The metaphysics of causation : causation, conditionals and regularities.

In this thesis I am concerned not with immanent causation, but with transeunt causation. In the Introduction I show how the Conditional Analysis and the Regularity Account of causation can be used to defend Causal Anti-realism and to supplement the Manipulability Account. I also mention three theses about Metaphysics which my discussion of causation illustrates. In Chapter One, I discuss some preliminaries. In Section One, I consider the method to be used for testing the permissibility of accounts of causation. I provide a stricter and a less strict criterion: the Analysis-criterion and the Reduction-criterion. The former is used in Chapter Two, the latter is used in Chapter Three. In Section Two, I argue for a distinction between two kinds of transeunt causation : explanatory and producing causation. I concentrate on producing causation in this thesis. I also argue that the class of particulars which can be producing causes - I call this the class of quasi-events - is larger than the class of events. Quasi-events are defined in terms of the notion of a causal field, which I discuss and defend. In Section Three, I briefly expound the kinds of conditional required for the Conditional Analysis. Chapter Two has two parts. In Part One, I defend the Conditional Analysis of causation. I begin with Mackie's account in The Cement of the Universe and I successively modify this account to meet various objections. The objections considered include the problems raised by collateral effects, overdetermination and simultaneous causation. I also briefly consider Lewis' account of causation. In Part Two, I discuss what account might be given of the conditionals used in the Conditional Analysis. I conclude that these conditionals should be treated as meta-inference conditionals based on a special kind of non-deductive inference. Chapter Three also has two parts. In Fart One, I defend the possibility of a regularity account, provided it is to satisfy only the Reduction-criterion. In Part Two, I provide a regularity account based on Mackie's account of causal regularities in The Cement of the Universe. Objections similar to those of Chapter Two are discussed. Finally, in Chapter Four, I discuss backwards causation, which I ignore in Chapters Two and Three. I argue that a causal anti-realist can quite rationally hold the position that backwards causation is logically possible but metaphysically impossible. More precisely, there are no coherent examples, described in non-causal terms, which a causal anti-realist need interpret as cases of backwards causation.