one equal eternity

From Ethnic to Civic Identity: The European Experience

By

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Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements
For the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
School of Government
University of Tasmania

January 2001
DECLARATION

This Thesis contains no material which has been accepted for the award of any other higher degree or graduate diploma in any other tertiary institution and to the best of my knowledge and belief, the thesis contains no material previously published or written by another person, except where due reference is made in the text of the thesis.

Adam Grover
January 2001
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ABSTRACT

This study examines the nature and evolution of European supranationalism and its relationship to European identity formation, together with the factors promoting and inhibiting the development of such an identity. The central proposition of the study is that there exist certain conditions for the emergence of an European identity. This identity is developing, in accordance with a 'civic' model based on a common sense of European belonging rooted in constitutionalism, participative citizenship, civil and humanitarian rights and shared democratic institutions.

The question of how political communities, increasingly ethnically heterogeneous, socially fragmented and territorially dispersed, yet institutionally and functionally linked, can aid a common consciousness and a sense of identity is addressed. This work predicates that there is a relationship between supranational institutional development and the development of European identity. It explores how supranational institutions developed within post-war Europe and demonstrates how such institutions affect communal European identity formation.

The study establishes that in common with the historical experience of European state formation in early modernity, that enlarged polities are closely and causally linked to the rise of broad identification amongst their named populations. We demonstrate that as European supranational institutions have become politically and socially entrenched that the appropriate conditions for the creation of European identity have emerged. Such an identity, necessarily civic in nature, is inclusive of, and sympathetic to, the diverse range of pre-existing European ethnonational identifications.

The study utilises an analytical framework which allows for the examination of European identification from a variety of perspectives. Utilising a typology of communal identity synthesised from sociology, social psychology and political science the study demonstrates that communal identity is a multidimensional phenomena. It is made up not only of shared feeling of community and belonging, but is further exhibited in collective self-description, shared values, collective attachment to common symbols, common actions and a common cognitive boundary separating 'us' from the 'other'.

The study demonstrates that there is a viable European identity. It finds that such an identity exists concurrently with pre-existing national, regional and local identities. European identity is found to exist, in part, as a result of the institutional recognition and securing of such pre-existent identities. The study concludes that it is from the construction of a dense and socially inclusive European civil society that European identity emerges.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

For his deep respect for scholarship, love of knowledge and his enduring support I thank my father, James George Montague Grover, and dedicate the study to his memory.

To Joanna, who endured much and continued to support and love, thank you.

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Academic staff within the University of Tasmania, most particularly my Supervisor Dr. William Bostock, Professor Jan Pakulski and Dr. Marcus Haward were crucial to the clarification of the research process and the finalisation of the project. The humor of Beverly Brill, and the enthusiasm of Della Clark were motivational and deserve acknowledgment.

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This work is dedicated to the memory of James George Montague Grover
They shall awake as Jacob did, and say as Jacob said, *Surely the Lord is in this place, and this is no other but the house of God, and the gate of heaven, And into that gate they shall enter, and in that house they shall dwell, where there shall be no Cloud nor Sun, no darkness nor dazzling, but one equal light, no noise nor silence, but one equal music, no fears nor hopes, but one equal possession, no foes nor friends, but one equal communion and identity, no ends nor beginnings, but one equal eternity*

*John Donne  XXVI Sermons (1660).*
Chapter One

In Search of European Identity

1.1 Introductory Remarks

"Over the last decades the search for uniqueness, roots, distinctiveness, differences - in short for identity - has become one of the key themes of our age, both in Europe and abroad. As a preoccupation, the search for identity has invaded and coloured all our speculations about Europe, including, first and foremost, our often unavowed anxieties about her future at this decisive moment in her history."¹

The political reorientation of Europe in the post-cold war period is far from over. The deconstruction of the old world order and its problematic re-configuration is occurring at a time when received notions of rootedness, of belonging and of authenticity, at both the collective and the individual level, are being questioned in a most fundamental way. The inquiry into the nature of collective European identity is a central element of the contemporary European experience. On one hand, we are confronted with the emergence of a highly sophisticated and mutually reinforcing set of institutions and political apparatuses, most generally associated with an emergent pan-European polity. On the other hand, there is a discernable level of ambivalence and uncertainty amongst Europeans as to further European integration and a revival of nationalist and regionalist sentiment.

There is evidence to suggest, in common with the historical experiences of European state formation, that enlarged polities are closely and causally linked to the rise of broad identification amongst their populations.² Thus we might expect to observe that, as European supranational institutions become politically and socially entrenched, the


appropriate conditions emerge for the creation of a European supranational identity. This identity, civic in nature, is inclusive of, and sympathetic to the diverse range of pre-existing European ethnonational identities. However, the exact nature of the relationship between supranational institution building and the development of a supranational identity needs to be explored. Further, retarding factors, such as the revival of nation and the problematic of collective social identification more generally, requires explicit attention, in order to evaluate their specific effects on supranational identity formation.

1.2 Summary of Research

This work is predicated on the assumption that there is a relationship between supranational institutional development and the development of supranational identity. It will explore how supranational institutions develop and how such institutions affect identity formation.

The study will address the question of how political communities, which are increasingly ethnically heterogeneous, socially fragmented and territorially dispersed, yet institutionally and functionally linked, aid the growth of a common consciousness and a sense of identity.

This thesis examines the nature and evolution of European supranationalism and its relationship with pan-European identity formation. It will also examine the factors promoting and inhibiting the development of such an identity.

The central proposition of the thesis is that certain conditions for the emergence of a European supranational identity exist. This identity is developing, in accordance with a civic model based on a shared sense of European "belonging", rooted in a common belief in constitutionalism, participative citizenship, democratic institutions and civil and humanitarian rights. Such a model can be contrasted with 'ethnic' identity, wherein community is rooted in commonality of culture, language, religion and race.

This work demonstrates that the advocates of European supranationalism do not ignore the potency of pre-existing national and sub-national sources of identification.
The institutions of the European Union are attempting to manage such ethnolinguistic identities in such a manner as to link their continuance and viability to the emergent supranational European polity. The intention of such a process is the belief that a positive sentiment will attach Europeans to the supranational elements of Europe because the European Union promotes and maintains pre-existing national and local identities.

Pan-European political, administrative and economic institutions are encouraging the maintenance of localised ethnolinguistic identities. This is occurring for two reasons. Firstly, European institution builders are cognisant of the ongoing significance of ethnic identification to the majority of Europeans. Secondly, in order for European civic identity formation to be successful, these identifiers need to be politically neutralised so that they do not politically mobilise and compete with supranational institutions as a basis of communal allegiance. Thus we argue that, while an implicit policy of inclusive European multiculturalism is being pursued, European policy is also being directed towards the institutionalisation of multiple European ethnic identifiers, such as language and regional cultural products. The intent of this process is to institutionally assimilate various ethnicities into a European civil society with its own distinctive European civic identity.

This study argues that the revival of European economic and social prosperity, made possible by an integrated, supranational Europe, enhances a common European identity. European integration counters the revival of ethnic, local and national identifications, which are, as we demonstrate, often the result of economic decline and reduced state competency. An integrated Europe in which equality, prosperity, and accessibility are promoted by institutional reform and enlarged policy domains, is one in which the spectre of national primordialism is reduced. Thus actions such as the advancement of a single market, environmental protection and the promotion of full

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3 We are informed here by the contribution of W. Kymlincka who in Multicultural Citizenship (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1995) outlines the mechanisms available to a polity for the inclusion of varying forms of cultural pluralism within a single state apparatus. We shall consider this process in Chapter Two.

4 The significance of European political, economic and social integration to the creation and maintenance of a positive European sentiment, most particularly in the context of the decline in competency of individual European states is one to which we will return in subsequent Chapters.
employment are consistent with the institution-building, and the strengthening of a pan-European identity. These policies create the necessary conditions for the establishment of a collective civic identification. Supranational Europe’s actions in the articulation and defence of European civic values including freedom, security, justice and the commitment to fundamental human rights, equality and non-discrimination further reinforce the development of a pan-European civic identity.

1.3 Methodology

Following an introductory discussion on the nature of European identity in late modernity, the study will examine the individual elements of identity, offer an integrated definition, and examine its elements. Utilising that definition it will test empirically and by analysis of both primary and secondary sources the extent to which a pan-European identity currently manifests itself. Further the work will consider the reinforcers and retardants that effect the emergence and continuance of a European identity. The work will focus on the influence of institutions in the rise of collective identification. It will be informed by a detailed review of the major theoretical contributions to nation building.

Given the diverse elements that constitute identity and identification the data utilised in this work comes from a variety of disciplines. The data utilised in the demonstration of an European identity include the following:

International Social Sciences Program (ISSP);
European Commission materials, most particularly the Eurobarometer series; and the European Values Systems Study Group (EVSSP).

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5 It should be noted that while the analysis of European identity will be undertaken on a comparative basis, the examination of retardants to European identity will be considered by case study of the elements that we expect to retard European identification, without empirical analysis of such elements.

6 We are against any methodology that attempts to sterilise individual elements of identity and identification. We find that adequately establishing a typology of identity is highly problematic, that said our examination of a collective form of European identification utilises a variety of data sources, as evidenced here.
1.3.1 Units of Analysis

There are two units of analysis in this thesis. The focus of the work will be on the attitudes, values and behaviours of both European individuals within discrete European states, and the behaviours of European states themselves. We are interested in both the character of individuals, and the institutional structures that inform individual behaviour, and shape the nature of collective identification. Both individual and collective data will be utilised. European identity will be considered on a comparative basis, between states, between differing demographic groups within states and longitudinally. For example, we shall consider the degree of European identification between differing member states of the European Union at its core and its periphery, and consider the variations amongst individuals within and between individual member states over time. As this study is concerned with exploring the relationship between institutional action and communal identity formation, the work is specifically interested in the manifestation of European identity amongst the peoples and states of the European Union. As a consequence examination of identity in those states outside of the EU will only be undertaken as a point of comparison for the central inquiry.

1.3.2 Analysis

The data analysis is to be guided by the definition of identity established, and the specific tests of collective identification derived from such a definition. The analysis will address each of the elements of the definition in turn, drawing on the relevant data collected by each method as required. Where possible the analysis will specify the relationships between various outcomes (i.e. manifestations of European collective identification). It will specifically examine the relationship between the establishment of a civic form of European identity on the one hand, and the continuance of national and sub-national ethnic identification on the other. Variations in the occurrence of European identity between different demographic groups and between different member states will be considered to demonstrate the uneven distribution of European identification.
1.4 Theoretical Framework

Theories of identity have been developed considering the basis of 'civic' or 'ethnic' bases of community and communal expression. The articulation of the duality of identity is variously found, with the most significant recent contributions being made by Hobsbawm (1990), Beiner (1995), A.D. Smith (1995), Spencer and Wollman (1997), Auer (1998) and by Pakulski and Tranter (1998). The most significant contribution to this discourse has been by Greenfeld in her work Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity. She argues that the basis of ethnic and civic configurations of community are based in the articulation of the 'people' within a state by the nature of the central objects of their loyalty and by the basis of their collective solidarity. The conceptual framework of community within the nation is centred upon common meanings of unity and collectivity. Greenfeld says that the two main bases of distinctiveness of a national community, and the conceptualisations around which collective imaginings and meanings cluster, are the 'ethnic' and the 'civic' archetypes. In ethnic forms of national community, shared meanings and associations are based upon a perceived awareness of 'primordial' or inherited group characteristics, components of which include, language, customs, territorial affiliation and physical type.

By contrast to the ethnic, 'civic' understandings of national community are associated with the interpretation of the primacy of 'civic' qualities such as individualism, a respect for social economic and human rights and political liberalism. Civic identity is tolerant, inclusive, focused on equality and reason, and ambivalent to ethnic signifiers.

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9 Ibid., 12.
of identity.\textsuperscript{10} Shared meanings are located within the sovereign state imbued with these civic values, and states act to protect such characteristics. Such a civic-based shared awareness is no less “national” than that provided by ethnic signifiers. However the conceptualisations differ in the raw materials of communal meaning that comprise them and in the basis of the group’s sense of particularity. The ethnic nation is a community of \textit{fate}, whereas a civic nation is a community of \textit{choice}. They share in common the generation of a unique communal identity that separates one community from another.

We can distil the characteristics of ethnic and civic identity in the following manner: ethnic identity is rooted in either \textit{jus sanguinis} (by ancestry - by blood and birth) or by \textit{jus Soli} (by living in a certain territory and adopting a certain lifestyle). This sense of identity is exclusive, compulsory and its object of attachment is the ethnic nation.

Civic identity is rooted in civil society and voluntary association. Citizenship is the principal institution of identification. Such identification is built upon civil rights and liberal civic engagement. It is inclusive and voluntary. Its object of attachment is civil society within a liberal state.

This work, utilising Greenfeld’s formulation, will establish to what extent a pan-European ‘civic’ identity has developed. It will further test the strength of that civic attachment and consider its relationship to other forms of pre-existing identity, such as national and sub-national ethnic identities.

\textsuperscript{10} Ibid., 399-401. Greenfeld argues that the historical emergence of ‘civic’ conceptions of nation originated in English nationalism, which is readily elaborated by the Third Earl of Shaftesbury, who articulated the basis of the English civil nation:

“No people who owed so much to a constitution, and so little to a soil or climate, were so indifferent towards one, and so passionately fond of the other.” See Greenfeld, 399-400.
1.5 Modalities of Identity

In order to fully analyse the contemporary problematic of identity a review of its modalities is necessary. In essence we need to distil the core elements of 'identity' so as to be in a position, later in this work, to establish valid tests by which to judge and measure European civic identity. The modalities are Sociology, Social Psychology and Political Science.

1.5.1 The Contribution of Sociology

The contributions of Marx, Durkheim and Weber form the cornerstone of sociological discussion on the development of social ordering and identity.

Marx considered that the keys to social structures and the identity of individuals and collectivities within such structures, is found in the mode of production. The material focus placed on social organisation and identity construction stemmed from Marx's consideration of the impacts of the industrial revolution and the development of European capitalist markets. According to Marx, social action generally, and identity in particular, can only be understood in terms of the impact of material interests on different groups within a society rapidly evolving to meet the demands of the industrial revolution. Thus property rights have the effect of separating society into different social classes, defined in terms of their relationship to the sources of economic power. Within this perspective economic ordering directly effects individual and collective identity formation. Marx says identity has historically been defined in terms of the social structures created to manage material interests. For example the "slave" mode of production generates classes which assume the identities of slave-owners and slaves. The "feudal" mode of production structurally organises identity into classes of feudal lords and serfs, and the "capitalist" mode of production generates identity in terms of capitalists and proletariat. Thus the structural exploitation and inequality characteristic of the evolving capitalist mode of production is primarily responsible for the determination of individual and collective identity.11

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Durkheim was primarily concerned with the question of how, in the face of an increasingly differentiated and complex society, social cohesion was possible. His conception of society and identity centred on patterns of social solidarity embodying moral consensus and normative regulation. In traditional society social cohesion and identity were determined by what he characterised as "mechanical solidarity"; that is on a direct or 'mechanical' relationship between the individual and society. Social order and identity were possible because of the links between individuals in small-scale settings.

Contrasting with "mechanical solidarity" modern society and identity are determined by what Durkheim characterises as "organic solidarity". This, for Durkheim, is based upon a set of generalised values. Durkheim argues that modern conditions of individualism and occupational specialisation do not necessarily lead to anomie. Rather, due to a stable normative order, individuals are tied together by difference. In such a context, inequalities of social and political power are addressed through a standardised, state-sponsored normative order. Such a form of social ordering and identity formation is determined by three primary factors: a common value system and collective norms, a common language and an educational system which reinforces the importance of co-operative interactions between groups, in particular occupational groups.

Weber's contribution to our understanding of identity is rooted in both his epistemological considerations and in his interpretation of the effects of rational goal-directed actions. Influenced by Kant's considerations as to the basis of human knowledge, he argues as to the subjectivity of the social world. In this world all human actors interpret and construct the meaning of the world in which they place themselves. Such meanings, including questions of personal and collective identification are socially constructed according to a plurality of different viewpoints

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13 Ibid.
embracing differing values and interests.\textsuperscript{14} Notwithstanding the subjective and interpretive nature of social life, Weber argues that the 'rationality' of modern capitalism requires the creation of an administrative architecture of bureaucratic methods and instruments designed to ensure the domination of the free market. Without considering his work in detail, the implications for our understanding of identity resulting from his theoretical contributions are significant. The impersonal albeit legitimate, structures and agencies of domination necessary for the operation of capitalism have the effect of altering the nature of social life along functionalist and instrumental lines. Such functional reorientations of material and social life, in turn affects the relationships and resultant identities adopted by individuals and collectives.\textsuperscript{15}

Thus the contribution of classical social theory to the concept of identity focuses on a number of key elements. Firstly, as Marx determined, identity construction is, in part, determined by external (material) forces. Durkheim expanded the notion of identity by injecting into the theorisation the importance of normative convergence and a set of generalised civic values allowing for individuals to identify within the group. Durkheim's focus on the transition from traditional to modern society and its effect on individual and collective identity is mirrored in Tonnies's contrast between Gemeinschaft (community) with Gesellschaft (solidarity based on voluntary contracts), flowing from which identity is structurally determined.\textsuperscript{16} De Tocqueville's focus on collective sovereignty within a liberal democratic state is an expression of identity defined in terms of individual, right-possessing citizens. Weber strongly influenced sociology's interpretation of identity by demonstrating that individual and collective identity is a result of human actors interpreting and constructing the social world around them. Just as action and meaning are linked with individual subjectivity,


\textsuperscript{15} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{16} Tonnies, F. Community of Society (Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft). (New York: Harper and Row 1963)
so too is individual and collective identity linked to the construction of societies predominant legitimising principles.\textsuperscript{17}

\textbf{1.5.2 The Contribution of Social Psychology - Social Identity}

The term “social identity” was introduced by Tajfel who defined it as:

"An individuals’ knowledge of his or her membership in various social groups together with the emotional significance of that knowledge".\textsuperscript{18}

Individuals define themselves in terms of their social group or categorisation. They seek positive social identity, or self-definition, in terms of positive group-memberships. As social groups acquire evaluative significance in the context of their relationships to other groups, social categorisations and comparisons between groups are basic to an understanding of social identity.\textsuperscript{19}

Social identity theory assigns a central role to the individual’s process of self-categorisation which partitions the world into comprehensible units. Social identity becomes salient when individuals categorise themselves and are caterorised by others as participating in a shared a social category with others in particular circumstances. An example of this is to be found when upon winning a Nobel Prize, the recipient’s fellow national members participate in and exhibit the commonality of identity because of the sense of involvement in sharing the same social category (nationality) and thus the same social identity.

Social identity theory has significant practical implications. The most important is that social categorisation (which is essential to the process of group formation) causes inter-group division and discrimination through its impact on self-perception. From the hypothesis that individuals tend to perceive and define themselves in terms of the

\textsuperscript{17} Turner, B. The Blackwell Companion to Social Theory. (Oxford: Blackwell 1996), 43.


\textsuperscript{19} Tajfel, H. Social Identity and Intergroup Relations. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1982), 65.
superimposed social categorization both perceived and actual changes occur. Tajfel argues that aspects of the self-concept based upon group memberships alters perceptions:

"that the systematic superimposition upon individuals of a cognitive division into in-group and out-group tends to cause the perceptual accentuation of intra-group similarities and inter-group differences and self-evacuative social comparisons in terms of these similarities and differences." 20

Boundaries are formed between groups based not upon purely functional requirements but on the initial act of the adoption of a particular social categorisation. From this group formation, motivational or functional interdependence for the satisfaction of needs, achievements of goals, or consensual validation of attitudes and values between persons, leads to further social and psychological interdependence. The main expressions of this are mutual interpersonal influence and attraction, affiliated social interaction and the cementing of a sense of collective identity.

Over time social relations tend to become stabilised, organised and prescribed through the development of a system of status and role relationships, social norms and shared values. Individuals become psychologically attached to the group through the development of cohesive social relationships. Behavioural dispositions resulting from the accentuation of group rather than individual identity include:

1. **Group Self Perception and Collective Consciousness** - the absorption of personal identity into that of the group. 21

2. **Shared Values** - the adoption of a social identity is largely based upon commonly held social representations between individuals within a group. Such representations are based in common values ideas and practices, and may form a group ideology. 22

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20 Tajfel, H. *Social Identity and Intergroup Relations*, 198.


3. **Inter-group Discrimination and Stereotyping** - utilised in order to make a complex social environment more orderly and predictable.\(^{23}\)

4. **In-group Affiliation, Cooperative Interaction and Relationship Building** - the development through interaction within the group, of in-group bias and favouritism, which positively effects group performance and productivity.\(^{24}\)

5. **Group Boundaries** – Intrinsic to collective categorisation and through the utilisation of a single language or vernacular, behavioural and normative convergence and intra-group interaction.\(^{25}\)

According to Hogg and Abrams, group behaviour is determined by the ability of individuals within the group to perceive themselves, and others, as forming a distinct, self-inclusive social category, from which collective or social identity originates.\(^{26}\)

Following from this, Tajfel and Turner suggest that the nature of the social group is centrally concerned with individual alignment of identification with the collective and the consensus and uniformity of behaviour that results from such identification:

"We can conceptualise a group, in this sense as a collection of individuals who perceive themselves to be members of the same social category, share some emotional involvement in this common definition of themselves, and achieve some degree of social consensus about the evaluation of their group and their membership of it. Following from our definition of inter-group behaviour is basically identical to that of Sherif... any behaviour displayed by one or more actors that is based on the actors' identification of themselves and the others as belonging to different social categories." \(^{27}\)


\(^{25}\) Sherif, M. *Group Conflict and Cooperation: Their Social Psychology*, 45.


1.5.3 Vernaculars and Social Identity

The relationship between language and identity formation - most especially ethnic identity formation, has been extensively documented. According to Lange and Weestin there are five conditions suggesting the connection:

1. Language is very significant to the individual as an instrument for naming the self and the world;

2. In essence, primary socialisation is a matter of linguistic interaction;

3. Social representations are the 'cognitive connective tissue' of a culture and are expressed in language;

4. Language is the medium of the ethnic group's mythological conceptions of its common origin; and

5. Of all ethnic markers, spoken language is one of the most salient. 28

The role of language is central in the process of group formation and as a process of identification is central. Identity formation is largely consequential upon the positive attribution that a common language amongst group members contributes. 29 The salience of this aspect of identity formation has been observed to be particularly strong in the conditions under which members of ethnic groups attenuate or accentuate their distinctive languages, dialects and speech styles in the presence of ethnic out-group members. Language behaviours are not only important in ethnic relations but also to the creation of a social identity because they are often a critical attribute of ethnic group membership - a basic cue to inter-ethnic categorisations.


Linguistic loyalties are both a salient aspect of ethnic identity and a means of fostering intra-group cohesion. Thus there is a strong link between social identity theory and ethnolinguistics in that the differentiation between one language group and another display some of the key features of social identity theory - it increases the perceived similarities between the individual and a collective. Further it establishes boundaries between one language group and others, and provides an empirical dimension of perceived similarities and differences between one-group and another.\(^{30}\)

1.5.4 The Contribution of Political Science - The Nation as a 'Community of Sentiment'.

Political Science's principal contribution to identity theorisation is rooted in its demonstration of the cognitive and psychological nature of communal identity as manifested in both the nation and national identity. The nation, as a social-political collective, is essentially reliant upon a collective psychological construction of a collectivity based upon subjective criteria. The contrived nature of national identity is reinforced by those theorists who see both the nation and national identity as modern constructs. As Weber suggests:

“If the Concept of 'Nation' can in any way be defined unambiguously, it certainly cannot be stated in terms of empirical qualities common to those who count as members of the nation. In the sense of those using the term at a given time, the concept undoubtedly means, above all, that one may exact from certain groups of men a specific sentiment of solidarity in the face of other groups. Thus the concept belongs to the sphere of values.”\(^{31}\)

While the (ethnic) nation is indirectly dependent upon the building blocks of culture, language and custom and the (civic) nation upon common participation in a liberal political system and the rights, privileges and duties associated with such, both ethnic and civic conceptions are ultimately dependant upon a collective sense of community.

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and solidarity which ideally unite all individuals within a given territory and within an abstracted state apparatus. Confirming the subjective focus of nation Kellas says:

"A nation is a group of people who feel themselves to be a community bound together by ties of history, culture, and common ancestry. Nations have 'objective' characteristics which may include a territory, a language, a religion or common descent (through not all of these things are always present) and 'subjective' characteristics, essentially a people's awareness of its nationality and affection for it. In the last resort it is 'the supreme loyalty' for people who are prepared to die for their nation."32

Perhaps the most persuasive argument from political science in support of the subjective and cognitive origins of the construct of the nation in the modern period is that offered by Anderson in his work Imagined Communities.33 Anderson argues that nations and national identity are a construct - they do not exist independently of peoples' needs to create them. Historically national identity came about by virtue of the decline of the interrelated certainties of a privileged script language, the belief in an ecclesiastically determined secular hierarchy of power and the view that the origins of the world and of men are essentially identical. He suggests that the most satisfactory interpretation of the ties that bind people together in increasingly disparate and heterogeneous communities must ultimately be cognately derived; 'imagined' because without this sense of community the absence of practical face-to-face interaction would lead to communal breakdown. As he states:

"The nation: it is an imagined political community. . . . It is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear about them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communities . . ."34

Renan advocates national communities as being constituted by belief, rather than by objective communal convergence. Nations exist where individuals recognise each other as equal members of a political community, and only while they perceive that

34 Ibid.
they share common characteristics (irrespective of whether they actually do or not). The nation is best described by its heroic past with its resultant rich trail of memories that the present generation can share in:

"A nation is a soul, a spiritual principle. Only two things, actually, constitute this soul, this spiritual principle. One is the past, the other is in the present. One is the possession in common of a rich legacy of remembrances; the other the actual consent, the desire to live together, the will to continue to value the heritage which all hold in common."35

Further reinforcing the cognitive basis of national communities, John Stuart Mill, in Representative Government, defines nationality in the following terms:

"A portion of mankind may be said to constitute a nationality if they are united amongst themselves by common sympathies which do not exist between them and any others - which make them co-operate with each other more willingly than with other people, desire to be under the same government, and desire that they should be governed by themselves or a portion of themselves exclusively. This feeling of nationality may have been generated by various causes... but the strongest of all is identity of political antecedents; the possession of national history and consequent community of recollections; collective pride and humiliation, pleasure and regret, connected with the same incidents in the past."36

Shared prejudices and shared emotions, shared pride and myths are the basis of nation, not language or culture on their own. When a group of people begin to feel proud or humiliated by the same things; when they are pleased or saddened collectively, then that group of people has acquired a common identity - insofar as they identify with the group based upon common emotional dispositions and common responses to the same stimuli.

It would be a fundamental mistake for an external observer to try to identify nations or national identity by reference to common criteria such as race or language. We argue that the basis of nation and of national identity is psychological not physical; as Miller suggests:


"We may find people who share one or more such attributes and yet do not constitute a nation because they do not think of themselves as forming one (Austrians and Germans, for instance). On the other hand, if we take those peoples who do by the test of mutual recognition and shared beliefs form nations, there is no one characteristic (such as race or religion) that each of them has in common."37

Accordingly, the existence of the nation depends, to use Renan's phrase, upon "a daily plebiscite"; its existence depends upon the continuance of shared beliefs and of reciprocal commitments, once such beliefs and commitments fail, so too does the nation, irrespective of demonstrably objective ties of blood or language.38

1.6 Identity - A Definition

Synthesising the elements of identity which can be traced from psychology, sociology and political science into a unified definition is a challenging task. We have seen that identity draws upon a number of different disciplines. Sociology informs us of the essential social and discursive nature of identity and the importance of identity as being capable of projecting across traditional associations due to civil and institutional linkages. Social identity theory best illustrates the nature of the linkages of members within a community, considering normative convergence, common objectification and intra-group cooperation and interaction as forming the basis for the articulation of a collective identity. Political science, while considering national identity to be essentially a modern construct, further informs us of the symbolic and imagined nature of such identity. The object of such common imaginings being capable of being split into two main objectification 'ethnic' signifiers of community and 'civic' signifiers of community.

Based upon our analysis we offer the following definition of identity:

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38 The fact that the number of potential national communities that exist throughout the world far exceeds the number of state apparatus that exist, or could reasonably be expected to exist, suggests that the claims of nationalism of the promotion of a unique and separate national identity within a single state is both untenable and in practice almost completely never found. Rather than states adapting to particular nation-groups the most common occurrence is that nation-groups adapt to state centred political arrangements.
Identity is best understood as a sense of belonging; to feeling part of a collectivity. It is associated with a readiness to adopt certain self-descriptions.

Identity formation is a process of community formation in which membership and association is based on a set of criteria which have both subjective and objective characteristics. Such as the characteristics of ethine or language, as in the case of 'ethnic' identity or the features of citizenship, individualism and equality - as in the case of 'civic' identity. Identity is enabled by individuals, who by making favourable comparisons with the in-group and unfavourable comparisons with out-groups collectively categorise themselves as part of the collective. Communal identity is displayed in cooperative intra-group interaction, normative convergence and functional relations.

Identity exists where individuals identify with and wish themselves to be identifiable as members of distinct social categories such as nations, ethnic groups or societies.

1.6.1 Elements of Communal Identity

1. **A Sense of Belonging** - A collective cognitive disposition (variously described as a sense of belonging, loyalty, or a communal sense of difference) toward a group with a common object of attachment, such as the nation, and a common medium of attachment such as language or citizenship.

2. **Collective Consciousness and Self-Description** - Group self-perception and self-consciousness - collective self-awareness as being part of a collective, and self-description as a member of the collectivity.

3. **Shared Values** - (Situational) normative convergence - shared values, ideas and culture, including political culture, especially where there is a common means of communication such as a shared language, and the totality of experience conditioned by such shared values.
4. **Common Symbols** - Collective attachment to common symbols such as flags, language, the arts, national monuments and historical figures and places with symbolic significance.

5. **Common actions** - Cooperative intra-group interaction - collective behaviour and collective goal definition and attainment. Demonstrable commitment to common action in the name of the collective.

6. **Common cognitive boundary** - A discernible cognitive boundary, demonstrated by in-group favouritism and out group discrimination - both positive discrimination of other collective members and negative discrimination of the constructed 'other' including collective memories.

Identity is essentially a discursive, relational and particularised state of shared consciousness. Identity relates to particular interactions in particular contexts, and is subject to spatial-temporal fluctuations. The objects of common identifications are open to change over time and space.

Identity varies in accordance with the strength of the social attachments within the community (strong or weak) and the nature of the objects of such attachments (such as 'ethnic' or 'civic' signifiers - blood or citizenship, nation or society). Communal identity is also influenced by the benefits that individuals perceive as being attainable as a result of group membership.

At its core identity is a subjective, psychological response to a set of objective conditions, which sorts the world into both favourable and unfavourable symbolic categorisations.

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39 Deeply rooted in the European cognitive boundary is the dynamics of Europe's frontier - both Southern and more particularly Eastern. An important element in the articulation of 'Europeaness' is Europe's East/South frontier and its effect on determining the character of Europeans and the nature of European identity. This point will be more fully considered in Chapters Two and Nine.
1.7 The Problematic of Identity in Late Modernity

The relevance of our analysis of the nature of European identity is heightened as a consequence of the fundamental transformations of political and cultural life in late modernity. The advanced capitalist state is facing a number of critical challenges: the impermanence of economic sovereignty, the decline in the institutions of the welfare state and, most significantly, in the context of this work, the fragmentation and contestation of received notions of individual and collective identification. This transformation of identification within the advanced capitalist state is most readily observed within the European context. A brief examination of this phenomenon is useful in illustrating the relevance and urgency of our broader work. The problematic of European identity in late modernity is predominantly concerned with issues of ethnicity, nationalism, fundamentalism, individual identity formation, ideological extremism, the effects of globalization, and citizenship. It is an understatement to suggest that we stand at the end of the twentieth century not so much in an identity vacuum, rather we float untethered in a kaleidoscope of identities.

The rise of “identity politics” comes at a time when a number of theorists are suggesting a fragmentation of broadly inclusive communal identities and the assertion, or re-assertion, of more fundamental, sometimes primal identities.

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41 The Advanced Capitalist State is defined as:
1. A differentiated set of institutions and personnel embodying;
2. Centrality in the sense that political relations radiate outwards from a centre to cover;
3. A territorially delineated area, over which it exercises,
4. A monopoly of authoritatively binding rule-making, back up by a monopoly of the means of physical violence


42 The term ‘identity politics’ refers to the hardening of exclusive cognitive and socially constructed boundaries around constructed or invented self-designated groups such as pre-national ethnic groups, women, gays or other traditionally voiceless social groups. It is claimed by Gitlin that its rise is; ‘the most compelling remedy for anonymity in an impersonal world’. It is a politics of dispersion and separateness which rejects the arbitrary commonalities of civil society. Such a process has significant political and social consequences as Gitlin remarks ‘The proliferation of identity politics leads to a turning inward, a grim and hermetic bravado celebrating victimisation and stylised
The composition of new forms of community and identity, centred in smaller, more tangible collectivities and based on special and exclusive value systems are emerging. The transformation of inclusive civil communities into smaller, exclusive fragmented communities based on income, gender or sexual orientation is contributing to the 'end of the social' - the end of received notions of cultural cohesion and social interaction within a national territory as forming the primary basis of political identity.44 What is occurring is the breakdown of the cultural forms of solidarity and generalised values that Durkheim saw as holding modern society together. In its place are emerging more authentic and more ancient identity 'fault lines' in political and civil life; which are ordering society according to aspects as diverse as race, gender, value systems and sexual orientations. The revival of nationalism in the Balkans, the alternative social ordering offered by the feminist movement and the religious return to the (fundamentalist) future in Afghanistan and Iran are the most obvious examples of reorientation of patterns of identification and community.

At the level of the individual, late modernity has paradoxically on one hand brought with it unique mechanisms for self-expression and the creation of self-identity through the mechanisms of advanced technology and, on the other, the decline of regulating and limiting social institutions. Late modernity has been characterised by what Giddens refers to as the reorientation of time and space and the expansion of 'dismembering' mechanisms which “radicalise and globalize pre-established institutional traits of modernity” and reorientate the fundamental elements of identity formation.45

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44 See Durkheim, E. The Division of Labor in Society., 121.

45 Giddens, A. Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age, 2.
At the collective level, the rise of identity politics has become one of the defining features of the last two decades. Wide varieties of collectivities based on gender, sexual orientation, ethnic origin, or socioeconomic collectivities (such as welfare recipients, or the underclass) have offered their own preferred signifier of their communal distinction. These denotations are not without social, political, economic or psychological importance: they offer a serious challenge to the Enlightenment vision of the nature of the European model of civil society; the configuration of the state and the ordering and distribution of economic resources within political societies. They additionally have the effect of feeding back into a loop of the reconfiguration of the self's identity, insofar as the individual's identity is a product of communal and environmental conditions. These new configurations also offer challenges to psychology's understanding of human nature and the psychological basis of selfhood and the formation of groups.46

The foundation of exclusive (insofar as those without the appropriate identity are excluded from the collective and the benefits and aspirations of the collective) identity politics comes at a time when a variety of theorists have suggested a fragmentation of inclusive communal identities, most especially in the political sphere.47 The Enlightenment construction of individual political identity based in citizenship, the emancipation of the self through constitutionalism, rule of law and liberty under the auspices of the sovereign state, have been questioned. The common identity determinants of citizenship, participatory democracy and universalism that were the promise of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth centuries have become too remote, vague and ethereal to unite and bind entire communities. The recomposition of new forms of association, (perhaps initially suggested in the student movements of the 1960s), are more appropriately centred in smaller, more tangible values and collectivities. They are based principally upon exclusionary, non-universalistic conceptions of group loyalty. As Wieseltier suggests: “It is never long before identity is reduced to


47 For an examination of the decentring of identity in late modernity see Giddens, A Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the late modern age., and Jenkins, B & Sofos, S. Nation & Identity in Contemporary Europe. (London: Routledge 1996)
loyalty." The division of broadly cohesive political and civil societies into divisions based upon race, gender, sexual orientation, post-material values or relative socioeconomic position represents what is characterised as either a revolt against the colonialist smothering of innate diversity or the inevitable roll-back of inappropriate narratives of power and exploitation. Each of these new collective movements claims that they have been denied a voice in establishing the conditions of life and in determining its own identity and subjectivity.

The cumulative effect of these processes has been the rejection of the familiar, both in practical action and intellectual theorising. The pre-ordained, unquestioned loyalties to self and community are giving way to impermanence, transition and irreconcilable dilemmas of self-image and communal participation. As Bauman argues:

"Everything seems to conspire against . . . lifelong projects, permanent bonds, eternal alliances, immutable identities."

The development of theoretical discourse challenging fixed or static notions of political, social and economic life reflects the increasingly self-contradictory unity of ideological, cultural or economic structures and practices. As Hinkson suggests:

"The momentous natures of the ruptures which characterise politics today is reflected in the inadequacy of our familiar interpretative frameworks. Disorientation, along with a sense of foreboding and even helplessness, has become widespread. Not only does this effect the relatively familiar political discourses of social democracy and socialism, it strikes too at the core of the more basic frameworks of liberalism and Marxism. The grounding categories of these different versions of political economy are opened out to questioning as change charts a course into unfamiliar territory."

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49 Sampson, E. 'Identity Politics: Challenges to Psychology's understanding' American Psychologist, 1219.


Thus the designation of social and political relations has itself come under sustained critical inquiry.\(^{52}\) In such an environment the already contested nature of self and collective identity has become highly topical. Not only has there been a splintering of communal identities, but there has also been a theoretical, discursive fragmentation which in itself negates communal identity.

The crisis of identity within pre-existing social networks has also effected the relationship between collectivities and those outside the community. Thus the rise of nationalism, which operates at a variety of levels, includes a return to xenophobia as social fragmentation finds an outlet in the rise of cultural nationalism and in an increased hostility against immigrants from other nations.\(^{53}\)

1.8 Nation and Supranation in Late Modernity

The foregoing analysis of identity in late modernity should be considered in the context of the decline in the competence and coherence of the state, given the fact that the state forms the backdrop against which collective identification has taken place in Europe. Since the late 18th century the dominant unit of political organisation has been the state. The state claimed a monopoly of administration and the use of legitimate force over a given territory. The State gained legitimacy and drew on the allegiance of a body of citizens possessing equal rights. This body of citizens, while varying from state to state in their degree of cultural and ethnic homogeneity, were

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\(^{52}\) The inherent paradox of deconstructionalism as a theoretical discourse has itself been critically read as being essentially unsustainable, as Gerry Gill has poignantly observed:

"On can deconstruct the construction of others, or deconstruct the deconstruction of others, or deconstruct one's own prior deconstructions. But by having no theory (or ethics) of how or when the moment of deconstructive seeing through should be reintegrated into shared collective practices and meanings, the dictum that 'there is nothing outside the text' when extended to social interpretation, places one in abstraction from (and in that sense outside) that society. Texts are amenable to endless interpretations, but of life - we have only one."

See Gill, G. 1984 "Post-Structuralism as an Ideology" in James, Nation Formation: Towards a Theory of Abstract Community, 179.

\(^{53}\) The relationship between a decline in societal security, the rise of ethno-nationalism and the social fragmentation most readily manifested in xenophobic behaviour is addressed by Waever, O. et al Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe. (London: Pinter Publishers Ltd 1993).
symbolically linked to each other and to the state by a collective process of cognitive identification, most readily described as political identity.

The traditional concept of the state is imbued with conceptions of a territorially bounded, politically sovereign and economically unified homogenous nation in which collective activity is conditioned by group loyalty to the state and where sanctions are taken, both internally and externally, by a state apparatus. This apparatus is significantly responsible for economic, social and political policy outcomes within the territory. Such a characterisation of statehood is under some considerable dispute. Confronted with a set of experiences broadly characterised by the terms 'globalization' and 'new world order' many theorists are concerned about the imminent collapse of the traditionally understood conventional model and experience of statehood.\textsuperscript{54}

The complexities associated with the nature of the state in late modernity are aptly characterised in what Rockman ironically refers to as: "The resurgent (yet possibly receding) state".\textsuperscript{55} Questions relating to the organisation and decision-making authority of the state as well as its political, military and economic sovereignty are being raised. The interconnection between the state and civil society are being addressed as theorists are attempting to fit the new reality of state action to the traditional conceptualisation of the state as a reservoir of a delineated society.\textsuperscript{56}

The transnational flow of global capital, large population flows across 'national' borders, an increased focus on individual and sub-national group rights together with the growing acceptance of trans-state military and security forces, taken together, constitute a challenge to the essential characteristics of the state. In the European

\textsuperscript{54} The literature on this phenomenon is extensive, see Spence, E. 'Entering the future backwards: some reflections on the Current international scene.' \textit{Review of international Studies} (1994) 20, 3-13; Cassese, S. 'The Rise and Decline of the Notion of the State'. \textit{International Political Science Review} 1986 and Rockman, B. 'Minding the State - or a State of Mind? Issues in the Comparative Conceptualisation of the State' \textit{Comparative Political Studies} Vol 23, April 1990.

\textsuperscript{55} Rockman, B. 'Minding The State - or a State of Mind? Issues in the Comparative Conceptualisation of the State' \textit{Comparative Political Studies}, 25-55, 25

context, postwar developments have shown a number of parallel but contradictory trends. These include the institutionalisation of trans-state economic, social and military arrangements, and the transnational flow of peoples, capital and information. They can be contrasted with increased regionalism, proto-nationalism and exclusion both at the community and national level.

The changes in the nature of the state have been observed by a number of commentators. Osterud has suggested that while the essential criteria for statehood have become gradually more specific during the twentieth century, the conceptual ambiguities of the system of states have proliferated. Strange has exhaustively examined the decline of the state as an autonomous vessel of economic and political activity. She shows that the pressures of world markets are not only forcing structural and practical changes on 'sovereign' states, but also more profoundly are contributing to a crisis of popular legitimacy and authority in the relationship between citizens and the state. A.D. Smith, while recognising the impact of global communications and economic trends on dissolving national boundaries, sees the true crisis of the state arising from the revival of pre-modern ethnie. According to Smith these ethnie have the potential to challenge the 'authentic' memories, symbols, myths, heritage and vernacular culture which form the basis of the national community and provide the state with its required legitimacy.

The principles of legitimate statehood remain contested, shifting between civic and ethnic basis of legitimisation. The ethnic basis of the nation continues to exert a strong attraction for the legitimisation of those arguing for the creation of new states and for the legitimisation of existing ones. The struggle of the Palestinians in Israel and the Kurds in Northern Iraq are two highly visible reminders of this. However, political communities based exclusively on organic national elements such as language, religion or ethnicity are an exception to the norm in political communities. The pursuit of such national purity in states is often a fraudulent and destructive

57 ibid.


59 Smith, A. Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era., 85.
activity. In the Balkans the problem of nationalities was not solved by the dissolution of the Habsburg Empire. Nor did the implosion of Soviet Union lessen nationalist feelings or allow for the establishment of viable states. The difficulty with states which are based on ethnolinguistic criteria, such as language or religion, is that as they attempt to create national unity by cultural standardisation and the assimilation of sub-national groups, they often trigger a nationalist backlash from those proto-national minorities which are being marginalised by such a process.  

In an environment of eroding state sovereignty and authority there has been a trend towards more supranational forms of governance in order to better manage what were once national economic and political activities. This is nowhere more evident than in Europe. As Strange argues: “Why should we imagine that states are the only institutions which exercise authority over others in setting not only rules but norms and customary procedures?” The primary functions of the state - the maintenance and protection of territory, the arrangement of socioeconomic settings for the protection of its peoples and the conduct of relations between itself and other states - are altering to a point where the most appropriate unit of analysis in discussions of power and socioeconomic ordering increasingly falls in the sphere of the supranational rather than the national. The recurrent failure of individual states to manage their domestic and external affairs has, with increasing frequency, been reflected in the emergence of international organisations, both inter-governmental and supranational. Such organisations have attempted to better manage those matters beyond the resources, competence and jurisdiction of individual states. Today matters as diverse as environmental improvement, arms control, international postal matters are dealt with by international organisations. In the European context the ignominy of military self-destruction and economic bankruptcy at the end of the Second World War imbued European elites with a strong motivation for the

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60 A poignant contemporary example of this process is the systemic repression of Kurdish identity in Turkey. For example the Turkish Government gave a two-year jail sentence to Akin Birdal, a Kurdish human rights campaigner who publicly spoke of a “Kurdish identity”. See ‘So where is Kurdistan?’ The Economist June 10 2000 Turkish Survey 10.


establishment of supranational institutions and structures to both avoid further conflict and to better manage pan-European economic, social and political matters.

An important consequence of the decline of the state and the rise of supranational institutions has been a fundamental reconsideration of communal identity in the late modern period. It has been observed that the 'state-nation', and the less common 'nation-state' have been the locus of self and collective identity in the modern period. The contemporary challenge to the authority and credibility of the state should not be seen as simply requiring a shift to supranationalism. More profoundly it poses a threat to social (and self) identity in the late modern period. The state-mediated nation, historically the focal point of self-identification, deeply felt amongst national communities, now, paradoxically, seems at once both redundant yet fiercely resilient. The question as to how such contradictions in national identity in a globalised political and economic system can be reconciled is highly problematic, and will be addressed within this work.

The conception of the state as playing the role of an intermediary in controlling the milieu for state-society relations is under some pressure. The expression of society is both compressed and splintered in late modernity. The organisation of private interests has taken on a public dimension and the expansion of difference and exclusion challenges the state for the premier role in the organisation of state/citizen relationships.

The response from supranational organisations to this identity crisis varies. On one hand some supranational institutions, such as the United Nations, have projected a universalist and normative institutional framework without seeking to unilaterally intervene in pre-existing states to force compliance to such a framework. Institutions such as Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), North American Free Trade

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63 For an examination of the differing conceptions of nations, States, state-Nations and Nation-States see Arbos, X. "Nation-State”; The Range and Future of a Concept.” Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism XVII. 1-2 1990.

64 The literature on the instrumental and modernist aspects of National identity is extensive. In the first instance see Gellner E. Nations and Nationalism and Nairn. T. The Break-up of Britain: Crisis and Neo-Nationalism (London: New Left Books 1977).
Agreement (NAFTA) and other functionally orientated supranational organisations have chosen to ignore the societal and identity implications of their activities, focusing rather on specific instrumental behaviours to serve the interests of the state structures and elites which constitute them. The circumstance in the case of Europe and its premiere supranational organisation, the European Union (EU), is somewhat different. Europe is providing the economic, societal, coercive and political certainty and security that Europeans once looked to their individual states to provide, and from which national identities originated. European supranationalism, responding at first to economic and geopolitical imperatives for integration, has progressively seen a convergence of supranational institutions and also sociocultural policy. Both are specifically capable and active in promoting a common acceptance and loyalty amongst its subject citizens – while acknowledging the differing cultural and historical origins of the pre-existing European states, and the status of the different ethnic and sub-national groups within its territories. From programs as diverse as the single market, the social welfare provisions associated with 'Social Europe' and the evocation of the concepts of a 'Europe of Nations', and European rights associated with the development of 'Citizens Europe', European supranational polity has actively sought to provide a sufficient impetus for a supranational identity based on civic grounds to develop. Importantly such a process, as this work will consider, has addressed the crisis of identity both at a national and sub-national level.

1.9 Identity and Europe

Given the profound differences which exist within European societies at all levels, is there any point in talking about a Europe as a discrete unit or as a meaningful framework for comparative research? We believe there is. There are a number of emergent factors suggestive of the existence of a common Europe. The (increasing) level of economic, cultural and personal exchange within Europe indicates the existence of a bounded discrete Europe. The predominance, at least within Western

65 The failure of such institutions to take account of the identity concerns of the citizens they act on behalf of is taking an increasingly violent aspect. The aggression exhibited during the Seattle WTO is evidence of the increasing backlash against international organisations apparently blind to the identity rights of their constituents.

Europe, of market economies and liberal democratic political ideologies and structures are additionally suggestive of a homogenous European polity. While there are significant variations in the robustness of political institutions and economies within greater Europe, it is reasonable that a commonality of political and economic culture indicates that the concept of Europe can be given meaningful boundaries. The political process of legislative and institutional alignment and standardisation, taken in the context of the historical process of nation-building in European history, suggests that the institutions of supranational Europe may act as a catalyst to greater cultural and national homogeneity within Europe and contribute to the possible emergence of a European consciousness.

However it would be unwise to ignore the significant historical and cultural differences within Europe. Even at the most superficial level there seems more to divide Europe than there is to unite it. The three main religious groupings; Catholic, Protestant and Orthodox have played their part in splintering Europe. There are at least three important and vastly different linguistic groups: Romance, Germanic and Slavonic, with their own particular characteristics and spatial-temporal discontinuities. The defining contribution of intra-European warfare over many centuries demonstrates that Europes’ internal boundaries are highly contentious and not easily erased. Its external frontiers are as much normatively and spiritually based as they are geo-politically. Delineating Europe's centre and periphery is historically contingent. Spain and Portugal were centrally important in the fifteenth century, a position they no longer enjoy today. Given the contested nature of middle Europe, we may ask whether Poland, the Czech and Slovak republics or Russia are part of 'Europe' or do they derive their 'Europeaness' from their geographical proximity to the West, rather than their active participation in it.

Beyond geo-political considerations there is little question that Europe is made up of a diverse range of peoples, each with their own discrete and enduring identity. These are identities, which have, for the last two centuries, been largely suppressed by the mono-identity of the 'nation'. They are now re-emerging. The foundering of the authoritarian states in Eastern Europe and the resurgence of nationalism there after years of state-sponsored ethnic suppression is further destabilising received notions of identity and Europeaness. President Havel of the Czech Republic commented:
"It is astonishing to discover how, after decades of falsified history and ideological manipulation, nothing has been forgotten. Nations are now remembering their ancient achievements and their ancient suffering, their ancient statehood and their former borders, their traditional animosities and affinities - in short, they are suddenly recalling a history that, until recently, had been carefully concealed or misrepresented." 67

Within Europe there has been an active collective re-invigoration of nationalism and identity. Such a process is occurring in two ways. Firstly we are seeing a return to the nation and proto-nation. 68 There has been a collective, empathetic response to the nostalgia of the sovereign nation, focusing on the protection of national self-determination and self-identity at the national levels based upon 'ethnic' models of nationhood. Such a phenomenon is most striking in the divisive, exclusionary and unstable expression of national identity offered by the various constituent elements of Europe's extreme right. Secondly, at the other end of the scale, the institutionalisation of both a pan-European polity and the incorporation within it of a 'civic' model of inclusive nationhood, belonging and identity. The rise of local and regional particularism that has characterised much of the post-cold war decade present as both a problem to pre-existing European state structures, but more importantly in the context of our discussion, makes the task of subsuming these allegiances within an overall European supranational identity problematic. While, in some European states a strong sense of national pride can coexist with strong local loyalties and a sense of European identity, such as in the case of Spain, the inability of state systems to respond adequately to the effects of globalisation is revealing weaknesses in the civic basis of identification. Into this vacuum is moving regional based political movements such as the Northern League and the MSI in Italy and the regional separatists in Spain and the United Kingdom.

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68 The term 'proto-nation' is taken from Hobsbawm, E. Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 46/47, and is defined as:

"Certain variants of feelings of collective belonging which already existed and which could operate, as it were, potentially on the Macro-political scale which could fit in with modern states and nations".
As a result of the discernible tension between the institutionalisation of a supranational Europe and the internal revival of more authentic ethnonationalism, a cautionary approach to an exploration of pan-European identity formation is required. In the context of a decline in the functional competency of the state, the revival of selective intra-national and trans-national historical bonds and cultural heritages and the perceived absence of meaningful 'ethnic' signifiers of a common European identification, the building of a European identity requires a focus on civic values which avoids conflict with the pre-existing loyalties of Europeans. Nevertheless this focus on civic values must somehow imbue in Europeans a sense of community and belonging.

As we shall consider in Chapter Two, differing approaches promote differing conceptions of European identity. Europe is Michaelangelo, Brecht, and the contents of the Louvre. Europe is also the political inheritance of the Age of Reason; constitutionalism, the rule of law, citizenship and rational secularism. If in the Fourteenth Century you were to look for Europe it would be sufficient to talk of Christendom. Europe for others is embraced in the notion of individualism, cosmopolitanism, universalism and the social contract. Alternatively Europe is simply the amalgam of its sovereign states and little else. For some 'Europe' is an empty vessel, suggesting that in the absence of a common culture, language and a sense of communal cohesion there is no common Europe as it lacks the necessary social and cultural homogeneity to enable it to assert a separate identity. However, for many there exists an innate and unshakeable notion that Europe is greater than the sum of its parts, that a great and powerful turn in the collective fate of its inhabitants is under way and that this will directly affect the common form of a European identity. It is from this starting point that our analysis begins. It is clear that European identity and the notion of a distinct European symbolic and discursive space invites constant speculation. It is never wholly, or even partially observable or definable. It is an essentially problematic entity. The problem of defining the exact nature of Europe is aptly suggested by Giner:

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“For many of its citizens, "European" is the widest possible social identity, beyond occupation, locality and nation: it is the ultimate frame of social reference in terms of education, taste, ethics, belief and public and private conduct. Yet its cultural and even physical boundaries are never clear. Until recently, Europe has been only a shared notion, albeit a crucial one, for a set of Western Peoples.”

This thesis examines both received notions of European identity and demonstrates, according to our established definitions and utilising both empirical and qualitative materials, that a form of European identification is clearly discernible amongst Europeans. Such an identity is necessarily civic in form and compliments and does not ‘crowd out’ pre-existing forms of individual and collective identity.

This work argues that contemporary Europe is comprised of diverse peoples, ethnies, languages and local identities acting out their fate within the confines of a European civic society. Such a society draws its allegiance and loyalty from the positive sentiment attached to it from amongst its peoples, as an institutional structure offering a limited measure of identity protection.

1.10 Concluding Remarks

Our principal argument is that there is a relationship between supranational institutional development and the development of transnational European identity. It will explore how European supranational institutions developed and how such institutions affect identity formation. We will establish that, in the context of the splintering of national and sub-national European identities and the ambiguous position of the state-sponsored national identity, the active intervention of European institutions and policies will determine the nature of such a pan-European consciousness. This thesis, building upon Greenfeld’s distinction between the civic and ethnic basis of identity, will demonstrate the mechanisms that supranational Europe is employing to develop a form of pan-European civic identity.

In Chapter One the thesis considers the contemporary crisis of identity and the disaggregation of received notions of meta-social integration and identification within national societies within the framework of modernity. It examines the nature of identity and offers a definition that is informed by the main discourses. We argue that in essence identity is a sense of belonging; to being a part of a collectivity associated with a readiness to accept certain self-descriptions, share common values, partake in common actions and display a common cognitive boundary. Having considered identity in broad terms we locate identity within contemporary Europe and illustrate a number of the tensions associated with European supranationalism, the contestation of the state and the evocation of a broad range of previously politically dormant 'imagined communities' most especially ethnic 'communities of fate'.

Chapter Two will provide a study of the discourse of identity and suggest the nature of, and tensions between ethnic and civic notions of European identity. Further, the main competing narratives of 'Europe' including linguistic, cultural and geo-political approaches will be defined and discussed.

Chapter Three will consider the origins and raison d'être of both states and supranations and consider the mechanisms utilised by states and supranations to engender communal identity from amongst their populations. The work will consider the relationship between supranationalism and pre-existing national and local identities and the mechanisms that may be employed by supranational institutions to neutralise the challenges of pre-existing identities.

Chapter Four will analyse the emergence of European Supranationalism since the end of the Second World War and consider the precise nature of a supranational European polity.

Chapter Five and Chapter Six will consider the reinforcers and retardants of a European supranational identity, respectively.

In Chapters Seven, Eight and Nine the manifestations of a European identity will be tested against the criteria of identity established in Chapter One.
In Chapter Ten it will be argued that only through a critical examination of both the meaning of identity and the rapidly changing structure of socio-cultural life that one can postulate a legitimate, albeit modest, basis for a common European identity. It will suggest that there exists a form of pan-Europeaness, based upon a civic, inclusive notion of political community sponsored and positively and directly assisted by the institutions of the European Union. Such a European identity, it will be argued, reflects the shift away from the nation as the prime locus of communal identity in the late modern period. Such identity exists above the level of the state or nation; it compliments, rather than overwhelms pre-existing national, regional and local identities. It will be argued that in contrast to the process of state building and nation formation in Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, wherein state elites suppressed emergent local and regional identities in the pursuit of an official national identity, the contemporary European experience is highly suggestive of a unique phenomena in community formation. We argue that the positive and concerted effort of Pan-European institutions and elites to create a European abstract community rooted in inclusive diversity and the disposition of ordinary Europeans to positively associate with Europe insofar as it positively expresses its aspirations has been successful. It will be noted that while a European identity is emerging, there are both some novel and unpredictable factors that will influence the nature of such an identity. Further we shall suggest that our understanding of identity requires some revision so as to be relevant in late modernity. While the historical experience of Western Europe has seen the construction of national based identities, we will suggest that it is in the construction of a denser and more socially inclusive conception of European civil society that a European identity will emerge.

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Chapter Two

Ethnic and Civic Conceptions of Identity in Europe

2.1 Introductory Remarks

Our search for evidence of supranational European identity, while focusing on civic identity, must not lose sight of the vitality of ethnic identification within contemporary Europe. As examples as diverse as devolution within the United Kingdom and the implosion of Yugoslavia demonstrate ethnic identification within Europe is both powerful and enduring. Prior to an examination of the civic basis of European identity we need to examine in some detail the competing claims made by signifiers of communal identification, in three main areas. Firstly it will be established that the basis of communal identification can be divided into two spheres; *ethnic*: language, customs and ethine, and *civic*: participation, citizenship, constitutionalism and rule of law. Secondly, this Chapter will explore the detail of both civic and ethnic identification and argue that while there is systemic tension between the two elements of identity, that ethnic and civic identities are not exclusive of each other and that they co-exist within contemporary Europe. It will be argued that it is improbable that either mode of identity can exist, without the influence of the other.\(^1\) Thirdly, we shall demonstrate the relationship between civic and ethnic forms of collective identity in Europe by reference to materials gathered by the European Values Systems Study Group (EVSSG), the European Commission, via its *Eurobarometer* surveys and international survey data gathered as part of the 1995 International Social Science Program (ISSP).

This Chapter argues notwithstanding the resistance between the two modes of identification, that communities based upon civic notions of belonging are, in part, reliant upon some elements of the ethnic to create and maintain a sense of communal belonging. Such congruence allows for the existence of a European civic identity, with the concurrent disposition of national and sub-national identification. The research will later establish that it is the successful institutional management of the

\(^1\) Which, in part, explains the systemic resistance between the two manifestations of communal identity.
ethnic mode of identification that determines the durability of the civic mode. This Chapter considers, based upon a review of the literature, the competing mental maps employed to present pan-Europeaness from both an ethnic and civic viewpoint. Finally we suggest that pan-European civic identity is in part reliant upon a common conception of Europeaness derived from ethnic signifiers.

2.2 Civic and Ethnic Nationalism

2.2.1 Introductory Remarks

The dual nature of identity, conceived, on one hand, as containing elements of ethnic, cultural and traditional signifiers while on the other as originating with the individualistic, voluntarist and rational conception of civic association, has particular significance in our consideration of contemporary Europe. A civic nationalism exists in Europe insofar as membership of Europe, and identification with it, is inclusive and open to all who adopt a particular cluster of civic virtues, irrespective of ethnic qualities. If the rights and duties which constitute European citizenship are both in principle and fact universal, then membership of a community of Europeans and identification with it is open to individuals who make secondary their ethnolinguistic or cultural particularity in order to become, as A.D. Smith describes, 'universal' individuals like 'everybody else'.\(^2\) However even in the context of individuals participating in a civic society and narrowing their ethnic identification to a more private sphere, the affinity of the people with those signifiers of race, language or culture remains important. Such ethnic identifiers are heightened in those circumstances where the promise of citizenship - participation, material benefit and protection are not readily achievable, or where citizenship fails to promote collective desires and aspirations.\(^3\) In the following sections we shall initially place the distinction between the two forms of identification in social theory and then contrast the ethnic and civic conceptions of collective identification, both from a theoretical standpoint and in their application to Europe. While the extension of a civic nationalism within Europe has proven to be easier in Europe's West relative to its

\(^2\) Smith A. Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era., 97.

\(^3\) The revival of ethnic identification in contemporary Indonesia is a poignant example of the effects of economic and material dislocation on identity formation.
East, that the legitimisation of a European civic identity is to a degree, reliant upon a highly selective and stylised form of common European ethnic imaginings.

2.2.2 Social Theory and Identity

The distinction between ethnic and civic identification reflects one of the most central distinctions in social theory; the distinction between “community” and “society”, “mechanical” and “organic” social bonds. Nations are “Gesellschaftlich” in so far as they are reliant upon non-contractual relations and strong social bonds. Society, by contrast is a far more calculated and deliberate entity. As we briefly reviewed in Chapter One, both Toennies and Durkheim see it as a product of modernity, a result of increasing interaction – “moral density” that is more purposive and calculated. Societal bonds, as distinct from communal ones, appear in the process of interaction and collaboration that accompany social differentiation and division of labour. Such bonds, stresses Durkheim, rely on recognition, acceptance and appreciation of cultural as well as functional differences. Therefore the spread of societal bonds- organic solidarity – coincides, in Durkheim’s view, with the ascendancy of individualism. In order to be effective as social glue, a collective requires societal bonds on an altogether more abstracted level than is typically found in traditional societies. Thus the process of modernisation and the resultant individualisation that is derived from functional specialisation requires a shift from ethno-cultural bonds and linkages to more universalistic civic ones. This process, as we considered briefly in Chapter One, is variously explained by key social theorists. While Durkheim explained the shift as a consequence of the implicit division of labour required by more functional production techniques, Toennies sees it as a consequence of spreading contractual relations. Marx saw the shift in collective identification resulting from the feudal to capitalist mode of production whereas Weber linked the changes in the mode of collective identification to Protestantism and marketization.4

It is in such a context that we consider the two orientations to collective identification in contemporary Europe.

4 For a more detailed analysis of the relationship between classical social theorists and collective identification see Pakulski, J. & Tranter, B. How Nationalistic are Australians? Unpublished research paper, University of Tasmania: School of Sociology and Social Work, 1999.
2.2.3 Ethnic Nationalism

For a number of writers the basis of nation and national identity is the existence of distinct ethnic groups and their ethnocentric behaviour and collective dispositions.\(^5\)

The conviction that collective identification is 'of the blood' is suggested by its definitional origins. As Connor notes, the word nation is derived from the Latin verb *nasci*, meaning to be born, and from the Latin noun, *nationem*, denoting breed or race.\(^6\)

E.H. Carr in trying to formulate a definition of nationalism committed to an ethnic conception of national identity wrote in 1945:

"The nation is not a definable and clearly recognised entity. . . . Nevertheless the nation is . . . far more than a voluntary association; and it embodies in itself . . . such natural and universal elements as attachments to one's native land and speech and a sense of wider kinship than that of family. The modern nation is a history group."\(^7\)

The ethnic model of the nation is, as Smith defines it; 'first and foremost a community of common descent'.\(^8\) Nations are the products of history and identity is derived from the extent that people are born into them. As Jenkins and Sofos relate; "Rather than free associations based on residence, they (are) historically determined entities based on ancestry."\(^9\) In short the ethnic nation is a community of fate, rather than as in the civic model, a community of choice; as Smith argues:

"Whether you stayed in your community or emigrated to another, you remained ineluctably, organically a member of the community of your birth, and were for ever stamped by it."

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6 Connor, W. A Nation is a Nation, is a State, is an Ethnic Group is an . . . *Ethnic and Racial Studies* vol 13 No.1 January 1990, 381.


Attachment to the ethnic nation is not a matter of personal choice. The nation is exclusive, closed rather than open. As Kellas suggests: ‘No one can become Kurd, Latvian or Tamil through adopting Kurdish etc ways.’

Citizenship is acquired by birth, through blood, determined by *jus sanguinis* not by *jus soli*. The perceived indelible and enduring nature of ethnic identification, is aptly observed by Margalit and Raz:

"Identification is more secure, less liable to be threatened, if it does not depend on accomplishment. Although accomplishments play their role in peoples sense of their own identity, it would seem that at the most fundamental level our sense of our own identity depends on criteria of belonging rather than on those of accomplishment. Secure identification at that level is particularly important to one's well being."\(^{12}\)

Considering in greater detail the elements of the ethnic model of national identity, there are six key building-blocks of the ethnic 'nation'. They are:

1. **Assumed Blood Ties** - kinship, tribal allegiances and family ties;  
2. **Race** - ethno-biological and phenotypical features - such as skin colour, facial form, hair type etc;  
3. **Language** - a central feature of national identity and of inter-national conflicts;  
4. **Region** - regionalism is a feature of national identity - small scale historical boundaries, it is linked in turn to tradition and folklore;  
5. **Religion** - can form the nation and give it cohesiveness or it can undermine the state; and  
6. **Custom** - differences in custom undermine state identity - however it can strengthen the identity of the nation. - the bearer of 'civilisation'.\(^{13}\)

Notwithstanding the differing 'weightings' placed on these factors in differing contexts, it is from a combination of these that (ethnically based) national identity

\(^{11}\) Kellas, J. *The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity*, 51.  


develops. The ethnic group is exclusive; its membership is based on certain inborn attributes, which are generally culturally or linguistically defined.

2.2.4 Civic Nationalism

The modern paradigm of the state, and most particularly the liberal European state, has generally assumed a civic basis of nation and national community.\textsuperscript{14} In such a schema membership of the national community is mediated through membership of the 'people' in which individuals are accorded the rights, duties and most significantly identity of (civic) citizenship. As Smith details:

"Only members of a people can be citizens and receives the benefits of modernity which only citizenship of a nation state can confer."\textsuperscript{15}

For Smith the nature of civic identity is:

"Historic territory, legal-political community, legal-political equality of members, and common civic culture and ideology, these are the components of the standard Western model of the nation;"\textsuperscript{16}

Or as Ignatieff theorises:

"Civic nationalism maintains that the nation should be composed of all those - regardless of race, colour, creed, gender, language or ethnicity - who subscribe to the nation's political creed. This nationalism is called civic because it envisages the nation as a community or equal, right beating citizens, united in patriotic attachment to a shared set of political practices and values."\textsuperscript{17}

Within the civic model, the nation is constructed freely as 'an association of citizens'.\textsuperscript{18} The polity comes into being on a voluntary, willed basis; it is the product of agreement, of consent. It is thus simultaneously national and democratic. As


\textsuperscript{15} Smith, A. \textit{Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era.}, 97


\textsuperscript{17} Ignatieff, M. \textit{Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New Nationalism.} (London: Vintage 1994), 3-4.

Ignatieff argues: "This nationalism is necessarily democratic since it vests sovereignty in all the people."\textsuperscript{19} The members of the civic nation are those who have rights and obligations as citizens of the polity. Membership is open to those who qualify as citizens and carry out the responsibilities as such.\textsuperscript{20}

A civic nation is one in which the shift away from particular, exclusive ethnic signifiers of identity leads to the creation and protection of a zone where individuals freely associate, as inclusive equals, to pursue shared purposes. It is within such a civic association that individuals are able to express distinctive identities, such identities existing without threatening the viability of the state.\textsuperscript{21} The civic conception of nation is strongly associated with the civic society, for it is from the dense network of differing individual and collective purposes, associations and identities that a set of inclusive non-prescriptive associations develop within the state, which stand apart from the state.\textsuperscript{22}

In its most idealised form, the civic nation does not attempt to prescribe the boundaries or inclusiveness of individual members by virtue of individuals' ethnic signifiers. The civic nation recognises the plural and often conflicting identities within society. Rather than attempting to enforce a limited, ethnically based state-sponsored identity, the state rather delineates a private space for the articulation of ethnic identities while at the same time instituting a set of overriding public, civic, principles.\textsuperscript{23} Such principles act to limit the plural and conflicting values associated

\textsuperscript{19} Ignatieff, M. \textit{Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New Nationalism}, 4.

\textsuperscript{20} It is interesting to note in the contemporary United States, that the failure of citizens to carry out their responsibilities, such as to maintain order, in fourteen American states, results in the deprivation of a central element of citizenship - the right to vote. Thus civic society is moulded to create insiders and outsiders on 'civic' rather than ethnic grounds. See 'Disenfranchised for Life' The Economist October 24th 1998


\textsuperscript{22} For a recent and novel analysis of the nature of civic identity, at a pan-European level, see: Deudney, D. & Ikenberry, G. 'The Nature and Sources of liberal International Order'. Review of International Studies (1999), 25, 179-196, 192-195.

\textsuperscript{23} The most obvious example of such public principles are found in the constitutions of liberal civic states, such as the United States, Germany or Canada, where the civic values of public cohesiveness and solidarity do not, unnecessarily, erode the sphere of private ethnolinguistic or cultural identities.
with differing ethnic identities. Further there is a public commitment to value pluralism and a commitment to limit its intervention in the internal affairs of civic associations. 

Within the civic paradigm the political creation of free and equal citizens, does not ignore the importance of families and communities or the ethnic, class and religious identities attached to them. Rather it establishes that which Bridges calls a system of 'preferences' - a set of differential identities, including community, religious and ethnic associations and identities with a primary civic signifier, - of citizenship - which makes the layered identities below it practical and feasible. Bridges argues:

"A liberal democratic state defines its citizens as free individuals who are only incidentally members of particular ethnic, class and religious communities."

A liberal state has a fundamental role to play in the creation of a civic identity. It achieves communal identification rooted in definitions of membership as citizens, rather than as linguistic, ethnic or tribal members. More profoundly, it institutes formal and informal mechanisms, such as political socialisation through public education, so as to ensure that the population identities with it and with each other on civic grounds, allowing for the greatest range of diversity consistent with the management of a civil society. It is a truism to state that the world contains plural and conflicting values. A liberal, civic polity is one in which the choice of sub-state identifiers remain in the private sphere for as long as they pose no threat to each other

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24 It is important to note that notwithstanding the overt inclusiveness of civic identification, all civic nations impose limits as to inclusiveness and acceptance, which often include ethnic criteria. The language competency criteria for citizenship in Australia and the blood association criteria in Germany are two examples of this not uncommon phenomenon. Other cases, such as the resistance to North Africans in France, and the historic animosity, albeit at a social rather than a political level, to former commonwealth immigrants, in the United Kingdom, demonstrates that ethnic exclusion operates even within civic states.

25 Ibid., 2.

26 While we suggest that citizenship is a central element in maintaining a common form of identification in multi-ethnic polities, such as Europe, we are cognizant that citizenship on its own is often incapable of, on its own, sustaining a common communal sentiment, and thus other elements such as non-civic identifiers such as symbols and language are important in maintaining the civic identity. See Requejo, F. 'Cultural Pluralism, Nationalism and Federalism: A Revision of Democratic Citizenship in Plurinational States'. European Journal of Political Research. (1996): 35, 255-286.
or to the predominant ideas of the civil state such as liberal politics, civic diversity, accommodation and non-discrimination on ethnic, religious or national grounds.  

2.2.5 Tensions Between 'Ethnic' and 'Civic' Identification.

It is important to examine in greater detail the relationship between ethnic and civic conceptions of collective identification. To understand the emergence of civic identification in Europe it is first necessary to consider the uneasy dynamic that exists between the two models.

The transformation of what Greenfeld describes as 'rabble' to 'nation', not only involves institutional reconfiguration but more significantly individual and collective cognitive reorientations. To be part of a national community, as Greenfeld suggests, is to be part of an elite, a separate community with qualities and opportunities removed from those non-members. National members as an elite resist those who do not share their national particularities strongly.  

We have observed that the distinctiveness of the ethnic community, which presupposes the ethnic uniformity of its origins as a source of uniqueness is easier to acquire and maintain than civic forms of community, based on more abstracted grounds. Whereas a clear line separates those of common ancestry and language from the other, such distinctiveness is less immediate in the case of communities of choice; civic communities.

Given that the articulation of uniqueness is both central to collective and individual identification and that both civic and ethnic modalities, to a greater or lesser degree, require the active intervention of institutions or elites to manifest themselves, the search for distinctiveness is intimately linked with the neutralisation and often the active suppression of alternative models of community. The modernity of nation and the emergence of new national identities, resulted from the appropriation and

27 We shall more fully consider the mechanisms available for managing ethnic signifiers within a civic nation later in this chapter.


29 We are not suggesting that collective identification in civic nations such as the United States is less distinct than that experienced in national communities rooted in ethnic sources of belonging and uniqueness. Rather, there needs to be a more conscious elite and institutional effort to create such distinctiveness.
manipulation of signifiers, ethnic or civic, to substantiate them. Further, the emergence of national identity involved the rejection of elements of signification that did not fit the chosen national model. Because the community was a construct and involved the comparison between itself and those excluded from it led to what Greenfeld denotes as *Ressentiment*; which is defined as:

"a psychological state resulting from suppressed feelings of envy and hatred (existential envy) and the impossibility of satisfying these feelings."[^30]

The macro-political manifestation of such *Ressentiment* is exhibited in both the promotion of particular elements of values, traditions and ideologies within a single national community and the active suppression of alternative and competing elements. Further such *Ressentiment* is displayed in the often uneasy relationship between the state-endorsed forms of signification and those rejected by the state, its elites and institutions.[^31] At the interstate level the tension between the differing basis of identity is exhibited in the tension between states whose basis of communal identification differs from others, such as that between France and Germany.[^32] Greenfeld argues that within a single national community the transformation from ethnic identification


[^31]: Examples of such intra-state tension between ethnic and civic conceptions of community are numerous. In Western Europe the revival of ethnic, xenophobic and exclusionary conceptions of national community by the extreme right forms a active counterpoint to civic forms of community. Whereas the endemic violence in Yugoslavia demonstrates the physical manifestation of the clash between civic and ethnic concepts of community.

[^32]: The clearest example of the tension between competing state-centred conceptions of civic and ethnic conceptions of community within Europe is exhibited by the civic and ethnic nationalisms of Germany and France respectively. This tension is considered primary and fundamental, as Brubaker suggests:

"for two centuries, locked together in a fateful position at the centre of state-and nation building in Europe, France and Germany have been constructing, elaborating and furnishing to other states distinctive, even antagonistic models of nationhood and national self-understanding."

Even today:

"the opposition between the French and German understandings of nationhood and forms of nationalism remains indispensable."

The origin of these archetypes can be traced to the intellectual contributions of the German Meincke on one hand and French writers such as Michelet and Renan, on the other. See Brubaker, R. *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe.* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1996), 3. We can further see this juxtaposition in the relationship between Western and Eastern Europe, as we shall consider later in this Chapter.
to a collective civic form of community results in structural constraints on the cultural traditions that preceded it. Such a process of the selective articulation of a particular form of national community within one state leads to open hostility being exhibited towards other states that do not share the same basis of community.33

The competition and antagonism between the two modalities of identity, if we accept Greenfeld's Thesis, presents substantial challenges to the articulation of a pan-European identity. If ethnic and civic identities stand in a position of Ressentiment relative to each other, so too do different European states whose basis of identity differ, then the synthesis of a common sense of pan-European belonging becomes highly problematic. Mechanisms must be found to manage such Ressentiment in contemporary Europe, lest the potential splintering effect of local identities contribute to the retreat from an inclusive civic European identity. Such mechanisms become necessary so as to manage the enduring nature of national and ethnic forms of identification while ensuring a pan-European civic form of identity can emerge. Such a process of identity management, as we shall demonstrate in this work, is currently underway in Europe. Ethnic identification will not disappear in Europe, it will endure, and accordingly pan-European civic identity must accommodate pre-existing and enduring (ethnic) signifiers. As Smith reminds us:

"Whenever and however national identity is forged, once established it becomes immensely difficult, if not impossible (short of total genocide) to eradicate." 34

Those advocating the formation of a European civic identity must be cognisant of the tensions between the two paradigms and act to politically neutralise ethnic identification and strengthen ethnic inclusiveness within a civic form of community. Such a process, in the contemporary context, is an urgent one as the institutions of the European polity lack resilience without a substantial sense of community and shared identity. As Deudney and Ikenberry suggest:

33 The occurrence of Ressentiment between the German ethnic conception of community and the French Civic conception, as suggested by Greenfeld, is perhaps the clearest example of the incompatibility of the two modes of community.

“Political identity and community and political structure are mutually dependent. Structures that work and endure do so because they are congruent with identities and forms of community that provide them with legitimacy.”

The mechanisms by which polities attach a communal sense of belonging to their structures and institutions will be considered in detail in Chapter Three and anticipated in the concluding sections of this Chapter.

2.3 The Objectification of European Identity - Competing Discourses on Pan-European Identity - Ethnic and Civic

In 1994 Giner aptly described the paradox of European identity as:

“Europe invites constant speculation because it cannot be taken for granted.”

Capturing the spirit of the paradox, Ash commented in 1996:

“In short, no continent is externally more ill-defined, internally more diverse or historically more disorderly. Yet no continent has produced more schemes for its own orderly unification.”

The question of the essence of Europeanness has been variously expressed, ranging from Dubois writing in the Fourteenth century of a Europe unified by virtue of its Christianity, to Durkheim’s Nineteenth century contributions on the common social structures that formed the basis of a common European society. The formation of representations of European homogeneity and identity reflects not only the complexities and histories of European peoples, but also, and equally importantly, the interpretations made of such experiences by theorists. As our analysis demonstrates the discourse of Europeanness is unclear as to the precise nature of its basis – ethnic or civic.


Even the most clearly defined civic conception of Europeaness, contains within it vestiges of a pan-European ethic or cultural community. Akyuz, considering Europe from Turkey, argues Europe is best understood by its own unique 'mental structure'. Such a structure has four strands. The French Revolution, seen as a 'premiere' result of Renaissance and Enlightenment, the industrial revolution and colonialism, German National Socialism with World War II, and the collapse of the Iron Curtain and the Soviet Union. Valery considers the most legitimate basis of Europe can be established by three factors. The influences that make Europeans European are Rome, Christianity and science. Rome, according to Valery, gave to Europe a model of organised and stable power, Christianity contributed to European identity by giving Europeans a common normative system and a common consciousness as sharing in a common people beyond individual localities or kinship relations. Science distinguishes Europe most profoundly from the rest of humanity - the Greek inheritance is the origin of this determinant of European identity:

“What we owe to Greece is perhaps what has most profoundly distinguished us from the rest of humanity. To her we owe the discipline of the mind . . . To her we owe the method of thought that tends to relate all things to man . . . Man became for himself the system of reference to which all things in the end must relate . . . from this discipline science was to emerge - our science, that is to say, the most characteristic product and the surest and most personal triumph of our intellect. Europe is above all the creator of science. There have been arts in all countries, there has been true science only in Europe.”

The Pan-European Movement reinforces Valery's thesis. The core elements of Europe, as articulated by the Movement, are, 'Liberalism, Christian, Social and European'. The heart of Europe is its focus on individualism, personal and collective self-determination, which necessitates a free market economy and a state of constitutionally guaranteed law and order. The Movement considers Christianity as: 'the soul of Europe, the foundation of its cultural, social and spiritual development'. From Christianity human rights are clustered and observed. The third element of


40 Ibid.

Europe is the social, humanitarian aspect of Europeaness - the preservation of concepts of justice and dignity of man, and the removal of discrimination and the protection of minorities, with just living conditions for all. Fourthly, Europe is European because it has, 'created a unique order of peace and justice'.

Writing at the end of the Second World War, T.S. Eliot strongly articulated the unity of Europe as a cultural community. An entity made complete and united by virtue of its common culture - and by this he meant ecclesiastical and the traditions and material cultural artefacts associated with it. Eliot states:

"The dominant feature in creating a common culture between peoples, each of which has its own distinct culture is religion. . . . I am talking about the common tradition of Christianity which has made Europe what it is, and about the common cultural elements which this common Christianity has brought with it. . . . It is in Christianity that our arts have developed; it is in Christianity that the laws of Europe - until recently - have been rooted. It is against a background of Christianity that all our thought has significance. An individual European may not believe that the Christian Faith is true; and yet what he says, and makes, and does, will all . . . depend on [the Christian Heritage] for its meaning. Only a Christian culture could have produced a Voltaire or a Nietzsche. I do not believe that the culture of Europe could survive the complete disappearance of the Christian Faith."

The inclusiveness of Europe, East and West, in a pan-European cultural community is well argued by Seton-Watson:

"The European cultural community includes the peoples living beyond Germany and Italy . . . something in no way annulled by the fact that they cannot today belong to an all European economic or political community . . . Nowhere in the world is there so widespread a belief in the reality, and in the importance, of a European cultural community, as in the countries lying between the EEC and the Soviet Union . . . To these peoples, the idea of Europe is that of a community of cultures to which the specific culture or sub-culture of each belongs. None of them can survive without Europe, or Europe without them."
The absence of a systematic expression of European identity is broadly observed. As Davies suggests, finding the essential ingredients of a common European culture, or more properly a common European Civilisation, is an extremely difficult exercise. Davies argues that Europe includes elements of both the ethnic and civic notions of community - Elements include the Christian faith, the intellectual and cultural inheritance of Greece and Rome as well as the influences of the Enlightenment, modernisation, romanticism, nationalism, liberalism, imperialism and totalitarianism. All such features assists in defining Europe from non-Europe and it is only from such a combination of such disparate factors that the complexity of a pan-European identity can theorised.

Davies identifies a number of models of 'Western Civilisation' in which 'Europe' has been defined, and which have both ethnic and civic elements. These frameworks include:

1. **The Roman Empire** - 'the West' came to be associated with those parts of Europe which can claim a share in the Roman legacy, as distinct from those which can not;

2. **Christian Civilisation** - Christendom was the West, Islam the East;

3. **The Catholic World** - In which the divorce of ecclesiastical and secular authority facilitated the rise of the Renaissance, the Reformation, the scientific revolution and the Enlightenment;

4. **Protestantism** - the rise of northern Europe;

5. **The French Variant** - the secular philosophy of the Enlightenment and the ideals of the Revolution of 1789;

6. **The Imperial Variant** - the assertion of perceived superior European cultural, economic and constitutional conditions on a pre-modern external world;

7. **The Marxist Variant** - That Western Europe had reached a superior level of development compared with the rest of the world

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45 Davies, N. *Europe: A History*, 15.

(notwithstanding the assertion that such development would end in decadence and revolution);

8. **The First German Variant** - The centrality and primacy of Germany within Mitteleuropa and the rejection of liberalism;

9. **The WASP Variant of Western Civilisation** - The commonalities of Protestantism, parliamentary government and common law shared by the US and Britain, in opposition to German Hegemony in Europe;

10. **The Second German Variant** - Conceived by the Nazi's features include 'Aryan' Racism, Greater German nationalism and pagan mythology;

11. **The American Variant** - democracy and capitalism versus the threat of communism; and

12. **The Euro Variant** - based firmly on the Franco-German alliance, intent on increasing material and social prosperity, and limiting the influence of the 'Anglo-Saxons'.

This discussion illustrates the difficulty in explicitly and categorically offering a universally acceptable or valid 'cultural' basis for pan-Europeaness that escapes conjecture. Further it demonstrates both the discursive nature of identity theorisation and that a European civilisation based upon a European culture is enormously elastic, and uses elements of both ethnic and civic elements of commonality and community.

Of relevance to this discussion are the priorities and assumptions implicit in the allied attitudes to Europeans in the Second World War. The allied leadership attempted, using the concept of a common cultural European inheritance, to rally the West against the European 'other', which had adopted values and behaviors that removed it from the sphere of the European civic community. Such attempts remain a clear statement of the core of Europeaness, notwithstanding being in the form of a trans-Atlantic Europeaness. As Davies concludes:

"The belief in a unique, secular brand of Western civilisation in which the Atlantic Community is presented as the pinnacle of human progress. Anglo Saxon democracy, the rule of law in the tradition of the Magna Carta, and a capitalist, free market economy are all taken to be the highest forms of the good."  

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48 Ibid., 40.
Perhaps the most famous recent example of the assertion of Pan-Europeaness rooted in a common culture is that offered by Huntington. The central theme of his work is that in the post cold-war world the premier patterns of cohesion community and identity are less political and more cultural reflected in a revival of what he terms 'civilization identities'. Rather than globalisation shaping a universal civilization, modernisation is rather reaffirming the importance of unique cultures and identities to communities, no where is this more the case, according to Huntington, than in non-western, specifically Asian and Islamic hemispheres. Accordingly Huntington suggests that a 'civilization-based world order' in which societies sharing cultural affinities are hieratically arranged and between which there is increasing conflict. The survival of western identity, which is dependent upon the United States, will be achieved only if the west accepts the practical challenges from the non-west.\(^{49}\) Huntington's analysis suggests that while the United States is the premiere military power, and thus has responsibility for carriage of the physical protection of the West, the decisive ideological, cultural roots of the west are centrally European. More specifically the ancestry, religion, language, history, values customs and institutions, at the broadest level are reliant upon Europe. Clearly for Huntington the central elements of Europe is its civilization, and it is the European civilization that created the western identity.\(^{50}\) He argues:

"Western ideas of individualism . . . human rights, equality . . . democracy . . . the separation of church and state . . . have little resonance in . . . Islamic . . . or Orthodox cultures."\(^{51}\)

Deudney and Ikenberry make a more recent exposition of a common European civic identity. Crystallizing the European civic community in terms of its adherence to the

\(^{49}\) Huntington, S. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. (New York: Simon & Schuster 1996), 1

\(^{50}\) There is little doubt as to Huntington's cultural preferences, as he argues:

"those with Western Christian heritages are making progress towards economic development and democratic politics; the prospects for economic and political development in the Orthodox countries are uncertain; the prospects in the Muslim republics look bleak."

\(^{51}\) Ibid., 1.
public values of political democracy, market economics, ethnic toleration and personal freedom, they suggest:

"The western civic identity is a consensus around a set of norms and principles, most importantly political democracy, constitutional government, individual rights, private property-based economic systems, and toleration of diversity in non-civic areas of ethnicity and religion. Throughout the West, the dominant form of political identity is based on a set of abstract and judicial rights and responsibilities which coexist with private and semi-private ethnic and religious associations."52

The advent of civic identity represents a distinctive solution to the issue of managing what are often reactionary ethnic and cultural loyalties and sensibilities. European civic identity allows, within a liberal tolerant framework, for identity pluralism. Contributing to such a framework is the development of economic and political structures, such as a market economy, and participative citizenship, to dilute the potential political influence of ethnic identities. European cohesiveness and solidarity is brought about by the civic ethic of toleration and diversity that dilutes the potency of ethnic identification.

2.4 The Division of Europe – ‘The West and the Rest’53

One of the key features in the evocation of Europe as a unified cultural community has been the maintenance of the division of Europe between its Western and Eastern hemispheres. While such a division is, at times, politically motivated and arbitrary, often forgetting whole histories and regions, there are 'real and important' lines on the map that divide Eastern and Western Europe.

2.4.1 The Eastern Frontier

The disposition of 'ethnic' and 'civic' forms of nation and national identity in Europe can be made on spatial, rather than purely theoretical grounds.54 First suggested by


Kohn, Plamenatz and Gellner, the distinction of the form of political community in the two European hemispheres has been most recently suggested by Spencer and Wollman.\textsuperscript{55} According to Kohn, nationalism in the West developed first, and was based firmly on 'civic' objectification. Such nationalism was the product of the Enlightenment, of the age of reason, as an expression of the confidence of self-interested rational individuals. Eastern nationalism, by contrast, developed in a profoundly different environment, along different, more ethnically orientated lines, and as a reaction to the success of the west. Plamenatz identifies in the West a:

"Nationalism of peoples who for some reason feel themselves at a disadvantage but who are nevertheless culturally equipped in ways that favour success and excellence measured by standards which are widely accepted and fast spreading, and which first arose among them and other peoples culturally akin to them."\textsuperscript{56}

In contrast, the Eastern model represents:

"The nationalism of peoples recently drawn into a civilisation hitherto alien to them and whose ancestral cultures are not adapted to success and excellence by these cosmopolitan and increasingly dominant standards. This is the 'nationalism' of peoples who feel the need to transform themselves, and in so doing organise themselves: of peoples who come to be called 'backward' and who would not be nationalists of this kind unless they both recognised this backwardness and wanted to overcome it."\textsuperscript{57}

The distinction between the emergence of the civic nation in the West and the ethnic nation in the East and by the characterisation of the differing forms of nation have set up an identity counterpoint, has been addressed by other authors. According to Kohn, nationalism developed in the West first and along singular lines. It was the product of the Enlightenment, the age of Reason - an essential expression of the confidence of rational individuals wishing to pursue their legitimate interests. Eastern nationalism by contrast was characterised as developing in a profoundly different environment, along quite different lines. The perceived fissures revealed in the literature on the

\textsuperscript{55} Spencer, P. & Wollman, H. \textit{Good and Bad Nationalism: A Critique of Dualism.}, 3.


\textsuperscript{57} Ibid., 33-34.
relationship between the West and the East is most acutely demonstrated in the typology offered by Spencer and Wollman in the table below.

**Table 2.1 Relationship Between Europe’s West and East**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Western</th>
<th>Eastern</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>Cultural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic</td>
<td>Ethnic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>Illiberal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individualistic</td>
<td>Collectivist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rational</td>
<td>Mystical/Emotional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universalistic</td>
<td>Particularistic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French Enlightenment</td>
<td>German Romanticism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contracts</td>
<td>Volk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constitutionalism</td>
<td>Authoritarianism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gesellschaft</td>
<td>Gemeinschaft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal-rational</td>
<td>Traditional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imperialism</td>
<td>National Liberation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


These distinctions while conveying a somewhat ethnocentric suggestion of Western superiority and characterising the East as backward, regressive, reactionary and not authentically modern, is useful in illustrating the enduring nature of the fissures in European identity conceptualisations. It is not a dramatic departure from such stereotyping of the East to see the origins of the evolution of the Eastern other - as stealing 'our' jobs, or swamping 'our' culture. The West has been and remains stereotyped as authentically modern and liberal, the East characterised as alien to liberalism, secularism and progressive rationality.\(^{58}\)

The division of Europe into the progressive 'civic' West and the more traditional 'ethnic' East serves two purposes. Not only may such an East/West,

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\(^{58}\) It is important to note that the analysis of the division between Eastern and Western European hemispheres is heavily value-laden, as is suggested by the terminology utilised. The East is variously described in terms of its backwardness (Plamenatz), inferiority (Kohn) and incompleteness (Gellner). Such stereotypical responses may be rooted in what Hall has called the discourse of the 'West and the Rest'; developed over hundreds of years of unequal contact, imperialism and colonialism, founded on elements of power and coercion. This discourse has deep historical origins in the form of opposition between western and eastern spheres of Europe. It goes back to the Roman and Greek hostility, to the barbarian Other from the East, to the schism in Christianity between Eastern Orthodoxy and Western Catholicism, and to Christianity's struggle with Islam.
progressive/backward division serve, in rudimentary terms, to illustrate the geographical division of Europe into civic and ethnic conceptions of political community, but further serves an important role in the maintenance of Western identity by imbuing it with a profoundly ethnocentric and superior self-definition, when contrasted with the eastern 'other'.\(^5^9\) Thus notwithstanding the uncertain theoretical basis of the East/West ethnic/civic schism, the practical effect of such a perception has been to further reinforce a sense of (Western) European identity, albeit at the expense of a stereotyped, Eastern, 'other'.\(^6^0\)

### 2.5 Ressentiment Revisited - The Impossibility of the Civic Without the Ethnic

At this juncture it is important to return to the ontology of Greenfeld's model of identity. Notwithstanding Greenfeld's compelling thesis, it is, in practical terms not plausible to completely discount the effect of ethnic identifiers, even within a civic community. As our preceding analysis has demonstrated, matters of language, ethnicity and culture are important signifiers of identity and community, even within a civic polity. By constituting sharp lines of demarcation between civic and ethnic conceptions of communal identification, theorists ignore a host of subtle interactions and causal influences between the two modes of identification. Such interactions and influences may be overlooked in an exclusive and absolute reliance on the narrative of either the ethnic or civic identification. This polarized ontology ultimately leads to a dead end, for such an understanding rejects the plausibility of overlapping identities, of both a civic and ethnic nature, within a single territory. In such a conception local and regional identities, which manifest themselves in ethnic signifiers such as

\(^5^9\) Jennifer Welsh offers a strong argument in support of the critical role of the other, Eastern and ethnic in her work 'The Role of The Inner Enemy in European Self-Definition: Identity, Culture and International Relations Theory'. *History of European Ideas*, (vol.19, no.1-3), 53-61.

\(^6^0\) The common cognitive boundary that the East/West Schism evokes has been variously described. Notwithstanding its inadequate scholarship Kaplan's work *Balkan Ghosts* aptly summarises the enduring historical divide between Europe's West and East, and the foundation that this division provides for European identification:

"...the battle between communism and capitalism is merely one dimension of a struggle that pits Catholicism against Orthodoxy, Rome against Constantinople, the legacy of Hapsburg Austria-Hungary, against that of Ottoman Turkey - in other words West against East, the ultimate historical and cultural conflict."

language, customs or common religious observance, may exist within a set of structural and institutional settings which promote and which are themselves reliant upon, a common sense of (civic) identification.61

The co-existence between differing forms of identification, such as ethnic identification at a local or national level and a civic form of association at a European level, first suggested by Waever, can be best understood by reference to psychological contributions and interpretations. We are informed by psychology that identity is multidimensional; it is in part formed by relationships within the family and extending from it to sub-group and group relationships, and their derived values and orientations developed from them later in life. Accordingly other interactions that develop, and the meanings that individuals attach to them, within social economic and political settings form conditions for the emergence of other modalities of identification. As one or another of these associations and relationships becomes more active or meaningful, and as behaviors alter to reflect the relative importance of such associations, the focus and intensity of identification may alter markedly.62 However the pre-existent identifiers continue to exist but are not operationalised concurrently or with the same intensity. In this way the primary identifier of citizenship within a civic polity can accommodate the secondary ethnic identifier of race, religion or language.

Identity and identification are not unidimensional; an individual can at one and the same time adopt the ethnic signifiers of language and ethnic origin while proudly declaring their confidence in, and allegiance to, the participative and right-bearing virtues of the civic state. In short, identity is much more variable than might be supposed by a simple division between ethnic and civic identification. Just as looking through a prism from different angles we observe differing images, so too with identification. Communal identification is situationally derived and malleable depending upon the context of the individual and the individual within the collectivity. What is certainly true, as Greenfeld argues, is that it is possible for

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multiple and overlapping centres of identity and identification to come into contact and clash with each other if not managed adequately, at both a societal and institutional level.\textsuperscript{63}

The nature of the relationship between ethnic and civic identification in contemporary Europe is best demonstrated by the results of the International Social Sciences Program (ISSP). While the ISSP survey considered a variety of issues, it considered the basis and intensity of respondents' attachments to their neighborhood, regional and national communities. Such consideration allows for an interpretation of the basis – ethnic or civic of individuals' communal identification. As part of the survey respondents were asked to indicate what, for them, were important factors in their form of belonging to a community, elements attributable to ethnic identification or alternately features which demonstrated the predominance of civic belonging. In short, as Pakulski and Tranter have argued, the ISSP data demonstrates what are the elements – civic or ethnic, or a combination of the two, which form the basis of communal solidarity.\textsuperscript{64} Ethnic identification was established by a positive response from survey participants to questions that aligned their sense of belonging to 'ethnic' factors, including attachment to customs, importance of birthplace and having lived all one's life in the state. By contrast, those who derived their sense of belonging on 'civic' criteria identified with their community on grounds including positive feelings

\textsuperscript{63} We are not suggesting that the two differing conceptions of identity are autonomous, or that different dimensions of identity do not impact upon each other – because they clearly do. As Greenfeld argues the two modes of identification do not coexist at all times amicably, however it is plausible that conditions may exist that allows them to coexist without overt tension or fragmentation. Accordingly the cultural traditions associated with the Crown, and the differing (ethnically derived) national identities of Scotland, Wales and England remain important reference points of identification within the United Kingdom, without threatening the integrity of a common form of British (civic) identification. The tension between ethnic and civic forms of identification and the systemic failure to manage such Ressentiment is perhaps most recently found in Europe in the case of Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav's demonstration of a primarily ethnic identification based on a historically enduring package of linguistic, cultural and social practices, and which was the decisive factor in the construction of a large scale national community, did not easily accommodate a form of communal belonging on civic grounds that the post-cold war environment required. Accordingly a shared affiliation between localised ethnic and transnational civic forms of identification in Europe, as it will be established, exist insofar as the European polity provides sufficient security, rights and privileges to these localised identities and those who share in them.

\textsuperscript{64} See Pakulski, J & Tranter B. 'How Nationalistic are Australians?'
of being a member of a state by virtue of their respect for the political institutions and the laws of their state.\textsuperscript{65}

Considering the 1995 ISSP data, the basis of collective identification varies significantly, and informs the spatial ordering of ethnic and civic identification in contemporary Europe. In a number of central and Eastern European states, most particularly Poland, Bulgaria and Russia, the population can be described as strongly ‘ethnic’ in their expression of collective identification. Whereas the citizen body of advanced industrial European states, including Italy, Ireland, Germany and Sweden are both civic and ethnic in their orientations; that is to say they value their communal membership because of both ethnic and civic orientations. Such a result suggests that under certain circumstances the \textit{Ressentiment} between the two modalities of identification can be accommodated within a single polity, most particularly in Europe’s Western hemisphere.

The figure below demonstrates the nature of both ethnic and civic identification amongst a number of European and non-European states. It shows that there is a considerable spread in the nature of communal orientations ranging from communities based firmly in ethnic conceptions of community such as those in Europe’s East, to ones more civic in orientation, not coincidentally territorially located in Europe’s West. Importantly it demonstrates the concurrent existence of states in which communal identification is both civic and ethnic in nature.

\textsuperscript{65} For an operationalisation of the typology of identity utilising ISSP data, see Ibid., 6.
Figure 2.1 Ethnic and Civic Orientations Amongst Europeans

Source: Pakulski, J. & Tranter, B. 'How Nationalistic Are Australians?' Unpublished Paper. School of Sociology and Social Work, University of Tasmania 1999

The figure demonstrates two significant points. Firstly, Western Europeans are comparatively more civic in their orientations when compared to those in the east. Secondly, the data supports our argument that ethnic and civic identification may exist conterminously. The data establishes that this is the case in Italy, Ireland, Spain and (West) Germany. It would appear that notwithstanding Greenfeld's thesis, that the two forms of identification are antagonistic, we suggest that in certain circumstances ethnic and civic identification are found to exist conterminously. The basis of such coexistence is, as we shall demonstrate in this work, based on the institutional creation of an environment where pre-existent identities are protected, made secure and maintained by the polity.66

Even the most cursory survey of the main contributions to social and political theory confirm our argument on the relationship between ethnic and civic forms of

66 It is worth noting again the significance of this argument. European identity, notwithstanding the shared cultural and historical basis, does not constitute an 'ethnic' community or in itself allow for the articulation of a communal sense of belonging on ethnic grounds, thus a civic form of association must emerge to unite Europeans, however given the enduring nature of pre-existing ethnic forms of community and belonging, such a form of pan-European civic association must accommodate rather than compete with those pre-existent, localised and enduring forms of community.
identification. Nietzsche keenly observed that the civic virtues of the Enlightenment had killed the (ethnic) Christian God. The result of this process was an agonised atheism, in which man searched for a new set of moral imperatives to avoid the intolerable consequences of such rootlessness, which for Nietzsche derived from what we might describe as a rational civic religion.\textsuperscript{67} Rousseau considered that the end of Christian society necessitated the development of a civic religion; some form of communal association that synthesises peoples without reference to what had been the unifying factor of Christianity.\textsuperscript{68} Such a view was taken up by de Tocqueville.\textsuperscript{69} Notwithstanding the tension between the two modality of communal identification, without some reference to the traditions, customs and relationships that underpinned (ethnic) communities, civic society becomes incapable of sustaining community, as societal bonds are brittle and vulnerable to the unresolved longing for (ethnic) community amongst its members.\textsuperscript{70}

Considering contributions by contemporary theorists we find that notions of exclusively civic or ethnic forms of identification are elusive; that it is not possible to entirely discount one's influence on the other.\textsuperscript{71} In the context of powerful, persuasive, yet highly stylised and 'imagined' ethnic identities in Europe, what scope is there for the evocation of a unifying civic identity? As Auer has observed, Habermas seeks to overcome: 'the ghosts of the past' by replacing conceptions of ethnically defined nation and national identity with a cosmopolitan notion of a Verfassungspatriotismus (constitutional patriotism) based on shared principles of justice and democracy.\textsuperscript{72}

\textsuperscript{67} See Nietzsche, F. Beyond Good and Evil. (New York: Canton House 1952)
\textsuperscript{68} See Rousseau, J.J. Basic Political Writings. (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishers 1987)
\textsuperscript{70} Perhaps the best example of the failure of civic communities accommodating ethnic forms of community were the states of the former eastern bloc, where the absence of substantive rights or security for ethnic forms of association contributed to the brittleness and weakness of those civic regimes.
\textsuperscript{71} For a closer reading of these matters see: Auer, S. Two Types of Nationalism in Europe? Contemporary European Studies Association of Australia. Unpublished research paper 1998.
\textsuperscript{72} Ibid.
Dahrendorf rejects Habermas' concept of constitutional patriotism as unrealistic. Rather, he looks to arrangements that would accommodate the needs of the majority of people in the world who cannot live without an ethnically derived national identity, with the requirements of a modern and open society. Dahrendorf suggests the creation of a heterogenous nation state - as opposed to a homogenous state built on the idea of an ethnic nation - which is liberal and open for people of other ethnicities. Tamir raised more serious objections to contract theories of nation-building that have national values hidden in their liberal agenda. According to Tamir if the liberal state were a truly voluntary project based on contract in which citizenship was ideally based on shared principles of justice and democracy, then two problems would arise. Firstly all those who comply with the criteria of constitutional patriotism should become citizens - clearly not a practical option for most states. Secondly, the implications of the civic model is that those who 'opt out' by questioning the value of justice and democracy should be stripped of their citizenship - which does not correspond to a general concept of justice. Further, a civic form of identity cannot escape the exclusionary and discriminatory aspects of all identities; as we established in Chapter One, identity, no matter what its objectification, involves some form of in-group favouritism and out-group discrimination, so too in a civic form of identification, Tamir suggests:

"Contrary to widespread perceptions, national communities might, in some respects, be more open and pluralistic than communities in which social bonds rely on a set of shared values. . . But in a society where social cohesion is based on national, cultural and historical criteria, holding nonconformist views does not necessarily lead to excommunication."76

An example of such a process of civic discrimination is the United States, where Communists were marginalised not because they differed in ethnolinguistic terms but because they were perceived as not sharing the political values of the state. Likewise

74 Auer, S. Two Types of Nationalism in Europe? P.2
75 Ibid
Germany's institutional intolerance for elements of the extreme right, which conceives German identity on fundamentally different grounds.

Today, as in the past, some form of ethnic national identity is required to support and sustain the structures and institutions of a civil society within a civic state. Further not only states in which civic virtues form the basis of association, most people cannot, or do not want to discard or marginalise their sense of belonging to the nation on ethnic grounds, whether such belonging is imagined or otherwise. As Tamir suggests:

"Features characteristic of a nation - language, history, culture, religion, geography - are amongst the most substantive components of individual identity."\(^77\)

Hence Hampshire is correct to observe that:

"in the last analysis, a sane nationalism is to be justified by a utilitarian argument - that most men and women are happy only when their way of life prolongs customs and habits which are familiar to them."\(^78\)

Thus even in the context of a civic state, one in which attachments are rooted in participative democracy and civic engagement and the evocation and protection of individual and collective rights, some concession must be made to the emotional, symbolic, yet central role of ethnic identifiers. Such is the challenge of the contemporary pan-European project, to champion an inclusive sense of belonging on civic grounds while allowing for the multi-dimensional and powerful evocation of pre-existing national ethnic identities, in a politically controlled manner. The mechanism by which such accommodations may be achieved will be considered in Chapter Three.

2.6 A Counterpoint - The Impossibility of an Exclusively Ethnic Nation Without Civic Components.

Just as there are limitations in attempting to portray any civic nation as exclusively so, without taking account of pre-existing and powerful ethnic signifiers, so too is it

\(^{77}\) Tamir, Y. 'The Enigma of Nationalism' World Politics 47 (April 1995), 427.

implausible to suggest that an ethnic nation with ethnic identification can remain exclusively so without some form of civic concession. As Kymlicka suggests:

"To assume that any culture is inherently illiberal, and incapable of reform, is ethnocentric and ahistorical. Moreover, the liberalty of a culture is a matter of degree. All cultures have illiberal strands, just as few cultures are entirely repressive of individual liberty. Indeed it is quite misleading to talk of 'liberal' and 'illiberal' cultures, as if the world was divided into completely liberal societies on the one hand, and completely illiberal ones on the other."  

As Auer reminds us, all nations that pride themselves on being liberal today had illiberal pasts. Similarly as ethnic states have within them elements of a political culture which has at least rudimentary characteristics of open deliberation and popular participation, even if such deliberation and participation is heavily qualified by the ethnic considerations. Accordingly to talk of the differentiation between the two conceptions of national identity can only be made sensible if it is conceded that neither a civic nor an ethnic nation can be entirely removed from some elements of the other. Civic nations are reliant upon some form of ethnic signifiers, no matter how formed or manipulated by the state, to give the state legitimacy, credibility and continuance (in the form of a mythologised national history and memory). Similarly states which are rooted in ethnic forms of communal attraction, cannot be consistently or universally intolerant or illiberal. Such an ethnic form of nation will contain within it some mechanisms for popular participation and the maintenance of a form of a civic normative order and structure.

2.7 A Civic Europe - The Resolution of the Civic and the Ethnic

One of the earliest conceptualisations of Europe as a civic rather than an ethnic community was given by Voltaire, Writing in 1751 Voltaire described Europe as:

"A kind of great republic divided into several states, some monarchical, the others mixed... but all corresponding with one another. They all have the same religious foundation, even if divided into several confessions. They all

79 Kymlicka, W. Multicultural Citizenship., 94.

80 Auer, S. 'Reflections on Nationalism and Minority Rights in Central Europe.', 12.

81 Such as in contemporary Iran
have the same principle of public law and politics, unknown in other parts of
the world."\textsuperscript{82}

We have argued in this Chapter that a civic model of community, insofar as it is
considerate of preexisting and enduring forms of ethnic identification, offers the
possibility for the emergence of a pan-European identity. The possibility of a
resolution of the ethnic within the civic model of identity is best demonstrated by
Tamir.\textsuperscript{83} Tamir argues that the civic cannot ignore the ethnic, notwithstanding the
unease between the two. Further she argues that: "the liberal tendency to overlook the
value inherent in nationalism is mistaken."\textsuperscript{84} Tamir explores the ways in which
nationalism may in fact contribute to liberal thinking. Offering a polycentric model of
liberal nationalism Tamir suggests that such a model, "respects the other and sees
each nation as enriching a common civilisation".\textsuperscript{85} Unlike ethnocentric nationalism:
"which sees one's own nation as superior to all others and seeks domination."\textsuperscript{86} Such
a concept of liberal nationalism is considerably more positive about the actual
potential for a nationalism for a modern liberal democracy. 'Nationalism', Tamir
argues: "is not the pathology of the modern age but an answer to its malaise - to the
neurosis, alienation and meaninglessness characteristic of modern times."\textsuperscript{87} The
proponents of liberalism and civic identity have more in common with some
proponents of ethnonational forms of identification and community than might at first
appear to be the case. Both liberal 'civic' nation-builders and ethno-nationalists
concede the importance of seeing individuals in a social context, for without such a
social context, the idea of a collective political identity is meaningless. Tamir suggests
that:

"the liberal tradition with its respect for personal autonomy, reflection and
choice, and the national tradition, with its emphasis on belonging, loyalty and

\textsuperscript{82} Voltaire, in Davies, N. Europe: A History, 7.

\textsuperscript{83} Tamir, Y. Liberal Nationalism.

\textsuperscript{84} Ibid., 4.

\textsuperscript{85} Ibid., 3.

\textsuperscript{86} Tamir, Y. The Enigma of Nationalism World Politics, 430.

\textsuperscript{87} Ibid., 432.
solidarity, although generally seen as mutually exclusive, can indeed accommodate each other.\textsuperscript{88}

2.8 A European Civic Identity with an Ethnic Sub-Text

As this Chapter has demonstrated many theorists have argued Europeans derive a broad and abstract sense of communal identity rooted in 'ethnic' criteria - language, history, and common descent. However such a form of communal belonging is too abstracted to form a primary sense of community, and involves too many historical, linguistic and geographic ‘fault lines’ to withstand either rigorous scrutiny or to effectively unite Europeans in an enduring manner. It is important to conceptualise a form of European identity which is inclusive, common and open to all - on civic, liberal grounds, while meeting the emotional, and symbolic needs of Europeans. Ethnic identity answers both some urgent psychological needs of people and also fulfils some important political functions. Ethnic identity can lead to feelings of solidarity in a community and alleviate alienation of individuals in modern societies. Furthermore it gives people a sense of community by strengthening the perception of a society as a partnership between what Burke describes as: “those who are living, those who are dead, and those who are to be born.”\textsuperscript{89} While imagining themselves as a part of a larger community with a deeply symbolic past and a common future, individuals can transcend their own limits, and even their own mortality.\textsuperscript{90} In that

\textsuperscript{88} Ibid., 432. An example of the close relationship between civic and ethnic conceptions of political community is found in the rise of civic identity in the Czech Republic, which is, in part, dependent upon ethnic signifiers of community. According to Holy, the Czechs pride themselves on being a ‘democratic, well-educated, and highly cultured nation’ Such was their ethnic unity and openness to civic reform that it was a relatively straightforward process for their former Prime Minister, Vaclav Klaus, to utilise their ethnic national sympathies and unity to engender support for civic elements of national community. Klaus argued that support for democracy and a free market economy was a 'natural' way of life for any civilised nation. Notwithstanding the embracing of a liberal, civic form of state-building, there is little to suggest that the Czechs have radically altered their self-definition of national identity on primarily cultural, 'ethnic' criteria. While, as Auer suggests, many Czechs still believe that their national identity is, 'in one's blood' and thus are rooted firmly in an ethnic conception of nation; their embracing of democratic reforms and values of popular participation and accountability suggest that our understanding of the dichotomy of ethnic and civic bases of nation and national identity require some revision to be relevant in contemporary Europe. See: Holy, L. 1996 The Little Czech and the Great Czech Nation, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1996), 77 & Auer, S. ‘Reflections on Nationalism and Minority Rights in Central Europe’, 12.


way membership in a nation promises individuals redemption from personal oblivion, a point made by both Tamir, and A.D. Smith.\textsuperscript{91} While such a common response evades strict conceptualisation amongst those who share in it, one should not dismiss their significant political impact; they shape, make and define communities, and give the ethnic nation a historic and moral dimension that civic forms of association find difficult to emulate. In such a context a polity, such as Europe, that unites on a civic basis, can only mobilize its population by what we call identity liberalization – that is by not threatening pre-existing identities, but by providing a structural and policy framework in which its population derives a sense of collective belonging because of, rather than in spite of, the diversity of its secondary ethnic signifiers, and the tolerance that the political structures display towards such signifiers of community.

The significance of the ethnic within a civic in Europe is well illustrated by the work of the European Values Systems Study Group and that of the European Commission. Within a civic community of Europeans the articulation and protection of ethnic identities provides one of the key binding elements that attach Europeans to each other and to the European polity. In its 1990 study Europeans were asked whether they felt that national identities (taken, in the context of the form of the question, as ethnic identities) would disappear or be enhanced in a united Europe. While 22% felt that a united Europe would probably mean the end of member states’ national, historical and cultural identities, 50% of those Europeans surveyed felt that there was more chance of a united Europe protecting national identities than undermining them, as the table below outlines.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|}
\hline
\textbf{Attitudes Towards the EC by Country 1990} \textsuperscript{92} \\
\hline
\textit{There is much talk about what the individual member states of the European Community have in common and what makes each one distinct. Which opinion is closest to your own opinion, the first or the second?}
\hline
\textbf{a)} Some people say: If the European member states were truly to be united, this would mean the end of their national, historical and \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{91} Tamir, Y. The Enigma of Nationalism World Politics, 433.

\textsuperscript{92} This table, originating from the European Values Systems Study Group is cited in Ashford, S & Halman, L ‘Changing attitudes in the European Community’ in Rootes, C. & Davis, H. Social Change and Political Transformation, 83.
cultural identities. Their national economic interests would also be sacrificed.

b) Others say: Only a truly united Europe can protect its states’ national, historical and cultural identities and their national economic interests from the challenges of the superpowers.

| By Country – Percentage of those who agree that EC means the end of identities. |
|-----------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| Total           | G.B.   | N.I.   | Ireland| West Germany| Norway| Belgium| France| Italy| Spain |
| 22              | 33     | 31     | 28     | 25     | 22     | 17     | 19     | 12    | 17    |

| By Country – Percentage of those who agree that the EC protects identities. |
|-----------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| Total           | G.B.   | N.I.   | Ireland| West Germany| Norway| Belgium| France| Italy| Spain |
| 50              | 35     | 38     | 49     | 44     | 45     | 48     | 59     | 65    | 47    |

| By Country – Percentage of those who are unsure/don’t know. |
|-----------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| Total           | G.B.   | N.I.   | Ireland| West Germany| Norway| Belgium| France| Italy| Spain |
| 28              | 32     | 31     | 23     | 31     | 33     | 35     | 22     | 23    | 36    |

Note: G.B – Great Britain; N.I – Northern Ireland


Notwithstanding regional variations, such as the views of the British towards Europe, the dominant view across Europe is that national and cultural identities are not threatened, but that they will be maintained or enhanced, by membership of a united Europe. Such a Europe resonates amongst Europeans because of the maintenance of civic virtues of tolerance and diversity.

Such results are replicated in the results of Eurobarometer surveys, conducted by the European Commission. The Editors of Eurobarometer 38 have found that a sizeable part of the European public is in favor of European integration in so far as Europe respects, protects and defends national and regional identities and where there are democratic channels of citizen influence. However Europeans reject a Europe in which National identity and cultural diversity is threatened; where citizens have
insufficient democratic influence and where their country and government has no say in European decision making.93

European beliefs as to the nature of collective identity are predicated on the institutional maintenance of pre-existing ethnic signifiers, within a tolerant, democratic, pan-European civic framework. As we shall more fully explore later in this work, European civic identity exists in the context of its protection of European ethnic identifications.

The dangers of nation-building on ethnic grounds and its implicitly exclusionary and divisive elements cannot form a basis of a common European identity. A common identity for Europe based upon a common language, history or ethnic inheritance can only be sustained at the most general level. While political stabilisation, economic integration and the weaving of a robust social network may appear unrelated to the building of a European identity, we have already observed that 'ethnic' identity is often evoked as a result of the failure of such institutional measures to benefit all the members of a community. Further, the continuance of ethno-national identities in modernity were sustained and legitimised by an emergent 'civic' state apparatus wherein individual's citizenship status and the blend of a states' normative order acted to sustain particular ethnic identities, while suppressing or dissolving others. Thus consideration of European identity in the late modern period must accomodate the ongoing significance of the 'ethnic' role that institutions have in moulding the conditions for the success or otherwise of such identifiers, and the importance of structural and institutional progress to ensure that there is not a revival of the nation as a reflection of social anomie and rootlessness.

Accordingly, the evocation of a European civic identity is possible to the extent that supranationalism in Europe can firstly maintain the ongoing significance of ethnic identities, such identities not easily dissipated. Secondly Europe must negate such identities and the implicit tension between it and pan-European civic identity by suppressing economic social and political marginalisation amongst its population and

thirdly, ensure that individualism, tolerance and participation on the social and political settings are maximised. The mechanisms available to facilitate such a process will be more closely examined in Chapter Three.

2.9 Chapter Two - Concluding Remarks

Writing in 1771, Rousseau ambitiously announced:

“There are no longer Frenchmen, Germans and Spaniards, or even English, but only Europeans.”

This assertion, reflecting a belief in the shift in European thinking from the ecclesiastical and particular to the secular and universal, stresses the commonality of Europeans and of Europe itself according to the emergent enlightened, rational and humanist collective focus. Europeans, according to Rousseau, were united as Europeans by virtue of their developing forms of secular polities and the promise of self-determination, rather than by their ecclesiastical or ethnic heritage.

This Chapter has provided an analysis of the paradigms of collective identification, ethnic and civic. We have observed that Ethnic identification is characterised by close communal bonds rooted in common ethnolinguistic origins. By contrast, civic identification is more inclusive, originating in the adoption of the civic virtues of participation, tolerance and the enjoyment of state-mediated rights and responsibilities. We considered Greenfeld’s arguments in support of her observations on the resistance between the differing conceptions of community. However, while agreeing with the bipolar nature of identity that Greenfeld proposes, we depart from Greenfeld’s contribution. We argue that the manifestation of communal identification is in practice somewhat more subtle and complex than Greenfeld’s contribution leads us to assume. We argued that ethnic and civic identities are not necessarily exclusive of each other and that they can co-exist, under certain institutionally mediated conditions, with each other. We demonstrated the enduring nature of both ethnic and civic identity in contemporary Europe by reference to ISSP, Eurobarometer and EVSSG data. The formation of a European civic identity, tentative as it is, is

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necessarily dependent upon the maintenance of the pre-existent ethnic and localised modalities of collective identification.

We further considered the contributions of contemporary theories considering the divergent interpretations of Europe and Europeaness on both civic and ethnic groups, and attempted to illustrate that the two elements are substantially interrelated. We argued that European civic identity in the contemporary period will be in part dependent upon the appropriation of elements of European ethnic identifiers. The search for a pan-European identity, looking back across European historical experiences is, as we have established, problematic. What makes for European distinctiveness and belonging is more than a common history, or culture or cluster of linguistic groups or even its unique contribution to political thought, it is all of these and yet none of them when each is considered in isolation. The difficult task of drawing historical experience and contemporary trends together is only made plausible by the acknowledgment of the necessity of each individual component for the substantiation of that which is uniquely European. 'Europeaness' shares not only a substantial part of the civic signifiers of political pluralism, individualism, constitutionalism and citizenship, but is also informed by an often ill-defined conception of a common European cultural heritage and 'ethnic' signifiers of culture, religion and her defence against the 'other'.

Prior to a detailed examination of the issues associated with the emergence of a supranational European civic identity, we need to consider the motive force behind the occurrence of supranational identities; the decline of the state and the evolution to supranationalism. This will be the subject of Chapter Three.
Chapter Three

States, Supranations and Identity

3.1 Introductory Remarks

"Transnational relations are not 'new', although . . . the growth of transnational organisation in the twentieth century has been spectacular. Yet, our contention is not only that the state-centric paradigm is inadequate . . . but also that it is becoming progressively more inadequate as changes in international relations take place."¹

In the preceding Chapters this thesis considered identity in late modernity. The work has illustrated identity's two-fold constellation: civic and ethnic. It is necessary, in the light of the recasting of political life since the end of the Second World War, to discuss the nature of supranationalism, and its effect on communal identity. This Chapter examines the mechanisms available to polities, both state-based and supranational, to engender positive identification towards them from their populations. This Chapter will demonstrate, utilising the theoretical contributions of a number of theorists, including Max Weber, Marx and Durkheim, that the development of a homogenous and mutually empathetic community, sharing a common identification within a supranational polity, is most readily achievable where civic rather than ethnic identifiers predominate. Such a common form of identification within a supranational polity is achievable only where sufficient political infrastructure is created to project and protect the rights and security of the population. We will demonstrate that in order to engender a common form of identification, the dominant value structure erected in a multicultural and multiethnic supranational setting must be built upon mutuality, security and tolerance, embodied in civic values including rule of law, citizenship and the advancement of rights.²

In short, we argue in this Chapter that just as the state, as a set of historically determined institutions within a given territory, specifically contributed to the


² We are largely informed by Kymlicka, W. Multicultural Citizenship: A liberal Theory of Minority Rights in the development of this argument.
emergence of an abstracted national community which only became possible, and
necessary, in the context of the stretching of economic, political and social relations
within the state, so too do supranational institutions require a community of sentiment
to sustain and legitimise them. This necessitates the creation of the conditions
contributing to the emergence of a common form of belonging amongst its citizen
body. 3

3.2 A Definitional Clarification - States, Supranations and Suprastates

Prior to an examination of the nature of the supranation, we are obliged to review its
precursor; the state. Having established the principles of the state we will then be in a
position to determine the extent to which supranational entities differ in their
structure, framework and breadth of responsibilities and powers, and most
significantly in their ability to engender a common empathetic response.

3.2.1 Defining the State

Any attempt to synthesise a common definition of the state is highly problematic.
Theorists select different characteristics of statehood and account for questions of
nation and national identity differently. According to Hall, the state includes three
elements. Firstly a state is a set of institutions which possess the means of coercion,
through violence should it be necessary. Secondly these institutions control a
geographically bounded territory, usually referred to as a society. Thirdly the state

[This argument is most simply stated as such:

i. that 'nations' 'national communities' and 'national identity' are a psychological
   exercise in communal cohesion; the development of a myth community;
ii. proto-nations may take an ancient form and may be configured around ethnolinguistic
   or civic attributes;
iii. that while proto-nations may take an ancient form, the assertion and projection of a
    nation and its national identity is most often achieved through the mechanisms of the
    state;
iv. that the institutional and policy basis and priorities of the state create the conditions
   for the emergence of a specific communal identification, such identification is
   directed to the functional interests of the state; and
v. that there continues to exist a number of proto-national identities within the state,
   which given their relationship of Ressentiment to the other forms of identification
   have the potential to conflict with the predominant basis of communal identification.

See Brubaker, R. Nations and Nationalism. Gellner, E. Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the
National Question in the New Europe. For an examination of the proto-nation see Hobsbawm, E.
Industry and Empire, (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books 1980).]
monopolises rule-making within its own territory. According to Hall this tends toward the creation of a common political culture by all citizens.\textsuperscript{4}

For Max Weber, giving perhaps the definitive critique of statehood, the state is best understood in terms of progressive political centralisation within a single polity. He defines it as:

[The modern state] possesses an administrative and legal order subject to change by legislation, to which the organised activities of the administrative staff, which are also controlled by regulations, are orientated. This system of orders claims binding authority, not only over members of the state, the citizens, most of whom have obtained membership by birth, but also to a very large extent over all action taking place in the area of its jurisdiction. It is thus a compulsory organisation with a territorial basis. Furthermore, today, the use of force is regarded as legitimate only so far as it is either permitted by the state or prescribed by it . . . . The claim of the modern state to monopolise the use of force is as essential to it as its character of compulsory jurisdiction and continuous operation.\textsuperscript{5}

An institutional definition of statehood is furthered by Mann who defines the state according to the following elements:

A differentiated set of institutions and personnel embodying:

a. centrality, in the sense that political relations radiate outwards from a centre to cover a;

b. territorially demarcated area, over which it exercises; and

c. a monopoly of authoritative binding rule-making, backed up by a monopoly of the means of physical violence.\textsuperscript{6}

While authoritative and coercive factors are central elements in conceptualisations of the state, the significance of the state as the central actor and the rational arbiter of social action is equally significant. The state, according to Crook, is intimately linked


with the process of modernisation and the rationalisation of social action.\footnote{Crook, S. et al Postmodernization: Change in Advanced Society. (London: Sage Publications.1993), 8.} Such modern rationality is linked to a variety of phenomena including the displacement of tradition as a basis for action and its replacement with action that is calculable and impersonal.\footnote{Ibid.} The state transforms social relations in four principal areas - production, law, administration and ethics.\footnote{Ibid.} In areas of production the state is characterised by industrial capitalism and relationships based upon material grounds. The law within the state is:

"characterised by an abstract formality and universality in which legal norms have no meaning . . . . but merely serve to solve disputes, protect property and enforce contracts."\footnote{Ibid., 9.}

The maintenance of such elements is subject to impersonal and technically efficient administration, by a bureaucratic administrative staff. Ethics and normative considerations are discounted to the rationality and efficiency of technically efficient, impersonal decision making systems in which specialist knowledge and the instrumental needs of the state predominate over personal or traditional values.\footnote{Ibid., 8-9.} In such a context there is an incremental breakdown of local loyalties allowing for the emergence of conditions in which ethnocentrism and ethnic loyalty weaken significantly so as to allow for the emergence of nationalism and a collective (state-sponsored) national identity.\footnote{See Kellas, J. The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity., 163.}

### 3.2.2 Defining The Supranation/Suprastate

Supranations are generally both poorly defined and misunderstood, we should more properly refer to them as suprastates. Let us explain what we mean by this. The state is, as we have considered earlier in this Chapter, an institutional apparatus with
executive and coercive powers, such powers exercised over a defined territory. By contrast the nation is essentially a collective spirit of belonging located within, and legitimated by, the state.\textsuperscript{13} Accordingly supranations are more accurately understood as ‘suprastates’ – that is, they are an institutional and regulatory apparatus that transcend state boundaries, irrespective of the emotional commitment populations may, or may not, have to them. Whereas we suggest the supranation, as with the nation, is the occurrence of a collective, positive, subjective perceptions of belonging to a society that transcends state boundaries and which unite peoples, albeit emotionally, across different states. However, for the sake of convention, we shall discuss the suprastate, according to its common term, supranation. Accordingly we adopt Magalhaes’ understanding of the supranation as:

"Supranational government institutions are organisations on nation-states characterised by possessing some degree of authority over those states. They typically are formed to promote collective security, advance economic interests or handle regulatory matters."\textsuperscript{14}

3.3 Supranationalism - An Overview

The first modern international government organisation (IGO), the precursor for supranational organisations, was established in 1815; the Central Commission for the Navigation of the Rhine. Complex supranational organisations are primarily a twentieth century phenomenon. Before the First World War there were fifty IGO’s, and eighty by 1940. In the decades following the end of the Second World War, at a time when complete and emphatic focus on the destructive limitations of sovereign statehood occurred in the international community, the growth of international organisations expanded rapidly. By the 1990’s there were approximately three hundred IGO’s that have given effect to the articulation of a complex network of overlapping memberships. Concurrent with the numerical growth of such

\textsuperscript{13} As we stated in Chapter Two we are adopting the theoretical position most recently articulated by Brubaker that the institutional apparatus of the state is the motive force behind the occurrence of a collective communal sense of identification. We argue in this Chapter that such a phenomenon of 'states making nations'; is equally applicable at the supranational level.

organisations, the scope and power of such IGO's has dramatically increased, as has their supranational ability to make binding decisions on their member states.\textsuperscript{15}

As Archer suggests, the rationale for the existence of international and supranational organisations can be found by considering events prior to their emergence. The emergence of the system of European states that resulted in the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, divided a notionally united Christian Europe and necessitated the introduction of mechanisms at the trans-national level for the making and regulation of voluntary agreements between sovereign states.\textsuperscript{16} However, as Claude suggests, it was not until the Nineteenth century that four necessary preconditions for supranational organisations came about. Firstly the existence of a number of states functioning as independent political units, secondly a substantial measure of contact between these subdivided units, an awareness of problems that arise from states' co-existence; and their recognition of the need for the creation of institutional devices and methods for regulating their relations with each other. Only the first of these qualities manifestly existed before the Nineteenth century.\textsuperscript{17}

The scope and stature of supranational organisations in late modernity is diverse. While we can consider organisations such as the United Nations, the Organisation of African Unity, the International Monetary Fund and the European Union, few international organisations can be properly described as supranational. Most international organisations are more accurately described as transnational in character and effect, yet whilst membership transcends state boundaries, sovereignty does not. In the case of many international organisations there is both a lack of institutional and judicial independence of the organisation, and an absence of coercive or judicial authority of the organisation over its member states. Accordingly international organisations can be evaluated in terms of the degree of supranational authority that they possess and the degree to which such organisations can obligate their members to take or refrain from taking certain actions.

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{15} Ibid., 1326.
  \item \textsuperscript{16} Archer, C. 1983 \textit{International Organisations.}, 3.
  \item \textsuperscript{17} Claude, I. 1964, in Archer, C. Ibid., 4.
\end{itemize}
There are several types of situations where cooperation and in some instances acceptance of supranational authority offers advantages for members. One of the most significant, for some members is the promotion of peace and security. Many supranational organisations have developed the primary goal of the prevention of regional or international conflict. The League of Nations, the United Nations and the Organisation of African Unity, for example, have all engaged in efforts to provide collective security. The role of the United Nations in the ongoing Gulf crisis is an unambiguous example of where a supranational institution has intervened diplomatically to manage conflict, has imposed economic and other sanctions on Iraq, which all members of the United Nations are (morally) obliged to follow.\textsuperscript{18}

Economic cooperation, has proved no less important a rationale for the increased occurrence and significance of supranational institutions. The years following the end of the Second World War have seen an increasing realisation of the impotence of individual states to manage their economic affairs independently of the affairs of other states, and the significance of international trade and capital flows on sovereign, national economies. The Bretton-Woods agreement of 1944 was the pre-cursor to international management of economic matters and the establishment of supranational organisations in order to achieve such management. The lowering of tariffs and the regulation of international trade, while clearly serving the interests of some individual states has only been achieved by institutionalised international cooperation, such as the case in the negotiations associated with the World Trade Organisation. Importantly, cooperation and international agreement in the case of economic affairs has had the effect, in a number of instances, of pushing back the boundaries of state authority and independence in non-economic domains. Such a process, best known as the 'spillover'\textsuperscript{19} effect leads to greater political integration in order to maximise

\begin{footnotesize}

\textsuperscript{19} Urwin defines 'spillover' as:

"A term used. . . to describe how sectoral integration lead to economic and political union in Europe. Functional spillover described how, as more economic sectors became integrated, they
economic growth and with increased economic cooperation, increasingly non-
economic, social and political alignment takes place.

Thus we can see that supranationalism is the process by which transnational
governing institutions are created by common agreement of two or more sovereign
states, and where such institutions have legal autonomy and authority over the states
that have formed it. A supranational government can take decisions that are legally
binding on its constituent member states whether the individual states approve of the
decision or not. It is this judicial autonomy and authority, and the legal obligation to
comply otherwise face legal sanctions, that ultimately defines supranational
organisations from intergovernmental ones. Accordingly supranational polities
develop their own international stature and presence as they go beyond being an
organisation of or between states, and become a new political entity that supersedes
individual state members.20

3.4 The Rise to Supranationalism - Transnational Interdependence and the
Decline of the Modern State

As we noted in Chapter One, there has been a heightened focus on international and
transnational cooperation between states in the post war period more than at any other
period. The increasing depth and breadth of international interdependence poses a
direct threat to the realist position of state sovereignty and state autonomy. The realist
presupposes that states are conditioned by their need to survive in an essentially
anarchic global system. Such rulelessness necessitates that the state competes openly
and often violently with other states in order to realise its ends. Thus an essential
feature of the traditional realist conception of the state is its geo-political sovereignty

would affect and place pressure upon the remaining sectors. Political spillover referred to the
belief that the benefits derived from integrated sectors would lead interest groups and other
organisations to look to the supranational level for the realization of their demands”

1996), 375

20 Magalhaes, ‘Supranational Government Institutions’ in International Encyclopedia of
Government and Politics, vol. II., 1323.
and the maintenance of strong externally focused coercive forces. By contrast, the liberal-pluralist position is far more relevant to the state in a global perspective in the late twentieth century. The central feature of states is their interdependence. States and societies have become enmeshed in a whole network of relationships - (economic, political, social and cultural) which tend to promote forms of stable international cooperation. Rather than states being cast in the realist mould of belligerent adversaries, states are best characterised as existing within a logic of what Keohane and Nye refer to as; “complex interdependence”. Such a process of interdependence has been made possible and facilitated by the growth of institutional arrangements which have allowed for much greater international cooperation than the realist conception of the sovereign state has traditionally allowed for. The contemporary logic of interdependence, institutionalisation, the development of international regimes in which relations between states are managed, and the emergence of transnational regional alliances in areas of trade, security and economic policy (such as the European Union) argues persuasively against the traditional realist model of the self-contained, sovereign state. The rise of the European Communities can be seen then as a regional response to the failing powers of the state.

The role of the unilateral exercise of force as a defining characteristic of state sovereignty, has dramatically declined in the contemporary period. While the ability

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21 Such a conception of the realist position can be described as the 'billiard ball' view of international relations in which a number of more or less self-contained and self-sufficient units crash into each other with more or less violent results.

22 Quoted in Pierson, C. The Modern State., 172.

23 According to Keohane:

"International Politics . . . is institutionalized. That is, much behaviour is recognised by participants as reflecting established rules norms and conventions. . . . Such matters as diplomatic recognition, extraterritoriality, and the construction of agenda as form unilateral organisations are all governed by formal or informal understandings; correctly interpreting diplomatic notes, the expulsion of an ambassador, or the movement of military force in a limited war all require an appreciation of the conventions that relate to these activities."


24 The literature on the nature of the state in late modernity is extensive. See Hoffmann, S. 'Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe' Daedalus Vol 95 No.3 Summer 1966, 862-915 and Spence E. 'Entering the Future backwards: Some Reflections on the Current International Scene'. Review of International Studies (1994), 20, 3-13.
to maximise military security and the monopoly of such forces was seen as a clear defining characteristic of the traditional state, the revised global order has largely diminished the role of military security as a reason of state. While the physical security of a state remains a fundamental concern it is not to the exclusion of other concerns, as Keohane and Nye argue:

“The agenda of interstate relationships consist of multiple uses that are not arranged in a clear or consistent hierarchy. This absence of hierarchy among issues means, amongst other things, that military security does not consistently dominate the agenda.”

While the uncertainty of the international order means that the military option may rapidly become salient, military forces in the context of an international system of complex interdependence occupy a quite 'minor role'. Thus the key characteristic of military force in the elaboration of a conception of the state in late modernity is that the achievement of state-centred goals are better achieved from a 'zone of complex interdependence' in which:

“Power is an important element in relationships . . . but this power does not derive from the use or threat of force towards one another.”

Even in those circumstances where the projection of coercive power is considered necessary, the unilateral projection of such power is increasingly unlikely, as Helmut Schmidt, the former West German Chancellor argued:

“The nature and magnitude of problems likely to confront us will prove too much for any individual state.”

The complexity of interrelated factors makes it difficult to quantify the scale of the changes to the state or to gauge with any accuracy the degree to which the forces of globalisation are subverting the economic, security, social and economic power of

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29 We adopt the definition of globalisation suggested by Rhodes, who defines globalisation as:
individual states. However there is sufficient evidence to suggest that the traditional conception of statehood is representative of modernity rather than late modernity. In such a context, trans-nationalism and globalisation have both profoundly altered the parameters of state action and, more significantly in the context of our argument, undermined traditional models of statehood and state-mediated identity. The practical limitations of the state in the late modern period are readily apparent. The role of the state as an authoritative, independent, policy making system, as an economic manager and its role as a repository, creator and mediator of societal interests and identities and the state as a provider of collective economic social goods are under serious critical review. States have found it difficult to both provide authority, and public goods and as a result is becoming less salient as a central repository for loyalties and commitments. The ‘over-burdened state’ called upon to live up to increasing societal demands is rapidly becoming impotent. The consequences of all such notions are unclear. What is significant is that the nature and logic of the traditional state is rapidly altering and the rise of supranational polities is directly attributable to the decline in the state's competence and credibility.

"the subsuming and rearticulation of individual national economies within a global system by international processes and transactions."


31 Rockman, B. ‘Minding The State - Or a State of Mind’ Comparative Political Studies, 40.

32 A variety of factors are suggestive of globalization's negative effect on individual states' policy making autonomy, most especially in economic and defence matters. Of the 100 largest economies in the world 51 are corporations. Ford Motor Company has larger sales revenue than the South African State. General Motors is economically more significant than Denmark. Military unilateralism is the exception rather than the norm. The NATO action against the former Yugoslavia in March 1999 and the Gulf War of 1991 illustrating the coordination of coercive force, once the clearest defining feature of statehood. (Global Corporate Power Statistics: Royal Australian Navy Reserve News February 1999, 10.)
3.5 Supranationalism and Identity I

The decline of the states' authority has not been without effect on communal identification.

A central consequence of the decline of the state's competence and the rise of supranational institutions, is the replacement of the state by the supranation, to the position as described by Yergin and Stanislaw as 'The Commanding Heights'.\(^{33}\) That is to say premier control and authority over political, social and economic management, has been a fundamental questioning of the basis and nature of communal identification in late modernity.

The structural impetus to build dynamic and efficient supranational institutions has yet to adequately address the issue of identity. The desire for material progress, rising standards of living, and increased international competitiveness that are core drivers of supranationalism, are yet to reconcile themselves with the (increasing) desire for the expression of primary group identities - religious, linguistic or cultural - which as we have already considered, provide a distinctive basis for a community's sense of identity. Accordingly, as Geertz points out, there has developed; “two powerful, thoroughly interdependent, yet distinct and often actually opposed motives” in contemporary sociopolitical life. Firstly, the desire for increasing institutional and structural efficiency via transnational integration. Secondly, the need for individuals to express distinctiveness and localised identities.\(^{34}\) The manifestation of increasingly larger polities has yet to adequately account for the normative basis of pre-existing 'national' societies and the central importance that such traditions, rules and practices have in effecting identity and identification.

In the period following the end of the Second World War there has been a rapid increase in the political manifestation of international political organisations and


supranationalism. At the same time, as Watts suggests, there has been a strong trend in the appeal of smaller-scale, more ethnically-based communities and the identities that flow from them.\textsuperscript{35} During the last fifty years the logic of international political and economic alignment has seen the establishment of supranational associations and organisations such as the European Union, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, and the World Trade Organisation. Such organisations are considered necessary for the efficient management of trans-national issues. During the same period there has been a rapid increase in the number of 'mini-states' according to Duchachek:

"... whose viability is rightly in doubt but their appearance gives evidence of the strength of the desires, particularly in former colonial areas to go it alone."\textsuperscript{36}

Notwithstanding the logic of international political integration, there has been a heightened resistance to such forces from amongst named populations. The demand for self-expression, identity and self-determination has been revealed in regional groups asserting difference most commonly on ethnic grounds. Differences of language, race, religion, social structure and cultural tradition have driven the politics of identity in areas as diverse as Canada, Nigeria, Afghanistan and most recently in Yugoslavia.\textsuperscript{37}

The (re)discovery of more local affinities and identities at the sub-national and regional level, in the context of a declining state competence has implications for the ongoing viability of state-sponsored 'national' identities. There are numerous indications of a disjuncture between the state and the (state mediated) civil society. Whereas in modernity old loyalties were overtaken by civic affiliations and social obligations were codified as legal codes, in late modernity confidence in state-

\textsuperscript{35} Ibid., 4.


\textsuperscript{37} On the Canadian experience, see Cameron, D. (Ed.) Regionalism and Supranationalism : Challenges and alternatives to the nation-state in Canada and Europe. (Montreal, Quebec: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1981.)
sponsored power and social arrangements have, according to Keane, plummeted.\textsuperscript{38} The consequences of such a disjunction are clearly disadvantageous to the articulation of communal identification.

As states engage in increasingly complex activities and face international coordination and integration, the state increasingly loses control over a range of social groups, including groups calling for local autonomy and local identification.\textsuperscript{39} Such a process is observable in cases such as the devolution debate in the United Kingdom, the Northern League in Italy and the Basque movement in Spain. Such instances not only reinforce the perceived impotence of the state, but also further challenge its legitimacy, not only in practical terms but also in its symbolic role as the vessel of a national community. The rise of anti-state movements then, are not simply political movements calling for localised political control, but are more a highly symbolic claim for self-identity along often ethnically-inspired lines.\textsuperscript{40}

The weakening of states' capacity to exercise executive power is having consequences on the confidence that it enjoys from its 'national' populations who are increasingly looking to other domains for meaningful associations and identities, such as sub-national and transnational movements. DiMuccio and Rosenau consider these 'loyalty shifts' as a multi-directional phenomena - comprising of 'inward shifts' - where loyalties are redirected toward sub-national groups and institutions, and 'outward shifts' where loyalties are redirected toward supranational or transnational

\textsuperscript{38} Keane, J. \textit{Civil Society and the State}. (London: Verso 1988), 22.


\textsuperscript{40} Thus the real threat to the existent state, is not that caused by a shift from practical sovereignty to supranational structures, but rather what Rose terms 'civic indifference' where the linkages between state and civil society become weakened. As Rose describes:

"An indifferent citizen does not need to take up arms against a regime; he simply closes his eyes and ears to what it commands. The apathetic masses may sit out power struggles within government, and turn the victor's position into a hollow triumph by shutting out a new government behind a wall of indifference." See Rose, R. 1979 "Ungovernability: Is there fire Behind the Smoke?" \textit{Political Studies} (27 September 1979), 368.
entities. \(^{41}\) This limitation of the state as a vessel of primary identification is further addressed by 'turbulence theory' which suggests multi-dimensional shifts in identification. \(^{42}\) Turbulence theory argues that as supranationalism and sub-groupism are occurring as a result of the global dynamic which has led to the decline of the state, that increasing global interdependence at a political level is occurring in parallel with increasing independence of identity determinants. Turbulence theory sees the simultaneity of integration and disintegration, fragmentation and aggregation, centralisation and decentralisation, not as a paradox but as an expectation. \(^{43}\) In the European context any analysis of identity and supranationalism has to be cognisant of the resultant split between Europhiles and Europhobes, the pro-European movement favouring Europe as a champion of material progress and European liberal multiculturalism, whereas the anti-Europeans, including the extreme nationalists, see supranationalism as failing to recognise the cultural diversity and identity at the national level.

Internationalisation, then, has profound and potentially complex effects on the way identity is manifested. Perceived threats to localised cultures, tradition and language - societal identity can, as Buzan suggests, have the effect of strengthening the local identities under threat. Even when supranational entities do not directly act to modify localised signifiers of distinctiveness, such as language or education, the resultant interplay of ideas and communication, which Deutsch has argued as being central to identity construction, can be enough to provide politically significant societal and cultural threats creating societal insecurities and a communal flight to primordial identities as a defence against supranational incursions. \(^{44}\)


\(^{42}\) Rosenau 1990, in Milnar, Z. Globalism and Territorial Identities, p. 4.

\(^{43}\) Milnar, Z. Globalization and Territorial Identities, p. 4.

In an environment of such disorientation the challenge then, is for supranational entities to overcome the contradictory tendencies which are on one hand contributing to their institutionalisation and on the other are concurrently enhancing micro-identification; a process giving rise to both political and market integration while significant numbers of communities react by looking inward. Such a globalization/internalisation dynamic is most noticeable, according to Larochelle, by the manifestation of a sense of resistance to the threat of the levelling characteristics of supranations, described as; 'diversity reveal[ing] itself in a moment of unity'.

Supranational integration, new localism and the effect of political-economic integration on social identification are interrelated forces that evade narrow conceptualisation. The expanding range of cross-level linkages and interdependencies at a macro-institutional level are effecting modalities of attachment both in terms of causing inward regionalism and yet advances in communications and technology are allowing for the attainment of non-territorial attachment and relationships. Within such a context the necessity to form a supranational civic culture based upon the values of some form of liberal multi-cultural becomes a complex yet pressing issue. Let us now consider how such a process may occur.

3.6 Supranationalism and Identity II: Attaching the people to the (supranational) Polis

3.6.1 The Making of a Polity

"Nationalism is not engendered by nations. It is produced - or better it is induced - by political fields of particular kinds. Its dynamics are governed by the properties of political fields, not by the properties of collectivities."46

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46 It is important to note that the analysis of the process of communal identity formation has produced a multitude of studies and theoretical approaches. There are many differences in approaches and findings depending upon the author, the theoretical and methodological framework used and the data utilised. Notwithstanding such variation our analysis in this section is rooted in the 'nationalising states' thesis, as applied to polities at both the national and supranational level. That is, rather than collective political identity being an organic, natural and somehow preordained process, that such a phenomena is better understood as a political and cultural form institutionalised within and among polities, both states and supranations. See Brubaker, R. 1996 Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe., 16-17.
In Chapter Two we reviewed the basis of civic and ethnic integration. In the case of ethnically-grounded community the ties that bind are those associated with a common ethnic and linguistic status, a common history, a set of traditions and symbols and the subjective consciousness built upon these ethnic and cultural signifiers. Civic integration, by contrast, is associated with the building of a common empathy founded in civic institutions wherein ethnic signifiers of identity and community, while important, are secondary to those of commonality rooted in participative citizenship, civil rights and rule of law. The process of political integration into supranational polities has, as was the case in the initial process of state formation in early modern Europe, had a direct effect on collective identification. Such a process leads, in certain circumstances, to a paradoxical communal awareness of the material benefits of political integration with the concurrent call for increased self-sufficiency and for communal autonomy from increasingly larger political structures at the national and supranational level.

In an environment where there is an apparent credibility gap between the deficiencies of states and the efficiencies of the supranation, polities are becoming increasingly reliant upon civic strategies to engender confidence in loyalty to the supranational polity from amongst its peoples. Such a process is necessarily reliant upon civic rather than ethnic qualities given the diverse ethnolinguistic qualities and origins of the peoples within the jurisdictions of the supranational polities.

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48 We need only to look to the Scottish and the Welsh cases of devolution for examples of this process.

49 The diversity of ethnolinguistic communities within states is significant, and has required strategies of civic inclusion and participation so as to prevent the splintering of communal identification. As Connor points out in a survey carried out in 1971, in only 23.5 percent of the 132 states surveyed did the predominant ethnic group represent more than 50 percent of the population, and that in only 9.1 percent of the states was there a direct correlation between the state's borders and the distribution of a singular ethnolinguistic group. Clearly the likelihood of an unadulterated ethnolinguistic basis of communal identification is even further removed at the European supranational level, than at the level of individual states. See Connor, W. Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding, (Princeton, NJ. Princeton University Press 19.), 96.
The role of the institutions of the state in fostering and moulding collective civic identity is well documented. As few states can count on the spontaneous loyalty of their populations, state intervention in enhancing and directing civic communal empathy is a well-observed phenomena. On one level we observe the contributions of Mustafa Kemal (Ataturk) who sought to 'modernise' Turkish culture and identity along western, civic lines, declaring that:

"The new Turkey has no relationship to the old. The Ottoman government has passed into history. A new Turkey is now born."\textsuperscript{50}

The distinctive civic nation in the United States of America came about by a direct and deliberate action by elites to create an inclusive and immediately cohesive community, irrespective of ethnolinguistic background. Such a process took a variety of forms from the more visible process of the mandatory daily flag salute and publicly sponsored civic education to the more banal process of the naming of counties and minor civil divisions after selected national heroes and notables.\textsuperscript{51}

The key to civic identity is the ongoing loyalty of its citizens to each other and their communal confidence in and support for the institutions of the polity. Such elements are far less immediate or emotive than elements of ethnic identity. Given the more abstract nature of civic identification the structures and institutions of the civic nation must actively and constantly intervene in society, in ways as diverse as the daily reproduction of the structures of a democratic polity, to regular elections, to maintaining a civic form of identity. Such a set of processes are taking place in contemporary Europe and are resulting in the articulation of a collective identity.

\textsuperscript{50} The Turkish example is perhaps one of the most significant cases of the manipulation of collective identity on civic grounds. Arrangements to create a civic state were comprehensive and included the abolition of the caliphate; the disestablishment of the state religion and the dissolution of dervish orders and brotherhoods. Steps taken to modernise, which in this context also meant to westernise the state included the adoption of the Gregorian calender; the creation of a western style penal code and the purgation of Persian and Arabic influences from the language. See Robbins, K. 1997 'Interrupting Identities: Turkey/Europe' in Hall, S. and du Guy (Eds) Questions of Cultural Identity (London: Sage Publications 1997), 61-87.

Let us review the mechanisms open to polities in achieving collective identification from amongst their populations and a sense of individual and collective attachment to them.

3.7 Polities Making Civic Nations - A Typology of Causal Factors

It is not coincidental that the rise of the modern state and the state mediated nation and national identity was associated with the enhancement of economic rights, the enfranchisement of citizens, the uniformity of cultural mediums and the entrenchment of territorial security.\(^{52}\) Notwithstanding the diversity of particular national experiences and the diversity of theoretical approaches we argue that not only is the provision of security and rights central to the emergence of new polities from old, but that such reordering has a specific, definitive and positive effect on identity formation.

We offer two macro-casual factors, security and rights, and develop from these eight specific mechanisms for the engendering of communal identity.\(^{53}\)

3.8 Identity and Security - The Development of an Integrated Security Domain

State sovereignty is, within the modernist paradigm, inextricably linked to the maintenance of security, both internal and external, within a finite territory.\(^{54}\) The

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\(^{52}\) We agree with Rokkan & Urwin that the modern states' core competencies and its core motive power in effecting communal civic identification are derived from three factors; Economic System Building, including, firstly, increasing economic interdependence and fiscal integration. Secondly military-administrative System building, including the organisation of armies police and administrative agencies. Thirdly, cultural system building which includes religious, linguistic and ideological standardisation at the core but allows for the maintenance of distinctive identity amongst peripheral communities. See Rokkan, S. & Urwin, D. Economy, Territory, Identity: Politics of West European Peripheries, 15.

\(^{53}\) It should be noted that we are not offering an integrated theory of the process of nationalism and/or nation building. It is beyond the scope and practical ambitions of this work to do so. Rather in this section we review the key factors, as argued by major contributors to social and political theory, as to the mechanisms available and utilised by polities to engender a sense of belonging and community amongst their national members. While we have attempted to be as comprehensive as possible, it is clear that the results of this approach may be subject to some debate. Understanding the rise of communal identification, whether ethnic or civic, is a highly complex social phenomenon that can and has been studied from various angles. Theories of communal identification; of national identity reflect the ethnic/civic distinction that we have made. To attempt to list the main contributors, while interesting, would not add relevance to our argument. This analysis clearly highlights the main theoretical contributions to the process of nation building, and thus has direct applicability to the broader issue of the formation and development of European identity.
combination of increased military technology, the costs associated with it and the difficulties elites found with maintaining territorial cohesiveness over increasingly larger polities and peoples, contributed to the necessary emergence of the centralised, bureaucratic western state system. Together these forces, as Tilly argues, required a more sophisticated political apparatus both to control coercive forces and to administer the increased taxation and revenue apparatus and demands made upon populations. Such a process in turn required a further consolidation of the territorial boundaries of the polity so as to create a compliant and contributive constituency. Further it created a physical then psychological division between those within, and those external to the polity – reinforcing collective identification. As Bloom argues:

"Studies of identity formation are back as a clue to questions of peace and war. Human collectivities such as nation-states forge their identities by offsetting the collective against other entities."

The process of polity formation involves not only the refinements of security provisions but concurrently involves the creation of a communal 'security community' which shares in a common allegiance with its members and a common and equal bond to the security provider – the state. Accordingly functional convergence, enabling an enhanced physical security framework, contributes to a stronger sense of communal consciousness and identity as communities both ally themselves with the state as a consequence of the protective measures instituted by the state and further, by participating in the security of the state, populations more readily identify with it, with each other, and against the 'other', external to the

54 The relationship between these two factors is, as we have earlier examined, explicitly stated in Weber's definition of statehood.


56 See Kellas, J The Politics of Nationalism & Ethnicity, 164-165.

security community. The relationship between security and identity is not however limited to security's most obvious manifestation – physical security. It includes economic, social and ethno-cultural security.

Physical security, while significant in conjoining a people to a polity is insufficient in itself to engender enduring loyalties and a common communal identity. Waever et al have suggested that a physical security centred analysis of communal identity formation is too limited, most especially in the context of the diminution of military security preoccupations in the late modern period. Populations attach themselves to a polity in circumstances where insecurity, social, economic as well as physical, is minimised and neutralised by the polity. The breadth of such insecurities is broad. Ranging from territorial insecurity manifested in disputed boundaries, to ethnolinguistic insecurity demonstrated in subregional conflict to external economic insecurities such as the effects of globalisation on national economies and fears of immigration, as representing a threat to economic as well as ethnic stability, such as signifiers of ethnic identity - language and culture. Accordingly, the integration process of state and society to create a communal national identity occurs when the dynamics of economic, political and more generally 'societal' insecurity are managed and reduced effectively by the polity.

Waever et al argue that the linkages between a polity and its population is enhanced, or diminished depending upon the relative strength or weakness of the 'societal security' that the polity is able to provide for its population. According to this argument polities can act to provide for, or neglect, societal security not only in the military sector, but in the political, economic, and environmental sectors as well.


59 For a contemporary critique of the role of economic and social security in creating communities see Steketee, M. 'Social Insecurity' The Weekend Australian, (December 27-28 1997), 17.

60 Waever, O., Buzan, B., Kelstrup, M & Lemaitre, P. Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe, ix.

61 Ibid., 3,17.

62 Ibid., 17.
Citing the Yugoslavian crisis as an example of the impact of societal security on the creation and maintenance of communal identity Waever et al considers that the combination of a number of factors contributed to the disjuncture between polity and society. The decline in Yugoslav economic conditions in the last two decades created a high level of economic insecurity. Such an economic decline, considered in the context of ethnonational contradictions, and the disjuncture between territorial aspirations and geopolitical realities, created territorial insecurity and contributed to a rapid and very public disintegration of not only a common state, but more significantly the breakdown of a common identity. The failure of military, economic and social security assisted in the emergence of an identity crisis, which contributed to a defence of the enduring signifiers of identity: ethnicity. Security and its effects on identity formation can be further broadened. Rhodes suggests the acceleration of societal convergence as a consequence of the enhancement of social security measures is a further means to enhance collective identification. Not only does physical protection and the protection of cultural and linguistic groups assist in the formation of collective identification so too does the provision of social welfare. Accordingly the adoption of public policy designed to provide public charity a strong interventionist public sector, the elimination of poverty and public insurance in the form of health and welfare aids are central to creating an inclusive (civil) society. Such an enhancement of identity, through the provision and improvement of social protection is further accelerated where the social goals of economic redistribution, welfareism and full employment are no longer provided by the ‘traditional’ social service provider: the state.

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63 Ibid., 93.


65 The threat to the articulation of a common identity is nowhere more prevalent than in contemporary Europe. As Hassner has observed:

"the perception of a threat to national identity coming, on the one hand, from the cosmopolitanism and standardisation of mass culture and consumption (often seen as "Americanisation") and, on the other hand, the influx of immigrants, who for racial or religious reasons are often seen as alien or hostile. Individual, social and national insecurity, the preoccupation with law and order, jobs and the nation are thus combined into one complex syndrome in which external threat and internal doubts are hard to disentangle."

The range of possible security factors affecting a society are far more complex than the simple question of physical security. The spectrum of possible factors that may enhance or inhibit locating collective sentiment within a polity include the more overt factors such as physical and economic security, but further include factors such as security for cultural expression, linguistic freedoms and the guarantee of an inclusive liberal education. While the expression of economic and territorial security may be common to both ethnic and civic conceptions of polity, the methods and bias differ significantly. The stringent expression of the nexus between polity and society made by advocates of ethnic nationalism strongly delineates those cultural and linguistic groups which are to receive the security of the state, and those which are to be physically and symbolically excluded. Whereas civic notions of community, while institutionally favouring particular vernaculars and cultures provide a far greater degree of certainty and security for minorities. Such security includes judicial elements such as legal protection, sympathetic public policy, the funding of minority cultural activities and symbolic support such as the recognition of minority cultural traditions and symbols.

3.9 Identity and Rights - The Development of an Integrated Rights Domain

The development of political community and identity has taken two paths in the West. Firstly, state elites and institutions pursued policies aimed at reducing multiple incidences of ethnic difference within a single polity by physical elimination, expulsion or coercive modification. In such a manner the promotion of a common identity among polity members is ethnically based and is achieved by the alienation, coercion and modification or destruction of (ethnic) difference. The second path to the construction of a common identity amongst polity members is the civic model. As Kymlicka suggests primary loyalty to the polity and common association based on the principles of inclusion, equality and tolerance within a highly rationalised state apparatus is the basis of civic identity. The promotion of higher aspirations such as

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66 The support given by the United Kingdom to cultural and ethnic groups is evidence of the adoptive measures of civic states at including and providing security for minority groups.

67 The actions of 'Ethnic Cleansing' in Yugoslavia is perhaps the most insidious and dramatic example of such a process.

68 Such as in the case of Yugoslavia
rule of law, procedural equality and common citizenship is implicitly associated with the enjoyment of common civil rights and the acceptance of the free expression of cultural and linguistic difference in a manner consistent with societal ends. A critical element in both civic and ethnic models is thus the projection or denial of rights. In the case of ethnic identification, such a process involves the denial and removal of peripheral linguistic, cultural and ethnic rights so as to create a sovereign 'right' for the state-mediated ethnic identity. Whereas in a civic, multiethnic setting the articulation of minority rights is a key feature of social life and may enhance, rather than inhibit, collective identification. As Kymlincka argues:

"The evidence is overwhelming that the members of liberal cultures do value their cultural membership. Far from displacing national identity, liberalization has in fact gone hand in hand with an increased sense of nationhood . . . . The same combination of liberalization and a strengthened national identity can be found in many other countries. For example, in Belgium, the liberalization of Flemish society has been accompanied by a sharp rise in nationalist sentiment."  

While an ethnic conception of political community perceives weakness in cultural and ethnic pluralism, the civic conception of political community finds strength in the expression of cultural and ethnic diversity. Such cultural diversity is only made possible as a result of the active intervention of the state in the institutionalisation of multiple identities and protection of them within a private sphere of civil society.

As suggested in a recent Jean Monnet Working Paper, the assertion of strong individual and collective rights provides a strong integrating force for communities. Free speech, assembly, association and cultural liberties are indispensable elements in the emergence of a civic identity where individuals can form voluntary associations, articulate particular interests and pursue their self-interested material, political and social goals individually or as members of voluntary associations. However the practice of participative citizenship is not sufficient to unite a political community within a common identity. Such an integrative process must extend beyond the


70 Ibid., 89.

recognition of formal civic and political rights to include the practice of, and protection for, social, economic, linguistic and cultural rights.\textsuperscript{72}

In the context of multiethnic polities, such as the European Union, Kymincka suggests that there are three key strategies that can be employed to strengthen the relationship and communal identification between differing ethnolinguistic groups. The three forms of group differentiated rights that may be instituted to ensure communal solidarity are:

1. **Self-Government Rights** – The delegations of powers to national minorities, often through some form of federalism.
2. **Polyethnic Rights** – financial support and legal protection for certain practices associated with particular ethnic or religious groups; and
3. **Special Representation Rights** – guaranteed rights for ethnic or national groups within the central institutions of the larger state.\textsuperscript{73}

Kymincka’s argument is a simple one - rather than civic states, excluding differences, it institutionalises ethnic difference by regulating the expression of it. Thus even within purely civic conceptions of community the special and enduring status of ethnolinguistic groups are not ignored.\textsuperscript{74} Kymincka argues that it is within the scope of the liberal civic notion of community that the liberal commitment to freedom and personal autonomy is such as to ensure the continuance and protection of ethnolinguistic and minority cultural signifiers. Thus within a civic liberal conception of community, while being institutionally ‘blind’ to ethnolinguistic and cultural signifiers, does by creating the conditions for a private civic society, and by creating obligations and sanctions within political society so as to ensure that ethnolinguistic minorities are granted rights.\textsuperscript{75}

\textsuperscript{72} Such a process being dependant upon active inclusive citizenship.

\textsuperscript{73} Kymincka, Multicultural Citizenship: A liberal Theory of Minority Rights., 7.

\textsuperscript{74} This point is consistent with our argument in Chapter Two of the inseparability of the ethnic and civic even within civic conceptions of communities.

\textsuperscript{75} While Kymincka’s work focuses on the necessity of integrating ethnolinguistic communities into the civic state by ensuring they have meaningful rights, the relationship between the institutionalisation of rights and communal identity construction has been furthered by other theorists.
While the political institutionalisation of rights and security overlap in areas such as territorial security, economic policy and cultural policy it would be erroneous to conclude from this that the relationship between identity formation security and rights are mutually compatible. We have observed that the construction of identity, most particularly in late modernity originates as much from the collective resistance to dominant institutions as it does from the positive influence of them. While social actors do internalise the norms, values and signifiers of political institutions and organisations and symbolically identify with the society and polity in which s/he is situated, the reverse is often the case. The construction of identity is assisted by the

Janoski suggests that inclusiveness and identity in civic communities is rooted in a far broader scope of rights. Suggesting that societal rights act to extend the linkages between a polity and its peoples, it is suggested that there are four main forms of rights. They are:

1. **Legal Rights:**
   a. Access to courts and counsel;
   b. Equal treatment under the law;
   c. Freedom of speech, religion, association and privacy;
   d. Freedom from assault and unsafe environment;
   e. Choice of residence;
   f. Choice of occupation.

2. **Political Rights:**
   a. Rights to run and hold office;
   b. Rights to form and join a political party;
   c. Legislative and administrative consultation;
   d. Refugee rights;
   e. Minority rights to equal and fair treatment;
   f. Social movement and protest rights.

3. **Social Rights:**
   a. Health Services;
   b. Primary and Secondary Education;
   c. Vocational Training;
   d. Educational Assistance for Special Groups;
   e. Old Age Pensions;
   f. Unemployment compensation;

4. **Participation Rights:**
   a. Labor Information Programs;
   b. Job placement and creation Services;
   c. Job Security Rights;
   d. Affirmative Action;
   e. Collective Bargaining Rights;
   f. Regional investment and equalisation programs

Just as the presence of rights have the effect of including members within a civic community, the absence of such rights are inherently exclusionary and directly and negatively effect the expression of a common sentiment of belonging and solidarity. The creation of a dense framework of rights within a polity, and the associated reallocation of societal resources to foster such rights, has the effect of promoting strengthened group solidarity. See Janoski, T. Citizenship and Civil Society: A Framework of Rights and Obligations in Liberal, Traditional and Social Democratic Regimes. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1998), 33.
development of security and rights domains functionally instituted by polities, which legitimates a regularised social identity and social action. However the political and social reorientations necessary for the provision of rights and security for societal members may have the effect either directly or indirectly of marginalising elements within the polity. In such circumstances Castells suggests a ‘resistance identity’ may emerge. Such an identity originates in those social actors that:

“... are in positions/conditions devalued and/or stigmatised by the logic of domination, thus building trenches of resistance and survival on the basis of principles different from, or opposed to, those permeating the institutions of society.” 76

Such domination includes that of the prevailing security and rights within a polity which may promote and protect certain groups, their interests and identities to the detriment of other societal members. We can readily find examples of such a phenomenon. The construction of dominant linguistic rights, and its institutional security, may have the effect of ostracising linguistic minorities which then form a point of resistance and a counter-identity to that endorsed and supported by the polity. The promotion of economic rights for certain groups within a polity may lead to economic inequalities, contributing to the economical marginalisation of societal members who are effectively economically excluded and may likewise provide a counterpoint of resistance and identity. While the provision of collective rights and security may have the effect of promoting collective identification, the process may also have the effect of creating points of exclusion and resistance with a consequential articulation of counter-identities.

Having considered the macro-influences affecting the dynamics of societal identity integration with a polity, consideration will be given to the specific mechanisms employed by the polity, state-based or supranational, in the manipulation of a communal identity.

3.10 The Influence of Elites

The central role of political, economic, religious and academic elites in both constructing a communal identity and influencing the growth of political institutions, political rights and a secure environment is readily apparent. In the initial stages of European modernity, 'national' consciousness was articulated by intellectuals and those who were intellectually trained such as clerics, well before the incremental consolidation of the linkage between state and nation occurred during the Nineteenth century.77 Brass demonstrates the effectiveness of elites in developing either positive or negative perceptions of communal attachment and in the creation of perceptions of communal sameness and difference.78 Llobera shows the role played by the French Monarchy, as early as the Middle Ages, in creating an idea of nation and through French language and culture portraying the idea of France as an imagined community.79

The recognition of the specific functions undertaken by elites in the creation of a communal identity, has been made by a number of theorists including:

1. **Howell** demonstrates the role of elites in defining a homogenising ethnic and cultural policy;80

2. **Zelinski** argues that elites play an important role in the formation of a communal conscious by their articulation of a common national or supranational, rather than local or regional, sentiment and their communication of it;81

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77 See James, P. 1996 Nation Formation: Towards a Theory of Abstract Community.


3. Lawson demonstrates the role of elites in the formation and dissemination of a homogenous mythology and common communal memory, including denying the validity of oppositional challenges to such a mythology and memory;\(^{82}\)

4. Harris and Desrues argue that elites, by virtue of their control of the security and military community from which elements of national or supranational memory, mythologisation and the consolidation of a national territory arise, actively influence the formation of a national community;\(^{83}\)

5. Wilterdink examines the positive role in communal identity formation that elite leadership plays in the consolidation of national or supranational territory and the intertwining of national or supranational politics and economics within such a territory;\(^{84}\) and

6. Rokkan and Elias demonstrate the effect of elite control over the maintenance of the level of institutional differentiation, the level of the extraction of resources and the extent of institutional penetration into civil society and its effect on communal identity formation.\(^{85}\)

The articulation of a national consciousness, even in those cases where there is a power struggle between existing state elites over the nature of the cultural and ethnic composition of the state, and the role of political and social interests within it has been shown, as in the case of state formation in Belgium in the Nineteenth century, to be a source of collective identity creation.\(^{86}\)

3.11 The Consolidation of Territory

As elucidated in Chapter Two, a central element of the state is its ultimate reducibility to its authoritative coercive power over a delimited territory. Unlike other forms of influence, the state's legitimate authoritative power stops at a defined territorial


\(^{83}\) See Harris, M & Desrues, T. 'The Role of War and Violence in the Origins and Evolution of the State.' Revista-Internacional-de-Sociología 1992, 2, May-August, 11-39.

\(^{84}\) See Wilterdink, N. 'State Formation from the Perspective of Figurational Sociology' Antropologische-Verkenningen: 1993, 12, 4, Winter, 59-71.


boundary. The scope of the state likewise is limited to the articulation of a single state-endorsed national community within its territorial boundaries. The construction of communal identity is intimately linked with the construction of a territorially bounded state and its physical security. It became apparent early in the formation of sovereign states, which were defined in part by their territoriality, that there was a necessary requirement to link a 'people' to the entity of the state. Theorists, including Jackson & Penrose and Preston, have demonstrated the effect of place on the evocation of communal identity resulting from a range of symbolic and cognitive responses from amongst a population to a territory. While the nexus between territoriality and identity is generally uncontested, the means by which the institutions of a polity construct and define the nation, through the consolidation of territory, is less certain. Individual self-identity cannot be meaningfully projected across a state-based, or supranational territory. Such a territory can only be cognately appreciated. Thus the construction of the self, in the context of a state-based or supranational territory, is consequential upon the identification within a social collectivity; of membership of a national or supranational community. It is from membership of such a community that meaningful individual conception of place and identity can be achieved.

The polity's consolidation of territory because of improvement in transportation and communication infrastructure engenders communal identity. The facilitation of individual mobility and communications, and the consolidation of a common education system allow for the transference of common symbols, norms and a common political culture within a given territory. As Mann suggests, improvements

87 With the exception of the projection of force by virtue of international agreement in the contemporary period, such as the circumstances in East Timor, in the southern hemisphere and Kosovo in the northern hemisphere.

88 Notwithstanding the fact that there may be a number of proto-national communities within its territory.


in conditions for the transport of peoples and ideas across a given territory greatly accelerates the homogenisation of a national or supranational community.  

3.12 Protection (both internal and external security)

As suggested earlier in this Chapter, the ultimate utilisation of coercive power is both a defining element in the emergence and maintenance of the state and a technique by which the state is able to engender a sense of communal, national community.

The maintenance of internal order has a varied effect of engendering positive feelings of belonging to the polity from its community. The control of internal societal economic and political activity, consistent with a uniform judicial system, both defines the individual's identity in terms of citizenship and as subjects sharing in the universalised law of the state, which allows for individual liberty. The creation of civil order, via the state's policing and judicial functions, acts to protect the majority from the arbitrary usurpations of socially and economically powerful groups, other than those sanctioned by the state. One of the important means by which the state assists in the development of a positive cognitive bias towards itself from among its population on matters relating to internal security, is the protection the national members enjoy by virtue of the states protection of existing property relations from the mass of the "propertyless".

Both the protection of society from external threat, and external military aggression, in part, define and create a community and a communal identity. Both military defence and offence requires the mobilisation of a community along national lines for its own self-protection or self-promotion. While defence may be generally a collective

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92 While Mann Op.Cit p.120 pursues this argument, it is from Weber and Marx that the nature of the relationship between property relations and community originates. See Weber, M. Economy and Society New York 1968 Vol 1 p.245. and Marx, K. Selected Works vol 2, 24.

93 The effect of military action in creating a national sentiment is related by Jahn in the case of Germany:

'Germany needs a war of her own. She needs a private war with France in order to achieve her nationality. Germany . . . needs a war against Frankdom to unfold herself in the fullness of her Nationhood' quoted in Greenfeld Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity., 370.
experience, requiring collective integrative and homogeneity in action and sacrifice; military action requires the state to co-opt the population by ideology, mythology and targeted information in order to act. The nation signifies its autonomy and declares its solidarity on the battlefield. The individual's self-conception is enhanced by the social commitment necessary for the defence of the nation. The external fight is internalised and insofar as the individual sees him/herself as assisting in the defence and/or liberation of the state from aggressors, the citizen becomes conscious of him/herself as a distinct national member. The citizen finds fulfilment in the public work of national defence, and national mythology associated with military service and sacrifice grows as an expression of the solidarity of the national members, such as the Australian ANZACs in the Twentieth century and the Yeomen of England in Sixteenth and Seventeenth centuries. Everyone could contribute, and often had no choice but to do so. Both preparation for and the actual process of warfare often involves the nullification of other complex identities by the categorical simplicity of ascribed nationality, and a renewed national consciousness and national spirit often results from military struggle.

The symbols and mythology of warfare, and the ideological rhetoric of the defence of the nation, are powerful elements in the creation of a communal identity and the linking of a people to the state. The tomb of the unknown soldier, the cry of, 'remember Pearl Harbour' and the innumerable war memorials, sacred battlefields and

95 Conscription is a key element in the political socialisation of a population into a national community.
96 The relationship between military participation and the creation of national identity is acutely summed up by Slavenka Drakulic, in relation to the recent Balkan wars:

"Being Croat has become my destiny. . . . I am defined by my nationality, and by it alone. . . . Along with millions of other Croats, I was pinned to the wall of nationhood - notionally by outside pressure from Serbia and the Federal Army but by national homogenisation within Croatia itself. That is what the war is doing to us, reducing us to one dimension: The Nation. The trouble with this nationhood, however, is that whereas before I was defined by my education, my jobs, my ideas, my character - and, yes, my nationality too - now I feel stripped of all that. I am nobody because I am not a person any more. I am one of 4.5 million Croats. . . . One doesn't have to succumb voluntarily to this ideology of the nation - one is sucked into it. So right now, in the new state of Croatia, no one is allowed not to be a Croat."

days of national remembrance and collective grief, all act to cement the individual to the national community.  

3.13 Economic Stimulation and Regulation

A less destructive source of engendering a positive sense of belonging to a political community is improvements to people's economic circumstances. Economic vitalisation and the redistribution of financial resources can be equally facilitated by both state and supranational polities, and as Gellner suggests is a prime driver of the creation of national communities.

As Gellner argues communal identity is the product of differentiated industrialisation. Technological progress demands occupational mobility but such social fluidity requires a unified culture across increasingly complex occupational structure. Gellner, along with Bendix, argues that the economic imperatives of efficiency and mobility required collective 'intellectual mobilisation' which links peoples across time and space within a single 'national' group. Confirming the role of an interventionist polity in the creation of a community of sentiment, Mann argues, the state forms a basis of economic and administrative cooperation which is capable of sustaining the character of a 'national' community. Mann suggests that the authoritative redistribution of scarce material resources between different groups within civil society has a strongly collective and homogenising effect within a given population. While the redistribution may benefit particular societal groups, the effect of such economic redistribution has a collective societal building dimension. Insofar as there is an accepted mechanism for the state-sponsored redistribution of


100 Mann, M. The Sources of Social Power., 121.
economic assets within a society, there exists a sense of collective responsibility and economic solidarity, which creates a national society, with a communal consciousness.

Associated with the more general regulation of the economic life of the polity is the introduction of a set of national financial institutions which reinforces the communal recognition of national membership.\(^{101}\) Included in this process is the establishment of a national bank and national financial regulatory institutions as well as a national currency, including coinage and bank notes. While a national currency allows for commodities to be exchanged under an ultimate value guaranteed by the state, it additionally acts as a symbol of the nation and ties individual everyday transactions with the mythology and history of the national or supranational community.\(^ {102}\)

The state's regulation of its international economic life has two further effects on communal identification. Firstly, consistent with the rational choice paradigm, the evocation of a communal sentiment is achieved when the benefits, including economic, of aligning oneself as a 'national' member, outweigh the costs. Frank's 'commitment model' explains communal national sentiment as resulting from people's rational analysis of their economic circumstances and entering into national relationships and cooperation where the pay-off offsets the costs. In such a model material interests form the basis of national identity.

The state's development of institutional uniformity and bureaucratic accountability were necessary conditions for the maintenance of effective state-based economic relationships which in turn allowed for the process of collective identification.\(^ {103}\) To the extent that the state normally regulates trade relations and currency exchanges across its boundaries it creates a heightened sense of the 'other', albeit in economic

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\(^{101}\) A clear example of the positive effect of economic stimulation on the accentuation of communal identification is the experience of the United Kingdom during the late Eighteenth and Nineteenth century. See Hobsbawm, E. *Industry and Empire*, 249.

\(^ {102}\) See Billig, M. *Banal Nationalism* (London: Sage 1995)

\(^ {103}\) See Davies, R. 'The English State and the 'Celtic' Peoples 1100-1400' *Journal of Historical Sociology*: 1993 6,1. March 1-14.
terms, between its national community and other communities. As we have earlier considered such a heightening of difference is an integral part of identity formation.

3.14 Representation and Participation of Interests

The transition to large scale polities, with new modalities of rule and power, involved, as Marx argues, a fundamental transformation in the relationship between the subject and the ruler.\(^{104}\) Despite the emergent state becoming centralised, institutionalised and powerful it lacked any substantial avenues of popular legitimization. The outcome of the tension between increasing powers and claims upon communities and the rise of individualism and liberal political philosophy led to a variety of popular responses ranging from local disturbances to revolutions.\(^{105}\) The revolutionary spirit revealed that states lacked any substantial means by which to take account of the disposition or aspirations of the community over which it had control. This exclusiveness had two effects. Firstly it distanced the state from the people. Secondly it made it extremely difficult for the state to claim legitimacy from the people. Compounding this, the absence of the recognition of communal or individual rights, made salient in the emergent philosophy of liberalism, made the relationship between the state and the community difficult to legitimately sustain. Such circumstances mitigated against the linkage of state to people and the building of a truly national community. Accordingly European history of the last two centuries involved the often violent negotiation of state power and popular legitimacy with the effect of the emergence of institutional mechanisms in which participation and representation affected the development of a national community.\(^{106}\)

The more intrusive and costly polity formation became, the more rulers had to bargain with and win the support of their subjects. With the increased demands of the state, whether financial or physical, according to Giddens, came the dependence of rulers on

\(^{104}\) The influence of economic systems on identity formation is most powerfully argued by Marx. See Marx, K. Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations (London 1964) and Marx, K. A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (Chicago 1904) and Mehring, F. Karl Marx (Ann Arbor 1962).

\(^{105}\) We can look to incidents as diverse as the French Revolution to the Chartist uprising in England and the Resorgimen to in Italy as examples of this process.

\(^{106}\) See Nairn, T. The Break-up of Britain: Crisis and Neo-Nationalism, 332-341.
cooperative forms of social relations. Resulting from this bargaining process were greater opportunities for subordinate groups to influence their rulers and a greater awareness of their membership of both a political and national community.

The introduction of conceptions of citizenship proved instrumental in the achievement of a state-mediated national community, by means of the ' politicization' of social relations that followed from it. The formalisation of social and political intercourse within the state achieved by the ascriptive identity as a citizen, is influential in the suppression of personal interest and consciousness, and the promotion of communal and public identification with the nation. The 'public space' created by citizenship provides an objective public world in which the individual finds personal fulfilment. Such fulfilment, whether in the form of meaningful involvement in public affairs, going to war for the nation or sharing in the normative values of the state has the effect of strengthening the loyalty and affection of the individual for the nation. From a cognitive viewpoint the effect of citizenship extends beyond an instrumental commitment to the affairs of state, but extends more deeply to the extension of the individual's self-concept to include a communal normative content centring around the nation. Individuals within the sphere of citizenship, define themselves not only in individual or kinship terms but also in national terms.

The institutionalisation of the state involves the integration of small local communities into larger 'national' entities. Such a process, a central element of nation building, is achieved within the context of state centralisation. The local community is merged into the larger polity and retains little political authority. In such an environment the state institutes a representative mechanism to allow the local community to align themselves and identify with the larger political structures and institutions, with which they have had only fragmentary contact. Further, the

109 Ibid., 458.
politicization of social relations embedded in the realignment of communities from the local to the collective and the consequential development of national identity was a central means of achieving the coordination of state policy and legitimacy. The state plays a crucial role in the development of a national civil society. The processes of self-organisation within society, the degree of political involvement and social mobilisation are products of the states’ actions. Whilst in the nations of the former Soviet Union the dominance of state institutions resulted in 'learned helplessness' and anomie within civil society, the experience in Western states where institutional intervention in civil society is less prescriptive and more representative allows for a more authentic and organic set of linkages to be developed between state and national members.111

At its most abstract and perhaps idealised level, the involvement of the citizen in the polity is a central element in nation-building. The granting of civic rights and duties and the response of citizens to such rights and duties is a key element in the enlistment of individual and communal loyalty to the nation and the state.112

3.15 Political Socialisation - via Education, Communication and Information (through the promotion of an official language)

The articulation of a collective political consciousness is significantly influenced by the political socialisation of a named population.113

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112 The articulation of nation and national community through the mechanisms of political participation has been no where more keenly felt than in the United States of America. De Tocqueville was perhaps the most famous advocate of political participation as a key to nation building, suggesting the positive effect of representative democracy within that state on the engendering of a positive spirit of nationhood. Participation in the political process afforded by participatory democracy in the United States resulted in a more engaged and interested national community, less individual-orientated and more concerned for collective liberty and advancement: elements central to the articulation of a national community of sentiment. The process of linking the community to the state is similar in supranational institutions. See: De Tocqueville, A. Democracy in America., and for a more contemporary examination of the importance of civic engagement in political community formation see: Putman, R. “Making Democracy Work.” Political Science and Politics (December 1995), 664-683.

113 Political socialisation is defined by Dekker as:
The means by which political socialisation occurs are varied. They include the transfer of a common national memory, the political education of youth within educational institutions, the effects of government sponsored information and media campaigns and induction into state-mediated professional life, most particularly the military. Importantly, as Anderson argues, the rise of the nation took the period of the widespread distribution of printed materials, allowing for the standardisation of information and education within a territory.¹¹⁴

Reinforcing the importance of social communication in the evocation of a state-mediated nation, and the cohesion derived from it is Deutsch's concept of a communications infrastructure. Within Deutsch's schema the creation of a collective identity is dependent upon the development of 'facilities of Communication'. Suggesting that the basis of identity is the collective perception of social communication which acts as a lubricant for national homogenisation, Deutsch defines the nation as a:

"Community which permits a common history to be experienced as common, is a community of habits and facilities of communication."¹¹⁵

For Deutsch what is important is not simply the presence of, 'languages, or character or memories or past history' but rather, 'the presence of sufficient communication facilities with enough complementarity to produce the overall result'.¹¹⁶ From such a perspective, the means of communication available have a direct effect on the development of a collective identity is further pursued by Anderson, who argues that the development of the printing process had the effect of changing 'the appearance

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¹¹⁴ See Anderson, B. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism.


¹¹⁶ Ibid.
and state of the world’ and the growth in communication resulting from it allowed for
the rise of national consciousness.\footnote{Anderson, B. \textit{Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism}, 89.}

The central element of state-sponsored political socialisation is an official language. A
common official language allows for a common symbolic structure to be constructed
and facilitates state-mediated and standardised messages about the nation, its culture,
traditions and history to be transmitted throughout the state's territories by its agents.
Further it enables legal responsibilities to be codified and stored.\footnote{For a closer examination of the 'storage' power of language and its application to the extension of state power see Giddens, A. \textit{A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism}. (London: Macmillan 1981)} A state-sponsored
national language further allows for the complex set of economic, political and social
interactions necessary for the state's continuance to take place efficiently.

The value of education in the achievement of collective political consciousness
represents another central element in the state's production and mediation of the
nation. Fichte's \textit{"Addresses to the German Nation"} placed education at the centre of
the state's moulding of a national community. Education was not simply to provide
the means for material advancement but was to 'mould men'. Fichte advocated a
national system of education, which would make German national culture something
'inner' and vital, not simply external. The national educational system was central to
producing the German 'fundamental character'. Its curricula had to be designed so as
to be compatible with the elements of this character. The uniqueness of German
culture, language and history both required a unique state-sponsored educational
system, and contributed to the continuance and strengthening of the nation.\footnote{A good analysis of Fichte's position on the mechanisms of German nation building may be found in McClelland, J. \textit{A History of Western Political Thought}. (London: Routledge 1996), 633-634.}

The insertion of the discourse of nation into educational settings varies in intensity
depending upon differing institutional and cultural settings. At one end of the
spectrum is the mandatory daily flag salute and the pledge of allegiance of the United
States of America and at the other is the curriculum of vernacular prose in Australian
schools. Education, as a sub-set of the process of political socialisation, plays a positive role in the amalgamation of individual into collective national community and the subsequent attachment of people to polity.\textsuperscript{120}

Other specific mechanisms by which political socialisation effects the creation of a common sentiment include the establishment of educational curricula for schools, the introduction of national anthems, oaths of allegiance and specific government sponsored information campaigns.\textsuperscript{121}

The effectiveness of central political actors in building national institutions and national loyalty is assisted by the institutionalisation of education. The centralisation of institutional responsibility for the budgeting and curricula of schools assists fragile states to build strong nations. The overcoming of local resistance to the state, and the suppression of regional and local loyalties and allegiances is also achieved by the political socialisation achieved through the education of a national community.\textsuperscript{122}

3.16 Communal Mythologisation

The development of a communal sentiment of belonging is closely linked to the creation of a homogenous and inclusive set of cultural products. The state-endorsed appropriation and enforcement of a standard ‘national’ historical memory, official customs and traditions, and the guiding of national cultural products is a dominant feature of the development of a sense of national community and identity. The process of “national awakening”, whereby an emerging collective cultural consciousness is manipulated so as to give legitimacy to the institutions of the state is most often deliberate and elite driven. Speaking before the Society of Estonian Literati in 1839,

\textsuperscript{120} For an examination of the role of Education, amongst other factors, in the American construction of American nationalism see Zelinsky, W. \textit{Nation into State: The Shifting Symbolic Foundations of American Nationalism.}, 76.

\textsuperscript{121} See Gellner, E. \textit{Nations and Nationalism.} & Anderson, B. \textit{Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism}

G. Schultz-Bertrams declared: "Let's give the nation an epic and a history; the rest will be won."{123}

The process of mass cultural production by the polity resulting in a sympathetic communal sentiment is most accurately described by Hobsbawm as the: "invention of tradition". The process by which elites invent, manipulate and impose on a community a 'national' history, culture and mythology is defined by Hobsbawm as:

" 'Invented tradition' is taken to mean a set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past."{124}

The invention of tradition is essentially a process of formalisation and ritualization of either pre-existing localised cultural products or the production of new products, such as a national literary and cultural movement, characterised by repetition and an endorsed narrative of political community.{125}

The processes by which such tradition is invented are varied. One way is the use of ancient materials by the state to construct novel invented traditions for novel purposes. A large reservoir of such materials, generally within various proto-national communities is accumulated in the past of any society and an elaborate language of symbolic practice and communication is always available to modernise and nationalise such pre-national traditions. In Switzerland existing customary traditional practices - folk-song, physical contests, marksmanship - were modified, ritualised and institutionalised for new national purposes.{126}

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125 One of the most dramatic recent examples of the 'invention of tradition' was the National Socialist appropriation of elements of German culture and the manipulation and stylisation of it for political purposes, to create a 'volk' within the mould of the Nazi ideology. See Wistrich, R. Weekend in Munich: Art, Propaganda and Terror in the Third Reich, (London: Pavilion Books. 1997)

126 Ibid., 6. Further, the Statutes of the Swiss Federal Song Festival declared its objective to be 'the development and improvement of the people's singing, the awakening of more elevated sentiments for God, Freedom and Country, union and fraternisation of the fields of Art and the Fatherland.'
Beyond those cases where states can rely upon a pre-existing reservoir of proto-national cultural products, new 'national' cultural products have to be invented by the state. Further, the claim of historical continuity of such products also have to be asserted. In cases such as central symbols of nationhood; the development of the National Anthem and the National flag, and the more banal examples such as the stereotypes of the English 'John Bull' or the American 'Uncle Sam', the symbolic vocabulary of the nation was at the same time entirely contrived, highly symbolic, and suggestive of a (fictional) national lineage and history.\(^{127}\)

The necessity for the invention of cultural products for the emergent polity is rooted in the impetus for revised social arrangements and of the new state-centred centres of authority and hierarchy. It was not that there was a dearth of cultural products available to European states that made them invent many such traditions and confirm many more. Rather those traditions of the pre-modern period reflected and reinforced pre-modern, localised social and communal arrangements and proved incapable of creating the social and economic homogeneity vital to the modern state. Accordingly the invention of tradition in modernity via the state based articulation of a national community was driven by the overt rejection of those pre-modern cultural products that were considered as being either obstacles to progress because of their regional nature (or sources of alternative-claims of legitimacy against the state).\(^{128}\) The state in modernity sought to invent and promote those cultural products, national memories and mythologies which exhibited one or a combination of the following three characteristics:

1. those establishing or symbolising national social cohesion or the membership of groups or communities within the nation;

2. those establishing or legitimising state institutions, the status of state elites or state-mediated hierarchies and authority; and

\(^{127}\) Ibid., 7.

\(^{128}\) It was only in very limited circumstances where the pre-existing cultural and traditional cleavages reflected the economic and occupational cleavages created by the modern state. Such an example is Sweden.
3. those whose main purpose was political socialisation; the inculcation of national beliefs, value systems and conventions of behaviour.\textsuperscript{129}

Examples of individual European states' creation of traditions, cultural products and collective mythology designed to unite a national community are plentiful. Those most central elements of Scottish national identity - the kilt, and the bagpipe are modern inventions, introduced and encouraged after the Act of Union by the English. The invention of tradition played an essential role in the maintenance of the Third French Republic. Firstly the development of a secular equivalent to the Church - primary education, imbued with revolutionary and republican principles.\textsuperscript{130} Secondly the invention of French public ceremonies, such as Bastille Day, was a deliberate action by the state to transform the heritage of the revolution into the assertion of France the nation. Thirdly the mass production of public monuments represented visible links between the Frenchman and the nation.\textsuperscript{131} Other examples of the production of 'tradition' within Europe as a means of better linking state to nation include the mass of monuments and statues erected in Germany in the 1890's such as the Reichstag building and the national monument to William I. While in the British context, the systematic staging of public events, such as the royal funeral of Queen Victoria in the United Kingdom, are examples of the creation of a national set of traditional and rituals designed to assist in the creation of a 'national' community.\textsuperscript{132}

3.17 Centralisation and Institutionalisation of Political, Economic and Social domains

An exploration of the key elements involved in creating communal identification in modernity cannot overlook the very economic, political and social reorganisation that implicitly defines modernity and community.

According to Mann, the polity's institutional and regulatory functions have significant social utility and assist in the creation of a national community of sentiment by the

\textsuperscript{129} This list is closely based upon that developed by Hobsbawm Ibid., 9.

\textsuperscript{130} Ibid., 270.

\textsuperscript{131} Ibid., 270-273.

\textsuperscript{132} Ibid., 289.
routinalisation of political and civil relationships and interactions. Successful states, with strong national communities, are those which have not only successfully consolidated territory, managed their economies and created a national mythology and history, but which had sufficient infrastructural powers including centralised, highly organised and hierarchically based bureaucratic institutions, both for executive decision making and for the development and implementation of public policy, providing for the maintenance of societal security and the allocation of material and social rights. Ancient Rome, the United Kingdom during its colonial period, and China are examples of the necessity of a strongly integrated institutional regime for the articulation of both state power and national consciousness.  

States which undertake a wide variety of social, economic and political activity require a disciplined and well organised bureaucracy working within the framework of a penetrative and legitimate set of authoritative institutions. The legitimisation of state power in military, economic, political and social fields required not only the territorial centralisation of power, but also created a need for loyalty to such institutions and power bases. The state's centralisation and bureaucratisation create opportunities for the generation of extra resources, for the achievement of previously unattainable goals and for the general protection and promotion of the civil society. It is in this way that regional communities develop a positive interest in efficient state centralisation and institutionalisation. The institutionalisation of the state's functions assists in communal identification in a number of ways. The institutionalisation of political and economic domains stimulate both core and peripheral populations stimulating them into a developmentally derived collective consciousness, which bypasses pre-existing ethnic and regional forms of identification. Secondly the defence of the national community from outsiders or from the misappropriation of the societies resources by elements from within it, forms a basis for the evocation of a national community. Such a community becoming increasingly national and collective as a result of the universal application of the states institutions over its members. 

\[133\] The principal contributor to the argument on the contribution of political rationality and institutionalisation to the development of a national community is given by Max Weber. See Weber, M. Economy and Society.

\[134\] See Mann in States in History, 128-129.
3.18 Limitations of Supranation Engendered Communal Identity

The tools available for the consolidation of state-mediated national communities, as examined above cannot be said to be universally or directly applicable to supranational polities. While a strong theoretical case can be made for the articulation of community and identity amongst named populations in increasingly centralised and autonomous supranational polities, there are significant limitations to such a process. Such limitations include:

1. supranational elites insufficiently concerned with or incapable of gaining sufficient legitimacy to provide 'identity leadership';

2. strongly motivated national and sub-national elites antagonistic to supranationalism and capable of effecting public support for it;

3. the non-territoriality of the supranational institution, or its universalism - thus removing the 'people' from place and the removal of a key determinant of identity - territory;

4. the national and sub-national backlash against the supranational entity as being too removed;

5. the absence of sufficient institutional uniformity structure or intent to provide a unified level of political socialisation;

6. the absence of executive political and judicial institutions, or competition with such institutions from national institutions with their supranational equivalents;

7. the absence of the supranational institution to have a mandate and/or sufficient resources to provide internal and/or external security;

8. the relative degree of economic and social penetration of the supranational organisation into the lives of its population;

9. the absence of supranational citizenship, and the resultant limitation on supranational authority and legitimacy and popular participation in decision making; and

10. the absence of a common supranational language, and the supremacy of national and sub-national language groups pursuing separate claims.
This list is not exhaustive, however it is indicative of the practical barriers for the development of a supranational identity. There are very few supranational organisations that would approach having sufficient 'state-like' qualities to be able to effect the creation of a positive communal identity. The European Union, as we shall presently consider, is the best placed to do so. Further in the case of a supranational entity promoting a civic form of identification the utilisation of 'ethnic' signifiers of identity such as language, custom and mythology, which are essentially localised and exclusive in nature, and not suitable for broader application, and further limits the avenues open to the supranational polity for the articulation of a common consciousness.

3.19 Chapter Three - Concluding Remarks

This Chapter has reviewed the nature of states, the nature of supranations and the mechanisms available to polities to engender a communal sense of positive identification from amongst their respective populations to them.

One of the central features of late modern political life has been the emergence of increasingly competent international organisations, both intergovernmental and supranational. The rise of such organisations has occurred in a period in which an increasing number of commentators have identified the difficulties experienced by states to deal with complex policy issues in an autonomous manner. In circumstances where the functioning of market places, societal protection and physical security as well as environmental and normative considerations are being globalised, the scope for meaningful state autonomy is significantly restricted. The internationalisation of political and economic activities not only raises questions about the nature of political activity in late modernity, but more significantly, the relationship between polity and people. Modernity synthesised polity and people into state and a state mediated 'national' community, with the occurrence of collective 'national' identification. In an international environment increasingly dominated by supranational organisations, national allegiances become increasingly problematic and supranational identification needs complex political intervention to become operationalised.
A specifically quantified analysis of the relationship between political structure and collective response is elusive, as the plethora of theoretical contributions attest to. This Chapter has demonstrated a number of core causal influences, based upon a critical reading of key theorists, which may act on and contribute to the development of collective (supranational) identification. Arguing that identity formation is primarily orientated around the concepts of security and rights, this Chapter illustrated specific mechanisms for the homogenisation of differing individuals and collectivities into a single; ‘community of sentiment’.

Notwithstanding the employment of the mechanisms for social, political and economic integration that supranational polities may employ, the potency of cultural, ethnic and linguistic identity remain. Rather than supranationalism removing difference it has, as Watts suggests, the power to heighten difference. In such a context the only plausible basis available for the alignment of supranational communities are civic identities.

The task at hand then is to demonstrate the emergence of European supranationalism and to demonstrate the mechanisms, based upon the typology presented earlier in this Chapter of how the European supranational polity has aligned allegiance to it from amongst its population. This will be demonstrated in the next two Chapters.

135 Watts, R. ‘Federalism, Regionalism, and Political Integration’ in Cameron, D. Regionalism and Supranationalism, 7.
Chapter Four

The Emergence of the European Civic Supranation

"The Nation-state is a thing of the past. Some ten years ago state nationalists in most of the European countries were resisting diversity, and their activities were based on retaining the borders of the nation, the currency, the army, the language and the flag. Now that the iron curtain no longer exists and most of the internal borders have disappeared with the Schengen treaty, the euro is going to replace the national currency in eleven states, most of the armies are co-operating in peace-keeping missions, and there is only one centre of coordination. The blue flag with its twelve yellow stars is becoming our common flag. In a few more years more states will join the European Family."¹

4.1 Introductory Remarks

The contemporary construction of a unified European polity² is a remarkable achievement. That states, historically belligerent and sharing a landscape divided by fundamental linguistic, ethnic, and political boundaries have not only freely cooperated to create supranational institutions, but further, have established structures and instruments which directly erode their own sovereign powers, is a historically unique phenomena.³ While the European project has proceeded on functional and pragmatic grounds, with a resultant 'spillover' from economic, to political and now to social and cultural policy, it is clear that the growth of the European polity also

¹ Bojan Brezigar, President of the European Bureau for Lesser Used Languages, European Commission Contact Bulletin June 1998, Volume 14 Number 3.

² In this work we are specifically interested in the emergence of a united Europe sphere of governance, accordingly we focus on the emergence of the European Communities and the European Union. While we are mindful of the various differing constellations of European integration during the last fifty years, we suggest that the European Union is the premiere sphere of European political and economic convergence, and importantly, in the context of this work, the best able to effect the realisation of a communal European identity.

³ The only comparable historical phenomena, and one that is not without some poignancy, is the initial process of European state formation in early modernity, which, as Schwartz has remarked, was without precedent:

"One of the great peculiarities of history is that an economically marginal, technologically backward set of religiously fractionalized and fanatic peoples “governed” by elites with virtually no administrative apparatus managed to conquer most of the world in about 300 years”

constitutes optimal conditions for the emergence of a common community of Europeans. Such a community reflects the institutionally derived civic qualities of constitutionalism, liberalism, and inclusion based upon a common normative position.

Our examination of the emergent European polity is predicated by its definitional uncertainty. We need to recognise and acknowledge that there is an extensive range of interpretations as to it nature. Notwithstanding the establishment of the European polity we remain profoundly ignorant of the appropriate terminology with which to describe it - state, proto-state, nation or confederation. This results from a number of factors. From the EU's unique status and structure, from its relationship both externally with the international community and internally with its citizen-body. Since the passing of the Single European Act in 1986, and the Treaty on EU in 1992, the European Union has been marked by an acceleration in its supranational qualities. Legislative developments, judicial activism and ongoing reform of institutional issues is indicative of what Caporaso has described as Europe’s: "long, meandering, often messy process of political change." That European integration has taken a non-linear path is not dissimilar to the processes taken by individual states in their formative period. Bulmer and Deudney remind us that the American state, at least between 1789 and the end of the Civil War, experienced similar characteristics of periods of rapid consolidation and reactionary paralysis. Contemporary Europe provides us with a keen paradox. On one hand, it has an established executive government structure; on the other hand we can be far less certain as to the existence of a European state, at least insofar as that term is normally understood. While Europe appears 'state-like' in its structure of political authority, and in its autonomy to decide within a specific 'European' territory, the European Union is far less state-like in questions of legitimacy, collective loyalty and in its ability to use coercive force either internally or externally.

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6 For a more detailed examination of the difficulties in adequately conceptualising an adequate theorisation of the European polity see; Warleigh, A. 1988 'Better the Devil you Know? Synthetic and
Our task in this Chapter is not to provide a definitive categorisation of the European polity, but rather to demonstrate that there is a definitive European supranational polity, one that has specific ‘state-like’ jurisdictions, qualities and competencies. In this Chapter we shall consider the structural and sovereign elements of the European supranational polity. We shall demonstrate that the pan-European polity represents an autonomous and sovereign sphere of governance. A sphere that is entirely consistent of the definition of supranation as established in the previous Chapter. The purpose of this analysis is to demonstrate that the European polity is well positioned to actively influence the emergence of a communal European identity, utilising the mechanisms described in Chapter Three.

The rise of a European supranational polity, as considered earlier in this work, is directly related to the crisis of individual states and the decline in the Westphalian understanding of statehood more generally. The development of the European polity not only provides a more certain and attainable basis for the actualisation of many of the traditional functions of states, including economic management, foreign relations and social protection, but further creates the conditions suitable for the manifestation of collective identification.

Let us now consider the nature of the emergent European Supranational polity in the years following the Second World War.

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7 As states decline in relative importance and as collective confidence in state competency similarly diminishes, state mediated identity becomes increasingly problematic. The result of this process has two consequences. Firstly collectivities look below and above the state for signifiers of identity. Below the state to regional and proto-national signifiers and above to globalised, environmental, social, humanitarian and gender signifiers. Secondly, as supranational polities are increasingly empowered, the constituent causal elements of identity formation become operationalised at the supranational rather than the national level. Accordingly as issues of security, the articulation and promotion of social, cultural, economic and political rights and the centralisation of administrative and bureaucratic domains, are activated at the supranational level, so too is an environment created for the emergence of collective identification. The re-invention of meaningful arenas for the maintenance of economic, political, economic and social life at the supranational level thus provides the appropriate infrastructure for collective identity formation.
4.2 Realigning European State and Society in Uncertain Times

In the areas where individual European states had traditionally been paramount; economic management and defence, the devastating effects of prolonged conflict and the rise of two technologically superior and belligerent superpowers had, in the immediate post Second World War period, severely eroded the role and potency of individual European states. Such a set of circumstances demanded a cohesive, coordinated response in order to halt and reverse Europe's declining position in the international arena.

The second global war had major implications for Europe. At its most manifest level its destructive effect on European material, personal and financial reserves returned Europe, in a practical way, to the depths of the Middle Ages. However, the destruction of the myth of the paramountcy and sovereignty of the self-interested, rational state was a more profound effect. It removed many of the practical and emotional barriers towards the construction of a united Europe. Whereas European states had enjoyed over a century and a half of expansion and the deepening integration of state and society, the product of total war and the rapid decline in European economic performance had profound implications for both the structural and cognitive composition of European society.

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8 There are a plethora of indicators demonstrating the destructive effects of total war on European economic, political and social conditions. Whereas in 1913 Western Europe had accounted for one half of the world's industrial production, by 1950 this had declined to one quarter. The European transport infrastructure had been seriously eroded, with the reduction of the European Merchant Fleet by 60 percent. European wheat production in 1947 fell to less than half of what it had been in 1938. British coal production in 1946 was 20 percent lower than it had been in 1938 and in the west of Germany the output had been reduced three-fifths over the same period. Inflation also had its effect. In France Wholesale prices rose 80 percent. Further the rapid loss of Europe's colonial assets in the immediate post-war period removed sources of cheap raw materials and markets. These factors combined to provide a powerful impetus for a rapid and dramatic reorientation of European economic and political life. See Williams A, The European Community. (London: Blackwell Publications 1994)

9 While it is not possible to come to any definitive conclusions as to the precise nature of supranational formation, post-war Europe shared a number of the key factors which have been identified as necessary for the adoption of more centralised political structures. Such features productive of the impetus for Pan-European supranational integration included:

1. **External Competition** - In common with the emergent European states in the early modern period, armed conflict was an essential determinant in institutional change leading to European supranationalism. Viewed through the lens of the two great European wars, the costs of technology, the inability of any one state to provide an effective umbrella of European security and the perceived threat from belligerent
European political convergence was initially necessary to give sufficient stimulus to re-build the European economy after the Second World War. The market imperatives of efficiency, competition and the removal of barriers required a 'spillover' wherein the political structure of Europe was altered to allow for a single European market, including the free transfer of goods, services and peoples across national boundaries. Such a process rapidly requires deeper political and then social integration.\textsuperscript{10} While in the early years the individual European states created a single European economy, more recently economic imperatives have driven supranational political and, poignantly, social convergence.\textsuperscript{11}

The military defeats of the Second World War impressed upon Europeans their collective impotence in the nuclear age. Just as in the early modern period the effect of the revolution in military costs and technology meant that pre-existing political forms of association became instantly redundant, which necessitated the emergence of the modern state.\textsuperscript{12} The development of a united (albeit under the leadership of the United States) response to matters strategic was the only option available to the

'outsiders', European political structures were obliged to respond to such challenges in an integrated pan-European manner.

2. Economic Rationale - became an increasingly important element in European supranationalism. Directly after the cessation of hostilities, Europe's economic base was dislocated in such a fundamental way that the great multiplicity and complexity of economic stimulus necessary to rebuild it, while initially aided by the United States, could only meaningfully be provided by a series of pan-European economic initiatives, taken at a supranational level. Further as the imperative of capital formation and economic competition both within and without Europe gained pace the requirement to reconfigure European economic life into a single market became necessary so as to secure Europe's long term viability. This resulted in a set of profoundly important functional and instrumental reforms that accelerated the rise of a European supranation so as to maximise Europe's economic position.

This model of the imperatives towards macro-polity formation is taken from Weiss, L. & Hobson, J. States and Economic Development: A Comparative Historical Analysis.

\textsuperscript{10} The most obvious example of such 'spillover' was the establishment of the freedom of goods, services, capital and peoples that the introduction of the European Single Market enabled.

\textsuperscript{11} We shall consider European economic convergence in greater detail in a subsequent part of this chapter. The arguments of Mark Wise and Richard Gibb in Single Market to Social Europe is particularly illuminating as to the 'spillover' effects of economic convergence in Post-War Europe. See Wise, M & Gibb, R. 1993 Single Market to Social Europe: The European Community in the 1990s. (Harlow:Longman Scientific & Technical).

\textsuperscript{12} See Tilly, C. The Formation of Nation States in Western Europe., 19.
Europeans. Further, and not unrelated to the first point, the revival of a free European market required the guidance of a pan-European set of institutions and provided a growing European fiscal basis for the financing of the institutions and structures of the European supranation.

This brief review suggests that similar factors conducive to the emergence of macro-polities, most particularly the European centralised state, were equally applicable in the context of the contemporary European experience.

4.3 Structural Characteristics of Supranational Europe

4.3.1 Introductory Remarks

While the literature on European integration is broad, we suggest that in most crucial spheres European Union governance is supranational.\(^\text{13}\) Examples of this are found in three main arenas, firstly the creation of supranational institutions such as the European Commission and the Court of Justice.\(^\text{14}\) Secondly, it is found in the establishment of a separate legal system with enforceable sanctions, and finally in the legislative process and the scope of policy domains; their universal applicability and the sanctions associated with them. Accordingly, while the significant treaties of the Union were negotiated at an intergovernmental level, the structure of European institutions, the nature of European law, the regulations and directives of the Commission and the articulation of policy within the Union is supranational.

4.3.2 The Creation of a Supranational European Institutional Domain

The creation of executive institutions is a central element in the manifestation of supranationalism. In the modern state political power over a wide territorial area is centralised, and is concerned with an increasingly large range of policy domains.


\(^{14}\) Such institutions are deriving their suprationality specifically as a result of their transnational judicial competence.
Further the modern state, as Weber suggests, involves bureaucratisation and the shift to rational-legal authority, as opposed to discretionary, traditional and customary authority. The strengthening of the state and its competency across a defined territory saw both the widening of the scope of Government activity and the growth of government bureaucracies. The European polity is remarkably similar to states in this regard, as Lord Cockfield suggests:

"The Commission is the executive arm of the Community, the Parliament and the Council of Ministers share the legislative function; and the Court of Justice in Luxembourg is the Judiciary."  

Elaborating upon this, the European Union shares the structure of a state in the following manner, it has:

1. A supranational Executive - (Elements of) The European Commission;
2. An Intergovernmental Executive - The European Council and the Council of Ministers;
3. A Legislature - The European Parliament;
4. A Judiciary - The European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights;
5. A Cabinet - The 20 Commissioners (the heads of the directorates);
6. Ministries - The Commission directorates; and

4.4 The Institutions of the European Supranation

4.4.1 A European Executive and a European Bureaucracy - The European Commission

The Commission is one of the most supranational elements of the European polity. Led by 20 Commissioners appointed by individual national governments and substantially comprising Europe's civil service is effectively the motive and executive

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power of supranational Europe. It has an exclusive right to initiate legislation and to largely mould the policy direction of the Union.¹⁷ Commissioners, while appointed by states should, according to the Commission; 'in the general interests of the Community, be completely independent in the performance of their duties'.¹⁸ In reality this is neither practical nor desirable. Emphasising the supranational focus of the College of Commissioners is the decision making process, which is by qualified majority voting, weighted not to unduly disadvantage smaller states, and which critically, ensures that decisions can be reached, even if certain individual states fail to support an issue.¹⁹ To provide suitable assistance, each Commissioner has cabinets; groups of advisers and support staff who are responsible for managing policy development and liaison with other parts of the Commission.

The responsibilities of the Commission are broad. The Commission is responsible for the development of European policy and legislation. Associated with this responsibility is the work of the Commission's advisory committee network which are organised to provide both specialist and non-specialist advice on specific Commission proposals.

The second key responsibility of the Commission is its diverse executive functions. The Commission has delegated rule-making powers under the European Treaties and EU legislation, in a similar manner to individual national executives, the Commission can and does provide a basis for technical and administrative law. Such law takes the

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¹⁷ However the Commission's executive and unilateral powers have been subject to modification as a result of the ascendancy of the European Parliament, most especially in the Parliaments veto and codecision powers, as a consequence of the wholesale resignation of the European Commissioners in . . 1999. Further the appointment of Neil Kinnock as Vice President for Administrative Reform and Loyola de Palacio as Vice President responsible for relations with the European Parliament reflects the greater importance of the European Parliament relative to that of the European Commission.


¹⁹ The importance of Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) in entrenching the competence and independence of the European Union, in reflecting its supranational nature, cannot be overstated. The incremental shift in the EU from unanimity to QMV ensures that in increasingly broad areas of European public policy, individual states are legally obliged to follow EU decisions, without the recourse of opting out. This consequently secures the functional sovereignty of the EU over the governments of individual member states. See Jupille, J. 'The European Union and International Outcomes' International Organisation 1998, 409-423.
form of directives, regulations and decisions. While most of these are routine and administrative some of this law has a significant policy component, such as that associated with competition policy or the Common Agricultural Policy. A further aspect of its executive functions, is the Commission’s responsibility for regulatory management, financial management and the actual supervision of policy implementation. The Commission is responsible for managing the budget of the EU, and in practical terms, is the treasury of the Supranational European polity.

4.4.2 A European Intergovernmental Executive - The Council of Ministers

Whilst the European Commission displays a large degree of autonomy in its structure, decision making processes and in its policy making, the Council of Ministers is the domain of national representatives and national interests, and is paradoxically intergovernmental by nature, but supranational in its decision making processes. The primary role of the Council is to initiate the more important legislative and policy proposals on behalf of the European Union. It is the principal legislative body of the EU (Although under the co-decision legislative procedure, its powers are shared with the European Parliament).

The decision making procedures of the Council reveal its increasing supranational powers and resultant lessening of national discretions. Whereas unanimity had been required within the Council for the adoption or development of policy, following the introduction of the SEA and the TEU conditions in which unanimity is required for Council decision making have been largely limited to issues associated with the Common Foreign and Security Policy and Justice and Home Affairs matters under the TEU. Qualified majority voting (QMV) is applicable to most decisions taken by the Council, qualified to the extent that the larger states can neither form a voting bloc, nor dominate the smaller states. This is as a consequence of the weighted votes that each state holds. France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom have 10 votes each; Spain has eight. Belgium, Greece the Netherlands and Portugal five, Denmark and Ireland three and Luxembourg has two. A qualified majority vote is 54 of the available 76 votes. Simple majority voting, in which all states have a single vote is used for minor procedural issues. The adoption of QMV ensures that in wider policy domains recalcitrant European states find themselves increasingly marginalised and
effectively powerless to prevent the adoption of a common, and legally binding, EU policy, thus enhancing the EU’s effective sovereignty and demonstrating the supranational qualities of the European polity.20

4.4.3 A European Intergovernmental Executive II - The European Council

The European Council was established to give greater urgency and direction to the process of European integration. Conceived and articulated by Giscard d'Estaing and Chancellor Schmidt, the Council was conceived as a body that would bring Heads of Government together to informally exchange ideas and more fully involve themselves in the strategic direction of European policy formulation.

Almost irrespective of the formal, legal status of the European Council, the public status of its membership and the high media profile of its meetings have assisted in ensuring that its deliberations are noted of by the other institutions of the Union. Historically the major areas of interest to the Council have been broad questions about the growth and evolution of the Union; including matters of the Single European Market and enlargement, in addition to the economic development of the European economy. Perhaps one of the most significant areas of policy addressed by the Council is that of external relations. First-order issues such as the EU's position with regard to international organisations and negotiations, such as the WTO, matters associated with high-profile international incidents such as the former Yugoslavia and the Middle East and the direction of policy towards the emerging states of Eastern Europe are all matters considered by Council members.21

4.4.4 A European Legislature - The European Parliament

We have considered the primary role of both the Council of Ministers and of the European Commission in initiating, formulating and implementing European legislation and policy; roles which would typically be notionally reserved for both the executive and legislative arms of Sovereign governments. The European Parliament,


has had, from its inception, a rather tenuous role in the development of the new Europe, as it has had very little practical power. However this power deficit, recognised virtually as soon after it was initially constituted as the Assembly of the European Coal and Steel Community, has, in part, been remedied, as a result of its symbolic and practical assertion of power in February 1999.\textsuperscript{22}

Rather than acting as the initiator of legislation, it is more accurate to characterise the European Parliament as a shaper or influence of legislation developed in other places. There are five principal ways that such influence may come about. Firstly the European Commission may involve appropriate elements, such as a Parliamentary Committee, in the pre-legislative discussion phase, secondly the European Parliament can generate its own legislative program, by virtue of the submission of structured reports or proposals to the Commission. The Parliament’s third avenue for legislative influence is through its input into the structure of the Commission’s annual budget; it must be formally consulted and agree to the annual legislative program of the Commission and finally the European Parliament must be consulted, and in particular cases its approval sought, in relation to the most significant or politically sensitive legislation.

4.4.5 A European Judiciary - The European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights

The European Court of Justice (ECJ) is a - if not \textit{the} - central element in the empowerment of the emergent European supranational polity. Ostensibly its role is to ensure that European law is observed. It achieves this end by hearing cases as to the particularities of the interpretation and application of the Treaties, of the legal acts and of the decisions adopted by the Council and the European Parliament or by the Commission.\textsuperscript{23}

\textsuperscript{22} The central role of the European Parliament in effecting the resignation of the entire membership of the European Commission in February 1999 is evidence of the increasing practical influence of the Parliament, as is its increased veto and co-decision powers – see Delegation of the European Commission to Australia and New Zealand European Union News vol.17, No.7, (September/October 1999), 5-6.

\textsuperscript{23} Its key powers are:

1. referral for a preliminary hearing - when it is asked to adopt a position on the validity of Community provisions;
The ECJ’s role in binding the European polity together is pivotal for three reasons. Firstly, the development of case law within the European Judiciary, and the Court’s willingness to extend the scope of the European judicial competency, has resulted in the emergence of a body of European law that elevates the EU above the level of being yet another variation of an intergovernmental organisation, to a truly supranational one in which member states are bound by specific European law to the collective decisions of the Union. Further, physical sanctions are taken against those states who transgress the accepted body of European laws. Secondly, the Courts are significant in ensuring European-wide judicial consistency; if the common rules of the Union were to be interpreted by member state national courts differently then the resultant divergence of legal outcomes would significantly erode the integrity of the whole Union edifice. Thirdly, as the Court has proven willing to not only rule on annulment it has reinforced the strength of the Union and provided the EU sufficient power, of a supranational nature, to exert authority over member state’s governments, national judiciaries, Parliaments and citizens.

As the above discussion suggests, notwithstanding its modest size (16 Judges and nine Advocates-General) the effect of the ECJ on binding Europe together into a practical and homogenous whole by virtue of its case law, and the integrative and state-making consequences of many of its decisions makes its importance disproportionate to its size. Corresponding to its structural importance the European judiciary is a reinforcing feature of European identification. It provides an evocation and defence of a common European normative system, it reinforces the status of Europeans as free and equal citizens, allows them the right to initiate actions and thus creates and sustains a meaningful common European rights domain. Finally it provides security for individual Europeans from the political resistance of national governments. Such

2. proceedings for annulment - to annul those acts of the institutions that are at variance with the provisions of the treaty;
3. proceedings for Failure to Act - to secure a ruling where the Council or Commission has failed to act to meet its legal obligations; and
4. proceedings for Infringement - where a member state has failed to comply with a ruling of the court of justice.

resistance forms either generalised resistance to integration or opposition to constitutionally granted European rights. Accordingly European Judicial integration contributes to civic integration and the promotion of common European rights and security, which are core elements of common civic identification.

4.5 The Policy Domains of the European Supranation

According to the scope of the initial treaties, the policy domain of supranational Europe was of a particularly limited and specific nature. The treaty establishing the ECSC resulted in policy development limited to economic policy while the Treaty establishing EURATOM was focused upon the trans-national management of atomic materials, their purchase, usage and disposal. The measures for establishing the internal market as outlined in the Treaty of Rome, establishing the European Common Market were strongly focused upon financial matters. Apart from the establishment of a unified customs union, the most important policy initiatives were:

1. competition policy, the attainment of free movement of persons and capital and the right of establishment;
2. coordination of general economic policy;
3. a common agricultural policy;
4. a common transport policy; and
5. preliminary positions in regard to energy and regional policy.

Development of broader social policy, external policy and deeper policy to assist further financial integration and harmonisation did not occur until some time after the initial treaty’s ratification. The European supranational policy mix is more than removal of internal trade barriers or harmonisation of internal non-tariff barriers; it extends beyond this into areas including working conditions, environment protection and education, areas normally reserved as domains for sovereign states.  

24 It should be noted that the European polity does not have a uniform degree of involvement in the development and implementation of policy within and between its member states. Its responsibilities for policy development varies significantly across policy areas. Accordingly while the European Union has extensive policy involvement and legal competence in areas such as agriculture trade and fishing, it shares such responsibilities with the governments of member states in policy fields such as working conditions, regional development and completion policy and has limited policy input and jurisdiction in areas such as health, education, foreign affairs and defence.
Significant policies of supranational Europe can be divided into the following categories:

1. external relations;
2. the Single Market;
3. regional and social policy;
4. economic and monetary integration; and
5. cooperation in the Fields of Home Affairs and Justice.

4.6 The Creation of a Supranational European 'Sovereign' Domain

4.6.1 Introductory Remarks

The construction of a European sovereign space, central to supranationalism, is influenced by a variety of factors. Such factors include the strength of the structures and institutions of the Union relative to the member states, the nature and scope of the European treaty system, and the relationship between Europe, its citizens, and with the rest of the world. The central element in sovereignty is, however, the autonomy of European institutions and the decisions of such institutions both internally, within European territory, and externally, in terms of the recognition of the European polity and its decisions by members of the international community. Both factors largely contribute to the description of a European sovereign space.

4.6.2 European Law and European Sovereignty

While the treaties and institutions of Europe are the building blocks of the European supranational polity; it is the competence of European law that is the mortar that holds 'Europe' together. As opposed to intergovernmental organisations, wherein action is cooperative and based on generally unenforceable international law, within the European polity the nature, competence and applicability of very detailed and specific European law is such that the polity has both a set of autonomous legal instruments, paramount over those other member states, and further it has a legal personality and a
institutional identity separate from that of its constituent member states. European member states have displayed a willingness to voluntarily surrender certain legal and institutional judicial powers across a diverse range of areas at the state level, and to accept the precedents of the European Courts that have greatly extended the Judicial competency of Europe. Such a process is both a reflection of member states' acceptance of their own national limitations in pursuing complex policy objectives, and more importantly reflects the importance and autonomy of the emerging European polity.

The Court of Justice has exercised the greatest influence in extending (widening) and strengthening (deepening) the competence of the European Union. Its judicial activism has significantly facilitated the formal adjustment from the primacy of member state's national legislation and judicial judgements to almost universal acceptance of the paramountcy of European law; a central element in the formation of a supranational European polity. As a consequence of Court judgements, European cohesion has been reinforced in areas as diverse as European citizenship, the practical operation of the Single European Market, employment law, health policy harmonisation and the Common Agricultural Policy. European Court judgements have required that not only other community institutions, but more significantly member state Governments, to act in a manner consistent with the European Treaty System and more broadly with regard to an expansionist, inclusive vision of European federation and harmonisation.

The paramount characteristics and effects of the European Judicial system in not only the direct application of EU law but further extending the bounds of supranational Europe are best illustrated by reference to particular cases. In 1963, in *Van Gend en Loos*, the Court observed that:

"The objective of the EEC Treaty, which is to establish a common market, the functioning of which is a direct concern to interested parties in the Community, implies that this treaty is more than an agreement which merely creates mutual obligations between the contracting states . . . the Community constitutes a new legal order of international law for the benefit of which the

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states have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields, and the subjects of which comprise not only Member States but also their nationals. Independently of the legislation of the Member States. Community law therefore not only imposes obligations on individuals but is also intended to confer on them rights which become part of their legal heritage.”

The ‘direct effect’ capacity of European law (which refers to the capacity of EC law to be invoked by individuals in proceedings before national courts) was the central principle of the Van Gend en Loos case. It ensures that not only can EC law be invoked at the supranational level, but also at a national level. While at the supranational level the Commission may initiate proceedings against a defaulting state, at the national level an individual who believes that s/he is prejudiced by a violation of Community law it is possible to both seek to persuade the Commission to bring the member state to account in the court and secondly the individual can invoke European law in national courts to seek redress. Accordingly ‘direct effect’ reinforces the independence and judicial sovereignty of the European polity, at the expense of the sovereignty and competence of member states. Further it acts to dissolve the division between community law and national law while at the same time serves as a means of creating individual rights and thus assisting in the practical elaboration of European Citizenship. As Mancini and Keeling have commented:

“As a result of Van Gend en Loos, the unique feature of Community law is its ability to impinge directly on the lives of individuals, who are declared to be the ‘subjects’ of the new legal order, entitled as such to invoke rights ‘which become part of their legal heritage’. The effect of Van Gend en Loos was to take community law out of the hands of the politicians and bureaucrats and to give it to the people. Of all the Court's democratising achievements none can rank so highly in practical terms.”

The supremacy of European over national law reveals not simply its independence from national constraints, but is further illustrative of the supranational sovereignty of the European polity. In Costa v. ENEL, the European Court of Justice defined the central constitutional principle of the supremacy of Union law, notwithstanding the fact that there is an absence of codification in Treaty of such supremacy; another


27 Ibid., 99.
indication of the progressive nature of the court in the construction of the European polity. In that case the Court ruled that:

"The integration into the laws of each member State of provisions which derive from the Community, and more generally the terms and spirit of the Treaty, make it impossible for the states, as a corollary, to accord precedence to a unilateral and subsequent measure over a legal system accepted by them on the basis of reciprocity. Such a measure cannot therefore be inconsistent with the legal system. The executive force of Community law cannot vary from one state to another in deference to subsequent domestic laws, without jeopardising the attainment of the objectives of the treaty." 28

It follows from these observations that the law stemming from the Treaty, an independent source of law, could not, because of its special and original nature, be overridden by domestic legal provisions, however framed, without being deprived of its character as Union law and without the legal basis of the Union itself being called into question. 29 Thus Community law has been held to be supreme over national law as the integrity of the Union would be undermined without such pre-eminence.

In those circumstances where member states fail to implement directives, and thus deny European citizens their intended rights, the European court, and in effect the national courts, which in practical and policy terms become community courts, can act to prevent the fragmentation of the Union system. Further, States are liable for failure to implement directives, and can be liable to an individual in damages. This was first illustrated in Andrea Francovich and others v. Italian State. 30 The ECJ held that Union law recognised the liability of the state to compensate for loss suffered as a result of their deprivation of the protection it was intended that the complainants should receive under the directive. Again Union law was found to be pre-eminent at national level and the court acted to apply sanctions against individual states which failed to act in a manner consistent with Union law.

Accordingly, the European Court of Justice is perhaps the most powerful institution in ensuring the provisions of the European Treaties and the legislative proposals of the

28 Ibid.

29 Ibid.

30 Ibid., 127.
Council and Community actually results in the harmonious operation of supranational Europe. We have earlier observed the Court's power of direct effect, the primacy of its decisions, and while its competence is a moot point it is clearly steadily increasing. It has the power to impose a penalty against either divergent states or individuals, and is capable of providing opinions on the compatibility of proposed international agreement is compatible with the provisions of the Treaty. It is not unreasonable to accept Nugent's remarks that:

"The legal framework (of the European Union) . . . constitute the single most important feature distinguishing the EU from other international organisation."  

4.6.3 Sovereign Outcomes - The Manifestation of a European Sovereign Space

We have considered the nature of supranationalism in Europe in some detail, having considered its legal and judicial framework and its formal institutions. In this section we will focus on an analysis of Supranational Europe’s tangible outcomes, or the degree to which the EU has displayed the authority and paramountcy that we earlier described as being central to supranationalism. The completion of the European supranational polity is demonstrated to the extent that European member states condition their behaviour to meet the expectations and to avoid the sanctions of supranational Europe.

The application of Union law at the member state level represents a particularly tangible test of the compliance of member states to European integration. To the extent that individual states demonstrate adherence to Union law we argue that the idea of a European sovereign space is manifested. Based upon analysis conducted by the Commission the number of suspected infringements of Community law has remained relatively static in the period 1990 to 1994 with the actual figures being:

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Table 4.1  **Level of Infringements Against Community Law 1990 – 1994**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Infringements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>1592</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>1432</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>1185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>1340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>1433</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Commission of the European Communities 12th Annual Report on Monitoring the Application of Community Law 1994, 82

The transposition of Commission Directives into national law, which is an essential element in both the effective manifestation of European sovereignty varies significantly between each member state, with Greece appearing the least conscientious in this regard, and Denmark the most, as the table below indicates:

Table 4.2  **National Adoption of Community Directives 1994**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Member State</th>
<th>Directive Applicable On 31 December 1994</th>
<th>Directives for Measures Have Notified</th>
<th>% Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>1213</td>
<td>1088</td>
<td>89.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>1213</td>
<td>1184</td>
<td>97.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1216</td>
<td>1107</td>
<td>91.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>1214</td>
<td>1053</td>
<td>86.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>1214</td>
<td>1108</td>
<td>91.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1214</td>
<td>1120</td>
<td>92.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>1213</td>
<td>1115</td>
<td>91.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1213</td>
<td>1072</td>
<td>88.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>1213</td>
<td>1137</td>
<td>93.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>1213</td>
<td>1137</td>
<td>93.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>1213</td>
<td>1171</td>
<td>96.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>1213</td>
<td>1084</td>
<td>89.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Commission of the European Communities 12th Annual Report on Monitoring the Application of Community Law 1994, v

Accordingly by 31 December 1994 the Member States had, on average, notified 91.89% of the national implementing measures required to give effect to the EU directives; thus confirming the supremacy of European legal authority. In the main areas of European policy, the single market, Agriculture and the environment, member states are improving the transposition of Community law into national law in the first two, but are less diligent in implementing Union environmental law at the national level.
A further test of the internal sovereignty of the European polity is the degree to which the member states' national courts have sought preliminary rulings from the European Court of Justice where difficulties arose within the national courts in the interpretation of community law or where there were doubts as to the validity of a Community Instrument. To the extent that this mechanism has increased, as the figures detailed in the table below illustrate, we conclude that the perceived authority of European law over that of its member states law and national judicial systems is increasing. Between the years 1990 to 1994 there was a 61 per cent increase in national references to the European courts.

Table 4.3 Preliminary Rulings Sought from the European Court of Justice

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>203</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Commission of the European Communities 12th Annual Report on Monitoring the Application of Community Law 1994, 338

4.6.4 European External Sovereignty

"[European States] will find themselves compelled - regardless of their original intention - to adopt common policies vis-a-vis third parties. Members will be forced to hammer out a collective external position (and in the process are likely to rely increasingly on the new central institutions to do it)."32

The cohesiveness of European sovereignty can be established not only by reference to the autonomy and penetrative powers of European law within its domestic setting but also by reference to the unity and cohesiveness and continuity of supranational Europe externally. European sovereignty is established by reference to the supremacy, cohesiveness and differentiation of its actions in world politics by virtue of its external relations in areas such as trade, defence and development policy. Such symmetry reveals both the European polity international personality and also its growing sovereignty, relative to the sum of the member states that comprise it.

32 Lindberg and Scheingold, The European Community in World Politics., 10.
European external sovereignty has, in part, been established by virtue of the international recognition of the EU as having both a legal personality and an independent role in international relations. The status of individual organisations as having a separate identity in international law has been established in the Reparations Case (Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations 1949)\(^{33}\). In that case, decided by the International Court of Justice, it was established that international organisations, in this instance the United Nations, "was an international person capable of possessing international rights and duties and capable of maintaining its rights by bringing international claims".\(^{34}\) From this, the court established that the organisation was exercising and enjoying functions and rights which could: "only be explained on the basis of the possession of a large measure of international personality and the capacity to act on an international plane."\(^{35}\)

According to Macleod, there is no doubt that the European Union, given the supranational powers conferred on them and their institutions by their constituent treaties, satisfies the criteria for international personality as established in the Reparations Case. Moreover, unlike the Charter of the United Nations, each Union treaty expressly confers legal personality on the organisation it creates, thus demonstrating the supranational intentions of the member states to establish a legal entity - with its own separate personality and identity. Furthermore, each treaty confers powers on the community to act on the international plane by concluding international agreements, and the EU has acted in a direct manner as a separate sovereign entity, in exercising its powers. The European Union's separate international sovereign identity is further established not only by its conferred external competencies, but also by the positive recognition given to it by other international actors to its legal capacity under international law. Macleod goes on to suggest:


\(^{34}\) Ibid., 30.

\(^{35}\) Ibid.
"So is the widespread acknowledgment of the Communities and their representatives as being entitled to possess certain rights and duties corresponding to the rights and duties of States and their representatives."36

The external recognition of its legal personality confirms the EU as a distinct, separate and unique actor in international relations and confirms the EU's status as a member of the international polity. For example Article XI of the Agreement establishing the World Trade Organisation, signed at Marrakesh on 15 April 1994, provides as follows:

"1. The contracting parties to GATT 1947 as of the date of entry into force of this Agreement and the European Communities, which accept this agreement and the multilateral Trade Agreements and for which schedules of Concessions and Commitments are annexed to GATT 1994 and for which Schedules of Specific Commitments are annexed to GATS shall become original members of the WTO" 37

The scope of the European polity in external autonomous action is conditional, but nonetheless comprehensive. It should be noted that although EU law has supremacy over the national laws of Member States, the EC is not recognised as a sovereign state and consequently does not have all the powers of sovereign states to conclude international agreements. However in the case of external trade policy, as with other policy areas, Member States, in accordance with the EEC and amending treaties, have given up some of their treaty making powers to the community. As with domestic, internal policy, the activism of the European Court of Justice has extended the competence of the Communities in external trade policy beyond that stipulated in treaty. Accordingly the Union has justifiably claimed the right to negotiate and conclude international treaties, covering an ever widening number of sectors of EU activity and to participate either together with or on behalf of member states. The participating role of the Union varies according to the terms of the treaty concerned and can be limited to participation without vote, with vote, on behalf of or with member states. The provisions of these treaties have a binding effect on member states and have a direct effect on individuals and can have a limiting effect on the

36 Ibid.

individual actions of member States once the Community has exercised its external competence.\textsuperscript{38}

4.6.5  The European Supranational Polity and World Trade

The practical completion of the Single European Market following the institution of the SEA has led to a greater centralising of powers, as considered in relation to EU external trade relations.\textsuperscript{39} This was further amplified as a consequence of the provisions of the TEU, which affected the roles of the institutions in relation to their power over the conduct of trade relations.

The EU, following the SEA, has taken full part in multilateral international trade negotiations including GATT rounds. Further, the recognition of the EU as having a paramount external competence is evidenced by the fact that over 140 countries have diplomatic representation accredited to the EC and about 120 trade and other agreements have been concluded between the EC and third countries as well as about 30 multilateral agreements.\textsuperscript{40}

The establishment of effective European sovereignty by virtue of its external trade relations is expressly stated by treaty and implied by the European Court of Justice and the principle of implied powers. The independence of EU institutions to act independently of member states, or to act in parallel with them, is stated in treaty and case law. Without wishing to give an exhaustive analysis of the minutia it is sufficient to state that following the reasoning of Article 113 of the EEC that in the commercial policy of the community that it should have the same content as that of a state. Further the ECJ has found that the community has both the capacity to enter into binding agreements with other subjects of international law and that whether the EU has the authority (competence) to enter into an agreement in a particular case depends on the question as to whether a treaty provision expressly or implicitly provides the authority


\textsuperscript{39} Emiliou, N. & O'Keefe, D. The European Union and World Trade Law, 19

\textsuperscript{40} Ibid., 20.
to do so. However it has been clearly established that the EU has exclusive competence in the fields of commercial policy including the entering into association agreements, the undertaking of financial obligations and entering into international agreements with third countries for research and development. Further the EU has acquired exclusive external powers in dealing with the UN and other international organisations including the GATT.41

Accordingly in matters concerning international economic relations, the role of individual member states is secondary. Member states cannot assume international responsibilities likely to affect community rules or obligation; the framework of EU commercial policy both internally and externally limits the scope of independence for individual member states. While there is some dispute over the division of power between the EU and member states in the field of external relations, there can be little doubt that the EU has a separate, differentiated and independent competency and thus acts in a sovereign manner relative to the position of its constituent member states.42

41 The principles of the powers relating to the EC's external relationships can be summarised as follows:

1. The Principle of General Powers. Article 210 of the EEC Treaty provides that the Community has legal personality which 'means that in its external relations the Community enjoys the capacity to establish contractual links with third countries over the whole field of objectives defined in part one of the treaty.

2. The principle of implied powers. In order to determine in an individual case the Community's authority to enter into international agreements:

"Regard must be had to the whole scheme of the treaty no less than to its substantive provisions. Such authority arises not only from an express conferment by the Treaty . . . but may equally flow from other provisions of the Treaty and from measures adopted, within the framework of those provisions, by the Community institutions."

3. The principle of exclusivity. Each time the Community, with a view to implementing a common policy envisaged by the Treaty, has adopted common rules, whatever form these may take:

"The Member States no longer have the right, acting individually or even collectively, to undertake obligations with third counties which affect those rules. As and when such common rules come into being, the Community alone is in a position to assume and carry out contractual obligations affecting the whole sphere of application of the community legal system."

42 The preeminence of the EU over its constituent member states is widely recognised in international trade. The US Government has publicly stated that the EU, rather than its member states form the locus of trade policy and perceived trade barriers. See National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers. (Washington D.C. Office of the United States Trade Representative 1996), 91-115.
Substantial examples of the external independence of a European polity are most prominently found in the negotiations associated with the GATT.

The Uruguay round of GATT demonstrated the international communities recognition of the EU's autonomy, while EC Member states acted independently of the EU, the European Court of Justice have recognised the 'substitution' of the EU for member states in the conclusion and implementation of international agreements such as the 1994 GATT.

The creation of the WTO offered the opportunity to draw the formal international law consequences from this both internal and external recognition of the supremacy and autonomy of the EU, and thus to formally replace the member states by the EC. However political considerations (the negotiations for the TEU was progressing concurrently with the negotiations for the establishment of the WTO and for pragmatic reasons it was considered unwise to push the issue of EC paramountcy in the WTO, in case negotiations towards the TEU was upset) led to the result that under Article XI of the WTO agreement both the member states and the European Communities have become original members of the WTO. Accordingly, despite the explicit external acknowledgment by international organisations and states of the separateness and paramountcy of the EU, the potential for internal dispute worked against the EU succeeding the member states formally as members of the WTO.

Perhaps the most obvious aspect of Europe's external economic competence is that associated with agricultural trade, and in particular with the external consequences of the Common Agricultural Policy. The Community's desire to formulate a new policy basis for agricultural production and income support for primary producers in the sovereignties has led, as the policy has evolved, to create policy and mechanisms that highlight the primacy and independence of the EU.

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While research into even a single aspect of the CAP has been likened to ‘chasing a moving target through thick fog’ ⁴⁴ for our purposes an examination of how it confirms supranational Europe competency is a relatively straightforward task. The CAP is a pivotal aspect of the creation of the European polity. The reverse side of CAP’s essential features which in effect are internal production subsidies, are externally focused export subsidies to shift excess European farm product off-shore, and the imposition of common agricultural tariffs to lower-priced world market primary products to inhibit their penetration into the European market. The European polity artificially increases prices paid within the Union for domestically produced foodstuffs by the application of production subsidies, and significantly restricts the introduction of third country products by applying import tariffs, and habitually ‘dumping’ surplus European product on the world market at below production cost.

The paramountcy of the CAP over member state’s agricultural policy, its external manifestation in export subsidies to community producers and import quota’s and tariffs for would-be importers is evidence of the very real and tangible presence of a separate, autonomous and most significantly, sovereign European polity in the international arena.

4.7 Who’s Running Europe? - Emergent Supranation and Existent Nation - Managing the Dynamic

It would be naive to argue that the transition from European intergovernmentalism to supranationalism has occurred on a linear path. There have been both significant disruptions and relapses into the assertion of member state autonomy and their right to pursue individual ends, and at the same time attempts by other states to hasten the process of integration. The United Kingdom’s failure to join the European Community in the 1950’s and then, as a consequence of France’s position, her exclusion from the Community until 1973 is perhaps the first significant example of differentiation or ‘variable geometry’ within the supranational process. While the United Kingdom represented the first division within the Union, even within the original EEC Treaty of Rome, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg were allowed (at Article 233 of the

Treaty of Rome) to develop a deeper form of integration than that agreed by the original six members. In 1963 France and Germany signed a bilateral treaty of friendship and cooperation which has had the effect of strengthening their mutual integration; Britain and the Irish Republic had established a closer relationship and members of the Nordic Council have developed linkages separate but complimentary to European integration.

The potential scale and competencies of the Communities became increasingly apparent once the customs union was completed. In 1975 the Belgian Prime Minister, Leo Tindemans, drew attention to the European Council and that some member states were more prepared in economic and political terms to fully integrate into Europe than other states.\(^\text{45}\) It was inevitable that a mechanism should be put in place to allow differences in development of the European member states towards fulfilling provisions of integration, as Tindemans said:

> "This does not mean Europe a la carte: each country will be bound by the agreement of all as to the final objective to be achieved in common; it is only the time scales for achievement which vary."\(^\text{46}\)

Accordingly flexible integration, with a common base and optional open partnerships in less important policy areas, provided a loose basis for the development of Europe on a variable geometry basis. However, such differentiation has provided haphazard results, and allowed European member states to evade complete integration. Such a result has compromised the supranational process. Examples of this 'differentiation' may be found in three main areas, the Social Charter, the common currency and defence matters.

The Social Charter, while endorsed and implemented by all the EU states with the exception of the United Kingdom up until the recent change of Government, is a central element in deepening the Union and strengthening it by including greater civil and social rights. In the case of Britain's intransigence, and the inability of the Union


\(^{46}\) Ibid.
to formally ensure compliance, reveals the primacy in this matter of national rather than supranational interests.

The common currency strongly illuminates the differentiation of member states in a less than solid supranational environment. The issues concerning the relationship between those member states that have made the transition to the single currency in 1999 and those who have not, further reveal a disjuncture in the supranational attributes of the Union. However the refusal of the United Kingdom to engage in the ERM not only reveals the opportunities that all EU states have to effectively 'opt out' of the supranational pact, but further demonstrates the brittleness of the supranational enterprise wherein certain states condemn themselves to the second or third tier of the European supranation. In the field of defence only ten of the fifteen member states have joined (in stages) the Western European Union (an organisation which itself lacks significant supranational differentiation from its constituent member states), likewise only eleven member states have joined NATO, although three others are participants in NATO's 'Partnership for Peace'.

Such differentiation does not necessarily distance Europe from an interpretation of supranational integration, but it does distance Europe from a more traditional definition of statehood. It is an environment of member states moving forward at varying rates, and with the practical replacement of a multi-speed Europe being replaced by a wider, multi-tier Europe. The 1996 Intergovernmental Conference illustrated the problematic issues associated with further integration. Further progress in the integration of social policy, the introduction of measures to make a reality of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and common monetary policy are frustrated not only by the practical difficulty in achieving such uniformity in functional terms, but the unwillingness of particular states to progress them. The enlargement of the Union in 1995 to include Austria, Finland and Sweden, and the further potential inclusion of central, southern and eastern states serves to attenuate the coherence of

the Union in important policy areas and to dilute its supranational effectiveness. Steps which would enhance the integrity and potency of the Union, and give it a greater supranational identity, include collapsing the third pillar into the first, the incorporation of the Schengen agreement within the Treaty and the implementation of practical measures to make a reality of the common foreign and security policy, while supported by the majority of states, has proven difficult to achieve when individual states have mounted opposition to further integration. In such a situation, most clearly illustrated in the case in the United Kingdom's posturing during the Thatcher years, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that European supranationalism has yet to fully present itself.

Notwithstanding the motivations of the individual member states and their differing capabilities to more fully integrate into the European project, the core elements of European supranationalism are in place. Europe, as a consequence of its treaty system has a coherent constitutional order. European law is constitutionally superior to that of its member states and has direct effect on the member states, and the individuals and corporate entities that exist within them. The tensions between the European


49 Importantly while enlargement has the potential to make decision making more difficult, the retention and spread of qualified majority voting in an enlarged European polity means that the role and importance of the smaller European states, becomes proportionately greater. For example in the EU of 12 (prior to the accession of Austria, Sweden and Finland) the qualified majority was attained when 54 votes were counted, constituting 71% of the 76 votes. Accordingly two big European States could ally with a 'small' one to block a decision. As the Union enlarges, with an increasing percentage of votes being held by smaller states, the ability of the major European states to block decisions is increasingly reduced.

50 Interestingly, its constitutional order is considerably more transparent than a number of its member states constitutional arrangements, such as the United Kingdom and Italy.

51 As was found in the Van Gend en Loos case:

"... the Community constitutes a new legal order of international law for the benefit of which the states have limited their sovereign rights..."; and

"Independently of the Legislation of Member States, Community law... not only imposes obligations on individuals but it is intended to confer upon them rights which will become part of their legal heritage."

polity and the member states, is, in part, explained by two factors, firstly European supranationalism has not been accompanied by a functional recharting of European political boundaries, to reflect the erosion of state sovereignty. Secondly, and more importantly, the member states have been quick to point out that the building of a supranational Europe, despite its material advantages, has yet to be fully matched by the building of a participative and representative 'people's Europe'. It is argued that community, society and identity continue to reside at a national rather than a supranational level.  

4.8 Chapter Four - Concluding Remarks

4.8.1 The European Polity - Supranational or a Late Modern Form of State?

"... never in human history have different nations cooperated so closely with one another, implemented so many common policies or, in such a short space of time, harmonised ways of life and economic situations which differed so greatly at the outset."  

Both the functioning and study of the emergent European polity is at an early stage.

Europe more closely resembles a state than many pre-existing states, yet to describe it as a state or even a 'proto-state' is premature. While Europe appears particularly strong in its institutional, policy and most especially judicial competencies, the European polity still falls well short of the basic profile of a state. The European polity lacks ultimate coercive force and is reliant upon intergovernmental, rather than supranational, structures for internal policing. The European Union is weak in terms of the traditional tax and expenditure functions of government. As Caporso aptly and simply states: "The extractive capacity of EU institutions is nearly zero." The question of legitimacy remains deeply problematic, and further distances the European Union from the traditional conception of the state. Further the EU's


institutions remain, as they began, systematically different from those of national governments.

Notwithstanding these limitations, the European polity displays significant supranational attributes. The emergent European supranational polity exists as a stable, clearly structured instrument not only of international co-operation, but supranational authority. It has agreed aims, and specific institutional features such as statutes, rules of procedure, and objective criteria for membership. It acts with significant autonomy in important policy domains with increasingly narrower avenues for other subordinate polities to constrain or induce its behaviour. The European supranation has its own constitution (the European Treaties), its own legislative, executive and judiciary. It has a range of autonomous policy instruments and policy objectives. Its decision making procedures, increasingly based on qualified majority voting and co-decision, undermine the ability of member states to opt out of its decisions. Compliance with the European supranation, as we have observed, is closely monitored, and actions are taken against its members for non-compliance. Such are the powers of the European polity, and its ability to compel its constituent member governments to act differently than they would otherwise have done, and the fact that the European supranation has a role separate than that willed by its membership, confirms that we are entirely justified in determining the separate, independent and capable nature of the European supranation. Further, its institutions, and the values that underpin them establish the pre-conditions for the articulation of a common European civic identity. As Jacques Delors suggests:

“For civilisation, the unification of Europe has a significance which goes beyond peace and security. Europe stands at the starting point of that progress from which we will all benefit; and Europeans, thanks to their creative spirit, can provide to the development of civilisation a contribution as great as that of the past. However to allow this creative spirit to bloom again, we must bring about union.” 55

The European Union, which evolved from both the renewed drive for European integration in the post war period, and which reflected the imperatives of the international market is perhaps the first of a new type of state. It is, as Bornschier has

commented: "a somewhat strange hermaphrodite - something between a confederation of states and a federal state." The European Union is not a federal State uniting several states within the framework of a single polity, with a single state-endorsed nation and national identity, and with an international legal personality. Nor is it a confederation of states. The EU appears as a federal state in so far as the sovereignty of its member states are truncated by self-imposed limiting treaties creating Community Law - the *acquis communautaire*, which is supranational in intent and execution. However the EU still appears as a confederation of independent states to the extent that individual member state jurisdictions continue to exist, as do active state sponsored nations. Taylor has suggested that the EU is simply a powerful illustration of the limits of state-theory insofar as it; "is neither a federation in the making nor a society in the betraying". Accordingly hitherto theoretical approaches to European integration may be imperfect insofar as Europe represents an entirely new form of political association, yet to be adequately categorised.

Despite these ambiguities the case for the recognition of the European Union as an emergent independent polity is strong. Within its territory, the Union has jurisdiction over an ever enlarging range of policy domains, including internal economic regulation, social policy and the regulation of transport, communications and increasing coercive responsibilities. There are few aspects of internal European life that are not directly influenced by the European Union and its laws. Externally, the European Union's autonomy and competence is acknowledged in its acceptance as a respected and powerful figure on the international stage. During the renegotiation of the GATT the EU was an accepted party to the bargaining process. Its status as an independent polity is further acknowledged, as Springer suggests; "International politicians have added Brussels to their itinerary when on world tours." The European polity shares considerable similarities with a confederation to the extent that it is dependent upon funding from local contributions from constituent member states.


58 Ibid., 2.
Europe resembles a federal state insofar as sovereignty is divided between itself and its constituent members and to the extent that its supranational law is supreme in its sphere and member state national law is supreme in its jurisdiction. However Europe also takes on the characteristics of a unitary state. There is an increasing degree of centralisation of state powers and to the extent that there exists European citizenship and where the European polity acts directly upon individuals, by-passing member states.\textsuperscript{59}

Whether or not we agree with Raymond Vernon's description of the European Union as: "an historical aberration smuggled into the family of nations"\textsuperscript{60} it is clear that the European Union presents us with a further challenge to the traditional conceptions of statehood and state formation. The European polity is clearly inconsistent with the traditional model of state formation based upon the expression of, and claim for self-determination of national elements within it. Neither does it accord with the traditional model of states, its external competence is limited, it cannot sufficiently project external power to guarantee its sovereignty by military means and it lacks a meaningful executive and forms of representation. However what the European Union does achieve in the context of the declining competence of the member states which comprise it, is that it pools and sharpens the sovereignty of its member states. The Union represents the real power of the member states in the face of rigorous global forces which have denuded the competency and authority of the individual European states. Europe has subsumed much of the authority of the member states however it is not a state. It is a new form of supranation, one which challenges our conception of statehood and confirms the vulnerability of the traditional state.\textsuperscript{61}


\textsuperscript{60} Quoted in Volker Bornschier, 'European Processes and the State of the European Union', 2.

\textsuperscript{61} However there are reforms that need to be instigated if the supranationality of the EU is not to be compromised; no greater example of this is in the matter of EU enlargement. The planned expansion of the EU to 20 or 25 member states poses central problems for the European polity, both in terms of achieving effective decision making processes, which are sufficiently inclusive but outcome orientated, and the need for reforms in fundamental policy areas, most especially the Common Agricultural Policy, in order to practically manage the EU's finite resources.
The significance of the emergence of the European supranational polity for the emergence of a clearly articulated European identity is clear. We have, in Chapter Three, established that centralised and authoritative political institutions can create the appropriate structures and policy instruments capable of influencing communal identity. That identities can originate from the dominant political institutions is not problematic, what is unique, is that in the case of contemporary Europe, however is that such institutions are supranational rather than state-based. Communal identity has been traditionally understood as a social construction, a collective imagining, originating in the collective self-definition of a community, and in the political structure of the state. By contrast the supranation forms the basis of a communal expression of belonging. Accordingly the preceding examination in this Chapter of the emergent European polity is relevant, as it is from its structural autonomy that the reinforcers of collective European identity are constructed.

Having established the clear supranational qualities of the European polity, and the scope of its political and policy structures, we will consider the mechanisms employed by Supranational Europe to reinforce a communal sense of European identity and the demonstrable features of such an identity in Chapter Five.
Chapter Five

Reinforcers of European Supranational Identity

5.1  Introductory Remarks

"Nations are more often the consequence of setting up a state than they are its foundations."¹

The development of commerce and industry, the widening of markets, greater social mobility, urbanisation, and the speeding up of communications made it easier for people to 'imagine' their membership of a national community.² In a similar manner the influences of trans-national economic, social and cultural markets, the 'Europeanisation' of previously national policy domains, the removal of internal borders, the practical implementation of European rights within a framework of European citizenship and institutional support for intellectual and cultural interaction and communication have collectively raised the degree of European social cohesion and created a positive environment for a communal European identity.

In Chapter Three we examined a number of the possible avenues available to a polity in its role as a stimulator of communal identity.³ In this Chapter we shall utilise the typology to establish their applicability at a European level. Chapter Five demonstrates that many of the institutional changes that have occurred in Europe since the end of the Second World War have had a positive influence on the development of a European identity.⁴

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¹ Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Program, Myth, Reality., 178.
³ These being:

1. the positive intervention of elites,
2. the consolidation of a bounded territory,
3. the protection of such territory, and the peoples it contains,
4. economic stimulation and regulation,
5. representation and participation of individual and communal identities and interests;
6. political socialisation,
7. the adoption of a state-sponsored mythology; and
8. the centralisation and institutionalisation of economic and social domains.
The importance of institutional elements in the advancement of individual preferences and behaviours within a European context has been variously examined. Keohane is perhaps the clearest on the complex and subtle interaction between the institutions and the evocation of communal identification:

"... individuals, local organisations and even states develop within the context of more encompassing institutions. Institutions do not merely reflect the preferences and power of the units constituting them; the institutions themselves shape those preferences and that power. Institutions are thus constitutive of actors as well as vice versa. It is not sufficient in this view to treat the preferences of individuals as given exogenously; they are affected by institutional arrangements, by prevailing norms, and by historically contingent discourse among people seeking to pursue their purposes and solve their self-defined problems."5

This Chapter demonstrates that the expression of belonging to Europe is in part determined by an objective materialistic calculation of perceived benefits of participation in the European polity. Such a phenomena is most strongly found at Europe's territorial periphery, where, not coincidentally, economic insecurity is most acute. Further, European identification is influenced by the EU's recognition and observance of pre-existing identities. Just as individual states provide collective security - a guarantee against both internal and external warfare, and personal security - the maintenance of personal social and economic rights; so too has Europe provided such rights and security sufficient to engender collective identification. Such a dynamic process has occurred within Europe as it has unified.6 European states became 'giant insurance companies' in the three decades following the end of the Second World War as a consequence of their expansive social programs and planned

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4 It is not our intention to demonstrate the manifestation of European identity in its entirety in this Chapter, but rather to demonstrate the central role that institutions have played in creating the conditions and opportunities for the realisation of a pan-European identity. In Chapters seven eight & nine we shall consider the evidence and manifestation of European identification in greater detail, consistent with our definition of communal identification established in Chapter One.


economic intervention.\(^7\) As those states, 'hollow-out' and become less capable of sustaining meaningful competencies and protecting their citizen bodies from the detrimental effects of globalised economic and social influences, the EU has increasingly assumed the functions and outcomes of the constituent member states, with a positive effect on European identification.

5.2 Specific Progress Towards a European Identity - The Role of European Elites

In Chapter Three we argued that a key factor in the creation and maintenance of collective identification is the active intervention of elites.\(^8\)

Even the most superficial exposure to the history of the idea of a unified Europe since the end of the Second World War provides a plethora of biographical detail on the central role of European elites in the conceptualisation and building of the European project. The role of Churchill, Monnet, Schumann and Adenauer in both articulating the vision of a common European home and in initiating the practical actions to give substance to their vision is unparalleled. Without the drive of Schum an there may have never been the emergence of the European polity, and in the absence of Monnet, the Schuman plan may never have been implemented. Further, the technical skill of Paul-Henri Spaak in establishing the framework of pan-European economic coordination was central to the creation of a working European polity.

The contemporary period offers other examples of the centrality of European political elites in the construction of supranational Europe. Perhaps the most influential European elite in the contemporary period is Jacques Delors, described as: "the first

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\(^7\) Ibid. US President Lyndon B Johnson, in attempting to replicate the European experience expressed the process of allegiance building through the implementation of an expansive public welfare program as "giving people a stake in society".

\(^8\) There are five domains in which elites effect the process of polity-formation and the engendering of collective identification. Elites are firstly important in the process of institutional consolidation and in the extension of political, social and economic rights to the polities' individuals. Secondly the role of economic elites is pivotal in the reconfiguration of society so as to ensure the most effective means of economic production and in the emergence of a regulatory system allowing for certainty and consistency of economic transfers within a territory. Coercive (military) elites provide the leadership and the motive power to both consolidate territory, and to resist competition from both internal and external threats. Intellectual elites are elemental to the process of conceiving and articulating a common mythology of a collective people within a specific territory, with unique values, lifestyles and aspirations.
transnational leader of the new Europe." Delors was not only focussed on the goal of European political and economic integration, but moreover he was committed to a unified Europe in which European citizens could fully enjoy both material prosperity, but also their combined cultural and intellectual traditions. For Delors economic interdependence was to lead to political and cultural interdependence. His vision was of a Europe both economically vibrant but also one in which citizenship and social issues were equally valued.

Within the immediate past ranks of the European Commissioners we find examples of European elites commuted to the furtherance of the European project. We examine two by way of demonstration. Commissioner Hans van den Broek, the man responsible for accession negotiations with Eastern and Southern European states has had the responsibility of both establishing the nature of the territorial expansion of the European polity, while maintaining that the civic values and practices of the Union are upheld. Such key values and practices, which in part divide Europe from non-Europe and define a European civic identity include; democratic practices and institutions, an independent judiciary, a market economy and the central body of European laws – the Acquis Communautaire. Accordingly van den Broek’s role is pivotal in the public expression of the essential elements of European civic identity-democracy, the free market, social protection and judicial independence, and is a tangible reminder of the European identity and the role of political elites in defining and enhancing it. A further example of European elites in the articulation of a common polity is the work of Emma Bonino – the former European Commissioner

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10 Ibid. The Single European Act and the Social Charter were largely the result of Delors’ passion and commitment. So central to the process of European institutional development, and to the empowering of a European vision, that many have doubted the ongoing viability of Europe during the difficult 1980s in his absence.

11 Delors’ contributions to the consolidation of the European polity can be contrasted with his British colleague during the period, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. Thatcher’s opposition to Europe during her tenure as Conservative Prime Minister of Great Britain had the effect of not only excluding Britain from the full benefits of European integration during her tenure, but further provided a counterpoint to her European counterparts who championed European integration. Thatcher argued that ‘Coming together in Europe would necessarily lead to a constraint on liberty.’ Her effect on European integration, while largely symbolic, did retard the adoption of European identification amongst the British, an effect, which is still currently felt. See Ibid.

responsible for Consumer Policy, Community Health Protection and the European Community Humanitarian Office. Commissioner Bonino has done much to strengthen the role and independent status of the European polity in the external world and in engendering a European consciousness such as in the field of food safety- specifically raising European awareness of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (or Mad Cow Disease), which has resulted in a strong public sympathy for the work of the Commission.\textsuperscript{13} Her support for international humanitarian issues, as diverse as women’s rights in Afghanistan and the plight of refugees in the former Yugoslavia, has struck a popular chord which resonates in the collective European consciousness, insofar as it reflects the primacy of European civic values.

Considering the empirical relationship between the expression of Europeanness and the strength of national elite support for European integration we find that there is evidence of a correlation between active political elites at the member state level and collective European identification amongst the citizen body. We find that in those ‘pro-Europe’ States, such as Germany, France, Ireland and Italy where political elites have been comparatively more supportive of the creation of the European polity than in other states, that the expressed level of European identification, from amongst the state’s populations is considerably higher than is the case in those states such as Sweden, Finland and the United Kingdom, where the respective political elites have been ambivalent towards the European project. The figure below demonstrates this phenomenon.

\textbf{Figure 5.1} \textit{European Elite Mobilisation and European Identification}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{figure5.png}
\caption{European Elite Mobilisation and European Identification}
\end{figure}

Source: Commission of the European Communities \textit{Eurobarometer 51}

\textsuperscript{13}Emma Bonino, Europe’s Commissioner for the Future’. \textit{The Economist}. (September 12\textsuperscript{th} 1998), 62.
Figure 5.1 illustrates in those states where European elites have been openly supportive, over an extended period of time to European integration, such as in Germany and France, under the leadership and direction of elites such as Monnet, Spaak, Adenaeur and Schumann that the level of articulated support for the EU is considerably higher than in those states, such as the United Kingdom, Finland and Sweden where elites, at least up until recently, have been resistant to European integration. Accordingly, we argue that there is a correlation, as the data above demonstrates, between the active involvement of political elites and the engendering of a stronger sense of support for the European project.

5.3 The Consolidation of European Territory

Europe's constructed landscape has taken shape more tangibly over the last five decades as a result of the institutional overlays that have been imposed upon it. An adequate definition of Europe's landscape must now take account of the evolution of the European polity and of the geo-political shifts of the post-cold war period. There has been both the realisation of a unified European landscape on one hand and on the other a splintering of national, cultural and religious paradigms of identity which have shaped the 'mental maps' of Europe. Examples of the practical consolidation of the European landscape are found in the uniformity of policy across the European polity; a single market, a Schengen security area wherein European citizens circulate freely, while excluding 'outsiders' and the free movement of goods, services, capital and people across a commonly shared European landscape. The extension of networks and flows across the EU have likewise circumvented the old 'internal' frontiers imposed on Europe. Those historical indicators of 'nationalised' landscape; nation and national territory, currency and markets, are rapidly being absorbed into the landscape of a greater territory. Primary markers in the remapping of the European landscape include hierarchies of inclusion and exclusion based on economic status (the prosperous middle class as opposed to migrants and the underclass) religion (the rediscovery of Orthodoxy, and the exclusion of the near east such as Turkey), economic modernity (the exclusion of the South and the East as being economically

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14 As we shall discuss more fully later in this chapter, the distinction between insider and outsider is based on civic grounds- on questions of citizenship - not ethnolinguistic criteria.
moribund) and the conception of European as a landscape of liberalism, pluralism and individualism.\textsuperscript{15}

5.3.1 The Creation of a European Territorial Space - The Historical Process

In order to appreciate the territorial raison d'être underling the European Union it is necessary to briefly examine the economic and geo-political influences upon which its spatial features are effected.

The consolidation of European territory has sprung from two primary sources, economic, and geo-political. Economically Europe was both the home of industrialisation and economic modernisation and had formed the workshops of the world for much of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The need to re-establish industry and to ensure that its reliance on foreign markets was reduced while maximising exports necessitated the consolidation of European trading and productive areas into one functionally determined territorial space. Thus from the first steps with the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) of 1952 up to and beyond the single currency the economic imperative of efficiency, competiveness and the challenges of economic competition has driven the centralisation of European territory.

The territory of Germany and France have historically formed the core of Europe, and so they remained in the formation of the first manifestation of European territoriality in the post-war period; the European Coal and Steel Community. These states along with Belgium, Italy and Luxembourg and the Netherlands consolidated functional Europe's territorial shape when they joined with France and Germany to become founder members of the European Economic Community and EURATOM in 1957. The expansion of the European Union's territory was further achieved in the following manner:

Table 5.1  The Expansion Of The European Union's Territory

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>State(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>France, Germany (west), Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg, Netherlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>United Kingdom, Denmark, Ireland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>Greece</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>Spain, Portugal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Germany (East)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Sweden, Austria, Finland</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.3.2 Supranationalism and/or A Mirror of the State?

Europe’s territorial disposition is progressively becoming more regularised and aligned with the spatial features of statehood. Political geographers have postulated a model of the spatial structure of the Western state and it is reasonable to examine the European polity against such a theoretical model. Central to the theoretical structure of the state is the centre-periphery structure identified by Whittlesy and Poinds, utilised by Christaller and von Thunen, and Rokkan and Urwin. Such theoretical conceptions postulate that the territorial state grows from a central core which has lesser, marginal peripheral spatial areas, are dependent upon the core for direction, economic support, and the provision of higher organisational and institutional functions.

The centre-periphery model, is consistent with the reality of the geopolitics of the European Union. The genesis of the core of the European polity is the area of central United Kingdom, Belgium in its entirety, the Rhineland, North-Eastern France and south to the Po Valley. This essence of Europe's core has been variously described as 'industrial Lotharingia' and as the European ‘Golden Triangle’. Within this area there has been both a historical and contemporary concentration of resources, finance, population and capital. Up until the development of the North Sea energy, this area

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17 Parker. A Political Geography of Community Europe., 41.

was responsible for the majority of Europe's energy output; it had the most significant concentration of Europe's heavy industry and it contains the economic core regions of Belgium, the Netherlands and western Germany which merge into each other into a core Europe of capital accumulation and utilisation and decision making. Kormoss has identified this area as a: "European metropolitan area' with many of the characteristics of a European 'megalopolis", similar to that of the eastern seaboard of the United States. 19 Rokkan and Urwin have further established this crescent as the core of Europe by examining data on European centre-periphery economic behavior such as the variations in income per capita, agricultural and industrial output and even by such socio-economic factors such as the numbers of doctors and telephones in this 'core' area as compared to more peripheral European territories. 20 These analyses suggest that, in common with European state formation in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the distributions of economic political and social flows are developing at a pan-European level. Reinforcing a geopolitical and economic division between the European polity and the ‘other’ which has the potential to consolidate and delineate cultural and social flows. Such a process, as Agnew and Corbridge argue, not only has the effect of consolidating markets but also society, and as such enhances communal identity as such identity is no longer anchored in the nation-state arena but is reconfigured at a supranational level. 21

5.3.3 A European Core and a Peripheral Europe

The fifteen members of the European Union represent one of the core economic groupings in the global economic landscape. Collectively the member states have a population of approximately 373 million with an annual GDP of 7472.5 1000 Million euro. 22 Notwithstanding the superficial integration and consolidation of the European economic space suggested by Europe's unambiguously impressive economic

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20 Rokkan & Urwin Economy Identity Territory.


performance, the European economic landscape has internal boundaries which shape the unity and identity of Europe.

The European economic territory comprises areas of both economic strength and economic inequality and marginalisation. While Germany has a GNP per capita of US$22,320, Portugal's is US$4,900\(^{23}\) There is significant spatial differences in European wealth. On a general table of wealth in Europe, with a standard European Union index of 100, Denmark scores 138, Germany 123, France 114, Italy 102, and Britain 98. Whereas at Europe’s territorial and economic periphery Ireland scores 60 and Portugal 33.\(^{24}\) Beyond these Western European states, are those of Eastern Europe. These states inhabit quite a different economic landscape; according to Preston: “The eastern areas of the continent approach third world levels of living.”\(^{25}\) Hungary had a GNP per capita of US$2,780, Czechoslovakia US$3,140, Bulgaria US$2,250 and Romania US$1,640.\(^{26}\) Within the overall European landscape then, we can identity three areas: a core landscape of the more advanced industrial economies, including Germany, France, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands; a non-core, peripheral, economic space including the states of Italy, Greece, Portugal and Spain and a frontier area, some of which lies outside of the European economic landscape including the former Soviet-dominated states of Central and Eastern Europe.

Thus a centre-periphery structure can be established on a pan-European level consistent with the model's validity at the level of the state. The centre of Europe connects Europe in not only in economic terms, but also in terms of the concentration of political power centres. It includes the locations of the Union's own executive and decision making institutions. As such we can see that while the European capital is shared at least in political and functional terms by Strasbourg, Luxembourg and Brussels, in terms of economic influence Europe's capitals are London and Frankfurt.


5.3.4 European Supranational Enlargement and the Question of European Territoriality

"The Union's environment is changing fast, both internally and externally. It must set about adapting, developing and reforming itself. Enlargement represents a historic turning point for Europe, an opportunity which it must seize for the sake of its security, its economy, its culture and its status in the world."\(^{27}\)

The political enlargement of Europe holds the promise of both the disillusionment of historical enmity amongst European states and a tangible aspect to create a 'Common European Home' for all European citizens. The European Commission has envisaged that the European polity could soon comprise some 25 European states and 475 million inhabitants.\(^{28}\) However, for the enlargement of European territorial space those states outside the Union have to 'fit' the endorsed European model; as stipulated by the accession criteria (such criteria largely reflecting the civic aspirations of a communal European identity). All applicants to the EU must accept all existing European rules - the *acquis communautaire*. Such a pre-condition proves to be a significant impediment to the expansion of Europe, as the EU's high standards in areas as diverse as social policy, the protection of citizen's rights, the operation of the free market and environmental policy will prove unobtainable for many aspirants to European membership.\(^{29}\)

\(^{27}\) *Agenda 2000* - European Commission at: http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg1a/agenda2000/


\(^{29}\) The criteria adopted by the European Council when it met in Copenhagen in June 1993 specifically required of those states wishing to join the EU compliance with a set of arrangements and standards. We believe these standards form, or aspire to form, the core of Europeanness, without which states may not be admitted, as a consequence of their lack of adherence to these key European values. Such values are expressed as such:

"membership requires that the candidate country:

1. has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and the respect for and protection of minorities;

2. the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union; and

3. [has] the ability to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union."

Thus what makes Europe 'European', what establishes its territorial boundary and what allows for extra-EU territory to be incorporated into the European polity is established by the fundamental alignment of territories and peoples with the above-stated civic criteria of democratic institutions and
Accordingly, the question of the territorial enlargement of Europe is largely dependent not upon questions of cultural or ethnic homogeneity with pre-existing member states as one might expect if Europe was sympathetic to the ‘ethnic’ paradigm of state-formation and collective identification outlined earlier. Rather, European enlargement primarily turns on civic issues. Issues of democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and the respect for and protection of minorities and prosaic issues such as agricultural pricing policy, the magnitude of structural funds required, the potential for the extension of the single market and the implementation of environmental, social and safety standards. Importantly, the extension of the European area of ‘Freedom, Security and Justice’ impacts directly on the question of territorial enlargement as it is in this field of legal and judicial activity that states, most notably those such as Turkey and the emergent Eastern states, have proved most deficient and least likely to achieve meaningful civic reforms.\(^\text{30}\)

5.3.5 European Territoriality and European Identity

European’s opinion as to the basis for possible inclusion of Central and Eastern European states demonstrate the civic underpinning of European identification. European citizens have clearly indicated which potential applicants they wish to see considered for membership. The uniformity of these views suggest a common European expression of identity, based both in the expression of a common normative system and by the expression of a clear grading of potential applicant states as (relative) outsiders, on civic grounds. As the tables below illustrate:

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functioning, a free market and a commitment to even closer union. The state’s ability to adopt the acquis further establishes the compatibility of extra-EU territories for inclusion into the European landscape.

Table 5.2 Importance of Civic Criteria for Accession to the EU

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>% Responding as Important</th>
<th>% Responding as Not Important</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The country has to respect Human Rights and the principles of democracy.</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It has to fight organised crime &amp; drug trafficking.</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It has to protect the environment.</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Its joining should not be costly for joining member countries.</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It has to accept whatever has already been decided and put in place through the process of building Europe.</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Its level of economic development should be close to that of other member States.</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Commission of the European Communities Eurobarometer 51 p.74

The above table demonstrates that (Western) Europeans define European spatiality and identity on civic grounds, the criteria for inclusion of additional states into the European polity are based centrally upon the practice of civic values including respect for human rights and democracy, rejection of crime and protection of the environment. More prosaic factors such as level of economic development and the costs to pre-existing states of enlargement rate lower.

Collective European perceptions as to territorial boundaries of Europe and the suitability, or otherwise, of potential future members is illustrative of the cognitive map of Europe held by Europeans. As the table below suggests, Europeans have a clear mental map as to those states which are, and which are not, elements of the European landscape. It is not simply that these states that Europeans are in favour of are economically and socially more advanced, but that they are also more aligned to civic notions of community. Thus Switzerland, Iceland and Norway are not only economically more aligned to the pre-existing members of the EU, but their observance and defence of civic values is far more significant than those states that Europeans are least in favour of such as Turkey and Russia. Such collective perceptions suggesting a commonality of civic consciousness which in part demonstrates a common civic European identification.
Table 5.3 Support for European Enlargement Amongst Citizens of the (EU15)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>% In Favour</th>
<th>% Not in Favour</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungry</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovina</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: All (except Russia) Commission of the European Communities Eurobarometer 51 p.72 – Russia - Eurobarometer 52 p.35

5.3.6 The Consolidation of the European Landscape - Concluding Remarks

The rapid changes effecting political and economic spaces in Europe and the east have effected the political, economic and imagined boundaries between Europe and the rest. Not only is Europe divided by relative levels of economic and social development but as we have suggested, by a civic/ethnic divide as well. The institutionalisation of the European landscape and its frontiers appears largely settled. Europeans define their landscape in detail and have put in place the institutional elements to secure its boundaries. The enlargement criteria establishes and demonstrates the key normative pre-conditions – civic in nature that map the European landscape, and reflect generalised communal convergence of a central element of European identity.

5.4 Security, Protection and European Identity

"There are so many crises and conflict going on in the world today – even here in Europe. My wish for the New Year is that in future such terrors will be banished forever from the European Union"\(^{31}\)

The significance of security in the creation of a communal political identity has earlier been established. The realisation of not only a secure European territory, but also

\(^{31}\) Boos, A. 1998 'New Year Wishes for Europe' Deutschland no.6/98 December/January, 2/3
economic and societal security, most especially in the contemporary context of the ‘hollowing-out’ of the individual state economic and political competencies, gives rise to functionally derived communal identification that had previously hinged upon the individual state.

5.4.1 An Internally Secure European Landscape

“European unification has already brought about a number of advantages, for example the abolition of border controls between the signatories of the Schengen Agreement, making travel between these countries much easier. But this has also brought a rise in crime. I hope that Europol will be an effective instrument in combating organised crime, so we can all feel safer again.”

The European Union has initiated a policy designed to create a (European) 'Area of Freedom Security and Justice'. While guaranteeing the free movement of European Citizens across Europe's internal borders, the policy seeks to ensure that Europe's internal landscape remains secure by the introduction of a range of specific policing policies. The elimination on the control of persons crossing internal boundaries has been offset against revised policies designed to control the movements of persons from non-EU states within Europe. Associated with this is the introduction of comprehensive immigration and asylum policies. The fight against crime within Europe is addressed by the work of the European Police Office (Europol) and by the cooperation between member states in combating organised crime, the spread of drugs and in combating the trade in human beings. Further institutional action to ensure a secure internal European landscape include judicial cooperation in civil and criminal matters and customs cooperation between member states.

Economic integration brought with it a trans-national focus on the need to provide adequate physical protection to the rapidly unifying Europe. As integration became more sophisticated it emerged that the informal cooperation between the policing units of the member states would not be sufficient to overcome the trans-European spread of crime networks or to satisfy the public need for security in Europe. The development of internal coercive elements within the European polity was another example of the

32 Van den Berg, M 1998 ‘New Year Wishes for Europe’ Deutschland no.6/98 December/January, 2/3

33 See http://europa.eu.int/comm/sg/scadplus/leg/ens22000.htm
'spillover' from economic integration into other policy domains. Such a process strengthens the institutionalisation of the European polity.

5.4.2 Cooperation in the Fields of Home Affairs and Justice

The institutional and legal arrangements for cooperation on justice and home affairs have resulted from a commitment from member states of the EU to harmonise their policy domains with regard to the following areas:

1. harmonisation in the area of asylum policy;
2. development of Community-wide immigration rules for third-country nationals;
3. police cooperation with a view to combating international crime effectively; and
4. framing of cooperation agreements in the fields of civil and criminal law.  

The Treaty of Rome provided only for the freedom of movement of persons on economic grounds. The introduction of Article 8a of the SEA established the objective of abolishing internal border controls on persons. The achievement of this goal required harmonisation of rules on entry, right of residence and freedom of movement of third country nationals. However these objectives have been made active as a consequence of intergovernmental cooperation and through differing international organisations, not necessarily involving all member states. Similarly the TEU does not provide for new powers in the fields of home affairs and justice to be transferred to the Union, rather pursuant to Article K.1 of the Treaty, they are included as the third pillar of the European Union and were 'without prejudice to the powers of the community' to be regarded as 'matters of common interest.'

Accordingly, policy matters relating to home affairs and justice were to be progressed by intergovernmental cooperation and negotiation, rather than supranational intervention. Matters relating to this policy domain is dealt with by the inter-governmental Council of

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35 Ibid., 65.
Ministers of Justice and Home Affairs, which under Article K.4 (3) of the TEU must act unanimously. A number of cooperative committees support this Council acting again at an inter-governmental level, such committees include:

1. **TREVI Group** ('Terrorisme, Radicalisme et Violence International') established in 1976 by the Council, its objectives are to fight terrorism and drug-related and organised crime. Importantly it has responsibility for the development of the European Police Office (Europol)

2. **The Working Party on Cooperation in the Field of Law.** Established under the auspices of European Political Cooperation. Its objectives are to improve cooperation in the fields of civil and criminal justice.

3. **The Schengen Group** Based upon the Schengen Agreement signed in 1991, the group’s objectives are to introduce a comprehensive program of security measures covering the harmonisation of the rules governing checks at external borders, visa policy, the right of asylum and the rights of aliens.


### 5.4.3 Immigration and Asylum Issues

EU immigration and asylum policy seeks to harmonise differing national policies on immigration and asylum matters. With regard to immigration, policy community law makes no express provisions on the status of third country nationals, other than Regulation 1612/68, which grants freedom of movement to members of EC migrant workers' families even if they are not nationals of a member state. In practical terms, Council and Commission immigration policy has been rather circumspect as their legal competence is extremely limited, and because member states have shown little willingness to harmonise immigration policy at the Union level. A significant amount of the work associated with the development of a common immigration policy for Europe is dependent upon cooperation between member states via the mechanism of intergovernmental committees, thus reinforcing the strongly intergovernmental nature of this policy domain.
In order to create the self-titled 'Area for Freedom Security and Justice', the Treaty of Amsterdam introduces a new title headed 'Visas, asylum, immigration and other policies related to the free movement of persons'. The title establishes pan-European, as opposed to purely national, controls on the external borders of the Union, and regulations on asylum and immigration matters. The combined effect of such institutional changes will be a more integrated European response to matters of internal security and the policing of the common European frontiers. Whereas national governments had traditionally provided the impetus for the internal security of the state, the European Council, assisted by the ECJ, is pivotal in the process of securing Europe from threats such as illegal immigration and drug trafficking.\(^{36}\)

The result of the institutional agreements has been the facilitation of the movement and interrelationship of European citizens, under a common set of agreements. More significantly, in the context of European identity formation, it has had the effect of both accentuating the distinction between Europeans and the 'other', and in providing a focus for Europeans on security matters. It provides a common (functional) bond which unites them both in their support for its activities, but in the articulation of a common positive sentiment to the European polity as a consequence of pan-European execution of security matters. The European polity has instituted measures suitable for the management of behaviours and relationships, while at the same time protecting and securing Europe and Europeans from potential internal threats. Such an institutionalisation of internal protective measures are poignant in the context of increasing awareness of, and concern over rising levels of criminality, most especially in the areas of drugs and illegal immigration being expressed by Europeans.\(^{37}\) Further, the agreement has reinforced the external frontiers of the European polity by strengthening the institutional barriers to entry by non-EU nationals and implementing security and police structures to resist the entry of those beyond the frontiers of Europe. Accordingly European identification is, as in the case of European economic and social

\(^{36}\) The ECJ will play a more significant role in maintaining internal security and the harmonisation of civil matters as it will enlarge its jurisdiction to deal with matters concerned with the free movement of persons, asylum, immigration and matters concerning member state judicial cooperation in civil matters.

\(^{37}\) We shall consider the empirical level of these concerns in Chapters Seven Eight and Nine.
policy domains, reinforced by the transformation of national to supranational arenas for the provision of European security and rights.\textsuperscript{38}

5.4.4 An Externally Secure European Landscape

"I have never experienced a war and I don't ever want to. For me, one of the main advantages of European Union is to prevent a recurrence of wars. This is far more important than economic advantages\textsuperscript{39}

The existence of the bipolar relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States, as manifested in the strategic and ideological divide of Europe during the Cold War, profoundly altered the nature of the European hemisphere, and Europeans consciousness of themselves. The extension of Russian control over its Western and Southern neighbours at the end of the Second World War overlayed a new security landscape on European territory, an overlay, which at the time, appeared permanent and reflective of a basic schism between Europe and non-Europe.\textsuperscript{40} Such a schism had two effects; it prompted rapid defence and security integration. Further, and more significantly it had the effect of consolidating the identity of Europeans into two ideologically polarised spheres.

The establishment of Communist influence in Central and Eastern Europe at the end of the Second World War was a complex process with Soviet and domestic communist influences being exercised in a variety of ways. Notwithstanding the commonality of purpose that had characterised the relationships been the Western allies and the Soviets during the hostilities with Germany, such relationships rapidly dissolved into antagonism, ideological division and the collective consideration of the importance of building firm boundaries between the two spheres of influence. This in

\textsuperscript{38} Specific controls put in place to protect the integrity of European Frontiers include the fact that carriers into Europe will have to check if passengers are in possession of adequate documentation if they are to cross the frontier into the Schengen area, Hotels are required to obtain a declaration as well as an identity paper from their customers.

\textsuperscript{39} Jaeger, D. 1997 in ‘Europe Confronts a Credibility Gap’ \textit{Time}, (June 23 1997), 36-42, 40.

\textsuperscript{40} It is interesting to note the enduring perception of Russia as perennially residing at Europe's eastern frontier. Count Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi considered that Russia marked the eastern border of Paneuropa, while in the view of Max Scheler Russia represented an independent and separate 'cultural sphere' see Lewis, Paul 'Europe and Russia' in Waites, B. 1993 \textit{What is Europe? : Europe and the Wider World}, (Milton Keynes: Open University Press 1993), 91.
turn led to a reinforcement of European identity as being formed within the 'free West' or the 'totalitarian East'.

The restructuring of the European landscape on strategic grounds has had a direct effect on the nature of European identity. As relationships between West and East Europeans were distorted by the geo-political restructuring of the European landscape, so too did the cognitive boundaries of the two communities alter. The establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the Western European Union (WEU) and the European Communities resulted with the increasing preoccupation with the consequences of a reformed European security landscape, and the place of individual Europeans within it. The most significant manifestation of a European security landscape at an institutional level is the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The CFSP attempts to ensure appropriate political commitment from amongst its members to protect and advance a common European security landscape. The altered perceptions of Europeans to their landscape both during and after the Cold War illuminates a consolidation of a particular European identity, one in which the outsider, on geo-political and security grounds is confirmed by the institutional defences and barriers constructed to control and repel it. While we shall consider this matter empirically later, it is sufficient to note that notwithstanding significant ideological and practical revision within the European security space in the post-cold war period that European identity has not entirely escaped the cold-war mind-set. The growing problems with economic modernisation and economic development in the states of Eastern Europe, most especially in the states of the former Soviet Union continues to form a framework for a consciousness division of the European landscape on security grounds. In Russia the political elites most

41 Ibid., 94.

42 The objectives of the CFSP are:

1. to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests and independence of the Union;
2. to strengthen the security of the Union and its member States in all ways;
3. to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter;
4. to promote international cooperation; and
5. to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedom.
highly prized are those from within the cold war mind-set of ideologically based expansion. This is demonstrated in the continued Russian preference for absolutist leadership. During a poll conducted in 1998 the largest percentage of respondents - 20 percent - supported the ultra-nationalist General Zyuganov as their first preference for their next President.\textsuperscript{44}

5.5 A Substantive External Coercive European Force - Towards a European Army?

As the EU has concluded, the post-Cold War environment necessitated the assumption of a greater responsibility for its own security and to prevent and manage European conflicts.\textsuperscript{45} The EU perceives that its external threats come not from large-scale military actions but rather from organised crime, the illegal trafficking of nuclear materials and ethnic and regional conflicts. It is these threats that individual Europeans most fear and look to the EU to counter.\textsuperscript{46}

With the formal ratification of the Treaty of Amsterdam, the Union is now able to take responsibility for operations to manage certain conflicts, including the use of military force. In the absence of such powers The European Union has lacked the authority to conduct military operations in such areas as Yugoslavia, and has had to accept the status of observer and humanitarian aid provider, while NATO and the United States has directly intervened militarily. Significantly under the Treaty of Amsterdam the EU is capable of forming a common defence policy. However the EU will be reticent to supplant the leadership of the Americans within the NATO regime, as the EU has stated:

\textsuperscript{43} Media reporting on the ongoing economic uncertainty of the former soviet states is substantive. The Economist as recently as July 1998, has reinforced the ongoing uncertainty of Europe's Eastern frontiers in geo-political terms, titling an article on Russia's problems as 'Russia's Crisis: Could it Lead to Fascism? The Economist. (July 11th 1998), 17-19.

\textsuperscript{44} The Economist. (July 11\textsuperscript{th} 1988), 19.

\textsuperscript{45} European Commission, Frontier-free Europe, No6/7 (Luxembourg: Directorate-General for Information, Communication and Audiovisual Media.1998) 11.

\textsuperscript{46} These concerns are expressed in both the 'fears' amongst Europeans in which an increase in drug trafficking and organised crime are considered very high and the importance placed by Europeans on applicant states to the EU fighting organised crime and drug trafficking. See Commission of the European Communities Eurobarometer 44 & 74.
"It is generally acknowledged that NATO will continue to play a fundamental role in the territorial defence of Europe."\(^{47}\)

The WEU has the principal carriage for European-specific defence elaboration, however its future role will be largely low-level, in support of NATO activities. The successful implementation of coercive forces under the auspices of the WEU, in the context of European states generally discounting the WEU as not much more than a forum for establishing security frameworks and procedures, remains distant.

Accordingly the prospect of an exclusively European army is remote. Such an army would never come about without the approval of each of the member states, which is highly unlikely given the practical and symbolic nature of military forces in the status and identity of individual states. Further there are no plans to compel any European Union member state to commit its own troops without the approval of its particular government. Such a significant decision as to whether soldiers should be sent to war or not, most especially in a fight for 'Europe' remains the firm prerogative of the individual member state. Further it is unlikely that the United States would give up its leadership position in European security, that it retains as part of NATO.\(^{48}\)

### 5.6 Immigration, Exclusion and European Identity

Synthesising the disparate elements of European security and its impact on European identification is Europe’s ongoing experience with asylum seekers and refugees. This is particularly salient given the recent general upsurge of ‘outsiders’ wishing to join Europe.

\(^{47}\) See ‘Defending Europe’ *The Economist* December 4\(^{\text{th}}\) 1999., 18

\(^{48}\) However the current 'Euro Corps' may be an indication of the future of a European Army. Operational since October 1995 the unit comprises France and Germany (with Spain and Belgium participating intermittently). The Unit comes under the operational command of either the WEU or NATO. With a multinational headquarters and a mixed headquarters battalion, it is expected to grow to over 50,000 soldiers.\(^{48}\) Further the Anglo-French agreement in December 1998 to develop an exclusive European defence force, either within the Western European Union or the European Union, is indicative of a growing perception of the need for a Eurocentric, autonomous and supranational defence mechanism to be adopted, as a spokesman for the Current British Foreign Secretary has commented: "Europe needs a stronger and more influential voice in international affairs, to match its economic weight. It needs to be able to back this with credible military force, which in turn requires a strong Common Foreign and Security Policy, backed by stronger military forces that are flexible and capable." See: ‘Europe defence force will cope without America’, Christopher Lockwood, *Electronic Telegraph* Issue 1287, Thursday 3 December 1998., 2.
There are more than 20 million foreign nationals now resident in the European Union. Six million from other European states, over four million from Turkey and the states of Yugoslavia, over three million from North Africa and other parts of Africa and one million from Asia.  The migratory pressure from the periphery of Europe is intense; most particularly from south Asia, the Balkans and North Africa.

The Iron Curtain had served not only as a tangible geo-political divide in the middle of the continent but further served as an effective migratory barrier, one that had significant implications for identity development. With the removal of the frontier the general migration problem has been intensified in Europe.

The creation of 'Fortress Europe' is a central element in the creation and maintenance of European identity. We proposed in Chapter One that the advancement of identity is associated with the creation or stereotypical categorisation of the 'other'. So is this the case in Europe, the clearest example of the European other is the immigrant or would be asylum seeker. Europeans form a meaningful community of sentiment and share a common form of identification, in so far as they reject the refugee and asylum seeker. The tension between Europeans and non-Europeans is an obvious and systemic one and one that heightens identity differentials. Those within Europe wish

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50 As of 1991 Turkish Nationals made up the largest group of non-nationals in the European Economic area, totalling over 2.3 million. There were approximately one million Yugoslavs and a similar number of Moroccans, with over 500,000 Algerians and just under 300,000 Tunisians. These figures do not include illegal migrants. These non-European Citizens are predominantly located in Germany, (which received 1.2 million in 1991) France, Italy and Luxembourg. The lowest figures are in Spain, Portugal, Greece, Denmark and Ireland.

51 Notwithstanding the fall of the Iron Curtain it is interesting to note that some of the EU member States, historically sources of West European labour during the last four decades have themselves become countries seeing the arrival of increasing numbers of legitimate and illegitimate immigrants. This is most particularly acute in Southern Europe: Spain for Moroccans, Italy for Moroccans and Albanians, and Greece for Albanians.

52 Anecdotal evidence of pressure on Europe's borders are numerous; an Italian navy corvette collides with a boat crammed with Albanian refugees killing eighty. A chartered aircraft picks up Bosnians from the German State of Bavaria and deposits them, against their will, in the country from which they fled. Six Turkish immigrants die as a result of arson in The Hague. See 'Who is a German?' The Economist April 5 1997
to protect their lifestyles and ultimately their identity - those ‘others’ - outside Europe aspire to both.53

With increasing European unemployment and reductions in government expenditure feelings of resistance to immigrants are increasing, entrenching feelings of Europe versus the ‘other’. Examples of the hardening of attitudes are numerous. The German Government is reluctant to take more east European refugees. A 1993 revision to the German constitution, reduced Germany's once general commitment to take in all seekers of asylum. Poignantly the CDU have called for stricter limits on the immigration of Jews from the former Soviet Union.54 While there is a proposal from the CDU to confer citizenship on anyone born on German soil and to discard the principle that German identity runs primarily through the blood. There is popular resistance to such plans.55

The exclusion and marginalisation of the immigrant and refugee in contemporary Europe reflects the perceived threats to economic and societal security that such peoples represent to Europeans and thus solidifies the distinctiveness between the European and the ‘other’. Europeans feel threatened – not as a result of perceived feelings that European cultural or ethnic values are under threat – but as a result of the threat to European economic security and the perceived threat that asylum seekers represent as a result of organised crime.56 In such circumstances individual European

53 There is no better example of the issue of immigration and identity in contemporary Europe than the case of Germany. The German State has accepted seven million immigrants and refugees since the end of the Second World War. However it is not enough to reside or even to be born in Germany. To be German, under Germany's 1913 Imperial Citizen Law, is to have German blood; a criteria for belonging that immigrants and refugees find difficult to meet. Paradoxically those who are guests in Germany have firmly established themselves, within the social and economic fabric of the German state. The two million Turks who arrived in Germany in the 1960s now run 40,000 small businesses in Germany, pay German taxes, have German speaking children and grandchildren and yet play almost no part in German political life. Further one in five infants born in Germany are born to non-Germans, however children of immigrants will need to have visas to enter Germany - their home.

54 About 60,000 had arrived by the beginning of 1997, tripling the number of Jews in Germany.

55 However giving anyone born in Germany the right to be German would follow the pattern of most other West European countries.

56 While the rejection of the European other on civic grounds will be empirically established in Chapter Seven is worth noting here that the European public is almost unanimous that threats to human rights, democracy, the threat posed by organised crime and the degradation of the environment are the most pressing threats to European security - rather than cultural or ethnic divisions or military threats. See Commission of the European Communities Eurobarometer 51 & 74.
States and the EU has acted, as we have considered earlier in this chapter, to form a comprehensive set of institutional measures to govern the European landscape's frontiers, and to consequently reduce the perceived insecurities amongst Europeans.

5.7 The Importance of the Creation of A European Secure Space for Europeans

The potential detrimental effects of threats to Europe and the common reaction amongst Europeans that a supranational, rather than a national, response to such threats, is appropriate, unite Europeans, and, in part, define Europeans insofar as they collectively inhabit a secure hemisphere.

Europeans share in common the expression of valuing their physical security, they articulate a common perception of the threats to Europe and believe that the European polity is best placed to further their security interests. Such a convergence of belief and aspirations reflect a common European political culture and a communal sense of identity. Europeans place a greater priority on a common European foreign policy (63%) and a common defence policy (73%) than they do on a single currency (60%). Further Europeans are united in the civic basis of their communal fears of the 'other'. The 'other' is not feared as a consequence of its potential ability to erode ethnolinguistic national identity, but rather is feared because of its ability to compromise civic values. Europeans collectively reject the 'other' insofar as its inclusion would contribute to an increase in drug trafficking and international organised crime, or undermine social and economic conditions within member states. Such a fear of the 'other' on civic grounds is far stronger (57%) that the fear of the loss of individual countries' national identities (46%) or fear of the loss of the central element of ethnolinguistic identity – language (39%). Such a communal civic ordering signifies the importance of security and of the communal expression of such importance, which is a contributing factor in the evocation of a common European identity.

57 Commission of the European Communities Eurobarometer 49, B.22
58 See Commission of the European Communities Eurobarometer 51, 44
59 Ibid.
Reinforcing the significance of security matters for Europeans is their preparedness to transfer competency for such policy domains from the national to the supranational level. More Europeans consider that the European Union should determine defence policy, rather than individual national Governments, (50% versus 44%). Further a sizeable majority (67%) of respondents to a recent survey agreed with the assertion that NATO has made a positive contribution to European peace and security. Of interest is the fact that when surveyed, members of the European polity felt significantly more secure than those outside it. A recent poll demonstrates that while citizens in states such as Slovakia, Russia, the Ukraine and Poland believe that the likelihood of a World War in the next ten years was very likely or quite likely, a far smaller proportion of the populations within the states of the EU surveyed, including Denmark, Germany and France considered a world war either quite likely or very likely, thus confirming our hypothesis that European integration, contributes to increased security and a common identification with the institutions of the polity.

5.8 Economic Stimulation and Regulation

"If it means subsidies will continue rolling in, I'll endure these austerity measures. It's better to have a belt to tighten than no belt at all. Otherwise our pants will fall and we'll be left naked." (Greek National)

"We see other European countries working. They have higher living standards and lower unemployment. The French and Germans are no better than us, and we want to be part of the club." (Spanish National)

Further demonstrating the civic basis of fortress Europe and European identification is the importance of enlargement criteria to Europeans. An overwhelming majority of Europeans would consider other European states suitable for accession only when the country respects Human Rights and the principles of democracy (95%) and where the country is fighting organised crime and drug trafficking (93%). The European identity is thus rooted in civic rather than ethnic criteria. See Commission of the European Communities Eurobarometer 51.,74

61 Commission of the European Communities Eurobarometer 49.,B.24


5.8.1 The Crisis of National Economic Management in Europe

Notwithstanding the significant growth experienced by European economies in the first two and a half decades after the end of the Second World War, Europe’s economic position, both in absolute terms, and relative to that of its main trading competitors, the United States and Japan, deteriorated rapidly during the 1970s and beyond. Such deterioration is displayed in the following table:

**Table 5.4 Relative Economic Position – Europe and its Main Trading Competitors**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GDP Real Growth (% Change per Annum)</th>
<th>Europe</th>
<th>USA</th>
<th>Japan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average 1961-1970</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average 1971-1980</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average 1981-1990</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unemployment Rate (as a % of the civilian labour force)</th>
<th>Europe</th>
<th>USA</th>
<th>Japan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average 1961-1970</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average 1971-1980</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average 1981-1990</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Europe’s economic position worsened in the 1970s reflecting a global economic downturn. However the economies of European states, in contrast to their main trading partners, failed to revive in the latter half of the 1970s and the early 1980s, heightening the imperative for further supranational coordination. Further, European elites, initially reticent to forego key elements of state-centred economic sovereignty, became increasingly articulate in their support for economic regulation on a pan-European level.

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65 Even one of the most potent Eurosceptics, Margaret Thatcher suggested in 1988 that:

"By getting rid of barriers, by making it possible for companies to operate on a Europe-wide scale, we can best compete with the United States, Japan and other new economic powers emerging in Asia and elsewhere."

Thatcher, M. 'Britain and Europe'. Text of the Prime Minister's speech at Bruges on 20 September 1988 quoted in Wise, M & Gibb, R. *Single Market to Social Europe: The European Community in the 1990s*. 

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In such a context the rationale for the removal of the administrative and regulatory barriers for optimum European market efficiency became increasingly compelling. The Cecchini Report on the ‘Costs of non-Europe’ illustrated that a single European market would put Europe in a position of:

“Competitive strength and an upward trajectory of economic growth lasting into the next century. Such additional growth . . . is not a tantalising chimera. On the contrary, it is a firm prospect.”66

5.9 The Supranational Rescue of the European Economy

The response from Europeans to the decline in their economic fortunes was swift. Already committed to the liberalisation of the internal European market, European policy makers aimed to both improve Europe’s internal competitiveness but more significantly to act to ensure Europe’s international viability in an increasingly global marketplace. Such a policy could only be made viable if it was directed by a supranational approach, rather than individual state-based approaches. Hence European economic reforms, rightly seen as the original motive power of European integration, required the acceleration of centralised pan-European initiatives, to deal with an increasingly liberal and deregulated international trading environment.

The European polity, in the context of the introduction of appropriate institutional measures to overcome the decline in European economic conditions, has succeeded in the establishment and maintenance of a functionally coherent and prosperous economic space. Such a process, in turn, has created the conditions fertile for the emergence of a meaningful European identity. The process of the Single Market program, EMU and the introduction of the euro currency has supported the emergence of both a cohesive European economic area. The financial contributions of the European Union to European economic life are significant and growing. Such contributions, totalling 74,449.4 million ECU in 1995, represents an increase from an expenditure per citizen from 105.5 ECU in 1985 to 212.4 ECU in 1995, suggesting, consistent with our earlier arguments, a functional basis for the alignment of

Europeans with the pan-European polity. The growing importance of pan-European Economic stimulation is aptly shown in Figure 5.2

**Figure 5.2 European Communities Growth in Receipts and Expenditure**

Source: European Commission *European Economy* 65, 370-372.

Not only has the EU provided increasing levels of financial support to its member states but there has been a clear convergence of macro-economic outcomes. The acceptance of the convergence criteria for EMU has resulted in a pronounced improvement in the economic conditions of European states most particularly those which had historically been at Europe’s economic periphery. As the figures below outline, the EUs economic policies have been instrumental in strengthening European economies, most especially peripheral ones and thus providing the conditions for the EU to adequately compete and survive in a global marketplace.

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5.10 The Creation of a Secure Supranational European Economic Space

"European integration has already extended beyond trade: and the 1992 process represents both a quantitative and qualitative shift towards to creation of a regional economic system. Yet EMU is something very different. In terms of national sovereignty, the stakes are infinitely higher . . . the plans for the creation of EMU could not be camouflaged as a technical matter with
limited political consequences. Money is, after all, at the heart of national sovereignty. \(^{68}\)

The primary logic of the Treaty of Rome in 1957 was the creation of a common European market. Consideration of what were then considered as being subsidiary matters such as monetary and financial integration across Europe were limited by both the limited practical scope of European integration at that stage, and the still infantile stage of international trade and capital flows.

The need to ensure truly pan-European financial and monetary stability and convergence grew out of the failure of the international monetary system in 1971 and the realisation that Europe lacked the necessary tools for economic and monetary cooperation. Later, the tension between the realisation of a European common market, without substantive internal frontiers and a common external one, required the centralisation of European monetary and financial affairs so as to both realise a truly common and equal market, and to ensure that such a market had sufficiently strong economic and financial institutions within it to support it in times of global economic competition and potential insecurity. The creation of the single market was a necessary consequence of the European project of economic modernisation. The two key elements in the creation of a European economic area are the Single Market, and Economic and Monetary union.

5.11 The Single Market

While the objectives of creating a single market are enshrined in the original Treaty of Rome, such a market was left incomplete. \(^{69}\) By the beginnings of the 1980s the Communities' achievements were considerable but far from constituting a unified entity resembling the internal community sought by the treaties. A whole series of trade barriers still existed leaving the European market fragmented. Accordingly questions of monetary union and the costs of 'non-Europe' were now seriously addressed. Estimates of both the macro and micro economic benefits of the completion of the single market provided sufficient impetus for heads of States, in 1985, to set the target of 1992 for the completion of the single market.

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\(^{68}\) Tsoukalis, L. The New European Monetary Integration. (London: Longman 1993), 176.

\(^{69}\) Article 8a of the SEA
The Single European Act of 1986 was the result of European concerns for the slowness of the completion of the single market promised in the treaty of Rome. The SEA provides the appropriate legal framework for the completion of the internal market and lays down the guidelines for the accompanying policies. Its objects was to accelerate European integration through improvements in the functioning of the institutions of the Communities through the widening of their powers and to provide for greater flexibility in the decision making process. Importantly the SEA increased the supranational competence of the Communities in areas including social policy, economic and social cohesion, research and technological development and the environment.

The implementation of policy following the adoption of the single market has added significantly to the cohesion and independence of the European supranation. The elaboration of the single market includes a number of aspects. At the level of the individual, the abolition of frontier controls for European citizens, the elimination of VAT controls on goods at intra-Community borders, and the creation of the right of European Citizens to reside without impediment in a member state of the community are substantial features. Provisions for the freedom of movement of workers were introduced, allowing for the worker's right of movement and residence, the right of entry for family members, the right to take up work and the right to equal treatment at work, and to reside in the host country at the termination of a minimum period of employment.

Provisions have been made for the removal of technical barriers to ensure the free movement of goods and capital, including the prohibition of charges effectively taking the place of customs duties and prohibition of quantitative restrictions on the movement of goods across intra-Union boundaries. In addition harmonisation has been achieved in national standards on goods, allowing goods as diverse as beer to concrete to be produced either at the same standard across Europe, or for national differences to be uniformly recognised by the Community. Further policy concerning European indirect taxation has been harmonised. Developments in the harmonisation of indirect and direct taxation include the harmonisation of Value Added Tax.

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70 By the extension of Qualified Majority Voting
5.12 Economic and Monetary Union (EMU)

There are few more poignant symbols of an independent polity than a commonly accepted unit of currency. On 1 January 1999 the creation of the euro area was achieved. Eleven Member States of the European Union began their financial undertakings including banking and capital transactions in the euro. The creation of a euro area on 1 January 1999, and the subsequent introduction of euro banknotes and coinage on 1 January 2002 will represent the finalisation of a central element in the strengthening of a sovereign European polity.

The implications of the introduction of the single currency on the status of the European supranation are difficult to overstate. Firstly the necessary requirement for a high degree of functional convergence amongst the member states' economies required for entry into the single currency regime has the effect of converging and compressing separate state-based economies into a European one, with its own autonomous dynamic.\(^72\) Secondly, economic management will now be dealt with on a pan-European level. Control over public finances, public debt, employment and financial management will move from the realm of the national to the supranational. No single European member states, once having adopted the euro, will ever be able to unilaterally determine fiscal policy - so central to the articulation of state identity - than they had before.\(^73\) While the European polity will essentially take the decisions, and run the instruments of economic policy, both through the European Commission and the European Central Bank, the respondent member states will be limited, at least with regard to national economic policy, to ensuring that their economic policies fit harmoniously and effectively into the economic policy decided at Union level.\(^74\)

\(^{71}\) Articles 118a, 130e, 130q(2), and 130s of the SEA respectively.

\(^{72}\) The requirement for a single European Currency is apparent from European trade flows. By the early 1990s nearly 60 per cent of the total EC members' external trade was with other members and that over 25 percent of EC members' GDP on average was accounted for by intra-EC trade. Accordingly the potential savings on transaction costs from the adoption of a single currency are quite substantial.

\(^{73}\) The most significant example of this is the EU wide determination of official interest rates by the European Investment Bank.

\(^{74}\) A recent example of supranational economic convergence was the joint decision taken by leading European States in December 1998 to concurrently lower interest rates.
The conversion process from national to supranational currency will further consolidate the power and autonomy of the European polity. The advantages of the process of the single market will be multiplied by monetary union. A single European currency will overcome the fragmentation of the single market and will produce greater transparency of costs and prices by making them comparable throughout the community, thus increasing competition. For Europe to sensibly uphold the veracity of a single economic space in the form of a single market, and to effectively compete against international trading blocs, then a single currency was inevitable. The sub-text is equally clear; monetary union will progress the cause of ultimate political union further, such political union being unlikely in the context of a splintered set of European currencies, as Grauwe argues:

"... Not a single monetary union in the past came about because of a recognition of economic benefits of the union. In all cases the integration was driven by political objectives."76

The single currency, wholly desirable in terms of economic modernisation and European convergence, has a symbolic dynamic above such practical considerations, one that will directly influence European identity. It has been suggested that the European progress towards monetary Union is a step towards European political union as the dynamics and imperatives of the former will lead to the latter in the same manner as steps towards economic convergence have necessitated measures in social reforms. The significance of the single currency on European supranationalism is convincingly stated by Bean:

"Neither the costs or benefits of monetary union are in principle as great as critiques or advocates respectively have made out. In fact, from a purely economic perspective, it seems to me something of a storm in a teacup. Why then has so much fuss been made over it? I think the answer is primarily political. . . . A separate currency is an important symbol of nationhood, while a common currency is an equally potent symbol of a shared political destiny. This is why anti-federalists such as Margaret Thatcher chose to

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75 Economic and Monetary Union has been a community objective since the 1969 Conference of Heads of state or Government held in the Hague. This has subsequently been restated on numerous occasions, such as the 1970 Werner Report, the Conclusions of the Presidency of the European Council in 1977. It was finally incorporated into the treaty of Rome by the Single European Act and enlarged by the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992.

make their stand here rather than on issues of greater economic significance."\textsuperscript{77}

The cumulative EU success in reorientating the economies of Europe is demonstrated in lower interest rates, falling unemployment a single currency and higher standards of living and international competitiveness. As the International Monetary Fund commented in a report released in July 2000:

"It is hard to remember a period where the fundamentals have been so good." . . .
"Conditions for a sustained recovery have not been so auspicious in a long time and leave scope . . . for the European Union becoming a high performing economy." \textsuperscript{78}

5.13 European Economic Development and The Expression of European Identity

What then have been the practical results of European economic convergence, and how have these effects contributed to European identification? We can best judge the relationship between European economic stimulation and European identification by considering the level of support for the EU amongst those European states that have comparatively, most benefited financially, from European integration.

5.13.1 Regional Economic Differences and Support for European Integration

Demonstrating the economic stimulus to European identification, regional variation reveals the influence of financial support for the development of communal European identity. Those states in which economic performance, as measured by national unemployment rate and GDP, is comparatively low compared with economically more prosperous European States, and where economic support from the European Union is comparatively high, then there is a greater level of support for the European polity. Accordingly in those states such as Spain, Greece, Ireland and Portugal, with


\textsuperscript{78} International Monetary Fund quoted in Bagwell, S. "Can an old Continent learn new tricks?" The Australian Financial Review Weekend 22-23 July 2000, 28
relatively high unemployment and low GDP benefit financially when proportionately compared with the core European states such as Germany, France, the United Kingdom and Belgium where there is a significantly higher level of support for a common European polity. This confirms our hypothesis that economic support contributes to a greater sense of support for and identification with the polity. As the table below indicates:

Table 5.5 Comparative European economic status, level of European financial aid and Support for European integration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Unemployment Rate</th>
<th>GDP per capita (US $)</th>
<th>% Support for EU</th>
<th>Cost/benefit (ECU Million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>12201</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>+3090</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>7465</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>+4135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>14735</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>+2372</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>8822</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>+2505</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>25179</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>-11830</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>17471</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>-3125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>24608</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>-1020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>21765</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>+60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


If we consider this process more closely, the demonstrated effect of economic stimulation and European identification becomes more apparent. Considering core and peripheral European economies, and the level of EU financial support, expressed as a percentage of the respective states GDP that they receive, we find that in those states where the economic redistribution from Europe, as a percentage of the state’s GDP has been higher, in comparison to other (more affluent) European states, that a greater sense of European identification has developed. Considering first the level of EU financial support received by core and peripheral European states, (as expressed as a percentage of the respective states’ GDP).
The figure clearly demonstrates that peripheral European states such as Portugal, Ireland and Greece receive a considerably higher return from the EU, expressed as a percentage of their GDP, than do the core European states, such as Germany, United Kingdom and France, which have far larger economies.

5.14 European Economic (In)security and European Identification

Beyond the gross effect of European economic stimulation on individual European states, if we consider specific areas of European economic stimulation, such as EU expenditure on social protection as opposed to that of the respective member state, we find that in those states where domestic expenditure on social protection is low, compared with the level of economic support for social protection provided by the EU that there is a positive correlation between high relative EU expenditure and popular support for Europe. As the following figure outlines:
Figure 5.6 National Per Capita Expenditure on Social Protection, European Financial Assistance and Support for the EU

The above figure demonstrates a correlation between low (national) expenditure on social protection, high (European) expenditure and a higher degree of support for European integration from amongst member states. (With the exception of the Netherlands and Luxembourg where support for Europe is high notwithstanding a low level of EU financial support for social protection.) Accordingly a feature of European identity formation is its relationship to relative economic instability. In those European states where financial support is comparatively high from the European polity, relative to the organic level of national financial support, there is a higher experience of European identification. This reflects the wish of Europeans in states such as Portugal, Greece and Ireland to avoid economic and societal insecurity by actively supporting the European polity.

5.15 Representation and Participation - (Through the Extension of Citizenship Rights)

5.15.1 European Citizenship and European Identity

European citizenship constitutes a central element in the creation and maintenance of a European identity. The precise articulation of the status of individual Europeans and the definition of the nature and boundaries of the inter-relationships between citizen and citizen, and citizen and state have transformed the notion of European identity. As Tilly suggests, citizenship entails duties, obligations, privileges and rights, which have the ability to link peoples together and to differentiate such peoples from others, and thus form the foundation of communal identity. The theoretical approaches to citizenship and identity demonstrate the range of positive influences that citizenship has on the creation of identity and as a mechanism of differentiation between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’.

Hobson and Lindholm have demonstrated that the formation of collective identity is facilitated by the composition of specific constituencies and the utilisation of power resources within the formal recognition of state-based citizenship. This is achieved by the states formal recognition of citizens as forming specific social groups that are, despite their multiple identities and loyalties, bound together and are able to imprint their own collective identity through participative citizenship, and the exercising of the rights associated with such citizenship. According to Soysal, Civic citizenship legitimises: “individuals’ participation and claims beyond national definitions” and imbues them with “actorhood”. Accordingly, European citizenship has a dual role in identity formation. It creates a common thread of identity amongst Europeans by virtue of common citizenship rights and obligations, while it concurrently allows for the display of sub-state, regional and cultural identities which are exercised in

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80 As our earlier argument suggested the maintenance, renegotiation and manipulation of the boundaries between state and society and between individuals are, in advanced multiethnic politics commonly organised on civic grounds, a central element of which is the social classification of citizenship, and differentiation on civic criteria.

individual and collective actor’s narratives and strategies, complimenting rather than competing with European civic identity. Thus within a civic notion of identity, second-order identities are given sufficient space to proliferate and become more expressive.

The EU, by constitutionally enabling a distinctive European citizenship with specific rights, such as democratic participation, economic freedom and social welfare, places such civic citizenship in the public domain as a common identifier, while non-civic identifiers, such as ethnicity and custom, are shifted to the private, politically neutral, domain. Thus communal civic identity emerges as a persuasive, persistent and meaningful discourse of participation, and is enacted as a symbolic organisational tool for creating new group solidarities and mobilising resources in national and world politics.\(^\text{82}\) The citizen identifies with the polity publicly on civic grounds, while in the private domain ethnic signifiers are practiced and enhanced, rather than repressed. The common 'vertical connectedness' of European citizenship allows for the divergent 'horizontal connectedness' of sub-national, cultural, ethnic or religious identifiers, without such ethnic signifiers needing to be publicly or politically mobilised for them to gain relevance or autonomous status. Thus the Ressentiment between the civic and ethnic is resolved in the balance between ethnic and regional signification within a political and institutional arrangement which both acknowledges difference and attaches rights and security to such markers.

The introduction of the concept of citizenship of the Union was an attempt to create a more direct relationship between the citizen and the Union and to engender a sense of loyalty, community and a more robust European identity.\(^\text{83}\) Such a sense of community that was not reliant upon the potentially divisive signifiers of ethnicity or linguistic signifiers, even though the rights associated with European citizenship, recognise and champion European national and sub-national identities, of which such


\(^{83}\) European Community 'Europe from A to Z': Guide to European Integration.,(Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Commission 1997), 184
signifiers are pivotal. The casting of European citizenship on civic rather than ethnic grounds diminishes the significance of ethnic signifiers in the adoption of a European consciousness. The objectives of such citizenship include the; 'increased protection of the rights and interests of member states nationals and perhaps more significantly in the context of this discussion; 'an increased awareness of European identity and as an affirmation of European solidarity.'

Symbolic elements of European identity including the European flag, passport, anthem and driving licence are linked to European citizenship, reinforcing the differing elements of communal identification. Most importantly special rights and privileges are affixed to European citizenship. Under the TEU every person holding the nationality of a member state shall be a citizen of the EU. Nationality is however, defined according to the national laws of each member state. European citizenship is complimentary to national citizenship and comprises a number of rights and duties, for all citizens of the union. For all citizens of the union, citizenship allows:

1. the right to move and reside freely within the territory of the member states;
2. the right to vote and to stand as a candidate in elections to the European Parliament and in the municipal elections of the member state in which they reside under the same conditions as the nations of that state;
3. respect by the member states of the fundamental freedom guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedom; and
4. the formal recognition of political parties at the European parties as contributing to the formation of a European awareness and the expression of the political will of the citizens of the EU. (Article 138a).

84 We shall consider the specific mechanisms employed in the promotion of regional and sub-national identifiers later in this Chapter.


86 Ibid.
The adoption of civil rights in the Treaties comprising the constitution of the supranational European polity reinforces the salience of European Citizenship amongst Europeans. The explicit creation and protection of civic rights of community citizens is a powerful force in the creation of loyalty amongst its population to institutional Europe. This is particularly so in the circumstances where Europe, not just its constituent member states, becomes an important locus of both rights and privileges. Thus Europe, as described by Soysal and Wiener, becomes a 'citizen-giver' in which individuals benefit from the rights derived from it, and give to it loyalty and identity.87

European citizenship has the effect of largely politically disempowering pre-existing ethnic signifiers, by both recognising and supporting the desire of minorities to maintain their own separate identities, while attaching benefits to the individual and collectivity by their adoption of the commonality of civic citizenship. Such citizenship is based on a shared liberal conception of tolerance, accommodation, fairness and non-violent change. As Europe incorporates permanent migrants as citizens it does so as individuals, not as communities. Notwithstanding such institutional tolerance of non-civic identifiers, Europe exercises a tacit policy of ethnic exclusion and neutralisation as Europe is reluctant, for example, to grant explicit legal recognition to Islamic religious practices. Thus the EU grants not only rights to individuals without making concessions to groups with which it may compete for loyalty, it does not need

87 The scope of these European civil rights, as created in the European treaties include:

1. the prohibition of all discrimination on the grounds of nationality. (Article 7 of the EEC treaty);
2. freedom of movement of European citizens and workers. (Article 48 of the EEC Treaty);
3. the creation of pan-European standards and conditions for social security; including industrial accidents, old age pension and maternity provisions (Article 51 of the EEC Treaty);
4. the right of freedom of establishment; the right of nationals of a member state to take up and pursue activities as self-employed persons in the territory of another member state under the same conditions as are imposed by that state on its own nationals; and
5. equal pay, that each member state must ensure that the principle of equal pay for men and women for equal work is applied.

to explicitly differentiate on ethnolinguistic grounds, but can do so on the basis of citizenship, thus reducing ethnicity as a marker of social and political difference.[88] European citizenship, by avoiding a link with ethnicity and focusing on common values assumes a more universalist tone. In Europe the standardisation of difference, implicitly in all citizenship, is based on civic rather than ethnic criteria.

5.15.2 European Constitutionalism and European Identity

The effect of the entrenchment of European constitutionalism on individual and collective European identity is compelling. At a superficial level of analysis it is clear that without the European treaty system - the basis of European constitutionalism - that there could be no European citizenship. Without European citizenship the dense set of obligations and rights enjoyed by individual Europeans, and from which a sense of attachment to the European polity is derived, could not have come about. Importantly, confirming our thesis on the deliberate management of pre-existing elements of national and regional signifiers by the EU, as with matters of European citizenship, European constitutionalism, while clearly establishing the supremacy and direct effect of European law, does not attempt to negate the identification of Europeans as pre-existent national members. As Article 8 of the Act of European Union establishes:

"Citizenship of the Union is hereby established. Every person holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union..."[89]

Accordingly the Union is composed of members - its citizens - whom, by definition, do not share the same nationality in common, (thus avoiding any possible fracture points based on ethnic conceptions of nationality) but rather share a common (European) citizenship. What European constitutionalism, and its resultant citizenship does is create a purposive framework of rules and relationships wherein commonality is rooted not in the 'traditional' ethnic signifiers of community such as ethine or language, but rather the substance of membership to the European Union. Under such constitutional circumstances there is, what Kymlicka refers to as a "separation of

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Such a separation reveals itself in a collective commitment to shared civic values, such as tolerance, rule of law, individualism and voluntarism, while allowing for the symbols, metaphors and narratives of nations and regions to continue under an umbrella of a civic constitutional order. Allowing for regional and national identification to coexist with supranational identity in an increasingly hostile environment.\textsuperscript{91}

The Treaty documents form the constitutional infrastructure for the elaboration of majority objectives, such as economic and social development and also the institutionalisation of minority group-differentiated rights and privileges. As such the statement of the rights, roles and duties of the institutions and citizens of the European Union contained within the European constitutional order, create both a framework and an operationalisation of a European civic society, in which community is not based on real or imaginary trans-European ethnic signifiers of community, but rather community rooted in a cohesion made possible by the common participation in a uniform, rational constitutional order, and from the rights and privileges, such as contained within European citizenship, that such a constitutional order facilitates. A model of entrenched European constitutionalism and a robust set of citizenship rights and obligations have, as Weiler suggests, the two-fold effect of both formally recognising and enhancing the value of the continuance of traditional European national and sub-national groups by recognising national identification and cultural differentiation, while at the same time reducing their splintering and fracturing potential for European society.\textsuperscript{92} European constitutionalism, and within it European citizenship is the 'civilising force' which allows for the existence of national and sub-national signifiers without a spillover into intra-European conflict based upon such differing signifiers.\textsuperscript{93}

\textsuperscript{90} Kyminlcka, Multicultural Citizenship: A liberal Theory of Minority Rights., 138

\textsuperscript{91} Falk has argued that the civic accommodation of cultural diversity is ultimately beneficial to the civic polity to the extent it; 'enhances the quality of life, by enriching our experience, expanding cultural resources' and in the context of 'self-destructive' modernity, such accommodation; 'may provide models, inspiration, guidance in the essential work of world order redesign.' See Falk, R. 1988 'The Rights of Peoples (in Particular Indigenous Peoples)’ in Crawford (ed), The Rights of Peoples (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 17-37.

\textsuperscript{92} Weiler, J. European Neo-Constitutionalism. 527.

\textsuperscript{93} As Treisman has observed it is in those circumstances where minority nationalities and ethnic collectivities feel removed from the dominant constitutional order and where the y believe that the pre-
5.16 The Extension of Regional Rights - Institutionalised Participation of Regional Interests and Identities

5.16.1 European Regional Participation

As our examination of Kymlicka's thesis of civic identity formation found, polities that employ strategies that formalise the position of regional or minority interests and apportion certain rights to them, are able to develop robust civic forms of identification amongst their populations. Such rights vary from forms of federal self-government rights, to less overt financial support, legal protection or special representation rights.\(^{94}\) Such a form of incorporation is currently practiced in the contemporary European polity.\(^{95}\)

5.16.2 EU Institutional Support for Regional Interests

Early in the process of European integration it was recognised that the increased competences of the European polity, would require not only a meaningful form of legitimacy obtainable only through popular participation, but moreover, given the geographic scope of the EU and its varying socioeconomic conditions, deliberate efforts would be required to provide substantive linkages between regional Europe and its core.\(^{96}\) Such a process, not uncommon to the historical process of European existing order denies them rights privileges and recognition, that ethnonationalist activism is mobilised. The EU's constitutional order, by recognising difference ensures that it is not politically mobilised. See Treisman, 212.

\(^{94}\) As established in Chapter Three

\(^{95}\) At the institutional level, regional representation and participation is formally encouraged and assisted by the European Union. Such representation and participation is channelled through associations such as the Federal Union of European Nationalities (FUEN), the European Centre for Traditional and Regional Cultures (ECTARC) and the European Bureau for Lesser-Known Languages (EUBLUL)

\(^{96}\) Consociational theory provides an explanation for this stability by illustrating the role that national and sub-national identities continue to play in supranational European governance. Consociational theory offers a valid theoretical explanation of the stability of democratic governance in severely segmented societies such as the EU and further explains the creation of a stable setting for both the manifestation of pre-existing identities and the evolution of a pan-European one. Consociational polities at the national and supranational level, rely on four institutional practices to mitigate social conflict - conflict which may include tensions between competing identities. First, the political elites actively seek to counteract the destabilising effect of cultural (identity) fragmentation through inter-elite accommodation. Secondly sub-cultural segments retain the power to block any
state-formation in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, would not only have the effect of ensuring that the constructed European polity moved towards socioeconomic uniformity, but more importantly in the context of this discussion, that regional constituencies were sufficiently included in the polity so as to avoid regional ethnonational identity mobilisation, which might result from a widely unbalanced European economic and social space.97

Notwithstanding the Treaty of Rome formally recognising states as the constitutional representatives of their respective national and regional groupings, the role of non-state actors in forging the common European home is at least equally important. 98

According to Marks and McAdam:

"Most states in Western Europe are arenas in which diverse ethno-territorial groups and sub-national governments contend for authoritative competencies."99

Regional movements have comprehensively mobilised around the institutions of the European Union. Over the last five years over 50 have set up their own offices in Brussels. Staffed and funded autonomously from their state of origin, they are

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attempting to give themselves an independent voice and access to otherwise difficult
to obtain information.\textsuperscript{100} Regional governments have extended their role and
representation in the EU and have succeeded in instituting a consultative Committee
of the Regions composed of local and regional representatives across the Union.

There are a number of reasons for the emergence of strong regional movements at the
pan-European level. Importantly these reasons are analogous with our understanding
of a sympathetic cognitive mobilisation that informs the emergence of a European
identity. Such reasons may be divided into three areas. Firstly as the activity of the
European Union has expanded, its effect on regional areas has grown commensurably.
Not only do inhabitants of regional areas want to know of European policies that will
effect them, they additionally wish to have some input into shaping European policy
consistent with their own interests. The greater the policy competencies of sub-
national actors the more intense their need for information and influence as Marks and
McAdam argue:

\begin{quote}
"Regions are steered towards Brussels to gain predicability and control in their
institutionally complex world, and in the Commission and Parliament they
have a set of interlocutors who are happy to engage in information
exchange."
\end{quote}

The second inducement to trans-European organisation is the maintenance of regional
distinctiveness. Regions that have a distinctive cultural identity, such as Scotland, the
Basque country or Wales, or which exhibit distinctive sub-state political differences
compared with their respective national governments, such as the north of England or
the north of Italy, are more likely to identify themselves with Europe by virtue of the

\textsuperscript{99} Marks and McAdam, 'Social Movements and the Changing Structure of Political Opportunity in
the European Union' \textit{West European Politics} vol.19 No.2 1996, 147

\textsuperscript{100} Such organisations are increasingly raising the profile and relative importance of regional
Europe to the Union. They provide the Union with access to information, with a regional twist, that
might otherwise be unavailable. They survey the European arena for upcoming issues of interest to the
regions and act to ensure that regional concerns are incorporated into EU decision making.

\textsuperscript{101} Marks and McAdam 'Social Movements and the Changing Structure of Political Opportunity in
the European Union' \textit{West European Politics} , 265
establishment of autonomous channels of trans-European exchange, supported by the EU, without necessary and constant reference to state-based channels.  

Thirdly, the efforts of regional Europe to gain status at a trans-European level reveals both their political ambitions, their fears of being out-flanked by the national governments of which they form a part, and the wish to enhance their regional identity. Aware that the EU is essentially a result of the efforts of central state executives regional Europe has worked hard to ensure that their political aspirations are not stymied by state governments at the European level.

5.17 The Institutionalisation of Regional Interests.

5.17.1 Regional Policy

The European Union has skilfully linked into the regional populism that has effected European political life. The popular impetus for a redefinition of European political life from centralised forms of political and economic representation and decision making towards local and regional entities, which as we have earlier observed reflects a movement towards the reassertion of local and regional identities, has been appropriated by EU policy. The EU provides the basis for both European regional policy and, in its support for the reformation of local and regional cultural identities, provides a juncture for European identification in so far as Europe, not its constituent member states, legitimately claim to secure, represent and grant civic rights to distinct regional European ethnic and linguistic groups.

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102 As Wise and Gibb argue, regional representation is a key element in the articulation of a common European identity especially from those on Europe’s peripheral. In Britain, the Welsh and Scottish advocates of devolution are also firm supporters of European unity. For such regionalist’s, their form, of ‘national independence’ conjures up visions of ‘international interdependence’ within the protective political and economic structures of the European Union. At its root it is the argument of a ‘Europe of Regions’ in which the end point is a European federation of numerous regional states. Wise and Gibb Single Market to Social Europe: The European Community in the 1990s, 39

103 There have been some notable successes. German Länder have observer status on the Council of Ministers and individual Länder are now mandated by the German Government to represent its position on certain issues in meetings of the European Council.

104 The appropriation of regions and the reconfiguration of regional identity is well addressed by Woods. See: Woods, D. ‘The Crisis of Center-Periphery Integration in Italy and the Rise of Regional Populism – The Lombard League’ Comparative Politics, 187-203
Notwithstanding its rather prosaic nature European regional policy is a central element in the formation of a communal European identity most particularly through its instrumental effect of managing Ressentiment between regional and supranational signifiers of identity. The Single European Act of 1986 introduced a new Title called 'Economic and Social Cohesion' The Articles concerned the development of the original commitment in the preamble to the EEC Treaty stating that the Community shall develop and pursue its actions leading to the strengthening of its economic and social cohesion. These measures were further advanced by the Treaty of Maastricht.

European regional and social policy seeks to reduce the economic and social disparities between the various regions while at the same time enhancing regional cultural distinctiveness. The intention is to prevent Europe from economically and socially operating on two levels (such a process most commonly known as 'variable geometry' or 'two-speed' Europe). Such a process intended to avoid the economic cleavages that Horowitz demonstrates give rise to the mobilisation of ethnonationalism and to better integrate European populations and popular sentiment to the European project. Further regional policy reflects a European centred conception of European society. An emphasis on the institutionalisation of policies that enhance the rights and security of Europeans at the peripheral as well as the European core. In short, the representation and mutual recognition of regional identities which are institutionally supported and retain conceptual coherence and distinctiveness, as a consequence of such support, form a basis of a civic European identity.

The specific mechanisms employed in promoting economic and social cohesion include the Structural Funds - (European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), the European Social Fund (ESF) and the Guidance Section of the European Agricultural Guarantee and Guidance Fund (EAGGF Guidance).

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105 Article 130a of the SEA
106 For a discussion on the rise of ethnonationalism amongst economically disadvantaged groups within economically less developed regions see Horowitz, D. *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press 1985).
5.17.2 European Regional Development Fund (ERDF)

Formally established by the Single European Act of 1986 it is the Union’s main structural instrument in redressing regional imbalances. The three objectives of the structural funds to which the ERDF contributes are:

1. the promotion of the development and structural adjustment of the regions whose development is lagging behind;
2. converting regions seriously effected by industrial decline; and
3. promoting the development of rural areas.

A further example, and perhaps its most well known, of institutional efforts to unite regional Europe within a unified European space, includes steps taken in regard to the implementation of supranational agricultural policy, more specifically the Guidance Section of the European Agricultural Guarantee and Guidance Fund.

5.17.3 Guidance Section of the European Agricultural Guarantee and Guidance Fund (EAGGF Guidance)

The influence of agricultural policy on the nature of the EU has been paramount. Agricultural support, at first necessary to overcome the potential for the recurrence of acute European food shortages, became increasingly symbolic of a particular way of life - of a technical and cultural tradition, in short a central element of European identity. Its protection was seen as essential not only for European economic stability but as a cornerstone of Europeaness.

There developed a wide range of Community legislation concerning agriculture and foodstuffs and the EAGGF Guarantee Section dominated the Community budget; between 2000 and 2006 rural areas in EU states will receive a total of 30.37 billion euro. European subsidies for agriculture protection, relative to Europe’s main agricultural competitors are significant, and a point of dissention in international trade

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negotiations. While attempts have been made to reform the Common Agricultural Policy the importance of it to community members, most especially those newcomers of the 70's and 80's Ireland, Greece, Spain and Portugal, has increased as their agricultural sectors represent a relatively larger part in their economies than the original members of the Community. Importantly, as the previous tables have shown the level of European identification and support for the further integration of the European polity in these new, relatively agriculturally dependent states, is relatively higher than in those European states with a comparatively lower level of reliance upon the agricultural sector.

5.17.4 The Representation of Regional Interests.

Under the terms of the Maastricht Treaty regional representation is institutionalised within the ‘Committee of the Regions’ which works to ensure that regions have a formal consultative role in the European policy process. Beyond the Committee regional governments have created a labyrinth of transnational networks linking regions based on a diverse range of commonalities including regions networks of industrial specialisation, geographical location, transnational cultural ties and common political institutions and roles. Such trans-European regional linkages include:

1. The Association of European Regions,
2. The Conference of Peripheral Maritime Regions,
3. The Association of Regions of Traditional Industry,
4. The European Association of Border Regions; and
5. The Union of Capital Regions.

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108 The magnitude of EU agricultural support is demonstrated by the fact that in 1998 producer subsidies, including the value of all protection and financial support, in the EU represented 45% of farm income. This compares to the United States where the figure is 22% and Australia where the figure is 7%. The OECD average is 37%. See Colebatch, T. ‘Trade giants maintain farmer protection’ The Age 22 May 1999 Business Section, 3.

109 The objectives of the Common Agricultural Policy include:

1. to increase agricultural productivity;
2. to ensure a 'fair standard of living' for the agricultural community; and
3. to stabilise markets.
In addition to which there are associations covering the western, central and eastern Alps; the Jura, and the Pyrenees, the Association of Frontier Regions and the Coal fields Communities Campaign.110

Regional movements have proven their ability to respond positively to European integration and have created a sense of focus and loyalty to the European idea. Regions have responded to the promise of a united Europe both individually, by setting up European offices and co-operatively within mutually reinforcing networks and transnational alliances. Such actions represent a shift in the locus of regional policy networks and identity, from the national to the supranational. The creation of a European identity benefits from effective regionalist movements operating at the trans-European level and which are committed to the innovation and elaboration of regional interests at the trans European level. This is achieved in a variety of ways. At the most prosaic, regional Europeans are supportive of European identity, as we have empirically established, to the extent to which it assists them materially. Secondly the networks of exchange and pluralisation of regional associations constitute a element of identity formation, insofar as we define identity in terms of communal actions and collective interrelationships. Thirdly because, as we shall presently consider, European regional policy acts not only as the guardian of the regional economic life, but further institutionalises participative rights for regional identities and cultures, including ethnic identities, and by the very process of institutionalised inclusion and participation it enhances the cognitive engagement of regional Europeans. Such engagement is central to collective identification.

The EU has actively encouraged the activities of regional governments at the transnational level. The mobilisation of regional governments is seen as a counterweight to state-based power bases and the EU has been eager to find an ally against the entrenched position of the member states. Further, regional organisations are a good source of information and intelligence as to the nature of European activities, and finally and most importantly, the regional movement is a sound catalyst for the funnelling and channelling of regional sympathies and loyalties to the concept of a supranational Europe.

110 Marks and McAdam ‘Social Movements and the Changing Structure of Political Opportunity in the European Union’ West European Politics., 266
The regional networks have played an important role in developing a pan-European focus amongst those at the peripheral, whether economic or geographic, of Europe. Their participation in dense consultative and policy networks with other regional offices and with the institutions of the Union ensures that non-state based, autonomous channels of communication and information sharing is established between disparate organisations and peoples. This forms the basis of meaningful communicative action across expanded and differentiated discursive spheres which forms a basis of collective identification.\(^\text{111}\) The contributions of regional agricultural and social policies has been to both add social and economic cohesion to the Union and to indirectly better articulate a common European unity, by the granting of specific benefits and economic rights to specific European (regional) minorities.

5.18 Political Socialisation (Education, Communication and Information - Via an Official Language)

5.18.1 European Identity and Language

Europeans are as a matter of practical utility, increasingly turning to English as a core language, however the continued place of national, regional and local languages remains strong.\(^\text{112}\) The introduction of effective strategies at the pan-European level to foster the enduring strength of local vernaculars is a central element in European identity formation.\(^\text{113}\)

\(^{111}\) See Habermas, J. The Theory of Communicative Action (Boston: Beacon Press 1984)

\(^{112}\) There are over 45 national and regional languages and major regional variants spoken by the peoples of the European Union. Most are Romance, German or Celtic in origin, others include Greek, Finnish and Basque. See Hearn, P & Button, D. (Eds.) Language Industries Atlas, Amsterdam: IOS Press for CEC, Brussels

\(^{113}\) The role of language in identity formation, most especially in the ethnic critique of identity, is central; we are what we speak, and we identify with those who share our language. As de Tocqueville observed; 'The tie of language is perhaps the strongest and most durable that can unite mankind'. Language not only allows for a common identification from amongst a named population, but also facilitates the polity's control and ability to manipulate and gain legitimacy from amongst its population. The role of language within Europe, most especially in the context of the institutional attempts to enhance European identity within a linguistically diverse environment is central to questions of identity. See Williams, C. (Ed.) Linguistic Minorities Society and Territory., 8.
European language policy is essentially one of accommodation, within a practical context of language rationalisation. Consistent with its support for regional interests and identities, national regional and local language groups are materially and symbolically supported. A diversity of European languages is a value institutionally upheld. Given that language is essential to identity, culture and memory European language policy commits to the defence of linguistic diversity in order to secure localised identities, which in turn provides a common basis for European identification. The result of such a process, as suggested by Stoneham, is a unique 'constellation' of European languages, rather than a single European language, which will be institutionalised and form the core of both the European linguistic identity, and European civic identity as it facilitates the key civic values of the differentiation of different discursive spheres.

Specific actions taken to enhance regional and local language groups include programs such as the operations of the European Bureau for Lesser Used Languages, the Leonardo da Vinci, Socrates, and Leonardo II programs and the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, which came into force in respect of the Seven states that ratified it, on 1 March 1998. Uniquely the Charter is the first international convention devoted to the protection and promotion of regional language in Europe. The Charter is a legally binding document which is intended to give

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114 Examples of institutional support for a multilingual Europe include:

1. safeguarding the status of official languages, in accordance with rules regulating the use of languages in the European institutions;

2. informing public organisations and industry of the importance of language issues in the information age, with a view to identifying common problems and possible solutions; and

3. raising awareness and promoting a multilingual approach to the information society in Europe, in relation to the content, interfaces, translation, interpretation and language learning. See Commission of the European Communities 'The Multilingual Information Society' Com (95) 486. 5.

115 Under the Socrates program support is provided for the initial and in-service training of language teachers and the development of new teaching materials and for joint educational projects. The Leonardo da Vinci program is designed to promote the development of vocationally orientated language skills through transnational pilot projects and exchange programs. Leonardo II is designed to "promote a quantitative and qualitative improvement in the knowledge of the languages of the European Union, in particular those languages which are less widely used and less widely taught" see Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on the proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council: European Year of Languages 2001 (COM(1999) 485 FINAL – 99/0208 (COD))
significant protection to, and rights for users of minority languages in the areas of education justice, media, cultural activities and European administration. In practical terms the Charter is intended to ensure that member states of the EU guarantee in legislation and implements in policy steps favourable to minority languages. This involves member states formally acknowledging language groups as official national minorities, and the introduction of language planning targets and programs to enhance linguistic diversity. Such actions are consistent with the security of regional Europeans participation and the institutional security of their civic rights including language rights, foundational elements in European civic identification. As Blair comments:

"A mere absence of discrimination is not enough to protect languages that are in a weak position. The main purpose is to devise positive measures to promote regional or minority languages."  

5.18.2 Community Action in Favour of Regional or Minority Languages and Cultures

The EU is active in the positive support for minority languages. Such support ranges from the symbolic decision to designate 2001 the European Year of Languages to the significant financial commitment to language support. In the context of the EU being a protector of pre-existing identities, and of respecting linguistic and cultural diversity, the European Parliament has adopted a number of resolutions to support regional or minority language communities. To support regional or minority languages the Commission has a budget of 3,741,000 ECU (1997 figures). The languages intended to benefit from this action are those autochthonous languages traditionally spoken by part of a population of member states of the European Union.

The objectives are designed to encourage initiatives in the fields of education, culture and information, to safeguard and promote regional or minority languages or cultures,

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117 Ibid., 1.

118 This does not include migrants languages or artificially created languages.
to strengthen the European dimension and stimulate cooperation between all those
seeking to preserve and promote such languages. Further the initiatives aim to
improve the exchange of information and the transfer of experience, to systematise,
improve and promote the teaching of regional or minority languages in all educational
channels, from nursery school to adult training.

Actions taken to promote minority languages and cultures include: conferences and
seminars, cultural events, information networks and documentation centres, teacher
and adult training, use of language through the media including the production of
films, videos radio and TV programs and the facilitation of meetings between
speakers of the same language who are situated in different EU countries.\textsuperscript{119}

The key element in this European program is MERCATOR, which is an information
and documentation network with the aim of improving the exchange and circulation
of information on minority languages and cultures. It seeks to encourage cooperation
and networking between institutions and universities and local, regional and national
authorities.\textsuperscript{120} The EU is actively pursuing policy in favour of regional or minority
languages or cultures within Europe.

5.19 Education and European Identity

5.19.1 Education, Information, Cultural and Community Development

The global society is now characterised by the almost instantaneous flow and
exchange of information and communication. Europe is intimately involved with this
process. These information flows which notionally order consumption and production
also play a significant part in determining identity. We have considered earlier,
especially in relation to the work of Anderson and Deutsch the pivotal role of
communication and developments in information technology (such as the introduction

\textsuperscript{119} The meetings must have a cultural content and aim at promoting and safeguarding the language.

\textsuperscript{120} The MERCATOR Projects goal is:

\begin{quote}
"to establish maintain and develop thematic databases (on education), legislation and
the media) which will assist in disseminating and improving knowledge of the
regional/minority languages of the European Union."
\end{quote}
of the printing press in sixteenth century Europe) has had on not only the institutions of society but on the creation, and diffusion of mass cultural products and on the promotion of a common, state-centred 'national' identity. The process of informationalism, industrialism, capitalism and statism that provoked the articulation of state-centred identities, is little different to the potential effects of the current technological revolution. The Institutions of the EU have embraced advances in information technology and have seen the spread of information and knowledge of the union as being central elements in the raising of a European consciousness.

The European Union has been extremely active in promoting Pan-European education and has used a variety of instruments to ensure the interchange of ideas between Europeans. The European polity has an active information, audiovisual and cultural series of policies designed to both allow for cultural interchanges across Europe and to more fully inform European citizens on Union procedures. The European information policy is designed to make the workings of the Union more transparent and to make decision makers and their decisions more accessible to individual Europeans. The Commissions office for official publications distributes a range of publications aimed at engendering a broader understanding of and a more sympathetic feeling amongst Europeans to Europe. Further the encouragement of pan-European education at the tertiary level as part of the Communities' education, vocational training and youth policies.\textsuperscript{121}

5.19.2 European Identity and Communication

"Information is a decisive, perhaps the most decisive factor in European Unification . . . European unification will only be achieved if Europeans want..."

\textsuperscript{121} Specific policies in the training and education field utilised by the Supranational European polity include the active involvement of the European Commission, more specifically Directorate XXII. The Direcorate manages three five-year programs; SOCRATES for education, LEONARDO DA VINCI for training, and Youth for Europe, a program for young people outside formal education and training systems. In the information and Communication field a total of 50 million ECU was made available in 1996 under PRINCE (information program for European Citizens). This program consisted of information campaigns for specific policies and has three elements. The first 'The Euro: a currency for Europe' (expenditure of ECU 22 million), the second 'Building Europe Together, an information campaign on the inter-governmental conference (ECU 22 million) and finally 'Citizens First' the aim of which is to provide European Citizens with Information on their rights in the internal market (ECU 6 million.) See: European Union 1998, Financial Report 1996, (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities) 43.
it. Europeans will only want it if there is such a thing as a European identity. A European identity will only develop if Europeans are adequately informed."\textsuperscript{122}

The role of communications in the creation of a communal identity has been established earlier in this work. Anderson comprehensively illustrated the significance in improvements in communications technology as a central enabling feature in constructing collective identity across a territorially diverse and abstracted community. Deutsch argues as to the importance of social communications in the construction of a collective identity. For Deutsch social communication is the key to building and sustaining communities. The EU fosters such communication by the establishment of appropriate policy and the funding of communication flows across territory. Such actions build the complex network of associations and discourses from which collective identification is founded; it contributes to the emergence of a pan-European community of sentiment. Deutsch proposes that the essence of community is the:

"ability to communicate more effectively, and over a wider range of subjects, with members of one large group than with outsiders."\textsuperscript{123}

The core of community is not a common ethnic origin or even a common language, but rather:

"What counts is not the presence or absence of any single factor, but merely the presence of sufficient communication facilities with enough complementarity to produce the overall result."\textsuperscript{124}

By giving access to Europeans the greatest range of television programs, the establishment of a common market in broadcast services and most importantly by the promotion of television programs with European content, the European Union is overtly attempting to foster an expanded but distinctively European cultural experience. European states have removed legal and technical restrictions which have inhibited wider European access to their television services. Further the European Union’s active support for specifically European media products is creating the

\textsuperscript{122} Commission of the European Communities Television without Frontiers: Green Paper on the Establishment of the Common Market for Broadcasting Especially by Satellite and Cable (Com 84,300 final) Brussels.1984 , 2.

\textsuperscript{123} Deutsch, K. Nationalism and Social Communication, 97.

\textsuperscript{124} Ibid.
heterogeneous media discourses which emphasises the plurality of identities, within the civic paradigm of institutionally supported mutual recognition. Thus the civic polity in an open and democratic information market, ensures the continuance of regional signifiers, which the ethnically-based polity would seek to limit or eradicate.


The European Union has facilitated the growth of information-based transactions in three areas. They are:

1. the creation of the necessary infrastructure,
2. the development of the Services using that infrastructure, and
3. ensuring the widest possible access to those services.

The EU has set in place policies to promote the investment required to build up the Europe-wide technological infrastructure within a short period. This includes the opening up of the telecommunications monopolies to effective competition, and encouraging its member states to establish the necessary state-based infrastructure and the establishment of independent regulatory structures. The benefits of such actions have been suggested in a recent report by the Federal Trust:

\[125\] Specific institutional action taken to create an inclusive but distinctively European communications sphere include:

1. the promotion of European co-productions and making 1988 the European Cinema and Television year; and
2. the drafting of an 'Action programme for the European audio-visual media products Industry. The action program MEDIA (Measures to Encourage the Development of the AudioVisual Industry) concerns the content of the media products, adopted by the European Council on 21 December 1990, for the period 1991 to 1995 it had a budget of 200 million ECU.

Further initiatives include the creation of a European multilingual television channel, was first raised in 1990 and in March 1991 the European Broadcasting Union (EBU) presented its EURONEWS service. EURONEWS is a dedicated multilingual satellite TV news channel which is specifically designed to compete with the US's CNN. (and in so doing provide a media product that differentiated Europe from the rest of global information flows.)
"The information superhighway offers a striking opportunity to enhance not only European competitiveness but also the understanding and participation of the general public in the affairs of the Union as a whole."\textsuperscript{126}

The development of the self-titled European 'Information Society' by the Commission represent a tangible attempt to integrate and inform individual Europeans into the institutions of Europe. It is in effect an adjunct of nation -building. It has the potential to both inform and educate Europeans but also to reinforce the benefits of Europeans social and labour market policies. Such a phenomenon is another example of European spillover. Economic integration requiring social and labour market reforms, thus requiring improved access to information which in turn leads to the promotion and inclusion of Europeans.

Following the development of a Green Paper in 1996, entitled 'Living and Working in the Information Society: people first', the EU has embarked on a program of activity to improve access and use of Information Technology amongst its citizens. The principal purpose of such a strategy was overtly to ensure that the EU economy had continuing growth and employment and the promotion of inclusion for people with special needs. Improving access to the tools of the information society is also considered pivotal in enhancing political progress within the union, including the enhancement of democracy and social justice and the Union believes it will have the effect of improving the working and living conditions of both men and women.\textsuperscript{127}

Specific actions taken by the Commission to strengthen the European Information Society include the following:

1. \textbf{At the National and regional level} the Commission will provide support to the member states to integrate a strong social dimension in the ongoing development of their information society strategies.

2. \textbf{At the Community level} the Commission will mainstream the social dimension in all relevant employment and social policies.


\textsuperscript{127} The Commission has allocated a total of 162M ECU for the purpose of Building the Information Society (ADAPT-BIS) for the period 1997-99.
3. **At the international level** the Commission will promote in the appropriate fora the development and use of technologies

The purpose of such a program is clear. The Commission wishes to improve economic and social conditions generally but more specifically is attempting to improve social cohesion by the improvement of living, learning and working conditions for all groups in European society. More generally the improvement of access to, and use of information technology will have the effect of creating a wider, more diverse field of Intra-European networks and relationships in a variety of fields from educational, to sporting to cultural, which may have the effect of engendering a stronger European consciousness.

5.19.4 The Effect of Information Flows on European Identity Formation.

The effect of formal and informal cultural interchange across Europe on the emergence of a European Identity is difficult to quantify with precision. However, its general effect is illustrated by the following:

"The exchange of ideas, and possibly also of artistic and literary productions is one of the most promising methods of fostering the development of world understanding and a sense of moral and cultural community among the peoples of the world."\(^{128}\)

Culturally, the rise of a European network society has had a dramatic impact on the cementing of existing European cohesion and the realisation of far broader European relationships and associations. While technology has the potential to contribute to what Castells describes as the 'individualization of labor in the labor process', the advent of an network society will have the effect of building dense networks of relationships and transactions, in increasingly more specialised fields of endeavour. Whilst the coordination of cultural production has been best suited to localised circumstances in the past, the utilisation of information technology will have the effect of exploding the space of flows, so that a truly European cultural and artistic

\(^{128}\) Ibid., 194.
community can develop. One that allows for a wide variety of diverse and overlapping identities to coexist within a civic identity allowing for mutual recognition, the protection of localism and the regulatory ordering of difference.

5.20 European Mythologisation

The logic of traditional ethnic nationalism requires the appropriation and uniform application of a standard set of historical memories, traditions, vernaculars and shared imaginings, in short a common national mythology. Such a phenomena is not the case in the development of the European Supranation. European integration runs contrary to the experience of the process of traditional state-formation. Whereas formative European states took actions to ‘invent’ or reconfigure a common set of traditions, or to unify the state around a set of state-mediated cultural practices, and the suppression of competing proto-identities, the supranational European experience differs markedly. Europe supports, rather than dilutes or destroys regional mythologies, national languages and local traditions and symbols. Europe does not need to create its own mythology, it rather acknowledges the needs of its peoples and their pre-existing identities, provides institutional rights for their practices, and creates a distinct and secure domain for their actualisation. Europe acts to encourage the enduring cultural practices and pre-existing mythologies, in a positive inclusive manner, so as to overcome their potentially destructive effects. In such a manner a common European civic identity – one in which a common sense of Europeaness based on a positive sense of belonging to a benign tolerant polity, is emerging. As Kymininka argues:

“What is clear, I think, is that if there is a viable way to promote a sense of solidarity and common purpose in a multinational state, it will involve accommodating, rather than subordinating, national identities. People from different national groups will only share an allegiance to the larger polity if they see it as the context within which their national identity is nurtured, rather than subordinated.”


The tolerance and support for pre-existing signifiers, often ethnically based, is complimented by the tentative emergence of specifically European traditions and cultural artefacts, such as the celebration of Europe Day, a European currency, the European Anthem and the most obvious, the European flag. As it flies alongside European member state flags, and is poignantly draped next to the national flag of member states at press-conferences and in briefing rooms, the European flag has the potential to act as a common symbol which compliments, rather than undermines pre-existing symbolic identifiers.

"Everyone nowadays recognises the sky-blue banner with 12 gold stars symbolising European unification, which we see more and more often flying alongside national flags in front of public buildings. Is there anyone who can fail to be moved on hearing the Ode to Joy . . . ? What community national does not enjoy following the 'European Community' sign in airport arrival halls, and passing through simply by showing the uniform passport adopted in 1985."131

However the common evocation of European symbols as a motive force for European identification is at best tenuous. European cultural diversity, and the liberal democratic nature of the EU means that finding defensible and politically neutral supranational symbols highly problematic, and in a very real sense unnecessary. Institutional attempts to create a civic European identity might well be undermined by heavy handed and imposed symbols of Europe which contradict or question the basis of the national and regional European symbols which show no sign of abating.

5.21 Europe as a Multi-Dimensional Identity Space - The European Supranation as a Protector of National and Sub-national Identities

"Europe will be stronger precisely because in has France as France, Spain as Spain, Britain as Britain, each with its own customs, traditions and identity. It would be a folly to try to fit them into some form of identikit European personality."132

Activities taken by the European Union to preserve and foster pre-existing cultural, national and proto-national identities form an important element in the loyalty shown


132 Thatcher, M. 'Britain and Europe'. Text of the Prime Minister's speech at Bruges on 20 September 1988, (London: Conservative Political Centre), 38.
by Europeans to Europe. As we have observed earlier the crisis of the sovereign state has led to a shift in loyalties to other arenas. The construction of a politically integrated European Community may well be the best hope, according to Rootes:

"of preserving national, regional and individual identities that would otherwise be threatened by the clash between the globalising tendencies of mass culture on the one hand and defensive nationalism and ethnic exclusivity on the other."^{133}

The transfer of practical matters of state administration to the supranational arena in which they can be effectively dealt may result in national governments focusing more on social questions and the mediation of global influences with local cultures. Alternately such a process of globalisation may require Europe to assume sufficient power and discretion to protect national and sub-national identities, such as national languages, customs and histories. We can see both in rhetoric and policy direction the attempts by the European Union to protect and foster traditional signifiers of national and sub-national identity. In this way Europe assumes the 'commanding heights' in its approaches to the role of the guarantees of minority rights and security to pre-existing identities.

The primacy of the development of an inclusive structure that affirms the importance of community, regional autonomy, language rights and social welfare has been pivotal in the creation of and collective attachment to a unified Europe which in effect becomes a civic equitable 'rights-domain' in which Europeans can make equitable claims on the supranational polity.

5.22 A European Social-Cultural Space - The Creation of a 'Peoples Europe'

The creation of a 'Peoples Europe' may be regarded as one of the most practical elements of the creation of a European social space. It was originally conceived to overcome some of the misunderstanding resulting from perceptions of a Europe remote, uncaring and often ignorant of the interests of its citizens. Its effect, in combination with the creation of other elements of the European social and economic space has been to deepen European identity by creating patterns of activity and

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^{133} Rootes, C & Davis, H. *Social Change and Political Transformation*. 2.
understanding over one another so as to create a deeper sense of belonging amongst Europeans to Europe.

One of the more significant aspects of the creation of a 'Peoples Europe' has been the establishment of the right of freedom of movement for European citizens. The abolition of frontier controls, for example, is according to the European Parliament 'for ordinary people a tangible sign of the existence of a true community'. Not only was the guarantee of freedom of movement important so as to ensure the coherence of the single market program but it was a central feature of creating a common European consciousness by creating a Europe without internal borders. The harmonisation of national policies with regard to the free movement of peoples, and importantly the establishment of uniform standards across Europe on the right of asylum and the status of refugees attempt to not only improve the quality of life for Europeans but also to provide a clear perception of commonality and shared conditions for all Europeans, thus enhancing a pan-European consciousness. Further a distinctive European boundary is established and enforced between EU citizens and outsiders. The creation of a functional barrier between 'Europe' and 'non-Europe' on citizenship grounds will greatly assist the development of a pan-European identity (as we have seen earlier, in-group favouritism and out-group discrimination is a central element of community identity formation.)

European social policy aims to provide for full employment, the improvement of living and working conditions, the involvement of labour and industry in economic and social policy decisions and social and economic cohesion. In the early years of the European Community Social policy was very much secondary to economic functionalism. Up until 1972 the only progress made was the introduction of free movement of labour, including social security provisions for those involved, and the creation of the European Social Fund. The late 1960s and early 1970s saw a greater focus on social matters and an initial Program of Social Action was adopted on 21 January 1974 by the Council and reaffirmed on 22 June 1984. The subsequent

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135 The objectives of these action programs have been achieved in a variety of ways. The objectives of the action programs with regard to improving the living and working conditions of
reaffirmation added a degree of focus to the development of European social policy by virtue of the demonstrable political will, exhibited by the European Council, to move towards the creation of a 'European social area'. Steps towards such an area manifested themselves both in the adoption of provisions within both the SEA and the Maastricht Treaty for social objectives to be widened and for the Community to formally operate a policy in the social sphere.

Such a widening of European policy represented both a reflection of the intentions of European elites to progress European integration from a broader, non-economic basis, and also the recognition of the effect of policy spillover; that effective economic harmonisation could only be achieved in the context of a homogenous European set of social conditions. As Vasso Papandreou, (then) EC Commissioner for Social Affairs and Employment, commented in 1990:

"Efforts towards completing the internal market in 1992 have highlighted the importance of this social dimension. It is not simply a question of ensuring freedom of movement for persons, together with goods, services and capital. It also contributes to improving the well-being of Community citizens and in the first place workers. The construction of a dynamic and strong Europe depends on the recognition of a foundation of social rights. A political signal given at the highest level was crucial."

The two most important symbols of the evolution of European Social Policy is the Social Charter and the TEU.

In December 1989 the Heads of State and Government of 11 of the 12 Member states - The United Kingdom having opted out adopted the Community Charter of the Fundamental Social rights of Workers, or Social Charter for short. The social charter, described by the European Parliament as the cornerstone of the Communities 'social dimension' deals with rights in 12 main areas which are:

vulnerable groups has been achieved in the form of directives in the sphere of equal opportunities and specific aid for the elderly, migrant workers and the elderly. The improvement of employees conditions has been effected by a number of European Directive, including directives limiting working time, collective agreements and employees rights in the event of an employers insolvency.

1. freedom of movement of workers;
2. employment and remuneration;
3. improvement of living and working conditions;
4. social protection;
5. freedom of association and collective bargaining;
6. vocational training;
7. equal treatment for men and women;
8. information, consultation and participation for workers;
9. health protection and safety at the workplace;
10. protection of children and young people;
11. the elderly, and
12. the disabled.

The TEU increased the Unions in the social and employment spheres. Not simply is the EU’s raison d’etre to improve economic conditions but also to ensure a high level of social protection. The treaty compelled the introduction of social welfare and employment policies and the scope of the social fund is to be widened and a whole new section inserted on education and vocational training. Importantly the scope of qualified majority voting will be widened increasing the supranational scope of the community in social affairs. The social charter introduced new areas of competencies and responsibility of the community. Whereas section 117 of the EEC Treaty talks about promoting improved working conditions and an improved standard of living for workers’ under the Social Charter, the Community was given the responsibility for employment, improved living and working conditions, proper social protection, dialogue between management and labour, the development of human resources with a view to lasting high employment and the combating of exclusion. Areas of cooperation requiring a qualified majority were extended to cover proposals for the improvement of the working environment and increasing opportunities for women at work and for information and consultation of workers and the integration of persons excluded from the labour market. The practical extension of QMV to these matters strengthens the supranational administration of the European polity.\textsuperscript{137}

\textsuperscript{137} European Parliament. \textit{Fact sheets of the European Parliament and the Activities of the European Union} 340
Thus the agreement between the European states has opened new areas of cooperation and the enhancement of pan-European supranational competence. Such an established integrated policy domain for Europe is further assisted by the decision-making processes which effectively make the European social policy domain supranational. European social policy for the Community is decided via voting by a qualified majority, this greatly increases the autonomy of the institutions of the community. 138

5.22.1 European Social Policy and European Identity

The efforts taken by the European Union not only to improve economic and social conditions are becoming increasingly prominent, and are having a direct, positive effect on European identity formation. The Single European Act and the TEU state that; ‘in order to promote its overall harmonious development, the Community shall develop and pursue its actions leading to the strengthening of its economic and social cohesion.’ 139 And further that 'Member States shall pay particular attention to encouraging improvements, especially in the working environment, as regards the health and safety of workers, and shall set as their objective the harmonisation of conditions in this area, while maintaining the improvements made.' 140

Accordingly EU inspired action to improve living and working conditions have taken on a variety of forms. The Structural Funds, and most especially the European Social Fund represent the main instruments for the promotion of social cohesion within the Union. Further the Union, despite the opposition from the then British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, introduced in 1989 a Community Charter of the Fundamental Rights of Workers, which represented the judicial side of social cohesion and which stressed the improvement of living and working conditions; social protection; freedom

138 Areas of policy which can be progressed by qualified majority voting include improvements of the working environment, equality of opportunity for men and women and information and consultation of workers. Those policy domains still requiring unanimity include proposals on social security, conditions of employment for third-country nationals and financial contributions for the promotion of employment. Such breadth of policy decided by qualified majority voting ensures that individual national veto's as essentially redundant to decision-making and implementation.

139 Article 130A of the Treaty on European Union

140 Article 118a of the Treaty on European Union
of association and collective bargaining; and participation of workers; the protection of health and safety at the workplace; and the protection of children and adolescents, the elderly and the disabled.¹⁴¹

European identification has been promoted by the integrative function that Marshall found to result from the expansion of meaningful citizenship rights. Such rights including not only the immediately obvious participative rights, but more broadly the economic and cultural rights that he found are often lacking in culturally diverse and economically inequitable states.¹⁴² Europe has overcome the potential splintering effect of heterogeneous polities by providing those policy outcomes which contribute to communal identification. Specifically Europe has, via the expansion of a substantive economic reformation in order to equitably assist Europe’s regions and thought regional, cultural, linguistic and educational policy provided the policy outcomes that at one and the same time have provided for economic improvements to overcome economic and cultural exclusion. Further it has provided group-differentiated rights for regions and ethnolinguistic minorities, which has had the effect of promoting what Marshall refers to as the ‘direct sense of community membership based on loyalty to a civilisation which is common in possession’. The common rights of European citizenship – including economic and cultural rights are central to the evocation of communal identity, civic identity that takes account of ethnic difference.

5.22.2 Cultural Policy

A European civic identity, inclusive of pre-existing (ethnic) signifiers of identity is promoted in two ways. the product of uniquely 'European Cultural products and the efforts made by Europe to protect and enhance national and sub-national cultural products.

While the EEC treaty does not provide for any Community action in the cultural field, the Treaty on European Union provides that: 'the Community shall contribute to the

flowering of cultures of the member states, while respecting their national and regional diversity and at the same time bringing their common cultural heritage to the fore.\textsuperscript{143}

Specific measures and achievements of the European Union in the field of Cultural Policy include:

1. the protection of architectural assets, including the restoration of assets and assistance for cultural events connected with the protection of cultural assets;
2. activities including the event 'European city of Culture', established in 1985 by the ministers responsible for cultural affairs with the aim of helping 'to bring the peoples of the Member States closer together' (379 fact sheets) the event 'European Cultural Month' established in 1990, the formation of the EC Youth Orchestra in 1985;
3. European prizes including the EC's Europhalia Literary prize, the Queen Elizabeth prize, the architecture prize and the European prize for the literary translations.

Other projects being implemented involve the promotion of books and reading, the publication of publishing statistics, the literary and translation prizes, the encouragement of company sponsorship and vocational training in the cultural sector.\textsuperscript{144}

\textsuperscript{143} The goals of the communities cultural policies are:

1. to preserve the memories of the European peoples by contributing to the conservation of cultural heritage in all its forms and by trying to increase awareness of it;
2. to promote the establishment of an environment favourable to the development of culture in Europe by taking cultural aspects into account in its other policies and programmes and by supporting artistic and literary creation, non-commercial cultural exchanges and networks; and
3. to help to promote Europe throughout the world by fostering cooperation with third countries.


\textsuperscript{144} European Parliament. \textit{Fact sheets of the European Parliament and the Activities of the European Union} 380
5.23 Chapter Five - Concluding Remarks

5.23.1 The European Union and Reinforcers of Identity: A Synthesis of the Structural Components.

"The EC has become the central frame of reference for an incalculable number of actors most of whom will hope to influence and/or gain from the eventual outputs of the EC's decision making process."\(^{145}\)

The editors of Commission of the European Communities Eurobarometer 38, in summarising the views of the European public towards the European polity, found that a notable part of the European public is in favour of European unification where such integration contributes, in the way described below, to circumstances:

1. where national and regional identities and cultural diversity are respected, protected and defended;
2. where democratic channels of citizen influence exist and visibly function; and
3. where sovereignty is pooled and exercised through common institutions only in such policy areas, where national or regional governments can no longer solve problems effectively.

Whereas they found that the European public would be resistant towards European integration insofar as it:

1. threatens national identity and cultural diversity;
2. gives citizens insufficient democratic influence; and
3. gives their country and its government no say in European decision-making;

European integration has provided for outcomes consistent with the aforementioned preferences — respect for pre-existing identities and participative citizenship in a

secure and prosperous domain with the transfer of appropriate policy domains to the supranational level.

The transformation in European political life that has empowered the European polity has concurrently integrated the peoples of Europe. The European polity has become the critical set of institutions and discursive framework for trans-European identity formation. It has increasing competencies in areas traditionally linked to its member states and its leadership has provided the material and cultural environment for a common identity to emerge. In short we have shown that European identity formation has been reinforced by those elements typically associated with communal identity formation, writ large at the supranational level.

The EU has instituted mechanisms and achieved demonstrable outcomes for a meaningful (European) social citizenship. Such a social citizenship is achievable only at a pan-national level as individual European states have lost their competence and authority in economic, social and political domains. The active involvement of the supranational polity in the consolidation of its territory, and in securing its boundaries is a central aspect of creating a substantive European identity space. European policies aimed at defending and promoting regional and local identities, linguistic, cultural and ethnic signifiers, are a considerable force in engendering a positive sense of Europeanness. Insofar the implementation of such policy creates and promotes an appropriate cluster of civic rights allowing for the practice and expression of such localised identities. Europe is relevant and attractive to Europeans because it fulfils European’s economic, normative, security, and most significantly identity needs better than the pre-existing member states can or do. This process is accentuated in a period of increased global competition, and in the context of the postmodern search for authenticity and rootedness.

The institutional arrangements that we have examined in this Chapter have had a two-fold effect on the creation of a common European identity. Firstly Europe has created, not only as a rhetorical device but also in substance, an area of 'freedom, Security and justice'. An area in which right-bearing citizens can enjoy free access to education, employment and the rights of residence, while at the same time providing social security and the protection of the common European normative system regional
interests and environment. Europe is not only a Europe of nations, but also of sub-nations and proto-national communities in which identity is institutionally supported as a mechanism to engender pan-European civic identification. Such a dynamic made possible because of a certain resilience of pre-existing identities and the realisation by the framers of the European polity that tolerance of such identities, would in itself create a motive-force for a common European identification. The second primary influences of European institutionalisation on the advancement of a European sympathy, and related to our first, is that Europe has established a firm, distinctive boundary between itself and other worlds. At the most obvious level the cessation of intra-European conflict, and notwithstanding the Balkans, an acceptance of established (national) borders, is the result of this. Just as the enhancement of European political, economic and social life and the benefits flowing from it has consolidated a positive empathetic response, so too have these processes effectively constructed boundaries between Europe and non-Europe, reinforcing a European identity. Such an identity constructed between 'insiders' and 'outsiders' on essentially civic criteria of political social and economic development.

The EU constitutes a powerful set of institutional arrangements which act as an incentive for the establishment and maintenance of civic identification. European institutionalism exerts a major supportive element for the achievement of societal security, in the broadest terms of social, economic, cultural and physical protection and the maintenance of a unique cluster of European privileges and rights, within its boundaries. As A.D. Smith remarks:

"This dense and pervasive set of institutions and practices is one of the central boundary markers between the EU and its European environment."\(^{146}\)

For the first time European identity is based in the European institutional promotion of a community of law, a community of culture and a community of security and prosperity. It represents and promotes civic rather than ethnic community, a feature that makes it attractive to groups both within and external to it. The intensification of institutional and legal rights amongst Europeans within the EU is both one of the most poignant assets in the articulation of Europeaness, and one of its most significant

\(^{146}\) Ibid.
departure points between itself, and non-Europe. Importantly the institutional matrix within Europe has a positive effect on European cultural life.

Such distinctiveness and identification expresses itself in the economic sphere as well. The cumulative effect of the creation of a common European customs union, the single market, a common migration frontier and within it an area from the free movement of goods persons and services has created a manifest transactional boundary between Europe and the other. This not only differentiates Europeans from the other, but has, as we will empirically examine later in this study, created a new positive dimension of European consciousness. While the completion of the single market has promoted intra-European linkages at a heightened level, it has further, via the creation of a free area of movement sharpened the focus of Europeans between their rapidly residing national boundaries when compared with the broader European frontier. The trans-national barriers to goods, services, capital and peoples intensify the boundary between Europe and the other. The process of transactional boundary confirmation within Europe operates at two levels, as Smith suggests:

"The gradient between insider status in the EU and the single market and the many outsiders who would wish to operate on equal terms with the EU is steep and in many areas well guarded."¹⁴⁷

We shall, in Chapters Seven, Eight and Nine, consider the empirical manifestation of European identity, however in our next chapter, Chapter Six, we shall review the retardants effecting the manifestation of a European identity.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid., 17.
Chapter Six

Retardants To The Development Of A European Identity

"The European Union has proved itself to be nothing more than a talking shop for failed politicians."¹

6.1 Introductory Remarks

At the end of the millennium the forms and structures of European politics, economics, society and identity itself are changing. What is new, now, is the accelerated development of autonomous, non-state mediated economic social, cultural and regional networks of relationships and dependencies. This process should be considered critically in the context of fundamental changes in the relationships between individual and collectivity, and more fundamentally by a reappraisal of the notion of self, and self-representation.² While some of these factors are creating conditions favourable to the configuration of a European identity, others are inhibiting the development of a European consciousness. These inhibiting factors will be the subject of analysis in this Chapter.³

There is evidence of indifference from amongst a number of Europeans to the concept of a unified Europe. As Europe becomes more centralised there is a quantifiable level of concern as to the perceived distance between Europe and Europeans. Recent data suggests this scepticism to the European project. As recently as 1998 Leonard demonstrated this level of ambivalence. He found:

1. only 46% of Europeans support their country's membership of the EU;


³ We use the term retardant cautiously. I wish to emphasise that the social, economic and cultural factors that the Chapter considers are acting to retard – that is to slow and to delay the accomplishment of a communal form of European identification. Such factors, it is argued, while impeding the manifestation of a European identity, are not sufficient to negate its onset altogether.
2. only half EU citizens feel European, just 10% place European identity above national identity;
3. only 41% think their country benefits from EU membership;
4. only one in 50 Europeans claims to be 'very well informed' about the EU; and
5. the EU devoted more time and resources to the Common Agricultural Policy and the EMU than any other issue - but these are priorities for only nine percent of Europeans.4

While it is possible to be selective with such statistics, these results suggest a high degree of uncertainty as to the form and nature of the European project, amongst significant numbers of Europeans. As Howe writes:

"The last 35 years may have seen an entrenchment of the European Community, but it is evident that there has not yet been a parallel forging of a community of Europeans."5

The intention of this Chapter is not to attempt to quantify precisely the retarding factors inhibiting the growth of European identity. Such a process is implausible given the subtlety and complexity of a number of the variables that this Chapter will address. Rather, this Chapter illustrates the key factors that may, based upon a qualitative analysis, inhibit the emergence of a communal European identity.

The current European political and economic order has contributed to a range of retardants to European identification - cultural, economic and institutional. Such retardants will be considered in this Chapter according to the following classificatory schema:

1. 6.2. Non-Institutional Retardants;
   a. 6.2.1. The Emergence of a Massified European Society;

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b. 6.2.2. EuroSceptism; and
c. 6.2.3. Radical Nationalism, Racism and The Resurgence of the Extreme Right.

2. 6.3 Institutional Retardants;

a. 6.3.1. Supranational Europe – Developmental Problems;
b. 6.3.2. The Democratic and Information Deficit;
c. 6.3.3. The European Decision Making Processes; and
d. 6.3.4. The Economic Failures of Europe

6.2  Non-Institutional Retardants of European Identity

6.2.1 The Emergence of a Massified European Society

The emergence of a massified European society poses a direct threat to the emergence of a common European consciousness. The 'massification' of society is associated with a range of socio-political trends; an atomised public with few of the networks or traditions of civil society, susceptible to popularism politics and hostile to European integrating processes.

The application of mass theory of European life has a wide basis, both within classical social theory and from contemporary theorists. It is informed by the tenets of Gemeinschaft/Gesellschaft expounded by Tonnies and Weber, and Durkheims's work on anomie and alienation.

Hannah Arendt's seminal work, ‘The Origins of Totalitarianism’ remains today as a foundation-stone of critical thought on the difficulty of sustaining a communal European society in the face of high levels of anxiety and uncertainty. She considered communal fragmentation as manifested in political extremism to be a particularly

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European phenomena. As Arendt argues, the decline of the nation-state, with its stable legal and territorial structures and the breakdown of class bonds in favour of racial and ethnic identification, set the stage for the formation of the European "mass man". Such a phenomenon, initially linked to the rise of the far-right in pre-war Europe, has direct application to contemporary European society. Elements of which, such as the unemployed, the underclass and the economically and socially disenfranchised lack the integrative, social economic and political linkages to an inclusive society that would normally allow for the development of a common sense of identity.⁹

This basic hypothesis has been adopted and applied to the European landscape by a range of contemporary theorists. According to Touraine, modernity endorsed the discipline of industrialisation, economic rationalisation, enforced laws and bureaucratic authority. It also encouraged and rewarded the adoption of social identities as citizens or workers. European society was essentially 'national' ensuring the survival and legitimacy of the state.¹⁰ Society's relationship to the state is now no longer so certain. The global market and mass global culture define individuals more so than do traditional 'national' societies.

"Society is no longer national, and the actor is no longer a citizen or a worker."¹¹

According to Giddens, the forces of the marketplace replace the primary influences of the nation and the state. National and social identifiers are subordinated to individual creativity and reflexivity. Assumptions about the bounded nature of 'society' and its alignment with the nation-state epitomise a phase in modernity which we are now transcending. Just as economic interactions, security arrangements and value systems have largely liberated themselves from the state and from the myth of the nation, so too has there been a liberation of desire, impulses needs and loyalties; transcending

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¹¹ Ibid.,18
the myth of nation and the need for nationalism and national identity. Such influences while providing a positive impetus for some is also creating widespread uncertainty and situational ambiguity for others.

The impact of the globalisation of markets and cultures and the splintering of civil society from the state has led to the decentering and massification of the subject and the subsequent deconstruction of metanarratives of forms of collective identity central to the mythology of modernity, such as nation and collective identity. The public/private distinction that relegated questions of non-political belonging and loyalty to the private sphere and promoted the mono-culture of public 'national' identity is now uncertain.

In such an environment the integrative and collective process of symbolic identity formation with Europe becomes highly problematic. Such a theoretical setting compliments our earlier argument as to the central role of security, or the avoidance of insecurity in the development of identity.

6.2.2 EuroScepticism

'The European Union is a well-oiled machine without a soul'

While there is considerable rhetorical embellishment associated with the anti-European movement, popular disquiet with the process of European integration is a readily identifiable phenomenon. This discontent comes from a variety of sources.

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15 Such a phenomena being experienced at and beyond EU's frontiers, such as the states of Yugoslavia and those of the former Soviet Union.

16 Father Harry Bohan, Irish Priest, 1996 reported in Leydon, M. 'Maternialist Union that leaves the spirit unfed The European 4-10 July 1997., 4.

17 Ranging from French Farmers publicly protesting CAP reform to the more widespread European resistance to the unresponsive 'Eurocrats' in Brussels.
Firstly, from those who feel politically excluded from the decision making process leading to integration. Secondly, from those who believe that European integration is a sub-text for the decline of member state sovereignty. Thirdly, from those who see the costs to the majority of Europeans being greater than the benefits granted to 'a select few'. Such a coalition of concern dealing more in populist suspicion than demonstrable fact, has crystallised itself into the loose alliance of movements known as the "Eurosceptics". The most adamant of the Eurosceptics has been the British Conservative elite, whose views are not entirely coherent or consistent. However, their main arguments suggest that they view Europe as both a threat to British sovereignty and a passport to Franco-German European economic and political hegemony that is advanced by stealth and is inherently undemocratic and corporatist. Popular novelist Frederick Forsyth, a committed British Eurosceptic, says:

"Euro-federalism in Britain therefore has always advanced its cause on a programme of stealth, guile, deception, dissimulation, evasiveness and occasional outright mendacity." 19

One of the difficulties with the European polity is that it cannot be framed within any one of the conventional frameworks of political or economic convergence or integration. Accordingly, there is sufficient political and rhetorical space for those who fear a federal model of Europe to articulate such concerns, and to leverage on peoples uncertainties. In raising these issues they attempt to influence popular opinion against further European integration. This process is clearly detrimental to the process of the formation of a positive European consciousness amongst European citizens. Without clear leadership from influential political, economic and cultural elites, the emergence of a collective form of identification is difficult to achieve. 21

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21 The dominance of British Eurosceptics may, in part, be attributed to the concept of Anglo-Saxon exceptionalism, which according to Wallace, deeply influences Britain's conception of and degree of integration with the European polity. See: Wallace, W. 'Foreign Policy and National Identity in the United Kingdom; International Affairs 67 No.1 1991, 65-80.
Anti-European movements emphasise the internal differentiation between the plans of the EU and the views and aspirations of what are pejoratively referred to as 'ordinary' Europeans. Such differentiation is at odds with the process of communal identification, as we have defined it, as it undermines the formation of a common cognitive boundary and a collective consciousness and self-description. These are qualities that are central to communal identity formation. This sentiment has arisen out of a network of anti-integration bodies, with views as diverse as the wholesale rejection of the TEU to opposition to further incursions into European rural areas of motorways.

Institutionally the movements take a variety of forms, as does the subject matter of their opposition to further institutionalisation. They include the Campaign against Euro-federalism and the European Anti-Maastricht Alliance. Issues addressed by these bodies include the recurring theme of the practical costs and welfare shrinkage associated with the 'Euro-austerity' drive for national economic readiness for EMU. Issues associated with this include the reduction in government benefits to a range of groups within the community including the elderly, and the unemployed occurring at the same time as an increase in 'middle class welfare' such as child support.22

6.2.3 Radical Nationalism, Regionalism and The Resurgence of the Extreme Right.

The Return of the (Ethnic) Nation - The less capable of managing the 'national' question individual European states become, the more sociopolitical space is made available for both the re-emergence of proto-national identities and for a rise in awareness amongst populations of their 'authentic' histories. Europeans are concerned with not only their respective state's eroding sovereignty, but also of losing their often ethnically configured 'national' identity. While some welcome the ambiguity of 'nationality', there are many who are responding to dissolving state-

signifiers, - political, economic, legislative and cultural - by attaching to fundamentalist, racist and extremist groups.  

We identify three key factors explaining the rise of nationalism in contemporary Europe. They are:

1. The crisis of the state and the rise of regionalism;
2. The attraction of the 'ethnic nation'; and
3. The resurgence of the extreme right and its resistance to 'outsiders' from 'insiders' - migrants and asylum seekers.

The nationalist backlash amongst certain national members against the globalisation of culture and the market place is observed by a number of theorists. Morris considers the cultural crisis emerging from the homogenisation of sovereign states. Hall notes that in response to the erosion of the state, most particularly state economies and state cultures that a defensive and regressive exclusionism is emerging, mostly apparent in policies and attitudes concerned with immigration. Similarly Smith writes:

"Fears of immigrant waves have fuelled resentments and spurred renewed interest in cultural identity, national solidarity and defence of national interests."

Individual European states grew around four central principles; political sovereignty, military assertiveness, economic self-determination and the 'myth' of cultural homogeneity, (no matter how contrived or forced such homogeneity was). As global forces are perceived as distorting and diluting the first three it is not surprising that the

23 It is important to note that there are a variety of "nationalisms" within Europe. Examples such as the regionalism of the Northern League, the nationalism of the Basques, the racism of the French National Front are the most public examples of the return of the ethnic nation. The more subtle, but still powerful, call to 'nation' by conservative governments. (The British Thatcher government being the most obvious example) and the increasing calls by mainstream political parties for greater controls on immigration, asylum seekers and a return to economic nationalism all have the potential to threaten the emergence of a Euro-nationalism.


fourth is also under attack. There are Europeans who have become increasingly resistant to further economic or political liberalisation in fear that it may further undermine their 'nation' and simultaneously undermine a prime determinant of their own identity.26

The highly sophisticated form taken by European political integration, and its perceived detrimental effect on state sovereignty and autonomy has created a significant revival of the nation as a backlash against an increasingly powerful supranational set of European institutions. As Janning has suggested, integration of European political structures give:

"Nations more weight. Global interdependence, which needs to be recognised and worked for as a result, is too abstract to meet the social-psychological identity needs. The nation remains as a framework of identity. The European integration relativises the role of each nation state by transferring sovereignty to supranational institutions. The need for national identification and sovereignty grows at the same rate as the process of political and economic levelling intensify."27

The strengthening of European unity through the European Treaty System, most notably the TEU and the Treaty of Amsterdam, has done much to contribute to supranationalism in Europe. So too has policy convergence in a myriad of areas most especially in economic and monetary union. However, the treaty system, the plans for monetary union and the perceived invasive nature of European policy have received significant opposition from 'national' forces and defenders:

"The opposition argued that the [Maastricht] treaty was conceived of by remote and detached politicians such as French President Francois Mitterand and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and by Brussels bureaucrats, out of touch with the realities of their countries."28

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26 Such fears are evidenced in the EU data outlined in Chapter Two, wherein Europeans resist further political and economic integration within the EU insofar as it is perceived as having the potential to threaten pre-existing national and cultural identities.


The rapid rise of regionalism, at the expense of the state, is indicative of the crisis of the European state. The crisis of the modern European state is caught up in contradictory polices. On one hand, as Hueglin argues, European states are: "trying to cope with the imminent turbulence of scarcity, hieratically centralised systems." On the other, the problem of economic and social redistribution: "The resulting financial and administrative impasse may then trigger revolts against the system where the demerits are felt most strongly, at the periphery."29 This rejection of the state is further accentuated by the growing significance of trans-national processes which give regions opportunities to achieve greater independence.30 Regional movements and the advocacy of their form of nation are a product of the contradictory processes of centre-periphery integration. On one hand such a process lead to the concentration of political and economic resources at the centre, while at the same time the modern state engendered the perception of: "geo-political distance, sociocultural difference and socioeconomic dependence."31 As Hueglin states:

"Regionalism appears as a protest movement against political-administrative and socioeconomic centrality. It is not so important its goals are socio-cultural autonomy, political federalism or outright separatism, whether its driving force is a small intellectual elite or politically organised party, nor whether its motives are predominantly cultural, economic or political. . . . Its rationale is not to impose an alternative set of postmaterial values on the social system, but the establishment of value differentiation as a strategy against the selective responsiveness of systemic centrality."32

The economic and political process that had dominated national life in areas such as northern Italy and pockets of France, Belgium and Spain ignored the effects of unequal distribution of economic and political goods away from regional groups and regions. Such inequalities provided fertile soil for the articulation of a populist

29 Hueglin, T. 'Regionalism in Western Europe: Conceptual Problems of a New Political Perspective', Comparative Politics, 19, July 1986, 455.

30 See Woods, D. 'The Crisis of centre-Periphery Integration in Italy and the Rise of Regional Populism', 188.

31 Ibid. See also Thompson, M. 'The Dissatisfactions of a Satisfied Minority': Val D'Aosta and Ethnic Nationalism in the European Community' History of European Ideas, 1994, Vol 19, Nos 4-6, 663-668.

32 Hueglin, T. 'Regionalism in Western Europe: Conceptual Problems of a New Political Perspective', 448-449.
ideology of regionalism as a viable alternative to the perceived deficiencies of the state. Regionalism seeks to redefine modernity away from centralised forms of economic and political representation towards regional and local forms. Within regional movements are the rhetorical devices of the virtues of community, tradition, and of identity based on the known, local and similar. Within this limited paradigm such virtues are considered: “The essential foundations of the functioning of modern societies.”

While the composition of regionalism varies according to particular circumstances, a key element of regionalism core identity derives from a successful juxtaposition between 'us' and 'them'. Such stereotyping, centrally important to identity formation, allows for the cementing of local, regional identities of the 'people', versus, and in open opposition to, large-scale cosmopolitan capitalist industries and bureaucratic elites who are perceived as not understanding the real needs and interests of the 'people'. This outcome results in a cognitive boundary being created between Europeans and the European project. Regionalism is politicised into a national movement insofar as it seeks to publicly articulate its own mythology of customs, traditions and identity in opposition to the pre-existing centralised political institutions. To the extent that the EU seeks to promote regional policy such as a ‘Europe of the Regions’ the opportunity for European heterogeneity may increase. As Malcolm argues:

“A federal Europe would revive the nationalist hostility and resentment.”

The Resurgence of the Extreme Right - The resurgence of the European right is another manifestation of the resurgence of ethnic signifiers of identity. The discourse

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33 Ibid., 195.


35 It is important to reinforce the artificial nature of regional identities. They are as contrived and imagined as those applicable at the state level. The claim for regional autonomy and identity lies not in some primordial truth, but in the creation of new identities, every bit as manufactured as the identities of the centralised system of governance and administration, that they are contesting.

of ethnic purification, nationhood based on blood and culture and opposition to outsiders on ethnic and cultural grounds, represents an opposition to assimilationism and a return to (ethnic) belonging and exclusion on regressive nationalist grounds. The most notable example of this phenomenon is the success of the Freiheitliche Partei Osterreichs (FPO) in Austria. However the continued successes of the Front National (FN) in France and the Moveimento Sociale Italiano (MSI) in Italy, amongst others also highlight the enduring attraction and support for the far right in Europe.

The resurgence of right-wing, nationalist, populist neo-fascist movements in Eastern Europe mirrored the rising prominence of the ultra-right political parties in Western Europe.\(^37\) Rather than embracing the ideas and values of a united civic and liberal Europe the far right unambiguously articulated an ethnic conception of nation, exclusiveness, a return to 'organic' society and ethnic purity through the use of violence.\(^38\)

The reasons for the return of the far right are complex and multi-dimensional, and include economic, social, political and psychological factors.\(^39\) Perhaps the most overt factor is the increase in European migration and its perceived relationship to increased unemployment and social fragmentation.\(^40\) For the European extreme right the wave

\(^{37}\) The increasing popularity of the Communist Party in the states of the former Soviet Union, most particularly the Russian Federation, is evidence of this trend.

\(^{38}\) There is an increasing literature on the return of neo-fascism in Europe; the more recent of such texts include Cheles, L. Ferguson R. & Vaughan, M. (eds.) 'The Far Right in Western & Eastern Europe'. (Addison-Wesley Publication 1995), Laqueur, W. Fascism; Past, Present, Future. (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1996), and Lee, M. The Beast Reawakens. (Little Brown & Company 1997).

\(^{39}\) Such factors include; a rapid structural decline in economic conditions leading to the emergence of an economically marginalised group allowing for a shift in political preferences to 'protest' parties of the right promising to protect their economic condition. The emergence of groups incapable of coping with change and modernisation, hostile to development and an associated romanticism for the past and a yearning for mythical values of family, Volk and nation. Psychological elements observed include the existence of a particular pre-political personality type - the Authoritarian personality - which is highly susceptible to fascist ideology and practice. For a more detailed examination on the rise of Fascism in Western Europe see Grover, A. 'A Generic Fascism: Towards an integrated Typology of the causal elements of Fascism and Neo-Fascism. University of Tasmania Honours Thesis, 1994.

\(^{40}\) The reality of the relationship between immigration and unemployment is overlooked by the extreme right. Increased immigration can occur, as it has in the United States, in an environment of full employment. Since 1973 the American economy has created 40 million new jobs while taking in about 1 million immigrants a year. Further in an environment of rapidly declining fertility rates in Europe,
of immigration from the South and East represents the introduction of alien and unwanted ethnic and cultural influences into the European world. The return of Fascism with its central ideology of blood ethnic and nation is proving to be a direct and increasingly prominent threat to both the civil state and to a civic notion of collective European identity.

Voting patterns reveal support growing for the extreme right at the expense of the centralist parties. In France in 1986 the Front National took just under 10% of the total national vote in the first round of voting; in 1997 it took 15%; the total orthodox right's vote in France declined from 45% to just over 35% in the same period. In the Austrian national election held on 8 October 1994, the Austrian extreme right party, the FPO obtained over twenty percent of the National vote and in effect became the main opposition party to the ruling Social Democratic Party. The inclusion of four neo-fascist Ministers in the Berlusconi Cabinet in Italy in the same year should also be noted. These results are replicated, albeit to a lesser degree, in most European states.

Beyond voting patterns, the values and attitudes of Europeans demonstrate the nature of European exclusion. a Commission of the European Communities Eurobarometer survey conducted in 1997 demonstrates a high degree of xenophobia and racism in

(most especially southern Europe) unless there is significant migration in the next half century then it is predicted that the European economies will become unable to compete in the global market place and to pay for the social benefits of a aged population. See Dickey, C. & Warner, J. 'Alien Europe' The Bulletin/Newsweek December 16, 1997. 49-52, 52.

41 Ibid.

42 More recently 27.2% of the Austrian electorate in national elections in October supported the FPO. As the front-page headline of Israel's best-selling newspaper the Yediot Aharanot declared "One of Every Four Austrians Voted For Neo-Nazi Chancellor". See: Kitney, G. 'Poll Coup for the Far Right'; The Age 5 October 1999.


44 The current European states in which the extreme right has increased its electoral success in the last decade include Austria, Switzerland, Belgium and Germany – see ‘Fascism resurgent?’ The Economist October 9th - 15th 1999, 61.
In spring 1997 33% of European respondents described themselves as ‘quite racist’ or ‘very racist’. Further only one in three of those interviewed felt that they were ‘not at all racist’. Paradoxically, the feelings of racisim coexist with a strong belief in the democratic system and respect for civic-based fundamental rights and freedoms. Such a degree of exclusion may have more to do with the fear of the diminution of pre-existent European rights and security, rather than with an absolute rejection on enthnolinguistic grounds, of the ‘other’. As the EC found, the expression of this degree of exclusion is attributable to fear of unemployment, low confidence in political authorities and insecurity about the future.

The Effects of Globalisation on Localism/Nationalism - Globalism influences the return of ethnic conceptions of nation in three main ways. Firstly it enhances the nation by accentuating people’s needs for a heightened tangible and local form of cultural or enthnolinguistic identification. In this way, the Welsh and Scottish in the United Kingdom or the Northern League in Italy reacted to the perceived diffusion of their culture under the forces of increased interaction with other cultures and economies, by appealing to a common cultural identity. This articulates itself in calls for independence, separation and political sovereignty to reflect the perceived cultural independence of their respective regions.

Secondly, ethnic nationalism emerges as a means of gaining control in a global climate in which economic and political factors are beyond the practical control of individual states, let alone smaller regional groupings or ethnic communities. Thus the Northern League want to ‘go it alone’ within the context of membership of the

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45 See European Commission, Employment, Industrial Relations and Social Affairs Directorate (DGV) Commission of the European Communities Eurobarometer Opinion Poll no 47.1

46 Ibid.

47 The basis of European exclusion, which we argue is rooted in economic and security grounds, will be further explored in chapter nine.

48 Those directly hostile to other groups are hostile for economic, not ethnic or linguistic grounds thus demonstrating our argument of the correlation between security and identity in contemporary Europe.
European Union convinced that the rest of Italy is restraining the region from its rightful economic prosperity and cultural flowering.\(^{49}\)

Thirdly, globalisation allows greater, not lesser identification with ethnicity and other forms of identity through communications technology such as the Internet, low cost computer publishing, lower-cost telecommunications and specialist ethnic pay television. The use of these media to generate nationalist sentiment has also been significant.\(^{50}\)

6.3 Institutional Retardants of A European Identity

6.3.1 Supranational Europe - Developmental Problems

The evolution of a pan-European sense of community and solidarity, is, as we have argued, dependant upon the development of effective pan-European institutions, European policy, and practical, positive outcomes which are directly relevant and of direct interest to Europeans. Both the difficulties in achieving a suitable administrative structure, and the highly public tensions between elements within the European polity, dilute the credibility of the polity and, most significantly, undermine a sense of belonging necessary for the articulation of European identification.\(^{51}\)

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\(^{49}\) Clearly such an accentuation of localism in the context of a supportive EU may have the effect of engendering a European identity under circumstances where resistance to the state is greater that that of the supranation. See Hoffmann S. 1966 'Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of The Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe' Daedalus. Vol 95 No,3 Summer 1966, 862- 915.

\(^{50}\) Barber, B. Jihad vs McWorld. Reproduced in School of Government, Introduction to World Politics (reader) (Hobart: University of Tasmania 1998), 18.

\(^{51}\) It is paradoxical to note that the very process of European integration is acting to create socio-political space for new configurations of identity to emerge, some of which are incompatible with the emergence of European identification. We have noted that the integrative process associated with capital, culture and security arrangements in the post-war period has acted to significantly disenfranchise the modern repository of communal identity - the state. The process of economic interdependence, social interpenetration and trans-state strategic engagement has presented difficulties for European states in their attempt to maintain loyalty and a sense of identity from amongst their populations. The process of European economic, social, security, administrative integration, in concert with the non-institutional factors discussed earlier in this Chapter, has largely decoupled the relationship between state and society from which collective identity is derived. If it is accepted that states depend upon their paramount economic, coercive, and administrative powers to engender a sense of nationhood and national identity, then their current manifest failures in these areas are creating room for new modes of sub-national and supranational identity to emerge. Examples are not hard to find, previously submerged proto-nations such as the Scots, the Basques and the Catalans have asserted their cultural independence within the European polity. Other clusters of identity, the environmental movement, the Women's movement and even the anti-Europe movement are finding legitimacy in the
European integration is faced with a number of critical problems, which, if not fully addressed, may make the hope of closer union unattainable. Questions central to the development of the European polity are unresolved - European enlargement, the related issue of the reform to the CAP, the question of cross-border crime and illegal immigration and a meaningful common security policy are examples of the impasse in much of European policy dialogue. This invokes incredulity and feelings of insecurity from amongst ordinary Europeans. The implications of such an impasse are two-fold. Firstly, unless current European developmental problems can be overcome the Union will not move towards a more state-like structure and in essence would become a loosely knit grouping of states restricted to essentially economic policy. Secondly, and more importantly, Europe would remain a collection of sub-groups with sub-loyalties and allegiances, thus denying a sense of collective European identity. Some of the main developmental issues include:

1. The EU's institutions are over-extended. Originally set up for six member countries, they must now cater for a membership of 12, which may soon rise to 20 or 25;
2. A growing differentiation of interests between member states, fuelled by differences in the level of socio-economic development, which threatens to obscure the basic commonality of interests and which may result in a two-speed or variable geometry Europe;
3. Different perceptions of internal and external priorities in a European Union which is geographically divergent;


53 As demonstrated in the Commission of the European Communities Eurobarometer Survey results which consistently outline Europeans unease with institutional integration.
4. The process of profound structural economic change, including mass unemployment, overextended social welfare systems and the more general massification of European society;

5. An increase in regressive nationalism in most member countries, which results from deep-seated fears and anxieties caused by the perceived failure of modern society to protect values, provide economic security, and to restrict access by 'the other' (mostly taking the form of resistance to migration) The nation-state and the myth of nation are seen as solutions to such problems; and

6. The highly debilitating effect of the enormous demands placed on National governments and their seemingly inability to deal with such demands, while at the same time playing the 'national self-determination' card against European integration.54

While many Europeans are eager to accept the benefits of a further integrated Europe, they are less interested in the tension between the elements within the EU.55 Unresolved questions of institutional reform have been most recently illuminated by the political impasse between the European Commissioners and the European Parliament. Superficially over the matter of corruption amongst European Commissioners, but fundamentally concerned with the issue of the Parliament's actual and moral power to remove individual Commissioners, it revealed not only a fracture in European institutionalism, but more significantly gave ammunition to those sceptical of the European polity. Similar institutional and structural difficulties such as the reform of the CAP, the impasse over foreign and security affairs and unemployment further illustrate the significant challenges facing supranational Europe and the present lack of institutional 'fit' between the institutions, their powers and substantive pan-European issues.


55 We have to look only to the generally favourable response that the euro has had from amongst European citizens and contrast this with the generally negative reaction to the absence of substantive democratic mechanisms over the European Executive - the European Commission, to illustrate this difference in perception and attitude.
Europeans have demonstrated that in those circumstances where the Union has successfully implemented policy with the active cooperation of all the institutions, such as in the case of the Single Market, support for the European project has been positive. This can be contrasted with those instances where there has been a perception that the Union has proven institutionally deficient to deal with substantive pan-European problems — and support for European institutions and integration has declined.\(^6\) Rather than Europeans turning to identify with Europe as a consequence of its functional efficiency and institutional harmony, they are, in part, turning away from it in contempt at the politics of integration. As Mace remarks:

“The EU is like any huge political machine - out of touch with the people. But much bigger than most, the neglect and inefficiency is much worse too. I want to be part of Europe but quite frankly find it a terrifying experience because of the dislocation and lack of understanding of those in charge.”\(^57\)

6.3.2 The Democratic and Information Deficit

“...the EU is basically out of touch, because it’s only really interested in talking to those who are already convinced of the rightness of Brussels' vision of Europe. If you are not convinced of the basic wisdom of Brussels, then Brussels is interested neither in talking to you or hearing from you ...”\(^58\)

The Democratic Deficit - We considered earlier in this work the positive effect of meaningful participative and representative mechanisms on the development of communal identity. The absence of democratic participation in the European Union, notwithstanding the development of European citizenship, significantly detracts from

\(^{56}\) See Commission of the European Communities Eurobarometer 40 December 1993, VII -X.


\(^{58}\) Livesay, J. BBC News 'Talking Point' 1 May 1998 at http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/talking_point/newsid_84000/84420.asp, p2. Such a view of the democratic process can be measured against, that which we suggest is a foundational expression of it, from Hobbes: “A Common-wealth is said to be Instituted, when a Multitude of Men do Agree and Covenant, every one, with every one, that to whatsoever man, or assembly of men shall be given by the major part, the Right to Present the Person of them all, (that is to say, to be their representative;) every one, as well he that Voted for it, as he that voted against it, shall Authorise all the Actions and Judgements, of that Man, or Assembly of men, in the same manner, as if they were his own, to the end, to live peaceably amongst themselves, and be protected against other men. . . . From this Institution of a Common-Wealth are derived all the Rights and Faculties of him, or them, on whom the Soveraigne Power is conferred by the consent of the People assembled.” See Hobbes, T. The Leviathan (1651) Chapter XV111, 228-229.
the development of a strong sense of European belonging amongst Europeans. It has
been widely argued that the EU institutions that have emerged since the end of the
Second World War suffer from a profound 'democratic deficit'.

Progress towards the integration of Europe was, in part, an elite driven process in
which the active and sustained consent and involvement of the people was neither
sought nor necessarily welcomed. However, with the deepening of European
integrative processes the scope of decisions taken, and the number of individual
Europeans effected by such decisions, calls for legitimate popular participation
increased. Despite the fact that increased efforts have been made to improve the
amount of information available about European policy, little has been done to
increase the power of individual Europeans to influence such policy. While the
European Commission has argued strongly that its decisions are in the interests of the
European citizen, critics suggest that there is a strong element of hollowness and
paternalism in these claims. This is particularly so in circumstances where individual
citizens are denied the opportunity to actively participate in the decision making
process and to give supranational Europe an aura of democratic legitimacy.

The cause of the 'democratic deficit' is the nature of governance upon which the initial
process of European integration was based. Decision-makers within the system are the
member states, not individual Europeans. The European Council has largely taken
decisions on policy with little input from individual citizens. Despite the fact that the
citizens of the Union have directly elected the European Parliament since 1979 its
functional impotence has simply highlighted rather than lessened the perception of
institutional Europe being controlled and moulded by unaccountable elites.

The limited jurisdictions of the European Parliament, notwithstanding the co-decision
reforms, lessen the linkages between European citizens and the European political

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59 A leading example of such an argument is given by Williams, S. 1991. 'Sovereignty and
Accountability in the European Community' in Keohane, R. & Hoffmann, S. The New European
Community: Decision making and Institutional Change., 155-176.

60 See: 'A Survey of Europe – A work in Progress' The Economist October 23rd-29th 1999

61 Reforms resulting from the Parliament's actions against the European Commission in early
1999 may mitigate against this in the long term.
elite. The locus of power within supranational Europe, at least up until the reforms in 1999, has been the unelected Commission, not the popularly mandated Parliament. While the introduction of the co-decision procedure (article 189b of the EC Treaty) attempted to overcome the substantially undemocratic nature of much of European decision making, there still exists a wide range of policy areas where consultation between the Council and the European Parliament remains optional. Beyond matters associated with the single market, the Council remains unaccountable to the citizens of Europe. This lack of accountability, as a consequence of the 'democratic' deficit significantly dilutes the opportunity for the creation of a sense of loyalty and affection for Europe amongst Europeans.62

In this context it is not surprising that Europeans believe that Europe is unresponsive. In a recent survey, conducted by the British Broadcasting Corporation in response to the question;

'Is the European Union sufficiently answerable to its citizens?'

Only 12% answered in the affirmative, the balance in the negative. The absence of a perception of democratic accountability is strong. As one respondent to the survey commented:

"The European Union needs a good dose of democracy with a strong democratic European Parliament. It is wrong that decisions affecting nearly 400 million people should be made by non-elected bankers or a small group of ministers from each member state. Governments are afraid of losing power to a strong European Parliament that might do things that the people of Europe really want. Roll on a truly federal and democratic Europe."

Without the legitimising and broadening effect of meaningful popular participation and democratisation the emergence of allegiances to, and affections for, supranational Europe from its citizenship is unlikely. Without inclusive participation a boundary will be established discriminating between European apparatchiks and ordinary European citizens. Just as in the experience of individual sovereign states in the nineteenth century, the realisation of practical democratisation amongst states

62 Commission of the European Communities Europe from A to Z: Guide to European Integration., 184.

incrementally improved the legitimacy and loyalty to them from amongst their populations.\textsuperscript{64}

Both the reality and, perhaps more significantly, the perception of the democratic malaise of European integration poses a direct threat to the emergence of a European sense of community and belonging. Firstly as it is perceived as being exclusionary to the European citizen body and secondly to the extent to which public Eurosceptics are able to manipulate their national constituents against the Union and the ideal of union.\textsuperscript{65}

Union governance, according to its critics, distorts the traditional balance between the executive and legislative arms of government. In so doing it prevents the effective representation of individual interests. A key feature of the classical democratic process within the state system is that the executive branch of Government is responsible to a Parliament and the Parliament then is accountable to the people. When policy requires legislation it must work through the 'public space' of Parliament. Further the Parliament, theoretically, gives the people a forum for the sharing of information, communication and provides the ultimate legitimisation and reference point between the people and institutional political elites. Such a model of democratic representation is at odds with the structure of Union governance.

The executive branch of the Union, The Council of Ministers, has an ever-widening jurisdiction over European public policy. The legislative arm of the Union, the

\textsuperscript{64} The reality of the absence of democratic control over the European executive has developed its own mythology, skilfully exploited by the Eurosceptics, of whom a notable example is the British author and avowed Euro sceptic Fredrich Forsyth:

"In the EU more and more real, effective power is passing steadily from national governments to the Commission in Brussels, the judges of Luxembourg and (soon) the bankers of Frankfurt. In the proposed governmental structures, parliamentary democracy is not even on the menu. Ten, 15 years from now there will be nothing for the elected regional governments to do but collect the traffic fines, rearrange the park benches and obey the orders passed down from the apparat." . . . "The new order may be efficient (which I doubt) but it will not be a democracy and not a state most of my fellow Countrymen wish to live in." see Forsyth, F. "The Choice: nation state or superstate.", 55.

\textsuperscript{65} The effect of the British Eurosceptics, including not an inconsiderable number within the Tory party, and their effect on British resistance to European integration, most particularly during the 1980s and first half of the 1990s is the most obvious example of this process.
European Parliament, does not however reflect the powers of a national counterpart. Not only is the Parliament relatively powerless to effect the decisions of the Council or the Commission (although this situation has improved in recent times) the technical ability of Members of the European Parliament to represent the views of their constituents is compromised by the large size of the EP.

The Union, especially in the period leading up to the TEU, has suffered from serious democratic deficiencies in its mode of governance. The cleavage between the 1992 plan and the Single European Act on one hand, and on the other, a general acceptance of Europe, but a lack of commitment and understanding has lead to that which Weiler has described as a: "transnational psychosis". This phenomenon is created by the cleavage between formal legal legitimacy and general popular participation and acceptance. Since Maastricht the legitimacy/illegitimacy debate has altered the prospects for a European identity for the worse. There is clear evidence, most readily observable in the Commission of the European Communities Eurobarometer series, that general public opinion has taken a far more sceptical and critical approach to the creation of the European supranation.

The European Information Deficit

"A lot of people throughout Europe have suddenly realised that they know hardly anything about the Maastricht Treaty, while rightly sensing that it could make a huge difference to their lives."

The development of a communal European identity is also weakened as a result of the perceived obscurity and remoteness of information concerning the European project.

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66 The wholesale replacement of the Commission as a consequence of the lack of confidence expressed in it by the European Parliament in 1998, may be the decisive turning point in the affirmation of the powers of the European Parliament.

67 Evidence of this can be found in European unhappiness with the amount of information available to them, lower levels of trust of EU institutions than national ones and ambivalence to a number of non-economic policy initiatives. See Commission of the European Communities Eurobarometer 48 and 49 in particular

In short information made available to Europeans, according to many Europeans, needs to be simpler and clearer. 69

Empirical evidence suggests an information disjuncture between European institutions and European citizens. Europeans are less well informed about the workings of the European Union than they are about their own national government. When asked the identical question referring to the (national) government and then to the European Union the following results have been obtained:

Table 6.1 Feeling Informed About National Government and European Union Institutions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale</th>
<th>% Knowing National Government</th>
<th>% Knowing European Union</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very Well</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quite Well</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Very Well</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not at all Well</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Commission of the European Communities Eurobarometer 47, 47

While few people claim to know either their own government or the European Union 'very well', it is clear that nearly half of all respondents have a reasonable knowledge of their own country's government. However only one in five have the same confidence in their understanding of the European Union. If we consider further results from the Commission of the European Communities Eurobarometer series we find that a very high percentage of Europeans feel that they need to know a lot more about Europe. As the figure below outlines:

The desire to know more was strongest in France, Portugal, Italy and the United Kingdom. Countries which stated that they were happy with the information that they already had were Belgium, Ireland, Austria and Germany – such States having higher than average levels of belonging to Europe. In the group claiming to 'feel informed' there was an even stronger demand for additional information (44% for the informed as opposed to 39% for the not informed). Further, there was a greater desire to learn more amongst those groups that had a positive attitude to their country's membership. Analysis shows a correlation between those who seek more information are those who have been come to be seen as more 'pro-European': the better educated, managerial, those to the left of the political spectrum and opinion leaders. Interestingly, low media users do not feel that they need any additional information as they are happy with the level of information that they already have.70

European youth display a similar degree of ignorance on European matters. When the question is put to them: "All things considered, would you say that people like yourself are sufficiently or are not sufficiently well informed about the problems dealt with by the European Community?" 71% of those 15-19 year olds said that they were not sufficiently well informed. It was concluded by the European Commission that:

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70 Commission of the European Communities Eurobarometer 47, Spring 1997, 48.
'Their feeling of being not sufficiently well informed seems to be directed against the information itself and is not derived from any intellectual laziness on their part.'

A further study found that only one European in four felt that they had a good grasp of the EC. A further indication of the information (and thus credibility) gap amongst Europeans was the absence of any answer from amongst 70 percent of respondents as to their impression of the Commission. Hewstone concluded that:

"Overall, few respondents mentioned the more specific ideas behind the Community. Very general ideas predominated and are found in nearly half the respondents, but more exact information is held only by a minority of respondents and its content varies across countries."

The results of these studies provide striking evidence of a lack of knowledge within the respondent's cognitive map of the Union.

Reasons for such a low level of European awareness and consciousness may be explained with reference to four factors. Firstly, knowledge of politics and political processes is generally low amongst Europeans, without fundamental civic education it is not surprising that there is a low awareness. Secondly, as Europeans are limited in their practical and direct participation in European decision making their consciousness of Europe is correspondingly low. Thirdly, according to Dekker, opinions and attitudes with regard to the European Community are not favourable for the acquisition of additional knowledge. Fourthly, there are only limited opportunities for people to have their consciousness raised on Europe and European matters. It is not surprising that European awareness is low in the circumstance where they have not had any direct 'European' political socialisation (whether in the form of formal education or state-sponsored media or communication).

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71 Commission of the European Communities The Young Europeans TYE82 (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities 1982,) 129.


73 Ibid., 104.

6.3.3 The European Decision Making Process

Where global influences are towards simplifying and streamlining decision making processes, the growth of the European Union has paradoxically necessitated a far more complex and intricate set of decision making processes, to deal with the complexities of enlargement and the differing political motivations and aspirations of member states. The five largest states (Germany, France, Italy, Britain and Spain), contain 80 percent of the population of the Union, but have only just over half of the votes in the Council.\(^\text{75}\) If the current applicants for membership to the Union were admitted without a revision to voting weights, the influence of these key states would fall further. It would resultant in the paralysis of decision-making procedures, with the possible effective disenfranchisement of the larger, more populous and economically significant European states, with a resultant lessening of European identification. Additionally, as greater numbers of non-core (at least in economic terms) states join the Union those poorer European states receiving capital transfers from the larger, more affluent, core states will shift from four out of the present 15 to a majority. The long-term sustainability of this outcome is doubtful. It may lead to resentment from amongst the populations of the larger European states to the newer, weaker members of the Union, and also more significantly, to raise questions as to the value and cohesion of the Union in its entirety.

Adjustments to the voting weight of member states in the Council is overshadowed by the weight of numbers. If the Union enlarges to the East and South East then the balance and symmetry of the European polity will be effected. The former communist Europe contains almost as many states as the traditional capitalist states of the West.\(^\text{76}\) This growth would, without revision to the current decision-making and voting regime, lead to institutional deadlock. This would in turn threaten the positive affection and identity with Europe from amongst its citizens. Europe, at the


\(^{76}\) According to Anderson, sixteen in the 'East' and seventeen in the 'West' if Switzerland is included. Ibid.
institutional level, could grow to assume absurd and completely unworkable proportions. 77 As Anderson suggests:

“The legendary complexity of the already existing system, with its meticulous rotations of commissarial office, laborious intergovernmental bargains and assorted ministerial and parliamentary vetos, would be overloaded to the point of paralysis.”78

The effect of these potentially cumbersome political arrangements on the evolution of a sense of European loyalty is negative. EU widening, without institutional reform to turn the Union into a 'tighter' and more coherent polity, may lead to functional unravelling and the acceleration of the negative perceptions amongst Europeans as to the administration and purposes of the European polity. Europeans already find the political processes remote and cumbersome. Only 37% of Europeans for example believe that the European Parliament has the ability to protect citizens rights, this result reveals a basis weakness in the institutions of the EU considering that the European Parliament is the most respected of the institutions of the EU. 79 Europeans might find the over-politicisation and weakening decision making difficult to support and would be less sympathetic to the institutional elements of Europe, and possibly, given the correlation between European enlargement and the sense of ambivalence to European integration, to the whole European ideal itself.80 At a time when the evolution of governments and administrative apparatus are supposed to be becoming smaller, more efficient and more resourceful, the perception of a bloated, ineffective and indecisive European Union has the effect of ostracising Europeans from the European project.81

77 As Anderson points out, the European Parliament could grow to eight hundred deputies, and the number of Commissioners would grow to forty. A ten minute introductory speech by each Minister attending a Council meeting could last five hours. Only then would substantive business commence.

78 Anderson, P. “The Europe to Come” in The Question of Europe, 143.

79 Commission of the European Communities Eurobarometer 51, 84.

80 Such an argument is based upon Commission of the European Communities Eurobarometer survey results which demonstrate Europeans ill-ease with increased institutional complexity and unaccountability.

81 As Commission of the European Communities Eurobarometer has found the European public perception is that the largest percentage of the EU budget is expended on decision making processes, paying for officials and the administrative infrastructure of the EU. In reality the administration of the
Europeans are united in their suspicions of European economic policy and decision making processes being removed from their influence. Seventy Three percent of Europeans believe that the European Central Bank should be accountable to the European Parliament for its decisions. The same percentage believes that the European Commission (President and Commissioners) should have the Parliament’s support or resign. These results confirm the importance to Europeans of transparency and accountability in decision making and the erosive effects of the absence of such qualities on European community building. The more states enter the European polity, without commensurate institutional and decision-making reform, and the degree to which the European Commission and its Commissioners are perceived as being removed from democratic accountability, the greater the likelihood of distorted outcomes and profound indeterminacy, and the greater potential for antipathy amongst European citizens. Europeans have shown over an extended period of time, to be willing to disengage from ‘Europe’ if they perceive that its decision making processes are flawed. The continuing low level of support for the European Commission, relative to the other institutions of the EU, and the increasing support for institutional reform demonstrate this. In spring 1999, 52% of EU citizens believed that reform of EU institutions was a priority, an increase over the preceding period of 3 percent. Further, Europeans express considerably more trust in the (democratic) European Parliament (50%) than they do in the European Commission and the Council of Ministers (30%) – the traditional target for criticism over closed and fragmented decision making in the EU.

The paradox of increasing regional potency, the practical absence of democratic processes and the sense of individual disempowerment have had a number of practical effects. Firstly it contributes to the phenomenon of institutional delegitimation. The unaccountable European polity, as it takes on classical symbolic 'state' functions without popular representation, results in the phenomena in which Europe is seen as

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81 Commission of the European Communities Eurobarometer 51, 16.

82 Commission of the European Communities Eurobarometer 51, 57.

83 Commission of the European Communities Eurobarometer 51, iii.
foreign and out of touch with everyday living and working conditions. Secondly, the perception of an unaccountable Europe in which EU policy influence in 'domestic' spheres appear to be increasing, create a perception, in the absence of democratic processes, that there is no effective limit to the ability of the Union to reach into areas which were once considered the preserve of the state. This scenario makes the resolution of a European identity with a pre-existent national identity difficult, as empirical evidence suggests that Europeans are resistant to Europe insofar as it is perceived that Europe threatens pre-existent states and state-mediated national identities.84

6.3.4 The Economic Failures of Europe

Europe's Underclass and European Unemployment - There exists today in Europe a generation that was born and has matured in an environment of systemic unemployment. In the first 25 years after the end of the Second World War, Europe was characterised by high growth and full employment. A period that has been referred to as: "mystical golden age of welfare capitalism."85

Full wage employment, welfare provision and the norm of a nuclear family with a single bread-winner has given way to significant economic and social disruption and growing insecurity. This phenomenon is particularly acute in those core European states, including Germany and France, where strong growth and full employment characterised the three decades after the end of the Second World War. Since the 1970s a fundamental change has occurred in Western Europe. The reorientation of Europe to the global economy, trade liberalisation, inflation maintenance and the reduction of social infrastructure has had significant social-economic effects. Social welfare, the maintenance of an economically unified and resilient community, via government interaction, while still the rhetorical objective of national governments, has been subsumed by Governments eager to roll back welfare and protective provisions to better 'compete' in a global market. As Standing remarks:

84 Refer to Chapter Two.

"Those looking back on the history of the second half of the twentieth century will note that the cherished social objectives in the postwar era became perceived by mainstream policy-makers as 'costs' to be avoided in the last two decades of the century." 86

The agenda of flexible labour markets, global best practice and the internationalisation of economies, is leading to the greater casualisation of the European labour market. Intermediated labour-force participation, especially amongst women, the erosion of the union movement and the tacit acceptance of inter-generational unemployment by political elites have had corrosive effects on personal security and identity. 87 Insecurity corrodes morale and at worst induces anomic despair in those not blessed by good education, good contacts, youth or those who are members of a minority. We have remarked in Chapter Two as to how, in modern industrial society, identity is centrally linked to occupation. For that increasing proportion of Europeans without work, or in a position of marginal employment, collective identity creation and maintenance becomes problematic. Further the unemployed (or underemployed) are often excluded from social life as result of their reduced consumption patterns, their inability to secure adequate education, health and housing and their marginal attractiveness to mainstream political groups. Such exclusion is contrary to the collective intergroup interaction and collective sense of belonging. This phenomena is most acutely experienced amongst Europe’s ‘underclass’.

The emergence of an economic and social “underclass” has been promoted by incidence of long-term unemployment, prolonged periods of low economic growth, the reduction in real wages and the polarisation of the socio-economic fabric of

86 Ibid., 203.

87 As E. Fitzgerald, the Irish minister of Labour Affairs, remarked in 1996:

“You can go to any school in Ireland and mark out certain four-year-olds with long-term unemployment written all over them.”

The economic and social cohesion, which predominated in the Europe of the 1950s, 1960s and early 1970s, is giving way to one in which extremes of economic, political and social opportunity and influence are being exhibited.

There is a direct relationship between European macro-economic change - primarily de-industrialisation, the shift to knowledge-based service industries and the growth of the urban underclass. Due to a range of sociopolitical changes during the 1980s there has been a threat to the ideals of participatory citizenship. Such a threat is heightened by the EU’s perceived remoteness and lack of access for the majority of Europeans most especially those in the lower socioeconomic groupings.

Despite the increasing creation of goods and services many members of European society have lost practical access to them. There has been rapid growth in neo-liberal political ideology, most recently demonstrated in Austria, creating justificatory regimes for placing restrictions on entitlements to social services. These have produced an underclass of economically disadvantaged, of permanently unemployed and underprivileged groups. Significantly these characteristics are disproportionately represented in European ethnic minorities. These people have lost regular and guaranteed access to the labour market, to the political community and to networks of legitimate social ties. Western society has become progressively more exclusionist.

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88 The term “underclass” lacks precise definition. It alternatively has been described as the: "estranged poor" and encompassing a situation where a group of people from a common ethnic and cultural background are excluded from the labour market. They have little prospect of finding employment and show no sign of intra or inter-generational upward mobility. There is some difficulty in assessing the precise development or characteristics of the European underclass. It is associated with the reduction in social, economic and effective civil rights caused by the massive transfer of wealth from the poor to the rich during the last ten years. See Omatsu, G. Amerasia Journal - 1991 Selected Bibliography. 17, No. 3, (Fall 1991), 83-169.

89 A recent exposition of this process is given by MacDonald et al in Youth, the ‘underclass’ and social exclusion. (London: Routledge 1997).


91 Such neo-liberal ideology is an amalgam of economic and socio-political narratives which, according to Bosanquet, champions the integrating effect of the market within society, producing order, justice, economic growth and constantly rising incomes, including those of the poorest. According to this paradigm inequality is the inevitable (and beneficial) outcome of individual freedom and interests. see Bosanquet ‘After the right’ quoted in Levitas, R. The Ideology of the New Right. (Oxford: Polity Press 1986), 2.
and has intensified the marginal socioeconomic position of these peoples. Further, the efforts made by the European Union member states to align their macro-economic outcomes with the convergence criteria necessary for the single currency has resulted in the decline in living standards for those most reliant upon diminishing member state expenditure. Such a process being described as "Human set-aside." Making Europe fit for EMU has had the effect of reducing the economic security of many Europeans. In such a context of instability, identification with Europe is highly problematic.

The underclasses lack of broad social, political (and by definition economic) assimilation provides a serious challenge to the emergence of a European identity. Communal identity formation is, in part, dependent upon cooperative intergroup interaction, in-group favouritism and a sense of communal belonging. The underclass do not exhibit the range and intensity of social, political or economic interactions with the wider European community. They are part of an economic and social 'out-group' and they lack the integrative sense of belonging that defines a common community and common identity. Further while the development of economic, social and political security and rights enhances common collective identification the absence of such rights and security diminishes communal identification. Why would those who are structurally prevented from exercising their economic or social rights, in effect becoming second class citizens, seek to positively align themselves with political and economic structures that appear to exclude them?

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94 New technologies, shifts in global economics and the transfer of information have further reinforced the exclusion of the European underclass and revealed the fragmentation of traditional allegiances and identities. Evidence of this process is found in various manifestations. The increased technological competence and social mobility of economically active Europeans has reinforced European identity amongst such groups as identity in the social world is defined by the intensity of social, political and economic relationships as subject, consumer and national member.

95 Auletta has identified four primary underclass groups;
1. The passive poor, usually long term welfare recipients
2. The hostile street criminals, drop-outs and drug addicts
apparatus of the emergent European supranational polity to provide the underclass with a sense of inclusion and practical economic participation creates the potential for a backlash against the European project and active resistance to it amongst significant numbers of Europeans.

Let us look in greater detail as to the nature of European unemployment. In 1997 more than 18 million people in the European Union were unemployed. More concerning is the fact that 40% of those 18 million have been unemployed for more than a year. (This figure compares with the United States where only 11% are in a comparable position.)

As the figure below illustrates, European unemployment while remaining benign during the period of rapid growth up until the early 1970s has growth rapidly since then, It has only been since the mid-1990s that the rate of unemployment in Europe has stabilised, but at a rate far higher than previously experienced in the post-war period, and significantly considerably higher than Europe’s main trading competitors.

**Figure 6.2 Trends in European Unemployment 1960-1997**

Source: European Commission: *European Economy* 1997, no 64 pp68-69

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3. The hustlers, dependant upon the underground economy, but rarely involved in violent crime
4. The traumatized drunks, homeless bag ladies and released mental patients.

In 1960 the unemployment rate across those states which now make up the European Union states was just over 2 percent. In 1995 it averaged 10.9%. The effect of this has been to curb collective European identification most particularly in those heavily industrialized states, such as Germany and France in which the effects of unemployment and economic restructuring have been most acutely felt. While the efficiencies flowing from the integration of the European economic space are having a positive effect on the European marketplace, certainly insofar as it is internationally competitive, the unemployment problem, most especially in those 'core' European states such a Germany and France, has reduced the shift to European consciousness.

Focusing on the German and French examples to demonstrate the correlation between increased economic insecurity, manifested in escalating unemployment, and support for European integration and European identification. During the 1950s and 1960s both Germany and France led European post-war reconstruction and economic growth. Germany's growth was 4.3% during the 1961-1973 period, while growth in France was 5.4%. Employment was strong, and unemployment was inconsequential (Germany's unemployment rate averaged 0.7% and France's 2.0% during this period). In the two decades following the oil crisis of the early 1970's the French and German economies went into relative decline. Growth in Germany fell to 1.7% and unemployment grew to 4.4% and in France growth slowed to 2.2% and unemployment grew to 6.4% in the decade 1974 – 1985. Neither recovered the resilience in economic or employment growth that they had enjoyed in the immediate post war period. Mirroring this economic slow down, support for Europe and European identification likewise stabilised. As the figures below demonstrate neither the Germans nor the French when compared with the rapidly growing economies of peripheral Europe have maintained their level of support for Europe not their sense of communal identification.

Considering first the relationship between European unemployment and perceptions of benefit amongst Europeans from EU membership there is an inverse correlation

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between unemployment and perceptions amongst Europeans of benefit from EU membership. In France and Germany as unemployment increased between 1983 and 1998 perceptions of benefit from EU membership fell. Whereas in the peripheral European states, such as Greece and Ireland, as unemployment fell during the same period, positive perceptions of Europe increased. Thus European unemployment can be seen as detrimentally effecting support for the European project.

**Figure 6.3 European Unemployment and Perception of European Benefit**

Sources: European Commission: *European Economy* 1999 Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs & Commission of the European Communities Eurobarometer 42,44,46,47 &48

Considering the relationship between European identification and European unemployment we find that as unemployment in Europe intensified in the core European states in the 1990s feelings of European identity fell in those states. Whereas in Ireland where unemployment fell during the same period, such European identification remained relatively stable. As the figures below demonstrate:
Figure 6.4 Germany – European Identification and Unemployment 1995-1998

Source: Sources: European Commission: Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs European Economy 1999 Commission of the European Communities Eurobarometer 42,44,46,47 &48

Figure 6.5 France – European Identification and Unemployment 1995-1998

Source: Sources: European Commission: Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs European Economy 1999 Commission of the European Communities Eurobarometer 42,44,46,47 &48
European Economic Convergence - EMU and Other Concerns - The European Treaty focus on economic convergence and the reduction of European inflation at all costs is proving to be socially dysfunctional. The political resources of the EU are being directed on a fight against inflation and public debt at a time when inflation has ceased to be a major problem in most European countries and public debt only slightly more so. The result of the almost exclusive focus on the convergence criteria for economic prosperity may prove to be self-defeating insofar as economic progress towards the European project, no matter how superficially impressive, may have significant social costs that contribute to attitudinal fractures within the common European Home.

By focusing on economic policies and narrowing social objectives to fit within these policies, a widespread anti-European backlash, as experienced most publicly in France in the mid-1990s has occurred. The most important example is the attenuation of the employment strategy developed by the Commission in 1994. The failure to
carry through such measures carries major political and conceptual difficulties for the Union. Europeans, most notably the French, have experienced the detrimental effect of the convergence program on employment, welfare and social stability. In this context of perceived economic myopia where the construction of the politico-economic edifice of Europe is perceived as being removed from the concerns and anxieties of ordinary Europeans, then ‘Europe’ itself will threaten individual loyalty towards it.

Demonstrating the corrosive effect of the costs of convergence on support for the European project is straightforward. We have only to look to reactions to a hypothetical abandonment of the EU amongst states between 1971 and 1993 to demonstrate the increasing dissatisfaction, most particularly from the core EU states, where the costs of the Union are centered. While in 1971 five percent of the French would have been relieved if the EC had been abandoned, by 1993 this figure had increased by 280% to 14% of the French population surveyed. In Germany the figure increased from seven to nine percent. This contrasted with the peripheral of Europe where economic redistribution from Europe had been principally experienced. In 1981, 18% of Greeks surveyed would have been relieved if the EU had been abandoned, whereas by 1993 this figure had reduced to only 5 percent. In Ireland the reduction was from 17 to five percent and in Portugal from eight to seven percent.99 Thus in those states where the ‘costs of Europe’ have been perceived as outweighing the costs of non-Europe support for the European project has faltered, as has the consolidation of European identification, as we examined earlier.

The speed with which European economic convergence is occurring and the inability of considerable numbers of European citizens to recognise the value of the process is aptly described in a letter written by a 'ordinary' European citizen to The European in late 1996:

“Our leaders may wish to go down as the first men to unite Europe since Charlemagne, but is it reasonable to expect 350 million people to suffer for their ambition? To achieve the convergence criteria for a single currency would cost millions of jobs; there would be far fewer people paying taxes - or

buying the goods and services produced by the fortunate few still in work. Public services would be reduced and social unrest and crime would increase considerably."¹⁰⁰

The increasing phenomena of trans-national economic mergers and rationalisations, were actively facilitated by the single market, exemplified by Renault's European actions in February and March 1997 which lead to the loss of 3,100 automotive jobs in Belgium alone. These policies are stimulating a backlash against the economic imperatives of Europe. As Commission President Jacques Santer, commented that in the haste to create a single market, the EU had left other vital concerns such as social cohesion by the wayside: "with dramatic implications at times."¹⁰¹ The persuasive sense of economic insecurity created by the required efficiencies of the single market spreads beyond any single industry and effects much of Europe's industrial heartland. The rapid decline of the coal industry in Germany which currently receives significant subsidies, and which in Germany alone, employ 90,000 is another example.¹⁰²

The perceived failure of European leaders to adequately take account of the concerns of increasingly economically vulnerable Europeans as part of the integration process has the effect of limiting the positive a consciousness that Europeans will have of the single European Home. As Christian Democrat MEP Raphael Chanterie commented:

"An economic and monetary union without a social dimension is not acceptable to our citizens. Europe is already lagging a decade behind the single market in social terms"¹⁰³

The dynamics of Economic convergence and the potential for a European Identity – What do these economic failures of supranational Europe tell us about the possibility of the emergence of a positive European sentiment amongst European citizens? One


¹⁰² Under the German Government's plans, subsidies would be halved to the coal industry over an eight year period from Dm 10.1 billion to Dm 5.5 billion. The German coalminers Union; IG Bergbau, have estimated that such measures would result in the closure of seven of the existing 19 German coal mines and the loss of 55,000 jobs by the year 2005 from Paterson, T. 'Miners heap scorn on Cuts' The European 13-19 March 1997, 4.

¹⁰³ Ibid.
of the most palpable consequences of the differing economic circumstances of European states is the level of support or lack thereof, for further European integration.

The French experience is the clearest example of the European project souring as a result of the narrow drive for European economic convergence. It is ironic that France, one of the original champions of a united Europe should have experienced painful and disruptive effects of economic convergence. The election of President Jacques Chirac in 1995 saw the most rigorous attempt to prepare France for monetary Union by virtue of the introduction of stringent monetary policy. Economic performance stagnated, unemployment increased and social tensions became more apparent. This provoked a significant protest movement. Domestic economic policy was left little room to manoeuvre. The austerity programs introduced appeared to work only in favour of the French Extreme right-wing and anti-EU camps, which during the 1990s have steadily increased in size and influence.104.

The divisive effects of monetary integration are significant to the potential realisation of a common European consciousness. It was predicted that EMU in 1999 would split Europe into two zones, according to whether countries had met the convergence criteria or not. It is still too early to conclude whether this prognosis is correct, however if there were to be a slowing of the European economy it might be expected that the historical economic ‘fault lines’ between core and peripheral European performance might remerge. This situation will place demands not only on economic convergence, but more significantly on social cohesion and will detract from a communal sense of belonging. The divisions between EMU and non-EMU states will not only effect commercial and political relations but will create friction between EMU 'insiders' and 'outsiders'. This will occur at the inter-state level, as was the case with the process of negotiations leading up to the introduction of the Single Market. It will also have an effect at the regional level as it does presently in states such as Italy, and the United Kingdom, where economically prosperous regions stereotype and disparage economically weaker areas.

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The quest for economic convergence may have two detrimental effects on the potential for the emergence of an inclusive European identity. Firstly on the internal, state axis tensions within national communities will accentuate social and economic exclusion as states struggle to reorientate their economic policies in order to become eligible to join the EMU ‘club’. Secondly, as states strive at the inter-state level to qualify for EMU, those healthy and more robust (at least in economic terms) states will assume a greater sense of importance. Those non-participating states, and the citizens within those states, may well be stigmatised as less productive, economically stable and less progressive - even less “European”.105

The attempt by smaller, less affluent states to meet convergence criteria by restricting public spending and deficits, do not simply aggravate social tensions, but provide a decisive point of disjuncture between European’s ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’. As such the emergence of a common European identity and affinity in a two-tier Europe, with increasing internal and external monetary exclusion and a widening gap between affluent and poor at the individual and the state level, will largely negate the possibility for a sense of common European cohesion. Such a phenomena will be most publicly highlighted during periods of economic recession, where the stronger states will not only be able to maintain economic security and social protection while the peripheral European states, unless they receive ongoing support from the EU will languish, albeit in relative terms.

Reflecting the public alienation that such a process involves are Renwick’s comments:

“The euro will be an utter disaster for all those who attempt to join. How can nations as strong as Germany and France grow at the same rate as Greece or Spain? This lunacy will end in tears on a grand scale. All countries will lose their own right for self determination, we will have no control over our interest rates, over exchange rates and inflation control. Each country will have to follow the leader - a strong country - which will ultimately mean Germany. Within only a few years fiscal control policies will be placed on countries' income policies and what each Government can do to set its own budget. Before long, each country's parliament will be like a parish council, populated by stuffed suits on the gravy train, with no more power than where to plant the

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105 This stigmatisation may occur in the same way as those in Southern Italy are treated as less Italian and outsiders by those in the prosperous North of Italy.
national flower bed. When this happens, there will be no more United Kingdom, no point in electing people to Westminster, no national pride, no England football or Cricket teams, no Monarchy, no Britishness. Just an extension of the continent, lead by men with no merit intruding on the way the British people live their lives.”

6.4 Chapter Six - Concluding Remarks

In Chapter One we considered the nature of communal identity. We argued that identity exists where individuals categorise themselves as part of a collective based upon favourable comparisons with the in-group (and unfavourable comparisons with out-groups) Further communal identity is displayed by a common sense of belonging, cooperative intra-group interaction and functional relations. This Chapter has argued there are a range of political, economic, cultural and social factors —what we refer to as retardants, which are inhibiting the emergence of a European identity. This examination has outlined the factors as seemingly diverse as economic exclusion, institutional remoteness, the return of the ethnic nation and ideological divisions do that act to inhibit European identification. In those circumstances where there is real scepticism towards the European project, where large numbers of Europeans are substantially economically socially and politically disenfranchised, there is little doubt, based upon the material presented in this Chapter, that the evocation of a pan-European identity will be problematic.

The factors inhibiting the emergence of a European identity are both subtle and complex. Notwithstanding the institutional and non-institutional retardants outlined in this Chapter, the lure of the ethnic may be the most powerful. Smith, reinforcing his argument that communal identity is possible only from a basis of a common communal cultural or symbolic basis, has suggested that in the absence of a common; 'intense and durable' pan-European cultural identity, that a common form of European identity is unlikely. Smith argues:

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106 BBC NEWS 1998 'Talking Point'

“There is no European analogue to Bastille or Armistice Day, no European ceremony for the fallen in battle, no European shrine of Kings or saints. When it comes to the ritual and ceremony of collective identification, there is no European equivalent of national or religious community.”107

At the non-institutional level there appears to be both the disintegration of integrative societal forces of community, as evidenced in the massification of society, the development of an underclass and the decentring of the subject. The return to seemingly more ‘authentic’ indicators of identity, such as race, language or sexual orientation are being tracked by a general disentanglement of all metanarratives of community and the potential for the emergence of a nihilistic death of the subject itself. Cultural and consumer products, that may have historically provided a basis for collective mythologisation, are being distorted and manipulated by trans-national economic forces and their reconfigured state confirm the postmodern critique of double-coding, irony and dispersal both in objects as well as subjects.

On a more tangible level ambivalence towards the process of European convergence, and hostility to the emerging European political and economic elites, further make the advancement of a common European empathy uncertain. The very process of convergence may form a constellation of resentment towards Europe. As Ash suggests:

“The rationalist, functionalist, perfectionist attempt to 'make Europe' or 'complete' Europe through a hard core built around a rapid monetary union could well end up achieving the opposite of the desired effect. A procedure aimed at finally overcoming the bad old European ways of competing nation-states and alliances risks hastening a return to precisely those bad old ways. Press the fast-forward button and you go backwards.”108


Chapter Seven

Towards A Civic European Identity

7.1 Introductory Remarks

Over the course of the preceding Chapters we have established that supranationalism and identity are central concerns in late modernity. These issues are nowhere more pronounced than in contemporary Europe. Increasingly conspicuous in the international arena, and relevant to its citizens, the European polity is subject to two separate, yet related, phenomena. Firstly, an increase in the expression of popular nationalism, often ethnically based and intrinsically exclusionary, which is narrowing the scope of communal identification for a significant number of Europeans. Running parallel with this process is the development of a distinctive pan-European identity; characterised by its inclusive civic characteristics. An identity, as detailed in Chapter Five, influenced by the institutions and policy domains of the European supranation. Such a pan-European identity, as we shall consider in this Chapter and the following two, reflects a heightened sense of self-awareness amongst Europeans as being Europeans, and displaying itself in collective behaviours, values, symbols and predispositions, which are distinctively European in nature.

This Chapter, in association with Chapters Eight and Nine, demonstrate that the combination of a communal European consciousness, normative convergence, the collective recognition of a common set of European symbols, collective European interaction and relationships and a common European cognitive boundary form a coherent pattern of European identification. We shall operationalise the pre-established model of identity, as established in Chapter One, and demonstrate that there is a distinctive communal identity in contemporary Europe.

Two points must be emphasised prior to a detailed examination of European identification. Firstly, as our argument illustrates, identity is operationalised on a number of levels, and in a variety of ways. Communal identity is demonstrated not only in a collective form of self-description and communal expression of belonging, but it is also demonstrated by communal behaviours and the values and symbols that
underpin and support them. Identity is further demonstrated by the collective exclusion of members of a defined ‘out-group’. Accordingly this examination of identity is informed by a variety of data, and not limited to straightforward utterances of “Europeanness” from amongst contemporary Europeans. Secondly, it should be noted that we do not intend to establish the existence of an exclusive European identity, one that is exclusive of other signifiers, such a task is beyond the scope of this thesis (and probably unattainable). Rather we will demonstrate that a European identity exists amongst other nation, regional, local and social identities and that its existence is reliant upon the institutional management of the Ressentiment between the pre-existent constellation of identity. As Chris Rootes argues:

“The promise and the challenge of European integration is to build a new, European identity that will not replace but supplement existing national identities and that will make Europeans less anxious to cling to exclusionary national and ethnic identities whose existing political representations are less and less effective in protecting their interests in the modern world.”

We argue that the resentment, between the varying constellations of identification within Europe — regional, national and supranational, - is managed peacefully only because of the deliberate and systematic intervention of the institutions and policy domains of the European polity. European identity is characterised by a number of enduring characteristics. Firstly European identity is primarily functionally driven and structurally supported. Common European actions, values and a common European language, are, in practice, necessary in order for Europe to remain internally coherent and to effectively engage in a highly competitive global arena. Secondly, the form and structure of European governance has closely shaped and determined the nature of much of the European identity that we shall examine here. European self-awareness has been assisted by a common European political culture which itself has been facilitated by the dynamics of democratisation in Europe. Further, European identity has been positively effected by the nature and intensity of European linkages and relationships that have been made possible only by the liberalisation of European economic and social policy. The institutionalisation of the Four Freedoms and the active intervention of EU policy domains, in particular EU economic, social, regional

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1 Rootes, C. & Davis, H. Social Change and Political Transformation, 3.
and youth policies, have collectively mediated and accelerated the growth of intra-European networks.

This Chapter, in concert with the next two chapters, will demonstrate that while Europeans’ *articulate* a weaker sense of Europe identity than they do to their state of origin, that European identity, expressed in terms of a generalised European value system, a collective European political culture and through a dense network of European interactions and relationships, is both apparent and distinctive. Importantly such a communal identity is significant in the context of a generalised decrease in national political participation, trust in political institutions and elites and a decline in formal normative convergence, and overall political literacy within contemporary Europe.² Notwithstanding a lesser supranational, as opposed to national, identity Europeans are increasingly conducting themselves as a collective. Europeans are developing close trans-European relationships based upon a distinctive European value system. Further, Europeans are increasingly relying on European institutions to provide solutions in ever wider policy domains, and actively engaging in common European political activities. However, common European symbols do not appear to be having a similar integrating effect.

7.2 Identity - a Definition (Reprise)

In Chapter One we established communal identity in the following terms:

*Identity is best understood as a sense of belonging; to feeling part of a collectivity. It is associated with a readiness to adopt certain self-descriptions.*

*Identity formation is a process of community formation in which membership and association is based on a set of criteria which have both subjective and objective

² The importance of the contrast between an increased European identity in the context of a decline in state-based trust in political institutions and popular participation in the political process cannot be overstated. European identity has arisen at a time when identification with state-mediated political institutions, and the state-mediated nation itself has come under serious review by national members. In such a context the rise of European identification is a remarkable achievement. See Dalton, R. *Citizen Politics in Western Democracies: Public Opinion and Political Parties in the United States, Great Britain, West Germany and France.* (Chatham: Chatham House Publishers, Inc. 1995); Dogan, M. ‘The Decline of Nationalisms in Western Europe’ *Comparative Politics* April 1994 & Dogan, M. ‘The Decline in Religious Beliefs in Western Europe’ *International Social Science Journal* September 1995.
characteristics. Such as the characteristics of ethine or language, as in the case of 'ethnic' identity or the features of citizenship, individualism and equality - as in the case of 'civic' identity. Identity is enabled by individuals, who by making favourable comparisons with the in-group and unfavourable comparisons with out-groups collectively categorise themselves as part of the collective. Communal identity is displayed in cooperative intra-group interaction, normative convergence and functional relations.

Identity exists where individuals identify with and wish themselves to be identifiable as members of distinct social categories such as nations, ethnic groups or societies.

The key characteristics of communal identity are:

1. a sense of belonging, collective consciousness and self-description;
2. shared values;
3. common symbols;
4. common actions and the development of intra-group relations; and
5. common cognitive boundary.

The aim of this Chapter is to demonstrate the patterning of such identity consistent with characteristic one. Chapter Eight will consider the manifestation of a communal European identity as demonstrated by shared European values and common symbols. Chapter Nine will consider the relationship between commonality of action and European identity and will demonstrate that there exists a common European cognitive boundary which reinforces a communal expression of European identification.

7.3 Establishing European Identity - The Empirical Evidence

7.3.1 A European Sense of Belonging

Identity manifests itself as a collective cognitive disposition and group self-perception (variously described as a sense of belonging, loyalty, or a communal sense of difference) toward a group such as the nation or society, and a common medium of expression, most particularly language. Applying such an understanding to
contemporary Europe we are essentially interested in examining the extent to which Europeans articulate a feeling of belonging to Europe.

The European Individual and the European Collective - Europeans come together for a wide variety of reasons, to play sport, work, to establish a family and to create wealth. Out of associations such as these Europeans develop a sense of identity, expressed, in part, as a self-conscious sense of belonging, to those with whom they share common characteristics or interests. This sense of commonality is possibly transitory or revealed only by point of contrast with those outside the collectivity.³

There are a number of key variables that determine the degree of European identification. The larger the group, and the lesser the organic face-to-face interaction, the more difficult it is to sustain a sense of belonging from amongst the group’s members.⁴ Interactive behaviour and support has a positive effect on group and identification, as does the sharing of a common language, a common set of values and in some cases a common mythology or customary practice.⁵ Identification is further enhanced in those cases where there is tangible reward for such a collective orientation, or where there may be sanctions against non-members of the collective.

Cultural considerations are significant determinants of communal identification. In the European context most particularly the commonality of a European political culture. We agree with Almond and Verba that a political culture is such that it provides a systematic structure of values and controlling guidelines for political behaviour. Political culture defines the various roles that the individual takes up in society and the structural effects on the individual and thus, contribute to defining both individual and communal identification.⁶

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⁵ As established in Chapter One
Feeling European - European and National Identity - The nature of communal identity as demonstrated by the articulation of a sense of belonging is operationalised by reference to an examination of the views expressed by Europeans as to their sense of feeling European compared to their expression of their national identity. Utilising data from the Commission of the European Communities Eurobarometer series produced by the European Commission, we find that there is a considerable level of “Europeaness” shared between Europeans. However national identification remains the most significant form of communal identification. As the data below illustrates.

7.3.2 With What do Europe's Citizens Identify Themselves - Their Nation or the Supranation?

If we consider the latest available data we find that Europeans predominantly identify with their nation, rather than with Europe. Such a straightforward indicator of communal identification can be demonstrated by reference to two instruments, questions relating to an empirical analysis of the extent to which ‘attached’ Europeans feel to Europe and the occurrence of European and/or national identity.

Figure 7.1 Level of Attachment to Europe - 1999

Source Commission of the European Communities Eurobarometer 51 p.9
These most current results reveal that the Swedish, Danish and those from Luxembourg feel most attached to Europe. Those in the United Kingdom are the least attached. Importantly, and confirming the predominance of national identity, when questioned Europeans feel significantly more attached to their country (89%), and their town or village (87%) than they do to Europe (56%).

Two points should be noted. Firstly more than half of Europeans surveyed have a feeling of attachment to Europe, demonstrating the importance of Europe to Europeans. Secondly, regional attachment and identification is almost of equal value than is national identity, this is most strongly experienced at Europe’s periphery – in Greece, Portugal and Spain. This fact demonstrates two points, firstly the growing importance of local identification to Europeans. Secondly the level of attachment at Europe’s periphery reinforces the strategic importance of EU regional and ethnolinguistic policy in positively effecting a sense of attachment to Europe, via the promotion of regional and ethnolinguistic rights. Accordingly to the extent that Europe enhances the standing of the regions - economically and culturally, a greater attachment to Europe might be anticipated.

However, considering specific data related to Europeans’ perceptions of their European and/or National identity we find that Europeans remain most centrally attached to their nation. While there is strong European identification it does not overwhelm pre-existing national identity.

**Figure 7.2 European and National Identity – 1998 Results**

Source: Commission of the European Communities *Eurobarometer* 50 p.59

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7 Commission of the European Communities *Eurobarometer* 51, 8.
Demographic analysis of the above data demonstrates that younger Europeans, tertiary educated Europeans and Europeans in the ‘managerial’ class are more likely to feel European. Those Europeans with a comparatively lower level of education, those who are less economically active and those who are older are most likely to identify solely with their own nationality. Such a demographic confirms our earlier discussion as to the positive correlation between the promotion of a secure and right-bearing European domain in which economic liberalism, political participation and the enjoyment of educational, cultural and economic networks and benefits would engender a stronger sense of European identification, it is Europe’s economically active and educated youth who predominantly benefit from this domain. Notwithstanding the predominance of national identity, it is important to note that there are seven EU states in which citizens who feel to some extent European represent a majority. As the Commission of the European Communities Eurobarometer authors comment: “Although one can still not speak of a truly European identity, the majority of EU citizens feel to some extent European.”

A longitudinal analysis of the expression of European identity between 1994 and 1998 confirms the enduring nature of national identity relative to European identification.

**Figure 7.3  Trends in European Identification 1992 - 1998**

Source: Commission of the European Communities Eurobarometer 49 p. 41 and Commission of the European Communities Eurobarometer 50 p.59

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8 Commission of the European Communities Eurobarometer 50, 59.
The contrast between 1992 and 1998 is such that a sense of solely national identity across European member states has increased significantly from 38% to 43%. Whereas exclusively European identity has remained static at four percent. The data does suggest that the percentage of Europeans expressing European as well as national identity is significant. Throughout the seven year period under review such a figure was no less than a total of 46% of the population surveyed (1996/97) and was as high as 55% in 1992. Considering specific periods, in 1997, 45% of those surveyed described themselves as 'nationality' only, 40% as nationality and European, six percent as European and nationality and a further five percent as European only. These figures have shown a downward trend of feeling European since the Autumn of 1995. The figures demonstrate that while comparatively few Europeans feel themselves to be exclusively European, around half, on average, feel some sense of dual loyalty. This notion is most prevalent in France, Italy and Ireland, and is least true in Sweden, Denmark and the United Kingdom.

While Europeans predominantly identify with their state their active expression of European identification is significant. Such a sense of identification is reinforced and reflected in the level of trust expressed in each other amongst Europeans. Europeans share a common sense of trust in each other. This trust, most particularly amongst those peoples of the European Union, demonstrate a distinct sense of belonging and attachment to each other and to Europe. When Europeans of the fifteen member states of the EU are asked how much trust they have in people from various countries, they, almost without exception trust fellow EU citizens more than Europeans outside of the EU or other nationalities, as the figure below outlines.

**Figure 7.4 Trusting Europeans – Who do Europeans Trust?**
Demographic variables of an articulated European sense of Belonging - Demographic analysis of the Commission of the European Communities Eurobarometer data demonstrates that:

1. while currently more men than women feel European, that less recent survey material suggests that the sex of the respondent did not correlate with nationalism or Europeanism;
2. there is an above average sense of Europeanness amongst Europe's youth;
3. Europe's late-middle aged and aged population display a higher degree of national rather than European identity; ⁹
4. a sense of belonging to Europe increases with socio-economic profile; more managerial and white collar Europeans, as a percentage of their demographic feel European, than the blue collar and manual workers;
5. education has a significant effect on Europeanism, and national identity; Europeans educated to a tertiary level show less national patriotism and national pride, and greater acceptance of Europeanism and of foreigners from differing ethnic groups;
6. the size of the community in which an individual inhabits correlates with the dimensions of Europeanism and national pride; the smaller the community where an individual lives the higher the level of his or her national identity and pride; and
7. consistent results demonstrate that European unemployed feel the least European. ¹⁰

It is significant that while Europeans are less inclined to openly express exclusively European identity, they are, as we shall consider later in this study, closely interlinked

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⁹ This has been discussed by Haller who concludes that as this demographic has contributed more actively to the achievements and the present position of their respective nations, they have a greater national identity as a result. That they have; 'invested their lifetime into improving and consolidating the situation of their families and often have also participated in semipublic and public life and affairs in their neighbourhoods, communes and society as a whole'. Haller, M. 'National Identity and National Pride in Comparative Perspective'. Paper presented at the 3rd Conference of the European Sociological Association 27-30 August 1997, University of Essex.

¹⁰ See Commission of the European Communities Eurobarometer 49 and Haller, M. 'National Identity and National Pride in Comparative Perspective', 22.
in dynamic social, economic and political interaction within a common institutional framework. Such an interlinking demonstrating the evocation of a common and distinctive European identity.

7.3.3 Collective Consciousness and Self-Description (via a Common Language)

In Chapter One we established that an element of communal identity is the development and display of a common consciousness and collective self-description expressed through a common language. In short we found that collective identity manifests itself where there is:

"Group self-perception/ self-consciousness - collective self-awareness as being part of a collective, and self-description as a member of the collectivity."

Introductory Remarks - Identity can be viewed as being reflexively constituted in two key narratives, either ethnic 'nation' or 'civic' society. Included in the case of the former are conceptions of exclusivity based in blood, ethnicity and traditions in which peoples are linked and collectively describe themselves as common members of an enthnolinguistic national community within a given territory. In the case of civic identity, collective consciousness is operationalised in terms of a collective sense of belonging to a collective of free, right-bearing citizens. Civic identity includes a collective confidence in other citizens based on a common participation with the civic institutions within a given territory, delineated from others by a particular civic and liberal legal and institutional framework. Notwithstanding the different objects of these differing conceptions of identity there are two common elements. Firstly community, for a communal identity to establish there needs to be a community spirit, civic or ethnically derived, and secondly a common consciousness amongst the collective of a sense of collectivity; the 'us' rather than the 'I'. In this section we shall consider the emergence of a collective civic European consciousness as it manifests itself in civic terms. We shall consider the detail of European consciousness in the following manner:

1. General European civic consciousness; and

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11 Refer to Chapter One for the definition in full.
2. European youth consciousness.

Europeans are increasingly aware of the European polity of which they are members; the rights and benefits they derive from it and their place within it, and the distinctiveness they derive from its unique institutional and policy structure. They demonstrate a developing knowledge of its functions and institutions, are aware of its importance to them and consider their state's membership of the EU positively. Europeans are active in gathering information about the EU and there is evidence that they can see the advantages of membership to both them personally and to their state. We suggest that a common European consciousness, insofar as it takes a civic form, can be demonstrated in three ways. Firstly Europeans' consciousness and interest in their civic rights, secondly Europeans' support for common policy issues and their level of support for their state's EU membership.

**European Consciousness and Citizenship** - Citizenship forms the heart of civic identity, it is the common thread that binds all members of a political community together, to the extent that its constituent elements are valued by Europeans we can establish one of the main elements of European civic belonging.

Europeans demonstrate a strong commitment to, and interest in, the central elements of a civic Europe, such a collective sentiment and commitment demonstrates a communal European civic identity. Europeans are united in a communal commitment to the underpinning's of a civic society; 81% believe that the EU should be active in guaranteeing the rights of the individual and respect for the principles of democracy in Europe. Europeans collectively are committed to action at the pan-European level that guarantees peace and security in Europe (89%). Europeans collectively share a civic consciousness insofar as they are committed to equal treatment at work (45%), the ability to vote and stand as a candidate in European elections (26%). Further demonstrating a common European civic orientation, 88% of Europeans believe that fighting poverty and social exclusion should be a priority of the EU.

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12 Commission of the European Communities Eurobarometer 51, 56.

13 Commission of the European Communities Eurobarometer 47, 62.
A clear indicator of a shared European civic consciousness is provided by the extent to which Europeans display knowledge of EU institutions and attribute importance to the ‘Europeanisation’ of policy domains. Europeans are increasingly focusing their attention on the common European polity, and its interventionist policy domains for the resolution of common European issues, this is suggestive of three phenomenon. Firstly the success of the European polity in actively intervening in European political economic and social life, secondly it confirms the increased acceptance amongst Europeans as to the legitimate role of the EU in their affairs. Thirdly it is an indication of a common positive sympathy amongst Europeans towards the European polity. Issues considered particularly relevant which have the potential to be instruments in the engendering and maintenance of a European identity include common foreign and defence policies, and support for curricula relating to the operations of Europe in the school curriculum.

Table 7.1 Awareness of EU Institutions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>European Union Institution</th>
<th>Percentage Answering ‘Yes’</th>
<th>Percentage Answering ‘No’</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The European Parliament</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The European Commission</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The European Central Bank</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Court of Justice</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Social and Economic Committee</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Commission of the European Communities Eurobarometer 50/51 p.102

Considering the nature of European support for specific policy domains we find widespread commonality of acceptance of the ‘Europeanisation’ of what were once the policy domains of the European sovereign states.
Table 7.2 National or Joint EU Decision Making?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy Domain</th>
<th>% Supporting European Union Jurisdiction</th>
<th>% Supporting Member State Jurisdiction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Policy</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fight Against Drugs</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single Currency</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fight Against Poverty and Social Exclusion</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection of the Environment</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration Policy</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source Commission of the European Communities Eurobarometer 51 p.54

Historically, the growth of interventionist state policy domains has led to an increase in national consciousness, as populations become increasingly reliant upon the intervention of the polity to provide structural and material support for the community at large. In a similar manner Europeans are collectively welcoming those steps that will heighten European institutionalisation and as a result of such a process are displaying a common European consciousness, derived from the key social, political and economic functional and structural imperatives - which take a civic form - of the European polity.

Europeans are displaying a collective sense of support for common European actions, such as the fight against drugs and foreign policy. European citizens are most likely to want decision-making to take place collectively at the EU level, including social

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15 Reinforcing the central role that the institutions are playing in the development of a European identity are the results of a Europinion survey which reveals the focus of European matters in voting deliberations. In response to the question:

*If you are voting in the general election, will your views on Europe play a significant part in your decision?*

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>26.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>73.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
protection, economic policy, regional aid and protection of the environment.\textsuperscript{16} Such a convergence of opinion of policy priorities and in the ‘Europeanisation’ of jurisdictions demonstrate the emergence of convergence in European consciousness, to the extent that Europeans collectively identify some policy domains as more suitably dealt with at the European rather than the national level.

7.3.4 The Success of Europe and the Evocation of a European Consciousness

As we considered in Chapter Five, European consciousness is correlated with increased financial support from the institutions of the EU. Put simply by Milward this means that: “French and German voters, like those in the rest of the Union, offer their allegiance to government - national and supranational, by deciding how its actions will affect their long-term family-income prospects.”\textsuperscript{17} The emergence of successful European apparatus for economic and political administration and policy formulation and implementation can be seen as having parallels to attempts by nineteenth century nation-builders to secure ‘the government of men by means of the administration of things’.\textsuperscript{18} The objective of providing the conditions for the exercise of government over an enlarging economic and social space has similarities to the development of European state formation in earlier periods. States emerged in order to provide predictability in the administration of markets, and to provide coherence and certainty to security arrangements, from which nations were empowered in order to legitimate the apparatus of the state. The convergence of social, economic and security policy and apparatus at the elite level has engendered a discernible affection and loyalty to Europe and to European institutions as a consequence of its application of economic rationality and administrative achievements.

If we consider the level of support for EC/EU membership in 1973 - and compare it with 1998 - we find that those states which have materially benefited more from the EU, relative to the size of their domestic economies, are those which exhibit a greater

\textsuperscript{16} Commission of the European Communities \textit{Eurobarometer} 49, 76.

\textsuperscript{17} Milward, A. ‘The Social Bases of Monetary Union?’ in Gowan, P. and Anderson, P. \textit{The Question of Europe.}, 157.

\textsuperscript{18} Rootes, C & Davis, H. \textit{Social Change and Political Transformation.}, 5.
increase in level of support for European membership. Of the original nine EEC states the level of support for membership has increased in Ireland from 56 to 79%, in the Netherlands from 63 to 75% and in Denmark from 42 to 56%. During the period the level of financial support granted under EU programs to these states has increased rapidly. Whereas in those states which have predominantly funded the integration of Europe – most notably France and Germany – the level of support for EU membership has significantly declined over the same period. In the case of France from 61% support for membership to 52% over the 25 year period, whereas in Germany it dropped from 63% to 51%. Further, it is in those states which were economically peripheral to Europe, and which have received a proportionally larger injection of European funding including Greece, Spain, Ireland and Portugal where their respective populations consider that their states have benefited the most from EU membership and where articulated feelings of European identification are higher.

Considering more recent results, between 1997 and 1998 support for EU membership has increased 10% in 12 months across Europe (European average: Spring 1997, 41% Spring 1998 51%). Since 1997 support levels had increased in 9 of the 15 member states. Increased support for the EU is most pronounced in those states which have benefited most from EU financial and social intervention; Italy (an increase of eight percent) Portugal (plus seven percent) and Ireland (plus eight percent). This increase is attributable to both an increase in confidence in the operations of the single market, and as a result of a generalised upturn in European economic conditions. As Fullinwider argues:

"To the extent that individuals find the larger system of institutions permits them to achieve their chosen ends and supports their causes, and that it is predicated on an unconditional respect for their choices and causes, not on

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19 Commission of the European Communities Eurobarometer 50, 18.

20 Analysis reveals that men (56%) are more likely than women (47%) to regard their country's membership as a good thing. The longer one is in full time education, the more positive sentiment towards membership, More managers than the unemployed, on average, support membership (63% as opposed to 43%). Support levels for Europe's youth are higher than those of older Europeans (54% to 46%). Reinforcing the importance of education as a catalyst to identity formation, the people with a greater knowledge of the EU were significantly more likely to regard their country's membership as a good thing, when compared to those with a lower knowledge of the EU (65% to 41%)
some overriding social goal that their choices just happen to further, they will come to value the system as good in itself.21

7.3.5 European Youth and a European Consciousness - The Development of a Distinctly European Youth

It is amongst Europe's youth that the strongest European consciousness is exhibited. In response to a poll published in 'The European' newspaper in 1996, 62% of British parents surveyed believed that their children would grow up feeling more a part of Europe than they (the parents) do.22 In contrast to their parents, young Europeans are demonstrably less resistant to European economic integration, see greater opportunities that a single European social space will bring and see little threat to their respective national identities (Interestingly only a very small percentage (eight percent) of youth in Europe see a supranational Europe as a threat to pre-existing cultural diversity or national identity).23 Resistance to Europe seems to increase with age. In 1996 only 28% of the 18-24 age group wanted to leave the European Union, compared with over 40% of the total adult population. While in 1996 a narrow majority of 18-24 year olds were against the single currency, the resistance rose to three-quarters amongst the over 65 year-olds. Anecdotal evidence further suggests that it is Europe's youth that forms the vanguard of an inclusive European consciousness. According to the Marketing Director of MTV Europe:

"Young people are more accepting of cultural differences . . . the psychological barriers have come down, in mobility, leisure, travel".24

Sales of inter-rail cards across Europe, predominantly utilised by students, have risen by five percent a year since 1994. In Britain, perhaps the most sceptical European state of all, the numbers of students taking A-level German and Spanish have grown by 37% and 43% respectively since 1989, demonstrating a growing openness and


23 Commission of the European Communities Eurobarometer 47, 57.

24 Nazerali, S. in 'Europe's MTV Generation', 12.
awareness of and to Europe from amongst British youth. The European Movement has an active junior wing, the Young European Movement, which is active in integrating a communal European youth consciousness. Its President has stated the practical interests of European youth:

"My experience is that young people are not interested in technical or political issues, in whether the European Parliament should have more power, they're interested in European languages, school exchanges and the European job market."26

Notwithstanding its support for a common Europe, European youth has proven to be highly critical of perceived deficiencies in the process of European institutionalisation. More specifically, the absence of meaningful democratic representation and the absence of substantive information on European convergence is, as we shall consider here, an inhibiting factor in the emergence of a meaningful and enduring European consciousness amongst European youth.

European Youth Opinions - European Youth is highly consciousness of the positive aspects of European integration. When asked to choose a set of features that best characterise Europe their choices are weighted towards positive concepts, with the following aspects featuring most prominently:

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>'Go wherever I Like'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>'A better future'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>'A better economic situation'</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Twice as many European youth think that an integrated Europe will, 'provide more employment opportunities (29.9%)', than believe that Union will lead to higher

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25 ibid.

26 Hargraves, J. in 'Europe's MTV generation', 12.

unemployment (14.6%). Associated with the positive aspects of European integration is the positive impact that the consolidation of the European polity has had on their ability to move across European (internal) borders. When asked about their perception of European citizenship most young Europeans stress the notion of mobility. The three main issues uniting European youth are: "Being able to work anywhere in the Union" (62.4%). Secondly: "Being able to establish oneself anywhere in the Union" (51.5%) and thirdly: "Being able to study in any country in the Union" (45.7%). The value of pan-European social protection is an important component of a common European sympathy, with access to health care and social protection being considered as an essential component of European citizenship amongst 34.6% of European youth.\(^{28}\) Importantly European youth do not view further European integration as being a threat to pre-existent national identities - questions of employment, mobility and rights predominate.\(^{29}\)

Demonstrating the concept of a communal European youth identity, rooted in civic criteria, is the high degree of involvement in European associations or organisations. Just over half of Europe’s youth belongs to an association, whether politically, socially, culturally, artistically religiously or sporting orientated. Further, young Europeans are not overtly conscious of ethnic differences based on race religion or culture. 48% of European youth say that they feel entirely at ease with peoples of another nationality, race, religion or culture or those who display different behaviours such as homosexuals, the disabled or the homeless. Young Europeans are more interested in Europe as an avenue for greater material, cultural and intellectual fulfilment, rather than Europe being an ethnically homogenous fortress. Such a phenomenon is consistent with a civic basis of European identification.

\(^{28}\) European Union ‘Young People on the Threshold of the Year 2000’

\(^{29}\) Ibid.
7.3.6 Self-description via a Common Language

English is the lingua Franca of the European Union:

"As the twentieth century winds down, English is the closest thing to a world language that the earth has ever had."\(^{31}\)

By the end of the year 2000, an estimated one and a half billion people – a quarter of the world’s population - will speak English. For 1.1 billion of that number English will be a second or third language, functionally necessary for professional and personal life.\(^{32}\) It is paradoxical that while European public policy promotes language diversity, Europeans are shifting, in much of their public lives, towards language unification.\(^{33}\) Within Europe minority languages receive public support and minority language speakers are institutionally protected.\(^{34}\) Consistent with civic inclusiveness European funding ensures that the decline in minority language usage is stemmed, whether it is Swedish in Finland, Welsh in the United Kingdom, South Tyrolean in Italy or Catalan in Spain. The European polity is actively supporting the linguistic minority as a central element of Europe's linguistic diversity within a civic model of inclusion. Such a process prevents the political mobilisation of minority language groups against Europe as a result of the loss of their language rights. Notwithstanding

\(^{30}\) The importance of Language as a companion of power and identity is best summarised by the Spanish Linguist Nebrija, who, in presenting a Castilian grammar to Queen Isabella of Spain in 1492, inscribed in it:

"Your Majesty, language is a perfect instrument of rule, a means toward external conquest, and internal suppression of undesired languages. Language was always a companion of power and it will remain its companion in the future."


\(^{31}\) British Airways 'Highlife' Magazine May 1992, 102-112.


\(^{33}\) While accepting that language is a key ethnic signifier of identity, it is additionally a vital mechanism in the civic mode of identification insofar as it allows for the transfer of civic norms, allows for a civic education and forms a point of commonality for civic relationships and transactions. As such it is appropriate to consider language as an element in the formation of a common European civic identity.

\(^{34}\) As discussed in Chapter Five, the institutional protection of European languages is a central element in the integrative effect of the creation of a civic-based security and rights domain within Europe, one which promotes communal identification.
linguistic diversity and the elements supporting it, Europe is increasingly dominated by English. It is the language of commerce, it is increasingly the language of culture and mobility and it is certainly the language of European youth. Languages of nation and region remain important signifiers of localised identity, however English is increasingly the mesh unifying Europeans and providing a central element of a common European identity.

As Schroder notes, with the exception of Latin, English is probably the only language in world history in which those utilising it as a *lingua franca* outnumbers the number of native speakers. As Schroder notes, with the exception of Latin, English is probably the only language in world history in which those utilising it as a *lingua franca* outnumbers the number of native speakers. Accordingly while European initiatives are focused on creating a European multilingual space, Europeans are increasingly conducting themselves in English as a unifying European language. Demonstrating the importance of English, when recently asked, 69% of European respondents considered English as the most useful language to know other than their mother tongue. With the exception of Ireland, Luxembourg and the United Kingdom, English is the most widely spoken language spoken apart from the respective mother tongue in all EU states. Deutsch, amongst others, as we considered earlier, have shown the central role of language as a unifying force in the creation of a communal identity.

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36 Take for example the suggestion for foreign-language teaching as found in Article 2 of the 1954 European Cultural Convention, which states:

> "Considering that the aim of the Council of Europe is to achieve a greater unity between its members for the purpose, among others, of safeguarding and realising the ideas and principles which are their common heritage, considering that the achievement of this aim would be furthered by a greater understanding of one another among the peoples of Europe . . ."

Each Contracting Party shall, insofar as may be possible,

(a) encourage the study by its own nationals of the languages, history and civilisation of the other Contracting Parties and grant facilities to the nationals of those Parties to pursue such studies in its territory . . .

37 French was nominated as the second most useful language to know apart from your mother tongue by Europeans. See Commission of the European Communities *Eurobarometer* 50, 111-113.

38 See Deutsch, K. *Nationalism and Social Communication*, and Anderson, B *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. 
English has come to dominate economic, political and increasingly social transactions in Europe. Commission of the European Communities Eurobarometer surveys demonstrate that 51% of European Union citizens report knowing English, overshadowing their language competencies in French (42%) and German (33%). Further the knowledge of English within the EU has grown far faster than for any other language group over the last decade. In a quantitative study of the European language constellation, De Swaan distinguishes the benefits of learning a language that would enable either direct communication (that is, with native speakers of that language) or indirect communication (ie, with people who speak it as an auxiliary language). The power of English, he found, is in the latter category. De Swaan concludes:

"[In the constellation after the United Kingdom's entry into the European Union,] English now was the most attractive single language for outsiders, and what is more, the speakers of all other languages in the constellation preferred English as an additional language over any other. Since any speaker could therefore expect all other language learners in the constellation to prefer English, they had every incentive to choose English. Only the English had an incentive to learn German or French as their first foreign language, but they might refrain from any languages at all, confidently waiting until the rest of the constellation had joined them."41

The central position of English is confirmed by the importance of English learning programs in Europe. In a study supported by the European Commission, it was found that 83% of secondary school students in the European Union were learning English as a foreign language, compared with 32% learning French and 16% learning German. Even in a country such as Estonia, which had a German ruling class for nearly a millennium, independence from Soviet control has resulted in a shift towards English as the language of international communication. In a 1993 survey of 1,454 Estonian respondents to the question of which language is most important for foreign

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40 Across the EU the knowledge of English as a second language has grown from 23% to 31% between 1990 and 1998. Whereas knowledge of French has only marginally grown from seven percent to eight percent and German from seven percent to eight percent. See Commission of the European Communities Eurobarometer 50, 111.

41 Footnote 24 'The Cultural Identities of a European State'

42 Ibid 25
business contacts, 90% said English and only 7.9% indicated German.\textsuperscript{43} Thus even in a predominantly German-language European state, English is the dominant second language, and the dominant language of politics and trade. Significantly the new relative prominence of German in Eastern Europe seriously weakens the role of French in wider Europe. A further indicator of the increasing role of English as Europe's lingua franca is found in the dominance of English as the language of translation for European books of other languages - in figures released in 1991, 59% of Austrian, 64% of Norwegian and 61% of German books translated from their respective languages were translated into English.\textsuperscript{44}

One of the most convincing indicators of the shift towards English within Europe is the fact that Europeans are willing to pay for its acquisition. 'English as a foreign language' is a major European industry. The United Kingdom alone earns about 6 billion pounds annually on language exports. In defence of their own languages, according to Coulmas, Germany spends about 450M Deutsche Marks to promote German culture overseas, a significant component spent on language, while France expends as much as 1.5% of its gross national product on the defence of French.\textsuperscript{45} The cumulative outcome, paradoxically, is the entrenchment of English, despite the national and supranational attempts to promote increasingly minority German and French.\textsuperscript{46} As Laitin suggests:

\begin{quote}

\textsuperscript{43} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{44} Calculations from UNESCO Statistical Yearbook 1991 quoted in Thorborn, G. \textit{European Modernity and Beyond: The Trajectory of European Societies 1945-2000.}, 219.
\textsuperscript{45} Ibid., 27
\textsuperscript{46} Despite the clear dominance of English as the \textit{lingua Franca} of Europe, given the sensitivity of language as a signifier of local and national identity, the EU has actively sought to promote such language groupings. European Union actions to promote state and local languages includes ERAMUS and the efforts of the Bureau for Lesser Used European Languages. Accordingly despite the dominance of English there is no evidence of any trend away from state languages within member state boundaries. In all EU states children learn their national languages first and go to school, in which schools remain the principal media of instruction. As Laitin suggests: "Newspapers, TV, leisure-time reading, advertising and official local and state services all continue to operate in the state languages." Further European commitment to regional and local languages connects speakers of such languages, both to prime signifiers of their local identity, but additionally helps upgrade the relevance of and loyalty to Europe. Such an outcome the rising role of English, within a context of institutional support of, and use of local languages clearly reflects the liberal, pluralist 'civic' ethos of the EU.
\end{quote}
“People are willing to pay high personal costs to learn English; they have to be bribed to learn French or German. The microeconomic handwriting is on the wall.”

By the year 2000 more than 60% of all peoples in the European Union are expected to be doing largely information-orientated work and be connected to the internationalised telecommunications net, the principal language of which is English. The collapse of the former Eastern European block has brought with it the training of an estimated 10,000 English teachers for an estimated 30 million learners in Eastern Europe.

English is becoming the dominant language in Europe. English has developed into the language with the greatest market value, and dominates the European telecommunications market in advertising, telecommunications, information technology, entertainment and news media. Further the exponential growth of the Information superhighway, European’s utilisation of technologies associated with it and the fact that English predominates on it, has further entrenched English’s dominant position. Its hegemony is accelerated by the political and economic integration of Europe, which, in accordance with the efficiency paradigm, functions best through a common language - English being such a language.

7.4 Chapter 7 – Concluding Remarks

A General European (Civic) Consciousness - Empirical studies demonstrate that Europeans still feel their national identity to be stronger than their European identity. Support for the euro is variable and strongest in those European states where the perceived benefits of economic and monetary integration is greatest. Support for European policy domains is strongest in fields which, as we have previously suggested, offer to secure the rights of Europeans such as European education, the fight against crime and the common defence and security policy. While Europeans do not feel well informed on the nature of European integration, a majority of Europeans have a good knowledge of their European-derived citizen rights, such as trans-national work and residency rights.

47 Laitin, D. 9.

48 Ibid., 351.
European Youth Consciousness - Europe's youth appears to be at the vanguard of a pan-European consciousness. Their knowledge of European affairs is higher than those in older age groups, as is their willingness to travel and work across Europe. There is an increasing perception that involvement in the EU was a positive experience and that they, and their respective states have benefited from such an involvement. There is an increasing sentiment that the EU has a role to play in traditionally national affairs such as education and consumer law and that the process of European unification is a positive one. Europe, for Europe's youth is important because it allows for free movement, it means more jobs and an improved economy. Very few European youth suggest that trans-European unification will compromise pre-existing cultural or political identities. However much of Europe's youth do not feel themselves to be sufficiently well informed on matters relating to the European Union and the process of European integration.
Chapter Eight

European Identity and Shared Values

(Situational) normative convergence - shared values, ideas and culture, including political culture.

8.1 A Common European Value System

8.1.1 Introductory Remarks

European values are at the epicentre of European identity. The development of the European polity has only been possible as a consequence of an enduring and commonly accepted set of key European values, beliefs and norms. Such normative convergence ranging from, at the most prosaic level, a common acceptance of the appropriate mechanisms of democratic political processes, to the more abstract, yet no less significant core set of civic values relating to individualism, the role of the free market and social justice. Further, as this chapter will demonstrate, the spatiality of Europe is defined, in part, by the realisation of a distinctively European value set. Europe is separated from non-Europe not by ethnicity, language nor custom, but primarily by values - essentially civic in nature. ‘Europe’ is made distinctive as a separate entity and a meaningful field of study by both the actualisation of such values and by the self-conscious assertion of them by Europeans.\(^1\) An Examination of European identity reveals that that which defines Europe is a core set of dominant normative civic reference points; the separation of spiritual and temporal powers, the allocation of specific rights to individuals and a separate social sphere. Such civic values have historically informed Europe and are both shared amongst and acted out by, contemporary Europeans.

The European value system owes much to the unique historical evolution of European political economic and social life and has been variously observed. Huntington identified European values with the separation of spiritual and temporal power, social

\(^1\) Examples of the assertion of European values at the intra-European level includes the struggle against fascism in the Second World War, and at the extra-European level, the European support for civil rights in the developing world.
pluralism and the development of an autonomous civil society. Roberts argues for the independence of a broad range of European values, including an innate faith in human progress the development of a separate civic culture and a rejection of despotism and a unique political ideological framework. The key elements, of the European value system are best stated by Meyenberg, who suggests the following five points are constitutive of the European value system;

1. Early on Western Christianity began to concentrate on the problems of a morality which was to prove itself in this world, not in the next.

2. Very soon the magical elements of faith were repressed in favour of reason as a key to understanding the world.

3. Early on the contrast between freemen and slaves, Jews and heathens were reduced in favour of a society to be formed voluntarily.

4. A state of awareness developed which brought about the central significance of a system of laws delimiting the spheres of the individual and society.

5. A value-orientated relationship towards work developed, which in the convents was expressed in terms of the two equally important demands made on the monks "ora et labora".

The European civic value set has been played out through European history and has been operationalised to differing degrees in different European geographic spheres. The Roman papacy, the medieval political order, the Renaissance, the scientific revolution, the 'New World' discoveries, the Enlightenment, the French Revolution, industrialisation and the arrival of the information revolution, have changed Europe and had a formative influence on European values, and in turn, European identity.

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2 See Huntington, S. *The Clash of Civilizations and the remaking of World Order.*

3 However he is acutely consciousness of the Asian and African ideas which formed the basis of much which we understand as 'European' see: Roberts, J. *A History of Europe.* (Oxford: Helicon Publishing Ltd 1996), 579.


5 The fact that such values have been adopted, to a greater or lesser degree, by other states and peoples, might appear to dissipate the 'Europeanness' of such value sets, but as Schlesinger states:

"The source - the unique source of the ideas of individual liberty, political democracy, the rule of law, human rights and cultural freedom ... These are European ideas, not Asian, not African, nor middle Eastern ideas, except by adoption."
These influences, which have infused European cultural and political life and informed the core civic European values, persist, notwithstanding the encroachments of globalised cosmopolitanism. One of the clearest contemporary affirmations of European civic values has been made in the 'Document on the European Identity', declared at the Copenhagen Summit in December 1973:

"...a determination to build a society which measures up to the needs of the individual, they are determined to defend the principles of representative democracy, of the rule of law, of social justice...and respect for human rights. All these are fundamental elements of the European identity."

We illustrate the central elements of the European civic value set by reference to two factors which are:

1. European human, social and political rights - A commonly shared European humanitarianism; and
2. A common European political culture and political ideology.

8.2 European Human, Social and Political Rights

The protection of human rights represents a cornerstone of European civic values. The European foundation of human, civic and personal rights can be traced back to the Magna Carta of 1215 in the English context, and in the French, the Declaration des Droits de L'Homme et du Citoyen of 1789. The most important contemporary expression of the European value set is expressed in the European Convention on Human Rights of 1950. The centrality of matters relating to human and civil rights is so essentially Eurocentric, that opposition to the maintenance of such values, by those beyond the European hemisphere, is often justified on the basis that it is improper to


6 Duparc, C. The European Community and Human Rights (Brussels: Commission of the European Communities 1992), 30. It is possible to point to a plethora of other European documents which declare the significance of civic values including human rights, liberal participative democracy and the value of the social, including the Paris Summit declaration of 1972, the joint Declaration on Fundamental Rights 1977 and the Declaration of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms 1989, it is in the common defence of such principles, that we are best able to illustrate the common European value system.

attempt to universalise such rights when they are more properly seen as products of a unique and particular Western liberal tradition.\(^8\)

The specific European rights to which we refer are diverse, and have evolved over time. In the contemporary context our understanding of such civic rights include factors such as the freedom to travel, publish and educate, freedom from slavery, forced or child labor. It further includes the independence of the media and political movements, openness to competing ideologies, equality of the sexes and of religion, freedom from state intervention into private affairs and the protection of religious, ethnic and linguistic minorities.\(^9\)

Such is the abstraction of the free society and the value pluralism that European humanitarianism suggests, it is all too easy to talk in platitudes of the rights and liberties of societies. We need to familiarise ourselves with both the degree to which individual Europeans hold such values, and the extent to which Europe acts them out in order to operationalise and demonstrate a key element in the common European identity.

8.3 The Institutionalisation of Human Rights in Europe

On the fourth of November 1950 the foreign ministers of the member states of the Council of Europe met to sign the European convention on Human Rights. Their aim, according to Ryssdal was:

"to lay the foundations for the new Europe which they hoped to build on the ruins of a continent ravaged by a fratricidal war of unparalleled atrocity."\(^{10}\)

The success of that work is readily apparent. The Convention, now simply one of a number of such declarations of the centrality of human rights in the


institutionalisation of Europe has been reinforced by the work of the European Commission and the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). The ECHR, since its inception, has shown considerable vigour in its championing of European human and rights. It has acted to ensure that the actions of European states, individual European citizens and the application of Community law, have been consistent with its understanding of basic European rights.

The extent of rights and freedoms guaranteed in the initial ECHR Protocol have been significantly extended in the nine Protocols subsequent to it. Increased competencies in the field of human rights include such matters as the non-expulsion of nationals from states of resident, the right of liberty of movement and residence for national members, the prohibition of the collective expulsion of aliens and the abolition of capital punishment.

The extensive case law of the European Court of Human Rights reflects and enhances the central position of normative considerations within the European polity, and as with the activities of the other arms of the European judiciary, has enhanced the supranational qualities of the European polity.  

8.4 European Attitudes on Human, Social and Political Rights

8.4.1 Respect for Civic Rights and European Racism

Empirical evidence demonstrates that individual Europeans are united in their strong articulation of civic rights, as the data below confirms.

In December 1990 Europeans were asked by the European Commission to rank ‘great causes’ worth fighting for. The results demonstrate that there is a core set of European values that are based in civic qualities, and which do not support ethnic or even nationalist aspects. In order of ranking, Europeans considered the following causes worthy of fighting for:

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It is noteworthy that Europeans considered the physical struggle in protection of either their own state, or of their religion – two key features of ethnic identification – to have lesser worth when compared with the central civic values of individualism, human rights and the struggle against xenophobia. Europeans demonstrably place a high value on civic values, humanism, liberalism and the defence of individual rights, more so than the articulation of national and ethnic values and pre-dispositions.

Further demonstrating a convergence of European values, Commission of the European Communities Eurobarometer tested the European respect for particular rights and freedoms. As the Table below demonstrates European are united in valuing civic elements.

Table 8.1 Responses to Questions on Rights and Freedoms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Right and Freedoms</th>
<th>Should be Unconditionally Respected (%)</th>
<th>Should be Conditionally Respected (%)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The right to education and training</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The right to live with one’s own family</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The right to legal protection against discrimination</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The right to housing</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The right to one’s own language and culture</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious liberty and freedom of conscience</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom of speech</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The right to vote and be a candidate in political elections</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom of Association</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source Commission of the European Communities Eurobarometer 47, 65.

12 Commission of the European Communities Eurobarometer 34. December 1990
These results is illustrative of two points, firstly that the protection and security of persons, their property, lifestyles and private religious, political and social orientations is a uniting element in the expression of a substantial horizontal fraternity amongst Europeans that has substance as well as symbolism. Secondly, Europeans are united in their collective support of civic rights, such as the right of freedom of speech and protection against discrimination. Such shared values provide a direct sense of community membership to all Europeans based on a common normative position and a loyalty to a political cultural and set of European political institutions of which they are in common possession, which institutionalised such values and provided security of civic rights.

8.5 The Operationalisation of European Human, Social and Political Rights

While the above data suggests that Europeans share a common civic value system with respect to human and social rights, we need to establish if Europeans act on such values. We note that the rhetoric of humanitarian values have not always been observed. Europeans, notwithstanding the championing of human rights, social protection and individualism are condemned never to leave behind the barbarity of two world wars, which were European and which, most especially in the Holocaust, opposed the central normative traditions that we propose as being the foundation of European identity.

We can establish to what extent Europeans share in a common civic value system by the extent to which they act on the social and humanitarian values that they consider important. Utilising data collected as part of the Freedom House survey of human rights we find that there is a natural community of Europeans and European states, as demonstrated by their respect for political rights, civil liberties and in their relative absence of human rights violations. If we first consider those states comprising the 15 member states of the European Union.\textsuperscript{13}

\textsuperscript{13} The concepts employed are taken from Freedom House:

Political Rights (PR): Free and fair elections, a major role of the elected parliament in the process of political decision-making, open competition between political parties, freedom of association, protection of minorities.
### Table 8.2 Human Rights in the Member States of the European Union

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>PR</th>
<th>CL</th>
<th>Freedom House Rating</th>
<th>GHRV</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Free</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Free</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Free</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Free</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Free</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Free</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Free</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.K.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Free</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Free</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Free</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Free</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Free</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Free</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Free</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Free</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Civil Liberties (CL): Freedom of religion, the press, association and meeting, trade unions; the right to property and equality before the law; protection from political terror and from corruption of the government.

Ratings 1 = best, 7 = worst

Evaluation (weighted from PR and CL ratings):

- "Free" = 1 to 2.5
- "partly free" = 3 to 5.5
- "not free" = 5.5 to 7

This scale is taken from the Freedom House 'Freedom in the World' report.

Political Terror Scale - used for assessment of Gross Human Rights Violation Scale.

Level 1: In countries under a secure rule of law, people are not imprisoned for their views. Torture is rare or exceptional, political murders are extremely rare.

Level 2: There is a limited amount of imprisonment for non-violent political activity. Few persons are affected, torture and beating are exceptional, political murder is rare.

Level 3: There is or recently was extensive political imprisonment. Execution or other political murders and brutality may be common. Unlimited detention, with or without trial, for political views is accepted.

Level 4: The practices of level three are expanded to larger numbers. Murders, disappearances, and torture is a common part of life. The terror affects primarily those who are interested in politics or ideas.

Level 5: The terrors of level four have been expanded to the whole population. The leaders of these societies place no limits on the means or thoroughness with which they pursue personal or ideological goals.
It is important to note the strength of the convergence of human rights observance amongst those states which comprise the EU. This, we argue, demonstrates the unity and commonality of the populations of the EU states. Further it suggests the alignment between institutional convergence and normative convergence; as European states have institutionally aligned they have moved to share in common normative reference points.

We can compare the normative alignment amongst EU states with the observance of human rights within other states within the Western and central European hemisphere:

**Table 8.3 Human Rights in Europe (Excluding EU States and Those Which Succeeded the Soviet Union)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>PR</th>
<th>CL</th>
<th>Freedom House Rating</th>
<th>GHRV</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Part Free</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Free</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Free</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Free</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Free</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Free</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Free</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Part Free</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


There is a broad normative convergence amongst these states, with the exception of Turkey, suggesting that they are common participants in the European value set. Such a community of Europeans, within a normative framework, can be readily distinguished from those states that succeeded the former Soviet Union where the adherence to a common normative framework is lacking.
Table 8.4 Human Rights in the States that Succeeded the Soviet Union

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>PR</th>
<th>CL</th>
<th>Freedom House Rating</th>
<th>GHRV</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Part Free</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Part Free</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Not Free</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Free</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Part Free</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Not Free</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyz Rep</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Part Free</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Part Free</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Part Free</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Part Free</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Part Free</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Not Free</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Not Free</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Part Free</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Not Free</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


We find that respect for human and social rights is not only a core European value but it is broadly operationalised. Positive European sentiment regarding human and social rights is linked to their protection. The common maintenance of political rights, civil liberties and the avoidance of human rights violations are demonstrated by the majority of Europeans and reflect their shared values and beliefs and thus their common solidarity and identity. However the clear schism in behaviours between east and Western Europe, notwithstanding the end of the cold war divide, remains.14

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14 As suggested above, to the extent that there have been occurrences of Human rights violations in certain territorial elements of Europe we can configure a European normative spatiality, with definitive boundaries. Actions which have had the effect of decisively altering and defining the frontiers of the European normative space during the 1990’s include the following:

1. Extrajudicial executions or possible extrajudicial executions by government forces or their agents in at least nine eastern and southern European countries including Bulgaria, Croatia, Russian Federation and Turkey.

2. Torture or ill-treatment, including rape, took place in at least 33 European countries including Albania, Armenia, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Spain, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, and Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

3. Prisoners of Conscience - several hundred prisoners of conscience were held in 17 European States including Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Cyprus, Greece, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Spain, Turkey, Turkmenistan and Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
The example of Kosovo provides not only the best (or worse) example of the enduring tension between ethnic and civic identification in contemporary Europe, but more significantly is evidence of a common European value set.

That the European polity, with the support of its population, has been actively involved in the defence of civic conceptions of community and identity in Kosovo is highly suggestive of the vitality of a common European normative set. The European intervention to effectively control ethnic preconceptions of community and identity advancing unchecked provides not only a clear spatial divide between (civic) Europe and the ethnic other, but demonstrates a fully developed sphere of European identification along civic criteria. The support for the defence of civic notions of community is significant, and provides evidence of a communal European civic orientation.

Table 8.5 Percentage of Europeans Supportive of NATO Actions Against Serbian Forces in Kosovo

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Percentage Level of Support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: “NATO, Defence and the War” The Economist April 24 1999, p.54.

Such can be contrasted with the opposition to such military intervention amongst the Russian population - 94% against and in the Ukraine - 89%.15

4. Death Penalty at least 471 executions were carried out in nine European countries; Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Mongolia, Russian Federation, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan.

5. Rape, institutional denial of basic civic and social rights, executions and forced relocations associated with the Serbian 'Ethnic cleansing' in Kosovo.

Further instances include the detention of opposition activists in Albania in the run-up to the May 1997 elections, The attacks on displaced peoples and refugees in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the imprisonment of conscientious objectors and their torture and ill-treatment in the Russian Federation and the torture and ill-treatment of peoples by police in Bulgaria, act to construct the boundaries of a normative map of Europe. For a more detailed analysis see Amnesty International 1997 Annual Report at http://www.amnesty.org/ailib/aireport/ar97/stats.html

15 Angus Reid Group www.angusreid.com/studies/pr990422_2.html accessed 4 May 1999. It is important to note, as Table 8.5 demonstrates, that the percentage of Europeans supportive of NATO
The level of support for military action expressed within Western European states is both a reflection of a common European willingness to defend Kosovo, but more significantly, given the clear ethnic basis of the conflict, it is a demonstration of a cohesive form civic community, within western Europe.\(^\text{16}\)

8.6 **European Humanitarianism - Concluding Remarks**

Not only are (West) Europeans united in their respect for human rights they act on their convictions.

While the centrality of humanitarianism and civic rights as a indicator of a shared European identity cannot be overemphasised, the elaboration of such rights are circumscribed. The European normative hemisphere is not unified. Southern and Eastern Europe have proven to be less capable of displaying the behaviour necessary for the full operationalisation of the European humanitarian value set. Whereas those states in the Western hemisphere appear to have upheld humanitarian values, those states within Eastern Europe, notwithstanding the political liberalisation following the end of the Cold War, have not adopted and implemented the normative framework typically characterised as being central to the European identity.

The European normative landscape continues to reflect the ideological spit imposed upon it as a result of the cold war. Western European counties have democratic governments, allow adequate representation of all ethnic groups and allow for freedom of expression, association and petition. Further the West's press, while increasingly centralised, is free from government controls. Notionally western Europeans have a court independent of the national courts, which has direct effect upon them and their citizen bodies.

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\(^{16}\) Such figures are impressive especially in the context of a rising tide of European anti-militarism, as evidenced in the European desire to reduce the size of their military forces, with support for defence spending cuts at 33% in France, 29% in Germany, and 34% in Italy. See *The Economist* April 24 1999 54.
8.7 A Common European Political Culture and a Common Political Ideology

The forms of European political association, the preferences for democratic political regimes, the trust shown in political actors and institutions and the value placed on citizenship are all informed by, and form the basis of, a distinctive European political culture, which is an element of European civic identity.\(^\text{17}\) Within contemporary Europe, there exists a strongly democratic, pluralist and inclusive political culture. Such a culture is demonstrably consistent with civic rather than ethnic forms of communal European identification, as it connects Europeans together on the basis of a stable, inclusive and right-bearing series of political ideas and aspirations.\(^\text{18}\) Let us consider the elements of the common European political culture.

8.7.1 A European Liberal Democratic Political System

We have observed earlier that one of the defining characteristics of Europe and European modernisation has been the development of an ideology centred on the discourses of liberalism, individualism and popular participation in the social contract. In short, the development of a common political culture within a state-transcendent European civic society. Further to this ideological discourse has been the practical implementation of liberal democratic political regimes and institutions throughout Europe, albeit at differing periods, and with varying degrees of success.

The modern age was established by the uniquely European axiom (of the French Revolution) ‘Liberty, Equality, Fraternity’. This phrase signifies not only three values cherished by Europeans, but in part, define Europe itself. The historical


\(^{18}\) The actions taken by the states of the EU to exclude and ostracise Austria as a result of the involvement in the Austrian Freedom Party (FPO) in a coalition Government is a clear demonstration of the significance of a common European political culture and the willingness of Europeans to exclude those who appear to compromise Europe’s civic democratic and tolerant political culture. As the Portuguese Prime Minister Antonio Guterres said: “A whole range of values which underpin our civilisation are at stake. We will pay maximum attention to the actions of the Austrian Government.” See Kitney, G. 'Austria facing isolation' The Age World, 5 February 2000, 19.
implementation of these principles, often through revolution, largely defined the beginnings of a unified European normative space, which allowed for effective social and economic convergence. The principle of social organisation that allows for a division between civil and political society, the freedom of the marketplace, and the realisation of the individuals choices within a communal setting generated a unique European society, a uniquely European set of social and political rights, and a communal bond uniting Europeans.19

While it is not our intention to exhaustively map-out a typology of European civic values and their related institutional forms, we can refer to a set of factors that reveal the significant aspects of European political theory, these being:

1. Individual liberty is the paramount value;
2. Equality and fraternity are important but secondary values;
3. Spontaneous allocation of resources, markets and free exchange;
4. Social transactions and cultural configurations should develop organically, without state involvement: the advent of a civil society;
5. Political action should be both representative and inclusive;
6. Political mobilisation and political preferences should be voluntary;
7. The purpose of the state is limited to physical security and to assist individuals to maximise their control over property and income; and
8. The state is the servant of the citizen.

An examination of European values, and their manifestation demonstrates the shape and frontiers of a European normative landscape, and the nature of European civic identity. We suggest the following evidence demonstrates a common European civic political culture.

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8.7.2 Empirical Level of Support for the European Political Culture.

To the extent that Europeans respect and uphold the liberal, participative European political values, it is possible to argue for a common European political culture, civic in nature, which is indicative of a common European identity and which unites Europeans as part of a common political community.

Figure 8.1 Satisfaction with Democracy in the European Union

Source: Commission of the European Communities Eurobarometer 47 & 48.

Perhaps the simplest and most important empirical verification of a common European civic culture is satisfaction with the cornerstone of such a culture - democracy.

Europeans are united in their opinion that democracy is the most legitimate basis of government. No less than 93% of Europeans expressed this opinion in every member state of the European community in 1998.20 This level of unanimity is significant given the late modern collective dissatisfaction with democratic practice.

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20 Cited in Budge, I & Newton et al The Politics of the New Europe, 130. It is important to note that while Europeans are united in their support for democracy, large elements amongst the population are dissatisfied with its practice, most particularly at the pan-European level, as discussed in Chapter Six.
Considering European's long-term satisfaction with democracy, over the last 25 years satisfaction with democracy has remained consistently high, with the exception of the period 1990 - 1993 when satisfaction with democracy fell in all EU states.21 This period paralleled an episode of economic decline for many advanced industrialised states and was associated with the rise in support for more extremist far-right and anti-democratic political influences in Europe.22

In contrast to the experiences of individual advanced industrialised states where the late modern 'crisis of democracy' has resulted in large sections of populations losing faith confidence in the institutions and practices of participative democracy, the pan-European experience runs contrary to this trend, notwithstanding the fact that Europeans are less overt in their feelings of national pride and allegiance when compared with other nationalities.23 This has reflected an enduring commitment to, and common participation in a distinct European political culture.24 Notwithstanding that the level of satisfaction with democracy fluctuates between individual European states, there has been a two to three percent increase in satisfaction over the period 1976 to 1991 across the whole of Europe, with pan-European democratic practice.25

22 See Grover, A. 'A Generic Fascism: Towards an integrated Typology of the casual elements of Fascism and Neo-Fascism.
23 We observe that the development of European identity is particularly significant in the context of Europeans having a lower overall sense of communal identification than other political communities. While the United States stands out as the state with the highest level of national pride amongst its citizens (83% of respondents are proud or very proud of their country) Europeans, by contrast are far less demonstrable about their own level of national identity, and as Haller argues, confirming the earlier findings of Dalton, Europeans are less likely to overtly demonstrate a form of communal, supranational identification. Accordingly the relative position that European identity holds in the consciousness of Europeans is significant given the cultural predilection amongst a large number of Europeans to articulate only limited national, let alone supranational, identification. See: Haller, M. National Identity and National Pride in Comparative Perspective Paper presented at the 3rd Conference of the European Sociological Association 27-30 August 1997, University of Essex., 25 and Dalton, R. Citizen Politics in Western Democracies: Public Opinion and Political Parties in the United States, Great Britain, West Germany and France., 237.
24 See Dalton, R. Citizen Politics in Western Democracies: Public Opinion and Political Parties in the United States, Great Britain, West Germany and France.
25 The Politics of the new Europe., 131
Further, evidence suggests Europeans have almost as much confidence in democracy in the European Union as they do in their national democracies, which in the context of the institutional retardants of European identification, such as the democratic deficit and the perceived remoteness of European political elites and institutions, is a notable achievement. Demonstrating the strength of communal civic identity in Europe. The figure below demonstrates the increasing resilience of Europeans' satisfaction with pan-European democracy.

**Figure 8.2  Satisfaction With European and National Democracy**

![Graph showing satisfaction levels with European and National Democracy from 1995 to 1998.](image)

Source: Commission of the European Communities Eurobarometer No's 43-49

8.8 Unwillingness to take Non-Democratic Action or to Engage in Political Violence

Further evidence of a communal civic identity is the collective European unwillingness to take revolutionary non-democratic action or to engage in political violence (action which we suggest is contrary to the prevailing European political culture). An analysis of the Commission of the European Communities Eurobarometer series demonstrates that, since 1976, not more than 8 percent, (and
usually only between 5 and 6 percent) of Europeans would act in an undemocratic manner. Between 55 and 70% of Europeans prefer democratic reform rather than revolutionary change.26 There is evidence suggesting a correlation between economic performance and satisfaction with democracy in Europe. Those advocating revolutionary change totalled 8 percent in 1976, at a time of increasing European economic slow down, while the figure dropped to four percent in 1990 just prior to the end of a period of sustained economic growth in Europe. It would appear that Europeans are both increasingly satisfied with democracy and increasingly less likely to take radical action to undermine it.

8.8.1 (The Absence of) European Political Violence

As we observed in Chapter Five, the realisation of the purposelessness of intra-European war, and the enormous physical cost of it, led European states to realise that they had more in common as a community than they had apart. Close institutional engagement and common political structures enhanced the common European interests of peace, security and individual prosperity.

In the context of both the common agreement to engage politically, and the establishment of the machinery for such engagement, Europe has become more pacific. Acts of political violence between European states have become exceptional.

8.8.2 European Political Violence - Between the States

The one and a half generations that were born in the period immediately following the end of the Second World War were born into an environment of unprecedented threat of political violence between two superpowers, who were in effect utilising Europe as the most suitable potential battleground. While the threat of total violence between the two superpowers was never realised, the polarisation of enmity between the two, had the effect of cementing a posture of extreme political violence between two clusters of European states. While there were instances of the Cold War deteriorating, such as the Berlin airlift and the Czech uprising, there was no major conflict between the two

26 Ibid., 131.
European groupings within the forty-five year period. Likewise within the two hemispheres of European states, most especially when contrasted with their historical antagonisms and violence, there was a negligible level of inter-state political violence. The situation at the end of the Cold War did not differ significantly in the West, while Eastern Europe saw a high degree of violence between the States of the Russian federation as demonstrated in Russia's war in Chechnya.

8.8.3 European Political Violence - Within the State

While Political violence between European states is relatively uncommon, the level of political violence within political states has, at least until recent times been far more pronounced. Between the mid-sixties and the mid-80's four European states have experienced profound levels of anti-state political violence. In Spain the Basque movement, In Italy the left-wing terrorist movement, In west Germany the Red Brigade, and in Northern Ireland the struggle between the British state and the Irish Republican Army.

While the Spanish have, in common with other Western European states, the right to change their governments democratically, they are not constitutionally free to reject the system and nature of national governance itself. Determination for political autonomy, reflecting pre-existing ethno-linguistic and cultural, has been resisted by the Spanish state resulting in considerable political violence. Basque separatism is a serious source of Spanish, and European political violence. ETA (the Basque acronym for Land and Liberty) has carried out terrorist attacks for many years, and over 700 people have died in ETA attacks since 196827 The Italian and German experience with the extreme left - the Red Brigade, has been no less violent. In Italy extreme terrorist activity aimed at splintering mainstream political activities, and destabilisation of the apparatus of the state was most widespread in the 1970s, however insurgent activities continue. The most recent example of extremist violence was the bombing of the Uffizi Gallery in May 1994, resulting in six deaths and the destruction of cultural artefacts, and the July bombings in Rome and Milan reveal the

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ongoing role of political violence in Italy. Further the experience with the extreme right in Germany and to a lesser extent Italy has revealed a constant level of politically inspired crimes including fire-bombing against immigrant's accommodation, murder, and other racially motivated attacks, which, in the case of Germany registered a total of 2,366 attacks in 1992. The idealism struggle with entrenched corruption, and the prominent, if not pivotal position of the Mafia in Italian political and economic life, and the attempts made to dislodge it, have led to graphic, infamous and bloody acts of political violence. The shift to the right politically in both Germany and Italy, at least until the late 1990's reveals a degree of intolerance of existing pluralist, and pacific political practices, and a willingness, albeit from amongst minorities within the respective populations, to condone political violence.

More recently developments such as the rise of the Revolutionary Organisation ‘17 November’ in Greece, and the Kurdistan Worker's Party in Turkey, demonstrate the willingness of terrorist organisations to take action against European states. The joint developments of the fragmentation of Yugoslavia, and the struggle within the states of the former Soviet Union are blunt and powerful reminders of the dramatic effect of political violence when inflicted upon a population by others within its community. It contrasts with the relative calm and absence of political violence within the western European political hemisphere.

8.8.4 Political Violence - Aimed at the European Supranation

Surprisingly, given the scope of European integration, and the general level of societal insecurity associated with late modernity, there has been little political violence directed at the persons or institutions of the European supranation. As the origin of much of European political violence is associated with attempts to secure political and cultural self-determination for minority groups within pre-existent European states, the European Union has been viewed ambivalently by such groups. On one hand, the EU has intentionally created the conditions within its boundaries for the promotion of regional and local identities, and thus is implicitly sympathetic to the broad aims, if

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not the means of many of Europe's separatist organisations. On the other hand, the EU is considered by some movements as a further layer of political opposition denying the opportunity for radical and substantial political reformation in Europe. Thus while the Basque movement is sympathetic to the EU, organisations such as the Greek 17 November organisation are firmly anti-European, anti-NATO and have taken action since 1990 to target EU facilities in Greece for physical attack. Interestingly, while Europeans appear far less interested in the utilisation of political violence at the supranational level, the degree of violence aimed at the state itself has increased, as manifested in the rise of terrorism and civil conflict in the post cold-war period.

8.9 European Support for Individualism.

A further test of a common European civic identity is European's support for individualism – a cornerstone of all civic polities. Evidence demonstrates that the civic values of individualism and individual self-development are valued highly by Europeans. We earlier considered the greater willingness of Europeans to fight for "human rights" and the "freedom of the individual" rather than for the state or religion. Demonstrating the collective importance placed on the individual within European society are results of further Commission of the European Communities Eurobarometer surveys. When surveyed, 87% of Europeans feel it important to 'discover new things about themselves' and 79% feel it 'important to put more time and effort into their own personal development'. A comparison of the country results illustrates that discovering new things about oneself is considered particularly important in Portugal (89%), Greece and Spain (both 85%). The Spanish are also most likely, together with the Italians, to value the importance of putting more time and effort into their own personal development. While individualism is important to Europeans so too is the respect for other individuals in civil society. The European Union's Continuous Tracking Survey (CTS) suggests the importance of societal protection. Europeans are very interested in their fellow citizens with more than 9 in


30 Ibid., 6-9.

10 feeling that it is 'extremely' or 'very' important to help others and to value people for who they are. Further, more than 8 in 10 Europeans believe it is important to be involved in creating a better society. These core values are held fairly uniformly across Europe.\textsuperscript{32}

The perceived role of women in society is also illustrative of a communal liberal European political culture, most especially in northern Europe. Only 25% of Europeans agree 'that a husband's job is to earn the money and a wife's job is to look after the home'. Interestingly patriarchal values are most prominent at Europe's territorial periphery in Greece (88%) and the least common in the Netherlands (53%), Denmark (58%) and Sweden (59%).\textsuperscript{33}

If we consider Europeans' confidence in public institutions we see that while there has been a decline in some, Europeans still have confidence in the major institutions that make up the institutions of the European political community, such confidence reflecting a common European civic political culture.

\textsuperscript{32} The figures ranged as follows:

| Importance of Helping other people: Highest - Ireland (98%), lowest - France (92%) |
| Importance of Valuing People for who they are: Highest - Greece (96%); lowest France - (88%) |
| Importance of being involved in creating a better Society: Highest Portugal - (93%), lowest Denmark - (76%) |

Source Europinion #13 http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg10/epo/

\textsuperscript{33} The figures ranged from:

'I want a world where people live by traditional values'
Highest Greece (88%), lowest Netherlands (52%).

'We'd [be] better off if we returned to our traditional ways of doing things'
Highest Greece (71%) Lowest Denmark (27%)

'A Husbands Job is to earn the money and a wife's job is to look after the home'
Highest Portugal (44%); lowest, Denmark (13%)
The liberal, pluralist basis of European political culture is an important supportive measure of a pan-European civic identity. As Europeans have endorsed a liberal democratic system of governance they have implicitly introduced a system of identity preferences. At the pinnacle of such a hierarchy of identity, at least in the public sphere, is their identification as citizens; European citizens. European’s self-understanding, in the political context, is more shaped by the prevailing norms of the liberal European political culture than they are by their identities as members of communities or families distinguished by ethnic, class and religious perspective.

8.10 Tolerance of Other Ethnic and Racial Groups

Europeans are not only bound together as a result of the communality created by a commonly held civic democratic pluralism within their political culture and political institutions, but also they further operationalise it. This is demonstrated in the tolerance Europeans display of other ethnic and racial groups. Survey data conducted by the EU suggests that 83% of those people surveyed were accepting of people of
other ethnic groups (with 13% not being accepting) while 81% were accepting of people of another race (while 15% were not accepting of other racial groups). While there is some resistance to the 'other', as we shall consider later in this Thesis, its basis can be found in economic and security grounds, not ethnic.

8.11 A European Political Ideology

The endorsement and support of a common European civic political ideology, rooted in a common European political culture, is rapidly manifesting itself in contemporary Europe. It demonstrates Europe and Europeans as distinctive, and both reflects and promotes a European communal civic identity.

A general European political ideology can be distinguished from a more general European political culture by its enhanced clarity and its greater articulation into practical political activity. As Dowse and Hughes suggest, political ideology contains a set of political values, states to be desired and, if possible striven for and maintained. It is from such an ideology, and the political values that sustains it, that core decisions and choices are taken as to the nature of political life, the scope and emphasis of public, social and economic policy and the role of individuals and collectivities within it.

As Effrat argues, the adoption of societal and political values into a broad political ideology has the effect of reflecting a specific cluster of values and assumptions about the relationship between the individual and the group. Further it brings about a generalised conformity to collective social and political norms and the allocation and acceptance of roles and tasks within the society based upon such codified values.

A political ideology specifies the desirable end states of a political society and the methods of achieving them. It is rooted in a cluster of communal norms on the basis of human behaviour, motivation and of the constitution of a desired community. A

34 Commission of the European Communities Eurobarometer 48, Figure 6.3, 72.


communal political ideology is capable of provoking communal action and is central to the allocation of specific roles to individuals and organisations within society. In short, a coherent and collectively adopted political ideology is highly suggestive of a communal identity.

8.11.1 A Distinctive European Political Ideology

The Left/Right cleavage in European politics is rapidly diminishing revealing a political and ideological landscape characterised by an emergent common ideological framework. In Western Europe, at both the national and supranational level, there appears to be a convergence of community expectations and values of the political system and the outcomes it produces. Such a convergence has been assisted by the process of European institutional and functional convergence. The internal market program, economic and monetary union, not only establish the means by which the European market should be organised, but additionally reflect a European normative position on the role of the market in European society. Likewise the European cohesion program and the development of a Social and a Citizens’ Europe at an institutional level, are in part reflecting the expectations and values of Europeans. At the national level, the success of centre-left political parties supporting a relatively homogenous cluster of policy reflects and demonstrates an emergent communal and distinctly European political ideology. Such parties advocate a common set of policies including support for a strong deregulated marketplace, strong social intervention and environmental protection. This not only reflects the political preferences of Europeans but also reveals a unique and increasingly uniform convergence of European values in the political, social, and economic spheres.38

37 Ibid.

38 There is a clear tension between the neo-functionalist and neo-institutionalist viewpoint of the role of European institutions to either create or reflect a common European normative position

We have earlier observed that neo-functionalists emphasise the importance of institutions in causing actors to develop new perspective and definitions of the social and political situation leading to a heightened level of co-operation and mutual understanding. Achieving the socialisation of Europeans through the process of integration and accommodation. (see Bulmer 1994, 1997 Pollack 1996)

While neo-functionalists consider political institutions and policy dimensions as capable of socialising political actors, neo-institutionalists emphasise the incapacity of institutions to shape the values, attitudes and political orientations of social actors. Thus given the diversity of institutional settings to which political actors belong it could be that various institutions affect values and orientations in differing ways at differing rates.
8.11.2 The Manifestation of a Common European Political Ideology

In 12 of the 15 Member states of the European Union, Socialist, Social Democratic and labour parties hold Government. Such an occurrence is a clear reflection of an emergent common European (political) ideology based in a common value system and an important constituent part of a common form of European identification. In short Europeans, sharing the common values of humanitarianism, social democracy and social protection, are identifying with and supporting those political parties which reflect and institutionalise such values. Let us consider in detail the elements of this ideology.

8.11.3 Constituent Parts of the European Political Ideology

Specific components of European political culture are demonstrated in the policy manifestos of the successful parties of the centre-left. The elements include those

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39 The constellation of the European centre-left Governments is comprehensive, as the table below details:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>County</th>
<th>Main Party</th>
<th>Coalition Partner(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Socialists</td>
<td>Liberal, Green</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Social Democrats</td>
<td>Radical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>Social Democrats</td>
<td>Various</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Socialists</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Social Democrats</td>
<td>Greens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>Socialists</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Democrats of the Left</td>
<td>Greens/Socialists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>Social Democrats</td>
<td>Christian Democrats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>Liberal &amp; Democratic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>Socialists</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Social Democrats</td>
<td>Left/Greens</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Delegation of the European Commission to Australia and New Zealand, email Grover/Hunter 4 August 2000

40 The 'Citizens' Revolt' in Italy is further suggestive of the embracing of political liberalism, By the mid 1990s Italians, sick of both political and Mafia corruption demonstrated both their 'republican virtue' and the 'responsibilities of citizenship'. In 1992 'Italian voters indicated in a referendum that they had 'had enough of a system in which the spoils of patronage had come to eclipse governance almost entirely' The vote with a 77% turnout represented a shocking indictment of the political class and the political system that have controlled Italy for almost half a century, observed the Economist.

This represents a clear endorsement, by members of perhaps the most corrupted political culture in Europe, of the embracing of political and financial reform. Italians in rejecting the traditional political parties have openly proclaimed their allegiance to the north-European social democratic values.

1. A strong Economy with a increased focus on both job and wealth creation; (SPD) / A commitment to a strong private market, but strict controls and review over privatised public assets (British Labour Party) / participation in the international market with a secure social-economic dimension (Dutch PvdA);

2. Strong labour market intervention, including labour market regulation and the creation of service jobs in the public sector (SPD) / Industrial democracy, including worker participation, in a deregulated labour market (British Labour Party) / minimum standards for working conditions, social security and equal rights for men and women (Dutch PvdA);

3. The strengthening of consumer rights (SPD);

4. Increase in levels of social protection including, affordable health, the security of pensions, family and child benefits in the context of lowering of gross government outlays on such protection and the replacement of social protection by employment (SPD) / Commitment to social protection, including signing of the European Social Charter, improvements to childcare and a 'New Deal' to improve the employability of the young unemployed and welfare reform, 'based on the principle of work for those who can and security for those who cannot' (British Labour Party) Tax advantages and better social security for 'flex' workers (Dutch PvdA);

5. The repositioning of the state 'as a partner in a free citizens society' including enhanced democratic participation for the public (SPD);

6. The control of immigration in a 'social way' (SPD);

7. A strong commitment to the fight against crime and enhancements to the judiciary and punishment (SPD) / Strong Focus on 'zero tolerance' policing as part of a new 'Crime and Disorder Bill' and the banning of all handguns (British Labour Party);

8. A focus on ecological regulation and protection (SPD) and

9. Shaping Europe as a citizens' space, focusing on employment and social justice. (SPD/British Labour Party)
The revised European political culture, of which the German and British examples are the most notable, is reflective of the particularly European ideology of the 'Third Way'.

Notwithstanding the difficulty in achieving practical implementation of certain elements of these platforms, the broad electoral success of European parties professing such values demonstrate their centrality, and the political ideology that champions them, to a majority of the European voting public. Further it demonstrates a distinctively European conceptualisation of Europeanness due to a common political ideology and value set.

8.11.4 A European Political Ideology - Concluding Remarks

Political ideology can be understood as the compartmentalisation and legitimisation of societal values, based upon a preconceived notion of human behaviour and societal motivation, which, based upon general societal conformity, results in the allocation of tasks and resources within a society. It is a symbolic link between political elites and

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42 The Third Way evades specific definition but contains various elements including:

1. Democratic Reform - enhancement of popular participation, proposed adoption of direct democracy, voter initiated legislation, the devolution of authority to regional communities;

2. Individual rights, including a Bill of Rights, protection of free association and freedom of expression and the right to privacy;

3. Cultural Diversity - offering protection against globalisation and its potential to reduce populations to 'rootless, transient and disconnected from history'; and

4. Environmentalism - the achievement of 'a good economic standard of life and an ecologically sound environment'.

See www.thirdway.org

43 It is not surprising that there appears to be a nexus between the shift towards the new European political culture, and the more archetypal elements of European political and philosophical development. European cultural and political life, is characterised by secularism, individualism, rationalism, humanitarianism, value pluralism and political and economic liberalism and the pursuit of individual merit through and within a strong social network of support and protection. The widespread shift to the left in the majority of European states amongst European citizens, in the contemporary period, reflects the integration and operationalisation of a common European political ideology. Such an ideology reflects a convergent European political culture and European identity, a sense of identification based upon a common set of norms, attitudes and expectations of the European political system.
the citizen body, and forms an additional link between individual citizens. In short it forms the basis for a common identity.

While no general conclusion can be drawn on the topic of a generalised European political ideology a number of limited conclusions can be made. Firstly as examined earlier, there does appear to be an increasing European conformity in political values, and broad consensus, expressed at the ballot box, of a European political and societal ordering. This is reflected in the manifestos of the European centre left, and is supported by the European populace in 12 of the 15 European member states. Secondly there does appear to be a generalised European consensus on the nature of European governance, and the allocation of European resources to achieve such goals. While clearly public and political elites have a considerable influence in shaping such values, European public opinion, as evidenced by electoral support, seems to condone such values. The relationship between Europeans values, across member state borders, appears to be a complementary and increasingly convergent one. Further the evidence demonstrates that this common strand of values is an element in the establishment of the relationships between Europeans. Insofar as the ideology is generalised across the European polity, it provides a powerful and substantial binding element which reflects European commonality, community and identity.

8.12 Common Symbols

Collective attachment to common symbols - such as flags, the arts, national monuments and historical figures.

8.12.1 European Symbols and European Identity

Communal identity may be facilitated by the European polity in a variety of ways, not the least being the development of common European symbols. However the role and effectiveness of common European symbols in European identity formation is not a compelling one.

The European Flag — formally adopted as the flag of the then, European Community on 22 April 1996, was chosen as it was considered to symbolise European unity and balance. After many proposals it was decided that the 12 golden stars on a blue
background symbolised ‘perfection’. Quoting the Commission: “There were twelve apostles, there are twelve hours in a day; twelve months in a year; and there are twelve signs in the Zodiac.”\(^{44}\) However, notwithstanding the fact that the flag is widely recognised and flown throughout Europe, there is no evidence that there is a significant emotional commitment to it expressed from amongst Europeans. As Dignan argues:

“It adorns licence plates in some of the 12 European Union nations and greets travellers at border points from Athens to Amsterdam to the Azores. But 40 years after it was created, the European flag and its twelve gold stars on a field of blue remains a source of confusion.”\(^{45}\)

**The European Anthem** - In 1955 Count Coudenhove-Kalergi said:

“I should like to propose the hymn from Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony as a European anthem, but I fear that I may discredit this suggestion by taking the initiative myself.”\(^{46}\)

The communal participation in the singing of a national anthem in appropriate political, cultural and sporting settings can act as a powerful rallying point for communal identification. We have only to look at its effectiveness at Olympic events to gauge this. The effectiveness of such can be seen in circumstances as different as the Olympic games to the use of a national anthem at national days of remembrance. The Council of Europe first suggested the Ode to Joy, its melody set by Beethoven, based upon Friedrich Schiller’s poem *An die Freude*, in 1972. However it was not until 1986 that it was adopted by the EC. Showing the sensitivity of the EU not to exclude Europeans from participation in a common anthem on linguistic grounds, the European anthem was adopted without words. It was decided in April 1986 that Ode to Joy should be performed at all Community events and ceremonies requiring the playing of a European anthem. In common with the European Flag, there is no

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\(^{44}\) Delegation of the Commission of the European Communities to Australia and New Zealand EU Background - European Emblems, undated., 1.


\(^{46}\) Delegation of the Commission of the European Communities to Australia and New Zealand EU Background - European Emblems, undated., 1.
evidence of a communal acceptance of, or common identification as Europeans as a result of the European anthem.

Europe Day - The contrived nature of pre-fabricated pan-European symbols is nowhere better demonstrated in the fracas over Europe Day. European nations had difficulty in selecting a common Europe day - so there are two - May 5 and May 9. The Council of Europe uses May 5 because it is the date when, in 1949, Churchill in his Zurich speech, argued; “we must build a United States of Europe”. The European Union calls May 9 Robert Schuman Day, in honour of the French statesman who was a key political member and co-founder of the Union. Under such circumstances it is not surprising that, notwithstanding their official commemoration, such days lack a popular resonance emblematic of a common sense of European belonging from amongst its citizen body. The most recent results available (1995) suggest that across the EU only 61% believe that Europe Day is a good idea and less than 50% think so in the Netherlands (46%), in Sweden (42%), in Austria (41%) and in Denmark (32%). These results demonstrate that Europeans do not derive a common form of belonging from such symbolism.

8.12.2 The Euro and the Euro Currency Symbol

The most promising European symbol capable of uniting Europeans and meaningfully progressing the articulation of a communal European identity is the euro and the euro currency symbol. The symbolic and identity implications of the move towards monetary union are profound. The single currency has the potential to act as a highly symbolic element in the evolution of a common European identity. Banknotes are the only industrial products that everybody handles, they are accepted by all members of a community without pause, from complete strangers. As Padoa-Schioppa suggests a state’s currency:

“Symbolise the power of the state and the sense of security that it is the duty of the state to provide.”

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The introduction of the notes and coins of the euro on 1 January 2002 and the removal of national currencies will mean the removal of one of the primary symbols of statehood and institutionalised national identity. A currency, according to the European Union:

"... symbolises this link with the state through the image it conveys, its use as a medium of payment of income and other taxes and the receipt of benefits, as well as in the severity with which the law punishes attempts at forgery."\(^{49}\)

It appears that it is the intention of European authorities to ensure that the symbolism attached to national currencies is transferred to the euro, despite the fact, as the EC states: "European Union institutions may often seem distant, or even inaccessible and often incomprehensible to the ordinary citizen."\(^{50}\) The Council of Ministers took this into account when deciding on the design of euro coins. The reverse side, showing the coins value will be identical throughout European member states in an attempt to symbolise the unity created by the euro. The face of the coin, however, will show national symbols, surrounded by the 12 Community stars. The intention of such a combined motif is:

"In this way the coins will affirm the continuation of the national identity of each Member State, but within the whole formed by the European Union. The Euro clearly symbolises European citizenship and identity."\(^{51}\)

The European Commission has suggested that the introduction of the euro will lead to a new pan-European consumer culture, making it possible for European citizens; 'to cooperate truly in the euro project.'\(^{52}\) If such a culture develops it will be another element in the fabric of positive sentiment binding Europeans together. Seeing the emotive and symbolic importance of the euro as a step towards a pan-European identity the EU has stated that:

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\(^{49}\) Frontier-Free Europe, April 1988, European Commission, Office for Official Publications, L-2985, Luxembourg, 1.

\(^{50}\) Ibid.

\(^{51}\) Ibid., 1.

\(^{52}\) Ibid.
“The euro must become the symbol not only of Europe but also of Europeans.”\(^{53}\)

A recent survey conducted by the American transnational corporation, Microsoft, has found a very high awareness of the euro currency symbol.\(^{54}\) The survey showed that in the European business community there is a 100% awareness of the euro currency symbol (with the exception of the UK with 89% awareness.) A total of 40% of business leaders said they knew the symbol for the euro. However 62% of the European business community was able to correctly identify the euro symbol amongst a sheet of similar symbols. Interestingly, when shown a sheet including the Euro symbol, 19% of managers who previously said that they knew the symbol were unable to correctly identify it, while 51% of managers who had previously said they didn't know the symbol were able to correctly identify it.\(^{55}\) Amongst the general European population, while there is a high degree of knowledge of the name of the European single currency, there is no evidence of a strong emotional commitment to it. Further there is an absence of evidence to suggest its ability to affect the creation of a stronger sense of European belonging, solidarity or identity, from amongst those who will have occasion to use it on a daily basis.\(^{56}\)

As the above analysis demonstrates, notwithstanding the success of the euro in representing a commonly held and recognised European symbol there is no evidence to suggest that other European symbols or emblems have had any effect on uniting Europeans. There is both a lack of organic, popular European symbols and an absence of popular participation in their creation or application. Further, with the exception of the euro, the European symbols appear largely irrelevant to the everyday concerns and aspirations of European citizens. They are neither rallying points for collective action, nor symbols of a united culture. The weakness of the European symbols may, in part be derived from their civic and somewhat distant, nature. National and regional

\(^{53}\) Ibid


\(^{55}\) Ibid.

\(^{56}\) See Commission of the European Communities Eurobarometer 49, 51.
symbols highlighting European particularism abound. From Scotland to Greece local and national communities affirm their identities in their participation in their symbolism often ethnically based. By contrast Europe can offer little of an enduring civic nature, no matter how hard the EC tries. The only truly European symbols are ethnic and/or national in character – Christmas, Easter, the commemoration of the individual nation’s war dead. The enduring strength of national symbols cannot be discounted, and to the extent that the European polity provides support and security to such symbols may provide a basis for the evocation of a collective form of European identification, however there is no direct evidence to support such an argument.

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Chapter Nine

Common European Actions and Relationships and European Identity

Cooperative intra-group interaction and relationship formation - collective behaviour and collective goal definition and attainment. Demonstrable commitment to common action in the name of the collective.

9.1 Action and Relationships and Contemporary European Identity

The concept of identity, as we examined in Chapter One, is in part expressed in the nature of the action of the individual within distinct, situationally-salient communities, and in the relationship between one community and others. Within the sociological tradition of the discursive examination of the social, identity is understood to be lodged within networks of relationships with others, society being formed by the overlay of persons in relationships and the series of commitments persons develop in such relationships.1 As Miller has observed, a distinguishing aspect of national identity is that it is an active identity: “The nation becomes what it does by the decisions it takes.”2 Progressing the nature of identity in its relational form, Social Psychology, within the paradigm of social identity theory, argues that distinctive identity construction and articulation occurs insofar as individuals identify with, and wish themselves to be identified as members of distinct social categories. Such a process of identity formation takes place both at the most banal level, such as a result of the relationships developed as a member of a football team, or at the political level such as the individual’s cognitive response to relationships as a member of a political community. It is possible to test the strength of such identity formation by reference to a set of standard criteria, including the occurrence of common roles and norms, behavioural cohesiveness and uniformity, interdependence and common goals and cooperative interaction within the relational group.3 Conversely the construction of identity in relational terms, while being partly defined by commonality or

1 Preston, P.W. Political/Cultural Identity – Citizens and Nations in a Global Era. p.25
2 Miller 1993:7 in Auer, S. Reflections on Nationalism and Minority Rights in Central Europe., 11.
3 Refer to Chapter One for details
homogeneity within common social structures, is also largely dependent upon its difference from or negation of some other form of social construct. As Hall suggests:

"Identity is a structured representation which only achieves its positive through the narrow eye of the negative."^4

Thus both 'self' and 'other'-definition are intimately linked, and cannot exist without each other. Each defines itself by marking itself as different from the other, and it is in the nature of the interactions and relationship between the self and the other, that identity is, in part, defined and formed. The importance of relationships as a basis of identity foundation is well articulated by Castells:

"Symbolic communication between humans and the relationship between humans and nature, on the basis of production (with its complement, consumption), experience, and power, crystallise over history in specific territories, thus generating cultures and collective identities."^5

A central question with respect to the articulation of a European identity as expressed in relational networks is: "how does it happen that individual Europeans come to think of themselves as being members of a European (civil) society and, at a more abstracted level a European (political) community?" Such a question is answered in terms of the nature of interaction between Europeans and with others and the relationships that such interactions constitute. Identity, considered in terms of relationships can be seen to have two distinct but interrelated aspects. The organic, non-political, non-institutionally based set of trans-European civic interactions forms the first component of European identity defined in terms of relationships. To what extent have individual Europeans formed transnational networks of relations, and in what way have such relationships engendered a sense of Europeaness? Secondly, part of the development of identity as relationships, at least in the European context, is the range of institutional measures taken by the EU to facilitate trans-European relationships and networks. We are concerned here with the policy and structural mechanisms that European institutions have implemented to facilitate the building of European relationships and consequently a trans-European consciousness. As we have earlier observed, identity is always, in part, constituted out of difference. Thus the

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creation of identity is additionally conditional upon the relation between the European subject and another, as we shall presently consider.

A number of theorists have considered the relational basis of European identity formation as being paramount. For Wallace it is from the density of interaction that Europe can be differentiated from non-Europe. The continuity of flow of social and economic interactions is considered by Deutsch as dividing the territoriality of Europe. Core Europe reduces with the intensity of interactions. The 'gravitational pull' of the economic dynamism of the core European economies has had the effect of increasing the degree of economic, social and cultural interactions between it and the more peripheral areas of Europe, such as Southern Europe and Scandinavia. Similarly the structure of core Europe has effected a greater degree of relationships between itself and the countries of central and Eastern Europe. Thus the network of bilateral and multilateral networks at an institutional and political level, which has been mirrored by relationships at the economic, social and cultural level, have been not only reshaping the relationship between core and peripheral Europe, but, more significantly have provided a basis of communal European identity.

In this chapter we delineate different types of relationships and assess their effect on the creation of communal European identity in the following manner:

1. **Pan European Economic Actions and Relationships** - which have the effect of binding people together through commercial exchange and markets;

2. **Pan-European Political Actions and Relationships** - through a system of political integration, delineating the mode of political relationships through a common system of justice, and administrative apparatus, creating a common centre for political allegiance;

3. **Pan-European Social Actions and Relationships** - which have the effect of individuals identifying with, and wishing to be identifiable as, members of distinct social groups; and

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6 Wallace, W. 'Foreign Policy and National Identity in the United Kingdom', 14.

7 Ibid.
4. Pan-European Cultural Actions and Relationships - which may have the effect of binding people together through a shared belief in a system of values, norms, language, symbols and rituals.

9.2 Pan-European Economic Actions and Relationships

Notwithstanding the initial economic raison d'etre that promoted the establishment of the EC, European economic integration lost considerable impetus by the early 1980s. The need to develop closer European relationships and the structural impediments associated with the maintenance of individual national markets was most critically highlighted in the Cecchini Report of 1988.9 The report, an exhaustive analysis of the costs of ‘non-Europe’, addressed a number of issues. Primarily a tool aimed at engendering impetus for the unification of what was perceived as Europe's fragmented markets, the report focused on the blockages in trans-European economic relationships associated with the (then) current system of member state border-related controls, divergent national technical standards and member state protectionism.10 The costs of regulatory diversity on existing trans-European economic relationships’ while difficult to quantify in detail, ran into tens of millions of ecu.11 Thus European inter-company linkages, and corporate expansion were considered to be inhibited by regulatory obstacles.

The adoption of the European Single Market in 1992 can be seen, in the context of the identified costs of ‘non-Europe’, as a significant aid to trans-European economic relationships. This in turn has assisted in the formation of a transactionally based

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8 This typology is a variation on one presented by Neil Smelser in Smelser, N. Sociology. (Cambridge MA: Blackwell Publishers 1994), 262.


10 The costs of non-Europe, by the artificial limits on European economic relationships were estimated as costing 4.5% of the EC's GDP, inflating the European Economy by 6.1% and costing 1.8 million jobs and adding 1.5% to the EU's unemployment rate – see Cecchini, P. The European Challenge 1992: The Benefits of a Single Market, 97.

11 Ibid., 31.
European identity. The positive effects of the single market on the development of European economic relationships may be considered in three ways:

1. Increases in trade and foreign direct investment flows: trade volumes between member states has increased by 20-30% since the introduction of the single market. Moreover from 1985 to 1995 the share of intra-EC imports in total manufacturing imports increased by 6.7% from 61.2% to 67.9%. For services during the same period, the share of intra-EC imports in total imports of services increased 3.1% from 46.9% in 1985 to 50.0% in 1995;¹²

2. Significant changes in member states' production structures, level of competition and a consequent impact on prices. There has been an explosion of European economic relationships as evidenced by the increases in European mergers and acquisitions (M&A). This growth has been particularly strong in cross-border activity, although the bulk of M&A activity has remained domestic (over 70%) The intensification in trans-European trade has largely prevented any potential for a reduction in economic competition resulting from such high levels of economic inter-relationships; and¹³

3. Improvements in EC total factor productivity, growth, employment and convergence: As a result of the heightened level of economic relationships within the European single market, Community income in 1994 is estimated to have been 1.1 to 1.5 percentage points higher than would have been the case in the absence of the single market. Territorially peripheral member states have, in relative terms benefited most from this improvement. The open European market has allowed for a convergence of member states real per capita income levels. Levels of employment are also higher as a result of the intensification of economic relationships within the single market. Somewhere between

¹² European Economy No.63, 275. This is particularly significant given the increased exposure to the global economy that occurred due to trade liberalisation during the same period.

¹³ The heightened level of European economic relationships as a result of institutional reform is demonstrated in the current level of European M&A including such cases as the Vodafone Air Touch PLC (UK) bid to takeover Mannesmann AG (Germany) at the bid value of 121,239 euro's, and French example of TotalFina SA bidding to takeover Elf Aquitaine at a bid price of 56,762 euro's. See; Miller, K. 'All of Europe is in Play' Newsweek December 1999, 90-95.
300,000 and 900,000 extra jobs have been created as a result of the single market.  

The table below demonstrates the increase in economic transactions between Europeans.

**Table 9.1  Intra-EU 15 Import of Goods 1960-1995**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>1960</th>
<th>1980</th>
<th>1995</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B/L</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>38.2</td>
<td>39.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DK</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>16.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GR</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>14.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>11.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRL</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>41.0</td>
<td>27.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>12.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NL</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>20.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>24.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIN</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>13.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>17.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>12.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU12</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>13.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU15</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: *The European Economy no.63 1997 pp274-275*

The increase in intra-European trade has not been uniform. As the figure below demonstrates economically peripheral European states have increased their level of intra-European trade at a greater rate than core European states.

As a result of the implementation of the single market, the level of economic interaction within the EU has greatly intensified. Such an intensification of economic relationships has resulted from not only the removal of the blocks to trans-European business activity as outlined in the Cecchini Report, but through active economic management by the EU in order to promote economic cohesion. We should not forget that the structure of EC imports between 1958 and 1994 saw an increase in intra EC trade (as expressed as a percentage of total imports) from 35.2% in 1958 to 57.0% in 1994.\(^\text{15}\)

At a more localised level, the expansive range of trans-national economic organisations demonstrates the development of European economic relationships. While some are centrally important in the facilitation of European economic relationships, such as the Association of European Chambers of Commerce and Industry (Eurochambres), the European Round Table of Industrialists (ERT) and the European Association of Craft and Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (UEAPME).\(^\text{16}\) A plethora of lesser known bodies exist such as the Association of European Manufacturers of Instantaneous Gas Water Heaters and Wall-Hung Boilers

\(^{15}\) See Table 46 'Structure of EC imports by country and region 1958 and 1994, 246; European Economy no 63 1997 Annual Economic Report for 1997.

(AFECI), the European Quality Assurance Association of Expanded Polystyrene Foam Manufacturers for Food Packaging (EQA) and the European Health Industry Business Communications Council (EHIBCC). These organisations play an important role in creating trans-national loyalties and associations.\(^\text{17}\) Further the current plan to create a pan-European stock market, valued at $US7 trillion, with a daily turnover of $US9 trillion, will further strengthen trans-European economic arrangements.\(^\text{18}\)

9.3 Pan-European Political Actions and Relationships

9.3.1 Pan-European Political Engagement and Participation

We have examined in some detail European macro-level political relationships; the cooperation between European states that has led to the formation of supranational Europe. We are concerned here with the question of political relationships at the individual level.

Political participation, at either the national or supranational level, is a foundation stone of political society. It has been defined by Dowse and Hughes as:

"those voluntary activities by which members of a society share in the selection of rulers, and directly or indirectly in the formation of public policy".\(^\text{19}\)

Political participation is highly suggestive of the strength of a society's cohesion and communal identity. Accordingly to the extent that Europeans collectively engage with European political life, such engagement is evidence of a heightened European identity.

The scope of political participation and engagement is potentially broad and can range from personal exposure to political stimuli and voting, at one end of the scale, to contacting a public official or political leader; to being a candidate for office and actually holding public and party office. It is important to note that in most western

\(^{17}\) Ibid.


\(^{19}\) Dowse, R. & Hughes, J. Political Sociology, 290.
liberal-democratic regimes the majority of the population is unaware and uninterested in the political world around them and that only between 1 and 3 percent of the population are politically active.\textsuperscript{20}

There are important variables that must be taken into account when considering political participation within Europe. The rate of participation at the national level, varies significantly between states. In the United Kingdom fewer than 80\% of the eligible population generally vote at general elections. In Germany the figure for the 1990 election was 77.8\% (West Germany 78.5\%, East Germany 74.5\%), - such figures can be compared with Russia, where in the June 1996 elections, 68\% of the population turned out to vote.\textsuperscript{21} The interest level amongst populations and the level of knowledge about political institutions at a national level, let alone a supranational level, varies significantly within member states, and even further across the pan-European electorate. Accordingly, we need to be wary of attempting to extrapolate conclusions that may be unsupportable.

We identify four key avenues for European political engagement. They are:

1. European Voting;
2. Political Interaction with the European Union (including the politicisation of the European Regions);
3. The formation of and support for European Political Parties; and
4. Pan-European NGO’s social movements and interest groups.

To the extent that Europeans are participating and engaging in European political life via these four mechanisms, we are able to demonstrate European identification as exhibited by collective actions and the formation of uniquely European political relationships. Such a process has the combined effect of creating the in-group bias and intergroup discrimination central to the articulation of identity.\textsuperscript{22}

\textsuperscript{20} Milbrath, L. Political Participation. (Chicago: Rand McNally 1965), 19.

\textsuperscript{21} Cook, C & Paxton, J. European Political Facts

9.3.2 European Voting

Europeans are strongly committed to European political engagement, via the ballot box. However their turnout rate at European as opposed to national elections is lower overall, as the figure below outlines.

**Figure 9.2 European Versus National Parliamentary Election Turnout**


As the above figure demonstrates, the level of European political engagement is lesser at the pan-European level than at the national level. Notwithstanding the actual European election turnout in 1999, the voting intentions of Europeans reveal a much higher level of proposed political engagement in 1999 than in previous years. In Greece 92% of eligible voters indicated prior to the election that they would vote however only 70% did so, whilst in Denmark 59% indicated their intention to vote, and only 45% actually voted. The only two states where voter turnout in the European elections of 1999 exceeded proposed voter intentions occurred in Belgium (89% intending to vote, 90% actually voted) and Luxembourg (75% intending to vote, 86% actually voted) which reflects these two states broadly stronger commitment to European affairs.\(^\text{23}\) The United Kingdom forms the weakest link in pan-European

\(^{23}\) Commission of the European Communities *Eurobarometer* 51, 79.
political engagement, largely as a result of a hostile political elite during the last period of Conservative rule. Demographic analysis shows that older people are more likely to take part in elections than those aged between 15-24. Considering the relationship between economic activity and voting intentions, we find that 83% of managers and 80% of the self-employed said they would vote, whereas only 64% of the unemployed intended to vote in the 1999 European elections. Education is positively correlated to European political engagement. Sixty-nine percent of people who left school by the age of 15 or younger say that they will vote, compared with 82% of those who stayed in education until the age of 20 or older. Those sympathetic to the European Union are further more likely to vote. Eighty-two percent of those who regarded their country’s membership as a good thing said that they would vote, compared with only 58% of those who felt their country’s membership was a ‘bad thing’.

9.3.3 Political Interaction with the European Union

To the extent that Europeans are willing to engage with the political institutions of the European Union two aspects of European identification are demonstrated. Firstly, such engagement demonstrates that Europeans are conscious of the role of the EU in their lives. Secondly, by virtue of the process of active engagement, and the relationships that build from such engagement, identity formation, occurs as European political life becomes more substantive and central to Europeans lives. As the table below demonstrates.

**Table 9.2 Willingness to be Pro-active in the Search for European Information**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>European Union Initiative</th>
<th>Percentage Positive Responses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Call a specially reserved free phone number.</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Go to a public Information Office.</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Send a fax to a specially reserved number, free of charge.</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Go to an Information Office of the European Commission.</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Commission of the European Communities *Eurobarometer* 49 fig 1.8a p.17

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24 Commission of the European Communities *Eurobarometer* 49, 74.
9.3.4 Interaction between Europeans and the European Parliament

Europeans are increasingly active in contacting and lobbying the representative institutions of the European polity. The European Parliament is being used by the European public as a forum for the fulfilment of political aspirations. As the figure below indicates, Europeans are increasingly utilising and participating in a uniquely European set of political interactions. Such increased interaction is emblematic of the shift to a European frame of reference amongst Europeans in political matters.

Figure 9.3  Petitions to the European Parliament

![Petitions to the European Parliament Graph]


9.3.5 Regional Relationships

Across the European Union sub-state regionalist and nationalists have created networks of associations and interests with a distinctly trans-national flavour. They have used the process of political and economic integration to imbue their particular message with a European flavour, in a transition from relatively marginalised separatism to significantly more popular politics of inclusive autonomy in a supranational Europe.²⁵

²⁵ See Goodman, J. 1997 The EU: Reconstituting Democracy Beyond the 'Nation-State' Contemporary European Studies Association of Australia Newsletter, Number 18, May 1997, 4-18.
During the 1970s and 1980s regional devolution was introduced within European states to assist with the representation of regional interests and to improve the democratisation of state structures. By the mid 1980s in France, Greece, Portugal and Spain, elected sub-state authorities had become a permanent feature of political life. These sub-state entities have assumed a pivotal role in the implementation of EU policies, most particularly the structural reform programs. More significantly they have developed direct relations both with the institutions of the European Union, but have direct and complimentary relations with other national and sub-national groupings within the Union. The effect of a heightened regional presence and a stronger degree of interrelatedness between such regions have been to strengthen a ‘Europe of Regions’. Local elites have maximised their autonomy from the central state and have acquired a key role in stimulating economic development. The increased EU-orientation is expressed in the burgeoning of the EU regional lobby with numerous authorities opening offices in Brussels as we observed earlier in this work.

As well as participating in purely formal relationships with the EU, generally through participation the Committee of the Regions, sub-state authorities have established strong trans-European relationships through the establishment of cross-regional associations. Legally recognised under EU law since 1989, these groupings are known as “European Economic Interest Groupings”. By 1992 there were 322 of these groupings, many acting as 'holding' organisations of broader inter-regional associations, often formally recognised as “Euro-Regions” by the Commission. The more prosperous regions have taken the lead in forging these inter-European relationships; Catalonia, Lombardy, Baden-Wurtemburg and Rhone-Alpes, for instance set up an association in September 1988 termed 'the four motors of a 'new 'intra-European high technology cartel'. Similarly a “High Technology Route of Southern Europe” has been established, linking Catalonia with the two adjoining French regions of Languedoc-Roussillon and the Mid-Pyrenees. Other regional

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27 Goodman, 'The EU: Reconstituting Democracy Beyond the 'Nation-State' Contemporary European Studies Association of Australia Newsletter, 13G.

28 Ibid.
relationships are organised along sectorial lines, for instance in the "Regions of Traditional Industry" or the "Motor Industry Cities and Regions."

Relationships of the sub-state actors have encouraged the development of a linking of both areas of common interest within regional and peripheral areas of Europe but has also had the effect of redefining Europeans consciousness. This has occurred both in realising the linkages across Europe and in the 'Europeanisation' of the demands for autonomy of sub-state actors. Such a sense of communal Europeaness has been particularly marked in the UK where Scottish, Welsh and Irish nationalists have become enthusiastically pro-European, defining themselves as 'European' and defining those who oppose regional autonomy and intra-European regional relationships as 'anti-European'. Thus European identification has become a vessel to further sub-state nationalist aspirations.

9.3.6 The Formation of, and Support for, European Political Parties

The role of political parties is an essential feature of European political life. Their existence, at a trans-European level is a further example of the linkages that exist above and beyond the level of the individual European member state. Political parties evolve to offer alternative conceptions of how to organise and coordinate the various complex and competing claims that exist within a society. To the extent that there is a meaningful sphere of political authority, public administration and public policy, political parties exist to coordinate and perform these functions. The existence of European political parties, reflect the existence of an independent European political sphere and an independent European society, with its own interests, values and institutions separate to those of the member states which comprise it.

European political parties contribute to the evocation of a European identity in a number of ways. They provide a unified, centralised structure for the development of pan-European policy. They also provide a unified point for the conduct of pan-European political representation. To the extent that they are effective at developing European policy, representing common European interests, and furthering the political aspirations of their constituent members, they form a communal instrument.

Ibid.
of European political engagement. Further, they demonstrate the commonality of the European’s democratic, civic political experience, reinforcing the perception of a community of Europeans.

Let us briefly consider the nature of the key European political parties. The Parliamentary Group of the Party of European Socialists consider that the key European priorities are employment, growth, European economic and social cohesion and harmony between the economy and the environment. The European Socialists are firmly committed to the European project. The European Liberal, Democrat and Reform Party is firmly pro-Europe and is committed to further European integration, most especially in the Eastern Hemisphere. It advocates a free and open European market, with sufficient protection at the European level to offset economic recession, political instability and rising crime. It further calls for a strengthened common foreign security and defence policy and the advancement of human rights.

It is important to note, consistent with our earlier arguments regarding European normative convergence, the party ideology of the key European parties have far more in common than they have separating them, notwithstanding varying degrees of priority and the proposed nature of policy execution. Such a reality further reinforces the normative convergence within European political life. The European Greens call for significant revisions to European transport, energy and industry policy, but in a similar manner to the larger European parties, are sympathetic to integration, popular participation and representation and the strengthening of European judicial and humanitarian powers. Finally the European Peoples Party, the second largest group in the European Parliament, advocate: “Christian responsibility in democracy, social market economy and human rights.” The Party is committed to a free European economy, a strong and independent European Parliament and democratic processes.

30 Parliamentary Group of the Party of European Socialists Home Page

31 European Liberal, Democrat and Reform Party Home Page.

and the advancement of Human rights both within the EU and in Eastern Europe and areas such as Yugoslavia.33

Considering the electoral successes of the respective parties we see that the Socialists have recently lost ground to the right, as the 1999 EP election results indicate:

Table 9.3 The Composition of the European Parliament (1994/1999)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party Title</th>
<th>Seats Held 1999</th>
<th>Seats Held 1994</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United Left</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greens</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialists</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radicals</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberals</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPP</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union of Europe</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe of the Nations</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independents (Far-Right)</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The Economist June 19th – 25th 1999 p.53

While the right and extreme right in Europe have been recurrent elements in contemporary European political life their level of support on a pan-European level is not sufficient to detract from the leading positions of centralist and social democratic political forces in Europe. The shift to the right in the EP elections of 1999 has been variously explained as a backlash against under-performing domestic socialist governments, and national discontent associated with the move towards a single currency and the perceived loss of national independence.34 The results do not contradict the broadly uniform normative convergence of the European political culture and ideology. The predominant political group in Europe is the left-centre, which as we have seen at the national level also predominate. Such predominance reflects a popular normative position.

The emergence of European, as opposed to purely national, political parties is highly significant. In common with the experience of party formation at the state level, the


emergence of a European party system is both closely associated with the emergence of an independent European polity, and a separate sociopolitical dynamic at the European, rather than then member state level. Political parties emerge when the activities of a political system reach a certain degree of complexity and autonomy from pre-existing forms of decision-making, resource-allocation and popular participation. Such political trends occurring within the context of an independent and distinctive collective form of European consciousness.

Space precludes a full examination of the complex interrelationship between European political parties, the institutions of the EU, European interest and pressure groups and individual European citizens. However in identifying the complex networks and inter-relationships between them, the enduring nature of the European party system and the nature of political interaction between the EU and citizens, we have demonstrated another strand of European political engagement, which contributes to a separate European form of political consciousness and identification. European political parties reflect not only attitudinal similarity at a pan-European level but reflect the allocation of political values and resultant interactions and relationships that transcend traditional state boundaries and European identification as opposed to national identity.

9.4 European NGO’s, Social Movements and Interest Groups

“It is time to realise that Europe is not just run by European institutions but by national, regional and local authorities too – and by civil society.”

The importance of European Non Government Organisations, social movements and interest groups in the articulation of European identity is central. The process by which social, political, economic and ecological values are shared between communities across intra-European borders demonstrates an adjustment in the conceptualisation and behaviour of communities of interest, which have become European rather than solely national. The practice of trans-European interest formation has the effect of building an association of individuals - as Europeans - who, in certain circumstances, identify more strongly with the interests of the group at
a European level than with the interests of their state of origin. Categories such as occupational strata, gender and environmentalism, become situationally salient in the process of political group formation. Such trans-national identification and interest consolidation is contained within and best understood by reference both from participants and observers, as a uniquely European categorisation. Europe provides the stage upon which the business of politics is played and against which identification is configured. In short such groups form the basis of a distinct and separate European civic dialogue and form an important element in the European civil society.  

We have considered earlier in this work the extent that the process of European integration reflects a decline in the importance and potency of the constituent sovereign-states. Under such circumstances we can expect attendant changes in forms of interest aggregation and articulation away from the state. Inglehart was one of the first to observe the potential for the shift from state, to trans-national non-government institutions to be associated with a similar shift in collective interest and identity articulation. Once considered as ephemeral and merely expressive, social movements are now best characterised as enduring and instrumental. They are both indicative of the widening political space for non-traditional action within traditional states, and evidence of the limitations of the state system. Argument on the nature of the emergence of social movements centres around their emergence in response to changes that rendered institutionalised political systems increasingly vulnerable or receptive to challenge. As Eisinger argues: “Protest signifies changes not only among previously quiescent or conventionally orientated groups but also in the political system itself.” Not simply were the emergent social movements challenging


36 We shall consider the emergence of a pan-European civil society and its demonstrable effects of a European civic identity later in this Chapter.


38 See Inglehart, R. The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles amongst Western publics.

established political orders to reform, but further, such social movements were challenging the sovereign-state as being politically involatile.

The precise role of member states in decision making at the trans-national level remains elusive. Decision making, policy development and policy monitoring is shared amongst diverse policy networks including member state executives and courts, sub-national governments and various private and semi-public groupings including social movements. The creation of such a multi-level polity has resulted in a centripetal process in which decision making has swung away from the state level and allowed for the creation of sufficient political space for the active involvement of social movements in the development of European policy.40

NGOs and interest groups in Europe have proven to be a potent force for change in many European countries. They have engendered trans-European networks of understanding and solidarity, albeit focused on specific issues, which contributes to a greater sense of European commonality and identity from amongst their respective membership. The scope of such movements is broad and has proven extremely difficult to quantify. However by referring to their institutional manifestations we gain a good appreciation of their scope.41 Such movements are represented by pan-

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40 Such a process has occurred at the member state level also. Over the last three decades Belgium has transformed from a unitary into a Federal polity. Italy France and Spain have created a comprehensive layer of regional government. Only Germany, according to Marks and McAdam, has resisted giving autonomy to regional government.

41 The most prominent NGO’s operating in Europe today are:

Fédération Européenne d’Associations / Nationales Travaillant avec les Sans-Abri (FEANTSA) / Comité européen des Associations d’Intérêt Général (CEDAG) / Siège social Eurolink Age / Lobby Européen des Femmes (EWL) / Observatoire social Européen / Euro-citizen-Action-Service (ECAS) / Plateforme des ONG européennes du secteur social / Comité de Liaison des ONG Développement–UE / European Network Against Racism (ENAR) / Forum Européen de la Jeunesse / Communauté européenne des coopératives de la consommation (EURO COOP) / Comité européen des coopératives de production et de travail associé, des coopératives sociales et des entreprises participatives (CECOP) / Bureau Européen de l’Environnement (BEE) / Bureau Européen des Unions de Consommateurs (BEUC) / Centre européen pour la promotion et la formation en milieu agricole et rural (CEPFAR) / Solidar / Forum des Migrants / Forum européen des personnes handicapées (EDF) / Antipoverty network (Réseau Européen des Associations de lutte contre la Pauvreté et l’exclusion sociale (EAPN) / Mouvement international ATD Quart / Fédération Européenne des Personnes Agées (FERPA) / Plateforme européenne des Organisations de seniors.
European NGOs as diverse as seniors, Women’s groups, European immigrant groups, agricultural groups, anti-poverty, anti-racist groups and social NGOs.\textsuperscript{42}

We shall consider four major European movements, and their institutional manifestations. The first three 'movements' have dominated in Western Europe over the last 25 years. The pan-European labour movement, the environmental movement and the anti-nuclear movement, and the fourth movement; the European women’s movement which is rapidly emerging as a powerful element in uniting European citizens and creating a collective form of identification centred upon ‘European’ understandings of community and action.

9.4.1 The Pan-European Labour Movement

The principal response to the process of the consolidation of the European polity has been the establishment of the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) which encompasses union federations in EU and potential EU countries. The ETUC, which was formed in 1973, represents 40 federations in 21 European countries with a combined membership of 44 million European workers, accounting for 86% of the total workforce in those countries.\textsuperscript{43} Notwithstanding its organisational uniformity and size, on important issues the ETUC is split. Unions in the richer European states, are interested in high wages, improved benefits and health and safety regulations whereas those in the poor countries resist the push for higher employment standards, being aware of their comparative economic standard. Further the ETUC is too decentralised to play a constructive role in collective bargaining as in particular European economic sectors the coverage and type of union differ substantially across countries.

\textsuperscript{42}It is important to note that not all pan-European groups are actively supportive of European integration. There are a number of significant interest and pressure groups that actively articulate an anti-European message. Most significant amongst these are the groups clustered around the Anti-Maastricht Alliance, the Bruges Group and the Eurosceptics. Such groups can be contrasted with the grouping of European far-right and neo-fascist parties whose policies include the role back of the European project. Then influence of employee and farmer groups, most particularly in Germany and France is also a significant element in organised anti-European resistance. These groupings have been considered in Chapter Six of this study.

\textsuperscript{43}Despite its extensive geographic and membership coverage the ETUC has been characterised as being 'a feeble peak organisation'. It has only 35 full time staff and as it is a loose confederation of 61 European union federations and confederations it tends to take the lowest common denominator position in representing union interests in the European Union. See Marks, G. and McAdam, D.
The ETUC, supported by its research arms, the European Trade Union Institute (ETUI) and the European Trade Union College (ETUCO), is active in overlaying a rich matrix of alliances and links between different trade unions and affiliated organisations across Europe. Adopting the role of advancing a range of industrial, economic and environmental policies, the pan European labour movement provides a strong unifying link for European labour, as Europeans rather than national members. Specific policy platforms adopted by the ETUC include the development of a statement of fundamental rights for European workers, the democratisation of the economy, including information and consultation of workers and the development of an equitable pan-European social policy in order to enhance European social cohesion. This collective effort, across member state borders towards environmentalism, social welfare and the advancement of human rights demonstrates an emergent element in a meaningful European civil society, with its own distinct identity.

The existence of the pan-European union movement, most especially in the context of the political alignment amongst European governments to the centre-left, is illustrative of the positive effect of interaction on identify formation. Such an identity is promoted by the engendering of a sense of social democracy and shared political-cultural practice originating within the union movement. The trans European labour movement also contributes to communal European identification by reinforcing the positive virtues of collective effort and common solidarity across national borders for European workers, and thus plays both a practical and an ideological and symbolic role in promoting a common European identity.


44 European Trade Union Confederation at www.etuc.org/Structure.cfm

45 It is worth noting that there is a employer derived NGO response to the Pan European labour movement. The Union of Industrial and Employers' Confederations of Europe (UNICE), and the European Centre of Enterprises with Public Participation and of Enterprises of General Economic Interest (CEEP) are other pan European social actors who form part of the dialogue and relationships which comprise a distinct European civil society.
9.4.2 The Pan-European Environmental Movement

The engendering of a collective European (environmental) consciousness has been perhaps the most successful example of collective European interaction, on a non-government level, in the last three decades. Not only has there been a general synthesis of support for European environmental matters across member state boundaries, but further the institutions of Europe have responded positively to the transnational concerns by developing specific policy domains sympathetic to the movement’s interests. An earlier expression of supranational Europe's receptivity to the concerns of the environmental movement came with the Union's proclamation of the Common Environmental Policy at its 1972 summit meeting in Paris. More recently the EU has initiated four major environmental action plans aimed at, amongst other priorities:

"The prevention and reduction of atmospheric, water and soil pollution; management of waste and dangerous materials and the promotion of clean technologies; [and] ... restoration of the natural environment and habitats."\(^{46}\)

The EU has been consistent on environmental matters and there has emerged a distinctive EU position that transcends an aggregation of national environmental positions. The environmental movement has been confronted with a EU, that has shown itself to be: “both attitudinally sympathetic and structurally open to the interests of the movement.”\(^{47}\)

The European environmental movement has proven to be both trans-European in focus and organisation and responsive to the political opportunities granted to it by a ideologically sympathetic EU. The movement is made up of four major organisations; the European Environmental Bureau (EEB), the European office of Friends of the Earth (SEAT), the World Wildlife Fund and Greenpeace. While it is difficult to estimate total direct and indirect membership of European environmental organisations EU Policy Director, Dr Christian Hey, has estimated such membership


\(^{47}\) Marks, G. and McAdam, D. ‘Social Movements and the Changing Structure of Political Opportunity in the European Union’, 269.
to exceed 11 Million in the EU. European environmental organisations are financially supported by various Union programs - so much so that in 1990 some ECU50 million was made available to these and other lesser environmental groups.

The environmental movement has established a strong lobbying presence in Brussels. The groups take part in information gathering, lobbying and educational activities at the European level. Significantly the movement has embraced parliamentary and judicial avenues of access to pursue their interests. Their representation in the European Parliament and their willingness to use the European court system is evidence of the truly European focus of the movement's activities.

The implications for the emergence of a communal European identity as a result of the interests and activities of the environmental movement are clear. The nature of European environmental concerns transcends regional and national borders. More significantly the vast majority of Europeans are united in their concern for environmental degradation. The EU provides a suitable forum for the organisation of environmental policy and for the lobbying of European decision makers. To the extent that the institutions of the EU remain responsive to the environmental movements concerns, and that such concerns transcend national boundaries and prompt a common response from amongst environmentalists, regardless of nationality, we discern a growing appreciation, and consciousness of a common European environment and a communal European identity.

9.4.3 The Pan-European anti-Nuclear Movement

Chernobyl clearly demonstrated the truly pan-European nature of and threat from nuclear technology. No corner of Europe was exempt from the fallout of the accident. The accident at Chernobyl proved to Europeans that they shared a common vulnerability which united them in an unprecedented way.

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48 e-mail correspondence Hey/Grover 14 January 2000

49 A poll carried out for the European Commission among 13,000 European citizens in March and April 1992 revealed a sharp rise in environmental awareness over the preceding five years. The percentage of Europeans who considered that combating pollution was a main objective of the EC rose from 72% in 1986 to 85% in 1992. See Fact Sheets of the European Parliament, 300.
The anti-nuclear movement is far less conspicuous in Brussels than the environmental movement. Not one anti-nuclear organisation maintains offices in Brussels, and the movement has been unable to pursue its cause with any of the leading EU institutions. However there are no organisational structural elements to impede the movement from taking on a truly pan European profile. The movement seems to have similar characteristics to the environmental movement which has allowed that movement to adopt a pan-European profile and awareness. While accepting and advocating the truly international aspect of nuclear dangers, the movement has long eschewed traditional bureaucratic forms of organisation. This combined with its ideological commitment to non-traditional forms of action, has prevented the necessary form of administrative and bureaucratic integration and centralisation which is a necessary component of an effective social movement. Whereas the environmental movement is a tightly set web of interconnected interests, the anti-nuclear movement 'tends to remain loose networks of adherents rather than enduring coalitions of formal movement organisations'. Accordingly while there are clear transnational and pan-European aspirations of the movement, such aspirations are somewhat frustrated by an ambivalent EU and an unstructured organisational base. Notwithstanding these limitations the movement does provide a particular 'European' point of reference around which distinctly European understandings, allegiances and relationships have been built.

9.4.4 The Pan-European Women’s Movement.

European women outnumber men; 51.9% of the European population is female. Despite the fact that women constitute a slight majority of the European population they, according to Glasner remain a disadvantaged group, and gender continues to be a major structural dimension in European societies.


51 Ibid.

The international Women's movement originated in Europe. The first wave of European feminism from the mid-nineteenth to the first quarter of the twentieth century had a pervasive effect across not only Europe but also in the United States and in European colonies. The second wave of feminism arose in the 1970s, under the umbrella of the women's liberation movement, and resulted in the formation of a large number of both European and international women's organisations. Factors that created these associations included birth-control, equal opportunity, and the peace movement. The Feminist movements in Europe in the 1970s and 1980s took on a variety of forms. In Britain, four basic demands emerged as the central issues; equal pay; equal opportunities in education and work; free contraception and abortion on demand, and free 24-hour nurseries. In Germany, the women's movement had a particularly significant impact upon changing women's expectations of the political process which, according to Glasner, had significant modification in the recruitment criteria of the main German political parties in the 1980s. In France, abortion was a pivotal element in the formation of the women's movement, while in Italy the platform for feminists has been divorce; workplace status and abortion.

A major element in the Europeanisation of the European Women's movement has been the Europeans Women's lobby (EWL). The EWL is the largest coordinating body of national and European non-Governmental women's organisations in the European Union, with over 2,700 member associations in the 15 member states of the Union. Established in 1990, it seeks to respond to the lack of woman's participation in the creation and participation in various European structures. The EWL monitors European legislative activity and takes action where necessary to ensure that women's interests are protected. The goal of the EWL is the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women and to serve as a link between political decision-makers and women's organisations. The EWL's membership comprises both

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53 Ibid., 73.
54 Ibid., 74.
55 Ibid., 75.
56 See http://www.womenlobby.org/gb_prese.htm#INTRO
57 Ibid.
individuals and other non-government European Women’s organisations as long as they are active in at least four EU states. National organisations become members indirectly by joining their country’s National Section of the European Women's lobby.

Specific actions taken by the European Women’s Movement in engendering closer trans-national Feminist European relationships include the European Women’s talent bank and the Women’s Electronic Business Incubators network (WEBIN). The European Women's Talent Bank is an active database of European Women experts in fields relevant to the process of European integration and the European Union. It provides speakers, teachers, consultants and conference participants for issues concerning women in Europe. Its aim is to foster stronger relationships between expert women in European affairs to ensure that there is full participation of European women in European Decision-making. The European Union recognises the strength of this organisation and often asks members of the Bank to find women speakers for the conferences they organise and to provide consultants when European working groups are established. WEBIN is a network of women in the European Union and Eastern Europe who support European women starting up in business. The Women's electronic Business Incubators network researches into different models of business incubation and how they can be applied to support the business interests of European Women. Closely associated with this program is the MUWIC association; Multimedia for Women in the Cultural Industries.

58 See http://195.109.137.2/cwt/talentbank.nsf
59 See http://www.agendum.se/webin.htm
60 It is important to note that the institutions of the European Union have been active in assisting in the development of not only a trans-national women’s movement and in the pursuit of the movements goals. Directly the European Union, under its program of 'Funding for the Social Economy' provides direct financial support to social programs such as WEBIN and MUWIC. More generally The European Union through its treaty system and its social charter, implemented in 1975, has supported women’s issues including the first Equal Opportunity action program of 1982, designed 'to strengthen and extend existing individual rights through legislation, but also to change habits and traditions by means of positive action' On the legal front the EU assisted the development of a feminist consciousness and feminist relationships by requiring member states to take action to monitor equal opportunities implementation and to provide legal redress with respect to equal treatment to review protective legislation and social security entitlements to women and to abolish discrimination against pregnant women in employment. Further programs were initiated in 1986 and 1991-95 to develop new initiatives for women in relation to vocational training and employment and to improve the integration of women into the labor market and the import the state of women in society. Accordingly the EU has worked in a close and complimentary fashion to raise the profile of the European Women's movement, to ensure that women's interests were being looked after, and perhaps most importantly in the context of this discussion, to ensure that trans-European Feminist relationships grew and thus gave a specific
9.4.5 European Social Non Government Organisations

Civic and social dialogue within and across Europe is not limited to the examples cited above. There is a extensive range of other pan European social NGO’s which individually and collectively represent an intricate matrix of European relationships which strengthen European social cohesion, and in so doing enhance European communal identification. The scope of social NGOs is extensive. It is estimated that there are over 1700 European social NGOs active in social development and human rights areas. They collectively represent a strengthening of European civil society. The Platform of European Social NGOs is the most notable of these NGOs. It comprises members including the European Federation of the Elderly, the European Forum of Child Welfare and the European Union Migrant Forum. It aims to enhance civil dialogue across Europe, promote the fight against poverty and social exclusion and aims to remove structural impediments to a deepening of relationships between Europeans.

Such an emphasis on participation, transparency and accountability acts to supplement the EU’s attempts to bring Europeans together and to engender a stronger sense of belonging based on democratic participation. Significantly the institutions of the EU are increasingly utilising NGOs to develop social and economic policy. The EU has recognised that NGOs have an important role in cementing together a community of Positive European sentiment insofar as they provide a common European focus for European citizens and that they can be instrumental in the delivery of public services and the regeneration of depressed areas, and the integration of socially and economically individuals and groups.

'European' flavour to the women’s movement, with the effect of engendering a greater sense of European identity amongst European women.

61 European Social Observatory at: http://www.ose.be/

62 The Platform of European Social NGOs at: http://www.socialplatform.org/

63 European Economic and Social Committee at: http://www.ces.eu.int/
9.5 The Effect of Pan European NGOs Social Movements and Interest Groups on the Emergence of a European Identity

The increased profile and involvement of European transnational NGOs, social movements and interest groups have a positive influence on the development of a sense of European identity amongst individual European citizens. As the competence and coherence of individual European sovereign states becomes increasingly questionable, new sociopolitical spaces have opened up in which new social movements have claimed a public role and legitimacy. Such communities of common interest constitute the nucleus of communities of pan-European identity that move beyond the territorial state.64

The emergence of pan-European movements effect the emergence of a European identity in a variety of positive ways. To the extent that such social movements are pan-European they reduce the sense of 'difference' and distance in terms of location for Europeans across pre-existing state borders. There is homogeneity of interest and action on issues, whether ecological or economic, that will highlight the positive effects of pan-European action and relationship building which will link Europeans as Europeans rather than as national members. Pan-European movements allow for a deeper web of relationships to develop. European NGOs facilitate the emergence of an active form of European citizenship. Their emergence reflects the 'Europeanisation' of what were traditionally areas of national interest and competence. Further, they reflect the new rights, duties and interests of Europeans within a progressive participatory model of European civic society. A society that has been shaped and made tangible by clusters of communal interests and identification. Such movements are increasingly pro-active, planned and enduring. In terms of trans-European action and interaction, such phenomena will assist in the development of a sense of being part of and loyalty displaying an affinity with 'Europe', regardless of national origin.

64 See Goodman, J "The EU Reconstituting Democracy Beyond the 'Nation State".
9.6 Pan-European Cultural Actions and Relationships

Pan European culturally based interaction and relationships are becoming a major element in European cultural activity. European cultural networks are playing a major role in acting as intermediaries between grass-roots cultural activities and the institutions of the state and supranation. As the European Commission has commented:

"[Cultural] Networks make it possible for cultural initiatives to break out of their isolation and participate in common projects. They enable people and ideas to travel and foster the emergence of new forms of expression and new ideas." 65

Some of the main European cultural networks include in the performing arts: L'Union des Theatres de L'Europe, The European Network of Information Centres for Performing Arts, Dance Network Europe and the Euro Festival; Junger Artisten. In the visual arts and Multimedia pan-European networks include Cartoon Arts Network and ECTN-European Children's Television Network. In the fields of books and reading EBLIDA European Bureau of Library, information and Documentation Associations and in the fields of Cultural heritage; NEMO – Network of European Museums Associations, the European Heritage Group and the European Network to promote the conservation and preservation of the European cultural heritage. 66

65 European Commission, 1.

66 There has been an explosion in the scope of Trans-European socio-Cultural associations in the last five decades...they include associations in the artistic fields such as the Europa Cantat - European Federation of Young Choirs (EFYC), the European Cultural Foundation (ECF), the European Academy of Arts, Sciences and Humanities (EAASH), Europa Nostra - International Federation of Non-Government Associations for the Protection of Europe's Cultural and Natural Heritage. Trans Europe Halles: Association of Independent Cultural Centres (TEH) European League of Institutes of the Arts (ELIA). Chamber Orchestra of Europe European Community Youth Orchestra and the European Union Baroque Orchestra are perhaps more notable associations of the European artistic community.

Pan European Educational Associations include the Association of European Universities (CRE) the Association of Faculties and Schools of Law in Europe (AFSOLIE) the Consortium of Institutions for Development and Research in Education in Europe(CIDREE), the ESIB - National Union of Students in Europe (ESIB), European Training Network (ETN), the European Vocational Training Network and specific Universities of a trans-European Flavour including European University, Antwerp European University, Brussels European University Centre for the Cultural Heritage, Ravello. Ibid.
The growing involvement of the European Union in both removing barriers from the realisation of trans-European sociocultural flows and actively sponsoring European culture and education, has resulted from the 'spillover' from economic to cultural liberalisation, and more generally an enhancement of the symbolic nature of a trans-European cultural networks. The EU supported more than 3500 transnational cultural activities in 1997, including 182 pan-European dance and theatre activities, 200 cases of the restoration and conservation of European cultural sites and buildings and assisted with 218 cases for the wider dissemination of literary works across Europe.\textsuperscript{67}

Both the Council of Europe and the European Union provide mechanisms for cultural flows across Europe. The Council of Europe is the main European forum for cultural cooperation, whereas the European Unions principal aim is to facilitate economic flows with cultural flows subordinated to this principal aim. Culture is expressly included in the Council's mandate and it has provided an institutional framework to facilitate the free flow of culture.\textsuperscript{68} The institutional set-up within the Council of Europe to facilitate cultural flows includes the European Cultural Convention which provides that: 'the Contracting Parties shall consult with one another within the framework of the Council of Europe with a view to concerted action in promoting cultural activities of European interest'.\textsuperscript{69} A number of intergovernmental bodies have been set up to undertake such action including the Council for Cultural Cooperation, the Standing Conference of European Ministers of Education, and the Steering Committee on the mass media.\textsuperscript{70}

\textsuperscript{67} It is significant to note that the European Commission approved on 6 May 1998 the First European Union Framework Programme in support of Culture (2000-2004). Here the RAPID press release:
The European Commission adopted a proposal aiming to introduce the First European Union (EU) Framework Programme in support of Culture. This global approach extends the scope of Article 128 of the Treaty by considering cultural action as a Community objective in its own right and by placing the European cultural project in the context of the construction of Europe. The proposal entails rationalizing and strengthening the effectiveness of cultural cooperation actions, within a single financial and programming instrument for the period 2000-2004 intended to replace the three current programmes (Kaleidoscope, Ariane and Raphaël). ECU 167 million have been allocated under this new financial instrument. See: \url{http://www.kaapel.fi/~ebilda/}

\textsuperscript{68} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{69} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{70} Ibid.
Within the European Union there is a range of cultural programs including the most recent Kaleidoscope program, the aim of which is to support artistic and cultural activities with a European dimension. Further support from the EU takes the form of the Ariane program, a support program for books and reading including translation into other European languages, the European City of Culture and European Cultural month initiatives and the community action program Raphael, which is designed to enhance the status of Europe’s common cultural heritage.  

Within Europe there are a range of cultural networks, which can be seen as separate from, but reinforcing cultural transfer and homogeneity within particular European regions. The Dutch language area has seen the creation of the Nederlandse Taalunie, The German language area is linked both within the Nordic Council, which has a specific Secretariat for Nordic Cultural Cooperation, and by the cultural linkages between Austria, Germany and Switzerland, although these are of an informal nature. As a subordinate part of the Franco-German relationship a cultural agreement was reached in the form of the Elysee Treaty of 1963, which made cultural cooperation into a major element of reinforcing political entente and economic solidarity between the two counties.

The positive effects on European identification as a result of the development of pan-European cultural flows are multi-dimensional. The heightened level of cooperation and interaction between European cultural practitioners promotes artistic creation and the promotion of European cultural heritage. Further it accelerates the process of European identification resulting from a common knowledge of and experience in European, rather than simply national cultures and the commonality of European culture and its appreciation across member state borders.

The emergence of European cultural interaction and networks provides a counterpoint to the eroding effects of economic and cultural globalisation. The cooperation between Europeans in the cultural sphere and the institutional support granted to pan-

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72 Ibid., 200.
European cultural activities by the EU means that local and national identities are preserved and the cultural rights of individual communities protected. As the EU argues:

"The public need not consider the Union as something which dilutes their cultural identities, but rather as something which guarantees the existence and flowering of such cultures." 73

Cultural flows across European national frontiers accelerate trans-national employment opportunities, thus furthering European associations, networks and a common European sense of community. They further promote European-based social cohesion by promoting cultural and social inclusion. In short Pan-European cultural networks confirm European identity as they accelerate European social cohesion and unity and provide an institutionally supported realisation of cultural difference without such difference being politically mobilised.

9.7 Pan European Social Actions and Relationships

Delineating the observable patterns of social relationships in Europe is not an easy task, however there are two indicators of pan-European social cohesion that we wish to examine:

1. The European Movement; and
2. Trans-European Mobility.

9.7.1 The European Movement

The European Movement is an independent voluntary association which exists to promote the economic, political and social development of Europe. Membership of the movement, according to the movement come from a wide range of political parties, from the corporate world and from interest groups, academics and the corporate sector.

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73 Communication from the Commission to the EP and Council of the Regions
The European movement, through a wide variety of activities attempts to shape individual and collective European attitudes to Europe. Further it seeks to play an active role in influencing the policy process and in the promotion of public discussion on issues relating to the development of Europe and the implications for individual Europeans and the Member States. Activities undertaken to build cross-national relationships amongst Europeans include the organisation of conferences, lectures, briefings on European developments, submissions to Government, provision of information services, including a monthly newsletter on European Affairs. The European Movement also organises a number of European awards and Educational competitions.⁷⁴

European Action and Interaction - European Mobility and Identity - An increasingly mobile European population is relocating from one member state to another. This network of population flows suggests that Europeans are becoming more aware of their rights of pan-European settlement. It further suggests that they are less 'national' in regard to their territorial aspects of identity formation. In 1990 over 600,000 persons left one Member State to settle in another. According to a study commissioned by Eurostat, European emigrants tend to move towards the centre of the European Union. Portugal and Greece have the highest levels of emigration, while Italy and Spain, which for decades had high levels of emigration, are currently witnessing the return of a number of persons who emigrated at the start of the 1980s.

⁷⁴ European Movement - Ireland Home Page www.europeanmovement.ie
Table 9.4 Estimate of Migratory Flows Between the Countries of the European Union 1993/4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of Emigration</th>
<th>Total Immigration/1000</th>
<th>Principle State of Immigration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EU 12</td>
<td>600.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>40.8</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>145.2</td>
<td>Italy/Greece</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>42.8</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>85.9</td>
<td>UK/Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>UK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>59.0</td>
<td>Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>32.3</td>
<td>Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>105.3</td>
<td>Ireland</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Intra-European mobility is increasing. Europeans are moving around Europe freely, with a reversal of the centre/periphery model. While many Germans are moving to the Mediterranean states, those at Europe’s periphery, such as Portugal and Greece, are moving to the European centre.

9.7.2 Trans-European Mobility

We should further consider trans-European mobility in the context of European holiday patterns. To the extent that Europeans choose to stay in another European State we suggest a higher degree of trans-European interaction, and communal identity formation through such interaction. According to the first Commission of the
European Communities Eurobarometer survey on the profile and habits of Europeans on holiday, six out of ten Europeans when travelling 'abroad' their main destination was to another European Member state. Significantly, only in nine percent of cases do Europeans spend holidays in a country outside the EU.\textsuperscript{75} For the calendar year 1997 53\% of Europeans had either travelled, or intended to travel, away from home for holidays. The Danish (74\%), Dutch (70\%), Swedish (68\%), and Finns (65\%) are the most mobile on their holidays, while the Austrians (41\%), Irish (38\%), and Portuguese (33\%) are the least mobile.\textsuperscript{76}

Culture and history rates highly in the rationale for European holiday-makers to holiday in Europe, demonstrating the acceptance of and interest in ethnocultural diversity in Europe. Historic centres in towns are visited by at least 60\% of Europeans on holidays. Half of them visit other European museums, exhibitions and archaeological sites, as well as nature parks and reserves. There is also a strong interest in visiting religious sites and churches (40\% of those surveyed).\textsuperscript{77} Such results demonstrate an openness to pan-European cultures and traditions and an interest in other cultures and religions from amongst a majority of European travellers which is consistent with a highly tolerant, multicultural European civil society.

European Student Mobility - Student mobility is the major form of mobility for European citizens. Under the EU education and training programs, including ERASMUS and TEMPUS, the phenomena of trans-European (student) mobility has become a leading example of the effectiveness of European action and interaction at contributing to a sense of European identification. The stock of mobile students within the EU represented some 184,000 people in 1993/94, two-thirds of whom (120,000) fell within the category of spontaneous mobility and one third within the category of organised mobility. The stock of mobile students represents some two percent of the total student population of the EU, which has been estimated by the


\textsuperscript{76} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{77} Ibid., 3.
Commission to be 9 million in 1993-94. It is possible to conclude from these figures that total European student mobility is still a relatively marginal phenomenon, despite the efforts of the EU. However the percentage of mobile European students varies considerable between European member states. It is low (around one percent) in the Mediterranean countries and Finland. Whereas it is high in Austria (5.6%), which is the leading host nation of students, the United Kingdom (four percent) and Belgium (3.6%).

9.8 Pan-European Actions and Relationships - Concluding Remarks

Europe is increasingly characterised by a complex matrix of collaborations, alliances and links between European economic, social political and cultural participants. European action and relationships form the basis of a communal European social setting and as such constitutes a collective European frame of reference and identity separate and distinct from others.

The imperative of economic globalisation has necessitated the removal of state-based impediments to pan-European interactions and relationships. Increased competitiveness and accelerated European growth that has resulted from the realisation of a truly single European market have been important for wealth creation, employment generation and welfare distribution. It has further established a distinct European economic network with its own structures and activities which progresses European identity by collective reward distribution and cooperative interaction.

Politically, as our analysis demonstrates, Europeans are increasingly interested, and participating in European political life. Increasing participation in European elections, interest in civil rights and the increase in frequency in claims against the European Parliament and Commission are indicative of a progressive European participatory civil society. This model enhances communal European identification through the development of collective engagement of European citizens in political issues that transcend national frontiers.

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78 See European Institute of Education and Social Policy 1996 'Student Mobility within the European Union', 1.
Pan-European NGOs, social movements and interest groups are demonstrative of the increasing nature of European interaction and the intensity of European political self-consciousness on a pan-European level. Such groups have had the effect not only of increasing self-identification amongst their respective memberships with the cause concerned, but further has resulted in a far greater level of interaction between Europeans, contributing, in part to a greater sense of European identification. They collectively unite Europeans from across a range of national, cultural and ethnolinguistic boundaries. European interest groups have arisen out of the increased 'distance' between centres of societal decision-making, which have progressively shifted from the national to the supranational level. While the basis of European political movements may vary, the significance of these associations is that they have emerged within a European context and have developed a high degree of interaction and intercommunication across intra-European boundaries.\(^7^9\)

The range of cultural and social actions and relationships are broad and multidimensional. They contribute to a cohesive, European community of sentiment, which as we have observed earlier in Chapter Three is a key feature of identity. They constitute a new set of understandings and linkages between Europeans that transcend the existent state system. While the process of globalisation is having a massive and historically unprecedented effect on the reconstitution of cultural products and the information society, European social and cultural relationships, with the active and open support of the EU, are enduring. They are creating a distinctly European social and cultural sphere. The increasing integration of economics, politics and sociocultural policy, such as positive employment support in the cultural field and the creation of a distinct European information society is contributing to a heightened sense of awareness of Europe and Europeanness which is consistent with the evocation of European distinctiveness and uniqueness.

\(^7^9\) While it is possible to conclude that European political engagement has been given greater weight by the emergence and activities of European interest and pressure groups, it is not possible to quantify the contribution of such a process to European identity formation. While pan-European political movements exert an influence on the European consciousness, their existence may further suggest a general internationalist and cosmopolitan consciousness that may not serve a European identity at all. Accordingly while the rise of European interest and pressure groups demonstrate a greater degree of European political engagement we cannot conclude that they are a necessary component of a Pan-European identity.
9.8.1 Common Cognitive Boundary

A discernible cognitive boundary, demonstrated by in-group favouritism and out group discrimination - both positive discrimination of other collective members and negative discrimination of the constructed 'other'.

Europe's Relationship with the 'Other' - Central to the assertion of identity is the discourse of difference and exclusion. We have previously examined the essentially discursive and socially constructed nature of identity, and in so doing argued against the essentialist position of identity being fundamentally fixed and unchanging. Such a discursive nature of identity infers identity as being largely cognitive, symbolic and differential. Identity within the group is cognitively and symbolically constructed based upon culturally or civic determined representations systems and markers. This social and symbolic nature of identity formation is predicated upon symbolic and practical interaction and relationships between both group members and those who are outside the group. Thus both the symbolic conceptualisations of identity and the practical interactions of individuals and communities establish who is included and who is excluded. Thus the relationships outside the group boundary are at least equally important to the formation of identity as those within the group. 80

Because communal identity is essentially constructed within discourses of 'self' and 'other' it is sustained by the marking of difference and exclusion. It is constructed by reference to that which it is not - the other. The construction of an identity is only possible because of what it is not. Identities can only function because of their capacity to exclude, to leave out, to render 'outside'. As Stuart Hall relates:

"Every identity has at its 'margin' an excess, something more. The unity, the internal homogeneity, which the term identity treats as foundational is not a natural, but a constructed form of closure, every identity naming as its necessary, even if silenced and unspoken other, that which it lacks" 81


The demarcation of boundaries is central to the process of identity formation. Through the relationship between 'us' and 'others' members of a community are able to mark out who they are and to differentiate between members and non-members. In the case of Europe - between Europeans and non-Europeans. As such European identity is produced through a series of relationships some affirmed and inclusive, while others are negated and excluded. The creation of a coherent sense of identity is a result of dynamic relationships of both affirmations and acceptance of the 'insider' and rejection and denial of the 'outsider'.

Perhaps the definitive 'ethnic' analysis of the relationship between Europe and the 'other' and the construction of Western representations and identity is that offered by Said. Referring to this process as Orientalism, a concise interpretation of the paradigm is put by Turner:

"Orientalism as a discourse divides the globe unambiguously into Occident and Orient; the latter is essentially strange, exotic and mysterious, but also sensual, irrational and potentially dangerous. . . . The point of Orientalism, according to Said, was to orientalise the Orient and it did so in the context of fundamental colonial inequalities. Orientalism was based on the fact that we know or talk about the Orientals, whereas they neither know themselves adequately nor talk about us."

Accordingly our consideration of the significance of relationships in the construction of a European identity must contain an analysis of those relationships between those included and excluded from the common European Home, and the basis of such inclusion and exclusion. We argue that in the contemporary period that the discursive element of European identity is based on 'civic' grounds. The European rejection of the 'other' is not rooted in ethnic or linguistic criteria, but rather in civic elements. Europeans reject those of the South or the East not because they are of a different ethnolinguistic or cultural group, but rather the erection of a common cognitive boundary of exclusion is based on the communal fears amongst Europeans that associates such out-groups with organised crime, drug trafficking, civil and human

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82 See Evans, M. 'Languages of Racism within Contemporary Europe' in Jenkins, B. & Sofos, A. (eds.) Nation & Identity in Contemporary Europe., 33.


rights abuses. Such qualities which are perceived as threatening European security and the enjoyment of European civic rights.

The Symbolic European 'Stranger/Enemy' - The identification of individual or groups not deemed to belong is a central element in any collectivity, including nations and emerging nations. While the Jewish community, the Gipsies, and the Muslim have, historically been symbolically categorised as non-Europeans, the asylum seeker and the immigrant now play a central role in the creation of the European other.

Immigration and the Literature of Ethnocentrism in Europe - It is important to make a distinction between the practice and reality of European exclusion and its resultant basis of a common European cognitive boundary. We are conscious of the extensive contemporary literature addressing the nature of racism, anti-immigration and xenophobia in Europe. However, while we do not deny its veracity, we question the basis of all such behaviours in Europe. We challenge the accepted basis of European exclusion, (but not its manifestation). European exclusion is a process that is both complex and diverse. We suggest that notwithstanding the very public occurrences of ethnic exclusion that it is, in the majority of circumstances, essentially based on civic, rather than ethnic, grounds. A brief review of the literature is illuminating. Muntz's analysis of European ethnocentrism suggests as Europe has not seen itself as an immigrant society, not withstanding the social and demographic realities of the post

85 The position of the Jew, the Gipsies, and the Muslim symbolically categorised as non-Europeans within European history have played a central role in the affirmation of a European identity. Importantly, the relationships with these 'others' is still a distinctive, but peripheral, element in the affirmation of Europeanness. Although the new anti-Semitism has much in common with the experiences of historical Europe, the perceived unacceptable qualities of Jewry is now invoked under new historical conditions and within a context specific to current circumstances. Within contemporary European racist literature Jews are symbolically characterised as 'alien, rootless' and fundamentally anti-European. The revival of the debate of the authenticity of the 'Protocols of the Elders of Zion' in a number of European states (albeit mostly Eastern) is evidence that some Europeans are yet to develop a more inclusive and humane relationship with its Jewish community. As with the relationship with the Jews, the Gipsies have also been subjected to renewed hostility and suffered less than satisfactory relationships with Eastern Europeans. According to Evans: "In common with anti-Semitism, anti-Roma racism is deeply embedded within European Culture." The period since 1989 has seen a heightening of the relationship of persecution between Europeans and the Roma, most especially in Eastern Europe. For (ethnically-based) nationalists, for whom the attachment to territory and the creation of a homogenous society are paramount, the Gipsies disrupt these assumptions and thus are the object of loathing. "Their whole existence is viewed as a threat, undermining ethnic purity." 85 see Hockenos, P. Free to Hate., (London: Routledge 1993). For an analysis of the circumstances in Eastern Europe see Landsman, N. 'Anti-Semitism in Eastern Europe' Journal of Area Studies, 1994, no.4, 159-71 and Evans, M. 'Languages of Racism within Contemporary Europe', 43.
war period, that there is an implicit tension between Europeans and those that they considered as 'foreign'. Notwithstanding, such foreigners have residency, and in some cases, citizenship status. Evans argues that European cultural identity, increasingly politicised in the post-war period, is contrasted with those who 'don't belong' within the European cultural hemisphere. While Heisler and Layton-Henry argue that contemporary migration in Europe challenges the ability of states to control their borders, and thus leads to both an institutional and individual reluctance to accept those potential migrants, asylum seekers and refugees. Even within these narratives of exclusion there is the suggestion of a non-ethnocentric basis of European exclusion. Munz analysis reveals that European exclusion is a sub-text for those who fail to fully socially and politically integrate into European society, rather than their ethnolinguistic 'otherness'. Evan's analysis suggests that the rejection of the 'other', while clothed in culture and ethnicity, is rooted in economics; suggested in the phrase: "Europe is not a welfare office for the Mediterranean". While the societal insecurity created by the European other, according to Heisler and Layton-Henry, is essentially concerned with increased pressures on European economic and social life caused by migrants and asylum seekers. Thus while nationalist and ethnocentric logics are initially formulated and deployed in the articulation of the European other, we argue that civic conceptions – centring upon questions of perceived economic and political insecurity – informs the construction and subsequent rejection of the European 'other'.

A Revised Basis of European Exclusion - The ideology of nationalism, fascism and ethnocentrism is difficult to ignore as a source of European exclusion; it is very public, very attractive to the media and thus very much in the public eye. However if we abstract out the root of the opposition to immigrants and asylum seekers in contemporary Europe we find the opposition is generally civic rather than ethnically...
based. Europeans collectively reject the 'other' not because of ethnic or racial grounds, but rather because of the perceived threat of increased crime, economic competition and the potential weakening of the European project. Europeans are united as Europeans in their rejection of individuals and collectivities which are perceived as threatening 'European' security and rights.

While Europeans find the prospect of increased immigration problematic they are not ethnocentric. Rather they are Eurocentric - they do not reject those of different racial or ethnic origins, because of their ethnic identity. However there is evidence that they do collectively object to the potential threat to their way of life, from increased crime, drugs and institutional and financial challenges that additional people present.

If we consider European attitudes to factors such as institutional enlargement, to ethnicity, to other racial groups and immigration we find results that confirms our hypothesis that European exclusion of the 'other' is based on civic rather than ethnic grounds.

**European Positive Attitudes to Enlargement** - Europeans consider the enlargement of the European Union, and the affiliated increase in European peoples, positively. As the table below outlines, 67% of EU citizens believe that the Union would be more important in the world if it were larger. Further Europeans are welcoming of cultural diversity. Sixty-one percent of Europeans believe that Europe would be culturally enriched as a result of enlargement. Such a phenomenon is inconsistent with the accepted paradigm that European exclusion is rooted in ethnic criteria. What does concern Europeans about enlargement is the costs which additional membership would involve. Europeans see that the inclusion of more peoples will have a detrimental economic, rather than cultural effect on Europe; as the table outlines 47% of EU citizens believe that their respective member state will receive less financial assistance if the EU is enlarged. Further 49% of Europeans believe that there will be a cost to pre-existing member states.
Table 9.5  
Attitudes Towards Enlargement of the EU (EU 15)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>% Agree</th>
<th>% Disagree</th>
<th>% Don't Know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The more countries within the EU the more important it will be in the world.</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With more member countries Europe will be culturally richer</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The more countries there are in the EU the more peace and security will be guaranteed in Europe</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Once new countries have joined the EU our country will receive less financial aid from it</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The enlargement will not cost more to existing member countries</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Commission of the European Communities Eurobarometer 48, p50.

The Gulf War experience demonstrated the civic rather than ethnic basis of European exclusion. If European exclusion is rooted in ethnic signifiers then, given the differing ethnic origins of the Arab world and of the resident Muslim community residing in Europe, we should expect to find a heightened sense of opposition and resistance to both the Arab world and the EU Muslim community dating to the time of the Gulf conflict. Quite the contrary is the case. Despite the fact that 39% of Europeans expressed the view that an expanded war was likely, 70% of Europeans had not altered their feelings towards the Arab world, and 77% had not altered their feelings towards European Muslims. In fact 45% of Europeans viewed the Arab world more favourably, and 2% viewed European Muslims likewise. This evidence suggests that exclusion in Europe can not be attributed to ethnic criteria.90

9.8.2  The Basis of the European Cognitive Boundary - What Makes the 'Other' Non-European?

If we consider the enlargement criteria considered important by Europeans we find that cultural or ethnic homogeneity are not the issues considered significant by most Europeans. Enlargement issues focus on the civic - respect for human rights, most

90 Commission of the European Communities Eurobarometer 34, 34.
importantly, the fight against crime, the protection of the environment, and the economics of enlargement.

**Table 9.6 Importance of Enlargement Criteria EU 15**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>% Important</th>
<th>% Not Important</th>
<th>% Don’t Know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The country has to respect Human Rights and the principles of democracy</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It has to fight organised crime and drug trafficking</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It has to protect the environment</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It has to be able to pay its share</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Its level of economic development should be closer to that of other member states</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source Commission of the European Communities *Eurobarometer* 49 p62.

This table is evidence that the majority of Europeans wish to see the new entrants to the EU protect its civic, rather than ethnic, values. Democracy, human rights, the environment, fiscal probity, these are the issues – the civic issues that denotes the basis of ‘otherness’. They are not ethnic criteria of language, race or ethnicity.

9.8.3 European Acceptance of Peoples from non-EU Countries

Highlighting the civic basis of European exclusion we can correlate the level of acceptance of peoples from outside of the EU to the priority areas for both action from the European Parliament and European’s preferences for increased funding within the EU. Europeans share a common fear that enlargement will potentially compromise human rights, democracy, lead to an increase in organised crime and a degradation of the European environment, as well as expressing fears as to the economic implications of enlargement. Such concerns are mirrored in the demands from Europeans for greater financial input into the fight against violence, terrorism and drug trafficking (78% want an increase).\(^{91}\)

\(^{91}\) Commission of the European Communities *Eurobarometer* 48, 66.
Europeans, as the figures below demonstrate, do not reject peoples of another nationality, or another racial group on the basis of their ethnicity alone.

**Figure 9.4**  
**Acceptance of People of Another Nationality**

Source: Commission of the European Communities Eurobarometer 48- Fig 6.3 p.72

**Figure 9.5**  
**Acceptance of People of Another Race**

Source: Commission of the European Communities Eurobarometer 48- Fig 6.4 p.72

On average, 83% of Europeans are accepting of others of another nationality, and 81% accept people of another race, clearly demonstrating that Europeans, while being Eurocentric, are not ethnocentric. Even in those states where there have been notable occurrences of ethnically-related violence - France and Germany - the acceptance of other nationality and races, from amongst the general population is high. In Germany
acceptance of ‘another nationality’ is 79% and ‘another race’ 76%, while in France
the figures are 85% and 78% respectively. Europeans do not reject the ‘other’ on
ethnic or racial grounds, thus we must look to other reasons for Europeans difficulty
with the ‘other’.

9.8.4 What do Europeans Reject in the ‘Other’?

Europeans are united in their rejection of the ‘other’ on grounds of security and civic
rights. Perceived threats to the structures and workings of liberal democracy, rising
crime and falling economic returns to pre-existing EU states forms the basis of
European exclusion, not ethnic or racial issues. Europeans reject the EU financial
‘cake’ being divided any further, wish to return to more ‘traditional’ lifestyles without
the perceived threat of crime and poverty that the non-European is perceived as
representing. The above analysis suggests that Europeans do not wish to exclude
those from south and Eastern Europe on ethnic grounds. Europeans are apprehensive
of rising crime, economic recession and threats to political stability and democracy,
that they perceive may result from the inclusion of non-Europeans. Accordingly the
rationale behind European exclusionary practice and perception are essentially civic
not ethnic. Claims made by commentators that Europeans are in the contemporary
period, ethnically biased, misinterpret the more substantial basis of European
exclusion. Although it would be naive to suggest that some European citizens do not
discriminate against the European ‘other’ on racial and ethnic grounds, the core
European population bases its discrimination on fiscal, normative and criminal
grounds. On the basis that the ‘other’ represents a threat to European social, political
and economic rights, and security.

9.9 A Community of Europeans Within the European Community?

9.9.1 Towards a European Civil Society

The cumulative effect of the emergence of the dense institutional, community, non-
government, cultural and business relationships, common European values and
political preferences, the expression of a common European form of self-description

92 For a current assessment of the economic imperatives of European exclusion see ‘A Single
and belonging demonstrates the emergence of a European civil society. Such a European civil society reflecting and existing as a consequence of a common European civic identity.

9.9.2 The Development of an European Society

In order to demonstrate that the above attitudes, relationships and economic, political and societal structures constitute a distinct European society - independent of pre-existing state structures we must first consider what is meant by a 'Society' - European or otherwise.

Simmel argues that society is understood as:

"When we talk of society we mean . . . whenever several individuals stand in a reciprocal relationship to one another . . . out of the sum total of individual elements which constitute it, a new entity emerges." 94

Whereas Bensman and Rosenberg suggest that;

"Society is a continuous chain of role expectancies and behaviour resulting from role expectancies. To put it another way, society is a fairly stable network of social relationships based on relatively uniform and predictable behaviour maintained between specific individuals in specified positions." 95

9.9.3 The Nature of Civil Society

While it is not our intention to give an exhaustive conceptualisation of civil society, a preliminary analysis of its meaning is necessary.

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93 We are aware of the literature doubting the possibility of a continuous European societal artefact. Europe is uniting at a time when her distinctiveness is becoming increasingly problematic. Faced with growing cosmopolitanism, rising immigration and asylum pressures, the spread of culturally syncretic mass media, telecommunications, global interdependence, the globalisation of social relationships, the globalisation of demographic and ecological imbalances and the globalisation of trade and industry, specifically European characteristics may become less distinct.


It was from the work of Aristotle that we derive the essential notion of civil society. The Aristotelian interpretation of civil society was *politike Koinonia* [political society or community]. Aristotle considered that the state was divided between political society (*polis*) and the household (*oikos*). It was not until the sixteenth century that the nature of the relationship between the state and its constituent society was considered. In *The Prince*, Machiavelli utilised the conception of a civil society to delineate the relationship between the ruler and his subjects. The influence of the enlightenment theorists in projecting the nature of civil society is pivotal. The liberal theorists; Locke, Hume, Paine and de Tocqueville, in stressing the primacy of the individual in political life, considered civil society as being separate from the state and capable of autonomous action. The conservative theorists, such as Hobbes and Hegel, considered civil society being created and under the direction of the state.

The Liberal Model of Civil Society - The nature of civil society, within the liberal paradigm was most strongly articulated by David Hume and John Locke. For Locke the nature of Civil society was such that its formation was an organic process where free men in order to escape the "inconveniences, insecurity and violence" formed a society which in turn collectively ceded its political authority to a political society. The act of formation of a political 'Common-wealth' is always preceded by the formation of a [civil] community. The primary motivation of moving from the state of nature to a community (a civil society) to a political commonwealth, is the protection of 'life, liberty and estate', the nature of the relationship between civil society and political commonwealth is based upon the social contract. It is from the primacy of the individual and the civil community that the basis and legitimacy of Government is established Government ‘must be by the people and aimed solely at their own good.’ Hume confirmed the pre-eminence of civil society over political society. He argued that civil society emerged out of the need to move away from the

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uncertainties of the state of nature, which then facilitated a political society that involved the formation of governing structures.\textsuperscript{99}

It was the work of Alexis de Tocqueville in his work \textit{Democracy in America} that the concept of, and necessity for an autonomous civil society blossomed. De Tocqueville saw the rise of the universalist state as dangerous and saw in the United States the lively complex set of non-state based relationships and associations that offered the best defence against the ambitions of an increasingly voracious political society. De Tocqueville viewed the range of American civil associations including "scientific and literary circles, schools, publishers, inns, manufacturing enterprises, religious organisations, municipal associations and independent households"\textsuperscript{100} as being integral components of a self-perpetuating, autonomous civil society. Rather than being the product of the state, or subject to the control of the state such relationships and organisations acted to prevent the expansion of the state and to create an independent society.\textsuperscript{101}

\textbf{Civil Society and Contemporary Theorists} - The heightened academic interest in the transformation of societies in the late modern period, the revival of conceptions of difference, ethnolinguistic diversity and the explosion of new social movements has resulted in a heightened interest in the nature of civil society in the late modern period. The decline of sovereignty thesis has been paralleled by the increased awareness of an expanding non-political societal space or a post-modern civil society. As Roniger has commented:

"Expectations had it that social movements, voluntary associations and intermediate institutions of civil society would effect an overall reconstruction of the political centres and a reformation of community through a strong emphasis on participation and the endorsement of an egalitarian vision of rights and entitlements."\textsuperscript{102}

\begin{footnotesize}

\textsuperscript{100} de Tocqueville, A. \textit{Democracy in America}. 90.

\textsuperscript{101} See Thomas N. \textit{Democracy Denied}, 176.

\textsuperscript{102} Roniger, L. 'Civil Society, Patronage and Democracy' \textit{International Journal of Comparative Sociology}. 1994 vol.35, no.3-4, 207.
\end{footnotesize}
Civil society in the contemporary period may be interpreted in two ways. Firstly it can be conceived as a space containing separate and overlapping spheres of social activity:

"Where privately and cooperatively owned enterprises, independent communications media and autonomously run cultural centres operate without direct interference from political agencies or other third parties."103

Thus civil society becomes an autonomous, self-defining, and self-perpetuating space independent of the state.

9.9.4 A European Civil Society

From the preceding analysis we may summarise a civil society in the following manner;

Civil society comprises of:

1. independent organisations, associations and relationships which populate the space between the state and the individual;

2. at the sociocultural level this includes organic organisations, associations, cooperative of a social or cultural nature, including social movements and interest groups, free of state control;

3. at the economic level it includes the elements of a free-market economy, including private ownership of capital, the free transfer of goods and capital and security of private ownership of property; and

4. at the political level it includes non-state sponsored political movements, politically orientated non-government organisations and key elements of liberal democratic practise, including freedom of association, citizenship and independent political movements vying for power.

Accordingly, in what manner can we talk of a European civil society?

The complex matrix of collaborations and alliances between European social, cultural and economic partners and the active efforts made to combat social exclusion and promote an inclusive non-discriminatory and economically equitable Europe is highly

suggestive of the existence of a distinct and active European society. The expression of a distinct European culture, in terms of cosmologies, political practices and technologies, exported to much of the rest of the world, further suggests a unique European society. However the export of much of the basis of this sociopolitical, cultural and economic practices has paradoxically reduced the distinctiveness of Europe herself.\(^{104}\)

Notwithstanding the effects of growing cosmopolitanism, high levels of immigration and the spread of media, telecommunications world trade and industry which has had the effect of blurring the territorial frontiers of Europe, we are justified in referring to a distinct European civil society. A society Independent of the rest of the world, and largely independent from the societies of individual European states.

The process of political and economic integration within Europe that began with the Treaty of Rome has had a profound effect on both individual national societies and has assisted in the formation of a pan-European society. There is little doubt, as the analysis in this work has suggested, that the introduction of the single market, the evolution of 'Social Europe' and the emphasis on regional Europe, amongst many other institutional measures, have linked the peoples of Europe together in a way that adds substance to the broad, but still ill-defined cultural, political and artistic inheritance that commonly defines 'Europeanness'. The attempt to develop European economic and political activity in a cohesive manner has had a 'spillover' effect on not only European polity building but also large-scale society building.\(^{105}\)

While on a superficial level it could be argued that a European society is an uncertain phenomena; that Europe is nothing more than a territorial expression lacking the characteristic networks of associations strong enough to realise an independently dynamic society, the contemporary trans-national trends suggests otherwise.\(^{106}\) There


\(^{105}\) Ibid., 19.

\(^{106}\) I am particularly concerned here for the sorts of criticisms Anthony Smith has made of the lack of an independent European Cultural or historical sphere see Smith, A.D. 'Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era'.

is a belief in the experience of a European society 'rising above and beyond the deep cleavages and confrontations that have divided her peoples'. Theorists such as Weber, Simmel and Pareto, Karl Mannheim and Norbert Elias have suggested there is a unique European Weltgeschichtliche (community of destiny). More practically, European culture politics and social structure are sufficiently unique and different to other non-European modes of society so as to warrant not only the idea of a European society, but its practical manifestation.

While for a considerable period European civil society could only be described as being signified by such qualities as liberalism, socialism, capitalism, citizenship and the divide between private and public life (civil/political society) the acceleration of European integration since the end of the Second World War has made it possible to consider European society from a less theoretical viewpoint.

The manifestation of a singular European society comes from a variety of sources. The growth of European youth organisations, distinct European social and cultural networks, the flow of Europeans across the European landscape and the development of both small and large scale European industry linkages, are but a limited example of the wide range of increasing deeply rooted social, economic and cultural linkages across Europe. The explosion in the number range and interests of European organisations and associations, the cross-national trade flows and trans-European economic mergers and employment flows is matched by the rise in power and potency of European non-government organisations and pressure and lobby groups.

It is central to the consideration of the development of an autonomous European society to appreciate the intimate involvement of the institutions of the European Communities. Policies and programs designed to promote trans-European economic and social cohesion, the promotion of education and information flows and the creation of a meaningful European network society are all trends that have reinforced the linkages made at the local and non-institutional level. Programs such as the Erasmus program have served not only to ensure that Europeans remain sympathetic to


108 Ibid.
European functional integration, but also that they move beyond a common market to a common society. We have examined above that a civil society may act independently of the apparatus of the political society (a liberal interpretation) or be conditioned by existing political structures (the authoritarian model of civil society). In the case of contemporary Europe neither model is entirely applicable, European political institutions are actively intervening in shaping a European civil society, however such a society is designed to exhibit enormous ethnic, linguistic, cultural and societal diversity. Unlike the Hobbesian State, contemporary Europe celebrates rather than attempts to banish societal variety and difference.

As empirical indicators of common European socio-economic activities converge there is a corresponding convergence in European society. The rise in European life expectancy, the shift from manufacturing to service industries, the harmonisation of welfare provisions throughout Europe and the reduction of gender inequality, increasing secularisation and greater education retention rates, and the growth of European higher education reveals the homogenous nature of European society on a variety of levels. Put simply, as Europeans move towards more uniform social, economic, educational, cultural and political conditions, the rise of trans-European independent organisations, associations and relationships will become as characteristic at the supranational level as they were at the national level during the period of initial state-formation in Europe in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth centuries. As macro-level political communities converge, and establish policy platforms to unite Europeans within specific socio-economic parameters the unsteady convergence of proto-national communities that occurred under the dynamic of European State-formation, will be replicated.

Developments such as these - the growth of European economic, cultural, social and political interpenetration beyond state and ethnic boundaries have according to Giner forced:

"... a substantial number of intellectuals and social scientists to address themselves to the implications of the possible rise of one single economy, one single polity, and even one single society within Europe."^{109}

^{109} Ibid., 23.
As European 'national' societies become bound together politically, economically, socially and culturally the process of fusion and interpenetration results in distinct sub-national ethnic and cultural communities existing and thriving under one political order. Within such an order communal identity is defined by citizenship and participation in a single market, a single social landscape, a single society: a unified Europe.

It is important to note that we are not suggesting that the existence of a unique European civil society precludes the ongoing existence of national, or sub-national societies. As we have previously argued, it is plausible that various modes of societal interaction can exist in parallel with one another. Further the various historical influences that produced stronger national civil societies in such European states as England and Sweden and weaker national civil societies in Italy or Spain, while acting as indirect prompts to the evolution of a pan-European civil society will not retard the general shift towards European society. Nor are we excluding the nature of civil society in the Eastern European hemisphere, notwithstanding significant impediments to its development.

Prior to the liberal-democratic transformations in Eastern Europe the basis of civil society was authoritarian, that is the state attempted to control, manipulate and incorporate all approved forms of social and political activity into the public realm of the state. The private realm was derivative and ideologically conditioned by the public, political society. It should additionally be noted that the most powerful expression of civil society was found in the former soviet bloc: the Solidarity Movement in Poland.

Civil society in such circumstances thus existed in an environment of collective cognitive dissonance - there was the officially sanctioned civil society and the unofficial, more vital civil society of unofficial associations and relationships. Political society created sufficient ideological space for the emergence of ideologically-consistent civil structures and associations. Thus non-state civic life was dependant upon the acquiescence of the state. While there were increasingly autonomous economic and cultural groupings within eastern Europe, eastern European authoritarian regimes found it impossible to allow for an autonomous civil society to emerge, within the liberal paradigm. Unofficial East European civil society was grass roots in orientation, self-organising and positioned in passive opposition to the state. The form taken by such society took in eastern Europe varied considerably; the basis of such organisations were variously religious, cultural or social an independent economic basis for civil society was not achieved until the political transformation had allowed for greater economic liberalism.

The rise of an Eastern European civil society initially occurred in response to the decline in the structural integrity of the Eastern European states. The implosion of east European economies, and the growing social dissatisfaction that resulted from it and the sociopolitical space created by the liberalisation of ideological doctrine in the Gorbachev era (post 1985) resulted in elements of the (unofficial) civil society challenge the state for legitimacy. A pivotal example of such an association was the solidarity movement in Poland and more generally the coalescence of groups associated with the 'Velvet Revolution' in Czechoslovakia.
Accordingly, we conclude that there is the visible assertion of a progressive, inclusive pan-European civil society. The pace and intensity of European convergence at the institutional level has assisted with a process that has its own dynamic as a consequence of the homogenising effect of market efficiency, increased education and a undefinable sense of a Europe as a common community of destiny - inclusive and civic.
Chapter Ten

To strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield . . .
Approaching European Civic Identification

10.1 Introduction

This work has examined the nature of European identity in late modernity. It has tested the hypothesis that supranational institutions contribute to the development of transnational identity formation. The work has considered evidence of a contemporary civic form of communal identification within Europe. In an argument that informs our understanding of European identification we found that conceptions of European identity based on civic grounds form the basis of contemporary European identity and belonging.

European identity, as this work has demonstrated, is rooted in the dynamics of European communal social, economic and political life. It demonstrates itself in a collective sympathy with, and participation in, European political culture and civic values. It is further demonstrated in the construction and rejection of the ‘other’ on civic grounds.

As we stated in Chapter One, the question of how political communities, increasingly ethnically heterogeneous, socially fragmented and territorially dispersed, yet structurally and functionally linked, can contribute to the formation of a common consciousness and a common sense of identity, required attention. This thesis has established that the emergence of European supranational institutions and the development of effective mechanisms for the maintenance of European rights and security - in economic, social, political as well as ethnolinguistic terms - have contributed to collective European identification and the emergence of a (positive) European sentiment.

The work initially discussed the difficulties associated with conceptions of both Europe and identity in late modernity. Identity, is, irrespective of its context, a deeply complex abstraction. It is built from social meanings and is transformed by social,
economic and political interaction. The complexity and diversity of the phenomena is illustrated by the crisis of identity in late modernity and by the challenges that different theorists have experienced in understanding the basis of such a crisis. The modernist construct of state-mediated national identity is, as we demonstrated, being undermined by the rapid growth of more 'authentic' signifiers of identity centred around narratives of consumption, gender, sexual orientation, environmentalism and, most potently, ethnolinguistic imagining. This crisis of identity, manifested in contemporary Europe by clusters of signification such as the multifarious regional movements and the neo-fascist movement, makes the elaboration of a homogenous sphere of national, let alone supranational identity, deeply problematic. Formulating a model of European identity, in the context of the heightened stylisation of identity, is thus difficult.

Europe and 'Europeaness' have been variously configured. Europe has been analysed as a community of destiny, as a centre of a unique civilisation and as a bounded community of history, values and languages. Differing conceptions often reflect differing political, academic or economic agendas. As we observed, in the context of the breakdown of received notions of community and the incongruities of liberal democracy (that sustained the European state and the state-mediated 'nation'), achieving an enduring understanding of contemporary European identity is highly problematic. This is especially so as a result of the normative and methodological suppositions that underlie each received paradigm of Europeaness, and the fundamental tensions between the two key paradigms of identity – ethnic and civic, as illustrated and defined by Greenfeld in her term Ressentiment.

We began our examination of European identity by considering the differing discourses of identity. We found that developing a model of communal identification requires the articulation of several different kinds and levels of analysis. The thesis argued that it is possible to synthesise the main theoretical approaches to identity formation and to define identity in such a way as to adequately test for the existence of a European identity. We found that:

*Identity is best understood as a sense of belonging; to feeling part of a collectivity. It is associated with a readiness to adopt certain self-descriptions.*
Identity formation is a process of community formation in which membership and association is based on a set of criteria which have both subjective and objective characteristics. Such as the characteristics of ethine or language, as in the case of 'ethnic' identity or the features of citizenship, individualism and equality - as in the case of 'civic' identity. Identity is enabled by individuals, who by making favourable comparisons with the in-group and unfavourable comparisons with out-groups collectively categorise themselves as part of the collective. Communal identity is displayed in cooperative intra-group interaction, normative convergence and functional relations.

Identity exists where individuals identify with and wish themselves to be identifiable as members of distinct social categories such as nations, ethnic groups or societies.

Identity varies in accordance with the strength of the social attachments within the community (strong or weak) and the nature of the objects of such attachments (such as 'ethnic' or 'civic' signifiers - blood or citizenship, nation or society). Communal identity is also influenced by the benefits that individuals perceive as being attainable as a result of group membership.

At its core identity is a subjective, psychological response to a set of objective conditions, which sorts the world into both favourable and unfavourable symbolic categorisations.

Having established the nature of the discussion and established a definition of identity, the thesis considered the differing strands of communal identity, and their application within the European context. Ethnic conceptions of identity are associated with a selective form of remembering; the mythologisation of history, the veneration of one set of cultural traditions to the selective exclusion of others. It is also deeply influenced by the definition and exclusion of the 'other' based on a set of meanings which are culturally, ethnically, and linguistically defined. The work found that ethnic identity is a powerful and enduring form of communal belonging. It defines a community as a fixed, relatively impermeable organic entity rooted in race, language, culture and intergenerational ties. Notwithstanding its overt permeance ethnic identification is, as with all other forms of collective identity, constructed and
malleable. Its central elements are associated with selective remembrance and narrow renditions of a mythological historical and ethnically purified past.

Civic identification, by contrast to ethnic, is inclusive. It is open to all who share civic values. It is based upon both a symbolic and practical commitment to equality, tolerance, diversity and the advancement of social, economic and civic rights within a social context of cultural and ethnic pluralism. Ethnic identity elevates ethnic group affiliation to the point where it is the primary basis of community, personal development and political stability. By contrast, civic identification binds communities together as a result of their common participation in, derived benefits from, and resultant shared sense of community from individual and collective rights and shared values. Such rights and values are what holds widely dispersed and ethnically heterogeneous societies together.

This work considered the relationship between the two manifestations of communal identity. The study established that there are two necessary conditions for the elevation of either paradigm of communal identity. Firstly, that as one or other of the basis of communal identification becomes politically entrenched that the political potency of the other will be institutionally neutralised. Secondly, we found that for communal identification to endure that some provision needs to be made for the other form of communal belonging in order to manage the resentment that exists between the two. We observed that as communities formed around either of these two modes of identity that they contain signifiers of the other form. As Greenfeld suggests these two paradigms of identity stand in an uneasy relationship with each other. There is resistance, or as Greenfeld denotes as Ressentiment between the two modalities of identity. This relationship requires direct and careful institutional management. We considered theoretical attempts to signify Europe according to these differing paradigms. While there have been attempts to describe Europe in civic terms, the enduring discourse, most famously put by Huntington, is the conceptualisation of a unique European cultural and civilisation 'space'.

There is a clear territorial dimension to the application of the dual communal identity within Europe. European spatiality is fractured along civic and ethnic grounds. Theorists link the liberal 'West' with a stronger articulation of civic values. Such
values include humanitarianism, individualism and a free market. By contrast, Europe’s ‘East’ is conceptualised as an area of ethnic signification, where shared history, culture and ethnic and racial distinctiveness are the prime mobiliser of collective identification.

As we considered, the attraction of the ethnic can appear irresistible. It is the most enduring and the least demanding form of identification. The myths of blood, custom and history require no great effort to imagine or articulate. The collective imagining of a historic, ethnically homogenous community is attractive to certain groups within every society, most particularly those who feel economically marginalised or politically disenfranchised. Ethnic identity offers a remedy for anomie, weak personal identity and communal insecurity by providing strong effective ties and fulfilling certain fundamental needs - security, identity and belonging. These needs may be difficult for certain individuals to achieve in other social contexts. Such a phenomenon is most readily evidenced in the emergent European underclass, those suffering economic and political dislocation and those within Eastern Europe.

The alternative, communal form of identification is based on civic virtues of participative democracy, communal human and social rights, meaningful citizenship legal equality, freedom of speech, religion, and association. These more constructivist bonds, while forming the basis of civic society within the Western liberal state, are less immediately attractive as the basis for civic homogeneity and societal cohesion. We found that given the resilience of ethnic identification, active intervention is required by liberal political organisations – such as the EU - to actively encourage inclusive civic identification in the context of the return of ethnically-derived Ressentiment.

As a field of study European identity is difficult to confine empirically and difficult to limit theoretically. The development of a model of European identification, as this thesis has demonstrated, requires the articulation of differing levels and modes of analysis. Our examination of the arguments surrounding the ‘decline of the state’ argument and the rise of international organisations and structures, demonstrates both the changing modalities of macro-polities and the nature of the impact that they have on communal identity formation. The phenomenon of transnational interdependence
in the context of a weakening in the credibility and competency of the state arises from a variety of influences. The internationalisation of production and finance; the integrative capacity of information technologies that have overcome economic and territorial borders and the increasing power of transnational corporations, that lead rather than follow national policy debates, has rapidly debased the effective autonomy of individual states. In such a context there has been an impetus for increased power for supranational organisations in order to best manage affairs that were traditionally orchestrated by the sovereign state. This phenomenon has been nowhere more apparent than in Europe.

An important result of the expansion of the supranational and the decline of the national has been the growing disjuncture between state and identity. As the state is increasingly less able to independently secure desired policy outcomes, there arises a general dissatisfaction with the state and a broader crisis of its popular legitimacy. This has the effect of undermining national identity, which was, in its formative stage, built upon strong centralised and centralising state apparatus. In such a circumstance communal identification can ‘default’ to primordial ethnic and exclusive signifiers, as a reflection of popular disillusionment with established institutions and elites.

We considered in detail that the state has been historically and intimately linked with the formation and management of a (state-sponsored) national identity. In an environment of declining state competency, key elements of identification have become problematic. Specific instruments utilised by states to engender a positive sense of communal identification such as the consolidation of territory, the creation of a state-centred economic and societal rights domain and protection system, the control over a common education system and the encouragement of a common set of historical memories are eroding. We found that policy domains, commonly associated with the engendering of communal identification and traditionally associated with the state are shifting to a supranational domain. Increasing political, economic and cultural dimensions critical for defining and creating communal identity are emerging at a trans-European level. However such a process is occurring in a context of ethnic persistence. The residual affection for the state, combined with the splintering impact of globalisation has encouraged the growth of exclusionary, ethnically based, attitudes. This poses a threat not only to the integrity of the civic state and
supranation, but more significantly to the mobilisation of a communal civic form of European identification.

In Chapter Four we examined the premier example of supranationalism in late modernity – the European Union. In the context of an economically and militarily impotent, but strategically important, European space at the end of the Second World War, the creation of a supranational Europe was acknowledged by Europeans as the most practical structure for the ‘rebirth’ of Europe. Nearly five decades of institutional building and the elaboration of sovereign policy domains – both internally and externally focused - have resulted in the emergence of a unique form of polity, neither state nor nation - but with the potential to be both.

The thesis considered in detail the reshaping of European political affairs in the context of a highly structured and increasingly sovereign European polity. We observed that the structural patterns of the European polity, increasingly ‘state-like’, include an emergent executive, legislature, bureaucracy and most significantly an active judicial arm. These institutions are establishing distinctive European patterns of political, economic and social activity. Such patterns, while notionally dependent upon the member states, are functionally independent of the states that comprise it. Such structures are creating particular and unique fields of action and interaction for Europeans, which systematically link Europeans to the polity. They are the links that hold Europeans together. More significantly such fields of action and interaction link Europeans collectively together, engendering a common form of European identification, in a manner not dissimilar to that experienced amongst individual European states in early modernity.

While the structuring of the European polity has taken on the broad characteristics of statehood, there exist certain unique qualities that lead us to categorise the European polity to be neither a: “state in the making or a nation in the betraying” as earlier observed. The European polity is not politically independent of its component states. Europe lacks practical material or security autonomy and is reliant upon rules, resources and leadership which remain essentially state based. Notwithstanding such limitations we found that in a number of critical arenas that Europe, rather than its
constituent member states, provides the central focus of political, economic and increasingly, social interactions.

We considered, in Chapter Five, the positive effects of the European polity on the engendering of communal European civic identification. We found that the European polity has created the necessary structural preconditions wherein Europeans act and interact within a specifically European delineated set of structural apparatus and possibilities. Such a uniquely European institutional and policy architecture provides sufficient room for Europeans to actualise their European civic rights and privileges. Resulting from such a process, ethnic group identification, at least as it politically mobilises and manifests itself as a rival for communal sentiment has declined, while the right, within a social context, to display ethnic identification has improved. This has been a direct result of a deliberate and subtle policy imperative at the supranational level that has both drawn attention to the importance of ethnic identification and persistence in a globalised marketplace and which legitimises the process of culturally enhancing – while at the active political level, marginalising - ethnic identification. Thus the Ressentiment between ethnic and civic is acknowledged and managed.

The thesis demonstrated that the European polity is acting to develop and protect its emergent civic identity by a variety of mechanisms. Most notably, this occurs through the creation of a meaningful rights and security environment, in which personal and collective economic, social and political rights (including the right to participate in and derive meaning from preexisting linguistic, cultural and ethnic networks and identities) are entrenched within a politically and economically secure environment. This process is manifested in the following manner:

a. By the active support of its political elite. The effectiveness of an organised European elite in engendering European identification was demonstrated. Reinforcing the significance of elites in engendering identification we found that in those states, most notably the United Kingdom, where political elite’s have resisted European integration, we demonstrated a lower than average level of European identification.
b. The consolidation of the European territory, the delineation of Europe from non-Europe on civic grounds, and provisions for its internal and external security and protection.

c. The control over and improvements to European economic and social conditions, that act to inhibit social and economic fragmentation and thus the potential for the revival of ethnic primordialism. This acts to neutralise the socioeconomic causal elements of ‘ethnic’ political mobilisation. Such improvements have, as this study demonstrates, the effect of engendering a greater sense of European identification most particularly from amongst those Europeans most benefiting from European economic redistribution, such as those found at Europe’s periphery.

d. The creation of a meaningful European arena for democracy and participatory citizenship, including the articulation of individual pan-European civil, political and economic rights and security and the institutionalisation and protection of regional, ethnic and linguistic interests and identities.

e. Associated with the previous point, a common European policy domain in defence of European civic values – freedom security, justice – a structural commitment to fundamental human rights, the principles of equality and non-discrimination.

f. Institutional support for information, education cultural and social interaction, contributing to the enhancement of trans-European social-cultural networks and the common enjoyment of pre-existing signifiers of identity.

We demonstrated that the European polity has created a unified European (structural) space in which the depth of institutional and policy domains attach individuals and groups together across preexisting national borders and ethnic differences. Further the EU has acted to promote the belief in the minds of its citizens that others within the EU are of the same community by creating meaningful boundaries of the community between itself and ‘outsiders’. The basis of difference, separateness and exclusion, so central to all forms of identity creation, is articulated and realised on grounds which are civic and culturally accommodating. They divide Europe from non-Europe on normative, economic and behavioural grounds rather than ethnic. Europe has responded to the demands of international economic competition, from the demands of regional and sectorial interests and from the struggle for jobs, incomes and
ultimately identities by creating a central — distinctly European — point of reference for its citizens. We noted that widespread economic and social instability and uncertainty characterize the global condition, where communal identities are no longer firmly anchored in the state. Responding to this, the EU has mobilized not only to reinvigorate its constituent economies but more importantly, in the context of this discussion, to provide a secure and right-bearing environment in which Europeans identify with each other precisely because of the certain and secure environment in which they live. Most particularly when compared with the effects of globalization and fragmentation that characterizes those outside of 'Europe'.

There are some significant institutional and non-institutional impediments to European identification. The thesis considered in detail the politically and socially disruptive effect of economic alienation and marginalisation within Europe. We demonstrated that the emergence of a European underclass and the emergence of a massified European society act to dilute the socially integrative effects that result from broad societal and economic integration. The western metanarratives of 'nation', 'subject' and 'liberal-democracy' are, for increasingly larger communities, giving way to a growing reorientation towards the particular niche clusters of identity. The modernist project of capital, democracy and the infinite capacity of the stable individualised subject are being seriously challenged by unresolved problems of systemic unemployment, economic exploitation, environmental damage, gender discrimination and increasing levels of insecurity at the individual and collective level. The realignment of community, territory and identity in late modernity has also acted to dilute the strength of a pan-European sense of community, as the disjunction between place, community and self, realised in a globalised market, erode notions of community at both the national and supranational level.

The resurgence of the ethnic nation, religious fundamentalism and political extremism, (as manifested in the European extreme right), is highly problematic for European identification. The resurgence of these splintering elements demonstrates the ongoing veracity of ethnic signifiers of identity. The thesis further found that a notable part of the European public is antagonistic towards Europe insofar as it is perceived as denying citizens sufficient democratic influence. Europeans are unconvinced by a European polity where there is the perception that national
governments have little say in European decision-making. Such developments and perceptions represent a clear threat to the manifestation of a European identity.

In Chapters Seven, Eight and Nine the study operationalised the model of identity established in Chapter One. We demonstrated that:

1. There is a genuine and enduring sense of both European and national identity amongst a majority of Europeans.

2. A significant percentage of Europeans feel that the European identity is at least as important as their national identity.

3. Europeans are attracted to Europe not only on economic and social grounds but, unlike pre-existing forms of macro-social identification, European identification is based upon a collective understanding that the European polity supports rather than threatens pre-existing national identities, including ethically derived ones.

4. Europeans are highly self-conscious and aware of the cementing functions of the institutions and policies of the European Union. Such institutions and policies are perceived as being beneficial to them both individually and collectively. This is most particularly the case at the territorial periphery of Europe.

5. There is a central European language – English. Notwithstanding the EU's promotion of regional and minority languages. English is predominant in the world of commerce, education and personal transactions. The EU by promoting and funding the continuance of minority languages and cultures mediates against ethnically based political mobilisation in response to the dominance of English.

6. The occurrence of European identity increases with youth, socio-economic position and education level. European identity is positively correlated with the relative economic gain obtained by individuals from the EU and from the depth of European transactions and interrelationships entered into.

7. Europe's aging, unemployed and disadvantaged feel the least European.

8. As relative economic conditions improve, support for European integration, democracy, a single currency and united economic foreign and social policy increases, this is felt most especially at Europe's core - Belgium, Luxembourg and France and at Europe's Periphery; Greece, Ireland and Spain.
9. The effect of common European symbols on the emergence of communal European identification is not convincing. There are a comparably limited number of European symbols, and while there is a high awareness of key European symbols such as the European currency symbol for the euro, Europeans are not united in their recognition of or affection for other European symbols such as Europe day or the European Anthem. National symbols continue to predominate as signifiers of state rather than supranation.

10. There is a demonstrable set of core European civic values, which inform a collective and distinctive European political culture. These values include political liberalism, democratic engagement, humanitarianism, and social protection. Europeans collectively uphold such values. The communal support for and participation in a common political culture is demonstrated in the communal European support for human rights and political parties which share a common set of political ideologies which are consistent with European civic values.

11. Europeans are engaging and interacting with each other in an increasing multi-layed and complex ways, leading to a stronger sense of community and communal identity. The European Union has been instrumental in facilitating the increased level of European identification resulting from this engagement and interaction.

12. While there is a widening expanse of pan-European engagement and participation across member-state boundaries, there is a historically low level of political violence both between European states and within them, demonstrating a heightened sense of community and identity.

13. Discrimination forms a key element of European identity. However the basis of communal European discrimination is civic rather than ethnic. Europeans are Eurocentric not ethnocentric - Europeans, by a large percentage, accept peoples of other nationalities and other races. As argued European identity, as with all other forms of communal identification, is rooted in discrimination and common attitudes to the 'out' group – the 'other'. The basis of this discrimination is not ethnically or culturally based. European discrimination is based on the common European concerns for an 'out' group that does not uphold the core European normative value set and which potentially threaten Europe's social and economic fabric. Such threats are manifested by the introduction of drugs, heightened criminal activity, or by threatening to compromise Europe's standard of living or international competitiveness.

14. European boundaries are an important part of identity formation. Such boundaries are both physical, through the articulation of a 'fortress Europe' and a rejection of the non-European on civic grounds.
15. There is an emergent European civic society, which is separate from individual member states’ societies. The structures and policies of the European Union influence the European civic society.

10.2 A Final Consideration on the Question of Europe

One of the core dilemmas facing states and societies in late modernity is the reconciliation of the impetus towards economic globalism, and the desire for quality of life within a progressive, socially cohesive society. Overlaying this tension, and revealing the depth of the dilemma between globalised markets and localised anxieties, are the unfulfilled ambitions of individuals and collectives of being someone; of sustaining meaningful identity. We argue that the European polity is uniquely placed to provide such a resolution to these anxieties. It is from this resolution that communal identification – common belonging – originates. The increasingly diverse and globalised patterns of social and economic interaction, the political impotence of the traditional state and the enduring need for community and belonging reveal that in many respects that communal identity can no longer be meaningfully sustained at a national level. The European Union, as this analysis has demonstrated, provides both the ideological framework and the practical policies that, notwithstanding differing cultural and ethnic heritages, bind Europeans together. Europe provides economic security, a rights domain and gives European security to choose. As Greenfeld argues in her work to be part of a national community is to be part of an “elite”. Such a phenomenon is nowhere more acutely felt than in contemporary Europe.

This study has demonstrated that European identity is essentially civic in nature. Internally Europe is an arena of articulated civic rights and collective economic, political and social security. European identification is effected by the systemic changes in European governance that have occurred in the period following the end of the Second World War. The component elements of European identification: collective self-consciousness and self-description, collective symbols, normative convergence and collective actions and relationships within a secure landscape have been actively and skillfully negotiated by the structures, institutions and elite intervention of the European polity. Such negotiation has been predicated upon the acknowledge persistence of ethnic identification which has been largely politically
neutralized within a materially supportive pluralist democratic structure. Europe is a structural phenomenon, a political and an economic project which has been instrumental in the articulation of a unique European empathy. Beyond the structure, Europe is its people, culturally and ethnically diverse, inheritors of a chaotic and deeply moving history yet protected and secure within the EU. They are united in their freedom to be whom they choose to be.

The search for the basis of European belonging in the contemporary period cannot overlook the prime signifier of communal identity in the modern period - the nation-state. We have considered at length the decline in the credibility and competences of the state and the resilience of collective identification for it. Loyalty to the State and identification with it is still the predominant marker of identity in contemporary Europe. Intimately linked with the resilient national identity is, as Greenfeld has argued, an active resistance between it and other signifiers of identification, either at the local sociocultural level, or the supranational level. The two-fold effect of national identification and national prejudice can be seen in a variety of arenas. In its benign form at the European football championships, or in the rhetoric of the Eurosceptic movement, and in its most destructive forms in the neo-fascist treatment of ethnic minorities, and in ethnic cleansing in the Balkans. As Martin Jacques reminds us:

“One of the most negative effects of this search for the true Europe, and the archetypal European, is that it can serve to reinforce one of Europe’s most fundamental, less attractive, characteristics: the relationship between territory and ethnicity. Europe’s ethnic groups often display a tenacious and proprietorial relationship with the land that they have inhabited, as the Balkans and Ireland, cases in extremis, demonstrate.”

Part of the challenge in the construction of an inclusive non-prejudicial ‘civic’ European identity is the enduring tension between it and the deep-seated bias and prejudice that has paradoxically assisted in the evolution of nations and national communities, and the ethnic preconceptions which are entrenched within them. While in the new European integrated space, with a common frontier protected by the Schengen agreement, a strong economic and social infrastructure and meaningful participative citizenship one might expect a lessening of intra-European rivalries. However more ancient divisions, selective remembering of histories that both unite
and divide remains. They are accentuated in an international climate of increasingly homogenised cultural and economic products. It is in the construction of a unified European polity, and its distinctive structural elements and distinguishing policy domains that have accentuated the division between Europe and the rest. The institutional ‘otherness’ while civic in form, appears ethnic in practice. The displacement of the North African and West Asian from Europe by increasingly restrictive immigration and asylum laws, reinforces the differences between an affluent and exclusive Europe and a more disjointed series of other spaces inhabited by other peoples. Such an institutionally derived ‘otherness’ is matched with a communal form of exclusion within the European polity based on ethnic signifiers - the exclusion of the Turk in Germany, the Indo-Chinese and Algerian in France and the West-Indian and Pakistani in the United Kingdom. If, as we have argued throughout this work, European identity is orientated around civic conceptions of community; diversity, tolerance, common participative citizenship and multiculturalism, then the endemic tension between Europeans on ethnic grounds on one level, and the more significant macro-tension between ethnic and civic conceptions of identification broadly need to be addressed. The ‘other’, as Greenfeld suggested in Chapter One, is a constant element in the form of the self, and unavoidable. Its permeance and durability in Europe is clear both in the physical presence of other groups and in the profound influence of the other such as the Turks and Moors on European architecture, science and mathematics. Accordingly if a European civic identity is to endure it will have to confront the paradoxes inherent in the tensions inherent in all identity at its boundary.

It would be unwise to forget the rationale that governed the construction of the European polity since the end of the Second World War. Torn by fratricidal war, Europe sought to institutionally unite not only to become domestically and internationally more efficient, but in order to eliminate the original grounds of European conflict - unchecked nationalism. Simply put, the European polity needed to redeem the myth of nation by politically neutralising it - removing it from its divisive, exclusive ethnic domain - and distilling its positive elements of belonging and loyalty. Old conceptions of national identity will endure, they can but not. The

1 Jacques, M. ‘... can't buck Trend’ The European, 19-25 (January 19910), 25.
challenge for Europe is to channel such loyalties to a supranational level, which creates a 'community of sentiment' based on common institutions; not in the divisive, antagonistic or exclusive manner in the way that European nationalism has historically been.

The European Union has provided the conduit for the emergence of a unique European identity. It has provided both an engine for the growth of state-like institutions that have historically linked 'national' communities to states. It has engendered a purposive elite capable of articulating a common European vision and it has provided the security and rights domain which provide a positive point of focus for Europeans. It has equally importantly sought to enhance rather than supplant pre-existing linguistic, ethnic local and national identities, conscious of their importance to Europeans and their enduring nature. Further the European polity has provided a point of reference for both determining individual states' commitment to a shared common destiny, and a point of individual self-reference. The European polity has consistently provided positive results in increasingly wide policy domains, from the Common Agricultural Policy, the European Social Fund, European cohesion policy quite apart from the central elements of a single market and economic and monetary integration. Such steps have, as we have empirically established, enhanced a positive European sentiment amongst Europeans.

Just as the EU is a unique organisation, so too is the form of communal belonging that is derived from it. Whereas in modernity the state appropriated elements of civil society to create the nation, in late modernity the European supranation has largely contributed to social and cultural change capable of articulating and supporting a pan-European form of identification, quite separate from the national identity that preceded it and yet accommodating of such identity within its own civic sphere. The European polity has effected dramatic change in the consciousness of its citizens. As Ingo Kolboom has commented, the EU:

"Equally united the victors, the vanquished and the others, the great, the medium and the small, the strong and the weak."2

2 Kolboom, I. Quoted in Lang, J. 1991 “Europe: the Dwarf that needs to Grow' The European, 2-10 (February 19910), 30.
For fifty years Europe has structurally reinvented itself. Functional and institutional alignment has assisted in the hitherto unknown assurance of increasingly uniform material well being for its citizen body. The development of an inclusive socio-economic infrastructure, granting Europeans specific rights as diverse social and economic actors have further developed a model that Europeans are largely sympathetic to and willing to collectively defend largely because of the cosmopolitan but protected society that has been created.

Those who perceive the process of European institutional deepening and widening as a threat to pre-existing national sociocultural identities, reveals a deep misunderstanding. As opposed to an ethnic conception of community, in which pre-existing forms of identification are excluded, often violently, civic nation building and identification offers the promise, and the institutional assistance to make it so, of a heightened profile for national and proto-national identities, rather than their diminution. Europe is uniquely placed to become a community of tolerance, diversity and equality, and is providing the institutional and financial resources, as we have previously examined, to make such a dream a reality. The European polity is a civic arena of diverse identification, rather than a super-state with a state-imposed mono-identity. As Francois Mitterand commented:

"Europe is in our nations' interest: it will not dissolve them but make them bloom."³

As the Scots, Catalans, and Gaelic speakers have found Europe does not stifle historical and cultural identities; it supports them, as evidenced by its institutional support for the European regions and European lesser-used languages. As Lang suggests:

"We must not confuse integration with absorption. The EU can function as a team, with each part contributing to the victory of the whole."⁴

³ Ibid.
⁴ Ibid.
10.3 Chapter Ten - Concluding Remarks

"Anyone who does not believe in miracles in European affairs is no realist."\(^5\)

We have demonstrated that European civic identity inhabits a separate hemisphere to that of the ethnic. European identity is broadly derived from the commonality of a civilisation of common values, ideas and aspirations. European identity is essentially progressive and democratic. The collective imagining shared by contemporary Europeans is of a secure and right-bearing community of aspiration and achievement. It is a commonality built on specific social, political and economic progress rather than a simplified and selective distortion of a mythologised past. It is much more than a narrow and exclusionary rendition of a oversimplified past. Regressive ethnic identity honours the past, Progressive European civic identity celebrates the potential and collective security of a common future.

Notwithstanding the veracity of European civic identification it would be foolhardy to overlook the enduring antithetical relationship between the different modalities of identity. Ethnic and civic identification do not coexist in an ambivalent relationship, just as they contain elements of each other, they resist each other, often violently. The potential for a 'spill-over'; from the civic to the ethnic, as the present circumstances in the Balkans clearly reminds us, is entirely possible in Europe. The political mobilisation of ethnic signifiers of identity in one part of Europe has the potential to reignite similar signifiers within Europe's heartland, in such a circumstance, the promise of Europe - the promise of one equal eternity - may remain unfulfilled.

In the context of the decline of the competence of the state, the rise of a global market place for goods, services, capital and also identities, the search for arenas that guard and secure pre-existing identities, as well as providing physical and material security and rights, the idea of a strong, secure Europe, laying within it a deep tapestry of identifiers has acquired a new saliency. The pre-existing attachment to the separate state and its supporting national myths of a unique national community, has been, for growing segments of the European population, replaced with attachments to new

forms of non-national communities, or with nihilistic self-absorption. It is in this manner that the idea of Europe, and its ability to act as a transmitter of identities, has acquired a greater importance. The previous concern for the nation-state has been partially replaced by a growing preoccupation with micro-identities such as configured within ethnic, gender or environmental narratives. Europe as a liberal, civic domain for the articulation of such niche identities, and its contributions to the realisation of more personal identification, has in itself induced a positive sentiment towards Europe from amongst its population.

Europe will emerge as the pre-eminent political community in the next millennia, how such enmity, suspicion, destructiveness and waste could have inspired such a sharing of sovereignty is an impressive phenomenon. The challenge has been to translate such a shared sovereignty into a common sense of attachment, belonging and loyalty amongst the citizens of Europe. The challenge is being well met.

Europe, a civic Europe, founded on humane and democratic values, has a message of hope for the rest of the world.

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Appendix A

Historical Imaginings of an Unified Europe

The idea of a politically unified Europe has its origins in a variety of sources, predating its present manifestations by at least 900 years. While it was not until much later that Charlemagne would be described as the 'Father of Europe'1 his revival of that which was the Western Roman Empire was a pivotal influence on the emergence of political unity in central Europe until the mid-fourteenth century. During the period some Emperors tried by propaganda to create a theoretical, rather than practical, edifice of European authority, albeit religiously rather than secularly based.

Despite the decay in the hegemonic aspirations and realisations of the Papacy, most acutely manifested in the failure of the last Crusade and the rise of more secular authority, proposals for an administratively coherent European space was advanced by various generations of thinkers and political elites. Writing in the late 13th century, Englebert of Admont and Alexander of Roes argued that centralised political (and religious) authority within Europe was essential as Europe was unlikely to achieve peace and security without it. Englebert suggested an argument which is remarkably modern that despite linguistic and cultural differences that there was an underlying homogeneity within Europe, based upon the precepts of natural and Roman law. Alexander went further and specifically suggested a triumvirate of German Emperor endowed with political leadership; Italian Pope with spiritual leadership and French King with intellectual leadership.2

Other, more secular theorists of the Middle Ages, suggested the necessity of centralised temporal authority in Europe.

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1 This Appendix is intended to provide a precis overview of the varying motive forces towards the idea of a unified Europe. It is broadly reliant upon the scholarship from two sources. See: Pim Den Boer et al. See Boer, P, Bugge, P & Waever, O. The History of the Idea of Europe. (Milton Keynes: Open University; London; New York: Routledge. 1995), and Heater, D. The Idea of European Unity. (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1992).

2 Heater The Idea of European Unity. 8.
Dante, in *De Monarchia* published in 1311, calls for a universal European monarch, separate from the Church to preserve the peace in Europe and to minimise aggression between individual European States. Pierre Dubois, despite being a layman, suggested in his *De Recuperatione Terrae Sanctae* of 1306 that European political union should proceed on the basis of a confederal 'Christian Republic' overseen by a Council. Such a Council, made up of judges, would arbitrate disputes between individual European states. European peace would allow for the consolidation of European Culture and for the development of European Culture and Education. Close to the methods proposed by Dubois were the 15th century plans of George Podebrad, the King of Bohemia and Antoine Marini, an industrialist. They suggested a confederal structure for Europe, against the Turks - *De Unione Christianorum Contra Turcos* and *Traite des Alliances et Confederations*. The principal institutional features of such a 'Europe' were to be an Assembly, a Court of Justice, international arbitration machinery, a centralised armed force and a confederal budget. The poignancy of this plan as a historical echo of what was to be made manifest 500 years later, is visionary. The plan suggests a degree of supranationally manifested in the decisions of the Council, where the sovereignty of individual states could be abridged by the use of decision-making by majority.

"The above-mentioned College shall have as well over us, over our subjects and those who will have prolonged its term, gracious and contentious jurisdiction, at the same time as material and joint empire, according as the above mentioned Assembly or majority thereof shall have resolved and decided."5

The prospects of a politically unified European Space during the early middle ages were constantly diluted by the tension between religious and secular paramountcy, however the effect of the reformation more deeply and acutely denied the prospects of a singular Europe. Despite the immediate divide between Catholic and Protestant Europe, the attractiveness, albeit theoretical, of a united state of Europe, remained active. Sully's 'Grand Design' of the 16th century acknowledges the recent European

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3 Ibid., 11.
4 Ibid., 13.
5 Ibid., 13.
religious schisms and rather suggests the reorientation of Habsburg power consolidated into a number of states. Europe, reconfigured into a continent of fifteen powers of approximate equal strength would create an equilibrium in which 'none of them might cause either of envy or fear, from the possessions or power of the others'.\(^6\) Representatives of these States would then form a senate which would:

"Discuss the different interests, pacify the quallels, clear up and determine all the civil, political and religious affairs of Europe, whether within itself or with its neighbours."\(^7\)

Political unity would require administrative and military unity. Europe would form a coordinated organisational framework with regional representatives, regional councils and a consolidated military force to deal with both internal and external threats. Again with premonitions of the future *raison d'etat* of a politically and administratively unified Europe, Sully suggested that political unity would contribute to the emergence of social unity, that his design would:

"unite them all in an indissoluble bond of security and friendship, after which they might live together like brethren, and reciprocally visit like good neighbours"\(^8\)

The intimately interrelated rise and consolidation of secular military states in Europe and the prolonged periods of aggression and rivalry between such states in 17th and 18\(^{th}\) centuries had the two-fold effect of inflaming tensions within Europe and promoting leading thinkers to conclude that Europe could only be lead out of such fratricidal conflicts by political integration. Despite a time of revived cosmopolitanism and humanism within the intellectual elite, Europe was characterised by over a century of continuous internal conflict. It was within this context that the leaders of the Quaker Movement were amongst Europe's strongest advocates during this period. George Fox, the leader of the Society of Friends, proclaimed the need for European political consolidation in order to avoid constant European war. William

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6 Ibid., 32.
7 Ibid., 32
8 Ibid., 34
Penn, writing in the early 1690's suggested a scheme for the pacification and unification of Europe based upon a particular parliamentary basis. The revised constitutional structure of Europe is suggested in; "An Essay Towards the Present and Future Peace of Europe by the Establishment of an European Diet, Parliament or Estates" in which the author argues for a unified European Parliament made up of a fixed number of representatives from the pre-existing European states. An annual Congress or Senate of Representatives would be instituted so that 'all the Princes and States of Europe' would be 'joined as one State' and 'a standing European Law' would be codified.

In the heartland of European cosmopolitism two Frenchman advocated a form of political union for Europe. Abbe de Saint-Pierre argued in minute detail the benefits of an improved Europe. A rationalist, who believed in the power of human thought, he was determined to articulate a scheme for European peace, consistent with the character of an enlightened European mind. His work, in three volumes, completed in 1717 in a book entitled 'Project for a treaty to restore perpetual peace in Europe among the Christian sovereigns, to maintain free trade for ever between nations, to strengthen even more the sovereign houses on their thrones. Proposed formerly by Henry the Great, King of France, agreed by Queen Elizabeth, by James I of England, her successor and by the majority of other potentates of Europe. Elucidated by M. the abbe de Saint-Pierre' In the work Saint-Pierre suggests that European warfare is endemic and that its final resolution, as opposed to temporary abatement, is a European Diet which; 'will secure the peoples of Europe from War, as the Germanic Diet has actually secured the Peoples of Germany for so many centuries. Membership of such a Diet would be open to all 'Christian Sovereigns' and disputes between such Sovereigns would be resolved within the Diet by mediation and arbitration. The operation and financing of such a political structure is spelt out by the author, as to is the judicial apparatus attached to it and the sanctions against non-compliance by individual member-states. The advantages of such a political-judicial

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9 Ibid., 53
10 Ibid., 57
11 Ibid., 71
arrangement are not simply measured by the absence of conflict but also are expressed in financial terms. In a not dissimilar approximation to the European Communities, the states would have an equal voice, would share in the economic benefits of peace and would implement sanctions against self-interested sovereigns and states.12

Jean-Jacques Rousseau argued in favour of European supra-state institutions. In his Social Contract he suggests that the relationship of the individual to the state and of the state to a confederate system are parallel and complementary. 'In both cases security and true liberty are enjoyed only through participation in the greater whole'.13 His argument is that at the level of the individual, the evolution of civil society is incomplete until such time as men have renounced their state of nature vis-a-vis the state, while at the state-level states likewise need to renounce their state of nature with regard to each other. Tyranny and war will remain endemic until the transition has been completed by bonding states into a confederal system. Rousseau follows Saint Pierre in suggesting a European confederation to preserve European peace and to promote prosperity, however Rousseau concludes that such a confederation could only be established by violent means which would deny the very reason for its initial proposal - the avoidance of war:

“No Confederation could ever be established except by a revolution. That being so, which of us would dare to say whether a league of Europe is a thing more to be desired or feared? It would do more harm in a moment than it would guard against for ages.”14

The concept of a European Union was progressed in far greater detail by Saint Simon, who believed that the acceleration of industrialisation, the trauma of Jacobinism and Bonapartism had provided both threats and opportunities for European unity. He believed that it would only be a result of supplanting existing modes of European

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12 As Heater reminds us Saint-Pierre's influence on the creation of a European Identity, impacts on the present day. In 1970 the Council of Europe and in 1986 the European Community adopted a European anthem; 'ode to joy' from Beethoven's Ninth Symphony. Beethoven took the words from Schiller, who was inspired to write them by reading Rousseau's Abstract of Saint-Pierre's Project.

13 Ibid., 80

14 Ibid., 84
governance and replacing it with a unified form of pan-European government and administration that modern industrial society could progress at an optimum rate. He was convinced that Europe was historically self-destructive, the revolutionary and Napoleonic wars being the most recent manifestation of that nature in his time, yet was potentially capable, via the process of unification of significant material and spiritual progress, and further argued that Europe was historically unified, but had fallen more recently into anarchy:

"Until the end of the fifteenth century, all the nations formed a single body politic, at peace within, but armed against the enemies of its constitution and independence."\(^{15}\)

Further more, in 'The Catechism of the Industrialists' he suggested that there existed a sense of European Identity shared amongst individual Europeans, which would form the basis of a unified Europe. He wrote:

"We are convinced that having thought about it, you will agree that philanthropic sentiments, those new family sentiments of Europeanism, take precedence today among all Europeans over their national sentiments."\(^{16}\)

The political manifestation of unification, a single government made up of a common house of commons, a house of peers and a European hereditary monarchy was based upon an Anglo-French model and was considered unworkable and improbable by Saint-Simon's contemporaries, however, despite being dated for us too, he did astutely outline what the basic pre-conditions for a collective European administration:

1. Any political organisation founded to link together several different peoples, while preserving their national independence, must be systematically homogeneous - that is to say, all the institutions should be derived from a single conception.

2. The common government must certainly be independent of the national governments.

\(^{15}\) Ibid., 102.

\(^{16}\) Ibid., 101
3. The members of the common government should . . . consider exclusively the common interest.

4. They should be endowed with a power which is their own, and does not derive from any outside authority; this power is public opinion.\textsuperscript{17}

The manifestation of institutional Europe received its most significant impetus as a consequence of violent repulsion felt by European intellectual and political elites to both the first and second great wars. Perceiving that European Warfare resulted in the contraction rather than the expansion of European values, economic life and social intercourse, best summed up in the comment of Jean-Baptiste Durosselle that 'De 1914 a 1918, il n'y a plus d'Europe' - From 1914 to 1918, there was no Europe.\textsuperscript{18} European oritans and political elites condemned the irrational nationalism and mindless patriotism that threatened to destroy the European ideal.

The key proponents of an institutional Europe in the inter-war period were Friedrich Naumann, T.G. Masaryk, Count Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, Aristide Briand and Edouard Herriot.

Naumann, deeply concerned with the detrimental effects of war upon Germany and Austria-Hungary, concerned himself with suggesting the formation not of a fully pan-European state, but rather of a post-war Europe with two 'Chinese walls' of economic and military character one between Germany and France the other between Germany and Russia. Within these boundaries he suggested 'Mitteleuropa' or Mid-Europe naturally existed rooted in the medieval Holy Roman Empire and the German Nation and that an Oberstaat - 'overstate' should be created to reflect the natural and historical symmetry of central European political and cultural life. Such a state would be a confederation of Germany, Austria, Hungary, the Balkan states and possibly Italy. Its principle manifestation would be political uniformity and the creation of a Central European common market, and a common defence force. Despite the criticism of his

\textsuperscript{17} Ibid., 104

\textsuperscript{18} Boer, P, Bugge, P & Waever, O. The History of the Idea of Europe 89
theory, most especially from those critics who saw it as an attempt to justify German hegemony in central Europe, Neumann believed that the lives and economies of Germans, Czechs, Hungarians and south Slavs would be sufficiently intertwined to make some form of supranational cooperation a necessity.\(^{19}\)

The Czech philosopher and statesman T.G. Masaryk presented a post-war political program for Europe in a book entitled *The New Europe* published in 1918. Suggesting that Europe could only progress if it was constituted with independent nation-states based on the values of self-determination and democracy. If such an arrangement was realised, an arrangement that would involve the introduction of a number of new nation-states in central Europe, including his own Czechoslovakia, then in time supranational structures would develop in Europe to promote modernisation and economic development for all European states. Masaryk was convinced that if they obtained their freedom, the nations of Europe would form some form of brotherhood for mutual benefit.

The most prominent orators of the interwar period supportive of the creation of an institutional Europe was Count Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi who argued for the creation of a Pan-European Union in his work *Paneuropa*, published in 1923. Disagreeing with Spengler who considered Europe to be declining in power, he saw Europe's natural pre-eminence as being retarded by the inappropriateness of its reliance upon states, rather than some form of cultural decline. Considering the state as being a abstract, malleable construct, wholly inappropriate to a reorientated political world system, characterised by global, rather than regional or national, power fields, Coudenhove-Kalergi believed that if Europe was not unified and included in the political world as a power, as it deserved to do, it would, in its fragmented form, come under increasing military and economic pressure from the other principle power grouping such as Russia, Britain and Panamerica. Paneuropa's main function was to secure peace and would involve a pan-European defence alliance, beyond this Paneuropa would promote the economic base of Europe and would create a 'common market' without internal customs barriers which would be able to compete efficiently.

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\(^{19}\) Ibid., 92
within the world market. Such arguments are highly suggestive of the theoretical and practical justifications for the tangible creation of institutional Europe after 1945.\textsuperscript{20}

Edouard Herriot and Aristide Briand, prominent French Politicians influenced by the profound effects of the First World War on the French nation, and greatly influenced by Coudenhove-Kalergi's pan-European aspirations were primary movers in the efforts to establish networks of pan-European political cooperation. Herriot made a watershed speech in January 1925 calling for the establishment of a 'United States of Europe', which in part contributed to the formal rehabilitation of Germany into European life. Aristide Briand pressed further and called, in a speech to the League of Nations in 1929 for the creation of a federal link between European states. Tangible outcomes of this were various, following discussions with all European foreign ministers represented in the league of nations Briand submitted an official memorandum suggestive of political and economic linkages across European states. Arguing the dangers to security and stability inherent in the contemporary division of Europe into small states, and reflecting upon the 'moral union' of Europe already established by virtue of a common racial background, common civilisation and geographical proximity, he called for the establishment of a 'European Conference' for all European states to meet regularly to deal specifically with the furtherance of political cooperation and integration of administrative, security and economic policies. Despite this form of pan-European political association being widely adopted by the European media, the 26 European Governments who received and commented on the memorandum failed to grant the scheme the political priority that it required if it were to have progressed from theory to reality.\textsuperscript{21}

It has been suggested that the National Socialists were the penultimate exponents of a unified Europe. The present day European Union conforms to the design of the plan for a European Economic Community ('Europaische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft') developed by the Nazi Economics Minister and President of the Reichsbank, Dr Walther Funk. The work of the National Socialists included plans for the establishment of a European Economic Community, with a common agricultural

\textsuperscript{20} Ibid., 101

\textsuperscript{21} Ibid., 105
policy, a common exchange rate system and monetary policy, as well as common industrial and trade policies and the establishment of a European central bank.\textsuperscript{22} The American academic Allan Nevins, working from Oxford in 1941 assessed Nazi's intentions. The Nazi plan for a United States of Europe was quite precise. The predominantly industrial Reich had been enlarged by the annexation of the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Belgium, Alsace Lorraine, Northern France and Western Poland. To feed this industrial heartland, food was to be conveyed from the outer periphery of Europe.\textsuperscript{23} The ultimate manifestation of the unified Europe as envisioned by the Nazi's would allow for the following transition, according to the Nazi Professor Hunke:

1. "the utilisation of the productive powers of the peoples will initiate a general change in what is produced in terms of its expansion."

2. 'secondly, the aim of future economic cooperation is a community of living space, ie. it should not be the task of the new economic policy to destroy mono-cultures only to replace them with insularities.'

3. 'the European States would run the risk of being economically overwhelmed and losing their political independence if trade barriers were removed all at once, unless one day a new organic organisation were to replace the economic impoverishment of the individual states.'\textsuperscript{24}

Interestingly in a concluding section of 'Europasche Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft' Professor Hunke wrote:

"Europe is much more than a geographical term. Its foundation will reflect its political power, and the extent of awareness of its political existence. It has been said that 'the natural boundary of Europe coincides with a boundary of peoples, a boundary of a way of life, of civilisation . . . .In our own times the

\textsuperscript{22} International Currency Review, 23, Summer 1996 35-42. 35.

\textsuperscript{23} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{24} Ibid., 36.
Fuhrer himself has yet again pointed out that there is no geographical
definition of Europe, but only "one of peoples and culture." 25

Despite a variety of premonitions ranging over a thousand years the idea of an
institutionalised pan-European order, notwithstanding the essentially ecclesiastically
structured Holy Roman Empire, was not manifested until the crisis of the second great
war of this century.

25 Ibid., 38
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