HITTITE DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICY IN THE OLD KINGDOM

by

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INTRODUCTION

This thesis has as its objective an analysis of the domestic and foreign policy of the Hittites during the Old Kingdom. It is not possible of course to make an arbitrary distinction between domestic and foreign policy since each inevitably modifies the other.

By domestic policy I mean the practices of internal government and politics as they pertained to the Hittite homeland proper and, more specifically, to the Hittite capital. An understanding of their domestic policy in this sense entails the study of political institutions and public affairs of an internal nature. Law, society, religion, economics, art and literature are considered relevant if it is thought that they in any way explain the domestic political practices of the Hittites.

The term foreign policy has as its scope an exposition of the expansionist tendencies of the Hittites. This will involve a study of why and how these people extended their domain of rule. It will also treat the way the Hittites governed their conquered territories. This essentially means the history of the Hittites in relationship to the other states of the ancient near east with which they came in contact during the period of the Old Kingdom. It is also necessary to give a definition of feudalism because of the feudal structure of the Old Kingdom. By feudalism I basically mean the granting of land by the king to the members of the nobility. In return the nobility was expected to render stipulated services, such as supplying military contingents, to the king. The nobility retained people on this land and it was they, who in return for a livelihood, owed services to the nobility who in turn owed them to the king.1

The problem of the order of the presentation of the material is not the least with which this thesis has had to contend. O.R. Gurney in his book "The Hittites"2 has as his first chapter an outline of Hittite history. His second chapter consists of a study of the Hittite state and society. This chapter is divided into five sections which deal with the king, the queen, social classes, the government and foreign policy. Chapters III and

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1. In connection with feudalism I have found Feudalism in History, edited by R. Coulborn, (Princeton, New Jersey; Princeton University Press, 1956), extremely useful as a basis of comparison.

IV treat Hittite life and economy, and law and institutions respectively. Chapter V deals with warfare and thus the scheme of presentation continues. Such mechanics of presentation have much to recommend them. For example, one can easily find the specific topic one is looking for. The chief criticism I have to make of such an ordering of the material is that it does not make manifest to the fullest extent the fact that the Hittites were essentially a developing, progressive people. This method of presentation does not allow the sequential plotting of the development of this remarkable people. At least it certainly does not allow one to do so with facility.

The Hittite state and society has a marked bearing on Hittite history just as Hittite history explains much of the Hittite state and society. The two are not separable. Therefore if one is to gain a clear picture of the development of Hittite domestic and foreign policy such topics as the kingship, social classes and foreign policy must be seen in their historical framework. That is, the monarchy must be seen as it was in the earliest period of Hittite history and then as it was in the various phases of the Old Kingdom.

Gurney does indeed attempt to show the development of Hittite government and foreign policy. But the fact that his first chapter is devoted to an outline of Hittite history makes repetition necessary in those sections dealing with government and foreign policy. And being aware of repetition, even though the mechanics of presentation demand it, an author tends to guard against it. Hence the line of progress is hard to realise to its fullest extent.

I do not mean to recommend facility to the exclusion of more important considerations. But if facility in tracing the growth of the political and imperial life of the Hittites can be gained by employing a different method of presentation of material which does not exclude other factors, such as accuracy, then I see no good reason for not attempting to realise a clearer picture of Hittite development.

Thus I have decided to use as a skeleton framework for this thesis the chronological order of Hittite kings. That is, those events and activities which are to be assigned to Labarnas will be treated in a chapter devoted to that king. Similarly with Hattusilis I and Mursilis I. The Hittites possessed a very acute sense of historical process, of the past affecting
the present and the present dictating the course of the future. One of the most characteristic traits of reigning Hittite kings is to hark back to the activities of their predecessors. It is perhaps not altogether fruitless to speculate that the Hittites would be happiest having their story presented in the manner I propose.

Probably the greatest pitfall to be avoided in any work to do with an incompletely documented period of history is to claim irrefutable truths and patterns from the material available. Even when all the surviving material has been brought to light a resignation to incompleteness and uncertainty must still prevail. This is quite obviously the case with the Hittites and always shall be. Where the inevitable lacunae occur one may reasonably infer, on the basis of what is known, what was most likely to have happened. But I believe that it is possible to do even better than that. More richly documented periods of history, modern and ancient, often offer likely analogies. These can be of inestimable value in the attempt to fill lacunae.

At the end of the thesis I have appended a note on the chronology of the Old Kingdom. The problems associated with Hittite chronology are of an especially difficult nature because of the dearth of evidence directly related to chronology. A great deal of reliance has to be placed on outside evidences of a synchronistic nature.

I feel that it is necessary to offer an explanatory note in respect to the first two chapters of this thesis. Much of what is contained in these chapters is the result of employing what we might well call the principle of retrospective probability. That is, many of the statements, especially those concerning the origins of the Hittites, are inferred from a study of the Hittites in Anatolia. It is really a question of many of the statements in the first two chapters resulting from an analysis of the evidence of the Hittites when they became an historical people. As a result, these statements concerning Hittite origins and geography being based in the way they are may be justifiably employed to help explain the nature of Hittite political forms and imperial practices. The statements must not be seen as being mere assumptions which explain various characteristics of Hittite domestic and foreign policy. They are ideas arising from the knowledge of the Hittites as a reasonably well
documented people in historical times. I believe that it is scholastically reasonable to work on the basis that historical knowledge suggests the geographic origins of the Hittites and that the likelihood of these origins permits one to try and determine what possible bearing they may have had on the Hittite achievement. But because this thesis is arranged chronologically in so far as it has been possible it has been thought best to place these two chapters at the beginning of the thesis.

Finally, it is hoped that in the future this thesis will be extended to include the New Empire. The Old Kingdom is to be seen as an historical unit or entity in itself but much of what occurred in the Old Kingdom undoubtedly made possible, in many respects, the Hittite political and imperial achievement under such kings of the New Empire as Suppiluliumas, Mursilis II, Muwatallis and Hattusilis III.


(A) Natural features.

This section does not propose to enquire exhaustively into the geography of Anatolia. But it is of vital importance that geographic factors which may modify and help to explain the political and imperial attitudes of the Hittites be set forth. As Buchanan has well written:

"Probably the history of no area in the world has been more conditioned by its geography than that of Asia Minor. Its coastal plains and central plateau are separated and sub-divided by enormous mountain ranges which both direct and limit the play of historical forces. War, trade, social organization, cultural influences and ethnic movements all have been to varying degrees affected by this factor."

But while this is true it is the problems associated with Anatolian geography that have helped to retard and limit our knowledge of the Hittites. Any Hittite specialist will readily admit to the fact that there are still many place names, and even areas, mentioned in Hittite texts, which cannot be definitively pin-pointed on a modern map. The importance of the positions of places and their geographic relation to each other is obvious.

The authors of the most recent book dealing with Hittite geography do not claim their results as being final. This problem is clearly illustrated by comparing the different conclusions that Garstang-Gurney and Goetze reach in respect to the localization of place names derived from one document. The particular document concerns itself with the "Festival of the Road of Nerik" (Garstang-Gurney) or "Festival of the Voyage to Nerik" (Goetze).


3. Ibid. Sections; I, II and VI.

The two resulting tabulations of places have considerable agreement for places in the near vicinity of Hattusas, but one is forcibly impressed by the margin of disagreement for the localization of places which would seem to be further removed from Hattusas.

Since I am not familiar with the Hittite language, which is essential for making possible equations of Hittite place names with their classical and modern versions and which partially enables the likely relation between different places being plotted, I have been compelled, by and large, to rely on the specialized attempts of others to fix the position of place names and areas.

As a guide to the probable location of areas and places I have reproduced the map compiled by Garstang and Gurney\(^5\)(see page 1). My choice fell in this quarter for three reasons. Firstly, it is the most recent geographical proposition of a reasonable nature of which I am aware; secondly, the two authors have had a sustained interest in the problems associated with Hittite geography, thirdly, their approach to Hittite geography seems likely to bear results of a permanent nature\(^6\).

\(^5\) Garstang-Gurney; op.cit.plate 1
\(^6\) Garstang,J; "The location of Pakhuwa", *Annals of Archaeology and Anthropology*, XXVII (1948),p.48. In his attempt to locate Pakhuwa Garstang consciously sets out to avoid the snares of name resemblances and the textual association of names without evident geographic relationship. He has taken as his basis the route marches and boundaries that are described with adequate precision. He then attempts to correlate these with all available material factors such as the dispositions of the known imperial monuments and especially "the physical immutability of the main lines of road upon the Anatolian plateau". In *The Geography of the Hittite Empire*, p.109, the authors, with good reason, believe that by including in their survey the whole of Asia Minor they have been able to avoid the contradictions which may have been latent in any partial treatment of the material.
The Hittite homeland, ensconced on the Anatolian plateau, enjoyed a natural protection rarely afforded by nature; and the natural defensibility of the area is basic to an understanding of the Hittite achievement. Indeed the most immediately distinctive feature of the Anatolian plateau is its encirclement by ranges of high mountains.

The Armenian mountains, to the east of the plateau, are really the westward extension of the Ellburz chain whose northerly slopes front the Caspian Sea. This chain reaches its final extension in a maze of watersheds around the sources of the Euphrates. The upper reaches of the Euphrates River may be seen as the eastern limit of Anatolia proper. Now the valleys running through the Armenian mountains proceed from east to west. Although these valleys are shut in and land-locked they have been throughout history a way of approach for migrations of people moving in an east-west direction.7 Thus while the communications of the Hittites with their eastern neighbours were by no means devoid of barriers they were relatively numerous and accessible.

The Anti-Taurus mountains run in a south westerly direction from the Armenian mountains in which their beginnings are merged. Then the Taurus range continues this process of encircling the plateau, running in a westerly direction and separating Cilicia from Anatolia. The Roman name Taurus is indication enough of the formidability of this particular mountain range.

But in the west the physical frontier is less continuous and the valleys of the Hermus, Maeander and Caicus Rivers give ready access to the plateau of Asia Minor. In the north-west also the Hellespont and Bosphorus were like open doors inviting rather than restraining invasions from the Balkans and Danube area. Throughout history the Hellespont and the Bosphorus have served to link rather than divide Asia and Europe. This is proved by the migrations of the Phrygians and Galatians from Europe to Asia Minor. Then Darius, and more especially Xerxes, indicated the feasibility of invading Europe from Asia Minor by taking this avenue of approach.

7. Lloyd, S; Early Anatolia (Harmondsworth, Middlesex. Penguin, 1956) p. 7-8
The main physical feature to the north of the plateau is the so-called Pontic arc which consists of high parallel mountain ranges which run steeply down to the shores of the Black Sea. Apart from this protection the region was heavily afforested in ancient times. It will later be seen that for various reasons the Hittites were persistently troubled by the tribes living in this mountainous region.

Hence we may conclude, that apart from the west and north west, the Anatolian plateau was ringed by a mountainous barrier giving a physical isolation which was of considerable advantage to the Hittites. It is worthwhile noting at this early stage, that the forces which were to destroy the Hittite Empire arrived from the north west.

Turning again to the ranges of Anti-taurus and Taurus we note their obvious importance to the Hittites. This natural wall of mountain terminated Mesopotamia and Syria to the north. Indeed this mountain wall effectively barred all waves of people from the south except of course the fervent physically transcendent Islamic wave in the seventh century AD.

But on the other hand the Hittites of Asia Minor menaced the fertile plains of Mesopotamia and northern Syria. This factor is one of the most consistently fitting keys to an appreciation of the history of the Ancient Near East, and more particularly of the Hittites.

There are, I believe, two reasons which help to explain this historically proven fact. Firstly, the Hittites gained control of the easily held passes of Anti-taurus and Taurus which give access to Mesopotamia and Syria from the north. Secondly, as Garstang\(^8\) contends, highland peoples, such as the Hittites, may in time adapt themselves to the easier but enervating life of the plains, but for those who have only been schooled to resist heat the rigours of ice and snow spell death.\(^9\)

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9. Egyptian sources allege that Hattusilis III accompanied his daughter, who was to marry Ramses II, to Egypt. But it is very unlikely if an Egyptian pharaoh ever visited Hattusas. No doubt there were other reasons as well which explain the apparent lack of Egyptian state visits to Hattusas.
Thus the plateau of Asia Minor was denied to the Semitic monarchies of the plains, as it was to Egypt. But the Hittites for a time established themselves firmly in northern Syria and pushed even further east and south. Other history bears this out. The Assyrians, like the Arabs in more recent times, failed to hold their hard won footing on the Anatolian plateau. Even while they were there their political existence was of a most precarious nature.

Those who between the Hittites and the Turks have ruled Anatolia for any length of time, Phrygians, Persians, Macedonians and Romans, all had a marked affinity with the linguistic group termed Indo-European, and they have all been familiar with mountainous terrain. That is, they have been readily amenable to the climate of Anatolia which is prone to contrasting extremes of temperature with a dearth of rain in the late summer and long winter months of snow.

But more to the point, perhaps, is the fact that these people who have held Anatolia successfully had all experienced the administrating of regions of a mountainous, sub-divided nature. But the peoples of the plains, forced by necessity to have a centralized form of administration, have failed to appreciate the political modifications necessary for survival as rulers in such an area as the plateau of Anatolia. I believe that it is the nature of the geography and climate of Anatolia which in many ways explains the distinctive political and imperial achievement of the Indo-European Hittites.

The Hittites penetrated beyond, and governed areas beyond, the encircling mass of mountains. But they were, more often than not, able to beat a retreat to the security of their 'mountain fastness' as for example after Mursilis I swept down upon Babylon. Hittite controlled territory beyond the mountain walls often shrank in size, but this people had the capacity, afforded by geography, to contain themselves within the protecting mountains until such a time as the next outside endeavour appeared likely to succeed.

However, this was not the only form of geographic containment that the Hittites possessed since the Hittite homeland proper was circumscribed and delimited by the Halys River on three sides. The Halys has its source in the Armenian mountains. It flows in a south westerly direction
until it is turned westwards by a ridge of mountains. This causes the river to bend in loop fashion, completely reversing its original course until it finds its way through the northern mountains, running finally in a north easterly direction to reach the Black Sea. Within this riverine confine lay the Hittite capital of Hattusas.

The Halys naturally lends itself to a division into three sections each with its distinctive geographic quality and thus its value for defence purposes or otherwise. In the uppermost reaches as far as the most southerly point of the river there is no noteworthy interruption to normal river communication, both along the valley and between its banks. Thus the easternmost section of the Halys did not afford complete immunity to the Hittites from contact in that area. This factor is important in relation to one of the Hittite problems in this eastern quarter: the threat from the people of Azzi-Hayasa.

The middle sector of the river includes the great loop of the river between the extreme southerly and westerly points of its course. In this sector fords become rare and increasingly difficult. Garstang reports that there are only three in a distance of 150 miles, namely those of Kesik Keupri, Chesme Keupri and Yaksi Han. The advantages of defence accruing from this factor are obvious.

In the lower course the river breaks through the northern ranges and descends from the plateau through a series of defiles, forming a barrier across which communication must at all times have been difficult. We also find that when the river turns north it is fed by a variety of small streams. The flood of water is then great and the Halys becomes a torrent. In this section fords are a rarity. Thus although there is little mountain protection given to the north west of the plateau the river in this quarter offered a natural line of defence. In fact the lowest section of the Halys has always marked a boundary.

10. Garstang, J; The Hittite Empire (London, Constable, 1929) p. 51
The territory surrounded by the Halys is a geographic entity, sharply limited on all sides by mountains sloping towards the river. These we may refer to as the inner circle of mountains in distinction to the outer circle of mountain ranges already discussed. Finally, the area enclosed by the Halys is divided by moderately fertile valleys which sometimes debouch onto plains.

The emergent truths resulting so far from this geographic survey are as follows. The Hittites had, especially to the south and south-east of their capital, ĉöften as many as three lines of defence. These consisted of the outer circle of mountains, the inner ranges and the Halys River. Secondly, the plateau of Asia Minor was sub-divided to a very great extent making possible the establishment of relatively isolated political units. Physical barriers divide Anatolia into a great number of pockets, each one surrounded and made fast by natural walls possessing few gateways. The people who occupied these fortresses ruled the whole country. Such a people were the Hittites. This is one of the considerations which explain why a minority ruling caste such as the Hittites could dominate so large and diversified an area.

It is also these geographic facts which partially explain, at least, the Hittite political flexibility and sense of political adaptability in relation to the conquered tribes of the plateau who, until the coming of the Hittites and for some time after their arrival, had experienced a political isolation and independence practically unique in the history of the Ancient Near East. Although the Hittites were to give a coherent political pattern to Asia Minor it was a pattern which obeyed the natural geographic dictates of Asia Minor.

11. Osten, H.H. von der; "Explorations in Hittite Asia Minor", The American Journal of Semitic Languages and Literatures, vo.XLIII, (Jan.1927.No.2) P.83. (The American Journal of Semitic Languages and Literatures will hereinafter be referred to by the abbreviation AJSL.)
The same may be said of the Hittite attitude towards northern Syria and Mitanni which lay respectively beyond the Taurus and Anti-taurus ranges. Later Hittite history clearly demonstrates that the Hittites were capable of political improvisation which was in many ways determined by the nature of the geographic situation.

The difficulties which the Hittites experienced in their attempts to absorb the native population of Anatolia are very largely geographically based. The physical features of Asia Minor tend to emphasize racial and cultural differences, especially between the coastal plains and the high, rugged interior. In retired, virtually inaccessible areas a spirit of independence was fostered which under the stimulus of racial fervour often developed into opposition to the ruling power. This point is demonstrated by the opposition which the native kings of Pontus offered to Roman authority. Indeed the Gasgans in their mountainous home leading down to the southern shore of the Black Sea were a perennial problem to the Hittites.

"By contrast, the open estuaries of the western coast seemed almost to invite invasion, and the Achaeans (textually, the people of Ahhiyawà) took full advantage of these openings. In this connection, it can hardly be without significance that the Hittites, who were essentially an inland and alpine folk, developed and maintained a high road from their capital to the western coast."\(^{12}\)

At this juncture it is relevant to discuss an interesting idea set forth by Frankfort.\(^{13}\) He sees Palestine, Syria, Anatolia and Persia as peripheral regions of the Near East which were overrun by foreign peoples on many occasions, and, he continues, the new comers succeeded in taking charge.\(^{14}\) These peripheral regions lacked cultural individuality, and once immigrants had asserted their power their mastery was complete. This, he contends, explains the Hittite mastery of Anatolia.

14. This statement is too general. See Supra. p. 5 for a discussion of the exceptions.
Frankfort then extends his thesis by stating that foreigners could rise to power in Egypt, but on the condition that they were culturally assimilated. Further, when large groups of immigrants—Amorites, Kassites—were absorbed by Mesopotamia, they insinuated themselves into the traditional fabric of Mesopotamian culture which henceforth determined their behaviour.

What Frankfort seemingly means is that a culturally superior people will prevent the less cultured invaders from attaining complete dominance, and in fact will finally assimilate the latter. That is, inferior peoples, from a cultural point of view, will attempt to emulate the superiority with which they come in contact and thus they will be in a sense dependent on those whom they have physically conquered. India and China have so far won the ultimate victory over invaders largely because of cultural superiority.

Frankfort is right when he claims that the autochthonous culture of Anatolia was feeble when the Hittites arrived. The relevant question we must ask is this: does the geography of the Anatolian plateau to any extent explain the absence of a highly developed culture? Because of the following considerations I would suggest that it does. Firstly, Anatolia was isolated from the great riverine civilizations of Mesopotamia and Egypt with their highly developed cultures.

15. But Frankfort should surely go further and state that the Hittites themselves did not achieve any great cultural status. However, that is another matter.
Secondly, the physical variation of the plateau did not encourage centralization and thus the interchange of ideas was retarded. Thirdly, the very independence of political units led to time-consuming wars. Lastly, and most important, the nature of the climate of the Anatolian plateau rendered existence precarious. The equation of leisure time with cultural achievement is self evident. Seton Lloyd writes as follows of the plateau of Asia Minor:

"What the traveller sees is an austere upland, arid and thinly populated, inhospitable in character by comparison with the natural amenities of the coastal fringe." 17

He later completes the picture of this uninspiring setting:

"Climatically, in the fourth millenium B.C., the plateau may have been even less inviting to potential farmers than it must appear today to its hardy Turkish cultivators." 18

In conclusion it is suggested that the geography of the highlands of Asia Minor helps to explain the absence of a highly developed culture. This paucity of culture in its turn is to be seen as one of the explanatory factors in the Hittite political mastery of Anatolia. This is so

16. It might be objected that these last two considerations apply to Greece. But it should be remembered that the cultural achievement of Greece was largely an Athenian achievement whilst the Ionians of the river valleys of Asia Minor did not have these geographic limitations with which to contend. The Greek achievement was much later in history and hence there may have been a greater chance of overcoming the handicaps of physical environment. Finally, the plateau of Asia Minor did not lend itself to the use of sea communication to alleviate isolation as did mainland Greece.

17. Lloyd.op.cit.p.2

18. Ibid.p.10
because the Hittites were not culturally dependent to any great extent on the indigenous peoples of Asia Minor. 19

(B) The Site of the Hittite Capital.

A survey of this type would not be complete unless something were said about the topography of the site of the city of Hattusas, since it was there that the ultimate control of the Hittite Empire later resided. Hattusas was situated in the north-east of the Anatolian plateau. More specifically, the ruins of Hattusas lie on the northern slope of a steep hill which rises sharply from a river valley. The capital lay in the vicinity of one of the small streams that feed the Cappadox River which is one of the main tributaries of the Halys. The Cappadox itself lies within the loop of the Halys and so provides yet another line of defence for the capital.

The northern slope of this hill is a low divide where rise two sources of the Kara Budak Su, the small stream mentioned, which flows north and west to join the Cappadox. The two streams, the sources of the Kara Budak Su, descend steeply on either side of the hill. In places

19. I do not mean to assert dogmatically that the Hittites were completely independent of the culture of the natives of Anatolia. Indeed the survival of the Hattian language in religious texts illustrates some form of dependence on the natives. The real point at issue is that the indigenous inhabitants of Asia Minor were not of a cultural standing sufficient to impair Hittite control of the area. See Goetze, A. "The Cultures of Early Anatolia" from Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, vol. 97, No. 2, (April, 1952) p. 220, where he speaks of the vigour of the new Hittite culture in contrast to the indigenous culture.
the descent is through deep gorges. They have their point of confluence at the foot of the hill just below the modern village of Baghazkeui. From the point whence these two streams rise to the joining of the main streams two miles away the fall is approximately one thousand feet. Thus their descent is very rapid and winter rains and snow heighten the rate of descent. This is especially true of the stream flowing down the eastern side of the hill, the Beuyuh Kayouin, which was worn down its rocky bed so deeply that its banks have become precipitous cliffs requiring little or no artificial defence. The Yazir Daresi, on the western side, flows through more alluvial grounds, and has there scooped for itself a gorge, in the steep banks of which the harder rocks are left protruding, thus making assault on that side also a precarious enterprise.

The main reason for choosing this site for the Hittite capital was its natural defensibility. The Hittite sappers who would have been responsible for the planning of the city's defences exploited to the full the natural given advantages of the position. For example, the slopes were banked up, and the enclosing city walls were brought, wherever practicable, to the edge of the rocks, in which possible footholds were eliminated by filling them up with masonry.

On the northern side the line of defence is less clear. Here the ground is broken by a third small stream. There is evidence of more artificial defence on this side than on the western or eastern sides. The most assailable point appears to have been the high ground to the south and here man-made fortifications were proportionately stronger. The wall on the southern side was built upon a great earthen rampart revetted with stone which in its turn followed the line of a natural ridge. 20

20. These topographic details have in the main been derived from Garstang's *The Hittite Empire*, (London, Constable, 1929), p. 79-82.
The topography of this locale which afforded such an easily defensible acropolis undoubtedly contributed to the political and imperial success of the Hittites. It is of interest to note that the Hittite capital was not transferred to this site until towards the end of the reign of Hattusilis I. There must have been good reason for changing the capital from Kussara to Hattusas and the above description of the site indicates the intelligence of the transfer. This move from Kussara to Hattusas will be dealt with at greater length in the section devoted to the reign of Hattusilis I. In that section the strategic considerations in relation to the geographic complex of Asia Minor, which must have been part of the motivation for the move, will emerge.

It will suffice to say for the present that the geography of Anatolia greatly assisted the Hittite rise to ascendancy in that area. But not only may geographic factors be held to partially explain the achievement of political mastery; they also helped to determine the nature of that mastery.
The Hittites were obviously a people familiar with mountainous regions. This is so because they were able to survive successfully in the demanding mountainous climate of Anatolia. Secondly, they were able to control and govern this mountainous area for many centuries. In short, the Hittites felt comfortable and at home in Asia Minor. They had knowledge of the requirements of the conditions of Anatolia. If the Hittites did not originate from a mountainous region their sense of adaptability in Asia Minor was truly remarkable.

Giles, when speaking of the Indo-European invasion of Asia Minor, which he claims had a northwesterly line of approach, says that it is impossible to believe that so many languages, with so complicated a grammar, could have developed on so closely similar lines, unless the speakers had spent a long time in contact with each other, and shut off from their neighbours, as in the Danube area they were, by mountains which offer comparatively few means of access. This development of many languages is interesting. It presupposes that related Indo-European tribes were sufficiently isolated from one another to develop different dialects. The Balkans and the Danube area foster tribal isolation because of the markedly sub-divided nature of the terrain.

That the Hittites, at such an early stage in history (about 2000 B.C.) moved from one mountainous area to another indicates that when they arrived in Anatolia their condition was perhaps more nomadic than it was sedentary.

The relevant question which arises is as follows:— To what extent does a nomadic -canton origin explain Hittite political forms?

1. Cambridge Ancient History (Cambridge University Press, 1924) Vol. II, Chap. II p.29. (The Cambridge Ancient History will hereinafter be referred to by the abbreviation C.A.H.)

The mountain-nomad would belong to a small tribe which attempted to move on to different pockets of fertility as soon as others had been temporarily exhausted. There would of course be considerable opposition from similarly existing tribes in the area who had the same object in view. The cold climate and rugged nature of the mountain terrain made the gaining of a livelihood difficult. Thus competition and the resulting conflict for the most favoured pastoral and agricultural areas was perhaps inevitable.

To survive under such conditions of competition demanded a high degree of skill in such related activities as leadership, warfare and organisation. Because of the precarious nature of existence the person most skilled in these activities would become the chieftain of the tribe. The greater the threat to survival the greater the effort to guard against extinction, and man's instinct to survive would be intensified by the very precariousness of his livelihood which pertained under these mountainous conditions. One may, I think, justifiably claim that the threat to survival heightens intelligence and makes very real demands on man's ingenuity.

Thus it follows that the members of the tribes, living under the above mentioned conditions, would be determined that only the most skilled in the relevant survival activities would lead them. The potential chieftain would have had to prove his capabilities in these activities before his fellow tribesmen would entrust him with the responsibility of keeping them alive. Hence the office of chieftain of the tribe would have been essentially an elective one. The old maxim, 'like father like son', would hardly have sufficed these nomads living under such threats of catastrophe. It is only when life has become sedentary, and thus more assured, that the hereditary factor in leadership can become operative, since with greater security one can afford to widen the margin of possible error often concomitant with the hereditary principle.3

3. This is, of course, not the only reason for the establishment of the hereditary principle. The reason given is the relevant one for the above discussion. The other reasons are given in the chapters concerning Labarnas, Hattusilis I and Telipinus when it was attempted to make the kingship hereditary.
Now because the leader of the tribe was elected to his position he must have been in many ways dependent upon the electors. It was to them that he owed his position and should he fail them they no doubt removed him from office. Since the tribe was so dependent on the ability of their chieftain for survival a watchful and critical eye would have been cast over his activities; hence the coming into existence of a council which had power over the king. It was, I believe, these nomadic—mountainous conditions which give the reasons for the existence of the historical Hittite council which was such an important political feature during the centuries of Hittite rule in Anatolia. Further to this, it was the strife engendered by friction between the council of nobles and the king which greatly undermined the stability of the Hittite state and this in turn had imperial manifestations of an unfortunate nature.

This close scrutiny of the king's activities prevented any great detachment on his part from those whom he led. This accessibility to, and familiarity with, the mountain chieftain precluded him gaining a transcendent status such as the pharaohs of Egypt and the Mesopotamian kings, the latter to a lesser degree, gained. The very nature of the chieftain's position demanded a close contact with the people he ruled and a responsibility to them. This is one of the most pronounced features of the Hittite kingship. Thus the Hittite king was never conceived of as a god during his lifetime. The nomadic—mountainous origin of the king led to too many real contacts with people and day to day situations for any deification to be possible while he still lived. The Hittite king was seen as being basically as other men and hence there was little likelihood of divinely sanctioned and thus legalized irresponsibility emanating from the Hittite throne.

The value which the Hittites accorded to the individual is also inherent in Hittite origins. We have already noted the mutual dependency between tribe and chief. A one-sided dependency has the manifest danger of making the person or institution with dependents contemptuous of them and hence irresponsibly disposed towards them. But mutual dependency leads to a mutual respect by the dependent parties. That is, owing they are owed. There appears to have been an awareness of kinship amongst the Hittites which derived itself from a shared nomadic past. The smallness
of the tribal unit, dictated by the confines of the mountain cantons must have fostered a familiarity and an intimacy amongst tribal members. This awareness of kinship is nowhere more apparent than in the importance that the Hittites attached to the family or clan. Indeed Hittite history is in many respects the history of leading families or clans. The same is, in many respects, true of Roman history. Hittite consciousness of the importance of the clan must be explained by geographic isolation of the clans from each other. The competition referred to would have also fostered an awareness of belonging to one clan rather than to a race or any of the other clans. Among the Hittites membership of leading clans or families was the basis of wielding political power. It is in the institution of family more than in any other institution that respect for individual members is accorded. This sense of the importance of the individual is not explainable in terms of Hittite origins alone. Other factors, such as the juxtaposition of a ruling caste in relationship to subjects of a different race, will be treated later. Moscati, speaking generally of the peoples of the Ancient Near East who had a mountain origin, says that they brought with them a social structure based on the power of a limited noble class. Outstanding among the nobles, primus inter pares, in war and peace, was the king. After their conquest the nobles share out the land in the feudal system, assuming the rights and obligations involved; their power is decisive, and that of the king is conditioned by it, at least in the very earliest phase.

4. For such purposes as defence and economy clans or families combine into the larger unit of the tribe, but a powerful sense of belonging to the family, in distinction to the tribe, still remains.

5. Because of the fierce competition between tribes value would be placed upon the individual in the interest of keeping up the numbers of the tribe.

In other words, the king's dependence upon the nobility forced him to reward their military efforts with land. Thus Hittite origins largely explain the undoubted feudal nature of the Hittite kingdom. It will be seen that this feature becomes one of considerable political importance to the Hittites.  

But where in fact did the Hittites come from? Opinion is still divided as to the avenue of approach used by the Hittites for gaining access to Asia Minor. There are two theories postulated: that they came in a north-westerly direction from Europe by way of the Bosphorus and the Hellespont, or that they penetrated by way of the Caucasian mountains thus coming from the north-east. What has been said in this section would seem to indicate a European (Balkan-Danube) origin for the Hittites. The steppes of southern Russia perhaps threw forth the Hurrians and the Kassites into the respective regions of the Khabur and Euphrates river valleys. The Hurrians and the Kassites successfully conquered and ruled areas which were essentially made up of plains. Their steppe origin suited them to this and no doubt helped to give them success.


"Feudalism as a method of government means that the performance of political functions depends on personal agreements between a limited number of individuals and that political authority is treated as a private possession. Since personal contacts are so important in feudal governments, it tends to be most effective at the local level where such contacts are easy and frequent."

Because the nobles of the Hittite kingdom were often to treat 'political authority' as a 'private possession' the Hittite state was prone to periods of anarchy.

But Hittite political forms and the area in which they finally settled successfully suggest a mountain origin. It is interesting to note that the Hittites did not possess any cavalry. It will later be demonstrated that it is not likely that the Hittites brought the horse to the Ancient Near East. But the Hurrians and the Kassites, coming from the steppes of southern Russia where the employment of cavalry is possible, and proceeding through the Caucasian mountains to areas of plains where cavalry is also possible, both had a cavalry arm.

The above features of the Indo-European Hittites may perhaps be held to be inherent traits of character but their geographic environment in many ways formed the so-called inherent characteristics.

9. Goetze, A.; Kleinasien (Munchen; Muller, Handbuch der Alterumswissenschaft, III I, iii, 1933) p. 117
   Mellaart; op. cit. p. 11 and footnote 62 does not believe that the Hittites brought the horse to Anatolia.

10. Gurney, O.R.; The Hittites. (2nd ed. Harmondsworth, Middlesex, Penguin Books Ltd., 1954) p. 117-118, where he correctly contends that the affinity of Hittite with the Indo-European languages 'has been proved beyond all doubt and for more than twenty years has been accepted by all those who have studied the subject.'
THE COMING OF THE HITTITES TO ASIA MINOR

It is not possible to establish exactly the date for the arrival of the Indo-Europeans in Asia Minor. But the so-called Cappadocian tablets, which mention the names of early Assyrian kings, permit the compilation of a reasonably accurate chronology.

These tablets, which in their majority come from a site near Kultepe, ancient Kanis, are linguistically Old Assyrian and they give an account of the activities of Assyrian merchants in Anatolia. The appearance of Indo-European words in the Cappadocian tablets is the first historical indication of the Indo-European element in Anatolia. But even more important is the occurrence of the names Anittas, and Pitkhanas (the former's father) in the tablets. Later Hittite kings claimed at least a spiritual connexion with Anittas.

The tablets are also synchronistic with the reigns of king Sarrum-kēn of Assur and with those of both his immediate predecessor and successor. Thus it has been possible to reckon that the vintage of the tablets is approximately that of the twentieth century B.C. To establish more firmly the relationship of the Cappadocian tablets with the appearance of the Indo-European Hittites it is possible to cite archaeological evidence of a corroborative nature. In Alisar, situated in the east of the Anatólian plateau, the following successive sequences of culture have been determined:

"Phrygian" - Alisar IV
Hittite - Alisar II
And there have been observed in the lower reaches layers of an
Early Bronze Age - Alisar I
Below it the remnants of a village have appeared which are held to be reflective of the Chalcolithic Age: Alisar O.

Now Alisar has yielded some Cappadocian tablets and their position in the sequence is important for obtaining a near absolute chronology.

2. Ibid. p. 214-215
They came from level 10c which is the lowest sub-level of the second last level within Alisar II. Goetze dates level 10c at about 1950 B.C.  

We also learn that the culture which is known as 'Hittite' to archaeologists was to some extent established when the Assyrian merchants entered Anatolia. But not only this; the 'Hittite' culture can be shown to grow out of Alisar I. This relatively early beginning of 'Hittite' civilization has been further borne out by excavations at Boghazkeui and more especially by those carried out at Kultepe. In Boghazkeui there appeared below an extensive 'Phrygian' layer (Boghazkeui II) two 'Hittite' layers (III and IV). On the next level, level V, Cappadocian tablets appear.

The work of Turkish excavators at the so-called karum kanis not only offered valuable information in so far as it showed the tablet carrying layer of the twentieth century (Kultepe II) existing between a younger 'Hittite' layer (Kultepe I) and two older layers (Kultepe III and IV), but it also indicated that Kultepe IV contains much Cappadocian pottery. At this level the ware is particularly abundant. It is evident here that the floruit of that ware antedates the twentieth century.

The appearances of Cappadocian pottery is intimately related to the coming of the Hittites. Goetze claims that whether we see in the bearers of the so-called Cappadocian ware the Indo-European element or not it is obvious "that the phenomenon as such is related in one way or another to the influx of a new component in the population." Be this as it may, it

3. Ibid.p.217. Goetze's chronology may be too high. Mellaart; "The End of the Early Bronze Age in Anatolia and the Aegean", AJA, Vol.62 (1958) p.33 thinks that Pitkhanas and Anittas ruled in the latter half of the nineteenth century B.C. This adds to my belief that Gurney's chronology for the Hittite kings should be lowered. Van der Meer, The Chronology of Ancient Western Asia and Egypt, (2nd ed, Leiden, E.J.Brill,1955), p.91 considers that Pitkhanas and Anittas "were contemporaries of Puzur-Assur and his father Sarru-Ken, who lived in the first half of the eighteenth century."


5. Ibid.p.220. Goetze had previously maintained in Kleinasiern (1933) 46ff, that the bearers of this ware were Hittites. He obviously still considers the connection to be possible but he is now not so convinced.
is acknowledged by Goetze himself that with the coming of the Hittites civilization acquired a new appearance that was more vigorous than before.

Seton Lloyd remarks as follows when speaking of the elaborately painted Cappadocian pottery:

"In a country with an unbroken tradition of plain and burnished ware, whose rare experiment in decoration had till now been almost completely limited to simple lines of white paint on a dark ground, the sudden appearance of these gay colours on a light clay must have been revolutionary, and can only have resulted from the admixture of a new element in the population. Sooner or later a tangible connexion must surely be found between this phenomenon and some major historical event, such as the arrival of the Indo-Europeans, who mingled with the indigenous people to produce the original Hittite stock."7

It seems scarcely necessary to pose the question of who else other than the Hittites could have introduced such a distinctive, vigorous and elaborate pottery. The Assyrian traders, whose main business was to gain copper from Anatolia, would hardly have been interested in this type of activity. To the best of my knowledge no such pottery as the Cappadocian ware has been unearthed in twentieth century B.C. Assyria. Lloyd has pointed out that the natives of Anatolia were not likely to have been responsible for it. Had they been capable of such exciting and vigorous ceramic art the outcome of the Hittite struggle for power in Asia Minor might have been vastly different.

Thus not only does the appearance of the Cappadocian tablets and pottery allow the early Hittites to be fitted into the chronological scheme, but the Cappadocian pottery is reflective of the Hittites in relation to the natives of Anatolia in a way which has a possible bearing on their political and military success in Asia Minor.

One of the archaeological phenomena which Goetze claims coincides with the coming of the Hittites are the layers of destruction which are observable in many sites. For example, Early Bronze Age at Alaca Huyuk ends in an apparent catastrophe. The same may be said of Polatli and Kussura. That the Hittites were not peacefully received, or were unwilling to co-exist peacefully with the natives of the plateau, is confirmed by the Anittas text which is the source for the activities of that king. But before recounting the expansionist drive of Anittas I propose to say something of the significance of the existence of different languages in the Boghazkeui archives.

In 1919 Forrer astonished Hittitologists with his announcement that the archives of Boghazkeui contained as many as eight languages. These consisted of Indo-European, Hittite, Luwite, Palaic, Hieroglyphic Hittite, Hattian, Akkadian, Sumerian and Hurrian. For their official state documents the Hittite kings used only two of these languages, Indo-European Hittite and Akkadian. The Indo-European Hittite language superseded Hattian which was the language of the indigenous, non-Indo-European, natives of Anatolia. This in itself is sufficient proof that the real power of Asia Minor was in the hands of the Hittites. Akkadian, which became the diplomatic lingua franca of the Ancient Near East, was to be of real importance to the Hittites when they entered the international complex.

The Luwite, Palaic, Hattian and Hurrian languages are mainly met with in religious texts. Hurrian is also associated with literature such as in the Hurrian reproduction of the Babylonian "Epic of Gilgamesh". But when it comes to affairs of state or empire these languages are conspicuous by their absence. While the Hittites were prepared to forgo control of religion and literature, which the demand to have literature and religious rituals entirely written in Indo-European Hittite would have helped to gain for them should they have desired it, the attempt at monopoly in

political and imperial affairs is witnessed by the exclusive use of Indo-European Hittite. The Romans had the same forbearance in relation to such peoples as the Gauls, Spaniards, Italians, Jews and Greeks. The same may be said of the Persians in their dealings with their subjects. It was only when dangerous political subversion became apparent through the usage of religion or literature that independence in these fields worried them. The Persian attitude to the subversive Davidites is a good example of this attitude. The preservation of the religious and artistic mores of the governed is, of course, one way of gaining their goodwill. In short, a ruling caste, such as the Hittites were, was not vitally interested in religious and literary practices so long as they were politically disinterested. They obviously felt that the advantages of such a toleration outweighed the risk of these local practices being put to subversive uses. It will become increasingly apparent that the Hittite achievement lay in the fields of state and empire rather than in any other. To a large extent this was due to the great emphasis placed on these two related fields to the exclusion of other interests. Indeed once the Hittites became a minority ruling caste in Asia Minor there was no other alternative open to them. If they had dissipated their energies by channelling them into fields other than those of state and empire their survival as a ruling caste would have been greatly threatened. The irreducible minimum of Hittite history is the continued attempt by the Hittites to remain the master people of Anatolia. They were never completely successful for very long in this respect but the attempt to be so was always the driving force of the Hittite state and the intensity of the attempt was seldom diminished. The Hittites did not find time for anything else, hence the dearth and comparative paucity of Hittite culture. Such inferior pursuits could well be left to others. One is here forcibly reminded of Virgil's implied contrasts between the Greeks and the Romans.9

Therefore it is not surprising that the Hattian language was used in quite a number of the religious cults, many of them being those of the leading deities of the Hittite pantheon. The Hattian litanies were often left as they were without being translated into the Indo-European Hittite. In the Hittite religious services, according to the Hittite religious texts, sometimes Hattian, sometimes Hurrian and sometimes Luwian singers took part. 10

Some scholars have seen in the Hittites an "extraordinary religious conservatism which resulted in the custom of continuing indefinitely the cults of ancient deities in the language of the communities whence they had been taken over": 11 I think that this statement is in need of correction. Conservatism would have been a more applicable term if the Hittites had insisted on the wholesale practice of their own religious customs. What Goetze calls "extraordinary religious conservatism" was in reality good politics based on the understanding that a numerically inferior ruling caste could not afford to offend the religious sentiments of the conquered. Cyrus of Persia was highly conscious of this factor when by his own patronage he reinstated Marduk as the national god of Babylon. This attitude on the part of Cyrus was founded on the realisation that the religious policy of Nabonidus had provoked much discontent. It would appear that Nabonidus, as king of Babylon, had been an energetic worshipper of the moon-god Sin with the result that the traditional national god Marduk was neglected. Nabonidus accordingly received opposition from the priestly class. Cyrus could not in safety have such opposition. The Hittite position must have been similar. 10

The existence of two other Indo-European languages, Luwian and Palaic, 12 proves that the Hittites were not the only Indo-European tribe in Asia Minor.

These facts are informative since they indicate that the Indo-European invasion of Asia Minor consisted of a series of incursions\textsuperscript{13}, possibly at different times, of several Indo-European tribes, rather than a combined overwhelming invasion occurring in the space of a few years. Hrozný claims that the Luwians comprised the earliest Indo-European wave to reach Asia Minor. He claims that the language of this vanguard of the later Hittites was destroyed to a greater degree by the autochthonous languages of Asia Minor than was the case with the language used by the Hittites.\textsuperscript{14} This is evidence for the contention that the Luwites were earlier residents in Asia Minor than the Hittites and that the Indo-European invasion of Anatolia took the form of a gradual penetration.

If we consider that the Hittites came to Asia Minor as a single tribe or people and at a different time to the other Indo-European tribes it is likely that this conquering people were not very numerous. This lack of numbers will dictate their attitude to the conquered to no small extent. It will mean that the doctrine of force is not possible in its entirety since they have not the numbers to hold down a far-flung area by Hittite man-power alone. An awareness of their lack of numbers and a sense of isolation in relation to the ruled resulted in a very close cohesion among the Hittites and the sense of mutual dependency, already mentioned, was heightened in the interests of survival and the maintenance of the position they had won. Thus the institution of the council with its control over the king was encouraged to remain in force and as life became more settled feudalism was the natural consequence of the king's dependence upon his nobles.

These political factors became even more apparent when we realise that the other Indo-European tribes in Asia Minor were subjugated rather than asked to coalesce with the Hittites in ruling Asia Minor.

\textsuperscript{13} Moscati; The Face of the Ancient Orient, (Vallentine, Mitchell and Co., Ltd., English translation, 1960) p.158, makes this claim but does not give any reasons.

\textsuperscript{14} "The Hittites", Encyclopaedia Britannica, The University of Chicago, Vol.11 (1947) p.603. Mellaart, J; "The End of the Early Bronze Age in Anatolia and the Aegean", AJA, vol.62, (1958) p.2, considers that the Hittites were inferior in numbers to the local population, the Hatti. He also considers p.32-33 that the Luwians arrived before the Hittites.
Hrozny remarks that Luwian appears to have been spoken in the Hittite kingdom, in so far as they did not use Hattian, by the peasantry. The infrequent appearance of Luwian and Palaic is evidence enough that their role in the political life of the Hittites kingdom was inconsiderable.

**PITKHANAS AND ANITTAS**

Before the activities of these two kings can be discussed it is necessary to say something about the sources from which we derive our information. In the so-called Anittas text, which in its present form Gurney considers to date from about 1300 B.C., there occurs the story of the struggle for power in Anatolia by Anittas and his father Pitkhanas.

Opinion is divided as to whether the text was contemporary with Anittas or not. The following is Gurney's view. Anittas was a contemporary of the Assyrian merchants. But the style of cuneiform used by the Hittites in this text is quite unlike that employed by the Assyrian merchants. Hence it is implied that the Hittites adapted their script from a source at a time when the Assyrians were no longer living in their midst. Therefore, the assumption that the Anittas-text is simply a late copy of one composed by Anittas himself leads to difficulties, since Anittas who was contemporary with the Assyrian merchants could hardly have written in 'cuneiform Hittite' if the script was not introduced into the country until after that time. Thus the following question arises. In what script did the Hittites of the time of Anittas write if in fact they did write? Gurney continues by saying that such elaborate inscriptions as

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that which is ostensibly of the time of Anittas do not come into being overnight, and not a single example of an Anatolian royal inscription of this period has yet come to light. The view that a whole literature inscribed on some perishable material such as wood, possibly in Hittite hieroglyphics, has been lost to us is unsubstantiated in view of the very brief and formal nature of the earliest extant hieroglyphic inscriptions. Gurney therefore concludes that the deeds of Anittas became legendary. If this view is accepted one cannot accept as historical the activities of Anittas and his father as recounted in the Anittas text. The importance of establishing whether the text is authentic or not does not need stressing.

Hardy considers that the Anittas text is most likely a chronicle compiled from several sources and may not have been written in its present form by Anittas. The first paragraph begins in the third person and its story is continued into the second paragraph. There then follows a section in the first person which is taken from an inscribed monument which Anittas claims to have erected in the gateway of the city of Nesas. (This must have been one of the sources for the tablet). The different use of person indicates the composite nature of the text.

Assuming that Hittite hieroglyphic or some other form of writing was available at the time of Anittas it is possible that later Hittite scribes pieced together into a whole the scattered information recorded at the time of Anittas. The fact that no uniformity was given to the text in the use of the first and third person perhaps indicates their accurate preservation of the information as it survived to them. The historical honesty of the Hittites is sufficiently attested to by many of the passages contained in such documents as the Annals of Mursilis II and the Apology of Hattusilis III. Why the text should mention that Anittas erected a monument in the gateway of Nesas is not understandable if in fact he did not since the Hittites were not vainglorious boasters of feats not performed. Their Royal Annals even

17. Hardy, R.; "The Old Hittite Kingdom", A.J.S.L, LVIII (1941), p.182 footnote 18. Hardy's translated lines from the Anittas text have been my source for the activities of that king.
mention defeats! If the later Hittites took the trouble to preserve a record of his activities it is to be seen as at least partial proof of their authenticity.

Goetze maintains that there was no break in tradition or culture between the time of Anittas and the dynasty of Labarnas and he implies the contemporaneity of the account of the activities of Anittas with the reign of the latter.18 This particular scholar has more to say regarding the Anittas Text and Bittel and Otten agree with him that the text is based on a trustworthy old source and that the events narrated therein actually took place in substantially the way they are related.

However, Landsberger still maintains that the text is apocryphal.19 His finding rests on two suppositions. Firstly, that Anittas was a Hattian and secondly, that before the Mari age the Anatolian languages were not written at all, or at least not in cuneiform. Goetze cannot bring himself to agree with either of these two suppositions. As to the first contention Landsberger recognises at the time of the Cappadocian tablets only Hattians and Luwians (who are said to be non-Indo-Europeans) By taking this stand Landsberger is compelled to remove all those Indo-European lexical elements in the Cappadocian tablets which, according to the majority of scholars, are common to the Hittite language. I am quite convinced that future Hittite kings would not claim even the vaguest connexion with Anittas if he were a Hattian. For obvious reasons it is extremely unlikely that a superior ruling caste would claim any indentification with any portion of the inferior subject population. One could argue that for reasons of state solidarity the Hittites were anxious to flatter the Hattians by such an indentification. But since there is nowhere any


indication to this effect it is hardly a worthwhile proposition.

The alleged illiteracy of the Anatolians, Landsberger's second point, is based on the argument of silence which is not evidence of a really admissible nature. Goetze states that he would not be surprised if Hittite tablets were discovered in Anittas or pre-Anittas levels. Finally, and most important of all, Goetze remarks that "the Hittite script, as is now well known dates back to the period of Ur III at the latest." This last statement gives an answer to Gurney's theory.20

All being considered I am inclined to believe in the historical worth of the Anittas text and I am also disposed to believe that Anittas had the means to record the expansionist drive of himself and his father in Anatolia.

It is not easy to give causes which adequately explain the rise to power of the Hittites in Asia Minor which had its historical beginning in the activities of Pitkhanas and Anittas. Hittite scholars are notorious for the lack of attention which they give to this fundamental problem. The usual section of a book or article on early Hittite history simply records how the Hittites expanded but neglects to make an attempt to explain why they expanded. While no evidence of a direct nature is forthcoming to answer this question there are indications implicit in our knowledge of early Anatolia which justify a tentative attempt to repair this omission.

It has already been shown that the coming of the Hittites coincided with destruction at certain sites.21 The Hittites were not welcome in Anatolia and they had to fight to gain admission. Hittite racial difference may have intensified the opposition of the non-Indo-European inhabitants. If the Hittites defeated one member of the barrier of opposition it is unlikely that they would have given the opportunity for a repeat performance.

20. Supra. p.28
21. Supra. p.23
The inhabitants will either be put to the sword or enslaved. The former fate is more likely when an incoming tribe, struggling for a foothold in a hostile land, cannot afford to be generously disposed towards the conquered. Such must have been the fate of the opposition until the Hittites established themselves in settled life, secure within the confines of a fortified city such as Kussara must have been.

The Hittites may have had no ambition beyond the attainment of this condition. But it is not likely that they were long permitted to enjoy such a condition. According to a text, admittedly of uncertain historical value, Naram-Sin (a successor of Sargon of Agade) who reigned from about 2159-2123 B.C.\(^2\) fought successfully against a coalition of seventeen kings which included a king of Hatti named Pamba. It is safe to conclude that this event took place before the time of Pitkhanas and Anittas. The important point is that there was some form of political organisation in Asia Minor when the Hittites arrived. Indeed we know that Anittas struggled for power against the ruler of Burushadum who called himself 'great prince'. Thus the sovereign of that city probably exercised hegemony over the other princes.\(^2\) The Cappadocian tablets tell us of local princes and their palaces and it is evident that the country was divided into at least ten small principalities. No doubt it was these that were in some way controlled by the 'great prince' of Burushadum.

If such a political coalition was in existence in Anatolia when the Hittites arrived it is unlikely that the first military successes of the latter passed unnoticed. In fact the Hittites would be regarded as a threat to the political status quo of Anatolia. Therefore even if they gained a sedentary form of existence because of their military prowess it would not be long before it was challenged. The Hittites were perhaps forced to break the military-political combination in Asia Minor if they were to remain intact in their newly won position. It is not possible

\(^{22}\) Van der Meer. op.cit. Table 2.

to definitively state who it was that began hostilities, but the Anittas
text attests to warfare and gives the impression of the Hittites making
a lone stand against various cities in Anatolia. It is more reasonable
to assume that the many attacked the one and thus prompted Anittas to
move against the individual cities of Salatiwara, Zalpa and Hattusas. The
military activities of Pitkhanas and Anittas are a testimony to their
awareness of the danger of their situation.

Having conquered a member of the Burushadum coalition the next step
would have been to seduce or force that member over to the Hittite side
in the hope of enlisting the former member's aid against the other members
of the coalition. That this may well have happened is proved by the
section in the Anittas text which deals with the policy of the Hittite king
towards the ruler of Burushadum. This process appears to have continued
for some time. But at the end of the reign of Anittas the Hittites con-
trolled the centre of the Anatolian plateau at least. The geography of
Anatolia must have greatly assisted the Hittites in their policy of divide
and conquer and in some ways the process must have been similar to the Roman
conquest of Italy.

It is not reasonable to say that the Hittites did not have any ambition
to control Anatolia, but in the light of the available evidence it is
possible to say that if any desire in that direction did exist it was heightened
and forced into application by the very nature of the situation which the
Hittites found in Anatolia. While it would be naive to claim that the
Hittites gained Anatolia by accident, circumstances not of their making
partially compelled them to take the course of action described above.

Pitkhanas came to power in Kussara which appears to have been the
main city of the Anatolian principality which the Hittites had carved out
for themselves. Pitkhanas most likely challenged the authority of the
'great prince' of Burushadum when he moved out of his own territory to
attack the city of Nesas which was the seat of another principality.
Although none of the inhabitants were harmed Pitkhanas placed the ruler
of the city in captivity. The idea of this may have been to leave the
city leaderless. Perhaps Pitkhanas had gained a hostage in return for
whose safety the inhabitants of Nesas were to fight alongside the troops
of Kussara. Anyway we know that when Anittas succeeded his father he
held Nesas as well as Kussara. Thus Pitkhanas may have decided to rule
in place of the ruler he had deposed. The Hittites appear to have realized
at this early stage that annexation was the surest way of eliminating danger.

At another time Pitkhanas inducted Anittas into the office of rabi simmilti. This title has been translated as meaning "chief of the citadel". If this translation is correct one may speculate that members of the ruling family were entrusted with military responsibility. This would give an indication as to whether one so entrusted would make a suitable king.

When Anittas began to rule he modestly claimed the title 'prince' or 'king'. But during his reign his kingdom increased and he then felt justified in calling himself 'great prince' or 'great king'. In fact the chronicle of his reign shows that his early years were occupied in establishing his rule over the surrounding kings. Thus it is unlikely that he immediately claimed the title 'great king'.

After his accession Anittas turned first to the lands east of his city. According to his own claim he conquered in one year all the lands in which the sun rose. He next moved in another direction and fought with Ullammas and Hattusas, the last named being the chief city of the Hattians. This city seems already to have been involved militarily with Anittas who declared as follows: "The king of Hatti came back". We may guess that the engagement ended successfully for Anittas. He then turned against the city of Harkiunas which fell before him in the 'warm time'. This probably refers to the early afternoon. Hardy thinks it unlikely that the 'warm time' refers to summer. In Anatolia this season was the only one in which to campaign since during any other time snow and muddy roads made military activities impossible. Thus the mention of summer would be superfluous. Hardy contends that in this part


of the text an attempt seems to have been made to distinguish between cities taken in the daytime and those taken at night. The following words in the Anittas text add weight to this assumption: "...... and the city......mas, which succumbed in a night attack......"27 In other words these early Hittite military forays did not lack the element of surprise or variety from the point of view of the time when they were launched. This will be seen to be a consistent factor in Hittite military enterprises.

The next moves by Anittas are not clear but he appears to have given certain cities into the safe keeping of the storm-god of Nesas. It is likely that at this time he set up in the gateway of Nesas an inscription testifying to his military activities and placing a curse upon anyone who should mutilate his record. The Hittite consciousness of power and superiority has had its first known manifestation.

Then Anittas warred with the city of Zalpas but we do not know the outcome. Trouble then began anew with the city of Hattusas. No doubt the expansionist tendencies of Anittas were a threat to the ruler of the Hatti. Although the two kings had come to blows at least once before the struggle between Anittas and Piustis, king of Hatti, cannot have been decisive. In this renewed action Piustis took the initiative and marched against Anittas but the former and his allies were defeated. But before Anittas could follow up this victory and attack the city of Hattusas he had first to eliminate Zalpas which remained a disturbing element. As a result all the countries between Zalpas and the sea were first subjugated.21

27. Ibid.p.182, footnote 17.

28.Ibid.p.183. Hardy in footnote.19 of the same page poses the following question. Is this sea the Mediterranean or one of the large salt lakes of Anatolia? He thinks that the kingdom of Anittas was more likely confined to central Anatolia. Therefore the Mediterranean is excluded, especially if we look for Zalpas somewhere near Hattusas and Kussara. The fact that Zalpas had to be disposed of before Hattusas could be dealt with indicates the proximity of Hattusas to Zalpas. Therefore the modern lake of Tuz Golu is probably the sea referred to in the Anittas text.
The conflict with Zalpas enabled Anittas to avenge an act of an earlier king of Zalpas, Uhnas, who had attacked Nesas and carried its gods Siusmis back with him to Nesas. The Hittites had apparently suffered some reverses since their annexation of Nesas by Pitkhanas. Anittas now took the city of Zalpas, retrieved the god, and took it, together with king Ḫuzziyas of Zalpas, to Nesas. Again we have the Hittites acting firmly in the hope of eliminating troublesome cities, and again we note that the Hittites did not kill the captured king.

Anittas had opened the path to Hattusas. He proceeded against the stronghold and laid siege to it. When hunger had weakened the inhabitants he stormed the city by night and destroyed it. He then placed a curse of death upon any king who in future times should rebuild it. This may not refer to Hittite kings but rather it may refer to any king who rebuilds the city with hostile intent towards the Hittites. Gurney makes the following remark in connection with this event: "it has been argued that the episode of Hattusas and the peculiar animosity shown by Anittas against that city proves him to belong to a tradition foreign to the kings who later made Hattusas their capital." Gurney is here referring to Hittite kings from the time of Hattusilis I onwards. He goes on to say that the Anittas story "would then have been preserved only as a saga with which the Hittites claimed a spiritual connexion." But would the Hittite Kings claim a 'spiritual connexion' with one who belonged to a different tradition? I do not think that the sacking of Hattusas means that Anittas belonged to a tradition which was 'foreign to the kings who later made Hattusas their capital'. On Gurney's own admission the connexion was forthcoming despite the action of Anittas. I believe that there is very good reason for this connexion. Hattusas was not a Hittite centre at the time of Anittas. According to Gurney it was 'a Hattian city'.

30. Ibid. p.17-19
We may conclude that Piūstis was a Hattian king. That Piūstis gave Anittas much trouble has already been sufficiently demonstrated. The trouble he gave was an indication not so much perhaps of Hattian strength but rather of the strength of the geographic position of the city of Hattusas. It is small cause for surprise that Hattusilis I later transferred the Hittite capital to that great stronghold. The later Hittite kings would be proud to have this connexion with Anittas who had rendered the double service of subjugating the Hatti folk and thus making the city of Hattusas available as the Hittite seat of government.

Salatiwaras, undaunted by the fate of the other cities which had fallen to Anittas, became so hostile that Anittas was obliged to proceed against it. He defeated the army of Salatiwaras and carried it away to Nesas. This must have had as its object the strengthening of the Hittite army by augmenting it with the conquered soldiery of Salatiwaras. Yet another consistent imperial practice has emerged very early in Hittite history. But this action did not quell the hostility of Salatiwaras. Within a year the ruler of Salatiwaras rebelled. Although we do not know the actual outcome of the engagement Anittas appears to have been the successful party since either booty or tribute consisting of chariots,

31. Hardy, R.S.; op. cit. p.184
horses, and a quantity of silver seems to have gone to Anittas. If this was tribute I believe that we have in the Salatiwaras episode the real beginnings of the Hittite Empire. There is an indication that the ruler of Salatiwaras may have been a Hittite vassal. The fate of the soldiery of Salatiwaras after the first known conflict with the Hittites points in the direction that the defeated Salatiwaras was obliged to provide troops to the Hittites. Secondly, it would be difficult for a new ruler or even the same ruler of Salatiwaras to become strong enough within a year (the army being absent) to engage in open conflict with the Hittites if the latter had completely subdued the area.

32. I believe that these horses should more properly be seen as asses. The chapter devoted to Hattusilis I deals with the Hittite acquisition of the horse. See Gurney, O.R. The Hittites, (2nd ed, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, Penguin Books Ltd. 1954) p.104-105 for a discussion of the introduction of the horse to the Near East. On p.104 Gurney claims that the Sumerian chariots were most likely drawn by wild asses. But he also considers that "the Assyrian merchants of Cappadocia seem to have used horses as draught-animals." But Lloyd, op.cit.p.117 disagrees. He maintains that the Assyrians used donkeys as a means of transport. See Hardy, op.cit.p.184, footnote 21, for a discussion of horses as part of the booty or tribute received by Anittas. He admits that one text does not preserve information that horses were received by the Hittites. It is interesting to note that Gurney does not use the appearance of the word horses in the Anittas text to refute the authenticity of that text. If he considered that the text indicated the use of horses and chariots at the time of Anittas he could well use it as evidence in his above mentioned refutation since he considers the introduction of the horse to Anatolia, at least as an instrument of war, to come after the time of Anittas. Therefore it is not likely that Anittas captured horses. We must see instead chariots (also mentioned as booty or tribute) drawn by asses. Mellaart, J. "The End of the Early Bronze Age in Anatolia and the Aegean", AJA, vol.62, (1958) p.13 and footnote 62 has a different opinion. He does not think that the Hittites introduced the horse and the chariot. He considers that 'horses on reliefs and horseheads on Kultepe pottery antedate the migration, though perhaps not by very long.'
In this second conflict the rebellious ruler of Salatiwaras seized the river Hulas which he held as a barrier against Anittas. But Anittas and his army encircled and burned the villages of the rebellious ruler. That the ruler of Salatiwaras should still be powerful enough to possess villages is informative. The Hittites seem to be granting some measure of autonomy to the conquered in return for soldiers and possibly tribute.

If the system of vassaldom commenced in the time of Anittas we may conclude that even at this early period the Hittites had definite desires, not only to defeat those who threatened their existence, but also to bring the conquered into an imperial system.

We now come to Burushadum which next received attention from Anittas. The ruler of Burushadum is designated not as king, let alone as 'great prince', but as the 'man of Burushadum'. There seems to be implicit in this lesser title the likelihood that some previous action on the part of Anittas had diminished the power of the ruler of Burushadum. I have already mentioned that Burushadum was more than likely the head of a coalition which Pitkhanas and Anittas were forced to break. The fact that Burushadum was not finally dealt with until last testifies to its powerful position. Anittas appears to have disposed of the satellites before attempting to eliminate finally the real centre of power which resided at Burushadum.

33. Hardy, R.S.; op.cit. p.184, footnote 22 claims that the meaning of the designation, 'man of Burushadum', in the Hittite records and especially here in the Anittas text, can only be that of a subject ruler. The phrase is used elsewhere to designate a ruler of Salatiwaras known to have been placed in subjection, but who is said to have rebelled. Hardy considers that such a designation cannot be considered in any other way. Thus in the case of Burushadum the same may be said.
Anittas was successful against Burushadum and the ruler of that city presented him with an iron throne and sceptre. Gurney thinks that such a statement "certainly looks like an anachronism". But Bittel believes that at this time the existence of an object such as an iron throne is archaeologically out of the question. Hardy stands by the authenticity and contemporaneity of the document until the non-existence of iron at this time has been definitely proved. Lloyd, when writing about Assyrian merchants in Anatolia trading with the inhabitants of that country, states that the rate of gold to silver was normally 8:1, and an even more precious metal, which is thought probably to have been iron, had five times the value of gold and forty times that of silver. Iron at this stage may have been extremely rare and available only to kings for limited purposes such as the making of a throne and sceptre. I have already given my views regarding the Anittas text.

After the defeat of Burushadum Anittas went to Nesas. He took with him the 'man of Burushadum', apparently as a guest. During the latter's sojourn in Nesas he accompanied Anittas to a holy place and occupied the position of honour on the right of Anittas. It is reasonable to conclude that Burushadum and the area over which it had formerly exercised sovereignty had become in some measure subject to Anittas. But the treatment given to the defeated ruler of Burushadum suggests that his status was of a special kind. If Anittas were anticipating further opposition in Anatolia, as he may well have been, these friendly overtures to the ruler of Burushadum may have had as their object the gaining of the support of an apparently powerful city. If Anittas gained such a powerful ally Hittite ambition, following a series of military successes, would inevitably increase and a wider scope of activities would be made possible. We also have here

35. Hardy, R.S.; op. cit. p. 184, footnote 23.
the first instance, of which we know, of that consistent Hittite and imperial characteristic whereby diplomatic overtures were considered as being more likely to be effective in some instances than the continual use of force. Such a line of approach is in keeping with a minority ruling caste which cannot afford the continual expenditure of man-power.

Lloyd remarks that "the indigenous people themselves, who were thereafter subjected or absorbed by the newcomers, seem previously to have been organised into a federation of small city states, one of which was known to them as the 'Land of the City of Hatti' (Hattusas)." 37 It would thus appear that the Hittite organisation was superior, in some vital respects at least, to that of the people whom they conquered. Perhaps the Hittites themselves were a federation of clans which moved out of the Balkan area and defeated an inferior but in many ways similar organisation to their own. If the Hittites did not arrive in Anatolia until the twentieth century B.C. it would appear that they had learnt to become politically organised elsewhere than in Anatolia. Because the geography of central Anatolia is in many ways similar to that of the Balkans the Hittites continued in usage a federal form of government.

It is interesting to note that after the subjection of Salatiwaras Anittas for the time being held warlike pursuits in abeyance and became engaged in building activities. Nesas was enlarged. The sanctuaries of one of the storm-gods of heaven, other gods, and of the storm-god whom Anittas regarded as his patron deity, were built. 38 The fact that his whole reign did not have to be spent in fighting is a measure of his success. The Hittites had so established themselves that the

37. Ibid. p.30

38. Hardy, R.S.; op.cit. p.183. It is interesting to note the increasing importance attached to Nesas. Could it have been a Hittite religious centre such as Nerik was later to be for the Hittites?
leisure time was available for such peaceful enterprises.

It is not likely that the kingdom created by Anittas was very large. The conquests achieved by himself and his father, where they can be checked, do not seem to have penetrated beyond the central plateau. Nesas was the first place attacked. Thus it was most likely in the near vicinity of Kussara. It has already been noted that before subduing Hattusas Anittas had first to deal with Zalpas. One gains the impression of a logical commonsense expansion. There appears to have been a gradual spreading outwards from the pivot of the home area. The policy was to secure the most immediate territory rather than to embark on distant enterprises. There is something preconceived in the course of action that Anittas took. The threat which the coalition headed by Burushadum offered to the Hittites may well have demanded a preconceived line of action on the part of Anittas. It was not Hittite policy to merely attack and subdue temporarily. The attempt to consolidate what had been gained is witnessed by the holding in captivity of enemy rulers, the use of captured soldiers and the attitude towards the ruler of Burushadum.

The history of the reigns of Pitkhanas and Anittas is that of the rulers of Anatolian principalities at the time of the Assyrian merchant colonies. Anittas emerges from the military scuffles of this period as the one man capable of imposing his rule over the neighbouring cities. By employing the policy of divide and conquer which led finally to the isolation of Burushadum Anittas commenced the movement which had its culmination in the Hittite domination of Asia Minor and areas beyond the confines of that region.

39. See Mellaart, J.; "The End of the Early Bronze Age in Anatolia and the Aegean", *AJA*, vol. 62, (1958), p. 14, where he discusses the positions of some of the cities which Anittas conquered. He considers that Kussara may have been at Alishar. See Mellaart Plate I.
Whether the Anittas text is of the time of Anittas or a later redaction of it, its continued existence among the state documents in the Boghazkeui archives is a sufficient testimony of his importance. Rome had a Romulus and Remus but it cannot be doubted that Anittas has a greater historicity and hence a greater importance than the legendary founders of Rome.  

**THE ASSYRIAN MERCHANTS IN ASIA MINOR**

It remains to complete this section with an analysis of the possible relations between the Assyrian merchants in Asia Minor and the Hittites. The bulk of the tablets on which the Assyrian merchants recorded their day to day business, have been found at a number of sites, but the majority come from Kultepe, the ancient Kanesh, near Kayseri. These of course are the Cappadocian tablets.

"The Assyrians of Kanesh seem freely to have intermarried with the Anatolians among whom they lived and generally to have been on the most friendly terms with them." Gurney remarks that "there is nothing to suggest that the attitude of the indigenous rulers to the Assyrians was anything but friendly. Indeed, we may well suppose that the foreign merchants were welcome to the native princes, to whom they brought the benefits of the higher civilisation of the Mesopotamian valley."  

While this may have been the attitude of the natives of Anatolia I do not believe that the same can be said of the Hittites.

The settlement of Kanesh had in the end been destroyed by fire. Tahsin and Nimet Ozguc unearthed five separate building levels which are to be dated between approximately 2000 and 1700 B.C. Level IA represented

40. Ibid. p.33 Mellaart has no doubt as to the military achievement of Pitkhanas and Anittas.

41. Lloyd op. cit. p.119.

a period before the arrival of the Assyrian traders and level IV sees the rebuilding of the settlement after their departure. In the three middle levels (IIB-III) were the houses of the colonists and in each case there were signs that the settlement had been destroyed by fire. Level II especially had obviously ended in a holocaust of no meagre proportions. The fire had spread so rapidly that the inhabitants had no time to remove their belongings. 43

I believe that it is possible that the Hittites were responsible for the disappearance of the Assyrian merchants from the Anatolian plateau. That is, it is possible that the Hittites destroyed the dwellings in levels IIB-III. From the above it would appear that the natives of Anatolia were not likely to have wreaked such havoc. Who, other than the Hittites could have been responsible for this catastrophe? We know that Anittas, a contemporary of the Assyrian traders, spent the greater part of his reign waging war in Anatolia. But if it were the Hittites who destroyed the Assyrian trade colony at Kanesh what were the factors which led them to take these drastic measures?

The basic essential for successful trading is peace. The activities of Anittas could well have been disrupting the pursuits of the merchants. We know that there was an Assyrian karum(trading factory) at Burushadum. 44 Apart from Kanesh Burushadum is the most frequently mentioned karum in the Cappadocian tablets. This may be seen as proof of its importance. Burushadum was the major Anatolian city with which Anittas warred successfully. Thus it may well have been that the Assyrians interfered in the local politics of Anatolia in the attempt to create conditions most favourable for trade. They may even have given aid to Burushadum against Anittas.

43. Lloyd. op.cit. p.48. For a different opinion see Mellaart,J. op.cit. p.33 who does,however, imply that the Hittites were at least indirectly responsible for the catastrophe that overtook the Assyrian merchants. 44. Lloyd.op.cit.p.116. Ibid. p.119.
Their interference may have been so extensive as to force Anittas to drive them out of Anatolia completely. Levels IB and II at Kanesh indicate that the existence of the Assyrians had been precarious for some time. One gains the impression that the Assyrians received warnings that interference in political or military concerns would not be tolerated. Apparently they did not heed the warnings.

Lloyd considers that direct dealings between the Assyrian merchants and the native Anatolian princes were infrequent. "They are in fact confined to rare cases of a prince intervening to protect one of his subjects, for example when he is in danger of being reduced to servitude on account of his debts." 45 Such a state of affairs offers excellent potential for upheaval. Turmoil does not seem to have resulted with the indigenous peoples of Asia Minor. But with the Hittites it may well have been different. One can imagine that disputes were likely to arise between Hittites and Assyrians, especially if the latter attempted to impede the course of the former. 46 The English Concession trading areas, and the excellent potential for dispute, in India and China offers an interesting analogy which has some similarity with the position in Anatolia. The Assyrian traders appear to have enjoyed a type of extra-territoriality. The very nature of the situation in Anatolia in relationship to the Hittites made it imperative that such interference, as may have been forthcoming on the part of the Assyrians, had to be eliminated.

45. Ibid. p.119

46. If the Assyrians were trading in Anatolia before the arrival of the Hittites they would have become reliant on the natives for the establishment of trade relations. Hence they may well have supported them in opposition to the Hittites.
If the foregoing is correct we have here the first instance of direct Hittite contact with a people from Mesopotamia. Although the Hittites would not tolerate them as political nuisances on the plateau the attraction of wealth from the Tigris and Euphrates valleys and the contact with a superior culture must to some extent have orientated their thoughts in a south-easterly direction. The expansionist drives of Hattusilis I and Mursilis I are sufficient to attest to this.
LABARNAS

Labarnas, the son of Pu-Sarrumas,¹ is the next Hittite king of the Old Kingdom, of whom we have any positive knowledge. His importance in connection with any analysis of the Hittites is very considerable.

In the political testament of Hattusilis I we read the following lines: "My grandfather had proclaimed his son Labarnas (as heir to the throne) in Sanahuitta, [but afterwards] his servants and the leading citizens spurned(?) his words and set Papadilmah² on the throne. Now how many years have elapsed and [how many of them] have escaped their fate? The houses of the leading citizens, where are they? Have they not perished?" ³

It is not altogether clear whether the rebellion occurred because Labarnas was made heir to the throne of Sanahuitta or because Labarnas was proclaimed heir to the Hittite throne while his father Pu-Sarrumas was in Sanahuitta. Hardy considers that the father of Labarnas sent him to govern the disaffected city of Sanahüitta. But the chief men of that city formed a conspiracy, set Papadilmah on the throne and drove out Labarnas. When the rebellion was put down the houses of the conspirators were destroyed.⁴


2. Hrozny, B.; Ancient History of Western Asia, India and Crete, (New York, Philosophical Library Inc., 1953), p.125. Translated by Jindrich Prochazka. Hrozny states that after Pu-Sarrumas died his son Papadilmah seized the throne illegally, but was soon replaced by the legitimate successor who was his brother Labarnas. Hrozny gives no evidence for this claim.


Perhaps the problem may be solved in this way. Labarnas was being groomed for the Hittite kingship by being entrusted with Sanahuitta. Such was usual Hittite practice. Pu-Sarrumas visited Sanahuitta and was satisfied with the way his son had handled the affairs of that city. Thus Pu-Sarrumas, while in Sanahuitta, formally designated Labarnas as heir to the Hittite throne. The context does not make it seem likely that a son of the Hittite king whom we know to have later become the Hittite king would have been merely the heir to the throne in Sanahuitta. The statement, "[but afterwards] his servants and the leading citizens spurned (?) his words and set Papadilmah on the throne," suggest that the rebellion most likely occurred when Pu-Sarrumas died and Labarnas attempted to fulfil his father's word and become king. It is hardly likely that the leading citizens and servants of Pu-Sarrumas would have been in the disaffected city of Sanahuitta which it had been the lot of Labarnas to pacify. The leading Hittite servants and citizens would have been in the Hittite capital of Kussara. But we do know that Labarnas finally became the Hittite king, but apparently not without a struggle. Since the political testament of Hattusilis I was concerned with the designation of his heir to the Hittite throne and the disobedience that he, Hattusilis, had experienced it follows that his reference to Labarnas dealt with the difficulty that king experienced in gaining the throne despite the edict of his father, Pu-Sarrumas.

The refusal of the leading Hittite citizens or nobility to accept the king's proclamations as binding was the curse of the Old Hittite Kingdom. If we suppose that the kingship was an elective office in the original instance the reason for the trouble surrounding the accession of Labarnas is quite obvious. Pu-Sarrumas had attempted to make the kingship an hereditary office. The leading citizens, jealous of their traditional privilege to elect the new king, did not accept this move to limit their power. But why should Pu-Sarrumas wish to confine the monarchy to his own family? There are a number of reasons which can be given.
Because of the Hittite king's dependency on the nobility for his office he would be obliged to treat them as a privileged class. Two of the most obvious ways of treating them as such was to reserve the offices of state to them and to give them grants of land. The Hittite law code, to be discussed later, proves the feudal nature of the Hittite kingdom. Gurney says that "it is clear that the king's kinsmen, called the 'Great Family', enjoyed special privileges, which they constantly abused. The highest offices of state were generally reserved for them." What the Hittite kings granted to the nobility to satisfy their demands and thus ensure their continued support is now being used as a weapon against the king who in his turn attempts to limit the increasing power of the nobility resulting from these gifts. But still the question remains: why should one family wish the kingship to be its prerogative? Another fundamental question also deserves consideration at this stage. Did the nobility use their powerful status to threaten the position of the king because he first attempted to curtail their powers or did the nobility first attempt to eliminate the king or further limit his powers and hence force the king to limit their power? I shall answer the first question first.

5. Coulborn, R. (ed.), *Feudalism in History*, (Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1956,) p. 5. It is stated that "in all feudal societies there has been a strong, almost irresistible tendency towards heredity of function. Even in Egypt between the Sixth and Twelfth dynasties, where the feudal character of the society is more than doubtful, the position of the nomarch (chief officer of local government) becomes hereditary." One can well imagine that the Hittite nobility, along with the king, would wish their positions to become hereditary. It is also claimed, Coulborn (ed).op.cit.p.7, that one of the conditions favourable to the rise of feudalism is "where military power has fallen into the hands of a relatively small part of the population." This was certainly the case with the Hittites who were a minority ruling caste.

The pleasures and relative security of settled court life as compared with the hazards of a quasi-nomadic existence plus the newly won power in Asia Minor may well have led to the desire on the part of a family, which had exercised the kingship, to make the attendant power and privileges their permanent possession. To achieve this desire would mean the soliciting of support from some of the leading Hittite families, who, in return for a privileged status, would be only too willing to lend their support.

Such an attempt to monopolize the kingship could not have been viewed favourably by other leading families with a similar ambition. Under such conditions, where you have families or houses aligned against each other, strife is inevitable. The same tendency for leading houses to monopolise the offices of state and to compete against each other for the privilege, is evident during the Roman Republic in respect to the consulship. Perhaps one of the Hittite families had possessed such ability that a number of kings had been elected from it. Power once tasted is hard to forego. It would only be necessary for a family over a period of time to hold the highest of offices successfully a number of times before tradition and custom would give such a monopoly a popular acceptance if not a strictly legal sanction. Again, the position in Rome is well worthwhile keeping in mind. But with the Hittites, as with the Romans, the popular acceptance of monopoly of office was never such as to eliminate rivalry and faction since other leading families could never bring themselves to accept the monopoly. At the time of Labarnas there was apparently no such acceptance. But perhaps the requisite amount of time had not elapsed to enable tradition and custom to become powerful political factors.

There is one more point in connection with the above and this has a direct bearing on the second question which was posed. Now that the Hittites had begun to rule other peoples they could not afford political faction of an internecine nature. Subject peoples are historically
notorious for making an attempt to throw off the yoke if the ruling people are beset with internal political difficulties. If the Hittite kingship were to remain an elective office there would most likely be several candidates nominated for the office by the various leading families, who, for obvious reasons would be more than politely determined that their candidate would be successful. This is suggested by the support given to Papadilmah in opposition to Labarnas. The faction supporting Papadilmah was forced to use violence because Pu-Sarrumas attempted to make the kingship hereditary. But even if the principle of electing the king still remained operative violence would no doubt still be used. The riches and privileges of a conquering people would surely sharpen the political ambitions of the more powerful Hittite houses. What Pu-Sarrumas and his successors presumably try to do is to make the hereditary principle a traditionally accepted principle so that a measure of political certainty might be gained and the succession to the throne be orderly and free from violence. It is not unreasonable to assume that the Hittite king would attempt to minimize the likelihood of revolt on the part of his subjects. This would certainly be a reasonable justification of the desire of Pu-Sarrumas to keep the kingship within the family fold. It is hardly surprising that the leading Hittite citizens were not prepared to surrender their ambitions and accept the hereditary principle in the interests of the security of the state.

In short, we may say that the Hittite nobility, enjoying the benefits of a conquering people and the riches and power resulting from the feudal system, challenged the power of the king. They possibly considered that their newly won power and the relative security of settled conditions made them less needful of the king's abilities. At the same time, however, individual members of the nobility aspired towards kingship. But at the same time the reigning king's ambitions for his family coincided with the interests of the Hittite state in relationship to the ruled. The hereditary principle in connexion with the kingship had only brief periods of acceptance in the Hittite Old Kingdom. Indeed, the struggle between the Hittite king and his nobility will be seen to be the tragedy of the Old
Kingdom, if not of the New Empire itself.

Another important document of the time of the Old Kingdom, the Proclamation of Telipinus, gives information concerning Labarnas. It bears out more fully what has so far been stated in this section. This document gives a brief account of the reigns of the predecessors of Telipinus to indicate that harmony in the Royal Family and the army leads to the prosperity of the state whereas the reverse leads to anarchy. The document will be treated at length when we come to Telipinus. The following is the relevant section of the Proclamation concerning Labarnas:

1.

(1) "Thus (speaks) king Telipinus, the great king.
(2) Formerly Labarnas was the great king. (2) And then his sons; his brothers, and his relatives by marriage, the members of his family, and his soldiers were united.

2.

(5) And the land was small, but on whatever campaign he went, by (his) strength (?) he kept the hostile country in subjection.

3.

(7) And he kept devastating countries, and he made the countries tremble (?); and he made them boundaries of the sea. (8) But when he returned from the campaign, one (of) his sons went to each (of) the countries —

4.

To Hupisnas, Tuwanuwas, Nenassas, Landas, Zallaras, Parsuhantas, Lusnas. They governed the countries; and the large cities were assigned (to them). 7a

The extract quoted sheds considerable light on the political and imperial stage of development at the time of Labarnas. Section one indicates that Labarnas had established unity between his family and the army. They were at one with each other. Since the ruling house was also a conquering house it was imperative that it should have the support of the soldiery.

The real importance of this opening section lies in the emphasis given to the family of Labarnas. One gains the impression of a group of people directly related to the king who in conjunction with the army wielded the basic Hittite power. There appears to be a quasi-regal exclusiveness operative here. This is further borne out by sections 3(8) and 4. Here we see that the newly conquered countries were assigned to his sons to rule. The use of his sons as governors placed them in a position whereby they could give strength to the dynastic tradition which Labarnas was trying to found. But at the same time they had the means to contest the authority of the king, in the form of armed support, should the occasion arise. If, as is likely, the Hittite kingdom was based in feudalism, the sons of Labarnas would not only have troops at their disposal in the areas they ruled. They would also retain people on the land they held and these people no doubt owed military service through them to the king. For the time being strong rulers were able to hold this danger in check, but such was not always the case.

Perhaps we have here "the existence of a class of local magnates, exercising considerable de facto political authority... If the central government cannot retain the obedience of these men, their de facto power easily becomes power de jure and is inherited by their descendants."7 At the time of Labarnas the dangers manifest in this situation were not realised.

Thus Hittite Imperial life is at this juncture a family affair. The monopoly of power vested in a family or house is here directly evidenced. There was of course to come a time when the Hittite Empire assumed such proportions as to make it impossible for the Royal Family to supply all the rulers for the conquered areas.

It is important to remember that the members of the Hittite ruling house would not comprise the whole of the nobility who owned land and retained people upon it. That other leading Hittites owned land sufficient to retain a significant body of men will be demonstrated later.

7. Coulborn(ed) op.cit.p.7 See also p.100.
This extract implies that unity at home was essential before military enterprises could be undertaken. It was of course this unity on the home front which enabled the military operations to be successful. Even though the land was small before Labarnas embarked on a series of military expeditions favourable conditions at home made possible an increase in Hittite controlled territory. Sections 2 and 3 of the quoted extract indicate that Labarnas was in personal control of the army. The Hittite king was always commander in chief of the Hittite army even though on occasions he delegated control of a section of the army to one of his generals.

The treaty which Muwatallis made with Alaksandus of Wilusa is also informative in respect to Labarnas and his activities:

1 "Thus saith the Sun Muwallis......the son of Mursilis....

2 In bygone times Labarnas, my ancestor, fought against the Arzawan lands and the land of Wilusa; he subdued them. Now after that Arzawa became hostile.....but never did the land of Wilusa secede from Hatti, but from afar they remained loyal to the kings of Hatti.....And when Tudhaliyas came into Arzawa, he came not into Wilusa because it was true to him......

3 And when my grandfather Suppiluliumas came and reconquered Arzawa, the king of Wilusa, Kukunnis, remained loyal, so he did not invade his territory.

4 And again when the King of Arzawa showed hostility towards Hatti...and my father (Mursilis) invaded Arzawa; but again the king of Wilusa remained loyal and sent help."8

Thus Labarnas (about 1640-1610 B.C.) was the first Hittite king of whom we know who conquered Arzawa and Wilusa. Even though Arzawa was soon lost to the Hittites and was never completely subjected by them, Wilusa remained consistently loyal. Wilusa, lying immediately to the north of Arzawa, (see map p.1.) remained loyal even though Arzawa made repeated efforts to gain independence from the Hittites. How much this consistent loyalty on the part of Wilusa was due to the original policy of Labarnas in that area it is difficult to say.

Garstang and Gurney place Arzawa in the fertile area of the Hermus valley, which later gave birth to the prosperity of the Lydian empire and witnessed the rise of Sardis. This new proposition, when compared with the theory of placing Arzawa in Lycia has much in its favour since the prosperity and fertility of Lydia reflect the former greatness and large population of Arzawa which held empire over several states in the western half of Asia Minor and successfully resisted the efforts of the Hittites to reduce it to vassalage for any length of time. The number of the prisoners taken by Mursilis and his generals during the two years of the Arzawa campaign amounted to over 100,000 men. The district of Lycia did not possess the natural advantages which led to the great prosperity of Lydia, nor could it show any imperial expansion commensurate with that of Lydia.

Despite the obvious power and resources of Arzawa and its persistent hostility towards the Hittites Wilusa not only remained loyal to the Hittites but lent them aid against Arzawa. In the treaty of Muwatallis with Alaksandus of Wilusa Muwatallis names Alaksandus as one of the four kings in the Arzawa lands. Garstang and Gurney contend that Muwatallis recognised Wilusa as an Arzawa land because of racial affinities that it had with the Arzawan population.

9. Ibid. p.84
10. Ibid. p.94
11. Ibid.p.101. Garstang and Gurney, p.104, equate Wilusa with the Troad and see it as the prototype of Ilios. Blegen, C.W.; C.A.H. (Cambridge, University Press, 1961) Revised edition of Vols. I and II, p.10 considers that Troy VI ushered in a new era distinguished by a culture of its own. Hence there was most likely the arrival of fresh human stock at this stage. Blegen thinks "there is every reason to believe that they formed part of the movement that at the same time swept over the Greek mainland." The Indo-European affinities of the peoples in this movement is widely held. In Mercer, S.A.B., The Tell El-Amarna Tablets, (Toronto, 1939,) p.182,183 it is suggested that the language of letters 31,32 has marked Indo-European affinities. These two letters more than likely comprise the surviving correspondence between the king of Arzawa and the pharaoh of Egypt, Amenophis III.
By the time of Muwatallis it is not likely that Wilusa was a satellite of the kingdom of Arzawa. It was situated on the outer fringe of the Arzawan states and it was far enough from the centre of Arzawan power to express wishes and policies of its own. Its territory must have been large enough to supply an army capable of keeping the Arzawans friendly, or at least making them unwilling to launch any attack against the Wilusan rulers in order to "win back" Wilusa into the Arzawan kingdom.\(^{12}\) The phrase "win back" is instructive.

It would appear that Wilusa once belonged to the Arzawan kingdom. "Relations between the chieftain of Wilusa and the Hittite kings dated in fact from the time long past when 'Tabarnaas' had just subdued the Arzawa land and annexed Wilusa, at that time an Arzawan province."\(^{13}\) The fact that Arzawa was hostile to Hittite kings from the time of Labarnas onwards and Wilusa was not, proves that Wilusa was lost to Arzawa.

It is reasonable to conclude that Labarnas seduced Wilusa away from its allegiance to Arzawa. We have operative here the time-honoured imperial device of 'divide and conquer' so skilfully practised by the Romans amongst the tribal confederacies of the Italian peninsula. It seems that Hittite dependency on Wilusa, in the form of aid for campaigns against Arzawa, is to be traced back to the time of Labarnas.

How Labarnas managed this seduction is not clear, but there is no trouble from that quarter until the last days of the Hittite empire. The terms of vassalage which Labarnas most likely offered Wilusa must have been

\(^{12}\)Garstang-Gurney. op.cit. p.102. On p.83 the same scholars agree that there was a kingdom of Arzawa itself, and the smaller states which at one time owed loyalty to the king of Arzawa, and later become vassal states under treaty with the Hittite king were Mira with Kuwaliya, the Seha River land with Appawiya and Hapalla. Their omission of Wilusa is informative.

sufficiently attractive to render negative the undoubted overtures made by Arzawa to Wilusa. To the best of my knowledge we have no direct information which indicates the policy of Labarnas towards Arzawa and Wilusa. It has already been stated that Wilusa should perhaps be equated with the Troad. Blegen gives 1900-1800 B.C. as the upper chronological limit of Troy VI and he has the lower limit within only a few years of 1300 B.C. If the equation of Wilusa with the Troad is correct it means that it is likely that the people of the VIth settlement were those who owed allegiance to the Hittites and gave military aid against Arzawa.14 Blegen states that "although the Sixth Settlement was thus contemporary with the early and the greater part of the late stage of the Hittite Empire in Central Anatolia, not a single object of any kind whatsoever that can definitely be called Hittite has ever been recognised in strata of Troy VI, nor have any certainly identified Trojan objects yet been recovered in the Anatolian Hittite layers. This negative evidence is not conclusive in precluding the possibility that relations were maintained between the two areas. A trade route to Cyprus was open, and there may well have been communications with Central Asia Minor by way of Cilicia."15 But perhaps one could well consider the possibility that the lack of Hittite objects in the strata of Troy VI is to be explained by the imperial policy of the Hittites to Wilusa. In the interests of gaining the support of Wilusa against Arzawa the Hittites may have given the former a very privileged status which precluded Hittite occupation of the area. Do we have here the first of the Hittite protectorates such as Kizzuwadna was later to be? Labarnas could well have claimed to have liberated Wilusa from Arzawa. In return for this liberation and the protection that the Hittites would give Wilusa it was expected that the king of Wilusa should give aid against the Arzawans.

14. Blegen. op.cit.p.11
15. Ibid.p.11-12.
But apart from this stipulation and the likely insistence that Wilusa surrender an independent foreign policy Wilusa was to enjoy an otherwise unimpaired autonomy which made it in the best interests of Wilusa to remain loyal to the Hittites. This would certainly be the case if membership of the Arzawan kingdom necessitated obligations of a more onerous kind. The fact that Helladic ware has been found at Troy VI does not prove that there was a Trojan foreign policy in relationship to the Aegean. The achievement of Labarnas in relationship to Arzawa begins the process of subjugating that area which reached its apogee in the days of Mursilis II.

This successful expansion of Labarnas in a westerly direction gives meaning to the statement contained in the Telipinus Proclamation: "and he made them boundaries of the sea." (See map, p.1.) It is interesting to reflect that as early as this the Hittites reached their ultimate extent in westward expansion.

Gurney has the following to say of the seven cities mentioned in section four of the Telipinus Proclamation:

"Tuwanuwa is certainly the classical Tyana, and Hupisna is generally equated with Kybistra; Landa and Lusna may be the classical Laranda (modern Karaman)....Zallara and Nenassa have not been identified with any certainty, but Parsuhanda must have been in the same general area, since it is said elsewhere to have been in the province called the Lower Land, which is the plain to the south-east of the salt lake (Tuz Gol) within the curve of the Taurus. The cities thus form a compact group separated by a considerable distance from Hattusas, and it is therefore not surprising to find that the capital of the kingdom at this time was most probably not Hattusas but the ancient city of Kussara, which has not indeed been located but may well have been south of the Halys."16

16. Gurney, O.R.; op.cit. p.22. But Mellaart, "The End of the Early Bronze Age in Anatolia and the Aegean", A.J.A vol.62, (1958) p.14 says that "although the location of Kussara is still disputed, we have elsewhere brought forward arguments that it may have been at Alishar". Alishar of course lies well within the loop of the Halys close to Hattusas. More will be said about Kussara in the section in the chapter devoted to Hattusilis I where the transfer of the capital from Kussara to Hattusas is discussed.
The whole area in which these cities are placed is low-lying in comparison with the central Hittite homeland, from which it is separated to the south of the Halys by a range of hills. This line of expansion is of great importance in the light of future Hittite expansion to the south and south-east. Indeed, one may say that the success of Labarnas in this area made possible the drive of Hattusilis I, the successor of Labarnas, into northern Syria.

It has already been noted that the sons of Labarnas ruled these conquered places south of the Halys. "They governed the countries; and the large cities were assigned (to them)", is the conclusion of section four from the Telipinus Proclamation. It would seem that the cities referred to were what Athens was to Attica. They must have been the focal points of administration for the areas of which they were the main centres. Such a system would have in many ways facilitated the administration of the areas over which the sons of Labarnas ruled.

In the treaty which Hattusilis III made with Tiliura the following statement occurs in respect to the Kaska folk:
(11) "...But at first Labarnas (and) Hattusilis used not to let them cross the river Kummesmaha." Garstang and Gurney claim that the chief town of the Kummesmaha district was Tiliura. They see this town as the Hittite frontier in that area in the time of Labarnas. Thus the Kaskans, who were to be a "running sore" to the Hittites, were first encountered, as far as we know, in the reign of Labarnas. The military successes of his reign indicate that he was able to confine them to their mountainous homeland north of the Kummesmaha river. (See map, p.1, for the position of Tiliura and the Kummesmaha river.)

To complete this section it is necessary to say something of the undoubted importance that Labarnas had for later Hittite kings. The fact that the Proclamation of Telipinus attempts to show that if the hereditary principle in politics is obeyed there will be unity in the Hittite kingdom and military success abroad makes it significant that the Proclamation begins with the reign of Labarnas. Telipinus regarded Labarnas as the

18. Ibid. p.24
founder of the hereditary principle in Hittite politics. Because Telipinus commences his treatise with Labarnas some authorities have inferred that this diminishes the importance of Anittas in relationship to the Hittites and that they considered Labarnas as the first of their line of kings. Gurney states that "no Hittite king ever claimed Anittas as his forebear, and it has been argued that the episode of the destruction of Hattusas and the peculiar animosity shown by Anittas against that city proves him to belong to a tradition foreign to the kings who later made Hattusas their capital." I have already answered this latter point. Gurney continues in the same vein when he says that "the later Hittite Kings liked to trace their descent back to the ancient king Labarnas, and with him therefore Hittite history may be said to begin, although he does not appear to have been the first of his line." Hardy has the same attitude in so far as he attempts to lessen the importance of Anittas on the basis of the Telipinus Proclamation.

I do not doubt that later Hittite kings identified themselves with Labarnas and that he was of great importance to them. But I do dispute the point that they traced their descent back to him. Gurney admits that Labarnas "does not appear to have been the first of his line." I do not think that the importance of Anittas is in any way less than I have claimed for him in the previous chapter. We may simply say that Labarnas made actual a practice which Telipinus and other Hittite kings heartily approved. In the time of Anittas the kingship was more than likely still elective. Since Anittas did not do what Labarnas did in this respect he is not important for the purpose of Telipinus which was not so much to recount history as to illustrate the worthwhileness of the hereditary factor, and obedience to it, in Hittite politics. Telipinus begins with an account of the activities of Labarnas because Labarnas is the first of whom Telipinus knows in connection with his coming declaration of the law governing the succession to the throne. This is the only conclusion possible after reading the Telipinus Proclamation. To say that Labarnas was the founder of the Hittite line to

20. Gurney, O.R.; op. cit. p. 21

21. Hardy, op. cit. p. 186. He has Labarnas ruling at Hattusas thus giving him an importance which is not warranted.
to which other kings traced their descent is to say more than the evidence warrants. If anything their identification with Labarnas is to be seen as a tracing back of their descent to a political practice or idea which was of the highest moment in Hittite political life until the destruction of their empire. The Apology of Hattusilis III bears out this claim. If Telipinus had proposed to give an account of Hittite history from its origins he would surely have made some mention of Tudhaliyas I and Pu-Sarrumas, to say nothing of Pitkhnas and Anittas.

I do not mean to diminish the undoubted importance of Labarnas. He was the founder of the dynastic tradition in so far as a ruling house was established in his time. The importance of his expansion to the west and the south has already been discussed. His greatness is well attested to by the fact that later Hittite kings styled themselves "Great King tabarna" Tabarnas is probably Labarnas in a different form.22 The name Caesar received similar usage, but if the Romans were asked to trace back their descent I doubt whether they would have stopped short at Caesar. This later identification with the name Labarnas resulted because he represented a political principle which when applied meant power and territorial expansion.

The successor of Labarnas I was Labarnas II. He kept the name of his father until he moved the Hittite capital from Kussara to Hattusas. But the title "tabarna" was to become a royal affixture. This type of practice helps to create a dynastic tradition. An association with a great name is not only flattering to the bearer of it but it also has an appeal to the sentiments of the ruled. It is permissible to speculate that such an association can conjure up the illusion of the existence of strength even in its absence. The number of Henrys and Georges who have been English kings is testimony to this psychological axiom. The continuing use of the name George after George III further proves this point.

Finally, the title of the Hittite queen became Tawannannas. This had its origin in the name of the wife of Labarnas. We do not know whether she exercised power to the extent of Queen Pudu-Heqa, the wife of Hattusilis III. The continuing usage of her name as a title for the Hittite Queen may be soley due to the fact that she was the wife of Labarnas.

22. Gurney, O.R.; op. cit. p.64
HATTUSILIS I

The reign of Hattusilis I (Labarnas II) is comparatively well documented. The so-called political testament of this king is, along with the proclamation of Telipinus, our main source of information for the political conditions of the Old Kingdom. But before attempting an analysis of the political testament it is best to set forth the other knowledge we have of his reign since that knowledge makes more apparent the significance of the political testament.

The proclamation of Telipinus, continuing on from the account of the days of Labarnas, has the following to say about the beginning of the reign of Hattusilis the first:

13. Afterwards Hattusilis became king. (13) And then likewise his sons, his brothers, his relatives by marriage, the members of his family, and his soldiers were united. (15) And on whatever campaign he went, he also by (his) strength kept the hostile country in subjection.

17. And he kept devastating countries, and he made the countries tremble(?); and he made them boundaries of the sea. (18) Moreover, when in those days he returned from the campaign, one (of) his sons went to each (of) the countries, and the large cities were put into his hands 1

On the basis of this we may say that at the very commencement of the reign of Hattusilis I there was harmony in the Hittite court. The royal family was united and it had the support of the soldiery. Hence the military success. Hittite controlled territory increased rather than

shrunk. Arzawa, Wilusa and the Lower Land remained in Hittite hands. The method of governing the newly conquered countries and cities was identical to that of the time of Labarnas. Hattusilis, at the beginning of his reign, would seem to have profited immensely from the strength and successes of his predecessor. But the next section of the proclamation presents a picture in complete contrast to the above. Rebellion and disobedience marked the last days of Hattusilis:

(21) "But when afterwards the subjects of the princes became rebellious, they began to despoil their (i.e., the princes') holdings, and to conspire (against) their masters, and to shed their (i.e., the princes') blood." 2

It will later be shown that Hattusilis managed to restore order before he died.

It must have been early in his reign that the Hittite kingdom expanded for the first time outside the confines of Asia Minor. Indeed it was during the reign of Hattusilis I that the Hittites made their first attack on northern Syria. This line of expansion was to preoccupy continually Hittite military ambitions.

Hattusilis attacked the kingdom of Yamhad (in northern Syria) which had as its centre and capital the city of Aleppo which is to be read in Hittite texts as Halap. In the time of Zimrilim of Maril (1722-1690 B.C.), 3 Aléppo or the country of Yamhad is specified as one of the five great kingdoms of western Asia. 4 This kingdom of Yamhad controlled twenty kings

2. Ibid.p.185.


and some time before the time of Hattusilis it was governed by rulers named Hammurapi and Yarimlim. The Hittites reduced the region to vassalage. According to Cavaignac Hattusilis did not send one of the members of the royal family to rule Aleppo but rather he let the local dynast of Aleppo exist as his vassal. Cavaignac, no doubt referring to the later revolt of Aleppo during the reign of Hattusilis, says that it was left to that king's successor to rectify this weakness caused by such a method of government. 5

The chief source for the relations of Hattusilis I with Aleppo is the treaty which Mursilis II made with Rimi-Sarma of Aleppo:-

Obverse
(9-10) "Thus the Sun, Mursilis...... the king of Hatti:
(11.-14) Formerly the kings of Halab held a great kingdom (kingship) and their kingdom, Hattusilis.....took away. After Hattusilis.....
Mursilis......the grandson of Hattusilis.....destroyed the kingdom of Halab and the land of Halab." 6

But Luckenbill admits that 'took away' could also be 'kept it up'. 7 Hardy claims that no problem arises from the contention that Hattusilis attacked the city but he admits that much difference of opinion exists as to what happened there. He considers that the usual translation has it that Hattusilis destroyed the city as did Mursilis I later on. But he further considers that a study of the treaty shows that the action of Hattusilis is differentiated from that of Mursilis. Hardy believes that linguistically we may conclude that the kings of Aleppo held a kingdom from Hattusilis I.

6. Luckenbill, D.D.; "Hittite Treaties and Letters", AJSL, vol.XXXVII, April, 1921, No.3,) p.188. (Luckenbill points out that the original treaty between Mursilis II and Rimi-Sarma had been broken. A new copy was drawn up by Muwatallis, son of Mursilis. This is the text we have.)
7. Ibid. page 188 Note 1
He offers the following translation of the relevant section of the treaty which Mursilis II made with Rimi-Sarma of Aleppo:

"Which [kingship Hattus] ilis gave Halap to perform [Mursilis destroyed, (and)] the king of the land of Halap." 

In short the revolt by Aleppo caused Mursilis to destroy it. This revolt no doubt occurred during the last years of Hattusilis when the Hittite homeland was torn by faction and the king was unable to leave his more pressing domestic concerns. Contenau considers that Hattusilis, either from free will or because he was forced to, allowed Aleppo to gain in importance. He also claims that the Hittites had to repent of their docility towards Aleppo since Mursilis destroyed it.

This is the first indication we have that the Hittite empire can no longer be administered solely by the Hittite nobility, let alone the governing family. Power is now left in the hands of a native king who is a Hittite dependent. We do not know the terms of the dependency but it must have owed some form of allegiance since Aleppo was destroyed when it disobeyed the terms of vassalage by revolting. The Hittites are using a form of indirect government to hold a conquered area outside the confines of Anatolia. The distance of Aleppo from Hattusas and its separation from Anatolia by the Taurus mountains forced the Hittites to grant this measure of independence to Aleppo. One may also contend that the Hittites were fully aware of the power of Aleppo and the corresponding futility of attempting to annex it or rule it directly by one of their own number. This may be seen as evidence that the Hittites were a minority ruling caste who could not afford the manpower to directly control a far-flung empire. It will be demonstrated in a later chapter that the Hittites

8. Ibid, p.188.
were never more than a minority element in northern Syria. But be this as it may, the very infancy of the Hittite kingdom might have precluded it from entertaining a more thorough scheme for the control of Aleppo.

The assault on the kingdom of Yamhad meant that the Hittites had emerged from their 'mountain fastness' and crossed the formidable range of Taurus through which only a few passes lead. A glance at the map (page 1) shows that the conquest by Labarnas of the Lower Land was fundamental to the success of the campaign of Hattusilis in northern Syria. The most feasible explanation for taking such a difficult line of expansion lies in the Hittite awareness that the south-east of Asia Minor was richer than the Anatolian highlands. Seton Lloyd remarks as follows:

"Through the medium of the Assyrian karum, the Hittites must long ago have come to understand the superior wealth and attainments of the people occupying the riverain country beyond their mountains in the south, and from the first it was in this direction that their political ambitions were orientated."\(^\text{12}\)

It will later be seen that Hittite contact with the peoples to the south-east modified their political and imperial attitudes.

It is at this juncture that the Hurrians make their first historical appearance in relationship to the Hittites.\(^\text{13}\) In the period of Hammurabi of Babylon (1724-1682 B.C.\(^\text{14}\)) Hurrians appear at Tell Atshaneh, marking the beginning of Hurrian penetration into northern Syria. Reports on the excavations of 1939 show that in the Hammurabi period the principal element at Tell Atshaneh was Amorite; but Hurrian nobles are mentioned.\(^\text{15}\)

\(^\text{11}\)infra p.
\(^\text{13}\)Hogarth, D.G.; C.A.H. (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, Vol. II, Chapter XI, iii, 1924), p.260, remarks that Hattusilis warred victoriously with Aleppo which is supposed to have been of Harrian origin. He also states that this indicates a wide enough territorial power to justify us speaking of an early Hittite empire preceding the New Empire.
\(^\text{14}\)Van der Meer, Op. cit. table 3
\(^\text{15}\)Gelb, I, J; *Hurrians and Subarians*, (Chicago, 1944), p.64
Thus it is more than likely that the drive of Hattusilis into northern Syria brought him into contact with the Hurrians who were to have a direct bearing on the imperial fortunes of the Hittite people.

After the death of Samsi-Adad I (1744 or 1734-1724 B.C.) all historical inscriptions from Assyria cease abruptly. Nothing much is known about the country for some two hundred years. This silence is perhaps as telling as any written document. It bears eloquent testimony to a great catastrophe caused by an invasion of people, the same who presumably drove the Kassites before them into Babylonia. It is not difficult to assume that the invaders were Hurrians. It would appear that this Indo-Aryan dominated people were a potent political force by the time of Hattusilis.

Gurney considers that the siege of Urshu, a literary description of which has survived, must have occurred during either the campaign of Hattusilis I or Mursilis I against the kingdom of Yamhad. The scene is laid outside the city of Urshu. Garstang and Gurney claim that Urussa is to be equated with Urshu, the territory of which extended to the Euphrates immediately to the north of Carchemish. The city is besieged by a Hittite army, the operations being directed by the king from the town of Luhuzantiya which is an earlier form of Lawazantiya. Goetze proves that Lawazantiya was a city in Kizzuwatna and that it was actually on or near the main route from Syria to Hattusas. He remarks that the evidence indicates that Lawazantiya is to be placed near Kummanni, the most sacred

   It is not unusual for a city to have the same name as the territory to which it belongs. They consider,p.59, that it was situated on the Hittite corridor to Syria.
20. Ibid.p.55
city of Kizzuwatna.\textsuperscript{22} Kummanni is to be placed in the north-west part of the corridor which gave the Hittites access to northern Syria.\textsuperscript{23}

Thus the evidence argues that if this siege was conducted by Hattusilis he had some form of understanding with the country of Kizzuwatna. But perhaps most important of all is that at this stage the Hittites had gained control of what was to be their main line of approach to Syria. It will be later shown in this chapter that the choice of the site of Hattusas as the Hittite capital must have been intimately involved with this strategic consideration.

The text dealing with the siege of Urshu suggests that the city was in contact with, perhaps allied with, the Hurrian city of Aleppo, and the city of Zaruar. It may also have been allied with Carchemish, "the forces of which are ensconced on a mountain overlooking the city and keeping watch."\textsuperscript{24} The following excerpts which I quote from the tale of the Siege of Urshu are taken from Gurney's translation of it.\textsuperscript{25}

"They broke the battering-ram. The king waxed wrath and his face was grim: 'They constantly bring me evil tidings;......Be not idle. Make a battering-ram in the Hurrian manner and let it be brought into place........Begin to heap up earth. When you have finished let everyone take post. Only let the enemy give battle then his plans will be confounded' (Later the king speaks to his general Santas): 'Would anyone have thought that Iriyaya would have come and lied saying': (We will bring a tower and a battering-ram' - 'but they bring neither a tower nor a battering-ram, but he brings them to another place. Sieze him and say to him': 'You are deceiving us and so we deceive the king'. There is then a lacuna.

\textsuperscript{22} Ibid.p.72
\textsuperscript{23} Garstang-Gurney. Op.cit.p.50
\textsuperscript{25} Ibid.p.178-179.
When Santas next reports to the king he finds him still raging at the delay:

'Why have you not given battle? You stand on chariots of water, you are almost turned into water yourself (?).....You had only to kneel before him and you would have killed him or at least frightened him. But as it is you have behaved like a woman'.....Thus they answered him: 'Eight times (i.e., on eight fronts ?) we will give battle. We will confound their schemes and destroy the city.' The king answered,'Good!'

But while they did nothing to the city, many of the king's servants were smitten so that many died. The king was angered and said: 'Watch the roads. Observe who enters the city and who leaves the city. No one is to go out from the city to the enemy.'

......They answered: 'We watch. Eighty chariots and eight armies surround the city. Let not the king's heart be troubled. I remain at my post.' But a fugitive came out of the city and reported: 'The subject of the king of Aleppo came in five times, the subject of Zuppa is dwelling in the city itself, the men of Zaruar go in and out, the subject of my lord the Son of Teshub goes to and fro'........The king waxed wroth....''

Hardy, when setting forth the "anecdotes" of the time of Hattusilis I gives one in connection with a certain Sandas (Santas). He was a prince and a native of Hurmas, but apparently an official in Hassuwas. He feared an invasion of the Hurri people. (This is probably the earliest mention of these people in a Hittite source). The Hurri people appear to have been harassing Sandas, but instead of staying to meet the invasion Sandas withdrew to his superior in the district. When news of this neglect of duty reached Hattusilis he sent word and had Sandas killed. Gurney gives a different version of what must be the same episode: "Santas, a man of Hurma, was a palace servant in Hassuwa. He served the Hurrians and went to see his lord (i.e; the king of the Hurrians.) The king heard of it and they mutilated him".

Despite the difference between the two versions they both possess one factor in common, namely, the disloyalty of Santas. If this Santas is the same as that of the tale of the Siege of Urshu then that event took place during the reign of Hattusilis I. This disloyalty and treachery on the part of Santas, the king's general in the siege of Urshu, (and his main general at that it seems) may well explain the perpetual delay and incompetence of the king's officers witnessed in this tale. The section concerning Iriyaya and the laxity in guarding Urshu illustrate an inefficiency or even planned treachery which may well have caused the most level-headed of monarchs to express annoyance. The incidents which made the king justifiably angry do not seem to have been unintentional mistakes. Explicit orders were given and disobeyed. Perhaps Santas was working in conjunction with the Hurrians during these siege operations.

If what has been said of Santas the general is true the prospects of Hittite military success are not good. Hardy says that he was a prince. If this is the case he no doubt possessed retainers who may have given him their loyalty rather than to the king where it was owed theoretically. The feudal nature of the Hittite kingdom made such a danger possible. Santas certainly could not have caused such trouble at Urshu solely by himself. The situation implies accomplices. Both Gurney and Hardy state that although Santas was of Hurma his duties lay in Hassuwa. The placing of officials in an area where they had few contacts and thus little influence with the inhabitants would be a means of minimizing the risks of rebellion inherent in the feudal system. Perhaps Hattusilis was aware of such a danger.

One gains the impression from this tale that the Hittite king was the military strategist who delegated the execution of his plans to his generals. That the Hittites have a military hierarchy at this stage is apparent on reading the above quoted extracts.

The Urshu text is informative in another respect. The statement: "Make a battering-ram in the Hurrian manner..." implies that the Hittites were at least partially dependent on the Hurrians for their weapons of war. The mention of eighty chariots in this comparatively early Hittite text need not be cause for the surprise it has engendered on occasions. The
Hurri were dominated by the Indo-Aryan Mitanni. They are evident in northern Syria at the time of Hammurabi who reigned in the late eighteenth and early seventeenth centuries B.C. It is quite possible that the Hurri brought the horse to the Near East, especially if they came from the steppes of southern Russia where conditions are suitable for the breeding and use of the horse. If, as I think is likely, Hattusilis I, reigned from about 1610 B.C. to 1580 B.C. he could well have gained the horse from the Hurri. He was not adverse to making battering-rams in the 'Hurrian manner' and Hittite religious texts owe much to Hurrian influence. Gurney says that "we must conclude that this Aryan clan, moving westwards, brought with them special knowledge of horse breeding, and that it was from them that the art was learnt by the peoples of Western Asia."29

The Boghazkeui archives contain four tablets "on the training and acclimatization of horses by a certain Kikkuli of the land of Mitanni."30 Gurney continues that "the treatise of Kikkuli is certainly later," (than the text containing the tale of the Siege of Urshu) and it is unlikely that the Hittites would have employed this Mitannian as their instructor if they were already familiar with the science of horse-training.31 I am in no position to question the date of Hittite texts. However, it is quite possible that the Hittites possessed horses and chariots before the time of Kikkuli, but not being as good as the Mitanni in training them they hired the services of an expert. Gurney does not deny the existence of a chariotry arm in the Old Kingdom. Speaking of the worth of the Hittite chariotry during the battle of Kadesh he goes on to say that "it is questionable whether this arm was equally well developed under the Old Kingdom".32

28. Supra p.65
30. Ibid p.104-105
31. Ibid p.105
32. Ibid p.105
This is surely evidence favouring my contention in respect to the Hittites hiring Kikkuli.

Another text from the time of Hattusilis I is largely concerned with the activities of a person named Nunnus. He was a resident or ruler of Hurmas who went to Arzawa, apparently as an agent of the king. He appears to have diverted property not his own, to his personal use. This crime was exposed by a man from the city of Huntaras. Hattusilis accordingly ordered Nunnus "brought up," (probably to the court) and sent Sarmassus to Hurmas to effect this royal decision. But Sarmassus delayed his departure and Hattusilis then dispatched "the man of the golden ensign", an official of unknown duties, in his place. "The man of the golden ensign" seized both Nunnus and Sarmassus. He had them carried to Mount Tahayas where he harnessed them to oxen.33 This punishment is clarified by law 166 of the Hittite Law Code:

"If anyone sows seed upon seed, his neck shall be put upon the plow. They shall harness two yokes of oxen and direct the face of one (of them) this way, and the face of the other that way, the man shall die and the oxen shall die too. He who sowed the field first, shall take it for himself. Formerly they proceeded thus."34 This means that they certainly proceeded that way in the days of Hattusilis I since the law code was not revised until later in Hittite history.

On the basis of the above quoted law it seems that Nunnus had attempted to appropriate land that was not rightfully his. Sarmassus disobeyed the king and possibly aided and abetted Nunnus. Hence his similar punishment. If Hittite society was a feudal society whereby the holding of land entailed service to the crown it was obvious why Hattusilis was concerned with this action on the part of Nunnus. The person who had previously owned the land

was now possibly free from his obligation to render service to Hattusilis. Nunnus, most likely a powerful lord and a member of a great family, would be gaining wealth and possibly additional followers or retainers. Hattusilis naturally sought to prevent such situations from arising. If Sarmassus was of similar status to Nunnus the danger to the stability of the Hittite kingship is all too apparent. Whatever the case may have actually been there is no doubt that two officials have here disobeyed the king.

There is also another piece of information from the time of Hattusilis which indicates the suspect nature of the Hittite nobility during the Old Kingdom. Asgaliyas, a lord of Hurmas, was a very important official who was generally praised by the residents of the city. The king appointed him steward in Ankuwas. But he does not seem to have sustained the same reputation while holding this position:

"He was a mighty man, but he died in shame, in the city Kuzurus he cut up kakkalius, (and) in Ankuwas the Kakkalius (were) thin."

We also have the knowledge of a second episode concerning Asgaliyas. He wished to kill Ispudas-Inaras, a hupralas man who had been appointed governor of Ullummas. Asgaliyas had Ispudas-Inaras imprisoned. But Asgaliyas failed, and the prisoner, on being released indicted his oppressor in the following way:

"You (are) corrupt; you disgrace the king greatly." 35

It is not possible to say anything specific about the significance of the first episode other than that Asgaliyas abused the responsibilities and attendant privileges of high office.

With the second episode it is different. Here we more than likely have rivalry between two powerful Hittites. Where you have members of leading families vying for high office there is bound to be competition which does not stop short of violence. Hattusilis, in his attempt to

prevent any one member of the nobility from becoming too powerful, no doubt drew his appointees for high office from as wide a field as was possible. The more ambitious members of the nobility would inevitably see this as a reason for resentment. The ambitious nature of some of the leading aristocrats would have forced Hattusilis to favour other members of the nobility whom he felt were more likely to remain loyal to the throne. The potential use of violence is obvious. Perhaps Asgaliyas had by this stage proved himself unworthy of trust. Hence he was passed over when it came to appointing a governor of Ullummas. His reaction must have been typical of many of the Hittite nobility. It was undoubtedly incidents such as this which explain the unsettled nature of Hittite domestic affairs during the last years of the reign of Hattusilis. His 'political testament', made during his last days, will bear out this statement more fully.

Following the unpleasantness of Asgaliyas Hattusilis made Ispudas-Inaras overseer to the squires Subbiumas and Marassus. The king decreed as follows:

"At night he shall await them for war (?)"

Further:

"At night they shall summon; and he shall place each of the mighty, excellent squires on horses. Then Ispudas-Inaras shall assign them the opening of the knife(?) and the taking of arms."

Hattusilis divided the squires into three sections and gave them, for training, to Nakkilid, chief of the cup-bearers, to Huzzis, chief of the smiths, and to Kizzius, chief of the Meside, and "they made them skilful." 36

A training rule obligated the troops to sleep before the king. Those who performed their duty were to be given wine to drink, but those who neglected it were to be given iyara (?) to drink. The latter were also to be in a state of nakedness and were to avoid being seen. 37

Thus we may say that there was a carefully regulated system for the training of young squires. Obviously it was the members of the nobility who were entrusted with the supervision of the squires. One would expect such organisation of military training from a state which had an essentially military basis. In fact the Hittite capacity for organisation, right

36. Ibid p.192

37. Ibid p.192
down to the most meticulous detail, is very evident in political
documents and religious texts. This undoubted ability to plan and be
methodical must have stood the Hittites in good stead as administrators
of empire.

The rule stipulating that the recruits should sleep before the king
is reminiscent of the practice of Alexander the Great. It no doubt had
as its object the fostering of an early attachment and loyalty to the
crown. These recruits who slept before the king would have been the sons
of the Hittite ruling caste. Hattusilis must have been conscious of the
fact that the gaining of their loyalty was essential. But apart from
this consideration these sons of the nobility were to be the future members
of the chariot arm which was the basis of Hittite military power and success.
Recruits such as these would have belonged to those Hittite families
capable of equipping them with horses and chariots.

Another document of the time of Hattusilis gives us information
concerning the chief men, cities and internal affairs of the Hittite kingdom.
This text mentions Arzawa as part of the Hittite realm. It also names
twelve cities some of which were administrative centres under Labarnas.
Those which can be in any way identified show only the extent of the kingdom
within Asia Minor. Huspisnas, which temporarily held a garrison, and
Nenassas were important just as they were in the time of Labarnas. Kussaras
was apparently only a royal residence at this time. Hurmas, under the
direct control of the king, was the seat of a petty king who may possibly
have supervised his counterpart in Ullammas. Hardy's use of the word
governor in this context is rather surprising. 38

Goetze believes that in the Old Kingdom the princes of the royal house
were often elevated to the rank of petty king even though they were subject
to the Great King. This, he maintains, was especially true of the central
core of Hittite possessions, of which we are now speaking. But, he continues,
in later times the organisation of the central core seemed to develop towards
a type of civil rule where governors rather than petty kings ruled. 39

38. Ibid. p.190. The information from this document is gained from Hardy.
39. Goetze, A; Kleinasien, (Muller, Handbuch der Altertumswissenschaft, III,
Munchen, 1933,) p.95,100.
Because of the following reasons I would tend to agree with Goetze. In the days of the New Empire when the Hittite kingship gained in power and grandeur which gave it Egyptian and Mesopotamian connotations it is not likely that officials ruling territories in central Anatolia would be permitted, for purposes of prestige reserved for the Great King, to bear the title of king. Since the kingship in the Old Kingdom was an essentially limited and qualified institution which did not pretend to the great importance of the kingship of the New Empire it is quite possible that the existence of petty kings in the Hittite homeland during the Old Kingdom did not give offence. We also find, in many respects, that in the Old Kingdom imperial life was a family affair. Thus it is not anomalous to suppose that the sons of Labarnas and Hattusilis were minor kings. But when the empire increased and administrators were perforce drawn from outside the ruling house it is likely that the lesser title of governor came into being.

The significance of one ruler supervising another is not clear.  

Perhaps the Hittites were using a system of checks and balances in their imperial administration.

Hassuwas and Ankuwas were administered in a similar fashion by the king who moved their officials from place to place as he pleased. The significance of moving officials from one area to another has already been stated in connection with the Santas episode. But this mobility which existed in the use of officials has yet another advantage. If an official is exceptionally gifted in one facet of administration his services can be utilized to rectify the short-comings of that facet of administration, should they exist, in other Hittite controlled areas.

The cities of Tibiyas, Hasbinas and Parduwas also came within the province of the activities of Hattusilis. The Hittite king made a settlement in Parduwas and Hasbinas. Cattle and sheep were driven from various localities to the settlement in Parduwas. It seems that two men, Zaharadus and Zahnares, with a garrison of three thousand warriors, were left in Tibiyas.

40. Supra p. 74
42a. Ibid p.193
Tibya was situated in the region dominated by the unruly Kaska folk. (See map, p.i) When once considers the trouble that the Hittites were to have with this people the stationing of such a large garrison among them is not surprising. Indeed, Hattusilis I appears to have actively concerned himself with the Kaska problem and to have had a large measure of success. In the treaty which Hattusilis III made with Tiliura (See map, p.i) the Kaska folk are spoken of in the following manner:

"But at first Labarnas (and) Hattusilis used not to let them cross the River Kummesmaha." 42b (See map, pi)

If Parduwatas and Hasbinas are to be located in the Kaska area we have yet another aspect of the policy of Hattusilis in relationship to the Kaskans. Hattusilis may have made settlements amongst them in an attempt to control an area which was never satisfactorily managed by the Hittites.

Hattusilis proceeded against Hahhas (site unknown) whose inhabitants and herds he transplanted. Hardy claims that this episode witnesses a Hittite king transplanting populations and herds, apparently to break the power of antagonistic cities. Similarly, by the means of establishing settlements and building or enlarging cities Hattusilis rendered hostile communities less dangerous. 43

The transference of populations is well enough known among the Assyrians and the Hittites in the time of the New Empire, but this is the first evidence that we have of its use by the rulers of the Old Kingdom.

The cities comprising the Hittite homeland appear to have been, in some important respects at least, under the direct supervision of Hattusilis. But there were attempts by some of his officials to flout his will. The very proximity of these cities, which must have been the centres of Hittite provinces, to the Hittite seat of government demanded the strongest possible control. Dependencies such as Arzawa, Wilusa and Aleppo, by virtue of their distance from Hattusas, cannot have received the same attention that Hattusilis personally gave to those areas which were more vital to the immediate safety and stability of the realm.

Up to this point events have been described which indicate that Hattusilis did not receive the individed loyalty of his officials. But during the early years of his reign Hattusilis was sufficiently able to keep these tendencies in check to permit him to have military successes. 44 But worse
to follow, and in this connection I requote the paragraph in the Telipinus Proclamation which concludes the section on Hattusilis:

(21) "But when afterwards the subjects of the princes became rebellious, they began to despoil their (i.e., the princes') holdings, and to conspire (against) their masters, and to shed their (i.e. the princes') blood." 45

For example, Huzziyas, who may have been the son of Hattusilis, was sent to the city Tappassandas whose people received him and began to wean him away from loyalty to the king, saying, "Revolt against thy father's head." 46 Perhaps Huzziyas refused and his blood was shed.

Then there is the incident connected with Zalpas which had become dissatisfied but was influenced to make peace. When peace was restored Hattusilis addressed the leading men of Zalpas. In reply the elders of Zalpas seem to have demanded a son of Hattusilis as their ruler. Hakkarpilis was accordingly sent. But while he was in Zalpas he declared against his father and urged the people of Zalpas to become hostile. A person named Kisusas replied for the people of Zalpas but the subsequent story is not preserved. 47

While it is not possible to claim definitely that these two incidents, with a marked tendency towards insurrection, took place in conjunction with the rebellious labarnas-son, whom Hattusilis denounced and disowned in his political testament, it is at least likely that the labarnas-son was behind them. The opening lines of the political testament support this view:

"Great King Labarnas spake to the fighting men of the Assembly and the dignitaries (saying): Behold, I have fallen sick. The young Labarnas I had proclaimed to you (saying); 'He shall sit upon the throne; 'I, the king, called him my son, embraced him, exalted him, and cared for him continually. But he showed himself a youth not fit to be seen: he shed no tears, he showed no pity, he was cold and heartless. I, the king, summoned him to my couch (and said): 'Well! No one will (in future) bring up the child of his sister as his foster-son! The word of the king he has not laid to heart, but the word of his mother, the serpent, he has laid to his heart." 48

47. Ibid p.193
It appears that the mother of the heir had corrupted him and made him treacherous. Hardy claims that some of the princes of Hatti became disaffected. They went to a person known as the "daughter" and poisoned her mind against the king:

"[Against the head] of they father [rebel]. [A servant he will set up......"49

It is difficult to point to a connection between the "daughter" and the sister of Hattusilis. That women should command so much power at the Hittite court speaks volumes for the amount of intrigue that must have been in existence. The exhortations of the disgruntled princes to the "daughter" indicate that they were not satisfied with some action or another on the part of Hattusilis; perhaps his designation of the heir. The incomplete line,"[A servant he will set up...", suggests this. It is of course impossible that the princes are here exploiting the thwarted wishes of the "daughter" to gain their own ends.50 Anyway the princes had their way with the "daughter" and the subsequent revolt threw the land into turmoil. But the rebels were overcome and captured.51

Hattusilis was lenient and merely banished the woman. She was given fields and herds for her support, but she was forbidden to return to the capital lest she should bring harm to the king's house. Before the assembled nobles the king disowned her:

"[Now you shall not do [evil to me]; that one [did not call] me father, I shall not call her daughter"52

Nothing definite may be said about this confused episode other than that the ambitious Hittite princes were prepared to exploit the jealousies and dissatisfaction of those closest to the king in order to undermine the power of the latter. Whether the "daughter" and the sister of the king are in any way to be connected it is not possible to say. But I would offer a tentative solution to this problem which has as its crux the undoubted power held by the woman relatives of Hattusilis. In the light of the later Telipinus Proclamation it seems likely that various women of royal standing were often determined that their son would become the next king.

50. She may have had ambitions for her husband or one of her children to become king, depending on her age.
52. Ibid p.195
The jealousies, resultant intrigues and bloodshed which are apparent in the time of Hattusilis and his immediate successors called forth the carefully regulated laws of Telipinus which were to govern the succession to the throne. The fact that the original heir of Hattusilis was only his nephew may have meant that women of strong maternal instinct did not stop short of the use of violence to put their sons in line for the kingship. If the successor to the throne was chosen from a wide area of relatives that could well have been the cause of this trouble. The wives of Hattusilis may have had cause for discontent. We know that Hattusilis had one son at least and most likely two. 53

But, to confuse the issue even further, Goetze holds that Hattusilis took the right of succession away from his eldest son and awarded it to his youngest son Mursilis. He further claims that Hattusilis ordered his wife Hastajar to recognise this change. 54 Hattusilis warned Hastajar not to oppose him or to let it be said, either by the king or by the princes that she was going to the Old Women for oracles. If she stayed away from them, the king declared, he would not have to protect her by claiming ignorance of her affairs when accusations were brought against her. Concluding his caution he again warned her not to oppose him, and that if she needed information she was to come to him and he would impart his affairs to her himself. 55 The whole situation smacks of intrigue and suspicion. Such situations could well breed groups of informers or delatores such as those who existed in the days of the Roman emperor Tiberius. Goetze considers that Hastajar was the Tawannannas, that is, the Queen Mother. She was also the wife of Hattusilis. 56

53. Supra p. 77
56. Goetze, A; Kleinasién, (Muller, Handbuch der Altertumswissenschaft, III, I, iii, Munchen, 1933) p. 87.
Hardy contends that Hattusilis issued an injunction to the nobles of his kingdom to the effect that anyone mentioning the names of the sons and daughters of a woman called the Tawannannas would suffer the penalty of being hanged in the gates. This woman appears to have been the wife of Hattusilis. Gurney makes the following remark in connection with the Tawannannas:

"Another peculiar feature of the Hittite monarchy is the strongly independent position of the queen. Her title, Tawannannas, was inherited only on the death of her predecessor. Thus as long as the Queen Mother lived, the wife of the reigning king could only be styled 'the king's wife'. One can well imagine that some Queen Mothers would wish to exert an influence that the new king would find difficult to tolerate. No doubt "the king's wife" was often unhappy with this situation. The problem had not been solved by the time of the New Empire.

While it is impossible to reconcile the conflicting points of view which have arisen in this discussion centering around the revolution and intrigue which prompted the political testament of Hattusilis, this much is certain: the women of the Hittite court possessed a power and an influence which could only spell disaster in so far as the stability of the throne and the orderly succession to it were concerned.

The political testament continues:

"Brothers and sisters spoke evil words to him, and to those he paid heed. But I, the king, learned of it; and then I met strife with strife. Now it is finished! He is no longer a son."

Thus Hattusilis evidently retained sufficient support to enable him to suppress the revolt. But it took civil war, the most bitter of all wars, before the king was able to again bring order into his kingdom.

"Then his mother bellowed like an ox: 'They have torn asunder the womb in my living body. They have ruined him, and you will kill him!" 'But have I, the king, done him any evil? Did I not make him a priest? Always I honoured him, thinking of his good. But he did not follow the king's will with love. How could he, following his own will, feel love for Hattusas? Behold, I have given my son Labarnas a house. I have given him [arable land] in plenty, [sheep in] plenty I have given him. Let him now eat and drink. [So long as he is good] he may come up to the city; but if he come forward[?] [as a troublemaker]... then he shall not come up, but shall remain [in his house]."

These lines are important in so far as they give witness to the Hittite practice of sparing the lives of members of the royal family who have opposed the will of the king to the extent of taking part in a revolt against him. We have already seen this attitude in connection with the "daughter" of the king. There must have been reasons for such leniency. To leave people at large who have proved themselves capable of treachery is in some cases, as can be well seen in the time of Hattusilis III, to give them the opportunity of a repeat performance.

Hittite origins may well have had something to do with this respect for individual life. Where tribes have to keep up their numbers in order to survive in relationship to other tribes a consciousness of the value of life could have been engendered. The intimacy of contact with one's fellows and the mutual dependency amongst the individual members of the tribe which must have been a powerful factor in an area of geographic and climatic hazards from whence came the Hittites perhaps partially explains this feature of Hittite domestic policy. The instinct to personally survive is heightened under such conditions and the more difficult it is to survive the greater the need for the assistance of others in order that this fundamental desire may be realised. It is interesting to note the infrequent mention of the death penalty in the Hittite law code.

60. Gurney Op.cit. p.171
61. Moscati,Op.cit.p.159. Gurney's translation of the political testament does not give the whole text so I have supplemented the missing parts, where it has been possible, with excerpts from Moscati's translation of the text and also from Hardy's version.
Secondly, it is more than likely that the rebellious members of the royal family possessed a following which would have given the Hittite king continued trouble if the leader were executed. Feudal conditions with lords and their retainers make this a possibility. A minority ruling caste cannot prolong civil war with any safety. An apparently united front must be presented to the ruled.

Thirdly, the proscriptions of Sulla, Antony and Octavian helped to deprive the Roman Senate of quality and ability. The Hittites may have been alive to this danger. They placed great reliance on Hittite officials for the control of conquered territory. The Hittites would not solely be concerned with whittling away the quality of their officialdom since the factor of keeping up the numbers must always be taken into account. The Hittite Law Code with its emphasis on compensation rather than the death penalty supports this contention.

Fourthly, the Hittite ruling family was but one family in relationship to other powerful families. An awareness of the need to keep the ruling family intact if it was to continue to rule may also have prompted this attitude towards insurgents who belonged to the family.

Finally, the very affection and sense of kinship which family or clan members would basically have for each other is not to be underestimated as a probable reason for this Hittite peculiarity. The lines, "[So long as he is good] he may come up to the city; but if he come forward(?) [as a trouble-maker],...then he shall not come up, but shall remain [in his house]," are suggestive of a sense of a family attachment. There is a form of conditional forgiveness displayed here.

Another informative statement from the above quoted section is as follows: "How could he, following his own will fell love for Hattusas?" There is obviously a distinction being made here between what the prince wants to achieve personally and what is in the best interests of the welfare of the state. Personal ambition was to be sacrificed should it conflict with, and threaten to disrupt, the harmony of the state. This sentence may be seen in the light of an appeal to the moral sense of the Hittites. One can imagine a Roman Senator in pre-Empire days giving voice to the
same sentiment. Perhaps Hittite rulers were intent on inculcating such virtues as firmitas and gravitas. The sense of dedication to the state, manifest in this statement, is one of the most impressive features of the testament of Hattusilis. While it is not permissible to say that this evidences an attempt at political theory on the part of the Hittites it is fair to say that it raises a universal problem which has never been solved satisfactorily. All states have had the problem of an Alcibiades in their midst.

The testament continues:

"Behold, Mursilis is now my son! Him you must acknowledge, set him on the throne. In his heart god has put rich gifts. In place of the lion the god will [set up another] lion. And in the hour when a call to arms goes forth..... you, my servants and leading citizens, must be [at hand to help my son]. When three years have elapsed he shall go on a campaign..... If you take him [while still a child] with you on a campaign, bring [him] back [safely]....

This extract is extremely important to an understanding of Hittite political life. Hattusilis, after declaring that Mursilis is now his son, proclaims him as heir to the throne. The proclamation has taken place before the "fighting men of the Assembly and the dignitaries." Hattusilis has convened a gathering of those who are entitled to a voice in the affairs of state. He talks to them directly and informs them of his chosen successor. The speech of Hattusilis does not indicate that the Assembly or 'pankus' has been consulted regarding the choice of Mursilis. The Assembly is simply told that Hattusilis has decided that Mursilis is to be the next king. What then, is the relationship of the assembly to the king? If the assembly originally had the right to elect the king it would appear that in the course of time that it had lost it.

64. Gurney Op.cit.p.171
65. Ibid p.171
The king is growing more independent of the assembly. He now chooses his successor from his own family. The reasons for this have already been discussed. But the assembly still possesses considerable power. The officials and princes with whom Hattusilis had trouble would have belonged, formerly at least, to this gathering. What is more, this body of men are entrusted with the responsibility of protecting the youthful heir. They are also to play their part in the education of Mursilis:

"Thus I have given thee my word, now this[tabl]et let them read aloud before thee month by month. Thus thou wilt impress my[wo]rds and my\document in thy heart, and my servants and great ones thou wilt govern well."66

Thus Mursilis is, in a very real way, dependent upon the pankus. The convening of the gathering to hear this proclamation is no mere exercise of lip service to a power that has passed away. This is not an Augustus speaking to the Roman Senate.

The power of the pankus is further indicated by these lines from the testament which Hattusilis addresses to Mursilis.

"The evil from anyone, thou will see; whether anyone sins before the god, or anyone speaks any word of evil, then ask again the assembly; thus then let the tongue (i.e. the decision) be turned back to the assembly. My son what is in [thy] heart, do it."67 Apart from the tendency of this last line it is obvious that Mursilis is to consult the assembly in relation to certain matters at least. I do not consider it likely that the youth of Mursilis explains this power of the Assembly. What we have here is the guarantee of the rights of the assembly.

Hattusilis also instructed the assembly how to behave:

"[Moreover]you shall not be overweening, let not anyone[be hos]tile, and let not anyone violate the word. The[affair]of the city Sinanumas, and the city Ubariyas. You shall not do; let evil not be established."68

67. Ibid. p.199
68. Ibid. p.197
Gurney's translation gives the reason why the assembly should thus behave: "[So] Hattusas will stand high and my land (will be) at peace. But if you do not keep the king's word.... you will not remain alive- you will perish." 69

Hattusilis is fully aware that the nobility and their supporters have the power and the means to wreck the state of Hattusas.

"When power is distributed on a local basis and put into the hands of fighting men, a good deal of rebellion and internecine war can occur. All these things have occurred often enough to cause some to say that anarchy is a normal feature of feudalism." 70

What has been recounted indicates the insecurity of the monarchical position in the Hittite Old Kingdom. This insecurity was basically due to the traditional prerogatives of the nobility which were a nomadic-canton inheritance. The root cause of conflict between the nobility and the king was centred in the attempt being made by the king to establish the principle of hereditary succession to the throne. That the assembly was convened to hear the heir proclaimed is testimony of its ancient right, if not to elect the heir, to at least be taken into the king's confidence. The very fact that Hattusilis enjoins the assembly to keep his word and be loyal to his heir is conclusive proof of the royal recognition of the nobility's power. If, as it is held, Hattusilis was trying to establish the hereditary principle it is hardly surprising that he omits to refer to the ancient right of the nobility to elect the king.

One is forced to conclude with Moscati that "the peculiar character of the Hittite regal power - its limitation and control by the assembly - renders it ill adapted to the pursuit of political expansion." 71 This was certainly true of the Old Kingdom.

Hattusilis further foresaw that if the disowned labarnas-son came to power he would avenge himself on the people who had sided with the king during the rebellion. Being well attuned to the political repercussions

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of such an event Hattusilis spoke to the following effect in the testament:

"His mother (is) a serpent; now it shall happen (that) the word of his mother, of his brothers and of his sisters [he] will continually hear, and he will approach to return vengeance. The warriors, dignitaries and servants who are appointed by the king, [he will swear (of) them: 'Now these shall continually die before the king'..... And it shall happen (that) whoever are sons of Hatti, he will approach thus, and to whom these is an ox or a sheep he will approach to lead (it) away....

Now let it not happen, afterwards he will establish [my land in ruin]."  

The rebellion in his kingdom must have made a very deep impression on Hattusilis since at about the same time as his political testament he made a second entreaty to the nobles of his kingdom:

"And my servants let your family be one as (that) of the wolf! And also whoever makes ineffectual the word of the king - whether the Mešed-i-men, the bastard-men, or the Musa-men make (it) ineffectual(?) - those curse the sons of the palace (i.e., the princes)....., whichever son of the palace his words shall make ineffectual(?), his neck(?) let them pierce, and let them hang him in his gate......"  

The testament of Hattusilis indicates his indubitable political insight. While recognizing the power of the nobility he points out that privilege must be coupled with responsibility. He appeals to their moral sense in so far as he asks them to put the stability of the realm before their own ambitions. But if this appeal should fail "you will not remain alive - you will perish." This is the political realist talking. In fact the testament, in so far as it is directed to the nobility, has as its tactics the iron hand in the velvet glove. The nobility has its importance recognized but should they turn their power to destructive uses their end point is threatened extermination. That an ill and perhaps aged king should still concern himself with the future of the kingdom suggests a high-minded seriousness and dedication to the office of monarch. This is not


73. Ibid p. 199-200
the least impressive fact to be gleaned from this important document. The political testament, is of course, an address delivered by Hattusilis to the assembly. It is not a royal edict delivered by an official on behalf of the king. The Hittite king was not remote and detached from his people. This intimacy of contact between the assembly and the king must have been a means whereby the king could rally and enlist the loyalty of his subjects if he was a gifted speaker and was able to discern accurately the nature of the situation with which he was dealing. Homer's 'Iliad' has interesting parallels to offer. There we see Agamemnon addressing not only the council of lesser kings, but also the whole assembly of warriors. One is tempted to say that we have in both cases a political characteristic which is typically Indo-European and which derives its origins from earlier times when the chief was directly responsible to the tribesmen who demanded the right to know from their chief his policy and decisions.

Another interesting extract from the testament is informative in a way which has at least an indirect bearing on the Hittites as a political people. Hattusilis is here talking to Mursilis:

"Keep thy father's word! If thou keepest thy father's word, thou wilt eat bread and drink water. When maturity is within thee, then eat two or three times a day and do thyself well! [And when] old age is within thee, then drink to satiety! And then thou mayest set aside thy father's word."74

This is Hattusilis in the role of pater familias. Mursilis is to be abstemious. He is to be disciplined and frugal in his private life. Excess and self indulgence are to be guarded against since they corrupt and prevent one from giving of one's best. It is only when life's work has been done that there is justification in indulging in the pleasures of the appetites. This firmness and hardihood which is to be practised in private life is very reminiscent of early Rome. There is implicit in the quoted extract a sense of dedication to duty. With the Hittites high position was not synonymous with a life of ease and luxury. Again

we have the suggestion of a mountain origin fraught with hazards which not only demanded this frugality but which made any other form of existence impossible. Such an attitude no doubt had much to do with Hittite success in Asia Minor and the Near East generally.

But it is not only Muršilis that Hattusilis thus addresses:

"[Now] you (who are) my chief servants, you (too) must keep my, the king's words. You shall (only) eat bread and drink water."\(^75\)

If a ruling caste is to survive it must practise the virtue of self denial and the ruling family must set the example.\(^76\)

A note of resolution and fixity of purpose is struck in the following passage from the Testament:

"And thou (Muršilis) shalt not delay nor relax. If thou delayest (it will mean) the same old mischief.... What has been laid in thy heart, my son, act thereupon always!....."\(^77\)

Hattusilis was not only the political head of the Hittite state. He was also, it would seem, the guardian of the morals of the state. He condemns as sinful ingratitude the disloyalty of the labarnas-son who has counted as nothing the kindness and consideration which he, the king, had displayed towards him.\(^78\)

There is the quality of the paternal in the advice or order that Hattusilis gives in respect to the private life of the ruling caste of which he is the leader and 'father'. This intimacy of concern with his nobility not only gives the latter an awareness of their importance but it could also foster in them a sense of responsibility in relation to the ruled since they are made to appear as a group to whom others will look to for guidance and example.

\(^75\) Ibid p.172

\(^76\) A superficial glance at Hittite art permits one to say that it has the quality of 'bare necessity' and even starkness. If art is reflective of the people who produce it the Hittites obviously possessed a certain austerity.


\(^78\) It may be suggested that some Hittite kings like some of the leading Roman Senators were not devoid of self-righteousness and even priggishness. The Apology of Hattusilis III certainly conveys this impression.
If religion is reflective of the people the 'Hymn to Telipinus' contains some lines which give the impression that the rulers thought more of the ruled than merely ruling them:

"Of the oppressed, the orphan and the widow thou art father (and) mother; the cause of the orphan, the oppressed thou, Telipinus, dost take to heart."\(^79\)

Goetze considers that it was the aim of each king to get for the country and self, health, victory and fertility. The ideal is that nobody in the land should be needy, hungry or unclothed.\(^80\)

The lines from the political testament, "Till now no one of my family has obeyed my will; but thou, my son Mursilis, thou must obey it,"\(^81\) gives direct and irrefutable evidence that the Hittite ruling family was not conceived of as blameless and consisting of god-like members to whom no evil could be attached. This admission by Hattusilis of the misdemeanours of his family is proof that responsible and loyal behaviour was expected from them. If it was not forthcoming the indignity of a public denouncement was experienced. The idea that privilege was to be equated with responsibility is obviously evident in this document.

The testament is also important from another point of view. It is the first evidence we have which proves that the Hittites had a most powerful historical sense. It is the first appearance of their capacity to think and write as historians in the modern sense. The testament provides no mere chronicling or listing of events. Hattusilis deals with the causes and possible effects of the event that he recounts. The cause of the disastrous family rebellion and the support given to it by members of the nobility is the activity of the labarnas-son's mother whom Hattusilis calls


\(^{80}\) Goetze, A; Kleinasien, (Muller, Handbuch der Altertumswissenschaft, III, I,iii, Munchen, 1933), p.83-84.

\(^{81}\) Gurney Op.cit. p.171-172
a serpent. The possible effect of this event is to threaten the very existence of the Hittite kingdom. To offset such a threat Hattusilis offers a remedy: loyalty to the king's word and the acceptance of Mursilis as the heir to the throne. In short, the document is a reasoned piece of statecraft. It is evidence of clear-sighted political thinking. Indeed, it is an appeal to the reason and commonsense of the members making up the gathering that Hattusilis is addressing. They are told why the situation has come into being. They are informed that their very existence could be threatened and they are told how the dilemma can best be solved. An appeal to the best interests of people is always a worthwhile starting point. The whole approach of Hattusilis is eminently reasonable.

When speaking of the fate in store for the nobility if they do not keep the king's word Hattusilis gives an historical example of what formerly happened to the nobility when the king's word was not heeded:

"My grandfather had proclaimed his son Labarnas (as heir to the throne) in Sanahuitta, but afterwards his servants and the leading citizens spurned (?) his words and set Papadilmah on the throne. Now how many years have elapsed and how many of them have escaped their fate (?) The houses of the leading citizens, where are they (?) Have they not perished ?....."82

Hattusilis is really saying that the nobility should take notice of the lessons that the past affords and profit by them. This awareness of the importance of events in time past in relationship to events in time present is one of the hallmarks of a politically minded people who attempt, by reference to happenings in the past, to remedy present political defects. Politics is essentially an art which uses the device of reference to what has formerly been politically. Indeed, political sense and the possession of an historical sense are inseparable factors. One cannot exist without the other. As further proof of the Hittite capacity in this respect I offer the following lines which are taken from what has been called the second entreaty of Hattusilis:

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82. Ibid p.172
"The man of the city of Zalpas threw away the word of the father; here (is) that city of Zalpas. The man of the city of Hassuwas threw away the word of the father; this (is) that city of Hassuwas. Well, the man of the very city Halpas also threw away the word of the father, and the city of Halpas will be destroyed." 83

One very important, but difficult question, arises in any analysis of the political testament. Does it indicate that there is both a Hittite Assembly and a Hittite Council? The opening lines of the testament are worth repeating in this connection:

"Great King Labarnas spoke to the fighting men of the Assembly and the dignitaries..." Is this to be taken as meaning that the dignitaries belong, not to the Assembly, but comprise another political group? It seems likely that the dignitaries formed a royal council of advisors who were close to the king and who exercised considerable power. The distinction between Council and Assembly will become more apparent when the reign of Telipinus is discussed.

One can well imagine that the Council consisted of the male members of the ruling family and the leading men of other Hittite families of standing. No doubt the petty kings of the Hittite provinces were summoned to the Hittite capital to hear this important proclamation. 84 Perhaps the Council had met and discussed at length with Hattusilis the appointment of the new heir. It is not surprising that the councillors and the assembly of warriors should be at the same gathering to hear the new heir proclaimed. It was a formal declaration to all those who had political rights. Even if the councillors had assisted in appointing the heir it was a matter of form that they should hear, along with the Assembly, the king's official statement. 85

In 'The Iliad' we have Agamemnon addressing both the assembled warriors and councillors after he has come to a decision with the latter. 86 That the


84. For a different view see Coulborn Op.cit. p.100-101

85. The gathering most likely consisted of all those male Hittites who had full citizen rights.

86. Hom.II.II 48-154
Achaean Assembly of warriors was becoming vocal is proven by the incident concerning Thersites. By analogy with the Indo-European Achaeans we may say that Hittite political organisation, regarding the Assembly and the Council and their relationship to the king was possibly similar.

There are sections from the testament which prove that there was undoubtedly a Hittite Council. The young Mursilis is to have his father's instructions read to him month by month. This task would surely be allotted to the chief councillors rather than to the whole Assembly of warriors. Words such as..."you, my servants and leading citizens" and "my chief servants" which divide the gathering into at least two groups are further proof of the separate existence of a Royal Council.

The assembled warriors would be essentially Hittite warriors, members of the ruling caste upon whom the Hittite king and his councillors were dependent for the extension and maintenance of the Hittite kingdom. The Hittite warriors, aware of their importance in relation to the subject natives of Anatolia especially, and to other subject peoples, inevitably gained political rights. The same may be said in respect to the Achaeans who invaded Greece. In Egypt the situation was different. Perhaps one...


88. Hom.Od.VI 53-55 (c.f.VIII 1-47) Here we see king Alcinous 'going out to join his princely colleagues at a conference to which he was called by the Phaeacian nobles' See also where the people's meeting place is referred to.Od.VI p.266
of the reasons why the rank and file of the Egyptian armies never gained political rights to the extent that their Hittite counterparts gained them was due to the absence in their home territory of a subject indigenous population in relationship to whom they could feel important or superior.

The following lines from the testament further bear out the above contention:

"The elders of Hatti shall not speak to thee, neither shall a man of... nor a man of Hemmuwa nor a man of Tamalkiya, nor a man of....., nor indeed any of the people of the country speak to thee."^89

Gurney considers that Hattusilis is addressing these lines to Mursilis.^90 But Hardy holds that they are directed to the assembled gathering.^91 The important point is that these people do not form part of the gathering that Hattusilis is addressing. That is, they do not have political rights in conjunction with the Hittite ruling caste. They are the subject people to whom full political rights have not been accorded. This is direct proof that the people addressed by Hattusilis are the ruling caste which has superimposed itself upon the native population of Asia Minor.

The reference to the elders of Hatti is most instructive. It seems that the subject people continued to have some form of self government. The elders of Hatti may well have comprised a Hattian council which was responsible for local affairs; a type of county or municipal government. In the time of Anittas we saw that Anatolia was divided into principalities which had as their centres a number of cities. Perhaps each principality had a council of elders, which in association with the local chieftain or king, had helped to conduct the affairs of the principality. By the time of Hattusilis there is no reference to the local king or chieftain. Apparently they had disappeared. But in the interests of facilitating administration and in the attempt to win the goodwill of the natives the local council had been allowed to remain. The political rights of these councils would, of course, be Hittite controlled.

89. Gurney Op.cit. p.68
90. Ibid p.68
91. Hardy Op.cit.p.197
At this stage it is appropriate to deal with a text which makes quite clear the nature of local government enjoyed by the subject people. This text instructs the commander of the border guards as to his duties in respect to local government while he is making a tour of inspection. The relevant portions of the text are as follows:

"In the town through which the commander of the border guards passes on his tour of inspection he shall attend to the necessary provisions for town-elders, priests, 'anointed', and mothers-of-god. He shall speak to them as follows: 'The sanctuary which exists in this town, whether it is of the Storm-god or of other gods, is now collapsed and in disrepair. It is not provided with priests, mothers-of-god and 'anointed'. So provide it again with such (functionaries).' They shall restore it. As it was built previously, so shall they rebuild it.

Furthermore, due reverence shall be shown to the gods, but to the Storm-god special reverence shall be shown. If some temple has a leaking roof, the commander of the border guards and the town commandant shall put it right, or if any rhyton of the Storm-god or any implement of any other god is in disrepair, the priests, the 'anointed' and the mothers-of-god shall restore it.

Furthermore, the commander of the border guards shall make an inventory of the god's utensils and send it before the Sun. Furthermore, they shall worship the gods on the right dates. If a certain date is set for some god, they shall worship him on that date. If some god has no priest, mother-of-god or 'anointed', they shall promptly appoint one. (iii) If no provisions have been made for sacrifices to the gods' stone pillars, provide for them now! They shall arrange for them and furthermore they shall present whatever sacrifices have long been customary.

The rites which are established for the springs that are in the town, they shall go to them and celebrate their rites. And those springs: for which rites have not been established, they shall go to them all the same. In no circumstances shall they omit them. They shall regularly give sacrifices to the mountains (and) to the rivers for which such are established." 92

It is evident from this extract that the commander of the border guards is responsible for matters concerned with religion. His duty is to see that the town-elders, priests, 'anointed' and mothers-of-god keep the temples in repair, that the Storm-god receives special reverence and that rituals are observed when and where it is proper that they should be observed. This concern with religion on the part of a military commander is not surprising. As the commander of the border guards he would be making a tour of those towns which were situated on the outskirts of one of the sections of the Hittite kingdom. If the area was one of rebellious inclination and hard to hold it would be thought necessary to make sure that the aid of the gods was enlisted. Hence we have this instruction that the commander is to ensure a rigid adherence to rites due to the gods to prevent their alienation from the Hittite cause. The nature of the situation explains the emphasis which is to be given to the Storm-god, one of the chief Hittite deities. In areas which were securely Hittite the supervision of local religious practices was probably not as detailed as it undoubtedly was in areas not so pacified. But this purely religious consideration would not be the only factor. In areas which are vital from a strategic point of view, such as boundaries to a kingdom are, there is a very real necessity for control right down to the last detail. The people on the outskirts of the Hittite kingdom must not be allowed to gain the impression that Hittite supervision of strategic outposts is in any way lax. Similarly, the inhabitants of the outpost must be made to feel the reality of Hittite mastery. It is vital in such areas that the attitude of having everything in a state of preparedness and good repair should be fostered.

The commander of the border-guards and the town commandant are to act in conjunction with each other on one occasion, at least, should that occasion arise. The town commandant was probably in charge of the local military garrison stationed in the particular town which his superior was inspecting. The town commandant was perhaps a native of the town. Thus it is possible that we have here a point of direct contact between the Hittite commander and one of his native subordinates in so far as they are made jointly responsible for the completion of the task mentioned. Such liaisons make good 'sounding boards' for the gauging of local conditions.
The power of the Hittite king is made to be felt in outlying regions in that an inventory of the god's utensils is to be sent to him. This reminder that the power of the king can make itself felt in all parts of the kingdom is a good subjugating agency. It never does to allow the subject population to forget to whom they owe their allegiance. The pilfering of temple equipment was a major crime in Hittite law. This was not only in the interests of keeping the favour of the gods but it is also to be seen as a means of preventing the priestly caste from becoming too wealthy and thus powerful. As far as can be ascertained the priests of the Hittite world never attained the power and influence of the priests in Egypt.

The text continues:

"Furthermore, the commander of the border guards, the town commandant and the elders shall judge and decide legal cases (10) in accordance with the law. As it has been from older days - in a town in which they have been accustomed to imposing the death penalty, they shall continue to do so. But in a town where they have been accustomed to imposing exile, they shall continue that (custom). Furthermore, the citizens shall bathe afterward and there shall be a public announcement. No one shall let (the exiled) return. He who lets him return, shall be put in prison....

If anyone brings suit by means of a sealed brief, the commander of the border guards shall judge it according to the law and set them right. If the case is too much, he shall send it before the Sun.

(25) He must not decide it in favour of his superior, he must not decide it in favour of his brother, his wife or his friend; no one shall be shown any favour. He must not make a just case unjust; he must not make an unjust case just. Whatever is right, that shall he do.

Whenever you arrive at a town, call all the people of the town (30) together. For him who has a complaint, judge it and set him right. If a man's slave or a man's slave-girl or a widowed woman has a complaint (against someone) judge it for them and set them right. Should Kaasiya people, Himmuwa people, Tagaramma people and Isuwa people be there,(35) attend to them in every way."93

This section is of first rate importance to any understanding of the Hittite attitude towards the subject population. The most important fact which emerges is the Hittite respect for local law. There is the recognition that different people in different locales will inevitably have different punishments for the same offence. But while respect and toleration of difference are evident it is not a case of letting the subject people have complete control of their legal affairs. The commander of the border guards judges cases in association with the town commandant and the elders. The administration of law is closely supervised by a Hittite army officer. With some law suits, those which come "by means of a sealed brief", the commander of the border guards shall judge it according to the law and set them right." Here we have a Hittite military officer judging alone but in accordance with local law. Again it is a question of making Hittite control felt and of ensuring official judicial proceedings. But the law has not been altered to make it adhere to Hittite legal practices. The impression is given that the Hittites are intent on seeing that justice is scrupulously done. It is reminiscent of the Persian attitude to the application of law even though the fate of a corrupt judge may not have been similar.94

This Hittite administration of local law means that the local officials have had their power curtailed. But there was possibly a feeling of gratitude on the part of the subjects because of the preservation of the laws with which they were familiar. Perhaps the Hittites also earned the gratitude of the subject people by ensuring that justice was done and that care was taken to guard against corruption. The commander of the border guards is not to be a free agent dispensing justice as he sees fit. His conduct was regulated and there were various dictates that he had to obey.

93. Ibid. p.210-211
94. Hdt.V.: .28
This text offers further proof of the Hittite capacity to organize. One gains the impression that there has been an attempt to take everything into account. A public announcement would make the people of the town familiar with the decision that had been reached. Ignorance was not to be an excuse. The people of the town were called together to give them a chance to air their grievances and have them set right if the commander of the border guard has the power to oblige. Again there is the opportunity for the Hittites to gauge the nature and trend of public opinion.

But the commander is not the only Hittite arbiter of local law cases. He is only the king's representative in certain cases.

"If the case is too much he shall send it before the Sun". The power of the commander is thus circumscribed. No doubt those cases which involved treasonable behaviour were cases for the court of the king. Any activity which threatened the Hittite Empire would be dealt with by the king. The significance of the intervention of the king in affairs pertaining to outlying regions has already been stated. It would not only be dangerous to place too much judicial power in the hands of an army officer who had the command of a vital sector of the realm, but it would also make the ultimate Hittite power less in the eyes of the subject people.

We also know that the elders of towns, on some occasions at least, exercised the sole legal power:

"If anyone finds an ox, a horse (or) a mule, he shall drive it to the king's court. If he finds it in the country, the elders may assign it to him and he may harness it. When its owner finds it, he shall receive the respective animal; there shall be no question of a thief. If the elders do not assign it (to him), he becomes a thief."95

Thus although the commander of the border guards and the king exercised legal control in respect to certain local affairs the independence of the elders in these matters still existed in some circumstances. No doubt the cases that the elders tried had only a local significance that did not bear directly on the Hittite state. A minority ruling caste would have no alternative other than to permit the continuance of judicial self-determination up to a point at least. This is not only to be explained

on the basis of available Hittite man-power, but it is also indicative of a Hittite awareness that such an attitude is least likely to alienate the ruled.

The mention of the Kassiya people, Himmuwa people, Tagaramma people and Isuwa people is very significant. If they are present they are to be attended in every way. They are obviously privileged people. The people of Hemuwa previously "did not render any services and did not perform socage." One does not have to look far to find the reasons for the importance of these specified peoples. The Hurrians, who were ruled by the Mitanni, were troublesome during the reign of Hattusilis. A glance at the map (p.i) indicates that Kassiya, Tagaramma and Isuwa could act as buffers against the Hurrians and make it difficult for them to gain a foothold in Asia Minor. Secondly, Kassiya, Tagaramma and Isuwa lie to the south-east of Hattusas. That is, they lie immediately in that area which gave the Hittites access to Syria and Mesopotamia. It is small wonder that they were given special consideration since the main Hittite line of expansion was essentially towards the south-east.

Because the text giving instructions to the commander of the border guards has been discussed in this chapter it is not to be taken that I necessarily consider it to belong to the time of Hattusilis. But since it does not seem possible to assign this text to any definite period of time and because the political testament of Hattusilis necessitated an analysis of the role of town elders I have thought it appropriate to include the text in this chapter. Since Hattusilis conquered Aleppo the importance given to the above mentioned peoples, who are basically connected with the Hittite approach to northern Syria, makes it not impossible that the text belongs to his time. Being the first Hittite king to conquer Aleppo it would be good policy to make secure the line of approach, by the granting of concessions to the people in the areas centred on that line of approach, to northern Syria. It is well to keep in mind that Aleppo rebelled later in the reign of Hattusilis. He may well have been aware of this danger. Hence his concern with the avenue of approach to northern Syria.

96. Ibid. p.192 Law 54. Goetze, p.211, footnote 2, appears to equate Himmuwa with Hemuwa.
In conclusion it is necessary to explain the significance of moving the Hittite capital from Kussara to Hattusas. Gurney has the following to say about this important change:

"The successor of Labarnas, Hattusilis I, was remembered in later times as king of Kussara, and it was at this city that he delivered the speech which is our main source of information for political conditions in the early kingdom. However, the same document shows clearly that the administrative capital at the end of his reign was Hattusas; it also indicates that his original name was not Hattusilis but Labarnas, like his father. Hence we may conclude that this king during the course of his reign transferred his capital from Kussara to Hattusas and adopted in consequence the name of Hattusilis. His choice of this northern stronghold as his capital was doubtless guided by strategical considerations.

But what were these strategical considerations? Gurney considers that "the ancient city of Kussara, which has not indeed been located, may well have been south of the Halys." Mellaart says that "although the location of Kussara is still disputed, we have elsewhere brought forward arguments that it may have been at Alishar, a great Middle Bronze Age city which appears to fulfil all the requirements." Garstang considers that Samuha might be located at Malatia. Garstang continues: "The fact that Samuha was associated in some way with Kussara... indicates broadly an area of search for the ancestral home of the Hittite kings." Malatia (Maldiya) lies well to the south-east of Hattusas quite near to the region where the Mitanni settled. I would tend to the conclusion that Kussara was situated too close to the Mitanni for comfort and that it did not enjoy the natural strategic advantages possessed by Hattusas. It has already been noted that the Hurrians gave trouble during the reign of Hattusilis. This may well explain the move from Kussara to Hattusas.

101. Ibid. p. 459
Garstang makes a very interesting observation when comparing the sites of Angora (Ankara) and Boghazkeui (Hattusas):

"As the road and trade centre of the western peninsula, Angora was well chosen as a site of the modern capital of Turkey; and it is interesting to reflect that from the days when the Hittite capital was stationed at Boghazkeui no deliberate effort has been made to rule and organize the country from within until today, after an interval of 3000 years. It is instructive to compare the situation of the two capitals. That of the Hittites is found where Nature afforded it protection and strategical advantage as regards the south-eastern frontier: but the problems of modern Turkish administration today are of necessity concerned more intimately with the European aspect." 103

Thus we may say that Hattusilis, the first Hittite king of whom we know who made a drive in a south-easterly direction which had northern Syria as its objective, chose for his capital a position which gave him "protection and strategical advantage as regards the south-eastern frontier." That this was one of the main reasons for the choice of Hattusas is borne out by the line of expansion taken by later kings.

Again it is informative to quote Garstang:

"...while the course of the Halys river marks a convenient outline for this region, it provided only on the north-west a political boundary and protection."104 The situation of Hattusas's enabled it to take advantage of this protection afforded by the Halys. If the Hittites gained access to the Anatolian plateau from the north-west they would, knowing the ease of such an approach, be intent on gaining a position which would give them protection against an invasion from the north-west.

104. Ibid p. 75
Garstang continues:

"On the other hand, towards the east and south the ways lay relatively open. We are now in a position to apply these conclusions to the position of the capital from the strategic standpoint....the site of Hattusas does not mark precisely the natural route-centre of this area: the roads that converged upon it were directed there by man. Difficult of access, by way of defiles that required to be known to be turned to advantage, commanding the approaches to more favourable lands in several directions, it was essentially the raider's retreat. Tactically good as a centre for tribal expansion, it possessed none of the advantages which might pre-determine the strategical and commercial capital of an empire, such natural facilities of communication for example as are found in the sites of Amaseia, Sebasteia (Sivas), Mazaca, Tyana, and Iconium. A glance at the map will show these very places to form a ring in the centre of which stood the city of Hatti (Hattusas). They lay like advanced posts beyond the Asiatic frontier."  

Thus Hattusas was ringed by a chain of cities which gave protection to the capital from the east, south-east and south-west. These cities must be seen as strategic outposts which were capable of offering opposition to hostility from the east, south-east and south-west. Even if they fell the way to Hattusas was still far from easy. When Kizzuwatna and Mitanni became part of the Hittite empire yet another line of defence to offer invading armies from the east and south-east was created.

105. Garstang, J; "Hittite Military roads in Asia Minor", AJA, Vol.XLVII, No.1, (January-March 1943), p.37 remarks as follows: "The Hittite capital was not itself a natural road centre, but it occupied a defensible position not far from the crossing point at Yuzgat of two ancient trade routes: one from the northern coast at Samsun towards Cilicia and Syria; the other from the upper Euphrates westward to the Aegean Sea...

106. Garstang, J; The Hittite Empire (London, Constable, 1929), p.75-76. For the map referred to see page 76.

107. The advanced posts of Mazaca and Tyana to the south-west would afford the capital protection from the Arzawans.
Still talking of these advanced posts Garstang continues:

"The routes connecting them provided lateral lines of communication, and the tracks along the ranges completed the scheme. The immediate rivals and dangers lay to the east and south-east beyond the wall of mountains, and it is from this standpoint that the value of the situation of Hattusas can be appreciated and understood. The original strength of its position lay in its natural defensibility, and this was supplemented in time by walled ramparts; but the secret of its development as an imperial capital lay in the organisation of its radiating communications with the great road centres. No headquarter staff could have devised a more perfect defensive system; history shows how the empire grew and was maintained upon these lines of which Hattusas....was the focus."\(^{108}\)

It was geographical considerations which made the south-eastern approach to Syria from Hattusas easier than the more direct southerly approach through Cilicia. The historic route through the Cilician Gates is the only pass available for traffic through the unbroken rock wall of Taurus. It was not until Persian times that this narrow defile became a main thoroughfare. The rivers Sarus and Pyramus which link Cilicia with the Anatolian plateau do not provide readily accessible channels of communication through Taurus. Thus it is unlikely that the chief military communications of the Hittites with Syria passed through Cilicia as they did in the time of Persian and Macedonian supremacy.\(^{109}\) The eastward pass of Amanus is high and rocky and it is doubtful whether wheeled chariots could go that way before Roman times.\(^{110}\) Indeed, the Amanus range forms the barrier between the south-east corner of Asia Minor and northern Syria. The route round the coast to Alexandretta and the Beilan pass is a more practicable line of approach but where it skirts the sea at the Gates of Syria it meets with rocky promontories which have called for centuries of skilful engineering and bridge-building. The passage

\(^{108}\) Garstang, J.; The Hittite Empire, (London, Constable, 1929), p.76-77
\(^{109}\) Tarn, W.W.; Alexander the Great, (Boston, Beacon Press, 1956), p.23
\(^{110}\) Xen. Anabasis I. 4.4-5. Cyrus seems to have avoided this pass on his eastward march.
by the sea across the bay would appear a likely possibility but there is nothing to suggest that the Hittites transported troops by ship.

Thus the main line of communication from Hattusas to Syria was inevitably forced in a south-easterly direction to the highland routes which issued from the plateau by the passes of anti-Taurus. And from centres such as Marash and Maldiya it was possible for Hittite armies to descend on such Syrian cities as Carchemish and Aleppo. The Hittites, having decided upon their lines of expansion, chose a site for their capital which made more likely of success their ventures to the south-east.

111. Gurney. Op.cit. Fig.1 - Map of Asia Minor.
MURSILIS I

Mursilis, the heir designated by Hattusilis, was the next Hittite king. The testament of Hattusilis suggests that Mursilis was probably very young when he came to the throne:

"When three years have elapsed he shall go on a campaign....If you take him while still a child with you on a campaign, bring him back safely."

Hattusilis may have been ill when he made his speech to the assembly. If he died shortly after the speech Mursilis was possibly only fourteen or fifteen years old when he took the kingship. The three year lapse referred to would make him seventeen or eighteen; old enough to independently undertake military campaigns. It is possible, then, that there may have been some form of regency while Mursilis was still too young to assume full monarchical responsibility. The fact that his education was entrusted to the nobility makes such a speculation feasible.

If Mursilis was only fourteen or fifteen when Hattusilis died the injunctions of the latter to the assembled Hittite warriors and nobility must have had good effect. While Mursilis was young and inexperienced the situation would have been ideal for a coup d'état by a leading Hittite who had a following at his call. But such did not eventuate. However, it must be admitted that there is no direct evidence to disprove the idea that Hattusilis lingered on for several more years, thus allowing Mursilis to grow somewhat older and so become more versed in the art of political survival. The proclamation of Telipinus indicates that Mursilis did not have any trouble in gaining the throne and that his early regnal years were not torn by family feuds.

(25)"When Mursilis became king in Hattusilis, then likewise his sons, his brothers, his relatives in law, the members of his family, and his soldiers were united. (26) And by (his) strength he kept the hostile country in subjection. (27) And he made the countries tremble (?); and he made them boundaries of the sea."2


This extract gives the impression that Hittite controlled territory was in no way diminished during the reign of Mursilis. Arzawa still belonged to the kingdom; Ankuwas, Sanahuditas, Hurmas and Ullumas, chief cities of the time of Hattusilis, were still important. But even so trouble did occur within the Hittite kingdom and Mursilis was occupied in the field suppressing rebellious cities and protecting his outlying provinces.  

Burushadum was rebellious but the inhabitants became the king's captives and the city was destroyed. Apparently the lenient policy of Anittas in connexion with this city had not been altogether successful. Also Zalpas, which apparently had not been sufficiently subjugated, again revolted. The Zalpas episode informs us that there may still have been disloyalty within the ranks of the ruling family. Happis, the leader or organizer of the insurrection, may have been the son of the king. These events with which Mursilis concerned himself in the Hittite kingdom must have taken place before his raid on Babylon since we know that he was assassinated shortly after his return from Mesopotamia. If Mursilis was young when he came to the throne his son would not be capable of leading an insurrection until sometime later. Thus if Happis was his son, and the Telipinus proclamation informs us that he had sons, the Zalpas affair must have occurred just before the attack on Babylonia.

But we learn that the Zalpas incident must have taken place some time before the campaign to the south-east. Mursilis marched to the city Hanahsus where he defeated the troops of Zalpás's, but Happis escaped. In three years time the king returned to Zalpas and besieged it. The city refused to surrender Happis and Mursilis accordingly gave greater impetus to the campaign against Zalpas. As a result many were killed. It was now time for Mursilis to go to Hattusas to officiate at religious ceremonies. But he left the great men to continue the siege against Zalpas. When the king returned the city was finally taken. In view of the possible youth

4. Ibid p. 201-202
of Mursilis and the fact that Zalpas revolted some time before the raid on Babylonia it seems that Happis may not have been the son of the king. But since there is no way at present of determining the length of the reign of Mursilis this question must remain open. However, it must be admitted that the Telipinus Proclamation credits Mursilis with sons at the time he ascended the throne. The evidence is difficult to reconcile. But this much is certain: leaving aside the question of the age of Mursilis when he ascended the throne we may conclude that if he had grown sons at that time they did not immediately become disloyal. If there had been treachery on the part of one of the sons of Mursilis early in his reign we can be rest assured that Telipinus would have mentioned it in his Proclamation. It was the objective of the Proclamation to point to the disruption caused by such disloyalty. The more treachery he could indicate the more forcible the message of Telipinus became.

One is tempted to conclude in the following way. The Proclamation of Telipinus offers official state information. Therefore Mursilis more than likely had grown sons when he came to the throne. But they did not become rebellious during the early years of their father's reign. Secondly, the history of Hittite politics does not indicate that a youthful heir to the throne would long survive his father's death if he, the heir, was still a youth. Thus Hattusilis perhaps recovered from his illness and ruled for several more years.

In connection with the Zalpas incident a characteristic feature of the Hittite monarchy emerges. The king was prepared to delegate military power and, as we saw in the last chapter, judicial power as well. But the Hittite king was apparently loath to delegate religious obligations. Guterbock writes as follows about Hittite religion:

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7. Supra p.105
8. But Hardy is not sure whether or not Happis was the son of Mursilis. Op.cit.p.201-202.
9. Supra p.106
"The main sources of our knowledge of the Hittite religion are the thousands of religious texts contained in the royal archives at Boghazkeui. It is not accidental that by far the largest number of all tablets found there are of the type generally called 'religious texts': this is a vivid manifestation of the religious character of the Hittite kingship. Tablets have been found at Boghazkeui mainly in one of the Temples and on the citadel. But this does not mean that religious texts were kept in the 'Temple Library', or political documents in the 'Palace Archives', on the contrary, at both places there were found all kinds of texts, which again shows that there was no distinction between what we would call the religious and political functions of the king and his court. 10

The Hittite king was chief priest. At first sight it might appear that the Hittite state had theocratic tendencies. A theocracy exists of course when the state is governed by God, directly or through a Sacerdotal class. But the Hittite state was not a theocracy because there the king became the chief priest rather than the chief priest became the king.

If one reads the descriptions of the elaborate and meticulously organised religious festivals celebrated by the king, often covering several days and sometimes including travels to many shrines of the country, one wonders how Hittite kings found time to do anything else. 11 But as Goetze says:

"Engaged in warfare during the summer season, worshipping the gods took a considerable part of his time during the winter." 12

In other words religious observations seem to have been so organized as to prevent them from often clashing with the campaigning season. The above case of Mursilis sees such a clash.

But why did the Hittite king take unto himself the office of chief priest and why was he so intent on fulfilling the functions inevitably associated with the office to the extent of leaving a military operation hanging in the balance?

12. Ibid, p.91
Firstly, the appearance of the Hittite king in an officiating capacity at the many festivals celebrated at local shrines by the ethnic groups of Anatolia identified him with the religious practices of his subjects. It fulfilled much the same purpose as when Cyrus grasped the hand of Bel. It gave official sanction to, and exhibited respect and toleration of, the religious customs of the people of Asia Minor. The mere fact that the king found time to attend to such ceremonies must have gained considerable respect for the Hittite monarchy. We know that Hittite kings celebrated religious festivals as far afield as Kizzuwatna. It was a means of making the Hittite empire a more closely knit organisation. Hittite subjects would be made to feel more than just subjects ruled in a detached manner from Hattusas. The idea that present day Royal Tours have as their object the strengthening of Commonwealth ties is not as vainly pretentious as the superficial reactions to them would indicate.

But no doubt these religious tours also had a more prosaic motivation. Indeed, they may be seen as Royal Tours of inspection which enabled the king and his dignitaries\textsuperscript{13} to scrutinize at close range such aspects of empire as the efficiency, or otherwise, of administration. The mere annual presence of the king, regular and precise, must have done something in the way of discouraging inefficiency and subversive tendencies.\textsuperscript{14} Such travelling, to be done efficiently, presupposed a developed road system on which the chariots or, for longer distances, the carriage of the king and his entourage could move quickly.\textsuperscript{15}

Since the king was chief priest he would have general supervision of all activities related to religion. This may partially explain why it was that a priestly class with excessive wealth, and consequently political power, never arose and threatened the Hittite monarchy.

\textsuperscript{13} Guterbock Op.cit.p.96

\textsuperscript{14} Though it may be argued conversely that this very regularity of royal visits gave the opportunity for the temporary suspension of administrative malpractices during the king's brief stay.

There is evidence in Hittite religious texts of an obsession with the mechanics of the ritual. The procedure to be followed in the ritual is carefully formulated right down to the last detail. The impression is given that the observance of procedure is of more importance than the religious idea inherent in the celebration. The analogy with Roman religion is all too apparent. Hand in hand with this type of attitude is the idea that punctuality is imperative in the celebration of the festival or ritual. Just as the gods will not pay attention if there is an omission of detail while the festival is being celebrated so they will pay no heed if the celebration does not occur at the appointed time. In this way we may explain why Mursilis hastened back to Hattusas to fulfil his religious obligations.

The following extract from a ritual text makes this obsession with exactitude more evident:

"The king and queen go into the temple of Zabaha. They kneel once before the spear; the statue-worshipper speaks, the herald calls.... The king and queen sit down on the throne. The palace servant brings in the cloth of the golden spear and the 'lituus'. He gives the cloth of the golden spear to the king, but he puts the 'lituus' by the throne on the right of the king.

Two palace-servants bring the king and queen water for the hands from a jar of gold.... The king and queen wash their hands. The chief of the palace-servants gives them a cloth and they wipe their hands. Two palace servants place a knee cloth for the king and queen. The verger walking in front, the 'table-men' step forward. The verger walks in front and shows the king's sons to their seats."16

This capacity to organize so minutely the procedure of a ceremony is reflective of the Hittites as a ruling caste. Their undoubted gift for organizing and regulating suggests that they were a people of a practical bent who indulged not in mere speculation but rather in the application of positive solutions, perhaps mechanical and fixed if one judges from their religious texts alone, to the various political and imperial dilemmas which confronted them. They appear to have been essentially a people with their

feet very much on the ground. If the Hittites were not the most imaginative of peoples they may have a reasonable claim to having been one of the most practical. Texts, such as "The Instructions to the Commander of the Border Guards" offer further proof of this ability for organized thinking and the consequent likelihood of organized, successful application of instructions. An analysis of their treaties with the subject peoples makes these qualities more manifest.

According to Hardy the Habiru appear for the first time among the Hittites during the reign of Mursilis. He considers that the Hittites hired them as mercenaries. This idea is, to say the least, very doubtful. If the Habiru are the Hebrews, as it is often held, it is difficult to see them soldiering in Asia Minor as early as the time of Mursilis. Gurney makes the following statement in connection with mercenaries:

"For garrison duties there must have been a small standing army containing a certain proportion of mercenary troops but we know little about its method of recruitment."  

By far the most significant event of the reign of Mursilis was his expedition to northern Syria and Mesopotamia. In respect to this adventure the Telipinus Proclamation gives the following information:

(28) And he went to Aleppo, and destroyed Aleppo, and brought captives and possessions of Aleppo to Hattusas.
(29) Then afterwards he went to Babylon, and destroyed Babylon, and defeated the Hurrians, and carried captives and possessions of Babylon to Hattusas.

The expedition to northern Syria must have had as its objective the reaffirming of Hittite control over the rebellious Aleppo. The fact that Mursilis destroyed Aleppo after his father had reduced it to some status of dependency indicates rebellion on the part of the dependent. Perhaps the failure of Roman policy towards Greece and the consequent sacking of Corinth by Mummius in 146 B.C., offers an interesting analogy. The whole affair presupposes a serious breach of conduct on the part of Aleppo.

The section quoted from the Telipinus Proclamation gives the impression that Mursilis, after destroying Aleppo, took captives and returned to Hattusas. Afterwards he went to Babylon. Even though the raid on Babylon may not have been a direct continuation from the punitive campaign against Aleppo, though it more than likely was, we may be reasonably assured that Mursilis operated against Babylon from military bases in northern Syria. The proximity of Aleppo to the Euphrates river suggests this. Mursilis would wish to have a base close handy upon which to fall back should his expedition down the Euphrates lead him into difficulties.

The wealth of the First Dynasty of Babylon and its decline in power must have been the inducement to the Hittite raider to undertake this perilous foray. The reasons for the raid and the reasons for its success are, I think, admirably summed up in this excerpt from the Cambridge Ancient History:

"The last kings of the dynasty were far more attached to their temples than to the camp. They multiplied their gifts in gold and silver to their gods, they dedicated emblems, statues, thrones, maces, solar disks; sometimes they built towns or digged canals called after their own names. They were unwarlike and were shadows of their great predecessor Hammurabi, and our knowledge of them decreases as the dynasty draws near its end..."

It was owing to this weakness that the ...Hittites suddenly appeared in Babylonia in a raid down the Euphrates, and were able to invade the land with impunity in the reign of the last king Samsu-ditana. The Chronicle describes the invasion with the words:

"In the time of Shamash-ditana Hattu came to Akkad"

This Hittite raid on Samsu-ditana down the Euphrates marks the end of the 1st Dynasty of Babylon. Samsu-ditana might call to his aid 'the great forces of Shamash and Marduk', but nothing could stay the fast flowing sands of his dynasty. He was prepared to meet his enemy only when he could look at him from the bastions of his city walls: so much perhaps one may glean from the following letter from him to Sippar: 'concerning what ye wrote to me, saying,"The corn which is in Sippar-Ya'rurum - it is not right that it be left on the land to the mercy of the enemy troops; let
the king our lord command that order be sent to us that the Shamash-gate be opened, and then this corn can be brought into the town". This is what you sent. As soon as they have finished the corn, which is the town-crops, open the Shamash-gate, and then until they have finished (bringing in) the corn which is the town-crops, seat the judges (i.e., in the gate), and let them not be negligent about guarding the gate! If this letter is to be ascribed to the time of the Hittite raid, the reference to Sippar shows that the enemy certainly appears to be from the north rather than the south. It is clear that the harvesters went almost in fear of their lives in bringing in the grain from the adjacent fields, for the city gate, now closed, could only be opened when the wisest and most responsible burghers of the town were acting as sentinels.21

A Babylonian inscription informs us that the Kassite king, Agum II, brought Marduk back to Babylon after an absence of twenty four years. The narrative of the inscription tells us that Marduk had remained in the Hittite land for these twenty four years in order to keep an eye on the trade relations between the Hittites and the Babylonians.22

Before the success of Mursilis against Babylon the 1st Dynasty of Babylon had been weakened by the encroachments of the Kassites. Mursilis' raid further weakened an already tottering dynasty and the end of Samsuditana's reign saw the Kassites ruling all of Babylonia. The activities of


22. Van der Meer, P; The Chronology of Ancient Western Asia and Egypt, (2nd ed, Leiden, E.J.Brill, 1955), p.22. But the Telipinus text says that Mursilis took "captives and possessions of Babylon to Hattusas" Marduk had no alternative but to stay with the Hittites. The trade-relations reason may be seen as an attempt to save face on the part of the Babylonians. Following the death of Mursilis a condition near to anarchy prevailed in the Hittite kingdom. During the twenty four years referred to, trade relations between the Hittites and the Babylonians must have been insignificant.
Mursilis most certainly hastened the process whereby the Kassites came to power in Babylonia. Agum II was a Kassite king. On the other hand Kassite infiltration, to some extent at least, explains the victory of Mursilis in Mesopotamia.

Van der Meer writes as follows:

"According to a text of Telipinus, Mursilis I advanced on Babylon, took prisoners and booty with him to Hattusas and captured Babylon. Among the booty were the figures of Marduk and Sarpanitum, which remained in Hattusas for twenty four years. In the inscription of Agum mentioned above he states that when the god Marduk, lord of Esagila, had decided to return to Babylon, he (Agum) went to the land of the Suti, to Hana, in order to bring Marduk and Sarpanitum to Babylon, where he caused them to enter the restored Esagila."23 Thus it would appear that in the period of anarchy, following the assassination of Mursilis, the Hittites lost a portion of this booty. They most likely lost it to the Hurrians who gave the Hittites much trouble during this period of domestic chaos.

This precocious feat on the part of Mursilis did not result in any territorial acquisition for the Hittites. It was a plundering raid of a transitory nature since Mursilis at once marched away again and he did not hold Babylon under Hittite rule. Indeed, we do not know of any other Hittite attempt on Babylon. Northern Syria, and the Mitanni kingdom centred in the area of the Khabur river were to be the main areas which occupied Hittite arms in the south-east. But Mursilis had utilised the advantages offered by the site of Hattusas which suggested the line of expansion he took.

Dynastic strife and Hurrian inroads into Asia Minor made impossible for many years any 'follow-up' campaign against Babylonia which the Hittites may have had in mind. By the time order and stability had been recovered again in the Hittite kingdom the Kassites had firmly established themselves in Babylonia.

This first direct Hittite contact, about the year 1550 B.C., with a people who possessed political practices markedly different from those of the Hittites may explain, to some extent at least, the transformation that Hittite political forms underwent in the New Empire. But not only is Babylonia to be taken into account in this connection. Now that the Hittites had gained access to northern Syria the influence of Egypt on Hittite political institutions must have become an important factor.

The Hittites have now entered the complex of Ancient Near Eastern international affairs. Their success against Babylon must have heightened imperial ambitions. Any feeling of inferiority which the Hittites may have had in relationship to a people who possessed a superior culture must have been drastically reduced.

During this Babylonian adventure the Hittites again came into collision with the Hurrians. The casual way in which the Hurrians are mentioned in the Telipinus Proclamation is striking; but there is nothing strange about conflict with this people in northern Mesopotamia during the march to or from Babylon. According to the Telipinus text Mursilis was successful against the Hurrians who were soon to have their revenge. Hurrian-Hittite antagonism is to be one of the dominant features of Hittite imperial life for the next two centuries.

At this stage it is appropriately convenient to discuss the role of the Hittites in northern Syria. Sir Leonard Woolley, one of the foremost scholars in Syrian studies, claims that when the Tell of Carchemish had attained a height of approximately fifteen metres the villagers built a wall around it. These wall-builders were a new folk; the Stone Age had been supplanted by the Bronze Age and there would seem to have been an influx of new blood. Woolley writes the following about the Hittite entrance into northern Syria:

"At first the introduction of metal does not seem to have brought with it other very radical changes; but not very long before the fortification of the citadel, far-reaching innovations were introduced. The Bronze Age man who built the wall turned his clay vessels on the wheel in shapes unknown before; he seldom used paint, and then only in the simplest and rudest ways. He buried his dead in stone-lined cists, at full length, with an elaborate tomb furniture of vessels, arms and ornaments. These
cultural innovations, affecting just those customs which are most conservative, would seem to denote a new race. On the other hand, they do not appear to have been either suddenly or violently enforced, for the two burial customs overlap and sometimes combine, whence it may be argued that the change in population was but partial, and that the old stock continued to live side by side with the newcomers, dominated by their superiority, driven to imitate their high culture, but still hankering always after their own traditions. Indeed, there is much to be said for the theory that throughout all history the Hittites were in a minority in north Syria, a fighting aristocracy alien to the land." Woolley recalls as an historical landmark the fact that the descent of Mursilis on Babylon implies a Hittite footing in northern Syria. (As evidenced in fact by the Aleppo episode.)

Summing up his position Woolley claims that the developed early Bronze Age marked the introduction of a new element into northern Syria:

"This we may call, at least provisionally, the Early Hittite; the Middle Period, succeeding to it we do not know when, will last down to 1200 B.C." Woolley in an earlier article modifies the above but the contention which is relevant to this study emerges more strongly:

"Unfortunately, we find from the beginning of the Bronze Age to its end a steady uniform development in which there occurs no sudden outcrop of markedly new types such as should signalize the event of an alien people. Yet there can be no doubt that at the end of the Amarna period Carchemish was a Hittite town. Probably the explanation is that the Hittites... were so small a ruling caste as to affect but little the civilization of the country as a whole; their innovations would be rather in the way of monumental buildings in their capital than of new types of pottery."26

That a nation should be politically influential in an area for such an extensive period of time and so little influence its culture is a startling revelation of the imperial practices of the Hittites. They apparently did not colonize the area with their own people in order to hold it more firmly. The king of Aleppo must have retained considerable independence. What Woolley has said of the Hittites in connection with Carchemish may be said to be true of the Hittites in northern Syria generally. It was especially in those areas which lay beyond the geographic containment of the Anatolian highlands that the Hittites allowed special status to the conquered. Because of the factor of geographic isolation and the limited number of Hittites available for settlement in areas distant from Hattusas the Hittites were never able to bind the subjugated by ties of common culture and customs. This very inability to provide a superior cultural lead and hence create some measure of cultural contact between the rulers and the ruled must have kept alive a sense of difference, independence and nationalism in such centres as Aleppo. It is factors such as these which gave the Hittite Empire its instability. In such indirectly controlled and remote centres there can have been little consciousness of having belonged to a political unit known as the Hittite Empire. However, the Hittites did manage a spasmodic control of northern Syria from the time of Hattusilis I until 1200 B.C.

They overcame the above deficiencies by the use of their innate political skill. The Hittites exploited the political conditions of northern Syria in relation to the other powers of the Near East. But as Woolley has implied, the roots of Hittite control cannot have struck deep in northern Syria. Should the chameleon-like nature of exploitable political conditions as a means of control cease to exist there was little else to hold the loyalty of the ruled.

The campaigning of Mursilis in northern Syria and Mesopotamia was to prove his undoing. What must have been a comparatively long absence provided the opportunity for political intrigues in the Hittite court. The pleas of Hattusilis I were to no avail. The ruling family proved itself untrustworthy in the king's absence and the action of Mursilis' brother-in-law ushered in a period of turmoil which was to shrink the
Hittite homeland almost to its original size. The efforts over a period of two centuries were rendered null and void. For the time being it was proved beyond all doubt that the nature of Hittite political life made distant campaigning an impossibility if the king was to maintain his throne. Personal ambition must have its avenue of assertion even though it might mean the total eclipse of the Hittite state:

10

(31) "And Hantilis was a cup-bearer, and he had Harapsilis (?), sister of Mursilis, in marriage.

11

(32) And Zidantas conspired (?) with Hantilis, and they formed a traitorous plot. (33) They killed Mursilis; they shed blood."27

HANTILIS AND THE LESSER KINGS

Retribution was meted out swiftly to Hantilis for his complicity in the successful plot to murder Mursilis. The one sentence of the Telipinus Proclamation concerning the reign of Hantilis which has survived intact is very revealing:

(35) "And Hantilis was afraid......."  

And well might this king be afraid since his reign was distinguished by disaster.

In the "Narrative of his Accession" Hattusilis III wrote the following words:

"Since Nerik had been in ruins since the days of Hantilis, I took and rebuilt it."

The treaty which Hattusilis III made with Tiliura contains the following lines:

(I; 7-19) "The city of Tiliura was deserted from the time of Hantilis...
(II;1-5) who surrounded, they kept coming......And Hantilis made of you an outpost. But at first Labarnas (and) Hattusilis used not to let them cross the River Kummesmaha."

The people whom the Hittites are intent on confining to the other side of the Kummesmaha river are none other than the Kaska folk, or Gasgans as they are sometimes called. It is clear that Labarnas and Hattusilis I were able to confine the Gasgans to the western side of the Kummesmaha. Hantilis did not have this success. The lines quoted, which tell us that

3. Ibid p.119
4. Ibid p.24. In the treaty which Hattusilis III made with Tiliura there occur a series of regulations in connection with the Gasgans (See p.119)
Hantilis made Tiliura an outpost against the Gasgans, indicate that the achievement of Hantilis in relation to the Gasgans was lesser than that of his two famous predecessors. Labarnas and Hattusilis had achieved more than the establishment of a mere frontier post against the Gasgans at Tiliura. \(^5\) The implication is, that although Hantilis established an outpost in the attempt to alleviate the pressure of this northern menace the Gasgans were nevertheless crossing the Kummesmaha river. During the period of dynastic anarchy which Hantilis bequeathed to the Hittite kingdom even Tiliura was deserted.

The Hurrians, under the ruling caste of the Mitanni, were pushing into the Hittite kingdom from the east. The Mitanni are becoming increasingly powerful and the might of the Egyptian empire was later to be expended against them. Dynastic turmoil coupled with the expansion of the Mitanni largely explain the series of disasters which befell the Hittite kingdom from the time of Hantilis to Telipinus. But the pressure exerted by the Gasgans must not be underestimated in explaining the temporary eclipse of the Hittites.

After setting out on a military expedition to bring rebellious lands back to subjection, Hantilis apparently spoke these words to his troops:

"Now this I did, and Zidantas.... I heard...."

Hardy considers that this is all that we have left of the justification of Hantilis for the murder of his predecessor. \(^6\) This says more than the evidence allows and seems to be an unwarranted application of the so-called 'conscience' of Hattusilis III to Hantilis whose crime was far worse than the understandable action of his more illustrious successor. Hantilis was possibly not the type to be smitten with remorse.

This apart, we know that Hantilis dispatched warriors southwards toward the territory of the cities Hurpanas, Astatas and Carchemish. The mention of Astatas (on the Euphrates river in the region of Carchemish) and Carchemish as well as the fact that Hantilis went to Tegarama, indicates that the Hittites still claimed control of northern Syria and the avenue of approach to it. \(^7\) But if the tenor of this king's reign

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5. See map, p.i., for the position of Tiliura on the Kummesmaha river.
6. Hardy, R.S; "The Old Hittite Kingdom", AJSL, LVIII, (1941), p. 206
7. Ibid p. 206
and the undoubted superiority of the Mitanni in northern Syria in the not too distant future are taken into account it is more than likely that Hantilis met with reverses in the area beyond anti-Taurus to the south-east of Hattusas.

It is not at all surprising to learn, in the light of what has been said, that Hantilis erected forts throughout the Hittite land and strengthened the fortifications of the Hittite capital itself. We do not hear of any of his predecessors having had recourse to such measures. We also learn that Hantilis, confronted by the Gasgans within Hittite territory, was forced to acknowledge this as a fait accompli. His inability to rid the land of these marauders is shown by the fact that he made settlements for them. This is perhaps illustrative of political wisdom on the part of Hantilis. Rather than further endanger the Hittite kingdom in a series of wasteful and futile wars he accepted the presence of the Gasgans.

There is yet one more piece of evidence which points to disaster as being the basically operative factor during the reign of Hantilis. In contradistinction to the people of Kalasma Hantilis neglected to perform certain purification rites. It was thought that this caused uncleanliness to be brought into the city and palace. Since our information about this neglect is derived from an 'historical-ritualistic' text it would appear that the priesthood explained some misfortune or another on the basis of the failure of Hantilis to fulfil his religious obligations. No doubt Hantilis was so preoccupied throughout his reign in stemming the mounting tide of disaster that he simply did not have the time to perform all his religious duties.

This is really a case of the priesthood censuring the king for misdemeanours of a religious nature. That the priesthood should be so bold indicates that the Hittite king was not beyond criticism. He had duties to perform, and should he fail to perform them there were bodies capable of reminding him of his failure. This check on the activities of the monarch by way of criticism is one of the healthy features of the Hittite kingship. This type of criticism or check on the behaviour of a ruler

8. Ibid.p.207
9. Ibid. p.207
10. Kalasma is situated to the south-east of Hattusas see map, p.i.
which may have a constructive result must in the case of this particular king have heightened his insecurity. But there were other more dangerous and ruinous factors which made the Hittite kingship a position fraught with peril and uncertainty. These other factors must have had a great deal of scope in which to work their worst during the reign of Hantilis.

These factors, always latent became accentuated because Hantilis came to the throne in the way recounted. He set an example which others were bound to follow. The murder of Mursilis plus an unsuccessful reign proved the undoing of Hantilis. It is doubtful whether Hantilis would have made his way to the throne uncontested. While Mursilis was in Syria and Mesopotamia other leading Hittites must have entertained the same ruinous ambition. If the Zidantas, who succeeded Hantilis after murdering the latter's sons and grandsons was the same Zidantas who conspired in league with Hantilis then one is forced to conclude that they came to some form of political understanding. Hantilis and Zidantas would have effected an alliance in order to counteract the similar ambitions of other leading Hittites. Their mutual desire for power threw them together because they realized that it was only through alliance that a measure of the desired power could be gained. Perhaps Zidantas was young and was prepared to wait to gain the supreme position of king.

One can imagine that throughout his reign Hantilis had to contend with those who were prepared to act as he had acted. The action of Zidantas suggests this. This ever present threat to the position of Hantilis must have consumed a great deal of his time. On this basis it is easy to understand the destruction of Nerik, Tiliura and the Hurrian success. The neglect of religious obligations may also be explained in this way. Continual preoccupation with the maintenance of his own position precluded a single-minded dedication to the task of keeping the Hittite kingdom intact. The knowledge that all was not well at the Hittite court gave the Gasgans and the Hurri a chance that they were not slow to utilize. The very people whose activities gave them this chance would be the first to lay the blame at the door of Hantilis and self-righteously set about to undermine his position.
In a way it is an impressive witness to the astuteness of Hantilis that he should have become old and died an apparently natural death:

(63) "And when Hantilis had become old and was about to become a god, Zidantas killed Pisenis, the sons of Hantilis, along with his (i.e. Pisenis') sons, and he killed his foremost subjects."\(^\text{12}\)

One might reasonably speculate that Hantilis had not kept his part of the bargain. Perhaps he had guaranteed the kingship to the younger Zidantas on his (Hantilis') death. But no doubt the range of Hantilis' ambition spread with the years and he now wished to keep the Hittite kingship in his own family. He accordingly designated Pisenis as his successor. Hence the action of Zidantas. But Zidantas did not stop there. He not only eliminated all the other potential claimants to the throne who belonged to the family of Hantilis, but he carried out a Sullan-type proscription by having his foremost subjects murdered. Zidantas being a foremost Hittite was guarding against the possibility of his peers achieving what he had achieved. If the Athenian Cleisthenes introduced ostracism he may have been guided by some of the motives which determined the behaviour of Zidantas. But at least the means to the end employed by Cleisthenes were a little more pleasant.

This killing of the foremost subjects must have been disastrous to the Hittites as a minority ruling caste. They could ill afford to waste ability at the top level. Admittedly Hittite controlled territory had at this stage shrunk in comparison to its extent at the time of Mursilis. But even so, such a purge amongst the leading Hittites must have considerably reduced the worth and effectiveness of the Hittite ruling caste for many years to come.

The carnage and anarchy continue:

(66) "And Zidantas became king. And then the gods avenged the blood of Pisenis. (67) And the gods made Ammunas, his (i.e. Zidantas') son, his enemy; and he killed Zidantas, his father."\(^\text{13}\)

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13. Ibid p.187
This extract from the Telipinus Proclamation seems to indicate that Zidantas ruled for only a short time. The suggestion of a religiously based revenge, similar to the Aeschylean vendetta, may have helped to dictate the course of the political turmoil during this period. But too little is known of this to enable any worthwhile conclusions to be drawn. That the Hittite kingdom should survive this almost frenzied wave of court murders is adequate testimony to the deep-rooted strength and resilience that the Hittite ruling caste must have possessed.

The Telipinus Proclamation continues:

20

(69) "And Ammunas became king. (69) And then the gods avenged the blood of his father Zidantas; they did not prosper(?) him (or), in his hands, the grain(fields), the orchards(?), the vineyards, the cattle, (and) the sheep."

21

(1) And the (following) countries became hostile to him,......, Galiwyas, Adaniyas, Arzawiyas, Sallapas, Parduwas, and Ahhulas; the infantry went on campaigns everywhere. (3) And they returned unsuccessful."14

During the reign of Ammunas the unpleasant fruits of dynastic chaos were really reaped. Areas such as Arzawa, and no doubt Sallapas, (see map) had been ruled by the Hittites since the time of Labarnas. There is evident in this extract an admission of total failure. The loss of Adaniyas in Kizzuwatna may be attributed to the activities of the Hurrians. By this time the Hittites must have lost all control of northern Syria. The loss of Adaniyas suggests this. It would be pleasant to think that Hittite desire for historical truth transcended considerations of national prestige. But as has been said before Telipinus was putting forth a contention: that palace murders and disputes surrounding the succession to the throne will inevitably result in disaster. This frank admission of imperial disaster was in the best interests of his contention. But even so, there is manifest the attitude that royalty is capable of failure. It is interesting to compare the Egyptian attitude in the inscriptions telling of the Battle of Kadesh.

14. Ibid. p.187
The proclamation proceeds as follows:

(4) "When Ammunas too became a god, Zurus, chief of the Mesidi, in those days secretly sent (one) of his family, his son Taharwailis, a man of the golden spear; and he killed the family of Tittis along with his sons.

(8) And he sent Taruhsus, the runner(?), and he killed Hantilis along with his sons. (9) And Huzziyas became king." 15

It is not definitely known who the Mesidi were. Hardy holds, and I think it is a likely view, that the Mesidi were connected with the army or else they were a type of police. 16 It is more than probable that under such conditions where there is rivalry among leading families, and kings are rising and falling quickly, that the army would become a powerful force which had more than strictly military interests. During this period of unrest and crisis the army most certainly would have been used for political purposes by those who aspired to the crown.

As a result of the assassinations order by Zurus, the chief of the Mesidi, Huzziyas became king. The impression is given that Zurus was 'in the pay' of Huzziyas and that he used his men in the interests of gaining the throne for Huzziyas. The logical completion of this set of conditions is that Zurus himself, a high ranking military officer, could well seize the throne. The important factor is that we have here three families who had aspirations towards the throne. Two of these families must be eliminated. This is final and conclusive proof of the political rivalry that existed, not only between members of the nobility, but between the leading Hittite families or clans as such.

If the Hittite kingdom had a genuinely feudal basis one may conclude that the members of the nobility would in many cases have a military following. Zurus may have been the head of such a military force which was enforcing the claims of Huzziyas to the throne. No doubt Tittis and Hantilis had similar military support. In fact this struggle amongst the

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15. Ibid p.187
members of the nobility and their capability of making and unseating kings is proof of the feudal nature of the Hittite kingdom whereby the lords leased out land in return for military service. Ideally the land would be expected to provide contingents of soldiers for the king to whom he owed his land in the original instance. The power of the nobility or council of nobles over the king forced the latter to grant them privileges which made them so powerful as to make this period of anarchy possible. Instead of the individual contingents of soldiers owing service and loyalty to the king, which was theoretically his due as a result of the lord-king contract, they gave it to those members of the nobility who retained them.

Perhaps the family of Tittis and the family of Hantilis were members of a larger unit which we may call the Royal Family. The king’s kinsmen, who would in many cases have been the heads of their own families belonged to what has been called the "Great Family". But these individual families, comprising the totality of the Royal Family, possessed sufficient strength, independent of the ruling family of the time, to enable them to make the attempt to replace the ruling family by their own family.

Perhaps the family of Tittis was intimately connected with the family of Ammunas and therefore had some grounds for wanting their claimant to have the throne. Ammunas had recently died and Huzziyas would be intent on removing those who were closely connected with him. The family of Hantilis was most likely of direct descent from king Hantilis. Their ambition to regain the power once exercised by a member of the family is understandable. Hence their necessary extermination.

During this period we have been witness to the violent struggles between the king and the nobility. Despite the efforts of Labarnas and Hattusilis I the nobility have not accepted the practice whereby the Hittite kingship was to be an hereditary office.

TELIPINUS

Telipinus, if not the last monarch of the Old Kingdom, was certainly the last important king belonging to that period of Hittite history. Telipinus is important because of his edicts, contained in his proclamation, which attempted to give a greater measure of stability to the Hittite Royal House and ruling caste generally. Coming to the throne during a period when the assassination of leading Hittites was the rule rather than the exception Telipinus attempted to counteract this destructive tendency. He was statesman enough not to be merely satisfied with securing his own position for the duration of his lifetime. He thought in terms of the future political and imperial destinies of the Hittites and he was not entirely unsuccessful in his attempts to create a greater harmony among the leading Hittite families. Ironically, he himself usurped the kingship. His own proclamation frankly admits to this fact:

22
(a) And Telipinus had (as wife) Istapariyas, his (Huzziyas') eldest sister. (11) Huzziyas would have killed them, but his plan became known, and Telipinus drove them away.

23
(13) His (i.e. Huzziyas') brothers (were) five; and he (i.e. Telipinus) built them houses, (saying): 'Let them go (and) dwell (there); let them eat (and) drink and do not do them any harm. (15) And I declare: "They did me harm, and I do not do them harm".'

24
(16) When I, Telipinus, had seated myself upon the throne of my father, I went to Hassuwas on a campaign, and I destroyed Hassuwas."

1. As we do not know who the father of Telipinus was there is no means of testing the truth of this claim. But at any rate it may be construed as a justification for his action.

The reason for Huzziyas' animosity towards Telipinus is not given. But the political situation in Hattusas was such as to make a king more than wary of any potential opposition to his position. If Telipinus at this stage gave proof of his undoubted later ability the plan of Huzziyas is readily understood. Perhaps Telipinus the reformer, becoming more and more exasperated with the nature of conditions at Hattusas, gave Huzziyas good reason to plan the early demise of himself and his wife. The statement "Telipinus drove them away" implies the use of armed force. There may have been civil war in Hattusas. But the bloodshed ceased once Huzziyas' threat had been overcome.

The conduct of Telipinus in relation to his would be assassins was exemplary. He exhibited the same attitude as Hattusilis I had exhibited to those who had planned him harm. The five brothers of Huzziyas were provided for by Telipinus and no harm was to be done to them. However, the case was different with Hattusilis. He was an established Hittite king nearing the end of his reign. This may partly explain his leniency to the subdued rebels. But Telipinus even though his father may have been a king before him was nevertheless a usurper, not an established king assured of his position at the time of his generosity towards the five brothers of Huzziyas. That such political generosity was dangerous is shown by a later section of the proclamation which will shortly be quoted. It would seem that Telipinus was early convinced that bloodshed in the Royal Family had to cease, even to the extent of being dangerously lenient. Thus Telipinus appears in the light of a dedicated reformer who was prepared to risk the hazards involved of convincing by his own personal example. But there was another consideration at stake of which he as an astute statesman must have been aware. If he had gained the throne by a series

3. We may assume that Huzziyas had been killed. The fact that his five brothers were singled out as having been given substance indicates that they had been involved in Huzziyas' plot against Telipinus and his wife. Telipinus is intent on showing that further bloodshed will not solve the problem.
of murders and secured it by the same violent means, his reforms, which had an opposite object, would have appeared both inconsistent and insincere. Perhaps the abject failure of the Sullan legislation is partly to be explained on the basis that Sulla proposed behaviour contrary to his own.

Having become king Telipinus immediately undertook a military campaign to repair the rapidly declining imperial fortunes of the Hittites. He first destroyed Hassuwas which must have revolted during the period of anarchy:

(18) "And my infantry was in Zizzilippas, and in Zizzilippas a battle occurred.

(20) When that time I, the king, came to Lawazantiyas, Lahhas was hostile to me, and incited Lawazantiyas to rebellion. (21) And the gods delivered it into my hand."4

The mention of Lawazantiyas in this context is most informative. It has already been demonstrated that Lawazantiyas is in Kizzuwatna, near to the city of Kummanni,5 and actually on or near the main route from Hattusas to Syria. Goetze contends that it is not improbable that Zizzilippas is identical with Zazlippa which is in Kizzuwatna. Hassuwas appears with Tegarama and other places in text B0479.6 Tegarama was also situated in this south-eastern area. (See map)

Thus we may say that Telipinus, although he did not venture as far as northern Syria, was intent on keeping in Hittite possession the area to the south-east of Hattusas which gave the easiest access to northern Syria. If Lawazantiyas is to be placed near Kummanni, which is in the north-west of Kizzuwatna, then we again have proof that the Hittites most likely penetrated into Syria by taking a south-east route through the anti-Taurus range.

5. Goetze, A; Kizzuwatna and the Problem of Hittite Geography, (New Haven, 1940), p.71 Kummanni was situated in the north-west part of the passage way through anti-Taurus.
6. Ibid p.72
The quoted section indicates that Lawazantiyas formerly owed allegiance to the Hittites. No doubt the Hurrians had taken advantage of Hittite weakness and incited Lahhas to forsake his obligation to Hattusas. The same may be said of Hassuwas and Zizzilippas. By inciting these cities to revolt the Hurrians were blocking the Hittite line of approach to an area in which they (the Hurrians) were rapidly becoming the ascendant people under the ruling Mitanni caste. But whatever the case may have been the Telipinus proclamation is here referring to a successful campaign conducted in the south-east.  

But this is not the only dealing which Telipinus had with Kizzuwatna. During the excavations carried out at Boghazkeui in 1934 a library catalogue was secured which, according to the excavators, contains the following item:

"One tablet treaty: 'When Isputahsu, the king of Kizwatna, and Telipinus the Hittite king, concluded a treaty' Complete."

Nothing else is know of this treaty. We only know that one was concluded.

During an archaeological expedition to Cilicia in 1934 a bulla was found at Tarsus which bore the impression of a type of seal so far only known from the Hittite capital. The inscription on the bulla runs as follows:

"Isputahsu, the great king, the son of Pariyawatru."

It can be considered as certain that the Isputahsu of Kizzuwatna who made a treaty with Telipinus is to be equated with the owner of the Tarsus bulla. In all probability the name Tarsus occurs as uruTar-sa in the

7. We do not know the outcome of the battle fought in Zizzilippas. But judging by the success in Hassuwas and Lawazantiyas we may infer that the same was true in connexion with Zizzilippas.
Boghazkeui texts. In a passage referred to by Goetze the name uruA-da-ni-ya precedes that of Tarsus. We know that A-ta-ni-ya plays its part in the description of the frontier of Kizzuwatna. The fact that Adaniya is most likely to be situated in Kizzuwatna will later be shown to be of considerable importance.

Isputahsu, as we have noticed, is called 'great king'. This suggests that Isuputahsu was a king of considerable power. In the second half of the second millennium B.C. the great kings of the Near East jealously watched that nobody adopted this title who was not entitled to it. No doubt this applied to the time of Telipinus who ruled at the beginning of the latter half of the second millennium B.C. This title may have been assumed by the king of Kizzuwatna during the period of Hittite weakness prior to Telipinus' usurpation of the Hittite throne. Apart from the one reference which indicates that Lawazantiyas may have had some form of understanding with the Hittites previous to the time of Telipinus this mention of the Hittite treaty with Isputahsu is the first definite evidence we have of an agreement between the Hittites and Kizzuwatna. It would seem that the ruler of Kizzuwatna was just as entitled to call himself 'great king' as was the Hittite king. Indeed, there is no need to assume that because Isputahsu and Telipinus concluded a treaty that the former was necessarily subjected to the latter. The treaty was most likely drawn up between the two kings on the basis of equality. The privileged status given to Kizzuwatna during the reign of Suppiluliumas, when the Hittites were much more powerful than they were in the time of Telipinus, accords well with such a view.

11. It occurs in the treaty which Suppiluliumas made with Sunassura of Kizzuwatna.
It is not difficult to find adequate reasons for the conclusion of this treaty. The drive of the Hurrians towards the west into Anatolia and northern Syria would have been just as threatening to the people of Kizzuwatna as it was to the Hittites. For a period of approximately two centuries after the death of Telipinus the westward drive of the Hurrians brought king's with Hurrian names to the throne of Kizzuwatna and Hurrian gods were worshipped in the shrines of Kizzuwatna. Then of course there is the ever present Hittite consideration of keeping their south-east line of expansion clear of hazards. A mutual defensive and offensive alliance with Kizzuwatna would help to guarantee Hittite access to northern Syria. But there is yet another reason for the treaty between Telipinus and Isputahsu which does not seem to have been sufficiently stressed. It has already been noted that Adaniya is to be located in Kizzuwatna. Section twenty one of the Telipinus proclamation, already quoted, gives a list of the cities which revolted during the time of Ammunas. The sequence, Adaniyas–Arzawiyas, suggests that the borderland between Kizzuwatna and Arzawa was narrow if it does not indeed suggest the actual contiguity of these two countries at this time. The trouble which Suppiluliumas and Mursilis II were to have with Arzawa suggests that that country had control of substantial territory. Telipinus may have feared that Arzawa and Kizzuwatna would form a coalition against the Hittites. But still more would have feared an alliance between the Hurrians and the Arzawans. Then there was the even worse threat of the Arzawans, Kizzuwatnans and Hurrians acting in conjunction against the Hittites. In an attempt to prevent any of these possibilities from becoming actual Telipinus concluded a treaty with Isputahsu. Kizzuwatna would make an excellent wedge or buffer between the Arzawans and the Hurrians. Such tactics on the part of Telipinus were merely to obey the dictates of elementary strategy.

13. Garstang and Gurney; The Geography of the Hittite Empire, p.53. See also Goetze, A; Kizzuwatna and the Problem of Hittite Geography, (New Haven, 1940), p.5-6 and notes.


But Garstang does not develop this idea fully as he perhaps should.
Telipinus also campaigned to the north and east of his capital with the object of pushing back the barbarian invaders. They were no doubt basically composed of the Gasgans. The Hittite king appears to have been successful in his bid to confine the barbarians and he perhaps recovered some of the lost Hittite territory in these quarters. The following lines from the twenty second year of the Annals of Mursilis II attest to the activities of Telipinus against the Gasgans:

Twenty Second Year
Vs II.1 "As soon as the Gasgan city saw me it hurried to help in its entirety.
2. and took... before me.... And they spoke as follows: 'We do not want to let him
3. leave'. And because it was not possible to go up with war chariots
4. I led the troops on foot and....
5. .... went up to the mountains on foot and the gods stood by me and I attacked
6. and slew the enemy. Then I journey on and burnt the land of Tapananuwa
7. Then I journeyed to Hatenzuwa, the city of the Zitharija,
8. and burnt also this land. Then I remained in the same land
9. And because since the days of the great king Telipinus no Hittite
10. had been to those lands, I spent some time there."

With trouble, threatening or real, on so many fronts Telipinus not unaturally sought the friendship of Isputahsu of Kizzuwatna who considered himself worthy of the title 'great king'.

The reign of Telipinus was essentially a period of reconstruction and his external policy seems mainly to have been directed to the south-east. He did not reconquer Arzawa or north Syria, but his dealings with Kizzuwatna indicate the partial restoration, at least, of Hittite imperial fortunes. His military campaigning to the north, east and south-east

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See also Hardy, Op.cit. p.209.
which must have had as its objective the establishment of strong, reliable
frontiers against the inroads of the Gasgans and the Hurrians, was so far
successful as to enable him to deal with pressing domestic affairs which
were inseparable from the imperial ambitions of Hattusas.

Immediately following on from the recorded success against the
rebellious Lawazantiyas the proclamation continues thus:
(22) "And foremost (officials were) the commanders of a thousand,...
and Karruwas; the chief of the overseers of the treasury, Inaras; the
chiefs of the cup-bearers, Killas and Dattamimmas; the chiefs of the
scepter-bearers, Zinwaselis and Lellis, great (men). (25) And they
secretly sent to Tanuwas, the scepter-bearer.

(26) I, the king, did not know (it)....(27) When I, the king, heard, they
brought Tanuwas, Taharwailis, and Taruhsus; and the senate therefore
held them for sentence(?) ; and I, the king, said: 'Why should they die?
(29) 'They (i.e. the officials) shall hide their faces (?)' (29) I, the
king, segregated them. (30) I made them farmers; I took their weapons
from their right side, and I gave them yokes(?)."

Although it is not directly stated this extract may be seen as
evidence of a plot against Telipinus. The theme of the proclamation is
the nobility's continued attempts to undermine the power of the reigning
king. The opposition to Telipinus was obviously considerable. Many
of the chief dignitaries of the Hittite kingdom, and no doubt their following,
were involved in some treacherous activity or another. We have already
met with Taharwailis and Taruhsus who succeeded in gaining Huzziyas the
throne. It would appear that the supporters of Huzziyas had not been
grateful to Telipinus for his previous leniency. One might speculate that
the family which Huzziyas had been head of still commanded sufficient
loyalty among the Hittite nobility to make another attempt on the Hittite
throne a worthwhile proposition.

18. Ibid. p.187 (21:4 and 22:8, 9.)
Tanuwas, Taharwailis and Taruhsus do not seem to have been high ranking Hittite dignitaries. Taruhsus was a runner and Tanuwas was an ordinary scepter-bearer. He is not listed as being one of the chiefs of the scepter-bearers. They were most likely assassins hired by the clique of nobles who were involved in the plot to overthrow Telipinus. Perhaps they are to be seen as the mechanics or the executors of the conspiracy. The nature of their role in the conspiracy may explain the leniency of Telipinus towards them. Gurney remarks upon this situation in the following way:

"It appears that these men were acting under the orders of more important personages, and Telipinus, in his anxiety to curb the power of the nobles, ordained that the pankus must in future ensure that the instigator of a crime should suffer punishment in his own person, even though he be a high-ranking dignitary or even the king himself."19

The next sections of the proclamation give a great deal of cogency to Gurney's suggestion.

Bechtel and Sturtevant translate pankus as meaning senate.20 The term senate implies a political body constituted by the nobility. But Gurney sees the term pankus as meaning the "whole body of citizens".21 Hardy claims that as a judicial body, the pankus, in distinction to the Tuliyas (senate, council) which exercised judicial control over the royal family, tried and punished lesser figures as when Tanuwas, Taharwailis and Taruhsus were tried and sentenced.22 If the assembled citizen body did have judicial powers it is likely that it tried members of its own standing. Also, if the citizen body consisted of the totality of those capable of bearing arms and if it had judicial functions then there is an analogy to be drawn with Alexander's Macedonian army.23 The three hired assassins were more than likely Hittite soldiers who have been accused of treachery. They are here being tried by the Hittite army. Gurney continues:

"It is not clear whether this represents a deliberate extension of the powers of the pankus or whether the king was merely recalling the assembly to duties which it had always possessed but which it had often feared to perform."24

23. See next page.
Footnote 23.

It is extremely informative to quote Tarn on this point: "If Philotas, general of the Companions, were a traitor, it was necessary to strike hard and quickly. It was Macedonian custom that in a trial for treason, where the king was virtually a party, the State was represented, as it was when the throne was vacant, by the Macedonian people under arms, the army; and Philotas was properly put on trial before the army."

See Tarn, W.W; Alexander The Great, (Boston, Beacon Press, 1956,) p. 63.
The former speculation seems more reasonable in view of the nature of the situation confronting Telipinus. He is attempting to lessen the power of the nobility. That is, he is trying to break the power of the Tuliyas, or council of nobles which has within it those people who are not only threatening the stability of the Hittite kingdom but also the position of Telipinus. Perhaps Telipinus is here delegating power to the assembly which had formerly been held by the council. The assembly 'must in future ensure that the instigator of a crime should suffer punishment in his own person, even though he be a high-ranking dignitary or even the king himself.'

The following section from the proclamation suggests that this may have been the case:

70 "If hereafter anyone does wrong, either the father of the house(?) or the chief of the palace servants,(or) the chief of the cup-bearers, (or) the chief of the Mesedi,(or) the chief of the exalted captains of a thousand,...., and do you, the senate have (him) brought before you and punish him." 25b

The people referred to in this extract are obviously members of the Hittite nobility who are more than likely to be tried by the Assembly if they commit an offence against the state. The indication seems to be that Telipinus gave the assembly the power to try members of the nobility as well as members of their own rank. Should it ever be demonstrated that the nobility unduly oppressed those that they retained, which to a great degree must have been the bulk of the soldiery who comprised the assembly, the suggestion of an alliance between the ruling house and the assembly in opposition to the nobility or council will become more substantiated. 26

25. Ibid p.69

25b. Sturtevant and Bechtel Op.cit.p.193 I have already indicated my preference for assembly rather than senate. For a further discussion of this extract see infra p.143

This is not to say that the Hittite council became nonexistent. It no doubt still retained its advisory power in relation to the king and the top-ranking Hittite officials would continue to be drawn from it. But the members of the nobility who were accused of treasonous activity were no longer to be tried by the body to which they belonged. The mutual, but at the same time conflicting, interests of the council members, would have precluded the likelihood of justice being scrupulously dispensed to those who belonged to the privileged fold. The assembly of warriors was less likely to be partial to the thwarting of justice in the interests of permitting the nobility to continue their course of irresponsible political ambition. Gaius Gracchus used much the same type of tactic in his attempt to raise the extortion court above corruption.

Telipinus then comes to the main part of his proclamation: the statement of the solution to the problem. But immediately before this statement he again emphasizes the nature of the problem, but this time in unmistakable terms:

27

(31)'Now blood(shed) of the royal family has become common. (31) And Istarpariyas, the queen, died; and afterwards Ammunas, the king's son, died. (32) And men also are setting a stamp(?) upon the situation): 'See there! In Hattusas blood(shed) has become common.'

Although it is not specifically stated, the context in which the death of his wife and son are reported gives the impression that they may have met violent ends.

(34)'Now I, Telipinus, have called an assembly at Hattusas. (34) From now on(?), let no one in Hattusas do harm to a son of the (royal) family, or thrust a dagger into him.'

28

(36)'Let a prince, a son of the first (wife), be king. (36) If there is no prince of the first rank, let one who is a son of the second rank become king. (38) If, however, there is no prince, let them take a husband for her who is a daughter of the first rank, and let him become king.'


28.Ibid p.189
In the attempt to solve the problem of palace murders, which have been basically connected with the succession to the throne, Telipinus has enacted regulations to govern the succession. The law is an attempt to guard against contingencies that could arise, such as there being no son by the first wife or no son of a wife of the second rank. The flexibility of the law contains both advantages and disadvantages.

The advantages lie in the fact that the flexibility permits the rules governing the succession to cater for various situations should they ever occur. The absence of a law is not to be an opportunity and a stimulus to a potential usurper to gain the throne by violence. Secondly, it need not necessarily be the eldest son of the wife of the first rank or the eldest son of the wife of the second rank who succeeds to the throne. This of course means that there is a greater chance of a man of real ability becoming king.

Perhaps the son of the wife of the first rank or second rank, as the situation dictated, who exhibited the greatest ability to rule was chosen. The situation may have been analogous to the way Augustus tested and tried his potential candidates for the position of Princeps, though otherwise the two situations concerning the succession are different.

But the flexibility of the succession law runs to even greater lengths. Judging by the power of Queen Pudu-hepa, the wife of Hattusilis III, there would seem to have been only one wife of the first rank. But no doubt there were many wives of the second rank. Thus the number of people in line for the throne, if the first succession law was not operative, could have been numerous. Again, it may be argued, there was a greater chance of choosing a king of real worth.

At the same time, however, this very flexibility makes possible the traditional political menace. The succession law offered wide scope for various treacheries which would have had as their objective the attainment of the kingship. The possibilities for fratricide could have been numerous on some occasions. Then there is also the possibility that an ambitious wife of the second rank might attempt to remove the sons of the wife of the first rank in the interests of one of her sons. Finally, the third law governing the succession offered possibilities for an ambitious nobleman with the means, such as a following of soldiers, to give effect to his ambition.
But be this as it may, the real point is that laws only work if a sufficient number of people wish them to work or if there is sufficient force applied to ensure that they are obeyed. The success of this law of Telipinus can only be determined in the light of later Hittite history. Generally speaking the law must be called a success. The law appears to have received its application on the death of Telipinus. His wife and son had died and Alluwamnas, in accordance with the third succession law, became the son-in-law of Telipinus and then king when his father-in-law died.29 The history of the New Empire, especially from the time of Suppiluliumas, attests to the general success of Telipinus' law. In comparison with the Old Kingdom domestic turmoil in connection with the succession was negligible.30 Either Telipinus had convinced the Hittite nobles that their attempts to gain the throne illegally would only end in the destruction of the Hittite state and hence themselves or else the kings of the New Hittite Empire were so strong as to be able to ensure that the legally entitled person gained the throne. The evidence points to the latter conclusion.

The increased power of the Hittite king and the stability which now generally surrounds the succession to the throne are to be largely explained in terms of Telipinus' policy. His law governing the succession could well have meant nothing if it had not been for one outstanding factor; namely, he appears to have successfully limited the power of the Hittite nobility. The princes in line for the kingship would have been members of the Hittite council. Those nobles not in the line of succession, but who may have entertained ambitions in that direction, would also have been members of the council. If my contention is correct, any noble who attempted to gain the throne illegally would not be arraigned before his own kind, but would be tried by the assembly where justice was more likely to be done. This provision may have prevented many an attempt

30. The obvious exception to this generalisation was the action of Hattusilis III who deposed his nephew Urhi-teshub. But the circumstances were extraordinary, in so far as Urhi-teshub greatly provoked his uncle, and Hattusilis was the brother of Muwatallis, the king who preceded his son Urhi-teshub.
on the part of the nobility to usurp the throne.

Telipinus had in fact established a new dynasty. The hereditary principle is to operate within the family that he has brought to power by usurping the kingship. This is not merely to be seen as an attempt to satisfy the ambition of perpetuating the power of his family. But rather it is also to be seen as a statesmanlike effort to fulfil the need of the Hittite kingdom for stability in the ruling circle. Perhaps it is not amiss to remark that here we have personal or family ambition coinciding with the higher needs of state. Such coincidences have been all too rare in Hittite history up to this point.

Telipinus then ordered that the families and soldiery of all future Hittite 'kings' through all time' were to be united so that the consequent strength would enable the hostile countries to be held in subjection:

(40) "Whoever after me through all time shall become king, in those days let his brothers, his sons, his relatives-in-law, the members of his family, and his soldiers be united; and you shall come (and) with (your) strength hold the hostile country in subjection." 31

His proclamation did not set forth a policy which was devised to meet a momentary need, but rather, as befits true statesmanship, it was an attempt to encompass the future and guide and direct along ordered lines the future of the Hittite kingdom.

The proclamation then concerns itself with what appears to be advice to future kings:
(43) "But do not speak thus: 'I grant complete pardon,' (while) however, you pardon nothing and actually order (his) arrest." 32

One of the objectives of such advice must have been to minimise the likelihood of injustice. People were to be sure of their position in relation to the king. The word of the king must be above reproach. His actions must not be underhand. Duplicity and intrigue could lead to a situation which seriously threatened the monarch's position. If the king was open and consistent in his conduct he would not arouse the resentment of his subjects.

32. Ibid p.191
The next sections of the proclamation regulate the behaviour of the king in relationship to the ruling family:

(45) "Do not kill any member of the (royal) family; it leads to disaster.

(46) Whoever hereafter becomes king, and plans injury of brother or sister—you are his senate—speak to him frankly: 'Read in the tablet the tale of blood(shed) (48) Formerly in Hattusas blood(shed) became common; and at that time the gods exacted of the royal family the penalty for it'.

(50) Whatever (king) does harm among (his) brothers and sisters, risks his royal head; call the Assembly. (51) If at that time he carries out his plan, let him atone with his head."33

If it becomes known that the king plans to injure his brother or his sister his council of royal advisors is to remind him of the penalty for such a crime. But if the king, after the warning of the councillors, persists in his plan to injure one of the royal family and actually does so the council or senate is to call the Assembly and the king is to atone with his head. It was to be the body of citizens at large which passed sentence of death if the king did not heed the council. There is one very good reason why the Assembly should have the ultimate power in connection with the above situation. Certain members of the council could be in line for the succession to the kingship. Such interested parties might profit if the present king was unjustly executed. Hittite history has so far proved that the Hittite nobility was exceedingly envious of the king's position and would not stop short of murder to gain it.

The fact that emerges from this section is that the Assembly met when summoned by the council. This dependency of the Assembly on the council perhaps pertained to matters other than deciding the fate of the king. It would be interesting to know if the council neglected to call the Assembly when it was legally obliged to do so. But later Hittite history indicates that the nobility, and thus the council, did not possess the power it undoubtedly had in the Old Kingdom.

33. Ibid. p.191
But on no account was the king to be killed secretly. Again we have evidence that Telipinus was attempting to guard against injustice and furtive behaviour with its attendant uncertainty, complications, intrigues and confusion.

(52) "But let them not kill (him) secretly, in the manner of Zurus, Tanuwas, Taharwailis, and Taruhsus. (54) Let them not contrive harm for his house, his wife, (and) his children. (55) If a prince does wrong let him atone even with his head. (55) However, let them not contrive harm for his house and his children. (56) In whose ever behalf princes are destroyed (it does) not (apply) to their houses, their fields, their vineyards, their barns, their slaves, their cattle, (and) their sheep.

32

(60) However, it (is) not right to give away the person (?) (or) property of the princes. 34 (61) Whoever institutes these injurious plans (whether) Lu.Mes..., fathers of the house (?), chief of the palace servants, chief of the Mesedi, or chief of the cup-bearers, because they desire to take the holding of the prince, they say: 'Such and such a city would become mine,' and they contrive harm for the lord of the city." 35

When the king or prince has paid the supreme penalty the matter is to end there. On no account is there to be a chain reaction of killings within the royal family which had formerly so weakened the Hittite kingdom.

Also the property of the deceased prince is to be in no way impaired. Nor is it to be given away. This proviso is proof of the political subtlety of Telipinus. It indicates his awareness that it was necessary to guard against the abuse of the law regulating the conduct of kings and princes. We have here the elimination of the profit motive which could well stimulate the instigation of "trumped up charges" against a king or prince. This was a very necessary and intelligent check on a

34. Telipinus is here referring to those princes who have suffered the death penalty for their misdemeanours.

situation which gave scope for members of the nobility to level false accusations against a member of the ruling house in the interests of furthering their own material advancement. It is informative to see that it was the leading dignitaries of the kingdom whom Telipinus considered would be most likely to contrive harm for a king or prince. This law was specifically directed against the nobility who comprised the council. If a member of the nobility attempted to have one of the royal family executed for his own gain this must have been seen as treason; and if my contention is correct he would have been tried by the assembly. Similarly, it is no cause for wonder that the Assembly rather than the council should try members of the royal family. Telipinus obviously considered that it was the Hittite nobility who stood to gain if the king or a prince was murdered.

In the next section Telipinus names the positions of the people he is addressing. Quite obviously the totality of the people present falls into two distinct political bodies; an assembly of lesser Hittites and a council comprised of the chief officials:

(66) "And now from this day in Hattusas, do you, palace servants, Mesedi, golden grooms, cup-bearers, salashiyas, (and) exalted captains of a thousand, remember this matter. (68) Moreover, let Tanuwas, Taharwailis, and Taruhsus be a sign for you."

These people must have belonged to the Hittite Assembly. They are warned against becoming the executors of the treacherous plans of the nobility.

The proclamation continues:

(70) If hereafter anyone does wrong, either the father of the house, (?) or the chief of the palace servants, (or) the chief of the cup-bearers, (or) the chief of the Mesedi, (or) the chief of the exalted captains of a thousand, ..., and do you, the senate, have (him) brought before you and punish him?"

37. I have already pointed out that pankus, according to Gurney and Hardy, should most likely be rendered as assembly rather than senate.
The people named here would have belonged to the Hittite council. As in the days of Hattusilis I the council met with the Assembly to hear the formal proclamation of the king, even though the former body may have advised the king in some of the matters contained in the proclamation. If the above argument is correct in connection with Telipinhus delegating judicial power to the Assembly which was formerly held by the council then these council members are to be tried, should the occasion arise, not by their fellow members but by the Assembly.

I would conclude in the following way. The king was not a law unto himself. If he harmed a member of the ruling House he was to be tried by the Assembly if the council's initial warning had failed. The council did not try him because some of its members may have profited by his death, politically or materially, perhaps both. Secondly, the council did not try their own kind because of the possibility that justice would be thwarted to ensure the continuation of the group interests. Thus although the council may still have acted in an advisory capacity to the king, and although it may have had the power of convening the Assembly, there is evidence to suggest that Telipinhus seriously limited the power of the nobility. The relative stability of the domestic history of the New Empire and the consequent imperial success of a more sustained mature are suggestive of the success of Telipinhus' policy in relationship to the Hittite nobility.

There is yet one other interesting point which arises from the Telipinhus proclamation:

(19) "And a case of murder is as follows. (19) Whoever commits murder, whatever the heir himself of the murdered man says; if he says: 'Let him die', he shall die; but if he says: 'Let him make restitution,' he shall make restitution. (21) At such a time, however, let no (plea be made) to the king." 39

39. Ibid p.193
This indication that private vengeance, or the blood feud was still in existence during the reign of Telipinus comes as a startling contrast to the undoubted attempts of Telipinus to establish law and order. The practice of private vengeance was apparently such a strong custom among the Hittites that Telipinus at this stage of Hittite social development either did not wish to abolish it or could not do so with safety. But the alternative of restitution is indicative of a tendency towards greater social and hence political stability. Perhaps Telipinus introduced this alternative. It would certainly be in keeping with the general tenor of his policy. The isolated mention of a law governing social behaviour in a proclamation dealing essentially with political matters suggests that it may have been seen as an innovation of real importance.
THE HITTITE LAW CODE

The Hittite law code is one of the most informative of the state documents that have survived to us. The sections relating to officialdom and feudal duties are particularly relevant to this thesis. Other sections are not as directly relevant but often make clearer the type of people that the Hittites were and this can be extremely useful as a guide to speculation when other evidence is lacking.

Because Telipinus essentially concerned himself with a policy of domestic consolidation and reconstruction I have thought it necessary to include a chapter on the law code. Since the Hittite code was often amended and no tangible information regarding the authorship exists it is impossible to assign any precise date to the code. But the great political and administrative ability of Hattusilis I and Telipinus suggests that much of the law code was compiled during their reigns. The important point is that the Hittite code was continually being adapted to meet new needs.

The power of the written word has always been dangerously formidable. People have continually exhibited a tendency to accept an attitude, idea or decree as being irrefutable and beyond criticism simply because it has been written down and has the sanction of officialdom. It is so much

3. Neufeld, Op. cit. p. 115, note 104, considers that Telipinus' restoration of law and order could not have been achieved solely by a proclamation before the assembly but must have been based on a long term policy necessitating a revision of pre-existing customary laws in which he attempted to bring about an increase in mercy and an improvement in the standards of justice. He concludes that Telipinus attempted to realize a new ideal in justice based on a definite link between claims and duties.
easier to comfortably accept other people's thinking, especially that of the expert, than to come to individual conclusions which may or may not be the same. Hence a codified body of law with its official stamp of approval can easily become anachronistic. This is especially a danger if the laws are considered as being a gift from the gods. There is very little trace of the divine element in the Hittite law code. Thus it could not be expediently argued that an amendment to the law code was tantamount to sacrilege. Hittite politics of the Old Kingdom indicate that the idea of change was a reality and a necessity to the Hittites. An awareness of new conditions demanding new or modified laws explains the amendments to the Hittite law code. The capacity to change and amend in politics has been seen in the political testament of Hattusilis I and especially in the legislation of Telipinus.

No legal documents have been found in the Hattic, Luwian, Palaic or Hurrian language. They are all written in the Hittite language. This in itself is proof of the importance that the Hittites attached to their law code. As a nation of rulers they insisted that this instrument of rule be couched in their own language. Their contrasting attitude to religion is informative. It is really a question of what the Hittites considered to be their chief concern. But the Hittite insistence on the use of their own language in the writing of their law does not mean that the Hittite insisted that this law be applied to all and sundry. The chapter devoted to Hattusilis I has dealt with the existence of different legal systems of a local nature.4

Section five of the Hittite code further proves the existence of different penalties in different areas.

"If anyone kills a Hittite merchant, he shall give 100 minas of silver and pledge his estate as security. If (it happens) in the country of Luwiya or in the country of Pala, he shall give 100 minas of silver and replace his goods; if (it happens) in the Hatti land, he has (also) to make amends for the merchants himself."5

4. Supra p.97
simply be an attempt on the part of the law-giver to lay down penalties in accordance with the various trade situations. The specifying of a merchant in this particular law seems to indicate that this may have been the case.
The fact that the countries of Luwiya and Pala are specified is interesting. These two countries possibly had a predominantly Indo-European population if the terms Luwian and Palaic as Indo-European dialects may be used as evidence to this effect. Perhaps the Hittites were intent on preserving the local laws of those racially akin to them in the interests of making these other Indo-European tribes privileged, and thus loyal, groups. But the different provision in connection with the merchant in Luwiya and Pala need not necessarily be the law of Luwiya and Pala incorporated in the Hittite law code. It is rather to be seen as a Hittite law to cover the merchant in a different trade situation. (See footnote 5)

Laws 19A, B, 20 and 21 indicate the inferiority of Luwians, both free-man and slave, in relationship to the corresponding Hittite. Especially serious is the crime embodied in section 19A:

"If any Luwian steals a person-man or woman from Hattusas and carries him to the country of Arzawa, but his master traces him out, he shall forfeit his estate."

It is understandable that the Hittites should impose a severe penalty upon a subject who commits an offence in the capital; especially if the offence was committed against a Hittite.

Law 19B illustrates the inferiority of the Luwian in relationship to the Hittite:

"If in Hattusa any Hittite steals a Luwian and carries him to the country of Luwiya, they would formerly give twelve persons, now he shall give six persons and place his estate as security."

The penalty is lighter for the Hittite. Laws 20 and 21, which are concerned with slaves also illustrate the inferiority of the Luwian. One can only conclude that the penalties laid down varied in accordance with the importance of the locality in which the offence was committed and the status of citizenship possessed by the offender and victim. The Hittites obviously saw themselves as a caste apart.

The last provision of law 23 is of considerable interest:

"..If a slave runs away and goes to any enemy country, whoever brings him nevertheless back, shall receive him (the slave) himself."

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7. Ibid. p.190
Apart from the reward being equated to the risk involved this law has imperial overtones. The interests of state security and the danger of adding to the enemy's ranks are here being catered for.

The Hittites, not unnaturally, insisted upon complete obedience to those in authority. If a ruling minority does not gain obedience on the home front little success can be expected with people outside the inner circle. Section 173 contains the following provisions:

"If anyone rejects the judgment of the king, his house shall remain a shambles. If anyone rejects the judgment of a dignitary, they shall cut off his head. If a slave rises against his master, he shall go into the pit." 8

Gurney considers that "house" should possibly be translated as "household." If this is the case this is practically the only surviving trace of collective responsibility in the Hittite law code. 9 Elsewhere the onus is placed on the individual responsible for the crime. That collective responsibility should survive in relation to an offence against the king is proof enough of the importance attached to any flouting of his judgements. Section 126 is reflective of the same attitude towards authority as represented by the king:

"...If anyone steals a bronze spear in the gate of the palace he shall die" 11 Disregard for a symbol of palace authority must have been seen as an affront to royalty. Hence the unusual severity of the penalty.

The Hittite law code emphasizes compensation in kind or money, rather than retribution, as a penalty. Retribution is the practice whereby the victim revenges himself upon the wrongdoer. If the victim dies the vengeance becomes the obligation of his relatives. There thus arises a blood feud

8. Ibid p.195
10. The exception to this rule is contained in law 49. See Pritchard (ed)Op.cit. p.191: "If a hipparas man steals, there will be no compensation. If he is considered a felon, the community to which he belongs will make compensation. If one would indict them for theft, all of them were criminals or would have to be considered as thieves."
which can lead to many deaths. This institution of blood vengeance which can be traced back to the beginning of social development, and which as an act of justice is an obvious manifestation of the principle of retribution, existed at some time among the Hittites.\footnote{12} But very little trace of the principle of retribution or private vengeance can be found in the Hittite law code.\footnote{13}


\footnote{13}Laws 197 and 198 in Pritchard (ed) Op.cit.p.196 seem to reflect the development from the practice of private vengeance to institutionalized or state justice:

197."If a man seizes a woman in the mountains, it is the man's crime and he will be killed. But if he seizes her in (her) house it is the woman's crime and the woman shall be killed. If the husband finds them, he may kill them, there shall be no punishment for him."

198."If he brings them to the gate of the palace and declares: 'My wife shall not be killed' and thereby spares his wife's life, he shall also spare the life of the adulterer and shall mark his head. If he says: 'Let them die both of them'... The king may order them killed the king may spare their lives."

The desire and the traditional right of the family to seek vengeance does not die easily. But during the time of the laws the central authority and social forces were strong enough to suppress private vengeance. The degree of progress from the principle of blood vengeance to the higher social technique of the surrender of persons in discharge of guilt is very great.\textsuperscript{14}

In short, the Hittite state has sought to make illegal the vendetta with its consequent social instability which inevitably impairs the harmony of the state. Justice has become a matter of official, rather than private, dispensation. The importance which the Hittites attached to guaranteeing the unimpaired course of justice is made clear by law 38:

"If men are implicated in a law suit and an avenger comes for them, (if) then the defendants get enraged and (one of them) strikes the avenger so that he dies, there will be no compensation."\textsuperscript{15}

The death penalty is rarely stipulated as a punishment. It was only operative in cases involving defiance of authority and sexual offences. In the great majority of such cases the king was the ultimate authority. He had the power either to grant reprieve or to command the sentence of death.\textsuperscript{16} The power to grant pardons appears to have been the prerogative of the crown. Thus punishment actually threatened by the law was often more severe than the punishment actually inflicted. Thus the king had scope for the application of leniency beyond the mere confines of the law. The king then, possessed a very powerful weapon. He commanded the power of life or death. The king could take extenuating circumstances into account and judge accordingly. There is something essentially casuistic about much of Hittite law. We have here proof of the Hittite capacity for flexibility. Despite the indication given in their religious texts the Hittites apparently realised that there was more to successful government than the mere application of formulae solutions which tend to push the problem out of perspective in order to allow an ill-fitting application. With them the problem dictated the nature of the solution.


\textsuperscript{15} Pritchard (ed) Op.cit. p.190

If this view is extreme it must at least be conceded that the Hittites were not so governed by an adherence to the letter of the law as to preclude a modification of it should a situation arise which demanded that the law be amended.

But what explains the rarity of the death penalty and the scope given for its commutation? The answer is to be found in the essential respect that the Hittite had for the individual and his rights. The existence of a council and an assembly which qualified the powers of the king attest to this. The nature of Hittite origins must be taken into account here. The large numbers of laws concerned with theft do not necessarily indicate a national Hittite weakness, but rather they may testify to the sanctity of private ownership.

Gurney makes the following interesting remark:

"An outstanding feature of Hittite legal procedure is the immense trouble taken to ascertain the facts. We possess highly detailed minutes of inquiry in cases of peculation and neglect of duty..."17

A portion of the text runs as follows:

"Regarding the stores which [the queen] entrusted to 'Great-is-the-Storm-God', son of Ukkuras the 'leader of ten' - to wit, [chariots], utensils of bronze and copper, garments and materials, bows, arrows, shields, [clubs], civilian captives (!), oxen, sheep, horses and mules - the stores which he had issued to anybody he had not sealed, and he had no dusdumis and no lalamis (two words of unknown meaning). So the queen said: 'Let the 'golden pages' and the chamberlains of the queen and Great-is-the-Storm-God and (?) Ukkuras the leader of ten go and swear solemn oaths in the temple of Lilwanis.'

After the sworn statements Great-is-the-Storm-God is then questioned:

"Thus said Maruwas: 'One pair of mules you gave to Hillarizzi'. Great-is-the-Storm-God replied: 'The mules belong to Hillarizzi; I took them and gave them back safe and sound (?)'.

Thus said Maruwas: 'You gave mules to Piha-...' Great-is-the-Storm-God replied: 'They were not from the stable.'

Thus said Yarrazalmas the 'golden page': 'Zuwappis sold a horse and got a talent of bronze.' Great-is-the-Storm-God replied: 'He told me it was dead!'

Gurney concludes that "the text shows a spirit of careful and unbiased investigation which may perhaps be taken as typical of Hittite administration as a whole." But while this is true Gurney misses the point in one important respect. If the defendant, Great-is-the-Storm-God, is found guilty he will obviously be punished. What is of great importance is the "careful and unbiased investigation" to determine the fate of one person. If the importance of the individual is conceded as existing among the Hittites respect for his life naturally follows. I feel sure that this factor had much to do with the nature of Hittite politics.

The fact that the penalties contained in the Hittite code of laws illustrate an evolution to leniency is an important reflection of a characteristic of the Hittite people which has a direct bearing on their attitude to the subjects of their empire. Just as the law code is free of cruel, barbaric penalties and evolves towards less severe punishments so was the Hittite disposition towards the conquered free of those atrocities which deservedly earned for the Assyrians the title of "scourge of the east". The Hittites early reached the stage whereby alternatives other than violence were considered as workable political and imperial techniques.

The general trend of the law indicates a concern with reparation of damage that has been done. Punishment for the offence seems often to be a secondary consideration.

Neufeld makes the interesting observation that the central conception of Hittite law "is that the fulfilment of one's obligations is required for maintaining the equilibrium of mutuality." He enlarges upon this idea by contending that the legal procedures function in the first instance to secure reparation that will re-establish smooth relations between the parties and thus maintain the social balance. The aim

18. Ibid p.94
19. Ibid p.94
21. Ibid See the later versions of laws 5 and 10, p.189
is to achieve a decision acceptable to all parties, not to adjudicate upon conflicting rights according to the letter of the law. There is as object the resolving of tensions rather than the deciding of legal issues as such. The courts were not arenas for forensic debate but agencies of arbitration for effecting compromises. Thus since appeasement of the parties is fundamental penalties and punishments became secondary and reparation primary.  

In short, the law code aspired to the attainment of harmony and balance between the members of the state who became involved in disputes. This attitude, clearly manifest in the law code, must to some extent have made itself felt in Hittite political and imperial activities. The effecting of compromises to give some degree of satisfaction to the parties concerned takes time, thought and discussion. In the interests of gaining stability within the state the Hittites did not arbitrarily apply a few limited rules to govern the outcome of all disputes. They were aware that a variety of situations demanded a corresponding variety of solutions if satisfaction and hence balance between the conflicting parties were to be achieved. Punishment was only justifiable if it achieved this harmony.

The main importance of the Hittite law code for the purposes of this study lies in the information which it gives in regard to the feudal nature of the Hittite kingdom. Generally speaking, land ownership among the Hittites entailed the rendering of services. But the details of ownership and the exact nature of the services expected are by no means clear. For example, it is not clear whether one type of holding was the responsibility of the "man of the weapon", a soldier who received the holding on terms of military service, or the responsibility of a "tool-man", a craftsman.

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But despite such confusion several salient factors of considerable importance emerge.

Law 39 indicates that the possessor of fields had to perform service to the liege lord who no doubt let certain sections of his property on that understanding:

"If the inhabitant of a town has possession of another (inhabitant)'s fields, he shall also perform (the respective) service to the liege lord. If he allows fields to lie idle, another man may take the fields, but he must not sell them."24

The activities of the Hittite nobles implies that they possessed retainers who were bound to give military service25 to the lord in return for receiving a livelihood from him. Under these conditions the lord would be expected to provide a contingent of soldiers for the king when it was required. That this system was subject to abuse has already been sufficiently demonstrated.

It is impossible to conceive of the powerful role played by the nobility in Hittite politics unless ownership of land on the part of the nobles, with retainers owing them military service, is assumed. Law 176B perhaps indicates that the nobility 'owned' people:

"If anyone buys a craftsman, either a potter, a smith, a carpenter, a leatherworker, a fuller, a weaver or he buys a maker of kapalli garments, he shall give 10 shekels of silver."26

Law 42 is also suggestive in this respect:

"If anyone hires a man and he goes to war and dies, if the hire has been given, there will be no compensation. If his hire has not been given, he shall give one person and as hire he will give 12 shekels of silver, and as the hire of a woman he shall give 6 shekels of silver."27

27. Ibid p.191
This law is more than likely to do with a lord hiring people for war in order to make up the numbers which the king expects from him. The law seems to aim at ensuring that the offspring and wife of the soldier will receive some form of compensation should the soldier die. Hence punishment is imposed for not paying in advance; that is, before the hired man leaves for war with its danger to life.

Law 40 attests to the fact that a socman may be assigned to a craftsman's fields if the latter disappears. As well as continuing to render his service as a socman he must also begin to render the craftsman's service. If he refuses this the people of the town were to work the fields. No doubt the lords of the town who owned or controlled the fields leased them to people who thus became their retainers:

"If a craftsman disappears (and) a socman is assigned (in his stead), (if) the socman says: 'This is my craftsman's fee, but this (other one) is my socage,' he shall receive for himself a sealed deed concerning the fields; then he has (legal) possession of the craftsman's fee and shall also perform the socage. If he refuses the craftsman's service, they will declare the fields of the craftsman vacant and the people of the town shall work them. If the king gives deportees, they shall give him the fields and he shall become a (landed) craftsman." 28

Hittite state law is here simply concerned with ensuring that the services, due to the Hittite king through the medium of the nobility, continued to be forthcoming. If these services included military service, as they more than likely did, it is small wonder that Hittite law did everything to prevent a falling off in them. It is important to note the power of the king in the assigning of land. If he ruled that a deportee was to be assigned to the vacant land that no doubt overrode the preceding proviso whereby the people of the town were to work the land. This may have aimed at limiting the power of the nobility. It would be interesting to know if this was a relatively late development in Hittite law.

Provision 41 is the same as provision 40 except that it deals with the disappearance of a socman. But in this case, if the craftsman refuses to perform the socage "they take the fields of the socman for the palace, and the socage expires." This is direct proof that the king directly controlled the use of land. No doubt the king, then appointed people to work the land that he controlled. The people who were assigned to this land would owe service to the king. That these services would have included military service is not only to be assumed but firmly held since the Hittite state was essentially military based. When one considers the consistent trouble which the nobility with their retained soldiery offered the king it is axiomatic that the king must have had his own soldiery dependent upon him for their livelihood.

Law 46 contends with the problem of evading services:

"If in a village anyone holds fields under socage as inheritance—if the fields have been given to him, he shall render the services; if the fields have been given to him only to a small part, he shall not render the services, they shall render them from his father's house..." The expected services would be in proportion to the land owned. It is unlikely that a family, in the interests of evading the services, would be able to find a member of the family willing to own all the land on the basis that he performed everybody's services. The individual referred to who only owns the part of the land does not evade all services. He simply renders them as a member of the family.

Section 47A and the later version, 47B, are interesting enough in themselves, but they are even more informative in comparison with each other. Law 47A gives further proof that the king owned land:

"If anyone holds fields as a gift from the king, he shall not render the services." This power of bestowing favours is illustrative of the powerful position of the Hittite king. If one receives favours there is a sense of dependency. This earlier version of law 47 gives the impression that a gift of land from the king always meant exemption from rendering the services. But 47B, the later version of 47A, reflects a different situation:

29. Ibid p.191
30. Ibid p.191
"If anyone holds field (and) fallow as a gift from the king and if the king exempts him, he shall not render the services.... If anyone holds field (and) fallow as a gift from the king he shall render the services connected with the field. If he is exempted by order of the palace, he shall not render the services."32

Thus the receiving of land from the king did not always mean that the holder was exempted from rendering the services. The king could give, the king could withhold. In this way the sense of dependency on the part of the land-holder would have been intensified. In times of national emergency the services would no doubt be required.

Other extracts in law 47B point to an increase in the power of the monarchy:

"If anyone buys all the field (and) fallow of a craftsman and the owner of the field (and) fallow perishes, he shall perform the socage which the king imposes upon him."33

There is no such allusion to this power of the king in laws 40 and 41 which deal with similar situations.

The extract from law 47B continues as follows:

"But if the owner of field (and) fallow is alive or the house of the owner of field (and) fallow is continued either in this country or in another country, he shall not perform socage."34

Thus the selling of property did not gain exemption from the services for the person who sold the property. This of course guards against the danger of evasion of service which law 46 may have made possible on some occasions.

The new role of the Hittite king in laws dealing with feudal dues may have had as its objective the limiting of the power of the nobles. Perhaps it was the nobility who received land as a gift from the king. If they abused this gift which formerly entailed freedom from service it is likely that the king would wish to acquire the judicial power which enabled him to demand the services. The monarchy's control of allocation of service to the craftsmen could very well have had the same end in view.

32. Ibid p.191
33. Ibid p.191
34. Ibid p.191
Law 47B belongs to the time of a strong monarch who enacted this legislation to lessen the stranglehold that the nobility had on the control of feudal dues. In order to have at his disposal the largest army possible the king began to play a more active role in the determination of dues technically owing to the crown but often dissipated by the nobles for their own ends. In the previous chapter we have seen that Telipinus made conscious efforts to curb the destructive activities of the nobility. While these later laws are perhaps not to be assigned to Telipinus it was possibly his policy in relation to the nobles that suggested their enactment to a later Hittite king. I have little hesitation in assigning such a law as 47B to the time of Suppiluliumas or Mursilis II when Hittite power reached its peak. These two kings have little or no trouble with the nobles and both needed large armies for their imperial achievements.

The provision embodied in law 51 indicates the same tendency to utilize all possible services which must have included military service: "Formerly the house of a man who had become a weaver in Arinna (was) exempt. Now (only) his own house (is) exempt, but his associates and his relations perform socage and render the services. In Zippalantiya it is just the same."35

35. Ibid p.191
CONCLUSION

The majority of the history of the Hittite Old Kingdom has witnessed a struggle between the king and the nobility. Labarnas and especially Hattusilis I and Telipinus attempted to confine and restrict the ruinous activities of the nobles. The imperial ambitions of the Hittites were incompatible with the domestic situation as we have seen it in the Old Kingdom. It was during the time of anarchy, caused by the rivalries and intrigues of leading Hittites, that Hittite controlled territory shrank in size. Before there could be a Hittite empire which possessed any genuine stability it was vital that the kings of the Old Kingdom should direct their energies to the task of ending domestic intrigue and confusion. Since the power of the nobility appears to have been customary and based upon traditional right the process of circumscribing this power was inevitably slow.

But Telipinus appears to have been basically successful since from his time the Hittite kings no longer have to contend, to the same extent at least, with the disloyalty of the nobles. The testament of Hattusilis I and the proclamation of Telipinus essentially work towards the elimination of this problem. The Hittite law code also offers evidence which points in the same direction. The fact that the Hittites successfully held an extensive empire, for those times, from Suppiluliumas down until the end of Hattusilis III's reign is sufficient indication that the power of the nobility had been considerably curbed.

Gurney makes the following interesting statement:

"During the later Empire tabarna is usually replaced by a title meaning 'My Sun'. This must have been properly a form of address used by the king's subjects, and was certainly borrowed from the contemporary kingdoms of Mitanni and Egypt together with the winged sun as a symbol of royalty. The oriental conception of a king endowed with superhuman powers also makes its appearance during the imperial age. It expresses itself in the phrase 'Hero, beloved of the god (or goddess)...', which follows the name of all the later kings, and in a passage such as the following from the autobiography of Hattusilis III:
'The goddess, my lady, always held me by the hand; and since I was a divinely favoured man, and walked in the favour of the gods, I never committed the evil deeds of mankind.'

Moscati considers that it was in the age of Suppiluliumas that the Hittite kingship evolved in the direction of that of the great oriental monarchies. When talking of the monarchy and divinity in relationship to the Egyptians and Mesopotamians Moscati contends that we should not underestimate the different situation of nomads. He considers that among nomads the likelihood of the deification of the ruler and the absolute authority which it presupposes are much reduced. "Whether he be the sheikh of tribal origin, controlled by a council of elders, or the elected leader of a restricted class of nobility, the nomad chief is very far from the ruler of a settled people. But it is a fact that the latter strongly attracts the former: for example, the Hittite sovereign of the New Empire differs from that of the old by his adoption of the Egyptian divine symbol, and his own deification after death." 

Thus, in conclusion, there is reason to think that the Hittite monarchy of the New Empire pertained in some respects at least to the absolutism of the oriental monarchies of the ancient near east. If the Hittite kingship gained in power to this extent one must presuppose that the power of the nobility had been effectively reduced. It would seem, then, that the policy of Hattusilis I and Telipinus in relationship to their nobility was so far successful as to make possible the increased power of the king during the New Empire. This in its turn in many respects explains the imperial success of such monarchs as Suppiluliumas and Mursilis II.

3. Ibid p.296.
Van der Meer says that since "there exists no list of the Hittite kings which gives the number of their regnal years, we can only look about for points of contact of some of the Hittite monarchs with their contemporaries in West Asia and Egypt."\(^1\) Fortunately we have one such point of contact for the Hittite Old Kingdom.

This point of contact is the raid of Mursilis I against Babylon. This took place during the reign of Samsiditana whom Van der Meer considers reigned from 1564 to 1534. He places the date of the raid at about 1550 B.C.\(^2\) We know that Mursilis was murdered not long after his return from the raid. The dates for the Old Kingdom have to be reconstructed from that of the death of Mursilis. If a king has had a successful reign it is perhaps reasonable to assign him a rule of thirty years. That is, he may have remained on the throne for approximately a generation. But this more than likely is not the case for those Hittite kings of the Old Kingdom who ruled during the period of anarchy.

Let us assume that Mursilis reigned from about 1580 B.C. to 1550 B.C. His predecessor, Hattusilis I, being a successful monarch, perhaps ruled from approximately 1610 B.C. to 1580 B.C. The predecessor of Hattusilis I, Labarnas, likewise enjoyed a relatively stable reign. He ruled from about 1640 B.C. to 1610 B.C. In this way we may go back to Pitkhanas and Anittas. Van der Meer considers that they lived in the first half of the eighteenth century.\(^3\) This can be proved by their contemporaneity with the Assyrian prince Sarru-ken and his son Puzur-Assur. Chronological data from Assyria enables an accurate dating of the Assyrian rulers.

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2. Ibid p. 90
3. Ibid p. 91
If we say that Anittas died in approximately 1750 B.C. we have over a gap of a century between the death of Anittas and the accession of Labarnas in 1640 B.C. Pu-sarrumas, and perhaps Tudhaliyas I, reigned during the intervening century. It is unlikely that these two kings reigned for the duration of a century. Therefore it may be suggested that the dates for Anittas and Pitkhanas be further lowered. On the other hand there may have been other Hittite kings, of whom we do not know, who reigned for a portion of this intervening century.

From the death of Mursilis to the accession of Telipinus the Hittite kingdom was torn with internal strife. During this period of anarchy we know of four kings. There was considerable activity during the reign of Hantilis, the successor of Mursilis.

The sources do not indicate that he met a violent death despite the fact that his reign was marked by disaster. If we assign to him twenty years as a ruler, he reigned, according to this scheme, from 1550 B.C. to 1530 B.C. We know very little of the reign of Zidantas, the successor of Hantilis, other than that he was murdered. If he ruled for five years he was on the throne from 1530 B.C. to 1525 B.C. The activities of his successor Ammunas were quite extensive but met with little success. If he ruled for fifteen years he was the Hittite king from 1525 B.C. to 1510 B.C. We know very little of the reign of Huzziyas. By giving him five years he reigned from 1510 B.C. to 1505 B.C. With the coming of Telipinus, who drove Huzziyas from the throne, order was re-established in the Hittite kingdom. He therefore may have ruled for thirty years or even longer. Thus he was more than likely on the throne from 1505 B.C. to 1475 B.C. But since he campaigned successfully in the south-east and pursued a successful domestic policy he may have ruled for a longer period of time. Because of this his death is more likely to have been closer to 1470 B.C.

With the period of the New Empire we are on firmer chronological ground. The Hittites become an international power. This results in more points of synchronistic contact between the Hittites and the other nations of the ancient near east. Tudhaliyas II is seen as the founder of the New Empire. He reigned from approximately 1460 B.C. to 1440 B.C.
Thus there is a ten year gap between Telipinus and Tudhaliyas II. This was more than likely bridged by the reign of Alluwamnas, the son-in-law of Telipinus. Alluwamnas therefore ruled from 1470 B.C. to 1460 B.C.

Gurney considers that there was an intervening period of forty years between the death of Telipinus and the accession of Tudhaliyas II. With the exception of the historically known Alluwamnas he fills this gap with three kings whose existence is uncertain. These three kings are Hantilis II, Zidantas II and Huzziyas II. With the exception of the occurrence of Ammunas their order and names are similar to the three of the four kings who reigned during the period of anarchy following the death of Mursilis. This fact in itself is enough to make their authenticity suspect. But if these three shadowy kings, of whom we have no positive knowledge, did exist, it presupposes that not all went well after the reconstruction policy of Telipinus. However, the history of the New Empire points to the conclusion that the policy of Telipinus successfully outlasted his own lifetime. Therefore the very existence of these three kings, ruling for a period of thirty years according to Gurney, is to be seriously doubted. Gurney's dates for the Hittite kings would seem to be too high. The lower chronology, as proposed by Van der Meer, Albright, and others, successfully bridges the gap between Alluwamnas and Tudhaliyas II. Thus the presence of Hantilis II, Zidantas II and Huzziyas II is no longer necessitated.

5. Ibid p.216