Complex persons : a holistic solution to personal identity

The contemporary problem of personal identity can be traced to Locke's initial formulation of the problem, and to the difficulties inherent in his solution. Following Locke, the favoured view in contemporary literature is that the primary locus of personal identity is in a person's psychological states or mind, to the exclusion of other factors, such as a person's body, or a person's environment. This thesis critically challenges the view that psychological continuity alone grounds personal identity. In addressing the psychological continuity criterion, I argue that the most fully developed version of this criterion contains untenable presuppositions about the nature of psychological states. In particular, I argue that the thought experiments advanced in support of the psychological continuity criterion are not adequate to establish that psychological continuity alone grounds personal identity. I also challenge the internalist conception of mental states implicit in the psychological continuity criterion, and the commitment to an atomistic, owner-independent characterisation of mental states. I argue instead for a characterisation that is holistic and owner-dependent. I also defend the view that the body plays a positive role in personal identity, and that self-unity is a necessary condition for the possibility of experience. Throughout the thesis there is a strong commitment to the view that conceptual analysis alone is insufficient to solve the crucial issues involved in personal identity. There is, therefore, a significant utilisation of current empirical research and studies to support this commitment. Throughout the thesis also, attention is paid to the ethical implications of the psychological continuity criterion's conception of personhood, and to the practical consequences which are likely to be involved in this conception, were it to be adopted.