The Republican Push: 
A Sociological Study of Political Reform

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Abstract

The spread of civic nationalism and the push for an Australian republic became inextricably linked in the 1990s. Specific socio-historical and socio-political factors provided the impetus for both in the post-WW II period. In the early 1990s civic national sentiments were harnessed by public intellectuals and activists of the ARM in the push for an Australian republic. The push started with Citizens for Democracy in the 1970s and it culminated in a referendum on November 6th 1999. The referendum for Australia to move to a republic was unsuccessful — which is surprising considering the pro-republican public sentiments and the successful mobilization of the Australian Republican Movement.

This study addresses this puzzle of the ‘surprising defeat’. It proposes a sociological model identifying the key factors necessary for major political reform. The model includes three sets of conditions of success and assesses the presence of these conditions empirically. The conditions include conducive public sentiments, the programmatic articulation of these sentiments by a social movement organization, and a high degree of strategic and tactical consensus among political elites, including the leaders of the republican movement. The study concludes that this consensus amongst republican and political elites was weak or missing on the eve of the referendum.
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Preface

This thesis adds another volume to an already wide library of works on the Australian republican movement and its attempts at reforming the political system. A number of historians and social commentators have already analysed the origin, development and the current state of the republican movement — and their work has been acknowledged below. Perhaps one of the best known is a study of the republican push by one of the key actors and prominent republican Malcolm Turnbull. Turnbull's early book titled 'The Reluctant Republic' addresses issues of national identity and links Australia's changing sense of nationhood with the republican cause. He also discusses the constitutional implications of the republican reform and the political background of the republican campaign. His later work entitled 'Fighting for a Republic', published only weeks after the 1999 referendum, looks at the strategic and tactical debates and the behind the scene deals that accompanied the constitutional convention and the referendum. In a similar vein, but with a added historical bent, Tom Keneally presents a partly personal and partly historical account of his republican childhood in 'Our Republic'. He analyses the social and historical background of Australian republicanism and the role of the ARM in shaping the most recent republican debate.

There are also a number of historians who have contributed to the analysis of the republican movement. They include, to name a few, John Hirst, Wayne Hudson, David Carter and Mark McKenna. Mark McKenna's analysis of republicanism titled 'The Captive Republic' stands out as one of the most comprehensive accounts of the history of Australian republicanism over the last 150 years. The study draws striking parallels between past and present arguments for a republic, and anchors the recent debate in history. McKenna's interpretation, especially his account of the contribution made by both political and republican elites to the latest republican push, has greatly influenced the analysis below — and it is acknowledged throughout. One should also mention numerous socio-historical and socio-political studies of Australian republicanism. For example, Donald Horne, a pioneer republican who lead Citizens for Democracy in the 1970s, has
written a number of important books. His ‘Ideas for a Nation’ and ‘Looking for Leadership’ examine expressions of national character and link civic values with an Australian republic. He analyses the causes of the most recent republican resurgence, and makes a strong partisan claim that full independence requires Australia’s becoming a republic. Paul Kelly, as editor-in-chief of the ‘The Australian’ in the early 1990s has also made a substantial contribution to the republican debate in his book ‘Paradise Divided’. There he analyses the republican resurgence in the 1990s as a reflection of political and economic trends. Particular attention is paid to the changing policies of the ALP leaders aimed at increasing Australia’s integration with the Asia-Pacific region. Kelly also comments on changing national identity and its dynamics in the context of political change. Finally, the contributions made by Ian McAllister, especially in ‘New Development in Australian Politics’ should be acknowledged. Here McAllister interprets the republican activisation in the 1990s in the context of the ideological and political re-orientation of the ALP and the role of Paul Keating in placing the republic at the top of the new Labor’s political agenda.

There are also numerous assessments of the republican movements’ ‘weakness’ as reflected in the referendum failure to support the minimalist option. In his ‘The Barren Years’, Robert Manne predicted the demise of the referendum based on the ‘fatal contradiction’ between the ‘minimalists’, whom he labels ‘nationalists’, and the ‘populists’, whom he calls ‘democrats’. He argues that as the republican debate progressed, the proponents of the republic suffered from a narrowing of vision and became bogged down in legal technicalities. As a result the republican movement was unable to capture public enthusiasm and imagination. Ian McAllister (2001), in turn, attributes a weak support for the minimalist position to the lack of clear party-political cues. He also argues that the results of the referendum reflected a lack of knowledge among large sections of the electorate and the perception amongst ordinary voters that the push for the republic was predominantly an elite initiative. Higley and Chase (2000) on the other hand see the principal reason for the failed referendum as a failure by political elites to reach agreement on the shape of the future republic. The result also reflected a widespread distrust of political elites by the public and a strong
preference for a directly elected president. Higley & Chase's analysis gets to the heart of the central role of political leaders in instigating change.

The analysis below critically integrates most of these arguments, and supplements them within a broader sociological account of the republican reform movement put in the context of a model of political reform. It focuses on three sets of conditions of success of any large-scale reformist attempt: conducive mass orientations, successful organization and consensual elite action. This model is derived from the Weberian tradition of sociological analysis supplemented by insights of contemporary theorists of nationalism, mass social movements and elites. Both the Weberian 'backbone' and the contemporary theoretical insights underlying the model, guide the empirical analysis of public attitudes towards the republic and nationhood, as well as the interpretive study of republican elites' views as reflected in the series of interviews. The analysis locates the recent republican push within a broader social landscape of a changing Australian society, changing forms of popular identifications and changing forms of public activism. The conclusions are largely in line with the suggestions of Donald Horne concerning the centrality of civic values, and they also support Higley and Chase's views on the impact of elite dissensus on the outcomes of the republican referendum. Unlike Horne, however, I see civic values as fused with popular nationalism, and unlike Higley and Chase, I extend the analysis of elite perceptions to the republican 'leadership core'. In contradiction to Manne, I argue that despite the failure of the 1999 referendum, the republican movement had largely succeeded in preparing the grounds for political change. But it failed to fulfill the last condition — to secure a broad elite consensus about the shape of the republic.

In the final chapter I argue that the future of the republic remains open. The proposed model suggests that republicans face three challenges: how to revive civic nationalism, especially in the atmosphere of increasing concerns about national security; how to re-mobilize political resources and stimulate republican movement organizations; and how to secure elite consensus as to the strategy and tactic of reform.
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

This is a sociological study of attempted republican political reform in Australia. It focuses on the sources and outcomes of the pro-republican movement in the 1990s that culminated in the 1999 referendum. The push for a republic, I argue, reflected the changing form of popular nationalism as well as the organized attempts of political leaders to forge a political reform program and to mobilize mass support for this program. In spite of the fact that opinion polls indicated that there was strong support for an Australian republic by the majority of the population, the referendum failed to deliver majority support for the ARM’s minimalist option. The simple explanation of this failure was that the pro-republican camp was divided. The more complex explanation, provided here, identifies the causes of these divisions, and poses a sociological question about the general social conditions for effective institutional reform. The theoretical model proposed here specifies three sets of conditions that must be present for the successful introduction of such reform. They include mass sentiments conducive to the reform, an effective organizational framework, and elite consensus about strategy and tactics.

Perhaps the most controversial claim made in this study is that mass sentiments conducive to the republican reform were linked to and were heralded by a shift in popular national identities in Australia in the post-WW II period. I provide evidence of this shift and argue that it preceded the mobilization of the republican movement in the 1990s. This shift involved a spread of a new form of civic nationalism, mainly among the educated urban ‘baby boomers’. The growing pro-republican stance identified by social surveys conducted in the 1980s and 1990s coincided with and reflected this new civic form of nationalism. The socio-historical sources of civic nationalism and republicanism are discussed in the empirical part of the study in the context of an analysis of survey data on public attitudes to the nation and the republic. Further, I argue that an Australian republican movement in the 1990s both reflected this change in public sentiments,
and provided the impetus for further proliferation of new civic national identifications, especially among non-British immigrants and their descendents. The forging of the reform program by movement activists and political leaders gave the republican push a clear direction and amplified its force.

The shift in national identifications that underlined a shift in public sentiments, I argue, can be attributed to a number of socio-historical trends: the post-WW II immigration program and its aftermath, including the changing ethnic composition of Australian society; the reorientation of the Australian economy away from Europe and the UK; increased prosperity and educational opportunities; and political reorientation of the major political parties, especially the ALP. These trends combined to bring about a change in public sentiments regarding what it means to be truly Australian and what is the proper political form for the Australian nation.

Changes in public sentiments can be indexed by attitudes towards the republic and the nation, as reflected in survey data and opinion polls. The social distribution of these sentiments is the key to the postulated causal links. The analysis of survey data confirms that this distribution reflects the impact of post-WW II trends, particularly immigration and ethnic composition, generational change, educational ‘revolution’, urban and metropolitan shift in population and the ideological transformation of the ALP.

As the proposed model suggests, the second set of conditions for successful institutional reform includes the political organization of public sentiments and the mobilization of the pro-reform movement. The conducive attitudes and orientations of the mass public became politically efficacious when forged into a reform program by republican intellectuals and political leaders, mainly from the ALP. The emergence of the Australian Republican Movement (ARM) in the 1990s heralded the successful forging and harnessing of mass sentiments by the pro-republican movement leaders. The strength of the republican movement was due to the fact that it was coordinated by a single organizational centre – the ARM. It attracted high profile supporters with quite diverse political and ideological
leanings, but was particularly popular among the ALP leaders. The ALP placed an Australian republic high on the political agenda and lead the campaign for the reform throughout the 1990s.

The public intellectuals and politicians who lead the pro-republican reform movement were both vocal and strategically placed vis-à-vis the mass media. They also shared formative experiences of the Australian baby-boom generation. Those shared experiences strengthened their integration and facilitated the formation of the ARM, preceded by Citizens for Democracy (CFD) in the 1970s and the Bicentennial celebrations in 1988. Those events precipitated the organized republican push for reform that led to the failed referendum in 1999. The ARM campaigned on a ‘minimalist’ platform and sought bi-partisan support for constitutional reform. The movement attracted high profile figures who mobilized republican sentiments by focusing on an Australian head of state. While an Australian head of state became the key symbol of the republican push, the underlying appeals stressed equality, cultural inclusiveness and the rights and responsibilities of all citizens regardless of their cultural heritage. These, I argue, reflected the key features of civic nationalism.

The reform push failed to deliver majority support for the pro-republican ‘minimalist’ option. The interview data reveal some causes of this failure in the orientations and actions of political elites in the three years preceding the referendum. The elites, who injected strategic consistency into the reform program, and provided a power push for collective action, were divided in their views on the strategies of reform and preferred tactics. This lack of consensus and the strong opposition coming from the Prime Minister and senior Coalition politicians sealed the fate of the republican push.

Thus the conditions of success of the republican reform (relating to the elite) were missing on the eve of the 1999 republican referendum. This deficiency, however, was not apparent to the republican activists, partly because other conditions were present. Popular support for the republic was strong. The organizational centre of the movement, the ARM, attracted a large number of public intellectuals and
enjoyed support by the ALP. A significant majority of Coalition leaders, however, were either hostile or indifferent to 'the Labor Republic'. Moreover, even the republican elite – the ARM leadership – lacked tactical and strategic unity. The interview data also show the tentative nature of the strategic consensus within the ARM, and the emerging divisions as to the best tactical moves to institute the republic. These divisions were seized upon and highlighted by their opponents. As a result, the pro-republican vote was split and the referendum failed to back the reform.

The sociological model of reform underlying the study is anchored in a number of theoretical perspectives. I start by discussing theories of nationalism, especially the civic form of nationalism. Mannheim's analyses of generations and generational succession are also evoked to explain the rise of cohorts that have similar national sentiments and identifications. I argue that the post-war generational change precipitated a shift in popular orientations and value hierarchies. The effects of this shift were amplified by increased levels of participation in tertiary education in the post-war period. Tertiary education plays a significant role in promoting attitudinal and value change, especially in a liberal direction. It makes participants more receptive to liberal views and more tolerant of cultural diversity. The analysis of the survey data provides clear evidence that those who are supporters of an Australian republic and express civic national sentiments are more likely to be tertiary educated, born after 1945, and to embrace libertarian postmaterialist views.

Mass migrations in the 1950s and 1960s played a significant role in creating conditions conducive to the spread of civic nationalism and republicanism. Non-British immigrants became strongly committed to Australia's legal and political institutions, but often shunned Australian customs and traditions. Their nationalism manifested itself in a loyalty to Australia's institutional (legal and political) framework.

I also draw on contemporary social movement theorists to explain the significance of social movement organizations and the centrality of intellectuals in social movements, especially in elaborating goals and strategies and in forming programs
of action. While the foundations of this perspective were developed by Max Weber, it was later elaborated by the 'resource mobilization' and 'new movement' theorists.

Finally, I rely on the insights of elite theorists in analysing the role of elites in shaping organizational strategies and instigating political reform. These insights help in explaining how small groups of people are able to influence the direction of political reforms. I concentrate on the orientations and actions of the ARM leaders and, to a lesser extent, on broader political elites. The neo-elite theorists add a further dimension by recognising the interdependence of elites and non-elites (mass audiences). They examine how elites are limited by the political orientations of mass publics. Those theories provide the basis for explaining the centrality of elites in the republican reform program, and the importance of unity and consensus for the successful realisation of institutional reform.

The empirical part of the study utilizes quantitative and qualitative methodologies. It relies on the data from the 1999 Australian Constitutional Referendum Survey which includes questions about values, identities and attitudes to the nation and the republic. In particular, the survey includes specific questions on the strength and nature of attachment to the nation, thus helping in identifying different forms of nationalism and their 'social locations'.

The survey data analysis is complemented by interviews with the leaders of the Australian Republican Movement (ARM) conducted over a period of three and a half years (1996-2000). They reflect the impact of both social and political developments that took place during the 1990s and reveal how those developments shaped the ARM’s elites’ goals, strategies and tactics. Not only do the views of the ARM leaders provide an insight into their personal vision of Australia, but they also highlight the issues that united and divided the leaders and activists in their campaign for political reform. The interviews reveal elite cleavages and divisions, as well as the impact of these cleavages on the ARM campaign leading to the 1999 referendum.
The plan of the study reflects the underlying sociological model of institutional reform. Chapter 2 focuses on nationalism and the question of national identity. At the same time it draws a distinction between identities and identification in order to explain the changing public (mass) sentiment. Citizenship and civic identifications are discussed in the context of the changing role of the state. This forms a springboard for a discussion of theories of nationalism and its changing forms. It also links the ideas on changing forms of nationalism with elements of social movement theory, especially the resource mobilization theory which argues that the most important part of movements are their organizational centres (SMOs). The third part of Chapter 2 covers elite theory, especially the contemporary version as developed by John Higley and his collaborators. They argue that elite consensus is essential for any effective political action. Here the focus is on broader political elites and a more narrow segment of ARM leaders. Although the ARM managed to mount a campaign and forge a reform program, the absence of elite consensus within the broader political elite, and strategic ambivalence within the republican elite, made the success of the campaign doubtful. Those three perspectives provide the theoretical underpinnings for my argument about the conditions of effective social and political reform.

In chapter 3, I outline the methodology used in the analyses of the empirical data. I utilize the survey data from the referendum in order to show the dynamics of public orientations and the social trends that underlined the emergence of civic nationalism. I also use interview data in my analysis of orientations of the republican movement, and the discussion of the role of republican elites.

In the next three chapters (4 – 6) I substantiate my argument. Chapter 4 analyses the origins of civic nationalism as an underlying public orientation that formed the mass basis for the republican push. The analyses concentrates on national sentiments and the republican vote in order to explore the relationship between civic nationalism and republicanism. Chapter 5 outlines the origins of the organized republican push and the role of public intellectuals and political leaders in the formation of the ARM. It focuses on the strategic significance of the core movement organization. Chapter 6 outlines elite orientations, and it is based on
interviews with the ARM leaders. I address the question of the relationship between the ARM activists, the major political party leaders and the Prime Minister.

The final chapter summarizes the argument and speculates about the future of civic nationalism and republicanism in Australia. It focuses on the tensions between different forms of national identity, the role of leadership in addressing issues of national identification, and the conditions for the success of political reform. Although public intellectuals and political elites successfully articulated changes in popular sentiments in Australia, they failed to convince the public about the desirability of the 'minimalist' option. The concluding sections analyse the interdependence of elites and the mass publics. That functional interdependence has become critical in the post-referendum period.
CHAPTER 2 NATIONALISM, MOVEMENTS AND ELITES

2:1 Introduction

In the first section of this chapter the question ‘what is nationalism?’ is posed in order to prepare the grounds for the analysis of Australian republicanism as a reflection of rising popular civic nationalist sentiment. The section focuses on the question of the nature and social sources of civic nationalism, and on the reason for its articulation in the form of popular pro-republican attitudes. Other key concepts - nation, nation state, national identity, public sentiments, mass identities and popular identifications are also discussed. Different forms of nationalism, I argue, are not mutually exclusive but tend to coexist and clash with each other. The most serious clashes tend to occur between civic and ethnic nationalist sentiments.

Nationalism is not just an expression of attachment to a particular category of people. It also carries with it a presumption that the solidarity that unites such a category of people is embodied in preferences for a specific political form of the state. This is the point made by Ernest Gellner (1983) and reiterated by Leah Greenfeld (1992). Both stress that nationalism links a people with the state, the latter considered ‘the ultimate source of authority’ (1992: 494). Greenfeld’s argument is particularly relevant here because it identifies the sources of civic nationalism and links transformations of popular nationalism with broader historical and socio-political changes. These changes form a background for the mobilization of mass social movements that articulate national sentiments.

The second part of the chapter outlines the theoretical background for the discussion of the formation of the republican movement. It focuses on the insights of resource mobilization (RM) theorists who emphasise the importance of social movement organization and leadership for the success of political reforms promoted by movements. The claims of RM theorists are discussed in preparation for the argument that the initial success of the republican movement was due not only to the articulation of popular civic national sentiments, but also to the effective
harnessing of those sentiments by the ARM, the key organization of the republican movement. The significance of organization and of intellectual leadership in the mobilization of social movements, especially in elaborating goals and strategies, and in forming programs of action, is also discussed. References are made to Max Weber's theory of charisma and mass democracy, and to the 'new movements' theorists, who emphasise the role of movement intellectuals in forming movement identities and managing movement organizations.

The role of political leaders, intellectuals and movement activists has been highlighted by the classic elite theorists. They provide a framework for explaining the centrality of elites as agents of social change. Mosca (1923/1939) and Pareto (1916/1935) analysed the role of elites in instigating social and political change. Their analyses were supplemented by Weber's (1922/1978) socio-historical studies of elite action and political outcomes, especially concerning social movements (e.g. his study of the Protestant movement). The neo-elite theorists add a further dimension to this discussion by recognising the interdependence of elites and non-elites, and by stressing the link between elite consensus and successful political action. They also examine how elite-led political reform programs can be limited by parameters set by the political orientations of mass publics. These theoretical insights form a springboard for my argument about the orientations of the political leaders and the leaders of the republican movement in Australia, and about the impact of those orientations on the successes and failures of the republican movement in initiating political reform in the 1990s.

2:2 What is nationalism?

In a narrow sense, nationalism is both a popular outlook circumscribing membership in a national community and an ideology identifying the principle of sovereignty. 'Nationalism defines membership of the state in terms of such common characteristics as language, religion or ethnicity. It is an ideology locating the political legitimacy of the state in self-government by co-nationals' (Abercrombie 1984:140). Although such a definition recognises the inter-relatedness of nation, nation state and national identity as constituent parts of nationalism, it does not acknowledge the controversies that surround these concepts.
The interpretation of, and the meaning given to concepts such as nation, state and national identity endow them with the status of 'contested concepts'. They have been central to debates about the formation of different types of nationalism. At the same time those constituent and contested concepts have undergone changes in meaning over time. This 'semantic evolution' of concepts helps to explain the diversity in meanings attributed to nationalism. These meanings, however, often mask the fact that the components that contribute to the formation of different types of nationalism do not develop in isolation. It is, therefore, useful to understand nationalism more broadly as 'a process, a kind of sentiment or identity, a form of political rhetoric, an ideology, a principle or set of principles, and a kind of social-political movement' (Beiner 1999: 56).

At the core of nationalism lies the concept of a 'nation' typically imagined as a homogeneous people occupying a national territory and organized within a framework of a single nation state. In this sense, nationalism refers to a set of ideas and ideals about the nation. These ideas form collectively held thoughts and creeds, as well as ideologies which are more complex intellectual constructs. Gellner (1983: 1) describes nationalism as

a theory of political legitimacy, which requires that ethnic boundaries should not cut across political ones, and in particular, that ethnic boundaries within a given state ... should not separate the power-holders from the rest (1983:1)

This definition reveals the importance he places on the link between the culturally circumscribed nation and the state. This link is an aspiration rather than an accomplishment. Although Gellner stresses the necessity of nation and state to correspond, he also recognises the fact that only a few nationalisms satisfy this condition. He acknowledges that 'many of the potential nations of this world live, or until recently have lived, not in compact territorial units but intermixed with each other in complex patterns' (1983: 2). Such a mix gives rise to different forms of nationalism in that there is a general recognition that 'a territorial political unit can only become an ethnically homogeneous unit ... if it either kills, or expels, or assimilates all non-nationals'. The most important constituent parts of nationalist sentiments and ideologies are, therefore, the relationship between culture and
political structure. Intense communication, industrial division of labour, and mass education, according to Gellner, created the pre-conditions for the emergence of nationalism — the ideology that links culture and the state.

The link, we may add, is not just between the culturally/ethnically circumscribed 'people' and the territorially circumscribed state in general, but often between particular aspects of ethnic culture (e.g. religion or language) and the particular form of the state (e.g. dictatorship or republic). The political form of the state becomes the issue of focus for all nationalisms because this form is closely related to the socio-cultural functions of the state. The state is seen as a 'natural political container' of nations and the principal defender of national cultures.

In contrast Greenfeld's (1992:7) discussion of the nature, origins and forms of nationalism is more encompassing. She sees nationalism as a principle of social integration and as an 'emergent phenomenon' that is determined by specific socio-historical circumstances, including cultural and political changes. The underlying feature of nationalism is a specific integrative ideology. The idea that lies at the core of nationalism is the idea of the 'nation' as a distinctive 'people' who form an 'elite' and see themselves as brothers and sisters. This makes nationalism a potent ideological foundation for all sorts of egalitarian collectivisms.

2:2.1 Nation

As Greenfeld (1992) shows the concept of 'nation' has undergone a number of semantic transformations as its meaning has been reinterpreted and reconstructed over time. By tracking the origin of the word 'nation' and its correlates with 'people' and 'country', Greenfeld traces our modern understandings to 16th century England. The word 'nation' (used at the Council of Lyon to mean 'an elite') was applied to the population of the country and became synonymous with the word 'people'. Such a 'semantic transformation signaled the emergence of the first nation in the world, in the sense in which the word is understood today, and launched the era of nationalism' in 18th–19th century Europe. Once 'nation' lost its meaning as an 'elite' and was applied to the population of a country, the term 'the 'people' lost its derogatory connotation' and 'acquired the meaning of the bearer of
sovereignty, the basis of political solidarity and the supreme objects of loyalty' (Greenfeld 1992: 6-7). Inherent in such an understanding is the fundamental recognition of the equality among various strata and the implicit recognition of the principles of democracy, sovereignty and solidarity that enable the nation to engender a sense of community. Nation is based on 'a collectivity and a unity, a present and a future' that is forged together and will only work if all the different voices are heard. In other words 'nation' becomes synonymous with 'sovereignty' and, in some ideological renditions, 'democracy' (see also Davidson 1997: 7).

All students of nationalism agree that the concept of nation engenders a sense of belonging. 'Where you belong is where you are safe; and where you are safe is where you belong' (Ignatieff 1993: 6). The members of a nation have a strong sense of collective belonging; they form an inclusive community that is national - a community of shared sentiments that is closely related to the idea of a 'people'; that is, collectivities sharing a 'culture'. In other words, we have nations where there is a mutual recognition of a collective membership.

National communities tend to have a number of special traits, including a strong link with a territory and cultural heritage. According to Kymlicka, a nation is 'a historical community, more or less institutionally complete, occupying a given territory, or homeland, sharing a distinct language and culture' (in Beiner 1999: 122). Guibernau's (1996: 47) definition also includes a social-psychological dimension. He describes a nation as 'a human group conscious of forming a community, sharing a common culture, attached to a clearly demarcated territory, having a common past and a common project for the future and claiming the right to rule itself'. Nations have the power to engender that sense of belonging or group consciousness, as well as the capacity to transmit an ideology of nationhood from generation to generation. Common culture not only forms the blueprint for the nation but also provides the nation with internal unity, as well as its own distinctive social form. Kymlicka describes such a form of culture as 'societal culture', and argues how societal culture is central to nation because it
provides its members with meaningful ways of life across the full range of human activities, including social, educational, religious, recreational and economic life, encompassing both public and private spheres. These cultures tend to be territorially concentrated, and based on a shared language (Kymlicka in Beiner 1999: 169).

Cultures and cultural heritage give nations their distinctive quality. National cultures unite the past and present and at the same time are capable of being projected into the future. Therefore the images of nations evolve and adapt to changes within their environments. They may broaden their ethnic base, assimilate new groups, and acquire a multi-ethnic character.

A common cultural heritage provides the blueprint for the re-creation of a symbolic order in society. That symbolic order is extremely variable but contains some common elements. The territory, for example, is regarded as sacred, even by diaspora nations; national boundaries separate one nation from another. Similarly, nations generally have their states, or their political forms, and states have the power to shape and transmit national cultures. Finally, the historical heritage provides a sense of identifying with a common past. Nationalisms combine these dimensions and shape the idea of the nation as a 'natural' entity; being 'nation less' is regarded as a pathological state — a form of cultural anomie.

This is why the term 'nation' is often used jointly with 'state' as in 'nation state'. The correspondence between the two, however, can take many forms. Nations do not necessarily overlap with states. Many states today are multinational and some nations (often called 'nationalities') inhabit different states. In spite of this, it is widely assumed that modern nations are vitally dependent on the state. The state is an instrument of historical survival of the people, and the effectiveness of the state is the key factor in international relations. The state, according to Weber, is a nation's instrument of coercion — the bureaucratic apparatus that safeguards the national dominance and autonomy by monopolizing violence over national territories. It also safeguards national identity by regulating the claim of different ethnic groups to representation through the institutionalized national culture.
The modern nation is thus reliant on the state for the cultural transmission and political affirmation of national identity. Weber (1968) saw the main source of national identity in the language community, the primary vehicle of cultural expression and collective sentiments. The state, on the other hand, was also seen by Weber as a political force laying claim to powers (monopoly of violence) on a circumscribed territory. Nations needed to become nation states in order to defend the boundaries of the cultural community against erosion or assault by powerful neighbours, and in order to provide the moral foundations of internal unity (1968: 395-98).

This cultural-political role of the state is emphasized by Guibernau and Beiner. According to Guibernau, the nation state seeks to unite the people subjected to its rule by means of homogenization. Unity is established by creating a ‘common culture, symbols, values, reviving traditions and myths of origins, and sometimes inventing them’ (1996: 47). The nation state is, therefore, where the ultimate source of unity and authority rests.

The state also serves in an ‘expressive’ capacity by actively reflecting a particular national identity in its symbols and institutions (Beiner 1999: 138). For many people a sense of belonging to a nation is an element in their ‘precious fabric of identity’. This takes the form of ‘not merely a consciousness of a continuity with the past, but also a will or hope for continuity into the future; and also consciousness of a form of cultural community that requires protection and expression in appropriate institutional forms’. The nation state is an expression of ‘what is ours’, and ‘what we have in common’; and it forms part of the national ideology (Beiner 1999: 200). It provides a sense of continuity, and distinctiveness, as well as identity and belonging. This state-enhanced national identity, as argued below, typically engenders a commitment to a particular form of the state.

2:2.2 National identity
Collective identities, reflect patterns of social bonds and collective attachments - a sense of belonging. They reflect a number of social categories to which we belong: collective identities can be attached to ‘familial, territorial, class, religious, ethnic
and gender roles' (Smith 1991:4). Social identities tend to be organized into hierarchies from the most central ('master') to the more peripheral. They are enacted or embraced depending on the particular social situation, with 'master-identities' enacted most frequently over a wide range of situations.

National identity is one of the most important modern 'master identities'. It involves a sense of belonging and attachment to a 'nation' understood as a distinctive people. Poole (1999: 69) argues that 'a major source of the strength of national identity has been its inescapability'. Everyone is suppose to belong to a nation – it is like a gender identity. With progressing modernization, national identity has become widespread and taken for granted. The referent of this identity, nation, has been described as an imagined political community 'because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion' (Anderson 1983: 6). A national identity is constructed depending on the relationship of the individual to the collectivity. This can be based on belonging to a particular culture, the sharing of a particular tradition or way of life. Nativist national identity, a derivative of ethno-nationalism, stresses ascribed characteristics, such as being born in a particular country and having lived most of one's life in that country (Jones 1997: 294). Such forms of national identity reinforce traditions and see the state as a unique supporter-defender of a particular 'national culture'. In contrast, a 'civic national identity' refers to a sense of identification with ethnically 'neutral' national institutions - laws, political and constitutional bodies which are key elements of the state. It is more in keeping with ethno-cultural diversity and it helps to accommodate socio-cultural difference. Civic national identification is characterised by a 'commitment to basic social institutions ..., the rule of law and equality before the law, freedom of the individual, freedom of speech, religious and other forms of tolerance ... and equality of opportunity'(Jones 1997: 302).

Before discussing this distinction in more detail, it is necessary to elaborate another pair of concepts: identities and identification. Identities involve the entire self; identifications are more partial, conditional and role-specific. Attachment to the nation based on ethno-cultural membership typically engenders strong national
This is because it is all-encompassing and because it is based on cultural attributes passed on at an early age: language, history, shared traditions and customs. In contrast, attachment to one’s society based on voluntary commitment to the laws and institutional framework of that society tends to produce identifications. Identifications are rational-functional, partial and typically situational. Their referent is a functional collectivity whose membership is based on the economic, social, and political institutional order. Identification implies that what holds a group together is not ‘deep’ cultural ‘roots’ but common laws, political commitments and institutions. The mutual co-dependency between individuals is therefore strengthened by the recognition of cultural difference. The sense of togetherness that underlies identifications may be a shared occupational position, legal status or formal citizenship.

Identifications and identifications are therefore treated here as ‘pair concepts’ and referents of two types of national sentiments: ethnic nationalism and civic nationalism respectively. That brings us to the point of distinguishing between different types of nationalism and national identities/identifications.

2:3 Types of nationalism

Studies of nationalism as a popular outlook, focus on two opposing types of national sentiments – ethnic and civic (e.g. Greenfeld 1992, Nairn 1995, Zubrzycki 2002). Although in reality they overlap, the way the characteristics and the nationalist spirit is expressed in each form differs substantially. While we highlight the differences, we also stress their ideal-typical nature; different forms of nationalism cannot be generalised empirically, but must be seen in context whereby ‘one conception rather than another one predominates’ (Zubrzycki 2002: 287).

Greenfeld (1992) charts the origins of nationalism and its trifurcation into distinct socio-historical types. Nationalism, according to her, originated in 16th century England, as a response to social turmoil and civil strife. As the word ‘nation’ meaning ‘a sovereign people’ was applied to other populations and countries other than England, ‘nation’ changed its meaning to signify ‘a unique sovereign people’ (1992: 4-9). The two meanings ‘a sovereign people’ and ‘a unique sovereign
people' tended to coexist and give rise to two radically different forms of national sentiments. Greenfeld's typology in fact identifies three different types of nationalism (see Figure 2:1). Ethnic nationalism can only be collectivistic-authoritarian in its orientation (Type III). Civic nationalism is either individualistic (Type I), or collectivistic (Type II). Individualistic nationalism can only be civic, while a collectivistic type of nationalism may be civic in its focus but more often it is ethnic in its focus.

<table>
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<th>Orientation</th>
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<th>Civic</th>
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<tr>
<td>Individualistic-libertarian</td>
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<tr>
<td>Collectivistic-authoritarian</td>
<td>Type II</td>
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Figure 2:1 Three types of nationalism as proposed by Greenfeld (1992)

This, Greenfeld stresses, is an ideal-typical distinction; in reality, different types of nationalism coexist and mix. One predominates over the other depending on specific socio-historical conditions. The resulting mixes - and this is an important point for my argument - affect the socio-political complexion of nations. The important distinction between the two mixes (civic and ethnic) is in their relationship to democracy and the constitution of the state. 'Sovereignty of the people' means that the people actually exercise sovereignty as members of the nation; the national principle that typically emerges is, therefore, individualistic. That is, sovereignty of the people is the actual sovereignty of individuals - citizens conceived as members of a nation.

The implication of 'a unique sovereign people' is that the uniqueness of the people translates into meaning that the nation-collectivity, and not individual citizens, is sovereign. Therefore, the national principle is collectivistic and 'collectivistic ideologies are inherently authoritarian, for when the collectivity is seen in unitary terms, it tends to assume the character of a collective individual possessed of a single will, and someone is bound to be its interpreter' (1992: 11).
Greenfeld pinpoints the characteristic tendencies within different types of nationalism, which assists in identifying the conditions under which they emerge and develop. She also points to their different socio-political correlates, especially different forms of the state. Civic types of national sentiments tend to coincide with republican preferences. This, however, is only a tendency reflected in typicality.

2:3.1 Ethnic nationalism

Ethnic nationalism refers to a commitment, and a sense of belonging, to a nation seen as an ethnically homogenous ‘people’. Co-nationals share culture and tradition, and the state is seen as a carrier-articulator and defender of the unique national culture and tradition. Greenfeld (1992) refers to this type of nationalism as ‘collectivistic-authoritarian’. Such nationalism, she argues, is typically transmitted by indoctrination and maintained by suppression of cultural minorities. Minority cultures tend to be seen from the ethno-national perspective as a threat to ‘national unity’. The state may tolerate them, but only as transitory (to be assimilated) or as a historical ‘imperfection’ and as a residue of the past. The core mission of the ethno-national state is to nurture and defend the ‘unique national culture and tradition’.

Each nationalism represents a different set of historical circumstances associated with its origins. The roots of ethnic nationalism have been identified with the German Romantic tradition of Volksgemeinschaft, civic nationalism has been linked with the French Enlightenment tradition. This is reflected in the social identities they engender.

The German nation, contrarily to the French, remains “closed”, exclusive, since membership is determined by ethnic origins, thus by birth. One is born a German; one cannot become one or at least, only with much greater difficulty than one becomes French (Zubrzycki 2002: 279).

In Germany, ‘the cultural nation precedes political unity. Statehood must be attained in order to preserve the genius of the nation’. Ethnic nationalism, therefore, promotes and maintains the homogeneity of the nation through exclusion of cultural ‘others’ – ‘Germany is for the Germans’ (2002:279).
Greenfeld (1992) also cites Germany and Russia as examples of nation states that embraced ethnic nationalism. Both nations experienced significant historical developments that provided the conditions conducive to mobilizing collectivistic and ethnic principles as status-enhancing measures. The strength of an ethnic form of nationality is that ‘collectivistic nationalism allows one to partake in the dignity of a far greater, stronger and more perfect being, the brilliance of whose virtues has the power to blind one to one’s own failings’ (1992:490).

The central component in defining ethnic nationalism, as noted above, is the unique culture of a nation. Such a culture typically includes not only ‘cultural markers’ such as language, religion, customs and traditions, but also manners, dress, rituals, norms of behaviour and systems of belief (Jary & Jary 1991: 138). As the subjective significance of each of these attributes waxes and wanes for the members of a community, so does the cohesion and self-awareness of the community’s membership. As these attributes come together and become more intense and salient, so does the sense of ethnic identity and, with it, an ethnic community. Conversely, as each of these attributes is attenuated and declines, so does the overall sense of ethnicity.

Another way of expressing it is to say that ethnic nationalism engenders attachment to a ‘people’ imagined as a distinctive ethnic community. For Smith (1991: 21), there are six main attributes of an ethnic community: a collective proper name, a myth of common ancestry, shared historical memories, differentiating elements of common culture, an association with a specific ‘homeland’, and a sense of solidarity for significant sectors of the population. The more a given community shares or possesses these attributes the more closely does it approximate the ideal type of an ethno-national community.

Ethnic nationalism develops when the cultural and structural elements of a specific context promote a community of race, language, culture and history – that is the ‘idea of a native people’s community’. Nationhood of the ethnic variety develops in peculiar political circumstances, such as from the tensions and conflicts of military campaigns. Zubrzycki (2002: 280) suggests that during the Napoleonic
Wars and the Franco Prussian War (1870/71) ‘both conceptions of the nation were used to legitimize the antagonistic parties’ respective territorial claims’. For Germany, in particular, the war against France fuelled particular ideologies that were peculiar to the German nation. The anti-French mentality infused specific values based on a cultural communal bond. These were forged together by the Romantic movement and a specific type of religious commitment. This commitment, according to Greenfeld (1992: 363), was based on the Lutheran philosophy that stressed personal piety over religious formality. What was clear was that ‘the triumph of Germany was willed by God, and that everyone had to toil without rest and do his part in helping to bring this triumph about. Patriotism was piety’. This appealed to the Germans who could read: the educated. At the same time those ‘Romantic ideals were “nationalized” and represented as the reality peculiar to the German people, language, and land’.

The identity of the people and the formation of the nation alters as a result of significant changes from events such as war, exile, religious conversion, influx of immigrants, political intervention and the introduction of mass literacy. Political intervention has in some cases supported ethnic identities and in other cases has been able to break up or cut across ethnic associations. Mass migration can also have a similar effect by challenging existing national identities and disturbing the existing social order. It is however, as Smith illustrates (1991: 39), a state’s ethnic core that often shapes the character and boundary of the nation. For some nations such as Australia, United States and Canada the national core was transplanted. The nation in each case was shaped by a transported form of nationalism – that is each was formed around a dominant ethnie and that dominant ethnie provided an already established cultural charter for the nation. How each nation evolved and developed that cultural charter over time depended on specific socio-historical influences which gave rise to different forms of nationalism and variants of a civic form of nationalism.

2:3.2 Ethnic nationalism in Australia

As argued in more detail in Chapter 5 below, ethnic nationalism in Australia developed in two parallel forms; a ‘transplanted’ British-derived ‘Anglo-Celtic’
nationalism, and a nationalism that can be described as distinctly Australian – an ‘ethno-nativistic’ form of nationalism. The first flourished under colonial conditions where Australia remained dependent economically and politically on Britain. The Australian colonists, unlike the American colonists, did not rebel against the mother country, and therefore found it much easier to accept the British racial and cultural heritage as the basis for their idea of nationalism. In fact, the British ideology made more sense in Australia than in Britain. The British experience was not of one people but of peoples in conflict – the English, Welsh, Scots and Irish retained a specific sense of belonging that incorporated their own homelands, languages, traditions and ways of life.

In Australia on the other hand the transplanted migrants from the British Isles mixed together in their new homeland and in many respects homogenised their traditions, the English tending to prevail and the Irish Catholic to be the most resistant. Consequently Britishness as an idea had more relevance for Australia than the United Kingdom (Meaney 2000: 82).

It is not surprising therefore, that the British nationalist ideology remained the dominant ideology in Australia in the early colonial period. Membership of the collectivity was restricted to those who embraced the ‘original’ culture, and at the same time served to exclude the indigenous populations.

From the 1850s onwards, however, a new type of nativist nationalism developed based on opposition to the close identification with the colonial centre of authority. This took the form of a cultural rebellion that focused on an independent Australia, and lead to the formation of the Australian Natives Association in 1871. The Association helped to mobilize the natives’ opposition to their status as colonials. It reinforced ‘the ideal that Australia should be free of old world social divisions’. What developed was an Australian nationalism that embodied this challenge and promoted Australians as a distinctive people; a community. This community ‘was to be a “better”, more progressive entity than Britain itself. Britain was part of the “old world”; they represented the new’. At the same time Australia’s membership of the British Empire was reconciled as ‘one of a voluntary union of independent states, to which each would contribute on larger issues, imperial foreign policy and defence matters’ (Birrell 1995: 90-97).
Citizenship supported and enhanced this type of development and acted as an effective mechanism for controlling entry into the Australian collectivity. It reinforced a particular type of cultural dominance that was predominantly white and Brito-Australian. An ethno-nativist form of nationalism became entrenched. It was able to flourish because, unlike the American experience where the constitution seeks to protect the individual from the state through a Bill of Rights, Australia's citizenship rights were decentralised and fragmented; they were, 'deliberately left to Commonwealth and state parliaments and governments' and not constitutionalised (Galligan 1998: 17-18). Australia's Aborigines were therefore able to be excluded on the grounds that they did not belong to Australia's family. In order to gain entry to the 'national family' Australia's Aborigines were required to show 'how “white” they had become as “proof” of civilisation', or they could also gain entry by showing how well they had 'learnt to play the Anglo-Celtic white man's rules of the game'. This meant that Aborigines had to meet at least the same sort of criteria as any ‘alien’ applying for naturalisation in Australia. In fact, 'the Aborigine was worse off since that citizenship could be revoked at discretion, whereas that of an “alien” was virtually unassailable once granted' (Davidson 1997: 206-207).

The dominance of an ethno-nativist form of nationalism remained prominent in Australia up until the demise of the White Australia policy in the 1960s. This was in contrast to America where 'nativist sentiments were not widespread' and uniformity on the part of the leadership remained half hearted (Greenfeld 1992: 483). An inclusive, well defined, form of citizenship and civic form of nationalism experienced in America explains in part why 'there is no debate in the USA today about whether an American identity does or should exist, while such discussion is common in Australia' (Freeman & Jupp 1992: 15).

In the Australian context, therefore, nativist ethno-nationalism can be defined as a derivative of colonial ethno-nationalism. It encourages a type of identity that stresses the importance of being born and having lived most of one's life in a particular country because only such thorough 'immersion' guarantees proper acculturation (Jones 1997: 294). Although cultural attributes form the basis of ethnic nationalism, it is birth and residency which engender and reinforce the
cultural heritage and at the same time give a sense of legitimacy and meaning to an ethno-nativist form of nationalism. Civic nationalism – to which we now turn - has quite different socio-cultural and socio-political overtones.

2:3.3 Civic nationalism

Civic nationalism involves a sense of belonging and commitment to a nation conceived of as either a 'society', an association of citizens sharing the same institutions, or a libertarian 'nation state'. It marks a shift in emphasis from common roots to common laws as the central identifier and as a basis of a bond with the nation. While ethnic nationalism tends to regard cultural minorities as a threat, civic nationalism has the capacity to accept cultural differences and develop a sense of wide cultural inclusiveness. The individual's entry to the civic national collectivity is typically based on a shared respect for the key social and political institutions such as laws and political systems. For civic nationalists, membership in the national collectivity is, therefore, open and voluntary. Greenfeld (1992) refers to civic nationalism as typically 'individualistic-libertarian' since as members of a nation individuals have rights that even state authorities have to respect. Even the collectivistic forms (Type II) accept cultural pluralism as a feature of national collectivity.

England, according to Greenfeld (1992) is where a civic form of nationalism originated. In fact, by the 17th century, England, Greenfeld argues (1991: 480-90), was a nation that owed its transformation to the pervasiveness of politics that centred on democratic ideals; 'the right of the individual conscience, the liberty of man, the autonomy of the rational being' were absorbed into the culture and considered supreme values. They became firmly entrenched as part of the 'people's very identity' and were inclusive and open to all. That intense mobility of ordinary people was sustained over a long period of time and the continuous regrouping of the social structure resulted in a process whereby a particular type of national identity – a civic identity – became accepted as it appealed to more and more people.
English nationalism was given a substantial boost by the Protestant Reformation. The Reformation movement played a significant role in providing fertile grounds for the development of nationalism and the emergence of a civic form of identification. It stimulated literacy and education by making people read – reading ‘was elevated and acquired a totally new dignity’. Education ‘was a great equalizer’, it caused a general redefinition of the social hierarchy by drawing together people from ‘very different walks of life’. Education had the capacity to blur ‘distinctions between previously sharply distinguished strata’. It provided the time for English nationalism to gestate and permeate every sphere of political and cultural life (Greenfeld 1992: 49, 86-87.

France, according to Greenfeld, is also an example of a nation where a civic form of nationalism evolved, but the form of French nationalism was collectivistic rather than individualistic. The socio-historical conditions in France gave rise to a model that exemplified a mixed heritage. France’s national identity was first derived from a religious identity. Subsequently, it shifted to the royal domain and later to the concept of the ‘state’. It remained civic, but collectivistic and state-focused. The main propagators of French civic nationalism were intellectual elites who were drawn to nationalism in opposition to aristocratic privilege.

In France, as in England, education played a significant role in fostering a civic but collectivistic and statist type of national identity. In fact, in the 18th century ‘the aristocracy appropriated education as a quality peculiar to it’ and redefined itself as a ‘cultural elite’ (1992: 148). As education became a necessary condition for success, ‘the literate and semi-literate population in France, the groups that constituted the ‘bourgeoisie’ or the middle class,’ realized that ‘their personal destinies depended on the existence of the nation’. They were therefore prepared to take full advantage of it.

They welcomed nationalization of identity. They were receptive to ideas of active membership in the political community, the guaranteed ability to exert influence on public policy which affected their lives, respect for themselves as individuals, liberty and equality in the English sense of these words. A nation defined as a unity of free and equal members both rendered legitimate these heretofore unthinkable bourgeois aspirations and made their realization possible (Greenfeld 1992: 184).
In France, the nation was personified not just as a nation, it was ‘the Great nation, la Grande Nation, the most national of nations’ (1992: 188). In many ways, the primacy of the nation state over the individual imposed general uniformity in national identification. The French conception of nation was ‘developed within a centralizing (national) state’ whereby the political nation precedes the cultural unification, and the state is in charge of the communalization (Vergemeinschaften) of the political tie (Gesellschaft).’ Entry into the collectivity was relatively open and voluntary. It reinforced the notion that ‘one could be French independently of his or her ethnic origins’, and that ‘the state was responsible for the cultural homogenization of the citizenry’ (Zubrzycki 2002: 279).

In France and England the idea of the nation was articulated first by social, political, and cultural elites. Only later was it passed on to the masses. Mass education was central in the transmission of these civic ideals. It acted as a liberalising force and played a critical role in the emergence of and changing form of nationalism (Greenfeld 1992, Anderson 1983, Gellner 1983).

In Australia, however, that shift towards a civic form of nationalism took a slightly different path and occurred much later. One of the most important factors that stimulated the emergence of a civic form of nationalism in Australia was the mass inflow of non-British immigrants in the post-WW II period. The socio economic consequences of the arrival of non-British immigrants and their gradual social integration into the ‘mainstream’ population had a transformational effect on Australia’s identity as a nation. Australian culture grew more diverse and tolerance of this diversity spread among urban social segments especially the younger generation. At the same time that shift was given a substantial boost by the ‘baby-boom’ generation (those born between 1946 and 1959). The baby boomers were the recipients of resources provided by unprecedented economic growth during this period, they grew up in a rapidly diversifying culture and they benefited from an expansion in educational opportunities. The combined exposure to education, cultural diversity and prosperity, as was the case in England and France, had a liberalising affect. The baby boomers, as I argue later, tend to be more tolerant and
more secular in their outlook and more open to new ideas than their predecessors and followers. In Australia, therefore, immigration, generational replacement, educational upgrading, cultural diversification and secularization have been identified as central factors in the changing form of nationalism (Pakulski and Tranter 2000). Those factors in combination, according to Pakulski and Tranter (1999), have made Australia 'one of the most civic societies in the world'. In order to link these processes of social and cultural change with changes in political orientation it is necessary at this point to look more carefully at the process of transformation and social diffusion of popular national identities and identifications.

2:4 Changing form of nationalism

Nationalism changes when historical conditions change, when dominant social values are under question and when old identities begin to disintegrate. The stimulus comes typically from 'a crisis of identity within an influential group in society, in most cases an elite, the changes within which later affect society as a whole' (Greenfeld 1991: 336). Intellectuals and elites have the skills of critical discourse, they belong to the educated and have the ability to present ideas in such a way as to gain the acceptance and support of the public. Intellectuals articulate changes within a society. They couch those changes in language that the public can understand and absorb. Changes within a society occur through the intervention of significant events, such as those that I have already mentioned – war, exile, religious conversion, influx of migrants and political intervention (Smith 1991).

Intellectuals play a central role in the change of mass identities by promoting ideas that create the incentive to adopt new identities – they popularize ideas and articulate a shift in values. Greenfeld (1992: 15-20) argues that a crisis of identity may arise when there is a sense of 'dissatisfaction with the traditional identity', and when there is 'a fundamental inconsistency between the definition of social order it express[es] and the experience of the involved actors'. Social action is typically mobilized by intellectuals and elites anchored in specific generations. Therefore the process of change is gradual and typically dependent on generational replacement. It may be violent and take the form of war, or it may be achieved by peaceful political interventions or reforms. As a result, the political form of the state can
change and take the form of a monarchy, a republic or a ethno-national (Volkgemeinschaftlich) dictatorship as was the case in Nazi Germany.

Movements, typically led by intellectuals and politicians, play an important role in the transformation of popular national identities. They act as elite 'transmission belts' and carriers of generation-based mass national sentiments. As pointed out by Weber, such movements are dependent on intellectual leaders who articulate national ideas and instigate political change. They influence generations by acting as the key social 'carriers' of national sentiments; charismatic intellectuals are the key articulators of these sentiments. Social movements form the 'linkage' between the two.

2:5 Generations as carriers of different types of nationalism

As generations replace one another, they facilitate value transformations and changing national identities. Change is reflected in specific 'generational segments' – persons who have been exposed to similar formative experiences and therefore share similar orientations and attitudes. Generations are critical agents of change, including change in the nature of popular national identifications.

For Mannheim (1972: 276-320) 'generation' was one of the key concepts in his sociology of knowledge and change. As Wirth (1952: xxx) states in his introduction to Mannheim's work, Mannheim seeks to throw light on the question of how the interests and purposes of certain social groups and generational segments come to find expression in certain theories, doctrines, and social and intellectual movements. He shows how ideas carried by specific classes, strata and generations can either maintain the status quo or challenge the existing social order. Nationalism, I argue after Mannheim, is a crucial element of these critical ideas, and generations are the key carriers of nationalist sentiments.

Generations have to be ideologically constructed before they become 'social actualities'. This happens when 'a concrete bond is created between members of a generation by their being exposed to the social and intellectual symptoms of a process of dynamic de-stabilization'. Individuals constitute an actual generation
when they are united, when they participate in the ‘social and intellectual currents of their society’ and have ‘an active or passive experience’ of the forces that contribute to a new situation (Mannheim 1972: 303-304). Intellectuals play an important role in this process of generational articulation. They are instrumental in forming generational units.

A generation unit is a more coherent social grouping which tends ‘to impose a much more concrete and binding tie on its members because of the parallelism of responses it involves’. Members of such a unit ‘see things from its particular “aspect”, endow concepts with its particular shade of meaning, and experience psychological and intellectual impulses in the configuration characteristic of the group’. It is characterised by ‘an identity of responses, a certain affinity in the way in which all move with and are formed by their common experiences’. At the same time, ‘within any generation there can exist a number of differentiated, antagonistic generation-units’. This explains tensions that exist between different groups over specific social issues. Those tensions are influenced by shared experiences and political outlooks of each group, which in turn shape their response to different forms of identification (1972: 306-7).

Some of these ideas, especially the notion of generational units and segments as carriers of specific value configurations was also identified by Inglehart (1977). Inglehart, argues that the ‘baby boom’ generation in advanced Western societies shows a distinctive configuration of value preferences. Those preferences include a strong endorsement of participatory democratic practices and a high degree of libertarianism that contrast with the value orientations and attitudes of the war generations. That shift in values can be attributed to the fact that the ‘baby boom’ generation was advantaged in terms of peace, economic security and educational opportunities. The baby boom generation can be described as more receptive of liberal orientations and also more likely to become politically active and join social movements.
National sentiments and identities are typically carried and promoted by movements based on generational segments. Leaders of such movements highlight particular aspects of nationalism through the displacement of one type of sentiment by another. Movement events create political platforms for public intellectuals with similar sensitivities and identifications. The key role in such movements, as recognized by Weber and Mannheim, is played by organizations ('parties') and their leaders. This point has been subsequently elaborated by 'resource mobilization' (RM) and 'new social movement' (NSM) theorists.

The resource mobilization perspective was developed mainly in the 1960s and 1970s by students of the civil rights movement in the US. It concentrates on the organizational aspects of social movements and on mustering resources to achieve movement goals. Successful social movements, according to RM theorists, have strong organizational backbones. Organizations are necessary for social movements to operate strategically, to be goal-orientated, to provide coherent leadership, and to respond to the political environment in a flexible way. Doug McAdam, Jo Freeman, Louise Zurcher and Russell Curtis all stress the importance of organizations in effectively deploying various political and social resources. They show how organizational activists and leaders disseminate collective identities, and forge goals and strategies. Social movement organizations (SMOs), they argue, take in the broader socio-political context as well as the constraints that impact on the mobilization process. Those constraints include prevailing dominant values, relationship to target groups, available opportunities and effects on the public. SMOs seize political opportunities for effective mobilization and transform protests into change-oriented action. They sustain pressure, translate public sentiments into reform programs, and give rise to new political elites. They also foster leadership dedicated to maintaining consensus and unity, as well as influencing policy by mobilizing a broad range of material and non-material resources (Pakulski 1991: 13).
SMOs are linked by communication networks that aid movements in attracting new members. Networks are an essential resource in that they 'largely determine the pattern, speed and extent of movement expansion'. If the network is established before a movement emerges, the likelihood of the emergence of a successful social movement is very high because networks help in disseminating information and facilitating concerted action. The existence of networked groups 'ensures the presence of recognized leaders who can be called upon to lend their prestige and organizing skills'. Networks also provide consistency, persistence and intellectual coherence, and they are crucial to the survival of the movement (McAdam 1988: 715-716).

SMOs give meaning and direction to the movement by adapting a typically hierarchical and highly routinized structure to maximize their efficiency in collecting money, activating members, and mobilizing resources. Such a structure 'highlights the importance of individual entrepreneurs in creating and directing these organizations. SMOs often would not exist without the initiative of a single individual or group of people, even though public interest in the cause may be longstanding' (McAdam 1988: 716). They articulate goals, forge strategies, mobilize resources and influence authorities. In all these tasks movement organizations compete with other movements and with organized pressure groups within the social and political environment.

McAdam (1988) sees the role of SMOs as mediators between the larger macro-environment and a set of micro-dynamics on which the movement depends. At the macro level the task of the SMO is to 'negotiate a niche for itself within the larger organizational environment'. This entails a complex set of relationships with actors representing 'the movement, the state, counter movements, the media, and the general public'. At the same time, SMOs continue to mobilize at the micro level. The way SMOs mediate these twin micro and macro challenges is by implementing goals and tactics. 'In effect, goals and tactics are the principal tools a SMO uses to shape its external environment while simultaneously attending to the ongoing demands of micro-mobilization' (McAdam 1988: 716).
Resource mobilization theorists have adopted the Weberian heritage in a rather selective manner. While they have elaborated the organizational conditions of movement success (i.e. mobilization of political resources) they have underplayed another key Weberian theme – the role of elites as ‘articulators of ideas’ and political leaders. This aspect has been developed by some of the ‘new social movement’ (NSM) theorists to whom we must now turn.

2:7 Intellectuals and movement organization

All movements, including nationalist movements, rely on public intellectuals to provide movements with consistent plans of action, strategy, tactics, identity and cohesion. Public intellectuals are those people who take an active part in the debates on major policy issues through the mass media. In Australia they are made up of key academics and politicians. Politicians usually have privileged access to the media but not all can be regarded as public intellectuals only those who combine their political role with media pronouncements and high education. Gouldner (1979) argues that highly-educated people have learned the culture of careful and critical discourse which forms a common bond between those intellectuals who use it. Intellectuals are recognised as being instrumental in coining the movement’s programs and in articulating new ideas which are then filtered to the public. These activities, according to Eyerman & Jamison (1991) constitute ‘cognitive praxis’. Cognitive praxis refers to ‘the concepts, ideas and intellectual activities that give social movements their cognitive identity’ (1991: 3). This is a crucial aspect of movement activity, and a key factor of movement success, because social movements express shifts in the consciousness of actors as they are articulated in the interactions between activists and their opposition(s) in historically situated political and cultural contexts. The content of this consciousness, what we call the cognitive praxis of a movement, is thus socially conditioned: it depends upon the conceptualization of a problem which is bound by the concerns of historically situated actors and on the reactions of their opponents. In other words, social movements are the result of an interactional process which centres around the articulation of a collective identity which occurs within the boundaries of a particular society (Eyerman & Jamison 1991: 4).

Eyerman and Jamison (1991) see movement intellectuals as ‘producers of knowledge’, strategists, tacticians, political leaders and mobilizers of popular support (1991: 94). They provide social movements with direction, strategic
consistency, programmatic cohesion and political leadership. Most importantly, movement intellectuals articulate the 'knowledge interests' of a social movements, that is, the movement's specific domains of concern, goals, and objectives. In societies permeated by the mass media, the quality of cognitive praxis is the main determinant of successful mobilization of resources and, ultimately, the movement's political success or failure.

In modern industrial societies, movement intellectuals operate in the context of communication dominated by the mass media. Social movements have grown increasingly dependent on the media through which their goals and objectives are communicated to supporters and sympathisers. Not only do the media allow for such information to reach a greater audience, but they also help reform intellectual life 'as the commercial and public media discover a movement, new roles and new actors come to the fore' (Eyerman & Jamison 1991:100-101).

With less direct contact between social movement supporters and leadership, the media have become critical in constituting a relationship between social movements, political opponents and the public. The media have become the dominant channel through which intellectuals communicate with one another and with the public. The media also provide the opportunity for movements to win the trust and support of the mass audience and to interact strategically with its opponents. The fact that there is less direct contact between individual social movement supporters and the representative leadership make elite-centred organizations more effective when it comes to contending with unknown and largely unsympathetic, and at times indifferent, mass publics.

Intellectuals, who are typically movement leaders and activists are instrumental in mobilizing political resources and in seizing opportunities for effective mobilization. Rucht (1996: 188-90) distinguishes three dimensions of these opportunities: cultural, social and political. The cultural opportunities refer to values and their resonance amongst cultural groups in the population. Social opportunities refer to conditions that facilitate or restrict the forming of collective identity and building movement structures. The political opportunity structure
refers to factors such as ‘access to the polity, political alignments, presence or absence of allies, and conflict among elites’ (1996: 190).

Public intellectuals and movement leaders also strengthen consensus through constructing collective action frames, that is, discursive constructs which identify injustice, attribute responsibility and propose solutions. Social movements direct their ‘frames towards action, and fashion them at the intersection between a target population’s culture and their own values and goals’ (Tarrow 1994: 123). This is done through the process whereby appropriate culturally encoded symbols are selected by movement leaders. By choosing the appropriate symbols with which to frame its message, movement leaders set a strategic course between cultural setting, political opponents, the radicals and the ordinary citizens whose support it needs.

Sidney Tarrow, Dieter Rucht and Ron Eyerman and Andrew Jamison bring into focus a key element in the movement’s socio-political context including political elites. Movement success, they argue, depends vitally on the relationships between movement leaders, intellectuals, mass publics and political elites.

2:8 Importance of elites

The classic elite theorists (Vilfredo Pareto, Gaetano Mosca and Robert Michels) argued that elites were critical and an inevitable feature of all societies including modern mass democracies. They are also important in shaping political parties and mass social movements. In fact, elites are even more crucial in mass social movements, because movements typically rely on charismatic leadership. This view has been accepted by contemporary elite theorists. Elites, according to neo-elitists, maintain their power and influence by virtue of their positions in powerful organizations, and social movements. These positions allow them to affect ‘national political outcomes individually, regularly, and seriously’ (Burton & Higley 1984).

The classic statements on the role of elites in modern democracy and in charismatically led mass social movements have been formulated by Max Weber (1978). Mass democracy enhances the power of both populists and bureaucrats. It
also prepares the ground for mass 'plebisectarian' movements and leaders, including nationalist movements. They are aided by declining traditionalism and the associated growth of mass literacy and the popular press – all of which makes the 'mass' increasingly significant for modern politics.

For Weber, mass involvement in the political process was shaped by demagogy. He rejected the views that massification of politics would be characterised 'by spasmodic and irrational [mass] intervention' unless responsible leadership collapsed. Massification, he added, does not aid participation. Universal suffrage, in fact, reinforced the centrality of what Weber refers to as the 'law of the small number', that is the centrality of elites.

Policy is always determined by a few, who then involve others only to the extent that their support is judged necessary, a principle which is as true of democracies as any other form of government. The mass only become involved as a result of initiatives from above, never from below; their role is limited to that of response (Beetham 1985: 106).

Weber and his students have pioneered the studies of movement mobilization and leadership. Movements (especially political and religious) are typically led by charismatic champions of great causes. The centrality of leadership in social movement organizations is also reflected in elite settlements and deals that affect ideological and institutional configurations in society. Therefore 'national elites' typically include leaders of social movements, political parties, and those who play a principal role in agencies such as government, the military, professional and religious organizations. For contemporary neo-Weberian elite theorists, the different configuration of elite power and the democratic competition between rival elite sections constitutes what is seen as the core of modern politics.

In traditional societies charismatic leadership provided the dynamic and revolutionary element in mass mobilizations. This was evidenced in the mobilization of the Protestant movement that helped to break traditions and the institutional status quo. It prepared the way for rationalist capitalist development in Europe and the spread of nationalist sentiments (Weber 1968). In modern society, power is transferred from dominant status groups to increasingly bureaucratized organizations. Organizational power and leadership provide the impetus for
movement mobilization and social change. Such a process is evidenced in the rise of modern political and religious movements and in their subsequent 'routinization' into regimes, parties, churches and sects.

This is why in modern society political movements tend to be shaped by political parties and intellectuals have become the main charismatic political figures. Their organizational power and 'intellectual' charisma help in transforming public sentiments into a more cohesive vision that combines the solidarity of the people with the political form of the state. In fact, Brym (1980) in his study of left wing intellectuals and movements argues that intellectual charisma is increasingly based on knowledge and education. Similarly, Gouldner (1979) sees intellectuals as a 'new class' with the potential for mobilizing powerful movements and attaining political domination. Intellectuals, according to him, become the carriers of progressive and emancipatory ideas, and act as reformists and instigators of change. Their power of persuasion is increasingly dependent on their holding positions in organizations (parties, pressure groups, lobbies, SMOs) and their regular access to the media.

New elite theorists recognise the changed circumstances of elites in modern society. They contend that elites can never know with any certainty what an eventual outcome will do to the many groups on whose support they rely. In many instances non-elites shape the problems with which elites must deal. This draws our attention to the relationship between elites and non-elites. Elites are independent, but non-elites have the capacity to place outer limits on their actions and non-elites depend on elites to carry out a program of action. The interdependent nature of elites and non-elites, therefore has the potential to cause division amongst elite factions (Burton & Higley 1984).

2:9 Conclusion

The theoretical streams outlined above – on popular nationalism, social movements, generations, elites and intellectuals – form the background for my analysis of the republican reform in Australia in the 1990s. They are incorporated into the tripartite model of effective political reform. Such reform, the model suggests, is
vitaly dependent on appropriate mass orientations (public sentiments conducive to change), effective movement organization (conducting successful resource mobilization and seizing political opportunities) and on effective leadership combined with wide elite consensus. Civic nationalist sentiments in Australia, I argue, formed the generationally carried mass orientations that fostered the republican movement of the 1990s. Those sentiments were effectively captured and harnessed by the Australian Republican Movement, and transformed by pro-republican intellectuals into a program of political reform. The reform program was negotiated with different segments of political elites at the national level. The lack of strategic consensus among the key sections of movement leaders (and political elites) resulted in the failure of the 1999 republican referendum.

This interpretation - and the underlying model – is substantiated by empirical studies of popular pro-republican sentiments as expressed by the leaders and activists of the ARM. The causal model I am testing in chapter 4 is basically reflecting theories of civic nationalism as well as studies of voting behaviour. When analysing the ARM, I make frequent references to the points raised by resource mobilization theorists and students of ‘political opportunity structure’. I show, for example, that the ARM was instrumental in the success of the national mobilization of public opinion.

I also show that the key factors in the success of pro-republican movement mobilization was the effective leadership by public intellectuals, especially those related to the ALP. The importance of pro-republican intellectuals and political elites was apparent in Australia in the 1990s under Paul Keating’s Prime Ministership. Keating revitalised the ALP by linking republicanism with the party program. This provided the ALP with a means of distinguishing itself from the Coalition as a ‘progressive force’ intent on redefining the identity and the political institutions of the nation. This process of re-definition was disrupted by the change of political leadership in March 1996. With a conservative Liberal leadership, the political opportunities and elite configuration changed significantly. Republican elites found that they were unable to maintain a high level of mobilization and internal strategic consensus. The ARM was perceived by some sectors of the
political elites as partisan. The new Coalition and the Prime Minister, openly opposed the republic. Moreover, the leaders of the republican movement were unable to secure wide elite consensus about the strategies and tactics of political reforms.
CHAPTER 3 METHODOLOGY

The empirical part of the study involves an examination of the patterns and dynamics of public sentiments on 'national issues' and an analysis of elite views on a broad range of issues related to republican reform. Public sentiments and their social sources are best reflected in and studied through national social survey data. Such data provide a snapshot of public sentiments and attitudes towards the republic and the nation. They also allow for substantiating the model of political reform in terms of testing the link between socio-historical changes in Australia, civic nationalism and pro-republican attitudes. As well, the survey data help in identifying factors that contributed to a shift in Australia's identity as a nation in the post-WW II period. Factors such as increasing levels of education, immigration and the diversifying ethnic composition, the role of political elites and intellectuals, generational effects and a shift in values have been mentioned in the previous chapter as influencing the formation of national identities among mass publics. The analysis of survey data provides a confirmation of these influences thus strengthening the core argument of this study.

Factors that influence popular attitudes towards the nation and the republican vote have been derived from studies of voting behaviour – the 'Michigan Model' in particular. This model gained prominence in the work of the University of Michigan's Survey Research Centre in the late 1950s. It specifies socio-demographic attributes and family background characteristics as the 'base' and as a starting point of a 'funnel of causality'. These attributes, it is assumed, affect party identification and evaluation of party leaders – factors that are added to the 'base'. They form a 'perceptual screen' that extends through time and affects the way voters choose to vote on particular issues (Campbell et al 1960: 133).

While used primarily in electoral studies, the model can be usefully applied in other studies of public opinion and attitudes. Here it is supplemented by Australian studies that draw attention to the role of occupation, subjective class identification,
religion and ethnicity as important influences on both voting behaviour and public attitudes in general (e.g. Gow and Stenner 1992: 13-14). Claims about the impact of these factors on attitudes to the nation, national identity and political preferences in general suggested by social theorists and commentators can be tested by including them as independent variables in the model where different types of nationalism and pro-republicanism are dependent variables. Regression techniques are used to gage the impact of 'blocks' of independent variables on these dependent variables.

While public sentiments are assessed through the quantitative analysis of survey data, elite views are empirically examined using interview data collected for this study. Such qualitative data lend themselves much better to an interpretive analysis that covers the main aspects of meanings, motives and intentions as well as strategies, tactics and goals of the key actors. These actors are republican movement leaders and activists. Interviews with these leaders and core activists collected over 3 years reveal a diversity of views on the goals and strategies of the movement. The main hypothesis 'tested' in this part of the study concerns elite consensus. It is argued that a lack of strategic consensus was the key factor in the failure of the final part of the republican push (the referendum itself). The interpretive analysis substantiates this argument by following the standard procedures of indexing the key items, and identifying key phrases and typical interpretive frames.

3:1 The survey data and the quantitative analytic model

The survey data analysed in this research are taken from the 1999 Australian Constitutional Referendum Survey (ACRS). The ACRS used a disproportionate, stratified, probability sample drawn from the Australian electoral roll in October 1999\(^1\). It was administered by mail, and collected between November 1999 and March 2000. As part of the Australian Election Study series, the ACRS investigated the Australian electorate's attitudes towards significant political issues.

\(^1\) The ACRS was a disproportionate sample in terms of the relative size of the sub samples for each state, that is, the principal researchers 'over sampled' the smaller states, relative to population size. A weighting variable was included with these data to adjust the sample to be nationally representative.
surrounding the 1999 constitutional referendum. Those issues incorporated patterns of public identification, the republic and its specific features (Gow, Bean & McAllister 2000). The sample included 3431 respondents with at least 500 respondents from each of the six Australian states\(^2\). The sampling strategy adopted by the ACRS researchers resulted in over-sampling of the smaller states and territories with respect to the larger states. They therefore included a weighting variable with these data to adjust the sample to be representative of Australia as a whole. The weighted sample has 2311 cases and all analyses that follow are calculated with weighted data.

The regression models estimated for the purpose of multivariate analysis are of two types and, as different types of dependent variables are analysed, different regression techniques are required. Firstly, a series of models are estimated to examine the social and political bases of two forms of national identity. These two forms and their historical dynamics are central in my argument about the changing sentiments of the Australian public in the direction of wider acceptance of republicanism.

In the initial stages of the multivariate analyses the 'ethno-nativist' variables (i.e. Tables 4:1; 4:2) and the 'civic' variables (i.e. Tables 4:3; 4:4) are treated as 'dependent' variables in regression analyses. This is in order to 'test' the argument about their socio-historical sources. As these are continuous variables they are analysed using OLS regression.\(^3\) Secondly, support for the republic as expressed in referendum voting (i.e. Republic voting 'Yes' contrasted with 'No') is modelled, and the results presented in Table 4:5. This is done in order to 'test' the argument about the impact of all factors, including the national sentiments, on pro-republican

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\(^2\) The sample were administered as follows: 1000 questionnaires sent to each of the six states, 100 sent to the Australian Capital Territory, and 50 to the Northern Territory with the following responses NSW 507, Vic. 557, Qld. 517, WA 548, SA 607, Tas. 588, ACT 57, NT 22 (Gow, Bean & McAllister 2000: viii).

\(^3\) All dependent variables in the OLS regression models (i.e. in Tables 4:1 to 4:4) are scored to range between 0 and 100. Therefore the regression coefficients (b's) for each independent variable are interpretable as a percentage change on the dependent variable.
attitudes. As the republic vote variable is dichotomous, OLS regression is an inappropriate method, therefore logistic regression is utilized (see Agresti 1996). In the second voting regression models it must be stressed, the national identity variables are included, but on this occasion they are treated as independent variables, as I seek to model the association between background factors, identity types and referendum pro-republican voting.

Perhaps the most problematic, and therefore deserving a separate comment, are the dependent variables constructed for the purpose of the analysis of different forms of national identity. They represent an ethno-nativist form and a civic form of national identity. I describe these variables in sections below. In the final stage of the analysis, national identity variables are included as independent variables to model referendum voting.

The independent variables in the regression models reflect the theoretical claims discussed in chapter 2 as well as those identified by voting behaviour studies. They include levels of education, occupation, gender, respondent’s country of birth, respondent’s political party identification, religious denomination, and income as impacting on attitude formation. Moreover, background variables have been constructed to represent subjective social class, ‘postmaterialist values’ and political ideology (left – right) as these aspects of social location are important influences upon national sentiments and voting behaviour. Predictor variables measure attitudes and feelings relating to political leaders in recognition of hypotheses that link forms of nationalism with elite views. Indeed, public attitudes towards the republic and identifications with the nation have been shown to have strong links with political party identifications and political leadership (McAllister 2001, Tranter 2003).

As mentioned, the analysis of survey data is derived from analyses of voting behaviour in the ‘Michigan Model’. The strength of the model is that it facilitates causal analysis by introducing ‘blocks’ of independent variables and monitors their

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4 Voting is scored as a dummy variable for the logistic regression analyses. That is: Yes for a republic = 1; No = 0.
impact in a systematic and controlled fashion (Campbell et al 1960: 14). The changes in the size of regression coefficients (or odds ratios) and the $R^2$ values help in assessing the relative impact of particular independent variables on key dependent variables. In order to draw causal conclusions, one needs to assume a time sequence (i.e. causes logically precede effects). This assumption is more justified in the case of background variables than, for example, attitudes to political leaders. While most observers suggest that elite persuasion and action affect public perception of republicanism and national sentiments, it may be the other way around. I signal this difficulty here and comment on it later.

The model also allows for an assessment of the role of political elites in influencing public views on the republic. It is worth remembering that the ALP, particularly under the leadership of Paul Keating, was not only supportive of an Australian republic but paved the way for its introduction.

3:2 The key variables and scales

Two types of dependent variables are constructed from the survey data. The first relates to the republic and the second represents types of national identity and identification. The republic dependent variable measures support or otherwise for an Australian republic at the 6th November 1999 referendum (i.e. referendum vote). The dependent variable 'referendum vote' is taken from the question 'In the Constitutional Referendum held on Saturday 6 November, did you vote YES or NO for Australia to become a republic?' The 'referendum vote' dependent variable provides the basis for measuring the strength of nationalist sentiment that is attached to the respondent's vote for an Australian republic. As the 'referendum vote' dependent variable is dichotomous, logistic regression analysis is an
appropriate technique for the analysis (Agresti 1996). Odds ratios are presented in order to facilitate the interpretation of the logistic regression estimates.  

Nationalist sentiment variables are constructed from the national identity section of the ACRS data. Given the range of meanings attached to national identity, several aspects have been operationalised to reflect different forms of nationalist sentiment with the emphasis placed on ethno-nativistic and civic types. Initially, four national identity variables are constructed from responses to two specific questions. The first question addresses the importance respondents attach to 'being truly Australian', and the second question focuses on particular issues that engender a sense of pride in Australia's achievements as a nation. Variables that measure what it means to be truly Australian have been extracted from the question 'Some people say the following things are important for being truly Australian. Others say they are not important. How important do you think each thing is?'  

In order to examine the underlying dimensionality of these variables, principal components analysis is employed (using varimax rotation). Tables 3:1a and 3:1b show the factor loading for all identity variables, as well as descriptive statistics, (i.e. range, mean) and scale reliability coefficients (i.e. Cronbach's Alpha).  

Principal components analysis of the 7 variables measuring what it means to be 'truly Australian' resulted in two factors (Table 3:1a). The first factor shows that 'living in Australia' 'being born in Australia' and 'being Christian' load on an

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5 Odds ratios are calculated as the exponential of the logits produced from each logistic regression equation. The odds ratios for dummy variables in Table 4:5 are interpretable in relation to their respective reference group (i.e. the category omitted from the equation). For example, in Model 2 Table 4:5, those born in countries other than Australia and the UK are 1.5 times as likely as Australian born respondents, to have voted Yes for a republic, as opposed to No. For the continuous identity variables, political ideology variables, postmaterial values scales, party ID scales and political leader scales, the odds ratios represent the difference between the extreme values or scores on each scale. Odds ratios for scale variables that are less than 1 indicate a negative association with the dependent variable. Odds ratios greater than one for scale variables indicate a positive relationship with the dependent variable. As an example of the interpretation of an odds ratio for a scale variable, postmaterialists are 1.2 times as likely as materialists, to have voted Yes rather than to have voted No (Table 4:5 Model 4).

6 The responses to the question are 1) Truly Australian to be born in Australia; 2) Truly Australian to be citizen; 3) Truly Australian live in Australia; 4) Truly Australian to speak English; 5) Truly Australian be Christian; 6) Truly Australian respect law; 7) Truly Australian feel Australian. The response categories are very important, fairly important, not very important, not at all important.
underlying dimension, while the second factor contains 'Australian citizenship', 'respect for the law' and 'feeling Australian'. The 'speak English' variable cross loads moderately on both Factor 1 and Factor 2 and is therefore omitted from further analysis. Reliability testing of the items loading on the first factor indicates on Alpha of .61. 'Being Christian' loads only moderately on the first factor and reliability analysis indicates that the scale reliability will increase to .67 when it is removed. 'Living' and 'being born in Australia are, therefore, combined as an additive scale to measure an ethno-nativist form of identifying with the nation and the scale rescored to range from 0 (low importance) to 100 (high importance).

The civic form of identifying with the nation is operationalised by selecting sub questions that signify the importance that respondents attach to 'Australian citizenship', 'respect for the law' and 'feeling Australian' (see Table 3:1a). These variables load on the second factor. Reliability analysis, however, suggests that they would not form a reliable scale (Alpha=.55). A decision was therefore made on substantive grounds to omit the 'law' and 'feel Australian' variables from further analysis. Only 'Australian citizenship' was selected to represent aspects of a civic form of identity as this question was judged to have superior face validity. 'Australian citizenship' has strong parallels with the culturally neutral requirements of identifying with the nation. Policy decisions that specifically relate to citizenship can therefore be plotted historically to represent changes over time.

In addition to those two questions, further questions on pride in Australia's achievements are included in the analysis (see Table 3:1b). Pride in Australia’s achievements is measured by the question 'How proud are you of each of the following?' The choice of responses to the question include 1) Proud of Australian democracy; 2) Proud of Australian influence; 3) Proud of Australian economics; 4) Proud of Australian Social Security, 5) Proud of Australian Science; 6) Proud of Australian History; 7) Proud of Australian forces; 8) Proud of Australian sports; 9) Proud of Australian Art. The response categories are very proud; fairly proud; not very proud; not proud at all.
reveals two factors, and additive scales are constructed to form the following two scale variables: 'sporting and cultural achievements' and 'political achievement'.

Items loading on the first factor form a reliable scale (Alpha = .70). These scale items include Australia’s cultural and sporting achievements. ‘Achievements’ includes pride in Australian science, Australian history, Australian forces, Australian sport and Australian art. As a measure of a national identity type, sporting and cultural achievements are an indicator of respect for the cultural rather than the institutional. Sporting and cultural achievements are characteristically tangible, concrete and easily identifiable, but they tend to take a narrower or a more inward looking perspective of what constitutes nationhood. Sports such as cricket, tennis, Rugby League and Rugby Union, are established games that have become accepted as traditional Anglo-Australian sports and attract a large following. They provide opportunities for competition between nations and are instrumental in the formation of cultural bonds between individuals. Sporting and cultural achievements act as a mechanism for emotional inclusion into the ‘national family’ as defined by shared socio-structural traditions. Sporting and cultural events have the capacity to bring people together in an ‘imagined community’ by drawing together those who do not know one another, but are united when supporting their country in sporting and cultural events. That unity reinforces a sense of belonging to the nation conceived as a culturally specific people. It creates a sense of solidarity between individuals that Greenfeld (1992) describes as a ‘national bond’ and Mannheim (1952) sees as a foundation of ‘actual generations’.

An additive scale derived from the second factor measures Australia’s political achievements. This scale combines ‘proud of Australian democracy’, ‘proud of Australian influence’, ‘proud of Australian economics’ and ‘proud of Australian social security’. Reliability analysis, however, again indicates that if the item measuring ‘proud of Australian social security’ is removed the scale reliability increases from Alpha .66 to Alpha .72. Therefore the first three items are combined and referred to as ‘political achievements’. The political achievement scale measures a more open civic form of nationhood, characterised by a respect for and identification with the institutional framework of society, rather than the cultural
attributes of the nation. It is assumed that political achievements emphasise those democratic ideals that take a more inclusive view of Australia as a nation. Those ideals tend to be intangible, subject to historical transformations and to shifts within the political arena.

All four identity dependent variables are rescaled from 0 – 100, where 0 signifies a low level of importance and 100 suggests high importance (also see footnote 12). As mentioned earlier, identity measures ‘born/live’ and ‘achievement’ describe a more exclusive form of identifying with the nation, characteristic of an ethno-nativist form of identity (Jones 1997). In contrast, a civic form of identity is represented by the variables ‘citizenship’ ‘and ‘political achievement’. The ethno-nativist and civic constructed identity correspond and relate to recent empirical studies conducted in Australia (Jones 1997, Pakulski and Tranter 2000, Charnock 2001). They provide an analytical springboard for further analyses in Chapter 4.
Table 3: Principal component analysis with varimax rotation of 'Being Truly Australian' sentiment variables.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>‘Being truly Australian’</th>
<th>Factor 1</th>
<th>Factor 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>‘Born/live’</td>
<td>Live</td>
<td>Born</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.78</td>
<td>.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Citizen’</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>-.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>.57</td>
<td>.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizenship</td>
<td>.29</td>
<td>.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feel Australian</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speak English</td>
<td>.51</td>
<td>.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eigen values</td>
<td>2.45</td>
<td>1.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of variance</td>
<td>34.99</td>
<td>17.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Range</td>
<td>0-100</td>
<td>0-100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>60.7</td>
<td>86.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alpha</td>
<td>.67</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3:1b Principal components analysis with varimax rotation of ‘Proud of Australia’s Achievements’ sentiment variables.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>‘Proud of Australia’s achievements’</th>
<th>Factor 1</th>
<th>Factor 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Science</td>
<td>.60</td>
<td>.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History</td>
<td>.67</td>
<td>.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aust. Forces</td>
<td>.68</td>
<td>.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sports</td>
<td>.71</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art</td>
<td>.69</td>
<td>.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Influence</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>.34</td>
<td>.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Security</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td>.71</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Eigen values                      | 3.28     | 1.33     |
| % of variance                     |          |          |
| Range                             | 0-100    | 0-100    |
| Mean                              | 77.7     | 62.6     |
| Alpha                             | .70      | .72      |
3:3 National sentiments and republicanism

In order to demonstrate and assess the strength of the relationship between civic national sentiments and republicanism, bivariate and multivariate analyses of the survey data are undertaken. The predictor variables are arranged in logical groups and models are constructed to measure the explanatory power of the predictor variables. Before the models are constructed, however, bivariate correlation analysis (Pearson’s r) of relationships between each of the predictor variables and the dependent variable (referendum vote), is presented. Bivariate analysis reveals associations between generational factors, place of birth, level of education, religious background, party identification and evaluation of political leaders on the one hand, and republicanism on the other.

Percentages derived from cross tabulations are reported in Appendix A, Table 1. The independent variables for political leaders are continuous, therefore correlations rather than percentages are reported in Appendix A Table 2. The results for both tables reveal that several variables have a considerable impact on voting behaviour, in particular, - education, generation, income, religion, ideology and party identification. For example, 70% of those with tertiary qualifications voted for an Australian republic compared to 44% of non graduates, while 70% of those on the ‘left’ voted Yes, compared to only 39% of those on the ‘right of centre’. In addition, all of the leader variables, with the exception of ‘Meg Lees’, were moderately correlated with voting behaviour. What the bivariate analysis does not tell us, however, is the net contribution of each independent variable on pro-republic voting. In order to provide such evidence, I use regression analysis to control for the mediating effects of the predictors. This allows for a more rigorous assessment of the impact of social location and other variables on the dependent variables.

The regression models are constructed by arranging independent variables in four ‘blocks’. For the analysis of national identity types (i.e. Tables 4:1; 4:2; 4:3; 4:4), the independent variables are introduced into the regression equation in the following order: 1) social background, 2) personal achievement, 3) values and ideology, 4) political leadership (see Table 3:2 for a summary).
In regression Table 4:4 where the analysis shifts to consider republican voting, an additional block of variables for, 'national sentiment', has also been included in order to measure the 'core' relationship between different forms of identity and support for an Australian republic (see Appendix B for a breakdown of dependent and independent variables). That is, the four variables analysed in Tables 4:1 to 4:4 as dependent variables, are later included in Table 4:5 as predictors of voting behaviour. In Table 4:5 the independent variables are introduced in the following order: 1) identity variables, 2) social background, 3) personal achievement, 4) values and ideology, 5) political leadership (see Table 3:3 for summary).

Socio-historical factors such as mass immigration on changing forms of nationalism (operationalised as country of birth) are assessed as background data in Model 1. Model 1 also includes social background variables that represent gender, age (based on a generational perspective where Generation 1 includes those born before 1945, Generation 2 includes those born between 1946-1959 and Generation 3, those born after 1960), and the respondent's country of birth (representing immigration). The respondent's country of birth includes 'those born in the UK' and 'those born in countries other than the UK and Australia'\(^8\), which are contrasted with the 'born in Australia' reference category.

Model 2 adds personal achievement variables and includes post secondary education, professional occupation (based on ASCO codes) contrasted with other occupational groups. Self-assessed middle class location versus working class and no class identity, income (income between $30,000 - $60,000, income over $60,000), with less than $30,000 as the reference category and urban versus rural location.

Model 3 adds religious denomination as Anglican or no religious denomination, values and political ideology dimensions. Political ideology is measured on a self

\(^8\) Countries other than the UK and Australia include New Zealand, Republic of Ireland, Italy, Germany, Greece, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Yugoslavia (former) Vietnam and Other.
identified left-right scale (10 = right, 0 = left) and value orientations are represented by Inglehart's 3 item scale (materialist, mixed and postmaterialist). Inglehart's empirical analyses of the materialist/postmaterialist value distinction are based on four responses to a question on national value orientations. Respondents who choose both the first and third options are considered to be 'materialist', while those choosing the second and fourth options are 'postmaterialist' in their value orientations. Postmaterialist is a specific orientation toward participatory democracy and libertarian views (Inglehart 1977). The remaining combinations form the 'mixed' category. In order to assess the impact of value orientations, Inglehart's (1977) four item value orientation battery is operationalised as a scale variable. The third model also includes respondents' party identification. This implies that party identification influences political attitudes and voting behaviour. It is based on the premise that the longer one identifies with a particular party, the less likely he or she is to defect from that traditional loyalty when it comes to specific issues (Campbell 1960: 185-187).

Model 4, in addition to all of the above, includes 'political leaders' variables. The logic of the 'Michigan Model' suggests that traditional party loyalties are sustained and reinforced depending on the appeal of the leader and the leader's attitude on a specific issue (Gow & Stenner 1992: 9). In the late 1990s, Kim Beazley and John

\[9\] Political ideology is taken from the question 'In politics, people sometimes talk about 'left' and the 'right'. Where would you place yourself on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means the left and 10 means the right? The ideology scale ranges from 0 (far left) to 10 (far right) for regression analyses with missing values assigned to the mean.

\[10\] If you had to choose among the following things, which are the two that seem most desirable to you?
1 Maintaining order in the nation.
2 Giving the people more say in important political decisions.
3 Fighting rising prices.
4 Protection freedom of speech. (Source: Inglehart 1977:28)
Inglehart also uses a more elaborate 12 item questionnaire. The original, however, is better known and remains the most widely used measure of value orientations.

\[11\] The value orientation scale is coded 1=materialists; 2=mixed, missing values; 3=postmaterialists.

\[12\] Respondent's political participation is taken from the question 'Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as Liberal, Labor, National or what? The party id scale is scored 1=Coalition; 2=minor parties, others, missing values; 3=ALP.

\[13\] Political leaders variable is taken from the question 'Again using a scale from 0 to 10, please show how much you like or dislike the following political figures. Again, if you don't know much about them, you should give them a rating 5. How do you feel about: Kim Beazley, John Howard, Meg Lees, Pauline Hanson. The leader scales were scored to range between 0 (strongly dislike) and 10 (strongly like) for the regression analysis, with missing values assigned to the mean of each variable.
Howard as leaders of the ALP and the Liberal Party respectively, Meg Lees, as leader of the Australian Democrats, and Pauline Hanson as leader of the One Nation party all presented different views on the republic. All four played an active role throughout the republican campaign.

The final regression analysis concentrates on the behavioural dependent variable 'republican referendum vote' (Table 3:3). In contrast to the analyses of identity types, for the voting regression analysis five blocks of independent variables are employed. These blocks contain the variables included in the four models already described as well as an additional identity that includes the four identity variables previously analysed as dependent variables in Tables 4:1 to 4:4. In the voting analyses (Table 4:5), the identity variables are introduced as independent variables in the first block in order to establish the association between the changing form of identity in Australia and the push for an Australian republic in the 1990s. The identity variables are included as the first block in order to examine their impact on voting prior to the introduction of other control variables. The identity variables in Table 4:5, Model 1 include 'achievement', 'born/live', 'political achievement', and 'citizen' the key indicators of ethnic nationalism and civic nationalism. Once the impact of the identity model has been established, Models 2-5 are added sequentially. As each block is introduced its effects are measured by monitoring the regression coefficients and R² percentage of variance 'explained' by the model.

The socio-demographic characteristics used in Table 4:5 include social background (Model 2), achievement (Model 3), values and ideology (Model 4), and political leadership (Model 5).

Table 3:2 lists the blocks of variables employed for the civic/ethnic identity analyses displayed in Tables 4:1 to 4:4. Table 3:3 shows the variables used to analyse republican referendum voting in Table 4:5. The results of the multivariate analyses are discussed in Chapter 4.

The identity variables were analysed in Tables 4:1 to 4:4 as dependent variables and were scored to range between 0 and 100. This allowed the interpretation of the OLS estimates as percentage changes on the dependent variables for a unit change in each independent variable. When the identity variables were included as independent variables to examine voting behaviour in Table 4:5, they were rescored to range between 0 and 1, in order to facilitate the interpretation of the odds ratios produced by the logistic regression models.
Table 3:2 Four Predictor Models for Civic/Ethno-nativist Identity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social background</td>
<td>Social background</td>
<td>Social background</td>
<td>Social background</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gen. 2 (1946-’59)</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gen. 3 (1960 + )</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Born UK</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Born Other</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Achievement</td>
<td>Achievement</td>
<td>Achievement</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middleclass</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income $30-60K</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income $60+K</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Values &amp; Ideology</td>
<td>Values &amp; Ideology</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anglican</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No religion</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political ideol. (+=right]</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Post Mat.’ (+=post)</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own party id.(+=ALP)</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political leaders</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beazley</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Howard</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lees</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hanson</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3: Five Predictor Models for Referendum Vote

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Identity</td>
<td>Identity +Social +Social +Achievement</td>
<td>Identity +Social +Achievement +Values &amp; Ideology</td>
<td>Identity +Political Leaders</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.4 The interview data and analysis

The interpretive analysis of the republican elite views was conducted using interview data. Forty-six interviews were conducted with 37 ARM leaders (some leaders were interviewed on more than one occasion). The leaders were key public intellectuals and leaders of the republican movement whose statements and actions affected the development of the ARM throughout the 1990s. The leaders gave a more coherent structure to public sentiments, and provided an organizational framework for the republican push.

Qualitative analysis of these 46 semi-structured interviews identifies actors’ motives, intentions, meaning, actions, and reactions (Weber 1947). It also provides ‘access to the multiple perspectives of the participants’ and sheds light on ‘long-term interaction with relevant people in one or several sites’ (Glesne & Peshkin 1992: 6). The interviews were conducted face-to-face over a period of approximately three and a half years; from early May 1996 to January 2000. They were of 60 to 90 minutes duration, and were conducted in various locations: the offices of respondents, the ARM headquarters in Sydney, and on some occasions at respondents’ homes. I conducted all interviews, analysed the interview data and used the same interview schedule throughout (Appendix D). Access to the interviewees was arranged through the Executive Director of the ARM.

Both the Director and the (potential) respondents were informed about the academic nature of the study and about its main objectives. Their informed consent was secured before interviews were conducted. There was only a handful of refusals – all based on time constraints. The interviewees were selected on a positional basis supplemented by snowballing (Higley et al. 1979, Minichiello et al. 1995: 161). This involved two steps. The initial list of republican movement leaders was drawn from the incumbents of the top positions within the ARM. Respondents selected that way were then asked to nominate other ‘most influential’ persons in the movement. These additional people were then added to the list of leaders if they were mentioned by more than two respondents. By relying on positional selection and snowballing, new and emerging leaders were included in
the study. Their presence reflected the changes that occurred in the composition and organization of the ARM as it responded to changes in the political arena.

The respondents represented a broad range of intellectual occupations: academics, authors, business leaders, lawyers, media personalities and political figures from the major parties. Their social profiles reflect a variety of social backgrounds. Approximately a quarter represented various non-British ethnic backgrounds. Though the majority of the respondents lived in Sydney, Melbourne and Canberra, I also interviewed ARM convenors from smaller centres and rural areas (see Appendix C). At times, the intellectual occupations of respondents coincided with leadership organizational roles, and in some cases the leadership roles overlapped, reflecting the broader constituency of leaders and core activists of the movement. Many respondents occupied multiple roles within the ARM, such as that of State Convenor and Constitutional Convention delegate. Others occupied positions within the hierarchy of the organization, as well as having represented the ARM at the Constitutional Convention (see Appendix C). Overall, the composition of the leadership group confirmed Eyerman & Jamison's (1991) observations about the merging of leadership and intellectual roles in contemporary movements, and the centrality of 'mediating' roles.

The formal positions held by the respondents included those on the national management committee, past and present executive directors of the ARM, and those who occupied senior positions in the hierarchy of the organization. Some occupied specialist roles, such as key strategists, public relations and media specialists. A number of movement activists who had played a key role in related political and social movements and who had provided expertise in the organization and mobilization of the ARM were also included through snowballing, as were figures from political parties. Also included were convenors in ARM branches – typically young people who gave the sample a generational balance. Some of those convenors were also members of the national management committee and represented the ARM at the Constitutional Convention. Most of those interviewed had been active as movement leaders since the inception of the organization.
The anonymity of respondents has been maintained throughout the analysis. This has been necessary, given the sensitive nature of some questions and the willingness of the respondents to give personal assessments on specific issues. Respondents were given code numbers, and these numbers are used in quotations in Chapters 5 and 6. In a few cases certain details from the interview had to be deleted in order to preserve anonymity. Overall, however, an atmosphere of trust was established. The interviewees were assured that they could give 'off the record' comments because these comments would be presented in a way that would not identify them.

The interviewees were located in Sydney, Canberra, Hobart and Melbourne. Those locations on Australia’s eastern seaboard were targeted because of ease of access in terms of travel. It was also in recognition that from its inception, the ARM evolved slightly differently in each state. This meant that it was necessary to view each state as a semi-separate entity, subjected to different political pressures, parochialisms and regional biases. Those differences and tensions between states are explored in the study and issues associated with the regional organization are examined.

Although the interviews were semi-structured, at times certain issues were explored at greater depth. The first area was the informal structure and development of the ARM from its inception in July 1991. The questions covered the formative events, the role of the ARM within the broader republican movement, the strategies and tactics of the movement, the strategic goals of the ARM, the key constituencies of the movement, patriotism, the type of national identity the ARM articulated and promoted, the role of, and attitudes towards political parties and the role of the media and ‘mediating’ intellectuals (see Appendix D).

The respondents also mentioned – and I noted – some other important issues: the tactics employed by the ARM to overcome major obstacles and the strategies developed in order to accommodate changes in the social and political arenas. The interviews allowed an exploration of the issue of the perceived elitism of the ARM and the strategies introduced to counter that perception in the broader community. Politicisation of the ARM, strong affiliation with the ALP, and the ARM’s ability to counter negative feedback were also explored. Discussions of programmatic
divisions concentrated on organizational aspects of the ARM and on the broader issues of the republican movement. They focused on the decision of the ARM to pursue a centralist and minimalist strategy and the question of whether, by choosing this approach, the ARM had placed itself in confrontation with, not only those in the broader republican movement, but also the leaders and activists within the ARM itself.

Another prominent theme emerging from the interviews was the attitudes of respondents to various ‘constituencies’ that the ARM either appealed to or needed to convince. These included those born overseas, particularly those from non-English speaking backgrounds, indigenous people, the rural population, the young and women. Social categories that were identified by the Civics Expert Group (CEG)\textsuperscript{15}, established by the Labor Government in 1994 corresponded with those groups the ARM identified as ‘problematic’. Those categories were described as the ‘disengaged’, the ‘disenchanted’ and included those with ‘low levels of educational attainment’. Attitudes of the respondents to these ‘problematic categories’ and the perceived difference between respondents in terms of the strategies adopted by the organization provided insights into the links between leaders and activists.

During the time in which the interviews were conducted a number of significant events occurred: the devolution of the ARM, the March 1996 federal election, and the Constitutional Convention. Those events caused significant change in the ARM. The interviews highlight the changes in leaders’ attitudes and in the strategic manoeuvring that the ARM was involved in over this period.

All interviews were audio recorded and transcribed. The analysis was carried out by using the software data package ATLAS.ti, a workbench for the analysis of large bodies of textual, graphical and audio data. ATLAS.ti provided the tools to manage, extract, compare, explore and reassemble the interview material. The

\textsuperscript{15} The Civic Experts Group was commissioned to prepare a strategic plan for a non-partisan program of public education on civic issues. The CEG viewed civic education largely in terms of knowledge about government machinery and process. From its national opinion survey the CEG made various recommendations to the government.
analysis included the segmenting of documents into passages to be indexed or coded. Then memos and annotations were added to facilitate the retrieval of related material and to connect selected passages and memos during the analysis. The analysis of all the interviews was completed with relevant codes and links that provided a concise representation of the relevant issues identified by the study.

Building trust, establishing a rapport and countering bias were essential parts of the interviewing process. Specific questions prompted some interviewees to think about issues and evaluate situations that they had not previously considered. Many interviewees were willing to invest extra time in the interview process and to substantiate their position by providing published and unpublished documentary evidence. Where evidence of bias or contradictory statements was noticed, further probing provided valuable information and a necessary check. Issues of accuracy were also raised with subsequent interviewees in order to gain a balanced view of related concerns or questions and to place those concerns or questions in context. These issues are presented in Chapters 5 and 6.
CHAPTER 4 PRO-REPUBLICAN AND CIVIC NATIONAL SENTIMENTS

4:1 Introduction
This chapter addresses the first set of conditions of successful political reform – public or popular sentiments conducive to change. I use the concept of ‘popular sentiments’ in preference to ‘public opinion’ because of the rather vague and unspecific nature of the term ‘public opinion’. ‘Public sentiments’ describes a readiness to adopt certain attitudes, an overall direction of value preferences that lend themselves to further elaborations (typically by opinion-making elites). The indicators of public sentiments are statements people make and symbols that they adopt. In this particular case, I infer the existence of specific public sentiments on the basis of responses to survey questions. More specifically public responses indicative of civic nationalism are seen, for the reasons discussed below, as conducive to the republican reform.

Some of the points raised in Chapters 1 and 2 need to be reiterated here. In discussing the survey data certain concepts, such as popular national identifications and identities, are at times used interchangeably. The term ‘identity’ refers to an identification that affects a sense of self (e.g. I am white, I am male). In the sociological literature, ‘identities’ are seen as organizing principles of self, indicative of a strong feeling of belonging and the normative commitments that belonging implies (Jenkins 1996). Social identities link self with society. Their referents, such as nations or religious communities, are seen as special, unique and imbued with values. In other words, shedding a particular identity can be problematic, especially if it is considered a ‘master identity’, that is, an identity that governs all occasions in life. Master identities are subjected to historical processes and their changes impact on the way individuals locate themselves in various collectivities. Identifications are more rationally circumscribed, conditional and more flexible than identities. They do not permeate all aspects of self, and are ‘evoked’ only occasionally.
The new civic nationalism, it is argued here, developed as a form of national identification rather than identity, and it took roots in the educated, cosmopolitan, urban strata of post war generations, especially among the European migrants and their children. It was harnessed for the purposes of the republican reform program by pro-Labor public intellectuals and the ALP political leaders.

The shift in popular nationalist sentiments is described here as involving a changing balance between (mainly ethno-) national identities and (mainly civic) national identifications. What is described in the literature as 'civic identity' refers to a sense of belonging that is more circumscribed and rational\(^\text{16}\). This sense of belonging to the increasingly culturally plural 'nation-society' – a multicultural Australia – started to spread in the 1970s and 80s, and it gradually balanced and supplanted the sense of national identity anchored in ethno-nativism. The republican movement both articulated and promoted civic national identifications.

The way movement leaders articulated civic national sentiments and directed them towards the issue of the republic is further revealed by the interview data analysed in the next chapter. Here, we look at the shift towards civic national sentiments, the key socio-historical determinants of this shift, as revealed by 'social background' variables, and the link between civic sentiments and republicanism. This is done primarily by analysing cross sectional survey data using multiple regression techniques. It is recognised that such analysis has limitations. Snapshot analysis is only a second best to time-sequence analysis. Moreover, the impact of socio-historical events is assessed only indirectly through background variables that serve as 'proxies' of socio-historical events. Unfortunately, time-sequence data, more appropriate for such an analysis are not available. Thus while I conduct a 'snapshot' analysis I am aware of these limitations, and of the fact that I make assumptions that this survey snapshot is reflective of socio-historical factors.

Migration, as reflected by ethnic background of respondents, is perhaps the most important of these factors. Education has also been identified as a key causal

\(^{16}\text{The term 'rational' is used here in the Weberian sense – that is 'rational' as a non-value laden term as in 'legal rational' as opposed to 'value rational'.}\)
influence, as has social and political leanings. Their impact, I argue, reflects specific generational experiences of Australians. Once the civic national and pro-republican identities and identifications take root within generational segments, they become a part of the political and ideological setting, and catalyse the formation of the pro-republican civic nationalist movement.

4:2 National developments and ethno-nativist identities – a historical outline
At the core of ethno-national identity lies a sense of belonging to a culturally distinct nation with specific traditions. This is reflected in references to a common descent, shared ethnic origins, and common national heritage. In the Australian context, ethno-national sentiments have developed in response to particular historical developments. Their origins are British, and loyalty to institutions that derive from the Anglo-Saxon traditions remains central. Over time this sentiment evolved and acquired elements that relate to Australia as a distinct ‘ethnie’ (people). The term ‘ethno-nativist’, therefore, is more appropriate; it captures a sequential process that includes vestiges of loyalty towards symbols that are British in their origin, as well as characteristics that are typically Australian. The shift towards an Australian (nativist) focus began in the mid and late 1800s when Australia began to establish a sense of its own autonomy and independence. For the supporters of the independence movement, Australia was no longer a colony of the British Empire but rather formed a separate ethnic entity, a new people able to control their own destiny; a nation in itself (Hancock 1930, Clark 1962-87, 1995, White 1981).

The development of an Australian national identity has been mapped by historians, sociologists and social commentators. Over time Australia has conjured up a number of images that proffers a view of Australia as a nation of multiple and changing identities. For example, Hancock (1961, [1930]) describes an independent Australian Briton who provided a sense of justification for an Australian nationality evolving alongside a British nationality. Then there is the noble bushman as described by Ward (1966 [1958]). Ward and his followers portrayed ‘Australians as independent, imbued with an ethic of mateship, laconic, irreverent, egalitarian, sharing, cooperative’ (see Curthoys in Hudson & Bolton 1997: 29). In turn, those masculine images provoked a response by writers such as Marilyn Lake (1986) who
articulated an alternative set of images based on a feminist conception of citizenship and introduced a particular gender dimension to Australian nationalism. As Lake (1997) explains, ‘Australian feminists invoked their status as citizens to promote a different understanding of rights and obligations’, and highlighted the private domain as opposed to the public domain. The public domain was the preserve of modern Western men; a preserve that women challenged drawing attention to the multiplicity of citizenship traditions in Australia. Australian feminists brought the ‘rights discourse’ into the private sphere of home and family. Through legislation feminists demanded that the state establish the right for women to exist as ‘independent economic units’ (Lake in Hudson and Bolton 1997: 96-99).

Clark’s (1987) greatest contribution to research on national identity is encapsulated in his central idea of a ‘shared sense of place’, a ‘shared sense of past’, and a ‘shared love of the land that we live in’. A shared sense of place refers mainly to land that is common to us all and unites us all. In terms of imagery, Clark’s sense of place also encompasses the characteristics of landscape, flora and fauna. It is about how Australia, with its unique landscape, may yet develop independently of Britain. Clark anticipated that ‘the time was coming when an Australian voice would be heard telling the story of who Australians were and what they might be. A new discovery of Australia was about to begin’ (1987: 494)

Some authors developed a set of images based on the economic interests of the nation. These proved to be particularly powerful in providing a sense of unity which in turn reinforced a peculiarly ethno-nativist form of Australian national identity. As White (1981: ix) argues:

Every powerful economic interest likes to justify itself by claiming to represent the ‘national interest’ and identifying itself with a ‘national identity’. In this view of the world there is no room for class conflict, and sexual and racial exploitations are also obscured. The ‘national interest’ must appear to work for the good of all.

National identity couched in such terms influenced the construction of a peculiarly Australian ethos. It was an ethos that promoted a distinctive and exclusively white, male-orientated, Brito-centric identity. Such an identity was a powerful construct that supported the nation’s economic interests during periods of Australia’s development as an independent nation. It masked, as critics noted, class and racial
divisions in Australian society. The dominant ideology of the period was justified by aligning Australia’s progress as a nation to sound economic development. Initially, such development was seen as conditional on economic links with Britain. Later, it was perceived as dependent on ‘national industries’ that sustained the independent Australian nation – a new people.

Australia’s economic success, as the ideologists of national independence recognised, was initially based on a vibrant and powerful pastoral industry. The pastoral industry was an important construct in identity terms. It reflected Ward’s (1966 [1958]) interpretation of what was considered to be typically Australian: that sense of rural mateship, and a spirit of cooperation. The pastoral industry was quintessentially Australian, representing the outback, the land, a particular way of life. At the same time it combined to prolong those ties to Britain by providing exports to the ‘mother country’.

The pastoral industry served the nation well from the late 19th century, but by the mid twentieth century, competing economic interests began to emerge. Those interests provided the impetus for increased competition between different groups and had implications for Australia’s national development. ‘Australia’s flocks were being challenged by Australia’s factories’ (White 1981: x). The older pastoral ethos depicted the bush as the ‘real’ Australia, but as the percentage of the labour force employed in primary industry dropped between 1933 and 1947 that image began to change. An image of Australia as an industrial nation became the dominant ideology. Australia began to be depicted as more urban, cosmopolitan and industrial. The expanding manufacturing sector meant that enterprise, development, progress and growth were increasingly woven into the image of the nation (White 1981). It also meant that Australia needed to draw on a wider pool of workers to support an industrial sector that was expanding rapidly. Industries were more likely to be located near the major cities and ports – changing the locus of activity from the country to the city.

The manufacturing industry’s success depended on expanding labour. In the immediate post-WW II period that growing demand for labour prompted the
opening up Australia’s immigration policy to migrants from non-English speaking backgrounds. This was a radical departure from the past Brito-centrism and needed to be handled sensitively. It was presented and defended on a number of levels. At times it was defended for its contribution to the economic and defence needs of Australia as reflected in the popular ‘populate or perish’ slogan. Australians were reassured that the cultural homogeneity of the nation would remain intact – ‘for every foreign migrant the government proposed to bring out ten from the United Kingdom’ (Clark 1995: 277). The justification for such reassurances was based on the perceived need ‘to protect the British predominance as well as to shield the foreigner from the veiled hostility of the native-born’. At other times, Australia’s post-WW II immigration program was presented as a humanitarian duty not to ‘turn away anyone who had the will to become a good Australian citizen’. It was accepted as a given that anyone who came to settle would become a ‘dinkum Aussie’ (Clark 1995: 277). But perhaps the most convincing argument presented by the government was that couched in terms of the survival of the nation.

We have not unlimited time to build our strength or plan our future. Our decisions now must be the right ones, else our Australian nation might not survive beyond the lives of the children of this generation (Calwell in Clark 1995: 277-278).

For Australia’s policy makers, however, it was clear that, due to the lack of British immigrants, Australia had to become increasingly dependent on immigrants from non-English speaking backgrounds. The influx of non-British immigrants meant that Australia’s national identity and cohesion was under threat (Castles in Freeman & Jupp 1992: 184). To counter those fears the Government introduced the policy of assimilation: ‘the doctrine that immigrants could be culturally and socially absorbed and rapidly become indistinguishable from the existing Anglo-Australian population’ (Castles in Freeman & Jupp 1992: 184 – 185). The assimilationist policy helped to allay fears and at the same time continued to sustain a characteristically Australian identity. Migrants were expected to adopt the ‘Australian Way of Life’. Cultural differences were an affront to a society which demanded socio-cultural uniformity. The expectation of ‘The Australian Way of Life’ disguised a general intolerance of and distaste for cultural diversity – a powerful mechanism for reinforcing ethno-nativist sentiments (White 1981: 160).
Australia was able to retain a dominant ethno-nativist identity throughout the 1950s by reinforcing assimilation as a policy and continuing to retain close links with Britain. She still relied on Britain for her defence needs (WW II had dented this reliance) and Britain continued to provide a ready market for Australia’s exports. That close relationship between Britain and Australia continued until Britain entered the European Economic Community (EEC) in the 1960s. As Ward (2001: 107) claims, Britain’s entry into the EEC was a turning point for Australia in that it marked the accelerated disentangling of Australian and British cultural identities, as well as their political and economic interests. It signaled the emergence of a new nationalism in Australia and a new identity that was heralded by pronouncements on such topics ‘as the British connection, the treatment of the Aborigines, the White Australia Policy, liberation through relations with Asian countries and the distinctively urban nature of Australia’ (Horne 1989: 37).

4:3 Ethno-nativist sentiments and identity

A particularist form of this ethno-nativist identity exacerbated the traditional divisions within the nation. In the case of the Aboriginal population, British settlement meant that the indigenous people were alienated from their traditional lands and culture. A Brito-Australian ‘ethnie’ meant that Australia acquired a form of nationalism that carried a strong colonial imprint. The indigenous people were, in fact, not considered part of the nation until much later. In terms of common descent, shared traditions and the occupation of a particular homeland, the Aboriginal population during this period could be described as an ‘under-nation’; separate from and subordinate to the dominant white Anglo-Australian population (Jones 1998: 5, Tatz 1995).

The exclusive nature of an ethno-nativist identity was, until recently, sustained through ongoing discrimination in Australia’s sporting and cultural events. In fact, the exclusive nature of sports such as cricket and rugby, meant that in many cases Aboriginal sportsmen were forced to pursue their sporting careers not in Australia but in the United Kingdom (Pilger 2002). A study of 1200 black sportsmen and women by Tatz (1995) reveals that only six Aboriginal sports people had access to
the same sporting facilities and opportunities as white Australians. That divide in public attitudes towards the indigenous population was highlighted more recently by Pilger (2002). With the lead up to the Olympic Games in Australia in the year 2000, Australia’s treatment of its indigenous people was documented as one of discrimination and exclusion (Pilger 2002). Tatz (1995) and Pilger (2002) argued that Australian sport and culture could not be accurately represented when many of the indigenous population’s top athletes were not given the same opportunities nor were they considered as part of the national community. In other words, until recently, Australian sport was a closed domain, dominated by white, Anglo-Australian males. It was selective and, as critics noted, perpetuated discriminatory attitudes.

Under those conditions a white Anglo-Australian form of ethno-nativist identity flourished and established itself as the core element of the dominant culture. It was fuelled by public policy decisions such as the Immigration Act 1901 (commonly known as the White Australia policy). It embraced exclusion by refusing entry to Asian immigrants between 1901 and the early 1970s. It was ‘a racist immigration policy, revealing a general fear, hatred and contempt for, specifically, Asians’ (Horne 2001: 207). Policies within Australia restricted the participation of the indigenous people in national institutions, and racist attitudes prevented Aboriginal involvement in the community and politics. Assimilation as a policy doctrine
markers are passed on from generation to generation.

Ethno-nativists tend to be ambivalent about the 'Australianness' of people from indigenous and non-British migrant backgrounds. While accepted as citizens these categories are nevertheless often seen as 'ethnics' who are 'not fully' or 'conditionally' Australian. They are accepted so long as they embrace as an aspiration the Brito-Australian traditions and ways of life. If they do not, they are socially marginalised. For ethno-nativists, culture and tradition marks the boundary of the nation 'proper'.

4:4 Recent studies of national sentiments

The distribution of national sentiment identities amongst the Australian public has been the subject of four recent studies (Jones 1997, 1998, Pakulski & Tranter 2000, Charnock 2001). These studies, conducted between 1997 and 2000 identify how public attitudes to the nation coalesce, how these attitudes affect support for the republic and how support for the republic varies across segments of the population. Jones (1997) draws on data from the 1995 National Social Science Survey. It contains a module on national identity from which Jones constructs a typology that represents 3 scales of national identification. The first involves ascribed attributes and measures an Australian ethno-nativism dimension, the second measures a civic dimension and the third acts as a behavioural bridge between the other two dimensions. Jones identifies four national identity types: Dogmatic Nativists who show strong nativism and strong affective civic culture; Literal Nativists who show strong nativism and weak to moderate affective civic culture; Civic Nationalists who show a weak to moderate nativism and strong affective civic culture; and Moderate Pluralists who show weak to moderate nativism as well as affective civic culture (1997: 297). According to Jones, these types are not exclusive, and include a 'mixed' type.

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17 The three scales focus on questions that relate to 'what it means to be truly Australian'.
18 Australian nativism includes questions regarding being Australian born, Christian and having lived in Australia most of one's life.
19 A civic dimension includes questions based on feeling Australian and respecting Australian laws and institutions.
20 Jones refers to this as an instrumental dimension and includes questions on the importance of citizenship and being able to speak English.
Charnock (2001) builds on Jones's study and addresses specifically the patterns of republican voting. He explains the impact of partisan influences and populist protest on republican voting, as well as the role of national identity and ancestry. By applying Jones's typology to the new data, Charnock (2001: 282) finds that the distribution of the four national identity types is almost the same as in Jones's earlier study\textsuperscript{21}.

The study conducted by Pakulski and Tranter (2000) analyses data from the International Social Science Program (1995) which contains a module on national identity. In order to separate civic identity and ethno-national identity from 'denizen\textsuperscript{22} identity', the study uses two additional questions: 'How close – how emotionally attached to Australia – do you feel?' and a question asking if respondents agree or disagree with the statement 'It is impossible for people who do not share Australian customs and traditions to become fully Australian'. Three forms of national identity are distinguished: civic, ethno-national identity and denizen. The remaining 26% of respondents who do not fit these types have been classified as a 'mixed type' (Pakulski & Tranter 2000: 211).

The three studies share a similar analytic strategy, use similar survey-based materials and come to similar conclusions. The typologies they use serve as a model for this study. However, my typology is limited to ethno-nativist and civic nationalist types for reasons discussed in chapter 2. These two types are most theoretically salient and, as the above studies confirm, differentially located in the social structure and in 'actual generations'.

\textsuperscript{21} The respective findings of the group sizes in the ACRS '99 data were Dogmatic Nativists 16\%, Literal Nativists 6\%, Civic Nationalists 39\% and Moderate Pluralists 39\%. Jones findings were Dogmatic Nativists 15\%, Literal Nativists 8\%, Civic Nationalists 39\% and Moderate Pluralists 38\%.

\textsuperscript{22} Those who show a weak attachment to either civic or ethnic identity.
**4:5 Socio-demographic ‘location’ of ethno-national sentiments**

Does the analysis of survey data confirm the above interpretation? Are the results consistent with the expectations (the hypotheses) derived from the proposed – and theoretically backed – account of change in public sentiment and national identifications? One would expect that those who adhere to an ethno-nativist form of national identity would tend to be Australian-born. Immigrants would be less likely to endorse such sentiments because of their exclusive implications. We may also expect to find expressions of such sentiment more frequently amongst older Australians especially those representing the ‘war generation’. One could also expect the adherents of such views to have left school at a younger age and be less likely to have tertiary qualifications. Further, one would also expect to find ethno-nativists differentially located in terms of occupation; that is, they would be less likely to be employed in the professions and in managerial positions. Partly because of the impact of education on political views ethno-nativists could be described as being right of centre in their political affiliation, less liberal in their thinking, and more inclined to approve of the views expressed by right wing parties such as One Nation. Given that the cultural underpinnings of the nation have been central in the formation of ethno-nativist sentiments, ethno-nativists would be more inclined to take pride in Australia’s sporting and cultural achievements, rather than the political institutions of the nation. Culture provides a mechanism for individuals to form bonds and attachments that, in turn, reinforce their sense of belonging. For ethno-nativists Australia, is an ethno-nation, and those who subscribe to the nation’s cultural and sporting achievements are expected to express that sense of pride as a reflection of their identity.

These expectations or research hypotheses are tested first by conducting an analysis of the social correlates of various ethno-nativist national sentiments. Profiles of the characteristics of the ethno-nativist identity are examined and they confirm the expectations. More interesting and reported in detail below is the analysis of direct causal links using regression models discussed in Chapter 3. The results are reported in Tables 4:1 and 4:2.
The results of the regression analyses broadly confirm the expectations. The regression estimates suggest that those who regard being born and living in Australia as important, and are proud of Australia's sporting and cultural achievements, tend to be predominantly Australian-born. Those born in the UK and countries other than Australia are less likely to display ethno-nativist sentiments. Another distinctive feature of ethno-nationals is their social location in the war generation. Examination of the standardized regression coefficients (not shown here) suggests that one of the strongest correlates of ethno-nativism is being born before 1945\textsuperscript{23}.

Although place of birth and generational location are expected to be predictors of ethno-nativist sentiments, the analysis also reveals a number of differences amongst those born in Australia. For example, gender differences appear in the sense of pride in Australia's sporting and cultural achievements. Women are more likely to be proud of Australia's cultural achievements than males ($b = -2.8$). Such a finding is in fact consistent with Charnock's (2001: 284) results. He also found ethno-nativism to be more prevalent among women. Pride in Australia's sporting and cultural achievements is less apparent among tertiary graduates ($b = -3.5$). There is, however, a disparity between the earning capacity of those who consider being born and living in Australia as important, and those who take pride in Australia's sporting and cultural achievements. Middle income earners are more likely than those on low incomes to be proud of Australia's sporting and cultural achievements. Table 4:1 indicates that those with less education and low income earners are most likely to be ethno-nativist. The non-tertiary educated, in particular, express a sense of pride in Australia's sporting and cultural achievements, although education has no statistically significant impact on the born/live dependent variable.

Ethno-nativists also tend to be less liberal in their orientation, religious and right of centre in their partisan preferences. In these respects, they contrast with the typical

\textsuperscript{23} In the tables I report the non-standardised regression coefficients in order to show the net impact of each of the independent variables on the dependent variables.
representatives of the baby boom generation. The baby boomers are more likely to challenge traditional national sentiments and social values. They also tend to be politically active, hold strong party identifications, and sympathise with left of centre parties. By contrast, the war generation tends to be more traditionalist, conservative and supportive of a rural status quo. Such a contrast seems to be in line with Inglehart’s (1991) claims that democratic liberal value orientations are more prevalent among those who have grown up in the post-war decades. Table 4:1 in fact indicates that ‘Materialists’ are more likely than ‘Postmaterialists’ to be ethno-nativists24. This is due, Inglehart (1977, 1990a) argues, to the fact that members of the baby boom generation have experienced unprecedented levels of material prosperity and physical security during their formative years. Consequently, the baby boom generation is more likely to give a higher priority to non-material needs and be actively involved in the left-libertarian social movements. By contrast, those born before 1945 are more materialist and less libertarian. They were also less likely to experience the benefits of education which, according to McAllister (1992) and Betts (1999), is the most powerful shaper of attitudes amongst mass publics.

The results confirm these regularities. For example, young people and Meg Lees (the leader of the Australian Democrats from 1998 to 2001) supporters are less likely to be ethno-nativists (Table 4:1 b= -.61) than other categories. This is not surprising. As a relatively new political party, the Australian Democrats concentrate on issues such as the environment and an Australian republic – typical ‘baby boomer issues’ and it attracts disproportionate numbers of baby-boom libertarians with pro-republican leanings (see also McAllister 1997).

On the other end of the spectrum, supporters of Pauline Hanson and the One Nation party are more likely to be ethno-nativists than any other category (Table 4:1 b= 1.09). They also support her views on immigration and the perception that Aboriginal Australians receive ‘special’ treatment to the detriment of other disadvantaged groups. These findings are consistent with my interpretation, as well as the findings of Jones (1997, 1998) who noted that Hanson’s views tended to be

24 The postmaterial values scale is scored: materialist = 1; mixed = 2; postmaterialist = 3.
echoed by persons adhering to an ethno-nativist identity. In the 1990s, the One Nation Party provided a voice for ethno-nativists by continuing a campaign of discrimination towards Australia's indigenous people and Asian immigrants.

Clearly political leaders play an important role in influencing popular national sentiments. Political leaders provide the cues on how different groups respond to particular issues. If we assume that party-leader orientations affect views on the nation and the republic (which is a reasonable assumption considering the relatively recent mobilization of republicanism), political leadership emerges as an important factor reinforcing engrained loyalties and influencing the formation of attitudes on national and republican issues.

One should also note some unexpected results. For example, pride in Australia's cultural attributes correlates strongly with gender. Women are more likely to embrace ethno-nativist sentiment and express a sense of pride in Australia's sporting and cultural achievements than men. Those who express such a sense of pride tend also to be middle income earners and their political preferences lean towards the major parties rather than the smaller political parties such as One Nation.

Overall, a relatively consistent profile of ethno-nativists emerges. They are typically members of the war generation, Australian-born, 'materialist' in their orientations and right of centre in their party political leanings. They do not rate highly in terms of occupational achievement and tend to have lower levels of education. They are less likely to be employed in professions, and overall have lower than average earnings. Ethno-nationalism is in the main a sentiment of older and less economically secure Australians.
Table 4:1 The key indicators of ethno-nativist sentiment (Born/Live)

OLS regression estimates for predictors for born/live

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
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* < .05  ** < .01  *** < .001

n = 3431
Source: 1999 Australian Constitutional Referendum Survey
Table 4:2 The key indicators of ethno-nativist sentiment (achievement)

OLS regression estimates for predictors for sporting and cultural achievements

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* < .05  ** < .01  *** < .001

n = 3431

Source: 1999 Australian Constitutional Referendum Survey
4:6 Civic national sentiments and identifications

Civic nationalist sentiment differs from ethno-nationalist in that what unites people into a nation is not the cultural traditions but rather more universalistic social bonds. Civic nationalists recognize and accept cultural differences and multiple ethnic allegiances. It is a strong attachment to Australian society and its institutions that draws civic nationalists together. Entry to the national collectivity is seen as dependent on a respect for Australia’s key legal and political institutions.

Civic national sentiments sometimes coexist with ethno-nativist sentiments, but the two are associated with different images. The ethno-nativist identity stresses one culture, common traditions and common descent. Civic nationalists by contrast stress shared respect for the rule of law and an awareness of (as well as pride in) individual rights and democratic institutions. A civic form of identification transcends cultural markers; it stresses a sense of unity based on valuing cultural differences rather than similarities.

One may hypothesize that in the 1960s the ethno-nativist form of identity that had sustained the nation for so long had began to show signs of weakening and fracturing. It began to be questioned by those intellectuals who could not relate to the images of Australia as a culturally uniform, white, British-derived nation. Civic sentiments started to spread because they had the capacity to engender a sense of belonging that was more inclusive and more in tune with a culturally diverse nation. Changes in popular sentiments and identifications in the post-WW II period have been attributed to a number of factors: mass non-British immigration, a growth in confidence in the economic prosperity of the nation, stability, and an expanding education system. As public sentiments began to change, citizenship rights entered the agenda of concerns and began to be defined in broader terms. Citizenship was no longer seen as just about being part of the cultural collectivity. It was increasingly seen as reflecting a culturally diverse nation.
According to most observers, those changes can be plotted historically as Australians began to adjust to changing circumstances. For example, up until the 1960s immigration was tightly controlled by Australia's citizenship policy:

Immigration policy is therefore a key part of citizenship policy because it controls those from outside the country who can become citizens, and it was used ruthlessly by Australia to keep out non-white people from access to citizenship until the 1960s (Chesterman and Galligan 1999: 9).

Australia's citizenship policy was not only used to effectively prevent certain groups from entering the country, but it was also used as a mechanism for controlling the indigenous population. The policy denied Australia's indigenous population 'major social policy benefits such as the maternity allowance, old-age and disability pension' (Chesterman and Galligan 1999: 10). Aboriginal Australians were excluded from participating in the national collectivity by limitations placed on their citizenship rights. It was not until the White Australia Policy was abandoned in 1967 that Aboriginal Australians gained the same rights as white Anglo-Australians. Similarly, the assimilation policy doctrine was gradually replaced by a policy of integration followed by a policy of multiculturalism. Multiculturalism admitted that cultural difference was no longer something to fear but rather was something that was considered integral to nation building. In turn, the acceptance of Australia as a multicultural nation fuelled the emergence of what has been described by some as a form of 'new nationalism' (Horne 1989, White 1981).

The new nationalism gained momentum with the election of the Whitlam government in December 1972. The introduction of multiculturalism provided the opportunity for the new Labor government to legitimise cultural diversity and promote a new nationalism. 'Multiculturalism meant that racial and cultural tolerance and the celebration of ethnic diversity were promoted as distinctively Australian symbols and that a new kind of nationalism could be built around the idea of the 'family of Australia' (Betts 1999: 164). Initially the concept of the new nationalism 'deliberately set out to help develop a national identity through artistic expression and to project Australia's image in other countries by means of the arts' (White 1981: 169) but it also encapsulated a number of civic sentiments.
Throughout the 1980s those civic national sentiments continued to gain acceptance and reached a high point with the approach of the Bicentenary celebrations in 1988. For many Australians the Bicentennial celebrations highlighted the inappropriateness of Australia’s head of state being from a ‘foreign nation’. They convinced many ‘that unless ordinary Australians spoke out against the monarchy and demanded that an Australian be our nation’s Head of State, the change might never come about’ (Turnbull 1993: 3).

The late 1980s and the 1990s was a period where the new civic nationalist ideals and republican sentiment fused into one. Republican sentiments manifest themselves through deliberations about the most appropriate form of the state as an expression of civic nationalist ideals. Support for an Australian republic grew substantially during this period. Opinion poll data, (see Figure 1) show that in the 1980s just over four in ten voters were in favour of a republic. This increased to 58 per cent in 1993 with an increase to 60 per cent in 1996 (McAllister in Galligan et al 1997: 15-16).

Figure 1 Public opinion towards the republic and the monarchy, 1967-96
The surveys also showed that this national identity was increasingly expressed in civic terms. What that meant was that you are an Australian not because you are 'British' or stereotypically Aussie or a hyphenated 'ethnic' but because you are a citizen of the Commonwealth of Australia, accepting the Constitution as determined by the people, the practices of a liberal-democratic society, the rule of law, the principle of toleration and a respect for the equal rights of Australians (Horne in Hudson & Carter 1993: 218).

The two major developments of the early 1990s that gave civic nationalism a coherent political shape included the formation of the republican movement and the embracing of republicanism by the political leaders of the ALP. The ARM was formed in 1991 and became the core of the republican movement. It provided a forum through which identity issues could be debated forging a link between expressions of civic national sentiments and demands for political reforms.

Political reforms were very much part of the push by the Australian Labor Party when it adopted an Australian republic as a part of its political platform in 1991. For Paul Keating, the then Prime Minister, an Australian republic embodied landmark issues – 'our cultural diversity, our evolving partnerships with Asia and the Pacific, our quest for reconciliation with Aboriginal Australians, our ambition to create a society in which women have equal opportunity, equal representation and equal rights' (Keating in Ryan 1995: 175).

In contrast, the Liberal Party responded by inferring that pro-republican intellectuals were responsible for 'creating a sense of crisis about identity'. John Howard, Prime Minister from 1996, argued that 'constant debate about identity implies that we don’t already have one or, worse, that it is somehow inadequate' (Howard 1995:3). By separating the identity of the nation from an Australian republic and by adopting a populist strategy, the Coalition was able to break the connection and play down the issue by the end of the 1990s. Although civic nationalist sentiments had emerged in the late 1980s and early 1990s, they were not considered by the Coalition as relevant for the nation.
4:7 Social location and historical sources of civic nationalism

In order to test this account, it is necessary to translate these developments into a series of hypotheses that can be assessed empirically. For example, with the constant changes throughout the post-WW II period, one would expect that the social location of those who display civic national sentiments would contrast with the location of ethno-nativists. The expectation would be that civic nationalists would be over-represented among non-British migrants or those born of migrant parents. They would be more secular, hold higher occupational status positions, and would be more frequently found among the tertiary educated. At the same time, partly given the benefits of education, one would expect that their income levels would be higher, and that they would live in the city rather than the country. It would also be expected that civic nationalist sentiment would be more significantly influenced by the major political parties. Supporters of the Australian Democrats and the ALP would be more likely to express civic nationalist sentiments than supporters of Pauline Hanson’s One Nation Party or the Coalition.

The results (see Tables 4:3 & 4:4) confirm these expectations. They show that civic nationalists, especially those who take pride in Australia’s political institutions, tend to be younger, better educated, located in the middle to high income bracket (b=3.0, b=2.1) and self identify as middle class. Although the relevance of class has been debated by a number of writers (MacGregor 2001, Pusey 2001, McKay 1997), self identification of middle class location is statistically significant. The specific generational location of those who take pride in Australian’s political institutions is also accompanied by an affluence not found amongst those who adhere to ethno-nativist sentiments.

Given the ambiguity in defining citizenship rights and duties, it is not surprising that there are inconsistencies in the data (see Table 4:3). The results indicate that the perceived importance of citizenship is higher among those born before 1946. In spite of these inconsistencies, the results tend to substantiate the interpretation presented above and confirm the key hypotheses. Those who consider citizenship as important for being Australian tend to live in the city rather than the country (b=...
2.8). The $R^2$ results, however, in Table 4:3 also indicate that the empirical models account for very little variation in the citizen dependent variable with only 3% of the variance 'explained' in model 4.

The explanatory power increases with the introduction of the political/ideological variables. Political leadership and attitudes towards the performance of political leaders on such issues as the economy and democratic ideals emerge as significant boosters of civic sentiments, as indicated by the increase in the $R^2$ from model 3 to model 4 in table 4:4. Howard and Beazley register positive impacts ($b=2.1$, $b=1.1$) while Pauline Hanson, not surprisingly, registers a negative impact ($b=-.5$). This result confirms the long term effects of party identification on respondents' identity. It is also consistent with the claims about the influential role of political party leadership in shaping different forms of national identity.

The four blocks of variables used in the regression models in sections 4:5 and 4:6 were – for 'social' variables – relatively good predictors of the political achievement dependent variable (Table 4:4). They 'explained' somewhat less variation (approximately 10 percent) for the ethno-nativist born/live and achievement measures. Although, again bearing in mind the nature of these measures, this is considered to be a respectable amount (Tables 4:1 and 4:2). All of the social and political independent variables combined, however, only accounted for approximately three percent of the variation in the 'citizen' variable. To an extent this lack of explanatory power indicates that citizenship is an important aspect of identity for all Australians, although these results are also due to the fact that our indicator of citizenship was not ideal\textsuperscript{25}. Social background was the best predictor of the born/live measure accounting for over half of the variation explained by the full model, although background measures were relatively poor

\textsuperscript{25} The other factor at play here is that because the citizenship variable is constructed from a single indicator (as opposed to the additive scales developed to measure other aspects of identity), it has less variation.
predictors for all other dependent variables. Alternatively, values and ideology and particularly political leaders, had by far the strongest impact upon the civic political achievement variable (Table 4:4), where seventeen percent of the variation was ‘explained’ by the full model. These political variables are expected to have an even stronger impact upon republican voting behaviour explored in the next section.
Table 4:3  The Key indicators of civic national sentiment (Citizenship)

OLS regression estimates for predictors for Citizen

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.3</td>
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<td>Gen. 2 (1946-'59)</td>
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<td>-.14</td>
<td>-.12</td>
<td>-.11</td>
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<td>-11.3***</td>
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<td>-2.6</td>
<td>-2.6</td>
<td>-2.7*</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>-.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Professional occupation</td>
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<td>-.7</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Middleclass (self assessed)</td>
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<td>1.1</td>
<td>.8</td>
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<td>2.9**</td>
<td>2.8*</td>
<td></td>
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<td>-.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>No religion</td>
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<td>-.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td>-1.9*</td>
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<td><strong>Political Leadership</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Howard</td>
<td>.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Lees</td>
<td>-.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hanson</td>
<td>-.1</td>
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<td>.02</td>
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<td>.03</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* < .05  ** < .01  *** < .001
n = 3431
Source: 1999 Australian Constitutional Referendum Survey
Table 4:4 The key indicators of civic sentiment (political achievement)

OLS regression estimates for predictors for political achievement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social Background</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>-1.3</td>
<td>-1.5*</td>
<td>-1.4</td>
<td>-0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gen. 2 (1946-'59)</td>
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<td>-3.3**</td>
<td>-2.6*</td>
<td>-1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gen. 3 (1960 +)</td>
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<td>-8.1###</td>
<td>-6.6###</td>
<td>-5.1###</td>
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<td>-0.2</td>
<td>-0.2</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Born Other</td>
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<td>0.1</td>
<td>-0.3</td>
<td>-0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>-0.2</td>
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<td>-0.5</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middleclass (self assessed)</td>
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<td>0.7</td>
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<td>Income ($30K - $60K)</td>
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<td>3.3**</td>
<td>3.0**</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income ($60K +)</td>
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<td>2.8**</td>
<td>2.1*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City (live in large city)</td>
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<td>0.5</td>
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<td><strong>Values &amp; Ideology</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anglican</td>
<td>-0.2</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No religion</td>
<td>-3.9***</td>
<td>2.0*</td>
<td>-2.0*</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.7**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Post Mat. Orientation’ (+=post)</td>
<td>-1.8**</td>
<td>-1.0</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respondent’s party id. (+=ALP)</td>
<td>-1.9***</td>
<td>-1.0</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political Leadership</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beazley</td>
<td>1.1***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Howard</td>
<td>2.1***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lees</td>
<td>0.5**</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hanson</td>
<td>-0.5***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

R² Adjusted

|       | .03 | .04 | .08 | .17 |

* < .05  ** < .01  *** < .001

n = 3431
Source: 1999 Australian Constitutional Referendum Survey
4:8 Civic nationalism and republicanism

In order to assess the plausibility of the claims about the fusion of civic national sentiments with the republican program of reforms, I translate these claims into a series of hypotheses subjected to regression analysis. For example, civic identification should be strong among the supporters and weak among the opponents of the republican campaign. By contrast, an ethno-nativist form of identity is expected to produce the opposite pattern.

Given the generational concentration of civic nationalism, one would expect support for an Australian republic to be high among the baby boom generation. Also in line with the interpretation presented in Chapters 1–3, those who were educated to tertiary level, identify as middle class, and were on higher incomes are expected to show strong support for the republic. Above all, one would expect that an Australian republic would be the preferred option for those born in countries other than Australia and the UK and for their children. The children of non-British immigrants should be far more likely to support a republic given that they were able to take advantage of multiculturalism, the educational opportunities and the economic security that Australia offered.

How do these hypotheses square with the results of the survey data analysis? Again, a few ‘anomalies’ apart, the results support the interpretation outlined above. (see Table 4:5). Those who articulate a civic form of identity are significantly more likely to vote for an Australian republic, whereas those who express a nativist form of identity are significantly less likely to support the republic. The link between civic identity does not remain statistically significant, however, when controlling for other predictors, suggesting that civic identity is mediating the effects of other independent variables. The indicators of ethno-nativism have a stronger, although negative impact on republican voting, although, once again, they appear to be mediating social background and socio-political effects in the later models.
The analysis also confirms the significance of education (O.R. 1.6, model 5) and the importance of generations (O.R. 1.5, model 5). This seems to be in line with Inglehart’s claims about a libertarian and pro-change orientation by the baby boom generation. Baby boomers were identified as more likely to challenge the status quo. This was stimulated by the fact that the baby boomers were in many cases ‘the first generation of their families to acquire a university education’ (Betts 1999: 80). In the case of Australia, they also embraced civic nationalism and disproportionately supported the republic. Moreover, civic nationalists, especially the most educated ones, are significantly more likely than ethno-nationalists to join the republican movement. Active support for the republic is also associated with professional employment and earning capacity, with those supporting a republic tending to earn in excess of $60 000 per year. Pro-republicans are predominantly educated, secular, city dwellers, who see themselves as ‘middle class’.

We hypothesized that those immigrants who came to Australia from the late 1940s onwards identified with the institutional framework of society rather than the cultural underpinnings of the Australian nation. They represented a challenge to the vestiges of an old nationalism that adhered to British symbols and an ethno-nativist form of identity. In line with this hypothesis, the results reveal the impact of migrant background (O.R. 1.4). Those born in countries other than the UK and Australia are strongly supportive of a republic – almost twice the strength of the UK born and 40% more than the Australian born.

This may also reflect the increasing political activism of migrants. McAllister (1992: 61) argues that those from non-English speaking backgrounds (NESB) display higher levels of campaign activity than the Australian-born. The first wave of immigrants that came to Australia after 1947 belonged to a generation that experienced both physical and economic hardship. Most of them did not have the skills or education to enter politics and to challenge established values. The experiences of the second generation, children of migrants, differed significantly from the experiences of their parents. Many of them benefited from the accumulative advantage of economic security, political stability and expanding education opportunities. As Castles et al (1992: 201) suggest, children of migrants
who have 'been educated in Australia, understand the system well, and are often
employed within the bureaucracy. They articulate the need of ethnic minorities not
in cultural but in bureaucratic terms, as expressed in the catch-words of access and
equity'. At the same time, those experiences have resulted in a greater level of
political activism – and stronger support for republican reforms.

The results, particularly the increase in the pseudo $R^2$, between models 4 and 5,
confirm the centrality of political leadership. Very strong positive responses to Kim
Beazley (O.R. 1.2 table 4:5 model 5) and Meg Lees (O.R. 1.1) increase the
likelihood of the pro-republican vote. Anti-republican votes come
disproportionately from those who evaluate John Howard and Pauline Hanson
highly. Such a response pattern is hardly surprising. It reflects the influence of the
leaders as well as the clarity of their views on issues concerning an Australian
identity.

The explanatory power of the overall regression model is very high (30% of
explained variance in the dependent variables). In fact, the strongest impact on the
referendum vote is exerted, not surprisingly, by the last two blocks of independent
variables: 'values and ideology' and 'political leadership', with place of birth and
identity formation remaining significant and consistent in the models. The role of
intellectuals and political leaders in articulating a pro-republican stance is clearly
confirmed by the results.
### Table 4:5 Logistics regression estimates for predictors for referendum vote (odds ratios)

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<tr>
<th>Identity</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
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</tr>
<tr>
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| Pseudo $R^2$         | .03     | .06     | .11     | .21     | .30     |

* < .05  ** < .01  *** < .001
n = 3431
Source: 1999 Australian Constitutional Referendum Survey
4:9 Conclusion

Republicanism in the 1990s grew on the fertile soil of popular civic national sentiments. These sentiments were growing predominantly amongst urban, educated and politically active Australians. By contrast, the opponents of republican reforms typically shared ethno-nativist sentiments and they were located amongst the older, less educated segments of the population. At the same time, the analyses support the hypothesis that both forms of identification also reflect specific socio-historical developments. For example, the evidence clearly confirms the significance of the effects of Australia's post-WW II immigration program – as reflected in the impact of migration and ethnic background variables. Those non-English speaking migrants who came to Australia in the post-WW II period and their children have been strongly supportive of an Australian republic.

The findings are consistent with the interpretation proposed in Chapters 1 and 2, as well as the account by Jayasuriya (1990:25) and Castles (1992: 198-199) who argue that ethnic groups act as agents of change by challenging existing values in their demand for the expansion of citizenship rights. Those rights are linked to a civic form of identification and the pro-republican stance in the referendum. The impact of leadership, generation, education, and ideology are also confirmed. Paul Keating's position and that of his successor as Prime Minister, John Howard, helped in articulating and firming up public sentiments. As Higley and Case (2000:10) argue prime ministers play the dominant role in referendum matters. Attitudes of prime ministers then tend to have a spiraling effect on issues that are seen as challenging the nation itself. Paul Keating saw the issue of Australia's identity as a nation and an Australian republic as inextricably linked. John Howard, on the other hand, refused to consider the two issues as related on the grounds of engaging in identity politics.

In the early 1990s the pro-republican position was embraced by the ALP under Paul Keating. This in itself was unusual as it represented a shift in the ideological orientation of the ALP. The party consciously re-modeled its very ideology and
appeals for support. It not only continued to accommodate its traditional supporters, such as the trade union movement, but also took on some broader social considerations. In the main these centred on articulating a sense of inclusiveness and the changing nature of Australia’s identity as a nation. The ALP leadership put in place an agenda that was new, different, exciting and perhaps more relevant to the mass concerns of an educated urban social category and class.

I argue throughout this thesis that in order to understand the dynamics of the republican movement and the results of the referendum we have to look at the broader socio-historical and socio-political picture. Public sentiment supportive of the republican program is only one condition of successful political reform. The second set of conditions has to do with an organizational framework and the role of public intellectuals in formulating and elaborating a specific program for political action. These conditions are analysed in Chapter 5. The chapter specifically focuses on the role of the ARM in articulating a program for change.
CHAPTER 5 THE AUSTRALIAN REPUBLICAN MOVEMENT

5:1 Introduction

The theoretical model presented in chapter 2 links shifts in popular identities and forms of nationalism to the mobilization of the republican movement in the 1990s. Changing public sentiments among urban segments of the post-WW II generation gave the impetus for republican reforms. The organizational framework for effective collective action developed in the form of the ARM, the republican movement’s main organization and leadership centre. As stressed by all sociological theorists from Marx to contemporary actionalists, effective reform programs are carried by movements with strong organization and unified leadership. The emergence in 1991 of the ARM meant that the changing sentiments of the mass publics could be forged into reform programs and channeled into collective action by the movement organization and its leaders.

The ARM can best be described as a movement organization aiming at political articulation of civic nationalist sentiments and their elaboration into a reform program. Its campaigns concentrated on one specific aspect of nation building – the most appropriate form of the state that represented a ‘new’ Australian nation. For the ARM leaders and activists, the republican form of the state epitomized the changes that had already occurred in Australian society in the post-WW II period, as well as the changes that that needed to occur in order to bring consistency between a ‘new’ Australian society and its political form. They stressed that the ethnic diversity of the nation and new aspirations for social inclusiveness and cultural tolerance as reflected in multicultural policies called for institutional change.

This campaign triggered opposition from mainly (though not exclusively) the ‘ethno-national’ camp. Civic nationalist and ethnic nationalist visions differed in respect to the functions and the role of the state. Ethno-nationalists considered the state as a guardian of the cultural integrity of the nation understood as a culturally
homogenous 'community of fate'. Civic nationalists saw the state as the guardian of civic rights and the guarantor of inclusive citizenship. For them, the nation was a society, a 'community of commitment' that includes a wide variety of culturally diverse 'peoples'. The state, according to civic nationalists, forms a shell where these different cultures can coexist in harmony, provided their carriers share commitments to the key national institutions (laws, polity) and their symbolic expressions. This political shell, the form of the state, regarded by the ARM elite as most appropriate, was republican.

The central issue was a symbolic-institutional expression of the republic. An Australian head of state represented the changing nature of Australia’s society and its institutions. It provided 'representation' for Aborigines, migrants and ethnic minorities forming a new multicultural nation – society. The ARM leaders had a strong sense of representing and articulating the changing substance of Australian popular sentiments. They saw their task as providing a new political framework that epitomized social and cultural changes and as paving the way for a political form of the state that would better fit the new patterns of national identifications. The ARM leaders, in other words, sought to restore the 'balance' between the cultural aspects of the nation and the political form of the state.

Movement organizations and their leaders – public intellectuals and political elites – are central in formatting public sentiments and forging them into a program of political reform. The leaders form the collective identity or to use Eyerman & Jamison’s (1991) term the ‘cognitive praxis’ that shapes social movement activity and identity. They provide the movement with direction and are responsible for consensus formation and mobilization. Movement organizations amplify movement influence and provide a framework for the systematic exertion of this influence in socio-political and socio-cultural domains.

The initial success of the republican movement was due to the fact that it was coordinated by a single organizational centre – the ARM – and that the ARM was very effective in mobilizing social and political resources. The movement attracted high profile supporters with quite diverse political and ideological preferences but
relied mainly on left-leaning public intellectuals and ALP political sponsors. It coordinated donations thus amassing a considerable ‘war chest’ for the republican political campaign. The activists established networks with influential political groups, professional associations and universities. ARM outposts mushroomed in every state, and ARM activists appeared in all major organizations including the main political parties. Perhaps most importantly, the republican activists cultivated media interest in the republican issue and tirelessly ‘fed’ the media with relevant stories about the republic. It lead the campaign for an Australian republic throughout the 1990s with the vigour and determination typical of a ‘new social movement’. It also capitalised on the liberal orientation of the educated segments of the baby boom generation by linking republicanism with the most popular left-libertarian causes from civil rights to the environment. This process of resource mobilization started well before the official launching of the ARM in 1991. The organized republican push actually started in the 1970s with the formation of the Citizens for Democracy.

5:2 The origins of the republican push – Citizens for Democracy

Citizens for Democracy (CFD) represented the first sign of a generational voice that expressed popular identifications of the civic nationalist type. It articulated those identifications and sentiments by linking constitutional reform with the identity of the nation. This took the form of a republican push that started in the 1970s and was invigorated in the late 1980s by the Bicentennial celebrations and the ideological transformation of the ALP. Those developments acted as catalysts in the formation of the ARM. The republican organization relied on the formative experiences of those who had been involved in earlier republican organizations to provide leadership into the reform push (Hirst in Manne 1999, Home 1992, McKenna 1996). Those intellectuals who had been active in Citizens for Democracy (CFD) provided strong leadership and strategic advice. In fact, the leaders involved in the 1970s constitutional reform program were the first representatives of the generation that formed the nucleus of the ARM. They were central in articulating the platform that the organization adopted in the 1990s. This point was stressed by most republican respondents during the interviews.
Two of the most influential leaders of the republican push were Franca Arena and Donald Horne. Arena had for many years agitated for a republican committee and was instrumental in the formation of the ARM (Keneally 1993: 71). Horne was regarded by many as a ‘pioneer republican’ (Hirst in Manne 1999) who championed and continued to advocate a civic sense of identification (e.g. Horne 2001). As chair of the ‘Kerr and the Consequences’ meeting at Sydney Town Hall in 1976, he attempted ‘to connect republicanism with national identity rather than the dismissal’. At the time, Horne declared that the ‘Queen as Australia’s head of state could only evoke two responses’:

One is the democratic statement about the political role of Australia’s monarchic constitution and in particular the monarchic role of the Governor-General in our present democratic crisis; the other is a republican statement, or as I would put it, the Australian statement in our present crisis in national identity (Horne quoted in McKenna 1996: 235-236).

The CFD was formed in November 1975 as a result of John Kerr’s dismissal of the Whitlam Government. This crisis drew attention to much deeper issues that had begun to surface in the early 1970s. In fact, many saw the advent of a new Labor Government as an opportunity to revitalise a civic nationalist vision for a new Australia. Intellectuals were attracted to the idea of a national republican renewal and social reform. With the sacking of the Whitlam government in 1975, much of the nationalist republican fervor generated in the early 1970s was subsumed under the push for constitutional reform. This shift was engineered mainly by the leaders and activist of the CDF.

The CFD emerged as a group concerned with constitutional reform and at the same time it incorporated republicanism as a central part of its platform. It gained national prominence after a successful meeting held on the 20th September 1976 at Sydney Town Hall organized by Donald Horne and his wife Myfanwy Gollan. After that meeting ‘a small group of authors, academics, artists and politicians decided to adopt the title Citizens for Democracy to wage an ongoing campaign for a democratic Constitution’ (McKenna 1996: 231). Interestingly, they explicitly recognized that they formed a generation unit, united by their exposure to shared formative experiences, especially during the ‘Whitlam years’. The political reform program of the group did not, however, tap directly into broader public sentiments,
but was rather based on a particular grievance — the stalling of the reforms and the dismissal of their key political sponsor. The CFD did not, therefore, engage in a pro-republican mobilization of the public, but rather formed an embryo for the reformist movement.

The embryo did not last long but generated a strong stimulus for the republican push. Some have attributed the disbanding of the CDF to the fact that ‘by late 1976 the dismissal and economic recession had actually dampened the nationalist fervour of the early 1970s’ (McKenna 1996: 238). There was also a recognition that constitutional matters did not engage the media and failed to excite the public. Others within the ARM have argued that CFD attempted to do too much, that the organization was too weak and that its charter for reform was too broad (Interview 13:21). In that sense the leaders of the ARM wanted to distance themselves from CFD. They were determined to present themselves as a ‘new force’ rather than a continuation of the 1975 debacle (Interview 27:24). In spite of these denials, the residue of the 1975 sentiments (and resentments) clearly persisted within the movement, though they were overshadowed by civic nationalist sentiment re-ignited by the Bicentennial celebrations.

5:2.1 The Bicentennial Celebrations

What emerged in the intervening years was a growing sense among public intellectuals of a change in popular identifications. This was diagnosed by the leaders of the movement as a key ‘political opportunity’. Therefore, the pro-republican activism focused on the diversity of the nation, the emergence of Aboriginal movements and the role of Australia’s political institutions in manifesting a shift in national identification (see also Spillman 1997).

The Bicentennial celebrations provided the opportunity for the republican issues to be brought to the attention of the media and the public, and opened a window of opportunity for the ARM to bring the issue of the reform to the headlines. In the first instance, the celebration provided a catalyst for a number of high profile members of CFD to become active once again. Secondly, it focused attention on questions about the identity of the nation and the civic status of Aborigines and
immigrants within it.

In turn, such action stimulated a wide-ranging debate among intellectuals and elite groups who found themselves propelled into the public spotlight by the occasion. The celebration also drew attention to the tension between Australia as a multicultural nation and its continued reliance on British symbols. The occasion, therefore, served as a catalyst for a 'new Australian spirit' that the media found attractive. The major cultural effect was to reinforce among elites and, to a lesser extent amongst the educated public, the discourse of republicanism as the proper expression of a new national spirit (Hutchinson 1994: 185-191).

The celebration generated heated debates about the adequacy of our symbols of nationhood, the contribution of migrants and Australia’s indigenous heritage. According to republican leaders, the suggested political reforms would ‘complete’ the long journey towards full national autonomy.

5:2.2 The role of the ALP

The republican push was given its greatest impetus when the ALP adopted the republican reform as part of its political program in the early 1990s. The party elites and particularly the then Prime Minister, Paul Keating, played a major role in supporting and publicizing the reform. The republic was represented as the ‘proper institutional framework’ for new national identifications.

One can only speculate about the reason for this enthusiasm in the ALP for the republican and new identity causes. Certainly the collapse of socialism (symbolised by the ‘fall of the wall’ and the demise of the Soviet Union) created an ideological vacuum that needed to be filled by a popular cause. It is also plausible to suggest that Paul Keating was eager to distinguish himself from his Labor predecessor and sponsor, Bob Hawke. Republicanism and a new identification thus came as convenient opportunities to re-invigorate the Labor camp ideologically and to strengthen the political profile of its leader.

Paul Keating acknowledged publicly that he attempted to bring about some sort of
consistency between Australia's political institutions and the reality of a multicultural society located in the Asian region. An Australian republic became synonymous with 'Australia's identity in the Asian region, multiculturalism and citizenship' (McKenna 1996: 254). For Keating, a republic would 'deliver a new sense of unity and national pride'. It would 'deliver a re-cast Australian identity defined by the commitment of Australians to this land above all others' which would unequivocally say 'to the world who we are and what we stand for' (Keating quote in Ryan 1995: 166).

Strong leadership by ALP elites saw an Australian republic placed firmly on the political agenda for the remainder of the 1990s. During the 1990s the ALP put in place a number of programs to prepare the ground for the introduction of a republic. The Republic Advisory Committee was established in April 1993 to examine the issues and develop

an options paper which describes the minimum constitutional changes necessary to achieve a viable Federal Republic of Australia, maintaining the effect of our current conventions and principles of government (An Australian Republic 1993: 1)

In the following year, the Civics Experts Group (CEG) was formed by the Labor government 'to prepare a strategic plan for a non-partisan program of public education on civic issues' (CEG 1994: 3). With the approaching 1996 federal election, the ALP's platform outlined the process for delivering a republic. This included plans for an indicative plebiscite followed by a referendum on the issue. What was required in the early 1990s was an organization that would champion the reform and lead in realizing the plan.

5:3 The emergence of the ARM

It was no accident that the ARM was launched soon after the controversy that surrounded the Bicentennial celebrations and that the launch coincided with the announcement of the ALP political reform agenda. A number of prominent public intellectuals and politicians greeted the organization as an opportunity for engaging the public in the reformist push. For many of them, Australia was a nation that 'did not have sufficient confidence in its own identity' (Turnbull 1993: 89). The vision
of the republic was about Australians defining their nationhood by their commitment to the institutions and ideals of this country. The ARM leaders felt responsible for the formation and development of an organisation that would forge a program of reform and promote an identity that represented the changing face of Australia as a nation. This became the mission of the organized republican movement.

This mission needs to be seen in the context of changing public sentiments. The 1990s represented a period when public support for the republic was fast increasing. There was a resurgence of interest in Australia's identity - its form, content and dynamics (Phillips 1996, Phillips 1998, Warhurst 1993). There was also a readiness to embrace change. A number of those involved in CFD, and who later joined the ARM, were sufficiently influenced by the Bicentennial celebrations to question the adequacy of the monarchy as a political institutional framework for Australia. They were high profile individuals, predominantly baby boomers who formed a 'ginger group' to 'influence the influencers' (Interview 1:17). As a generation unit, they were also representative of the changing face of Australia in that they included Anglo-Celts, migrant intellectuals, academics, high profile media personalities, new political activists and young members of political parties (Keneally 1993, Turnbull 1999). Characteristically, they were highly educated, urban and politically active.

In fact, most of them explicitly acknowledged that their past experiences had a direct influence on the strategic decision of the ARM leaders to focus on a single issue and to adopt a minimalist reform platform. By focusing on the head of state, the leaders and activists avoided a charter that was too broad. They wanted to avoid problems associated with bringing about constitutional reform in Australia. Constitutional reform could be manipulated by political elites aligning themselves against the issue. Minimal change reduced the likelihood of this occurring.

The interviews confirm that the reforms the ARM proposed appealed directly to new public sentiments and identifications. As one activist explained

*when arguing the case for a republic it's about identity, it's about a confidence about ourselves and our place in the world and it's about Australia; our sense of*
purpose, direction and identity and how we project ourselves internally and externally (Interview 20:30).

Others described a republic as ‘leading to a more inclusive form of identity, an identity that would take account of what we are now; a new form of identity, whereas our present identity is very much that of a colony, inextricably linked to the mother country’ (Interview 28:25). The symbolic representation of Australia’s head of state as a framing mechanism was, therefore, strategically significant for the ARM in that it highlighted nationality as a key issue. Nationality, in turn, served the purpose of identifying the inadequacies of past policies.

5:3.1 The development of the ARM

Responsibility for the early stages of the development of the ARM’s minimalist position has been attributed to a small group of high profile individuals located in Sydney. They belonged to a generation that voted for Whitlam and supported CFD. Those leaders and activists formed the nucleus of the organization and used their influence to convince a number of high profile politicians to support the reform program. Their role was to provide leadership and articulate the movement’s identity – its cognitive praxis.

Movement intellectuals included Franca Arena, the former New South Wales Labor member and the ex-Premier of New South Wales, Neville Wran. Both Arena and Wran have been credited with conceiving the idea of the ARM. Arena had long argued in the early stages of the republican push for the formation of a non-partisan national committee of prominent Australians to lead the republican debate (McKenna 1996:249). The successful development of the organization was the achievement of Malcolm Turnbull.

From its inception the ARM leadership recognised the strategic importance of remaining politically neutral. Bipartisanship was seen as a primary objective and as a key condition for success. One leader captured it this way:
Look at the history of referenda in Australia and you can see without bipartisanship you have got a very, very, very slim chance of getting not only a majority of people, but a majority of people in the majority of states (Interview 15:16)

It was for that reason that Neville Wran chose to stay in the background (Turnbull 1999: 3). He was recognised as a skillful negotiator and strategist and worked closely with Franca Arena in the setting up of the ARM and guiding the movement throughout the 1990s.

The key actors understood that for the ARM to be a success they needed to energise the republican debate. Neville Wran’s proposal was that the ARM needed ‘to put together a small committee of visible and markedly Australian people who would enunciate the republican credo’ (Keneally 1993: 79). Their reputation needed to be such that as a body they were representative and respected. The success of the organization depended, above all, on the mobilization of intellectual charisma, and strategic access to the media. The initial membership was, therefore, broadly based and representative.

The author Tom Keneally was to be chairman: he was joined by Donald Horne and Geoff Dutton, also authors and long-time republicans, along with journalists Geraldine Doogue and Mark Day. The business world was represented by myself, Franco Belgiorno, founder of the Transfield engineering firm, and David Hill, then the general manager of the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) (Turnbull 1999: 3).

Tom Keneally was ARM chair from 1991 to 1993: Malcolm Turnbull occupied the role from 1993-1999. Turnbull shaped the ARM by forging its program, writing books, debating the issue on the media and directing the strategic operations of the organization. His ‘strength and intellect’ was widely recognised, particularly within the ARM. He exhibited a certain intellectual charisma that appealed to the media and to the intellectual strata. In fact, he has been described as a ‘very successful icon who was sought out by the media’ (Interview 14).

Although ‘charisma’ was seldom used to describe the intellectuals that made up the ARM, it has been acknowledged that what attracted many to the organization was the high caliber of leaders. They were described as ‘generating a certain energy’
Interview 17:18), as having 'powerful personalities' (Interview 19:18), 'strength of intellect' (Interview 9:36), and 'personal authority' (Interview 8:13) that were articulated through their political reform program. This recognition of leadership and charisma proved an important asset in the republican campaign – a key 'resource' generated and mobilized by the ARM.

5:4 The formal structure of the ARM

By the end of the 1990s the ARM had evolved into a three tiered organization. It included a federal level, a state level and a national campaign level. The three tiers represented the outcome of a devolution process that continued in the ARM throughout the 1990s.

Although, the three levels were hierarchical in an organizational sense, the chain of command between the various tiers has been described as loose and informal (Interview 12:99). The federal level included the Board of Directors. The Board provided the legal responsibility for the ARM but had no real power beyond its corporate statutory role. Those on the Board of Directors were represented on the National Management Committee, the ARM's policy making body. They included Franca Arena, Mark Day, Libby Greig, Donald Horne, Tom Keneally, Neville Wran, and Michael Ward. The National Management Committee also included the Chair, Tom Keneally (from 1991 to 1993) and then Malcolm Turnbull (from 1993 to 1999), as well as the Deputy Chair, Marise Payne (from 1994 to 1997) and then Wendy Machin (from 1997 to 1999). The founders of the ARM were also included, together with a number of people who were co-opted on to the committee as the need arose (Interview 7:99, 12:99).

The National Management Committee was not formally elected. Incoming members were usually selected and adopted by the Chair and the Committee worked on the basis of consensus. The role of the National Management Committee changed once state branches had been established and the Constitutional Convention accepted the ARM's model (Interview 9, 12, 13).

Although up until 1994, the ARM leaders maintained tight control, the organization
began to expand as state branches became established; first in Melbourne in February 1992, closely followed by the ACT, then Perth and Adelaide in 1993. Those branches did not, however, become state incorporated associations until 1994. From 1994, a new structure was established in each state; first in Brisbane in April 1994, followed by Adelaide, Perth and Tasmania. This structure gave more autonomy to the branches. Branches were also formed at the University of Sydney, University of NSW and the University of Adelaide. The University of Tasmania branch was part of the ARM state branch. The state and university branches were gradually formalised once their constitutions had been prepared. They were represented at the National Management Committee meetings by their leaders or representatives either in person or by phone. Often there would be a phone hook-up of state representatives before the National Management Committee met (Interview 9, 12).

In the mid 1990s the ARM started to organize state forums – public meetings and campaigns. As forums began to be established, first in NSW and then in the other states, the movement took on a different level of development. By 1995, the National Management Committee was no longer the operational centre of the ARM; the focus had shifted to the states. The state forums transformed the ARM from a centralised organization to one that was fairly decentralised. The state forums were able to shape tactical moves, issue media statements when necessary, as well as being responsible for organizing functions, attracting members and renewing membership (Interview 9:99).

The formal structure of the ARM increased in complexity with the introduction of the National Campaign. As the republican campaign gained momentum, the national campaign office took on greater responsibility. It was during this period that the ARM leaders recognised they could no longer rely on their volunteers and part time people and so appointed professionals in each state to lead the campaign (Interview 7:99). With the announcement of the referendum in 1999 the role of the states altered yet again.

Once the membership of the government-appointed 'Yes' committee had been
announced in February '99, a smaller national campaign committee was formed which overlapped with the government-appointed committee (Interview 7:99). The group included Andrew Robb, Peter Barron, Karin Sowada and Malcolm Turnbull. Greg Barns was appointed ARM campaign director from June '99, and together with Neville Wran became an ex-officio member of the committee. In reality, the leadership group included six people who became the political strategists for the organization ‘and had the blessing of the ARM and of the official ‘yes’ advertising committee’ (Interview 7:99). Professional campaign managers were appointed in each state to work with the forums and direct the campaign. The state campaign managers worked closely with the smaller national campaign committee throughout this period.

The formal structure of the ARM was thus shaped from above by the leaders in a number of steps. For the first four years the organization had a centralized structure and it was controlled from Sydney with a Board of Directors, Chair, Deputy Chair, and the National Management Committee. In 1994 branches became semi-autonomous state-incorporated associations with their own constitutions and state committees.

The leadership of the ARM introduced strategies that were designed to coordinate activities, to publicize the republic and to build consensus. The forums in particular were essential in making the republic relevant to the people. Forums provided a venue for leaders and activists to engage different groups in discussing the reform proposals. They were quite effective in reaching different segments of the population and promoting a new vision for Australia (Interview 32:10).

5:5 The key activities – mobilizing political resources

Although the ARM was initially established as a ‘ginger group’ and operated as a national management committee, the leadership acknowledged that the success of the reform program depended on the ability to involve the public. The ARM recognised that as an organization it was essential to move from a small group controlled by elites to one that linked with national constituencies. Strategically this
was a demanding period in the mobilization process.

In the early stages the organization concentrated on gaining the support of the media and attracting those high profile individuals. Later, the efforts were directed towards broadening the appeal of the organization and gaining the respect and attention of the media. The media was seen as very important for amplifying and consolidating the republican issues (Interview 1:21). Many described the media as a major force in their push for a republic, particularly ‘in getting a fair hearing for the ARM and vital in getting a successful referendum up’ (Interview 13:30).

This was the domain where the role of public intellectuals was particularly important. The major dailies were cited as the most supportive in mobilizing support for the issue. The **Australian**, in particular, was considered as a leader, ‘a key player and a very important medium for bringing the debate to the people’.

One activist described The Australian as presenting a ‘national record of big picture issues as opposed to news, crime and local corruption and that the republic fitted neatly into that policy’. As a national daily they printed and published wide-ranging opinion on stories about the republic and issues connected with the republic. They were ‘interested in questions of national identity and Aboriginal issues. Aboriginal issues also fitted into that search for national identity and what an Australian republic could do for Australia’. In fact many felt that as a newspaper The Australian had ‘tracked and fostered the republican debate more than any other media outlet’ (Interview 32:29). Paul Kelly was cited as both influential and insightful and as having an ‘incisive mind of the highest order’ and providing leadership through out the period (Interview 32:30).

Although the ARM leadership was effective in capturing the attention of the media, some within the ARM felt that the tendency to focus on The Australian and The Sydney Morning Herald may have been restrictive. They felt that their arguments were best presented in different formats and that there was a need to focus on newspapers such as the **Telegraph Mirror**. As one activist explained
such newspapers use a totally different language. Most of the people who read The Australian and The Sydney Morning Herald have already made up their minds; we are not going to shift a lot of people there but in the Telegraph Mirror we are talking to a very different group.

The same strategy applied to commercial television. Rather than taking a condescending view, some felt that it was important to present the republican view in a form the people liked, that was acceptable and that media commentators recognised. For the message to reach all the people, it was important to be genuinely interested in the way that people might think and react to issues. Many recognised that it was more comfortable and easier to go with the national dailies and the ABC ‘because the journalists and commentators were by and large on side but for the ARM it was not where the debate was going to be won or lost’ (Interview 22:44).

There were also peaks and troughs in the media mobilization process. In the early stages of consensus mobilization the ARM attracted much media attention. The issue according to one leader had ‘a heretical, sacrilegious, blasphemous zing to it. All of us were constitutional Salman Rushdies for a while and everyone wanted to talk to us’ (Interview 2:20). With the change in government in 1996 came a shift in the ‘fashionable edge of the issue’. The basic premise did not change but the ‘Liberal swing meant that the ARM would need to find different strategies to reach the people as well as the new government’ (Interview 14:46). This period was described as ‘a limbo’, a waiting period for the ARM leadership as they took stock of the situation and anticipated which direction the government would take.

The media campaign was supplemented by the setting up of forums in each state. This was an important phase directed at mobilizing supporters as well as generating financial backing through fund raising activities and an increase in membership. Although during this period the ARM ‘was primarily an eastern seaboard organization, the fastest growing membership was in Western Australian and South Australia’ (Interview 25:6). The membership base was not, however, as broad as that of the Environment or the Greens movement. While the leaders and activists
were passionate about an Australian republic, it was difficult to arouse the same
degree of passion in terms of membership. It was also difficult to strike a balance in
terms of consolidation and mobilization. As one activist explained

The ARM has always had to balance the tension that exists with mass movements,
because if you want to have a large membership you can't afford to charge a large
membership fee. If you don't have a large membership fee, say forty or fifty dollars
a year, you are actually going to lose money servicing those members. If you
charge people five dollars or ten dollars a year and send them a couple of
newsletters, do any basic kind of servicing of them, you are actually going to lose a
lot of money, so we have taken the view that we have just got to strike a balance
between being a movement that has got a lot of members and is open to everybody,
but also not creating this membership, administrative nightmare that we then can't
afford to manage (Interview 7).

During this period the ARM was also sustained financially through the key leaders
within the organization. Many recognised the considerable support given by
Neville Wran and Malcolm Turnbull and acknowledged that 'the ARM would have
gone nowhere without their financial backing and the fact that they made their
offices available'. It was their combined influence that generated a network of
major names and an organizational structure that was able to sustain the movement
until the referendum (Interview 19:00).

Perhaps the most important stage in the mobilization process was when the ARM
recognised how essential it was for the organization to move to a much broader
church. The focus for this phase of consensus mobilization was to engage the
people and win grassroots support. Broad public support was considered crucial if
the republican reform program was to be delivered. As one activist explained

It was important that the rest of the community saw the movement as supported by a
broad range of people, people from different backgrounds, from different socio-
economic classes, from different ethnic backgrounds (Interview 16:8).

At the same time the ARM was required to devise strategies that would appeal to
various groups and social categories. That process resembled a ripple effect
whereby the ARM targeted those close to the heart of the organization and then
capitalised on the skills of those individuals to reach out to groups in the community. For example, in the early 1990s, the ARM captured the imagination of a number of university students who were prepared to set up branches at universities in various states. They provided a voice for presenting and debating the issues with guest speakers from both sides. Some were invited to join the National Committee as the ‘voice of youth’, and then continued their work at various levels in the community.

In its campaign to reach out to the people and mobilize consensus, the ARM was required to address the diversity of certain segments of the population. Strategically, the ARM leaders recognised that some groups were more likely than others to challenge the ARM’s position. There were degrees of difference, with those who would always remain ‘difficult to convince’, to those who were supportive but required different strategies. For example, although the ARM remained confident that they could rely on ethnic minorities for support, they were also aware that they needed to treat the minorities with a degree of sensitivity. The ARM leadership acted cautiously – if the push was to come from migrant groups it could prove counter productive and create divisions in the community (Interview 30:40). The representatives of ethnic minorities were also aware of how the debate could be misconstrued if the focus was on the ethnic composition of the nation. They responded by being supportive of an Australian republic, but not loud and overt in that support. In this case, the ARM leadership relied on ethnic leaders to mobilize ‘quiet’ support within their communities, and to assist in the ARM’s campaign in the lead up to the referendum.

The ARM also strategically targeted ‘constituencies’. They included the young, the elderly, women, rural dwellers, as well as ‘progressives’ from both the major and minor political parties. Although young people were identified by opinion polls as the strongest supporters of a republic, many in the ARM recognised that they often lacked passionate commitment to the reform program (interview 27:20).

The ARM leaders and activists also acknowledged that gaining the support of the elderly was problematic. The elderly belonged to a generation that still remembered
the Queen’s tour in 1954, and they tended to be fearful of change (Interview 8:32). Older women also needed convincing – they were generally less educated and much more ambivalent about moving to a republic (Interview 11:22). The one group that was considered the most difficult to convince was the rural population (Interview 14:24). In dealings with rural audiences the ARM leadership attempted to reassure rather than convince. They did this by identifying leaders within the ARM that those from the rural community could trust and identify with. They also relied on prominent people in the community, those whom the people respected (Interview 21:9).

In NSW, a number of Coalition supporters aligned themselves with the ARM’s reform program. They included Marise Payne, a prominent Liberal party figure and senator, who became deputy chair of the ARM in 1994. Wendy Machin, a former National Party cabinet minister in New South Wales joined the ARM and replaced Marise Payne as deputy chair in 1997. Andrew Robb, a former national director of the Liberal Party became involved with the ARM as founder of Conservatives for an Australian Head of State. He ‘enlisted the support of many leading business figures and others on his side of the political spectrum’ (Turnbull 1999: 82).

With the lead up to the Constitutional Convention, the ARM also recruited a number of high profile figures from Victoria. They included Eddie McGuire, a celebrity and natural communicator, Steve Vizard, a corporate lawyer-turned-television producer, Poppy King, the young lipstick entrepreneur, Mary Delahunty, the then ABC radio and television journalist and Lindsay Fox, the trucking magnate. Some made substantial contributions (Turnbull 1999: 30).

The supporters in other states also included high profile figures who lead the ticket for the Constitutional Convention. They included Janet Holmes à Court from Western Australia, Michael Lavarch from Queensland, former Liberal Senator Baden Teague from South Australia and Julian Green, a farmer and former politician from Tasmania. They formed a strong network and gave a focus to the campaign in their state.
5:5.1 Making the connection
The pro-republican elites centred their campaign on the symbolic representation of Australia’s head of state, and ensuring that an Australian head of state was instituted by the Centenary of Federation. They conveyed their message by drawing attention to the fact that the current arrangement was out of step with social change, and that many Australians were uncomfortable with a foreign monarch being their head of state (Horne 2001: 265). Such a focus served the purpose of highlighting ‘those very important symbols of identity’ and avoiding the difficult issue of constitutional reform (Interview 20:15).

As noted by Guibernau (1996) symbols are critical for nation building. They draw people together by inculcating a sense of belonging, and at the same time they reinforce the idea of belonging to a collectivity, a particular nation. The republican leaders also stress this point and refer to symbols as heightening ‘people’s awareness of, and sensitivity to, their community’. But symbols also reflect change. Symbolic representations are part of the cultural equipment for dealing with the future. In other words, symbols need to be constantly reinterpreted, and even re-created, in order to avoid the danger of becoming stereotyped, decorative or meaningless.

As one activist explained:

the ARM always recognised the importance of symbolism in demonstrating the change process, particularly changes such as cutting our ties with Britain and asserting Australia’s place as an independent nation, able to stand on its own two feet – that is expressing a new vision for Australia (Interview 32:10).

For the ARM leaders, the minimalist model was both pragmatic and fundamental in that it avoided the complexities of broader constitutional change. The minimalist model involved replacing the Queen with an Australian head of state elected by the parliament. Such a position, however, was at odds with some segments of elites – they expected greater and far more reaching changes. Despite the divisions in the broader republican movement, the ARM leadership kept promoting its minimalist model as ‘consensual’. Such a strategy was effective in the political arena
(particularly with political elites in the ALP). It was less appealing to the public. The public had more radical expectations, and were leaning towards a popularly elected head of state. The ARM rejected the radical option of constitutional reform as too risky and too divisive and impossible to negotiate through the referendum (Interview 8:53).

This highlighted a number of strategic and tactical dilemmas faced by the ARM leaders. Should they stick to the minimalist program and risk a popular backlash (coming from the radical republicans), or open the maximalist option, a popular election of president, and face a serious division within political elites? Should they continue the ‘top down’ mobilization and risk the perception of ‘elitism’, or embrace a more populist tactic (in the words of one activist ‘put more pub into the republic’) and risk losing control of the campaign?

These tensions became more apparent as the ARM leaders began mobilizing grassroots support in preparation for the republican referendum. As the state branches became active and the ARM began to ‘get to the people and get feedback from the people’, the republican reform program gradually took on a greater level of complexity. This was particularly the case with the range of options and the level of grassroots input. Grassroots input revealed a multiplicity of voices: each state had its own local peculiarities, its different strengths and weaknesses that impacted on the ability of the ARM to establish programmatic coherence. The ARM recognised that ‘grassroots membership was critical in those centres outside Sydney. They played a key role in generating local debate, getting leaflets into boxes, fighting the local battles and making sure the issue was represented accurately in the local media’ (Interview 32:9). It also gave ‘the people’ an opportunity to voice their preference.

What had begun as a grassroots campaign to bring the republic to the people soon started to manifest itself as a strategic tension. More involvement by the ‘public’ had the capacity to weaken the coherence of the reform program. Making the connection exposed a number of tensions that became increasingly difficult for the ARM leadership to resolve during the referendum campaign.
5:6 Conclusion

As the republican push gained pace, the ARM became the strategic centre for the movement. It attracted the high caliber intellectuals who effectively publicised the republican issues, forged a coherent program of reform – a key aspect of their cognitive praxis – and publicised it through the mass media. Their stature lent credibility to the republican cause. Through an extensive network of state and regional chapters, the ARM mobilized wide public support, especially among the educated and young urban strata. Last but not least, the core ARM activists cultivated political connections and helped in collecting money for the campaign. It thus effectively mobilized political resources and utilized the opportunity structure provided by the Bicentenary celebrations and the ALP’s ideological re-orientation. The republican movement directed by the ARM leaders appeared, therefore, to have a very good chance in winning majority support in the referendum. On the eve of the referendum, however, it became fractured as the ARM leaders faced – and failed to resolve – the strategic and tactical dilemmas.

The divisions within the leadership were initially played down and patched up. During the campaign, however, the tension arose and strengthened, due partly to the pressures coming from the opponents of the republic. The latter were championed by a powerful and influential figure – the Prime Minister.

Chapter 6 analyses the forms and the consequences of the divisions within the republican elites. The chapter embodies the third set conditions necessary for successful political reform – that of consensual elite action. The republican elites, I argue, were unable to resolve the dilemmas of mobilization which further exacerbated the divisions within their ranks. Those divisions, in turn, opened the way for orchestrated campaigns by opponents of republic, and affected the ARM’s reform program in a number of significant ways.
CHAPTER 6 REPUBLICAN ELITES AND THE DILEMMA OF
MOBILIZATION

6:1 Introduction

This chapter looks at ‘elite’ factors involved in the push for an Australian republic. It has three aims: to analyse the beliefs of republican elites, to demonstrate the strength of civic commitments among ARM leaders, the elite of the republican movement and to comment on the consequences of the unresolved ‘dilemmas of mobilization’. The impact of these unresolved dilemmas on intra-elite consensus is discussed in the final section.

The divisions that emerged within the republican camp and in the broader ranks of Australian political elite on the eve of the referendum critically affected the outcome of the republican push. The 1999 referendum did not deliver the expected majority support for the ‘minimalist’ republican option. The failure of the referendum to legitimize the republican reform was to a large extent an elite failure, a failure to resolve strategic and tactical dilemmas that arose during the successful pro-republican campaign. The strategic dilemma centred on the following: the republican leaders could either follow the radical-libertarian rhetoric of their campaign and propose an equally radical reform – but risk being bogged down in difficult constitutional changes, or they could tone down the radical rhetoric of mobilization and propose a reform that did not radically alter the constitution – but at the risk of disappointing many supporters and triggering more radical, populist-libertarian dissent. They adopted the second option (in fact, this choice was made in the early stages of the republican campaign) and consequently faced the second horn of the mobilization dilemma. While this mobilization relied on a radical appeal for ‘public appropriation’ of the Australian republic and tapped into the widespread civic nationalist, libertarian and egalitarian sentiments, the proposed solution was a ‘minimalist model’. The model was conservative and it was based
on political expediency. It was a cautious attempt at a minimal reform that stood in clear contrast with the radical rhetoric of republicanism. It was bound to disappoint the more radical libertarians and it made the ARM vulnerable to divisions and to manipulation by the opponents of the reform.

Moreover, the republican leadership had problems with resolving a lesser tactical dilemma. While the republican rhetoric was populist, egalitarian and participatory, there was little attempt – apart from the decentralization of the ARM structure – to involve the mass public. This led to accusations of 'elitism' and facilitated the mobilization of the 'populist' faction under a demagogic slogan: 'No to the politicians' republic'. The irony, of course, was that this faction was lead by seasoned politicians.

As noted in Chapter 2, significant political outcomes depend on elite consensual action within the parameters set by the orientations of mass publics. Therefore, the division within the republican camp, and the split within the broader political elite, was fatal for the outcome of the referendum campaign. It was not just a matter of divisions intensifying elite competition. Competition between elite groups is unavoidable and persistent. Issues can be manipulated and conflicts can be sharpened or defused. But a division over strategic issues, such as the republican reform, creates an intra-elite rift that is hard to bridge – and spells doom for reformist attempts.

6:2 Beliefs and values of republican elites

The beginning of the republican campaign was quite successful. The decision by the ARM to target the nationality of the head of state as the centre piece of its reform program drew public attention to the broader issues of nation building. It specifically highlighted the incompatibility between mass identities and the political constitution that accepted the British monarch as the Australian head of state. This was at the time when Australia's principal institutions and popular lifestyles started to reflect the cultural diversity of Australian society. As Jupp (1997) argued, the disputes over national identity were difficult to ignore, and they were couched in popular egalitarian rhetoric that reverberated well with the mass public and liberal
intellectuals. Republican leaders emphasised the growing cultural heterogeneity of the nation and they questioned the socio-political and socio-cultural hegemony of the British-derived majority. They focused on the right of all Australian citizens to aspire to the nation's highest office and emphasised the fact that many popular assumptions central to the old Brito-Australian national identity could no longer be sustained. For many it was moving away from an Australia characterised as Anglo-Saxon and Anglo-Celtic to an Australia that was inclusive.

*Many people cannot understand why someone who is not an Australian, never will be an Australian, will never live here, is our first citizen. The psychology of having an Australian who is our first citizen, who understands us and is one of us will have a huge impact on how we see ourselves. It will certainly bring the poles a lot closer together* (Interview 25:22).

The old position, it was claimed, was no longer sustainable because of the re-orientation of Australian politics and economy towards the South East Asian region, because of the multicultural composition of Australian society and because of the recognition of the rights of indigenous peoples. Multiculturalism insisted on the salience of cultural difference and brought into question the very nature of what constitutes a 'true' and 'full' Australian identity. It 'played an important role in developing a distinctive “Australian” outlook freed from its British origins and its backward-looking nationalism' (Jupp in Stokes 1997: 143). The ARM reflected these changes. In fact many of the ARM leaders felt that

*an Australian head of state demonstrated Australia's growing sense of confidence and provided a mechanism for recognising the changing ethnic composition of Australia as a nation. It embraced those democratic values which made the idea of a monarchy less relevant. The monarchy was seen as obsolete and no longer capable of portraying a new Australian identity* (Interview 8:63, 8:64).

The form of identity that the ARM leaders expressed and promoted was based on civic foundations: on a multicultural Australia in which full membership of the national collectivity is open to all citizens who share a 'commitment to democracy, a commitment to a tolerant and a diverse society and who recognise the centrality of egalitarianism in those traditions’ (Interview 7:15). Becoming a republic was therefore seen as a 'chance to show the world a tolerant nation state' (Horne in
Hudson & Carter 1993: 218). Those sentiments were to appeal to the ‘hearts and minds’ of the Australian people, particularly to the young and idealistic baby boomers, liberal intellectuals, indigenous Australians, immigrants and ethnic groups. They were central to the personal beliefs and values of pro-republican elites. The interviews clearly reveal this centrality.

The Australian Republican Movement represents a clear break from certain forms of identity, particularly that linked to Britain. From my involvement in the movement and from the people that I have met it’s that sense of sharing, sense of belonging, a civic form of identity, rather than an isolationist, turning Australia into a fortress type of identity (Interview 21:19).

The values expressed by the republican leaders were also embraced by political elites in the ALP, in particular, by Paul Keating, the then Prime Minister. Labor elites embraced the values expressed by the ARM leadership, and they supported the ARM’s republican push and the minimalist reform model as a ‘low risk’ solution. This commonality initially gave strength to the republican campaign (particularly in the early stage of mobilization) and politically sustained the leadership of the ARM throughout the 1990s.

The ALP connection, however, became a liability with the resounding victory of the Coalition in the 1996 federal elections. The republican program became associated with the defeated Labor elite in spite of desperate attempts to remodel it as bi-partisan. Moreover, the socially conservative leader of the Coalition, John Howard, seized the opportunity to strengthen his conservative credentials by publicly opposing the republican reform as unnecessary, potentially disruptive and partisan in its inspiration.

Initially, however, the push progressed well. Commitment to the ARM’s reform program by political leaders and civic activists evoked a sense of national effervescence. The leaders felt an urge ‘to fully participate in society – to help to create it and shape it; to share its benefits and to ensure that others were given the opportunity to share in its benefits’ (Interview 18:36). Republican leaders encouraged this participatory civic spirit described as a ‘strong moral obligation to
the state to which as a citizen you are bound by law' (Interview 36:27). Such a strong sense of civic obligation has also been described as a form of patriotism in which national identity 'takes precedence over a host of other types of identity, such as family, class, gender, even ... religion' (Taylor in Beiner 1999: 228).

The republican campaign soon adopted a heady, radical rhetoric appealing to the highest values. In fact, the republican movement was described by some as 'a harbinger of a new values shift' towards a more tolerant and libertarian civic culture. In many ways the ARM encouraged such a description and cultivated an image of a 'value-driven movement'. The leaders and activists of the ARM saw the republic as a 'symbolic issue about people’s values' and a new tolerant society. It was about 'putting in place a better constitutional arrangement and values system' more appropriate for such a plural and tolerant society (Interview 24:39). Many leaders recognised that going from a monarchy to a republic would mean a huge shift for those who benefited from the status quo, as well as undermining established political traditions. Despite this, they saw their role as articulators of a more universalistic ideology – a ‘set of values that had come to the fore and that needed to be reflected in the constitution’ (Interview 24:41). Those values were expressed in universalistic terms, as values for ‘all Australians’, as acceptable to people from different cultures and diverse socio-political backgrounds.

The value repertoire evoked by the ARM leaders was quite broad – and in many ways vague, lacking a clear definition. The republican leaders declared a commitment to the notions of tolerance, inclusiveness and egalitarianism. This provided a platform for the integration of equality and unity as pre-eminent values of the movement, and as a value basis for the proposed institutional reform. One interviewee captured well that high level of commitment and involvement.

*To me it actually has the potential to be the surrogate for a really great possibility for unity and reconciliation, which doesn’t mean that it’s going to be effortless and it won’t be without its moments of tension and conflict, but I actually think that it’s headed towards [resolution] and it has got resolution marked all over it* (Interview 11:30).
Those sentiments resonated well with the public, as revealed by public opinion polls showing a steady growth of pro-republican attitudes. The republican cause provided a connection between an Australian republic and popular civic nationalism. Republicanism, in fact, was promoted as a popular idiom of Australian civic engagement and as an expression of 'national spirit'.

6:2.1 What it means to be truly Australian

There was agreement amongst public intellectuals and leaders of the ARM that what it means to be truly Australian had changed overtime. Those changes were attributed to the transformation of Australian society over the last generation. Today's Australia was far more 'outward looking', 'a multi-ethnic society' and a multicultural nation that had resulted in 'a maturing of Australia as a nation' (Interview 30:41). That change was credited to a combination of the political and economic re-orientation towards Asia, the diversity of people that had come to the country, recognition of the indigenous heritage, an increase in the education level, as well as a progressive weakening of Australia's 'umbilical' ties with Great Britain (Interviews 13:20, 21:35).

Many identified social inclusiveness amongst Australians as an essential quality of being 'truly Australian'. In particular, they stressed the importance of accepting social diversity and being 'judged on the basis of what I do and how I perform, rather than where I was born or any class-based characteristics' (Interview 24:21). The interview data reveal a common theme of 'Australian egalitarianism, Australian casualness and the acceptance of equality — those characteristics that have made Australians distinctive' (Interview 27:33). There was also a strongly held view and appreciation of Australian's capacity and willingness to accept those from other than Anglo-Celtic cultures. Australia was described as a country 'that lacked very sharply divided ethnic tensions ... a country where no one ever asks 'where do you really come from?' (Interview 21:21, 19:50). One republican leader expressed the essence of being Australian this way:

For me multicultural diversity is critical. I'm of that generation where Anglo-Celtic is no longer some overwhelming majority that I have to conform to. That sense of being Australian is so far removed from what I consider to be truly Australian. I
am very much part of the 90s generation so for me being Australian is inextricably tied to a multicultural, multi ethnic-society. (Interview 30:25).

At the same time, many expressed a personal vision in which this cultural pluralism fused with 'core values' of democracy, tolerance and egalitarianism – all embedded in the nation’s core institutions. Overwhelmingly, that vision was expressed in civic terms. Australian laws and political system should serve as a symbol of recognition and celebration of social inclusiveness. That civic commitment reflected the leaders' shared understanding of and expectation as to what the republican movement could deliver; it united them throughout the republican campaign in the 1990s and provided meaning to the organization and its supporters.

The dominant view that prevailed among the republican leaders was that a republic would strengthen social unity and value consensus. This unity would be a truly 'national unity' transcending all socio-economic, socio-political and socio-cultural divisions. Patriotism was expressed as a positive and unifying concept, as a shared commitment to the core liberal-egalitarian values that makes one 'truly Australian'. It was also seen as bringing a new strength to Australia's identity as a nation – a tolerant multicultural nation. For the leaders and activists of the ARM, such a 'common value' perspective provided an emotional and rational drawcard for reaching out to the 'hearts and minds' of the people. It was a way of bringing people together and bringing the past and the present together. This civic-national value vision played a major role in mobilising public support for the republican cause among the educated and libertarian baby boomers.

6:2.2 Republicanism and patriotism

Patriotism is typically defined as a strong commitment to one’s country and its interests. It ‘characteristically involves a regard not just for one’s own nation, but for the particular characteristics and merits and achievements of one’s own nation’ (MacIntyre in Beiner 1995: 209 – 210). To add to the complexity, ‘patriotism’ is often used interchangeably with ‘nationalism’. A ‘possible distinction being that patriotism implies an emotion while nationalism connotes a conscious ideological stance’ (Penguin 1988: 261).
Although the interviewees expressed quite diverse views on the relationship between republicanism, patriotism and nationalism, there was general agreement that patriotism was a positive term. It provided a sense of justification and historical relevance for the story of Australia’s progress as a nation. The adjective ‘national’ was used with caution; it usually indicated the changing nature of national identification by large segments of the population. The ARM leadership felt strategically constrained in articulating the reform program as a form of nationalism. The term was too negatively charged, especially for libertarian audiences. Rather than engaging in ‘nationalist’ rhetoric, the republican leaders stressed ‘Australianness’ and (less frequently) ‘patriotism’ and they relied on the symbolic representation of an Australian head of state to encapsulate the republican message.

‘Patriotism’, like ‘Austalianness’, was articulated in civic terms. Patriotism provided an emotional link between the past and the present and, in the eyes of the leaders, gave the republican cause a sense of continuity and consistency. It was described as representing a synthesis of national experience. Such a view carried with it a notion that leaders had a specific obligation and responsibility to the public in articulating and synthesising socio-political changes. Patriotism recognised an emotional attachment to the nation, as well as a solidarity with co-citizens regardless of their cultural backgrounds and traditions. In statements of republican leaders, ‘the citizen’ takes precedence over other forms of identity.

The ARM leaders recognised that in a culturally diverse society patriotism – a sense of civic unity – was instrumental in promoting a vision of Australian society as tolerant, inclusive and egalitarian. Multicultural societies such as Australia, therefore, reinforced the notion that political culture must serve as the common denominator for a constitutional patriotism which simultaneously sharpens an awareness of the multiplicity and integrity of the different forms of life which coexist in a multicultural society (Habermas in Beiner 1995: 264).
An expression of how an inclusive society was defined was reinforced by Australia's move to a republic. An Australian republic formed 'that central civic idea that defines Australians. A civic Australian patriotism becomes possible only with Australia becoming a republic' (Interview 1:13).

Australian patriotism and republicanism were thus regarded by the ARM leaders as complementary. 'The idea of repatriating Australia's head of state to ourselves' was described as an 'opportunity to increase our level of patriotism' (Interview 24:27). For some, appealing to patriotic ideals was seen as a catalyst for the ARM achieving its goal, as well as taking that final step in an evolving national identity. As one interviewee explained – 'for most people, if they vote for a republic, it will be essentially because it appeals to their love of country more than anything else. It appeals to their patriotism and their sense of where they are' (Interview 10:42).

Linking the republic with a sense of Australian patriotism was strategic and tactical — it was seen as a mechanism for broad effective mobilization of public support and as guaranteeing the success of the reform program.

Although many saw the issue of Australian patriotism and a republic as facilitating the change process and enabling Australia to evolve and develop as a nation, they were also aware of the dangers. They recognised that some would see an Australian republic as a threat to Australian traditions and symbols, and that an Australian republic had the capacity to divide the people along cultural-educational lines. They expressed those views in different ways:

*I think some do see republicanism as undermining patriotism, but I think they are generally older Australians who have seen the flag and monarchy and Australia as one. For them the danger that the republican movement represents is that those symbols of unity are now being threatened; they are beginning to be disassociated and separated* (Interview 18:47).

There was also recognition that an Australian republic might not only threaten certain segments of the population, but that it could be easily misconstrued. Some feared that republicanism may acquire sectarian connotations. It was in danger of being seen 'as a radical idea, even a Catholic idea, particularly amongst some older
members of society who still associated republicanism with Irish Catholicism'. Many accepted the fact that those opposed to an Australian republic would, include 'many older Anglicans and that it would take time for those religious connotations to fade' (Interview 20:33).

Despite those fears, the connection between patriotism and republicanism was regarded by the interviewees as a necessity, a tactical imperative. They depicted Britain's contribution to Australia's national identity as an important but superseded 'building block'. 'What we fought for in the two world wars' was also described as 'building blocks' that contributed to our current sense of belonging. They also described Australia's move to a republic as an update, a necessary modification and a valuable end product. For them national identification was an evolutionary process that represented something that was 'quintessentially patriotic'.

I think an Australian republic will reinforce patriotism in the sense that it will make people feel that they have a reasonable destiny and a reasonable influence of their own in the world and in the region. That's already happening, but I think we are going to be immensely more credible when we are unambiguously our own people by self definition, by our forms and formulae, so I think it will increase patriotism (Interview 2:15).

6:2.3 Patriotism and civic nationalism

The connection between patriotism and nationalism has been described by Taylor (1997) in terms of civic nationalism providing the intellectual underpinning for patriotism, and patriotism providing the emotional fuel for nationalism. He argues that this can be done in two distinct ways. The first is by thinking 'of patriotism as a strong citizen identification' in terms of a political allegiance based on 'ethnic, linguistic, cultural, or religious identity'. Patriotism is therefore engendered in terms of ethno-national factors. The second connection that can be made between nationalism and patriotism is directed at politically defining the 'patria'. Patriotism is therefore defined in terms of 'I love my fatherland, and what makes it essentially mine is its laws' (Taylor 1997: 40). The connection in the second case can be attributed to an understanding of patriotism in relation to the political circumstances of one's nation. In this sense, patriotism blends with civic nationalism the latter
being a form of national identity appropriate for a ‘new Australia’.

As noted above, the key actors of the ARM expressed the changing form of Australia’s identity as a nation in terms of the political, cultural and demographic transformation of Australian society since WW II. They embraced cultural difference and recognised the potential and strength of couching an Australian identity in civic terms. A culturally diverse society exposed inconsistencies in Australia’s political institutions that needed to be addressed. By identifying symbols that related to a new identity, the ARM leaders saw themselves as sending a powerful message to different groups: you are an integral part of the nation, a core element of a ‘new Australia’ and your task is to adjust the political institutions to this new socio-cultural shape of the Australian nation.

An Australian republic was in the eyes of the leaders, instrumental in differentiating between past forms of nationalism and a new form of nationalism that emphasised different aspects of ‘new Australianness’. ‘The issue of Australian patriotism, of Australians standing up for their country and wishing to be part of it, links very nicely with that situation’. Republicanism did not in anyway reinforce that nationalist chauvinism of Australia’s past - that male and white Anglo-Saxon nationalism that existed during the first fifty or sixty years of Australia’s development as a nation (Interview 13:25).

There were some, however, who expressed a degree of ambivalence or uneasiness in describing an Australian republic in national-patriotic terms. They wanted to distance themselves from a nationalist rhetoric that implied the extremes of nationalist fervour and insisted on clearly distinguishing between those old connotations of Australian nationalism and a new form of Australian civic nationalism.

... It depends on what you mean by nationalism. The problem with the word ‘nationalism’ is that it has negative connotations, but if by ‘nationalism’ you’re saying when people think about Australia and Australians that instead of connoting
a British country still linked to the queen, you think Australia, a young country in the South East Asian region, a land with people who are committed to notions of ethnic diversity, tolerance and equity; then that sort of nationalism I'm not uncomfortable with (Interview 19:34).

Many explained the link between republicanism and nationalism 'as a new form of nationalism', that reflected a 'much deeper understanding of our place in the world'. It reflected 'a community of interest with our Asian neighbours, and a much less fearful nationalism'. There were a number of negative perceptions associated with an old form of nationalism that the leaders and activists wanted to clearly move away from. They expressed the 1890s form of republicanism as 'what we are not':-

We want to get away from all the old connotations of the old 1890s republicanism and nationalism and focus on a nationalism that is more in keeping with the nature of our civic identity. We want to highlight the fact that we don't believe people should have positions by virtue of birth or background; those sorts of very powerful egalitarian identity symbols are not part of the old form of nationalism (Interview 19:33).

Similarly,

It is our challenge for this nationalism not to become a type of chauvinism, or to become a kind of grand idea of us being a kind of super. I think that is our challenge, but we have got to give it a name; it is nationalism. We must be proud of being Australian, not because we are better than anybody else, but because we are Australian ... What binds us together is our nation and that's what I mean by nationalism (Interview 4:31).

In this formulation, the difference between patriotism (an emotional commitment) and civic nationalism (ideological rationalization) blurs. The form of nationalism the ARM promoted stressed a sense of belonging and tolerance, which was a type of bond that contrasted with the 'old inflexible nationalism'. The 'old nationalism' was the antithesis of the 'new nationalism'. It was described as intuitive and imitative:-

very much a male-dominated pale imitation of the British Empire; white, Anglo-Saxon, keep the race pure, a very traditional role for women and basically Britain
being the decider of issues of national significance and Australia falling into line, including any participation and support of world wars and smaller conflicts. I think that is very much the old nationalism. White, male-dominated, increasingly independent, but essentially supportive of decisions made in Whitehall (Interview 13:28).

The leaders described the 19th century style nationalism as 'almost an addiction to identity that didn't recognise the existence of other people; their identity and validity'. It was exclusive and carried with it a clear message 'that others had no right to that identity and that a narrow sense of identity was superior in some way'. Many expressed the view that they felt that Australians had a much saner perception of Australian identity and that an Australian republic would act as a catalyst in symbolically reinforcing that identity (Interview 2:16).

Linking the identity of the nation to an Australian republic had the emotional pull to mobilize support and to tap into the hearts and minds of the people. The linkage between Australianness, civic nationalism and republicanism provided (to use Eyerman and Jamison's (1991) term) a 'cognitive frame' that reverberated well with the sentiments of the post-WW II generation and the new ideological directions adopted by the Labor elite. Paul Keating described the republican reform program as 'a chance which few other countries have' to 'give expression to both our best traditions and our current sensibilities and ambitions' (Keating in Watson 2002: 586).

6:3 Egalitarianism and radicalism – the dilemma of mobilization

The notion of civic egalitarianism clearly imbued in the beliefs and values articulated by the ARM leaders. It was embedded in their views on being Australian – that is being equal to all other Australians. The egalitarian principles, however, caused a dilemma for republican elites in the latter stages of the republican mobilization. As the referendum approached and the republican campaign drew to a close, the republican elites were forced to face a difficult choice: either embrace a radical path – and risk the entanglements of constitutional changes – or tone down their radicalism and embrace a moderate reform – thus risking alienation by many supporters who expected to 'appropriate the republic'.

For the pro-republican public, the values of egalitarianism and tolerance were an important part of what the republic could — and was expected to — deliver. Whilst the ARM leaders’ personal commitment was couched in those terms, those values did not translate into how the public interpreted its reform program. The minimalist model was conservative and rejected radical change; it simply replaced the queen as Australia’s head of state. The ARM’s model was not about making radical changes to the constitution, but about reflecting those changes by making minor adjustments, without disrupting the constitution and without changing the key political institutions.

This created the danger of a public backlash — something clearly sensed by the republican leaders. They sensed that the mobilization of egalitarian values was interpreted by many people as their right to take greater ownership of the republic and elect the head of state. As the campaign gathered momentum and different players entered the arena, it became increasingly difficult for the ARM leadership to convince the public of the merits of its minimalist program. Consensus among the republican leaders also became more difficult to sustain, because the republican elites themselves were unable to resolve the dilemma and reconcile their differences. Public demands for a ‘popularly elected head of state’ became louder and introduced a serious challenge to the ARM’s political reform program.

As a result, a split appeared within the ARM itself. Some saw it as a failure on the part of the organization, a failure to ‘reach the public’. Others attributed it to insufficient persuasion. They felt that the minimalist model did not adequately represent the change process in a way that was easily understood by different segments of the population. One prominent ARM leader expressed the issue this way ‘having a president doesn’t give you an identity, it gives you an Australian head of state. It helps but it is not sufficient’ (Interview 18:32). Although many considered the minimalist position a good starting point, they wanted the organization to publicly acknowledge a far more reaching plan for change. Despite those concerns, the leaders of the ARM continued to support the minimalist option and remained overtly united in their position. In the end, that unity came at a cost.
The political reform program became more vulnerable to attacks not only from its opponents, but also from 'radicals' within the republican movement itself. The issue was often represented as a rift between minority elites and the masses of 'ordinary Australians'. It was then that the notion of civic egalitarianism became a force operating against the ARM.

The ARM leaders had not prepared themselves for this turn. It became increasingly difficult for the elites to convince the people and the radicals within its ranks that the minimalist model was the most appropriate and that a popularly elected head of state posed 'too serious' a problem for constitutional reform. Some segments of the public found the complexity of the issues difficult to comprehend and suspected the leaders of 'exclusivism' and 'elitism'. For many it was about having a sense of ownership of the republic — as reflected in a popularly elected head of state - which they found engaging and attractive. The constitutional complexities that the elites stressed in the justification of the minimalist model were received with growing suspicion. As the more perceptive leaders acknowledged, the minimalist option ran the danger of being seen as a 'cop-out'.

6.4 Political opportunism

The republican campaign, especially in its early stages, embraced the notions of government by the people and of the people, including ethnic minorities, being part of the governmental process. It focused on those participatory democratic ideals that reinforced the notion of popular sovereignty and civic engagement. This triggered a growing tension: the minimalist model was increasingly perceived as opportunistic, a betrayal of a radical cause. As the republican campaign became more intense, not only did the opportunism of the minimalist model become a divisive accusation, but the implications of a directly elected head of state began to dominate the headlines.

Desperate attempts by the ARM leaders to defend the minimalist program as 'safe', 'realistic' and 'prudent' proved unsuccessful. In order to mount an effective defence, the republicans had to acknowledge that republican reform carried a risk of 'constitutional chaos' and political instability. The ARM leaders could not change
direction for this reason. It would mean losing the support base and it would weaken bipartisan support. As a consequence, they exposed themselves to accusations of opportunism and elitism.

The alternative radical model of a popularly elected head of state also posed serious difficulties. It drew attention to such issues as the codification of the reserve powers and the competition between the President and the Prime Minister. Concerns about the reserve powers were also expressed by many of the ARM leaders. They were concerned about the scope of the President's power, especially vis-à-vis the Prime Minister and the foundations of the power, especially in a popular election.

*We need to put all our cards out on the table so that if we are as citizens of this country voting for one of us to represent the rest of us, then we ought to know what powers we are investing this person with. I think it is very important for the reserve powers to be spelt out* (Interview 16:13).

Those concerns, however, were not articulated and the differences were not resolved within the republican elite. The process had already been set in place with the release of the Republic Advisory Committee Report to formulate a 'common position'. Although a number of models had been advanced the minimalist model was favoured by the then Prime Minister Paul Keating. It was seen as easier to implement and the least disruptive constitutionally. At the end of the day political pragmatism ruled the day. One activist summed it up this way

*Codification is a difficult process. It's not impossible, but it's one that takes a of hours of discussion and fine print detail and I think that at the Convention we are going to have to convince people that direct election is not just a simple rhetorical issue of people having their say. It's not like that. It has ramifications for the balance between the different branches of government and it is also something that you can't just say I will directly elect and leave it at that. If you codify powers, you have to do all these other things. I think a lot of people do not realise that it is a very complex issue. So that's the biggest issue. Pushing through our model is going to be hard but not impossible* (Interview 30:17).

In turn, both John Howard and Peter Costello strongly opposed a process that
included a public system of nomination. Neither was prepared to back any proposal that would relinquish the Prime Minister's power of appointment. Peter Costello's view was that the Prime Minister should have the power to make his own choice and not be impeded by public nominations (Costello in Turnbull 1999; 63-64). As the debate became embroiled in constitutional detail, the public became disenchanted and disengaged. Many of the arguments were lost on large segments of the public. The situation began to resemble the tensions that had plagued CFD nearly twenty-five years earlier.

As a result, some republican groups and leaders began to distance themselves from the ARM, and the grassroots support that the ARM relied on began to wither away. Although the organization remained formally united in their support for the minimal reform program, the populist program had greater appeal for the majority. The republican push now became a radical push which went against the intentions of the ARM leaders.

The ARM leaders could not accept populist radicalism for a very simple reason - they saw it as 'too difficult' and 'unrealistic'. Those who wanted a more radical change did not have a program in place that could deal with the constitutional complexities the radical change process engendered. Groups opposed to an Australian republic were therefore able exploit those tensions by mounting an effective campaign that exacerbated the divisions in the republican camp. They used the argument that the republican reform was dangerous and potentially destabilizing, and that it was controlled by 'the politicians'.

6:5 Internal divisions and tensions

The rift that centred on the overall strategy brought to the fore a number of associated issues. Perhaps the most significant that the interviews revealed was a tension between those who saw republicanism as naturally allied with the Labor Party, and those who attempted to mould it as a truly bi-partisan and a 'de-politicised' cause.

From its inception in the early 1990s one of the most contentious issues for the
ARM was its close association with the ALP. That association proved difficult on a number of fronts and had the potential to threaten the ARM’s bipartisan position. Many within the organization were ambivalent in the way they described their relationship with the ALP. For some it was ‘a mixed blessing’, ‘a double-edged sword’. Others were more circumspect. Although many recognised that it was ‘a great help to the movement to have a Prime Minister pushing for a republic’ others referred to it ‘as a hindrance’. They felt that as Prime Minister, Paul Keating’s involvement ‘had damaged the movement by personalising and politicising the republican issue’ (Interview 5:3). Some felt that under Paul Keating the issue had, in fact polarised the two major parties to the extent of having lost any prospect of consensus that was necessary for constitutional change. Others felt compromised in the sense that the Labor government had made the ARM the official republican movement by appointing Malcolm Turnbull to chair the Republican Advisory Committee. At the time the Republican Advisory Committee was part of the process instituted by the ALP when in government. It was established in 1993 in order to examine the minimum constitutional changes necessary to achieve an Australian republic. It included a number of prominent names that had become closely identified with the republican cause – Malcolm Turnbull, Nick Greiner (former NSW Liberal Premier) the academic Dr. John Hirst and media presenter Mary Kostakidis.

The committee cemented even further the links with the ALP. In many respects it was not surprising that the ARM’s position up until 1996 was closely aligned with the ALP. They were both promoting the same cause and focused their message on Australia’s identity as a nation as well as supporting the minimalist model. The ARM had benefited from a government that had placed an Australian republic high on the political agenda. This was attributed to Paul Keating’s ‘public espousal of the cause’. As the leader he had considerable power and therefore gave the issue ‘a credibility and profile that it had not had before’ (Turnbull 1993: 196). But at the same time and perhaps more importantly he irrevocably associated an Australian republic with the ALP which in itself politicised the ARM in a partisan manner.
The response by the ARM leadership to the change of government in 1996 exacerbated tensions further. The leadership was divided on the issue of how to deal with the new situation. Initially, some felt that the Coalition would only have a minor impact on the movement. Others expressed a degree of uncertainty and apprehension. Although a sense of gratitude still remained towards the ALP, many realised that by definition it was the role of the opposition to oppose the government. This was what the Coalition had done up until 1996 which made it difficult to anticipate the direction that the Coalition would take on the republic. At the beginning, the ARM leadership ‘deliberately adopted a policy of not confronting the Howard government’. Many felt reassured by the fact that ‘Howard had promised he would implement a democratic and consultative process’ (Interview 7:21). Constant speculation, however, caused rifts within the ARM with some leaders confident that John Howard could deliver a republic, whilst many disagreed. Some held strong views about the direction that John Howard would take and believed that Coalition leaders would do everything in their power to steamroll the republic, that the Prime Minister was hostile to the issue and that no convincing could make him accept a republic (Interview 19:12). Others went so far as to predict that ‘John Howard would have stymied the debate by 2000’ (Interview 10:34).

The decisions made by the Coalition to re-direct the republican debate had far reaching consequences for the ARM. The Liberal Party’s formal position on a republic was announced in 1995, when John Howard committed his party to a Constitutional Convention — an alternative reform path. The leader and the deputy, Peter Costello, took opposing positions on the republican issues. As a result they were unable to reach a consensus, which in turn, set the stage for a progressive fragmentation of views within the elite and a concomitant proliferation of ‘reform options’.

The ARM leadership had to grapple with the fact that John Howard openly opposed the republican reform. Howard had on previous occasions accused the Labor party of ‘asserting that the only nationalism worthy of the name [was] republican nationalism’ and that ‘Mr. Keating had been engaged in an attempted heist of
Australian nationalism' (Howard 1995: 2-5). He distanced himself from the previous government's sympathetic position on the issue of reform. In fact, on a number of occasions he sought to distance his government from what he termed 'the identity debate' claiming that 'although Australians shared a common national identity, governments ought not intervene to shape it' (Howard 1995: 3). Such a position spelt a mortal danger for the republican campaign that had up until then successfully relied on the identity argument and the sponsorship of the political elite.

6:5.1 Republican elite factions

The differences between elite sections widened as the republican campaign became more intense. These divisions occurred along partisan sympathy lines as well as programmatic options. Roughly, the pro-Labor sections of the ARM remained committed to the minimalist reform as a more realistic way forward. The 'bi-partisans' by contrast, were more open-minded, more inclined to consider rapidly changing 'alternative paths'. To bridge these differences, ARM leaders adopted a number of 'consensus building measures': negotiating, convincing and facilitating the change process. Those measures made little impact as it became increasingly difficult for the ARM to gain the necessary support for its minimalist model and at the same time to maintain cohesion and unity. Their reform program was subject to attack by opponents within the republican movement, among political elites and in the broader community. The opponents were effective in highlighting inconsistencies in the minimalist program and attacking the ARM's 'elitism'. The ARM leadership were well aware of the dangers that the 'elitist tag' posed for the organization. One activist summed it up this way:

One of the biggest obstacles for the ARM is being perceived as an elitist organization. If the leaders are seen as being beyond the reach of, and not relating to ordinary people, it is going to be very difficult to spread the word. If we want the message to get out we need to relate to people on a more personal level (Interview 21:5).
The opponents of the republican reform were quick to exploit the 'elitist tag' and they labelled republican activists as belonging to a Chardonnay set. They also led a well organized and effective campaign by focusing on divisions and differences within the movement, concentrating on the constitutional and legal aspects of the reform program and sidelining the issue of patriotism and the identity of the nation. It was a confrontation between not only two visions of the nation and its political institutions, but also between two agendas of reform.

The Coalition and the Monarchist camps proved to be astute opponents in the lead up to the referendum. They achieved their goal by employing tactics that concentrated on technical debates and tapped into widespread cultural prejudices. What the ARM leaders did not foresee was the ability of its opponents to tap into the anti-elite, anti-political, anti-intellectual and anti-change sentiments of the general public (Hirst 1999). Another significant factor that the leadership of the ARM did not anticipate was the strong campaign mounted by an important section of the political elite that included its most influential opponent of the republican cause – the Prime Minister who brought to the fore a powerful argument: Australia does not need reform, her political institutions are fine, do not fix 'what ain’t broke'.

The ARM leaders acknowledged that they could not compete with the counter argument that capitalised on those 'old Anglo traditionalist sectors of society' (Interview 20:9). The opponents of the republic tapped into 'the innate conservatism of the Australian electorate' (Interview 5:1) and skilfully exploited a campaign based on fear of disruption. In the end as one activist predicted 'it is the doubters and the fearful, those that fear change that are our biggest challenge. They need to be convinced that an Australian republic will not mean a change to our system of government, to a democratically elected government and our parliamentary system' (Interview 20:20).

The second divisive issue concerned tactics and questioned the role of public opinion in the debate. Should the issues be decided by 'experts' (constitutional and
political) or by public preferences? Factions that embraced expert views were accused of being removed from ‘ordinary Australians’. They couched the debate in a specific language and used complex terminology which made it difficult for the mass population to grasp, engage with and feel a part of. The Constitutional Convention illustrated the process.

Although the impetus will come from the Convention the real problem for the ARM is that it has been perceived as an elite, a Chardonnay group. The ARM leaders are seen as gatekeepers of public opinion. Although they have successfully brought the issue to this point, the real problem is translating the issue to the broader public and making the public feel part of the process (Interview 19:22).

As the referendum approached, the debate became more intense and immersed in the merits of the different models and variation on different models. At the same time, the public was losing interest in the outcomes; focus on technicalities reduced public interest and played into the hands of those opponents of the republic who criticized the reform as irrelevant to the average Australian.

Concentration on the different models also exposed the conservative and radical factions within the republican movement itself. Although many were antagonistic towards the ARM’s minimalist model, a number of allies emerged from unexpected quarters. One such ally was the conservative support network headed by Andrew Robb titled ‘Conservatives for an Australian Head of State’. The group included not only a number of leading business figures but also academics such as Greg Craven, the Perth-based constitutional lawyer. At the federal level the ARM gained another ally in Peter Costello who threw his support behind the minimalist model and campaigned for a Yes vote in the referendum (Turnbull 1999: 82-83).

The opponents of the republic included the Prime Minister, John Howard, Nick Minchin a conservative monarchist, Liberal senator and Special Minister of state assisting the Prime Minister on Native Title and constitutional issues, and Tony Abbott, a NSW Liberal member and former executive director of Australians for a Constitutional Monarchy. The latter group was formidable in the tactics employed, first in the Constitutional Convention and then in the referendum process itself. Initially, Nick Minchin attempted to abandon the Convention by claiming that it
was not a 'core promise' of the newly elected government. After a series of public meetings around the country that 'challenged Howard to give the people a say' cabinet decided to uphold its promise. Nick Minchin, however, was successful in introducing a voluntary postal vote rather than a compulsory, secret attendance ballot. Such a strategy was designed to downplay the event and 'reduce the participation from groups Howard and Minchin saw as sympathetic to the republic' (Turnbull 1999: 19). It had a significant effect on one particular group. They were the 14 per cent of Australians whose first language was not English. Even if you had enough English to get by at work and socially, it was quite another thing to understand a package of material about the Constitution. The government refused to provide translations of the electoral material (Turnbull 1999: 19).

The ARM gained much needed support in facilitating the passage of the Constitutional Convention Bill from the ALP and the Democrats. But in the end it was two Tasmanian senators, Bob Brown and Brian Harradine, who voted for the Bill on the 28th August 1997 which made the Convention a reality (Turnbull 1999: 23).

Another aspect that caused division was the actual process of the referendum itself. From the early stages of the campaign the ARM leadership flagged the need for a proper series of questions. They recognised that the very framing of the referendum questions was extremely important (Interview 24:17). As one activist foreshadowed

At the end of the day, if the government wants to sink the referendum process, all they need to do is to ask the most complicated questions imaginable. That would have the desired affect. The public would treat the process as a nonsense, or worse they would not be able to either comprehend or understand the questions and vote 'no' (Interview 24:18).

As predicted, the Coalition was successful in significantly altering the process. While the ALP's stand was to have an indicative plebiscite to test the public's support followed by a referendum, the Coalition entered into a period of consultation with the Constitutional Convention. This was followed by a referendum based on the preferred model for a republic. Such a process successfully managed to avoid testing the public's support for an Australian
republic and at the same time effectively ignored the public's readiness for change.

The Convention supported 'in principle, Australia becoming a republic', and the bi-
partisan model of a parliamentary elected head of state which was carried by 73
votes for and 57 against (Turnbull 1999: 74). Although the Convention paved the
way for the referendum, what followed was a series of events that generated
misinformation and exacerbated fears. Examples included pronouncements by
Tony Abbott that a 'Yes' vote would usher in a Weimer Republic, that republicans
were engaged in ethnic cleansing and that an Australian republic would mean a
change to the flag (Turnbull 1999: 173). Such remarks were designed to frighten
the elderly who saw the republic as a real threat to political order.

By November 1999 the referendum debate was focusing on complex constitutional
issues far removed from a vision of a new form of national identification that the
ARM had intended. The elite divisions that had developed towards the end of the
1990s meant that the political reform proposed by the ARM had little chance of
success.

6:6 Conclusion

On the eve of the 1999 referendum campaign the ARM leadership was fractured by
unresolved tensions and dilemmas. Although they formed a common front in public
pronouncements, behind the façade of programmatic unity there was the reality of
growing rifts. Moreover, large sections of the political elites opposed the
republican reform and they had a strategic advantage in that they had a powerful
and influential spokesman – the Prime Minister and Prime Ministers, as Higley and
Case (2000) argue, play a vital role in the successful outcome of referendums in
Australia.

Despite the fact that the ARM leaders capitalised on political opportunities and
attracted key public intellectuals, they were unable to get a majority vote at the
referendum. Radical sections of the public wanted to appropriate the republic and
clearly stated their preference for the 'populist model' of a popularly elected head of
state. The ARM had to also deal with another segment of the population who were
fearful of 'disruptions' the reform could bring. That split amongst the elites and the accompanying public rift, was the most critical factor in the failure of the republican push. The final chapter poses the most obvious question: What does this outcome mean for the future of republicanism in Australia?
CHAPTER 7 THE FUTURE OF CIVIC NATIONALISM AND REPUBLICANISM IN AUSTRALIA

The political reform model proposed in Chapter 1 suggests that the key ingredients of successful political reform include widespread mass orientations conducive to reform, well organized articulators of the reform program in the form of a social movement organization and, elite consensus about the strategies and tactics for implementing the reform. Such a model reflects the Weberian theoretical framework and research tradition that combine analyses of social structures with studies of meaningful actions of key social actors. The framework is applied here to the study of the mass configuration of nationalism, the republican social movement and the orientations of the key actors, in particular, the pro-republican leaders of the ARM. The methodology of the study combines a quantitative analysis of survey data and an interpretative analysis of interview data. The former identifies public configurations of nationalism and sources of organized support for an Australian republic. The latter gives insight into the views of the key actors concerning the strategies and tactics of the ARM on the eve of the 1999 referendum.

The analysis in previous chapters helps in resolving the ‘puzzle’ of a sudden - and largely unanticipated - arrest of the republican push. It confirms the initial success of the republican campaign in mobilizing public support for the republic. The orientations of the public, especially the educated middle class baby boomers, were conducive to the reform; they were strongly influenced by the spread of civic nationalism and the pro-republican campaign. Civic nationalism was also strong among Australians with ethnic backgrounds, particularly among non-British immigrants who came to Australia in the post-WW II wave and among their children. Tertiary education was another key factor that influenced civic sentiments and pro-republican sympathies. Those sympathies were reinforced by those with
pro-Labor leanings and they were endorsed by Labor leaders. The fact that the ALP championed the republican cause strongly boosted the republican campaign in the early 1990s, but became an obstacle after the defeat of the ALP in the 1996 federal election.

What the analysis reveals is the unanticipated convergence of civic nationalist ideals with the populist position on the Australia republic. For Donald Horne civic nationalism was personified by Australia’s move to a republic. The preferred form of the republic for Horne was minimalist. What emerged, however, was a populist backlash parading under a banner of democratic right of ordinary people to choose their own head of state. That banner was soon identified with popular nationalism that helped to split the republican camp.

The study also shows the centrality of the ARM as the core social movement organization. The movement was successful in attracting the support of public intellectuals who played a central role in forging the reform program. The ARM mobilized political resources and successfully mobilized public support for political change. Therefore, the conclusions here differ from the assessment offered by Robert Manne. It is suggested that the ARM was, in fact, quite successful in galvanizing civic public sentiments and orientations. Certainly the division between the ‘materialists’ (minimalists) and the ‘democrats’ (populists) became a serious issue in the latter stages of the campaign, but as the core movement organization, the ARM was instrumental and successful in putting the republic on the political agenda. What was missing, especially in the late 1990s, was the third ingredient of success – elite consensus that would galvanize public support for the reform. Major political reforms require the strategic and tactical consensus of key political actors because these actors are the most effective public persuaders. As Higley and Chase confirm, the weakness of elite political consensus in the late 1990s was the major cause of the failure of the republican push. This analysis confirms and extends this diagnosis. It reveals that the failure of the republican push was due to a combination of political elite and republican elite division. There was not only a lack of consensus but also claims of ‘elitism’ that extended to the republican ‘leadership core’. Those labels were used very successfully by the republicans opposed to the
minimalist position, as well as those who were against the republic. Together both groups fractured the debate and placed the ARM leaders in an untenable position which resulted in the demise of the republican push. Under such conditions the referendum was deemed to fail.

Since this failure, the republican push has lost momentum. The spread of pro-republican sentiments has been arrested and public interest in the republic has been overshadowed by a wave of security concerns. The sense of civic identification that galvanized the republican push in the 1990s seems much weaker in the new century. Although survey data are not yet available, one is tempted to conclude that national identity has been shifting in the ethno-national direction, as reflected by popular support for restrictions on immigration and access by culturally foreign asylum seekers. As one critic observed, Australia has become a nation where ‘tolerance looks frailer and xenophobia more robust’ (Keating 2002: 2).

As suggested in Chapter 2, events that impact on the security of the nation influence different generations in different ways. They have the capacity to affect value priorities of cohorts coming of age. Inglehart claims, for example, that the baby boomer generation was postmaterialist in their value orientations. They were a generation that embraced change and were prepared to challenge the status quo. It is difficult to predict the value orientations of the current ascendant generations – particularly the ‘generation Xers’ and the ‘millennials’. Given the current security concerns as well as heightened terrorist fears, there may well be a generational shift towards a materialist values priority. If this happens the civic sentiments and pro-republican orientations may also weaken.

On the other hand, the social locations of civic national sentiments and pro-republican attitudes may contribute to their further spread. They are strongest among the educated, urban, affluent, middle class strata that are growing in absolute size and proportion to the population. Such predictions seem to be in line with the more recent Newspoll (2002) data that show that strong pro-republican sentiment continues to prevail. Public support remains at a high 51 percent. This level of support is in keeping with (and at times slightly higher than in) the period preceding
the referendum in 1999. Furthermore, 80% of respondents were in favour of a referendum on the republic being held in the next 5 years.

The more recent scandals and the ensuing resignation of Australia’s Governor General, as well as the publicity regarding the method of appointment of the Queen’s representative are factors that may lead to a resurgence of interest in the republican reform program. Critics of the present system point to the fact that this program envisages more effective public and parliamentary control over the selection and appointment of the head of state.

Since the 1999 referendum the ARM has made an effort to rebuild the organization. It is now smaller and includes ‘eight members directly elected by the whole membership, a youth member elected by the whole youth membership and eight ex-officio state and territory conveners heading elected state and territory councils’ (Warhurst 2003: 7). The leadership structure has changed. Malcolm Turnbull, who occupied the position of chair, has been replaced by John Warhurst an academic from the Australian National University. There are now two new deputy chairs - Susan Ryan and Richard Fidler.

Flagging membership is another challenge for the republican movement (Warhurst 2003). Since the 1999 referendum the ARM’s membership has fallen from 8000 to 1500. The new leaders are attempting to boost membership by concentrating their campaign on the less densely populated areas outside the inner metropolitan areas, especially those areas that showed a low support in the 1999 referendum. Gaining the support of women continues to pose a challenge to the new leaders. Women are less supportive of a republic than men with 46% of women compared to 57% of men in favour of a republic (Newspoll 2002).

Since the referendum there have been signs of a growing consensus within the ARM leadership. Many republican leaders are now more accepting of the direct election model. This is more in line with public opinion that remains steadfast in its preference for this model. Just under 80 percent of republicans support direct election ‘with virtually the same support among monarchists when pressed to
nominate a preference’ (Kelly 2002: 11). There is by no means universal agreement about this model. For example, the continued strength of commitment to the parliamentary election (minimalist model) was clearly apparent at the November 2002 Constitutional Futures seminar. Conservative republicans, such as Greg Craven from Notre Dame University, made it clear that no ‘form of direct election is acceptable’ (Kelly 2002: 11).

There are some other signs of attempts at consensus building. The ARM leaders have proposed a national plebiscite rather than a referendum –‘a non-binding expression of national sentiment on the principle of monarchy versus republic and then a vote on preferred republican models’ (Kelly 2002: 11). This is reminiscent of that proposed by Paul Keating in 1996 whereby the people signal their readiness for change. If the vote is a clear majority, then a referendum is proposed for the public to choose their preferred model. For the ARM the most difficult part of the process is to present a model that is ‘able to resist arbitrary political interference’ and at the same time be ‘democratic, expedient and conclusive’ (Fowles 2002: 1).

The revival of the republican push is, however, complicated by Australia’s constitutional configuration. Australia has a constitution that is regarded as one of the most complex among English-speaking parliamentary democracies. The implication of fear that constitutional change tends to generate is understandable when considering that Australia combines a Westminster parliamentary system and a federal system with a bicameral parliament with two equally powerful chambers. The upper chamber (the Senate) represents the interests of the states and it is rare for the same party or party coalition to control both upper and lower chambers. A further impediment is the still unresolved question of the relationship between the prime minister and a president. The reserve powers remain uncodified, which means that the governor-general has the power to dismiss a prime minister, grant or refuse parliament’s dissolution and issue election writs. Such complexities makes the constitution very difficult to change, and tends to exacerbate divisions particularly when political interest favour the existing system (Higley & Chase 2000).
The next stage of the republican push is therefore likely to centre on the capacity of republican elites in tackling constitutional complexities and the unresolved strategies and tactical dilemmas that unfolded throughout the 1990s. This has a number of implications for the future of the republican cause. At the parliamentary level the role of the Senate is likely to become critical. The Senate is beyond the control of the government and has the power to create deadlocks. And given that there is no formal separation of executive and legislative powers that would enable government functioning to continue, and with no fixed parliamentary terms, parliamentary deadlocks in Australia may have to be resolved by the Queen's representative, the governor-general, decreeing a "double dissolution" of parliament and a new election of both chambers (Higley & Chase 2000: 6).

The position taken by the Prime Minister is also likely to be critical. If John Howard retires, as many expect him to, the successor is likely to be pro-republican Peter Costello; this may open a 'window of opportunity' for the republican movement. If a popularly elected head of state is considered as an option, however, the reserve powers of the president would need to be carefully codified. This is because an elected president would have considerable impact on the role of the Prime Minister. The president's 'reserve powers' would need to be clearly spelt out in regard to what the president could and could not do in the event of a parliamentary deadlock or, as was seen more recently, in the event of political damage to the office of Australia's head of state.

Another event that is likely to influence elite views on the republican reform is the controversy triggered by the appointment of Peter Hollingworth as Governor General. Recent events have highlighted a real flaw in the process of selection and appointment with many top politicians and commentators drawing attention to the fact that the much used adage 'if it ain't broke, don't fix it' has been proven wrong. The current system where the appointment of Governor General relies on the Prime Minister's discretion is widely seen as inadequate and in need of repair. Although the current Prime Minister remains opposed to any change in the selection process, this view seems to be shared by only a few of his senior colleagues.
This brings into consideration a factor of 'party in power'. While the republican issue divides both major parties, the Coalition camp, as a whole, stands behind its anti-republican leader, John Howard. As long as Howard leads the Coalition and the Coalition stays in power, the prospects for successful republican reform will be impeded.

Of the three key factors essential to the success of the push for republican reform, both public sentiments and organizational factors continue to favour republicans. What remains is the key impediment: lack of elite consensus as to the shape of the reform. The key task for republican elites therefore is to strengthen their tactical consensus and to win support from a broader range of political leaders, especially the Prime Minister: If this is achieved, Australia may well become a republic.
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Weber, Max (1968) Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology New York: Bedminster


# APPENDIX A

## Table 1 Results of bivariate analysis (percentages)

Socio-demographic characteristics of republican vote (per cent of yes vote)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>Yes Vote (%)</th>
<th>Chi-Squared</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gender</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>50.2</td>
<td></td>
<td>.085</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>46.6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Generation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generation 1 (born before 1945)</td>
<td>37.4</td>
<td></td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generation 2 (born between 1946-1959)</td>
<td>55.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generation 3 (born after 1960)</td>
<td>53.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Country of birth (Respondent’s)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Born in Australia</td>
<td>47.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Born in UK</td>
<td>38.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Born in other countries</td>
<td>56.4</td>
<td></td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Achievement</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non graduate</td>
<td>43.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree</td>
<td>70.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>63.9</td>
<td></td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>45.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper class</td>
<td>50.3</td>
<td></td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle class</td>
<td>53.6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working class</td>
<td>43.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>44.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chi-Squared</strong></td>
<td>160</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income (under $30 000)</td>
<td>42.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income 1 ($30 000 – $60 000)</td>
<td>51.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income 2 ($60 000 +)</td>
<td>57.1</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi-Squared p=</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Anglican | 36.6 |
| Other religion | 46.1 |
| No religion | 63.4 |
| Chi-Squared p= | .000 |
| Rural | 38.8 |
| City | 52.9 |
| Chi-Squared p= | .000 |

Political ideology (0-10)

| Left (0-3) | 69.8 |
| Centre (4-6) | 47.2 |
| Right (7-10) | 38.6 |
| Chi-Squared p= | .000 |

Values

| Materialist | 43.1 |
| Mixed | 48.3 |
| Postmaterialist | 56.5 |
| Chi-Squared p= | .001 |

Political identification (Respondent’s)

| ALP | 63.1 |
| Liberal | 35.9 |
| National Party | 23.0 |
| Democrats | 70.0 |
| Greens | 63.3 |
| One Nation | 23.9 |
| Chi-Squared p= | .000 |

n = 3431
Source: 1999 Australian Constitutional Referendum Survey
APPENDIX A

Table 2 Results of bivariate analysis (correlations)

Pearson’s correlation for leaders with the yes vote.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Leadership</th>
<th>Correlation</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Beazley</td>
<td>.31*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Howard</td>
<td>-.30*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lees</td>
<td>.08*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hanson</td>
<td>-.24*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* <.01

n = 3431
Source: 1999 Australian Constitutional Referendum Survey
APPENDIX B

Means, standard deviation and range for dependent and independent variables

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Deviation</th>
<th>Range</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vote</td>
<td>.48</td>
<td>.50</td>
<td>0-1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Political Achievement</td>
<td>63.6</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>0-100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Achievement</td>
<td>78.0</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>0-100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bornlive</td>
<td>60.9</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>0-100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen</td>
<td>86.9</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>0-100</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Deviation</th>
<th>Range</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>.19</td>
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<tr>
<td>Achievement</td>
<td>.78</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>0-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bornlive</td>
<td>.61</td>
<td>.29</td>
<td>0-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen</td>
<td>.87</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td>0-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>.48</td>
<td>.50</td>
<td>0-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generation 2</td>
<td>.27</td>
<td>.45</td>
<td>0-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generation 3</td>
<td>.33</td>
<td>.47</td>
<td>0-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Born UK</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.28</td>
<td>0-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Born Other</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.32</td>
<td>0-1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Degree</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.37</td>
<td>0-1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.36</td>
<td>0-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middleclass</td>
<td>.46</td>
<td>.50</td>
<td>0-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income 1</td>
<td>.29</td>
<td>.45</td>
<td>0-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income 2</td>
<td>.25</td>
<td>.43</td>
<td>0-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anglican</td>
<td>.26</td>
<td>.44</td>
<td>0-1</td>
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<tr>
<td>No Religion</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.40</td>
<td>0-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City</td>
<td>.65</td>
<td>.48</td>
<td>0-1</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
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<td>-------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ideology (Left-Right)</td>
<td>5.26</td>
<td>1.77</td>
<td>0-10</td>
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<tr>
<td>Postmaterialist</td>
<td>1.97</td>
<td>.58</td>
<td>1-3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Respondent’s Party id.</td>
<td>2.01</td>
<td>.86</td>
<td>1-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beazley</td>
<td>5.65</td>
<td>2.77</td>
<td>0-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Howard</td>
<td>4.97</td>
<td>3.05</td>
<td>0-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lees</td>
<td>4.47</td>
<td>2.14</td>
<td>0-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hanson</td>
<td>1.95</td>
<td>2.62</td>
<td>0-10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### APPENDIX C

**List of interviewees**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Date of interview</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arena, Franca</td>
<td>13/6/'96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-founder of ARM, Director and member of National Management Committee</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blackwell, Nina</td>
<td>22/1/'98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/9/'98</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National campaign manager ARM from ’98</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boyce, Peter</td>
<td>10/7/'98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academic and Republican Tasmania</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burns, Wayne</td>
<td>17/9/'97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsible for communications and public relations. Media Director for the referendum campaign</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cassidy, Frank</td>
<td>19/1/'98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convenor ACT, elected ARM delegate to Constitutional Convention</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collins, Peter</td>
<td>13/6/'96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican and Liberal Leader of the Opposition in New South Wales, 1995-98.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cormack, Judy</td>
<td>12/9/'96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15/12/'99</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Management Committee, responsible for setting up forums</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coroneous, Peter</td>
<td>31/3/'96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tasmania ARM convenor - 1994-96</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Day, Mark 17/9/96
Board of Directors, National Management Committee

Derriman, Frank 16/1/98
Ballarat ARM convenor

Doogue, Geraldine 11/9/96
ABC journalist and member of National Management Committee

Elvey, Anthony 18/9/96
National Management Committee

Fitznead, Joan 22/6/98
Tasmania ARM convenor 1997-’98

Fullilove, Michael 10/9/96
National Management Committee, ARM. Responsible for setting up republican club at University of Sydney

Greig, Libby 16/9/96
Board of Directors, National Management Committee

Greiner, Nick 12/6/96
Former New South Wales Liberal Premier; republican and member of the Republican Advisory Committee, 1993.

Grogan, Peter 15/9/97
New South Wales ARM convenor and elected ARM delegate to the Constitutional Convention
Hannon, Cecilia 09/9/’98

Hill, David 12/6/’97
National Management Committee

Hirst, John 31/1/’98
Academic historian and Convenor of the Victorian branch of the ARM

Horne, Donald 11/6/’96
Author, academic, former chair of the Australia Council and founding member of the ARM

Irving, Helen 10/9/’96
Legal academic and ARM candidate for the Constitutional Convention

Jones, Brendan 13/6/’97
National Management Committee and ARM webmaster

Keneally, Tom 11/6/’96
Author, founding Chair of the ARM, Board of Directors, National Management Committee

Kirner, Joan 05/6/’97
Former Victorian Labor Premier, republican and Chair of The Centenary of Federation Advisory Committee

Kostakidis, Mary 18/9/’96
SBS television journalist, republican and member of the Republic Advisory Committee ’93.
Machin, Wendy 18/8/97
ARM deputy chair, former National Party cabinet minister in New South Wales and elected delegate to the Constitutional Convention, National Management Committee

Payne, Marise 14/6/96
Prominent Liberal Party figure in New South Wales, Senator from 1999 and deputy Chair of the ARM, 1994-97

Pooley, Tony 12/9/96
04/1/00
ARM Executive Officer Sept. 1991-1993, National Management Committee

Puplick, Chris 16/9/97
Former Senator (Lib.) for NSW 1985-'90 and republican

Sowada, Karin 23/1/98
Former Democrat Senator 1991-93, elected ARM delegate to Constitutional Convention and member of the ‘Yes’ campaign Committee

Thompson, Elaine 11/6/97
Academic, author and republican

Tsang, Henry 16/9/97
Deputy Lord Mayor Sydney, republican

Turnbull, Malcolm 09/9/96
17/9/97
10/9/98
17/12/99
Prominent lawyer, Chair of Republic Advisory Committee 1993, Chair ARM November '93-'99, Board of Directors, National Management Committee, ‘Yes campaign’ and ‘Committee of four’
Ward, Michael
25/6/96
10/9/96
22/12/99
24/12/99
Executive Director ARM March '94 - Jan. '96, Board of Directors and National Management Committee

Williams, Robert
06/4/96
University of Tasmania ARM convenor

Witheford, Anne
20/1/98
ACT convenor '98-, elected ARM delegate to Constitutional Convention for the Australian Capital Territory and co-ordinator of the 'Yes' campaign in the ACT.
APPENDIX D

Interview schedule

1. In your view, what is the Republican Movement about?
   (Having a republic involves many things - what are the steps that need to be taken to achieve a republic? What is the most important?)

   What are its aims?
   What are the strategies and tactics?
   Where do you see the major obstacles?
   Whom do you see as your major supporters?
   Who do you see needs convincing?
   What do you regard as the key conditions of success?

2. Do you see the ARM as a vehicle for expressing a new form of national identity?
   What is this identity?

3. What does it mean to you to be Australian?

4. What sort of impact do you see the major political parties having on the ARM.

5. Do you think the ARM is politicised and partisan?

6. In your view will Republicanism undermine Australian patriotism?

7. How do you see the role of intellectuals and the media in the republican debate?