WOMEN IN POLITICAL ELITES:
A Comparison of Australia with Taiwan

by
Hai-Chuan Chou
B. A.
M. A.

Submitted in fulfilment of
the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

University of Tasmania
July 1996
Declaration

The Thesis contains no material which has been accepted for a degree or diploma by the University or any other institution, except by way of background information and duly acknowledged in the Thesis, and to the best of my knowledge and belief no material previously published or written by another person except where due reference is made.

Hai-Chuan Chou

Authority of Access

This thesis may be made available for loan and limited copying in accordance with the Copyright Act 1968.

Hai-Chuan Chou
ABSTRACT

This study compares recruitment and career paths of women politicians in Australia and Taiwan. It is based on the analysis of biographical materials and interviews with women MPs. The thesis argues that access of women to political elites is influenced by social dynamics, especially the pattern of modernisation. Different paths of modernisation — 'even' in Australia and 'uneven' in Taiwan — are associated with different configurations of gender-related political opportunities and resources, and with different political career paths. Political opportunities concern the overall access to social statuses and crucial pools of 'political eligibles'; political resources refer to those characteristics which are pivotal to securing promotion to elite positions. 'Even' modernisation in Australia is marked by economic, political and sociocultural modernisation, growing individualism and equalisation of political opportunities for women. However, such modernisation does not necessarily give women equal access to political resources, which tend to be concentrated in political organisations. 'Uneven' modernisation in Taiwan is marked by persistence of many traditional cultural norms and values, especially those concerning gender roles and the family. Consequently, women in Taiwan have more limited political opportunities than women in Australia. However, they have access to political resources, some of them gender-specific, which are concentrated in family networks and local communities. The career structures of women politicians (MPs) in both countries reflect these differences. Organisational (party or union) activist careers are dominant in Australia; they involve early entries into organised politics and long political apprenticeships. The dominant political career path for women in Taiwan represents a family-sponsored type; it involves a period of intense local activism.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to express my deepest gratitude to Dr. Jan Pakulski, the supervisor of this thesis, for his patience, experience, encouragement, valuable suggestions and his continued efforts to improve my English throughout the course of my postgraduate studies.

I also wish to thank Professor Malcolm Waters and Dr. Baogang He for their invaluable advice and comments, all of which have greatly improved the quality of this thesis.

This thesis is a comparative study. Many friends have helped to make this study possible. I especially wish to express my gratitude to Miss Chung-Peng Bai of National Chengchi University, Miss Kwei-Mei Lin, and all interviewees who have kindly provided information about their personal and political experiences.

I thank Mrs. Louise Oxley for her helpful comments and linguistic assistance.

My deepest appreciation goes to my parents and my parents-in-law for their financial support and continuous encouragement. Finally, my deepest debt is to my husband Su-Ke whose continuous assistance and encouragement were an invaluable contribution to my work.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

**Introduction**  
Research Problem 1  
Source of Evidence 3  
Plan of the Thesis 3  
Reasons for Comparing Australia with Taiwan 5

**Chapter One**  
**Theoretical Framework:**  
**Elites, Modernisation and Women** 8  
Elites and Political Recruitment 9  
Political Recruitment 13  
Political Elite Recruitment and the Modernisation Processes 19  
Patterns of Modernisation 20  
Women, Political Elite Recruitment and Modernisation 34  
Summary 49

**Chapter Two**  
**Modernisation in Taiwan and Australia** 51  
Historical Background 51  
Economic Modernisation 56  
Social-cultural Modernisation and the Women's Movement 64  
Political Modernisation 75  
Conclusions 86

**Chapter Three**  
**Family, Culture and Women's Opportunities and Resources** 89  
Family, Culture and Women 89  
Women's Opportunities and Resources 103  
Conclusions 131
TABLES

2.1 Life Expectancy at Birth in Australia and Taiwan, 1972-1992
2.2 Female Students as Proportion of Total Students in Three
   Levels of Education in Taiwan, 1950-1992
2.3 Full-time Educational Enrolment Rate by Age and Gender,
   Taiwan and Australia, 1992
2.4 Divorce Rate in Taiwan and Australia, 1966-1992
2.5 Single Parent Families as Proportion of Total Families,
   Taiwan and Australia, 1986, 1992
3.1 Liberal Individualism and Confucian Familism
3.2 The Average Length of Education by Gender, Taiwan, 1993
3.3 Female Membership in Major Political Parties, Australia (%)
3.4 Membership in the KMT by Gender (%)
3.5 Women Office Holders within the ALP State Executives (1992)
3.6 Women's Representation within the KMT's Central
   Committee and the Central Standing Committee
3.7 Women's Representation within the DPP's Executive
   Committee and the Central Standing Committee
3.8 Women as Proportion of Total Administrators/Administrative
   Executives, Managers, and Professionals (%)
3.9 Women as Proportion of Higher Education Students,
   Australia and Taiwan, 1964-1991
4.1 Structural Features of Electoral Politics
   in Australia and Taiwan
4.2 Women Candidates and the Reserved-seat System (Examples)
4.3 Women MPs with Political Family Background
4.4 Education Attainment of Women MPs
4.5 Occupation before Entering Parliament
4.6 Women MPs' Political Party Affiliation, 1969-1993
4.7 Age at Which Women Parliamentarians Were First Elected
4.8 Age at Which Women MPs Began Politically Active
4.9 Women MPs with Experience of Local Government Services
4.10 Political Party Experience of Women MPs
4.11 Involvement of Women MPs in Women's Organisations
4.12 Involvement of Women MPs in Voluntary Organisations
4.13 Political Careers of Women MPs
FIGURES

1.1 The Opportunity and Resource Model and Typology of Elite Recruitment 16
1.2 Percentage of Women in Lower House in 25 Countries, 1993 41
2.1 Infant Mortality Rate in Taiwan and Australia, 1965-1993 65
2.2 Total Fertility Rate (Per Woman)
in Taiwan and Australia, 1961-1992 66
2.3 Women's Median Age of First Marriage
in Taiwan and Australia, 1971-1993 66
2.4 Numbers of Ex-nuptial Births as Proportion of Per Thousand Live Births, Taiwan and Australia, 1975-1992 (%) 70
3.1 Female Labour Force Participation Rate by Marital Status 118
INTRODUCTION

This thesis explores the question of how women's recruitment into political elites is affected by social dynamics, especially the pattern of modernisation. The impact of social dynamics on the gender composition and paths of recruitment of political elites in Australia and Taiwan is analysed over the last two decades. The different patterns of modernisation in Australia and Taiwan are associated with different configurations of political opportunities and resources, and these configurations, in turn, shape the paths of women's recruitment into political elites and affect the changing gender composition of political elites.

Research Problem

The revival of the women's movement in the late 1960s brought to public attention the need for empowerment of the female half of population. The changing roles and status of women in public life become the subject of public debates and academic research. These debates highlighted the fact that among the most salient features of women's position in contemporary public life is their limited presence in political elites. However, the research results reveal that women politicians are rare. Women who are interested in political careers face barriers derived from patriarchal tradition, inequitable institutional arrangements, financial constraints and patriarchal organisation (Kelber 1994).

A common view is that these barriers are stronger in less modernised societies and that women are more likely to succeed in political contests in more developed countries. It is assumed that modernisation helps in reducing gender bias. Modernisation is widely seen as woman-friendly, and women's presence in political elites is often seen as a product of modernisation (eg. Huntington 1968; Putnam 1976; Etzioni-Halevy 1981; Berger 1987). Variation in this presence is typically attributed to variation in modernisation level and path. The classic early version of this modernisation theory points to the overall level of societal modernisation as the key determinant of gender divisions and correlates these divisions with sociopolitical
processes of elite recruitment and party formation (e.g. Apter 1965; Huntington 1968). More later and more complex versions of modernisation theory have qualified this view (e.g. Nettl and Robertson 1968; Apter 1992). Although modernisation is global in its scope, the patterns of modernisation may vary in different societies. According to these complex versions of modernisation theory, different patterns of modernisation result in different social-structural and institutional arrangements and lead to differential elite composition.

The classic version of modernisation theory has been challenged by some empirical 'anomalies'. In some advanced (modernised and industrialised) societies, women fare well. The female education and labour force participation rates are increasing and gender inequality is reducing. In some other advanced societies, however, the situation is more complex. Gender divisions are decreasing in education and occupation, yet, the representation of women in political elites remains low. Australia and Taiwan are good examples of such 'anomalous' societies. In spite of high levels of modernisation, especially in the economy, both societies have a similar (and low) proportion of women in political elites. Clearly, the classic version of modernisation theory cannot provide a good explanation of the skewed gender composition of political elites in these societies.

The thesis argues that in order to understand the gender composition of the two national elites it is necessary to explore the more complex versions of modernisation theory and to pay more attention to the institutional and socio-cultural factors that affect women's recruitment into political elites. A modified version of modernisation theory, which sees modernisation as a complex multi-dimensional process, can serve as a good theoretical framework. Each aspect — economy, polity, and culture — may, or may not exhibit the same pace. In fact, an 'even' pattern of modernisation, whereby it progresses on 'all fronts' with the same speed, is relatively rare. It is a unique West European pattern\(^1\). East Asian societies follow an 'uneven' pattern, whereby economic modernisation exceeds in its speed and scope, while political and socio-cultural modernisation is

---

\(^1\) Some, like Bendix (1967), argue that the USA retained many pre-modern features in its political system.
slower and limited in scope. Such an 'uneven' pattern is found in
Taiwan. It results in a specific 'gendered' configuration of political
opportunities and resources which, in turn, is reflected in elite
recruitment and gender composition. Thus an analytic model is
preferable which modernisation is seen as affecting political
opportunities and resources in political recruitment, and women's
presence in political elites is, in turn, affected in these different
combinations of political opportunities and resources and the resulting
recruitment channels.

Sources of Evidence
This study uses a variety of quantitative and qualitative data on
women's political recruitment and career profiles. These data include
biographies of successful women politicians in Australia and Taiwan
as well as statistics about the overall position of women in both
societies. However, because the biographical data are less available in
Taiwan, information from interviews of some Taiwanese women
politicians are used to supplement the biographical sources.

The analysis covers the political careers of 153 women politicians
in Australia and Taiwan who advanced to national parliaments
during the last two decades. It includes 52 Australian (34 Senators and
19 members of House of Representatives), and 101 Taiwanese women
politicians (70 members of the National Assembly and 35 Legislators).2
The information analysed includes their family backgrounds,
education, occupation before political elevation, organisational
affiliation and the sequence of political positions. The interviews fill
the gaps in the political biographical data, as well as providing
additional information on the nature of political campaigns and
political resources utilised.

Plan of the Thesis
The thesis comprises four main chapters. The mostly theoretical
Chapter One discusses elites, modernisation and gender inequality. It
reviews the theoretical frameworks in each of these areas and
combines them for the purpose of this analysis. The main argument
developed in Chapter One is that the access of women to political elites

---
2 One Australian woman politician has served in both Houses, and four Taiwanese
women have served in the National Assembly and the Legislative Yuan.
is affected by social dynamics, especially the pattern of modernisation. The impact of social dynamics on women in political elites is mediated by and reflected in the paths of their recruitment. These paths reflect the differential composition of political opportunities and resources that are shaped, in turn, by the pattern of modernisation. The model of political elite recruitment is derived from Putnam (1976) and Pakulski (1982). Recruitment is seen as located within the social structure, as well as in institutional frameworks and specific institutional and organisational settings. The process of recruitment is conceptualised as a selection from the 'pools of eligibles' by the key selectorates according to specific criteria. The key concepts are those of political opportunity and political resources. The former refers to the overall level of access to crucial pools of eligibles. The latter means those characteristics that are crucial in securing promotion in recruitment and political success in selection from one pool to the other. The combination of opportunity and resource is reflected in career path of women politicians.

It is argued in Chapter One that the Western modernisation pattern encourages innovation and achievement in organisations, and that it draws a boundary between the public sphere, the economy and politics on one hand, and the private sphere, especially the family, on the other. This pattern of modernisation is characterised by growing individualism and equalisation of political opportunities. The East Asian modernisation pattern, by contrast, maintains many traditional norms and values, and integrates the family more tightly into the process of modernisation. It stresses individuals' subordination and duty to the family, and thus blurs the divisions between the public and the private spheres. This pattern of modernisation limits political opportunities for women but, paradoxically one may say, opens some gender-specific political resources for aspiring women politicians.

Chapter Two analyses modernisation paths in Taiwan and Australia. The process of modernisation is examined in the areas of economy, society and polity. Taiwan and Australia share some common features of economic, demographic and social development, with some differences in the pattern of democratisation. They differ most in respect of socio-cultural trends.
These differences in the patterns of modernisation are reflected in women's recruitment into political elites. Different socio-cultural orientations associated with the different patterns of modernisation are labelled here 'Confucian' and 'Western'. They are discussed in more details in Chapter Three.

Chapter Three examines family and culture in the context of modernisation paths and different combinations of political opportunities and resources. It also links social dynamics and socio-cultural orientations with the more specific issue of political recruitment of women. As far as socio-cultural orientations relevant to study of political recruitment are concerned, Confucianism and Western liberalism can be contrasted along four dimensions: familism vs individualism, education vs performance, credentialism vs apprenticeship, and duty vs right. The combination of political opportunities and resources and women's political career types reflect these contrasts. The empirical data are employed to measure the opportunity and resource structures in both countries.

Chapter Four analyses in more detail political recruitment of women in Taiwan and Australia. Women's political careers are analysed in respect of personal background and occupation(s) before entering the parliament, personal affiliations and working experiences in political parties and local government. The typology of recruitment paths is constructed. Biographies and interview data are used in analysing the patterns of women's political elite recruitment in both countries.

The concluding chapter returns to the key questions addressed in the study: why and how are different patterns of modernisation affecting the composition of opportunities and resources and shaping the paths of women's recruitment into political elites? In the light of the findings, it evaluates the theoretical accounts and suggests future research.

Reasons for Comparing Australia with Taiwan
By comparing two societies like Australia and Taiwan with similar proportion of women in political elites but different patterns of modernisation, we can assess the ability of the opportunity and resource model to explain the gender composition of, and recruitment
into, political elites. Such comparison follows the 'Weberian' model of global socio-historical method used in order to assess the viability of a theoretical account. In our case, the account links modernisation paths, opportunities and resources, and elite recruitment and gender composition. More specifically, modernisation is seen as affecting opportunities and resources in political recruitment. Women's recruitment into political elites is affected in these different combinations of opportunities and resources, and gender composition reflects these combinations.

Australia is an advanced industrialised society, and it is a pioneer country in granting women full citizenship including the right to vote and to stand for the national parliament. Australia more or less follows the path of political development that modernisation theory would predict. It presents, with some qualifications, the main characteristics of Western modern societies and elites. Women's representation in Australian political elites increased from 1.1% in 1970 to 13% in 1993 (Millar 1993), in line with progressive modernisation, especially of politics. Further increases resulting from the 1996 federal election follow the general trend.

Taiwan is a latecomer in modernisation, and has experienced 'uneven' modernisation. It is a typical Confucian society which is seen as patriarchal and woman-unfriendly. However, Taiwan has a similar proportion of women in political elites and shows a similar trend. After the general election held in 1992, women's representation in political elites has reached 13%— the same proportion as in Australia. However, the way in which Taiwanese women politicians are recruited is quite different from the Australian paths of recruitment. These differences in modernisation paths and political careers, and the similarity of outcomes, form the main research problem we address here.

This similarity of outcomes may be seen as challenging the feminist assumption that women cannot benefit from modernisation without eliminating those existing traditional barriers of which familism is the central one. It is believed that 'genderised' social roles and domestic responsibilities must be eliminated before women can have equal access to the public sphere, particularly to politics.
However, Taiwan may be seen as an example of an uneven modernisation pattern, whereby politics has been 'genderised' in a way that maintains unequal opportunities but gives women wider resources, partly derived from women's gender-specific roles. Although the family has been changing in the process of modernisation in Taiwan, the gender roles and the domestic responsibilities are still largely traditional with pronounced patriarchal elements. However, it is clear that these roles have been integrated into political recruitment in the way that at least partly can reduce women's disadvantage. Consequently, the ratio of women in political elites in Taiwan has been higher than the average ratio of women in politics elsewhere.

One qualification should be made at the outset. The presence of women in political elites in both countries is also influenced by political promotion and various forms of affirmative action. In Taiwan, it takes the form of the reserved-seats system; in Australia recruitment is influenced by informal preferences (mainly by the ALP) and semi-formal quotas. The thesis comments on these policy factors and argues that they, by and large, balance each other out.

---

3 Some scholars treat the reserved-seats system as an analogue to affirmative action promoted by women's movements in North and Western Europe. It helps in expanding women's active participation in politics. See Chou et al. (1990).
CHAPTER ONE
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK:
ELITES, MODERNISATION AND WOMEN

This chapter draws together three theoretical frameworks in the areas of elite and political recruitment, modernisation, and gender inequality in the social and institutional context. The main argument is that access to political elites by women is affected by social dynamics, especially the pattern of modernisation. The impact of modernisation is reflected in diverse paths of political recruitment. These paths in Australia and Taiwan show the impact of political opportunities and political resources, which are shaped, in turn, by the different patterns of modernisation in the two societies. Thus the differences in the distribution of opportunities and resources in the context of different modernisation paths can explain the political career trajectories and gender composition of elites in Australia and Taiwan.

It begins by contrasting the 'Western' and 'East Asian' patterns of modernisation. It is argued that the Western pattern of modernisation is characterised by the growth of industrialism and equalisation of political opportunities. But due to its promotion of universalism it also narrows down the bases of political resources available for women. The 'uneven' East Asian modernisation path is more gender particularistic, and maintains some traditional and collectivistic values and norms. It draws the family into the process of economic and political modernisation in a specific way by stressing individuals' subordination to the family and focussing on familial duties, thus blurring the division between the public and the private spheres. This pattern of modernisation results in narrower political opportunities for women, but it also opens some gender-specific resource bases which aspiring women politicians can tap. While the the importance of opportunities is widely recognised, the significance of political resources often escapes the attention of students of political recruitment. This significance is highlighted here in order to explain the differences in political career structures in Australia and Taiwan,
and to re-valuate critically the popular view of Western modernisation as necessarily woman-friendly.

This chapter has four sections. The first section discusses elites and political recruitment. It outlines a model of opportunity and resource in the context of modernisation theory. The second section explores the relationship between modernisation and political elite recruitment. The third section analyses the reasons for different patterns of modernisation in Australia and Taiwan. The two patterns of modernisation are analysed in their different social-structural and historical contexts. The fourth section links gender inequalities and women's political recruitment with modernisation trajectories.

Elites And Political Recruitment

Political Power and Elites
Political power and its social distribution are the central concern of classical elite studies. Classical elite theorists — Vilfredo Pareto, Gaetans Mosca and Roberto Michels — agree that the advent of democracy makes little difference to the distribution of political power, with democratic authority still resting in the hands of elites.

Schumpeter (1942) was first to elaborate a realistic, empirical theory of democracy which was in line with the classical elite studies. He recognised that even in a democracy the elite had to rule. It was seen as 'the irony of democracy' that 'democracy is government "by the people", but the survival of democracy rests on the shoulders of elites' (Dye and Zeigler 1990: 3).

The central concept of elite theory is 'power'. The possession of power defines elites. Consistent with conventional usage, power could be defined as:

- 'the chance of a man or of a number of men to realise their own will in a communal action even against the resistance of others' (Weber 1948: 180);
- 'a tool to get other social goods— wealth, economic influence, social status, educational advantages for their children (...) these become themselves powers' (Parry 1969: 32);
- 'a positive social ability as a circulating medium, analogous to money, to complete communal ends and secure common aims of a social system' (Parsons 1986: 101)
• 'the capacity of a social class to carry out its particular objective interests' (Poulantzas 1986: 144)
• 'the ability to affect the behaviour of individuals by the real or threatened use of rewards and punishments; a special form of influence; a relationship among individuals, groups, and institutions in society' (Dye 1990: 4).

In these definitions, power subsumes the notions of influence, control and authority. It is exhibited in an interactive relationship, so it can be seen as a product of social interaction.

To be a human being is to be an agent and to be an agent is to have power. 'Power' in this highly generalised sense means 'transformative capacity', the capacity to intervene in a given set of events so as in some way to alter them. (Giddens 1985: 7)

By and large, power can be seen as the generalised capacity to realise one's own will in a systematic way (Weber 1978). However, power is never fully institutionalised and seldom directly observable. The visibility of power comes from individuals' or groups' access to, mobilisation of, and control over, power resources.

The main container of power resources in modern society is the state. Both the classical and contemporary elite theorists agree on this, and focus on political elites, that is, the incumbents of strategic positions in governmental organisations. Political elites are the principal power holders, and their power is regarded as most legitimate (authoritative).

The common perspective of the classical elite theorists also includes their acceptance of the inevitability of elites, and their scepticism as to the development of democracy beyond periodic election and middle-class participation (Nye 1977; Nagle 1992; Bottomore 1993). All societies, in this perspective, are inevitably divided into the rulers and the ruled. The former constitutes an elite, a minority group. The latter comprises the masses, a majority category. Elites are largely self-perpetuating, autonomous and typically, though not necessarily, drawn from the top strata of society. Classical elite theorists are concerned with analysing elite cohesion, structure and circulation rather than elite backgrounds. Elites are potentially able to exploit their organisation, political skills and personal characteristics so as to preserve their domination (Parry 1969). The domination of elites
is regarded as a universal and ineradicable characteristic of all societies. This is explained either by psychological differences among people (Pareto) or by social organisation (Michels).

According to Pareto, elites are 'a class of the people who have the highest indices in their branch of activity, and to that class give the name of elite' (1965: 552). In this view, elites are those with specific psychological attributes: Machiavelli's 'foxes' and 'lions'. All political elites comprise both 'lions' and 'foxes'. The struggle between the innovating, demogagic, persuasive, and cunning 'foxes' and the conservative, honest, and strong 'lions' leads to the circulation of elites, a mobility between elites and non-elites. There is no analysis of gender in Pareto's work, but his view on the circulation of elites is useful for theorising about the 'political opportunity structure' as shaped by overall processes of social development (Pareto 1969: 551-558).

By contrast, Mosca (1939), Michels (1962), and Mills (1956) adopt an institutional perspective and place emphasis on organisations as the principal bases of elite power (Parry 1969; Bottomore 1993). They also analyse specific criteria of selection and recruitment, thus providing a useful foundation for the political resource model.

Mosca scrutinises the constitution of the elite itself, particularly in modern democratic societies. He believes that political elites govern the masses because they are organised:

> the domination of an organised minority, obeying a single impulse, over the unorganised majority is inevitable (...) the minority is organised for the very reason that it is a minority. [1939: 53]

Small groups find it easier than large ones to organise themselves and to act coherently. To elaborate the advantages of organisations, Meisel (1962) proposes the 'three C's' formula: elite power is based on group consciousness, coherence, and conspiracy (common intentions). The elite, according to him, is internally homogeneous, unified, and self-conscious.

Weber's student, Roberto Michels (1962) further elaborates the links between organisations and elites. He argues that the organisation and bureaucratisation of modern political parties leads to the supremacy of the elite. The rise of elites derives from the very
structure of any organised group and the organisational ability to accumulate and enhance power. Monopoly of resources and skills gives elites the ability to manipulate organisations. Elite oligarchies, therefore, are unavoidable in all sizeable organisations and in all complex societies. As Michels puts it (1962: 333):

It is organisation which give birth to the domination of the elected over the electors, of the mandatories over the mandators, of the delegates over the delegators. Who says organisation says oligarchy.

In the studies of C. W. Mills (1956), elites acquire a ruling class complexion. Mills identifies the existence of the 'power elite' whose authority is rooted in the integration of socio-economic, military, and political power. He stresses the unity of elites, the homogeneity of their social class origins, and their strategies to preserve the status quo. All these help to consolidate the governing capacity of the rulers. Power elites are the product of institutions and reflect the institutional structure of society. Some institutions tie up 'pivotal positions' in societies. The top ranks of the institutional hierarchy own the 'strategic command posts of the social structure' (Mills 1956: 4).

Contemporary elite scholars (eg. Higley et al. 1979; Dye 1990) share the 'modest' view of democracy (as an elite-controlled regime) and see elite structure and composition as key determinants of social and political outcomes. They mostly use the positional approach to identify elites their strategic decision-making locations in the largest organisations. By and large, they can be seen as the followers of the institutional approach.

Both the classical and countemporary elite theorists see elites as controlling their composition through domination over recruitment and selection processes. Some studies (Matthews 1954; Miliband 1969) illustrate this process of elite reproduction by analysing elite recruitment paths and social (class) composition. The social exclusiveness of elites and the difficulty of obtaining entry into elite ranks result from this self-reproductive ability. Incumbent elites lay down the procedures, requirements and credentials for admission to the circle of rulers. These procedures, requirements and credentials may include intensive apprenticeship, conformity to standards of educational attainment and social background, similar values,
ideology, interests and loyalties. As Prewitt and Stone (1973: 142) argues, 'persons who have some control over the pathways to membership in the political elite tend naturally to favor persons of similar ideology, status, and background'.

Political elites form the core element of modern elites seen here as those few who control organisational resources and who are capable of affecting organisational outcomes individually, regularly and seriously (Higley et. al 1979: 8). Non-elites are all others without such power. Political elites exercise authority or influence, and are directly involved in struggles for political office. In this thesis, we focus on national political elites. Political elite recruitment refers to the sequences of moves and positions that lead to the top political offices in the state.

Political Recruitment
In Pareto's view, it is necessary for political elites to open certain opportunities for upward mobility for the mass, so that those individuals who are born with 'elite psychological characteristics' can be absorbed into political elites. Otherwise elites decay. On the other hand, Mosca and Michels argue that political elites have to maintain some exclusiveness although they emerge from various strata. Elite members are able to entrench their position due to control over crucial political resources, organisational skills, and ability to coerce and manipulate. Weber (1948) links such organisational control with the historical process of bureaucratisation, especially of the state administrative apparatuses. He notes (1948: 103),

Naturally power actually rests in the hands of those who, within the organisation, handle the work continuously. Otherwise, power rests in the hands of those on whom the organisation in its processes depends financially or personally.

This view associates the rise of modern elites with the concentration of command over organisational resources in the hands of political bureaucracies. Here, we adopt a model that combines the perspectives of Mosca, Michals and Weber. It has been elaborated by contemporary students of elite recruitment, especially Robert Putnam (1976).

Putnam (1976) develops a political elite recruitment model in which channels, gates and gatekeepers, and credentials determine the
aspirants' recruitment into political elites. The aspirants come from various societal strata and form increasingly circumscribed 'pools of eligibles'. In premodern societies (with few exceptions, including the recruitment of civil servants in China), inheritance was the main channel to the top. In modern societies, institutional channels for finding, selecting, and socialising elite candidates differ quite widely. They may include educational institutions, labour or trade unions, political parties, state administrative bureaucracies, and local governments. However, these institutional channels do not determine who will fill political elite positions. They form a framework for recruitment within which gatekeepers and their policies shape the composition of elites.

Gatekeepers are responsible for the way in which aspirants are selected. They include incumbent elites as well as the controllers of selecting institutions, such as exclusive schools and corporate hierarchies. Putnam mentions three techniques used by gatekeepers to select aspirants: automatic, quasi-automatic, and discretionary. The automatic technique is the premodern one and is the simplest. It relies on aspirants' ascribed status. In the quasi-automatic technique, including seniority and examination, achieved status replaces ascribed status. The discretionary technique is embodied in elections. In modern democracies, pre-selection in political parties is an important element of the gatekeeping process. The role of organisational gatekeepers is central in political recruitment, even under the conditions of representative liberal democracy.

Credentials are those qualities which aspirants should have in order to be selected. They include political skills, education, knowledge, orientations, and affiliations. In modern societies, access to education and political skills seems to provide most individuals with relevant knowledge and skill credentials. Yet, orientations and affiliations also distinguish those who succeed. Both authoritarian regimes and democracies give priority to loyalty, and affiliations are vital resource for all elite aspirants.

In Putnam's model, aspirants form hierarchical pools of eligible candidates. They are filtered out at every consecutive gate. The differences between pre-modern and modern systems of recruitment lie mainly in how aspirants enter the pools. The entry conditions are
analysed as opportunities, while the characteristics which determine selection from pools, and which are used by gatekeepers in 'filtering the winners', are referred to as 'political resources'. Putnam largely focuses on differential opportunities. This focus, which underplays the importance of resources, weakens the capacity of Putnam's model to explain the divergent recruitment paths to political elites. It cannot explain why recruitment patterns and outcomes vary so widely, and why, with open and gender-neutral opportunities, women still have difficulty in securing equal access to political elites.

It is argued that political opportunities and resources can, and typically do, vary independently. Opportunities shape the overall social access to the pools of eligibles, and resources help aspirants succeed in consecutive rounds of selection. The former shape institutional openness that makes aspirants enter the eligible pools. The latter propel aspirants from one pool to the other and favour their elevation to political elites. The composition of opportunities and resources, that is, how open the opportunities are and how the resources are distributed, are the key parameters of elite recruitment systems.

The opportunity and resource model is useful to explore women's recruitment into political elites in the context of modernisation. The composition of opportunities and resources in different societies with different patterns of modernisation can be compared and analysed. Similarly, the relationship between women's access to opportunities and resources and modernisation paths can be empirically examined. This relationship is reflected in the gender composition of political elites.

The opportunity and resource model used in this study is shown in Figure 1.1. There are four types of political elite recruitment based on the different composition of opportunities and resources.
Figure 1.1 The Opportunity and Resource Model and Typology of Elite Recruitment

- Type I: 'Achievers' are found in an environment with high opportunities and wide resources. They seek to run for political office because they can easily enter the eligible pools, through various channels, and have access to wide resources. The career paths are routinised.

- Type II: 'Apprentices' have high opportunities, but narrow resources, with the latter controlled by political organisations. They can easily enter the eligible pools, but need to experience apprenticeship in various organisations to accumulate enough resources to prospell themselves to political elite positions. Therefore, the career paths of this type are long and organisation-oriented.

- Type III: 'Pioneers' face an environment in which opportunities are low and resources are narrow. Pioneers are obliged not only to seek available channel to the eligible pool, but also to accumulate
limited resources. The career path, thus, can be described as a breakthrough.

- Type IV: 'Clients' enjoy wide resources but limited opportunities. With the powerful support of patrons, client aspirants can be channelled into the eligible pool; thereupon, the career path is sponsored.

The Structure of Political Opportunities

The concept of opportunity is doubly relative: to a social category (gender) and social goal (political recruitment). We use it here in a restricted sense; it means gender opportunity for political recruitment.

Political opportunities are seen here as socially defined; they vary with the extent of institutional openness. Women's political opportunities, that is their access to the channels of entry to the eligible pools, can be analysed in three broad areas. The first is access to political organisations, including political parties and unions. The second is access to the labour market, including participation in the labour force and access to those professional positions which form springboards for political careers. The third is access to education. This, in turn, is related to social-cultural norms and expectations, including gender role expectations. Education, it must be stressed, plays a dual role as an aspect of political opportunities and resources. Access to education provides women opportunities to enter political springboard occupations, that is, pools of political eligibles. Education credentials, especially higher education and postgraduate degrees, are also seen as a political resources. This is especially evident in Taiwan where highly educated political aspirants can achieve fast political elevation without intense political experience. This reflects the tradition of Chinese mandarins which had valued education above other political qualities. These three aspects of opportunities are interrelated; they form a structure. Change in one aspect, as it is argued, affects other aspects. However, the structural change typically starts with some aspects altering 'ahead of' the other. Taiwanese society, as argued below, has experienced a rapid change in the political opportunity structure which started with accelerated access by women to education. We review these aspects in Taiwan and Australia in Chapter Two.
The Structure of Political Resources

Political resources are those characteristics which facilitate political elevation. Political resources vary widely, and they can be material and non-material. They comprise those characteristics which enable aspirants to succeed and which favour their elevation from one pool of eligibles to the other. Political resources vary from society to society and from time to time. In traditional society they typically involve gender, lineage, religion and status; in modern society they typically involve money, influence, loyalty, political skills and experience, organisational affiliations, media exposure, education, and location in social networks.

Some studies (Randall 1987; Chou et al. 1990; Rush 1992; Schlozman et al. 1994) associate access to political resources with political competition. Randall divides explanations for the small number of women in political elites into two broad categories: those stressing the supply factors, and those focussing on demand factors. She sees resources as a part of supply factors. Education, employment, social class and political experience are regarded as the key political resources. Chou et al. (1990) see political resources as including political organisational affiliations (with the KMT), previous political experience, and relationship to organised groups in society. Rush (1992) develops a supply-demand model of political recruitment. He distinguishes the primary, secondary, and tertiary opportunity structures. Resources are present in the secondary and tertiary opportunity structures; they include knowledge, skills, experience, time, money and ideological positions. Schlozman et al. (1994) divide political resources into two types: general resources and politically relevant resources. The former facilitate political activity and determine whether social processes prior to participation produce gender differences; they include money, time and civic skills. The latter, while they are not clearly defined, may be interpreted as including education, money, time, occupational and employment status, organisational affiliation and skills.

These views place political resources in the public sphere, mainly in the spheres of employment and organisational affiliation. The different locations of political resources, the interaction between them,
and the impact of different political resources-source on political success, are not analysed comparatively in these studies.

The sources of political resources are divided into three categories: organisations, local communities, and the family. The variation in the sources and patterns of political resources in different societies should be seen in the context of modernisation paths. In the Western path of modernisation political resources are concentrated in organisations. In the East Asian path of modernisation political resources are concentrated in organisations, local communities and the family. These two patterns of political resources and their impact on women's political recruitment are reviewed in Chapter Three.

**Political Elite Recruitment And The Modernisation Processes**

One of the central concerns for ruling elites is control over recruitment of new members. Forms of recruitment vary from time to time and from society to society. This section examines the relationship between different patterns of modernisation and different combinations of political opportunities and resources that affect political elite recruitment of women.

The essential aspects of political elite recruitment are where the political elite derives from and how they are selected. These aspects define different recruitment systems. Mosca suggests, for example, that there are two kinds of elite recruitment. In an autocratic aristocratic society the elite consists of self-recruits drawn from the top social strata. In a liberal democracy, with more circulation between elites and non-elites, elite recruits rely on various forms of organisational and group sponsorship.

With the breakdown of feudalism and the rise of capitalism, the intellectuals, industrial managers, professional workers and bureaucrats who comprised Mosca's 'new middle class' had gradually gained access to political elites (Bottomore 1993). Their power relied on their control of large and complex bureaucratic organisations. This was confirmed by Mills (1956, 1958, 1963). The lower ranks of the elite mediated between the core of the elite and the mass, and supplied new recruits to the core. For outsiders, these lower ranks formed the entry into the elite circle. Mills stressed that the elite recruitment reflected the openness of political opportunities for the mass.
Political modernisation increases elite circulation. The alternation of political elites can be seen as the result of growing social mobility. Under democratic regimes, the eligible pools of political elites are enlarged and the method of recruitment changes from ascription to achievement. Democracy can be seen as a modern achievement-based method of recruitment to political elites. Schumpeter (1942: 269) defines it as follows:

the democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's votes.

The democratic formula is that 'no one can decide by himself that he is better than others; it is the others who must decide this; and the method for ascertaining who is outstanding is election' (Sartori 1965: 103). Political elites in a democratic system are selected through their competition in regular elections.

Such a view of the democratic recruitment of political elites emphasises the openness of a political system to co-opt new members. Elites 'often [benefit] simply from the mere chance of being in the right place at the right time' (Higley et al. 1979: 105). This perspective seems to indicate a 'classless' recruitment of political elites. More 'classless', however, does not mean more 'genderless'. Gender imbalance seems to survive the modernisation process. Even the most egalitarian (in their class composition) modernised regimes show a remarkably persistent gender imbalance.

Patterns Of Modernisation
Modernisation alters political opportunities and changes access to political resources. Different configurations of modernisation result in different composition of political opportunities and resources. This section explores the concept of modernisation and different patterns of modernisation, with special attention paid to 'even' and 'uneven' modernisation trajectories.
**The Concept of Modernisation**

Modernisation is a general term to describe the process of change in societies. It can be understood in three ways (Sztompka 1993: 129). First, it is a synonym for progressive social changes whereby society advances according to some acceptable standards of improvement. Second, it connects with the concept of modernity. Change is seen as a series of transformations of social life — industrialisation, urbanisation, rationalisation, bureaucratization, democratisation, the supremacy of capitalism, the expansion of individualism and achievement motivation, the affirmation of reason and science. The momentum of this transformation is the appearance and growth of industrial capitalism. Compared with a given form of social life, the new form is named 'a modern society', and this is characterised by 'machine technology, rational and secular attitudes, and highly differentiated social structures' (O'Connel 1976: 13). This process of transformation leads from traditional to modern social institutions. Therefore analyses of modernisation often concentrate on changes in the institutional orders: political, cultural and economic (Bryjak and Soroka 1992: 403). Third, modernisation may refer to endeavours by developing societies to catch up and overtake the top-rank. In the world-system perspective, it is the movement from the peripheries to the core of the modern world (Wallerstein 1974).

In this thesis, modernisation is used in the second sense. By examining the transformations in society, economy and polity, we discuss the Western (even) and the East Asian (uneven) patterns of modernisation respectively.

Classic modernisation theories claim that the development toward the final stage of modernisation is natural, and that the experience of the West is the blueprint for development of other societies. After a short eclipse in the 1950s and '60s, modernisation theory was revived again. Most of the 'new' modernisation studies have modified the old version, and focus more on the impact of cultural differences and various external factors. They acknowledge that tradition may be a helpful factor in modernisation, that the paths of modernisation may differ, and that the modernisation process may be affected by external factors such as wars and crises (So 1990).
The Western Modernisation Pattern

The classical theories often adopt Darwin's evolutionary concepts to describe and explain social change. They focus on the different stages of social development. Society is viewed as analogous to a biological organism whose development is seen within a global, evolutionary scheme. The modernity vs. tradition dichotomy, in respect of complexity and adaptive capacity, is employed to categorise different stages of development, and to contrast the transition from one stage to the other (Parsons 1951 et al.; Levy 1966; Etzioni-Halevy 1981). Within these general types, perspectives on modernity vary: Comte focuses on the development of knowledge; Durkheim looks at the pressure of population growth and moral density; Weber connects the transition with the reformation and the rise of rationality; Marx points to the effects of commodification, capital accumulation and industrialisation; Spencer analyses a shift from militant to industrial society in the context of progressive differentiation; and Tonnies analyses the collapse of community (Gemeinschaft) and the extension of geoeellschaftlich relations.

The classical evolutionary modernisation model is based on some assumptions (Eisenstadt 1992: 412-13) which may be summarised as follows:

- Structural differentiation is exemplified by the growth of specialised roles which leads to shifts of resources and changes in the social division of labour.
- Society is seen as a relatively closed system. Social division of labour includes different levels of structural differentiation and leads to an increase in specialised roles in institutions.
- An aligned differentiation in every area is a 'natural' consequence of the structural change. Any other development is seen as deviant or problematic.

Structural functionalism inherits most of these assumptions and places more emphasis on internal changes in societies. The master concept employed to describe and explain social changes in differentiation. Modernisation is the process of unlimited functional differentiation (Levy 1966; Smelser 1968; Eisenstadt 1973), and the direction of this process is toward adaptive upgrading.
If differentiation is to yield a balanced, a more evolved system, each newly differentiated sub-structure...... must have increased adaptive capacity for performing its primary function, as compared with the performance of that function in the previous, more diffuse structure. (Parsons 1966: 22)

Structural functionalists view modernisation as a universal, worldly phenomenon. Parsons' five pattern variables not only illustrate the classical evolutionary view, but also indicate the results of modernisation: the fundamental social relations which are 'enduring, recurring, and embedded in the cultural system — the highest and the most important system in Parsons's theoretical framework' (So 1990: 21). The pattern variables include:

Affectivity vs Affective neutrality. Social relations in traditional society are characterised by affective orientation. Personal, face-to-face relations dominate people's social action. In modern society social relations show affectively neutral orientation. Social action is based on impersonal, indirect and discrete relations.

Collective-orientation vs Self-orientation. In traditional society, collective interests are more important than individual interests and benefits. They are a useful means of reducing the social disequilibrium caused by individual variation and inventiveness. In modern society, individuals are released from collective constraints, encouraged to develop their talents, and prompted to pursue their own careers. All these are conducive to technological innovation and economic growth. Individual benefits have priority over collective obligations.

Particularism vs Universalism. In traditional society people are immersed in their primary relationships — kinship, friendship, and neighbourhood. The relationships are particular to people who trust each other, and emphasise their specific duties. In modern society, urban life forces people to interact with abstract categories of strangers. Secondary relationships make them employ universalistic criteria in their interaction (eg. the rule of law).

Ascription vs Achievement. In traditional society people are judged by, and benefit from, their inherited statuses, such as family background. In modern society, people use their achieved status, such as occupational position.
Diffuseness vs Specificity. In traditional society actors engage with others totally across a wide range of activities. In modern society actors participate in activities with specific, structured purposes.

Pattern variables form a scheme of modernisation that suggests general convergence of modernisation paths, and stipulates that common characteristics will appear in all modernised societies regardless of national and regional variation. On the material level, a modern society is characterised by the wide use of technology, commercialised exchange, and machine power. On the non-material level, value orientations become universalistic. On the social structural level, highly bureaucratic organisations extend control over the functionally differentiated social units.

Changes are also reflected in the physiological level, Inkeles and Smith (1974: 19-25) also point out twelve personal qualities of 'modern men': openness to new experience, the readiness for social change, the growth of opinion, getting information, time orientation, efficacy, planning, calculability, valuing of technical skill, educational and occupational aspirations, awareness of, and respect for, the dignity of others, and understanding production.

Aspects of Western Modernisation
Economic modernisation refers to the movement from a steady subsistence economy to self-sustaining commodity, production, market exchange and economic growth. It includes technological improvement, expansion of money economy, and the growth of extensive markets (Levy 1966). Rostow’s take-off model (1971) provides a framework for the analysis of growth, although it is more descriptive than explanatory.

Social modernisation comprises changes in social relationships and the differentiation of social structures. These changes in social relation are summerised in Parsons' five pattern variables (Parsons et al. 1951: 76-98). Structural change is manifest in the social division of labour, specialisation, centralisation, bureaucratization and a decrease in the self-sufficiency of social units. Modern society is characterised by a high level of urbanisation, literacy, health care, mass media, a low fertility rate and death rate, growing life expectancy, weakening kinship ties, prevalent nuclear family, and high levels of education and literacy.
Political modernisation follows the general pattern as described by Huntington (1968: 34):

Political modernisation involves the rationalisation of authority, the replacement of a large number of traditional, religious, familial, and ethnic political authorities by a single secular, national political authority (<...> the differentiation of new political functions and the development of specialised structures to perform those functions (<...>) legal, military, administrative, scientific [areas] become separated from the political realm, and autonomous, specialised, but subordinate organs arise to discharge those tasks (<...>) [and] increased participation in politics by social groups throughout society.

These three aspects of modernisation coincide, forming a widely recognised Western pattern:

Differentiation, commodification and rationalisation, then, define the transformation of premodern into modern systems as well as the central internal processes of modern societies. The three processes are closely related: modern social systems have a high or complex level of differentiation and are equally characterised by progressive commodification and rationalisation. (Crook et al. 1992: 10).

A modern Western society is a highly organised industrial society, which is characterised by complex differentiation and systematic organisation (Crook et al 1992: 15-16). Most advanced industrialised Western societies such as Australia more or less conform to this modernisation model. This model represents a pattern of 'even' modernisation which shall be called 'Western modernisation'.

Critiques of Modernisation Theories
While modernisation theories did chart well the path of development in Western societies, they did not describe and explain well the configurations and processes found in non-Western societies, such as the East Asian societies. These 'anomalies' provoked criticisms and subsequent revisions of modernisation theories. Most criticisms centred on their Western-centrism and the excessively rigid tradition/modern dichotomy (eg. Nisbet 1969; Tipps 1973; Huntington 1971; Gusfield 1973; Baykan 1990; Lauer 1991; Eisenstadt 1992). Some critics also pointed to the neglect of external factors (eg. Frank 1967,
These critiques can be summarised as follows:

**Western-centrism**
Modernisation theories predict a convergent development.

Scholars formulated stages through which all backward societies would pass on the journey to modernity, and they ranked nations by how far they had come according to their own particular set of criteria. Openness to Western economic and cultural forces has a positive, simulative effect on this process (Gold 1986: 12).

Modernisation will overcome ideological and political differences between East and West. Therefore, for all non-Western societies, modernisation equals Westernisation. Indeed, ideas such as 'modern', 'advanced', or 'traditional' are often criticised as ideological labels employed to legitimise Western superiority. This view is also challenged by the development of the East Asian countries which are 'modernised' or 'modernising', but are not totally Westernised. While the capitalist market economy and democratic trend in East Asia have been Westernised to some extent, the development of social-cultural dimension in Asian countries is different from that in the West.

**The Tradition/Modern Dichotomy**
The dichotomous view tends toward rigid polarities and flat totalisations. Modernised and modernising societies are categorised into two contrasting categories, and each shows one set of pattern variables. Modernity and tradition are seen as two contrasting concepts. The former is set forth, but the latter is everything which is not modern (Rustow 1967: 12; Huntington 1971: 293-4). Critics point out that this rigid dichotomy is less than useful. Modern features should be seen not only as a matter of degree, but also as 'patterned' in a variety of ways.

**Overlooking the Impact of the External Factors**
Modernisation theories are also chastised for neglecting the impact of external forces, especially the world-market context. Frank (1967; 1969) proposes the 'metropolis-satellite' model to explain the development of the West. This model suggests exploitation of an economic surplus from the Third World. The exchanges between the metropolis and the
satellite regions are proceeding in an unequal global economic network. Wallerstein (1974) suggests a world-system model which divides the global economy into the core, the semi-peripheries, and the peripheries. He examines both development and underdevelopment. Both authors argue that modernisation theories fail to connect developments in the core and periphery within the world system. They stress that the systematic relations which affect development have an extra-societal scope. 'Modernisation' is specific to the 'core' or 'metropolis' regions.

**Modernisation Package**

The view that modernising changes are simultaneous and interrelated (eg. Huntington 1968: 32) is questionable. Although Parsons assigns the cultural system a leading role in the process of modernisation, the fact that different cultures have different social dynamics is often ignored. As Berger suggests (1987: 140-41), 'modernity, even hyper-modernity, superimposed upon a civilisation that continues to be emphatically different from that of the West (....) East Asia has generated a new type, or model, of industrial capitalism'. Palley (1990: 1137) further points out the key difference that 'even though a nation’s [economy] may become modernised, it does not necessarily follow that its social and political values (....) will be completely supplanted'.

The 'modernisation package' is not an accurate description of the complex and diverse trajectories of change. It can, however, explain why 'those 'traditional' factors which used to be looked upon as a cause of stagnation have come to be picked up as a factor for promoting modernisation' (Sonoda 1991: 175), and the East Asian countries are labelled as 'atypical' or undergoing the 'miracle' (Berger 1987; Kim 1994; Amsden 1985; Gold 1986; Clark 1989; Vogel 1991). East Asian modernisation is not only undermining the view of a 'modernisation package', but is also suggesting a possibility of variation in patterns of modernisation.
The Modernisation Pattern in East Asia

The 'new' modernisation studies differ from the 'classic' versions in placing more emphasis on cultural differences and the impact of external factors. Economic modernisation in East Asian countries has attracted the attention of scholars' critical of the 'classic' model. (eg. Morishima 1982; Berger 1987, 1988; Gold 1991a; Hsiao 1988; Kahn 1979; Tai 1989; Vogel 1987, 1991; Winckler 1987; Wong 1988). In these critical studies, culture is seen as a major contributor to East Asian economic modernisation. This is different from the classical perspective that stresses the centrality of socio-economic factors (eg. Weber 1951; Levy 1952, 1955; Eisenstadt 1968) and sees (Confucian) culture as a major obstacle to economic modernisation in East Asian societies.

The role of Confucianism and the family is central to these arguments. The Weberian view on Confucian culture is that its kinship relations impede rationalisation, and the Chinese family is 'a highly particularistic structure' which is inimical to industrialisation. Some students of Asian modernisation disagree with this view. For example, Kahn's World Economic Development (1979) claims that many features of the Confucian culture, such as the high value placed on education and the work ethic, are conducive to modernisation, but that family loyalty is harmful to modernisation because it nurtures particularism, corruption and nepotism. Some recent studies (eg. Greenhalgh 1984, 1988) argue that the family has both a positive and a negative impact on economic modernisation. Its positive impact lies in the family being able to generate the very organisations which contribute to 'internal economic growth and external integration into the global economy' (Greenhalgh 1988: 231). Its negative impact lies in hindering the accumulation of capital and narrowing the scope of trust (Fukuyama 1995b).

What these criticisms often ignore is the dynamic nature of culture. Tu (1985) distinguishes 'politicalised Confucianism' and 'Confucian personal ethic' in East Asian societies. The former legitimised a hierarchical, stagnant political system in imperial China and communist China; the latter regulated people's attitudes towards work, education, family and other dimensions of everyday life in East Asian societies. Tu argues that Confucian personal ethic, including traditional familism, strong ties and geographical affinity, is salient to
the processes of East Asian modernisation and contributes to East Asian economic success. Even Fukuyama (1995a: 26) acknowledges that:

Chinese Confucianism [develops] an intense familism that took precedence over all other social relations, including relations with political authorities. That is, Confucianism builds a well-ordered society from the ground up rather than the top down, stressing the moral obligations of family life as the basic building block of society.

All these observations indicate that Confucian culture can be compatible with modernisation, including economic and political modernisation. While Confucianism does not support individualism and a transcendent law, its emphasis on respect for authority, high regard for education, and its relative tolerance may favour the development of democracy (Fukuyama 1995a). It must be kept in mind that one of the most important values in Confucian culture is a harmonious relationship within and between groups. It is believed that harmony can overcome chaos. Modifications also favour harmony. The family is also the basic social unit and the model for politics. If the family works well, then — it is believed — society and politics work well. The relationships between family members can change, and this is evident in the changes in gender relations and women’s employment, and in closer ties with wives’ natal families. This change has a potentially important impact on the resources available to women. When the family extends, women may get resources from both sides of the family, though some traditional family values may still confine women’s access to politics (see eg. Lu 1984; Gallin 1985; Yang 1978; Pye 1985, 1988; Winckler 1987).

To sum up, the East Asian countries on the 'Confucian cultural rim' are characterised by 'uneven' modernisation. We call this East Asian or 'uneven' modernisation under the impact of Confucianism. It is a different pattern of modernisation from the Western one. Uneven modernisation juxtaposes modern and traditional features. This is most conspicuous in the development of East Asian 'dragon' societies to which we turn now.
Aspects of Uneven Modernisation

In East Asian countries, the economy is highly modernised, while the political and social modernisation seems to be much less advanced. As some scholars point out, successful economic modernisation in East Asia has occurred under authoritarian regimes (except for Hong Kong and Japan) and in the context of highly traditional cultures (e.g., Cumings 1987; Robinson 1991; Eberstadt 1991; Pei 1994). There are many reasons for this 'anomalous' development. First, economic success is often seen as a legitimator of elite rule in Confucian societies, and this is especially true in the case of Singapore. Political elites are expected to look after the populace (see Pye 1988: 84-85; Fei 1991). When its economic growth persists, the political elites are 'naturally' justified. However, it must be kept in mind that in a 'real' Confucian polity like Taiwan scholar-officialdom is also seen as the top attainment, thus the real legitimate of elite rule. This is discussed in the subsequent chapters. Second, most East Asian countries developed while facing threats from both inside (ethnic strikes and communist insurgencies) and outside (invasion by neighbours). This is especially evident in Taiwan, South Korea, and Singapore. Successful economic modernisation has been seen there as a key to not only internal political stability and cohesion, but also to external security. It has been fortified by Confucian values stressing cohesion and respect for authority. As mentioned above, Confucianism uses its personal ethic discipline to achieve economic success and political stability. Thus one may argue that traditional Confucian virtues, such as familism and respect for authority on one hand, and modern economic development on the other are compatible and co-present in different instances of East Asian modernisation.

East Asian countries incorporate the family into the process of economic modernisation. This is very different from the Western economic modernisation pattern that separates the family from the workplace and politics. In East Asia, especially in Taiwan, the family itself can be seen as an important part of the productive system, and the controller of productive organisations. This is obvious in family firms and export-processing zones in Taiwan.

Thus the modernising East Asia has two faces. One is modern and the other is traditional. The modern side is represented by the
highly developed economy, modern technology, vibrant markets and improved standards of living. The traditional side is represented by dominant value orientations. One of the most significant features of these orientations is that they 'place more value on the collectivity and to be less sensitive than the West to the values of individualism' (Pye 1985: 26). People in East Asian societies are more inclined to believe that greater wellbeing emanates from suppressing self-interest and acting for the benefit of the family and the nation. While many modern institutions are built, the family is getting smaller, and the rigid hierarchical relationships between family members are changing. The family is still strong and individualism is 'underdeveloped', but many patriarchal features are attenuated.

The East Asian experience implies that individualism and the decline of broad family ties do not have to be either a precondition or an outcome of economic modernisation. Accordingly, it is not surprising that the tangle of tradition and modernity makes Parsons' five pattern variables problematic as a foundation for measures of modernisation in East Asia.

Also the political modernisation in East Asia, while formally consistent with Huntington's model (rationalised authority, differentiated structures, and mass participation), occurs in a somewhat 'anomalous' way. This is especially visible in political elite recruitment. The differences are mainly rooted in different value orientations — collectivism in East Asia and individualism in the West — and in the impact of values on the composition of political opportunities and resources.

It must be stressed, however, that these differences are a matter of degree. Individualism and collectivism are located on a continuum. Due to the greater stress placed on family-like collectivism, the leadership style in East Asia is inclined to be paternalistic. This is reflected in 'the East Asian political model' (Pye 1987: 84-5):

Authority is expected to combined with grace and benevolence, both elitism and sympathy— that is, aloof dignity and nurturing concern. The cultures revere hierarchy, accepting gradations of rank and merit as natural, but they also expect rulers to be concerned about the livelihood of the masses. (...)
It therefore follows that East Asian governments are the unquestioned dominant institutions in their societies, but in each country the government is expected to manifest paternalistic concern for all the people. All segments of the society are expected to yield to the government as the guiding force of the collectivity, but in return rulers should be supportive of everyone who displays proper awe.

Political leadership involves setting national goals and priorities, mobilising resources and public attention for collective tasks, and squashing debates that might dilute the national will. Government sees itself as the embodiment of the national destiny, and hence it has the obligation to tell everyone what needs to be done and censor divisive ideas and initiatives.

Confucian culture stabilises authority by granting its automatic legitimacy, but also charges the government 'with heavy responsibilities for managing society' (Winckler 1987: 176). This is why the state can play a very active role in moulding society in all East Asian countries. However, due to this statism, most East Asian regimes may be labelled authoritarian. 'Economic miracles' are typically state-sponsored and often associated with a 'strong state' rather than a vibrant civil society.

There is a paradoxical relation between Confucianism and politics. Confucian values and norms hinder political modernisation by legitimising patriarchal and patrimonial relationships. They also place emphasis on harmony and the interests of the collectivity; the latter usually identified with the state (Huntington 1984; Cotton 1990; Price 1990). Stress on harmony often results in the suppression of dissenters. According to the norms, individuals should not challenge the interests of the collective; and individual rights are seen as granted by the state rather than inherent in people. However, the same Confucian norms also pave the way for strong government interventions that underline the politically assisted forms of economic and social modernisation. While in the West the stimulus for modernisation came mainly from civil society (with modernising elites emerging out of the societal trends), modernisation process in East Asia have been led by interventionist and typically authoritarian states and elites.
In the East Asian path, the family is an important link between the state and society. Confucianism stresses that leading the family prepares for governing the state. Politics is seen as the enlargement of the family and as an extension of patriarchal power. The main tasks of the state are similar to those of the father in the family: providing security, cohesion, and solidarity. Pye's interpretation of the family and the state makes it clear that '[Confucianism] elevated government and the family to be the two key institutions of society, with each reinforcing the other' (1985: 61). This has a number of consequences. One is that the family is integrated into politics, thus becoming a legitimate resource-source. The other is that conflicts between different political groups are difficult to organise because 'family loyalties' may cross-cut political divisions. The kaleidoscopic realignments, which are common in the coalition politics in the West, are difficult to conduct in East Asian societies.

The social dynamics leading to the Western modernisation originate from an emphasis on individualism which is a common feature of Roman Law and Christian morality. Many modern concepts such as contract, equality, and rights are based on individualistic ethic and outlook. Individualism has always been one of the mainstream values in the modern West. Weber's well-known work, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, illustrates this centrality of individualism and rationalism well. This-worldly success has to be an individual success because individuals, rather than families or groups, are God's chosen.

Uneven modernisation has a somewhat different social dynamics. The key role in the East Asian path has been played by the family and the state. Modernisation in society, economy and polity has been manipulated by the state, and has followed a familial logic, thus promoting a family-centred development. The family-centred networks have constituted a strong base for developments of individual and the key mediator-legitimiser of state interventions.

These two patterns of modernisation are reflected in different recruitment of political elites, and in different configurations of political opportunities for women and the availability of gender-specific political resources.
Women, Political Elite Recruitment And Modernisation

The strong universalism coded into the Western modernisation pattern has been conducive to equalitarian reforms, especially the elimination of various forms of discrimination, including gender discrimination. Under the impact of social trends, civil rights and feminist movements, the most salient forms of discrimination and the most conspicuous inequalities of opportunity have been gradually eliminated.

The East Asian pattern of modernisation has not been conducive to such equalisation of opportunities. The gender gap in opportunities has remained wide in spite of dramatic improvements in standards of living, education and political participation. However, the persistence of this gender gap, tolerated and even encouraged by Confucianism, has some paradoxical effects. The persistence of gender specific roles also means the persistence of gender specific resources. Women in East Asian societies have access to such resources in pursuit of political careers, even though they have more restricted opportunities for political advancement than their sisters in advanced Western societies. In the latter, women enjoy much more equal opportunities than in East Asian societies. However, they cannot tap 'gender specific' resources, because the legitimacy of the latter is undermined by the very principles of universalism that have propelled egalitarian social and political reforms. Women have to compete as the equals of men, on the same terms as men. That is, women and men are equal individuals whose merits and achievements are judged by common criteria without gender-specific standards. Such competition, however, puts women at a disadvantage because of their limited access to political resources.

Patterns of Modernisation, Opportunities and Resources

Both the imperial tradition of educational meritocracy, and the state-promoted modernisation drive, have made education an essential political and moral qualification in political contests. In the Confucian ethos, the top politicians should be well-educated people who are moral and intellectual models for the masses. It is not surprising that in East Asia access to education is the key element of the political opportunity structure, and Taiwan especially shows this feature.
Educational credentials, which are set by the electoral law in Taiwan, are one of the requirements for all legislative candidates at the national level\(^1\).

Political resources are closely linked with the modern organisations and the family. Basically, there are two main sources of political resources. One is formal political organisations. The resources controlled by political organisations are similar to those in most Western political organisations. They include financial support, influence, campaign staff, mobilisation of organisational networks and media exposure. The other type of resources derives from the family and community; these include support, money and influence in local factions, geographical ties and acquaintanceship, and so on (Palley 1992: 792; Nathan 1993: 428-29). Because the government is seen as the extension of the family, many familial ties can be easily transferred into politics and become powerful campaign resources.

As mentioned above, Confucian societies have followed a modernisation path that has not weakened gender division and inequalities. Compared with Western modernisation, women have lower political opportunities due to the emphasis on their performance of gender specific familial roles, even though women's representation in labour markets and their education is improving. Yet, this does not mean women are totally confined by their familial roles because the family plays a dual role in women's access to political opportunities in the context of running for political office. It is both a confiner and a facilitator. It confines women to familial roles, but facilitates access to familial resources. Some studies (eg. Chou et al. 1990, 1992) show familial socialisation is an important influence encouraging women to run for political office. On the other hand, the family is often reluctant to release women from their gender specific duties. This contradiction is sometimes revealed under a basic Confucian belief that to practice filial piety is to honour one's family. Women politicians (like their male counterparts) are thus defined as promoting the status and interests of the family.

---

\(^1\) According to the Statute and Implementation Rules on the Election and Recall of Public Officials, all candidates (at the national level) must be graduates of senior high schools or pass the Junior-grade Civil Service Examination.
The point we stress is that if the role of a woman politician is defined in this way, she can tap the broad range of resources the family controls, and she can utilise gender-specific resources in political campaigns. For example, women politicians in Taiwan can evoke their status as 'good mothers' or 'wives' which reverberates well in traditionally family-oriented Confucian society. They stand as family figures and can mobilise strong local support. In this sense, women in Confucian societies can access wider political resources than their Western counterparts. The latter are, on average, less confined by gender-specific family roles, but also unable to utilise gender statuses in politics in any other way than claiming 'affirmative' privileges.

Formal organisations play a similar role in Confucian societies to those in the West in distributing resources, such as financial support, political skills, and organisational affiliations. Women in those organisations face similar problems to those faced by women in Western societies. Yet, there are other resources, such as child care and financial support essential to women candidates that organisations are unlikely to supply. These resources are often available to women in Confucian societies via their wide family networks. Past studies suggest that lack of these resources hinders women's political recruitment in Western societies (McAllister 1992; Rogers 1993; Schlozman, Burns and Verba 1994).

The family is a 'special' political resource for women in Confucian societies. Its role is enhanced by close association between the family and the government. The latter is often seen as an enlargement and extension of the family and family roles can be easily transformed into political resources. Thus while in the West women's domestic roles and responsibilities are often seen as an impediment to their political careers, in Confucian societies they may be seen as sources of political clout.

In Confucian societies, women can transfer their 'successful familial roles' into political assets. Male candidates are not able to do that because their familial roles are vague. They cannot claim credit for

---

2 Studlar and McAllister (1991: 477) write: "In advanced industrial societies, it appears to be a positive advantage for male candidates to be married and to have children. By contrast, for a female politician it represents a double burden which inhibits her electoral potential."
successful performance in the family because they are seen as general providers rather than essential runners of the family.

Thus the family in 'patriarchal' Confucian society may become a rich resource provider for aspiring women politicians. In contrast, Western modernisation creates a woman-friendly environment with equal political opportunities, but seldom produces political resources widely accessible for women. This is reflected in the disproportionately low presence of women in political elites around the world. This also brings us to the wider topic of the nature and sources of gender inequality in politics.

**Gender Inequality and Modernisation**

Women's under-representation in political elites should be seen as an aspect of a broader societal pattern of gender inequality. Gender inequality in education, and occupational and organisational hierarchies lead to women's relatively unequal access to power resources and opportunities. As Western (1983: 133) points out, in his study of Australian society,

> Gender is having an independent effect (...) there are gender-based differences within the society which importantly determine the manner in which valued resources are distributed among its members.

One consequence is that women's career paths are different from men's paths. Women's working careers, for example, are more likely to be part-time, in low levels of authority, and in clerical, nursing and teaching occupations (Western 1983; Galvin and West 1988; Bradley 1994). Women have fewer career choices than men, and fewer opportunities in political competition.

Some feminist authors argue that gender inequality in modern capitalist societies is rooted in the distinction between the private sphere, relating to the domestic and familial activities, and the public sphere, relating to non-familial economic and political activities. The central concept in their analysis is patriarchy. It refers to a pattern of domination in the family, and a social system with different aspects of gender inequality (Walby 1990). Modern capitalism, according to this argument, plays a significant role in maintaining, consolidating and restructuring this patriarchal system of male domination. While
biological reproduction causes women's subordinate status, capitalist domination adds to patriarchal domination by aggravating market exclusion and limiting property rights (Firestone 1972; Mitchell 1971; Eisenstein 1979, 1981; Rosaldo 1974; Ortner 1974; Brenner and Ramas 1984; Bradley 1994; Walby 1994). This is reflected in views on remedial strategies which stress that economic independence is the key to women's liberation (see Barrett 1980). Women's equal participation in the labour market is identified as the key condition of gender equality. However, it is limited when paid work is controlled by 'patriarchal relations in the workplace and in the state, as well as by those in the household' (Walby 1994: 23).

In fact, the structure of gender inequality can be seen as a series of gender-related practices. Connel (1987: 91-118) points out that labour, power and cathexis reflect three dimensions of gender inequality, and they are differently arranged in different institutions ranging from the family, work place, to the state. Gender division of labour, according to him, women are posted in the position of disadvantage. Men can also gain control over women through kinship system, economic production, and state agencies. Similarly, 'the construction of emotionally charged relationships with objects' (1987: 112) which structures affectual relations of the members of a society, leads to stereotypisation and gender discrimination. This tripartite of gender domination structure constraint women's access to, and elevation in, society, economy and politics.

Modernisation only partly reduces gender domination. While women are no longer excluded from access to certain occupations and political representation, they are still segregated and subordinated within modern capitalist economy and politics. There is a 'glass ceiling' limiting women's opportunities of promotion (Kanter 1977). As Walby (1990) points out, the shift from exclusionary closure to segregation can be seen 'in the institutional form of each of the structures'.

Modern forms of gender domination shift from an individual-familial to more collective-occupational form. Waters (1989) argues that the concept of patriarchy is unable to describe accurately these modern structures of gender inequality. He analyses what Walby calls public patriarchy as an 'extended viriarchy'. While in a patriarchal
system the senior men of extended kinship webs exert control over women, in a viriarchy all adult males enjoy collective advantage regardless of their location in the kinship webs. By and large, women's inferior status in gender relations is produced by the interaction of economic and non-economic viriarchal organisations in modern societies. The viriarchal patterns of inequality in the major institutional orders such as educational and the economy, form the framework of what we call political opportunity structure.

While Marxist feminists stress the role of economic institutions and property relations as the main generators of gender inequality, others point to the importance of cultural and political factors (Berger 1988; Hsiao 1988). Cultural traditions are typically reinforcing gender domination in public spheres that are defined as 'male domains'. Such views find confirmation in studies of gender inequalities in non-capitalist societies (eg. China), and in the analyses of gender discrimination in politics. But they are also conducive to a view that the key aspects of gender inequality are eliminated, or at least weakened, in the process of modernisation.

To sum up: gender inequalities are linked with sexual division of labour in the market, political organisations and the domestic sphere. During the processes of modernisation patriarchal forms of gender inequality are gradually replaced by viriarchal ones. The latter affect the career opportunities of women in public spheres of occupation, education and politics. In politics, women are stereotyped as less politically interested than men, as less active and capable than men, and as less skilled in political analysis. Due to such perceptions, women are often excluded from processes of political representation.

Gender inequalities are evident in the composition of political elites. We argue that this gender-biased composition reflects women's unequal access to political opportunities and resources which are closely linked with their success in political recruitment. We examine this uneven access and explore gender inequality in political recruitment in the following sections.

Women in Political Elites
It is believed that the right to vote betokens access to political power, and the franchise makes up a certification of eligibility for political
leadership. Since the beginning of this century, women have been granted franchise in most countries. Women's franchise, however, does not open up access to political power, and it is demonstrated by the fact that the representation of women in political elites has remained very low for most of this century, and is still low in the 1990s both in modernised and modernising societies (Aberbach, Putnam and Rockman 1981; United Nations 1991, 1992). Australia was a pioneer in granting women's political rights both to vote and to stand for the national parliament in 1902, but Australian women were not elected to the national parliament until 1943.

Gender imbalance in political power sharing is clearly reflected in the composition of political elites. Australia again provides a good example. 'Until 1980, when three women candidates were successful, there had never more than two women in the House of Representatives, and more usually there was none' (Kelly and McAllister 1983: 366). In other old democracies, such as the US and the UK, the proportion of women in political elites also remains low: 7% and 6.4%, respectively (The Economist, November 19th 1994). Even in Nordic societies, renown for their egalitarian policies, there is a considerable gender gap in politics. While women form a much higher proportion of political elites than in other societies, gender composition of political elites is still unbalanced (Eduards 1981; Haavio-Mannila 1981a, 1981b; Skard 1981; Bystydzienski 1988; Keränen 1990; Parvikko 1991; Phillips 1991; Siim 1991; Skjeie 1991; Nicholson 1993) (see Figure 1.2).
Figure 1.2 Percentage of Women in Lower House in 25 Countries, 1993

Note: The percentage in Taiwan refers to the proportion of women in the Legislative Yuan.

The imbalance is much greater in Asian societies (Hargadine 1981; Darcy and Song 1986; Hooper 1989; Abeyasekere 1989; Miki et al. 1992; Fung and Teo 1993; Park 1993; Soh 1993; Yasuko 1993; Roces 1994) (see Figure 1.2). In order to increase the representation of women in political elites the quota system has been employed in some countries.
(Chou et al. 1990) and some political parties have started to give women preferential treatment (see Gallagher and March 1988; Kelber 1994). Such a system, however, is not 'absolutely certain of creating equality of representation between the sexes' (Valen 1988: 223). In Taiwan, the quota system, introduced in 1947, reserves for women 10% of legislative seats. Male candidates cannot fill these seats even if there are not enough women candidates. For several decades, women's presence in political elites in Taiwan has been at approximately this reserved 10% level. Some scholars (eg. Liang 1987, 1993; Lee 1990) criticise this quota system, arguing that it has become a barrier for women political aspirants because political parties treat the reserved 10% as a 'maximum' and are reluctant to nominate more women candidates than the quota.

While the quota system boosts women's recruitment into political elites, it does not eliminate gender barriers in political elite recruitment. Most studies of women's under-representation in politics focus on three types of factors responsible for gender imbalance: cultural factors, socioeconomic factors, and institutional factors (Currell 1974; Kirkpatrick 1974; Welch 1978; Mackerras 1980; Jones and Nelson 1981; Rasmussen 1981; Rule 1981, 1987; Sawer 1981; Nuss 1982; Kelly and McAllister 1983; Hunter and Denton 1984; Bernstein 1986; Studlar and Welch 1987; Gallagher and Marsh 1988; McRae 1990; Welch and Studlar 1990; Studlar and McAllister 1991; McAllister 1992; Rule 1994).

Cultural factors mainly refer to traditional images, values and norms that constrain women's access to politics. Kirkpatrick (1974) lists four hypothetical constraints: physiological, cultural, role constraints, and male conspiracy, as the main barriers to women's pursuit and exercise of power. After studying 46 women incumbents at the state level in US, she concludes that physiological constraints, male resistance, and even cultural constraints are less inhibiting to women's participation in decision-making than the traditional sex role requirements. The confinement of gender roles is regarded as being responsible for women's reduced access to politics and as leading to their underrepresentation in political elites. An obvious factor is that women have been burdened with disproportionate and heavy family
responsibilities, and these are seen as inhibiting their electoral potential and political success.

Socioeconomic factors are mainly associated with women's employment and occupation. In her study of British women MPs, Currell (1974: 166) suggests that women are different from men in that they are less frequently successful in business. Lovenduski and Hills (1981), in conclusion of their book of women in twenty countries, point to a strong association between political activism and women's participation in the labour market. Occupational credentials are often treated as essential for success in elections. Women's access to professional jobs is limited and that limits their opportunity to get 'membership' in the eligible pools from which political elites are typically recruited.

Institutional factors refer mainly to the effects of electoral systems on women's political recruitment. The impact of party lists, proportional representation and the type of electorate are seen as the most important influences on women's recruitment into political elites. Some studies (eg. Duverger 1955; Currell 1974; Rule 1987; Darcy et al. 1994) show that there is a positive relationship between proportional representation (PR) and women's chances of election to political elites. Also, multi-member electorates are likely to be more advantageous to women than single member ones. Many scholars believe that women's recruitment into political elites is influenced mainly by the electoral system. In this view, women fall victims of a vicious cycle: they are not elected because they are not incumbents; and because they are not elected, they cannot be incumbents.

However, some studies dispute these conclusions, Gallagher (1988: 268) for example, stressing the role of gatekeepers. He argues that

\[w\]hile a PR electorate system obviously makes the selection of women more likely, it is not the electoral system which does the selecting. The selectors are not the prisoners of the electoral system. The active role of the selection process in determining how many women enter Parliament should not be overlooked.

The final decision about candidate selection and placement is frequently made by the most senior party leaders (Putnam 1976: 54). This means that the process of selection by the leaders-gatekeepers rather than the electoral system itself is crucial to understanding
women's access to political elites. To stress women's political force, Matland (1993) argues that party size should be considered in the context of the entire political environment. Since women become a major political force, the impact of the electoral system alone is no longer significant. This view is also reflected in recent studies. As Rule (1987: 494-5) points out:

Women's political activity is very important for increasing women's recruitment in parliment in various electoral systems. Negative impacts of the electoral system have been overcome by women's political mobilisation.

Affirmative action and changes in electoral laws are also seen as an effective way to enhance women's representation, although the Australian Labour Party experience in the last federal election would be evidence against this view. Especially in most advanced industrialised societies women's movements are so strong that they may successfully change traditional gender divisions and reduce the extent of gender inequality. They do it typically by seeking state intervention, such as the introduction of Equal Opportunity policies and laws. Yet the impact of institutional factors on women aspirants has not diminished. This seems to be in line with the disappearance of patriarchy and the formation of viriarchal organisations in Western societies, like Australia, and with the continuity of patriarchy and viriarchy in East Asian societies, like Taiwan.

**Women's Political Recruitment and Modernisation**

All elite studies imply that there is a connection between women's recruitment into political elites and modernisation. Modernisation leads to alternations of gender roles and stimulates growth of women's paid employment. It also creates more channels of political recruitment, equalises opportunities, and establishes rationalised and universalistic criteria of selection. This is especially important for women aspirants for two reasons. First, the ascribed status, such as gender, is no longer an unassailable barrier. Second, the political opportunities for women improve together with increasing opportunities for education and employment. In this sense, women are more likely to be incorporated into 'the circulation of elites'. The opening up of political opportunities for women follows
modernisation. Women's participation in the labour market also provides opportunities of access to status granting and resource-rich organisations. This means that women can hold positions in organisations with access to, and control over, political resources. This view, although widespread among students of elites, has been heavily qualified by some feminists, who point to the remarkable persistence of gender inequalities in highly modernised societies. The two views on women and modernisation — the optimistic and the qualified — deserve more careful scrutiny.

Most scholars believe that modernisation is essentially beneficial for women suffering from various forms of traditional-patriarchal domination. Modernisation is believed to erode patriarchal traditions and make society gender-neutral, open, equal and merit-based. Thus the key improvements in women's access to the public spheres are results of modernisation. This view reflects a dichotomous perspective: 'traditional societies are male-dominated and authoritarian, and modern societies are democratic and egalitarian' (Jaquette 1982: 269).

With the exception of Marxist feminists, this view of modernisation as woman-friendly is virtually taken for granted. Industrialisation, technology, and changes in social values and norms are closely related to women's access to the public sphere (Lengermann and Wallace 1985; Lauer 1991: 342-50). Industrialisation extracts women from the confines of domestic-familial roles, and reduces the negative social consequences of traditionalism. Demographic changes, combined with contraception, release women from uncontrolled and long-term child-bearing. Access to education widens their opportunities to obtain skills and to participate in paid work. Modern liberal democracy creates more opportunities for women to exert influence on government policies than pre-modern forms of polity (Lovenduski 1992: 610). The transformation of the familial roles and structures (especially the weakening of kinship ties) gives women more access to out-of-home activities. Achievement motivation, as an essential feature of modernity, is seen as an important element to push women into the public sphere. Paradoxically, the traits of 'modern men' (Inkeles 1964), maybe more of the features of 'modern women', who become the main beneficiary of modern trends. Universalism and
egalitarianism gradually weaken patriarchal values and norms, and undermine institutionalised forms of gender discrimination. Women gain control over reproduction and access to information that together help them in altering unequal gender relations.

This view is challenged by some feminist studies based mainly on empirical data from the modernising societies (Boserup 1970; Rogers 1979; Chandler et al. 1988; Marshall et al. 1988). The authors of these studies argue that this woman-friendly view of modernisation over-emphasises the positive effects and exaggerates women's access to the public sphere (eg. Black 1976). The consequences of modernisation that are detrimental to women are ignored. Improved technology in farming may decrease women's access to productive work and thus lower their status. Women's kinship support networks, as well as their traditional economic and social roles, are thus reduced. Women start to occupy lowly paid and low-status positions in modernised economies.

**Opportunities and Resources**

These debates suggest that the relationship between women's opportunities and resources on one hand, and the process of modernisation on the other, are more complex than is suggested by both apologists and critics of modernisation. In order to capture this complexity, we have outlined a model of recruitment in which women's access to political elite positions is seen as a product of both social opportunities and available political resources. The former refer to societal patterns of access to those social characteristics which determine political selectability, in particular social status. The latter refer to those characteristics which constitute political assets and which allow political aspirants to pass each gatekeeper's selection. While opportunities reflect the broader patterns of stratification, resources are more politically circumscribed — they make successful political competitors.

Modern democracy is a type of society in which the opportunities are widely open and equal in principle, and elites are recruited from different social strata and categories on the basis of individual merit (Bottomore 1993: 9). Women's access to politics opens up and becomes more equal. But why, in spite of this opening up, do those women who seek to run for political office in modern societies still experience
considerable difficulty? There are two possible answers to this question. First, political opportunities are open to all individuals, but 'late comers' need to make greater efforts to modify, balance or be accustomed to the rules of competition. Second, women do not have enough political resources that are essential for political success. We discuss these two possibilities respectively.

While women share the same rights as men in political participation, they are 'late comers'. They follow 'man-made' rules in political contests. Many studies indicate that women are sifted out from the 'eligible pools' not necessarily because they have lower skills and capacities, but also because of party selectors' bias (eg. Mackerras 1980; Rasmussen 1981; Sawer 1981; Kelley and McAllister 1983). The established elites, which are predominantly male, are reluctant to share political power with women 'late comers'. Therefore, in order to enter political 'springboard positions', women have to resemble male elites. Women have to prove that they share the values, priorities and the behaviours, of their male superordinates (Chafetz 1990: 221, 226). They have to play the 'male game'. This pushes women into disadvantageous position of being forced to be man-like and to play under the man-made rules of politics. These rules reward aggressive behaviour and 'macho' attitudes which women have learned to abhor.

There is also an argument that the equalisation of opportunities has not been accomplished. Women's status is still lower than men's, especially in the crucial areas of occupation and in the political organisations. Comparative data from East Asia, in particular, show the slower pace of egalitarian trends, as far as gender gap is concerned (United Nations 1991, 1992).

In the process of Western modernisation political resources change, shifting from the private to the public spheres. Rationalised authority replaces most traditional, religious, and familial authorities. Modern bureaucracy based on meritocratic principles becomes the dominant organisational form (Weber 1948: 197). While in traditional patrimonial and patriarchal systems of authority lineage, age and status constituted the key political assets, modern political bureaucracies are increasingly education and skill oriented. Promotion in such organisations also requires specific, political connections,
media exposure and, last but not least, money, especially when political elevation follows long public campaigns.

Thus political resources in modern politics are highly organised and increasingly controlled by organisations. Access to political resources relies on aspirants' affiliations with formal organisations, such as political parties, trade unions, lobby groups and interest groups.

Modernisation does not necessarily increase women's access to resources. As many of these resources are transferred from the private to the public areas and to large organisations, they may, in fact, move out of women's reach. In pre-modern societies, the family performs multiple functions. As Stacey and Price claim (1981: 13) 'Women have had power before, but always as members of families.' In modern societies, many functions, such as education and economy, are played by specialised institutions. The family shrinks and is increasingly separated from the public sphere. Individuals develop their capacities to accumulate, organise, and allocate resources in formal organisations.

Women share the value of individualism 'which became the right of men as a concomitant to industrial capitalism' (Stacey and Price 1981: 13). Ironically, they rely heavily on male-dominated organisations. As a result, women suffer the disadvantage of difficult access to crucial political resources. As Cahfetz (1990: 222-3) claims:

The possibility of enhancing women's representation among elites rests upon their increasing control of resources due to their greater labour-force participation and upon the equitable division of household and familial labour (...) To gain entrance in more than token numbers, women will probably have to employ their resources collectively and coercively (...) In order to run, especially for state or national office, extensive resources are required.

Complex bureaucracies operate according to regular procedures and rules clearly defined within a hierarchical authority structure. Bureaucratic power rests in positions, regardless of who occupies these positions. Western modernisation leads to the domination of bureaucracies, and encourages professionalisation of political leadership. Bureaucratic organisations become a key supplier of political resources that affect aspirants' success in running for political
office. Women may not benefit from these changes to the same extent as men do because the criteria of bureaucratic selection and promotion centre around the lifestyle of men and are a masculine construction which marginalises women's life cycle (Pateman 1988; Gordon 1994). For example, a continuous occupational career is seen as a prerequisite for seniority which is the key criterion of promotion in bureaucracies. Because women's careers are often disrupted by childbearing, women may suffer a serious disadvantage.

By and large, modernisation lessens patriarchal discrimination and generates more equal political opportunities. But because women's success in political recruitment relies heavily also on their access to resources, the woman-friendliness of modernisation is an open question. Their access to political elites may or may not increase with the waning of patriarchy and gradual erosion of viriarchal patterns. The following chapter will examine the way women's political opportunities widen, and how their resources are accumulated in two paths of modernisation.

Summary
The present discussion of women, elites and modernisation suggests four propositions:

1. Women's access to political elites depends on opportunities and resources. The former reflect the overall position of women in the societal structure; the latter reflect access to specific political assets.

2. The society-specific combinations of opportunities and resources form in the process of social and political change and reflect the overall pattern of modernisation. Different paths of modernisation produce different gender balances of political opportunities and resources.

3. Australia and Taiwan represent two very different paths and patterns of modernisation labelled here 'Western' (liberal individualistic/even) and 'East Asian' (Confucianised/uneven). The former reflects in equalising and widening opportunities for women, but does not necessarily open access to political resources (controlled by bureaucratic organisations). The latter does not lead to such rapid opening up of opportunities, but gives women access to some important political resources which are controlled by families.
4. These differences are reflected in (1) a similar levels of gender (under-)representation in political elites, and (2) different political career structures of successful women politicians in Australia and Taiwan. In Australia organisational careers of 'apprentice' type should prevail, while in Taiwan one should find most women following family-sponsored, 'client' type careers.
CHAPTER TWO
MODERNISATION IN TAIWAN AND AUSTRALIA

This Chapter focuses on modernisation processes in Taiwan and Australia. These two societies exemplify two different patterns and paths of modernisation: the East Asian (uneven) and Western (even) paths. The Chapter starts with a brief historical background and is divided into three sections: on the economic, social and cultural, and political aspects of modernisation.

Historical Background
In order to understand the different patterns of modernisation in Taiwan and Australia, it is necessary to look at the historical backgrounds of the two societies. Social dynamics of modernisations emanated from quite different historical legacies. Women's roles and positions in societies have been shaped and changed in the context of these different legacies.

Taiwan's history was a history of colonisation and migration, and so was Australia's. The early settlers in Taiwan were fishermen, traders, and gangsters. In Australia, they included settlers, convicts and colonial administrators. In both cases the colonisers had displaced and marginalised aboriginal populations.

Taiwan had been colonised by Portugal, Spain, and Holland for a short period, then controlled by China (1662-1895), then ceded to Japan (1895-1945), and finally taken back by China to become a province of the Republic of China (under the KMT government) after the Second World War. Historically, the Western impact on Taiwan was negligible until the World War II. While Japan occupied Taiwan for a half century, the influence of Japanese culture was alleviated because Japan had also been a Confucian society. The mainstream of Taiwan's culture has always been Chinese Confucianism.

Such a multi-colonial historical background has triggered debates about national identity issue. The issue of unequal distribution of

---

1 Taiwan became a province of imperial China in 1884 (the Ching Dynasty). In 1894, China and Japan went to war. Due to the defeat of the war, China ceded Taiwan and the Pescadores to Japan under the 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki.
political power between mainlanders and native Taiwanese has continued to be a crucial element of these debates. Under these circumstances, clarifying what constitutes the national identity and reducing the conflict between the native Taiwanese and mainlanders have become a critical issue, thus overshadowing the importance of gender issues.

Unlike Taiwan's 'multi-colonial' history, the past of Australia has been shaped by British colonisation and British heritage. The traditions of convicts, pioneers, and the mateship ethos of the bushman's life, have shaped White Australia's culture and identity since the nineteenth century. The key elements of this identity were individualism, self-reliance and strong egalitarianism. The harshness of the early years of settlement also promoted conformism as a means of collective survival and the unusual role of the state as a natural arbitrator in society. All these factors have contributed to shape the character of Australian society and Australians' political outlooks (Hancock 1961; Horne 1965; McGregor 1968, 1980; Ward 1978; McAllister 1992; Connell and Irving 1992; Lovell et al. 1995). These cultural legacies already defined gender identities, and placed the emphasis on masculine domination. Colonial women experienced exploitation, exclusion, hardship and isolation. Women were stereotyped as 'damned whores' and 'God's police', and they were also described as 'the doormats of the western world'. The conditions of the colonial settlements were seen as factors determining the continuing low status of Australian women (Dixson 1976; Grimshaw 1990; Summers 1994a).

Unlike Australia, Taiwan has never been a stable, self-governed, independent polity until the KMT's retreat. The civil war between the KMT and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) caused turmoil in Taiwan's economy and slowed down the development of the island society in the early 1950s. In addition, the Taiwanese were initially totally excluded from the government. Since Taiwan had been

---

2 All Taiwanese and mainlanders are Chinese. Mainlanders refer to the post-Second World War immigrants and their Taiwan-born offspring; they account for about 15% of the total population. Taiwanese refer to native born and their decendants. In fact, the Taiwanese are the decendants of people who migrated to Taiwan from the Chinese mainland before 1945. The only indigenous Taiwanese are aborigines whose population is about 300,000. See A. Y. L. Lu (1985: 1085-1092).
colonised by Japan for 50 years prior to the civil war, the incoming mainlanders distrusted the Taiwanese. A gap and a tension between the Taiwanese and the mainlanders were created. The most serious conflict between the two was the 2-28 Incident, which erupted on February 28, 1947. It happened in Taipei, and very soon the protests spread to the whole island. The KMT army suppressed the protests eventually, but the political wound has never healed. This incident had sowed the seeds of the tension between mainlanders and the Taiwanese, and the political opposition movement in subsequent decades reflected this tension (Lu 1985; Moody 1992).

The KMT lost the civil war and retreated to Taiwan in 1949. However, it has still seen itself as the successor of the Republic of China. The KMT sensed that Taiwan was the last line of defence, and the greatest preoccupation of the KMT leaders was to rebuild its regime in Taiwan. First, the KMT devoted itself to stabilisation of the economy and maintenance of social order. Second, it secured its rule by tightly controlling military and political power, and by strengthening its political legitimacy (Hu 1989; Cheng 1989; Nathan 1990). Because the legitimacy of the Republic was rooted in mainland China (Dr Sun Yet-sen built it in 1912), bringing the legitimate authority back to the mainland became the goal of the KMT regime. The KMT leaders have been preoccupied by issues of national security, political stability and economic growth for four decades. By so doing, they hopes to strengthen their legitimacy and, ultimately, restore national unity by extending their rule to the mainland.

Two strategies were adopted to reach these aims. One was to stress the common Confucian cultural tradition and the historical tie between Taiwan and mainland China. The other was to develop an efficient and competitive market economy. Both strategies not only helped the KMT in securing its rule in Taiwan, but also served the political aim of recovering mainland China. As the late Premier Yen Chia-kan (served 1963-72) asserted,

---

3 The 2-28 Incident started with police harassment of an old Taiwanese woman cigarette-seller. Many Taiwanese people thought that the policeman unjustly treated this woman, and it triggered ethnic conflict between mainlanders and native Taiwanese. See Gold 1986: 50-51.
We believe that in the present situation, accelerated economic development and the establishment of a prosperous, stable, profit-oriented, modern economic society in this country not only can internally strengthen the loyalty of our people (...) Economic development also can serve as the force of propulsion in prompting the people of the mainland to rise against the Peiping [ie. Beijing] regime at an early date. (China Yearbook 1972-1973: 783)

In fact, the KMT government in Taiwan faced a triple threat. The first, and the most serious threat, came from the CCP. The KMT government developed Taiwan as an anti-communist base, thus directing most resources in consolidating defence. The second threat came from the Western culture, especially the US. To contain the communist bloc, the US built military bases in Taiwan during the cold war period. It recognised the KMT government in Taiwan as the only legal government of the Republic of China, and provided a large amount of financial aid from 1951 to 1965 (Ying 1985: 58; Jacoby 1966). With the building of American military bases and the flow of financial aid, American values and popular culture were unavoidably permeating Taiwan society. Under the impact of this cultural threat, the KMT government deliberately preserved and emphasised the Confucian cultural tradition. Since Confucian culture articulated Taiwan's ties with mainland China, the KMT government could effectively consolidate its political legitimacy by protecting Confucian culture and tradition. Confucian culture also provided a basis for popular trust and legitimation. This legitimation was also based on very high educational backgrounds of the KMT technocrats. For example, in the 1950s and 60s 43 out of 44 top economic planners were university graduates; 52% of them had postgraduate degrees from the US, and 9% had postgraduate degrees from Europe (Vogel 1991: 26).

The third threat came from the inside of Taiwan. In order to survive, the KMT government had to ease the domestic tensions, and seek the support from the native Taiwanese. It adapted two methods to achieve this goal. One consisted in incorporating local elites as civil servants in the government. The other consisted of a land reform (1949-1953) in which many previous land owners were transformed into industrial shareholders (Hsiao 1991: 128).
These threats, and the responses of the KMT leaders, affected women's traditional roles and statuses, and they prompted women's access to politics. First, the Chinese Women's Anti-Aggression League was established in 1950 by Madame Chiang Kai-shek. The Women's Department of the KMT was established in 1953 (also directed by Madame Chiang Kai-shek). These women's organisations originally aimed at mobilising women to entertain troops, to help the war effort, to do social work and charity, to establish contacts with various other women's groups, and to boost grassroots support for the KMT (Chou and Chiang 1989). While these activities may look like 'party's housewife' roles, they encouraged women to participate in social activities. More importantly, women activists became practically involved in political campaigns as the KMT's staff at the grassroots level. This was a starting point for weakening the gender constraints.

Confucian culture stressed the fulfilment of women's familial roles as a major social value. Paradoxically, the private and the public spheres were bridged by these familial roles. Further, the strong emphasis on the value of education helped to reduce the traditional gender discrimination against women. Well-educated women were seen as 'elite' candidates rather than 'women' candidates.

Also, land reforms substantially improved the economic condition of women in rural households. The better the economic condition, the more opportunities for women to gain access to education. Without access to education, women's political opportunities were almost nil.

These factors combined in forming the background for modernisation in Taiwan. The momentum to modernisation derived from the state, and it was state elite-led. It served the KMT's political purpose — to maintain anti-communism and to recover mainland China. The well-known slogan, 'all strength is used to anti-communism; all preparation is for recovering mainland China', illustrates well this political orientation. Such orientation, as suggested above, was conducive to uneven modernisation with strong economic development combined with limited social, cultural and political aspects of modernisation.

This process has been continuing throughout the 1980s and 90s. As Chiou (1993a: 17) points out,
In the last four decades Taiwan has made startling economic progress under the authoritarian rule of the Nationalist government, increasing its per capita Gross Domestic Product from about U.S. $50 in 1945 to about $8,000 in 1991. Politically, however, Taiwan has moved with great caution, reluctance, and conservativeness, maintaining martial law and ruthless militarist control until 1987.

Economic Modernisation

As in other societies, the economy in Taiwan and Australia was transformed in the process of industrialisation. Both countries became modern industrial capitalist societies. The foundation for their economic development was laid in the colonial period. Taiwan was paving the way for economic modernisation under the rule of the Chinese Empire during the late nineteenth century. Some public works, the sugar industry, mining, tea trade associations, and modern schools were developed. Modern capitalist relations were established by 1905. In Australia the initial economic progress was accelerated by the gold rush and wool booms. Both contributed to the establishment of financial markets and the development of a transport system and construction. Increasing population, extending pastoralism and mining changed Australian economic life dramatically (Ho 1985; Lin 1987; Waters and Crook 1993; Connell and Irving 1992).

Women's roles and status had changed in this process. However, these changes had been slow. The first impressive changes, in terms of growing female participation in paid employment, did not happen until Australia's entry in World War II, and until the establishment of the export-processing zones in Taiwan (Encel et al. 1974; Eccles 1984; Bian 1985; Lee 1985; Tsai 1989). Women's paid employment was an important indicator of their growing involvement in public life, in particular their improving access to politics.

Taiwan and Australia developed their economies along different paths, and women were integrated into each economy in a different way. Australian women were encouraged to fill vacancies left by men who were recruited into the army during World Wars I and II. The Taiwanese women were encouraged to participate in paid work and to accumulate wealth for the family in the politically prompted economic modernisation drive, mainly in export-processing zones. The most important difference between Australia and Taiwan was in the role of
the family. The family in Taiwan was more fully integrated into paid employment while the role of women remained circumscribed by patriarchal norms. In Australia, the process of modernisation resulted in individualisation, exclusion of the family from production and the public sphere of politics, and the erosion of a gender-specific division of labour in the domestic sphere (Encel 1974; Winckler 1987; Greenhalgh 1988; Redding 1990).

**Industrialisation, the Family, and Women in Taiwan**

Large scale and planned industrialisation in Taiwan was based on the growth of the agricultural sector after the Second World War. The KMT government introduced economic reforms\(^4\) and rural reforms\(^5\) which boosted the agricultural sector and increased income equality, improved the infrastructure\(^6\), and started the import-substitution industrialisation (Myers 1984; Gold 1986: 56-73; Chou et al. 1990: 38; Hsiao 1991: 129). The KMT government adapted the strategy that 'the agricultural sector is used to nurse the industrial sector, and the industrial sector helps to develop the agricultural sector'. It implemented land reforms, developed agriculture and promoted then import substitution industrialisation. The majority of the labour force was absorbed by the agricultural sector during this period. While the female labour force increased from 848,000 in 1953 to 1,009,000 in 1964, the average annual growth rate of the female labour force was only 1.6% during the same period (Lee 1985: 3). Women's paid employment was rare because of the social norms, high fertility rates, and few employment opportunities.

---

\(^4\) Economic reforms included the introduction of the New Taiwan dollar, reduction of interest rates, rigid control over the financial system to control the increasing of money supply and credit, and unification of the foreign exchange rate.

\(^5\) Rural reforms include the land reform, the improvement of agricultural techniques, and social reforms in villages. Among them, the land reforms played a key role. From 1949 to 1953, there were three-stage land reforms: farm rental reduction, the sale of public farming land to farmers, and the "land to the tiller" plan which helped tenant farmers become owner-farmers. See Huang, T C. (1986) The Retrospect of Rural Development in Taiwan, in C. L. Chu (ed.) Social Change and Development in Taiwan. Taipei: Dongta. (in Chinese).

\(^6\) These infrastructures included some light industries, mining, electric power and transport system which were built by the Japanese but destroyed during the Second World War. In addition, the textile and fertiliser industries as well as electric power were also developed.
The establishment of export processing zones in the mid-1960s was a milestone for women's employment. Young peasant girls comprised one-third of the total workforce during this period (Kung 1981; Kuo 1983; Gold 1986: 89). These export-processing zones concentrated on labour-intensive export industries. They had grown fastest in 1966-73, and increased the proportion of employment in the industrial sector from 22% in the 1940s to 34% in the mid-1960s. The female labour force participation rate also rose sharply from 33% in 1966 to 42% in 1973. Women provided a flexible supply of unskilled labour at low cost (Council for Economic Planning and Development 1984: 104). 41% of employed women worked in manufacturing industries in 1973. They were concentrated in textiles, electronics, and plastics. The female labour force grew from 1,028,000 to 1,837,000 between 1965 and 1973. Its average annual growth rate reached 7.5% which was more than twice the rate of growth for the male labour force (Lee 1985: 8). In other words, the female labour force increased by 66% from 1966 to 1973. The labour-intensive industries not only absorbed the growing number of female workers, but also encouraged mobilisation of the new 'womenpower' gradually relieved of domestic duties.

Because of women's growing participation in paid employment, low income families could improve their economic position. The rise in incomes, in turn, facilitated women's access to longer education. This growing access will be discussed later in the section on social modernisation.

Women with pre-school age children worked in their homes. The state-sponsored 'living room factories' program encouraged those who could not work in factories to do piece-work at home (Cheng and Hsiung 1992: 243). In fact, by associating domestic duties with paid work at home, not only women, but also other family members were mobilised to take up paid work. The family was tightly integrated into the labour market.

Families not only supplied a flexible labour force, but also utilised their networks to build small and medium size family firms, especially during the economic boom. Business families heavily depended on their own savings to start or expand businesses, and many got loans from friends and relatives or, in rural areas, from local credit.
associations. Most employees in these family enterprises were family members. The small and medium-sized family businesses played a critical role in Taiwan's economy and contributed to relatively equal distribution of household income. They have been mushrooming since the early 1970s. A very high proportion of private industrial firms have been organised along familial lines. Their success has depended on the mobilisation of the family resources and social networks (Greenhalgh 1984; Vogel 1991; Gold 1991b).

The family continued to play a vital role in the transformation of Taiwan's economy in the 1980s, from a labour-intensive to a capital-intensive, high-technology one. In 1981 the Hsinchu Science and Industry Park was set up. It was modelled on Silicon Valley in California. Many scientists who had worked in the US came back to Taiwan to assist their families or friends in funding new firms. While staying in their American companies, some organised subcontracts with their former cousins, classmates or friends who worked in Taiwan's companies (Vogel 1991). Family-centred business links have never been an uncommon strategy in Taiwan. Even in the 1990s, family firms are still the dominant form of enterprise, although the proportion of the unpaid family workers is decreasing.

This family-based economic transformation had a strong impact on women. While the growth rates of the workforce slowed down, the growth rates of female workforce remained higher than men's (3.4% to 2.7%) (Chiang 1989: 98-99). The proportion of white-collar women workers has exceeded the proportion of blue-collar females since 1982. Like Australian women in the 1970s, The Taiwanese women have moved to the tertiary sector, and started to enter male dominated occupations. This has given women access to a greater diversity of careers (Eccles 1984: 85; Lee 1985).

The 'transformation of women's employment' in Taiwan in the 1980s was mainly promoted by women's increasing access to education. With the demographic changes and the successful integration of the family into economic modernisation, the traditional Confucian gender order started to weaken and women's access to the public sphere of the economy started to increase. Women could not only legitimate their aspirations to paid employment (increasing family wealth), but also demanded a more equal share of family resources for access to
education. Education was, in turn, a useful means to gain support for participation in political activities.

Greenhalgh (1984: 529) found that '[f]amily networks undergird both the society and the economy of Taiwan.' This means that the family has the ability to link the private and the public spheres, and to change the public spheres. Thus, the economic modernisation in Taiwan has prompted the integration of women into the economy, and, gradually, also the public sphere of politics.

Industrialisation, the Family and Women in Australia

Australia began industrialisation earlier than Taiwan. The industrial revolution started in the second half of the nineteenth century, boosted by the gold rush and based on technology imported from the UK, the US and Germany (Jones 1989: 118). Employment in the manufacturing industry was tripled in the 1870s. The factory system developed, mainly in Sydney and Melbourne. Following the recession in the 1890s, mechanisation increased rapidly (Fox 1991). With the advancing rationalisation of a capitalist economy, the domestic sphere was gradually segregated from economic production. Businesses activities were progressively removed from the sphere in which women were increasingly confined.

It is noteworthy that early industrialisation in Australia was not associated with a rapid increase of female labour force participation, as in Taiwan. Women did not benefit from early industrialisation in Australia.

Industrialisation separated the workforce from the domestic sphere. The family became a private domain, and lost connection with the public, productive sphere. It had to buy commodities and pay for these commodities by selective earning income. This has been done through (male) involvement in the labour market (Probert 1994: 161). The lives of predominantly male factory workers illustrated this change. They were confined to factories while women were confined to domestic duties. Women were subjected to patriarchal domination attenuated by liberal ideology and egalitarian ethos. A married woman's place was at her home: raising children, and catering for her husband's needs. The gender division of labour is rigid; married women were excluded from paid work, and men were excluded from
women's labour at home. Thus the early industrialisation separated women, especially married women, from the economy and thus from the major source of social status (increasingly engendered in occupational roles).

The capitalist development in Australia speeded up at the turn of this century. Technological changes and innovations, especially in transport and food processing, pushed the development in manufacturing and agriculture. Women started taking jobs in some light industries, such as food, textiles, and clothing. A large proportion of Australian female labour force became concentrated in routine tasks, such as folding sheets of newspaper, sewing, painting cardboard boxes, and so on. For the first time, women started to enter the public sphere of the economy in large numbers (Fox 1991; Waters and Crook 1993). However, women's labour force participation rate was still very low. The ratio of economically active women to total female population was 17% in 1911 (Encel and Campbell 1991: 38). Needless to say their political opportunities were also very limited. Politics, like the economy was a male business. This was reflected in women's education. The curriculum was designed to favour girls receiving household arts and preparing for domestic futures. The equation of femininity with motherhood influenced educational provision for women until the Second World War (Western 1983; Blackburn 1984; Summers 1994a). An article in the Bulletin demonstrated such views:

Women cannot too much learned, provided the learning she has helps her to fulfil her varied functions of mother, nurse, educator and trainer of her children (...) Woman, as woman, cannot be too much or too well educated; but her education must have the future well in view (...) Any education which unfit her for the fulfilment of her maternal responsibilities is not only useless — it is most emphatically a curse. (The Bulletin, 10 May 1890, cited from Summers, 1994a: 373)

World War II changed Australia's economy. It changed the social roles of women, and created new employment opportunities for Australian women. Prior to the outbreak of war in 1939, the social roles of men and women were regarded as inflexible: the men brought home the wages to maintain the family, while the women bore and brought up the children' (Curlewis 1984: 97). War labour shortage changed that.
New industries emerged, including manufacturing of aircraft, cars and trucks, weapons, optical instruments, pharmaceuticals and electronic gear. Fox (1991: 125) described the transformation between the Great Depression and the War as 'from one where hundreds of thousands of workers could not find jobs to one in which there were not enough people to fill the jobs created'. Women were recruited to the labour force to replace men who entered the armed forces. They were pulled into the occupations for which they had not been trained. Female labour force participation rose from 25% in 1939 to 34% in 1943. While initially single women were targets of recruitment, after 1942 married women were also recruited; 11% of married women held paid jobs by 1943. Women workers were primarily channelled to three areas: auxiliary services, heavy industry, and agriculture. This meant that women were entering men's jobs (Richmond 1974; Curlewis 1984; Encel and Campbell 1991; Fox 1991).

After the Second World War, Australia enjoyed more than 20 years of continuous economic growth — 'the second long boom'. GNP was growing 4-5% annually (Jones 1989). 'The economy continued to ride safely and comfortably on the sheep’s back' (Lees and Senyard 1987: 9). Ironically, women did not benefit from 'the second long boom'. They were pushed back to 'their' place as decommissioned men were re-claiming their jobs. This return to patriarchal status quo was based on the assumption that '[women's] fulfilment lay in the domestic sphere, with the care of children and the home' (Probert 1994: 154).

This trend was mirrored by low access to parliamentary positions and political elites. Only 2 out of 110 federal parliamentarians were women in 1946. The proportion of women federal parliamentarians never exceed 3% throughout the 1950s (Macintyre 1991).

With the creation of a large number of new jobs in community service sector, finance, property and business services sector, and the wholesale and retail trade sector, Australian women started to re-enter the labour market in the 1960s, 70s, and the 80s (Probert 1994). The rapid growth of the welfare state in the 1970s boosted women's opportunities in the 1970s. While the female labour force participation grew from 25% in 1947 to 41% in 1972 (Eccles 1984: 80; Foster and Stewart 1991: 152), occupational segregation did not diminish. For
instance, in 1971 all stenographers, typists, and receptionists were women, but all plasterers, electricians and bricklayers were men. Gender segregation in employment was seen as a natural differentiation of roles (Western 1983: 149-57; Eccles 1984: 87; Fox 1991: 147-8). Australian women worked disproportionately at the lowest level of authority, and held part-time jobs. According to Western (1991: 73), Australian women today

are more likely to be expert non-managers than men, noticeably 'lower' professionals, nurses, other health workers and teachers, and unskilled managers and supervisors.

While Australian women's economic roles were changing under the impact of their increasing participation in the labour market, their familial roles were not publicly recognised. Before the rise of the second wave feminist movement, Australian women were often seen as domestic labourers and treated as the 'reserved army of industrial labour'. When the economy was short of male labour, the female labour was absorbed.

In 1961, only 28% of women aged 20-55 were in the labour force (Probert 1994: 162). During the 1970s and 80s, job creation overwhelmingly emanated from the community service sector, the finance, property and business services sector, and the wholesale and retail trade sector. The rapid increase of part-time employment (especially in the public sector) encouraged mothers with young children to enter the workforce, especially in the fast-growing white collar employment in education, science, health, culture, and social services. The rising employment opportunities brought women into the labour market. Middle-class, well educated women were the main beneficiaries of this 'post-industrial' transformation (Zagórski 1984; Booth and Rubenstein 1990; Ronalds 1990; Probert 1994).

While women benefited from the expansion of the service sector in the 1970s and 80s, large numbers of women were employed part-time. About 80% of part-time workers have been women since 1970 (Foster and Stewart 1991; Encel and Campbell 1991). In the early 1980s, more than half of women part-time workers concentrated in services, sales and clerical occupations which were unskilled and semi-skilled. More than half of women worked part-time in recreation, personal
and other services, compared with 19% of men. Nearly a third of women part-time workers were in the category of 'professional, technical and related workers', compared with 7% of men in this group (ABS 1982).

Concentration in lower white collar and service occupations and in part-time work has some negative implications for women. The 'feminised' occupations are less unionised and less strongly limited to political organisations than the predominantly male jobs. Most of these 'new occupations' are also semi-skilled, and they seldom grant high status that distinguishes 'political springboard' occupations (especially law). It is difficult for women working in these occupations to develop their political knowledge and skills, and accumulate other political resources essential for political successful careers. It is the same for women in professional occupations because part-time workers can hardly keep continuous working careers which are vital to access to high positions in occupational hierarchy.

The rapidly increasing labour force participation in the 1970s can be seen as an important factor in the political activation of Australian women. As women improved their working status, they organised lobby groups (eg. WEL), and tried to gain equal employment opportunities. Such developments also prompted women's entry into party politics. Occupational careers gave women experience in running organisations in the public sphere. The women's movement was both a cause and a symptom of a massive change in gender relations. This change took revolutionary proportions in the 1980s and 90s.

**Social-cultural Modernisation and the Women's Movement**

Economic modernisation has had a profound impact on social modernisation in Taiwan and Australia. This can be seen in demographic changes, urbanisation, changes in social behaviour, attitudes, and values, increasing education and social differentiation. With increasing standards of living and improved health care, for example, the average life expectancy is rapidly increasing (see Table 2.1). Infant mortality declined from 24% in 1965 to 5% in 1993 in Taiwan, and from 19% in 1965 to 6% in 1993 in Australia (see Figure 2.1). Women especially benefited from demographic changes. Fertility rates decreased from 4.8 in 1961-65 to 1.7 in 1992 in Taiwan, and from
3.3 in 1961-65 to 1.9 in 1992 in Australia (see Figure 2.2). The women's median age of first marriage grew from 22.3 in 1971-75 to 26.1 in 1993 in Taiwan, and from 21 in 1971-75 to 24.8 in 1993 in Australia (see Figure 2.3). A relevant trend was the delay of child-bearing age. These changes in marriage and confinements, it has to be emphasised, were most strongly marked among educated women in both countries.

Table 2.1 Life Expectancy at Birth in Australia and Taiwan, 1972-1992

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Australia</th>
<th>Taiwan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>68.6</td>
<td>75.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>71.3</td>
<td>78.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>74.5</td>
<td>80.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Figure 2.1 Infant Mortality Rate in Taiwan and Australia, 1965-1993

Figure 2.2 Total Fertility Rate (per woman) in Taiwan and Australia
Source: Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive
Yuan, Social Indicators in Taiwan Area of ROC, 1993; Year Book
Australia 1965-95.

Figure 2.3 Women’s Median Age of First Marriage in Taiwan and
Australia
Source: Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive
Yuan, Social Indicators in Taiwan Area of ROC 1993; Year Book

In Taiwan, changes in social behaviours, attitudes, and values
were affected by the implementation of universal education.
Education has risen rapidly over the last five decades in Taiwan, from
a time in the 1940s when many females didn't even make it to the sixth grade to today when twelve years of education is rapidly becoming the norm for everyone' (Parish and Willis 1993: 870). Compulsory education was extended from 6 to 9 years in 1968. Its impact on all aspects of society, in particular on women, was far-reaching. This was the first time that all women had the opportunity of access to longer universal education. It was reflected in the increasing proportion of female students in three levels of education, and their share of the tertiary level, in particular, more than triple (see Table 2.2).

Table 2.2 Female Students as Proportion of Total Students in Three Levels of Education in Taiwan: 1950-1992 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Primary</th>
<th>Secondary</th>
<th>Tertiary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950-51</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Economic growth has facilitated women's access to education and to politics. Education is the main means of access to certain 'politically-friendly' occupations, such as lawyer, teacher and journalist, which, in turn, are one of the most important springboards to political careers. Likewise, education is directly associated with political elevation in Taiwan because it grants social status. All these can be seen as the reflection of the high value which Confucianism places on high education. The differences in the full-time educational enrolment rates in Taiwan and Australia may reflect different social values of education (see Table 2.3).

Some studies concluded that growing affluence contributed to The Taiwanese women's increasing access to education. Tsay's study (1985) compared average years of schooling for men and women from 1951 to 1983. He found that the accumulation of family wealth was correlated with women's growing access to education. The traditional
preference of males over females became less emphasised as the economic constraints eased. Parish and Willis (1993) used retrospective data on the life cycle and family behaviour of The Taiwanese who came of age from the 1940s onward. They also found that educational attainment relied on family economic security. When the family was poor, children's access to education was significantly differentiated by gender. However, among the affluent families, the number of siblings, gender, and the birth order were all irrelevant to educational opportunity. It meant that women had the same educational opportunity as men in rich families. Moreover, this was not limited to a few elite families, but to 'about one-third of all families and even to some extent to the broader middle class' (1993: 887).

Table 2.3 Full-time Educational Enrolment Rate by Age and Gender, Taiwan and Australia, 1992 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Australia</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Taiwan</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>98.2</td>
<td>99.0</td>
<td>98.7</td>
<td>97.1</td>
<td>97.0</td>
<td>97.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>98.9</td>
<td>99.0</td>
<td>99.0</td>
<td>99.0</td>
<td>98.7</td>
<td>98.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>99.3</td>
<td>99.8</td>
<td>99.5</td>
<td>96.6</td>
<td>96.8</td>
<td>96.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>99.3</td>
<td>99.5</td>
<td>99.4</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>99.6</td>
<td>99.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>99.6</td>
<td>99.6</td>
<td>99.6</td>
<td>98.4</td>
<td>98.4</td>
<td>98.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>97.7</td>
<td>98.6</td>
<td>98.1</td>
<td>102*</td>
<td>102*</td>
<td>102*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>99.0</td>
<td>99.1</td>
<td>99.1</td>
<td>93.6</td>
<td>94.4</td>
<td>94.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>98.1</td>
<td>98.8</td>
<td>98.4</td>
<td>96.5</td>
<td>98.4</td>
<td>97.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>97.8</td>
<td>98.3</td>
<td>98.0</td>
<td>94.4</td>
<td>95.3</td>
<td>94.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>92.7</td>
<td>93.9</td>
<td>93.4</td>
<td>77.3</td>
<td>80.5</td>
<td>78.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>79.2</td>
<td>82.9</td>
<td>81.2</td>
<td>82.3</td>
<td>87.9</td>
<td>85.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>58.2</td>
<td>62.4</td>
<td>60.5</td>
<td>72.9</td>
<td>81.8</td>
<td>77.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>41.6</td>
<td>40.2</td>
<td>40.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>36.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>31.1</td>
<td>30.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The Department of Employment, Education and Training 1994

* It is a result of rounding.

Access to higher education improved women's status and broke the myth that 'the virtue of a woman lies in her ignorance'. Moreover,
education encouraged women's occupational aspirations, increased confidence and stimulated their interest in seeking more participation in politics.

Education has long been valued in Confucian culture as a major means of social mobility and source of respect. In Taiwan a good educational background is usually followed by higher social prestige, well-paid employment and high socio-economic status. Therefore, education aspirations have been reinforced by the growth of affluence. Modernisation has led to increases in women's education, employment and social status. However, the persistence of family-centred orientations in Taiwan highlights the differences in social modernisation patterns between both countries. In Taiwan, modernisation has not undermined traditional norms to the same extent as in advanced Western societies.

This was, at least partly, a matter of conscious and organised opposition to the erosion of cultural traditions. The Chinese Cultural Renaissance Movement was officially organised in 1967. It aimed at the revival of the traditional Confucian culture, in particular on filial piety, the mother's role, and the family ethic. Gold (1986: 30) noted that the KMT government 'primarily defined Taiwan's identity in security terms — Free China, but it also cultivated Taiwan as the last outpost of traditional Chinese culture.' The traditional Confucian culture was used as a means to strengthen the political legitimacy of the KMT government, to expunge the Japanese colonial culture, and to be a barrier against the impact of communist culture and ideology in the Chinese mainland. Women's familial roles were seen as an essential part of the defended cultural tradition.

In spite of the formation and expansion of various non-familial organisations in Taiwan, the family continues to be a centre of authority, a main supplier of resources, and an information network in Taiwan. Most social interactions centre on the family. However, the family has two faces in modern Taiwan. One is characterised by adaptation to the new social environment. The other is more traditional — as a repository of values, norms, and traditional patterns of interaction (Thornton and Lin 1994). The former allows for women's participation in the economy and politics; the latter perpetuates traditionalism and conservatism. Ex-nuptial births, for
example, continue to be seen as immoral in Taiwan. In the last two decades, the number of the ex-nuptial births per thousand live births increased little in Taiwan from 1.7 in 1975 to 2.2 in 1992. By contrast, this increased in Australia from 10.2 in 1975 to 24 in 1992 in Australia (see Figure 2.4). Other indicators of familial stability, such as the divorce rates, the proportion of single parent families, and the proportion of young people living in de facto relationships also show more dramatic changes in Australia than in Taiwan (see Table 2.4 and 2.5).

Figure 2.4 Numbers of Ex-nuptial Births as Proportion of per Thousand Live Births, Taiwan and Australia, 1975-1992 (%).
Table 2.4 Divorce Rate in Taiwan and Australia, 1966-1992
(per 1,000 married population)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Australia</th>
<th>Taiwan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 2.5 Single Parent Families as Proportion of Total Families, Taiwan and Australia, 1986, 1992 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Australia</th>
<th>Taiwan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan, Social Indicators in Taiwan Area of ROC, 1993; Year Book Australia 1995.

**Social Modernisation and Women in Australia**

Changes in social behaviours, attitudes, and values in Australia were closely related to industrialisation, universal education, and to the mobilisation of the women's movement. Industrialisation transformed Australia gradually into an individualised class society. Class became the base for political organisation and 'communal action'. Relatively stable partisan identifications frustrated endeavours to mobilise political action around gender issues (Sawer and Simms 1993).

Like their Taiwanese counterparts, Australian women did not enjoy equal access to education until the social reforms and mobilisation of the women's movement in the 1970s. Women's education during the colonial period was very limited, and reflected nineteenth century concepts of femininity. Its aim was little more than
instilling middle-class courtesy and preparing women for marriage. Women's access to tertiary education was very limited. Although the University of Sydney was established in 1851 and Melbourne University in 1854, women were not admitted until 1881. Universal secondary education for women in Australia did not become a reality until the early 1960s. The expansion of tertiary education began in the early 1970s. However, women had lower enrolment rates than men in both levels of education till the late 1970s (Porter 1988).

In the last decade, with changing social norms and concerted pressures from the women's movement, all states and the federal government have developed educational policies aiming at eliminating gender-related inequalities in education. At present, Australian women account for more than half of the higher education students, and their presence is increasing in various disciplines previously reserved for males (eg. law, medicine, engineering).

In modern society, education plays a key role in political elite recruitment in the sense of selecting aspirants and granting them social status. In particular, educational credentials become the key characteristics of elite formation (Putnam 1976: 205). However, in spite of enormous educational advances, the presence of Australian women in politics has remained very low until the mid-1990s. One explanation for this 'lag' may be that education has not been directly linked in Australia with political status and resources. This issue will be discussed in Chapter Three.

The Women's Rights Movement in Taiwan and Australia

Many changes in social norms concerning education, employment, and marriage in Australia could be linked with the rise of the 'second wave' feminist movement. The goal of the movement was equality between sexes in employment opportunities, pay, work conditions, access to education and presence in politics. In other words, the women's movement aimed at creating a gender-balanced environment.

The Australian women's movement was very different from that in Taiwan (Scutt 1988; Summers 1994b; Sawer 1994). As Watson (1990: 3) pointed out,
Australia offers us one of the best opportunities to evaluate what these feminist interventions have meant for feminism and feminist thought. Since the mid 1970s, and the latter years of the reform-oriented and progressive Whitlam government, a small but significant number of feminists have held positions of (relative) power within federal and state governments and bureaucracies, influencing policy and funding women.

Women's Electoral Lobby (WEL) illustrated the link between the women's movement and the state bureaucracy. It was a reformist organisation which worked within the existing system to improve the positions of Australian women. It relied on moderate tactics bargaining, negotiation, and pressure exerted mainly through the media and the parliamentary political system (Wills 1983). Most of the achievements were through prompting the initiatives of governments.

The women's movement in Taiwan was underdeveloped before the lifting of martial law in 1987. It was closely linked with the political opposition movement and therefore subject to suppression by the KMT government. 'Neo-feminism', analogous to the first wave women's movement, was advocated in Taiwan by Lu Hsiu-lien who obtained her master degree in the US and came back to Taiwan in the early 1970s. The rise of 'neo-feminism' could be regarded as 'pioneer feminist activities in male chauvinist Taiwan' (Chiou 1986: 21), and also be seen as affected by the emergence of women intellectuals and the spread of Western culture. The movement was not widely supported, and the public ridiculed it as 'rich, young, married women's movement'. The political climate was crucial to the success of this movement. As the political opposition movement started to gain strength, the women's movement became increasingly visible. As Lu (1991: 339) noted,

The women's liberation movement in Taiwan began in the early 1970s under extremely adverse circumstances—politically, it was a martial law regime of authoritarian autocracy; culturally, it was a patriarchal society full of Confucian and Japanese androcentrism. However, the socio-economic structure was in the stage of shifting from agricultural to an industrial economy. Economic prosperity provided the young generation, both men and women, a considerably good environment for education and
for mobilisation. Tradition was facing severe challenge from rapid social development.

Lu's (1990) appeal did not go beyond the Confucian great tradition — assigning high value to harmony between the family and the society. What she pursued was a reformist version of the civil rights movement with emphases on a balanced gender division of labour. While Lu absorbed the ideas of the women's movement in the US, she still adopted a more 'Chinese-style' method to introduce her ideas in Taiwan. Her famous slogan was 'to be human beings first, then to be men or women'. More importantly, women's familial roles were never devalued in her neo-feminist appeals.

The women's movement in Taiwan was almost finished after Lu was jailed in 1979. However, a new women's group, the Awakening, was formed by a younger generation of women intellectuals in the early 1980s. It was led by a woman academic intellectual, Lee Yuan-chen, who had worked with Lu. This new women's group took some of Lu's ideas, and it received a broadly sympathetic response from the public. It was successful in reviving the women's movement in Taiwan and still continues to be active in the 1990s (Ku 1989).

In 1982, this new feminist group started to publish a magazine, Awakening, which aimed to 'awake women, support women, and build a harmonious society with gender equality' (Lee 1988). Further, the Awakening Foundation was established in 1987. Most of the members were women intellectuals, and their ideas were present in these annual goals of actions: 'Developing Women's Potential' in 1983, 'Protection of Women' in 1984, and 'Dialogue between the Sexes' in 1986. The effort towards political democratisation in the 1980s, it must be stressed, was conducive to the emergence and growth of numerous women's groups. Compared with its Australian counterpart, the women's movement in Taiwan has never been incorporated into the state bureaucracy. Therefore, its influence on public policy is negligible.

Improvements in women's status have been closely related to political modernisation in both countries. In Australia, these improvements were achieved mainly through government policies. Many policies, such as affirmative action, were responses to the demands of the women's movement. In Taiwan, the women's
movement was much less developed. Few women were concerned about women's disproportionate representation in politics. The quota system at different levels of elections since 1947 was used to defuse women's political demands. Women had not become vocal in politics until 1980. It was because of their special roles in the political opposition movement that women entered politics at the wave of democratisation. Political modernisation was, thus, the key factor in political status of women in Taiwan.

Political Modernisation

In the 1980 national election, many women entered politics for the first time. This election can be seen as a landmark in Taiwan's democratic transition. Gender equality, however, continued to be a minor issue compared with the threat from communist China. In Australia, by contrast, politics was stable, and gender issues could be systematically and successfully pushed into the political agenda by the women's movement. The issue of women's under-representation in politics gained a top priority in the 1980s. Many policy initiatives aimed at equalising opportunities could be linked with the initiatives of the reformist feminist movements.

The Changing Political System in Taiwan

The political system in Taiwan is based on the Three Principles of the People, which include nationalism, democracy, and social well-being, formulated by Dr. Sun Yat-sen, the founding father of the Republic of China. It differentiates the 'political power' of the people from the 'governing power' of the government. People exercise their political power by electing their representatives to the electoral bodies. Thus elected bodies, however, have a wide autonomy in formulating and pursuing policies.

The government in Taiwan is divided into three levels: central, provincial/municipal, and county/city. The central government is made up of the Office of the President, the National Assembly, and five governing branches (called 'Yuan') which are the Executive Yuan, the Legislative Yuan, the Judicial Yuan, the Examination Yuan, and the Control Yuan (details see Appendix A).

Both the National Assembly and the Legislative Yuan comprise the parliament. The National Assembly consists of delegates who are
elected from each county/city or area. The Legislative Yuan is the highest legislative branch of the state, composed of popularly elected representatives who serve for 3 years and are eligible for re-election. A single non-transferable vote, multimember system\(^7\) is used for the election of parliamentarians in both the National Assembly and the Legislative Yuan.

The first nationwide election of the Legislative Yuan was held in 1948. Of the 760 members elected, 82 were women. General elections for the Legislative Yuan have been frozen since 1949 because of the communist rebellion. Supplementary elections have been regularly held since 1969 to replace those members who were unable to continue in their office. Additional seats have been added due to the rise in population since the mid 1970s.

Following its retreat to Taiwan, the KMT government announced a state of national emergency and martial law was imposed on May 20, 1949. It restricted constitutional rights, including the right to form political parties. General elections to the national parliamentary bodies were suspended, and participation in mass activities, such as labour strikes, street demonstrations, and so on was banned. In September 1953, President Chiang Kai-shek recommended an extension of the terms of the first National Assembly delegates, elected in 1947, until the second National Assembly could be elected. In March 1954, the second session of the first National Assembly approved indefinite extension of the Temporary Provisions during the Period of Communist Rebellion.

During the 1950s, the KMT built its cells at the grassroots level to work through patron-client networks allied with local factions which cemented control over local politics. In this way, the KMT penetrated the entire social fabric to secure compliance with party-state policies. With an internal party purge, the KMT extended its control over the polity, army, internal security apparatus, legal system, economy and society. With the establishment of a state corporatist structure, the KMT achieved full control over state-designated organisations, such as labour unions, business and professional associations, women's associations, and student bodies (Gold 1986, 1995; Tien 1989; Lu 1991b; Hu 1993; Chiou 1993b, 1995).

\(^7\) Some electorates are single member because of their small population.
Besides the maintenance of tight political control, there were two major political goals pursued by the KMT in the 1950s. First, land reforms were initiated. Many previous land owners were transformed into entrepreneurs. One important political consequence of this was the elimination of the economic bases for local The Taiwanese political leaders. The threat of opposition was reduced, and the KMT could gain support among the rural people (Hsiao 1991; Jacobs 1993). Second, a popular election for a Hualien county council was held in 1950. This marked the beginning of the local self-government which gave The Taiwanese political leaders and citizens an opportunity to play more active role in politics. While these elections were local and limited, their impact was profound. As Chou et al. (1990: 125) indicated, there was lively grassroots local politics which served as a foundation for political careers. Local political leaders used these elections to regain the status lost in the land reform. Many of them were recruited into the central government later (Yang 1970; Jacobs 1980; Gold 1986).

Political Modernisation and Women in Taiwan

Although women were included in Taiwanese politics even before the democratic reforms (mainly in local politics, but also the national level due to the quota system) their political role was enhanced in the process of political modernisation. It is noteworthy that some women were active in the local elections already in the 1950s. The majority of them were characterised by their The Taiwanese origin, KMT affiliation, and high educational background. At that time, women who gained access to higher education, it has to be stressed, were usually from very rich families. Such families often enjoyed a good reputation in the local communities, and had a profound influence on local affairs. A large proportion of them were recruited into political elites in the supplementary general elections after 1969.

Until the 1960s, those members of the National Assembly and the Legislative Yuan who were elected on the mainland in 1947 continued to serve their extended terms. No new members were selected. However, due to death, health problems, and advancing age, some of them were no longer 'active'. The size of the National Assembly declined from 2,916 in 1947 to 1,488 in 1966, and the Legislative Yuan from 760 in 1948 to 493 in 1967 (Copper 1981: 1031; Chou et al. 1990: 51).
These demographic trends prompted the KMT to call supplementary elections in 1969. 26 new members were elected, 15 to the National Assembly, and 11 to the Legislative Yuan in the 1969 election. Of 26 new members, 3 were women. All these women were active in the KMT and the KMT-sponsored Women's Association, and 2 of them had served in local governments for more than 2 terms.

Under the impact of diplomatic setbacks, the KMT government started new reforms in the 1970s.

It was only limited reform, but in stark contrast with his aging father, the young Chiang [Chiang Ching-kuo] did create a fresh political image and gave the distinct impression that he meant to democratize Taiwan, or at least soften the authoritarianism he inherited from his father. (Chiou 1993a: 19)

A new generation called for social justice, political, legal and social reforms. Members of this generation who were born after World War II, experienced expansion of educational opportunity, as well as economic prosperity unprecedented in Taiwan, and many of them were educated in North America, Europe and Japan. They were excited by Western democracy, and were more inclined to take social and political risks than the previous generation. Dissatisfied with the KMT-monopolized policy-making procedure, they sought to exert more influence in the political arena. They campaigned for the seats in national supplementary elections, and adopted a mutual help strategy— pooled resources and formed a campaign organisation. In 1978, they form a quasi-party organisation — 'Dangwai Campaign Assistance Corps' (Dangwai means outside the KMT). In August 1979 the oppositional Melitao Magazine was published, and almost all important Dangwai figures were included in its editorial board. The main office of Melitao Magazine was set in Taipei, and various branch offices were set up in many cities and small towns (Domes 1981; Lu 1985, 1992; Chiou 1986; Huang 1992).

---

8 The People's Republic of China replaced the Republic of China on Taiwan in the United Nations in 1971. During the 1970s the KMT government was defeated by the CCP regime in many international bodies. For example, the ROC team withdrew from the Montreal Olympic Games to protest competing under the name of "Taiwan" in 1976. In 1979, the US. normalised its diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC) led by the CCP regime, and derecognised ROC on Taiwan.
While *Dangwai* members were active in local elections, the KMT did not severely suppress their activities. They again and again tested the limits of permissibility of the KMT government. The 'Chung-li Incident' in 1977 was a good example. It was a violent demonstration about alleged election meddling in Chung-li city. The conflict intensified in December 1979. *Dangwai* mobilised a number of demonstrations, and eventually provoked a violent clash between demonstrators and police. This was well-known as the 'Kaohsiung Incident' (or *Meilitao* Incident). Most leaders of the political opposition movement were jailed after this incident (Chiou 1986, 1991, 1993a).

The political opposition movement nurtured some women political activists who were also well-educated, like those active in the 1960s. Lu Hsiao-lien and Chen Chu, for example, were two central figures in the Kaohsiung Incident, and they devoted their life to participating in the opposition movement (Chiou 1993a: 21). Most opposition leaders succeeded in local and national elections in the 1980s. The most salient figures in these elections were wives whose husbands were imprisoned after the Kaohsiung Incident. By 1985, of 10 *Dangwai* women who held electoral office ranging from local to national levels, 7 were wives of these 'political martyrs' (Lu 1990: 180).

Thus while women politicians in Taiwan had emerged in the early 1960s, their presence in electoral politics was never as salient as after the 1980 elections. 'Dangwai members who had not been charged and the wives of jailed activists scored decisive electoral victories' (Gold 1991b: 58; Chiou 1993b). Some people held that the success of these *Dangwai* candidates, especially women, relied on the 'sympathy votes'. The loss of international identity and status was responsible for the setback suffered by the KMT. These failures also pushed the KMT to speed up political reforms improving the party's legitimacy.

During the 1980s, the KMT speeded up its reforms, recruited more the Taiwanese into national politics (Winckler 1984; Tien 1992), and extended its tolerance of the opposition movement. As President Chiang Ching-kuo states, 'because the times have changed and the circumstances have changed, the government and the party also have to change.' These reforms were institutionalised by the end of the decade. With weakening restrictions on freedom of expression, elections, especially at the national level, started to heat up. Some
politically sensitive topics, such as the 'long-life' parliament, abolition of martial law, and the independence issue entered public debates (Lu 1991a).

The establishment of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in 1986 was generally seen as the beginning of the democratic transition. It also symbolised the triumph of democratic evolution. Taiwanisation was one of the main goals of political reforms after the early 1970s.

In order to deal with the new international realities and the growing power of the new Taiwanese commercial class, Chiang Ching Kuo began wresting power away from hard-liners of his father's generation and pushing for a series of 'reform and protect Taiwan' policies. He also sought to cultivate the semblance of a new internal consensus (...) [and] appointed some Taiwanese to high party and government positions, thus starting the so-called Taiwanization process. (Chiou 1993a: 19)

Since the power structure of the party-state was long monopolised by mainlander elites under the existing KMT, democratisation inevitably weakened the superiority of the mainlander political elites and encouraged the absorption of the Taiwanese into political elites (Tien 1989; Chou 1991; Chiou 1993a; Tien and Chu 1994; Tien 1995).

Under these circumstances, gender issues were less important than democratisation. Also sub-ethnic considerations were much more important than gender. Women's political opportunities were affected by these factors to some extent. This was especially evident in cases of the KMT women aspirants. For example, one of my interviewees (A) said, 'I sought the endorsement of the KMT to run for political office several times, but I was told that I was a mainlander and the preference was for the Taiwanese women.' Another B added, 'my husband was as good as me (maybe better) to run for political office. However, I got the priority because of my Taiwanese origin.'

Political reforms after 1987 included

[a] mixture of presidential decrees (before the emergency regime was dismantled in 1993), KMT intra-party resolutions, legislative acts and constitutional revisions were aimed at weakening the regime's past authoritarian practices and liberalising Taiwan's political climate. (Tien 1995: 14-15)
The character of political campaigning also changed after 1986. The climate of politics was more liberal, and the access to mass media was fairer. Women candidates, in particular, stressed their gender more than their status as wives of 'political martyrs'. As one candidate (B) pointed out, 'I stood for KMT women in the 1986 national elections. The most important thing was not necessarily to be a wife of a political martyr. A good woman candidate could be from a 'normal family'. She was a good wife and a good mother, and her husband had a usual occupation and her children studied in schools.'

Political reforms and indigenisation of political elites split the KMT. The New Party (NP) was formed by the second generation of mainlanders, the young elites of the KMT, in 1993. Ethnic cleavage and national identity made it different from the DPP. In the 1994 elections, of 51 seats in the Taipei City Council, the NP won 11 including 3 won by women. Most observers (such as Tien 1995: 32) claimed that its electoral strength was limited to the Taipei City where the majority of mainlanders resided. Yet, this myth was broken in the 1995 Legislative election. The NP successfully captured some seats outside the Taipei City. For example, a NP woman was the most successful candidate in Taichung city (located in the middle of Taiwan).

The issues of independence and national identity are still the dominant issues in Taiwan's politics. The gender issues are increasing in salience, but they are likely to be overshadowed by the dominant issues in the foreseeable future.

The Political System in Australia

Political system in Australia is based in part on the Westminster model and in part on the US model of federalism. Parliament is the key element of the Westminster system. It is the outcome of representation of the citizens and is responsible to the citizens. The parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia (the Federal parliament) was first elected in 1901 after a long history of reforms in the colony, including the granting of franchise to women in South Australia in 1894. It is a bicameral parliament, with the House of Representatives (lower house) and the Senate (upper house) elected in a different manner.
The electoral districts and the methods of counting the votes vary in both houses. For the House of Representatives, voters cast a preferential ballot in a single-member constituency; the majority formula is used to count the number of votes. For the Senate, voters cast a preferential ballot in a multi-member, state-wide constituency; the single transferable vote system is used. In 1924, the compulsory voting system was introduced in the Commonwealth.

Party politics is the most salient feature of Australian politics. While the Australian party system is multi-party in form, essentially two-partism has developed, similar to the British pattern. The two major parties, the Australian Labour Party (ALP) and the Liberal Party of Australia (LP), have been competing for control of the legislature since early this century. The ALP is the oldest party in Australia, established in 1890, and has a strong masculine tradition at least partly reflecting its social base in the manual working class and the formal affiliation with trade unions. The affiliated blue-collar unions dominate collective membership and exercise extensive power within the ALP. The largest feminised unions, like the teachers' union, are not affiliated to the party (Sawer and Simms 1993: 178-79; Smith 1993). Unlike the ALP, the social base of the LP is less socially distinctive, and the power of business groups within the LP remains substantial. Since World War II, the LP has operated in coalition with the National/Country Party. The current changes of policy in favour of recruiting women to the ALP, and the LP's strategies of boosting women representation are discussed in Chapters Three and Four.

The 'third' parties, such as the Australian Democrats (ADs) and the Greens, are the products of the 1970s and 80s, and they increasingly play a significant role in providing recruitment avenues for women politicians. The participatory structure and orientation of the ADs has appealed to women. So did the party leadership. This became more evident when Janine Haines was elected as the party leader in 1986. However, these minor parties are fragile and their support varies regionally. They do not comprise a clearly defined interest and do not generate stable and deep loyalties. Therefore, they are more successful in the Senate, but find it difficult to win seats in the House of Representatives. Further discussion of the position of women within these parties is in Chapters Three and Four.
Political Modernisation and Women in Australia

Unlike Taiwan, Australia has been a liberal democracy since 1901. While political modernisation in Australia led to the abolishment of the White Australia policy, the enfranchisement of Aboriginals, and multicultural policies, gender discrimination has survived well into the 1970s. Consequently, women's issues have played a significant part in contemporary Australian politics.

Australian women were amongst the first to obtain political rights both to vote and to stand for the national parliament. A lot of Australia's egalitarian social legislation could be traced to the impact of women's suffrage (Sawer and Simms 1993: 1). These early achievements were underscored by persisting patriarchal attitudes and strong gender inequalities in education, employment and politics.

It is a very Australian tradition that the state — a comprehensive manager of the colonial economy then, and an arbitrator of interests of different individuals, classes, and groups now— plays a central role in meeting the different demands from various social categories. This can be seen in the changes in women's political status, the rise of femocrats in the federal bureaucracy, and in the emergence of liberal feminist political organisations, including the Women's Electoral Lobby (WEL) (Encel et al. 1974; Ryan 1990; Sawer 1990; Millar 1993). This highlights a major difference in the role of the state in Australia and Taiwan. The state in Taiwan made little effort to improve women's political opportunities. By contrast, a powerful women's political organisation, such as WEL in Australia, could not have existed without state sponsorship of woman's causes.

The early version of the Australian national identity was 'constructed in terms of the white, masculine, outdoor person originating from the British Isles'. 'Mateship' derived from this intensely masculine working-class cultural environment (Castles et al 1992: 8). Under such conditions,

not only that women have been omitted from consideration, but that the qualities and attributes of Australian society identified as important have been ones which were germane to male interests and ambitions (Summers 1994a: 79).

The first Australian women ran for parliament at the 1903 federal election. Three were candidates for the Senate, and one for the House
of Representatives. While the total number of women candidates who ran for the federal parliament was more than 31 during the period 1903-40, no women succeeded until 1943. Women were largely excluded from the professions and the trade unions. Encel et al. (1974: 251) held that the Second World War, the disintegration of the conservative coalition parties, and the mass entry of women into men's jobs during the war contributed to the presence of a great number of women candidates in the 1943 federal election.

After the Second World War, more women competed for party endorsements. During the 1960s, women gradually gained a foothold in Australian politics. A Women's Bureau in the Department of Labour and National Service was set up in 1963. The ban on the employment of married women in the Commonwealth Public Service was lifted in 1966. In 1969 the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Commission made a decision that 'equal pay for equal work' would be incorporated in stages by 1972 (Encel et al. 1974).

As in many other countries, the federal government and major political parties in Australia started to revise their policies in the 1960s. Since then, although only few women have been sent to the federal politics, politics has nevertheless ceased to be men's playground. The women's movement played a major role in this transformation. The creation of the WEL was the fruit of the women's movement. There was a constituency for change among women, but a vehicle was needed to change the new consciousness rising from the women's movement into politically effective and systematic demands. The WEL was such a vehicle, and it played a major political role in bridging the movement and politics (Sawer 1990; Millar 1993: 74).

The 1970s was a decade of political transition in Australia, and also a decade of women's unprecedented success in politics that brought changes of policies.

These changes, which came about partly in response to the social attitudes of the period, were far-reaching, continuing on into the 1980s and having direct bearing on the increase in the numbers of women who have entered the Parliament since that time. (Millar 1993: 71)

Following 23 years of the conservative government, the Whitlam Labour government, which was the first Commonwealth government
to break significantly a long-established system, came to power with an extensive reform program, such as the 1972 equal pay policies. They were re-launched by the Conciliation and Arbitration Commission (Campbell and Halligan 1992: 38). The child care issue was also pushed into the public agenda, and with the improvement of child care provision, more women entered the labour force.

Perhaps the most dramatic change was that the elevation of women's issues to the ministerial level and the appearance of femocrats. Elizabeth Reid was appointed as adviser to the Prime Minister to organise affairs associated with women's welfare. This position finally became the embryo of the Office of the Status of Women. The appointment of Reid also meant that the federal government took its first step to give women's issues a high political and public profile. The first woman Minister with portfolio was Senator Margaret Guilfoyle, Minister for Social Security in the 1976 Fraser government. However, women were poorly represented in the federal parliament. There were only two women Senators and no women members in the House of Representatives after the 1972 election. After the double dissolution in 1974, Joan Child won a seat in the House of Representatives. She was the first woman to sit in that House since 1969. Likewise, the number of women Senators increased to four after this election. Child lost her seat in 1975. After that time there was no women in the Lower House until 1980 (Sawer 1990; Millar 1993; Sawer and Simms 1993).

Reid's appointment proclaimed the commitment of the Whitlam government to the serious incorporation of women's issues into government decision-making processes. The number of femocrats increased in the decade following Reid's appointment. About 17 women advisers quickly entered the bureaucracy in the 1980s and grew into the first femocrat lobby (Eisenstein 1990; Sawer 1990: 22; Ryan 1990). This was to a large extent a result of affirmative action by government agencies.

Affirmative action was 'a systematic means, determined by employers in consultation with employees and unions, of achieving equal employment opportunity for women' (Encel and Campbell 1991: 173). It could be seen as a response to the women's movement, and as a further embodiment of the principle of state intervention in
improving women's access to the economy and politics. Some major political parties, such as the ALP, also implemented affirmative action to enhance women's chances in political competition. While it is too early to assess the results of these forms of affirmative action and related policy initiatives, one can conclude that gender issues have been integrated into mainstream political debates in Australia.

Conclusions
The classic view of modernisation has been shaped by such authors as Ward and Rustow (1967), Huntington (1966, 1968, 1971), Parsons et al. (1951) and Inkeles (1964). The Inkeles and Smith's study of 'modern man' [sic] states that

With the possible exception of religion, no institution of society is more often depicted as either an obstacle to or a victim of modernisation than is the extended kinship structure (...) We had little reason to doubt that when urbanism increased the physical distance between kin, and industrial employment decreased their economic dependence, the strength of kinship ties as manifested in common residence, frequent visiting, and mutual help in work would decline (1974: 25-26).

However, Inkeles and Smith also point to the possible strengthening of family ties in the process of modernisation (1974: 26) — a development which we have diagnosed in Taiwan.

Modernisation in Taiwan has been 'uneven' with the economic institutions showing modern configurations while social and cultural patterns preserving many traditional elements. Growing affluence and demographic changes have improved women's access to education and paid employment. However, unlike Australia, the family has played a vital role in these processes of modern transformation in Taiwan. The family has been integrated into the overall economic development, and has helped in bridging the gap between the private and the public spheres. Therefore, although many social norms and expectations remain traditional and patriarchal, some of these traditional elements have been seized by women, and they help in women's political activation by opening the way for mobilisation of traditional family roles and networks in political contests.

Australia experienced an 'even' pattern of modernisation during the last century. As in most advanced Western societies, women in
Australia have benefited from demographic changes, reproductive technology, access to education and paid employment. As in other Western societies, the family has been separated from the public sphere in the process of modernisation. Women gained social and political status in economic and political spheres. As Inkeles and Smith point out (1974: 26),

[The liberating influence of the forces making for modernisation would act on men's attitudes, and incline them to accord to women status and rights more nearly equal to those enjoyed by men.]

The rise of the feminist movement and the emergence of femocrats helped in creating a gender-balanced environment and improving opportunities for women. Especially, the formation of the WEL helped in pushing women's issues into the political agenda. Gender issues gained a top priority in political modernisation in Australia.

Unlike Australia, politics has been unstable in Taiwan since the end of the Second World War. The communist threat has resulted in the issues of national security dominating other political and social issues. During the US aid period, defending national culture was also interpreted as a call for the preservation of Confucian patriarchy against Western influences, especially the American one. Because of these factors, gender issues did not figure prominently in social change and political democratisation in Taiwan.

As it is argued in the next chapter, the different modernisation paths in Taiwan and Australia have been reflected in different patterns of women's political recruitment. Uneven modernisation in Taiwan has generated relatively low political opportunities but relatively wide and diffused political resources. By contrast, modernisation in Australia has resulted in enhancing women's public roles. The emphasis on training, organisational membership and continuous working career for promotion in organisations, leads to equalisation of political opportunities. However, political resources are concentrated in highly masculine organisations, and Australian women find it difficult to access them in an equal fashion. This results in the 'truncated' political careers of women, and gives rise to the notion of 'glass ceilings'.

87
Finally it is worth highlighting here the different character of women's 'double burden' in both societies. This double burden of domestic responsibilities and working life is heavy in both societies, although social norms and gender roles in Australia are more modern and egalitarian. However, by and large, in Australia, women cannot utilise their familial roles in political competition. This is a matter of political culture as well as strong opposition from the feminist movement which is opposed to promoting the images of mothers and wives. In Taiwan, where social norms and expectations are more traditional and gender-specific, women are able — and encouraged — to transform their familial roles into an asset of their public life. The burden of women's domestic duties can be converted into social status that counts in political elevation. These themes are explored in more details in the next two chapters.
Different dynamics of social change in Australia and Taiwan create different social environments for political recruitment of women. Different social values, norms, evaluative criteria as well as different bases of the status claims in these two societies affect the distribution of women's political opportunities and resources. This chapter examines these structures of opportunities and resources in two sections. The first section examines how social dynamics affect women's political recruitment in general. The second analyses the impact of social dynamics of modernisation on the distribution of political opportunities and resources.

Family, Culture and Women

Liberal individualism and Confucian familism are the two major ideologies and social-cultural patterns affecting women's access to politics in Australia and Taiwan respectively. Their impact is mediated through cultural beliefs and practices of everyday life. For the purposes of presentation here, they can be contrasted along four analytic dimensions: the central social value, the main evaluative criterion, method in organisations, and the main bases of claim for social status.

At the centre of the liberalism lies individualism as a central tenet of social philosophy and the main value standard shaping social life. In individualistic Western societies absorption of individuals into organisations occurs through apprenticeship with performance being the major criterion in judging individuals and accomplishment, in particular their political potential. Individual rights to fair competition are also the basic element of liberalism. (Table 3.1)
The central idea of individualism is that all people are free and equal beings, liberated from ascribed statuses and hierarchical bonds of traditional society. It is the fundamental ideological tenet of Western modernity. With the development of the modern societies, the rationalisation of the state, and the extension of the capitalism, the individual becomes 'the ultimate source of value and meaning', and is treated as a main constitutive element: the sovereign source of the public life, the apt beneficiary of the public life, and the primary element of the social structure (Lodge 1987: 9). Individualism promotes autonomy and lack of self-control, and presents a package of ideas that place emphasis on rational calculation (Berger et al. 1974; Bell 1979; Bellah et al. 1988). Individuality encourages people to do their own thing. Men and women are no longer to be stereotyped by societal definitions. Each individual is encouraged to find and achieve his/her unique potential free from gender presumptions (Bem and Bem 1988).

Familism lies at the core of Confucianism. It refers to the ideology that values strong cohesion in the family relationships. The members show their loyalty to and identification with the family unit, and expect substantial supports from it. The overriding concern is with the perpetuation and success of the family unit. Education is seen as the most effective means to enhance the status of the family and is the best way to increase the wellbeing of its members. The main basis of status claims is fulfilment of familial duties. The family, in turn, is responsible for its members' welfare, and the members are under obligation to support and honour their family rather than to claim individual rights.

One of the most outstanding features of familism is 'the willingness to learn and sacrifice in order to accumulate wealth for future generations' (Vogel 1991: 37). The emphasis is therefore placed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3.1 Liberal Individualism and Confucian Familism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Individualism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the central social value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the main evaluative criterion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the main evaluative method</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the main bases of status claim</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The central idea of individualism is that all people are free and equal beings, liberated from ascribed statuses and hierarchical bonds of traditional society. It is the fundamental ideological tenet of Western modernity. With the development of the modern societies, the rationalisation of the state, and the extension of the capitalism, the individual becomes 'the ultimate source of value and meaning', and is treated as a main constitutive element: the sovereign source of the public life, the apt beneficiary of the public life, and the primary element of the social structure (Lodge 1987: 9). Individualism promotes autonomy and lack of self-control, and presents a package of ideas that place emphasis on rational calculation (Berger et al. 1974; Bell 1979; Bellah et al. 1988). Individuality encourages people to do their own thing. Men and women are no longer to be stereotyped by societal definitions. Each individual is encouraged to find and achieve his/her unique potential free from gender presumptions (Bem and Bem 1988).

Familism lies at the core of Confucianism. It refers to the ideology that values strong cohesion in the family relationships. The members show their loyalty to and identification with the family unit, and expect substantial supports from it. The overriding concern is with the perpetuation and success of the family unit. Education is seen as the most effective means to enhance the status of the family and is the best way to increase the wellbeing of its members. The main basis of status claims is fulfilment of familial duties. The family, in turn, is responsible for its members' welfare, and the members are under obligation to support and honour their family rather than to claim individual rights.

One of the most outstanding features of familism is 'the willingness to learn and sacrifice in order to accumulate wealth for future generations' (Vogel 1991: 37). The emphasis is therefore placed
on the subordination of the members to the development of the family group. The family applies pressure on its members to achieve professional and material success and its members expect, indeed often demand, financial and material support in return for their loyalty (Hodder 1992: 35). This is the way to encourage and promote individuals' social mobility, including success in politics. As Yang claims (1978: 72), the family '[gives] Chinese society its peculiar character and strength both as a basic component of society and as that which determined the quality and power of the social structure of which it was a part.'

**Individualism vs Familism**

Studies show that Australia is a highly individualistic society, and Australians are one of the most individualistic people in the world, only second to Americans (Hofstede 1980; Hofstede and Bond 1988; Benjamin 1988). Individualism permeates attitudes towards every aspect of life. Australians see individual liberty as the source of equality, and appraise individual decisions, initiative and achievements as leadership ideals (Galvin and West 1988: 105).

The strong sense of individualism has created a social environment in which individuals are independent and rational. They are seen as the producers of their own needs and choices, and as the best judges of their own interests. Political representation is thus regarded as representation of individual interests (Lukes 1973: 79). Egalitarianism reflects this individualistic commitment, and it is expressed in the role of the state which is to ensure that all have a 'fair go'.

This ideological commitment affects gender inequality and women's presence in politics in many ways. First, individualism has punctured the ingrained prerogatives of males in organisations, in particular in political organisations. With the progressive modernisation of politics, women are treated as individuals and evaluated by their merit and achievement. Second, the ideology of individualism helps women free themselves from the confinement of the patriarchal family. Goode (1970) links individualism with the increasing activation of women in the labour market. Paid employment and economic independence, in turn, make it possible to
weaken the traditional — and subordinate — gender roles and the sexual division of labour. As Goode (1970: 56) writes:

the gradual, logical, philosophical extension to women of originally Protestant notions about the rights and responsibilities of the individual undermined the traditional idea of 'women's proper place.'

Familism has a strong root in Chinese history and social structure (Weber 1951; Levy 1952). It affects social change in contemporary Taiwan. The family may change in forms or functions, but scarcely in its overall importance and structure. Many traditional Chinese familial values and attitudes have been retained in contemporary Taiwanese society, and they are still extremely strong during the modernisation process (Freedman et al 1978; Thornton and Lin 1994). The key characteristics of the Chinese family include the follows:

- The family network eradicates the spatial distance between rural and urban, domestic and foreign (Greenhalgh 1984: 529). The separate nuclear family still keeps interdependent relationships with their original extended families, though nuclear families are widespread and extended families fall into a decline. Social networks centred on the family are important in exerting political influence and in accumulating political resources in Taiwan.

- The family is a crucial resource provider for its members. Married siblings not only maintain close economic and affective relations with each other and with their original family, even if they are scattered geographically, but also think of themselves as members of the family, even after the family has been divided.

- The government is seen as the super-family. The qualities of righteousness, harmony and order are identified closely with familial relationships. Thus the whole society is framed by these relationships. The emphasis on belonging is very strong (Ketcham 1987, Redding 1990).

These features highlight the role of the family in women's political recruitment. The wide familial networks can be mobilised in politics and the familial resources are available in elections. The infusion of morality of the family into the state can be particularly advantageous to women in political campaigns because the image of 'a good woman'
can be utilised effectively. The family is a vital unit of political
ascentancy and survival in Taiwan (Winckler 1987: 176).

However, many studies (eg. Diamond 1979; Greenhalgh 1985;
Metraux 1991; Cheng and Hsiung 1992; Salaff 1992) also confirm that
Taiwanese women suffer from patriarchal domination inherent in
Confucian familism. Women sacrifice themselves for the family's
happiness, suffer from the gender inequality, especially men's priority
in getting education, and are financially exploited by their parents and
husbands. The family becomes women's 'iron cage', and makes
women's political success the outcome of family favours.

Such views may exaggerate the inferior status of women in the
modern Chinese family. They tend to overlook the interactive
relationship between women and men in the family, and ignore the
changing relationship between women and other family members.
The improvement of women's social and economic status, and in
particular their success in education and politics are to some extent at
least, founded on familial relations. Women's access to higher
education is the precondition of this success. In the past, women left
school early and worked to support their brothers' education if the
family was poor (Chiang and Ku 1985). Yet, as long as the family could
afford educational expenses, women would get access to education.
That is, men benefit from family affluence first, and women later.
When the transformation of economy brings increasing family
affluence, the gender gap in access to education is narrowing. Many
women politicians who were born in the 1910s and 1920s, and elected
in the late 1960s, held university degrees before entering parliament. Some of them were even educated overseas. All of them, needless to
say, were from well off families.

The reduction in family size, economic growth, and the relatively
equal distribution of family income in modern Taiwan all have
contributed to women's improved access to education, in particular to
higher education. This is confirmed by a narrowing gender gap in
education. The younger the age group, the smaller the differential
between the sexes in education (see Table 3.2). Brothers and sons no
longer monopolise the access to education at the expense of their
sisters and daughters. In many cases, the family becomes women's
'springboard' to politics, rather than their 'iron cage'.
Table 3.2 The Average Length of Education by Gender, Taiwan, 1993 (years)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Group</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>25-29</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-34</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-39</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-44</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-49</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-54</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55-59</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60-64</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65+</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Many consequences of modernisation, including universal education, women's paid employment, the women's movement, and demographic change have helped in weakening traditional gender bias in the family. The declining fertility means that increasing number of couples have fewer than two children. Fewer siblings and growing affluence help women to gain access to education. The wide family networks and the closer relationship between women and their natal families, provide an effective support system. Both are crucial to women's success in education and politics.

Individualism and modernisation cut the links between the family and politics, promote the notion of autonomy, and are conducive to the functioning of the liberal democracy. The modern liberal democracy is characterised by the shift from a system based on the influence of kinship and connected with local communities to a system that encourages 'the monopolisation and regulation of 'legitimate' coercive power by one universalist coercive institution' (Weber 1978: 337). Depersonalisation of administrative management

---

1 The total fertility rate rapidly dropped decade by decade. It was 6.7 in the 1950s, 4.6 in the 60s, 3.1 in the 70s, 2.0 in the 80s, and 1.7 in the early 90s. Average persons of per household reduced from 5.6 in 1964 to 3.8 in 1993. See Directorate-general of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive yuan, ROC (1994), Social Indicators in Taiwan Area of the Republic of China 1993, and Greenhalgh, S. (1984), Networks and their Nodes: Urban Society on Taiwan, China Quarterly, 99: 529-52.
by bureaucracy and rationalisation of law complete the divorce of the private and the public spheres. Within bureaucratic organisations, individuals obey the law which is generally and clearly defined rather than the person who implements it. When confronting the law, individuals are legal equals. They need not establish a relation with a given person. An individual — a man or a woman — can autonomously decide about involvement in politics without relying on status or family connection. Access to the top depends on merit judged through performance in organisations.

The modernisation of politics also poses obstacles for women, although these obstacles are less and less likely to be legal ones. The rationalisation of production and administration, and in the legal system in modern societies leads to the professionalisation of politics, that is, the rise of the professional politician who lives 'for' and 'off' politics (Weber 1948: 77-128). For him, politics is a vocation and a way of life. The professionalisation of politics shapes the path and the method of entrance into the political hierarchy which is an organisation, demanding 'training in the struggle for power, and in the methods of this struggle as developed by modern party policies' (Weber 1948: 90). Political elevation relies on appropriate political and occupational skills and experience at each level in the process of political 'climbing'. Every political advancement won by women, it must be stressed, is at the expense of male competitors. In order to be successful, women have to start early enough. Yet, as mentioned in Chapter One, this early start reflects the style of men rather than women.

The split of the family and politics means that success in politics begins and ends 'with mobilisation of resources, achieving maximum impacts, calculating prudentially, articulating interest group claims, engaging in reward distribution functions' (Elshtain 1981: 246). It poses some problems for women entering political competition. Modernisation produces status disadvantage for women in organisations. If they are not equally resourced, women cannot compete with men on an equal footing. This resourcing includes access to these characteristics that are vital for recruitment and promotion in organisations: education, experience and administrative skills. For example, the modern bureaucratic organisations have established
conditions of recruitment, selection and promotion. Access to decision-making positions is determined by rules and conventions. A political aspirant is set for a career within the hierarchical order of bureaucracy. Thus, the disadvantage women face in political competition is an outcome of the combination of institutional changes and societal location.

These problems present differently in Taiwan because of the stronger fusion between the family and politics. An individual's position in organisations is closely linked with the honour of his/her family. Social mobility of individuals is an honourable symbol of the family's status. Individuals can extract resources from the family networks to compete in organisations. In this context, a woman is not only an individual, but also a member of a family group, with her own supportive networks. She participates in politics by mobilising family resources. Paradoxically, this may help in reducing gender bias in organisations in the sense of reducing gender disparity in resourcing.

In Australia, the individual's prestige and rewards are attached to their achievements in organisations, and are dependent principally on the labour market position rather than the position in the family. Women's familial roles thus, are ignored in the public sphere, including politics. The family performs biological functions such as reproduction, some social reproductive ones, such as child-rearing, caring, and some psychological functions. As Susan Bastick, the NSW Secretary of the Australian Family Association, asks:

Do we recognise unpaid work as work which has a parity of value— and equal dignity with paid work— or have we still got some sort of the hierarchy of work which places unpaid work as lesser work that has to be fitted around the demands of 'real' paid work? Do we still think of paid workers as greater contributors to our society than unpaid workers and think of needing to minimise unpaid work so that we can all spend more time participating in real paid work? (quoted from House of Representatives Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs 1992: 40-41)

The devaluation of the familial roles derives from the formally 'non-productive' status of the family. One can argue that public recognition of unpaid domestic work would not alter the devaluation of familial roles. The family has been losing its economic functions since the
separation of the family and the workplace, and this trend has been inherent in modernisation. Under the climate of 'modern economy', production and paid work become the major measures of contribution by individuals to society and the major sources of social status. As one Australian woman points out,

I was recently quoted $600 per week to get a live in nanny. It seems ludicrous that my work in the home has no worth, but it costs $600 to replace it. (Ibid pp. 40-41)

The value and the importance of familial roles and home duties are publicly recognised in Taiwan. Confucian tradition connects the private and the public spheres with a step by step logic relation: one should cultivate the moral principles necessary for organising one's own life, then managing one's family, then governing one's country, and then maintaining peace in the world. In this order, familial roles are highly valued by society and successful performance in familial roles is as important as organisational achievement. In this respect, the contrast between Australia and Taiwan is quite striking. Taiwanese women can use their familial roles and familial achievements as political resources. This means not only mobilising family resources of money, support and influence, but also using family roles of mothers and wives as bases for status claims. While using the social prestige gained in the family, women can mobilise other resources available from family networks.

It may also be argued that the Australian family is a less autonomous social unit than the family in Taiwan, because it relies heavily on the state. This is particularly evident in the nature and scope of welfare provisions. Women may get some welfare provision from the state, and the state takes some domestic responsibilities, such as child care. When modern state transforms its role from a night watchman into an interventionist welfare state, the traditional boundary between the private and the public spheres is blurred. One symptom of this blurring is evident in state interventions becoming essential for women who want to conquer traditional obstacles to social and economic equality (Nevitte and Gibbins 1990: 75). Women become dependent on the resources and welfare provision of the state in their occupational political careers.
By contrast, the typical Chinese family in Taiwan is relatively autonomous. Because the family forms a complex network, some positions are interchangeable. For example, women's domestic responsibilities may be absorbed by her family networks (rather than the state) if her other duties—eg, public functions—are regarded as important for family welfare. Such 'familial welfare provisions' are crucial to aspiring women politicians in electoral campaigns.

These differences between Australia and Taiwan in the centrality and autonomy of the family are reflected in political recruitment. Individualism makes it easy to release women from traditional restrictions and creates more equal opportunities for Australian women. However, this equalisation does not extent to political resourcing and it creates an environment of 'dependency' whereby access to political resources is increasingly controlled by bureaucratic political organisations. In Confucian Taiwan, familism hinders women's political opportunities, but paradoxically, it may help women in mobilising a broad range of gender-specific political resources which are relatively independent of the political organisations and the state.

**Apprenticeship and Performance vs. Educational Credentialism**

The single most significant feature of political elite recruitment is a high level of formal education (Putnam 1976: 27). While Australian elite studies (Higley et al. 1979; Rydon 1986) stress this feature, there is also a historical legacy of anti-intellectualism. This legacy derives 'at least in part from an ethical and intellectual scepticism that is anti-utopian' (Pusey 1993: 32). The very expression of anti-intellectual legacy is the emphasis of the political apprenticeship as the most legitimate mode of political recruitment.

High education does not lead to fast elevation in Australian politics. Ministerial positions, for example, are usually gained after lengthy political apprenticeship that starts outside parliament and leads through backbench positions. Before becoming a backbencher, a political aspirant typically serves in his/her political party in election campaigns. He/she may be as a party official for a period, or contest an unwinnable or marginal seat to build his/her reputation for hard work and reliability (Aitkin, Jinks, and Warhurst 1989: 109). This is the time to demonstrate the 'political potential'. The aspirants' performance
during the apprenticeship determines their elevation in the party and parliamentary hierarchies. Australian women politicians frequently point to this 'long climb' feature of political careers.

I was far too low on my party's ticket to be elected then, but a few months after I had served my apprenticeship as a Legislative Council candidate, I sought and won preselection as a candidate on the Liberal Movement's Senate ticket for the 1975 double dissolution. (Haines 1992: 139)

The timing of my entry into Parliament in 1970 was preceded for me by three years service as State President of the Women's Section of the Liberal Party of Victoria (...) My real political entry started at the time that I accepted that responsibility within the Party and used that opportunity to be part of the Party structure in the national and State spheres(...) I think it was probably as good an apprenticeship as you could have. (Guilfoyle 1995: 21)

Needless to say, such a long-climb career can disadvantage women who temporarily opt out to have children or to perform family duties. In politics, like in any other bureaucratised institution, continuity and full-time involvement tend to be essential for success. 'Political apprenticeship' seems to be 'designed' for men's life style rather than women's. Women's success in politics depends on time they spend in their party/union work, and on positions they achieve in their parties/unions. Women's efforts are evaluated by their length of service and organisational performance. It is forgotten that women still have to cope with more domestic chores than men. Women's duties, such as caring for the family and child-bearing, make it difficult to have a continuous and full-time political apprenticeship and career. This affects the evaluation of women's political performance and hinders their promotion in political organisations.

The political arena is less bureaucratised and more moralised in Confucian Taiwan. According to Confucian teaching, good government relies on good persons who should be selected on the basis of their 'good character' (see Bahm 1992: 91). Politicians are expected to be 'wise' and serve as moral models for the people. 'The rule of virtue can be compared to the Polar Star which commands the homage of the multitude of stars without leaving its place' (Confucius, translated by Lau 1979: 63). As one of my respondents (D) said, 'the personal image and morality, free of visible shortcomings and sexual
scandals, as well as 'clean' family background, are critical to my nomination.' Morality and 'good character' are seen as reflected mainly in caring for one's family. As the Analects put it, albeit in somewhat sexist terms, 'Simply by being a good son and friendly to his brothers a man can exert an influence upon government. In so doing a man is, in fact, taking part in government' (Confucius, translated by Lau 1979: 66). One may argue that this principle has been effectively extended to women, especially with the end of Imperial China and the modernisation of Taiwanese politics. Women have an increasing say in politics, and the teachings of 'imperial Confucianism' have been re-interpreted in the context of modern Chinese society. 'A good son' can be viewed as 'a good child', and 'his brothers' as 'his/her siblings'.

Confucianism links politics, morality and education with the family. Education becomes the best propellant of upward social mobility, the main status basis, a key family asset and a key criterion of access to politics in Taiwan (Yang 1978). It is seen as both an individual and a family accomplishment. Without providing education to its members, the family never obtains the opportunities to improve its social status.

The Confucian legacy has also some equalitarian elements. It stresses that education should be universal and available to all people, not just the upper strata. According to the Confucian ideology, all people should be able to enter politics via education. This makes class division blurred. According to Gold (1991a: 8),

Taiwan's proletarians in large part do not see themselves as lifetime industrial workers, but as petty capitalists accumulating capital, knowhow and contacts as part of a (usually family-based) strategy for upward mobility. This inhibits their formation of a sense of themselves as a class.

Although this egalitarianism had not been explicitly extended to gender, it nevertheless had crucial impact on women's access to politics in the process of modernisation. To some extent, modernisation contributes to women's access to education which is a vital political asset in Taiwan. Taiwanese women are in a good position to mobilise the argument about fairness and claim political position on the basis of familial roles, and 'good character'. They can use 'morality' and education as the key political credentials. Both are
nowadays as easily accessible for women as they are for men. Women can transfer their educational attainment into political capital. Thus, for example, two of my respondents reported that they emphasised their 'PhD' in political campaigns. High education helped them in the pre-selection within political parties and served the similar function as political apprenticeship in Australia. It implied intellectual shells, gave high prestige and indicated high political potential.

The point can be summarised as follows: it is easier for women today to gain university degrees than it is to negotiate bureaucratic 'long climb' apprenticeships. Those recruitment systems which rely on educational achievements and prestige are more open for women competitors than those which make a long organisational apprenticeship, the key condition of political elevation. Similarly, the emphasis on 'morality' and 'good character' (often identified in terms of successful performance of familial — rather than organisational — roles, minimises some important gender disadvantages suffered by women in political competition.

It is not necessary for Taiwanese women politicians to complete long organisational apprenticeships before obtaining political elevation. By contrast, Australian women rely heavily on such apprenticeships or on the affirmative action-type fast-trading. They cannot use other credentials, such as education, to signal their achievements and capacity and cannot employ their familial roles as assets in political claims. Ironically, Australian women are better educated now, but their education is unlikely to be shifted from an individual asset to a political capital. They still have to pass the 'training period' — and this remains a significant source of disadvantage.

*Rights vs. Duties*

These differences in political credentials and modes of political recruitment in both countries reflect the cultural differences discussed above. In Australia, the opportunities and access to politics are widely open for women. Women's rights to compete for political posts are protected by the concepts of individualism and egalitarianism, and are formally supported by the state. As Hancock (1961: 55, quoted from Head 1989: 287) points out, 'To the Australian, the State means
collective power at the service of individualistic 'rights'. Therefore he/she sees no opposition between his/her individualism and his/her reliance upon Government.'

The ideology and the practices in Taiwanese society are quite different. Duties still outweigh rights, either the family duties to the state, and/or the individual to the family. The family relies on duties and obligations being respected, especially between generations. Women's duties to the family constitute a heavy and uneven burden, at the first glance. Taiwanese women, however, are able to transform these duties and burdens into social values and political assets by mobilising support from the family and revoking familial roles (Lee 1990). This was stressed by two of my respondents:

During the political campaign, first of all, I emphasise that I do not have to worry about domestic responsibilities, because my mother-in-law looks after my family. My husband has a stable good job, and my children are in school. Second, I talk about my political ideas (E)

For me the family is a springboard rather than a barrier. I chose to look after my family first, and pursue my career second. (I)

Further, the family may encourage women to run for political office, because successful politicians can benefit their families (Fang 1982). Women candidates and their families built a reciprocal relationship. Women politicians extend and consolidate the political influence of families and boost their social status. The family has the obligation to support them in political campaigns, both materially and non-materially. Domestic responsibilities are automatically shared within the family and financial and overall support are widely available.

An important qualification must be added here. Males are still regarded as the best political candidates, and the most effective carriers of familial responsibilities. However, this gender preference has been weakening with the demographic change, increasing education of women, and the increasing importance of female-linked family networks (see pp. 97-8). Many families face the situation that they do not have male scions available for political sponsorship, that their male scions are not good enough to compete for political office, or that their male scions are not ready to run for political office. Instead, they have a growing pool of highly educated, able and ambitious, daughters
and daughters-in-law. This 'supply' increases with the increasing education profiles and accompanies an increasing demand for women politicians.

The source of this demand, it must be stressed, is located both in the traditional notion of balance — Confucian beliefs in women's familial virtues balancing those of males — as well as in the distinctly modern orientation towards gender egalitarianism that spreads in the younger generation.

**Women's Opportunities and Resources**

The key principle of democracy is that any eligible person can become a candidate in an election. However, those who become members of parliament are very few, and they are disproportionately extracted from the higher strata of society. For example, federal parliamentarians in Australia are overwhelmingly middle class, male, Australia born, and more likely to hold a university degree than voters. A similar disproportion can be found in Taiwan and indeed in most advanced societies (Higley 1979; Pakulski 1982; Peng 1986; Verba et al. 1987; McAllister 1992; Lovell et al. 1995).

While some of these disproportions, especially those due to class differences, have been widely studied and well understood, gender inequality in political recruitment is more puzzling. It is argued here different patterns of women's under-representation in political elites reflect different combinations of political opportunities and resources. These two concepts are used here in a way analogous to social movement theories of 'opportunity structure and resource mobilisation (eg. Tarrow 1994; McCarthy and Zald 1977). The former identifies facilitative conditions that increase the likelihood of movement mobilisation. The latter focuses on those characteristics of social actors that increase their power capacities. Here we use the opportunity and resource concepts in the context of an elite recruitment model developed by Putnam (1976). In this context, political opportunities refer to the overall position of women in society or, more specifically, women's access to the aspects of social status which are relevant for political recruitment. In other words, political opportunities concern women's access to the pools of eligibles. Political resources are political career propellants. They include those
characteristics that help political aspirants in competing effectively for top political offices and in prompting their elevation to elite positions. Gender political opportunities form a structure in the sense of being inter-related and relatively stable. They are reflected in the overall position of women in the social structure and, indirectly, elite recruitment. Barriers encountered by women seeking access to politics reflect their broader societal location in the status-granting systems, including, above all, the economic, educational, and institutional systems. More specifically, political opportunities of women are comprised of their participation in the labour market, their position in the social-cultural sphere (norms and gender roles), their access to higher education, their presence in political organisations, and women's citizen rights movement.

Political resources are career propellants. They empower political aspirants in political competition. They include financial support, political influence, loyalty and support, campaign staff, and media exposure. Differential access to political resources helps explain women's success and failure in political contests for the top positions of power. Australian women have higher political opportunities than their Taiwanese counterparts, but their access to political resources — which happen to be heavily concentrated in political organisations — seems to be more limited than in Taiwan.

**Political Opportunities**

Indicators of political opportunities of women in political organisations include a proportion of women as total party/trade union membership, as well as their share in decision-making positions, such as presidents of party branches, members of executive committees, and so on. We will examine these indicators in Australia and Taiwan.

Women's availability for political elites is also linked with their access to gainful employment. This is important because such employment carries status and forms springboard for political careers. Like male politicians, most women politicians are recruited from the top of the occupational hierarchy and from professional positions, especially 'political springboard' professional occupations, such as law, teaching and journalism. Thus women's presence in managerial,
administrative and professional positions, and especially their presence in 'political springboard' professional occupations, are viewed as key indicators of their political opportunities.

The constraints of social cultural norms and gender roles are seen as one of the main factors determining the availability of women politicians (eg. Lee 1976; Bers 1978; Phillips 1980; Wolchik 1981; Lovenduski 1986). Norms making women primary carers for pre-school children and domestic chores are a part of broader social cultural norms and social arrangements of gender roles. They are reflected not only in labour force participation rates, but also in gender division of domestic labour and the images of women's familial roles.

The most typical occupational backgrounds of politicians are lawyers, teachers, administrators, managers, and other professions. Most have higher education degrees. People with these attributes are seen as most appropriate by both elite selectors and mass electors. It is particularly true for women. Their positions in political organisations, their share in some 'politically advantageous' occupations, and their portion in higher education are important indicators to measure their political opportunities. The social-cultural mechanism — the social expectation on gender roles and the sexual division of labour within the family and society — is another key factor in helping their access to political opportunities. This factor is specially significant for women when politics is traditionally seen as 'men's playground'.

1. Political Organisations:

Women in Political Parties and Trade Unions

'Australian politics is the politics of parties, not of class' (Aitkin 1977: 142). Most political elite members are affiliated with political parties or supported by trade unions and pressure groups. Political organisations are the key sponsors of political careers, and therefore women's presence in their ranks is an important indicator of women's political opportunities, especially in Australia. Political parties are also the main players and sponsors in Taiwan politics. The KMT effectively controls politics and trade unions. However, in both countries the party's control over political recruitment is far from complete and may well be weakening as indicated by the growing number of successful independents.
There are four major national political parties in Australia: the Australian Labor Party (ALP), the Liberal Party of Australia (LP), the National Party of Australia (NP), and the Australian Democrats (ADs). The Greens are also important in the Senate. The majority of candidates for the federal parliament are endorsed by these parties. Parties groom and select politicians, and control the key political resources, including electoral funds, political exposure and networks of influence.

The proportion of women among the party rank-and-file are not available. There are, nevertheless, some secondary data which can be used to estimate to what extent women have access to parties and are involved in party politics. These data show that women's access to parties at the local level is, generally, low. The rank-and-file members are predominantly male. This is less the case with political parties in Australia than it is in Taiwan, and less the case now than 20-30 years ago.

During the past three decades women's representation has increased to about half of the Australian Liberal Party. The ALP seems to be more 'a man's party'. Only 25% of its membership were women in 1978, and 30% in 1981. After an intense recruitment drive and affirmative action campaigning, women's membership increased to a high of 46% in Victoria and a low of 32% in Queensland in 1986 (Simms 1981; Sawer and Simms 1993). Taking major parties in Victoria as examples, White (1981: 34-35) pointed out that women were increasingly active at the membership level in all parties. They comprised more than half of membership in the ADs; about 50% in the LP; about one third in the ALP and the NP in the late 1970s. The NP remains most masculine in its membership.

Historically, the major non-Labour parties have attracted the greatest number of women (Irving 1974/75). The success of the LP in coopting the Australian Women's National League (AWNL) in 1945, the largest women's non-Labour organisation, can be seen as an example. In South Australia, for instance, urban branches of the LP have normally included more women than men members (Western 1983: 188). The lower number of women members in the ALP may have been caused by its close relationship with 'masculine' trade unions. Since 1986 the 60:40 rule has been used in selecting
representatives to all ALP state conferences: 60% of representatives from affiliated unions and 40% from local branches. As Susan Ryan has said (cited from Sawer and Simms 1993: 179):

one of the major obstacles to gaining women's support for the Labor Party has been its traditional structure: machines, steering committees, complicated trade union connections. These antiquated, unrepresentative, male-dominated hierarchies with their mysterious and indirect ways of getting the numbers for pre-selections and the election of Party officers deter many women who are otherwise attracted to Labor policies. The absence of such structures is part of the explanation for the participation of women in large numbers in newly formed parties, such as the Australia Party and the Australian Democrats.

The latest data (see Table 3.3) show that in most states and territories women's membership in major parties is increasing. In the ALP women comprise now 41% of members.

Table 3.3 Female Membership in Major Political Parties, Australia (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LP ALP</td>
<td>CLP ALP</td>
<td>ADs ALP</td>
<td>ALP</td>
<td>ALP</td>
<td>ALP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44 38</td>
<td>37 45</td>
<td>52 40</td>
<td>c.50</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Asia Pacific Women's Studies Journal No. 2, 1992; Sawer and Simms 1993: 179.

Women's membership in trade unions was traditionally low. Australian unions were resistant to women, and treated them as subordinate to men. Until the 1970s, it was accepted that women received about two thirds of the male wage. Also women paid lower membership dues than men (White 1984; Wieneke 1992). Encel et al. (1974: 276-7) found that in 14 federal and state unions with a total membership of 260,000, only 110,000 were women in 1968. The increase of women membership in trade unions was one of major changes during the past two decades. White (1984) observed that the portion of female membership increased from 36% in 1970 to 48% in 1980. Griffin and Benson (1989) found that from 1970 to 1986 the number of women
unionists rose by 88%, compared with 21% rise for men. This amounted to the increase of 871,600 union members during this period, 57% of whom were women.

The latest data (ABS 1995c: 132) reveal that women account for 40% of all union members around Australia. It is noteworthy that among permanent women employees, women managers and administrators, and women professionals there is higher proportion of union membership than among men in these occupations (25.8% to 19.3% and 52.1% to 36.5%, respectively) (ABS 1995c: 107). Australian women's participation in trade unions is thus increasing, similarly to their participation in political parties.

In Taiwan the KMT was the major party from 1949 to 1987. While there were other two political parties, the Young China Party established in 1923, and the China Democratic Socialist Party, established in 1932, both were relatively weak, received subsidies from the KMT, and indeed played the token role. The DPP became a major party in 1986, though it was not technically legal until 1987.

The total membership of the KMT increased from 1,934,011 in 1980 to 2,620,179 in 1994. However, even at the rank-and-file level, women's participation was low. They comprised only one fifth of total members in 1980 and one-quarter in 1994 (see Table 3.4). The DPP's membership has been relatively small; it increased from 1,285 in 1986 to 24,546 in 1991 (Huang 1992: 53). Although the data on gender comparison are not available, it is believed that the percentage of women members is well below that in Australia.

Women's access to decision-making positions within political organisations is a better indicator of opportunities than membership. The majority of political elites are normally recruited from active and senior members in these organisations. Our data show that the increase in women's membership in political organisations has not translated into their elevation to senior decision-making positions. Their overall presence in political parties is much higher than their representation in the executive bodies and the national parliament.
Table 3.4 Membership in the KMT by Gender

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Male (%)</th>
<th>Female (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: KMT documents.

Personal communication with the KMT staff

This is true for both Australia and Taiwan. However, Australian women have better representation in heading party decision-making positions than their counterparts in Taiwan. During the last two decades, the ALP and the LP have promoted more and more women into various decision-making positions. This can be seen in the increasing portion of women delegates to national conferences, and the growing number of women heads of branches/divisions at the state/territory and national levels. Thus while in 1979 only two out of 49 delegates to the National Conference of the ALP were women, approximately 11% of all State Conference delegates were women.

Women's under-representation in the ALP decision-making positions might be caused by their low representation in the trade unions. A study of Annual Conference of the ALP in NSW, for example, showed that only 10-15% of 825 delegates were women. Of all delegates, trade unionists held 60%, but women account for one-third branch delegates. Among the branch delegates, 8 positions were
reserved for members elected by the NSW Labour Women’s Committee (Simms 1981a: 87). In 1994, 8 out of 32 national and state/territory presidents among four major political parties were women (ABS 1995c: 129).

Table 3.5 Women Office Holders within the ALP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>% of Women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACT</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New South Wales</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Territory</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Queensland</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Australia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tasmania</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victoria</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Australia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Women in Politics and Public Life, Asia Pacific Women’s Studies Journal No. 2, 1992.

Women benefited from the affirmative action within the ALP. The proportions of women office holders within the ALP state branches have been increasing since 1990 (see Table 3.5). In Victoria, for example, one third of all positions in policy committees are automatically filled by women. Typically, women’s representation is higher than this minimum ratio. Two-thirds of all elected positions are currently occupied by women at the branch level, and half of all Branch Secretaries are women. Women’s presence in the National Conference is important, because the ALP demands that its parliamentary representatives are also its delegates (Jaensch 1991: 136). At the National Conference in 1991, women made up 32 of the 101 individuals with voting rights (delegates, proxy delegates and party leaders). At the same time, women occupied 6 of the 32 places on the National Executive of the party (Commonwealth of Australia 1992).

While the quota, goal or any type of affirmative action is still a bête noire to the Liberals (Simms 1994a), women’s representation within the party decision-making positions is not lower than that in the ALP. In the 1970s, only the Victorian division of the LP had a
constitutional requirement that a half of its executive members must be women. This was the result of the incorporation of the AWNL into its Victorian division. Liberal women were guaranteed equal representation in the Administrative Committee, the Policy Assembly, preselection conventions and electorate committees in Victoria. Also state offices of metropolitan and rural vice-presidents holders included equal numbers of men and women.

In other states Liberal women were not so lucky as their sisters in Victoria. They constituted 33% of members of the State Council in South Australia, and held 20-33% of elected positions in the Party Executive in the CLP in the Northern Territory. At the Federal level, the LP has an eleven member Federal Women's Committee, 82% of which were women. Women filled 4 of the 32 positions on the Federal Executive in the 1970s and 80s (Encel et al. 1974; Commonwealth of Australia 1992; Sawer and Simms 1993).

The NP in NSW also adopted some strategies to increase women's representation in decision-making positions. During its 1976 Annual General Conference it was resolved that the existing 14 electorate councils, each of which had two representatives on the central council, should all include at least one woman representative. At the party's 1977 Annual General Conference women comprised 40% of delegates (White 1981). The NP elected its first woman federal president, Shirley McKerrow in 1981. She held the position until 1987.

The ADs are seen as the most women-friendly of Australian political parties. They use the rank-and-file ballot to elect party leaders and party position holders (Sawer and Simms 1993). In Victoria, women constitute half of the state executive (White 1981). Recently three of the ADs leaders are women; they are Janine Haines (1986-90), Janet Powell (1990-91) and Cheryl Kernot (1993-). The ex-leader, Senator Janet Powell, claims (Powell 1990: 53):

Old boys' networks, built up over generations, can be almost unassailable. Simply because the Democrats did not exist before 1977, we carry none of that 'baggage'. I have to be frank and admit that there were, at one point, a few men who had brought some of that baggage' with them and who thought they could impose the 'old' ways on our party. If there are any of them left in our party— and some chose to leave with great sound and fury— they
have to be faded quietly into the background and have no impact on our day-to-day operation.

There is little available data on women's presence in decision-making positions in trade unions. The Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) does not gather this kind of data, but has estimated that about 10% of decision-making positions are held by women. The Council promises to implement affirmative action and makes 3 seats reserved for women on its 38 member Council. At present women comprise 11% of senior position holders in South Australia, and 23% in Victoria. Also the Victorian Trades Hall Council adopts affirmative action to create 3 extra positions reserved for women, raising women's representation on the executive from 14% to 25% (Commonwealth of Australia 1992).

Women's representation in decision-making positions of trade unions has been improving in recent years. Jennie George has been elected as the first woman president. Women comprise one quarter of the ACTU executive and two thirds of the council in 1995. Of all affiliated unions, 16% of the national or general presidents and secretaries are women. Women in professional unions are also more likely to hold leadership positions. However, there are no women executives in unions of tradespersons and labourers and related workers (ABS 1995c: 132).

In the Report of Human Rights Indicators 1993 of Taiwan Area, two items of women's rights were directly related to women's representation in political parties. One was that 'There is no discrimination against women when political parties nominate candidates.' The score of this item was 1.892. The other was that 'Women enjoy the equal opportunities in participating in political activities and heading decision-making positions within political parties.' The score on this item was 1.94. These low scores reflected women's low representation in important positions both within the KMT and the DPP.

This at least partly reflects the organisational structure and the process of decision-making in the KMT, both of which are highly centralised. However, at the grassroots level, the gender balance is

2 The score is from 1 to 5. 1 means the worst, and 5 the best.
better. Party members are organised in cells of about 3 to 29 members. It has district, county/city, provincial/special municipal congresses and committees, and finally the National Congress and the Central Committee (CC). Major vocational groups, such as journalists, farmers, seamen, and overseas Chinese communities, various labour groups, and women have their own branches.

In accordance with the conclusion of the 7th second Central Committee Conference of the KMT on 7 October, 1953, the Women's Department was established in order to incorporate women into the political process and to promote women's welfare policies. The structure of the Women's Department was hierarchical ranging from the centre (the state), province, hsien (county) to town. Membership was widespread throughout Taiwan. The organisational activities of the Department included ideological persuasion and community services. The Department was also linked with various women's groups. Its work was useful for the KMT mobilising voters' support. For example, in the 1986 General Election, all of the KMT women candidates were elected (Chou and Chiang 1989).

The Women's Department was linked with the other six Departments in the KMT. For decades the heads of Department held seats in the National Assembly. Apart from carrying out the Party's policies, it also delivered services, such as protecting step-daughters, assisting prostitutes, advocating family issues, improving the standard of living in rural areas, contacting women's groups domestic and overseas, and assuring the employment right of married women (Chien 1988: 21-22). However, its ideals reflected conservative and patriarchal vision and failed to encourage more women into politics.

The Central Standing Committee (CSC) that represents the CC when it is out of session is the most influential organ within the KMT. Members of the CSC meet once a week to deliberate and approve important policies for the government, and to nominate people for important government and party positions. The Secretary-General is

---

3 The National Congress convenes every four years or more. It amends the constitution or charter of the party, decides on the platform and other important resolutions, elect the members of the Central Committee and the party chairman as well as approve members of the Central Advisory Council nominated by the chairman. During recess, the supreme party organ is the Central Committee which holds a plenary session every year.
also a powerful position within the party. There are 7 Departments, 4 Commissions, 2 parliamentary Coordination, and 1 training institution at the national level. All are heavily male dominated.

The proportion of women in the top decision-making bodies at the national level has been very low. Within 7 Departments and 4 Commissions, only the Women's Department has always been headed by women. No woman has ever been appointed as the Secretary-General, and the first woman deputy Secretary-General was selected only in the early 1990s. Among members of the CC, women's representation has never exceeded 9%. The CSC has had no woman member until 1988 (see Table 3.5). At the grassroots level, the Directors of each county/city and provincial/special municipal branch have been powerful positions. Yet, none of these positions has ever been held by women.

The organisational structure of the DPP closely resembles that of the KMT. The DPP's annual National Congress elects the chairman and 31 members of the Central Executive Committee (CEC) who, in turn, elect the 11 members of the Central Standing Committee (CSC). The chairman appoints the Secretary-General and two deputy Secretaries-General. There are 4 Departments, 7 Committees, 1 Centre, and the Secretariat at the national level. Among them, only the Financial Affairs Committee, Women and Development Committee, Secretariat, and the Department of Foreign Affairs have been headed by women in 1994. Compared with the KMT, the DPP has better gender representation within the CEC and the CSC (see Table 3.6). This may be seen as a result of women's early involvement in political opposition movement in the mid 1970s and 1980s. All women members of the CEC and the CSC are either central figures in the opposition

---

4 The day-to-day affairs of the party are managed by the Central Committee headed by a Secretary-General and three deputy Secretaries-General.

5 7 Departments include: Organisational Affairs, Mainland Affairs, Overseas Affairs, Cultural Affairs, Youth Activities, Social Affairs, and Women's Activities. 4 Commissions include: Finance, Party History, Evaluation and Discipline, and Policy Coordination. The training institution is The Sun Yat-sen Institution on Policy Research and Development.

6 4 Departments are: Organisation, Culture and Information, Foreign Affairs, and Social Movement. 7 Committees are: Financial Affairs, Policy Coordination, Party Negotiation, Election Management, Indigenous Affairs, DPP Development, and Women and Development. The Centre is the Policy Research Centre.
movement or members of political families which have played an important role in local politics and the opposition movement.

Table 3.6 Women's Representation within the KMT's Central Committee and the Central Standing Committee (persons)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Member Total</th>
<th>Woman</th>
<th>Alternate Member Total</th>
<th>Woman</th>
<th>Member Total</th>
<th>Woman</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: KMT document. Personal communication with KMT staff.

Note: * All members were appointed by the chairman. In 1993, 15 were appointed by the chairman, and 16 were elected by the members of the CC.

Table 3.7 Women's Representation within the DPP's Executive Committee and the Central Standing Committee (persons)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Members of the Central Executive Committee Total</th>
<th>Woman</th>
<th>Members of the Central Standing Committee Total</th>
<th>Woman</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. The Occupational Pools:

Women in 'Political Springboard' Occupations

Most politicians start their careers as teachers, lawyers, administrators, managers, and other professions. These occupations form the major eligible pools in recruitment to political elites. The higher the percentage of women in these occupations, the more likely is the presence of women among the top politicians.

During the last two decades, the common trend between Australia and Taiwan has been the increase in the proportion of women in these political springboard occupations (see Table 3.7). However, Australian women have shared higher proportion of administrators, managers and professions than their counterparts in Taiwan. Since 1988, the proportion of women in administrative executive and managerial positions in Australia has dramatically increased, but has dropped in professional positions. In Taiwan, the administrator and manager category includes politicians. This means that when excluding women politicians from this category, the proportion of women administrators and managers will be lower than that in Table 3.8.

Table 3.8 Women as Proportion of Total Administrators/

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Administrative Executives, Managers, and Professionals (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Administrative Executive &amp; Managerial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professionals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: * data for 1994.

7 This may due, at least partly, to the new method of classification.
While a large number of political leaders are recruited from professions, some professions are particularly compatible with politics. Studies of elites (e.g. Encel 1970; Currell 1974; Putnam 1976; Pakulski 1982; Rydon 1986; Darcy et al. 1994) point out that teachers, lawyers, public relation workers, journalists and medical doctors, develop specific skills that are vital to successful politicians. These professions train in symbol manipulation and provide job insurance against possible defeat in elections. By contrast, some occupations like farmer and manual workers, are less likely to enter politics due to low symbolic skills and job security (Randall 1987; Putnam 1976).

Among these professions, law is the biggest supplier of political elites in many countries like Australia, UK, and USA. Weber (1948: 85, 93-94) gives the explanation for this preference for lawyers in political elites. The lawyer is economically 'dispensable', familiar with the law which is the traditional means of statesmanship, and able to 'plead effectively the cause of interested clients.' Other characteristics of lawyers include skills in public debate and contacts with people and community.

Some scholars (e.g. Kirkpatrick 1974; Randall 1987; Darcy et al. 1994) argue that women's under-representation in political elites is due to their under-representation in law. This argument needs to be revised in the light of the recent data on feminisation of law which is seldom reflected in feminisation of politics.

Women are often over-represented among teachers. Large numbers of women political elites in Australia and Taiwan come from this occupational category (see Chapter Four). Thus, women's proportion in professional occupations cannot fully explain limited women's political opportunities. The social-cultural norms and the constraints of gender roles are also important obstacles in women's political careers.

3. The Social-Cultural Norms and Gender Roles
Gender role constraints are regarded as one of the greatest barriers for women pursuing political careers. The labour market participation rate of married women, gender roles, and the domestic division of labour can be used as indicators of political opportunities. This assumes that women's domestic roles are conventionally seen as the barrier to their
social roles, including paid employment and political activities. Female labour force participation rate is usually seen as an important indicator of the changing sexual division of labour and gender discrimination. It is also a good indicator of the political acceptance and activation of women. It is believed that the higher is the female participation rate, especially among married women, the more accessible the political positions for women aspirants.

The married women's labour force participation rate in Australia increased from 41% in 1979 to 53% in 1993. Women's labour force participation rate in Taiwan also grew from 32% in 1979 to 44% in 1993, but this growth was from a much lower basis than in Australia, thus indicating lower political opportunities for women in Taiwan (see Figure 3.1).

Figure 3.1 Female Labour Force Participation Rate by Marital Status

Female average weekly earnings as a proportion of male earnings, also increased in Australia to 84% in 1993. This compared with the Taiwanese proportion of 66% (ABS 1995c: 100; Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan and Council for
Economic Planning and Development, Executive Yuan 1994: 33). In this respect, Taiwanese society illustrates a persisting wide gender gap found in all East Asian societies.

It is also noteworthy that the participation rate among unmarried Taiwanese females has dropped since 1979. This trend reflects a high proportion of young women continuing their education and thus delaying their paid employment (details will be discussed later).

Cheng and Liao's study (1985) of gender roles in Taiwan found that 'traditional familial roles' have still been identified as preferable by employed women in spite of many modern values permeating Taiwanese society. 'Motherhood/wifehood' and 'traditional femininity' have been the cores of women's role identification in Taiwan. The study indicates that:

- 61% of women politicians agree that women's self-image is with subordinate and docile. In order to gain voters' support, women politicians think that it is inappropriate to be presented as anti-traditional or 'quasi-men'.
- Two thirds of respondents agree with the statement that 'Women manage households, and men are breadwinners. It is women's natural vocation to look after husbands and children.'
- 76% of respondents agree with the statement that 'To be a standard modern female, a woman should be a good wife and good mother. To be a good wife and good mother is not out-of-date.'
- 93% of respondents agree, and 56% of them strongly agree with the statement that 'A modern woman should give the priority to her family.'
- More importantly, 79% of women politicians agree with the statement: 'A woman politician can use her femininity and her role as mother in political appeals' 61% of all women respondents agree with this statement. This seems to be

---

8 They used questionnaire and interview methods to survey 540 women in various occupations. The respondents included 92 nursing professionals, 89 school teachers, 29 women legislators at all levels, 45 civil servants, 58 white-collar and blue-collar workers, 43 women managers, 18 civilian organisation workers, 81 women scholars, 57 social workers, and 5 professionals (physicians, writers, journalists, etc.).
consistent with the results above, and implies that the familial roles can be used in political appeals.

- 94% of respondents agree that 'A modern woman should not behave like a man and become 'the second class man'. She can exert her own capacity to be 'the first class woman', and contributes her skills and knowledge to our society.' This statement is seen as a combination of modernity and tradition. The fact that high proportion of women agree with it may mean that social prestige is not derived from paid employment. Less respondents (34%) agree with the statement that 'Paid employment promotes modern women's dignity and rights.'

Lu's studies (1980, 1982) also found that Taiwanese women give priority to their familial roles rather than professional career roles, although the latter is also seen as important. Most women tend to combine their 'traditional' familial roles with 'modern' working roles, and even those with higher education are likely to give the same weight to both family and career roles rather than choose one over the other. However, the emphasis on familial roles has different consequences to women's political opportunities in Taiwan. One is that the successful familial roles are recognised by voters and party selectors, thus becoming a useful political resource. The other is that the combination of familial duties and political activities is difficult because intensive political activities and harmonious family life are usually seen as mutually exclusive, thus limiting women's political careers. One of my respondents, for example, reported:

My husband supports political opposition movement as much as I do. He also shares with me housework and child care, but strongly opposes my involvement in politics, because he thinks this will affect our family life. For example, when I became the director of the Department of Women Development, the DPP, he felt uneasy. He agrees, but hopes that I better serve one term only. (J)

Domestic labour is unevenly divided between sexes in both countries. However, husbands of working wives start to share more housework in Australia, though their contribution is less than their wives (Bryson 1983). Recent Australian studies (Bittman and Lovejoy 1993; Baxter 1993) suggest that urban and dual earner couples share egalitarian
attitudes to domestic division of labour. They also show that men are more involved in child care, cooking, and laundering (Office of the Status of the Women 1991b). Goodnow and Bowes (1994), for example, argue that the gender division of tasks is no longer separating men's and women's work within households. The house work in practice moved away from the conventional distinctions between 'men's work' and 'women's work', not by role-reversals but by simply blurring the usual gender lines, dividing work on the basis of fairness, practically, or likes and dislikes rather than on the basis of one person being male and the other female (1994: 1).

The domestic division of labour in Taiwan is more strictly demarcated by the gender line. It is not surprising to find this arrangement within a Confucian society. Women in such societies have traditionally been responsible for the majority of domestic tasks. The results of the Women's Life Survey conducted by the Taiwan Provincial Government confirm this gender division (Department of Social Affairs 1992). Half of women respondents believe that husbands should help housework, but still one-third maintains that husbands' help should be limited to some areas only. 36% of women respondents say that 'housework is exhausting', but also agree that 'it does not matter because this is my job.' This may be the main reason for the belief that politics affects the family life. Such belief restricts political opportunities of Taiwanese women.

4. Access to Higher Education
Higher education seems to become a prerequisite for successful political career in Australia and Taiwan. Both the basic political recruitment and elite selection occur increasingly from the pools of highly educated eligibles (Putnam 1976; Pakulski 1982). Women's access to higher education is therefore a good indicator of political opportunities.

There has been the same trend in Australia and Taiwan of increasing access by women to higher education. This trend is particularly salient in Australia where the proportion of women in higher education starts to exceed the proportion of men (see Table 3.9).
Table 3.9 Women as Proportion of Higher Education Students (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Australia</th>
<th>Taiwan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>42*</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * including students in colleges of advanced education and universities.

Australian women seem to have benefited from the educational reforms and the active feminist movement by dramatically rising their educational profiles during the period of 1964-1974. By contrast, Taiwanese women experienced an educational reverse in the early 1970s. There seemed to be a concern that the proportion of female students may exceed that of male students in senior colleges and universities in 1971. Some politicians proposed to set the 'male quota' in the annual joint university entrance examination (Lu 1990; Lee 1988). While this proposal was rejected, it nevertheless revealed a deep-rooted traditionalism. With the improvement of family economic resources, women gained a broad access to higher education although their proportion was still lower than men's in 1991.

5. Citizen Rights and the Quota Systems

To vote and to stand for the parliament are seen as an important part of political participation and citizen rights in modern societies. Australian women gained these citizen rights at the beginning of this century and Taiwanese women after the Second World War. These extensions of citizen rights have assured legally equality between sexes in both societies. In an attempt to translate legal equality into social equality, the (in-)formal quota systems have been introduced in Australia and Taiwan. The quota system in Australia has been introduced recently within the ALP, and has been an informal arrangement. By contrast, the reserved-seat system in Taiwan was established in the Constitution initiated in 1947 when the KMT regime controlled the Chinese mainland. It was a very helpful initiative to create women's political opportunities in patriarchal Chinese society at
that time. After four decades, the system is seen as inimical to women's political opportunities. This is discussed in more details in Chapter Four.

**Political Resources**

Political resources can derive from political organisations, local communities, and the family. In Australia, the main resourcing bodies are political organisations, especially political parties and trade unions. Local communities are unlikely to produce and deliver sufficient political resources. As far as the family is concerned, its impact on political careers seems to be limited, although it still plays an important role in providing early exposure, valuable contacts and doubtless, financial resources. Some family members may exert their influence within organisations to help their children. Nevertheless, this practice is rare and regarded as corrupt.

In Taiwan, local communities are powerful and they can effectively support candidates in elections at all levels. Sometimes the extent of their support can decisively affect the results of elections. This power, in turn, often reflects family power. Family can be seen as basic cell of local community. Most of the local factions within local communities are based on family ties. It is therefore particularly important for an aspirant candidate to secure family support. Under such arrangements, the importance of gender is often reduced. Because the KMT deliberately establishes local political factions in local community as its electoral foundation, the distribution of political resources, such as political influence, loyalty and financial support, is in the hands of leaders of local community. For example, one of my respondents reported,

> If you campaign within Taipei City, the importance of the family/local community connections is less. However, outside Taipei City, you will not succeed in elections without these connections. (C)

Therefore, the family/local community system of distribution of political resources is much less gender biased than the organisational

---

9 It was estimated that 1 of every 8 political elite members in mid-1970s owed part of their success to their political family background. See Higley et al. 1979: 74-107.
system of distribution in Taiwan. It is discussed in the section of the local communities as political resource controllers.

1. Resources in Political Organisations

Political organisations, in particular political parties, lies at the centre of the Australian politics. Political parties are also the most evident and visible actors in the Australian political system. One common feature of Australian major parties is their active role in selecting and grooming political leaders. Party members and activists serve an important function in election campaigns. They hand out leaflets or pamphlets or to do fund-raising (Jaensch 1991). In theory, resources such as political expertise, money and campaign staff, are to be distributed in a gender-neutral way. However, as is argued below, this is not necessary the case in practice.

Australian candidates for federal parliament elections could receive public financial support for their campaign, so long as they gain at least 4% of first preference votes. The funding is directly paid to the parties (except for the Independents) in Australia, and to each candidate in Taiwan. However, this financial support is relatively small, and it is paid after elections. For example, funding for per first preference vote for a member of House of Representatives in Australia is $1, and for a Senator 50 cents (Office of the Status of Women 1995: 46). Candidates who cannot find other sponsors or financial sources have little chance of winning in elections.

Political organisations in Taiwan also control important resources, especially the financial resources and media exposure. For example, the KMT is the richest political party in the non-communist world. It has money invested in more than 100 companies ranging from nearly bankrupt firms to enormously profitable financial industries. These businesses supply more than US$450 million which the KMT has recently spent (1994).

With these huge businesses as its backbone, the party budget for the 1994 Provincial election was reported at NT$7 billion (A$350 million). The real spending could go higher (Far Eastern Economic Review, August 11, 1994). Apart from its affluence, the KMT could also

---

10 As long as candidates can get at least 4% of first preference votes (regardless of whether or not they are elected), they can receive public funding for their campaigns for federal, NSW and ACT government elections.
successfully mobilise various voter groups in elections. This will be discussed in Chapter Four.

With the exception of the Dangwai women, the overwhelming majority of women politicians in Taiwan were affiliated with the KMT. For most of these KMT women candidates, the party nomination was the equivalent to success in elections. For example, all women candidates that KMT nominated in the 1986 national election won their seats (Chou and Chiang 1989: 82). This reflected the fact that the KMT still played a hegemonic role in Taiwanese politics until the mid 1980s. However, its monopoly over the whole society was being undermined.

The organisational systems of distribution of political resources are controlled by the party campaign staff, the majority of whom are male. Some women politicians report that male members of the campaign staff consciously or unconsciously ignore the media exposure of women candidates. They think that this may be an institutional (the reserved-seat system) bias since women candidates are often seen as competing with each other rather than with male candidates. This reduces women's share of overall political resources, especially media exposure and financial support. By and large, the organisational resources are unlikely to exceed family/community resources (see further comments on p. 131 and pp.133-134).

2. Local Communities as Political Resource Controllers
'The ideal of local democracy and the existence of strong and active local government itself were never significant in Australia' (Simms 1989: 9). Lack of active local politics, and the dominance of centralised mass political parties in national politics, both diminish the role of local communities in recruiting and resourcing aspiring political elites in Australia.

Unlike their Australian counterparts, the political parties in Taiwan have strong grassroots in local communities. The KMT has built complicated local patron-client networks. Within each county/city, the KMT supports and maintains at least two competing local factions contending for political offices in semi-official organisations, such as Farmers' Associations or Irrigation Associations. The KMT permits these local factions to compete for 'a share of the
region-based economic rents in the non-tradeable goods sector to be distributed by the party-directed local spoils system' (Hu 1993: 138). In this way, the KMT may utilise and manipulate the elections through its local factional clientele.

The existence of political factions in local communities is evident in most electorates (except for Taipei City and Nantou County). Both the KMT and the DPP are influential, and have their own wings in local factions. These factions are integrated by familial, schoolfriendship, geographical, and interest bonds. They supply political resources and define dominant economic interests. The factional conflicts often surface during local political elections (Chi 1985: 102; Chen 1990: 421; Liang 1993: 11; Bosco 1994). According to Liang (1993), very high proportion of Provincial Assemblywomen, both the KMT and the DPP women, relied on the support of local factions. Recently, the percentage is estimated to range from 69% to 90%.

Local communities also include two other types of organisations: Tung Hsung Huei and schooling associations. While they are organised more loosely than local party factions, both are important 'vote stocks' for most candidates. Many interviewees mention seeking support from these associations during political campaigns.

*Tung Hsung Huei* is formed by those who came from the same province, city, county, and so on. Such voluntary associations are often established in urban areas, such as Taipei City, Kaohsiung City, and highly urbanised towns of Taipei county, due to the presence there of a large rural population. Schooling associations are alumni associations. Their functions in elections include mobilising votes for candidates, donating money, and exerting influence through members' personal connections.

These local community-based organisations are by and large gender-neutral. The gender-neutral character, it must be stressed, derives mainly from the predominant emphasis on community interests. Women's political opportunities are low in local community, particularly in rural areas and in some traditional associations (such as *Tung Hsung Huei*), because these organisations tend to be patriarchal and masculine. However, when women are selected as candidates, they represented the interests of these organisations, thus being less affected by gender-biased distribution of
political resources. The local community-based organisations are often key resource-sources for successful women politicians. Factors, such as family connections, shared birth place, and studying location, are used by women to generate political resources.

3. Political Resources and Family Networks

Some studies (Currell 1974; Randall 1987; Chou et al. 1990; Haines 1992; Darcy et al. 1994) suggest that the earlier familial political socialisation a candidate experiences (e.g., being from supportive or politicised families), the more likely is his/her political success. This is true for Australian men and women. For example, Senator Janine Haines, the former leader of the ADs, wrote (1992: 110), 'A non-traditional upbringing was also to have a strong impact on my development.' The similar experience was reported by such political 'scions' as Kim Beasley and Simon Crean.

The structure of the family is also important. Geographical distances have weakened the kinship networks in Australia. The family developed into a nuclear form without the assistance from extended kinship networks. It was further weakened due to the processes of secularisation and urbanisation. 'Australian families developed in a more insular, nuclear form from the outset' (Graetz and McAllister 1994: 23). Such weak kinship ties limit the resourcing capabilities. They also increase domestic pressures thus posing serious dilemmas for aspiring women politicians. Sandra Nori, Member of the NSW Legislative Assembly, expressed well this dilemma (1993: 26):

Politics is not an easy game (...) it is very hard for a woman to be in politics and still manage a family. You have crises of conscience and guilt pangs that I am sure the men don't have because they have that wife role at home for them.

Unlike in Australia, the extended families have not only survived in the process of economic modernisation, but are also still prevalent in contemporary Taiwan. The economic modernisation and the increase in the importance of nuclear bonds do not break the broader kinship ties. The Women's Marriage, Fertility and Employment Survey reports that 69% of married women aged 15-49 lives with parents during the first five years after their marriage. The proportion of young couples living with parents is especially high: 96% of those aged 15-19, 83% of
those aged 20-24, and 73% of those aged 25-29 (Department of Social Affairs 1990). These living arrangements may make it easier to cope with domestic chores and facilitate involvement in politics. One of my interviewees reports:

I have lived with my parents-in-law since I got married. I have been always busy, and have no time to look after the children and to deal with the domestic responsibilities. However, it does not matter. My mother and mother-in-law look after the children and perform domestic responsibilities for me. Everything goes well. (A)

The family plays another key role in women's political recruitment, as well. Without the family networks, women would not have access to rich political resources. In particular, 'having an elite family background, women and men are surprisingly equal in the possession of political resources' (Chou et al. 1990: 190).

Family networks themselves form the basic supportive electorate. "The family is a rich resource of votes in that it is a very large network. Many Taiwanese candidates hold such a large 'vote stock". It is not limited to candidates of Taiwanese origin. Chung Ching Huei is a kind of family-based organisation similar to a clan association. Those who have the same family name or whose family names are different but have a common ancient ancestor, form their own Chung Ching Huei. Many of my interviewees mentioned their connections with these organisations.

The family can be used as a tool to 'hunt' votes. For example, my family name is Chu, and I will contact the Chu Chung Ching Huei to seek for support. Chu, Chaung and Yuan have the same ancestor, so I also seek their support. (E)

A family can also exert its influence through its members. Connections built by family members can be transformed into the candidate's resources during political campaigns. Two of my interviewees reported such experiences. Candidate E shows how the spouse effectively establishes grassroots networks, and Mrs. F illustrates how the daughter successfully succeeds her father by taking over his political resources:
Life of a Legislator is very busy. I have not enough time to attend many grassroots activities. However, my husband has been doing this for me. The electorate treats him as my best representative. He has been involved in many different kinds of voluntary organisations, such as the Lions Club, trade unions, and he attends weddings and funerals on many occasions. All these are very important activities, helpful in accumulating political resources. They strengthen personal networks and voluntary organisations' support which are essential in political campaigns.

During the period of campaign, I found that the electorate had sweet memories of her father, although he had died two years ago. As we visited the electorate, everyone said 'I would give her a vote!' The only reason was that she was the daughter of this influential man. Think about it: she was only 24 then and knew little about politics. If she had not inherited her father's political resources, she would have not been nominated and elected. Her mother was one of the main contributors, who was active during the campaign and effectively exerted influence through the personal networks.

It should be restated that the family constitutes the basic unit of a local community. Essentially, the establishment of family networks implies the mobilisation of local communities. The complicated family networks can spread across large distances and form a 'political net'. Sometimes, they may transcend political parties, especially if their interests are not in conflict (e.g. the candidates of two local factions are registered in different districts).

The distribution of political resources in Australia can be seen as 'concentrated'. In fact, one may argue that such concentration goes hand in hand with the modern bureaucracy and rationalisation. The distribution of political resources is ordered by rules and administrative regulations in political organisations. Calculable rules are of paramount importance in modern bureaucracy (Weber 1948). Political organisations have to deliver effectively and gender-neutrally their resources to the candidates. However, these organisations are mainly male-dominated. The mostly male officials in these organisations know the availability of, and decide the distribution of, resources. It is predictable that unwinnable and marginal seats will receive relatively less resources. Not surprisingly, the majority of candidates in those seats are women.
By contrast, political resources in Taiwan are 'diffused' or 'spread'. Those resources which are derived from local community and family networks are at least as important in propelling political careers as those derived from political organisations. 'Gender-neutrality' is the most salient feature of resources from local community and, to a lesser extent, from family networks. A gender bias/preference in selecting candidates in local community and the family typically reflects disadvantages women suffer in political opportunities rather than access to resources. As long as women are selected, they are able to command wide resources. Some of these resources, we argue in the conclusions, are gender-specific in the sense of being available to women rather than to men. For example, both Yeh Chu-lan (the DPP candidate) and Hung Dong-kwei (the KMT candidate), the most famous women Legislative candidates in Taipei City, emphasised their familial roles in the 1989 national election (Lee 1991: 139).

Organisationally concentrated distribution and diffused distribution of political resources are ideal types. No political systems in any existing society has a completely concentrated or completely diffused distribution of political resources. Thus even in the Australian political system, which approximates the concentrated type, some political resources are available from families, communities and non-political organisations (eg. the green movement). Similarly, in the Taiwanese system, which approximates the diffused type, many political resources, as stressed above, are under organisational control, especially by the KMT.

It is worth highlighting further the differences between the concentrated and diffused resources. One is the gender composition of managers of political resources. Men have always dominated the concentrated organisational resources. This is in part the historical legacy of gender bias in political organisations traditionally seen as 'men's playground'. It is not necessary the case with diffused resources. They are likely to be more equally distributed with less gender-restricted resource managers. For example, Yu-Chen Yueh-ying, former Provincial Assemblywoman, Legislator, and the first woman magistrate in Taiwan, is the head of the 'Black' (the strongest local political faction in Kaohsiung county). The former head of the Black
was her father-in-law. He selected her replacing his son-in-law in local elections because of her performance and the family inheritance. The Black is equal to the Yu family in Kaohsiung county. Women candidates from this family can be resourced from the networks of the Black, thus succeeding in elections. Essentially Yu-Chen's political success has been built on her family networks. As well, her daughter has won political office because of her support. Under this arrangement, women's political resources are more 'evenly' spread. Therefore, the diffused type is likely to be more advantageous for women politicians.

Conclusions
Different dynamics of social change in Australia and Taiwan result in different configurations of women's political opportunities and resources. Australian women have higher political opportunities than their Taiwanese counterparts. They enjoy a better location in occupational structure, better access to and representation in political organisations (both in membership and decision-making positions). They have higher labour force participation rates, narrower gender gap in domestic labour, and better representation in higher education. In general, their access to societal statuses that 'count' in politics and that form the springboards for political careers has been rapidly improving. Consequently, they are increasingly present in the political 'pools of eligibles' for political careers. However, Australian women rely heavily on resources controlled by political organisations which are male-dominated. This is reflected in the low success rates in political competition for highest offices and in truncated political careers. The political 'glass ceilings' reflect narrow resourcing.

Compared with their Australian counterparts, Taiwanese women's political opportunities are low because of traditionalism and patriarchal elements in Confucianism. Yet, women's access to political resources, especially gender-specific resources, is relatively wide. Many of these gender-specific resources, it must be stressed, are derived from and dependent upon traditional Confucian values and norms. Aspiring women politicians in Taiwan can use the family and its networks, and local community as their supplementary political resources to compensate for the unequal share of resources from
political organisations. Moreover, women's familial roles — those of good mothers and good wives — can be utilised in political campaigns.

While not all women choose to mobilise these gender-specific resources in political campaigns, they can and do use them. This accessibility of gender-specific resources reduces the gender gap and results in the similar proportion of women politicians in Australia and Taiwan. By contrast, like in other Western societies, the feminist movement devalues women's familial roles, and these gender-specific resources may be destroyed in Australia in spite of the latter's traditionalism. The next chapter is an analysis of the accumulation and mobilisation of these gender-specific resources in women's political careers.
CHAPTER FOUR

INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORKS
AND
WOMEN'S POLITICAL CAREER STRUCTURE

The institutional framework in which selection of politicians occurs is a central feature of the opportunity structure. The political careers of women MPs are the key to understanding of their political recruitment patterns and in turn, to the overall nature and structure of political resources available to women. As indicated in the previous chapters, the balance of political opportunities and resources is considered as a central feature of political selection system that shapes the patterns of political careers and gender composition of elites in Australia and Taiwan.

This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section discusses the core elements of the selection system, namely the electoral system and political institutions in Australia and Taiwan. The second section identifies and compares political careers of women MPs in both countries. The third section analyses the overall patterns of political recruitment of women MPs. The empirical sections are based on published biographical materials and interviews with women politicians.

Electoral System and Political Institutions

The structural features of political selection system in Australia and Taiwan are summarised in Table 4.1. Five differences between the two systems are highlighted here: in the electoral system, in the process of pre-selection, in the overall position and mobilising capacity of political organisations, in voters' attitudes, and in the role of traditional social networks. Each of these aspects, it is argued here, affects the distribution of opportunities and resources, and consequently the political recruitment of women.
# Table 4.1 Structural Features of Electoral Politics in Australia and Taiwan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structural Features</th>
<th>Australia</th>
<th>Taiwan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legal age to vote</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal age to stand for parliament</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral System</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper House: Multi-member PR</td>
<td></td>
<td>Multi-member PR + Reserved-seat System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower House: Single Member</td>
<td></td>
<td>(Guarantees a minimum portion of women in parliament, since 1947)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Affirmative Action, ALP 35% winnable seats by 2002)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single transferable vote in the Upper; majority formula in the Lower</td>
<td></td>
<td>Single non-transferable vote</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-selection</td>
<td>decentralised</td>
<td>centralised</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Influence of Political Organisations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Political Parties</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Union autonomy</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Weak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voters’ Attitudes</td>
<td>Political Party Oriented</td>
<td>Individual Candidate Oriented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Impact of Traditional Local Social Networks on Electoral Politics</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Strong</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Legal Age to Vote and to Stand in Parliament

In Australia the minimal legal age to vote and to stand for parliament is the same (18), and it is lower than those in Taiwan (20/23). However, in Australia, no one has been elected at 18. In Taiwan though, some women, including national and local elections have been elected at 23. This early elevation, it is argued, can be attributed to their access to rich political resources available outside the political organisations.

The Electoral System

In Australia, the multi-member party list PR system is used for the Senate, and the single member system in the House of Representatives. In Taiwan, both the National Assembly and the Legislative Yuan adapts multi-member PR system. Also the reserved-seat system has been institutionalised since 1947 to guarantee a minimum of 10% of total seats for women.

The general principles of the reserved-seat system were not listed in the Constitution until the amendment in 1992. Before that, the exact number of reserved seats and the regulation for selecting women to fill the seats were set by the Public Officials Election and Recall Law. In fact, before election of the second term of the parliament in 1991 and 1992, the reserved-seats system worked differently for elections of the Assemblywomen and the women Legislators.

The reserved-seats in the National Assembly are filled by members of the Women's Organisation which is one of many organised constituencies, including minority ethnic and occupational groups. However, since the supplementary election in 1969, under the Temporary Provisions, the Women's Association¹ (Fu Nu Huei) is the only legally qualified constituency for the election of candidates to fill these reserved seats². The members of the Women's Association

¹Taiwan Provincial Women's Association (Fu Nu Huei) was established in 1946. Its membership includes all county and municipal women's association in Taiwan Province. Its basic units are village and town associations. As Taipei and Kaohsiung became special Municipal cities in 1968 and 1979, respectively, the Taipei and the Kaohsiung Municipal Women's Associations became two independent associations.
²There are also some other women's organisations. Before the lifting of the martial law, large scale women's organisations were very close to the KMT and small scale women's groups seemed relatively more autonomous. These included Chinese Women's Anti-Aggression League, established in 1950 by Madame Chiang kai-shek; Taipei International Women's Club, established in 1951 by women of the Chinese and foreign communities; Taipei Zonta Club, established in 1964 and later its branches established in many counties; and Business and Professional Women's Club Taipei established in
can choose to register as voters of general constituencies or the Women's Organisation constituency in the elections for the National Assembly. This latter constituency is controlled by the KMT. All Assemblywomen representing it are members of the KMT. The reserved-seats for women Legislators are distributed in every general constituency according to the size of the population (for details see Appendix A). Generally, there is one seat reserved for women in each general constituency.

In 1992 the Constitution was amended, and the constituencies were changed. All members of the National Assembly and the Legislative Yuan are now elected from four constituencies: two Special Municipalities and counties, lowland and highland Aboriginal groups, Chinese citizens residing abroad, and from the nationwide constituency which adopts party list PR to determine the party balance.

Due to Taiwan adopting single non-transferable vote with the plurality formula, women may be elected by less votes than men, as there are reserved seats for women candidates in each constituency. Table 4.2 shows some examples. Let us assume that there are 8 candidates, and 5 should be elected in a particular constituency. According to the principle of the reserved-seat system, one seat is reserved for a woman candidate. Of all 8 candidates, candidates B, D, F, G, and H are elected, according the plurality formula. Because there is a woman (F) elected already, there is no need for the reserved seat.

1973. After the lifting of the martial law, numerous women's groups and foundations were established in the late 1980s.

3 These reserved seats are only applied to the popular election of the directly elected Legislative members from Taiwan Province, Taipei City and Kaohsiung City, two special municipalities of provincial status. There are no reserved seats for women in the constituencies of Occupational and Aboriginal groups, and Chinese residing overseas.

4 The seats in this constituency are called regional seats because each Special Municipality and county is divided into many sub-constituencies according to the size of its population.

5 Any political party has to collect at least 5% of the votes cast in the regional electoral elections to get a share of the seats of the nationwide constituency for party list PR. Votes won by Independent candidates or party-affiliated aspirants whose participation is not approved by their parties are not to be taken into account in the distribution of these seats. When distributing elected candidates from the party list, women candidates should get priority if the numbers of the elected women are less than their quota. This means women candidates may be elected even if their positions are behind men's.
arrangement. In Example II, candidates B, D, E, G, and H are elected. Therefore, the reserved seat arrangement works: candidate E will not be elected, and candidate F is elected.

Table 4.2 Women Candidates and the Reserved-seat System (Examples)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidates</th>
<th>Example I</th>
<th>Example II</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>2568</td>
<td>2568</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>3580*</td>
<td>3580*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C (female)</td>
<td>1684</td>
<td>1984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>4866*</td>
<td>4866*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>2907</td>
<td>3407</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F (female)</td>
<td>4862*</td>
<td>2162*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>3896*</td>
<td>3896*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>5211*</td>
<td>5211*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

However, from 1969 to 1992 very few women relied on this system to win their parliamentary seats in Taiwan. Of all 101 women politicians, only 7 of them — 1 woman Legislator and 6 Assemblywomen — relied on the reserved seats to win in general elections. Three women (1 from the DPP and 2 from the KMT) out of these 6 Assemblywomen were elected from the nationwide constituency. This meant that they were placed at the bottom of their party lists.

The reserved-seat system boosts women representation. However, it hinders women's nominations in pre-selection, because political parties are inclined to nominate no more than the quota of women to fill the reserved seats. For example, in the 1989 Legislative election, there was a woman who sought the KMT's nomination as a candidate for the Legislative Yuan. Due to the high popularity of the other woman, the KMT was reluctant to nominate her, and persuaded her to contest a seat in the Taipei City Council instead.

In Australia, the introduction of the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 and the Affirmative Action (Equal Employment Opportunity for Women) Act 1986 were important steps in boosting women's political prospects. They helped in co-opting more women into the pools of

---

6 She was elected to the Taipei City Council at 24, following in her father's footsteps. She served in Taipei City Council from 1981 to 1991, and became a Legislator in 1992.
eligible political candidates. While the more radical Carlton Proposal was not accepted, throughout the 1970s and 1980s all the major political parties adopted some forms of affirmative action to encourage women's candidacy and boost women's political recruitment.

The ALP set some specific targets on its 1981-1991 Affirmative Action plan. It included a target of one-third party positions to be held by women. In 1993 the Victorian Branch of the ALP reached a decision to employ new pre-selection rules that guaranteed women 35% of winnable seats by the year 2003. During its national conference in 1994, the ALP leadership made a historical decision to introduce a quota of 35% women in winnable parliamentary seats by the year 2002.

The LP founded a national Liberal Women's Candidates Forum in 1993 to attract women aspirants for parliament. In addition to that, there was an active feminist network (Millar 1993: 88), and some affirmative strategies are also developed within the party. They focus on the provision of training, support and education to aspiring women politicians. Recently some special training courses were introduced to help women succeed in nominations. This included courses on personal representation, policy, handling the media, party organisation, the selection process and the resolution of problems faced by women in parliament (The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia 1994: 20-21).

A comparison of the Taiwanese reserved-seat system and the affirmative action in Australia shows how liberalism and Confucianism work in a different way. In Australia there is a strong individualistic emphasis on apprenticeship and training. The ALP promotes women within party executive positions by providing encouragement and training programs for women, so they can be selected on individual merit. Women's right to access is defined in terms of citizenship rights. In Taiwan, the reserved-seats system reflects the traditional notions of gender balance and rectification of names. The emphasis is placed on parties' moral duty and obligation

---

7 In 1993, Liberal MP the Hon. Jim Carlton suggested that the Commonwealth of Australia's Electoral Act should be altered to allow voters to elect equal numbers of women and men to both Houses. For detail, see Carlton, J. (1994) Women in Parliament, Canberra Bulletin of Public Administration, 76: 13-16.

8 In Book XIII, Tsze-lu, Confucian Analects, one of students asked Confucius, "The ruler of Wei has been waiting for you, in order with you to administer the government. What will you consider the first thing to be done?" Confucius replied, "What is necessary is
to find 'appropriate' woman candidates for reserved seats. Morality, prestige, educational attainment, and local contacts (patronage) are considered as important factors. These are reflected in support for women candidates coming from the local factions or communities. Normally two women candidates — one from the party in power and one from the opposition — compete for each of the reserved seats.

The Processes of Pre-selection
Preselection is an important gatekeeping process, the first important gate on the way to parliament. Political parties in Australia recruit most of their successful parliamentarians from the party organisation, trade unions or the staff of leaders of a party. Coming from a political family is also an important asset, as well as holding a degree or being a member of a profession, especially in the fields of the law, medicine, accountancy or teaching.

The mechanisms of pre-selection in Australia is an internal party affair, and is seen a game played in a 'secret garden' (Gallagher and Marsh 1988; Jaensch 1994). As Simms (1994b: 241) says:

[T]he processes themselves are part of the 'private' face of political parties as opposed to their more 'public' role of running election campaigns and nominating candidates for public office (...) The selection process itself is mostly conducted behind closed doors.

However, some aspects of party pre-selection are better known. Generally speaking, in Australia pre-selection for party candidates is highly decentralised (Gallagher 1988: 257). Each state and territory party organisation selects its candidates for federal elections; central (federal) selection is relatively rare. By contrast, in Taiwan the selection is relatively highly centralised, especially within the KMT. The Central Standing Committee of the KMT is the last and the most powerful selector.

to rectify names. (...) If names be not correct, language is not in accordance with the truth of things. If language be not in accordance with the truth of things, affairs cannot be carried on to success." Here to rectify names means to rectify the names of all things. That is, when each person in his/her relations is what the name of his/her relation would require. In traditional Chinese society, women should not participate in politics. The reserved-seat system, to some extent, can be seen to justify women's "name" in the relations of political participation between men and women.
In Australia, the formal pre-selection is typically made by a committee of local party activists. The ADs, a minor party however, selects candidates through a plebiscite of all its members rather than a small group of pre-selectors (Jaensch 1995: 80), and this method may result in a selection of younger women candidates, such as Sowada, at a tender age of 21. The ALP has moved away from the rank-and-file ballot (except in NSW and the ACT), and towards a more centralised control at the level of the state branch or division. By this method, the ALP selectors hope to have a better chance of selecting good candidates. The system of factions makes it a bit more complicated (Simms 1994b). There is little doubt that within the ALP the factions plays a crucial role in pre-selection. Factional leaders recruit parliamentary candidates in an attempt to change the factional equilibrium of power in their favour. Sometimes, women candidates may become victims of factional struggles. For example, Senator Jean Melzer entered the federal parliament in 1974, but in 1979 she was dropped to the third place on the ALP list as a result of factional deals (Millar 1993: 85). It must be stressed, though, that factions are entrenched in the local levels of the ALP.

Compared with the ALP, there has been less factional recruitment within the LP and the NP. However, since the late 1980s, there has been growing factionalism also within the conservative camp (Smith 1993: 139). This factionalism may start affecting seriously the selection process. Also the pre-selection within the LP is different from that within the ALP. Liberals tend to adopt a mixture of local representation (branch delegates) and central representation (members of the executive of the state council) representation. However, in Victoria, Queensland, and Tasmania the LP uses the local branch-based selection system (Simms 1994b).

Holding internal party positions in the major parties is another important asset in pre-selection. Committee members, officials, leaders, conference delegates, presidents of local branches are always preferred candidates. A relatively large proportion of Australian women MPs have held such positions in their parties before they were selected as candidates. This channel of recruitment can be seen as more institutionalised and safer for the party. Women may benefit from it because during the long period of organisational activism they are able
to accumulate resources for further stages of career and contest. For example, Kathy Martin Sullivan had 13 years experience in party branches working and almost 10 years experience as a federal Senator. When contesting the Lower House seat, she received strong support from the party on meritocratic grounds. She stressed this proudly (1993: 10):

Until the 1990 election, no woman member of the House of Representatives was given a 'safe seat'. All women, except me, won their seat from an opposing party. My seat of Moncrieff was considered on paper to be National Party, and the pundits all wrote off my chances of winning in 1984. Therefore, whilst it was a safe non-Labor seat, it was not a Liberal seat for the taking.

Before the process of democratisation in Taiwan started in the mid 1980s, the KMT dominated the selection of candidates. Most of those who campaigned for elections without the KMT endorsement and sponsorship relied on their family networks, and this was especially evident in the careers of women MPs. Most women politicians who ran without the KMT endorsement, entered politics either as wives of political activists or as political activists themselves (Domes 1981). For example, 12 out of 35 women Legislators between 1969 and 1992 who were not members of the KMT followed the family career. These 12 women Legislators could be divided into two groups. Ten represented a family-sponsored career type. Four of them came from political families. One of them came from a wealthy and well-known family and she was elected to the local government at 23. Another one of them came from a prestige family. The remaining four represented what is normally called 'fight for husband' career type. Their husbands had been in political opposition movement since the 1970s and all were sent into prison after the Kaohsiung Incident. Only 2 women Legislators were political activists on their own right, without a family background of influence, prestige and political activism.

The DPP emerged as a legal opposition party in the 1989 election. Officially, the principle of selection is merit and chances of success; gender is a lesser consideration. Some men are reluctant to compete for the seats in the National Assembly, because the Assembly is regarded as less powerful. It is not the main arena of politics, and
cannot help in accumulating political capital. Therefore women have more chances to be nominated as candidates to the Assembly.

In the 1992 Legislative election, the DPP adopted a meritocratic and open rank-and-file selection to determine the candidate order on the party list for the nationwide constituency. One woman won a quarter of all votes, and she was subsequently granted the top place on the list.

The KMT selection process is shrouded in secrecy. However, it is clear that the party's CSC is the ultimate gatekeeper. During the 1989 election the CSC for the first time allowed for an open pre-selection among rank-and-file members (Ling and Myers 1990). One woman Legislator mentioned that she won the rank-and-file pre-selection within the KMT, but it did not assure her nomination. The final decision was made by the CSC elites. Another Assemblywoman talked about her experience in pre-selection. She said that at the beginning all aspirants were invited to make a public speech to the party officials. Then the officials investigated their backgrounds. They concluded that the woman candidate had a good chance to win the election because of her PhD (she was then lecturing in universities), her good family background, and her appealing personality. Thus while she had never had any experience in party activism or electoral contest, she was, nevertheless, selected. The director of Taipei City Branch told the CSC that as long as she was formally nominated he could guarantee her success. She was nominated, and subsequently did win the election.

Another woman Legislator depended entirely on her family network to win the pre-selection within the KMT. Her performance in rank-and-file pre-selection was not good, but she was nominated with the strong support from a large and rich family business group. One DPP Assemblywoman concluded that the common feature of the KMT and DPP selection was that neither of them considered the gender balance as an important factor in the process of nomination. In the DPP, and like in the KMT, women were sometimes used as chesspawns.

---

9 One of her sons married the daughter of the president of a large rich family business group, and the other son married the daughter of an active woman politician who is the head of the Black, discussed in Chapter Three.
In both countries most political gatekeepers are males, and they set male criteria of selection. Women candidates face problems in meeting these criteria. According to Simms (1994b), the Candidates Studies (1987 and 1990) and the State Secretaries Studies (1988) indicate that most selectors judge 'a good candidate' using the criteria that are usually associated with males: a continuous occupational career, political and media exposure, being a good 'family man', strong community ties, local government service experience, as well as business and/or trade union links. These criteria reflect what are considered to be the key political resources. Clearly, Australian women candidates have less access to these resources than their male counterparts.

Women candidates in Taiwan are in a relatively better position because they can utilise some gender-specific resources. Thus being a good 'family woman' is an important asset, as is a successful 'wifehood' or 'motherhood'. Naturally, successful occupational careers, political activism and political exposure are also important assets. Access to these resources is often mediated by family networks.

Australian women candidates enjoy greater and more equal opportunities than their counterparts in Taiwan, where no women candidates hold the position of president in any county/ city or provincial/ special municipal branch of the KMT. Yet, their limited access to resources eliminates them from the top political echelons and results in an under-representation in political elites.

The Influence of Political Organisations
Since 1924, in Australia, it has been compulsory to register in an electorate and vote in an federal election. The compulsory system reduces the need of the parties to worry about their 'loyal' supporters. However, it also means that it is difficult for political parties to manipulate voters. They have to fight for the swinging — often unwilling — voters.

As Andrew Robb, the Federal Director of the LP, points out (1995: 422) personal contact, direct mail, advertising and earned media are all used in the LP campaigns. The LP also mobilises its party members and supporters to deliver the party message to the target voter categories. The ALP seems to be more powerful in using organisational links
because of its formal affiliation with trade unions. As Robb mentions, in the 1993 election the unions contributed very much to the success of the political campaign because they were well-entrenched, well-resourced, had well-developed abilities for political campaign, and were united in their support for the ALP.

In Taiwan, the organisational landscape is very different, reflecting the past authoritarian polity. Until recently, the KMT almost completely controlled all organisations, including the unions, and had strong links with local factions. In the past, the KMT could deliver a certain size of vote to each of its endorsed candidates due to its control over various voter groups, such as veterans, military dependents, public servants, and so on. These votes were called 'iron votes'. Their number was estimated at about one million. The common feature of these one million voters was that they were residentially concentrated and showed strong loyalty to the KMT. Nowadays these 'iron votes' are less numerous, but they still have a powerful effect in elections. (Lu 1991b; Nathan 1993).

**Voters' Attitudes and the Impact of Traditional Social Network on Electoral Politics**

Perhaps the most striking difference in voters' attitudes between Australia and Taiwan is their orientation to, and identification with, political parties or candidates. Party orientation and identification are much stronger in Australia. Candidate orientation and identification are much stronger in Taiwan. Aitkin (1977) argues that the strong party identification enhances the stability of the party system, and sets Australia apart from other liberal democracies. Evidence confirms that the strength of party identification in Australia is much higher than other countries (Bean 1988: 45-49; Graetz and McAllister 1988: 268). The family and the traditional social networks are relatively less important in electoral politics, except when they operate via political parties.

In Taiwan, the candidates themselves are the focus in the electoral contests. The personal image of the candidate and his/her personal connections become the key to winning an election (Lu 1991b). In Hu's study\(^{10}\) (1986) of voters' orientations in Taipei City. The

---

\(^{10}\)This study was based on the 1980 national election. Researchers interviewed 954 Taipei citizens in February 1981. Among the 954 sample, 754 voted, 183 did not vote, and 17 were invalid. Interviewees could make multiple choices among all voters'
candidate orientation emerges as the most important one (59%). It can be found that even in Taipei City the traditional networks play an important role, and traditional expectations are evident. For example, 39% of the voters who were candidate-oriented tended to stress candidate's achievement, 25% of them stress morality, and 20% stress education. Traditional relationships also account for 20% of choices. 'In fact, elections in all counties and cities (except Taipei City) are 'traditional wars'. This means that candidates heavily rely on traditional social and kinship ties to win elections', one of my interviewees reports. This contrasts with the Australian situation where elections are party contests.

One may explain the strong party identification and orientation in Australia by evolving tradition, compulsory voting and frequency of elections (see Jaensch 1991; Lovell et al. 1995). These accounts seem to emphasise the institutional impact rather than the social dynamics within society. In our view, the difference between Australian and Taiwanese voters' identification can be attributed to the patterns of modernisation in each society. In Australia, organisations have been dominant mobilisers in public life, and have played the key role in political modernisation. Political parties grew into dominant mediators and articulators of voters. Some even see them as generators of the major political changes. In Taiwan, voters' orientation reflects the traditional Confucian teaching: the well-educated should govern and form the moral model of the populace. In that sense, broad political participation— the key consequence of the political modernisation— has always been traditionally regulated. The family plays a fundamental role in this regulation and in shaping voters' preferences. Under these circumstances, the aspiring women MPs in Taiwan have to seek the support in these traditional structures.

Political Career
The overall social and economic positions of Australian and Taiwanese women have been improved in the process of modernisation. This is reflected in women's political careers. As argued earlier, they appear to be more accessible to women in both orientations, including candidate orientation (59%), political issue orientation (39%), political party orientation (21%), personal relationship orientation (17%), social relationship orientation (10%) and other personal factors (10%).
countries, but pattern of accessibility is quite different. A 'political career' refers to the steps and stages in political elevation to national parliament. These steps may have a direct (e.g. as a political party worker) or an indirect (e.g. as a member of a voluntary organisation) link with political organisations.

The backgrounds of MPs are useful indicators of the type of political careers pursued. By analysing the family, educational and organisational backgrounds of successful women politicians, we can assess how political careers start and progress. The age of first political engagement and electoral success, for example, indicates how long it takes to progress from a political activist to a MP. The relevant personal backgrounds include education, political party affiliation, political family background, occupations before entering parliament and the age of the first successful election.

This analysis includes 153 women, from 1970 to 1993 in Australia (52) and from 1969 to 1992 in Taiwan (101). In Australia, our sample includes 34 women Senators and 19 women members of House of Representatives (MHRs). (The total is 52 because one woman served in both Houses.) Likewise, in the Taiwanese sample, there are 70 women in the National Assembly and 35 women Legislators in the Legislative Yuan. The total is 101 because four women have served in the National Assembly and the Legislative Yuan.

**Political Family Background**

The family is a crucial place of socialisation. Family involvement in politics may be conducive to people developing political interest and knowledge. Political family background provides not only political socialisation, but also the personal networks, associations and influence which help to pursue a political career. Three out of the seventeen members of the 1993 Keating cabinet, for example, had political family backgrounds (Lovell et al. 1995).

There is much higher portion of women MPs with political family background in Taiwan than that in Australia (see Table 4.3). This difference highlights again the fact that while the family plays minimal role in Australian politics, it is a key to political career in Taiwan. It must be stressed that while we classify less than half of Taiwanese women MPs as representing political family background,
the influence of the family on politics is much wider. As mentioned in Chapter Three, the KMT builds intensive patron-client networks in local communities to assure its control over local politics. These networks are interwoven with family networks, especially with networks of political families. In addition, the influence of the family can reach local communities and some traditional associations.

Table 4.3 Women MPs with Political Family Background

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Australia</th>
<th>Taiwan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total No</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There is little doubt that the contest for MHRs is much harder than that for Senate seats. One important reason is the institutional factor. The PR system used in the Senate is conducive to increasing number of women senators. Single member districts as in the House of Representatives affects women receiving party endorsement for safe seats. Two woman MPs had resigned from the Senate to contest the election of MHR. One without political family background succeeded; the one who failed was from a political family (Haines 1992).

In Taiwan, the contests in Legislative elections are very competitive compared to the National Assembly election. Women Legislators with political family background are more successful in these competitive elections than others. Their success, it is argued, can be attributed to strong political and financial support they get from the family.

Education

Education is seen as one of the most important credentials for women MPs. Many studies (e.g. Duverger 1955; Putnam 1976; Verba et al. 1978; Randall 1987; Darcy et al. 1994) link the role of education with women's increasing political participation. Education is seen as the most decisive influence on women's political activism because it is related to women's employment, especially political springboard occupations.
Higher education is particularly important in Taiwan. As mentioned earlier, it has traditionally been seen as the key political credential and the major enhancement of family prestige. It is therefore hardly surprising to find that women MPs in Taiwan are better educated than their counterparts in Australia (see Table 4.4). The contrast is especially represented in the share of women MPs with higher degree in both countries. They account for 11% of all women MPs in Australia, but 19% in Taiwan. In Australia there are almost one-quarter women MPs with secondary education, but less than one fifth in Taiwan.

Table 4.4 Education Attainment of Women MPs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Australia</th>
<th>Taiwan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Senate</td>
<td>House of Representatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No %</td>
<td>No %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PhD</td>
<td>1 3</td>
<td>- -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Master</td>
<td>5 15</td>
<td>- -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bachelor</td>
<td>17 50</td>
<td>12 63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College</td>
<td>1 3</td>
<td>3 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior High School</td>
<td>1 3</td>
<td>- -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>9 26</td>
<td>4 21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>34 100</td>
<td>19 100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *9 Senators and 4 MHRs do not hold any degree.

In Taiwan women Legislators are better educated than Assemblywomen. One-quarter of women Legislators hold higher degree, compared with 16% of Assemblywomen. This reflects some political realities in Taiwan. The National Assembly is not the main political arena, and most politically ambitious and better qualified women may not be interested in contesting its seats. Most of women who served in the National Assembly came from the special constituency, the Women's Organisation, which was tightly controlled by the KMT. With affiliation to the KMT and serving as branch presidents of the Women's Association, women could easily win the
seats. Since the 1980s, the Legislative Yuan has no longer been the 'rubber stamp', and more and more ambitious politicians aimed at contesting the Legislative seats. Therefore, the Legislative Yuan could recruit better qualified women.

By contrast with MHRs, the proportion of women Legislators with degree is much higher, and the share of those with secondary education is lesser. This reflects different main evaluative criterion and method in both societies. In Australia, the emphasis of political elevation is placed on performance and apprenticeship. However, in Taiwan, education and credentialism play a key role in determining political success.

One may argue that the difference in educational backgrounds between Australian and Taiwanese women MPs reflects the different value attached to education in politics. While education is an important credential for politicians in Australia, its importance is lesser than in Taiwan when the Confucian tradition enhances the value of educational credentials. Some women MPs in Taiwan who are lack party experience and organisational training can be nominated and win elections if they have high education and family backing. The educational attainment and family support are the key to their success because they are consistent with the Confucian teaching that the well-educated should govern, and that the family is the centre of loyalties.

*Occupations before Entering Parliament*

The importance of specific skills as credentials for political recruitment is reflected in over-representation of certain occupations in political elites. The legal profession, for example, is conducive to developing some skills and techniques, including interaction with people, the skills and techniques of speech and the written word, and the formulation and exchange of ideas, which are of special value in a political career. Flexible working hours and insurance against possible electoral defeat also make some occupations especially compatible with a political career.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Australia Senate</th>
<th>Australia House of Representatives</th>
<th>Taiwan National Assembly</th>
<th>Taiwan Legislative Yuan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>school teacher</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>school executive position</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>school/college principal</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lecturer/ associate professor/ professor</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pharmacist/nurse</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>medical doctor</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>judge/lawyer</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>manager/ company director</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>general manager</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>journalist/editor</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>accountant</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>family/ own business</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>civil/public servant</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>political researcher**</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TV/ radio worker</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>assistant of MP***</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>member of local council</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>consultant</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>political party worker</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lobbyist</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>others</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>32</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * including clerk, university non-academic staff, real estate agent, librarian, social worker, public relations officer, advertising, retailer, and sales.

**including research assistant.

***including assistant for provincial/state MPs.
Women MPs in Australia and Taiwan had engaged in a wide range of occupations (see Table 4.5). In both countries, most of women MPs were school teachers before entering parliament. More women MPs in Taiwan than those in Australia have been professionals such as medical doctors, judges as well as lawyers, and university academic staff. This is consistent with the differentials in educational attainment between both countries.

A higher proportion of Australian women MPs have worked in politics-related occupations, such as political party worker, lobbyist, political researcher, and so on. Political careers in Australia show clear dependence on the early organisational exposure. This is in line with the importance of political apprenticeship in Australian politics.

Political Party Affiliation
Political parties are the main players of modern politics. They are an integral part of the processes of representative democracy. Their impact on politics is paramount. Political parties dominate the electoral process and organise the government through recruiting candidates and nominating party members for elections. That is, political party affiliation can be seen as access to political opportunities, and then utilisation of political resources controlled by them.

Women MPs' political party affiliation is shown in Table 4.6. 96% of Australian women MPs and 92% of Taiwanese women MPs affiliated with political parties. Those women MPs affiliated with major parties account for the majority of them, 79% in Australia and 91% in Taiwan. However, the share of Independents in Australia is slightly lower than those in Taiwan.

In Australia, most women MPs are affiliated with major parties, the ALP and the LP. The minor parties, especially the ADs and the Greens, are also able to elevate women into parliament. As Kathy Martin Sullivan, former Senator and now MHR, says (1994: 10),

The apparent increase in the Senate since [1983] has been virtually all due to the increasing representation of the Australian Democrats and the independent senators (Nuclear Disarmament or Greens), most of whom are women (...) If it were not for the Democrats and the Greens, the proportion of women in the Senate would actually have declined.
Table 4.6 Women MPs' Political Party Affiliation, 1969-93 (person)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Parties</th>
<th>Senate</th>
<th>House of Representatives</th>
<th>Political Parties</th>
<th>National Assembly</th>
<th>Legislative Yuan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ALP</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>KMT</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LP</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>DPP</td>
<td>14***</td>
<td>10***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCP</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>NP</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADs</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WAG</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDP</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ind. for NDP</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>37*</td>
<td>19</td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>70</td>
<td>36**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * 2 women changed their affiliation from NDP to Independent for NDP, and 1 woman changed her affiliation from NDP to Independent for NDP to WAG.

** 1 woman changed her affiliation from the KMT to the NP.

*** including those who were identified as members of Dangwei before the DPP became a legal political party.

The ADs and the Greens have been more energetically wooing women's vote and have been recruiting more women than major parties (Sawer and Simms 1993: Table 3.1). The ADs, in particular, have selected a relatively high proportion of women candidates since its formation in 1977. This is partly because the ADs has been a relatively new party attempting to carve up its support base, and partly because it has lacked the entrenched vested interests and hierarchies of major parties. Therefore, the ADs women do not 'have to get into an existing system dominated by men. [They have] the opportunity to start things on an equal basis. That [makes] things easier' (quoted in Sawer and Simms 1993: 56). However, women candidates from these minor parties have not yet won any seat in the House of Representatives.

The inflow of women into Australian parliament occurs mainly via the Senate. Due to the proportional party list electoral system, women have been relatively successful in the Senate contests (Simms
Women politicians in the House of Representatives have been usually recruited via the marginal seats. This reflects the viriarchal nature of selection in the major parties, and it means that women representation in the Lower House increases after 'wide margin' elections, when a large number of seats change hands (like in the 1996 federal election). This also means that women hold the most marginal seats, most vulnerable to swings in party preferences.

While major parties have become more conscious of the electoral value of women candidates in order to woo women voters, women have still suffered from male-dominated party pre-selection processes and the internal party factions (Reynolds 1991; Smith 1993; Sawer and Simms 1993; Simms 1981a, 1989, 1994a). One Labour woman says, 'Men do keep women out because the structures work that way. Women are still in secondary positions in the ALP' (cited from Sawer and Simms 1993: 58). Tokenism to factions determines the ALP's selection of parliamentary candidates. Although the LP has a significant proportion of women active at the branch level and has recognised the importance of working and career women after its defeat in the 1983 federal election, until recently the LP has not shown 'a greater willingness either to preselect women for winnable seats or advancing them through the party's organisation and hierarchy' (Reynolds 1991: 206).

Like in Australia, most women MPs in Taiwan are affiliated with the two major parties. Yet, women Independents are noteworthy and very important. Unlike in Australia, family connection among them are very strong. Three out of five Independents in Taiwan belong to the same family: mother and two daughters. The mother served as Legislator from 1972 to 1980, the younger daughter served as Legislator from 1989 to 1992, and the elder daughter served as Assemblywoman from 1986 to 1992. All of them are medical doctors, and the mother is the first female medical doctor with doctorate of medicine obtained in Taiwan. They enjoy very high social prestige and are very popular in their electorate. This can also be seen in the fact that they have been serving in the same local government, in the position of City Mayor, from the 1950s to the present. Even if the KMT mobilised the 'iron votes' and nominated a male, such a candidate could not defeat them. It is especially noteworthy that in their district only one candidate can
be elected due to the small population. Another Independent was elected as Assemblywoman in 1986 from the electorate of the Labour Group. In this district three out of eight candidates were elected, and this Assemblywoman received the highest number of votes (including male votes).

**Age at Election**

Politics is described as 'very much a middle-aged occupation' (Mellors 1978: 27). This has different implications for male and female politicians. For the former, this means that men spend a few years in serving their apprenticeship in political organisations; for the latter, this not only means apprenticeship, but also reflects women's life cycle. Middle aged women are free from child-bearing and their children have grown up. Therefore, they are more likely to be involved in political contests.

Table 4.7 Age at Which Women Parliamentarians Were First Elected (persons)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Australia</th>
<th>Taiwan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Senate</td>
<td>House of Representatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-24</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-29</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-34</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-39</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-44</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-49</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-54</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55-59</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60-64</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65+</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>43.2</td>
<td>44.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Consistent with most previous studies, the average age of women MPs first entering in parliament is in their early 40s in both Australia and Taiwan. However, there are some differences between both countries (see Table 4.7). The Senators are almost 2 years younger than MHRs, 43.2 and 44.9, respectively. In Taiwan Legislators are 2 years younger than Assemblywomen. In Australia, this may imply that the Senate contests are relatively easier than the House of Representatives. In Taiwan, this reflects the fact that more young ambitious women would rather compete Legislative seats because the Legislative Yuan is the main political arena.

Women MPs entering parliament before their 40 are seen as early starters and those entering the parliament in their 50s are seen as late starters. The proportion of early starters in Taiwan (33%) is higher than that in Australia (25%). The most outstanding feature of women MPs between Australia and Taiwan is that no women MPs enter parliament before their 30 in Australia, but there are 8 out of 101 enter parliament in their 20s in Taiwan.

More early starters among Taiwanese women MPs cannot be seen as the result of different electoral system. We suggest that this reflects the difference in the nature and distribution of political resources. Family-controlled resources are very important in Taiwan, and they are accessible to younger candidates. Such candidates may be less politically skilled, have less party experiences, and less organisational exposure. The family electoral and financial support is a likely reason for their success in elections. During the 1992 election, for example, it has been reported that a young woman MP got huge financial support from her family, about NT$20,000,000 (A$1,000,000). She won the election and became Assemblywoman. Of total 32 early starters in Taiwan, about one thrid of them have political family background.

**Political Career Patterns**

The family is an important medium affecting women's political success in Taiwan. Thus, it is expected that Taiwanese women politicians will have typically family-sponsored careers. By contrast, political organisations play a key role in recruiting women politicians in Australia. Therefore our recruitment model suggests that, typically, Australian women politicians should represent organisational activist
careers. These models are tested by examining women politicians' politically active age, local government service experience, political party and trade union experience, and their involvement in other organisations. These form the bars for our general typology of political career which, in turn, serves as the tool in comparative analysis.

**Politically Active Age**

It is hard to find at what age women MPs became politically active. The data do not clearly show this. However, some other information, such as becoming presidents or executive officers in political party branches, involvement in political opposition movement or running an electoral political office in local government, may indirectly reveal the time of political activation. Unfortunately, not all of women MPs held such political party or government positions, and some records of Taiwanese women MPs do not clearly show when they served in local government. Therefore, the age of activation can be identified for only 18 out of 34 women Senators, 10 out of 19 women MHRs, 18 out of 70 Assemblywomen, and 19 out of 35 women Legislators (see Table 4.8).

The mean age at which women MPs became politically active is higher in Australia than that in Taiwan. This means that women MPs in Australia have a longer experience of organisational activism. Most of them have served on various important positions in their parties before entering politics full-time (see Table 4.8). By contrast, women MPs in Taiwan start running for electoral political office relatively early. Most of them have local government service experience rather than experience in political party activism (see Table 4.9). In local government, organisational apprenticeship is less important.

More importantly, in Australia it takes women Senators 8 years, women MHRs 10 years, whilst in Taiwan it takes Assemblywomen 14 years, and women Legislators 12 years to first win national parliament elections. Australian women MPs show a long apprenticeship in political parties, and it is particularly true for women MHRs. Usually, they move from rank-and-file to top positions such as president, delegate, member of committees. As a woman Senator who has been elected at 30 and is the youngest woman MP in Australia says:

I joined the Democrats at 20 (...) I was Branch President, [and] held virtually every position in every committee over the last ten
years or so, I thought about the positions that would elevate me to some prominence within the Party and therefore bring me to the attention of the Members, which included positions on National Executive, Party Campaign Director for 1988 and 1990 Federal Elections and 1988 State Election, and a whole range of things that firstly would give me the experience within the Party to perform some new and more important role (...) it was a fairly deliberate effort on my part to adopt a fairly strategic approach in deciding how my goal would best be achieved. [Sowada 1993: 32-33]

Table 4.8 Age at Which Women MPs Began Politically Active (persons)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Australia</th>
<th>Taiwan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Senate</td>
<td>House of Representatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>under 20</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-24</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-29</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-34</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-39</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-44</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-49</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-54</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mean</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total*</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *Refers to the number of the women MPs whose data are available.

Taiwanese women MPs rely mainly on family sponsorship. In the local elections the family is the most active agency. Its influence, networks and links with local factions are relatively easy to mobilise, and women can utilise these networks as easily as men. During the service period in local government, women can run political office and look after their families because of the less work in local administration and close geographical distances.

Australian women MPs are older and more experienced in organisational politics. Compared with Taiwanese women, Australian women usually enjoy more equal educational and occupational chances, domestic division of labour, and they more actively
participate in organisations, especially political parties. Thus their opportunities are higher, but they suffer from restricted access to resources, such as political clout, media exposure and money. Their ability to run for top political offices may be not proven until they have 'enough' party working experiences.

In Taiwan, women frequently are asked to perform their family roles even when involved in politics full-time. However, these tasks are regraded as politically important and relevant for their career. They can use it as a political asset. Women's ability to run political office is not narrowly defined by party experience. One of my respondents reports,

My case demonstrates that women candidates are not necessary to be associated with political martyrdom. I have three children who are doing well in school. My husband has a good job. I am lecturing in university. I can say that my family is a perfect family. This fact makes me popular in my electorate.

**Local Government Experience**

More than one-third women MPs in Taiwan have had local government experience (see Table 4.9). More than one quarter Assemblywomen and near half of women Legislators had served in local governments before entering parliament. If those two women Legislators' experiences in the National Assembly are included, then 18 out of 35 (51%) of all women Legislators in Taiwan have experiences of running a local political office before entering the Legislative Yuan. The portion of Assemblywomen with experiences of running political office is 31%.

By contrast, few Australian women MPs have experience in local government service. There has been a reduction in the shifts from state parliaments, and a growing proportion of women members win their seats without previous electoral experience (Rydon 1986: 47). It looks like local government is not an important channel for MPs to reach the federal elite position in Australia.
Table 4.9 Women MPs with Experience of Local Government Services

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Australia</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Taiwan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Senate</td>
<td>House of</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>Legislative Yuan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Representatives</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4*</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>22**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * 1 woman MHR had served in the Senate before entering the House of Representatives.

** 2 Assemblywomen had served as Legislators before entering the National Assembly. 2 women Legislators had served as Assemblywomen before entering the Legislative Yuan.

This difference reflects the composition of political resources. In Taiwan, local communities and the family-centred networks are crucial resource suppliers. In order to run for local political office, one has to build solid political connections which are helpful in contesting first the local and then the national seats. In Australia, political parties themselves are the main resource providers. They effectively deliver political resources and place their members in federal parliament. Therefore, activism in political parties, rather than in local politics, is more advantageous to those who try to reach the positions of the political elite.

**Political Party Experiences**

As expected, Australian women MPs are much more active in political parties than their counterparts in Taiwan. In Australia, 24 out of 34 women Senators had held significant positions in political parties, as had women MHRs (13 out of 19). In Taiwan, only 27 out of 70 Assemblywomen and 4 out of 35 women Legislators had held party positions. Equally important, Australian women MPs overwhelmingly had held top positions in local or state branches of political parties. Taiwanese women MPs, by contrast, had only served in lower positions, such as members of party branch committees. It is

11 Members of committees, at either local or provincial level, are not a powerful position in the KMT. The chairperson at local or provincial branches has much more power.
noteworthy that 15 Taiwanese women MPs entered the top positions in parties after their election. Two women Legislators, for example, were granted directorships in the KMT's Sun Yat-sen Institution on Policy Research and Development. Both held PhDs and got the positions after winning the election. It is clear that political parties are less central arenas of political ascent in Taiwan than in Australia.

Table 4.10 Political Party Experience of Women MPs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Party Experiences</th>
<th>Senate</th>
<th>House of Representatives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Secretary/Treasurer</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vice-President, local branches</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President, local branches</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vice-President, state branch</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President, state branch</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vice-/Deputy President, federal</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President, federal</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convenor/Policy co-ordinator</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delegate to state conference/council</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delegate to national conference/council</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive, state</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Member of committees</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member/Delegate, state council/executive</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member of committees</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officer/Secretary/(Vice-) President of electorate council</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member/Chairperson of women's council</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spokesperson</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign manager/chairman/staff/assistant</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong>*</td>
<td><strong>24</strong></td>
<td><strong>13</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4.10 (Continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Party Experiences</th>
<th>National Assembly</th>
<th>Legislative Yuan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Sun Yat-sen Institution on Policy Research and Development</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member of Central Committee, national</td>
<td>2**</td>
<td>13**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member of Central Standing Committee, national</td>
<td>1**</td>
<td>1**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women's Department, local</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women's Department, provincial</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women's Department, national</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member of committee, local branches</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member of committee, provincial branches</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive officer, local branches</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive officer, provincial branches</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive officer, national</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delegate to the provincial conference</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delegate to the national conference</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>27</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * Number of persons out of all women MPs who had political party working experiences. However, the records of those who were first elected in 1993 are not available in Australia; and the records of some of those who were first elected in 1991 are unclear in Taiwan.

** The positions were gained after successful election.
Trade Unions

Few women MPs in both countries were active in unions. Four Australian women MPs (two Senators and two MHRs) were Liaison Officers of a trade union, President of a Chamber of Commerce and members of other unions, member of Miscellaneous Workers' Union, and organiser of Hospital Employees Unions. In Taiwan, five women MPs (one Legislator and four Assemblywomen) were active in unions: one was board director of the Telecommunications Union; one was board director of the News Agency Union; one was chairperson of the Post Union; and two were General Managers of the Farmers' Association. While most of these nine women MPs were union activists, two Taiwanese women MPs who were General Managers of the Farmers' Association may have obtained their positions via family networks, because the position was sponsored by local factions.12 All five Taiwanese women MPs also held university degrees and diplomas. Education was important in getting to the top positions in Taiwanese unions.

The relation between political parties and unions was reflected in women MPs' careers. In Australia, the ALP has always maintained very close relation with trade unions, and 3 of 4 women MPs from trade unions were members of the ALP. In Taiwan, the KMT tightly controlled unions until the late 1980s. Four of 5 women MPs with a union background were also members of the KMT.

Involvement in Other Organisations

Women MPs have been involved in two other types of organisations: women's, and voluntary (see Table 4.11 and 4.12). The women's rights organisation (WEL) seems to be most successful in sending their members into parliament in Australia. Only two women MPs in Taiwan came from such women's groups, and both were members of the DPP who entered in the Legislative Yuan in 1992. One was an advocate of neo-feminism in the early 1970s, and the other was her successor in the 1980s. Most women MPs in Taiwan participated in the kind of women's organisations which were very close to the KMT.

12 The General Manager of the Farmers' Association is a very powerful position in local community. Usually the person who heads this position is supported by local factions. See Bosco, J. (1992) Taiwan Factions: Guanxi, Patronage, and the State in Local Politics, Ethnology, 31(2): 157-83.
Table 4.11 Involvement of Women MPs in Women's Organisations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Women Organisations</th>
<th>Australia</th>
<th></th>
<th>Taiwan</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Senate</td>
<td>House of Representatives</td>
<td>National Assembly</td>
<td>Legislative Yuan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women's Electoral Lobby (WEL)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feminist Groups</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Zonta Club</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women's Associations</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese Women's Anti-Aggression League</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>3</strong></td>
<td><strong>1</strong></td>
<td><strong>23</strong></td>
<td><strong>12</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The total is less than the sum of each column because one woman was involved in more than one organisation.

Voluntary organisations are an important channel of access to elite positions, especially in Taiwan. The involvement of women MPs in voluntary organisations in Australia is lower than in Taiwan (27% vs 37%). The character of these voluntary organisations are different in both countries. In Australia, women MPs participate mainly in social issue or charity oriented organisations. In Taiwan, they are likely to be involved in social or personal relationship organisations, such as alumni associations, clan associations, and Tung Hsung Huei. Through these organisations people build their personal and social networks, and this is very important in mobilising support in elections. This may also reflect the fact that women MPs in Taiwan are more grassroots oriented than their Australian counterparts, and that voluntary organisations in Taiwan are more important as controllers and providers of political resources.
Table 4.12 Involvement of Women MPs in Voluntary Organisations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisations</th>
<th>Australia</th>
<th>Taiwan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Senate</td>
<td>House of Representatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State College Staff/ School/ University Association/ Council</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumer Association</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sport Associations</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal Aid Commission</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Red Cross</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the Girls Guides' Association</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YWCA</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Trust</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Planning Association</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional Associations</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foundations</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lions Club</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alumni/ Clan Associations; Tung Shung Hui</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>11</strong></td>
<td><strong>3</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The number of total is less than the sum of each column because one woman may be involved in more than one organisation.
The Patterns of Political Recruitment and Career Types

Political parties in Australia have recently started to emphasise gender balance within higher party positions and to place more stress on training programs and affirmative action for women. In Taiwan, by contrast, gender balance within parties is not a big issue. Due to the reserved-seat system, parties are likely to ignore gender issue, and do not give women appropriate political training, let alone affirmative advantage. This difference makes the aspiring women politicians in Australia keen party players, and pushes aspiring women politicians in Taiwan into local and familial politics.

This is clearly reflected in our data. There is a high proportion of Australian women MPs with party experience. By contrast, few women MPs in Taiwan have held important party positions before their political elevation. This is also reflected in the differences in the organisational exposure. In Australia, there is a high proportion of women MPs with party decision-making experience. Training programs designed by parties and unions for women are popular and help women in pre-selection. In Taiwan, party experience is rare and it does not involve holding decision-making positions. Also, the proportion of women MPs with union affiliation and experience is higher in Australia than in Taiwan. This availability of the union channel increases women's opportunities in Australia.

Taiwanese women MPs, by contrast, seem to have access to more diffused political resources. They can mobilise their family roles (as mothers, wives, and so on) in political campaigns. They can also utilise traditional social and family networks which are very helpful in political campaigns in Taiwan. The family networks are mobilised mainly during political campaigns and pre-selection contest. This is reflected in the high proportion of women MPs in Taiwan who gain local government experience.

Thus, Australian and Taiwanese women MPs may be seen as representing two general configurations and types of political recruitment. In Australia, most women MPs climb to elite positions through long apprenticeship in political organisations, especially political parties. In Taiwan, most women MPs represent sponsored careers; they are clients of different patrons, including influential
political families. These different patterns of political recruitment and ascent are summarised in Table 4.13:

Table 4.13 Political Careers of Women MPs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Patterns</th>
<th>Australia</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Taiwan</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Organisational Activist Career</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Political Party/Union Career</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Grassroots Organisational Activist Career</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Political Family Career</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Indirect Family/Party-sponsored Career</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Direct Family-sponsored Career</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Self Made Career</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Independent Political Activist Career</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Political Opposition Movement Activist Career</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Self Made Career</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Entrenched Institutional Career</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>52</td>
<td></td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Political Careers in Australia

This pattern, by far the most dominant among Australian MPs, is presented by 42 women. Their career include a prolonged political party or union experience and affiliation. Most of them are early starters, have been school teachers or professionals, and hold university degree. They comprise of three sub-patterns: political organisation apprentice, grass-root apprentice, and political family apprentice.

Thirty eight women MPs can be grouped as political party/union career. Their elevation to political elites depends mainly on their organisational positions. They have held some powerful positions, such as branch presidents, members of executive committees, conference delegates, within political parties and unions before election to parliament.

Two women MPs are classified as grassroots organisational careerists. They have served in local government and have less political party experiences than the party apprentices. For most party selectors, local government service may be significant, but most women MPs do not meet this criterion. Paradoxically, the proportion of women parliamentarians in state and local governments is much higher than on the federal level, but most women MPs have not shifted between these two levels. One possible reason may be that on the federal level the party training is more important than on the state level. Five women MPs have local government service experiences: three have held top positions in parties; two have not held any significant positions in parties. Among the latter two, one had served in local government for 20 years and the other had been a civil servant for 20 years and had 2 year experience in local government.

Two women MPs represent family-sponsored political career. However, it must be stressed again that the impact of political families in Australia is limited. Families may give encouragement, skills and contacts with political parties but they cannot guarantee political elevation. Close family members can provide substantial advantages in the form of contacts with strategic positions in party bureaucracies,

13 While seven women MPs have a political family background, 5 of them are deeply involved in political party work and 2 of them do not have any clear party work records.
but these advantages are mediated by parties rather than coming directly from the family itself. This is reflected in the fact that the political elevation to elite positions of the family politicians has also involved long apprenticeship in political parties.

Few Australian women MPs represent a self made career. All of them are professionals and all held 'political' occupations, such as political research officer, lawyer, and lobbyist. They are relatively better educated than those representing an organisational activist career. They seem to be more active in seeking resources outside political parties, and their party involvement is lower and party experience is more limited.

Another five women MPs cannot be assigned to any one of these political career types because their career records are too vague or brief to identify clearly their career paths.

**Political Careers in Taiwan**

Women MPs in Taiwan are mostly the sponsored career type. This type includes 95 women MPs. It is composed of three sub-patterns: indirect party/family-sponsored career, direct family-sponsored career, and entrenched institutional career. Party-sponsored career comprises two thirds of 95 women MPs. The educational backgrounds of these women ranges from PhD to senior high graduates. Few have served in local government. Most of them are affiliated with major parties, especially the KMT, and have been sponsored and supported not only by parties but also by local factions. The family is a basic and influential element in this sponsored relation. As mentioned in Chapter three, political parties, especially the KMT, consolidate their electoral foundation through the family within local communities and factions. Both educational background and local faction influence networks are their main resources. Those women MPs who hold higher degree but lack local faction support are strongly sponsored by their parties. Those whose educational background are low typically have endorsement of local factions and/or are nominated and supported by parties.

A large proportion of family-sponsored women MPs also have local government service experience. MPs with family-sponsored careers come from three different types of families: grassroots political families, political martyrdom families, and political families allied
with the ruling party. Grassroots political family refers to a family in which politics is the main 'business'. Most aspirant members are encouraged to seek political office to maintain their 'family business'. These families are typically of Taiwanese origin\textsuperscript{14}, and usually have strong ties with local factions. Some of the women MPs in this type are heads of local factions or wives/relatives of heads. Eight women MPs come from this background: three are mother, daughter, and mother's sister-in-law; two are sisters; one is married to an electoral political officer; one has parents running an electoral political office; and one has an uncle who is running an electoral political office.

Political martyrdom families are those families whose members actively participated in political opposition movement and were sent to prison during the 1970s. The women politicians in this type have been involved in politics early and have followed their husbands' footsteps to build local networks. They had not run for political office until their husbands' imprisonment. All of them are also members of the DPP, and all have higher education. It is noteworthy that some of them described themselves as full-time housewives. They rely on networks and 'traditional' affective orientation of voters.

Many political families are allied with the ruling party. Their members (mainly father, father-in-law, or husband) have held powerful positions within the KMT or in government. They enjoy advantages in pre-selection, and can win elections due to the party factional distribution of 'iron votes'. It is not surprising that half of women in this type have local government experience. Compared with those from grassroots political families, these women MPs rely more strongly on the ruling party to win their seats. Once the ruling party loses its power, or their family members lose powerful status in the party or government, their political careers are in crisis.

Thirteen women MPs represent the entrenched institutional career type. All of them were recruited by the institutional mechanism. They were elected in the district of the Women's Group. All of them served prior to election in various positions of the Women's Association, and most of them held positions of the heads of it in their

\textsuperscript{14} Their ancestors migrated to Taiwan before the establishment of the Republic of China. Generally, these families have been settled in Taiwan for several generations. In this sense, these families can be called "of Taiwanese origin". Those families settled in Taiwan after the 1940s are usually seen as mainland origin.
own city/county. Since the 1991 National Assembly election, this pattern of political career has no longer been accessible, because of the amendment to the constitution.

Like their counterparts in Australia, those Taiwanese women who represent the self made career are few. Compared with sponsored careerists, they are more politically active and relatively less reliant on party or family sponsors. They are propelled by their own political interests and capacities, while their family or personal networks remain helpful. Among the six women MPs who belong to this type, there are two distinct sub-types: independent political activists and political opposition movement activists.

Each of the three independent political activists has very distinctive character. The only common feature is that they have not been affiliated with any political party during their political life. One was medical doctor with doctorate of medicine, who was a member of the KMT and later of the Social Democratic Party for a very short period. She has been politically active since the 1950s and run electoral political office on various levels. The second had a higher education background and has been active in the labour union. Still another without university degree was a school teacher and manager.

Three self-made women MPs rose through the political opposition movement and now are members of the DPP. One of them combined the feminist movement with the political opposition movement, and the other two devoted themselves to establish an opposition political party. All had been sent to prison after the Kaohsiung Incident. Clearly it was much harder for them to run for political office because they had to break both the 'political taboo' and the gender stereotypes.

Conclusions

Our results indicate that the different patterns of women MPs careers are affected by the different composition of political opportunities and resources in Australia and Taiwan. The higher opportunities of Australian women MPs are reflected both in societal location (occupation, education, and so on) and in their active participation in political organisations. There is less discrimination against women within the Australian society and political system. Taiwanese women
MPs, by contrast, suffer from patriarchal and viriarchal disadvantages, but have access to wider political resources, including some gender-specific ones, which they can derive from their extensive social and family networks.

It is noteworthy that opportunities and resources do not develop in isolation. As opportunities for women improve, organisations are forced to distribute more equally the political resources under their control. This becomes an election issue. In Australia, it is apparent that major political parties try to woo women voters and promise to nominate more women candidates. Once a woman is nominated, however, they often 'stall' because of poor resourcing. In order to promote them, the political parties need to give them either preferential treatment or more access to resources to increase their chances of political success. If women's opportunities increase without improvement in access to resources, women are likely to monopolise lower ranks of political posts and mainly contest unwinnable seats.

The arrangement of opportunities and resources affect career paths leading to political elites. High political opportunities provide Australian women's access to political organisations and, increasingly, to powerful positions within these organisations. This, in turn, affects the access to, and the accumulation of, political resources which are located mainly in bureaucratic organisational positions. These resources, in turn, propel women to elite positions. Therefore, the dominant career path of Australian women MPs is organisation-based. By contrast, Taiwanese women have low political opportunities. They have less party experience and less media exposure, and seldom hold powerful positions in political organisations. Their political success emanate mainly from mobilisation of wide political resources, especially from family networks.

Thus Australia and Taiwan women show different patterns of political recruitment. In Australia, as Rydon (1986: 120-21) notes, party and family affiliations usually seem to counter each other; family connections within a party do not guarantee loyalty and may be regarded as corrupt. Furthermore, family ties are relatively unimportant, and family careers are rare. The significance and the advantage of political family background may be restricted to the process of socialisation and early exposure.
In Taiwan, party and family affiliations strengthen each other, and family roles can be used in electoral politics. Not only voters but also party selectors look for family men and family women. For Taiwanese women this is especially advantageous because men cannot compete with them for the merit and distinction of 'good mother and good wife'. Women, in fact, monopolise the claims to familial virtues, since they, more than the men-providers, are seen as the sustainers of familial bonds.

In the next concluding chapter, we will re-examine our four propositions proposed in Chapter One, and discuss theoretical implications for modernisation theory, gender inequality and elite recruitment in the light of these findings.
CHAPTER FIVE
CONCLUSIONS

Women in Political Elites
Following the rise of women's movements, the gender composition of elected representatives has become an important political issue. Neither the processes of economic modernisation, nor representative democracy, as feminist critics point out, have prevented the biased gender composition of political elites. Three aspects of this biased composition are highlighted here. First, though it is universal, under-representation tends to be greatest in less developed and in unevenly modernised societies with strongly traditional cultures. Second, the pattern of under-representation conforms to the "law of growing disproportion": the higher we go in the political hierarchy, the smaller proportion of women we find. Third, the patterns of gender inequality have been changing in the process of modernisation. However, this change is slow and uneven, and it reflects the specific paths of modernisation followed by different societies. While patriarchal domination typical of traditional societies is waning everywhere, various viriarchal forms of inequality and organisational exclusion persist even in advanced modern societies, such as Australian and Taiwanese society. In order to explore this pattern of inequality — and resolve the puzzle of the similar level of gender under-representation in such dissimilar societies as Australia and Taiwan — we have conceptualised gender inequalities in terms of political opportunities and resources, and have located them within a framework of a sophisticated version of modernisation theory on one hand, and the elite recruitment model, on the other.

The impact of modernisation on gender inequalities, it is argued, needs to be re-examined in the light of the findings on women's representation in, and access to, political elites in both countries. The main weakness of the simple version of modernisation theory is that it ignores variations in modernisation paths, and that it places a disproportionate emphasis on equalisation of women's political opportunities, while ignoring inequality in access to political resources.
A more sophisticated version, embraced here, forms a useful explanatory framework for the analysis of gender inequalities in political recruitment in both evenly and unevenly modernising societies.

The elite recruitment model proposed here is based on the classical work of Mosca (1939) and Michels (1962), and has been elaborated by Putnam (1976) and Pakulski (1982). It stresses the importance of social, structural and organisational factors, and points to elites' control of recruitment through the system of selection and gates leading to pools of eligible candidates from which elite selection is made. This model is linked with the key concepts of political opportunities and resources, while the former reflect the access to the selective pools, the ultimate elevation to elite position is seen as propelled by political resources. In other words, political opportunities can be seen as collective mechanisms facilitating women's access to the pools of eligibles. By contrast, political resources can be regarded as personal characteristics and capital, which empower women in political contests.

Women's access to political elites results from the overall structure of political opportunities and resources. Political opportunities are reflected not only in the women's overall societal location, such as occupation, education and social norms, but also in the institutional arrangement, political selection systems for instance. Political resources are reflected in women's access to specific political assets concentrated in different locations, including political organisations, local communities and family networks.

The arrangement of political opportunities and resources is shaped by the social and cultural dynamics within societies, and reflects the overall paths of modernisation. The social dynamics in Australia have led to a typical "package-like", even modernisation. By contrast, Confucian familism has affected social dynamics in Taiwan, resulting in tradition and modernity being juxtaposed in a pattern of uneven modernisation.

It is stressed here that the combination of women's political opportunities and resources in the two societies is quite different. Liberal individualism in Australia places emphasis on a person's rights, performance and organisational apprenticeship, and has
prompted a rapid equalisation of political opportunities, professionalisation of politics and the withdrawal of the family from the public sphere. However, it has also resulted in the concentration of political resources in the hands of viriarchal political organisations. By contrast, Confucian familism in Taiwan stresses educational credentialism and duties, as well as preserves some traditional patriarchal social arrangements and gender-specific roles. While women's political opportunities are limited, diffused political resources, some of which are gender-specific, are accessible to aspiring women politicians and prompt their elevation to political elites.

The political careers of women MPs in both societies reflect these differences in their access to political opportunities and resources. In Australia, women's greater political opportunities are reflected in the growing proportions of women in higher education, in decision-making positions in political organisations, and in upper level of occupational hierarchy. By contrast, Taiwanese women have fewer opportunities, but they can utilise local government service experience and the support of traditional family networks. As expected, the typical political career patterns in both societies vary: the organisational activist career dominates in Australia and the sponsored career is most frequently found among successful women politicians in Taiwan. This is consistent with the proposed model of political opportunities and resources.

**Implications for Modernisation Theory**

The simple version of modernisation theory has been based on Western (European and North American) experience. It does not fit well the experience of East Asian societies, in which social, economic, political and cultural change have occurred at a different pace and under very specific circumstances, involving colonial domination, authoritarian imposition and political conflicts. The complex versions of modernisation theory, outlined in Chapter One, help in understanding these uneven — and often emulative — forms of modernisation and their consequences for gender inequality and elite recruitment.

It is found in this research the cultural factors and traditionalism have played an important role in shaping the paths of modernisation
in Taiwan, and in changing the status of women there. This implies that the durability and the flexibility of cultural traditions has been under-estimated in modernisation theory. As Archer (1988) and Giddens (1994) suggest, traditional norms and arrangements survive modernisation and adapt to new "modern" conditions. Historically, both Australia and Taiwan were masculine and strongly patriarchal societies. The woman's place was at home, and women were subordinate to men. However, different cultural factors have had different impacts on the improvement of women's positions in the processes of modernisation. Liberal individualism in Australia has helped Australian women's access to the market, education and political organisations. Confucian familism in Taiwan has been less conducive to such status equalisation, yet women in Taiwan have been finding their way to political elites in not much lower proportion than in Australia. They turn, as we argue, many aspects of Confucian traditionalism to their advantage.

Uneven modernisation is characterised as a multi-dimensional process. Changes in each aspect of a society do not occur at the same pace. While some traditional cultural elements help the economic development and affect the formation of political culture, this does not mean that culture determines the outcomes of economic and political modernisation. What we mean is that there exists an interactive relationship between different aspects, and cultural tradition may, or may not, play an important role in this process. Thus, one needs to analyse the specific relationship between the economic, cultural and political aspects, rather than suggest a single pattern of causality between them.

Thus, as far as different social dynamics in different societies are concerned, there exist many different patterns of modernisation. Any view of Western modernisation which shows a systematic fit between different institutional arrangements is exaggerated. Continuous modernisation does not necessarily eliminate asymmetry in women's political opportunities and resources, or increase women's representation in political elites. What this study suggests is that different patterns of modernisation have a different impact on the composition of political opportunities and resources. This composition may be changing with the changing relations between economic,
cultural and political aspects of society. Women's advantages and disadvantages in political contests form in this process. This view enables us to go beyond the simple attribution of women's under-representation in political elites to such factors as patriarchy, low level of modernisation, or discrimination.

**Implications for Theories of Gender Inequality**

Patterns of gender inequality vary widely. Modernisation promotes equalisation in women's access to education and participation in the labour market, but it may not advance women's presence in political elites nor equalise domestic responsibilities. It is clear that the higher the political office, the fewer the women represented. Of the 159 United Nations member states, only 4% were headed by women, and worldwide only 4% of the world's cabinet ministers and 10% of members of lower houses were women by the end of 1990 (United Nations 1991).

Gender disadvantage in politics takes many forms. Political opportunity structure refers to overall access to societal status and it is affected by the universalistic modernisation processes. Access to political resources is not necessarily equal in modern bureaucracies, thus producing hidden forms of gender inequality, often diagnosed as "glass ceilings". In this study, we suggest that increasing women's political representation is able to reflect the interaction between the overall women's societal location, the political institutional arrangement and the locations of political assets. That is, women's access to political opportunities and resources and their political success are formed in this interactive process.

Thus, while gender inequality is a common social fact of human societies, the nature and characteristics of gender inequality may vary widely. Uneven modernisation has its correlation in uneven gender equalisation. Some institutional domains contain more entrenched "inequalities" and are more resistant to universalistic and egalitarian trends and policies.

Theories of gender inequality have to consider both this wide variation in forms of gender inequality and the adaptive patterns observed in Taiwan, whereby women can acquire some advantages within the highly genderised and patriarchal social settings. Confucian
familism does contain entrenched institutionalised gender inequality, and it derives from traditionalism based on a patriarchal structure. However, paradoxically, one may say, gender-specific political resources are preserved in the patriarchy, prompted by traditionalism, and mobilised through familism. Access to these gender-specific political resources is often overlooked by students of gender inequality. Consequently, recipes for gender equalisation often ignore the costs of the imposition of gender universalism. If gender ceases to count, gender-specific resources also disappear. As Australian women have been discovering, they may have equal rights and opportunities, but still lose systematically in their political competition with men.

The experience of women's political recruitment in Australia and Taiwan suggests that to analyse the nature of women's political success is far more realistic than either blindly believing the impersonal processes of modernisation to be women-friendly, or arguing that women are politically without hope in patriarchal societies, no matter what social and political change occurs.

**Implications for Elite Recruitment Theories**

Gender cannot be ignored as an aspect of elite composition and recruitment. Modernisation has not only broken the monopoly of the upper social strata in elite positions, but also changed the overall composition of political elites, including gender composition. In this respect, both the classical and the contemporary elite theories need modification.

Neither the classical nor the contemporary elite theories pay much attention to gender composition. They are preoccupied with psychological make up, class backgrounds, interest representation, internal hierarchy, and unity vs divisions among the power-holders. The issue of gender composition has been brought to the agenda of elite studies by the current wave of feminist theories stressing two theoretical issues. First, that gender composition of elites reflects the general inequality of power relations in society. It is a societal index of the gender gap. Second, it has been argued that the presence/absence of women in political elites affects the very characters of these elites. Not only their representativeness (though this is an important issue), but also their orientations and agenda are affected by gender balance.
While women inhabit both left and right ideological position, they bring into the agenda the glossed over issues affecting women in society. Moreover, some see them as a moderating force in politics, softening ideological divisions.

Thus, the fundamental issue is why gender matters in political elites. Answers to this question can be summarised as follows: First, the inclusion of women in central roles in politics is a matter of social equality and justice. Second, men and women are different in terms of orientations and interests, and thus women cannot be properly represented by men. Third, valuable human resources are wasted when talented women are excluded from politics. Women account for half of the population in any society and their involvement in politics can enhance the quality of political leadership. Fourth, women's political representation concerns the legitimacy of the political system itself. Representative democracy embodies the idea of the "mirror of the nation", and the design of electoral institutions is to ensure this outcome. Thus, the composition of political representatives serves to legitimise political regimes. Male-dominated political elites are no longer able to serve this legitimising function (Norderval 1985: 84 in Phillips 1991: 75; Hernes 1987; Darcy et al. 1994).

Taiwanese women's unequal access to political opportunities is relatively easy to explain — it derives from the unequal gender relations within patriarchal culture and social structure. Unequal access to political resources by Australian women is more difficult to account for. The major Australian political organisations are viriarchal, few women hold high positions within them, and the majority of resource managers are male. This unequal access to organisational statuses and resources may be understood in terms of elite perpetuation and self-protection. Through institutional arrangements, the masculine political elite affects the selection of recruits, and filters out those who may change the collective ethos and arrangements. Men, it must be stressed again, constitute the majority of these elites. They tend to select their successors from among the skilled and eligible pools, which are predominantly masculine. Thus women's exclusion from political elites and their unequal access to political resources within political organisations become a vicious cycle.
This is reflected in the fact that most Australian women contest marginal seats\(^1\), but most resources are delivered to safe seats which are held by male candidates. By contrast, although Taiwanese women are limited by patriarchal tradition, they can utilise and control political resources from different locations through the established traditional social structure. Thus, a further study of political resources is necessary. These variations in the nature and structure of elite recruitment and gender inequality need to be incorporated in both gender theorising and studies of power.

**Recent Developments and Future Research**

The results of the latest national elections in Australia and Taiwan show some interesting changes. The proportion of women political elites increased to 20% and 14%, respectively. While the proportion of Australian women MPs increased rapidly as a result of the 1996 federal election, women continued to be marginalised and poorly resourced — they either held unwinnable seats or were low on the Senate tickets. The dramatic increase of Australian women politicians has been attributed to a large electoral swing. The new women MPs are seen as "one-term wonders", because most of them hold marginal seats. This vulnerability of Australian women MPs reflects male-dominated pre-selection and resource distribution. But it also reflects a major shift in elite orientations. As mentioned above, gender balance is on the political agenda. Both parties woo women candidates. The ALP promises to fill 35% of safe seats with women candidates in the next decade. This are signs of a gender revolution of unprecedented scope\(^2\).

---

1In Australia until the 1990 election, no women members of House of Representatives were given "safe seats". All women, except Kathy Martin Sullivan (Liberal), won their seats from an opposing party. See Chapter Four.

2 The ALP and the LP are forced to nominate more women candidates and both of them have introduced different strategies to help women in political contests. However, this is not reflected in the result of the 1996 federal election. "In percentage terms Labor nominated fewer women than any party other than the Nationals, despite the adoption by the Labor party of national rules on affirmative action which committees labor to a quota, ensuring that at least one third of its winnable seats would go to women. Women made up only about 24 per cent (42 out of 173) of the candidates nominated by Labor compared with 27 per cent (43 out of 160) of the candidates nominated by the Liberals; 8 per cent (5 out of 58) of the nationals' candidates; and 35 per cent (59 out of 169) of the Democrats' candidates" (Thompson 1996: 5).
The latest national elections in Taiwan were held in 1994 for the Legislative Yuan, and in 1996 for the National Assembly. The proportion of women MPs remained stable. Major parties continued to nominate women candidates as the rivals from other parties. While they had access to diffused political resources, their political opportunities were still very limited. It is worth stressing that some women politicians from political families and local factions remained very successful in these elections. This shows that political opportunities alone cannot provide a complete explanation for women's political success. The role of political resources in women's political recruitment should be emphasised.

Because of the limited data available, we focus here on the career paths of successful women politicians in both societies. In order to examine further the role of opportunities and resources, one needs to study also unsuccessful women candidates. By examining the experience of unsuccessful women politicians, one can further strengthen and extend the political opportunity and resource model by identifying the critical levels of opportunities and resources, and their combinations critical for political success.

There are also some other questions that require further analysis. What is the relationship between culture, government policy and organisational strategies in affecting change of women's overall position? How does cultural variation affect elite change? In particular, how does gender equalisation affect, and how is it affected by, democratisation in Confucian societies? To answer these questions one needs to explore more deeply the nature and mechanisms of gender equalisation and the relationship between cultural legacies, on one hand, and political recruitment in different societies and in different historical contexts, on the other.


Chiou, C. L. (1993b) *Democratising China and Taiwan: Cultural and Institutional Paradigm*. Regime Change and Regime Maintenance in Asia and the Pacific, Discussion Paper No. 11. Canberra: The
Department of Political and Social Change, Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University.


Cotton, J. (1990) The Limits to Liberalization in Industrializing Asia: Three Views of the State. Working Paper No. 9, Canberra:
Department of International Relations, Australian National University.


Department of Social Affairs, the Taiwan Provincial Government (1990) *Taiwanese Women Statistics*. Nan-tou: Department of Social Affairs, the Taiwan Provincial government. (in Chinese).


Tien, H. M., and Chu, Y. H. (1994) Taiwan's Domestic political Reforms, Institutional Change and power Realignment. in G. Klintworth (ed.), Taiwan in the Asia-Pacific in the 1990s. Canberra and St. Leonards: Allen & Unwin in association with the Northeast Asia Program and Department of International Relations, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, ANU.


Tsai, Y. L. (1989) Anthropological Studies of the Taiwan Area: Accomplishments and Prospects. Taipei: Department of Anthropology, National Taiwan University.


APPENDIX

A. Political System in Taiwan

The president is the highest representative of the nation. He/She is elected by the members of the National Assembly. Starting with the coming presidential term in May 1996, each term of the president and the vice president will be reduced from current 6 to 4 years, and the president and the vice president will be directly elected by the entire electorate. With the consent of the Legislative Yuan, the president appoints the premier (the president of the Executive Yuan) and the auditor-general of the Control Yuan. With the consent of the National Assembly, the president also appoints the president, vice-president, and the grand justices of the Judicial Yuan; the president, vice-president, and members of the Examination Yuan; and the president, vice-president, and members of the Control Yuan.

Both the National Assembly and the Legislative Yuan comprise the parliament. The National Assembly consists of delegates who are elected from each county/city or area. Its functions include: (1) electing the president and the vice president; (2) recalling the president and the vice president; (3) amending the Constitution; and (4) voting on proposed Constitutional amendments submitted by the Legislative Yuan by way of a referendum. The National Assembly meets 90 days before the expiration of each presidential term. However, since 1992 members of the National Assembly are elected according to the new provisions, and the proportion of seats reserved for women is clearly specified (for details, see Appendix B). The members of the National Assembly serve now 4 year terms. The functions of the National Assembly include: (1) election of the president and the vice president1;

1 Under some conditions, the National Assembly will elect the president and vice president. Article 12 of the Additional Articles of the Constitution states: "Should the office of the Vice President become vacant, the President shall nominate a candidate within three months and envoke an extraordinary session of the National Assembly to elect a new Vice President who shall serve out each respective original term until its expiration. Should the offices of both the President and the Vice President become vacant, the president of the Legislative Yuan shall serve notice on the National Assembly to convoke an extraordinary session within three months to elect a new
(2) impeachment of the president and vice president; (3) amendment of the Constitution; (4) voting referendums on proposed Constitutional amendments submitted by the Legislative Yuan; and (5) exercising the power of consent to confirm the appointment of personnel nominated by the president.

The Legislative Yuan is the highest legislative branch of the state, composed of popular elected representatives who serve for 3 years and are eligible for re-election. Its functions include: (1) exercising a general legislative power; (2) confirming emergency orders; (3) examination of budgetary bills and audit reports; (4) consent of appointment of personnel nominated by the president; and (5) amendment of the Constitution.

The Executive Yuan is the highest administrative organ of the state. It has a premier, a vice premier, eight ministers, and a number of ministers without portfolio as well as directors of councils and commissions. It needs to be mentioned that whether Taiwan is a presidential or cabinet system is uncertain because "the exact division of labour between the president and premier is unclear and depends to a considerable extent upon their personal power positions." The relationship between Executive Yuan and the Legislative Yuan resembles that of the President and Congress in the US in the sense of having veto and override powers (Chou et al. 1990: 45).

The Judicial Yuan is the highest judicial organ of the state. It is responsible for the adjudication of civil, criminal, and administrative litigation, and the disciplinary actions of civil servants. It is comprised of a president, a vice president, and 15 grand justices.

The Examination Yuan is responsible for the examination, employment, and management of civil service personnel at all levels of the government. It supervises all examination-related matters including all matters relating to qualification screening, security of tenure, pecuniary aid in case of death, and the retirement of civil servants; and all legal matters relating to the employment, discharge, President and a new Vice President, who shall serve out each respective original term until its expiration."
performance evaluation, scale of salaries, promotion, transfer, commendation, and award for civil servants.

The examination system applies to all levels of government workers from rank-and-file to cabinet members. There are two main types of government examinations, Civil Service Examinations and Examinations for Professionals and Technologists. Civil Service Examinations mainly include Senior-grade and Junior-grade. The former is divided into Level I for holders of PhD, and Master degrees; and level II for holders of Bachelor degrees, and secondarily for those who have passed the Senior Qualifying Examinations or those who passed the Junior Civil Service Examinations at least 3 years previous to taking the examination. The majority of top position holders within the government are recruited from this channel, in particular from Level I. The latter mainly applies to graduates of senior high/vocational schools, and equivalents.

The Control Yuan is the highest control organ of the state. It exercises the powers of impeachment, censure, and audit. Before, its members were elected from provincial and municipal city councils. Starting in 1993, it is comprised of 29 members, including a president and a vice president, all of whom are nominated and appointed by the president of the state, with the consent of the National Assembly. Each term of the office is 6 years.
B. Constitution of the Republic of China

1947
The National Assembly

Article 26,

7. "The number of delegates to be elected by women's organizations shall be prescribed by law."

The functions of the National Assembly include: (1) to elect the President and the Vice President; (2) to recall the President and the Vice President; (3) to amend the Constitution; and (4) to vote on proposed Constitutional amendments submitted by the Legislative Yuan by way of referendum.

The Legislative Yuan

Article 64

6. The number of women to be elected under the various items...... shall be prescribed by law.

Article 75. No member of the Legislative Yuan shall concurrently hold a government post.

1992 Additional Articles of the Constitution of the Republic of China
The National Assembly

Article 1. Members of the National Assembly shall be elected according to the following provisions without being subject to the restrictions in Articles 26 and 135 of the Constitution:

1. Two members shall be elected from each Special Municipality, each county or city in the free area. However, where the population exceeds 100,000 persons, one member shall be added for each additional 100,000 persons.

2. Three members each shall be elected from the lowland and highland aborigines in the free area.

3. Twenty members shall be elected from the Chinese citizens who reside abroad.

4. Eighty members shall be elected from one nationwide constituency.

If the number of seats allotted to a Special Municipality, county or city covered under Item One (1) above; or if the number of seats won by a political party under Item Three (3) or Four (4) above is between
five and ten, then one of the seats stipulated in the pertaining item shall be reserved for a female candidate. Where the number exceeds ten, one seat out of each additional ten shall be reserved for a female candidate.

The Legislative Yuan

Article 2. Members of the Legislative Yuan shall be elected according to the following provisions without be subject to the restrictions in Article 64 of the Constitution:

1. Two members shall be elected from each province and each Special municipality in the free area. Where the population exceeds 200,000 persons, however, one member will be added for each additional 100,000 persons; and where the population exceeds one million persons, one member will be added for each additional 200,000 persons.

2. Three members each shall be elected from the lowland and highland aborigines in the free area.

3. Six members shall be elected from the Chinese citizens who reside abroad.

4. Thirty members shall be elected from one nationwide constituency.

If the number of seats allotted to a Special Municipality, county or city covered under Item One (1) above; or if the number of seats won by a political party under Item Three (3) or Four (4) above is between five and ten, then one of the seats stipulated in the pertaining item shall be reserved for a female candidate. Where the number exceeds ten, one seat out of each additional ten shall be reserved for a female candidate.

Article 4...... The members representing Chinese citizens residing abroad and the numbers representing the nationwide constituency shall be elected by way of party-list proportional representation.

Electoral and Recall Law

As the members of each constituency are five to ten, there is one seat reserved for women, and another reserved seat was added whenever the size of the constituency increases by ten.