SOME PROBLEMS IN THE ATHENIAN STRATEGIA
OF THE FIFTH CENTURY B.C.

by

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To the best of my knowledge and belief this thesis contains no material which has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma in any university, and contains no copy or paraphrase of material previously published or written by another person, except when due reference is made in the text of the thesis.
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iii.
Abbreviations

I include abbreviations of periodicals and standard reference works in addition to my own special abbreviations of works which have been frequently adverted to in the text and notes.

**Ant. Class.**

L'Antiquité classique.

**AJP**

American Journal of Philology.

**Ath Pol**

Aristotle, Athenaión Politeía.

**ATL**


**Badian**


**Beloch**

Beloch, J., Die Attische Politik seit Pericles, Leipzig, 1884.

**Bicknell**


**Bicknell, DR**


**BS**

Busolt, G., - Swoboda, H., Griechische Staatskunde, vols. i-ii (in Iwan Muller's Handbuch), Munich, 1920, 1926.

**BSA**

Annual of the British School at Athens.

**Burn**


**Busolt**


**CAH**


**CP**

Classical Philology

**CQ**

Classical Quarterly
<table>
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<th>CR</th>
<th>Classical Review.</th>
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<td>Hesp.</td>
<td>Hesperia.</td>
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<td>HSCP.</td>
<td>Harvard Studies in Classical Philology.</td>
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<tr>
<td>IG</td>
<td><em>Inscriptiones Graecae</em>, Berlin, 1873-</td>
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JHS *Journal of Hellenic Studies.*


PACA *Proceedings of the African Classical Associations.*

RE Pauly-Wisowa-Kroll, *Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft*, Stuttgart, 1894-

RFIC *Rivista di Filologia e di Istruzione classica.*


SEG *Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum.*


TAPA *Transactions of the American Philological Association.*


vi.
ABSTRACT

At the beginning of the fifth century the Athenian strategia constituted, together with the polemarch, the chief military executive institution of the newly established democracy. It soon outgrew its purely military function and became the single most important magistracy of the state at the heart of fifth-century Athenian politics and government. Possession of the strategia was the only way to political prominence and power, at least until the demagogues found an alternative path. All the most important and influential politicians of the fifth century from Themistocles to Alcibiades, including Aristeides, Cimon, Pericles, Nicias and Cleon, only became or remained the leaders of Athens as generals. It is not surprising therefore that the strategia has been the subject of close attention by modern scholars. Our knowledge of the character of the Athenian democracy is certainly not complete without an understanding of the workings of its major executive institution. However, modern scholarship has failed to resolve many of the problems concerned with the strategia and has produced a wealth of argument without any general measure of agreement, rather than any basic conclusions.

It is the purpose of this thesis to submit some of these problems to a reexamination. Many of them, admittedly, have come under the scrutiny of Charles W. Fornara, and his recent work ("The Athenian Board of Generals from 501 to 404", Historia, Einzelschriften, Heft 16, 1971) is the most valuable recent contribution to the subject. I agree with much of Fornara's analysis but concerning
many important considerations I am unable to accept his conclusions. In what follows I argue that the reform of 501/0 established the electoral procedure whereby the generals were elected by the whole Demos. At the beginning of the fifth century each general was elected from a different tribe, one general being chosen from each of Cleisthenes' ten tribes, but an electoral reform of about 480 or one or two years earlier removed the requirement providing for tribal representation. Henceforward the generals were elected εξ ἀναφοράς rather than εξ ἐκάστης φυλῆς ἕνα. The Athenians cannot be said to have departed from the practice of electing ten generals annually at the ἀρχαία εἰς ἑκάστην στρατεύσιμον but the removal of the tribal-representation restriction also removed the obstacle to an increase in the number of generals beyond ten. In some years of the fifth century there is a numerical increase in the strength of the board. The Athenians elected extra generals as circumstances dictated. Finally, the principle of collegiality was strictly maintained in practice throughout the fifth century except for one minor aberration in 407/06. A strict differentiation can be drawn between the political prestige and influence pertaining to an individual and the official authority which he possessed as a general.
PART I
CHAPTER 1

Ath Pol 22.2 and the Reform of 501/0.

The only conclusion that can be drawn with safety and without fear of challenge about Aristotle's statement is simply that one result of Cleisthenes' constitution was the creation of ten strategoi, one from each tribe. It is not possible to summarize further any widely accepted viewpoint as to what the reform was or what it was not. In short, no general agreement has been reached in answering questions which arise from this sentence. Was the strategia a continuation of a pre-Cleisthenic military institution which of necessity adjusted to Cleisthenes' tribal reorganization, or was it more than a simple mechanical adjustment and rather an innovation which broke sharply with the past? Secondly, what was the relationship between the strategoi and the polemarch and in which of the two elected positions did real authority reside? For example, was the polemarch effectively the commander-in-chief and the generals merely tribal commanders or were the strategoi the military executive of the state as well as tribal leaders, the polemarch retaining only some of his traditional powers rather than effective command? Thirdly, who elected the strategoi, the tribes voting individually or the ecclesia voting on all candidates, and what was the procedure whereby candidates were chosen and then elected to office?

Before an attempt is made to examine each of these questions
in turn, it is perhaps necessary to briefly consider the chronological difficulties in *Ath Pol* 22.2. In the sentence immediately before the one about the strategoi Aristotle says πρῶτον μὲν ὁμόν ἐτεί πέμπτῳ μετὰ ταύτην τὴν κατάστασιν ἡμικρέοντος ἁρκαντὸς τῇ βολῇ τοῖς πεντακοσίων τῶν ἀρχῶν ἐποίησαν δὲν ἐτεὶ καὶ νῦν ὀμφόσον.

If the dating point provided by κατάστασις is identified with Cleisthenes' legislative activity in the year of Isagoras' archonship, 508/7, then the archonship of Hermocreon belongs to 504/3. However, this conflicts with the assertion of Dionysius of Halicarnassus that Acestorides was archon in 504/3 and with Aristotle's succeeding chronological indication that ἐτεί δὲ μετὰ παύνα δωκεκάτῳ, that is, after they began to elect the strategoi, the battle of Marathon and the archonship of Phaenippus occurred. The battle of Marathon took place in the archon year of 490/89, and working back 12 years from this date, it is impossible to place the archonship of Hermocreon in 504/3. Accordingly, most scholars have dated the archonship of Hermocreon to 501/0, by either supposing that the ordinal is corrupt and emending πέμπτῳ to ὀλὼν, or by accepting some corruption in the text, namely that the κατάστασις refers to the ostracism law of 22.1, which may have been the last of Cleisthenes' reforms and dated as late as 505/4. If Summer's objection to the first possibility be accepted that changing πέμπτῳ to ὀλὼν is not at all an easy emendation, and in fact untenable, and if Hignett's objection to the second possibility be accepted that the author of the *Ath Pol* would have told us if the ostracism law was passed in 505/4 rather than in 508/7, then clearly the answer lies elsewhere.

Aristotle separates his mention of the inauguration of the
bouleutic oath in the archonship of Hermocreon, and the establishment of the strategia, by the word τρέχω. The problem is partially solved if Aristotle meant this word to cover an interval of those years between the new oath and the first election of the generals, thus dating the archonship of Hermocreon to 504/3 and the election of the strategoi to 501/0. At least the internal puzzles of the Ath Pol are thus straightened out, but the conflict with Dionysius remains. Fornara's solution, that Hermocreon may have been the archon of 506/5, 505/4 or 503/2 returns us to the former difficult situation by accepting an emendation of πιμυμή. At this stage, perhaps the safest and most honest viewpoint is one of neutrality. I believe with Badian that it is more realistic to remain undecided and to adopt a position which does the least violence to the Ath Pol. Acistorides and Hermocreon both have good claims to the archonship of 504/3, Aristotle's use of the word τρέχω, suggesting that the bouleutic oath was introduced before the generals were first elected and therefore tentatively in 504/3. The reform affecting the strategia can be more definitely assigned to 501/0.

Suffice it to say that if the chronological difficulties of Ath Pol 22.2 are solved without postulating some corruption in the text, the archonship of Hermocreon did not fall in the same year as the reform of the strategia, and this reform most probably occurred, as Aristotle informs us, in the twelfth year before Marathon, which is 501/0.

What was the extent and nature of the reform of 501/0? Wade-Gery has suggested that the reform "created" the strategoi and Fornara has argued that the strategia was a totally new magistracy.
which revolutionized the army. The question arising from this, of course, is what was the pre-Cleisthenic military organization of Athens? *Ath Pol* 4.2, the so-called constitution of Draco, suggests that the institution of the strategia existed in pre-Cleisthenic Athens and that generals were elected (προδύναμο) to office even at the time of Draco. Most scholars, however, regard this section of the *Ath Pol* as unhistorical, but as Hammond has noted, it is part of the *Ath Pol*. There are two other indications in the *Ath Pol* that the strategia was a pre-Cleisthenic institution. At 22.3...

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Apart from Aristotle, other sources provide several examples of pre-Cleisthenic strategoi. Herodotus mentions the strategia of Peisistratus against Megara, stating ἐν τῇ πρὸς Μεγαρέας ἕνωμεν στρατηγὸς, and Androtion mentions Peisistratus as strategos becoming tyrant. Plutarch notes that according to the Delphic record Alcmaeon was Ἀθηναίων στρατηγὸς in the Sacred War. Wilamowitz
has assumed from these examples that strategoi commanded the army of Athens in military operations before the time of Cleisthenes. It is the usual view that the pre-Cleisthenic army, subdivided into the four tribal groups, must have required its leadership to be divided in the same way, and that these leaders occupied an elective position. However, it is not the usual view that sixth-century strategoi (whether called strategoi or something else) were any more than tribal commanders. It is generally concluded from Herodotus 1.59.4 that Peisistratus was polemarch in the war against Megara. Herodotus certainly used the word to describe the commanders of a state's forces or of a coalition's forces. The meaning of the word ἐπαρχός in the Ath Pal is also that of an officer leading the army, as Hammond has pointed out. The problem is simply this. There is no evidence linking pre-Cleisthenic "strategoi" with the military organization of the pre-Cleisthenic tribes. Did Aristotle mean that Peisistratus as "strategos" was one of the duly elected generals described in Ath Pol 4.2, and if so, can he be considered as the commander of one of the four tribal contingents? Similarly, was Plutarch's Alcmaeon a tribal commander? These questions do not admit of certain answers.

It cannot be demonstrated beyond this that the strategia was a pre-Cleisthenic magistracy, or as Hammond asserts that before the beginning of the sixth century the responsibility for the safety of the state was in the hands of the polemarch and an unknown number of strategoi, the former being responsible for the defence of Attica, and the latter commanding forces sent on expeditions outside Attica. References to sixth-century strategoi in sources other than in the
Athen Pol may indeed be anachronisms, and it is not unlikely that Aristotle used these sources for his information about Peisistratus. It is hard to know what else Herodotus could have called Peisistratus, apart from *stratēgos*, unless he had known he was polemarch. He uses the normal Greek word for leader of an army, the word he consistently assigns to commanders of military forces. Furthermore, as Fornara notes, it is understandable that Alcmaeon and Peisistratus would have been referred to in conventional terms even if more precise information was available about their specific roles.

Accordingly, some scholars have resisted the temptation to use the scattered references to pre-Cleisthenic strategoi as evidence for the existence of a regular elected magistracy which was a forerunner to the fifth-century strategia. Hauvette has suggested that such strategoi were appointed only when there were special military needs, and they were therefore not regularly elected. However, returning to a point previously mentioned, it is generally agreed, and I believe rightly, that the pre-Cleisthenic military system must have been based on the Solonian tribes. Whether these tribal commanders were called strategoi or not is unknown. Schwahn thinks that "strategoi" replaced the *φυλαρχος* of the aristocratic state as commanders of the Solonian tribes. Herodotus, in speaking of Cleisthenes' tribal reform states: "δέκα τε ἐν δὲ φυλαρχοῖς εὕρη
tεσσαράων ἔπολεσε, δέκα αὐξ. καὶ τους δήμους κατέσχεμε ἐν τὰς φυλὰς." Myres has concluded from this that Herodotus was using *φυλαρχος* in a non-technical sense, and in fact meant the ten strategoi. If Myres is right then the pre-Cleisthenic tribes were commanded by "strategoi" and the reform of 501/0 did not create them as Wade-Gery
has postulated. I do not believe that we can categorically assert, as Hignett does, that the statement of Herodotus is false. It may very well be that the importance of the $\phi\upsilon\lambda\alpha\rho\chi\omicron\omicron\iota$ does not justify Herodotus' attention upon them here, if the meaning of the word is the same as at Ath Pol 61.5 where a $\phi\upsilon\lambda\alpha\rho\chi\omicron\omicron\iota$ is described as $\tau\omicron\nu \epsilon\iota\nu\varphi\omicron\omicron\mu\epsilon\omicron\omicron\nu \tau\omicron\nu \iota\pi\pi\epsilon\omicron\omicron\nu$. However, the chances are equally as good that Herodotus meant "tribal commanders" rather than "cavalry commanders". If so, here is evidence that the four Solonian tribes were commanded by $\phi\upsilon\lambda\alpha\rho\chi\omicron\omicron\iota$, and if not but perhaps less likely, the term may be a survival from the days when cavalry was the essence of the Athenian army. Herodotus may have used the word in the technical sense and indeed the passage is one in which we would expect him to do so. He may simply have used the old technical term on the understanding that everybody knew the Cleisthenic commanders were called $\sigma\tau\rho\alpha\tau\eta\gamma\omicron\omicron\iota$, or failed to mention that the old $\phi\upsilon\lambda\alpha\rho\chi\omicron\omicron\iota$ were now called $\sigma\tau\rho\alpha\tau\eta\gamma\omicron\omicron\iota$. I do not think such an argument to be any more or less plausible than the others here considered, except that Herodotus' statements should not be dismissed as lightly as in the instance cited. Suffice it to say that it is still a matter for conjecture whether Herodotus used the word $\phi\upsilon\lambda\alpha\rho\chi\omicron\omicron\iota$ in a technical or non-technical sense, as is the assertion that we should replace the word with another, preferably $\sigma\tau\rho\alpha\tau\eta\gamma\omicron\omicron\iota$.

If we may assume, purely on the basis that no importance was attached to $\phi\upsilon\lambda\alpha\rho\chi\omicron\omicron\iota$ in the fifth century which would warrant attention being paid to them by Herodotus, and irrespective of whether the term be considered non-technical or not, that the historian is describing the reform of 501/0, then here (5.69.2) is evidence of
pre-Cleisthenic military organization based on the old Solonian tribes, and the reform of 501/0 was in some sense a continuation of the past. In other words, whatever Herodotus meant by φυλήσις, we have at least some indication from the statement that these officers were increased from four to ten, that some mechanical adjustments were made in the military organization of the state to conform with Cleisthenes' new tribal system, and on the assumption that the reference is to the reform of 501/0, the ten tribal strategoi were at least cousins to the tribal leaders of the old Solonian state. It is not possible to accept Wade-Gery's solution that Cleisthenes created the strategoi any more than it is possible to accept Hammond's view that the strategoi existed as standing officers in pre-Cleisthenic Athens.

The question concerning the nature of the reform of Ἀθ. Πολ. 22.2 still remains. The view of Wilamowitz that the ten strategoi were first elected from their respective tribes in 501/0 has in its favour the fact that the natural meaning of Ἀθ. Πολ. 22.2 fits this interpretation exactly. Hammond and Badian appear to be in substantial agreement with Wilamowitz, both believing that it was only in 501/0 that the Cleisthenic tribes were first connected with the military system. Most modern scholars have ranged themselves in almost complete opposition to this viewpoint. The usual view is that the reorganization of the system of military command cannot have been deferred for a period of time as long as six years after Cleisthenes' tribal reform, and that the natural meaning of Ἀθ. Πολ. 22.2 cannot therefore be accepted. Essentially, proponents of this opinion consider it imperative that once the old tribal system was abolished...
the military organization superimposed on the old structure ceased to exist automatically. Accordingly, ten generals must have come into existence at the same time as the tribal reorganization because it is not plausible that the state either remained without tribal leaders between 507 to 501, or that the new tribal system persisted with the old military organization presumably based on the old tribal structure and the polemarch. Busolt's solution, formulated in recognition of the supposition that the military organization must have adjusted itself to the new tribal structure well before 501, is that *Ath Pol* 22.2 is speaking of an alteration in the method of election of the strategoi. His proposal, that between 507 to 501 each of the ten generals was chosen by the members of his own tribe and that in 501/0 this duty was removed from the individual tribes and became the province of the Demos as a whole, has become the ruling theory to explain the nature of the innovation of *Ath Pol* 22.2. 39

Busolt's hypothesis suffers from two severe limitations. Firstly, there is no evidence whatever to indicate that Cleisthenes' tribal reforms must have included the provision that ten tribal strategoi be instituted at the same time, that is in the year after 508/7 when the reforms became effective. If the *φυλακαρεω* of Herodotus are the strategoi of *Ath Pol* 22.2, then of course, Cleisthenes may have adjusted the military organization of Athens to conform with his tribal reforms as early as 508/7. The passage in Herodotus linking the creation of the new tribes and demes with the increase in number of the *φυλακαρεω* does suggest he thought the reforms occurred concurrently, but the inference is not inevitable. If Herodotus knew the reforms were separated by several years clearly
it was not important to him. It is not impossible that Cleisthenes was behind the reform of 501/0, and if correct it is reasonable enough that Herodotus should connect this with the tribal reform without making mention of the time gap. If he was not aware of the time gap it is not an unreasonable supposition that he linked the reforms together and attributed them all to Cleisthenes. Even if Herodotus meant strategoi, Busolt's solution is by no means conclusive. Furthermore, if ten strategoi were created by Cleisthenes in 508/7, the assumption that they were elected by the individual tribes until 501/0 is completely without support. It is indeed eminently reasonable to suppose, as has been previously noted, that the pre-Cleisthenic military organization of Athens was based on the four tribes and that the fifth-century strategia was derivative, to an extent unknown, from the previous military organization. The similarities however, remain unknown. Busolt's argument, which considers it reasonable to conclude that Cleisthenes must have instituted ten strategoi in 508/7, is surely based on the assumption that the pre-Cleisthenic military organization was similar to the fifth-century strategia to an extent which is unwarranted from the evidence available. This solution would be plausible only if it was fairly evident that four tribal strategoi were elected by their tribes in pre-Cleisthenic Athens.

Secondly, the author of the *Ath Pol* does not imply at 22.2 that he meant to indicate the reform consisted of a change in the body which elected the strategoi. I believe with Fornara that if the essence of the reform was a change in the method of electing the generals, Aristotle would have been more explicit. Hignett also
has doubts on the same grounds, inferring that he believes *Ath Pol* 22.2 to mean that there was a change in the body from which the strategoi were chosen. Hignett appears undecided about the reform because he makes no attempt to reconcile his doubts on Busolt's interpretation of *Ath Pol* 22.2 with his previous sentence that before 501/0 "each of the generals was perhaps chosen by the members of his own tribe".42 In short, Busolt's hypothesis is not easily compatible with the wording of *Ath Pol* 22.2, and whereas Hignett considers that Busolt's interpretation cannot be excluded on this ground alone, the combination of this limitation with the other outlined above perhaps constitutes a more serious obstacle to the theory.

Fornara has accepted the orthodox viewpoint that the military organization of Athens cannot have waited till 501/0 before it was brought into line with Cleisthenes' reforms, but in seeking to overcome the weaknesses in Busolt's theory he has postulated an alternative hypothesis to explain the meaning of *Ath Pol* 22.2, an interpretation which is immediately attractive because it is more compatible with the sentence of Aristotle. Fornara suggests that the emphatic word in the sentence may be ἀραβρόντο, that the real meaning of the reform is in the possible implication in the passage that before 501/0 the people did not in fact elect generals.43 Apart from the reasonable possibility that Aristotle may be implying the reform was of this nature, Fornara notes two other considerations in support of his interpretation. Firstly, the intent of *Ath Pol* 22 is to point to the progressive democratization of the state that followed after Cleisthenes' tribal reform and which culminated in the application of the law about ostracism to Hipparchus in 488/7;
the popular election of strategoi would be exactly the type of
democratic innovation Aristotle is talking about. 44

Secondly, the remark about the polemarch becomes highly
relevant, rather than somewhat superfluous, because an effect of the
reform was to diminish the power and authority of that office, although
not to the point of depriving the polemarch of hegemony. 45 The
emphasis of the reform on this interpretation was to democratize the
army by making the leadership of the tribes an elective office for the
first time, but not to break the polemarch, although this was an
inevitable aspect of it. Fornara suggests that the statement by
Herodotus about the increase in numbers of the φύλακτο
may be evi-
dence for the military organization between 507 and 501, but emphasis-
izes that this is not necessary to his hypothesis, 46 and that whatever
the military arrangement in those years, the reform of 501/0 was not
a mechanical adjustment but a radical innovation which brought the
army into line with the Cleisthenic πολιτεία in the broadest sense.
Fornara concludes that if ὑποκύπτω means that prior to 501/0 the
generals were not elected, it follows that Aristotle did not bother
to inform us of the nature of the electorate; in combination with
the considerations, firstly, that it would have been the purpose of
the reformers to strengthen the cohesiveness of the tribes, and
secondly, that the polemarch was still commander-in-chief, and the
strategoi just tribal leaders, it is thus likely that in 501/0 the
generals were elected by their respective tribes and not by the people
as a whole. 47

This interpretation certainly eliminates some of the weak-
nesses of Busolt's reconstruction. There are however some difficulties
with Fornara's hypothesis which should not be overlooked. Hammond's viewpoint, which is in fact in direct opposition to virtually all of Fornara's conclusions, may, it is proposed, serve as a vehicle to expose the limitations of the latter. Many of Hammond's opinions have already been noted, and many, on the basis of the arguments presented earlier in this chapter, have been considered unacceptable, including his conclusion that the strategia was a sixth-century institution similar to that of the fifth century. Be that as it may, Hammond categorically asserts that the innovation which *Ath Pol* 22.2 intends to convey does not lie in the use of election. He considers it absurd to suppose that military commanders had been appointed before 501 by any other method, and that the principle laid down by *Ath Pol* 43.1, that χειροτονοῦσα...τὸς πρὸς τὸν ἀδελφόν ἀγείρεται, is just as applicable to the sixth century as to the fifth century and fourth century. According to Hammond the possibility does not exist that the word ἄρπον is an indication that before 501/0 the generals were not elected. The complete opposition of Fornara's view that we are not entitled to make fifth-century practice an invariable basis for inference about procedures of the previous century, especially when we are dealing with an apparent innovation, Hammond's insistence that military commanders must have been elected in the pre-Cleisthenic state, is more indicative of our ignorance of the sixth-century military organization of Athens than anything else. On this point Hammond and Fornara nullify each other. The question of whether military commanders of the highest level, apart from the polemarch, were elected before 501/0, cannot be said to admit of any answer.
However, another statement by Hammond which does seem valid is his aggressive assertion that *Ath Pol* 22.2 does not allow the interpretation which Fornara postulates, that each individual tribe, rather than the Demos as a whole, was the body which elected the strategoi. Herein lies the main difficulty of Fornara's hypothesis. The natural meaning of Aristotle's phrase τοὺς στρατηγοὺς ἀρρόνυτο κατὰ φυλὰς, ἐξ ἐκάστης φυλῆς ἕνα is "they (the people) elected the generals on a tribal basis at one from each tribe". To be sure Aristotle does not explicitly name the subject of ἀρρόνυτο. This is in no way unusual. The rest of the *Ath Pol* is written in exactly this style. In all places where it can be reasonably implied that the noun ἡ ἐκκλήσια could have been used by the author, this does not occur. His normal mode of expression is the use of the third person plural, and more rarely the use of the nouns ἡ Ἀθηναίων and ὁ νόμος. Obviously he did not find it necessary to be more explicit. Everybody knew what he meant. The generalized style, typical of the whole treatise, does of course make it difficult to reach absolute conclusions, but surely it makes it all the more imperative to adhere to the natural meaning of the Greek. Bearing this in mind, if we look at the phrase in question within the context of the immediately preceding and immediately following sentences, the balance, I suggest, weighs in favour of the ecclesia (more specifically, "the people" or "the Athenians") as the subject of ἀρρόνυτο. *Ath Pol* 22.23 is as follows: πρῶτον μὲν ὅδε ἐτεί πέμπτῳ μετὰ ταύτην τὴν κωβύσταν ἐφ᾽ Ἐρμοκρέοις ἀρχοντὸς τῇ βούλῃ τοῖς πεντακόσιοι τῶν ὑποσκότων ἐποίησαν ὥς ἐτί κατὶ νῦν ἥμοισθεν. ἔπειτα τοῖς στρατηγοῖς ἀρρόνυτο κατὰ φυλαῖς, ἐξ ἐκάστης φυλῆς ἕνα.
There is no ambiguity as to the subject of the verbs ἐποίησαν and ἔχρισαντο. Aristotle is referring in very general terms to the ecclesia. The two relevant passages can be translated as follows: "First of all, in the fifth year after these enactments, in the archonship of Hermocreon they (the people) instituted the oath for the Council of 500 which they still swear at the present time".

"In the twelfth year after this, in the archonship of Phaenippus, they had won the battle at Marathon, and two years having passed after the victory, the people being now in high confidence, they (the people) used for the first time the law concerning ostracism". This does not definitely prove that the subject of ἐροῦντο is the same. However, the onus of proof rests with those scholars who believe otherwise. In other words, are we to consider that Aristotle would have used such a general statement if he thought each tribe individually elected its own strategoi? At Ath Pol 63.1 Aristotle states that the archons and the Clerk of the Thesmothetai were responsible for the appointment of jurors – Τὰ δὲ δικαστήρια νηπιοῦσιν ὀἱ θ' ἄρχοντες κατὰ φυλὰς, ὁ δὲ γραμματεὺς τῶν θεσμοθετῶν τῆς δεκάτης φυλῆς. May we not expect the same sort of precision at Ath Pol 22.2?

Aristotle could quite simply have written ἔπειτα τῶν στρατηγῶν ἔροῦντο αἱ φυλαὶ κατὰ φυλὰς ... If each tribe was the electing body, it would not only be careless for the author to use the third person plural, ἔροῦντο, between ἐποίησαν and ἔχρισαντο,
without noting the change of subject, but would also mean he abandoned, in this instance, the characteristic precision which is evident, for example, at 63.1. This, coupled with Herodotus 6.104.2, which names the general Miltiades as άδρεθείς ἀνα τοῦ δημοῦ in 490, is sufficient indication that the ecclesia, and not each tribe individually, was responsible for the election of generals.

If Aristotle merely wished to inform us that starting in 501/0 ten generals representing all tribes were elected by the ecclesia, the subsequent reference to the polemarch becomes even more relevant than under Fornara's reconstruction. Fornara is probably right that Aristotle mentioned the polemarch because he knew that an effect of the reform was to diminish the power and authority of that office, but if Aristotle is telling us that the generals were now elected for the first time but by their respective tribes, his reference to the polemarch is no more than a reflex, a statement of the obvious, for such a method of election implies that the strategoi were to be subordinate to the polemarch anyway, even if henceforth they assumed some control of decision-making at his expense. Therefore, apart from the fact that Fornara's interpretation of Ath Pol 22.2 has the weakness of not conforming with the natural and obvious meaning of the passage, as has been demonstrated, his attempt to argue that the phrase dealing with the polemarch becomes highly relevant within the framework of his hypothesis is also not without difficulties. On the other hand, if Hammond's interpretation of Ath Pol 22.2 be accepted, that ἔρηπεντιον is a reference to the electing body, the ecclesia, the purpose of the remark about the polemarch may indeed by exactly that which Fornara has suggested. This may be an explicit
reminder that the polemarch, one of the nine archons who were still
the chief executive officials of the state, did not lose hegemony
of Athenian forces as a consequence of the reform which entrusted
the election of generals to the whole citizen body. In other words,
may not the meaning of the whole passage be that even though the
strategoi were now elected by the ecclesia and therefore by implication
became important executive officials, the polemarch, who was also
directly elected by the ecclesia, still retained hegemony of the army?
Aristotle has just noted that the strategoi were elected by the
Demos. He has thought it necessary to explicitly clarify the position
of the polemarch at the time this reform took place. In short, such
a fundamental relevance cannot be associated with Aristotle's phrase
unless the natural meaning of Ath Pol 22.2 be accepted as the correct
interpretation.

Scholars who assume that the military organization of
Athens cannot have waited until 501/0 before it was brought into line
with Cleisthenes' new tribal system and who try to explain that the
real nature of the reform has been obscured by the wording of Ath Pol
22.2, are faced with the further difficulty of needing either to
explain the polemarch's position in the army and in relation to the
strategoi between 508 to 501, or to assume that Aristotle did not
intend the last section of the sentence to be any more than an after-
thought. However it is by no means inconceivable that there was an
interval of seven years before the strategoi were instituted. It
was not until 504/3 that Cleisthenes' boule was finally constituted.51
In addition, during the years immediately after 508/7 Athens was
involved in protecting herself from attacks on three sides. The
Peloponnesians penetrated as far into Attica as Eleusis in 506 and Chalcis was engaged in ravaging the northern areas of Attica at this time. After Chalcis was defeated the Athenians were faced with the threat posed by the fleet of Aegina when it plundered Phalerum and raided the Attic coast. The military necessities alone may have been sufficient to delay the institution of any proposed military reorganization.

But this is probably only part of the answer. In a general sense it is perhaps logical enough to believe that the total military reorganization only followed after the civil side of the system had been set up in working order, which only occurred, as has been indicated, about the time of the archonship of Hermocreon, in 504/3. Badian's suggestion may be correct that the precise method of election and the precise powers of the generals, and their relationship to the polemarch, were issues which did not necessarily admit to an immediate decision, and that the several years of delay were spent in debate. He is certainly right that the fear of tyranny would play a part in ensuring that a concentration of military powers in the hands of one official, such as the polemarch, did not eventuate. Such an interpretation is admirably compatible with the _Ath Pol._

On the basis of the considerations outlined above, and conforming with the natural meaning of _Ath Pol_ 22.2, it was not until 501/0 that the Athenians finally brought their military organization into line with Cleisthenes' tribal reforms. In the first place, and in a general sense, the popular election of the strategoi fits neatly the obvious intent of chapter 22 to illustrate the progressive democratization of the state after Cleisthenes' reforms. The army
has been democratized. The hegemony of the polemarch, however that worked in practice, with its implication of acknowledged superiority, subordinated the military to the civil power. But a limitation on the authority of the polemarch was imposed by the institution of a board of democratically elected tribal generals. One effect of the reform was to make the polemarch dispensable. But no one man controlled the army and the chance that a military leader could now establish a tyranny was virtually eliminated. Secondly, it is not known what the pre-Cleisthenic military organization of Athens was, whether strategoi existed or not. If the organization was based on the old Solonian tribes, as appears likely from Herodotus 6.104.2, we do not know what relationship such tribal commanders had with the polemarch, or how they were elected if indeed they were elected at all. The dangers of making assumptions about both the pre-Cleisthenic system and the situation between 508 and 501, it is hoped, have been made patently obvious. The only sensible procedure, I believe, is to adhere as closely as possible to both the chronology and actual meaning of the Ath Pol. In 501/0 the ecclesia elected ten generals, one from each tribe, and the emphasis of the wording does not allow the assumption that ten strategoi existed before this date and were now elected for the first time or that the reform was in fact a modification of an election procedure which had been instituted when Cleisthenes' tribal system took effect. The nature of the case allows no conclusions to be drawn about the military organization prior to 501/0. The only thing that Ath Pol 22.2 may indicate about the years 508 to 501 is that the Athenians were debating the method of election and powers of these tribal leaders in relation to the
civil executive, or that the military situation allowed no time for a change,\textsuperscript{52a} or that an alteration of the old organization did not even occur to Cleisthenes or the Athenians until after the establishment of the boule set up the civil side of the system.\textsuperscript{53} If the delay was the result of negotiations to democratize the army deliberately and minimize the possibilities of the re-establishment of the tyranny, the chances are that elements in the old system which permitted a military leader to use his position as a stepping stone for control of the state were removed, and the reform of 501/0 was in fact a substantial innovation. But we do not have the evidence to know whether the innovation also consisted of having tribal commanders elected by the ecclesia for the first time, although the remark about the polemarch may be an indication of this. Simply, 501/0 was the first time that TEN tribal commanders were elected by the whole Demos.
A great deal of attention has been paid to the relationship between the strategoi and the polemarch in the early years of the fifth century. Virtually the only evidence available is the phrase in *Ath Pol* 22.2 ἂς δὲ ἀπάσης στρατιάς ἡκμῶν ἄν ὁ πολεμαρχὸς, and Herodotus' account of the Athenian command at Marathon.

What is the precise meaning of ἡκμῶν as used by Aristotle? There are not enough instances of this word in the *Ath Pol* to be sure. Hammond has argued that the ἡκμονία of the polemarch meant only honorary and nominal leadership of the army. The polemarch marched at the head of the armed forces on ceremonial occasions and on military occasions where they left the city, and he occupied the right-hand position when the army was in line. ἡκμονία simply means that the polemarch retained some residual powers or privileges of his traditional office, functions which had originally been the prerogative of the king at Athens. Thus, at *Ath Pol* 20.4, Κλεισθένης ἡκμῶν ἄν καὶ τοῦ δήμου προστάτης, ἡκμῶν only expresses the position of a leader in the state who leads the way and not as one who exercises command. Similarly, the related word ἡκείτι means "he leads the way", as at *Ath Pol* 61.1, ... ὁς ἡκείτι τῶν ὀπλίτων ἄν ἐξήλθα, which translates as "... who leads the hoplites when they go out".
However, it is questionable whether Hammond is justified in using *Ath Pol* 20.4 to support his interpretation of 22.2. Certainly, ξεμων at 20.4 is used in the general sense as "leader" rather than in the more specific sense as "one who exercises command". This is no indication that the general meaning applies to 22.2. We are not here dealing with a word which has only one exact meaning. The context within which the word is used surely must be our first criterion for judging what is meant. It has already been emphasized that one of the glaring weaknesses of some attempts to explain the nature of the reform at 22.2 has involved making the remark about the polemarch somewhat superfluous. If ξεμων is only a reference to nominal rather than real leadership, Aristotle's comment indicates the opposite to what the word, in the whole context of the sentence, suggests, that the remark was intended to be highly relevant. Why, if Aristotle meant to say that the strategoi were now the real commanders of the army and the polemarch only the titular head, did he use the word ξεμων, unless he was being deliberately vague? Why did he not state explicitly that the polemarch was not still in overall command of the army?

But there is no reason to think that Aristotle was being vague. It would be difficult to find a more succinct statement and indeed hard to know what other word he could have used. Furthermore, it is clear from Herodotus and Thucydides that ξεμων is used interchangeably with στρατηγος and αρχων in reference to a military commander. For example, at Herodotus 7.62.2 Ἄρκανιοι δὲ κατὰ πέρ Πέρσαι ἐφεύραξατο, ξέμωνα παρεκμενοι Μεσάπανον ... Herodotus names the commander of the Hyrcanians as ξεμων after listing the
commanders of the other contingents in Xerxes' army as ἀρχοντες.

At Herodotus 7.158.5, ἤτιδε λόγῳ

tούτῳ τάδε ὑπάχομαι, ἐπ' ὑ τε στρατηγὸς τε καὶ

ἡγεμὼν τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἔσομαι πρὸς τὸν βάρβαρον

the historian informs us that Gelo of Syracuse offered aid to the Greeks against Xerxes on the condition that he be appointed overall commander of the combined forces. At Thucydides 3.105.3 πέμπουσι δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ Δημοσθένη τὸν ἐφ' Ἡττολίαν Ἀθηναίων στρατηγήσαντα,

ὅπως σφίσιν ἡγεμῶν ἡγησθαι. Demosthenes is made ἡσεμὼν by the Acarnanians. This does not mean that the Acarnanian strategoi relinquished all command of their forces. Demosthenes and the Acarnanian commanders are frequently mentioned together. But are we to believe with Hammond that ἡσεμὼν means Demosthenes held merely a position of prestige which included the leading place on the march and the right-hand place in the line of battle? Thucydides is more explicit.

At 3.107.2 he states καὶ ἡγεμόνα τοῦ παντὸς Ἑλληνικοῦ αἱρέσαται

Δημοσθένη μετὰ τῶν σφετέρων στρατηγῶν. It is clear from the succeeding narrative that τῶν σφετέρων στρατηγῶν are the Acarnanian generals and do not include the Amphilochians and the Argives. It is with Δημοσθένει καὶ τοῖς Ἀκαρνάνων στρατηγοῖς that the Peloponnesians propose a truce. The phrase Δημοσθένης μετὰ τῶν εὐστρατηγῶν Ἀκαρνάνων is an indication that Demosthenes was ἡσεμὼν by virtue of being on the Acarnanian board of generals. Thucydides 3.107.2 is surely not an indication that the Acarnanian generals were στρατηγοί and not ἡσεμώνες, as Hammond believes. The natural meaning of the passage is "they chose Demosthenes leader of the whole allied force with their own generals."
Thucydides' use of the word ἐξεμικράνυμ at 3.105.3 with reference to the Acarian request to Demosthenes may simply mean that they wished the Athenian to have an active role in the command structure of their army. The fact that the Acarians entrusted Demosthenes with the duty and honour of leading out the army, of making arrangements on how it was to march and of commanding the right wing in battle, is not necessarily an indication that he was officially commander-in-chief. He was, after all, the military representative of Imperial Athens, and this alone may have been sufficient reason to ensure he occupy the position of prestige, ceremonially at least. However there is another consideration which perhaps should not be overlooked and which may give a more precise indication of the meaning of ἐξεμικράνυμ in Thucydides 3.105.3. By 426 the Acarians had probably come to rely heavily on Athenian military expertise and to expect from Athenian strategoi a high degree of competence. Several years previously they had requested that a relative of Phormio be sent as an official representative and partner in command. The successes of Phormio and the respect engendered among the Acarians signalled the beginning of a unique relationship between individual Athenian strategoi and Acarnania, a relationship which was not upset when Phormio disappeared from the scene, a relationship which in practice enabled Athenian generals to have a greater influence on the military policy and a stronger control over the forces of an independent ally, than we should reasonably expect. Thucydides' whole narrative makes it very clear anyway that Demosthenes did occupy a position of real command. But whereas Thucydides 3.107.2 is an indication that theoretically Demosthenes shared the command
with his Acarnanian counterparts, it should be noted that there are instances when he appears to have had, in practice, the chief role in decision-making. To cite but one, when the word was brought to Demosthenes and the Acarnanians that the Ambraciots were marching to Olpae, it was Demosthenes alone who made the decision to send a force to occupy strategic positions and to follow with the rest of the army. I don't think it possible to be more precise than this because Thucydides' phraseology at several points through the narrative contradicts the notion that Demosthenes was officially commander-in-chief. To summarize, the Acarnanians asked Demosthenes to be their leader, and they elected him to their board of generals and gave him joint command of their forces with their own generals, theoretically. But in practice he was deferred to not only in being allocated the duty and honour of leading out the army and commanding the right wing, but also in having the major role in decision-making.

Hammond's belief that only allows ceremonial leadership will not do. This was certainly part of the Acarnanian offer, for Demosthenes did fulfil such a function, but it is more than doubtful that the word can just be removed from the context in which it is used and be seen purely and simply as the embodiment of that function. There is every reason to believe, as has been shown, that Thucydides means Demosthenes was offered a military command in a very real sense. The only difficulty, or so it seems to me, is in evaluating whether means "commander-in-chief" in this context, or something less. If the interpretation offered above of the relationship between Acarnania and individual Athenian strategoi is correct, Demosthenes' position of prestige when on the march and in battle
line is a reflection of that relationship, an extension of privilege to the man possessing the greatest real authority in a collegiate command.

To give a second example, at Thucydides 2.87.9, when οἱ τῶν Πελοποννησίων στρατηγοὶ addressed their men before a sea battle with Phormio they promised to prepare for it no worse "than the previous commanders"—τῶν δὲ πρῶτον ἡγεμόνων. When the word ἡγεμόν is used of the military in our sources it invariably means "one who exercises command". Manifestly, Aristotle's use of this word at Ath Pol 22.2 has the same meaning. The problem of defining the actual powers of the ἡγεμόν is no less present in Aristotle's terse phrase than in Thucydides 3.105.3. This is not to say that Demosthenes' position in relation to the Acamaniad strategoi is parallel to that of the polemarch in relation to the Athenian generals, but simply that Ath Pol 22.2 gives no indication of how the Athenian command structure operated in practice.

Herodotus' description of the events at Marathon is the only other evidence available for the relationship between the polemarch and the strategoi during the early fifth century. According to Herodotus the Athenians were commanded by ten generals—ὥν δὲ σφεας στρατηγὸς δέκα, τῶν δὲ δέκατος ἦν Μιλτιάδης. When the strategoi became deadlocked on the issue of whether to fight or not, Miltiades went to the polemarch, Callimachus, for there was ἐνδικατος ψυφωδόφορος ὁ τῇ κτάμφω λαχὼν Ἀττιαῖοι

πολεμαρχεῖν (τῷ πολιῶν γὰρ Ἀθηναῖοι ὁμόφημον τῶν πολέμαρχον ἐποίειτο τοὺς στρατηγοὺς). Miltiades persuaded Callimachus to vote for an engagement. μετὰ δὲ οἱ στρατηγοὶ τῶν ἓ γενόμη ἐφερε συμβάλλειν, ὡς ἐκάστου αὐτῶν ἐγίνετο
The conventional view of Herodotus' account is that Miltiades is portrayed in the text as superior to his colleagues, the other nine strategoi, and that the generals themselves occupied a more important position than the polemarch. Most recent scholars have discounted both the primacy of Miltiades and the inferiority of Callimachus, believing from *Ath Pol* 22.2 that the polemarch was commander-in-chief, and inferring that Herodotus inaccurately transferred to the time of Marathon the system of command as it functioned in his own day. Some have been content to foist upon Herodotus their own conceptions of the mid-fifth-century strategia and have been all too ready to reject parts of his information without making a real attempt to understand him. The only worthwhile method of approach is to trust the main facts of Herodotus unless there is good evidence for not doing so, and these facts can be adduced by carefully evaluating the narrative. Even if he was thoroughly confused this will become apparent once we have looked closely at what he actually says.

Fornara has convincingly demonstrated that the arguments which have been put forward to indicate that Herodotus thought Miltiades was superior to his colleagues or held supreme command are
largely based on the conclusion that certain technical expressions were used by Herodotus to convey the legal pre-eminence of Miltiades.

Thus, the reference to Miltiades as ὁ δ' ἔκατος at 6.103.1 suggests ὁ δ' ἔκατος ὁδύτης to How, implying superiority. However, all that Herodotus says is that "Miltiades was one of the ten (generals)".

Similarly, the sentence, οὗτος ὁ ἄν τότε ὁ Ἔλληνες ἔπεφεξα, is thought to be an indication of the legal supremacy of Miltiades. It was Miltiades alone, and not the board of generals, who was in command of the Athenians. However, the point is that Herodotus is in the middle of relating the history of Miltiades and his father Cimon. He is merely emphasizing that the man who was named Miltiades after the founder of the settlement in the Chersonese was the man (ὁ δ' ἔκατος ὁ ἄν τότε ὁ Ἀθηναῖος), who was one of the generals of the Athenians (ὁ ἑσπαργυρεύς Ἀθηναίων). Herodotus is even more specific at 6.104.2. Miltiades was elected a general after he had been tried and acquitted for establishing a tyranny in the Chersonese. We have a description of a reversal in the fortunes of Miltiades. He narrowly escaped a διπλανὸν τὸν κόσμον, and after the second escape "he was thus chosen as a general of the Athenians" - ἐσπαργυρεύς ὁδύτης Ἀθηναίων ἀπεδέχθη. This is not a description of the constitutional refinements of his position, a statement of his legal pre-eminence. It is not in any way a comparison with the other strategoi.

Herodotus' whole narrative implies the pre-eminence of Miltiades, that his strategia was more important than that of the other generals, but it cannot be inferred from the text that the reasons for his pre-eminence were constitutional. In fact, if
anything, Herodotus stresses the collegiality of the strategoi. When they became deadlocked over the issue of whether to fight or not, Miltiades was not able to break the indecision by overruling the generals opposed to action. The :c.inuse., 'Aelvcjov -Tra -rvi gad' .61 /t/f.; VTD ():Ct. C&L WC3 it,t(1.1 , probably means that there was an even split of opinion, five generals voting for battle and five opposing. Herodotus does not allow Miltiades any predominant role in the debate which produced the deadlock, merely noting that he was one of the group in favour of battle - τιν θε θε άν θε ω κέλευοντ.26

It has been concluded from Herodotus' assertion that each general held the πρωτανηγ' for one day, that its holder was in supreme command of the army, and when ευαντος αυτων εκυπτεινο πρωτανηγ' προ τημερης, Miltiades περεδεσειν,27 that Miltiades was effectively supreme commander, even on the days when he did not have the πρωτανηγ'.28 Such an interpretation is supported by the succeeding narrative. Miltiades refused to fight until the day of his own πρωτανηγ', implying that he made the decision as to when battle should be joined. Hignett believes that this section in Herodotus is traceable to a Philaid source, anxious to emphasize the constitutional propriety of Miltiades' behaviour and to vindicate for him the chief credit of the victory.29 The statement that each general held the πρωτανηγ' in turn is but a further indication of collegiality. The other strategoi voluntarily deferred to Miltiades. However, is Herodotus confused at this point? Are we to understand that the πρωτανηγ' came into force only after the decision had been made to fight the Persians? If the word means supreme commander
it would seem rather pointless for the strategoi to vote on policy unless the command began to rotate only when it was resolved to offer battle. Otherwise, Miltiades need only wait until his day of the command, or persuade the commander of the day to fight, the other generals having no power to obstruct a colleague when he was the προύτανις. I do not think it helps at all to suppose that we here have a retrojection of a practice which developed later than 490, that Herodotus transferred to Marathon the conditions of his own time. It is just as likely that rotation of the προύτανις did occur in 490 and that Miltiades held this position on the day of the battle. On the other hand there is no reason to believe that the account of the division of opinion among the generals and the role of the polemarch in breaking the deadlock is unhistorical. We must attempt to explain the apparent contradictions.

The answer may be that Herodotus did rely on the information that contemporary members of the Philaid family gave him. It must be remembered that by the time he was writing some years had elapsed since Marathon, the institution of the strategia had much matured and the polemarch was no longer an active official with any powers in the military. More specifically, Philaid attempts to preserve Miltiades' claims of credit for the victory involved a distortion and an exaggeration of his role as the προύτανις, which, naturally enough, Herodotus was not able to reconcile, at least to our satisfaction, with other information he had about the command structure. Bicknell has ably demonstrated the extent to which Herodotus may have been influenced by propagandist information of a pro-Miltiades character. 31 Briefly, Bicknell suggests that a picture in the
Peisianacteion (later the Stoa Poecile), a building completed probably not long before 462/1 and intended as an advertisement for Cimon, strongly influenced the account of Herodotus. The representation not only gives Miltiades the position of command, but has much else in common with the description of Herodotus; — the arrival of the Plataeans, the death of Callimachus at the ships, the hacking off of the hand of Cynegiros, the blinding of Epizeleos and the absence of Persian cavalry. 32

If Bicknell is right about the influence of evidence such as the picture in the Peisianacteion on Herodotus, this consideration, in combination with the incompatibility of two sections of Herodotus' account, one which appears to suggest a rotating supreme command, \( \psi \; \nu \tau \alpha \nu \eta \), and the other, the vote by the strategoi to determine policy, which suggests strict collegiality, provide some grounds for believing that \( \psi \; \nu \tau \alpha \nu \eta \) was in fact something less than supreme command. When the Athenians were drawn up for battle, Callimachus the polemarch led the right wing, in accordance with the law at that time, and the tribal contingents were placed to his left, one after the other, in an unbroken line, with the Plataeans stationed on the far left. 33 Some scholars have believed, following Plutarch, that the tribe of Callimachus, Aiantis, occupied the right wing. 34 Plutarch's inference is probably incorrect. Herodotus did not conceive of the polemarch as leader of his tribe, as is clear from 6.111.1, where we would expect to read \( \alpha \; \kappa \lambda \nu \lambda \alpha \; \phi \omega \lambda \alpha \) if such was the case. 34a The leadership of Aiantis would have been exercised by its own strategos, wherever it was placed in the line. 35 However, one tribe had to be given the post of honour on the right, where
the polemarch was stationed. This may be the essence of the meaning of the πολέμαρχος, as it originally operated. The προτατος may have been the strategos who led the army into battle from the right wing, and at Marathon this man was Miltiades. By the time Herodotus wrote, the real meaning had become lost and his account simply reflected the distortions. We do not need to deny that Miltiades was recognized by his colleagues as the most capable and experienced commander present, that he surpassed the others in prestige, and that they all gave him their own position on the right wing on their day of the προτατος.

In conclusion, firstly, Herodotus, in his word usage, cannot be said to have attributed to Miltiades superior technical authority over his colleagues. Popular tradition made Miltiades the hero of Marathon, and rightly, as Burn notes, if his was the master plan. But the description of the debate between the strategoi, the clause ἡ δὲ σφαῖρα στρατηγῶν δὲκα, and the clear indication that the προτατος was rotated among the generals daily, all suggest that Herodotus envisaged a collegiate command at Marathon. Secondly, the interpretation here offered of the προτατος straightens out some inconsistencies otherwise apparent in the narrative. It conforms very neatly with the system of command which Herodotus describes, the working of the principle of collegiality, and it suggests some answers to problems for which the historian gives no clues. Equality is more fully preserved if προτατος did not mean operational command in the hands of one general. We therefore need not assume the Athenians adopted a rather inefficient system whereby each strategos had supreme authority a day at a time. Furthermore,
the willingness of nine generals to hand over their πρωτανις to Miltiades is much more suitably explained as a means they utilized to effectively strengthen the vital right wing and hence enhance their prospects for a victory - Miltiades being recognized as the most experienced and capable military commander present - rather than as a virtual surrender to him of the powers and prerogatives vested in the strategia. Presumably the tribal contingent of the πρωτανις fought on the right wing and the rotation of the πρωτανις served the additional purpose of deciding that in an army composed of ten equally competent divisions, the regiment which occupied the right on the day battle was joined, did so only by chance. A further advantage of this interpretation is that the question of whether the polemarch was in command of a detachment of troops, such as his own tribe, whether his tribal affiliation meant the presence of that tribe on the right wing, is satisfactorily resolved. The strategoi were in command of their own tribal contingents and the polemarch was stationed with the regiment whose general was πρωτανις for the day. At Marathon any tribal jealousies arising from the decision to keep Miltiades' tribal contingent on the right would have been outweighed by the practical consideration of permanently stationing the most experienced tribal commander at the dangerous and crucial point in the line.

Scholars who insist that the πρωτανις was not of this nature are confronted with difficulties in explaining the arrangement of the Athenian army at Marathon. Burn states that Callimachus led the right wing with his tribal regiment, Aiantis, and yet he implies that he believes the tribal contingents were commanded by strategoi,
for he notes that Themistocles and Aristeides, as generals of their tribes, Leontis and Antiochis, may have commanded the centre of the line, if Plutarch can be trusted. Presumably Burn has noticed no contradiction for he does not say what happened to the general of Aiantis. Perhaps his belief that Herodotus' story of the rotating πρωταυμη is both fatuous and anachronistic and must be completely dismissed on the grounds that the polemarch was the permanent president of the war-council, has forced him to conclude that the general of the polemarch's tribe was deprived of actual command. But he does not say so. Hammond does not dismiss the story in Herodotus, but like Burn is convinced that πρωταυμη can only mean "presidency" in the sense of "commander-in-chief". This does not however belong to the polemarch but to each general in turn.

To Hammond, Miltiades was commander-in-chief at Marathon. Because the generals decide strategy and tactics and have operational command of the whole force they are envisaged as army, rather than contingent, commanders. Hammond supposes that the tribal regiments were commanded by taxiarchs both in and out of battle. Presumably this explains why he fails to suggest where Miltiades fought in the line, whether on the right wing where the polemarch was stationed and which was the normal position for a commander-in-chief, or at some other point where he could have effective control over the marching line of the army. It is in fact difficult to know where else the strategoi could have been than with their respective tribes, and if this was the case there was no need for subordinate officers such as taxiarchs to act as tribal leaders. It is virtually inconceivable that the generals did not occupy command positions at
different points of the line, and hard to see why the natural division of the army into ten tribal groups should be abandoned at the highest level of command. Furthermore, there is no evidence for the existence of taxiarchs as early as 490, and *Ath Pol* 22.2 is surely sufficient indication that the strategoi were tribal commanders at this time. Hammond also follows Plutarch in assigning the polemarch's tribe to the right wing, not because the polemarch was there but because Marathon was a deme of Aiantis. There is a possibility that the Athenians may have arranged their army in this way when fighting in Attica but the evidence needs to be more substantial to conclude that it is any more than just a possibility. It was left for others after Herodotus to infer this position for the tribe Aiantis, as Fornara has noted, and although Hammond does not consider that Callimachus commanded his tribal contingent, it seems more likely that later tradition secured the right wing position for Aiantis from Callimachus' tribal affiliation than from the fact that Marathon was a deme of Aiantis.

The question of the role of the polemarch in the command structure, of his relationship with the strategoi, still remains. Hammond postulated that Callimachus had no operational command and was simply the right-hand man in the line. One of the arguments he uses in support of this hypothesis, his interpretation of the word *ήνευμον* as used of military command in our sources, and specifically of the polemarch in *Ath Pol* 22.2, has already been discussed in detail earlier in this chapter, and it is thought, been demonstrated to be questionable. However, Hammond's conclusion that the polemarch lost all power of command and deliberation to the strategoi
in 501/0 is also based on the considerations that he may have ceased to be directly elected, and that he no longer had an equal vote with the strategoi, by the time of the battle of Marathon. Hammond suggests that Herodotus' description of Callimachus as ὃς κυράμων λαχών Ἀθηναῖων πελεμαρχεῖν may be correct. The orthodox viewpoint, on the basis of Ath Pol 22.5, is that sortition was not introduced for the election of archons until 487/6, but Hammond states that Aristotle was advancing a controversial view since Herodotus laid such emphasis on τῶς κυράμους. It is surely simpler and more convincing, as Bicknell notes, to suppose that Aristotle had foolproof grounds for dating the election of archons by sortition from the year of Telesinus. Aristotle corrected the error in Herodotus. The only worthwhile conclusion is that Herodotus was unaware of the reform of 487/6 and that his phrase is an anachronism of the situation existing after the archonship of Telesinus. The fact is that Herodotus was not interested in constitutional matters, unlike the author of the Ath Pol. The choice between the two sources is obvious. Herodotus mistakenly assumed that the polemarch was appointed by lot in 490.

Hammond's other argument, that at Marathon the polemarch no longer had an equal vote with the strategoi on policy, that he had already lost his deliberative powers to the generals, is based on his interpretation of τὸ παλαιῶν in the phrase τὸ παλαιῶν ἀνά "Ἀθηναίων ἐστίν ἀνάφθον τὸν πολεμαρχὲς ἑποίητο τοῖς στρατηγοῖς at Herodotus 6.109.2; ὅς ἐκ δὴ ἤξε ὑπὸ τὸ ἐγκαίνητο καὶ ἐνίκα ἣ ἕξω ἄνδρῶν τῶν νυμέων ἐνθίπτω, ἦν ὡς ἐνέκατος ψυχιδοσφόρος ὁ τῷ κυράμῳ λαχὼν Ἀθηναῖων πολεμαρχεῖν (τὸ παλαιῶν ἀνὰ Ἀθηναίων
He suggests that τὸ παλαιόν refers to the period before (but not in) 490. He comes to this conclusion from his "acquaintance with the style of Herodotus"; τὸ παλαιόν is written in relation to the word τοῦτο in Herodotus' next phrase, and means "in earlier times than then". According to Hammond, Miltiades went to the polemarch, Callimachus, because the polemarch was the eleventh voter because in earlier times (before 490) the Athenians continually made him equal in vote to the generals. The word ὅμοψις does not have the same meaning as ἐνδικτός ψηφιδοφόρος on this view, and Hammond considers it logical and reasonable to believe that the ὅμοψις the polemarch once was is an explanation of his being ἐνδικτός ψηφιδοφόρος at Marathon, in the sense of having a "casting vote" only.

This interpretation of Herodotus 6.109.2 is not without its difficulties and indeed has attracted a deal of criticism. In the first place, as Hammond himself admits, Herodotus' use of the words τὸ παλαιόν at 3.58.2, which is a good parallel to 6.109.2, clearly refers to the time of the action itself. Secondly, within the context of the whole passage, the phrase under discussion makes perfect sense if τὸ παλαιόν has the same meaning as at 3.58.2, and does in fact include 490. To repeat Badian's discussion of the matter, the natural and obvious meaning of the phrase, as an explanation of why there was an eleventh vote, is fairly conclusively proved right by the presence of the word ὡς. Quite simply, Herodotus is saying there was an eleventh vote "for the Athenians formerly made the polemarch equal in vote with the generals." We need not assume
with Hammond that ἐνδέκατος θησιδοφόρος means a casting vote exercised by the polemarch only in the event of the council of ten generals reaching a stalemate. Callimachus certainly used his vote as a casting vote but because there were eleven ὑμόφησι. It is indeed very difficult to understand how the ὑμόφησι the polemarch once exercised, some time before 490, can logically explain why he was entitled to be ἐνδέκατος θησιδοφόρος in 490. Furthermore, Herodotus' account does not allow the inference that the polemarch did not have a place in the council of generals from the beginning. To be sure, Callimachus did not vote until Miltiades had persuaded him to decide in favour of battle, but this is not to say that the polemarch sat alone in his tent while the strategoi debated without him. Nor does it mean that two meetings were necessary before a decision was reached, the first resulting in a deadlock, with the polemarch either absent or abstaining, and the second occurring after Miltiades had spoken to him. It is possible, of course, that the meeting was adjourned and that Miltiades used this opportunity to talk alone with Callimachus. From Herodotus' account, the inference is equally as plausible, if not more so, that the polemarch was undecided about which course of action to support. As Badian notes, Callimachus, in his role as hegemon, may have presided over the meeting and as a cautious chairman may have been reluctant to swing such an important issue with his own vote. All that Herodotus says is ὡς δὲ δίκα τε ἐξίνοντο καὶ ἐνίκα ἡ κείρων τῶν ἐνμισέων...πρὸς τούτων (Callimachus) ἔλθων Μιλτιάδης ἔλεε τὰξ. There is nothing here, or in Miltiades' speech, which forces the conclusion that Miltiades had to leave the meeting to make his appeal. The word ἔλθων is quite
compatible with the view that at this critical point in the debate, the chief advocate for what Herodotus states is the losing argument, perhaps left his position to approach the polemarch directly, who as yet had not been an active participant. For all we know, Herodotus may have imagined the generals conferring on their feet, as Burn notes. 61

To summarize Herodotus, at Marathon the polemarch had an equal vote with the generals on policy (εὐμέτρητος), and when the strategoi became deadlocked he was persuaded by Miltiades to vote (ἐνδεκατος ψηφιδοφόρος) in favour of an engagement. Herodotus has given neither Miltiades nor Callimachus any special authority. The polemarch's vote was decisive only because a deadlock existed, not because the ultimate and final decision belonged exclusively to him. To put it differently, Herodotus has made the polemarch into an eleventh strategos, coequal in authority with the others, 62 and yet at the same time his account has emphasized the importance of the role the polemarch played. Fornara has argued that because the polemarch was a relic at the time Herodotus was writing, and because any information of a technical, constitutional kind which defined the relationship between the strategoi and the polemarch in 490 was only incidentally preserved, the historian was confused when confronted with the task of reconciling the tradition which attested to Callimachus' importance and that which accredited the victory to Miltiades. 63 Herodotus has attempted to give Callimachus partial responsibility for the victory but he knew of no other role to assign him than that of eleventh strategos. What is significant is that Herodotus attests the importance of the polemarch at Marathon, although the office
was merely a fossil when the historian was writing and although there may be some confusion in the account of the command structure as a result. It is difficult to determine the extent to which Herodotus' inability to envisage military command, except as emanating from the strategoi, has prevented him from achieving an accurate portrayal of the polemarch's actual powers and position in the command structure.

The orthodox viewpoint is that he has stressed sufficiently the importance of Callimachus for the conclusion to be drawn that the polemarch was superior to the strategoi in authority, that he was in fact commander-in-chief. For example, the mere fact that Herodotus placed Callimachus on the right wing of the line permits the inference that the polemarch held supreme command. The only explanation Herodotus can offer – δ ἦτα νόμος τοῦ Ἐθέρειου ὑπὸ τοῦ" Ἀθηναίου οὗ 66 – indicates that he did not know why Callimachus was there. He attached no military relevance to the polemarch's position. In other words, the orthodox interpretation holds that Herodotus envisaged a system of command in which a commander-in-chief played no part. He was confused by his sources and completely distorted the position of the polemarch. This interpretation of Herodotus' account is strengthened by IG i2 609 and the fact that Callimachus as the Athenian spokesman made the Marathon vow to Artemis. However, neither of these pieces of evidence, nor the fact that Callimachus held the position of honour, conclusively proves that the polemarch was supreme commander.

The whole question, of course, revolves around whether it is possible to isolate the fact from the fiction in Herodotus
6.109.1-2. Are we in a position to assert that Callimachus was able to override the vote of a majority of the strategoi, that the generals were merely an advisory body and the polemarch not bound to follow their advice? As Herodotus envisaged the situation, this would not seem to be the case. His phrase, ἐνῆκα ἦν Κῆρων τῶν ἵππων, may mean that those opposed to battle could achieve their objective by simply maintaining the deadlock. The failure to reach a conclusion was tantamount to accepting the decision not to fight. However, he may be suggesting that a majority decision not to engage would have resulted if Miltiades had not approached the polemarch, and if so, we have an indication that the polemarch could not act against a majority of the generals. Miltiades spoke to Callimachus at this point in a desperate attempt to force a conclusion before a majority of the generals adopted the decision not to fight. Obviously, such conjecture should not be pushed too far. But neither are we justified in concluding that the polemarch had the authority to overrule the strategoi. Perhaps a vote of the polemarch was necessary to give validity to a majority decision among the generals, and no action could be taken before such ratification. Ultimate responsibility rested with Callimachus. This would explain why he initially decided not to participate in the debate. In the final analysis if the wrong decision was made he would suffer the consequences. He preferred to let the strategoi thrash the issue out in the hope that they might make the final decision for him.

I do not believe that the position of the polemarch can be defined much more closely than this. He was ἦν Κῆρων of the army in the sense that his was the final responsibility for adopting policy.
If he could not act against a majority of the strategoi, which is however not clear, he could act with the support of only half their number. To be more specific, he had three courses of action open to him. Firstly, he could refrain from voting at all and thus tacitly support the indecision among the strategoi. Secondly, he could vote with those opposing battle, achieving the same result as in the first alternative, but more effectively because conclusively deciding the issue. The third alternative, and that which he opted for, was of course, to vote for an engagement. What Herodotus has preserved, it is here suggested, is not that the polemarch was inferior to the strategoi in deliberation and command, or ranked below them, but that no action could be undertaken if he was indecisive. Both the strategoi and the polemarch could effectively veto each other, in a sense. The endorsement by the polemarch of a majority opinion among the generals was necessary to finalize a decision, and the polemarch was prevented from acting if opposed by the strategoi. The possibility that the fate of Athens rested with an official who ranked below the generals is not commensurate with the importance of Callimachus in Herodotus' account. At the same time we should perhaps avoid labelling the polemarch as supreme commander. The concept is loaded with a certain inflexibility and decisiveness which may not be applicable. In the first place the situation at Marathon was unprecedented. This was the first time the ten generals and the polemarch had operated together since the reform of 501. It is probable that no one was sure what the structure was, the polemarch included. The constitution had not as yet been tested to define specifically the relationship between the two executive offices.
Secondly, it cannot be asserted that the strategoi were, even at this early time, purely tribal leaders. They were elected by the whole Demos. It follows that they were envisaged as the chief military leaders of the state, as well as tribal commanders. They were certainly given command of Athenian forces operating overseas as early as two short years after 501. The 20 ships sent by Athens to help the Ionians were no mere tribal contingent and were led by an Athenian general, Melanthius. Furthermore, the functions of the strategoi were incredibly expanded by the time of Xerxes' invasion, if they only operated as tribal leaders in 490.

In conclusion, the Athenian command as it existed at the time of Marathon may have been more flexible than is generally thought. We cannot assume that the role of the strategoi was similar to that of the taxiaruchs in the days of the primacy of the strategia, and any description of the polemarch as supreme commander needs to be strictly qualified. However, the polemarch as had certain prerogatives and powers which were recognized by the generals. Essentially, the ultimate responsibility rested with him, not with the strategoi, and he would be the first to be prosecuted if things went wrong. Accordingly, he held the position of honour on the right wing, although he did not command the troops in that position. It was no more than coincidental that the battle took place when Miltiades was , if this is not merely a Philaid myth to emphasize the constitutionality of Miltiades' behaviour. The authority vested in the polemarch as must be balanced against the fact that the strategoi were more than contingent commanders and possessed very real positive powers of deliberation. The two offices juxtaposed
approximated very nearly to a complete collegiate command.

Pausanias' description of the picture in the Stoa Poecile probably gives us the most accurate account we are likely to get - τῶν μαχομένων δὲ δήλοι μάλιστα εἰσίν ἐν τῇ γραφῇ Καλλιμαχὸς τε, ὡς Ἀθηναῖοι πολεμαρχεῖν ήρητο, καὶ Μιλτιάδης τῶν στρατηγοῦντων. Miltiades was instrumental in forcing the decision to fight but the strategoi could not act without the vote of the ἡγεμόν.
CHAPTER 3

Election Procedure

Very little is known of Athenian election procedures, yet this has not prevented some scholars from developing elaborate reconstructions concerning the precise nature of the procedure adopted by the ecclesia to elect the strategoi. The first such attempt was made by Wade-Gery in the early 1930's, and his theory remained virtually unchallenged until the mid 1960's. In 1966 the problem was once again subjected to close scrutiny by E.S. Staveley, and more recently by P.J. Bicknell, who utilized a suggestion by A.H.M. Jones, to propose an alternative hypothesis. All three scholars above mentioned have been concerned with the problems connected with the tribal double representation in the strategia in the fifth century, and have consequently formulated election procedures to explain this phenomenon.

According to Wade-Gery, Aristotle's statement at *Ath Pol* 44.4 that the ecclesia conducted the elections of the strategoi καθ' οὖν τι ἀν τῷ δήμῳ δοκή, can be dated to the fifth century. A προσβολεύμα was required each year to determine what method the ecclesia would choose in that year. In some years it was decided to elect a στρατηγός ἐκ ἑπάνων and nine tribal strategoi. Presumably this meant that elections were held in two stages. In the first stage one general was elected without regard to tribal representation. In the second, ten tribal strategoi were elected, one from each tribe by the whole Demos, and the one with the fewest votes
was dropped. If the man with the smallest vote belonged to the same tribe as the στρατηγὸς ἐξ ἀπάντων, double representation did not occur, but if he belonged to any other tribe that tribe had no general, and the tribe of the στρατηγὸς ἐξ ἀπάντων had two representatives. Wade-Gery used as support for the procedure he envisaged, that is, of dropping the man with the fewest votes, the method Plato prescribed in the Laws for the election of ἐξηγηταὶ for Delphi - τοὺς δὲ ἐξηγητάς τρίς φερέτρωσαν μὲν αἱ τέταρται φυλαὶ τέταρται ἐκαστὸν ἐξ αὐτῶν, τρεῖς δὲ οίς αὐτῷ πλείστη γένηται ψύφος δοκιμάσαντας εἰναὶ πέμπτειν εἰς Δελφοὺς ἀνελευ ἐξ ἐκάστης τριάδος ἐνα. 8 Wade-Gery translates: Exegetai : three groups of four tribes each (literally three times over, the four tribes) shall elect, each group, four; one per tribe. The state shall put through their dokimasia the three (in each group) who get most votes and send these nine to Delphi, who will choose one from each group of three. 9 However, it is by no means certain that this interpretation of the passage is correct. In the first place there is some evidence to support the reading τρεῖς after the words τοὺς δὲ ἐξηγητάς. 10 Secondly, the phrase φερέτρωσαν μὲν αἱ τέταρται φυλαὶ τέταρται may be a description of the nomination, rather than the election, of men as candidates for the position of exegetes. Thirdly, it is debatable whether ἐκαστὸν ἐξ αὐτῶν must mean ἐξ ἐκάστης τῆς φυλῆς ἐνα, as Wade-Gery asserts. 11 This is crucial to an acceptance of Wade-Gery's theory, for if Plato is not advocating the representation of each of the four tribes, there is no analogy in the ancient sources for dropping the tribal representative who receives the smallest total vote. Quite simply, an alternative
translation, replacing τρίς with τρεῖς, may be: "As regards the exégetai three (in number) let the four tribes nominate four (men) each (μην) from their own personnel, and let them (i.e. the State) scrutinize whichever three gain most votes and send nine to Delphi to appoint one from each group of three". 12

There are other difficulties with Wade-Gery's theory. It is based on the assumption that only one tribe could be doubly represented in a given year, but double representation of two tribes occurs in 433/2, 431/0 and 426/5. Secondly, there is no support in the sources for an electoral reform geared to singling out one candidate for special treatment, allowing a single general to be elected ἐκ ἀπάντων. Aristotle refers to only one reform, at Ἀθ. Πολ. 61.1, a change from electing each general from one tribe, to electing them all without regard to tribal representation—χαιροτονοῦσι φιλης ἔως, νῦν δ' ἐκ ἀπάντων.

Staveley has attempted to overcome the major difficulties apparent in Wade-Gery's hypothesis by suggesting an election procedure which both allows double representation of more than one tribe and also (he believes) accords with the reform mentioned by Aristotle in Ἀθ. Πολ. 61.1. He does not, however, question Wade-Gery's assumption that double representation occurred because one of the two generals from the same tribe had been elected ἐκ ἀπάντων. But he rejects the theory of the two-phase election process on the grounds that the Athenians would have considered it unattractive and unworkable. In the first place such a process would have involved voting twice on all candidates, except for the man elected ἐκ ἀπάντων. Secondly,
the results of voting in the first phase would indicate the comparative popularity of rival candidates from the same tribes, and would thus most likely encourage inter-tribal electoral agreements designed to eliminate close competition or overtake more popular tribal rivals in the second phase of the election. Staveley also rejects Wade-Gery's provision requiring the tribal representative with the smallest total vote to be dropped. In practice it would prove to be inequitable and therefore unattractive to the Athenians. He explains that the candidate in the lowest position of the ten elected must have had either a multiplicity of tribal rivals or a very small majority over a single opponent.

Staveley suggests that starting about 441 the ecclesia ceased to choose in turn between the several candidates from each of the ten tribes and inaugurated the procedure of voting on the entire list of candidates, from all tribes, in one operation, and without regard to their tribe of origin. The successful candidates were the ten, each from a different tribe, who had severally polled a higher total than their tribal opponents. A provision also accompanied this reform which allowed the possibility of double representation of one or more tribes. A candidate who received a vote total above a stipulated minimum was automatically elected. The remaining positions were filled by each tribe's most popular candidate, and could include a second representative from the tribe which produced a representative of the tribe (or tribes) with the least total vote being excluded. In other words, if a candidate (or candidates) from a tribe (or tribes) which produced an elected representative polled high enough to obtain a place among
the remaining positions to be filled, double representation occurred. The problems associated with dropping the man with the fewest votes under Wade-Gery's hypothesis do not exist because Staveley envisages that the voters were free to distribute their votes as they saw fit, voting for as many candidates as they wished, perhaps merely refraining from voting for men whom they held in low esteem. Any tribe's failure to gain representation was thus due to a lack of popular support for its candidates.

The strength and attraction of this theory resides in the fact that multiple representation is allowed in a system where the principle of tribal representation is also recognized as of some importance. The major weakness is that it is not compatible with the obvious interpretation of Aristotle *Ath Pol* 61.1. According to Staveley, *Ath Pol* 61.1 means that the Athenians no longer concerned themselves with the tribal membership of the candidates during the course of the voting. But Aristotle says more than that. I suggest that Χειροτεμαίοι · · · στρατηγον δέκα, προτέρω μέν. ἄφ᾽ ἐκλάτης. ὑμᾶς ἐνα, νῦν δ᾽ ές ἀπάντων. means: "They elect ... ten generals now from the whole (electorate) but previously one from each tribe." Surely, precisely what the wording implies is that there was no longer a necessity for each of the ten strategoi to belong to a different tribe. Theoretically all could belong to the same tribe. Aristotle's choice of words demonstrates that the reform involved not a procedural change in the voting system, that is, merely a change in the method used by the ecclesia in voting on candidates for office, which in no way altered the previous arrangement whereby each general still came from a different tribe, but a fundamental
change in the nature of the electorate from which the strategoi were chosen. The object of ἐπιγραφοῦσα is στρατηγοὺς δέκα and they were chosen ἀπὸ ἀπάντων, that is, regardless of their phylai. It would certainly seem to follow from this — the removal of the provision requiring the Athenians to be concerned with the tribal affiliation of the "στρατηγοὺς δέκα" — that there was also no regard paid to the tribal membership of the candidates during the course of the voting. Surely Aristotle would have been more specific if the process involved the allocation to office of the ten candidates who had polled highest within their own tribes, as Staveley asserts.

There are other difficulties with Staveley's theory which cannot be overlooked. As has already been noted, the view, which he shares with Wade-Gery, that double representation was the result of the singling out of one candidate for special treatment — based on the belief that in all cases one of the two generals from the same tribe would have received great popular support — which involved the election of a single στρατηγὸς ἀπὸ ἀπάντων, or more, depending on whether one or more tribes was doubly represented, finds no support in Ath Pol 61.1. Furthermore, there is no analogy in our sources for the accounting procedure which he envisaged was used to determine whether a στρατηγὸς ἀπὸ ἀπάντων was elected, and to explain how double representation occurred in practice.

The most attractive theory so far advocated to explain double representation in the strategia is that of Bicknell. His theory is based on a suggestion of A.H.M. Jones that Aristotle's phrase "one from each tribe" in Ath Pol 22.2 and 61.1 is not accurate. If each tribe nominated candidates before the election, it may have been
possible for a tribe which lacked distinguished candidates to nominate outsiders. Thus, every tribe had a representative among the strategoi, but it sometimes occurred that generals were not members of the tribes they represented. A similar arrangement allowed demes to be represented in the Council of 500 by members of other demes. Bicknell suggests that support for this explanation can be found in IG 12 929, a casualty list of the tribe Erechtheis dated to the campaigning season of 460. The relevant sections of the list are as follows:

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line 5   [σ]τ[ρα]τευψ
6     Φ[....]χος
62    στρατηγὸς
63    ἅπινδολμας
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Two generals from Erechtheis were killed in action in the same year. Unless one general was elected for 461/0 and the other for 460/59, double representation occurred in either one of these years.

Hippodamas, called στρατηγὸς, was the representative of Erechtheis. Φ(....)χος, whether he be Phrynichos or Phylarchos, unexpectedly described as στρατηγῷν,17a which word Bicknell accepts as a genitive, meaning "of the generals", was the elected nominee of another tribe.

In conjunction with this hypothesis Bicknell extends further the analogy drawn by Jones between election of councillors and election of strategoi. On the evidence of Aeschines 3.62 - which indicates that substitutes may have been held in reserve when councillors were chosen by lot, presumably in the event of bouleutai-elect being rejected at their dokimasia.18 - he suggests that at the cheirotonia of strategoi the ecclesia may have chosen not only ten
generals but ten alternates as well. This would explain some of the examples of double representation, particularly during the Peloponnesian War, substitutes having assumed office when strategoi died or were deposed.

The possible analogy between the election of bouleutai and strategoi and the supporting evidence of IG i² 929 gives Bicknell's hypothesis a greater degree of credibility than the theories postulated by Wade-Gery and Staveley, but perhaps a closer look at the evidence that does exist concerning the election procedure used by the Athenians to choose their generals, such as it is, should be surveyed before any further conclusions are made.

Aristotle's statement, Ποιοῦν δὲ καὶ ἀρχαργοὺς καὶ ἱππάρχους καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον, ἀρχον ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ, καθ' ὅ τι ἄν τῷ δήμῳ δοκῇ, may mean it is virtually impossible to reconstruct procedure used to elect the strategoi. The statement is so broad as to prohibit us speculatively defining the degree to which the ecclesia could manoeuvre within a set procedure. We do not know what the variables were. On the other hand, it does seem unlikely that some kind of framework within which the ecclesia consistently operated, year by year, was not fairly firmly established. The Athenians, after all, did develop elaborate and stable election procedures for most of their magistracies and administrative offices. But, be that as it may, caution is required, for there is a possibility of a certain amount of variation from year to year in the way the elections of military officials were conducted.

There are several indications that the ten tribes had some
part to play, at least in the early stages of the electoral process. We know from Aristotle's phrase, εἶς ἐκάστης φυλής ἐνα, at **Ath Pol** 22.2, that at the beginning of the fifth century each one of the strategoi came from a different tribe. Secondly, from an overall survey of yearly lists of generals for both the fifth and the fourth centuries, although they are often only partially complete, it can be seen that a wide range of tribal affiliations was more usual than not. Thirdly, as a general rule, the Athenians adhered to the principle of choosing each of its many boards of officials on a tribal basis.

There is some evidence in our sources to support the view that candidates for offices were nominated and then a vote taken between them. A passage in Demosthenes indicates that when several nominations were made in the assembly for an individual to pronounce a funeral eulogy over the bodies of troops slain in battle, a show of hands decided the successful candidate.20 Again, when ambassadors were elected to treat with Philip concerning the peace of Philocrates, this was conducted in the ecclesia, after candidates had been nominated, also in the ecclesia.21 Whether candidates for the strategia were nominated in the ecclesia in the same way as these extraordinary officials is a matter for conjecture. The fact that we are dealing with a regular magistracy may or may not mean there was a slight difference in procedure. **Ath Pol** 56.3 seems to demonstrate that it was the responsibility of each tribe at its own assembly to nominate, every year, a person for the position of choregus for the competitions at the Dionysia, and every two years a choregus for the festival at the Thargelia.22
In the absence of any direct information regarding nomination of candidates as strategoi, and on the strength of the chance of an analogy to be drawn with the methods used to appoint other officials, two procedural possibilities seem open to us. Each individual tribe may have been responsible for preparing a list of nominees at its own tribal assembly, which were then subsequently voted upon at the electoral ecclesia, held in the prytany after the sixth, when the omens were favourable. 23 This is analogous with the procedure for appointing the choregoi, up to a point, but not completely, because each tribe may have forwarded only one nominee as a potential choregus to be approved by the eponymous archon. 24 A formal probouleuma was required for the election of strategoi, as for any other business, 25 and if the nominating procedure was the same as that for the choregoi, the Council may have included on its probouleuma the list of nominees from each tribe. All that would then be required of the ecclesia would be to vote in turn on each of the ten tribal lists, or on a list of all candidates in one operation, the most popular candidate from each tribe being elected general. 26 The reform of Ath Pol 61.1 does not necessarily mean that nomination by tribes was abandoned. Once the restriction compelling tribal representation was removed, perhaps the ten tribal lists were amalgamated into one, if this was not already the case before the reform, and the most popular men elected irrespective of whether some tribes remained unrepresented or not.

Alternatively, and using as an analogy the procedures evident in Demosthenes and Aeschines for electing extraordinary officials, the nomination of candidates may have waited until the
convening of the electoral ecclesia. In that case the nominations and the elections occurred in the same place and at the same meeting. Whether each tribe decided by prior arrangement a list of nominees who were now formally nominated or whether this occurred on the day of the election, we do not know. Under either system, nominations would be called from the floor and would not be incorporated in the probouleuma of the Council which authorized the electoral proceedings. If tribal lists were already decided, the most straightforward method of election, after the names of candidates had been received by the meeting and made public, was to vote on the entire list in one operation and to allocate office to the most popular candidate in each tribe. After the reform of *Ath Pol* 61.1 the successful candidates would gain office in competition with all those nominated, not merely in competition with their respective tribal rivals. If however nominations were not previously decided by tribes, it would only be practicable to conduct the operation in a slightly more complicated manner. To ensure that candidates from each and every tribe were put forward, perhaps nominees were called for in official tribal order. Under this system the ecclesia could receive nominations for one tribe and immediately choose one from among them to be general, or receive the nominations for every tribe and then vote on each list in turn or all together. Now, the question of whether it was necessary for the Athenians to be ordered into tribal groups for the purpose of nominating, rather than voting, only seems to arise if it was the rule that candidates could be nominated only by fellow-tribesmen. Such being the case, it would be natural enough anyway for prospective candidates to mingle with their fellow-tribesmen, but efficiency would be greatly facilitated by the absence of the necessity to check
on the credentials of nominators while the nominating process was being conducted. However, if there was no restriction and a candidate from a particular tribe could be nominated by an individual from any other, it would be no less expedient for nominations to be put forward, firstly for men belonging to the tribe Erechtheis, secondly for Aigeis, and so on, by any individual present in the assembly, without a division of the people into their tribal groups.

Thus, even on the assumption that the election procedure adopted by the Athenians for the strategia conformed with either of the two procedures to elect other officials for which we have evidence in our sources, there is still a myriad of possibilities to choose from. There is one other consideration which may have been significant in determining how the Athenians conducted the electoral ecclesia and that is the question of the voting method and the counting procedure. I do not believe there is any reason to doubt that voting was determined by $\text{XE}i\rho\tau\omicron\nu\alpha$ in the fifth century, as in the fourth century. 27 There is no evidence that the vote was taken by written ballot, as at an ostracism, and such a method may be ruled out on a number of other general grounds. At an ostracism it was quite a simple matter to inscribe, or have inscribed, a name on a piece of tile or a potsherd. 28 All voters would know whether they wished to ostracise a man or not, and if a choice was to be made it was probably restricted to two or three names. 29 At the election of strategoi it would be much more difficult for voters to remember the names of all the candidates and much easier for supporters of particular candidates to remain undetected in manipulating illiterate voters.
If we accept the literal meaning of κειροτονία in the Ath Pol, how were the votes counted? In the fourth century one of the duties of the nine πρόεδροι was to count votes at a κειροτονία. These officials were selected by lot by the ἐπιστάτης of the ruling prytany on the day of the assembly, one from each of the other nine prytanies in the boule. According to Staveley the nine πρόεδροι may have been joined by the ἐπιστάτης to produce ten enumerators, each of whom would concern himself with the counting of votes of his own tribesmen. In the fifth century the 50 councillors of the prytany may have divided this responsibility amongst themselves. If in the fourth century people were strictly grouped according to their tribes at the electoral ecclesia, it is quite likely that this arrangement also existed in the fifth century. However, it is by no means proven that at either routine legislative assemblies or at electoral assemblies the citizens were grouped by tribes. It does appear however, that at special plenary assemblies which were held to decide the rights and fate of certain individuals, to decide for example, if anyone should be ostracized, the citizens were arranged into tribal groups. Xenophon's account of the trial of the generals in 406 indicates that a probouleuma of the Council, drafted by Callixeinos, required the Athenians, διαψηφίσασθαι ... ἀπαντας:
κα. ἀ φυλῶς θείναι δὲ εἰς τὴν φυλήν ἐκάστην δὸς ὑδραγμενος
ἐφ' ἐκάστη τῇ φυλῇ κήρυκα κηρίττειν ... 32 Xenophon's last phrase - "in each tribe a herald shall proclaim" - clearly means that the Athenians were arranged by tribes.

There is some evidence to suggest that plenary assemblies may have been organized differently from legislative and electoral
assemblies. They seem to have been held in the market place rather than the Pnyx, they required a quorum of 6,000 and they possibly were presided over by the nine archons and the whole boule rather than one of the ten tribal sections of the boule. The division into tribal groups may therefore be peculiar to plenary assemblies and not a reliable guide unless evidence suggests otherwise.

Excavations on the Pnyx have revealed three beddings for stelai, which were interpreted as indicating some sort of division of the seating area. The beddings were too few to plot any system of division. If each of the nine πρόεδροι were responsible for counting the number of hands in a separate distinct area (in the fourth century) when there was a Χειροτονία, perhaps there were posts erected at intervals to divide the seating arena into nine divisions. If, however, as seems more logical, there were ten divisions, and the πρόεδροι were assisted by the ἔνωσις, either it was thought that an official from each and every tribe should participate in the counting or the supervision of the counting of votes, or the ecclesia was ordered according to tribes, each teller counting the votes of his own tribe. The evidence clearly indicates that a citizen could ordinarily sit where he wished when an assembly was held on the Pnyx. At the time of the debate on Sicily, Nicias evinced alarm on noting that the supporters of Alcibiades were congregating together. This, together with the indication in Plutarch that Thucydides, son of Melesias, persuaded his supporters to sit themselves apart, may mean it was customary for supporters of particular political leaders to sit together in the same part of the assembly. The collective weight of evidence is strong enough
to override the conclusion that political groups sat together only so far as was allowed by the division of the assembly into tribal sections.\textsuperscript{41}

Obviously, the lack of information does not allow us to conclude one way or another whether citizens sat where they wanted to at electoral assemblies, as they did at legislative assemblies. Voting was determined by $\chi_{\epsilon r\rho o\tau o\nu i\alpha}$ in both cases and there would be no less a need to check the credentials of the voters at routine assemblies, than at the electoral assemblies. Presumably the six lexarchs and their assistants, the thirty collectors, who were responsible for ensuring that only qualified citizens attended a meeting,\textsuperscript{42} were equipped with deme lists for this purpose. Certainly, the task of these officials would be greatly facilitated if the citizens sat by tribes, as Staveley notes,\textsuperscript{43} but ordinarily they did not. Clearly the scrutiny was conducted in some other way, perhaps as the citizens entered the assembly area, but as the need to check credentials did not force the Athenians into tribal divisions at legislative assemblies, there is no reason to assume it did at the electoral assembly.

We are not in a position to know whether any restrictions existed limiting the number of candidates for office, but at the $\chi_{\epsilon r\rho o\tau o\nu i\alpha}$ we may reasonably expect that there was a need to count votes carefully, and it would certainly have been a lengthy and difficult task to count with any exactitude the number of voters in favour of each candidate, especially if a long list of nominations was received. It has recently been suggested that Xenophon, \textit{Memorabilia} 3.4.1, may be an indication that only two nominees could be put forward by each tribe.\textsuperscript{44} The passage is as follows: 'ιδοὺ δὲ
Most scholars have accepted without question that Nicomachides and Antisthenes were fellow-tribesmen and therefore that only one person could be elected from each tribe at the end of the fifth century. Antisthenes may be of the deme Kytherros and therefore a member of the tribe Pandionis, but there is no corroborative evidence for the tribal affiliation of Nicomachides. He may or may not have belonged to Pandionis. There is no reason to suppose, at least from Xenophon, that both men belonged to the same tribe. Quite simply, Nicomachides complained about not being elected because he thought his own qualifications for office were greatly superior to those of the successful candidate, Antisthenes. As Fornara notes, it should not be concluded that the ecclesia could not have elected them both if it so desired.

We cannot safely deduce from Memorabilia 3.4.1 that there could be only twenty nominees for office. Furthermore, may we be sure that in most years more nominees were put forward than there were places to be filled? Socrates' initial question to Nicomachides - Τίνες, ὦ Νικομαχίδη, στρατηγοὶ ἤρηντα; - may imply that there was
a list of candidates from which the strategoi were selected, but
this is not inevitable. Perhaps it is safe to assume that Nicomachides
was a nominee, yet this is at best still only assumption. Neverthe-
less, the possibility that the ecclesia had to choose from a list
of thirty or forty nominees cannot be ruled out. Clearly, if such
was the case, the votes for all candidates would have to be recorded,
with the provision – for as long as the procedure of Ath Pol 22.2 was
in operation – that the top man from each tribe be elected. If the
attention to detail and the time consuming voting habits of the
routine assemblies can be taken as a guide, there is no reason to
think that the Athenians would have baulked at such a complication,
or at the lengthy proceedings which would be involved in choosing
between forty or so candidates.

Plato, in his Laws, devoted a chapter to describing the
officials to govern his State, including strategoi, and prescribed
the methods used to secure their appointment. Where Plato does not
explicitly prescribe provisions it is safe to presume that they
mirrored actual Athenian procedure. In his State three generals
are to be elected (τρεῖς δὲ, οἷς ἄν ἡ πλείστη θεώρονια νῦνηται,
τούτως εἶναι στρατηγοῦς...) from candidates who were initially
nominated by the nomophylakes. (τούτων δὲ
στρατηγοῦς μὲν ἐξ ἀυτῆς τῆς πόλεως τούτης οἱ νομοφύλακες
προβελλάσσουσιν, ἀλλὰ τούτοι δὲ ἐκ τῶν προβληθέντων πάντως οἱ
τοῦ πολέμου κοινονὶ γενόμενοι τε ἐν ταῖς ἡλικίαις καὶ γεννόμενοι
ἐκαίστοτε.) On two points, namely, the number of candidates,
and the counting procedure, Plato is silent. What is clear, however,
is firstly that there is no suggestion of any restrictions on the
number of nominees who could be put forward by the nomophylakes, but merely that all nominees should be citizens of the State. Secondly, it is obvious that the votes on all the candidates would have to be counted carefully and recorded in order to decide which three men received the highest totals. Plato's very silence on both matters, I suggest, is significant. There is no need to describe procedural details unless they differ from what everyone would naturally expect. May we not believe that in Plato's own day there were no restrictions on the number of candidates for office, and the counting procedure employed was the same as must of necessity be connected with the election of his three strategoi?

If we can therefore reasonably conclude that the actual voting and counting of votes was a lengthy business, and bearing in mind that together with the strategoi, the other military officials - taxiarchs, hipparchs and phylarchs - also have to be directly elected annually, it would perhaps be all too time-consuming an affair to conduct both the nominations and the vote at one and the same meeting. On these general grounds therefore, it is more likely that a formal list of candidates was prepared before the election day, probably by the prytaneis, incorporating all the names decided on at tribal meetings. Plato's statement that, in his state, at the Xειροτονία of the strategoi, it was possible for a citizen to propose the substitution of a candidate of his own for one who was already listed, may in fact be an indication of exactly this. The list of candidates was prepared beforehand, and additional nominations could not be accepted at the assembly. Any citizen preparing a substitution would surely need to be fairly confident of his chances of success in a straight
trial of strength with the supporters of another candidate to make it worth the effort. The substitution provision would therefore be used sparingly, and while on the one hand ensuring that no worthwhile candidate was overlooked by the tribal assemblies, it has the great advantage of being quite a straightforward matter not involving much time. Furthermore, if as many as three recounts of votes could be asked for, presumably by unlucky candidates, there is all the more reason to believe that the electoral ecclesia dealt exclusively with voting; and as previously noted, the extant lists of generals support the notion that the tribes were individually responsible for providing candidates from among their own number.

Lack of epigraphical evidence prevents definite conclusions about procedure adopted by the Athenians to elect strategoi, but if it be accepted that Plato may be a guide (or rather his omissions may be), whether his detailed provisions adhered fairly strictly to actual Athenian practice or not, we are in fact dealing with probabilities in proposing solutions to the problems here discussed. The evidence tilts in favour of supposing that the tribes were charged with the responsibility of nominating candidates, a procedure which would be analogous with that for appointing choregoi rather than that used to choose extraordinary officials. At the actual ecclesia voting would commence immediately after the list of candidates had been read out, in some instances being delayed for a short time while a preliminary vote was taken to decide if substitutes should replace candidates already on the list. Presumably, the names would be arranged in official tribal order so that candidates for Erechtheis would be voted on first, those from Aigeis second, and so on. The counting
of hand votes was the responsibility of the προδρομι and ἐγκατάτιμοι in the fourth century. We can assume that the need for accuracy meant a responsible board existed for this purpose in the fifth century, perhaps the ἐγκατάτιμοι and members of the ruling prytany. The assembly arena on the Pnyx was probably divided into ten counting areas by stelai located at intervals, and each teller was responsible for counting the hands raised in one of these divisions. This is not to say that citizens were grouped by tribes, but other than a tenfold division would surely be inappropriate, for the same markers were probably used to define tribal areas at plenary assemblies in the earlier years of the fifth century. When the voting on all candidates was completed, the results were probably read out, and candidates who had lost narrowly could demand a recount.

There are certain other problems which this inquiry has as yet not touched on. No comment has been offered on the question of whether every citizen was restricted to only one vote or could theoretically vote on as many candidates as he wished. On the one hand, if the Athenians employed the principle of "one man, one vote", the counting would be greatly facilitated, but on the other hand it would be very difficult to police, especially when votes were counted on thirty or forty candidates in turn. However, even if it was possible for an individual to vote for several candidates, the chances are that most electors restricted themselves to only one or two votes. In the first place, although there is no way we can measure the strength of tribal loyalty, the consideration that every tribe wished to secure the election of one or more of its candidates, cannot be casually dismissed. It is not possible to determine whether
or not only outstanding political and military leaders would be assured of support outside their own tribes, but in many cases it is likely enough that little-known candidates received the bulk of their votes from fellow-tribesmen. Secondly, many voters would have realized, as no doubt prospective office-holders reminded them, that a vote for one's second preference was a vote against one's first preference. Perhaps only those voters who were fully confident that their first choice was virtually assured of election would hazard to vote for other candidates anyway.

No account of election procedure adopted to appoint Athenian military officials would be complete without devoting some attention to the methods used to fill vacancies created by the injury, death or disgrace of commanders in the field. As already noted, Bicknell has suggested that at the Xειροτονία the Demos not only elected the strategoi but alternates as well, who would serve if a general was rejected at his dokimasia, killed in action or otherwise relieved of office. It may very well be that the scrutiny was generally only a formality, but it would be very unusual if no procedure existed to cover the possibility of a general being rejected at his dokimasia by ensuring that his place would be automatically filled by another man. Each tribe would undoubtedly select only those nominees whom it felt would have no trouble passing the dokimasia. This would certainly lessen the chances of officials being rejected. But only if the scrutiny was conducted before the vote, on all the candidates, could we be sure that there was no necessity to elect extra men as a precaution. However, it is abundantly clear from our sources that the dokimasia was an examination which magistrates had to undergo between
their selection and entry on office.\textsuperscript{60} Furthermore, \textit{Ath Pol} 61.2 indicates that in every prytany the strategoi were subjected to an examination in the ecclesia on the satisfactoriness of their administration to date - ἐπιχειροτονία δ' αὐτῶν ἐστὶ κατὰ τὴν πρωτανείαν ἐκάστην, ἐ' δεκαδέχοντας αἰῶν᾽ ἀρχεῖν. If the assembly voted against a general and he was convicted in a dikasteria, he was either fined or banished - κἂν τινὰ ἀποδεικτηκὼς, κράτουσι ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ, κἂν μὲν ἄλλῳ τιμῶσιν ὅ τι χρῆ παθεῖν ᾧ ἀποτείχα, ἢν δ' ἀποφάγῃ πάλιν ἀρχεῖ. In either case he lost office.\textsuperscript{61}

To return to Bicknell's hypothesis, there is no supporting evidence that alternates were selected. His suggestion that Pythodorus, who took command from Laches in Sicily in the winter of 426/5, was elected as alternate when Laches was deposed, is far from certain.\textsuperscript{62} Both men probably belonged to the same tribe, Kekropis,\textsuperscript{63} However, Thucydides, in his account, does not say that Laches was deposed,\textsuperscript{64} although the inference has been drawn by most scholars.\textsuperscript{65} It may well be that Laches was tried for misconduct in Sicily, but if so he was acquitted.\textsuperscript{66} From Thucydides it seems reasonable enough to conclude that Laches did not leave Sicily until Pythodorus arrived. If that was the case, on Bicknell's viewpoint Pythodorus was elected as substitute even before Laches had the opportunity to defend himself in a law court. If, on the other hand, Laches had been recalled to Athens and tried before Pythodorus was sent out (an improbable alternative, for in the intervening period there was no strategos in Sicily) the latter was chosen as alternate even after Laches was acquitted and presumably restored to office. Clearly, Bicknell's suggestion will not do unless we accept the possibility that the
Athenians resorted (at times) to the practice of electing substitutes for officials charged but not convicted - that is, after their *ἐπιΧειροτονία* but before their trial. In the event of the official being acquitted, as in Laches' case, this would mean in effect that the numerical strength of the board was increased by one.

Surely, what is more likely is that Pythodorus and Laches had both been elected for 426/5 and double representation existed for Kekropis. Either Sophocles or Eurymedon could have been chosen as Laches' immediate διάλοχος. But it was a coincidence, nothing more, that his successor was a fellow-tribesman. Whether Laches was replaced because the Athenians expected more of him, or simply because he had been in Sicily from October 427 until February 425, we do not know. If the former alternative be preferred, this does not necessarily mean he was immediately prosecuted. Aristophanes' *Wasps* was not produced until 422. Therefore, even if this is evidence that Cleon brought charges against Laches, the information against him may not have come to light until a year or two had elapsed after his command.

There are several other instances during the Peloponnesian War when generals were dismissed from office, but the first certain instance of by-elections is not until 411, when the troops at Samos removed some strategoi and trierarchs from command and elected replacements. Thucydides gives no hint that a substitute was elected when Pericles was deposed in 430, or when Sophocles, Eurymedon and Pythodorus met the same fate in 426/5, or when Procles (426/5), Hippocrates (424/3), Lamachus (414/3), Nicias and Demosthenes (413/2) were killed. Thucydides' treatment of Pericles' dismissal
may be an indication that the ecclesia could hold a by-election whenever it wished. Pericles was probably accused at a regular ἔτη ΧΕΙΡΟΤΟΝΙΑ, convicted in a law court, fined and removed from office. According to Thucydides Ὑστερον δ' άδυσα oô πολλα, ὃπερ φιλεῖν όμιλος πολείν, στρατηγὸν εἶλοντο ... These words do not suggest that Pericles had any recourse to appeal after he was fined but they do suggest that he did not have to wait long before he was again in office. If he was deposed in the summer of 430 and Thucydides means he was elected in the spring of 429 to enter office later in the year, we must suppose that he was out of office for nearly a year. It would be strange if Thucydides had departed from his usual precision in using the phrase Ὑστερον ... oô πολλα. As Gomme states, the historian is more likely to mean that Pericles was back in office only a few weeks after his dismissal.72 I have argued elsewhere73 that Cleon was chosen strategos in 425/4 at a by-election to command at Pylos. The two cases are very similar, the only difference being that Pericles was reinstated whereas Cleon was an addition.

This in no way proves that it was a regular practice for the Athenians to replace dead or disgraced strategoi at by-elections, but it may serve to demonstrate that the ecclesia was not bound to follow rigid constitutional guidelines in such matters. By the time of the Peloponnesian War precedent had probably been established for most, if not all, of the various exigencies which could arise, for example the failure of a strategos to pass his δοκιμασία or ἐπιΧΕΙΡΟΤΟΝΙΑ, or his death in battle, and the ecclesia probably relied to some extent on past experience. However, even allowing for this, we should probably expect a certain amount of flexibility in the
action taken by the ecclesia when dealing with similar cases, and
depending in large measure on the circumstances in which they found
themselves. Procedure which may have seemed appropriate to the
ecclesia in one case may not have been judged as the correct measure
in a similar case several years, or even months later. In the early
summer of 411 the soldiers at Samos immediately elected replacements
when they dismissed their strategoi, and after Arginusae Athens
deposed eight strategoi and immediately elected two men to replace
them, but in 430 the ecclesia probably did not bother to replace
the dismissed Pericles. It is certainly true that the strategia was
affected in the turbulent and unstable period between 411 and 404,
but it is difficult to determine if the by-elections held in these
years were a complete abrogation of custom and bore no resemblance
to the procedure used, for example, when the three generals, Eurymedon,
Sophocles and Pythodorus were deposed in 426/5. There is a possib-
ility that the evidence about the strategia after 411 is valuable
information.

Xenophon, Hellenica 1.7.1 indicates quite clearly that at
least in the latter years of the fifth century the ecclesia did not
elect alternates, or that if it did it preferred to elect new strategoi
rather than to use them. Furthermore, the fact that only two men,
Adeimantus and Philocles, were elected to replace eight, does not
necessarily mean that the old rules had broken down. There is no
other evidence at all to suggest that the ecclesia was bound to act
in any other way than it thought appropriate, either after or before
411. The evidence we do have, as already noted, demonstrates that
one must be cautious in advocating "standard" procedures. In this
context it is here suggested that Aristotle’s statement Ποιούσι δὲ καὶ ἀρχαιοκρατίας στρατηγῶν... ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ, καὶ τῷ τῷ ἰθμῷ δοκῇ is not restricted in its reference merely to the electoral ecclesia. After the elections the assembly retained full control over the board and its personnel. An integral part of the ἀρχαιοκρατίας στρατηγῶν was the δοκίμασια. It was up to the ecclesia to decide what was to be done if a general failed this test - καὶ τῷ τῷ ἰθμῷ δοκῇ. If the ecclesia decided to replace him, perhaps a by-election was held in some instances (if the ecclesia so desired), or perhaps the candidate at the top of the list of unsuccessful candidates filled the position. Before the reform of Ath Pol 61.1 this would be done on a tribal basis.

Pursuing this line of thought I surmise that Aristotle’s statement extends further and includes all action taken by the ecclesia connected in any way with the composition of the strategia after the formal elections. This of course involves accepting that Aristotle’s phrase is not entirely precise, at least for us. But it is exactly the type of generalization and lack of attention to procedural details which is characteristic of the whole Ath Pol. I imagine that the whole process worked roughly in the following manner. Every year a προβούλευμα was required to determine what method the ecclesia would use to elect the strategoi in that year. This may simply mean that there were slight modifications (in the interests of efficiency) in the presentation of the list of candidates and the voting and counting procedures, depending on such variables as the number of candidates who were running for office and the number of citizens who were able to attend the assembly in a particular year. The προβούλευμα may
also have contained the method, if any, that would be used to replace a general who was immediately rejected at his δοκήματα.

If a single general was charged at an ἔννοια and convicted in a δικαστήριο, military circumstances and the length of time that remained before the next board took office probably determined whether or not the ecclesia filled the vacant position, and whether it did so at a by-election or by appointing, for example, the most popular unsuccessful candidate of the last election. The same kind of factors were also involved when a single general was charged with a crime unconnected with his military administration, and therefore not at a regular ἔννοια, for example Alcibiades. Furthermore, the assembly probably was able to re-elect in the same year strategoi who had been deposed and fined, however rare this may have been. The payment of the fine removed the technical ἀρματα. It was probably more usual for a general who was fined to remain διώκειται for the rest of the year, but he could of course hold office again, as did Eurymedon. The possibility of re-election in the same year may not be applicable to generals who were convicted and imprisoned, and certainly not to those who were banished.

Irrespective of these considerations, the numerical strength of the board could be increased at the discretion of the assembly when leadership resources were stretched to the limit or when it wished a particular man, who had not been elected in spring, to conduct a particular expedition, for example Cleon at Pylos in 425/4. Similarly, when a general was accused of misconduct, in his absence from Athens, and it was necessary to appoint a διοικός immediately, a by-election would be held only if there was no general available.
in Athens at the time. Are we to believe with Bicknell, for example, that the alternate Pythodorus was sent out to Sicily to replace his fellow-tribesman, Laches, when there were two other generals (if not more) who surely ranked above an alternate, in Athens without commands? In other cases, such as when a general on operations was accused, but like Alcibiades, opted to desert, or like Demosthenes after his failure in Aetolia, only returned when he felt safe against successful prosecution, I suggest that replacements were elected if the military circumstances warranted it, but not if there were strategoi in Athens waiting for a command. In a situation where the majority of the board, or all the generals, were deposed at the one time, as after Arginusae, replacements had to be elected immediately, before the trial of the accused took place.

Plato's statement - Ἐὰν δὲ τις δημοσίαν ἄρχην ἄρχον ἀποθάνῃ πρὶν ἡ ἡ ἂν τὴν ἄρχην πλείον ἅ. τριάκοντα ἐπιβεβηκόμενη ἡμερῶν, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἐπὶ τὴν ἄρχην ἄλλον καλιστᾶναι οἷα ἦν τοῦτο προσεποιητος μέλον 80 may be an indication that machinery was there to be used if strategoi died or were deposed, but this passage is not necessarily the full answer. Plato may indeed have borrowed this procedure from Athens, but the silence of Thucydides, Aristotle Ἀθ. Πολ. 44.4 and Xenophon's account of the last years of the Peloponnesian War may reflect the fact that in practice the ecclesia had other options to choose from if it so desired. The system was flexible. In other words, once the ten strategoi assumed office, and military operations got under way during the campaigning season, the size of the board fluctuated, sometimes containing more than ten members, sometimes less. This is not to say that the Athenians did not consider it desirable usually to keep the board up to full strength, but it may be misleading to consider that vacancies
were automatically filled as they occurred, that in fact each individual seat on the board was, as it were, a recognized entity and that strict emphasis was given to this principle to ensure that each position was always occupied. The fifth-century strategia cannot be compared with the board of nine archons and their functional specialization. Certainly, by the time of the writing of the *Ath Pol*, five of the strategoi had been allocated specialized duties, but the duties of fifth-century generals were the same as the remaining five, as described by Aristotle — τοὺς ὄλλους πρὸς τὰ παρόντα πράγματα ἐκπεμπομενίν. To put it differently, the Athenians were concerned not with ensuring that individual positions be occupied, but with ensuring that the state had the military leadership it wanted at a particular time. When the Athenians replaced eight generals with two after Arginusae, obviously they were not filling vacant positions on the board, otherwise they would have elected eight men. We cannot assume that when a strategos was killed in action or deposed, the Athenians elected another man to fill "the position" left vacant. To fill the dead man's shoes, perhaps. In this sense it is possible that the procedure outlined by Plato was regularly followed.

The whole problem is quite simply solved if it be accepted that the ecclesia could hold by-elections whether it was replacing strategoi or not. This would satisfactorily explain all the instances in our sources where it is otherwise necessary either to postulate a departure from usual procedure or to force an interpretation on, for example, Thucydides, which stretches the natural meaning of his words. Are we to suppose that the Athenians would have committed all their strategoi to Samos in 440, or eight to Arginusae in 406, unless they were either so confident that an emergency would not occur,
requiring at short notice a major military operation on a second
front, or as is more likely, unless they were able to obtain command-
ers by some other means than recalling those on active duty far
away? Furthermore, Thucydides' account of the early years of the
Peloponnesian War clearly shows that it was not unusual for six
or seven strategoi to be absent from Athens on operational command
at the same time, and he was only concerned with giving the details
of the more important events, not with listing the activities of all
the strategoi. Many routine operations involving generals, such as
the collection of tribute from the Aegean states, were not worthy
of mention. When one considers for example that in 433/2 a minimum
of eight strategoi (if Aristeides had more than two colleagues,
more than eight) were involved in activities in the vicinities of
Corcyra and Potidaea, there is not much scope for other military
activity simultaneous with these operations, routine or otherwise,
when only two generals at the most are immediately available. The
appointment of extra strategoi was in all likelihood very rare, even
at times when resources were fully stretched, if not over-extended,
but I do not believe it is plausible that the ecclesia would commit
as many as eight generals to two fields of action as late as 433,
even if those at Corcyra were expected to be absent for only a short
time, if rigid constitutional guidelines existed which would effect-
ively limit the military capability of the state in the meantime.

If this whole hypothesis is correct, obviously at some point
in time during the fifth century the strategoi ceased in every way
to be tribal representatives or tribal leaders or commanders of
contingents within the armed forces, and became exclusively military
officials of the highest rank, in command of Athenian armies and
navies no matter what the tribal composition and irrespective of what
specialized contingents were incorporated under their command. It
has already been argued that as early as 490 the strategoi were more
than purely tribal commanders, and indeed they possibly always had
been, at least since their inauguration in 501/0. However, as long
as the principle remained in force that each of the strategoi had to
belong to a different tribe it cannot be assumed that in practice the
generals had shrugged off all the functions associated with tribal
leadership. For this reason it is likely that replacements were
necessary for individual generals who were deposed or died in office,
and that new appointees belonged to the tribes of the men they were
replacing. When did all this change?

The first change which may reasonably be expected to have
affected the structure of the Athenian military command in the fifth
century occurred in the archonship of Telesinus in 487/6. The system
was then introduced of appointing the archons by lot, including the
polemarch. The reason for this reform remains a vexed question,
and there is the possibility, among others, that it was a relatively
minor administrative reform entirely in keeping with Cleisthenes'
democratic legislation. We are not in a position to know whether
the reform also entailed the removal of the polemarch from his position
as ήρωμον τῆς ἀνασής στρατιᾶς, or indeed, from the army altogether.
Badian has argued that the reform made no recognizable difference to
the quality of the men who held the eponymous archonship, but it
would be illogical to believe that the office retained the same
attraction for Athens' leading statesmen and politicians. The only
other alternative was the strategia. Even before 487/6 this office had a natural advantage over the archonship, the absence of any restriction on re-election. Generals, of course, were not entitled to membership of the still prestigious Areopagus Council, but the strategia already allowed ambitious ex-archons the opportunity for continuous participation in the decision-making process in addition to that which went with belonging to the Areopagus. Whether or not there was a change in the position of the polemarch or in his powers as a consequence of the reform of 487/6, it cannot be denied that the natural advantage pertaining to the strategia would only be further emphasized. Because re-election of generals was permitted, in all likelihood the strategia would ultimately have come to be the supreme politico-military executive institution even without the reform of Telesinus. It is almost certainly inevitable that the polemarch would have become completely dependent on the strategoi for advice, that he was nominally ἐξημερία and nothing more. Perhaps the most important effect of 487/6 was that the process was speeded up. The polemarch was rendered redundant and dispensable sooner than otherwise may have been the case. Due to the fact that we hear nothing more of him— he is present in 490 but absent in 480/79—this effect may have been almost immediate.

It cannot be assumed that the Athenians deliberately reformed their command structure between 490 and 480. Whether or not the reform of 487/6 involved a demotion of the polemarch, in the war against Xerxes in 480/79 the commanders of Athenian forces, both naval and military, were strategoi. The answer may simply be that with the Persian invasion of Greece the polemarch became an anachronism.
The strategia was a much more flexible institution, better equipped in all respects to deal with the military circumstances. The polemarch could only be at one place at a time. But this war was not fought on a single front, on a single battlefield. Some generals were needed with the fleet, some with the army. Consequently, any vestige of authority retained by the polemarch as ἐπιτιθιμωτός was effectively pre-empted by them. Furthermore, the precedent had already been established of sending generals on military operations outside Attica. The expedition of Miltiades in 490/89 and that of Melanthius in 499/86 are probably the two most important of a number of military excursions undertaken by Athens in the early years of the fifth century. Many of the strategoi who participated in the Persian Wars would already have had some experience of military command. For all we know the polemarch may have been present at Plataea, for example, but he had no important place in the command structure. The men who are described by Herodotus at 9.46.1 as οἱ στρατηγοὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων held the top command posts at Plataea.

The fact that strategoi were army and navy commanders rather than contingent leaders during 480/79, in combination with the fact that they were divided up among the two wings of the armed services, meant that they could in no way act as tribal leaders. All ten generals could not conceivably have participated in the battle at Plataea because some were required with the fleet. However, the Athenian army was composed of the ten tribal regiments and presumably the organization of the Athenian line on the left wing of the Greek army was by tribes, as at Marathon. Even irrespective of the role of the strategoi now as supreme commanders, clearly leadership
of these contingents must have been transferred to other officials merely on the grounds that there were not enough generals available to lead them individually. It is generally assumed by most scholars that the ten ῥαξιαρξοι were instituted either simultaneously with, or soon after the reform of 487/6, or at some time after 480 and 479. They are first mentioned by Aeschylus, which certainly dates their introduction to about the first 30 or so years of the fifth century. Obviously, the ῥαξιαρξοι were instituted when the strategoi had ceased to be commanders of the tribal regiments, and most logically therefore before the battle of Plataea, or possibly as successors to officials appointed to lead the tribes at that time. It makes little difference whether they were introduced after 487/6 or after the Persian invasion. What is important is that the ῥαξιαρξοι relieved the strategoi of their command of the tribal regiments, and once this occurred there was no reason for each of the generals to belong to a different tribe.

There is a strong possibility that double representation in the strategia occurred for the first time in 479/8, if Leocrates belonged to the same phyle (Akamantis) as Xanthippus. The problem is neatly resolved if Bicknell's hypothesis is correct that a strategos did not necessarily have to belong to the tribe he represented. However, on this view it must be accepted as plausible that one man - such as Pericles or Carcinus or Glaucon from Akamantis or Phormio or Hagnon from Pandionis - would be continually re-elected as the representative of another tribe. Moreover, the frequency of duplication, even before the Peloponnesian War, and the instances of double-doubles, and a possible triplication, make this theory difficult to accept. They may even, as Fornara believes, disprove
it. Even without the indication at *Ath Pol* 61.1 the most obvious explanation is that all the strategoi were elected *ἐξ ἀπάντων*.

There are just too many cases of double representation in the fifth century, where it is unlikely that either strategos was deposed and where it is known that neither was killed, to consider that the procedure whereby the ecclesia elected its generals *κατὰ φυλὰς*, *ἐξ ἐκάστης φυλῆς ἕνα* was not changed. Most scholars have thought that the reform of *Ath Pol* 61.1, the election of generals *ἐξ ἀπάντων*, should be dated to the last third of the fourth century. As Fornara has asserted, Aristotle's *νῦν* in the phrase *πρῶτερον μὲν ἀφ' ἐκάστης φυλῆς ἕνα, νῦν ἐξ ἀπάντων* need not only refer to his own time, especially if *πρῶτερον* refers to the procedure he knew was adopted in 501/0. The formula *πρῶτερον μὲν ... νῦν δὲ* is common in the *Ath Pol*. In most cases, it is impossible to know whether *πρῶτερον* refers back to the fifth century or not, but at 53.1 it certainly does, and may also at 45.3. It is by no means inevitable that Aristotle's words at 61.1 imply that election of all strategoi *ἐξ ἀπάντων* was recent.

I suggest that the ideal time for a change in election procedure was about the time of the Persian invasion of 480/79, if it had not already occurred. If there was a time when the undesirability of limited eligibility to the strategia was obvious, it was in these years. Athens needed her strategoi to be the best men available, irrespective of tribal representation. It is not as if all the ingredients necessary before such a change can be postulated are not evident in 480/79. The polemarch has disappeared from the scene and is no longer an active participant in the command. Whether or not
the reform of 487/6 meant the polemarch was no longer ἡ ἐπιτραπέζης στρατηγός, his absence in 480 is by itself sufficient indication that "final responsibility", as it were, in decision making, which the polemarch enjoyed in 490, had passed to the strategoi.

However important the generals were at Marathon and however far their function extended beyond tribal leadership in the first twenty years of the fifth century, the removal of the polemarch from his position of responsibility over the entire army weakened still further, if it did not destroy, the already tenuous role of the generals as tribal leaders. Secondly, there is evidence that tribal commanders, the ten τάξιατάχια described by Aristotle at Ἀθ. Πολ. 61.3, existed at Athens at least in the first third of the fifth century. These officers, or their forerunners, must have commanded the Athenian hoplites in and out of battle at Plataea, unless we assume that tribal organization for military purposes, when the entire Athenian army was in the field, was abandoned after Marathon, or consider that each of the strategoi present commanded a combination of two or more tribal contingents. Thirdly, there is a likelihood of double representation in 479/8. This should not be dismissed on the grounds that double representation did not occur until the 430's. Nor can it be explained by assuming that one man was the representative of another tribe, when the frequency of double representation in the second half of the fifth century is more satisfactorily explained by election ἐκ ἐκατοντάρχων, a procedure which we know was definitely used in the fourth century.

If the reform can be dated to about 480 rather than the late 460's or the 450's or 440's, the absence of any mention of a
reform in the historical part of Aristotle's work is more easily explained. In 501/0 the Athenians brought their military organization into line with Cleisthenes' new constitution, and the institution of the ten tribal strategoi at this time was a natural and logical development following the new tribal reorganization. It was equally natural and logical that the strategoi be replaced in this role by other officials during the Persian Wars. The dichotomous position the strategoi had always occupied by being the elected contingent leaders, but in practice army commanders as well, worked well enough while the polemarch retained an active role in the command structure and when there was no need to split Athenian forces, but this was not the case in 480. The change may have been merely a mechanical administrative adjustment in recognition of the fact that the strategoi were the supreme military executive and had completely outgrown in practice their function as tribal leaders. It may be misleading to suppose that there was a legal obstacle which needed to be eliminated by a deliberate reform before the strategoi could be elected without regard to tribe. The taxiarchs or their fore-runners simply replaced the strategoi as tribal leaders, and thereby removed the obstacle to an efficient strategia filled by the best men available. The Persian invasion acted as a catalyst. The Athenians began to elect their generals ἔξαρχοι in the latter years of the 480's to ensure they had the best possible military leadership for the next confrontation with the Persians.

Essentially, therefore, election of generals may not have involved a deliberate reform to change the nature of the strategia, but rather arose quite naturally from the emergency situation created
by Xerxes, and was a culmination anyway of the gradual development of the functional role of the strategoi during the first twenty years of the fifth century as the supreme military officials of the state. The importance of the strategoi during 480 and 479 ensured that by the end of the Persian Wars they were firmly established as army and navy commanders. From 479 onwards Athenian strategoi were continuously in the field and speaking relatively, the role of the generals before 480 as army commanders was the exception to what became the rule immediately afterwards. If the reform of *Ath Pol* 61.1 occurred about 480, it was so timely as to be almost completely unobtrusive. May not Aristotle's silence about the date in the historical part of his work be an indication that the transition from electing generals *κατά φυλὰς* to electing them *εἰς τὰ ἀνάπτυξιν* was so smooth as to occur without notice? The decision by the Athenians may not, in fact, have been acknowledged by them as a reform of the procedure which existed from 501/0, either at the time it occurred or in the years immediately following, due to the circumstances under which the change took place and the pre-eminence of the strategoi after 480. This is not to say that Plutarch's sentence at *Cimon* 8.8, that *Cimon* μετὰ τῶν συντατίτων προελθὼν εἰς τὸ βιατρὸν ἐποίησαν

τῷ θεῷ τὰς νεομισμένας στοιχάς, οὔκ (the archon) ἀφήκεν

αὐτοὺς ἀπελεύθη, ἀλλ' ὀρκώσας ἑνάγκασε καθίζει καὶ κρίνει ἐκα ὀντικά, ἀπὸ φυλὴς μίᾶς ἐκαστον, (in 469/8), is inaccurate. It is quite possible that in many years each one of the ten generals belonged to a different tribe after the reform of *Ath Pol* 61.1. After all, the tribes were probably always responsible for nominating candidates, and tribal loyalties probably ensured that complete tribal representation was often the case. However, it is just as likely as not that
Herodorus referred from calling articulars a strenuous, both on this

extents were receded before the elections of 480. However, 109

shows that he was one of the senators elected for 480/79, then the

held in the spring of 479. If articulars' action at Pyrystara 108

was right depends on whether the amnesty law preceded the elections

The possibility that Phoruses

from the extelle imposed on them by articulars some time after the

election in the spring of 479, 106

he was in command of the Athenian contingent of the Greek fleet at

479. Now Xenophon's was certainly strenuous in the year 480/79 for

called to be re-elected at the electoral elections in the spring of

or rather his source, Phorus, is wrong, and that Thuroscoetes simply

It is usually concluded from this that Phoruses' 105

where the sympathetic, and the highest, etc. "Phoruses' manuscript above

at Spartes, and Xenophon elected General in his place."

the strenuous (480/79) for his acceptance of honours conferred on him

according to Dodorus St Hondus, Thuroscoetes was deposed from

lost to the author of the Ath Pol.

is all the more reason for explaining why the date of the change was

loyalty and the force of custom rather than anything else, but this

of the board. The passage may be evidence for the strength of tribal

61.1 did not stand an immediate dramatic change in the composition

joinable the passage may be an indication that the reform of Ath Pol

positions they held in the state. 104

Phoruses' source is untrust-

Phoruses as tribal representatives, but by virtue of the preexistent

the articulars were not participating in the ceremony decreed by
Result. The Thucydides belonged to the lyre poets and lyre players for a moment that Phoebus is right, some important consequences phoebous account Platon in plato's theo.

Gain re-election to office for 479/8.

be reason enough to conclude that the Thucydides did indeed fall to have acquiesced policy had probably now fallen into disfavor, may for 480/79 ran out; this, together with the consideration that his course prove that the Thucydides was deposited before the term of office.

Thucydides' political opponents, and although this does not on course can be no doubt that the Thucydides and aristades were included their forces to exclude the Thucydides from office in 479 and recently been argued that the recalled exiles Aristides and Lycurgus has been able to satisfy correctly explain the instability. II 2 Thucydides was a general during 479 although scholars have not been

notwithstanding Herodorus' statement, it is generally thought that from the narrative of Herodorus after his return from Sparta, certain parts played no part in the operations of 479. He disperses

phoebous may be right about the Thucydides being deposited. Thucydides if this is so, then Lycurgus was elected at a by-election and that the exiles did not return until after the elections of 480.

The behaviour at the battle at Salamis. It is just as likely as not looking to the future. He may have owed his strategy in 479/8 to him to be a strategist, may be correct. III conclusion that Aristides was困境 in the Thucydides at Salamis prior to the naval battles, 110 the Thucydides was acting as a private citizen. Indeed, the historian implies occasion and earlier in his narrative.
to Akamantis. If one replaced the other, obviously the Athenians were not concerned with tribal representation in 480/79, or else Themistocles would have been replaced by a fellow-tribesman.

Secondly, it disproves the hypothesis which maintains that later cases of duplication are due to the death or disgrace of either general. Thirdly, it destroys the notion that alternates filled positions vacated by fellow-tribesmen. On the other hand, if the tradition followed by Ephorus is incorrect, it is still difficult to know how the story could gain any acceptance at all unless no regard was paid to tribal representation in the replacement of Athenian strategoi during the fifth century. In other words Ephorus may have simply transferred to 480 the procedure applicable to his own time.

Obviously, the hypothesis is not capable of proof, but if double representation occurred in 479/8, it was certainly not to replace a dead or disgraced general, because Xanthippus was a strategos in the previous year and was a general engaged in the subjugation and capture of Sestos after a winter siege, in 478, an operation which he survived. From about 480 the Athenians were no longer concerned with tribal representation in the strategia, perhaps out of a desire to ensure that their military forces were commanded by the best men available and in recognition of the fact that the generals were no longer tribal leaders. This does not mean that the election procedure inaugurated in 501/0 was appreciably modified either at this time or later in the fifth century. The nature of the election procedure, incorporating the nomination of the candidates by tribes, was probably never changed, and the force of custom was responsible for the continuing adherence in practice to tribal
representation, evident in some of the years of the Pentacontaetia, for example 469/8 and 441/0. Custom was probably also responsible for limiting the numerical strength of the board to ten in most years. However, after the reform of *Ath Pol* 61.1 it was only the force of custom which prevented departure from tribal representation, and this inevitably broke down. At the annual electoral ecclesia throughout the fifth century the Athenians elected ten men as their military executive for the year, but the ecclesia maintained strict control over their destiny and number, rather than any constitutional guidelines. The strategoi were treated *καὶ δότες τοῖς πεσθέντι κατακλείτωμεν οἰκεῖ*.

When generals were killed or deposed the board was probably restored to full strength in most instances, but there is evidence, beginning with the list of generals for 441/0, that the number of strategoi varied during the year, occasionally exceeding the number initially elected and occasionally being less than ten.
PART II
CHAPTER 4

The Persian Invasion, 480/78.

N.G.L. Hammond has recently argued\(^1\) that during Xerxes' invasion of Greece, when Sparta was entrusted by the Greek states with leadership of their forces by land and by sea, the Spartans not only employed the system they always used of being led and commanded in the field by a single officer who enjoyed full powers, but they also imposed such a system upon each of the national contingents of the other Greek states, including Athens. The Spartan officer, who was both commander-in-chief of the combined forces and commander of the Lacedaemonian army, had as his immediate subordinates the next ranking officers within the Spartan army itself, and, in accordance with Spartan practice, the commanders of the allied contingents, one officer for each contingent. Therefore, in effect, the command system within each of the contingents which combined to form the Greek army and navy resembled the Spartan system. In Thessaly, the Athenian forces, the Theban forces and the Thespians were each commanded by a single general.\(^2\) Similarly, at Artemisium and Salamis one strategos commanded the Athenian section\(^3\) and one the Corinthian,\(^4\) and at Plataea, Aegina and Sestos we find a single commander for the Athenians each time.\(^5\)

Furthermore, Hammond considers that the tenure of command of all the commanders in the Greek League forces was from spring to spring.\(^6\) Each of the Greek states appointed one officer to command their forces from spring 480 to spring 479 and continued this practice
annually for at least three years. As far as the Athenians are concerned Hammond suggests that the tenure of command of their commander-in-chief was changed to from midsummer to midsummer in 477. Therefore, in the years 480, 479 and 478 the Athenians appointed strategoi whose tenure of office was entirely different to the regular board of generals, for these latter officials assumed office in midsummer. In 480 Themistocles, in 479 Aristeides and Xanthippus, and in 478 Aristeides, were all appointed by the ecclesia to full and sole command of the Athenian forces under the Greek League. They were probably not chosen at the same election which appointed the regular strategoi, although Hammond concedes that Themistocles, for example, may have been one of the ten strategoi elected for 481/0 and 480/79, as well as being commander of Athenian forces from spring 480 to spring 479.7

The especially elected στρατηγοὶ τῶν Ἑλλήνων in command of the Athenian contingents contributed to the Greek armies and fleets were, Hammond believes, elected ἐκ ἀπὸ φυλῆς. They formed an entirely different category to the ordinary generals who are described as στρατηγοὶ ἀπὸ φυλῆς. Indeed, the practice of electing generals of two categories did not cease when Xerxes was repulsed, but continued at least until the death of Pericles. Briefly, what happened, in Hammond’s view, was as follows. When the Spartan Pausanias was recalled in autumn 478 and the Greek alliance offered the supreme command to Athens, Aristeides succeeded Pausanias as commander-in-chief of the combined Greek forces, and Athens continued the Spartan system of command. In the following years such men as Cimon, Leocrates, Myronides, Tolmides, Pericles, Ephialtes and Charitimides
were elected ἐκ ἄπαντων to hold the position of ὁ στρατηγὸς τῶν Ἑλλήνων. This position became an anachronism, of course, once the Athenian Alliance ceased to exist as an autonomous combination of states, either during the early 440's or with the attack on Samos in 440. However, the double representation of Pericles' tribe during some years of the 430's indicates that the Athenians continued to elect him as στρατηγὸς ἐκ ἄπαντων even though the function for which the position had been invented had come to an end. Once the tenure of the office of the στρατηγὸς ἐκ ἄπαντων had been brought into line with that of the στρατηγὸι ἀπὸ φυλῆς in 477 the Athenians used two methods of election. In some years (for example in 469/8 when Cimon was commander-in-chief of the combined forces of the Athenian Alliance, and when there were ten strategoi, ἀπὸ φυλῆς μιᾶς ἐκάστου), they elected ten strategoi, one στρατηγὸς ἐκ ἄπαντων, and then, discounting his tribe, nine στρατηγοὶ ἀπὸ φυλῆς. In other years (for example in 441/0, for which year we have a list of eleven generals with double representation of Pericles' phyle, Akamantis), they elected eleven generals, one στρατηγὸς ἐκ ἄπαντων and ten στρατηγοὶ ἀπὸ φυλῆς.

Hammond's construction, if it were plausible, would certainly explain the double representation of Akamantis in 479/78, as Bicknell has noted, as well as the later much more frequent cases during the 430's and later years. I do not however, believe it satisfactorily explains the double representation of Erechtheis in 460/59. Although our lists of strategoi for the late 460's and the 450's are very sparse it is wild speculation to conclude from the mere fact of this double representation that either Hippodamas or Phrynichos was
of the required eminence to be appointed as Hammond's στρατηγὸς τῶν Ἐλλήνων. If we were to make any evaluation of the eminence of military and public figures in Athens in the late 460's from the evidence, scant as it is, apart from Cimon, a choice of who would be most likely to hold the hypothesized position, would seem to be between Ephialtes, Myronides and Leocrates, the latter two holding office in fact in 460/59. 10

It is also difficult to accept Hammond's assertion that the tenure of command for all commanders in the Greek League forces was from spring to spring, at least on the basis of the evidence he presents in support of the view. According to Hammond, 11 the fact that Themistocles commanded in Thessaly in spring or early summer 480, 12 and the fact that Xanthippus commanded an Athenian squadron in spring 479 13 and besieged Sestos in winter 478, 14 means that both men were appointed immediately after the Ἀρχαιεστὶ στρατηγῶν held in late February or early March of 480 and 479 respectively. The other strategoi elected at the same time or at a separate election about this time (in both years) waited until July before they assumed office. However, there is nothing unusual about Athenian strategoi being given operational command of forces in spring. It happened quite regularly during the Peloponnesian War. The coming of spring, after all, merely signalled the beginning of a new campaign season. Surely any Athenian general who is mentioned on operational duty in the spring of any year, whether it be as early as 480, or in the later years of the fifth century, must have been elected at the electoral ecclesia of the previous year. It is quite clear, for example, from Thucydides' narrative of events through the winter
of 426 to the spring of 425, that the generals Sophocles and Eurymedon, who were sent to Sicily in the early months of 425, were generals in 426. They commanded in spring 425 as strategoi holding office for the archon-year 426/5. There is nothing in Herodotus' narrative to suggest that either Themistocles or Xanthippus were specially elected to command in spring. All that the historian says of Themistocles is ἐστρατηγεῖν Ἀθηναῖων ἕκε Νεοκλέος, and all that he says of Xanthippus is Ἀθηναῖων ἐστρατηγεῖν Ξανθίππος ἦραππονος. This merely proves that Themistocles was a general for the archon-year of 481/0 and that Xanthippus was a general for 480/79, and is no indication that their tenure of office was for a different period of time than that of the other generals who held office in 481/0 and 480/79. There is no evidence whatsoever to support the view that the Athenians differentiated between generals of two categories on the basis of tenure of office, in order to conform with the Spartan system of command, and that they accordingly elected a single στρατηγὸς ἐξ ἐπαντῶν to hold office from spring to spring.

Of more serious ramifications, however, for an evaluation of the fifth-century Athenian strategia, is Hammond's proposal that from 480 until at least 429 the Athenians regularly entrusted one of her annual strategoi with a position of superior responsibility and power than the others; a position which in the first few years meant command-in-chief of the Athenian forces participating in the war against Xerxes under Spartan hegemony, but from 477 to probably 440 meant τηρονία of the alliance of Greeks as well; a position defined by Hammond as ὁ στρατηγὸς τῶν Ἑλλήνων initially relinquished by
Pausanias to Aristeides and sometimes identifiable by the double representation of one tribe. The idea that the Athenians appointed a single supreme commander during the Persian Wars is of course not new. Nor is the idea that Pericles, whose tribe frequently provided two generals to the board in the years between 441 and 429, was elected as the στρατηγὸς ἐξ ἀπαντων and therefore occupied a position of superiority to his colleagues. However, Hammond's theory that there is a direct connection between the position created by the Athenians in 480, and that occupied by Pericles in the 430's, is new. It has been the usual view that the creation of the single στρατηγὸς ἐξ ἀπαντων was a development of the second half of the fifth century. Hammond not only shares with some other scholars the view that Themistocles, Xanthippus and Aristeides held the superior position of στρατηγὸς ἡμείων or στρατηγὸς ἀυτοκράτωρ but argues that they were also στρατηγοὶ ἐξ ἀπαντων.

I have already argued that the Athenians reformed the electoral procedure in the late 480's eliminating the necessity for tribal representation in the strategia and began the practice of electing all the generals ἐξ ἀπαντων. Furthermore, as previously noted, Hammond's argument for the existence of a single στρατηγὸς ἐξ ἀπαντων in 480 is seriously weakened by the absence of evidence to support his conclusions that this position differed in terms of tenure from the other annually elected positions on the board. However, quite obviously, if the theory is correct that double representation beginning in 441 is an indication that one general was elected ἐξ ἀπαντων and the others ἄδω φυλῆς, and if Hammond is right that the origins of this system can be directly traced to a procedure
instituted in 480 of electing a single general with superior powers to the others, then the proposal that all generals were elected εἴς ἀναστῆσας as early as 480 merits no serious consideration. The problem divides itself into three separate areas of investigation. Firstly, is there any evidence in our sources for the period of Xerxes' invasion to support the view that certain generals held a superior position to their colleagues? Secondly, is it plausible to conclude that the instances of double representation which occur in the second half of the fifth century result from the election of the so-called single ἀναστήσας εἴς ἀναστῆσας? Thirdly, is there any evidence for the years after 477 to indicate different levels of authority among the strategoi? It is the purpose of this section to answer each of these questions in turn and to attempt to demonstrate that it is difficult to accept the widely held viewpoint which maintains that the principle of collegiality was not a characteristic of the strategia. It is here postulated that the extant evidence, far from proving that the Athenians either entrusted an individual strategos with superior powers and authority over his colleagues or created a position within the board which conferred more authority or prestige, indicates, in fact, exactly the opposite — strict adherence to the principle of collegiality.

Support for the conclusion that the ecclesia entrusted one of her strategoi with hegemony over his colleagues or supreme command of the Athenian contingent within the Greek League forces during the Persian invasion of Greece, is based to a large extent on Herodotus' account and to a lesser extent on certain expressions Plutarch uses in describing Themistocles and Aristeides. At Aristeides 8.1, Plutarch
says that the Athenians recalled exiles who had been ostracized because they feared Aristeides might go over to the Persian side, and he goes on to state ... \( \text{Θεμιστοκλέους στρατηγούς αυτοκράτορος,} \\
\text{πάντα συνέπραττε (Aristeides) καὶ συνεβούλευσεν, ἐνδοξότατον ἐπὶ} \\
\text{ἀμφιρή κοινῆ ποιῶν τῶν ἐκθεστῶν}. \) At Aristeides 11.1, Plutarch refers to Aristeides' position at Plataea with the following words:

\[ \text{Χειροτομθῆς δὲ στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ ἐπὶ τὴν μάχην, καὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων} \\
\text{ὀκτακισχίλιων ὀπλίτας ἀνιλεβῶν, ἤκεν ἐς Πλαταιάς.} \]

Plutarch's phraseology, describing Themistocles as στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ in 480 and Aristeides in 479, does not count for much, as Fornara has pointed out. 21 His sources, including Herodotus, have emphasized the role played by the most important of the Athenian generals, and he has gone a step further and transferred his own preconceived notions of the Athenian command structure onto Themistocles and Aristeides. Plutarch, writing in the Roman world of the first century A.D., has, quite simply, used the Greek equivalent of "imperator" 22 and has assumed that such an office existed in fifth-century Athens. 23 However, it is clear from Thucydides that the three generals sent to Sicily as στρατηγοὶ αὐτοκράτορες in 415 held no special office but were αὐτοκράτορες by virtue of special powers which enabled them to enjoy more freedom in certain areas of decision making. 24 Plutarch's conception of the Athenian command system is amply demonstrated in an anecdote he relates, derived obviously, from the same hostile tradition so apparent in Herodotus which testifies, once more, to the corruption of Themistocles. 25 According to Plutarch,

\[ \text{"Ἡδὴ δὲ τοῦ Μήδου καταβαίνοντος ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα καὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων} \\
\text{βουλευμένων περὶ στρατηγοῦ, τούτῳ μὲν ἄλλους ἐκώτας ἐκατέρω} \]
If I am not mistaken, this passage strongly implies that Plutarch envisaged the Athenian strategia as an executive institution of one elected official. When the Athenians were deliberating as to whom they would choose as their general, all the candidates withdrew from the contest for office except Epicydes and Themistocles. When it seemed that the office and leadership of the Athenian forces would fall to Epicydes, Themistocles resorted to bribery.

If this is not enough, there is one other story recounted by Plutarch which demonstrates even more conclusively how he has thrust his own notions of command onto the Athenian command structure, a story which again involves Aristeides and the Plataean campaign. According to Plutarch, Alexander of Macedon secretly visits the Athenian lines during the night and asks for Aristeides. Once Alexander has achieved his purpose and left and Aristeides has reported the information gained from him to Pausanias, the Spartan commander-in-chief orders Aristeides to transfer the Athenian contingent from the left wing to the right wing. The other Athenian strategoi are at first openly opposed to Pausanias' new orders and are only finally agreeable when Aristeides convinces them of the greater advantages and distinction of fighting on the right wing rather than the left. Plutarch says Herodotus is his source for the information that
Pausanias ordered Aristeides to change the Athenian position in the line. In his own words, 'Ἐν τούτῳ ἄν ὡς Ἡρόδοτος ἵστορεῖ, Παυσανίας Ἀριστείδης προσέφερε λόγον, ἀδίκητον τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐπὶ τὸ δεξίον μετατέθεις ... 30 Yet in Herodotus' account Aristeides is not mentioned at this point. It is the Athenian generals, and not Aristeides, who report Alexander's message, (οἱ δὲ στρατηγοὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἔλθον ἐπὶ τὸ δεξίον κέρας ἐλέγον Παυσανίῳ τὰ περ ἡκούσαν Ἄλκιμὴν) 31 and Pausanias orders them collectively to switch their position with the Spartan troops. Furthermore, when Alexander rides to the Athenian guard-posts it is to have a parley with the Athenian generals, (... Ἀλέξανδρος ἐπὶ τοῖς στρατηγεῖσι έστο λόγους ἔλθειν ) 32 whom according to Herodotus, he names, and not to have a private conversation with Aristeides, although the latter was presumably one of the generals Alexander requested to see. The only commander on the Greek side mentioned by name by Herodotus in relating this story is Pausanias. There is no indication that a difference of opinion existed between Aristeides and the other Athenian generals. Quite to the contrary. The Athenians immediately acquiesce and respond to Pausanias' orders. 33

There is no question as to the relative reliability of Plutarch and Herodotus. Where various actions attributed by Herodotus to the Athenian strategoi are ascribed by Plutarch to Aristeides, Plutarch's ascription may be due to constructive inference, 34 and if not, his source is more than likely merely a later untrustworthy embellishment, a later accretion, over-emphasizing for the sake of glorifying the pre-eminence of Aristeides. Yet, even though Plutarch uncritically reserves a pre-eminent position for Aristeides where
Herodotus does not, it is significant that he has Aristeides persuading his fellow strategoi to accept Pausanias' orders. How did this story develop if not on the underlying basis that the Athenian command system involved collegiality? Plutarch has unwittingly preserved the real mechanics of the internal decision-making structure of the strategia. However, it should be emphasized that the view is not acceptable which maintains that Plutarch should be preferred to Herodotus because Herodotus does not bring out the Athenian system of command. If Herodotus thought Aristeides was in sole command why does he have Alexander ask to talk to the Athenian generals collectively? Quite simply, scholars who start with the assumption that the Athenians conformed with the Spartan system of command by appointing their own commander-in-chief cannot then conclude that Herodotus is no help because he does not demonstrate the existence of a supreme strategos. I would suggest that the absence of an Athenian commander-in-chief is not due to carelessness on the part of the historian. Far from it. Command of the Athenian contingent was in the hands of in the hands of , in the hands of the men who received Alexander, reported to Pausanias and carried out his orders, and was not the preserve of a single general.

The only time Aristeides is mentioned in the ninth book of Herodotus is at 9.28.6 when the historian is detailing the size and order of the Greek forces at Plataea. According to Herodotus

\[ \text{το ευώνυμον, δησκασαίλιον έστρατήγησε δ' αυτών 'Αριστείδης } \]

Hammond would have us believe that this is an indication that the Athenian contingent was commanded by a single officer. At
first sight, certainly Herodotus' later narrative is contradicted by 9.28.6. However, the historian names only three Athenian strategoi for the years 481/0, 480/79 and 479/8 – Themistocles, Aristeides and Xanthippus. His interest is concentrated on the main actors. Precisely the same kind of apparent contradiction which exists between 9.28.6 and 9.44-48 is repeated in Herodotus' account of the operation at Sestos in 479/8. When the Greek forces which sailed from Mycale to the Hellespont found that the bridge had been destroyed, the Spartans under Leotychidas returned to Greece, but the Athenians remained – Ἀθηναίοι δὲ καὶ Ξάνθιππος τῶν στρατηγῶν αὐτοῦ ὑπομείναντας περιεβαίναν τὴν Χερσονήσου, and they besieged Sestos. At the conclusion of the operation the captured Persian officer Artayctes attempted to bargain with his captors, but ...τὸν στρατηγὸν ... οὐκ ἐπείθετο (Artayctes). Both these phrases in Herodotus seem to suggest that Xanthippus was in sole command of the expedition. However, during the actual siege, which proved a more drawn out affair than the Athenians anticipated, the troops ἐδειοῦ τὸ ῥῶν στρατηγῶν ὡς ἀπάγον τῷ σφαές ὡς ὄλοι δὲ οὗ ἔφασαν πρὶν ἦ ἐξέβαζον τὸ Ἀθηναίων κοινὸν σφαές μεταπέμφηται. If Herodotus considered that Xanthippus held the supreme command surely the Athenian soldiers would have addressed their request to him. It is implied that all the Athenian generals were of equal rank, that Xanthippus had no special or overriding authority.

Herodotus' descriptions of Aristeides at 9.28.6 and of Xanthippus at 9.114.2 and 9.120.4 are no more an indication that these two officers held supreme command at Plataea and Sestos respectively, than they are evidence for the presence of only one Athenian general in these areas of operation. If Herodotus knew the names of the
other strategoi who took part in the various battles against the Persians, it was not important to him. The same applies to his description of the battle at Marathon in 490. Of the three Athenian officers mentioned by name in his account of the Marathon campaign, the general Stesileos is noted simply as having died in action. The prominence given to Miltiades does not dispute the fact that the Athenians were commanded by ten generals - ἰσομοιροί ἐστί τοῦτον υἱὸν τῶν Ἳλλοντας δέκα. Nor does Herodotus' statement that Miltiades ἔστι ἑορτασμένος Ἀθηναίων mean that Miltiades held a specially defined position of superiority, as the subsequent narrative proves. Just as it cannot be argued that Herodotus is incorrect in assigning Miltiades and Callimachus the most important roles at Marathon, nor is it likely that the tradition preserving the importance of Themistocles, Xanthippus and Aristeides is incorrect in emphasis. However, it is an entirely different matter to assume that the historian's emphasis on the importance of Themistocles, for example, is in any way a comment on the position Themistocles occupied as strategos, a comment on the precise legal position he held in the strategia in relation to the other elected members of the board. The statements of Herodotus that Themistocles in Thessaly ἔστι ἑορτασμένος ... Ἀθηναίων, and that at Artemision he was ὁ Ἀθηναίων στρατηγός and at Salamis στρατηγός ὁ Ἀθηναίων, and that at Aegina Xanthippus ὁ Ἀθηναίων ἔστι ἑορτασμένος, do not intrinsically define positions of superiority within the strategia. We cannot, of course, categorically conclude that other generals were present, for example, in Thessaly with Themistocles or at Aegina with Xanthippus, and that these two officers were trammelled by equal colleagues as were Aristeides at Plataea, Xanthippus at
Sestos and Miltiades at Marathon, for reference to other generals is absent from the narrative. However, the statements under discussion have the same meaning as the statement at 6.104.1 that Miltiades ἐργαθεὶς ἈΘΗΝΑΙΟΙ ΕΠΕ and cannot be used in support of the hypothesis which maintains that the Athenians conformed with the Spartan system of command by appointing a single commander to lead their contingents within the Greek League forces. To put it differently, where Herodotus' narrative indicates that the Athenians employed a collegiate system of command, as at Plataea, Sestos and Marathon, the phraseology he uses in specific reference to Athenian generals he names is similar, and in some cases exactly identical, with the phraseology which describes individual generals engaged in operations where his account does not include any indications that more than one strategos was present.

Where Herodotus names only one Athenian general, his intention is not to indicate that the strategos in question did not share his command with other Athenian officers of the same rank, or to suggest that other strategoi who may have been present were subordinate to the man named. Rather, his intention is to inform us which of the three Athenians who gained in large part the credit for the victory over Xerxes participated in which action, to place the three strategoi Themistocles, Aristeides and Xanthippus at the various battles and areas of military operation. The anecdotes related by Herodotus about Themistocles' actions at Artemisium and Salamis, which demonstrate the important and influential role of Themistocles in determining the final decision to fight in both instances, do not provide any information about Themistocles' position vis-a-vis other
Athenian strategoi who may have been assigned with him to the fleet. In the case of Artemisium, the Euboeans bribed τὸν Ἀθηναίων στρατηγὸν, Themistocles, to influence Eurybiades, the Spartan commander, and the Corinthian Adeimantus, to stay and fight. It is most unlikely, however, that the series of events as related by Herodotus ever took place. The whole story of the Euboeans successfully resorting to bribery can be refuted on a number of grounds. If we can glean any information from the anecdote at all, we may perhaps be entitled to consider that there was some indecision among the Greek command as to the course of action to be adopted. At a conference on tactics, Themistocles may have been instrumental in settling any disagreements which existed. He may have simply presented a plan of action which was acceptable to the other Greek commanders, including Eurybiades, Adeimantus and perhaps Athenian strategoi as well.

It may very well be that the tactics employed by the Greek fleet at Artemisium to hold the Persians were Themistocles'. It is no more safe to conclude from this, however, that he was the only Athenian officer involved in the decision-making process than it is to assume that Eurybiades, Adeimantus and Themistocles were the only officers entitled to a voice at conferences. Surely the commanders of the contingents from Megara and Aegina, for example, were not excluded from deliberations. It would be just as unusual, to say the least, if the Athenians entrusted only one of her strategoi with the command of a fleet as large as 127 ships, especially when it be considered that several Athenian strategoi were assigned to the Greek fleet of 110 ships at Mycale. If it be accepted that the Athenians may have assigned more than one general to the fleet at
Artemisium, the possibility cannot be excluded that these commanders, in addition to Themistocles, attended council meetings and in the final analysis received orders directly from Eurybiades.

According to Herodotus 8.1, fourteen states were represented at Artemisium on the Greek side. Therefore, if at least one general from each contributing state sat at conferences, a minimum of fourteen men were present. However, the Plataeans served in Athenian ships within the Athenian command, and other states such as Styra and Ceos, which each supplied two ships, and Troezen, which supplied five, were probably also attached to a larger squadron, such as the Corinthian, and served under its officers. On this consideration the size of the council would be somewhat less than fourteen but may in fact have exceeded this number if some of the larger contributors, such as Athens and Corinth, employed a collegiate system of command.

There is indeed no reason to assume that the Greeks limited the size of council meetings to one representative from each state at either of the two sea battles, Artemisium or Salamis, or at Plataea, as Hammond asserts. Hammond is certainly right in concluding that if ten Athenian generals and perhaps five Corinthians and so on for twenty-four states all assembled when summoned by Pausanias at Plataea, the combined total of over one hundred men would be too unwieldy to operate, either to deliberate on tactics or to receive orders. However, there are several weaknesses in this argument. In the first place, some Athenian strategoi were with the fleet and not all ten were present at Plataea. This would also apply to the military executive of other states like Corinth and Megara who spread their resources between the army and the navy. Secondly,
such a huge total of general officers only exists if it be assumed that all states provided four or five commanders of equal authority. It seems a little perverse to argue along those lines. Even though the Athenian practice was to elect a board of annual strategoi, Sparta certainly did not. For all we know, none of the states represented at Plataea (with the possible exception of Corinth) had developed an institution in any way comparable with the Athenian strategia. Their systems of command may have conformed with that of Sparta quite by nature. The Athenian strategia, after all, developed as a result of Cleisthenes' democratic reforms, if its creation was not incorporated within the changes themselves. We may be sure that if the battle at Plataea had taken place in 510 instead of 479, the Athenian polemarch, and not Athenian strategoi, would have attended deliberations with military leaders of other states and received orders affecting his command from the Spartan commander-in-chief. Thirdly, although twenty-four states provided troops, Herodotus clearly indicates that some of them did so not as separate contingents but in combination. The three hundred troops from Potidæa in Pallene were added to the Corinthian contingent. The twin cities Mycenae and Tiryns jointly contributed four hundred hoplites. Therefore, twenty contingents rather than twenty-four comprised the Greek force.

It is still difficult of course to determine the exact size and composition of the group of general officers mentioned by Herodotus, for example, in the following statement: Τούτου δὲ τούτου...

Although any attempt to determine the number of
generals at war councils is purely guesswork, the problem can be approached with perhaps some degree of objectivity by an examination of the Greek army in line. The army was arranged in four divisions. This is not apparent in Herodotus' list of the Greek contingents but is noticeable in his account of the actual battle. The right wing was composed of the Spartans and their old ally Tegea. The Corinthians were at right centre, the Megarians at left centre and the smaller contingents were apportioned to these two divisions, undoubtedly with a view to making both centres approximately equal in strength. On the left wing the Plataeans were stationed with the Athenians. Quite obviously, the arrangement of the line, with the two most powerful contingents from Athens and Sparta on the wings and the Corinthians and Megarians in the centre, was planned. Instructions issued by Pausanias would be directed to the various divisions, rather than to contingents, and Corinth, Megara and Athens furnished the backbone of three of these divisions. Again, this is not to say that only four states were involved at meetings of strategoi. But if generals or polemarchs from, for example, the ten or so separate contingents which fought at right centre with the Corinthians attended conferences, the Corinthian high command (the most important) would have been present in whatever capacity it was constituted, whether it involved one general or several. Similarly, as in the instance of the Alexander episode, there is no reason to believe that the Athenian strategoi as a body did not report to and receive orders from Pausanias whenever it was necessary. It is at any rate preposterous to consider that the smaller contingents in the centre of the line would not have been satisfied with the presence of only one of their
officers at conferences, even if they employed a collegiate system of command. This consideration, in conjunction with the probability that collegiality was at this time unusual, makes it highly unlikely that Pausanias had to deal directly with more than about thirty generals.

In brief, the evidence in Herodotus that Athens assigned several strategoi, equal in power, to the command of her various naval and military contingents during 480 and 479, cannot be dismissed on the grounds of the impracticability of the system when operating in conjunction with a whole host of allies and the Spartan hierarchical system of command. What does seem remarkable is a situation where the Spartan commander-in-chief dealt with commanders of twenty or so separate contingents as if they conducted their activities on the battlefield completely independently. This is patently unreal. But this is exactly the situation envisaged by those scholars who assume that one officer commanded each allied contingent because the assumption is based, in the final analysis, on the consideration that the Spartan commander could only personally deal with and issue orders to officers if their numbers were restricted in such a manner. However, as hopefully has been demonstrated in the case of Plataea, the Greek line was not organized haphazardly but in distinct divisions. Each division, whether it comprised ten different contingents or only two, was itself a unit. It is not at all unlikely, but in fact eminently reasonable, to consider that at conferences the generals were organized by their divisional groups and that the Spartan commander-in-chief therefore dealt with groups of officers rather than individual contingent commanders.
To return to Herodotus' narrative, it has already been argued that none of the historian's statements about Themistocles, Aristeides and Xanthippus indicate that these Athenian strategoi occupied a special position in the strategia. It has also been noted that these individuals were singled out for attention by Herodotus because they were the men recognized as playing major parts in the Greek victory over Xerxes. Herodotus' attention to individuals is by no means unusual, often to the extent of gross distortion as, for example, in his assignation of the causes of the Ionian Revolt to the two tyrants Aristogoras and Histiaeus. Again, this is not to say that his emphasis on individuals during the Persian invasion is far wrong, particularly regarding Themistocles. In the last years of the 480's Themistocles was \( \delta \pi\rho\omega\tau\sigma\sigma\omega\nu\eta\rho \) in Athens. After the ostracism of Aristeides in 482, Themistocles had probably gained almost complete control of Athenian foreign policy. It was, at any rate, at his instigation that Athens developed her naval strength, not only for the war against Aegina, but also in anticipation of the Persian invasion. Furthermore, he persuaded the Athenians to make their main effort by sea in 480 and not to attempt to defend Athens. The ecclesia had accepted Themistocles' advice to evacuate Attica as soon as it was threatened with imminent invasion. When Attica was evacuated, the refugees went to Troezen, Salamis and Aegina. In view of this we can hardly consider that the Athenians did not expect the Greek fleet to fight at Salamis. In this context, and bearing in mind that it was Themistocles' plan which was adopted, it is no surprise that Themistocles was responsible, at the third conference of generals, for finally persuading Eurybiades, against the prevailing
mood of other Greek commanders, to fight at Salamis. We can be sure that the arguments used by Themistocles, detailing the tactical advantages of engaging at Salamis rather than at the Isthmus of Corinth, were his own. However, as Fornara has pointed out, this does not mean that the decisions enunciated by Themistocles did not represent the collective opinion of other Athenian strategoi present. Yet even so, Fornara, I suggest, understates the situation, or at least does not define it with perhaps enough precision. Themistocles enunciated the decisions made by the ecclesia. He was the natural spokesman for other Athenian strategoi, but also for Athens, for Athens had committed herself to his strategy.

In a similar way that the Athenian generals at Marathon each gave up the πουρανη to Miltiades, it is not inconceivable that Athenian generals at Salamis allowed Themistocles the important task of influencing Eurybiades to fight at Salamis. On the other hand, if Themistocles' own arguments and tactics were the major reasons for the victory of the Greek fleet, the chief credit for the success should go to him. Suffice it to say that the prominent role played by Themistocles can be explained satisfactorily without needing to assume that he held a position within the strategia of higher rank and authority than other Athenian generals. The role of Aristeides and Xanthippus in the remaining campaigns of the next year can be explained in exactly the same terms. Themistocles, apparently, for whatever reason, had no further significant contribution to make after the battle at Salamis. His proposal that the Greek fleet should consolidate their position by an expedition against the Hellespont and Ionia in order to cut the Persian army's communications with
Persia, was initially rejected by Eurybiades. If Herodotus is right, Themistocles may nevertheless have continued to press for such an offensive during the spring of 479. His arguments failed to impress the Athenians for the first time. By the spring of 479 the combined Greek fleet numbered only 110 ships. The Athenian contingent alone at both Artemisium (127 ships) and Salamis (180 ships) far exceeded this total. The Athenians had abandoned Themistocles' strategy of making their main effort by sea. Xanthippus and Aristeides were probably directing Athenian policy at this time. The two returned exiles were certainly restored to favour, for they were both elected generals in the spring of 479. It is here suggested that Herodotus' mention of Xanthippus and Aristeides during his narration of events is due to the fact that they were responsible for reversing Themistocles' strategy of the previous year, by advocating a more cautious naval campaign and an increase in the hoplite strength of the army at the expense of the navy. They were, for the time being at least, as Themistocles had been before, and this justifies the attention paid to them by Herodotus, rather than any legal powers of superiority they were granted over their fellow strategoi. They were the most important of the Athenian generals because they were also predominant as politicians.

In conclusion, I agree generally with Fornara's analysis of the Athenian command system as it operated during Xerxes' invasion. There is no doubt that when Sparta held the Ἐλλάδα of the Greeks against Persia she employed her own system of command, and appointed a commander-in-chief, conveniently described by Thucydides, in reference to Pausanias, as ὁ στρατηγὸς τῶν Ἐλλήνων, and described
by Herodotus, in reference to Leonidas, as παντὸς τῶν στρατηγῶν ἡμῶν. However, it is far from proved that each allied state had to provide a single commander for the operations of the war and for meetings of οἱ τῶν Ἑλλήνων στρατηγοῖ, and that Athens especially elected a single στρατηγὸς ἐξ ἀδελφῶν to take his place among οἱ τῶν Ἑλλήνων στρατηγοί. It certainly cannot be implied from Herodotus' use of the words οἱ τῶν Ἑλλήνων στρατηγοί in 9.50 that we have here a strictly definable term which was applied to a special group composed of a single officer from each state. Herodotus does not use the phrase consistently, and even if he did, it would hardly be enough to warrant the assumption, for example, that some Athenian generals (those elected ἐξ ἀδελφῶν on Hammond's hypothesis) were known as στρατηγοὶ τῶν Ἑλλήνων while others (those elected ὁμοῖοι φυλῆς) were not. Furthermore, there is no need to assume that a single Athenian strategos succeeded Pausanias as commander-in-chief of the Greeks, as στρατηγὸς τῶν Ἑλλήνων when Sparta was deprived of a hegemony of the Greek forces in 478. The Athenians, to be sure, accepted the ἡμερονία, and her strategoi would now be ἡμερονεῖς τοῦ παντὸς στρατηγῶν. This does not mean that the Athenians also continued the Spartan hierarchical system of command by appointing a single officer as commander-in-chief from among their own strategoi. If Aristeides was the only Athenian strategos with the squadron of thirty Athenian ships attached to Pausanias' command, which raided Cyprus and Byzantium in 478, he did in fact become the supreme commander of the expedition when Pausanias was recalled to Sparta. However, and in brief, the evidence in our sources for the structure of the Athenian strategia during Xerxes' invasion of Greece does not
indicate that individual generals were entrusted with special authority giving them legal superiority over their colleagues. The importance of Themistocles, Aristeides and Xanthippus is not to be explained by their possession of any such superior position within the strategia of ἱερεῖων or ἱερεῖων ἀυτοκράτωρ, nor by their regular appointment as sole commanders with any particular contingent by virtue of a special election procedure required by the need to conform with the Spartan system of command. The Athenian strategoi serving in operations against the Persians were of equal authority and when several generals shared the command of Athenian contingents within the Greek League forces under Spartan hegemony, they dealt with the Spartan commander-in-chief collectively.
If it be accepted that the Athenian strategia was a collegiate military executive during the war against Xerxes, that all Athenian generals who served in the Greek armies and navies in the various operations were of equal rank, then quite obviously the more orthodox viewpoint which maintains that a single strategos became commander-in-chief upon the demise of the polemarch is untenable. The probable double representation of Akamantis in 479/8 cannot be explained as a consequence of the election of a single ἵππος ἐκ ἀπαντων. However, until recently, double representation of a tribe in the strategia of the fifth century was thought to have involved only Pericles' phyle, Akamantis, in the years of his political predominance at Athens — and also that of Alcibiades, Leontis, in only once instance, 407/6. The known cases involving Pericles are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Generals</th>
<th>Source(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>441/0</td>
<td>Pericles and Glauc</td>
<td>And. F38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>439/8</td>
<td>Pericles and Glauc</td>
<td>IG i² 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>433/2</td>
<td>Pericles and Glauc</td>
<td>Thuc.1.51; IG i² 295.19-20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>432/1</td>
<td>Pericles and Carcinus</td>
<td>Thuc.2.13.1; 23.2; IG i² 296.36-38.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>431/0</td>
<td>Pericles and Carcinus</td>
<td>Thuc. 2.31.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It was on the basis of these examples that the theory of the single ἵππος ἐκ ἀπαντων initially developed which reserved
for Pericles the position of commander-in-chief or chairmanship of the board, or which merely allowed other capable men to be elected from Akamantis in the period when Pericles' continuous re-election was taken for granted. However, even though it became increasingly obvious that double representation was not confined to the tribe of Pericles, and often involved strategoi who were not particularly eminent, either militarily or politically, the theory remained well established until convincingly refuted by Fornara. In short, the occurrence of double representation of one tribe on the board of strategoi during some years of the fifth century had hitherto (before Fornara's contribution) been explained as a consequence of the election of a single στρατηγός Ὑς ἀπὸ ἀποντων.²

No apologies are made for entering this field of conjecture, not because the disruption of the orthodox theory leaves no satisfactory explanation of double representation, (although Fornara's solution ignores the fact that double representation may have occurred before about 460.³ Fornara, to be sure, argues, as I have done,⁴ that double representation is a consequence of the obvious, namely the election of all the generals ὑς ἀπὸ ἀποντων, rather than just one, although he dates this innovation to the time of Ephialtes' reforms in the late 460's rather than to the time of Themistocles' political predominance in the late 480's), but, in view of the fact that for the years of 441/0, 426/5, 425/4 and 424/3, evidence for the existence of a board comprising more than ten generals is difficult to dismiss. It is here suggested that an important consequence of the reform which enabled all the generals to be elected without regard to tribe was in effect the removal of obstacles which prevented a numerical increase
in the strength of the board. It is for this reason that an examination of well known evidence yet one more time is felt to be justified. This is not to say that double representation, as a general phenomenon, was the result of an increase in the number of strategoi but, if I am not mistaken, it may very well be that in some specific instances doubling should be explained by the election of extra generals. At this point it may be as well to state quite categorically, and to repeat, that there is no evidence of the Athenians ever having elected more than ten generals at the regular annual electoral ecclesia and therefore it cannot be concluded that this ever happened. But there is evidence that the Demos elected strategoi at assemblies other than the regular electoral assembly during the Peloponnesian War. It is the purpose of this chapter to attempt to demonstrate firstly, that double representation is not evidence for the existence of a single general elected who held the position of commander-in-chief or chairmanship of the board, and secondly, to provide an explanation for the apparently extraordinary size of the board in some years during the last half of the fifth century.

This involves, in the first instance, a review of the literature which has made some impact on the evolution or modification of the theory of the . It involves also a detailed examination of some examples of double representation which pose, it is thought, a decisive threat to the traditional theory, and an examination of the evidence, particularly in Thucydides, which indicates for some years a numerical increase in the size of the strategia.

The theory of the was first advocated by Beloch in 1884. Beloch believed that one general was regularly
elected without regard to tribe, while the other nine continued to be elected one from each tribe. This man was president of the board of strategoi for the year and commander-in-chief, and such a man could be identified by the double representation of his tribe. The commander-in-chief was elected \( \varepsilon \xi \alpha \nu \tau \omega \nu \) and the other man from the same tribe was elected \( \alpha \pi \nu \lambda \nu \). Beloch's arguments have been modified somewhat in the intervening century, but this concept of a single general elected \( \varepsilon \xi \alpha \nu \tau \omega \nu \) has remained unquestioned, except by Fornara, Bicknell and Staveley, as the explanation of double representation of Akamantis by Pericles and Glaucon or Pericles and Carcinus. 9

The first significant modification came in the early 1930's with Wade-Gery's idea that the original purpose of double representation was to allow an exceptionally eminent man, like Pericles, to be elected from all Athenians, and not permanently bar preferment in his own tribe. Wade-Gery considers that no strategos of the 420's, including Nicias, was of this eminence. 10 Wade-Gery's hypothesis that there was a modification of election procedure whereby after the election of a \( \sigma \tau \rho \alpha \tau \iota \gamma \iota \sigma \varepsilon \varepsilon \xi \alpha \nu \tau \omega \nu \) the remaining nine positions were filled by dropping the man with the fewest votes, thus leaving a tribe unrepresented, has been accepted by Jacoby, Gomme, Sealey and Hignett. 11

The effect of Wade-Gery on the development of conclusions concerning the strategoi is of some importance. Beloch's hypothesis that there existed an annual president of the strategoi was replaced by the notion that the \( \sigma \tau \rho \alpha \tau \iota \gamma \iota \sigma \varepsilon \varepsilon \xi \alpha \nu \tau \omega \nu \) had no strict legal basis.

The prevailing opinion which has persevered since the time of Wade-Gery is that the election of a single \( \sigma \tau \rho \alpha \tau \iota \gamma \iota \sigma \varepsilon \varepsilon \xi \alpha \nu \tau \omega \nu \) was created to overcome the difficulty caused by the continuous re-election
of Pericles, and that a general so chosen did not have increased legal powers but increased prestige. Although it became the orthodox view that the position was created due to the eminence of Pericles and for the benefit of his fellow-tribesmen, the suggestion of Accame and Ehrenberg that Pericles was not the only στρατηγός εξ αμανττων between 441 and 429, replaced Wade-Gery's premise that the privilege was the private monopoly of Pericles.

To this extent has Beloch's original theory been modified. His dictum of presidency has finally been discredited by Dover's demonstration that the phrase δέκατος αὐτός cannot be used as evidence that one general on the board had superior powers, as this adds considerable if not overwhelming weight to the argument that superior powers cannot be inferred from election ἕξ αμανττων. There are nevertheless some scholars who still accept Beloch's original thesis in terms of "chairmanship" rather than "presidency". Jameson suggests that the στρατηγός εξ αμανττων was the annually elected chairman of the board who had no superior powers to his colleagues, but whose special function, which entailed additional prestige, meant presiding over meetings of the strategoi and acting as group spokesman. As late as 1961 Lewis made the statement that "the formulae which had been thought to indicate chairmanship are not reliable guides but there remains some force in Jameson's contention that double representation of tribes arises rather from electing one general ἕξ αμανττων to provide a chairman than from any desire to ensure fairness to candidates in a tribe where the post was monopolized over a long period by one candidate". Hammond is critical of the view that the introduction of the στρατηγός έξ αμανττων was due to Pericles' continuous re-election,
yet his belief in the στρατηγὸς ἐξ ἀπάντων demonstrates how the theory has proved irresistible to modern scholars as an explanation of double representation. 17

The generally accepted view may be summarized as follows:

1. In any particular year, but not necessarily every year, the Demos could elect one στρατηγὸς ἐξ ἀπάντων. In such a year nine other generals were elected, each from a different tribe, but one of whom may have belonged to the tribe of the στρατηγὸς ἐξ ἀπάντων.

2. At least nine tribes were represented in any particular year, and if a στρατηγὸς ἐξ ἀπάντων was not elected, all ten tribes were represented.

3. There were never more than two generals supplied by one tribe in any particular year.

4. The position of στρατηγὸς ἐξ ἀπάντων did not confer special powers but entailed special prestige and was therefore limited to the outstanding statesmen Pericles, Nicias and Alcibiades. (Some scholars would also include Phormio in this group.)

5. Election ἐξ ἀπάντων was a device to break the monopoly of a man who was prominent enough to be assured of continuous re-election, by allowing another to be elected from the same tribe.

The modern term στρατηγὸς ἐξ ἀπάντων has been derived from Ath Pol 61.1, from Aristotle's statement, Ἀθηναίοισι ... στρατηγὸς δὲ ἐκ νὰ, πρῶτον μὲν ἄδικον ἐκάστης φιλὸσ ἔνα, νῦν δ' ἐξ ἀπάντων, ... As has been shown there is general agreement that a reform did take place in the fifth century, albeit one which is not in
keeping with *Ath Pol* 61.1, and seeks usually to explain the double representation of Pericles' tribe, Akamantis, between 441 and 429. Most scholars have followed Wade-Gery in ignoring *Ath Pol* 61.1. Jameson's contention that until shortly before the time of Aristotle each of the ten generals was elected from a different tribe, expresses the widespread opinion which places the reform mentioned in the fourth century. It is indeed incongruous that those who have placed *Ath Pol* 61.1 in the fourth century are also those who would extrapolate the three words στρατηγὸς ἐξ ἀνάντων to justify a theory explaining double representation in the fifth century. The fact is that the concern with the single στρατηγὸς ἐξ ἀνάντων has directed all attention away from the significance of Aristotle's mention of a reform, the only reform which is attested in the ancient sources. There is no evidence for the existence of a single στρατηγὸς ἐξ ἀνάντων in the sources for either the fifth century or the fourth century. As I have noted in the section where I discuss election procedure, *Ath Pol* 61.1 refers to a procedural change whereby all the generals, not just one, were elected without reference to tribal representation.

As yet there has been but one attempt to explain double representation in the fifth century in terms of the reform mentioned in the sources, and that by Fornara who thinks the Athenians effected a reform not for Pericles or his fellow-tribesmen but for everyone at the same time. Fornara's argument may be summarized as follows:

In 501/0, when the reform of *Ath Pol* 22.2 was effected, the ten strategoi were elected by their respective tribes, each one of Cleisthenes' ten new tribes electing one general. The elections to the strategia were modified some time after 487/6 when sortition was
introduced in the choosing of archons, and the strategoi became both politically important and no longer merely the leaders of their own tribes but on occasions of the whole army. The reform took place after 469/8, possibly as a consequence of the democratic innovations of Ephialtes in 462/1, but before the double representation of Erechtheis in 460/59.\(^{22}\) Fornara's theory is that the reform effected two basic changes:

1. The generals were now elected by the Demos as a whole.
2. The generals were elected without regard to tribal representation.

According to Fornara, his hypothesis allows more than a democratic improvement in accord with the reforms of Ephialtes. He argues that the archaic provision limiting representation to but one man in each tribe must have been felt to be unduly restrictive\(^{23}\) during the Pentacontaetia when the strategoi had become the politico-military executive of a now imperial state. A reform at this time (that is, the late 460's) which logically removed the restrictions to an efficient strategia composed of the most capable men\(^{24}\) explains very satisfactorily the instances of double representation, except of course that of 479/8, and is precisely the innovation of \textit{Ath Pol} 61.1. Furthermore, the need to devise a complicated election procedure whereby one general was elected \(\xi\xi\upsilon \alpha\pi\alpha\nu\tau\omega\nu\) and the rest \(\tilde{\alpha}\rho\omicron\upsilon\upsilon\phi\upsilon\upsilon\alpha\) is thus eliminated. The modern term \(\kappa\pi\omicron\alpha\gamma\omicron\upsilon\rho\omicron\upsilon\sigma\omicron\upsilon\delta\) \(\xi\xi\upsilon \alpha\pi\alpha\nu\tau\omega\nu\) and all it means in the currently accepted view, is relegated to the realms of fiction.

However, in addition to the fact that Fornara's conviction is highly questionable that \textit{Ath Pol} 22.2 means each general was
elected by his respective tribe, I would also suggest that his arguments are just as applicable, perhaps more so, if the reform (that is, the election of the strategoi without regard to tribal representation) is dated some twenty years earlier, in the 480's. At least the problem of double representation as early as 479/8 is thereby neatly resolved. Certainly there is no reason why *Ath Pol* 61.1 *must* describe a reform which belongs to the fourth century rather than the fifth century. The silence of the *Ath Pol* on the date of the reform which eliminated tribal representation indicates that the author either did not have the information or considered it unimportant. If he did not have the information and the reform occurred in the fifth century, as has been demonstrated is highly likely, it follows he was ignorant of the reasons for it, and the consequences of it. In the context of the circumstances of fourth-century Athens, it mattered little if the strategoi were chosen with respect to tribal affiliation or not. They were no longer the military executive leading Athens in a fight for survival against Persia any more than they were the politico-military executive of an imperial state leading Athens in a fight for the control of Greece. To be sure they were still the military executive, but in times of war or peace each general had specific and narrowly defined duties to perform. It seems that only one general had the opportunity to gain distinction on the battlefield, for only one was assigned the duty of leading hoplites on foreign expeditions. The primary responsibility of four other generals was the organization of the defence of Attica and the Peiraeus and the tedious supervision of the symmories. At the time of writing of the *Ath Pol* the strategoi were largely an
administrative body concerned with the day to day running of the mundane affairs of state. The contemporary situation was inimical to an understanding of the significance of the strategia in the fifth century and the significance of a reform which eliminated tribal representation in election to the office.

Cases of double representation, to be examined in detail, which pose a decisive threat to the traditional explanation and which strongly support a dating of the reform of *Ath Pol* 61.1 to the fifth century, are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Generals</th>
<th>Tribe</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>479/8</td>
<td>Xanthippus, Leocrates</td>
<td>Akamantis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>460/59</td>
<td>Hippodamas, Ph(ryni)chos</td>
<td>Erechtheis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>440/39</td>
<td>Phormio, Hagnon</td>
<td>Pandionis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>433/2</td>
<td>Archestratus, Proteas</td>
<td>Kekropis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>432/1</td>
<td>Proteas, Eucrates, Callias</td>
<td>Kekropis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>431/0</td>
<td>Phormio, Hagnon</td>
<td>Pandionis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>430/29</td>
<td>Phormio, Hagnon</td>
<td>Pandionis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>426/5</td>
<td>Lamachus, Sophocles</td>
<td>Oineis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>426/5</td>
<td>Hipponicus, Aristoteles</td>
<td>Antiochis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>425/4</td>
<td>Lamachus, Sophocles</td>
<td>Oineis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>424/3</td>
<td>Thucydides, Nicostratus</td>
<td>Leontis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>423/2</td>
<td>Cleon and unknown</td>
<td>Pandionis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nicias, Sophocles</td>
<td>Aigeis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>418/7</td>
<td>Alcibiades, Nicostratus</td>
<td>Leontis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>414/3</td>
<td>Lamachus, Charicles</td>
<td>Oineis</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**479/8 Xanthippus and Leocrates**

There is a strong possibility that double representation occurred as early as 479/8. This is argued by Bicknell. He suggests that if Leocrates, son of Stroibus, who was strategos in 459/8 can be identified with the Leocrates who was a strategos at
Plataea in 479/8, and if the inference can be drawn from IG i² 821 that Leocrates Stroibus belonged to the deme Hagnous, then there was double representation of Akamantis in 479/8, as Xanthippus, of the deme Cholargus, was also general in that year. Fornara has also identified the son of Stroibus with the general of 479/8, but is silent about his tribal affiliation.

IG i² 821 is a dedicatory inscription found at Markopoulo which fell within the territory of Hagnous.

It reads as follows:

\[\Sigma\rho\iota\omicron\beta\omicron\, \pi\alpha\iota\nu\alpha\iota\mu\alpha\, \Lambda\nu\omicron\kappa\omicron\acute{\iota}\kappa\epsilon\omicron\sigma\varsigma\, \epsilon\omicron\tau\omicron\omega\nu\delta\epsilon\omicron\eta\epsilon\kappa\omicron\upsilon\varsigma\]\n
\[\varepsilon\rho\omicron\omicron\epsilon\iota, \kappa\alpha\lambda\lambda\iota\kappa\omicron\acute{\iota}\mu\upsilon\varsigma\, \xi\omega\kappa\alpha\varsigma\epsilon\omicron\omicron\varsigma\, \kappa\alpha\pi\iota\omicron\varsigma\]

Bicknell suggests that Leocrates had this caption written for a dedication that was linked with his successful participation in the battle at Plataea. From the evidence Bicknell presents — the discovery of several grave inscriptions of Hagnousioi at the same site, and the discovery of a fourth-century inscription, which accompanied a dedication to Hermes by a known Hagnousios evidently set up, like Leocrates', at a local cult centre of Hermes at Hagnous — it would indeed by unusual if Leocrates was not a demotes of Hagnous.

460/59 Hippodamas and Ph(ryni)chos.

In a casualty list of the Erechtheid tribe, which Fornara dates to the archon year 460/59, two generals are listed. Whether or not there was double representation in this year depends on the meaning of \(\tau\omicron\ \alpha\omicron\tau\omicron\ \epsilon\nu\iota\nu\alpha\uptau\upsilon\). If \(\epsilon\nu\iota\nu\alpha\uptau\upsilon\) means "campaign year" the list could refer to both 461/0 and 460/59, Hippodamas being a general in the former year and Ph(ryni)chos in the latter. But if it means "archon year" there is certainly double representation in 460/59, for
the only evidence against it is the double assumption that there could only be one general per tribe, and that Ph(ryni)chos replaced Hippodamas. Either interpretation is compatible with Thucydides' account of the events attested to by the inscription where fighting occurred. However, as Fornara has pointed out, a campaign year is actually a season and ἔνιαυτός is not a season but a year. The possibility cannot be discounted that double representation occurred in 460/59.

440/39, 431/0, 430/29 Phormio and Hagnon.

There is good evidence that Phormio belonged to the deme Paiania and therefore to the tribe Pandionis. In Pausanias 1.23.10 Phormio retired to Paiania after his inability to pay a fine. Some scholars have held rigidly to the notion that Pausanias proves only that Phormio had property in Paiania. However, Phormio's retirement to Paiania supports the hypothesis that this was his deme. Secondly, many Athenians still lived in their native demes and he may simply have been one of them. This is more likely, for men who lived away from their demes surely moved to a more fashionable residential area, not away from it, for Paiania was not a fashionable district. Thirdly, as Fornara notes, Pausanias' source either inferred from the deme name of Phormio the place of his withdrawal or omitted the deme name because he considered it sufficiently obvious from his mention of Paiania, for otherwise Pausanias would have noted in some way that Paiania was not Phormio's deme. Fourthly, before the theory of the ἀρχηγὸς ἀρχαντὼν became widely accepted, it was generally thought that Paiania was the deme of Phormio - to preserve intact this theory it is necessary to allocate Phormio to another tribe.
because in 431/0 both Akamantis and Pandionis would have two representatives.

Of the other pieces of evidence the strongest is a fragment containing the list of generals who swore to observe the peace terms with Samos in 439/8. The difficulty of Wade-Gery's restoration, accepted for example by Ehrenberg and Sealey, is that it relies on the strategia of a Demokleides from Aigeis in this year. The relevant part of the fragment is:

\[ \Delta \epsilon [ \ldots \Delta \epsilon \nu e i d e s \ldots ] \]

\[ \nu \delta i c v i d e s \]

In the first place, names beginning with \( \Delta \epsilon \) are common, so that if Demokleides is not the correct restoration Phormio may not fit. Secondly, it is possible though less likely, that Aigeis is not the tribe here represented, and that Pandionis is doubly represented.

Thirdly, Hagnon, the other general apart from Phormio most regularly from Pandionis during the 430's, may have been strategos in 439/8. Fourthly, if Demokleides is correct, there are many seven-letter names instead of Phormio's which can provide fitting restorations, but the problem still remains one of proving that such a general belonged to Pandionis. All these objections have much less merit than Wade-Gery's original restoration, for they make the gaps much more difficult to complete.

We know that Phormio was strategos in 440/39 and also in 432/1, the next attested incidence of a general from Pandionis. If we are to judge from Phormio's later record it is probable that he was general fairly regularly between 440 and 432. Phormio's Acarnanian operations could have occurred as early as 439/8, but the more likely
date, and that generally accepted, is 432. In short, there is no other general of the 430's besides Pericles who is more likely to have held a nearly continuous strategia. If we had supplementary evidence for a generalship of Phormio in 439/8, the restoration would be virtually certain. The possibility of a Demokleides being general in 439/8 is strengthened by the fact that a man of this name was the proposer of the Brea Decree, which is usually dated between 445 and 438. If we assume that he proposed the decree as strategos, then there was a Demokleides prominent enough in Athenian affairs in the late 440's and early 430's to perhaps be general on several occasions.

Another indication of the deme of Phormio is IG i2 296 where in lines, 13, 17 and 23 a Φορμίσαντοι would provide a fitting restoration. This is not conclusive. However, the evidence of Pausanias and IG i2 50, when taken together, add up to more than mere coincidence. Phormio's deme is not unsafe, especially considering that scholars who reject the evidence do so simply out of the wish to preserve the currently held theory of election. The tribal affiliation of Hagnon is beyond doubt.

433/2 Archestratus and Proteas

Thucydides 1.57.6 names an Archestratus, son of Lycomedes, in command of a mission to Potidæa. We cannot identify this Archestratus with any of the others known, although it is conceivable that he proposed a rider to the Chalcis Decree in 446/5. More likely he was Treasurer to Athena in 429/8, and restoration of the deme-name Φωλεύς to IG i2 237 is as possible as any six-lettered
alternatives. However, the name Lycomedes present more attractive possibilities. Firstly, a Lycomedes from Kekropis is named in a casualty list of about 425. Secondly, a Cleomedes, son of Lycomedes, who was strategos in 416/5, almost certainly belonged to Phyle. Thirdly, Herodotus mentions a Lycomedes who fought at Artemesium, and who is connected with Phyle by Plutarch. Fourthly, a restoration of IG ii² 1446 at line three reveals a possible Archestratus Lycomedous of Phyle of the fourth century.

Hignett thinks we need more proof that the important family from Phyle which used the name Lycomedes, also used the name Archestratus. But if we assume that Archestratus did not belong to this family, which is the alternative, we must assume another prominent family which also used the name Lycomedes. This is not impossible but lacking in supporting evidence because during the fifth century prominent men of the name Lycomedes all came from the deme Phyle. We are not justified in dismissing the very probable tribal affiliation of Archestratus on the grounds that it is not absolutely certain and because it upsets the currently prevailing theory of the στρατηγῶν τῶν Αρχεστράτου. Archestratus may easily have been the son of the Lycomedes who fought at Artemesium and the brother of the general of 416/5. A combination of Thucydides 1.45.2, which lists the generals Lacedaemonius, Proteas and Diotimus on a mission to Corcyra, and IG i² 295 line nine, places the tribe of Proteas beyond doubt.

432/1 Proteas, Eucrates and Callias.

The evidence for a strategia of Eucrates is IG i² 296 line five. His identification with the demagogue places him in the tribe
Kekropis. This is safer than the Eucrates, father of Diodotus, mentioned by Thucydides, and whom Hignett tentatively suggests unless the father of Diodotus can be identified with the demagogue. Aristophanes refers to the demagogue Eucrates as Μελιτεύς Καλλίνος. Eucriates either lived away from his native deme or the demotic is correct. However, if Eucriates lived in Melite but it was not his deme, why did Aristophanes use the demotic to describe him? There is no evidence that people were identified by the deme in which they lived rather than to the deme to which they belonged, and it needs to be demonstrated, as Fornara points out, that Themistocles Phrearrios, for example, who lived in Melite, could be called Themistocles Meliteus. It is also possible that the Eucriates, brother of Nicias, who was strategos in 412/1, was also general in 432/1, in which case there would have been double representation of Aigeis, as Socrates Halaieus was general in 432/1.

Thucydides 1.61.1 names Καλλίνος τον Καλλιάδου πετρατον άρων στρατιωτών on a mission to Potidaea. The combination of PA 7827 and 7849 gives Callias the demotic Αἰσινώευς of the tribe Kekropis. Lewis, attempting to refute the ascription of Phormio to Pandionis, substitutes Callias for him as the seven-letter alternative in IG i² 50. Lewis argues that this Callias, as the likely proposer of the financial decree IG i² 91-92, and the renewals of alliances with Rhegion and Leontini, (IG i² 51 and 52) was no non-entity, and could therefore have been strategos in 439/8. His evidence is a fragment of a manumission list of about 320 which names a Καλλίας Καλλιάδου Παλανιεύς. However, PA 7848 and 7849 are equally suitable and Lewis' only reason for not accepting Αἰσινώευς as Callias' demotic
in the first place is that Proteas, his colleague in 432/1, belonged to the same deme.  

As Phormio's tribe is more likely to be Pandionis, it little matters if Callias came from Pandionis, Kekropis or neither. If he belonged to Pandionis there is double representation of three tribes in 432/1; if he came from Kekropis there is double representation of Akamantis and triple representation of Kekropis, and if he belonged to neither there is still double representation of Akamantis and Kekropis. But the theory of the στρατηγὸς ἐξ ἀναντων cannot be used in determining probability of demotics.

426/5 Hipponicus and Aristoteles.

Thucydides 3.91.4 names Hipponicus, son of Callias, on a mission against Tanagra. There does not seem any doubt that the deme of the Callias - Hipponicus family is Alopece, of the tribe Antiochis, as three separate inscriptions testify to the affiliation. Furthermore, Plutarch makes reference to a Καλλίας ὁ ἀληθικὸς who indulged in looting when Aristeides and his tribe, Antiochis, remained to guard the prisoners and spoils after the battle at Marathon.  

It is generally accepted that Aristoteles, the son of Timocrates, strategos in 426/5, can be identified with the Αἰσχροῖος Θεοφᾱλεῖ in IG i2 299, and Aristoteles of the tribe Antiochis who was hellenotamias in 421/0, oligarchic strategos in 411 and one of the Thirty Tyrants. It seems that PA 2055 and 2057 are the same person. However, even if they are not, Aristoteles' deme is safe enough, as Lewis has noted. The tribe Antiochis produced two generals in 426/5.
425/4 Sophocles and Lamachus.

Apart from the poet, Sophocles is the name of two other figures in late fifth-century Athenian history. A Sophocles was one of the Thirty in 404/3, and came from Oineis.\(^76\) Sophocles, the son of Sostratides, who was strategos in 425/4,\(^77\) has been identified as the oligarch by Fornara.\(^78\) Lewis' objection that the identification must be rejected because he is colleague of Lamachus, who certainly belonged to Oineis, is not sufficient reason to dismiss the possibility.\(^80\)

424/3 Thucydides and Nicostratus.

Thucydides the historian belonged to the deme Halimus and therefore to the phyle Leontis.\(^81\) It has always been considered highly likely that Nicostratus, the son of Dieitrephes, is the same as Nicostratus Scambonides, mentioned in Aristophanes' Wasps. Wade-Gery's argument that Nicostratus was a general in the years when Alcibiades Scambonides was not\(^82\) has been accepted without question by Sealey and Mattingly,\(^83\) but is not conclusive proof that Nicostratus belonged to the same tribe as Alcibiades.

According to MacDowell, at the performance of the Wasps in 422, Nicostratus Scambonides was present in the front row of the audience. He bases this conclusion on consideration of the manner of performance of Wasps 71-85.\(^84\) The front seats of the theatre were reserved for holders of certain offices, including generals, and Nicostratus, the son of Dieitrephes, was a strategos in 424/3.\(^85\) Although Nicostratus is a common name and another office-holder of this name may have had the privilege of occupying a front seat at the
performance of the play in 422, nevertheless the identification of the general with the Scambonides is strengthened. An argument by Fornara further increasing the possibility has been prompted by the discovery by Vanderpool that the grandfather of Nicostratus the general was Euthoinos. The proposition that Aristophanes is thinking of Nicostratus' grandfather when he puts the words \( \phi \lambda \chi \theta \psi \eta \chi \) and \( \phi \lambda \chi \varepsilon \varepsilon \psi \eta \) into the mouth of Nicostratus is not too forced an association for the playwright, but not so probable that the identification of the two Nicostratoi with each other is certain, as Fornara thinks. However, it is not unreasonable to conclude that Nicostratus the general most likely belonged to Leontis. A good reason, at least, is necessary to reject the identification.

423/2 Cleon and Unknown.

If Cleon was a general in this year, there is double representation of Pandionis, but some scholars have expressed doubt that he held office in 423/2. According to Thucydides Cleon left Athens for the Chalcidice \( \mu \epsilon \tau \alpha \nu \varepsilon \kappa \varepsilon \chi \varepsilon \iota \rho \alpha \varepsilon \nu \). The usual view is that Cleon did not leave until after the Pythian Games which were held in Metageitnion (August) 422, and that he was therefore a general in 422/1, but not in 423/2. This view is based on Thucydides' phrase at 5.1.1 \( \alpha \mu \varepsilon \nu \varepsilon \nu \iota \alpha \iota \iota \sigma \sigma \o \sigma \alpha \chi \iota \iota \chi \iota \lambda \epsilon \lambda \nu \tau \o \sigma \mu \tau \iota \iota \nu \o \nu \), meaning that the truce continued until Metageitnion. But Thucydides does not give a date for when Cleon left Athens and the Scholia on Aristophanes' Peace, 48, reveals that Cleon was killed eight months before the production of the play at the Dionysia of 421. The play was performed in Elaphebolion or April. The death of Cleon, according to this, was therefore in Metageitnion, the same month that the Pythian
Games were being held.

However, it is generally agreed that Thucydides 5.1.1 is corrupt or some words have dropped out. McGregor believes that the phrase means "the year's truce had been broken and remained so until the time of the Pythian Games" rather than "the truce for the year ended, after lasting until the Pythian Games". McGregor's translation obviates the necessity to extend the truce past the logical date for expiry, April 422, for the truce, to last for a year, began in Elaphebolion 423. Even if we ignore the possibility of corruption in Thucydides' text, and accept the expiry date as April, the whole matter becomes much simpler. Cleon left Athens \( \nu\varepsilon\tau\alpha \tau\eta\nu\varepsilon\iota\psi\iota\rho\iota\nu \), that is, in early summer 422, and was killed shortly after the Pythian Games were held. Even if the battle at Amphipolis took place in September, it is still late enough in the summer to be compatible with Thucydides' chronology. The appearance of \( \text{M} \text{υρρινας} \) in IG i² 324, line 38, dated 423/2, means there was another general from Pandionis in this year.

423/2 Nicias and Sophocles.

One case of double representation, apart from that of Pericles' tribe, which has been used to support the theory of the statesman Nicias and the poet Sophocles, and is based on the following anecdote in Plutarch.

\[ \text{καὶ διὰ τῶν μήτας ὧν καὶ διὰ τῶν πλοίων} \]

\[ \text{καὶ διὰ τῶν δόξαν ὧν ὄγκος. Λέγεται δὴ ἐν τῷ στρατηγῷ τούτῳ} \]

\[ \text{Βούλευσαν τι κοινὴ τῶν συναρχῶν, κελεύσαντες ὑπ' αὐτοῦ} \]

\[ \text{πρῶτος εἰπεῖν ἡμῶν Ὀσφοκλῆς ὅς ποιηθής ὡς πρεσβύτατος} \]
It is certainly beyond doubt that Nicias and Sophocles both belonged to Aigeis. 99 Westlake considers that the πρεσβύτατος accorded to Nicias by Sophocles can be explained by his election εξ ἀνάβρων, the point of the original story being a reference to Nicias' special position on the board, and not as Plutarch has naturally assumed, a reference to his wealth and fame. 100 Jameson concluded that the post of στρατηγός εξ ἀνάβρων could be filled by some other than Pericles, that it involved merely chairmanship of the board's discussions and was occupied only by men who were experienced strategoi. 101 Dover concedes that Nicias was στρατηγός εξ ἀνάβρων but is inclined to the view that Plutarch is right in ascribing πρεσβύτατος to Nicias' personal achievements rather than constitutional position, that the story is not incompatible with rotation of chairmanship among all the generals, rather than Jameson's suggestion, and the incident occurred when Nicias was taking his turn in the chair. 102 Woodbury takes the point a little further. Although he is non-committal about whether Nicias' precedence was due to Plutarch's reasons or to his election εξ ἀνάβρων, he suggests that the customary prestige he was accorded by his colleagues was on this day inhibited because he was in the chair and he adopted this procedure to overcome the inhibition. 103

However, Woodbury is basically concerned with confining a generalship of Sophocles to 441/0 by casting doubt on the authenticity of the anecdote, 104 but his argument is not conclusive enough to warrant rejection of Plutarch, especially since the tone of the story conforms with the tradition which contrasts the abilities of Sophocles as a poet with his lack of military acumen. Woodbury suggests that

ἀν τῶν συστρατήγων, "Εγώ," φάναι, "παλαιότερος εἰμί, σὺ δὲ πρεσβύτατος." 98
the anecdote is a conflation of two events, namely the strategia of Sophocles in 441/0 when he was involved in the expedition against Samos, and operations against some Samian exiles at Anaea in 428 or 427, which Nicias may have commanded. Woodbury uses an hypothesis advanced by G. Perrotta to show how such conflation may have occurred. Perrotta took a statement in the *Vita* 9 that Sophocles, when sixty nine years old, was a general in the war against the Anaeans seven years before the beginning of the Peloponnesian War, altered the text to read πρὸ τοῦ νεολοποννησίκην κυρρίων σπονδοῦν, thus dating his generalship to 428/7 rather than 439/8, named the poet and Nicias as colleagues in the campaign as well as for 428 /7, and allowed the age of Sophocles as reported to remain unchanged if his birth – according to the Parian marble – occurred in 497/6.

The weakness of the whole reconstruction is the assumption that Nicias was involved. The Athenian forces were νῦν διάδεκα και Λυσικλέα εἰς μυπον αὐτῶν στρατηγῶν. There is certainly room for Nicias here, but may we not be sure that Thucydides would have named the man whom he later calls the foremost man in Athens, if he was a partner in this command? There is no other reason to assume that Nicias held office in 428/7. However, it is not impossible, as he was certainly general in 427/6, and according to Plutarch Nicias was often the colleague of Pericles. Apart from this, there is no other evidence for a generalship of Sophocles in 428/7. The *Vita* 9 probably refers to a strategia of Sophocles during the Samian revolt or to a further campaign, with Sophocles as general, in 439/8 against the Samians who settled in Anaea in 439. It is not necessary to dismiss entirely the evidence of the *Vita* for a generalship.
of Sophocles in a year other than 441/0. He may indeed at some time have been the colleague of Pericles and Thucydides the son of Melesias.\textsuperscript{113} But the attempt to link Plutarch's anecdote with \textit{Vita} 9 and Woodbury's hypothesis that events involving the Anaeans in the early part of the Peloponnesian War became confused with the Samian revolt of a decade earlier with regard to Sophocles' generalship, are invalidated by the assumption that Nicias was general in 428/7.\textsuperscript{114}

Furthermore, the $\pi\rho\varepsilon\sigma\varsigma\upsilon\tau\alpha\tau\omicron\omicron\varsigma$ is not appropriate if the dating of the anecdote is to be 428/7. If the incident took place at all, it probably occurred after Nicias already had considerable achievements to his credit, that is, between 421 and 415, after the Peace of Nicias.\textsuperscript{115} The view that Sophocles was elected general in 423/2, when diplomatic rather than military abilities may have been required for negotiations with Sparta, cannot be dismissed.\textsuperscript{116} Certainly Nicias was entitled to Sophocles' $\pi\rho\varepsilon\sigma\varsigma\upsilon\tau\alpha\tau\omicron\omicron\varsigma$ by this time. He had already served as general in 427/6, 426/5, 425/4 and 424/3. It is no less reasonable to consider that Sophocles, who was in his seventies, if a date in the 490's is accepted for his birth, may by 423 safely refer to himself as $\pi\alpha\lambda\alpha\omega\tau\alpha\tau\omicron\omicron\varsigma$ in the real meaning of the word. If the story came from Ion, 423/2 would seem to be the terminus ante quem for the incident, because Ion died in 422/1.\textsuperscript{117} On such a date Thucydides and Plutarch are complementary for it is during the summer of 422 that Thucydides refers to Nicias as the foremost statesman in Athens.\textsuperscript{118} Thucydides lends support to the natural interpretation of Plutarch, that Nicias' precedence was due to his personal authority, and Sophocles' remarks are a compliment and an acknowledgement of his political prestige and influence in the state rather than deference.
to any official rank which set Nicias apart. In short, Plutarch's source may just as easily have described Nicias as πρεσβύτατος as a result of his wealth and fame than for another reason which has been lost or unmentioned. If Nicias and Sophocles were both generals for 423/2, there is double representation of both Aigeis and Pandionis for this year.

418/7 Alcibiades and Nicostratus.

Alcibiades belonged to the deme Scambonides. The restoration of his name and demotic in IG 1 2 302, line 18, fits perfectly the available space and means Alcibiades was a strategos in 418/7. Thucydides' phrase καὶ ἐλέγων οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι Ἀλκιβιάδου πρεσβύτου παρόντος, does not prove that Alcibiades was not a general at the time of Mantinea, not because he may have been elected at a by-election, although that is possible, but because there is no reason to suppose that the Athenians could not use a general as an ambassador. The diplomatic abilities of Alcibiades were put to use. Alcibiades was general in 420/9, 419/8, 417/6, 416/5 and 415/4. Why omit him from 418/7 and break the continuity simply because he plays the role of diplomat, and when there is evidence to the contrary? Nicostratus held a joint command with Laches in the summer of 418.

414/3 Lamachus and Charicles.

Charicles, the son of Apollodorus, general in 414/3, can be identified as one of the Thirty, and belonged to Oineis. Lamachus was killed in Sicily during this year.
In summary, the theory of the stragyn'qos ek ΑΠΑΝΤΩΝ is seriously weakened by the many cases of double representation which are apparent from 441/0 onwards. The theory is virtually destroyed by the almost certain incidence of more than one case of double representation in certain years, and the triple representation of Kekropis in 432/1. The instances of at least two tribes doubly represented are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Generals</th>
<th>Tribe</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>433/2</td>
<td>Pericles, Glaucos</td>
<td>Akamantis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Archestratus, Proteas</td>
<td>Kekropis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>432/1</td>
<td>Pericles, Carcinus</td>
<td>Akamantis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Proteas, Eucrates,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Callias</td>
<td>Kekropis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>431/0</td>
<td>Phormio, Hagnon</td>
<td>Pandionis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pericles, Carcinus</td>
<td>Akamantis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>426/5</td>
<td>Lamachus, Sophocles</td>
<td>Oineis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hipponicus, Aristoteles</td>
<td>Antiochis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>424/3</td>
<td>Nicostratus, Thucydides</td>
<td>Leontis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lamachus, Sophocles</td>
<td>Oineis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>423/2</td>
<td>Nicias, Sophocles</td>
<td>Aigeis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cleon, Unknown</td>
<td>Pandionis</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If Archestratus was also strategos in 432/1 there was quadruple representation of Kekropis in this year. Furthermore, the problems for those scholars who believe in the existence of a stragyn'qos ek ΑΠΑΝΤΩΝ are not alleviated by proposing alternative tribal affiliations for such strategoi as Eucrates and Callias. From their viewpoint the situation worsens, if that is possible. If Eucrates was Nicias' brother and belonged to Aigeis he was a colleague of his fellow-tribesman Socrates Halaieus, thereby producing a
third double representation in 432/1. If he is not to be affiliated with either Aigeis or Kekropis there is still the problem of double representation of Kekropis by Proteas and Callias. But alternative demes for Callias are even more difficult. If this Callias was general in 439/8 on the basis that his name be restored in IG i² 50 instead of Phormio's, as a general from Pandionis, the problem then involves disproving Phormio's affiliation with Pandionis for he was also general in 432/1. However, Callias' restoration depends on the identification of Callias with the proposer of the decrees IG i² 51 and 52, for quite obviously if he was not as predominant in Athenian affairs as Phormio during the late 440's and early 430's Phormio's name must be preferred in IG i² 50. The proposer of the decrees could quite easily have been Callias Hippponicus Alopecethen of the tribe Leontis, father of Hippomaticus, strag.egos in 426/5. Therefore, the generalship of a Callias Calliades Paianieus in 439/8 is very questionable. Callias, the son of Calliades, general in 432/1, cannot be assigned to Leontis because there is no known link between his family and the Callias-Hippponicus family. In short, double representation of at least two tribes in 432/1 cannot be satisfactorily explained away.
CHAPTER 6

The Size of the Board.

If the numerical strength of the strategia varied from year to year and in fact fluctuated even during the time space of a year, quite obviously the theory of the στρατηγείς ἐξ αἵρων is totally destroyed. The theory, after all, is based on the assumption that tribal representation was a firm constitutional requirement only partially loosened in some years to allow the election of two generals from a single tribe, and which resulted in just one tribe failing to gain representation. It would indeed seem a little perverse to argue that instances of double-doubles merely necessitate a modification of the theory to fit the new evidence, a modification, for example, which permitted two chairmen or which allowed more than one man to be honoured by election ἐξ αἵρων. Major difficulties would follow. Once it be admitted that double-doubles occurred, there are no good reasons to impose a limit on two στρατηγείς ἐξ αἵρων per year as there are if the evidence firmly suggested only single double representations. Evidence of triple representations add, of course, further complications. It is not possible, however, to determine with any exactitude fluctuations in the size of the strategia within a given year, because of the nature of our sources. The death or deposition of strategoi does not necessarily mean that replacements were immediately elected or co-opted in some way. We must assume for example that generals who are named by Thucydides on operations towards the end of an archon year (May–June), but who
are not mentioned as holding office earlier in the year, were in fact strategoi for the whole year unless Thucydides says otherwise. There are in fact certain years where evidence for the existence of a board of generals comprising more than ten generals is difficult to dismiss even by postulating by-elections to replace generals killed or disgraced. An attempt, first of all, shall be made to demonstrate the extraordinary size of the strategoi in the years 441/0, 433/2, 426/5, 425/4, 424/3 and 414/3. Secondly, the difficulties of reducing the numbers to ten at any one time in some of these years will then be considered.

441/0

In 1941 F.W. Lenz found that the Venice manuscript of the Scholia on Aelius Aristeides contained the names of eleven generals for the year 441/0. The list is as follows:

Σωκράτης Ἀναμιράσιος
Σωφοκλῆς Σοφίλλου ἐκ Κολωνοῦ
Ἀνδρικής Λέωνικου Κυδαθηναίος
Κρέων Σκαμβισκής
Περίκλῆς Σανθέππου Χολαργεύς
Γλαύκων Λεσίρου ἐκ Κεραμείων
Καλλίστρατος Ἀχαρναῖος
Σένοφθων Ἑυριπίδου Μελιτεύς
Λαμπίδης Πειραιαῖος
Γλαυκής Ἀθηναῖος
Κλείτοφθων Θωραίος

About 1875 Wilamowitz inspected the Venice manuscript but
had found only ten names, overlooking that of Lampides Peiraius.² Wilamowitz suggested replacing the incorrect or corrupt demotic ἈΘηναῖος with Ἀσηνειῶς, thus preserving the official tribal order by allocating Glauketes to the eighth tribe, Hippothontis. This correction was accepted until the discovery of the eleventh name. When Lenz added Lampides Peiraius to the list he replaced ἈΘηναῖος with Ἀφιναῖος in place of Wilamowitz's Ἀσηνειῶς, thus solving the problem as he saw it, of the missing ninth tribe and double representation of tribe eight by Lampides and Glauketes.

For the purpose of discussion, it is convenient to divide modern opinion into two broad groups. One group accepts eleven generals on the grounds that it offers evidence for the position of στρατηγὸς ἐς ἀπαντῶν.³ On this view ten of the generals occupy positions of στρατηγικὰ παρά πολλὰ while Pericles, whose tribe is doubly represented, is στρατηγὸς ἐς ἀπαντῶν. The other group has rejected the possibility of more than ten generals being elected in any year and has sought to remove one of the names from the list. Most have followed Wade-Gery's solution to a greater or lesser degree, that Lampides Peiraius is an "alternative suggestion for the corrupt word ἈΘηναῖος".⁴ Jacoby took this a step further by suggesting that the scholiast, proving that ἈΘηναῖος was corrupt, looked up Glauketes and found that he could be a member of either of two families which belonged to the demes Peiraius and Lamptraï.⁵ The scholiast reproduced both demes in the list, Λημνῖδαι being a corruption of Λημνίποι. Fornara has pointed out the weakness of these arguments by noting that "the scholiast, in that case, would not have reproduced the problematical word ἈΘηναῖος". He goes on to suggest that Glauketes is a doublet of
Glaucon, that the scholiast found the name in the list without a
demotic and added Λήνυνίς as an afterthought. Λήνυνίς to
Fornara is not a corruption.

If Fornara is right, we would expect Glauketes to appear
in the list after Glaucon, not between Lampides and Cleitophon, where,
conveniently, there is a space for a general from tribe nine. The
fact that the names and demotics are in the official tribal order
suggests authenticity. The heading in the scholion, ΤΩΝ ΔΕΚΑ,
στρατηγῶν, suggests that the list should be emended to ten names,
but a much simpler explanation is to emend δέκα to έν δέκα. However,
as Hammond points out, the δέκα is referring to the generals who went
to Samos, and the names are the list of generals for 441/0 from the
Atthis of Androtion. Thucydides informs us that ten generals were in
command of operations against Samos in 440; the scholiast may simply
have been unaware of the discrepancy. This explanation is much more
acceptable than the hypothetical attempts to remove a name made by
Wade-Gery, Jacoby, Fornara and others.

If we accept that this list represents a board of eleven
generals for 441/0, the problem of the deme and tribe of Glauketes
remains unsolved. On the one hand if the scholiast had no demotic for
Glauketes, there is another explanation worth considering; that he
came from the deme Peiraeus of the phyle Hippothontis. This would
mean Glauketes and Lampides belonged to the same deme. Because they
shared the same demotic, that of Glauketes could have dropped, the
demotic of Lampides referring to both - this occurring some time before
the text reached the scholiast. Finally, in further transmission,
Glauketes' name appeared independent of Lampides', and without a
demotic. On this hypothesis the list would therefore contain double representation of two tribes, Akamantis and Hippothontis. On the other hand if we accept Αθηναίος as a corruption of Ἀθήναῖας, (Lenz's correction being more plausible than that of Wilamowitz) all the tribes are thereby represented.

For those who find it necessary to reduce the board to ten by removing a name and demotic, the onus of proof rests with a conclusive argument by them that the position of Lampides Peiraieus and Glauketes Athenaios in consecutive order of tribes is merely accidental - that is, it is not enough that there is no other reference to a Glauketes from Aiantis, for there is certainly evidence for a Glauketes from Hippothontis.

433/2

Thucydides 1.57.6 states: - ἐνήχον ἡμέρα

τριάκοντα μαζὶ ἀποστάλλοντες καὶ χίλιοις ὀπλίταις ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν αὐτοῦ

'Αργεστράτου τοῦ Ὀνυμήδους μετ' ἄλλων δέκα... στρατηγοῦτος.

This army of 1,000 hoplites was sent to Potidaea in anticipation of the revolt, but Thucydides 1.59.1 notes that by the time of its arrival Potidaea was already in revolt. According to Thucydides 1.61.1, when news of the revolt reached the Athenians they sent a second army, Καλλίαν τὸν Καλλιάδου πέμπτον αὐτὸν στρατηγὸν. Thus, if the text of Thucydides is to be trusted, sixteen generals were involved in the siege of Potidaea at the same time. But most scholars have rejected the number δέκα except Lenz. The accuracy of the text cannot be questioned on
the grounds that at least as many generals would have accompanied Callias and 2,000 hoplites as accompanied Archestratus and 1,000 hoplites. Apart from the fact that Callias was to reinforce Archestratus rather than to operate independently, the evidence in Thucydides suggests that an inconsistent relationship exists between the number of generals sent on campaign and the size of the forces they commanded. Nevertheless, the problem of Thucydides' unusual expression, μερισμένα μέκα, still remains. Could it be that Thucydides has here departed from his customary use of the αὐτός formula? If that is the case, emendation of the μέκα to τρισάρπον or ἄρα is difficult to accept, thereby strengthening the likelihood that there were more than ten generals in 433/2. However, if the expression is corrupt all that can be said is that we do not know if Archestratus had command with two, four or ten colleagues.

An attempt by Thompson to solve the problem is based on his restoration of the financial document IG i² 296, line 5, which reports that a loan was made during the second prytany (August 432/1) to a general Eucrates and his colleagues. Thompson argues that Eucrates was a colleague of Callias, that the name and demotic of Callias can be conveniently restored in IG i² 296 and that Archestratus and his two colleagues were the remaining three of Callias' four colleagues. If Thompson is right Archestratus and his colleagues were strategoi for 432/1 as well as 433/2. Such a conclusion presents the possibility of quadruple representation of Kekrops in the strategia for 432/1. The weaknesses of the argument are of course the assumption that Archestratus had two colleagues and the fact that there remains
some conflict with Thucydides. The natural meaning of Thucydides 1.61.1 is that five generals in command of 2,000 hoplites and forty ships left Athens together. There is evidence that Thucydides means exactly this. If the five included Archestratus and two others who were already in the north, logically the details about the size of the force sent with Callias should also include the forces of Archestratus. But after the siege of Pydna, which involved the forces of both Archestratus and Callias, the combined forces marched towards Potidæa, τρισχείλιοι μὲν ὀπλίταις ἑαυτῶν, χωρίς δὲ τῶν ἐφημέρων τοῦλος, ἱππεῖς δὲ ἐξ Κασσάπης Μακεδόνων τοῖς μετὰ Φιλίππου καὶ Παυσανίου ἀμα δὲ ἀρχάς παρέπτειν ἐξαρχήσατο.¹⁹ The forces mentioned in Thucydides 1.61.1 do not include the army of Archestratus. Attractive as is Thompson’s argument, his restoration is not conclusive enough to override the natural meaning of Thucydides 1.61.1, that 2,000 hoplites and forty ships left Athens with Καλλιάν τῶν Καλλιάδου πέμπτον ἀρτιῶν στρατιῶν.

None of the attempts to explain away the ten colleagues of Archestratus have been successful.²⁰ The strongest reason for rejecting the number is Thucydides’ phrase, but without wishing to exaggerate the possibility, I do not believe any argument is strong enough to prevent a stalemate. The question remains open despite almost unanimous agreement that the text is unsound.

426/5

The generally accepted opinion is that Demosthenes and Procles were generals for 427/6 and not for 426/5, and that Demosthenes was general in 425/4.²¹ If we are to judge from Thucydides’ narrative, the expedition of Demosthenes and Procles around the
Peloponnese left Athens about the same time or a little earlier than that of Nicias against Melos. Nicias had a force of sixty ships and 2,000 hoplites, surely adequate to subdue Melos in a relatively short space of time. But Nicias had to leave Melos, after devastation of the land had failed to reduce it, to meet Hipponicus and Eurymedon at Tanagra. Now that it is more likely that the battle of Tanagra occurred in 426/5, rather than in 427/6 as has been previously thought, Nicias probably left Athens towards the end of the old archon year. Demosthenes and Procles were besieging Leucas at about the same time that Nicias was detained in Melos.

Before the Aetolian expedition of the Athenians, the Aetolians sent to Corinth and Sparta for reinforcements to attack Naupactus. When the reinforcements assembled at Delphi in the autumn of 426/5 under Eurylochus they contained 500 hoplites from Heraclea Trachinia, a colony which had been founded at about the same time that the Athenian expedition against Tanagra was completed. Operations against Tanagra must have occurred very early in the archon year of 426/5 to enable the Spartans to establish their colony and draw on its manpower for a campaign before winter. Clearly the appeal from the Aetolians arrived too late for the Peloponnesians to assist them against Demosthenes and Procles, but the arrival of Eurylochus so late in the year means either his force was delayed for some time, about which Thucydides is silent, or more likely, that the Aetolian debacle occurred later than has been thought and not in 427/6 as Sealey would have us believe.

On the strength of Thucydides 3.94 and the inference that Nicias' conquest of Melos was cut short by plans to meet with another
Athenian force at Tanagra, the Aetolian expedition of Demosthenes and Procles must have occurred about the same time, if not later. If we allow only three months for the attack on Leucas and the Aetolian campaign, knowing that Demosthenes remained near Naupactus for some time before late September 426 when the Spartans assembled at Delphi, the expedition against Melos probably left Athens some time in May. Allowing for some delay at Melos the Athenian blockade at Leucas could then be dated about mid-summer. From all this it would seem that the Aetolian expedition occurred about early August or July. This date explains more satisfactorily the late arrival of Eurylochus on the scene. Demosthenes and Procles were Athenian strategoi in the Aetolian campaign and were therefore in office for the year 426/5. As Gomme says it is still in the summer of 426, though near autumn.

It is difficult to accept that Thucydides' phrase, τὸν εἰς τὴν Ἀἰτωλίαν Ἀθηναίων στρατηγὸν αὐτοῦ, as interpreted by Fornara and Sealey, means that Demosthenes was no longer general in the winter of 426/5, or the view that his generalship expired after his failure in Aetolia. It would seem from Thucydides 3.104.4 that Demosthenes had command of some Athenian ships in the autumn of 426. Earlier he had left Leucas to invade Aetolia against Acarnanian wishes, so it is unlikely that he had the use of an Acarnanian fleet at this time. It is possible, as Gomme notes, that the original thirty Athenian ships had returned or that some of these had remained with Demosthenes when the main body sailed home in Thucydides 3.98.5. If these ships were Athenian, Demosthenes must have been strategos to use them to obtain Acarnanian reinforcements to defend Naupactus.
Clearly, some Athenians had remained with Demosthenes when the rest went back to Athens after the Aetolian campaign, for he commanded a detachment of Athenian archers at Olpae in the winter of 426. Unless he was still in office it is difficult to see how he could retain command of Athenian troops, especially now that two other generals were on the scene. That Aristoteles and Hierophon had been sent out to supersede Demosthenes cannot be correct for they made no effect to interfere with his command, and after they had cooperated with him at Olpae sailed on to Naupactus. These two generals having gone on to Naupactus, Demosthenes must have had command of some Athenian ships to return to Athens immediately after the battles of Olpae and Idomene, with both the booty the Acarnanians and Amphilochians had given him as a personal gift, and the sixty Athenian archers he had commanded.

In the spring of 425 Thucydides tells us that Δημοσθένει...
anaxwvdeiv hμις λακωναίας is that Demosthenes was a private
citizen after his return from Acarnania. It could be that Thucydides
means to tell us that Demosthenes had remained in Athens "without
a command" until now, (as Gomme) and was therefore still a general,
but this is avoiding the issue. If we accept the natural meaning and
the more likely interpretation that Demosthenes was a private citizen,
Thucydides' intention must be to inform us that Demosthenes was not
a general after he returned from Acarnania.

Sealey has used the inference implied as evidence that Demos-
thenes was not general for 426/5. But the description of Demosthenes
is unique in Thucydides. He refers to no one else in the same terms.
An equally valid interpretation is that Demosthenes had been deposed
from office in the winter of 426 and had afterwards perhaps been re-
instated. We know that he was afraid to return home after his failure
in Aetolia and he probably expected to be deposed. He could easily
have been deprived of office, without knowing it, at a regular
έμπχειροτονία, this taking place after the generals Aristoteles
and Hierophon had left on their mission around the Peloponnese. The
arrival of these two strategoi would certainly end Demosthenes'
authority over the Messenians and the Athenian archers if he was not
recognized by them as a colleague, even if the independent Acarnanians
kept him as one of their leaders. It is unlikely that the Athenians
would have heard of Demosthenes' winter victories until he arrived
himself, the spoils allocated to the Athenians and which he sent on
before him having been captured on the way. Thus, when he arrived
towards the end of winter he was ἄπωρ but he was quickly restored
to favour. He was acquitted by the dikasteria of the charges brought
against him at the ἐπεισόδιον (for his failure in Aetolia), because of his winter successes, and therefore resumed office. He was elected general for the next year, 425/4, and granted a commission in April to use the fleet, as it sailed to Sicily, on the coast of the Peloponnese. It is difficult to see how Demosthenes could be empowered to use the fleet around the Peloponnese, to be in a position of command where two other generals were present, unless he was strategos himself. Secondly, he was left at Pylos with five ships to garrison the place. Thirdly, he was able to summon the ships of Eurymedon from Zacynthus, and Eurymedon acted according to his message. Fourthly, when the armistice was agreed on in Thucydides 4.16 it is "with the consent of the Athenian generals". The only general Thucydides names as being present at Pylos at this time is Eurymedon. Sophocles undoubtedly was present also. But Demosthenes as the instigator of the events at Pylos and the commander of the garrison there, must be included among the decision-makers. Fifthly, in Thucydides 4.29.1 Demosthenes is τὼν τε ἐν Πυλονᾳ στρατηγὸν ἐνα. This is by now in August of 425 and therefore in the archon year of 425/4. Demosthenes was certainly strategos in 425/4 as Sealey and Fornara have been quick to point out. But Demosthenes had already been authorised to command troops in April 425 and had been at Pylos for more than two months in this capacity before Thucydides mentions, in passing, that he was a general. His position was now no different than before midsummer. If Thucydides had failed to mention Cleon's desire to share the command at Pylos with Demosthenes and to add the additional scrap of information, the prevailing opinion would be that Demosthenes was neither general
for 426/5 nor for 425/4.

Between 4.105.2 and 4.29 Thucydides does not specifically refer to Demosthenes as strategos. But when the historian names a general on campaign he does not find it necessary to always describe him as general. Taking all the evidence into consideration we cannot dismiss Demosthenes from the board of 426/5 purely on this basis. I suggest that the use of the word ἀρχηγός by Thucydides means that Demosthenes was dismissed from office during the winter of 426 but reinstated when his victories at Olpae and Idomene were confirmed, Thucydides' information being that Demosthenes was not a general (as Fornara) after his return from Acarnania, but was when he left for Pylos in April 425. He had also been elected strategos for 425/4 by this time.

Aristophanes' Acharnians, lines 593 to 619, (produced in February 425) attests a generalship of Lamachus in 426/5. This is usually discounted in view of a later passage in the play which suggests that Lamachus was not a strategos. The belief which maintains that lines 593 to 619 were last minute additions certainly helps, as Lewis has noted. Lamachus may have been chosen at a by-election, possibly as a replacement for Procles who was killed earlier in 426.

If Demosthenes, Procles and Lamachus be considered as strategoi in 426/5 there are thirteen generals in this year.

425/4

Cleon is significant in Thucydides' History as the only major political figure whom the historian condemns for his conduct and his character. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the second
debate on Pylos, and Thucydides' primary motive in giving a detailed account of this scene is undoubtedly to expose the personal failings of Cleon. But there is no reason to doubt that Thucydides has here given a factual account of what happened during the debate, if we ignore the unfavourable motives and feelings which he attributes to Cleon throughout. It is indeed very possible that Thucydides himself was present on this occasion. The episode is certainly significant in the attention it draws to the conduct of the assembly and the picture it portrays of Nicias, but the ultimate significance from Cleon's point of view is that he gets the opportunity to lead troops in the field, as far as we know for the first time. He is in fact embarked on a military career, including membership of the strategia for successive years until his death in 422. Surprisingly there has been no attempt to interpret this scene from the point of view of the possible motives of Cleon.

The whole debate on Pylos is dominated by Cleon, and all his arguments are those which are acted upon from the outset. It was Cleon who was instrumental in rejecting the peace overtures of Sparta in the first debate. He was later successful in accusing the messengers from Pylos of making a false report, for he was chosen as a commissioner to find out the true facts. Cleon's next step was:

This passage demonstrates that Cleon was not a general and that only generals had the authority to lead and command troops.
The remaining part of the debate can be summarized as follows:

1. The Athenians clamoured for Cleon to go to Pylos and Nicias offered him the command on behalf of the generals. Cleon accepted.  

2. Cleon withdrew from the command stating that Nicias was general but he was not.  

3. When the assembly and also Nicias became more insistent Cleon finally reaccepted the appointment.  

Are we to believe with Gomme that Nicias revealed "light-hearted dereliction of duty"? We have already seen how Cleon has dominated the proceedings throughout and that it is his recommendation that the ecclesia approves and adopts. It is interesting that Cleon twice alludes to the fact that he was not a general whereas Nicias was. An equally valid interpretation is that Nicias was forced by popular demand to give his support to Cleon. Let us assume that Cleon wanted the command but could not see his way clear to obtain it because he was not general, and moreover there were strategoi in the city who were available to command. It is useful at this point to remember that Cleon was a demagogue, he owed his political prominence to his ability to assess correctly changes in the political climate from moment to moment, from day to day, to his skilful manipulation of popular opinion, to his ability to control the ecclesia.

When he stated that if he were general he would go to Pylos, popular demand was so strong that Nicias could do nothing in opposition. By again protesting to lack of official rank, Cleon ensured that he had overwhelming support and that Nicias as a general had virtually
none. It is thus plausible that Cleon was in full control of the situation throughout the debate, that he gained his first military command in the best way he knew how, through his skill as a demagogue. By appearing reluctant to assume the command Cleon's purpose may have been to make certain there was no last minute reaction to deprive him of it. As Westlake has pointed out, Cleon's political opponents, reluctant to support Nicias, would probably vote against his appointment unless he was being jockeyed into it against his will. 55

A successful campaign at Pylos would be the beginning of a military career, and Cleon, adept at the role of the opportunist, had no reason to be orthodox in his methods. It is quite possible and indeed probable, that Demosthenes had asked for more troops, 56 and Cleon chose Demosthenes as his colleague, relying on his experience and his eagerness for victory. The whole Pylos affair had developed as a brainchild of Demosthenes and failure would undoubtedly destroy his military career. In view of Cleon's references to his lack of official rank prohibiting him from command it follows that he was elected strategos. It is clear that Nicias did not resign from the strategia to make way for him for he was in joint command of an operation with two colleagues into Corinthian territory 57 soon after the Athenian victory at Pylos. Cleon's use of allied troops does not prove that he had no authority to command Athenian hoplites. The situation at Pylos called for light-armed troops. Moreover, Cleon is seen to be acting as an equal partner with Demosthenes at Pylos which would surely be unlikely if their authority was not identical, if Demosthenes was the senior both in military experience and rank. The possibility that Cleon was strategos in 425/4 cannot be dismissed
easily. If Thucydides had mentioned the entire episode in a single sentence, merely noting that Cleon was appointed to command reinforcements sent to Pylos, this would be viewed as evidence adequate for placing a strategia of Cleon in 425/4. If Cleon was a general there were eleven strategoi in this year.

424/3

There are thirteen generals named by Thucydides as strategoi during 424/3. If the possibility of Cleon is also added the list is fourteen. Nicias, Nicostratus and Autocles swore to the armistice in the spring of 423. Demosthenes and Hippocrates fought in the Megarid during August 424. Thucydides and Eucles were engaged in the Thraceward region against Brasidas in December 424. Demodocus, Aristeides and Lamachus were collecting tribute in the summer of 424. Pythodorus, Sophocles and Eurymedon were generals in Sicily during the summer of 424. There have been no lack of suggestions to explain the extraordinary size of the board, but all of these have been concerned with the objective of reducing the number to ten. Of these suggestions three will be considered in detail.

Sealey postulates three alternative compositions, firmly believing in the necessity to reduce the numbers but equally firmly undecided as to the names to remove from the list. He eliminates Eurymedon immediately on the basis that Eurymedon and Cleon could not be on the board in the same year because they both belong to Pandionis. From two of his reconstructions he omits Thucydides on the basis of Wade-Gery's suggestion that because Nicostratus and Thucydides both came from Leontis, Thucydides may have had a special command. On the two lists where Thucydides is omitted, Demodocus, Aristeides and
Lamachus are removed from the first, thus leaving nine names, and Sophocles and Pythodorus are removed from the second, leaving ten names. On the third list where Thucydides is added, Demodocus, Aristeides and Lamachus are again left off. The names common to all three lists are Nicias, Nicostratus, Cleon, Hippocrates, Demosthenes, Autocles and Eucles. Sophocles and Pythodorus are included on two lists, Demodocus, Aristeides and Lamachus on one and Thucydides on one. If any of these lists is as equally viable as the others then we must assume Sophocles and Pythodorus were more probable candidates than those on only one list - but this situation exists only because Eurymedon has already been eliminated.

It is by no means certain that Eurymedon belonged to Pandionis, yet this assumption is the foundation of Sealey's reconstruction. Further, if Eurymedon was not strategos in Sicily, if he held a position of lesser responsibility, why was he fined on his return to Athens? The phrase ἦσσε κτιστάτης Σικελία, καταστρέφασθαι ἡμῶν perhaps applies to all three men, Sophocles, Pythodorus and Eurymedon. In this context the banishment of Sophocles and Pythodorus and the relative leniency to Eurymedon, while implying lesser responsibility to the latter, suggests that the responsibility be considered in terms of "degree" rather than "position". It could easily have come about:— the opinion of Pythodorus and Sophocles concurred to outvote their colleague, the degree of responsibility thereby accruing to Eurymedon being less. This is reflected in the sentences. Eurymedon convinced the ecclesia. There are other possibilities but Sealey's suggestion is not compatible with the narrative of Thucydides which certainly implies, as Comme says, that the three
stand and fall together. Finally, Thucydides refers to them collectively as τῶν στρατηγῶν, surely evidence enough by itself. 68

The fatal weakness of Sealey's reconstruction is that it is based on the theory of the στρατηγῶν ἐξ ἀπόφασιν. If Thucydides was not a regular general, what criterion do we use to determine who was, or who was not, a general? The phrase στρατηγὸν τῶν ἔτη ἔφηκας 69 must mean that Thucydides was an elected general, otherwise we must regard the History as unreliable source material for reconstructing lists of the strategoi. The weakness of Sealey's argument is further demonstrated if we suppose for a moment that Aristeides' deme was known, and he belonged to the tribe of Nicias, or Demosthenes. In such a situation would Aristeides be dealt with in the manner of Thucydides or Eurymedon?

Fornara lists nine generals for 424/370, expressing doubts about Demodocus, Aristeides, Pythodorus, Sophocles and Eurymedon. All these men are assigned to the preceding year 425/4. Fornara's main objection to assigning them to 424/3 is that "we do not know whether they were re-elected or not". 71 In the case of the generals in Sicily, "if there were not prosecution but we heard nothing of them in the year 424/3, would we still presume they were generals?" In the case of Aristeides and Demodocus, Fornara thinks this will not have been the first time a general failed to return at the expected time, because of delay or exceptional circumstances. Thucydides 4.75.2 indicates a strategia for Lamachus, a colleague of these two in 424/3.

The case against the generals who were collecting tribute
is Thucydides 4.50.1 which names Ἀρίστειδῆς ὁ Ἀρχιππός, εἰς τῶν ἀρχομένων νεωτάτων ἀρχατήρων, ἀνεξεπερμυθότων πρὸς τοὺς εὔμηκους in the winter of 425. If the only reference to these generals was 4.75, they would be strategoi for 424/3. If Aristeides' unnamed colleagues of 4.50.1 were Demodocus and Lamachus, then all three were certainly in office during 425/4. But there may have been two separate operations with Aristeides engaged in both. His colleagues may have been different. Thucydides describes the attack on the Megarid, which occurred in 424/3, immediately before detailing the activities of the tribute collectors. Unless we ignore the chronological sequence of the narrative, these three generals were actively engaged during 424/3. If this is a different mission to 4.50.1, then these men were in office for 424/3.

However the possibility, and the accepted view, that the operation lasted from the winter of 425 until the autumn of 424, cannot be overlooked. It is reasonable to believe that commands were extended into the next Attic year for reasons such as delay, but can we assume that the length of this mission is the consequence of delays or special circumstances, that the Athenians expected this operation to be completed before the beginning of the new official year, or thereabouts?

The further attested activities of the generals may have been part and parcel of their sailing orders. Their main objective was to collect tribute, but of nearly equal importance they were required, as the only Athenian force in the area, to maintain stability and meet any threats. It is not usual for Thucydides to give details of routine operations. The tribute collecting forces only rate a mention in 4.50 and 4.75 because they became involved in activities
of greater significance, yet these activities in the Hellespont, at Antandros and in the Black Sea, suggest that the operation involved something more than the collection of tribute. Furthermore, could Athens afford the luxury of sending out three strategoi merely to collect debts? Collecting tribute must have been a fairly lengthy procedure in itself, and the further operations undertaken, even if begun in the early summer, cannot have been expected to be completed (by the ecclesia) before the beginning of Hekatombaion.

The excursion of Lamachus into the Black Sea confirms his strategia for 424/3. It also increased the likelihood that Demodocus and Aristeides were also elected. The separation of Lamachus from his colleagues only proves that they were now acting independently, not that Aristeides and Demodocus sailed home because their term of office had expired. For all we know the collection of the tribute was not completed and the generals worked separately for this purpose. The onus of proof rests with those who would remove Aristeides and Demodocus from the list because Thucydides 4.75.1 indicates that they were strategoi in the summer of 424/3. The possibility of Fornara's argument cannot be denied, but what is needed is refutation of Thucydides' chronology, not a discussion designed to conveniently reduce the board to ten.

In the case of the generals in Sicily the narrative of Thucydides would appear to provide the answer. Pythodorus and Sophocles were banished and Eurymedon was fined for having taken bribes to depart when they might have subdued Sicily. Although it is not significant that there is no indication that the Athenians intended to supersede the three strategoi, as Fornara has shown, nevertheless
Thucydides implies that the Athenians were not expecting the return of their army from Sicily during the summer of 424. To the criticism that the Athenians expected victory and that the only thing they did not expect was a peace without victory, the answer is the further implication in Thucydides that the generals should have remained in Sicily until victory was achieved. The clear indications from this are that the Athenians were not going to supersede the generals at the end of 425/4 and that the three men had the authority to command during 424/3. If they were not prosecuted and we heard nothing of them in 424/3, there would be no case for their strategia, but if they remained in Sicily we would have to presume they were strategoi.

MacDowell believes that the fourteen generals (at least) did hold office during 424/3, but never more than ten at a time. The larger number is due to by-elections. He postulates that the generals in office at the beginning of the official year were Aristeides, Demodocus, Demosthenes, Eurymedon, Hippocrates, Cleon, Lamachus, Pythodorus, Sophocles and another whose name is not known. At the end of the year the list comprised Aristeides, Autocles, Demosthenes, Demodocus, Eucles or an unknown, Cleon, Lamachus, Nicias, Nicostratus and another unknown. The generals on the first list but missing from the second were certainly either killed or dismissed before the end of the year. Pythodorus and Sophocles were both dismissed and probably Eurymedon also. Thucydides and Eucles may have been elected to replace two of these unless either of them is the unknown of the first list. Thucydides was exiled before the end of the year. Eucles may well have shared his fate, and Hippocrates was killed at Delium during the winter of 424. Autocles, Nicias, Nicostratus and two
others were elected at by-elections to replace any of those removed during the year, again under the proviso that one of them may have been the unknown of the first list. According to this reconstruction six generals were replaced at by-elections (five if Eucles was not dismissed). One of the seven possible replacements was also the unknown on the first list, and of the five strategoi whose names we have, he could have been any one of Thucydides, Eucles, Nicias, Nicostratus or Autocles.

This elaborate reconstruction is based solely on the assumption that all strategoi who are not mentioned by Thucydides on campaign during the summer of 424, but who held commands after the summer, had been, with the one unidentifiable exception, elected at by-elections. The weaknesses of such an argument are obvious and there is no other year where the number of strategoi and their military activities during summer, winter and spring are so fully documented as to create a parallel situation. Shall we assume for example that Nicias, who was strategos in all the years from 427/6 until 423/2, and that Nicostratus, who was general in 427/6, 425/4, 423/2, were both elected at by-elections in 424/3? The likelihood is that neither were, yet if these two were both regular strategoi at the beginning of the new official year, one could fill the vacancy in MacDowell's first list, but the other would bolster the list to eleven names.

The list of generals for 424/3 may have included fourteen men.

414/3

Some conclusions that may be drawn from Thucydides' account
of the events of the year 414/3 pose direct contradictions to the orthodox viewpoints about the appointments of strategoi and the number that could be elected in any one year. According to the narrative of Thucydides there is the possibility of thirteen generals for this year, who are as follows:— Nicias, Pythodorus, Dietrephes, Lamachus, Charicles, Demosthenes, Conon, Eurymedon, Euthydemus, Menander, Demaratus, Laispodias and Euetion.

A scholium on Aristophanes' *Thesmophoriazusae* 841 dates the death of Lamachus 81 a few years before the play, that is, in the year 415/4. The dating of the events of Thucydides 6.96-105 cannot be calculated precisely except from the Aristophanes scholiast. On such a calculation, Thucydides 6.96-102 occurred before Hekatombaion (July). Thucydides' chronology is consistent with the view that the Athenian reinforcements arrived in Sicily in late spring. In Thucydides 6.94 and 6.95 it is still "spring," but it was not until "summer" that the Syracusans learnt of the arrival of the reinforcements. 82 The return of the Athenian forces to Catana 83 cannot have been much earlier than late April, if we are to judge from the several activities which they undertook, and it may well have been later. If the Syracusans did not learn of the arrival of the Athenian reinforcements until the first or second week in May, the first battle of Syracuse and the death of Lamachus occurred not many days before the beginning of the new official year, allowing several weeks for the series of events which culminated in the capture of the second Syracusan wall.

The activities of Gylippus 84 occurred very soon after he heard of the Athenian circumvallation of Syracuse. 85 If we date Thucydides 6.104 as close as possible to the Syracusan defeat, the
movements of Gylippus can be confined to the first weeks in July, but no earlier. It follows from this that the Spartan invasion of the Argolid occurred at the turn of the Attic year or later, for it is clear that 6.104 is roughly contemporaneous with Thucydides 6.105. On such a calculation the Athenian raid into Laconia belongs to the Attic year of 414/3, towards the end of July or early August. Even if the Spartan expedition can be dated to June the Athenian response can hardly be confined to 415/4. Pythodorus, Laispodias and Demaratus were generals for 414/3. Therefore, if the scholium on Aristophanes is to be used as a guideline, the events of 6.94 - 6.105 are to be confined between April and August. Such an interpretation fits neatly with Thucydides' chronology of the rest of the events in Sicily during the remainder of the summer of 414.

It is possible however that the Athenian raid into Laconia should be dated to September 414. Thucydides states at 6.105.1 άμερ τας σπονδας φευρόμενα τας προς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίων αὐτών ἔλυσεν. If the truce began in November 421 and ended as a consequence of the Athenian raid, it is necessary to date the mission of Pythodorus after the beginning of September.

The imprecise nature of the chronology of Thucydides is no help, but does not invalidate such a late date. If the death of Lamachus is kept in the archon year 415/4, the events of Thucydides 6.103-104 must be spread over a longer period of time than Thucydides' narrative suggests, and the events of Thucydides 7.1-7 must be correspondingly compressed. Even if the scholium on Aristophanes is ignored and the death of Lamachus is placed in the new official year, the chronology of Thucydides, imprecise as it is, must be subjected to
some distortion, Certainly, Lamachus was killed after the elections of spring 414 and we may be sure he was re-elected. The only objection that can be raised is that Lamachus was not on active duty in 414/3, but even this is uncertain. All that can be said is that his death was accidental and very close to the turn of the Attic year. On this basis he must be included on the board of strategoi for 414/3.

The only other general whose strategia for 414/3 may possibly be questioned is Conon. His stay at Naupactus may have continued into the next year, but the twenty Athenian ships confronting the twenty-five Corinthian vessels at Naupactus during the spring of 413, which were initially dispatched from Athens during the winter of 414/3, were undoubtedly the same force which Conon sought to reinforce in case of attack by the Corinthian squadron. Presumably he had already lost two of his twenty ships by this time, which may explain his call for reinforcements.

The problem of the large size of the board has been neatly skirted by Fornara, who divides the generals into two categories. The first category consists of the generals in Sicily, including Demosthenes, Eurymedon, Menander and Euthydemus as well as Nicias and Lamachus. According to Fornara these men occupied specially created positions not fixed by the time limit imposed on the regular office by the annual spring elections. Thus from 415/4 until 413/2 the generals in Sicily were not subject to the procedure of annual re-election, nor were they members of the regular strategia, for their office was not that of στρατηγός but of στρατηγὸς ἀνεκφάτωρ. At the elections in the spring of 414 the Athenians elected a board of
ten regular generals, of whom we know seven, and these fall into Fornara's second category. By this reasoning, in 414/3 there were sixteen generals in all, but six occupied the extraordinary office of στρατηγὸς ἀυτοκράτωρ.

The weakness of Fornara's argument lies in his assumption that the Athenians created the new position of στρατηγὸς ἀυτοκράτωρ. There is by no means unanimous agreement that such an office existed. The usual view is that an official was ἀυτοκράτωρ by virtue of special powers conferred on him by the ecclesia, not by virtue of powers pertaining to an office. It means that officials were empowered to make decisions without receiving instructions from the ecclesia, decisions which were binding on the state, but which were designed to gain a particular end which had already been determined. Such a view is consistent with every instance in Thucydides where an official, or group of officials, is designated as ἀυτοκράτωρ.

In Thucydides 1.126.8, when Cylon was besieged on the Acropolis, ἐπιτρέφοντες τοὺς ἑνών ἀρχοντίς τὴν φυλακὴν ταῖς καὶ τὸ πᾶν ἀυτοκρατοῦν διαβείναι ἐν ἀν ἄριστα διαγραφόμενοι. It is the archons who are entrusted with extraordinary powers in the methods adopted to blockade Cylon. In Thucydides 5.45.2 Spartan envoys arrived at Athens καὶ λέγοντες ἐν τῇ βουλῇ περὶ τε τούτων καὶ ὡς ἀυτοκράτορες ἥκομεν περὶ πάνων ἑμῖν ἔμμεθαι τῶν διαφόρων. The Spartan envoys had power to negotiate with Athens without reference back to Sparta, although it is not clear whether they were empowered merely to swear to certain proposals if Athens accepted them, or use their own judgement. In Thucydides 8.67.1, just prior to the establishment of the Four Hundred in 411, καὶ πρῶτον μὲν τῶν ἐπιστολῶν ἑκατέρας ἔλεγεν ἐννομὸν εἰς ἐπιγραφὰς ἀυτοκρατόρας, τούτους δὲ ἐννομοῦν εἰς ἐπιγράφον.
In Thucydides 6.8.2 the Athenians \( \xi \phi \psi \rho \theta \sigma \theta \alpha \omega \) 

The three generals had complete power to decide without reference to Athens when the objectives, here detailed, were accomplished and what military or other means were to be used. The inference is clear that specific and detailed instructions from the ecclesia would be inappropriate in this case, if only because the strategoi were in a much better position to evaluate the situation and because the leadership of the ecclesia was effectively invalidated by the communications problem.

In Thucydides 6.26.1 at the second Athenian assembly ...

\( o l \ \lambda \delta \gamma \alpha \alpha o i \ \xi \phi \psi \rho \theta \sigma \theta \alpha \omega \) 

If indeed Thucydides 6.8.2 can be cited as evidence for the existence of the office of \( \sigma \tau \rho \alpha \rho \gamma \varepsilon s \ a u t \sigma k \rho \alpha \tau \omega \rho \), Thucydides' phraseology in 6.26.1 clearly belies that interpretation. If in 6.8.2 the Athenians created that position, may we assume that Fornara would have us believe that at the time the
Athenians failed to fully specify the powers of the office, and that subsequently in the second assembly those powers were increased? But in 6.26.1 it is to the position of στρατηγός that Thucydides is referring. His meaning is not that the generals as στρατηγοὶ αὐτοκράτεις thereby had the power to decide the size of the forces and the conduct of the whole expedition, but that the ecclesia delegated this power to the strategoi, specifically defining in what further respects the three generals were αὐτοκράτεις. It follows that the grant made in the first assembly was limited, the second grant covering powers which the ecclesia had initially preserved for itself. The only essential difference between the grant in 6.8.2 to "help the Egestaeans ..., to restore Leontini ..." and that in 6.26.1 to decide "the numbers of the army and of the expedition generally ..." is merely that in 6.8.2 Thucydides does not specify the powers delegated by the ecclesia, the context clearly indicating that the strategoi were αὐτοκράτεις by virtue of receiving no detailed instructions about the methods and means they would employ to obtain the determined goals. They were αὐτοκράτεις because they were given freedom of action in deciding if the aims of the state had been achieved and by what means they were to be accomplished. As in the other instances where officials are designated αὐτοκράτεις, Thucydides makes clear the extent and nature of the powers conferred. Thucydides surely cannot be used as evidence for the existence of the extraordinary position of στρατηγός αὐτοκράτωρ. In the only case we know where the officials were elected and appointed αὐτοκράτεις at the same time, Thucydides provides us with the information. Here he does not. The natural inference is that these men had been elected to the strategia of 415/4
in the spring elections of 415. Even if Thucydides' use of the word 
\( \alpha u r u \kappa a \rho a r e p e s \) in 1.126.8 is anachronistic, as Gomme thinks, nevertheless his belief that office-holders could be appointed \( \alpha u r u \kappa a \rho a r e p e s \) is certainly a reflection of late fifth-century practice. It follows that Nicias, Alcibiades and Lamachus did not occupy specially created positions, although endowed with extraordinary powers, and that they were regular strategoi for 414/3 as well as for 415/4. There is no other indication in Thucydides that these men occupied special positions. In subsequent comment on their activities the terms of reference used by the historian are by no means unusual and no different to those describing the activities of other generals on active duty. For example at 6.31.5 they are \( \tau e w s \) \( \varsigma \rho a r a n y c o s \); at 6.42.1 and 6.47.1 \( \varsigma \rho a r a n y c o i \), and at 6.62.1 \( \tau \delta \nu \) \( \chi o u r h \kappa w o w \) \( \varsigma \rho a r a n y c o i \).

There has also been some discussion about whether Demosthenes and Eurymedon were strategoi in 414/3. Fornara thinks that the mere fact of their appointment in 7.16.2 to lead the reinforcements sent to Sicily is evidence enough. It is difficult to understand how Fornara reconciles this view with his belief that Demosthenes and Eurymedon were also \( \alpha u r u \kappa a \rho a r e p e s \) in 414/3. It seems a logical conclusion from his statement that the \( \alpha u r u \kappa a \rho a r e p e s \) were separate from the regular annual strategoi that these men were not regular generals in this year. Or perhaps they were elected in the spring of 414, but later appointed as \( \alpha u r u \kappa a \rho a r e p e s \) and removed from the board? Such a conclusion is suggested from his list of generals for 414/3. But he gives no clue. However, Thucydides nowhere indicates that Demosthenes and Eurymedon were granted extraordinary powers similar to those made to Nicias, Alcibiades and Lamachus, although the possibility
cannot be discounted.

Dover is undecided but inclined to believe that Demosthenes and Eurymedon were not generals for 414/3 but pre-elected for 413/2 and given immediate authority to act as normal strategoi, the Athenians waiving constitutional procedure to enable the best equipped men to handle a matter of such importance. On first view such an interpretation has its attractions. This is the first appearance of Eurymedon in a command since he was disgraced and fined in 424. He also had knowledge of Sicily, having gained experience as one of the generals with the expedition of the Archidamian War. As for Demosthenes the last known occasion he held office was in 418/7, but he had not been entrusted with any major command since 424. As Westlake has suggested, this may have been an occasion for emergency measures, the situation compelling the ecclesia to resort to its experienced military leadership. But such an argument can go no further. In the first place the lists of generals for the years between 424 and 414 are by no means complete. There is no way of knowing how many times, between these years, Demosthenes and Eurymedon were members of the strategia. For all we know they were generals for 414/3. In the second place, as has already been demonstrated with reference to Cleon and the Pylos affair of 425, the ecclesia probably had the power to elect and appoint new strategoi during the year, a power most likely used only in exceptional circumstances. Thucydides' phrase, καὶ Εὐνάρχηται αὐτῷ ἐπίλυτο Δημοσθένη τῇ τῶν Ἀλκισθένους καὶ Εὐρυμέδοντα τῆν Θούκλεους, may indeed refer to such a procedure. I do not believe we can assume with Dover that the Athenians may have waived "constitutional procedure". Surely it is safer and easier
to believe that they may have resorted merely to "unusual procedure". Our lack of knowledge of the strategia must be our only firm guide-
line.

However, it is not until Thucydides 7.47.1 in the archon year of 413/2, that the historian describes Demosthenes and Eurymedon as οἱ ὑπὲρ τῶν Ἀθηναίων στρατηγοὶ. As has already been noted, Thucydides 7.16.2 is usually cited as evidence for a strategia of these men in 414/3.108 Thucydides 7.16.1-2 is as follows: 'Ἡ μὲν τοῦ Νικίου ἐπισκόπησε ἡ τοσαῦτα ἐξήλθοι, οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι ἢκοίσαντες ἀρχής, ἀλλὰ αὐτὸ, ἐκ τῆς ἐτεραίς εὐναρχοντος οἱ στρατηγοὶ τῶν ἐκ τῶν ἀρχηγίαις, παρέλυσαν τὴν ἀρχήν. Ὁ, μὲν Νικίαν ὑπέρ τῶν εὐναρχοντῶν μὲν ἀρχηγίας, παρέλυσαν τὴν ἀρχήν. τῶν αὐτῶν ἐκεί ὑπὸ προσεῖλοντο, Μεναιὸν καὶ Εὐθύδημον, οὕτως μὲν μοῦσα ἐν ἀρχηγίαις ταλαιπωροῦσθε στρατηγοὶ οἱ ἐκ τῆς ἐνοίκιαν ἀρχῆς πέμπεις καὶ ταυτικὴν καὶ πεῖκὴν Ἀθηναίοι τῷ κατιολόγῳ καὶ τῶν εὐναρχοντάς αὐτῷ εἶλοντα Δημοσθένη τοῦ Ἀλκισθέους καὶ Εὐρυμέδων τῆς Ἐπικλέους. The Athenians sent reinforcements as a result of the communique from Nicias. On this understanding the natural inference from the passage is that Demosthenes and Eurymedon were strategoi. Such a supposition is reasonable but the question is decided if the meaning of the word εὐναρχοντας in this context can be determined. In 7.43:1 we are told that when Demosthenes had resolved to attack Epipolae he had first to obtain the approval of the other commanders for his plan - ἀλλὰ πεῖσας τὸν τε Νικίαν καὶ τοὺς άλλους εὐναρχοντας. Although Thucydides' chronology of Demosthenes' voyage to Sicily is not clear, it is not safe to date the arrival of the second expeditionary force, and therefore the battle for Epipolae, before the start of 413/2. At the end of 414 Eurymedon was sent to
Sicily with ten ships, Demosthenes remaining at Athens to organize the force which was to sail in spring. By about the beginning of April Demosthenes was at Aegina with part of his force. After leaving Aegina he ravaged the Laconian coast and arrived at Corcyra about mid-May. It was about the turn of the Attic year when Demosthenes and Eurymedon were engaged in attempting to levy forces at Thurii, for about this time the Athenian commander at Naupactus, Conon, was replaced by Diphilus. The natural explanation, as Dover has noted, is that Conon was strategos for 414/3 and Diphilus for 413/2. Demosthenes and Eurymedon reached Sicily towards the end of July, the battle of Epipolae taking place, according to Busolt, in the second week in August. The events of Thucydides 7.43 occurred in 413/2. Demosthenes and Eurymedon were certainly strategoi in this year, and Thucydides' phrase τοὺς Κλέως Εὐνάρχευτας is a reference in part to the general Eurymedon. The use of the word in Thucydides 7.16.2 is no different, the natural meaning of καὶ Εὐνάρχευτα αὐτῷ ἔδωκεν Δημοσθένη ... καὶ Εὐρυμέδοντα ... being "and they elected Demosthenes and Eurymedon to be co-commanders with him (Nicias)". The implication, difficult to dismiss, is that Demosthenes and Eurymedon had the same official status as Nicias in 414/3, and were in fact strategoi.

It is generally accepted that Menander and Euthydemus were elected to help Nicias during the winter of 414/3 but were given only temporary office and temporary command. Thucydides 7.16.1–2 supports the view that they were given temporary command. It is clear the historian means that Menander and Euthydemus were elected to share the command with Nicias until the arrival of Demosthenes and
Eurymedon. But it is also clear from the narrative that this did not eventuate. It seems that Menander and Euthydemus did not assume their former rank after the arrival of the second expeditionary force. At 7.45.1 it is with Nicias and τοὺς ἀλλούς ξυναρχοντας that Demosthenes obtains approval, indicating there were others apart from Eurymedon who had to be consulted. At 7.43.2 Demosthenes and ... Εὐρυμεδών καὶ Μενανδρὸς ἀναλαβὼν τὴν πᾶσαν στρατιάν ἐκείρει πρὸς τὰς Ἐπιπεδάς. This suggests that Menander had a share in the command.

But at the debate which followed the failure at Epipolae, neither Menander nor Euthydemus is mentioned. This does not necessarily reinforce the view that these men were by now inferior in status. It seems that Nicias and Demosthenes were the only active participants in the debate, but after Eurymedon finally sided with Demosthenes still no decision was taken. Presumably, if Demosthenes and Eurymedon comprised a majority, Nicias would have been outvoted as he was by Alcibiades and Lamachus at Rhegium. Although the possibility remains that no decision was made because Nicias was suspected of concealing further information, it would be surprising. It would be stranger if Nicias did not attempt to use either Menander or Euthydemus for support. If one of these two, being entitled to vote, had sided with Nicias, the failure to reach a decision may reflect unwillingness by Demosthenes and Eurymedon to put the issue to a vote. If Menander is the source of Thucydides' abundant information, which is possible, the attractions of such an interpretation are obvious. The three generals mentioned by Thucydides did not escape from Sicily and Menander, in view of the consequences resulting from the Athenians remaining in Sicily, may have been reluctant to reveal his own part.
in the debate. Furthermore, if Menander and Euthydemus were strategoi at this time and theoretically entitled to equality in decision-making, nevertheless they were in prestigious company. The main aim of Thucydides in his account of this vital debate is to compare the two senior strategoi and in no small way to allocate responsibility for the final disaster of the expedition. He has no use for the opinions of Menander and Euthydemus. 

Aside from the avowed aim of Thucydides' account, which may however explain his failure to define the status of Menander and Euthydemus, it must surely be close to the reality of the situation that what counted, first and foremost, were the opinions of Nicias and Demosthenes. Eurymedon took a background seat. It is reasonable to suppose that Menander and Euthydemus would be more inclined, if not forced, to do so, leaving the decisions, as far as possible, with their senior and more experienced colleagues. Use of Thucydides 7.47-49 as evidence that Menander and Euthydemus cannot be regarded as strategoi is far from conclusive, and on the interpretation above must be regarded with scepticism.

The further evidence of Thucydides 7.69.4 where Menander and Euthydemus, as well as Demosthenes, are described as *κοινοὶ ξαφνικῶς τῶν θεματων στρατηγῶν ἐξέγοναν*, cannot be dismissed, as Fornara suggests, by assuming that they were temporarily given that role by the other generals. The whole question rests on whether or not Fornara's reasoning that there is a basic contradiction between Thucydides' words of 7.16.1 and his narrative of the events in Sicily in the next year, is correct. It has already been admitted that while 7.16.1 indicates that Menander and Euthydemus were to be *ευναρχωντες* with Nicias until the arrival of Demosthenes and Eurymedon, 7.43.1
suggests that after their arrival Menander and Euthydemus were still ἐξουσιαστές. Could it be that the distinction Thucydides makes in 7.16.1 is finer than has hitherto been supposed? That the responsibilities of Menander and Euthydemus as ἐξουσιαστές with Nicias would be largely eliminated by the arrival of Demosthenes and Eurymedon, but that in practice, by virtue of being strategoi, they remained, if only perfunctorily, ἐξουσιαστές.

In other words, they were essentially no longer ἐξουσιαστές in 7.43.1. Demosthenes merely acted according to form, treating them as such in recognition of their official position. The silence of Thucydides about the status of Menander and Euthydemus in his account of the conference of 7.47-49 is perhaps best explained by this hypothesis, that they were no longer ἐξουσιαστές but still strategoi, they were no longer concerned with the questions of operational planning and strategy but still retained the authority vested in their office as field commanders, Menander acting in this capacity in partnership with Demosthenes and Eurymedon at Epipolae, and both he and Euthydemus with Demosthenes at the last battle in the harbour. On this interpretation there is no need to suppose with Dover that Menander and Euthydemus were involved in command of field operations only at the discretion of the other generals, or to believe with Fornara that an apparent contradiction between Thucydides 7.16.1 and the later narrative necessitates the assumption that at 7.69.4, where Menander and Euthydemus are described as στρατηγοί, the other generals had simply temporarily given them that status.

Although it cannot be asserted with certainty when Menander and Euthydemus (and indeed, when Demosthenes and Eurymedon) were
elected strategoi, whether at the assembly of 7.16.1, as is probable, or at some other time, the advantage of the argument here presented, or so it seems to me, is that the inconsistencies of Thucydides' account which are created by the standard viewpoint that Menander and Euthydemus were given both temporary office and temporary command, are appreciably eliminated. There is nothing to suggest that the ecclesia could not elect strategoi to assume temporary commands. But Thucydides' narrative of the events in Sicily during the archon year of 413/2 indicate that once the temporary command of Menander and Euthydemus had expired, they still retained their official rank. They were temporarily Συνάρχονες with Nicias but not temporarily στρατηγοί.

It is very difficult to reduce the number of generals to ten in all these years, with the possible exception of 433/2, for which year our list of strategoi is incomplete. If my conclusions about the list for 441/0 are accepted there was certainly a minimum of eleven generals in office at the same time. Of the thirteen generals in office during 426/5 Procles was killed and perhaps replaced. That still leaves twelve strategoi. It is possible that a by-election was held after Demosthenes' failure in Aetolia, but this is speculation. There is no other evidence to indicate that any other generals were killed or deposed. All of them except for Hierophon and Simonides definitely held office in later years. Pythodorus' succession to Laches' Sicilian command does not prove that Laches was cashiered. Laches was again strategos in 418/7 and for all we know may well have been in most of the years of the late 420's. The list of eleven for 425/4
is more easily explained - Cleon was elected at a by-election. 424/3 is more complicated. Of the fourteen generals it is hard to know which ten comprised the board initially elected in the spring of 424. Indeed, if there was some reason to suppose that the Athenians envisaged the necessity of employing more than ten strategoi on active duty at the same time during the coming archon year, it would not seem unreasonable to conclude that more than ten were initially elected. As it is, ten of the fourteen, namely Demodocus, Nicias, Nicostratus, Hippocrates, Lamachus, Sophocles, Pythodorus, Demosthenes, Eurymedon and Aristeides, must be considered virtually certainties. It is just as likely that the other four (Cleon, Thucydides, Autocles and Eucles) were added to the board as need arose rather than to fill vacancies which occurred when Pythodorus, Sophocles and Eurymedon lost office. Not much more can be said. It is of course possible, but not inevitable, that replacements were elected for the three strategoi deposed after the Sicilian debacle, for Thucydides when he was dismissed (late 424 or early 423) and for Hippocrates after his death in the winter of 424. But we simply have no evidence to support the hypothesis that by-elections were held to replace individual strategoi who lost office or were killed.

However, our information for 414/3 makes it clear that the Athenians did appoint extra generals as the need arose. The generalships of Menander and Euthydemus in Sicily cannot be explained in any other way. Even if the view that Menander and Euthydemus were only temporarily strategoi be accepted - which is as I have argued, very improbable due to Thucydides' reference to these men as generals after the arrival in Sicily of Demosthenes and Eurymedon - nevertheless
the mere fact of their appointment demonstrates that the Athenians could and did increase the numerical strength of the strategia beyond ten in certain circumstances. Furthermore, if Thucydides 7.16.2 means that Demosthenes and Eurymedon were also appointed at a by-election and were therefore not already strategoi for 414/3 – which view of course is by no means certain – the only worthwhile conclusion is to suppose that, generally speaking, extra generals were elected in exceptional circumstances. On the one hand it cannot be categorically asserted that the same sort of situation, resulting in extra appointments, existed earlier in the Peloponnesian War, but the large size of the board in 426/5 and 424/3 may easily be explained in this way. On the other hand, it cannot be denied that whenever by-elections are suggested in our sources they are to be explained as the result of decisions reached by the Athenians to meet particular military needs rather than to fill vacancies which have occurred on the board.

By way of conclusion, in the final analysis I would suggest that attempts by modern scholars to explain both double representation and the large size of the board in some years, particularly during the Peloponnesian War, by postulating either by-elections when generals were deposed or killed, or by supposing that the ecclesia granted special commands to individuals, such as Cleon in 425/4 or Thucydides in 424/3, may be misleading. In the first place many cases of double representation are clearly not to be explained as the result of one general losing office during the year and being replaced by a fellow-tribesman. Secondly, Thucydides nowhere specifically tells us that any Athenians in command of military operations held special positions outside the strategia, and that includes Cleon's command at
Pylos in 425. In the case of Thucydides' own generalship in 424/3, we need to label the historian as a self-glorifying liar to dispute it. If Thucydides calls a man a general very good reasons are needed to doubt it. Thirdly, as I have continually emphasized, there is no supporting evidence for the hypothesis that the ecclesia held regular by-elections whenever individual strategoi lost office. Fourthly, and perhaps most importantly, the almost universal belief in the existence of a single σπαρτικής ἕξ αμινίτου has successfully inhibited the development of alternative lines of enquiry into the phenomenon of double representation. All attention has been directed away from a consideration of the possibility of a fifth-century reform which eliminated the need for tribal representation, a reform, after all, of which Aristotle makes particular note in *Ath Pol* 61.1. Yet if this reform did take place in the fifth century, not only does it explain satisfactorily the numerous cases of double representation and double-doubles which are becoming increasingly more apparent with time, but it also enables the proposal of a much less complicated solution to the problem of the size of the strategia in some years than those alternatives which have been constructed in recent times. Ten is not a magic number unless tribal representation was a constitutional requirement. It is not unreasonable to consider that once tribal representation had been done away with, presumably out of a desire to ensure that all the most capable Athenians would have a chance of election, there were no legal restrictions preventing a larger board. Even if the ecclesia never departed from the procedure of electing just ten strategoi at the annual electoral assembly and also adhered fairly closely to the practice of maintaining tribal representation,
whether as a result of tribal loyalties or a fairly even distribution of talent throughout the ten tribes, this does not mean that extra generals were not appointed in military emergencies or when leadership resources were utilized to the limit. Support for such a practice can at least be found in Thucydides whereas the means used by those scholars who would attempt to limit the board to ten under all conditions are speculative, without foundations on direct evidence.
It is indeed unfortunate that Thucydides was not able to leave for posterity a detailed chronological history for the period between 477 and 441 similar to his account of the Peloponnesian War. As it is, his brief narration of the events of the Pentacontaetia is of primary importance, and our lists of strategoi from 477 to 441 are correspondingly very sparse and often non-existent. This has not prevented some scholars from assuming that strategoi who are named by Thucydides (and in some instances, supplementary sources) in sole command of Athenian forces or combined confederate forces, held a position of superiority within the strategia. Thus, Cimon succeeded Aristeides as commander-in-chief of the combined forces of the Athenian Alliance, as στρατηγὸς τῶν Ἑλλήνων, in 477, and such πρωτεύουσ τὲς as Leocrates, Myronides, Tolmides, Ephialtes, Pericles, Thucydides and Charitimides were στρατηγὸς ἐκ ὀπάντων and held the office of commander-in-chief of the combined forces at later dates.

Again, the evidence available does demonstrate the premise of supremacy to be highly questionable. In 477/6 Byzantium was captured from Pausanias by the allies, Κύρων τοῦ Μιλήτου στρατηγοῦντος, and in 476/5 the Athenians besieged and captured Eion on the Strymon, Κύρων τοῦ Μιλήτου στρατηγοῦντος. At the battle of the Eurymedon River the Athenians and their allies defeated the Persians by land and by sea on the same day, Κύρων τοῦ Μιλήτου στρατηγοῦντος.
In the late 460's when Sparta appealed to Athens for help against the rebels at Ithome, οἱ δὲ Ἴλεον (the Athenians) κύμωνες στρατηγόντες πήθει εὖκ ὑλίζω. 6 After the Athenians defeated the Aeginetan fleet in 460/59 they invested the island, λεωκράτους τοῦ Στροίβου στρατηγόντος, 7 and in the same year they invaded the Megarid, Μιρυμίδου στρατηγόντος. 8 Two months after the battle at Tanagra, in one of the early years of the 450's, Athens defeated a Boeotian army at Oenophyta, Μιρυμίδου στρατηγόντος, 9 and some time after the surrender of Aegina, καὶ Πελοπέων περιπλευσαν Ἀθηναῖοι Τολμίδου τοῦ Τολμίδου στρατηγόντος. 10 In 454/3 the Athenians reduced Sicyon, Περικλέους τῶν Ξανθίππων στρατηγόντος, 11 and in 451/0, in conjunction with their allies, launched a large expedition against Cyprus, κύμωνες στρατηγόντος. 12 In 450/49 Athens was again involved in conflict in Boeotia, Τολμίδου τοῦ Τολμίδου στρατηγόντος, 13 and in 447/6 quelled the revolt of Euboea, Περικλέους στρατηγόντος. 14 This is a complete list of Thucydides' phraseology used in reference to Athenian strategoi from 477 until (but not including) the revolt of Samos in 441/0. There is nothing here to indicate different levels of authority within the strategia or to suggest that a single Athenian officer (rather than all Athenian generals) filled the position left vacant by the Spartan commander-in-chief when Sparta lost the ἱερευνή of the Greek League forces.

It should be noted that the historian mentions several important military expeditions without naming Athenian generals. We do not know from Thucydides who commanded the Athenian forces which reduced Carystus and Naxos in the 470's and Thasos in the 460's. Nor do we know if any generals were involved in attempting the settlement at
Ennea Hodoi in 465, or which strategoi led the Athenian army at the battle of Tanagra, or who commanded the large forces committed to Egypt in the 450's. Some names are provided by other sources. According to Plutarch, Cimon was a general in the war against Thasos, and Herodotus associates two otherwise unknown strategoi, Sophanes and Leagros, with the same war. Pericles may have been a general at Tanagra, although this is not inevitable from Plutarch, Pericles 10.2. There is evidence that a Charitimides was a general with the Athenian expedition to Egypt. It is not insignificant that Thucydides only names the five strategoi, Cimon, Leocrates, Myronides, Tolmides and Pericles, in his account of the earlier years (down to 441) of the Pentacontaetia and that he never names more than one general in command of a particular mission. But without supporting evidence it is certainly not safe to assume that these generals were superior in powers to their colleagues or occupied special positions as a result of Athens succeeding Sparta as of the Greek allies. A more satisfactory explanation follows if, as is very possible, Thucydides relied to some extent on oral tradition as a means of determining who were the Athenian generals involved in the various military operations of the early Pentacontaetia. As Dover has noted, popular tradition magnifies the impressive individual. Cimon was the foremost politician at Athens during the 470's and 460's. In exactly the same way and for exactly the same reason that Herodotus neglected to mention the participation of generals other than Themistocles, Aristeides and Xanthippus during the Persian invasion of 480, they were politically predominant at Athens and the men most responsible for the strategy adopted to defeat Xerxes — only Cimon's involvement
as a general in the military operations during the 470's and at
the battle of the Eurymedon are preserved.

If any conclusions are to be drawn about generals named
by Thucydides on several occasions as active during the mid-fifth
century, such as Myronides and Tolmides, we should perhaps consider
the possibility that tradition preserved their connection with particu-
lar military campaigns because of their political importance rather
than as the result of their possession of superior authority within
the strategia. The participation of other strategoi, less distinguish-
ed or not significant politically, was forgotten. One may of course
object to this interpretation on the grounds of the chance that the
Athenians appointed only one general for all the missions mentioned
by Thucydides for which he also names a commander. However, as
already noted, without exception during the early Pentacontaetia
either just one strategos is named by the historian or no names are
provided, and although there are numerous instances beginning in the
430's in which one strategos commanded Athenian troops, this was by
no means the rule either in the years immediately before or during
the Peloponnesian War. Furthermore, whereas there are isolated
instances where Thucydides details Athenian forces on campaign during
the Peloponnesian War without mentioning their commanders, such cases
are rare and by no stretch of the imagination constitute a similar
sizeable proportion of all missions described, as during the Penta-
contaetia. It is in fact very unusual for Thucydides not to name
all the generals or to indicate how many are involved with each mission.

In view of the considerations outlined above, I would suggest
that we cannot conclude, for example, that Cimon was the sole
Athenian general at the battle of the Eurymedon. Thucydides' information for the early Pentacontaetia was restricted by factors beyond his control and he was unable to maintain the strict attention to detail for this period which is so typical of the rest of the History. It would indeed seem unlikely that Thucydides would deliberately omit the names of the generals who fought, for example, at Tanagra in about 457. It was certainly not a battle for which Athenian generals who took part would later wish to be associated. If, as is possible, (but not probable), Pericles was a strategos at Tanagra, it is just as likely that Pericles himself was responsible for suppressing his connection with the defeat rather than Thucydides. If it be accepted that Thucydides' information about individual strategoi of the mid-fifth century is in all likelihood limited to the more eminent and better known politicians, it is nevertheless still necessary to stress that a certain amount of caution is required. Unavoidably, any judgment is based on subjective criteria and does permit a variety of opinion. Hammond, for example, would have us believe that when Herodotus or Thucydides says that one general was appointed we should assume this to be correct, even for the period of the early Pentacontaetia. Dover, on the other hand, suggests that when Thucydides describes military actions even as late as 431 which involved a single strategos but which were on a large scale, this merits seriously questioning whether only one general was appointed. It is impossible to accept, for example, from Thucydides' phrase, Άωνηνύδι πανδημε...ἐσέβαλον ἐς τὴν Μεσάρηα Περικλέους τοῦ Ξάνθιππου στρατηγοῦντος, that all the other generals were left in Athens in the autumn of 431 with nothing to do. The problem does not therefore
allow a conclusive solution. However, if it be considered within the terms I have suggested, the answer would seem to be a compromise between the opposite views of Hammond and Dover. The weakness in the viewpoint expressed by Hammond is the possibility that Thucydides' information for the mid-fifth century was limited, and the fact that Thucydides selects particular incidents of the Pentacontaetia to indicate the progress of Athens towards imperialism and does not narrate any of them in full detail. On the other hand, precisely because of Thucydides' scrupulous attention to detail, where he names only one general in command of larger forces during the years of his adult life, (including the 430's) the probability that we are dealing with first-hand information cannot be overlooked. Pericles may well have had sole command of the mission to the Megarid in 431.24

For the period of Pericles' political supremacy and the Peloponnesian War, roughly the last forty years of the fifth century, literary and epigraphic evidence for the Athenian strategia is much more plentiful than for earlier years. But the abundance of evidence after 440 is only relative to the lack of evidence prior to 440. Certain evidence, particularly modes of expression and terminologies used by Thucydides in reference to generals has, in the past, been thought to demonstrate the existence of positions of superiority on the board.25 It is certainly true that it is not unusual in both literary and epigraphic sources for expressions to emphasize one general more than his colleagues. However, both Dover and Fornara have convincingly refuted the orthodox viewpoint by challenging the assumption on which it is based, the supposed technical precision contained in the expressions, and have explained the emphasis given to
individuals at the expense of others as the product of entirely different considerations. 26

The problem is simply this. Although there are many instances where no one strategos among a group listed is given any kind of emphasis, 27 there are nevertheless particular deviations of sufficient number and consistent construction in terms of types of words used, where a single general is emphasized, to warrant explanation. As far as Thucydides is concerned, his usual mode of expression when more than one strategos was appointed to a command is to name the generals without special emphasis to any, 28 as in 1.45.2 — ἵστρατηγεῖς δὲ αὐτῶν Λακεδαιμονίων τοῖς Ὀλυμπίοις καὶ Διότιροις ὁ Ἐπιμήκιος
καὶ Πρωτέας ὁ Ἐπιμήκιος; in 3.86.1 — ... Ἀθηναίοι εἶκοσι ναῦς ἔστειλαν ἐς Σικελίαν καὶ Λάγητα τῶν Μελανώπου στρατηγῶν αὐτῶν καὶ Ἀργυρίδην τὸν Εὐφίλητον ; and in 3.91.1 — ... οἱ Αθηναίοι τριάκοντα μὲν ναῦς ἔστειλαν περὶ Πελοπόννησος, ὑπὸ ἵστρατηγεῖς Δημοσθένης τὸν Ἀλκισθένους καὶ Προκλῆς ὁ Θεοδώρου. A variant of this is at 1.117.2 — καὶ εἰ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν ὃ τερον προσεβιβάζουσαν τεσσαράκοντα μὲν αἱ μετὰ Θυκινιδίδου καὶ Ἀργυρίδου καὶ Τρικέλους καὶ Σαρδανίδους, εἶκοσι δὲ αἱ μετὰ Τλησσόλεμου καὶ Ἀρτέμιδος.

Thucydides also sometimes names just one strategos but indicates the presence of others by mentioning the numbers involved and using the pronoun αὐτός, as at 3.19.1 — ... Ἀμικλέας πέμπτον αὐτῶν στρατηγῶν. Apart from the use of the αὐτός formula there is another common terminology found not only in Thucydides but in epigraphic sources as well which again provides the name of just one general and refers to the others generically, with or without making mention of
the number, as at 1.62.4 - Καλλίας ὁ δ' ὁ δ' τῶν Ἀθηναίων στρατηγὸς καὶ οἱ Ἐυαρχοῦντες ..., 4.54.2 - ... καὶ ἄλλοι ξενέβισαν πρὸς Νικίαν καὶ τοὺς Ἐυαρχοῦντας ..., and IG i² 296, line 39 - Σωκράτης ἀπελευθερώσατο καὶ χίουναρχότες.28a Other less common and sometimes unique expressions fall loosely,29 within this category, for example at 2.58.1 - ... Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ ΚΛΕΟΠΟΜΟΣ καὶ Κλεινίον, ξενοστρατηγοὶ ὑπὲρ Ἐρικλέεως, 1.57.6 - ... Ἀρχαστράτευ τοῖς Λυκομήδοις μετὰ ἄλλων δέκα στρατηγοῦσας, Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.5.20 - Κόμῳ ... ἀφίκητο ... μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων στρατηγῶν, and IG i² 105, line 5, -στρατηγοὶ τοῦ μετὰ Περίκλεκέως.

It is no longer safe to consider that terminologies which emphasize one strategos indicate his legal superiority over the others referred to by an ordinal number or generically, because, as has been shown by Dover and Fornara, not only are these various terminologies used interchangeably with each other, but are also used interchangeably with the expressions which list the names of all the generals without any emphasis being placed on one of them. In short, these terminologies are not used consistently or carefully, which is the basic prerequisite necessary for concluding that they were meant to be technically precise when used either in literary or epigraphic sources.30 There are several conspicuous examples. At Thucydides 1.61.1, for example - ... καὶ Καλλίαν τὸν Καλλιάνον τοῖς οὖν στρατηγῶν ... The same generals on the same mission are again described at 1.62.4 as Καλλίας ... ὁ τῶν Ἀθηναίων στρατηγὸς καὶ οἱ Ἐυαρχοῦντες. As Fornara notes,31 the two formulaic expressions are interchangeable and hence no different in meaning, technically. At Thucydides 4.54.2, as previously noted, the historian names Nicias, and his colleagues are
Earlier in the narrative the commanders of this same expedition are listed in the following way: ἔστρατηγεὶς δὲ ἀυτῶν Νικίας καὶ Νικηφάτεω καὶ Νικήστρατος καὶ Λυτέκλης καὶ Τελμαίων. Therefore these two types of usage (at 4.53.1 and 4.54.2) are equivalent. Fornara concludes from this, and I think rightly, that all three categories of terminology here mentioned are interchangeable. If this is so the phraseology used by Thucydides at 1.61.1, 1.62.4 and 4.54.2 cannot mean that either Callias or Nicias were superior to their respective colleagues, because 4.53.1 clearly indicates exactly the opposite, except if the assumption be accepted that the first named in a list is always the legal superior of the rest, which assumption is easily refuted. At Thucydides 2.23.2 the historian lists some generals employed on a mission around the Peloponnes - ἔστρατηγεὶς ἐκ Καρκίνους τε ἐκ Ξενοτίμου καὶ Πρατείς καὶ Ἐπικλέος καὶ Σωκράτης ὁ Αντισένους. The order of names is different in IG i² 296, lines 30 and 31 - στρατηγὸς Σωκράτης ἡλικιωτείς Πρατείς Ἀρχισεντείς Καρκίνει Θερικίοι. Furthermore, these generals are referred to later in the inscription as Καρκίνει Θερικίοι καὶ ξυνάρχοι and Σωκράτει ἡλικιωτεί καὶ ξυνάρχοι, which reinforces the interpretation above expressed in relation to the variety of reference in Thucydides.

One does not have to look far in Thucydides to discover more examples involving the ἀυτός formula and the verb συνάρχω or noun συνάρχων. To deal with the former category first, at 2.79.1 - ἐστρατηγεὶς δὲ Ξενοφῶν ὁ Εὐριπίδεω ἑπτὰς ἀυτὸς. At 2.79.7 Thucydides records the death of Xenophon and his colleagues but merely states, ἀπεθανοῦν δὲ ἀυτῶν ... καὶ δὲ στρατηγοὶ πάντες. Prior to
this disaster in the Chalcidice the three generals Xenophon, Phanomachos and Nestiodoros accepted the surrender of Potidæa—

"...οὖν δὲ λόγοις προσφέροντι χειρὶ ἔμφοβοι τοῖς στρατηγαῖς τῶν Ἀθηναίων τοῖς ἄφις τεταγμένοις, Χειροδώροι τῷ Εὐπορίου καὶ Εὐσιμοῦ καὶ Ἰωσιμάχου τῷ Καλλιμάχου. οἱ ἐπιτελόμενοι ..." 35 No hint here of the superiority of Xenophon, yet there is no reason to believe that these three strategoi were not the same as those at Thucydides 2.79.1. 36 At 3.3.2—

"Κλεισσώρις δὲ ἔν τῷ Δεινίου τριτες αὐτοὶ ἐστρατηγεῖ. Thucydides makes it quite clear that these generals made decisions collectively and shared equally in the command. This much is at least obvious in his sentence: Καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι οὐ πολὺ ἐστερούσιν καταπλῆσαντες ὡς ἱπποὺ, ἀπήγκειλαν μὲν οἱ στρατηγαὶ τὰ ἐπιτελοῦσαν πρὸς τῶν Ἰθακείων ἐν πόλεμῳ καθιστήτο, and when the Mytilenians offered terms, οἱ στρατηγοὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἀπεδέξαντο ..." 37

There is still some debate and disagreement about the exact meaning of the ἀὐτὸς formula, or to be more specific, there are differing views as to a precise translation, even among scholars who agree that the terminology implies nothing more than collegiality. 38 According to Dover the ἀὐτὸς formula contains within itself a concessive implication. He maintains that when Pericles, for example, is described as δέκατος ἀὐτὸς by Thucydides, this is not to indicate that Pericles had superior authority but "intended to remind us that he did not". 39 Thucydides, therefore, is stating that Pericles was only one of ten. Dover suggests that a passage in Aeschines 2.178 and in Herodotus 6.103.1 reinforces his interpretation. 40 Thus, the sentence in Aeschines, δέκατος ἀὐτὸς πρεσβεύσας μόνος τὰς
εὐθύνας ἐξιμεῖ, he translates: "although there were nine others with me on the embassy, I am the only one ...," and at the other example in Herodotus, ἦνον δὲ ὁφελεῖ στρατηγοὶ δέκα, τῶν δὲ ἐκατόν ἦν Μιλτιάδης, the historian is emphasizing that Miltiades was only one of ten generals. Fornara argues that the formula ὁ δὲ ἐπώνυμος (ordinal) ἀυτός indicates that the person named is in some sense more notable than his colleagues, but that it neither makes no statement about legal authority or the lack of it, nor defines the nature of the predominance of ὁ δὲ ἐπώνυμος. Therefore, according to Fornara, Herodotus 6.103.1 is emphasizing that of the ten generals Miltiades was one, rather than that Miltiades was only one of ten. On this interpretation the phrase is not concessive, and in Aeschines 2.178 the concessive force in the sentence is supplied by the word μόνος rather than the phrase ἐκατόν ἀυτός.

Fornara's interpretation does in fact seem the more preferable on the general grounds that ὁ δὲ ἐπώνυμος (or ἐπιτυχός) ἀυτός is more adequately explained as a result of ὁ δὲ ἐπώνυμος being in some way or for some reason distinctive, (but not legally so), rather than, alternatively, because Thucydides wished to remind us that ὁ δὲ ἐπώνυμος had no superiority. Why would the historian do this when everyone knew anyway that strategoi always shared equally in command of missions for which more than one general was appointed? Moreover, even if we assume for a moment that this is Thucydides' intention, and the phrase in question is concessive, there is nevertheless a certain ambiguity in stressing (by naming) the participation of ὁ δὲ ἐπώνυμος, which ambiguity disappears if we consider that the phrase is not in itself concessive. The objection to Dover's interpretation gains in force...
upon examination of his statement that "there is a difference between ἑκατοντών ἱεῖς ἀυτὸς used of a man in joint command of an expedition, when the writer is informing us how many generals were in command, and ἑκατοντών δέκατος ἀυτὸς when the reference is to a man's relationship to a whole board for its whole year of office." The phrase δέκατος ἀυτὸς is used twice by Thucydides and both times in reference to Pericles. At Thucydides 1.116.1, τέσσαράκοντα δὲ οὐκ οὐκαί πέντε ἄρσι Περικλέους δέκατον ἀυτὸς ἑκατοντοιων ἐναμαξαίρασι...

There is no reason to believe that Thucydides is here using the terminology any differently than in the other instances which involved fewer generals unless it can be shown that as many as ten generals did not participate in this action against Samos. However, there is supplementary evidence which indicates that ten Athenian strategoi were involved in the same campaign. The idea that Thucydides' phraseology is meant to indicate that Pericles was one of the ten generals employed against Samos has support and Dover's argument that there are two distinct usages of the ἀυτὸς formula, that the phrase δέκατος ἀυτὸς is to be distinguished from the other phrases where the number with ἀυτὸς is smaller than ten, is weakened. In brief, if, as in all likelihood, ten strategoi participated in the war against Samos, Thucydides 1.116.1 is not describing the relationship of Pericles to the whole board for the whole year.

The other example of δέκατος ἀυτὸς is at Thucydides 2.13.1. Pericles is described as ἑκατοντάρθρως ἀναξιόν δέκατος ἀυτὸς, but in this instance not as a general on campaign with nine colleagues. The context within which the phrase is used is as follows. The Spartans were preparing to invade Attica and Pericles considered it possible
that Archidamus might bypass his estate without ravaging it, either
for the purpose of creating prejudice in Athens against him and his
strategy and thereby to the detriment of Athens' war effort, or for
reasons of personal friendship. Pericles therefore publicly relinquish-
ed ownership of his property and urged preparations for war. Has
Thucydides merely taken the opportunity to inform us that Pericles was
one of the ten generals or is this a reference to Pericles' relation-
ship to the other generals for the whole year and a reminder that
Pericles was not superior? Either idea is compatible with the context.
However, if it is the latter idea we must accept that there is a
single instance where the use of the $\dot{\alpha}\nu\tau\'\varsigma$ formula is to be isolated
from others of the same type, for it has already been shown that the
use of $\delta'\kappa\alpha\tau\'\varsigma \dot{\alpha}\nu{\varsigma}$ in Thucydides 1.116.1 is unlikely to be a reminder
that Pericles was not superior, a definition of his "relationship" to
the whole board. Another example of $\delta'\kappa\alpha\tau\'\varsigma \dot{\alpha}\nu\tau\'\varsigma$, although not
in Thucydides and not in reference to strategoi, certainly fits
Fornara's interpretation much more satisfactorily than it does Dover's.
Xenophon 2.2.17 states, $\mu\varepsilon\tau\alpha \tau\nu\rhotata \dot{\iota}\pi\tau\varepsilon \Theta\iota$ (Theramenes) $\pi\varepsilon\sigma\beta\varepsilon\upsilon\tau\eta\varsigma$
$\varepsilon\iota\varepsilon \Lambda\alpha\kappa\varepsilon\delta\alpha\mu\nu\alpha\upsilon\alpha\nu \omega\tau\kappa\rho\alpha\tau\mu\rho\upsilon \delta'\kappa\alpha\tau\'\varsigma \dot{\alpha}\nu\tau\'\varsigma$. If $\delta'\kappa\alpha\tau\'\varsigma$ is used con-
cessively to emphasize the collegiality of the ambassadors it was
unnecessary for Xenophon to do so at this point for he later says that
all of them were $\dot{\alpha}\nu\tau\kappa\rho\alpha\tau\mu\rho\upsilon\varepsilon\iota\varepsilon \varepsilon\iota\pi\nu\nu\lambda\varsigma$. It is more likely
that the historian has simply emphasized the participation of the
most significant member of the delegation, Theramenes.

Dover and Fornara arrive at the same conclusions, both argu-
ing for strict collegiality in the strategia. Their difference over
the precise translation of the $\dot{\alpha}\nu\tau\'\varsigma$ formula is a fine one, but in
favour of Fornara is the fact that on his interpretation all instances of the formula conform in meaning. Furthermore, the fact that the formula is used in the same way as other terminologies which contain an eponym and generic reference to other strategoi (such terms are interchangeable) suggests that the same conclusions should apply to the \( \alpha \omega \rho' \) formula that apply to the other terminologies. According to Dover the eponym in these terminologies is the man who for any reason is uppermost in the mind of the writer at the time of writing, whether the reason be that the man denominated is more impressive than the others, or because the writer recorded habitually in the same terms as his predecessor in secretarial office or in the terms which he had often heard a particular group of officials referred to, or because the writer himself considered one man more noteworthy than the rest.

I would suggest that Dover's remarks are equally applicable to strategoi who are the eponym in \( \delta \epsilon \nu \) (ordinal) \( \alpha \omega \rho' \). I do not think we can safely conclude, as does Fornara, that all strategoi so described, such as Cleippides and Lysicles, were emphasized because they were the most significant of the three or five appointed. It is possible that Thucydides had recourse to inscriptive evidence which named only one of several generals in some of these instances, or, as may well have been the case in Thucydides 1.116.1, that he copied (or rephrased to suit his purposes) the generic references rather than the complete list or used verbal descriptions he often heard. This is not to say that Thucydides used eponyms carelessly, but that he emphasized certain strategoi because they were for some reason uppermost in his mind at the time he wrote. Naturally enough, generals such as Pericles and Nicias were often so emphasized. But the fact
that eponyms in terminologies were often indeed the more significant men does not prove that all of them were. It merely proves that these strategoi were the more important to Thucydides, surely different to assuming that the historian wished to emphasize the participation in events of particular generals "because they were the more significant men, the natural leaders".53 A good example in point is the different eponym used by Xenophon and Lysias in reference to the same election of strategoi in 406. According to Xenophon, στρατηγεύς ἐλέοντο ἄλλος ἄνεκα, Κένωνα... but Lysias emphasizes Thrasyllus rather than Conon - τῶς ἐς μετά Ὀρασίλλην ἄνεκα ἐλέετε.54 Therefore, emphasis given by Thucydides to Cleippides and Lysicles, for example, only proves that they were for some reason foremost in Thucydides' mind, not that they were necessarily the more eminent of the strategoi appointed.

In conclusion, the difference between στρατηγός πρῖτος αὐτός and στρατηγός δέκατος αὐτός, as expressed by Dover, is more apparent than real. Furthermore, the only difference between ὁ δὲ ἔνα τρῖτος, δέκατος αὐτός and, for example, ὁ δὲ ἔνα καὶ ὁ εὐνεχοντες or ὁ δὲ ἔνα καὶ ὁ ἄλλοι, is that the additional information about the number of generals involved is provided within the former usage but not within the latter. It is certainly abundantly clear that the verb συνερχόμενων and the noun συνεργοῦν are used in our sources as a reference to officials who shared equally in command or authority with the eponym.55 However, the discovery by D.W. Bradeen of the hitherto unknown title ἀρχον τὸ ναυτικῶν on an Athenian casualty list of the late fifth century, and his conclusion that the term is not equivalent to στρατηγὸς or ναυαρχις, but was most likely used to refer to commanders
elected by the fleet at Samos in the last decade of the fifth century, has prompted the recent attempt by B. Jordan to identify a military office which ranked immediately below the strategia. His contention is that some Athenian commanders mentioned by Thucydides who have hitherto been regarded as strategoi occupied a position he calls "a military grade of archon", which was a subordinate rank.

Jordan considers that the only difference between the term ναυαρχος used by Xenophon and the title of ἀρχον τὸ ναυτικό is one of nomenclature and not of fact. Although it is primarily my purpose here to comment on the examples Jordan draws from Thucydides, it should be noted that of the evidence he uses, one terminology, that of ναυαρχος, is drawn from Thucydides and inscriptive evidence but not from Xenophon, and the alternative term ναυαρχος is drawn from Xenophon but not from Thucydides. The question is of some importance for if the ναυαρχος of Xenophon and the ἀρχον τὸ ναυτικό of Thucydides all belong to the same military office of ἀρχον τὸ ναυτικό, Xenophon may conceivably be used to support the proposition that some commanders mentioned by Thucydides are not strategoi. It is certainly clear from Xenophon 1.6.29 that the three nauarchs at the battle of Arginusae were distinct from the strategoi. Even if ναυαρχος and ἀρχον τὸ ναυτικό cannot be accepted as identical, this merely means, on Jordan's view, that there were two subordinate ranks instead of one. Nevertheless, Thucydides alone cannot be used as conclusive evidence for the existence of one of these subordinate offices. Without the support of Xenophon Jordan's whole hypothesis is seriously weakened.

Jordan claims that as the essential element in the titles under discussion is ἀρχων, whenever this word appears in some form
or other in defining the command of an officer, here is evidence
attesting one of the alternative terminologies used (ἀρχῶντες),
whether the title consists of the participial noun ἀρχ- or its
verbal equivalent coupled with a prepositional phrase or a word in
the genitive. Thus statements in Thucydides 7.31.4, ... κόνων ...
ἐς ἡράχε ἑναυακτοῦ, and 7.34.3, οἱ Ἕλεγον ἐκ τῆς ἑναυακτοῦ ...
ἡράχε δὲ αἴτων Διφιλός, and 7.20.1, ἐνετείλαν καὶ ἠρικλέου τῶν
ἀπελλογόρου ἀρχοντα, all mean that the commanders mentioned were not
strategoi but held a subordinate rank. Similarly Aristoteles and
Hierophon can no longer be regarded as strategoi for 426/5,58 nor
Drieitrophes for 414/3,59 nor the ten colleagues of Archetrautus sent
with him to Potidaea in 433/2.60 Jordan considers that evidence of
a more positive character is provided by the careers of the two command-
ers Diomedon and Leon. During the summer of 412, ἀρτικαὶ νησι...
ἐπίστυχον ἐς Λέσβον, ἀλλ' ἡράχε λέων καὶ Διομέδων.61 Diomedon and
Leon were ἀρχοντες at this time. Later in the winter of 412/1,
ἀμα τε διάζαλοντι καὶ Φρύγιχον τοῦ
Πεισίδρου παρέλυσαν τῆς ἀρχῆς καὶ τῶν
ἐυφρύχουντα Σκιρανίδην, ἀντεπεμφν ἐς στρατηγοῦς
ἐπὶ τῶν καὶ λευτέοιτα καὶ Λέουσα.62 Upon the deposition from office
of Phrynichos and Scironides, Leon and Diomedon were elected strategoi
not only to fill the vacancies on the board of generals but to relieve
the cashiered generals of their command. Similarly, Strombichides
began his career as an ἀρχῶν in the spring of 413,63 but had been
elected strategos by the winter of 412/1.64

However, Jordan does not isolate all the cases in Thucydides
where the same terminology is applied to other Athenian commanders -
Thucydides states, "that is ἄρξε, ἄν ἄρξε, ὅργη τῶν νεών. Thucydides 1.51.4 states, τοῖς ὑπὲρ Κερευραίας στρατοπεδευμένοις ἐπὶ τῇ Λευκίμην ἦν εἰκοσί ἑνεῖς αἱ ἐκ τῶν Ἀθηναίων αὐτοῖς, ἣν ἄρξε Ἡλεύκων τε ὁ Λευκήρου καὶ Ἀνάκτινην ὁ Λευκήρου ...

IG i 2.295, although naming Glaucon with two colleagues, Metagenes and Dracontides, verifies that Glaucon was strategos on this mission to Corcyra. In the winter of 430/29, Ἀθηναῖοι ναὸς ἔστηλαν εἰκοσὶ μὲν περὶ Πελοπόννησον καὶ Φορμίνα στρατηγόν ἐς ἐρμύμενος ἐκ Ναυπάκτου...

Later in the summer of 429, Phormio is still at Naupactus. Thucydides' phrase, describing Phormio as the man ὃς ἄρξε τῶν εἰκοσὶ νεῶν τῶν Ἀττικῶν καὶ περὶ Ναυπάκτου ἐφρύρειν, surely cannot mean that Phormio was no longer strategos. The historian is merely reminding us that Phormio was "in command of the twenty Athenian ships stationed off Naupactus".

Similarly, in Thucydides 4.66.2, Demosthenes and Hippocrates are described as τῶν τῶν Ἀθηναίων στρατηγῶν, and later when the two generals split their forces, ...

Thucydides does in fact use the terminology Jordan would have us believe is used to describe a sub-ordinate rank, in reference to strategoi on campaign.

Can we safely assume, in contradiction to Jordan's hypothesis, that Thucydides only uses the terminology in describing strategoi?

The assumption would be unnecessary if there was supplementary evidence for generalships of those commanders who are not called strategoi by Thucydides and referred to only by the terms under discussion. The fact that these terms are used to describe generals on campaign makes nearly inevitable the inference that when the same terminology is
applied to commanders who are not specifically named as strategoi, these commanders are also generals. It is an entirely different matter to assert that when terminologies, which are applied to known strategoi, are applied to commanders who are not explicitly named as strategoi, this is an indication that such commanders were not generals but occupied a subordinate rank.

In many cases where Thucydides uses the words ἀρχων or ἀρχεῖν in their various derivative forms he is describing the "command" of a general officer rather than the "office" of a commander. After the death of the general Charoiades in Sicily in the summer of 426, (Χαροιάδου γὰρ ἤδη τοῦ Ἀθηναίων στρατηγοῦ τεθνηκότος ὑπὲρ Συρακοσίων πολέμῳ) Laches is described as ἀπασαν ἐχον τῶν νεών την ἀρχήν. The whole sentence, in fact, would make little sense unless Laches was general. Indeed, Laches was certainly a strategos, the historian merely emphasizing that Laches now had sole command of the fleet.

In the winter of 426/5 the general Pythodorus arrived in Sicily, ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς διάδεχον δὲ Λάχης ἀρχεῖν. He had come to succeed Laches in command of the fleet. δὲ Πυθόδωρος ἦδη ἐχον τὴν τοῦ Λάχητος τῶν νεών ἀρχήν. Laches had by now been relieved of the command and Pythodorus had sole command. In Thucydides 4.28.3, when Nicias offers ἐξείστατο τῆς ἐπὶ Πύλων ἀρχῆς, he is not resigning from office, but relinquishing his claim to a command, as strategos, at Pylos. Again, in Thucydides 7.16.1, when the Athenians read the dispatch of Nicias and his request to be removed from command, the Demos οὐ παρέλυσαν τῆς ἀρχῆς. Nicias is not requesting to be removed from office but from the command in Sicily.

In this context, the generalships of Leon and Diomedon
during the summer of 412/1 cannot be disputed, as Jordan asserts, by maintaining that the terminology used to describe them, \( \text{ο\̄ς κυρίος} \), precludes the possibility. It has already been demonstrated that such terminology is used of strategoi, the only difference in this case being that they are not named as strategoi by Thucydides until later in the year. If they were in fact elected as strategoi after Phrynichus and Scironides were relieved of command, Thucydides makes no reference to it. Furthermore, it is not inevitable that Phrynichus and Scironides were removed from office. Perhaps in this case the phrase, \( \text{παρ' ἡμένοις κυρίοις} \), has this meaning, but the same words, used in Thucydides 7.16.1, do not. It has been suggested that Phrynicos held a special position at Samos, implied by the words \( \text{ἐν τῇ κυρίᾳ} \), that Leon and Diomedon, when sent to assume this command, were sent as \( \text{ἐν τῇ κυρίᾳ} \), meaning a particular command granted to strategoi by a special vote of the ecclesia. If special competencies of strategoi had become regularized by this time and if this instance is an indication of such a practice, Leon and Diomedon were certainly not elected to office to replace Phrynichus and Scironides, but as strategoi were assigned a special competency. Irrespective of whether this was the case or not, the clear implication of Thucydides 8.54.3 is that Leon and Diomedon were sent to Samos because they were strategoi, not because it had been necessary to elect them to office first and subsequently appoint them to this command. Similarly, the description of Strombichides as a general is less an indication that he had been elected to office some time before the winter of 412/1, than that he was already strategos when in command (\( \text{κυρίος} \)) of eight ships earlier in the year. In
short, we have two further instances where Thucydides uses the words ὅν ἤρχε to describe strategoi, but with the difference that they can be verified as generals in military commands later, rather than earlier, in the year.

There are several other examples where Thucydides uses terms such as ὅν ἤρχε or ἤρχε τῶν νεκρῶν rather than ἔστρατηγαί or ἔστρατησιτών, which warrant some comment. At 5.116.3; καὶ ἱλιαδεῖς στρατεύειστε ὥστεν ἐκ τῶν Ἀθηναίων... ἢς ἠρχε Φιλοκράτης ὥ Αμήνω, at 6.105.2; καὶ τότε ἔν ποικιλόντων καὶ Λαιποπολίω καὶ Ἀμαρίατω ἀρχόντων... and at 7.20.1; ... ὅ Αθηναῖοι ναὸς τριάκοντα ἐκτείλαν καὶ Χαρίκλεα τῶν Ἀπολλόνων ἀρχόντα... Jordan has made no mention either about the position occupied by Philocrates in his command at Melos, or about the official status of Pythodorus, Laispodias and Demaratus. Philocrates was in command of reinforcements to Melos, although Thucydides does not say whether he was the replacement for the generals Cleomedes and Teisias, or supplemented them. Clearly he was sent to command Athenian hoplites rather than a naval squadron and cannot be classified as an αὐτικὼν ἐν νεκρῶν. The combination of Thucydides 6.105.2 and Aristophanes, Birds, 1569, is evidence enough for a strategia of Laispodias in 414/3. Although the inference is not inevitable that Aristophanes is mocking Laispodias both as a general and as an example of lack of elegance, the reference, in the context, would make less sense if Laispodias was not a general in the year of the performance of the play, 414. It follows that Pythodorus and Demaratus were also strategoi. Diodorus 13.9.2 states: Ἀθηναῖοι... τριάκοντα τρίητος ἀπεστείλαν καὶ Χαρίκλεα στρατηγόν. This is a reference to the same mission as Thucydides 7.20.1. If a
mistake was made it was that of Diodorus, but taking into account a
degree of unreliability does not alter the fact that Charicles was,
more likely than not, a strategos. According to Thucydides 3.7.1
... 'Αθηναίοι ... ναός ἀπέστειλαν τριάρχητι καὶ Ἀσώπιον τὸν
Φορμίωνος στρατηγὸν, κελευσάντων Ἀκαρνανῶν τὸν. Φορμίωνος τιπα διός πέμψαι
ἡ ὑπὸν ἡ ξυγγενὴς ἀρχοντα. I take this to translate as: "The Athen-
ians sent thirty ships and Asopius the son of Phormio as general,
the Acarnanians asking that a son or relative of Phormio be sent in
command to them". At Thucydides 7.20.1 the meaning of ἀρχοντα is
identical - "the Athenians sent thirty ships and Charicles the son of
Apollodorus in command."

Several examples of the terminology (ἁρχοντα, ἄρχειν ) used
by Jordan in support of his hypothesis refer to Athenian commanders
at Naupactus. Athenian forces were regularly stationed at such
strategic localities as Naupactus,83 (and possibly at Pylos and in
Thrace) and it was general practice to assign strategoi to a base of
this significance - for example, Phormio, Asopius, Nicostratus and
Demosthenes during various years of the Peloponnesian War.84 In all
likelihood Athens appointed officials other than strategoi to govern
some of the subject states, but at the strategically more important
localities where Athenian hoplites and naval squadrons could become
involved in combat at any time and where commanders' decisions may be
of some importance, the prerogatives of command enjoyed by strategoi
would seem to be required. In this context Fornara's view that
specialized duties became regularized and distributed among strategoi
has some attraction with respect to Conon's position at Naupactus
in 414/3. As a result of the regular practice to assign strategoi
to this base, finally we hear that Conon ἐπὶ Ναυπάκτου. Presumably for Fornara, Diphilos' command (ἡρκε) at Naupactus in 414/3 should be explained in the same way. But, as has been noted, Thucydides also describes Phormio's command there, in the summer of 429, in the same terms, as well as that of Aristoteles and Hierophon in the winter of 426. It seems unlikely that as early as 429 the command at Naupactus was regarded as a regularized duty, allocated to certain strategoi as a consequence of apportionment of special competencies. However, Naupactus was certainly one of the most important Athenian bases throughout the war, perhaps increasing in strategical significance as the war progressed. On this consideration, together with the fact that it was common practice to send strategoi to Naupactus, and bearing in mind that Thucydides often referred to generals by using the word ἀρχηγὸς and its derivatives, it is more probable than not that Aristoteles, Hierophon, Conon and Diphilos were strategoi.

I suggest that Thucydides, in describing Athenian commanders, only uses the terminology Jordan believes is indicative of a subordinate rank, to describe strategoi. At Thucydides 1.57.6: ... (ἐπιχων γὰρ τριάκonta τῶν ἀποστέλλοντες καὶ χελίους ὑπῆρτας ... Ἀρχεστράτου τοῦ Λυκομήτου μετὰ ἄλλων· δέκα· ἀστρατηγοῦ τοις ἄρσοι τῶν νεῶν ... Jordan considers that as only one of the eleven commanders is a general Thucydides refers to the entire contingent as ἄρχοντες τῶν νεῶν rather than στρατηγοῦ. A more satisfactory interpretation is that Thucydides means what he says. Archestratus was strategos but he was also one of τῶν ἄρχοντων τῶν νεῶν, this meaning "the commanders of the fleet". The eleven men are referred to collectively in this way because they are all generals. The inference
from the phrase Ἀρχεστράτευ...μετ' ἀλλων δέκα στρατηκῶν is not that the Athenians gave instructions τῷ στρατηκῷ καὶ τοῖς ἁρχασι τῶν νεῶν... but that there were ten other generals as well as Archestratus. Whether the δέκα be emended or not, Jordan's hypothesis is rendered invalid by Thucydides 1.59.1-2. Clearly ὁ δὲ τριάκοντα νῆς τῶν Ἀθηναίων are the ships that were sent under Archestratus, but they are now commanded by ὁ στρατηκός. Manifestly, these men are τοῖς ἁρχασι τῶν νεῶν of 1.57.6. 88

The appearance of the title ἂρχου τοῦ ναυτικῆ at the top of an Athenian casualty list of the tribe Leontis, referring to two men named Theoros and Pasiphon, followed by the names of two taxiarchs and four trierarchs, is less of a problem with the knowledge that Thucydides used the word in reference to Athenian strategoi. Bradeen's explanation is that the title applies to the men elected by the fleet at Samos to command them in the last decade of the fifth century. 89 Pasiphon Phrearrios, of the tribe Leontis, is one of ὁσι στρατηκῶν ἐς Σάμων in 410/9. 90 Bradeen's argument that the casualty list can be more satisfactorily dated to 409 than to any of the other years from 409 to 404 is attractive but not conclusive. 91 However, if correct, here is strong evidence for the identification of ὁσι ἂρχουντες τοῦ ναυτικῆ with ὁσι στρατηκῶν ἐς Σάμων. The only difficulty with the view that Athens refused to officially designate the strategoi of the fleet as strategoi on a casualty list is the indication in IG 1² 304, line 35, independently supported by Thucydides 8.97.3, that the city recognized the authority of the generals at Samos. The oligarchic general Thymochares certainly worked in conjunction with the strategoi elected by the fleet at the Hellespont in late 411, after.
the two factions joined forces. However, the difference between the two sets of generals may be illustrated by the heading on the casualty list. Although Athens may have recognized the authority of the generals at Samos, they had not been elected by the Demos, and officially could not be designated as strategoi on a casualty list.

Bradeen's solution is a neat explanation of the otherwise unknown title, irrespective of whether the entire monument should be dated to 409 or later.

Furthermore, Jordan's hypothesis that the title describes a rank higher than taxiarch but lower than strategos is not supported by any of the passages he cites from Xenophon where the word is used of Athenian commanders, Hellenica 1.6.29 and 1.5.18. The relevant section in Hellenica 1.6.29 is as follows: ἐξομένας δὲ αἱ (ἡνευρυχν) τῶν ταξιάρχων δέκα, καὶ αὐταὶ ἐνὶ μᾶσ, ἐνὶ δὲ ταύταις αἱ τῶν νεανίρχων τρεῖς... If anything, Xenophon's report of three Athenian ναυάρχοι participating in the battle of Arginusae behind the ships of the taxiarchs is an indication that they were equal or inferior in rank to the taxiarchs, rather than superior. At Hellenica 1.5.18 Xenophon notes that Phanosthenes was sent to Andros to replace Conon who had been sent from Andros to Samos. The historian's phrase, ἀντὶ δὲ Κόνων εἰς Ἀνδρον ἔστημαν Φανοσθένης, τέτταρας ναῦς ἐξοντα, is not evidence that Phanosthenes is more likely to be a nauarch rather than a taxiarch or strategos. Jordan's argument that Xenophon has just listed the ten strategoi of the year is no indication that Phanosthenes was a nauarch. It follows from the fact that the Athenians sent Phanosthenes to replace Conon that the two men were colleagues, that they held the same rank.
I do not believe that we can identify with any precision the position in the chain of command of Xenophon's ναυπρχοi. The historian's description of the line of Athenian forces just prior to the battle of Arginusae suggests that the ναυπρχοi were subordinate officers. They were incorporated into the left wing of the fleet which comprised detachments led by four strategoi, a detachment of Samian ships and the ships of the taxiarchs. While each of the strategoi was in command of fifteen ships, the nauarchs appear, like the taxiarchs, to have had control of only a single ship each. This suggests that they were officers in charge of special contingents, perhaps similar in function to the taxiarchs, but in command of a section of the Athenian forces outside the jurisdiction of the taxiarchs. The fact that ναυπρχο seems to be the official title of a subordinate officer, together with the indication that they were not superior in rank to the taxiarchs, makes it hardly possible that they could be the equivalent of the χρον το ναυτικό of Bradeen's casualty list.

In conclusion, I think it should be stressed that if Thucydides had consistently used the same phraseology in his references to individual Athenian generals and groups of generals there may be some grounds for concluding that his vocabulary is technical and meant to indicate different levels of authority among the strategoi, or the existence of a board of military officials, apart from the board of taxiarchs, which ranked immediately below the strategia. However, the opposite is the case. Thucydides' word usage with regard to strategoi is not consistent, and the variety of terminologies and sentence constructions are such as to allow only a very general
categorization and virtually preclude a meaningful classification. In fact if Thucydides can be claimed to be consistent in his rigorous attention to detail he can also be claimed to be consistent in his variety of phraseology in presentation of detail. The various theories which have been advanced about the Athenian system of command based on the belief of Thucydides' technical precision in his word usage all founder because they inadequately explain or fail to take into account exceptions and contradictions.

If it be accepted that Thucydides did not deliberately imply that certain strategoi were superior to their colleagues, there is no need to assume that the Athenians sometimes resorted to the practice of allocating supreme authority to one strategos over his colleagues but at other times appointed several strategoi with joint command and equal authority. The assumption which maintains that collegiality was occasionally dispensed with is seriously threatened by the indication in Thucydides 3.4.1 and 3.4.3 that the general Cleippides and his colleagues (τρίτος αὐτός) shared equally in authority. If this is not enough there are numerous other instances in Thucydides testifying to collegiality of generals on campaign. For example, when the generals Diotimus, Proteas and Lacedaimonius were sent to Corcyra in 433/2 they received specific instructions and collectively decided not to help the Corcyraeans in the sea battle against Corinth: 

-μάχης δὲ οὐκ ἤρχον δεδίτες σι στρατηγοὶ τὴν πρόρρησιν τῶν Ἀθηναίων. Similarly, when the Athenian fleet on route to Sicily in 414 put in at Rhegium, οἱ στρατηγοὶ πρὸς τὰ παρόντα ἐβουλεύοντο. The three generals each voiced a different opinion, but when Lamachus sided with Alcibiades the course of action proposed by the latter...
Although there is ample evidence attesting collegiality, without the support of the argument from terminology there is no evidence which attests positively to the superiority of a general over his colleagues. Thucydides' phraseology at 2.22.1 and 2.65.4 in reference to Pericles has been thought by some scholars to mean possession of supreme authority by Pericles in 431 and 429. At 2.22.1 Thucydides states that Pericles ἐκκλησίαν τε οὐκ ἐπιτείχει ἀνεξάντων ὀλίγων εὐμέρειαν αὐτῶν. There is no reason to assume that this passage means that Pericles suspended or prevented a normal meeting of the ecclesia. As a general Pericles had the power to ask the πρωταρχητεῖς to convene the ecclesia. Pericles may have refused to summon a special meeting and prevailed upon the other generals not to convene an assembly, being able to do this because of the prestige he enjoyed as a statesman rather than because of any extraordinary powers vested in him as strategos. The other passage, at 2.65.4, is as follows: οὔστερον οὕτως οὐ πολλῷ ... στρατηγὸν εἰκόνα καὶ πάντα τὰ πράγματα ἐπιτρέπει. According to Hignett this may mean that the ecclesia conferred plenary powers on Pericles when they elected him. However, Thucydides does not say that Pericles was στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ or that he was elected ἀπάντων ἡγεμόνων ἀυτοκράτωρ, which words we could reasonably expect if Hignett is right. It is more likely that Thucydides means that the Athenians "entrusted him with everything" in the sense that they put all their confidence in his advice; they restored him to his previous position of ὁ πρῶτος ἅνω in the state, quite apart from restoring him to office as general. There are other examples. For instance, when a force of Athenian ships was
sent around the Peloponnese in 427/6 under the command of the two
generals Demosthenes and Procles, all subsequent action seems to have
been taken on the decision of Demosthenes along. According to Thucy-
dides, οἱ δὲ Λακρατίνες ἡξίουν Δημοσθένη τὸν στρατηγὸν τῶν Ἀθηναίων
ἀπετείχεσιν αὐτῶς. The Acarnanians sought out Demosthenes as
if he was the sole Athenian commander. Similarly, Δημοσθένης
γιγαντεύεται κατὰ τὸν χρόνον τούτον ὑπὸ Μασσηνῶν... Λατωλοὺς
ἐπιθέσθαι. Again, Procles is missing. Are we to believe that
Demosthenes was superior in authority to Procles? The indication at
3.91.1 is that they were jointly in command - ἡν ἐστρατηγεῖ
Δημοσθένης τε ὡς Μακεδόνιος καὶ Πρόκλης ὡς Θεσσαλός, and when Procles
was killed in action he is ὡς άλλος στρατηγὸς Πρόκλης. The
emphasis on Demosthenes proves that he was the more important of the
two generals but does not prove that Procles was not his equal collea-
gue in the legal sense. We cannot assume that Demosthenes possessed
anything more than natural authority over Procles. Procles acquiesced
in Demosthenes' decisions.

The main difficulties associated with the theories that the
board of strategoi had a chairman or president who was legally
superior to his colleagues or that one of a group of generals on
campaign was given some authority over the others, are the evidence
in our sources testifying to the existence of a collegiate system of
command and the contradictions to such theories in the evidence thought
to support them, whether it be the existence of more than one case of
double representation in particular years or the fact that terminologies
thought to be technically precise are used inconsistently and carelessly.
For the same reasons it is becoming increasingly difficult
to accept the compromise solutions which maintain that the principle of strict collegiality was violated as early as Xerxes' invasion of Greece and thereafter operated in practice in some instances but not in others.\textsuperscript{116} On the other hand, if it be accepted that collegiality was not violated, but remained in force throughout the fifth century until at least 407,\textsuperscript{117} the difficulties which arise, for example, from Thucydides' description of the Athenian generals Demosthenes and Procles between 3.91.1 and 3.98.5 disappear, or to be more precise, can be explained much more simply and satisfactorily and in exactly the same way as can all the other instances, without exception, where a particular general is emphasized in relation to his colleagues in our literary and epigraphic sources. I agree with Dover and Fornara that whenever special emphasis is given to one strategos it is a reflection of his eminence, an acknowledgment of the realities of influence and prestige and importance, at least in the mind of the writer.\textsuperscript{118} As far as Thucydides is concerned, it is not his primary purpose to provide us with lists of officials, and we should perhaps be grateful that he has described the military activities of Athens during the Peloponnesian War in such detail and often taken care to explicitly name strategoi. In this context it is understandable that the historian does not always name the commanders or that when he does he employs no consistent phraseology, interchanging complete enunciation with such expressions as  "δείνα τρίτος, πέμπτος αὐτος" and  "δείνα καὶ ὁ ξυνήρχοντες", and interchanging the descriptive nouns and verbs  ἄρχων, ἄρχει ἄρχοντα. Evidence in epigraphic records permit the same conclusions. It should be noted that the expression  "δείνα καὶ ὁ ξυνήρχοντες" is very common
in epigraphic sources, not only in reference to groups of strategoi, but to other officials as well, and while IG i² 296 virtually proves that Ὑδίνα cannot be regarded as superior, a suitable explanation (although the eponym may simply be explained in the same terms as in literary sources) may be that Ὑδίνα is the original proposer of the mission or the receiver (as the representative of all the generals involved) of money paid by the disbursing board.¹¹⁹
PART III
APPENDIX I

List of Generals

For each year of the fifth century down to 405/4, I list the name and where possible, the patronymic and tribal affiliation of each general, and I cite the evidence which fixes his tenure of office. Only those years for which there is evidence of at least one general are listed. Thus the list begins with the strategia of Melanthius in 499/8 for there is no evidence for 501/0 or 500/499. I only give a commentary where there is some dispute, but in some cases where controversy does exist commentary has been given elsewhere, in the sections dealing with double representation and the size of the board.

Generals whose tribal affiliations are known are listed first and in order of phyle, and the others are then listed in no particular sequence. The order of the ten Cleisthenic tribes is as follows:

- Erechtheis  
- Aigeis  
- Pandionis  
- Leontis  
- Akamantis  
- Oineis  
- Kekropis  
- Hippothontis  
- Aiantis  
- Antiochis

499/8

Melanthius Phalanthou  

Hdt. 5.97.3 (9764)

The patronymic is supplied by Hesperia, Supplement 8, pp. 400 f. See also Fornara, p. 41. There is no evidence for the names of strategoi in the years between 498/7 and 491/0 inclusive.
490/89

Miltiades Cimonos Laciades VI  Hdt. 6.104.1 (10212)
Aristeides Lysimachou Alopecethen X  Plut. Arist. 5.1 (1695)
Stesileos Thrasyleo  Hdt. 6.114 (12906)

Fornara is doubtful about a generalship of Aristeides, considering that his name may have replaced that of Callimachus in Plutarch's account. Herodotus is silent but this does not mean that Plutarch is wrong in this instance. The story repeated by Plutarch that Aristeides was left behind with his tribe to guard the booty may be based on fact. It is possible, but less likely, that Themistocles was also a general at Marathon. Plutarch does not specifically refer to Themistocles as a strategos, although the inference has been drawn by some scholars. Miltiades' expedition against Paros may have occurred in 489/8 but more likely in 490/89. How and Wells date it to the spring of 489 (therefore 490/89), some months after Marathon. Alternatively, it could have taken place immediately after the Persian defeat. There are no known strategoi for the period 489/8 to 482/1.

481/0

Themistocles Neocleous Phrearrios IV  Hdt. 7.173.2 (6669)

Themistocles was probably strategos for several of the years in the 480's, and if Thucydides' phrase, ἐν τῷ ἐξέβινετο ἀρχηγὸς καὶ κατέβινετο Ἀθηναίοις ἡμερές, is a reference to the generalship rather than the archonship and means "in that position of his that he held at Athens year by year", we should perhaps believe that Themistocles was a general for some years in succession prior to 481/0.

480/79

Themistocles Neocleous Phrearrios IV  Hdt. 8.4.2.
Xanthippus Arifronos Cholargeus V  Hdt. 8.131.3 (11169)

It is possible that Aristeides was also a strategos in 480/79, but he is not so called by Herodotus when the historian is describing his initiative at Psyttaleia. The story about Aristeides crossing from Aegina to Salamis to inform Themistocles that the Persians had the Greek fleet trapped at Salamis is more an indication that Aristeides was not a strategos. We can reasonably assume that the Athenian strategoi participated in the conference.
479/8

Xanthippus Ariphronos Cholargeus V
Leocrates Stroibou Hagnousios V
Aristeides Lysimachou Alopecethen X
Myronides Calliou

Diod. 11.34.2
Plut. Arist. 20.1 (9084)
Hdt. 9.28.6
Plut. Arist. 20.1 (10509)

For Leocrates' deme see chapter 5, pp. 122-123.

478/7

Aristeides Lysimachou Alopecethen X
Cimon Miltiadou Laciades VI

Diod. 11.44.2
Plut. Cimon 6.1 (8429)

According to Plutarch, ἦτε δὲ Μίδων φιάζότων ἐκ τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἐπεμείθη στρατηγός, κατὰ διάλαταν οὖσα, τὴν ἄρχειν Ἀθηναίων γέυσιν, ἐπὶ δὲ Παυσανίας τε καὶ Λακεδαιμονίως ἐπορεύον, ... Pausanias was recalled by Sparta in 478. As Fornara notes, it is difficult to date Cimon's first generalship to 477/6 by dismissing this very explicit statement of Plutarch's.14

477/6

Cimon Miltiadou Laciades VI

Ephorus F. 191

The capture of Byzantium from Pausanias probably occurred in this year.

476/5

Cimon Miltiadou Laciades VI
Cratinos
Lycourgos
Lysistratos

Thuc. 1.98.1
Schol. Aesch. 2.31 (8750)
Schol. Aesch. 2.31 (9246)
Schol. Aesch. 2.31 (9591)

Fornara suggests that the operations at Eion were begun in 477 and that Cimon should therefore be regarded as a strategos for 477/6, as well as for 476/5, on this evidence alone.15 Even if Plutarch, Cimon 7.4 implies a long siege it is perhaps not enough to date backwards to the previous year.
469/8

Cimon Miltiadou Laciades VI Thuc. 1.100.1; Plut. Cimon 8.8

Cimon was probably also a general in many (if not all) of the years from 476 to 469, but we do not have names for the strategoi who led Athenian forces against Naos and Carystus in these years. The battle of the Eurymedon is usually dated to 469/8, but if it occurred later Cimon was strategos at least once more between 469 and 466.

466/5

Cimon Miltiadou Laciades VI Plut. Cimon 14.1

Plutarch's report of Cimon's activities in the Chersonese in command of four Athenian ships, soon before the revolt of Thasos, is probably evidence enough for his generalship in this year.17

465/4

Leagros Glaucos ek Kerameon V Hdt. 9.75 (9028)
Cimon Miltiadou Laciades VI Plut. Cimon 14.218
Sophanes Eutychidou Deceleus VIII Hdt. 9.75 (13409)

463/2

Cimon Miltiadou Laciades VI Plut. Cimon 14.2

According to Thucydides 1.101.3 the siege at Thasos lasted for more than two years. It is possible that Cimon did not return to Athens in the years from 466 till the suppression of Thasos.19 If this is so he was strategos for 464/3 as well.

462/1

Cimon Miltiadou Laciades VI Thus. 1.102.1-2
Ephialtes Sophonidou Plut. Cimon 13.4 (6157)

Plutarch, Cimon 15.1 notes that Cimon led an Athenian
naval force after being tried for accepting a bribe from Alexander of Macedon. This is either a reference to Cimon's expedition to Ithome in aid of Sparta or (less likely) to another mission which intervened between his trial and the expedition to the Peloponnese. Both Ephialtes and Pericles were active as generals in at least one of the years of the late 460's, if we are to trust Plutarch, Cimon 13.4. Plutarch's reference may be to generalships before 462/1 but it is quite possible that Ephialtes' popularity ensured his election in the last two or three years of his life, which encouraged further his opposition to Cimon and his attacks on the Areopagus. He may well have been strategos in both 463/2 and 462/1.

460/59

Hippodamas Erechtheidos I  IG i² 929.33 (7611)
Phrynichos Erechtheidos I  IG i² 929.6 (15009)
Leocrates Stroibou Hagnousios V  Thuc. 1.105.2
Myronides Calliou  Thuc. 1.105.4
Charitímides  Fr.Gr.Hist. 688 F14 (15497)

The dating of events of Thucydides 1.104 ff. is difficult. Myronides' advance into the Megarid may belong to 459/8 rather than 460/59. Charitímides may well have remained as strategos in Egypt for several years, as may Leocrates at Aegina. Myronides was a general in at least two of the years between 460 and 456. Two months after the battle at Tanagra (458/7?) he was a strategos of the victorious Athenian army which defeated the Boeotians at Oenophyta (457/6?). A tentative reconstruction may be:

459/8 : Myronides, Leocrates, Charitímides
458/7 : Leocrates, Charitímides, Pericles?
457/6 : Myronides, Leocrates.

456/5

Tolmídes Tolmaiou  Thuc. 1.108.5
Schol. Aesch. 2.75 (13879)
455/4

Myronides Calliou Thuc. 1.111.1; Diod. 11.83.3

? Tolmides Tolmaiou Diod. 11.84

Unless Diodorus is confused the expedition he describes of Tolmides around the Peloponnese may be different to that of Thucydides 1.108.5. According to Thucydides the places attacked by Tolmides were Chalcis and Sicyon, but in Diodorus they are Methone and Gytheium in Laconia. The only similarity in the two accounts is the destruction of a Spartan depot by fire.

454/3

Pericles Xanthippou Cholargeus V Thuc. 1.111.2; Diod. 11.85

Perhaps Tolmides should be considered as a general in this year on the basis of Diodorus 11.85.28 According to Fornara this may well be the first generalship of Pericles.29 He considers that Plutarch, Cimon 13.4 may be equated with Thucydides 1.116.3.30 Staying as close as possible to Thucydides' chronology it is easier to date Pericles' expedition to the Corinthian Gulf in 454/3 rather than in 453/2.31 If the expedition to Thessaly occurred in 454/3 Myronides was a general in this year rather than in 455/4.32

451/0

Cimon Miltiadou Laciades VI Thuc. 1.112.2

Anaxicrates Diod. 12.3.4 (805)

450/49

Cimon Miltiadou Laciades VI Diod. 12.4.1

Tolmides Tolmaiou Diod. 11.88.3

The expedition to Cyprus may have occurred in 450/49.33 It may however, have extended over two years.34 I follow Fornara here for a generalship of Tolmides although it may have been later.35
I have followed Gomme's chronology for Thucydides 1.111-114.37 Fornara assigns a generalship to Pericles for 448/7 on the evidence of Plutarch, Pericles 21.2 that Pericles led the Athenian expedition to Delphi.

The final conquest of Euboea and the measures taken against Histiaea probably occupied at least part of the year 446/5.38

According to Plutarch, Pericles ... ὁ μὲν ἔλαττω τῶν πεντεκαῖδρων ἐπὶ τῇ δινησίᾳ καὶ μίαν σεβηκὼν ἐν τοῖς ἐνεπιστευμένοις στρατηγικοῖς ἀρχήν ... This is the first of Pericles' unbroken tenure of office for fifteen years. Fornara assigns a generalship to Thucydides, the son of Melesias, in 444/3.
Andocides Leogorou Kydathenaieus III
Creon Scamonides IV (8785)
Pericles Xanthippou Cholargeus V (3027)
Glaucou Leagrou ek Kerameon V (8148)
Callistratos Achaireus VI (8148)
Xenophon Euripidou Meliteus VII (11313)
Lampides Peiraius VIII (2951)
Glauketes Peiraius VIII (8548)
Cleitophon Thoraieus X (8548)

The problem with the eleven names is that in preamble the scholiast wrote of Pericles, ἐπὶ μὲν Ζάμων δέκα τῶν στρατηγῶν τῶν δέκα στρατηγῶν τῶν ἐν Ζάμῳ τὰ εἴσιμα κατὰ οἰκρατίαν. It could easily have happened. Forty four of the sixty ships sent to Samos gave battle off the island of Tragia, περικλέους δεκάτων αὐτοῦ στρατηγῶν. In other words, ten generals, including Pericles, took part in the engagement. The scholiast may have copied Thucydides' phraseology and failed to notice the discrepancy in the number. The sixteen ships detached from the sixty to watch out for the Phoenician fleet may have been commanded by the eleventh strategos of Androtion's list, or alternatively, Athens may have appointed an extra general to command the forty ships sent out to reinforce the sixty already at Samos. The only objection to this interpretation is the damage it does to the theory which maintains that only ten generals could hold office at the same time.

440/39

Hagnon Niciou Steirieus III Thuc. 1.117.2 (171)
Phormio Asopiou Paianieus III Thuc. 1.117.2 (14958)
Pericles Xanthippou Cholargeus V Thuc. 1.117.2
Anticles Thuc. 1.117.2 (1051)
Thucydides Pantainetou Gargettios II or Aristonos Archerdousios VIII Thuc. 1.117.2 (7272) (7271)
Tlepomos IX or X Thuc. 1.117.2 (13863)

It is generally agreed that these generals belong to 440/39 rather than 441/0. The generalship of Epiteles is assigned by some scholars to 440/39.
Socrates Anagyrasios is generally accepted as the general from Erechtheis in IG i² 50. Phormio is likely. Xenophon and Tlepolemos are virtually certain. The list in IG i² 50 is in tribal order which means that Tlepolemos belongs to Aiantis or Antiochis:

1. Aiantis if :-
   a) two generals were elected from this tribe and the relevant section in IG i² 50 is restored as ΤΛΕΠ [ΕΛΕΜΟΣ ... ΑΙΑΝΤΙΔΕ]s, or
   b) both Aiantis and Antiochis were represented, ΤΕΠ [ΕΛΕΜΟΣ ΑΙΑΝΤΙΔΕΣ ... ΑΝΤΙΟΧΙΔΟ]s.

2. Antiochis if the inscription is restored as ΤΕΠ [ΕΛΕΜΟΣ ... ΑΝΤΙΟΧΙΔΟ]s, thereby meaning double representation of Antiochis.

The general from Oineis may be Callistratos, strategos in 441/0. All scholars agree that IG i² 50 contains generals for 439/8 rather than 440/39 because the list does not include some of the generals for 440/39 known from Thucydides. It is worthy of note that if Socrates and Callistratos are correct restorations, five of the generals of 441/0 were elected in 439/8. This raises the possibility that some generals remained at Samos from the beginning of the war until the treaty was drawn up, and that they should therefore be included on the list for 440/39 - a case in point is Xenophon, and perhaps Socrates and Callistratos as well.

Phormio may have been a general in this year.
A generalship of Lamachus in this year depends on the date of the Athenian expedition to the Pontus. It may have occurred in the previous year.49 A Menippus was probably also a general in some of the years between 438/7 and 434/3,50 as perhaps was Nicias.51

Generalships of Glaucon and Proteas are not certain.52
Phormio may also have been a general in this year. A problem is created by the conflict between Thucydides 1.51.4 and IG i² 295. Thucydides names Λκυσίνειος Ο Λευκόπου as the colleague of Glaucan while IG i² 295 names Metagenes and Dracontides. It is generally accepted that Andocides is an interpolation. If both Andocides and Phormio were generals there are three sets of double representation. The generalship of Archenautes is not certain.

432/1

Socrates Antigenous Halaieus II
Phormio Asopiou Paianieus III
Pericles Xanthippou Cholargeus V
Carcinus Xenotimou Thorikios V
Proteas Epicleous Aixoneus VII
Euocrates Meliteus VII
Callias Calliadou Aixoneus VII
Archestratus Lycomedous Phlyeus VII

There is no indication in Thucydides that Callias and his colleagues replaced Archestratus, although the inference has been drawn by some scholars. Even if Archestratus arrived at Potidaea at the end of June or beginning of July, 434, and was therefore sent out about May, the forces of Archestratus and Callias cannot have joined forces at Pydna before the turn of the Attic year. Callias' expedition was dispatched after the Athenians heard that Aristeus was sent with Corinthian reinforcements to Potidaea. Aristeus arrived forty days after the revolt began, therefore about a month after Archestratus. Callias cannot have left Athens before the beginning of 432/1, and yet when he arrived in Macedonia he found the Athenian force previously sent out engaged in a siege of Pydna. This suggests that Archestratus was a general for 432/1 as well as for 433/2. On this chronology perhaps Callias should not therefore be considered a strategos for the previous year, 433/2. If Archestratus was a general in 432/1 there is a possibility of quadruple representation of Kekropis.

431/0

Socrates Antigenous Halaieus II
Hagnon Niciou Steirieus III
Phormio Asopiou Paianieus III
Pericles Xanthippou Cholargeus V

Thuc. 2.23.2
Thuc. 2.58.1
Thuc. 2.29.6
Thuc. 2.31.1
It is generally agreed that Socrates, Carcinus and Proteas were on active duty in the autumn of 431, and that Cleopompos was a general in this year rather than 432/1. According to Gomme the expedition of Hagnon and Cleopompos left before the end of 431/0. There is no need to doubt a generalship of Phormio. Even if Thucydides 2.29.6 is dated to 432/1, Thucydides 2.58.2 makes little sense unless Phormio had remained for some time near Potidaea and was still on active duty with his 1,600 hoplites.

430/29

Hagnon Niciou Steirieus III Thuc. 2.58.1
Phormio Asopiou Paianieus III Thuc. 2.68.7
Pericles Xanthippou Cholargeus V Thuc. 2.59.3
Xenophon Euripidou Meliteus VII Thuc. 2.70.1
Hestiodoros Aristocleidou Thuc. 2.70.1 (5207)
Phanomachos Callimachou Thuc. 2.70.1 (14069)
Cleopompos Cleiniou Thuc. 2.58.1
Melesandros Thuc. 2.69.1 (9803)

Hagnon and his troops returned to Athens, not because his term of office had expired, but because of the effect of the plague. Presumably he thought to prevent the disease spreading through the ranks of the troops who preceded him (and Cleopompos) to Potidaea.

429/8

Phormio Asopiou Paianieus III Thuc. 2.88.1
Hagnon Niciou Steirieus III Thuc. 2.95.3
Pericles Xanthippou Cholargeus V Thuc. 2.65.4
Cleippides Deiniou Acharneus VI Thuc. 3.3.2 (8521)

Some scholars consider that Thucydides 2.65.4 refers to the election of Pericles for 429/8 rather than to his reinstatement in 430/29. I have suggested elsewhere that it refers to his reinstatement. However, there is no reason to doubt that he was re-elected and held office until he died.
There is some dispute about Hagnon's strategia. According to Fornara he was not a strategos but commanded in Thrace as hegemon after the deaths of the generals there. However, Thucydides makes it quite clear that after the defeat of the Athenian force and the deaths of the three generals in Thrace the remnants of the Athenian army retired temporarily to Potidaea and then returned to Athens. Hagnon had no force to command. Nevertheless, Thucydides 2.95.3 may be an indication that he was a general. The context is as follows. Sitalces of Thrace began a campaign in the winter of 429/8 against Perdiccas of Macedon and the Chalcidians taking with him Amyntas, son of Philip, to replace Perdiccas, καὶ τῶν Ἀχαιων πρεσβείας, ὡς ἐπέκειτο τοῖς ἑνῶν ἔνεκα, (on account of the campaign) καὶ Φεσαλίαν ἀγωνίαν ἐδεί καὶ καὶ τῶν Ἀχαιων παρατείχε. It is possible Thucydides means that Hagnon was hegemon of the embassy but the last sentence of the passage, beginning with ὥστε, implies his hegemony had something to do with the expected Athenian forces. Ehrenberg has suggested that Hagnon may have been destined to lead the common army of the Athenians and Thracians and like Demosthenes in Acarnania in 426/5 was a strategos and hegemon of the allied forces. However, according to Thucydides' later narrative Athens did not send a force in support of Sitalces and probably never intended to. Alternatively, but less likely, Hagnon, who was well known in Thrace (he was oikistes of Amphipolis) was not a general but as hegemon was advisor to Sitalces and leader of his forces. I say less likely because Thucydides' last sentence, interpreted naturally, does seem to be a deliberate explanation of the words ἡγεμόνα Αὐγαμία, thus implying that Hagnon was a strategos.

428/7

Asopius Phormionos Paianieus III

Aristoteles Timocratous Thoraieus X

Paches Epicourou

Lysicles

It is not certain that Aristoteles held a strategia in this year. It is possible that Nicias was general in the early 420's, including 428/7. Beloch suggested that Nicostratus was at Naupactus during the early months of 427. It is possible, but perhaps his evidence, Thucydides 3.75, is not enough.

427/6

Nicias Niceratou Cydantides II

Eurymedon Thucleous (Myrrhinusios III)
See also the list of Fornara and Sealey. 84

426/5

Nicias Niceratou Cydantides II  Thuc. 3.91 Athen. V. 218b
Eurymedon Thucleous (Myrrhinusios III)  Thuc. 3.91.4
Hippocrates Ariphronos Chalargous V  IG i 2 324.3 (7640)
Lamachus Xenophanous Oethen VI  Aristoph. Aoh. 593ff.
Sophocles Sostratidou Oineus VI  Thuc. 3.115.5 (12827)
Laches Melanopou Aixoneus VII  Thuc. 3.99; 103
Pythodorus Isolochou Phlyeus VII  Thuc. 3.115.2 (12399)
Demosthenes Alcisthenous Aphidnaios IX  Thuc. 3.97
Hipponicus Calliou Alopecethen X  Thuc. 3.91.4 (7658)
Aristoteles Timocratous Thoraieus X  Thuc. 3.105.3
Hierophon Antimnestou  Thuc. 3.105.3 (7515)
Procles Theodorou  Thuc. 3.98.5
Simonides  Thuc. 4.7.1 (12713)

Lewis also assigns generalships to Demosthenes, Procles and Lamachus in this year. 85

425/4

Demodocus Anagyrasios I  Thuc. 4.75.1 (3464)
Nicias Niceratou Cydantides II  Thuc. 4.27.5
Cleon Cleainetou Cydathenaieus III  Thuc. 4.28
Eurymedon Thucleous (Myrrhinusios III)  Thuc. 4.65.3
Nicostratus Dieitrepheous Scambonides IV  Thuc. 4.53.1
Lamachus Xenophanous Oethen VI  Thuc. 4.75.1
Sophocles Sostratidou Oineus VI  Thuc. 4.65.3
Sealey gives Cleon a special command in this year. Fornara leaves him out.

424/3

Demodocus Anagyrasios I
Nicias Niceratou Cydantides II
Eurymedon Thucleous (Myrrhinusios III)
Cleon Cleainetou Cydathenaieus III
Nicostratus Dieitrephous Scambonides IV
Thucydides Olorou Halimousios IV
Hippocrates Ariphronos Cholargeus V
Lamachus Xenophonous Oethen VI
Sophocles Sostratidou Oineus VI
Pythodorus Isolochou Phyleus VII
Demothones Alcisthenous Aphidnaios IX
Autocles Tolmaiou Anaphystios X
Aristeides Archippou
Eucles

Sealey is undecided about the composition of the board of 424/3 and has constructed three alternative lists in an attempt to restrict the numbers to ten, which in two cases involves allocating a special command to Thucydides. Fornara removes five generals from the list for the same reason.

423/2

Nicias Niceratou Cydantides II
Sophocles ek Colonou II
Cleon Cleainetou Cydathenaieus III
Eurymedon Thucleous (Myrrhinusios III)
Nicostratus Dieitrephous Scambonides IV

Sophocles the poet may have been a strategos in this
Thucydides does not call Cleon a strategos in his account of the events up to and including the battle of Amphipolis. However his strategia cannot be doubted. The seventeen signatories to the Peace of Nicias are interesting. Nicia's, Laches, Demosthenes and Lamachus were often generals during the Peloponnesian War. Pythodorus is probably not the general who was banished in 424 but he may well be the general of 418/7, 414/3, and 413/2. Euthydemus may be the strategos of 418/7, 414/3, and 413/2. Hagnon is probably the general of the late 430's and early 420's. Thrasycles may be the general of 412/1. Leon may be the general of 412/1. Aristocrates is probably the general of 413/2, 410/9, 407/6 and 406/5. Timocrates may be the father of Aristoteles the general, or the politician who moved the imprisonment of the generals after Arginusae. Lampon is probably the well-known soothsayer and founder of the colony of Thurii. Apart from the four certain identifications, six others, Pythodorus, Euthydemus, Hagnon, Thrasycles, Leon and Aristocrates can in all probability be identified with generals of the Peloponnesian War. I suggest that we may have a list of most of the generals for 422/1 - apart from Cleon, who was killed at Amphipolis, and one or more generals who were involved in suppressing the revolt of Scione. It was common for Athenian generals to take the oath in treaties. The three strategoi Nicias, Nicostratus and Autocles signed the truce of 423.106 and Athenian generals signed the treaty with Samos in 439/8. Unfortunately there is no evidence for the names of strategoi of 422/1 except for Cleon. Nicias was general in all the years from 427/6 to 423/2 and again in 421/0. According to Thucydides 5.16.1 ... τάτε ὅτι ἐκαίνε τὴν τάξιν συνεδρώντες τὸ μέλαιτα τὴν ἱρείαν Πλευστιάνητα τε ὅ Παυσανίου βασιλεὺς Λακεδαιμωνίων καὶ Νικίας ὁ Νικηφάτου, πλείστα τῶν τάτε εὖ ἐξεμένους εὐ στρατηγάις ... This is not evidence for a generalship of Nicias, but it is hard to believe that he was elected for the last five or six years of the 420's except 422/1, the year in which he was finally able to take the initiative as the chief proponent of peace. If Nicias was a general it would be strange if others among those who took the oath were not. It is worthy of notice that in 418/7, the next year after 422 for which we have a list of more than one general, four of the strategoi were signatories to the Peace of Nicias - Nicias, Laches, Demosthenes and Euthydemus. However, it is difficult to isolate those men among the delegation who were generals from those who were not. Presumably some delegates were chosen for their negotiating ability and experience - perhaps, for example, Hagnon. Lampon's function was probably religious. According to Andrewes and Lewis, Isthmonicus was a colleague of Lampon.
delegation will have been commissioners chosen especially for the task.\textsuperscript{110} The list may nevertheless be evidence for generalships of Nicias, Laches, Euthydemus, Lamachus and Demosthenes, and perhaps others as well. Demosthenes, Lamachus and Nicias were probably generals in most of the years of the late 420's and early 410's. If Nicostratus had been a member of the peace delegation such a conclusion would carry more authority, for he is the one general, except for Nicias, whose tenure of office in the late 420's is most fully attested. Perhaps his absence can be explained — he may have been sent to quell the rebellion at Scione.

421/0

Nicias Niceratou Cydantides II  
Plut. \textit{Nicias} 10.9

That Nicias was a strategos has been accepted by Fornara and Sealey.\textsuperscript{111}

420/9

Alcibiades Cleiniou Scambonides IV  
Plut. \textit{Alc.} 15.1;  
\textit{Nicias} 10.8 (600)

There is no reason to dispute Alcibiades' strategia in this year.\textsuperscript{112}

419/8

Alcibiades Cleiniou Scambonides IV  
Thuc. 5.55.4

418/7

Nicias Niceratou Cydantides II  
IG i\textsuperscript{2} 302.20

Alcibiades Cleiniou Scambonides IV  
IG i\textsuperscript{2} 302.17

Nicostratus Dieitrephous Scambonides IV  
Thuc. 5.61.1

Callistratos Empedou Oethen VI  
IG i\textsuperscript{2} 302.21 (8142)

Laches Melanopou Aixoneus VII  
Thuc. 5.61.1

Demosthenes Alisthenous Aphidnaios IX  
IG i\textsuperscript{2} 302.6, 15

Autocles Tolmaiou Anaphystios X  
IG i\textsuperscript{2} 302.17

Euthydemus Eudemou  
IG i\textsuperscript{2} 302.9 (5521)
Alcibiades' strategia depends on the restoration of his name in line 17 of IG i² 302.113

417/6

Nicias Niceratou Cydantides II  Thuc. 5.83.4
Rhinon Charicleous Paimieus III  IG i² 302.26-7 (15207)
Alcibiades Cleiniou Scambonides IV  Thuc. 5.84.1
Teisias Teisimachou Cephalethen V  IG i² 302.29 (13479)
Cleomedes Lycomedous Phlyeus VII  IG i² 302.30 (8598)

Rhinon is not certain but a strong probability.114

416/5

Nicias Niceratou Cydantides II  Thuc. 6.8.2
Alcibiades Cleiniou Scambonides IV  Thuc. 6.8.2
Teisias Teisimachou Cephalethen V  IG i² 302.29
Lamachus Xenophonous Oethen VI  Thuc. 6.8.2
Cleomedes Lycomedous Phlyeus VII  IG i² 302.30
Philocrates Demeou  Thuc. 5.116.3 (14585)

415/4

Nicias Niceratou Cydantides II  Thuc. 6.47.1
Alcibiades Cleiniou Scambonides IV  Thuc. 6.48.1
Lamachus Xenophonous Oethen VI  Thuc. 6.49.1
Telephonos  IG i² 302.63

I follow Fornara in dating the generalships of Demaratus, Laispodias and Pythodorus to 414/3 rather than 415/4.115

414/3

Nicias Niceratou Cydantides II  Thuc. 7.16.1
Pythodorus (Epizelou Halaieus II)  Thuc. 6.105.2
Eurymedon Thucleous (Myrrhinusios III)  Thuc. 7.16.2
Pythodorus is probably the son of Epizeles although he may be the general exiled in 424 and therefore of tribe VII. Less likely, he may be Pythodorus Polyzeiou Anaphlystios X. Beloch tentatively assigns Androcles and Peisander to this year.

413/2

Strombichides Diotimou Euonymeus I
Nicias Niceratou Cydantides II
Eurymedon Thucleous (Myrrhinusios III)
Aristocrates Sceliou Kekropidos VII
Demosthenes Alcisthenous Aphidnaios IX
Euthydemus Eudemou
Menander
Hippocles Menippou
Diphilus

There is no good reason for leaving Euthydemus and Menander off the list for 413/2. According to Thucydides they were generals at the last battle in the harbour at Syracuse - δὲ Αἶματα λέγουσα καὶ Μενανδρὸς καὶ Εὐθυδήμος (ἐντείχοντα ἐπὶ τὰς μύτες τῶν Ἀθηναίων στρατιῶν τεῖσθαν) ... Sealey does not include Strombichides on the board for this year.

412/1

Strombichides Diotimou Euonymeus I
Eucriates Niceratou Cydantides II

Schol. Aristoph. Lys 103 (5757)
Phrynichos Stratonidou Deiradiotes IV  Thuc. 8.25.1 (15011)
Onomacles Kekropidos VII  Thuc. 8.25.1 (11576)
Thrasyycles  Thuc. 8.15.1 (7317)
Diomedon  Thuc. 8.19.2 (4065)
Leon  Thuc. 8.23.1 (9100)
Scironides  Thuc. 8.25.1 (12730)
Euctemon  Thuc. 8.30.1 (5782)
Charminos  Thuc. 8.30.1 (15517)

See also the lists of Fornara and Beloch.121

411/0

Strombichides Diotimou Euonymeus I.  Thuc. 8.62; 8.79
Eumachos Euonymeus I  Xen. 1.1.2
Theramenes Hagnonos Steirieus III  Thuc. 8.92.9 (7234)
Thrasyboulus Lycou Steirieus III  Thuc. 8.76.2 (7310)
Alcibiades Cleiniou Scambonides IV  Thuc. 8.82.1
Dieitrephes Scambonides IV  Thuc. 8.64.2
Aristarchus Deceleelus VIII  Thuc. 8.98.1 (1663)
Aristoteles Timocraticus Thoraieus X  Xen. 2.3.46
Conon Timotheou Anaphlystios X  Diod. 13.48.6
Chaireas Archestratou  Diod. 13.50.7 (15093)
Thrasylus  Thuc. 8.76.2 (7333)
Alexicles  Thuc. 8.92.4 (535)
Thymochares  Thuc. 8.95.2 (7406)
Melanthius  Xen. 2.3.46 (9768)
Simichos  Schol. Aesch. 2.31 (13030)

It is difficult to know to what extent established procedures were ignored and abrogated in this period of revolution and counter-revolution.122 After the revolution of the Four Hundred at Athens the soldiers at Samos deposed some of their generals and elected others. Whether they elected a complete board or merely replaced (in number) the men they removed is not clear.123 Perhaps they deposed Charminos, but not Leon and Diomedon. Diomedon was again strategos in 406/5. Presumably the oligarchs elected some generals after the revolution of the Four Hundred,124 and maintained in office such men as Dieitrephes, who, to use Fornara's words, anticipated the normal course of events by joining the oligarchs and by going to Thrace to hold it in their interests.125 Should
the strategoi of the fleet and the generals of the oligarchy be considered separately? Both Fornara and Beloch believe so, at least for the first few months of 411. However, after the fleet and the city were reconciled in the autumn of 411, and the city recognized the authority of the generals at Samos, the board of generals was probably larger than ten, even though oligarch generals such as Alexicles and Aristarchos fled to Agis at Decelea and to Oenoe on the border with Boeotia. Certainly, in the last months of 411 and early 410, before the battle of Cyzicus, the generals of the fleet and of the Five Thousand co-operated, working and fighting together. Nevertheless, some scholars have maintained that the generals elected by the fleet in 411 continued for some years as a separate board distinct from the boards appointed annually by the city. This view is usually based on the indication in Xenophon that Alcibiades was first elected by the city in 407. According to Xenophon 1.4.10... οἵ τε ἱστορεῖς ἐπίτηδος Ἀλκιβιάδην μὲν ἀνεύσατο καὶ Ὁμήρωος Ὀλυμπίαν, κατατάξας ἐκ τῶν υἱῶν Ὀλυμπίου. Xenophon makes it clear that Alcibiades was nervous about returning to Athens, and only sailed into the Peiraeus when he heard that he had been elected general. The fact that he found reassurance in his election is an indication that he was not chosen by the city before 407. However, he was chosen by the fleet in 411 and fought as a general at Cyzicus in spring 410, presumably having been confirmed in his position as strategos by the city. Furthermore, Alcibiades was active as a commander of Athenian troops in the years before 407 and the inference from Xenophon 1.3.8 is that he was a general in 409/8.

In his recent interesting study of Alcibiades, E. Bloedow has argued that Alcibiades' cautious attitude on his return to Athens in 407 was a piece of adaptation. Bloedow questions the tradition preserved in Xenophon that Alcibiades was afraid to return to Athens. He suggests that Alcibiades' address to the council and assembly in the form of an ἀπελευθερία was superfluous, because his election as strategos before he arrived nullified the previous sentences against him, or rather, proves that they had already been nullified. Furthermore, the decree of banishment had been officially revoked in 411, and without opposition once Peisander had asked each person who spoke against his proposals whether Athens could survive without an individual who could persuade Tissaphernes to support Athens rather than Sparta. If Bloedow is right the statements in Xenophon that Alcibiades was still an exile are not precisely accurate. It would seem to follow from all this that Xenophon 1.4.10 may not be an indication of Alcibiades' first election by the city. His command of Athenian troops in the Hellespont in 409 and 408 suggests in fact that he was elected earlier than 407. However, the use of the title άρχην το νωτικό in reference to a certain Pasiphon (who was certainly one of the generals at Samos) on a casualty list of about 409 tilts the scales in the opposite direction, implying that some sort of distinction existed between the generals at Samos and those elected by the city. But I am not convinced that Athens regarded the generals at Samos as strictly "unofficial". I would suggest in fact that the evidence of the casualty list and IG 1² 304,
when taken together, enable us to define more precisely the relationship which existed between the city and the generals at Samos. IG II² 304 indicates that they were accorded full authority and status as strategoi by the city. To all intents and purposes they enjoyed the same prerogatives as generals elected at home. The casualty list merely indicates that they were not elected by the city, nothing more. The Athenians made the distinction and it is understandable that they should do so, but the heading of ἀπὸ τῆς πόλεως φόβος is at the top of the list, an acknowledgment of the rank of the two casualties named immediately below, a confirmation of their authority.

Thus, even if we assume some sort of separation between the city and the fleet in the years 410 to 407, there is no difficulty in thinking that there was no legal distinction between the strategoi of the city and the fleet. To put it differently, if Alcibiades, for example, was not elected by the city, he was probably nevertheless recognized as a strategos because he was maintained in that position by the fleet. A brief examination of the career of Thrasyllus in these years may, it is suggested, cast some light on the situation. He was a general of the fleet in 411 and went to Athens late in that year with news of the victory of Abydos and a request for troops and ships. While Thrasyllus was in Athens he led Athenian troops against a Spartan invasion of Attica (now in 410) and then received the troops and ships he had requested. By this time the full democracy had been restored at Athens and it is possible that he was elected as one of their generals. However, his repulse of Agis may easily have occurred before the restoration and this command may therefore be an indication of the attitude of the city to the generals of the fleet. Even if the restored democracy overlooked such men as Theramenes, Alcibiades and Thrasyboulus, I find it difficult to accept that their positions should be regarded as unofficial or irregular. For all we know Thrasyllus was not elected by the city for 409/8 but was voted troops and ships by Athens in recognition of his official position as general with the fleet.

It seems obvious enough that the democracy was unwilling to replace Alcibiades and Thrasyboulus in their commands at the Hellespont if only because they were wary of alienating a fleet in control of their lifeline. However, it was probably not as simple as that. The generals at the Hellespont were actively promoting the war against Sparta and Athens probably realized that they were the best commanders available. It is possible that Athens deliberately sent Thrasyllus to Ionia in the summer of 409 in an attempt to demonstrate their power to the generals at the Hellespont. If this is correct and the forces at the Hellespont were in urgent need of reinforcements, the Ionian expedition was not only foolish, but dangerous both for Athens and the fleet. However, was the fleet in desperate need of reinforcements? After the battle of Cyzicus the Spartan fleet was broken. Furthermore, the inactivity of the generals and their failure to attack and capture Spartan bases on land (during 410/9) until the arrival of Thrasyllus in 408 may be satisfactorily explained by the fact that they had been engaged
in continuous fighting since the summer of 411. The battle at Cynossema took place in about September 411. This was inconclusive and not surprisingly another major action resulted, this time at Abydos, in about November. The battle at Cyzicus occurred in March or April of 410. None of these engagements was a skirmish. They were serious encounters. By mid 410, not only was the Spartan fleet no longer the threat it had been, but the Athenians needed a rest. The inactivity of the generals is therefore explained. After the decisive action at Cyzicus there was no immediate need to reinforce the Hellespont. It is true enough that when Thrasyllus finally did reach the Hellespont and joined forces with Alcibiades, some friction was apparent between the two forces. According to Andrewes, troops were needed at the Hellespont and the ill-feeling of Alcibiades' soldiers towards the hoplites of Thrasyllus was due to the delay (the expedition to Ionia) in their arrival. Xenophon is more explicit. He states that the veterans of Alcibiades refused to associate with troops who had just been defeated. I suggest that Athens realized that further progress in the Hellespont could only be achieved by sending reinforcements to Alcibiades. Accordingly, Thrasyllus was dispatched in 409 but was instructed to make use of his forces in Ionia on the way because the situation at the Hellespont was favourable. It follows that Athens recognized Alcibiades' authority as a general. After Thrasyllus linked with Alcibiades their joint forces marched against Abydos. Alcibiades made use of Thrasyllus' troops.

Neither Fornara nor Beloch include Strombichides on their lists for 411/0. However, the implication of Thucydides 8.79.3 is that Strombichides had been elected by the fleet. Due to the events of 411 nothing much can be made of the large size of the board in 411/0.

410/9

<table>
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<th>Name</th>
<th>IG i² 304A. 35-36.</th>
<th>Diod. 13.64.3</th>
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<th>Hesp., v. 33, p. 49</th>
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It seems highly likely that Eumachos, a general in 411/0, should also be considered as a general for this year. His name is easily restored to IG i² 304A, lines 35-36.152

409/8

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408/7

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407/6

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<td>Phanosthenes</td>
<td>Xen. 1.5.18 (14083)</td>
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Xenophon 1.4.20 states that Alcibiades was proclaimed ἀριστερὰς ἡγεμόνας τοῦτος ἀντικράτωρ. Whatever else this may mean it is not connected with Alcibiades' election as a strategos. He had been elected as a general before his return to Athens, but was not proclaimed ἀριστερὰς ἡγεμόνας τοῦτος ἀντικράτωρ until after his arrival.
and his speech in the ecclesia. It is not therefore evidence for the so-called single οὐκότως οὐκέταν and does not explain the double representation of Leontis by Alcibiades and Adeimantus. Presumably Xenophon's expression means that Alcibiades was authorized to conduct the war in whatever way he saw fit. He was entrusted with powers which extended beyond those which he already possessed as a general, but his powers do not seem to have been specifically defined as were those of the στρατηγοί αὐτοκράτορες sent to Sicily in 415. This grant was an unprecedented measure which gave Alcibiades supreme command and authority over other strategoi. This much is clear from the fact that when he left the fleet anchored at Notium to visit the general Thrasyboulus, who was investing Phocaea, he appointed the pilot of his own ship to command the fleet in his absence. There were two other generals present with the fleet, Adeimantus and Aristocrates. Quite obviously Alcibiades was their superior for the command would have automatically become their responsibility if they had been equal colleagues with Alcibiades. Furthermore, the blame for the defeat at Notium was placed solely on Alcibiades' shoulders. Although Adeimantus was not one of the ten generals elected after the battle, Aristocrates was. Adeimantus was restored to office after Arginusae. No blame was attached to these two generals - they were subordinate to Alcibiades.

The special grant to Alcibiades of powers which in effect reduced the other strategoi to subordinate officers was an aberration, quickly dispensed with. The immediate election of a new board of generals is indicative of the change. The appointment of Alcibiades as οὐκότως οὐκέταν αὐτοκράτορ in 407 is the only deviation from the principle of equality in the strategia. Strict collegiality, in principle and in fact, except in this instance, was unbroken throughout the fifth century. It has been thought by some scholars that Alcibiades was granted special powers by the fleet at Samos when they elected him strategos in 411, for in addition to mentioning the election Thucydides also states...

However, Alcibiades did not participate as a strategos in the battle at Cynossema, and unless the generals were equal in authority and able to decide strategy and tactics and give battle on their own initiative, the absence of Alcibiades provokes difficulties. Further the late arrival of Alcibiades on the scene at the battle of Abydos is not commensurate with an alleged position of superiority. Once again, other strategoi had acted as if they needed only consult themselves. It would seem an over-interpretation of Thucydides' words to consider that Alcibiades was made commander-in-chief. A more likely interpretation is that the Athenians at Samos relied on his judgements on political policy rather than military strategy. He, at any rate, persuaded them not to sail to the Peiraeus but to allow him to negotiate with Tissaphernes - in this sense the fleet τα πράγματα πίστις άντιθέσεων. As far as the battle of Cyzicus is concerned, it is true that Xenophon reports as if Alcibiades made all the decisions and that credit for the victory was his alone. However, when we turn to Diodorus' account, significantly much more detailed, Alcibiades' predominance disappears. Decisions appear to have been made by all the generals collectively, and at the point of action they decided to divide their force into three squadrons, Thrasyboulus leading one, Alcibiades another and Theramenes the third.
There cannot be any doubt that the Athenian command at Arginusae was collegiate. According to Xenophon each of the eight generals had direct command over a contingent of fifteen ships. It was merely a matter of deciding where in the line each general and his contingent should be placed. After the battle and the victory the Athenian generals decided collectively upon the next course of action – ἐκείνες δὲ καὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίων στρατηγοὺς ... All the generals were judged responsible for failing to rescue their shipwrecked comrades after the battle and were deposed. Those who returned to Athens were imprisoned, tried and put to death. Obviously, if any one or two of the generals had authority over their colleagues the whole eight strategoi would not have been condemned, only those, as in the instance of Alcibiades after Notium, who were entrusted with superior powers.

406/5

Archestratus Phrearrios IV
Adeimantus Leucolophidou Scambonides IV
Pericles Pericleous Cholargeus V
Aristocrates Sceliou Kekropidos VII
Conon Timotheou Anaphlystios X
Aristogenes
Diomedon
Erasinides
Thrasylus
Protomachus
Lysias
Philocles

The ten generals elected after Alcibiades' failure at Notium are listed by both Xenophon and Diodorus. Diodorus 13.74.1 names Thrasyboulus instead of Thrasylus. There are no difficulties here for it is clear from Diodorus' later narrative that Thrasyboulus was not a general and should be considered a trierarch, as in Xenophon's account. Leon appears in Xenophon's list but is Lysias in Diodorus. Again there is no difficulty. Leon does not reappear in Xenophon but becomes Lysias at the battle of Arginusae, and at 1.7.2 Diodorus 13.101.5 names a Calliades as one of the generals who returned to Athens after Arginusae. This is probably Diodorus' mistake but puzzling nonetheless. He can only be identified with Diomedon or Erasinides, both difficult.
405/4

Eucrates Niceratou Cydantides II Lysias 18.4
Adeimantus Leucolophidou Scambonides IV Xen. 2.1.30
Tydeus Lamachou Oethen VI Xen. 2.1.16 (13884)
Conon Timotheou Anaphlystios X Xen. 2.1.28
Cephisodotos Xen. 2.1.16 (8312)
Menander Xen. 2.1.16
Philocles Xen. 2.1.30

According to Xenophon 2.1.16, the Athenians συνέλαβεν τρεῖς διπλῆς δοκίμασε Μένανθρον, Τυδεον, Κεφισοδοτον. This suggests that three additional generals were elected after the regular dokimasia. There is another possibility. Lysias states that Theramenes was elected for 405/4 but rejected at his dokimasia. These generals may be replacements for three men rejected, Theramenes and two others. It is possible that Archestratus was a general for 405/4. After the deposition of the eight generals in 406, Adeimantus and Philocles were elected. These two, plus Conon, were confirmed in office for 405/4. There is no evidence for Archestratus but he may have merited the same consideration. It is also possible that Cleophon was a general.
APPENDIX 2


According to Hignett, after the reform of Telesinus in 487/6, the presidency of the ecclesia may have been transferred from the eponymous archon to the generals. There is no evidence to indicate that this occurred. In Periclean Athens the ἐπιστεφάνης of the Council of Five Hundred also acted as the president of the ecclesia if it met during his day of office. If the archon was deprived of the presidency of the ecclesia in 487/6 it may have been transferred at this time to the ἐπιστεφάνης chosen from the Council. Even this is not certain. The change may have been effected at a later date. Hignett is probably right in believing that the innovation of choosing the president of the ecclesia from the Council can hardly be dated later than Ephialtes' reforms but need not be earlier. There seems no reason to think that the Athenians deemed it necessary to transfer the presidency to the strategoi in 487/6, unless it be assumed that there was a deliberate attempt (by Themistocles, perhaps) to substitute one executive in the state for another (the generals for the archons), and that this was part of the process. However, such an assumption appears unwarranted. The reform of Telesinus was a democratic innovation and as such was designed to weaken executive power rather than strengthen it. The incongruity is obvious if the reformers, after objecting to a strong archonship and strong civil executive, vested the powers they removed from it in their military executive. Moreover, it is surely an
argument from hindsight to suggest that there was a direct
collection between the demise of the archonship and the rise of
the strategia. In the 480's the strategia was a military institution.
It was only later and as a product of entirely different developments
that the strategoi became political leaders no less than military.\(^5\)
It is nothing short of anachronistic to consider that the Athenians
associated civil powers with the strategia as early as the 480's.
In brief, for these reasons it is very unlikely that there was an
intermediate stage in the transference of the presidency of the ecclesia
from the archon to an \(\varepsilon \iota \iota \tau \iota \alpha \tau \iota \varsigma\) chosen from the boule during which
the generals were allocated the responsibility. Rather, the problem
is one of dating the changeover to the \(\varepsilon \iota \iota \tau \iota \alpha \tau \iota \varsigma\) from the archon,
and the obvious choice is between 487 and 462.

In the period before the institution of the taxiarchs the
strategoi were probably given certain administrative responsibilities
associated with their tribes. In addition to assuming direct command
over their tribal contingents when they all participated in a battle,
as at Marathon, they were also probably responsible for discipline
of their regiments,\(^6\) and presided over cases involving hoplites charged
with desertion or failure to report for duty.\(^7\) Other routine duties
which later became the responsibilities of the taxiarchs may have
fallen to the generals in the first twenty years of the fifth century.
They may, for example, have appointed \(\lambda \chi \alpha \nu \iota \nu\iota\iota\iota\) as their immediate
tribal subordinates\(^8\) and prepared and kept up to date the catalogues
of the \(\varphi \omega \lambda \epsilon \tau \iota \varsigma\) eligible for military service.\(^9\) When only one general
commanded an Athenian expedition, as did Melanthius in 499/8 and
Miltiades (against Paros) in 490/89, the other generals were possibly
therefore involved with such administrative details as those connected with the organisation of tribal contributions to the forces, but once the expedition left Athens the conduct of the whole army, rather than merely the conduct of a single tribal contingent, was the responsibility of the strategos appointed. The strategoi were never purely tribal commanders, but when in command of Athenian armies and fleets, whether only one was present or several, decisions for or against battle and tactical arrangements were solely their responsibility. It is quite clear from Herodotus' account of the battle at Marathon, for example, that the generals had the authority either to risk an engagement or withdraw.

It seems that even though the taxiarchs were empowered to preside over the trials of hoplites accused of desertion and failure to report for duty, this responsibility was always shared with the strategos. Generals, to be sure, had to act as legal officers in cases which were outside the jurisdiction of taxiarchs. Charges of desertion and cowardice brought against soldiers and sailors who were not under the direct command of taxiarchs were probably dealt with by generals, and during the fifth century they had the power to inflict the death penalty. Strategoi were empowered to punish lesser breaches of discipline with imprisonment, exile or (less commonly in practice) the imposition of a fine. The generals were the highest authority to which the troops could appeal in disputes when on campaign and there is evidence which indicates that generals arbitrated even in disputes between trierarchs. It goes without saying that the strategoi were in immediate charge of taxiarchs, trierarchs and hipparchs, although on occasions generals deliberated
with them about strategy and tactics.16

In one sense it is an overstatement to assert that when Athens, on the eve of Xerxes' invasion, became a great naval power, the strategoi acquired the command of the fleet as well as the army, and on the foundation of the Delian League they became the leaders of the naval and military forces of the new confederacy.17 From their inauguration in 501/0 the strategoi were naval commanders, small though the Athenian navy may have been in the early years of the fifth century. Melanthius had command of twenty ships in his expedition in support of the Ionians in 499/8, and Miltiades was granted a fleet of seventy ships in 490 to conduct his campaign against Paros.18 However, the competence of the strategoi was certainly enlarged by the creation of a large fleet in the 480's and their powers were made more important when Athens acquired the hegemony of the Greek League forces from Sparta in 478. From the time of the early years of the Delian League the generals probably supervised the collection of financial contributions from the allies - it is clear that under the Empire, generals commanded the squadrons which collected the tribute from the subject states.19 They probably also supervised the imposition of terms and penalties on recalcitrant member-states of the empire which revolted.20

The prestige of the strategia was no doubt enhanced during the Persian War of 480/79; the actions and decisions of Athenian strategoi, particularly Themistocles, played no small part in contributing to the Greek victory. The increased scope of the magistracy after the Persian invasion, together with the fact that there was no legal limit to the number of times a man could hold office,21 meant
that the strategia did not long remain the preserve of men elected for military leadership alone. Indeed, whatever effect the reform of Telesinus had on the quality of candidates for the archonship, if any, after 487/6 the strategia was the only important office to be filled by direct election and its attraction to members of the leading families seeking political leadership of the state was a development which, although evident before Xerxes' invasion, \(^{22}\) became more obvious afterwards. Although the authority enjoyed by Themistocles perhaps depended less on his possession of the strategia than on his retention of the confidence of the ecclesia, \(^{23}\) Cimon's success as a strategos in the early years of the 470's (beginning in 478/7), while ensuring that his tenure of office continued virtually unbroken until 461, \(^{24}\) played a large part in his rise to political predominance. A statesman like Cimon, whose popularity was reflected in his annual re-election and whose position of πρωτος ἀμφί in the state was achieved and maintained by a combination of military and political ability, was able to exert a positive influence on the shaping of policy, and as a general, play a major role in the execution of policy. Thus, under the influence of Cimon, Athens continued a pro-Spartan policy throughout the early years of the Pentacontaetia and at his instigation sent a force of hoplites under his command to assist Sparta in her struggle against the Helots in the late 460's. Cimon was the first of a series of prominent Athenians whose rise to power was facilitated by tenure of the strategia. From the early 470's (if not before) until the 420's the only path to a distinguished political career was through constant military achievement. There is no reason to doubt that the prominence of Ephialtes in the late 460's was aided
by his military success as a general, or that Pericles' career was launched in the 460's by his election to the strategia. Proven military ability and achievements contributed to the prestige and power which Pericles enjoyed at Athens from the late 440's until 429 and that which Nicias enjoyed during the Archidamian War and later.  

Although the strategia had political importance throughout the fifth century, the demands of purely military matters on the generals during the Peloponnesian War, the fact that they were engaged in operations away from Athens for much of the year, was partially responsible for the emergence of a growing distinction between the military and political professions, a process which was by no means completed until some time during the fourth century. It does seem clear that certain distinguished generals of the Peloponnesian War, for example Demosthenes and perhaps Phormio to a lesser extent, concerned themselves almost totally with military affairs, and when compared with their predecessors played a relatively minor role in the political arena and the shaping of policy. A growth in specialization in political affairs was a contiguous development. It needs to be noted that the more important of the demagogues of the fifth century, the men who became prominent politically through their oratorical ability, may have all been generals. Cleon certainly was, and there is a chance that both Hyperbolus and Cleophon were also. It was only during the fourth century that the strategia ceased to be the politico-military executive institution of the state, for by the middle of the fourth century no prominent politicians were also generals. Even though it would seem that the strategia held some
importance to the demagogues as a vehicle to promote their political
d power, their careers form a sharp contrast with those of their
political predecessors. Cleon and perhaps Hyperbolus came to the
strategia after and because they were already prominent politicians.

The period of the Peloponnesian War was in effect a time of
transition for the strategia, a period which saw the beginning of
its decline in political power. An avenue to political prominence,
other than by military accomplishment, was opened up to prospective
politicians, an avenue which was at first exceptional but which later
became the rule - the phenomenon of eloquent orators whose rise to
power was not facilitated by election to the strategia. Aristotle
summed up the change in his observation that capable speakers of his
own day no longer concerned themselves with military affairs because
they lacked the experience. Cleon's military career foreshadowed
this development - Amphipolis suggests that he, a general who came to
office relatively late, an amateur, was no match for a professional
soldier, a Brasidas. Conversely, (that is, in the sense of a growing
distinction between the military and political spheres) Demosthenes'
career foreshadows the development - a successful and distinguished
commander, a specialist concerned with military matters. A new
pattern was set, the old rules were broken, but the change was gradual.
For the time being at least, as the careers of other prominent Athenians
indicate (Nicias and Alcibiades, for example) political power
and prestige was more usually achieved by success on the battlefield,
by proven military leadership.

Although the military success of a general was useful in
promoting his prestige and political authority, although the strategia
provided a congenial field of action for the members of the traditionally important political families, this path to power and the consolidation and strengthening of political influence was not without its hazards. The Demos dealt harshly with generals who failed to achieve objectives laid down or failed in the execution of a policy they had advocated. The failure of Cimon to win the trust of the Spartans in 461 contributed to his humiliation and ostracism, and the failure of Miltiades' Parian expedition resulted in his trial and the imposition of a heavy fine. There are numerous other examples. Pericles was deposed from office in 429 and fined, and Phormio, also dismissed from office not long afterwards, may have become and barred from re-election when unable to pay the fine. In 424 Pythodorus and Sophocles were banished and Eurymedon fined, and in 407/6 Alcibiades was deposed. Demosthenes was probably removed from office in 427/6. He was too afraid to return to Athens after his failure in Aetolia, and only came home when his military fortunes had improved. The eight generals at the battle of Arginusae were deposed and the six who returned to Athens executed. Thucydides himself was exiled for life, and probably as a result of his failure, when general, to check Brasidas in the Thraceward region in 424/3. In most of these instances (but possibly not all) the generals were deposed at one of the regular meetings of the ecclesia when a confirmatory vote was taken on the satisfactoriness of the conduct of magistrates in office. A vote was taken (ἐν χαρησκονία) in every prytany which meant that a general's behaviour was assessed ten times during his year of office. If the vote went against on official (ἀπεχαρησκονία) he automatically lost office and was tried by a jury
If he was convicted by the court the penalty was assessed by the assembly, and if he was acquitted he resumed office. The ecclesia had the power to inflict the death penalty but, if we are to judge from the evidence, usually imposed a fine or exiled the offender.

The confirmatory vote every prytany reflects the degree of control the ecclesia had over the elected magistrates. The ἀξιόμαχία, an examination which magistrates-elect had to undergo before their entry on office, and the ἐπιθετήμα, an examination of the accounts of a magistrate at the end of his term of office, were no doubt designed to ensure that undesirables and incompetents were unable to attain public office, and to minimise corruption and encourage diligence, but they further emphasize the extent to which the Demos maintained a close watch over the activities of its chief officials. The military officials, including generals, not only had to face the wrath of the people if unsuccessful on the battlefield or if they were judged to have made a decision not in the best interests of the state when on campaign, but were also exposed to the dangers of combat. The casualty rate of generals killed in action was not low. At least one of the ten generals at Marathon was killed, as was the polemarch. Thucydides records the death of some generals during the Peloponnesian War. Three generals were killed in the Chalcidice in 429. An Athenian general was killed in Sicily in 426, and Lamachus, Eurymedon, Nicias and Demosthenes, the commanders of the second disastrous expedition to Sicily, were all killed there. Procles was killed in Aetolia and Hippocrates at the battle of Delium, and two Athenian generals were killed at the battle of
Mantinea. Casualty lists record the death of other generals.

In spite of the fact that the Athenians exerted a stern control over the strategoi using the procedures outlined above and even if Fornara's statement is correct that they exercised a sovereign authority not merely in the general formulation of policy but in the detailed supervision of that policy's execution, nevertheless the strategia did not lose its attraction to men of ambition, ancestry and wealth, and year after year the ecclesia returned to office men whose opinions were respected. It has sometimes been thought that there was a property qualification for the office, but this is by no means proved. As Jones has noted, respect was based on the grounds of ancestry and wealth, and although a property qualification was required for the office of treasurer of Athena, the strategia was probably reserved, generally speaking, to men of noble birth and landed wealth and to men with a family tradition of military and political leadership, not by the need to conform with a restricted qualification requirement, but for reasons of expediency, de facto therefore, rather than de jure. There are several passages in our literary sources which testify to the unwillingness of the ecclesia to promote men from its ranks to military office. Aristotle notes that during the Pentacontaetia, Athenian forces were commanded by men with no experience of war but elected on account of their family reputations, and in the time of Xenophon this was still not uncommon. There is of course some irony in the fact that the radical democracy looked to the aristocratic families to fill executive positions. However, the strategoi were accountable for their actions and the Demos, not unconscious of its power, was not slow to punish generals who abused their authority.
Accordingly, as Hignett has stated,\textsuperscript{71} it may be more true to say that the ecclesia was not afraid to take its leaders from the higher ranks of society because it was secure in its knowledge of its control over them. Moreover, it had always been customary to choose generals from the nobility and custom does not change overnight.

On the other hand the strategia retained its prestige and remained the most attractive office throughout the fifth century, and therefore it would be strange if its members did not possess certain well-defined constitutional prerogatives. However, the evidence is weak and due to the fact that the people elected men whose opinions they respected and to whom they therefore already looked for advice, it is difficult to evaluate the extent to which the control of defence and foreign policy by strategoi was the result of certain constitutional prerogatives. The generals may have been ex-officio members of the boule\textsuperscript{72} but this would not seem an extraordinary privilege for ordinary citizens could make applications and gain access to the Council.\textsuperscript{73} Nevertheless, if the strategoi could propose motions in the boule\textsuperscript{74} they did possess some advantage, for magistrates and citizens who were not members of the Council could not propose motions when admitted but had to rely on a bouleutes to act on the statements they made. An ordinary citizen may have encountered some difficulties in gaining access to the Council as a permit was required from the prytaneis for admission. However, we can safely assume that magistrates would have no difficulty in obtaining permission from the prytaneis for an audience and that their statements would be taken up and introduced as proposals by members of the Council. Thus it would make little difference whether the strategoi were members of the boule or
not. There is in fact some evidence which suggests that generals were not members of the boule, or that if they were they preferred to follow the ordinary procedure and allow councillors the responsibility of introducing their proposals.75 When it is also considered that the ecclesia was empowered to instruct the prytaneis to admit a citizen before the boule,76 it follows that citizens who were in the confidence of the Demos could in reality effectively enjoy exactly the same privileges, in relation to the boule, as the magistrates, including strategoi. Popular politicians were of course usually generals, but a προστάτης τοῦ δημοσίου who was not a general was not thereby significantly disadvantaged with regard to the influence he could exert in shaping policy by causing to have placed on the agenda for decision by the ecclesia measures he thought desirable.

We can therefore expect that there was a close co-operation between the boule and the leaders of Athens whether they were generals or not. Nevertheless the boule probably relied on the opinions of experienced generals when dealing with military measures and preparing agenda for the assembly,77 and the prytaneis convened the assembly on the request of the generals,78 giving priority on its agenda to any business they brought forward.79 It was within the powers of the strategoi to have the prytaneis convene a special meeting of the ecclesia,80 but Thucydides' phrase at 2.22.1 - Περίκλης ... ἐκκλησίαν τε ὅτι ἐποίει οὕτων οὕτως ζυλοκοιχον οὕτως - does not necessarily mean that strategoi had the authority to postpone or disallow regular meetings.81 It is just as likely that Pericles, in his capacity as a strategos, prevailed upon his colleagues not to have a special meeting convened,82 or that the ecclesia itself suspended meetings
during the actual invasion period, leaving it to the discretion of the strategoi to summon a meeting if they required it.\textsuperscript{83} The fact that the strategoi were able to have summoned special assemblies presupposes their power to initiate business in the ecclesia which would be given precedence over other matters at regular meetings,\textsuperscript{84} but the special privileges of the generals in regard to the ecclesia do not appear to have extended further. These prerogatives hardly amounted to much when, theoretically, at least, policy could be decided by a vote on the proposals of any person eligible to sit in the assembly,\textsuperscript{85} even if, as Hignett observes,\textsuperscript{86} the initiative was generally left to the elected executive and the politicians.

Although the strategoi did possess a positive political advantage to the extent that matters which they brought forward had preference over all other business, their control of defence and foreign policy in the fifth century was not so much by virtue of constitutional prerogatives they enjoyed, but rather by virtue of the tendency of the ecclesia to follow the advice and recommendations of its generals cum political leaders. Generals, to be sure, used what special privileges they were granted to introduce business on their own initiative, either individually or collectively. Pericles proposed the Megarian Decree\textsuperscript{87} and because he was a general it was probably given top priority on the agenda for decision by the ecclesia.\textsuperscript{88} However, probably more usually, generals introduced business directly connected with military policy or with a view to obtaining military commands. Thus, Demosthenes in 425 applied and obtained permission to use the fleet embarked for Sicily under Eurymedon and Sophocles, if he wished, on the coast of the Peloponnese,\textsuperscript{89} and Cleon in 422
prevailed on the Athenians to send an expedition under his command to Thrace. This procedure, whereby a military expedition was sent from Athens upon the instigation of a general (or generals) and commanded by him (or them), may have been quite common throughout the fifth century, and may account for a sizeable proportion of the operations of the Peloponnesian War. This procedure may in fact be an explanation for some of the instances in our sources, both literary and epigraphic, of phraseologies such as ὅ δὲ ἡμα τρίτος, ἔμπρος αὐτὸς or ὅ δὲ ἡμα καὶ ὁ Συνάρχοντες. Thus, Thucydides' phraseology may have sometimes been determined by the fact that a particular general proposed a particular mission. To take an example, Thucydides' choice of eponym in the phrase Ἐλευθέρια τὸν Καλλιάδου πέμπτον αὐτὸν στρατηγῷ, at 1.61.1, may be an indication that Callias was responsible for initiating the proposal to send a force to Potidaea, or that he acted as the spokesman in the ecclesia, and perhaps before the boule, for a group of five generals.

However, even though generals often obtained commands through their own initiative, the fact remains that they had to persuade the ecclesia to adopt a particular course of action. In the final analysis the ecclesia made the decision to launch a particular expedition, determined which strategoi would command it, issued instructions as to the size and composition of the force and laid down the objectives and strategy of the campaign. The advice and recommendations of strategoi in all these matters might often, as Fornara has noted, be decisive, but it is clear from the grant of special powers to Nicias, Lamachus, and Alcibiades in 415 that strategoi were not usually able to decide how a particular campaign would be conducted or to
decide the size of the forces to be sent. Thucydides also notes that Nicias was appointed as one of the commanders against his will, which was probably unusual, but nevertheless demonstrates the extent to which the ecclesia was the master of its chief executive officials. It would appear that individual generals had no control over their assignments unless they themselves proposed a course of action, and even then it was not a certainty. The instructions issued to the generals sent to Corcyra in 433, that they were to avoid a collision with the Corinthian fleet unless the Corinthians threatened a landing on Corcyra or her possessions, were probably more precisely defined than was usual. It must have been generally expected that strategoi would use their initiative within the framework of the instructions they received and therefore perhaps, common practice to allow strategoi some discretionary powers of action. Generals, for example, had the authority to make agreements and draw up treaties when on campaign, but they were accountable for the actions and initiatives they saw fit to put into effect. Thus Pythodorus, Sophocles and Eurymedon acted on their own initiative in concluding a peace with the Sicilians in 424. They were brought to account not because they overstepped their authority but because their action proved unacceptable to an ecclesia which thought in the circumstances that the generals should have used their discretion to press for a military victory.

According to Fornara, by the last decade of the fifth century the Athenians had begun assigning special competencies to strategoi on a regular basis. The most important command which could be allocated was ἐπὶ τὰς Ἀθηναίων πόλεις. Thus, Phrynichos, in reference to whom Thucydides says, ἐστὶ ταξιδεύει δὲ καὶ κύριος ἤν, 


held a special position in 411, and when \( \phi \rho \nu \iota \chi \omicron \sigma \omicron \nu \iota \zeta \nu \chi \omega \nu \) and another \( \delta \iota \mu \omicron \sigma \omicron \tau \omicron \nu \sigma \omega \nu \iota \zeta \) and the Athenians subsequently \( \alpha \nu \tau \varepsilon \pi \varepsilon \mu \iota \psi \gamma \rho \sigma \nu \iota \zeta \) \( \delta \varepsilon \sigma \iota \tau \rho \iota \chi \eta \sigma \tau \rho \iota \chi \eta \) \( \delta \iota \zeta \nu \varsigma \nu \) \( \delta \iota \zeta \nu \varsigma \nu \) \( \delta \iota \zeta \nu \varsigma \nu \) \( \delta \iota \zeta \nu \varsigma \nu \) this is an indication that Phrynichos and Scironides and their replacements were allocated a particular command which was \( \delta \varepsilon \iota \tau \sigma \zeta \tau \omicron \nu \sigma \omega \nu \iota \zeta \) \( \delta \varepsilon \iota \tau \sigma \zeta \tau \omicron \nu \sigma \omega \nu \iota \zeta \) However, in Sicily in the winter of 426/5, we have an identical situation - the replacement of one general by another. Pythodorus replaced Laches in command of the fleet there. Thucydides 3.115.2 describes the transfer of the command using these words: \( \alpha \nu \chi \alpha \omega \rho \sigma \iota \varsigma \varsigma \varepsilon \varsigma \tau \iota \zeta \) \( \theta \iota \varsigma \nu \varsigma \nu \zeta \nu \varsigma \nu \varsigma \nu \) \( \theta \iota \varsigma \nu \varsigma \nu \zeta \nu \varsigma \nu \varsigma \nu \) \( \theta \iota \varsigma \nu \varsigma \nu \zeta \nu \varsigma \nu \varsigma \nu \) \( \theta \iota \varsigma \nu \varsigma \nu \zeta \nu \varsigma \nu \varsigma \nu \) \( \theta \iota \varsigma \nu \varsigma \nu \zeta \nu \varsigma \nu \varsigma \nu \) \( \theta \iota \varsigma \nu \varsigma \nu \zeta \nu \varsigma \nu \varsigma \nu \) \( \theta \iota \varsigma \nu \varsigma \nu \zeta \nu \varsigma \nu \varsigma \nu \) \( \theta \iota \varsigma \nu \varsigma \nu \zeta \nu \varsigma \nu \varsigma \nu \) \( \theta \iota \varsigma \nu \varsigma \nu \zeta \nu \varsigma \nu \varsigma \nu \) \( \theta \iota \varsigma \nu \varsigma \nu 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Similarly, Leon and Diomedon were sent to replace Phrynichos and Scironides in command of the fleet. This they did - \( \theta \iota \varsigma \nu \varsigma \nu \zeta \nu \varsigma \nu \varsigma \nu \) \( \theta \iota \varsigma \nu \varsigma \nu \zeta \nu \varsigma \nu \varsigma \nu \) To be sure, they were \( \sigma \tau \rho \iota \chi \eta \sigma \tau \rho \iota \chi \eta \) \( \delta \varepsilon \iota \tau \sigma \zeta \tau \omicron \nu \sigma \omega \nu \iota \zeta \) but so were all the other generals who commanded fleets during the Peloponnesian War and earlier. Nor does Thucydides'
description of Phrynichos imply that he held a special position. The words the historian used are part of a sentence and that sentence must be considered within the context of the preceding passage.

Phrynichos had just been urging the army to fortify Samos and look to the defences. Thucydides then states, ἔστρατηκει δὲ καὶ κύριος ἔν αὐτὸς πράσσαν ταῦτα. Phrynichos, as a general, had the power to order the fortification. This does not mean that no other general was empowered to issue the same instructions. Phrynichos used the authority vested in his office, not any powers which were entrusted especially to him and to him alone.

However, although I do not agree with Fornara that the examples discussed above are evidence for specialized duties, there are other instances in our sources which do not so readily admit to an alternative explanation. Thus, at Hellenica 1.4.21, Xenophon states that when the Athenians dispatched Alcibiades in 407, μετ’ αὐτὸν Ἀριστοκράτης καὶ Ἀδείμαντος ὁ λευκολοφίδος εὐνεπέμφθην ἐπὶ τῷ μαύρῳ κατὰ τὴν στρατηγοῦ. The inference is that Aristocrates and Adeimantus only had authority to command troops on land and had no powers in relation to the fleet. Was this a specialized duty for which Aristocrates and Adeimantus had been especially elected at the ἀρχαίρεσιαι or were their powers defined only for this particular mission? If at the elections consideration was given to prospective duties, we can expect that two or more generals were elected every year to command κατὰ τὴν. But this was not the case. Eight generals participated at the battle of Arginusae in command of the Athenian fleet. On Fornara's reasoning they are στρατηγοὶ ἐν τῷ ναῦ. Conon did not take part in this battle. He was however, a strategos and he was
commanding a separate Athenian naval squadron at the time of Arginusae. Ostensibly, he was also a στρατηγός ἐν τὰς ναῦς. Of the ten generals listed by Xenophon as elected for 406/5 only one is left (Archerstratus) to command κατὰ κήν.

How is Xenophon's description of Aristocrates and Adeimantus to be explained? I would suggest that it is simply another example demonstrating the power of the Demos to control its executive officials. The ecclesia, in its instructions, defined the powers of two of the generals for a particular mission. They were to command on land. To be sure, Alcibiades' duties were not defined, but he was ἀποτύων ἡθελούν αὐτοκράτωρ and superior to Aristocrates and Adeimantus. On this interpretation there is no reason to suppose, as does Pornara, that Conon could not take Alcibiades' place as στρατηγὸς ἐν τὰς ναῦς until a vote of the Athenians assigned him this particular command. The Athenians, certainly, sent Conon to take over Alcibiades' command after Alcibiades was deposed - μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα (after Alcibiades left Samos). How is this to be explained? I would suggest that it is simply another example demonstrating the power of the Demos to control its executive officials. The ecclesia, in its instructions, defined the powers of two of the generals for a particular mission. They were to command on land. To be sure, Alcibiades' duties were not defined, but he was ἀποτύων ἡθελούν αὐτοκράτωρ and superior to Aristocrates and Adeimantus. On this interpretation there is no reason to suppose, as does Pornara, that Conon could not take Alcibiades' place as στρατηγὸς ἐν τὰς ναῦς until a vote of the Athenians assigned him this particular command. The Athenians, certainly, sent Conon to take over Alcibiades' command after Alcibiades was deposed - μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα (after Alcibiades left Samos). Κόων ἐκ τῆς Ἀρδροῦν σὺν αἰς ἐχεῖ ναυσὶν εἰκοσιν ἡσφιοκεθέων Ἀθηναίων ἐν Σίμων ἔπλευσεν ἐπὶ τὸ ναυτικοῦ. But this does not mean that Conon was not already, if we are to use the term, a στρατηγός ἐν τὰς ναῦς. He had command of twenty ships at Andros. What the Athenians decided was not to appoint Conon to a special position but to give him a new command. The situation is no different to that of Pythodorus in 426/5 or that of Diomedon and Leon in 411. A general replaced another. Thus Phanosthenes was sent with four ships to replace Conon at Andros when Conon was sent to Samos. Phanosthenes' duties, like Conon's, were defined. He had no duties other than those defined in his instructions, and his
instructions were to replace Conon. Conon, when he was sent to Samos, no longer had responsibility for Andros.

In opposition to Fornara I do not think we can satisfactorily conclude that special competencies of strategoi were regularly apportioned in the latter years of the fifth century. Although the evidence indicates that the Athenians often assigned generals to the strategic localities of Naupactus and Thrace, Thucydides' phrase "โทνοονν ος ἐστὶν ὄρος ὄρος ὄρος", in reference to Dieitrephes, is not necessarily an indication that Thrace became a regular ὄρος, a special command. True enough, Dieitrephes had been elected to govern Thrace, but the Athenians probably often elected particular generals with a view to their prospective assignments, and much earlier than the time of Dieitrephes' command. Asopius, in all likelihood, was only elected in 428 to aid the Acarnanians, and perhaps the founder of Amphipolis, Hagnon, was elected in 429 to serve with Sitalces of Thrace. But there is a difference between electing generals for particular purposes, for planned or anticipated operations, and regularly apportioning special competencies, as was the practice by the mid-fourth century. Neither the instances above mentioned nor the statement, for example, that Conon ἢφραῖς Ναυπάκτων, conclusively demonstrate special competencies. Although many military operations conducted during the Peloponnesian War were routine - amphibious forces were regularly sent around the Peloponnese and until 424 the Athenians invaded the Megarid annually - the fact remains that strategoi were used wherever they were needed. And priorities changed. In 406/5 no generals were assigned to Thrace or to Naupactus but nine of them were used to command the navy. To the extent that different campaigns and assign-
ments required variations in the degree of control exerted (and restrictions imposed) by the Athenians over their strategoi, to this extent can it be asserted that special competencies were apportioned. Thus in some (if not many) instances, for example when secrecy was essential, generals will not have been issued with the detailed, binding instructions we know was often the case.

By way of conclusion, in theory the privileges of the strategoi were not much more than those of the ordinary citizen. In practice the ecclesia generally left it to her leading politicians to initiate policy and the leading politicians were usually generals. The strategoi, in particular individuals such as Cimon and Pericles, were in a position not only to shape policy, partly through their continuous contact with the boule but largely because of their political predominance, but as leaders of the armed forces were able to play a major role in the execution of policy. Sometimes generals were made ἀρχηγός, granted specially defined privileges which increased their freedom of action in conducting military operations, although this seems to have been unusual, but the leading statesmen of Athens owed their power to their political authority and popularity, the confidence and trust placed in them by the Demos, rather than to any rights inherent in the strategia automatically conferred on its members. After the reform of Telesinus the strategia replaced the archonship as the most important executive institution in the state and it remained the most prestigious office as long as it retained its attraction as a necessary adjunct for πρῶτοι ἐξάρχεις to obtain and maintain political prominence and influence.
I have assumed that the strategoi entered on office at the same time as the archons and most other Athenian magistrates, that is, on the first day of Hekatombaion, in midsummer. There is almost unanimous agreement about this, although some scholars have argued that the generals entered on office shortly after they were elected, at the beginning of the campaigning season. According to Aristotle, the election of generals and other military officials took place μετὰ τὴν σ' πρωτανεύοντες ἔφυλον ἀν ἐκειμένον ξένηται. It is quite possible that the ἀρχαίρεσια were frequently held in the seventh prytany, but this would not necessarily have always been the case. They would only take place in the seventh prytany if the omens were favourable. Conceivably, sometimes elections may not have been held until the last prytany before the new archon year. It is certainly a misinterpretation to consider, as does Mayor, that Ath Pol 44.4 fixes the date of the election in the seventh prytany. As Meritt has noted, ἔφυλον refers to ἡ μετὰ τὴν σ' πρωτανεύοντες, and therefore Aristotle's phrase might be translated as "in whatever prytany after the sixth there are favourable omens." Mayor stressed that it would be much more sensible for a number of reasons for the strategoi to enter on office at the beginning of the campaigning season rather than in midsummer. However, as Pritchett has observed, Mayor did not produce any solid evidence to support his theory, and his arguments are not convincing when
considered beside some of the evidence produced by Pritchett to refute his viewpoint. The abundant inscriptive evidence which suggests that the term of office of military officials and archons was identical, is objection enough to Mayor's theory. The fact is that the language employed in inscriptions in reference to the term of office of military officials makes it very difficult, if not impossible, to conclude that strategoi entered on office before the beginning of the archon year. To give but one of the examples listed by Pritchett, in several fourth-century inscriptions generals are honoured as ἐπὶ τοῦ δεῦνα ἀρχοντος. However, although I agree with Pritchett's conclusions on the basis of this evidence, his elaborate refutation of Mayor, if justified, nevertheless resorts to the use of questionable evidence in one aspect, his conclusion that twelve generals in office in 425 under Mayor's theory offers a real difficulty. As I have attempted to demonstrate elsewhere we are simply not in a position to assume that the strength of the fifth-century strategia was limited to ten members every year. Moreover, unless I am mistaken, Ath Pol 44.4 is evidence enough against dating the generals' entry on office to the beginning of the campaigning season. How could the strategoi enter on office in time for a spring campaign if the omens were unfavourable to holding an election not only in the seventh prytany but in the eighth as well? I would suggest that the Athenians allowed themselves as many as four prytanies in which to hold the elections because (in Meritt's words) the ἔσπερμια was an extraordinary dispensation valid particularly for the ἀρχαρχονταί, not realized until after the seventh, eighth and perhaps even the ninth prytany had come and gone. Religious
considerations were of no little importance. For this reason it would matter nothing to the Athenians that in some years their elected military officials would have to wait some months before assuming office. It seems rather odd, at least to me, that Aristotle's terse phrase has not been considered decisive evidence, by scholars such as Pritchett, for dating the term of office of strategoi from midsummer to midsummer. The phraseology of the fourth-century epigraphical evidence, implying simultaneity of office for archons and military officials, not only supports the evidence of *Ath Pol 44.4* but puts to rest the theory (if it has not already been done) that the strategoi assumed office at the beginning of the conciliar year rather than at the beginning of the archon year.  

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If it be accepted that the εὐσήμια in *Ath Pol 44.4* were not based on weather signs, which could effectively prevent not only the convening of the electoral assembly on a given day within a prytany but which could cause regular assemblies within prytanies to be postponed, can we admit the possibility that the εὐσήμια for the ἄρχαις may not occur in the last four prytanies of the year? In practice, were the elections sometimes deferred until after the beginning of a new archon year, or were they held annually, without exception, in one of the four prytanies after the sixth? The answer to this question not only depends on the nature of the εὐσήμια but whether a prognosis taken, say, at the beginning of a prytany decided if the elections should be held then or postponed until the next prytany, for if that was the case there were only four chances for deciding before the new year. The only evidence we have is for an election held in the second century B.C., in the year 188/7.  

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that year the election was held late in the tenth prytany, but as
there were twelve tribes at that time compared with the ten of the
fifth and fourth centuries, the date, translated back three centuries,
would fall in the ninth prytany.\(^{15}\) The election was held only after
the Delphic oracle had been consulted, and approval was given in the
tenth prytany.\(^{16}\) As Meritt states, this is more an indication of the
unique nature of the \(\epsilon\sigma\nu\gamma\mu\alpha\) rather than evidence that sanction from
Delphi was always sought.\(^{17}\)

However, may it be that the Delphic oracle was only consulted
when two or three prytanies had gone by without the \(\epsilon\sigma\nu\gamma\mu\alpha\) being
realized? If we can assume for a moment that this is correct, it
would seem to follow that the \(\alpha'\rho\chi\alpha'\rho\varepsilon\alpha'\alpha\) could only be held before
the beginning of the new year. In the first place, the fact that the
clearance was sought when there were still at least two prytanies of
the year left suggests some urgency was felt about the matter. Second-
ly, unless the Delphic oracle was approached only in extraordinary
circumstances and extremely rarely, we can expect that Aristotle
would have mentioned the procedure at 44.4. Thirdly, a postponement
of the \(\alpha'\rho\chi\alpha'\rho\varepsilon\alpha'\alpha\) to the next year implies that the generals already
in office were prorogued or that there was a period of time when the
state had no military officials, matters about which Aristotle, signi-
ficantly, is silent. I would hazard the guess that the nature of
the \(\epsilon\sigma\nu\gamma\mu\alpha\) was such that it was very unusual if they were not apparent
in the two or three prytanies after the sixth. Whatever may have
caus ed delays in holding the elections there is no reason to suppose
that they were ever delayed for the duration of the last four prytanies.
Implicit in \(\text{Ath Pol}\) 44.4 is the fact that the elections could be
delayed, but the author has been incredibly remiss if he has failed to note that the elections were sometimes prevented. We can only assume that Aristotle knew they were not - there were never any difficulties in holding the ἀρχαῖα before the end of the old archon year and the term of office of strategoi always expired at the end of the tenth prytany because a new set of generals was ready to assume office.

Unless it can be shown that elections were sometimes postponed until the new archon year it seems reasonable to assume that there was never any need for the Athenians to make use of the principle of prorogation. According to Aristotle, ἀρχαῖα ἤπε τὰς μὲν κατὰ πολέμου ἀρχαῖς ἐξεστὶν ἡλεονάκις, and we know that the tenure of office of some generals, for example Cimon, Pericles and Nicias, continued for years without a break, a practice which probably applies to others as well, men for whom the evidence is less fully attested, strategoi such as Phormio, Demosthenes and Alcibiades. In brief, it would make little sense to prorogue generals when they could simply be re-elected. Fornara has suggested that some leeway must have been given to generals still at their appointed tasks after the legal expiration of their command. I am not convinced. In the first place, strategoi conducting operations away from Athens sent back reports. The city was probably kept fairly well informed about the progress of campaigns and the time needed to achieve objectives. There will possibly have been exceptions, but we can expect that generals whose term of office expired while they were on campaigns were replaced. Decisions would be made, presumably, according to the military circumstances in which Athens found herself. Conceivably,
if all newly elected generals were needed elsewhere or if a mission, from information received, was nearing completion, it may not have been feasible or practical to replace strategoi whose term of office had legally expired. Nevertheless, I do not think we can safely conclude that generals who are described by Thucydides as still engaging in military activity after the beginning of the new archon year were not elected for that year. Secondly, it is quite possible that the Athenians may have deliberately delayed the ἀρχαίης αὐτοῖς at times, particularly in wartime, in order to avoid proroguing strategoi. In terms of military considerations such a practice would certainly have its advantages, for not only would the Athenians be better able to decide whether to re-elect or replace generals who were commanding lengthy operations, on the basis of their progress, but they would be in a better position to judge the capabilities of strategoi who had completed missions before the end of spring or early summer. We can at least be sure that generals sent out in spring or early summer on missions which were expected to last the whole campaign season or longer would have been elected for the next year as well, although the Demos reserved the right to recall them. It will not do to assert, as does Mayor, that Laches, who was replaced in Sicily by Pythodorus in the winter of 426/5, was therefore commanding as "pro-strategos" in Sicily from July 426 until February 425. Laches was simply elected in early 426 for the year 426/5, and replaced half-way through his term of office and before he completed his mission, at the discretion of the ecclesia. Similarly, the activities of Demodocus, Aristeides and Lamachus in the summer of 424 are more likely an indication that they were re-elected for 424/3 than that they had failed to return
to Athens before their term of office expired, as Fornara argues. Thucydides uses the words οἱ τῶν ἀρχιρόλοσων νεῶν Ἀθηναίων στρατηγοί to describe them. The inference is that they were still generals in 424/3.

It has been argued by some scholars that the Athenians employed the practice of giving commands to "strategoi-elect" or to men who were not generals. Thus Cleon was not a general when he was assigned the command at Pylos and nor was Demosthenes, and Thucydides had a special command in 424. However, just as the annual election of generals and the possible re-election of the same men indefinitely for year after year render the idea of prorogation unnecessary and therefore unattractive, so would it make little sense if the Athenians gave commands to men who were not legally strategoi. I have argued elsewhere that Cleon was elected to office to command at Pylos and that Demosthenes was reinstated before he took up his appointment.

There should never have been any doubt about Thucydides' strategia. According to Fornara the assumption of by-elections, like prorogation, would be happy only if we believed that a strategos, and a strategos alone, could lead Athenian soldiers. However, without the examples of Cleon and Demosthenes at Pylos, Fornara's idea that any citizen could be empowered with a command becomes questionable. The only other case he cites is the command of Hagnon in Thrace in 429, but Thucydides' description of Hagnon as ἅρμον is not evidence that Hagnon was granted a special command in 429/8.

It may be objected that the granting of special commands was for a particular purpose, the grant expiring when that purpose was achieved, and that such a practice would not impinge on the prestige
of the strategia or threaten its viability, and nor would it interfere with the practice of electing ten generals. However, unless I am mistaken, the only time it may have seemed practicable to the Athenians to grant special commands was in a situation where the generals available were not suited to the task, when unforeseen circumstances arose which demanded the specialized abilities of a particular individual who had been overlooked at the amairecrial. Unless that was the case the granting of special commands would undermine the basic reason for the existence of the strategia. In this context it is worthy of note that if Cleon and Demosthenes were granted special commands at Pylos it was not because they were thought to have specialized abilities over and above those of the strategoi available but because they persuaded the ecclesia. There is no evidence to suggest that individuals were allocated commands in preference to strategoi because they were considered more suitable to the circumstances of the command. But the unique qualifications of individual strategoi were certainly given consideration. Thucydides, familiar with the Thraceward area, had his only recorded command as a strategos in that region. Asopius, the son of Phormio, was dispatched around the Peloponnese in 428, the Athenians deliberately acknowledging the respect the Acarnanians felt towards Phormio. Furthermore, in some years of the fifth century where the evidence for more than ten generals cannot be overlooked, the increased number cannot be explained by the granting of special commands to "strategoi-elect" or to ordinary citizens, because men whom Thucydides describes as strategoi cannot be considered as anything less. In short, the belief of Fornara and others that strategoi were not the only persons who could command Athenian troops
is far from proved. Aristotle's statement that οὗτος (the taxiarchoi)
δ' ἕξεται τῶν φυλετῶν καὶ λοχαρῶν καθετήνυς,36 not only indicates
that taxiararchs were tribal leaders, but also shows that the Athenians
had a developed military organization. The strategoi were a functional
part of this organization. The overwhelming evidence is that the
leaders of Athenian military expeditions, the commanders of Athenian
troops during the fifth century, were invariably strategoi. I would
suggest that it is misleading to isolate one or two cases, like the
command of Cleon and Demosthenes at Pylos, as examples on which to
construct the hypothesis that not only strategoi could command military
operations.

There is no problem if it be accepted that the Athenians
could and did have by-elections. Fornara has noted that by-elections
and suffect-generals have commonly enough been inferred since, like
prorogation, they help to explain away troublesome instances of double
representation. True enough, but he nevertheless finds no difficulty
in restricting the board to ten members every year by postulating
special commands or, as in the case of Aristeides and Demodocus in
424, by suggesting that they failed to return home before their term
expired - in effect, if we are to believe Fornara, Demodocus and
Aristeides prorogued themselves. Without wishing to be pedantic,
a further note on Cleon and Demosthenes may be in order. Their cases
are different. Demosthenes had been deposed after his failure in
Aetolia and hence was ἢδιωθείς on his return. But he returned after
some military successes and was reinstated in the spring of 425 and
elected general for 425/4 at the regular ἀρχαίες θέα. He asked for
permission to use the fleet at Pylos as a strategos for 426/5.
Cleon was elected at a by-election to join Demosthenes. The fact that Thucydides does not name him as a strategos is unimportant in this instance because Thucydides never calls him a general, not even on his ill-fated campaign against Brasidas in 422. Cleon was therefore a general for 425/4 and his term of office would expire at the end of the tenth prytany in 424. Although it was the rule that generals retired from office at the end of the tenth prytany to make way for the new board, and in that sense their term of office was fixed, the ecclesia had the power in exceptional circumstances to depose her strategoi or make additions. There was not necessarily a connection between depositions and by-elections. The strength of the board fluctuated during the archon year. Strategoi elected at by-elections will not have always served a full term unless they were re-elected and held office for the next full year.37
APPENDIX 4

Possible Double Representations.

Apart from the examples discussed, there are other less certain, but nevertheless possible, cases of double representation as well as several instances in the last decade of the fifth century which I have not listed. ¹

The first grouping is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Generals</th>
<th>Tribe</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>426/5</td>
<td>Demokleides, Nicias</td>
<td>Aigeis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Laches, Pythodorus</td>
<td>Kekropis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>425/4</td>
<td>Cleon, Eurymedon</td>
<td>Pandionis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>424/3</td>
<td>Cleon, Eurymedon</td>
<td>Pandionis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>412/1</td>
<td>Phrynicos, Scironides</td>
<td>Leontis</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

426/5 Demokleides and Nicias

A strategia for Demokleides depends on whether Mattingly's proposed date of 426/5 for the Brea Decree (IG i² 45) is correct.² The decree is usually dated some fifteen or twenty years earlier.³ If Mattingly is right double representation further depends on the identification of the Demokleides who established the colony of Brea, with the Δμηκλείδης Αἴγειδας ..., strategos in 439/8.⁴ The identification is of course much more likely if the Brea Decree can be dated, as Woodhead argues, to 439/8, because the restoration of Demokleides' name is based to a large extent on the assumption of an eminent Demokleides in Athens during the late 440's. Double representation of Aigeis in 426/5⁵ is perhaps the least likely possibility among all examples discussed, including the other four possibilities listed above.

426/5 Laches and Pythodorus

Laches, son of Melanopus, came from the deme Aixone,⁶ and belonged to Kekropis. Fornara thinks the identification of Πυθόδωρος ἤρως Ἰσολόχος with Pythodorus, the son of Isolochus, strategos in 426/5, is safe.⁷ A further indication that Isolochus belonged to Kekropis would put it beyond doubt. As it is, the identification is not certain, although a strong chance.⁸
Double representation of Pandionis occurs in these years if the deme of Eurymedon, the son of Thoukles, is Myrrhinous. Wade-Gery has restored to line 38 of IG i² 324 [Εὐρυμέδονι Μυρρήνωσι], which means, if he is correct, that the unknown fellow-tribesman and general with Cleon in 423/2 was Eurymedon. Wade-Gery based his restoration on the fact that a Eurymedon Myrrhinusios, brother-in-law of Plato and father of Speusippos, is known in the immediately succeeding generation after that of the general. Eurymedon is a very rare name, and if the Eurymedon Myrrhinusios was the father of the general, the latter belonged to the phyle, Pandionis. Wade-Gery has suggested, albeit tentatively, that all the known Eurymedons may have been descendants of the general. His stemma is as follows:

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>460</th>
<th>Thoukles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>427</td>
<td>Eurymedon I (general)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>394</td>
<td>Eurymedon II of Myrrhinous, Plato's brother-in-law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>361</td>
<td>Eurymedon III</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Speusippos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>daughter?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>co-executor, with</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Speusippos, of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Plato's will.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Eurymedon IV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aristotle's accuser</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Diog. Laert. 5.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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Wade-Gery's restoration in IG i² 324 has been accepted by Tod, Sealey and MacDowell, but doubted by Gomme, Fornara, Lewis and Davies. The major weakness is that of the several known Eurymedons, one, the son of the famous fourth-century general Charidemus, belonged to the deme Acharnae of the tribe Oineis. Wade-Gery admits as questionable the assumption that Charidemus may have named his son after his father-in-law, (which would if plausible, explain the change of deme) but then suggests as an explanation that Charidemus had a romantic taste in names, as he called another of his sons Troilos. It is of course possible that Charidemus was in no way related to the earlier Eurymedons, and it is certainly true that Athenians were often named after their fathers but seldom after their maternal uncles. Therefore, Gomme's objection to Wade-Gery's construction that Eurymedon Myrrhinusios may have been related to the general through his mother suffers from the same weakness as Wade-Gery's explanation for the demotic (Acharnae) of Eurymedon son of Charidemus. I agree with Fornara that Wade-Gery's method of assigning tribal affiliations to individual strategoi (by a process of eliminating from consideration those tribes which have already definitely produced a general in
the same year) cannot be accepted. MacDowell also uses the same method as Wade-Gery to identify tribes of certain strategoi, and application of this method is utilized by both scholars to determine Eurymedon's (the strategos) tribe. However, no longer can it be assumed that only one double representation could occur in a particular year, and that no-one else could therefore have the same tribal affiliation as a known strategos when there is already well attested evidence for the existence of one case of double representation.

Even allowing for all the objections to Wade-Gery's hypothesis, he still may be right in considering Eurymedon Myrrhinusios, the brother-in-law of Plato, as the father of Eurymedon Thoukleous, strategos during the Peloponnesian War. The suggestion, at least, is supported by the fact that Speusippos, the son of Eurymedon Myrrhinusios, was born about 410. Eurymedon Thoukleous was obviously born after Cimon's victory in 467, in the last years of the 460's at the latest, and if Eurymedon Myrrhinusios was the son of Eurymedon Thoukleous, a birth date for Speusippos of 410 fits without any difficulties. It would not be unreasonable to conjecture, on this construction, that Eurymedon Myrrhinusios was born about the mid 430's, perhaps a few years earlier or later, and was therefore some six or seven years older than his brother-in-law Plato (born between 430-27) and about twenty five when Speusippos was born. Plato's brother Glaucias was born about 428/7, and Potone, Plato's sister and wife of Eurymedon Myrrhinusios, was probably born in the early 420's as well. Such conjecture by no means adds up to a demonstration, but nevertheless the possibility that Eurymedon Thoukleous belonged to Myrrhinus, and therefore to the phyle Pandionis, should not be casually dismissed.

421/1 Phrynichos and Skironides

Phrynichos, son of Stratonides, came from the deme Deirade, of the tribe Leontis, and was strategos in 412/1. Scironides, named by Thucydides in the same command as Phrynichos, shares his name with only one other Athenian, a Skironides of the tribe Leontis who proposed a decree in the fourth century (during the 340's) at a meeting of his tribe. According to Lewis there is a high probability of a relationship between the fourth-century Skironides and the fifth-century general if the readings in both Thucydides and Demosthenes are secure. However, they are not completely secure, as there is some evidence that the name Kironides should replace Skironides in Thucydides 8.25.1, and that Kritonides should replace Skironides in Demosthenes 58.17. The nature of the case prevents firm conclusions either way. Double representation of Leontis in 412/1 remains an open question.

Of the four cases of double representation here examined, the two most likely cases, involving Laches and Pythodorus of Kekrops and Cleon and Eurymedon of Pandionis, produce further examples of two doubles during some years of the Peloponnesian War,
and in the years 426/5 and 424/3, three doubles. They are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Generals</th>
<th>Tribe</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>426/5</td>
<td>Laches, Pythodorus</td>
<td>Kekropis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lamachus, Sophocles</td>
<td>Oineis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hipponicus, Aristoteles</td>
<td>Antiochis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>425/4</td>
<td>Lamachus, Sophocles</td>
<td>Oineis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cleon, Eurymedon</td>
<td>Pandionis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>424/3</td>
<td>Nicostratus, Thucydides</td>
<td>Leontis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lamachus, Sophocles</td>
<td>Oineis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cleon, Eurymedon</td>
<td>Pandionis</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If a Demokleides Aigeidos was a general in 426/5, there is a chance of a third double representation in this year, and of course, the double representation of Pandionis in 423/2 involves Eurymedon if the restoration of his name in IG i2 324 is correct.

The second grouping, for the period after the revolution of 411, is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Generals</th>
<th>Tribe</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>410/9</td>
<td>Theramenes, Thrasyboulos</td>
<td>Pandionis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Alcibiades, Pasiphon,</td>
<td>Leontis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>409/8</td>
<td>Theramenes, Thrasyboulos</td>
<td>Pandionis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>408/7</td>
<td>Theramenes, Thrasyboulos</td>
<td>Pandionis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>407/6</td>
<td>Alcibiades, Adeimantus</td>
<td>Leontis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>405/4</td>
<td>Cleophon, Tydeus</td>
<td>Oineis</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

410/9 Theramenes and Thrasyboulos, Alcibiades and Pasiphon

As a general of the Five Thousand, Theramenes fought at Cyzicus in the spring of 410.29 Thrasyboulos, elected as a general by the fleet at Samos in 411,30 was also a general at Cyzicus.31 After the full democracy was restored it is possible that only one set of generals was elected.32 If that is correct, Theramenes and Thrasyboulos were generals in 410/9,33 there being double representation of Pandionis. However, if as Fornara believes,34 the restored democracy did not hold new elections in 410 but merely continued in office the generals already on active duty, nothing much can be made of the double representation of Pandionis in 410/9.
There is no evidence which indicates that Alcibiades was deposed after the demise of the Five Thousand.\textsuperscript{35} As Fornara has noted,\textsuperscript{36} the presence of Pasiphon, a tribal colleague of Alcibiades, in the strategia of 410/9 does not mean that Alcibiades' generalship was cancelled. There is in fact, evidence to the contrary, that Alcibiades was a general in 410/9.

409/8, 408/7. Theramenes and Thrasyboulus

I am not at all convinced that the position of Alcibiades, Theramenes and Thrasyboulus was unofficial in these years. No attempt was made to deprive them of their commands and they were conspicuous as commanders of large forces in the Hellespont.\textsuperscript{38} The only thing against this conclusion is, of course, Xenophon, Hellenica 1.4.10-12. I think the passage can be explained. Xenophon has a vivid recollection of Alcibiades' return to Athens. The reason is not hard to find. It was an event out of the ordinary, a memorable occasion. Alcibiades was famous and he had not set foot in Athens for nearly a decade. Xenophon's statement at 1.4.10 that οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι στρατηγοὶ εἶλον Ἀλκιβίαδην καὶ Θεράμην ἀπέλτατοσ, καὶ ὑπάρχουσιν ἐκ τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ θείου, should be considered in this context rather than as an indication that Alcibiades was still legally an exile. His banishment had been revoked some years earlier,\textsuperscript{39} but he had made no attempt to return until now. He remained in effect in exile. The words Ἀλκιβίαδην μὲν ἀπέλτατοσ are used by way of emphasis to suit the scene which follows, and as such should not be interpreted as being strictly accurate. Even if Alcibiades and Thrasyboulus were not elected strategoi by Athens in the years after 411 down to 407, their authority as generals elected by the fleet was recognised by the city.

407/6 Alcibiades and Adeimantus

In 407 Alcibiades was δαναψηχεῖς ἀπάντων ἐπίτευχεν δυτικράτωρ. Alcibiades received this extraordinary grant of power some time after he was elected general, and as I have argued elsewhere\textsuperscript{41} there is no reason to think that the grant was implicit in the election, that it indicates that Alcibiades was elected as a single στρατηγὸς ἐκ ἀπάντων, thus explaining how Adeimantus, his fellow-tribesman, came also to be a general. Xenophon 1.4.10 mentioned the election of Alcibiades, Thrasyboulus and Conon and presumably failed to name the rest. If only three generals were elected the reference may not be to the regular ἀρχαρχεῖα for there were other generals - Adeimantus and Aristocrates, for example, who were soon to sail with Alcibiades.\textsuperscript{42} I would merely surmise that the three men were uppermost in Xenophon's mind at the time of writing - his immediate subject is Alcibiades and he has just mentioned Thrasyboulus' activities in Thrace.\textsuperscript{43} Conon was soon to play a prominent part in his narrative.\textsuperscript{44}
Cleophon and Tydeus

There is a possibility, admittedly not strong, that Cleophon was a general in this year. The statement that he himself was general in Aristophanes, *Frogs* 679 with the scholia, is the main evidence. It is not proof. However, since it has been shown that Cleophon belonged to a family which had held the strategia, the idea gains in plausibility. There are numerous examples of two or more generations within families holding office during the fifth century. The double representation of Oineis in 405/4 must still be considered a remote possibility nevertheless, for as Lewis has noted, Lysias 13.12 is more probably an indication that Cleophon was not a general than that he was.
NOTES TO THE TEXT

CHAPTER 1

1. *Ath Pol* 22.2

2. *Ath Pol* 22.2


5. *Ath Pol* 22.3.


7. e.g. Schachermeyr, *Klio,* vol. 25, 1932, p. 347; refined by Sumner, *op.cit.,* pp. 36ff. Fornara is certainly right about dismissing the possibility of emending the number ἀμφικτυον, and I believe with him that the possibility is not worth consideration, and also for his reason. p. 1, n. 1.


9. Fornara, *ibid.* p. 104, has noted that Aristotle's use of the formula ἡδοι τον μῦσιν, ἐνετο. in the *Ath Pol* may be as a separation of connective items in chronological sequence, e.g. at 15.2 and 34.1.


11. Badian, pp. 2-4, p. 32.

12. N.B. If it is still thought reasonable to conclude that Hermocreon was archon in 501/0 on the basis that 504/3 is already occupied, on good authority, by Acestorides, then an alternative interpretation is that the institution of the strategia took place in the archonship of Hermocreon and the institution of the bouleutic oath took place in the archonship of Acestorides, Aristotle mistakenly assigning Hermocreon to one reform rather than the other. This however does some violence to the *Ath Pol.* For a more complete discussion of the alternatives see T.J. Cadoux, *op.cit.,*


23. See Busolt, vol.2, p. 38 n.1.; Schwahn, p. 1071f.; Badian, p.29, n.74; Wilamowitz, vol.2, p.44, also thought the early strategia to have been an elective office. E. Meyer, *Forschungen I*, Halle, 1892, p. 237f. is more cautious about accepting sixth-century strategoi and Hignett, p.77, n.9, p.113, n.9 is not completely convinced.


25. e.g. Hdt. 5.109.1, 6.11.1, 6.13.1, 8.15.1, 8.50.1, 9.82.3.


27. at *Ath Pol* 17.2, 22.3.


29. Fornara, p.7, n.22.

30. Hauvotte-Besnault, *Les stratégès athéniens*, Paris, 1885, p.5f., This is also the view of Sealey, *Essays*, p.26; Badian, p.29, n.68; Bicknell, p. 441.

31. Schwahn, p.1072; accepted by Hignett, p. 169.

32. Hdt. 5.69.2.

33. J.L. Myres, *Hélanges Glotz*, vol.11, pp. 664f; accepted by Hignett, p. 146.
However, it needs to be emphasized that the evidence for the existence of a pre-Cleisthenic strategia simply does not allow us to conclude that such an office did or did not exist. Alcmaeon and Peisistratus may have been appointed for particular campaigns and, as Bicknell has noted, the state in a time of crisis may have turned to proven leadership rather than to the incumbent polemarch. (p.441 and n.16)

It is also possible that Alcmaeon was polemarch at Kriss and Peisistratus at Salamis, and that our sources are misleading, that both Herodotus and Aristotle, not to mention Androtion and Plutarch, were not using the terminology in a technical sense, but just using the usual and most appropriate Greek for the commander of a state's forces. There is no other corroborative evidence in support of Ath Pol 4.2 for pre-Cleisthenic tribal strategoi, certainly none that can tie such an office to the positions of Alcmaeon and Peisistratus, nor that indicates, as Hammond believes, (pp. 122-123) that the polemarch was equal in powers of deliberation and command with the strategoi in the years before the reform of Ath Pol 22.2.

Wilamowitz, vol. 2. p. 78.

Badian, p. 29, n.74; it is Hammond's view that the innovation of Ath Pol 22.2 lay in the system of having one general from each of Cleisthenes' 10 tribes (p.113), whereas before 501/0, and indeed before 508/7, there existed an unknown number of strategoi. Seeley, Historia, vol.9, 1960, pp.175ff., also believes that the military reform was an adjustment necessitated by Cleisthenes' tribal reorganization. His argument that Cleisthenes' reforms were introduced in 502/1 and became effective in 501/C is based on Pollux 8, 110, which states that in the archonship of Alcmaeon the 10 tribes ἔφόντο. The violence such an argument inflicts on Ath Pol 21-22 seems to invalidate Sealey's hypothesis, as Fornara has demonstrated (p.2 and n.4.).

So Hignett, p. 169; Fornara, p.1.

BS., p.881. Also Schwahn, p. 1072; Staveley, p.276; Hignett, pp. 169-170; Accame, RFIC, vol.63, 1935, p. 342. Hammond, p.112, also believes that the meaning of Ath Pol 22.2 can only be that the Athenians as a body in the ecclesia began to elect the generals one from each tribe, but does not consider, of course, that between 507 and 501 the military organization had been made to conform with the new tribal system.

Fornara, pp. 3-4. Fornara's argument is that if Aristotle's words are supplemented by introducing them with a phrase which indicates the situation of the strategia before the reform in terms of Busolt's hypothesis, the result is a very odd statement - i.e., "Until 501/0 the separate tribes elected their
generals by tribe, one from each tribe".


42. Hignett, p. 170.

43. Fornara, p.5.

44. Fornara, p.4, n.12

45. Fornara, pp. 5–6.

46. Fornara, p. 8 and n.25.

47. Fornara, p.10.


49. Hammond, p.113 and n.1.

50. I do not think Aristotle's use of κατὰ φυλὰς can be categorized in the way Hammond envisages. According to Hammond, κατὰ φυλὰς has the same meaning at 22.2 as at 22.5, 56.3 and 63.1. But the words do not have any consistently exact meaning irrespective of the context in which they are used. The precise meaning is in fact determined by the context and can only be understood within the framework of each individual sentence.

51. Ath Pol. 22.

52. Badian, p.29.

52a. It is of course possible that the military necessities clarified the answer needed. Herodotus 5.78 remarks on the newly acquired military prowess of the Athenians, attributing it to the institution of democracy after the overthrow of the tyranny. May it be, however, that the military system, finally established in 501/0, was tried against Chalcis in 506/5? — that is, it proved successful ergo it was adopted.

53. See Badian, p. 29, n.74.
CHAPTER 2

1. The conclusion of Badian, p. 31.


3. See also Badian, p. 31.


5. Thuc. 3.109.1.

6. Thuc. 3.109.2.


8. Thuc. 3.110.

9. Thuc. 3.105.3.

10. Thuc. 3.107.2.

11. Thuc. 2.86.6.


15. Hdt. 6.111.1.


17. Also the opinion of Fornara, *Diss.*, p. 121.


22. 6.103 and 6.104.
23. Hdt. 6.104.2.
27. Hdt. 6.110.
29. p. 171.
30. See Fornara, Diss., p. 133 and n. 43, pp. 173-174.
33. Hdt. 6.111.1
34a. So Fornara, Diss., p. 133, How and Wells, ibid., p. 111,
36. So Grundy, The Great Persian War, London, 1901, p. 176. This is also the view of Fornara, pp. 173-174 and n. 43.
38. Hdt. 6.103.1,
40. Burn, p. 250.
41. Burn, p. 246.
42. Hammond, JHS, pp. 48-49.
43. Hammond, p. 119, n. 140.
44. Hammond, JHS, p. 49 and n. 141.

44a. See n.45.

45. See also Plut. Arist. 5.5. This is not to say that tribal officers subordinate to the strategoi did not exist. Athenian generals were never merely staff officers but field officers in the real sense. They led their troops into battle. Unless they all fought together (on the right wing), which idea seems not to merit serious consideration, it is only reasonable to suppose that they personally commanded their respective tribal regiments. The fact that they fought with their men means that they could become casualties and during the fifth century many did. There must have been subordinate officers at Marathon who acted as the seconds-in-command. We do not know who they were. Were they the φυλαρχοι of Herodotus 5.69.2? If so they were superseded by the taxiarchs when the generals ceased to function as tribal leaders. By the time of Aristotle the chain of command was strategos-taxiarch-lochargos for the heavy infantry and hipparch-phylarch for the cavalry. (Ath Pol 61.1-5. See also Dem. 4.26). Whoever ranked immediately below the generals at the time of Marathon, their powers would have been somewhat less than those of the taxiarchs at a later date because the strategoi in 490 were the chief tribal officers.

Bicknell, "Herodotus, Callimachus and the Bean", Acta Classica, vo1.14, 1971, p. 147 n.6, tentatively suggests that Herodotus 5.69.2 may mean that Cleisthenes created ten phylarchoi who were deployed by the strategoi in the year of Hermocrates, Ath Pol 22.2 thus indicating that the strategoi were elected by a different process than their Cleisthenic counterparts. He uses as support for this an interpretation of Lysias 12.43 that Eratosthenes and Critias, after Aegospotamoi and before the abolition of the democracy, placed phylarchoi over the tribes - that is, a throwback to Cleisthenes' constitution. However, it is by no means certain that the word φυλαρχος in Lysias 12.43 should be emended to φυλακτις, that Lysias is referring to "tribes" rather than "pickets". See E.S. Shuckburgh, Lysiae, Orationes, London, 1892 (reprint 1951), p. 41, pp.240-241.

46. Hammond, JHS, p. 49 and n. 141.

47. Fornara, Diss., p. 134.

48. See Fornara, Diss., p. 175, n. 47.

49. Hammond, JHS, pp. 48-49; CQ,1969, pp. 116-123.

50. Hammond, JHS, p. 50.

51. So Hignett, p. 173; Bicknell, p. 428; Burn, p. 246, p 284. Badian has suggested that an electoral reform affecting the archonship may have been instituted by Cleisthenes and that
this involved a combination of direct election and sortition. His proposal is that the board of archons was directly elected and the men then drew lots for their particular posts. Herodotus knew this and was simply referring to the part played by sortition in the distribution of offices to the various elected archons. (pp. 21-27) M. Lang, "Allotment by Tokens", Historia, vol. 8, 1959, pp. 84-88, has suggested that Callimachus may have been elected by his tribe, but allotted as representative of that tribe to the polemarchy. P.J. Bicknell, "Herodotus, Kallimachos and the Bean", Acta Classica, vol. 14, 1971, p. 148, takes the process a step further. He suggests that the archons were elected directly by the ecclesia. The ten successful candidates were then assigned by the bean to the eponymous, king, and polemarch archonships and so on. (Bicknell's whole argument contradicts his assertion in Ant. Class., 1970, p. 428, that Aristotle (Ath Pol 22.5) was determined to correct the error in Herodotus by assigning the introduction of sortition in 487/6. I cannot determine where Bicknell stands on this issue, whether by his later or his earlier article.) However, Ath Pol 22.5 explicitly states that the archons were elected until the reform of Telesinus. Furthermore, the natural meaning of Herodotus 6.109.2 is that Callimachus, the elected archon, obtained the post of polemarch by lot, but that the polemarch was an Athenian official chosen by sortition. Other evidence, anyway, is heavily weighted in support of the conclusion that the archons were directly elected after the fall of the tyranny until 487. For example, the mere fact of Isagoras' archonship in 508/7 is an almost conclusive indication of direct election before Cleisthenes' reforms. If Cleisthenes changed the electoral method, the author of the Ath Pol was unaware of it. Themistocles was elected archon in 493/2, (D.H. 6.34; we simply do not know that he was not prominent in Athens in the 490's), Aristides may have held the office in 489/8, (Plut. Arist. 1.8) and Hipparchus, ostracized in 488/7, was archon in 496/5; these three men were foremost in Athenian political life. The chances that Cleisthenes reformed the archonship elections by introducing sortition are remote. It should be noted that Pausanias (1.15.3) stated that Callimachus was elected polemarch and that Idomenes (Plut. Arist. 1.8) held that Aristides was elected eponymous archon of 489/8, rather than chosen by lot. See also R.J. Buck, "The Reforms of 487 B.C. in the Selection of Archons", CP, vol. 60, 1965, pp. 96ff.

51a. I have interfered with what Hammond actually says. Hammond states that the author of Ath Pol 22.5 laid emphasis on τῷ κυκτῇ, not Herodotus. If I am not mistaken that would make no sense whatsoever. Firstly, the words τῷ κυκτῇ do not appear at Ath Pol 22.5 but at Herodotus 6.109.2. It is Herodotus who laid emphasis on τῷ κυκτῇ. After all, Herodotus did not need to note that the polemarch was chosen by the bean, irrespective of whether he was mistaken or not. Secondly, Aristotle cannot be said to be emphatic in detailing the reform. Rather, this is just one of the several reforms he listed in
order in chapter 22. He merely states that the archons were elected by lot for the first time in the archonship of Telesinus. Bicknell, p. 426, follows Hammond in believing that Aristotle is emphatic at *Ath Pol* 22.5.

52. Bicknell, p. 248.
53. See also Pausanias 1.15.3.
55. Hammond, pp. 122-123.
56. Badian, p. 26, n.68.
57. So Badian, p. 26, n.65.
58. See Hignett, p. 171, Fornara, p. 72.
59. Badian, p. 32.
60. Badian, p. 26, n.68.
60a. Note the tense of ἐξικα.
63. Fornara, *Diss.*, pp. 131-133.
64. Fornara, p. 72.
65. Hignett, p. 171.
67. See Fornara, *Diss.*, p. 133.
69. As Hignett, p. 171.
70. Hdt. 6.109.2.
72. As Bicknell states, p. 431.
74. Pausanias, 1.15.3.

2. Except for the view of S. Accame, RFIC., vol. 63, 1935, pp. 34ff., which has attracted little support.


7. It should be noted that Wade-Gery does not make it clear how the machinery worked. From his description (Essays., p.115), we can only suppose he envisaged that the στρατηγός ἐξ ἀνώτατων was chosen at a separate election.

8. Plato, Laws, 759D.


15. Unless of course, one or more gained the distinction of being elected ἐξ ἀνώτατων, permitting the possibility of double representation.

16. See further at p. 49.


18. The fact that "strategos" appears at the top of the casualty list makes it unlikely that it is a man's name rather than a title. Bradeen, "The Athenian Casualty Lists", CQ., vol. 19, 1969 n.s., p.147, thinks that Θ[ΔΑΡ]κες is more plausible than
suggesting that lines 5 and 6 refer to Pantaleon in line 7, meaning that he was "phylarch acting as general". Bicknell, _DR._, p.106, n.41, objects to this on the basis that one would expect a taxiarch to fill in. A general seems more likely, and perhaps a Phrynichos is preferable to a Phylarchos, because as Bicknell notes, the name Phylarchos is not attested for Erechtheis. Bradeen (p.147) considers that Hippodamas is a certain general.

18. According to Bicknell it was possible for just one man in a deme's bouleutic contingent to be a member of another deme. This is the way he considers it happened. Every year at deme assemblies demesmen put themselves forward for approval as potential councillors. Each deme had to provide a stipulated annual quota of councillors. Enough individuals had to be found to make up this quota and to provide a number of alternatives as well, perhaps the same number as the quota. If those approved by the deme assembly as candidates for office fell short of the required quota of councillors and alternates, the demarch drafted conscripts. In the event of a deme being unable to provide the required number of qualified individuals, even by conscription, the demarch was able to include a single draftee from another deme. The evidence suggests that such a draftee usually came from the same trittys, but not always. Each deme's full contingent of nominees was presented at the Thesion on an appointed day and it was decided by lot which were elected as councillors and which as alternates. If a councillor was rejected at his dokimasia or for some other reason was unable to continue in office, his place was automatically filled by an alternate. Bicknell, "Kleisthenes as Politician: An Exploration", _Historia_, Einzelschriften, Heft 19, 1972, pp. 4-5, and p.4, n.16.


19. _Ath Pol_ 44.4.


21. Aesch. 2.18. Also Dem. 18.149.

22. At the Thargelia one man from two tribes, each tribe supplying the choregus in alternate years. Dem. 21.13 supports this interpretation of _Ath Pol_ 56.3.

23. _Ath Pol_ 44.4

24. See also Bicknell, _DR._, p. 105, n.30.

25. _Ath Pol_ 44.4.

26. See p.17f. for the ecclesia, rather than each individual tribe, as the electing body.

27. _Ath Pol_ 43.1, 61.1.
30. *Ath Pol* 44.2-3.
31. Staveley, GR., p.86.
32. Xen.*Hell.* 1.7.9.
33. It should perhaps be borne in mind that in the earlier periods of the Pnyx, specifically the fifth century, plenary assemblies may have been held here, with the citizens voting by tribes and sitting in marked off sections with their fellow tribesmen.
34. The evidence for the plenary assembly is Philochorus fr. 79B; Plutarch *Aristeides* 7. See also Hignett, p. 149, Staveley, GR., p.89. For the Pnyx as the venue for routine assemblies see Thuc. 8.97; Dem. 18.169; Aesch. 3.34; Plutarch *Nicias*, 7. This is the view, for example, of Hignett, p. 275, Staveley, GR., p.80.
36. As A.L. Boegehold notes, an improbable alternative would be for each to count the hands of the whole assembly and compare sums, *Hesperia*, vol.32, 1963, p. 373.
37. As well as the examples cited see also Dem. 18.143; Aristophanes *Ecclesiazusae* 297ff.
38. Thuc. 6.13.1.
41. See Boegehold, *op.cit.*, p. 374; Staveley, GR., p.81, draws the opposite conclusion.
42. Poilux 8, 104.
43. Staveley, GR., pp. 80-82.
45. Wade-Gery, *CQ.*, vol.24,1930, p.38, n.21. Schwahn, p.1074, concludes from this that the ecclesia conducted the elections in ten instalments, voting on the candidates from each tribe in turn. Staveley, p. 277, does not consider the passage indicates the strategoi were still elected by tribes and not ἐκ τῶν ἄπαξ ἀναρχών, but does believe the two men belonged to the same tribe.
46. If PA 1184 and PA 1196 can be identified as the same person.

47. PA 10931.


49. N.B. It is clear from Demosthenes 18.149, even allowing for exaggeration on the part of the orator, that only a few nominations were received for extraordinary offices in the fourth century. Only a few hands were raised and Aeschines was immediately declared elected as an ambassador.

50. See n.52a.

51. Laws, 755 D.

52. Laws, 755 C.

52a. For the view that Plato followed to a large extent Athenian constitutional forms, see E. Barker, Political Theory of Plato and Aristotle, p. 202. Acceptance of this view is not necessary to my argument. Where Plato takes care to describe a provision and there is no evidence of such a procedure being used at Athens, it is only safe to assume that it was unfamiliar to his readers. On the other hand as G.R. Morrow has noted, the table of military officers parallels that of Athens, and the electoral procedures are likewise based upon Athenian practice, though with considerable modification. (See G.R. Morrow, Plato's Cretan City, Princeton, 1960, p. 179). My only point is this - where Plato's provisions and procedures differed from what could be expected, he detailed them. Morrow, ibid., p. 180, states: "Plato does not say that the term of office in all these cases (that is, military officers) is one year, but this was the law at Athens, and it is safe to presume it in Plato's law whenever a longer term is not explicitly prescribed." Similarly, if there was a restriction on the number of candidates who could run for office in Athens, Plato has been rather lax in not specifying his departure from this practice.

53. Ath Pol 61.3-5.

54. Laws, 755C.

55. Laws 756B.

56. Aristotle, Ath Pol 30.5 states that five bouleutai were selected to count the votes of their colleagues in the council in 412/1. Surely, this is at least some confirmation that tellers must have been used to count the hands of a much greater number of voters in meetings of the ecclesia. So also Boegehold, op.cit., p. 373.

57. So also Fornara, pp. 25-26, and p. 25, n.53; Staveley, pp. 284-5.
58. As Fornara thinks, p. 25, n.53.


59a. However, it does seem that strategoi-elect were sometimes rejected. According to Lysias 13.10 Theramenes failed to pass the dokimasia in 405/4.

60. According to Ath Pol 55.2 πάντας καὶ οἱ κληριτοὶ καὶ οἱ χειροτεντοὶ δεκαμαθέντες ἄρχουσιν; Demosthenes 40.34 ἀλλὰ καὶ χειροτεντές των δημον ὑπὲρ ταξιαρχεῖν, ηὲ καὶ ἀντὶ τὸ δικαστηρίου δεκαμαθησιωτέρον λέγεται. Also Aeschines 3.15. Plato Laws 755D. See Hignett, p. 205; Staveley, GR., pp. 57ff.

61. Thuc. 2.65.4; 4.65.3.

62. Bicknell, DR., p. 106, n.39. Bicknell states that a replacement was also chosen for Procles, killed in action in 426/5, but does not inform us who he was.

63. For Laches see PA 9019; for Pythodorus see I² 335, 1.51.

64. Thuc. 3.115.2.

65. For example, Fornara, p. 58; Lewis, p.120.


66. Aristophanes Wasps 836-997.

67. May Xen. Hell. 1.7ff. be an indication of this?

68. Thuc. 3.115.5.


70. Thuc. 8.76.2.

71. Respectively Thuc. 2.65.4, 4.65.3, 3.98.5, 4.101.2, 6.201.6, 7.86.2.


73. pp. 151ff.

74. Thuc. 8.76.2.

75. Xen. Hell. 1.7.1.

76. Note, for example, the extraordinary election of Cleon in 425/4 and the reinstatement of Pericles in 430/29.
77. *Ath Pol* 44.4.

77a. According to D.J. Mosley, "Voting Procedure and the Election of Athenian Envoys", *Weiner Studien*, vol. 85, pp. 140-144, there were variations in the procedure used to elect Athenian envoys, depending on circumstances. Whether this may only apply to extraordinary officials is not known, but there is a chance, of course, that this is what Aristotle meant at *Ath Pol* 44.4 where he stated that military officials were chosen in whatever manner seemed best to the Demos.

78. Thuc. 6.6.1.

79. Thuc. 2.65.4.

80. *Laws* 766C.


82. *Ath Pol* 22.5.

83. So Badian, pp. 27f. Cf. Hignett, pp. 183ff; Fornara, pp. 11f; Burn, p. 284.

84. As Fornara, p. 12.


86. Hdt. 6.132, 5.97.3 respectively.

87. Because Aristeides was the most prominent Athenian general at Platea, and because Themistocles was the most prominent at Salamis and Artemisium, does not mean that other generals were not present. See next Chapter.

87a. I see no reason why we should not consider that the Athenian army (or sections thereof) was organized and fought in tribal divisions throughout the fifth century. Thucydides 6.96.4 describes a section of the Athenian force which became involved in a skirmish outside Syracuse in 414, with these words: καὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων [πλὴν] μὲ τῶν ἐκλιπῶν καὶ οἱ ἰδίοις μετ' αὐτῶν πάντες ... Presumably the hoplites in Sicily (numbering 1,500) were organized by tribes into fighting units - there were therefore probably about 150 hoplites to each unit. See also Dover, *RCT.*, v.4, p. 372. This conclusion is reinforced by the indication in IG i2 1085 line 10 that the contingents of three tribes, Pandionis, Kekropis and Autiochis, supplied the force (2,000 troops) which invaded the Megarid in 446 under the general Andocides. See M-L, p. 137.

88. So Hignett, p. 348; Bicknell, p. 441.

thinks they commanded the tribal divisions in 490, at Marathon.


91. See pp. 122-123.

92. See pp. 52ff.

93. Fornara, p. 20, n.32.

94. In 441/0, 440/9, 439/8, 433/2, 431/0, 426/5, 425/4, 424/3, 423/2, 418/7.

95. So for example Schwahn, p. 1073; Beloch, p. 275; Bicknell, *DR.*, p. 112.

96. *Ath Pol* 22.2.

97. See at 45.1, 45.3, 53.1, 54.3, 55.2, 55.4, 56.3, 56.4, 60.2, 62.1.

98. See Hignett, p. 206.

99. I do not understand how Bicknell can reconcile his belief that Aristotle's words imply the election of generals έξ έπάνων to the fourth century only, with his acceptance of Jones' view of nomination by tribes of candidates for the generalship in the fifth century, using as support the procedure for appointing choregoi. (*DR.*, p. 105) Aristotle states (56.3) that the archon used to appoint choregoi for the comedies (πρότερον ἃδε), but in his own time the tribes put forward candidates (τὸν ἐξ τῶν εὔνων ή τῆς καθό τετελεύθην). The formular πρότερον... τῶν is used in exactly the same way at 56.3 as at 61.1. If Aristotle's words imply a late fourth century reform at 61.1 why not also at 56.3?

100. Herodotus often uses the word ταξιαρχεῖς to describe subordinate officers in Xerxes' forces (7.99.1, 8.67.2, 9.42.1), and also designates Spartan officers by it (9.53.2). Jordan, *Diss.*, pp. 118-119, asserts that his use of the term is indefinite and imprecise because he uses ταξιαρχεῖς as an equivalent to στρατηγὸς and τριβορχεῖς. However, in each case cited by Jordan it is clear from the context that Herodotus consistently used the word to designate subordinate officers. Artemisia is described as τῶν ταξιαρχεὶν (7.99.1) because she ranked below the men described immediately above by Herodotus as τῶν στρατηγῶν (7.98.1). Similarly, at 8.67.2 the commanders described as τῶν στρατηγῶν at 7.98.1 become οἱ τύραννοι καὶ ταξιαρχεῖς because they rank below Xerxes, who had summoned them to a meeting.

At 9.42.1 Mardonius summons τῶν ταξιαρχεῖν τῶν τελευτῶν καὶ τῶν μητέρων τῶν Ελλήνων τῶν στρατηγῶν. It is interesting that the historian refers to the barbarian contingent commanders as ταξιαρχεῖς and their Greek counterparts as
He is merely emphasizing the fact that the Greeks were not integral parts of Mardonius' force but independent allies under his overall command for the moment. To be sure, Herodotus uses terms designating command interchangeably, but surely not imprecisely within the context of each individual case. The fact is that to a large extent the terms are used relatively. Quite simply, men described as the commanders of a state's forces are always ἀρχηγοὶ but these same men become ἀρχηγοὶ relative to Xerxes' or Mardonius' position, or as in the case of Artemisia, relative to the importance of other leaders within Xerxes' army. Since Herodotus was well acquainted with military terminology, and particularly with that of Athens, he probably transferred the official term for Athenian tribal leaders to subordinate officers of other states (at 9.53.2 the immediate subordinates of Pausanias within the Spartan army) and contingent commanders within the Persian army.

102. As Staveley, GR., p. 42.
103. See Fornara, p. 27.
103a. In this context Themistocles may have had something to do with it. Other preparations to meet Xerxes were not completely improvised and Themistocles was largely responsible for those (Hdt. 7.142 ff).
105. Diod. 11.27.3.
106. Hdt. 8.131.3. See also Hignett, XIG, p. 277; Fornara, p.42.
108. Hdt. 8.95.
110. Hdt. 8.79 ff.
111. Fornara, p.42.
112. e.g. Beloch argues that Themistocles was unwilling to be subordinated to Pausanias. However, he served in such a capacity to other Spartans at Artemisium and at Tempe; Hignett, p.278, argues that Themistocles disapproved of the strategy now in favour at Athens of making the main effort by land rather than on the sea and hence was not prepared to undertake a position of responsibility. There is no evidence for this or for the opposing view, advocated by Macan (vol.2, p. 332ff.) that Themistocles approved of the policy adopted in 479. See also Fornara, p. 42.
113. D.W. Knight, *Historia*, Einzel, Heft 13, 1971, p.32. Knight argues that Themistocles had a hand in the ostracism of Xanthippus in 485/4 (pp. 29-30) and was responsible for that of Aristeides in 482. (p.31) The latter two combined to get rid of their proven political enemy, Themistocles.

114. Hdt. 9.114.2.

115. Hdt. 9.120.4.
2. Hdt. 7.17.32, 7.205.2, 7.222 respectively.
3. Hdt. 8.42 and 8.75.2.
4. Hdt. 8.5.1. and 8.59.
10. Thuc. 1.105.4 and 1.105.2 respectively. Both Myronides and Leocrates had been strategoi at least once prior to 460/59, (in 479/8; Plut. *Arist.* 20.1) and Myronides at least once during the 450's.
13. Hdt. 8.131.3.
15. Thuc. 4.2.2.
16. Thuc. 3.115.
17. Hdt. 7.173.2.
18. Hdt. 8.131.3.
20. See pp. 80ff.
22. See Plut. Pomp. 8.
23. See also Fornara, p. 14.
24. Thuc. 6.8.2. See also Hignett, pp. 247-48.
26. Plut. Arist. 15.2
27. Plut. Arist. 15.5.
29. Plut. Arist. 16.2-3. According to Hammond, pp. 135-6, Plutarch's account expresses very well the relationship of the στρατηγεῖς ἐκ ἀπόφασιν to the normal στρατηγεῖς ἀπὸ φυλῆς. He states that Aristeides opposed the wishes of the other Athenian generals and implies that he overruled them. Aristeides does indeed declare that the others are wrong, (ὁ δ' Ἀριστείδης διαμαρτάνειν αὐτοὺς ἐφασκε τοῦ πατρός) but he then sets about persuading them, rather than forcing them, to follow Pausanias' orders. And he succeeds, (ἐκ τευχεῖα πίστις πρεσβύτερος εἰ ἡμιν εἴη) ἐπειδὴ ἐπέβοτο τοῖς ἑλπίσῃς τῆς ταξιν. Similarly, at Arist. 20.1, Aristeides does not use force when his colleagues are opposed, once again, to a Spartan proposal, as Hammond implies, but he converts them through persuasion. (...) πολλὰ παρρησίων καὶ ἀδίστηκαν τοὺς εὐστρατηγοὺς ἢ Ἀριστείδης, καλεῖ τα ἡσυχασθαν καὶ Μυρωνίδην ...). See also Bicknell, BR., p. 111, and n.5.
31. Hdt. 9.46.1.
32. Hdt. 9.44.1.
33. Hdt. 9.46.3.
34. See also Macan, op.cit., vol.2, p. 86; Hignett, XIG., p.21.
35. As Hammond, p. 136, n.1.
37. Hdt. 9.44ff.
40. Hdt. 9.120.4.
41. Hdt. 9.117
42. See also Bicknell, *DR.*, p.111; Fornara, p.16.

43. Hdt. 6.114.

44. Hdt. 6.103.1.


46. See pp. 29ff. Note also that οἱ ἐπαρνάγγειοι are responsible for despatching Philippides to Sparta (Hdt. 6.105.1, 106.1).

47. Hdt. 7.17.32.

48. Hdt. 8.42.

49. Hdt. 8.110.3.

50. Hdt. 8.131.3.

51. Hdt. 8.4.

52. For a convincing refutation see How and Wells, *Historical Commentary on Herodotus*, vol.2, pp. 236-7.

53. See Hdt. 8.1.

54. Hdt. 8.131.1.

55. Hdt. 9.118 - The fleet was the same one which besieged Sestos later in 479. According to Diodorus 11.34.2 the fleet was 250 strong. If he is to be preferred to Herodotus it was approximately the same size as the Greek fleet which fought at Artemision.

56. Thucydides indicates that at the battles of Leukimme in 435 (1.29.2) and Sybota in 433 (1.46.2) the Corinthians employed a collegiate command.


59. Assuming, of course, that their supreme military officers were not institutionally categorized into generals and admirals, but were interchangeable between land and sea commands in much the same way that Spartan and Athenian general officers were.

60. Hdt. 9.28.3.

61. Hdt. 9.28.4.

62. Hdt. 9.28.5.
63. Hdt. 9.50.

64. See Burn, pp. 523-524. He details the composition of the four divisions.

65. See also Fornara, pp. 12-19, especially pp. 14-17.

66. See Hdt. 7.144.1.

67. See Thuc. 1.14.3.

68. Hdt. 7.143.2-3.

69. As Hignett, XIG., p. 198.

70. Hdt. 8.41.1.

71. Presumably with the exception of the generals of Aegina and Megara, in view of Hdt. 8.74.2.

72. According to Hdt. 8.57-58, Themistocles only approached Eurybiades and persuaded him to convene the third council after Themistocles himself had been approached by Mnesiphilos. The story of Mnesiphilos' role in the affair does not seem trustworthy. See Hignett, XIG., p. 204. However, at the council meeting Themistocles used none of the arguments provided by Mnesiphilos, as Hdt. notes in 8.60.

73. Fornara, p.16.

74. See pp. 85ff.

75. Hdt. 8.109.4.

76. Hdt. 8.131.

77. Hdt. 8.1.1, 44.1 respectively.

78. I have attempted, as faithfully as possible, to note the instances where my arguments follow the same lines as Fornara's. In particular, I find myself in substantial agreement with his belief that the phraseology used by Herodotus in describing Athenian strategoi in no way indicates different levels of authority among the generals and certainly does not prove that the three generals named in his account, Themistocles, Xanthippus and Aristeides, occupied some kind of special position within the strategia by virtue of being granted extra legal powers or hegemony over the other elected members of the board; and essentially for the same reasons, specifically, that Herodotus' interest is focused on the main actors in the events, the men who were recognized as largely responsible for the Greek victory, and secondly the fact that in two instances Herodotus demonstrates the existence of a collegiate command of Athenian forces.

However, Fornara's argument does not include a detailed
analysis of Herodotus' account of the actions at Artemisium, Salamis and Plataea, as far as Athenian strategoi are concerned; nor does he consider in detail the problem of how the Athenian system, if collegiality was operative, worked in conjunction with a Spartan commander-in-chief in practice. It is all very well to merely state that Themistocles, Xanthippus and Aristeides were the most important members of the strategia, as Fornara does, but the controversy which surrounds the whole question of the nature of the Athenian command system, the widespread acceptance in fact, of the view that these generals were superior in powers to the others, necessitates, if anything, an attempt at resolving the question of why and how Themistocles, Xanthippus and Aristeides were the most important strategoi if not within terms of the usual explanation. The nature of the case, I would suggest, demands precision. To put it differently, Fornara's statement, for example, that Themistocles, Aristeides and Xanthippus were the most important members of the strategia and dominated it just as Miltiades did in 490, (p.15) is not precisely accurate. In the case of Themistocles, Aristeides and Xanthippus, I have argued that Herodotus' attention to them is explained by their political predominance, the very significant part they played in determining military strategy the Athenians adopted against Xerxes' forces. This also applies to Themistocles' role at Salamis, but if there is any basis for comparison, it rests with the consideration that Miltiades' persuasion of Callimachus is to a certain extent similar with Themistocles' influence on Eurybiades at Salamis, but only because no action could be taken without the decision of Callimachus and Eurybiades respectively. Miltiades dominated the strategia only in the sense that the other generals deferred to his experience by giving him the rotating τραχαίον every day up to the time it was rightfully his, and after the polemarch had reached a decision. The deadlock among the generals indicated the extent of Miltiades' influence over his colleagues. What was important was Miltiades' initiative (and perhaps his imagination as far as battle tactics were concerned) not his dominance of the strategia. At Salamis there is no question of Themistocles being opposed by other Athenian strategoi. Athens could protect her people at Salamis, Aegina and Troezen only if the Greek fleet controlled the Saronic Gulf. Themistocles was the natural spokesman for Athens because it was at his instigation that Athens made their defense by sea. If he was the dominant Athenian strategos at Salamis it was because his colleagues deferred to him for this reason. Miltiades' importance at Marathon rests simply with his initiative as a strategos, but an appreciation of the importance of Themistocles, Aristeides and Xanthippus as strategoi should be considered within the context of their political importance in the state as πρωτεύοντες at Athens.

80. Thuc. 1.94.1.
81. Hdt. 7.204.

82. As Hammond, p. 135.

83. See, for example, his phraseology at 8.49.1 and 7.204.

84. As Hammond, pp. 136-7.

85. Thuc. 1.76.1, Hdt. 8.3.2.

86. Which is not inconceivable. See Diod. 11.44.2.

87. Thuc. 1.94-2.

88. See also Bicknell, DR., pp. 111-112.
1. Fornara, especially, pp. 19-27.

2. I cite below a bibliography of those who believe in the existence of a "strategos ex hapanton".

Beloch, pp. 280ff.

Ehrenberg, pp. 114ff.
Gomme, vol.1, p. 386.
Hignett, C., pp. 349ff.
Jameson, pp. 63ff.
Dover, pp. 61ff.
Lewis, pp. 118ff.
Hammond, p.132, n.1.
Jones, p. 127.
Staveley, pp. 277ff. Also GR., pp. 43-47.

3. Fornara appears unaware that Leocrates, general in 479/8, may have had the same tribal affiliation as Xanthippus.

4. See pp. 80ff.

5. BS., p. 891, n.3; Meyer, ibid., 347f; Schwahn, p. 1080, and Kahrstedt, U., Untersuchungen zur Magistratur in Athen, Stuttgart, 1936, pp. 27f. explained double representation as the result of exceptional circumstances, such as the inability of one tribe to provide a candidate, or the deposition or death of generals.

6. Lenz, op.cit., pp. 226-32, presented a case for the existence of more than ten generals in 441/0 and 433/2. Hammond, p.132,
thinks there were 11 generals in 441/0 and Hignett, p. 355, admits the possibility.

7. See p. 88.


9. Fornara, pp. 19ff; Bicknell, DR., pp. 103ff; Staveley, pp. 275ff; Ehrenberg, p. 132, thinks that the ecclesia elected Phormio \ε'σκελεστος in 440 and 430 rather than Pericles.


11. Jacoby, p. 135; Comme, p. 386; Sealey, p. 66; Hignett, p.352. For the weaknesses of Wade-Gery's hypothesis, particularly his analogy see pp. 48-49. Staveley, GR., pp. 43-47 distinguishes the στρατηγοί ἐξ άλλων from other strategoi but allows several στρατηγοί ἐξ άλλων in a particular year. Compare with Fornara, p. 22, n.36. See further at chapter one, pp. 48ff.

12. See also Dover, p. 66; Ehrenberg, p. 132; Hignett, pp. 352-3; Sealey, op.cit., pp. 66-7; Westlake, p. 112.


14. Dover, pp. 61ff. For the use of the ἄρτος formula to indicate superior powers see Schwahn, p. 1079; Ehrenberg, p. 116; Hignett, p. 352.

15. Jameson, pp. 63ff; cf. Sealey, op.cit., pp. 65-66. According to Jameson the best parallel for the existence of an annual chairman comes from the next most important elected board in Athens the hellenotamiae. Such a conclusion is questionable even if the hellenotamiae did have a chairman. As has been pointed out by W.E. Thompson, ("Notes on the Treasurers of Athena", Hesperia, vol.39, 1900, pp.58ff) there is a major difference between the two offices. The treasurers had a collective responsibility throughout the year but the strategoi did not. Generals were responsible individually, not as a group, for the monies they received. Thus, there may have been a good reason for the hellenotamiae to have a chairman. That reason does not exist for the strategoi.

16. Lewis, p. 118.


18. Jameson, p. 63. See also, for example, Sundwall, Klio, Beilheft iv, 1906, p. 20; BS., p. 1124; Hignett, p. 348; Sealey, op.cit., p.65.

19. p. 49.
It is interesting to note that in 445 the Athenians chose ἀδελφοὶ ὀνειρωτικοὶ ὑπάτων πρόσβεις (Andoc. 3.6) to arrange the Thirty Years Truce with Sparta. It cannot be denied that election of officials ἐξ ἄνώτατων was a fifth-century practice. It is also worthy of note that the choice of the number of ambassadors (ten) was not decided by the need for tribal representation. For a full discussion of the election of Athenian ambassadors see D.J. Mosley, "Voting Procedure and the Election of Athenian Envoys", Wiener Studien, vol. 85, 1992, pp. 140-144.

20. Fornara, p. 22. Staveley, pp. 278ff., has also argued that Aristotle's reform took place before 441, but see my discussion, pp. 50ff.

21. I have criticized Fornara's interpretation of Ath Pol 22.2 at pp. 13ff.


24. Fornara, p. 27.

25. See my discussion at pp. 80-82 and p. 66.

26. The reform of 501/0, for all we know, may have been an extra-constitutional development, for clearly, the connection between Cleisthenes' new constitution and the reform of 501/0 was a natural one. Cleisthenes' tribal reorganization was the basis for the introduction of ten annually elected strategoi, but this is a different thing to saying that the constitution allowed only ten to be elected. Of course if the strategia was not provided for in the constitution, the silence of the Athenaion Polyteia on a fifth century reform is thus explained. Time and events and circumstances and personalities would determine the character, role, size and powers of the institution in a rather more evolutionary manner than the "radical constitutional reform" in the sense which Staveley, p. 278, suggests. The evolution of the strategia throughout the fifth century conforms to such an interpretation.

27. By the time of Aristotle the strategia had declined in political power to the extent that prominence in politics and election to the strategia were no longer complementary. No prominent politician of the late fourth century was also a general. See Connor, The New Politicians of Fifth-Century Athens, Princeton, 1971, pp. 143-147.


29. See Ath Pol 61.1. It is not known when in the fourth century the Athenians began to assign set functions to the strategoi, whether between 357 and 351, as Staveley, p. 278, thinks, or
earlier, or later. We can assume, I think, that in practice there would be a degree of flexibility allowing more than one general to lead hoplites in the field under peculiar circumstances, for example, when it became necessary to fight on more than one front at a time. See also Hammond, p. 115, n.2. However, the glamour of the fifth-century strategia had certainly disappeared by the time the generals were allocated the monotonous and tedious duties Aristotle mentions.

31. Thuc. 1.105.2; Diod. 11.78.4.
33. Hdt. 9.114.2.
34. Fornara, p. 42.
34a. See Bicknell, *DR.*, p. 102.
36. IG i² 929. M-L 33.
37. Fornara, pp. 44-46.
38. Line 4.
40. Fornara, p. 44.
41. Even if ἐνίαυτον means "campaign year" this does not preclude the possibility that Hippodamas and Ph(ryni)chos were colleagues. The description of Ph(ryni)chos as στρατηγὸν is difficult to explain. Bicknell has suggested the genitive plural of the noun, στρατηγῶν, and concluded that Ph(ryni)chos was the elected nominee of another tribe. Fornara, p. 46, is sceptical of στρατηγῶν, but if so, implies it has the same meaning as at Hdt. 6.114; ἀν' ή ἐθανέ τῶν στρατηγῶν Στησίλεως ὧν Θρασύλεω. Neither view is conclusive. However, concerning Bicknell's conclusion see n.18, p. 284. στρατηγὸς may be a participle, but whether this is right or the word is a noun, it is not safe to premise a legal distinction between Hippodamas and Ph(ryni)chos or to consider that Ph(ryni)chos represented another tribe.

42. For example, Hignett, p. 351.
43. Fornara, pp. 77-78.
44. IG i² 50.
46. Ehrenberg, pp. 121-122; Sealey, op.cit., p. 66.
47. IG i² 45+.
49. Generals had the authority to introduce business and propose decrees individually.
50. See PA 171.
51. IG i² 39.
52. IG i² 949, line 14.
53. Thuc. 5.84.
54. IG i² 302, lines 29-31; See Fornara, p. 78, n.13.
55. Hdt. 8.11.2; Plut. Them. 15.3.
57. See Fornara, p.78. Bicknell, DR., p. 107, and n.50 and n.51 also makes the identification.
59. A-combination of PA 5745 and 5759.
60. Frg. 143.
61. See Fornara, pp. 77-78.
62. See Bicknell, DR., p. 110.
63. See Fornara, p. 53.
64. Lewis, p. 118.
66. Lewis, p. 118.
68. Αν' Ίπτνίκος Ίπτνίκος Ἀλωτέκαθεν, appears in IG ii² 4680. Also in IG ii² 1582, line 110, Ίπτνίκος Ἀλωτέκ (See Meritt, Hesperia, vol.6, 1937, p. 400 and 410.) Also IG ii² 2407
line 31, and 43 (Καλλίος Ἰππονίκος) if Lewis' reconstructions of [Ἀκτυλήθην to Ἀλκηθῆν is accepted. (See Lewis, BSA., vol. 50, 1955, pp. 13-14). However if the deme here is Ankyle of the tribe Aigeis, which is clearly now less likely, double representation of Aigeis occurred in 426/5, for Nicias was also strategos in this year.

69. Plut. Arist. 5.5.
70. Thuc. 3.105.
71. See also SEG., vol. x, p. 226, line 6.
72. IG i² 220.
74. Lewis, p. 121.
75. For Lamachus' strategia in 426/5 see p. 55b.
76. Xen. Hell. 2.3.2.
77. Thuc. 4.65.3.
80. Lewis, p. 121.
82. Wade-Gery, CQ., vol. 24, 1930, p. 34.
85. Thuc. 4.129.2.
88. Fornara, p. 57, n.74.
89. Nicostratus, therefore, is probably PA 11011 and 11051.
90. e.g. Sealey, p. 110.
91. Thuc. 5.2.1.


95. Thuc. 4.118.12.


97. For Cleon's deme as Kydathenaion of Pandionis see Aristoph. *Wasps* 895.


99. For Nicias' tribal affiliation see IG 1 2 302, lines 20-21 and 44; for Sophocles', a combination of his deme name Colonos and the Androtion fragment listing the generals of 441/0. Westlake, *Hermes*, 1956, p. 111, n. 4, identifies a Sophocles who is placed second in a list of ἐνεχωριαί for 400/399, as the grandson of the poet.

100. Westlake, *ibid.*, p. 112.


103. Woodbury, p. 212.

104. See also Ehrenberg, p. 117, n. 1.

105. See Thuc. 3.19.2; 32.2; 4.75.1.


107. See also Westlake, *op. cit.*, p. 110, n. 1.

108. Thuc. 3.19.2.

109. Thuc. 5.16.

110. Thuc. 3.51.1


113. See *Vîta* 1; cf. Ehrenberg, p. 117, n. 1. See also Jameson, "Sophocles and the 400th, *Historia*, vol. 20, 1971, p. 541, who notes: "Twice at least he served as general ..."
114. See Jameson, p. 71, n.19.
115. See also Ehrenberg, p. 117.
118. Thuc. 5.16.1; cf. Comme, HCT., vol.3, pp. 661f.
119. Plut. ALC. 22.
120. Restored by Tod, p. 186, and accepted by Fornara, p. 63.
121. Thuc. 5.61.2.
123. See Wade-Gery, CQ., vol. 24, 1930, p. 34. n.2.
124. See Thuc. 5.61.1.
125. Thuc. 7.20.1.
126. Xen. Hell. 2.3.2. See also Fornara, p. 65.
127. Thuc. 6.101.6.
128. See also pp. 268-273.
130. See Sealey, p. 87.
CHAPTER 6


3. Lenz is of this view and shares the opinion of Beloch and Meyer that there was a commander-in-chief of the strategoi but differs with them "inasmuch as the number did not always have to be nine besides the commander-in-chief but sometimes was ten." (p.232)


6. Fornara, p. 49.


10. Thuc. 1.64.2.

11. For example in Thuc. 1.45 the three generals Lacedaimonius, Diotimus and Proteas have command of a fleet of 10 ships, cf. Thuc. 3.105 where two generals Hierophon and Aristoteles have command of 20 ships, or twice the number.

12. See Ehrenberg, p. 118, n.16.

13. See Jacoby, IIIb, Suppl. 11, p. 135, n.8-12.


15. Thus agreeing with the accepted view which dates Thuc. 1.61.1 to 432/1.


17. See Bicknell, DR., p. 108.
18. See pp. 126ff and p. 137.
19. Thuc. 1.61.4.
21. So Fornara, pp. 56-59; Sealey, pp. 107-8. For another discussion of Demosthenes' campaigns in these years, see Mayor, "The Strategoi at Athens in the Fifth Century. When did they enter on Office?", JHS., vol. lix, 1939, pp. 50-55.
21a. Thuc. 3.91.
23. Thuc. 3.94.
24. Sealey, p. 36.
25. Thuc. 3.98.5.
26. See Fornara, p. 57, n.78.
28. Thuc. 3.105.3.
30. Gomme, HCT.,
31. Thuc. 3.105.3.
32. Thuc. 3.114.1.
33. Thuc. 4.2.4.
34. Gomme, HCT., vol.3, p. 438; Mayor, op.cit., p.53; Fornara, p.57.
35. Sealey, p. 104.
36. See Ath Pol 61.2.
37. See pp. 67ff.
38. Thuc. 3.114.
39. Thuc. 4.7.
40. Thuc. 4.8.
41. i.e. Thuc. 4.45.
42. Sealey, pp. 108-109; Fornara, p. 59.
43. Lines 1073ff.
44. Lewis, p. 120.
45. See Lewis, p. 120, p. 121. Compare with Fornara, p. 58.
46. Thuc. 4.27.3-29.1.
48. Thuc. 4.20.
49. Thuc. 4.27.3.
50. Thuc. 4.27.5.
51. Thuc. 4.28.1-2.
52. Thuc. 4.28.3.
53. Thuc. 4.28.4.
57. Thuc. 4.42.
58. Thuc. 4.119.2.
59. Thuc. 4.76-7, 89-101.
60. Thuc. 4.104.4.
61. Thuc. 4.75.
62. Thuc. 4.65.
64. Which Wade-Gery however thought not altogether probable, CQ., vol. 24, 1930, p. 38, n.3.
65. Sealey, p. 106.
66. Thuc. 4.65.3.
68. Thuc. 4.65.3.
69. Thuc. 4.104.4.
70. Fornara, p.59.
71. Fornara, p.60.
72. Thuc. 4.66-74.
73. Thuc. 4.75.
74. Thuc. 4.65.3.
75. Sealey, p. 105.
76. Fornara, p. 60.
78. Thuc. 4.65.
79. Thuc. 5.26.5.
80. Thuc. 4.101.
81. Thuc. 6.101.6.
82. Thuc. 6.96.1.
83. Thuc. 6.94.4.
84. Thuc. 6.104.
85. Thuc. 6.103.
86. Thuc. 6.105.1.
89. Thuc. 7.1-7.
90. Thuc. 6.105.1-2.
91. Thuc. 5.36.1.
92. W. Jerusalem, Wiener Studies, vol.3,1881, pp. 287-90, first advocated the truce period as beginning at 5.36.1 and concluding at 6.105. and this has been accepted by Busolt, 111/2, p.1198 and Steup, Thuk. Stud. 1.87n. But see Dover, ECT., pp. 6-9, for a thorough discussion of the problem.
93. Thuc. 7.31.4.
94. Thuc. 7.19.5.
95. Thuc. 7.17.2.
95a. Fornara, pp. 64-65.
96. See Hignett, p. 248; Gomme, HCT., vol.1, p. 426; Dover, HCT., p. 228; Jameson, p. 83.
97. See Dover, HCT., pp. 51-53.
98. Thuc. 8.67.
100. Fornara, p.65. The view also of Sealey, p. 77.
101. Fornara, pp. 64-65.
102. Dover, HCT., p. 393.
103. Thuc. 4.65.
104. Thuc. 5.80.3.
105. Westlake, op. cit., p. 264.
106. Thuc. 7.16.2.
107. Dover, HCT., p. 393.
108. See note on Fornara, p. 65; Sealey, p. 77; also inferred by Lewis, p. 122.
109. Thuc. 7.16.2.
110. Thuc. 7.20.2. See Westlake, op. cit., p. 264.
111. Thuc. 7.20.3, 26.
112. Thuc. 7.26 Westlake op. cit., p. 266.
113. Thuc. 7.33.5
114. Thuc. 7.31.4.
115. Thuc. 7.34.3.
118. Busolt, vol. iii/2, pp. 1372f., n. 4. See also Dover, HCT., p. 423.

119. As well as 7.47.1, see 7.48.4, 50.4, 52.2, etc.

120. Dover, HCT., pp. 391-3; Fornara, p. 65. Lewis, p. 122, considers that the election of these two may have meant there were more than ten generals on the board.

121. Thuc. 7.47-49.

122. Thuc. 7.49.3.

123. Thuc. 6.47-50.

124. See also Westlake, op.cit., p. 199, n. 1.

125. This Menander was probably the strategos of 405/4 - Xen. Hell. 2.1.16.

125a. In this debate, as is his usual practice, Thucydides puts two opposing viewpoints and therefore he needs only two speakers here, as elsewhere - for example, Cleon and Diodotus on the fate of Mytilene. Since Nicias (whose defeatism has been underlined by Thucydides ever since the letter to the ecclesia) was the principal author of the disaster on Thucydides' view, the historian must put forward his opinion. Demosthenes, characterised as far more energetic, is the suitable proponent of a different viewpoint. The debate cannot be used as evidence that Menander and Euthydemus were not generals. The matter is one of Thucydidean technique and the presentation of the debate would have been no different however many generals attended.

126. Fornara, p. 65, n. 113.

127. Dover, HCT., p. 392.


129. See pp. 155-161.

130. See pp. 171-175.

131. Thuc. 7.16.2.

132. As for example, Sealey, p. 109.

2. See Hammond, p. 137, pp. 142-143.


4. Thuc. 1.98.1.

5. Thuc. 1.100.1.

6. Thuc. 1.102.1.

7. Thuc. 1.105.2.

8. Thuc. 1.105.4.


10. Thuc. 1.108.5.

11. Thuc. 1.111.2.

12. Thuc. 1.112.2.


14. Thuc. 1.114.3.


16. Hdt. 9.75.

17. ἐδιό καὶ δοκεῖ Περικλῆς ἐρρωμένους τὴν μάχην ἀγοράσασθαι καὶ γενέσθαι πάντων ἐπιφανέστατος ἀχείδησις τοῦ ὑματος.

18. Jacoby, IIIc, rp. 446.

19. Dover, p. 75.

20. If I am not mistaken there are only ten instances where the information is lacking - Thuc. 2.94.2; 3.16.1; 4.49; 4.68.5; 5.32.1; 6.7.2; 6.7.3; 6.94.4; 7.17.2; 8.24.1. These can be reduced to seven. The forces at 6.94.4 are reinforcements to Sicily in spring 414 and did not include a general. The fleet at 7.17.2 is the force stationed at Naupactus in winter 414 with the general Conon. (See Dover, HCT., p. 393). The 20 ships at 8.24.1 are probably the same as those in 8.15, commanded by Strombichides and Thrasycles.
21. See also Dover, p. 75.

22. Thuc. 2.31.1.

23. See Hammond, p. 126; Dover, p. 64.

24. The same applies to other generals noted by Thucydides as commanding Athenian forces alone, during the Peloponnesian War. See Thuc. 1.64.2; 2.26.1; 2.68.7; 2.69.1; 2.69.2; 3.7.1; 3.18.3; 3.51.1; 3.75; 3.80.2; 3.91.1; 4.7; 5.50.1; 5.52.2; 5.55.4; 5.83.4; 7.9; 8.95.2. Also Plutarch, Nicias 2.2 says of Nicias, ἣν μὲν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ καὶ Περικλῆος ζωτος, διότι κάκισθαυ συντρατηγήσαται καὶ καθ' αὐτὸν ἀρξαί τολάκας.


26. See in particular Dover, pp. 61ff. Also Fornara, pp. 28-37.

27. That is, by simply listing their names.

28. See also Fornara, p. 28.

28a. ξυναρχος is a supplement. But see p.188 above and Dover, p.65.

29. I include, for example, cases where more than one general is named but where others are also referred to generically.

30. See also Fornara, p. 30.

31. Fornara, p. 31.

32. Thuc. 4.53.1.

33. Fornara, p. 31.

34. Lines 36 and 39 respectively.

35. Thuc. 2.70.1.

36. See also Fornara, p. 32. They probably remained in the vicinity after the surrender of Potidaea. Diodorus 12.47.3 provides the name of Phanomachos. It is possible also that Nestiodoros had returned to Athens and that Diodorus is right in only naming the two generals Xenophon and Phanomachos, in which case we should replace τρίτως αὐτῶς with δεύτερος αὐτῶς in Thucydides. However, as Fornara suggests, this may be an oversight by Diodorus.

37. Thuc. 3.4.3.

38. For δέκτερας αὐτῶς as commander-in-chief see Ehrenberg, p. 166, Jameson, pp. 78-79.
40. Dover. p. 70.
41. See Fornara, p. 36.
42. Fornara, pp. 33-34.
43. Fornara, p. 33.
44. See, in particular, Fornara, p. 30, n.7.
45. Dover, p. 71.
47. According to Fornara, p. 35, if Thucydides used a different phrase in 2.13.1, it would either overstate (for example, ἔτι ἡμείς στρατηγεῖς) or suggest that Pericles acted by virtue of his official position in doing what he did (for example, εἰς τὸν στρατηγὸν or στρατηγὸς ὑπὼν). On the other hand "the phrase Thucydides wrote is compatible with his (Pericles) importance and his tenure of a magistracy that was strictly collegiate in nature."
48. Xen. Hell. 2.2.19.
49. See also Fornara, p. 35.
50. Including ἐκαρτος αὐτός. Xen. Hell. 2.2.17 refers to Theramenes as ἀρχηγὸς ἐκαρτος αὐτός. The same men are referred to at 2.2.19 as ἀρχηγοὶ δὲ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πρέσβεις.
51. Dover, p. 68.
52. Fornara, p. 35.
53. Fornara, p. 35.
54. Respectively, Xen. Hell. 1.5.16; Lysias, 2.18. See also Dover, p. 67, pp. 68-69.
55. See, in particular, Fornara, p. 31; Dover, p. 67.

58. Thuc. 3.105.3.

59. Thuc. 7.29.1, 8.64.

60. Thuc. 1.57.6.

61. Thuc. 1.57.6.

62. Thuc. 8.54.3.

63. Thuc. 8.15.1.

64. Thuc. 8.30.2.

65. IG, ² 295, lines 19-21.

66. Thuc. 2.69.1.

67. Thuc. 2.80.4.

68. Thuc. 4.67.1-2.

69. Thuc. 3.90.2.

70. Thuc. 3.86.1: Ἀθηναῖοι εἶκοσ εἴσες ἑστειλαν ἐς Σικελίαν καὶ Λάχητα τῶν Μέλανώτων στρατηγοῦ αὐτῶν καὶ Χαριοίδη τῶν Ἐφεσίων

71. Thuc. 3.115.1.

72. Thuc. 3.115.3.

72a. See further at pp. 68ff.

73. See Thuc. 4.42.1; ἡ στρατηγεῖ ἡ Ἡλίκια ἐν Ἰκηρήτω τρίγον καὶ Ἐντών.

74. Thuc. 8.54.3.

75. Thuc. 8.51.1.

76. Thuc. 8.54.3.

77. See Fornara, pp. 79f.

78. Thuc. 8.30.1.

79. Thuc. 8.15.1.

80. Thuc. 5.84.3.

81. See also Dover, *HCT.*, p. 189.
82. See also Beloch, p. 308.
83. See Thuc. 3.69.2, 4.13.2.
84. See, respectively, Thuc. 2.80, 3.7.1, 3.75.1, 3.102.
85. Thuc. 731.4. See Fornara, p. 80.
86. Thuc. 7.43.3.
88. Jordan's idea is one more attempt to confine the strength of the strategia to ten members at any one time, albeit in this case without emending the ἈΚΑ, but his reconstruction only reads satisfactorily with a further emendation of the text elsewhere. If the ἈΚΑ is emended to τεσσαρων or ὄντων, the introduction of Jordan's subordinate rank is unnecessary and adds further confusion to the question of interpretation of the passage. If, on the other hand, the text is allowed to stand and there were ten ἄρχοντες under Archestratus, the issue arises concerning the numerical strength of another office.
89. Bradeen, Hesp. vol.33, 1964, p. 49.
90. IG i2 304, at line 35.
92. Xen. Hell. 1.1.1.
94. Xen. Hell. 1.5.16.
95. Beloch, p. 312, and Fornara, p. 69, list Phanosthenes as a general for the preceding year on the strength of Xen. Hell. 1.5.18.
96. Xen. Hell. 1.6.29.
97. Without wishing to place undue emphasis on the fact, because there are exceptions, it is noticeable that when Thucydides employs the terminology, ἐρχε, ὄν τῇ ἄρχε, in detailing the size, objectives and leadership of Athenian forces, it is usually in description of forces which have been absent from Athens and involved on active duty for a period of time, rather than in reference to forces noted by the historian as being recently sent from Athens. The classification is not binding but it does suggest that Thucydides' choice of terminology may be a subtle reflection of a natural (for him) association of words and phrases with regard to the two slightly different contexts; his choice of words may have been partly determined by stylistic habit.
98. See also 1.62.4.

99. Apart from the examples here given, or noted elsewhere in this chapter (for example, 3.4.3-4) see also 1.59.2, 1.61.3, 1.59.2, 2.70.1, 3.90.2, 6.8.2, 6.25.2, 6.42.1, 6.46.5, 6.62.1, 6.93.4. Also Fornara p. 36, n.28.

100. Thuc. 1.49.4.

101. Thuc. 6.46.5.

102. Thuc. 6.47-49.

103. Thuc. 6.50.1.


105. For example, Hignett, pp. 353-354.

106. See Dover, p. 75; Gomme, HCT., vol.2, p. 76; Hignett, p. 246.


108. As Dover, p. 75.


111. See also Dover, p. 75; Gomme, HCT., vol.2, p. 183; Fornara, p. 36, n.26.

112. Thuc. 3.84.2.

113. Thuc. 3.94.5.

114. Thuc. 3.98.5. Fornara, p. 36, n.38, considers 3.98.5 evidence for collegiality.

115. Jameson, p. 72, contends that the best parallel for the existence of an annual chairman of the strategoi comes from the hellenotamiai. He concludes (p.73) that the eponym in the formula δ ἰείνη καὶ συνέρχεσθαι in inscriptions is the chairman for all years down to 410/9, for which year a multiplicity of eponyms occurs in IG i² 304A. He suggests (pp. 74-75) that this may be explained as a result of changes in financial arrangements that year. However, the contradiction exists not only for 410/9. (See IG i² 304B for 407/6). Further, Dover, p. 69, has noted that no other extant records are comparable in preservation and detail to IG i² 304 AB, and that there is therefore no justification for treating the variety of reference as exceptional.
116. For this compromise see, for example, Comme, *HCT.*, vol. 1, pp. 178-179; Hignett, p. 247.

117. As Fornara, pp. 36-37.

118. See Dover, pp. 76-77; Fornara, pp. 35-36.

119. See Dover, p. 68.
APPENDIX I

1. See chapters 5 and 6. For alternative lists of strategoi see in particular Fornara, pp. 40-71; Beloch, pp. 289-295. Other recent constructions are by Sealey, pp. 86-94, pp. 107-110, for the period 441/440-412/11; Hill, pp. 401-403 for 441/40-429/28; Lewis, pp. 119-20, for 427/6 and 426/5.

2. When a general is first listed the number in parentheses is Kirchner's in Prosopographia Attica.

3. See Fornara, p. 41.

4. Plutarch, Arist. 5.5. See Bicknell's discussion at pp. 433ff. Also Burn, p. 250; Badian, p. 7.

5. Plut. Arist. 5.3.

6. For example, Burn, p. 250; Lenardon, "The Archonship of Themistocles, Historia, vol.5, pp.400-419; Cf. Fornara, p.41; Bicknell, pp. 436-437; Badian, p. 7.


8. See Bicknell, p. 435, n.63; Fornara, p. 42.

9. Thuc. 1.93.3.

10. As Bicknell, p. 437, n.78.


12. See also Fornara, p. 42.

13. Hdt. 8.79.

14. Fornara, p. 43.

15. Fornara, p. 43.

16. See Gomme, HCT., vol.1, p. 408; Fornara, p. 43.

17. Fornara, p. 43, does not consider a strategia for Cimon in this year.

18. See at 463/62.

19. See, for example, Hignett, p. 193.
20. See also Fornara, p. 44.


22. For the chronology of Thucydides 1.104ff. see Fornara, pp. 44-46; Gomme, HCT., vol.1, p. 311, p. 395.

23. See Fornara, p. 46.


25. Thuc. 1.108.4.

26. Thuc. 1.108.2; Diod. 11.81.4 – 11.83.4

27. Gomme, HCT., vol.1, p. 387, thinks Pericles a certain or probable general at Tanagra.


29. Fornara, p. 46.

30. See also Wade-Gery, Essays, p. 203, n.2.


33. See Gomme, HCT., vol.1, p. 396.

34. Diod. 12.3 – 12.4.

35. Fornara, p. 47.

36. For the problems involved see Gomme, HCT., vol.1, pp. 376-380.

36a. Epiteles' name comes from a casualty list. His rank is inscribed alongside his name. (It seems that titles on lists were inscribed above, below or alongside a name – see D.W. Bradeen, "The Athenian Casualty Lists", CQ., vol. 9, n.s., 1969, p. 147). His name is inscribed immediately above the name of the first tribe, Erechtheis. Meiggs and Lewis (M-L, p. 128) think this may be to emphasize that the generals were not merely commanders of tribal contingents. Two other fifth-century Epiteleses belonged to Erechtheis and he has been identified with one of them by M-L, p. 128. If correct PA 4953 and 4962 are the same person.

37. Gomme, HCT., vol.1, p. 409; See also Fornara, p. 47.

38. See Gomme, HCT., vol.1, p. 409.


41. Thuc. 1.116.1.

42. Thuc. 1.116.2.

43. For the deme of Thucydides see Gomme, HCT., vol.1, p. 354. For the tribal affiliation of Tlepolemos see at 439/38.

44. See for example, Hill, p. 401; Ehrenberg, p. 133; Fornara, pp. 49-50; Beloch, pp. 289-290.


46. See Wade-Gery, CP., vol.25, 1931, p.312; Hill,p.306; Ehrenberg, p. 133; Sealey, p. 87; Cf. Fornara, p. 50.

47. See for example, M-L, p. 154.


49. See Gomme, HCT.,vol.1, p. 396; Beloch, p.290.

50. Plut. Per. 13.15. See Fornara, p. 50; Beloch, p. 290.


52. Tentatively accepted by Hill, p. 402, and Sealey, pp. 86-87.

53. See Gomme, HCT., vol.1, p. 367; Hill, p. 402; Sealey, p. 86.

54. See Fornara, p. 51; Jacoby on 323a F24; Ehrenberg, p. 133, Hill, p. 402.


56. For example, Gomme, HCT., vol.1, p. 209.


58. As Fornara, p. 52, n.49.

59. Thuc. 1.61.2.

60. Thuc. 1.61.1.

61. See also Fornara, p. 52, n.49.

62. Accepted, tentatively, by Hill, p. 402.

63. The battle at Potidaea can therefore be dated to about September which fits Thucydides' statement that the Peloponnesian War began in the sixth month after the battle (Thuc. 2.2) in spring

64. See Fornara, p. 53; Ehrenberg, p. 133; Hill, p. 402; Cf. Sealey, p. 87.

65. See Fornara, p. 53; Hill, p. 402.

66. Gomme, HCT., vol.2, p. 164. See also Fornara's list for 431/30; Sealey, p. 87; Cf. Hill, p. 402.

67. Which is unlikely. See Jacoby, II Ib, Suppl. 1, p. 130.

68. As Hill, p. 402. See also Fornara's argument, pp. 53-54. Sealey, p. 88, gives Phormio as special command.


70. So, for example, Fornara, p. 55; Hill, p. 403.

71. See pp. 69-70.

72. See also Gomme, HCT., vol. 2, p. 183.

73. Fornara, p. 75.

74. Thuc. 2.79.7.

75. Thuc. 2.95.3.

76. See also Ehrenberg, pp. 129-130.

77. Ehrenberg, p. 130.

78. Thuc. 2.101.1.


82. Beloch, p. 301.

83. See also Sealey, p. 107.
84. Fornara, pp. 56-57; Sealey, pp. 107-108.
86. Sealey, p. 59.
87. Fornara, p. 59
89. Fornara, pp. 60-61, argues against assigning generalships to Demodocos, Aristeides, Eurymedon, Sophocles and Pythodorus.
90. See Westlake, pp. 110ff; Sealey, p. 110. Not accepted by Fornara, p. 61.
91. For example, Sealey, p. 110, leaves him off his list. But see Fornara, p. 61; Jacoby, IIib, Suppl. 11, p. 137, n.3.; McGregor, "The Last Campaign of Cleon", AJP.,vol.lix,1938,p.154.
92. See also Fornara, p. 62; Sealey, p. 110; Beloch, p. 292.
93. Thuc. 5.19.2; 5.24.1.
96. See at PA 171; Gomme, ibid., p. 679; Andrewes-Lewis, ibid., p. 178.
97. See at PA 7317; Gomme, ibid., p.680; Andrewes-Lewis, ibid., p. 178.
98. See at PA 9100; Gomme, p. 680. Andrewes-Lewis, ibid., p. 179, are tempted to identify him with the general elected after Notium, (Xen. 1.5.17. But the name Leon in Xen. 1.5.16 is probably a mistake for Lysias - see at 406/05), but suggest a Leon who was general in 439/8. (They restore his name to IG i 50).
99. See at PA 1904; Gomme, p. 680; Andrewes-Lewis, ibid., p. 179.
100. Thuc. 3.105.3.
101. Xen. 1.7.3. See also Andrewes-Lewis, op.cit., p. 179.
102. Plut.Per.6.2. See at PA 8996.
103. Diod. 12.10.4
104. Thuc. 4.120, 5.32.
106. Thuc. 4.119.2.
107. IG i² 50.
108. See also Andrewes-Lewis, op.cit., p. 180.
110. According to Andrewes-Lewis the sixth to fifteenth names may be in tribal order and probably constitutes the ten commissioners. They suggest that the order of the list is the order of proposal in the assembly; two seers (Lampon, Isthmonicus), three generals (Laches, Nicias, Euthydemus), ten commissioners, two more to make the number seventeen (Lamachus, Demosthenes). However, the tribal order is by no means established.
111. Fornara, p. 62; Sealey, p. 92.
112. See Fornara, p. 62; Sealey, p. 91; Cf. Mayor, pp. 48ff.
114. Beloch, p. 292, lists him as Chairemon. But see Tod, 75, p.185; M-L., p. 231. Fornara, p. 63, although doubtful about Rhinon's strategia, notes that he may be the same as the general of 403/02.
117. PA 12412, See also Fornara, p. 65.
119. Thuc. 7.69.4; Cf. Fornara, p. 65.
120. Sealey, p. 91; Cf. Fornara, p. 65.
121. Fornara, p. 66; Beloch, p. 293.
123. See Thuc. 8.76.
124. See Thuc. 8.73, for the sympathies of Charminos, Leon and Diomedon.
125. See Thuc. 8.76.3, 8.89.2.
126. See Fornara, p. 66.
127. Fornara, pp. 67-68; Beloch, pp. 293-94.

129. Thuc. 8.98.1. After the fall of the Four Hundred, Aristocles and Melanthios may likewise have fled.

130. For example, Thymochares, the oligarchic general, operated in the Hellespont in 411 (Xen. Hell. 1.1.1), and Thrasyllos the democratic general sailed to Athens for reinforcements and supplies (Xen. Hell. 1.1.8). See also Fornara, p. 67.

131. For example, Beloch, p. 72, p. 77, p. 81.

132. Xen. 1.4.11-12.

133. Andrewes, op. cit., p. 3.

134. Xen. 1.1.11 ff.

135. See also Andrewes, op. cit., p. 3.

136. Xen. 1.2.16; 1.3.3.


138. Xen. 1.4.18-20.

139. Thuc. 8.97.3.

140. For example, Xen. 1.2.13; See also Andrewes, op. cit., p. 3.

141. See also at p. 272.

141a. IG i 304.

141b. Fornara, p. 69, regards Alcibiades, Theramenes and Thrasyboulus as "quasi-independent agents of Athens until 407".

142. As Andrewes, op. cit., p. 2.

143. Xen. 1.1.33.

144. Xen. 1.1.34.

145. As Fornara, p. 69; Andrewes, op. cit., pp. 2-4.

146. As Andrewes, op. cit., pp. 3-4.

147. Xen. 1.1.23.


149. Xen. 1.2.15. Thrasyllos was defeated at Ephesos. See Xen. 1.2.7-10.
150. Xen. 1.2.16-17.

151. For a categorization of the list into generals of the fleet and generals of the oligarchy see Fornara, pp. 67-68.


153. See also Dover, p. 62; Hignett, p. 353; Jameson, p. 85.

154. See also Dover, p. 63; Cf. Andrewes, op.cit., p. 3; Hammond, p. 139. According to Hammond Alcibiades was probably elected ὑπ' ὀλίγας ἐκ ἀνώνυμου in a special election on his return home, thus releasing a tribal strategia into which Adeimantus, his fellow-tribesman, was elected to be general.

155. Xen. 1.5.11.

156. Xen. 1.4.21.

156a. Against this it may be argued that Aristocrates and Adeimantus were only authorized to command troops on land (Xen. 1.4.21). However, Alcibiades could just as easily have entrusted the command to Aristocrates and Adeimantus if he was empowered to give it to Antiochus.

157. See also Fornara, p. 36.

158. Thuc. 8.82.1.

159. See Thuc. 8.104 ff.

160. Xen. 1.1.5.

161. See also Bloedow, op.cit., p. 47.

162. Xen. 1.1.11-18.

163. For example, Diod. 13.49.3; 49.5.

164. Diod. 13.50.1. For a full discussion of the inadequacies of Xenophon's account, see Bloedow, op.cit., pp. 46-55.

165. Xen. 1.6.29-30.

166. Xen. 1.6.35.

167. Xen. 1.7.1. Xenophon notes that Conon was not deposed. He did not take part in the battle. Presumably Arachistratus, the other general, elected at 1.5.16, who also did not participate in the battle at Arginusae, remained in office.

168. Xen. 1.7.34.

170. Xen. 1.6.35.

171. Xen. 1.6.30.

172. See also Fornara, p. 70.

173. The names common to Xen. 1.7.2, and Diod. 13.101.5 are Pericles, Lysias, Aristocrates and Thrasyllus. Diodorus names in addition Calliades, and Xenophon, Diomedon and Erasinides.

174. Lysias 12.10. See also Andrewes, op.cit., p.3.

175. See Jameson, pp. 86-87. It is generally agreed that the scholion to Frogs, lines 679ff. is not evidence for a strategia of Cleophon. See Lewis, pp. 122-123; Fornara, p. 70.
APPENDIX 2


4. See also Badian, pp. 28-29.

5. See also Fornara, p. 27.

6. See Plut. *Arist.* 5.5

7. See BS., vol.II, p. 1127, n.2 for this as the responsibility of the taxiarchs.

8. *Ath Pol* 61.3.


10. Presumably on land the Athenian army was always arranged by tribal order, each tribal contingent (that is, hoplite units) forming a compact unit in itself, whether the ten strategoi were present or not. In such a situation a general in sole command would therefore not always have direct command over his own tribal regiment but would fight with the hoplites in that section of the line which constituted his command position, usually at the right wing. On the other hand the arrangement of the fleet cannot have been decided by tribal considerations alone. A tribal contingent will necessarily have been distributed throughout a number of ships and even if some attempt was made to ensure that the forty or so hoplites on each ship belonged to the same tribe, this would have been by no means always possible. Moreover, experience and abilities of individual trierarchs and kybernetes must have played some part in determining how the fleet would be ordered for battle.


12. Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.15; 1.2.13; Lysias 8.67. They had lost this power by the time of Aristotle. See *Ath Pol* 61.2.


15. See for example, Thuc. 1.70.8; Xen. 

16. Thuc. 4.4.1; 7.60.2; 8.92.4.

17. See Hignett, p. 176.


19. Thuc. 4.75.1.

20. Thuc. 1.114.3


22. The most important politicians of the late 480's, Themistocles and Aristeides, were also generals.

23. See also Hignett, p. 250.

24. See Hignett, p. 191. Even if Cimon's tenure of office was not unbroken, he was strategos in most of these years.


27. See Aristotle, Politics, 1305a, llff.

28. Phormio was active as a general in the years before the Peloponnesian War. He may have been of some political importance.


30. See also Connor, op.cit., p. 145.

31. For Hyperbolus, see Connor, op.cit., p. 146.

32. Politics, 1305a, llff.

33. As Hignett, p. 209.

34. Plut. Cimon 17.2.

35. Hdt. 6.136.3.

36. Thuc. 2.65.3.

37. Jacoby at 324 fr 8. See also Perna, p. 37, p. 58.

38. Thuc. 4.65.3.
39. Xen. 1.5.16.

40. Thuc. 3.98.5.

41. See also Fornara, pp. 37-38.

42. Xen. 1.7.34.

43. Thuc. 5.26.5.

44. Thuc. 4.104.4 ff.

45. Ath Pol 43.4.

46. Sometimes in the fifth century, as in the case of the six generals tried after Arginusae, the ecclesia acted as the court. See Xen. Hell. 1.7.3.

47. See, for example, Hdt. 6.136.3; Thuc. 4.65.3.

48. For this procedure see Ath Pol 61.2.

49. I have suggested elsewhere that the leniency of the penalty imposed on Eurymedon compared to the punishment meted out to Pythodorus and Sophocles may have been due to a strong defence by him. Alternatively, all three may have initially been convicted and subsequently fined. Pythodorus and Sophocles, being unable to pay, may therefore have been banished, while Eurymedon was able to meet the fine and retain his privileges as a citizen.

50. See also Fornara, p. 37.

51. Ath Pol 55.2; Lysias 16, 31.

52. Ath Pol 48.3-5, 54.2.


54. Thuc. 2.79.7. Xenophon was one (Thuc. 2.79.1) The others were probably Phanomachos and Hestiodoros. (Thuc. 2.70.1).

55. Thuc. 3.90.2. He was Charoiades.

56. Thuc. 6.101.6.

57. Thuc. 7.52.2.

58. Thuc. 7.86.2.

59. Perhaps Euthydemos as well. Menander may have escaped. A general of this name was active later in the Peloponnesian War.

60. Thuc. 3.98.4.
61. Thuc. 4.101.2.
62. Thuc. 5.74.3. Presumably Nicostratus and Laches (Thuc. 5.61.1).
63. For example, IG i2 929 (Hippodamas and Phrynichos).
64. Fornara, p. 38.
65. The evidence is Deinarchos 1.71 which states that the strategoi had to possess landed property in Attica. Hignett, p. 224, considers it not improbable, but Cleon for example, probably did not pass this test. His father was a tanner.
67. This office was restricted to the Pentacosiomedimnoi, even during the fourth century. See Ath Pol 47.1.
68. It seems natural enough that the Demos should rely on men who were trained from childhood to strive for political and military leadership, and to accept that they possessed the special talents required of generals, whether this was true or not.
70. Xen. Mem. 3.4.1. See also Ps. Xen. Ath Pol 1.3.
71. Hignett, p. 249.
72. See Hignett, p. 245ff.
73. See Jones, p. 125.
74. See IG ii2 27; restoration of IG i2 71, lines 47-48, in SEG, vol.x, 86, p. 53.
75. IG ii2 108. See also Jones, p. 125.
76. IG i2 45, lines 32ff. See Hignett, p. 243.
77. So Hignett, p. 243; Jones, p. 125.
78. Thuc. 4.118.4.
79. IG i2 57, lines 55-56. See also Hignett, p. 246; Jones, p. 125.
80. Thuc. 2.59.3.
82. As Gomme, HCT., vol.2, p. 76.
83. As Jones, p. 127.
84. IG i² 57.
85. As Jones, p. 125.
86. Hignett, p. 246.
89. Thuc. 4.2.4. Thucydides does not specify whether Demosthenes had explicitly asked for permission to fortify Pylos. Perhaps his request was more general, although it does seem from Thucydides 4.3.1-2 that Demosthenes had the fortification of Pylos in his mind as his main objective from the beginning.
90. Thuc. 5.2.1.
91. So, for example, Hdt. 6.132.
92. Fornara, p. 37.
93. Thuc. 6.25.1 indicates that the ecclesia asked the advice of its generals before deciding the size and composition of a force.
95. Thuc. 6.8.4.
96. Thuc. 1.45.3.
97. See also Fornara, p. 37, n.34.
98. See also Jones, p. 125, who cites as an example Thuc. 4.66, 4.76.
99. Thuc. 4.65.3-4.
100. Fornara, pp. 79-80.
101. Thuc. 8.51.1.
102. Thuc. 8.54.3.
103. Thuc. 3.115.6.
104. Thuc. 8.55.1
105. Xen. 1.6.29.
106. Xen. 1.6.15-17, 1.6-38.
107. Fornara, p. 79.
108. Xen. 1.5.18.
109. Xen. 1.5.18.
110. Thuc. 8.64.2.
111. Thuc. 7.31.4.
APPENDIX 3


3. Ath Pol 44.4

4. op.cit., p. 45.


6. As Meritt, ibid., p. 278.


11. Meritt, op.cit., p. 278.

12. Wade-Gery, CQ., vol. 27, 1933, p. 28, believed that the strategoi assumed office at the beginning of the conciliar year. This idea was rendered untenable by Meritt, Hesperia, vol. 5, 1936, p. 376, who proved that the conciliar year was not introduced at the same time as Cleisthenes' reforms but only later during the fifth century. See also Hignett, p. 348.


14. IG ii² 892, IG ii² 954, IG ii² 955.

15. Meritt, ibid., p. 278.


17. Meritt, ibid., p. 278.

18. Ath Pol 62.3.

19. See also Fornara, pp. 74-75.
20. Fornara, p. 74.

21. Thuc. 7.11ff. Xen. 1.7.4, 1.7.17. See also Jordan, Diss., p. 105.

22. See also Fornara, p. 40. As a general consideration it does not seem unreasonable to suppose that in practice generals may sometimes have been delayed and failed to return before the expiry of the old year. See also p. 158. The point is that our sources, including Thucydides, are silent about the matter.

23. Mayor, op. cit., p. 47.

24. See also Fornara, p. 58; Pritchett, op. cit., pp. 473-74.

25. Thuc. 4.75.1-2.


27. See also Sealey, p. 105; D.M. MacDowell, CQ., vol. 15, n.s., 1965, p. 42.

28. So Fornara, p. 75, for Cleon and Demosthenes; Sealey, pp. 108-109, for Cleon; Lewis, p. 120, for Demosthenes.

29. For example, Sealey, p. 109.


31. See, for example, Comme, HCT., vol. 3, p. 577.

32. Fornara, p. 75.

33. Thuc. 2.95.3.

34. See p. 223.

35. Thuc. 3.7.1.

36. Ath Pol 61.3.

37. i.e. their term of office would expire at the same time as generals who were elected at the regular ἀρχαία.
1. See Chapter 5.


4. IG i2 45, lines 8-9 read as follows:-Δημοκλείδες δὲ κατατέθεα τὴν ᾿Αθηναῖον ἀναπτυξάρα τοῦτο, καθότι ἐν ἄνεται ἡ ἥπειρα. Mattingly assumes that Demokleides, not being a member of the Council, proposed the decree as a strategos.

5. IG i2 50, line 28.

6. That is, involving Demokleides.

7. Aristoph. Wasps 895; Plat. Lach. 197c.

8. IG i2 355, line 51.


10. See Lewis, p. 121.


12. I have included Eurymedon on the list for 423/2. See p. 225.

13. For the deme of Eurymedon, brother-in-law of Plato, see Diog. Laert 3.42.43.


17. See also MacDowell, op.cit., p. 44, n.4.

18. Fornara, p. 78.

20. See also Lewis, p. 119, for the suggestion that ..Μηδενοικιοι may be a hellenotamias, rejected in turn by MacDowell, op.cit., p. 44, n.4.


22. See Davies, op.cit., p. 332, p. 334.


24. Plut. Alc. 25.2

25. Thuc. 8.25.1.


29. Xen. 1.1.12.

30. Thuc. 8.76.2.

31. Xen. 1.1.12.


33. Diod. 13.64.2-4.

34. Fornara, p. 69.

35. As Andrewes, p. 3.

36. Fornara, p. 69.

37. Cf. Fornara, p. 69; Andrewes, pp. 2ff.

38. Diod. 13.64-13.68; Xen. 1.4.9.

39. Thuc. 8.97.3.

40. Xen. 1.4.20.

41. See pp. 234-236.

42. Xen. 1.4.21.

43. Xen. 1.4.9.

44. Xen. 1.5.18ff. G.E. Underhill, A Commentary on the Belles-Is, Oxford, 1906, at 1.4.10, suggested that of the ten generals
elected Xenophon only mentions the commanders of the fleet. See also Jameson, pp. 85-86.

45. Fornara, p. 70, completely dismisses this as evidence.

46. Cleophon's father was Cleippides, most probably the same man who was general in 429/28. See Vanderpool, *Hesp.* vol. 21, 1952, pp. 114ff.

47. See Jameson, pp. 86-87; Lewis, p. 123.

48. For example, Xanthippus - Pericles - Pericles; Miltiades - Cimon - Lacedaemonius; Phormio - Asopius; Hagnon - Theramenes; Lamachus - Tydeus.

49. Lewis, p. 123.
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