Politics of Meaning: The Impact of the Tasmanian Greens on Environmental Debate

by

Michelle Bridget Gabriel B.App.Sc. (RMIT)

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This thesis contains no material which has been accepted for the award of any other higher degree or graduate diploma in any tertiary institution and, to the best of my knowledge and belief, contains no material previously published or written by another person, except when due reference is made in the text of this thesis.

Michelle Gabriel

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ABSTRACT

This thesis is about the 'politics of meaning' in the context of environmental debate in Tasmania. The central argument is that movement-generated political parties play a vital role in this politics, particularly in generating new interpretations and new frames of meaning. Party political actors operate from a privileged position within 'public arenas' and their participation within public debate differs significantly from that of movement activists. Party formation entails the politicisation and pragmatisation of debate, enhances the use of official media strategies, results in a diffusion of issues and encourages compliance with established political boundaries. These processes are viewed as critical for the organisation of new frames of meaning into more systematised and institutionalised knowledge.

The analytical framework for studying politics of meaning is developed throughout chapters two and three. It is derived from three bodies of literature: on new social movement and new political parties; on public arenas; and on mass media. A distinction between social movement organisations and political parties forms the basis for an argument that these two play different roles in contests over meaning. Literature on public arenas forms the basis of analysis of how meanings are circulated and knowledge is contested in public domains. Literature on mass media provides a source of concepts used in the analysis of framing and agenda formation. Chapter four outlines a research strategy, and chapter five is a case study of environmental debate in Tasmania. The coverage of the Tasmanian Greens and environmental movement organisations is examined over two key periods: before (1984) and after (1994) the formation of Tasmanian Greens. Content analysis of The Mercury is supplemented by analysis of internal movement media - the Tasmanian Greens' journal The Daily Planet and the Wilderness Society's journal Wilderness - as well as analysis of election campaign materials and policy documents issued by the party. The level and mode of attracting media attention, range and scope of issue agenda, and framing activities of social movement activists and party officials are examined in the context of environmental debate.
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CHAPTER ONE: GREEN PARTY FORMATION AND THE POLITICS OF MEANING

Environmental Politics in Tasmania

Environmental politics has become a central feature of the Tasmanian political landscape, signifying not only the urgency of environmental issues in Tasmania, but also the maturation of a vocal, popular, grass-roots environmental movement. This process of maturation is evident in the shift from a series of spontaneous protests to a more systematic form of political lobbying by an organised network of environmental activists who operate through both movement organisations and a newly formed green party - the Tasmanian Greens. The organisational shift has coincided with important changes in the nature of environmental debate, such as an extension from a preoccupation with damming and logging native forests to a broad spectrum of concerns including economic and social justice issues. The relationship between these two aspects of change, especially the influence of green party formation on environmental debate in Tasmania, provides the focus for this study.

The impact of the Tasmanian Green Party on environmental debate needs to be understood against the background of almost two decades of environmental action within the public arena. While conservation campaigns in Tasmania have been noted as far back as the early 1900s (Holloway 1991: 83), the emergence of the present environmental movement is traced to the more recent Lake Pedder campaign (1971-72) (Easthope and Holloway 1989: 189). This protest campaign over a proposal to flood Lake Pedder generated an unprecedented groundswell of environmental activism and marked the beginning of ongoing public debates over the protection of Tasmania's wilderness, particularly in the South-West.

While the Lake Pedder campaign was ultimately unsuccessful, the environmental support it tapped became the basis of an ongoing semi-permanent political force. In 1976 the Tasmanian Wilderness Society (WS) was formed in order to unite environmental action groups, networks and activists (Walker 1989: 170). The explicit purpose of the WS
was to protect Tasmania's South-West wilderness. This commitment to the protection of South-West resulted in the WS taking a central role in orchestrating support to save the Franklin River (1982-84), one of Australia's largest and most renowned environmental campaigns (See McQueen 1990).

Within the public arena, the environmental movement led by the WS captured media attention through novel stunts, blockades and mass protest rallies. It deployed highly emotive visual images of the wilderness in its campaign against environmentally destructive practices. Images of the wilderness were juxtaposed with images of environmental destruction in an effort to mobilise support. Within the mainstream media, environmental activists featured more prominently than they had previously. However, they continued to be stereotyped as radical antagonists and portrayed within conflictual situations (Sylow 1994).

Following the Franklin Dam campaign, the environmental movement in Tasmania became noted for its uncompromising pursuit of wilderness protection. The employment of non-human centred arguments, such as saving wilderness for its own sake, led commentators to regard the movement as an exemplar of a 'biocentric' or 'deep-green' ecological philosophy (Easthope and Holloway 1989). The movement was also viewed as a forerunner in ecological thought, in that it articulated ecological principles independently of a socialist-left agenda. This stood in contrast to similar protest mobilisations in Europe, which were organised around nuclear disarmament and developed within a human-centred, socialist-left framework (Hay and Haward 1988).

After the Franklin dam campaign, several environmental activists stood for parliament as 'Green Independents'. However, the full force of the green vote did not register until the 1989 election when five Green Independents gained seats. This result gave the Greens the balance of power in the lower house. In order to form government the ALP entered into an accord with the Greens (Haward and Smith 1990). Two years later the Tasmanian Greens consolidated as an official political party.

During the 1989 election campaign the Greens featured prominently within mainstream media and, in fact, received disproportionate press
coverage (Tanner 1993: 184). This was linked to several factors, including the Greens' novelty as an environmentally-based political force, their potentially destabilising impact on Tasmanian state politics, their open policy towards the media and their experience in dealing with the media (Tanner 1993: 190-191). It was also a product of the growing legitimisation and interest in environmental concerns in mainstream press coverage in the late 1980s (Einsiedel and Coughlan 1993; Sylow 1994: 209; Crook and Pakulski 1995).

The emergence of an official green political party has been viewed as evidence of both the expansion of the earlier movement and the diversification of the movement. The Tasmanian Greens are often viewed as the parliamentary wing of the environmental movement due to the close association between the movement and the party. Both Bob Brown and later Christine Milne, party leaders, were key environmental activists before standing as political candidates. The Tasmanian Greens have also worked on environmental campaigns with movement organisations and action groups. Yet divergences between the Greens and environmental activists have become increasingly apparent as both the Greens and existing movement organisations have become more permanently established within the political landscape. In some instances it has been necessary for the Greens to distance themselves from environmental activists and vice versa.

Outside the anticipated sources of tension between activists operating at a grass-roots level and politicians working within the parliamentary arena, the Tasmanian Greens face some particular dilemmas due to the nature of the earlier environmental movement from which they have emerged. The wilderness focus and the uncompromising, ecological arguments employed by early movement activists have posed particular problems for the Greens. Such arguments are difficult to accommodate within the parliamentary arena and provide little scope for mobilising votes. The Greens have emerged from a particularly 'green' basis and have had little guidance in relation to social and economic issues. Consequently, the Greens have had to look beyond the existing movement in order to extend their issue base.
An examination of the problem of how party formation reshapes environmental debate provides the opportunity to pursue these issues further. It raises questions such as: What is the message being articulated by the Greens in the public arena? What distinctions have arisen between activists and party officials in public debate? What environmental issues are being raised? How are environmental arguments being framed? Who represents the environmental movement and, in turn, who represents the environment within public debate?

Party Formation

Interest in the shift from environmental movement to green party stems from classic political sociological studies which have drawn attention to the implications of pursuing parliamentary strategies. Weber's (1978) classic work on routinisation of charisma and Michels' (1962) work on the oligarchic tendencies inherent in party formation remain central references in any discussion of the institutionalisation of power. Weber showed that the establishment of bureaucratic structures typically follows the routinisation of charismatic leadership. In line with Weber, Michels analysed this process of routinisation and bureaucratisation in the workers movement and showed that party organisation inevitably leads to an oligarchy of party leaders. Oligarchic and centralistic tendencies were linked to the pursuit of efficiencies, personal ambitions of party elites and maintenance of political power. Both Weber and Michels drew attention to the problems that accompany the transition from movement to party, particularly the growing divide between grass-roots supporters and party elites.

Offe's (1990) more recent model of the movement-party transition revisits the themes raised by Weber and Michels. He charts three important stages within the process of movement institutionalisation and formal organisation. During the 'take off' phase movement action is characterised as radical, conflictual, non-strategic and non-compromising, and there is no formal separation between the support base and elites (1990: 236-7). This is followed by a period of 'stagnation' where movements confront difficulties in maintaining momentum and their survival becomes increasingly dependent on formal organisation. At this
stage, spontaneity and informality are sacrificed in order to achieve a more workable, long term organisational arrangement (1990: 238-40). In the final phase, the advantages derived from institutionalisation become increasingly attractive and progressive organisation becomes justified as a rational pursuit of political ends. In Tasmania, the environmental movement is entering this final phase. The Tasmanian Greens are established as a relatively permanent political force and are continuing to expand in terms of political candidates and voting support base.

Offe's movement-party transition model, like Weber's and Michels' models, is underscored by a rational model of action. Offe, however, does not focus on the oligarchic tendencies of party formation. In fact, he recognises that the benefits of party formation outweigh the costs (i.e. the reduction of grass-roots democracy). He identifies four key benefits: pooling together of electoral support through alliance-formation; the capacity to tap into the resources of those who may not be willing to act, but are willing to vote; access to financial subsidies and special privileges available to political parties; and the opportunity to confront opponents on the same institutional terrain of party competition (1990: 240-2). Instead, Offe is concerned with the limitations of the party system, and in particular with the failure of the party political system to realise the socio-cultural ends promoted by the new social movements. In relation to the Tasmanian Greens, the question Offe raises is whether or not the party can deliver the demands of the earlier environmental movement. More specifically, can the Tasmanian Greens continue to provide a space for the articulation of wilderness-centred values?

Although Offe points to the limitations of the party system in realising the socio-cultural ends promoted by the new social movements, these limitations are not clearly delineated. Aided by the insights offered by more recent literature on the socio-cultural dimension of new social movements, this study of how green party formation reshapes environmental debate provides an opportunity to identify the nature of these limitations.
Politics of Meaning and Public Arenas

While Weber, Michels and Offe address the issue of party formation, they provide less guidance in terms of the implications this has for environmental debate. Recent sociological work on the 'politics of meaning' provides additional insight into the role of new social movements in the generation of new meanings, identities and norms. The label 'politics of meaning' subsumes a range of work on the 'symbolic challenge' (Melucci 1985, 1989), 'socio-cultural dimension' (Touraine 1985) and 'cognitive praxis' (Eyerman and Jamison 1991) of new social movements.

The term 'meaning' refers to a broad range of interpretations, world views and frames articulated by actors in public debates. Although these issues have been analysed previously in sociological literature, particularly under the labels of 'ideology' (Marx and Engels 1965, Abercrombie et al, 1980) and 'sociology of knowledge' (Mannheim 1966), such studies have focused on more established and organised bodies of knowledge. In contrast, studies of the 'politics of meaning' focus on newly emergent forms of knowledge and the process by which established forms of knowledge are challenged. Such studies draw attention to the contest amongst actors over the articulation of their preferred interpretations and frames.

Literature on the 'politics of meaning' emphasises that in contemporary advanced society the boundaries of politics are highly contested. Politics can not be simply reduced to the activities of political parties, electoral systems, voting behaviour and governance; it also involves cognitive struggles and debates over meaning, norms and identities (Melucci 1985; 1989; Touraine 1985; Eyerman and Jamison 1991). While conventional political activities include the recruitment of leaders and staging of campaigns, organisation of government, formulation of policy, aggregation and articulation of interests, and mobilisation of voters (Hrebenar and Scott 1982), 'politics of meaning' entails the redefinition of cultural norms, affirmation of identity, reshaping of ideational frameworks and contestation of accepted assumptions about social reality. The contest is primarily over knowledge, information and norms, rather than over votes, influence and organised political power.
Within the 'politics of meaning' political actors vie for acceptance of their preferred interpretations and frames. Such contests occur in 'public arenas' where meanings are circulated and information exchanged. 'Public arenas' refers to a broad range of established public forums, such as parliament and the law courts, and temporary public forums, such as protest rallies and public meetings. In advanced societies, the principal public arena in which the politics of meaning is articulated is mass media.

At the forefront of this 'politics of meaning' are social movements, such as the feminist, peace, civil rights and environmental movements. These movements are said to be typically located outside the orbit of conventional politics and, instead, operate within the sphere of cognitive and normative conflicts (Melucci 1985; 1989; Touraine 1985; Eyerman and Jamison 1991). They address their protest to civil society, aim at affecting public behaviour and contest social norms. In doing so, they effectively challenge the boundaries of conventional politics and displace the state as the principal target of pressure for social change. They draw attention to and politicise struggles over meaning - an area of political contest which has previously been overshadowed by contests over political organisation and influence.

Rising interest in the cognitive and normative aspects of politics reflects wider processes of social change. Three key developments within advanced societies have been viewed as particularly important here. First, there has been a significant transformation in the value orientation of Western populations, which Inglehart refers to as the 'culture shift' (1990). Inglehart argues that under the conditions of peace and prosperity, mass education and widespread satisfaction of basic material needs have led to political energies being channelled into 'postmaterial' values relating to identity, self-determination and freedom of expression. Second, rapid advancements in technology and the expansion of multi-media and mass communication have produced 'global village' effects whereby geographical distance is transcended through electronic communication (McLuhan 1967). These developments have facilitated an increasing reliance on information and exchange within contemporary society and have opened up new forums for political exchange independent of the state. Third, higher levels of education and improved literacy have
encouraged broader participation in political processes and a more critically informed public. These actors are able to challenge old political elites by effectively utilising communication technologies for political ends (Berger 1979: 28-31; Dalton 1988: 18-27).

Literature on the politics of meaning signals the growing importance of issues raised in this study on green party formation and environmental debate. It highlights that environmental debate is a key site for political conflict and struggles. Moreover, it highlights the critical role of social movements and the activists that comprise these movements, through focusing attention on the cognitive and normative aspects of politics. Although students of the politics of meaning have concentrated on movement activists and intellectuals and semi-formal movement activities (Melucci 1985: 1989; Touraine 1985; Eyerman and Jamison 1991), the ascendancy of new social movements in general, and the rise of green parties across Europe, North America, New Zealand and Australia in particular, suggest that these new political actors will take on a heightened role within the process of knowledge formation and dissemination. Consequently, understanding how party leaders and officials participate within this politics of meaning becomes an increasingly pertinent issue.

Overview

In the following chapters I examine the research problem in relation to existing research and propose an appropriate research design for addressing the problem. In chapter two sociological literature on social movements and the politics of meaning is discussed. This review focuses on how existing sociological literature has understood the role of social movements and movement-spawned parties in the generation of and articulation of new meanings. Chapter three presents a more detailed review of literature on public arenas, mass media and framing, in order to chart the processes by which actors and arenas interact to shape environmental debate.

In accordance with the issues raised by existing literature, chapter four outlines the key research questions and the research design. In order to examine how green party formation has reshaped environmental debate
and, more generally, how new political parties engage in questions of meaning, I examine environmental media coverage before (1984) and after (1994) the emergence of the Tasmanian Greens. A content analysis of mainstream press articles which make explicit reference to environmental activists and the Tasmanian Greens is conducted. The content analysis of press coverage is supplemented by analysis of internal movement media.¹

In chapter five and six I present the findings and discuss their implications. In view of the findings, I suggest that green party formation does significantly affect environmental debate and that green party politicians play a vital role in the generation of new interpretations and new frames of meaning. The case study indicates that green party politicians operate from a privileged position within 'public arenas' and that their participation within public debate differs significantly from that of movement activists. Moreover, green party formation entails the politicisation and pragmatisation of debate, enhances the use of official media strategies, results in a diffusion of issues and encourages compliance with established political boundaries. These processes are viewed as critical to the organisation of new frames of meaning into more systematised and institutionalised knowledge.

¹ 'Internal movement media' refers to media generated by and circulated primarily amongst movement activists. This includes election campaign materials and policy documents, in addition to the Tasmanian Greens' journal The Daily Planet and the WS's journal Wilderness.
CHAPTER TWO: SOCIOLOGICAL APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND NEW POLITICAL PARTIES

The first part of this chapter examines the treatment of green parties as 'new political parties' in contemporary sociological literature. This literature provides the context for a study on green party formation, but has only limited application to an examination of the relationship between party formation and environmental debate. A review of the two traditions from which literature on new political parties is derived - resource mobilisation and action-identity - illustrates why such cognitive issues have not received much attention to date. In view of these gaps, the second part of this chapter turns to developments in the literature on the politics of meaning. This literature taps into the central question of how party formation reshapes environmental debate. It focuses on the role of political actors in articulating new frames, interpretations and emergent forms of knowledge. Three separate approaches that describe and analyse the politics of meaning are reviewed and themes which relate to the problem at hand are discussed.

New Political Parties

'New political parties' is the label used to describe the movement-spawned parties (eg green parties, rainbow alliances, nuclear disarmament parties) currently proliferating across Europe, North America, New Zealand and Australia. These parties represent the political wing of the new social movements that have arisen since the 1960s, such as the ecological, peace, feminist and human rights movements. Although the new political parties represent a more organised form of political participation than the social movements from which they are derived, they share similar values, goals and orientations (Kitschelt 1990: 179-80).

This view of the new political parties as a continuation of movement projects is reflected in studies of the new political parties, particularly the West German Green Party (Muller-Rommel 1982, 1989, 1990; Papadakis 1984, 1988; Frankland 1988; Kitschelt 1989; Poguntke 1993). These studies regard both the new movements and parties as symptomatic of wider changes in citizen behaviour and part of a 'new politics' (Berger 1979;
Baker et al 1981; Offe 1985; Dalton 1988). This new politics is evident in three key developments: changes in political culture; changes in values and issues; and changes in social support bases.

First, students of the new politics have noted fundamental shifts in political culture and political participation across Western industrial nations (Baker et al 1981; Offe 1985; Dalton 1988). There has been a growing awareness of the limits of state power and an increasing scepticism towards the state amongst Western publics (Berger 1979; Crook et al 1992). This has been accompanied by a general rise in political participation and, moreover, an increase in alternative modes of political participation independent of the state (e.g. demonstrations and protest rallies). Together these shifts have been interpreted as part of a reorientation in conflict around the affecting of cultural norms and social behaviour, rather than focusing exclusively on obtaining state-authorised political power. Citizens are more active and demand more open, participatory processes, yet they do not limit political action to the state. This is tied to the incapacity of the state to address new values and issues.

Second, observers of the new politics cite dramatic changes in values and issues. 'Postmaterial' values such as self-determination, freedom and self-actualisation, have displaced the predominance of material values such as economic growth, wealth distribution and military security across Western populations. These value changes have generated new issue agendas relating to quality-of-life issues such as the environment, nuclear energy, educational quality, women's rights and ethnic identity. (Inglehart 1977, 1990; Baker et al 1981: 136-159; Dalton 1988: 77-95).

Third, observers point to a shift in political cleavages and a rise in what has been described as a 'middle-class radicalism'. They argue that younger generations and well-educated, middle-class citizens, particularly service sector professionals, represent the most active political citizens and main supporters of the new politics (Parkin 1968; Gouldner 1979; Dalton 1988: 151-76).

Viewing new political parties as part of this new configuration, draws attention to the continuities between the new social movements and the parties they spawn. For example, Poguntke (1993) uses Offe's old politics/new politics distinction to show the innovative nature of the West
German Greens and to illustrate their resistance to political conventions. Innovativeness, however, has been narrowly circumscribed. Studies have tended to focus on organisational structure and practices (e.g. rotation of parliamentary leaders, non-hierarchical structures), voting base (e.g. middle-class, service sector) and political values (e.g. postmaterial values such as self-expression) (e.g. Kitschelt 1989; Parkin 1989; Poguntke 1993). Less attention has been paid to the continuities and discontinuities between movements and parties in relation to the socio-cultural orientation of new politics, ie the shift in focus away from obtaining political influence to affecting social behaviour and cultural norms.

In the following section, I suggest that existing studies of new political parties have not taken issue with the way party formation has reshaped debate due to the constraints of the theoretical perspectives that dominate social movement theory: resource mobilisation and action-identity. The treatment of formal politics (green party formation) and ideology/meaning (environmental debate) within these two perspectives are discussed.

Sociological Perspectives on Social Movements and Political Parties

Resource Mobilisation

The resource mobilisation perspective, developed in the United States (Zald and Ash 1966; Zald and McCarthy 1979; Gamson 1975; Oberschall 1973; Tilly 1978; McAdam 1982), signalled a major challenge to the social-psychological theoretical paradigm that had dominated collective action literature (Cohen 1985: 671). This paradigm depicted collective action as a marginal and irrational response to societal strains and breakdown (Pakulski 1991: 13). In contrast, resource mobilisationists emphasised the rationality of collective action, evidenced through the instrumental pursuit of resources.

Within the resource mobilisation perspective, collective action is recast as a 'normal' response to conflicts that inevitably arise in a complex society. Movement formation is not the result of systemic breakdown and disorder, but rather is a legitimate part of open democratic political processes. Accordingly, movements are closely aligned with
conventional politics and are recognised as a 'politics of by other means'. The use of novel and innovative modes of action, is simply an unconventional means for obtaining strategic conventional political ends (Gamson 1975: 139).

Advocates of resource mobilisation emphasise the instrumental rationality of collective action. Within this framework, movement actors are seen as both calculative and rational. They articulate clearly defined goals and are effective in mobilising resources in order to achieve desired ends:

The choice of the amount, type and mixture of conciliatory and coercive means of challenge and of response will depend on a calculation of expected gains and loses, of benefits and costs (Oberschall 1973: 48).

This view is heavily influenced by economically-derived 'interest transaction' and utilitarian frameworks, particularly Olson's (1965) utilitarian model of action. More recent work which incorporates the interests of groups and collectivities into this framework, provides an important corrective to this individualistic understanding of participation in collective action (Zald and McCarthy 1979).

An additional feature of the resource mobilisation perspective is its emphasis on movement organisations. Resource mobilisation theorists focus on sites and actors that have a direct influence on the formal political arena:

they stress the importance of movement organisations and the centrality of movement 'entrepreneurs' (leaders and activists) in setting goals and defining strategies (Pakulski 1991: 13).

This is linked to the assumption that success entails political recognition and increased material benefits. Both are interlinked, as in democratic societies the distribution of material goods is tied to state power; consequently, the gaining of legitimacy within the formal political arena is viewed as a positive progression towards this end. Party formation, therefore, is the culmination of this process and is a sign of the rational actor's success in penetrating the political arena (Scott 1990: 10-11).

Resource mobilisation offers insights into the strategic orientation of collective action and the competitive environment in which activists operate. Consequently, it is a useful perspective for understanding how
activists seek to influence formal political processes, how they organise collectively to extract material concessions from the state and how representatives of formal organisations and key activists come to play crucial roles within this process. In doing so, it acknowledges party formation as a legitimate, indeed normal and expected, transformation of collective action. The key weakness of this perspective is its focus on mobilising resources and extracting political concessions, at the expense of the symbolic significance of collective action. It is unable to respond to questions relating to identity formation and the articulation of new meanings (Melucci 1985: 797-8; Touraine 1985: 769).

**Action-Identity**

Action-identity theorists challenge many of the assumptions made by advocates of resource mobilisation. This perspective, developed in Europe by Alain Touraine (1985, 1988) and Alberto Melucci (1985, 1988, 1989), does not revert to an anti-systemic understanding of collective action, but neither does it accept instrumental rationality as a complete basis of collective action. Instead, action-identity theorists introduce the analysis of meaning and identity into the study of collective action.

Action-identity theorists do not view social movements as a series of movement organisations mobilising resources; instead social movements represent struggles over the 'social control of the main cultural patterns' (Touraine 1985: 754). Touraine uses the term 'self-production' to denote the endless transformation of society through the articulation of new social interests by social movements. Social movements are recognised as historical agents of change engaged in the realisation of 'historicity' which entails the passing from one societal type to another (1985: 778-9). This is exemplified by the shift from an industrial to the present post-industrial, 'programmed' society. Within this programmed, information-based society, the principal stakes of conflict are socio-cultural. They relate to control over knowledge and information, rather than control over production and distribution:

Industrial societies were able to transform "means of production" to invent mechanical devices and systems of organisation, but our (programmed) society invents technologies to produce symbolic goods, languages, information... The result is that the field of social
movements extends itself to all aspects of social and cultural life. (Touraine 1985: 778).

Although action-identity theorists emphasise notions of consciousness and ideology adopted from neo-Marxist analyses of collective action, they reject the "primacy of structural contradictions, economic classes, and crises in determining collective identity" (Cohen 1985: 691) central to classic Marxism (Touraine 1985: 767-9; Melucci 1985: 796, 1988: 329-30). Touraine criticises the structuralist-Marxist view of "a society without actors....dominated by systems of control and manipulation" (Touraine 1985: 768). Social movements transcend rather than conform to any predetermined systemic forces. In fact, they are recognised as 'action systems' which unfold according to their own logic. The role of actors within an action-system is to affirm their identity, reinterpret social norms and reveal new meanings:

Actors...do not fight merely for material goals, or to increase their participation in the system. They fight for symbolic and cultural stakes, for a different meaning and orientation of social action. (Melucci 1985: 797).

In emphasising the increasing role of symbolic and cultural stakes within contemporary conflict, action-identity theorists recognise the cultural realm as a critical site from which collective action can emerge (Melucci 1985: 799-801; Touraine 1985: 780). Touraine revives the concept of 'civil society' to describe this non-political sphere (Touraine 1985: 780):

New social movements are less sociopolitical and more socio-cultural. The distance between civil society and state is increasing while the separation between private and public life is fading away. The continuity from social movement to political party is disappearing; political life tends to be a depressed area between a stronger State in an changing international environment and, on the other side, socio-cultural movements.

This focus on the cultural realm further reflects the anti-state nature ascribed to contemporary social movements by action-identity theorists. They portray these movements as fiercely defensive of their independence from the state. The state is an imposition which limits cultural innovation. In accordance with this view, party formation is an undesirable step that threatens to inhibit the cultural innovation of the
movement. Political parties are viewed as incapable of realising new ways of existing and understanding.

The action-identity approach makes an important contribution to the study of new social movements and new political parties, by drawing attention to the increasing salience of conflict over meaning and identity. It raises questions relating to the construction of meaning, as opposed to traditional lines of inquiry relating to class bases and voting behaviour. However, by insisting on the primacy of the cultural realm and stressing the anti-state orientation of contemporary movements, action-identity theorists have narrowed their focus to informal, spontaneous collective action.

This preclusion of institutionalised and formally organised collective action can be criticised at three levels. First, in precluding formal politics from social movement analyses, action-identity theorists overlook important empirical developments such as the formation of well organised pressure groups and political parties. Second, by coupling 'identity' and 'meaning' with non-institutional collective action, they perpetuate the myth that identity and organisational strategy can be analysed in isolation. They assume that strategy is the concern of actors operating in the political sphere, while identity is the concern of actors operating in the cultural sphere. Third, action-identity theorists can be criticised for their failure to develop a clear notion of the public arena. As Cohen points out, "Touraine nowhere develops either a theory of civil society or a concrete analysis of its institutional makeup". (Cohen 1985: 701). As a result, in action-identity theory, contemporary conflicts over meaning remain disconnected from the dynamics of the actors and public arenas in which they take shape.

The discussion above indicates why the two issues of green party formation and the nature of environmental debate have tended to be examined in isolation. While resource mobilisationists have attended to the issue of party formation in their focus on the strategic orientation of movement activists, they have payed less attention to issues of meaning and identity. In comparison, action-identity theorists, in placing meaning and identity at the centre of their analyses of social movements, have disregarded the significance of formal organisation. Yet these perspectives
provide an important background to more recent developments in literature on the politics of meaning. This literature represents the most recent attempt to examine the role of new social movements in generating new meanings and identities within public arenas. Accordingly, this literature addresses questions central to the key problem of how green party formation reshapes environmental debate: How are meanings circulated in public arenas? What is the role of movement activists within this process? Does party formation extend the movements influence in public arenas? How are meanings constrained by the public arenas in which they take shape?

In the following section, the main frameworks used in analyses of the 'politics of meaning' are evaluated: public spaces, civil society and cognitive praxis. In line with the research interests of this study, the review focuses specifically on how theorists have linked the politics of meaning with an understanding of the public arenas in which this politics takes shape.

**Frameworks for Examining Politics of Meaning**

**Public Spaces**

Action-identity theorists have played a critical role in signalling the increasing salience of politics of meaning in contemporary society. Melucci's work (1985, 1988, 1989, 1992, 1995), in particular, represents the most extensive engagement with questions relating to the symbolic challenge of the new social movements. He draws on semiotic concepts to elucidate the symbolic and cultural dimensions of social movements. However, while theorists such as Melucci have promoted issues of meaning and identity and have based their assertions within the framework of a media-saturated, information-based society, they have not paid equal attention to the development of a model of the public arena in which meaning and identity construction takes shape. The most explicit attempt to engage with questions of the public arena is Melucci's (1989: 173) concept of public spaces:

> A necessary condition of democracy in this sense are public spaces independent of the institutions of government, the party system and state structures. These spaces assume the form of an articulated...
Melucci explains the purpose of independent public spaces. Public spaces are viewed as a powerful avenue for 'rendering visible' issues raised by movements without these movements becoming institutionalised. They provide an opening for the generation of new meanings and make possible a 'democracy of everyday life':

The main function of public spaces is that of rendering visible and collective the questions raised by the movements....the consolidation of independent public spaces is a vital condition of maintaining - without seeking to falsely resolve - the dilemmas of 'post-industrial' democracy (Melucci 1989: 174).

Melucci is less specific regarding the location of these public spaces. He suggests that public spaces exist as 'points of connection' between the state and civil society. It remains unclear as to how the meanings generated within public spaces are 'rendered visible' to the wider society.

In focusing on the symbolic construction of meaning which happens prior to political organisation, Melucci does not deny wider processes which entail transformation of these internal movement practices into political demands. In fact, he outlines the interdependence of these processes in his dual conception of latency and visibility:

Latency allows visibility in that it feeds the former with solidarity resources and with a cultural framework for mobilisation. Visibility reinforces submerged networks. It provides energies to renew solidarity, facilitates creation of new groups and recruitment of new militants attracted by public mobilisation who then flow into the submerged network (Melucci 1985: 801).

However, Melucci does not provide an adequate account of the processes which enable latent voices to reach a wide audience. Subsequently, he ignores the question of how the visible actors (e.g. party representatives) who claim to represent the latent voice of the movement (e.g. submerged movement network), effectively reshape and reconstruct meaning. Although public spaces are recognised as points of connection between civil society and the state, there is no explicit reference to the vehicles which seek to communicate these 'signifying practices' to mainstream...
public audiences such as social movement organisations and new political parties.

While the action-identity approach plays a critical role in announcing the politics of meaning, it lacks adequate grounding in theories of the public sphere and civil society, and, therefore, stops short of detailing how this politics of meaning might be realised in practice.

Civil Society

The politics of meaning is granted further consideration within Cohen and Arato's theory of civil society (Cohen 1985; Cohen and Arato 1992). Their framework is based on a synthesis between the two major paradigms embraced by students of the new social movements; resource mobilisation and action-identity. They criticise both the resource mobilisation and action-identity paradigms for offering only partial accounts of the relations between contemporary collective action and civil society. While resource mobilisation theorists acknowledge the centrality of civil society as a terrain of collective action, they focus on political goals and, hence, exclude civil society as a potential target of collective action (1992: 509). In contrast, action-identity theorists acknowledge the centrality of civil society as both terrain and target of collective action, but in doing so exclude the polity as a potential target of collective action (1992: 520).

In view of the limitations of both paradigms, Cohen and Arato seek a social theory which recognises civil society as a legitimate terrain and target of contemporary collective action, without denying the possibility of targeting the polity and pursuing strategic political goals. They argue that social movements are simultaneously "a politics of identity and influence, aimed at both civil society and the polity" (Cohen and Arato 1992: 504). They suggest that Habermas' reformulated theory of communicative action (1987) can provide an essential bridge between the two social movement paradigms. Habermas' distinction between 'teleological action' and 'dramaturgical action' corresponds to the rational action made explicit by resource mobilisationists and the expressive and subjective action made explicit by action-identity theorists (Cohen and Arato 1992: 520-523). Moreover, their distinction between 'the polity and civil society' follows Habermas' 'system and lifeworld' divide (1992: 524).
Cohen and Arato's theory of civil society parallels Melucci's analysis of public spaces by reintroducing rational action into the realm of communicative process. It also represents a more comprehensive view of communicative processes, based on Habermas' theory of communicative action and his conceptualisation of the public sphere (Habermas 1987, 1989). However, Cohen and Arato's theory of civil society is vulnerable to criticisms directed at Habermas' work, and in particular, at his normative understanding of the public sphere (Curran 1991; Fraser 1992; Calhoun 1992; Peters 1993; McLaughlin 1993). These criticisms are targeted at Habermas' failure to accommodate the increasing role of mass media as a major communicative vehicle within contemporary society. Habermas defines an authentic public sphere as a domain drawing together 'private persons' to engage in rational discourse about 'public matters' free from commercial interests and separate from the state. He laments the demise of such an authentic public sphere and dismisses contemporary mass media as a site of mass consumption, entertainment and spectacle (Peters 1993: 545). Elsewhere it has been suggested that a more critical understanding of mass media within a reconstructed public sphere(s) is required (Williams 1958; Curran 1991; Dahlgren, 1991: 11-12; McLaughlin 1993).

Cognitive Praxis

Eyerman and Jamison's cognitive praxis (1991) represents an important advance on other analyses of politics of meaning. In line with action-identity theorists, they focus on the symbolic and expressive aspects of social movements and, in fact, view social movements primarily as 'producers of knowledge':

It is precisely in the creation, articulation, formulation of new thoughts and ideas - new knowledge - that a social movement defines itself in society. (55).

They suggest that the significance of social movements lies with their capacity to produce new everyday knowledge and, accordingly, develop their cognitive view of social movements by explicitly linking collective action with a theory of knowledge (45-50).

Although Eyerman and Jamison (1991: 117) are concerned with knowledge and meaning, they understand knowledge as a product of the everyday 'praxis' of social movements:
Social movements are after all political phenomena, operating in established political cultural contexts, a point stressed by resource mobilisation theorists and often forgotten by those, like Melucci (1989) and Habermas (1987), who stress the symbolic nature of social movements.

Like Cohen and Arato (1992), they propose a synthesis between resource mobilisation and action-identity. They inject questions of meaning and identity into the strategic logic proposed by resource mobilisation theorists by situating the production of knowledge within the strategic political field in which knowledge takes shape. For Eyerman and Jamison (1991: 58), the production of knowledge does not emerge from nowhere; instead it takes place,

in the interaction between movement groups and their opponents,

in the myriad of arenas and confrontation and dialogue that make up the public sphere.

This cognitive understanding of social movements represents the most advanced attempt to link collective action and issues of meaning with reference to the arenas in which meaning takes shape. Eyerman and Jamison (1991) move beyond other accounts preoccupied with charting the terrain and target of collective action (Cohen 1985; Cohen and Arato 1992; Melucci 1985, 1988, 1989; Touraine 1985, 1987) by examining how this terrain is acted upon and realised. They chart the dimensions of 'cognitive praxis' and discuss the role of 'movement intellectuals' through case studies of the environmental and civil rights movements (Eyerman and Jamison 1991: 66-93, 120-145).

Although Eyerman and Jamison utilise a Habermasian framework to elucidate the dimensions of cognitive praxis, they do not limit their analysis to Habermas' restrictive conception of the public sphere. They offer a more inclusive understanding of the public sphere which includes the mass media. In line with Hilgartner and Bosk's (1988) competitive public arenas model, they stress the interaction between arenas, actors and media as central to the production of knowledge. For example, they highlight the role of media in propelling individuals into positions of leadership:

All activists do not participate equally in the cognitive praxis of social movements, however. Some actors are more visible as organisers, leaders or spokespersons. This visibility, often helped along by
sources outside the movement like the mass media, is the basis of the usual distinctions between the leaders and the led (Eyerman and Jamison 1991: 94).

While they agree with 'new politics' theorists regarding the decreasing distance between political leaders and the public, that is the shift from 'elite-directed' to an 'elite-directing' politics (Inglehart 1990: 338-339), which has largely been attributed to the 'levelling effect' of mass education, they also note communicative developments that have counteracted this process:

The commercialisation of cultural experience, which undermined the idea of "high culture," has removed the platform from which "intellectuals" could claim privileged insight. But at the same time new barriers have been built: the mass media and in particular its electronic variant have distanced the leaders from the led. (Eyerman and Jamison 1991: 115).

Eyerman and Jamison's cognitive praxis represents the most extensive analysis of politics of meaning. However, they stop short of specifying the role of movement-spawned parties in providing a framework for producing new knowledge. In fact, the increasing dependence of social movement organisations on professionals skilled in media relations (i.e. professionalisation) is seen as indicative of the demise of the movement. The once autonomous public space created by activist intellectuals is, in effect, 'invaded' by new professionals (e.g. in relation to the environment movement this has entailed the emergence of environmental lawyers, environmental science researchers and specialised journalists). The international organisation 'Greenpeace' and Green parties, amongst other examples, are undifferentially understood as the result of the 'parliamentary professionalisation of environmental politics' and, hence, both represent a shift from 'movement intellectuals' to 'established intellectuals'. This shift marks the decline of the movement as 'a relatively autonomous public space' (106-108).

Eyerman and Jamison's (1991: 166) distinction between 'movement' and 'established' intellectuals serves in highlighting different stages in the production of knowledge. Yet the value of viewing 'movement intellectuals' (activists) as producers of knowledge and 'established intellectuals' (professionals) as merely carriers of this movement-
generated knowledge is contradicted by Eyerman and Jamison's own interactive understanding of knowledge production:

  cognitive praxis does not come ready made to a social movement. It is precisely in the creation, articulation, formulation of new thoughts and ideas - new knowledge - that a social movement defines itself in society (55).

While Eyerman and Jamison's (1991) work represents a valuable attempt to conceptualise the symbolic aspects of movement challenges within a concrete understanding of communicative processes, their continued focus on non-institutional movement activism denies the interaction between movement activists and organised political actors. Although they acknowledge the significant role of 'established intellectuals', such as the politicians of new political parties, in 'carry(ing) the cognitive praxis of the movement on into the larger society' (166), they do not explain how such established intellectuals reshape knowledge and how political organisation affects cognitive praxis.

The theoretical developments charted above indicate a growing interest in the politics of meaning. They represent an important addition to previous collective action theories that have largely dismissed or undervalued the cognitive aspects of politics. In doing so, they provide a basis for addressing the problem of how green party formation reshapes environmental debate. Eyerman and Jamison's emphasis on the interaction between movement activists and media professionals in the process of producing new knowledge provides a particularly useful framework for this study. However, in order to extend this cognitive approach to an analysis of green parties a more explicit understanding of the role of political actors in mediating knowledge is required. The following chapter addresses this gap by sketching a more detailed picture of the dynamics of public arenas and mass media in which environmental debate takes shape.
CHAPTER THREE: MEANING, MEDIATION AND PUBLIC ARENAS

In order to examine how green party formation has affected environmental debate, it is necessary to first chart the dynamics of the public arenas in which environmental debate takes shape. In the first section I look at mass media, focusing on media practices and formats which influence what news is selected and how such news is framed. In the second section, I turn to the news-shaping activities of issue 'sponsors' (e.g. politicians and activists), and in particular to how such sponsors frame issues and events. In the final section, I focus on arenas, other than media, in which sponsors operate, such as parliament and law courts, and examine how these institutional contexts influence the message being articulated. Within each section, specific attention is paid to the role of social movements, in contrast to political parties, in shaping environmental debate.

Underlying this approach is the assumption that the meanings brought to public attention by new social movements are not simply a product of the activities of an inner circle of activists, but rather that meaning is produced in the process of dissemination and mediation of information to wider audiences. This is consistent with Eyerman and Jamison's (1991: 4) cognitive approach to social movements. They focus,

upon the process of articulating a movement identity (cognitive praxis), on the actors taking part in this process (movement intellectuals), and on the contexts of articulation (political cultures and institutions).

The chapter is structured around three key sections: mass media, sponsor activities and institutional contexts.

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1 'Sponsors' refers to individuals or organisations interested in promoting the career of a particular issue (Gamson, 1988: 225).

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Mass Media: Practices and Formats

Media do not comprise a series of neutral sites "on which various social groups, institutions and ideologies struggle over definition and construction of social reality" (Gurevitch and Levy 1985: 19), but rather are part of the process by which issue cultures are produced (Gamson and Modigliani 1989: 3). Accordingly, media professionals play an active news-shaping role by intervening in the process of transmitting messages, prioritising issues, interpreting events and excluding or including views. McQuail (1987: 52) notes the pervasive role of media in shaping interpretations of issues and events in contemporary society:

We can know relatively little from direct experience of our own society and our contact with government and political leaders is largely based on media-derived knowledge.

An understanding of the influence of media professionals and practices in the production of news, therefore, is essential in accounting for the impact of the Tasmanian Greens on environmental debate.

The message-shaping role of mass media is a central feature of two major theoretical models within media and communications literature: media hegemony and the bureaucratic model. Although both models support the view that media is active in the production of news, they emphasise different aspects of this process. While the hegemonic model specifies media ownership as critical to the production of news, the bureaucratic model focuses on media codes and practices.

The media hegemony model is derived from the Marxist tradition; however, it focuses less on economic determinants and more on ideological elements (McQuail 1987: 63). Media hegemony theorists view mass media as a reflection of dominant ideology. Media coverage is controlled directly by an established elite through media ownership and, more pervasively, through the selection of material which exhibits a pro-establishment bias and professional practices which resonate with the dominant ideology. News producers are not overtly manipulated by elites, but rather facilitate this process of ideological domination by reporting events in a way which supports the status quo, discrediting or ignoring unofficial or marginal sponsors, and promoting pro-
establishment commentaries and opinion (Altheide 1984: 478). Hall (1982) notes the subtle encroachment of a ruling ideology:

One had also to see that dominance was accomplished at the unconscious as well as the conscious level: to see it as a property of the system of relations involved, rather than as the overt and intentional biases of individuals in the very activity of regulation and exclusion which functioned through language and discourse. (Hall quoted in McQuail 1987: 66).

According to the media hegemony model, power resides in an established elite whose views prevail within a dominant ideology. News producers are accorded less influence as they reproduce, rather than challenge the dominant view. Sponsors are even more passive and dependent within the process of news production. If their views do not conform to the prevailing status quo, then they are marginalised and excluded.

Media hegemony has been identified as an important framework for studies of radical movements, which are unable to access media and whose views are suppressed by a disproportionate focus on officials and pro-establishment commentary (e.g. Gitlin's 1980 study of the SDS movement). Media hegemony has also been a useful reference point in the examination of media ownership, especially the political controls which govern such ownership. Media hegemony has, however, increasingly been challenged and refuted by a range of studies which point to more complex interactions between social norms, news producers, sources and audiences (Cancian and Ross 1981; Kielbowicz and Scherer 1986). This interactive view is more consistent with the bureaucratic model.

The bureaucratic model represents an important supplement to the media hegemony model. It draws attention to processes overlooked within this former model by shifting attention away from external agents controlling news content and focusing on the activities of news producers. Within the bureaucratic model, news is recognised as "a product manufactured by the needs of the daily paper" (Windschuttle 1988: 264). The model specifies office procedures and professional practices as critical to the process of news production.
The bureaucratic model highlights how office procedures encourage journalists to approach routine sources in search of news. Managers assign journalists with 'beats' that are covered on a regular basis. Signal's (1973) findings indicate that most media stories are from routine sources rather than enterprise channels. It is government officials and politicians operating within major institutions who are advantaged by this process, rather than movement activists. Negrine (1989: 44) shows how this orientation towards authority sources is realised in British media practices:

To regularise the flow of news and to use the news organisation's labour power efficiently, journalists are placed in institutions (Parliament, the Courts, police stations) which guarantee a regular supply of news.

In addition to the assignment of routine beats, journalists are said to have a tendency to favour 'official' versions of events and to reproduce the assumptions which underpin 'official' interpretations (Gamson and Modigliani 1989: 7). There are professional norms which operate as a check on this tendency, such as the 'balance norm'. This principle involves provision of the opportunity for both sides to tell their story. However, commentators have noted that this principle does not necessarily eradicate bias; instead it favours official version of events as journalists look for the 'establishment critic' or 'responsible spokesperson' to provide the counter argument (Gamson 1988: 226-227; Gamson and Modigliani 1989: 8).

This media preference for 'expert' sources has resulted in movement activists often being represented on the margins of debate. This is evident in the case of the early environmental movement in Tasmania (Sylow, 1994). In contrast, political parties are considered 'primary definers' within media coverage, in that they "...command greater access to the media by virtue of their claims to expert knowledge, their powerful position, or their representative status" (Hall et al 1978; Anderson 1993: 53). Government officials and politicians are key participants within debate and often define the parameters of debate.

Media selection principles, however, are more complex than simply the preference for 'experts'. Observers also point to media preference for drama, novelty and visual events (Kielbowicz and Scherer 1986;
Hilgartner and Bosk 1988: 62-63). Movement campaigns and activities, particularly protests and demonstrations, tap into media interest in drama and novelty. While this provides an avenue for extending media coverage, it also presents a dilemma for activists wanting to avoid negative media images. Activists using such tactics are more vulnerable to being stereotyped as irrational, radical and law-breaking within media coverage. This stereotyping has been noted in relation to media coverage of environmental movement activists in Australia (Sylow 1994; Doyle and Kellow 1995).

In addition to influencing what is selected, media are also active in framing issues and events. Both media codes regarding what is a good story and personal value systems are recognised as key determinants within this process:

   Journalists may draw their ideas and language from any or all of the other forums, frequently paraphrasing or quoting sources. At the same time, they contribute their own frames and invent their own clever phrases drawing on a popular culture that they share with their audience (Gamson and Modigliani 1989: 3).

Pre-established formats are particularly important in relation to how issues and events are framed within media coverage.

Due to the politically ambiguous status of movement activists and their articulation of innovative repertoires, movement activists tend to fall outside standard media political formats and frames. In contrast, party politicians are easily accommodated within such formats and frames. News producers consistently reproduce stories which accord with standard political themes, such as election speculation, political conflict, policy debate, factional fighting and politicians' personal lives. The prominent role of politics in media is also evident in the regular space allocated to political news (e.g. political supplements, political commentaries and opinion columns, and regular interviews with politicians). Negrine (1989: 195) makes a similar point in relation to television coverage of politicians and political events:

   Television devotes a large part of its journalistic resources to the task of covering general elections. News bulletins are usually extended to incorporate election coverage, current affairs programs are rearranged so as to deal with election issues and personalities, special
programs are placed in the schedules to deal with election issues, voters are invited to meet and question politicians, and so on. Specialist political correspondents also play a role in the prominent profile of politics in media. Specialist correspondents are valuable in that they encourage a regular supply of news items and, due to their high status, their political reporting often appears on the front pages of newspapers (Negrine 1989: 145).

Sponsors: Strategies and Framing

While media hegemony and the bureaucratic model have detailed the critical role of media ownership, media professionals and media practices in the process of news production, they have paid less attention to the active role of sponsors. Critics note that where studies have referred to sponsors, the focus has predominantly been on official sources such as experts, government officials and scientists (Anderson 1993: 53). The recently developed source-media relations model represents an attempt to analyse this previously under-examined dimension, non-official sources, within the process of news production (Schlesinger 1990: 62; Anderson 1993: 52). This model emphasises the role of non-official sources and their activities prior to news production:

We need to go beyond the present approach, then, and develop a model which recognises the complexity of the linkages between source activity, public attitudes, media agendas and the political domain. (Anderson 1993: 55).

The source-media relations model stresses the news-shaping capacity of sources. For example, organisations often "employ professional specialists whose daily job involves interacting with journalists" (Gamson 1988). These media professionals are highly familiar with media practices. They are aware of what events will attract media attention, they feed information to media in readily digestible formats and they establish routine relationships with journalists (Gamson 1988: 225). This media awareness is noted by Lowe and Goyder (1983) in their study of environmental groups in the late 1970s. They found over half the groups they surveyed had staff with journalistic or public relations skills.
Sponsors are said to be particularly active in the selection of different strategies for gaining media attention. Sponsors feed media with stories and information items, thus suggesting new avenues for investigation and different story angles. This perspective also recognises that sponsor activities can affect relations with news producers. When sponsors develop more sophisticated strategies for gaining media attention, opportunities for media coverage can expand (Anderson 1993: 55). Anderson (1993: 59-60) outlines the alternate strategies employed by environmental organisations. While 'Greenpeace' predominantly attracts attention through its controversial views and novel stunts, 'Friends of the Earth' rely on research and lobbying in order to gain media recognition as a reliable and informed source.

The simultaneous preference for dramatic events and reliance on routine government officials (highlighted in previous section) suggests that alternative strategies are available for pressure groups to affect media coverage. Cracknell (1993: 15-16) draws a distinction between insider and outsider strategies. Insiders "may be 'expert' organisations who are invited to contribute to governmental committees because their knowledgability is recognised", whereas outsiders "place an emphasis on unpredictability. By generating public concern or outrage through the media they hope to force the hand of government and thus get a rapid commitment to action.".

The insider/outsider dichotomy is valuable in reflecting crucial distinctions in the way the social movement-media relationship has been portrayed, in contrast to the political party-media relationship. In the absence of established contacts with media professionals, newly emergent social movements have relied on protests, demonstrations and stunts to attract media coverage (Otte 1985: 830). Social movements have been noted for their employment of highly visual campaign activities and events:

Movement events are natural 'media events'. Innovative repertoires, combined with eccentric, sometimes scandalising forms of expression, are in high demand among event hungry journalists and reporters (Pakulski 1991: 42).
In contrast, media coverage of political parties is largely dependent on routine relationships between politicians and political reporters (McQuail 1987; Windschuttle 1988; Negrine 1989). Politicians have at their disposal recognised channels for feeding media. For example, when making an announcement politicians do not have to draw together a huge crowd; instead they hold a press conference. They also issue media releases based on policy initiatives. The interdependence of journalists and politicians is well recognised (Seymour-Ure 1974: 62; Negrine 1989: 6). As Negrine (1989: 11) notes:

There can be little doubt that the mass media are a vital part of the political system. Political strategies now usually incorporate media strategies as well; indeed, the two are no longer separate.

**Framing**

Sponsors have not only been noted for the strategies they employ for gaining media attention, but are also recognised as active in the process of framing issues and events. Whereas media and communication studies use the term 'framing' predominantly in relation to how media frame stories, literature on social movements illustrates the central role movement activists play in framing events (Snow and Benford, 1988, 1992). For many movement activists, having their preferred frame circulated in mainstream coverage is a sign of success (Gamson and Modigliani 1989: 6-7).

Sociological use of the term frame can be traced to Goffman's (1974) frame analytic perspective. The term 'framing' has since become a widely used tool for understanding how movement activists, experts/officials, journalists, as well as more general categories, such as elites and media, interpret and make sense of events (Gamson 1988; Gamson and Modigliani 1989; Gamson and Wolfsfeld 1993; Tarrow 1992, 1994: 118-34; Dunwoody and Griffin 1993: 22-50; Corner and Richardson 1993: 222-33). This wide application of the term reflects its analytical utility, but also results in a degree of conceptual confusion. There are numerous examples of loose and open-ended applications of the concept of frame. For example, Tarrow's observation that the core frames of the American Civil Rights movement and Polish solidarity are, respectively, 'rights' and 'solidarity' is hardly illuminating (Tarrow 1994). In other studies it is not
always clear what is being framed and who is doing the framing (e.g. Gamson 1986). Snow and his collaborators (1986, 1988, 1992) extensive work on framing in relation to social movements is important in clarifying such vague definitions.

The specific tasks and 'signifying work' performed by sponsors in framing issues and events is most explicitly examined by Snow and Benford (1988, 1992), Snow et al (1986) and Benford (1993). They use the term 'framing tasks' to describe these activities. A frame is, according to Snow and Benford (1992: 137):

an interpretive schemata that simplifies and condenses the "world out there" by selectively punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, experiences, and sequences of actions within one's present or past environment.

Furthermore, frames introduce a moral angle. They underscore and embellish the seriousness and injustice of a social condition or redefine as unjust and immoral what was previously seen as unfortunate but perhaps tolerable.

Snow and Benford (1988: 199-204) specify three core framing tasks: diagnostic; prognostic; and motivational. The first two framing tasks, diagnostic and prognostic, are interrelated. Diagnostic framing entails movements identifying what problems need to be addressed and what are the causes of such problems. Prognostic framing, the inverse of diagnostic framing, entails movements suggesting solutions, particularly strategies for corrective action. The solution proposed often depends on initial identification of a problem. The third framing task, motivational framing, entails motivating potential participants to engage in action. This involves movements providing a rationale for action.

Although Snow and Benford's (1988) three core framing tasks (diagnostic, prognostic and motivational) were developed specifically for the analysis of social movements, they are also relevant to actors operating through the formal political system. Politicians are also in the business of identifying problems and proposing solutions. Likewise, their existence is equally dependent on mobilisation of a potential support base. Despite these common goals, there remain key distinctions in the way parties, in contrast to movements, execute framing tasks.
The first distinction which is critical in the analysis of framing is the well established view of movements as 'reactive' and political parties as 'proactive'. This refers to how activists and politicians identify problems and solutions. To some extent, this distinction reflects different modes of action. Political parties formulate policy and attempt to make changes through policy innovation. These policy statements are aimed at attracting the votes of electorates and, consequently, focus on strategies for improvement and positive ways of addressing the problem. In short, policies communicate to the electorate what a particular party will 'do' to bring about change. In his study of the West German Green Party Poguntke (1993: 109-10) alludes to the proactive nature of political parties:

The major external function of programmatic statements is to present a specific party image with which it is hoped electoral support can be attracted....In trying to maximise support, programs often become incoherent, sometimes downright contradictory. They tend to resemble warehouse catalogues where most people can expect to find something to their liking.

In contrast, movements, particularly new social movements, rely heavily on non-official modes of action, especially protest politics. Offe (1985: 830) highlights that protest demands are articulated mostly in negative logical and grammatical forms, as indicated by key words such as "never," "nowhere," "end," "stop," "freeze," "ban," etc.

This negative approach to framing is further underpinned by recent accounts which point to the 'defensive' nature of new social movements. This defensive orientation has been linked to the social bases of new social movements. The educated, middle-class supporters of these movements are viewed as incapable of challenging the capitalist system which guarantees their economic security (See Cotgrove and Duff 1980; Eckersley 1989; Offe 1985: 850-52). This is consistent with the more general observation that contemporary social movements reflect a widespread disillusionment with utopian projects. Touraine (1985: 779) refers to this phenomenon as "the disappearance of metasocial limits". Consequently, social movements mobilise in defence of specific sites, rather than harbour revolutionary ambitions for social reconstruction.
There are also critical distinctions in the frames used by social movements in mobilising participants to act, in comparison to political parties. In general, 'moral' claims tend to be more prevalent in the appeals of social movements, whereas the appeals of political parties are anchored in 'practical' economic-political concerns. This is tied to the observation that movements motivate people to act in a number of ways (eg march, strike, demonstrate, write letters, boycott), whereas political parties focus on motivating people to vote.

The reliance on practical economic-political frames is linked to the central role of economic-political issues within formal politics. Economic-political considerations are fundamental to political debate and underpin political processes. This is reflected in the major parties' programs, in the status and power bestowed to the treasurer/treasury and the amount of parliamentary time granted to pursuing the issue of economic growth. This adherence to economic-political questions is reiterated in new politics literature which points to the key distinctions between old and new politics (Berger 1979; Baker et al 1981; Offe 1985; Dalton 1988). Inglehart's (1990) post-materialist thesis illustrates important distinctions in the values and priorities of old and new political advocates. The former are concerned with economic growth and distribution of material goods, whereas the latter are concerned with more abstract issues of human rights and self-expression.

In contrast, the motivational frames articulated by social movements tend to centre on moral considerations. Contemporary social movements aligned with the new politics are recognised for their preoccupation with personal, cultural and moral questions (Melucci 1985; Touraine 1985: 780; Offe 1985: 828-9; Pakulski 1991: 40):

Social conflicts move from the traditional economic/industrial system to cultural grounds: they affect personal identity, the time and the space in everyday life, the motivation and the cultural patterns of individual action (Melucci 1985: 796).

This relates to a reorientation in the questions being raised by movements towards issues such as sexuality, ethnicity, nature and cultural practices (Offe 1985: 829), as well as to the non-compromising nature of movements:
Mass social movements do not formulate platforms and programs, or if they do, they ignore them in practice. They do not enter tactical coalitions, and, above all, they refuse to compromise on central moral issues and principles (Pakulski 1991: 36).

Although political parties have been firmly aligned with 'old politics', recent studies of new political parties suggest that the values associated with a 'new politics' are increasingly entering the formal political arena through these movement-spawned parties (Papadakis 1984, 1988, 1993; Offe 1985; Kitschelt 1989, 1990; Poguntke 1993). These studies view green parties as a synthesis of institutional and non-institutional politics. Papadakis (1988) suggests that the West German Green Party represents 'combinations of pragmatic organisation and radical orientations' and he argues that such combinations give rise to a form of 'self-limited' radicalism. In view of the ambiguous role of new political parties, this study examines how frames are currently being negotiated and realised by the Tasmanian Greens. Issues such as whether or not party formation leads to the coexistence of alternative frames, adjustment of earlier frames, substitution of frames, and, more specifically, whether or not the framing efforts of environmental activists are being refracted through established economic-political priorities, are examined in chapter five.

**Institutional Contexts**

In the previous sections, the news-shaping capacities of media and sponsors have been charted. This final section turns to the institutional contexts in which sponsors operate. Here the conventions and limitations of such institutional contexts are examined in relation to how they affect the nature of the message articulated by sponsors - social movement activists and party officials - and, thereby, influence environmental debate.

Within media and communications studies there is a tendency to limit such analyses to the immediate realm of media. More general models of the public sphere and public arenas represent an important supplement to such studies as they are able to account for processes outside this specific site. Hilgartner and Bosk's (1988) public arenas model, in particular, highlights that the public sphere is comprised of a range of interacting
arenas. They show that media coverage is conditioned not only by media-sponsored relations, but also by the institutional contexts which sponsors operate within and media professionals report on, such as parliament and law courts. They specify the limits of institutional contexts through two key concepts; 'carrying capacities' and the 'principles of selection'.

Central to Hilgartner and Bosk's (1988) public arenas model is the notion of 'carrying capacities'. Carrying capacities refers to the limits of public arenas in terms of the potential number and type of problems which can be carried at any one time:

It is this discrepancy between the number of potential problems and the size of the public space for addressing them that makes competition among problems so crucial and central to the process of collective definition (57).

Carrying capacities are identified at both the institutional and individual level. Some examples of institutional carrying capacities include the length of newspaper columns, the minutes of a radio broadcast and the number of hours per sitting of Parliament. Examples of individual 'carrying capacities' include the amount of time activists can afford, the extent of their 'compassion' and their financial situation (59-61).

In accordance with Hilgartner and Bosk's model, the messages articulated by social movements and political parties are constrained by the carrying capacities of different institutional contexts they operate within. While social movements and political parties are exposed to similar societal biases, they are ascribed quite distinct organisational roles and have different levels of access to resources, by virtue of their location in separate sites (i.e. civil society/ the state). Both Offe (1990) and Kitschelt (1990) draw attention to the institutional constraints that accompany party formation in their studies of the West German Green Party. As Kitschelt (1990: 181) notes,

Parties that, even if advertently, engage in a process of organizational dealignment must eventually come to terms with the constraints of electoral competition.

Social movements and political parties, for example, command different amounts of resources. As Offe (1990: 242) points out, there are considerable financial rewards for political parties that achieve electoral success. Political parties are provided with financial and infrastructure
support when they gain office. Politicians receive salaries, they have support staff, and they are provided with office facilities. Social movements, in contrast, are largely dependent on donations and volunteer activists. They operate on limited budgets, they have little access to infrastructure (phones/ facsimile/ photocopy machine), and rely heavily on the commitment of individual activists. There are, however, important exceptions to this rule, as some major social movement organisations are provided with financial support from the government, while others have pursued successful commercial operations that finance their activities. On the other side, there are political parties, particularly minority parties and those outside government, that are given minimal government support and remain dependent on donations and volunteer efforts.

Media coverage is also affected by conventions that dictate what problems are most likely to receive attention within a particular institutional context. Hilgartner and Bosk (1988: 64-5) refer to these conventions as the 'principles of selection'. The principles of selection that are most relevant to the two arenas, social movement and political party, are 'organisational characteristics' and 'cultural preoccupations and political biases'. Hilgartner and Bosk (1988: 65) illustrate how organisational factors affect the process of selection by comparing different arenas. For example, television news is a much more visual and immediate medium than print journalism. Consequently, television producers will favour problems which are dramatic and have exciting visuals. How 'cultural preoccupations and political biases' affect principles of selection is more difficult to illustrate. Hilgartner and Bosk assert that problem definitions which 'fit closely with broad cultural concerns' are generally more successful. This is referred to elsewhere as 'cultural resonance' (Snow and Benford 1988; Gamson 1988: 227-228).

Political parties are particularly exposed to conventions that dictate what a party should do and what it should look like. For example, a conventional political party is expected to be comprised of democratically elected leaders, produce policy and operate according to a constitution. In his study of the West German Green Party, Poguntke (1993) questions this view by showing that new political parties do not conform to 'old political' styles, but instead introduce innovative processes and programs.
Despite his insistence, the weight of political convention is evident within his account. For example, central to a party's message is its stated program. Drawing on the observations of existing political accounts, Poguntke suggests why it is critical for political parties to develop a broad political platform, rather than mobilising support around a limited range of issues:

Party programs perform a multitude of internal and external functions. They help to attract voters and members, create party identity, are instrumental for internal faction fighting, and define the space for political action against potential dissidents and competitors in the party system (Poguntke 1993: 107).

He views the development of a political platform as essential in enabling political actors to operate within the formal political system.

Movements in contrast, are not exposed to the same pressures. In relation to issue range, social movements tend to be relatively limited. The fragmentary nature of contemporary social movements underpins the notion of people mobilising around a particular instance, event or issue. A single-issue focus enables social movements to retain their potency and coherence by focusing on the principle at stake and disregarding the implications for other political concerns. This facilitates the formation of loose, temporary coalitions of participants who may be mutually opposed on other political grounds (Pakulski 1991: 35-36). Feher and Heller (1988: 37) note this distinction:

Whereas political parties without a comprehensive program are immediately found defective by their perceptive constituency, such a total view of society [which parties represent] is counter-productive for movements precisely for movements' transfunctional character.

A further organisational constraint relates to legislative roles ascribed to political parties. Political parties operate within the formal political arena in which local-state-national government boundaries underscore the parameters of debate. Parties operating at a particular level (e.g. local, state, national) have associated strategic roles which define what issues can be addressed. For example, state policy is formulated within the legislative constraints of the role of state government. In general, the issues addressed conform to established state portfolios (e.g. education, health, public transport, housing) and, subsequently, these issues are addressed in terms of benefits and implications for the particular state (e.g. Tasmania).
Social movement activists enjoy more autonomy in relation to the level at which they are able to address issues. They are able to address issues at a local or global level, without reference to established political boundaries, policies and budgetary constraints. Melucci (1985: 811) notes the particularly global and holistic focus of new social movements:

Their voice is difficult to hear because they speak from a particularistic point of view, starting from a specific condition or location as being young, being a woman, and so on. Nevertheless, they speak to the whole society. The problems they raise affect the global logic of contemporary systems.

These distinctions between the boundaries in which political parties and social movements address issues re-emerge in new politics literature. Pakulski conceptualises old politics as particularistic, and new politics as universalistic (See Pakulski 1991: 40). Likewise, Offe (1985: 831), in comparing new and old politics, notes that:

the most striking aspect is that they (new social movements) do not rely for their self-identification on either the established political codes (left/right, liberal/conservative, etc.) nor on the partly corresponding socioeconomic codes (such as working class/middle class, poor/wealthy, rural/urban population, etc). The universe of political conflict is rather coded in categories taken from the movements' issues, such as gender, age, locality, etc., or, in the case of environmental and pacifist movements, the human race as a whole.

Inglehart's (1990) theory of post-materialism also provides insight into the universal orientation associated with the new politics. His thesis aligns material values based on economic and physical security with 'old' institutional politics. These institutions address such values within nation-state political boundaries and, as McAllister (1994: 24) suggests, "through the maintenance (by force, if necessary) of territorial borders". In contrast, post-materialist values aligned with the new politics are based on quality of life and are realised through grass-roots, informal social and political action. The concerns are both personal and universal and, consequently, they transcend national boundaries.
These debates raise important questions regarding new political parties. New political parties, such as the Tasmanian Greens, are an anomaly in that they express 'post-material' values (i.e. new politics), while operating from within the formal political arena (i.e. old politics). Consequently, whether new political parties are tied to state-nation boundaries, or whether they are able to transcend these boundaries, is a question which remains unresolved. Although in his study of the West German Greens Poguntke (1993) alludes to the introduction of universalistic, global concerns in the party's program, he does not investigate at what level the party actually addresses issues within public debate. His account falls short of explaining how the institutional contexts in which green parties operate impact on the process of the nature of environmental debate. This issue is examined through the case study of environmental media coverage in chapter five.

The above outline of the arenas in which environmental debate takes shape signals key processes which need to be accounted for within this study: the role of media professionals, media-sponsor relations, framing, and the conventions associated with specific institutional contexts. The issues raised in this chapter, and in particular the distinctions between movement and party, form the basis of the proposed research questions and inform the research design detailed in the following chapter.
While chapter two illustrated how a study of the Tasmanian Greens and environmental debate engages with sociological questions raised in literature on the politics of meaning, chapter three sought to detail the arenas - mass media, movements, parties - in which this politics of meaning unfolds. Informed by this overview of how movements, parties and media interact to shape public debate, in this chapter I return to the research problem - namely how green party formation has reshaped environmental debate. I further specify the research problem, identify key research questions and propose an appropriate research method. The advantages and limitations of this method in discerning the impact of party formation on environmental debate are discussed.

Research Problem

Since the late 1980s environmental debate in mainstream media has globalised and diversified, reflecting the increasingly central role of environmental issues within scientific research communities and political arenas, as well as the expansion of support for environmental issues amongst the general public (Papadakis 1993; Crook and Pakulski 1995). Accordingly, traditional clashes between activists and developers have been complicated by the increasing profile and legitimisation of pro-environmental 'professionals' and 'experts' entering such debates, shifts in the environmental policy positions of mainstream political parties and, of particular interest here, the expansion of the environmental movement.

The expansion of the environmental movement has played an important role in facilitating a multi-faceted attack on anti-environmental practices within environmental debate. For example, action groups and organisations representing a range of environmental issues such as forest protection, coastal management, toxic chemicals and recycling, and targeting their concerns at various levels - local national and/ or global, have ensured a vocal opposition to established interests. However, diversification has also been accompanied by considerable tensions
amongst different groups and organisations. This has been particularly
the case with the formation of the Tasmanian Greens.

The consolidation of the Tasmanian Greens represents the final phase in a
long period of negotiation amongst environmental activists over whether
to enter or remain independent from party politics. Early attempts to
enter into party politics can be traced back to the Lake Pedder campaign. In
1972, several environmental activists stood for election in an effort to save
Lake Pedder from the proposed damming. These candidates formed what
was, subsequently, labelled the world's first green party, the United
Tasmania Group (UTG) (Walker 1989: 163-4). However, the lack of
parliamentary success saw these early ambitions stalled and, in the mid-
1970s, movement activists refocused on grass-roots protest outside the
parliamentary arena.

The Tasmanian Wilderness Society (WS), which arose in place of the
UTG, provided the focus of environmental activism throughout the
Franklin Dam campaign in the late 1970s and early 1980s. WS activists
were committed to the clearly defined agenda of saving Tasmania's
wilderness. Activism centred on issues such as protection of the South-
West from hydro-electric schemes, logging practices, woodchipping, world
heritage areas and threatened species. During their early campaigns to
protect wilderness, activists argued for saving wilderness for its own sake
(Easthope and Holloway 1989: 191). This position was substantially
different from previous utilitarian arguments that wanted the
environment preserved for human use and recreation.

On the wave of growing environmental support, activists began to re-
enter the parliamentary arena in the mid-1980s. In 1989 the success of five
Green Independents resulted in a hung parliament and led to the signing
of an ALP-Green accord. Two years later the Greens consolidated as an
official political party - the Tasmanian Greens. The early 1990s have been
marked by an unprecedented pursuit of formal party political strategies by
environmental activists.

In choosing to enter party politics, the Tasmanian Greens have faced the
constant dilemma between maintaining a commitment to the issues,
demands and strategies of the earlier movement and developing an
alternative agenda in line with conventional politics. Such tensions have
previously been noted in relation to the West German Greens, and in particular the trade-off between radical aspirations and conventional organisation (Papadakis 1988; Offe 1990). The nature of the earlier environmental movement has made reconciliation between competing demands particularly difficult in Tasmania. Both the strategies employed and the arguments articulated by the earlier movement have been difficult to accommodate within the parliamentary arena and have provided little scope for mobilising votes. The focused wilderness agenda and the allegiance to uncompromising, deep-green values, has provided a fairly limited basis for the development of a broader green political program. This differs from the European experience where new left alliances have provided a framework for a more encompassing reorientation in values (Inglehart 1977, 1990).

Within environmental debate, tensions between the Tasmanian Greens and environmental activists have been manifested in the distancing of green politicians from movement activists and vice versa. Contradictions between politicians and activists have arisen as the Greens have had to look beyond the immediate movement circle in order to extend their issue base. These emerging distinctions have challenged perceptions of the movement within environmental debate. Whereas previously environmental movement activists were labelled by journalists as a uniform group of 'hippies' or 'greenies', today the 'greens' refers to a specific political party, rather than to a broad movement.

Such distinctions signal growing divergences between the movement and party as the Greens become further established within the parliamentary arena. Differences in the priorities of the Greens, in comparison to movement organisations, are already evident. While the WS have continued to fight on wilderness issues, the Greens have divided their attention between economic, social justice and environmental issues. This study attempts to account for such differences and why these differences emerge by examining how the dilemmas of green party formation are being played out within environmental debate.
Research Questions

Green party formation in Tasmania has raised some real dilemmas for environmental movement activists, particularly in relation to who/what the Green party represents and the nature of the message articulated by the party in mainstream environmental debate. This study taps into these problems by posing the general question - how has Green party formation reshaped environmental debate in Tasmania? In examining this issue the study aims to provide some insight into where the party has diverged from the original message of the movement, why this divergence has occurred, what role the media has played in this process and the significance of sources in shaping environmental debate. These issues are examined through three key questions.

- Where are the Tasmanian Greens positioned within environmental debate?
- How have the Tasmanian Greens reshaped the boundaries of environmental debate? and
- How have the Tasmanian Greens reframed environmental debate?

a) Where are the Tasmanian Greens positioned within environmental debate?

Before analysing how the Tasmanian Greens have changed the content of environmental debate, it is necessary to examine whether or not they represent a prominent voice in environmental debate in comparison to other movement organisations, government officials and industry representatives within the public arena. Are the Greens primary definers within environmental debate? Do the Greens represent the environmental movement? Does their presence silence movement activists? These questions provide scope for examining the significance of party political actors within environmental debate, in contrast to the usual focus on grass-root activists by students of the politics of meaning. The purpose of such questions is to extend our understanding of the role of newly emerging environmental 'professionals', such as green party politicians, within a politics of meaning.

b) How have the Tasmanian Greens reshaped the boundaries of environmental debate?

In this second question I turn to the content of the message articulated by the Tasmanian Greens in mainstream media. 'Boundaries' refers to the
range and scope of issues linked with the Greens. Both media conventions and pressures arising from the Greens' role as a political party are viewed as potential constraints on the boundaries of debate. The need to appeal to a broad electorate and to operate effectively within the parliamentary arena, while remaining committed to the original issues which mobilised the earlier movement, is a key source of tension for the Greens. The boundaries of the Greens' issue agenda are further complicated by standard media treatment of political parties. This raises questions such as: Are there differences between the range and scope of issues addressed by the Green party and environmental movement organisations today? To what extent do media practices and media professionals affect the range of issues linked to the Greens in press coverage?

c) How have the Tasmanian Greens reframed environmental debate?
In this final question I move beyond sketching the boundaries of debate and ask how the Tasmanian Greens have reframed the nature of environmental debate. Underlying this question is the assumption that not only will the media play an important role in framing environmental debate, but so will the sources themselves. In this instance, changes in the way sources frame debate is examined in the context of the changing organisational arrangements of the environmental movement. This raises a number of questions: How do the Greens frame environmental problems and solutions? What frames are used in generating support for addressing environmental issues? Do the Greens frame environmental issues differently from the earlier movement? Do the Greens frame environmental issues differently from other contemporary movement organisations?

Research Design

In order to address these questions, environmental debate within mainstream press coverage and movement media in Tasmania is examined. The focus on mainstream media reflects a central concern with meanings and messages as they are produced and circulated within broad public arenas. The mass media are considered privileged public arenas in that they reach a broad cross-section of society (Hilgartner and Bosk 1988):
As a collective political actor, a social movement must establish itself...through communicative action to a wide audience as a force to be taken seriously, while at the same time interacting strategically with opponents. State owned and commercial mass media, as opposed to those internal media established by the movements themselves, are crucial factors in constituting these relationships (Eyerman and Jamison 1991: 139).

However, it is also important to examine movement-generated media. These materials record the arguments of movement activists independently of mainstream journalistic devices and frames, and in greater detail than mainstream media accounts.

The central research method employed to examine the impact of the Tasmanian Greens on environmental debate is content analysis. Content analysis provides a useful avenue for studying meanings circulated by and linked to political actors and organisations in the public arena (Berelson 1952: 26-90; Krippendorf 1980; McQuail 1987: 175-82).

**Media Content Analysis**

Content analysis is a well-established method which is utilised for multiple purposes and encompasses a variety of techniques. In order to obtain a broad picture of the changing nature of environmental debate, as well as a more detailed picture of media formats and source statements, both traditional methods of content analysis which generate quantitative data, and more interpretive methods which generate qualitative data, are employed.

The traditional method of content analysis is concerned principally with providing an accurate record of the number of instances a word, phrase, label, actor or theme appears in the text. Berelson (1952: 18) defines content analysis as "a research technique for the objective, systematic and quantitative description of the manifest content of communication". It claims to be objective in the sense that the results can easily be reproduced by other researchers. McQuail outlines how traditional content analysis is applied:

1. choose a universe or sample of content;
2. establish a category frame of external referents relevant to the purpose of the enquiry (e.g. a set of political parties or countries);
3. choose a 'unit of
analysis' from the content (word, sentence, item, story, picture, sequence, etc.); (4) match content to category frame by counting the frequency of the references to items in the category frame, per chosen unit of content; (5) express the result as an overall distribution of the total universe or sample in terms of the frequency of occurrence of the sought-for-referents (McQuail 1987: 183).

Although many assumptions within traditional content analysis, particularly claims of objectivity, have been challenged, this systematic, common-sense approach is valuable in getting a handle on the breadth and range of data. For example, it is important in comparing the range and scope of issues addressed by the Tasmanian Greens in comparison to other social movement organisations, particularly the WS. It is also useful in measuring the level of attention different organisations/actors receive. In emphasising frequency above context, however, this traditional method is relatively limited in explanatory application.

Traditional content analysis, therefore, is supplemented by a more interpretive and qualitative analysis. Altheide's (1987) ethnographic content analysis provides a particularly useful framework for developing a more qualitative approach. Altheide suggests that documents be viewed as ethnographic material, that is, as 'products of social interaction'. This reintroduces the actor's intentions for developing policy documents or releasing media statements, thus situating static texts within a dynamic process of social interaction. Altheide also distances himself from conventional content analyses by acknowledging the "...reflexive and highly interactive nature of the investigator, concepts, data collection and analysis" (Altheide 1987: 68).

Interpretive issues made explicit in Altheide's ethnographic content analysis are evident at all stages of the data collection. Even when frequency counts are employed, the process of constructing a coding system is still dependent on a theoretically informed understanding. Interpretive issues, however, come to the fore in the attempt to understand media content in relation to the dynamics of the public arenas. For example, they are important in understanding why the Tasmanian Greens receive media attention in relation to such wider processes as their role as local politicians, their own public relations strategies and journalists' coverage of parliamentary affairs.
Sampling Framework

The content analysis covers two key periods: before (1984) and after (1994) green party formation. This time frame provides a basis for establishing how environmental debate has changed since the formation of the Greens. While some studies have already pointed to changes to environmental debate during the late 1980s independently of the formation of the Greens (e.g. globalisation of environmental issues), by focusing on articles that explicitly mention or attribute statements to the Greens and other movement organisations, this study is able to account for the relationship between sources and environmental debates. Comparisons are made between press coverage of the Greens and contemporary environmental activists, action groups and organisations. This is important in establishing to what extent these changes can be linked the Greens.

Television, radio and newspapers are the three major media forums for articulating and disseminating information amongst the general public. Here newspapers and other printed materials are selected for examination. This selection is based on existing research which points to printed media as a primary source of information on political developments (Hansen 1993).

In Tasmania there are three state-based newspapers, The Mercury, The Examiner and The Advocate. The Mercury is recognised as being the most state-oriented newspaper, whereas The Examiner and The Advocate have a more regional focus. In view of this difference, The Mercury is selected for analysis.

All articles that had an environmental theme or that referred to environmental movement organisations were included in the samples. In 1994, the sample framework was expanded to include any article that made reference to the Tasmanian Greens or a Green politician. In 1984, 528 items were identified and in 1994, 999 items were identified. The difference in sample sizes reflects the expansion of environmental
coverage in the late 1980s and the inclusion of non-environmental articles featuring the Tasmanian Greens.¹

Although the research focuses on environmental debate within mainstream media, it also covers debates circulated within the narrower circle of movement activists and sympathisers. Internal movement media provides particular detail in relation to the way environmental activists and green politicians frame issues and events independently of the practices of newspaper journalists and editors. Materials examined include political campaign materials, policy statements, strategy documents, the Tasmanian Greens’ charter, the Tasmanian Greens’ journal, The Daily Planet, and the WS’s journal, Wilderness. The Daily Planet is produced bi-monthly and has only been in production since 1989. It is, therefore, possible to review all editions from 1989 to the present. Wilderness is also produced bi-monthly and has been in production since 1976. The analysis focuses on early publications, 1976-1984 (from the WS’s inception to the Franklin Dam), as well as on more recent publications in 1989-1995.

¹ The details of all articles collected were entered into a filemakerpro file system where they could be easily retrieved and analysed.
CHAPTER FIVE: THE IMPACT OF THE TASMANIAN GREENS ON ENVIRONMENTAL DEBATE

In this chapter, I address the problem of how green party formation has influenced environmental debate, through an examination of media coverage of such debate in the Tasmanian 'mainstream' and 'internal' movement media. I start by outlining the analytical framework and specifying how the concepts were operationalised. In the remainder of the chapter, I present the findings. These are organised around the three themes specified in the analytical framework: position in debate; the boundaries of debate; and framing of the debate.

Framework and Concepts

The analytical framework is informed by theoretical literature and studies discussed in chapter three. It is organised around three key concepts: a) position in debate; b) boundaries of debate; and c) framing of the debate.

The first concept refers to the position of political actors in public debate. 'Position' is analysed along two dimensions: (i) media attention; and (ii) mode of attracting media attention. Media and communication studies make some important distinctions in the level of attention accorded to social movement organisations, in contrast to political parties, and in the relations between news producers, social movement organisations and political parties. These studies suggest that media coverage of movement organisations tends to be sporadic and that this coverage is reliant on unofficial strategies for gaining media attention (e.g. drama and novelty). In contrast, political parties are said to receive higher and more routine levels of press coverage due to their usage of official 'insider' strategies for attracting media attention.

Operationalisation of these two dimensions entailed measurement of the level of coverage (i.e. number of times mentioned or quoted), as well as examination of the contexts in which the party and environmental organisations appeared, the prevalence of standard characterisations and storylines, and their appearance in regular columns and supplements.
The second concept refers to the *boundaries* of debate associated with social movement organisations and political parties. 'Boundaries of debate' refers to: (i) the *range* of issues (e.g. education, defence, environment); and (ii) the *scope* of issues (e.g. local, state, national, global). Differences between social movement organisations and political parties are suggested in both these dimensions. Social movement organisations are said to lean towards a focused, single-issue approach, whereas political parties develop diffuse political platforms. Social movement organisations also tend to display a degree of autonomy in the scope of issues they address. They are guided by codes which are relevant to their own experience. In contrast, political parties, are supposed to display less autonomy as established legislative roles determine the level at which they address issues.

Operationalisation of these two dimensions entailed documentation of the issues each organisation engaged in and was associated with, as well as the level at which these issues were addressed. Lists of issues were compiled in relation to the range of issues associated with the WS and the Tasmanian Greens. Attention was paid to fluctuations in the range of issues and to particular clusters of issues which consistently emerged. 'Scope of issues' included: 'local-state'; 'national'; 'international'; and 'global'.

The third concept of framing refers to how social movement organisations and political parties organise ideas and arguments in public debate. The two analytic dimensions, (i) *diagnostic and prognostic* and (ii) *motivational*, are adapted from Snow and Benford's (1988) work on framing. It is claimed that social movements tend to frame their arguments in defensive/reactive terms and that their appeals are generally moral and fundamental. In contrast, political parties begin from a proactive position and make appeals in the practical economic-political terms which dominate conventional political debates.

Operationalisation of these dimensions involved a search for key words and phrases used in the slogans and arguments articulated by the WS and the Tasmanian Greens. The context in which these words and phrases evolved was also considered; i.e. the development of arguments and appeals, the formation of the organisation, established views contested by
the organisation. Materials which specified the Tasmanian Greens' and the WS's arguments and appeals were examined, particularly movement publications and election campaign materials. Secondary sources provided background and contextual information.

The key concepts, dimensions and hypotheses relating to movement organisations and political parties are summarised in Table 5.1 below.

Table 5.1: Political Actors in Public Debate - Key Concepts and Hypotheses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Concepts</th>
<th>Dimensions</th>
<th>Movement Org.</th>
<th>Political Party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Position</td>
<td>Media Attention</td>
<td>low/sporadic</td>
<td>high/routine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mode of Attracting</td>
<td>unofficial</td>
<td>official</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boundaries</td>
<td>Issue Range</td>
<td>focused</td>
<td>diffuse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Issue Scope</td>
<td>autonomous</td>
<td>established</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Framing</td>
<td>Diag &amp; Prognostic</td>
<td>defensive/reactive</td>
<td>offensive/proactive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Motivational</td>
<td>moral</td>
<td>practical</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5.1 POSITION IN DEBATE: Media Attention, Source Strategies and Media Practices.

The central concern of this section is to examine the position of the Tasmanian Greens in environmental press coverage. Establishing where actors (organisations/individuals) are positioned is critical to understanding the extent to which they are able to influence debate and contest meaning. Media and communication studies use the term 'primary definers' (Hall et al 1978) to refer to individuals who occupy a privileged site within the public arena and who "command greater access to the media by virtue of their claims to expert knowledge, their powerful position, or their representative status" (Anderson 1993: 53). Individuals or representatives of an organisation are recognised as primary definers when they receive routine press coverage, when they are quoted directly and when their views are granted legitimacy in the public arena. Becoming a primary definer often entails being recognised as an official source or expert and being part of established institutions (e.g. parliament/legal courts).

The extent to which the Tasmanian Greens have positioned themselves as primary definers in local press coverage is the key question addressed here. In the first part, I evaluate whether or not the Tasmanian Greens are primary definers by examining media attention they receive. The level of media attention is measured (i.e. high/low, sporadic/routine) and is compared with other key spokesgroups, particularly the WS. In the second part, I examine the Tasmanian Greens' mode of attracting media attention. This includes an analysis of the Tasmanian Greens as a media source (i.e. strategies for gaining press coverage), as well as, an analysis of media practices (i.e. routine beats, specialist commentators/journalists and media formats).
Media Attention

Environmental pressure groups and organisations have been noted for their focus on and heavy usage of mass media (Lowe and Goydner 1983; Cracknell 1993; Hansen 1993). Mass media have provided important forums for raising public awareness of such organisations, their activities and the problems they are addressing. The Tasmanian environmental movement is no exception.

In the 1970s and early 1980s, the Tasmanian environmental movement orchestrated major public, media-targeted campaigns in order to draw attention to environmental problems in Tasmania. Of particular concern were the Hydro-Electric Commission's (HEC) power generating schemes, which directly threatened Tasmania's South-West wilderness. Although a number of semi-permanent action groups and environmental organisations engaged with the local press in their campaign to protect the South-West\(^1\), the WS, formed in 1976, was by far the most effective and heaviest user of mass media. Throughout the Franklin Dam debate (1982-84), one of Australia's most renowned environmental campaigns, the WS organised major blockades and mass rallies directed at gaining media attention. It also used powerful emotive images of wilderness juxtaposed against destructive bulldozers in order to mobilise support (Easthope and Holloway 1989). The WS's media-targeted strategies were described by observers as a 'public relations masterstroke' (Lambert Wilderness 1983, no.19: 7).

During the Franklin Dam debate WS activists established themselves as key environmental antagonists in Tasmania and, accordingly, were the most prominent environmental representatives within local press coverage in 1984 (See Figure 5.2). The WS's national expansion in 1984 positioned the organisation as a serious political force and thereby guaranteed the WS a more central and permanent public profile within environmental debate. This national profile, combined with a network of media-smart activists, set the foundations for ongoing symbiotic engagement between the WS and media. However, by the late 1980s the

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\(^1\) Lake Pedder Action Committee; The United Tasmania Group; and The South-West Action Group.
WS had been displaced as the major environmental spokesgroup in Tasmania by green political representatives - the Green Independents and then the Tasmanian Greens. The fielding of Green Independent candidates gave rise to a new pro-environmental voice located within the formal political arena. This development was clearly reflected in local press coverage (See Figure 5.2).\(^2\)

**Figure 5.2: Coverage of Key Environmental Spokesgroups in Environmental Articles - The Mercury, 1984 & 1994 (%).**

![Graph showing percentage coverage of environmental articles for different spokesgroups in 1984 and 1994.]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Spokesgroup</th>
<th>1984</th>
<th>1994</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greenpeace</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACF</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tas Greens</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TCT = Tasmanian Conservation Trust  
ACF = Australian Conservation Foundation  
WS = Wilderness Society

It must be noted that in the late 1980s press coverage of environmental debate underwent substantial changes both in Tasmania and elsewhere (Einsiedel and Coughlan 1993; Pakulski and Crook 1995; Sylow 1994). The environment became recognised as a major public concern and, accordingly, was afforded greater legitimacy and space in press coverage. When five Green Independents stood for election in 1989 they received unprecedented media attention. In fact, they enjoyed 'disproportionate coverage' in comparison to the other major political parties throughout the election campaign:

\(^2\) Since most newspaper articles feature multiple spokesgroups, the categories represented in Figures 5.2, 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5 are not mutually exclusive.
[The media] treated the campaign as a three way contest, even to the extent of giving the Green Independents' policy launch similar coverage to that accorded the major parties. The Greens' claim that they were a group of 'likeminded individuals' rather than a formal political party did little to temper the newspapers' coverage of them or their policies (Tanner 1993: 184).

However, media attention did not culminate until after the election when five Green candidates won office, resulting in a hung parliament. This triggered off a spate of press coverage, particularly in relation to negotiations over the signing of the ALP-Green Accord. Nine months later, media interest was reignited by the breakdown of the Accord:

the Tasmanian newspapers managed to wring every ounce of coverage possible out of the split. They fed upon the emotionalism of the debate and built an element of suspense into the negotiations - if only by reporting that attempts were being made to save the Accord (Tanner 1993: 188).

Although excitement surrounding the 1989 election eventually subsided, the Green Independents did not disappear from press coverage. Instead they consolidated their position as a formal party, the Tasmanian Greens, in 1991 and continued to actively engage in local political debate. They also established themselves as the key pro-environment voice within press coverage, even outside election periods. Figure 5.2 shows that in 1994, a non-election year, the Tasmanian Greens had displaced the WS as the major environmental spokesgroup. The Greens were referred to in almost twice as many environmental articles (161) as the WS (80). The media exposure accorded the Greens was further accentuated when coverage was extended to non-environmental issues. In fact, the Greens' media profile doubled in size (161 to 333 articles).

Being recognised as the key environmental spokesgroup amongst other environmental movement organisations, networks and action groups, does not mean that the Tasmanian Greens have necessarily positioned themselves as primary definers. It is also essential that the coverage of the Greens is compared with coverage of other key spokesgroups outside the movement. Figure 5.3 indicates that in 1994 the Greens enjoyed less coverage within environmental debate than the state Liberal government (38%), but more coverage than the opposition, the Australian Labor Party (ALP), (8%). Although the Tasmanian Greens did not command the same
attention within environmental debate in 1994 as state governments (39%), federal government (19%) and industry (32%), they did feature within more environmental articles than local government officials (14%) and scientific experts (13%) (See Figure 5.4).

Figure 5.3: Coverage of Tasmanian Political Parties in Environmental Articles - The Mercury, 1994 (%).

Figure 5.4: Key Spokesgroups in Environmental Articles - The Mercury, 1994 (%).
While 'government officials', including major political party leaders and bureaucrats, continue to dominate environmental debate, Figure 5.5 shows that the gap between such officials and environmentalists is narrowing. Environmental bodies now represent a significant oppositional voice to recognised government officials, featuring in 50% of 1994 environmental articles. Notably, the Tasmanian Greens have been a driving force behind the environmental movement's expanded voice in press coverage.

Although the Tasmanian Greens have not displaced government officials within environmental debate, they do enjoy significant levels of media attention in comparison to other segments of the environmental movement. Consequently, the label 'primary definer' can be tentatively applied to them. In order to understand why the Tasmanian Greens have achieved this position, it is necessary to examine two interrelated processes identified by Gamson (1988) which comprise the symbiotic relationship between media sources and media practitioners. The first is 'source strategies'; that is, what individuals/groups do to attract media attention and project their views to wider audiences. The second is
'media practices'; that is, what journalistic practices operate to favour particular groups and to ensure particular voices are included or excluded from press coverage. The analysis of these processes reveal some clear differences in the way the Tasmanian Greens are able to access media coverage in contrast to environmental organisations, such as the WS.

Mode of Attracting Media Attention

Source Strategies

In the early 1980s, the environmental movement in Tasmania, led by the WS, was very successful in mobilising public support and targeting the media. It skilfully used the media preference for action, drama, performance and novelty. Environmental movement activists focused on action and drama partly because they did not have formal, routinised access to the local press. Instead, activists utilised standard movement repertoires, such as blockades, marches and mass rallies, for commanding media attention (Kielbowicz and Scherer 1986; Gamson and Wolfsfeld 1993). This inevitably resulted in activists being stereotyped as oppositional, law-breaking and anti-development. During this period, conflict scenarios were a central feature of environmental press coverage.

Throughout the Franklin Dam dispute, WS activists were consistently portrayed in local media in opposition to the State government and the HEC (Sylow 1994: 205). In subsequent environmental disputes over forest protection, world heritage boundaries, logging and development of alternate power schemes, the WS continued to be pitched in opposition to state government, as well as to local industry leaders.3 In fact, the WS came to accept state government opposition as a predictable feature of environmental debate:

A co-director of the Wilderness Society, Mr Chris Harris, said the national park proposal had been mooted two years ago but the Government simply was opposed to anything that smacked of conservation (The Mercury 11/8/84: 3).

3. 'New park battle looming' The Mercury 10/3/84: 1;
'OTD ready to fight greenies' The Mercury 12/3/84: 3;
'Greenies could cost hundreds of jobs: Gray' The Mercury 16/11/84: 12;
'Greenies hit back at Gray attack' The Mercury 17/11/84: 11.
Environmental news at this stage was a mixture of apolitical environmental-scientific research stories and fiercely divisive environmental battles between activists and public authorities.

Despite significant changes in the nature of environmental debate, particularly the growing presence and legitimacy of environmental groups and organisations in press coverage (Lowe and Goydner 1983; Hansen 1993; Sylow 1994), in the early 1990s press coverage of the WS continued to be characterised by conflict. Words such as 'dispute', 'row', 'controversy', 'protest', and 'opposition' reappeared throughout headlines of articles that mentioned the WS, a decade after the Franklin Dam dispute, for example, 'Bid to end ALP forest dispute', 'Rally points to state logging row', 'Conservationists slam police', 'Forestry fight defused by pre-debate discussion', 'Anger grows at link road plan', 'Regrowth core of dispute', 'UN help sought to keep war out of wilderness', 'Protesters call for joint effort to save forests', 'Bitter bout on world heritage funding' and 'Green fury at new licence' (emphasis mine - MG).

When the Tasmanian Greens emerged in the early 1990s, more formal strategies for gaining media attention began to be employed, particularly those associated with established political parties. The Greens adopted standard strategies used by government media officers and press secretaries, in an effort to establish the party as a serious political contender, and promote themselves as a legitimate, official voice of the movement. This entailed the Greens feeding media systematically with releases, developing policy documents and strategy plans, cultivating the public profile of key leaders, attaching expert labels to spokespeople, and in particular initiating political attacks on marginal electorates and fuelling speculation surrounding electoral outcomes.

Early media coverage of the Tasmanian Greens focused principally on their novelty value. Realising that this media interest would eventually go stale, the Greens set about establishing themselves as a serious political force and a party not to be dismissed as single-issue or amateurs.4

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peculiar parliamentary electoral system in Tasmania, the Hare-Clark system, which grants minor parties a relatively high success rate, added credibility to claims regarding their electoral prospects. In view of their early electoral success and a favourable electoral system, observers found it increasingly difficult to dismiss the Tasmanian Greens as a group of marginal political actors. The Greens were able to exploit this by using their electoral standing in environmental campaigns.\textsuperscript{5} For example, at the Greens' state conference in 1994, leader Christine Milne announced the party's intention to

direct Green preferences away from the ALP in 12 marginal mainland seats in a bid to pressure the Federal Government to intervene to stop the Heemskirk link road on the West Coast and to end logging in old-growth forests (The Mercury, 17/10/94: 1-2).

A further source strategy utilised by the Tasmanian Greens was the effective use of leadership to command media attention. They successfully tapped media interest in key figures, heroes, celebrities and self-proclaimed experts. This strategy was not exclusive to the Tasmanian Greens, but was also utilised successfully by the earlier movement. Bob Brown, the director of the WS, during the time of the Franklin Dam was portrayed within the media as a mythical figure, a guardian of the wilderness and even a 'prophet' (Flanagan 1990: 130-132). However, the party differed from the movement in that it systematically generated leaders. The formation of the Tasmanian Greens in the early 1990s generated a band of leaders portrayed as political candidates. These Green candidates were actively promoted and their public profiles cultivated within the public arena for specific political ends. This was particularly the case for the Greens' leader, Christine Milne, who started to feature prominently within news articles and headlines:

Christine Milne suffers unfairly;
Historians have been silent for too long-Milne;
Milne eyes cabinet post;
Milne fears on MPs rejected by probe boss;
Franklin fracas backfires on Milne;
Milne call for pupil psychiatric help;

\textsuperscript{5} 'Link road a state issue-feds' The Mercury 18/10/94: 5;
'Political front sees a surge of Green' The Mercury 22/11/94: 9;
Labor's greening driven by polling-Milne;
We have never been wrong: Christine Milne tells Moya Fyfe of her vision of a surging wave of Green.

Unlike the folk-hero status extended to key activists in the environmental movement, Tasmanian Green leaders, by virtue of their status as political candidates, were recognised within the media as 'official' sources. This official status was underscored by the allocation of 'portfolios' and formal titles that identified the Tasmanian Greens as 'quasi-authorities': Tasmanian Greens' small business spokesperson; Greens' energy spokesperson; Greens' social justice spokesman; Greens' mining spokeswoman; and forestry spokeswoman.

Media Practices

The use of confrontational tactics by environmental activists, particularly WS activists, during the early 1980s, was in part a response to frustration with media practices that excluded activists views and kept them at the margins of debate. Early movement activists were not strategically located in arenas which received routine coverage, such as parliament and legal courts. They did not enjoy regular contact with journalists and their ambiguous political identity did not conform to the media formats that privileged party political matters. At the time of the Franklin Dam debate, such media practices resulted in press coverage focusing principally on federal and state government relations and political outcomes, rather than activists' views and activities. This preoccupation with party political concerns limited WS activists' input within debate and trivialised their independent campaign activities. It was only after it became clear that the conservation vote had important implications at federal and state elections that media attention focused on WS activists, at least in the short term. In the long term, the WS's strategy of retaining independence from the formal political arena meant that the WS operated against, rather than with, mainstream media practices.

With the emergence of the Tasmanian Greens, broader opportunities for media attention were opened up to the environmental movement. By virtue of their institutional status, the party leaders were better positioned to take advantage of media practices, such as the tendency to privilege 'officials' as natural sources of information and to give routine coverage of party political forums. The Tasmanian Greens satisfied the media's
obsession with party politics, and they were more easily accommodated within standard media formats. Press coverage of the Tasmanian Greens in 1994 shows that the party was recognised as part of the regular political scene. This was evident in daily coverage that linked the Tasmanian Greens to a host of party political issues: MP pay rises; women in politics; parliamentary inquiries; legislative council; election speculation; election results; minority government; leadership struggles; state/federal budget; parliament events/ antics; and political resignations. Subsequent election campaigns have also been cast as a three-way contest between the Liberal Party, the ALP and the Tasmanian Greens.

Media preoccupation with election speculation has provided particular advantages for the Tasmanian Greens in gaining press coverage. Themes that fuel election speculation, such as 'the green vote', 'minority government' and 'hung parliament', were regularly recycled within 1994 news articles and often used as news hooks. This was reflected in headlines such as 'Hate that won't heal-why Labor and the greens will never share power' (The Mercury 27/11/94: 21), 'Labor MPs no deals agreement' (The Mercury 6/12/94), 'Greens set to share power' (The Mercury 18/12/94: 2) and 'Greens play Brown trump' (The Mercury 18/12/94: 18). Inclusion of the Tasmanian Greens in opinion polls, and subsequent analyses of such results, provided a further avenue for cultivating media attention.

In addition to general news coverage, 'party politics' re-emerged in commentaries, opinion pages and specialised, regular news columns allocated specifically to political reporting, such as The Mercury's weekly political column 'The State'. The Tasmanian Greens featured regularly within 'The State'. They were sourced or mentioned in 21 of these columns throughout 1994. By comparison, the WS were only mentioned in 4 columns, all of which also sourced/mentioned the Tasmanian Greens. Seven of 'The State' headlines, in fact, suggested the centrality of the Green Party and environmental issues to state politics:

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Movement organisations, such as the WS, were less likely to feature in such columns, as they tended to fall outside the boundaries of what news makers constructed as political. Notably, they were also generally excluded from specialised environmental columns, as these columns primarily covered apolitical issues such as scientific-environment research, outdoor recreational pursuits and nature-based stories. Movement organisations were not as easily accommodated within regular media formats; nor did they tap standard media practices to the same extent as their political counterparts, the Tasmanian Greens. As Gamson and Wolfsfeld (1993: 117) note, while movements do "make good copy for media" they "must not only compete with other potential newsmakers but are forced to start the race much further back on the track".

Domination or Coexistence

The strong symbiotic relationship between party politics and news makers has resulted in the Tasmanian Greens articulating their message from a more privileged position than those of other movement organisations. Although environmental groups have been recognised for their particular media orientation (e.g. Lowe and Goydner 1983; Hansen 1993), the results here indicate that political status has some clear advantages in gaining systematic and serious media attention. The Tasmanian Greens' political status is more conducive to developing an established media profile.

The Tasmanian Greens' ascendancy within environmental press coverage can be viewed as an important access point for the voice of the entire environmental movement or, more negatively, it can be seen as indication of an organisational take-over by the Tasmanian Greens that results in the increasing marginalisation of other environmental
organisations and activists. The first view is held by those who see party formation as a progressive step towards political maturity by the environmental movement. The second view is held by those who fear the inevitable oligarchic reorientation that accompanies party formation, and subsequent divisions between an emerging political elite and grassroots constituents.

Strategies available to political leaders for counteracting the marginalisation of other environmental activists, include acknowledgment of the role of other actors and their diverse points of view, the passing on of acquired media skills to non-institutional actors, and engagement with other environmental activists and supporters within alternative forums. For example, the Tasmanian Greens have established an activists' page within their own journal, The Daily Planet, in an attempt to encourage input from grass-roots activists and facilitate links between activists and party leaders.

Even with the implementation of such strategies, the dynamics of the mainstream media coverage remain relatively unchanged. Being in the 'right' place remains central to obtaining extensive coverage. However, Gamson (1988) makes the critical point that coverage of official voices is often reliant on the actions of less visible, marginal, non-institutional actors. These actors play a critical role in initiating contacts between media and officially recognised actors by providing the conditions for media coverage. Gamson (1988: 235) notes this dualistic strategy in relation to the nuclear power movement: "When demonstrators are arrested at Seabrook, phones ring at UCS (Union of Concerned Scientists)". Likewise, the coexistence and mutual dependency between the Tasmanian Greens and movement activists is not necessarily invalidated by the party's dominant position in press coverage.

The question of whether this privileged coverage represents an 'organisational take over' that will overshadow the message of other movement activists or whether it represents a new access point for articulating the message of environmental movement activists, cannot be fully appreciated without understanding the role of the Tasmanian Greens as key mediator. Consequently, the following two sections examine how the messages of the environmental movement are transformed when they become mediated by the Tasmanian Greens.
5.2 BOUNDARIES OF DEBATE: Issue Range and Scope

This section examines how the boundaries of environmental debate are reshaped with party formation. It focuses on the boundaries of debate associated with the Tasmanian Greens and WS in Tasmanian media coverage. Boundaries of debate are defined here in terms of the range of issues (limited/broad) and scope of issues (local/national/global).

Issue Range: Diffuse Political Platform

The environmental movement in Tasmania is characterised by its focus on wilderness conservation (Hay and Haward 1988). In the early 1980s, the WS campaigned and mobilised support around a specific set of wilderness concerns, reflecting a tight, focused agenda. Wilderness protection, logging, woodchipping, world heritage nomination, protection of natural river systems and endangered species took precedence over urban-related environmental issues, such as smog, acid rain, chemical pollution, nuclear waste and nuclear power. This wilderness-centred approach remained relatively unchanged over the past decade, despite significant transformations within environmental debate, particularly the globalisation of environmental issues (greenhouse effect, ozone layer), and despite changes to the organisation itself (the WS became a national organisation in 1984). Although the original wording of the WS's 1977 mission statement was slightly altered, the central theme remained the same:

The Wilderness Society aims to foster wilderness. It aims to promote the concept of rights of wilderness, to prevent its destruction, and secure its future. The Wilderness Society also aims to enlarge the area of wilderness, and promote ideas and actions which will enhance humanity's understanding, enjoyment and protection of Earth's natural environment (Wilderness 1994, no.139: 3).

This continued focus on wilderness conservation was also reflected in press coverage. The WS was predominantly linked to a narrow band of wilderness concerns such as damming, logging, woodchipping, world heritage areas and opposition to development in environmentally sensitive areas.
Such a tight, focused agenda accords with the 'transfunctional' character of social movements (Feher and Heller 1988: 37; Pakulski 1991: 35-36), allowing activists to unite and mobilise a range of supporters who may in other respects hold opposing views. In concentrating campaigning around key wilderness issues, the WS has attracted supporters from a cross-section of society. This unifying strategy is captured in the commonly quoted phrase "Everybody loves the Wilderness Society" (Geoff Lambert, 'A Watershed' *Wilderness* 1983, no.19: 4-7).

Spawned from such a wilderness-oriented movement, the Tasmanian Greens continued to actively engage with the issues that mobilised the movement in the 1970s and 1980s: damming; logging; wilderness protection; and endangered species. Simultaneously, they embraced a broader range of environmental issues and, more contentiously, developed an all-encompassing political platform that addressed economic and social issues. Whereas the WS specified a clear aim to 'foster wilderness', the Tasmanian Greens viewed their role as a broad-based political force. This is evident in the Tasmanian Greens' charter:

> Reflecting an awareness of the interrelatedness of all ecological, social and economic processes, the general principles of The Greens are: ecology, democracy, social justice, peace, an ecologically sustainable economy, meaningful work, culture, information, global responsibility, long-range future focus (Tasmanian Greens *The Charter of the Greens Constitution Draft 5, June 1994: vi-vii*).

This broadened issue-agenda developed and expanded further, as the Tasmanian Greens consolidated as a party. Yet even during early political campaigns Green Independent candidates promoted themselves as having a broad-based approach that extended beyond environmental concerns. Prior to the 1989 State election, for example, Gerry Bates argued this point in a response to accusations that sought to undermine the credibility of Green candidates as serious political contenders: "He said the Greens were not single-issue and had produced policies right across the board" (*The Mercury* 7/5/89: 1). In a further effort to transcend the single-issue label, Green Independent candidates spoke out on a range of non-environmental issues, such as education, health, youth, Aboriginal land rights, small business, and housing, throughout the 1989 election
Their policies were also compared with the policies of the major parties on 35 different issues. Such efforts by the Greens to publicise their wider agenda during election campaigns is consistent with Poguntke's (1993) understanding of the role of party programs and particularly with the need to situate the party within the broader political landscape.

The 1989 ALP-Green Accord further highlighted the necessity of developing a comprehensive policy agenda. Following the formation of a hung parliament in 1989, the Greens entered in negotiations with the major parties in order to form government. Their vulnerability within this process was accentuated by the lack of a pre-formulated package of priorities and policy guidelines that could form the basis of negotiations:

She [Greens leader Christine Milne] said that when the Greens held the balance of power in 1989 they had not been prepared but the party now was following the example of the Alliance in New Zealand and drawing a range of "bottom-line" policies as the basis for negotiations with the major parties after the next election (The Mercury 17/10/94: 1-2).

In response, the Tasmanian Greens have instituted formal processes for formulating policy, and have established forums, such as local electoral division meetings and the party's annual conference, in order to generate, debate and ratify party policies.

The Tasmanian Greens have since developed a comprehensive set of policy statements that comprise a full political platform. The Party's 1992 election policies illustrate the diversity of their agenda. Their policies encompass social concerns such as AIDs, youth affairs, education and health, economic concerns such as industrial relations, business, and employment, and environmental concerns including forestry, national parks, urban planning and coastal management (See Appendix A for a comprehensive list). Notably, the Greens have formulated policies that relate to all the major government portfolios.

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Although the Tasmanian Greens have often accused mainstream journalists of inaccurately portraying the Greens as a single-issue environmental lobby group, analysis of 1994 local press coverage shows that this is not the case. In fact, as was highlighted in the previous section, the Greens have tended to be portrayed within local press as a third political force, reflecting the reliance of journalists on established party-political frames and formats. Accordingly, the Greens' broadened agenda was evident in press coverage in 1994. Table 5.6 shows that the Greens were linked with non-environmental issues just as often, if not more often, as with environmental issues and concerns. In comparison, environmental movement organisations generally, and the WS specifically, were associated predominantly with environmental issues and concerns.

Table 5.6: Issues Linked to Environmental Bodies in Press Coverage - The Mercury, 1994 (%).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Issue</th>
<th>Tas Greens</th>
<th>Mov. Orgs</th>
<th>WS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-environment</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Articles</td>
<td>(333)</td>
<td>(220)</td>
<td>(88)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Tasmanian Greens' expanded agenda challenges the public perception and the media's representation of the category 'environment'. Associations between environmental and non-environmental issues serve to blur the boundaries separating the 'environment' from other issue-area and broader social concerns. For example, in 1994 press coverage Green MPs made explicit statements connecting public information and environmental damage. They drew attention to the need for more effective Freedom of Information (FOI) legislation in order

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to ensure that decisions that lead to environmentally damaging practices were open to public scrutiny:

Tasmanian Greens Leader Christine Milne said the move to exempt the corporation from the scrutiny of Freedom of Information would make it even more difficult to expose the level of public subsidy of losses on forest operations (The Mercury 9/2/94: 4).

FOI was also recognised as an important vehicle for monitoring environmentally damaging practices:

"The Ombudsman's decision is highly significant because it can now be used as a precedent to obtain the release of information with respect to other polluting industries throughout Tasmania" Dr. Bates said. The Greens had been arguing the issue with the DELM for many months (The Mercury 24/3/94: 4).

Tasmanian Green MPs also explicitly linked environmental damage with government financial mismanagement and government accountability. In terms of financial mismanagement, they pointed to the costs of the government's hydro-industrialisation development policy:

Tasmanian Greens leader Christine Milne said the King and Anthony schemes - which cost taxpayers $760 million - were built to keep West Coast support for the Liberal government. "Every teacher, every policeman, every public servant who have lost their jobs have had that happen to them because 44 per cent of the state debt is the Hydro's" Mrs Milne said (The Mercury 2/3/94: 5).

More explicitly,

But Mrs Milne said: "Finally someone in the Hydro has prepared a report that has spelt out the terrible costs to Tasmania of hydro-industrialisation" (The Mercury 8/5/94: 1-2).

Government accountability was also recast by Tasmanian Green MPs as an issue that had environmental implications. The Greens highlighted the need for public accountability and public control over powerful organisations such as the HEC:

"In simple language what that means is the new corporation will be totally separate from ministerial control", she [Green MP- Peg Putt] said. "Mr Groom has learnt nothing from the runaway environmental destruction of the largely autonomous HEC, which has taken years to bring under control, and is instead set to repeat the scenario. Corporatisation of forestry as peddled by Mr Groom
represents a massive loss of public control and accountability" (The Mercury 21/2/94: 7).

In another extract, Green MP Gerry Bates drew the issue of public accountability into a small environmental dispute over the felling of trees: He [Green MP- Gerry Bates] said his comments were not just about the felling of the trees but were a warning to all public officials such as Warden Norris that they could not do whatever they wanted to, whenever they wanted to, regardless of the laws, without the expectation of being put under the public spotlight (The Mercury 21/2/94: 6).

Linkages between issues are further facilitated by the Greens' constant attacks on political opponents and by negative portrayals of the government within mainstream media. Although all movement and action groups are inclined to attack government officials for their action (or inaction), there are even higher political incentives for party politicians to do so. By highlighting government financial mismanagement and lack of accountability, Tasmanian Green MPs are able to undermine the credibility of their opponents and strengthen their own image as an effective alternative. This is evident in the explicit linking of environmental and economic issues by the Tasmanian Greens. Such connections serve to discredit existing government policy and improve the Green MPs' image as good politicians and responsible economic managers.

Linkages between economic and environmental issues made by the Greens have been particularly important within environmental debate in mainstream media. The Greens have used economic issues as leverage for improving environmental protection:

But Greens Leader Christine Milne said more World Heritage areas would enhance Tasmania's appeal to tourists and so create jobs...."Rather than continue to give away our mineral and forest resources for no effective return to Tasmania, we should instead protect these areas so that they can create jobs and wealth." she said (The Mercury 21/1/95: 5).

Economic issues have also been used to pressure governments to act to prevent environmentally damaging practices

But Tasmanian Greens Leader Christine Milne said this was not good enough. She said the Federal Government's decision to extend the
deadline for Pasminco to stop sea dumping for two years had undermined Tasmania's push to enter the $9 million Asian food market. "The private sector and government have been working up the 'Clean Country' proposals, a whole marketing strategy underpinned by the image of food from a clean, healthy environment," Mrs Milne said. "The strategy has now been compromised by the decision to allow continued ocean dumping off Tasmania of jarosite, which contains heavy metals including mercury and cadmium" (The Mercury 5/2/94: 6).

In maintaining a narrow, focused agenda, movement activists do not develop issue-linkages to the same degree as party politicians. While party formation broadens the message of the movement and generates a more coherent, inclusive and systematised political package, at the same time the potency of the message is potentially undermined through a diffusion of the movement's original agenda.

**Issue Scope: Established Political Boundaries**

The global orientation of the environmental movement has emerged from ecological principles specifying the interconnectedness of nature, as well as from increasing awareness of global environmental problems such as the greenhouse effect and the ozone layer (e.g. Bookchin 1980; Spretnak and Capra 1985; Einsiedel and Coughlan 1993). In accordance with this global approach, environmental movement leaders in Tasmania have effectively worked at incorporating a local-global dynamic into their activism. Even in the early environmental campaigns, activists in Tasmania combined grass-roots localism with an international outlook and global awareness.

When formed in 1976, the WS was grounded in local concern for Tasmania's South-West. However, WS activists recognised that the idea of wilderness preservation had global implications. While early Wilderness publications debated happenings at home, these debates were often set against global concerns:

Associated with this debate was a continuous linking of the south-west of Tasmania to more universal issues of wilderness: there were attempts to set the south-west in a world perspective in all but three
[of nineteen] issues. For example an article in no.3 'Wild Lands of the Roaring Forties' linked wilderness areas in Tasmania to wilderness areas in Patagonia and New Zealand. Such linkages gave a local dispute global meaning to members. The debate was over 'Not just a River' (as one book produced after the campaign was entitled; McQueen 1983) but over the sacred nature of wilderness everywhere (Easthope and Holloway 1989: 195).

Explicit attempts to adopt a global perspective were also evident in the decision to allocate regular journal space to international environmental happenings. In the first five editions there was a specific section called 'International Wilderness'. The significance of international issues is captured in this extract:

At the inaugural meeting of the TWS it was suggested we launch an international alliance of wilderness groups by contacting other conservation organisations with a view to approaching the problem of wilderness conservation with an international perspective. So far the TWS has promoted this perspective with at least one article of international significance in every issue of the Journal. The importance of the South West can only be appreciated by realising the international significance of its desecration (Wilderness 1977, no.3: 21).

Despite the intentions of early movement activists, this global orientation did not penetrate into mainstream media coverage. The global connections were lost on local journalists preoccupied with electoral implications and federal-state relations throughout the Franklin dam debate. This was particularly apparent in The Mercury - a paper which consistently adopted a pro-state and local perspective (Crook and Pakulski 1995).

Ironically, national priorities began to supplant the WS's earlier local-global orientation at a time when mainstream media were becoming increasingly receptive to the global context of environmental issues (Einsiedel and Coughlan 1993; Crook and Pakulski 1995). The WS's national expansion following the Franklin Dam debate in 1984 combined with federal government initiated leverages for change - such as world heritage listing, native title recognition, and control over woodchip licensing - encouraged a national orientation. Amongst later Wilderness editions there was less debate over the concept of 'wilderness' and over
the philosophical issues raised by leading activist Kevin Kieran. Instead, later editions were packed with Australia-wide campaign news. By the 1990s the local-global orientation of earlier WS activists was clearly overlaid with state-nation priorities. This was reflected in local press coverage in which the WS was depicted as engaged in issues at a state, global and, most significantly, at a national level (See Table 5.7 below), and evident in the WS's 1994 campaign priorities which targeted local, global and international issues:

- Forests
- Cape York Peninsula
- Wilderness Education
- Outback (arid and semi-arid) wilderness
- Commonwealth wilderness protection
- International protection

(*Wilderness* 1994, no. 139: 10).

The Green Independents appeared in the late 1980s when environmental press coverage was becoming increasingly globalised (Einsiedel and Coughlan 1993: 140; Crook and Pakulski 1995). This period represented an opportune moment for projecting the global agenda articulated by the earlier movement into the mainstream environmental debate. In accordance with the global orientation of the earlier movement and new political parties elsewhere, the Tasmanian Greens set global concerns as a priority. The need to 'think global' was explicitly recognised in the party's charter:

**Global Responsibility**

- to promote equity between nations and peoples by:
  - facilitating fair trading relationships;
  - providing for increased development assistance and concerted international action to abolish Third World debt;
  - providing increased green technology transfer and skills to developing countries;
  - opposing human rights abuses and political oppression'  
  - ensuring that Australia plays an active role in promoting a peace and ecological sustainability (*Tasmanian Greens The Charter of the Greens Constitution Draft 5, June 1994: vii*).

Although these global ideals were promoted within the Tasmanian Greens' charter, traditional political boundaries played a more defining
role in the level of issues addressed by Green MPs. Despite attempts to inject state politics with a global perspective, the Tasmanian Greens' participation in environmental debate was primarily state-focused. In comparison with other environmental movement organisations, such as the WS, the Tasmanian Greens were more likely to engage in environmental questions at a state level, and, inversely, were less vocal on global concerns than other environmental movement organisations (See Table 5.7).

Table 5.7: Issue Scope of Articles featuring the Tasmanian Greens and Environmental Movement Organisations - The Mercury, 1994 (%).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Tas Greens</th>
<th>Mov. Org.</th>
<th>WS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State only</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National (State)</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global (Int-Nat-State)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not spec.</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (%)</td>
<td>100</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total (N)</td>
<td>(323)</td>
<td>(220)</td>
<td>(88)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The state-orientation of the Tasmanian Greens is compounded by the political mileage gained from appealing to the state-based interests of the electorate. This entails promoting Tasmania's future within mainstream media and relating events to how they affect Tasmania. For example, when the WS proposed a plan to expand Tasmania's existing World Heritage Areas, Greens leader Christine Milne focused on the benefits for Tasmania:

But Greens leader Christine Milne said more World Heritage areas would enhance Tasmania's appeal to tourists and so create jobs. (The Mercury 21/1/94: 5).

Similarly, when a USA nuclear-ship visited Hobart, Milne did not denounce nuclear-ships generally, but rather focused on the negative implications for Tasmania:

Mrs Milne said a nuclear accident while the Indianapolis was in port would "destroy Tasmania's reputation for clean, green products,
costing Tasmania millions in export earnings" (The Mercury 22/11/94: 9).

The Tasmanian Greens' state-orientation is further compounded by constant attacks on state political opponents. This is illustrated well in press coverage relating to the Zeehan-Smithton link road, a major environmental issue in 1994 that triggered an ongoing well-publicised campaign to save the Tarkine. In one article, a WS activist criticised the state government for being anti-environmental and described the decision to proceed with the road work as a desperate attempt to do as much damage as possible to the Tarkine wilderness to prevent Environment Minister John Faulkner nominating it for World Heritage listing (The Mercury 13/10/94: 10). Green MHA Di Hollister's and Greens leader Christine Milne's comments also appeared in the article. Not only did they criticise the state government for its anti-environmental action, but also portrayed the government as deceitful and willing to put political gains above environmental concerns:

the decision was a malicious attempt to undermine the wilderness value of the Arthur-Pieman area to prevent it being nominated for World Heritage protection (...) Mrs Hollister said the Government had altered the route and the whole concept of the Heemskirk Rd from Smithton to Corinna approved by the Parliamentary Public Works Committee in 1985 (...) Tasmanian Greens leader Christine Milne branded the move a deliberate strategy to polarise the community and shore up Liberal support in the North-West ahead of the state election in February 1996 (The Mercury 13/10/94: 10).

The Tasmanian Greens, in contrast to environmental organisations, were also much more likely to criticise the state government on a wide range of issues that reached beyond strictly environmental concerns. Criticisms of the state government extended to:

• regressive energy price restructuring (The Mercury 8/7/94: 1-2; 22/7/94: 3; 26/7/94: 3);
• state budget (The Mercury 11/8/94: 1-2; 11/8/94: 6);
• cuts in MP numbers (The Mercury 17/8/94: 9);
• government expenditure (The Mercury 23/8/94: 6; 23/8/94: 6; 24/8/94: 8);
• community input (The Mercury 19/10/94: 2);
• FOI legislation (*The Mercury* 20/10/94: 1);
• tobacco advertising/ smoking bans (*The Mercury* 22/1/94: 1; 15/3/94: 9);
• business enterprise schemes (*The Mercury* 20/3/94: 6);
• parliamentary reform inquiry (*The Mercury* 1/4/94: 5);
• MP pay rises (*The Mercury* 27/5/94: 9; 29/6/94: 12).

Finally, the state-orientation of the Greens is linked to their daily involvement in formal politics. Such politics is necessarily organised in accordance with established political conventions and boundaries. The three levels of government - local, state and national - have associated strategic roles that define what issues can be addressed at a particular level. For example, state policy is formulated within the legislative constraints of the role of the state government. The Tasmanian Greens, in addressing social problems through political channels, are subject to these constraints and, subsequently, problems are automatically defined as local, state or national issues.

Moreover, the portrayal of the Tasmanian Greens by mainstream journalists within standard party-political frames and formats has further contributed to the Greens' state-orientation. Established legislative boundaries are entrenched in public debate and are reflected in media formats. For example, *The Mercury* column 'The State' focused specifically on state politics.

Although both movement organisations and political parties are constrained by established political conventions and boundaries, the situation is compounded for party politicians who have to operate within the constraints of these boundaries in their daily engagement with the conventional political arena. Party politicians are also subjected to electoral competition and, consequently, there is pressure to substitute the global-planetary appeals of the movement with a local-Tasmanian perspective.
Opportunity and Constraint

The expanded issue agenda of the Tasmanian Greens represents an important opportunity to extend existing notions of what 'environmentalism' encompasses. The day-to-day linkage between the environmental and non-environmental issues also provides the first pragmatic steps in developing further the 'interconnected' approach alluded to in theoretical eco-political thought. In linking environmental issues with social, economic and political issues, the Tasmanian Greens play an active role in breaking down the dualism between nature and society within mainstream debate.

Such an integrated approach has an instant attraction as it acknowledges the interdependence between diverse issues and concerns, and, more importantly, translates this interdependence into policy initiatives, legislative changes and parliamentary debate. However, in the broadening of agendas, focused and clearly defined goals are overshadowed by other competing issues and priorities.

When a wider approach in terms of issues is taken, there is also some trade-off in the degree and level at which individual issues can be pursued. In relation to the Tasmanian Greens there are additional political pressures to focus on state concerns when addressing issues. McAllister (1994: 39), in highlighting that "cosmopolitanism, already the dominant dimension of environmentalism, will continue to be a major issue", notes the implications for minor parties such as the Tasmanian Greens. He warns that "the politicisation of cosmopolitanism will make it increasingly difficult for minor parties and groups to establish an electoral presence". His comments resonate with the experience in Tasmania, whereby the Tasmanian Greens have not relied entirely on the earlier local-global wilderness base, but have worked at establishing a strong locally-oriented political platform geared at a broad range of state-oriented electoral concerns. These dilemmas are returned to in the concluding chapter.

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The previous sections have focused on the portrayal of movement organisations, in contrast with green politicians in mainstream media. Attention has been paid to the news-shaping role of the media (e.g. party-political formats, conflict-driven portrayals), as well as to the institutional conventions that influence the terms of debate (e.g. established policy areas and legislative boundaries). This final section turns to the issue of how green party formation has affected the arguments articulated by environmentalists within environmental debate. It focuses on the active role of sponsors - movement activists and political leaders - in framing issues and events.

While media literature has generally focused on how journalists frame issues, political sociologists have extended the concept of framing to the interpretive activities of political actors (Snow and Benford 1988, 1992). Framing is understood here as a key organising principle connecting a set of ideas. The analysis is structured around the three framing tasks specified by Snow and Benford (1988): diagnostic; prognostic; and motivational. The first two are discussed concurrently due to their interdependence. Internal movement media are examined in order to identify the framing devices utilised by activists and political leaders independently of the mass media. This is supplemented by an examination of the circulation of these frames within mainstream media.

Diagnostic and Prognostic Framing: Industrial Problem, Postindustrial Solution

Environmental campaigning in Tasmania has been primarily targeted at 'hydro-industrialisation' and at the bureaucrats, politicians and industrial leaders who propagate this 'hydro-industrial ideology'. Hydro-industrialisation entails the provision of cheap power as an incentive to major industries and has underpinned government development policy since the 1960s:

The hydro-industrial formula, coupled with exploitation of natural resources, was an early response to the enduring problems of isolation, such as the high cost of transportation, a small, highly
decentralised population (which afforded a low revenue base), a small domestic market and limited manufacturing potential (Callaghan 1977: 94-99). The 'hydro response' to these problems swiftly developed into a hegemonic ideology, with the advocacy and cross-party support of pragmatic politicians and entrenched administrators" (Crowley 1989: 48).

The stronghold of hydro-industrialisation on Tasmania was first brought to attention by environmental activists during campaigns to oppose power-generating schemes that directly threatened wilderness areas, such as proposals to flood Lake Pedder and, later to dam the Franklin River (Pybus 1990: 63; Burton 1990: 70-81). As one activist noted:

It was when the government-protected industry seemed to think that it had the right to build hydro-schemes forever more, without regard to the requirements of other interests in the State, that the greenies mustered forces to aid the silent, suffering assets of the State's natural beauty (Mark Roberts 'Conscience and Cowardice: the HEC' Wilderness 1981, no.17: 7).

Hydro-industrialisation was recognised by early environmental activists as part of the wider problem of technological and industrial development. Activists argued that societal obsession with technological development, economic growth and material consumption was as much to blame as the interests of specific politicians and bureaucrats. In his review of the state of the Tasmanian wilderness campaign in the late 1970s, Kevin Kieran (founding director of the WS) situated the ongoing cooperation between the State government and the HEC within this broader context. He pointed to the economically-focused, consumption-orientated, technologically-driven society that promoted anti-environment practices:

So many of attitudes of our society bear resemblance to the cargo cults of the New Guinea region, for we are always waiting for someone to return and deliver to us. Especially we wait with great faith for technology to save the day, or for something else on a different plane altogether. Well, we've seen technology (...) But its pretty hard to have much faith when so many good people are overwhelmed by evil forces of giant churches and when the most subversive thing you can do is not to spend money (or not to have it) for you are thereby minimising the extent to which you personally consume or participate in a system that's heading nowhere but needs you to feed
upon. Dole bludger bashing and ministerial mutterings against those pursuing alternative lifestyles are open admissions of that (Kevin Kieran 'Where to now?' *Wilderness* 1979, no.13: 18-20).

Moreover, the problem of technological and industrial development was implied in the very definition of wilderness promoted by the WS:

Wilderness is a large tract of entirely natural country. It is a region of original Earth where one stands with the senses entirely steeped in Nature and free of the distractions of modern technology. Contrary to that which the developers would have us believe, there is no room whatever in wilderness for roads, quarries, buildings or machines (Bob Brown 'The Disappearing Wilderness' *Wilderness* 1982, no.18: 7).

This definition posited modern industrialism and modern technology as the antitheses to wilderness.

In order to address what was recognised as a complex and integrated problem, WS activists set objectives that extended beyond simply the reversal of specific government decisions. They adopted the more general aim of protecting wilderness. In doing so, WS activists adopted defensive frames entailing protection of wild areas from further encroachment and opposition to those who, directly or indirectly, allowed such environmentally destructive development to continue. Environmental protection was fundamental and any action that would prevent further destruction was required:

That is why the South-West campaign has spread not only nationally, but internationally. That is why every peaceful measure, including a blockade, is necessary and underway to halt the destruction. And that is why the Federal Government must act immediately to protect not only the World Heritage areas, but the entire remaining Tasmanian wilderness (Geoff Law 'An Embattled State' *Wilderness* 1992, no.18: 18).

In framing solutions in terms of environmental protection from development, the WS used key phrases such as 'preserve', 'conserve' and 'stop'. Indeed, activists viewed themselves as the main critics of environmentally damaging development and the defenders of the environment:

So with a clear concept of wilderness, the next step is for us to stand in defence of its besieged remnants on Earth, against the aims of
commercial exploitation, or as Sir Mark Oliphant has so clearly put it, against the "so-called 'development' of greedy men" (Bob Brown, 'The Disappearing Wilderness' Wilderness 1982, no.18: 7).

This defensive framing was underscored and accentuated by local press coverage which focused on negative, protest action. At the time of the Franklin dam campaign, local journalists were not receptive to the views of environmental activists. The anti-development sentiments articulated by movement activists were highlighted and consistently used to depict activists' as 'irrational' and 'radical' opponents of official government policy. As Sylow (1994: 206) points out, "Coverage of the Franklin blockade tended to focus on the publicity-seeking and law-breaking activities of protesters". WS activists were labelled 'Greenies' and were portrayed by their opponents as obstructionist and anti-development:

Hundreds of jobs would be lost in the forestry industry if conservationists had their way in Tasmania, the Premier, Mr Robin Gray, said yesterday. (...) Well funded and militant conservationists posed a serious threat to the Tasmanian timber industry he said. The Wilderness Society and its allies did not care about the people whose jobs and families depended on forest based industry (The Mercury 16/11/84: 12).10

When the Tasmanian Greens emerged in the early 1990s this defensive orientation was gradually replaced by a more positive, proactive framing. Exposed to electoral competition, the Greens reoriented frames around strategies for improvement and positive ways of addressing environmental problems. This entailed reexamining the causes of environmental problems and redefining who was to blame (diagnostic framing).

For the Tasmanian Greens it was not development per se, but specifically industrial development that was the problem. The solution, therefore, was not to stop development (an ideal expressed through the abstract notions of 'preserve' and 'stop', rather than instituted in concrete

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10 Also, 'Gray warns forestry officials of threat to industry greenies' The Mercury 26/7/84: 2;
'More criticism for Wilderness Society' The Mercury 12/9/84: 18;
practices), but to replace 'industrial development' with 'postindustrial development'. In a 1994 edition of *The Daily Planet*, Milne identifies the industrial problem and postindustrial solution:

Herein lies the opportunity. Now is the chance for a clean break with the old Hydroindustrialisation ethos and the opportunity for the HEC to absorb the additional power into the general load so as to optimise the public interest and for the benefit of the economy. The small business sector together with primary industry are the job creators and the wealth generators of the future (Christine Milne, 'Chaos and Opportunities in 1994' *The Daily Planet* 1994, no.29: 14).

The 'postindustrial' vision outlined by the leaders of the Tasmanian Greens advocated transferring development in Tasmania away from resource-intensive industries to high-technology, information-based service sector industries (Green Independents, *Strategies of the Future*, 1992). This postindustrial solution involved a number of specific proposals designed to encourage the development of newly emerging growth industries such as tourism, higher education, creative arts and computer technologies. Such industries would provide an 'environmentally sustainable' future.

Although some of these proposals were flagged in the past by the environmental movement (e.g. wilderness tourism potential), they were sporadic and never systematised into an integrated package that could be used to frame environmental debate. This extract from the Greens' policy document *The Green Independents' Business and Industry Strategy, Green, Dynamic and Prosperous* (1992: 1) illustrates how the Greens integrated these specific proposals into a new 'postindustrial' package:

The Green independents' platform shows that economic prosperity need not be at the expense of our environment or quality of life. In fact, environmental protection is one of the keys to Tasmania's economic future. The Green Independents' strategy recognises the need for a new economic direction. Industry analysts around the world recognise that prosperity can no longer be based solely on resource exploitation. Skill and knowledge based industries now offer Tasmania its best economic future. Applications of skills and knowledge must apply to all industry sectors. Traditional industries must upgrade their human resources to become more innovative and creative.
The message was essentially positive, and implied a compatibility between environmental protection and economic growth.

The key frame that encapsulated this postindustrial vision was 'clean and green'. The phrase 'clean green' was used to frame more complex themes relating to the economic importance of information-based industries, as well as the environmentally-friendly nature of these industries:

Information is now the key to economic prosperity. Knowledge and skills rather than natural resources are the commodities of the future. When we sell a clean, green product we are not selling only the actual produce but the skills and knowledge that goes into producing it without chemicals (Christine Milne, 'Fibre optic Super Highway, or 4wd dirt track? The Daily Planet 1995, no.36: 19).

Discussions of technological development, economic growth and environmental protection reappeared regularly in The Daily Planet publications, particularly within the Green MPs' individual columns, indicating the reliance upon a different set of assumptions regarding the cause of and solution to environmental problems. In contrast, only two articles amongst nineteen early publications of Wilderness (1976-84) referred to the compatibility between technological development, economic growth and environmental protection. Amongst 1990-94 publications of Wilderness there were some references to the compatibility between technology progress, economic growth and environmental protection, but they remained marginal to defining discourses centring on wilderness and environmental campaigning; 'clean and green' did not feature as a central frame.

These differences between the party and movement activists in diagnostic and prognostic framing were also evident in mainstream media. The Greens' positive framing of environmental debate was important in challenging the negative, radical and anti-development portrayal of earlier


12 These articles were written by a local councillor and focused on the tourism potential within Strahan, the councillor's local area (McDermott Wilderness 1977 no.4: 12-3; McDermott Wilderness 1979 no.11: 5-6).
environmental activists. The Greens' positive 'clean and green' frame was circulated within mainstream media and adopted by journalists. Mainstream acceptance of this frame was most evident in linkages between the Greens' clean and green policy and other major political parties in local press coverage:

Last month the Labor Party released a jobs options paper which canvassed the need to focus more on export-oriented manufacturing industries and to capitalise on the state's clean environmental image (The Mercury 7/4/1994: 2).

Not surprisingly, this linkage was advanced in press coverage by the Greens themselves:

Says the leader of the Tasmanian Greens, in a boast which always manages to raise the hackles of her political opponents: 'I believe we have now reached the point where both the Labor and Liberal parties have recognised that the Greens' direction for Tasmania is the right one - that is, encouraging small business, high quality and environmentally based products, and selling Tasmania as a clean and green environment producing high quality products" (The Mercury 2/12/1994: 21).

This positive framing was also important in communicating to the electorate that the Tasmanian Greens had a range of realistic solutions in hand:

The Tasmanian Greens have welcomed the Liberal Party's move to adopt a "clean green" image for the state.

They have also suggested a package of reforms to develop Tasmania as a world leader in the booming environmental industries (...)

- Developing a plan to rapidly reduce the use of chemicals in agriculture.
- An immediate start on phasing out ocean dumping jarosite.
- Banning the use of Atrazine in forestry operations and stopping fluoride and cyanide emissions into the air and water by Comalco (The Mercury 8/4/1994: 9)

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The increasing receptiveness of local journalists to environmental issues during the late 1980s, coupled with the Greens' promotion of a positive approach to framing, has resulted in a significant reorientation in the framing of environmental debate within local press coverage.

**Motivational Framing: From 'Moral Outrage' to 'Economic Sense'**

In addition to defining problems and solutions, movement activists and party leaders also play a critical role in mobilising potential participants. Snow and Benford (1988: 201) refer to this task as motivational framing, i.e. providing a 'rationale for action'. In Tasmania, there are clear contrasts between the motivational framing efforts of environmental movement activists, such as WS activists, and Green Party politicians. While the former have relied on moral and ethical appeals, the later have adopted more pragmatic appeals and economic arguments.

The employment of moral arguments throughout the Franklin campaign by WS activists was not simply a tactic, but rather was a reflection of their philosophical orientation. Basing their arguments on extracts from early *Wilderness* publications, Easthope and Holloway (1989: 194) assert that the dominant ethic articulated by WS activists was biocentric, based on wilderness being valued for its own sake. This ethic subsequently became the basis of mobilisation strategies whereby people were called to act through a moral obligation to preserve the natural world:

What had generated mass rallies were pictures of the lake as a wilderness. The very word 'wilderness' has an emotive baggage that mobilised people into action (Easthope and Holloway 1989: 194). Easthope and Holloway (1989: 195-6) make further reference to the use of powerful religious symbols by WS activists within *Wilderness* publications to construct a moral frame of the wilderness as 'sacred':

Articles exhorted members to go and see the Franklin: 'A word of advice to aspiring Franklin goers: go'. Such exhortations were like calls to go on a pilgrimage. The correct clothing, rituals and attitudes were essential if one was to attain a religious/wilderness experience. (...) Such experiences were considered worth enduring hardship to achieve and in the final four issues there even appeared suggestions that the wilderness was worth dying for. Those who died in the wilderness were eulogised and their obituaries expounding the
virtues of love of wilderness, dedication and inspiration to others - all the qualities of martyrs.

In more recent publications, moral arguments continued to dominate the motivational frames articulated by the WS. In political-targeted campaigns, the image of the wilderness as sacred remained central in appeals to potential supporters to act. This was evident in the continued use of strong images of wilderness, particularly of the world's most remote and vulnerable ecological areas, including rainforests, deserts, grasslands, and Arctic regions.

Although images of wilderness and endangered species are powerful motivating sources for all environmental organisations, the Tasmanian Greens' motivational framing efforts have extended beyond the moral appeal of wilderness as sacred. This extension is linked to the Tasmanian Greens' distinct purpose for motivational framing. Whereas the WS sought to mobilise large numbers of protesters and supporters, the Tasmanian Greens aim at increasing electoral support and gaining parliamentary seats. The motivational frames articulated by the Greens within environmental debate are, therefore, geared towards the electoral demands that drive conventional politics.

In the Greens' 1992 campaign materials, designed to mobilise votes, 'wilderness as sacred' barely rated a mention. Instead, there were three primary themes around which the Greens' motivational frames were organised: economics, social justice and the environment. This last is popularly definitive of the Greens, distinguishing the Greens from other major parties and providing the most scope for 'new' 'moral' and 'ethical' questions to be pursued. Yet environmental appeals sat alongside, and were even subordinate to, economic and social justice appeals, these dimensions being more established within the formal political arena and being a recognised source of voters' concern. Economic appeals were

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14 The term wilderness has been virtually absent from the Tasmanian Greens' campaign materials. In one brochure the word 'wilderness' was never mentioned, nor were any associated symbols or phrases implying the 'wilderness as sacred' evident (The Green Independents Business and Industry Strategy: Green, Dynamic and Prosperous, 1992 campaign). In a second brochure, 'wilderness' appeared once, but was not expanded upon (Fifteen years of Green achievements, 1992 campaign), and in a third brochure there was a small section on 'Wilderness and Forests', outlining the Party's World Heritage Protection policy, which appeared only on the fourth and final page.
particularly prevalent in the Tasmanian Greens' 1992 campaign materials. While one brochure focused specifically on economic appeals (*The Green Independents Business and Industry Strategy: Green, Dynamic and Prosperous*), in other brochures with a more general orientation economic appeals proliferated throughout the opening statements:

At home, the Greens have been leading the economic debate. Green economic policies espoused in the 1970s are increasingly part of official government policy. Tasmania's economy is in a state of transition. Gone is the unshaken belief in "hydro-industrialisation". Gone is the belief that Tasmania can create wealth by selling off its resources for a song. The Greens' opposition to the Franklin Dam and the Electrana Silicon smelter has been proved right. They were economic debacles. Tasmania's economic future is clean, Green and brains-based. The Greens' 10-point 10 year business plan has received widespread acclaim. Again and again they have generated real information to back their economic policies. Only the Greens are providing a sense of direction for the Tasmanian economy (*Fifteen years of Green achievements* 1992 election campaign).

Environmental concerns, in comparison, tended to be cited towards the end of campaign brochures, following economic and social justice concerns.\(^\text{15}\)

This order of priorities may be interpreted as a short-term strategy to promote policy areas that are not automatically associated with Green parties. However, political campaign materials in 1995 followed a similar pattern, indicating a more substantial and permanent reorientation in priorities:

The challenge for Tasmania and the Greens over the next 25 years is to create an economically prosperous, socially just, and environmentally healthy society - a 'State of Excellence' (*Tasmanian Times* 1995).

\(^{15}\) In the brochure *Strategies for the Future* (1992 campaign) the first major environmental policy, 'forestry industry', was not mentioned until the second page after five other sub-headings: 'Business and Industry Strategy'; 'State Government Income'; 'Community Economic Development'; 'Jobs' and 'Education'. In a further brochure the order of policy achievements was as follows: economy; employment; education; energy; transport; business; welfare; rural; environment; health; and government. (*Fifteen years of Green achievements*, 1992).
The permanence, and prevalence, of economic and social justice concerns within the Tasmanian Greens' agenda is evident in the five major sections featured within this brochure:

'Clean Green' Tasmania;
Encouraging Dynamic and Innovative Businesses;
2020 Vision;
Building Community Spirit;
Greens Call For Cooperative Government. (Tasmanian Times 1995).

Neither 'environment', 'ecology', 'wilderness' nor 'nature' were mentioned or alluded to in these titles. These new priorities were also evident in press coverage of the Greens' broadened agenda (outlined in section 5.2).

However, the most striking example of this shift from 'moral' to 'pragmatic' appeals was the reorientation of the original definition of wilderness promoted by the WS. Whereas the WS appealed to people through an image of the wilderness as sacred and promoted the protection of wilderness for 'its own sake', the Tasmanian Greens promoted wilderness as a powerful marketing tool for the tourism industry and protection of wilderness was viewed as essential for economic competitiveness and prosperity. This position was consistently articulated by the Greens in local press coverage.16 This extract from the Greens' 1995 election campaign materials (Tasmanian Times 1995) provides a clear example of how motivational framing was substantially altered in order to appeal to the voting public:

The arts and design industry have also profited. The explosion of wilderness paraphernalia is obvious to even the most casual observer. These industries have recognised the power of wilderness images as a marketing tool. The multiplier effect has provided business to the printing, packaging and retail sectors. (...) While the economic value of World Heritage has been proven, political pressure has consistently excluded magnificent forests of internationally acclaimed significance from protection. A

comprehensive survey found the primary reason for travel to the North west was "wilderness scenery", but that area's primary resources, the 'Tarkine Wilderness', Australia's largest temperate rainforest, is unprotected and under threat. Just as Strahan has blossomed following the protection of the Franklin River, a Tarkine Wilderness National Park will do the same for the North West Coast. Likewise businesses offering forest walks, cave tours, rafting, and fly fishing are campaigning to protect the Great Western Tiers and southern forests as a key element to future prosperity.

In the final paragraph of this article the transition from wilderness as sacred was complete:

Wilderness offers Tasmania a unique opportunity for both individual enjoyment and economic prosperity (my italics - MG).

Contradictory or Complementary Frames

Charted above are two significantly different frames circulated in environmental debate. While the WS has adopted a defensive approach and focused on moral and ethical appeals, the Tasmanian Greens have activated a proactive, positive frame grounded in practical concerns. More specifically, the WS has sought to defend wilderness for its own sake. In contrast, the Greens have initiated strategies that accommodate both economic growth and environmental protection (i.e. an ecologically sustainable future).

The use of alternate framing strategies results in a less-unified identity. This has both advantages and disadvantages. It can strengthen pro-environmental messages by highlighting a range of arguments and justifications for rethinking environmental attitudes and changing environmentally damaging practices. It allows for environmental problems to be tackled from a number of angles. However, it can also highlight internal contradictions amongst environmental activists. This increases the possibility of internal splits, thus weakening the bargaining power of the environmental movement. Major divergences amongst environmental activists can also result in more radical, fundamental and less compromising positions being undermined and marginalised. This has been the case with the West German Greens. Internal conflict between the two camps, 'fundamentalists' and 'realists', over issues such as animal
experimentation and German unification, culminated in the resignation of Green leader Rudolf Bahro and the defection of party supporters to the ex-Communist PDS (Bahro 1986: 210-211; Poguntke 1993: 103-104).

In Tasmania, the use of moral arguments was a conscious attempt by early WS activists to avoid the pitfalls that arise from defining wilderness in terms of recreational values. Kevin Kieran highlights this point:

Wilderness conservationists are obviously in a bind. Public awareness itself in many ways threatens destruction at a rate only marginally less rapid than lack of public awareness will allow (...) I suggest that we have to try to sell not the wilderness experience, but the wilderness itself: the right for wilderness to exist. To suggest that it is every bit as valid to have laws protecting wilderness as it is to have laws protecting animals from cruelty. Not for man, but for the animals and the wilderness. To encourage as much distaste at the concept of wanton destruction of wilderness as society feels towards evil treatment of a dog. And an appreciation of the scale of things. An emphasis on the philosophical and the ethical (Kevin Kieran Wilderness 1976, no.1: 5).

Despite these early warnings, the Tasmanian Greens have relied on the idea of wilderness as a recreational resource in order to turn around the Tasmanian government's longstanding hydro-industrial development policy. Green MPs have also sought to establish themselves as responsible political leaders and sensible economic managers. This has in some instances led to the WS and Tasmanian Greens taking different positions on particular issues. For example, the WS is firmly committed to supporting the recent proposal to drain and restore the original Lake Pedder. The proposal is linked to the earlier campaign to prevent the flooding of Lake Pedder in 1971-2, the campaign that marked the beginning of major environmental activism in Tasmania (Pybus 1990; 17) and that for many activists, was a deeply emotional experience: For several years I continued to fight for the south-west but I never again had the same motivation or energy. In reflective moments I would wonder at the worth of fighting for the remnants of a wilderness which has had its heart torn out. The whole will not be healthy until that heart is restored (Kieran 1990; 33).

In contrast, the Greens did not automatically support the proposal, instead their position was presented as a carefully considered, balanced view:
In the final analysis the Tasmanian Greens support for the proposal to recover Lake Pedder is conditional upon the advantages outweighing any disadvantages which may be incurred. It is not a black and white issue” (Chris Harries *The Daily Planet* 1995, no.36: 7).

Further contradictions have emerged with the Tasmanian Greens' promotion of eco-tourism. The major political parties have used eco-tourism as a justification for universal support for tourism investment, without regard for environmental considerations. This led to a rally organised by the WS in 1994 against dubious and financially-driven eco-tourism investment (*The Mercury* 11/11/94: 7). Ironically, the Tasmanian Greens assisted in the organisation of this rally and Green politicians were invited as key speakers: Bob Brown (National Greens); Christine Milne; and Peg Putt. The Tasmanian Greens have had to modify and qualify their idea of eco-tourism, in order to distinguish themselves from the catch-all policies of the major parties.

However, contradictions arising from the use of alternate framing strategies, may be outweighed by complementary uses of these frames. In the environmental movement in Tasmania this has entailed what Holloway (1991) describes as a process of 'differentiation', involving the use of different strategies by different people.

This process of differentiation was evident in the WS's and Tasmanian Greens' united campaign to extend world heritage boundaries in January 1994. Initially the WS put forward a world heritage nomination and focused on arguments to protect wilderness areas. This proposal was subsequently rejected and criticised by the State Government (*The Mercury* 19/1/94: 5). Tasmanian Greens leader, Christine Milne, then entered the debate, counteracting the Government's opposition to the WHA nomination with economic appeals. She stressed the importance of marketing Tasmania's image as a 'clean, green' state (*The Mercury* 20/1/94: 3; 21/1/94: 5).

The use of alternate framing strategies, therefore, can be both negative and beneficial, depending on the contexts in which they are applied. An awareness of distinctions between framing approaches, and the potential impact of these approaches, may minimise internal conflict and maximise the effectiveness of appeals to outsiders and potential supporters.
This issue, along with the dilemmas identified in the previous sections, are discussed further in chapter six. In this final chapter, I summarise the key findings, and discuss the significance of these findings to the central themes of this thesis: green party formation, environmental debate and, more generally, the politics of meaning.
CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSIONS

New Political Parties as Meaning Producers and Mediators

In a highly mediated 'programmed' society, movements are increasingly reliant on mass media to project their messages and to claim a stake in the 'social control of the main cultural patterns' (Touraine 1985: 754). Although interpretations internal to the movement provide an important foundation for new frames, it is only when these interpretations enter major public domains, such as the mass media, that they transform into institutionalised knowledge and begin to affect seriously social norms and behaviour. Therefore, it is media relations, impact on public debate, and location within prominent public domains that are crucial in the processes of knowledge production and dissemination and consequently in a politics of meaning. Yet within existing accounts, mass media has only played a secondary role. This is most evident in the tendency within these accounts to privilege spontaneous, non-institutionalised movement activists as the key 'symbolic challengers' and producers of new knowledge. As a result, internal movement intellectuals and activists have been the focus of attention. However, when analysis shifts from the activities of movement activists to the dynamics of the mass media, party leaders emerge as central players within public debate.

This study of the impact of the Tasmanian Greens on environmental debate provides some insights into the role of new political parties in generating and disseminating new interpretations. The study shows that the Tasmanian Greens play a prominent role in environmental debate, alongside a range of scientific experts and government officials. The privileged position of Green politicians in the public arena enhances the movement's opportunities to influence public debates. Not only does party formation expand the media exposure accorded to movement activists, but it also affects the nature of the debate.

Firstly, with party formation the debate becomes increasingly politicised and structured around standard political strategies. There are heightened pressures on party leaders to adopt political conventions and established practices. In addition, media interest in electoral speculation and party
politics, encourages party leaders to use conventional political strategies and tactics in gaining media attention.

Secondly, the parameters of the debate increasingly follow the logic of existing formal political discourse. Party politicians tend to address issues in accordance with established legislative boundaries. Party politicians are pressured to focus on the local implications of a particular issue in order to appeal to the state-based interests of the electorate.

Thirdly, the issue agenda expands. Development of a broad political platform is essential in providing politicians engaged in public debate with a consistent and pre-formulated position on a host of issues. With a comprehensive political platform, politicians are less likely to react in an ad hoc manner and are less vulnerable in negotiating with political opponents. As a result, linkages between previously unconnected issues multiply.

Fourthly, the message becomes increasingly framed in a pro-active and pragmatic way as party politicians seek to extract wider public sympathies and appeal to a diverse electorate. The politicians advocate reformist strategies and present themselves as responsible, trustworthy and reliable community leaders capable of providing economic security and political stability. To do this, they abandon the moral, value-laden, radical appeals of former protest movement activists.

Finally, the message becomes increasingly systematised and ordered within an encompassing political program. Party politicians develop more integrated and coherent political packages that link new ideas to existing political traditions. They also provide a framework for addressing long term reforms.

These changes enhance the movement's standing in public debate, but also pose new risks, such as the growing division between movement activists and party leaders. The risks associated with party formation represent dilemmas for activists and party leaders who are committed to advancing the message of the movement.
Dilemmas of Party Formation

The dilemmas of party formation have previously been examined in relation to structural developments, such as bureaucratisation and 'oligarchic tendencies' (See Weber 1978; Michels 1962). Here it is suggested that party formation may be evaluated not only in terms of structural developments, but also in terms of cognitive developments, such as the generation of new frames and meanings. This study follows Offe's (1990) analysis of the electoral and organisational evolution of the West German Greens, but incorporates cognitive dimensions.

The results support Offe's (1990) view of party formation as an advantageous development. There are clear symbolic rewards for movement activists who choose to formally organise as a political party. The party receives regular media exposure and is more readily accepted as an official voice than are other less institutionalised sectors of the movement. The party also provides a formalised structure for generating leaders and cultivating their profiles in the mainstream media. In doing so, it expands the voice of the movement in public debates.

In addition, party formation facilitates the development of new linkages between previously unconnected issues. For example, the Tasmanian Greens make explicit connections between environmental and non-environmental (economic, social etc.) issues. Such linkages are advantageous in that they advance the voice of the movement in new arenas of discourse previously viewed as outside the domain of the movement. In cultivating such linkages, the movement becomes increasingly relevant to a wider scope of people. For example, when issues such as pollution and pesticides are linked to public health, the message of the environmental movement becomes increasingly relevant to health workers and policy makers.

Most importantly, party politicians translate movement messages into 'mainstream-speak' in the process of transforming movement slogans and ideals into political programs and strategies. In doing so, they provide a channel for articulating the concerns of the movement in mainstream public arenas, such as mass media, parliament and law courts. This is consistent with Offe's (1990: 242) observation regarding the need to 'join and confront the opponent on the same institutional terrain of party
competition'. Such a condition is viewed by Offe as essential to the initiation of any kind of change within the established political arena.

However, party formation also presents new problems. For example, as news makers increasingly look to party leaders for information and opinions, the views of other environmental bodies and activists are frequently overlooked. This results in the party becoming recognised amongst the wider public as the official voice of the movement. For party leaders this raises the issue of their own role as representatives. Green party leaders are called to speak on behalf of a diverse range of activists, community associations, single-issue action groups, pressure groups and movement organisations. This situation becomes increasingly problematic as the environmental movement expands and, inevitably, diversifies.

Further, in translating the messages of the movement so that they are concordant with 'mainstream-speak', party leaders are subject to the criticism that they are distorting and deradicalising the movement's program. Mainstream acceptance of the party's pragmatic message can operate to marginalise other more radical views.

In addition, emerging differences in interpretations and frames between movement activists and party politicians expose internal tensions. As was highlighted in chapter five, there are already examples where the WS and the Tasmanian Greens have taken separate stances on particular issues, such as the proposal to drain Lake Pedder. However, in Tasmania these tensions remain latent. Elsewhere, growing divisions between movement activists and party leaders have been more pronounced. In Queensland for example, movement organisations, such as the WS and the ACF and organised political interests, such as the Aboriginal community, have sought to distance themselves from the Queensland Green party (The Australian 7/8/95: 4; The Australian 19/7/95: 11).

Ironically, the Greens' party political status, as well as emerging distinctions between environmental bodies, feed conflict-centred media interest. Whereas in the past environmental debate was characterised by divisive battles between pro-development and anti-development arguments, today media-reported conflict also centres on disputes between the Greens and their political opponents, and on divisions internal to the
environmental movement. In effect, party formation and diversification are linked to re-organisation of the conflict-driven frames utilised by journalists.

These dilemmas suggest that there are some trade-offs to be made with party formation, not only in relation to structural issues but also in relation to cognitive concerns. The complementary use of different frames in environmental debates for the same ends, as well as the use of alternate - 'insider' and 'outsider' - strategies for gaining media attention, indicate that movement activists and party leaders have already begun to negotiate some strategies for the confrontation of these dilemmas. An awareness of the distinct roles and priorities of movement organisations and political parties aids such negotiations.

Environmental Debate and the Politics of Meaning

In addition to highlighting the dilemmas facing party leaders, the study also addresses some general issues regarding the nature of environmental debate in mainstream media. The origins of frames circulated in environmental debate and the strategies used by individuals and organisations to promote their preferred frames have been of particular interest.

This study supplements existing accounts of environmental debate by analysing a series of competing frames promoted by different environmental bodies. The findings suggest that environmental debate is becoming increasingly complex. It involves not only a competition between the views of established government officials and radical movement activists, but also an emerging contest between different movement and party frames. This use of multiple frames by the environmental movement complicates the clear-cut nature of environmental conflicts in public debate.

The study also provides insight into the strategies employed by movement activists in order to influence environmental debate. Existing studies have begun to recognise the importance of 'insider' strategies for cultivating a prominent and permanent profile in mainstream media (Anderson 1993; Cracknell 1993; Hansen 1993). They point to attempts by
environmental organisations to become recognised as credible and reliable sources, by for example, conducting reliable research and offering expertise to government officials. This study supplements these insights by showing that party formation also provides a potential avenue for gaining recognition as an official and reliable source.

Finally, the study points to important convergences between the politics of meaning and conventional politics. It suggests that new political parties alter dominant interpretations and meanings, and reshape them in accordance with the logic of conventional politics. Party leaders translate frames generated by movement activists into political programs for conventional political ends. Moreover, the study suggests that contests over meaning - that is vying to have ones preferred frame dominate in public debate - reflect similar struggles over power and influence evident in conventional political contests. In short, those who already have political influence, have a head start in the politics of meaning.
REFERENCES


APPENDIX A

List of 1992 Green Party Election Policy Areas

Human and Community Services
Regional Development
Regional Economic Development
Aged
Aboriginal Community
AIDS
Adolescent Health Care
Dental Services
Youth Affairs
Employment, Education and Training
Legal Issues
Family and Children’s Services
Child Care
Family Support
Corrective Services
Domestic Violence and Sexual Assault
Disability Services and Support
Housing
Residential Tenancy Legislation and Reform
Aged Housing
Youth Housing and Homelessness
Co-operative Housing
Neighbourhood Houses
Commonwealth-State Housing Agreement
Consumer Rights
Gambling
Benefits and Concessions
Mental Health
Transport
Non-Government Sector Funding
Funding Model
Insurance
Tax Deductibility
Guidelines
Data Collection
Management Support, Information and Training
Volunteer Referral
Industry Training
Welfare Rights
Women
Gay and Lesbian Issues
Formation of the State Budget
Multicultural Affairs
Police
The Corrections System

The Economy
Business and Industry
State Government Income
Community Economic Development
Local Employment Initiatives
Co-operatives
Local Currency Systems
Work and Employment
Jobs
Youth Conservation Corps
Industrial Relations
Education
Corporate Sponsorship
Science and Technology
Information Services
Arts and Culture
Recreation and Entertainment
Health
Energy
Agriculture
Forestry
Restructuring the Forestry Commission
Corporatisation of the Softwood Plantations
Hardwood and Softwood Plantations
Veneer from Regrowth
Small Sawmillers Speciality Timbers and the Woodbank
Resource Security
Mining
Tourism
Forests
Wilderness, World Heritage and National Parks
Flora and Fauna
Nature Guarantee Threatened Species and Private Land Conservation
Environment and Planning
Coastal Development
Urban Development and Conservation
Resource Conservation
Land Transport
Urban Reform
Reducing Car use
Statewide Bicycle Plan
Local Government
Electoral and Parliamentary Reform
Global Policies

(The Green Independents Strategies for the Future, 1992)