outward-looking Filipino populace following the upheavals of the Asia-Pacific War and the spread of mass communication.

Correlative to an ethnic identity – but not always relative to an ascribed identity – was the issue of language. It soon became clear from participant interviews that identification with an ethnicity was not necessarily contingent upon the ability to speak the language of the group to which the individual ascribed. Even as relatives remaining in the region-of-origin continued to use language as a marker to differentiate themselves from other groups in their midst, language diminution was the transmigrant experience. The inculcation of the national language (Filipino / Tagalog) and the further academic language of instruction (English) in the education system added to the competing struggle for identity maintenance. To this might be added the phenomenon of the increased linkages with the wider world, occasioned by the participation of self, siblings, or relatives in the Overseas Foreign Worker (OFW) program.\footnote{The Philippine OFW program represents a growing trend in Asian labour migration to more affluent economies in the region and across the world. These Filipino workers provide the construction workers, domestics, engineers, gardeners, nannies, nurses, and sailors from the Gulf States to the Gulf of Mexico, from Tel Aviv to Tokyo. Camroux (2009: 49) states that the more than 8 million Filipinos overseas represents 10 % of the Philippine population and some 22 % of the country’s workforce, a statistic rivalled by few countries. It is the remittances of the OFW that helps sustain the Filipino economy. As a percentage of the Philippines GDP the USD 17 billion remitted in 2006 accounts for approximately 13 %, eclipsing by far the remittances to Bangladesh, Indonesia and Mexico. Relatively high birth rates dictate that the OFW program will continue to be of salience to the social, economic, and political stability of the Philippines. As such it mirrors some of the objectives envisaged by the transmigration / resettlement paradigm in the postwar years. Filipinos participating in the OFW program are more prone to eschew regional and ethnic identities for a national one in certain circumstances.}

Other issues analysed in this chapter relate to religious adherence, and how the transmigration process impacts upon belief structures. An assessment of whether educational attainment played a role in identity maintenance is
undertaken. Given the increased educational opportunities of the younger cohort of respondents, especially the local-born, their continued conviction in the identity certainties of their parents and grandparents is scrutinised. Maalouf (2003: 1-21) warns that identities cannot be easily compartmentalised. For example, we do not identify with ethnicity alone: class, occupation, religion and pastimes all contribute to an individual’s identity at one and the same time as that individual adheres to a given ethnic identity. In view of this, the question of supraethnic convictions, and the fit between ethnic and national identity will be canvassed. The chapter concludes with an analysis of whether respondents experienced a sense of dilution of their ethnic moorings, and how they dealt with this dilution and the attendant sense of cultural loss or gain.

Identity Self-Ascription v Ethnolinguistic Heritage

Before undertaking any analysis of the impact of transculturation on the Narra resettlement zone was possible, I needed to establish what ethnocultural material the transmigrants had brought with them. To do this, however, I needed to ascertain who this diverse group of transmigrants were, where they had come from, and how they identified themselves. It was only possible to start a discourse on sociocultural change once an individual had revealed who they were – what identity (ethnolinguistic or otherwise) they ascribed to – and what their actual ethnolinguistic heritages were. This was undertaken by posing the questions:

(1) “How would you describe your identity or ethnicity?”
(2) “From which region or province did you resettle?” Further, to discover the degree of identity conviction it was asked:
(3) “Is your ethnicity important to you?”

On the basis of responses to these broad questions I hoped to establish whether the propensity for sociocultural change was possible or likely – given there existed the potential to elicit responses ranging from chauvinism to ambivalence.

In theory, identity self-ascription should not have presented any confusion; a respondent who had two ethnolinguistic Ilocano parents was likely to ascribe to being Ilocano. If they had mixed Ilocano / Cebuano parentage a more nuanced self-ascription was expected and, as was discovered, exogamous marriages were both prevalent and, I suggest, a significant transculturative catalyst. Ethnic heritage identity was further complicated by the realisation that generational
change had contributed to an altered self-identification among Palawan-born respondents. It became apparent that the seemingly unambiguous question: “How would you describe your ethnicity, or your parent’s ethnicity?” required a nuanced response that confounded predictable certainties. To overcome the interlocutory impasse I needed to ask a rider question: “How would you describe your identity?” Rather than eliciting black and white responses to identity interrogation, a sizeable interview cohort suggested a juggling with multiple or coexistent identities and loyalties.

Table 6.1 – Ethnic Identity by Self-Ascription c.f. Ethnic Heritage: By Generation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cohort</th>
<th>GEN 1</th>
<th>GEN 2</th>
<th>GEN 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Identity / Heritage</td>
<td>Identity / Heritage</td>
<td>Identity / Heritage</td>
</tr>
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<td>Aklanon</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambivalent</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
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<td>Batanes</td>
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<td>(3)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
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<td>Batangueño</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bicolano</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cebuano</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuyonon</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Igorot</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ilocano</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>(8)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ilonggo / Hiligaynon</td>
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<td>(3)</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(2)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>33</td>
<td>(33)</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Interviews

The first thing to note about the interview cohort (Table 6.1) is the diversity of the transmigrants. Whether viewed in the context of the respondent’s self-ascription, or in the context of their actual ethnolinguistic heritages, they comprised at least 20 separate ethnic identity groups, which mirror those of the Narra Municipality (Appendix F) and the Province at large.\textsuperscript{212} What is also of note

\textsuperscript{212} Although Appendix F – courtesy of the Municipal Planning and Development Office (MPDO) – is headed ‘Population by Dialect’ a more appropriate denotation would be ‘Population by
is the absence of a dominant group. I suggest that the lack of a dominant ethnic
group – to which the minority groups might tend to acculturate – is a major factor
in the advancing of transcultural change in the Narra resettlement zone. Had the
settler cohort been limited to one, two, or three ethnicities – as was the case, for
example, in some Indonesian resettlement projects – identification with one’s
group might have been much more sustained. Alliances advantaging some groups
over others are less easily forged and compromises more easily wrought in
situations where greater diversity exists.

In the absence of a dominant in-group, in a developing society such as the
Narra settlement, the struggle for resources was going to be of less salience than
in other archipelagic resettlement zones where the dominant / subordinate model
of resettlement existed. Among the Narra respondents the two most numerous
ethnolinguistic cohorts were the Ilocanos and the Ilonggo / Hiligaynon. Each of
these however comprised no more than 15 % of the total interview sample. That
is, the balance of the respondents accounted for 70 % of those interviewed,
demonstrating the non-dominance of any group. Even if we add the relevant
antecedents in the ‘Mixed’ cohort, to both the Ilocano and Ilonggo, they barely
account for half those interviewed. In view of this a dominant ethnic in-group
would be moot.

Almost one-third of respondents declared a mixed-heritage, and this was
accentuated among those Palawan-born (GEN 3) indicating that the intermarriage
rate had accelerated once transmigrants had been domiciled in Narra. To illustrate:
of the pioneer cohort (GEN 1) only one-fifth of respondents declared a mixed
ethnolinguistic heritage, while half of all GEN 3 respondents had mixed
antecedents. That is, the rate of exogamous marriage increased post-resettlement.
This might reflect both the diversity of the original transmigrants and / or the
absence of a dominant group(s) that could have the capacity to influence
endogamy, as was demonstrated by Hardjono’s (2001) study of transmigrant
marriage patterns in Riau Province, Indonesia. However, there are other factors
that have influenced intermarriage acceptability: social and physical mobility, the
media, adherence to a similar faith or denomination, the inculcation of national
values over regional ones in the education system, and the introduction of the

Language’. While there exist discernible correlations between many Austronesian languages, their
dissimilarities anchor them as separate languages. Mutual intelligibility, in the opinion of Paz
(pers. comm. 2011-04-14), is the test that needs to be applied to authenticate a language’s reality.
If the informant indicates he / she is unable to understand the speech form of someone, then that
person is as likely as not speaking a different language.
national language Filipino / Tagalog itself, which allowed for easier intra-generational social intercourse. Intermarriage as much as sense-of-place might also have contributed to the phenomenon that I shall call Palaweño-ness, that is, identification with Palawan, over other (including ethnic) identifications. While identification as Palaweño smacks of a new regionalism – a Filipino attribute that nation-state builders decry (Pelzer 1945, Abinales 2004) – it is as a signifier of transcultural change that this self-ascription becomes significant.

Identity by self-ascription in the Narra resettlement context gains salience when juxtaposed against the known ethnolinguistic heritages already outlined in Table 6.1. In the overall interview sample approximately two-thirds (70%) of respondents self-identified as members of an ethnic-linguistic cohort. However, this self-ascription was greatly influenced by generational change. Just as GEN 3 were more than likely to be the products of mixed marriages, so too did their self-ascriptive proclivities mirror their less defined statuses. More than one-half (55%) were inclined to self-ascribe their identity as being Palaweño, while if we add those ambivalent about their identities – wanting to choose neither one parent’s ethnic identity over the other in a mixed marriage, then it might be suggested two-thirds (66%) of GEN 3 were prepared to acknowledge an identity that failed to mirror that of their pioneer parents or grandparents and put them at odds with their ethnolinguistic relatives still residing in the pre-migration region-of-origin.

The basis for self-ascription was somewhat ambiguous; ethnolinguistic heritage dominated the field, but did not preclude other paradigms of identity. A self-ascribed Ilonggo among the second-generation (GEN 2) could not speak Hiligaynon. Rather than ascribe as ethnolinguistically Ilonggo one respondent stated his identity as Visayan, that is, he imagined a regional identity premised on the Visayan Islands better reflected his identity.\(^{213}\) A provincial-regional identity such as Batangueño indicated that although the respondent spoke Tagalog, they did not automatically identify with a broader ‘Tagalog-dom’.\(^{214}\) An example of

\footnotesize{\(^{213}\) Hiligaynon or Ilonggo are interchangeable expressions for the same ethnolinguistic grouping in the Visayan region of the central Philippines. *Ethnologue* (2009) chooses to denote the language as Hiligaynon, whilst respondents from the region generally identified as Ilonggo.\(^{214}\) Tagalog is at once a language and an ethnicity. While the first language of approximately one quarter of the Philippine population – centred primarily on Manila and surrounding provinces – Tagalog has come to represent more than an ethnicity / language. For those living outside the ‘Tagalog belt’ the inculcation of Tagalog has come at the expense of other languages, which for some ethnic groups and regional languages (Cebuano, Ilocano, Maranao etc.) continues to be a cause for anxiety. In this sense ‘Tagalog-dom’ is viewed as the imposed values of one group of Filipinos over another. As for the people of Batangas Province, *Ethnologue* posits that Batangueño
mixed-ascription identity was premised on one parent being Pangasinan, the other Ilocano, where the Palawan-born respondent suggested a three-way identity existed, in which all three strands; Pangasinense, Ilocano, and Palaweño were of equal importance. One respondent hailing from Metro Manila (MM) self-ascribed as Manileño; the generations of domicile there have obliterated a pinpointing of ethnic region-of-origin. For other MM transmigrants the link with region-of-origin had been maintained and identification with Batanes or Maranao heritages was confirmed. Several respondents ascribed to the ethnicity of either of their parents; in one instance the ascription Maranao mirrored that of the father rather than the Hong Kong mother, while in another it was the mother’s identity – owing to hands-on maternal grand-parenting – that influenced the direction of self-ascription.

The motivation for Palaweño self-ascription varied. The anthropologist Carlos Fernandez (pers. comm. 2011-03-05) suggests that self-ascription as Palaweño is an indication that identity imposition by others (parents, community, state) can be resisted or ignored by individual agency. The state attempts to impose a national, Filipino identity on its citizens, while the ethnolinguistic community and parents are generally reluctant to exit the security of known cultural heritages. For some interviewees Palaweño ascription was in response to what they perceived as the negative aspects of regionalism – that is, a reaction to a continuing Tagalog, Visayan, or Ilocano ascription that thwarted the inculcation of a broader national identity. The reaction was itself a contentious one, given that Palaweño ascription might be seen as an expression of a new regionalism – one that superseded those of the settler generation. By and large, however, it is generational change that contributes to this new self-ascription. Second-generation or local-born Narrans as well as those more educated are more likely to self-ascribe as Palaweño, though this was not a universal outcome (Table 6.5).

I suggest that there are several factors that have contributed to Palaweño self-ascription. Firstly, the inculcation of the national language, Filipino / Tagalog via the education system meant that most second and third generation interviewees had something in common, a means of communication that set them apart from their elders, who might have continued communicating in their pre-migration language. Thus, it became clear that second and third generation

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along with Lubang, Manila, Marinduque, Bataan, Bulacan, Puray, Tanay-Paete, and Tayabas – are dialects of Tagalog.
Narrans often could not communicate well with their parents or grandparents and in some cases would have to juggle several languages. Their parents might address them in the pre-migration language, to which they would answer in Filipino, the language to which they were acculturated.

‘Confused identity’ was the response of one Palawan-born respondent whose parents were ethnically different. This respondent’s opinion was that Palaweño ascription smacked of regionalism, which necessitated the proffering of a post-regional Tagalog identity. The interviews revealed that transmigrants of mixed-heritage might either identify with the region in which they had spent their formative years, or with the region from which one or other of their parents’ hailed. One Palawan-born respondent of mixed heritage, identifying as ‘Palaweño with mixed emotions’, suggested that his legacy was a ‘lost culture’. ‘Composite identity’ combined with exogamous marriages among respondents also had the potential to create ambivalent feelings with regard to identity. More than one Palaweño ascriptee stated that their identification with the current place of domicile did not preclude pride in the ethnic heritages of one or both parents.

The divergence of ascriptions: ‘hybrid Palaweño’, to ‘GI (Genuine Ilocano)’ and all variants in between is a basis for understanding – in view of the existence of complex sociocultural parameters – the trajectory for transculturation. That is, identity ambivalence has the potential to facilitate transcultural change, while strong convictions have the potential to impede such change.

Language use Modification
Language use in the polyethnic Philippines is complicated by the need for many individuals to juggle several languages: the language they speak at home with their family, the national language (Filipino / Tagalog) if they reside outside of the Tagalog-speaking belt of Luzon, English if they are academically employed, or a combination of these. Therefore for most Narrans interpersonal communication was more linguistically complicated than in their region-of-origin. For example, a

215 Advantaging one parent’s heritage over the other is not uncommon. In Choosing Ethnic Identity Miri Song (2003) suggests that societal demands as much as individual agency contributes to this advantaging. The growth of mixed race (or ethnically mixed) people plays a role in this contestation for identity preference. Song states that “…mixed people may feel they have to choose sides in relation to their multiple backgrounds; this is because, rather than recognizing or legitimating the multiplicity of heritages, the politicized discourse around racial identity tends to be dual and exclusive in nature – for example, one is regarded as Black or White, rather than Black and White” (pp. 63-64). Waters (1990) posits that multiple factors impact on the choices made to advantage one ancestry over another: knowledge about ancestors, socio-economic status and education, family structure, generation, knowledge and labelling of surnames, the effects of ‘othering’, physical appearance, and the ranking accorded ethnic groups.
Cebuano transmigrant hailing from the Visaya region (outside the Tagalog belt) and working in agriculture would probably have needed only one working language. However, once in the settlement zone, confronted with the necessity to interact with the resettlement agency, the cooperative activities expected of settlers, and the randomness of neighbour placements, interpersonal communication skills were tested.

A sizeable proportion of respondents adamantly professed that their ethnocultural identity was still important to them. Yet Narrans’ willingness to become multi-lingual (or in some instances discard their region-of-origin language) suggests that language might not be as integral a marker of ethnic identity as some might assume. I have already demonstrated that the Narra resettlement project did not support a dominant ethnolinguistic grouping that might have had the capacity to influence language use modification. Several factors have influenced the use of language in the resettlement zone. Those factors include intermarriage, the diversity of languages, the inculcation of the national language Filipino / Tagalog, generational change, mobility, and the pervasiveness and cosmopolitanist bent of mass communication.

The interviews suggested that, once in Palawan, language use modification took place immediately, as a matter of necessity. The monolingual first generation often could not communicate with neighbours – this at a time when Tagalog was unknown to some. The question asked of first and second-generation respondents: “Apart from the national language, what was your pre-migration language?” educed that there were more than a dozen in the interview cohort. It was revealed that a sizeable cohort had been conversant with more than one pre-migration language. Furthermore, those continuing to arrive in the Municipality were often multilingual.

That established, and with reference to the ongoing arrival of settlers from across the Philippines, a conundrum has evolved. The pioneers came ill-equipped linguistically and expanded their language horizons at the expense of their pre-migration language. Their likely recourse to Filipino / Tagalog heralded the diminution of both region-of-origin language(s) and ethnolinguistic certainties. Unlike the pioneer settlers, those recently arrived had been exposed to a broader sample of languages; partly as a consequence of the education process and increased mobility. While better equipped linguistically they were just as likely to resort to the national language in many interpersonal communication situations.
To clarify, we may classify approximately one-third (33) of the respondents as local-born (GEN 3), while the first-generation (GEN 1), and accompanying children (GEN 2) constituted the remaining two-thirds (58 respondents). As shown in Table 6.2, as well as eliciting the pre-migration languages of the pioneer generation, three further questions were added in order to determine what language use changes had occurred. These were:
(1) “What is your preferred language use at home?”
(2) “What language(s) do you use most with friends or in social situations?”
(3) “What language do you use most in the workplace?”

Table 6.2 – Language Use: Pre-migration / Preferred Home / Social / Work

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cohort</th>
<th>All</th>
<th>All</th>
<th>All</th>
<th>All</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pre-migration</td>
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<td>Social</td>
<td>Work</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>Batanes / Ivatan</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bicolano</td>
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<td>Cebuano</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cuyonon</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ilocano</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ilonggo / Hiligaynon</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local-born (not applic.)</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>-</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>35</td>
</tr>
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<td>-</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waray</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>91</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Interviews

The Ilonggo / Hiligaynon, Ilocano and a cohort comprising settlers utilising more than one pre-migration language represented the major arrivals but, mirroring the trend for ethnolinguistic heritage as described in the previous section, no one language group dominated. The category ‘Mixed’ reflects the fact that almost one-fifth (17 %) of those arriving in Narra were conversant in / and utilised more than one pre-migration language other than the national language.
Only four respondents (7%) of arriving migrants stated that their pre-migration language was Tagalog, but that is not to say that those of other ethnolinguistic heritages did not have some knowledge of the national language, given indigenous Tagalog-speakers form between a fifth and a quarter of the Philippines population. A distinction may be made between Narra’s migrant pioneers and the continuing arrivals.

When the settlement zone hinged primarily on the arrival of farmer-settlers, they were often from among the lower socio-economic sector of society. Landlessness, agrarian unrest, population pressure, tenancy and insurrection were all push factors; this was reflected in the monolingualism of some of the pioneer cohort – those least prepared to face a new domicile linguistically. However, technicians, public servants, educators, and health workers needed to be multi-lingual. This trend continues, with the increasing arrival of an entrepreneur class, exemplified by market traders such as the ethnolinguistic Maranao.

The home, especially in rural isolation, has the potential to isolate and insulate co-ethnics from a broader community. However, when the Narra settlement project was established the migrants were allocated a house-lot in Población, the administrative centre for the resettlement agency. As well, by drawing lots, each settler-beneficiary was allocated an out of town farm-lot. The capacity to ethnically isolate occurred when some settlers exchanged lots to reside near co-ethnics with whom they might better cooperatively work their farms. However, ethnolinguistic ghettos did not eventuate in Narra; conversely the pioneer generation embraced linguistic change. When asked: “What is your preferred language use at home?” more than one-half (57%) of the respondents stated that they used Filipino / Tagalog in their homes as a matter of course. The fact that Tagalog was given as arrival language by four individuals demonstrates the speed with which ethnolinguistic identities could be influenced once domiciled in the resettlement zone.

A further one-third (33%) employed Tagalog and one or more other languages within the home, reiterating further the increasing significance of the national language. The remaining 10%, including some younger GEN 3 or local-born respondents, stated that they continued to use their ethnolinguistic heritage.

216 Población has since morphed into the town of Narra, becoming the principal urban centre of the Municipality. As such it is the administrative, commercial, social, and educational locus for the approximately 70,000 people of the Municipality. Straddling the National Highway it is also a transit point for locations farther south.
language in lieu of recourse to the national language. It should not be interpreted that the latter group and those households mixing language use were unable or unwilling to use Tagalog. Older folk were more prone to communicate in their pre-migration language, while with children or grandchildren they would need to speak Tagalog. Conversely children were less likely to respond in the pre-migration language even if they understood it. Several families juggled Tagalog with English – given the continuing importance of English in the education system and bureaucracy. Intermarriage, generational change and the need to socialise in the wider society contributed to changes in home language usage. In consequence of the high rate of mixed marriages, several couples chose the language of one or the other spouse to communicate within their domicile. The education of their children in the national language appeared to be a catalyst for the increased usage of Filipino / Tagalog.

A further indication of how language use may be contributing to broader sociocultural change is its use in the broader community. The question: “What language do you use most with friends, or in social situations?” requires careful scrutiny. Almost three-quarters of interview participants (73%) volunteered that in social situations, or mixed company they tended to use Tagalog, whatever their preferred home language. The remaining one-quarter (27%) acknowledged that they used a mixture of languages (a category I have deemed Tagalog +) in which Tagalog is the foremost language, which by some might be supplanted for a language appropriate to a given situation. Some older respondents fell into this category. Attending a Rotary Club meeting entailed switching to English to communicate. If a group of Ilocanos were meeting then they might speak in Ilocano, or Tagalog. A retired cleric of the Aglipayan Church stated that English had been used in his services. Among GEN 3 the majority (90%) stated that their only social interaction language was Tagalog, while the remainder used both Tagalog and other languages as appropriate.

The interviews revealed that language retention among the ethnic Maranao has been more resilient. It is unclear however whether the attachment of the Maranao to their pre-migration language results from their belonging to a

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217 The medium of instruction at Palawan State University and Narra National High School continues to be English. In one primary school visited, billboards reflected the exhortation that a certain zone was to be English-speaking, while one day per week was to be an ‘English-speaking day’. Whether this continues into the future is dependent upon how strongly Filipino / Tagalog can be promoted. The reality of millions of Filipinos working abroad, adds to the status of English within the Philippines, given that many need the language to gain placement abroad.
Municipality minority faith (Islam) or whether retention is an aberration consequent to their more recent arrival. And yet, apparent language retention may be ephemeral. Given their involvement in Narra’s commerce necessitates their immersion in languages outside their ethnoreligious sphere. Even if the Maranao constitute a numerical dominance among Muslims in the urban area, like religions alluded to above, they do not represent ‘all’ Muslims. This necessitates language compromise in the mosque at least, even if social and home milieux afford opportunities for language retention. Not unlike other Narrans, Maranao children are faced with the educational inculcation of Filipino / Tagalog, suggesting ongoing generational compromises.

In their work situation, more than half the respondents (62 %) declared (Tagalog +); that is, they would use Tagalog and whatever other language was appropriate to their task. Included in this cohort were the College student interviewees. Two educator respondents stated that English was their work language, though at times they would fall into the Tagalog + cohort. An exemplar of this cohort would be an agricultural extension officer who might use English at his desk, Tagalog across the counter, and when dealing with remote rural clients, speak with them in Ilocano in order to make them feel at ease. Two individuals spoke English at work and over one-third (38 %) indicated that Tagalog was their work language.

In summation I suggest that the Narra language use modification neatly demonstrates a facet of the transculturation paradigm in the resettlement process. If we acknowledge that language is an important signifier of identity (Fishman 2003: 123-124), then the Narra resettlement experience has encompassed compromise and thereby acted as a catalyst for sociocultural change, new accommodations and in a cyclical manner further contributed to the diminution of language-as-identity marker. While it could be argued that societal change

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218 The link between religion and language (or in some cases religion and ethnicity or race) is dependant on circumstance. Linkages may result from chauvinism, social isolation, or ostracism. Examples abound: the Patagonian Welsh, Utah Mormons, Pennsylvania Amish, Australian Lutherans, and diasporic Jews are representative of the three models. Australian Lutherans epitomise neatly the religion / language duality; prior to the World Wars religion and language were for them integral. Not so for German Catholics who formed part of a wider Catholic community in Australia.

219 To illustrate the language / identity correlation Fishman (2003: 123-124) advances the case of Turkey. “As part of its over-all post World War 1 program of seeking a new Turkish identity (in contrast with its old Ottoman-Islamic identity) governmentally sponsored language planning conscientiously and vigorously moved to attain script reform… [including the] vernacularization and simplification of non-technical Turkish… [with] the language of the Anatolian peasant held up as a model of purity and authenticity…”
within the Philippines has impacted on Narra language use modification, the reality is more complex. Anecdotal evidence suggests that language use modification among relatives in the region-of-origin has not evolved along the path experienced in Narra. Narrans – across generations – have embraced the national language as a means of interpersonal communication, whereas in the region-of-origin ethnolinguistic diversity has not materialised to the same degree.

It should be noted that Filipino / Tagalog is being inculcated via education and the media but with a majority ethnolinguistic cohort remaining extant in some provinces, recourse to Tagalog in the non-Tagalog zone for social and employment intercourse is less pressing. The implication is that when Palawan-born individuals visit their cousins in the region-of-origin their ability to communicate is constrained, because as Palaweños they may have already rejected their parents’ / grandparents’ region-of-origin language. As revealed by several respondents, recourse to Tagalog or school-English during visits to relatives limits spontaneity, putting the transmigrant offspring at a social disadvantage.

As younger Narrans’ understanding of their parent’s pre-migration languages decreases – or else they openly reject the use of these languages as their social milieu broadens – the Tagalog + cohort will most likely continue to diminish. By contrast a reification of altered identities, a national Filipino one in conjunction with a regional Palaweno one, will likely develop. It would appear that the language use trajectory has been inevitable. Members of the pioneer generation, thrown together in adverse circumstances, were willing to learn each others’ languages. The progression to adopting Tagalog and the increased rejection by the Palawan-born of pre-migration languages contribute to ongoing change.220

Rural-to-rural transmigration to Narra did not create ghettos. While a perusal of the documents ‘Population by Religious Affiliation’ (Appendix G), and ‘Population by Dialect [read Language]’ (Appendix F) confirms that individual barangays host ethnicities and religious cohorts disproportionate to their share of the population, it appears that ‘rural ethnic ghettos’ have not eventuated. Reasons for this might be the rate of intermarriage, the diversity of ethnic heritages and

220 Settler societies the world over: Argentina, Australia, the U.S., and newer post-decolonisation settler societies: France and the U.K. have faced similar scenarios. In each of these a dominant existing national language has impacted on new arrivals. An added observable fact is that these settlement models are urban-based, and depending on the diversity of the immigration have had the potential for ghettoisation.
religious persuasions, and the commodification of land once the settlement agency granted title to the farm-lots. By contrast, three examples – Davis (1976), Waters (1995), and Hardjono (2001) – illustrate that rural-to-rural resettlement does have the capacity to effect ‘rural ethnic ghettos’.

Waters’ study of German rural resettlement in Russia and the United States demonstrates that in certain circumstances immigrants (in this case Volga Germans in Russia and Hutterites in North America) may resist acculturation with the surrounding society, a process that can be sustained for centuries.

Similarly Davis and Hardjono have investigated cohorts of Indonesian transmigrants for whom little transculturation has taken place. Davis posits that Balinese settlers were amenable to acculturating with groups among whom they settled in Sulawesi, when their numbers were few, but once a critical mass of their own ethnic group was reached, language, religious observance, dress, and diet could be reinvigorated, that is a reification of their culture occurred when their position altered to one of being a dominant group, rather than a minority in a given settlement zone. Indeed, unlike the Philippines where the national language was a link language, in the Indonesian context the national language (Bahasa Indonesia) could be employed when economically necessary while the ‘rural ethnic ghetto’ supplied all other sociocultural needs.

Religious Adaptation Paradigm

Religious transculturation in the Philippines (as elsewhere across the Archipelago) has been a process of producing faiths that are distinctly regional in nature and outlook. That is, they are manifestations, or syncretic versions of transplanted faith structures. The remnant Hinduism of Bali, the Buddhist / Hindu fusion of the Tengger people from the Mount Bromo massif in East Java and the diverse Muslim and the Christian adherents across the Archipelago are hybrid examples, neatly epitomising regional realities.²²¹ In essence and name they are synonymous

²²¹ All faith / belief structures (including the monotheist) introduced into the Archipelago had to contend with existing sociocultural practices and diverse Animist belief systems. Not all extant cultural practices at odds with new faith structures could be eliminated, and it is in the context of partial compromises that syncretic faiths emerged. An example of the changing role played by religious change is that of gender equity. Women in Austronesian societies had greater status in the pre-monotheist period. The coming of Christianity and Islam reversed much of this status, by the inculcation of patriarchal societal structures. Matrilineality (among the Minangkabau in Sumatra) and gender equality (among the Pala’wan of southern Palawan) has survived in pockets, but cultural change has been widespread. For a graphic illustration of how archipelagic gender relations and broader cultural mores were undermined by the grafting of sixteenth century Spain’s patriarchal values onto a Philippine society refer to Carolyn Brewer’s (2004) text Shamanism, Catholicism and Gender Relations in Colonial Philippines, 1521-1685.
with the colonial and trader-instigated faiths that overwhelmed existing Animisms, but in lived experience they diverge from the orthodox. For example, few Spanish Catholics would accept the passion with which a Filipino Catholic engages in the annual Easter Crucifixion exhibition. Esteban (2002) and Macdonald (2001) demonstrate how religious ascription among evolving ethnic communities continues to be a means utilised in improving marginal temporal situations. Macdonald illustrates the effect of religious transculturation with his analysis of the ethnic sub-group *Pânimusans*.

Living in the south of Palawan Island, the *Pânimusans* to all intents and purposes appear to mirror their co-linguals, the ethnic Pala’wan. Living on the coastal fringe, among migrant Muslims from Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago, they identify as Muslim. As Macdonald notes, their adoption of the proscription on eating pork and turtle appears to be one of the few religious practices that the *Pânimusans* undertake. Wedged economically between the ‘genuine Muslims’ (for example, the Jama Mapun and Tausug) traders, and the Animist interior Pala’wan, they appear to be involved in a state of ethnogenesis. While appearing to stand at the top of the social scale in the ethnic Pala’wan world, in Macdonald’s opinion, they stand at the bottom of the social scale in the Muslim world. Although these observations concern a section of Palawan’s autochthonous population I insert this observation to illustrate that identities – including religious / belief structure identities – are not static, and have the potential to be embellished or diminished.

In order to test the hypothesis that movement to the ‘frontier’ had the potential to dilute devotion and thereby demonstrate the propensity for transcultural interaction, I posed the questions: “What is your religion / denomination?” and “Do you practice the same religion / denomination as you did in your region-of-origin?” For the pioneer generation (GEN 1) this was straightforward; they were raised in eras when there were greater certainties. If one’s parents were Roman Catholic, Seventh Day Adventist, or Muslim, one generally followed suit. I suggest that the potential existed for renewed religiosity in a frontier setting where one was removed from former environmental certainties; however, the participant responses showed that the opposite was also

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222 What Macdonald is inferring is that in the Muslim world the *Pânimusans* – with their minimal observance of religious practice and proscription – are regarded as ‘incomplete Muslims’ by other ethnic groups professing Islam. Conversely, even their partial observances of practice and proscription aligned them – in the eyes of the wider ethnic Pala’wan world – with those Muslim ethnic groups (for example the Tausug and Jama Mapun) that had dominated regional commerce for centuries, thus advancing their status, and elevating them on the social scale.
possible. It is not clear whether this is an element of transcultural change due to the heterogeneous milieu of Palawan, or simply the manifestations of the options that a modern world has to offer, but the fact that change in religious observance is possible augments the transcultural paradigm. The increasing intermarriage pattern in the resettlement zone necessitates religious decision-making that involves the offspring of such unions.


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<th>Adherents / Municipality</th>
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</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evangelical / Pentecost</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>609 (1.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iglesia Ni Cristo</td>
<td>2 (2.2 %)</td>
<td>2476 (3.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islam</td>
<td>8 (8.8 %)</td>
<td>826 (1.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life Church</td>
<td>1 (1.1 %)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>19807 (28.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roman Catholic</td>
<td>59 (64.8 %)</td>
<td>38670 (56.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seventh Day Adventist</td>
<td>8 (8.8 %)</td>
<td>2131 (3.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tribal Religions</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Methodist</td>
<td>2 (2.2 %)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>91</td>
<td>68806</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Interviews / Municipality of Narra (CBMS)

Perusing the ‘Population by Religious Affiliation’ document (Appendix G) it appears that several barangays are over-represented in adherents of a given faith when measured against the overall data for the Municipality. An example would be the Seventh Day Adventists in Barangay Estrella Village or the Muslim adherents in Barangay Antipuluan; two barangays visited for this project. While on a municipal-wide basis the Adventists were 3.1 % and Muslims 1.2 % of the total population, in Barangay Estrella Village, Adventists represented 10.1 % of the population, while in Barangay Antipuluan adherents to Islam registered at 4.5 %. I mention this to pre-empt any perception that religious enclavism (in the vein of ethnolinguistic ghettoism mentioned above) has developed in Narra. While it is true that the majority of Muslim adherents resided in three barangays: Antipuluan, Aramaywan and Población, this is easily explained. Antipuluan and Población are
designated as urban barangays, and since many of the recent Muslim immigrants are engaged in commerce and trade they have made their homes within orbit of the marketplace.

The interview participants reflected a spectrum of religious affiliations that mirrored the Municipality at large. The biggest cohort of adherents identified as Roman Catholic, though a dozen other persuasions were recorded. 65% of participants identified as Catholic as against 56% for the Municipality records. Of the respondents the Aglipayan, Muslim, and Seventh Day Adventist cohorts were over-represented when compared with the Municipality at large, though I suggest this does not influence the overall religious landscape, the degree of religious stability, change, and/or cultural compromises associated with a mixed-faith environment.

While settlers in general kept the faiths that they arrived with, one-fifth (18%) altered their affiliation after arrival. Their accompanying children were more consistent; their conversion rate reduced to half their parent’s rate (8%). The local-born cohort exhibited a more complicated picture. They sometimes had to choose which parent’s religion they would adopt; therefore while almost one-fifth (18%) of the local-born stated that they had faiths different from their elders, a similar cohort among the local-born revealed that they had adopted the faith of one parent over the other. No respondent stated they were without faith, though degree of observance appeared to vary. One respondent suggested that her father had converted to marry and had subsequently never set foot in the church of his wife. Whether this pragmatic act implied irreligiosity or subliminal retention of original faith was not made clear. Sociocultural flexibility was exhibited by instances where spouses adhered to different faiths. One respondent who had married interfaith where each party wished to have the ceremony in their family’s place of worship made the pragmatic compromise to have the ceremony in the church of a third faith, a compromise that appears to have been acceptable.

Interfaith marriages, that is, situations in which spouses practised different faiths, appeared to be more prevalent in those professing Christian denominations; however one respondent who had converted to Islam revealed that his spouse had remained a Roman Catholic. Anecdotal evidence suggests that interfaith arrangements for self or offspring were tolerated and imagined to be limited to within the broader Christian faith. That said, there did not appear to be a proscription as such for Muslim and Christian intermarriage. However, several
Christian interviewees suggested that they would be against their children marrying someone who was Muslim. Conversely, several Muslim respondents appeared to be more receptive to their offspring marrying someone who was Christian, the supposition being (in the eyes of the respondent parent) that the Christian party would convert to Islam.

Table 6.4 – Religion: Continuity v Change

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cohort</th>
<th>GEN 1</th>
<th>GEN 2</th>
<th>GEN 3</th>
<th>77 (85%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Same religion</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>27</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changed religion</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>14 (15%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>33</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Interviews

In summation, I wish to speculate why Narra’s religious reality does not mirror that of other resettlement projects in both the Philippines and the Archipelago. I acknowledge that religion is not the only marker of difference between transmigrants and others, yet its invocation as a differential between those opposing resettlement and the settlers themselves – in resettlement zones other than Narra – requires explanation. In contrast to several resettlement zones in Mindanao, where communalist violence (the tribulation of the resettlement phenomenon) and displacement has hinged on recourse and reification of opposing religious traditions, Narra (and Palawan) continue to experience reasonable stability. That is not to say that amity has reigned supreme. In Palawan’s south, where both Animist and Muslim have been impacted upon by an influx of primarily Christian transmigrants, there continue to be anxieties that manifest in religious reification. I suggest that several factors have a bearing on why Narra as resettlement zone has avoided the negative tribulatory outcomes experienced elsewhere.

Firstly, the volume of transmigrants from across the Philippines – both Christian and Muslim – has been of a magnitude able to overwhelm any potential antagonism from the indigene population (who may themselves have been Animist, Christian or Muslim) already resident in the Municipality. Secondly, a hegemony of sorts was created and sustained by settler recruitment from those areas of the Philippines more densely populated (the north and east) that was home to predominantly Christian Filipinos. Thirdly, the Muslim arrivals into the
Municipality have not come from among those in the Palawan Island’s south – itself a Muslim in-migration area for centuries (Evangelista 2008a) – but rather from areas such as Mindanao where destabilising internecine violence has impacted on livelihoods and safety. Fourthly, those Muslims (exemplified by the Maranao) that have come to the Municipality, generally earn their livelihoods as traders and merchants, and therefore have not competed for land with previously privileged settler-beneficiaries.223

By these observations I am not implying that an increased juxtaposition of the Animist, Christian and Muslims trinity in the Municipality would be grounds for social and political instability. Rather, that in Narra (unlike in certain Mindanao migration zones) ethnic and communal reifications have not been invoked in defence of economic advantage. Two factors contribute to the avoidance of tension. Firstly, there is the numerical imbalance between the communal cohorts. Secondly, the ethnoreligious cohorts fill differing niches in the local economy.

**Maintenance of Identity v Educational Attainment**

A correlation between the continuing conviction for a given ethnic identity and the level of education of the respondent became apparent. Surmising that an increased level of education has the potential to broaden people’s worldviews, the tertiary-educated would appear to be advantaged in any re-assessment of individual ethnocultural identities. Conversely, the ethnocultural worldview of those less educated, hailing from the marginalised in society, might be expected to remain more inflexible. Fernandez (1975: 231-232) states: “Given their backgrounds as poor tenants, with low educational attainment, and limited technical or managerial skills, the settlers are in a very vulnerable position.” Not only were the weak forced back into the proto-typical landlord-tenant relations from which they fled in their regions-of-origin, they had the potential to seek security in known-realities – that of their ethnic or identity group. Viewed against Fernandez’ Narra of the 1970s, the interview responses of the current survey required a nuanced assessment. Four decades on, in a more globally connected world, Filipinos – many of whom have relatives working abroad and in some

223 A cohort of Muslims within the Municipality, who do not fit this criterion are those residing in the rural Barangay Aramaywan, where they represent 6.2 % of the population and are involved in agriculture. It should be noted that despite the transmigration of Muslims into Palawan Province, in percentage terms their position vis-à-vis the general position has not altered. Yet, in essence, those continuing to arrive are joining the urban sector.
cases married abroad – are likely to have a more cosmopolitan outlook than the former narrower identity ascriptions of the pioneers.

To determine if educational attainment played a role in settlers’ spiritual attachments to ethnolinguistic heritages it was necessary to marry the responses to the following questions:

1. “Is your ethnicity important to you?”
2. “Have you experienced ethnic dilution since resettlement?”
3. “Do you feel a sense of cultural loss since resettlement?”

Individuals might well state that their ethnicity was very important, but if they held that they had experienced ethnic dilution and went on to state that they didn’t feel a sense of cultural loss, then they were categorised as having ‘mild convictions’ regarding their heritage identity. For example, one-third (31%) of the tertiary-educated respondents stated that they maintained strong passions for their ethnolinguistic heritage (Table 6.5). Similar scrutiny was applied to the other cohorts. Before proceeding, a note of caution is warranted; the sample appears to be heavily weighted in favour of the tertiary-educated because included in this cohort are a number of undergraduates from the Narra Campus of Palawan State University. However, when viewed alongside the interviewees in toto their inclusion has appeared not to skew the overall convictions displayed by the tertiary-educated cohort.

Those with the highest educational attainment – the tertiary-educated group – are divided between those that maintained weak (43%), mild (26%), or strong (31%) convictions for their parent’s ethnolinguistic heritages. While the degree of conviction was not contingent upon the attainment of a tertiary education, the small sample of Masters and Ph.D. elucidated a more cosmopolitan outlook. Although some of the younger tertiary-educated maintained that their conviction to their ethnic heritage was steadfast, at the other end of the spectrum an ambivalence toward heritage was evident; that is, where feelings for inherited identities were ‘neutral’. One respondent revealed that he did not identify with any ethnicity and suggested that his current lived reality was one of ‘postethnicity’. The self-ascription of an increasing cohort as Palaweño was further evidence of how inherited loyalties had lapsed. Yet, one tertiary respondent viewed this new allegiance as just a further form of regionalism – which was critiqued as a hindrance to a national Filipino identity.
Table 6.5 – Identity Conviction: By Educational Attainment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cohort</th>
<th>Primary</th>
<th>Secondary</th>
<th>Tertiary</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conviction / strong</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conviction / mild</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>18</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conviction / weak</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>30</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Interviews

It appears that the act of transmigration itself has had a bearing on how individuals see themselves vis-à-vis their resettlement fellows. The intercultural contact zone has played a role in the re-alignment or altered self-ascription of some individuals. Notwithstanding the propensity for interethnic marriages to contribute to mixed or ambivalent notions of self-ascription – especially among offspring cohorts – a more subtle manifestation of identifying with ethnic antecedents is apparent. The evidence suggests that ethnolinguistically diverse migrant cohorts thrown together in a resettlement environment experience their ethnicity differently from those that migrate to already-settled regions of the country. One respondent, who had been born in Metro Manila but whose antecedents had been Cebuano, suggested that during her time at University in the capital she had felt an affinity with other Cebuano students with whom she had primarily socialised. Working for a national corporation before transmigrating to Palawan, and committing to an exogamous marriage, has altered this respondent’s worldview, to the point where she feels comfortable in admitting neutrality towards a former strongly felt ethnic identity.

Among respondents with a secondary education an equal three-way division existed between those voicing strong, mild, or weak convictions for their ethnolinguistic antecedents. As tertiary education becomes more widespread, the secondary-educated cohort is destined to decline and reflect an older group of respondents. This model of decline also holds for those having primary education only. This cohort is for the most part represented by the pioneer generation, for whom a limited primary education had been the norm. While the primary-educated form the smallest cohort of the interviewees, they displayed the strongest attachment to their ethnic heritages, 83 % suggesting strong convictions and 16 % falling in the weak-conviction category. Anecdotal evidence suggests that some
among the GEN 3 educated in Narra are departing for larger urban areas in other provinces – a reverse migration of sorts. Whether this exodus from the Municipality (and Province) of a more educated, articulate and nuanced cohort will impact on the region’s overall level of interconnectedness with an increasingly globalised world is far from clear.

In summation I suggest that a number of factors coalesce in order for education to play a role in an individual’s identity dilemma. Firstly the Filipino state mandates that the education system be conducted in Filipino / Tagalog, which regularises a mode of interconnectedness across the country. However, in the regions-of-origin – despite this regularisation – the necessity to use the national language is limited in situations where an ethnolinguistic population remains dominant. For example, in regions where ethnic Ilocanos predominate, there is less incentive for individuals or families to communicate in a language other than their heritage language.

However, in resettlement regions such as Narra, being versed in the national language has circular and recurring impacts. In this limial space, where ethnolinguistic diversity reigns supreme, education in a common language has allowed social interaction and intermarriage on a scale not imagined in the region-of-origin. This has ensured the national language’s status as the lingua franca, rather than merely a language of advancement, which it might continue to be in Cebuano or Maranao regions-of-origin. With the national language thus employed – that is, as social and advancement language – the transmigrant offspring, not having to juggle their heritage language with the national language, are better situated to participate in higher education. This, I suggest, impacts on educational attainment, which in turn – if we examine the weakening identity convictions of the tertiary-educated as interviewed above – contributes to reassessments of identity self-ascription.

While languages continue to be powerful markers of ethnic identity in resettlement zones such as Narra, their diminution – in the face of ethnic diversity – contributes to a situation in which further interethnic cooperation is probable. Factors influencing ethnic-language diminution include the combined effects of the inculcation of a national language, and the increased educational opportunities this affords. The educational milieu further allows a liminal space in which younger cohorts of Narrans are able to reassess former identity certainties, a space conducive to additional transculturative transformations.
Offspring Convictions

The potential for transcultural change is dependent upon, in the first instance, the identity convictions of those moving to the settlement frontier. The adamancy of one interviewee that he was a ‘genuine Ilocano’ (GI) well illustrates the articulation of a strong identification with ethnolinguistic region-of-origin – in rhetoric at least. It has already been demonstrated that the pioneer settlers were amenable to change in the use of language, were prepared to marry outside their ethnic group and adopt or adapt customs of their neighbours. However, reality dictates that migrants would necessarily arrive with cultural baggage, and the propensity to compromise former lifeways would depend on individual agency. Secondly, the identity convictions of settler children and subsequent generations would further influence transcultural outcomes. Hypothetically, if one belonged to a dominant group, with economic and political advantages, then the identity convictions of succeeding generations might be sustained – or even reified into something more potent. The resultant ethnic chauvinism might be sustained if the progeny of the pioneers continued to identify strongly with the identity of preceding generations.224

To gauge the convictions of post-pioneer Narrans, the question was posed: “Do your children feel as strongly about their ethnicity as you do?” While there were inconsistencies, the responses were instructive, and may be précised thus; the further removed the offspring were from settlement date the greater would be the diminution of attachment to ethnic heritages. Simply stated, almost one-half (43 %) of the pioneer generation deemed that their children felt no, or little attachment to the ‘identity-baggage’ of their parents, thereby demonstrating an ambivalence. That did not preclude a degree of feeling or a respect for ethnic heritages. Rather, that the heritage was not central to decision-making about life choices (every-day language use, who to socialise with, and whom one should marry). Again, I suggest that the ethnic diversity of Narra contributed to this ambivalence. This contrasts sharply with resettlement projects in both Indonesia and Malaysia. Anecdotal evidence from a visit to Baturaja (South Sumatra) suggests that offspring identity convictions there more closely mirrored that of

224 A modern example would be Protestant youth in Ulster continuing to identify strongly with their pioneer forebears – the settlers that arrived in the ‘Irish Plantations’ during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Their cultural practices reflect the anxiety they feel about the uncertainties inherent in coexisting with the Other and having to concede a position of economic and political dominance once protected by the state.
their parents. The continuing enclave nature of this particular settlement and the lack of ethnic diversity no doubt contributed to the reassurance with ‘the known’.

At the other end of the spectrum, one-third (33 %) of the respondents in the Narran pioneer generation responded that their offspring’s attachment was as great as their own. While I acknowledge that this was a mediated response it is possible that a direct approach to their offspring might have evinced a more nuanced response. That observation notwithstanding, the revelation that some offspring households continued to speak the pre-migration language and maintain strong links with the region-of-origin appears to indicate that attempts at identity maintenance were being pursued. However, closer scrutiny revealed that whatever the rhetoric – whether offspring conviction was strong or partial – transculturation was taking place. In the face of non-dominance of any group, even the ethnic marker of language was being assailed. Factors such as the education system (premised on the languages of instruction Filipino / Tagalog and English), intermarriage, and the changing economic basis of society from an agricultural base to one of commerce and services, conspired to make it more difficult to maintain a holistic ethnocultural separateness within the settlement zone.

This contrasts with the Baturaja model of resettlement mentioned above. While it is true that the Indonesian education system is premised on the language of instruction Bahasa Indonesia, once back in the bosom of their families, living in ethnolinguistic enclaves that might be Balinese, Javanese, or Ogan (the local autochthonous group), recourse to region-of-origin language, customs and belief structures could more easily be observed and defended.

The responses of second-generation and local-born respondents (Table 6.6) show that attachment diminution progressed rapidly, so that the local-born respondents – with children old enough to be cognisant – could suggest that no child had a strong attachment to their parent’s ascribed identity. Further, the vast majority (92 %) of the local-born respondents with applicable (compos mentis) children suggested that their children felt little or no attachment to either their parent’s identity convictions, or more generally a conviction for the ethnic region-of-origin. That said, where individuals identified as Palaweño, their offspring would overwhelmingly feel similar sentiments. However, it was association with the ethnolinguistic heritage that was central to the line of questioning. While the sample was constrained by the fact that seventeen of the overall sample were childless at the time of interview (majority not yet childed), and a further fifteen
had children too juvenile to have coherent identity feelings, the sample
nevertheless indicated a trend, that is, a diminution of ethnic identity conviction,
the further in time a respondent was from arrival date in Narra.

Table 6.6 – Progeny Attachment to Parent’s Identity Conviction: By Gradation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cohort</th>
<th>GEN 1</th>
<th>GEN 2</th>
<th>GEN 3</th>
<th>Discounted</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strong attachment</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partial attachment</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambivalence</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Juvenile</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Childless</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total surveyed</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Interviews

Gradations of attachment were not set in concrete, however. Due to the
number of interethnic marriages, responses were complicated by divided loyalties.
One respondent suggested that her children wanted to maintain links with the
identity of each parent, a situation that precluded dogmatism. Conversely,
attachment could lean toward one parent or the other. As one Ilongga stated, if
anything, her children’s attachment was closer to their Chinese father. Strong
offspring conviction – at times predicated on the maintenance of the pre-migration
language in the household – was complicated by the offspring’s dual heritage
where interethnic marriage had occurred.

For one respondent who had children born on both sides of the
transmigration process, there was a divide in conviction between those that had
been born in Palawan and those born in Iloilo – the region-of-origin – and this
despite the fact that both sets of children had been educated and socialised in
Palawan. One pioneer respondent stated that while his children could speak
Igorot, his grandchildren were monolingual in Tagalog. This would indicate that
identity inculcation – while possible with one’s own children – was less likely a
generation further removed, especially in view of contemporary social and
economic realities.
Globalisation is another phenomenon impacting on the likelihood or otherwise of maintaining strong convictions for one’s ethnolinguistic heritage. Narra (and Palawan) may have been geographically isolated from the Philippines at large in the recent past, but with modern communications this is no longer the case. With an increasing population vying for resources and opportunity and a finite frontier in which few new lands are available for further resettlement, Palaweños – mirroring Filipinos at large – are increasingly seeking employment in the wider world as nurses, ships engineers, maids, or technicians in the Persian Gulf and elsewhere. Several respondents had children working internationally or had married abroad. If anything, these expatriates identified as Filipinos – with the Philippines (a national affiliation) rather than with a specific region of it – and especially so if their forebears had already made the move from region-of-origin to Palawan in the first place. In essence these expatriates were continuing the diminution of conviction for an ethnolinguistic heartland. The reality of having a fifth (Camroux 2009: 49) of the country’s working population abroad may have implications for the inculcation of a broader national (or for some a cosmopolitan) identity in lieu of a narrower one premised on ethnicity.225

**Supraethnic Attachments**226

Individual ethnolinguistic ascription, as Nagata (1974) has shown, does not infer an inflexible, given identity. One’s ascription may be Cebuano, Ilocano or Maranao, but regional proclivities, religio-cultural attachments and national loyalties all compete to create what Nagata deems ‘situational loyalties’. Yet

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225 By this I mean that an identification as Filipino-first may come more readily for those participating in the OFW program. Wherever they are in the world it is probable that they will be identified by others (and identify themselves) as Filipino rather than their narrower regional or ethnic affiliation. For those not participating as OFW, the potential exists that a continuing ethnic affiliation will be maintained, in one sense because they are less mobile than their OFW compatriots, and in another sense because not having the opportunity to participate in the OFW environment might engender feelings of exclusion (in a struggle for resources sense), which rather than stimulate national feelings may prompt ethnic or communal reification. An analogous exemplar exists for example in that of the Turk national as gastarbeiter in Germany. The German citizen, employer, and state have little interest in knowing whether the gastarbeiter is ethnic Turk, Kurd, or Arab. Likewise the ethnicity of the Ilocano or Maranao abroad is of little concern to those in the environment to which they proceed. That is not to say that given sufficient numbers in the abroad-environment, that members of these ethnicities might seek each other out. That said, there also exists among emigrants abroad a feeling of a shared experience that allows the gastarbeiter, migrant and sojourner to feel some affinity with others in his liminal position.

226 In another section of this thesis I invoke the term ‘supraethnic’ to examine the notion of ‘Palaweño’ identity and ascription. That is, the prefix _supra_ was employed to represent the idea of ‘beyond’ or ‘transcending’ the ethnic, which the term ‘Palaweño’ is inferring. A further interpretation might be that of describing the cosmopolitan as a ‘trans’ or ‘supra’ ethnic. However, in this section I use the term ‘supraethnic’ to represent the attachment various ethnicities might feel for the nation-state in which they reside.
when diverse groups share a political or social space, they are as likely as not to juggle their markers of identity in ways that create cultural overlap and harmonious intersections – thus precluding social tension. However, when attempting to maintain state cohesion the polyethnic archipelagic nation-state is faced with greater challenges than that of the classic European model of the nation-state. Centuries of state intervention and proscriptions have created a French citizen who speaks French and is nominally Catholic, an Irish citizen who speaks English and maybe either Catholic or Protestant, or a Dutch citizen who speaks Dutch and was previously segregated by the Catholic-Protestant divide. The degree of proscription was such that in some cases the nomenclature for the nation came to mirror the language spoken there-in; Poland (Polish), England (English), Germany (German). This has not been possible in the Archipelago.

Not only was the postcolonial archipelagic nation-state faced with creating institutions that suited its diversity, decisions about national languages, religions and other supraethnic markers had to be faced in a climate of regional and ethnic sensibilities, and often in the fraught atmosphere of the hurried nature of the de-colonisation process. While Indonesia chose Bahasa Melayu – a minority language (and trade lingua franca) – as a national language to placate the anxieties of the 59 % of non-Javanese in that imagined nation-state,227 the Philippine sense of inculcating a national ideal, while less hurried, was just as fraught with anxiety. Both Spanish and American rule had emanated from the Tagalog belt, and this influenced the decision-making process in choosing a non-imperial language for a national language and a catalyst for inculcating a national loyalty. Unlike Indonesia, where 41 % of the population were ethnically Javanese, the Tagalogs represented at best one-quarter of the country’s population. A further aspect of difference is the fact that Filipinos, more than Indonesians, had been exposed to the languages of their colonial overlords. I mention this by way of

227. The choice of Bahasa Melayu to represent the national language of the putative Indonesian state occurred in 1928 when young intellectuals gathered in Batavia to promulgate the Sumpah Pemuda (Youth Pledge): one fatherland, Indonesia; one nation, Indonesia; and one language, Bahasa Indonesia (Ricklefs 2001: 233). This choice did not reflect a rejection or reaction to the language of the coloniser, Holland, but rather a pragmatic choice dictated by the fact that it had been Dutch policy to limit exposure of their language to the colonial populace at large (Groeneboer 1998). A French visitor in 1940 stated: “Dutch colonial policy has never for a moment considered that the Dutch language could play a part in the culture and civilization to be given to the native. On the contrary, by opposing him with a language intended to mark the distance which sets him apart from the European, the Dutch have striven and still strive, though vainly, to deprive their ward of contact with the outside world” (p. 268-269). This differed markedly from the U.S. policy in the Philippines where the language of the coloniser became the lingua franca of the colony, and a link with the outside world.
illustrating that the inculcation of a supraethnic identity – one based on the nation rather than on ethnic or regional loyalties – has impacted on regional and ethnolinguistic attachments. In a sense this contributes to the creation of spaces in which transcultural change is more possible. The process, I suggest, is one of self-perpetuation; once one has begun to experience change in one aspect of one’s life, further change is less angst-ridden and more probable.

To gauge the degree of supraethnic attachment in the settlement zone – where theoretically there existed a space for reification of one’s ethnic identity (as evidenced in Mindanao) – I posed the question: “Do you primarily think and identify as a national citizen or a member of an ethnicity?” How should one interpret the revelation of an individual who identifies strongly as Cebuano, Ilocano, or Maranao, while then admitting that his first loyalty was to the Philippine state? The intersection of responses to questions #1 (self-ascription), and #4 (identity conviction) with #21 (supraethnic conviction) (Appendix A), illustrates how individuals juggle their identities. It is unclear what percentage of one’s identity is marshalled in order to define one’s ethnocultural heritage as weighed against a national persona. The Filipino diaspora previously mentioned faces this question on an ongoing basis. When abroad – whatever their diverse ethnocultural proclivities – they generally identify as Filipino, but on repatriation this identification may be renegotiated in favour of a pre-expatriate reality.

The majority (81%) of respondents stated that their first loyalty was as a national citizen, or Filipino. However, a subsection of this cohort admitted that the degree of conviction was tempered by the individual’s particular circumstances. Yes, they had feelings for the state, but these were reflective of previous socialisation and environment. One respondent, for example, acknowledged a three-way loyalty, that is, citizenship with reservations: Filipino first, Palaweño second and Aklanon (Panay Island) third. The divided loyalty theme was not contingent upon educational, economic or age factors. One pioneer respondent professed Filipino loyalty as primary, with the codicil ascription of being cosmopolitan, ‘a person of the world’. The response from one educator was that of ambivalence; while grudgingly acknowledging primary conviction for the state, reservations hinged upon the perception that the ‘state ideal’ fell short of its potential. An alternative response from another educator was that it was

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228 The ‘state ideal’ in this respondent’s opinion envisaged a scenario where the state would better guarantee its citizens social and economic security; that is, in deed rather than rhetoric.
incumbent upon educators to be national role models and to inculcate the national ideal.

A minority (19%) stated that in their current location (Palawan), ethnicity, region-of-origin, or a combination of ethnicity and cultural marker such as religion, better represented their primary loyalty. This ranged from primary conviction reflected in attachment to a Palaweño loyalty only, to a position where Palawan was primary, but the state had almost equal billing. One respondent suggested a stronger Palaweño conviction than Filipino, while a contrary opinion stated a reluctance to subscribe to a born-again or postethnic notion. A less complex stance encompassed that of ethnicity or language-group only.

While Philippine academe proffers a simplistic triangulation of Filipinos as ‘lowland Christian’ ‘Muslim’ and ‘upland indigenes / Animist’, no response from the majority of respondents who identified as Christian, put faith in the forefront of their identification with the state. This may result from the perceived certainty surrounding the touting of the Philippines as a ‘Christian Asian country’ (Malcolm 1951) – in the manner in which Indonesia is constantly being referred to as the ‘world’s largest Muslim nation’. Whatever the bias, several respondents in the survey professing Islam were divided as to their supraethnic conviction. One Maranao suggested he was a Filipino Muslim, while a co-ethnic defined his conviction for his Maranao heritage, in which Islam played a central role.

The illustrated examples show that while Narra as a zone of intercultural interaction continues to impact on individual attachments, the lack of dogmatism revealed in the range of convictions allows a space for further transcultural interactions to occur. The fact that a respondent, who had proudly admitted his GI (Genuine Ilocano) credentials was as likely to admit that he was a proud Filipino, puts ‘situational loyalties’ into stark relief. Maalouf’s (2003: 23) suggestion that “identity isn’t given once and for all” but rather something that is “built up and changes during a person’s lifetime” holds true for transmigrants and their descendants more than it does for those they left behind. Like migrants the world over they are confronted with more choices that need to be addressed than their non-migratory relatives, and among those choices is the one tested by dimensions of loyalty. I suggest that convergent responses to questions of supraethnicity and ethnolinguistic identity conviction among the majority of interviewees denote a propensity for further sociocultural amendments to an individual’s identity – as
suggested by Maalouf – and that these amendments will be drawn from, and be influenced by, the cultural baggage of their ethnically diverse fellow-settlers.

**Sense of Ethnic Dilution and Cultural Loss**

Resettlement has the potential to result in two outcomes: a reification or diminution of identity, the latter both influencing and being influenced by the transculturative process. While reluctant to stray into the realm of social psychology à la Tajfel (1981), it is the individual that determines whether he has experienced a diminution or dilution of his ethnic certainties and in the process experiences a cultural loss. The degree to which the individual reacts to ethnocultural stimuli in his midst, or the alacrity with which he is able to interact with fellow (but ethnically disparate) settlers has the propensity to determine whether harmony will reign in the resettlement zone. The responses of Narra interviewees reflected that some individuals – especially among the pioneer cohort – had great difficulties in letting go of known sociocultural realities and adopting or adapting new ones. Their progeny find it less difficult.

The adage: ‘absence makes the heart grow fonder’, connotes the possibility that away from regions-of-origin a potential for recourse to ethnic certainties might eventuate. Factors that could influence this inclination among pioneer transmigrants might include a perception of a lack of success in the resettlement milieu; a perception that some other group was succeeding at one’s expense, or simply to justify one’s position in a basic struggle for resources, in which one’s family and identity group – rather than the settler cohort at large, facing similar hardships – would feature foremost as agents for action. Superimposed on these anxieties could be suspicion of the ‘other’, ethnic chauvinism, and homesickness.

To comprehend the dimension of ethnic dilution and/or sense of cultural loss in Narra two questions were posed: “Have you experienced ethnic dilution since resettlement?” and “Do you feel a sense of cultural loss as a result of resettlement?” The responses indicated that there was no mutual inclusivity

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229 Tajfel acknowledges the pressures faced by individuals – one plus one creates a group and influences individual action – attempting to make sense of their social-psychological identities. It continues to be the individual who has the capacity to determine whether he wishes to cling diligently to his known ethnocultural enculturation or whether other options are more amenable. While he cites (1981: 197-206) several examples of the devaluation of national or ethnic affiliation by the children of resettled migrants, it is difficult to isolate the individual/group divergence. The fact that some (not all) individuals are prepared to reject or modify former ethnocultural certainties would indicate that in spite of group (including generational peer) pressure the individual continues to be the final arbiter of his ethnocultural future – whatever the potential sense of loss.
between the two notions. However, a rider needs inserting here. Half the pioneer
generation (GEN 1) responded that they had not experienced a diminution of their
ethnic identities, though when the majority (88 %) of this cohort volunteered that
they had not felt a sense of cultural loss, a more nuanced scrutiny was required.
On reflection the responses could be interpreted in several ways: either they felt
little sense of ethnic dilution and felt they were maintaining their culture, or that
cultural loss had occurred and it didn’t bother them greatly. That is, a ‘no’
response to either question might be interpreted as ‘we are holding our own’.
Based on anecdotal evidence I suggest that a disconnect exists between the
‘actual’ maintenance or diminution of ethnic certainties and cultural loss and the
‘perceived’ versions of the same. An example to illustrate this is language. A
respondent might claim that he holds fast to his Ilocano or Maranao ethnic
heritage at the same time as he has learned and primarily uses another language –
usually Filipino / Tagalog as medium of communication with friends, work
colleagues, and children.

Table 6.7 – Sense of Ethnic Dilution and Cultural Loss: By Generation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cohort</th>
<th>GEN 1</th>
<th>GEN 2</th>
<th>GEN 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sense of ethnic dilution / yes</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sense of ethnic dilution / no</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>33</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sense of cultural loss / yes</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sense of cultural loss / no</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>33</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Interviews

At the other end of the spectrum the responses of local-born participants
also need some unravelling. One-fifth (21 %) of the local-born (GEN 3) felt a
sense of ethnic dilution – that is, of their forebears' heritage – while the majority
(79 %) suggested otherwise. This response, it must be remembered, was from a
cohort who identified increasingly with the new regional Palaweño identity, and
might be regarded as a reaction to the previous pioneer reality of identifying with
the past. Their perception, or otherwise, of having experienced a diminution of
their antecedent identity, appeared not to influence their identification with Palaweño-ness. While the GEN 3’s sense of ethnic dilution was minimal and understandable, in the matter of cultural loss almost one-third (30 %) admitted that they felt a sense of cultural loss; possibly a nostalgia influenced by parents and grandparents.

GEN 2 responses fell somewhere between their pioneer parents and their local-born offspring. Two-thirds (64 %) felt that they had experienced dilution of their ethnic heritage, while only a quarter (24 %) inclined to state that they had experienced a sense of cultural loss. On reflection, I sense that admitting to a dilution in one’s ascribed identity or acknowledging that ethnocultural diminution had occurred should not necessarily be interpreted in a negative sense. One Ilonggo respondent suggested that yes, he had experienced ethnic dilution, an adaptation necessary for adjustment to a new home, and that the cultural loss of his language was not all negative – the adoption of Tagalog being a convenient medium for discourse. Conversely, language diminution for a fellow Visayan was expressed as a cultural loss in which he felt dependent on his majority language (Ilocano) neighbours.

While acknowledging socio-economic progress, one respondent regretted the cultural loss associated with diminution of marriage and mourning rites that their culture-group had performed pre-migration. For a Maranao respondent cultural loss was expressed as not being able to practice Ramadan in the manner it had been in pre-migration Mindanao. However, this was offset with the revelation that there were fewer restrictions for females in Narra than in the Maranao ethnic heartland. In a similar vein one local-born respondent paraphrased her parent’s lamentation that Narra weddings were not accompanied by the slaughter of a carabao (buffalo), as had been practiced in Luzon.

On the matter of ethnic diminution, one 85-year-old respondent (transmigrated from Batangas Province in 1951) is representative of many. He admitted to a decreased longing for his region-of-origin, a diminution of his Batangueño identity, and the cultural relegation of his pre-migration language – Batangueño. As a consequence of cultural accretion he has learned the Ilocano language (of his Ilocana wife), the indigene Tagbanua and Pala’wan languages, and the national language that he uses at home and socially.

Rather than a sense of cultural loss, one respondent intimated that for him resettlement had engendered ‘cultural gain’ in that he had formerly had no
connection with other ethnic groups. The embracing of a new Palawan (Palaweño) identity occurred without a sense of cultural loss in one case. Local socialisation – or ‘acculturation’ as one person put it – appeared to have the same effect. Yet other responses suggested ethnic diminution with the erosion of language use, levels of respect and diminished hospitality. The decline of cultural practices such as use of native songs and wedding and funeral customs contributed to a sense of loss, but did not slow the pace of change.

Several respondents for whom the attributing of an ethnic label was problematic, who were ambivalent about ethnic or regional proclivities, or who considered cosmopolitanism better suited their disposition, appeared to be minimally impacted by changes occurring in the settlement zone. The presence of co-ethnics was one response to not feeling a sense of diminution or loss.

In summation, the interviews and anecdotal evidence show that the tempo of sociocultural change for Narra transmigrants increased for each succeeding generation. Overall, immunity from transcultural change was difficult. The changing nature of economic pursuits – increasing urbanisation and attendant service sector pursuits – led to more social interaction than would be likely in isolated farmsteads. Intermarriage, the non-dominance of any one group, the adoption of Filipino / Tagalog as medium of communication all contributed to this change. While a sense of ethnic dilution and cultural loss was expressed by some, few attempts at altering the culture flow were attempted. Altered language use patterns best epitomises the fact that nearly everyone arriving in Narra / Palawan experienced sociocultural change to some degree. With language a prime marker of ethnolinguistic identity, when that language is superseded by necessity or generational change, transculturality is in progress. Whenever the pioneer settler is confronted with a possible non-endogamous partner, and grandchildren with whom he wants to communicate – but who are unlikely to speak a pre-migration language – his wish to retain his culture-language appears fraught.

The responses to enquiries regarding cultural adaptation – in the fields of identity self-ascription, language use modification, identity maintenance, offspring conviction, supraethnic attachments and sense of cultural loss – in this chapter, provide the foundation for testing the hypothesis that transculturation in the Narra resettlement zone has impacted positively on ethnocultural identity, which has in turn facilitated interethnic harmony.
CHAPTER VII – NARRA: TRANSCULTURATIVE CATALYSTS

In the previous chapter I discussed some of the findings of the participant interviews. The interviews began with determining how individuals in the Narra / Palawan resettlement zone identified themselves. Self-ascription, it was revealed, did not always coincide with ethnic heritage, and for younger Narrans identity was increasingly premised on a sense of being Palaweño – regarded by some as an alternative regionalism. During the process of distilling the degree and nature of any transculturative changes that had taken place in the Municipality it was established that there had been a substantial diminution of pre-migration language use. Further, it emerged that there existed a correlation between the level of ethnic identity maintenance and the educational attainment of Narrans. Concomitantly, when respondents were questioned about the degree of conviction their offspring exhibited for inherited ethnocultural attachments, it transpired that diminution was occurring. The further distant the individual offspring was from the pioneer generation, the weaker was their degree of conviction for former ethnic attachments. An analysis of interviewee’s supraethnic (Filipino) convictions concluded that ethnocultural attachments, or former regional proclivities, did not appear to be diminished by recourse to a broader national identity. It was less discernible whether (and how) transculturation had impacted on Palawan transmigrants and their progeny – whether participants perceived that they had experienced cultural loss and / or a sense of ethnic dilution.

This chapter will elaborate on some of the factors or catalysts that have contributed to sociocultural or transculturative change in Narra. The basis for the assertions made continues to be the revelations of the participant interviews, though anecdotal evidence and the contribution of key informants have helped to expand the insight. The first catalyst I examine is what links transmigrants (and their progeny) continue to maintain with the region-of-origin. I then investigate the extent of non-endogamous marriages and how they have impacted on the self-ascription of succeeding generations. Given Narra’s ethnic diversity – with no dominant group able to dominate the sociocultural scene – I explore the nature of socialisation in the resettlement milieu. Before addressing the concept of cross-cultural cooperation, the notion of cultural compromise will be addressed. Cultural compromise and negotiation is the quintessence of what allows diverse ethnic elements in the resettlement zone to coexist harmoniously. By compromise I do not mean ‘acculturation’ whereby one group – typically a numerically weak
or ‘civilisationally weak’ (Zialcita 2006: 145-159) one – bows before a dominant group, but rather ‘transculturation’, whereby there is an interchange of cultural practices without attendant dominance baggage.230

**Links with Region-of-Origin**

The potential for transcultural change in the resettlement zone is challenged by the multi-layered loyalties to family, co-ethnics, region-of-origin and friends. These loyalties influenced the push-pull factors associated with transmigration. Some interviewees had difficulty tearing themselves from extended family. It was revealed, more than once, that for the pioneer generation homesickness was of real concern for many. Not only did some transmigrants abandon their allocated farm-lots because they were unable to succeed at frontier farming, many genuinely grieved for the relatives and region they had left behind. However, despite the hardships faced by settlers (Veloro 1995, 1996), the push-factor of poverty and the pull-factor of land determined that few would return to regions-of-origin. In an age when migrants arrived in Palawan by sea, to return was expensive and rarely contemplated. However, this did not mean loss of contact. In the interim the nature of communication has become more diverse: air travel, the cell-phone, and Internet are affordable for the offspring-generations, potentially putting relatives and co-ethnics in closer touch with each other. Yet the continuing interaction with the past appears not to have stymied the transculturation phenomenon – the shedding of region-of-origin languages in favour of the *lingua franca* Tagalog being but one example.

Responses to the survey question: “Do you maintain links with or visit your region-of-origin?” revealed a generational shift away from identifying with the heritage of parents and grandparents. The participants revealed that, despite easier communication, maintaining links with region-of-origin depended on

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230 By ‘civilisationally weak’ I do not imply the existence of any moral turpitude, but rather that some groups in the polyethnic Philippines have not experienced the same consciousness-raising interaction with the diverse ethnicities in their midst. In his civilisational trinity trajectory: ‘primal’, ‘chiefdom’ and ‘civil culture’ Zialcita (2006) eschews the term ‘civilisation’ à la Tylor for the label ‘civil culture’.

The ‘acculturation’ / ‘transculturation’ dualism is poignantly illustrated in Elaine Brown’s (1991) thesis *Tribal Peoples and Land Settlement* in which she recounts an intercultural exchange thus: “…while playing in the school yard, little Palawan [sic] girls lacking underpants (knickers) have been ridiculed by Christian Filipino girls. In humiliation, these girls fled school and have never returned. Those girls’ experiences have encouraged other parents to furnish their daughters with underpants or shorts” (p. 166). The effect, I suggest, was acculturative – one group was coerced into compliance or mimicry. A transculturative outcome would have encompassed some Palawan girls adopting knickers, while some Christian Filipino girls would reject their wearing. The ‘civilisational’ model dictates that in a progressive world all girls will wear knickers.
generational ascription, and as shown above the Palawan-born increasingly eschewed former heritage identities for a new Palaweño identity. Linkage for this group (GEN 3) with region-of-origin might be superficial. In general, succeeding generations did not feel an obligation to extended family in the region-of-origin, whatever they felt about the uniqueness of their ethnic heritage. The decreasing links with region-of-origin among succeeding generations, I suggest, acted as a transculturative catalyst. Unlike the pioneer generation, succeeding generations were less burdened by their ethnocultural baggage and more responsive to interaction with their peer group irrespective of the diversity of their ethnic heritages.

In the previous chapter it was revealed that the majority of respondents – discounting the local-born who were more strident in expressing their new Palaweño identity – maintained that their ethnolinguistic heritage, regardless of volunteered self-ascriptions, continued to be an important marker of identity. This revelation has not impeded sociocultural interaction and exchange amongst Narra migrants. Bearing this in mind, the maintaining of links with region-of-origin might be interpreted as encompassing a notion of nostalgia, rather than a re-connection or reification with the asserted claims of pre-migration identities. Whatever the rhetoric, there were individuals who, despite stating that their ethnic heritage conviction was strong, had not maintained links with family or their region-of-origin.

Over half (58%) of the pioneer respondents (GEN 1) stated that they visited their region-of-origin often. The denotation ‘often’ proved to be imprecise; some interviewees were able to return annually, while for others return visits were irregular. If a respondent had visited five or more times, I deemed that as ‘often’, two to five visits were deemed ‘seldom’, though this construal needed to take cognisance of the respondent’s age. Five visits would be viewed as ‘seldom’ for a 60-year resident, while for a 20-year-old GEN 3 respondent it would appear as ‘often’. Whatever the model employed, context illuminates the trend. One-third (30%) of GEN 1 seldom visited their region-of-origin; several respondents had visited once, while a similar number had never paid a return visit, although this cohort did maintain communication of a sort.

Linkage with region-of-origin decreased for GEN 2 respondents. One-third (32%) disclosed that they visited often; with a similar response (36%) admitting that they had visited seldom. One-fifth (20%) had made a single visit,
while among the remainder one respondent had never visited and a further two had no connection at all with the region-of-origin. At the other end of the spectrum, almost one-third (30%) of GEN 3 admitted that they had no connection with the region-of-origin; a further 9% had connections, but had never visited. Of the balance; 18% visited often; one-quarter (27%) had visited seldom; and 15% had made one visit back.

Table 7.1 – Maintaining Pre-Settlement Linkages: By Generation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cohort</th>
<th>GEN 1</th>
<th>GEN 2</th>
<th>GEN 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Visit often</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visit seldom</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visit once</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No visit</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No connection</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>33</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Interviews

The first thing to note is the correlation between the three cohorts’ length of residence in Palawan and the diminution of their contact with region-of-origin. It seems that absence does not always make the heart grow fonder. While one-third of respondents advised that they were in cell-phone and / or email contact, this was less likely for the local-born. Anecdotal evidence suggests that once socialised as Palaweño, with Tagalog replacing the language-of-origin, communication with relatives was not as comfortable or spontaneous. Linguist Consuelo Paz (pers. comm. 2011-04-14) suggests that while communication with region-of-origin could be conducted in the national language Filipino / Tagalog, many of the people in the regions (including young people) felt more comfortable speaking the Ilocano or Bicolano, and so forth of their region-of-origin, reserving the national language for appropriate occasions. Hence, the local-born Palaweño,

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231 This holds true for migrants the world over. A personal communication with a Philippine-born UTAS student corroborated this notion. Having arrived in Tasmania as a ten-year-old, and subsequently socialised in English and Tagalog, the student revealed that return visits to Bicolano relatives in the Philippines were attended by linguistic difficulties; that is, while the relatives learnt English and Tagalog, they were more comfortable with the Bicol language, which the UTAS informant was not. This difficulty holds for many younger Palaweños; their socialisation is in Tagalog, not in the region-of-origin language with which their relatives continue to communicate.
having eschewed the language of their antecedents was put at a disadvantage socially with his region-of-origin relations.

The increased mobility afforded to the postwar generation produced a further complication. A number of interviewees, when asked the ‘maintaining links’ question, found it difficult to respond succinctly; they had made several migrations before eventually settling in Narra. Furthermore, mobility had afforded interethnic interaction on a wider canvas, complicating the region-of-origin reference point. It emerged, for example, that the reference point for one interviewee who had been born in Manila of a Maranao (Mindanao) father and a Chinese / Bicolana mother, was his father’s religion rather than either of his parents’ region-of-origin. That is, he was at ease with Maranaos in Narra not because of their ethnicity but because the majority of them espoused his faith. For others the reference point was more confused; having been born in one place (Metro Manila for example) they had linkages with that place rather than the region or province from whence their parents or grandparents hailed.

In summation the interviews indicated that with each successive generation the links with the region-of-origin continued to weaken. This has had implications on several levels. Firstly, those living in the Narra settlement zone were thrown onto their own sociocultural resources. Unconsciously they have had to weigh up what aspects of their culture needed to be retained in order to bolster their ethnic credentials, while at the same time subordinating those aspects detrimental to their coexistence with others. What they needed to negotiate was which facets of their lifeway would be useful in their new locale and which would hinder economic success and / or smooth interethnic, and interpersonal relations. Two examples illustrate the point. From an economic perspective, the Narra pioneer’s need to eschew wet-rice cultivation by reverting to slash and burn agriculture (Chapter 5) – which while regarded as ‘civilisationally’ retrograde – was nevertheless an (agri)cultural necessity. In the matter of smooth interpersonal relations, what is significant is the alacrity with which the pioneer generation learnt their neighbours’ languages.

Secondly, the resettlement experience itself differentiated Narrans from their region-of-origin kin and co-ethnics. The shared privations of the frontier were instrumental in creating a bond between settlers, which distanced them from kin who had not shared in these privations. The pioneer narrative was one of hardship: paucity of rations, unsuitable skills for developing virgin forest lands,
accidental death while land-clearing, malaria, and the isolation of the settlement from the perceived security of a nearby town. Before the National Highway was constructed Puerto Princesa was often inaccessible by road. The aura of resettlement privation helped generate a sense of a differing identity. Describing the settling of Quinlogan (southern Palawan), Veloro (1996) suggests that for the pioneer generation a pecking order evolved, one based on the degree of sacrifice and privation (penitensya) they had experienced. The Narra pioneer generation, for whom letting go of the past would have been the most difficult, demonstrated that they had the capacity to do just that. The new camaraderie that developed among a heterogeneous settler cohort excluded or at least minimised the previous connections with region-of-origin certainties.

**Interrmarriage**

Marriage between persons of different ethnolinguistic, religious, and other cultural particularities might be regarded as facilitating transcultural change. The process requires compromises. For example, couples with different pre-migration or home languages, or diet or rituals (marriage, birth, and death) need to determine which strategies they will adopt for harmonious coexistence. As already demonstrated, a sizeable Narra transmigrant cohort strongly affirmed a continuing ethnic pride. The prevalence of exogamous marriages, however, necessitated a dilution of ethnic convictions and attendant cultural particularities. For such intercultural relationships to succeed, compromises, by one party (or both) had to be accommodated. In the majority of cases neither the respondent’s self-ascription nor their ethnocultural heritage appeared to impact on decisions made with regard to marriage options. Among the factors facilitating interethnic marriage were the adoption of a new *lingua franca* (Filipino / Tagalog), a broader range of social interaction, and the possibility of maintaining pre-marriage religious convictions.

There were two facets to the matrimonial issue. Firstly, to discover the degree of miscegenation that had occurred in Narra, respondents were asked: “Are you married to a person of your ethnicity?” For those not yet married (including the majority of PSU undergraduates) an ancillary inquiry was made to discover whether their parents were of differing ethnicities. Secondly, to gauge if there existed a preference among parents about whom their offspring might marry,
respondents were asked: “Would you prefer your children to marry within your ethnicity or identity group?”

Table 7.2 – Marriage Patterns / Marriage Preference for Progeny: By Generation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cohort</th>
<th>GEN 1</th>
<th>GEN 2</th>
<th>GEN 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Married – Endogamous</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married – Exogamous</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unmarried – Parents Endogamous</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unmarried – Parents Exogamous</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>33</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Child Marriage Preference – Self-choice | 24    | 21    | 21    | 66    |
| Child Marriage Preference – Reservations | 7     | 4     | 11    | 22    |
| Child Marriage Preference – n.a.       | 2     | -     | 1     | 3     |
|                                       | 33    | 25    | 33    | 91    |

Source: Interviews

Whichever way the data is viewed, it becomes obvious that generational change continues to impact on decisions or preferences that individual respondents made, or would be likely to make, with regard to marriage options. Of the GEN 1 marriages – either entered into pre-migration or on the settlement frontier – (60 %) were endogamous; that is, somewhat more than half the pioneer cohort was married to a person mirroring their own ethnolinguistic heritage. The balance of the pioneer marriages (40 %) were exogamous, or interethnic. For GEN 2 the trend was reversed; one-quarter (26 %) of respondents were endogamously married, the balance (74 %) were exogamous. This tendency was magnified for GEN 3: 14 % endogamous, compared with 86 % exogamous marriages. This trend gains salience by the acknowledgment that 25 % of those claiming interethnic marriages had spouses of mixed parentage. A further observation reveals that while some of the GEN 2 had been children who had
accompanied their parents to Palawan, they were as likely as local-born second or third generation respondents to marry across the ethnic divide.

In all cohorts, among the unmarried, those with mixed parentage exceeded those who had parents of the same ethnicity, and from this it could be surmised that they too will not feel any compulsion to marry within their identity ascription. The enquiry about what marriage preferences parents had for their children elicited varied responses: the overwhelming majority of Narrans were unwilling to interfere in their offspring’s marriage proclivities. Of the parents surveyed, 75% stated that ‘self-choice’ in choosing a mate was the expected norm. 25% maintained they had reservations about whom their children should marry; that is, a preference for the marriages to be within certain ethnolinguistic and / or ethnoreligious parameters. However, even among this cohort there was a fallback position that envisaged ‘self-choice’, regardless of the parent’s reservation. Of interest was the revelation that a small group of parents, who had themselves been married exogamously, nevertheless harboured reservations about whom their own children should marry.

Several respondents, who would have preferred endogamous liaisons for their children, were realistic enough to accept the reality that their children had married ‘out’ despite their reservations. A smaller cohort was less concerned about interethnic marriage than about interfaith relationships. Of these, two Christian respondents voiced that they did not mind which denomination their offspring married so long as it was within the broader Christian faith. Muslim preferences were more likely to come with a codicil for differing arrangements for male and female progeny, although there was no consistency in any imagined marriage arrangement. In one instance it was suggested that male offspring could marry Christian females, who it was assumed would then become Muslim. Again, preference did not seem to indicate dogmatism, as one Muslim respondent already had children who had married out of faith without conversion, and without recrimination.

One respondent, having herself made an interethnic marriage, and avowing that ultimately they would support their children’s choice, stated that she preferred her children to marry within the ethnic band Tagalog, Ilocano or at least Pangasinan, or Bicolano. A further position (from a female respondent) was that her preference was for offspring to marry into the husband’s ethnic grouping, though again no dogmatism was involved. Having mixed antecedents did not
dissuade one respondent from favouring one side of the ethnic divide for their offspring. Preferences notwithstanding, several respondents had offspring or siblings who had married abroad (Canada, Denmark, France and Australia), further defining the transcultural paradigm.

Among the respondents, those yet unmarried (20%) embodied primarily the GEN 2 and GEN 3 cohorts. Their numbers were represented principally among the PSU undergraduates. To test the reliability of the generational trend toward an increasing interethnic interdependence I posed to the unmarried cohort the hypothetical question: “If you were parents, would you prefer your children to marry within your ethnicity?” Their responses mirrored those of the married cohort. That is, one of decreasing dogmatism. The largest segment advocated ‘self-choice’; a smaller group had endogamous preferences, but would accept realities as they developed. One female student (Muslim) respondent imagined future daughters would marry co-ethnics (in this case Maranao) but would allow sons free choice. A fellow-Muslim respondent expressed an endogamous preference.

The role of intermarriage as a transculturative catalyst in the Narra model of resettlement is not as evident in other archipelagic transmigration zones. Factors contributing to exclusionary matrimonial attitudes include social status, ethnic, racial, and religious chauvinism, and ‘civilisational’ status. The social standing of transmigrants – be it in the Philippines or farther afield – reflects the fact that they often hailed from among the poorest, the landless, and the least able in society (Fernandez 1975, Arndt 1983) and in consequence were often looked down upon by those already residing in the resettlement area. As already alluded to, in her Riau study Hardjono (2001) illumines that few migrants were prepared to marry exogamously, notwithstanding identical adherence to Islam. Malaysia’s 1958 FELDA resettlement project at Lurah Bilut (Lee and Bahrin 2006), while incorporating Chinese, Indian and Malay settlers, did not experience the Narra model of miscegenation. The constraints being race, religion, and ethnicity.

232 By ‘civilisational’ I infer the divide between the perceived superior statuses of wet-rice cultivators when contrasted with the indigene slash-and-burn agriculturalists in resettlement areas. Wet-rice cultivation was regarded by state planners, economists, and politicians as the epitome of development, of progress, while indigenous practices were regarded as wasteful, backward.

233 While my visit to Lurah Bilut was a cursory one, anecdotal evidence suggested that intermarriage was not occurring. What was most probably intended by the interlocutor was that ‘interracial’ marriage was not occurring – interethnic marriage (intra-race) would, I imagine, not have been stymied. What was patently obvious was that within this resettlement project, housing had been zoned along racial lines. This mirrors the reality of enclavism as occurred in some
Mindanao (Tigno 2006) and Lampung (Wertheim 1957) both exemplify the ‘civilisational’ divide. In these cases transmigrants entered zones already occupied by swidden agriculturalists, who owned their lands communally. Resettlement projects premised on individual ownership of land contributed to that resource being commodified, and as shown in Chapter 4 this generally disadvantaged the indigenous peoples in most regions, which in turn contributed to the reification of ethnocultural proclivities. In Mindanao the indigene-settler interface was more troubled, in that the migrants were Christian while the indigenes were Muslim or Animists. Because of the numbers involved, in-group identification prevailed, permitting the shunning for the most part of interfaith marriage, for example. In the context of intermarriage the Mindanao and Lampung examples reveal the antithesis of the Narra resettlement reality. The data demonstrates that even when Narrans had reservations about interethnic and interfaith matrimony, the maintenance of intercultural relationships (or their socialisation) with the wider community, was not precluded. 234

In summation I suggest that exogamous marriages were both a facilitator of transculturative change and an act of transculturation itself. Previously it was established that a sizeable proportion of younger Narrans have forgone an identity ascription mirroring that of their parents and grandparents and now ‘imagine’ themselves as Palaweños. This, I suggest, correlates neatly with the role played by intermarriage. Notwithstanding the fact that both a Filipino and Palaweño identity could be ascribed to concomitantly, intermarriage has put Narrans out of step with their region-of-origin co-ethnic kin. Because of the diversity of ethnicities in the settlement zone Narrans are a step removed from the Filipino-ethnicity dichotomy that encapsulates the identities of most Filipinos. Intermarriage has allowed Narrans to ‘imagine’ a third identity – one that cannot be imagined by their kin in the region-of-origin. The ramification of this is that a space has been created in which further transcultural change can take place.

Indonesian resettlement zones, but is the antithesis of the Narra model in which house-lots and farm-lots were drawn by lot to encourage the mingling of ethnic groups.

234 To restate, I consider that the absence of a dominant group (in both numerical and political context) has contributed to Narra’s success as a model of resettlement. The heterogeneity of the Narra settler cohort avoided the dominance paradigm faced by alternative resettlement regions both in the Philippines and the wider world.
Resettlement Zone Socialisation

I now examine the social interaction of Narra transmigrants, and demonstrate how diverse ethnocultural groups acquired a sense of community that facilitated transcultural change. Socialisation helped break down barriers between ethnocultural groups, which in turn assisted the forging of a new Palaweño identity. The following example illustrates the process of socialisation. One elderly respondent from the pioneer generation stated that for him loneliness had been an important catalyst impelling his interethnic connections. As Appendix F shows his Bicolano ethnicity represented a minority of approximately 0.6% of the Municipality’s diverse population – their dispersal across all barangays furthering a sense of ethnic isolation. As an educator, this respondent was obligated to socialise widely; his pre-migration language (Bicolano) ill-equipped him for the role. He faced initial difficulties teaching and understanding others, Ilocanos for example. His socialisation continued on a more personal level. Whether from loneliness or love, this respondent married across ethnic lines, an Ilongga, a process smoothed by his having learned, from other settlers, his partner’s language (Hiligaynon). This illustration aptly represents the socialisation process and how it underpins the Narran transculturative trajectory.

However, the above example of socialisation should not be regarded as a replicable precedent. In settler-societies the world over, migrants, when beset by racism, ethnic chauvinism, exclusionary practices and when being overwhelmed by the integrative and acculturative demands of host societies, may seek the certainties of their ethnocultural anchors, their known worlds. The travails faced by pioneer Narra transmigrants – isolation, homesickness, malaria, hunger, and disillusionment – had the potential to propel individuals and families towards their co-ethnics, thereby hampering interethnic socialisation. Previously mentioned archipelagic resettlement scenarios – the lowland Christian transmigration to Cotabato (Mindanao), the Javanese movements to Lampung and Riau, the Balinese passage to Central Sulawesi, and Javanese and Madurese transfer to

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235 I use the term ‘socialisation’ to mean the act of socialising with others; that is, social intercourse on a day-to-day basis, whether in work situations, neighbourliness, or wider social interaction. Henri Tajfel (1981) differentiates between inter-individual behaviour and intergroup behaviour, which, I suggest has a bearing on the degree of socialisation possible. It takes only one negative inter-individual experience, for judgements to be made about that individual’s ethnic, religious, or cultural particularities. A wider socialisation conversely shows up the futility of stereotyping at the behest of one negative inter-individual experience.
Kalimantan – have all experienced reifications of ethnic identities at the expense of interethnic socialisation. This was not the Narra resettlement zone experience.

Simons (cited Fenton 2008: 144) suggests that “…deficiencies of state authority in impoverished societies have a profound influence on the choices people make about whom they can trust.” Archipelagic nation-states, variously authoritarian and variously able to satisfy the social requirements of their citizens, force those citizens to rely on the ‘known’ and in the case of transmigrants this means relying on their kin rather than on the state. The Cebuano settler in Mindanao, or Balinese resettled in South Sumatra, facing the trauma of relocation and not receiving the state support needed, are at times thrown onto their own resources and the security of what is familiar, their ethnocultural heritage. Arndt and Sundrum (1977: 89) suggest that isolation, enclavism and separation are inherent in rural-to-rural resettlements in ways that would be impossible in rural-to-urban settings. They suggest that urban integration – including via the pathways of social interaction and intermarriage by young people – is a less fraught process than that experienced in the isolation of frontier settlement projects. In ethnocultural transmigrant enclaves the scrutiny of the community has the power to influence what social choices individuals make. In this environment personal restraint, censure and ridicule by others limit both integrational and transculturational possibilities.

Despite similar travails faced by the pioneer generations in a range of migration milieux, the Narra model of resettlement has defied the intra-ethnic resolution of adherence to in-group solidarity. Rather than resort to the security of their co-ethnics, Narrans cooperated, soon made cross-cultural friendships, attachments, and married interethnically. The propensity for social interaction and the space for this to occur were not unique to the Narra settlement zone, but Narra does demonstrate the potential for harmonious interethnic relations to occur. Interethnic socialisation between Ilocano and Cebuano in Narra should be no more remarkable than that between Javanese and Balinese in Baturaja, or various ethnic groups in Mindanao – and yet it was. I suggest that it was the absence of a dominant group (or groups) that was the variable defining the Narra socialisation model when juxtaposed with others.

To determine what degree of socialisation had occurred, or was occurring, or whether there was a rejection of intercultural dialogue, I posed the question: “Do you socialise primarily with persons of your ethnicity?” To nuance the
response I established several categories of social interaction: (1) those who
socialised primarily with co-ethnics, (2) those who preferred to socialise with co-
ethnics, yet stated that they mixed with all comers, and (3) those for whom ethnic
distinction did not factor into social relations, that is, they were without
reservation ‘total mixers’.

The overwhelming response to the interview question was that interethnic
social interaction (that which I deem socialisation) without reservation was as
widespread among the GEN 1 of the pioneer years as it was among the GEN 3, or
the local-born Palaweños. Overall 80 % of interviewees divulged that they were
‘total mixers’, and that ethnolinguistic deliberation did not influence their social
interactions. For GEN 3 this figure rose to 90 %. Two individuals in GEN 1 and
one in each of the other cohorts admitted that their primary socialisation was
within their ethnic group. That left 15 % of the interviewees who stated a
preference for co-ethnic socialisation, but who in reality mixed widely. In
actuality, whether individuals had reservations or social interaction preferences,
the interviews revealed that 95 % of respondents socialised widely outside the
limitations of their ethnocultural heritage. Among the GEN 3 – many of whom
professed a transethnic Palaweño identity – this would appear to be a logical
response. For the GEN 1 pioneers, however, the revelation that there were no
constraints on social mixing across the ethnic divide is indicative of a rejection of
chauvinism and ethnic reification.

Table 7.3 – Socialisation Preference: By Generation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cohort</th>
<th>GEN 1</th>
<th>GEN 2</th>
<th>GEN 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Preference</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preference – however…</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Mixers</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>33</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Interviews

Interethnic socialisation was widespread enough for some individuals to
be unconscious of it. One GEN 3 respondent admitted that she had not been aware
that the ethnic group to which she nominally belonged (Ilonggo) was the largest in
her barangay; an indication that ethnicity was not a consideration in her everyday
world. It might be argued that a college education and employment in urban Narra
opened the socialisation horizons for this respondent, though her returns to the
barangay would continue to influence who her premier interactees would be –
which it turned out were broadly-based. Living in the isolation of the rural
Barangay Princess Urduja, the Batanes respondents presented a more complex
example of social interactions. Their remoteness facilitated a wider maintenance
of social customs in spite of their small numbers within the Municipality. Several
individuals aside, their social cohesion did not preclude interaction with other
ethnic cohorts in their community. That the Batanes were from the pioneer cohort
– which in rural isolation might be imagined to be less socially interactive with
outsiders – makes their interaction all the more significant.

A Cebuano respondent, recently arrived from Mindanao (to where his
parents had transmigrated), volunteered that in Narra his social interactees were
his uncle’s Cebuano friends, whereas in Mindanao most of his friends had been
Maranao, or as he put it – Muslim. Conversely, a Maranao migrant to the
Municipality stated that most of his friends were Christian, equating Christianity
as the reverse of his self-ascription to being a Muslim. Several tertiary-educated
respondents baulked at the idea that social interaction premised on the basis of
ethnicity could be entertained. Mixing socially did not, however, preclude a
feeling of comfortableness within the orbit of one’s co-ethnics. The revelation that
several respondents had sought out their co-ethnics for socio-moral support whilst
studying in locales distant from their families and regions-of-origin, appeared not
to influence interethnic socialisation once domiciled in Narra.

Anecdotal evidence suggests that it was the shared difficulties of
pioneering that promoted the first cross-cultural socialisations. As demonstrated
by the Bicolano example above, however, myriad factors, including diversity and
size of ethnic groups, socio-economic similitude, the necessity of teamwork, and
shared experiences, were conducive to closer interethnic socialisation. The
settlement agency strategy of having settler-beneficiaries ‘draw straws’ to
determine which farm-lot they would receive resulted in the ‘mixing’ of ethnic
groups and to the social exposure with ‘unknown others’. The random home-lot
allocation encompassed living alongside a mix of ethnic neighbours, facilitating
the exposure to previously unfamiliar languages and cultural practices.
Nevertheless, there were instances when allocated farm-lots were exchanged so
that co-ethnics or family relations could reside nearer to each other; however this
phenomenon was not widespread, and of itself appears not to have impacted on the wider interethnic socialisation trajectory.

The Filipino concept of *bayanihan* (mutual cooperation) was integral in forging cross-cultural socialisation. To achieve a sustained progress in an era before mechanisation, clearing land for crop sowing and rice planting required the marshalling of human resources. The *bayanihan* system of cooperation exposed the settlers – very often for the first time – to the cultural practices of the Other. From *bayanihan*’s economic imperative it was but a short step for groups to cooperate in other social ways: for wedding celebrations, in time of sickness, or in support of a promising student studying outside the settlement and this occurred regardless of ethnocultural proclivities. As expressed by one respondent, the *bayanihan* concept continues to play a transcultural role as a socialisation adjunct, in unanticipated ways. When in recent years an attempt to establish a *sararay* (mutual-aid organisation), premised on the Narra Ilocano community, met with a subdued response, the organisers decided to continue with the project but made it eligible to interested parties other than the Ilocano cohort. The continuation of the organisation as a multiethnic entity demonstrates succinctly, I suggest, the impact that cross-cultural socialisation has had in Narra.

Other cooperations in the manner of *bayanihan* exist in Narra. In Carlos Fernandez’s (pers. comm. 2011-03-05) opinion these function to effect both integration in the Municipality, and to transcend ethnic particularities. Such cooperative efforts are exemplified by churches, schools, the market, the bureaucracy, cooperatives, PTA, irrigation organisations, service clubs, and *Sangguniang Kabataan* (junior government). While organisations such as the Narra Hacienda de Panacan Tricycle Operators and Drivers Association, the Palawan Unified Adventist Multipurpose Cooperative, the Executive Barangay Health Community, the Southern Star Game-fowl Association, Inc. and the Narra Muslim Association Inc. have the potential to divide society along class, religious, ethnic, and recreational pastime lines, the opposite holds true. The Adventists encompass tranethnic adherents; the Muslims comprise more than the Maranao majority; the tricycle drivers embrace various ethnicities. These examples demonstrate that socialisation across ethnic boundaries has occurred and has played a central role in Narra resettlement outcomes.236

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236 This does not hold in all settlement models. In his discourse on German resettlement in North America, Waters (1995) demonstrates that for the ethnically German Anabaptist Hutterites,
In summation, I suggest that interethnic socialisation occurred at the very outset of Narra’s inauguration as a resettlement project and that that trajectory persists as migrants continue to arrive in the Municipality. A rider of sorts might be proffered at this point. While Christian and Muslim settlers, and resident indigenes, continue to share the Narra spatial setting, the degree of socialisation between the three culture groups is contingent upon differences as much as shared experiences in the settlement zone. Evangelista (2002: 18) suggests that the key factors in social relationships are kinship and ethnicity. While having the national community in his purview, extrapolation to the resettlement zone is not unreasonable. Interethnic socialisation appears to be less constrained where cultural markers are not too dissimilar.\textsuperscript{237} That said, the premise that transethnic socialisation has been the norm in Narra stands. Even an organisation such as the Palawan Unified Adventists Multipurpose Cooperative – predicated on a religious foundation – consists of migrants from across the country, and as with the Ilocano social security saranay attempt at incorporation discussed above, may over time possibly open its membership to include non-Adventists.\textsuperscript{238}

**Cultural Compromise / Modification**

By ‘cultural compromise’ I do not mean to imply that individuals have forsaken the cultural fundamentals defining their ethnic identities, but that their altered ways of life might not resemble the ethnic praxis with which they had arrived in the settlement zone. In this section I shall examine aspects of the cultural changes that transmigrants have experienced, why these changes have occurred and how they have been shaped. That is, I offer an analysis of the way migrants now live

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\textsuperscript{237} Refer also Evangelista (pers. comm. 2011-03-04). In the context of dissimilarity I would proffer the example of cultural differences occasioned by the Christian-indigene / Animist-Muslim divide. As the interviews revealed, these cultural markers do not preclude socialisation, but do make it a more complex and fraught proposition.

\textsuperscript{238} A parallel example, which admirably demonstrates the point, is the Union Jack Club, a social organisation formed to assist the integration of British immigrants into Australian society in the 1950s. As it transpired the Club came to embrace migrants other than British, including recent war adversaries, the Italians and Germans. The rationale for the inclusion being that the migrants (whatever their ethnic affiliation) had more in common with each other than with the host society at large – region-of-origin language notwithstanding. My point is that often the shared immigrant experience was as important as, and at times superseded affinity relationships with co-ethnics.
their lives vis-à-vis the lives they may have lived when aligned with the lives of their kin and co-ethnics continuing to live in the region-of-origin. These changes, I suggest, could occur by deliberate decision, or by osmosis, without the individual even acknowledging that they had adopted a facet of someone else’s culture. It is not the mode of transmission that is important, but the fact that cultural exchange (transculturation) has taken place.

Transcultural catalysis is given impetus in situations where groups and individuals are prepared to accept, adopt or modify the customs of others in their midst. Ilocanos continuing to live in Ilocos Norte or Cebuanos continuing to live in the Visayas are able to maintain their preference for goat-meat and raw fish respectively. However, in a resettlement milieu such as Narra their cultural predilections would be tested, if only by an altered resource base, increased intermarriage, peer group influence, inquisitiveness, or for the pioneer generation the unavailability of many foods. The aforementioned notwithstanding, it must also be kept in mind that while members of an identity group may adopt each other’s cultural practices (or the practices of outsiders) this does not preclude their potential for acting in exclusionary or chauvinistic ways.239

While PSU anthropologist Jackie Abela (pers. comm. 2011-04-02) states that Narra is “a smorgasbord of cultural practices that have contributed to a halo-halo (a mixture) ethos,” the responses to the interview questions reflected how widespread cultural changes have been.240 Catalysts influencing cultural absorption and adaptation might be précised thus: the resolve of individual agency, compromises required within mixed marriages, and peer influences. As discussed previously, one-third (36 %) of the married interviewees acknowledged endogamous relationships, while two-thirds (64 %) were in interethnic marriages. To determine the degree of cultural compromise realised among Narrans, the interview questions: # 12 (re marriage arrangement), # 17 (re cultural compromise), and # 24 (re adopted practices) were posed (Appendix A). The responses reflected that, of the possible culture-altering catalysts, interethnic spousal relations were among the most significant. For ease of comprehension I shall divide the responses thematically: cuisine, language, agriculture, traditions,

239 In Australia, the era of the exclusionary White Australia Policy (WAP) – during which Asians, including Chinese were not allowed to enter Australia – did not deter the adoption of ‘Chinese food’ as a cuisine. In a sense racial chauvinism capitulated to the cultural attribute food.

240 Halo-Halo is a popular Filipino dessert that is a mixture of shaved ice and evaporated milk to which are added various boiled sweet beans and fruits. A further archipelagic equivalent is es campur in Indonesia.
the perceptions of others, religious and spiritual beliefs, and cross-cultural cooperation.

*Cuisine*

The interviews determined that diet and food preparation is the sphere in which cultural compromise is widespread. Respondents consistently raised the issue of changed diets as a result of their resettlement. Factors such as privation, intermarriage, and socialisation influenced the way Narrans were exposed to the consumption patterns of their settlement-mates. To illustrate I shall juxtapose two noticeably diverse diets: the Visayan fish-rice diet and the Ilocano diet predicated on meats, *pinakbet* (a mixed vegetable dish), and corn, in addition to rice. Visayans consumed raw-fish dishes but less meat or leafy vegetables; however the introduction of Ilocano cuisine spread the consumption of meat including goat, dog and buffalo. Other regional proclivities added to the dietary range. Coconut oil use is widespread in the Bicol region, while in the Visayas spices feature more significantly than in other locales. Exposure to coconut wine, fried food, *tamilok* (woodworm) and other local specialities added to the dietary blend. In recent years, increasing mobility, prosperity and a general cosmopolitan exposure to the wider world via the OFW program has altered further the cuisine exposure and dietary preferences of Narrans.

Initially, the pioneer generation were supported by the resettlement agency. They were allocated basic food rations to sustain them until their farm-lots could be cleared and became productive. However, the reality was that the rations were discontinued long before their plots could support them. The ensuing periods of privation and hunger forced many to abandon the clearing of their land and to relinquish their farm-lots altogether (Fernandez 1975: 224-228, Suyat and Tejada-Suyat 2005: 26). Afflicted by the shortages many were forced to modify their food consumption patterns, yet at the same time introduced their dietary proclivities into the settlement zone, thereby exposing others to different cuisines. Migrants whose life had hinged on rice as a staple might access corn in its stead.

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241 Fernandez (1975: 223-224)) states that subsistence rations were given on credit, and were at times inappropriate to farm diets and cultural proclivities. One administrator deploiring the practice of selling these rations quipped: “If they do not have the taste for [Scandinavian] sardines, [Australian] butter, and [CARE] powdered milk, it is just as well. We do.” Suyat and Tejada-Suyat (2005: 26) outline that when rations slackened desperate folk broke into the *bodega* and pilfered rice. Without rice settlers were forced into eating cassava and *camote* (sweet potato). “The farmer’s rice was the *camote* root and his fish the *camote* tops...It was not merely a life of austerity. It was famine.”
The raison d’être of the Narra resettlement project was the development of rices, but in the early years before the introduction and building of the irrigation infrastructure, its production was severely constrained.242

Interethnic socialising and marriage have played an important role in disseminating regional cuisines. One GEN 2 Ilocana who admitted a strong attachment to her ethnic heritage divulged that compromises were required when she married her Cuyonon husband. His heritage encompassed a cuisine without the use of ginger and the variety of vegetables essential to Ilocano cooking; she described her husband’s cuisine as ‘simple’ and bland. In this transcultural household altered gastronomic practices included the use of *tamilok* (wood-worm) into the respondent’s diet, while her husband was introduced to goat and dog meat. An Ilocano respondent married to an Ilongga précised the interchange as *pinakbet* (leafy vegetables) versus fried food. A further cultural interchange, involving a Bicolana / Ilocano couple, centred on the variance between fish and *pinakbet* consumption.

**Language use**

Compromises in language use followed the trajectory of that outlined for dietary changes: intermarriage, the dictates of the work environment, general socialisation and bureaucratic interaction all influenced the changes. While I have already dealt with language use modification in the previous chapter, it is language use as a cultural compromise that I address here. Language is an important marker of ethnic identity (Das Gupta 1975, Fishman et al. 2001, Harris et al. 2003) therefore any compromise of the ‘linguistic’ in ethnolinguistic would appear to be a catalyst for further transculturative changes. Narra resettlement is different from the usual (or classic) models of settler-societies where migrants were expected to use the dominant or state language. At the time of the pioneer settlement in Narra, the language issue was in a state of flux. When Tagalog was chosen to represent the

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242 In ‘The agroecological mythology of the Javanese and the political economy of Indonesia’, Dove (1985) outlines the centrality of wet-rice agriculture in the national psyche. The rice ‘philosophy’ was also at the forefront of Filipino state planner’s consciousnesses; to the detriment of alternatives and possibly more appropriate agriculture given the lag in irrigation infrastructure or suitability of soil and terrain. Food culture is difficult to ‘undo’ but not impossible to influence, as witnessed by the large-scale introduction of the potato into Europe, a region previously dominated by grains; or China and a wider Asia in which rice is a quintessential staple to which has been added the maize (corn) of the Americas. The way food culture endures change is neatly exemplified by China’s production of rice (197m tonnes), corn (164m tonnes), wheat (115m tonnes) and potato (72m tonnes) (EBYB 2012: 572, FAO 2008).
national idiom, it was one among many languages, but often was not spoken by
the diversity of transmigrants to Palawan.243

Interethnic marriages, especially during the pioneer years, necessitated a
different strategy from that of the classic settler-society, one of plunging into a
national or mandated language. There were a range of options: one partner
learning the language of the other, both partners learning each other’s language, or
recourse to a third language – which increasingly came to be represented by the
national language Filipino / Tagalog. The reality of the Narra frontier was the
inculcation of Filipino via the education system, a factor epitomising cultural
compromise. Not only was the use of specific languages influenced by the
adoption of a ‘neutral’ idiom, the lapse, rejection, or subversion of a given
language among the transmigrants had cumulative effects further influencing the
transculturative process. For example, an Ilocana respondent married to a
Cuyonon spoke to her husband in Cuyonon, and addressed her children in
Tagalog. It should be added that she additionally spoke Ilonggo (Hiligaynon) and
the Palawan indigene languages Tagbanua and Pala’wan. In this sense the
respondent was exposed via language to an extended ethnocultural cohort. A GEN
1 Bicolano respondent declared that he spoke both Bicolano and Ilonggo
(Hiligaynon) with his Ilongga spouse, Tagalog with his children and generally in
social situations.

Socialisation also had an impact on language compromise. Pioneers
readily opted to learn the languages of those among whom they toiled and resided.
Among the first generation respondents it was not uncommon for an individual to
juggle four or five languages. However, this practice is changing with the
inculcation of Filipino / Tagalog and English via the school curriculum. The
transition to a critical mass of Filipino speakers has now been reached in Narra,
with the consequence that, unless of course they maintain strong contact with their
antecedent regions-of-origin, most Narrans – be they Palaweños ascriptees or not
– have less need to juggle a range of languages.

243 When Tagalog was chosen to represent the national language toward the end of the American
era Cebuano speakers, almost as numerous, were aggrieved. Language penetration figures are
slippery, but extrapolating EBYB, Ethnologue, and NSO data it would appear that English as
lingua franca continues to dominate. Any discourse of Tagalog as lingua franca needs to be
juxtaposed against Tagalog as ethnicity.
Agricultural Practice

(Agric)ulture, in both form and practice, is a further arena in which cultural compromises occurred, and significantly so in the pioneer period. Although Narra is increasingly becoming a mixed economy, agriculture premised on wet-rice cultivation was its raison d’être. Narra’s success of being Palawan’s ‘rice granary’ was to some extent premised on the compromises migrants had to make. I suggest that agriculture has played a role of some importance as a transcultural facilitator.

Firstly, in the early years of land clearing and development it threw together various ethnicities (including the indigenes and informal settlers), who, in lieu of the resettlement agency’s or individual’s inability to make a reality of wet-rice agriculture, forced the migrants to resort to the agricultural practice of kaingin (swidden) agriculture. Secondly, it introduced practices (such as labour exchange) specific to some ethnic groups (Ilocano) that were adopted by others. Thirdly, because of the cuisine preferences peculiar to given ethnic groups, it broadened the range of foodstuffs available to all, allowing an intersection with transcultural dietary realignments.

Despite the inflow of Ilocanos, corn production has been eschewed in favour of wet-rice. A respondent formerly growing rain-fed rice, corn and cane, and hailing from what he deemed was an ‘upland’ region, had to switch to irrigated rice-growing, which was entirely alien to him. For others – especially during the pioneer period – acquired skills as irrigated-rice growers had to be set aside as they reverted to a primitive form of kaingin agriculture (Fernandez 1975: 224-225, Suyat and Tejada-Suyat 2005: 24-25). Fernandez states: “The majority of settlers…come from parts of the country where the slash-and-burn (kaingin) cultivation has long since disappeared from the cultural landscape” (p. 224). For lowland irrigation-savvy agriculturalists, clearing land was an alien experience with which many could not cope. They (along with the resettlement agency’s agricultural extension officers) had to seek instruction from the indigenous Tagbanua and earlier Cuyonon arrivals for guidance in land clearing and the application of kaingin agricultural practices.

Several respondents reiterated the agricultural trajectory they faced: from the rain-fed agriculture of their region-of-origin to becoming kaingineros, and eventually, when irrigation infrastructure became available, reverting to a wet-rice regime. This ‘forced flexibility’ allowed a space where former certainties could (and would) be challenged. As previously mentioned, the Ilocano practice of
labour exchange was adopted widely by others. Several respondents stated that their status previously had been as landless sharecroppers; they had not had the liberty to make choices about agricultural practice – these having been the preserve of the *amo* (landlord, employer) or *encargado* (overseer). In the resettlement zone, even the routine choice of selecting a sickle or *bolo* (machete) was influenced by preferences that reflected the regional differences of the diverse pioneer cohort. That is, an interchange of implements occurred in tandem with an interchange of ideas, idioms, and cuisines.

An unintended transcultural catalyst has evolved as a consequence of the Geertzian philosophy of ‘agricultural involution’. While Geertz (1963) had in mind the agriculture of Java, his thesis – hinging on the finiteness of land and its increasingly diligent exploitation – has implications for the Archipelago at large and the resettlement zones of the Philippines in particular. The deteriorating land: man ratios are testament to the fact that the Narra Municipality is not immune to the pressures of ‘agricultural involution’. These pressures are being circumvented by the increasing movement out of agriculture, especially by the GEN 3. One respondent revealed that he had diversified from rice to pigs because too many of his siblings were sharing the original land grant, which begs the question of what is to become of his own children. As stated by him, the original farm-lot of six hectares would have been sufficient for a settler with six children, but the need of six inheriting siblings to share that agricultural space vindicates Geertz’s assertion. The unintended consequence is that being squeezed from the land into urban pursuits requires further micro-managing of cultural certainties, and fosters further interaction with a more diverse urban milieu. The limitation of the Municipality to absorb excess rural Narrans furthers the transcultural potential. Seeking opportunity, some find their way to urban areas of the Philippines while many join the growing OFW program, whose unintended consequences are additional cultural modifications and compromises.

*Traditions: Secular*

Tradition and customs are embedded in the DNA of a culture’s repository. If ethnicities, in the words of Barth (1998a), are ‘culture bearing units’, maintained within these is a diverse melange of traditions – some religious, some secular. Dress, circumcision, hairstyle, architecture, and music are but a small sample of what differentiates one ethnolinguistic group from another. Cultural practices,
while not invulnerable to change, may endure without regard to the rationalising of their existence or maintenance. Some practices may be shared by many ethnic groups, further ethnic group boundaries notwithstanding. An example is the practice of male circumcision. The Philippines has one of the highest male circumcision rates in the world (WHO 2007), with in excess of 90% of the male population having undergone the procedure. Muslim Filipinos – for whom male circumcision is a religious requisite – constitute approximately 5% of the population, which presupposes that regardless of ethnic proclivity, the majority Christians and Animists also practice near universal male circumcision.244

The above reveals the influence that the repository of tradition – the ethnic group – can muster. Yet traditions transferred to Narra have not gone unchallenged; they have been rejected by some, endorsed by others, and adapted to suit an increasingly transculturated population that is despite its diverse past becoming increasingly interdependent via intermarriage, regional acculturation and globalisation. Several examples will illustrate the quandary faced by those attempting to cling to tradition, those wanting to share in others’ traditions, and those reluctant to support old ways in a new environment.

A respondent originating from Pangasinan (Luzon), but married to a local-born husband of Cuyonon heritage suggested that the Philippine custom of respect shown by the young to their elders via mano or mano po (hand-kissing) among the Cuyonon was very pronounced – to the point of obsequiousness. Conversely a Cuyonon mourned the fact that youthful respect in Narra was not what it had been in Cuyo. Two influences might be at play here; that society at large has moved on, or that living in a polyethnic or multicultural environment has meant that some customs will become less pronounced in a transcultural milieu. One tradition that has gained increasing cross-cultural acceptance is the Ilocano practice of pinning money on to the bride’s dress at weddings. Conversely, several respondents bemoaned the demise of the three-visit courtship tradition.

244 As a cultural tradition male circumcision is in a state of flux. For those mandated to accede to religious dictates (Jews, Muslims) its application is fairly universal. Cultures as diverse as Australia (50%), Japan (<5%), Sweden (<5%), U.K. (20%), U.S. (70%) show that even similar cultures can support traditions that are implemented at great variance. The speed with which a tradition can be adopted is exemplified by the case of South Korea. Whereas the Philippines – along with the Austronesian world at large – is in male circumcision maintaining a pre-Islamic, pre-imperial cultural tradition, in contrast South Korean male circumcision – which has risen from zero to universal adoption since the arrival on the Peninsula of U.S. forces in 1945 – is an ‘invented tradition’. I mention this by way of demonstrating that traditions can move interethnically as well as being adopted or transculturated.
Intergroup Perceptions

Perception of ‘others’ has the potential to either stimulate or stymie sociocultural change. The diverse ethnolinguistic groups that transmigrated to Narra arrived with cultural values particular to themselves, and these they used as a yardstick to measure, critique and stereotype others in their midst. Many of the GEN 1 pioneers, previous to their arrival in the resettlement zone when they were poor, landless, and socially isolated, were among the least able to rationalise the prejudices they held about ‘others’. Even if a Cebuano had never socialised with (or met) an Ilocano, he would have had a perception, a stereotypical image of the quintessential Ilocano. Once settled in Narra this might have influenced caution in the dealings with those different from himself and thereby might have limited his intercultural socialisation and cooperation. In determining to how and to what degree the perception of the Other in the resettlement zone had evolved, I posed the questions: “Has your perception of other ethnicities altered since your resettlement?” and “In which respect?”

Before unpacking some of the ‘perception’ observations of respondents, an exemplar will serve to illustrate the stereotypicalities and prejudices individuals grappled with. The Ilocanos – with a reputation for thrift and hard work (a trait that is lauded by some and mocked by others) have been labelled with epithets ranging from frugal, grasping, covetous, to tightwad. When asked: “What ethnocultural markers of others have you adopted / modified since interacting with the wider settler community?” one respondent stated that she admired the Ilocanos and in imitation of them was striving to be more frugal. A Palawan-born interviewee of Ilonggo antecedents suggested that in contrast to her Bicolano husband – whom she stated exhibited a regional trait of being more direct / frank – her identity group was more softly spoken, less brusque. The cultural characteristics perceived in these two examples have differing implications. However ambivalently the Ilocano is viewed, it appears that he contributes to a more efficient society.245

In the main GEN 1 respondents revealed either that they already had an open and positive attitude toward others prior to embarkation, or that their perception of others became positive later on within the resettlement milieu. For

245 When viewed alongside the Kalimantan (Borneo) resettlement zone experience, the alleged directness of the Bicolano might be perceived as divisive. The apparent ‘directness’ of the Madurese in Kalimantan juxtaposed against the more ‘polite’ or ‘reticent’ ethnic cohorts in their midst, became a stress point contributing to ethnic violence in that locale (Tanasaldy 2012: 220).
the local-born, the perception reality was less strained. Unless unduly influenced by doctrinaire kin or co-ethnics their socialisation amidst (and with) an increasingly heterogeneous cohort of peers prepared them for a furtherance of social interaction. For example, a GEN 3 respondent stated that on resettlement her Waray (Visayas) parents felt anxious among other ethnics and their attendant melange of languages. This included a negative perception of Ilocanos (don’t marry one!), although once settled in the Municipality the respondent’s parents eventually gained Ilocano friends, which mediated formerly held perceptions.

Positive perceptions of the Other were at times hindered by the language barrier. One respondent revealed that he had had initial reservations about those with whom he could not communicate, his limitation being his region-of-origin language and English. The inability to speak Tagalog confronted numerous migrants. Facing an array of other languages was daunting, but eventually language interaction improved along with more positive perceptions of the Other. Again the issue of loneliness was a theme alluded to by several interviewees. In the opinion of one respondent it was a psychological sense of isolation that helped to dictate a positive reassessment of the Other. Several interviewees expressed that in general they held positive perceptions of the Other (or at minimum an ambivalent view) before arrival in Narra, positions that were maintained once settled. A respondent working as an agricultural technician suggested that his perception of others was conditioned by his requirement to have a broad working relationship with a diversity of ethnic cohorts.

An interviewee revealed that during the pioneer days of the settlement, it was easier to cooperate with one’s own group. But any initial interethnic aloofness or guardedness was counterbalanced with the recognition that fellow settlers faced similar coexistence concerns. Interpersonal communication difficulties notwithstanding, one respondent stated that interaction with others was central to surviving in the early resettlement zone. A more positive perception of others materialised with a closer working relationship. In a branch of the Municipal bureaucracy the sole Muslim employee stated that shyness and anxiety were a real concern although the positive and supportive workplace environment had turned out to be a catalyst for reinforcing the positive perceptions of colleagues of diverse ethnic backgrounds.

Pre-transmigration positive perceptions were also in evidence. One respondent stated that his perception of others was already optimistic when he
arrived in Narra, and he considered that living among others was a way to experience new opportunities. Returning for a moment to the ambivalent perception of the Ilocano as alluded to earlier in this section, for one Narran there was a great respect for the wet-rice culture of the Ilocano, which had been introduced with their migration. Another volunteered that just because Ilocanos eat dog-meat doesn’t make them bad people. He added that although he personally didn’t like to eat dog, in a social situation (such as a wedding) he partook so as not to offend. I suggest that this response embodies the lengths to which individuals and groups will go to endeavour to accommodate difference and ‘fit in’ to altering sociocultural environments.

At the outset, however, for some it was difficult to set aside chauvinisms and prejudices. A former resettlement agency functionary admitted that she previously perceived indigenous groups in the settlement zone as less developed, a sociocultural prejudice and an oblique critique in view of the fact that the Tagbanua had been instrumental in educating the starving pioneers on how to clear their lands and implement kaingin agriculture. One Cebuano perceived that his ethnic group was more advanced culturally and socio-economically. The respondent who suggested that her culture-group was more polite, gentle and humble inferred that some others were not. As demonstrated by a respondent who had converted from Christianity to Islam, former reservations and / or ambivalent perceptions of the Other could be overcome under certain circumstances.

Historically, perceptions of Muslim Filipinos by the Hispanicised Christian Filipinos have been negative.\(^{246}\) When viewed in context with the social upheavals that have ensued between the lowland Christian transmigrants and the indigenous Muslims – whose lands were forfeit for ‘development’ in Mindanao and the south – the legacy of mistrust has continued. Several respondents volunteered that they felt an antipathy toward Muslims, yet in spite of this sentiment migrants continue to arrive in Narra and Palawan from Mindanao and the south, in large measure because of the continuing unrest in their region-of-origin and the perception that Palawan is a ‘zone of peace’. This might be an

\(^{246}\) Attitudes between religo-cultural groups suffer from a historical amnesia. Some who profess Christianity today had antecedents who formerly professed Islam. The Metro Manila region at the time of Spanish subjugation was ruled by Rajah Sulayman. Both Christian and Muslim Filipinos – as are those exemplified by the indigenous Lumads who continue to identify as Animist – are descended from Animist-Austronesians who have since the 13C been assailed by West Asian belief models. In the case of Palawan this process of missionaryisation continues among the remnant Animist Pala’wan and other minority groups.
opportune time to segue from a perception of the Other through the prism of faith to briefly examine some examples of religious practices that are subject to cross-ethnic evaluation, adoption and adaptation.

*Traditions: Religious*

Religious proclivities and the traditions that underpin their continuance, while seemingly invulnerable to change, are not as monolithic as might be imagined. The two monotheisms, Christianity and Islam, introduced into the Archipelago by commerce, conquest, and colonialism, are not copies of the faiths that emanated from Europe and West Asia. They are a syncretic version of faiths to which were fused the supernatural apprehensions of ingrained indigenous Animisms. In their long trajectories both monotheisms absorbed pre-prophetic folk accretion of the regions through which they passed. For Islam the route to the Philippines was via India and the Archipelago, a seven hundred years journey that reached Mindanao in the fourteenth century. Cultural accretion for Filipino Christianity occurred via Spain and Mexico, beginning in the sixteenth century. I mention this by way of introducing the notion that no matter what accretions have occurred in the Filipino versions of revealed faith, the process is far from complete; cultural modification and cultural compromise continue.

In a country where more than 100,000 people have perished in indigene-settler violence, in which recourse to religious tradition has been central as a rallying point, the Barthian boundaries of faith are observably a serious matter. In this context it is easy to overlook the role that Palawan has played in the trajectory of both faith dissemination and its possible impact on transcultural change. I suggest that Palawan be viewed as the final destination, the end point, of the aforementioned monotheistic trajectories. Islam coming from the west and south, and Christianity issuing from Spain (via Mexico) in the east, both encountered the Animisms of Palawan. As such, Palawan continues to be a zone of interfaith coexistence, while at the same time one of proselytisation. The degree and trajectory of transculturation in this milieu is dependent on the decisions that individuals make, what aspects of indigenous beliefs are amenable to be fused onto ‘revealed’ belief structures. The act of proselytisation itself might be viewed as a tussle between the forces of acculturation and transculturation.

At the time of Spain’s ouster by the Americans at the beginning of the twentieth century, the religious *modus vivendi* was that Muslims controlled the
coastal areas of southern Palawan, the Animist indigenes the interior, while Palawan’s northern islands, and increasingly the northern Mainland was occupied by the Hispanicised Filipinos. *Pax Americana* halted Muslim intransigence in the south, and it was this hiatus that allowed greater incursions of lowland Christian settlers from the north and east.

As elsewhere across the Archipelago, Animism in Palawan is under pressure from missionary proselytising, intermarriage and the cultural pressures emanating from a globalised world. In the Philippines however, it continues to exude influences that conspire to make the monotheist belief structures in essence syncretic. Narra respondents revealed that even within a nominal persuasion such as Roman Catholicism, regional religious practices continue to exist. When these practices arrived with the transmigrants, far from being rejected by Catholics from other regions or by those of other denominations, some of these practices were actually adopted more widely. I suggest that the inclination for this to occur indicates the propensity for Narrans to adopt or adapt such cultural practices that would be less amenable in more monoethnic regions of the country.

While aspects of the supernatural *aswang* (ghoul – an evil creature believed by many Filipinos to be able to assume different forms) may be dismissed by mainline religious proponents, it would appear that *aswang* beliefs continue to augment transcultural practice by crossing ethnocultural boundaries. One respondent exemplified this by suggesting that his parents had adopted the superstitions practiced by ethnic groups different from their own on arrival in Palawan. Thus the injunction by some parents to be in before dark is given as a general warning to avoid the malevolence of evil spirits. One highly-educated respondent, who saw herself as a modern, ‘globalised’ daughter-in-law, was aghast when advised by her mother-in-law that ‘seeing or hearing an owl during pregnancy would be harmful to her unborn’. It was suggested anecdotally that Cuyonon transmigrants exuded more spirituality and superstition than other groups; however, what is interesting for this thesis is that in Narra individual belief structures could be re-calibrated to fit new realities. Several examples help to illustrate the point.

The practice by some Christians of preparing food and firewood prior to Holy Week (Easter) in order that they need not work on this auspicious occasion, and the desisting from handling a *bolo* (machete) during this period, have been adopted by others who had not heeded such injunctions previously. This is not to
say that the converse has happened. One interviewee indicated that the sociocultural injunctions accompanying his parents to Palawan were not as rigorously observed by him – some not at all. Whether this reflects generational change or the demands of a more complex transcultural society is not clear. The observation that couples (and sometimes their children) did not always practise the same religious faith might have been a contributing factor in the decision-making process of what traditional practices would be adopted or adapted. The Ilocano tradition of placing offerings of food near the altar during the All Saints celebration has been adopted by some Catholics hailing from other ethnolinguistic regions.

A further example of the interplay of religio-cultural traditions is the revelation of one Roman Catholic respondent who related that when she suggested that her husband have a priest bless his newly-launched fishing-boat she was told that he had already dealt with the blessing: his choice was a quasi-Animist / Islamic ceremony in lieu of the optional priest blessing, one in which the spilling of chicken’s blood sufficed. To what extent this ritual was Animist-based and what segment Islamic was not made clear: what is significant is the intercultural nature of the act, an example of transculturation in action.

Changes in cultural practice have affected the Muslim minority in greater ways than those endured by the Christian majority. Given their minority status in both Narra Municipality and the Philippines in general, the Muslim settler’s ability to blend into a more encompassing societal structure has not been straightforward, taking into account the sociopolitical dominance of the lowland Christians. Anecdotally it would appear that the Muslim settlers have had transcultural experiences in which there appears to be a palpable sense of loss. One respondent suggested that several factors – their numerical minority status, their obvious degree of religious ‘difference’ (in some instances dress, or observance patterns), and historical lowland Christian antipathy – coalesced to create an environment in which some Muslims felt that they were tolerated rather than embraced as fellow-Filipinos.

In *A study of Muslim / Christian Social Relations*, Hall (2010) demonstrates the complexity in the sharing of cultural particularities in a dichotomous Christian / Muslim environment. Hall observes that in General Santos City (Mindanao) social boundaries can be breached but the numerically dominant group dictates the degree to which this is possible. While the political primacy of the Christian settlers remains, there are religious events such as All Soul’s Day, in which the possession of a practice becomes blurred. Hall adds that the increasing rate of intermarriage across ethnic lines results in some unusual articulations of identity and practice.
As a consequence, it was stated that to avoid difficulties with the surrounding community there was a tendency to modify or curtail some religio-cultural practices. It was revealed that the ethnic groups practising Islam could not celebrate their ‘holy days’ as exuberantly as they would have in pre-migration Cagayan de Tawi-Tawi or Bukidnon. Be they ethnic Maranao or Jama Mapun, it appeared that little of their cultural values influenced Narran ethnicities that identified as Christian. Conversely, several Muslim respondents revealed that they were impacted upon by the traditions and cultural practices of the majority. Whether altered population percentages would influence the degree of religio-cultural interchange is a moot point. However, the perception of a majority / minority (Christian / Muslim) dichotomy acts similarly to other majority / minority exemplars in the resettlement world, that is, the advantaging of one cultural tradition over others when there is an absence of diversity. Such milieux are likely to encourage a reification of culture, or alternatively a qualified acculturation, rather than advantage the transculturative trajectory.

**Cross-Cultural Cooperation**

Narra’s success as a zone of resettlement has been contingent upon the degree to which a heterogeneous cohort of peoples and cultures (whether ethnic, linguistic, religious) cooperate in their day-to-day lives. This might be at the individual level, within the parameters of special interest groups (churches, service clubs, and irrigation association), or within the bureaucracy (Municipal, and Barangay). To ascertain the reach of cross-cultural cooperation I posed the open-ended question: “Do you cooperate with other ethnicities in the resettlement area?”

The responses elicited an affirmative 99%. The only dissenting voice was a recent arrival who, outside his college attendance, was under the patronage of a strict Cebuano uncle who controlled his movements. Despite the overwhelming

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248 The absence of a majority / minority dichotomy has played an important role in the success of Narra as a settlement zone. The diverse transmigrant cohort, with no group approaching numerical dominance, was drawn from across the Philippines. This differed markedly from Indonesia resettlement model in which two or three ethnic groups provided the transmigrant cohort, who came to dominate ethnically certain settlement projects. This has relevance in the matter of religious persuasion as well as ethnicity. I suggest that had it been possible for settlers in Narra to be drawn from a wider range of belief structures (Animism, Baha’i, Buddhism, Confucianism, Hinduism, Jainism, Judaism, Taoism, and so forth) than the Christian and Muslim cohorts – in which no group approached dominance – then the negative consequences of the dichotomous religious nature of Palawan resettlement might have been proved moot. Just as ethnolinguistic diversity and non-dominance advanced transculturation in the Narra contact zone; a similar outcome, I suggest, might have been expected from a diverse religious cohort in which no one group was dominant.
response, a note of caution is in order. The notional ‘yes’ answer to the interview question obscures the degree of cooperation possible given the negative attitudes of several respondents to minority groups. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the existence of negative feelings towards ethnic groups professing Islam, and allusions to the backwardness of certain autochthonous groups, such as the local Tagbanua, occurred in tandem with the self-assertion of being a co-operator. A local-born Narran suggested that cooperation with others in the community was a ‘given’, and that this cooperation was proffered without deliberation. Cooperation for those in the teaching profession and advisory bureaucracies, such as the DAR and the Nutrition Office was especially manifest; as one respondent put it, “diversity demands cooperation.”

Community organisations facilitate cooperation. Fernandez (2011) suggests that they are tranethnic levelling devices. Narra abounds with such entities: the PTAs, churches, irrigation associations, multi-purpose cooperatives, service clubs, local government initiatives, NGOs, and suchlike. The following example helps illustrate the lengths to which an organisation will go (and the compromises required) for it to be inclusive and cooperative. The Aglipayan Church priest acknowledged that his services were conducted in English. He explained that this was to embrace the various ethnolinguistic groups, who although they shared a faith, did not share a common language. In Narra, English is regarded as a neutral language that does not advantage one ethnic group over the other.

In a municipality of 70,000 persons, with a police complement of only 27, dispute settlement necessitating cooperation is crucial. Given that nuanced responses are required to mediate disputes that are at times cross-cultural, the cooperation between the Lupon Tagapamayapa (Justice of the Peace) and the community is essential. The Sangguniang Kabataan (SK – Youth Council of the Philippines), which has a chapter in each barangay across the country, plays a similar role.249 The SK acts as an advisory body for the views of 15 – 21 year-olds in society and represents a widespread mechanism for cooperation, which in view

249 SK (Sangguniang Kabataan) is a uniquely Filipino institution. Each barangay in the Philippines is mandated by law to have its own chapter of the Katipunan ng Kabataan (KK – Youth Federation). Membership is restricted to those between the ages 15 – 18 who have resided at least six months in a given barangay. The SK initiates policies, programs, and projects for development of youth in their respective barangay, for which monies are set aside. The SK Chairperson automatically sits on the Sangguniang Barangay (SB – Village Council) as ex-oficio member.
of Narra’s ethnic demographic is of more salience than in the more monoethnic regions of the country.

Taking Barangay Población (Narra township) as representative, the ethnic ‘enclave’ nature of settlement is conspicuously absent. Cross-cultural cooperation is witnessed in many non-formal, social situations. Thus, at times such as high holidays, weddings, and other social occasions there exist opportunities to transcend residual ethnocultural divides, which in turn provides conduits for lasting friendships and ongoing supraethnic cooperations. Cooperation in Narra, be it in response to bureaucratic initiatives (the DAR, the Municipal and Barangay councils), or social ones (church, PTA, service clubs) act as a catalyst for the further social interaction (socialisation) of Narrans. As illustrated in the ‘socialisation’ section earlier in this chapter, the attempt to establish an Ilocano *saranay* (help each other) organisation expanded to include others, thereby increasing interethnic cooperation. Cooperations are also experienced in rural areas of the Municipality. In the agricultural sphere where ploughing, planting, and harvesting schedules are time-driven, these pursuits become vehicles for sharing and co-operating. The reality of interethnic or intercultural cooperation in Narra decreases the potential for chauvinism – a positive transculturative facilitator.

*Primordialism of Culture?*

Before proceeding, I wish to raise the issue of primordialism *à la* Geertz (2000) and Shils (1957) and its potential to influence or retard transcultural change. Stated simply, how sacrosanct is the culture content of any ethnolinguistic or identity group? The degree of (in)vulnerability of an ethnic group’s cultural baggage may influence and determine the way in which individuals and groups are prepared, or willing, to view and interact with the Other in their midst. Indeed, a single boundary (religion or language) has the capability of shaping attitudes, and establishing the parameters by which the Other (and the Other’s culture) will be judged, accepted, or denied. The inviolability afforded a given cultural practice will help uncover the sacrosanctity (or otherwise) of the ambit claims of primordialism.

The Narra interviews were premised on the relative positions of ethnocultural diversity, incorporating the cultural baggage that the settlers had brought with them from their regions-of-origin. The cultural practices and
particularities in that baggage had the potential to culturally divide transmigrants in this ‘contact zone’. This presupposed that settlers had less in common than might be imagined: indeed, the very notion of ethnolinguistic identity is based on differences – not like attributes. Yet we know that many cultural practices (dietary predilections, male circumcision, and respect for elders) transcend the boundaries of the more than one hundred ethnolinguistic groups that comprise the Philippines. Which practices are primordial and therefore likely to influence or hamper change is a moot point. Where cultural differences do exist, the degree of difference between ethnocultural groups may not be an insurmountable barrier for intergroup interaction or integration, be it in the resettlement frontier or wider world. What should be noted is the reality of the ‘lifeways’ of any identity group. Contrast the minimalist degree of Muslimity invoked by Macdonald’s (2001) ethnic Pänimusun – who keep the taboo on consuming pork or turtle – with Zialcita’s (2006: 233) assertion that some Mindanaon and Indonesian Muslims are not averse to keeping the taboo on raising pigs and consuming raised pork, yet are amenable to eating wild pigs they have hunted in the forest.

If the cultural practices of Barth’s (1998) ‘culture-bearing units’ are not set in stone it might be asked what degree of primordiality any culture-group can claim in the aftermath of millennia of commerce, slaving, resettlement, and colonialism? Or put more succinctly, how long a given ethnicity has adhered to a given cultural practice? Examination reveals that what constitutes a matter of importance to a particular culture-group may be less imbedded than imagined. While not wanting to diminish the passion with which a practice continues to be sustained by this group or other I nevertheless raise the question of the possible constancy and longevity of such a practice. If a culture-group can adopt or adapt some practice or other without trauma, then concomitantly (in theory) its removal or substitution could just as well occur.

Viewed in this context, the potential for transculturation might not be as fraught a proposition as imagined. The sixteenth century religious restructuring in Western Europe illustrates the point. The hitherto overarching power of the

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250 Not only are many cultural practices pertinent to a broad range of Filipino identity groups; they may be applicable to the Archipelago, the Austronesian world, or a more globalised dimension. Respect for elders is illustrative. In the Philippines this is reflected in the Mano Po gesture, in which the child presses the offered hand of an elder against his forehead. The Javanese show inter-generational respect by linguistic politeness. Confucianism in China and Australian indigenes alike valued respect for elders. That said these traditions are being undermined as individualism and respects for greater ‘knowledges’ (higher education, cosmopolitan attitudes) transcends that of the elder ‘knowledges’ of the past.
Roman Catholic Church was questioned by those wanting to reform the practices of the Church, and due to irreconcilable differences and political opportunism a religious schism – known as the Protestant Reformation – was ushered in. The ensuing internecine struggles, in which millions died, left a legacy that resonates to this day – parochial schools and hospitals, marriage injunctions, and in some cases divided political parties, divided labour unions, and employment opportunities that favour one religion over another.  

What is of salience in this exemplar is that the adoption or retention of a given religious persuasion often did not fall to the individual, the catalyst for change being the fiat of a monarch or the like. If arbitrary decisions can dictate worship patterns and inculcate new loyalties – for which individuals were (and are) prepared to die – then might such unassailable positions be redirected by fiat or individual agency, thereby undermining the sanctity of primordialism as a definer of cultural exclusiveness. Viewed from this perspective, the Narran, whatever his self-ascribed ethnolinguistic identity, would appear to be in a state of cultural limbo. At the same time as he is reluctant to question the violability of his cultural DNA, he is exposing himself to ongoing transculturative influences.

Zialcita (2006) casts doubt on the fastness of primordialism, and the concomitant sacrosanctity of cultural DNAs. He questions the very notion of identity and uses his predecessor Franz Boas as an example of a voice that challenged the former flawed Eurocentric scholarship designed to underpin the imperialist mandate. Identity, Zialcita suggests, should be interpreted culturally rather than in a psychologistic or biologistic manner, which he regards as racist. “…there is no correlation between ways of thinking and body form. People think differently from each other because they grow up in a particular culture, each of which has its own way of interpreting the world. …it was normal for a culture to accept new ideas from other cultures but that these are inevitably filtered and transformed by the pre-existing local tradition” (p. 231).

Zialcita attempts to defend the lowland Hispanicised Christian Filipino culture from being assailed by those who cannot accept the syncretic or fused

\[251\text{ The Thirty Years War (1618-1648) culminating in the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) epitomises the capacity and intensity with which one identity ‘boundary’ – religion – can have for division and destruction. It is estimated that the population of the German states alone reduced by a third from 12 million to 8 million during this period. While this schismatic ‘boundary’ has been eroded in the latter half of the twentieth century, the instability of Northern Ireland in modern times continues to exemplify the power of a ‘boundary’ that has the capacity to divide an ethnicity, itself already a division of mankind.} \]
nature of this culture. He states: “Two fears have haunted discussions of identity among thoughtful Filipinos since independence in 1946. One fear is that… Filipino identity is ‘schizophrenic’. Another fear is that because the lowland Christian majority’s way of life is the child of two different cultures, the Western and Eastern, it must therefore be ‘illegitimate’, that is a ‘bastardised’ culture” (p. 211). In defence of the authenticity of lowland Filipino culture a comparison is made with the Javanese, who Zialcita suggests are not critiqued for being ‘schizophrenic’, but regarded as being representative of the ‘true Asia’. Yet how ‘authentic’ is Javanese culture? Javanese Moslem peasants revere the Animist ‘spirit of the rice’ Dewi Sri and “offer gifts to the founding spirit of their village, and fear certain places as the abode of spirits” (p. 213). Further they embrace the Hindu places of worship, the Mahabharata, and the Brahmanic tradition of meditation. Unlike the lowland Christian Filipinos the Javanese do not feel the need to apologise for their syncretic culture.

I raise this issue to demonstrate that the transcultural changes (cuisine, agriculture, languages, and social practices, both religious and secular) that have occurred in the Narra contact zone are less singular than might be expected. While some cultural practices in Narra have metamorphosed in a single generation, we do not know how long it took for the syncretic Javanese cultural practices to settle into a modus vivendi. If Boas and Zialcita concur on the reality of continuing cultural interchange, then it might be asked at which point the primordiality of the Cebuano, Ilocano, or Maranao identity originates, and at what point aspects of the culture cease to be the ‘authentic’ markers of a particular ethnic tradition.

Two aspects of culture – religion and cuisine – help to illustrate the potential fickleness of a cultural tradition and its relationship to an ascribed primordiality. Islam and Christianity are central to the cultures of the Javanese and lowland Christian Filipinos respectively. Yet for certain Javanese, Islam overlies Animist, Buddhist, and Hindu traditions. For lowland Christian Filipinos the trajectory is an overlaying of Animism and in some cases a prior attachment to Islam.²⁵² It would appear that religion at least cannot be relied upon as a primordial marker. Cuisine also is a questionable reference point. While the vast majority of Austronesians favour rice as a staple, Ilocanos among others embraced

²⁵² Constantino (2008: 25) suggests: “Manila and its environs were already outposts of Bornean principalities” at the time that Miguel Lopéz de Legazpi’s arrived in the Archipelago to claim it for Spain (1565). “If history had taken its course undisturbed, the Muslims might have Islamised the whole archipelago” he adds.
maize when it arrived from the Americas. Pierre Chaunu (cited Zialcita 2006: 239) suggests: “The Philippines constitutes the only true end-point of the world.” By this he was inferring that the Philippines, as terminus of the Manila-Acapulco galleon trade, should have been the first place where plants from the Americas – maize, tomato, chilli, tobacco, and so forth – might have lodged themselves. Yet the chilli, recognised as quintessentially Southeast Asian, without which no Javanese meal would be complete, exists in the Philippines only incidentally.253

In this sense the primordialism defence, which imagines certain ingrained cultural practices to be attributed to given ethnic groups, might be viewed in a less sanguine manner. As the Narra resettlement model shows, cultural attributes of given ethnic groups may be adopted, adapted, or discarded under certain conditions. The transculturation process shows that learned cultural practices (enculturation), however ingrained, may be unlearned (deculturation), and in that sense questions the inviolability of any premise of primordialism.

Summary

In this and the previous chapter, I have examined, from the perspective of the migration experience, what have been the sociocultural ramifications of transmigration in a specific zone of resettlement – that centred on the Municipality of Narra in Palawan. The participant interviews, and key informant engagements illustrate that Narra reflected a space in which an ethnoculturally heterogeneous migrant cohort had experienced a degree of cultural exchange that was neither planned nor coerced. The mutuality associated with that cultural exchange contributes to the transculturation schema as envisaged by Ortiz and Malinowski seven decades ago. Their theorising – in the context of the hitherto immigration to Cuba of a diverse settler cohort – that all migrants contributed to the Cuban sociocultural legacy, encouraged them to imagine the term defining that process as ‘transculturation’.

Compared with Cuba, the timeline involved in the Narra transculturation process (two generations) is quite remarkable, and I suggest could not have been imagined by Ortiz / Malinowski when they coined their neologism. I acknowledge that there are extenuating circumstances advantaging the speed of Narran

253 An analogous example is that of the potato. Native to South America it became by the nineteenth century a quintessentially European (especially Northern European) staple. China which is regarded as quintessentially a rice-staple nation is now the world’s largest potato producer with more than 20 % of world production. Conversely South America as a region has the lowest level of potato production (FAO, 2008).
transcultural exchange when compared with other models in time and place. These include degrees of similitude occasioned by the Austronesian connection, the *zeitgeist* of the modernity project, an absence of a dominant / dominated dichotomy, and so forth. Nevertheless, the interviews gleaned that whether interlocutors were adamant about their region-of-origin identities or not, the process of transculturation was occurring around them, involving them even if unconsciously, and was not resisted. Factors analysed above: degree of intermarriage, language use modification, resettlement socialisation, and so forth have all contributed to the transcultural outcome in Narra that has not been replicated on the same scale, or is replicable, both in other regions of the Philippines, and in the wider migrancy world.

In testing the hypothesis that transcultural change in the Narra model of resettlement has been contingent upon a set of catalysts that have facilitated such cultural change, this chapter has outlined some of those catalysts – continued links with region of origin, the rate of intermarriage, resettlement zone socialisation, cultural compromises made and cross-cultural cooperation among them. In the vein of this line of enquiry the chapter also questioned the basis for the hallowness of the primordialism concept.
CHAPTER VIII – CONCLUSION

Given the finite nature of the agricultural ‘frontier’, resettlement programs as represented by the Narra / Palawan project, are becoming less feasible than previously. However, this does not mean that the migration and resettlement of heterogeneous peoples phenomenon has decreased. The former state-initiated, rural-to-rural transmigration of peoples in the Archipelago has been replaced by the spontaneous movements of migrants, both intranational and international: a process that is predominantly rural-to-urban or urban-to-urban.\textsuperscript{254} Furthermore, the movement of peoples worldwide – whether for economic or political reasons – is on the increase, and with this movement there is a concomitant increase in intercultural encounters. As a consequence of this movement, greater numbers of people than ever are called upon to reflect on their ethnocultural identities and question what aspects of their ethnic identities are important to them, which of their cultural particularities continue to be relevant, or need maintaining, and which are to be jettisoned once they are resettled. Juxtaposed against this dilemma is the need for the migrant-settler to examine what aspects of his new cultural environment might be adopted or adapted.

I began this thesis by suggesting that the rationale for the investigation was to understand why the Narra / Palawan resettlement initiative – in light of the uneven sociocultural outcomes of some resettlement elsewhere – appeared to be a successful one. To this end a line of enquiry was established to make sense of the differing outcomes. The thesis was prompted by the need to better comprehend why disparities in sociocultural integration have contributed to the tribulation of ethnic violence and displacement in some zones of resettlement (exemplified by Mindanao), while others have witnessed a smoother pluricultural transition. The research has demonstrated that several factors have the capacity to impact on the type of coexistence that is possible in milieux of intercultural interaction. The chief of these factors is the propensity with which individuals and groups are prepared to compromise aspects of their ethnocultural identities via a process of mutual cultural exchange we now know as transculturation.

\textsuperscript{254} At the same time as ‘frontiers’ were developed and settled, an urban-ward movement of population continued apace. In the second-half of the twentieth century – in the Philippines and Indonesia for example – urbanisation has absorbed migrants by a factor of ten when compared with rural-to-rural migration. Rather than decreasing, population movements are possibly the greatest in magnitude (in relative terms) of any previous period in human history. Among factors influencing this movement are: economic opportunity, ongoing sociopolitical persecution, the boredom and strictures of rural life, and the ease of mobility.
To test the hypothesis that interethnic harmony is contingent upon the degree to which individuals and groups are prepared to compromise aspects of their ethnocultural lifeworlds the thesis posed two fundamental questions: (1) ‘What cultural changes take place among heterogeneous populations disrupted by resettlement?’ and (2) ‘Under which circumstances are transmigrants’ ethnocultural identities maintained, diminished, or amplified as a consequence of the resettlement process?’ Narrans, it has been revealed, were quite amenable to adapting aspects of their (and adopting aspects of others’) ethnocultural lifeways to create an environment in which a sociocultural *modus vivendi* could ensue. Several factors have contributed to this outcome, and might be useful to support a hypothesis that would explain replicability (or otherwise) in further migration / resettlement milieux – whether archipelagic or in the wider world.

The accretion, reification or diminution of ethnocultural identities in the Narra / Palawan zone of resettlement, I suggest, is determined by the degree of transculturational change that a given individual or group is prepared to accept and this is further dependent upon: (1) the degree of cultural difference of those settled (religious practice, language, customs), (2) the numerical strength of a given settler cohort, (3) the diversity and numbers of the settler cohort(s), in which no dominant group exists, (4) access to education, the mass media and the world beyond the settlement area and (5) the degree of ongoing mobility for individuals – both social and economic. The interaction of these factors is what has facilitated transcultural change in Narra, the consequence of which is the development of a widely ascribed supraethnic identity – that of the Palaweño. This ascription, while not necessarily superseding national or ethnic proclivities, is nevertheless an affirmation that signals the fact that transcultural changes have taken place.

The thesis reveals that increasingly Palaweño-ness differentiates Narrans from their relatives in the regions-of-origin. The data confirms that the longer the separation from co-ethnics the more likely respondents would sanction the Palaweño self-ascription. Whether this re-ascription would have been possible in the absence of the transculturation trajectory is moot, yet when measured against ethnic and communal reifications that have taken place in other resettlement scenarios referred to in this thesis, it is clear that the resettlement experience itself (the shared experiences, privations and successes) is not enough to bind the transmigrant to others in his midst or guarantee harmonious integrations in
evolving societies. A circular line of reasoning is possible: that mutual cultural exchanges (transculturation) facilitated a re-positioned Palaweño identity in Narra / Palawan, or that identification with the notion of Palaweño-ness itself encouraged increased sociocultural interactions among an ethnically diverse settler cohort.

In light of the data gathered I suggest that the Narra / Palawan resettlement scenario differs from contemporary archipelagic (and wider world) resettlement scenarios in the following respects. Firstly, generational change is being accelerated by the degree of intermarriage, the corollary of which is that succeeding generations are less likely to self-ascribe as narrowly as their parents. Mixed parentage requires an individual to discern what aspects of each parent’s ethnocultural heritage the offspring will decide to encompass. Secondly, among an ethnically diverse settler cohort, the inculcation of the national language as a lingua franca allowed for the fast-tracking of cross-cultural communication, in ways not replicable in the region-of-origin, where the national language continued to be used as an ‘auxiliary’ rather than the lingua franca.

Mutual cultural exchange in Narra has been further advantaged by three intersecting factors: the degree of cultural difference among ethnic groups settled, the number of settler cohorts involved, and the relative numerical strength of the settler cohorts in percentage terms. The data shows that no one ethnocultural group dominated the Narra resettlement milieu, thus precluding the prospect of one group’s cultural values being advanced over others. Furthermore, the degree of cultural difference within the settler cohorts was not so great that any one group would be viewed adversely. The Narra / Palawan transmigrants hailing from across the Philippines, while ethnically distinct, were culturally less distinct. Primarily, they represented the majority lowland Christian strata of society.255

Social and economic mobility in Narra, the thesis reveals, has not impinged on transcultural re-alignments. If anything, the education sector, in tandem with an increased rate of intermarriage has been shown to advantage further mutual cultural exchanges. No ethnocultural cohort appears to have dominated the contact zone socially and economically, in the way Hall (2010) has demonstrated to have been the case in Mindanao, for example. It appears that the

255 While acknowledging that the degree of cultural difference between settlers was not so great as to impinge on the potential for transculturation to occur, it should also be noted that in the Narra Municipality, the numerical dominance of the transmigrants (as a group) vis-à-vis the indigene was of such a magnitude as to preclude the indigene-migrant reactions that have been a feature of other Philippine (e.g. Mindanao) resettlements.
more highly educated settler descendants in Narra have a wider worldview than their pioneer forbears. This fact, combined with the greater mobility occasioned by the ‘modernity project’, has meant that as well as an exchange of cultural particularities, Narrans are absorbing cultural desiderata at rates that accelerate the undermining of former ethnocultural lifeways.

To recapitulate then, the thesis demonstrates that in certain circumstances ethnically diverse peoples are able to integrate into new societies and create for themselves new lifeworlds predicated on a revised cognisance of their former lifeways. Narrans have managed this by the accretion of mutual cultural exchanges. Beginning with the learning of each other’s languages in the pioneer days, transculturation has proceeded to include other aspects of culture that once divided ethnic groups whose lifeworlds were synonymous with an ethnic homeland. What is significant is the timeframe in which these changes have taken place. It is a mere six decades since President Quirino signed Proclamation 190 (Appendix C), paving the way for resettlement in what is now the Municipality of Narra. The transcultural changes that have been wrought have been effected by at best three generations, a very compressed timeframe when compared with the Ortiz / Malinowski overview of the transcultural changes experienced in the Cuban migrancy / integration milieu.

Whether reflecting on Narra or the wider world migrancy / resettlement phenomenon, the ‘transculturation’ concept, I suggest, continues to be a relevant tool for understanding intercultural possibilities – one that should not be undervalued or disregarded. It may not appear to be as useful in circumstances of dominance, as the mutuality of cultural exchange cannot be guaranteed in such situations. However, because no blueprint exists for best-practice sociocultural interaction, no migrant or host can determine before ‘contact’ what of each other’s cultural baggage may be mutually culturally exchanged, appropriated, or repressed. Whatever initial difficulties diverse groups of migrants face in ‘contact zones’ the world over, for the sake of integration and harmony (as evidenced in Narra) it appears that the finding of modi vivendi are required to allay feelings of sociocultural dissonance. The manner in which transculturation is engaged or rejected in this process has a bearing on the outcomes sought.

256 While the resolving of difference may take centuries to eventuate, addressing the differences is of paramount concern. Ireland in general and Ulster in particular is a salient example of the depth to which individuals and groups will go to maintain sociocultural positions. It has taken four centuries for the people of Ulster to find any common ground that dents hitherto intractable
In tandem with an investigation of the Narra / Palawan transmigration / transculturation paradigm, the thesis considered the national unity implications for nation-states that support a heterogeneity of ethnic groups. Two factors are at play: the world’s rapidly increasing population, and an increased migrancy, both preclude the continuance of monoethnic states. The repercussion of this is that all nation-states increasingly need to embrace their ethnocultural diversity if a harmonious national coexistence is to be maintained. Using the archipelagic transmigration parameter as a model, the thesis revealed that not all intercultural interactions will necessarily result in transcultural tendencies. Resettlement and integration may involve a mutual cultural exchange as theorised by Ortiz / Malinowski, or a process of acculturation in which the latest migrants continue to accede to the norms and influence of an already-resident dominant group, or a scenario in which ethnic groups maintain cohesion while residing in propinquity with others – represented in essence by the concept of multiculturalism.

Irrespective of the coexistence model (asymmetrical acculturation, multiculturalism or transculturation à la Ortiz) to which individual nation-states ascribe, no set of sociocultural and political factors guarantees coexistence for all time. What the Narra / Palawan study reveals is that, under certain circumstances, sociocultural transformation predicated on a reciprocal, or mutuality of cultural exchange is possible. In that sense Ortiz’s transculturation theorisation has been vindicated. However, demographic trends, politics, and the modernity project may yet determine the theory’s future. What cannot be discounted – in view of the world’s existing ethnocultural diversity (within a limited number of nation-states) – is that 
modi vivendi
for coexistences need to be kept in the forefront of consciousness.

One of the main contributions of my thesis is that it has provided evidence to show that polyethnic milieux need not develop into antagonistic or reifying contact zones (such as Mindanao) as a consequence of migration. I did not have the luxury of Ortiz’s four and a half centuries retrospective in developing a theory to explain Cuba’s transculturation trajectory. In the Narra / Palawan context therefore, what might be instructive would be a further study – two generations hence – to determine whether the Narran transcultural trajectory was being maintained. At the time of my fieldwork Narra continued to be a zone of in-
positions of support for one side or the other in the Catholic-Protestant schism. Furthermore the antagonisms generated in Ireland were readily transplanted across the globe to new settler societies in North America and Australasia.
migration, and therefore amenable to further cultural influences. Given the inconstancy of cultural particularities – a factor influenced by the ‘information / technology age’, an ongoing migrancy, cultural imperialism, social mobility and the modernity project, among other factors – the ethnocultural future in resettlement milieux such as Narra would appear to be indeterminate.
**APPENDIX A – QUESTIONNAIRE: NARRA / PALAWAN (2011)**

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>How would you describe your ethnicity?</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>From which region / province did you / your parents resettle? What year?</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Do you maintain links / visit your region-of-origin?</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Is your ethnicity important to you?</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Do you socialise primarily with persons of your ethnicity?</td>
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<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>What is your preferred language use at home?</td>
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<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>What language do you use most with friends / in the workplace?</td>
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<td>8.</td>
<td>Apart from the national language, what was your pre-migration language?</td>
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<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>What is your religion / denomination?</td>
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<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Do you practise the same religion / denomination as in your region-of-origin?</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>What is the highest level of education you have completed?</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Are you / your parents married to a person of your ethnicity? If not, what cultural markers have you compromised on in your household?</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>Do your children feel as strongly about their ethnicity as you do?</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>What is the preferred language [home / school / work] of your children?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>/ /</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>Would you prefer your children to marry within your ethnicity?</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
16. **Does your current livelihood mirror that of your region-of-origin?**

[ ]

17. **If so, are their cultural compromises that you have needed to make? For example, wet rice v swidden v other…**

[ ]

18. **Have your work / business pursuits increased your interaction with other ethnicities?**

[ ]

19. **Do you cooperate with other ethnicities in the resettlement area?**

[ ]

20. **Has your perception of other ethnicities altered since resettlement? In which respect?**

[ ]

21. **Do you primarily think as a national citizen or member of an ethnicity?**

[ ]

22. **Have you experienced ethnic dilution since resettlement?**

[ ]

23. **Do you feel a sense of cultural loss as a result of resettlement?**

[ ]

24. **What ethnocultural markers have you adopted / modified since interacting with other settlers?**

[ ]

25. **What is your age group? Under 15 / 15-24 / 25-34 / 35-44 / 45-54 / 55+**

[ ]

Comments
## APPENDIX B – Narra Municipality: Area, Population, Density by Barangay

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Barangay</th>
<th>Area (Sq. Km.)</th>
<th>Population (Persons)</th>
<th>Population Density (Person / Km²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Urban Barangays</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antipuluan</td>
<td>12.37</td>
<td>5,482</td>
<td>443</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panacan</td>
<td>2.22</td>
<td>4,229</td>
<td>1,903</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panacan 2</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>4,471</td>
<td>1,490</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Población (Narrá)</td>
<td>53.28</td>
<td>10,954</td>
<td>205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub-total</strong></td>
<td>70.87</td>
<td>25,139</td>
<td>1,011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Urban Average</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rural Barangays</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aramaywan</td>
<td>65.06</td>
<td>4,134</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bagong Sikat</td>
<td>25.66</td>
<td>1,853</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Batang-Batang</td>
<td>7.80</td>
<td>986</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burirao</td>
<td>34.89</td>
<td>2,798</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caguisan</td>
<td>14.64</td>
<td>1,452</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calategas</td>
<td>75.45</td>
<td>5,678</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dumagueña</td>
<td>23.80</td>
<td>3,742</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elvita</td>
<td>34.15</td>
<td>882</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estrella Village</td>
<td>49.59</td>
<td>1,246</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ipilan</td>
<td>9.74</td>
<td>1,780</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malatgao</td>
<td>19.49</td>
<td>2,076</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malinao</td>
<td>80.17</td>
<td>3,190</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Princess Urduja</td>
<td>64.72</td>
<td>5,348</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sandoval</td>
<td>14.95</td>
<td>2,705</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Isidro (Bato-Bato)</td>
<td>135.38</td>
<td>2,228</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tacras</td>
<td>24.72</td>
<td>1,016</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taritien</td>
<td>66.12</td>
<td>1,741</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teresa</td>
<td>8.62</td>
<td>1,483</td>
<td>172</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tinagong Dagat</td>
<td>5.38</td>
<td>1,044</td>
<td>194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rural Average</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>93.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub-total</strong></td>
<td>723.25</td>
<td>45,382</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>794.13</td>
<td>70,521</td>
<td>84.73</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: MPDO (2009)
APPENDIX C – Proclamation No. 190: Proposed Land Alienation

MALANCAÑAN PALACE
Manila

BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES

PROCLAMATION NO. 190

RESERVING FOR RICE, CORN AND OTHER FOOD PRODUCTION PURPOSES CERTAIN PARCELS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN IN THE BARRIO OF PANACAN, MUNICIPALITY OF ABORLAN, PROVINCE OF PALAWAN, ISLAND OF PALAWAN.

Upon recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and pursuant to the provisions of section Eighty-three of Commonwealth Act Numbered One Hundred Forty-One, as amended, I hereby withdraw from sale or settlement and reserve for rice, corn, and other food production purposes under the administration of the Rice and Corn Production Administration of the National Development Company, subject to private rights, if any there be, and to future classification and final survey, and to the condition that the timber and other forest products therein, as well as the use and occupancy of the areas indicated as timberland or forest reserve, shall be place[d] under the administration and control of the Bureau of Forestry, in accordance with the Forest Laws and regulations, the following described parcels of the public domain situated in the Barrio of Panacan, Municipality of Aborlan, Province of Palawan, Island of Palawan, to wit: [here follow several pages of survey details]

The total combined area of the three lots is TWO HUNDRED FIFTY-THREE MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED SEVEN THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE (253,807,989) SQUARE METERS, more or less. These three lots combined as one lot, is bounded on the north by Public Land, on the Southeast by the proposed National Road, on the South and on the West by Public Land. Bearing true, the Declination 1020’ E.

Points referred to are marked on the plan now in progress of preparation for submittal for verification and approval of the Bureau of Lands. Surveyed January 23, to March 24, 1950, by the Certeza Surveying Company, Inc.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the Republic of the Philippines to be affixed.

Done in the City of Manila, this 29th day of June, in the year of our Lord, nineteen hundred and fifty, and of the independence of the Philippines, the fourth.

(SGD.) ELPIDIO QUIRINO
President of the Philippines
APPENDIX D – Proposed Conversion of Central Palawan Resettlement Agency

Republika ng Pilipinas
KAGWARAN NG REFORMANG PANSAKAHAN
(DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM)
Tanggapan ng Kalihim
Diliman, Lungsod ng Quezon
3008

Department Special Order No. 35
Series of 1976

In the interest of the service Team No. 04-14-111 (Central Palawan Resettlement Agency) Narra, Palawan, Region IV, is hereby converted into a Pilot Special [Project] Settlement Project and shall henceforth be under the direct supervision and management of the Office of the Secretary.

A Management Committed to supervise and monitor the operations of Project is hereby created and shall be composed of the following:

Undersecretary, Ernesto Valdes – Chairman
Assistant Secretary, Benjamin R. Labayan – Member
Assistant Secretary, Jose C. Medina – Member
Director, Romeo C. Casteñeda, BURE – Member
Director, Oscar C. Villaseñor, BLADD – Member
Director, Severino Madronio, BFM – Member
Director, Guadencio Besa, BALA – Member
Mr. Delfin Romero, Special Assistant – Member &
Executive Officer

Mr. Marcial dela Cruz, Agrarian Reform Team Leader 1 is hereby designated Project Manager of the Pilot Special Settlement Project and as such shall be under the direct supervision of the Office of the Secretary thru the Management Committee.

As Project Manager, Mr. dela Cruz shall be responsible for the management and the implementation of plans and programs for the full development of said Project.

All orders, circulars and / or memoranda inconsistent herewith are hereby revoked, superseded and / or modified as the case may be.

This Order shall take effect immediately.

February 10, 1976

(SGD.) CONRADO ESTRELLA
Secretary
APPENDIX E – Act Creating Municipality of Narra

SIX CONGRESS OF THE REPUBLIC
OF THE PHILIPPINES
FOURTH SESSION

( REPUBLIC ACT NO. 5642 )

AN ACT CREATING THE MUNICIPALITY OF NARRA, PROVINCE OF PALAWAN

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of the Representatives of the Philippines in Congress Assembled:

SECTION 1. The barrios of Malatgao, Tinagong Dagat, Taritien, Antipolohan, Teresa, Pancacan, Narra, Caguisen, Batang-Batang, Bato-Bato, Malinao, Sandoval, Dumagueña, El Vita, Calategas, Aramaywan, Tacras and that part of Barrio Abo-Abo now belonging to the Municipality of Aborlan, Province of Palawan, are now separated form the said Municipality and constituted into a distinct and independent municipality to be known as the Municipality of Narra. The seat of the new municipality shall be in the present site of Barrio Narra.

Section 2. The Mayor of the Municipality of Aborlan elected in the elections of November 15, 1967, shall be the Mayor of the Municipality of Narra. The Vice-Mayor of Aborlan elected in the last elections shall be the Mayor of Aborlan. The councillor who obtained the highest number of votes in the last election shall be Vice-Mayor of Narra and the one who obtained the second highest shall be the vice of Aborlan. The appointment of councillors to fill the vacant positions in both municipalities shall be made in accordance with the provisions of Republic Act Numbered Five Thousand One Hundred and Eighty Five.

Section 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

Approved, June 31, 1969.

CERTIFIED TRUE COPY:

(SGD) C. N. ZABANAL
Records Division
### APPENDIX F – NARRA MUNICIPALITY: POPULATION BY DIALECT / LANGUAGE (2005)

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<th>Cebuano</th>
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<th>Ilocano</th>
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Source: MPDO / CBMS   NB: Original documentation equates language with ‘dialect’.
### APPENDIX G – NARRA MUNICIPALITY: POPULATION BY RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION (2005)

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**Total** | 68806 | 38670 | 1840 | 2476 | 609 | 2308 | 2131 | 826 | 129 | 19807

Source: MPDO / CBMS
Source: MPDO
Abela, Jackie (pers. comm. 2011-04-02).


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