SOUTH AFRICA'S WITHDRAWAL FROM THE COMMONWEALTH:

A RESPONSE TO MULTI-RACIALISM?

THESIS SUBMITTED BY VALMA RAE HAWKES IN FEBRUARY 1968,
IN FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENT FOR A MASTER OF ARTS
DEGREE IN POLITICAL SCIENCE IN THE UNIVERSITY OF TASMANIA.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I am grateful for the unstinted guidance and encouragement of my Tutor - Dr. A. K. Fryer, the patience of my family and the skill of my Typist - Mrs. Patricia Charlesworth.
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

Full bibliographical details for each book appear in the first reference only. Where a number of books by the same author are used, all but the first reference carry an abbreviated title.


Full details of Periodical articles appear in the Bibliography. References throughout the text usually cite single page numbers.
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PREFACE
At the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference held in London 3-13 May 1960, an attempt was made by the Tunku Abdul Rahman to have South African racial problems debated. Although the Conference subsequently agreed not to discuss the matter as a conference, Mr. Louw agreed to informal discussions with limited groups of Prime Ministers. Thus a showdown with South Africa was temporarily averted, although part of the communique issued by the Conference, for the first time publicly expressed the Commonwealth's belief in the equality of peoples:

"The ministers emphasized that the Commonwealth itself is a multi-racial association and expressed the need to ensure good relations between all member states and peoples of the Commonwealth."

The Conference also made clear South Africa's position regarding an application for republican membership. It was decided that in the event of South Africa choosing to become a republic, her continued membership in the Commonwealth would not be automatic. Conference refused to anticipate the issue despite the fact that a precedent had been set in 1957 when a Prime Ministers' Conference had agreed in advance to Ceylon remaining in the Commonwealth as a republican member.

Thus the 1960 Conference, although technically a victory for those members who believed intrinsically in the observance of non-interference in domestic affairs, was in essence a clear adumbration that their predominance was on the wane, and that confrontation of South Africa would not long be delayed.
This was borne out by the events of the 1961 Conference, when countries hostile to South Africa made their attitudes clear. South Africa's racial policies were to determine the decision to allow the Republic of South Africa to remain within the Commonwealth. With mutual intransigence, Dr. Verwoerd and his opponents failed to find a compromise. The former remained steadfast in his belief that apartheid was the only practical solution to his country's racial problems and the latter adamantly maintained that South Africa's racial policies were a threat both to Commonwealth cohesion and world peace.

Dr. Verwoerd eventually withdrew his country's application to remain as a republican member of the Commonwealth, an action which was a significant landmark both in the evolution of the Commonwealth and in the development of the South African nation. Thus a bald summary of the immediate events preceding South Africa's withdrawal ...

It is the purpose of this thesis to trace the long-term pressures which were present in South Africa, firstly as a result of her multi-racial society and secondly as a result of her membership in the multi-racial Commonwealth. The Documents (Appendices C and D) have been included to highlight:

(i) the consistency of the Afrikaner antipathy for the symbols of Commonwealth association;

(ii) the widespread nature of the hostility of Commonwealth members to South Africa's racial policy.

(iii) To show the interwoven threads of conflict at home and hostility abroad - the combined effects being felt particularly in the context of South Africa's
Commonwealth membership.

South Africa's racial complexity has stimulated the proposal of a unique *modus operandi* for solving the great problems of a multi-racial society, in a decade where it has become obvious that few, if any, multi-racial societies have succeeded in overcoming the evils of prejudice and social and economic discrimination, although as in the case of India, Britain and the United States, there have been legislative attempts to do so. South Africa's crime in the post-war world has been to appear to legislate for the indefinite extension of White supremacy within the Union. This permanent aspect of apartheid has become less attractive to international society as each year new nations add to the heterogeneity of institutions and associations such as the U.N. and the Commonwealth. Apartheid, therefore, has been a target of vilification for more than two decades though few of its antagonists have ventured a practicable alternative which could take into account the fact that White South Africans have no other home.

The tendency of the nations of the world to cluster in self-conscious racial divisions in the display of attitudes and reactions to many vital political issues has caused apartheid to assume the role of a chronic irritant in international affairs. The unprecedented collapse and the discrediting of "colonialism" (with its loose and ubiquitous definitions) have rendered Afrikaner Nationalism (and notions of racial superiority) an anachronism in an era marked by both adherence to the ideal of equality of all peoples and by the growth of "white guilt".
Thus a thesis on South Africa's withdrawal from the Commonwealth has some significance as a task performed in an Australian university. While no claim is made that in South Africa similar undertakings may not be under way, in Australia there has been relatively little apparent interest in the issue. This is in spite of the fact that it highlights the development of an exclusive White nationalism interested in preserving a unique culture in close proximity to vast numbers of alien peoples and that it reveals the collective and irresistible determination of the non-White Commonwealth to extract racial justice (perhaps revenge) from the Commonwealth association.

The study of South Africa's withdrawal sheds much light on both the influence of racialism in international affairs and on the excesses and resources of the defence mechanism of a beleaguered nationalism. It shows the complexity of the problems of achieving multi-racial co-existence within a single state and multi-racial co-operation within an international association.
INTRODUCTION
The White settlers of South Africa were colonists who did not intend to return to Europe after a period in the new land. Today, the majority of Whites in South Africa have no strong ties with any other country. South Africa is their homeland. Race relations have been a dominant factor in South African politics since the earliest days of settlement and have developed against this background of the permanence of the White settler. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, South Africa did not hold many attractions for large-scale European migration and the first years of settlement saw relatively little discrimination on the grounds of skin colour. The distinction between racial groups was more significantly based upon religious differences - Baptism having a social value which temporarily out-weighed pigmentation.

The gradual evolution of the social equation: White = Christian; Black = heathen, led to the almost complete subjugation of the Hottentots by the Europeans at the end of the eighteenth century. Bushmen were hunted as beasts, the frontier Boer


4. Ibid., p. 119.
never regarding them as fellow-humans and justifying his right to dominate the surrounding heathen by virtue of his religion. The concept of treating a non-Christian as an equal, was alien to the frontier mentality. The heathen were excluded from the pattern of Calvinist salvation.¹ Thus the criteria of membership of the superior social class were Christianity and skin colour.² By the end of the eighteenth century, the former tradition of admitting coloured Christians to the European social milieu was dying out. The Boers had come into contact with African tribes with a more advanced culture who had migrated as far as the Zuurveld as cattle-herders and farmers. This confrontation produced raids and counter-raids,³ which continued for more than a century and long after the last major war in the Cape in 1878, continued to strengthen inter-racial antipathies.

Soon after the British Government occupied the Cape for the second time in 1806⁴, it re-organized administration, abolished the slave trade and instituted circuit courts which highly incensed the Boers, for they were now eligible for trial for mis-treatment of Hottentot servants.⁵ The attempt of the British Administration

¹. Ibid. p. 127.
⁴. Ratified by the Congress of Vienna, 1815.
to fix a boundary for the colony and the substitution of sale at auction for grants of land, exacerbated the Boer-British ill-feeling and increased the desire of the Boers to free themselves from alien British institutions by trekking to the territory beyond the frontiers of the Colony.¹

The Orange Free State and the South African Republic developed along their own lines and, in 1858, the Constitution of the South African Republic included the clause: "The people desire to admit no equality between coloured people and the White inhabitants, either in church or state."²

Despite this definite statement of racial distinction, the discovery of diamonds in 1866 and gold in 1868 led to the mass employment of 100,000 Africans as mine-boys. This had a threefold effect. It hastened the inexorable dependence of White profits upon Black labour and it also highlighted both the servile relationship of Blacks to Whites and the differences between the Boer farmer, the urbanized Dutch in the South and the British industrialists. The mineral wealth also accelerated British imperialism and the increasing intensity of the Anglo-Boer confrontation culminated in the Boer War - the "Second War of Independence."³

² Vatcher, op. cit., p. 12.
³ The Boers regard the war of 1881-82 as the "First War of Independence".
The Boer War and the memory of real and imagined events during the war accentuated and perpetuated the differences between the two European communities in South Africa. These differences were apparent during the First World War, when Boer leaders organized protests against involvement in "England's wars".¹

The rapid industrialization of South Africa between the two World Wars had far-reaching consequences in the field of race relations. The balance of the European population shifted from rural to urban and the numbers of manufacturing and commercial establishments quadrupled. The ports and railways, public service and public expenditure showed corresponding development and created great demands for employment, especially in urban areas.²

Not only did the Boers flock to the towns,³ but many Bantu were needed as the unskilled labour force for the new industries. This dual urbanization threw into relief the problem of "poor whitism". The poorer Whites, in the main, Afrikaners, in terms of commercial or industrial skills, had only the badge of colour

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1. Marquard, op. cit., pp. 23-4. Despite these protests, however, 136,000 of 685,000 European men of fighting age enrolled for service.


to distinguish themselves from the African and, as they could
not indulge in "Kaffir-work", a livelihood was precarious.\(^1\) At
the same time, the Black proletariat was increasing and labouring
for insufficient wages, and by the early 1920's the plight of
the newly-urbanized Boers was so serious that 20% of them could
be classed as "very poor".\(^2\)

The Nationalist answer to this problem was a "civilised
wage policy", based on colour and aimed at making "Kaffir-work"
tolerable to the White man, so long as he was better paid. These
poor Whites remain, in the 'sixties,\(^3\) the most prejudiced and
loyal supporters of the Nationalists, as their superior social
status is based almost wholly upon colour\(^4\) and legislation.

The continued increase in the rate of urbanization threw
the labour market into a state of chaos and the Native Economic
Commission, appointed in 1930 (President, J.B. Holloway) declared :
"It is essential that no time shall be lost in developing the
Reserves and in reducing the present pressure on land, by
making available more areas for Native occupation."\(^5\) This
Commission also drew attention to the development of native

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   "The Poor Whites in South Africa", p. 605.

2. Patterson S., The Last Trek, Routledge and Kegan Paul,

   Sheila van der Horst quotes 22% of white labour still earning less than £500 a year in 1960.


5. Neame, op. cit., p. 60.
nationalism or race consciousness and is one of the earliest official recognitions of the potential of the Bantu as an influence on South African politics. The increasing volume of discriminatory legislation which reached its ultimate expression in apartheid, as announced in 1948, and as "separate development" in 1958, reflects both the growing insecurity of the European group and its determination to keep South Africa under White control despite almost universal international hostility.

The main factor to keep in mind when considering the history of race relations in South Africa is that divisions are seldom clear-cut. The most obvious division is between White and Black, but it is further modified, if one discounts divisions within these groups, by the existence of the Coloureds (mostly in the Cape) and the Asians (mostly in Natal and along the Reef). It must also be noted that the ramifications of the racial cleavages extend beyond the frontiers, to include Portugese and Rhodesians within the White group and 70 million Bantu with the Black group of South Africa. The Asian minority also has strong ties with India, which cause complications in the international attitude to race relations in the Republic.

With increasing demands for equality from all the non-White groups in South Africa it seems impossible to envisage a state in which the claims and aspirations of the five main racial groups

1. Marquard, op. cit., p. 34
in South Africa would coincide in one course of action. It is claimed by the Nationalists that "separate development" will remove sources of friction and allow the separate groups an autonomy to manage their own affairs, without infringing on the rights of others.

Given the long history of complex race relations in the Union, the fact that White South Africans have been established for three centuries, and the mushrooming of Black states in colonies where the Europeans had an alternative home, then the friction generated by apartheid is comprehensible. It is not that apartheid or "separate development" in themselves are intrinsically different in concept from the practical applications of previous racial policies. Rather, it is that the Anti-White-supremacists have become more politically powerful and articulate since the formulation of apartheid.

It is against this background of the multiplicity of races and the attendant problems that the withdrawal of South Africa from the Commonwealth must be studied. One must be all the time aware of a triple perspective; firstly, the development of Afrikaner nationalism throughout the entire history of the Union; secondly, the corresponding development within the Union of groups hostile to Afrikanerdom; and thirdly, the effect of the Second World War on the development of Afro-Asian nationalism, the negative aspects of which - anti-imperialism, anti-colonialism
and anti-whitism - became increasingly important in South Africa's relations with the Commonwealth.

In many ways a convincing case may be built to substantiate the contention that withdrawal was a manifestation of the anti-imperialist doctrine of Afrikaner nationalism. Republicanism had been, since Union, a long-term objective for the Afrikaner nationalists, an achievement which would completely sever all vestiges of limitations of sovereignty - an ever-sensitive preoccupation of Afrikanerdom. Of all the nationalisms to crystallize in the present century, Afrikaner nationalism has perhaps been the least successful in finding a champion.¹ Fraught by dissension within and threatened by unsympathetic forces outside the country, Afrikaner nationalism reflects one long battle for consolidation to achieve synonymity of "state", "nation" and "volk". It has been, since 1945, an increasingly popular target for attack by other successfully emergent nationalisms.

The racial composition of South Africa has ensured the continuance of domestic disunity, and the campaign waged in the U.N. has understandably been viewed by the Afrikaners as a threat to their sovereignty and also as a cynical example of the application of dual standards of judgment of the conduct of the

¹ Fred Alexander makes the interesting observation that even in Quebec he found little sympathy for the Afrikaner nationalists. c.f. Canadians and Foreign Policy, Cheshire, Melbourne, 1960, p. 137.
larger and the smaller powers within the U.N. The persistence of this campaign ensured that South Africa would either have to give lip-service to the concept of racial equality or suffer the wrath of the anti-colonialist revolution. The development of anti-whitism, anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism as aids to the consolidation of African (and Asian) nationalisms in the post-independence stage, has created a limited and specific cohesion among many of these nations who use the terms in abusive and acrimonious accusations against former colonial powers. The tremendous impact of these 'isms may be seen in the sudden change in the nature of the post-war Commonwealth. As recently as 1958, Nicholas Mansergh was able to generalize on the one broadly-defined obligation of Commonwealth membership - the adoption of parliamentary democracy (albeit with local variation).\(^1\) By 1960, this was at the best only marginally accurate. The reason for the changing emphasis lay in the expansion of independent Africa and the increasing articulateness of Asia. Multi-racialism was, by 1960, considered to be the over-riding concept of Commonwealth membership, and more negative obligations such as parliamentary democracy, and non-interference in each other's affairs were no longer as important as the expression of the politically idealistic aims of a great multi-racial association of people. The concept, to be valid as a raison d'etre of the

Commonwealth, must necessarily be unanimously recognised.\(^1\) Despite this obvious need for unanimity, the South Africans insisted on their sovereign right to formulate and execute their own domestic policies without external influence. (It should be noted also, that South Africa had both her own definition of "multi-racialism" and unique fears of its implications).

With a growing appreciation that the role of scapegoat for the Western world had been assigned to them, the South Africans showed their awareness of the necessity for maintaining their belief in the righteousness of apartheid (or "separate development") as the whole world gradually accepted the fact that White South Africa's claim for a permanent settlement in South Africa (at the same standard of living) was no longer as important as the need to uphold the doctrine of equality of all peoples, and to vocalize this concept in the respective international forums.

The complexity of the factors contributing to the decision to withdraw is no doubt due to the coincidence of the origins of the internal fissures within South Africa and the external threats from outside the country. The traditional English-speaking Afrikaner antipathy was exaggerated by South African-British collisions - most evident in the Commonwealth connection; the Indian problem was exacerbated by India's policies within the Afro-Asian world, and in the U.N.; and the historical fear

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\(^1\) N.B. the pressure being brought to bear on the traditional supporters of South Africa in the U.N.
of the "black peril" within South Africa was given profound
dimension by the increasing militance and success of the emerging
African nationalism. With the kaleidoscopic effect of
potentially disruptive forces inside the country merging with
threatening external pressures, it is little wonder that the
Nationalists persisted in maintaining a stoical intransigence
in the face of criticism.1

It is the purpose of this thesis to outline the internal
tensions and the external threats born of the racial composition
in South Africa to decide whether South Africa had any real
alternative to withdrawal, given the historical legacy of the
Boer War, her "laager" ethos and the anti-colonialist revolution
in the post-war world. Consideration must also be given to
the possibility that the South Africans had a much clearer
perception of both their own attitude to the prospect of withdrawal
and the subsequent results, than had the Afro-Asian states which
were largely responsible for her actual decision. In other
words, the question must be asked whether the Commonwealth had
clearly defined expectations of the effectiveness of the use
of ostracism and isolation as methods of political punishment
which would encourage South Africa to reform. Putting the
question more positively, just what was achieved by the forced
withdrawal, given the assumption that the Commonwealth stance
was made in the attempt to ameliorate the conditions of life for

1. c.f. Australian Outlook, Vol. 19, No. 2 (August 1965), "National
self-determination and the multi-racial state : the problem of
the non-White members of South Africa's population, and that it was not merely another manifestation of the anti-whitism that had been increasing since the Second World War?

At the same time, the ambivalence of South Africa's attitudes to withdrawal must be kept in mind. The 1961 Conference was not necessarily a simple victory for South Africa's opponents. An attempt must be made to evaluate both the forcefulness of Afrikanerdóm's old antipathy to the Commonwealth and its traditional objective of secession, and the effectiveness of the "new" Commonwealth's antipathy to South Africa's racial policies.

That the withdrawal profoundly influenced the Commonwealth cannot be doubted: what is questionable is the contention that isolation would cause a liberalization of the racial policies of South Africa.

Thus the study of South Africa's withdrawal bears great relevance for the consideration of three distinct political phenomena. It leads to the observation of the behaviour of a beleaguered, emergent nationalism, which at all times believed itself to be intrinsically threatened by diverse hostile forces. Secondly, it reflects the changing nature of the Commonwealth and its ability to adapt itself to demanding circumstances, and thirdly it questions the effectiveness of the use of isolation as a punitive measure in the attempt to bring external pressure to bear on a country to enforce a change in its domestic policies.
CHAPTER ONE

AFRIKANER NATIONALISM
Forgive? Forget? Is it easy to forget?
The sufferings, the anxiety was so very grievous.
The iron has scorched and marked for the ages,
Branded our people, and this wound is too deep,
too close to our heart, and too deep in our being --
Patience, oh Patience, that can endure so much.

Louis Leipoldt (1880-1947)
Of all the nationalisms flourishing within the African continent, Afrikaner nationalism is the most classic in form. It has been described in terms of Toynbee's theory of challenge and response\textsuperscript{1} and its rapid development and progress seem to bear out this description. Afrikaner nationalism is born of the common language, religion and history of an ethnic group. Its one digression from the "pattern" of nationalism, is that it is nurtured by a fear from within\textsuperscript{2}. This has caused a perpetual closing of the ranks to form a rigid exclusiveness that is not based solely on aversion to coloured groups alone, but on a deep-seated fear of any out-group.

Afrikaner nationalism is based on the Calvinist idea of the divine election of a chosen people\textsuperscript{3} and its broad biblical basis justifies, for the militant Afrikaner, his rejection of admixture of blood and the concept of equality of races. He sees the Black Africans as Canaanites, or sons of Ham\textsuperscript{4} and, as such, they are ineligible for admission to the political structure of South African society\textsuperscript{5}. The Afrikaner nationalism, already growing in the eighteenth century, became increasingly a reaction against British domination and anglicization\textsuperscript{6} and the concomitant humiliations experienced by the Boers.

4. Ibid. p. 7.
Its propaganda is centred around three crises which caused unification of the group to preserve its self-conscious existence - (1) the Great Trek; (2) the struggle against British imperialism, specifically in the Transvaal War 1880-81, the Jameson Raid 1896, and the Boer War 1899-1902, and (3) the rise of the Black man in Africa while the Afrikaner was still trying to reverse the decisions of the Peace of Vereeniging, between 1902 and 1960.

The Great Trek was a reaction to the British insistence on law enforcement, the abolition of slavery and Ordinance 50, and the attempt of the British to limit the expansion of the colony. The Trek has formed the core of Afrikaner nationalist mythology, for it was the enactment of the story of a chosen people moving into the wilderness in pursuit of freedom. It has been a perpetual cause of difference between the two white groups in South Africa - Blood River has become the symbol of determined Afrikaner resistance against great odds¹.

Prior to 1877 there had been little need for the Boers to concern themselves with their own history² - they had not experienced a crisis as a self-conscious group, united throughout the nation against an aggressive pressure. The difficulties confronting the Transvaal Afrikaners, upon realizing that nature had provided boundaries to their land as formidable as those of the British, made them consciously accept the Transvaal as a fatherland³.

¹. Vatcher, op. cit., p. 9.
². Van Jaarsveld, (The Afrikaner Interpretation) op. cit., p. 160.
³. Ibid., p. 165.
The annexation caused the further realization that the destiny of the Republic and its independence were bound with the future of the whole of South Africa. Sympathy from the Free State Volksraad\(^1\) and the Cape Houses of Parliament awakened the concept of South Africa as a political entity for the Afrikaner.

In 1879, 6000 Afrikaners gathered at Wonderfontein in the Transvaal\(^2\) and Britain was made aware of the rapid deterioration of the South African situation and also of the rising phenomenon of Afrikaner nationalism. After the outbreak of war, the consolidation of the Afrikaners was made manifest in correspondence between the Orange Free State and the Transvaal\(^3\), in the materials and men crossing the boundary\(^4\) and in the political and cultural movements in the Cape.

The reunion of leaders from the Transvaal and the old Cape Colonists, who had been separated by the Great Trek, led to the conscious recognition of the unifying force of common language and religion as a basis of a South African nation, inspired by a love of freedom from oppression\(^5\). After 1881, "the people" gradually became synonymous with "the nation"\(^6\) and the geographical boundaries were less important\(^7\).

1. Ibid., p. 167
2. Vatcher, op. cit., p. 15.
3. Van Jaarsveld, (The Awakening) op. cit., p. 168
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid., p. 186.
6. Van Jaarsveld (The Afrikaner's Interpretation) op. cit. p. 35
The same year saw the establishment of an Afrikaner Bond in the Free State, with the explicit purpose of uniting all Afrikaners throughout South Africa. Much use was made of history to infuse nationalism into the now self-conscious group of Afrikaners and to give them a unity of purpose to oppose British imperialism.

A cultural re-awakening was also taking place - the First Language Movement and the newspaper Patriot becoming major instruments for making Afrikaans a "legitimate" language.

The growing consciousness of common cultural characteristics and common religious beliefs developed the concept of nation, and aggressive propaganda was aimed at "traitor" Afrikaners who favoured the British. The love of the past and a sense of mission for the future, became the major features of Afrikaner nationalism; monuments and symbols proliferated to make the people more aware of their valiant struggle against the British.

The Boer War, which was the culmination of the Anglo-British confrontation, was seen by J.C. Smuts as, "...an epic struggle between the smallest and greatest of peoples." The British used 450,000 troops drawn from the vast empire and the Boers with 87,000 men enforced a two-stage war - a regular campaign, fought in 1900 and guerilla warfare which persisted until 1902. In this "Second War of Freedom" the Boers found the spiritual emphasis which could stimulate their nationalism albeit on a basis of revenge.

1. Ibid., p. 191.
3. Patterson, op. cit., p.31.
The Boers equated the losses in the concentration camps with genocide - 20,000 women and children died.1 The Boer charges were substantiated by stories of "fish-hooks in the bully-beef" and poison in the sugar.2 In point of fact, the British were also appalled by the death-rate in the camps and the team sent to investigate conditions laid the blame on circumstances largely beyond British control. The previous isolation of the Boer families had kept them safe from infectious diseases, but the close confinement of the camps, allied with an appalling lack of hygiene and beliefs in quack remedies, led to an unprecedented susceptibility to diseases such as dysentery, measles, bronchial pneumonia and diphtheria which were rampant in the camps. Martin draws attention to the incredibly high infantile death-rate before the war.3 The "ordinary" consequences of war - lack of food, cattle diseases and unprocurability of dairy products, were, in themselves, sufficient to increase this figure.

Whatever the degree of culpability4 (and it must be remembered that the British army lost 13,750 young men from disease in the same period), the fact remains that Afrikaner historians have subjectively interpreted the results to exacerbate Anglo-Boer antipathy.5

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2. Ibid., p. 76.
3. Ibid., p. 36.
4. Halperin V. Lord Milner and the Empire, Oldhams London 1952, p. 117
   Amery J. Life of J. Chamberlain Vol. 4, p. 95.
   "We would have closed the camps the day the war was over, had we not known that, as a matter of certainty, it would have involved the deaths of thousands and tens of thousands of women and children". (Quote from Hansard, Fourth Series, vol. cxxiv, Co.232, Nov. 5, 1902)
5. Martin, op. cit., pp 77ff. quotes from J.C. Otto, Die Konsentrasiekam
The Boer women, in their suffering, became identified with the Boer nation itself:

"I was in the veld until they made peace. Then we laid down our rifles and went home. What I knew my farm by, was the hole under the kopjie where I quarried slate stones for the threshing floor. That was about all that remained as I left it. Everything else was gone. My home was burnt down. My lands were laid waste. My sheep and cattle were slaughtered. Even the stones I had for the kraals were pulled down. My wife went into the concentration camp with our two children and she came out alone. And when I saw her again, and noticed the way she had changed, I knew that I, who had been all the way through the fighting, had not seen the Boer War." 

Poets like Eugene Marais, Celliers and Totius, who had experienced heartbreak because of the camps, added depth and bitterness to the growing fund of Afrikaans literature, and the sense of common tragedy rallied the battered Afrikaner nation against the even more insidious threat of Milner's anglicisation. With the stark memory of the camps, the devastation of the scorched earth policy and the plan for a fusion of cultures under British rule, the Boer nation prepared for Union.

1. Patterson, op. cit. p. 241 (quoting H.C. Bosman)
Lord Milner believed that, as Afrikaans had no formal grammar or literature, English should become the official language of the country. This caused further hardening of the Afrikaner nationalists, who saw in this a direct attack upon their group-consciousness and pride. Despite the policy of anglicization, the Christian-National schools were maintained, as were the Afrikaner political organizations which kept alive the unifying sense of grievance against the British and forced a Constitution at Union which has been described as a "delicately-balanced compromise".

The First World War, the crushing of the Afrikaner Rebellion, and the strikes of 1914 and 1922, caused a further consolidation of the exclusive quality of Afrikaner nationalism. Anti-British feeling ran high and there was overt sympathy for the Germans from some sections of the Afrikaner community. The Fourie execution after the Boer Rebellion became another nationalist symbol, akin to the Jameson Raid and the Slagter's Nek episode. The abortive rebellion taught Afrikaner extremists the wisdom of careful planning and accentuated the importance of the political field in the battle against the English-speaking group.

4. Vatcher, op. cit., p.45. Hertzog believed that in the Boer War the Germans had "in their darkest hour, opened their hands and hearts to them (the Boers)" c.f. South African House of Assembly Debates (1915) col. 44 (2/3/15).
5. Patterson S., op. cit. p. 15.
The Nationalist Party came to power, with the aid of the Labour Party, in 1924 and Hertzog was influential in the preparation of the Balfour Declaration of 1926, which he believed held the true statement of South Africa's independence. Thus the die-hard demand for a republic was neither necessary nor desirable. The twenties saw the increasing urbanization of the Boers and the consequent change in the traditional way of life built on family, farming and Calvinism. Urbanization removed the economic basis of Boer family life and caused a degradation of the role of father, and equally significant - the appearance of a clearly-defined class structure in Afrikanerdom, with a growing proportion of "poor-whites".

These effects were noted by the Afrikaner leaders and the Afrikaner Broederbond (established 1918) gradually spread its influence into every sphere of South African life. An exclusive, secret organization, modelled on Masonic lines, it comprised influential Nationalists "accountable only to God" for its actions. It had the broad aim of bringing about South Africa's God-given destiny - a Christian, National, Calvinistic Afrikaner Republic.

1. Marquard, op. cit., p. 25.
2. Note also the tremendous diminution of the size of estates under the Roman-Dutch law of inheritance - c.f. De Kiewiet, op. cit., p. 191.
3. Vatcher, op. cit., p. 84.
   Ngubane, op. cit., p. 134.
The Afrikaner Broederbond decided to advance the Afrikaans medium schools as the most vital means of achieving its aims: "A nation is made through its youth being taught and influenced at the school in the traditions, customs, habits and ultimate destination of its volk."¹

The Afrikaner Broederbond fostered a growing interest in Nazism by visits and training periods in Germany² which increased the propensity of some Afrikaners to favour Germany at the expense of Britain.

During the thirties, the Afrikaner Broederbond influenced the educational, economic, cultural and church life of South Africa and was the subject of an investigation and a subsequent attack by Hertzog³, which caused publication of the report of a military intelligence inquiry by the Smuts' Government in 1944. Despite this attack, the Afrikaner Broederbond's hold on South Africa strengthened, especially against British "domination".

The basic and continuing strength of the Afrikaner nationalism⁴ lies in the interlocking directorate of the numerous community institutions which it supports.

1. Ibid., p. 15.
2. B.g Dr. Diedrichs qualifying as a quisling at the Nazi Komintern Training School. Military Intelligence Report op. cit., p. 8.
4. It is now assumed that most of the members of the present Government are members of the Afrikaner Broederbond c.f. Vatcher, op. cit., p. 87.
This degree of cohesion\(^1\) gives the vital sense of security and belonging which reassures the new urban migrant in particular.\(^2\)

The development of internationalism caused the fanatical Afrikaner to try to perpetuate both the division in the White South African group, and the more obvious divisions between Black and White,\(^3\) in the interests of Afrikaner cohesion and exclusiveness.

The tone of Afrikaner nationalism has altered radically since the thirties. As late as 1925, some Afrikaners were ashamed of their language,\(^4\) and the nationalist movement was largely defensive, endeavouring to maintain and popularize group unity. The corresponding development of the National Party has seen various moods, from the intransigence of du Toit and Kruger, through co-operation with the British under Botha and Smuts, to the hiving of the "purified" party of Malan. The present composition of the Party is largely a homogeneous group which is almost completely synonymous with Afrikanerdom. The 1948 Election returned the Nationalists to power in full control of their own political destiny, and by changes of political mood and direct manoeuvres\(^5\) the Party has entrenched itself with increasing power.\(^6\)

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4. Vatcher, op. cit., p. 76.

5. E.g. The removal of Coloureds from the voting roll. Ibid., p. 141.

Partly to enforce a strengthening of the two major European groups in the population, and partly because of the traditional rivalry with Britain, the Nationalists increased their demands for a republic and, by 1960, the time was considered opportune: "the final victory in the long struggle for supremacy". Thus a defensive movement, born as a response to British policy had become an exclusive nationalism, intent on maintaining its adherents' supremacy over a far larger majority of the population, which, although politically impotent, showed similar signs of awareness of group-consciousness as those present in the early days of Afrikaner Nationalism.

To recapitulate then, Afrikanerdom's exclusive nationalism is based on a unique language, common race, culture and religion, a sense of grievance for humiliations inflicted by Britain, and at least informally upon white superiority. It uses as one of its most powerful methods of consolidating the group a doctrinaire system of education, based largely on the importance of the Mother-tongue. It is an exclusive nationalism which has identified itself as the "true spirit of South Africa" and in its most militant form tolerates non-Afrikaner Whites for political expediency only.

1. Vatcher, op. cit., p. 174. N.B. many Afrikaners believed that India, Pakistan and Ghana had achieved believable constitutional autochthony and sovereignty before South Africa.

2. Deutsch, op. cit., p. 159.
It has tightened the cohesion of the group firstly by exploiting the fear of the British and more recently by the threat of Bantu domination, and its basic mythology is centred around a small group overcoming great odds - the chosen people. Its religion, politics and culture are inextricably entwined\(^1\), to give a fanaticism to its self-righteousness and an authoritarian nature to its government which is, in effect, responsible only to God.

CHAPTER TWO

ENGLISH - SPEAKING SOUTH AFRICANS
True sons of Africa are we,
Though bastardized with culture,
Indigenous, and wild and free
As wolf as pioneer and vulture -
Yea, though for us the vision bleary
No membrane nictitates the light,
Though we are cursed with sense and hearing
And doubly cursed with second sight.

Still doomed that skyward screech to hear
That haunted us in youth,
We shall grow terrible through fear,
We shall grow venomous with truth,
And through these plains where thought meanders
Through sheepish brains in wormy life,
Our lives shall roll like fierce Scamanders
Their red alluvium of strife.

Roy Campbell.

Stanzas 9 and 10 from "Poets in Africa".
O'Donnell, Margaret J.,
The English-speaking group in South Africa comprises 1.4 million of the European population, who live predominantly in Natal, Cape Town, the Eastern Cape and Witwatersrand. The group still shows certain attributes which distinguish it from Afrikanerdom and some of these attributes are the direct result of heavy migration from nineteenth century Britain — already highly urbanized. Thus the English-speaking group is much more highly urbanized than the Afrikaners.¹ Class differences between the two groups are still apparent. The English still enjoy a higher socio-economic status, despite the growth of the number of Afrikaners entering the professions.²

The English-speaking group are also aware of the advantages of a world language, and a certain proportion in the group still tend to regard Afrikaans as inferior, although 70% of the European population is more or less bi-lingual.³

Although there has been a tendency for both groups to cooperate during crises (for example, the Second World War) both display different political behaviour. Lack[ing] the militant, articulated objectives of Afrikanerdom, the English-speaking South Africans project no clear image.⁴

1. About 82% of the European farmers are Afrikaans-speaking. Marquard op. cit. p. 70.
2. Only 30% of the country's professional personnel are Afrikaners. Vanden Berghé, (Çaneville) p. 105.
They have been content to build the national economy and to divert their enthusiasms and energies into the achievements of material comforts and financial success. The greater proportion of English-speaking South Africans are of British origin and, although they regard South Africa as their homeland, they have, nonetheless, not felt the same degree of isolation as the Afrikaner, and have therefore not developed the same defensive cohesiveness. For the most part they have been town-dwellers, active in commerce and industry, the skilled trades and the professions. They control most of the wealth in South Africa, and have been responsible, not only for the growth of industrialization, but also for much of the cultural and educational progress of the country.

By 1960, despite aggressive forays by the Afrikaners into big business, the English-speaking group still controlled 90% of the invested capital and 99% of the mining capital in the country.

Virtual monopolization of economic power has not brought proportionate political power to the group. Political activity was at its height in the period 1910-1933, when the English-speaking group were engaged in party and trade union affairs, sometimes in alliance with Afrikaners, but more often in direct competition with them.

1. A large and influential body of Jews is active in the South African business world and are linguistically assimilated with the English-speaking group.
3. Ibid., p. 73.
5. In 1962, only 36 of the 160 Members of Parliament were English-speaking.
The competitive spirit waned with the coalition of the South African Party and the Nationalist Party, when Afrikaner leaders only, seemed to gain prominence. Since 1931, the United Party has represented the older line English-Afrikaner compromise, and, until the declaration of the Republic, favoured co-operation with Great Britain and the Commonwealth. It has traditionally retained the majority of English-speaking votes although, in recent years, many of the English upper class and many Jews have turned to the Progressive Party. The chief feature of the United Party is its great diversity. Its membership exhibits a wide range of attitudes to the dominant question in South African politics - race relations. This makes the statement of a coherent policy on race relations a virtual impossibility - yet the United Party remains the only theoretical alternative to the Nationalists in Parliament.

The heavy weighting against the urban votes (predominantly United Party), and the consequent need to woo the rural vote, has forced the United Party to adopt an ultra-conservative race policy.

3. It has however, become the underlying assumption of the South African political system that the parliamentary opposition, whatever else its function, does not provide an opposition. "The South African Party System", Stanley Trapido, Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies, July 1966, p. 83.
Its party platform tends to exhibit a certain ambivalence - on the one hand, the necessity for opposing the Nationalists and, on the other, the need to be cautious in racial matters in the effort to retain and enlarge its European following. This dichotomy renders the United Party a poor and incohesive shadow of the Nationalist Party, with no comparable ability to awaken ideological fervour.

Since the 1948 elections, and the subsequent political emphasis on colour, the English-speaking group as a whole has been roused from political passivity on two significant occasions. The most notable was at the proposed legislation to remove the Cape Coloureds from the common roll of voters. This caused the dramatic inception of the Torch Commando, professing (for a time) complete sympathy with the Coloureds, and aiding the United Party in a protest election. The Torch Commando had the specific objective of forcing the Nationalist Party from office and the more general aim of bringing together the two European groups. It flourished briefly, but was never liberal in the same sense that the present South African Liberal Party understands the term.
Its main significance lies in its reflection of the inadequacy of the party system to provide constitutional channels of protest in South Africa. ¹

The second occasion in which the English-speaking South African group acted with decisive cohesion was in the period immediately preceding the referendum for a Republic. The bare majority in favour of the Republic (52%) is a token of the effectiveness of the group's support.

It is on the vexed question of apartheid that the English-speaking group remains irrevocably divided. The more liberal and more radical members tend to give political allegiance to the Progressives or to the Liberal Party. The Progressive Party enjoys Oppenheimer's support and is pledged to "the maintenance and extension of the values of Western civilization, the protection of fundamental human rights and the safeguarding of the dignity and worth of the human person, irrespective of race, colour or creed".² Its racial policy is more liberal than that of the United Party, but it is not liberal enough to command the support of the non-European groups. The Party is seen as too liberal by the majority of Whites and as too conservative by the non-Whites. Nevertheless, it has attracted many intellectuals to its ranks, for it gives an alternative to the largely identical policies of the Nationalists and the United Party.

2. Legum, op. cit., p. 106.
The Liberal Party supports universal franchise and therefore receives qualified support from non-European groups and in 1961 received 0.31% electoral support from European South Africa. It is comprised of a small group of crusaders who refuse to moderate their demands and objectives to create a wider electoral appeal.

Other socio-political bodies for anti-government action in South Africa are the Education League, the Congress of Democrats, the Institute of Race Relations and the Black Sash Organization. Perhaps their greatest contribution lies in the international publicity they receive in the role as the conscience of European South Africa.

Perhaps the most effective champions of liberalism in White South Africa are the non-political bodies - the English-speaking universities, the Churches and the Press. These have been the innovators of campaigns against the restrictive legislation of apartheid. The English-speaking universities, mindful of academic freedom, have consistently opposed discriminatory legislation and they have a history of greater liberalism in attitudes to non-European students. Similarly, the English-speaking churches have been more liberal than the D.R.C., in relation to non-Europeans, having far less segregation by colour and no theological justification for that which does occur. Church leaders such as Bishop Reeves and Monsignor Denis Hurley have been pioneers in radical opposition, but without, one suspects, the wholehearted support of their respective congregations.

1. Communist-dominated.
2. Legum, op. cit., p. 100
3. Carter, op. cit., p. 337
4. Now in exile.
5. Sometime President of the South African Institute of Race
The English-speaking press dominates the daily paper circulation in South Africa. Of the 22 daily newspapers, 17 are English-language, and support either the United Party or the Progressives. Despite the constant threat of Government censorship, they remain relatively outspoken and critical of Nationalist policies. Ownership of the English-language press is dominated by two major industrial combines, and despite editorial insistence on independence the papers sometimes reflect the equivocal relationship between big business and the Government in South Africa.

This relationship is an important one. South Africa shows a sharp distinction between capital - largely held by the English-speaking group - and political power, in the hands of the Afrikaner. The ineffectiveness of political protest against apartheid has led the business leaders to concentrate more and more on the economic ramifications.

1. Afrikaners are very touchy on this point: See South Africa House of Assembly Debates, Vol. 105, Col. 8280, 20/5/60 (Dr. De Wet) "That is the tragedy in South Africa that particularly the English Press - as well as certain Afrikaans periodicals - are controlled by a number of financiers who dictate what should happen in South Africa."

The hostility of the English speaking press was noted in Parliament by Hertzog as early as 1915, - See South Africa House of Assembly Debates, Vol. 1915, Col. 170. This has remained a constant theme of the Nationalists.

2. Spottiswoode, op. cit., p. 74.
Dr. Coetzee asserts that the English-language press keeps alive the caricature of the Afrikaner bogey.
It has become the fashion for big business to make accommodation with the Government on matters which do not directly threaten their economic progress. The main concern of the business leaders is to maintain the status quo, or to initiate gradual changes which will not create revolutionary upheavals. As militant African politics threaten to be disruptive, the business leaders give qualified support or, at least, passive resistance, to Government policy, rationalizing their inaction by the belief that apartheid will be rendered unworkable by the economic integration of the country.\(^1\)

English-speaking opposition to apartheid is not based so much upon moral grounds as on the methods of implementing the policies. The English-speaking group fears that the utter inflexibility of the Nationalists might precipitate a revolution and that a few minor concessions would prolong White domination for the foreseeable future.\(^2\) The characteristic attitude of the English-speaking South African is not liberal on racial matters - the majority uphold the segregationalist philosophy, but prefer a degree of flexibility and a more pragmatic approach than that of the Afrikaners.\(^3\)

1. Legum, op. cit., p. 111.
Most business men do not oppose apartheid because they are liberals, but rather because they consider it to be impractical, costly, harmful to their own economic interests, and politically dangerous.\(^1\) The United Party has supported the Government on many issues\(^2\), including dictatorial legislation that vastly extended the power of the Nationalists. The formation of the South Africa Foundation\(^3\) to publicize South Africa abroad, in an attempt to mitigate the effects of a largely unfavourable world press, indicates that a significant proportion of English-speaking businessmen have agreed to a *modus vivendi* with the Nationalist Government\(^4\).

The traditional respect for parliamentary legalism has militated against the desire to resort to extra-constitutional tactics against the Government, because it is clear that the English-speaking group could bring effective pressure to bear against the Government, through economic action, if it so desired. It seems obvious that the English-speaking group prefers to maintain the *status quo* for the time being\(^5\) and is willing to pay the price of increasing dictatorship for a relatively free hand in economic development.

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2. Ibid., p. 105.
4. Van den Berghe, (Caneville) op. cit., p. 69.
5. There is a growing body of evidence to support the claim that English-speaking financiers are aware of the tremendous wastage under the system of migratory labour and that this will eventually dissipate their unreserved, if passive, support of the *status quo*. c.f. Hunter, op. cit. p. 136.
The Government, on the other hand, in return for self-imposed political impotence in the English-speaking group, promises to interfere as little as possible with business, and not to use the wide dictatorial powers at its disposal to muzzle the press and to ban the (ineffectual) political opposition.

The Afrikaners have traditionally looked upon the English-speaking group as un-South African and as possessing a dual patriotism. The Afrikaners have long accused the English-speaking group of a spurious sense of superiority and this has persisted throughout the history of the Union. Yet it must be remembered, when considering the English-speaking group, that it is not a cohesive, fully united group in anything but the linguistic sense. Even radical opposition to apartheid is not restricted to the English-speaking group. It is certainly not completely antipathetic towards Afrikanerdom, as in many cases attitudes and values are shared simply because of Whiteness. Hence, racial attitudes and policies tend to be similar for all practical purposes. There has also been a large degree of Afrikanerization of the English and Anglicization of the Afrikaners and there certainly seems to be much validity in recent the/Afrikaner claim to have cemented the two White groups.

The development of South Africa since withdrawal seems to verify the traditional contention of the Afrikaners, that unity would be possible only when the ties with the monarchy were cut. Perhaps the one dominant characteristic of the English-speaking group (besides its economic domination) is that its more radical members see themselves, and indeed are seen by the outside world, as the conscience of European South Africa. The effectiveness of radical protest is, of course, marginal in a country whose whole social, political and economic pattern is geared to either discrimination or segregation, and it seems probable that, in the event of a future crisis, both European groups will laager together to meet the "black peril", and English-speaking South Africans will indeed have much more in common with the Afrikaners than with the British¹.

¹ This phenomenon has appeared in an extreme form among White Rhodesians in the face of any suggestion of military interference by Britain.
CHAPTER THREE

SOUTH AFRICA - BRITAIN:

(I) COLLISION COURSE

(II) COLLISION POINT: 1960
South Africa's relations with Britain were largely coloured by the incompatibility of the Afrikaner - English-speaking groups, and this caused the Afrikaners to transfer internal antagonisms to the sphere of Commonwealth relations and vice-versa.

The possible collision courses between Britain and South Africa were many. The hyper-sensitivity of the Afrikaner to interference, real or imagined, ensured the continuation of the conflict for the duration of South Africa's monarchical status. Perhaps the most specific causes for contention lay in the existence of the High Commission Territories, in the constitutional complications of the "entrenched clauses" particularly in respect of the Cape Coloured franchise and in the persistent republican movement. As the first two issues have been dealt with elsewhere in considerable detail, this chapter is primarily concerned with republicanism, which in some measure permeates the whole ambit of British-South Africa relations. It certainly prohibited the Afrikaners from attaining complete objectivity in the appraisal of political situations and most definitely was an obvious and omnipresent factor in the making of the decision to withdraw.

1. For details of the Cape Coloured community, see Appendix A. p. 195
Not merely concerned with the abolition of constitutional ties, the republicans were even more obsessed with the psychological considerations which could not be permanently exorcized by any means other than secession.

The history of the republican movement in the Union of South Africa falls naturally into two significant periods - (i) 1911-48 and (ii) 1948-61, the former period reflecting the success of the more moderate Afrikaner groups and the latter encompassing the period of political paramountcy of the more extreme Afrikaners. The periods are divided by the 1948 General Election which returned a Nationalist Government for the first time and on the basis of a "Black Peril" election at a time when the Commonwealth was about to undergo a complete transformation. Rather than reflecting the pressures and tensions of the Afrikaner-English-speaking antipathy, the history of republicanism is more accurately the story of the various and changing fortunes of the factions of Afrikanerdom. These factions may be imperfectly described as (i) the "imperialists"; (ii) the moderates; and (iii) the extremist republicans. The triumph of the last group is the measure of the success of an extreme nationalism which was not only concerned with the constitutional limitations of sovereignty but with any symbol or implication of external domination. For the die-hard Afrikaner the chief threat to sovereignty, at any stage since Union, was the imperial connection.

1. Other issues were important. The mood engendered by the Great Trek centenary celebrations, although temporarily obscured by the Second World War, reached new intensity after the war ended.
The legacy of the Boer War was deliberately kept alive and, from time to time, re-vitalized to consolidate the republican movement.

Afrikaner nationalists, like most nationalists emerging from colonial status, concerned themselves with the trappings of sovereignty - flag, anthem, language and the attainment of completely unfettered autonomy. These preoccupations led to discussions on the desirability of a republican constitution and Afrikaner writings proliferate with claims that the only true sovereignty for South Africa lay in the abolition of all ties with the monarchy. Nevertheless, the proponents of this creed were for many years over-shadowed by more moderate leaders who succeeded in attracting the support of the majority of the population until the success of the Nationalists at the 1948 election.

The early period in the development of republicanism is characterized by ambivalence, as more moderate Afrikaners such as Botha and Smuts were determined to fuse the two White races into a great South Africa. Hertzog, too, not as extreme as Malan, Strijdom and Verwoerd, was able to come to terms, at least temporarily, with the constitutional changes in the Commonwealth. The whole of this period in the development of republicanism is characterized by the strong personalities and differing views of the acknowledged leaders of Afrikanerdom whose personal attitudes to, and evaluations of the formulation of imperial and Commonwealth policies caused some marked nuances.
and variations in the exposition of the republican ideal. The whole issue, throughout the history of the Union, bears the tremendously acrimonious emotionalism of a civil war, with various factions simultaneously claiming to represent Afrikanerdom.

Botha, in his opening address to the Boer Congress held in Pretoria in May, 1902, prayed "That it may please the Almighty Father to inspire all the Whites of South Africa with like-mindedness, that hence one nation may be born." \(^1\) "That one nation may be born" became the plea of the successive leaders of Afrikanerdom - "imperialists" and their bitterest opponents. For the first period (1911-48) this ensured that the more negative aspects of Commonwealth membership would be significant, and that Commonwealth relations would be dominated by considerations of autonomy and autochthony.\(^2\)

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There can be little doubt that Botha's moderation, and Smuts's eventual "conversion" by Campbell - Bannerman's gesture in granting self-government to the Transvaal and the Orange River Colony\(^1\) led many other Boers to look favourably at the imperial connection in the first decade after Union. Nonetheless, the forces of militancy, although outnumbered, remained vocal and increasingly effective. Botha himself believed that the key to South Africa's development as a nation lay in the ability to forget the grievances of the past\(^2\) while continuing to strive for sovereign independence within the Commonwealth.\(^3\) From 1911 onwards he repeatedly praised the imperial connection\(^4\) which drew him much support from the English-speaking South Africans,

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1. *Round Table*, No. 41 (1950-51) p. 17. "It was Campbell-Bannerman perhaps more than any other British statesman who enabled General Smuts to know and appreciate British character, and to admire and value British democracy." See also, Millen S.G., *General Smuts*, Faber & Faber, London, 1936, (vol.2) p.211.


5. N.B. the Boers' outraged reaction to the report that Botha, while attending the Conference (1911) had been a guest of His Majesty the King in full court dress, including silk stockings. These became a symbol of national treason. c.f. Brady Alexander, *Democracy and the Dominions*, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1947, p. 349.
but at the same time alienated many Afrikaners whose bitterness concerning the Boer War had not yet had time to dissipate. His concept of "nation" was never marked by Afrikaner exclusiveness, but was wide enough to embrace both peoples, emphasizing those common factors shared by both groups\(^1\). Unhappily for South Africa, his generosity was not shared by many of his own people who could not agree with his contention that membership of the Empire carried no taint of British domination.

The Treaty of Versailles and Botha's death in the same year (1919) each had a marked effect on the development of Afrikaner republicanism. Smuts, Botha's successor, with a Weltanschauung based on the philosophy of Holism, went even further than Botha in praising the Empire. He envisaged the Empire as the greatest community of nations and states that had ever existed\(^2\), the most successful experiment in international co-operation\(^3\), held together by an hereditary kingship\(^4\).

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1. Hancock, (Smuts), op. cit., p. 355.


3. In 1919, the Empire seems to have been significant to Smuts, not as an imperial federalism but eventually a world government but more a world legal and moral order. c.f. O.D. Schreiner's view in Coming of Age E.H. Brookes & Co., Cape Town 1930 pp 87-98.

His admiration for, and participation in the Commonwealth, earned him the scorn of avid nationalists who dubbed him "the handyman of the Empire"\(^1\) and accused him of national abandonment\(^2\). The greater his popularity (particularly as a member of the War Cabinet) the more bitterly was he resented. Yet it is inaccurate to assume, as did his Nationalist opponents, that Smuts sought to immerse his South African nationality in the greater depths of an imperial unity\(^3\). In his opinion, Commonwealth membership enhanced South Africa's stature in international affairs. As proof of this, Smuts drew attention to the new status of the Dominions achieved at the Versailles Conference\(^4\). His view was not shared by the republicans. Tielman Roos, for example, denied that South Africa's status had been changed by the War - she was simply "an entity of the British Empire"\(^5\). His opinion was endorsed by Malan, who wanted to know if the Dominions had the right to separate from England, as she apparently had the


\(^2\) Millen, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 46.

\(^3\) Ibid., p. 44. Hancock, (Smuts) op. cit., p. 351.

\(^4\) It is interesting to note the opposed objectives of Smuts and Hertzog at the Conference, Hancock Keith, Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs, Oxford University Press, London, 1937, (vol. I) p. 70.

right to divest herself of her colonies. Hertzog, too, was unimpressed, declaring the Afrikaner people more interested in freedom than in status in the imperial context.

Hertzog himself had found conciliation too difficult a policy to follow and, as a compromise, had developed his "two-stream" policy, maintaining equal rights for the separate development of the cultures of the two White races. The imperial connection was to him desirable only insofar as it served South Africa's interests. Throughout the duration of the War, his National Party continued (with marked success) a campaign of opposition to Botha's policies, featuring the demand for a republic as the only possible means of achieving national independence. The two mutually hostile forces continued to divide Afrikanerdom - the division being

1. Ibid., p. 117.
2. Ibid., p. 117.
3. Hancock, (Smuts) op. cit., p. 361.
5. Dawson, op. cit., p. 146
accentuated by the persistent "home complex"\(^1\) of the English-speaking group - which incited nationalist accusations that the British were participating in unwarranted interference in the domestic affairs of the Union.\(^2\)

Hertzog's demands for a written statement of South Africa's constitutional status in the Empire\(^3\) received substantial satisfaction in the Report of the Inter-Imperial Relations Committee of 1926\(^4\), and for a time, he, and many other republicans, were subdued in their opposition to the imperial connection and tended to concentrate their energies on the many domestic problems of the Union.\(^5\) The moderating effect of the Balfour Declaration enabled Dr. Malan to supersede Hertzog as the arch-enemy of the Empire, and as Hertzog's 'reviving

1. The attitude of superiority of the average English-speaking South African towards the other official language, undoubtedly made many converts to the Nationalists in the years that followed Union. See an interesting article in *Round Table*, Vol. 19, (1928-29) "Afrikander Culture and Politics", pp 125ff.


3. He was particularly concerned that the international community recognise the sovereign independence of the individual dominions. *c.f. S.A. House of Assembly Debates* Vol. 7, Coll. 4296-8 (May 28th 1926).


fears for Union Sovereignty continued to be subjugated by the interests of Fusion, Malan became the chief spokesman for those who saw the destiny of the nation outside the Commonwealth.

Malan's tactics were based on the need to persuade Afrikanerdom that Hertzog had deserted the Nationalist cause, and in this course he had the support of the intellectual and cultural leaders of Afrikanerdom and the core of Afrikaans Calvinism. Malan's policy was not merely a variation of Hertzog's "South Africa First". It was more openly hostile, for he believed that independence and sovereignty were incompatible with Commonwealth membership. His republicanism tended to be exclusivist racially, secessionist as far as the Commonwealth was concerned and isolationist in foreign policy.

At first glance, the Balfour Declaration and the subsequent Statute of Westminster robbed the republicans of their raison d'être. They had been concerned with full equality for South Africa, but almost immediately raised other questions

2. Mansergh (Survey Vol. 1) op. cit., p. 226.
specifically concerned with amendments to the Constitution.\footnote{1}{For a summary of the diametrically opposed interpretations of the Statute by Hertzog and Smuts. See Mansergh, (Survey Vol. I) op. cit. p. 224. For a description of the ambiguity of the impact of the Statute upon South Africa, see Marshall, op. cit., p. 144ff.}

The Statute led to the Status of the Union Act\footnote{2}{No. 69 of 1934. Mansergh (Docs. Vol I) op. cit. pp. 4-6.} and the Royal Executive Functions and Seals Act,\footnote{3}{Mansergh (Docs. Vol. I) op. cit., pp. 9ff.} the former ensuring that the King must act on the advice of His Ministers for State for the Union, and the latter formally placing the conduct of foreign affairs under the complete control of the Union Government.\footnote{4}{Mansergh, (Survey, Vol I) op. cit., pp. 23-25.}

The Nationalists' preoccupation with the legal aspects and implications of Commonwealth membership (at least until 1953) forced successive parliaments to concentrate on four major aspects of membership:

(i) the right of secession;
(ii) neutrality;
(iii) the divisibility of the Crown;
(iv) republicanism.
This concentration tended to obscure the positive benefits of membership such as consultation, economic concessions and defence co-operation. It was also instrumental in creating the obvious tension in parliamentary debates concerning the symbols of nationhood - flag, anthem and the right to declare war. Republicanism was upheld as the only complete means of resolving any doubts about sovereignty.

The first flag debate may be taken as a clear example of the intensity of emotion involved in the republican issue. Malan asserted that "in settling the flag question, we settle the race question, we facilitate the settling of all other problems and questions in South Africa". In other words, the imperial connection was the divisive factor in White South Africa. "The Union Jack", declared Malan, "reminds us of the past and it reminds of the past in such a way that whether it is right, or whether it is wrong, it is in any case

1. See for example, Dr. Malan's introduction to the Second Reading of the Nationality and Flag Act (1926) South African House of Assembly Debates Vol. 7, Col. 4031 "that the absence of a South African national flag, one common South African national flag, and the presence of two or more other flags, which practically have the practical effect of dividing the people - that that position darkens and confuses every other issue in the country." (25/5/26)

a fact, that to a large section of the population, it will stand for domination and conquest and defeat ... If we eliminate the Union Jack then we shall eliminate something that would remind us that we are not a free country."

A similar bitterness was shown in the controversy which followed the first official playing of "Die Stem" in public. Hertzog stated quite categorically, that "God Save the King" had never been the national anthem of South Africa. It was simply "an invocation to the Almighty" to be played "on appropriate occasions" and that regardless of its legal status, "Die Stem" would be supplementary to it. Thus the dual acceptance of a dual symbolism for state occasions in South Africa, although so often a compromise, did succeed in highlighting the Nationalists' claims that South Africa

1. Ibid., p. 129. In the same speech, Malan continued: "So far as we are unwilling to adopt an altogether new design we have already made a concession, but further, if it is so, as we represent, that we are the party standing for secession; that we do not wish to recognise in any way that we belong to the British Commonwealth then by adopting a clause in this Bill, in which we specifically make mention of the relationship between South Africa and the British Commonwealth of Nations, in agreeing to display on certain occasions the flag of the Empire, is that not a concession that is worth something to our English-speaking South African friends?" pp. 130-131.


would ever be a divided nation while the trappings of monarchy remained important to one section of the White community.

Republicanism received a tremendous boost from the celebrations of the Great Trek anniversary in 1938. The fervour, and indeed fanaticism engendered by the celebrations boded ill for the continuance of the Commonwealth connection. In the following year, the long debate which preceded the announcement of South Africa's entry into the Second World War, dispelled any semblance of restraint which may have been operating under Fusion, and once more the country was at war with itself along racial lines.

For a time dissension within the ranks of Afrikanerdom kept Smuts relatively secure in Parliament, but for the duration of the War he faced overt hostility from those Afrikaners who, as well as being traditionally anti-British were, in many cases, pro-German\(^2\) and were quite convinced that Germany would win the War.

The basic causes for dissension among the Opposition were concerned with the type of republicanism to be attained and the tactics which were to be employed to expedite the creation of the republic. Throughout the War the Opposition stressed

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1. Mansergh (Survey Vol I) op. cit. p. 385.

2. N.B. the proliferation of Nazi-type organizations in South Africa during the 'thirties - the Ossewabrandwag, the New Order etc. (1939)
the claim that South Africa's participation was due to the imperial connection (as in the First World War) and that sovereignty in this case was just a sham.

In July, 1940, Hertzog, in an open letter\(^1\), called upon Smuts to abandon the struggle, and Dr. Malan demanded a Republic of South Africa as the only means of dissociating South Africa from the certain ignominious fate of the Empire\(^2\).

In Malan's Republic, the English-speaking South Africans would either be absorbed, or enjoy some ill-defined but inferior status\(^3\). He declared: "Afrikanerdom is now unanimous on the breaking of the British connection and the establishment of a republic."\(^4\) The Draft Constitution\(^5\) for the Republic\(^6\) (published in Die Burger) caused many more moderate Afrikaners

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1. Kruger (The Generals) op. cit., p. 196.
2. Paton (Hofmeyr) op. cit., p. 338.
3. Paton, op. cit., p. 79.
6. This was subsequently repudiated by Malan and by Verwoerd as a viable basis for the establishment of the Republic of South Africa. South African House of Assembly Debates, Vol. 98, col. 4150 (18/9/1958).
to give temporary support\textsuperscript{1} to the United Party, enabling Smuts to give unstinted aid for the Commonwealth War effort.\textsuperscript{2}

At the close of World War II, Smuts was in much the same kind of situation in his domestic politics as he had been in 1919, his grand view of world order once again contrasting with the "little South Africa" policies of the Opposition. While he believed that the Commonwealth had been "the sole refuge of the world in mortal peril", the Nationalists claimed that membership of the Commonwealth had involved South Africa in a war of Britain's making. Twenty-five years after Hertzog's visit to the Treaty of Versailles Conference in the attempt to gain a republic, the Nationalists were more vocal, and even more disenchanted with "imperialism"\textsuperscript{3}; increasing support was being derived from the consolidating cultural and political institutions of Afrikanerdom.

1. In the 1943 Election, 650,000 voted for Smuts and 350,000 against him. This Election entirely eliminated the New Order, Afrikaner Party and some Independent candidates sponsored by the O.B.


3. When a Royal Visit was first proposed in 1946, General Kemp typified the Afrikaner reaction: "The position of the Afrikaner and the republican is clear. Those of us who took part in the South African War, or whose forebears took part, and who have since striven and are still striving for a Republic in South Africa, and other pro-republicans, cannot take part in a festivity which will strengthen monarchy in this Union." Smuts, op. cit., (Smuts) p. 501. It might also be noted that the monarchy had no sure hold on all English-speaking South Africans.
In the campaign preceding the 1948 Election, Dr. Malan toned down his republican propaganda and laid the main emphasis of the campaign on the "Black Peril". For the first time in the history of the Union, the new Government was comprised entirely of Afrikaner ministers. The Election had at last made the Afrikaners "masters of their own house" and the republic would be established "when the time was ripe". The question was no longer if but when the republic would be established. From the constitutional triumph of the Afrikaners, the debates about the desirability of a republic gave way to the considerations of the technical means of how the Republic was to be brought about.

1. Paton, op. cit., p. 493, quoting Hofmeyr: "The determining factor in this Election has undoubtedly been the appeal to colour prejudice. That it should have succeeded as it has done, puts us in a very bad light in the eyes of the world."

2. Ibid., p. 80; p. 492.

3. Vatcher, op. cit., p. 138, quotes Malan: "South Africa belongs to us once more."

4. Smuts alluded to Malan's Government: "this blight ... this Broederbond Government. Smuts (Smuts) op. cit. p. 521."
The second period in the development of republicanism in South Africa (1948-61) coincides with the development of the new Commonwealth, initiated by the membership of Coloured nations on the basis of equality with the White members. Until 1948, the questions of republicanism and secession were inseparable for the Afrikaners but the Commonwealth was about to undergo perhaps the greatest feat of adaptation to date. The old Afrikaner concepts used in anti-Commonwealth propaganda were to be seriously threatened by Indian membership in the Commonwealth. Unenamoured of any change in the notion of a "White Commonwealth" and almost completely disenchanted by India's vendetta in the U.N., the South African Government nonetheless anticipated some advantage to be gained in the separation of republicanism and secession. It was hoped that the appeal of a republic could be widened and that the retention of Commonwealth membership would be beneficial for South Africa, already deeply concerned about Communism on the continent.

Although it may be reasoned that Malan's support for India (in a lengthy and somewhat revolutionary speech) was based not so much on faith in a multi-racial Commonwealth,
but more upon a desire to keep India out of the Communist camp, his speech does highlight the fact that the Afrikaner could now see that the old acceptance of the common allegiance to the Crown as an **obligation** of membership had lost its validity.\(^1\) In a negative sense, General Smuts, in his anxiety that India should not be regarded as a precedent\(^2\) in the future development of the Commonwealth, acknowledged the distinction between republicanism and secession and advised his colleagues in Parliament to treat India as a case apart, not as an example to follow\(^3\).

Despite the fact that the distinction between republicanism and secession was acknowledged by the Afrikaners, they now began to look upon the achievement of Constitutions by Ireland, India and Pakistan, through their own respective Parliaments, as a direct contrast to South Africa (and the other White dominions) who, although enjoying autonomy for a far longer time, nonetheless owed their Constitutions to the **Imperial Parliament**\(^4\). (The fact that they were also enacted in Dominion Parliaments, was conveniently ignored or discarded)

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1. *South African House of Assembly Debates* Vol. 68, Col. 5661: (12/5/1949) "... and if no obstacles are placed in the way of the exercising of members' rights to self-determination, if a population, the population of a constituent member decides to become a Republic, the Commonwealth as such, will raise no objection .... as long as that is the case, I have no objection to remain."

2. Vol. 68, Col. 5573 (11/5/1949)

3. Ibid., Col. 5574.

Many Afrikaners believed implicitly that the new Coloured nations had received their complete independence and autochthony before South Africa\(^1\). For this reason they re-affirmed their determination to remove all ties with Britain.

The republican movement gained great impetus in the passing of the South African Citizenship Bill\(^2\) which removed "common citizenship" on the grounds that a common allegiance was no longer an essential condition of Commonwealth membership\(^3\).

Thus Strydom was able to assert with confidence that "the Nationalist Party's policy was to establish a Republic of South Africa, separated from the British Empire and the British Crown. That is the position, the question is only how and when"\(^4\). Many Nationalist spokesmen reiterated the theme that a republican South Africa would resolve the internal racial conflict which would never be resolved "while the body politic in South Africa is identified with its original form of Government"\(^5\).

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1. Mansergh (Survey Vol. II) p. 389. See also Cowen, op. cit., p. 21 on the varying significance of the written statement of independence.

2. No. 44 of 1949 Kruger (Parties) op. cit. pp 200 ff.


5. Ibid., coll. 5609ff.
The Citizenship Act was followed closely by the Removal of Appeals to the Privy Council\(^1\) and the Royal Style and Titles Bill which reflected Malan's unswerving desire for a republic. South Africa deliberately omitted "by the grace of God" and "Queen of the United Kingdom" in the specific attempt to stamp the Nationalist concept of the divisibility of the Crown on the Royal Title itself\(^2\). Malan's own attitude to the Crown is seen in one of his speeches in the House:

"That means that we in South Africa have nothing to do with the actions or decisions of the Queen advised by Her Ministers in any other part of the Commonwealth. The Crown was not only divisible, but has now been divided, and the constitutional significance of that, is this, that the kingship as far as South Africa is concerned, has now come exclusively under the control of South Africa herself."\(^3\)

The most obvious ties with Britain having been severed, from 1953 onwards, a slightly changed emphasis is discernible.

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in the parliamentary allusions to republicanism, as events outside South Africa show her vulnerability in an increasingly hostile world. The republic becomes desirable not only as the means of welding the two White races in South Africa, but more definitely as the means for ensuring White survival. Five recurring themes are dealt with intermittently in the Debates from 1953 onward:

(i) that South Africa may, as a Republic stay inside the Commonwealth\(^1\);

(ii) that at the moment, Commonwealth membership allowed South Africa a greater freedom than she would enjoy in isolation\(^2\);

(iii) that a Republic would essentially unite South Africa\(^3\);

(iv) that the establishment of a Republic would, by cutting the remaining ties, practical or psychological, strengthen the White community's claims to be a permanent group in South Africa with no alternative home\(^4\);

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1. Ibid. Vol. 82, Col. 60; Vol. 84, Col. 47, (2/2/54)
2. Ibid. Vol. 84, Col. 47, (2/2/54)
3. Ibid. Vol. 85, Col. 3651, (8/4/54)
4. Ibid. Vol. 100, Col. 2901 (20/3/59)
(v) that South Africa, as a republic within the Commonwealth, would retain the right to withdraw as soon as the disadvantages outweighed the benefits of membership.1

As well as the need to respond to the new dangers to South Africa's security on a Black continent, and its connotations with the desirability of a republic, a new alignment of forces is seen. The old dissenting factions of Afrikanerdom have been partly submerged by an increasingly obvious United Party-Nationalist confrontation2 for, by 1953, membership of the politically-conscious sector of Afrikanerdom was becoming synonymous with support of the Nationalist Party. The English-speaking Members of Parliament (i.e. the United Party) persisted in regarding propaganda for a Republic as a "mischievous matter"3.

1. Ibid. Vol. 85, Col. 4518 (4/5/54)
2. Ibid. Vol. 84, Col. 257; "The United Party is the Commonwealth Party just as the Party on the other side is the Republican Party of South Africa." Mr. J. Strauss) 8/2/54.
They were convinced that the Nationalists paid only lip-service to the notion of a Republic within the Commonwealth and that this would be but a transition stage preceding the attainment of the Republic outside the Commonwealth. They demanded definition of the "broad will" of the people—the avowed basis for the establishment of a Republic, regarding the "simple majority" of the Nationalists as a breach of faith.

Mr. DuPlessis, on behalf of the Government, in a speech delivered in the House of Assembly on 23/4/56 considered the six most frequently repeated queries of the United Party:

(i) what is the motive for gaining a Republic?
(ii) how is it to be achieved?
(iii) on what basis?
(iv) what would be its attitude to the outside world?
(v) what would be its relationship with the Commonwealth? and
(vi) when would the Republic be achieved?

He then proceeded to deal systematically with these questions—his answers giving little comfort to the Opposition. The Nationalist Party would obtain unity for South Africa on the basis of equal treatment of English-speaking and Afrikaner groups. It would be a purely democratic Republic, gained by a special mandate from the people. The Republic would favour the

1. Ibid. Vol. 91, Col. 4094 (23/4/56)
2. They favoured a 2/3 majority for the declaration of a Republic. c.f. Vol. 84, Col. 43 (2/2/54).
the maintenance of friendly relations with Africa, Western Europe and U.N.O., if there was no interference with South Africa's domestic policies. The question of Commonwealth relations was "a separate question from that of the Republic" and the Republic would be achieved only when the Government felt confident of a "safe majority".¹

The debates on the second Flag² and Anthem³ bills showed that the Boer War legacy was still uppermost in the minds of some Nationalists, many of whom equated the English-speaking group with a fifth column inside South Africa. Old recriminations against the group's "superiority" were coupled with the inevitable accusations of a dual loyalty⁴.

The Government, obviously not prepared to take a referendum on the Republic until it could be certain of victory, embarked on a policy of removing the last vestiges of symbolic dependence on Britain.

2. Ibid. Vol. 91, Coll. 4198ff. (24/4/56)
4. See for example South African House Assembly Debates Vol. 91, Col. 4213 (24/4/56). "The fact that official Opposition are forever and consistently placing the interests of Britain before the interests of South Africa is the greatest possible cause of the germs of dissension and strife in this country." (Van Den Berg)
The traditional enmity for the Union Jack was again paraded\(^1\) in the Flags Amendment Act (1957), the necessity for which was alluded to by the Prime Minister. He believed there were three major reasons for not delaying the Flags Bill: the "vast majority" of the population wanted one flag; there was a pressing need to expedite co-operation between the two races; and, finally, that "as the flag was the strongest outward symbol of nationhood, national unity must therefore grow under one flag\(^2\)".

The one comfort for the anti-republicans was the Government's denial that the Draft Constitution (1942)\(^3\) for the Republic would form the basis of the impending Constitution. Dr. Verwoerd stressed this strongly: "it will not form the basis of any republican constitution drawn up in the future. More plainly and unequivocally I cannot put it\(^4\)." The Nationalists remained adamant in their insistence that the decision to remain in the Commonwealth would be made immediately.

1. Ibid., Vol. 93, Col. 2075, (Minister for Justice) "We who went through the Anglo-Boer War saw our flag being taken away and the Union Jack hoisted over us." (1/3/57)

2. Ibid., Vol. 93, Col. 487. (1/2/57)


prior to the referendum so "that the best interests of the nation might be served".\textsuperscript{1} The Prime Minister had already adumbrated the possibility that a Labour Government in Britain could well precipitate South Africa's withdrawal from the Commonwealth\textsuperscript{2}, and this was but one of the obvious causes of the hesitancy of the Government to commit itself prematurely to Commonwealth membership. While being uncomfortably aware of the British Government and the Labour Party's increasingly vocal support for a multi-racial Commonwealth, the more positive attraction of secession as the culmination of the Nationalists' fight for independence exerted a strong influence on the Party. One is led to the opinion that the South African Government would have retained membership if a measure of support had been forthcoming from Britain, only so that apartheid (or "separate development") might be more firmly established under the republican constitution.

By 1960 the time was opportune for the establishment of the Republic. The Prime Minister made the appeal for everyone to disregard party allegiances "to co-operate to achieve something which will put an end to the 150 years' struggle between South African nationalism and what is, to some extent, a foreign nationalism"\textsuperscript{3}. He believed that his Government's

1. Ibid. Col. 4161 (18/9/58)
2. Ibid. Vol. 103, Col. 107 (20/1/60)
The developments within the Central African Federation were increasing hostility between the British Labour Party and South Africa.
3. Ibid. Vol. 103, Col. 104 (20/1/60)
traditional "consideration of South Africa's interests" would be sufficient reassurance for those who feared the loss of Commonwealth membership.

On the other side of the House some members were either more aware of, or more concerned with, the mounting Commonwealth hostility to South Africa's racial policies and voiced the doubt that South Africa's choice of a Republic within or outside the Commonwealth would, in fact, have much bearing on the Commonwealth's attitude to South Africa. Mr. Mitchell, while criticizing the Government's tardiness over announcing the decision to remain in the Commonwealth, laid a pertinent charge at the feet of the Government: "May I suggest to the Prime Minister, that when he is not prepared to say when the referendum will be held, it is because he is still hoping that circumstances beyond our borders will provide the right climate, at the right moment for his going to the country on the question of the republic, believing that the natural resistance to interference from outside will swing the whole mass of people in his favour in regard to that particular question."1

1. Ibid. Vol 103, Col. 113. (20/1/60)
Verwoerd's sincerity on the matter of retaining the Commonwealth connection is more than suspect. In the light of the Nationalists' consistent campaign, the most probable attitude to maintaining the Commonwealth connection would be to regard it simply as an interim measure before the attainment of the ideal. The Prime Minister's own affirmation that South Africa was merely following in Ireland's footsteps by way of the Status Act, the Flags Acts, Privy Council and Citizenship Acts, lends weight to the assumption that Ireland's example would be followed to the bitter end. Eight years previously (1952) Die Transvaler had printed the following comment on the theme of following Ireland: "But this we can only do by casting the dead hand of the British from us. How? By establishing a Republic outside the Commonwealth Only then will we be single and pure." Again in a leading article in Die Transvaler (quoted by Steyn) "The Nationalist Party will go forward step by step towards the republican form of government for South Africa, and a republic which, in the meantime, remains a member of the Commonwealth, can be regarded as an interim step towards our ultimate goal."

1. Quoted by Sir De Villiers Graaf. Ibid. Vol. 103, Col. 293.


3. Like the Irish until 1948, the South Africans until 1961 were determined on complete severance from the Commonwealth, partly because of territorial ambitions. (Northern Ireland/the Protectorates).
Verwoerd himself had left no room for doubt about his lack of sentiment for the Commonwealth: "Membership of the Commonwealth when viewed soberly, is not based on any sentimental reason ... on the other hand ... we believe that on sober, commonsense grounds, the Commonwealth is of value to us today."¹

Pro-Commonwealth citizens could not claim to have been misled about the Government's ultimate objective. Yet it is possible that Verwoerd himself may have been sincere in desiring to keep South Africa within the Commonwealth for perhaps a few more years. After all, there was very little need for the Nationalists to be hypocritical on this score; they had progressed gradually to their penultimate aim, so presumably a few more years in the Commonwealth "for South Africa's interests" may well have been the projected course of action. (Always providing that the Commonwealth did not interfere in South Africa's affairs.)

On the other hand, there was ample warning of the inevitability of hostility at the 1961 Conference. Abundant evidence may be found in the various Party Debates of the White Commonwealth, that a day of reckoning was at hand in 1961. It is clear that the 1960 Conference should have

¹. Ibid. Vol. 104, Col. 3777 (21/3/60)
indicated to Verwoerd that if it were expedient for South
Africa to remain a little longer in the Commonwealth, then
the controversial question of the Republic should have been
postponed, as indeed Malan and Strijdom had found it necessary
to do, despite their own personal fanaticism. In many ways
the 1960 Conference seems to have been the moment of decision
for the Nationalists; either they must shelve the issue of a
Republic indefinitely and perhaps remain as a monarchy in the
Commonwealth for a few more years, or else they must go ahead
with the referendum and, in giving the Commonwealth a pretext
to discuss South Africa, risk political isolation and possible
economic retrogression. As the past decade has clearly shown,
emergent nationalism does not always place immediate economic
considerations at the head of a list of priorities.¹ In many
ways, Verwoerd's decision is a reflection of the concept of
independence before all else. The Republic had been the
Utopia of the Nationalists for so long that not even the threat
of ostracism could, at this stage, stop the juggernaut. It is
difficult to make an accurate estimate of the proportions of
emotion and calculation involved in the decision to proceed
with the plans for the Republic after the 1960 Conference.

R.A. Butler: "The financial and economic consequences for
Nyasaland will be serious and substantial. The Nyasaland
Government are fully aware of them and are ready to adopt
policies to minimise them."
One might postulate the theory, with the wisdom of hindsight, that the South Africans had been reassured that their economic connections with the Commonwealth (and this means mostly with Great Britain) would not be disturbed and, as this factor had been the over-riding factor for keeping South Africa in the Commonwealth for many years, it may well have been the determining issue. One must also observe that an assurance of this kind from Britain would have let both sides off the hook as far as the Commonwealth was concerned. Britain had long been embarrassed by South Africa in the Commonwealth and South Africa had long been disenchanted by the Commonwealth. If economic links could be maintained, then withdrawal was obviously the most satisfactory means of appeasing South African Nationalism and assuring Commonwealth cohesion.

1. One must keep in mind the fact that South African national income rose from £693 million in 1946-47 to £2535 million in 1962-63. (For greater details pertinent to this point see Austin D., Britain and South Africa, Oxford University Press, London, 1966, especially chapter 5.)

2. Although South Africa is outside the Commonwealth, Britain is still her chief trading partner - 2/3 of all foreign investment is British, 5% of all British manufactures go to South Africa; £60 million dividends per annum go from South Africa to Britain; London remains the centre of the world's gold market. c.f. Ingram, D., Commonwealth for a Colour-Blind World, Allen and Unwin, London, 1965, p. 197.
The contention that Louw and Verwoerd could have misinterpreted the strength of Commonwealth opposition to South Africa is not well-founded on the evidence available. On the other hand, there is some credibility in the charge that Verwoerd deliberately failed to inform the electorate-at-large about the gravity of the opposition in the Commonwealth. Afro-Asian hostility had long been articulate and was perhaps accepted as the norm in South Africa, but the attitude of the White Dominions hardened perceptibly at the 1960 Conference and in the months which followed it.

1. See for example the letter from Menzies to Verwoerd (2/7/60) "My own anxiety arises from the fact that I do not regard it as quite certain that an application by a Republic of South Africa will be accepted by all Prime Ministers. If one or two of them dissent, the well-established rule of unanimity would put you out. I am afraid in particular of what the attitude may be of Nehru and Nkrumah." Menzies R.G., Afternoon Light, Cassell, Melbourne, 1967, p. 201.

Cope asserts his belief that the referendum would not have been successful had the public been adequately informed of "the critical atmosphere" left by the 1960 Conference. Cope also makes the point that as Malan and Strijdom had been prepared to shelve the issue for less cogent reasons, then Verwoerd could have done so, had he really wanted to remain in the Commonwealth.
A sample of the Parliamentary debates of the respective Dominions, when viewed against the background of the communique, leaves little doubt about the tenor of the Commonwealth as a whole. Canada and New Zealand were categorically opposed to South Africa's racial policies and in both countries there were no significant cleavages on party lines. In Canada, Mr. Pearson saw the policy of "separate development" as being "particularly offensive to the other members of the Commonwealth, especially those in Africa and Asia, who make up 4/5 of the people of the association." Mr. Diefenbaker, reporting after the 1960 Conference, claimed that multi-racialism in the Commonwealth had been accepted in theory by all the Western world, except South Africa; and that the refusal to accept this concept would mean "losing the struggle against Communism by default."

1. See Canada, House of Commons Debates, (Vol. 4 - 1960) p. 3900, Mr. Diefenbaker: (Mr. Louw) "...recognised that of all those present there, no-one in the informal meetings or elsewhere, could give support to racial discrimination in a multi-racial Commonwealth."

2. J.D.B. Miller in Britain and the Old Dominions p. 259, discounts Verwoerd's claim that extreme liberals in Canada were calling the tune. The evidence in the Parliamentary Debates would suggest that their influence, if any, was marginal. See also Mr. Holyoake in New Zealand House of Representatives Debates, Vol. 223, p. 1099, 2/8/60).


4. Ibid., Vol. 4 - 1960, p. 3901.
In the New Zealand House of Commons Mr. Nash spoke for his country: "I would affirm that the legislation in the Union of South Africa, in keeping one section of the people at a lower level than others, is blasphemy. It is a complete denial, I would say, to the established Christian faith."  

Although the South African Government could look with some justification on Mr. Menzies as its lone champion, a closer examination of views of influential Australians other than Menzies reveal a far greater disparity of opinion about South Africa than perhaps was present in any other country of the Commonwealth. The Parliamentary debates which followed the news of Sharpeville show clearly that Menzies's reliance on "no interference in domestic affairs" enjoyed anything but unanimous support in Australia. 

Britain, although not so openly hostile to South Africa, when compared with New Zealand and Canada, had long been committed to the principles encompassed in "the wind of change" speech, which had been simply a reiteration of an old theme in more portentous surroundings. It should have been obvious


2. c.f. Australia, *House of Representatives Debates*, Vol. 26, pp 779ff (Mr. Calwell), pp 789ff (Mr. Whitlam.) 

3. See Appendix D, p.p. 312-17
that, for Britain to save face before the Afro-Asian world, South Africa, if necessary, must appear to be sacrificed on the altar of multi-racialism if she could not conform to the world's pronounced acceptance of multi-racial equality.

The South African Opposition at least was aware of the dangers involved if the referendum proceeded. As Mr. E.G. Malan put it: "I regard this is a plan to force South Africa out of the Commonwealth which is being hidden from the public of South Africa."²

Verwoerd's words after the 1961 Conference ring with great irony when one considers the historical struggle of the Afrikaner for a Republic: "I may say here in parenthesis that the question of a republic or a monarchy was never discussed or regarded as being of any importance. All that happened was that everybody said it had nothing to do with this matter, that we were perfectly free to change our form of government and that was not the basis of any arguments."³


2. For a detailed account of the proceedings of both the 1960 and 1961 Conferences, see Menzies, (Afternoon Light) op. cit., pp 194ff.

For long the controversy dividing White South Africa, the republican issue had no direct relevance for the countries of the Commonwealth. What was important to them - South Africa's racial policy - was, in fact, not nearly such a cause for controversy within South Africa itself. In fact, the fear of submersion by an antipathetic Black majority was the major unifying force in South Africa.

It seems clear that the Commonwealth as a whole could not take full cognizance of the complexity of South Africa's racial problems. They were more concerned with the sense of permanence of White superiority in a world that was moving rapidly in the direction of removing (at least by legislation) racial inequality. Not one of the coloured members of the Commonwealth showed that it accepted the two basic premises of "separate development" - that the White South Africans were entitled to a permanent stake in their country, and that "separate development" was a conscious attempt to develop all sections of the racially-complex community. Apartheid was equated with racial exploitation and therefore it must be destroyed. Even these states not yet within the Commonwealth had shown their hostility towards South Africa, and if we can

1. See for example Commonwealth Survey (1961) Nkrumah: "I am not happy in a way. Even if they had shown any sign of moderating their apartheid system we should have gone along with them." p. 364.
take Nyerere's word\textsuperscript{1} that it would be impossible for Tanganyika to share membership with South Africa, conditions within the Commonwealth of the future could certainly only deteriorate for the South Africans.

Thus a portion of the Conference communique read:

"The Prime Minister of South Africa informed the other Prime Ministers this evening that, in the light of the views expressed on behalf of other member governments and the indications of their future intentions regarding the racial policy of the Union Government, he decided to withdraw his application for South Africa's continuing membership of the Commonwealth as a republic."\textsuperscript{2}

Verwoerd returned to a hero's welcome in South Africa with the opinion "what happened in London was not a defeat but a victory ... something greater than we could have expected has happened ... We have freed ourselves from the Afro-Asian states."\textsuperscript{3}

\begin{enumerate}
\item Mansergh (Docs., Vol. 3) op. cit. p. 365 (1961)
\end{enumerate}
CHAPTER FOUR

BANTU NATIONALISM
If you could see me die
The millions of times I have been born ...
If you could see me weep
The millions of times you have laughed ...
If you could see me cry out
The millions of times I have kept silent ...
If you could see me sing
The millions of times I have died and bled...
I tell you, European brother
You would be born
You would weep
You would sing
You would cry out
And you would die
Bleeding ...
Millions of times like me !!!

J. Craveirinha
"Song of the Negro on the Ferry"

Mphahlele Bzekiel, (Ed.) African Writing Today Penguin,
Harmondsworth, 1967. p. 315
In order to form a coherent assessment of the pressures of multi-racialism (inasmuch as they influenced the decision to withdraw from the Commonwealth) an examination of the development of Bantu\(^1\) nationalism must be made. The complexity of the movement, with its vastly different overtones and appeals to the diverse groups within Bantu society\(^2\), forms a stark contrast to the clearly defined nationalism of the Afrikaner, although its amorphous nature did not detract from the pervading fear of the Bantu which increased in proportion to Bantu political activity.

Emphasis in this chapter is given to three aspects of the nationalist movement:

(i) the importance of the differing social and economic divisions apparent among the Bantu;

(ii) some of the special grievances of the nationalists; and

(iii) the two most important institutions of the nationalist movement.

1. I have used the term "Bantu" in preference to "African" merely to distinguish South African Black nationalism from the nationalisms of other African countries and peoples. The Bantu in South Africa, prefer the term "African" and my choice of "Bantu" is simply to avoid confusion in this thesis.


The Bantu groups of "Nations" recognised by the Republic are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Xhosa</td>
<td>3,134,265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European descended</td>
<td>3,067,638</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zulu</td>
<td>2,788,415</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Coloured</td>
<td>1,488,267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bapedi</td>
<td>1,188,859</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sotho</td>
<td>1,156,436</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tswana</td>
<td>886,240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shangaan</td>
<td>518,775</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asians</td>
<td>477,414</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smaller Bantu national units</td>
<td>1,134,819</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[15,841,128\]
Perhaps the most divisive force in Bantu nationalism is the division of the population, (on grounds other than ethnic groupings) on economic lines, drawn by the demands of mining, industry and agriculture. These provide the greatest sources of employment for the Bantu, and subject them to vastly different experiences from those of the tribal environment in the Reserves, which are, in general, poverty-stricken areas, unable to support their own population.

Unlike the social structure in the Reserves, where tribalism is dominant, and the role of the chief still meaningful, life at the mines and in the urban areas is dominated by a westernized money-economy, which replaces the communal integrated co-operation in the tribal structure with an individualistic materialism and the desire to purchase the luxuries of the White community. The urbanization of the Bantu has caused the movement of large numbers of people from an environment of local isolation, traditionalism and political apathy. The old elites of chiefs and headmen are no longer as meaningful in the urban context but the problem of tribalism within the urban setting remains one of the most divisive factors in Bantu nationalism - despite the preoccupation of the press.

1. Marquard, op. cit., p. 39
2. Carter, op. cit., p. 20
with "nationalism". Tribal fights still take place on the Reserves and in the mines and tribal customs such as lobolo are retained in urban areas, despite the impact of the urban economy and the increasing savoir-faire of the urban Bantu.

The increasing rate of urbanization has developed a type of westernized tribalism which is manifest in the growth of voluntary associations of Africans in towns. It has also caused alienation of many Africans, who cannot find an adequate substitute for tribal life to provide themselves with the social security and sense of belonging, inherent in an integrated unit. The newly-urbanized African finds himself in a hostile environment of restrictions and regulations, low wages and very little community backing and he must obviously be quite bewildered by the revolution of social values.

This process of urbanization has been cumulatively absorptive of a large proportion of the Bantu male population. In 1904, 15% of the Bantu population was urban; and by 1961 the proportion was 32% and on the increase. The social adjustment of the urban Bantu requires an effort to compromise between three societies - the urban township, the European society and the tribal society, and this adjustment is further complicated by the fact that many of the urbanized

6. Ibid. p. 98.
Bantu have left their families at home on the Reserves. The disruption of family life and the escapist activities in the cities, tend to degrade the African's integrity, and significantly, his "worth" in the eyes of the White population.

As well as the Bantu who still retain family ties within the Reserves, there has emerged a growing number of urban Bantu, who have only a very tenuous link with the Reserves and for whom tribal life has very little relevance - despite the Government's persistence in regarding them as a temporary labour force. For these Bantu, some, three generations removed from the Reserves, European social divisions of class operate. The chief criteria of class are education and wealth as expressed in the ownership of western luxuries, and the whole social structure of urban Bantu is rapidly approximating western institutions. For the Bantu who is both westernized and urbanized, life is perhaps more frustrating than for those who have retained their tribal culture. Education does not automatically open the doors to social advancement within the whole society of South Africa - this is to a large degree controlled by his "nuisance-value" (or lack of) to the Government.

4. Ibid., p. 743.
It is little wonder that the educated, professional Bantu - the potential nationalist spokesman\(^1\) feels bitterly the evils of racial discrimination and makes this discrimination the key to his nationalist demands\(^2\).

The Bantu who live on the Reserves form another group\(^3\) who view nationalism from a very different aspect. The total area of the Reserves is about 13\% of the Republic and about 94\%\(^4\) of the total population of the Reserves live on communally-held land which is impoverished by primitive farming methods, soil erosion and the cultural-religious importance of the quantity of cattle owned\(^5\). They have been referred to as "rural slums"\(^6\) and they provide huge reserves of manpower for the mines and factories. The economy of the Reserves is largely a simple agricultural subsistence economy which cannot support the population.

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2. De Ridder, op. cit., p. 127

3. 3,651,000 in 1957, Marquard, op. cit., p. 37.

4. Ibid. p. 39.


At least 25% of the amount needed to keep the people at bare subsistence level comes from outside earnings\(^1\) and there is a constant interchange of population (usually male) between the Reserves, the cities and the mines.

Tribal loyalties are strong and the traditional role of the chiefs is still recognised, although they are now subject to a magistrate, who is vested with "all the authority of the White upper class of South Africa"\(^2\). Despite this restriction, the chiefs still symbolize tribal traditions and values and the recognition afforded them by traders and missionaries adds to their status.\(^3\)

Their value for co-operation with the Government has been recognized by the Nationalist Party, who do not hesitate to depose those who are critical of the policies of apartheid. Those chiefs, who, like Mantanzima, seem to espouse apartheid policy, to the detriment of Bantu nationalist aims, receive a blistering attack from the nationalists. Mantanzima has been termed the "classic collaborator"\(^4\) and Mbeki rather cynically draws attention to the fact that for the first time in South African history, the Government is paying a Black man more for his services than it pays some of its White employees.\(^5\)

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3. Ibid. p. 175.
The opportunities for self-advancement and the direct monetary rewards for collaboration with the Government, may in fact, invite so many abuses of power\(^1\), that the Nationalist Government policy may suffer a complete reversal, because of the destruction of the prestige of the role of chief. Mbeki sees the plight of the Reserves as "pathetic" and it is interesting to note that the most effective open rebellions against apartheid, have occurred in the Reserves, where the people are less-politically mobile, but at the same time, are less conscious of the armed might of the Government, which must be the ultimate victor against any nationalist uprising\(^2\). The pondoland Rebellion\(^3\) harassed the authorities for some time, and sounded an aminous new note in the claims of the nationalists.

The Reserves showed their rejection of the notion of Bantustan development in the defeat of Matanzima's programme in the 1963 Transkei elections\(^4\), and although the specific claims of the Reserve nationalists differ considerably from those of the urban nationalists, they both have in common a resentment of the grinding poverty\(^5\) of the Black African, and an intense hatred of Government interference in everyday life\(^6\).

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2. The American Political Science Review, op. cit., p. 502, (Deutsch)

   De Ridder, op. cit., p. 171.


In the Reserves, tribal structure and security are being eroded by Government interference and the influence of Christianity, and in the urban areas, by the impact of a western economy. In both cases, the Bantu are being forced to replace their shaken tribal loyalties with some other form of social orientation which will provide them with security. Nationalism appears to fill the vacuum for many. Alienated individuals become potential demonstrators and participants in riots against a State which refuses to grant them political safety-valves. Nationalism must eventually blur tribal loyalties which remain the persistent divisive factor in African nationalism, despite the tendency of many White South Africans to fear the African "mass" as a distinct, cohesive entity. Far from this, divisions even occur within tribes, regarding the degree of westernization desirable, and the divisions between Christian and Pagan in the towns as well as in the Reserves, decrease the unifying force of urbanization. The language barriers are formidable, and are likely to be perpetuated by the segregation of residential areas and schools on an ethnic basis. Yet, in spite of these great forces which retard

1. *The American Political Science Review*, op. cit., p. 499 (Deutsch)
2. UNESCO report, op. cit., p. 743 (Hellman)
the growth of nationalism, the Black South Africans, as well as becoming aware of their economic role in South Africa, are becoming increasingly more aware of their emergent political rights as human beings, rather than as labour units.¹

This awareness takes shape in the voicing of specific grievances in the nationalist struggle against White supremacy, which is the unifying cause in non-European nationalism² - although the African National Congress consistently denied that the objective of seeking removal of White supremacy was tantamount to Black racialism³. Thus the nationalists have claimed that there is a major difference between South African Bantu nationalist objectives and ideology, and those apparent in other African states. Hodgkin admits that factors common to all African nationalisms, will be modified by varying colonial experiences and different stages of economic development⁴.

1. Reader, op. cit., p. 33
2. Ibid. p. 173
In the case of South Africa, the most salient of these variant factors appear to be:

(i) the country was not settled extensively by Africans, before the arrival of the Whites;
(ii) the White population is at the same time, more numerous and entrenched in its only homeland;
(iii) the processes of civilization have had far longer to form patterns of religious, cultural and economic integration, and
(iv) the existence of the many racial groups, which has complicated the more obviously convenient Black-White confrontation.\(^1\)

Thus we find that the traditional nationalist demands claim no more for the Black man than the benefits enjoyed by the Whites. These claims have centred around a more equal distribution of the land\(^2\), higher wages, the repeal of the pass laws, and more recently, universal suffrage\(^3\).

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1. De Beer, op. cit., p. 11

2. cf. Smuts, J.C., Africa and Some World Problems, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1930. "In not setting aside sufficient such areas (native reserves) in South Africa in the past we committed a grievous mistake, which is at the root of most of our difficulties in native policies." p. 92.

on the basis that the interdependence of the racial groups in South Africa, should eliminate the great disparity between living standards of the White and Black population. For although the Bantu comprise 16 million of the population, (approximately 73% of the total) they still enjoy only 32% of the net national income. The low wages cause a constant restlessness among the Bantu and this leads to job changeability in the constant search for higher wages. The consequences of this are the wastage of trained labour and the system of dual morality, in which many Bantu justify stealing from employers, as a means of redressing exploitation. The wages system for the urban Bantu, remains based on the understanding that his family is able to eke out an independent existence back home on the reserve.

The conditions of urban African life are conducive to the promotion of crime and the "tsotsis" exemplify the delinquent results of the clash of societies.

3. Reader, op. cit., p. 81.
4. De Ridder, op. cit., p. 156. By law they are forced to return to the reserves at the end of one year and then apply for re-entry and a new contract.
5. Reader, op. cit., p. 81.
7. 1 in every 236 Bantu in gaol in 1963. (Kohn op. cit., p. 65)
Other more embracing facts are revealed in any comparison of living standards for groups in South Africa. The Tomlinson Commission Report cites a 20% death-rate for Bantu children in their first year\(^1\), while life expectancy charts show for Bantu - 36.4 years and for White South Africans - 66 years\(^2\).

The Bantu intelligentsia maintains that the disadvantages of being Black are most clearly seen in the field of education, which features high on the list of nationalist grievances. While apologists for apartheid show that South Africa is spending more money per head of population than Uganda, Nyasaland, or the British Protectorates\(^3\); Bantu nationalists claim that the only relevant comparison lies in the analysis of spending for the different racial groups within South Africa.

In 1960, statistics cited at a Conference on Education in Natal, showed the per capita spending for White children to be £67 per year, and for Bantu children, £8 per year. The comparative teacher:pupil ratios were 1:24 and 1:45 respectively\(^4\).

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Quite apart from the physical disabilities of the Bantu education system, the nationalists have attacked the whole concept of separate aims for Bantu education, interpreting the Government's desire to co-ordinate Bantu education with the "aims of the Bantu community" as the equivalent of imposing "permanent inferiority" on the Bantu people. The ethnic differences among the Africans are stressed and perpetuated by the system which promotes mother-tongue instruction for the different tribal groups in an attempt to resuscitate "outmoded tribalism".

The Government believes that educated Bantu are "the class which has learnt to believe that it is above its own people and feels that its spiritual, economic and political home is among the civilised community of South Africa." Tabata asserts that in the bid to eliminate successors to this "class", the three "R's" are almost crowded out of the curriculum by the religious instruction, manual work and singing lessons, on the basis that it would be absurd to teach a Bantu child mathematics.

3. Tabata, op. cit., p. 10 - quoting Bantu Education.
4. Ibid., p. 56.
The mere fact that the ability to rise above manual labour entails knowledge of at least one of the official languages,\(^1\) leaves little prospect for the graduate of mother-tongue language schools. The Government statistics on Bantu education show 1897 students in all the universities and university colleges - in 1964 the total population of 14 million Bantu\(^2\).

On the other hand, the Government claims that the transfer of Bantu education to its control has resulted in a great expansion of educational activities. It has doubled the number of pupils attending Bantu schools\(^3\), despite the fact that its expenditure is pegged at R13 million and that Africans must bear the cost of any expansion themselves\(^4\). South Africa has the highest literacy rate in Africa\(^5\) and despite the experience in Morocco, where a bid to remove French as the medium of education failed because of the pupils' inability to cope with Science and Mathematics in the mother-tongue\(^6\), the Nationalists claim that the use of mother-tongue instruction is justified by the UNESCO experiment in the Philippines\(^7\).

5. De Ridder, op. cit., p. 172, gives the U.N. figure - 63%.
The Biselen Commission Report proposes as the major aim of Bantu education, "the creation of opportunities for the spiritual, moral, intellectual, physical development of each individual, within the framework of the community"\(^1\).

It appears that the Bantu nationalist leaders differ with the Government in their definition of the role of the African in the community-at-large. There is no doubt that they see in their educational system, regardless of the numbers it accommodates, a cynical and sinister attempt to perpetuate their inferior social and economic status. Because the educated elite is by far the most articulate group within the nationalist body, the bitterness of the question of education seems personal and increasing. It is indeed reminiscent of the history of Afrikanerdom's fight for its own C.N.O. schools in the fact of both systematic and insidious campaigns of Anglicization.

The next most pressing area for nationalist grievances lies in the general question of the distribution of land. This falls into specific problems - the development of the Bantustans; the Group Areas Act, and the pass system, the policing of which, leads to the most obvious humiliations of apartheid\(^2\).

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The Bantu "homelands" consist of 260 small, separate areas throughout the country and comprise 13% of the total area of South Africa - the amount allotted to the Bantu by "history". This has long been the subject of dispute by Bantu leaders, and as early as 1913, a delegation was sent to London in protest against the Land Act of 1913, and another delegation was sent to Versailles in 1919. The present distribution of the land means that within the "White areas" (where nearly 2/3 of the Bantu live and work) the Bantu are regarded as "migrant labour", enjoying neither political rights nor the right of free-hold ownership. Thus while the removals of Bantu from congested slum areas have decreased the crime rate and have led to the development of vast new townships.

1. Mbeki, op. cit., p. 16.  
"There is no hope in the Bantustan Act for any African. There is not intended to be any".  
(Mr. Lawrence, MP, South African House of Assembly Debates Vol. 105, Col. 8314 (20/5/60) refers to the Bantustans as "the Shangri-la of the heated brain")

2. Ngubane, op. cit., p. 86.  
Roux, op. cit., p. 111.


like Soweto\textsuperscript{1}, Bantu nationalist leaders view the lack of freehold rights as one of the major discriminatory practices on the grounds of colour\textsuperscript{2}.

The Group Areas Act has resulted in many cases of individual hardship, in the separation of families and in the curtailment of individual movement\textsuperscript{3}. Further, the restrictions and enforcement of the laws concerned, have caused widespread resentment and frustration\textsuperscript{4} and have increased the under-current of anxiety and insecurity within the Bantu personality\textsuperscript{5}. The constant brushes with the police on the matter of passes\textsuperscript{6}, often for unnecessary and humiliating demands, have caused a traditional struggle against the pass system to emerge.\textsuperscript{7} This also had its beginning in 1913 and the common resentment felt by the majority of the Bantu, has caused demands for the abolition of the pass laws to feature prominently on the programme of the African National Congress.\textsuperscript{8}

\begin{enumerate}
\item Soweto with a population of 711,000 is the largest city in the Republic - \textit{Newsletter}, Department of Information October 1964.
\item Marquard, op. cit., p. 52
\item Nyubane, op. cit., p. 62.
\item Reader, op. cit., p. 74. De Ridder, op. cit., p. 157.
\item De Ridder, op. cit., p. 170
\item Roux, op. cit. p. 117.
\end{enumerate}
Thus the pattern of nationalist grievances displays the recurrent theme of resentment against discrimination and the inequalities due to race - the one unchangeable human characteristic. The inequalities are many - political, social and economic, and they are highlighted by the growing trends of urbanization and westernization and by the consequent growth of awareness of the disadvantages of a black skin in the many diverse manifestations of apartheid.

Because of this growing urbanization, one puzzling fact concerned with African nationalism is revealed. The movement has failed to attract mass support\(^1\). Given the great variety in development and education, some grievances still remain common to all Black men in South Africa. Yet their nationalism continues to be very much a movement of the intelligentsia, after more than half a century of organization\(^2\). The nationalist movement has been dominated institutionally by the African National Congress (A.N.C.), which from its inception in 1912, until the late 1950's, espoused three basic principles - non-racialism, non-tribalism and non-violence. Two strands of thought have always been discernible in the A.N.C., the moderate-favouring conciliatory and

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1. Ibid. p. 116.

constitutional tactics; and the more radical and assertive, the proponents of which have become more vocal and influential as the Nationalist Government refused to compromise with the Congress and as the legislative programme of apartheid began to escalate.

For almost half a century, the A.N.C. remained steadfast in its demand to share in the Government of the whole country, accepting the permanent participation of the other racial groups in South Africa, and rejecting the racialist theory as a valid reaction to Afrikaner herrenvolkism. Unlike many other nationalist movements in Africa, the A.N.C. maintained that its policy was not to oust the Europeans from South Africa, but to bring changes to the existing system so that the Bantu could gain a share in political power.

Moderate leadership has been characteristic of the A.N.C., but the futility of moderation has been keenly felt by men like Luthuli:

"who will deny that thirty years of my life have been spent knocking in vain, patiently, moderately and modestly at a closed and barred door? What have been the fruits of moderation? The past thirty years have seen the greatest number of laws restricting our rights and progress until today, we have reached the stage where we have almost no rights at all."  

1. Legum, op. cit. p. 174
   Ngubane op. cit., p. 92.
That this obvious desperation penetrated the ranks of the Congress is reflected in the change of attitude, and in the rise to leadership and popularity of more radical spokesmen, such as Nelson Mandela and Govan Mbeki. The most dramatic evidence of the reversal of general principles of operation, was the formation of the "Spear of the Nation" as an organizationally independent body, committed to the use of violence as a key tactic. This was a public admission that the A.N.C. accepted the conviction that the rigours of apartheid would not be ameliorated by peaceful persuasion or by western pressure on the Nationalist Government. 1

This changed attitude of the A.N.C., had been foreshadowed by the hiving off of the Pan-African Congress in 1958, principally because of disagreement on tactics and also on the role of non-European allies in the nationalist struggle against White supremacy. Robert Sobukwe, the emergent leader of the P.A.C., stated: "...the Africans are the only people, who, because of their material position, can be interested in the complete overhaul of the present structure of society." 2


The P.A.C. denounced the A.N.C.'s retention of the principle of multi-racialism as pandering to racial bigotry, and as such, was simply a brake on the dynamism of nationalism. It formulated a four-point plan for the development of South Africa, on the principle of "Izwe lethu" - the land is ours:

(i) Complete socialization.
(ii) Redistribution of "usurped" land from the Cape to Luanda.
(iii) A new process of naturalization for foreigners.
(iv) No man should be denied citizenship on the basis of colour alone.

Sobukwe's new hard-line nationalism also contended that the test for deciding a citizen's right to claim Africa as his homeland, was the acceptance of the slogan "Africa for the Africans".

3. Ibid.
The rapid growth of popularity for both Sobukwe and the P.A.C., and the impact of Sharpeville,\(^1\) when viewed with the Pondoland Rebellions\(^2\) and the brief, if somewhat abortive history of Pogo\(^3\), show the fading attraction of the ideal of a multi-racial nation. The banning of both the A.N.C. and the P.A.C. has removed the political safety-valves open to the majority group within the population, who have neither effective trade union organization, nor parliamentary representation. The imprisonment or exile of the Bantu leaders has, on the one hand, temporarily emasculated the nationalist movement, but on the other, has widened the spheres of influence for the leaders in exile, and has provided the martyrs\(^4\) which are apparently necessary for the success of an emergent nationalism.

To conclude then, it is necessary to describe the formidable barriers which prevent the development of a mass Bantu nationalist movement in South Africa.

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1. Ibid., p. 209. (Sobukwe).
N.B. Since Sharpeville, military expenditure alone has been increased five-fold by the Nationalist Government - to £157 million in 1966 - 20% of the country's total budget. The Observer (London) September 11th, 1966. p. 11

2. South Africa: Information and Analysis, November 1962


This development is retarded by the wide gap between the educated, highly articulate, but small, professional elite, and the great mass of unskilled workers and peasants, because of the lack of an appreciable commercial class and the restrictions on the trade union movement. It is also greatly hampered by the inevitable closeness of the bans, the necessity to work underground, and the persistent tendency for inter-organization conflict to erupt along tribal lines.

Bantu nationalism must somehow blur the sharpness of these divisions and formulate the conscious will to be a nation, that the mass of Africans in South Africa seem to lack.

It is clear that the nationalist movement lacks mass support from the failure of the civil disobedience campaign in June 1952.

The highly-efficient South African police force, the severe penalties involved and the natural disinclination to strike because of poverty, are further crippling limits to


3. UNESCO Report, op. cit., p. 724 (Epstein)


the amount of effective action available to influence the
trend of Nationalist policy. At the moment Government action
is successfully forestalling the tendency of industrialization
to create a politically mobile mass.\textsuperscript{1}

There is obvious bitterness between the A.N.C. and the
P.A.C., with the former accusing the latter of racialism\textsuperscript{2}
and the P.A.C. alleging strong Communist collaboration with
the A.N.C. and a general charge of "non-Africanism"\textsuperscript{3}.
Yet both bodies claim that their objectives are not aimed
at the removal of the White man, but the removal of White
supremacy\textsuperscript{4}. The European settlers naturally find some
trouble in divorcing the two.\textsuperscript{5}

\begin{enumerate}
\item Hunter, op. cit., p. 263.
\item Shepherd, op. cit., p. 127.
\item Legum, op. cit., p. 178.
\item Lutuli, A. op. cit., p. 116
\item Sithole, op. cit., p. 24.
   \textit{The New African}, op. cit., p. 209 (Sobukwe)
\end{enumerate}
One must be wary of under-estimating the potential force of the Bantu nationalist movement\textsuperscript{1}. The increasing economic integration\textsuperscript{2} and the resultant urbanization\textsuperscript{3}, despite the Bantustans, will extend further the influence of the western money economy, which must in turn, expand the politically-relevant strata of the population\textsuperscript{4} and make it more receptive to the force of nationalism. The supreme difficulty for the Bantu leaders in South Africa has been, and will continue to be the problem of reconciling tribalism and nationalism. From the viewpoint of the Afrikaner, Africans remain of the State but never conceivably of the Nation, and as their numbers increase so does their potential threat to Afrikanerdom which has formulated for them an unacceptable definition of their role in South Africa. The unacceptability of this definition had been acknowledged by both the Commonwealth and the U.N. prior to 1961. Mounting pressure within the Bantu movements heightened their impact on both the Commonwealth and the U.N., making the Afrikaners increasingly sensitive to interference by both these organizations and as a concomitant, making Bantu nationalism more appreciative of its world-wide support.

\textsuperscript{1} Spottiswoode, op. cit., N.B. "Those who deny the existence of Bantu nationalism on the force of the argument that political consciousness is to be found in only a small and negligible minority of detribalized leaders are confusing nationalism with a formulated political development". (Coetzee, p.69

\textsuperscript{2} Carter, op. cit., p. 118.

\textsuperscript{3} Moraes, op. cit., p. 372.

\textsuperscript{4} Reader, op. cit., p. 33.
One must be wary of under-estimating the potential force of the Bantu nationalist movement\(^1\). The increasing economic integration\(^2\) and the resultant urbanization\(^3\), despite the Bantustans, will extend further the influence of the western money economy, which must in turn, expand the politically-relevant strata of the population\(^4\) and make it more receptive to the force of nationalism. The supreme difficulty for the Bantu leaders in South Africa has been, and will continue to be the problem of reconciling tribalism and nationalism. From the viewpoint of the Afrikaner, Africans remain of the State but never conceivably of the Nation, and as their numbers increase so does their potential threat to Afrikanerdom which has formulated for them an unacceptable definition of their role in South Africa.

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CHAPTER FIVE

AFRICA AWAKENS
I'll talk no more,
    I'll listen to nobody's talk,
I'll wait no more;
I'll lead myself towards the goal,
Though countless hurdles cross my path
And danger lurks on every side,
I'll go forward and do and dare.

On library doors
I'll knock and gain entrance;
Of the strength
Of nations past and present I will read,
I'll brush the dust from ancient scrolls,
And drinking deep of the Pyrrhean stream
Will go forward and do and dare.

I'll sail the seas
And learn the might of God and man,
Behind my name
To tie a string of alphabets,
Melting bubbles will not end all.
I'll come back home with strong arms bared,
I'll go forward and do and dare.

Dennis Osadebay.
"Young Africa's Resolve".

O'Donnell, op. cit. p. 348
African\(^\text{1}\) nationalism shares certain characteristics with Afrikaner nationalism, despite local variations resulting from diverse historical experience and economic development\(^\text{2}\). The chief force for cohesion among the various African nationalisms is found in the display of anti-whitism and anti-colonialism, although these are not powerful enough to dispel the divisive effect of tribalism, which remains the chief barrier to the universal acceptance of membership of either national states or pan-African federations. Consequently, many African nationalist leaders tend to emphasize and exaggerate those features which are common to the phenomenon of nationalism throughout the entire continent. Despite the fact that generalizations about the development of the nationalist ideologies must necessarily be viewed cautiously, some factors may be discerned which have a bearing on South Africa's decision to withdraw from the Commonwealth.

Perhaps the most constant demand of the nationalists has been for racial equality and this has usually been linked with claims for economic justice and political independence. African nationalism has often been fostered

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1. I have used this term to encompass all forms of African nationalism outside South Africa.

2. Hodgkin, op. cit., p. 56, cites the following as some of the most important factors inducing variability in African nationalism: (1) the extent and type of economic development; (2) the development of airports and other speedy means of communications; (3) the nature and degree of western civilisation; (4) the policy of the colonial government in regard to Asian and European settlement; and the importance of external influences, e.g. the U.N., Islam.
by a resentment of white superiority as expressed in economic and political control which, in turn, generated exploitation and social discrimination. Demands by nationalists which include higher wages, higher prices for farm products, and a heightened appreciation of the urgency of the need for industrial development, have been precursors to claims for a greater share in the profits of natural resources than the White man had previously seen fit to allocate. Thus, social rights, racial equality, political freedom and independence have been inextricably woven into the process of achieving national sovereignty. Quite often the amalgam of all these claims has resulted in the espousal of socialism as a panacea for all the troubles of the immediate post-independence era, and this, in turn, has promoted a spirit of fellow-suffering in Africa that has no counterpart in the newly-emergent nations of Latin America or Asia.

One of the most commonly supported nationalist concepts (again with local variation of emphasis) has been that of negritude, which fosters a pride in Blackness, and has exerted great influence upon various cultural movements. It is based largely on the belief in the desirability of being Black - for so long the criterion for discrimination and exploitation by Europeans. The concentration on the virtues of being Black has two corollaries, viz., a tendency towards hostility to Whiteness, and an intense and pre-occupied searching for
"African-ness" in an attempt to reveal a history and culture to rival that of the European. Cultural achievements and priorities which differ from those of the European are upheld as being eminently desirable; this leads to the dual temptation to espouse doctrines of Black supremacy and to attempt to suppress, or at least to minimize, European influences. Although negritude is seen in varying degrees either as a sub-conscious or a deliberately self-conscious element in the cultural activities of the nationalists, there is ample evidence to show that it is a widely-used tactic in the battle for compensation for years of racial humiliation and degradation.

Other common defence-mechanisms are seen in the development of certain post-independence slogans which have been formulated and adopted as a kind of pejorative shorthand for use in the castigation of former colonial powers and their allies. Often they have been necessary to promote some form of political cohesion in states which too often have shown the disadvantages of ethnic disunity and economic non-viability immediately after the attainment of independence. "Anti-imperialism" and "anti-colonialism" (or "anti-neo-colonialism") have become commonplace political jargon since the arrival of the new

1. Shepherd, op. cit., p. 11 See articles such as "Education and African Culture" and "Ideas WE Must Fight" in The Spark, [ōhaná].15/2/63.

African states (Even Russian neo-colonialism has been held as a danger for the new states to fear.) These "isms" have been synonymous with, or at least inter-changeable with, accusations of White racialism and have been consistently used in the U.N. proceedings since the advent of the numerical superiority of the coloured nations. They have innumerable definitions and are used in a wide range of connotations, usually concerned with charges of political meddling or economic exploitation by the former colonial Powers.

Quite often these slogan insults have been important unifying factors in states which were haphazard products of the nineteenth century colonial map-makers. As may be seen in all modern nationalisms (not the least obvious example being Afrikaner nationalism) a sense of grievance has helped to coalesce diverse strains in the nation and the threat of neo-colonialism has been a psychological stimulus to maintain the continuation of the nationalist dynamic, which may well have waned disastrously upon the achievement of independence. Thus, to recapitulate, anti-Whitism, or more positively, negritude, anti-colonialism, anti-imperialism, socialism and a feeling of solidarity based on a history of past racial exploitation have been the common threads in the pattern of nationalism in Africa.
From the general significance of anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism, one is inevitably brought to the specific consideration of South Africa against this background. Apartheid is, to the Africans, the most classic and formidable example of colonialism and imperialism in their most highly developed forms. As African states were individually divorced from the political trappings of colonialism, they were brought collectively to consider South Africa as a living and apparently permanent denigration of the concept of racial equality. From the historical viewpoint, South Africa was an accident; an unfortunate anachronism swimming frantically (and somewhat successfully) against the mainstream of historical development. As such, she became the target for the most strongly articulated aspirations of the African nationalists both within the Commonwealth and more particularly in the U.N.

A study of South Africa's attitudes and responses to the various African independence movements (especially in the context of the Commonwealth) revealed many themes which were not reflected in the respective responses of the colonial Powers in Africa's decade of independence.

The concurrent emergence of what has been termed "white guilt" as well as the general acceptance of the concept of racial equality within the Commonwealth, was a fact not
apparently appreciated by the policy makers in South Africa, for the country seemed to be strengthening its resources to perpetuate White supremacy. From the inauguration of the "new" Commonwealth, South Africa had had markedly reserved views on the virtues of Commonwealth membership, and as the admission of India to the Commonwealth all but coincided with the electoral success of the National Party in South Africa, the warring factions in the Commonwealth were soon to be articulated.

To gain a spectrum view of the development of attitudes, opinions and responses to the political events of the African continent in the years following 1948, in order to isolate consistent themes which led to the complete rift in the Commonwealth in 1960, I made a survey of the Debates of the South African House of Assembly. In the following section, I have deliberately avoided discussion of the U.N. interference in South Africa's affairs, and also the question of republican membership of the Commonwealth. (These have been considered in other sections.)

1. Despite the publicity accorded Dr. Malan's rather revolutionary speech on the occasion of India's entry as a republican member into the Commonwealth, c.f. South African House of Assembly Debates, Vol. 68, Coll. 5551-65 (11/5/49), he was not long in showing his disenchantment of the idea. c.f. Vol. 82, Col. 495, (8/7/53) "Some of us regret it (India's admission) today". Again in Vol. 85, Col. 4533 (13/5/54) - "I was disappointed in my expectations. And not I alone, but everybody is disappointed."
A number of significant themes persist in the Debates. The first of these is the comparative lack of interest in the indigenous peoples of Africa as political factors at least until the mid-fifties. Any discussion before this tended to be in the form of oblique and nebulous warnings of the "Black Peril" type which, in fact, did not differ substantially from those voiced many years prior to the Second World War. It is as if the failure to include the Bantu as an integral part of the South African nation, led the South Africans (particularly those on the Government benches) to disregard the indigenous peoples in all African countries, in favour of negotiations with those colonial Powers who were interested in the continent. Another major theme which persisted throughout the period, with varying degrees of emphasis, was that South Africa was being systematically persecuted by a campaign of distortion and dishonesty in the world press. This very widely-held belief tended to make the South African Government completely hostile to any critical suggestions that apartheid may well be a disruptive issue in international relations.

This led to the third major theme in the debates - the refusal of the Government to admit publicly that apartheid was the chief tension-making factor in South Africa's external relations.

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1. See for example South African House of Assembly Debates, Vol. 68, Col. 5016, (12/5/49), Vol. 85, Col. 4388 (3/5/54), Vol. 95, Col. 7627 (10/6/57) (this also refers specifically to distortion by the British Labour Party.) and Vol. 97, Col. 2363 (18/8/58).
(No doubt this was largely due to their reluctance to fall into the trap of self-contradiction in the issue of the "domestic jurisdiction defence" in the U.N.) The final theme which dominated the earlier part of the period 1948-60 was the fear of Communism and its destructive potential within South Africa and the continent as a whole. Thus a tendency of the South Africans to identify every threat of trouble with the Communist menace caused the passing of the Suppression of Communism Act in the interests of the country's security.\(^1\)

In some ways the Debates of the period reflect in microcosm the bewilderment of the whole Western world at the speed of political events in Africa. It is significant that in 1948, early murmurs of apprehension about possible self-government for Ghana\(^2\) led Dr. Malan to canvass the possibility of a Pan-African charter involving the interests of all the European Powers in Africa\(^3\) to forestall the development of an African nationalism which would embrace 120 million adherents. The appointment of Mr. as a roving ambassador to "sell"

2. Ibid. Vol. 64, Coll. 1311-12 (1/9/48)
apartheid in Europe showed no immediate success\(^1\), but it was symptomatic of the Nationalists' desire to remove persistent charges of Nazism which were a carry-over from World War II, and which did little to expedite closer relationships with the nations of Europe.

From 1953 onwards, as the broad trend of British policy was discerned, the Debates reveal a growing consensus of opinion regarding the undesirability of granting independence to Black African states, for this was simply opening the doors for Communist infiltrators\(^2\). Both Government and Opposition speakers alike expressed the opinion that Black Africa would need the guidance of the White man for generations to come.\(^3\) Malan probably spoke for the majority of the Parliament, in his summary of the Government's attitude to the prospect of self-government for the Gold Coast;

"Personally I have no doubt about its failure. It is unrealistic and must, in my opinion, be a repetition of an idealism which will end in tragedy, because the facts are not taken into account. It is a case where the good principle of democracy, wrongly applied, makes itself ridiculous."\(^4\)

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1. Ibid., Vol. 68, Col. 5716. See also Cope, p. 191 (12/5/49)
2. Ibid., Vol. 75, Col. 6798 (16/5/1951)
3. c.f. Ibid., Vol. 78, Col. 4354, "The Africans are just like children striving for a new way of life. We must have patience with them and we should try to lead them." 24/4/1952
4. Ibid. Vol. 75, Col. 6878, See also Mr. Lawrence (U.P.) 16/5/1951 "We feel that the (British) Labour Party was precipitate in according that measure of self-government to the Gold Coast which was given it by its new constitution."
The elections on the Gold Coast were held to be a British concern, but Malan objected to the statement that the Gold Coast might eventually attain full Dominion status within the Commonwealth. He believed that the policy would result in the disappearance of the White man from the greater part of Africa. His objection, he claimed, was based not on an objection to the principle of granting gradual self-government, but on the low level of civilisation and sense of civic responsibility in the relevant colonies. The Commonwealth's position would soon become untenable - the admission of the Asian members had already created great difficulty in Commonwealth relations, because they were so much at variance with Western civilisation. Great stress was placed on the low level of education standards within the British colonies and members showed an eagerness to consolidate the White man's stand against the British policy in Africa.

1. Ibid., Vol. 75, Col. 6818 (16/5/51).
2. Ibid., Vol. 75, Col. 6820 - Malan described the granting of self-government to the Gold Coast with its 90% illiteracy rate as a "precipitate action" (16/5/1951).
3. Ibid., Vol. 75, Col. 6821 (16/5/1951)
4. See for example, the references to Nigeria in this context, Vol. 75, Col. 6852 (16/5/1951).
5. E.g. in Vol. 75, Col. 6797, Welensky quoted as expressing regret that "the Empire should be liquidated in this way." (16/5/1951).
Once again the ubiquitous threat of Communism was raised; Ghana was becoming "the gateway to Africa for the Russians" and "a nail in the coffin of the Commonwealth"¹

The eruption of the Mau Mau in Kenya brought home to the South Africans the force of anti-Whitism and the necessity for keeping nascent nationalism in check. It also intensified the fear of the Bantu within the Union. The march by the blacks towards independence was a sobering thought for the Nationalists who had long lived with the fear of submergence by the Bantu.

The claim that the black nations of Africa were too backward for independence was repeated long after it was clear that a policy orientated to a refusal to acknowledge emergent black governments was no longer compatible with the changing acceptance by the world of the new Africa. It was this stubborn refusal to come to terms with what was fast becoming a fait accompli which led to a growing gulf between the South Africans and the British.

Expressions similar to "Dark Africa is on the move"¹ recur frequently in the Debates, causing more liberal speakers such as Mrs. Ballinger to repeat many warnings that South Africa by isolating herself from her own Bantu population, was leaving herself vulnerable to nationalist extremists.²

¹. Ibid., Vol. 75, Col. 6797 - Mr. Nel. (16/5/1951)
². Ibid., Vol. 71, Col. 3684, Mr. DuPlessis. (27/3/1950)
3. Ibid., Vol. 66, Col. 318, (31/1/49), Vol. 78, Col. 4488-89 (28/4/1952)
Subsequent advice that the Government should heed the Bantu nationalist claims brought forth only pessimistic responses from Malan that "What is happening in West Africa ... should serve as a pointer and a warning to us in South Africa."

Yet the refusal to acknowledge the wisdom or perhaps the inevitability of the emergence of African states did not imply that the Government was unaware of South Africa's increasing isolation. It is characteristic that the Government, in the early and mid-fifties, continued to look for liaison with the colonial Powers who were far from eager to ally themselves with South Africa.

The early references to the proposal of the pan-African charter were given a more detailed character by Mr. Durrant in 1954. His motion to effect the establishment of the organisation outlined the following broad aims:

1. to centralize spheres of development;
2. to combat Communism;
3. to exchange information on Europeans;
4. to provide adequate measures of defence against an aggressor;

1. Ibid., Vol. 71, Col. 4221 (13/4/50)
2. Ibid., Vol. 84, Col. 2163 (16/3/1954)
3. This reflects the realization of the significance of the non-inclusion of South Africa in NATO. (c.f. Vol. 82, Col. 2172, 24/8/53). In Vol. 88, Col. 4049 (18/4/1955) Mr. Tighy advocates a common defence policy for all Europeans in Africa ... "One for all, all for one."
(v) to stimulate trade and industry.

It may be assumed from the ensuing discussion that both sides of the House envisaged this organization as being comprised exclusively of the colonial Powers and South Africa\(^1\) and it is but another example of the differing policies of those people who actually lived in Africa and those who were geographically, if not politically, remote. From the earliest Nationalist proposal for a pan-African alliance, the whole concept had been inimical to the emerging political pattern of Africa yet, even as late as 1956, the South Africans had certainly not abandoned hope on this issue. Official renunciation did not come until a few weeks before the Suez crisis\(^2\).

\(^1\) Probably with headquarters in South Africa. Ibid., Vol. 85, Col. 4385 (3/5/1954)

\(^2\) Ironically, the Suez crisis which so gravely disrupted Commonwealth relations in 1956, evoked no heated response in South Africa, the Opposition maintaining that Nasser had taken upon himself the role of the leader of the movement "to win Africa for the Africans" in order to drive the Europeans from Africa. Bayrs maintains that if the Asian members of the Commonwealth had left as they had threatened, this would have suited South Africa admirably. c.f. Bayrs James, *The Commonwealth and Suez*, Oxford University Press, London 1964, pp. 395-6. See also South African House of Assembly Debates, Vol. 93, Col. 54 (22/1/1957).
The statement by the Minister for External Affairs was cited in Parliament: "Circumstances are not favourable, but all my plans have been shelved and I blame the British Government.\(^1\) It would appear that Suez subsequently dispelled any lingering tendency for Britain (or France) to remain in Africa and that the only pan-African charter would be solely for members of a predominantly Black Africa.

As the policies of the colonial Powers became increasingly orientated to withdrawal, Afro-Asian interest and solidarity had become more pronounced. The Bandung Conference (1955) highlighted, at least for South Africa, the need for White solidarity not only in Africa but in the whole ambit of international affairs. The Conference was seen as the forerunner of a direct East-West confrontation to which "the European World cannot remain indifferent.\(^2\) The concern with the more general ramifications of the Conference tended to obscure the great divisions already discernible within the Afro-Asian group.\(^3\) Its prominence in the U.N., an organisation

\begin{enumerate}
\item Ibid., Vol. 93, Col. 582 - duPlessis quotes statement of Minister for External Affairs - dated (14/8/56) - (4/2/57)
\item Ibid., Vol. 88, Coll. 4112 and 5129. (19/4/1955) and (5/5/1955)
\end{enumerate}
traditionally hostile to apartheid, added new dimensions to both the Union's sense of political isolation and direct confrontation by an increasing number of foes. It was forcefully argued by Dr. Friedmann that the Western Powers would "certainly not lift a finger to preserve South Africa as the last stronghold of White baasskap."¹

The publication of the Freedom Charter² in the same year as The Conference in Bandung gave added intensity to the programme of instituting new defence measures for internal security, as Members pondered on the fact that new Black Governments would involve new Black armies on the continent³. A sense of urgency was now discernible in the field of propaganda warfare, with the Minister of External Affairs announcing a re-organisation of the Africa section of his Department, and at the same time claiming that his Department was not averse to making contact with the non-White self-governing states in Africa⁴.

4. This Announcement appeared in Die Burger, 31/12/55.
More pleas for a united Parliamentary front in external affairs were also followed by the expression of hope by the Minister that, on the basis of mutual acknowledgment of each other's right to exist, South Africa and the new states might co-operate against the common enemy - Communism.

This theoretical "co-operation" was, of course, impracticable, largely because the problem of effecting the exchange of diplomats remained a disproportionately strong barrier to South Africa's free movement in African politics; for, while the Government remained unable (or unwilling) to yield to pleas for greater co-operation between the races within South Africa, it could not resolve its dilemma regarding intra-Africa co-operation. So, while the Government persisted in Parliamentary kite-flying about South Africa affording the link between the Western Powers and the indigenous peoples, south of the Sahara, the Opposition, with corresponding persistence (if little effect), demanded to know exactly how this might be achieved, particularly with the absence of direct contact with states such as Ghana, Gambia, Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Sudan, Ethiopia, Somaliland and Tanganyika.


2. Ibid., Vol. 97, Coll. 2431 and 2483 (18/8/1958) and (19/8/1958)
Talking about the desirability of co-operation did nothing to allay the general fears in South Africa that the colonial revolution would eventually result in the cultural extinction of the White South African, who was now able to articulate his fears in terms of the emergent Black governments and in the increasing effectiveness of the A.N.C.'s peaceful demonstrations in South African cities.

South Africans continued to claim that the world press— in a campaign of distortion and inaccuracy, (which matched the tenor of the corresponding campaign in the U.N.) was proving the greatest barrier in the development of South Africa, Africa and the Commonwealth, but even prior to 1950 it had been clear to many observers both in South Africa and outside it, that apartheid, however well it may be justified, would become the most divisive force in Commonwealth relations.

South Africa was forced to take a close view of the development of British policy in other parts of Africa. Britain's attitude to the Central African Federation caused great concern in the Union, which suspected that the British were anxious to forestall any closer liaison between South Africa and the Federation Europeans. Dr. Hertzog believed that the British policy would eventually bring about the end

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1/ c.f. Round Table, Vol. 41, "Dr Malan and the Commonwealth" p. 219.
of European civilisation in Africa and he was concerned at
the invidious encroachment of Black power on the continent.¹
(It is interesting to note that the hitherto exclusive Afrikaner
nationalism was flexible enough to include the White settlers
in Rhodesia and the Portuguese colonies in Africa, for the
purposes of some propaganda. This phenomenon was not unmarked
by antipathetic African nationalists. See The Spark, Dec. 12/62,
p.4.) Hertzog's fears were shared by many other Members who
began to question frequently the validity of the Commonwealth
connection on grounds other than those based on republicanism².
As Mr. Abraham put it: "I trust that if that day comes, when
in the Commonwealth of Nations, non-European states will be
allowed to be on an equal footing with the European states of
the Commonwealth, to such an extent that they will have a majority
vote in the councils of the Commonwealth, the hour will have
struck for South Africa to get out of the Commonwealth."³

1. The time-lag in the appreciation of the development of the
Africans is made obvious in many relatively trivial
statements in the House. E.g. a typical example of this may
be found in the reaction to this statement made by a Member
of the House of Commons and quoted in the South African
Parliament: "I look forward to the day when we will have in
this future imperial army, Native officers and European
sergeant-majors." S.A. House of Assembly Debs. op. cit.,
Vol. 85, Col. 4428 (3/5/54)

2. Ibid. Vol. 85, Col. 4431 (3/5/54)

3. Ibid. Vol. 85, Col. 4465 (3/5/54) South Africa's exclusion
from various defence pacts such as NATO, had lent a certain
amount of attractiveness to membership of the Commonwealth,
which for purposes of expediency, diverted some of the
attention from the anathema of the monarchy, c.f. Mansergh,
(Survey, Vol. 2,), op. cit. p. 362.
Mr. duPlessis in July, 1958 quoted Patrick Gordon Walker's information regarding the fact that Nigeria, the Gold Coast, the Caribbean Federation, Malaya and the Central African Federation would soon be applying for membership in the Commonwealth, and there seems at this stage to be an increasing, if no less-reluctant acceptance that a colour-dominated Commonwealth was imminent. This stimulated the Opposition to demand a more intensive incursion into African diplomacy for South Africans, unlike the colonial Europeans, had no other home to which they might retreat, and must therefore find a means of co-existing with the "new" Africa. Opposition Members were well aware that almost every nationalist leader in Black Africa, from Nkrumah to Nyerere, had made vociferous and consistent denunciations of apartheid. While the development of British policy in Africa had shown the pressure of demand and response in the creation of a new liberalism towards African demands, there was no liberalism obvious in the reaction of the White South Africans. On the contrary, their responses exhibited the tendency towards greater repression in their dealings with the nationalists in their own country, as more voices were added to those denouncing apartheid.

1. Ibid. Vol. 97. Coll. 127 and 2361 (10/7/1958) and 18/8/1958)  
2. Ibid. Vol. 97, Col. 2430 (18/8/1958)  
The Afro-Asian conferences had already cemented a spirit of solidarity among the peoples of Africa. Nkrumah, among others, saw apartheid as being detrimental to the Commonwealth's continued existence, and Sekou Touré, with somewhat different emphasis, saw apartheid policy as the strengthening force in the formulation of resistance and determination in the struggle against "shameful racial segregation".

The great disparity in the responses of South Africa and Britain to the same events in Africa was also mirrored in another disparity between the interpretations of the same events by South Africa on the one hand, and Black nationalists on the other, (particularly in reference to Kenya and Central African Federation).

The year 1958, stands out in the history of the parliamentary exposition of the policy of apartheid. The Prime Minister likened the policy of Separate Development to the development of the Commonwealth - the Bantustans corresponding to the various nations in the process of the development of self-government. He implied that the Bantustans might develop

2. Ibid., p. 318.
3. S.A. House of Assembly Debs. op. cit. Vol. 98, Coll. 4148 etseq - Speaker, Dr. Verwoerd. In Col. 4157 (18/9/1958) "The establishment of the authorities on the basis of his (Bantu) background of self-government linked with a progressive development in his own areas to the stage of a territorial authority is what we can foresee and promote today." Cf. Appendix D pp. 30⅔-15.
as rapidly and as radically as the British colonies had done since 1949. This new interpretation of apartheid should have been a major sop to the criticism of the outside world, but the economic unfeasibility of the Bantustans tended to derogate from any merits of the policy as a whole. The world press continued its unsympathetic, or, in fact, hostile reaction to the Union's racial policies - causing much obvious concern about the economy of South Africa and also accelerating the development of Bantu nationalism.

The Accra Conference gave new impetus to the embryonic pan-African spirit and subsequent attacks on South Africa and on remaining colonial Powers showed a remarkable hardening of approach by the African nationalists. The change in the tone of Dr. Hastings Banda's anti-British utterances is noted by Griff-Jones as evidence of this tangible hardening:

Dr. Banda, July 1958: "I am not anti-European, still less am I anti-British."

Dr. Banda, December 1958: "In Nyasaland we mean to be masters and if that is treasonable, make the most of it." 4

Kenneth Kaunda gave added weight to the new "hard-line" nationalism:

1. Ibid. Vol. 98, Col. 4157 (18/9/1958)
2. Ibid. Vol. 98, Coll. 4177 etseq, and Vol. 99, Coll. 85-7 (18/9/1958) and (28/1/1959)
3. Ibid. Vol. 99, Coll. 86 and 1322 (28/1/1959) and (23/2/1959)
"We do not need to find grounds for unity as does the multi-racial party. Our unity is already there in the colour of our skin and in our common suffering."¹

The speeches and writing of Azikiwe² and Awolowo³ left no doubt about Nigeria's attitude to apartheid, and Mboya⁴ and Kenyatta⁵ showed that the Commonwealth would soon be no longer permitted to classify apartheid as a domestic issue.

Never before had so many countries stood on the verge of independence and, if there were many dissimilar circumstances involved, all of them were joined by the strongly emotive ties of Blackness and anti-colonialism. What better personification of the system of racial exploitation than South Africa? Verwoerd's new exposition of apartheid, although in theory and adjustment of Strijdom's old policy of "baasskap" to a recognizable adoption of the U.N. Charter principle of "equality of peoples great and small", failed to make any inroad on the mounting conviction of coloured people, that the White South Africans must be made to accept and acknowledge their pariah status.

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1. Kaunda and Morris, op. cit., p. 93. See also Kaunda K., Zambia Shall be Free, Heinemann Educational, London, 1962, p. 101, Art. 2 (3) and (5)


Despite the drift and vacillations in the Tory Government's African policy, Macmillan, in 1958, while on a Commonwealth Tour, extolled the virtues of the new Commonwealth "as a great practical working example of inter-racial co-existence."\(^1\) Yet Britain herself faced almost insuperable racial problems in unravelling the complexities of the Central African Federation. It was not until she felt the combined effect of the mounting tension in Nyasaland in 1958-59 and the impact of the Devlin Report\(^2\) that she rejected categorically the possibility of a political *volte-face* in Africa\(^3\). The Freedom Charter of the regional grouping of PAFMECA (later to become PAFMECSA) left no doubt about the concerted African nationalist attitude to both the Central African Federation and the racial policies of the Union\(^4\). Increased propaganda bombardment, including high power radio transmitters, caused a great deal of anxiety in South Africa\(^5\). Members of the Opposition made repeated

pleas that South Africa should not isolate herself from the developments in Africa, and emphasised the need to retain Commonwealth ties lest she become "a lonely little republic in dangerous isolation".¹ Optimism about South Africa's role in African affairs was well on the wane by 1958, kept alive by half-hearted statements by Government spokesmen. Considerable alarm was expressed by the Opposition that the Afro-Asian Conference at Cairo had classified apartheid most definitely as "colonialism" according to the Conference definition, and that this rendered both South Africa and her Allies extremely vulnerable to international pressure.² Apartheid had thus succeeded in antagonising the majority of the world's people outside the Union, and within the Union, had succeeded in establishing a united Bantu nationalism with diminishing inclination to co-operate with the Whites³.

A new tack in the strategy of the Opposition is seen in the emergence of a greater emphasis that South Africa's domestic policies were inextricably woven into the thread of

1. Ibid., Vol. 98, Col. 4135 (De Villiers Graaf) (18/9/1958)
2. Ibid., Vol. 96, Col. 81 (22/1/1958)
3. Ibid., Vol. 96, Col. 608, Major van der Byl quoting Professor Pistorius (30/1/1958)
African history and could not be disengaged, for the Cold War was being waged for the "political soul" of the people of Africa. Apartheid was described by the Opposition as the greatest bar to amicable relations with other states in Africa, but the persistent administrative difficulties involved in the exchange of representatives could not easily be resolved, despite constant Opposition niggling on this point. The Government continued to claim that South African participation in bodies such as FAMA and CCTA was far more beneficial than diplomatic exchanges and that the newly formed Africa Institute would provide the means for greater understanding between South Africa and the rest of the continent.

1. See for example the speech by Mr. Durrant, S.A. House of Assembly Debs. op. cit., Vol. 100, Col. 2932 (20/3/1959) "... it is fundamental ... to remember in developing any foreign policy, that we cannot legislate in isolation, because what we do here within our borders, has repercussions in Africa and what happens in Africa is bound to have repercussions in the life of our country."

2. Ibid., Vol. 101, Col. 5465, Mr. Greyling (6/5/1959)

3. Ibid., Vol. 101, Coll. 5502 and 5510 (11/5/1959) and (11/5/1959)

4. Ibid., Vol. 105, Col. 5536 (19/4/1960). These claims were somewhat deflated by Mr. Durrant's figure for the annual expenditure - £29,000.

Opposition disillusionment in the years 1958-60 destroyed any shred of truth in the Government's assertions that the whole Parliament was united in its stand on international affairs. With the Opposition's lack of commitment to the infallibility of apartheid they were more able to acknowledge its importance in international affairs. As Mrs. Suzman exclaimed: "I want to know what sort of a mad defiance campaign does this country think it can carry on against the rest of Africa, against the East, against the Iron Curtain countries and now even against the Western democracies!"

The long drawn-out publicity of the South African Treason Trials was exacerbating the increased tension within the Commonwealth regarding the admission of Ghana to the Commonwealth. The British Secretary of State for the Colonies had announced the desire of the British Government that Ghana should achieve her independence within the Commonwealth, although it was maintained that this question of full membership

1. Ibid., Vol. 105, Col. 5680 (20/4/1960)

   NB. the concern at this time, that the Bantu were so sufficiently well-disciplined that for many weeks thousands had walked 18 miles each day during the bus boycott. S.A. House of Assembly Debs., Vol. 93, Coll. 739 et seq. (6/2/1957)
must be answered only by all the members of the Commonwealth\(^1\).

The South African Prime Minister persisted in referring to the "precipitate action" of granting self-government to the Gold Coast, reminding the British that although this was their business, it also had grave repercussion in South Africa. (Shades of the "wind of change")\(^2\).

The admission of Ghana caused a stock-taking of the advantages of Commonwealth membership - one member could show his lack of apprehension of the climate of hostility engendered by apartheid by asserting that South Africa had been a great asset to the Commonwealth, for, with its own racial policies, it had shown the Commonwealth how it might overcome its own racial problems!\(^3\) The Opposition urged the Prime Minister to attend the forthcoming Conference\(^4\) because of the increasing tendency for the world to isolate South Africa. (Even the U.S.A. with a quickening interest in Africa had shown no desire to openly co-operate with South Africa.\(^5\)

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1. Mansergh (Docs., Vol. 3,) p. 40 and p. 50 (Lord John Hope).
3. Ibid., Vol. 94, Col. 5265, Mr. Greyling. (2/5/1957)
4. Ibid., Vol. 94, Col. 5416 (6/5/1957)
5. Ibid., Vol. 95, Col. 7618 (10/6/1957) - reference to Mr. Nixon's visit to every African state except South Africa and the Rhodesias.
The observation may be made that, once the South African Government had accepted the inevitability of Ghana's membership in the Commonwealth, it embarked on a policy of deliberately down-playing its significance. In a great show of spirit, Mr. Pouché warned Ghana that she was still a back-bencher amongst the states of Africa, apparently to quell any incipient delusions of grandeur amongst the Bantu in neighbouring protectorates. On a more official plane, the Government chose to send a "public servant" to Ghana's inauguration an action condemned by the Opposition as flying in the face of the much-repeated Government claim that South Africa should become a bridge between Africa and the West.

Just how far some opinion among South African Parliamentarians varied from the spirit of MacMillan's policy is reflected in the following extract from a speech by a Government member: "We know that these concessions to political demands involve the dishing out of political baksheesh to power-drunk Blacks." On the other hand, it cannot be doubted

1. Ibid. Vol. 54, Col. 5463 (6/5/1957)

2. Mr. Waterson's term - Ibid. Vol. 95, Col. 7618. He comments on the fact that the U.S.A. sent Mr. Nixon and the U.K. sent a Secretary of State. (10/6/1957).

3. Waterson again. "... the rest of Africa and the West will eventually combine to isolate us." Ibid. Vol. 95, Coll. 7620 and 7664 (10/6/1957) and (10/6/1957)

4. Ibid., Vol. 105, Col. 3044 (9/3/1960)
that some members of the Opposition were able to view external affairs with great elasticity and perhaps more realism. This extract from Mr. William's speech is typical of the views of those South Africans who were not irrevocably committed to apartheid; "... and no matter how courageous and how right you may think you are, if, in the historical background you are out of phase with the world, then you are in danger."¹

Increasing hostility towards South Africa as shown by British Labour circles, and the obvious lack of an international means for South Africa to combat hostile propaganda², contributed to the growing sense of impotence in the battle to defend apartheid. As the independence movements progressed to their rapid climax of self-government in the period 1959-60, the traditional threads of debate in South Africa tended to recur with greater frequency. These may be generally defined as follows:

(1) the concern at the mushrooming of Black states all over the continent;

¹ Ibid., Vol. 105, Col. 5640 (20/4/1960)
(2) anxiety at the much-publicized, and perhaps over-emphasized Afro-Asian solidarity movements;¹

(3) the tendency to identify, or confuse African nationalism with Communism;²

(4) the stress laid on the desirability of becoming a republic, in order to substantiate claims to being a permanent White community in Africa;³

(5) the increasing tendency for erstwhile allies to register their disapproval of South Africa in the U.N.;⁴ and

(6) the lesson to be learned from the fate of the White man in countries such as Kenya with the implication that any concessions to the Bantu would bring about a blood-bath in South Africa.⁵

The intensification of the feeling of hostility from the world in general did nothing to abate the absolutism of apartheid theories. In fact it succeeded in hardening the resolve of the Nationalists, ideologically attracted to the path of righteousness in the face of overwhelming odds, and

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1. Ibid. Vol. 100, Col. 2906 (20/3/1959)
2. Ibid. Vol. 100, Col. 2922 (20/3/1959)
3. Ibid. Vol. 100, Col. 2901 (20/3/1959) (Dr. Verwoerd)
succeeded in including many hitherto non-Nationalists in the development of the "laager mentality". Thus the difference between the macrocosmic views of the colonial peoples able to return home to Europe, and those of the South Africans - a people who, since Smuts, had had no Weltanschauung, but who were interested simply in preserving their national identity. South Africa's domestic affairs were inter-acting with international events over which she had no control and, in many ways, the pressures of multi-racialism within the country, the threats from other African states, the hostility in the U.N. and the wavering sympathy of the Commonwealth, fostered the birth of a far wider concept of South African nationalism than Afrikanerdom had previously tolerated.¹

From the viewpoint of a country besieged, South Africa saw seventeen new states emerge in 1960 (including Nigeria), and Tanganyika and Zanzibar were hovering on the brink of Commonwealth membership². The South African Government continued with its gloomy prognostications about the future of nationalism on the continent, preferring to dwell with masochistic interest on the brutalities and excesses in the

1. In the context of fighting Black domination, the Nationalists were able to see a collective fate of European civilisation in Rhodesia, Kenya, the Portugese Territories and the Union which transcended political barriers. c.f. Ibid. Vol. 85, Col. 4528 (4/5/1954), Vol. 88, Col. 4158 (19/4/1955), Vol. 91, Col. 4427 (26/4/1956).

Congo as evidence of their fears.

Macmillan's much celebrated "wind of change" speech, was, in a sense, the point of culmination for the collision forces operating between Britain and the Union in the vital issue of African policy-making. In many ways, the speech said nothing that the British Government had not said many times before regarding its attitude to Africa and the Commonwealth. Its significance lies in the fact that it was unmistakably an ultimatum issued by a British Prime Minister in the South African Parliament - complete anathema to the Nationalists and psychologically devastating for a people who resented British meddling almost as much as they feared the "Black Peril". Despite this, the immediate reaction amongst the White South Africans was not really as marked as the reaction among the African nationalists both in South Africa and elsewhere, for within a few days the speech had been translated and circulated to nationalist cells throughout the country.

Within six weeks of the speech, the tragedy of Sharpeville exploded on the tense country. A spectacular sequence of events focussed the attention of the world on South Africa.

1. Included in Appendix D pp. 312-17.

2. It is interesting to note the die-hard Tory reaction to this speech. See for example, Lord Kilmuir, Political Adventure, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1962, pp 314-17.
for a prolonged length of time. More riots in Johannesburg and Langa, followed by the attempt on the life of Dr. Verwoerd, ensured that the world's interest was maintained. Tremendous revulsion was expressed by many Governments throughout the world, some of them entering the circle of critics for the first time. With critical observers within the country adding to the furore, the whole colour problem was laid bare to the already sensitive conscience of the Western world and the ever-ready condemnation of the non-Western nations. Even the most fanatical supporter of apartheid could not ignore the fact that the world had chosen to interpret Sharpeville as dramatic proof of the intention of the Government to maintain White supremacy in South Africa. It was this sense of the obvious permanence of apartheid that succeeded in alienating even those countries struggling with multi-racial problems within their own borders.


2. See for example, Reeves R.A., Sharpeville, Gollanéz, London, 1960


4. Reeves op. cit. p. 78. "History, I believe, will recognise that Sharpeville marked a watershed in South African affairs. Life can never be quite the same again for any racial group in the Union ..."
It was in this unprecedented limelight, with so many new states at the point of independence\(^1\), the fate of the Central African Federation in the balance, and the whole world aware of the "battle of the mind" in Africa, that the Commonwealth Prime Ministers met in London, primarily to discuss the admission of the Republic of Ghana to the Commonwealth.

U.N. precedent had already established, at least for the majority of the members of the Commonwealth (as well as all the aspiring members), that apartheid was not simply a domestic issue, and it was with this in mind, with the publicity surrounding Sharpeville adding to the indignant righteousness of some of the members, that the Commonwealth adopted a more uncompromising stand on the question of racial policies in the Union.\(^2\) For the first time, the Commonwealth acting as a concert of nations made it unequivocally clear to the world that it was an association based on the ideal of multi-racialism. It seems almost

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1. Between 1947 and 1961, the Arab, Asian and African States, taken together, increased from 25 to 47 per cent of U.N. membership. 

2. It is noted that purists insist that discussion took place only after the acquiescence of Mr. Louw.
incredible that a South African representative, could, at that stage, sincerely believe that he might be able to persuade the Commonwealth that apartheid was not without some merits in the attempt to solve the tremendous problems of South Africa's multi-racial society. South Africa, already judged by the U.N., the world press and Afro-Asia, must now be judged by the Commonwealth which had hitherto upheld as a virtue the fact that it was not a court.

The 1960 Conference in London showed that there was no lingering doubt that South African racial policies were inimical to the spirit of the Commonwealth and there seems no justification for the claims that the Commonwealth had not made its collective will clear on the principle of racial equality. The South African Nationalists should not have interpreted events in the previous decade in any other way. They could not interpret the mood of the Conference in any terms of ambiguity. The *justice* of apartheid was no longer relevant in the context of Commonwealth discussions.¹ South Africa was faced with the invidious choice that had been latent since 1948, either to amend her racial policies and thereby destroy the Nationalist conception of South Africa

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as a nation-state, or to maintain apartheid without the forum provided by Commonwealth membership and attempt to bolster the exclusive nationalism of Afrikanerdom by emphasizing the isolation of the nation by universally hostile forces. Thus the traditional threat from the Bantu within the country had been augmented by the growth of a continent-wide militance which had become increasingly articulate and had reached a position of dominance in the councils of the Commonwealth.

South Africa had become the test case of the sincerity of those who expounded a belief in the concept of racial equality in a colour-conscious world.

That Britain remained at least mildly hopeful that South Africa might be kept within the Commonwealth was not in any sense an equivocation on this issue of multi-racialism, but rather a forlorn hope that the South Africans might respond to the offer for a compromise in the period before the following Conference. Macmillan's speech in Oslo in June, 1960, adequately summarized Britain's attitude:

"We must make terms with change, not battle with it uselessly. The result of failure in the exciting task ahead in Africa, might be that it would become a terrible danger, not only to ourselves, but to the whole free world."
South Africa's point of reference for "terrible dangers" lay much closer to home; her definition of failure in the task of Africa was clearly divergent from that of the British and her concept of Commonwealth (for long dominated by self-interest) could no longer embrace the desirability of continued membership.
CHAPTER SIX

THE INDIANS IN SOUTH AFRICA
Another complicating factor in South Africa's relations with the Commonwealth has been the existence of a large group of Indians within the Union. This chapter is concerned only with the South African Indians as an out-group impinging on the security of the white South Africans. Chapter 7 deals with the international support given to the Indians and its bearing on South Africa's decision to withdraw.

Of the five racial groups in South Africa, the Indians are by far the most complex in stratification and segmentation. Numbering approximately half a million, they are divided along religious and linguistic lines which are correlated with socio-economic status; the most profound cleavage is that between Muslims and Hindus, the former being, generally, the wealthier. The religious groups are further sub-divided along linguistic lines, which make inter-group contact and inter-marriage difficult and rare. Another divisive factor is the distinction between "indentured" and "passenger" Indians - the latter considering the former socially inferior. Western criteria of status too, are being increasingly applied - education, income and occupation are growing in importance as determinants of social group membership.

Unlike the Coloureds, the Indians have a language and a religious and cultural difference which accentuate their ethnic differences in the South African society. They resist assimilation,

1. Van den Berghe, (South Africa) op. cit. p. 65.
2. 3% of the total population of South Africa.
3. Van den Berghe, (South Africa) op. cit. p. 65.
4. Gujarati or Urdu-Muslims; Tamil, Hindi, Teluga and Gujarati - Hindus.
5. Van den Berghe, (South Africa) op. cit. p. 66.
at least to the obvious extent of retaining the Indian languages, despite the widespread knowledge of the two official languages.

The retention of allegiance to two world religions has retarded cultural assimilation, and despite the almost complete acculturation of the younger, professional elite, certain aspects of the Indian way of life (cooking, family and kinship structures and dress for women) have shown great resistance to change. The European stereotype of the Indian is based on the small merchant class, but the majority are unskilled labourers, with a number of small traders and a few wealthy property owners and merchants. Their unassimilable qualities have largely determined the progress of their political development and have caused them to be treated as "outlandish" elements by successive South African Governments which, until 1961, sought to reduce the Indian population to the "lowest possible minimum" by a policy of repatriation (regardless of place of birth) to India.

2. In 1951, only 21% spoke no European language - 62% spoke English - Van den Berghe, op. cit., p. 43.
4. Van den Berghe, op. cit., p. 44.
5. Ibid., p. 67.
This use of the notion of an alternative homeland for Indians has undoubtedly caused the hardening of prejudice against Indians since the earliest days of their permanent settlement in South Africa.

Indian settlement in South Africa originated under the indenture system for sugar plantation workers, which began in 1860. A committee inquiring into the possibilities of a sugar-cane industry was told in 1852 that it was impossible to rely upon the Kaffir-population to supply a permanent and effective supply of labour. This could be ensured only by the introduction of "foreign, free coloured labour". This was despite the fact that the Native races then out-numbered the Whites by about ten to one. When in the 1860's the British settlers in Natal began to cultivate sugar, Asians were brought in as indentured labour. Many stayed on after completing their indentures as free labourers, small farmers, shopkeepers, traders and domestic servants. By 1885, however, the European settlers in Natal were showing opposition to free Indians becoming rivals and competitors in agricultural pursuits.

1. As in the case of the English-speaking group.
5. Roskam, op. cit., p. 43.
This opposition took practical shape in the form of discriminatory legislation, which began with the law excluding Indians from citizenship rights in the Transvaal in 1885\(^1\). In 1893 a tax was levied on every Indian worker who had completed his indenture, and on every Indian woman and child over 16 years\(^2\). This had the objective of forcing the Indians home and was followed, in 1896, by the exclusion of Indians from the franchise of Natal\(^3\). The British administration under Milner, in the period following the Boer War, did not remove the colour bar from the gold-mines in the admission that they could not defy popular feeling\(^4\). Pass laws were enacted in the Transvaal in 1906 and this provoked a protest campaign, led by Gandhi, which caused great consternation in the South African Government\(^5\). The Indian Government stopped the recruitment of labour and the South African Government took immediate action to prohibit free immigration, in the realization that another complicating factor in South Africa's already complex society\(^6\) would be intolerable.

2. The annual tax was £3 - equivalent to six months' wages.
3. Marquard, op. cit., p. 86. No Indians have ever been allowed to settle in the Orange Free State.
5. Roux, op. cit., p. 104
The "coolie problem" grew after the cessation of immigration from India and, by 1924 it was acute, particularly in the Transvaal, where property values were lowered by proximity to Asian slums. This gave rise to the proposal of a Class Areas Bill for the segregation of Asians. This was met by furious opposition, but was followed by an even stronger measure in 1926 which, in turn, led to the Cape Town Agreement, providing assisted repatriation to India and better conditions for those who remained.

The consistent policies of successive governments in South Africa who regarded the Indians as being a foreign element, led to the harshness of the legislation which followed the failure of the repatriation scheme. The Smuts Government, despite the passive resistance campaigns in Natal, and bitter opposition in the U.N., passed the "Pegging Act" in 1946. This restricted land purchase by Indians and was the fore-runner to the even harsher Group Areas Act of 1950 which was used as a lever to encourage Indians to leave the country.


Their economic position was particularly vulnerable, and economic ruin for the whole community was forecast. Of the total population of Indians in the Transvaal (48,892) 38,367 were faced with eviction. Indian traders were faced with the complete removal of their custom and were to be forced to trade in restricted areas.

The official attitude of regarding Indians as aliens was not reversed until 1961, when they were formally admitted to the plans of apartheid. A Department of Indian Affairs was established and Indians were given much the same machinery for political expression as the Coloureds. The Indian Council was to consist eventually of elected representatives with legislative and administrative powers in respect of all matters directly affecting the Indian community, and who would consult with the Government and with Ministers on all matters of importance to the Indian community such as opportunities for employment, industrial development and the development of local government.

3. Van den Berghe, (South Africa) op. cit., p. 152.
5. The first meeting was on March, 1964, with 21 appointed advisers.
Although the Indians may be approximated with the Coloureds as far as political and economic status are concerned, they are differentiated in their social status by the European attitude to them. The Indian stereotype is that of a sly, dishonest competitor, whose intelligence, greed and high birth-rate pose dangerous threats to peace in South Africa¹. The economic basis for European prejudice against the Indians holds true in the case of the African antipathy for them also². This flared into open violence in the Durban riots of 1949, which created as Indian mistrust of the excesses of African nationalism. The Indians, traditionally competitors for the African market, have now assumed the position of scapegoat - usually ascribed to the Jewish community in some other Western societies³. For such a long time regarded as unassimilable, they still retain the stigma of being a foreign element in South Africa. European hostility to them has been increased by India's attitude to South Africa in the U.N. This has re-inforced charges that the Indians have another loyalty to another homeland and as such are potentially subversive elements in the Republic⁴.

1. Van den Berghe, (South Africa) op. cit., p. 152. Van den Berghe, (Caneville) op. cit. p. 211.
2. Van den Berghe, (South Africa) op. cit., p. 169.
4. Ibid., p. 158.
How have the Indians responded politically to the long history of discrimination and alienation in South Africa? The parent body of Indian political associations is the Natal Indian Congress, established by Gandhi in 1896. He introduced the tactic of passive resistance against the pass laws in the Transvaal in the period 1906-14 and gained a measure of relief without intrinsically changing the pattern of discrimination. In 1920, the South African Indian Congress was established, composed of the provincial Indian Congresses of Natal, the Cape and the Transvaal. Until 1943, it was controlled by moderates, who favoured the gradual development of the Indian community towards full citizenship rights and equal economic opportunity. However, the left-wing elements of the Congress had gained ground during the thirties, and Dr. Dadoo's joint protest with the African and Coloured communities against the "servitude scheme" strengthened a hope for the effectiveness of Non-European co-operation.


2. Ibid.

Their invidious position as scapegoat for both European and African economic ills, and the widespread fear that they may be replaced by African labour\(^1\) have held back any firm growth of Non-European unity,\(^2\) although Gandhian techniques influenced all liberatory movements, at least until the late 1950's. It is at the policy-making level that the Indian political leaders could influence the Non-European Unity Movement, which with African numerical strength\(^3\) and Indian funds and organization\(^4\) could mitigate the mutual distrust and obscure the organized separateness of apartheid. The "Pegging Act" brought to the forefront the militant intellectuals of the Indian Congress and changed the emphasis of the movement to the furtherance of Non-European unity, with the objective of gaining political rights for all the coloured races of South Africa by means of passive resistance campaigns.

1. The Indian National Congress has tended towards greater co-operation with the A.N.C. - De Beer, op. cit., p. 22. Neame, op. cit., p. 96.


against discriminatory legislation.\textsuperscript{1}

This take-over by the militant group precipitated the founding of the South African Indian Organization in Natal in 1947. It differed fundamentally from the Congress in that it shared Golding's view on co-operation with the Government. It is significant that its leaders are, in general, the better-off traders, who have a vested interest in maintaining some aspects of the status quo\textsuperscript{2}. Thus the dilemma faced by all the Non-European political organizations - co-operation or non-co-operation with Government. The appeals to India\textsuperscript{3} have also had an ambivalent reaction upon the Indian political movements - they provide them with an international forum for voicing demands and grievances, but they endorse the charges of disloyalty and political treachery laid against them by the Whites. Officially admitted to the plans of apartheid in 1961, the Indians now maintain their official status on a level between Coloureds and Bantu, but also retain their "alien" qualities for other South Africans who view with concern the economic activities of other Indian groups in East Africa.

\begin{enumerate}
\item Horrell, op. cit., p. 5. N.B. U.N. S/6073, op. cit., p. 37. "The Indian people had asked for no special privileges and had thrown in their lot completely with the other oppressed people in the struggle for human rights, for justice and for liberty."
\item Van den Berghe, (Caneville) op. cit., p. 211.
\item Carter, op. cit., p. 363.
\end{enumerate}
CHAPTER SEVEN

INDIA VS. SOUTH AFRICA
The moral massacre, the murder, the rape of religion
Many were the agonies borne to spawn the child
That had been kicking the womb
For a century and a half .......
The maggoty corpse rotting in the well, the stenching camp,
The shivering refugee and the violated virgin.

Death Disease Destruction

We know that there were no anaesthetics;
The Caesarean was painful.
But was that labour worth it after all ? ..... 
Ask the starving Kisan, and the struggling baboo in the city office;
Or question the politician who betrayed them with a kiss.
The fact, of course, is this :
In spite of the rickets the teething child shows promise.
A decade is nothing in the history of a people.
Let us wait for the morrow.

Reginald Massey.

"The Child"

O'Donnell, op. cit. p. 386.
A purely arbitrary distinction may be made between the internal manifestations of the "Indian problem" in South Africa and its external or international concomitant - the problem with India, although South African statesmen have found this distinction to be anything but clear-cut, especially in the years following World War II. The chief feature of the problem with India has been the inter-action of the U.N. and the Commonwealth revealing both the confusion arising from dual membership and the widely varied approaches and attitudes of the respective members. As the South Africa-India issue in the U.N. has been dealt with in detail by T.B. Millar in The Commonwealth in the U.N. (Sydney University Press, Sydney, 1967), I have avoided the duplication of most of the details. For the purposes of this thesis, general observations may be drawn in order to reveal the fact that the intra-Commonwealth concern for the racial policies in South Africa, although not being displayed openly in Commonwealth proceedings, was certainly being developed and perhaps exacerbated in the United Nations. The seeds of dissension for South Africa in the Commonwealth had been planted early in the U.N. and were to be carefully nurtured by a decade of anti-colonialist revolution.

1. See for example, Smuts, quoted in Louw, E.H., The Case for South Africa, Macfadden Books, New York, 1963, p. 23: "In South Africa, the Indian problem would never have attained its present dimensions, or even reached the U.N., if it had not continually been exploited from India, as a political weapon and as a means to further India's political aims."
As the Afro-Asian group representation increased in the U.N., so also did the force and effect of India's campaign against South Africa.

The U.N. proceedings reveal the contrapuntal attitudes of South Africa and India towards the functions and the purpose of the U.N.: India's generally a-legal outlook\(^1\) clashed with South Africa's steadfast concentration on the legality (or otherwise) of the issues before the U.N., or on its subsequent activities\(^2\). The Indian delegation self-consciously avoided every temptation to build the U.N. on legal rather than "moral" or idealistic grounds. On the other hand, South African delegations persisted in the use of legal arguments in a field where sentiment and lofty ideals (or at least lip-service to them) were to prevail.

Another major consideration which must be taken into account in a description of the India-South African confrontation is the increasing tendency for India to proclaim herself the spokesman for the liberated ex-colonies and those countries still struggling under the yoke of imperialism, particularly in Africa and Asia.

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This tendency brought the attendant result that South Africa was to be closely identified with the colonialist Western Powers. As the most blatant "European" exploiter of native peoples in Africa, she became the ever-convenient scapegoat for the sins of colonialism and imperialism. Her racial policies, then, enjoyed the ambivalent position of being a source of acrimony for the Afro-Asian nations and a tremendous source of embarrassment for the West which was increasingly anxious to avoid the interminable charges and confrontations of the anti-colonialists. Thus South Africa found herself in a cleft stick, particularly as those Western Powers without an economic interest in South Africa were tending to show a mounting sympathy with the anti-South African bloc.

The actual campaign "to compel South Africa to submit to the pressure of so-called 'world opinion'" embodied two major tactical approaches. The first was the earlier concern shown only for the treatment of Indians in South Africa. This gave way to the more general consideration of all the racial policies of the Union after the 1948 Election had spot-lighted apartheid in South Africa. From the First Session, India raised the issue annually, with the South African delegation stubbornly refusing to recognise the legality of any discussion of her racial policies, claiming that any such discussion contravened Article 2 (7) of the Charter for long a matter of grave concern for South Africa.

The first case submitted by the Indians against South Africa, under Articles 10 and 11 of the Charter, was based on three main issues:

(i) That the South African Land Tenure and Indian Representation Act of 1946 resulted in the complete segregation of the Indians in commerce and places of residence. This was considered to be a uni-lateral repudiation of the Cape Town Agreement\(^1\), and, therefore, of international concern.

(ii) This same Act was a violation of the U.N. Charter provisions concerned with human rights and freedoms\(^2\).

(iii) A situation had arisen which was likely to impair the friendly relations between India and South Africa\(^3\).

The vexed question of the Cape Town Agreement was doomed to a future of repetitious charges and counter-charges. The South Africans categorically rejected the treaty status of the Agreement, preferring to describe it simply as the formulation of "mutually acceptable policies"\(^4\).

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2. *United Nations Bulletin*, 1946, p. 31. The Act was referred to by Mrs. Pandit as the "ghetto law".


Resolution 44 (1)\(^1\) rejected South Africa's application of Article 2 (7) of the Charter\(^2\), the interpretation of which has been a source of dissension throughout the history of the U.N.\(^3\)

After only three years of membership in the U.N., South Africa was, as early as 1948, showing an almost cynical disillusionment. Many South Africans believed that the U.N. had developed "into a gigantic grouse against the White world"\(^4\) and that it had become a major irritant in Native relations\(^5\) in South Africa. Very early demands for South Africa's withdrawal\(^6\) from the U.N. culminated in the "token representation" of 1956-58\(^7\).

In the Sessions following 1948, the Indian delegation increasingly asserted that some humanitarian questions were of interest to all mankind and that apartheid was one such question.\(^8\)

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2. On August 31, 1948. For a discussion of this rejection see South African House of Assembly Debates, Vol. 70, Col. 1290 (14/2/50)


5. Ibid., Vol. 70, Col. 1494 (16/2/1950)

6. Ibid., Col. 1493, Vol. 82, Col. 57 (7/7/53) "The U.N. will break down the Commonwealth". (The Prime Minister).


By 1952, the fact, if not the legality\(^1\) of the annual discussion\(^2\) of apartheid, had been established. India was now constantly seeking justice for the "long-sinned-against millions"\(^3\), and South Africa's stolid assertions that the U.N., by permitting interference in South Africa's affairs, was sowing the seeds of its own dissolution\(^4\), lacked the emotional attractiveness of the Indian claims.

With the increasing emphasis on "fundamental human rights" South Africa's attitude vacillated between the legal-literal interpretation that "human rights were left uncertain, vague and nebulous concepts in the Charter, and that members could not, therefore, be said to have undertaken any obligations in respect of them"\(^5\), and secondly, the rather unconvincing ideological stance that differentiation between the races in South Africa did not constitute a violation of the human rights and fundamental liberties enunciated in the Charter\(^6\).

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1. At the first Session, both U.K. and the Netherlands had also been concerned with:
   (a) "Whether there were international obligations and if so, whether they had been violated
   (b) The correct interpretation of Article 2 (7) of the Charter

2. Excluding only the Fourth Session.


4. It is interesting to note the change in the 20th Session - c.f. Millar p. 141. Also the warning by OAU in 1967 that the world must treat the Biafran revolt purely as a domestic concern for Nigeria.


6. Ibid., p. 685.
Either claim was too inadequate to prevent the discussion of South Africa's policies for the acceptance of "humanity" and "morality" in international politics was by far out-weighting the desirability of legal considerations, particularly in any instance of White domination. The change in approach to the U.N. is revealed clearly by the White Commonwealth countries. In the early years of the U.N., they had supported South Africa's objections to the illegality of discussion of her domestic affairs but, by 1953, they had recorded their opposition to any policy of racial discrimination and by 1956 only the U.K. and Australia were left as embarrassed supporters.⁴

With the growing consciousness of the potential force of Afro-Asian co-operation in the U.N., Western dismay at South Africa's intransigence became more justified.⁵ The Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung (1955) showed "special consideration of the Union of South Africa and the position of people of Indian and Pakistani origin"⁶ and incited Nehru to state that

1. It is difficult to determine how much of the U.K.'s support was derived from the embarrassment of repeated references, by India, to Lord Salisbury's nineteenth century assurance that Indian migrants to South Africa "would be free men in all respects, with privileges no whit inferior to those of any class of Her Majesty's subjects resident in the Colonies. See Foreign Affairs Record, Vol. 1, (1955) p. 242.


"there is world-wide opinion today against the Union of South Africa".  

It was ironical that South Africa, with her immovable insistence on legalism in the U.N., should see Menon, armed with Oppenheimer's definition of Article 2 (7):

"The exclusion of the right of 'intervention' on the part of the U.N., must be interpreted by reference to the accepted technical meaning of the term .... It does not rule out action by way of discussion, study, inquiry, recommendation, falling short of that type of intervention".  

Thus in a sense a coup de grace had been delivered and world opinion of apartheid needed only the impetus of Sharpeville for a nuanimous condemnation of South Africa.

Nehru's campaign in the U.N. throws into relief his cautious appraisal of the Commonwealth in the period 1947-61. Because of the honoured convention that the internal affairs of member countries were sacrosanct in Commonwealth meetings, it was obvious that India's Commonwealth association could not achieve the international forum for expediting the attainment of self-respect

for the coloured peoples subordinated by colonialism. From the point of decision to remain in the Commonwealth, Nehru appreciated that the benefits of Commonwealth membership would be more abundant if political dissension was referred to the world body and not to the Commonwealth itself. His assurances made to the Indian people about retaining Commonwealth membership in 1949 abound with phrases concerning both India's historic mission\(^1\) and the "distasteful"\(^2\) policies of some members of the Commonwealth. It is obvious that he meant to reconcile these policies and the sense of mission:

"We stand for the freedom of suppressed nationalities and for the ending of racial discrimination. I am convinced that the Sovereign Indian Republic, freely associating herself with other countries of the Commonwealth, will be completely free to follow this policy, perhaps in an even greater measure and with greater influence than before."\(^3\).

1. Nehru - Opening speech at the Asian Conference 1947 - "Standing on this watershed which divides two epochs of human history we can look back on our long past and look forward to the future .... Asia after a long period of quiescence has suddenly become important again in world affairs." Mansergh N., *The Commonwealth and the Nations*, (R11A) Oxford University Press, London, 1948, p. 100.

2. Nehru. op. cit., p. 133.

3. Ibid., p. 133 (10/5/49).
Re-iterating this theme, he justified his refusal to bring the issue of the South African Indians within the ambit of Commonwealth discussion. This might have meant that the Commonwealth would have come to be considered as some kind of superior body, "which sometimes acts as a tribunal, or judges, or in a sense supervises the activities of its member nations. That would certainly have meant a diminution in our independence and sovereignty, if we had not accepted that principle. Therefore we were not prepared, and we are not prepared to treat the Commonwealth as such, or even to bring disputes between member-nations of the Commonwealth before the Commonwealth body."

This extract raises a number of interesting questions. Were the Indians after independence able to enjoy a greater sense of objectivity in their U.N. membership - completely free of any direct historical backwash (associated for some with Commonwealth membership) with accompanying fears of impaired sovereignty? Was the refusal to see in the Commonwealth an avenue for chastising South Africa simply a foreshadowing of intensified Indo-Pakistani disputes and their potential for disrupting the flow of Commonwealth aid, consultation and co-operation?

1. Ibid., p. 139 (It is interesting to note that R.G. Menzies said much the same in the Smuts Memorial Lecture in 1961. The context was no longer valid.)

2. Ibid. p. 158.
Was it simply based on the correct appraisal that South Africa and the "White lobby" were still the predominant forces in the Commonwealth? Whatever the reasons, it is clear that India sought the means of retaliation against South Africa in the U.N. and not in the Commonwealth. The wider forum and the greater support in the U.N., were able to bring about the transformation of the Commonwealth so that Nehru's patience would not long be tried by "distasteful" policies. By the mid-fifties, Nehru was able to predict with some accuracy that the nature of the emerging Commonwealth would be such that South Africa would either have to conform or to withdraw¹.

Mounting pressure on the White Commonwealth members in the U.N.² and on pro-Commonwealth Indians in the Lok Sabha forced the Commonwealth to re-appraise itself as an entity, for the forces opposing South Africa were questioning the validity of India's claim to speak for dependent peoples while she remained associated with South Africa³. As we have seen in other sections in this thesis, the year 1960 was the flashpoint in the concern for racial problems in South Africa. The emotional and somewhat over-played

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3. Ibid., Vol 6, (1960), p. 27 (Speech in Lok Sabha).
reaction to Sharpeville ensured that any remaining half-hearted Western support for South Africa would be dissipated. At the U.N. Seminar on Human Rights, \(^1\) India lost no opportunity for lambasting South Africa for "contravening the human rights and human civilization" upheld by the Charter of the U.N. \(^2\) Thus the outspoken attitude of Commonwealth members to South African racial policies at the Conference in London \(^3\) (3-13 May, 1960) received the endorsement of the international body within a few short days.

Nehru's long campaign had now succeeded in amalgamating the Commonwealth and the U.N. in a general disapproval of South Africa. The U.N. had been instrumental in hastening the evolution (perhaps revolution) of the Commonwealth although it was unable to change the rigidity of the policies of the member it was anxious to castigate and/or reform. \(^4\) The Commonwealth's virtual ultimatum to South Africa at the 1960 Conference had the effect of creating an ostensible cohesion or unanimity of members in support of the principle of multi-racialism as the over-riding ideal of membership.

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2. *Foreign Affairs Record*, Vol. 6, 1960, p. 130
4. T.B. Millar, op. cit., suggests that India was more concerned with achieving condemnation of South Africa, rather than achieving accommodation with her. p.145.
Thus Krishna Menon's statement in the General Assembly of the U.N. in the preceding year became applicable to the Commonwealth as well "...there is not a country in the world, including my own, where there is not discrimination based on race, caste, creed or colour or whatever it may be .... But equally, there is not a country in the world except the Union which is not trying to get away from it. The difference between the apartheidists and the others is that the latter recognize it as evil and recognize the error and weakness that is theirs in still permitting it."¹

International disparagement and ostracism for South Africa had been achieved in a revolution in the Commonwealth in less than a decade and one-half. But how little was achieved in either ameliorating the general rigidity of apartheid or in dissipating gravely cynical attitude of South Africans to the lofty ideals mouthed so glibly in the U.N. It is no wonder that the South Africans, especially the Afrikaners, tended to consolidate in the face of the campaign led by India.

Again one must question the efficacy of the idea of using international isolation as a punitive measure. In terms of the improvement of material and political well-being of the Indians or, for that matter, any of the non-White groups in South Africa, the U.N. - Commonwealth campaign achieved nothing. Conversely, one must consider how much it succeeded in destroying the liberal forces at work in South Africa, and in contributing to the "laager mentality" and intransigence of the pariah.

1. Ironically, in 1961 the Indians in South Africa were officially admitted to the plans of apartheid.
CHAPTER BIGHT

CONCLUSION
"The silence of the winter night was broken in the early hours of this morning in cities, dorps and country places of South Africa, by the officially joyful ringing of bells. They are tolling in the hearts of all true lovers of the Union. Never has a republic been born under a less auspicious star. The South African Government leaves the Commonwealth, having already, thanks to those who have held power for the last thirteen years, lost the friendship and respect not only of British countries but of the world. The only questions being asked outside the Union now are how long will this racial tyranny last and how, if at all, can the transition to a happier, more just and stable state be made without bloodshed..."

The Times, 31/5/61, Editorial

"So has our Republic come. Come from our God. Our altar was our bulwark. Our belief our shield. Our history was our conscience. Had it depended only on the ingenuity of our people, then would the ship of our people have sunk in the stormy waters of the Referendum on Wednesday, 5 October 1960. But the boat has arrived safely. Arrived with its crew! Just as the Ark of Noah arrived on the mountain top. The sun-tinted mountain top of our people's dream of freedom. Of this memorable occasion of the beginning of the Republic, David writes this very afternoon: 'The net has been broken and we have become free.' "

Dr. G.J.J. Boshoff on the occasion of Republikeinse Dankfées, October 15, 1960.

When reviewing and evaluating the various pressures operating on South Africa in the context of Commonwealth relations, three major issues arise: (i) multi-racialism; (ii) Afrikaner republicanism; and (iii) the significance of the enforced withdrawal - each of them playing a significant part in the formulation of South Africa's decision to withdraw.

Bearing in mind the fact that the Commonwealth's criticism of South Africa was based on the apartheid policy, the most fundamental question seems to be whether the Commonwealth had a clearly articulated racial policy which enshrined opposite concepts to those underlying apartheid. If the answer to this question is positive, then Dr. Verwoerd should have been far less sanguine about the "formality of the acceptance" of South Africa's application for renewed membership following her change in constitutional status.1 It cannot be proved that the South African electorate fully appreciated (or had been encouraged to appreciate) the fact that multi-racialism had indeed become the driving force of the Commonwealth Association. Had the electorate shown awareness of this fact, then the collision between South Africa and the Commonwealth may well

have been temporarily postponed. If, as the evidence suggests, the Commonwealth Conference in 1960 emphasized the multi-racial spirit of the Commonwealth to Mr. Louw, then Dr. Verwoerd must be credited with having forced the issue of the republic to expedite the end of South Africa's involvement in the Commonwealth: it must be remembered that this was the traditional objective of the National Party.

Given the fact that the Commonwealth had expressed its belief in multi-racialism, a further line of enquiry must explore the distinction between the articulation of a policy of multi-racial equality and the actual execution of its practical applications. If, as it was stated, the most objectionable feature of apartheid was its permanence then one must question the motives of some of South Africa's most bitter opponents. There is considerable evidence of widespread political and


2. Mansergh (Docs. Vol III) op. cit., p. 362. Part of the 1960 Conference communique reads - "The Ministers emphasized that the Commonwealth itself is a multi-racial association and expressed the need to ensure good relations between all member states and peoples of the Commonwealth".

social discrimination in other Commonwealth countries such as Ghana\(^1\) and Ceylon,\(^2\) to say nothing of the actual plight of India's untouchables.\(^3\) Perhaps the greatest negation of the contention that it was the permanency of apartheid which alienated the Commonwealth, is the existence of the Malay-Chinese "compromise" in Malaya. The "special position" privileges of the Malays, written into the Constitution, may not have introduced any precedent\(^4\) in Malaya, but they bear a marked resemblance in type to the "special privileges" enjoyed by the White South Africans.\(^5\) Tunku Abdul Rahman's comment after the 1961 Conference: "It is a good thing that South Africa has left the Commonwealth of her own accord. With apartheid out of the way, the Commonwealth can now become

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2. On the treatment of Tamils in Ceylon see Ingram (Commonwealth for a Colour Blind World) op. cit., p. 52.


5. Ibid. p. 206.
a living force\textsuperscript{1} seems, at best, incongruous; at worst, hypocritical. Malaya's racial compromise appears to be as permanent as apartheid, even if one somewhat purblindly ignores (as did the Commonwealth) the South Africans' insistence on "separate development" which would lead eventually to a Commonwealth of South Africa.\textsuperscript{2} In this sense apartheid (at least in the sense of a policy of baaskaap) was certainly not permanent. One is led to the conclusion that there was a wide disparity between the exposition of the concept of multi-racialism and the execution of the implicit practical policies, and that there must have been a great deal of tongue-in-cheek speech-making on the theory of "unanimously accepted multi-racial Commonwealth".

A closer analysis of the motives of South Africa's Asian and African opponents must necessarily appraise the effect of anti-imperialism and anti-whitism as self-consciously aggressive phenomena of Afro-Asian nationalisms at a time when imperialism and white supremacism were very much on the defensive. The 1961 Conference took place within 15 months of Sharpeville

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and immediately following the attainment of independence by seventeen African states,\(^1\) all of them to some extent influenced by negritude and anti-whitism. It might well be argued that South Africa's racial policies put her beyond the pale, simply because they provided a most blatant example of European exploitation of coloured peoples. That the great pressure from countries not innocent of racial discrimination was strong enough to obscure or suppress South Africa's counter-charges, is, in effect, a fair indication of the apologetic posture of those suffering from "white guilt".

\(^1\) Commonwealth Survey 1960, pp. 1208-09

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The Afro-Asian pressure succeeded in destroying a cherished convention of the Commonwealth - that Conferences might not discuss the internal affairs of a member - and this reflects the influence of the U.N. on Commonwealth Affairs. The U.N. had long considered discussion of South Africa's racial policies as a "hardy perennial," despite Article 2 (7)\(^1\) of the Charter. That this U.N. precedent was observed at the 1960 Commonwealth Conference (albeit with the token "acceptance" of Mr. Louw) adumbrated a new procedure for future Commonwealth meetings.\(^2\)

The insistence that everyone pay lip-service to multi-racialism had so far transformed traditional proceedings in the Commonwealth that it was obvious that there would probably be future forays into domestic affairs. The Commonwealth was forced to face the fact that the old criteria of membership had been rendered obsolete by the spirit of multi-racialism, or perhaps more cynically, the verbal support of the concept.

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1. See Appendix "D" pp. 266-68.

2. N.B. Menzies's concern that this might happen: *Australia, House of Assembly Debates*, Vol. H/R 26, April 1960, pp. 639ff. "We may well find that, the door having been opened ... somebody will be willing to assert sometime or other in the same circumstances that we, in relation either to our own internal population or to the population of our Territories, are also subject to international condemnation and international jurisdiction."
So far, we have been concerned with the withdrawal as if it were solely a product of external pressure upon South Africa. A second consideration must be made that the decision to withdraw may have been inevitable in the more restricted context of Afrikaner - British relationships. It may be convincingly argued that the antipathy of the Afrikaner towards the British provided cogent enough reasons for withdrawal and that the external pressure may have been only marginally influential. The psychological forces at work in the ideological basis of Afrikaner nationalism, when considered with the specific causes of collision, - the vexed question of the Protectorates, the Indian problem, representation of the Coloureds and, more recently, the ever-widening gap between the respective responses of the British and Afrikaners to the claims of African nationalists - were formidable barriers to an indefinite continuation of a political association in the form of the Commonwealth. The ethos of Afrikaner nationalism, centring around a people besieged, must have been an important factor in the making of Verwoerd's decision.

The final issue raised by the study of the withdrawal is concerned with the use of ostracism as a punitive measure in the conduct of international affairs. There are two factors which arise in the context of South Africa and the Commonwealth.
The first is to consider the attitudes of those who sought to apply enforced isolation,¹ the second is to review its effect upon South Africa.

The immediate Commonwealth reaction to withdrawal was to express the belief that South Africa's departure would have a cathartic effect on the Commonwealth and would remove any lingering traces of overt or implied racial inequality (or more accurately, white supremacy).² In one sense, this was an end in itself. South Africa's departure gave ample publicity to a moral victory of the coloured world over a European nation - and with the acquiescence of other Europeans.³ In another sense, the treatment meted out to

1. For a brief resume of the reactions of Commonwealth leaders, see Commonwealth Survey (1961) p. 364. For a more detailed information see Mansergh (Docs.Vol III) op. cit. pp. 365-400.

2. The Spark (Ghana) 19/2/65 "We were in the forefront in making sure that it (the Commonwealth) was cleansed of the presence of the South African Government, and if it had not been for our determination, then no doubt South Africa would still be a member." See also Ngubane op. cit., p. 239 "Her virtual expulsion from the Commonwealth indicates that even within this family of nations which still has its Notting Hills and Naga problems, race oppression is strongly disapproved."

3. Padelford and Emerson, op. cit., p. 29 "A consensus was reached in accordance with the way the winds were blowing."
South Africa would provide an object lesson to other potential transgressors - Australia in Papua-New Guinea, Australia and Canada in their immigration policies and Britain in her handling of the Rhodesian crisis.¹ In other words, the Commonwealth had become a court, able to pronounce judgment on the domestic affairs of its members - in the interests of "racial equality."²

The ambivalent reactions of the British and the Australian Governments to the decision to withdraw shows their respective awareness of the dangerous new precedent, Australia, in particular, being uncomfortably conscious of the vulnerability of the "White Australia" policies. The British seem to have been more concerned with preserving the best of two worlds, of retaining both their key position in a multi-racial association and the profitable economic relationship with South Africa.

South Africa's withdrawal, then, from the British point of view,

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1. Mboya op. cit., p. 245.
In the light of the "new" Commonwealth's determination to achieve complete racial justice in the context of its definition, the 1964 edition of the Commonwealth Relations List carries a somewhat vague and perhaps vain assertion: "There is no legal or formal obstacle to any member pursuing a policy diametrically opposed to that of any other member.

2. Balewa, Nigeria Speaks : The Speeches of Sir Abu Bakar Tafawa Balewa, p. 91. "There is no question of such an action being interference in the internal affairs of another country - the policies at present being followed by the Government of South Africa constitute a threat to the peace of the world."
may be seen as a compromise: the gesture was made, the Commonwealth asserted the majority will and the coloured members were publicly appeased. On the other hand, South Africa's Commonwealth association had been for many years, largely a bi-lateral association anyway, and it seems clear that Britain had no intention of changing the essence of this, despite warnings from the Commonwealth that she must curtail her economic involvement with South Africa.¹ (British investment has shown a steady annual increase, notwithstanding persistent threats of "imminent" revolution in South Africa.²

1. Cf. Kenyatta J., Harambee: The Prime Minister of Kenya's Speeches, Oxford University Press, London, 1964, p. 46. "Another crucial matter which was emphasized by the African leaders ... (at the Commonwealth Conference in London, 1964) ... was that of South Africa. We pointed out that some Commonwealth countries treated South Africa as though she was still a member of the Commonwealth despite her continued racial policies. We also called for a complete ban on the supply of arms, compliance with the U.N. resolution and application of economic sanctions."
   See also Burke Fred, Africa's Quest for Order, Prentice Hall, New Jersey, 1965, p. 135 cites a similar warning given by Mboya in 1961.

2. By 1963-4, South Africa provided a larger market for British exports than the combined Commonwealth countries of Africa - Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Uganda and Kenya. (£225 million compared with £175 million.)
   Cf. Austin, op. cit., p.39. South Africa takes 5% of total British exports per annum.
   Cf. Ibid. p. 18.
What appears (to the "new Commonwealth") to be British cynicism in the question of trade may, in fact, have been born of an enlightened evaluation of the inadequacy of ostracism with its implicit termination of dialogue to improve the living conditions of South Africa's non-European population. Alternatively, it may have been stimulated by a sincere desire to retain a multi-racial Commonwealth (for reasons of prestige, sentiment or idealism) while at the same time avoiding any major upset to an already precarious trading pattern.

Appreciation must also be shown for the tremendous complexity of attitudes involved for Britain in vocally subscribing to the ideal of multi-racialism and thereby removing one of the "old" Dominions from the Commonwealth and, at the same time, as the previous imperial mistress, being aware of the dragooning and bullying by states new to parliamentary democracy and international diplomacy. There is little wonder that to some die-hard imperialists in Britain the Commonwealth had assumed Frankenstein qualities. The Commonwealth as a whole had not remained universally faithful to either parliamentary democracy or independence of the judiciary, to name but two of the previously accepted tenets of membership, and it was clear that cohesion of interests and ideals would continue to wane as membership increased. In terms of national self-interest, Britain had very little choice (or, inclination perhaps) but to continue to enjoy the more tangible benefits of a bi-lateral economic association.
The African members of the Commonwealth have not been tardy in noting the fact that South Africa-British relations have not been transformed. Consequently, South Africa has remained, to some extent, a Commonwealth problem. The Commonwealth seems unable to force Britain to jeopardize her own economic position¹ for the sake of an ideal, supported by questionable sincerity². Britain's acquiescence in the enforced withdrawal may well have derived from the demand that justice must appear to be done.

The final aspect from which to review the withdrawal is from its effect upon South Africa. Ironically, perhaps the most marked effect has been the closer social and political cohesion of White South Africans. They have tended to consolidate against the hostility of the world. The English-speaking element has shown a more marked acceptance of the Afrikaner identification of "nation" with "state", as the exigencies of perpetuating White survival have militated against the historic factionalism of the European South Africa.

1. The notable exception to this has been the arms embargo imposed by Britain upon South Africa and confirmed in December 1967, despite the great loss to British industry and export trade.

2. Segal R. Sanctions Against South Africa, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1964, includes an interesting collection of articles on sanctions against South Africa.
The results of the 1961 election (Nationalists 53.5% of the popular vote) and the 1966 election (58.52%) have demonstrated the willingness of a greater proportion of the population to throw in their lot with the Nationalists, who at least provide a coherent opposition to international hostility. The Nationalists' gesture of appointing two English-speaking ministers to the 1961 Cabinet is symptomatic of increasing goodwill on both sides.

Another marked effect of withdrawal has been the increased spending on the para-military defence force, so that South Africa now boasts one of the best-equipped defence potentials on the continent.


2. The Nationalists increased their seats from 102 to 126 in this election. They received 758,345 votes - all other Opposition received 537,415. Cf. Africa Report (May 1966) "South Africa's Partition Election" p. 28 - Dennis Worrall.

3. Since Sharpeville, military expenditure alone has increased five-fold to £157 million in 1965 (20% of the country's budget) The Observer, London, September 11, 1966. See also an article "Where Might is White" in Economist, August 7, 1965 Supplement "A Survey of Southern Africa" p. vi. This defence build-up is seen by The Spark as having no other purposes than "to frighten the struggling African nationalists" (March 8, 1963).
Apartheid legislation has not declined, nor apparently has the Nationalist conviction that it will provide a valid and just solution to the country's complex racial problems. Conversely, the liberal opponents of apartheid have lost most of their legitimate channels for dissension, as the Governments' racial policy becomes increasingly identified with the only positive means of ensuring white survival. The traditional assertion by Nationalist leaders, from Hertzog to Verwoerd, that the attainment of a republic would result in a greater consolidation of White South African nationalism has been vindicated, whereas the political plight of the Bantu, Asiatics and Coloureds seems no whit improved by South Africa's withdrawal from the Commonwealth.

Verwoerd had made other predictions about the outcome of withdrawal, which were perhaps more factual and less intuitive. These were largely in the economic sphere, both in the contexts of trade with and investment by Britain, and in South Africa's

1. Dr. Verwoerd in a speech delivered on 17th March 1961: "Our trade and bilateral agreements need undergo no change. They include the maintenance of preferential trading agreements, South Africa's membership of the Sterling Area, defence agreements, etc. This is a comforting assurance. We need each other. With friendship and so many interests so intertwined to our mutual benefit this is a wise policy and will, I trust - and have reason to believe - become wise practice."
Cited in Legum (Crisis for the West) op. cit. p. 124.
domestic development. Although he was well aware that Commonwealth emotionalism and perhaps idealism over the concept of multi-racialism was against South Africa, in the economic sphere he could count on the considerable reliability of four significant factors which were more relevant to South Africa's prosperity than was Commonwealth membership:

(i) the relative stability of the British market;
(ii) as well as the stability of gold and wool, the broadening basis of South Africa's economy, especially the increasing diversification in manufacturing;
(iii) increasing foreign investment, e.g. by E.B.C. countries; and
(iv) increasing South African investment abroad particularly in mineral development (e.g. Anglo-American Corporation)

That his predictions were logically based and accurately fulfilled may be seen in the official statistics of the net national income:

1. Over 2/3 of the gold imported into Britain in 1963 came from South Africa. cf. Austin, op. cit., p. 158.
2. By 1964, manufacturing was contributing 26% of G.N.P.
3. Net National Income

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<td>3574.7</td>
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(All in Rand millions)
in the geographical dispersion of income\textsuperscript{1} and in the export trading figures, particularly those connected with South Africa-British trade\textsuperscript{2}.

\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
\textbf{YEAR} & \textbf{AGRICULTURE} & \textbf{FISHING} & \textbf{FORESTRY} & \textbf{MINING} & \textbf{MANUFACTURING} & \textbf{TRADE} & \textbf{OTHER} & \textbf{TOTAL} \\
\hline
1955 & 461.0 & 393.0 & 797.0 & 478.0 & 1248.0 & 3377.0 \\
1956 & 476.0 & 454.0 & 864.0 & 504.0 & 1322.0 & 3620.0 \\
1957 & 557.0 & 501.0 & 928.0 & 534.0 & 1439.0 & 3959.0 \\
1958 & 461.0 & 519.0 & 966.0 & 556.0 & 1530.0 & 4032.0 \\
1959 & 450.0 & 557.0 & 993.0 & 538.0 & 1636.0 & 4174.0 \\
1960 & 491.0 & 621.0 & 1058.0 & 572.0 & 1749.0 & 4491.0 \\
1961 & 509.0 & 656.0 & 1123.0 & 593.0 & 1831.0 & 4712.0 \\
1962 & 537.0 & 681.0 & 1228.0 & 635.0 & 1956.0 & 5036.0 \\
1963 & 568.0 & 719.0 & 1399.0 & 703.0 & 2093.4 & 5481.4 \\
1964 & 558.9 & 764.1 & 1698.2 & 784.6 & 2228.8 & 6095.6 \\
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2.

\textit{South African Year Books (1963 p. 316}  \\
\textit{(1964 p. 232}  \\
\textit{(1965 p. 233}  \\

\textbf{SOUTH AFRICA'S EXPORTS TO U.K. AND U.S.A.}  \\
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
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\hline
1959 & 219.4 & 223.1 & 249.9 & 241.9 & 272.0 & 301.0 \\
U.S.A. & 70.5 & 54.5 & 68.4 & 78.3 & 80.5 & 82.2 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

(All in Rand millions)
Although the Commonwealth had maintained its cohesion as an association of nations upholding the principle of multi-racialism, and in a sense, had achieved a political advantage, the South Africans could be pardoned for believing that the loss of membership would hold little sting for them. Their post-withdrawal prosperity seems to bear out the contention that the Commonwealth over-estimated the value of isolation (which was never complete anyway) as a means of disciplining a member who refused either to conform or reform.

Withdrawal from the Commonwealth as a response to multi-racialism - and a bi-lateral response at that (both from the South African and the "new" Commonwealth's respective viewpoints) held more vital significance for the Commonwealth for it forced a re-assessment of Commonwealth values to replace the old criteria of membership. The "re-modelled" association threatened to become increasingly irksome to Britain and perhaps the old Dominions. South Africa's withdrawal marked with dramatic emphasis the end of the White Commonwealth and the shifting of the political centre of gravity to the non-White members.

If we accept two contentions that firstly the isolation of South Africa was an imposition by the "new" Commonwealth (and not an achievement by the Afrikaners) and secondly, that it was not simply an opportunity for re-stating anti-imperialism and anti-whitism, then its short term effectiveness as a punitive tactic
was certainly miscalculated.\textsuperscript{1} It solved no problems for anyone but White South Africans and created new ones for the non-European population in South Africa, for the Commonwealth, and in the realm of international relations. The Commonwealth menace (inasmuch as it provided a venue of coincidence for the major traditional threats to Afrikaner nationalism) had been sidestepped and the values of Afrikanerdom were retained intact by the withdrawal. While it cannot be reasonably assumed that a Republic of South Africa is any safer in swimming against the tide of history, than in fact the Union was, it can be assumed that the republicans feel a greater security. They have asserted their national distinctiveness, consolidated their nation and are continuing to solve the problems of multi-racialism in their own way.

\textsuperscript{1} Nigeria, House of Representatives Debates (Fourth Session, Vol. 12, 1/8/63) p. 2430. M. Sule Abba Biu - "We thought that by expelling South Africa from the Commonwealth she would change her policy, but it continued and she even became more severe on the black people than she did before."
A NOTE ON THE COLOUREDS.

Apartheid had the deepest effect on the Coloureds in South Africa; a people\(^1\) who form a no-man's land in the international campaign against the racial policies of South Africa. Their significance for this thesis lies in a purely negative phenomenon. Of all the racial groups in South Africa, they were the only ones who had no international lobby to protect their particular rights. The very absence of a champion (outside South Africa) gives added weight to the contention that it was the double-barrelled nature of the hostile force (Bantu-Africans; Indians - India and English-speaking group - British) which led to South Africa's withdrawal from the Commonwealth. The Coloureds are the descendants of the mixed slave population of the early Cape and the remnants of the Hottentot people, together with a certain amount of European and Bushman blood\(^2\). They have been almost completely acculturated in European customs, language and religion\(^3\). The 1946 Census revealed that 89.1% of the Coloureds were Afrikaans-speaking and the 1936 Census showed that 92.1% were Christian\(^4\).

The geographical distribution of the Coloureds has made them elements of importance in some parts of the country\(^5\), with

\(^2\) This applies with less accuracy to a distinctive group - the Cape Malays - 40,000 who are kept separate by their Mohammedan religion.
\(^3\) Report of the U.N. op. cit., p. 441
\(^4\) Roux, op. cit., p. 354.
25% of the total Coloured population living at Cape Town and 88% of them in the Cape Province. The general urbanization of all population groups in South Africa since the 1920's has been reflected in Coloured population patterns also. In 1921, there were 45,612 more Coloureds in rural areas than those in towns, but by 1960, approximately 2/3 of the total Coloured population were urbanized.

Marais divides the development of the Coloureds into three clear periods:

(1) from settlement to 1828-38 when they were subjected to compulsory labour and acquired the skills and the habit of work which enabled them to survive in civilized society;

(2) 1838-1920's saw a development under the policy of laissez-faire; and

(3) the period following the 1920's when the state began the process of excluding the Coloureds from occupations they would have had under a system of free competition.

2. Marquard, op. cit., p. 75.
5. Marais, op. cit., cites examples: the Apprenticeship Act, 1922; the Industrial Conciliation Act, 1924; the Wage Act, 1925-6, p. 262.
The earliest official recognition of the political equality of the Coloureds and Europeans is seen in the Municipal Ordinance of 1836\(^1\) which provided for the election of Municipal Boards. The franchise regulations did not discriminate on the grounds of colour. In 1846, the principle of representative institutions for the Cape, was accepted by the Colonial Secretary on the understanding that there should be no political discrimination against the Coloured people\(^2\). In 1853, the Cape Colony obtained representative government, with European, Coloured and African males enjoying the franchise within the same property qualifications\(^3\), and sharing a common roll of voters. Nevertheless, the Coloureds did not play a significant role in the Cape Parliament, no Coloured man nominating for election to Parliament. This was in a sense a measure of their political contentment in accepting the European monopoly, for it does not appear that the Coloured people felt the racial cleavage in political matters, until the second decade of the twentieth century. On the other hand, the Europeans of the Cape Colony appear to have adjusted to the economic and political relationships existing between themselves and the Coloureds.

2. Ibid., p. 5.
The Coloureds have now and then been offered assimilation with the Whites, and in the early 'twenties, the Nationalists made assimilation a definite plank in the party platform, until they gained power in 1924\(^1\). Hertzog believed that as the Coloureds were descendants of Europeans there were no just grounds for separating them on political, economic and industrial lines\(^2\). However, the European attitude to them became increasingly ambivalent in this period and legislative measures began whittling away at their political status.

The Hertzog Government in 1930, enfranchised European women and in the following year, voting qualifications were abolished for European males, but were retained for Africans and Coloureds - further weighting the scales in favour of the Europeans\(^3\). Prior to 1930, the Coloured vote in the Cape was important in several constituencies\(^4\), with Coloured men being consistently returned to the Cape Provincial Council\(^5\). The final blow aimed at reducing the political status of the Coloureds was delivered in 1951 by the introduction of

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1. Roux, op. cit., p. 355. Even in 1928 Malan referred to the possibility of giving the vote to Coloured women.
4. Over 25% of the total number of registered voters in Cape Flats were Coloured. 20-25% in Paarl and Woodstock.
legislation to place the Coloureds on a separate roll. The Separate Representation of Voters' Act became law in 1956, after a constitutional crisis, and limited the Coloureds to no participation in the general elections and to the election of four members in the Cape constituencies.

The social development of the Coloureds in the nineteenth century, was marked by a laissez-faire attitude which allowed the Coloureds to "cluster" in the poorer parts of towns, or in the municipal locations which were established on the outskirts of the towns and villages. A survey by the Tuberculosis Commission in 1914, revealed the appalling lack of sanitation and the sub-standard houses. The influenza epidemic in 1918, momentarily stirred the conscience of European South Africa and initiated the Public Health Act in 1919, which empowered the Central Government to compel Municipal Councils to report on crowded conditions and insufficient housing. This seems to have achieved little improvement, for the Report of the Cape Coloured Commission (1934-7) showed that tuberculosis was still 4-6 times more prevalent among Coloureds than among Europeans.

3. Marais, op. cit., p. 259
Nevertheless, some Coloureds and Europeans shared the same residential areas until 1950, when the Group Areas Act was passed. By 1961, the group areas already proclaimed, made it clear that tens of thousands of Coloureds and Indians would have to leave their areas.

The Coloured community in general has been retarded by inadequate housing and clothing, inferior schooling and prevalent drunkenness - the latter being commonly ascribed to the "tot system" entrenched on farms employing Coloured labour. The chief avenues of employment have been in the building and printing trades, and as factory operatives, domestic servants, shop assistants and postmen. They have faced increasing competition from Bantu labour in the Cape Province and since the 1920's have suffered from state intervention, mainly in the interests of the politically dominant Europeans.

Coloured male workers receive 1/3 of the earnings of white workers and this disparity is present in professions as well - Coloured school-teachers earn considerably less than their European counterparts. They, with other professional Coloureds are particularly frustrated by the colour bar and bitterly resent their removal from the common voters' roll. They form

1. Marquard, op. cit., p. 83.
3. Marquard, op. cit., p. 84.
5. Ibid. p. 12. In mining it is only approximately 1/6 of white wage.
the potential elite for leading agitation against apartheid, because before 1948, they cherished the fact that they were administered on the European side of the colour-line.

The political organizations for voicing Coloured grievances, have been divided on the question of the degree of co-operation with Europeans\(^1\). The first political organization of significance, was the African Peoples' Organization\(^2\) formed at Cape Town in 1902 and which saw a rapid expansion to over 100 branches by 1907. Its direct political influence remained restricted to the area of the Cape Province. Its members traditionally voted "British" as against "Afrikaner"\(^3\). The leader of the African Peoples' Organization was Dr. Abdurahman, who in 1927, attempted to weld together the most influential non-European organizations, but his attempt foundered on opposition from a strong section of African opinion\(^4\).

A more recent and slightly more successful attempt had been the Non-European Unity Movement, which secures some support from African intellectuals and from the Coloured organizations which oppose the Government.

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1. Marquard, op. cit., p. 84.
2. Originally the African Political Organization.
3. An exception to this was the Afrikaner Bond which flourished in the period 1920-24. (Roux, op. cit., p. 84)
Anti-co-operation sentiment is directed specifically against the Coloured Advisory Council which was established by the Smut's Government in 1943. Many of the educated Coloureds feared this as a step to separate them politically and administratively from the Europeans and as such would be the fore-runner to further discriminatory on racial lines. Its establishment caused the greatest split among the Coloureds and initiated the Anti-Coloured Advisory Council group which includes many educated Coloureds who will co-operate only with those Europeans who support complete equality. Other leaders believe that more benefits lie in co-operation with the Government, and they support the Coloured Peoples' National Union which is being embarrassed by each extension of apartheid to the Coloureds.

The significant occasion when divisions of opinion within Coloured ranks were blurred in an uneasy alliance, was in the agitation over the introduction of the Separate Roll; but this was transient. The Coloureds remain the most politically


2. Later changed its name to the Non-European Unity Movement.

3. Marquard, op. cit., p. 84.
divided of all the non-European groups. They belong culturally to the Europeans\(^1\), who, in turn, display a variety of attitudes to the Coloureds, ranging from sympathy and guilt to the revulsion born of the deep-seated fear of miscegenation\(^2\). Many Europeans regret the loss of Coloured friendship which may have developed as a bridge between White and Black\(^3\), in a country where race relations are the dominant factor in politics.

The importance of colour as a criterion for deciding social status is reflected in the "going-over" of some Coloureds to the European side of the colour line. The personal suffering involved in the arbitrary definition of Whiteness is seen in the division of some families with varying colour shades\(^4\). Yet it cannot be said with certainty that the Coloureds are anti-white in their demands for higher living standards - they want the benefits inherent in equality of treatment with the Whites. What is clear is the possibility that the continual frustration of Coloured demands will accelerate the perceptible movement of Coloured organizations towards the Left\(^5\), and intensify unity with the more radical objectives and methods of the African nationalist groups.

4. Cope, op. cit., p. 29
## APPENDIX "B"

### CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS IN AFRICA AND SOUTH AFRICA 1948-61

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>AFRICA</th>
<th>SOUTH AFRICA</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>General election. Dr. Malan and the Nationalists in power. Government declares the intention of repatriating Indian population.</td>
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</tbody>
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1. This Chronology owes much to (i) Hatch J., (Africa : Today and Tomorrow) op. cit. pp. 314 ff; and (ii) Unesco (South Africa and the Rule of Law) op. cit. pp. 15-17.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Africa</th>
<th>South Africa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>Kabaka of Buganda returned with a new constitution. First ministerial system for Uganda.</td>
<td>Parliament passes a law to increase the number of judges on Appellate Division from 6 to 11 when sitting on constitutional cases. Senate Act increases the number of Senators from 48 to 89.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>Third general election in the Gold Coast. Nkrumah and C P P returned again. Seretse Khama returned to Bechuanaland. Togoland votes for incorporation in the Gold Coast.</td>
<td>South Africa Act Amendment Act gives force of law to the Separate Representation of Voters Act (1951) and limits competence of the courts to pronounce upon the validity of laws passed by Parliament.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>Government Commission (Tomlinson) submits plans for large-scale development in African reserve areas. Nationalist Government eventually triumphs in the struggle with the Courts. The Appellate Division (10:1) upholds the South African Act Amendment Act and the Senate Act, 137 South Africans of all races arrested on charges of treason. More arrests followed. December 19th - preliminary hearing. Mr. Louw announces South Africa's intention to maintain only token representation in the U.N.</td>
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<tr>
<td>DATE</td>
<td>AFRICA</td>
<td>SOUTH AFRICA</td>
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<td>DATE</td>
<td>AFRICA</td>
<td>SOUTH AFRICA</td>
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</table>
3. Zambia Congress banned in Northern Rhodesia. 
5. Devlin Commission on Nyasaland. 
7. Effective responsible ministerial government introduced in Tanganyika. 
8. Disturbances in Ruanda-Urundi 
2. Progressive Party formed under Jan Steytler; Lawrence - chairman. 
3. U.N. General Assembly adopted resolution expressing "deep regret and concern" that South Africa had not discarded its racial policy. Twelve Africans killed in Windhoek in South West Africa as police, supported by troops, opened fire on stone-throwing crowds |
| 1960 | 1. French Cameroons independent 
2. Basutoland primary elections for Basutoland Council. 
5. Algerian settler insurrection unsuccessful. 
6. Sierra Leone elections under the new constitution. 
8. Constitutional conference on Tanganyika Madagascar - independent (Malagasay) 
11. U.N. intervention 
12. Monrovia Conference 
2. "Wind of change" speech. 
3. Sharpeville massacre. 
4. State of Emergency declared (234 arrested) 
5. U.N. Resolution (Security Council) adopted called on South Africa "to abandon its policy of apartheid." (France and Britain abstained.) 
6. Attempted assassination of Dr. Verwoerd. 
8. Johannesburg police disclosed that more than 4,500 arrests were made since March 30. 
9. Mr. Louw attended the Commonwealth Conference in London. 
10. Affirmative Republic referendum result : For : 849,958 
Against : 775,878 |
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<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>AFRICA</th>
<th>SOUTH AFRICA</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960 (cont.)</td>
<td>Mali - independent.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Monckton Commission reports to British Government.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Nigeria independent.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Mauritania independent.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>C.A.F. conference in London.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Southern Rhodesia constitutional conference adjourns to Salisbury.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Northern Rhodesia constitutional conference opens in London.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>New Bechuanaland constitution.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Zanzibar elections deadlocked: a caretaker government established.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Primary elections in Kenya under new constitution.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Patrice Lumumba murdered in the Congo.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Southern Rhodesia constitutional proposals published.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Kenya elections.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Northern Rhodesia constitutional proposals established.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Third All-African Peoples' Conference in Cairo.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Uganda elections won by the Democratic Party.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Uprisings in Angola: suppressed.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Sierra Leone - independent.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Another unsuccessful Algerian settler insurrection.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Bechuanaland elections.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Tanganyika - self-governing - Julius Nyerere first Prime Minister.</td>
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APPENDIX C

THE NATIONALISTS AND THE REPUBLIC

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<td>Extract from a speech by Joseph Chamberlain (1903)</td>
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<td>Programme of Principles of the Nationalist Party (1914)</td>
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<td>Dr. Malan in the House of Assembly (1941)</td>
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<td>The Draft Constitution for a Republic of South Africa (1942)</td>
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<td>Motion by Malan in House of Assembly (1944)</td>
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<td>Extract from House of Assembly Debates (1949)</td>
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<td>Extract from House of Assembly Debates (1949)</td>
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<td>Dr. Malan (P.M.) in the House of Assembly (1953)</td>
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<td>Dr. Du Plessis in the House of Assembly (1956)</td>
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<td>Dr. Verwoerd's Letter in Die Burger (1960)</td>
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<td>Dr. Verwoerd's speech after the 1961 Commonwealth Conference. (1961)</td>
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1. Full titles and sources appear in the text.
As we have up to the present not succeeded in inducing the British Government to grant further assistance to our people, and as the needs are indescribably great, no other course is open to us but to apply to the peoples of Europe and America.

The people of the two Republics were prepared to sacrifice everything for their independence; and now that the struggle is over they stand totally ruined ... at least thirty thousand houses of the Boer farms, and, further, a number of villages, were burned or destroyed by the British.

In this great distress we now turn to the World with our appeal to help ....

The small amount which England will contribute, according to the terms of surrender, would, even if multiplied tenfold, be totally insufficient to cover even the war losses.

The widows and orphans, the maimed and destitute, and our children, for whom alone we make this appeal, will therefore, receive little, and in the most cases nothing, from this source ....

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1. Amery, op. cit. (Vol. IV) p. 91
EXTRACT FROM A SPEECH BY JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN.¹

... If the aspiration which we know existed in the minds of some, possibly of many, of our Dutch fellow-subjects - an aspiration for a separate Republic outside the British Empire; if that aspiration were renounced for ever; if we knew that the Dutch accepted with absolute sincerity our idea of a common State, one great difficulty at any rate would be removed. We want someone with authority to tell us that no longer in the history of this colony shall there be any racial or political or religious ostracism on the ground of loyalty to its institutions. We want evidence and I hope it will be forthcoming, that our Dutch fellow-citizens recognise that in the future their dealing is inseparable from ours, and that they are ready to share our pride in the Empire to which we all belong; that they are ready to accept their full share in its obligations as in its principles ......

Referring to his Nylstroom speech General Hertzog said it was the policy of the Government that the South African (Africander) should be "baas" everywhere in South Africa. He should be "baas" politically in the Administration and in the schools. The Government to which he belonged was a South African Government. He had said that South Africans should be "baas" at Grahamstown, Port Elizabeth, Uitenhage, and many other places, and the sentiment had been heartily welcomed. Colonel Byron was the first to object to it.

Only one person had the right to be "baas" in South Africa - namely, the South African. He could understand that statement was not in accordance with the policy of the Opposition, because there were few South Africans in the Opposition. There were a few misled men, but still true. Sir Percy Fitzpatrick was much upset at the doctrine of "Good South African and foreigner". What he (the speaker) did say at Nylstroom, was that the people had become conscious of themselves as a nation. They felt their own power. They had reached national manhood, and they felt that South Africans and not strangers should rule the country. Formerly they had been governed by people who were not South Africans, and who would never become South Africans. Now that they were capable of ruling themselves they would no longer allow themselves to be ruled by those who were not South Africans. That was what he had said at Nylstroom, that Colonel Byron need not worry about the South African being "baas".

He would be. He would not allow himself to be governed by foreign fortune-seekers ("fortuin zoekers") like Colonel Byron. He (General Hertzog) did not know why Sir Percy had taken offence at that, for no one could deny - certainly not Colonel Byron - that in the sense intended he is a stranger in South Africa, for he came from elsewhere. He (General Hertzog) had used the word "fortuin zoeker", and if anyone liked to translate it "adventurer" he could not help it.

Sir Percy thought it a pernicious doctrine that South Africa should be governed by South Africans. Was it pernicious that England should be governed by the English? Sir Percy could not pretend that he (General Hertzog) meant only the Dutch when he said South African. Grahamstown knew he did not, Port Elizabeth knew he did not, Uitenhage knew it, and even Nylstroom knew that

he had referred to all South Africans. In the same speech he had said that the journey of Sir Thomas Smartt and his confreres to Natal was useless, because the Natalians were South Africans. They had only to meet them to see that they were as good South Africans as the Dutch-speaking people. He (General Hertzog) had said South Africans should be "baas" but he wished to draw no line between South Africans and the outsiders.

That was the policy which Sir Percy had said was pernicious and appealed to the prejudices of ignorant, superstitious people. He could assure Sir Percy that among the people so described were many as well educated as Sir Percy and many who had a great deal more common-sense. He (General Hertzog) had said Sir Thomas Smartt was not a good South African and that Colonel Byron was a fortune-seeker. He meant that they had come to South Africa to seek their fortunes and had not yet become South African in feeling. As regards the Leader of the Opposition, he thought a man who was really a South African would not have advised that the Constitution of the Cape Colony should have been suspended. The least that could be said of a man who did that was that he was not a son of the people whom he served.

Speaking of the Opposition generally, General Hertzog said it was ridiculous the way in which they appealed for sympathy. Arguments they had none. If they had convinced South Africa of anything it was the unfruitfulness of their intellects. The only thing they prided themselves on was the support of the Government - where the Government was right. That was not difficult. "The difficulty is to be right ourselves and to get others to support us." The Opposition had expressed not one original thought and had shown no initiative. They simply trotted forth overworked platitudes and made pathetic appeals ad misericordiam, or else they tried to arouse suspicion. The outbursts that had followed Nylstroom he could only ascribe to suspicion, to a desire to cause nervousness, and to work on the feelings of the public, especially the English-speaking public. If any one deserved the name of criminal those people did who wished to gain sympathy in that way. There was absolutely nothing in his Nylstroom speech to which any South African could take exception. People like those who lived on the Rand, who came to the country to make fortunes and then leave, would be frightened of the speech, because they felt that their influence was in danger of being lost. There was, of course, nothing wrong in coming to South Africa to seek one's fortune, but what he did object to was these people ruling the country as against South Africans. Against that he would protest ....
1. THE NATIONAL PARTY represents the national conviction and aspirations of the South African people within the Union, and strives to develop and realise this conviction and these aspirations to the utmost blessing of the country and its people.

2. The party acknowledges the guidance of God in the destinies of countries and peoples and seeks to develop the people's life along Christian national lines.

3. The party recognises the necessity of fostering a strong sense of national autonomy and expressly declares that the interests of the Union and its people should be put before those of any other country or people.

4. The position of the Union in regard to its relationship towards the United Kingdom, resting on the good faith of two nations, is unequivocally recognised by the party. It is convinced that the maintenance of a cordial understanding between the Union and the Empire depends on a meticulous avoidance of any act whereby the political liberty of the people of the Union might be curtailed or restricted or whereby any of the liberties of the country or its Government might be withdrawn from the immediate supervision or control of the people of the Union.

5. The party recognises the just claims of the people of Union to mutual respect and free enjoyment of all that belongs to a people in respect to language, history, religion, customs and morals. By encouraging a feeling of true appreciation of these qualities the party strives to develop a sense of national worth and of a healthy national character.

6. The party recognises that the promotion of the spiritual, national and material welfare of the people is the duty and calling of the State. It is convinced that that calling may only be exercised by means of an impartial and conscientious official view of the rights and privileges of every part of the population, guaranteed by the Constitution.

7. The party recognises the right of every inhabitant of the Union to have the official language which is his own, acknowledged

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1. Programme of principles as approved of by the special congress of members of the South African Party, Orange Free State Province, held at Bloemfontein, 7-9 January 1914. Published as a pamphlet by Het Volk Drukkerij, Potchefstroom. Translated from the original Dutch by the present editor.
   Cited in Kruger (Parties and Policies) op. cit., pp 69-70.
in public offices or in the public service everywhere in the country, and to be served in that language by Government officials. The party declares, therefore, that the appointment of officials who do not possess the necessary knowledge of both official languages, is a negation of the rights and interests of the inhabitants.

8. As the maintenance of its rights and liberties is the first duty of a people, the party recognises the necessity of increasing the people's knowledge of the rights and liberties guaranteed to it by the Constitution as a free and autonomous people.

9. The party is convinced that the basis of the welfare of South Africa rests on the unity of the European population in a spirit of dedication to South Africa and of mutual esteem of and loyalty to their fellow-citizens, and further, that the achievement of this goal should be sought by firmly demanding that each section of the population be accorded its own rights.
II POLITICAL STATUS AND FUTURE

5. The Party is founded on the unequivocal recognition that South Africa is a sovereign, independent state, which possesses every right, and, on its own authority, can exercise all the functions of a state in the fullest international sense.

6. It undertakes to maintain this independence faithfully and to oppose by every permissible means any interpretations, tendency, action or policy contrary to or threatening such independence, and also to remove any inconsistency hampering the fullest realization of that independence.

7. It will thus ensure that the Government of the country is carried out on the basis of South African national principles and in the spirit of national autonomy as a free, sovereign and independent nation.

8. The unitary basis of a united South Africa, as laid down in the South Africa Act, will be upheld, and no power or right in conflict with or which can be applied in conflict with that basis will be granted to any province. The Party also declares itself in favour of retaining the provincial system, for the present.

9. The Party acknowledges without reservation the right of the nation to change its form of Government or state by constitutional means at any time, if it considers it to be in the country's interests.

10. It is convinced that the republican form of state, separated from the British Crown, is the form best adapted to the traditions circumstances and aspirations of the South African nation, and is also the only effective guarantee that South Africa will not again be drawn into Great Britain's wars.

1. Carter (Politics of Inequality) op. cit., pp 468.
11. While the Party thus declares itself in favour of the attainment of this form of state, it recognizes at the same time, however that a republic can be established only on the broad basis of the national will, and with the faithful observance of the equal language and cultural rights of the two sections of the European population. Accordingly it stipulates that this constitutional change can be brought about only as the result of a special and definite mandate from the European electorate, and not merely by a parliamentary majority obtained as the result of an ordinary election.

III NATIONAL FLAG

12. The Party declares emphatically that it views the national flag as the only exclusive symbol of our own South African nationhood and of the constitutional authority and power of the Union.
EXTRACT FROM A SPEECH MADE IN SOUTH AFRICAN HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY.¹

... Mr. Strydom: Nothing except this, that we have to induce our English-speaking fellow citizens, and the Afrikaners who are not yet sympathetic towards a republic, to become so. I go further and say that until such time as we have a republic in South Africa we shall never really have actual racial peace here. I would like my English-speaking friends to think about this. If there is really to be race unity in South Africa we must ultimately be entirely free from the British empire. I know it will be foolish to try and secede unless our English-speaking citizens concur in that respect, but inasmuch as true racial peace anyhow depends on it I think that just as we have gradually reached to this position of acknowledging the sovereign independence of South Africa, they will also ultimately agree with us, and gradually come to the idea that a republic is the best form of government for South Africa.

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¹. South Africa. House of Assembly Debates, Vol. 23, Col. 2099⁹ (1934)
Mr. J.G. Strydom: I just want to ask this: Are there any members on the opposition side who blame the Minister of Agriculture for having referred to their Prime Minister as a fanatic? If so, then I would like to have their views about the matter very much, especially those of the Minister of Justice. I think that that will suffice, so far as the charge of the Prime Minister of racialism is concerned. We who propose the motion are not inspired with racialism, as the Prime Minister accused us of being. No, we are inspired with the same ideals as those which he himself had when he sat on this side of the House. Our attitude is that we want to comply with the desires of the Afrikaner people, and the Afrikaner people do not want a national anthem which is nothing else but the national anthem of the conqueror. We want to have what other nations also want to have - those who cherish high ideals - we want to have our own national anthem, by which we can give expression to our own national pride, and to the things we are striving for. This motion has been moved with that object, and instead of the Prime Minister treating the matter on its merits, instead of his telling us - if he wanted to fight our point of view - why our people could not have their own national anthem, he has had recourse to the kind of charges that we heard made by him, and the arguments out of which I have read out a little jewel here. I want to say that this is our attitude, we do not want any German national anthem, no French national anthem, no English national anthem; we merely want one national anthem and it is the Afrikaans national anthem. What then is the attitude of the other side? One does not really know what it is, because they speak with so many voices that one does not know who is speaking on their behalf. We have heard here how the Prime Minister, by means of an amendment, set out the attitude of his party. But subsequently the Minister of Justice took up a different attitude, and we also heard what the Minister of Justice said in East London, namely that "God Save the King," if not the national anthem, then at any rate would be a national anthem of South Africa for ever. Do you really think that the Afrikaners will submit to the national anthem of the conquering nation always being their national anthem, and does he think that we as an Afrikaner nation will ever get our freedom for which he is longing so much, as long as that is the case? The attitude of the Minister of Justice, and the section of hon. members on that side which he represents, is that "God Save the King" will remain the or a national anthem of South Africa. In that way then he wants to conciliate his English-speaking supporters. But they go further, and the Prime Minister moves
in his amendment that we shall have no national anthem - according to his party, but on the same amendment for which he wants us to vote, the Minister of Justice comes - one can almost not credit it - but he comes in the same debate and makes the English-speaking people believe that "God Save the King" will remain the national anthem of South Africa.

Mr. Bezuidenhout : That is not true.

Mr. J.G. Strydom : Yes, I took it down, and the hon. member will, if he does not believe it, see that I am right when Hansard appears. He said the "God Save the King" would remain a national anthem of South Africa; he said it at least half a dozen times. What results now from the different attitudes which that side has taken up, what is the interpretation which the people in the country are to put on the different attitudes of hon. members in that party? I have the speech here of Mr. Charles te Water lately made in London. He there said -

South Africa consists of two races who are accustomed to lead a two-fold life in every respect. There are two languages, two flags, two capitals, and now two national anthems as well.

I do not blame Mr. Te Water at all for coming to that conclusion. How could he do other than accept it after the statement on these lines made by the Minister of Justice, to which we have constantly to listen? That is the conclusion to which any reasonable man would have to come. But now they go further, and to conciliate the Afrikaans-speaking people the Prime Minister says that there is in fact no national anthem, but he also says that in future, until such time as the people decide otherwise, "God Save the King" and "Die Stem" will be played on all occasions in which the state is concerned, and where the Governor-General is present. We also know that on such occasions when the Governor-General is present "God Save the King" is played first. This is what the Prime Minister wants to persuade us of, he says that we have no national anthem, but he pays all the honour to the national anthem of another nation, of England, which is due to a national anthem. On what occasions is "God Save the King" played officially in England? On all occasions when the King appears, on the opening of Parliament, at all state functions. Precisely the same thing will now take place in South Africa, and the Prime Minister is now giving to "God Save the King" all the honour which is shown to a national anthem. He treats "God Save the King" as if it were our national anthem. He merely gives another name to it and says it is a prayer. What is going to happen? Notwithstanding the fact that the Prime Minister says that there is no national anthem, he lays down the practice that "God Save the King" is to be treated as our national anthem. That is where the Minister of Justice and the Prime Minister act together. What is said by the Minister of Justice is carried out by the
Prime Minister and the party. In other words, whatever he may call it, "God Save the King" is treated as if it were the official national anthem of South Africa. What is more, he is going to show the same honour to "Die Stem" because everywhere, where the Governor-General appears, not "Die Stem" but "God Save the King" is played first. Therefore "God Save the King" is treated as the national anthem, and "Die Stem" is simply played as being complementary. If there is any hon. member on the Government side who wants to deny that they are going to use "God Save the King" in their party in the same way as every independent country uses its national anthem, then I will be glad if he will get up and say where they are not doing so. I should be glad if the Minister of Justice will, on a subsequent occasion, explain to what extent the use of "God Save the King" in South Africa will deviate from the user of "God Save the King" as national anthem in England. The Prime Minister also said that the procedure that was laid down, namely to use "God Save the King," which he called a prayer, as our national anthem in practice, would continue until such time as the people of South Africa decided differently. That means that as long as that Government maintains the British connection so long will South Africa never have its own national anthem. It is the policy of that side to maintain the British connection, to live under the British Crown, and as long as that is the case this practice will continue to exist. Or does the Minister of Justice want to tell me that as long as we remain a part of the British Empire the attitude of the English-speaking people in regard to "God Save the King" will also change.

Mr. Verster: Certainly not in view of the way you are carrying on.

Mr. J.G. Strydom: Yes, that is the hon. member who introduced a petition here which was to be signed, to the effect that "God Save the King" should no longer be played in the bioscopes.

Mr. Verster: To a point of order, that is absolutely untrue. I moved that "Die Stem" should be played, but what the hon. member says is absolutely untrue.

Mr. J.G. Strydom: I say that that is the hon. member who went to hon. members, not in this House, and he also approached me to sign a petition which he got from the students in Pretoria, to prevent "God Save the King" being played any longer in the bioscopes.

Mr. Verster: I say that it is untrue.

Mr. J.G. Strydom: I say that the consequence of the policy of the other side is that we shall never get a national anthem of our own. Just see the way in which the Prime Minister is charging us with wanting to force our national anthem down the throats of the English-speaking people, but for how many
more generations will the Afrikaners have to be satisfied with having "God Save the King" forced down their throats in future? Then I come to another question, because it was raised in the course of this debate as well. I ask how far the Government has decided to push "God Save the King" down the throats of the Afrikaners on the great occasion of the laying of the foundation stone of Voortrekker Memorial? You will remember that the Minister of Native Affairs said that such a decision had never existed, and not only did the Minister of Native Affairs say that but certain newspapers also supporting that side tried to mislead the people, they wanted to persuade the people that the Government never intended to have "God Save the King" played at the laying of the foundation stone of the memorial. To enquire whether that is true I want to go back to a report which appeared in the English press, because the Nationalist newspapers are always accused of publishing untrue reports. In the Argus of the 20th July 1938, I find the following -

The Government, I understand, will not hesitate to face the agitation against the playing of "God Save the King" and the flying of the Union Jack at the Voortrekker Memorial unveiling ceremony and will not countenance any attempt to detract from the national character of the ceremony.

Here we have in what is possibly the most important English newspaper the announcement on good authority, that the Government will allow "God Save the King" to be played at the laying of the foundation stone of the memorial. I also find that the Star of the 21st July, says the following in a leading article -

It is a matter for satisfaction that the Prime Minister has finally decided that the forthcoming Voortrekker Memorial ceremony at Pretoria in December shall be a truly national one, with all that that term implies. That the Prime Minister at the eleventh hour should agree to what was intended to be a national ceremonial assuming a purely sectional character would be the negation of all that the word "national" means.

Surely the Star is well acquainted with things, and that is what it said in the leading article of the 21st. Subsequently the Argus on the 22nd once more confirmed what it had already said, but in view of the tremendous storm of indignation which had arisen in the meantime, it started already to suggest that the Government should if necessary, abandon its proposed decision. Now we come to the statement of the Government itself. After they saw what a terrific storm of indignation had arisen amongst the Afrikaners throughout the length and breadth of the country, the Government fortunately came to its senses and on the 27th July published the following official statement in the public Press -
The Government thought that in order to attain this object it was desirable that the laying of the foundation stone of the memorial should be a state occasion in such a way that expression could there be given to the feeling which both sections of the people cherish for the Voortrekkers, and the spirit which inspired them. That would mean His Excellency the Governor-General, as representative of the head of the state, being invited to attend the ceremony, and that he should be greeted with the customary expression of honour.

In other words, the Governor-General would be received and "God Save the King" would be played and sung. Could the Government have an opinion, unless the Government had discussed the matter and come to a decision about it? It says "the Government thought". Then it continues -

It however appeared that in the present circumstances such an arrangement would lead to considerable unpleasantness and bitterness, and the fear arose that the peaceful development of our unity as a people would in consequence be handicapped.

That was why the Government abandoned the decision first come to.

Mr. Bezuidenhout: Are you quoting from Die Transvaler?

Mr. J.G. Strydom: The hon. member does not seem to understand that when an official statement appears in one and the same language in different newspapers it does not matter from what newspaper you quote. Can you imagine that a man like the Prime Minister, not to speak of other Afrikaners on the other side, was prepared in consequence of their change, so far as political beliefs were concerned, to commit an act of that kind against the standpoint and traditions of the Afrikaners? Can you realise that on this solemn occasion of the laying of the foundation stone of the Voortrekker Memorial, they were prepared to allow the national anthem of the conqueror to be played? The Voortrekkers, that stout generation, abandoned their homes and hearths in the south and trekked into the wider north to find a new home. Why? For the very reason of escaping the destructive protection of "God Save the King" and the Union Jack. Let us speak the naked truth. That is the reason why they trekked to the north to find a new home. But "God Save the King" and the Union Jack followed them up, and against their desires and will they were placed under the tyranny.

This little nation of ours has had a tragic past and became the prey, in the past, of many crimes and acts of cruelty which were committed under the Union Jack. Acts were committed which have hurt the Afrikaner people very much. I just want, in passing, to call to mind such occurrences as Slagters Nek, the three years war.
An Hon. Member: What about the National Scouts?

Mr. J.G. Strydom: In Bloemfontein there is a memorial which was erected in memory of 26,000 women and children who died. When an Afrikaner has reached the length of being ashamed to look at the women's memorial, then it is time to be desperate.

An Hon. Member: You want to make political capital out of it.

An Hon. Member: To us it is too sacred a matter.

Mr. J.G. Strydom: Most of these cruel acts against Afrikanerdom were committed by the conquerors, and now at this stage we would have to see possibly the greatest cruelty of all being committed against the Voortrekkers. All that those people went through in the past they passed through in consequence of their effort to get rid of "God Save the King" and the Union Jack, and now after 100 years an Afrikaner leader would be prepared to sully the memory of the Voortrekkers and to have "God Save the King" played in regard to what you can practically call the mortal remains of the Voortrekkers, and to have the flag of the conquerors flying over it. We speak of racial co-operation and peace in South Africa......

Mr. Johnson: How do you think that you are going to get it?

Mr. J.G. Strydom: I only want to say that if we want to get it we shall have to understand each other's point of view so far as this matter is concerned.

Mr. Grobler: You do not do so.

Mr. J.G. Strydom: If understanding each other means that on the occasion of the laying of the foundation stone of the Voortrekker Memorial you must have "God Save the King" played, then we will never get it. I want to go further: The Prime Minister said that the difference between us and them in this debate was that the Nationalist Party stood for a republic.

Mr. Grobler: What does the Act say?

Mr. J.G. Strydom: I am not concerned here with what the Act says. The Prime Minister was right. It is a cardinal point of difference between them and us, and I say with all seriousness that racial peace and co-operation are necessary, but that you will never obtain them as long as the anthem of the conqueror, and the flag of the conqueror, is played and is flown.
It will be a republic in which there will be no place for British public institutions. These things, which are foreign to the spirit and wishes of the Afrikander people, will be annihilated to the very foundations. It will be a republic with a government that is not subject to all sorts of foreign influences. General Smuts' holistic views, according to which the small Afrikaans culture must be dissolved in the great English culture, and South Africa be but a part of the great British Empire, will find no place in the Afrikaans republic. Mr. Hofmeyr's negrophilism and liberalism, which would wipe out all colour bars and would make the Afrikander a backboneless being, will have no place in this Afrikaans republic. Colonel Stallard's imperialism, which would make South Africa subordinate in all respects to British interests, will have no place in this Afrikaans republic. Mr. Madeley's socialism, and conceptions of the Afrikaans people, will have no place in this Afrikaans republic. The spirit of people who are too afraid to speak about a republic, will also find no entry in this republic. In economic policy this republic will be no milch-cow of Britain. It will be a republic in which the Chamber of Mines will not have authority. It will be a republic built up on the ideals and views of such men as Piet Retief, Paul Kruger and Marthinus Steyn.

Dr. Malan: You can plunge the country into war for the sake of England, or because England is at war, or for the sake of France, or for the sake of Poland, which was the immediate cause of the war.

The Minister Without Portfolio: What about our own interests?

Dr. Malan: You are able to do so on that side, we on this side were not in a position to prevent it. Once and for all we cannot approve of it, and the reason for that is that with us there is a completely different point of view, a completely different outlook with regard to this matter, with all the affairs of our country. We regard them from the point of view of South Africa's interests and South African nationalism, and you on the other side of the House regard them chiefly from the attitude of British Imperialism. I believe that, taken as a whole, there is no one in this House and no one outside of it who does not long for what is usually described as national unity. National unity is in the interests of South Africa, something desirable, something to be wished for, something to acquire which we ought to use all our powers of attainment. There will, however, be no national unity in the country as long as the difference which runs right through the history of South Africa, continues to exist in the country. While that lasts you will not get it. There are only two ways to get it, and the one is that we should all take up the attitude of the British Imperialist, that we should all also identify ourselves with the interests of a nation or a country overseas. If you do that then it means that South African nationalism will either be dwarfed or it must die. Only then will you in that way on that basis get national unity in the country. And the other alternative for getting national unity in the country is that everybody should take up the attitude that everyone should accept South Africa's own nationhood to the fullest degree, and not only accept it in words, but should as a matter of fact, live it out in practice. If everyone accepted that attitude you would also get national unity. I think, however, that experience in South Africa has taught us this - all the experience that we have had: That you will never get it as long as British Imperialism in South Africa can get a firm footing, as long as the British connection exists, and as long as by virtue of the British connection it can on each occasion be argued that there shall happen what happened here on the 4th September and thereafter. If you do not get

the length in South Africa of seeing that the British connection with all its implications, as interpreted here by a section of the population and by the Prime Minister and his followers, is broken, then the apple of discord in South Africa between one section and the other will remain. Then you will never get national unity here, but South Africa will then be doomed to eternal discord - unless the nationality minded section of the population is prepared to sacrifice the selfrespect of South Africa. There can be no peace between nationalism and imperialism and there can be no compromise of any kind. On the 4th September you on the other side, your Government, chose the Empire and we opposed it, because we took up a sound South African attitude, and because we did so, we opposed you. In connection with the arguments which are being used to justify the attitude of the other side of the House, especially the argument that they believe that they made the choice because it was in the interests of South Africa, I want to add the following: I think that I am saying here, without objection on the part of any unprejudiced impartial person, that if South Africa had not the British connection, if South Africa had not been linked up with England, then no one, no responsible section in the country when the war broke out, would have dreamt of being in favour of South Africa also taking part in the war. In addition, we do not believe in the view which you on your side hold as to what is actually our duty at the present time. Your idea of what our duty is is apparently this: That if there is anything wrong, if there is anything largely or radically wrong in any other part of the world, provided England also is concerned in the matter, then we must also interest ourselves in it, then we must also go and put right or assist in putting right the thing that is wrong. That you regard as our duty, just imagine. A small white population of 2,000,000, barely 2,000,000, living in a new and to a great extent still undeveloped country, a small population with big problems and questions looking it in the face, and a tremendous task to carry out, a task to maintain the white civilisation here, in South Africa, must solve the difficulties in other parts of the world! We in South Africa have that tremendous task, and the great questions stare us in the face, and we have a large section of the population living below the bread line. Just imagine! It is the duty of this small population to go and put right everything in the great world. And that while even England, as far as you can judge, is not prepared to go and put right what she decided and solemnly undertook to go and put right. England disapproved, and strongly disapproved of the annexation by Russia of three small states, Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia. I believe that there is no longer today any question of the giving back of their freedom and independence to those countries. We do not hear a word about it any longer. There was also Poland, the immediate cause of the war, and a solemn undertaking on the part of England to guarantee Poland's independence. Poland was cut in half. Germany got one part and Russia got the other part.
I would like to know from the Prime Minister - I have not yet heard it in a statement by one of the English statesmen - whether it is going to be an aim or object of the war that Poland should be made free, not only from Germany but also from Russia. I fear that in this case things will go as happened in the judgment of Solomon, where the pretended mother made the announcement: I am prepared if I get my way - and she would not even get her way - to see the baby divided in two. We do not believe that this war is being waged in the holy name of democracy and Christianity. It remains to be seen when this war is over what will remain of democracy even in England. We must not forget that England, as is already the case, but much more so at the end of this war, will be a completely exhausted country. There is no doubt about it that the properties classes, and more particularly the middle class in that country, will be completely eliminated, and in those circumstances what will remain of the old institutions in that country? Will England, in those circumstances, remain on a democratic basis, and do so after she has experienced to the full in this war, how effective and how efficient another system is? That is the question, and apart from the question whether England will remain a democratic country, there is the cry of Christianity, that that is the reason why we must carry on the war. That is the first time that I have heard that Christianity needs to be protected to be benefited by the sword. The most un-Christian principle to follow is the idea that Christianity is to be protected or promoted by the sword. Christianity does not need the sword. On the contrary, if Christianity has to be protected or promoted, or if an attempt has to be made to benefit Christianity by the sword, then it has always yet appeared to be a hopeless failure, and, what is more, to test the honesty with which these arguments are used - if England has got its way to establish the state of affairs which she tried to create by all the means she had in her power, then you would have had not only, as is actually the case now, that in this struggle for Christianity the whole of Jewry in the whole of the world at war, and giving every support, but you would also have had the Turks and the Russians, who have made history during recent years, of the un-Christian point of view, of an anti-religious State policy, which had become a tradition with them. Just imagine, Christianity must be furthered, and you fight shoulder to shoulder with the Jew, with the Turk and with the Russian. I do not believe that war was ever entered into by any Government in such a frivolous way as by this Government, and that it has been carried on in such a useless way as by this Government. If a Government plunges its country into war, then that in itself is a matter about which it should think twice, ten times and a hundred times before resolving on that step, and especially a war like this one, with its great devastation which is so serious and, in addition, a war which involves enormous expenditure, paralysing expenditure to a country like this. A government has to consider a long time before it goes to war. This Government did not hesitate for a moment. This Government undertook the task in spite
of the fact that they knew that they were not dealing with a unanimous population, but with a population which was deeply divided on the subject, and a population which was almost equally divided on both sides about this war. I say that for any government to go to war with a people which is divided in that way is nothing else than committing a crime against its people.
EXTRACTS FROM THE DRAFT CONSTITUTION FOR THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA.

The following Draft Constitution for the Republic of South Africa was published in DIE BURGER and DIE TRANSVALER on January 22 and 23, 1942. It was published by the authority of Dr. D.F. Malan, leader of the Herenigde Nasionale Volksparty, who became Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa in 1948. At the time of publication Dr. Verwoerd was an editor of DIE TRANSVALER. It will be interesting to note whether this Draft Constitution will be adopted by the recently determined Republic in substitution for the South Africa Act of 1909 which is the present Constitution.

The Draft Constitution reads as follows:

CONSTITUTION FOR THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

ARTICLE I

INTRODUCTION: In obedience to God Almighty and His Holy Word, the Afrikaans people acknowledge their national destination, as embodied in its Voortrekker past, for the Christian development of South Africa, and for that reason accepts the Republican Constitution which follows, to take place of all the existing regulations in law, which are in conflict with it, and especially with the total abolition of the British Kingship over the British subjects within the Republic.

ARTICLE 2 : THE STATE

(1) The name of the State is "The Republic of South Africa".

(2) The Republic is grounded on a Christian-national foundation and therefore acknowledges, as the standard of the Government of the State of, in the first place, the principles of justice of the Holy Scriptures; secondly, the clearest direction of the development of the national history; and third, the necessary reformation of the modern government of States, especially with an eye to the circumstances of South Africa.

(3) The Republic is as a perfectly sovereign and independent State, the successor of the rights of the Union of South Africa.

(4) The national Flag is the Vierkleur of the Old South African Republic, with the red band replaced by one of orange; the National Anthem of the Republic will be "Die Stem van Suid-Afrika".

(5) Afrikaans, as the language of the original white inhabitants of the country will be the first official language. English will be regarded as a second or supplementary official language which will be treated on an equal footing and will enjoy equal rights, freedom and privileges with the first official language, everywhere and whenever such treatment is judged by the State authority to be in the best interests of the State and its inhabitants.

ARTICLE 3: CITIZENSHIP

(1) All people whatsoever, settled within the bounds of the Republic, are its subjects and subject to its authority. They will retain their citizenship of the Republic, with a right to its protection, even when out of the country, unless they are subjects of a foreign State or have forfeited their citizenship.

(2) The white subjects who are acknowledged as members of the State by the Government, will be called "burgers", without distinction of race, as long as they do not abandon or forfeit their citizenship. Such recognition will only be accorded to subjects of whom it can be expected that they will act as builders up of the nation, whatever status they might have possessed before.

(3) Only "Burgers" can obtain the right to vote with regard to the Government of the Republic as such, and that on reaching their 21st birthday.

(4) The State may not bestow any titles (with the exception of academical degrees) or in any other way give rise to what might develop into class distinctions. Nor may any citizen accept titles from foreign powers.

(5) The State makes a call upon the consecrated national service of every citizen, in every capacity whatsoever, and has the power to make sure that the individual citizens, as well as the organs of public opinion, such as the existence of parties, the radio, the press, and the cinema, whilst their rightful freedom of expression, including criticism of the government policy, will be protected, shall not be allowed, by the actions, to undermine the public order or good morale of the Republic internally or externally.

(6) The State acknowledges the fundamental interests of the household and of a sound family life for the community, and undertakes to protect this against all onslaughts. The State especially recognises that, by her work within the house, the woman gives a support to the State without which the general welfare cannot be attained, and will thus ensure that mothers should not be forced by economic conditions to seek work outside of the house, where this might give rise to neglect of the household duties.
(7) The State grants recognition to all organisations which, within the national community exercise service to the State in different spheres, with deference to their internal independence.

(8) The State acknowledges the full freedom of the Christian Churches in their own spheres.

**ARTICLE 4: THE HEAD OF THE STATE.**

(1) At the head of the State will be the State President.

(2) Only a registered citizen of the Republic is eligible for the post of President.

(3) A citizen can be nominated as a candidate for the presidency by Parliament on a recommendation from the Cabinet (Minister-raad), or by the requisition signed by at least 2\(\frac{1}{2}\)% of the registered burgers.

(4) The State President is chosen by the registered burgers (citizens) within a period of three months before the term of office of his predecessor elapses, or within three months after the post has become vacant for any other reason. If only one candidate is duly nominated, he will be declared duly elected without voting, by the Chief Justice of the Republic, or his lawful substitute, under whose supervision the election of the State President must be held.

(5) The State President will hold this position for a period of five years from the date on which he takes up his work, unless he dies, resigns is put out of his position, as hereafter defined, or becomes permanently unfit, such unfitness to be proved before a Court consisting of the Chief Justice, supported by all the Judges of the Appeal Court. The State President is further directly and only responsible to God and over against the people for his deeds in the fulfilment of his duties, and in his actions in connection with the last-named as well as the carrying out of the holding of his office, he is altogether independent of any vote in Parliament.

(6) The State President may not be a member of Parliament, or of the Community Council, or hold any post of position to which any payment is attached, except the position of President.

(7) When taking up his high position, the President lays down the following oath and declaration: "In the presence of the Almighty God I declare solemnly and uprightly that I will serve the people of South Africa, will maintain the Republic
and do everything in my power to honour its constitution and laws and to cause them to be honoured. I shall put forth all my strength to further the good of the people and the welfare of the whole of the population of South Africa, to carry out all the duties laid upon me, to protect the independence, safety and honour of the Republic against all attacks, and to maintain the authority and respect for the Christian religion and the public Christian morals in this country. May the God of my fathers lead me and make me strong therein to the glory of His Name".

(8) The State President shall take the lead in all State ceremonies.

(9) The State President declares war and peace in the name of the Republic as hereafter defined.

(10) The State President stands at the head of the Defence force of the Republic, but the manner of the exercise of the supervision must be defined by legislation.

(11) The State President decides on all laws, which can only become valid by his personal signature.

(12) The State President is charged with the task of choosing a burger to serve as Head Minister, and with the approval of the State President, he must call together an Executive Council, to be known as the Council of Ministers, who, together with the Head Minister, will be responsible to the State President for the effective control of matters relating to the country. The State President also has the power to dismiss the Head Minister or any other Minister.

(13) The State President will summon Parliament, or prorogue it or dissolve it, on the recommendation of the Head Minister, unless the State President is convinced that the latter no longer is trusted by Parliament, when he will act according to his own discretion, either to relieve the Head Minister of his post, or to dissolve Parliament and to let a new election take place, as later defined (Article 6, para. 7).

(14) In time of National danger the State President can, within the period of his term of office, suspend the customary obligations as laid down in this Constitution, as long as it may be in the interests of the people and grant full powers to the Head Minister and the Council of Ministers, for the government of the Republic, which must, however, be carried out under the direct supervision of the State President, and will only continue as long as it meets with his approval.

(15) The State President may not leave the country during his term of office without the consent of two-thirds of the members of Parliament. Disobedience to this regulation means the immediate laying down of his high position.
(16) The State President may send messages to Parliament and/or to the Community Council about any matter of great national interest, and indicate the direction which he considers such body should take in this connection. Likewise, he can convey messages about such matters to the nation and, in case of need, call for a referendum which shall be final. He MUST exercise this right of calling for a referendum when a Draft Act is accepted which will have the effect of violating the republican independence of this country, or which threatens ultimately to have the effect of violating such independence.

(17) Should the State President die, or become incapacitated in any other way during his term of office, then his post shall be filled by the Chairman of the Community Council, until such time as a new State President has been elected, or until the State President is fully restored.

(18) When the State President acts in conjunction with the Council of Ministers he will be called the President-in-Council. Any decision of the President-in-Council demands the approval of the State President as well as that of the Council of Ministers, which, with this object in view, can meet under the Chairmanship of the State President.

(19) The right of exempting from or alleviating sentences passed by any Court of Law is granted to the State President, who, however, is expected under ordinary circumstances, to do this on the advice of the Head Minister supported by the Council of Ministers.

(20) The State President cannot, during his term of office, be brought to trial before any of the ordinary courts of the land, whether in connection with an accusation of an ordinary transgression, or in connection with his carrying out of the duties of the position laid upon him. His behaviour can, however, be brought to the notice of Parliament by means of a written document, signed by at least one-third of the members of Parliament or one-half of the members of the Community Council. In the case of such an accusation the Parliament must investigate it or cause it to be investigated, and when this has been served on him, the State President shall have the right to appear personally and/or to let himself be represented at the investigation. If a motion is accepted by a two thirds majority, in which it has been laid down that the complaint against his behaviour or the exercise of his duties connected with his position is found to be correct and that the behaviour has been of such a nature that it has made him unfit to continue in his position, then such resolution of Parliament will remove him from his high position.
ARTICLE 9: GOVERNMENT OF THE NON-REGISTERED NON-EUROPEAN GROUPS

(1) Every Coloured group of Races, Coloured, Natives, Asiatics, Indians, etc. will be segregated, not only as regards the place of dwelling or the neighbourhoods dwelt in by them, but also with regard to spheres of work. The members of such groups can, however, be allowed to enter white territories under proper lawful control for the increase of working power and also for the necessary increase of their own incomes.

(2) To each of such segregated race groups of Coloured subjects of the Republic, self-government will be granted within their own territory under the central management of the general government of the country, in accordance with the fitness of the group for the carrying out of such self-government for which they will have to be systematically trained.

(3) In urban non-European residential areas, non-European town councils with a paid White or non-White official as the head of the village, will be instituted and carry out functions, which will be laid down by law, under the supervision of the Mayor (Appointed official).

(4) In Reserves Native Chiefs will carry out the rule over their own race in accordance with the system and customs of the tribe, but under supervision of the government of the country and subject to the demands that such rule shall not work against the interests of the Republic, and may not lead to the deterioration of the ground in the Reserve or of anything else of value. For this reason guidance must be made available by the Republic and supervision exercised by special officials of the Government.

(5) Accordingly, as the different non-European groups become fit for it, a Coloured People's Council, a Native Council, an Asiatic and an Indian Council must be developed for the whole of the Republic. Each of these Councils will be chosen by the Heads or representatives of the race group concerned out of their race members who are major subjects of the Republic, in a manner which will be laid down by legislation. Provision will be made for the appointment of a number of non-European representatives of the race group concerned, or of the Council of the Group by the President-in-Council, and also of having a number of White advisers to give guidance.

(6) The government and functions of such Councils will be fixed by legislation but the object must be quite clear that each Council must discuss the interests of its race group, in a constitutional manner, in public, and that any recommendations concerning these must be laid before the State President, the Government, Parliament or the Community Council.
(7) Non-Europeans, educated for any of the professional callings, and non-European traders, are shut out from practice or trade among White people, except with special permission from the Mayor, who must be convinced that such exception in such special cases is in the interests of the whole of the local community concerned. At the same time such non-European professional persons and non-European traders must be encouraged to work among their own race group in their special lines. They will be protected there by the Government against White competition, except in cases where the non-European group concerned is not yet itself able to make sufficient provision for the services needed by the non-European community in a specified place.

(8) White employees may not be employed by non-European employers.

ARTICLE 10 : THE OATH OF LOYALTY

An oath of exclusive loyalty to the Republic and to the people of South Africa and of readiness to protect and strive for its independence at all times and to honour and to maintain its Constitution in all things must be taken by all strangers when they become citizens, and by all servants of the Republic when taking up service. This concerns not only the State President, as Head of the State, but also the Head Minister, the members of the Council of Ministers, members of Parliament, and of the Community Council, appointed or elected representatives of the people in local bodies, Civil servants, including teachers and members and officials of the non-European Councils.

ARTICLE 11 : BASIC PRINCIPLES OF (NATIONAL) STATE POLICY

(1) The public tone of life of the Republic is Christian-National, without any forcing of conscience and the honouring of this tone of life is demanded in all public activities which have a formative influence upon the spirit of the people. The propagation of any State policy and the existence of any political organisation which is in strife with the fulfilling of this Christian-National vocation of the life of the people is forbidden.

(2) The Republic acknowledges the freedom of the organisation and government of Churches, provided their acts do not disturb the public order, undermine the national morale or attack the authority of the State. But the acknowledged Christian Churches, as established in a Protestant Christian people, will be protected and supported by the Republic, especially as regards Sunday rest and mission and the Republic expects from them support for their authority and advice with regard to education, public morale and other things of the same kind.
(3) The public education and instruction is a national duty, and schooling must be available for every child. The education must link up with the general Christian-national principles for public life, but with proper supervision for acknowledged deviating groups in the population. In particular, the home language of the child and the religious tendencies of the parents must receive the fullest consideration. Culture of the body as well as that of the mind must be attended to and especially also with regard to the awakening of the proficiency. The task of supervision over national education, so that it will not become undermining for the State, or for the national morale, does not cease in the ordinary educational institutions in the community, but also stretches out to the Youth organisations and other social and philanthropic organisations and in particular to the radio, and amusements in all their divisions. A general cultural development in pure Christian-National spirit must be furthered (fostered).

(4) The attitude of Whites over against non-Whites is being regulated in the spirit of Christian guardianship, the former over the latter. The Principles of no mixing of blood and of segregation must be maintained as of fundamental importance for the future existence of a white civilisation in the Republic of South Africa.

(5) The economic and social organisation of the Republic must be directed to the highest measure of production, coupled with prosperity and happiness, which shall not be the privilege of a limited group, but must be evenly spread as far as possible over all layers of the population, so that there shall be no extremes of great wealth and great poverty in the Republic. Everyone must get paid work and a reasonable compensation, taking into account his capabilities and his value to the community, and there must be a minimum scale of wages so that each one out of the earnings of his calling will be able at least to provide decently the ordinary household needs for his family. The principle of private assets is acknowledged, but all exploitation on the ground of private assets, or private undertaking, must be fought as well as economic competition, when it assumes a character that is destructive and impoverishing instead of spurring on and building up the people. The duty of labour in the service of the people rests upon all subjects and citizens of the Republic.

(6) It is the right and also the duty of the State Government to take the control and co-ordination of the economic and social life under its supervision beginning with the agricultural basis of the national life, with the object of keeping the balance between the different population groups in the different callings and trades, and between capital and labour, and to protect against agricultural, industrial and commercial undertakings of a parasitic nature or undertakings which come into conflict with the interests of the community as a whole.
(7) All natural resources of the country must be placed by the Government at the services of the people, but cultivation can be allowed private people or bodies by law. The State must, however, on the principle of utility or otherwise, take such cultivation, industrial undertaking or other economic activities under its control when the general interests of the people demand it, or when an activity is not being conducted in the best interests of the Republic and its citizens. The State must exercise strict control over economic activities of importance to the country which are in the hands of subjects of foreign States.

(8) The currency of the Republic must bear a purely indigenous character, and to assure this a State Bank must be developed with all necessary divisions and branches throughout the whole of the country with the object that this institution shall directly control the money and credit transactions of the Republic for the good of the people.

(9) The State must encourage industrial development and also help to finance it, but not only with an eye to the greatest amount of profit but also to serve social interests alongside of the economic objects. Industries on the platteland should be specially encouraged with an eye to maintaining as large as possible a rural populations, including the population of the towns.

(10) Country-wide group organisations for employers and employees in the various trades and callings, must receive the recognition of the State, which can also call them into being or reform them, in accordance with the object of organising them for self-government, by the official licensing of suitable persons for undertaking the work and by linking them up with the say of such groups in the governing of the State by means of the Community Council.

(11) The State must establish as many citizens as possible and economically desirable on the land, control the division and capitalisation of agricultural land economically and must also further the increase of the White population by the encouragement of immigration or assimilable elements.

(12) The health of the nation is a special care resting upon the shoulders of the Government. It must take steps which will be reckoned to make the necessary nursing and medical treatment available to all.

(13) The State must act in a protecting, supporting and uplifting manner towards the weaker portions of society. In conjunction with private social welfare and charitable work, it must make provision for the proper handling of the widow and the orphan, the weak in body or mind and the old of age.
(14) The Republic must regulate its dealings with other countries in such a way that friendship and peace with all can be assured, without allowing itself to be dominated by anybody or on any sphere. It must however realise its special destination and task in the Christian development of Southern Africa and will therefore develop its own powers to the full, and in particular maintain an independent defence force, consisting of a standing army and a citizen force on a national basis.

(15) Every citizen is obliged to serve in the Defence Force of the Republic. This military service can also be extended to all subjects and classes of subjects.

ARTICLE 12: REVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION

(1) This Constitution of the Republic of South Africa recalls and replaces the Constitution of the Union of South Africa of 1909 as well as any Statutes or regulations of any kind whatsoever, of the Union or of another country, which may be looked upon as supplementing or amending the Constitution of the Union of South Africa. This Constitution comes into immediate efficacy.

(2) Any regulation of the Constitution can be amended or recalled, but this can only be done by a Special Amending Act of the Constitution which must be published in the Government Gazette at least two months before it is dealt with by Parliament.

(3) A Draft Act which contains a suggestion for amendment of the Constitution may not contain any other proposals.
Mr. Malan: I move -

That this House identifies itself with the opinion expressed by the Prime Minister before British Members of Parliament on the 25th November last, viz.: That after a successful conclusion of the present war for the Allies (1) Russia "will be in a position no other country has ever occupied in the history of Europe", and (2) England, on the other hand, will occupy a weak position owing to economic exhaustion and will even in the Tripartite Alliance be in an unequal partnership, on the one hand as against Russia, "the Colossus of Europe", and, on the other hand, as against the United States "with its enormous assets, its wealth and resources and its unlimited potential might". This House accordingly expresses as its deep conviction:

(a) that any war aim which contemplates the destruction, crippling or elimination of such countries as Germany, Italy, Poland, the Baltic States or Finland, which formed a bulwark against the communistic avalanche and may in the future continue to do so, is in conflict with the true and lasting interests of Europe and the Western European Christian civilisation in which America, England and also our own South Africa share;

(b) that a stable and just world peace cannot be brought about or maintained by the domination of the so-called leadership of any combination of victorious great powers supported by their own armed forces;

(c) that such world peace can be developed and maintained only on the basis of territorial demarcation which above all takes into consideration ethnographical and national boundaries and the right of self-determination of the peoples concerned and further upon the basis of a policy of general disarmament and internation co-operation, promoted

and guided by an inclusive Union of Free Nations in which the small nations of the world will have equal status and authority with the great nations, and which the Union of South Africa will then also be prepared to join; and

(d) that in view of the changed international position of England as well as in view of our internal solidarity South Africa's interests demand that its existing constitutional status should be further developed and converted into that of a free independent Republic, separated from the British Crown and Empire, based upon the principles of popular government and the equal language and cultural rights of both sections of the European population, anti-capitalistic and anti-communistic by nature, and made safe for the European race and Christian civilisation as well as for the development of the non-European population according to their own character and ability by the loyal maintenance of the principles of separation and trusteeship.
Field-Marshal Smuts: We hear from various sides this propaganda on behalf of a republic in this country. We see it in the Government Press, we find it mentioned by Ministers of the Crown. We find this formula which has been evolved for keeping India in the Commonwealth used as an incentive for republican propaganda in this country. We see it stated both by Ministers and by the Press that the way is now open; that this formula which has been evolved for India opens the way to a republic in South Africa; that we are free to do anything. There is no question about it. We are free to move in any direction we like. This sovereign country can move in any direction it likes. But now it is a question of policy. It is a question of how far the Prime Minister approves of this republican propaganda and how far it is a declaration of the policy of his party. You see, Mr. Chairman, in this question we are up against something that has been a bone of contention between our peoples in South Africa, and I do not think that the Government should make its position plain and state its policy on this matter of a republic to the country. I am quite satisfied with what happened at the London Conference - excepting with regard to India.

The Minister of Justice: I thought you were the one sad exception.

Field Marshal Smuts: Yes, so far as India is concerned and even if I stood alone I would still feel that something has been done there which is a leap in the dark.

The Minister of Justice: What would you have done if you had been there?

Field Marshal Smuts: With regard to the rest I agree that the declaration of this formula is satisfactory and that it is in harmony with the preamble of the Statute of Westminster but I think we must have some statement of policy. We must get our people together, and the Prime Minister, on his arrival in South Africa, said that the step that has been taken will be a contribution towards racial unity in this country. Well, Mr. Chairman, we are all aware that a republic, so far from being a bond of union in this country, will produce just the opposite effect; that there is today probably no single factor which is tending more to keep the two portions of the European race in this country apart than this republican propaganda that is going on. If that could be side-tracked. I think there would be a much better chance of our working together.
The Minister of Justice: So we must give in to you, then there will be peace.

Field-Marshall Smuts: No, you need not give in to us. I am not talking of the distant future. I am talking about the situation that faces us in South Africa today, and we are all agreed that an attempt should be made to keep the people of this country together and to help them to form a united nation in South Africa. We are all agreed on that.

The Minister of the Interior: Do not the principles of your party allow propaganda for a republic?

Field Marshal Smuts: Yes, but it is not our policy.

Maj. Van Der Byl: We can do what we like, but it is not our policy.

Field Marshal Smuts: No, my hon. friend will admit that that is a verbal score. We have a declaration in our programme of principles which allows an opening for it.

The Minister of the Interior: But surely it cannot be a bone of contention then if you allow it.

Field Marshal Smuts: As an actual policy it is.

Major Van Der Byl: This is not a Broederbond meeting you are having.

Field Marshal Smuts: There is no question—everybody knows it—that in the background there was this danger and this danger is keeping the people of this country apart. If the people knew that there would not be this agitation for a republic, this continual attempt to reconstruct this country on a republican basis, you would have much more unity; you would have much more co-operation in this country than we are having today, and I would ask the Prime Minister to state the policy of the Government on this point because I think there is nothing today which keeps the two sections of our people further apart than this question of establishing a republic. Mr. Chairman, do not let us use this exceptional case of India as a precedent for this country. India is not a precedent for us to follow. We need only look at what is happening abroad in these days in New York to realise that we should not follow India. Nobody knows what will become of that exceptional case.

The Prime Minister (Dr. Malan): The hon-member for Claremont (Mr. Waterson), as did other hon. members, appealed to me to repeat what was done in 1927 in connection with the Flag Act. At that time, so they say, a compromise was agreed upon and now they expect that the same procedure will again be followed in this case and that we shall again have recourse to a compromise. All I can say is that in view of the experience which we have gained, if there is anything which warns me against a compromise, then it is the happenings of 1927. The compromise of 1927, embodied in the Flag Act which was passed, laid down that there would be one single national flag in South Africa and not two, but when we recollect how that compromise was carried out and what was for a long time and still is today the point of view of hon. members on the other side, then I say that from the outset they broke that compromise both in the letter and in the spirit. The late Gen. Hertzog also repeatedly stated in this House that such was the case....

The Prime Minister (Dr. Malan) : No, I have no objection to it if any member, any European power with possessions in Africa, wants to develop its possessions in a judicious manner. I have nothing against that. It is their right to do so and so the Gold Coast also has that right. But what I want to emphasize is this, that they should exercise their rights judiciously. What the experiment, as it is called, on the Gold Coast has resulted in is that the whole of Africa is today in a turbulent state. It had its influence on Kenya. It had its influence on Nyasaland. It had influence in North Rhodesia where the Natives say that they will be satisfied with nothing less in regard to the Federation than the Gold Coast Constitution, and that eventually numbers must count in regard to those territories. That is the influence which is exercised and much of the dissatisfaction in Africa today resulted from that, and also from Communist agitation.

Now, my amendment is as follows :-

To delete all the words after "That" and to substitute -

"(1) (a) the House expresses its approval of the close consultation and co-operation in matters of common concern with other members of the Commonwealth by the Government at the recent Prime Ministers' Conference in London, and more especially so in view of the disturbed and unsettled conditions in the world;

(b) it further expresses its conviction that such co-operation may also in the future prove to be possible and desirable irrespective whether South Africa is a Republic or not and irrespective whether she is a member of the Commonwealth or not;

(c) it further approves of and confirms, as the basis of the Commonwealth, the full recognition of the sovereign independence of its member states, their freedom of association with each

other as well as their equality in respect of their national and international status, and the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of the respective member states; and

(d) the House accordingly reaffirms the sovereign right of the Union of South Africa under the supremacy and guidance of Almighty God to be the sole master of its own destinies and of its own constitutional structure, subject only to the true interests of its people as determined from time to time in a constitutional way. It rejects therefore every attempt to curtail this right of self-determination; and ...
national will, and with the faithful observance of equal rights in all respects of the two sections of the European population and as the result of a special and definite mandate from the European electorate and not merely by a Parliamentary majority obtained as the result of an ordinary election;

There must be a special authorization by the nation on this point. And further -

(b) that, in view of the London Declaration of 1949, the proclamation of a Republic and withdrawal from the Commonwealth have become two separate questions which need not be answered simultaneously, and that the last-mentioned should be judged and decided at any given time in the light of the then existing circumstances and South Africa's interests and position in the international world.

In other words, there may be a republican South Africa, but South Africa will still be a member of the Commonwealth, just as any other member which wants a republic. And if it decides to leave the Commonwealth, that has to be done afterwards by means of a separate resolution.

Mr. Lawrence: Will that resolution be by way of a referendum?

The Prime Minister: That is not a matter we need discuss at the moment, because we do not intend to go to the nation now for a republic. Those are matters which can be decided later. But my object is this, that we want a united South Africa, and for that reason we must remove fear, and especially unfounded fear, of one another from the life of the nation. That is our purpose and we are not asking the Opposition to vote for a republic but just to take notice of it and of the assurances given, and to leave these assurances as a solemn and full guarantee to the nation which we dare not, and we on this side of the House will not, break......
Dr. J.H.O. Du Plessis: I do not intend making a speech about the republic, but I feel the need to protest strongly against the attack made here this afternoon by the hon. member for South Coast (Mr. Mitchell). The hon. member accused us this afternoon of acting maliciously, or mischievously, when we plead for a republic. Now I just want to tell the hon. member for South Coast and other hon. members opposite this: They cannot render the country a greater disservice at this stage of our history, when we need White unity in South Africa more than ever before, than to proceed with this opposition, malicious opposition on their part, against the republican ideal of the Nationalist Government and the Afrikaners. The greatest task with which we are faced in this country is to build up a united White race. If we cannot unite the Whites, we have no hope of surviving the period of crisis ahead of us. Now we have had the position that attempts have been made to create a united White population in South Africa by force of arms. That attempt failed miserably. Secondly, an attempt was made to create a united nation on the basis of a Crown colony. That attempt also failed miserably. Thirdly, an attempt was made to unite the White people in South Africa on a dominion basis, without sovereign independence and full freedom, and also that attempt did not succeed. It is our solemn duty to strive to attain the only real constitutional basis on which the White people can be united. It is my deep conviction that that basis is the republican freedom in which one will have symbols which are South Africa's own, and where also the head of the State is our own, but a republic co-operating with Britain and the members of the Commonwealth and all friendly states in the greatest friendship; not a state or a republic which isolates itself. That is the only real basis of unity. As long as the member for South Coast and other hon. members opposite continue their propaganda and those attacks on the republican aim, sowing suspicion by saying that it is the policy of suppression and isolation, for so long are they busy opposing national unity in South Africa.

I think that I am speaking on behalf of the whole House in saying that we have listened with the greatest interest to the speech of the hon. member for Hospital (Mr. Barlow). Let me say this as far as his Bill is concerned. South Africa, as he has said, is a sovereign independent country; but, as he also indicated, a sovereign independent country which, in contrast with all other independent countries, occupies the peculiar position that we have two official flags, one being our national flag and the other also a national flag but the national flag of another sovereign independent country, namely Great Britain. It is difficult to imagine such a state of affairs in other sovereign countries such as Britain, for example. Can anyone imagine Britain accepting the flag of another country, in addition to her own national flag, or that the U.S.A. or Holland or Belgium or Germany would do such a thing? What then is the reason for the peculiar position that we have here? Those reasons are known to most of us but for the sake of clarity I want to deal with them briefly.

The fact that the Union Jack which flies in South Africa today is the flag of another independent country is, of course, due to the fact that South Africa is or was a conquered country and, as happens in all conquered countries, whether the conqueror be Britain or Germany or France, the flag of the conquered flies in that country. Similarly the Union Jack was flown in South Africa was a conquered country. But after South Africa had become a conquered country and a Colony of Britain's, a very interesting development took place in the composition of the British Empire. Some of the Crown Colonies, as a result of legislation passed by the British Parliament, first developed into self-governing Colonies; and later on some of them, as the result of an agreement with the British Government, countries such as Canada, Australia and South Africa developed into sovereign independent countries, bound together in what was formerly called the British Commonwealth and what is now called simply the Commonwealth. DE FACTO we in South Africa, for all

1. On the second reading of a Bill introduced by Mr. Arthur Barlow doing away with the Union Jack as one of the official flags of the Union. It was enacted as the Flags Amendment Act No. 18 of 1957. Kruger (Parties and Policies) op. cit., pp. 215-219.
practical purposes, attained independent status at the end of 1926. Juridically we attained it in 1931 when the British Parliament passed the Statute of Westminster.

Mr. Speaker, what would one regard as the logical and natural consequence of attainment of independent status by South Africa? One would have expected the disappearance of the Union Jack, which was the national flag of Britain, and which had flown over us because up to that stage we were subordinate to Britain. But it did not disappear, and there are reasons why it did not disappear, reasons which I want to deal with just briefly. I do not say that they are good reasons, but there are certain reasons. I ask myself - and this is a question which every stranger, who does not live in South Africa, would ask himself - why, when South Africa attained independent status, our people did not immediately celebrate with pride the attainment of independent status by accepting and hoisting the outward sign and symbol of that independence, namely a national flag of our own as the only flag of this country. Why, instead of that, did we have the struggle to which the hon. member for Hospital referred, a bitter and unpleasant flag dispute - let us admit it today - which lasted for a long time and which caused feelings in this country to run high and which eventually led to Act No. 40 of 1927 which gave these two flags to our country, namely the Union Jack which is the national flag of Britain, and our own national flag. And it then became necessary to attach to the Union Jack the meaning which the hon. member over there quoted, that is to say, that it would indicate the association of the Union with the other members of the group known as the Commonwealth of Nations. Principally - and let us admit it in all honesty, without reproaching one another, because there is not the slightest reason why at this stage in our history there should be any recriminations with regard to these things - principally because we in South Africa had two European groups who in respect of this matter adopted two diametrically opposed attitudes and who viewed this matter from two different angles, posed attitudes and who viewed this matter from two different angles, the one being the Afrikaans-speaking group, the conquered group, which naturally viewed the Union Jack and as a matter of fact the whole question of the independence of South Africa and the question of our own flag in quite a different light to the way in which our English-speaking fellow-Afrikaners viewed it. That was quite natural.

As against that there were English-speaking citizens of this country who naturally, in view of their history and perhaps for the very reason that we had another group here, namely the Afrikaans-speaking group, did not at that stage regard themselves as a separate South African nation, but who then still regarded themselves as part of the British nation and for that reason saw the Union Jack in the same light as the British people in Britain that is to say, as their flag. Well, viewed in retrospect one can appreciate that. However disappointing it may have been to us, the Afrikaans-speaking section, that most of our English-speaking
fellow-citizens in the years 1926-27 and thereafter adopted an
attitude which so strongly conflicted with the attitude adopted
by us with regard to the flag issue, I personally am convinced
that what I have just said here was perhaps the main reason for
their attitude at that time. Under different conditions today -
we are no longer living in the year 1926, 1927 or 1931; we are
now living in the year 1957, 30 years later - today under
different conditions and looking back over the years calmly we,
the Afrikaans-speaking section, can perhaps better appreciate
the feeling of our English-speaking fellow-citizens in those
days than we were able to appreciate it in the heat of the
struggle, and I am convinced that the majority of our English-
speaking fellow-countrymen in South Africa are also in a position
today to appreciate with greater sympathy and better than they
did in those days the feeling of the Afrikaans-speaking people
in the country. This feeling on the part of the English-speaking
people in this country in those days that they still formed part of
the British nation and that for that reason Britain's national
flag, i.e. the Union Jack, was also their flag, was so strong in
the years 1926-27 that, as we all know, a rebellion was threatened
if the then Government proceeded with its plan to give the Union
one flag only, namely the national flag.

In view of this deep-seated feeling on the part of the
English-speaking people of South Africa that they still formed
part of the British nation and that they still regarded the
Union Jack as their flag, therefore the then Government, in
those circumstances, entered into a compromise in order to meet
the English-speaking section, and as a result of this compromise
the Flag Act of 1927 was then placed on the Statute Book, which
then, as the hon. member for Hospital has said, gave our country
this system of two flags, namely a national flag as described in
our present Act, and the Union Jack. The terms of that compromise
have been read out by the hon. member over there. I do not want
to quote them therefore. I just want to say briefly, in the
first place, that the Union Jack was to be retained to indicate
our association with the other Commonwealth countries; in the
second place, that the Union Jack, together with our national
flag, would be hoisted over the Houses of Parliament, the main
Government buildings in the two capitals and in the capitals of
the provinces and over the Government offices overseas. And
that is a very important thing when one bears in mind that here a
sovereign independent country was required to fly the flag of
another country over its offices overseas. But that was part
of the compromise. At this stage I want to ask whether there is
any member in the House who can tell me, without prejudice and
calmly, that he can imagine Britain, for example, flying the flag
of another country such as the South African national flag,
for instance, over her foreign offices, or that he can imagine
Canada doing so? Even Canada and Australia do not do it. This
provision, which is contained in our Act as a result of the compromise
entered into in good faith at that time, is to be found in the
legislation of no other country in the world, as far as I know.
South Africa therefore occupies that illogical, inconsistent position.

The question now arises - and this is the question which the hon. member for Hospital raised - whether this state of affairs should continue. The question whether this state of affairs should continue was frequently raised after 1927. It was raised in this House in the course of various debates from time to time. It was frequently raised on public platforms, and the question was frequently raised in letters, in leader columns and in documents whether this state of affairs, this unheard of and illogical state of affairs, should continue, namely that South Africa should have two flags, that is to say, our own national flag and in addition to that the national flag of another country. This question was raised frequently and it was done after 1927 when this compromise was entered into, great changes took place in South Africa and the situation changed completely. Quite apart from other changes which came about after 1927, when for practical purposes we were already independent but were not yet juridically independent, the Statute of Westminster was subsequently passed in terms of which South Africa then became a sovereign independent country not only DE FACTO but also DE JURE and in every sense of the word. This tremendous change came about after the flag agreement had been entered into in 1927, and this change inevitably exercised an enormous influence over the population as a whole. I make bold to say - and I do not think that any right-thinking person would contradict me - that gradually the fact that South Africa had become a sovereign independent country and was recognised as such throughout the world by all other sovereign independent countries, inevitably exercised an enormous influence over many of the English-speaking citizens of this country, in the first place with regard to their relationship with Britain and in the second place - and this is the most important aspect - their relationship with South Africa.

It stands to reason that the fact that together with us they were witnessing and participating from day to day in the exercise and implementation of our sovereign independent powers, brought home to them the realisation and the feeling which we had already had for generations, that they were no longer part of Britain or of the British nation but that, together with us, they formed the South African nation and that the independence of our nation could be symbolised by one flag only, namely by a national flag. Gradually the fact that since 1931 we had been a sovereign independent country, brought home to many of the members sitting over there and to the English-speaking section throughout the country the realisation that it was a completely inconsistent, illogical state of affairs for a sovereign independent country to allow the national flag of another country to fly as one of her flags. As a result of this course of events in the first place, and, in the second place, as the result of expressions of opinion which you, Mr. Speaker, and I and many of the members
in this House have heard in recent years from English-speaking people, particularly from those English-speaking people in this country who were born here in the last 50 years and who grew up here and also many others who settled here and adopted South Africa as their fatherland - I say as a result of what we have observed and learned from them, I have become deeply convinced and I think most people at least on this side of the House - and I would say throughout the country - have become deeply convinced that over and above the Afrikaans-speaking section of our people there is also today a very large section of the English-speaking people, citizens of our country, who want only one flag for South Africa. I say that in the opinion of the vast majority of our people, the time is ripe to bring about this much-desired change, namely that South Africa should have only one flag. I think that the vast majority of people in South Africa are convinced - whether they all desire it, is another matter, and I do not suggest that - I say the vast majority of people in South Africa, even those who do not desire it, whatever their reasons may be, are convinced of the fact that sooner or later South Africa is going to become a republic. That, I think, is as plain as a pikestaff .........
READING NO. 17

EXTRACT FROM SOUTH AFRICAN HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY DEBATES, 18/9/58

The Prime Minister (Dr. Verwoerd): I also wonder whether that is true, because apart from the fact that they are demanding that we should sacrifice our entire policy, I believe that the United Party will then search for other bones of contention in other fields - between English and Afrikaners, between Whites and non-Whites - in order to come into power. This has indeed been the basis of our struggle over the years: Nationalism against Imperialism. This has been the basis of the struggle since 1910: A republic as against the monarchial connection. That is why I say we should not allow ourselves to be bluffed by such contentions.

In this connection another allegation has been made regarding myself to which I must reply. It is the contention that I am supposedly the person who above all others does not want to have anything to do with a republic within the Commonwealth. The standpoint which my party has stated before is the standpoint I advocate, and this standpoint is clearly set out in the party's constitution. This standpoint is that while the issue prior to 1949 was whether the Union would become a republic (obviously outside the Commonwealth) or whether it should remain in the Commonwealth, the situation was changed after the 1949 London Declaration in terms of which States such as India became republics and remained within the Commonwealth. Thereafter the National Party adopted a clear standpoint which was stated in this House, first by Dr. Malan and later by Mr. Strydom. I repeat it today, namely, that the issue as far as we are concerned has since been split into two sections. The first is that the question should be asked: Should we or should we not become a republic? Thereafter, the second question which must be asked is whether it will be a republic within or outside the Commonwealth. Our reply is this: As regards the first point we stand unequivocally and clearly for the establishment of the republic by the correct methods and at the appropriate time: but as regards the second question, we shall not nor can we come to a decision at the moment. This decision will have to be taken when the time for establishing a republic arrives. Then the decision will have to be taken when the time for establishing a republic arrives. Then the decision as to whether the republic should be within or outside the Commonwealth will depend on what will be in the best interests of South Africa under the prevailing circumstances. I stand by this standpoint as unequivocally and as firmly as my predecessors .........

Dr. De Wet: To strengthen our case and to give it more force, I believe that South Africa should become a republic as soon as possible. Mr. Speaker, the establishment of a republic will emphasize the individual identity of the White man because we cannot get away from the fact that in the outside world - and anyone who has travelled knows this - we are simply regarded as a British colony. That is the general belief. Most people of the Western world are not even fully aware of the fact that South Africa forms an independent part of Africa. I say that our becoming a republic will focus attention on South Africa. This is what happened in the case of Ghana. The fact that Ghana became independent focused the attention of the world upon her. Such a great constitutional change would contribute more than anything else towards showing the world that we are a permanent White community. It would give substance to the rights of the White man. An independent republic would earn recognition of our right to a permanent home here on the southern tip of Africa.

Mr. Holland: Will the Black people have a say in that republic?

Dr. De Wet: I shall not allow myself to be distracted by such silly interjections.......

LETTER POSTED TO VOTERS THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY BEFORE THE REPUBLICAN REFERENDUM.

Libertas
Bryntirion
Pretoria.
21/9/60.

Dear Friend,

The time is approaching when all of us must help to decide at the referendum what the immediate future of our country and people must be.

Only in a republic will we be able to unite in giving our full attention to what is of vital importance. This includes the development of a safe future for our white population, coupled with justice towards the Non-whites. It is also necessary to ensure prosperity for everybody.

Above all, however, we must create a republic in which we can all co-operate in truly building one South African nation. Self-preservation and the interests of our children must compel us to look forward instead of backwards.

Or will you, through not voting for a republic, let South Africa continue as a state in which the English- and Afrikaans-speaking sections cannot unite? Then the struggles of the past and differences of descent will remain stumbling blocks due to the unsolved conflict on the question: British Monarchy or South African Republic? Peace and order and economic progress demand a final settlement of this dispute.

Should South Africa remain a monarchy, it will have to suffer, time and again, from instigated racial clashes and economic setbacks, since these are the weapons used to prevent the coming of the republic.

I sincerely trust that you will co-operate with me in developing a united nation within a prosperous South Africa by voting for a republic now. Never has the time been more suitable for this. Indeed, circumstances are such that it will prove unwise to wait longer.

The struggle between Eastern and Western nations, between communism and Christendom, is such that both groups of nations will
grant and concede anything (including the white man of Africa, his possessions and his rights) to seek the favour and support of the black man. This has led to chaos in the Congo. Internal conflict and further elimination of the white man seem imminent in most other parts of Africa. Until the Western nations realize more fully what is happening, we should at least combine and protect ourselves.

A democratic republic within the Commonwealth which guarantees both languages, enjoys so much support today for this very reason. The time is truly ripe.

If we do not take this one step now, we ourselves may possibly, but our children certainly, will experience all the suffering of the Whites who are being attacked in and driven out of one African territory after the other.

You love your country. You love your children. Sixty or more years of life lie ahead of many of them. I plead for their sake, their unity, safety and prosperity.

For all these reasons I feel justified in approaching you personally with this urgent appeal. Become, by answering "Yes" through your cross on the voting paper, one of the founders of our Republic of South Africa.

With best wishes,

H.F. VERWOERD.

The Prime Minister (Dr. Verwoerd): The mandate was this, that South Africa, when it becomes a republic, wants to remain a member of the Commonwealth. That is the first point. I gave the assurance that I would do my best, notwithstanding all the doubt in the minds of hon. members, to keep our word to try to achieve that. And if we succeed we will continue, as we said in all honesty, to remain a member of the Commonwealth as long as the Commonwealth remains what it is. If in future the Commonwealth should change its character and become a body which tries to interfere in the domestic affairs of member states, then for the same reasons why otherwise we would not become a member, we would then not be able to remain a member. Everybody understands that. As long as the Commonwealth remains what it is we stand by our firm undertaking to co-operate to the best of our ability with a Commonwealth which does not interfere in the affairs of member countries. Now the honesty of that standpoint is being unjustifiably doubted.

But there was a second leg to our standpoint, viz, this. If the Commonwealth should refuse us membership, or if we should be granted membership only subject to humiliating conditions which would reflect on the honour of our country, we will still become a republic, but not a member of the Commonwealth. Those who voted for a republic also voted for this second aspect of our standpoint.

Now I want to tell the hon. member this also. If he puts this question to us, as he does in the amendment, then all that is necessary to negative the decision of the electorate is that at the next Commonwealth Conference there should be a refusal for us to remain a member. If I give the guarantees he asks for the establishment of the republic would be destroyed. And who prepared the smoothest path for a refusal of membership, if only we want to make this concession, but the hon. the Leader of the Opposition himself? Before the election on 5th October, he allowed the impression to be created overseas that if only they are firm enough in preventing us from becoming a member of the Commonwealth their opposition would eventually triumph.

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The Prime Minister: I move—That the House discuss the following matter, viz.: The withdrawal of the Union's application for continued membership of the Commonwealth after the establishment of a republic on 31st May 1961.

... May I inform hon. members that there were two reasons in particular which, amongst others, persuaded me to allow a discussion of our colour policy, the first being the discussions which I had had in advance with the leaders of Great Britain herself. It is common knowledge that strenuous efforts were made by the Prime Minister of Britain and the Minister of Commonwealth Relations to have discussions with the various member countries to bring home to them the basic idea that the Commonwealth should remain intact for the sake of points of agreement and in spite of the points of difference. I was then informed that if I adopted the attitude, which we had adopted in the past, that South Africa's affairs may not be discussed, even if that was the correct constitutional position, or if I conceded no more than we had conceded last year, that is to say, that the policy of South Africa may be discussed in private conversations and in private groups, I would probably spoil the atmosphere to such an extent that the prospects of success would immediately disappear. An appeal was therefore made to me not to press this demand on this occasion. I then said: "Very well, if it is necessary to create the right atmosphere for South Africa's admission to the Commonwealth, I shall accept your advice and allow this policy to be discussed, but I want to say perfectly clearly that I regard it as wrong, and that I also regard it as a dangerous precedent." I went on to say: "I must say that, although I am giving my consent now, which is the only way in which such a discussion can take place, it must not be regarded as a precedent that I shall give permission in the future, and that I am also of the opinion that such a discussion ought not to take place in the case of other countries' affairs." In the circumstances, therefore, so as to help to create a favourable atmosphere, I gave that permission.

But there was a second reason, and this is a purely logical reason. If, when South Africa's application for membership came before the Conference, there were people present who, on the grounds of our colour policy, either objected to our membership or (and this would be more reasonable) had certain doubts which they were anxious to have removed by hearing our side of the case, I did not see how I could say that they should not be allowed to advance their reasons for their attitude. In other words, I felt that in these circumstances it was only reasonable and desirable, even unavoidable, that permission should be given to discuss South Africa's policy colour policy on this occasion. Both in view of the request of those who had taken the lead in their attempt to keep South Africa within the Commonwealth and because of the reasonableness of such a request, I therefore felt obliged to give this permission. I am convinced that if we had refused permission, it would have led to much more unpleasant discussion and insistence, and the result would have been no different. Then I would have been reproached here today for the very opposite reason, namely, for my refusal to make just the "small concession" of permitting a discussion.

That was the first serious concession that I made therefore in an attempt to keep us within the Commonwealth, in accordance with my promise to do everything possible to ensure our continued membership.

I may say here in parenthesis that the question of a republic or a monarchy was never discussed or regarded as being of any importance. All that happened was that everybody said that it had nothing to do with this matter, that we were perfectly free to change our form of government, and that that was not the basis of any of the arguments. That has also been stated in his latest speech by the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom. It is true that the establishment of a republic could be used as an excuse for this discussion, and it is true that the argument was advanced by our opponents in South Africa that if only we had not come forward with the proposal to establish a republic, the question of our colour policy would not have come under discussion. In that regard I want to give two replies. The one is that the abandonment of our republican policy on this ground would have meant that membership of the Commonwealth would have placed such limitations upon South Africa that she would not even have been able to make up her own mind or to act in regard to a matter which is obviously her own affair. That very curtailment of our power to act in accordance with our own wishes would then have been a good reason basically to leave the Commonwealth without further ado, because it would have restricted the sovereign freedom of the nation and the State. Secondly, I am perfectly convinced that the absence of this constitutional issue would not have helped at all, because, in the course of these discussions, it emerged perfectly clearly that the Afro-Asian members, with one single exception, intended to try to force us at every opportunity, indeed, at the first opportunity, to abandon our colour policy. Failing that, they would have come along with a proposal that we should be expelled, and this matter would then
still have come under discussion. I am not so sure that it would not have come under discussion on this occasion. I think it would have been discussed. In other words, I have no doubt in my own mind that, although the establishment of a republic was used as a convenient excuse for dealing with this matter, the policy of separate development would have been dealt with and would have led, sooner or later, to the same result - rather sooner than later, and probably now!

We must be under no illusions. This whole dispute concerned the colour policy. The outcome, too, is based entirely on differences with regard to the question of colour policy. Moreover, in the final analysis it is based not only on our party's attitude, although inevitably Government policy became the bone of contention, because we happen to be in power. In essence the reason for the clash was the unequivocal demand that the White man must not be allowed to protect himself anywhere in Africa or in the world by putting up barriers. That was regarded as being in conflict with complete equality. I admit that initially the critics would have been satisfied with "small concessions". In that regard I shall have a few more words to say. However, one must look beyond the immediate shadow at the substance behind it, and the substance, the reality, was unambiguously that the White man must no longer be allowed to protect himself by erecting barriers, either here in South Africa or anywhere else in the world. There must be complete equality everywhere; full and equal political rights must be given everywhere. I know that the Tunku stated recently that he had no objection to the White Australia policy; in other words, to the erection of such barriers. I know that, but that is what is being said today. Like Mr. Menzies, I, too, fear that the self-protection of the White man in other countries will give rise to future attacks. I am as strongly convinced of that as he is.

I put forward the proposition that it was not our aim, just as little as it is the aim of the other side, to make one group of the population subordinate eventually to the other. I pointed out that we all sought, along different roads, to bring about non-subordination eventually. I tried to prove, in terms of our Bantu policy as well as our Coloured policy, that in every way we were seeking some means whereby co-existence would become possible. I said, just as I stated in my South Africa Club speech, that when a particular group, perhaps a smaller group, had acquired something for itself, it was entitled to its continued existence, without its being watered down in any way. Sometimes it can only retain its possessions and its independence, just as a small nation can only retain it next to a great nation, by a separate existence, with political independence and with its own geographic boundaries. That is why we must retain our borders, not only materially in terms of geography, but spiritually and physically as well. That is why I said that we were not fighting for anybody's permanent subordination.
It is true that there is a transition period during which there are certain forms of separation and even certain forms of discrimination against the Black man within the White area and against the White man within the Black area. But these are transition periods. One also finds discrimination, however, in India and in Canada and in practically every country of the world where there are Black people and White people - or different kinds of non-Whites - although, perhaps, in different ways. I pleaded that we should accept in principle therefore that everybody was in favour of ultimate free co-existence and that every one of us was striving towards this end in our own way, and that that should not be used as an argument to push us out of the Commonwealth. But even this clear statement and this revelation that the policy of apartheid was not aimed at subordination but at co-existence, at good neighbourliness, made no impression. I regarded this as proof of what they contemplated. What they sought was not equality through co-existence and non-subordination in countries like South Africa, but the domination of superior numbers in the name of full equality and, therefore, eventual victory over the Whites by forcing out or swallowing up the Whites. It was there that we had to draw the line .........

The opposition to South Africa's continued membership of the Commonwealth is based on alleged discrimination against and oppression of the non-White peoples of South Africa. I do not intend now repeating my strong denial of those allegations. I do, however, wish to state that it is ironical that those allegations have come from Prime Ministers in whose countries oppression and discrimination are openly practised, and where the basic principles of democratic government are flouted. In this connection I refer particularly to Ghana, India, Malaya and Ceylon, although certain other Commonwealth countries are also not free from such practices which are sanctioned by legal enactments. In other cases, while not expressly permitted by law, little or no attempt is made to discontinue such practices.

In conclusion, I wish to state that the proceedings at today's meeting which have obliged me to take this regrettable step, in my opinion, mark the beginning of the disintegration of the Commonwealth. This free association of states cannot hope to survive, if instead of devoting itself to co-operation in matters of common concern, Commonwealth Prime Ministers are going to continue the practice of interfering in each other's domestic affairs, and if their meetings are to be made the occasions for attacking their fellow members. The practices which have led to the present unsatisfactory conditions prevailing in the United Nations will, I venture to predict, lead to the eventual disintegration of the Commonwealth, which all would regret.....
APPENDIX D

THE NATIONALISTS AND THE WORLD

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BILL OF RIGHTS OF THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS

We, African people in the Union of South Africa, urgently demand the granting of full citizenship rights, such as are enjoyed by all Europeans in South Africa. We demand:

1. Abolition of political discrimination based on race and the extension to all adults, regardless of race, of the right to vote and be elected to parliament, provincial councils, and other representative institutions.

2. The right to equal justice in courts of law, including nomination to juries and appointment as judges, magistrates and other court officials.

3. Freedom of residence and the repeal of laws that restrict this freedom.


5. Freedom of the press.

6. Recognition of the sanctity or inviolability of the home as the right of every family, and the prohibition of police raids on citizens in their homes for tax or liquor or other purposes.

7. The right to own, buy, hire or lease and occupy land and all other forms of immovable as well as movable property, and the repeal of restrictions on this right.

8. The right to engage in all forms of lawful occupations, trades and professions, on the same terms and conditions as members of other sections of the population.

9. The right to be appointed to and hold office in the civil service and in all branches of public employment on the same terms and conditions as Europeans.

10. The right of every child to free and compulsory education and of admission to technical schools, universities and other institutions of higher education.

11. Equality of treatment with any other section of the population in the state social services, and the inclusion on an equal basis with Europeans in any scheme of Social Security.

(The declaration stresses a number of specific issues connected with industry and labour, commerce, education, public health and medical services and discriminatory legislation.)

A. Equal opportunity to engage in any occupation, trade and industry. In order that this objective might be realized to the fullest extent, facilities must be provided for technical and university education of Africans so as to enable them to enter skilled, semi-skilled occupations, professions, Government service and other spheres of employment.

B. Equal pay for equal work, as well as equal opportunity for all work and for the unskilled labour workers in both rural and urban areas such minimum wage as shall enable the workers to live in health, happiness, decency and comfort.

C. Removal of the Colour Bar in industry, and other occupations.

D. The statutory recognition of the right of the African worker to collective bargaining ...

E. The extension of all industrial welfare legislation to Africans engaged in agriculture, domestic service and in public institutions or bodies.

F. The recognition of the right of the Africans to freedom of trading.

G. The state must provide full facilities for all types of education for Africans' children.

H. Abandonment of the theory that 'there is a need of a special type of education for Africans as such'. Africans must therefore be given the type of education which will enable them to meet on equal terms with other people the conditions of the modern world.

I. It is the duty of the state to provide adequate medical and health facilities for the entire population of the country.

J. It is fundamental to the establishment of a new order in South Africa to abolish all enactments which discriminate against the African on the grounds of race and colour ... 

K. In short, we demand the repeal of any and all laws as well as the abandonment of any policy and all practices that discriminate against the African in any way whatsoever on the basis of race, creed or colour in the Union of South Africa.

ARTICLE 2

The Organization and its Members, in pursuit of the Purposes stated in Article 1, shall act in accordance with the following Principles.

1. The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.

2. All Members, in order to ensure to all of them the rights and benefits resulting from membership, shall fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter.

3. All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.

4. All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.

5. All Members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter, and shall refrain from giving assistance to any state against which the United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement action.

6. The Organization shall ensure that states which are not Members of the United Nations act in accordance with these Principles so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security.

7. Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.

ARTICLE 10

The General Assembly may discuss any questions or any matters within the scope of the present Charter or relating to the powers and functions of any organs provided for in the present Charter, and, except as provided in Article 12, may make recommendations to the Members of the United Nations or to the Security Council or to both on any such questions or matters.

ARTICLE 11

1. The General Assembly may consider the general principles of co-operation in the maintenance of international peace and security, including the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments, and may make recommendations with regard to such principles to the Members or to the Security Council or to both.

2. The General Assembly may discuss any questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security brought before it by any Member of the United Nations, or by the Security Council, or by a state which is not a Member of the United Nations in accordance with Article 35, paragraph 2, and, except as provided in Article 12, may make recommendations with regard to any such question to the state or states concerned or to the Security Council or to both. Any such question on which action is necessary shall be referred to the Security Council by the General Assembly either before or after discussion.

3. The General Assembly may call the attention of the Security Council to situations which are likely to endanger international peace and security.

4. The powers of the General Assembly set forth in this Article shall not limit the general scope of Article 10.

ARTICLE 13

1. The General Assembly shall initiate studies and make recommendations for the purpose of:

   (a) promoting international co-operation in the political field and encouraging the progressive development of international law and its codification;

   (b) promoting international co-operation in the economic, social, cultural, educational, and health fields, and assisting in the realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.
ARTICLE 13 (contd.)

2. The further responsibilities, functions, and powers of the General Assembly with respect to matters mentioned in paragraph 1 (b) above are set forth in Chapters IX and X.

ARTICLE 14

Subject to the provisions of Article 12, the General Assembly may recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation, regardless of origin, which it deems likely to impair the general welfare or friendly relations among nations, including situations resulting from a violation of the provisions of the present Charter setting forth the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.
THE SOUTH AFRICAN NATIONALIST PARTY DEFINES ITS RACIAL POLICY, 1948

In the spring of 1948, prior to a general election, Dr. Malan, then the prime minister, and Mr. Strijdom, who was later to succeed his chief as head of the government, made several statements laying down the Nationalist Party's stand on basic issues of racial policy.

Referring to the stand taken by a member of the opposition United Party, Mr. Strijdom declared: The Hon. Minister of Mines (Mr. J.H. Hofmeyr) rejects with contempt the principles of the white man's domination. He dismisses with scorn the Herrenvolk idea .... Are we ruling South Africa as a result of his stupid leadership idea? No, we are ruling South Africa today because the legislation placed the power in our hands and not in the hands of his friends .... But he does not want to rule the country by power. Our policy is that the Europeans must stand their ground and must remain Baas (master) in South Africa. If we reject the Herrenvolk idea and the principle that the white man cannot remain Baas, if the franchise is to be extended to the non-Europeans, and if the non-Europeans are given representation and the vote and ... are developed on the same basis as the Europeans, how can the Europeans remain Baas? Our view is that in every sphere the European must retain the right to rule the country and to keep it a white man's country.

Dr. Malan made his position clear in the following statement: Give the non-Europeans numerical strength; give them social security; give them the right to organise in the field of labour; give them political equality and give them arms, and then there is only one ultimate result and that is the non-European will govern the country and the European will have to leave it.

Dr. Malan's views on the Indian minority in South Africa were set out thus: The Party hold the view that Indians are a foreign and outlandish element which is unassimilable. They can never become part of the country and must therefore be treated as an immigrant community. The Party accepts as a basis of its policy the repatriation of as many Indians as possible and proposes a proper investigation into the practicability of such a policy on a large scale in co-operation with India and other countries.

I am often asked how we can join a Commonwealth in which there is racial discrimination, in which there are other things happening to which we object. That, I think, is a fair question and it is a matter which must necessarily give us some trouble in our thinking. Nevertheless, it is a question which does not really arise. That is to say, when we have entered into an alliance with a nation or a group of nations, it does not mean that we accept their other policies, it does not mean that we commit ourselves in any way to something that they may do. In fact, this House knows that we are carrying on at the present moment a struggle, or our countrymen are carrying on a struggle in regard to racial discrimination in various parts of the world.

This House knows that in the last few years one of the major questions before the United Nations, at the instance of India, has been the position of Indians in South Africa. May I, if the House will permit me, for a moment refer to an event which took place yesterday, that is, the passing of the Resolution at the General Assembly of the United Nations, and express my appreciation and my Government's appreciation of the way our delegation has functioned in this matter and our appreciation of all those nations of the United Nations, almost all, in fact all barring South Africa, which finally supported the attitude of India? One of the pillars of our foreign policy, repeatedly stated, is to fight against racial discrimination, to fight for the freedom of suppressed nationalities. Are you compromising on that issue by remaining in the Commonwealth? We have been fighting on the South Africa Indian issue and on other issues even though we have thus far been a Dominion of the Commonwealth. It was a dangerous thing for us to bring that matter within the purview of the Commonwealth. Because then the very thing to which you and I object might have taken place. That is, the Commonwealth might have been considered as some kind of a superior body which sometimes acts as a tribunal, or judges, or in a sense supervises the activities of its member nations. That certainly would have meant a diminution in our independence and sovereignty, if we had once accepted that principle. Therefore, we were not prepared and we are not prepared to treat the Commonwealth as such or even to bring disputes between member nations of the Commonwealth before the Commonwealth body.

We may, of course, in a friendly way discuss the matter; that is

...
or the people of the individual countries - that will survive and no amount of theorizing and no amount of warfare can make the system that does not deliver the goods survive. I refer to this because of the argument that was raised that India could not join the Commonwealth because it disapproved of certain policies of certain Commonwealth nations. I think we should keep these two matters completely separate.

We join the Commonwealth, obviously, because we think it is beneficial to us and to certain causes in the world that we wish to advance. The other countries of the Commonwealth want us to remain, because they think it is beneficial to them. It is mutually understood that it is to the advantage of the nations in the Commonwealth and therefore they join. At the same time, it is made perfectly clear that each country is completely free to go its own way; it may be that they may sometimes go so far as to break away from the Commonwealth. In the world today where there are so many disruptive forces at work, where we are often on the verge of war, I think it is not a safe thing to encourage the breaking up of any association that one has. Break up the evil part of it, break up anything that may come in the way of your growth, because nobody dare agree to anything which comes in the way of a nation's growth. Otherwise, apart from breaking the evil parts of the association, it is better to keep going a co-operative association which may do good in this world than to break it.

Now, this declaration that is placed before you is not a new move and yet it is a complete reorientation of something that has existed in an entirely different way. Suppose we had been cut off from England completely and we had then desired to join the Commonwealth of Nations, it would have been a new move. Suppose a new group of nations wanted us to join them and we joined them in this way, that would have been a new move from which various consequences would have flowed. In the present instance, what is happening is that a certain association has been in existence for a considerable time past. A very great change came in the way of that association about a year and eight or nine months ago, from August 15, 1947. Now another major change is contemplated. Gradually the conception is changing. Yet that certain link remains in a different form. Now, politically we are completely independent. Economically we are as independent as independent nations can be. Nobody can be 100% independent in the sense of absolute lack of interdependence. Nevertheless, India has to depend on the rest of the world for her trade, for her commerce and for many supplies that she needs, today for her food unfortunately, and so many other things. We cannot be absolutely cut off from the world. Now, the House knows that inevitably during the past century and more all kinds of contacts have arisen between England and this country, many of them were bad, very bad, and we have struggled throughout our lives to put an end to them. Many of them were not so bad, many of them may be good and many of them, good or bad, irrespective of what they
may be, are there. Here I am the patent example of these contacts, speaking in this Honourable House in the English language. No doubt we are going to change that language for our use, but the fact remains that I am doing so and the fact remains that most other members who will speak will also do so. The fact remains that we are functioning here under certain rules and regulations for which the model has been the British Constitution. Those laws which exist today have been largely forged by them. Gradually, the laws which are good we will keep and those that are bad we will throw away. Any marked change in this without something to follow creates a hiatus which may be harmful. Largely our educational apparatus has been influenced. Largely our military apparatus has been influenced by these considerations and we have grown up naturally as something rather like the British Army. I am placing before the House certain entirely practical considerations. If we break away completely, the result is that without making sufficient provision for carrying on in a different way, we have a period of gap. Of course, if we have to pay a price, we may choose to do so. If we do not want to pay the price, we should not pay it and face the consequences.

But in the present instance, we have to consider not only these minor gains, which I have mentioned to you, to us and to others but, if I may say so, the larger approach to world problems. I felt as I was conferring there in London with the representatives of other Governments that I had necessarily to stick completely and absolutely to the sovereignty and independence of the Indian Republic. I could not possibly compromise on the question of allegiance to any foreign authority. I also felt that in the state of the world today and in the state of India and Asia, it would be a good thing if we approached this question in a friendly spirit which would solve the problems in Asia and elsewhere. I am afraid I am a bad bargainer. I am not used to the ways of the market place. I hope I am a good fighter and I hope I am a good friend. I am not anything in between and so when you have to bargain hard for anything, do not send me. When you want to fight, I hope I shall fight and then when you are decided about a certain thing, then you must hold on to it and hold to it to the death, but about minor things I think it is far better to gain the goodwill of the other party. It is far more precious to come to a decision in friendship and goodwill than to gain a word here and there at the cost of ill will. So I approached this problem and may I say how I felt about others? I would like to pay a tribute to the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and also to others there, because they also approached the problem in this spirit, not so much to score a debating point or to change a word here and there in this declaration. It was possible that if I had tried my hardest I might have got a word here and there changed in this declaration, but the essence could not have been changed, because there was nothing more for us to get out of that declaration. I preferred not to do so, because I preferred creating an impression and I hope the right impression that the approach of India to these and other problems of the world
was not a narrow-minded approach. It was the approach based on faith and confidence in her own strength and in her own future and, therefore, it was not afraid of any country coming in the way of that faith, it was not afraid of any word or phrase in any document, but it was based essentially on this that if you approach another country in a friendly way, with goodwill and generosity, you would be paid back in the same coin and probably the payment would be in an even larger measure. I am quite convinced that in the treatment of nations to one another, as in the case of individuals, only out of goodwill will you get goodwill and no amount of intrigues and cleverness will get you good results out of evil ways. Therefore, I thought that this was an occasion not only to impress England, but others also, in fact to some extent the world, because the matter that was being discussed at 10 Downing Street, in London, was something that drew the attention of the entire world. It drew the attention of the world, partly because India is a very important country, potentially so, and actually so too. And the world was interested to see how this very complicated and difficult problem which appeared insoluble, could be solved. It could not have been solved if we had left it to eminent lawyers. Lawyers have their uses in life; but they should not be spread out everywhere. It could not have been solved by those extreme, narrow-minded nationalists who cannot see to the right or to the left, but live in a narrow sphere of their own, and, therefore, forget that the world is going ahead. It could not be solved by people who live in the past and cannot realize that the present is different from the past and that the future is going to be still more different. It could not be solved by any person who lacked faith in India and in India's destiny.

I wanted the world to see that India did not lack faith in herself, and that India was prepared to co-operate even with those with whom she had been fighting in the past; provided the basis of co-operation today was honourable, that it was a free basis, a basis which would lead to the good not only of ourselves, but of the world also. That is to say, we would not deny that co-operation, simply because in the past we had fought, and thus carry on the trail of our past karma along with us. We have to wash out the past with all its evil. I wanted, if I may say so in all humility, to help in letting the world look at things in a slightly different perspective, or rather try to see how vital questions could be approached and dealt with. We have seen too often in the arguments that go on in the assemblies of the world, this bitter approach, this cursing of each other, this desire, not in the least to understand the other but deliberately to misunderstand the other, and to make clever points. Now, it may be a satisfying performance for some of us on occasions to make clever points and be applauded by our people or by some other people. But in the state of the world today, it is a poor thing
for any responsible person to do, when we live on the verge of catastrophic wars, when national passions are roused, and when even a casually spoken word might make all the difference.

Some people have thought that by our joining or continuing to remain in the Commonwealth of Nations we are drifting away from our neighbours in Asia, or that it has become more difficult for us to co-operate with other countries, great countries in the world. But I think it is easier for us to develop closer relations with other countries while we are in the Commonwealth than it might have been otherwise. This is rather a peculiar thing to say. Nevertheless, I say it, and I have given a great deal of thought to this matter. The Commonwealth does not come in the way of our co-operation and friendship with other countries. Ultimately we shall have to decide, and ultimately the decision will depend on our own strength. If we dissociate ourselves completely from the Commonwealth, then for the moment we are completely isolated. We cannot remain completely isolated, and so inevitably by stress of circumstances, we have to incline in some direction or other. But that inclination in some direction or other will necessarily be a basis of give-and-take. It may be in the nature of alliances: you give something yourself and get something in return. In other words, it may involve commitments far more than at present. There are no commitments today. In that sense, I say we are freer today to come to friendly understandings with other countries and to play the part, if you like, of a bridge for the mutual understanding of other countries. I do not wish to place this too high; nevertheless, it is no good placing it too low either. I should like you to look round the world today and look at the relative position of India and the rest of the world more especially during the last two years or so. I think you will find that during this period of two years or less, India has gone up in the scale of nations in its influence and in its prestige. It is a little difficult for me to tell you exactly what India has done or has not done. It would be absurd for anyone to expect that India can become the crusader for all causes in the world and bring forth results. Even in cases that have borne fruit, it is not a thing to be proclaimed from the housetops. But something which does not require any proclamation is the fact of India's prestige and influence in world affairs. Considering that she came on the scene as an independent nation only a year and a half or a little more ago, it is astonishing - the part that India has played.

One more thing I should like to say. Obviously a declaration of this type, or the Resolution that I have placed before the House is not capable of amendment. It is either accepted or rejected. I am surprised to see that some hon. Members have sent in notice of amendments. Any treaty with any foreign power can be accepted or rejected. It is a joint declaration of eight - or is it nine? - countries, and it cannot be amended in this House or in any House.
It can be accepted or rejected. I would, therefore, beg of you to consider this business in all its aspects. First of all make sure that it is in conformity with our old pledges, that it does violence to none. If it is proved to me that it does violence to any pledge that we have undertaken, that it limits India's freedom in any way, then I certainly shall be no party to it. Secondly, you should see whether it does good to us and to the rest of the world. I think there can be little doubt that it does us good, that this continuing association at the present moment is beneficial for us, and it is beneficial in the larger sense, to certain world causes that we represent. And lastly, if I may put it in a negative way, not to have had this agreement would certainly have been detrimental to those world causes as well as to ourselves.

And finally, about the value I should like this House to attach to this declaration and to the whole business of the talks leading up to this declaration. It is a method, a desirable method, and a method which brings a touch of healing with it. In this world which is today sick and which has not recovered from so many wounds inflicted during the last decade or more, it is necessary that we touch upon the world problems, not with passion and prejudice and with too much repetition of what has ceased to be, but in a friendly way and with a touch of healing, and I think the chief value of this declaration and of what preceded it was that it did bring a touch of healing in our relations with certain countries. We are in no way subordinate to them, and they are in no way subordinate to us. We shall go our way and they will go their way. But our way, unless something happens, will be a friendly way; at any rate, attempts will be made to understand one another, to be friends with one another and to co-operate with one another. And the fact that we have begun this new type of association with a touch of healing will be good for us, good for them, and I think, good for the world.
EXTRACT FROM A SPEECH MADE BY THE PRIME MINISTER, DR. D.F. MALAN IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY, 11/8/53.

The PRIME MINISTER: In regard to U.N. I just want to add this, that what has been developing recently and what will bring more discredit to U.N. is that nothing at U.N. is considered and dealt with on its own merits. It is nothing but a horse-sale where one bids against the other. Blocs have been formed. There is the South American bloc. Good or bad, right or wrong, they always vote together. They do not regard any matter on its merits, but they vote together. There is the Arabian bloc. They vote together, rightly or wrongly; and then there is the continual back-scratching: "Do this for me in that regard and I will do something for you in this regard". I say it has become a horse-market, where one bids against the other. That organization cannot continue to exist in that way and in any case it can be of no benefit to the world or a guarantee for the maintenance of world peace.

I just want to add a word about U.N. and the Commonwealth. We are a member of both. In so far as U.N. and the Commonwealth are concerned, I want to express this thought - and I say it with emphasis - that U.N. is busy undermining the foundations of the Commonwealth. U.N. will eventually become the greatest catastrophe for the continued existence of the Commonwealth. Do hon. members ask me why? The Commonwealth exists and can only exist on the basis of no interference with each other's internal affairs. Therefore, when at a conference of Prime Ministers a complaint is lodged by one member of the Commonwealth against the other, it is simply scrapped from the agenda. The matter cannot be discussed. In that way there was a complaint on a previous occasion in regard to the dispute between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. The Chairman simply looked at it and said but that complaint should not be there. That is a ruling which operates in favour of the maintenance of the Commonwealth, and when we came into power I stated that we did not want to be accused at U.N. in regard to our internal affairs, just as little as we want to be accused at a conference of Prime Ministers of the Commonwealth. I was given the assurance that that would not happen, and in fact it has not happened. There was no complaint about that. But India - and I mention India especially - leaves the conference of Prime Ministers where it cannot ventilate a complaint about us, and it goes to U.N. and U.N. interferes in our internal affairs.

and then India is the chief attacker of South Africa, which is a co-member of the Commonwealth. India attacks a co-member of the Commonwealth in that round-about way. I say that where U.N. exceeds its own limits and attacks us, U.N. is busy undermining the foundations of the Commonwealth and U.N. will eventually be the greatest danger to the continued existence of the British Commonwealth of Nations.

That is what I wanted to say in regard to U.N. and the Commonwealth. There is only one thing that can save us, namely, that the members of the Commonwealth should stand together, and they can divert that danger threatening us from U.N. by driving back U.N. within the limits of its own Constitution. If U.N. does not interfere in our internal affairs, another member of the Commonwealth like India will also not be able to do it in that way....
READING NO. 6

"ASIA AND AFRICA AWAKE" - SPEECH MADE BY JAWAHARLAL NEHRU AT THE CONCLUDING SESSION OF THE ASIAN-AFRICAN CONFERENCE AT BANDUNG, APRIL 24TH, 1955.1

For seven days we have been in this pleasant city of Bandung, and Bandung has been the focal centre - I might even say the capital - of Asia and Africa during this period.

We have met here because of an irrepressible urge amongst the people of Asia and Africa. We have met because mighty forces are at work in these great continents, moving millions of people, creating in their minds urges and passions and desires for a change in their condition.

So we met and what have we achieved? Well, you have seen the draft statement which has been read to you. I think it represents a considerable achievement. But I should like to draw your attention even more to the importance of the fact that we have met here together, seen and made friends with one another and argued with one another to find a solution for our common problems.

My friend the hon. Prime Minister of Burma referred to our diversities of opinion as differences, and we wrestled with one another these seven days because we wanted to arrive at a common opinion and common outlook. Obviously, the world looks different according to the angle from which you look at it. If you are sitting in the far east of Asia, you have a certain perspective of the world and the world's problems. If you are sitting in the far west of Asia, you have a different perspective. Again, if you are in Africa, it will be quite different.

We all came with our own perspectives, each considering his own problem the most important in the world. At the same time, we are trying to understand the big problems of the world, and to fit our problems into this larger context, because in the ultimate analysis, all our problems, however important they may be, cannot be kept apart from these larger problems. Thus, how can we solve our problems if peace itself is in danger? So our primary consideration is peace. All of us are passionately eager to advance our countries peacefully. We have been backward. We have been left behind in the race, and now we have a chance again to make good. We have to make good rapidly because of the compulsion of events. If we do not make good now, we shall fade away not to rise again for a long time to come.

We are determined not to fail. We are determined, in this new phase of Asia and Africa, to make good. We are determined not to be dominated in any way by any other country or continent. We are determined to bring happiness and prosperity to our people and to discard the age-old shackles that have tied us not only politically but economically - the shackles of colonialism and other shackles of our own making. No doubt there were differences in our discussions, and great criticism was levelled at certain resolutions; we had to meet such criticism because we wanted to achieve a common goal. But it is not resolutions that will solve the problems that face us today. Only our practices and actions will bring success to our aims and ideals. It is only then that we can make good what we lost in the past. We have to take a realistic view of all things and face them in a realistic spirit.

But there is yet another spirit in Asia today. Asia is no longer passive; it has been passive enough in the past. It is no longer a submissive Asia; it has tolerated submissiveness too long. The Asia of today is dynamic; it is full of life. Asia might make mistakes, but they do not matter so long as she is alive. Where there is life there is advance.

Our achievements at this Conference have been great - because we have been in general agreement in all our resolutions - but much greater has been the background of all those agreements. We had to wrestle with our differences. We are not yes-men sitting here to say 'yes' to this country or that, not even to one another. We are great countries of the world who live in freedom without dictation. If there is anything that Asia wants to tell the world, it is that there is going to be no dictation in the future. There will be no yes-men in Asia nor in Africa, I hope. We had enough of that in the past. We value the friendship of the great countries, but we can only sit with them as brothers.

I say this not in any spirit of hatred or dislike or aggressiveness in regard to Europe or America. We have sent them our greetings, all of us here, and we want to be friends with them and to co-operate with them. But in the future we shall only co-operate as equals; there is no friendship when nations are not equal, when one has to obey the other and when one dominates the other. That is why we raise our voices against domination and colonialism, from which many of us have suffered for so long. And that is why we have to be very careful to see that no other form of domination comes our way. We want to be friends with the West and friends with the East and friends with everybody. The only approach to the mind and spirit of Asia is the approach of toleration and friendship and co-operation, not the approach of aggressiveness.
I wish to speak no ill of anybody. In Asia, all of us have many faults as countries and as individuals. Our past history shows that. Nevertheless, I say that Europe has been in the past a continent full of conflicts, full of trouble, full of hatred. Europe's conflicts continue, its wars continue and we have been dragged into these wars because we were tied to Europe's chariot wheels. Are we going to continue to be tied to Europe's troubles, Europe's hatreds and Europe's conflicts? I hope not.

Of course, Europe and Asia and America are all dependent on one another. It is not right to think in terms of isolation in this modern world which is moving towards the ideal of one world. Nevertheless Europe and some other great countries, whatever their political persuasion may be, have got into the habit of thinking that their quarrels are the world's quarrels and that therefore the world must submit to them. I do not follow that reasoning. I do not want anybody to quarrel in Europe, Asia or America, but if the others quarrel, why should I quarrel and why should I be dragged into their quarrels and wars?

I realize, as the Prime Minister of Burma said, that we cannot exercise any decisive influence on the world. But there is no doubt that our influence will grow. It is growing, in fact, and we do exercise some influence even today. But whether our influence is great or small, it must be exercised in the right direction, in a direction which reflects the integrity of purpose and ideals and objectives embodied in our resolution. This resolution represents the ideals and the new dynamism of Asia. We are not copies of Europeans or Americans or Russians. We are Asians and Africans. It would not be creditable for our dignity and new freedom if we were camp followers of America or Russia or any other country of Europe.

As I said, we mean no ill to anybody. We send our greetings to Europe and America. We send our greetings to Australia and New Zealand. And indeed Australia and New Zealand are almost in our region. They certainly do not belong to Europe, much less to America. They are next to us and I should like Australia and New Zealand to come nearer to Asia. I would welcome them because I do not want what we say or do to be based on racial prejudices. We have had enough of this racialism elsewhere.

We have passed resolutions about conditions in this or that country. But I think there is nothing more terrible than the infinite tragedy of Africa in the past few hundred years. Everything else pales into insignificance when I think of the infinite tragedy of Africa ever since the days when millions of Africans were carried away as galley slaves to America and elsewhere, half of them dying in the galleys. We must accept responsibility for it, all of us, even though we ourselves were not directly involved.
But unfortunately, in a different sense, even now the tragedy of Africa is greater than that of any other continent, whether it is racial or political. It is up to Asia to help Africa to the best of her ability because we are sister continents.

I am sure that the Conference has left its powerful impress on the minds of all who are here. I am sure that it has left an impress on the mind of the world. We came here as agents of historic destiny and we have made history here. We have to live up to what we have said, and even more so, to what the world expects of us, what Asia expects of us, what the millions in these countries expect of us. I hope we shall be worthy of the people's faith and our destiny.
The Asian-African Conference, convened upon the invitation of the Prime Ministers of Burma, Ceylon, India, Indonesia, and Pakistan, met in Bandung from the 18th to 24th April, 1955. In addition to the sponsoring countries the following 24 countries participated in the Conference:

1. Afghanistan  
2. Cambodia  
3. People's Republic of China  
4. Egypt  
5. Ethiopia  
6. Gold Coast  
7. Iran  
8. Iraq  
9. Japan  
10. Jordan  
11. Laos  
12. Lebanon  
13. Liberia  
14. Libya  
15. Nepal  
16. Philippines  
17. Saudi Arabia  
18. Sudan  
19. Syria  
20. Thailand  
21. Turkey  
22. Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam  
23. State of Viet-Nam  
24. Yemen

The Asian-African Conference considered problems of common interest and concern to countries of Asia and Africa and discussed ways and means by which their people could achieve fuller economic, cultural and political co-operation.

A. ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION

1. The Asian-African Conference recognised the urgency of promoting economic development in the Asian-African region. There was general desire for economic co-operation among the participating countries on the basis of mutual interest and respect for national sovereignty. The proposals with regard to economic co-operation within the participating countries do not preclude either the desirability or the need for co-operation with countries outside the region, including the investment of foreign capital. It was further recognised that the assistance being received by certain participating countries from outside the region, through international or under bilateral arrangements, had made a valuable contribution to the implementation of their development programmes.

2. The participating countries agreed to provide technical assistance to one another, to the maximum extent practicable, in the form of: experts, trainees, pilot projects and equipment for demonstration purposes; exchange of know-how and establishment of national, and where possible, regional training and research institutes for imparting technical knowledge and skills in co-operation with the existing international agencies.

3. The Asian-African Conference recommended the early establishment of the Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development; the allocation by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development of a greater part of its resources to Asian-African countries; the early establishment of the International Finance Corporation which should include in its activities the undertaking of equity investment; and encouragement to the promotion of joint ventures among Asian-African countries in so far as this will promote their common interest.

4. The Asian-African Conference recognised the vital need for stabilising commodity trade in the region. The principle of enlarging the scope of multilateral trade and payments was accepted. However, it was recognised that some countries would have to take recourse to bilateral trade agreements in view of their prevailing economic conditions.

5. The Asian-African Conference recommended that collective action be taken by participating countries for stabilising the international prices of and demand for primary commodities through bilateral and multilateral arrangements, and that as far as practicable and desirable, they should adopt a unified approach

6. The Asian-African Conference further recommended that Asian-African countries should diversify their export trade by processing their raw materials, wherever economically feasible, before export; that intra-regional trade fairs should be promoted and encouragement given to the exchange of trade delegations and groups of businessmen; that exchange of information and of samples should be encouraged with a view to promoting intra-regional trade, and that normal facilities should be provided for transit trade of land-locked countries.

7. The Asian-African Conference attached considerable importance to shipping and expressed concern that shipping lines reviewed from time to time their freight rates, often to the detriment of participating countries. It recommended a study of this problem, and collective action thereafter, to induce the shipping lines to adopt a more reasonable attitude. It was suggested that a study of railway freight of transit trade might be made.

8. The Asian-African Conference agreed that encouragement should be given to the establishment of national and regional banks and insurance companies.

9. The Asian-African Conference felt that exchange of information on matters relating to oil, such as remittance of profits and taxation, might eventually lead to the formulation of common policies.

10. The Asian-African Conference emphasised the particular significance of the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes for the Asian-African countries. The Conference welcomed the initiative of the Power principally concerned in offering to make available information regarding the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes; urged the speedy establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency which should provide for adequate representation of the Asian-African countries on the executive authority of the Agency; and recommended to the Asian and African Governments to take full advantage of the training and other facilities in the peaceful uses of atomic energy offered by the countries sponsoring such programmes.

11. The Asian-African Conference agreed to the appointment of Liaison Officers in participating countries, to be nominated by their respective national Governments, for the exchange of information and ideas on matters of mutual interest. It recommended that fuller use should be made of the existing international organisations and participating countries who were not members of such international organizations but were eligible, should secure membership.
12. The Asian-African Conference recommended that there should be prior consultation of participating countries in international forums with a view, as far as possible, to furthering their mutual economic interest. It is, however, not intended to form a regional bloc.

B. CULTURAL CO-OPERATION.

1. The Asian-African Conference was convinced that among the most powerful means of promoting understanding among nations is the development of cultural co-operation. Asia and Africa have been the cradle of great religions and civilisations, which influenced other civilizations and cultures while themselves being enriched in the process. Thus the cultures of Asia and Africa are based on spiritual and universal foundations. Unfortunately, contacts among Asian and African countries were interrupted during the past centuries. The peoples of Asia and Africa are now animated by a keen and sincere desire to renew their old cultural contacts and develop new ones in the context of the modern world. All participating Governments at the Conference reiterated their determination to work for closer cultural co-operation.

2. The Asian-African Conference took note of the fact that the existence of colonialism in many parts of Asia and Africa, in whatever form it may be, not only prevents cultural co-operation but also suppresses the national cultures of the people. Some colonial powers have denied to their dependent peoples basic rights in the sphere of education and culture which hampers the development of their personality and also prevents cultural intercourse with other Asian and African peoples. This is particularly true in the case of Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco, where the basic right of the people to study their own language and culture has been suppressed. Similar discrimination has been practised against African and coloured peoples in some parts of the Continent of Africa. The Conference felt that these policies amount to a denial of the fundamental rights of man and impede cultural advancement in this region and also hamper cultural co-operation on the wider international plane. The Conference condemned such a denial of fundamental rights in the sphere of education and culture in some parts of Asia and Africa by this and other forms of cultural suppression.

In particular, the Conference condemned racialism as a means of cultural suppression.

3. It was not from any sense of exclusiveness or rivalry with other groups of nations and other civilisations and cultures that the Conference viewed the development of cultural co-operation among Asian and African countries. True to the age-old tradition of tolerance and universality, the Conference believed that Asian and African cultural co-operation should be developed in the larger context of world co-operation.
Side by side with the development of Asian-African cultural co-operation, the countries of Asia and Africa desire to develop cultural contacts with others. This would enrich their own culture and would also help in the promotion of world peace and understanding.

4. There are many countries in Asia and Africa which have not yet been able to develop their educational, scientific and technical institutions. The Conference recommended that countries in Asia and Africa which are more fortunately placed in this respect should give facilities for the admission of students and trainees from such countries to their institutions. Such facilities should also be made available to the Asian and African people in Africa to whom opportunities for acquiring higher education are at present denied.

5. The Asian-African Conference felt that the promotion of cultural co-operation among countries of Asia and Africa should be directed towards:

(i) the acquisition of knowledge of each other's country;
(ii) mutual cultural exchange; and
(iii) exchange of information.

6. The Asian-African Conference was of opinion that at this stage the best results in cultural co-operation would be achieved by pursuing bilateral arrangements to implement its recommendations and by each country taking action on its own, wherever possible and feasible.

C. HUMAN RIGHTS AND SELF-DETERMINATION

1. The Asian-African Conference declared its full support of the fundamental principles of Human Rights as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and took note of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations.

The Conference declared its full support of the principle of self-determination of peoples and nations as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and took note of the United Nations resolutions on the rights of peoples and nations to self-determination which is a pre-requisite of the full enjoyment of all fundamental Human Rights.

2. The Asian-African Conference deplored the policies and practices of racial segregation and discrimination which form the basis of government and human relations in large regions of Africa and in other parts of the world. Such conduct is not only
a gross violation of human rights, but also a denial of the fundamental values of civilisation and dignity of man.

The Conference extended its warm sympathy and support for the courageous stand taken by the victims of racial discrimination, especially by the peoples of African and Indian and Pakistani origin in South Africa; applauded all those who sustain their cause; re-affirmed the determination of Asian-African peoples to eradicate every trace of racialism that might exist in their own countries; and pledged to use its full moral influence to guard against the danger of falling victims to the same evil in their struggle to eradicate it.

D. PROBLEMS OF DEPENDENT PEOPLES

1. The Asian-African Conference discussed the problems of dependent peoples and colonialism and the evils arising from the subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation.

The Conference is agreed:

(a) in declaring that colonialism in all its manifestations is an evil which should speedily be brought to an end;

(b) in affirming that the subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and is an impediment to the promotion of world peace and co-operation;

(c) in declaring its support of the cause of freedom and independence for all such peoples; and

(d) in calling upon the powers concerned to grant freedom and independence to such peoples.

2. In view of the unsettled situation in North Africa and of the persisting denial to the peoples of North Africa of their right to self-determination, the Asian-African Conference declared its support of the rights of the people of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia to self-determination and independence and urged the French Government to bring about a peaceful settlement of the issue without delay.

E. OTHER PROBLEMS

1. In view of the existing tension in the Middle East, caused by the situation in Palestine and of the danger of that tension to
world peace, the Asian-African Conference declared its support of the rights of the Arab people of Palestine and called for the implementation of the United Nations resolutions on Palestine and the achievement of the peaceful settlement of the Palestine question.

2. The Asian-African Conference, in the context of its expressed attitude on the abolition of colonialism, supported the position of Indonesia in the case of West Irian based on the relevant agreements between Indonesia and the Netherlands.

The Asian-African Conference urged the Netherlands Government to reopen negotiations as soon as possible to implement their obligations under the abovementioned agreements and expressed the earnest hope that the United Nations would assist the parties concerned in finding a peaceful solution to the dispute.

3. The Asian-African Conference supported the position of Yemen in the case of Aden and the Southern parts of Yemen known as the Protectorates and urged the parties concerned to arrive at a peaceful settlement of the dispute.

F. PROMOTIONS OF WORLD PEACE AND CO-OPERATION

The Asian-African Conference taking note of the fact that several States have still not been admitted to the United Nations, considered that for effective co-operation for world peace, membership in the United Nations should be universal, called on the Security Council to support the admission of all those States which are qualified for membership in terms of the Charter. In the opinion of the Asian-African Conference, the following among the participating countries viz., Cambodia, Ceylon, Japan, Jordan, Libya, Nepal, a unified Viet-Nam, were so qualified.

The Conference considered that the representation of the countries of the Asian-African region on the Security Council, in relation to the principle of equitable geographical distribution was inadequate. It expressed the view that as regards the distribution of the non-permanent seats, the Asian-African countries which, under the arrangement arrived at in London in 1946, are precluded from being elected, should be enabled to serve on the Security Council, so that they might make a more effective contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security.

2. The Asian-African Conference having considered the dangerous situation of international tension existing and the risks confronting the whole human race from the outbreak of global war in which the destructive power of all types of armaments, including nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons, would be employed, invited the attention of all nations to the terrible consequences that would follow if such a war were to break out.
The Conference considered that disarmament and the prohibition of the production, experimentation and use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons are imperative to save mankind and civilisation from the fear and prospect of wholesale destruction. It considered that the nations of Asia and Africa assembled here have a duty towards humanity and civilisation to proclaim their support for disarmament and for the prohibition of these weapons and to appeal to nations principally concerned and to world opinion, to bring about such disarmament and prohibition.

The Conference considered that effective international control should be established and maintained to implement such disarmament and prohibition and that speedy and determined efforts should be made to this end.

Pending the total prohibition of the manufacture of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons, this Conference appealed to all the Powers concerned to reach an agreement to suspend experiments with such weapons.

The Conference declared that universal disarmament is an absolute necessity for the preservation of peace and requested the United Nations to continue its efforts and appealed to all concerned speedily to bring about the regulation, limitation, control and reduction of all armed forces and armaments, including the prohibition of the production, experimentation and use of all weapons of mass destruction, and to establish effective international control to this end.

G. DECLARATION ON THE PROMOTION OF WORLD PEACE AND CO-OPERATION

The Asian-African Conference gave anxious thought to the question of world peace and co-operation. It viewed with deep concern the present state of international tension with its danger of an atomic world war. The problem of peace is correlative with the problem of international security. In this connection, all States should co-operate, especially through the United Nations, in bringing about the reduction of armaments and the elimination of nuclear weapons under effective international control. In this way, international peace can be promoted and nuclear energy may be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. This would help answer the needs particularly of Asia and Africa, for what they urgently require are social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom. Freedom and peace are inter-dependent. The right of self-determination must be enjoyed by all peoples, and freedom and independence must be granted, with the least possible delay, to those who are still dependent peoples. Indeed all nations should have the right freely to choose their own political and economic systems and their own way of life in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.
Free from mistrust and fear, and with confidence and goodwill towards each other, the nations should practise tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbours and develop friendly co-operation on the basis of the following principles:

1. Respect for fundamental human rights and for the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

2. Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations.

3. Recognition of the equality of all races and of the equality of all nations, large and small.

4. Abstention from intervention or interference in the internal affairs of another country.

5. Respect for the right of each nation to defend itself, singly or collectively, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations.

6. (a) Absention from the use of arrangements of collective defence to serve the particular interests of any of the big Powers.

(b) Abstention by any country from exerting pressures on other countries.

7. Refraining from acts or threats of aggression or the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any country.

8. Settlement of all international disputes by peaceful means, such as negotiation, conciliation, arbitration or judicial settlement as well as other peaceful means of the parties' own choice, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations.

9. Promotion of mutual interests and co-operation.

10. Respect for justice and international obligations.

The Asian-African Conference declares its conviction that friendly co-operation in accordance with these principles would effectively contribute to the maintenance and promotion of international peace and security, while co-operation in the economic, social and cultural fields would help bring about the common prosperity and well-being of all.
The Asian-African Conference recommended that the five sponsoring countries consider the convening of the next meeting of the Conference in consultation with the participating countries.
THE FREEDOM CHARTER OF THE PEOPLES OF EAST AND CENTRAL AFRICA (1958)\(^1\)

Freedom is our birthright; self-government our heritage as sons and daughters of the free men and women who inherited Africa for the Africans. It is, therefore, not only just but imperative that we restore our birthright which is freedom and our heritage - self-government - for ourselves, our children and our children's children. This we must do now. Every hour that passes under imperialism takes in its train a measure of our freedom and a portion of our noble heritage as Africans, the true and just and rightful masters of Africa's destiny. Every hour that passes means one more hour of subjection, degradation, exploitation, and humiliation by imperialists, white supremacists, and foreign self-seekers.

Therefore we, the undersigned, on behalf of the African people of East and Central Africa, dedicating ourselves to the great task of restoring our freedom, devoting our energies to the cause of African Freedom and prosperity, and pledging ourselves individually and collectively to this task and this cause until imperialism is wiped out of our motherland, hereby declare:

I. That democracy must prevail throughout Africa from Senegal to Zanzibar and from Cape to Cairo.

II. That colonialism, the so-called trusteeship, and so-called partnership, apartheid, multi-racialism, and white-settlerism are enemies of freedom and can be eradicated only by African nationalism - virile and unrelenting.

III. That the right of self-determination is God-given and no man or nation is chosen by God to determine the destiny of others.

IV. That poverty, ignorance, ill health and other human miseries cannot be satisfactorily eradicated under imperialism but only under self-government and international co-operation on the basis of equality and mutual benefaction.

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V. That we of East and Central Africa, believing in the above declarations, commit our lives, our wealth and all our endeavour to the following set of purposes:

(a) The setting up of the Pan-African Freedom Movement to establish in each territory, in East and Central Africa, a government of Africans by Africans for Africans on Pan-African lines.

(b) The Movement shall fight white racialism and black chauvinism.

(c) The Movement shall seek liberty of the subject within the law and pledges itself to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the United Nations Charter.

(d) Economically the Movement shall press for full industrialisation and the enhancement of co-operative methods and for the control of the major means of production by the peoples themselves through their democratically instituted government.

(e) The Movement shall press for the recognition of full trade union rights in every country in Africa.

(f) The Movement shall work for the establishment and perpetuation of true parliamentary democracy in every territory within the African Continent.

(g) The Movement shall work for complete equality and justice in all social, educational, political and economic affairs.

(h) The Movement shall carry on the national struggle against poverty, ill-health, ignorance and imperialistic exploitation so that the African may lead a progressively decent, informed, and dignified life within the community of free and democratic nations.

Signed on the 18th September 1958, Thursday, at 10:45 a.m., in the Conference Room at Mwanza, for and on behalf of the PAN-AFRICAN FREEDOM MOVEMENT OF EAST AND CENTRAL AFRICA by:

(SGD.) FRANCIS JOSEPH KHAMISI
Chairman of the Conference

(SGD.) I.M. BHOKA MUNANKA
Secretary of the Conference.
A decision to withdraw the South African delegation from the General Assembly and to maintain only a token representation in the United Nations was announced by Mr. Louw on November 27th, 1956.1

I do not intend once more to traverse the ground that I covered when I fully set out my Government's objections to the inscription of items 24 and 61. In order, however, to keep the record straight, I must refer to the statement of the leader of the delegation of India - a statement which, as has so often been the case in the past, contained allegations which were not in accordance with the facts. I do not intend to deal with the Indian representative's allegations regarding the treatment of the Indians and other non-white people in my country, except to deny emphatically and categorically that these people are being oppressed or that they - to quote his words - "live in conditions that are just beyond slavery." The representative of India has sufficient information in his possession to know that his statement is not true. Not only do I deny his accusations, but I repeat my previous statement - namely, that generally speaking the South Africans of Indian origin are materially much better off and far happier than masses in the Indian representative's own country. That is why the South Africans of Indian origin refuse to take advantage of the repatriation scheme arranged between the two Governments in 1947.

The Assembly will have noted that the leader of the Indian delegation carefully avoided the legal points relating to Article 2, paragraph 7 of the Charter, upon which the South African Government's objection is based. He of course, realizes that the Union of South Africa has an unimpeachable case in resisting interference in its domestic affairs.

The support which, during the past years, has been accorded by the General Assembly to the Indian delegation and its allies is a sad reflection on the extent to which the United Nations has moved away from its own Charter - not only in regard to Article 2, paragraph 7, but also in regard to other fundamental aims and purposes.

I wish to deal with a statement made by the representative of India, to the effect that the South African Government has refused to discuss with the Government of India the settlement of this dispute.

What are the facts - facts with which the representative of India is fully conversant? In December 1954, the South African Government, while reserving its position on the question of domestic jurisdiction, took the initiative in making a friendly approach to the Governments of India and Pakistan, respectively, informing those Governments that the Union Government was prepared to discuss this dispute.

While the telegrams were being exchanged that are usual in such cases - telegrams relating to the basis for the proposed discussions and other relevant matters - Mr. Nehru, the Prime Minister of India, considered that that was an opportune time to make violent attacks on the Government of South Africa. In two speeches at New Delhi, he said the following, inter alia:

"I call upon Russia and the United States to declare their stand on the tyrannical oppression of peoples of Indian origin in South Africa by the white South African Government."

To enlist the aid of the Soviet Union in regard to alleged tyrannical oppression is, in the light of recent events in Hungary, distinctly ironical. But I shall let that pass.

The Prime Minister of India went on to refer to what he termed "the naked racial persecution being perpetrated by the capitalist white Government of South Africa on African and Indian people." Not content with making these baseless charges, the Prime Minister spoke of the "dastardly happenings in South Africa." The Prime Minister of India received his education in the United Kingdom; he is well acquainted with the English language; and he knows the meaning of the word "dastardly." He went on to say that "the South African Government should learn some decency."

May I remind my fellow representatives that this attack was made while telegrams were actually being exchanged between the two Governments, in consequence of the South African Government's suggestion that the Governments concerned should get together around a conference table.

After this outburst by the Prime Minister of India, the South African Government naturally concluded that the Government of India was not serious about continuing these discussions, and that, in fact, the Prime Minister of India was deliberately trying to wreck the proposals for a discussion which had been initiated by the South African Government. In the circumstances, the South African Government decided that it would be futile to continue with these discussions.
In fairness to the Government of Pakistan, I must add that it was in no way to blame for the breakdown of the negotiations. It was, however, not possible to continue the discussions with Pakistan separately, because of the fact that there is complete freedom of religion in South Africa, and no distinction is made between different religious faiths and groups. It is thus not possible to single out the Muslims, who are, moreover, a small minority compared with Hindu and other religious groups. It is also a practical impossibility to determine whether the forebears, the ancestors of persons of Indian origin in South Africa came from those parts of India which now form Pakistan.

In the light of this information, I am entitled to ask my fellow representatives how much value can be attached to the statement of the leader of the Indian delegation that the South African Government has always refused to discuss the matter with the Government of India, or, to quote his own words, that "no such negotiations were forthcoming." I also ask how much value can be attached to his assurance of, I quote his words, India's "desire to live in peace and friendship with South Africa."

The leader of the Indian delegation told the General Assembly on November 15th that his delegation has "at all times scrupulously refrained from the use of vindictive, violent or vituperative language." One wonders in what category he places the unsavory remarks of his Prime Minister, which I quoted a few minutes ago.

The General Assembly repeatedly has been a party to a violation of Article 2, paragraph 7 of the Charter, thereby permitting the Government of India and its Soviet and other allies to carry on a vendetta against South Africa.

Apart from this interference in South Africa's domestic affairs, this negation - one might say repudiation - of a fundamental principle of the Charter is evidence of what is happening in the United Nations. It shows how far the Organization has wandered from the path clearly defined by its founders, and it shows to what extent the United Nations is developing into an entirely different organization from that conceived and established at San Francisco.

I can speak with feeling because, for the past ten years, my country has been the object of baseless accusations and violent attacks both in the General Assembly and in its Committees. Those who were present in the past years at these demonstrations of malevolence and hostility against South Africa, demonstrations which, invariably led by India acting in concert with its Soviet and other associates, will be able to testify that successive South African delegations replied to these attacks in restrained language and endured them with commendable patience.
I now turn to another development which was not envisaged by the founders of the United Nations. Soon after the Organization came into existence, various geographical, racial and ideological groups or blocs came into existence. The members of these groups generally act in concert and stand together when votes are taken on certain proposals. The existence of such groups is openly admitted, and they have become part of the structure of the United Nations.

There is something else. One of the contributory causes to the decline and fall of the League of Nations was the extent to which each Member State looked to its own national interests when deciding to vote for or against a particular proposal. That attitude is perhaps not an unnatural one; it is in accordance with human nature. But as one who represented my country also at two sessions of the Assembly of the League of Nations, I can testify that the guiding and the compelling motive of self-interest exists to a far greater degree in the United Nations, where it is aggravated by the fact that delegations act not only in accordance with the interests of their respective countries, but what is far worse, generally act in accordance with the interests of the group of States to which they belong. More often than not, they act in accordance with the decisions of the group caucus.

It often happens that delegations reverse their policies and abandon principle in the interest of political expediency. At Geneva the practice of what is colloquially known as horse trading was also indulged in. But it was never carried on to the same extent that it is in the lobbies and lounges of the United Nations building. It is well known that in regard to many matters delegations record their votes not in accordance with the merits of the issue but as a quid pro quo for favors received.

May I remind this Assembly that South Africa, like certain other countries which shall be nameless, is faced with difficult racial problems which we are trying our utmost to solve in a manner which will take account of the interests of both the European and the non-European peoples, and which if carried out in the right spirit on both sides, will provide the basis for harmonious co-operation between the two sections of South Africa's population.

The continued interference of the United Nations in South Africa's problems accompanied as it is by baseless charges of oppression and ill-treatment, made from the rostrum of this Assembly, has had the effect of aggravating racial tensions and of seriously disturbing racial relations in South Africa. One wonders whether the more responsible delegations who have
who have no knowledge of the actual position in South Africa, and who do not know what the Government is doing to provide housing, health and social services, and education for the large non-European majority - one wonders if these more responsible delegations realize what the effect is of their support of India's vendetta against South Africa, and what harm they are doing to the cause of co-operation between the white and non-white population of our country.

We are not willing any longer to be even an unwilling party to the continued interference in South Africa's domestic affairs - interference moreover, which is detrimentally affecting the maintenance and the promotion of harmonious racial relations in our country.

It has therefore been decided that until such time as the United Nations shows that it is prepared to act in accordance with the spirit of the San Francisco Conference of 1945 and to conform to the principles laid down by the founders of the Organization in Article 2, paragraph 7 of the Charter, the Union of South Africa, while as yet continuing to be a member of the United Nations, will in the future maintain only a token representation or a nominal representation at the meeting of the Assembly and at the Headquarters of the Organization.

In respect to the normal work and the agenda of the Assembly and its committees the new arrangement will operate as from the close of today's proceedings. In view of the fact that the Union of South Africa will continue to be responsible for the payment of its annual assessments, a member of its delegation will attend the meetings of the Fifth Committee when necessary in order to watch South Africa's interests.

The decision which I have just announced was taken by the Union Government only after serious reflection and because it was considered to be necessary in the interests of South Africa. I want to say the following: The full sense of the responsibility - the responsibility for the step which South Africa has been obliged to take - rests and must rest squarely upon the shoulders of those Member States which, at the instigation of the Government of India, or in pursuance of their own policies, have since the first meeting of the Assembly in 1946 acquiesced in this interference in South Africa's domestic affairs and in the unjustified attacks to which we have annually, and again this year, been subjected.

There is a strong and growing feeling in my country that South Africa should withdraw from the United Nations. The Union Government has, however, not entirely given up hope that the more responsible Members of the United Nations may yet prevail upon the Assembly to return to the ideals and the objectives of its founders. Relying on that hope, however slight, South Africa will meanwhile maintain its membership of the Organization.
But as I have said, our representation will be on only a purely nominal basis. It will be a token representation.

To those delegations which during the past years have supported South Africa in its resistance to unwarranted and illegal intrusion into our domestic affairs, I wish to convey the sincere thanks of the South African Government.
SOUTH AFRICAN COMMONWEALTH

An outline of the concept of a South African Commonwealth of white and non-white States formed the subject of Mr. Louw's main policy statement to the General Assembly at the 1959 Session.1

Today I propose dealing with that part of the world which includes my country - namely the continent of Africa, on which the spotlight of world interest has been focused especially during the past year or two.

It is more particularly in sub-Saharan Africa that startling changes and developments have taken place during the past two years. Three fully independent states - Sudan, Ghana and Guinea - have come into being, to join South Africa and Liberia, which until then were the only sovereign independent states south of the Sahara.

The status of certain other territories, including the former French colonies, has also undergone a significant change. Next year the already fully independent African states will be joined by Nigeria, the Cameroons, Somalia, Togoland and possibly by the Federation of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland.

In Africa, south of the Sahara, the world has been witnessing a rapid and at the same time a relatively peaceful political evolution, of a magnitude which must necessarily bring with it the need for large-scale adjustments, not only within the newly independent states themselves, but also in their relations with other states and territories in Africa, as well as with the rest of the world.

First of all, there is necessary a reappraisal of the relationship between the newly independent country and the previous administering or metropolitan power. This is an important stage in the growth from dependence to full, or even partial independence. Thereafter the new state will have to decide what its relations are going to be with its neighbors - with other African states and territories, as well as with the rest of the world.

Events in Africa during the past two years have been the subject of much discussion. It has for instance been suggested that some of the territories aiming at independence are not viable, and will thus have to rely on foreign assistance, which is often not actuated by altruistic motives.

A representative of India, speaking in the Trusteeship Council in 1954 warned:

"A stable, contented and viable state cannot be built up without strong economic foundations. Political independence will mean little if it is not based on economic independence."

I think it will be generally agreed that apart from the interests of the emergent African States themselves, it is in the interest also of the continent of Africa as a whole that its constituent States should be built on solid economic foundations.

I wish, as the representative of an African State, to convey to the newly independent African States the good wishes of the Union of South Africa for their progress and prosperity, and to assure them of our hearty co-operation in regard to matters of common concern.

With the exception of Liberia, South Africa is an African State with a life and experience of sovereign independence longer than any of the other independent States geographically south of the Sahara.

I have thus the right to speak from this rostrum as the representative of an African State in the fullest sense of that term, and it is in that capacity that I today welcome those fellow African States that have acquired independence during the past two years, and also those that are on the threshold of independence. It is in the spirit of a common African heritage, that on behalf of my country I offer our friendship and our co-operation.

But I would hasten to add that South Africa's offer of co-operation is equally made to other African territories - to the two neighboring Provinces of Portugal, namely Mozambique and Angola, and to those territories which in the language of the United Nations are described as "non-self-governing". Indeed, I am glad to be able to testify to the excellent relations which in the past have existed between the Union on the one hand and the Portugese Provinces; the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland; and the territories administered by France, Belgium, and the United Kingdom, respectively.

During recent years, attacks on the metropolitan Governments have been made inside and outside the United Nations. It is not necessary for me to defend those Governments. That has been ably done by their respective delegations at previous Assemblies of this Organization. As the representative of an African State, who is better informed regarding some of those territories than most of the critics from outside Africa, may I be permitted to say that there seems to be little realization or appreciation of what the much maligned metropolitan Governments
have done in opening up and developing the natural resources of these territories; combating human and animal diseases; creating conditions of law and order; putting an end to internecine strife; and raising standards of living.

Those who are in control of the newly independent African States, and those about to become independent, will be able to testify to the great value of the development work and benefits inherited from their predecessors, the metropolitan Governments.

In spite of what has been accomplished by the previous so-called colonial administrations, much still remains to be done for the development of the emergent African states. Not only will capital from outside be required, but there is a great need also for technical skill and assistance. Some of this will be provided by the former administering or metropolitan countries. Some of it will be supplied by certain countries that are anxious to obtain an economic and perhaps also a political or ideological foothold in Africa. And then there is also the economic technical assistance rendered by the Specialised Agencies of the United Nations.

It is unfortunate that when these matters are discussed inside and outside of the Assembly, mention is seldom made of the fact that there is in Africa itself, a joint co-operative pool for providing technical and scientific assistance, the resources of which are available to the countries south of the Sahara whether they are independent or not. This is the Commission for Technical Co-operation South of the Sahara (generally known as the C.C.T.A.), together with its associate bodies, the Scientific Council (C.S.A.) and the Foundation for Mutual Assistance (F.A.M.A.).

The original members of these organizations were the metropolitan countries, namely Belgium, France, Portugal, and the United Kingdom and also South Africa and the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. They were later joined by Liberia, Ghana and Guinea.

The object of C.C.T.A. is to pool and exchange technical knowledge; the C.S.A. is a body of independent scientists, organized for the exchange of scientific information and for undertaking special scientific studies. These two bodies working in close collaboration have done valuable work, particularly in the fields of human, plant and animal diseases; nutrition; soil conservation and productivity; rural welfare; housing; sociology; forestry and fisheries.

Co-operation in these fields between African States and territories has been of immense value, and has moreover contributed to the promotion of friendship and understanding between the States and territories in the immense sub-Saharan region.
In the work of these organizations South Africa has played a prominent part. It has been able to do so because of the great advances made in my country in the field of scientific and technological research and development. The huge laboratories and experimental workshops of the Council of Scientific Research at Pretoria have been described as among the finest in the Commonwealth, and compare favorably with any in the world.

This institution has attained outstanding results in several fields, including housing and personnel management which have been used for the benefit of the rest of Africa. Some of its discoveries are being applied and used in many countries. The Veterinary Institute at Onderstepoort is well known all over the world for its work and research in connection with animal diseases, and has made a valuable contribution toward freeing Africa from such diseases. The South African Bureau of Standards has also gained a great reputation.

Two years ago the work of the C.C.T.A. and the C.S.A. was extended by the establishment of F.A.M.A. -the Foundation of Mutual Assistance in Africa. The purpose of this body is to channel available and offered scientific and technical assistance. The idea is to bring the donor and the receiver into touch with each other. South Africa has on many occasions been able, and has been glad, to provide such assistance to other African States and Territories.

The work of the C.C.T.A. and its associated bodies is not intended to be exclusive. It is prepared to co-operate with the Health, Agricultural, Labor and other international organizations which have been taking a keen interest in Africa during the recent past. It is, however, necessary that there should be proper co-ordination between these organizations and the C.C.T.A. so as to prevent overlapping of activities and a waste of valuable skill and resources.

I would have liked to deal more fully with the great economic and material progress of my country - particularly during the past 25 years; with the almost phenomenal industrial development which is taking place and which has made South Africa the most highly industrialized country on the whole of the African continent; with the Union's progress and growth in other fields such as mining and agriculture. Unfortunately however, time will not permit me to do so.

I wish however, to inform the Assembly of what we are doing in order to find a satisfactory method of dealing with the problem of relations between South Africans of European descent and the Bantu peoples, both of whom have their homelands in South Africa. This is particularly necessary in view of the misconceptions prevailing in many countries, as the result mainly of misinformed and often distorted news despatches.
South Africa is not unique in having to deal with problems derived from relations between races. Recently, within the short period of ten days, the newspapers of three different Western countries carried headlines of interracial troubles and clashes in those countries. May I add that in the history of South Africa, organized attacks by white on non-whites have never yet taken place - a record of which we are justly proud in view of our far more difficult and complex situation.

In the eyes of the outside world South Africa's problem has assumed extraordinary dimensions, not only because it has been prominently featured in the world press, but also because of the fact that in some countries it has been grossly and also cruelly misrepresented not only in certain newspapers but latterly also on the cinema and television screens.

I will mention only one recent instance to show to what lengths this misrepresentation is being carried. A cinema film has recently been completed which purports to portray conditions in South Africa. It was described by the film critic of the Rand Daily Mail - an Opposition paper - as "one of the greatest hoaxes (deceptions) in film history." One of the scenes shows what the producer describes as a "systematic destruction by bulldozers of African homes which it took the owners years to pay for."

The cinema audience is not told that this is, in fact, a slum clearance operation - that the occupants of the shacks being torn down were some time previously transferred to well-built homes in a new township at Meadowlands, that the removals were occasions of cheering and joy, and that those whose new homes had not yet been completed begged to be removed as soon as possible. Nor was his audience told that former owners were compensated at such reasonable valuations that less than 1% of them sought arbitration.

Two days before my departure from South Africa a special article written by a Bantu appeared in a leading Opposition newspaper under the headline "We Couldn't Be Happier in Meadowlands."

One can imagine the indignation of the New York public and press if a foreign film producer has given a version of the tearing down of the old, dilapidated and unsanitary tenement houses on the East Side, without mentioning that Peter Cooper Village and other projects such as the huge blocks of apartments erected by the City Housing Board rose in their places.

I have mentioned only this latest instance of the calumny to which South Africa is being subjected, so that this Assembly can have some idea of the difficulties with which we have to contend in dealing with a complex and delicate problem. There have been numerous similar instances of completely distorted and false presentations of the South African scene.
The early European pioneers followed the course that has since been the traditional policy of South Africa, namely the policy of separation between the white and black races. It was realized that only in that way could the differences and clashes that necessarily must arise where two entirely different races live together in the same locality be avoided.

History records that such racial clashes have taken place in all countries, and are still taking place today in countries represented in this Assembly. Indeed, the past history of the African continent is a record of almost continual strife not only between different African races, but also of tribal wars between different ethnic groups of the same race.

In the early 19th century in the Cape Colony, as it was then known, it was found necessary to have a boundary in the East between the ground occupied by the British settlers and the Bantu inhabitants, respectively. Toward the end of the last century this policy was carried further, and the Glen Grey Native Territory was established in the Eastern Cape which provided for a measure of self-government in regard to local affairs.

This principle was later extended to the Transkeian Territories and was further developed recently when Bantu Authorities were established in the huge areas reserved for occupation only by the Bantu. South Africans of European descent are not permitted to acquire or to occupy land in the Bantu territories, except under permit for trading purposes, and only for so long as the needs of the Bantu are not fully provided by their own traders.

South Africa's traditional policy of separate development was clearly set out by General Smuts when he addressed a gathering in London on May 22, 1917. His words, uttered more than forty years ago, are of particular significance in the context of what has recently been happening in other parts of the African Continent:

"There is now shaping in South Africa a policy which is being expressed in our institutions, and which may have very far-reaching effects in the future civilization of the African continent ... A practice grown up in South Africa of giving the natives their own separate institutions on parallel lines ... On these parallel lines we may yet be able to solve a problem which otherwise may be insoluble ... We have felt more and more that ... it is useless to try to govern black and white in the same system ... Their political institutions should be different, while always proceeding on the basis of self-government.

"In land ownership settlement and forms of Government (our policy is) to keep them apart ... Thus in South Africa you will eventually have large areas cultivated by blacks and governed by blacks ... while in the rest of the country you will have whites who will govern themselves according to accepted European principles."
In 1929 - twelve years later - General Smuts enunciated the same principles when he delivered the Rhodes Memorial Lectures at Oxford University:

"It is clear that a race so unique, and so different in its mentality and its cultures from those of Europe, requires a policy very unlike that which would suit Europeans. Nothing could be worse for Africa than the application of a policy the object or tendency of which would be to destroy the basis of this African type - to de-Africanize the African ... If Africa is to take her rightful place among the continents we shall have to proceed on different lines, and evolve a policy which will not force her institutions into an alien European mould, but which will preserve her unity with her own past, conserve what is precious in her past, and build her future progress and civilization on specifically African foundations."

If I am not mistaken, a prominent member of the Government of one of the independent African States, recently expressed views similar to those I have quoted when he was replying to outside criticism regarding the policy or methods followed by his Government.

I have quoted these statements made by a previous and well-known South African Prime Minister to show that the policy at present being followed in South Africa is not only the traditional policy of my country, but that it takes account of the traditions, the cultures, and the needs of the Bantu peoples.

This policy has during recent years been developed and put into practice by means of legislative enactments which are intended to reaffirm and to implement the policy of peaceful co-existence, on the one hand of Bantu communities which can eventually attain full self-government, and on the other hand of a separate European community or State controlled by South Africans of European descent. The implementation of this policy culminated in the enactment by the recent session of the Union Parliament of measures designed to provide Bantu self-government for six different ethnic groups which comprise the Bantu population of South Africa.

An important step toward the implementation of this policy was the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951. It provides the basis for future development on modern lines, and is intended to safeguard the Bantu's traditional and essentially democratic system of self-government, to which he is strongly attached and which has always been centered in the authority of the Bantu chief advised by his Council.

Under this system increased executive and judicial powers are exercised by different grades of chiefs - or rulers-in-council. At the same time the necessary safeguards are provided to ensure that the authority granted to them is exercised in the interests of the community, and in accordance with its will and desires.
The Bantu Authorities Act was warmly welcomed in all the Bantu territories, particularly as it was followed in 1953 by the Bantu Education Act, which gave to Bantu parents both in those territories and in the European areas the power to control their own schools. Already more than 4,000 School Committees and 500 School Boards composed only of Bantu parents and leaders have been established and are functioning with excellent results.

May I at this stage briefly recount what we have done in South Africa in the field of Bantu education. Illiteracy is not only an African problem. Far from it! It is found also in some of the most modern countries. In evolving an educational policy for the Bantu we are following the universally accepted educational principle of leading the child in his education from the known and the familiar to the unknown and the unfamiliar.

We have to bear in mind that we are dealing with a child trained and conditioned in a Bantu culture, generally knowing only a Bantu language, and acquainted with values, interests and behavior patterns learned from a Bantu mother. These are the facts which must to a large extent determine the methods to be employed in the system of a separate Bantu education intended for a Bantu people - as happens also in the education systems of other peoples.

The success of any particular method employed in any sphere is best judged by results.

A literacy map of the world shows that most of the continent of Africa is burdened with some of the highest illiteracy rates. Only a few of the African territories show a rate below even 80%. The success of the system of Bantu education in South Africa has, under the circumstances, been outstanding. The illiteracy rate among the Bantu which, according to a UNESCO report was 73% in 1946, was by 1951 reduced to 69%, and by 1956 to 63%. It can be assumed that today, three years later, it is even lower.

Our progress in the field of education is even more significant when it is noted that in the 7,600 Bantu schools, 26,000 teachers impart knowledge to 1,400,000 pupils. Before the Bantu Education Act came into operation there were 800,000 pupils. The increase to 1,400,000 in a period of only five years testifies to the efficacy of the new legislation.

In this connection I could make comparisons with many other countries which would show South Africa in a very favorable light. However, I will refrain from doing so.

I come now to the important legislation passed by this year's session of the South African Parliament, namely the Act to provide for self-government in the territories of the six ethnic groups of the Bantu race. Experience has shown, not only in South Africa but also in other parts of the African continent, that clashes and even internecine wars have resulted from rivalry and other
differences between ethnic groups of the African peoples. In this respect the black man in Africa is no different from the white man in Europe - as history can testify.

The Act for the promotion of Bantu self-government provides the means for the different Bantu territories to progress along the road toward self-government, and eventually to form part of a South African Commonwealth, together with the Union of South Africa, which will during the intervening period act as the guardian of the emergent Bantu self-governing States.

The question has been asked as to why the emergent Bantu states will not continue to be represented in the South African Parliament. May I, in passing, remind the Assembly that South Africa is not the only country where the indigenous population or a portion thereof is not represented in the Central Legislature.

In replying to that question I can do no better than to refer to the White Paper that was issued concurrently with the publication of the Bill providing for Bantu self-government. The following is a summary of that particular part of the White Paper:

The political autonomy envisaged for the Bantu national units demands that factors or impediments that may retard this development should be removed. Such an impediment would be the continued representation of the emergent Bantu national units in the Parliament of the white population. On the one hand, this would tend to encourage fears harbored by the white community of being politically swamped by the numerically superior Bantu. On the other hand, the representation of the emergent Bantu States in the Union Parliament would have the effect of discouraging the development of Bantu institutions because of the expectation of greater participation, thereby promoting the desertion of trained human material from service in their own communities.

The White Paper further points out that experience has shown that representation in the parliament of the guardian or metropolitan country is not a factor that plays a role in the attainment of self-government by the dependent territory. So, for instance, none of the previously different territories comprised in the British Empire or in the Commonwealth, which were destined for autonomy, were at any time or are now represented in the Parliament of the United Kingdom.

The further question has been asked as to what the position will be of the Bantu who are resident outside of the Bantu territories.

Their position will be no different from that of the thousands of Bantu from the neighboring British Protectorates who are at present working and temporarily resident in the Union. They have had political or similar rights in the Union, and if they are able to enjoy such rights in their own countries they are free at any time to return to their respective territories.
For instance, in the case of Basutoland, to which a measure of self-government has recently been granted, the Basutos resident in the Union could if they wished and if the local law so provides return to exercise their political rights there.

The legislation providing for Bantu self-government has, however, given due attention to the interests of those Bantu who are working or are resident outside their own territories. It is provided that the Bantu Authorities established in terms of the Authorities Act can nominate persons to be their representatives in urban areas outside the Bantu territories.

There they will serve as a link between the Bantu living in the urban areas, and the Authority in the Bantu territory, which in turn can make representations to the Union Government on behalf of the members of their ethnic group working or resident in such urban areas. It is intended to establish Bantu Urban Authorities with jurisdiction in Bantu townships which fall within areas reserved for white occupation.

I would add that in each of the respective Bantu territories there will be a Commissioner General whom, particularly during the earlier years of political development, will act as an adviser and a link between that territory and the Union Government, and later as the Union's representative in such territory.

The Parliamentary enactment providing for Bantu self-government was accompanied by a measure to provide for the establishment of three Bantu University Colleges within Bantu territories. These University Colleges will be obliged to provide as high a standard of education and the same standards of equipment as any of the existing universities, since for examining purposes they will be constituent colleges of the University of South Africa.

This development is in accordance with the policy set out in the preceding part of my address. It provides that the Bantu will in an increasing measure control the university education of their children, and that the teaching staff will be supplied by Bantu graduates as and when they become available.

I have sketched the course upon which we in South Africa have embarked - the course which we firmly believe will provide the ultimate solution of the problems of the relations between the two races in our country. It follows recent trends and developments on the African continent, and aims at progressively giving the Bantu control of his own homeland. At the same time this policy ensures to the South Africans of European descent control of their homeland, which was opened up and developed by their ancestors and by succeeding generations.

The carrying out of the policy which I have outlined brings with it a heavy responsibility. In discharging that responsibility we will act in accordance with the dictates of our consciences and in the light of our knowledge of conditions in our country -
conditions which are unknown to and misrepresented to people outside of South Africa.

The implementation of our policy will entail large sacrifices and make heavy demands upon our economic and financial resources. For that we are prepared. Few people outside of South Africa realize the immensity of our problem and the sacrifices it entails; they certainly do not appreciate that in South Africa we have never yet resorted to foreign aid or to other forms of outside assistance.

In spite of this urgent and prior call on our financial resources we have in the past, when possible, contributed toward humanitarian and meritorious measures designed to assist under-developed countries, and other worthy causes sponsored by the United Nations. At one stage my country was one of the leading contributors to the International Children's Emergency Fund.

We need our resources for carrying out the projects intended to serve as a solution to our great problem. I may, however, here state that it is the intention of my Government to make a further contribution to some of these funds in order to give expression to our sympathy with action which is being taken by the United Nations in these fields.

A final word regarding the continent of Africa. I have in this address directed attention particularly to that part of the continent which lies roughly south of the Sahara, extending to its southernmost end, the Cape of Good Hope. Not only has the spotlight of world attention been directed to the constitutional developments that have already taken place or that are in the process of taking place, but in the international sphere interest has been aroused by reason of the fact that the African continent lies midway between the West and the East.

Upon the independent, the near independent, and the emergent States of Africa rests the responsibility of resisting attempts to use the continent of Africa for the play of power politics and international intrigue.

In pursuance of this aim the Union of South Africa will play its part, and assures the States and territories of Africa of its willingness to co-operate on all matters of common concern.
As a soldier in the First World War, and as a Minister in Sir Winston Churchill's Government in the Second, I know personally the value of the contribution which your forces made to victory in the cause of freedom.

I know something too of the inspiration which General Smuts brought to us in Britain in our darkest hours ...

Ever since the break up of the Roman Empire one of the constant facts of political life in Europe has been the emergence of independent nations. They have come into existence over the centuries in different forms with different kinds of government. But all have been inspired by a deep, keen feeling of nationalism, which has grown as the nations have grown.

In the twentieth century, and especially since the end of the war, the processes which gave birth to the nation states of Europe have been repeated all over the world. We have seen the awakening of national consciousness in peoples who have for centuries lived in dependence on some other power. Fifteen years ago this movement spread through Asia. Many countries there, of different races and civilisations, pressed their claim to an independent national life. Today the same thing is happening in Africa.

The most striking of all the impressions I have formed since I left London a month ago is of the strength of this African national consciousness. In different places it may take different forms. But it is happening everywhere. The wind of change is blowing through this Continent.

Whether we like it or not, this growth of national consciousness is a political fact. We must all accept it as a fact. Our national policies must take account of it.

Of course you understand this better than anyone. You are sprung from Europe, the home of nationalism. And here in Africa you have yourselves created a free nation, a new nation. Indeed in the history of our times yours will be recorded as the first of the African nationalisms. And this tide of national consciousness which is now rising in Africa is a fact for which you and we and the other nations of the Western world are ultimately responsible.

For its causes are to be found in the achievements of Western civilisation in pushing forward the frontiers of knowledge, applying science to the service of human needs, expanding food production, speeding and multiplying the means of communication and perhaps, above all, and more than anything else, in the spread of education.

As I have said, the growth of national consciousness in Africa is a political fact and we must accept it as such. This means, I would judge, that we must come to terms with it. I sincerely believe that, if we cannot do so, we may imperil the precarious balance between East and West on which the peace of the world depends.

The world today is divided into three main groups. First, there are what we call the Western Powers. You in South Africa and we in Britain belong to this group, together with our friends and allies in other parts of the Commonwealth, in the United States of America and in Europe. We call it the free world. Secondly, there are the Communists; Russia and her satellites in Europe, and China - whose population will rise by the end of the next 10 years to the staggering total of 800,000,000. Thirdly, there are those parts of the world whose people are at present uncommitted either to Communism or to our Western ideas. In this context we think first of Asia and of Africa.

As I see it, the great issue in this second half of the twentieth century is whether the uncommitted peoples of Asia and Africa will swing to the East or to the West. Will they be drawn into the Communist camp? Or will the great experiments in self-government that are now being made in Asia and Africa, especially within the Commonwealth, prove so successful, and by their example so compelling, that the balance will come down in favour of freedom and order and justice? The struggle is joined, and it is a struggle for the minds of men.

What is now on trial is much more than our military strength or our diplomatic and administrative skill. It is our way of life.

The uncommitted nations want to see before they choose. What can we show them to help them choose aright? Each of the independent members of the Commonwealth must answer that question for itself.

It is a basic principle of our modern Commonwealth that we respect each other's sovereignty in matters of internal policy. At the same time we must recognise that, in this shrinking world in which we live today, the internal policies of one nation may have effects outside it. We may sometimes be tempted to say to each other "Mind your own business". But in these days I would myself expand the old saying so that it runs "Mind your own business, of course, but mind how it affects my business too."
If I may be very frank, I will venture now to say this. What Governments and Parliaments in the United Kingdom HAVE done since the last war in according independence to India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Malaya and Ghana, and what they WILL do for Nigeria and other countries now nearing independence - all this, though we must and do take full and sole responsibility for it, we do in the belief that it is the only way to establish the future of the Commonwealth and of the free world on sound foundations.

All this, of course, is of deep and close concern to you. For nothing we do in this small world can be done in a corner and remain hidden. What WE do today in West, Central and East Africa becomes known to everyone in the Union whatever his language, colour or traditions. Let me assure you, all those here assembled and all who may be listening, in all friendliness that we are well aware of this, that we have acted and will act with full knowledge of the responsibility we have to you and to all our friends.

Nevertheless, I am sure you will agree that in our own areas of responsibility we must each do what we think right. What we British think right derives from a long experience both of failure and success in the management of these affairs. We have tried to learn and apply the lessons of both. Our judgment of right and wrong and of justice is rooted in the same soil as yours - in Christianity and in the rule of law as the basis of a free society. This experience of our own explains why it has been our aim, in the countries for which we have borne responsibility, not only to raise the material standards of life, but to create a society which respects the rights of individuals - a society in which men are given the opportunity to grow to their full stature, and that must in our view include the opportunity of an increasing share in political power and responsibility; a society finally in which individual merit, and individual merit alone, is the criterion for a man's advancement, whether political or economic.

Finally, in countries inhabited by several different races, it has been our aim to find means by which the community can become MORE of a community and fellowship can be fostered between its various parts.

This problem is by no means confined to Africa. Nor is it always a problem of a European minority. In Malaya, for instance, though there are Indian and European minorities, Malays and Chinese make up the great bulk of the population, and the Chinese are not much fewer in numbers than the Malays. Yet these two peoples must learn to live together in harmony and unity, and the strength and future of Malaya as a nation will depend on the different contributions which the two races can make.
The attitude of the United Kingdom Government towards this problem was clearly expressed by the Foreign Secretary, Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, speaking at the United Nations' General Assembly on the 17th of September 1959. These were his words:

In those territories where different races or tribes live side by side, the task is to ensure that all the people may enjoy security and freedom and the chance to contribute as individuals to the progress and well-being of these countries. We (that is the British) reject the idea of any inherent superiority of one race over another. Our policy, therefore, is non-racial; it offers a future in which Africans, Europeans, Asians, the Peoples of the Pacific and others with whom we are concerned, will all play their full part as citizens in the countries where they live, and in which feelings of race will be submerged in loyalty to new nations.

I have thought you would wish me to state plainly and with full candour the policy for which we in Britain stand. It may well be that, in trying to do our duty as we see it, we shall sometimes make difficulties for you. If this proves to be so, we much regret it. But I know that, even so, you would not ask us to flinch from doing our duty. You too will do your duty as you see it.

I am well aware of the peculiar nature of the problems with which you are faced here in the Union. I know the differences between your situation and that of many other States in Africa. You have here some three million people of European origin. This country is their home. It has been their home for hundreds of years. They have no other. The same is broadly true of Europeans in Central and East Africa.

Of course, in most other States those who have come from Europe have only come to work, to spend their working life, to contribute their skills, perhaps to teach, perhaps to administer and then go home. That is quite a different problem.

The problems to which you as members of the Union Parliament have to address yourselves are therefore very different from those which face the Parliaments of countries of homogeneous nations. Of course, I realize that these are difficult, hard, sometimes baffling problems. And, therefore, it would be surprising if your interpretation of your duty did not sometimes produce different results from ours, in terms of Government policies and actions.

As a fellow member of the Commonwealth we always try and, I think, we have succeeded, in giving to South Africa our full support and encouragement, but I hope you won't mind my saying frankly that there are some aspects of your policies which make it impossible for us to do this without being false to our own
deep convictions about the political destinies of free men to which in our own territories we are trying to give effect. I think therefore that we ought as friends face together - without seeking, I trust, to apportion our praise or blame - the fact that in the world of today this difference of outlook lies between us ....

I certainly do not believe in refusing to trade with people because you may happen to dislike the way they manage their internal affairs at home. Boycotts will never get you anywhere and may I say in parenthesis how I deprecate the attempts which are being made in Britain today to organize a consumer boycott of South African goods. It has never been the practice so far as I know of any Government in the United Kingdom, of whatever complexion, to undertake or support campaigns of this kind designed to influence the internal politics of another Commonwealth country. I and my colleagues in the United Kingdom Government deplore this proposed boycott and regard it as undesirable from every point of view. It can only have serious effects on Commonwealth relations and trade and be to the ultimate detriment of others than those against whom it is aimed ....

The members of the Commonwealth feel particularly strongly the value of interdependence. They are as independent as any nation in this shrinking world can be, but they have voluntarily agreed to work together. They recognize that there may be, and must be, differences between them, in their institutions or in their internal policies, and membership does not imply either the wish to express a judgment on these matters or the need to impose a stifling uniformity. It is, I think, a help that there has never been any question of a rigid constitution for the Commonwealth. Perhaps this is because we in the United Kingdom seem to have got on all right for several hundreds of years without a written constitution and are rather suspicious of such things. But whether that is so or not, it is quite clear that a rigid constitutional framework for the Commonwealth would not work. It is not that kind of thing. At the very first of the stresses and strains which are inevitable in this period of history cracks would appear in this rigid framework and the whole structure, in my view, would crumble. It is the flexibility of our Commonwealth institutions which gives them their strength ...

In conclusion, may I say this. I have spoken frankly about the differences between our two countries in their approach to one of the great current problems with which each has to deal within its own sphere of responsibility. These differences are well known: they are matters of public knowledge - indeed, of public controversy. I would have been less than honest if, by remaining silent on them, I had seemed to imply that they did not exist. But differences on this one subject, important though it is, need not and should not impair our capacity to co-operate with one another in furthering the many practical interests which we share in common.
The independent members of the Commonwealth do not always all agree on every subject. It is not a condition of their association that they should do so. On the contrary, the strength of our Commonwealth lies largely in the fact that it is a free association of free and independent states each responsible for ordering its own affairs but co-operating in the pursuit of common aims and purposes in world affairs. Moreover, these differences may be transitory. In time they may be resolved. Our duty is to see them in perspective against the background of our long association. Of this, at any rate, I am certain. Those of us who by the grace or favour of the electors are temporarily in charge of affairs in my country and in yours, we fleeting, transient phantoms over the great stage of history, we have no right to sweep aside on this account the friendship that exists between our two countries. That is the legacy of history. It is not ours alone to deal with. To adapt a famous phrase: it belongs to those who are living, it belongs to those who are dead and to those who are yet unborn ....
The Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa: Dr. the Hon. H.P. Verwoerd, in thanking Mr. Macmillan for coming to South Africa and putting before them his point of view, said:

I am glad you were frank. We are a people who are capable of listening with great pleasure to what others have to say even though they differ from us. I think it is an attribute of civilization that one should be capable of discussing matters with friends with great frankness and even in spite of differences great or small, remain friends after that and be able to cooperate in all that remains of mutual interest.

May I say that we can understand your outlook on the picture of the world, and on the picture of Africa in that world. I also do not find fault with the major objects you have in view. South Africa has the same objects: peace, to which you have made a very considerable contribution and for which I also wish to thank you today. The survival of Western ideas, of Western civilization; throwing in your weight on the side of the Western nations in this possibly increasing division which exists in the world today - we are with you there. Seeing Africa as making possible balance between the two world groupings, and hoping to develop the mind of man as it exists in Africa in the abovementioned direction - that, too, can be of the greatest value in your search for goodwill between all men and for peace and prosperity on earth. It is only a matter of how that can best be achieved. How can Africa be won? There we do not see eye to eye very often.

You believe, as I gather, that policies which we deem not only advisable for South Africa but which we believe, if rightly understood, should make an impact upon Africa and upon the world, are not to the advantage of those very ideals for which you strive and we strive too! If our policies were rightly understood, we believe, however, that it would be seen that what we are attempting to do is not strange to the new direction in Africa but is in the fullest accord with it. We never presume to criticize the application of other policies in the areas for which you are responsible, but when on an occasion such as this, on which we are perfectly frank, we look at them critically,

then we see, different to you, that there may be great dangers in those policies. The very object at which you are aiming may be defeated by them.

The tendency in Africa for nations to become independent and, at the same time, the need to do justice to all, does not only mean being just to the black man of Africa but also to be just to the white man of Africa. We call ourselves Europeans but actually we represent the white man of Africa. They are the people, not only in the Union but throughout major portions of Africa, who brought civilization here, who made possible the present development of black nationalism by bringing the natives education, by showing them the Western way of life, by bringing to Africa industry and development, by inspiring them with the ideals which Western civilization has developed for itself. The white man who came to Africa, perhaps to trade, in some cases, perhaps, to bring the Gospel, has remained to stay and, particularly we in this southernmost portion of Africa, have such a stake here that this has become our only motherland. We have nowhere else to go. We settled a country which was bare. The Bantu, too, came to this country and settled certain portions for themselves. It is in line with the thinking of Africa to grant those fullest rights to them there which we also, with you, admit all people should have. We believe in providing those rights for those people in the fullest degree in that part of South Africa which their forefathers found for themselves and settled in. But we also believe in balance. We believe in allowing exactly those same full opportunities to remain within the grasp of the white man in the areas he settled, the white man who had made all this possible.

We also see ourselves as a part of the Western world, a true white State in Africa, notwithstanding this possibility of granting a full future to the black men in our midst. We look upon ourselves as indispensable to the white world. If there is to be a division in the future, how can South Africa best play its part? It should both co-operate with the white nations of the world and, at the same time, make friends with the black States of Africa in such a way that they will provide strength to the arm of those who fight for the civilization in which we believe. We are the link. We are white, but we are in Africa. We have links with both and that lays upon us a special duty and we realize that.

I do not wish to pursue this matter any further but do wish to assure you that in the Christian philosophy which you endorse, we find a philosophy which we, too, wish to follow. If our methods should be different, let us try to understand one another and may we at least find in the world at large that trust in our sincerity which must be the basis of all goodwill and true understanding.
I wish to thank you for coming to South Africa, not in order to commit yourself to our policies, not in order to become either the mediator or the judge in our problems or between the various racial groups which we have in this country. We thank you for coming to see us simply because that shows that you wish to be our friend as we wish to be yours. It also shows quite clearly that between us and Great Britain there exists now, and should, and I hope will, exist in the future, the best co-operation on those many matters in which we can co-operate. You mentioned the economic relations which exist between our two countries. We know they are very good; we know they go very far. We, Members of the present Government, would be the last to wish to deduct in the slightest from that. We wish to increase our prosperity and yours by good co-operation, and I can truly endorse the wise words you uttered when you said: Nothing can be gained by trying to harm each other economically, in the political or theoretical fields. There at least, we have a sphere of activity in which we not only think fully alike, but in which we are equally interested - the economic world, the prosperity of South Africa. I pledge myself and my Government to the fullest co-operation in seeking that prosperity and happiness for all.
... After referring to defence and the economic development of Africa, I came to the issue of racialism, which strikes at the very heart of the Commonwealth. Ghana, as the only truly African member of the Commonwealth had a responsibility to make its views on the subject absolutely clear:

The Government of Ghana is concerned with racialism wherever it exists in the world, and particularly with apartheid as one aspect of the racial problem in South Africa. My Government is concerned with racialism, not only as a practice repugnant to every decent principle and contrary to Christian faith and ethics, but also because of its effect on the basic principles which determine the existence of the Commonwealth. We believe that the Commonwealth cannot exist as an effective association of nations, all dedicated to the same basic principles of life, if exceptions are made. It is illogical and unreasonable to expect African states to be happy about joining and remaining within the Commonwealth if the Commonwealth tolerates governments which perpetuate policies of racialism and apartheid.

One of the principal aims of the Prime Ministers' Conference should be to preserve the Commonwealth as an effective organisation where racial policies of the member-governments are consistent with the multiracial character of the Commonwealth. This is a basic issue. It is a matter of principle, and the march to independence of many African territories makes it inevitable that it must be faced honestly by the individual members - and resolved - in order that we may not be faced with a crisis which could do irreparable harm to the Commonwealth as a whole.

Today the lives of thirteen million human beings in South Africa are at stake. If the Commonwealth has any meaning, it cannot - and it must not - let this situation drift until a revolution of desperation creates another Algeria on our continent. The warning has been written in blood for all to read. The Commonwealth cannot avoid this situation....

The people of Tanganyika are working to build a non-racial democratic society. We fought successfully against our classification as a multi-racial state because what we want is a society where the individual matters, and not the colour of his skin, or the shape of his nose. Racial group privileges or discriminations are incompatible with this.

Success in these efforts will not come easily. It is true that we have made a good start; all visitors to Tanganyika are struck by the prevailing atmosphere of inter-racial harmony. But the people of Tanganyika are the same as those elsewhere in the world - subject to reason and prejudice, to feeling of sympathy and revenge, selfishness and self-sacrifice. Also, we have to overcome a legacy of inter-racial suspicion, as well as to change an economic structure where the high correlation between income and race mocks the concept of the fundamental equality of man. The internal difficulties are thus formidable. Yet we believe that they can be overcome, and we are determined to take every action which is necessary to weaken the possibility of racialism in our country.

We have not decided on this policy because we expect to gain economically if we do so. On the contrary, if it becomes necessary, we shall accept economic loss. We are following this policy because we believe that it is the only one which is morally justifiable. In our struggle for self-government and independence we have spoken of the brotherhood and equality of man. We are not hypocrites who merely used these phrases for our own ends. Now that we are in positions of responsibility we are continuing our attempts to establish conditions where these concepts can become the stuff of everyday life.

The policies of apartheid now being practised in the Union of South Africa are a daily affront to this belief in individual human dignity. They are, in addition a constantly reiterated insult to our own dignity as Africans, about which we cannot be expected to remain indifferent, and which could inflame our own passions if not otherwise dealt with. To be successful in building up a good society in our country we must therefore make

our detestation of the South African system apparent in every action. The Tanganyika Government cannot afford to have any relations with the South African Government, and it must, within the bounds of international law, lend support to those who struggle against the system of apartheid. It is for these reasons that we have, as a Government, already indicated our support for the boycott of South African goods, and have ended the labour recruitment contracts despite the heavy economic costs to this economically poor territory.

Now that the question of South Africa's membership of the Commonwealth is under discussion, our attitude is inevitable. We believe that South African membership under the present conditions makes a mockery of the "inter-racial" composition of the Commonwealth. If the Commonwealth is, as we believe, a voluntary association of friends, a "Club", we do not see how any country like ourselves, committed to policies based on the dignity of man, can be a member at the same time as South Africa is one.

There are, it is true, many people who sincerely dislike South Africa's policies, yet feel that her exclusion from the Commonwealth would destroy the organization. For this reason they would have us ignore the problem facing the Commonwealth, and when we refuse to do so they feel that it is we who are damaging the "Club". They say truly that the Republican issue, which is the occasion for the present Prime Ministers' Conference discussion of South Africa's membership, is irrelevant to the apartheid issue. Yet the fact remains that the Commonwealth has now to take a definite stand on the question of South African membership - because of a decision with South Africa. All matters affecting the issue must be considered.

Whatever the phraseology used to announce the decision, or afterwards, the whole world will take the re-admission of South Africa into the Commonwealth as condoning her policies, or at the very least as a cynical dismissal of all principles of human political activity. Speeches, however phrased, will make no difference. The judgement of the world, and particularly of Africa, will be based on actions. Suffering is not helped by sympathy from those who call the attacker their friend; it might be by actions designed to weaken the attacker, or even to isolate the evil.

Neither can the issue be avoided. To discuss the admission of Sierra Leone, which becomes independent in April, and pretend that South African membership does not have to be discussed because the Republic only comes into existence in May is cynicism and hypocrisy carried to extremes. Its only result would be to make the Commonwealth a target for contempt. The issue must be faced. No one realizes more than we, who were looking forward to our admission, the danger that this question could wreck the very structure of the Commonwealth. But if this happens it will
be the result of South Africa's attitude, not of ours. Their policies are a daily challenge to the basic concepts of the Commonwealth. Neutrality is not possible.

Still there are some people who are worried about the possible future implications of excluding South Africa. They point out that the great virtue of the Commonwealth is that each individual country remains completely free, while at the same time obtaining the intangible benefits of association with other peoples. They often use this analogy of a Club, through which members gain the benefits of community living at the same time as retaining their freedom to live their own lives as they wish.

We accept this analogy, but believe that this Club, like any other, can only survive while certain basic laws of humanity are taken for granted as a guide for conduct. No Club exists which allows a member to get all the benefits of association while he continues deliberately to commit serious offences against the other members, and against the principles of the Club itself.

The seriousness of South Africa's design is not in question. Neither is there likely to be much dispute that what this amounts to is a systematic attempt to degrade the Non-European population of South Africa.

Is this, however, an internal affair - as South Africa says - and thus no concern of the other Commonwealth Members? We believe not. In the first place, there has been since the Second World War a realization that human oppression is of international concern. This we believe. But we do not base our case on this alone. Every country in Africa feels the effects of South African policy in its own life. The political and social pressures working against our aim of non-racialism are greatly strengthened by the events in South Africa. It is not that we fear a resurgence of discrimination against Africans in this Territory; what we fear is the evils of racialism, and its results on the minds of majorities and minorities alike. It is this which we must guard against, and we know that an evil idea can only be defeated by clear and unqualified support for a better idea, pursued with all the energy at our command. We believe that the dignity of man is the idea which can defeat racialism; but we know that any action of ours which appears to compromise with the evil we fight correspondingly weakens the execution of our own policies.

This means that we cannot join any "association of friends" which includes a State deliberately and ruthlessly pursuing a racist policy. To do so would be to confuse the minds of our own people, and to jeopardize our own purposes. By refusing we would be making it clear to all enemies of the freedom and dignity of man that we are prepared to do anything which is
necessary to protect our society from spiritual as well as material evils.

There is one other argument which worries people who are concerned to help the Non-Europeans and liberal Europeans of South Africa. It is suggested that diplomatic pressures through the "Club" are likely to be more successful in ameliorating their conditions than any public expression of opinion, or action designed to isolate the Union. To use this argument is, of course, accepting the use of the Non-Europeans as hostages for the "good behaviour" of other States in the international field. It is blackmail, and succumbing to blackmail very rarely gives any lasting benefits. But in any case, there is no evidence that the South African government is amenable to reason, even from other members of the "Club". We presume that the United Kingdom has been trying to use her influence, yet conditions in South Africa have been getting worse year by year. In fact, the policies are based on fundamental beliefs, not subject to arguments or reason. The only hope is to make people realize the full implications to themselves of their false doctrines, and perhaps to shock them into thinking more deeply about their basic assumptions.

The important issue, however, is the effect on the Non-European peoples of South Africa, on other Africans, and on the principles and strength of the Commonwealth. We have to face the fact that, rightly or wrongly, South Africa's membership of the Commonwealth leads to a cynicism about "fine words and theories" which affects every member - not least the United Kingdom. The whole idea of democracy and non-racialism is likely to fall a victim to this cynicism. The exclusion of South Africa from membership will demonstrate to the whole of Africa that these are not mere words, that they are valid concepts, with a world wide applicability and a meaning for every human being. When, eventually, changes do come in South Africa this will be of fundamental importance. The emerging people will look first for their ideas and their friends to the opponents of the old regime. Are they to feel that these can only be found in Communism? Such an answer would be naive, for doctrines are not invalidated by the failure of men to live up to them. But it is natural enough after a period of difficulty to trust those whose voice has been loudest in your support; their motives are generally questioned much later.

We in Tanganyika value the principles on which the Commonwealth is based. We could both give and receive benefit from Commonwealth membership provided we are not asked to compromise the principles upon which our society is based in order to get the benefits of association with other peoples. We believe that the principles of the Commonwealth are betrayed by an affirmative answer to South Africa's application for re-admission
as a Republic. Inevitably, therefore, we are forced to say that to vote South Africa in, is to vote us out. This decision we have made reluctantly, in the face of full knowledge of what this will mean to us - an undeveloped country, determined to overcome the poverty, ignorance and disease which now afflict many of our nine million people.

In announcing this stand now we are under no illusions. Even if we wished to do so, we could not blackmail the Commonwealth; it is comparatively wealthy, and has a large number of people of European descent. We are smaller, poorer, and not yet even independent. But we have an elected government, representative of the people, committed to fundamental human values which are rooted in world-wide traditions and we wish to have the greatest opportunity to apply these principles in our country.

We want the Prime Ministers' Conference, and all other people, to understand our position, for we believe it epitomizes the choice before the Commonwealth.
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