THE AWARENESS OF TIME AND ETERNITY IN THE GERMAN LYRICS OF ANDREAS GRYPHIUS

by

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E. K. Everingham
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Abstract of Thesis submitted by Edith Katherine Evenhuis
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The intention of this thesis has been to demonstrate the centrality of Gryphius' awareness of time and eternity in his German lyrics. By way of introduction, we have looked briefly at the poet's life and background, as well as at the concept of poetry prevalent in his era.

In the main body of the thesis we have then proceeded to discuss the poet's awareness of time and eternity as revealed, firstly, in the theme and subject matter of his German lyrics, secondly, in structure and imagery. Wherever relevant, reference has been made to his drama and funeral dissertations.

Having attempted to define the concepts of time and eternity - as far as possible in terms of Gryphius' own statements - we have then dealt with the poet's predominant themes: transience of universe, world-system, man and his values, human life, the use and conquest of time - always within the wider context of the awareness of time and eternity.

From the above analysis we have arrived at the following conclusions: far from being torn apart by the dichotomy between time and eternity, Gryphius' whole creative personality is orientated towards the ultimate integration of the two. This is not to deny, in any way, his profound sense of the transience and futility of the things of time in themselves. But here his awareness does
not end. While refusing to ascribe any eternal or eternalising qualities to anything born of, or created in, time, he is swift to recognise that the temporal may well serve as a pointer to the eternal. He also believes in the potential of every individual to conquer time, not by any of the temporal means, whose spuriousness he decries, but by availing himself of the ultimate conquest of time accomplished by Christ.

It is still within this essentially Christian framework that we have viewed Gryphius' use of structure and imagery. In examining his exploitation of the sonnet form, we have pointed to a definite correspondence between structure and the view of life presented, it being virtually impossible, in Gryphius' serious sonnets, to speak of intricacy of form for its own sake. Similarly, in the domain of imagery, we have detected a clear purpose behind his incorporation of even the most conventional metaphors and similes.

We have shown that Gryphius' frequent use of allegory and emblem is highly symptomatic of his assessment of time in the light of eternity: it is not just that merely incidental or accidental phenomena from the material realm may assume universal and spiritual significance, but rather that, according to Gryphius' conviction, the temporal assumes value, significance and durability only as it is brought into focus with the eternal.

In our final conclusion we have noted that, for Gryphius, the only unit of time to which man may lay any claim is the moment. Depending on the individual's attitude towards it, it is either an elusive, moving point in the inexorable course of time or the very point at which eternity offers itself to us.
INTRODUCTION.

The subject of this thesis is the awareness of time and eternity in the German lyrics of Andreas Gryphius, reference being made, wherever relevant, to his dramatic and prose writings, in particular the Funeral Dissertations. It is not, however, our intention to deal with his Latin works.

By way of introduction to the main body of the thesis, we have included a short biographical chapter in which we have attempted to draw attention to those facets of the poet's life, background and experience that appear to have a bearing on his poetry. Thus we have emphasised Gryphius' immense learning, his scientific curiosity and, above all, his acute sense of vocation as a Christian in secular life - all of which attributes are reflected in his literary works.

In passing, we have glanced at the general concept of the poet's role in Gryphius' era, noting, once again, the importance attached to the notion of social responsibility. It is this aspect that we stress before commencing the discussion of our central topic. Translated into the specific terms of this thesis: we have expressed Gryphius' poetic vocation as the readily accepted responsibility of opening men's eyes to their condition, of freeing them from their enslavement to time and of pointing them towards eternity.

The thesis proper is divided into two main sections. In the first section, the poet's awareness of time and eternity in its relationship to the predominant themes of his works is discussed. The second section is concerned with the way in which Gryphius makes use of structure and imagery to give shape to his basic
dualistic awareness, attention being focussed on the significance of his exploitation and manipulation of the sonnet-structure, as well as on his use of allegory and emblem.

This present work does not purport to be a synthetic analysis of critical texts on Gryphius. Our intention throughout is to discuss Gryphius' Weltanschauung, as far as possible, in terms of his own statements. Invariably, our point of departure has been his lyrics, whose ideological content we have then attempted to elucidate and expand by reference to his own dramas and funeral dissertations, rather than to secondary literature. However, this does not mean that we disavow our indebtedness to the authors listed in the selective bibliography. Nevertheless, at this stage we must emphasise that, being far from expert on the subject of theology, we have tended to disregard those works which have a purely theological approach. On the other hand, given the undeniably Christian orientation of Gryphius' writings, we have preferred not to take up cudgels with critics who attempt to impose an agnostic or atheistic perspective on his works.

Our primary sources throughout have been the Gesamtausgabe der deutschen Sprache by R. W. L. Waller, referred to in our thesis as Ga., Marian Szymocki and Hugh Powell, Max Niemeyer Verlag, Tübingen, 1963 (we have chosen this edition, in preference to others, for the sake of convenience and relative completeness, in spite of some doubtful readings) and the original edition of the Dissertationes Funebres, abbreviated Diss. Fun., Edition Treschern, Leipzig, 1667.
CHAPTER I.

THE LIFE AND BACKGROUND OF ANDREAS GRYPHIUS.

Andreas Gryphius was born in Glogau, Silesia, on the 2nd. of October 1616, two years before the outbreak of the Thirty Years' War. An orphan by the time he was twelve - his father, an archidiakonus in the Lutheran church, died in 1620 and his mother in 1628 - his childhood and early youth were difficult and unsettled and dogged by a long series of illnesses and mishaps. There is, moreover, some indication that his relationship with his stepfather, Michael Eder, in whose care his mother's death left him, was not particularly cordial.

Owing to the state of war in his homeland, his education was continually interrupted, as, for instance, in 1628, when Glogau was occupied by the Lichtenstein Dragoons and Gryphius was forced to take refuge in Driebitz, with his stepfather who was the Lutheran pastor there. During the next two years Gryphius studied at home, under Eder's tutelage.

Early in 1631, after a fruitless attempt to find lodgings in Gailitz, where he had hoped to attend the Gymnasium, he witnessed the razing of Glogau by fire. Eventually his stepfather found him a place in a school at Fraustadt, and here, thanks to his considerable scholastic abilities, he was able to help himself out financially by tutoring the sons of well-to-do families.

In May 1634, he set sail for the prosperous merchant-city of Danzig, experiencing a close encounter with death when his ship ran into a violent storm. In Danzig, then part of the kingdom of Poland and endowed with special rights and privileges, he found himself, for the first time, in a material and intellectual climate conducive to the development of the arts and the pursuit of learning. In-
dustrious and gifted student that he was, he was quick to grasp the opportunities presented by this new and fertile milieu. He made friends with scholars like Peter Crüger, the mathematician and Riecius, the lawyer; and won quite a reputation for himself with his Latin poem, Parnassus.

Upon Gryphius' return from Danzig, Eder was instrumental to his obtaining a position as house-tutor to the sons of the wealthy and cultured nobleman, Schönborner. Here, once again, Gryphius found himself in a stimulating intellectual climate. His patron, who was in possession of an extremely well-stocked library, was knowledgeable on a wide variety of subjects and, although subject to fits of intense depression, a brilliant conversationalist. Swift to recognise Gryphius' scholastic and poetic potential, Schönborner bestowed on him the title of Magister Artis and had his daughter, Elisabeth, crown him poet laureate. Schönborner's death in 1637 was a cruel blow to Gryphius who was called upon to deliver the funeral oration – another indication of the Schönborners' appreciation of the young poet's gifts.

In mid 1638, six months after his patron's death, Gryphius left for Holland with a group of wealthy young men, among them Schönborner's two sons. After a brief stay in Amsterdam, the party moved on to the university town of Leyden, where Gryphius spent the next five years – the formative years of his life.

In spite of the serious illnesses that marred his time in Holland, he was able to play an active role in the university life of a cultural centre, then second to none and through which passed some of the greatest thinkers of seventeenth century Europe. Besides attending lectures on a wide range of subjects, he himself led discussion-groups on Metaphysics, Aristotelian Philosophy, Geography,
Astrology, Trigonometry, Logic, Poetry, Tragedy and Physiognomy; and lectured on Roman Antiquity, History, Mathematics, Physics and Chiroiunacy. In marked contrast to his obvious thirst for knowledge in every known field of science, he held a public discourse: De Rerum Omnium Vanitate 2).

In June 1641, having benefited to the full from all that the "most cultured country in Europe" 3) had to offer an astute young scholar, having "served his apprenticeship as a dramatist" 3), Gryphius left Holland for France, as travelling companion to the rich young Pomeranian, Wilhelm Schlegel. After sixteen months in Paris, where Gryphius was greatly impressed by Cardinal Richelieu's library 4), they set out for Italy, whose great artistic and historical centres they intended to visit. Rome, in particular, seems to have fascinated Gryphius. In sonnet and epigram he records vivid memories of, above all, its catacombs 5) and its fleas 6).

From Italy Gryphius went on to Strasbourg, staying there for six months, during which time he made the acquaintance of the eminent professors Biccius, Dannhäuser and Bööler and finished his Leu Armenius. His wanderings then took him via Speyer, Mainz, Frankfurt am Main, Cologne and Amsterdam to Stettin, where he stayed for some time with Wilhelm Schlegel, finally leaving for Fraustadt on the 8th November 1647.

Although his fame as a scholar brought him offers of professorships both in Germany and abroad, he declined them all, preferring to remain in war-scarred Silesia, which, he believed, it was his God-given vocation to serve. Early in 1649 he married Rosina Deutschlander, the daughter of a well-to-do Fraustadt merchant and in May of the same year, became syndic of Glogeu, which post he held until his sudden death in 1664.
The last fifteen years of his life were no easier than the preceding ones: as a protestant filling a responsible civic office, in a community which, although predominantly protestant, was nevertheless under the supremacy of the catholic Hapsburgs, he would continually have been called upon to exercise more than average resourcefulness and discretion in the furthering and protecting of protestant interests, without incurring the displeasure of the catholics. The very fact that he was able to work as syndic for so long a term, without ever changing or compromising his religious loyalties, is an indication of his rare diplomacy and integrity.

In 1656 Glogau was ravaged by the Plague; and the following year, the town fell prey to another disastrous fire. In the blaze, Gryphius lost his home and a large number of books and manuscripts.

Nor was his intimate family-life free from sorrow and anxiety. He and his wife had seven children of whom one was still-born and three died in their infancy. A daughter, Anna Rosina, developed severe mental illness at the age of forty; Gryphius himself, whose whole life had been dogged by sickness and mishap, died of a heart attack.

Gryphius' native Silesia had been, and still was, a centre of German mysticism, with such names as Böhme, Spee, Scheffler and Kuhlmann. The border towns of Lissa and Fraustadt (actually in Poland) were a melting-pot of various religious sects. In addition, Silesia lay directly in the path of the Counter Reformation with its military and ideological coercion. Gryphius' own staunch and unwavering adherence to the Augsburg Confession, throughout his life, by no means implies that he kept himself sternly aloof from all other religious influences.
Indeed, he must have been characterised by an unusually large measure of tolerance— an ability, in the words of Saint Paul in I Thessalonians 5,21, to "prove all things" and "hold fast that which is good."

As a schoolboy he took part, as an actor, in Jesuit-produced plays. The Latin works of his youth, in particular his Herodesepen, written when he was seventeen, do not merely fit into the Humanistic tradition, the "Gefolgschaft des Marino oder des Daniel Heinsius, sondern besonders auch jesuitischer Werke wie vor allem Jakob Bidermanns Herodiss..."8). Included in the first collection of his German sonnets ever published (Lissa 1637), as well as in later editions, were three "Nachdichtungen" of Latin originals by the Jesuits Bidermann, Sarbiewski and Bauhausius. His Kirchhofsge- dancken are, to a large extent, inspired by the Poema de Vanitate Mundi of the catholic Jakob Balde. That Gryphius was not averse to drawing on the experience and skill of the great Jesuit dramatists, is borne out by the dramatic and stylistic techniques he employs in his tragedies and by the very themes he treats: martyrdom, unflinching constancy and endurance, the sudden decline of greatness, vanity, which are among those beloved of the learned padre.

The subject matter of his Leo Armenius was presumably suggested by the Latin play of the same title, written by the English Jesuit, Josephus Simon— although Gryphius' interpretation of the facts is at variance with Simon's. He also translated Nicolas Caussin's martyr-drama, Felicitas.

In much the same way as he adopted and adapted Jesuit material and techniques, as corresponding to, and giving apt expression to basic elements of his own awareness, he may also be said to have drawn on certain of the language-resources of the mystic 9), as, for instance, in Ewige Freude der Ausservahlten.
Verlangen nach den Ewigen Hängeln (Ga. Bd. II, p. 35) and so on, where he attempts to evoke realities outside the possible realms of concrete experience. But to assume, on the evidence of such passages, that Gryphius had a definite disposition towards mysticism, would be to overlook the context in which they occur and to deny the evidence of his whole life—a life spent, not in solitary meditation and aspiration towards the "unio mystica", but in the active pursuit of knowledge and the unselfish service of his fellow men.

This preacher of earthly vanity and transience and of eternal bliss or damnation, beyond the grave, did not summarily turn his back on the world and what it had to offer in the way of allurements or challenges. Rather, he studied it and its institutions carefully. The face, which Kiliàn's engraving of the poet presents to us, is not that of an ascetic, but a full-blooded face, tempered by sadness, wisdom and experience. Born into the "century of genius"10), when scientific discovery challenged much traditional belief— to the extent of coming into conflict with certain church doctrines— Gryphius delved into the new sciences, even writing a treatise refuting the previously accepted theory that fire was an element 11). As a classical scholar, polyhistor and statesman, he was, no doubt, continually involved with those very values that his poetry dismisses as spurious. Or was this really the case,... since, in these pursuits, his ultimate authority was still the divine wisdom and order of God? This particular question will be covered in a later chapter.

Andreas Gryphius, the scholar, may be said to have been a typical example of the enquiring mind of his day. As a protestant, growing up in the insecurity and
terror of a country torn by religious wars, his was the experience of many. But what of Andreas Gryphius the poet? Is he to be regarded as a representative spokesman for his age, or is he a unique figure in seventeenth century German literature?

The perusal of any comprehensive anthology of seventeenth century German verse reveals an abundance of evidence to the fact that Gryphius was far from being an "Einzelgänger, either as regards themes and sentiments expressed, or even imagery and technique. His is a voice in a chorus of many voices, standing out from the others only by virtue of its resonance, clarity and power. But, in order to appreciate fully the extent to which Andreas Gryphius, as a poet, is representative of his age, it will be necessary to examine briefly his contemporaries' concept of the poet's role and of the nature of poetry, and to see how far Gryphius and his works conform to this concept.

The sixteen hundreds saw in Germany a phenomenon, observable a century earlier in Renaissance France and Italy: an attempt to emulate, on a national level, by way of the national language, the great literary achievements of classical antiquity. For the Germans, there was now the added incentive of emulating the prowess of other European cultures. To the seventeenth century German theorists, whose tenets were based largely on Greek and Roman poetics, the poet was necessarily a man of great learning, since poetry, at its highest level, was almost equivalent to philosophy - to the imparting of wisdom. The poet was, moreover, expected to be well-versed in the theory of poetry, i.e. poetics, which was taught as a school and university subject. He must be a craftsman, skilled in versification and the welding together of images and ideas from diverse sources into new and pleasing patterns. Not only was he to be conversant with Greek and Latin lit-
erature, but also to have a wide knowledge of contemporary foreign languages and literatures and to be practised in the art of translation 14). In addition, he was a responsible member of the community - usually with a dual role: the civic or social vocation of his workaday profession and his poetic vocation, equally socially orientated, to instruct and please.

"Nützen" and "ergötzen" - these, in short, were the poetic criteria of the age. In his Buch der deutschen Poeterey, Martin Opitz lays particular stress on "Nützen" when he speaks of the oracular nature of poetry:

Die Poeterey war anfangs nichts anders als eine verborgene Theologie und Unterricht von göttlichen Sachen 14).

"verborgene Theologie" because disguised by the attractive covering of poetic form Harsdörffer also draws attention to the serious, didactic function of the poet:

Es soll der Poet den Inhalt seines Gedichte auf den Nutzen und die Lehre richten:

once again coupling the instructive element with the pleasing, captivating or moving aspect:

die Ausführung aber mit schönen Worten und Gedanken leisten/dass der Leser dadurch belustigt/ und ihm gleichsam das Hertz abgewonnen wird 15).

That "delectare" and "movere" may be complementary, or even interchangeable, is brought out by Buchner's insistence on the careful choice of words and expressions by the poet, whose language must be

schön/ lieblich und scheinbar...../ damit er das Gemüth des Lesers bewegen/ und in demselben eine Lust und Verwunderung.....erwecken möge.../ 16).
In its higher manifestations, poetry, for the seventeenth century German theorists, is the conveying of universal values and eternal truths by the temporal means of an extremely "zielbewusst", audience-conscious and often highly ornate prosody. However, it would be an oversimplification to state that precisely the same criteria governed the so-called "lower" Gattungen. While these criteria may, to a large extent, be said to apply to the "strafgedicht", whose didactic purposes are self-evident, it would be difficult to extend them to include many examples of the pastoral lyric — with, of course, the notable exception of "geistliche Hirt enlieder."

In the person of Andreas Gryphius we have virtually the epitome of the seventeenth century German poet, as defined in the poetics of the time. He was a scholar of extraordinary intellectual capacity and versatility, whom Kuhlmann, in his Entsprassende Teutsche Palmen des Palmen-Ordens, eulogises as 'Der deutsche Sophokles/ das Wunder unser Zeit...17)

He was a master in the use of verse-form and rhetoric, a meticulous artisan, when it came to polishing and repolishing his lines for greater smoothness, effect and succinctness of utterance. Besides having a thorough knowledge of the Classics, he wrote fluently in Latin, having, while little more than a child, won acclaim with his Latin verse. He is said to have known eleven languages, including Hebrew. Certainly, his extensive travels would have given him ample scope for exercising his linguistic abilities and a far deeper insight into contemporary foreign cultures than could ever be achieved by mere reading. His capabilities as a translator are borne out by his renderings, in lively German, of Latin, Dutch, French and Italian originals.
Above all, he must have had a profound sense of social responsibility and
vocation, reflected in his fifteen years of untiring service as syndic of Glogau,
in preference to less arduous positions outside Silesia; reflected, too, in the
predominant note of seriousness in his writing. If his poetry were, as he puts it
merely the "Beschäftigung wäisiger Nebenstunden 18), then, his sense of mission
in life was certainly not limited to his normal working hours 18). As a poet,
it is the spiritual good of his fellow men he is concerned with, rather than
their material, or even moral, well-being. His calling is to point to a solid,
external reality beyond the ultimate instability of this temporal life; if neces-
sary, to shake the foundations of false security, to prick the bubble of illusion,
but always in order to superimpose absolute, inalienable values. Even his satire
is not the destructive axe of the idealist, driven to nausea or despair, but the
judicious pruning-knife of the sage, whose wisdom is based upon experience and
faith. Although, like most writers of his day, he produced his share of flippant
and saucy "Gelegenheitsverse", by and large, the tenor of his work does indeed
 correspond to Opitz' definition of the original function of poetry: "ein gött-
liches zu verkünden" 19).

To sum up: Paul Hankamer's appraisal of the Baroque poet can be applied
word for word to Gryphius:

Der Dichter der Zeitt steht als geistiger Mensch in der Haltung da,
wie sie die sittlich vorbildliche der Zeit war, als der standhaft Beharren-
der... Was er zu sagen hatte, wenn er ernsthaft sprach, war nur nach Klar-
heit, Tiefe und Umfang unterschieden von dem Wissen aller. 20)

Such then, is the image of Andreas Gryphius, the poet: "der standhaft Beharrende"
among the ruins of time, giving expression to the genius, the problems, the ideal of his age.

References:


2 " " p.xxix.

3 " " p.xxxi.


10 Hugh Powell: Introduction to Andreas Gryphius' Carolus Stuardus. p.xii.

11 " " Andreas Gryphius and the "New Philosophy". In: German Life and Letters N.S.5, 1951-1952; p.274.


19 Martin Opitz: Poetik des Barock. p.11.

CHAPTER II.
The Awareness of Time and Eternity in Gryphius' Works.

It is impossible, when considering the works of Andreas Gryphius, to speak of an acute awareness of time, without simultaneously referring to an equally strong awareness of eternity, 1) since it is against the background of an unchangeable and unshakable "Jenseits", that the transience and mutability of temporal existence are thrown into sharp relief. In other words: temporal existence, with its rapid succession of events and changes, is seen in contrast to an immovable eternity; and it is in the perspective of this stationary, timeless background that the impression of movement and transience is intensified.

Time and eternity, as two distinct realms or spheres, are co-existent for Gryphius and his contemporaries; and condition their whole assessment of reality. Far from being a matter of reasonable doubt, the existence of an Eternal Creator God, who has expressed himself both in the Scriptures and in the created universe, is, for the seventeenth century artist and scientist alike, an unquestioned and unquestionable truth.2) But equally unquestioned is the doctrine of original sin: and the fact that the expression of God in the universe is imperfect and only "in part" (I Corinthians 13.9.), is ascribed to the fall of Adam - as is also the whole tragicality of time. For whilst time came into being with the beginning of creation,3) it had no dominion over creation till man incurred the curse of death upon himself 4) and all created life: "verlohr die Ewigkeit". (Epigrammata. Das I Buch, Ga. BdII, p.172.) The possibility of regaining eternity has been offered to man through the life, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ, Himself the only perfect creation and, therefore, the only complete expression of the eternal, in
terms understandable to temporal man, (i.e. the only perfect manifestation of eternity in time). Apart from him, nothing created or material is capable of being either a source or a guarantee of eternity, since at best, it can be nothing more than a mere token - a pointer to the eternal.

Temporal existence, per se and in se, is felt to be futile for the very reason that it is not held to be man's ultimate destiny. However, it is imbued with intense significance as a period of preparation, opportunity and trial, in which it is up to every individual to make his stand for the spurious or the valid, to choose his own course towards destruction or eternal life. In the words of Daniel von Czepko, in his Consolatio: man

ist weder von der Zeit noch der Ewigkeit, sondern ist eine Natur gemacht zwischen beyden. (Consolatio. p. 80. 5)

Whether or not he is ultimately "zeitlich" or "ewig" hinges on his inclination towards temporal or eternal things. This alternative of choice is, in essence, the main theme of Gryphius' lyrical and dramatic works.

Before proceeding with a detailed discussion of the various themes to be found in Gryphius' lyrics, it will be useful to demonstrate, in broad lines, how these themes arise from, or are part of, his awareness of Time (always understood as being inseparable from his awareness of eternity.) With this end in view, an attempt will now be made to outline in brief Gryphius' concept of time, as revealed in a number of poems and epigrams where he deals specifically with this question: the sonnets An Herrn Christophorum Loth (a propos of a "Tagebuch"), Auff den Anfang des 1660sten Jahres; the odes Beschluss des Jahres and Ode XVIII (Vermischte Gedichte; Geistliche Lieder); the epigrams Ende des Jahres, Betrachtung der
Following this, since it is impossible, in the context, to consider time without also considering eternity, a brief examination of Gryphius' concept of eternity will be undertaken, reference again being made to his own statements on the subject.

a) The awareness of time.

For Gryphius, time, in itself, is neither positive nor negative; nor, on the other hand, is it something completely neutral, since, depending on man's attitude towards it and on the perspective in which it is viewed, it is open to both positive and negative evaluations. In the broadest sense, time is the realm of the finite and circumscribed, as opposed to the immeasurable infinity of eternity:

Hier eilen wir durch Zeiten
0 Herr der Ewigkeiten/
Nach jenem grossen Tag
Den weder sonnenlauff noch Abend schliessen mag. (Vernischte Gedichte:Geist-

In a much more restrictive sense, time is personal time (i.e. man's allotted time, his life-span):

Die Anzahl schneller Tag' in dehn uns ach und leidt
So lange k"ankt bis sic'und wir mit ihr entflihen, (in Herrn Christophorum

Again, time is something elusive and intangible which, because of its very nature, it is impossible to possess, control or predict. It is this elusive, unsubstantial quality that Gryphius stresses in the sonnet, Auff den Anfang des 1660sten
Jahres:
Wir zehlen was nicht ist und Längst in nichts verschwunden/
Verwichener Zeiten Lauff und Menge vieler Jahr
Und was den Augenblick noch kaum vorhanden war.
Wir zehlen was sich noch nicht von der Zeit gefunden. (Ga. BdI, p.105.)

and again, in the opening lines of the epigram, Betrachtung der Zeit, where the impossibility of laying claim to either past or future is clearly stated:
Mein sind die Jahre nicht die mir die Zeit genommen/
Mein sind die Jahre nicht/ die etwa möchten kommen. (Epigrammata. I. Buch, IXXVI. Ga.Bd.II, p.182.)

For all his calendars, his calculations of the movements of the heavenly bodies, his reckoning of dates, man has no hold over time:
Wir armen schawn die Sonn' itzt von/ itz zu uns sichen:
Und geahn den Sternen nach/ wir lernen welche Seitt
Der Himmel Phoebe kritt/ ....
Wir rechnen Monatt aus/ und spilen mit dem Jahr
Und ordnen Tag zu Tag/ Undt wen die Rmitung klaar: uns doch

Although he can predict with accuracy the rising and setting of the sun, moon and stars, even where his own personal time, his life-span, is concerned, he has no means of predicting its future duration - the length of his day, the hour of his setting.

Something of the enigmatic nature of time is reflected in the following lines
taken from the ode, Beschluss des Jahres:

Je mehr wir Jahre zählen:

Je mehr uns Tage fehlen/

Je mehr uns Zeit abgeht... (Oden. III. Buch, IX. Ca. Bd. II, p. 87.)

a truism that grasps at the very essence of time, its paradoxical capacity of
becoming less and less, of eluding us more and more, the more years we accumulate.
In other words: the longer we have lived, the less time we have to live and the
more conscious we are of the passage of time.

Of all the qualities of time, it is its swift passage that has the most pro-
found effect on man and his whole environment; since everything that is born or
created in time shares in that swift passage and disappears with time:

Wie uns die Jahre entfallen

......

Wie sich das Ziel abkürzt

So wird mit ihm verloren/

Was in der Zeit geboren... (Beschluss des Jahres. Oden. III. Buch, IX, Ca.
Bd. II, p. 87.)

Indeed, how could anything temporal, "zeitlich", be expected to last

...in dem selbst die Zeit muss schnell vergehn? (Auf den letzten Dezember.
Epigrammata. II. Buch, LXXXIII. Ca. Bd. II, p. 196.)

This type of awareness of the passing of time and of all things "zeitlich"
may be so augmented as to give rise to a demonic image of time, as a destructive
force similar to, if not more potent than, death, a force "die alles fällt und
stürzt;" (Beschluss des Jahres. op. cit.) and which nothing can withstand:
Nichts ist das Zeitt und todt nicht unterdrücken kan.. (An Herrn Christoph-  

whose impact has been felt by entire empires and civilisations:

Die Zeit hat gantze Reich' alss Asch in Wind gesiebt.. (An Herrn Guilhelm  
Schlegel. Sonnette. Das Ander Buch.XVII. Ga.,Bd.II,p.74.)

The awareness of the finite nature of time, of its elusive, unsubstantial  
qualities, coupled with the awareness of its swift passage, leads to a profound  
sense of the vanity and futility of things temporal which affects all areas of  
man's life and activity. The adjectives "zeitlich and"vergänglich" may, on occasions, be equivalent in meaning to "eitel", as, for instance, in the ode,Beispiel des Jahres:

...lass sie nicht beschweren

Mit dem was zeitlich ist/ (Ga. Bd.II,p.88.)

On the other hand, the swift passage of time has its positive side - time may  
rung out quickly, but it runs out into eternity:

Der Menschen Jahr vergeht/ du der du zeitlich bist/

Lern/wie was Ewig/folg auff diese kurze Frist. (Epigrammata. I.Buch,IX. Ga.  
Bd.II,p.179.)

The knowledge that time leads to eternity and that the cutting short of personal  
time, with death, is not the end of everything, imbues time with significance,  
as a phase in which man is able to work out his ultimate destiny. Unpredictable,  
elusive and swift of passage time may be - "Jahr/Monatt/Tag und Stunden sind kein  
beständig Gut/" - , yet it is the raw material of our eternal destiny, bringing  
with it both"Gefahr" and "höchsten Nütz". (Auff den Anfang des 1660sten Jahres. Ga.  
Bd.I, p.105.) It is as man uses his time, moment by moment, that he determines
that eternal destiny:

Ach Menschen / diese Jahre
Die führen nach der Baare
Und nach der Baar zur Kron ...

Weinenicht zu stetem Hohn. (Beschluss dess Jahres, Ca. Bd 2, p.88.)

an Eternity of Heaven or Hell.

Here then, in brief, is Gryphius' concept of time. An attempt will now be
made to show how this concept is vitally linked to the various themes he deals
with in his works. He is preoccupied with the finite nature of time, its elusive, unsubstantial quality, its swift passage: one of his major themes is that of transience - whether it be taken in the sense of the passage of all things temporal with time or of the destructive tyranny of time. Arising from this theme is the theme of instability and vanity - of the world, of man himself, of human values and achievements - a theme that gains added resonance from the fact that Gryphius sees time as running out into eternity. His treatment of the question of the significance of life is conditioned both by his awareness of transience, instability and vanity and by his awareness of time as leading to eternity, as is also his handling of the related themes, the use of time and the conquest of time. Closely linked to these themes is that of death, whose significance is shown to vary with man's attitude to life (his personal time). According to the way in which he has used his time, death is either the cutting off of everything he has striven for or the gateway to everything. Intimately connected with this whole complex - time leading to eternity, the use of time, death, is the theme of the Last Judgment, that day at the end of time (in the broadest sense) when the eternal fate of every individual will be decided.
b) The awareness of eternity.

Although the awareness of eternity is so integral a part of Gryphius' awareness of time, a perusal of his works soon reveals that actual statements on the nature of eternity are far less frequent and far less specific than those on the nature of time; and is this to be wondered at? The poet is surrounded on every side by concrete evidence of the effects of time; and eternity, by definition, is outside, and not to be confined in, or by, the concrete. The latter may, at best, be a mere pointer to it, in much the same way as a guide post indicates a destination.

The majority of Gryphius' statements about eternity are "negative time-statements", i.e. eternity is evoked in terms of what time is not, as, for instance, in the tableaux of transience presented by the sonnet Es ist alles gantz eytel and, in much greater detail, by the prologue to Catharina von Georgien, where "die Ewigkeit", in person, steps on to the stage. In both cases eternity is shown to be absent from the entire realm of the concrete and material and from the whole field of man's feverish strivings after self-aggrandisement and immortality.

Even Gryphius' most explicit attempt at evoking eternity, where he enlarges upon a statement made by Boethius, leans heavily on a depiction of the characteristics of time:

Die Ewigkeit ist ein gentzer / stets vorhandener und vollkommener Besitz eines unendlichen Lebens... Denn was hier sich auffhält / laufft von dem Vergangenen durch einen Augenblick auff das Zukünftige: Und wir sehen ja nicht in dieser Zeit / dass seinen Anfang und Ende / ja sich gantz / uns auf stets vorstellen könne. Das Morgende sol noch erscheinen. Das Gestürige ist verschwunden. Der Augenblick / in dem wir Athem holen / ist kaum
unser. So ist denn dieses nur ewig / was das unendliche Leben / gantz und
vollkommen zugleich besitzet: Welchem nichts abgehet / das verstrichen;
nichts mangelt / was noch kunfftig / sondern beydes gegenwärtig / ...

Gryphius is swift to point out the inadequacy and incompleteness of this attempt
at evoking eternity, comparing it to the fruitless efforts of even the most talent-
ed painter to represent the sun "mit irdischen Farben":

Was ist aber dieses? als eine / zwar .../ sehr vernünfftige / doch gantz-
unvollkommene Abbildung dessen / was in dieser Zeit so wenig recht abge-
mahlet werden kann/ als unmöglichen auch dem kunstreichsten Maler die hell-
stralende Sonne mit irdischen Farben / in ihrem Glantz und Wesen vorzu-

Yet the sun is no less real for being impossible to paint in earthly colours. In
much the same way eternity, for Gryphius, is no less real for being virtually in-
expressible in earthly language.

In the above enlargement on Boethius, the basic aspects of Gryphius' aware-
ness of eternity are indicated. In order, however, to understand more fully this
concept and its implications for the poet, it will be useful to bring together,
from various sources, examples of the way in which he uses and refers to "Ewigkeit"
(i.e. of the various associations in which the term occurs.)

Eternity is, above all, a quality of the Godhead, the "dreymal einig Ewigkeit"
(Sonnette: Ewige Freude der Ausserswelt, Ga. Bd. I, p.91.), the great I Am, the
"unendlich ewig Wesen" (Beschluss des Jahres, Ga. Bd. II, p.88.) who is from ever-
lasting to everlasting: "der vor Ewigkeit geherrscht: und in Ewigkeit wird blei-
ben." (Beschluss des Jahres, Oden das andere Buch XII, Ga. Bd. II, p.61.), who
does indeed see everything past and future as an endless present: "dem nichts

In its endlessness and wholeness, eternity is seen to be the very matrix of time, out of which, in the words of one of the "Übersetzte Lobgesänge", time was born: "eh die Zeit Gebohoren aus der Ewigkeit" (Vermischte Gedichte; Übersetzte Lobgesänge I, Ga. Bd. III, p.61-62.) always existent before time, always to be existent after time comes to an end.

In the broadest sense eternity is, as stated previously in the discussion on time, the realm of immeasurable infinity "die durch kein End aufhört" (Sonnette IXV, Aus dem Nachlass, Ga. Bd. I, p.127.), of timelessness (as opposed to the circumscribed, measurable units which go to make up time), the realm where "ein Tag allein... wird vor alle Jahre seyn", (Geburtsgedancken an Jesum; Epigrammata I. Buch, IXXI, Ga. Bd. II, p. 181.) in stark contrast to time, the realm of the finite and time in the sense of personal time.

In a more restrictive sense, corresponding to the restrictive sense in which "time" may be understood (i.e. personal life-span), eternity may be used by Gryphius to imply "personal" eternal life, the one true form of immortality: "...wenn mir Zeit abgeht verley die Ewigkeit". (Beschluss des XXIV Jahres, Ga. Bd. I, p. 72)

Nothing in the realm of time is capable of imparting such eternal life to the individual, only God whose attribute it is:

Der immer König bleibt
Den keine Zeit vertreiben
Der einig ewig machen kan. (Vanitas; Vanitatum Vanitas! Oden; I.Buch TX, Ga. Bd. II, p. 20)

This quality of eternal life is for Gryphius the "pearl of greatest price" for which the individual must be prepared to sacrifice everything:

Diese Ewigkeit ist die einzige Perle / die in dem tieffen Acker der inneren Geheimniss verborgen / welcher wegen so viel hoher Seelen / Ehre / Stand Reichtum und alles verworffen / damit sie dieselbige erhalten mochten / zu welcher man anderwerts nicht / als durch den Tod gelangen kan... (Diss. Fun.: Abend Menschlichen Lebens p. 486.)

It is not to be obtained by mere physical death but by spiritual rebirth in the sense of the well-known passage in the third chapter of John's Gospel where Nicodemus comes to Jesus by night. "Was zehlt ihr newe Jahr?" writes Gryphius in the Epigramme Auf das neweJahr; "es bleibt die alte Zeit / Wer newgel.ohren wird erlangt die Ewigkeit". (Epigrammata das ander Buch XVI, Ga. Bd. II, p. 200.)

Closely related to the concept "Ewigkeit" in the sense of eternal life, is "Ewigkeit" in the sense of indestructible, absolute values such as absolute, unlimited wisdom, absolute truth - the goal of those serious-minded people who recog
nise the momentous significance of their personal time (cf. Weicher Stein "Zeelen / die... Durch Tugend volle Schweiss die Ewigkeit zu kauffen Euch Tag für Tag bemüht"); values that are, once again, qualities of the Godhead and not to be found in, or imparted by, anything material or temporal, for all man's searching or questioning of the material universe. (cf. Grabschrift eines Hochberühmten Mannes. Sonnette: das ander Buch XXXVII. Ga. Bd. I, p. 85.) What we apprehend with our finite senses and reasoning faculties is so limited in its scope, so restricted in its duration and significance, as to be nothing: "Was Augen sehen ist nichts."

(Augen. Optisches Paradoxon; Epigrammata, Das erste Buch XL. Ga. Bd. II, p. 157.) It is usually only when we are freed from such restrictions by death "Wenn wir die Augen schliessen" (ibid.), that we are able to grasp the absolute, "Die ewig Ewigkeit die hier nicht zu erreichen" (Grabschrift eines Hochberühmten Mannes, ibid.) to apprehend infinity "ja, alles seh'n und wissen" - (Augen. Optisches Paradoxon, ibid.) - because, as Gryphius remarks in the funeral oration, Mutua Amantium Fuga, "Was in der Ewigkeit gezeuget / von der Zeit nicht begriffen werden kan."

(Diss. Fun., p. 691.)

Finally, Gryphius uses eternity to denote the other world "jene Welt", man's ultimate destination, as in the sonnets Ewige Freude der Ausserwelten and Die Hölle (Ga. Bd. I, p. 91.) and in the prologue to Catharina von Georgien where eternity personified confronts man with the choice between Heaven and Hell:

Hier über euch ist dies / was ewig lacht
Hier unter euch / was ewig brennt und kratzt. (lines 71-73.)
Diss ist mein Reich! Wohlt was ihr wünscht zu besitzen!' (lines 80.) (Ga. Bd. VI, p. 141.)
As remarked previously, it is this connotation of eternity that imbues time with profound significance, as a phase of decision and choice.


O ewig Königreich! O Vaterland glück zu! (Catharina IV-Abhandlung, v.244, Ga. Bd. VI, p. 199.)

In either case the choice of nouns in the evocation of eternity (Heaven) is significant. "Schloss" is suggestive of solidity, stability, durability as opposed to the complete lack of these qualities in the realm of time. In addition, the word is frequently coupled with epithets which further emphasise the complete "otherness" of eternity, eg. "reich", "werth", epithets expressive of value-judgments, here used positively, but to be found, if at all, in Gryphius's appraisal of things temporal, only in the negative sense. "Vaterland" is again suggestive of durability, of the permanence of man's destination in eternity, as against the transitory nature of his sojourn in the realm of time. This same juxtaposition is the theme of the funeral dissertation Ausländische in dem Vaterland (Diss. Fun. p. 501 ff.), where man's nominal fatherland is contrasted with his real fatherland.

To sum up: eternity, for Gryphius, is first and foremost the complete opposite of time - endless, complete, immeasurable, unmoving and immovable, unchang-
ing and unchangeable. It is a quality of God, imparted by Him and by Him alone to man— as eternal life. It is a quality of certain absolute values of which God is the source; and, finally, it is seen to be man's ultimate destiny: be that an eternity of heavenly bliss or an eternity of damnation in Hell. It is simultaneously the backdrop against which the passage of time is registered, the yard-stick against which man's activities are measured, the goal toward which he presses forward confidently or the inexorable gallows toward which he stumbles blindly.

References:

2 cf. H. Powell: Andreas Gryphius and the "New Philosophy". In: German Life and Letters N.S. 5, 1951-2; p. 275-6
4 ibid.
CHAPTER III.
The Awareness of Transience.

The theme of transience is probably as old and as universal as poetry itself, being found as early as the so-called "poetic" books of the Bible and running through the literature of Middle Ages and Renaissance alike. However, in the works of Gryphius and his contemporaries it is manifested with a new intensity, corresponding to a heightened awareness of time and its effects on the entire man and his universe, in both of which, thanks to the Renaissance, there is a newly-awakened and vital interest.

Certainly the awareness of the effects of time is present - even if only by implication - in works dating from the Middle Ages such as Temple's Ackermann aus Böhmen, in much of François Villon's verse, be it pagan or Christian in orientation, as well as in the broad stream of memento mori literature; but here, as in the Bible, the attitude towards change and decay tends to be one of quiet resignation, summed up in the belief that everything is directed and ordained by God, and therefore part of his purpose, an attitude also to be found occasionally in Gryphius' works.

In medieval literature, as well as in the religious writings of the early Italian Renaissance, time is a figure similar to, if not equivalent to death - witness the pictorial representations of Father Time, the skeleton with hour-glass and scythe - with an equivalent role to play, a role that has a definite place in God's plan and purpose for men. Like death, time is seen to be a messenger sent by God from the next world to summon men into eternity. 2)

In the secular literature of the Italian Renaissance, above all in the works of Petrarch, transience is a major theme but, in general, limited to gentle laments
over the passage of youth, on the one hand, and carpe diem exhortations on the other: as in the lines written by Lorenzò il Magnifico, where the realisation that youth and beauty are of such brief duration, gives rise to the counsel that what time we have must be made use of while it is there, i.e. before it escapes us:

Che tempo aspetta, assai tempo si strugge
E il tempo non aspetta, ma via fugge...

Ma l'animo gentile e ben discreto
dispensa il tempo, mentre che via fugge....

Io credo che non sia maggior dolore
Che del tempo perduto a sua cagione;
questo a ciascun debbe essere uno aprone

di usare il tempo ben, che vola e fugge. (Opere at.;II, p. 201.) 3)

These and similar sentiments regarding transience are echoed by the "Renaissance" poetry of other cultures, influenced and inspired by the Italian Renaissance. In the works of the French Pléiade and of Spenser and Shakespeare it is again chiefly the transience of beauty that is dealt with: be it regretted with graceful melancholy - "Mignonne, allons voir si la rose" 4), playfulness and irony - "Quand vous serez bien vieille, le soir à la chandelle..." 5a), or matter of fact resignation to the inevitable - "When I do count the clock that tells the time ... then of thy beauty do I question make". 5)

In general, with some exceptions - notably some of the later poems by the ageing Ronsard - the poet of this era remains purely an observer of the effects of time, and is not personally involved in the changes he sees taking place. He sees roses wither and the beauty of his mistress's face fade; and these observation
while giving rise to feelings of gentle melancholy and regret, lead him to draw the conclusion that, because time is so fleeting, it is best to "gather rosebuds while (he) may", to enjoy to the full the delights of life and love and beauty, since they may be snatched away from him at any moment. This "carpe diem" outlook, reflected, for instance, in German literature, in the verse of Weckherlin and Fleming, persists throughout the literature of the seventeenth century, side by side with a much more "serious-minded" and pessimistic assessment of transience, already present in the works of the disillusioned François du Bellay - Les ruines du temps, Les Antiquités, in the verse of another French poet, Jean Desponde, with his acute awareness of bodily decay. At times both the light-hearted and the pessimistic attitude towards transience may be reflected in the same poem, as in Andrew Marvell's witty lines To his Coy Mistress, where the "carpe diem" motif is combined with touches of almost brutal realism, which realism the poet uses, tongue in cheek, to shock his lady out of her coyness.

Where the theme of transience is concerned, Gryphius' era is remarkable for the number of different threads, from entirely different origins, that are drawn together and may be found woven parallel or inextricably intertwined; and this is not merely in the works of the many writers but also in the works of the individual writer. It is not uncommon to find a biblical image of the passage of time coupled with a pagan awareness of the transience of beauty; medieval memento mori warnings side by side with carpe diem exhortations; disillusionment with humanistic values, arising from a sense of their impermanence on the one hand, optimism based on a belief in their durability on the other; radical and uncompromising rejection of things temporal as spurious and unreal and a genuine regret for their swift disappearance.
To some degree, all these elements may be said to have a bearing on Gryphius' attitude towards transience, or at least to colour the expression of his outlook. But it must always be borne in mind that all of them are, in turn, coloured, if not sublimated, by the poet's attitude towards eternity. He is extremely well-versed in the Scriptures and a firm believer in the truth of the Bible, whose teachings on transience he frequently repeats. He is a scholar and admirer of classical antiquity, but like du Bellay, acutely aware of the effects of time on the great and "indestructible" monuments of the past. He is fascinated by the intricacies of the human body but, like Desponde, as painfully conscious of the destructive work of time on its physical perfection as the writer of Des Todes Gehugde. In short, he is conscious of the transience of all things material. But in common with the religious writers of the Italian Renaissance, his awareness of transience extends still further than this, to include those non-material values, such as fame, held by the Renaissance Humanists to be immortal and immortalising. 8)

An attempt will now be made to trace the various aspects of the theme of transience in Gryphius' works, beginning with transience as manifested in the universe created by God, proceeding to transience reflected in the world system (built up by man), to transience reflected by man himself and by what he values.

Transience reflected in the universe created by God.

It would be a gross misjudgment to declare that in the whole material universe Gryphius sees only the evidence of transience. As has been stated previously, he is very much aware of God's expression of Himself and His Truth - however partial that expression may be - in the universe of His creation. Like Addison
or Opitz, he is filled with wonder at the immensity, intricacy and order of its design that point to the unlimited power and wisdom, the infinite skill of its Creator:

Dass du den Bau gemacht / den Bau der schönen Welt
Und so viel tausend Heer unendlich heller Lichter
Und Körper die die Kraft gleich fallender Gewichter
An den gesetzten Ort / durch deinen Schluss erhält /
Dass du die Körper selbst mit so viel Schmuck bestellst
Und auf der Erden Hauss unzählich Angesichter /
Die ungleich dennoch gleich als vorgesetzte Richter


But that same creation that testifies to the nature of the eternal Creator also teaches that nothing like, or equal to Him is to be found here. It is this realisation that is virtually the crux of Gryphius' whole attitude towards material "reality"; and these lines, written on his birthday should not be regarded as an isolated example in his works of the Leibnitzian view of the universe, but rather as an implicit statement of his poetic credo, of his concept of the poet's role: to point beyond creation to the Creator. Far outweighing the wonders of creation and his own ability to see these wonders, is the fact that God has opened his eyes to see Him. It is in the light of His eternity, His perfection and completeness that the finite and incomplete nature of even the most exquisite creation becomes apparent; and if in Gryphius' poetry the negative aspects of creation far outweigh the positive, this is not to be ascribed to a purely negative view of material reality, a sweeping rejection of it as valueless, but rather to a complete and un-
compromising refusal to promote or indulge in idolatry, i.e. to become so wrapped up in the creation as to lose sight of the Creator or, in the terms of this thesis, to extol the temporal at the expense of neglecting the eternal.

So it is that, even in those spheres of God's creation beyond the jurisdiction of man, Gryphius is aware of the passage of time. The very heavens that "declare the glory of God" (Psalm 19 v.1), whose stars are pledges of eternity (cf. An die Sternen, Ga. Bd. I, p. 53.) are subject to time and change. The sun, in its radiance an emblem of Christ, "the light of the world" (John 8 v.12), in its cyclical movement an emblem of eternity, is also a reflection of passing time. In the ode Beschluss des Jahres (Oden III. Buch, IX, Ga. Bd. II, p. 87), its movements, by which time is measured, are seen as a manifestation of transience:

In dem ein Jahr vergangen:
Hat eines angefangen/
Den Anfang führt das Ende/
Vor stieg die Sonne nieder,
Jetzt kommt ihr Wagen wieder

Der schon was höher rennt. (Ga. Bd. II, p. 87.)

while in the epigram, Auff den Schluss des Jahres (Ga. Bd. II, p. 200.), the same sun that is described as regulating and dispensing time - "die aus sich die Zeit gebührt und teilet" is shown to be subject to time and finite - "wird mit der Zeit vergehn so ihrem Ziel zueilet". Together with the sun, the movements of other heavenly bodies, the moon and the comets, also reflect the dominion of time over all things temporal:

Der sonnen grosse Flucht
Dass Horden Wanckelmuth / die Leiche der Cometen
A
Der Säume laub und Frucht
and give rise to a sense of instability and inconstancy, of proneness to change affecting the whole material universe. This is the awareness that comes to the fore in the following lines taken from the funeral dissertation, *Schlesiens Stern in der Nacht*:

\[\ldots\text{in dem Himmel selbst haben wir inner wenig Jahren traurige Veränderungen wargenommen / wo selbst die Sterne nicht nur auf und untergehen / sondern auch ganz verschwinden...}\] (p. 94).

As examples of instability, then, the poet cites not only the rising and setting of the stars, but also their actual disappearance.

If even the heavens are a mirror of transience and instability, how much more so is the earth, where the effects of time may be observed at close hand, both in those areas over which man has no control and in the sphere of his influence. Before discussing Gryphius' awareness of transience in these two fields, it is imperative to point out that, in his poetry, they are not always kept separate and are therefore not necessarily distinguishable one from another, but tend either to overlap or present themselves simultaneously in the poet's experience—especially as he tends to think on more than one level at a time. Thus when he speaks of "der Fall und Zerrtung irdischer Dinge" as evidence of the instability of "alles was in der Welt..." (Diss. Fun. *Schlesiens Stern in der Nacht*, p. 94.), he is presumably referring both to the world of God's creation and to the world-system of man's organisation. Again, when he describes the world as "das verzauberte Palast Radbodi / welches in einem Augenblick phahlet und verschwindet ..." (ibid), it is an all-embracing view of transience and instability with which the reader is con-
fronted. This is also the case in the following lines taken from a poem written on the death of his young step-mother, Maria Rissmann, where the theme of universal transience is coupled with the expression of genuine grief:

O dass doch auff der Welt nichts kann beständig bleiben.
O dass doch alle Dinge so nichts und flüchtig sind!

Nichts ist / dass sich nicht selbst zum untergang muss treiben..." (Ga. Bd. 1, p. 23.)

In the two latter quotations a third element besides transience and instability comes into play - a sense of futility and vanity - reflected (implicitly) in the image of the momentary splendour of "das Palast Radbodi" (Diss. Fun., p. 94.) that dissolves into thin air and, more explicitly, in that recognition of the nothingness of all things, the outcry: "O dass doch alle Ding so nichts und flüchtig sind!" (Ga. Bd. 1, p. 23.). This juxtaposition "nichts" - "flüchtig" is a recurrent one in Gryph's assessment of this world and what it holds. We find it, for instance, in the Brunneniskurs, an oration delivered by Gryphius at the grave of his patron, Schönborn, in which he refers to this world as "unser Schauplatz eitel Nichtigkeit" and in the same breath points out the transient nature of everything in the world "findet was jemals entstanden seinen Untergang." (Diss. Fun., p. 55.)

Or we may find the same juxtaposition expressed in even more pictorial terms as, for instance, in the sonnet, Grabnachricht eines hochberühmten Mannes:

Die Welt hat nichts aus Dunst
Was lebt muss stracks erbleichen...(Ga. Bd. 1, p. 85.)

where the abstract concept "Nichtigkeit" is replaced by the concrete and visual equivalent "Dunst"; and transience is epitomised in the imminent fading of life: "muss stracks erbleichen".
In his observations of the universe, the poet's recognition of transience is coupled with a sense of instability, resulting from his awareness of the changes that take place in the condition and position of the heavenly bodies with the passage of time. In his observations of the Earth, the awareness of transience and instability leads quite naturally to a sense of futility, of "vanity" - as is the case with Solomon (Ecclesiastes). Before proceeding further it will perhaps be useful to examine briefly the concept, "vanity", and to point out how intimately it is linked with the concept of transience. Unlike the other closely-connected concept, instability, it is not always self-explanatory. Whereas transience and instability may be said to be intrinsic, objective qualities of things temporal, "vanity" necessarily implies a value-judgment arising, in this case, from the recognition of those objective qualities and the comparison of them to a predetermined standard. In Gryphius' case, the ultimate point of reference, the supreme standard, against which temporal reality is measured and found to fall short, is eternity. In its broadest sense, then, the term, "Eitelkeit", is a condemnation implying a falling short of the ultimate standard, a lack of eternity-content. (Cf. Isaiah 40 where God's eternity is contrasted with human transience. Verses 17 and 23 are especially relevant.) If we consider again, for a moment, Gryphius' concept of eternity - its qualities of being endless, immeasurable, immovable, unchanging and unchangeable - it becomes clear that, in the terms of the above definition, any deviation from these qualities may be assessed as "vanity"; hence, the intimate association in Gryphius' works, of transience - vanity, instability - vanity. Because of this intimate connection, it is not the intention of this thesis to deal with the theme of vanity under a separate heading, but to treat it for what it is - an element in the transience - instability - vanity syndrome.

Gryphius experiences this vanity both in the transient, unstable world of God's creation and in the even more transient and unstable world-system organised
by man; what he observes in the former having obvious repercussions and parallels in his assessment of the latter; i.e. his realisation of the unenduring quality of even God's creation makes him doubly aware of the impermanence and futility of anything man may set up. So it is that his most sweeping condemnations of vanity - the sonnet, *Es ist alles eitell*:

> Du sihst / wohin du sihst / nur Eitelkeit auff Erden... (Ga. Bd.I,p.33.)

and the ode:

> Die Herrlichkeit der Erden muss Rauch und Asche werden... (Oden. I, Buch IX, Ga. Bd.II, p.17.)

are corroborated by evidence drawn both from creation and from the sphere of man's influence, while in that exemplification and demonstration of the vanity in the world-system, the drama *Leo Armenius*, a clear parallel is drawn between the vicissitudes of human affairs and the instability and impermanence of all things temporal:

> O du Wechsel aller Dinge!
> Immerwährend' Eitelkeit
> Laufft denn in der zeiten ringe

It is now the intention of this chapter to examine and discuss Gryphius' awareness of transience, instability and vanity in the specific areas of (a) the world of God's creation and (b) the world system of man's organising.

a) The awareness of transience, instability and vanity in the world of God's creation.

Like the heavens, "der Bau der schönen Welt" (Auff seinen Geburtstag. Ga. Bd.)
p.106.), besides testifying to the skill of the Eternal Creator, also testifies to the effects of time upon creation:

Wir dringen durch die Welt


being in a state of perpetual change. The ravages of time are manifested in the destruction of the very components of the Earth, in the disintegration of metal and stone: "Nichts ist / das ewig sey / kein Ertz kein Marmorstein"; (Es ist alles 
itell. Ga. Bd.I, p.33.) "kein Fels kein Ertz kan stehn..." (Oden.I Buch IX. Ga. Bd. II, p.17.) Time is described as consuming or annihilating these substances: "die Zeit die Marmor frisst / und ertz in nichts verkehrt". (Carolus Stuardus II. Abhandlung, v.296-297, Ga. Bd.IV,p.82.) Its effects are also evidenced by the radical changes that take place in the face of the Earth; such being the instability of things temporal that, with the passage of time, creation itself contributes to its own downfall - and here vanity-motif obtrudes, the elemental forces of fire, wind and water working hand in glove with time:

Dort schluckt die Erd' ein Jahr pracht /

Die dar in Rauch verschwunden:

Was nicht der strenge Nord auslescht!

Was nicht die stolze Well' abwäscht

Wird durch sich selbst verkehret. (Terra vele! Dominum Vitae stat alire


So universal, indeed, is the dominion of time, that whatever does not succumb to the elemental forces, destroys itself. For Cryphius, "temporality" - being born of,
and subject to, time - implies the inevitability of undergoing changes and of coming to an end, be this through the agency of external factors or simply through the maturing of those seeds of self-destruction, incipient in everything created. (cf. the lines written on the death of Maria Rissmann: "Nichts ist / das sich nicht selbst zum Untergang muss treiben /" (Ga. Bd. I, p. 23, v. 39.). It is this awareness that nothing is constant, nothing is permanent that makes Gryphius perceive, even in the wonders of the world that God has created, in its apparent solidity and durability, the mark of vanity and futility.

Transience, instability and vanity are manifested in all aspects of the created world, where even seemingly static phenomena, because of their subservience to time, are seen by the poet to be in a state of perpetual flux. What then of those non-static phenomena whose very essence is movement or change (or both) - the elemental forces of nature shown above, the cycle of the seasons and the whole realm of lower creation? In all these areas the poet is so profoundly conscious of the manifestations of passing time, that in his works such natural phenomena virtually cease to exist in themselves, or as themselves, but persist almost exclusively as purveyors of the abstract moral or spiritual truths they are found to embody, or to parallel (i.e. they tend to become emblems of transience.)

The elemental forces of fire, wind and water and their accompanying phenomena recur throughout Gryphius' work as manifestations of passing time or embodiment of its destructive powers.

Fire is first and foremost an embodiment of time the destroyer, time the perpetrator of change, instability and vanity, to which nothing material is immune. As such we see it in the sonnet Threnen des Vaterlandes Anno 1636 (Ga. Bd. I, p.48. and in the lines Über den Untergang der Stadt Freystadt (Ga. Bd. III, p.171-173.)
In the New Testament fire is seen to be both a means of purification, of eliminating dross and a test of integrity - straw and wood being consumed, pure metal withstanding it and actually being refined by it. As such, fire is a perfect parable of Gryphius' concept of time which for him is also a destroyer of dross, a test of ultimate worth - true worth residing only in those values or qualities that instead of being destroyed by time are refined by it. From this concept of fire it is but a short step to the eschatological connotations it so often has in Gryphius' works (cf. Über den Untergang der Stadt Freystadt, Ga. Bd. III, pp. 171-173), pointing ahead as it does to that day in which the whole earth shall burn like an oven: "Was frag' ich nach der Welt / sie wird in Flammen stehn..." (Verleugnung der Welt, Oden III. Buch, Ga. Bd. II, p. 40.) - the day of judgment in which the ultimate worth (i.e. the eternity-content) or worthlessness of everything will be revealed.

Completely consistent with the way in which Gryphius' concept of fire relates to his main theme of time and eternity, is his observation and assessment of the residue or products of fire - smoke and ash - both of which become equivalents of transience, insubstantiality and vanity - of transience and insubstantiality because of the speed with which they can be dissipated: "Was sag ich wir vergehn wie Rauch von starken Winden" (Menschliches Elende, versions CDE, Ga. Bd. I, p. 35.); of vanity because, as the only residue left by fire, they reveal a lack of worthwhile content: "Die Zeit hat ganzes Reich / als Asch in Wind gesiebt / " (An H. Guilhelm Schlegel, Ga. Bd. I, p. 74.)

In wind Gryphius also sees a manifestation of transience and vanity. Like fire, it may be an equivalent or parallel of time the destroyer - a force against which things temporal cannot stand:
Was nutzt mein Thun und Treiben
Das die geschwinde Zeit
Wird als den Rauch zutreiben. (Dimitte me, Oden III. Buch, VII, Ga. Ed. II, p. 82.)

The poet sees in wind a manifestation of that dissipating, disintegrating force which, again like fire, tries the eternity-content of earthly values, proving their spuriousness and insubstantiality by the swiftness with which they are made to disappear. At the same time, the quality of wind itself to be invisible, unsubstantial, swift of passage, suggests further parallels. Not only does Gryphius use wind as a manifestation of time the destroyer, time the demonstrator of vanity, but also as an equivalent of temporality, of those things that are destroyed by time, whose vanity and nothingness are revealed by the course of time:

Was ist doch alles was man allhier find

Wir sind ein windt / ein thau... (Threne in Schwere Krankheit, Sonette Gro. Bd. I, p. 59.)

The same capacity to be used both as a manifestation of time (in the active sense) and as a manifestation of temporality is observable in water, although its use as an equivalent of time the destroyer is limited to but a few examples, in each of which it is the water of the sea—the action of the waves— that is cited as a cause of change, instability and destruction, as for instance in the ode, Terra vale. Dominum vitae stat adire Tonantem: "Was nicht die stütze Well abwäscht..." (Ga. Ed. II, p. 50.)
On the other hand, there are numerous examples of water and its accompanying phenomena being seen as embodiments of transience and vanity. Thus the inevitable passage of things temporal is likened to the inexorable course of a river "den keine Macht aufhält" (Menschliches Elende, Ga. Bd. I, p. 35.), "den niemand halten kann" (Oden, III.Buch, VII, Ga. Bd. II, p. 24.) - a simile drawn not so much from personal observation, perhaps, as from the Bible, which fact is clearly demonstrated by a passage in the Brunnendiskurs (Diss. Fun. op.cit., pp. 55-56) where Gryphius gives biblical reference for expressions of transience based on water.

Other phenomena deriving from water and equally, if not more, swift of passage are used by Gryphius to convey transience and vanity: the foam of the sea as it breaks on the rocks - "Wir sindt ein Wind ein Schaum Ein Nebel / eine Bach / ein reiff / ein taw. (Threnen in Schwerer Kranckheit, Ga. Bd. I, p. 59.); the morning dew that so quickly evaporates - "Gleich wie der Thau verraucht" (Auf einer nahen Anverwandten Tod, Vermischte Gedichte, Begräbnisgedichte II, Ga. Bd. I, p. 59.) the apparent solidity and substance of ice and snow that dissolve and disappear in the heat of the sun (Diss. Fun. pp. 246-247.), the insubstantiality of mist, like smoke, the ultimate expression of transience and vanity, since it is something dissipated or dissolved in a matter of moments (cf. Oden, II.Buch, Ga. Bd. II, p. 40 and also Sonnette, Das erste Buch. Ga. Bd. I, p. 59.).

The seasons for Gryphius are also a manifestation of passing time and its effects, and may be an illustration of vanity. In the allegorical poem Der Weicher Stein, for instance, the poet uses the various times of the year to parallel the various stages in human life (Ga. Bd. III, p. 54.). A similar technique is used in the drama Cardenio und Celinde, where "die Zeit" leads the seasons one after another on to the stage (Ga. Bd. V, p. 138ff.). In both cases the effects of
passing time become a demonstration of the vanity of temporal things, a lesson on the futility of man's pursuits, since he, like the seasons, is destined to follow the same patterns of change—of growth and decline.

Gryphius is also very much aware of transience, instability and vanity reflected in that much more restricted sphere of God's creation, biological life—an area of creation that is for ever being subjected to the elemental forces of nature to the cycle of the seasons, even to the destruction brought about by man. He sees transience and vanity embodied in the rapid decline of animal exuberance: "Was ist so poch't und trotzt / ist morgen asch und kein" (Es ist alles gantz eyte Sonnette, I. Buch, VII, Ga. Bd. I, p. 33.), in the futile toil of the silk-worm (Oden, I. Buch, V, Ga. Bd. II, p. 10.), the seasonal changes in a tree: "Der Blume Laub und Frucht" (Scire tuem nihil est, op. cit., Ga. Bd. II, p. 72.) or the short-lived beauty of "Die Blumen auf der Au" (ibid.). To such an extent is his vision of plant life coloured by the transience-instability-vanity syndrome, that he rarely refers to it apart from this context. (cf. Gryphius' awareness of time and eternity reflected in his use of allegory and emblem—a subject that will be covered in a later chapter of this thesis.)

In the cases cited above, the poet has presented the evidence of passing time in God's creation: the changes in the heavens, in the structure of the earth, in biological life-forms—in such a way as to point to deeper levels of significance it may well be said with a definite didactic purpose, consistent with his sense of poetic vocation. This didactic purpose is borne out in every instance by the explicit or implicit parallels that present themselves. Thus in the epigram, Auf den Schluss des Jahres (Ga. Bd. II, p. 200.), there is a juxtaposition of the sun, which is shown to be transient and finite, and the sun that never sets—everlast-
ing and infinite - in an antithesis whose terms derive from the common concept "sun"; while in the lines quoted from the funeral oration, Schlesiens Stern in
der Macht, there is a direct parallel - the one truth, the mutability of the univer-
se, illustrating and corroborating the other, the mutability of "irdischer
Dinge". In the quotation from Terra vale! Dominum vitæ stat adire Tonantem, (Ga.
Bd. II, p. 50, v. 36ff.), the parallels are implicit, becoming apparent only in
the context of the whole poem; and in the extract from Scire tuum nihil est (Ga.
Bd. II, p. 72.), we are confronted by the explicit pointing of a moral without
the intermediary of a parallel, although, once again, the parallel would seem to
be implicit. Finally, in much of Gryphius' poetic use of the elemental forces
of nature we find a phenomenon also observable in his references to biological
(in particular botanical) life-forms: the parallels have become so accepted as
to warrant no need of explanation. The natural object, by reason of the very
attributes by which it is known, becomes a chiffre of the abstract truth it is
seen to embody.

The phenomenon that has been observed here, i.e. the relating of concrete
manifestations of transience and instability in creation to abstract spiritual or
mortal truths - futility, vanity - is symptomatic of an outlook, reflected par-
excellence in the wide use of emblem and allegory in Gryphius' era, an outlook
that can best be summed up in the Thomistic concept that Truth is one. Also con-
sistent with this outlook is the fact that what applies in one sphere applies in
another. It is therefore not surprising to find that the recognition of the effects
of passing time in God's creation great and small, besides giving rise to moral
and spiritual abstractions (i.e. parallels and conclusions on a general and ab-
stract level) should have very marked repercussions in the poet's assessment of
man's sphere of influence and activity - the world-system organised by him.

If what eternal God has made is transient and subject to change, how much more so must be the results of man's activity.

Transience, instability and vanity reflected in the world-system.

Where the world-system is concerned, Gryphius' conclusions are similar to those of Grimmelhausen's Simplicissimus, who realised, in the course of time and experience, that there is no more constant phenomenon in the world than inconstancy or instability itself. Gryphius' intense awareness of this inconstancy obtrudes at all times, when he is dealing with the subject of the world system, be it through the medium of drama, comedy, ode, sonnet, or epigram. This awareness and his expression of it can be summed up in the witty, half-jocular question addressed to Levinus, in an epigram: "denn was kann fest auf der Erden stehn?" (An Levinus. Epigrammata XXIX; Ga. Bd. II, p.199.) An almost identical rhetorical question is found in Der Weicher Stein: "Kan iemand auff dem Rund der Erden feste sitzen?" (Ga. Bd.III, p.54, v.34.) The serious implications of these and similar witticisms becomes clear when we taken into consideration the ideology behind them - an awareness of both time and eternity - and the tangible evidence upon which they are based: change, destruction, reversals of circumstances.

In the world of God's creation, Gryphius has recognised the incipient seeds of destruction in everything created in, or born of, time - "nichts ist/ das sich nicht selbst zum Untergang aus treiben". (Mariae Rissmanae. Ga. Bd.I, p23, v.39) and it is this recognition that brings him to decry its nothingness, its vanity. In the world-system, he has observed the same elements in operation; and here,
his realisation of transience, instability and vanity is borne out by his assessment of the past and his observations of the present. In both past and present, he sees evidence of the power of time to change and destroy; he is confronted by the instability and vanity of the world-system and its institutions manifested, above all, in those sudden reversals of circumstances brought about by war and the struggle for power.

In the past, the relics of past generations, he is primarily aware of the ravages caused by time, that consumer of metal and marble. Like the disillusioned François du Bellay, he is swift to recognise the impermanence of the great monuments of classical antiquity. While enthusing over the splendours of contemporary Rome, risen like a phoenix from its ashes, "Adel Begriff der Welt..." (Ga. Bd.I, p.57.) and declaring that it is impossible to see enough of it with one pair of eyes, he recognises in the Colossaeum, that vestige of Roman supremacy over the early world, a proof of the supremacy of time:

Auff diesem Platz / da vor die Römischen Spill gepreiset
Schaw itst die Traur-Spill an die dir die Zeit anweiset. (Epigrammata III, LXX. Ga. Bd.II, p.74.)

Where once the tyrannical Roman emperors took their pleasure in the spectacle of men fighting to the death, time now gives a demonstration of its tyrannical powers, in this sad spectacle of destruction and ruin.

It is the same realisation of the total impermanence of the antique world, in view of the tyranny of time, that comes to the fore in the sonnet addressed to Guilhelm Schlegel, (An Herrn Guilhelm Schlegel in Gastain und Mohringen. Ga. Bd.I, p.74.) where the impossibility of finding anything material, that can outlast time
is stressed. The splendour of the ancient world, the poet points out, has disappeared with the world, i.e. shared in the transience of this world; and he emphasises the role of time, while enlarging upon the opening statement: "Die Zeit hat gantze Reich' als Asch in Windt gesiebtl. Entire empires have been dissolved, reduced to nothing, by time. That this process of disintegration embraces both past and present, is clearly demonstrated in the following line of the same sonnet, where Gryphius makes a generalisation which succinctly links his assessment of the past with his observation of present realities:


The cumulative work and growth of a thousand years can be cancelled out in a matter of hours. Viewed in this light, antiquity is no proof or guarantee of durability but simply provides a further manifestation of that futility and vanity contained in the spectacle of the earth destroying itself (Cf. Oden; II. Buch VIII, Ga. Bd. II, p. 40.) as we shall see subsequently, of one man's work being destroyed by another's.

Mention has already been made of Gryphius' recognition, in God's creation, of the incipient seeds of change and destruction; and even in this sphere, we have also been able to point out an awareness of tendencies towards self-destruction. In the elemental forces of nature to which the higher and the lower creation are exposed, the poet sees both a manifestation of time, the destroyer, and a manifestation of time, the consumer of its own children. In the world-system, he is confronted by a similar pattern of destruction and self-destruction; but here, the whole process has been accelerated and telescoped to a degree, where rhythms of natural rise and fall have largely been supplanted by a feverish alternation of constructive and destructive activity, of meteoric ascents and cataclysmic

Dort fällt ein Reich das ander kracht

Und diss wird nicht gefunden. (Oden II. Buch, VII; Ga. Bd. II, p. 40.)

What better embodiment of this pattern could there be than the phenomenon of war. Like time, (especially time as manifested in the elemental forces) it is a perpetrator of change, a demonstrator of the instability and vanity of those structures and institutions that it sweeps away in its furious progress. In the well-known sonnet, *Threnen des Vaterlandes,* (Ga. Bd. I, p. 48.) the power of war to lay waste, not merely the concrete structures of a civilisation, but to shake and destroy its ideological foundations - its civic and religious order, even its moral and spiritual values - is clearly shown. In the phenomena accompanying war - fire, plague and violent death - Gryphius sees a further demonstration of the finite nature of earthly things, of their mutability and vanity. (Cf. *Über den Untergang der Stadt Freystadt.* Ga. Bd. III, p. 171.) Thus, in the dedication to his earliest drama, *Leo Armenius,* he speaks of the effects of war upon his homeland, epitomised in its devastation by fire:

Indem unser gantzes vaterland sich nunmehr in seine eigene Asche verscharrt in einen Schauplatz der Eitelkeit verwandelt... (Ga. Bd. V, p. 3.)

Just as that great amphitheatre, the Roman Colosseum, has been changed by time into a setting and spectacle of transience. (Epigrammata, III. Buch; LXXX; Ga. Bd. II, p. 214.), so Germany is seen to have been changed by war into a spectacle
and amphitheatre of vanity.

The proneness to change, the state of continuous flux, the finite nature of the temporal, as opposed to the unchanging, immoveable endlessness of the eternal is epitomised not only in the changes wrought by war or the fluctuating fortunes of war, but also in the extraordinary reversals of circumstances governing the lives of the rulers of the world - who because of their very prominence, the magnitude of their role, the attention focussed upon them, can become living and representative demonstrations of the "Wechsel aller Dinge" (Leo Armenius, Ga. Bd. V, p. 46, v. 617.) to which all men are subject. On the one hand, the very heights to which they rise means that their fall is all the more resounding, the magnitude of their role, their prominence, implies that they meet with disaster where other lesser men, thanks to their insignificance, remain unscathed. Gryphius uses, in this context, the analogy of a ship and a small boat: both are tossed about by the waves, but whereas the boat can slip safely between the rocks of a reef, the larger vessel runs aground on them and is destroyed (cf. Leo Armenius, Ga. Bd. V, p. 48, v. 30-32.). On the other hand Gryphius argues that if rulers, in their power and greatness "die mächtigsten Götter dieser Erde", are subject to the vicissitudes of fortune, lamenting "diese Wanckelmut aller Dinge", the same must necessarily be true of those in humbler positions "die / in dem Niedrigen wohnen" (Diss. Fun., p.229-230.). In either case the basic lesson to be learned is the same: the complete inconstancy, and therefore by implication, the futility of earthly things.

Gryphius finds graphic expression for this lesson in the image of the waves of the sea and above all in the image of the revolving wheel:

Wie...ein Rad wenig oder nimmer still stehet / sondern bald mit diesem Theil oben / bald unten gesehen wird; so verandert sich unser Zustand in gemein" (Diss. Fun. p. 356-357.).
Just as a point on the perimeter of a wheel changes its position in relationship to the ground, so it is with human affairs: "also verkehrt sich der Menschen Hoheit in ein tieffes Elend. (Diss. Fun., p.228.)

War certainly plays its part in these sudden reversals of circumstances, but again, as a particular manifestation of something above and beyond itself, rather than as an autonomous force. It is little more than an agent of that universal mutability and vanity it so aptly demonstrates. Gryphius speaks of the way in which the violent fall of empires and kingdoms actually pays tribute to vanity:

Der bestehende Scepter Pracht /
Stuhl und Trone bricht und kracht


He points out how the very rapidity, with which such radical changes take place in the world-system, confirms its complete lack of stability:

Ach Krone die ihr kracht / und knaekt....
Was steht wo alles fällt? und wie so bald geschehn / (Der Weicher Stein. Ga. Bd. V, p. 54.)

'Of all Gryphius' works the drama Leo Armenius provides the most explicit demonstrations of the transience, instability and vanity of the world-system as typified in the fortunes of one of its rulers - although this is by no means the only major theme to be dealt with there. However, in the Vorwort the poet clearly announces his intention, in this and other dramas not yet written, to present to the reader or viewer "die Vergänglichkeit menschlicher Sachen". (Ga. Bd. V, p.3) Certainly we find in Leo Armenius a synthesis of most of those elements of the
poet’s assessment of the world-system already referred to in his lyrics. Moreover, the very magnitude of the work, as compared to the brevity of even an ode, allows for a much more detailed treatment of ideas and therefore gives the reader a deeper insight into Gryphius’ Weltanschauung. "That is presented graphically in Leo Armenius is virtually summed up in more abstract terms in one of the funeral dissertations, Winter-Tag menschlichen Lebens, already quoted from, further confirming the representative and "typical" nature of this drama. Following a brief examination of Leo Armenius in the light of the theme under discussion, an attempt will therefore be made at indicating the basic accord between the two works, while bearing in mind that attention will necessarily be focussed on one particular section of Winter-Tag menschlichen Lebens.

In Leo the Armenian we have the figure of a despotic ruler who both plays an active or instigating role in the "Wechsel aller Ringe" and is himself subject to it, i.e. ultimately falls prey to it. His sudden ascent to the throne having been achieved by violent means and at the expense of the previous ruler whom he deposed, his fall from power is equally sudden and equally violent — and, moreover, at the hands of the man who, more than anyone else, was instrumental to his gaining power in the first place. The message, for, as we have pointed out, message there is, is adequately expressed by the Reihen der Höflinge at the end of Act II. Not only is the perpetual flux and flow in temporal existence equated with perpetual vanity "immerwährend Eitelkeit" and continual uncertainty: "Jaufft den in der zeiten ringe Nichts als unbestendigkeit" (v. 597-599), but his vanity and uncertainty are then further exemplified in the extremes that govern the lives of rulers, of whom Leo is the type: "fall und stehen" (Strophe 2, v. 621), "Cron und Henkerstrang" (v. 62) — manifestations of that "Evig wankelbares glücke" that is no respecter of persons.
not even of the rulers of this world and their authority: "siehst du keine Zepter an?" (v. 605, 606.).

The suddenness with which such reversals of fortune take place is stressed by the mention of the brief space of time separating two extremes: "Kaum ein sonnen untergang" (v. 604.) lying between the heights and the depths. This is a message that will be reiterated throughout the drama. In stanzas five and six of the same Reihen it is clearly brought out in two examples of reversed situations. Firstly, the poet refers to the princes, gods of this earth, shortly to find themselves in the role of vassals:

Printzen / Götter dieser erden
Schawt was euch zu fussse fällt /
Denckt wie plötzlich könt ihr werden
Unter Fremden Fuss gestellt (vv. 613-616; all ref. from Ga. Bd. V, p. 46.)

Secondly, he points to the way in which power may be lost or exchanged in the brief span of a moment:

Auch ein augenblick verrücket
Ewerer und der feinde Thron,
Und ein enges nun / das schmücket
Die ihr hasst mit eurer Cron / (vv. 617-620.)

In Act V of the play the same grim message is repeated - this time only by one of the conspirators who have plotted and brought about Leo's downfall - as a warning to all those who, at the moment, find themselves in a position of extreme authority

Lern' jetzt / die du regierst gehorchen: und versteh;
Finally, in the closing scene of the drama, when Leo's wife refers back to the action that has taken place, in terms of what she has learnt from it:

...wie nahe hohn und tall beysammen stehn

Wie wenig zwischen stuhl (=throne) und Kercker Zeit vergeh... (Ca. Bd. V, p. 91. v. 417-418.)

the same message is again repeated, and in very similar language.

The truth of such statements has been amply demonstrated by Leo's fate in the drama which has assumed the function of an object lesson on the transience, mutability and vanity of the world-system with, as remarked before, Leo himself as the type of the prince of this world who is exposed to these elements and eventually becomes a victim of them. So central to the whole play has been this transience-mutability-vanity theme that it has been expounded throughout, not merely in the dramatic action, but also in the explicit statements cited above.

So it is that we find it indicated in the Vorwort with the poet's outlining of his intentions, enlarged upon by the Reihe, whose position is that of a neutral commentator and assessor of the action, and corroborated by both sets of protagonist involved in the action.

In Winter=Tag menschlichen Lebens, probably Gryphius' most complete statement of his assessment of the world-system, he is once again preoccupied with the suddenness of the changes that take place, as well as sensing their inevitability. Thus he compares the collapse of empires at their pinnacle with the inevitable descent of the sun immediately after the moment of its apogee:

Nach dem Augenblick / in welchen die Sonne aufs höchste kommen /... beginnt

sie wieder abzusteigen: weil nichts in der Welt beständig! Wo ist ein Königreich / dessen Untergang nicht vor der Thür? dessen Herr und Hencker nicht
Here, in a few words, is the essence of the happenings in *Leo Armenius*. Leo's career has already reached its zenith by the beginning of the play's action. What is presented to the reader or viewer is the inevitable decline of his power - in other words, the moving of his sun towards its setting. The simultaneous presence of ruler and executioner within a kingdom, resulting in the sudden overthrow of the former by the latter, their close proximity to each other, this is the situation personified in Leo and Michael Balbus. But the striking similarity does not end here; it persists in the use of language and imagery. We are virtually presented with a prose rendering of passages in the *Reihen* at the end of Act I: the image of the deposed ruler kneeling at the feet of his conqueror, the reversal of his role after so short an interval, this brief time-lapse between the two extremes of fortune in particular, being expressed in almost identical terms: "ein enges Nu / nur ein Augenblick..."

Now follows a further emphasising of the same basic idea, namely the inconsistency of the affairs in the world-system. This time the poet makes use of an image not to be found in *Leo Armenius* - the revolving wheel; but once again there is a striking similarity between what is expressed through this image and what is expressed both through the action of the drama and the words of the protagonists:

"Wie die Räder an Sesostris Wagen sich herumwenden / also verkehrt sich der Menschen Hoheit in ein tieffes Elend; ja wir fallen viel plötzlicher herunter als wir hinauf gestiegen..." (Winter-Tag me-schlichen Lebens, op. cit., p. 228-229.)
In the funeral dissertation, *Tolter menschliches Lebens*, Gryphius further enlarges upon the image of the wheel as an expression of instability. It is above all the quality of the wheel hardly, if ever, to stand still, that he seizes upon, finding in its repeated revolutions a perfect, if accelerated, reproduction of the pattern of ascent and descent in the world-system. Just as a point on the perimeter of a wheel necessarily changes its position in relationship to the ground in the course of every revolution, so, he declares: "verändert sich unser Zustand in gemein." ( *Tolter menschliches Lebens*. Diss. Fun., p. 356-357). The sudden alteration of circumstances, as has already been pointed out, is clearly demonstrated through the happenings in Leo Armenius. But is it possible to speak of a wheel-like pattern in this drama? To recognise such a pattern it is necessary to look beyond the actual confines of the action presented. What has happened previously and what will happen subsequently? Prior to the beginning of the play, a ruler has been deposed and his overthrower has ascended the throne; in the course of the play, the overthrower is, himself, overthrown. Thus the wheel has turned full circle. What will happen subsequently would be a matter of pure surmise but for the explicit statements on human affairs made throughout the play. On the strength of these, we can assume that the same pattern of rise and fall will be repeated, i.e. that the wheel will continue to revolve. Finally, if we compare the above-mentioned image of the wheel with the words of the protagonists already cited, we find, once again, a striking affinity of language and concept. In either instance the emphasis is upon rise and fall, height and depths and the suddenness with which one state switches to another. In stanza 2 of the Reihen, at the end of Act I, instability and impermanence are expressed in terms of "fall und stehen"
while in the two quotations from the final act, it is a question of "fall und H8h°" in the passage from Winter=Tag Menschlichen Lebens, virtually the same extremes are contrasted: "der Menschen Hoheit" and "ein tieffes Elend"; "fallen..herunter" and " hinauff gestiegen". ( Diss. Fun. , p. 228-229.) It remains only to point out that both Leo Armenius and the extract from Winter=Tag Menschlichen Lebens, the figure of the all-powerful ruler, " die wäch-
tigen Götter dieser erde", appears as a representative manifestation of the in-
stability of the world-system. In Leo Armenius the poet's message has its focal-
point in this figure, while in the funeral dissertation, the same figure, although not really central to the argument, is used to confirm and corroborate it.

In attempting to draw an all-embracing picture of Gryphius' attitude towards the world-system, in view of his awareness of transience, we have pointed firstly, to his assessment of classical antiquity, which he conceives of, not as an indic-
ation and proof of durability, but, on the contrary, as an indication of the com-
plete dominion of time over the material world. Secondly, we have pointed to his concept of war as a manifestation, not only of the destructive powers of time, but also as a demonstration of the vanity and futility of earthly structures and institutions. Thirdly, we have discussed briefly his concept of the "Printzen
dieser Erden" ( Leo Armenius. Ca. Ed. V, p. 46, v. 513), as the representative embodiment of the subjection of all things temporal to sudden and violent change. Whatever the aspect of the world-system under consideration, the poet's assessment of it is consistent with his assessment of the cosmos created by God, being col-
oured and conditioned by the basic realisation mentioned previously, that every-
thing born or created in time, is necessarily subject to the inexorable laws of time and, therefore, without permanence, stability or ultimate value.
References:
"Sie (die Zeit) ist die unheimliche Göttin des Barock, der alles.... Welt, Mensch, Leben und Natur in der Form der vergehenden Zeit erlebt."
"Die Zeit ist der Grundbegriff des Barocks."

2 Alberto Tenenti:
"Gli scrittori spirituali arrivano a far del tempo un messaggero analogo alla morte e parlante il medesimo linguaggio."

3 quoted by Alberto Tenenti:
Ibid. p.201.

4 Ronsard:

4a "

5 Shakespeare:
Sonnets XII. In: English Verse. Chosen and arranged


CHAPTER IV.

The Awareness of Human Transience.

What Gryphius has observed in the universe of God's creation and the world-system organised by man, namely, the subjection of all things temporal to the effects of time, he also observes in man himself and his values. Man, like the created world and the world-system, in which he finds himself, is simultaneously a manifestation and a victim of transience, instability and vanity. To a large degree, the various aspects of the poet's attitude towards cosmos and world-system have their parallels and their repercussions in his assessment of man.

In the same way as Gryphius is aware of God's sublime handiwork in the wonders of the created universe, he is conscious of the miracle of intricacy and design in man, the creation of God, the result of God's handiwork. So it is that he is able to write in the sonnet, Auff seinen Geburtstag:

...die Glieder die ich führ /  
Der Deiner Meisterstück / das Fleisch / der Adern Zier /  
Sind Wunder...  


These lines give expression to both the scientist and the devout Christian in Gryphius. He speaks the anatomist and physiologist, the dissector of corpses and Egyptian mummies, the enquiring seventeenth century mind, intrigued and fascinated by physiological detail, just as it is intrigued and captivated by the detailed pattern of the universe; and yet, here in this realm precisely, as in his appraisal of the cosmos, Gryphius never loses sight of the creator behind the creation, nor of the fact that man's true significance lies above and beyond his physicality, however miraculous its components may be. We have only to place the
above lines in their context to realise this:

Du hast mit deinem Licht in den verborgenen Schatten
Die Seele in mir entsteckt / die Glieder die ich führe /
Der Beiner Meisterstück / das Fleisch / der Adern Zier /
Sind Wunder. Wunder ists was du mir willst verstatte;

The whole excerpt is reminiscent of verses 11-16 in Psalms 139. Once again, as in the lines already quoted, written in praise of the wonders of creation: "Dass du den Bau gemacht / den Bau der schönen Welt. (Auf seinen Geburts-Tag. XXIV. Ga. Bd. I, p. 106), the hyperbolical presentation of the temporal - in this case, the structure of the human body - is completely outweighed by the reference to the eternal. Not only is God the master craftsman responsible for the perfection and ingenuity of the human mechanism, but he is also the very source and instigator of its driving force, the human spirit; and the human spirit is, at the same time, that spark of light in man that enables him to perceive and know God. This ability or capacity is, in itself, a miracle that far surpasses anything purely physical or temporal. For although the rest of creation may have spiritual significance as a pointer to the Creator and His qualities, it is, nevertheless, ultimately finite and therefore incapable of comprehending the Eternal Creator or of being eternal. But man is conceived of as being endowed with an eternal part and hence a potential capacity of knowing God. (In the terminology of the Bible, he alone, of all creatures, has been created in the image of God.) Basically, it is this realisation that conditions Gryphius' treatment of "man". His frequent
dwelling on physical corruption, on illness, vulnerability and decay, like his preoccupation with the impermanence of the created universe, cannot be viewed merely as a sweeping rejection of material reality, but rather as a transcendence of it. When considering the universe, Gryphius never loses sight of the Eternal Creator behind transient creation - a fact that has already been emphasised. Nor, when he looks at man, does he lose sight of that potential of grasping the eternal of being eternal, that the Creator Himself has implanted in him.

As noted previously, in his appraisal of the universe Gryphius refuses to indulge in any form of idolatry. This, indeed, would be inconsistent with his concept of his role as a poet: to point beyond the temporal to the eternal. Where man and man's values are concerned, his attitude is equally uncompromising. Only by revealing man's misery, as a perishable being, can he reveal his true grandeur, as a being with an immortal soul, not only made in the image of the Eternal Creator, but capable of grasping what is eternal. To fulfil his purpose, Gryphius is prepared to show man divested of all temporal trappings, be they literal or figurative; if necessary, to strip the very flesh from off the bones of both the living and the dead. Hence the profound significance of torture and graveyard scenes, the description of Philosette's rotting corpse ("Die Gebeine des ausgegrabenen Philosetten, Ga. Bd. I, p. 51."), the graphic account of Catharine's torture ("Catharine von Georgien, Ga. Bd. V, p. 210."), to name but two examples.

It is now the intention of this section to examine in detail Gryphius' awareness of man's transience (instability and vanity), always bearing in mind that, underlying and counterbalancing this awareness is the realisation of man's eternal potential. Firstly it is proposed to deal with that broad awareness of human transience which, for the sake of convenience, will be referred to as "general".
It is then proposed to consider the particular aspects and implications of human transience arising from this general view: on the one hand, the transience, instability of the human body, which awareness may with Gryphius, as with the ageing Ronsard, be translated into what appear to be very personal terms; on the other hand, the transience, instability and vanity of human values, be they material or ideological.

Gryphius' general awareness of transience, as we have already indicated, is bound up with his assessment of the whole of material creation, in particular of those biological forms previously discussed. The patterns of growth and decline, of resplendent exuberance and sudden disappearance, observable in nature, are also the dominant patterns where man is concerned. In this area the reader is acutely conscious, if not of Gryphius' indebtedness to the Bible, then of the coincidence of his outlook with biblical teaching, as reflected above all, in the Psalms, Ecclesiastes, Job and Isaiah — in particular chapter 40. He is forever alluding to the basic Biblical concepts of transience, contained in the aphoristic statement that "all flesh is grass" (Isaiah 40. 6 ; 1 Peter 1. 24) — fragile, unsubstantial and of brief duration; and in the teaching of man's origin, namely that he was fashioned from the dust of the earth, to which he must ultimately revert. The expression of the two concepts virtually becomes fused for Gryphius in the emblem of the flower. For like man, the flower (quite literally) has its origins in the dust, from which it rises and blossoms for a brief moment, and to which it (quite literally) returns when it withers and decomposes.

The fusion of the two concepts is clearly demonstrated in Sonnet XLV, in an explicit parallel:

Itzt sindt wir hoch und gross / undt morgen schon vergraben!

and again, in the implicit parallel found in the ode, Beschluess des Jahres:

Wir, / die wir eine weile blühen.

Und mit der zeit von hinnen ziehen.

Wir werden mit der zeit in Erden

"und leichten Staub verkehret werden / (Oden II. Buch,XII. Ga. Bd.II, p.61)

In either case the common destiny of man and flower is stressed. Indeed, the analogy between the brevity and insubstantiality of human life and the brief duration and fragility of a flower, recurs throughout Gryphius' works, almost as a Leitmotif. We find it varied and modulated, as the poet accentuates first one set of implications and then another, or interwoven with other motifs, also expressive of human transience.

Thus, we find the basic motif in the sonnet, Es ist alles eitell, although here it takes the form of a sweeping generalisation, rather than of an explicit analogy: "Was itz und prächtig blüht sol bald zutreten werden." (Ga. Bd.I, p.33).

Nevertheless, the basic elements that make the flower-analogy so valid for the poet, are present, namely, the rise to splendour and the sudden decline and, above all, the brevity of duration - the time-span between "itzt" and "bald". In Ode XI of the first book, the same elements are stressed, in a much more detailed and explicit analogy:

Wie eine Rose blüht /

Wen man die Sonne siiht /

Begrüssen diese Welt:

Die ehr der tag sich neiget /
Ehr sich der abendt zeiget
Verwelckt / und unversehns abfällt.
So wachsen wir auff erden... ( 19).

Here, man's life-span, his time of blossoming and withering, expressed in the
opposition of "itzt" and "bald" (in the sonnet, Es ist alles eitell), is revealed
as merely the interval between sun-rise and sun-set. This same conception of the
brevity of life is developed and expounded still further in the funeral dissertat-
ion, Winter-Tag menschlichen Lebens, where the poet enquires quite openly into
the question of human duration:


In this case, he supplies the reader with what might well be termed the "raison
d'être" of the flower analogy or, for that matter, of any analogy expressive of
human transience. The flower-analogy is marked by a virtual telescoping of time;
that is to say, in order to show the brevity of man's life-span, the poet con-
ceives of it as coinciding with the life-span of a flower. That such a concept
of brevity is not, in Gryphius' case, to be ascribed merely to the experiencing
of the effects of time, but also to an awareness of eternity, is borne out by the
answer he supplies to his own rhetorical question as to man's duration:

Tausend Jahre sind vor Gott wie ein Tag. Welcher aus allen Sterblichen
hat ie dieses Ziel erreicht? Wir sind /wie lange wir auch sind / nur Blum-
en / die des Morgens aufgehen / und noch vor Abend welck werden und ver-
dorren... ( Diss. Fun. p.208 ).

Thus, it is against the eternity of God that man's life-span is measured and re-
vealed in its ultimate brevity - God, for whom a thousand years are like a mere
day. It is interesting to note here, how Gryphius uses the quotation from 2 Peter
3, verse 8, out of its original context, in order to make his point. The original Biblical statement is a paradox, indicating the complete relativity of time. For God, who is eternal and therefore outside time, time as we conceive of it, does not exist. Nor does it impose any limitations, i.e. in the words of Peter: "a thousand years are as a day and a day as a thousand years", Gryphius omits the second term in the paradox and focusses his attention on the first term, on which he bases his argument. If a thousand years are nothing more than a day, in the eyes of God, then what of man's life-span, he reasons, for no mortal man has ever lived to be a thousand? Logically it would follow from this, that man's duration is less than a day. Hence, the metaphor of the flower that lasts only from sunrise to sun-set. But even here, the potential of this particular expression of human transience has not been exploited to the full. With typical thoroughness and precision, Gryphius proceeds to consider the question of the actual day on which the plant, man's equivalent, blooms. Once again, as in his use of the Biblical quotation, it is the brevity of man's life-span that is accentuated, by means of juxtaposition and comparison. Ansonius, so Gryphius points out, has referred to man as a plant that matures and dies on the day of the summer solstice. But Gryphius rejects this day, the longest of the year, in favour of the day of the winter solstice, the shortest, which he finds far more indicative of man's flowering time: "wegen des gar zu kurzen Morgens und nahen Abends. (Diss. Fun. p. 206.)

Quite apart from the flower-motif, the idea of man's existence filling but a day, recurs frequently in Gryphius' works. His sense of the brevity of human life, expressed par excellence, in the condensed time-span implied by the image of the plant blooming at the winter solstice, finds further expression in images,
whose telescoping of time is still more drastic. As remarked previously, these motifs are frequently to be found interwoven with the flower-motif, whose significance they may corroborate or complement. Thus, in the sonnet, Threnen in schwerer Krankheit (Ga. Bd. I, p 59), human transience and insubstantiality, epitomised first in the parallel of the flower - "Ist't blumen / morgen kott..", that so swiftly disintegrates, are further accentuated by a whole crescendo of parallels. All of these are illustrative of either swiftness of passage: "Wind", "Bach" in particular, or insubstantiality: "Schaum", "Nebel", "Reif", "Thau", "Schatten". Or, they may reflect both: "Wind", "Schaum", "Nebel", "Reif", "Thau", "Schatten".

In the ode, Scire tuum nihil est, in which we again find a sequence of transience-parallels, the flower-motif is subsidiary to another parallel that goes far beyond it, in its depiction of transience and instability:

.../ was kann ich anders hören?

Als dass ich gleich dem Klang;
So ist die Luft durchstreicht / und ist doch ganz verschwindet
Bill auf den Untergang
Gleich einer Wiesenblum die man nicht wieder findet.
Gleich einem leichten Tau /
Gleich einem Wintertag / und grünen Sommersgrase /
Gleich blätnten auff der Au...(Oden III. Buch, II. Ga. Bd. II, p. 73.)

In this passage there is greater elaboration of the transience-motifs than in Threnen in schwerer Krankheit; and instead of working up to a climax, to a crescendo of intensity, the poet begins, so to speak, fortissimo, with the comparison of man's life to the momentary passage of a sound through the air. The other
parallels - and among them, the flower-motif is used twice - come as more muted repetitions of the opening theme. There is also more detailed use of the various transience-motifs than in the sonnet. Nevertheless, the net effect, achieved by the poet, is very similar to that produced by the closing lines of the sonnet. He once again succeeds in communicating an acute sense of the brevity and fragility of life, showing it to be, in this case, of no more substance than the duration of a note of music.

We have seen how the flower, with its fleeting period of splendour and its swift return to the dust of its origins, epitomizes human life in all its brevity and frailty. In addition, we have observed how such an image of transience may be interwoven or interchanged with other images or emblems, expressive of the same basic concept. Quite apart from the concept of the rise and decline of flowers and of their limited life-span, we find Gryphius stressing man's limitation to a brief period of time, be this expressed as a day or, even more drastically, as an instant. In the sonnet, Abend, (Ga. Bd. I, p.66), for example, it is a day whose confines are seen to coincide with the confines of man's life, a day, imbued here with added shades of significance drawn from the Bible, (cf. John 9. 4), as the period of man's activity, before the coming of the night, when no man can work. In what is virtually a retrospective glance, the sonnet immediately confronts the reader with the speed, with which this period elapses, as time itself pursues its unrelenting course: "Der schnelle Tag ist hin / ....Wie ist die Zeit verthan..." (Ga. Bd. I, p.66). The same quality of brevity is again stressed in the funeral dissertation, Hingang durch die Welt. Here, as in the parallel of the note of music, there is a telescoping of time, an acceleration of the processes of transience. Gryphius quotes an incident recounted by Rudolphus Agricola concerning a learned man, who, when asked:
..was doch eigentlich des Menschen Leben? sich ein wenige hatte ansehen lassen / bald aber verborgen. (Hingang durch die Welt. Diss. Fun. p.315).

This he finds to be a realistic assessment:

So ists mit uns: wir kommen auf Erden / verharren allhier eine kurze Zeit / und verschwinden unversehns / als flügen wir davon. (Ibid.)

Just how brief our sojourn on Earth is conceived to be, is further illustrated in the funeral dissertation, Folter menschliches Lebens, with the image of the wheel, an image that lays greater emphasis on brevity than does even the note-of-music-parallel:


Man's allotted time, then, far from being conceived of as a day or less than a day - the daylight hours of the shortest day, is here shown, reduced to almost the smallest imaginable unit of time. It has become "kaum einen Punct und Augenblick" - that fraction of a second, in which a point on the perimeter of a moving wheel is in contact with the level ground, or, in the words of Job, less time than it takes a man to swallow his own saliva.

Finally, in this reduction of man's life-span to the ultimate terms of brevity, we are brought face to face with yet another aspect of Gryphius' awareness of human transience, namely, that it is something determined and foreordained by God Himself. Not only is the brevity of man's existence thrown into sharp relief against the background of God's changeless eternity, but God is conceived of as deciding, even limiting, the duration of man. So it is that Gryphius echoes
Job, in what is virtually a complaint of being deprived by God of time. Time itself does not merely run out, or escape us; God sets our temporal limits, i.e. cuts short our time. This same realisation may be expressed, as is the case here, with an underlying sense of deprivation, of being pressed for time, or with matter-of-fact resignation to what God decrees.

Among the lines written by the young Gryphius on the premature death of his step-mother, Maria Rissmann, there is a passage that reflects a profound sense of deprivation and loss, brought about by God's curtailment of human life. The whole poem is centred on the question of untimely death, i.e., the untimely cutting short of life, the expression of the poet's particular and personal grief giving rise to reflections on transience of a far more general nature. In these reflections, it is the inevitability of life's coming to an end that is the dominant theme; and, as noted previously, it is not merely a question of the inexorable course of time, but also of God's intervention, a fact which strengthens rather than attenuates the sense of inevitability:

Wil uns das Alter gleich ein wenig Frist versprechen /
Dass als ein Strom doch fleust / so kommt Gott selbst heran

In the face of God's omnipotence man is powerless, just as he is powerless to resist the force of time indefinitely. But where the action of time is a process and, as such, may be resisted for a period, however brief that may be, God's action is immediate and irresistible. This immediate and irresistible action on the part of God becomes synonymous, for the poet, with the premature death of his step-mother:
At first sight, this appears to convey the notion of a harsh Old Testament God, a dispenser of life and death, unmoved by the suffering of his children. Nevertheless, this very identification of human transience with God's will and plan is a source of comfort, or at least, of resignation. It lifts transience and the sudden cutting short of life out of the realm of purely physical processes (be they biological or mechanical) and purely accidental occurrences into a realm of reason and significance. True, in the juxtaposition of the two lines: "Gott ists / der... den Schmetzens Riss gethan" and "Doch was Gott schleusst ist gut" - a juxtaposition of pathos and self-persuasive reasoning - it is the pathos that at first prevails. But the outcry of protest, in which the transience-theme culminates, is made to undergo a complete transformation. It strikes, initially, a strident note of discord (with God's will), which discord reason then dampsen and eventually brings into harmony with the new theme of acceptance and resignation, precursor to the final burst of Christian hope with which the poem ends:

Doch was Gott schleusst ist gut / obs schon sehr häfftig scheint
Und Menschen sauer geht ein. (ibid.)

In the discussion of Gryphius's "general" awareness of human transience emphasis has been laid, firstly, on the profound and central significance that the parallel, man - flower, has for the poet - as an indication of the origin and destination of the human body, as well as of man's fragility and short duration. Secondly, Gryphius' assessment of the brevity of human life, his reduction of it to the smallest imaginable unit of time, has been shown to stem ultimately from his awareness of the contrast between the time of a man's life span and the timelessness of
God's eternity. Lastly, attention has been drawn to the poet's concept of human duration as something determined, not by chance circumstances, nor even by the cumulative effects of time, but decided by God himself. To sum up this section, we can probably offer no better synthesis of the various elements dealt with than the following lines, taken from the ode, Beschluss des Jahres:

Wir / die wir eine weile blühen
Und mit der zeit von hinnen sinnen
Wir werden mit der zeit in Erden
Und leichten Staub verkehret werden / (Ga. Bd. II, p. 61, stanza 2.)

In the above extract, already quoted earlier in this section, we find par excellence the comparison of man's life with that of a flower; and this parallel is followed by the juxtaposition of man's transience and God's eternity:

Der vor Ewigkeit geherrscht: esd in Ewigkeit wird bleiben
Heist uns Menschen wieder kommen; doch ihm selbst mag nichts vertreiben (ibid.)

and simultaneously the implication that God determines our life span, which becomes an explicit statement in the following stanza (3):

Er hat uns Mass und Ziel gestzet:
Indem die Welt uns ihre schätzet:
So bald wir arme diss erreichen
Muss dieser Wangen Ros' erbleichen.

God's dispositions are accepted with matter-of-fact resignation, the only note of pathos, and it is a very mute note at that - being sounded by the exclamation on man's common destiny: "wir arme".

From that area of human transience which, for the sake of convenience, has been referred to as "general", it is now intended to turn to the more specific case of
the human body. The transience, instability and vulnerability of the human body, that is, of the physical side of man, is a theme which presents itself repeatedly and with considerable intensity throughout Gryphius' works, finding its culmination in his descriptions of opened graves and rotting corpses, in the physical effects of death, which may, in the terms of this thesis, be synonymous with the effects of time. As has been pointed out previously, the poet's awareness of the susceptibilities of the body to time, change and decay may, on occasions, be translated into very personal terms, his own illnesses and their effects on him serving as object-lessons on transience. But whether the point of view be internal or external (personal or impersonal), the focus is unaltered. The perfection of the human mechanism, for all its beauty and strength, is shown to be subject to precisely the same laws as the rest of God's material creation: it may, in its harmony and design be a pointer to the ingenuity and skill of the Eternal Creator, but it is also the register and gaug of man's transience and instability.

We have discussed the centrality of the flower-emblem to Gryphius' whole concept of transience, stressing in particular its aptness as an expression both of the brevity of life and the origin and destiny of man the physical being. In addition, we have touched upon its significance as an embodiment of fragility, even of vulnerability. In Gryphius' assessment of the human body there are frequent echoes of the flower-parallel and its implications - above all, in its insistence on the fragility and vulnerability of the body and the inevitability of its decay.

What is the human body for Gryphius, apart from being a highly intricate example of God's handiwork? In order to find an answer to this question, we must inevitably take as our point of departure a concept connected in some way with the Biblical flower-transience parallel. Thus we find, quite explicitly, the assertion that our
flesh has been created from the dust of the earth:

Wir Sterblichen / was sind wir anders als arme Erde und Asche.. (Diss. Fun. p. 122),
to which, moreover, it must ultimately revert, just as an earthenware pot, for all its apparent solidity and form, returns to the insubstantiality and formlessness of its basic components, when it is shattered:

Was ist unser Fleisch als Thon aus Leimen gemacht / muss es nicht wieder in Staub und Erde verfallen ? ( Diss. : Fun. p. 142-143.)

Coupled with the awareness of the ultimate fragility and insubstantiality of the human body is, however, the belief, already touched upon in the general introduction to this section, that man is more than a temporal, destructible manifestation of life - embodied par excellence in the flower. For he is conceived of as being endowed with an eternal soul, temporarily contained within the body, but altogether distinct from it, as regards both origin and destiny. So it is that we find a further assessment of the body, also ascribable to Biblical sources, that goes far beyond the flower-parallel in its implications. The concept of the body as the temporal and temporary housing of the soul tends to accentuate rather than to minimise the sense of the body's subjection to time and change, since its limited duration and its fragility are contrasted with the eternity of the soul. In the ode, Scire tuum nihil est, this contrast is present, by implication:

Der mäden Seelen Haus /

Der Körper den du trägst / und schmückest muss verwesen .. ( Ca. Bd. II, p. 73)

while in the following extract from the drama, Cardenio und Celinde, it is much more explicit:

Was du trägst an dir ist Staub /

Er kam von der Erden.
The body, because of its very qualities and components, must necessarily decay, but the soul has no part in this purely physical process; and yet, this is not to say that for Gryphius, the eternal soul is uninfluenced and unaffected by the temporal body, during life. We have only to look at Cardenio und Celinde to find a graphic demonstration of this. However, that particular subject will be dealt with in detail at a later point. What it is intended to stress here, is the relationship and the contrast between soul and body, with regard to the broad theme of tranience. It is interesting to note, in the context, that it is the body, the transient and temporal part of man, the physical manifestation of life, that is seen to be the source of most human misery. This is largely because of its vulnerability to external forces. In the funeral dissertation, Hingang durch die Welt, Gryphius speaks of the dead person in precisely such terms:

Ohn ists nicht / dass ihr Hintritt vielen Gefährlichkeiten unterworffen gewesen. Denn sie trug den unvergleichlichen Schatz ihrer Seelen / und die Beilage des Höchsten in dem irdischen und zubrechlichen Gefäß ihres Leibes.

(Diss. Fun. p. 323).

The Biblical source of the image, the treasure in earthen vessels, II Corinthians 4.7, is immediately obvious, but this by no means prevents its being an apt and valid vehicle for Gryphius' particular awareness of soul and body.
The body is, like all things material and physical, completely subservient to time, but it is conceived of as being more fragile and more vulnerable than most phenomena in the created universe. It may be likened, in its fragility and vulnerability, to a flower or an earthenware pot, or contrasted with the solidity and durability of rocks and metal, whose own ultimate lack of stability underscores still further the insubstantiality of human flesh:

Und mag ein zartes Fleisch ihm lange Raitung machen?


From whichever aspect the human body is viewed, whether in contrast to what is genuinely durable - the eternity of the soul or of God, or apparently so - stone, metal, or in comparison with the fragile and fleeting, it is, above all, its transience and vulnerability that obtrude.

The precariousness and brevity of life itself are inextricably bound up with these qualities of the body. This is, in essence, the message conveyed by the song Domine, quid est homo, quod memor es eyus, where the emphasis is upon the triviality of those factors that can curtail life: "Ein fall / ein Wassertropf..." (Ga. Bd. I, p. 79). In that catalogue of human misery, Menschliches Elena, where man is referred to as "ein Wohnhaus grimmer schmertzen...", (Ga. Bd. I, p. 35), the susceptibility of the body, in the context of transience, again comes to the fore. This is also the case in the following extract from the funeral dissertation, Magnetische Verbindung des Herrn Jesu / und der in Ihme verliebten Seele:

Wie unversehns stürzt der Mensch / wenn er in seiner höchsten Höhe / wie plötzlich leget er sich auf das Siechbette und verschwindet / wann nunmehr aller Augen nach ihm sehen... (Diss. Fun. p. 103).
Here, in this picture of human decline at the very pinnacle of achievement, we are
reminded again of the flower-emblem. Man's glory is, indeed, the short-lived glory of the flower, because his body shares in its susceptibility. For man to come to an end, he need not necessarily be figuratively trodden under foot, i.e., fall prey to external circumstances, however trivial or momentous. The core of sudden destruction may also lie within himself, as sickness or disease.

Up to this point, the transience and vulnerability of the body, as it affects human-kind in general, has been dealt with. But, as mentioned previously, the same awareness that finds expression in an appraisal of the common condition of man, can also be translated into what are apparently very personal terms — "apparently", because when dealing with seventeenth century poetry, it is not always possible to distinguish between fact and fiction, spontaneous gesture and theatrical pose. It is precisely in the area of "personal" sickness and disease, that some of Gryphius' most explicit statements on the transience and susceptibility of the human body are made. In four sonnets, in particular, personal illness and the awareness of transience virtually become synonymous for the poet. With these sonnets, Threnen in schwerer Krankheit, Andie umbstehenden Freunde, An sich selbst and Defecit in dolore vita mea, it would be impossible to determine, with any accuracy, how far they are the expression of unique and genuine personal experience, and to what extent they are typical, i.e., representative, reflections of the broad stream of human experience. Nor have such considerations any real bearing on the subject under discussion. Suffice it to point out that, given Gryphius' basic awareness of time and eternity, the particular may always refer beyond itself to the typical, while the typical necessarily includes the particular in its broad
sweep.

In Threnen in schwerer Krankheit and An sich selbst, we find what is virtually the counterpart to the lines written by Gryphius on his birthday, in which he marvels at the intricacy and ingenuity of the human body-structure, as an example of God's handiwork. In both sonnets, there is again an acute sense of the structure of the body, but, in this instance, it is not a question of recognising the consummate mastery in its design, but rather of perceiving the ultimate frailty of its components and the signs of their imminent collapse. Of the two works, An sich selbst presents by far the balder and more uncompromising view of the transience of the body, reflected in the decline of its members:

Mir grauert vor mir selbst / mir zittern alle glieder
Wenn ich die lippe und nass und beider augen kluff /
Betracht / und die schon erstorbenen augenlieder:
Die zunge / schwarz vom brandt / fett mit dem worten nieder /
Und lalt / ich weis nicht was; die müde Seele ruft /
Den grossen Träster zue / das Fleisch reucht nach der graut.
Mein Körper ist nicht mehr als adern / seel / undt hein.
Das sitzen ist mein todt / das liegen meine pein.


The poet looks at his body and his reaction is not one of amazed admiration but of immediate horror and fear. He recoils, trembling at the undeniable proofs of his own transience that confront him:

Mir grauert vor mir selbst / mir zittern alle glieder.... (v. 1).

Painfully aware, as he is, of the structure of his body and of the state of its individual parts, his appraisal of them is far from being a clinical one. Indeed, there is a definite absence of data uncoloured by emotion. The face, suggestive
of a death's head, that ubiquitous reminder to seventeenth century man of the proximity of his demise, even in the midst of life, is evoked by means of the poet's reaction to it, rather than by detailed description. Any specific detail there is, has the effect of adding to, and confirming the image of the death's head: "beider augen kluft", "die schon erstorbenen augenlieder". The poet's depiction of the fever-blackened tongue and its incomprehensible mumblings is again far-removed from clinical objectivity, as is also his reference to the odour of his sick flesh: "das Fleisch reucht nach der gruft". The look (facial features), the sound (the tongue's mumblings), the smell and even the feelings of transience in the wasted body are conjured up. After a glimpse of the body-total, reduced to the bare bones of its physical composition - "Mein Cörper is nicht mehr als adern / seel undt bein", there comes an insight into its sufferings: "Das sitzen ist mein todt / das Liegen meine pein". Its complete debility is suggested, not without a glimmer of black humour, in the following line: "Die schenckel haben selbst nun träger wohl von nöten".

In this revelation of human misery, set as it is in present time, seemingly in the "here and now" of the poet's experience, there is no reference to either past or future, no direct or explicit encounter with the passage of time. Yet, the whole sonnet is permeated by a profound sense of the unsubstantial and temporary character, not merely of human flesh, but of the totality of those values, concrete or otherwise, that owe their existence to man's existence as a physical being. (The question of such values will be dealt with at a later stage.) For all its focussing of attention on the signs of personal vulnerability and transience, the sonnet, on the evidence of the last lines, is clearly intended to be universal in its application. What has been depicted here is not the misery and transience of
of one man, as manifested in the succumbing of his body to illness and decay, but
the misery and transience of the whole human race.

In Threnen in schwerer Krankheit, the reader is once again made aware of the
universal implications of personal experience. Whereas, in An sich selbst, the
sense of human vulnerability and subjection to time is conveyed by descriptions of
a purely present reality, in Threnen in schwerer Krankheit, the present becomes
a stepping-stone between past and future, or, in other words, a vantage-point, from
which past and future can be viewed. An sich selbst deals quite mercilessly on
the present state of the body, confronting the reader, not so much with the actual
passage of time or the progress of an illness, as with the effects of both and the
poet's reaction to these effects. Threnen in schwerer Krankheit is marked by the
close interweaving of an acute awareness of passing time with that sense of the immin-
etent disintegration of the body-structure, mentioned previously. From the very
outset, that intimate association is present. So we find that, in line 1, the
passage of time is suggested in the implicit comparison between the former and
present states of the body:

Ich bin nicht der ich war / die Kräfte sind verschwunden... (Ga. Bd. I, p. 34),
while in lines 5 and 6 of versions D and E, there is a similar evocation of the
contrast between past and present, in the emphasis laid on what is now lacking:
(Tbid.)
"die Adern sonder Maus..." and "Die Armen sonder fleisch..." Immediately following
the implicit juxtaposition of past and present in line 1, and consistent with
its evocation of the present state of the body, is an image suggestive of the immin-
etent collapse of its structure:

Die glieder sind verdorrt / als ein durch brandter graus... (Tbid.)
and this comparison by the poet of his limbs to burnt-out rubble, i.e., to the disintegrated remnants of a building, is not merely a hyperbolical expression of the state to which illness has reduced him, for it also foreshadows the actual collapse of the body-fabric - "mein schwaches Haus", predicted in lines 5, 6 and 7:

Wer siht nicht / wen er siht die Adern sonder Haus ( versions D , E.)

Die Armen sonder Fleisch / dass dass mein schwaches Haus ( versions C, D, E )

Der leib einbrechen wird / noch inner wenig stunden... (Ga. Bd. I, p. 34).

The evidence of the passage of time is inseparable here from the evidence of the fragility and the impending destruction of the body, whose past, present and future states are evoked in the course of the sonnet's octave. In the sestet, the basic elements of transience, fragility and imminent destruction are again fused, this time, in the almost inescapable simile of the wild-flower:

Gleich wie das wiesenblum' lebt / wen das licht der welt

Hervorbracht / und noch ehr der middag weggeht / füllt

So sterb ich vor der zeit... (Ibid.)

The significance of the flower-parallel, in the poet's general awareness of transience, has already been discussed in some detail. Here, we find this particular parallel as the final expression of his realisation of the transience and vulnerability of his own body and, hence, of the brevity and precariousness of his life.

In An die umbstehenden Freunde, the same realisation is conveyed by a merging of the effects of illness and time: that is to say, the effects of illness on a living body are conceived of as being synonymous with the effects of time on a dead body:

...Mein fleisch der Eltern Gabe /

Ligt nuh mehr schon und fauln in nicht nur einem grabe...
Hyperbolical as is this last assertion, it is, nevertheless, indicative of the same basic truths as are found in Threnen in schwerer Krankheit. The human body, for all its apparent solidity, when subjected to the irresistible forces of time and change, has ultimately no more substance than dust or vapour dispersed by the whim of every wind. On the one hand, this image is a reference to the wasted condition of the sick body; on the other hand, it foreshadows a future state, when the body has completed disintegrated, and all that persists is a wraith or spectre.

Finally, in Defecit in Dolore vita mea, we find yet another illneds-transience juxtaposition. In this case, the poet's attitude towards his own transience appears to be somewhat paradoxical. On the one hand, there is a sense of being pressed for time, on the other, impatience with the slowness of its course. Thus, in the opening quatrains, in the very midst of pain and anguish, there is an awareness of the swiftness with which time is running out, comparable to that expressed in the funeral dissertation, Folter menschliches Lebens, with the image of the point on the perimeter of a revolving wheel. (Diss. Fun. p. 357.) This awareness is paralleled here, by the awareness of the inexorable course of the illness:

Mit thären und mit ach / mit arbeit weh und zagen

Verschliess ich Stund und Tag / der Feber grimmes Leidt

Nimmt mit dem Jahr mich hin / die flucht der schnellen zeit /

Läst mich mein herbes Weh / mein Elend kaum beklagen! (Ga. Bd. I, p. 77.)

Quite at variance with the complaint, that the swift passage of time does not even allow sufficient respite for him to lament his ills, is the sense of the indefinite prolongation of these ills, expressed in the impatient outcry of line 11:
Wie lange sol ich noch in diesem kummer stecken? (Ibid.)

But are the two attitudes expressed here really so contradictory? If the poet's belief were to accept only the realm of time, then, yes, they would be contradictory. But, given his belief in eternity, they are actually complementary. Transience, subjection to the effects of passing time, like the susceptibility of the body to illness, is inevitably and inextricably associated with existence in time. The only release from transience is, necessarily, a release from time. Superficially, the poet's outcry of impatience and despair: "Wie lange sol ich noch in diesem kummer stecken?" refers to release from the illness that is wracking his body. On a more profound level, and in the light of the opening quatrain, it refers to a release from the whole "malady" of time.

In the four "first-person" sonnets discussed, in which illness and bodily vulnerability have virtually been equated with transience, it has been, in general, the typically-human, rather than the uniquely-personal aspects that confront the reader. Just as in works where the point of view is external, for instance the funeral dissertations, or universal-Menschliches Elend, Domine, quid est homo, quod memor es ejus—the central question has still been man in his relationship to time and eternity.
CHAPTER V.

The Transience of Human Values.

Having discussed Gryphius' awareness of transience, as manifested in the created world, the world-system organized by man and, lastly, in man himself, we now come to the question of human values and their relationship to time and eternity. From the poet's assessment of universe, world-system and man, it follows logically that the durability of any values, deriving from these areas, will be suspect. Indeed, we might well go so far as to say, that for Gryphius, the durability of human values, be they material or ideal, concrete or abstract, is intimately connected with the durability of the whole realm of the material and concrete.

Ach! was ist alles dis was wir vor köstlich achten /
Als schlechte nichtikeit als schaten staub und windt...

exclaims the poet, in the sonnet, Es ist alles eitell (Ga. Bd. I, p. 34); and again, in ode IX of the first book:

Was sindt doch alle sachen /
Die uns ein hertze machen /
Als schlechte nichtikeit ? (Ga. Bd. II, p. 18.)

What man prizes has no more substance or duration than his own fragile body or the transient world, in which he exists. His values are ultimately nothing - of no greater consequence than shadow or dust and as unstable as the wind.

Any values that are qualities of objects in the material universe - for instance, beauty, apparent durability; or of the human body - facial and bodily beauty, outstanding strength - share in the subjection of all matter to the effects of time.
A purely material value, such as wealth, is no different, because, when reduced to basic terms, it represents the amassing of destructible matter, to which worth has been ascribed by destructible human beings. Even so-called ideal values - art, wisdom, glory, fame - seen by Renaissance man as endowing men with immortality, are held by Gryphius to be of little more duration than purely material values.

Dis was uns kan ergetzen /
Was wir für ewig schätzen /

Indeed, we may, with justification, speak of a materialisation of ideal values, in the sense that Gryphius tends to stress the transience of the actual physical components of, for instance, a work of art. In the case of a poem, he refers to the susceptibility of the paper on which it is written. Similarly wisdom, fame, glory are linked to the material universe and its transience, being dependent for durability, on the kinds of men, the lasting qualities of stone or paper.

Broadly speaking and for the sake of convenience, we may divide the human values Gryphius deals with, into three main categories:

I. Those values deriving from man's assessment of the realm of material creation, taken as including the human body.

II. Those values deriving from his relationships with the world-system (world-system being understood in the sense defined in chapter III of this thesis).

III. Those values pertaining to the human mind and its activities.

However, it must be pointed out, that these categories are, by no means, always clearly defined. They tend, rather, to overlap. Nor are they exhaustive, since there are, above and beyond them, values such as fame or glory, which cannot just-
ifiably be confined to any particular one of them. Fame could well be described as deriving from, or being relevant to, any or all of them. For instance, fame may result from men's attitude toward outstanding beauty or strength, toward worldly position or possessions, toward intellectual or artistic achievements. Finally, before proceeding with the discussion of Gryphius' awareness of the transience of human values, it is necessary to stress the point that, without reference to eternal counterparts, any such discussion would be incomplete.

As we have already remarked, the poet's sense of time and its passage is rendered more acute by his belief in eternity; his sense of the brevity of human life is heightened by his belief in the timeless infinity of God. Similarly, when it comes to the question of human values, his awareness of their transience is intensified by his belief in the existence of values outside the jurisdiction of time, absolute values, having their source and origin in God and His qualities, and which may also be manifested as qualities of that eternal and indestructible part of man, the human spirit.

In the following section it is intended to consider, in some detail, Gryphius' attitude toward human values, arranged, for the sake of convenience, under the broad headings set out above.

Of the values arising from man's relationship to the realm of material creation, there is little doubt that beauty is the one that most concerns and captivates him. We have only to compare the volume of Gryphius' output, on this subject, with the dearth of his references to, say, strength, to be made aware of this fact. Beauty may be a quality of material creation, sharing in its transience; or it may, on the other hand, be an absolute value, a quality of God. For the purposes of the present discussion, only the first aspect will be considered in any detail.
i.e., beauty as a quality or attribute of material creation. Since we are dealing with man and his values, we shall be concerned, above all, with beauty as manifested in the human body.

The transience of beauty is, as we have already stressed, one of the major themes of European Renaissance poetry, and again, of seventeenth century anachronistic verse. Indeed, it is a theme of such universality in literature, that it would be virtually impossible, either to follow it back to its sources, or trace out the route of its divergent tributaries. At the risk of overgeneralising and oversimplifying the matter, we might, in the terms of this thesis, divide the theme of the transience of beauty into two main streams: a time-orientated awareness and an eternity-orientated awareness. On the one hand, because of the realisation that time is flying and that, therefore, beauty cannot last, all emphasis is placed on the "here and now," the implication being, that beauty should be enjoyed to the full, now, while there is still time to enjoy it. In concrete terms: all the fragrance, colour and sweetness of the flower must be savoured, before it fades. On the other hand, the same realisation of the passage of time and beauty leads to a sense of their ultimate nothingness. Rather than a commitment to the here and now, a tasting to the full of the present reality, in an attempt to forestall time and all its effects, there is a reaching out beyond time - not necessarily a rejection of it, but a transcendence of it that is simultaneously a refusal to see it as being endowed with ultimate value.

Gryphius' awareness of the transience of beauty is quite definitely eternity-orientated. His belief in eternity, his recognition of the hand of the Creator behind creation, conditions his way of handling this theme, as does also, in the case of bodily beauty, his belief in man's eternal soul. Probably, the most strik-
ing aspect of the poet's treatment of this theme is his frequent focussing of attention on the actual physical processes of change and decay, in much the same way as he does, in those poems dealing with the transience of the body, as manifested in illness.

Intimately associated with the decline of all physical beauty, is the transient beauty of the flower. Just as its brief life-span presents a parable of the brevity of human life, so its ephemeral beauty is a pointer to the insubstantiality of bodily perfection. This association, which recurs throughout Renaissance literature, usually in passages of delicate lyricism and gentle melancholy, undergoes certain quite radical changes in Gryphius' works, with the result that, very often, there is a definite rejection of poetic euphemism, in favour of unsparing realism. Examples of this phenomenon will be discussed in a later chapter, with reference to the sonnets, An Eugenien (Ga Bd. I , p. 44) and Über die Gebaine der ausgegrabenen Philosetten (Ga. Bd. I, p.51-52).

When we turn to the evidence of Gryphius' works, it is possible to pick out isolated passages, where the poet's awareness of the transience of beauty is, indeed, expressed in delicate images of flowers fading. For instance, in the Brunnen=Discurse, we find the following lines:

0 dass alles was schön / so hinfällig! müssen den die edelsten Rosen so zeitlich verwelken und die Lilien / in dem sie aufwachsen ? (Diss. Fun. p.45)

lines, which have their parallel in the ode to Maria Rissmann:

Das Wunder der Natur / Ewer mehr als zarter Leib /
Ewer Rosen=roter Mund erblast und wird zu nichts /
Nichts ist /das mehr an Euch bei seiner Schönheit bleiben!
So stirbt die Lilien... (Ga. Bd. I, p. 22.)

The second quotation is virtually a particular application of the general truths propounded in the first passage. Both extracts are taken from works, written on the death of someone particularly close to the poet, so that there is obviously no connection here between the use of what we might term conventional imagery and lack of sincerity. On the other hand, we might, perhaps, speak of a certain masking if not of genuine grief, then of the cruder realities of transience, a sparing by the poet of his own and others' feelings. (After all, a funeral dissertation, besides being a eulogy of the deceased, was meant to bring words of comfort to the mourners.) There is no insistence on the actual processes of transience, no focussing of attention on the details of these processes. The disappearance of beauty is indeed like the fading of a rose — "Müssen den die edelsten Rosen so zeitlich verwelken...", "Euer bosen-roter Mund erblast...", (Ga. Bd. I, p.22), the premature withering of a lily — "(müssen den) die Lilien / in dem sie aufwachsen untergehen..", (Diss. Fun. p.95), "...So stirbt die Lilien...", (Ga. Bd. I, p.22), and here the comparison rests.

Still within the framework of the same type of comparison, it is, however, possible to point to an expression of the transience of beauty, that is unsparing in its realism and that probes into the very substance of things. In the funeral dissertation, Ausländer in dem Vaterland, we find a striking example of this, in the coupling of the flower-bodily-beauty-simile with sharp observations of reality. The point of departure, for the poet's observations, is the floral emblem in the deceased's coat of arms. The way he makes use of this emblem not only gives the reader an insight into his poetic technique, but, more important still, it is indicative of his whole attitude towards physical beauty:
The white flower, in the unspotted purity of its beauty, is seen to be the epitome of perfection and nothingness, because those very qualities, that contribute to its perfection, are also the source and register of its transience. White, of all colours, is most susceptible to being sullied; the delicacy of form of a flower, from which its beauty derives, is at the same time a mark of fragility and vulnerability.

In a series of short questions - "Was ist höher...", "Was zarter...", "Was lieblicher", Gryphius builds up a picture of unparalleled beauty and perfection which he then proceeds to efface, in a further series of questions, based on the same formula: "Was verfällt plötzlicher...", "Was verwelkt mit widerwärtigem Gestank...", "Was wird leichter befleckt..." and "was verfaulet unverschener". The snow that swiftly melts, roses that wilt, lilies that wither, whiteness that soon loses its purity and the "See=Blume" that rots in the twinkling of an eye - all these manifestations of beauty are also manifestations of transience; and already, with lily, whiteness and See=Blume, there is a focussing of attention on the actual physical processes of transience. The two flowers mentioned do not simply fade gracefully, but they
decay, in the case of the lily, with what is described as a highly disagreeable odour. The whiteness of a flower is not seen merely to melt away into nothing, like snow, but it undergoes a process of discolouration. Even in the case of a flower, then, very emblem of ephemeral beauty, there is an emphasising of its material aspects. The poet is acutely conscious of the susceptibility, rather, the corruptibility of its material substance, whose decay he both sees and smells. What has been applied to the flower, as the epitome of beauty, is now applied in even stronger terms to the human body:

\[\text{Wie nichts schöner} / \text{denn ein volgeschickter Leib: Wie nichts schöner in einem volgestalten Leib / den anmuthige Glieder... also wird nichts eher versehret / Nichts eher verstelllet / nichts eher zubrochen / und in faulen Stanok und nichts verkehret / als des köstlichste Geschöpf menschlichen Leibes. (Diss Fun., p. 628.)}\]

Once again there is a clear demonstration of the fact that beauty, for Gryphius, is not something abstract, but a quality embodied in the phenomena of the material world, be it in the fragile fabric of a flower or in human flesh. In the same way as the very substance of a flower quickly becomes discoloured and rots away, so the perfection of the human body is seen to be subject to the rapid processes of transience: it is consumed, distorted, changed into "faulen Stanok und nichts". The flower-bodily-beauty-parallel has undergone a radical transformation; from being a euphemistic circumlocution of the effects of time on beauty, it has become a realistic appraisal of them - so realistic, that it includes not only the appearance of transience but also the smell, and points unwaveringly to the ultimate "nothingness" of all material manifestations of beauty.
Underlying Gryphius' assessment of beauty is, indeed, the sense of its nothingness, its lack of ultimate reality - or otherwise expressed, of eternity content. We have already referred to his awareness of the transience of beauty as being an eternity-orientated awareness; and this orientation is clearly illustrated in the above passage. It is also evident in the implications of sonnets such as An Eugenic and Uber die Gebaine der ausgegrabenen Philosetten (Ga. Bd. I, p. 51-52) where there is a similar focussing of attention on the processes of bodily decay. But it is nowhere more clearly demonstrated than in the drama, Cardenio und Celinde with its sharp differentiation between illusion and reality, deception and truth, in short, its handling of man's attitude toward physical beauty as a moral issue - a decisive factor in determining his destiny (i.e. the destiny of his eternal soul).

Before looking briefly at the synthesis of Gryphius' ideas on the transience of beauty contained in Cardenio und Celinde, it will be useful to examine some of the moral implications of his awareness, as expressed in particular poems. We have already noticed, in the extract from Auslander in dem Vaterland, the connection in Gryphius' mind between the destructibility of physical beauty and its ultimate nothingness (lack of value), from which it is but a short step to the assessment of such beauty as pure illusion - illusion which is, nevertheless, capable of captivating and enthralling men, to the extent that he loses sight of what is eternal in his wholehearted preoccupation with the temporal, his surrender of himself to it. With that same thoroughness that marked his superimposing of a picture of physical decomposition over the graceful imagery of transience in the See-Blume-bodily-beauty-parallel, Gryphius sets about destroying the illusion of beauty that ensnares man's senses. It is now proposed to examine three examples of this illusion-shattering, as incorporated in the sonnets An Iolinden, An Clelien and the ode Manet unica Virtu.
In the sonnet to Iolinde, we find what might be termed an emblematic representation of Gryphius' ultimate assessment of physical beauty, in all its transient and illusory qualities:

An Iolinden

Was habt ihr das ihr mögt an euch ew'r eigen nennen!
Die schminck ists die euch so bluttrotte lippen macht:
Die zähne sind durch kunst in laeren mundt gebracht.
Man weis das meisterstück / wodurch die wangen brennen.

Ewr eingekauftes haar kan auch ein Kind'erkennen.

Der schlimme schweis entdeckt des halschles falsche pracht
Und die polirte stirn wird wolveräint verlacht
Wen sich der salben eys will bey den runtzeln trennen.
Gemahlte! sagt mir doch wer seidt ihr / und wie alt?

Ihr mein ich / sechzehn jahr / drey stunden die gestalt.

Ihr seidt von haus' und sie ist über See ankomen. (Ga. Bd. I, p. 49.)

Here, in this depiction of a presumably ageing woman, whose every feature appears to be dependent either on paint or on some artisan's skill (in the case of hair and teeth), have we not, admittedly in satirical form, the essence of physical beauty as Gryphius conceives of it? The opening line - "Was habt ihr das ihr mögt an euch ew'r eigen nennen!" - could apply equally well to a woman in the prime of natural beauty as to the over made-up person, to whom it is addressed. In brutally revealing the deceptions that contribute to Iolinde's appearance, in stressing the fact that no feature that she has is really her own, is not the poet pointing to the transience of all physical beauty, which, because of its brief duration, its manifestation in inevitably corruptible matter, is, in the deepest sense, something
superficial and merely borrowed, of which it is impossible to claim ownership?

In the sonnet to Clelie, the transient, illusory qualities of beauty are again emphasised by means of another "negative" presentation. (In this case, probably the only person to suffer from illusions is the unfortunate example of mutton dressed as lamb, who has failed to notice that her former charms have deserted her.) Gryphi is quite unsparing in his frank reminder to her that time has passed and, with it, youth and beauty:

Zeit mehr denn über Zeit die Brüste zu verdecken /
Indem der Jahre Reiß sich an die Schläfte legt /
Deckt zu was Grauen / Hass / und keine Lust erregt /
Verdeckt / vor was ihr selbst (beschaut euch) must erschrecken.
Der Rosen Schnee ist weg / verdeckt die dörren Hecken /
Ob Chloris od Dian nackt einzuziehen pflegt /
Stets dennoch dir nicht an / die nichts als Knochen trägt /
Gehüllt in schrupfend Fell voll schwärzlich-gelber Flecken /
Legt ein / eur Markt ist aus / schliesst Kram und Laden zu /
Fragt nicht was Lieben sey / decket an die lange Ruh.
Doch nein! was fällt mir ein entblösset Hals und Brüste /
Entdeckt (damit ihr noch was nützet auf der Welt)
Wie Seuch und lange Zeit uns Schminck hab euch verstellt:

The whole sonnet is reminiscent of Giorgione's painting, Col tempo, in its juxtaposition of youth and age. In the opening quatrain there is a harsh reminder not only of the passage of time but also of the devastation it causes in the face of beauty - witness the implicit contrast between the effect of Clelie's former beauty
on those who saw her and the reactions of loathing and horror provoked by her presence:

**Deckt zu was Grauen / Hass / und keine Lust erregt**/

The second quatrain is a further demonstration of the transience of beauty, firstly in terms of a much more explicit contrast between past and present, seen in the opposition of "Rosen Schnee" and "dürren Hecken": and secondly, in the juxtaposition of those classical embodiments of physical perfection, "Chloris" and "Dian", and Clelie herself, as she is now. In the depiction of Clelie the poet avails himself of brutally realistic colours:

**Ob Chloris ob Dian nackt einzuziehen pflegt**/
**Stehts dennoch dir nicht an / die nichts als Knochen trägt**/
**Gehällt in schrumpfend Fell voll schwärzlich-gelber Flecken**/

This, then, is what Clelie's beauty has been reduced to - a few bones covered with grotesquely wrinkled, age-splotched skin. This, in the course of time, is what all physical beauty is reduced to, for the portrait of Clelie, like that of Iolinde, is representative of a general principle. Indeed, the general application of the decay of Clelie's beauty becomes evident in the sestet where, instead of continuing to point out to the ageing coquette that it is high time she covered up her doubtful charms, the poet urges her to display them openly, as an object-lesson on transience designed to dampen the exuberant passions of headstrong youth.

In the confrontation of men with the stark reality of old age and the loss of beauty, Gryphius sees a means of freeing them from their entanglement in the temporal and illusory, from their imprisonment within the realms of the senses. But he does not stop at this point of purely destructive activity. There is a very positive side to his negation of the enduring qualities of physical beauty. He rejects it as a
value, certainly, but at the same time he points, by implication, to another type of beauty that is not subject to time, nor indeed, to any of the laws that control the destiny of the material universe, namely, beauty of spirit. So we find in the ode, Manet unica virtus, a clear exposition of the poet's reasons for refusing to be ensnared by the usual paraphernalia of bodily beauty.

Es ist vergebens Laelia dass man acht
Der Augen glantz der strefflichen Stirnen pracht /
Der Purpur Mund / der Schnee der Wangen;
Sey mächtig dieses Hertz zufangen! ...

...Die Marmor Brust / der lustigen Füsse gang /
Diss Fleisch dem alle Lilien weichen
Der Leib dem kein geschöpf zu gleichen;

Der Hände Schnee / der mächtigen Arme bandt
Sini viel zu nichtig / wenn nicht das werthe Pfandt /
Das nur dess Himmels gunst ausstheilet /
Die Tugend ew'or Schwachheit heilet. (Ca. Bd. II, p. 41-42.)

These lines combine playful banter and wit with an almost moralising seriousness of tone. In the opening stanza the poet declares himself to be impervious to Laelia's charms, in a manner that is reminiscent of Thomas Carew in Disdain Returned. Like Carew, Gryphius refuses to see in a woman's outward appearance, sufficient grounds for loving her. Like him, he makes somewhat ironical use, "in this and the following stanzas, of platitudinal expressions of beauty and of hyperboli: "Der Augen glantz", "Der Purpur Mund", "Die Marmor Brust" and so on. But it is not a question here of "If she be not fair to me, what care I how fair she be!", nor even of a rejection of
beauty when unaccompanied by more enduring qualities, such as we find in Carew's lines. At first sight, Carew too, is concerned with the transience of beauty, but not in terms of time and eternity, merely in terms of time. In this life, he points out, a lasting love-relationship cannot possibly be based on anything so prone to change as physical beauty:

**Disdain Returned**

He that loves a rosy cheek,
Or a coral lip admires,
Or from star-like eyes doth seek
Fuel to maintain his fires:
As old Time makes these decay,
So his flames must waste away.

But a smooth and steadfast mind,
Gentle thoughts and calm desires,
Hearts with equal love combined,
Kindle never-dying fires.
Where these are not, I despise

Gryphius goes much further than Carew, in his rejection of physical beauty as a basis for love. His ode to Laelia, however light-hearted the tone of its opening stanzas, is written against the background of his awareness of time and eternity. It becomes, virtually, a refusal to commit himself to purely temporal values, i.e. in the specific terms of the poem itself, a refusal to be influenced or held by transient physical beauty, unless it is redeemed by God-given spiritual beauty (viz.
Once again there is an insistence on the "Nichtigkeit", the nothingness and worthlessness of physical beauty, seen to derive, above all, from its transience; and this transience is further stressed by being contrasted with something of enduring value: (stanza 5)

Die werthe Tugend Laelia bleibt und steht!
Wenn nun die schönheit als lichter blitz vergeht
Und wenn die beyden Stern' erbleichen:

Rather than being excited by the sight of bodily charms that must inevitably decay, the poet declares himself to be excited and compelled by a sense of spiritual beauty:

Die steckt mich jetzt mit schattenenden flamen an!
Die macht dass ich mich selbst nicht regiren kan
Die zwingt mich aus mir selbst zu reissen /...(ibid.)

Here the language and imagery he uses are those usually associated with physical passion, making all the more striking the climactic declaration of the effects of this spiritual passion:

Die zwingt mich aus mir selbst zu reissen /
Und was nicht ewig / hin zuschmeissen. (ibid.)

Immediately, the reader is aware of a complete change in the tone of the poem, a widening of its scope, to include not merely a playful rejection of the claims of
beauty, but also a serious refusal to become enamoured of anything temporal, a
determination to pursue indestructible values. The poet's appraisal of bodily
beauty, in the light of time and eternity, has thus been a point of departure for
an appraisal of human values in general.

Finally, in order to bring together the various aspects of Gryphiuss' awareness
of the transience of beauty, let us take a brief look at the drama Cardenio und Celinde
and its treatment of this theme. It would, of course, be a gross over-simplification
to insist that this awareness was the central issue of the play - and yet it is intimately connected with it. Basically, Cardenio und Celinde represents man
confronted with the choice between the things of time and the things of eternity,
between the apparent and the real, the sensual and the spiritual. The attitude of
the protagonists towards beauty is virtually equated with their attitude towards the
things of time, so that any change in their assessment of physical beauty necessarily
corresponds to a change in their assessment of reality in general. Their realisation of the illusory, transient nature of beauty leads them to recognise the
illusory, transient nature of the whole world of appearances perceived through the
senses. Both Cardenio and Celinde have to be shocked into this realisation by being
confronted with the stark reality of death and its effects of the human body. Mar-
cellus' rotting corpse is both a demonstration of the brevity and nothingness of
physical beauty and, by extension, a warning against wholehearted abandonment of
oneself to things temporal:

Cardenio: Was aber find ich hier? Wie? ein entseelte Leich',
Gelehnt an diese Maur! von Fülle blaw und bleich:
Verstelltes Todten-Bild! weit eingekrämpfte Lippen /
Was sind wir arme doch! so bald man an den Klippen
Des Todes scheitern muss / verschwindet die Gestalt,
Die vorhin frische Haut wird vor dem Alter alt

The same may be said of Cardenio's encounter with the ghostly Olympia, whom he sees transformed before his eyes, from the beautiful woman he desires into the very personification of death - a skeleton with bow and arrow directed at him.

The noble and virtuous Olympia herself is fully aware of the "unreal" qualities of her own beauty, which she refers to, at the close of the play, as something momentarily borrowed. In no uncertain terms, she distinguishes illusion from reality, where bodily perfection is concerned. Speaking of Cardenio's unrequited passion for her, she declares:

Ich hat mein nichtig Fleisch / der falsche Schnee der Wangen
Und dass Gesichtes Larv / und dieser Schmuck gefangen
Den mir die Zeit abnimmt;... (ibid., p. 166, v. 405-407.)

Everything that has drawn Cardenio to her has been "unreal" - "nichtig Fleisch", "falsche Schnee der Wangen" and temporarily imposed - "Gesichtes Larv", Schmuck den (mir) die Zeit abnimmt" - no more to be considered a genuine or lasting part or possession of the person they adorn than are the artificially maintained features of Iolinde. The genuine face of Olympia, i.e. of the purely physical Olympia (and, by extension, of all bodily beauty), so she declares, is indeed the skeleton:

............................ nun hat die wahre Nacht
Mein Antlitz recht erschrockt. Herr! dieser Lilien Pracht /
Des Halses Elfenbein sind nur geborgte sachen... (ibid., v. 407-409.)

For with the passage of time, in this case a mere three moons, this is what bodily beauty is reduced to:
Wenn das gesteckte Ziel mit mir wird ende machen;
Und mein beklagter Leib /...
Nun zu der langen Ruh' in seine Gruff versetzt /...
Denn such er meinen Rest! Was ihm der Sarg wird zeigen
........................ das schätz er vor mein eigen /
Das ander war entleht! (ibid., vv. 410-412; 417-419.)

The illusion of bodily beauty is replaced by the reality of the decomposing corpse, the bare-boned skeleton -- a reality for which it is, at best, merely a temporarily borrowed mask. But to see Cardenio und Celinde as an example of "Illusionszerstörung" per se, would be a grave error. In common with the portrayal of the decay of beauty in the sonnet to Clelie, its destruction of illusions has a definite purpose. The protagonists are not merely shocked into recognising the transient, deceptive nature of appearances, but they are also brought to the point where their eyes are opened to ultimate reality and they become aware of their own eternity-potential. Cardenio's words leave little doubt as to this: his confrontation with the physical side of death, in all its horrifying detail, have forced him to review his attitude toward himself, toward life in general and the world in which he is placed, in the light of eternity.

Dass zwinge mich...

Zu dencken wer ich sei! auff welcher Bahn ich stehe /
Wie alle Pracht der Welt in Eitelkeit vergeh;
Wie schnell ich dieses Fleisch der Erden soll vertrauen /
Und den gerechten Thron des höchsten Richters schauen /
Der schon mein Lebens-Buch durchsieht und Überschlägt /
Wie werd' ich vor ihm stehn / ... (ibid., p. 161, vv. 221-227.)
With this new insight comes the realisation that, because this life, however brief, is not terminal, i.e., is not the complete measure of man's existence as body and spirit, our actions in time have repercussions in eternity. Cardenio is not merely answerable to himself for what he does, but also to God.

Renouncing the world of the senses, with all its destructive sensual appetites, its false and transient values - epitomised in the pursuit of beauty and the gratification of the senses, Cardenio and Celinde both turn to a life focussed upon the beauty that is, or may be, a quality of the human spirit, virtue. Thus, Cardenio speaks of dissociating himself from his former way of life:

Ich flieh' was flüchtig ist / und such ein höher gut... (Ga. Bd. V, p. 162, v. 272);

and Celinde dismisses her former consuming passions:

..... Ade nicht rein Flammen!

Ihr Vorbild höllischer Glut! Celinde wil verdammen /


Throughout the play there has, indeed, been that opposition of mortal body and immortal soul, i.e., of the values (transient) pertaining to the body and the values (eternal) pertaining to the spirit, that we find in the ode to Laelia, Manet Unica virtus, (Ga. Bd. II, p. 91). Even while hammering out the theme of the transience and corruptibility of the physical side of man, and while decrying its innate depravity, the poet never loses sight of man's "better part" nor of its potential.

Contrasting with, and yet to some extent complementary to, Cardenio's account of his past career and the pitfalls he has encountered, in the pursuit of temporal values and sensual gratification, (Ga. Bd. V, p. 111 ff.) is the description of "der hohe Geist" (Ga. Bd. V, p. 121. v. 529 ff) given by the Reißen, where the bipartite nature of man is stressed, in a vision of the unlimited capacities of
the human spirit. It is able to flout death, to rise above the material world and evaluate it correctly and "bey dem Thron der höchsten Weisheit stehn" (Ga. Bd. V, p. 122, v. 542). But these capacities are considerably thwarted, in life, by the imprisonment of the spirit within the body.

Again in the Reihen at the end of Act IV, following Cardenio and Celinde's encounter with the spectre of Marcellus, the contrast between temporal body and eternal soul is again brought out. The body, with all its beauty, is shown to be doomed to decay, whatever means we adopt in our attempts to arrest the processes of disintegration (Ga. Bd. V, p. 153-154, v. 393-416). The human spirit, on the other hand, is seen to be unaffected by time, death or decay:

.....unser bestes Theil
Weiss nichts von verwesen /
Es bleibt in den Schmerzen Heil /

The whole question of the transience of physical beauty is closely linked, for Gryphius, with serious moral issues. Man's attitude towards physical beauty is, as we have stressed previously, symptomatic of his attitude toward material reality in general. Is he to allow himself to be completely ensnared by what is ultimately pure illusion, or will he be able to recognise, beyond the realm of the material and temporal, that indestructible beauty, that relates to the indestructible spirit and, ultimately, to God? By unmasking beauty, by revealing it for what it is, Gryphius brings the reader, or the protagonist in his play, to a point where he is prompted, even forced, to question those values incorporated in the material world that he has formerly taken for granted; and in addition, he is incited to scrutinise his own particular standing with regard to eternity.
We have examined the question of the transience of beauty, as being representative of Gryphius' attitude toward those human values relating to, and embodied in, the realm of God's material creation. It is now intended to discuss his awareness of the transience of values pertaining to the world-system organised by man. What has been found to apply to beauty applies, by and large, to all other human values, be they, like beauty, manifested in some concrete, material form; be they of a more abstract nature and therefore entirely dependent, for their existence, on the mind of man. Where Gryphius' appraisal of the world-system is concerned, the two values, to which he devotes most attention, are, on the one hand, wealth, which falls into the first category and, on the other hand, position, which may be said to belong to the second. It is these two values that the following section will deal with.

Wealth may be defined as an abundance of material possessions, whether in the form of tokens (money), or actual goods (land and so on). As something purely material, it is subjected to the same inexorable laws of time and change as the whole material universe. In addition, any value that it has, is ascribed to it by transient man; and its duration, as a value, for any particular individual, is necessarily limited to the duration of his own life, at the close of which, it has no further relevance to him. On the other hand, like beauty, wealth may become a moral issue - in the sense that man's attitude toward it may be time or eternity-orientated - and as such, it may determine man's ultimate destiny. As with beauty, Gryphius stresses the temporary and illusory qualities of wealth. In sonnet XLIII, he refers to it as something which, despite appearances to the contrary, is not our own, but merely "eine leere Pracht" or, as versions C, D and E put it, "ein geborgter Pracht", while in the ode, Verklärung der Welt, he dismisses it as being
so unsubstantial as to be comparable to vapour: "Wer Schätzt' und Reichtumb sucht; was sucht er mehr als dunst." (Ga. Bd. II, p. 58), and in the challenging opening lines of the sonnet, Absit mihi gloriari nisi in Cruce Domini nostri Jesu Christi, wealth is again shown to be a spurious and transient value:

Pocht auff eur Gold / auff die nichts werthen Schätze!


As has been pointed out previously, wealth is a spurious and transient value, first, because it shares in the subjection to time of all created matter and, secondly, because its value and relevance to any individual are limited by his own transience:

Dis alles wirdt zerrinnen/
Was müh' und fleis gewinnen

The curtailment of a man's life necessarily corresponds to his being cut off from all material possessions, whose significance ceases for him. The ultimate factor in deciding and revealing the reality of physical beauty is the grave. In the following lines, the same is seen to be true of material possessions:

Was nützt der Schlüsser Menge /
Dem hie die Welt zu enge /

Just as bodily beauty is held to be only momentarily borrowed, little more than an illusion to be dispelled by time and death, so it is with the wealth that we are born to or that we acquire, by dint of patient effort. For, essentially, we are born without any material possessions and die with none:

Bedencket / ob wie wir /.../ in diese Welt blos und nackend gehoren und
Even before the final curtailment of everything by death, wealth, like beauty, may desert us, for it is prey not only to time but also to the whims and caprices of fortune:

Ja noch ehe wir sterben müssen wir entweder alles verlassen / oder von allem verlassen stehen. Die Güter des Glücks / Häuser / Palläste / Gärten werden geschwinder verloren / als erhalten. (Ibid.)

But what of the moral or spiritual issues involved? How does Gryphius conceive of man's attitude towards material possessions as determining his eternal destiny?

Is it possible, as was the case with beauty, to find references to both material and spiritual wealth? Probably one of Gryphius' most explicit statements concerning the issues involved in the pursuit of wealth, is contained in ode V of the first book of odes, (Ga. Bd. 11, p.10-11), with its parallel presentation of man's activities and those of the silk-worm (or spider):

"Der sich hier müht
Umb flüchtig geldt / muss ohne geldt zur erden.
Er sammelt fleissig (doch für ander ) ein.
Undt stirbt allein.

Das kleine thier
Das seiden spint / verstrickt sich in sein spinnen.
So müssen wir
Durch unsern fleis / oft unsern todt gewinnen....( Ca. Bd. II, p. 10.)

Here, quite clearly stated, is the juxtaposition: transient wealth - transient man,
pointing to the inevitable conclusion that, for all his frantic accumulation of material possessions, a man is no richer at his death than at his birth. In much the same way as the toil of the silk-worm is exploited by men, the fruits of a rich man's labours will ultimately benefit, not him, but others. But the significance of the silk-worm-parallel does not end here. Jöns has pointed out that, in the Emblematic, the silk-worm traditionally stands for the avarus, the miser, whose whole life is centred upon his love of money. If we look at the parallel in this light, then, the silk-worm's spinning of its cocoon becomes the pictorial equivalent of man's inextricable involvement in wealth. It is the self-spun cocoon that ultimately brings about the actual physical death of the silkworm; and, the poet remarks, the same applies to us, where our money-making efforts are concerned. For it is our busy preoccupation with things material that results in our death - not merely in the literal sense of physical death, but in the more profound sense of spiritual death. By the complete abandonment of ourselves to the pursuit of temporal goods, we neglect what is eternal and, by our own choice, damn ourselves. (The whole question of choice and ultimate destiny will be dealt with in a later section of this thesis.) In the funeral dissertation, 'Folter menschliches Lebens, where the above lines are quoted, there is a definite shifting of emphasis, although the same thematic threads are still clearly discernible, i.e., the basic interrelationship of man's transience and the transience of what he pursues. The question of man's activities and possessions, as a direct cause of death, is again taken up, indeed, it becomes the central issue of the passage:

Man bedencke / wie viel durch ihre Aemter in Verderben / und durch ihre Güter in den Tod gebracht. Die Spinne wird mit ihrem Gewebe herunter ge-
rissen und zutreten. Wir werden mit und bei unsern Gütern und Besitzungen ernichtet / und in den Abgrund gestürzt. (Diss. Fun. p. 359.) Firstly, on a quite literal level, there is a linking of material possessions and vulnerability, as was also the case in the silk-worm-parallel. Wealth is seen to expose a man to danger, in much the same way as does rank or position, laying him open to attack and destruction by other men. Secondly, on another level, there is once again a warning against whole-hearted involvement in material wealth, which points away from the very real threat of physical death to the danger of spiritual perdition. In this case the image of the silk-worm in its cocoon is replaced by that of the spider in its web. In the same way as the spider may be destroyed, together with the results of its patient labours, so the destruction of a man and his wealth may be simultaneous - the one being lost with the other. The spider dies because of its web, i.e. as a direct result of its web being torn down and trampled underfoot - so that the web is virtually the source of its vulnerability. A man's wealth may, as remarked previously, be the source of his vulnerability because, in the first place, others are prepared to kill him for it and, in the second place, he becomes so engrossed in it as to lose sight of all else. He therefore fails to recognise his own eternity-potential and perished together with those destructible goods that have become the be-all and end-all of his existence.

Gryphius' awareness of the transience of both man and his material possessions is such that he dismisses wealth as an "unreal" value, as in the sonnet, Auf den Tag Bartholomei, in which he speaks of the princes of this world:

Ihr Diamanten Glanz / ihr eitle Purpur Zir /
Und Wollust / Macht und Gut / ist rauch und Dunst für mir.
Anyone who commits himself to the whole-hearted pursuit of wealth is thus committing himself to a fleeting illusion. This point is again stressed by "Die Ewigkeit" at the beginning of Act I of Catharina von Georgien:

*Ihr die ihr euch in Gold verliebt
Und Süd und Ost durchrennt um andre reiuh zu machen;
Wo bleibt ihr wenn man alles übergiebt? (Ga. Bd. VI, p. 140; Act I, v.49-51.)

For all his efforts to enrich himself, a man succeeds, ultimately, only in enriching others and is himself left with nothing. At the same time Gryphius, like the Bible, distinguishes between "laying up treasures on earth" and "laying up treasures in heaven" (cf Mat. 6:20,21), a distinction that is implicit in the following extract from the funeral dissertation, Überdruss menschlicher Dinge:

Welcher Kauffmann ist reich zu schätzen ehe er gestorben / weil sein Vermögen
in fremden Händen / und seine Güter dem wind und der See unterworffen...
(Diss. Fun., p. 288-289.)

Here we have a parable illustrative of man's whole relationship to wealth or possessions - and by extension to any human value - in view of time and eternity. The paradoxical assertion that no merchant is to be considered rich prior to his death, because everything he possesses is either at the mercy of the elements or in the hands of strangers, is simply a picturesque re-statement of one of Gryphius' basic concepts, namely, that man cannot genuinely claim ownership of anything that is subject to the effects of time. It is only on the death of the merchant, when his trading activities cease, that the true extent of his fortune can be evaluated; similarly, for any man, only those possessions remaining to him after death, when his involvement with temporal things ceases, have any relevance (i.e. are truly his) in the final reckoning (in the Last Judgment). So it is that in the prologue to Catha-
rine von Georgien, we find eternity personified voicing the warning that we have quoted previously:

Ihr die ihr euch in Gold verliebt
Und Süd und Ost durchrennt umb andre reich zu machen;
Wo bleibt ihr wenn man alles Übergiebt
Wenn eine stunde schleusst die reitung aller Sachen. (Ga. Bd. VI, p. 140, v. 4')

It is much more difficult to define precisely Gryphius' concept of indestructible wealth, "unvergänglich Gut" than it is to come to grips with his concept of indestructible beauty (or beauty of spirit). But clearly it is again something that relates directly to the human spirit and which has its source in God, in eternity. In the funeral dissertation, Hingang durch die Welt, the poet speaks of the incomparable treasure of the soul of the deceased - "Denn sie trug den unvergleichlichen Schatz ihrer Seelen und die Beilage des Höchsten" (Diss. Fun., p. 323-324) - from which it is not immediately apparent whether "Schatz" applies to the soul or spirit itself or to something God-given, perceived and appropriated by the human spirit. But if we refer back to the most probable source of this image, II Corinthians 4, v. 7, and read it in its context, then the second possibility seems to be the more likely, by "Schatz" being meant the perception and recognition of God through Christ, i.e. the ability to grasp the eternal. This again appears to be the significance of "Schatz" in the sonnet Auff den Tag Stephani:

Zubrecht was irdisch ist / dies Fleisch / die Arm und Bein!

As opposed to material riches which virtually cease to exist for a man with the curtailment of his biological life, this spiritual treasure, and its significance for the individual are unaffected by the fate of the body. Indeed they are unaffected
ed by the fate of the whole material universe — so we find in the sonnet, *Auff den Tag des Apostels Andreae*, with its rejection of all that the transient world has to offer, the following assertion:

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Mein Schatz / auf den ich Gut / Hertz / Haab und Geister setze
Ist einig meine Lust! ob schon der Himmel fällt
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In these lines the reader is quite clearly confronted with the choice that Gryphius considers every person has to make, between "falschem gutte" and its opposite — "Mich der ich falschem gutte nachgestellt.." (An Gott den Heiligen Geist II. Ga. Bd. I, p.30), ultimately, between time and eternity. This is also true of the following lines from sonnet LII of the Sonn-und Feyrtags Sonnete:

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Lasst Erd und Welt vergehn! wenn mir der Himmel bleibt:
Das Schloss der Ewigkeit! das Gott mir selbst verschreibt:
So bin ich ewig=reich! und ewig gross zu schätzen. (Ga. Bd. I, p. 216.)
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Here there is, once again, a complete rejection of the transient universe and its values and a turning to the indestructible riches of eternity. These are riches that cannot be snatched from us by force, by death, by time itself, because they are completely beyond and outside the jurisdiction of time and temporal powers.

In the temporal realm possessions and position are frequently associated: both are usually obtained by the exertion of force, power, or even violence; both are liable to be lost as a result of the exertion of power by a usurping fellow-man, or through a caprice of fortune. Otherwise, they disappear as an inevitable consequence of the power of time and death: "Mein gutt / mein stand ist hin /.." (Grab-schrift eines hoch berühmbten Mannes. Ga. Bd. I, p. 85.) Gryphius' first drama, *Leo Armenius*, already referred to as a manifestation of the instability and vanity
in the world-system, furnishes us with an excellent concrete example of the poet's awareness of the transience and uncertainty of position, dependent as it is on the whims and favours of men and fortune, both of which are equally unreliable. Michael Balbus compares holding an exalted position to standing on slippery ice: and asks:

Kan jemand ohne fall auf glattem Fyss bestehn?


Such a position would in itself be precarious enough, but with the presence of ill-will and disfavour on the part of men, downfall (loss of position) becomes inevitable. In the following lines, Balbus again stresses the precarious nature of position. But here, in contrast to the above quotation, which deals with the imminent downfall of the person at the pinnacle - the prince or ruler, it is now a question of the ambitious underling, who strives to rise in the world by insinuating himself into the favour of those at the top:

Kom't und lehrt

Ihr die ihr Fürsten hoch / und gleich den Göttern ehrt /
Die ihr durch Herren gußen wol't in den Himmel steigen /
Wie bald sich unser Ruhm muss in die aschen neigen.
Wir steigen / ab: ein Wnsch dem man den Hals abspricht /
Auff den gespitzten Pfahl der seinen Leib durch sticht.

The very means, by which such a man rises in the world, are seen to be the cause of his destruction; little wonder then, that his ascent is compared to that of smoke which rises only to disappear, dispersed by the wind. So much for position, whether it be dependent on the favour of underlings or princes. It is, of necessity, short-
something tenuous and ephemeral, not simply because they themselves are short-lived, but because they are also unstable and fickle in the bestowing of their approval:

Ach Menschen! eure Gunst stirbt eh' als wir erbleichen /

They are just as unreliable in the keeping of their promises. In the funeral dissertation, Winter=Tag menschlichen Lebens, Gryphius compares the "Leichtigkeit menschlichen Versprechens" to the misleading and treacherous qualities of ice:

"so fest / das man darauf Buchstaben hauen könte / aber so vergänglich / dass es eins / ob man darauf oder auf klares Wasser schreibe". (Diss. Fun. p. 247). He regrets the numerous "standhafter Seelen" (ibid.) who have put their trust in the apparent firmness of such promises and, in so doing, have been precipitated to their own downfall.

As mentioned previously, besides being subject to the fickleness and inconsistency of transient men, rank and position are also governed by the whims of fortune, that supreme manifestation of vanity and futility in the world-system. In the drama, Paninius, Julia refers to the suddenness with which a prince's rule may be terminated, the imagery she uses being the swiftly revolving wheel of fortune:

Ist jemand der nicht weiss was Zepter und Paläste /
Der komm' und blick uns an! Wir sitzen Demant=festen /
Umbriingt mit glanzem Stah / verwahrt mit tausend Wahren /
"umschrankt mit strenger Macht / beschützt mit tausend Heeren /
Biss sich das schnelle Rad umbweniet /
Und ein schneller Augenblick
"Unshakable and impregnable as is the ruler's position, protected on every side by a formidable array of weapons, a thousand armies at his command, it takes but one revolution of the wheel of fortune and, in a single moment - "ein schneller Augenblick", his whole situation is changed; he plummets from the pinnacle of majesty to the very depths of servitude and misery.

Quite apart from the caprices of men and fortune, worldly position or rank is, like everything temporal, subject to the inexorable laws of time and death. In the sonnet, Absit mihi gloriareri nisi in Cruce Domini nostri Jesu Christi, Gryphius speaks of the short duration of a ruler's power:

Pocht...

Auf, cure Macht die über Erd und Flutt

Where a ruler is not depoited by the hand of a usurper or by a whim of fate, he will inevitably, with the passage of time, be depoited by death:

Du must vom ehren throne
Weill keine macht noch krone
Kan unvergänglich sein. (Ga. Bd. II, p. 17. vv. 38-40)

and strive as man may to reach the pinnacle of power and success, and strive as he may to maintain his position there, his efforts are ultimately futile. Whether he is born to position or achieves it, the outcome is the same, he must lose it:

Arme / sucht doch hoch zu steigen /

Eh der Ruhmb euch recht erblickt /

Muss sich eure blume neigen

Basically, there is little difference between Gryphius' assessment of worldly position and possessions and his assessment of beauty. What applies to beauty in the realm of material creation, applies to wealth and worldly position in the realm of man's activity - the world-system. Beauty, as a value, shares in the transience and instability of all material creation, above all, in the transience of man; and, because of this, it is conceived of as being unsubstantial and illusory, because it is subject not only to the laws of time and change that govern God's creation, but it also shares in the instability and transience of the world-system set up by man.

It is interesting to note that in the funeral dissertation, Winter-Tag menschlichen Lebens, the unsubstantial, transient qualities of rank and position are embodied in the image of melting snow - an image frequently associated in Gryphius' works with the rapid decline of beauty:

Wie glänzt der Schnee menschlicher Würden / wie bald aber verschmelzt er / und wird zu Wasser. 'Diss. Fun., p. 246.)

Here, too, by implication, we are confronted by the illusory nature of rank and position - in the contrast between the apparent firmness and solidity of snow and its sudden transformation into something as fluid and evasive as water. For Gryphius' most explicit statement on the illusory nature of rank and position, we must turn to the funeral dissertation, Überdruss menschlicher Dinge, where he refers to them - and again the reader is reminded of his assessment of bodily beauty - as temporary adornments, so unreal as to be comparable to dreams, so unsubstantial and volatile as to be likened to vapour:

Was sind aber diese Zierden / als nichtige Träume / als ein verschwindender Dampf / der auff einem fremden Wahn bestehet / und oft in einem Mun entste- het und vergehet / (Diss. Fun., p. 285.)
Dreams, vapour, madness, extreme brevity of duration - here there is a definite coupling of the concepts of insubstantiality and transience (embodied in the image of vapour which often arises and disappears in the space of a moment) with that of illusion or even madness. We have seen in the section on beauty, how Gryphius denied the reality of bodily beauty. Here, he is denying the reality of position, as is understood in the world-system, and relegating it to the realm of irreality and fantasy. Man's pursuit of position is hardly different from his pursuit of wealth or beauty; it is simply a further manifestation of his commitment of himself to temporal things, of his identification of himself with time rather than with eternity. As is the case with beauty and wealth, there are, in Gryphius' view, serious moral issues involved. In the sphere of position too, man is confronted by the same basic and inevitable choice: time or eternity, a choice that is nowhere more clearly defined than in the octave of the sonnet, Auf den Tag Bartholomaei. Indeed, these lines could well serve as a resume of this whole section, since they touch on most of the points dealt with here:

Lass Fürsten auf der Welt den Namen prangen:
        Ihr Diamanten Glantz / ihr eitle Purpur Zir /
Und Wollust / Macht und Gut / ist Rauch und Dunst für mir /
Der / wenn ein Wind entsteht / ist unversehens vergangen
Wer das besternte Schloss / wer Kronen will erlangen/
Die keine Zeit abnimt; wer fröhlich für und für
Will herrschen; muss den Weg durch die gedränge Thüre/
Die Demuth auffschleusst / gehen /... (Ga. Ed. I, p. 237.)

Expressed in simple terms, the choice here is between ruling in time and ruling in eternity - a choice which, from the very outset of the sonnet, has obviously been
resolved. Exalted position (as exemplified by the princes of this world), together with all it entails - pomp, splendour, power, possessions - is rejected by the poet as empty, meaningless and transient, as "Rauch und Dunst" (v. 3)

Der / wenn ein Wind entsteht / ist unversehns vergangen (v. 4).

In marked contrast to this negative appraisal of position in the temporal realm, there is the evocation of position in the eternal realm, unaffected by time or change or the vicissitudes of fortune. It is no longer a matter of crowns that may be forfeited overnight, of a rule beset with anxieties and uncertainties, but of "Kronen" (v. 5) "Die keine Zeit abnimmt" (v. 6) and "fröhlich für und für...herrschen" (vv. 6-7.) As opposed to the attainment of position in the world-system, which necessarily entails some form of self-aggrandisement, this position is attained to only by way of "die gedrange Thür / Die Demuth...auffschleusst" (v.6) - i.e. by humility and self-negation (in the sense of sacrificing any personal ambition or self-centred aspirations toward greatness.) To appreciate the full significance of these lines we must, however, turn to the passage in Luke 22, on which the sonnet is based. Not only does this passage contain Christ’s promise to His disciples that they will rule in eternity, like Him, but it also gives expression to the very essence of the Christian concept of greatness - a truly Christ-like humility:

v.25 And he said unto them, The kings of the Gentiles exercise lordship over them; and they that exercise authority upon them are called benefactors.

v.26 But ye shall not be so: but he that is greatest among you, let him be as the younger; and he that is chief, as he that doth serve.

v.27 For whether is greater, he that sitteth at meat, or he that serveth? is not he that sitteth at meat? but I am among you as he that serveth...

v.29 And I appoint unto you a kingdom, as my Father hath appointed unto me;
v.30 That ye may eat and drink at my table in my kingdom, and sit on thrones judging the twelve tribes of Israel.

In the New Testament, we find repeated instances of a person's willingness to occupy a humble place leading directly to his being accorded an exalted one by God - and vice versa. Witness the parable of the seating arrangements at the feast (Luke 14) or Christ's answer to the disciples' question as to who was the greatest in the Kingdom of Heaven (Mat.18, v. 2) or His reproach to James and John's mother (Mat.22, v. 21 ff.). Finally there is that most explicit and concise account of Christ's own example in Philippians 2, vv. 5-11, where the connection between willingly accepting self-abasement and being exalted by God is clearly shown. Christ's supreme humility expressed itself not merely in His relinquishing of the position that was rightfully His and in His assuming of a servant's role, but also in His acceptance of a form of death normally reserved for criminals; and, the writer of Philippians points out, as a direct consequence of His willingness to accept the lowest position, God has raised Him to the highest.

It is against such a background of ideas that we have to understand the references to position in the sonnet, Auf den Tag Bartholomaei. (Ga. Bd I, p. 237.) Position in the temporal realm is a transient and futile thing, subject to the effects of time and the whims of fortune. Position in the eternal realm is unaffected by any of these factors, being something accorded by God Himself. Self-aggrandisement has no part in it; rather, the very opposite is true. It is accorded by Eternal God in response to temporal man's refusal to identify himself with the values current in the transient world-system, a refusal expressed in an identification of himself with Christ and His humility. Christ might easily have allowed Himself to be crowned as king in the temporal realm, but chose instead to submit to all manner of indignities...
culminating in death on the cross. Had He decided for temporal position and power, the easier of the alternatives that faced Him, He would have proved Himself unfit for the position to which His very humility and submission raised Him.

Finally, it must be pointed out that, although Cryphius repeatedly emphasises the transience and uncertainty of position in the world-system, the dangers and anxieties connected with holding a high rank, his presentation of the figure of the ruler himself is not necessarily a negative one. Indeed, in his drama we find both sides of the spectrum represented, in the sense that his rulers usually show a definite orientation towards either time or eternity. Thus, in the case of Schach Abbas (in Catharine von Georgien) and Bassianus (Papinianus), there is total commitment to the exercising of absolute power in this world, manifested in acts of tyrannical cruelty and in the arbitrary annihilation of any challenge - ideological or otherwise - to their authoritarian dictates. On the other hand, we find in both Charles Stuart and Catharina von Georgien an equally uncompromising attitude, in their adherence to values above and beyond the sphere of temporal power and position. Catharina, for example, prefers to die in, and for her faith, painful and physically degrading as is the means of death, rather than accept the temporary role of Abbas' consort. Only in the figure of Leo Athenicus do we, perhaps, find a certain reconciliation of the two opposing trends: it is Leo's willingness to compromise - i.e. not to continue unerringly in the path of violence and tyranny, but to show clemency - that contributes to his downfall in the temporal sphere. At the same time it seems implied by the manner of his death, that this same factor may contribute to his ultimate salvation in the eternal sphere. We might even go so far as to say that in Leo's death, as well as in the deaths of Charles Stuart and Catharina von Georgien, there is a parallelism with the death of Christ, the implications of which, with regard to
position in time and eternity we have just been discussing.

Gryphius sees position in the temporal realm as being transient, illusory, uncertain and ultimately futile. Its eternal counterpart is, in his view, only to be attained to by a clear refusal on the part of the individual to commit himself to time manifested, in the examples cited above, as a readiness to identify himself with the humility of Christ rather than with the pride of Lucifer. 1)

When we come to the consideration of Gryphius' assessment of those values relating to and deriving from the human mind, we find that what applies in the spheres already discussed, also applies here, whether the poet be referring to the creative activities - plastic arts, literature - or to more abstract intellectual activities, such as the accumulation of knowledge, the pursuit of wisdom. To a large degree, especially in the case of literature, these activities may be so interrelated as to become virtually inseparable, but, for the purposes of this thesis, they will be taken as two different aspects of man's mental potential - the one tending to be concrete, the other largely abstract.

That Gryphius could dwell with enthusiasm on man's creative achievements is clearly demonstrated by the sonnets, In Bibliothecam (Ga. Bd. I, p. 33) and Als er auss Rom geschieden (ibid., p. 87). In much the same way as he is alive to the wonders of God's creation as revealed in the intricacy of the universe or the human body, he is capable of expressing genuine delight at what man has created. Witness his enumeration of what Rome has to offer:

\[
\text{Ihr Wunder der gemäld} / \text{ ihr prächtigen Palläst} / \\
\text{Ob den die Kunst erstarrt} /... \\
\text{Du herrlichs'Vatican} / \text{ dem man nichts gleich kan bawen}; \\
\text{Ihr Bücher / Gärten / grüßt; Ihr Bilder / Madeln / Stein /... (Als er auss} \\
\text{Rom geschieden, Ga. Bd. I, p. 87 )}
\]
and again his enthusiasm over the powers of the written word, in the epigram, Über eine Bibliothec:

Diss ist was nach uns lebt / wodurch wir selber leben /


Such enthusiasm is in direct contrast to the sentiments expressed in the ode, Scire tuum nihil est:

Und was ich hier seh stehen!
Der wehrten Bücher Lust! Was kan die anders lehren
Alls dass wir unterzehn!


On the one hand, we are confronted by confidence in the preservative powers of art, on the other, by pessimistic recognition of the proofs of transience. It is hard to imagine how two such diametrically opposed attitudes could have been expressed by the same author - always excluding the possibility of a complete change of heart on his part. If we are to reconcile these two attitudes at all, then, perhaps, we may refer to the first as conventional and platitudinal, and to the second as sincere, if not actually personal or individual. But is this type of appraisal borne out by the bulk of Gryphius' work? It does, in fact, appear to be, since the number of references to the second attitude far outweigh the references to the first.

As with God's material creation, Gryphius repeatedly shows himself to be intensely conscious of the subjection of art to time. He does not usually conceive of art as being endowed with those immortal and immortalising qualities ascribed to it by the Renaissance, but rather as sharing in the destructibility and vulnerability of everything in this world, exposed as it is to the corrosive action of time,
to the effects of death, circumstances and the elements. Closely linked with his acute sense of the transience of art, indeed virtually constituting one aspect of it, is his insistence on the lack of durability of the splendid graves and tombstones, by which man attempts to perpetuate his memory. (Cf. Kirchhofsgedanken, Ga. Bd. III, p. 8, Strophen 12-13.) These concrete tokens of man's having once lived must inevitably be destroyed, because of the ultimate corruptibility of the matter from which they are formed. As a means of perpetuating a man's existence, a work of art is no different.

So we find that in the sonnet, An Valerium, where Gryphius denies the possibility of creating a lasting memorial to his friend, he stresses, above all, the transience and susceptibility of the actual material components of a work of art—be they metal, stone or paper:

Umbsonst / Mein Freund umbsonst! Ich kan dir nicht gewehren
Ein denckmal das von fall / von strenger Tyranney

The tyranny of time over all matter is admitted to be complete and absolute:

Die zeit kan Ertz und Stein in kott und grauss verkehren / (Ibid.; p. 86)

Throughout Gryphius' works, we find similar mention of its ravages upon the apparent solidity of marble or stone; small wonder, then, that the poet questions the durability of the flimsy paper on which his verses are written:

Meinst du / dass dis Papir werd' unversehrt bestehn; (Ibid.)

Having witnessed the devastation caused by the fire at Freystadt, he well knows how swiftly the work of a man's life-time, accumulated in books, the entire fruit
of a man's strivings to achieve immortality, can be destroyed:

Ihr Musen! ach umsunst!

Auch euer Schatz vergeht. Es hat die tolle Brunst
In diss was heilig heist / sich grimmig eingedrungen;
Und mit der Blätter Rest weit über Feld geschwungen!
Und was ein weiser Sinn erforschet und erdacht/
Wodurch ein sterblich Mensch sich ewig hat gemacht/
Nimmt eine Stunde weg.. (Über den Untergang der Stadt Freystadt, Ga, Bd, III, p.172-173, v. 51-57.)

Fire, like time, is unsparing in its annihilation of man's achievements, but, besides being an embodiment of the destructive power of time, it may also have wider eschatological connotations. This is clearly the case in An Valerium, as well as in the poem written on the occasion of the Freystadt fire. Thus, in the first tercet of An Valerium, the poet poses the following question:

Meinst du / dass die Papir werd' unverseht bestehn;
Wenn nun der Erden Bow in flammen/wird vergehn /
Und sein beschwertes Grab in eigener Aschen wären ? (Ga, Bd. 1, p. 86) ;

while in the closing lines of Über den Untergang der Stadt Freystadt, he draws a parallel between the Freystadt fire and the fire of the Last Judgment. It is not simply a question of art's being rendered futile by the effects of passing time, but of a futility that stems from the finite nature of time itself, whose end is prefigured in such eschatological visions. (In other words, it is a juxtaposition of time and eternity.) Thus, a work of art, like everything temporal, is sensed to be doubly transient, because, in the first place, it is subject to the effects of time and, in the second place, because it shares in the finite qualities of
time itself— as opposed to the infinity of eternity. The memorials we raise to ourselves and others, in the form of art, are no less futile than the empty splendour of sumptuous graves. If they are not destroyed by time, then they must inevitably come to an end, together with time, on the day of Judgment.

When Gryphius refers to the actual creative activities of the artist, in particular the writer, it is nearly always against the background of the awareness discussed above. Again and again, he emphasizes the futility of such activities, a futility resulting from the dissipating force of time:

Was nützt mein Thun und schreiben /
Dass die geschwende Zeit /
Wird als den Rauch zu treiben. (Dictit me. Ga. Bd. II, p. 84, v. 50-53.)

Or from the power of death over man and his works:

Weg meine Lauten! was wird das singen seyn /
Wenn man die Glieder setzt in die gruben eyn?
Wird jemand was ich schreibe lesen;

The writer’s pen cannot, in Gryphius’ view keep his memory alive, any more than it can ward off the actual physical effects of death on his body:

Schiesser Feder Macht
Mit schärffen den Verstand / und mich dem Tod’ abdringen /
Dann / wann die schwertze Macht
In the above extracts from Gryphius' odes we have, in slightly more explicit terms and in expanded form, a recapitulation of the statement made in the opening quatrain of In Valerium:

Ich kan dir nicht gewehren

Ein denckmal das von fall / von strenger Tyrannney


Both the writer and the results of his activity are caught up in the inexorable processes of time and death. The writer's reputation, skill and prowess are not sufficient to exempt him or his creation from the effects of time; and vice versa. The creation itself, whatever its merits, cannot be so durable as to survive indefinitely the mind that conceived it. Ultimately, it cannot triumph over death and grant its creator or others immortality, i.e., commit them to eternity. The complete futility of the writer's attempts to conquer death and time is again clearly demonstrated in the prologue to Catharina von Georgien, where eternity, personified, enumerates the various ways in which man becomes involved in things temporal, to the exclusion of things eternal:

Wo aber hin? nach was doch ringet ihr

Ihr die ihr glaubt das euer Feder Macht

Den Tod und Zeit hab' an ein Joch gebracht?

Glaubt friey die Ewigkeit beruht nicht auf Papir.

Indem ihr Fremde wolt dem Untergang entzihn;


Eternity does not reside in a piece of paper or, in more general terms, it is not to be attained to through man's creative activities in the sphere of art. Artistic
merit and achievement, then, would appear to have no positive bearing on man's ultimate destiny and, therefore, seen in the context of time and eternity, constitute a spurious value. Reflecting on the ultimate futility of poetry, Gryphius writes in the ode, Manet unica Virtus:

Was wird es helfen / wenn der entleibte Geist
Blos und alleine nach dem Gerichte reisst /
Dass mich ein sterblich Mensch geehret:

Seen in this light, art, for Gryphius, has no more relevance to eternity than have physical beauty, material wealth or worldly position - except in the negative sense, that it constitutes a possibility of complete involvement with the things of time - a preoccupation with the spurious rather than with the real.

But here Gryphius' assessment of art, in particular literature, does not end. While refusing to believe in art as an absolute value, and while flatly denying the existence of any of those perpetuating and self-perpetuating qualities commonly ascribed to it, he is, on the evidence of his work and its tendencies, fully aware of its potential as a pointer toward absolute values, in short, towards eternity.

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them the things of time - their own preoccupations, possessions and activities - not simply in the perspective of the here and now, but in that of eternity.

Much of what applies to Gryphius' appraisal of art also applies to his appraisal of learning (knowledge) and wisdom. That he was by no means without enthusiasm and curiosity in the pursuit of learning is borne out by the wide variety of his interests, mentioned in the introduction, as well as by the occasional references in his works: for instance, the sonnets In Bibliothecam (Ga. Bd. I, p. 38) and Über Abraham Ortels Parergon (Ga. Bd. I, p. 54-55.). Once again, as was the case with art, it seems that we have to distinguish between two possible assessments of knowledge: a time-orientated assessment, that sees knowledge as an end in itself and an eternity-orientated assessment, that sees knowledge and learning - in particular, the study of creation - as a means of discovering more about the nature of the Eternal Creator. Gryphius is more frequently concerned with the former assessment.

Were it necessary to find a single word with which to sum up Gryphius' appraisal of time-orientated knowledge and learning, the first word to suggest itself would undoubtedly be "futility". In the funeral dissertation Winter=Tag menschlichen Lebens, for instance, he quotes from Solomon what is virtually a set of "variations on a theme" of futility; and this passage could well serve as the introduction to our discussion:

Alles / alles sagt Salomon / nach dem er alles versucht / ist eytel: Und ob
zwar etliche / äusserlichem Scheine nach / vor der Welt hoch und köstlich
scheinen / ist doch ihre Wissenschaft nur ein Wahn; Ihre Weissheit ein eingebiltes Wesen; ihr Verstand ein unvollkommen Nachsinnen; Ihre Erforschung eine vergebene Bemühung... (Diss. Fun., p. 251-252.)

It is symptomatic of Gryphius' whole attitude, no less than of his thoroughness in coming to grips with a subject, that he should quote, as evidence of the futility of
knowledge and wisdom, from the words of the very man reputed to be the wisest that ever lived. Moreover Gryphius immediately points out that this is no a priori judgment on the part of Solomon, but a conclusion based on profound and extensive experience - "nachdem er alles versucht". The statement has two main implications as to the nature of human knowledge and wisdom. On the one hand, their imperfection and fallibility are suggested by the failure to recognise the futility of everything in the world; on the other hand, they are seen in themselves to constitute part of that futility. Closely associated with the futility of human knowledge and wisdom, in this statement, is, then, their quality of being incomplete and prone to be duped by illusion; and not only this, they themselves are virtually relegated to the category of illusion and madness - "ein eingebildetes Wesen", "nur ein Wahn". This juxtaposition of futility and illusion is one that recurs throughout Gryphius' works.

Knowledge in itself is rendered futile by human transience and mortality. Not only is it powerless to ward off the effects of time and death but, as suggested in the ode Vanitas mundi, a man's wholehearted pursuit of learning may contribute directly to his death:

Viel hat verstandt / und was uns weise macht;

and, given the context of involvement with temporal values to the exclusion of eternal values, it is not simply physical death that is implied. Time and death are no respecters of the distinctions and achievements that elevate one man above another in the temporal realm:

Es hilft kein weises wissen /
Wir werden hingerissen /
and for this very reason, the relevance of knowledge, even to the individual who has
pursued it all his life, ceases when he dies:

Was nützt doch / bitt ich / unser wissen;

Wenn wir die lassen Augen schlüssen?... (Ga. Bd. II, p. 8, v. 11-12.)

Our learning is of no further use to us at, or after death - a point that the poet
again emphasises in the following lines taken from the ode, Dimitte mei ut plangam
paulum dolorem meum, where he depicts a dying man taking leave of his books:

Was hilfft dein Unterricht

Nun mein betrübter Geist vom Leibe scheiden sol! (v. 35-36)

...Was hilfft das stette lesen? (v. 38)

...Was hilfft dass ich die Zeit und die Natur gekenn't (v. 43)

(Ga. Bd. II, pp. 83-84.)

Nor have knowledge and learning per se any determining role when it comes to the
Last Judgment:

Was hilfft die 'wissenschaft? wenn vor des Herren Throne

Die seel erscheinen muss... (Scire Tuum nihil est, Ga. Bd. II, p. 74, v. 54-55)

unless they have been surrendered to the service of God:

Gott dem wir rechnung obergoben

Schaut kein gelehrtes wissen an... (v. 61-62)

Er will zwar weisheit mit viel Kronen;

Doch nun wen sie ihm dient belohnen. (v. 65-66)

(Prosopopaeia Viri Literati e Tumolo, Ga. Bd. II, pp. 8-10.)

For it is ultimately not our knowledge and wisdom that will be taken into consider-
ation, but the uses we have put them to.

Apart from sharing in the futility of all time-orientated human activities, our
knowledge also shares inevitably in the limitations - i.e. the finite nature of time
itself, as opposed to the infinity of eternity. As we have seen above, our knowl
is no use to us at the end of time. But here Grypius' concern with the limitations of human knowledge and wisdom does not end, as will be apparent from the following passage from the funeral dissertation, Magnetische Verbindung des Herrn Jesu und der in ihn verliebten seele:

Wie viel ist menschlichem Nachforschen verborgen / und wie ein geringes ists / dass wir wissen; wo wir ja etwas in dem wir leben / vollkommen und ausführlich wissen können! zumal wir ja gestehen müssen / dass alle unsere Weisheit ein zusammengesuchtes Wesen / unsere Künste Stückwerk. (Diss Fun. p. 127.)

Here it is the scope of human knowledge whose limitations he is describing - in contrast to the infinite knowledge and wisdom of God, Himself the source of all wisdom, as the sun is the source of light. So much is hidden from our probing minds that, what we do know, is infinitesimally little compared with what we cannot know. Even where we have / what appears to be a complete grasp of a subject, we are forced to admit that, here too, our knowledge can be but partial.

Besides being incomplete and finite, human knowledge and wisdom are prone to error and misconceptions. In the same funeral dissertation we find a number of references to this. On page 126, for instance, the poet sums up, in an image based on the contrast between light and darkness, the limitations and the inherent fallibility of human wisdom. He has been speaking of man and God in terms similar to those of I John I, man's situation in the world: "ein Ort / der mit steter Finsterniss und Nacht...umbgeben" - being opposed to God's eternal existence in light - light which man, because he is accustomed to perpetual darkness, cannot bear:

Gott wohnet in einem Liecht: welches wir nicht vertragen können. (Diss. Fun. p. 126.)

It is against this background of perpetual darkness on the one hand and eternal light on the other that we have to understand the subsequent comparison of human wisdom and
reason to moon and stars in the night sky:

Es ist nicht ohn es schimmern uns etliche Funcken der Vernunft als Gestirne
\[\text{des Himmels / dennoch scheinen sie sehr dunckel / und ob der Mond irdischer}
\]
\[\text{Weissheit gleich lieblich glänzet / ist diese Leucht dennoch nicht die hellst}
\]
\[\text{Sie ist beständig in ihrer unbeständigheit... / und wenn sie voll / dass ists}
\]
auffs höchste kommen; ist sie der Verfinsterung / das ist dem Irrthum dennoch
\[\text{unterworffen. (Diss. Fm., p. 126.)}
\]

The reason we have is not sufficient to lighten our darkness. Although we can
orientate ourselves with the help of the stars, they are not bright enough for us to
see by. Nor is our wisdom, despite all appearances to the contrary - "ob der Mond /
gleich lieblich scheinet" - capable of dispelling the darkness that surrounds us:
it is unreliable, inconstant and, at the very apogee of its development, liable to
lapse into the darkness of error.

We find a similar use of the moon-human-wisdom-parall: in the dissertation,
Winter=Tag menschlichsn Iebeas, and here there is explicit reference to the fact
that such light as the moon does shed is only borrowed light, reflected from the sun
the implication being that human wisdom, far from being a source of light (or en-
lightenment), is at best only a pale and wavering reflection of the wisdom of om-
niscient God, Himself absolute wisdom and the source of all "light":

Bedenken wir - / was diesen Wintertag erleuchte / so werden wir zu Abend so
zu Morgen den Mondon schauen / welcher bald wachst; bald schwindet; nur mit
geborgenen liecht stralet / sehr ungleich mit tückel / und ßfftern Verfin-
sterung unterworffen...(Diss. Fm, p. 237-238.)

Here too, marked emphasis is given to the fallibility of human wisdom, again in
terms of the waxing and waning moon.
An example of the errors to which human wisdom is prone is given in the funeral
dissertation *Magnetische Verbindung*...

Es rühme die "Welt ihre Weisen / als welche nicht nur schauen / was vor den
Füssen lieget / sondern auch was künftig / vorher sehen / und durch sinnbares
Nachforschen ergründen und vorstellen können... Wie oft gehen solche Weis-
sagungen der Sterblichen schimpflich zurück... (Diss. Fun., p. 157.)

This passage virtually equates the finite limitations of human wisdom with its fallibility. As opposed to God, who sees both past and future as an eternal present, and
who knows the end from the beginning, finite man, while capable of comprehending the
present and, to a certain degree, the past, can lay no claim to knowledge of the
future: any predictions that he makes, however laboriously he may arrive at them, are
liable to be erroneous, because they are based on an illusion, namely, the false as-
sumption that human knowledge is not limited by the boundaries imposed by time. The
abortive attempts of human understanding and reason to comprehend ultimate reality
are described, once again, in very pictorial terms of light and darkness, on page 157
of the same funeral dissertation. Human wisdom, so Gryphius states,

ärgert sich an den hohen und unergründlichen Geheimnissen des allwissenden
Gottes. In dem sie in dem Finstern herum-sappet / und ihr einbildet / wie ge-
nau sie alles begriﬀen / erblindet sie / so bald die stralen der ewigen Wahr-
heit ihr die Augen fallen. (Ibid., p. 157.)

The poet is stressing, on the one hand, the inability of the human intellect to
penetrate the unfathomable mysteries of God and, on the other hand, the readiness
with which it comes to precise and definite conclusions about the very matters that
it cannot fully understand - cannot see in the dark. The parallel between human
wisdom and a person groping about in the darkness, able to gain only a very vague
and inexact impression of his surroundings, is carried still further. In the same way as anyone who has spent some time in the dark is blinded by the sudden appearance of light (cf. Diss. Fun., p. 125), so human wisdom, in the darkness of its erroneous concepts, is unable to bear the full light of God's eternal truth; and in this parallel have we not, in essence, an expression of Gryphius' whole attitude toward human wisdom and learning: his awareness of their futility - few activities could be more futile than groping about in the dark - of their false and illusory quality, as summed up elsewhere in the ode Verleugnung der Welt:

\[\text{Was hilft die Wissenschaft / der mehr dem falschen Dunst! (Ga. Bd. II, p. 40, v. 3)}\]

his sense of their incompleteness and proneness to error; and not only this, their tendency to lead man astray, to turn him away from the truth to the extent that he is unable to bear the truth, that is, cannot stand before God who is the truth:

- Gelehrte Torheit / köstlicher Unverstandt! (v. 29)
- Mein Schmerz und Irren / geh bei seite (v. 31)

As has been emphasised before, Gryphius' chief concern is to point man away from what is subject to time and chance towards what is eternal and unchangeable, to lead him to recognise and relinquish what is partial and to aspire to what is complete and infinite - even if, in his present finite state, he cannot attain to it. It is in the light of this pressing concern for eternity, rather than in the gloom of a pessimistic negation of time, that we must view Gryphius' appraisal of wisdom and learning.

Finally, we come to the question of Gryphius' attitude toward fame, glory, honour - values that may derive from any, or all, of the categories of human values
treated above. Given the very adequate coverage of this subject by J. H. Tisch in
his paper Ruhm und Ehr bei Bidermann und Gryphius, our discussion will be but brief,
being included mainly for the sake of completeness. (To a certain extent, too, this
question has been touched upon already, if not explicitly, then by implication, in
the discussion of art as a means of perpetuating both the artist and those whom he
celebrates in his works.) Like the human values from which it derives, fame, far
from representing, or offering a type of immortality, shares in the transience of
everything temporal, above all, in the transience of man, a fact that is very clear-
ly expressed in the sonnet, Menschliches Elende, where, within the general context
of human transience, "Nahm, Lob, Er und Ruhm" (v. 11) are described as being swept
away by the inexorable course of time - "wie ein Strom verfließt" (v. 10). In common
with the other human values discussed, fame, because of its very transience, is
frequently equated by the poet with futility and illusion. So, for instance, in
that sweeping condemnation of universal vanity, Es ist alles eitell, we find it
referred to as a fleeting dream:

Der hohen theen ruhm mus wie ein traum vergehn. (Ga. Bd. I, p. 33, v. 34.)

Man's aspirations toward earthly glory, be they manifested as high-sounding deeds or
as achievements in the field of art or learning, are all doomed to futility, because
fame is ultimately of no duration:

O überfalscher Wahn! wie viel gelehrter Sinnen
Hat weder Fleiss noch Kunst

Bei immer stettem Ruhm und Lob erhalten können...(Scire Taum nihil est, Ga.
Bd. II, p. 73, v. 14-16.)

Far from being a means of triumphing over time, death and the grave, fame, in
common with the values from which it derives, must inevitably succumb to them, being
circumscribed by the limits of man's biological life. In order to illustrate this
point, it is now intended to juxtapose two quotations, in which the destruction of fame by death is described in very global and drastic terms. The first quotation is taken from the sonnet, *Grabschrift eines hochberühmten Mannes*:

Mein gutt / mein stand ist hin / kein Freund weiss mehr von mir /
Mein Ruhm hat auch sein grab / man lässt doch alles hier /
Umb dass jhr Menschen pflegt / was Ewig. zuverlieren. (Ga. Bd. I, p. 85.)

The second excerpt is from the ode, *Vanitas! Vanitatum Vanitas!*:

Der ruhm nach dem wir trachten /
Den wir unsterbl. achten /
Ist nur ein falscher wahn.
So baldt der geist gewichen;
Und dieser mundt erblichen:

Fragt keiner / was man hier gethan. (Ga. Bd. II, p. 18, v. 13-18.)

Like other human values, fame is shown to be of no more duration than man's actual life-span. No sooner has the spirit left the body, no sooner has the colour faded from the dead person's features, than the living cease to show interest in his lifetime achievements. Material possessions and worldly position are no guarantee of perpetuity beyond the grave; nor is fame, for like them, it is merely a temporary and temporal distraction from what is eternal. In both the above quotations emphasis has been laid on the rapidity with which our fame deserts us. Its disappearance is seen to coincide with the curtailment of life. In addition it is shown to be subject to the same laws of time and change as other temporal values. In either quotation there is a sense of simultaneity of disappearance, i.e., of equal brevity of duration. Hyperbolical as may be the assertion, that fame, as a value, does not outlast life itself, it is virtually borne out, even by those passages in Gryphius' works where fame is depicted as persisting after death. In the ode, *Procopopoeia*
Viri Literati e Tumolo, the following words are put into the dead scholar's mouth:

Mein nahme der noch scheint zue stehen

Wird auch in kurzer zeit vergehen. (Ga. Bd. II, p. 9.)

the inference being that what persists is merely a soon to be dissipated illusion.

In the funeral dissertation Winter-Tag menschlichen Lebens, in which these very lines are quoted, the same idea is expressed quite explicitly in a comparison of posthumous fame with the momentary image of the sun, with which we may be left after its setting:

Wir schawn offt / wenn die sonne schon untergegangen deroselben Bild in der Lufft / welches sich unversehens und in einem Augenblick verlourt: so scheinen wir zwar eitn in dem Gedächtng der Lebendigen: nach unserm Begräbniss aber heist er doch endlich

Mein nahme / der noch scheint zue stehen

Wird auch in kurzer zeit vergehen. (Diss. Fun., p. 233.)

To recapitulate, then, fame, for Gryphius, shares in the transience of the other human values, from which it may be said to derive, and in the transience of man himself. It cannot offer immortality or eternity beyond the grave, because, it too, is subject to the annihilating effects of time. From this realisation arises, in part at least, the sense of its futility, of its illusory and dreamlike qualities, its kinship with madness. Man pursues it as a means of conquering the very powers to which it necessarily must fall prey - time and death.

In order to come to grips with the central issue in the poet's awareness of the futility of fame, we must refer back to our original quotation from Grabschrift eines Wochberühmten Mannes, where fame, in common with worldly goods and position, is shown to be a temporary and temporal distraction from what is eternal, a distraction that is, nevertheless, so potent as to cause man actually to forfeit "was ewig"
Man lässt doch alles hier /

Umb dass ihr Menschen pflegt / was Ewig zue verlieren. (Ga. Bd. I, p. 85.)

Basically, we are confronted here with the same situation as is expressed in the final line of Es ist alles eitell:

Noch wil was ewig ist kein einig mensch betrachten. (Ga. Bd. I, p. 34.)

Man, faced with the choice between time and eternity, chooses time or, in other words, faced with the alternative of pursuing reality or illusion, chooses to pursue illusion, which decision represents, for the poet, the ultimate in futility and self-delusion. Hence the frequent references to fame as madness - "ein falscher Wahn" (Sanitas! Vanitatum Vanitas, Ga. Bd. II, p. 16, v. 15), "oberfalscher Wahn" (Scire Tuum nihil est, Ga. Bd. p. 73, v. 14), "Ruhmb ist ein blosser Wahn / den Todte nicht begehren." (An Valerium, Ga. Bd. I, p. 86, v. 8.) Hence the comparison of it to a dream, since both madness and the dream-state imply, if not always a complete divorce from reality, then a distorted or deceptive view of it. In the closing tercet of An Valerium, the poet juxtaposes, in terms of fame or glory, the two extremes of illusion and reality:

O selig wer die Träum / und nichtig Lob verlacht /

Der immer newem Ruhm und ewiger Ehr nachtracht;

Der uns der Himmel schenckt / nicht die vergänglich Erden. (Ga. Bd. I, p. 86, v. 12-14.)

As was true of the human values discussed previously, Gryphius conceives of earthly fame as having its heavenly counterpart. Happy the individual, he maintains, who sets his sights on this indestructible form of glory, who recognises earthly fame for what it is - "Träum und nichtig Lob" (ibid. v. 12), because he sees time itself in the perspective of eternity and realises that whatever derives from time, or the things of time (from "die vergänglich Erden" - v. 14), must inevitably share in the
qualities of time, whereas, whatever has its source and origin in God, in eternity, shares in God's eternity and is real and of lasting value.

In this section we have discussed Gryphius' attitude toward human values, against the background of his awareness of time and eternity. We have seen how, irrespective of the category of value concerned, the same basic elements tend to colour its appraisal, namely, an acute sense of the transience of all things temporal, closely linked with a sense of their futility and of their illusory qualities and again, related to both of these aspects, a sense of the dangers inherent in the whole-hearted pursuit of time-bound values. Finally, in sharp contrast to this whole basic awareness of the qualities embodied in the temporal realm and of the values relating to it, there is the poet's belief in its eternal counterpart and in values, whose source and origin is to be found, not in the unstable and constantly changing realm of time, but in the unchanging nature of an eternal God.

References:


Having considered Gryphius' general view of time and eternity, his awareness - always against the background of eternity - of the effects of time as manifested in the universe, the world-system, man himself and, finally, in human values, it is now our intention to discuss the implications of this awareness as they affect the poet's appraisal of human life.

Given the transience and instability of the material universe that surrounds man, the uncertain circumstances governing the world-system, the brevity of time that is his, the fragility and vulnerability of his own body, the proven futility of nearly all his values and pursuits, how is he to assess his time on Earth, his life? Gryphius' works present no single or simple answer to this question, his appraisal of human life tending to vary, according to which aspect of it he chooses to emphasise. But there is a constant element in this appraisal, namely, his belief in eternity, manifested as the realisation that man's biological life in time, whatever be its qualities, is not the ultimate. It is not the only life accorded to man. This belief, as we shall see, may, on the one hand, appear to rob earthly life of significance. On the other hand, it may imbue it with intense significance.

If we peruse Gryphius' works, we will find a number of different assessments of life, each of them illustrative and symptomatic of his basic outlook, none of them, however, really peculiar to him. As far as volume is concerned, it is the transience-instability-bodily-vulnerability juxtaposition that prevails, life on this Earth being equated, time and time again on a quite literal level, with suffering, imprisonment, torture and even death. On a more figurative level, we find man's unstable situation amid the rapidly changing circumstances of the world-
system being compared to a stormy sea-voyage. Where the poet's emphasis is rather on the illusory qualities of man's values, the futility of his pursuits, life is conceived of as a dream, a play or a game. It is now proposed to discuss each of the above assessments of life in turn, always bearing in mind their connection with Gryphius' basic outlook and, because of this, their undeniable interrelationship.

Gryphius' equation of human life with suffering is, as we have already indicated, closely connected with the temporal sphere, in which man finds himself, and the human body, in which the eternal part of man is temporarily housed. Any discussion of life as suffering must necessarily include these factors.

The world, the setting for human life, the scene of our suffering:

(Der) Schau-Platz herber Angst und rauher bitterkeit:

(Der) Schau-Platz grimmer Pein ... (Carolus Stuardus. V. Abh., v. 258-259, Ga. Bd.IV, p. 49), is described as a dark "Thränenthal" (Sonnette Das Dritte Buch, XXXVII, Ga. Bd. I, p. 208), so dismal that the poet declares it far better to die at birth than to have to endure its miseries, (Sonnette Das erste Buch, X. Ga. Bd. I, p. 35), for it is a place...

welche wir mit Thränen beschreiten / mit Unwissenheit betreten / mit Verdruss... 

...Abscheu und Angst durchwandeln / mit Wehmut und Trauren gesegnet... (Diss. Fun. p. 258).

Again, in the ode, Verlangen nach den ewigen Hängeln, it is referred to as the castle of mortality - "O Burg der sterblichkeit!" (Ga. Bd. II, p. 37, v. 37), as the dungeon in which we are incessantly tortured - "O Kercker voll von Leid!" (ibid., v. 38).

The comparison of the world to a dungeon or torture chamber is also used in the ode, Terra vale! Dominum vitae stat adire Tonantem:
Du unglück's Hauss du jammer Saal
Du Folter reiner Hertzen... (Ga. Bd. II, p. 48, v. 3-4);
and in the funeral dissertation, Überdruss menschlicher Dinge, the element of tormen
is again stressed:

Sie (the world) ist die Hoffstadt des Tyrannen Draculae, besetzt und umringt
mit Spiessen / Galgen und Rädern...welche der Stanck so vieler Leichen / und
der scheussliche Anblick verdorrter Todtengerippe / hesslich verstelllet...
(Diss. Fun., p. 259.)

Indeed, numerous are the references to its darkness, its gloom, its resemblance to
a place of torture. Simultaneously there is the sense that man does not rightfully
belong here, in the same way as the Israelites of the Babylonian captivity did not
rightly belong in Babylon. In the funeral dissertation Folter Menschliches Lebens,
the world is compared, not merely to a torture chamber, but to one in which we are
held, as strangers, far from our homeland:

Die Werckstadt der Folter ist nirgend anders als in den Kerckern zu suchen /
welcher diese Welt / in welcher wir fern von dem Vaterland / fern von Gesells-
schaft der Heiligen / verwahret werden...(Diss. Fun., p. 347)

and in the sonnet, Auff den Sonntag dess von der geheimen Ewigkeit lehrenden Gottes,
the poet goes so far, in his emphasising of the fact that our true homeland and
destination are elsewhere, as virtually to prelude the possibility of man's being
anything but dissatisfied with life on earth:

Und ist das werthe Schloss der Ewigkeit bestimmt.
Wem mag das trübe Thal der Erden denn belieben? (Ga. Ed. I, p. 268.)

The human body, the other major source of man's suffering, is, we might well
say, the very factor that lays him open to the afflictions imposed upon him by the
world, as we find in the funeral dissertation Magnetische Verbindung...:
Wie vielen Schmerzen und Krankheiten ist unser Leib nicht unterworfen?
(Ja was ist diese Welt als ein Kercker...) (Diss. Fun., p. 184.)

In the ode, *Terra vale!* *Dominae vitae stat adire Tonante*, the body itself, as the temporal and temporary housing of the soul, is referred to as a dungeon and torture chamber, from which one would be inclined to deduce that Gryphius conceives of the body, not merely as a passive vehicle of human misery (i.e. because of its fragility and vulnerability), but also as one of the active causes of suffering:

Mein iridisches Hauss der Leib geht eyn
Der Nothstall meiner Seele /
Der Stock / die ‚erzstatt herber pein /
Die enge marternöhlen... (Ca. Bd. II, p. 49, vv. 15-18.)

Because human suffering in life is not limited to physical pain alone, but includes torment of spirit, the body may be said to represent to the human spirit, what the world at large represents to human-kind in general, namely, the scene and setting of misery, the torture chamber in which the spirit is held prisoner, even the very instrument of torture.

Having, so to speak, set the stage for life as suffering, we now intend to delve more deeply into this subject. Closely linked with the concepts of world and body discussed above, are the following general statements regarding the sadness and the tribulations of earthly life:

1) Mit Thränen grüssen wir /
   In Thränen lebt man hier:

2) Hier bringen wir die Jahr
   In Ach und Seuffzen zu
Hier schmachtet deinei Schaar


The first of these statements expands the idea of life being a passage through the Biblical valley of tears, its beginning (birth), its course, its ending (death), inevitably being accompanied by sadness - a concept that recurs, in much expanded form, in the funeral dissertation, Winter-Tag menschlichen Lebens, to which we intend to refer later; the second further stresses the sadness of life in what seems to be an implicit comparison of it to the Jewish captivity; the third is a concise assessment of the inextricable relationship between life and suffering, as the poet poses the same question as that found in II Corinthians, chapter 4.

Each of these three statements could well serve as a heading for this section, since each of them, despite the variation in viewpoint and model of expression, stress the same basic idea, namely, the equation of life with suffering and, by implication, the contrast between "here" and "there", between time and eternity; and each of them is borne out by the vast mass of Gryphius’ writings.

One of Gryphius’ most detailed and explicit representations of life as suffering is to be found in the funeral dissertation, Winter-Tag menschlichen Lebens. We have already discussed the poet’s comparison of human life to the shortest day of the year, from the point of view of its transience and brevity. However, it is not merely the brevity of the shortest day that makes it so apt a parallel for life, but also, as the poet himself remarks, the fact that it is indeed a winter’s day, with all the harshness, coldness, darkness and gloom that mid-winter entails:

Sintemal unser gantzes Leben / wie lang / wie herrlich / wie prächtig es auch
immer / doch nichts in dieser trüben / unseligen und rauen Zeit / als ein
rechter Wintertag... (Diss. Fun. p. 215.)

Using this sustained imagery of the shortest day, the poet compares the various periods of the day to the stages of a man's life; and in each comparison, the emphasis is upon human misery and suffering. The birth of a child is not hailed as a joyful event, rather, it is compared to the gloomy beginnings of a winter's day, when the sun, though risen, is obscured behind banks of cloud:

Wie lange verhält sich der sonnen Licht in dem Winter hinter trüben und
dunkeln Wolken? Wie schmerzlich ist die Geburt des Menschen! (Ibid.)

Gryphius further emphasises the misery of human life by contrasting the helpless condition of a newly born child with the innate cleverness of the young animal, the perfection of the newly-opened flower:

Der Mensch allein kann nichts als weinen. Und das Geschöpf, das alle anderen
beherrschen soll, muss um alle Gliedmassen gebunden... werden. (Ibid.)

He then points out that just as the morning hours of a winter's day are frequently associated with stormy conditions, a child's early years are beset with illness:

Und wie keine Zeit bequemer als diese zu Veränderung des Gewitters ebenso
ist kein Lebenspunkt des Menschen grösseren und heftigeren Krankheiten
unterworffen als der Anfang des Lebens... (Ibid. p. 216.)

Nor does Gryphius confine himself to the physical weaknesses to which the young child is heir. He is also aware of the spiritual imperfections (original sin), that cloud life's beginnings and influence its whole course:

Mit dem Auffang der Sonnen erheben sich Dickere und stinkende Nebel: Mit
unserer Geburt wird die auf uns geerbte Schuld unserer Vor-Eltern geboren. (Ibid.)

Gryphius then completes the picture of life as suffering with references to the
anxieties and unstable circumstances to which man is exposed in the adult stages of
life, before he sinks into the evening hours of senility and, finally, into death —
the ultimate manifestation of human misery.

But even here, Gryphius' use of the life-winter's day analogy does not end. It
is not merely man's own condition (his proneness to suffering, his exposure to ex-
ternal circumstances) that constitutes human misery. It is also the harshness of
the external circumstances themselves. It is already indicated on page 208 (ibid.),
in the reference to "dieser trüben / unseligen und rauhen Zeit", and again implied
in the poet's depiction of the vicissitudes of fortune governing adult life. On pag
252 of the same funeral dissertation, he once again uses the winter analogy to state
quite explicitly, the role external circumstances play in determining the quality
of human life. Indeed, he goes so far as to equate life with those destructive
forces that, on the general plane of human experience, bring misery and suffering to
mankind and, on the plane of his own personal and particular experience, have devast
ated his fatherland, bringing misery and suffering to its inhabitants:

Wie der Winter alles verüdet " verderbet und verwüstet: so ist dieses Leben,
welches nichts den Asch und Elend Über uns geführet / unsere städte mit Grass
unsere Kirchen mit Aschen / unsere Pallaiste mit gefallenen Steinen bedecket
und unsere Felder mit Todtenbeinen verunreinigt. (Diss. Fun., p. 252.)

What a picture of the misery and instability of existence in time!

We have seen how suffering may derive from man's environment, from his own
body, from life itself. Indeed, Gryphius sees suffering as so integral a part of
living that he associates it with its very opposites - pleasure, joy. Frequently
the source of joy is also the source of suffering (for instance, to use a cliche,
the colour, form and fragrance of a rose give pleasure, but its thorns inflict pain.
It is therefore not surprising to find that he associates suffering with the temporal values so prized by man, such as beauty, riches, position—values that might logically be expected to be a source, if not of joy, then of pleasure and satisfaction. To use Gryphius' own words:

Wo lust ist / da ist angst; wo freud' ist / da ist klagen.

Wer schöne rosen siht / siht dornen nur dabey

Kein stand / kein ort / kein mensch ist seines Creutzes frey.

Wer lacht; fühlt wen er lacht im hertzen tausend plag'en.

Wer hoch in ehren siht / mus hohe sorgen tragen.

Wer ist der richtumb acht / und loss von kummer sey

In these lines we are given quite a comprehensive resume of the poet’s attitude toward earthly joys, various aspects of which are easily corroborated by further reference to his works. The close connection between human values and suffering we again find in ode V of the first book. In stanza 4, with its parable of the tulip, physical beauty is shown to be a direct source of pain:

Der Tulipan

Wird weil er glänzt / von jungfrawen abgeschnitten /

Schaw Menschen an /


Was not Catharina von Georgien's outstanding beauty one of the major causes of her suffering? The following stanza of the ode stresses how riches and position may contribute both to a man's downfall and to his load of suffering—in the form of worry and anxiety. However, the basic message of the two passages quoted above is not so much the indication of the common sources of joy and sorrow, pleasure and
pain, as of the inextricable relationship between earthly joy and its exact opposite. Such is Gryphius' conception of this relationship that joy becomes little more than a transient veneer of illusion, momentarily embellishing the reality which is inevitably revealed as pain, sorrow and suffering:

Was sindt die kurtzen frewden /
Die stets / ach! leidt / und leiden /
Und Hertzens angst beschwert.
Das süsse jubiliren /
Das hohe trimphiren

Wirdt oft in hohn und schmach verkehrt. (Vanitas, Vanitatum Vanitas, Ga. Bd.II, p. 18-19, vv. 31-36.)

In the funeral dissertation, Folter Menschliches Lebens, Gryphius actually represents pleasure as merely another form of torture to which man is subjected; the unpleasant consequences of our pleasures, remaining with us like a hang-over, far outweigh the fleeting moments of enjoyment:

Und 0 der Wollüste! 0 der elenden Wuste... Wer heute trunken daunelt / fühl't
morgen die Schmertzen des Haupts / und das Nagen des Gewissens... (Diss. Fun., p. 290.)

Using the analogy of the extremely beautiful flower that rots with a most disagreeable odour, he establishes a direct link between the intensity of the pleasure and the degree to which its consequences are disagreeable (cf. ibid, p. 292), while still hammering out the basic theme of the transient and illusory nature of earthly joy which inevitably reveals itself as the opposite:

Die lieblichsten Blumen geben / so bald sie nur etwas welck / den widerwertigsten Geruch... Ja je größer die Wollust / je höher der Ekel... Mitten in dem Geniessen (befindet sich) der Mensch doch sonder Freude. (ibid., p. 291-292.)
Up to this point, we have discussed Gryphius' view of life as suffering, as it affects mankind in general. It is now proposed to examine some first-person presentations of the same theme, always bearing in mind, however, that these presentations will not necessarily correspond to the poet's genuine, personal experience, but may well fall into the category of dramatic lyric, especially in the case of poems written around Bible texts. Given the whole orientation of Gryphius' writings towards the typical rather than the unique, the question of genuineness does not really concern us here. What does concern us is the way in which the basic theme remains unchanged, even when viewed from the perspective of the "I"; i.e., what has been stated on a general level is corroborated on the particular level. So we find in the sestet of the sonnet, Der Welt Wollust, the following "personal" confirmation of the idea that the whole of man's life in time is suffering:

Ich red' es offenbahr / so lang als Phoebus licht
Vom himmel ab bestralt / mein bleiches angesicht

Again, in the sonnet, Dominus de me cogitat, we find the same awareness presented in what, at times, appear to be autobiographical terms:

In meiner Erzten blüht. Im frühling zarter tag
Hat mich der grimme Todt verwaiset / und die Nacht
Der Traurigkeit umbhüllt / nich hat die herbe macht
Der Seuchen aussgezehrt / ich schmacht in stätter plages.
Ich theilte meine Zeit / in Seuffzer/Noth und klage / (Ga. Bd. I, p. 80.)

The point that the poem actually makes is the ever-present help afforded to the individual by God, but, at the same time, it does present a vivid picture of the pangs of living.
The pangs of living are again reflected in poems dealing with illness, such as the sonnets, *Threnen in schwerer Krankheit* (Ga. Bd. I, p 59), *An die umstehenden Freunde* (Ga. Bd. I, p. 60) or *Schluss des 1648sten Jahres* (Ga. Bd. I, p.103), no less than in works whose point of departure is a passage of Scripture, where, rather than hearing the cry of the individual, we hear the cry of pain of humanity. In the sonnets, *Auff die selige Geburt des Herrn Luc. 2* (Ga. Bd. I, p. 189) and *Auff den Sontag dess vor uns verborgenen Helffers* (Ga. Bd. I, p. 204), the wider application of the poet's words makes him the spokesman for mankind in its misery and darkness (*Auff die selige Geburt des Herrn Luc. 2*), mankind for whom the agony of living - physical and spiritual - is comparable to the pains of childbirth (*Auff den Sontag dess vor uns verborgenen Helffers*). Both sonnets are in the form of an appeal for deliverance addressed to Christ (we shall quote only the lines relevant to our present subject):

Schaue höchster König schaue / wie unmässig mich geschätzet
Der ergrimme Fürst der Erden / mit Weh' / Ach und Angst und Leid /
Schaue / wie mich jetzt umhüllt hat die Nacht der Traurigkeit

Kom' und schaue doch / wie ich nun in lauter Tränen fliesse!
Kom / denn ich nicht sehen kan / kom mein Schmerz nit überhand....
Kom / eh' ich die grimme Noth mit dem letzten Seuffzer schliesse /
Eh' ich den gepress'ten Geist mit der Jammerklag ausgesisses.
Gleich wie ein hochschwanger Leib der die herbe Zeit erkannt /
l.e. Die Ihm zu der Arbeit ruft / schmachtet in der Weh=Mut Band
In both these instances, the poet is virtually bringing the reader face to face with the concept of original sin, with the repercussions of the "Fall" of man. It has been pointed out in the introduction to this thesis that the whole tragicality of time is conceived of as dating from the Fall. The tragicality of life itself - i.e. the basic concept of life as suffering, and here our authority is the book of Genesis - may be said to have the same origins. In Romans 8, we find reference to the whole of creation "groaning in travail", as it awaits the coming of the Redeemer; and it is against such a background that we must understand the quotations above, indeed, the whole concept of life as suffering. Both quotations clearly show - albeit in metaphorical terms - the connection between man's unredeemed state and his suffering. Having chosen to disobey God, he now finds himself at the mercy of the Prince of this World, the Devil - racked by "Woh! Ach und Angst und Leid" (Auff die selige Geburt des Herrn, Ga. Bd. I, p. 189, v. 2), enveloped by "die Nacht der Traurigkeit" (ibid., v. 3) - "night" in Gryphius' poetry is used repeatedly as an emblematic representation of man's plight without God, his unredeemed state. "In dem Stalle der Bedrängnis" (ibid., v. 4), he is a prisoner of his own misery, till God Himself releases him. And here there is an interplay between "night" and "stall", representative of man's state and the actual birthnight and birthplace (a stall) of Christ. In Auff den Sontag dess vor uns verborgenen Helffers, the presentation of man's plight is still more dramatic, the focus of attention being on that climactic point in the progression of suffering where it borders on the unbearable, where release is sensed to be imminent but is as yet not forthcoming. (cf. op.cit., Ga. Bd. I, p.204.

We have seen how Gryphius' appraisal of human life as suffering is closely connected with his appraisal of its milieu and setting - the world and the human body - and indeed of the whole realm of time. We have attempted to show how, basically,
whether the poet chooses to express himself in general or particular terms, to use

alegory or dramatic first-person outcry, he is dealing with the same truth, as it

affects all men, for whom he is the spokesman.

The concept of life as suffering, as presented in Gryphius' works, may be said
to have two important corollaries, which it is now our intention to examine. On the
one hand, we find the poet accentuating the suffering involved in living, to the
point where this life is referred to as equal to, or worse than death. On the other
hand, we are confronted with a positive appraisal of suffering itself - a sense of
its necessity and purpose.

The assertion that life is death is one that is reiterated throughout Gryphius' work. We find it in its most unadorned form in the sonnet, Grabbschrift eines Hoch-

berubmten Mannes, where it is followed by the equally paradoxical statement that
death is life:

Das was ihr leben nennt' jhr sterblichen / ist todt

Was jhr für todt anschaw't ist leben sonder noth. (Ga. Bd. I, p. 85, v.12-13)

It recurs in similarly bald terms at the end of the first stanza of the ode Verleug-
nung der Welt - "dies Leben ist der Todt" (Ga. Bd. II, p. 40, v. 6) and in the
alegorical poem Der Weiicher Stein:

...Was nennt ihe Menschen Leben!

Es ist ein stetter todt... (Ga. Bd. III, p. 54, v. 42-43)

with the added element in this case of its being a continual death. The implicit
connection contained in "stetter todt", between the concept of life as suffering and
life as death, becomes more explicit in the following lines taken from the ode Ver-
langen nach den Ewigen Hügeln:

Wir die wir lebend todt /

Und stets voll herber noth. (Ga. Bd. II, p. 35, v. 9-10)
and again in the ode, Terra vale! Dominum vitae stat adire Tonantem:

Meist ihr diss leben die ihr lebt!

Und zwischen furcht und leiden schwebt


But for a really clear substantiation of the points raised above, we must turn to the funeral dissertations. In the Brunnendiscurs, Gryphius declares how, in the course of experience, the deceased has come to realise:

...dass dieses Leben mehr ein tausendfacher Tod und unablässliche heneckerey zu nennen. (Diss. Fun. p. 51.)

The most explicit statement of the relationship between suffering and the concept of life as death is corroborated, in its every aspect, by the following passage from Hingang durch die Welt:

Dies Zeitliche scheinet ausserlichem Ansehen nach dem Tode gantz zuwider.

Wenn wir solches aber was vernunftiger beschauen / ist es dem Tode nicht nur gantz gleich / sondern nichts als ein immerwehrend sterben selbst. Jedweder Augenblick stirbt uns ab / und die unaufhörlichen Veränderungen unseres Leibes sind nichts denn eitel eintzele Tode... Wie viel sterben in ihren Freunden und setzen / ...in Eltern und Kindern / ihr eigen Fleisch auf' Sauer? Nur dieses scheidet uns von den Todten / dass jener Leiche ihre Verwesung nicht fühlet: wir aber unsere stete Schmerzen mehr denn zu hefftig erfinden... (Diss. Fun., p. 327.)

Firstly, the poet upholds the paradoxical assertion that life is death, pointing out that, despite appearances to the contrary, this assertion is, indeed, founded on fact. Life is not merely "dem Tode...gantz gleich" but "ein immerwehrend sterben selbst" - a continuous process of dying. He then considers various aspects of
this process: the ceaseless changes in our bodies which he describes as "nichts des eitel einzeln Tode", the fact that we also die a little with the deaths of those we love - friends, parents, children. Finally, he comes to the conclusion that the only way in which we differ from the dead is that "jener Leiche ihre Verwesung nicht fühlet: Wir aber unsere stete Schmerzen mehr denn zu heftig fühlen" - Whereas the dead are well and truly dead, i.e. past feeling physical pain, we, the living, are perpetually subjected to the suffering inherent in the process of living. Here we can refer back to our earlier remark that Gryphius conceives of life, not simply as being equal to death, but quite literally, worse than death.

In the above assessment are we not confronted with a complete devaluation - indeed, the ultimate devaluation of life as it is lived in time? Paradoxically, the second corollary to the poet's concept of life as suffering - his sense of the necessity and purpose of suffering - re-endows life with value and significance.

Probably, the chief factor in the positive evaluation of suffering is the example of Christ, through whose willingness to suffer and die, mankind regained its potential for eternal life forfeited at the Fall:

\[\text{Der Mensch / das Spill der Zeit verlohr die Ewigkeit /}  \\
\text{Und Gott der ewig ist nimm an sich Fleisch und Zeit /}  \\
\text{Und trägt der Zeitten Fluch / den Tod / dass er das Leben}  \\
\text{Dem was hir sterblich ist auff ewig kenne geben. (Über die Geburt des Herren, Epigrammata VIII, Ga. Ed. II, p. 172.)}\]

In a sonnet stressing the necessity and inevitability of suffering, Gryphius points out that, in view of what Christ had to bear, man can hardly expect to come through life unscathed:

\[\text{Was sucht ein blosser Mensch / wenn TESUS dornen trägt /}  \\
\text{Der Kriegsman Rast / wenn man den Fürsten schlägt}\]
Moreover - and he uses the analogy of a soldier whose leader is under attack - how can man look for respite and seek to evade suffering, when Christ's example points the way to its very depths.

The way of the cross is also understood by Gryphius to be the way to glory. Christ's readiness to undergo humiliation and suffering led directly, as we have remarked previously, to his glorification by God; and Gryphius indicates a similar connection between man's temporary sufferings in life and eternal glory:

Wie kan uns doch so hoch fur Noth und Sterben grauen
Wenn der so hier in Angst ohn allen Trost verschmacht

Again, in the sonnet Auff den Sontag dess vor uns verborgenem Helffers, are we not to understand similar implications regarding suffering and eternal joy, particularly since the image used - albeit a Biblical one - is that of childbirth? Just as the agony of childbirth is the necessary precursor to the mother's joy over her new baby, so suffering would almost appear to be conceived of as a prerequisite to the eternal joy of knowing God:

Wie sich aber nach der Toth ein Weib an der Frucht ergetzt
Also wird mein mattes Hertz / dem die kurtze Qual zusetzt

Gryphius' recognition of the link between earthly suffering and eternal glory, earthly suffering and eternal joy, does rather smack of the much parodied "Pie in the sky when you die" outlook. He tends in this context - because his attention is focussed on the final outcome - to stress the transience of suffering as opposed to the infini-
ity of what eternity offers, rather than dwell on any positive aspects it may possess. However, we do find him emphasising the positive aspects, as he contemplates the actual suffering itself and not merely its outcome. In the sonnet to the Erlaufterten Unglückseligen, with its mention of the misfortunes of the person to whom it is addressed and of the plight of his fatherland, the inference is that there is far more to be learnt from suffering and the consideration of suffering than from pleasure:

Man rühme wie man will / ein Blumenreiches Feld/
Wer alles Überlegt / wird / tieffgesinnter Held/

The Bible (Hebrews 12) speaks of God's "chastening whom he loveth"; and the analogy is obviously that of a parent bringing up a child and disciplining it, when necessary, for its own good. Gryphius also appears to accept suffering in this light — i.e. as something laid upon man by God, and used by him for man's betterment, as a means of tempering and testing him. In the funeral dissertation, the Brunnendiscurus, for instance, he speaks of the positive influence on man of harsh and difficult times — which are far better training, which "ein und ander Gemüth besser auf die Probe stellen" (op. cit., Diss. Fun., p. 71), than times of ease, with which any one can cope. The same principle of the beneficial effects of suffering and difficulty applies in the opening ode of the third book, where it is quite clearly seen to be God himself who imposes such afflictions on man:

Er fordert in den Kampf / die / die sich ihm ergeben /
Er führt sie in den Streit!
Er läßt sie eine Last auff ihre Schultern heben
Er prüfft sie durch viel Leid. (Ga. Bd. II, p. 68, vv. 41-44.)

Not only is it a matter of God's proving man's mettle through suffering, but of all
things working together for the good of those who love him:

Er würget unser Glück und Leben /

Wenn uns der Narfter Glut umgeben /

Er lässt in Bande führen

"wenn er befreyen wil. (ibid., p. 70, vv. 99-102.)"

How, in the poet's opinion, does God use suffering to effect man's "Glück"; "Leben" and liberation? It is again to Gryphius' funeral dissertations that we must turn in order to gain a deeper insight into the concepts expressed in the lyrics. On page 161, suffering is described as a means used by God to separate man from the vanities of this life which would otherwise cause his damnation, as a means of refinement which reveals the difference between "Nachlässigigkeit" and "Tugend" and as a means of making man all the more dependent on Him. In short, suffering serves to direct man's gaze away from time and towards eternity. This, essentially, is the same therapeutic role that is ascribed to suffering in Der Todt als Arzt der Sterblichen (Diss. Fun., p. 374 ff), namely the preparation of man for eternity by ridding him of the sickness of temporality (of his adherence to the things of time). As remarked previously, the positive evaluation of suffering imbues life itself with a certain significance, only as the period in which suffering as a power for good is active in man. For, as such, life is also a period in which man's ultimate destiny is shaped.

The very factors that condition the poet's assessment of life as suffering - to be concise, the whole time-syndrome - also give rise to those further concepts of life already referred to. Not very far removed from the life-suffering concept are, on the one hand, the equation of life with imprisonment (not in the sense discussed above) and, on the other hand, with a (sea)-voyage and, intimately linked with both
these views, the realisation that life is synonymous with error.

Gryphius sees man as imprisoned within the finite bounds of time: in more precise terms, man is the prisoner of his own body - "in Fleisch und Bein verstrickt" (An den Gefangenen Dicaeus, Ca. Bd. I, p. 71. v. 2), of the temporal world in which he lives and of the circumstances governing it, of his own preoccupations and fears, of the material possessions he accrues (cf. An den Gefangenen Dicaeus). Leo Armenius speaks of a servant's being bound with iron, a prince with gold - meaning that, whatever a man's position in life, he is a prisoner of that position and of the anxiety and suffering it entails (cf. Leo Armenius, Ca. Bd. V, p. 48, v. 27.). But here man's imprisonment does not end - as a temporal being in the thrall of the temporal realm, of the things of time. The most profound source of this sense of imprisonment is the poet's belief in man's eternal soul, hampered and impeded in this life by the restrictions imposed upon it by the temporal part of man, the body (cf. An seinen Herrn Bruder Paul Gryphius, Ca. Bd. III. p. 167.). What really concerns the poet, then, is man as a creature of both time and eternity in the thrall of the temporal realm:

Der hohe Geist wird über alles gehn /
Und bey dem Thorne der höchsten Weisheit stehn;
Wenn beyde Flügel ihm nicht fest gehemmt  

The juxtaposition of the concepts of life as imprisonment and life as a sea-voyage may, at first sight, seem rather an odd one, but we shall try to justify it. What both these concepts underline, as a basic reality, is the position of man as a being who is destined for eternity, under the jurisdiction of time. On the one hand he is chained to circumstances, to the body and its weaknesses. On the other hand,
like a boat at the mercy of the waves, he is swept hither and thither by their active influences:

Gleich als ein kahn
Bald hin / bald her / wird von der flutt geschwissen;
So fällt uns an
Der sorgen Sturm / wir werden hin gerissen
Auff dieses Lebens schmerzen volle see. (Vanitas mundi, Ga. Bd. II, p. II, vv. 31-33.)

Man is in constant danger of shipwreck (cf. Diss. Fun., p. 134), in constant danger of being swept off course and going under in the storms of his own making - i.e. of not finding his true destination, eternity.

Both the views of life we have just dealt with allow for the possibility of man's so being involved with time as to lose sight of eternity - in their own terms, he may stifle in his prison or drown in the sea. It is precisely man's propensity to fall prey to his own limitations and to the circumstances governing the temporal realm that leads to the association of human life with error and uncertainty - an association that is summed up in Michael Balbus' maxim in Leo Armenius - "Wer lebt / der irrt und fällt" (op. cit., p. 31, v. 174) and in that of Cardenio - "Wir Menschen irren stets" (Cardenio und Colinde, p. 111, v. 150) and given more detailed treatment in the sonnet, Überschrift an dem Tempel der sterblichkeit:

Ihr irrt in dem ihr lebt: die gantz verschränkte bahn
Täst keinen richtig gehn, diss was ihr wünscht zu finden
Ist irrrhumb: irrrhumb ists der euch den Sinn kan binden.

"Was Ever herta ansteckt / ist nur ein falscher Wahn." (Ga. Bd. I, p. 70.)

Error, error and self-delusion are seen to permeate every aspect of man's activity, waking or sleeping, in the sphere of time. "In diesem Irrgang" (Diss. Fun., p. 325)
he is misled by the spurious and transient values of this life, to the degree where he is unable to distinguish what is ultimately false, and squanders his eternity - potential in the vain pursuit of "diss was fleisch und schweiss und blut / und fall und weh nicht hält /" (Uberschrift an dem Tempel der sterblichkeit, Fa. Bd. I, p. 70 v. 5-7).

Such is the blindness of humankind, or rather the restricted nature of its vision, that in the frantic search for life it finds only death. All too often - and here lies the very crux of its error, in Gryphius' view - it chooses to limit its search to the realm of the transient and material. This, essentially, is the assessment of human life and activity presented by the prologue to Catharina von Georgien.

In the equation of human life with suffering, imprisonment, a sea-voyage, error we are confronted by an appraisal that takes into account, above all, man's vulnerabilities and restrictions, as they result from his own nature or from the nature of the temporal sphere in which he exists. The concept of life as error, while having its roots in the recognition of human vulnerabilities and restrictions, also takes into account a further aspect of existence in time, namely the unreal, illusory qualities of the temporal realm. It is above all this unreal and illusory aspect of life that gives rise to the view that sees life as a game, a "Theaterstück" or a dream.

We have already referred to the connection between the awareness of transience and instability and a profound sense of irreality and futility. The interrelationship is immediately apparent in that most explicit representation of life as "Theaterstück", Ebenbildt unseres Lebens. The whole of human life is compared to a theatre-performance on the stage of the world, where the role a man plays is of brief duration and far from predictable or safe. Changing scenes bring abrupt
changes of fortune:

Der steigt und jener fällt / der sucht die Paläste /


And basically only the quirks of fortune and the borrowed costumes of the actors -

Der trägt ein purpur-kleidt / und jener gräbt im Sande (ibid., v. 10)
distinguish one man from another. All alike are participating in an empty masquerade whose conclusion is as imminent and menacing as the sword of Democles. All alike, at this conclusion, that is, their exit from the stage, must surrender their borrowed trappings, together with anything they have apparently gained in the course of the play. Implicit in Ebenbildt unser Leb ens is the same condemnation of human-kind that we find in the final line of Fa ist alles eitell:

Noch wil was ewig ist kein einig mensch betrachten. (Ga. Bd. I, p. 54, v. 74.)

Man is so caught up in the unreal sphere of the play (=time), so involved in its action as to ignore the reality beyond the confines of the stage, a reality that inevitably has to be faced, with death.

It is, undoubtedly, the continual proximity of this reality that causes Gryphi to refer to the play as "dis ernste spiell" (Ebenbildt unser Leb ens, Ga. Bd. I, p. 58, v. 12). Man gives himself wholeheartedly to his role, to the pursuit of position, possessions, knowledge, power of which he may be divested at any moment. And all the while he is committing himself to spiritual life or death, for these are the real issues involved.

In the allegorical poem, der Weicher Stein, where life is compared to a game of cards, we find the sharp distinction between the illusory nature of the game itself and the reality of the actual stakes. In playing to win, man is prepared to risk everything, not merely what he has already accumulated in the course of the game -
honour, position, possessions and life itself, but even his very soul; and for what actual gains? Gryphius leaves little doubt as to the nature of the values pursued with such fervour:

Die Wahrheit überzeugt den der Vernunft noch hört /
Dass alles was man mit gebogenen Knien ehrt;

They share in the unreality and worthlessness of fantasy and game, their pursuit is futile:

Welch Zucken / welch Geschrey um so geringe Sätze!
Was sucht ihr Sterbliche? Wie nichtig sind die Schätze /
Umb die ihr alles wag! (ibid., p. 55, vv. 77-79.)

As with the Theaterstück, reality manifests itself only at the conclusion of the play:

Dann findet sichs wem Nutz / Wem Schaden zugeschossen. (ibid, p. 57, v. 132.)

In this case it is the reality of the Last Judgment, where the basic issues involved in the game of life are revealed and their gravity emphasised. Man's exit from the stage of life was seen to be synonymous with the loss of everything gained in the course of the play, so that it was divested of temporal trappings, that he was shown to face reality. The same applies here, where the confrontation with reality, far from being merely implied, is described in clear and explicit terms. The outcome of the game, i.e. man's ultimate destiny, is seen to hinge upon his attitude towards time and eternity during the game. The vital point is whether he has regarded the game as an end in itself and committed himself totally to the pursuit of temporal values or whether, recognizing behind the facade of the transient and the illusory the existence of an eternal God, he has conceived of life and its activities as a potential road towards Him:

Dann Überlegt der Höchst / und schleust: Wer Zeit und Gitter
The various elements of human life are lifted out of the realm of illusion and futility and assume value and significance, as they are orientated towards eternity that is, in the specific terms of this poem, the personal time allotted to man, his capacities (here, ingenuity) when used, not for self-aggrandisement, but for the glory of God, take on reality (are imbued with something of eternity), in that they have a positive bearing on his ultimate destiny, when the game is played out, if only as a manifestation of the choice he has made. Whereas the same elements, time-orientated, consecrated to self-aggrandisement and the exploitation of the here and now for its own sake, share in the finite qualities of time itself and cease to exist for any man, when his personal time is curtailed. Thus, they have no bearing unless it be a negative one, on his ultimate situation with regard to eternity. Like the substitute chips used in a card-game, their significance is limited to the game to the unreal realm of "Fantasie und Spil" (ibid., p. 54, v. 53), outside which they are nothing.

In the comparison of life to a play or game, we have an assessment that stresses implicitly or explicitly, as the case may be, the disparity between the unreal and circumscribed sphere in which the action takes place (time), and the limitless reality beyond (eternity). The same is true of the comparison of life to a dream. A dream also represents a period of unreality which inevitably gives way to reality.
when the sleeper wakes up. In Calderón's drama, *La Vida es sueño*, the protagonist reaches a point where he prefers not to distinguish between waking and dreaming, to such an extent have life and the dream-state become synonymous for him. While Gryphius' references to life as a dream do not show quite the same fusion and confusion of the two terms of the simile, they are nevertheless indicative of an analogous awareness of the illusory qualities of life and of man's attitude towards it.

It is now proposed to enlarge upon the concept of life as a dream as reflected in Gryphius' works. In ode VII of the third Book, it is the brevity and sadness of life that finds expression:

Diss lebenlose Leben
Pfält / als ein Traum entweicht /
Wenn sich die Nacht begeben
Und nun der Mond erbleicht!

Doch mich hat dieser Traum / nur schreckenvoll gemacht. (Ca. Bd. II, p. 85, vv. 20-24.)

Here we see human life as a nightmare, a brief spell of torment and fear, futile, fleeting, empty of meaning, incoherent and inconsistent. Is not this also the picture that obtrudes in the well-known sonnet *Themen in schwerer Krankheit*? - we do not refer only to the concluding line with its pessimistic appraisal of man's activities:

...und was sind unser thaten?


But to the implications of the whole sonnet, in particular the sestet, regarding the qualities of life.

Gryphius recognises in life the same incongruities, the same lack of coherence and cohesion, the same lack of substance that mark a dream. In the words of the
Reihen in Leo Armenius:

Sterbliche / was ist dies leben /
Als ein gautz vermischter trau /
Dies was ehr' und fleiss uns geben

Schwindet als der wellen schaum / (Ga. Bd. V, p.46, v. 609-612.)

Life is not simply a dream, but a mixed-up and confused dream; in addition, anything that we may gain from it has no more reality or substance than the objects that are ours in our dreams. In the following passage from Carolus Stuardus, this awareness of the inconsistency and insubstantiality of life is given what is probably its most sensitive and explicit utterance. The bishop of London has been describing the transience of man and his values, the sudden reversals of fortune that govern men's lives:

.../ man stürzt als von der Höh'

In die vertieffte Klufft / man siht nicht was man sihet
In dem so jehen Fall / wie man sich träumend mühet
Umb ein / ich weiss nicht was / und wenn der Schlaff verschwind /
Kaul ein Gedächtniss mehr des Schatten-Bildes findt;
So spilt was Irrdisch ist durch die bestürzten Sinnen
Und ädret Lust in Leid....(Ga. Bd. IV, p. 82, v 300-306.)

As in a dream, man is bewildered by the incoherent sequence of events, the sudden illogical changes - "man siht nicht was man sihet In dem so jehen Fall". As in a dream, the objects pursued in life remain blurred in outline, indistinct. Man strives for "ein / ich weiss nicht was" that dissolves into less than the faint recollection of a shadow, into mere nothingness, with the advent of reality. Life itself, then, together with everything we experience in it, is, in the words of this excerpt, little or no more than the dreamlike passage of "was irrdisch ist"
through the senses.

As compared to the concept of life as a game or even as a theatre performance, where man may play an active and autonomous role, the concept of life as a dream appears, at first sight, to relegate man to a state bordering on complete passivity. But this is certainly not the case with Gryphius' use of analogy. It is true that man has little or no control over the events in a dream and little or no control over the circumstances affecting his life. These facts Gryphius accepts. The crucial point for him is not whether a man "dreams", but whether or not he believes in the reality of what he dreams. In other words, human life, although played out against the background of eternity, takes its course in the realm of time and therefore is influenced by the whole time-syndrome. The important question is not whether man comes under this influence, which he inevitably will, but whether or not he accepts it as ultimately real.

The refusal to believe in the reality of the temporal realm and what it offers man in life, is very clearly manifested in the ode, Verleugnung der Welt, with its unequivocal "no" to being further misled by what, after all, is only a dream:

Auff meine Seele' / auf! auf! entwach aus diesem traum...

...soll dieser leichte dunst
bezaubern mein gemüt mit solcher Phantasie! (stanza 3)

Biss her! und weiter nicht! verfluchte Phantasie
Nichts werthes Gauckelwerk. Verblendung-voller traum / (stanza 4)
(Ga. Bd. II, p. 40)

on which very decisive note we shall end this particular section.

In summing up this discussion of human life, we can point simultaneously to positive and negative evaluations: for instance, life is suffering, imprisonment, a trying sea-voyage, but suffering and testing have a purpose in God's eternal plan,
if man is prepared to accept it. Living is synonymous with error and uncertainty: life and its activities are futile, incoherent, unreal, but reality is there for the finding, if man will but choose to look beyond the things of time and see them in the perspective of eternity. In short, although life per se is, in Gryphius' opinion, incoherent, meaningless, in the context of time and eternity, it assumes intense significance. Just as the suffering with which life is associated, when viewed in the light of God's plan for mankind, loses its stigma of needless, meaningless torment, so the whole of life, the whole of man's time, when conceived of as fitting into that plan, becomes a period of testing, of preparation, of choice, in which it is up to every man to prove his own identity as a child of time or a child of eternity, or, otherwise expressed, as the victim of time or as its conqueror.
CHAPTER VII.

The Conquest of Time.

It is now intended to examine life from the positive point of view of the conquest of time. In approaching this question as it is manifested in Gryphius' works, we are immediately confronted by two important considerations: firstly, God's plan for mankind and, secondly, man's role. God's plan may be summed up briefly, as follows: God originally destined man for eternity, but man, through his own disobedience relegated himself to time and to all the ills that time is associated with. God in his mercy responded by offering in Christ (God become man, eternity become time) the means by which man may regain eternity. Man's role in the conquest of time hinges on God's plan, not by any means in the sense that he has become its puppet, but rather in the very opposite sense, that it offers him freedom from being controlled by time. Instead of being exploited by time, he can, if he chooses, exploit and use it.

The original conquest of time has been effected by Christ's birth, life, death and resurrection, through which man can claim deliverance not only from time, but from the whole time-syndrome. This is essentially the message of the sonnet, über die Geburt Jesu, with its exclamations of exultant joy:

Ö freudenreiche nacht / in welcher ach und klag /

Und fürsterniss und was sich auff die welt verschworen

Und fürcht und hallen angst und schrecken ward verloren.

Der himmel bricht! doch felt nuh mehr kein donnereschlag.

Der seitt und rächte schuff ist diese nacht ankommen!

Und hatt das recht der seitt / und fleisch an sich genommen!

Und unser fleisch und seitt der ewigkeit vermacht. (Ga. Bd. I, p. 80, vv. 5-11)
By reconciling God and man, time and eternity, Christ's death brings a release from
the darkness of fear and the curse incurred by man's disobedience, from the tragic-
ality of time itself. The fact that Christ who was Eternal God and therefore outside
the jurisdiction of time, in becoming man, submitted himself to time and to all the
miseries that are an integral part of life in time, restores significance to man's
existence:

Das wesentliche Wort / das in den Ewigkeiten
Eh' eine Zeit entstand / Gott ist / und Gott geschaut (v. 1-2)
...hat sich der Welt vertraut

Und nimbt an unser Fleisch und schwere Last der Zeiten.

Er ist vom Ehrenthron ins Threnens-Thal ankommen... (vv. 7-9)

This fact gives meaning to man's very temporality and vulnerability. Life, as lived
out by Christ, is not a labyrinth of confusion and suffering, leading nowhere, but
a very definite route towards eternity. The whole of Christ's life, His time on
earth, may be described as eternity-orientated, both in the sense that it is com-
pletely focussed on God and His will, without any deviation at all, and in the sense
that every aspect of it is an integral part of God's plan of redemption for mankind.

In its perfection and complete orientation towards eternity, as well as in its
transcendence of sorrow, suffering and death, Christ's life offers the blue-print
for man's potential conquest of time. So it is that, frequently, we find Gryphiou
pointing to a parallelism between this blue-print life and human life in general.

Thus he relates events in Christ's life to the common lot of mankind, in order to
courage the Christian in his troubles, and to indicate the sense and purpose
behind the vicissitudes of fortune. He also links concrete events in Christ's life
with spiritual realities in the life of the Christian as, for instance, in his refer-
ences to Christ's circumcision and his imprisonment. He shows Christ's circumcision to have its parallel in the freeing of the Christian from the things of time (cf. Auff die Beschneidung des Herrn, Luc 2, Ga. Bd. I, p. 191) while, in the case of Christ's imprisonment, we may speak of an inverse parallel, since he relates Christ's captivity to man's potential freedom:

Der hellen Gottheit glantz wird in der schwarzen nacht

In fessell' eingelegt uns freiheitt zu erlangen. (Über des Herrn gefängnus, Ga. Bd. I, p. 31. v. 7-8.)

Finally, in Christ's death and resurrection there is, for the Christian, the ultimate conquest of time. As we have remarked previously, death may be viewed quite simply as the curtailment of man's personal time; and as we have also pointed out in the opening chapter, from the entry of death into God's creation, as a direct consequence of man's original disobedience, derives most, if not all, of the tragicality of time. Christ's voluntary acceptance of death, i.e. of the penalty of man's disobedience, and His triumph over death, His resurrection, mean that death no longer need hold any horrors:

Vein Bruder / der Gesetz und Gottes Fluch bestillt /

Durch dessen Tod der Todt den Stachel hat verlohn. (An Gott den Sohn, Ga. Bd. I, p. 102, v. 3-4.)

It no longer represents the final demonstration of the power of time, because Christ's death has offered man freedom from this. It has proved the subservience of time to eternity, the subservience of physical decay to eternal spiritual life. It is the potential panacea for the whole malady of time. "Durch dich lebt was erbleicht", writes Gryphius in the sonnet Auff den anlern Ostertag (Ga. Bd. I, p. 230-231) and again, in the ode Beschluss des Jahres, he addresses Christ as follows:

Unendlich ewig Wesen:

Durch dessen Tod genesen /
Was Zeit und Jahre zehlt! ... (Ga. Bd. II, p. 88, vv. 31-33.)

Through Christ's life, death and resurrection time has effectually been related to eternity and the destructive power of time potentially overcome - potentially, because it is up to every individual to accept, to avail himself of Christ's conquest. Man is still a free agent and can choose to ignore the re-established rapport between time and eternity, just as he can also choose to attempt to conquer time by his own temporal means.

Bearing in mind Gryphius' belief in the accomplished work of Christ in relating time to eternity, it is now proposed to deal with the question of the use and conquest of time, as it concerns the individual. Just how crucial a matter man's use of time is, becomes clear from the following lines, taken from Auff den Anfang des 1660zigsten Jahres:

...Ach! Jahr / Monat / Tag und Stunden /
Sind kein beständig Gut / doch bringen sie Gefahr
Und höchsten Nutz zu uns. Sie bieten alles dar /
Wodurch die Ewigkeit uns Menschen wird verbunden. (vv. 5-8)
(Gott) Wil auch vor Augenblick uns Ewigkeiten geben.
Ach Seele! Ach! sey mit Ernst denn auf die Zeit bedacht /
Nimm Jahr und Monat / Stund / und Augenblick in acht.
Ein einig Augenblick verspricht Tod oder Leben. (vv. 11-14)


For all its insubstantiality, time is recognised as being vitally significant to man as the "raw material" of eternity, so fraught with both danger and opportunity, that man's attitude to its smallest components may determine his ultimate destiny. In Gryphius' view, it is of the utmost importance for every individual to realise the significance of the time that is his, to be "mit Ernst...auf die Zeit bedacht",
to use every moment of it judiciously. After all, it is only by coming to grips with the moment, the present moment, that a man can come to grips with time at all. This is the substance of what is probably Gryphius' best-known epigram, Betrachtung der Zeit:

Mein sind die Jahre nicht die mir die Zeit genommen / Mein sind die Jahre nicht / die etwa möchten kommen
Der Augenblick ist mein / und reh'm ich den in acht
So ist der mein / der Jahr und Ewigkeit gemacht. (Ga. Bd. II, p. 182-183.)

Past time has already escaped us and future time may never concern us, so that it is impossible to lay claim to either. The only time of which we can be certain and, hence, the only time to which we can lay claim, is the present moment; and in the use of this only available time Gryphius sees man's key to eternity. The enormous potential of the present moment springs from the fact that, in itself, it belongs to both time and eternity. As an ever-advancing point in the progression from past to future, it shares in the characteristics of time, above all, in its fluid mobility, while as the ever-present "now", it partakes of the timelessness of eternity. It is because of Christ's original conquest of time that the moment has eternity-potential. As we have stated previously, Christ's life, death and resurrection have reconciled time to eternity, endowing life (man's time) with significance and freeing it from the effects of the time-syndrome. But man, for Gryphius, is still an autonomous being - a point that we have already stressed - and again, it is up to him to realise and appropriate for himself, in his moment by moment existence, all that Christ offers him.

But how is man to do this? Up to this point, we have considered, in fairly broad and abstract terms, the question of the conquest of time, as it concerns the individual. We shall now examine this question more closely. As we have already
indicated, the basic issue is one of perspective: the recognition, firstly, that man's time is not an end in itself, but exists against the background of God's eternity, into which it may ultimately lead; secondly, that in order to realise the full potential of time, man must be fully aware of eternity and act accordingly.

In other words: in everything he does he must take into account the existence of God. In the following lines, written Über seinen Geburts-Tag, we find Gryphius summing up this whole matter of the use of time and man's attitude toward it, in a plea addressed to God:

Hilff dass ich meine Zeit genau und wol abtheil /
Gerechtigkeit Ach hilff! Hilff dass ich nimmer feil /
Und leben mag an dir wann du wirst Urtheil hegen.
ich
In dessen gie dass das Pfand so mir vertraut
Zu deiner Ehr und Nutz / der die auf dich erbaut /
Möge emsieg weil ich hier auf Erden leb' / anlegen. (Ga. Bd. I, p. 105.)

Again, in the sonnet, Auff den Sonntag des Himmlischen Weingärtnern, he deals with the same question, this time in an exhortation to man to make use of the time that is his:

Auff Menschen auff / gebt acht auff eure Sachen
Die Nacht bricht an / der Tod wil Abend machen....(v. 2-10)
..Fr (Cott) siht zwar den und mehr denn gnädig an /
Der eine Stund ihm fleissig dienen kan... (v. 12-13) (Ga. Bd. I, p. 196.)

In either case emphasis is laid upon man's using his time, not for his own personal advancement in the world, but in the service of God and to His glory. In the first passage, we see man's time, his life, as something entrusted to him by God - "dieses Pfand so mir vertraut" - in much the same way as the talents in the parable were
entrusted to the three servants by their master (cf. Math. 25). In the parable, only those servants who used their money to advantage won their master's approval, when the moment of reckoning came. The inference here is similar: at the final reckoning, the Last Judgment, whether or not we gain God's approval will depend on how, and how well we have invested our time. In the second quotation, with its insistence on the brevity of life, the important consideration is again shown to be the way in which man uses the time that is available to him. God is not so much concerned with how long a man serves Him as with the way in which he serves Him. It is not the length of life but its quality that counts.

It is not merely the fact that man's time must inevitably be terminated by death, followed by the Last Judgment, that moves Gryphius to insist on the necessity of man's using his time judiciously, but also the firm belief that time itself will soon end, with the Second Coming of Christ, at an hour when men are not expecting Him. This is illustrated by the following lines from the sonnet, Auff den Tag Nicolai Matth. 25:

O selig! die er nicht auss Fauler Ruh
Wird in die grausam Angst der stetten Marter senden /
Wohl dem der emsig wacht / der mit geschwinden Händen
Thm wenn er klopf't: es sey denn oder nu /
Die Thür entschleust... (v. 3-7) Ca. Bd. I, p. 225

Wir können nicht die Stund aussprechen;
Doch wird er unversehns einbrechen:
Menschen ach seyd unverdrossen / euer Heil ligt hieran / wachet! (v. 12-14) (op.cit., p. 226.)

It is imperative for man's salvation that he remain busy and alert in God's service.
Like the faithful steward in the parable who, in spite of his master's absence, carried out his work industriously, in the constant anticipation of his master's return.

The consequences for man of behaving as did the unfaithful steward, who squandered his master's substance on riotous living and then fell asleep, are clearly implied. Man is free to squander his life, his time, without regard for God who entrusted him with these gifts. He is free to be lazy and ignore his calling but, inevitably, he will be required to answer to God, both for what he has done and left undone. (cf. Der Weicher Stein, Ga. Bd. III, p. 57, v. 145ff.) In both sonnets referred to above the basic theme is that of time orientated towards eternity, of man's using his time with eternity in view. The same theme - but in more general terms - emerges in the ode Vanitas Vanitatum Vanitas, particularly in the last three stanzas. Here again there is a stressing of the brevity of the time at our disposal and of the necessity of life and its activities being focussed on God. In this case, there is a definite rejection of those temporal pursuits and values which, far from being a source of eternity, are simply a distraction from it. (cf. op.cit., Ga. Bd. II, p. 20.)

We have noted the intense significance that Gryphius ascribes to life, man's time, as the raw material of eternity and, in consequence of this, the crucial nature of man's own attitude towards this time. Indeed, Gryphius sees the ultimate destiny of the individual foreshadowed in his attitude towards the time that is his. Every man is born into time, but has the potential to be eternal; and even while living in time, may realise this potential. Although man's physical body, like everything born of, or created in time, must inevitably fall prey to the effects of time - whichever of the two alternatives he chooses to identify himself with - his spirit will come under the jurisdiction of time only by his own choice. So it is that, in one of the Geistlicher Lieder, Auff seinen Geburts-Tag, we find the poet
contrasting the transience of man, as a creature of time, with his potential transcendence of time, as a child of God whose life is entirely orientated towards Him:

Was sag ich / wir vergehn
In dem die Zeit verfällt;
Doch werden ewig stehn
Die über Zeit und Welt
Hertz Seel und Sinn erheben /

Und in der Zeit dir leben... (op.cit., Ga. Bd III, p. 116, vv. 9-14.)

The importance for Gryphius of man's attitude towards life can hardly be overemphasised. Nor can too much stress be laid on the poet's basic orientation towards eternity, an orientation that leads, not to an impoverishment of life, but rather, as we have attempted to show, to an enrichment of its significance. These two considerations (man's attitude and the orientation of time towards eternity) are brought into focus for us by the closing lines of the sonnet Einsamkeit:

Der Mauren alter grauss / diss ungebawt'te Land

Ist schön und fruchtbar wir / der eigentlich erkannt /


Following a picture of lonely desolation, sown with emblems of man's transience and futility, there is, with the above lines, a sudden shift of perspective that imposes meaning and fruitfulness, where before there was none. Is not what happens emblematically in this sonnet, somehow expressive of Gryphius' whole assessment of man's position with regard to life (his time)? In itself, human life is desolate, senseless, futile and fleeting, and only for those individuals who recognise, in God's changeless eternity, their source of stability and duration, can it become fruitful and meaningful.
As we have noted previously, it is fundamentally through the personal appropriation of Christ's conquest of time, of His re-establishment of the link between time and eternity, that man is able to rise above the futility and transience of his own existence. In this transcendence of time, Gryphius attaches special value to one particular quality, that of "Beständigkeit". Indeed, we might say that this quality represents for the poet an ideal to be aspired to. In our discussion of the transience of human values, we have pointed out that, in his view, only those values that have their source and origin in God or in man's relationship to Him, have any validity in the face of the destruction caused by time. In Beständigkeit we have just such a value: on the one hand, it is seen to be a quality of God (cf. Einsamkeit. Ga. Bd. I, p. 68) in His changeless eternity; on the other hand, it is extolled as an ideal quality of man, manifested, above all, in his relationship to God - in his steadfast adherence to his belief in eternity, despite the temptations, upheavals and vicissitudes of the temporal realm. So writes Gryphius in the sonnet, Über seines jüngsten Sohnes Danielis Geburt, referring back to the prophet who was his child's namesake:

Komm sey mein Daniel / komm / weil die Zeit einbricht /
Die Jammer uns gedraut: komm / gilt kein Rathen nicht /
So ist Beständigkeit vor weise Kunst zu schützen.
Lass jenem Stand und Amt und Gold den schönen Kott /

Beständigkeit, then, in the poet's view, is the most valid response of the eternity-conscious individual to the disorder, danger and uncertainty of the world-system, the transience and instability of the whole material universe. It is the outstanding quality embodied in his heroes Charles Stuart, Catharina and Papinianus, all of whom
prefer to die rather than compromise. In the Vorrede to Catharina von Georgien, Gryphius leaves little doubt as to what his heroine represents:

...Catharina tritt nunmehr auff den Schauplatz unsers Vaterlandes / und stellet dir dar in ihrem Leib und Leiden ein vor dieser Zeit kaum erhöretes Beyspiel unaussprechlicher Beständigkeit... diss einige beklage ich; dass meine Feder zu schwach / so hohe Geduld / so hertzhafte Standhafftigkeit / so fertigen Schluss das Ewige dem Vergänglichen vorzuziehen / nach Würden herauszustreichen. (Ga. Bd. VI, p. 133.)

Papinianus is no Christian, but he is as ready to sacrifice everything, for the ideals he holds, as Catharina is, to die for her faith. In the lines written An den Erlauchten Unglückseligen / als er ihm den Papinian übersendete, Gryphius describes his hero as follows:

Der standhafft reine Gast / der für das Recht der Welt
Ehr / Amt / und Ruhm und Gold / Hof / Kind und Leib auffsetzet /
Lebt / ob des Kaysers Beil schon Fleisch und Hals verletzet.
Und pocht was Erd und Zeit in engen Grünstzen hält. (Ga. Bd. I, p. 119, v.1-4.)

Once again, it is essentially a question of "das Ewige dem Vergänglichen vorzuziehen" (Catharina. Ga. Bd. VI, p. 133), of an inflexible adherence to what is sensed to be real and true, whatever be the cost - loss of position, possessions, life itself. The same quality of inflexible adherence to the eternal is reflected in the early sonnet, An den gecruetzigten Jesum:

Hier wil ich gantw nicht weg! lass alle schwerder klingen.

Greif spies, und seebell an! brauch aller waffen macht
Und fläm' und was die welt för unerträglich acht.
and again, in the sonnet, *Auff den Sontag dess gegenwertigen Messias*. In the former sonnet, the writer declares, almost as a challenge to the world outside, that nothing — be it physical or spiritual — shall ever make him move away from the crucified Christ. In the latter sonnet, he extols such an unwavering position in man's relationship to Christ:

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O seelig / den von hier kein Aergerniss abdringt /
Den keiner Wollust Wind gleich leichtem Schilfe zwingt /
Den kein Tyrannen Trutz / kein Schwert in Feindes Händen /
Kein Kärcker! keine Schmach! kein welches Purpurläuf/
Auch keiner Höfe Pracht / kein Gut / noch grimes Leid /
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Finally, in order to sum up the points that we have made in this section, we shall use Gryphius' own words in the epigram, *Beständigkeit*:

```
Beständigkeit wird stehn / wil gleich der freund betrigen...
Drew' ihr mitt raad und spies / las flutt und flammen krachen /
Erläng ihr lebensziel / heis sie in angst vergehn /
```

Here, if anywhere, we have a representation of the true conquest of time through unwavering steadfastness of belief and purpose. Despite very real and pressing danger, despite the allurements of the world, despite earth-shaking catastrophes, the dawning of the Day of Judgment itself, Gryphius asserts, "Beständigkeit" will prevail. It is in this way, that even in death, Catharina, Papinian and Charles Stuart remain true, both to themselves and to their beliefs, flouting by their constancy, the inconstancy and instability of the temporal realm, eloquently demonstrating which way their choice between time and eternity has fallen. No matter
which aspect of life is stressed, Beständigkeit, in Gryphius’ view, represents the ideal attitude towards it. Life is suffering: Beständigkeit is endurance; life is a stormy sea-voyage: Beständigkeit is that inner calm, based on belief in one’s ultimate destination; life is error and uncertainty: Beständigkeit is certainty, derived from faith in God; life is a play, a game, a dream: Beständigkeit is adherence to the reality of God’s eternity.

We have discussed Gryphius’ awareness of time and eternity and how this dual awareness is reflected in his appraisal of man and his environment – the universe created by God, as well as the world-system organised by man – in his appraisal of man himself and his values and, finally, of life and the use and conquest of time. As a conclusion to this section of the thesis, we now intend to examine the poet’s concept of death, for it is in his treatment of this particular theme, that the various threads of our topic may be seen to converge. Given the body of scholarship devoted to this theme, we can afford to be brief.

In the same way as all men – indeed all things in the created universe – are subject to time, they are also subject to death: “Nichts ist ohne seinen tode” (An H. Guilhelm Schlegel / in Castain und Möhringen. Ga. Bd. I, p. 74). Death is as universal and inevitable as the effects of time, with which it frequently becomes synonymous. As the inescapable conclusion towards which man’s fleeting years carry him, what is death other than a manifestation of the finite nature of time and of everything temporal? What is it but irrefutable proof of the nothingness of earthly things? As we read in the opening lines of the ode, Verlangen nach den ewigen Himmeln:

Der schnellen tage raum

Der leichten jahre raum


But just as Gryphius’ appraisal of time and its effects is coloured by his belief in eternity, so also is his attitude towards death. Time is finite, but
it may lead to the infinity of eternity; and death, as the final curtailment of personal time, may be held to be the gateway to this eternity. So it is that we find, in Tryphius’ works, the expression of two distinct aspects of death, of two distinct attitudes towards it, which, at first sight, might appear to be completely irreconcilable. On the one hand, death is the grim reaper, the ultimate manifestation of the irresistible and destructive power of time. On the other hand, it is the welcome liberator, representing the final release from time and all its ills. We shall now look at these two aspects of death, as they serve to sum up the various points raised in this section of the thesis.

The universality of death - an instance of the universal effects of time in the temporal realm - is expressed, first of all, in the type of statement that we find in the ode, Verleugnung der Welt: "Der Tod reisst alles hin... (Ga. Bd. II, p. 40, v. 2), where it is a question of an external destructive force. It is further expressed in references that accentuate the inextricable relationship between our temporal existence and death, that is, that show death, like transience, to be inherent in life, from its very inception:

Wir sind von Mutter-Leib zum untergang erkohren....


Death, the grim reaper, the supreme demonstration of the power of time to destroy, is depicted in all its brutality and suddenness, in the lines written by Tryphius on the death of his young step-mother (Ga. Bd. I, p. 22 ff.) and again, in the sonnet, An Eugenien (Ga. Bd. I, p. 34).

Probably the most vivid portrayal of the power of time to change and destroy, manifested in the effects of death, is found in those works in which the poet focuses his attention on the physical processes of decay that take place in the grave, where, as we have pointed out, the fate of the temporal body becomes a grim reminder to man, to direct his thoughts away from the things of time, towards etern...
The grave, for Gryphius, is also the focal-point for his ideas on the effects of time on human values — and not merely those values like physical beauty that are attributes of the transient human body, but every temporal quality or achievement to which man may aspire: position, wealth, wisdom, artistic merit, fame. For death, like time, deprives man of all these. He brings nothing into the world at birth, and can take nothing from it, in death. Death, like time, is a great equaliser, reducing all men, whatever their qualities or achievements, to the same dust. Such is the message of the sonnet, Der Todt (Ga. Bd. I, p. 90) which gives a comprehensive resume of death as Gryphius sees it affecting man and his values. At the same time, the sonnet reveals clearly the second aspect of death as the gateway to eternity: and not only this; it also raises another point which we have discussed with regard to time, namely, the question of the relevance of human activities and values. Death, the final manifestation of the power of time to destroy, is the acid test to which man’s life-time activities are subjected. Only those values and qualities that outlast death and time have any positive bearing on man’s destiny at the Last Judgment. Ultimately, it will be man’s choice between time and eternity that will determine which face of death he sees — that of the grim reaper, or that of the welcome and "oft gewünschter Todt". (Terra vale! Dominum vitae stat adire Tonanten, Ga. Bd. II, p. 49, v. 3.)

The positive appraisal of death, the end of man’s time, may be ascribed, like the positive evaluation of life itself, above all to the life and death of Christ, through whose death and resurrection death has lost all its terrors and become, not simply an end, but the beginning of eternal life. As such, it is hailed by Gryphius
as a liberation from the whole scheme of time, from the transience of the created universe, from the futility, instability and perilous insecurity of the world-system, from all the symptoms associated with life: suffering, bewilderment, illusion. It is the point at which the limitations imposed on man's eternal spirit by time and by the body itself, are swept aside. It is the arrival in port, after a long and weary voyage; it is the moment of attainment, after a life-time of striving, the exit from the dark and dreary valley of tears into "das reiche Schloss der Ewigkeit" (Terra vale!... Ga. Bd. II, p. 51, v. 64).

In this context, the ideal posed by Gryphius is his notion of "Martyrertod". The martyr shows, by his ready acceptance of suffering, that in the face of the eternal reality of God, the things of time - earthly values, earthly joys, even his own body - are worthless to him. His death, physically degrading and humiliating as it may be, is nothing short of a triumph, a transfiguration. The sonnet, _An einen unschuldig Leidenden_ (Ga. Bd. I, p. 52) can be interpreted in this way; and we find the same concept of martyrdom in Catharina von Seckendorf. Whoever like Catharina is "beständig" in the face of torture and temptation, "lebt in dem er stirbt... steigt in dem er fällt" (_An einen unschuldig Leidenden_). By his readiness to die rather than compromise, he triumphs over time and death. He may, at the moment of death, appear to lose everything he has, no less than the man who has committed himself totally to the pursuit of temporal values. But for the poet, the very manner of the martyr's death, in the imitation of Christ, is the positive affirmation of his having gained everything.

Thus, we are confronted once again with the central issue of Gryphius' preoccupation with time and eternity: the question of man's identification of himself with the one or the other. We have seen how Gryphius' choice of themes, his manner of
treat them reflect his basic orientation of time towards eternity. We have also
seen how the vast mass of his writings reflects his deep sense of responsibility
as a poet, to influence man in his choice, to direct his affections away from the
fluctuating, unstable realm of time and to fix them on an unshakeable "jenseits".
CHAPTER VII
The Awareness of Time and Eternity as Reflected in Structure and Imagery.

Gryphius' basic duality of vision is reflected not only in the theme and content of his work, but also in his choice of structure and imagery. The analysis of a typical verse-form – the sonnet – will bear this out. In the sonnet, structure and imagery are usually so intimately related to theme and content, that it would be impossible to discuss one without touching on the other. Under the heading of structure, then, we shall be discussing not merely the "skeletal framework" of the poems under review, but also the way in which ideas are developed and interrelated with imagery within that skeletal framework.

Gryphius, in common with many other writers of his day, shows a marked predilection for the sonnet. Longer than the epigram, while necessarily retaining much of the latter's succinctness of utterance – without its terseness, it provides an ideal vehicle both for the systematic and progressive development of an idea and for the presentation of dialectical argument. The basic sonnet structure – as well as the possibility of variation within the framework of that structure – lends itself admirably to the expression of a dualistic point of view, allowing for an infinite variety of juxtapositions and contrasts. Octave and sestet can put forward opposite viewpoints; quatrains can be opposed to quatrains and tercets to tercets; octaves and first tercets can contrast with second tercets; and within the individual lines, hemistichs can be opposed to hemistichs. This is to mention only a few of the more obvious possibilities.

However, as the sonnet is a relatively short verse-form, vis a vis the ode or the elegy, it is not uncommon to find only one side of a poet's dual awareness expressed in a particular poem. In the case of Gryphius, it would be highly unreal-
istic to overlook such sonnets as being unrepresentative of his true outlook, since representative they are, but not of the whole truth. As examples of this type of sonnet, we have chosen for discussion two poems which may well be said to complement each other: Menschliches Elend - awareness of time, in terms of human misery and transience, and An Gott den Heiligen Geist - awareness of eternity in terms of the sublimity and timelessness of God. Both these sonnets are to be found in the first collection of sonnets published (Lissa 1637), and reappear with certain alterations and modifications in later editions of the poet's works.

Menschliches Elend

Was sind wir menschen doch? ein wohnhaus grimmer schmerzen
Ein baall des falschen glucks / ein irrich der dieser zeit.

Ein schwaplatz herber angst / und wiederwärkeit / (C.D.E.: besetzt mit scharfem Leid)
Ein bald verschmelzter schnee und abgebrante kertzen,
Die Leben fleucht davon wie ein geschwätz und schertzen.
Die vor uns abgelagt des schwachen Leibes kleidt

Und in das todten Buch der grossen sterblichkeit
Längst eingeschrieben sind / sind uns aus sinn und hertzen.
Gleich wie ein eitell trom leicht aus der acht hinfällt
Und wie ein strom verscheust / den keine macht auffhält /
So mus auch unser nahm / lob ehr und ruhm verschwinden.

Was itzund athem holt / fält unversehns dahin (C.D.E.: wird mit der luft entfliehn)
Was nach uns kommen wird / wird uns ins grab nachzihn.

Was sind wir menschen doch? - The rhetorical question of the first hemistich is
answered in the remaining lines of the first quatrain: "ein wohnhaus grimmer schmerzen, Ein baall des falschen glücks / ein irrlicht dieserzeit. Ein schwamplatz herber angst...". The emphasis, as borne out by lines one and three, is on human suffering and fear. But that such misery is not ascribable to purely bodily causes is made clear by lines two and four. Man suffers from the precariousness and uncertainty of his situation - as "ein baall des falschen glücks". A will o'the wisp - "ein irrlicht dieser zeit", he suffers from the futility of his existence and his own proneness to error; but, above all, he is a prey to the effects of time, to transience - as "Ein bald verschmeltzter schein und abgebrante kertz-n". From lines one to four there is a distinct crescendo and accelerando, the hemistich by hemistich depiction of man's state in the first three lines culminating in the uninterrupted flow of line four.

From the outset of the second quatrain the process of crescendo and accelerando continues. The first line, an appraisal of human life in its futility and brevity - "Das Leben fleucht davon wie ein geschwätz und schertzen" - is an even more sweeping expression of transience than the previous one (v. 4). Melting snow and a burnt-out candle necessarily leave some residue, "geschwätz und schertzen" none whatsoever apart, perhaps, from a faint memory in somebody's mind; although the very choice of simili suggests an absence in life of any contents worth remembering. Having suggested this lack of worthwhile content, the poet is then swift to cancel out any possibility of memory as an immortalizing or preservative force. Hence the remaining lines of the second quatrain:

Die vor uns abgelegt des schwachen Leibes Kleidt
Und in das todtten Buch der grossen sterblikeit
Iängst eingeschrieben sind / sind uns aus sinn und hertzen.

The first tercet carries on and amplifies the same trend of thought, but from the
past, from the long since forgotten generations, Gryphius turns to the present generations, whose expectations of posthumous remembrance are equally unfounded. The rapidity and inevitability of the disappearance of those very qualities that are believed to outlast death and time being reflected in the double simile:

\[
\text{Gleich wie ein eitell traum leicht aus der acht hinfällt}
\]

\[
\text{Und wie ein strom verscheust / den keine macht aufhält}
\]

\[
\text{So mus auch unser nahm / lob ehr und ruhm verschwinden.}
\]

In "eitell traum" the futility - insubstantiality note, sounded in "irrlicht", "geschwätz und schertzen" is again touched. As in the transition from "bald verschmelzter schnee und abgebrante krtzen" to "geschwätz und schertzen", there is, in the transition from the latter ("geschwätz und schertzen") to "eitell traum", an increase in insubstantiality, i.e. "geschwätz und schertzen" can be registered and remembered however briefly, by a number of persons. An empty dream affects the dreamer alone. At the same time, in the rushing of the inexorable river, there is an intensification of the rapid process of transience, reflected previously in melting snow and burning candle. With this dismissal of those very qualities in which the Renaissance Humanists saw a guarantee of immortality, as being inevitably subject to time, the pinnacle of the sonnet has been reached. Human misery has been epitomised in terms of human transience. What is there for the poet to add?

The first line of the second tercet sums up the content of the first tercet, but in terms broad enough to include all biological life:

\[
\text{was itsund athem holt / wird mit der luftt entflühn. (version C.D.E.)}
\]

Whatever breathes in, must ultimately breathe out its life and disappear, like the very breath of its exhalation. This statement, reminiscent of Job, has all the impact and succinctness of a proverb, the intriguing circularity and ambiguity of an epigram. Structurally and thematically it is important, providing the link between
second quatrains and first and second tercets - i.e. the link between past ("die vor uns abgelegt des schwachen leibes kleidt"), present ("Was itzund athem holt") and future ("Was nach uns kommen wird"). The most profound of human miseries, transience and subservience to time, culminating in death and oblivion, is thus shown to be common to the past, present and future generations. It is merely a matter of sequence, since, "Was nach uns kommen wird / wird uns ins grab nachziehn". Ultimately all share the same lot. The first two lines of the second tercet, then, as well as summing up the content of the entire sonnet, preclude any possibility of its grim message not being universally applicable. The third line of the second tercet, like the opening line of the sonnet, begins with the rhetorical question: "Was sag ich?". Rather than throwing into doubt or cancelling what has been said in answer to the initial question, this second question is directed at the terms in which the answer has been couched - as though, even now, the poet were seeking a more adequate expression of man's transience. The image, with which the reader is left, adds little to what has been stated before - "wir vergehn wie Rauch von starken winden" (version C.D.E.). It is the final summing up, the final presentation of man's passivity, insubstantiality and helplessness in the face of the relentless, dissipating and dissipating force that is time.

This particular sonnet adheres to the conventional sonnet structure of octave and sestet, with appropriate rhyme-scheme and clear divisions between the individual quatrains and tercets. Within these units there is, however, a marked freedom and variety of pattern corresponding to the emotive and thematic development of the poem. In the first three lines of the first quatrains, line endings and caesurae are sharply defined by punctuation marks. The first line, with its opening question and the implied pause before the answer, has the most definite caesura and the slowestmove-
ment. From then on, as has been previously pointed out, there is a distinct accelerando, the hemistich by hemistich enumeration of the various elements of man's misery culminating in the unbroken flow of line four with its double-barrelled metaphor of transience. This accelerando is maintained throughout the second quatrain and the first tercet, where the use of longer periods reflects the increased momentum of the onward rush of time.

Line one of the second quatrain restates man's situation, again in terms of a double simile: "Dis Leben fleucht davon wie ein geschwätz und schertzen". Lines two, three and four, then, form the one long sentence, whose first and only break coincides with the caesura in line four. The entire first tercet is taken up with another double comparison contained in the one long sentence. This is the most explicit and detailed imagery employed so far:

Gleich wie ein eitell traum leicht aus der acht hinflit
Und wie ein strom verscheust,,/den keine macht aufhält /

So mus auch...

Added emphasis results from the fact that, in the whole sonnet, this is the only case in which the sequence of comparison is inverted. In every other example the abstract state or the human situation precedes the concrete point of comparison. Here the contrary is true. Moreover, whereas elsewhere there was merely the one human point of reference (and that the general "Sir" or "Dis Leben"), there is now an enumeration of specific, so-called "intransient" qualities in a final crescendo of transience:

So mus auch unser nahm / lob ehr und ruhm verschwinden.

The real break in the continuity of the sonnet would seem to come here, where, as has been pointed out, the pinnacle has been reached - structurally and thematically.

The second tercet, as we have tried to show, is an integral part of the sonnet,
generalising as it does upon what has been stated before. However, the reader is immediately aware of a complete change in tempo, a sudden slackening of pace. From the long, flowing sentences of the second quatrain and the first tercet, there is a change to short, epigrammatically significant sentences with well-marked caesurae (lines one and two, second tercet). In both lines one and two there is a wave-like structure, rising to a crest at the caesura (iambic or rising metre) and falling away at the end of the line (trochaic or falling metre). In either case the caesura comes between two verbs:

Was itzund athem holt / fällt unversehns dahin (C. D. E.: wird mit der luft entfliehn)

Was nach uns kommen wird / wird uns ins grab nachzihn.

The pattern of rise and fall is arrested by the terse opening question of the last line: "Was sag ich?", bringing a natural pause before the answer: "wir vergehn wie Rauch von starken winden", which, with its falling rhythm and its comparative length (in regard to the homistichs of the two preceding lines) suggests the final breaking of the wave:

Was sag ich? wir vergehn wie Rauch von starken winden.

coinciding with the final image of dissipation and disintegration - a unique image, as far as this sonnet is concerned, since it is the only case in which human transience is not expressed through a multiple metaphor or simile.

In Menschliches Elend the awareness of passing time is equivalent to the awareness of the manifestation of its effects on man and his environment. Passing time is the source of instability and futility, the perpetrator of inexorable change. Phenomena that most graphically embody and reflect these qualities are used here in a completely negative view of temporality and transience. The impact of the poem comes not from any contrasting of the shifting with the static, the provisional with the permanent, but from an ever mounting sense of impermanence and insubstantiality,
borne out in the choice of images that become progressively less substantial and permanent.

The pendant to Menschliches Eblend is provided by An Gott den Heiligen Geist, included as sonnet number I in the Lissa collection, as well as in all later editions. The poem may be summed up as a prayer for sustenance and enlightenment (enlightenment, no doubt, in the task ahead - i.e. the writing of the sonnets.) It consists almost entirely of apostrophising evocation of the nature of God:

An Gott den Heiligen Geist

4. O ewer wahrer lieb! O brun der guten gaben!
2. O Meister aller kunst! O Hohesten Heiligkeit!
1. O allmähl grosser Gott! O Lust die alles leid

Betreibt! O keusche taub! O furcht der Hellen haben!

Die / ehr das wüste meer / mit bergen rings umbcroben / (E.: eh das)

Ehr luft und erden ward / ehr das gestirnste Kleid (E.: gestirnste)

Dem himmell angelegt / ja schon vor ewikeit (C.: vor ewigkeit und zeitt)

Die zwov die gantz dir gleich / von sich gelassen haben.

O weisheit ohne maass; O reiner seelen gast /

O tewre gnaden quell! / O trost in herber last!

O regen der in angst mitt segen uns befeuchtet!

Ach lass ein tröppflin nur von deinem lebens-taw

Erfrischen meinen Geist. Hilff das ich doch nur schaw!

Ein füncklin deiner glutt; so bin ich recht erleuchtet. (Ga. Bd. I, p. 29.)

From the very outset, the reader is aware of an entirely different viewpoint from that taken in Menschliches Eblend. The poet's attention is centred on a realm beyond.
the jurisdiction of time and change - a realm of absolutes, in which the purely negative has no part. In the opening line he apostrophises the Holy Spirit:

0 Fewer wahrer lieb! 0 brun der guten gaben!

In either case it is the epithet that points to the absolute - God, the embodiment of Truth, of true or genuine love as opposed to false or deceptive love, God the embodiment of absolute goodness - a source not just of gifts, but of good gifts. Something of the mystery of the infinite nature of God is implicit in the juxtaposition of the antithetical concepts of "0 Fewer" and "0 brun" - an association that is taken up again in the second tercet. But fire and water, as manifestations or parables of the activities of the Holy Spirit, are familiar Biblical concepts. In lines two and three the apostrophe continues in the same vein:

0 Meister aller kunst! 0 Höchste Heiligkeit!
0 dreymal grosser Gott! ...

There is no question here of hyperbole per se, but of an effort to grasp the essence of the inexpressible within the finite boundaries of language, whether by means of the absolute: "Meister aller kunst" or the superlative "Höchste Heiligkeit" or by the elliptical "0 dreymal grosser Gott" of line three, where "dreymal" is not merely an amplification of "gross", but an allusion to the Trinity.

In the second hemistich of line three and in line four, effective use is again made of antithesis: but here the contrast is not between two aspects of the nature of God, but between God and what is not God:

0 Lust die alles leid

Betreibt! O keusche teub! O Turocht der Hellen raben.

Thus "Lust" is opposed to "leid", but more than this, God is addressed as the personification of that joy that necessarily excludes all sorrow and suffering. Similarly
the obvious antithesis between "keusche taub" and "Hellen raben" has undertones of wider significance than at first apparent. The dove is the Biblical symbol of the Holy Spirit, the raven popularly linked with evil and death. The white dove is traditionally an emblem of peace, the black raven a harbinger of ill-omen. Paradoxically, it is the white dove that is shown to instill fear into the heart of the raven. What is expressed in abstracts in "O Lust die alles leid Betreibt", is echoed in pictorial language in line four: "O keusche taub! O furcht der Hellen raben!" Line four is then understandable in its widest implications, only in the context of line three and, of course, of I John, as the eternal antithesis between God, who is light, and the powers of darkness that take flight when the light comes.

Whereas the first quatrain has been an attempt to evoke the manifold aspects of the Godhead, the second quatrain is concerned entirely with God's eternity. The pre-existence of the Holy Spirit before Creation, before time itself, is emphasised in the one long construction - a time comparison, based on the repeated use of the preposition, "ehr" and the final variant, "vor":

Die ehr das wuste meer / mit bergen rings umbgraben /
Ehr laft und erden ward / ehr das gestirnte Kleid
Dem himmel angelegt / ja schon vor ewikeit
Die zwey die gantz dir gleich / von sich gelassen haben.

Superficially there is little in common between the technique of aspect-by-aspect evocation, employed in the first quatrain, and this step-by-step attainment of the one absolute concept (God's eternity), through a progression from the particular to the more general to the abstract, from the smaller to the greater. Essentially what takes place is this: there is a retracing of time, necessarily measurable and perceptible only by the succession of events occurring in it, to its very origin.
and source in eternity.

In the first quatrain, on the other hand, there is, as it were, a prismatic technique. Just as the various rays of coloured light emanating from a prism all radiate from, and point back to, the one source and are all components of white light, so the various absolute attributes evoked - truth, love, goodness - all emanate from God and point back to God; and all are part of the nature of God.

The first tercet shows a return to the hemistich by hemistich apostrophe of the Holy spirit found in the first quatrain, but with a gradual but definite shift of perspective from the evocation of God, in the absolute, to the evocation of God in his relationship to man.

O weisheit ohne maass; O reiner Seelen Gast /
O tewre gnaden quell! / O trost in herber last!
O regen der in angst mitt segen uns befeuchtet!

The transition is immediately apparent, in the juxtaposition of God's immeasurable wisdom - "O weisheit ohne maass" - and His indwelling of the pure in spirit - "O reiner Seelen gast/". The allusion to absolute wisdom is followed by the inference that some of that wisdom is available to the pure in spirit, whom the Holy Spirit Himself inhabits and enlightens (cf. James 3. 17). In "O tewre gnaden quell!/ O trost in herber last!" those attributes of God that have particular bearing on man and his situation are stressed: His unlimited mercy and compassion, qualities that find more concrete expression in the following line: "O regen der in angst mitt segen uns befeuchtet!" The abstract concepts of "gnaden", "trost", "segen" are given tangible reality in the sustained metaphor of falling rain - a natural phenomenon familiar to all. At the same time there is a transfer from the ideal category
of "reiner Seelen" to the more general human category of "uns". (This whole image has its basis in the language of the Bible, where rain can be an expression of God's mercy towards all men - (He) "sendeth rain on the just and on the unjust" (Matth. 5. 45) - or a token of blessing and renewal.)

The real division in the continuity of this sonnet does not occur between octave and sestet, although thematically a new element is introduced there, but between the two tercets. With the second tercet, there is a sudden change from liturgical invocation of the deity to personal prayer, a change from a communal realisation of God's infinite mercy and wisdom to a personal appropriation of what He offers:

Ach lass ein tröpfflin nur von deinem lebens=taw
Erfrischen meinen Geist. Hilff das ich doch nur schaw'
Ein füncklin deiner glutt; so bin ich recht erleuchtet.

The images of fire and water on which the sonnet opens are taken up again here, but on a microscopic scale and in reverse order. In place of the unlimited and infinite there is the infinitely small "ein tröpfflin nur von deinem lebens=taw Ein füncklin deiner glutt". This transition from "Fewer" to "füncklin", "brun" to "tröpfflin" reflects the movement of the whole poem from the infinite to the infinitesimal. From God, the Eternal and Absolute, in terms of His own immeasurable greatness, there is a transition to God in terms of His relationship to the individual. But in this final expression the Eternal and Infinite has by no means been reduced to human stature: rather the contrary is true. A mere "tröpfflin deiner lebens=taw" is seen to give ample refreshment, "ein füncklin deiner glutt" complete enlightenment - "so bin ich recht erleuchtet". The insistence on this fact emphasises the infinite greatness of God no less than does the hyperbolical apostrophe of the first quatrains.

Structurally, as well as thematically, this sonnet is a trinity, definite div-
isions occurring between lines eight and nine and lines eleven and twelve. In the octave, the first quatrain consists of a series of short exclamatory phrases each of which expresses one particular attribute of the deity. In every case the caesura corresponds to an exclamation mark, as do the line endings - with the exception of line three where a variation is brought about by enjambement:

O Lust die alles leid
Betrieht!

The second quatrain which deals exclusively with God's eternity, is grammatically linked to line four of the first quatrain by the relative pronoun "die". It consists of the one long relative clause.

The first tercet which deals with God in His relationship to mankind is the second unit in the poem. In pattern, it reverts to short exclamatory phrases of apostrophe, similar to those employed in the first quatrain. In lines one and two the caesura is observed, while the contrast brought about by the uninterrupted flow of line three aids weight to its content and helps to mark the end of the section.

The final section of the sonnet - the second tercet (God in His relationship to the individual) - stands out from the rest of the poem because of its comparative "naturalness" of phraseology and language. After the stylised, almost liturgical address to the Holy Spirit in the preceding lines, here is a sudden change to the spontaneity of personal prayer:

Ach lass ein tröpfflin nur von deinem lebens-tau
Erfrischen meinen Geist. Hilff das ich doch nur schaw'
Ein flünklin deiner glutt; so bin ich recht erleuchtet.

From the high-flown, poetic solemnity of "O", there is a turning to the every-day simplicity of "Ach" and "doch". There is also a use of longer periods, replacing the preceding sequence of highly concentrated and weighty utterances. What we find
in the second tercet is normal speech (or perhaps rather entreaty) at normal concentration and intensity.

That this sonnet falls into three distinct sections and not two or four is almost certainly not ascribable to mere chance but rather to intent, the trinity of the Godhead finding a correspondence in the triple structure of the poem. At the same time the reader is aware of a striking circularity in the thematic development and structure of the sonnet. As noted above, it begins and ends with the juxtaposition of images based on fire and water, the order being fire-water in the opening line and water-fire in the closing tercet. This reverse order at the conclusion means that not only does the poem begin and end with the same concept, but also that line one may be read as the logical sequel to line fourteen:

...so bin ich recht erleuchtet.

O ewer wahrer lieb!...

Nor can this phenomenon be a mere coincidence, given the significance of the ring or "Kranz" in the "Emblemak" of the time as a token of eternity, and given the subject matter of this sonnet. There seems little reason to doubt that Gryphius, in his evocation of the eternal, intentionally made use of the ring-form to give added emphasis to his content - added emphasis in the sense that the very shape of his sonnet is an emblematic representation of what the content seeks to express. Many rigid and arbitrary examples of actual manipulation of structure in order to reflect content may be found in the literature of the seventeenth century such as the Sanduhrgedicht, the Schelengedicht or the Kreuzgedicht. In these extreme cases the very arrangement of the lines produces a graphic representation of the particular emblem used, often to the detriment of content. In Gryphius' sonnet, however, content and form are one to such an extent that any structural peculiarity is intimately linked
with theme and content - i.e. is subservient to theme and content. There is no sense of virtuosity for its own sake. This becomes increasingly apparent if two such disparate works as *Menschliches Elend* and *An Gott den Heiligen Geist* are compared. In the former work, the final impression to which the structure and imagery of the whole sonnet have contributed step by step, is one of complete transience, dissipation and disintegration - aptly epitomised in the closing image of smoke driven in the wind. In the second poem the end-result, again contributed to substantially by imagery and structure, is the exact opposite: an indication of a central, eternal and absolute reality - essentially unchanging - like a circle - from whatever angle or in whatever perspective it is viewed.

Each of the above sonnets is representative of one side of Gryphius’ dual awareness. However, it is more characteristic of the poet to find expression for both sides of his awareness within the one poem. As has been previously pointed out, the basic sonnet structure allows ample scope for this. In the very well-known Gryphius sonnet *Es ist alles eitell*, for instance, the fourteenth line, with its reference to eternity is sharply opposed to the preceding thirteen lines, while in *Domine, qui est homo quod memor es ejus*, the contrast is between line eight and the preceding lines and between the first and second tercets. *Wobei die Gebeine der ausgegrabenen Philosophierinnen* brings an antithetical juxtaposition of octave (transience of the body) and sestet (eternity of the soul). Finally in sonnet XI, also addressed to the Holy Spirit, there is a sustained use of internal antithesis (i.e. between the two hemistichs of the individual lines.) It is now my intention to deal with each of the above-mentioned sonnets in turn, as examples of the various ways in which Gryph’s duality of vision expresses itself in imagery and structure.
Es ist alles eitell

Du sihst / wohin du sihst nur eitelkeit auff erden.
Was dieser heute bawt / reist jener morgen ein:
Wo itzund städte stehn / wird eine wiesen sein
Auf der ein schäffers kind wird spielen mitt den heerden.
Was itzund prächtig blüht sol bald zutreten werden.
Was itzt so pöcht und trotzt ist morgen auch und kein.
Nichts ist das ewig sey / kein ertz kein marmorstein.
Itzt lacht das glück uns an / bald donnern die beschwerden, (C.D.B.; das glück)
Der hohen存储 ruhm mus wie ein träum vergehn.
Soll den das spille der seitt / der leichte Mensch bestehn.
Ach! was ist alles dis was wir für köstlich achten /
Als schlechte nichtikeitt / als schutten staub und windt.
Als ein wiesen blum / die man nicht wiederfindt.

Noch wil was ewig ist kein einig mensch betrachten (Ga. Bd. I, p. 33-34.)

The whole poem is built up within the framework of three sweeping generalisations,
each of which refers back to, and corroborates the theme brought out in the title:
Du sihst / wohin du sihst nur eitelkeit auff erden. (v. 1)
Nichts ist das ewig sey / kein ertz kein marmorstein. (v. 7)
Noch wil was ewig ist kein einig mensch betrachten. (v. 14)

In the first quatrain, the opening statement, reminiscent in its pessimism of the
wisdom of the Preacher, is elaborated and corroborated by lines two, three and four.
The complete futilite and vanity of the world-system as a whole - "Du sihst / wohin
du sihst nur eitelkeit auff erden" - is exemplified in the futility of human activ-
ity and achievement and their lack of durability: "Was dieser heute bawt / reist
jener morgen ein", one man's work being negated by another's. The completeness of this negation is reflected in the use of an antithesis, in which every element of the first hemistich is cancelled out by its counterpart in the second hemistich: "dieser...jener", "bawt...reist ein","heute...morgen". Implicit, moreover, in the confrontation of "heute" and"morgen", is the awareness of passing time. Lines three and four are a pictorial expansion of line two, a further antithesis between present and future: "Wo itzund steht stehe stehn / wird eine wiesen sein", between what man has built up and its inevitable levelling out, with a return to the original state represented here by the pastoral scene.

In the second quatrain, the transience-instability-motif is sustained and enlarged upon; not only the world-system (in the sense of man's sphere of activity), but all manifestations of life are subject to the effects of the passage of time:

Was itzund prächtig blüht sol bald zutreten werden,
Was itzt so pocht und trotzt ist morgen asch und bein.

Once again, effective use is made of antithesis to create the impression of instability. In the space between "itzund" and "bald", "itzt" and "morgen", the resplendently flourishing has been trodden under foot, the defiantly proud has become bone and ashes. In each case there has been an irreversible change of state from the active to the passive, the dynamic to the static. The full implication of such change is clearly stated in line three, linking up, as it does, with the opening line of the sonnet: "Nichts ist das ewig sey / kein ertz kein marmorstein." Nothing in the material realm of this world is immune to the effects of time, not even matter of so seemingly durable a nature; no metal is so hard, no marble so permanent as to have a claim to eternity.

The last line of the second quatrain strikes an apparently new note in the
evocation of transience and mutability, with the inclusion of the "Fortuna"-element: "Itzt lacht das gluck uns an / bald donnern die beschwerden". Again emphasis is laid on passing time, in the antithesis between present ("Itzt") and immediate future ("bald"). Again every term in the first hemistich is counterbalanced by its opposite in the second. The mutability of fortune, intimately connected with passing time, and itself, an expression and measure of passing time, also contributes to the vanity and futility of earthly existence. This line, rather than causing a break in the coherent development of the sonnet, actually reaffirms the previous examples of transience and mutability, in each of which, as is the case here, there has been a complete reversal of circumstances. The imagery used is drawn from that most fickle and inconstant of phenomena - the weather: "Itzt lacht das gluck uns an, (sunshine) bald donnern die beschwerden" (storm). With the inclusion of "uns", there is, moreover, a shift from the general and purely impersonal view of the world-system and its manifestations of life, to a view that shows mankind to be subject to the same inexorable laws. In the second line of the sonnet, man is seen to be an instrument of change; in line eight he is a victim of it - a view that is taken up again in the sestet.

From a consideration of man as he affects, and is affected by, the instability of his material environment, the poet now turns to a consideration of man and his relationship to ideological values:

Der hohen thaten ruhm mus wie ein traum vergehn.

Soll den das spiell der zeitt / der leichte Mensch bestehn.

Where the octave relies for its effectiveness on antithesis, the sestet uses simile and metaphor. Lines one and two of the first tercet together form an elliptical statement of transience and vanity. Line one carries on the universal-transience-
theme of the octave, here extended to include a non-material possibility of immortality - fame, which is shown to be as spurious as the material permanence of metal or marble. Outside the realm of material destruction it may be, but its durability is inevitably that of a dream (cf. Menschliches Elend). If then, the very values so ardently sought after by man, because of their properties of outlasting time, are of such brief duration, what of man? "Soll den das spieill der zeitt / der leichter Mensch bestehn".

Man is not only subject to the whims of fortune, but he is the plaything or game of time - a plaything all too quickly discarded, a game soon abandoned, something hardly worthy of consideration and not to be taken seriously. The epithet, "leicht" ("der leichte Mensch"), sums up these qualities of man - transience, instability, lack of significant content in his life. The following three lines qualify still further the assessment implicit in "leicht"; they are a protestation of the worthlessness of what man, in his "Leichtigkeit", holds dear. The one long rhetorical question dismisses human values as valueless, in a sequence of images of transience and insubstantiality:

Ach! was ist alles di was wir für köstlich achten /
        Als schlechte nichtikeitt / als schaten staub und windt.
        Als eine wiesen blum / die man nicht wiederfindet.

What is expressed in the abstract, "schlechte nichtikeitt", is repeated four times in pictorial language: first in the three terse concepts of shadow, dust and wind and, finally, in the developed metaphor of the flower. Each of these pictorial equivalents seems to have been selected expressly for its insubstantiality and lack of stability. A shadow has no substance or existence in itself; it changes from second to second and is but a colourless and vague copy of reality; it is im-
possible to grasp or hold and likely, at any moment, to disappear completely. Dust, the anonymous substance to which all matter ultimately reverts, is worthless, scattered by every wind and, like sand, a measure of passing time. Wind, like shadow, is the epitome of the empty and unsubstantial, the elusive and the changeable. The swiftness of its passage is like time itself; like time, it is a dissipating and disintegrating force. The image of the "Wiesen blum / die man nicht wiederfindt", the epitome of fragile beauty and transience, harks back to the first line of the second quatrain: "Was jetzt so prächtig blüht sol bald zutreten werden". However, sudden destruction is not mentioned here, in the second tercet, but sudden and complete disappearance - as a result of internal qualities rather than external circumstances. In common with the whole material world-system, man and his ideological values have no more permanence than shadow, dust, wind or the grass of the field; and therefore, in the words of the title: "Es ist alles elend".

The first thirteen lines of the sonnet have, then, built up a picture of transience, instability and vanity reflected in the external world and in man and his aspirations. The fourteenth line introduces a third element into the basic skeleton of the sonnet, and with it, a complete change of perspective:

"Noch wil was ewig ist kein einig-mensch betrachten."

Nothing in the material world (cf. lines seven and nine), nothing in the way of human values is capable of being eternal or granting eternity. But here, for the first time, is the indication that, outside and beyond these spheres, and in antithesis to them, the eternal does exist. No doubt whatsoever is cast on its existence. What is doubtful is man's attitude towards it. The final line of the sonnet is at once an accusation, a condemnation and a warning, introducing as it does the question of choice and responsibility. In the light of this line, the preceding
lines are thrown into sharp relief. "Wherever he looks in the world, man sees nothing but vanity, transience and instability. He himself and what he values are here to-day and gone tomorrow. He is a prey to the whims of fortune, the plaything of time. But this is of his own volition. It is by choice that he remains ensnared in the allurements of the temporal realm, preferring not to dwell on the eternal; and so he is nothing more than what he worships: this fact makes his whole activity doubly futile.

The full impact of the sonnet is achieved with the last line, in the sudden confrontation of time and eternity. Not only does this line present the complete antithesis to "vanity" as depicted in the preceding lines, but it also presents the ultimate manifestation of vanity: refusal to consider the eternal.

To what extent, if at all, is Gryph's dualistic awareness of time and eternity reflected in the actual technical structure of this sonnet - in prosody and syntax? As stated previously, the whole poem hinges on three sweeping statements contained in lines one, seven and fourteen. In view of this fact, is the reader aware of the poet's adhering to the basic sonnet structure, or is this lost sight of completely? Superficially, the sonnet retains the basic pattern of octave and sestet, the division between the two quatrains being clearly marked, both thematically and grammatically. The sestet comprises an opening rhyming couplet followed by a final quatrain.

The initial quatrain of the sonnet consists of two sentences: the opening sentence with its brief but all-inclusive statement of vanity occupies the whole of line one; the second sentence - an exemplification of this vanity - occupies lines two, three and four. In line one the repetition of the verb "Du sihst / wohin du sihst" underscores the implication of "nur" ("nur Eitelkeit") which is then illustrated in the following lines. In both lines two and three there is a well-marked caesura, cor-
responding, in either case, to the division between the two terms of an antithetical statement. As noted previously, the antithetical structure in lines two and three, with its pattern of rise and fall - what is built up in the first hemistich of each line is fully negated in the second - adequately illustrates and corroborates the opening statement of vanity (line one). The end of line two coincides with a punctuation mark, a colon, but while line three follows the basic pattern of line two and could itself form a complete sense-group, it is carried on into line four, the whole of which is an unbroken relative clause dependent on "Wiesen". It has already been pointed out that lines three and four are a pictorial expansion of line two. At the same time, the disproportionate length of the negative term (transience) of the antithesis reflects the predominance of the transience-instability motif in the world-system. It is this motif that again finds concrete expression in the antithetical structure of lines five, six and eight (second quatrains). Here there is a return to the rise and fall pattern of line two. In each case, we find a complete sentence, whose ending coincides with the line-ending and whose grammatical division coincides with the caesura and the thematic division into two antithetical terms. In each case, as remarked before, emphasis falls on the adverbs of time; in each case the first term of the antithesis (representative of the reality at an earlier point of time) is completely negated by the second term (representative of the reality at a later point of time). Line seven, a departure from the antithetical representation of transience, also shows a clear division into two hemistichs. Here, what is stated in the first hemistich is not negated but corroborated by the content of the second, the all-embracing statement of vanity, "nichts ist das ewig sey", being underlined, not cancelled out, by the exemplification - "kein ertz kein marmorstein" - this whole statement following on logically from the initial line of the sonnet.
Where the octave has stated (lines one and seven) and then demonstrated, by effective use of antithesis (rise and fall), the vanity and transience of the world-system, the sestet relies on a different technique, a technique already foreshadowed in line seven (i.e. exemplification). The sestet opens with a rhetorical question, contained in an epigrammatic rhyming couplet, which depends for its effect on the explicit simile in line nine and the implicit parallel between the transience of fame (line nine) and that of man (line ten). At the same time, a modified form of antithesis persists in the sense-contrast of the two rhyme-words, "vergehn" and "bestehn". The closing quatrain consists of the one long sentence. It begins with a further rhetorical question (lines eleven, twelve and thirteen), imbued with exclamationary pathos by the "Ach" which precedes it, the answer being contained in lines twelve and thirteen. In line eleven, the almost anguished intensity of utterance is echoed in the slow, stertorous movement of the verse; the use of predominantly one-syllable words, the repetition of "was" and of the "s" and "st" sounds tending to arrest the flow of the line, as does also the somewhat cumbersome grammatical construction: "was ist alles das was..." In lines twelve and thirteen, the reader is at once aware of a quickening of the tempo, reflected not only in the use of longer words, but also in the rapid enumeration of concrete manifestations of "nichtigekeit" - "schatten", "staub", "wind", "eine wiesen blum" - corresponding to a heightened awareness of the flow of time itself. Here the relative clause, coming at the end of a thought-group, tends to accelerate rather than slacken the tempo. With the fourteenth line - in its unadorned simplicity a foil to the two preceding lines - there is once again a slackening of the pace (brought about, largely, by the insertion of the short noun-clause "was zeit ist". This deceleration is in keeping with the depth of significance of this final sweeping statement of vanity. It is interesting
to note that the noun clause, "was ewig ist", is inserted in precisely the same position in the line as a similar clause in line seven, "das ewig sey", to which it obviously harks back.

The bald statement: "Noch wil was ewig ist kein einig mensch betrachten" has, as noted previously, a double relationship to the rest of the sonnet. On the one hand, it forms a parallel, both structurally and thematically, to lines one and seven. On the other hand, it is in complete antithesis to all except the above-mentioned lines, both in the content it presents and the manner of presentation. In this particular sonnet, Gryphius' dualistic awareness is reflected to such a degree in technical aspects that, far from distracting from the ideological values put forward, structural details emphasise and underline them.

In Domine quid est Homo, quod memor es ejus, the dualistic awareness of time and eternity is expressed in terms of man's transience and irresponsibility and God's eternal forethought (octave), and man's vulnerability and God's protective strength (sestet).

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Domine quid est Homo, quod memor es ejus.

Wir armen! ach wie ists so bald mit uns geschehn!
Wie plötzlich gehn wir fort / oft / eh wir uns besinnen
Ruft uns der schnelle Todt: kommt Menschen / kommt von hinnen
Kan jemand was ihm dren't / was itzt gleich anbricht sehn ?
Wir spielen sorgenfrey / wir schimpffen / lachen / schmehn!
Doch unser End ist dar. Wir werden gantz nicht innen

Wie nahe wir der grufft. Dass Leben muss zerrinnen
Wenn Gott nicht beystand schickt / eh wir umb beystand flehn.
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Ein Stein / ein Stücklin Bley / und ein vergiftend schnauben. (D., E. Stücklein)
Ein fall / ein Wassertropff / kann uns dies leben reuben
Geschwinder den es Pest und frost / und Schwindsucht thut.
Wir sorgen nur umsonst / wenn Gott nicht für uns wacht /
Wenn er nicht Wall und Burg und Lager umb uns macht.

Der ist schon lebendtodt der nicht in seiner Hut. (Ga. Bd. I, p. 79-80.)

The first four lines of the octave are a dramatic presentation of man's predicament: the brevity of life, the suddenness and unexpectedness with which it can be cut short are stressed. The sonnet opens with an exclamation, "Wir armen!", followed by two exclamatory clauses: 

... ach wie ists so bald mit uns geschehn!

Wie plötzlich gehen wir fort/...

In each case, the emphasis falls on the adverb of time: "wie ists so bald", "Wie plötzlich". It is man's transience, his subservience to time, that has prompted the cry: "Wir armen! ach...". The second hemistich of line two repeats the two time-elements of proximity and suddenness in the adverbial clause, "oft / eh wir uns besinnen"; and the same concept is reiterated in the epithet applied to death in line three; "der schnelle Todt":

... oft / eh wir uns besinnen

Ruft uns der schnelle Todt: komm't Menschen / komm't von hinne...

This dramatic introduction of death, personified and given its line to speak, is followed by a rhetorical question (line four), which refers once more to the imminence and unexpectedness of man's demise:

Kan jemand was ihm aern't / was itzt gleich unbricht sehn?

Here, a new element is introduced: man's unpreparedness. Death, the final
cutting short of life, comes so unexpectedly because of man's failure to recognise the danger he is in, because of his inability to scan even the immediate future. This idea is further developed in the second quatrain, where the poet depicts man's lackadaisical unawareness of his own transience, his careless and carefree attitude, manifested in a complete absorption in temporal activities of an unserious nature:

Wir spielen sorgenfrey / wir schimpffen / lachen / schmehn! (line one).

In stark contrast to this state of oblivious uncertainty is the certainty of death, expressed in the bald statement with which line two opens: "Doch unser End ist dar" and reiterated in the second hemistich of the same line and in the first hemistich of line three:

Wir werden gantz nicht innen

Wie nahe wir der grufft.

The second hemistich of line three continues in the same vein: "Diss Leben muss zerrinnen...". But to this further evocation of transience is suddenly opposed the possibility of arresting the flux of time, through the intervention of the Eternal:

Diss Leben muss zerrinnen

Wenn Gott nicht beystand schickt / eh wir umb beystand flehn.

Eternity - God's protective forethought and care - confronts time - man's vulnerable unawareness and carelessness.

In the sestet, the time-eternity antithesis is rather between man's powerlessness and God's power. The first tercet again takes up the transience-vulnerability-theme with an enumeration of the various simple and apparently trivial means of curtailing life:

Ein Stein / ein stcklin Bley / und ein vergiftend schnauben.

Ein fall / ein Wassertropff / kan uns diss leben rauben
The transitory and precarious nature of human life is stressed still further by a comparison, in which the commonplace - "Ein Stein", "Ein Fall", "ein Wassertropf" - and the very small or unsubstantial - "ein Stücklein Bley", "ein vergiftend schnauben" - are shown to be capable of causing death more swiftly than such universally dreaded killers as "pest", "Schwindsucht" or rigorous "frost".

The opening line of the second tercet introduces a new thought: even if man does realize the imminent danger of his position, as opposed to the attitude of complete obliviousness described in the octave, all his worrying is futile; he is powerless to avert disaster: "Wir sorgen nur umsonst". But in the very same line, this impotence is offset by God's omnipotence:

Wir sorgen nur umsonst / wenn Gott nicht für uns wacht /  
As in the final line of the octave, God's help and protection are shown to be the only means of prolonging life. Whereas in the octave this divine intervention was referred to simply as "beystand", the second tercet now elaborates upon it, making sustained use of imagery drawn from the military sphere:

Wir sorgen nur umsonst / wenn Gott nicht für uns wacht /  
Wenn er nicht Wall und Burg und Lager umb uns machet.  
Two concessional clauses, dependent on "Wir sorgen nur umsonst", enumerate facets of God's protective power, in terms reminiscent of the language of the Psalms. God is the infallible watchman (cf. Psalm 127.1), our refuge and strength (Psalm 46.2). His angel encamps "round about them that fear Him" (Psalm 34. 7). The last line, while maintaining the same trend of imagery as the two preceding lines, succinctly restates the theme of the whole sonnet:

Der ist schon lebend-todt der nicht in seiner Hut.
The oxymoron, "lebend=todt" sums up the content of the first seven lines of the octave, as well as that of the first tercet: such is man's transience and vulnerability that death is always imminent to life. At the same time, within the context of the entire last line, "lebend=todt" points to, and confirms a level of significance already hinted at, in lines seven and eight of the octave:

Disse Leben muss zerrinnen

Wenn Gott nicht bestand schickt / eh wir umb beystand flehn.

This second level of significance is not concerned with life (or death) in the literal and physical sense, but with life and death in the Biblical, spiritual sense. ("I am come that they might have life..." John 10.10; "I am the way, the truth, and the life:" John 14.6; "And this is life eternal, that they might know thee the only true God," John 17.3.) God who is life and eternal is man's only guarantee of life, i.e., eternal life. Without Him, temporal man is not only a prey to the inexorable laws of transience and physical death, but, speaking in terms of "eternal life", he is already spiritually dead. In this sonnet, then, Gryphius' dualistic awareness is reflected, not only in the confrontation of man and God, but also in the contrast between biological and spiritual life.

As was the case with Es ist alles eitell, Gryphius' awareness of time and eternity finds expression to such a degree in the technical aspects of this sonnet that, far from distracting or detracting from the ideological values presented, structural details tend to emphasise and confirm them.

The sonnet shows a clear division into octave and sestet, the rhyme-scheme being similar to that of Es ist alles eitell. As regards the time-eternity-content the sestet is virtually a re-statement of the basic idea of the octave. In both
cases, the confrontation of time and eternity hinges on the concessional construction, "wenn...nicht". In the octave, the time-transience-content (lines one to seven) far outweighs the eternity-content (line eight), while in the sestet, the space devoted to the two opposite poles is more nearly equal.

The language used throughout is simple and explicit, some of the poetic techniques employed being similar to those found in the sonnets already discussed - as, for instance, the evocative use of exclamation, rhetorical questions and enumeration.

In the first quatrain, the evocation of transience is achieved by dramatic means. The opening line, with its two exclamatory bursts of pathos - "Wir armen! ach wie ists so bald mit uns geschehn!" - sets the tone for the remaining three lines, both in its vehemence and in its use of predominantly one-syllable words. The opening hemistich of line two is another exclamatory clause introduced by "wie", a further statement of transience in the form of an outcry. This is followed by an adverbial clause of time, "oft / eh wir uns besinnen", which owing to its position (second hemistich of line two), could be read as being dependent on the initial clause of either line two or line three, although the indications are that it modifies "Ruft uns der schnelle Todt" of line three. Because of the possible double application of this particular adverbial clause of time, there is no significant thought-break between the two hemistichs of line two. This, added to the fact that there is an enjambement between lines two and three, causes an acceleration of the tempo, in keeping with the theme - the sudden curtailment of man's time. What is suggested by the movement of the verse, is indicated quite explicitly in the adverbial constructions: "Wie plötzlich..." and "eh wir..."; and in the adjective applied to death: "schnell". Just as human transience culminates in death, so the dramatic
presentation of transience, in the first quatrain, culminates in the dramatic presentation of death in line three: "Rufft uns der schnelle Todt". With the second hemistich of this line, there is a sudden ritardando, brought about largely by the repetition, in death's utterance; of the imperative, "komm't", and coinciding with the sense of finality in the words themselves: "komm't Menschenn / komm' von hinnen".

Line four, the summing up of the preceding three lines, is a further rhetorical question. Here, once again, repetition and the predominance of one-syllable words have the effect of slowing down the verse-tempo and of giving added emphasis to what is said. In this case, it is the repetition of the noun clause-pattern, introduced by "was", that contributes to the intensity of utterance, underscoring as it does, the repetition of the idea of imminent menace. The caesura in this line is clearly marked and coincides with the break between the two noun-clauses.

The second quatrain opens with a further evocation of transience. The presentation of human frailty is still essentially dramatic, but shows, in line five, a departure from the emphatic to the graphic. Instead of relying on exclamation and rhetorical questions to make his point, the poet now resorts to enumeration - an enumeration of man's "on-stage" activities. The very phenomenon of enumeration brings an acceleration of the tempo, as does also the use of longer words. In the whole of line five, use is made of only one one-syllable word - the personal pronoun, "wir", which occurs twice. The change to mainly two-syllable words gives the line a certain lilt and lightness, suggestive of the light and unending nature of man's activities. The caesura in this line is far less marked than in the preceding line, coinciding with one of the three virgulas, used in place of commas between the various elements of the enumeration - a factor which also contributes to the acceleration.
ion in tempo. Finally, attention must be drawn to the fact that, in this enumeration, we are confronted with a list of active verbs, more suggestive of movement and change than a corresponding list of nouns would be: and if the preceding lines are examined with regard to verb-content, it will be noticed that, in every evocation of transience, the verb - usually a verb of motion - or the verb-plus-adverb plays the major role, and not the noun or the noun-plus-adjective. In marked contrast to the augmented movement in line five, the first hemistich of line six shows a return to emphatic, monosyllabic simplicity. In its slow, deliberate rhythm, as well as in its context, this short sentence is a complete foil to the preceding one.

From dramatic evocation the author now turns to plain re-statements of human transience:

Wir werden gantz nicht innen (line six)

Wie nahe wir der gruft. Diss Leben muss zerrinnen (line seven)

Again, after the terseness and deliberation of the first hemistich of line six, the verse gains momentum and fluidity. There is enjambement between lines six and seven and lines seven and eight, and a use of longer periods. Thus, the second hemistich of line six and the first hemistich of line seven together form one sentence, the second hemistich of line seven and the whole of line eight another. The first hemistich of line eight, the climactic point to which the second quatrain has been building up, stands out in sharp relief against the preceding lines. In addition, it forms a clear contrast with the second hemistich - virtually its antithesis - both by reason of its grammatical construction (a concessional clause, used for the first time so far) and its content (the eternal as opposed to the temporal).

The sestet is characterised by the use of even longer periods, the first tercet consisting of the one long sentence, the second tercet of two, the shorter of which
(line fourteen) is the final summing up of the whole sonnet. In the first tercet, the time-transience-motif—here exemplified by the swiftness with which death can strike—is echoed in the uninterrupted flow of the verse, in the rapid enumeration of the diverse means of death (line nine and the first hemistich of line ten), in the comparison "geschwindere..." and in the further, if slower, enumeration of the means of death (line eleven). The second tercet, which has the same relationship to the first tercet as line eight to the preceding lines, is also based on the concessional clause pattern, "wenn...nicht". Both the second hemistich of line twelve and the whole of line thirteen—the latter being a repetition, in concrete terms of the former—are dependent on the opening hemistich of line twelve, whose antithesis they present. In these two lines, as in line three, repetition has the effect of slowing down the tempo and emphasizing what is stated. As opposed to the rapid enumeration, illustrative of transience, in lines nine and ten, the enumeration in line thirteen, suggestive of solidity and stability, is rendered slower by the use of mainly one-syllable words as well as by the use of "und", rather than a comma or virgula. The concluding line of the sonnet, in itself a complete sentence, is a reiteration of the antithesis upon which the sonnet is based. It falls naturally into two hemistichs, owing to its grammatical structure, the second hemistich being a subordinate adjectival clause introduced by "der":

Der ist schon lebend-todt der nicht in seiner Hut.

This construction, "der...nicht", corresponds closely in function to the "wenn...nicht" constructions used previously. The role of the oxymoron, "lebend-todt", has already been discussed, in the context of the thematic development of the poem. This is one of only three adjectives occurring in the whole poem. The sparing use of adjectives, added to the fact that two of the three used, are virtually verbal (i.e., particip-
ial) adjectives, is in keeping with the poetic technique employed throughout the sonnet: dramatic and dynamic evocation rather than static depiction.

Finally, if this sonnet is compared, as regards time-eternity presentation, with *Es ist alles eitell*, some interesting similarities and dissimilarities are at once apparent. Both sonnets evoke transience by dramatic means; both employ dynamic rather than static depiction; in both, such colourful evocation is offset by statements of an unadorned simplicity. In both, the tendency is toward "negative" portrayal of the eternal; i.e., by implication, the eternal is what the temporal is not. Indeed, in *Es ist alles eitell*, there is no "positive" portrayal of the eternal whatsoever; it is presented merely as a possibility which man refuses to consider. However, in *Domine quid est Homo, quod memora eis ejus*, certain qualities of the eternal, in terms of certain qualities of God, are "positively" evoked, this positive approach being borne out by the very poetic technique. As opposed to the depiction of transience in the same sonnet, where concepts drawn from diverse sources are linked together, use is made of sustained imagery; and this in itself, apart from the nature of the images used, contributes to the evocation of stability and durability.

In *Über die Gebäude der ausgegrabenen Philosophen*, the time-eternity antithesis is that of body and spirit. The transience of bodily beauty (octave, first tercet), epitomised by the decay of a corpse in a grave, gives rise to a grim warning to the living, to look into the state of their eternal souls.

/(c.  *Über die Gebäude der ausgegrabenen Philosophen.*

O hübsch! anblick! ach! wo sindt die güt'nen haar!

?/Wo ist der stirnen schnee? wo ist der glanz der wangen?

Der wangen die mitt blut und lilien umbfanden?
Der rosen rote mund! wo ist der zähne schar ?  
Wo sindt die sternen hin? wo ist der augen paar  
Mitt dehn die liebe spielt / itzt flechten schwartze schlangen  
Sich umb das weite maul / die nasen ist vergangen

Der ohren kahlen ortt / der augen lucken schwaben?  
Ist iemandt / der sich nicht für dieser stirn entsetzt ?  
Der dencke wie sich doch sein geist den wird befinden  
Wen er in kurtzem wird aufg gleichen schlag verschwinden /  
Weill schon der todt auff ihn die schnellen pfeile wetzt. (Ga. Bd. I, p. 51-52.)

This sonnet shows a clear division into octave and sestet; and while there is no marked break between the two quatrains, there is a very sharp division between the two tercets, the eternity-content of the second tercet contrasting with the time-content of the eleven preceding lines.

The octave and the first tercet are a dramatic evocation of the effects of death and time on beauty. The contrast between the previous and present states of the body now lying in the grave, or rather exhumed from the grave, is registered in the poet's reaction to what he sees, rather than by any detailed description. The exclamation of horror with which the poem opens: "O häslich! anblick! ach!" is followed by a series of short rhetorical questions, imbued with an almost frantic intensity by the repeated use of "wo".

O häslich! anblick! ach! wo sindt die güldnenhaar!  
Wo ist der stirnen schnee! wo ist der glantz der wangen ?
Wo ist der Zähne schar?
Wo sindt die Sterne hin? Wo ist der Augen Paar...

No attempt is made, at this point, to qualify the initial exclamation, "O häuslich' anblick". Instead, the poet relies on the impact of suggestion. One by one, the conventional attributes of beauty are enquired after, use being made of the hyperbolic phraseology of the love-lyrics of the epoch: "die goldenen haar", "der Stirnenschnee", "der rosen rote mund" and so on. By means of this spate of questions, the contrast between the previous and the present state of Philosette is evoked, in terms of the absence of the components of her former beauty. With the second hemistich of line six, there is an abrupt change to explicit description of the present reality:

...itigt flechten schwartse schlangen
Sich umb das weite maul / die nasen ist vergangen
Die keinem Helfenbain vorhin zu gleichen war.

The first image, reminiscent of the crass realism of a whole tradition of Sterbelieder, is unsparing in its frankness, brutally replacing, as it does, the conventional image of prettiness, "der rosen rote mund", with one of naturalistic ugliness, "das weite maul". "Maul", moreover, is a word usually applied only to animals, which makes the juxtaposition even more brutal. With the second image, the poet virtually returns to his previous technique of evocation, namely, the stressing of the absence of former beauty, once again couched in the idiom of convention:

die nasen ist vergangen
Die keinem Helfenbain vorhin zu gleichen war.

The first tercet, with its challenging rhetorical questions:

Ist iemandt der noch kan behertzt und sonder graven
Der ohren kahlen ortt / der augen lucken schawen ?

Ist iemandt / der sich nicht für dieser Stirn entsetzt ?

makes use of suggestion coupled with unadorned realism, which forms a sharp contrast to the descriptive language of the sonnets first six lines. Images like "der ohren kahlen ortt" and "der augen lucken" effectively obliterate the conventional ones contained in lines one and five: "die güldnen haar" and "die sternen...der augen paar". The application of the poem has now been extended, so that the "häslich' anblick" is no longer evoked, merely by the poet's own reaction to the rotting corpse, but by the calculable reaction ("graven", "entsetzen") of any viewer:

Ist iemandt der noch kar behertzlt und sonder graven....

Ist iemandt / der sich nich für dieser Stirn entsetzt ?

The third line of the first tercet relies entirely upon suggestion for its effectiveness, "dieser Stirn" - a sight likely to cause horror - replacing the earlier image of "der stirnen schnee".

With the second tercet a moralising, didactic element is introduced. Up to this point, the poet has been concerned only with the effects of time and death on the human body, his evocation of transience being achieved through a confrontation of the past and present states of something purely temporal. But now, the temporal becomes a grim reminder of the eternal: anyone who is not horrified by the sight of the exhumed corpse is warned:

Der dencke wie sich doch sein Geist den wird befinden....

A completely new perspective is thus imposed upon the whole sonnet. The state of the body, the "horrifying" symptoms of physical decay are of minor significance, compared to the fate of the immortal soul. The imperative necessity of doing some-
thing about the state of one's soul - about the fate of one's body one can do no-
thing - is further emphasised in lines two and three of the second tercet, with
their insistence upon the inevitability and imminence of death:

\[ \text{Wen er in kurtzem wird auff gleichen schlag verschwinden} / \]
\[ \text{Weill schon der todt auff ihn die schnellen pfeile wetzt.} \]

Line two is reminiscent of the legend of the "drei Lebenden und die drei Toten" in
its reference to the future and to the universality of the manifestations of death.
What has been observed and described in Philosette, is here lifted out of the realm
of the particular into that of the typical, becoming universally applicable. At
the same time, man's transience and the imminence of death are stressed in the
adverbial phrase, "in kurtzem", this transience- imminence-motif finding final ex-
pression in line three:

\[ \text{Weill schon der todt auff ihn die schnellen pfeile wetzt.} \]

One of the traditional personifications of death is brought into play here - the grizzly figure
with bow and arrow. He is shown coming to execute his rights, not merely at the
conclusion of life, but already, "media in vita", as he whets his arrows on the
still-living. The swiftness of his imminent onslaught is emphasised by the adject-
ive "schnell".

This sonnet is an excellent example of the interrelationship of poetic aware-
ness and poetic technique. Of the poems under discussion it represents probably
the most dramatic evocation of transience. Apart from the second tercet with its
didactic, sermonising trend - it points the moral of the object-lesson and places
it in its eternal context - almost the entire sonnet consists of exclamations and
rhetorical questions. In the first five lines of the octave, use is made of short
periods and frequent repetition; and in all but line three, the caesura is clearly
mark this, corresponding, in every case, to the break between two phrases or periods. These phenomena, far from having a slackening or retarding effect on the verse-tempo, actually imbue it with a breathless, almost frenzied intensity of movement, the swiftness of passing time itself being reflected in the swift sequence of exclamatory questions beginning with "wo". This staccato technique is offset by the uninterrupted flow of line three (an enlargement upon the second hemistich of line two), by the enjambement between lines five and six, and by the long period running from the caesura in line six to the end of the octave. Here, again, is a reflection of the passage of time, not in spasmodic jerks, but in a smooth, unbroken course from past to present. Structurally as well as thematically, there is no transition-phase in this sonnet between past and present. Just as the dramatic evocation of Philosette's former beauty is followed immediately, without any form of introductory preliminaries, by the depiction of her present state (lines five and six), so there is a sudden switch from one technique of evocation to another, underlining and emphasising the radical change of state, brought about by time in so brief a space.

With the sestet, there is a change in tempo, corresponding to a change in the sonnet's orientation. The transience-theme is still predominant, but its application is now more general than in the octave, sentence-structure and rhetoric being adapted accordingly. In the first tercet, rhetorical questions are again brought into play, as a further means of conveying the present reality. In contrast to the short, exclamatory questions of the octave, these are longer, more deliberate questions, in keeping with a deliberate dwelling upon this reality. There is no caesura in line nine and an enjambement between lines nine and ten. The caesura in line ten coincides with the virgula between the two features of the corpse that are mentioned: "Der ohren kahlen ortt / der augen lucken...". In line eleven there
is again no caesura, the sentence-break coming after the third syllable. The use of repetition - both sentences in the first tercet begin with: "Ist iemandt der...", is, in this case, emphatic rather than dramatically evocative. What we are confronted with here, is not the rhythm and pattern of normal, or even dramatic speech, but of conscious oratory. This trend is still more apparent in the second tercet, where the challenge, implicit in the transience-content of the first tercet, culminates in a serious warning (line twelve). The second tercet consists of the one long sentence, the principal clause of which occupies line twelve. The warning it expresses is corroborated by the adverbial clause of time in line thirteen (transience), and, following quite logically from this time clause, by the adverbial clause of reason in line fourteen (death). If this sonnet is regarded as a piece of didactic oratory, the second tercet occupies the place of the final conclusive argument, in a series of examples and arguments intended to bring the orator's audience to a certain and irrefutable conclusion.

Unlike Domine quid est Homo, quod memor es ejus, where the passage of time, the instability of man's situation and the imminence of death are reflected in a style that relies for its effects chiefly upon the active verb and the adverb, and makes very sparing use of the adjective, here is a sonnet, in which virtually the same basic theme is treated, but in which, with the exception of the second tercet, noun and adjective play the major role. Thus, in the first five lines of the octave, the only finite verb used, is the verb "to be"; Yet these are lines in which the reader is aware of an intense movement - the movement of time, reflected in the evocation of a drastic change of state. Although in the remaining lines of the octave and in the first tercet, some evocative verbs are introduced ("flechten..sich", ...
"sich.. entsetzt"), the main impact still comes from noun and adjective. The only graphic depiction of the active processes of decay occurs in line six: .."itzt flechten schwartze schlangen.."etc., this being in immediate contrast to the only "active" depiction of Philosette's charms; "der augen paar Mitt dehn die liebe spielt" (lines four and five).

The opposition of the content of the second tercet to the rest of the sonnet has already been discussed. Also in marked contrast to the preceding lines, is its use of verb-adverb constructions. Indeed, it relies for its impact chiefly on such constructions (the imperative in line twelve, the "active" expression of transience in line thirteen - "in kurtzem ...wird..verschwinden" - and the picture of imminent death in line fourteen - "Weill schon der todt...die schnellsten pfeile wetzt").

In the tradition of much memento mori literature, the grave has provided an object lesson on human transience culminating in a vision of the power and universal dominion of death - involving present, past and future. In demonstrating the inevitable corruption of the purely physical and temporal side of man, the poet has forced open the question of his spiritual and eternal side; the urgency of this question being accentuated by an insistence upon the shortness of life and the imminence of death. The time-content of this sonnet far outweighs the eternity-content; and yet, the whole orientation is, by implication, towards the eternal.

In the XIth sonnet aus Dem Nachlass, a sonnet addressed to the Holy Spirit, it is the eternity-content that predominates. Here the antithesis is that of the transient "I" and eternal God, temporal man's need and God's capacity to provide for every need, this contrast being brought out within the structure of each individual line. There is not, as in the sonnets previously discussed, an opposition of one part of the sonnet to the other(s), but the opposition of one section of a line to another,
this technique recurring in every line of the sonnet. For this very reason, perhaps, the reader is less aware of the poet's adherence to the basic sonnet-structure than in the other examples cited. As far as the rhyme-scheme is concerned, this is a Shakespearean sonnet, consisting of three quatrains and a final rhyming couplet but there is little correspondence between this scheme and the thematic development of the poem.

Sonnet XI aus dem Nachlass

Ich schmacht' / O Lebens-Lust! erquicke mein Gemüth!
Ich brenn / O süßer Thau! befeuchte meine Glieder:
Ich zag' / O höchste Freud! komm du mit Trost hernieder /
Ich gleite / treue Stärk / befeste meinen Schritt.
Man hasst mich: bleib mein Freund / O unverfälschte Gatt:
Ich schlummer / lichte Flamm / strahl auf mein Augenlieder.
Bleib du mein Gast und Wirth mir ist die Welt zuwider.
Ich seuffz' / erhöre mich / und gib mir was ich bitte;
Ich irre / führe mich / Verstand / auf rechte Wege /
Ich zweifel; Wahrheit steh mit deiner Weisheit bey/

Ich diene / Freiheit / reiss die harten Band entsewey /
Ich zitter / Schutz / halt auf des Himmels Donnerschläge/
Ich schwind / O Ewigkeit! erhalte für und für /
O Leben aller Ding! Ich sterbe! leb in mir. (Ga. Bd. I, p. 100.)

As in a prayer, the need of the "Ich" is stated, simply and succinctly ("Ich schmacht'"), the deity invoked, in terms of those very qualities that answer to
the need ("O Lebens-Lust"), and help requested ("erquicke mein Gemath"). In the following lines, the same pattern is repeated: and in each case, the very clear antithesis between "Ich" and "Du" is emphasised by the structure, indeed, by the grammatical constructions themselves. The state of the "Ich" is expressed by a verb in the present indicative: "Ich schmacht!", "Ich brenn", "Ich zag", "Ich gleite". The Holy Spirit is then apostrophised (exclamation, adjective, noun), as the epitome of what the individual needs: refreshment ("O süßer Thau"), joy ("O höchste Freud"), strength ("treue Stärck"), the finite nature of the individual being further borne out by the use of a finite verb, the infinity of God by the absence of any verb that might limit the application of the concept evoked to a particular point in time. (Where God's help is invoked by means of a verb, it is always an imperative.) The antithesis, man-God, which is also marked by a baroque virgule, occupies the first hemistich of each line. In the second hemistich, although the antithesis is not dissolved, there is a rapprochement of the two extremes. Man, in his need, realises that he must depend on the resources of God. Thus, his downheartedness gives rise to the plea: "erquicke mein Gemath", his feverish desire for refreshment to the cry: "befeuchte-meine Glieder", and so on.

The second quatrain introduces variations into the basic pattern. In line five:

Man hasst mich: bleib mein Freund / O unverfalschte Gatt

the antithesis in the first hemistich is not between the state of the "Ich" and the nature of God, but between the world's attitude and God's attitude towards the "Ich" suggested by the request: "bleib mein Freund". The second hemistich, another apostrophe of the deity, "O unverfalschte Gatt", implies a further antithesis in the epithet "unverfalscht", the genuineness of God's kindness and goodwill being in
contrast to the counterfeit "Glück" of men. Line six, a plea for enlightenment and spiritual alertness:

Ich schlummer / lichte Flamm / strahl auf mein Augenlieder

shows a return to the pattern of the first quatrain, while line seven, the only line in the whole poem without a punctuation-break:

Bleib du mein Gast und Wirth mir ist die Welt zuwider

clearly falls into two hemistichs owing to the very nature of its content: an antithesis, echoing that in line five, between a benign God and a hostile world. With line eight, there is a return to the threefold line-structure, although the basic pattern of the first quatrain is not completely resumed:

Ich seuffz' / erhöre mich / und gib mir was ich bitt...

Following the expression of the individual's need, there is no apostrophe of the deity. Rather than being antithetically opposed to each other, the two parts of the first hemistich are complementary: "Ich seuffz' / erhöre mich"; the second hemistich being an enlargement on the same theme - "und gib mir was ich bitt." At the same time, the sense of difference and distance between the "Ich" and the "Du" is fully maintained. This line is central to the whole sonnet, stating explicitly the relationship of the transient and the finite individual to an eternal and infinite God in terms of the individual's complete dependence on God's hearing his prayer and granting his requests.

The remaining lines of the sonnet sustain the contrast between the state of the individual and the nature of God and His fulfilment of the individual's needs. Lines nine and ten are concerned with man's proneness to error and doubt:

Ich irre / führre mich / Verstand / auf rechte Wego /

Ich zweifel; Wahrheit steh mit deiner Weisheit bey /
As opposed to the limitations imposed by man's finite reasoning and his inability to recognize ultimate reality, God is the epitome and source of all understanding, truth, and wisdom. Lines eleven and twelve contrast man's servitude to fear to the freedom and protection that God affords:

Ich diene / Freiheit / reiss die harten Band entzwey /

Ich zitter / Schutz / halt auf des Himmels Donnerschlage...

The image of bondage is not uncommon in seventeenth century literature, used not only, as is the case with the mystics, to express the imprisonment of the soul within the body, but also (cf. An den gefangenen Dicaeus, Ca. Bd. 1, p. 71) in the wider context of the restrictions imposed on man by life itself with all its worries, responsibilities and commitments, as well as those restrictions resulting from human fallibility and bodily weakness. Closely linked with this complex is a sense of fear and vulnerability: "Ich zitter" - a sense of being exposed not only to the blows of fortune, but also to "des Himmels Donnerschlage" - i.e. just retribution for human fallibility and error. But in contrast to human fallibility and its consequences, the poet evokes the protection afforded to finite man by an infinitely merciful God. The sonnet reaches its climax in the concluding couplet, where the transience of the individual and his subjection to death are opposed to the nature of God, who is eternal and the source of all life:

Ich schwind / O Ewigkeit! erhalte fur und fur /

O Leben aller Ding! Ich sterbe! leb in mir.

Just as the evocation of the state of the "Ich" culminates in the expression of its transience - "Ich schwind" - and proneness to death - "Ich sterbe!", so also the opposite pole, the nature of God, is summed up in the concepts "Ewigkeit" and "Leben aller Ding".

In this sonnet, ideological and structural details are so fused and interrelated
within the individual lines, that there is virtually no need for further discussion of structure as revealing duality, since this question has already been covered in the line by line discussion of the poem. Compared to the other sonnets discussed, this one represents, at first sight, an extremely simple and direct solution to the task of presenting a view of both time and eternity, but a closer examination shows such apparent simplicity to be the result of consummate art: economy of words, judicious and highly conscious choice of language and grammatical constructions, skillful manipulation of the basic pattern so as to avoid any monotony, adherence to a set verse-form (the sonnet) without a resultant sense of constraint or artificiality.

The sonnets discussed in this chapter have not been chosen as examples of how Gryphius explodes (cf. Die Höhle) or even transcends a verse-form in order to express his basic duality of vision, but rather, how he explores and exploits the various possibilities inherent in a particular verse-form, as they correspond and help to give shape to his particular awareness.
CHAPTER IX.

The Awareness of Time and Eternity Reflected in Gryph's Use of Allegory and Emblem.

Nothing is perhaps more indicative of Gryphius' dual awareness of time and eternity than his use of allegory and emblem. He follows here in a thousand-year-old tradition that sees in the phenomena of nature far more than their obvious, objective reality. Dietrich 'alther Johns, in his work "Das Sinnenbild," has traced the various elements, pagan and christian, contributing to this "mundus significativus der Dinge" tradition 1), laying particular emphasis, with regard to the seventeenth century, on the medieval view of God's revelation of Himself in creation 2). This view, based on the teachings of the Church Fathers, recognises in the transitory objects of the created world an expression of the Eternal Creator, complementary and parallel to that found in the Scriptures 3). A natural object, then, like the word of Scripture, is not merely representative of itself, but is also indicative of the universal and eternal truths above and beyond itself. Like the scriptural word, it may have, in addition to its literal sense, a moral, "heilgeschichtlich" and eschatological interpretation and application.

The "mundus significativus" is the basis of the medieval allegory, in which the description of the concrete and material is followed by its interpretation in abstract and spiritual terms, a procedure which has a very obvious prototype in the parables of the Bible. At first sight, this type of allegory appears to be completely at variance with the new, generally accepted concept of allegory - the concretisation of the abstract - as summed up, for instance, by Louis Barjon in his work on Paul Claudel: "L'allégorie concrétise des abstractions. Le symbole, par une démarche inverse, part du réel pour rejoindre l'idée." But if we take into account the fact that in medieval allegory, the natural object itself is already a concrete expression of
the abstract and spiritual, the poet's role being to explain its significance, then, basically, there is no great difference between the two concepts. Gryphius' *Feicher Stein* (Ga. Bd. III, p. 53) provides an example of both types of allegory although, fundamentally, it follows the form of the medieval allegory, being an interpretation into spiritual and universal terms of a concrete and specific situation.

The nature of the emblem and its popularity and significance in the seventeenth century have been set out by Benjamin, Jöns and others. Like the medieval allegory, its basis is the "mundus significativus". It also shows similarities in structure to the allegory, consisting as it does of title, engraving and explanatory verses, the latter two of which may be said to correspond respectively to the "Dingbeschreibung" and the "Deutung" in the allegory. Jöns has demonstrated how the "pictorial" emblem-form may be transposed into completely verbal equivalents.

Much of Gryphius' imagery is based on the use of traditional emblems, whose connotations would, no doubt, have been immediately apparent to the informed reader of his day, so that far from being purely ornamental, their use would provide the poet with a type of pictorial short-hand for the expression of spiritual truths, as for instance references to thistles, laurel trees, palms, hour-glasses and sun-dials. Jöns also points to an emblematic use of language by Gryphius that extends further than this. In certain sonnets, notably the *Morgen, Mittag, Abend, Mitternacht* cycle as well as the *Einsambkeit* sonnet (Ga. Bd I, pp. 65-68), he sees verbal equivalents to the basic emblem structure 5). In each case, the descriptive opening phase corresponds to the engraving in the emblem and the following non-descriptive lines, with their inevitable reference to spiritual values, to the accompanying verses.

It would be no easy matter always to distinguish between allegory and "verbal" emblem in the works of a writer such as Gryphius, nor is it the purpose or intention of this thesis to do so, this particular section being included merely as a further
illustration of the poet's dual awareness of time and eternity. However, for the sake of convenience, it will be necessary to differentiate between the terms as employed in this thesis.

The term "emblem" will be used to denote, firstly: those pictorial concepts such as palm-tree, silk-worm, laurel tree etc. borrowed freely and without special elaboration from the general fund of emblematic works existent in Gryph's day. Generally, in such cases, the natural object so borrowed will be considered under one aspect only, i.e. in its capacity to express one particular truth, only the characteristic expressive of that truth being taken into account - as opposed to the allegory where various aspects of the natural object are enumerated in the light of their spiritual parallels. The term "emblem" will be applied, secondly, to the pictorial use of language in order to illustrate by implication, rather than by explicit drawing of parallels, a truth subsequently formulated in abstract or spiritual terms, but without direct reference back to its pictorial representation (as in the Morgen, Mittag, Abend, Mitternacht cycle).

"Allegory" will be used to refer to firstly, (medieval procedure) the spiritualisation (i.e. the interpretation in spiritual terms) of the various aspects or attributes of a concrete object or a specific situation; or, secondly, to the inverse process: the elaborate concretisation of the abstract - i.e. the expression of spiritual truths in terms of tangible reality. In either case, we are confronted by more elaborate and explicit drawing of parallels than in the emblem.

It is now our intention to discuss Gryphius' use of allegory and emblem in specific poems, in the light of his fundamental, dualistic outlook.

Allegory

As mentioned previously, Gryphius' Weicher Stein provides a good example of the
poet's use of allegory. The chief interest of this poem lies not so much in any aesthetic values as in the insight it gives into some aspects of a seventeenth century poet's outlook, aims and methods. In this particular case, we are aware of the circumstances under which the poem came to be written, and these too have a certain relevance to the theme of this thesis. Gryphius and two of his friends had been for a walk in the country and found a large stone on which they had sat down to play a game of cards. Afterwards, all three set about writing verses in memory of the occasion - a not uncommon practice at the time, when "poetry" accompanied a man's progress from the cradle to the grave.

We see Gryphius, as it were, in his workshop with a commission to carry out - the task of providing his friends with a fitting keepsake of their outing together. That this is no trivial matter, no intellectual exercise to be undertaken lightly, is immediately apparent from the words of the dedication which set the tone for the whole poem:

\[
\text{Thr Seelen / die entfernt / von den nicht freyen Hauffen /}
\]

\[
\text{Durch Tagend vollen Schweiss die Ewigkeit zu kaufen}
\]

\[
\text{Euch Tag für Tag bemüht: Was fordert ihr von mir? (vv. 1-3)}
\]

\[
\ldots \text{Soll dann von jenem Stein ich meine Meinung sagen /... (v. 17)}
\]

(Ga. Bd. III, p. 53.)

His friends, as opposed to "den nicht freyen Hauffen", are devoted to the pursuit of the things of eternity and not bound by the things of time. They are an elite capable of and intent on, penetrating beyond superficial reality to deeper levels of significance. In view of this, Gryphius' solution of his poetic task will be - in the manner of the medieval allegory - to interpret the temporal in terms of the eternal. Far from dwelling on the particular and incidental aspects of the situation which gave rise to his poem, he immediately launches into an exploration of the mor-
The stone, then, and the game of cards played on it, are a parable of the world, where men gamble with much higher stakes, risking life, honour, possessions and position, even their very souls for a mere game - i.e. for ends that, in themselves, are ultimately worthless. After this general statement of the significance of the stone, Gryphius proceeds to enumerate its attributes, as they are representative of those of the world. Its barrenness brings to mind the fruitlessness and futility of life in the world:

Was trägt ein rauer Stein? Mit kurtzem: keine Früchte.

Was liefert uns die Welt? Rauch / Nebel und Gedichte. (v. 24-25)

It is an admirable sense of irony that makes Gryphius mention "Gedichte" in the same breath as those two tokens of vanity, transience and insubstantiality - "Rauch" and "Nebel" - or are we to take "Gedichte" as having the same sense here - "Fantasie und Spil"? The "literal" weight of the stone - "Wie drückt des Steines Last" - is suggestive of the figurative weight of the world: firstly, in the sense of a restraining weight - the weight of the preoccupation with temporal things that prevents man from fulfilling his eternal destiny:

...der steigt nicht Himmel an:

Der nicht was Irdisch ist vom Halss abwerfen kan. (v. 27-28)

secondly, in the sense of an oppressive and degrading weight - the weight of the worry, difficulty and servitude of earthly life:
Und lebt dieselb er lebt bey Überhauffer Mühl /
... mehr vischisch als ein Vieh. (v. 31-32)

Up to this point, the qualities described could apply to any large stone, but now Gryphius indicates a special feature of the Weicher Stein, the insecurity of its balance, once again drawing a parallel between this attribute and an attribute of the world (here, the insecurity of man's situation on earth):

Der Stein steht ungewiss / er ruht auf scharffer Spitzen.
Kan iemand auf dem Rund der Erde fest sitzen. (v. 33-34)

He then elaborates upon this insecurity: power, wealth, honour and pleasure are all shown to be subject to sudden change and reversals of circumstances. Life itself is a continuous death. The last-mentioned attribute of the stone, in addition to suggesting a parallel state in the world, has given rise to a whole discourse on instability and transience, from which the poet draws the moral of his allegory:

Die Wahrheit überzeugt den der Vernunft noch hört /
Dass alles was man mit gebeugten Knien ehrt;
Mut, Fantasie und Spil. (vv. 51-53)
(Instability and transience lead to the one conclusion: vanity.) In "Fantasie und Spil", there is a reference back to the initial situation that gave rise to the poem, the game of cards; and now, having explored the various parallels between "Stein" and "Welt", the poet takes up again and further develops the game-of-cards motif, which now becomes associated not only with man's fruitless activity, his striving after false values, but also with the whole game or, by extension, play or pageant of life. In this case a type of allegory consistent with Marjon's definition comes into play: the abstract or spiritual is given concrete form. The various stages of man's activity in the game of life against the background of passing time...
i.e. the phases of his progress through life find pictorial expression in the manifestations of the four seasons:

Biss Anmut / Lust und Kraft und Kunst und Witz vergeht /

Und unser Überrest in Wörten nur besteht / (v. 71-72)

This is a traditional parallel, used for instance by Spenser in his Faerye Queen, by Shakespeare in his sonnet:

That time of year thou mayst in me behold

When yellow leaves, or none, or few do hang... (Shakespeare: Sonnets, LXXIII, in English Verse, chosen and arranged by W. Peacock, vol. I, p. 436, O.U.P., 1956.)

and by Grypius himself in his drama, Cardenio und Celinde.

There follows a return to the card-game pure and simple and a clear statement of its moral and spiritual significance: the utter vanity and spuriousness of any gains to be had:

Welch Zancken / welch Beschrey umb so geringe Sätze!

... wie nichtig sind die Schätze / (v. 77-78)

and the disproportionate risk of losing everything worthwhile:

Wäl hoffen von dem Spil nicht schlechtes Gut zu bringen /

Und setzen alles zu. 'Wir wünschen gross zu sein;

Und müssen darob oft Schel. / Ehr und Leben ein... (v. 74-76)

The end of the game, with death, is depicted in the grim colours of the "Totentanz": death, the great equalizer, throwing together rich and poor, nobleman and peasant, strong and weak in the final equality of the grave where all are "in gleiches nichts verkehrt". It is only then, the poet points out, when all incidental trappings are removed, that the results of the game become evident:

Dann findet sichs wem Nutz / wem Schaden zugeschossen. (v. 138)
At this juncture, Gryphius' allegory assumes eschatological significance, the weighing up of the consequences of the game becoming synonymous with the Last Judgment:

Dann Oberlegt der Höchst / und schleust: Wer Zeit und Glätt
Er sprösslich aufgesetzt / und sondert die Gemälter
Die ihr scharffsinnig seyn verwend't zu seiner Ehr /
Von jenen Seelen ab / die sich ie mehr und mehr
In Eitelkeit verwirrt und sonder einig achten
Und Sinnen / ihre Tag' als Sinnenloss durchbrachten.
Und spricht sein Urtheil aus / ob dem die schwarte Nacht /
Die Grundfest diser Welt / der Himmel Baw erkracht... (vv. 145-152.)
(Ga. Bd. III, p. 57.)

In summing up, we can trace the development of this poem from the initial situation - the game of cards on the "Weicher Stein" - to the concluding eschatological vision. The poet has brought to bear his ingenuity upon the original situation, according to the methods of the fourfold interpretation of Scripture 6), discovering moral, heilsgeschichtlich" and eschatological parallels which completely transcend the literal, or immediately apparent significance. The consideration of the qualities of the stone has given rise to a consideration of the qualities of the world (= world-system): barrenness, heaviness (a deterrent to man's salvation), instability, ultimate vanity; while the card-game, with its element of risk, its uncertain outcome has come to stand for all human activity. The risk or danger inherent in this game is epitomised by the Last Judgment, the final reckoning - a matter not merely of a few coins, but of spiritual life and death. In terms of time and eternity, there has been a transition from the time-bound and gratuitous pastime of a game of cards (a means of making time pass) to the momentous and universally significant question of the use of time in the game of life, where the implicit choice con
fronting every player is between temporal (death-destroyed) and eternal (death-transcending) values. Consistent with the belief in God's two-fold revelation of Himself (through Scripture and creation), this poem has taken a specific situation involving a natural (created) object and dealt with it in much the same way as an exegete might deal with a passage of Scripture, not approaching it merely with the intention of interpreting and explaining it, but also in order to draw a lesson from it, to discover (eternally valid) guidelines for living (in time) (cf. II Timothy 3:16 on the nature and function of the Scriptures). By pointing out the relevance, in terms of eternity, of something in itself purely temporal and, in this way, demonstrating how the whole orientation of life in time should be towards eternity, the poet has accomplished the task that he set himself in the dedication.

The Emblems

The use by Gryphius of traditional emblems has been explored in considerable detail by Dietrich Walthers and it is not our intention to go back over ground already covered by him and others. However, in order to illustrate how Gryphius' awareness of time and eternity is reflected in the use of such emblems, we shall deal briefly with two closely linked ones - flower and grass. Both of these, most commonly seen as expressions of transience, have their prototypes in the Bible, in particular in the language of the Psalms and Proverbs. One of the simplest of these emblems and one of the closest to its Biblical source is "die Wiesenblum / die man nicht wiederfindt..." - a recurring expression of the brevity of human life. (cf. Menschliches Blend, Ga. Bd. I, p. 35, Scire tuum nihil est, Ga. Bd. II, p. 72.)

In number XXI of the Lissaer Sonnets, An eine hohen Standes Jungfrau, (Ga. Bd.I, p. 16-17), the emblem used is that of the rose. Eugenie herself is addressed in the
opening line as "Ihr Rose der Jungfrawen". That this is not purely a reference to her beauty becomes apparent from lines two and three, where the rose which she holds in her hand is seen to be already fading. This fragile embodiment of beauty is a pointer to the fragility and transience of her own beauty, to the brevity of life in general and its susceptibility to change. There is, thus, a direct link between the use of the delicate rose-emblem in lines one, two and three and the almost brutal references to the decay of the body that follow.

A similar use of the flower-emblem is made in the lines written by Gryphius on the death of his young stepmother in February 1637, Maria Riemanniae. Once again the manner of address - "O Blume dieser Welt" (op.cit., Gd. Bd I, p. 22, v. 5) - is both a reference to outstanding beauty and an evocation of transience - an association that is sustained in "Eur Rosen-roter Mund erblast und wird zu nichts" (ibid., v. 15) and "eh dem Ihr recht noch bëßnet" (ibid., v. 21). However, it becomes clear from the context that the reference to beauty is not limited to its merely physical manifestation:

O aller Tugen! Lécht! O Blume dieser Welt. (ibid., v. 5)

This suggestion of spiritual beauty is borne out by another flower-emblem incorporated in the simile:

So stirbt die Lilien wenn sich die Winde sausen. (ibid., v. 17)

Again the transience and fragility of physical beauty are evoked, but at the same time other elements are introduced. The lily being an emblem of purity (beauty of spirit) and also of the resurrection (i.e. of immortality) prepares for the positive note on which the poem ends:

Itzt seid Ihr aller Angst und allem "eh entsetzt (v. 48)

...Ihr seid uns nur voran / wir werden alle gehen

Der Ewigkeiten Weg ... (v. 53-54)
There is no such positive note in the sonnet written to Eugenie (An eine hohcn Standes Jungfrau, Ga. Bd. I, p. 16-17), nor is there any explicit reference to the beauty that outlasts time. But is such a reference not there by implication? There is certainly no "diesseitig" reaction to transience, no injunction to "Gather ... Rosebuds while ye may" (To the Virgins, to make much of Time, Robert Herrick, Oxf. Bk. of Seventeenth Century Verse, p. 308, O.U.P., 1951). The graceful rose-emblem is followed so closely by the evocation of bodily decay as to suggest a warning against complete involvement in the temporal and transient.

In Sonnet XLIX An den Erlauchten Unglückseligen, (Ga. Bd. I, p. 119), flowers as the emblem of transience, and in particular of the transience and vanity of earthly joys and earthly splendour, are opposed to thistles - emblem of suffering and persecution:

Man rühme wie man wil / ein Blumen-reiches Feld /  
Wer alles Überlegt / wird tieff=gesinnter Held /  
Vor leichten Rosen Lust die ernsten Disteln achten. (vv. 12-14.)

The preference for thistles implies a non-acceptance of generally accepted temporal values, specifically a refusal to become entangled in transient pleasures and earthly splendour, and a serious involvement, even at the cost of great suffering, with non-temporal values. (cf. Der Weicher Stein, Ga. Bd I, p. 53 ff.)

Common to all examples of flower-emblems discussed here has been the element of transience, but this is not to say that Gryphius' use of flower is invariably associated with transience: other concepts such as suffering may be involved and we have already noted that the lily, for instance, may have a number of connotations.

Transience is again the basic element in Gryphius' use of the grass-emblem, although here too there are wider connotations. In Prosopopeia viri Literati e Tumul...
grass, the embodiment of transience, is used to indicate man's helplessness in the face of the destructive forces of death and the grave:

Hier hilft kein krautt: der Mensch ist Gras... (Ga. BdII, p. 9, v.44.)

Such a juxtaposition of ideas could well be termed a "metaphysical conceit". On one level the statement is a witty play on words: herbs are of no use, since man himself is a herb, grass. On a more profound level, there is the implication that no herb (in the sense of medicinal or embalming herbs), can help to avert death and decay, because man is a transient being, whose destruction and disappearance are as inevitable as the withering of the grass of the field.

In the epigram, Auf das Hew in der Krippen, the grass-emblem, in association with the flower-emblem, plays a major role:

Diss Kindlein liegt auf Hew' es will dein Hertz zum küssen /

Das wie die Blum und Hew doch wird verschwinden müssen. (Ga. Bd. II, p. 173)

The Christ-child, eternal God in transient human form, is bedded in hay, itself an emblem of the transient, destructible body, to which God in His humility has descended. At the same time, the situation of the child lying with its head pillowed on the hay (kissing the hay), is paralleled by the expression of its love for transient man: "es will dein Hertz zum küssen", literally, it desires to pillow its head in man's heart. In the brief space of this epigram, chiefly through the implications of the grass-emblem, the nature and profound significance of Christ's birth have been expounded: transience embracing eternity (cf. Philippians 2:6-11) and eternity embracing time and transience (cf. John 3:16).

The use of such emblems makes for a succinctness of expression and density and depth of meaning. Each of them, like a transparent brick in the wall of appearances, allows brief glimpses of what lies beyond, without ever ceasing to be a brick
in the wall.

As far as content is concerned, the emblems discussed above have been almost exclusively representative of but the one side of Gryphius' dualistic awareness, his awareness of time. That there has been no discussion of those emblems representative of eternity or of eternal qualities - e.g. palm-tree, wreath or ring, diamond and so on - is the result of an arbitrary choice rather than an oversight. For the sake of brevity and convenience, we have chosen to deal with (thematically) related emblems, since the question here is not one of symptomatic content but of symptomatic outlook; and, as remarked previously, the use of emblems is, in itself, indicative of a whole attitude, of a whole assessment of apparent and ultimate reality.

It is that quality of the emblem to mean more than it actually says and to represent more than it actually is, that comes to the fore in sonnets such as Morgen, Mittag, Abend etc., in which it is possible to speak of an extended emblematic use of language. A typical manifestation of this phenomenon is to be found in Sonnet XXVII Aus dem Nachlass:

Der himmel brand im Feuer / die Luft erklung vom krachen
Der schrecklich harten Donner Schläge /
Die Nacht verdeckte Land und Stege /
Die Nacht die in den Lauff des Lichs sich drang zu machen;
Der Wind heult / brüllt und bliess und riess aus Ditis Rachen /
Die tollen Geister wurden rege/
Die Mauern stürzten und die Wege /
Verdeckte Grauss und Kalck der Strom zustiess die Nachen;
Als mitten in dem Feld ' mich / Herr / der Todt ergriff /
Der hinter mir in Sturm / vor mir in Flammen lieff / 
Vor mir die Bahn verfällt / und über mir die Hütten
In leichte Splitter stiess. Doch lebt ich / Herr / durch dich /
Mir selber war ich todt / dein Engel wacht um mich /

Here the pictorial part of the emblem is provided by the vivid description of a thunder-storm, in a rapid succession of images, each of them evocative of intense activity and turmoil. Most effective use is made of onomatopoeia, coupled with alliteration and assonance, to suggest the fury of the unleashed forces of nature:

Der Himmel brand im Feuer / die Luft erklang vom krachen...
Der Wind heult / brüllt und bliess und riess aus Ditis Rachen / ...
In leichte Splitter stiess ...

Simultaneously, a rich use of highly evocative active verbs lends a dramatic quality to the whole description. This is no static engraving but a highly complex sequence of movement and sound, an everchanging interplay of light and darkness.

In the whole sonnet, there is only one line that does not contain an active verb. For instance, in lines one, three and four, the verb plays a major role: "Der Himmel brand...die Luft erklang..." (line one); "Die Nacht verdeckte Land und Stoge /" (line three); "Die Nacht die in den Lauff des Lichts sich drang zu machen;" (line four). In line four, even the darkness of the night appears as an active force, while in line five, the furious power of the wind is suggested, not only in the onomatopoeia already mentioned, but also in the use of four different verbs in rapid succession: "heult / brüllt und bliess und riess...". Each of these verbs
is short and vehement as a sudden gust of wind, the first two being evocative of furious sound, the second two of violent movement. This fury of movement is sustained in the lines that follow: firstly in the image of the awakening of mad spirits, an image that arises quite naturally from the allusion to "Ditis Rachen", and then in images of walls crashing and the river raging: "Die Mauern stürzten", "der Strom zustieß die Mauern". Finally, it reaches its climax in the sudden approach of death, embodied in the violence and swiftness of the storm:

\[
\text{Als mitten in dem Feld mich / Herr / der Todt ergriff /} \\
\text{Der hinter mir in Sturm / vor mir in Flammen ließ/. . .;}
\]

and this is followed by further evocations of violent destruction: the falling away of the road, the splintering of the houses.

This is the description of a night in which, to use a cliché, all Hell is let loose about the poet. That he survives it, he ascribes to the protection afforded him by God:

\[
\ldots \text{Doch lebt ich / Herr / durch dich /} \\
\text{Mir selber war ich todt / dein Engel wacht um mich /}
\]

At this point, we begin to recognise the emblematic structure of the sonnet. Here, as in the verses accompanying the engraving in the conventional emblem, the spiritual significance of what is pictured is stated. In the first instance, this occurs within the framework of the actual situation, in the second instance, the final line of the poem, in a far wider context:

\[
\text{Stets neugeboren wird / den Gott wil stets begitten.}
\]

In the light of this concluding line, the whole storm-scene is lifted out of the realm of the particular and the time-bound into that of the typical and the timeless-liberated. Each element of the scene assumes a spiritual significance above and
and beyond its literal sense. The raging of the storm, with its thunder and lightning, the all-enveloping night, the destructive fury of the river are all emblematic equivalents of physical death, in constant threat of which the poet finds himself. At the same time, on a more profound level, they are also pointers to spiritual death, to the destruction of the soul in Hell, after the Last Judgment. Thus, in the first line, there are definite eschatological overtones:

Der Himmel brand im Feuer / die LufI erklang von krachen...

a suggestion of that day that "shall burn as an oven" (Malachi 4.1); while in lines three and four, night and darkness impinging on the realm of light are representative, not only of the unredeemed state of man without God, his condemnation to death (cf. I John 1, über die Geburt Jesu. Ga. Bd. I, p. 30), but also of the dark, satanic forces that try to prevent his coming to the light and cloud his vision of it. The satanic element is further emphasised in the following lines, with their allusion to Hell and the mad spirits, escaped from there:

Der Wind heult / brüllt und bliess und riess aus Ditis Rachen /

Die tollen Geister wurden rege /

In addition, these lines and the two preceding ones are reminiscent of what happened after Christ's crucifixion, so that in the very midst of the evocation of forces of violent physical and spiritual destruction, their conquest through Christ's death, the ultimate triumph of life over death, is called to mind. The concluding lines are, then, intimately linked to the rest of the sonnet, since they sum up the spiritual significance of the whole. It is only through God's grace and merciful protection that, in the very jaws of death, the poet, and in broader terms, the Christian, has life - a perpetual rebirth from death into life:
...Doch lebt ich / Herr / durch dich /  
Mir selber war ich todt / dein Engel wacht um mich /  
Stets neu geboren wird / den Gott wil stets begütten.

Were it necessary to find a suitable heading or motto for the "verbal" emblem manifested here, then surely, one of the first to suggest itself would be a reversal of the old "Mors media in vita" into "Vita media in morte".

What we have observed in Gryphius' use of allegory, emblem and emblematic language, is completely consistent with his basic awareness of time and eternity. In every case, the concrete or incidental is related to the spiritual or typical, being lifted out of the context of time into that of eternity.

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2 " " " Ibid. p. 81.
3 " " " Ibid. pp. 57, 58, 81.
6 " " " Ibid. p. 30.
CONCLUSION.

The intention of this thesis has been to demonstrate the centrality of Gryphius' awareness of time and eternity in his German lyrics. By way of introduction, we have looked briefly at the poet's life and background, as well as at the concept of poetry prevalent in his era. Here we have noted, in particular, Gryphius' obvious sense of responsibility and vocation, both in his everyday activities and in his writing of poetry - an awareness that sees the totality of life in time as being enriched, not impoverished, by the certainty of eternity beyond.

In the main body of the thesis we have then proceeded to discuss the poet's awareness of time and eternity as revealed, firstly, in the theme and subject matter of his German lyrics; secondly, in structure and imagery. Wherever relevant, reference has been made to his drama and funeral orations.

Having attempted to define the concepts of time and eternity - as far as possible in terms of Gryphius' own statements - we have then dealt with the poet's predominant themes: transience of universe, world-system, man and his values, human life, the use and conquest of time - always within the wider context of the awareness of time and eternity.

From the above analysis we have arrived at the following conclusions: far from being torn apart by the dichotomy between time and eternity, Gryphius' whole creative personality is orientated towards the ultimate integration of the two. This is not to deny, in any way, his profound sense of the transience and futility of the things of time in themselves. But here his awareness does not end. While refusing to ascribe any eternal or eternalising qualities to anything born of, or created in, time, he is swift to recognise that the temporal may well serve as a pointer to the
eternal. He also believes in the potential of every individual to conquer time, not by any of the temporal means, whose spuriousness he decries, but by availing himself of the ultimate conquest of time accomplished by Christ. Christ's life in time, in its complete surrender to the will of God - i.e. its unequivocal orientation towards eternity - provides, in Gryphius' view, the perfect blue-print for the Christian's life. It is only in the moment by moment surrender of his time, his life, to God's purpose, that the individual begins to fulfil, even in the here and now, his eternity-potential.

It is still within this essentially Christian framework that we must view Gryphius' use of structure and imagery. In examining his exploitation of the sonnet form, we have been able to point to a definite correspondence between the structure and the point of view presented, it being virtually impossible, in Gryphius' serious sonnets, to speak of intricacy of form for its own sake. Similarly, where the poet's choice of imagery is concerned, one is aware of a definite purpose behind his incorporation of even the most conventional metaphors and similes - as in Über die Gebaune der ausgegrabenen Philosetten (Ga. Bd. I, p. 51-52).

Above all, Gryphius' frequent use of allegory and emblem is symptomatic of his assessment of time in the light of eternity. It is not that merely incident or accidental phenomena from the material realm may assume universal and spiritual significance, or that, when reduced to their most typical manifestation, they are capable of becoming chiffres of, or pointers to, universal truths. Rather it is, once again, the basic realisation that only as the temporal is brought into focus with the eternal, does it assume value, significance and durability. A flower, for all its beauty, is, in itself, nothing - merely a fragile manifestation of earthly transience; but viewed as a reflection, however partial and imperfect, of the
eternal and absolute beauty of God, to which it, in turn, may point, it is imbued with something of eternity. In just the same way, the moment, the only unit of time to which man may lay any claim, depending on the individual's attitude towards it, is either an elusive, moving point in the inexorable course of time or the very point at which eternity offers itself to us.
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