ANATOMY OF A POLIS-SYSTEM: MAGNA GRAECIA DURING THE ARCHAIC PERIOD

by

Anthony Miller (B.A. Hons.)

Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

University of Tasmania

(August, 1999)
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VOLUME 1
I declare that this thesis contains no material which has been accepted for the award of another higher degree or diploma in any tertiary institution nor, so far as I am aware, any material published or written by others, except when due reference is made in the text of the thesis.

Anthony Miller
25 August 1999

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25 August 1999
ABSTRACT

The aim of this thesis is to examine the development and dynamics of Magna Graecia's polis-system during the archaic period, and to evaluate the sources, nuances, parameters, and exercising of Italiote power in the context of inter-polis relations for these centuries. Particular attention is given to the rise of large imperialist poleis in this period, and the impact these states had upon the polis-system as a whole.

Following thematic studies of the conceptual addition of Magna Graecia to the Hellenic world and the ways in which the earliest Greek presence in southern Italy influenced the parameters of the future Italiote polis-system, the thesis then divides Magna Graecia's poleis into separate geographic regions for detailed examination. Special attention is paid to the way in which the northern, southern, and central regions of Magna Graecia were dominated by Greeks of one particular ethnic identity, be it Euboian, Achaian, or otherwise. Analysis of the maritime interests and strengths of the Euboians and their poleis on the Bay of Naples and the Straits of Messina, is followed by a study of the Achaian hegemony in central Magna Graecia and the enduring preponderance of the senior Achaian polis of the archaic period, Sybaris. Attention is also paid to the
considerable effect these hegemonies had upon the *poleis* of Magna Graecia not of Euboian or Achaian extraction, in terms of their foreign policies and development.

The thesis concludes with a study of the last decades of the archaic period and the momentous changes that took place within the Italiote *polis*-system at this time. Essentially, power within this *polis*-system experienced long-term and fundamental redistribution. Particular attention is given to the way in which internecine warfare brought about the destruction of many of the props of Achaian Italiote power in Magna Graecia, which in turn ushered in a far less monopolistic era in terms of strength within this *polis*-system.

It is concluded that the collapse of Sybaris and the chain reaction it sparked, facilitated a widespread decline in the political stocks of the Italiote *poleis* from which it took generations to recover. It is thus maintained that Sybaris was the symbol of archaic Magna Graecia's power and that its demise ultimately exposed the Italiote *poleis* to numerous hitherto dormant dangers and outside interference. Moreover, it is demonstrated that the parameters of Magna Graecia's *polis*-system, so long linked to the stability of its dominant Achaian and Euboian components, were irrecoverably altered during the
transition to the classical period.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

During the writing of this thesis I received invaluable assistance and support from many people, who I would now like to thank. In particular, for his advice during the early days of my work, I thank Dr. Ian Worthington. For her continued encouragement, commentary, tolerance and support, I thank my partner, Sarah Hyslop. I would also like to acknowledge the support of my postgraduate comrades at the School of History and Classics, University of Tasmania. I am truly indebted to my supervisor, Dr. Paul Gallivan, whose advice, positive outlook, and depth of experience, was crucial to the completion of my work.

Thanks also to the Tasmanian Friends of the Australian Archaeological Institute at Athens for granting me a scholarship, thus enabling me to visit Magna Graecia, and discover some of its treasures firsthand.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABBREVIATIONS .......................................................... i

LIST OF MAPS ............................................................. iv

INTRODUCTION ............................................................. v

CHAPTER ONE: The colonial period and the primary influences upon the development of the Italiote polis-system ............................................................... 1

Section One: Patterns of settlement ......................................................... 1
  1.1 The commercial phase ......................................................... 2
  1.2 The agricultural phase ......................................................... 4
  1.3 The refugee phase ........................................................... 8

Section Two: The Italian context and relations between Greek and non-Greeks ................................................................. 12
  2.1 Attrition and stalemate ......................................................... 14
  2.2 Imperialism and expansion .................................................... 17
  2.3 An Ionian alternative? ........................................................ 21
  2.4 Trade and competition ........................................................ 25

Conclusion: ........................................................................... 29

CHAPTER TWO: The hellenization of the past and present: conceptual and physical means of constructing ‘Magna Graecia’ ......................................................... 31
Section One: The importance of tradition and the role of myth

1.1 Myth as a colonial imperative
1.2 Myth as consolidator and appropriator

Section Two: Physical aspects of 'Great Greece': the role of ritual and architecture

2.1 The ritualization of colonization
2.2 The role of public architecture

Conclusion: The foundation and demarcation of the Greek poleis in southern Italy

CHAPTER THREE: Parameters shaped by trade: the foundation and development of the Euboian poleis in southern Italy to the end of the sixth century

Section One: The Euboians in Campania and the central Tyrrhenian region

1.1 The political and physical landscape of Euboian trade interests in the West and the foundation of Pithekoussai
1.2 Pithekoussai as a microcosm of Euboian adaptability in the western Mediterranean
1.3 The foundation of Kyme and the shape of the new polis-system in Campania
1.4 Kyme and the growth of the Greek poleis in Campania
1.5 From periphery to core: Kymaian high tide and the tyranny of Aristodemos

Section Two: The Euboians on the Straits of Messina and the lower Tyrrhenian region

2.1 Via Messina I: geography, currents and colonization
2.2 Via Messina II: political and strategic considerations
2.3 The construction and consolidation of a Straits ‘system’
2.4 The Straits poleis and the lower Tyrrhenian region down to the end of the sixth century

Conclusion: Parameters shaped by trade

CHAPTER FOUR: ‘Mainstream’ Magna Graecia and the Achaian ascendancy

Section One: Achaian expansion and solidarity in Magna Graecia

1.1 The expansion and consolidation of a ‘magna Achaia’

Section Two: The empire of Sybaris

2.1 Population and empire
2.2 The Sybarite system of empire
2.3 The empire of Sybaris in action: territorial and economic aspects of Sybarite imperialism

Conclusion: The ‘mainstream’ Italiote polis-system and the advent of Achaian hegemony
CHAPTER FIVE: Non-Achaian poleis under the Achaian hegemony

Section One: The price of isolation: the death of Siris

Section Two: The artful survivor: Lokroi Epizephyrioi and the struggles of the sixth century

Section Three: Life on the periphery: Taras and its ‘quiet’ centuries

Conclusion: a century of working within limitations

CHAPTER SIX: The breakdown of Achaian solidarity and the end of the balance of power in archaic Magna Graecia

Section One: The fall and rise of Kroton

1.1 Early expansion and failure

1.2 Kroton and the ‘Pythagorean revival’

Section Two: Ideological polarization and territorial competition: inter-Achaian conflict in the late sixth century

2.1 Pythagoreanism, anti-aristocratic revolution, and the clash of Sybaris and Kroton

2.2 Regional rivalry and the end of ‘easy’ expansion in central Magna Graecia
Section Three: Balance of power recast: the collapse of Sybaris and the Krotoniati new order

3.1 The fall of Sybaris
3.2 The Krotoniati 'new order'

Conclusion: Balance of power recast: losses and gains

CHAPTER SEVEN: The successors to the post-Sybarite polis-system and the diffusion of power in Magna Graecia

Section One: Kroton: the legacy of Sybaris and the inadequate heir

Section Two: Rhegion: the 'principality' of the Straits

Section Three: Syracuse: foreign intervention, pax Syracusana, and their impact upon the Italiote polis-system

3.1 Syracuse and southern Magna Graecia: the humbling of the principality of the Straits and the clientship of Lokroi
3.2 Syracuse and northern Magna Graecia: the decline of Kyme and the retreat of Italiote power from the Tyrrhenian Sea
3.3 Syracuse and central Magna Graecia: Kroton and the reality of Syracusan power
Conclusion: The end of the archaic period:

opportunities lost 412

CONCLUSION 418

APPENDIX 423

MAPS 456

BIBLIOGRAPHY 462
ABBREVIATIONS AND TRANSLITERATION

The abbreviations for ancient works used in this thesis correspond to those given in H.G. Liddell and R. Scott's *Greek-English Lexicon* (Oxford, 1996 [9th ed. with suppl.]); and those for journals and periodicals are given in *L'Annee philologique*. Collections of inscriptions and fragments are abbreviated according to the guidelines set out by the *Oxford Classical Dictionary* (Oxford, 1996 [3rd ed.]). Texts, both ancient and modern, which do not correspond to these parameters are detailed below. The names of widely recognizable Greek authors, such as Plutarch and Aristotle, retain, for the most part, their latinized form. However, the vast majority of place names, as well as less commonly cited authors, adhere to Greek spelling: thus Kyme instead of Cumae, Rhegion instead of Rhegium, and Apollonios instead of Apollonius.

**ACGC**


**Atti Taranto**

*Atti del ... convegno di studi sulla magna grecia: Istituto per la storia e l'archeologia della magna grecia-taranto.*


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<td>Thouk.</td>
<td>Thoukydides.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
LIST OF MAPS

1. MAP 1 The Colonization of Magna Graecia
   Greek foundations, c. 775- c. 650  456

2. MAP 2 The Colonization of Magna Graecia
   Greek foundations, c. 650-471  457

3. MAP 3 The Bay of Naples
   Greek settlement, c. 775-474  458

4. MAP 4 The Empire of Sybaris
   c. 570-510  459

5. MAP 5 Lokroi vs Kroton
   c. 550-470’s  460

6. MAP 6 The Principality of the Straits
   488-480  461
INTRODUCTION

The aim of this thesis is to examine the development of the *polis*-system of Magna Graecia, or *Megale Hellas*, during the archaic period. However, it is not the intention of this work to present a regional history of Magna Graecia, nor merely to highlight the ways in which the *polis*-system of Magna Graecia was either different or similar to that of the Aegean world. Moreover, while some aspects of this study rely to a degree upon comparisons with developments which occurred in the classical and hellenistic periods, it is not my intent to engage in a large scale comparative study of Magna Graecia beyond what is necessary to place the archaic period in perspective. The focus will be upon the interaction between *poleis* situated within the time and place specified by this thesis: archaic Magna Graecia. Furthermore, in seeking to trace the course of these interactions, periodical assessments of the health and state of the *polis*-system as a whole will also be conducted. In other words, inter-*polis* relations within the framework of a *polis*-system form the basis of this study. Consequently, the internal workings of *poleis* will only be analysed when they can be demonstrated to have affected the foreign policy of the *polis* in question. For instance, internal political instability
and *stasis* would at times precipitate distinct shifts in the way in which *poleis* interacted with one another.

Moreover, similar parameters will also apply to the population indigenous to southern Italy at the time of the Greek colonization. Although the contributions of many of these peoples to the history of the Italian peninsula were indeed of a momentous nature, these contributions are also beyond the scope of this study. Rather, it is their impact upon the *polis*-system that was built by the Greek colonial population which will be examined. Unless a specific tribe or national grouping is being referred to, for convenience the collective term 'Italian' will therefore be used to describe members of the pre-Greek population, whereas 'Italiote' will only be employed in relation to the Greek colonists and their descendants. Similarly, in the instances where the Greeks of Sicily are referred to, the term 'Sikeliote' will be used.

The geographical scope of Magna Graecia itself will also be subject to specific limitations in this thesis. The term 'Magna Graecia' came to mean many different things to the ancient sources and its earliest usage appears to have encompassed all of the Greek world (*Eur. Medea* 439-40; *Iph. Aul.* 1378). The first known use of the term that
possessed a clear connection to southern Italy occurs in Polybios, although the reference is to an event which occurred in the fifth century (2.39.1). Other sources suggest a variety of boundaries, including from Lokroi to Taras (Pliny, *NH* 3.38; Silius Italicus, *Punica* 11.20), and from Kyme to Taras (Servius on Virg., *Aen.* 1.569). Strabo is the only source who explicitly includes all the Italiote *poleis* of Magna Graecia within his definition, although he also includes Greek Sicily (6.1.12). The geography of Magna Graecia, as defined by this thesis, will be confined to that part of southern peninsular Italy settled by the Greeks known as Italiotes. This area approximately corresponds to the territory lying between Kyme, Rhegion and Taras. Sicily will not be included within this definition, although, as will be seen in relation to the Straits of Messina, due to both geography and politics there were points at which Sicily and Magna Graecia overlapped.

The chronological parameters of this study correspond to those of the archaic period of the Greek civilization. All chronological references will therefore be to B.C.E dates unless otherwise specified. This time frame will also include the colonial ‘sub-period’ of the eighth century, in order to facilitate the discussion of the earliest developments in the Greek colonies and their influence on the evolution of the
polis-system of Magna Graecia. Moreover, the traditional terminus date for the archaic period, 480, will be extended slightly into the 470's in order to examine the culmination of certain events whose origins clearly belong to the archaic period.

The thesis itself is divided broadly into three parts within which the birth, development, and problems of the Italiote polis-system during the archaic period are discussed. The first part consists of two chapters which trace the foundation of the Greek presence in southern Italy and the first steps towards transforming the region into 'Magna Graecia'. Chapter One gives an account of the different phases of Greek settlement in southern Italy and demonstrates that the distribution and future disposition of the Greek poleis in southern Italy relied heavily upon the motivations that originally drew the colonists to the western Mediterranean. This chapter also gives brief attention to the demographic context of southern Italy just prior to the Greek colonization of the region. It examines both the Greek impact upon this population and the ways in which the various indigenous groups influenced the development and dynamics of the future polis-system. As will be seen, the resources, strength and territorial appetite of the future Greek poleis were often directly related to the strength and
cohesiveness of the indigenous units which they encountered. The second chapter discusses the process of founding a Greek presence in southern Italy and the tools, both conceptual and physical, which the Greeks used to achieve this. Of particular importance to this chapter is the way in which these tools were used to outline the basic structure of a proto-polis-system by establishing sacred colonial boundaries, as well as ethnographic 'facts'.

The second part of this thesis examines the individual development of the poleis of Magna Graecia as well as their role in the polis-system as a whole. The far flung geography of the Italiote polis-system and the diversity of the poleis themselves in terms of raisons d’être has necessitated the sub-categorization of Magna Graecia into broad but separate geographical and cultural zones. Moreover, the nature and content of the sources has also ensured that the discussion of the Italiote poleis is in many ways effectively centred around the Italiotes of Euboian and Achaian origin. This also reflects the colonization process itself, in which the bulk of the poleis of archaic Magna Graecia were founded by colonists from Euboia and Achaia. Therefore most of the major events which affected the polis-system during this period will be seen to have either involved or revolved around Euboian and Achaian apoikiai.
Chapter Three thus examines the Euboian *poleis* of Magna Graecia, the influence of trans-Mediterranean commerce on their physical situation, and the two geographical zones in which they operated - Campania and the Bay of Naples (the north), and the Straits of Messina (the south). It will be demonstrated that both zones in many ways constituted sub-systems of Magna Graecia's *polis*-system for much of the archaic period, possessing their own balance of power, strategic and political concerns, and patterns of behaviour. Chapter Four deals with the Achaian *poleis* of Magna Graecia and the advance of the Achaians to the political and military hegemony of the 'mainstream' (central) zone of the Italiote *polis*-system, within which the majority of the Italiote *poleis* were situated. Particular attention is paid to the mechanics of this hegemony and the pan-Achaianism and resources upon which it was built. It is also proposed that the standard-bearer of this hegemony, Sybaris, developed a unique system of imperialism in order to administer and maintain its position of dominance. The final chapter in this part of the thesis examines the impact of the Achaian hegemony upon the non-Achaian *poleis* of Magna Graecia, as well as the dynamics of the Italiote *polis*-system in general.
The remaining chapters of the thesis provide a study of the critical ‘decades of change’ within the Italiote *polis*-system, which correspond to the final years of the archaic period. Chapter Six examines the collapse of Achaian solidarity due to the outbreak of war between the two senior Achaian *poleis*, Sybaris and Kroton. The territorial ambitions, as well as the political developments within both *poleis*, are given attention in order to explain the eruption of this particular brand of inter-*polis* rivalry. The last chapter deals with the consequences of the destruction of the Sybarite hegemony and pan-Achaianism and their replacement with Krotoniate rule. The rise of other pretenders to the hegemony, against a backdrop of general diffusion of power in the Italiote *polis*-system, is also examined. Particular attention is also paid to the advent of non-Italiote Greek efficacy in Magna Graecia, and the potential this had to distort the balance of power within the Italiote *polis*-system. General consideration of these latter developments is also given in order to provide an assessment of the Italiote *polis*-system of the archaic period, and whether it is appropriate to apply labels such as success or failure to this system; and crucially, whether the archaic period merely represents the beginnings of the Italiote *polis*-system as a whole, or in fact its apogee.
CHAPTER ONE

The colonial period and the primary influences upon the development of the early Italiote Greek polis-system.

The purpose of this chapter is to give a broad outline of, as well as to compare and contrast, the different themes that typified the colonial period of Magna Graecia. Emphasis will be placed on the way in which these themes helped to influence the shape of the future polis-system of Magna Graecia. Within this framework the chapter will divide its attention between the various impulses which led to colonization, and the context in which the colonization took place. In both cases the effect upon the polis-system will be the focus of the inquiry.

SECTION ONE: phases and types of settlement.

One of the key aspects of the Greek colonization process of southern Italy is the sheer ethnic and chronological diversity involved. The major source of this diversity lies in the fact that the colonization of southern Italy took place over three different phases of immigration into the western Mediterranean, henceforth called the commercial, agricultural
and refugee phases. Although in some respects chronologically defined, these phases were at times intertwined and possessed overlapping features. Moreover, all three phases of colonization in southern Italy were to have considerable and in some cases momentous impact upon the way in which the Italiote Greek poleis were to evolve, as well as the dynamics of their relationships with each other. As will be seen, this influence stems directly from the role of these phases in determining the geographical distribution pattern of the future Italiote poleis, as well as the timing of that distribution. In other words, the colonial phases which the Italiote poleis conformed to can in many ways be seen to have structured their future behavioural and interactional patterns.

1.1 the commercial phase.

This earliest phase of Archaic Greek colonization in southern Italy formed part of a wider, Euboian-based, expansion into the region, with commerce as the major impetus. Traders from the poleis of Chalkis and Eretria entered the western Mediterranean around the turn of the ninth century, and had planted a settlement at Pithekoussai by c. 775 (Strabo 5.4.9; Livy 8.22.5-6). This ‘discovery’ of the West was in fact a rediscovery, following an hiatus in Greek contact with the

region of some three centuries. Previously, the Mykenaian Greeks had traded and on occasion, settled in small numbers in Campania, Basilicata and Apulia. While probably only an emporion initially, Pithekoussai burgeoned into an apoikia of some 6,000 people, and the Euboians continued to consolidate their trade interests in the region with further foundations at Naxos (Sicily, c. 734), Zankle (Sicily, c. 725-c. 717), Rhegion (Calabria, c. 715), and Kyme (Campania, c. 725), until the Euboian presence in the western Mediterranean resembled a virtual trade empire.

Of great importance for the development of the polis-system in the south of Magna Graecia, within this ‘empire’ the Euboians established the earliest known ‘straits system’ - that is, unified control of the modern day Straits of Messina. Control over

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these straits was vital for traders involved in commerce between the eastern and western Mediterranean as they straddled one of the fastest maritime routes available, especially in relation to the main markets for Greek goods, in Etruria, Campania, southern Gaul and Tartessos. Therefore, the Euboians took steps to secure the Straits by founding poleis on both the Sicilian and Italian shores. Although the relationship between Sicily and the Italian mainland is of course geographically close, the Chalkidian foundations there between c. 725-c. 715 thus introduced political and economic imperatives hitherto unknown. Moreover, the creation of this economic system virtually ensured that any action on one side of the Straits would resonate on the other. As will be argued, such a pattern was to shape the development of the polis-system in most of southern Magna Graecia, eventually crystallizing into a territorial as well as an economic system.

1.2 the agricultural phase.

The commercial nature of the Greek rediscovery of the western Mediterranean also proved crucial for the later settlement patterns of the Magna Graecia. In particular, it is probable that the Euboians facilitated the emigré urges of other Aegean

Greeks. Indeed, word of opportunities in the West clearly did not take long to reach the rest of Greece, as attested by the presence of other commercial poleis such as Korinth and Megara. News of the West also touched the more marginal and the less, or even non, commercially orientated regions of Greece. Lokris, Achaia and Lakonia also soon became interested in Italy as well, but for reasons very different from those of the commercial poleis, and arguably with far more impact upon the history of Magna Graecia. These states appear to have been motivated not by commerce but to a large extent by a dearth of arable land in their homelands, the result of a range of factors including demographic and political pressure. Such motivations are in part attested in the choices made by these 'marginal' colonists for the sites of their colonies in Italy - the fertile coastline of the Ionian Sea, an area avoided by the commercial powers in their own colonial ventures.\footnote{Korinth founded Syracuse in 733 (Thouk. 6.3.2), and Megara Nikaia founded Megara Hyblaia in 728 (Thouk. 6.4.1). See also TWGa, p. 16; Casson, The Ancient Mariners, pp. 72-3.}

\footnote{Most voyages from Greece to the western Mediterranean required a coast-hugging stint along the Ionian coastline of Italy (Thouk. 6.44.1-3), making it highly improbable that the Euboians were not aware of the aformentioned area's agricultural disposition. Moreover, Euboian traders appear to have been active in Otranto and elsewhere in the Salentine peninsula in the eighth century: see F. D'Andria, "Greek Influence in the Adriatic: Fifty Years after Beaumont", Greek Colonists and Native Populations, J-P. Descoëndres (ed.) (Oxford, 1990), p. 283; FWG, p. 34.}
Similarly, as with their Euboian, Korinthian and Megarian predecessors, the colonial migrations of the seventh and sixth centuries involving long-standing commercially-minded peoples (such as the Phokaians and the Samians) also avoided the Ionian littoral. The area may have been fertile but its position *vis à vis* trade was, at least initially, considered negative or at least neutral. Thus began the agricultural phase in the Greek settlement of southern Italy.

While trade may have been only a very minor factor at most in the minds of the colonists of modern day Calabria and eastern Basilicata, as stated above, trade did play an indirect but important role in the process. With the possible exception of Sparta, none of the homelands of these arable-land seeking colonists possessed any significant sea-going capabilities. Access to Italy therefore required carriers from outside those homelands, and it is very likely that it was the commercial *poleis* who had originally re-opened the West who fulfilled this need. Given the proximity of Achaia and both Opuntian and Ozolian Lokris to Euboia and Korinth, it would not have been difficult to organize some form of collaboration between prospective colonizers and merchant ships. Moreover, given the geographical advantage of any expedition departing for

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8 Access to ships is implied in the claim that Archaic Spartans colonized Melos, Thera and Knidos (Thouk. 5.84.2, 89, 112.2; Hdt. 1.174.2).
southern Italy via the Korinthian Gulf, it is thus unlikely to be coincidental that the Achaians (presumably in Korinthian ships), reached the east coast of southern Italy first and consequently settled or gained influence over the most choice agricultural zones. Indeed, the general disposition of the Greek colonies in southern Magna Graecia tends to reflect an arrival date/availability-of-arable-land nexus. Thus the Lokrians, who did not colonize southern Italy until the first half of the seventh century, remained one of the poorest poleis of the region for centuries to come. The impact of this distribution pattern on the Magna Graecian polis-system was twofold. A spiralling cycle of greed, envy and violence culminated two centuries later in the destruction of the region’s two wealthiest poleis (Siris and Sybaris), at the hands of their fellow Greeks (Justin 20.2.4; Ath. 12.522a; Diod. 9.2-10.3). Both defunct poleis commanded the lion’s share of arable land in southern and central Magna Graecia and drew their wealth from it. Furthermore, due to their agricultural gains as firstcomers, Achaian poleis were able to lay the foundations of regional hegemony and maintain some semblance of that hegemony into the fourth century.
1.3 the refugee phase.

The previous sub-sections have given much attention, and necessarily so, to the geography of colonialism in southern Italy. However, in discussing refugee populations the colonial process is often more the case of latecomers attempting to establish themselves in a pre-existing system, with all the problems contained therein. News of the opportunities in the western Mediterranean not only permeated the periphery of mainland Greece, but also lapped upon the eastern edges of the Aegean. Although there are hints in the ancient sources and archaeological records of Rhodian settlements along the coast between Sybaris and Kroton from the early seventh century onward, the first East Greeks to sail west were primarily interested in Sicily.\(^9\) It is sufficient to say that no Rhodian colony in Magna Graecia ever rose to prominence in the Italiote Greek polis-system, or even evolved as far as the polis stage. However, a different type of East Greek colonist began to arrive in the West from the first half of the seventh century and it is evident that the arrival of new Greek settlers into the established Italiote Greek polis-system made a considerable impact in both the long and short terms. Indeed as will be seen, over time, if not immediately in some cases, feelings amongst established Greek interests in the region were rarely

\(^9\) TWGa, pp 34, 159-60.
better than ambivalent towards the newcomers, and the foundations of the latter often proved a source of exploitation, discord and violence in the areas they settled. In the first half of the seventh century the Mermnad Lydian conquest of Kolophon in Ionia precipitated the refugee phase of colonization in Italy (Hdt. 1.15), and in particular the first of many waves of East Greek immigrants into the western Mediterranean (Strabo 6.1.14; Ath. 12.523c). With the determination of people without a home, the Kolophonian refugees managed to establish themselves on the rich Siritid plain in north-eastern Magna Graecia. Thus a lone Ionian polis was planted within a wide belt of Achaian and Dorian settlement, with serious consequences for the future development of the Archaic polis-system in the region. Already diverse in its make-up, the influx of Ionian Kolophonians into Magna Graecia in many ways appears to have been one migration too many for the existing poleis to tolerate. As will be discussed in chapters 4 and 5, the Kolophonian polis of Siris was inspiring feelings of resentment by the early sixth century at the very latest.

The next wave of East Greek refugees entering the western Mediterranean was a victim of the Achaimenid Persian conquest of their home polis, Phokaia (Hdt. 1.166-7). Besides drawing upon knowledge of earlier Euboian activities in the

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10 TWGb, p. 172.
West as well as the success story of their fellow Ionians (the Kolophonians), the Phokaians themselves had been involved in the commerce of the region since the second half of the seventh century (Hdt. 1.163; Strabo 4.1.4). Indeed, by c. 560 the Phokaians had already established colonies in southern Gaul and Kyrnos (Corsica). Eventually settling in western Magna Graecia around 540 (Elea), and initially with the permission of non-Ionian Italiote Greeks, the Phokaians like the Kolophonians before them also encountered hostility from the established poleis.11

The last significant wave of East Greek migration to the West occurred in the wake of the Ionian Revolt (499-494). An expedition comprised mainly of Samian and Milesian refugees departed for Italy in 494, landing first at Lokroi Epizephyrioi and then probably Rhegion (Hdt. 6.22-3). In circumstances similar to those of the Phokaians, the Samian-led colonists were at first welcomed by the Italiote Greeks but were later disowned and conquered by them (Thouk. 6.4.5-6). Moreover, as will be discussed further in chapter 7, the Samians also found themselves used as pawns by their Rhegine Italiote ‘benefactors’ in a bitter struggle to reconstruct the eighth

11 Neighbouring Poseidonia at first appears to have been amenable to the idea of a Phokaian colony, however, as attested in Strabo (6.1.1), this friendship did not last. See Graham, “The Colonial Expansion of Greece”, CAH v.3 pt.3 (Cambridge, 1982 [2nd ed.]), p. 142.
century Euboian Straits-system.

A somewhat analogous migration occurred earlier in the archaic period, originating from Messenia. Most probably arising out of defeat in the Second Messenian War (c. 685-c. 668), a band of Messenians appears to have migrated to the Italiote Greek polis of Rhegion (Paus. 4.23.6).\(^\text{12}\) However, unlike the East Greek colonists, the Messenians prospered in their host polis and in time were even able to establish themselves as its ruling class. The consequences of this secondary colonization and takeover were considerable for the development of the Magna Graecian polis-system, as it was the Messenian element which championed the violent reunification of the Straits poleis by force (Thouk. 6.4.6). Consequently, for nearly three decades a Messenian dynasty straddled the Straits (488-461), and in the process bound together the interests of north-eastern Sicily and southern Magna Graecia in a way not seen since the days of the Euboian hegemony. Thus the refugee-based migrations into the western Mediterranean clearly demonstrate that the settlement patterns of generations earlier continued to influence and even dictate the actions and fates of those living centuries later.

SECTION TWO: The Italian context and relations between Greeks and non-Greeks.

Greek commercial and colonial expansion into the western Mediterranean from the early eighth century onward encountered numerous pre-existing or co-existing ethnic, economic, political and cultural systems, many of which were to have a significant impact upon the development of the Italiote Greek 

*polis*-system. When Greek colonists first began to arrive on the Ionian coastline of Italy a variety of native peoples occupied the area. The collective term 'Oinotrian' was applied to all of those natives ranging from western Basilicata to northern Calabria (Hdt. 1.164-7; Strabo 6.1.15). Another group of natives, usually referred to collectively as Iapygians, occupied Apulia. The indigenous population of the southern tip of Magna Graecia around the Lokrian band of settlement were possibly different again in that their culture had more in common with the Sikels of Sicily than the Oinotrians of the mainland (Thouk. 6.2.4; Polyaïnos. 6.22; Polyb. 12.6.2-5).  

Moreover, the Greek colonists also had to deal with such peoples as the Etruscans and the Phoenicians. However,  

although important players in the wider western Mediterranean context, the Etruscans and Phoenicians were often less immediate in terms of their actual impact upon the Greek colonization process, at least as far as the early archaic period was concerned. Providing the exception to this rule were the commercially-orientated Greeks who had first re-opened the West to Greek exploitation. As the interests of these Greeks were directly related to trade in Etruria, the disposition of the Etruscans, as well as the Phoenician merchants in the region, was more consequential. As will be seen, the relationships forged between the first Greek colonists and the denizens of Italy often proved crucial in the development of Greek policy towards both local and regional issues.\(^\text{14}\) This in part stemmed from the problems raised by the presence of an existing native population in areas designated for Greek colonization, which consequently required an almost exclusively locally-based approach to policy-making in the nascent Greek polis. Moreover, whether inter-communal relations were violent, peaceful or ambivalent during the first few years of colonization, they often dictated the conduct of future generations.

2.1 attrition and stalemate.

Representing one pattern, or extreme, of Greek colonization and its repercussions vis à vis the native population is Spartan Taras. Almost from the moment of their landfall (traditionally c. 706), the Spartan colonists appear to have engaged in violence against the native population of Apulia. Phalanthos, the semi-legendary leader of the Greek expedition, is said to have fought numerous battles around the first site of Spartan colonization at Satyrion before launching a successful assault on an existing indigenous town – the future Taras, some 25 kilometres to the north-west (DH 19.1.2-5; Paus. 10.10.6-8). Moreover, the archaeological record also attests to the disappearance of several prospering native sites in the immediate vicinity of Taras around the time of the Spartan colonization.15 Thus the birth of the Tarentine polis was one which was hard fought and based upon the supplantation of existing native settlements. Consequently, hostility and outright warfare were to characterize Tarentine-Iapygian relations for the next three hundred years.

Aside from the initial aggression committed by the Spartan colonists in the name of securing a viable astu and chora, part of the cause of the hostilities between Greek and Iapygian lay

15 Ibid., p. 28.
in the fact that both represented strong and assertive cultures. The dominant culture in Apulia at the time of Greek colonization (Iapygian) was itself an immigrant body, having arrived from Illyria around 1100 and had retained its Messapic-Illlyrian dialect. By c. 706 the Iapygians had clearly evolved from a nomadic conglomeration into an agricultural economy and had undergone a degree of synoikismos, and in general appeared to be a culture firmly entrenched in the Iron Age. Some of these Illyrian-speaking peoples had also achieved a considerable degree of commercial sophistication. Regional trade contacts with Greece had been in place since the Mykenaian period, and a Mykenaian emporion at Scoglio del Tonno near Taras had traded with the Iapygians' native predecessors between the fifteenth and eleventh centuries. Pottery from Illyria, Latium and Villanovan Etruria were also imported into Apulia, and Mykenaian-inspired local painted pottery industries arose in the region as well. Indeed, so successful was the pottery of the Daunian sub-division of the Iapygians that it was exported to Campania, Etruria, Picenum, the Po Valley, and even as far as Dalmatia and Bosnia. Therefore, the arrival

17 Ibid., p. 7; Lomas, Rome and the Western Greeks, p. 26.
18 FWG, pp. 4-5; de la Genière, "The Iron Age in Southern Italy", pp. 70-2.
19 Lomas, Rome and the Western Greeks, p. 27; Brauer, Taras, p. 6
of Greeks in Apulia was by no means the case of a militarily and technologically superior people dominating a weak indigenous population.

Moreover, in many ways Greek colonial penetration was perceived by the Iapygians as an invasion, reflected in their incessant hostility towards Taras and their maintenance of a degree of isolation from Tarentine cultural influence. Indeed, even when far greater Greek powers such as Korinth and Athens began to encroach upon Daunian trade in the Adriatic, bringing the Daunians with them into a more static orbit of Greek culture, the Messapic Apulians fiercely retained

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The receptive nature of the Picenian culture to the north of Apulia towards Hellenism further implies that the Iapygian isolation from Tarentine was probably a deliberate choice: see M. Pallotino, *The History of Earliest Italy*, trans. M. Ryle & K. Soper (London, 1991), pp. 74-5.
their political independence. Furthermore, Greek colonization in south-west Apulia may have also have been a catalyst for an existing pattern of native synoikisms. Certainly large native settlements such as those in the Gravina area, existed in Apulia by c. 706, but the arrival of aggressive Greek colonists may well have played a role in the gradual process of native urbanization which culminated in the late fifth and fourth centuries. Further incursions by the Spartan colonists therefore became even more problematic. Thus, as a result of the Iapygians' cultural, economic and military resilience, much of Taras' diplomatic and military energies were focused to its north and east. In turn, Taras became and remained one of the weakest members of the Italiote polis-system for most of the archaic period.

2.2 imperialism and expansion.

The second major pattern of Greek colonist-native relations in Italy is well illustrated in the case of the southern poleis of Magna Graecia. Like the Iapygians, the Oinotrian population of

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22 Nava, "Greek and Adriatic Influences in Daunia in the Early Iron Age", pp. 572, 577-8.

Basilicata and Calabria had also achieved a considerable level of Iron Age cultural sophistication. Trade with Mykenaian Greece is attested by pottery finds at Broglio di Trebisace and Torre del Mordillo (Calabria), and San Vito di Pisticci and Termitito (Basilicata). Moreover, a degree of cultural exchange between the Oinotrians and Phoenicians is also attested to by metalwork found at Francavilla Marittima (Calabria). A ceramics industry in Basilicata, based on Greek geometric ware (*tenda Geometric*), was also successful enough to export its produce to western Apulia and northern Calabria, and to a limited extent, into southern Etruria. In terms of demography, these natives, as with their Iapygian neighbours, were in some instances concentrated in small towns. Indeed, some Oinotrians exercised control over the fertile valleys and plains of northern Calabria by fortifying key points on and around these areas.

However, despite the apparent strength of the Oinotrians' position, their early relations with the Greek colonists were radically different from those between the Greeks and the Iapygians. In contrast to Apulia, where there existed a

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24 *FWG*, pp. 4-5, 110; Lomas, *Rome and the Western Greeks*, p. 27; de la Genière, "The Iron Age in Southern Italy", p. 77.

25 De la Genière, "The Iron Age in Southern Italy", pp. 72-4; *FWG*, p. 107.

26 De la Genière, "The Iron Age in Southern Italy", p. 63.
relatively long history of militarism, regional hegemons operating from fortified bases and quasi-feudal kingships (Strabo 6.3.6; Thouk. 7.33), the relatively poorly organized Oinotrians rapidly succumbed to Greek aggression. The Oinotrian band of settlement adjacent to the newly founded Greek poleis contracted drastically. Francavilla Marittima was occupied by the Sybarites, Castiglione di Paludi, Amendolara, Torano and Castrovillari disappeared altogether, and archaeological evidence reveals that Torre del Mordillo was destroyed by fire not long after the foundation of Sybaris (c. 720) – almost certainly in a Sybarite attack. In contrast to the heavily restricted nature of Tarentine expansion vis à vis adjacent natives, in some instances the physical impact of the first Sybarites was felt over 30 kilometres away from the astu, at such sites as at Torano. A similar pattern is evident for the Greek colonies of Metapontion, Lokroi and Rhegion. Situated near Metapontion, Incoronata, San Teodoro and Cozzo Presepo were all abandoned by the Oinotrians, and the native

populations near Lokroi and Rhegion were also soon evicted (Polyb. 12.5.10; DH 19.2.1).²⁹

The relative ease of Greek expansion in Basilicata and Calabria had major repercussions for the development of the poleis of southern Magna Graecia. While Taras remained stunted and surrounded by hostile natives who regularly sought vengeance for past dispossessions, Sybaris and Metapontion reaped huge benefits from possessing far weaker indigenous neighbours. As a result, large tracts of fertile land were rapidly brought under Sybarite and Metapontine control and as will be discussed in chapter 4, Sybaris in particular converted these agricultural assets into political power. While most Greek colonies that chose or were forced to choose violence in their dealings with natives fall in between the examples of Taras and Sybaris, it is without a doubt that both the incidence of violence and the relative strength of the natives concerned proved crucial in the evolution of the poleis of Magna Graecia, and the dynamics of the future polis-system.

2.3 an Ionian alternative?

Patterns of Greek-native relations during the colonial period were not always violent, and this too had considerable influence over the development of the poleis involved. Non-aggressive or relatively non-aggressive colonization in many ways appears to have been a characteristic of the Ionian colonies in Italy.\(^{30}\) Around 650, Ionian-speaking Kolophonians settled in southern Italy, and although Strabo (6.1.14) states that the Kolophonians took the site of their colony, Siris, by force (βίο ἡλατεία), archaeological evidence suggests that a significant level of co-existence characterized Greek-Oinotrian relations in the hills above the Siritid plain.\(^{31}\) Thus it is possible that the wealth achieved by Siris by the sixth century did not necessarily stem only from a Sybarite-style conquest of the surrounding natives, but in part from intercommunal co-operation. Further peaceful Ionian interaction with a native population is evident during the early years of Phokaian Elea. Founded around 535, Herodotos (1.167) states that the site of the colony was procured (ἐκ της οαντο) from the Oinotrians. The use of such a verb presupposes the conducting of negotiations of some kind,

\(^{30}\) Morel, “Greek Colonization in Italy and the West”, p. 125.

\(^{31}\) Evidence of mixed burials at Policoro containing both Greek and native elements is a strong indicator of such co-existence: see Morel, “Greek colonization in Italy and the West”, p. 125; TWGb, p. 184.
between Greeks and natives, and again provides a useful insight to an Ionian approach to colonization.\textsuperscript{32}

A similar pattern can be observed in the Ionian Chalkidian band of settlement in north-eastern Sicily. Among the numerous Chalkidian foundations and their sub-colonies in Sicily, initial violence against the native Sikels is not unheard of (Diod. 14.88.1), but subsequent relations appear peaceful, particularly when compared to the behaviour of the Dorian colonies to the south and west. Chalkidian \textit{phrouria} and imperialism at the expense of the Sikels do not appear in the ancient sources, and when north-eastern Sicily was absorbed into the Dorian empires of the fifth century, the Chalkidians' weakness was almost certainly a reflection of their lack of imperialism in the past.\textsuperscript{33} Indeed, with the exception of Kyme (see below), none of the Ionian \textit{poleis} in either Sicily or Magna Graecia had particularly large \textit{chorai}.

A crucial factor in the relatively peaceful relations between the Ionians of Magna Graecia, and indeed Sicily, was the nature of


\textsuperscript{33} E. Sjöqvist, \textit{Sicily and the Greeks: studies in the interrelationship between the indigenous population and the Greek colonists} (Michigan, 1973), p. 55; \textit{TWGb}, pp. 177-9, 186.
the Ionian colonies in the western Mediterranean. As discussed earlier, commerce brought the Euboians into the West and caused them to settle. Similarly, the next wave of Ionians, arriving as refugees, soon reverted to the commerce they had practised for generations in their homelands and integrated themselves into the regional trade of their new homes. With commerce as either the *raison d’être* or the natural prerogative of the Ionian colonists, it is not surprising that most of their colonies had small *chorai* and often possessed relatively good records *vis à vis* inter-communal relations. In sum, the development of such *poleis* conformed to the *diktat* of secure port facilities and maritime trade routes rather than the needs of landed aristocrats whose interests were to shape the policies of *poleis* such as Taras and Sybaris.

A second and in many ways considerably more complex Ionian band of settlement and associated Greek-Italian relations existed in Italiote Campania. The first Greek settlement in the region, and indeed Italy, was at Pithekoussai around 775, on modern Ischia. Although archaeology has revealed that no native Italian settlement had existed on this site at this time, the nature of the Greek presence ensured that contact with the peoples of the mainland was frequent and essential to

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Pithekoussai's existence. As will be discussed further in chapter 3, settled by Chalkidians and Eretrians, Pithekoussai began its life as an *emporion*, largely established for the purpose of tapping the metals trade between Etruria and southern Italy. With commerce as its *raison d'être*, relations between the Ionians of Pithekoussai and the Etruscans to their north were largely peaceable and mutually beneficial.

However, two developments were soon to complicate relations between Greeks and non-Greeks in and around Campania. The first was the establishment of Kyme, a Euboian colony on the Campanian mainland, around 725 (Strabo 5.4.4). Here it would appear that Ionian colonists rapidly adopted an expansionist policy, possibly destroying an existing native settlement on the site of the Kymaian *astu* (Livy 8.22.5-6), and establishing a large *chora* within a short period of time. However, despite the imperialism apparent in these actions, archaeological evidence suggests that the region encompassed in the Kymaian *chora* was only ever sparsely populated at the time of Greek expansion, and that the Italian peoples of the Campanian interior, called Ausones and Opici/Osci by Greek

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35 Frederiksen, *Campania*, pp 55-6; *FWG*, p. 34; Cunliffe, *Greeks, Romans and Barbarians*, p. 13.
authors, maintained not only their independence, but also a healthy commercial relationship with their Greek neighbours. While essentially a land of villages during the Greek colonization of coastal Campania, it is likely that a degree of basic synoikism had taken place from c. 800 at a number of key sites, and it is with these that the Greeks conducted most of their business. Thus at Nola, Capua and Suessula in particular tomb finds demonstrate that Ausonian elites were accumulating Greek-made goods as prestige items. Hellenization and prosperity via commerce rather than conquest was therefore the key feature of Greek-Italian relations in Campania during the colonial period.

2.4 trade and competition.

The Greek-Italian equation in Campania was again complicated further around 650 by the rise of Etruscan political power. Although proto-Villanovan and Villanovan deposits in Capua illustrate trade between Campania and ancient Etruria from at least the ninth century, it is not until the period of Greek colonization of Campania that Etruscan-Campanian contacts intensify. Consequently, Greek tastes become Etruscanized

37 Strabo 5.3.4; Arist., Pol. 1329b18; Thouk. 6.2.4, 4.5.
38 Frederiksen, Campania, pp. 32, 58.
39 Ibid., pp. 31, 33, 58, 135.
40 Ibid., p. 118.
to a significant extent, as did those of the inland Campanian Italians, particularly in relation to metalware. However, the Etruscan takeover of Capua, Nola and Suessula far from interrupted the flow of Greek made goods into inland Campania, but rather increased the demand.\(^4\) Indeed, there is no indication of conflict between the Greeks and Etruscan Campania until the late sixth century. Campania, despite its ethnic, commercial and political complexities remained a fluid yet relatively pacific and spacious environment for over a century after the Etruscan advance. The Greeks appear to have satisfied their major territorial ambitions by the end of the eighth century, and settled into the profitable undertaking of supplying both the Etruscans of Campania and Etruria with the Greek-made luxury goods they demanded.\(^4\) Thus, despite the considerable changes Campania underwent, including the advent of the Greeks themselves, Greek-Italian relations were more or less static for over two centuries, helping to foster the great prosperity enjoyed by Pithekoussai, Kyme and their sub-colonies in turn.

However, southern Italy was far from being the exclusive


\(^4\) Frederiksen, *Campania*, p. 126.
commercial preserve of the Euboian Greeks. From the late ninth century Phoenicians were operating in the western Mediterranean, firstly as traders and by the second half of the eighth century as colonists. Whether or not the Phoenician ventures pre-dated those of the Greeks is not important in that serious impact upon the markets of interest to the Greeks did not occur until the eighth century. Phoenician pottery and metalware, and Phoenician-inspired local imitations are detectable in Etruria, Calabria and even Greek Pithekoussai throughout much of the eighth century. Moreover, Phoenician ships may have even supplied Pithekoussan silversmiths with metal from Spain, and Ridgeway has credibly suggested that Phoenician merchantmen may have carried Attic and Rhodian vases to Pithekoussai as well.

The Phoenicians' greatest impact upon the Greek colonization process in Italy was their participation in the de facto partition of the major trade routes into the western Mediterranean between Phoenician and Greek. The Phoenician potential to compete seriously with Greek commercial interests, particularly in Campania and Etruria, in part led to the Euboian occupation of that crucial node of the Tyrrhenian Sea trade, the


44 FWG, pp. 64-5, 99, 110-14.
Straits of Messina. Similarly, the Phoenicians entrenched themselves along the trade routes of the southern half of the western Mediterranean, particularly on the African coast. Thus, after a period of commercial competition it would appear that by the late eighth century the Greeks and their Phoenician rivals were concentrating much of their resources on establishing largely separate spheres of activity and influence. Relations were unlikely to have been antagonistic, at least not in the racially-charged sense characteristic of the sixth century and onwards. Apart from the apparently close Pithekoussan-Phoenician trade links outlined above, Phoenician refugees fleeing the Assyrian wars of the late eighth century appear to have found a home amongst the Pithekoussan Greeks and maintained a degree of cultural autonomy. As with Greco-Etruscan relations, it was not until the sixth century, when scope for easy commercial and territorial expansion was beginning to expire, that the Phoenicians and the Punic colonies began to quarrel in any large-scale way with the Western Greeks.

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46 FWG, pp. 111-14.
47 Boardman, The Greeks Overseas, pp. 207-9; Cunliffe, Greeks, Romans and Barbarians, pp. 17-19.
CONCLUSION: a *polis-system* foreshadowed.

The Greek colonization of southern Italy can therefore be seen to have been a process which was subject to numerous variables. Moreover, the key patterns of colonization were closely linked to the specific interests of the diverse range of settlers who were drawn westward. In turn, the peculiarities and requirements of each foundation in many ways proved to be the fundamental building blocks of the future Italiote *polis*-system. Thus key *polis*-system features such as which of its members could and would possess maritime interests and power, as well as those who would pursue land-based hegemony and imperialism, were in many ways determined in the colonial period. The influx of refugee peoples also helps to highlight future concerns among established *poleis* over the limited nature of resources as well as the tendency towards chauvinism, exploitation and intolerance on the part of many Italiote *poleis* when dealing with outsiders in the archaic period.

The relationship between Greeks and the pre-colonial population of southern Italy also can be said to have been decisive in determining the hierarchy of the nascent *polis*-system. The Achaian *poleis* by and large profited from the weakness of their Oinotrian neighbours, whereas the Dorian
Tarentines struggled to make their voices heard within the Italiote polis-system for the bulk of the archaic period due to the tenacious opposition of their non-Greek neighbours. In contrast to both groups, the Ionian colonists regularly adopted a relatively conciliatory attitude towards the local population, due in no small part to their emphasis on commercial, as opposed to imperial, activities. As a result of this commercial imperative, the Ionians also came into contact with a variety of non-Greek peoples who were not geographically connected to Magna Graecia, including the Etruscans and the Phoenicians. Interaction with these peoples required further compromises and a general commitment to conflict avoidance in the interests of trade.

Broadly speaking, these were the primary influences upon the development of the early Italiote polis-system. As has been demonstrated, many of the parameters within which the Italiote poleis moved during the archaic period were established during the colonial period. Moreover, as will be discussed in detail in later chapters, attempts to shift these parameters more often than not inspired or coincided with periods of violence, instability, and regional upheaval within the Italiote polis-system.
CHAPTER TWO

The hellenization of the past and present: conceptual and physical means of constructing ‘Magna Graecia’.

The colonization process which exported what was to become a Greek polis-system to the shores of southern Italy not only entailed the building of new oikoi, but also the construction of the very idea of Greek life in outremer. The latter objective required an ideological hellenization of the colonial territories, effectively investing the land, its people, mountains and rivers with Greek cultural symbols. This process often emphasized similarities between the various Greek colonists, whether Achaian, Dorian, Ionian, Lokrian or otherwise, as well as between the Greek colonists in general and the indigenous population. However, it was also often the case that the key tools of hellenization, myth and religion, were used to delineate the borders of the future Italiote polis-system, paradoxically highlighting the differences between the Greeks. Moreover, as will be seen, these borders could either take a physical or conceptual form.
SECTION ONE: the importance of tradition and the role of myth.

The extent to which the Greek colonization of southern Italy was a journey of cultural as well as physical distance cannot be underestimated. Compounding the initial difficulties and potential trauma of a lengthy sea voyage was the harsh reality that at the end of the trip there awaited a foreign land from which the colonists would have to shape a new life. While a crew of experienced sailors or a contingent of hoplites may not have found these conditions particularly trying, colonial expeditions invariably involved men of a variety of age groups and experience as well as women and children whose previous exposure to sea travel would presumably have been minimal.¹ Landfall too heralded not merely an exercise in *epiteichisis* but the beginning of a community in lands often devoid of allies and equally barren in relation to gods, temples and tradition. All previous religious and spiritual references were now beyond the sea, be they Delphoi, Olympia or an *oikos*’ original goddess of the hearth.

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1.1 myth as a colonial imperative.

The extent to which the colonization of southern Italy was a cultural leap of faith is firmly attested in the attempts by the Greeks to ensure the existence of solid ground at the terminus of that same leap. In essence, Greeks, and particularly those of Italiote and Sikeliote extraction, spent centuries crafting and transplanting myths and legends that would consolidate Greek culture in the lands that they had adopted as their own in southern Italy. Thus, while the physical distance between the Aegean and western Mediterranean poleis could not be written (or recited) out of existence, a 'correction' of the equally real absence of Greek culture in pre-colonial Italy was a far easier task for the historians, poets and playwrights of the Greek West. To the modern observer, this may appear to be an elaborate collective and self-inflicted delusion, but to the boatloads of apprehensive and surely disorientated colonists, the need for certainty and familiarity was crucial. Moreover, such a need was equally relevant to the descendants of the colonists, in that the socio-political unit required a sense of its own past to ensure community identity, legitimacy and longevity. Hellenization of the past was thus an imperative no colonial community could afford to ignore, and the historians, poets and biographers who operated within such communities acted accordingly, if only subconsciously. Furthermore, it
should be noted that such myth-building constituted no more and no less than what had already occurred in Greece proper, and what was still occurring in the other reaches of Greek colonization. *Every* Greek *polis* would have developed a foundation myth of some description, plundering Homeric and Hesiodic works in the process.\(^2\) The Greek colonists of southern Italy and their descendants were therefore not peculiarly averse to the truth, but were rather members of a *milieu* which had a very human craving for a ‘history’ to which they could refer.

While it is beyond doubt that conscious steps were taken to transform the colonial environment into a segment of the wider Greek mythological past and cultural present, consideration must be given to the ‘when’ of this phenomenon. In particular, as no accounts survive from the colonial period itself, it cannot be argued with certainty that the various myths associated with the Italiote *poleis* were contemporary with the colonies’ respective foundations.

One well preserved text that should be regarded with care is Homer’s *Odyssey*. Numerous later ancient sources freely associated Skylla and Charbydis with the Straits of Messina and

\(^2\) *GHW*, p. 3.
the Land of the Kyklopes with eastern Sicily, but the degree of association in the Homeric context is likely to be far more shallow.\textsuperscript{3} It is very difficult to maintain that the \textit{nostoi} cycle is an accurate geographical guide to an area only reopened to effective Greek contact in the eighth century and consequently even more difficult to maintain that the Greeks who sailed West in that century were "consciously following the traces of the heroes".\textsuperscript{4} Rather, the wanderings of Odysseus were most probably a compilation of a variety of locations, both well known to Homer and his predecessors, as well as less well known. It was not until \textit{after} the Greeks began to repenetrate the western Mediterranean that the Homeric texts could be applied to the shores of Italy, and that the subsequent colonial myths could arise.\textsuperscript{5}

Indeed, it is probable that a great number of the colonial myths

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{3} For example: Thouk. 6.2.1; Thphr. \textit{Hist. Plant.} 5.8.3; Strabo 5.3.6.
\end{itemize}
were in fact only given their definitive forms in the late fourth and early third centuries. Pearson has argued convincingly that the hand of Timaios of Tauromenion (c. 356-260) is evident in the majority of the surviving heroic and mythological accounts of the Western poleis, whether cited directly or through the works of later sources such as Polybios, Strabo and Diodoros.⁶

An inveterate systemizer, Timaios would have drawn upon the mythic references predecessors such as Antiochos of Syracuse had made, as well as an assortment of oral and archaeological sources, and rendered an end product that simply cannot be accepted as 'ancient' in all its content.⁷ Timaian exercises in etymology, either cited by a later ancient source (e.g. Diod. 4.56.6), or deduced by modern scholars from Timaios' penchant for the art, demonstrate clear cases of poetic licence. The identification of alleged Greek settlements at sites far beyond the pale of Greek colonization, such as Sardo (Sardinia), and Aithalia (Elba), must be seen as fabrications on the part of Timaios or one of his predecessors.⁸ Neither the

⁷ Pearson, "Myth and archaeologia", p. 178; GHW, p. 54.
⁸ Strabo 5.2.6-7; Diod. 4.29-30, 5.15; Tim., FGrH 566 F85, A.R., Argonautika 4.654-8.
archaeological nor historical evidence exists to support such claims. Nevertheless, both directly and indirectly, Timaios' influence over Italiote mythology spanned the Hellenistic and Roman periods.

Despite the predominance of fourth and third century material, a small corpus does in fact predate Timaios and his successors, although it must be said that the surviving evidence is largely fragmentary. The aforementioned Antiochos of Syracuse (second half of the fifth century), wrote on the history of the West Greeks, and his account, along with that of Herodotos, of the flight of Daidalos to Sicily and the subsequent murder there of Minos of Krete indicates that the fifth century too was a period of myth recording. Moreover, despite his self-proclaimed aversion to τὸ μυθόδης, Thukydides also felt it necessary to record certain traditions concerning Kyklopes and Homeric nostoi in Sicily (Thouk. 1.21.1, 6.2.1, 3). Poets also attest to the existence of a fifth century conception of a mythological Italy, with various works of Pindar, Bakchylides, Aischylos and Sophokles being liberal in their references to such fantastic characters as Arethousa (Pind. Nēm. 1.1-6; 13

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10 Ibid., pp. 172-4.
11 GHW, p. 4.
12 Antiochos, FGrH 555 F13; Hdr. 1.170.
Pyth. 3.69), Kokalos (Soph. Kamikoi F324 [Radt]), and the Palikoi (Aisch. Aitnaia F27-8 [Mette]). The sixth century also contains hints of such myths, in the fragments of works by Hekataios of Lesbos and perhaps also in the Geryoneis of Stesichoros, a native of the southern Italiote town of Metauros.

The Stesichoros fragment in question (F184 [Page]) is downplayed by Pearson as decisive evidence for a western Mediterranean chapter in the Heraklean cycle as early as the first half of the sixth century.\(^{13}\) However, I believe that Stesichoros, like the poets operating in the West during the early fifth century (Pindar, Aischylos, Bachylides), would have made references to Italiote mythology or even concocted that which could not be found locally. Such poets not only wrote about what they knew, but what their West Greek patrons knew or wanted to hear. Thus Pindar often includes references to the Fountain of Arethousa on Ortygia when writing for his Syracusan patron, Hieron I (Nem. 1.1-6; Pyth. 3.68).

Moreover, native West Greeks such as Stesichoros can surely be expected to have drawn upon their own geographic situation and the various peculiarities of their own Italiote culture for

\(^{13}\) GHW, p. 5.
inspiration, if not in the *Geryoneis*, then in other, unfortunately non-extant, works. By extension, Stesichoros was in effect expressing a consciousness of Greek myth localized in Magna Graecia, and in the process connecting it to the rest of the Greek world. In many respects the argument is of course partly dependent on silence but it would be harsh to rule out any potential influence over a poet’s work derived from his own homeland. In this light Ibykos of Rhegion (sixth century), and the even earlier Arion of Methymna (seventh century) should also be regarded, particularly as the *Theogony* of Hesiod (1011-16) provides a reasonable precedent for the Greek mythologization of southern Italy soon after c. 700.

1.2 myth as consolidator and appropriator.

Apart from the generic concepts of cultural ‘certainty’ and ‘familiarity’, the mythologization of southern Italy provided the Greek colonies with a wide range of specific assets, particularly


15 Pearson, “Myth and archaeologia”, p. 179; *GHW*, p. 64; Dench, *From Barbarians to New Men*, p. 36; Biraschi, “*Nostoi* in Occidente ed esperienza ‘precoloniale’ nella tradizione e nella coscienza antica”, p. 98.
in terms of the colonists' place in the wider Hellenic world. Perhaps the most common use of myth was the wide scattering of epiphanies of gods, demi-gods and heroes throughout Magna Graecia and Sicily. The purpose of these epiphanies was to enrol the colonies into the range of the mainland Greek gods, a region where such appearances were already well established by Homer and Hesiod, and to provide the sites of the colonies with dignity and sanctity.\textsuperscript{16} Moreover, an equality of sorts was also established \textit{vis à vis} the \textit{metropolis}, with the colonial epiphanies and associated cults providing a minimum qualification for true \textit{polis} status.\textsuperscript{17} Magna Graecia was thereby endowed with religious familiarity and the seeds of psychological belonging were sown. Thus Aristeas of Prokonessos (at Metapontion: Hdt. 4.15; Ath. 13.605c), Artemis (at Syracuse: Pind. \textit{Pyth.} 2.6ff.) and a version of the Rape of Persephone (at Lokrian Hipponion: Ath. 7.302a), were all imported into Italy.

An extension of these epiphanies is the impact that various Greek gods, titans and heroes made upon the physical environment of southern Italy. Strabo (5.4.6) and Diodoros (4.22.1-2) state that the causeway of Avernus outside Kyme

\textsuperscript{16} \textit{GHW}, p. 3.

\textsuperscript{17} M.P. Nilsson, \textit{Cults, Myths, Oracles and Politics in Ancient Greece} (Göteborg, 1986 [rep.]), pp. 15-16.
was in fact a construction of Herakles, and Strabo goes on to explain that the volcanic springs nearby were the legacy of the wounds inflicted by Herakles on the Leuternian giants. Similarly, Typhon is said to be responsible for the earth tremors endemic to Pithekoussai and Mt. Aitna (Strabo 5.4.9; Pind. *Olymp.* 4.6ff, *Pyth.* 1.18ff). The presence of the Greek gods on Italian soil was thus evident to all in the colonies and stood out as religious as well as physical markers of the known and newly expanded Greek world.\(^\text{18}\)

Therefore, with their gods appearing in person and with the very landscape testifying to such manifestations, the Greeks could far more easily call their new homes their own. Moreover, the fears and uncertainties associated with life on the colonial frontier, symbolized in Italiote myth by such ambivalent entities as Kirke of Kirkaion (Strabo 5.3.6), were ‘tamed’ through the efforts of heroes such as Odysseus, whose equally symbolic ‘marriage’ to Kirke pacified the threat posed to the Greeks.\(^\text{19}\) Thus in many ways we are dealing with a communal, and not necessarily cynically conscious effort to minimize the trauma of colonization and survival in the West, and to maximize the psychological commitment of the colonists to the colony. In essence, Italy was thus colonized not only by

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\(^{18}\) *GHW*, p. 62.

\(^{19}\) Dench, *From Barbarians to New Men*, p. 37.
the Greek people but also by their gods, as part of a concerted effort to transform the unknown into the known and to bind the New World irrevocably to the Old.

A second vital function fulfilled by the placement of mainland Greek mythical figures in southern Italy was its role in the appropriation of Italian soil and the legitimization of that appropriation. The most effective way to achieve this end was to extend the hellenization of the present, the colonial movement itself, into the past. Therefore, from at least the time of Hekataios (fl. 500), scores of Greek heroes were 'recorded' as having visited the western Mediterranean, both just prior to and after the ancients' dating of the Trojan War. Thus journeys through Magna Graecia and Sicily by Daidalos (Antiochos FGrH 555 F13), Herakles (Hekataios FGrH 1 F76-7), Theseus (Hdt. 1.170), Odysseus (Thouk. 6.2.1) and Iason and the Argonauts (Strabo 6.1.1; Apoll. 4.760-5),20 appear in the ancient sources from the sixth century and onwards, possibly with an earlier, oral pedigree. Aptly named by Lévêque "les héros supermen" and "les héros coloniaux", not only do these heroes traverse the hills and plains of southern Italy, but also from time to time performed the role of "fondateurs de

20 Pearson makes a good case for Timaios (i.e. the fourth century BCE) as being the source for Apollonios and Strabo (from the third and first centuries BCE respectively): see GHW, pp. 64-6.
sanctuaires et de villes". 21

Consequently, many of the colonies founded in the eighth and seventh centuries could also lay claim to a heroic 'ancestor', and in the process conceptualize themselves not as intruding foreigners, but rather as heirs to an older Greek presence in Italy. 22 Furthermore, such 'facts' were occasionally reiterated through the emission of coinage featuring a selection of heroes believed to have been involved in the earliest history of the given polis. 23 Appropriation of Italian land, whether occupied by Italic indigenes or not, was therefore in many

22 Such as in the cases of Lagaria and Epeios (Strabo 6.1.14), Siris and Kalchas (Lykophron 978ff ), Petelia and Philoktetes (Strabo 6.1.3), Thourioi and Philoktetes (Justin 20.1.16), Poseidonia and Jason (Strabo 6.1.1), and central Italy and the sons of Odysseus (Hes., Th. 1011-14). See also GHW, p. 42; I. Malkin, Religion and Colonization in Ancient Greece (Leiden, 1987), p. 90.
23 For the depiction of foundation heroes on Krotoniate coinage, see ACGC, p. 181; Holloway, Art and Coinage in Magna Graecia, (Bellinzona, 1978), pp. 59-60; P. Attianese, Kroton: Ex Nummis Historia (Dalle monete la storia, il culto, il mito di Crotone) (Settingiano, 1992), pp. 130-8. For Taras, see ACGC, pp. 175-6; Holloway, Art and Coinage in Magna Graecia, pp. 35-6. For Kyme, see ACGC, p. 178.
respects a right due to those Greeks who chose to settle in the West.

The key figure in the campaign to hellenize the history of Italy was the hero Herakles. As the earliest of the Greek heroes to journey into the western Mediterranean, Herakles possessed a special primacy within the heroic pantheon. Moreover, he also constituted the vanguard of the aggressive face of hellenization. In much the same way as the Dorians claimed descent from Herakles in their bid to legitimize their conquest of the Peloponnesos, the Greek colonies of southern Italy deployed Herakles to consolidate their grip on their new territories.24

Similarly, just as Herakles and Dionysios carefully preceded the conquests of Alexander III of Makedon (Arrian 4.28.1-4; 5.2.1-7), Herakles was also a champion of Greek civilization in the West, and impediments to his progress (i.e. barbaroi), were promptly destroyed.25 Consequently, tales of Herakles’ defeat

24 Nilsson, Cults, Myths, Oracles and Politics in Ancient Greece, pp. 13-14; The GHW, p. 42.
of various Italian giants, monsters and native heroes abound. \(^{26}\)

Implicitly, and at times explicitly, linked to the annihilation of non-Greeks by Herakles is the question of land and its ownership. \(^{27}\) When Herakles wrestles with the giant Eryx, the possession of Eryx's land is the prize at stake: \(\text{ἡ μὲν Ἑρακλῆς νικήσῃ, γὰς τὴν Ἑρύκος Ἑρακλέους εἶναι:}\) Paus. 3.16.4; see also Diod. 4.23.2ff, 79.5). So influential was this myth that two separate waves of Greek colonists exploited or were said to exploit the Herakles’ ‘connection’ to Erykine, the name given to that part of western Sicily seized from Eryx by Herakles. Pentathlos of Knidos, c. 580 (Diod. 5.9) and Dorieus of Sparta, c. 510 (Hdt. 5.43) were both said to have couched their colonization plans in terms of a \textit{reconquista} of their Herakleid patrimony. The Heraklean legend of Erykine occurs at least as early as Hekataios (\textit{FG\,r\,H} 1 F76-7), and thus probably pre-dates Dorieus and perhaps, as Dunbabin has argued, arose out of Pentathlos' failed expedition - and was possibly by the hand of

\(^{26}\) Such as Herakles’ victories over Eryx (Diod. 4.23.2; Paus. 3.16.4-5), the Leuternian giants (Timaios \textit{FG\,r\,H} 566 F89), and Leukaspis (Diod. 4.23.5). See also Lévéque, "Expansion Mycénienne et imaginaire colonial", p. 154.

\(^{27}\) \textit{GHW}, p. 191.
Stesichoros or one of his successors. The heroic cycles of southern Italy were evidently ambiguous and flexible enough to constitute potent propaganda tools, particularly in the instance of Herakles whose travels and battles could be and were articulated as a raison d'être for Greek aggression against the non-Greek peoples of Italy.

The non-Greek peoples of the Italian peninsula and surrounding islands also formed an important part of the hellenization program in the West. Although relations between the Greek colonists and their non-Greek neighbours were often violent, nonetheless the Greeks integrated many of these peoples into their own hellenic mythology. Apart from explaining the presence and history of the native population in terms understandable and familiar to the Greeks, it also provided another valuable link back to mainland Greece. Antiochos of Syracuse is one of the earliest known historians to systemize the various native groupings of Italy into artificial kingdoms (FG rH 555 F2-7); and the later Dionysios of Halikarnassos, who frequently quoted Antiochos, recorded a tradition, perhaps Antiochian in origin, that states that many of these alleged native kings had Greek ancestors (DH 1.11-12.1). Also, from the fifth century, Herodotos and Thoukydides were aware of traditions which gave the Messapians an ethnic

28 TWGa, p. 330. See also TWGb, p. 187.
Kretan ancestry (Hdt. 7.170), and Trojan origins to the Elymians (Thouk. 6.2.3). Moreover, aside from serving as a legendary link to Greece, in many ways such arbitrary and ethnocentric labels could also facilitated attitudes of cultural superiority on the part of the Greeks. The barbaroi of Italy had been subject to Greek or hellenized (in the case of the Trojans) rule in the distant ‘past’, and therefore deserved to be subjugated, if necessary, in the future. At best the indigenes were second class Greeks who had failed to evolve since the days of the Kretan thalassocracy and the Trojan War, and at worst, barbaroi whose treatment depended utterly upon the current interests and needs of the Greek colonists.\(^2\) Mythology was clearly an instrument of power and a contributive determinant of power relations in colonial and archaic Magna Graecia, as well as a tool of cultural familiarization. Indeed, when wielded correctly and effectively, legitimization, justification and consolidation (both political and cultural), could be achieved through myth, thus laying the foundations for successful colonization and the building of a dynamic polis-system.

SECTION TWO: physical aspects of ‘Greater Greece’: the role of ritual and architecture.

The act of colonization by the Greeks in southern Italy also carried with it a number of physical as well as mythic pillars upon which to base itself. Moreover, like the concept-based ‘foundation’ myths and ‘ancient history’ discussed in the previous section, the physical aspects of the Greek colonization of Italy were also imports. Indeed many of these myths became important ritual components of the colonial poleis, such as in the case of Persephone and the Hipponiate abduction cycle. This myth went on to become a prominent cult in the wider band of Lokrian settlement in southern Italy.\(^\text{30}\)

However, the two physical aspects most crucial to colonization were ritualistic acts associated with the earliest phase of the expedition and the establishment of public architecture within the new colony.

\textbf{2.1 the ritualization of colonialism.}

Although a large proportion of surviving Delphic colonization

oracles should be seen as either spurious or at least spuriously preserved, the role of Delphoi in eighth and seventh century colonization is less problematic. While it is unlikely that the eighth century will ever produce definitive and non-anachronistic evidence in relation to Delphoi and its connection with colonization in southern Italy, a strong circumstantial case can be built and supplemented with the testimony of later sources such as Herodotos (eg. 5.42.2). Colonzation was after all in essence the equivalent to appropriation of others' land and justification through religious sanction from mainland Greece would have been a natural step in the evolution of colonization. Moreover, Delphic approval would have constituted a source of confidence for the colonists who were, after all, undertaking a potentially dangerous expedition.

Certainly it would be unlikely that the very earliest of the Greek colonies in southern Italy involved Delphoi, but by the time of the mass migration of Achaians, Lokrians and Spartans into the area during the last quarter of the eighth century, colonization had been a feature of Greek civilization for nearly two generations - time enough to absorb and be absorbed by


the Delphic phenomenon.

Clearly, both colonists and Delphoi stood to gain from such a symbiosis. Among other things, the latter received *kudos* and gratitude expressed through respect and gold, whilst the former group, who will constitute the focus of this section hereafter, received the physical and religious foundation stone of their prospective colony. While no colonist could claim to have witnessed the ancient deeds of Herakles or Theseus in southern Italy, many could stake a claim to having experienced a blessing from Delphoi - either by actually having been present during the initial oracular consultation, or through the simple experience of being led by a Delphic-approved *oikistes*.

As discussed in section one, mythology was an important source of legitimization and explanation. However, Delphoi lent the colonial experience a concrete and fixed point of reference, both in terms of the history of the colony, and its cultural origins. Thus in this sense Delphoi’s status as *ὁ δυσφαλός* (Pind., *Pyth.* 4.74; Aisch., *Eum.* 166), was of particular importance to the colonists seeking to anchor their new existence to the rest of Hellas.

Even in the centuries following foundation, ethnic Italiotes could point to the streets, temples and districts laid out by the
oikistes, all constituting physical reminders that Delphoi had a hand, albeit by proxy, in the life of the colony. Moreover, as in the case of the numismatic celebration of myth discussed earlier, the importance of Delphic origins were also emphasized with the appearance of Apollonic motifs upon the coinage of some Italiote poleis.

However, above all Delphoi was a place that could be visited and consulted again, thus reinforcing the role of the Oracle in the life of the new polis. The literary details of Delphoi's involvement with the Italiote colonies may well reflect the influence of mythologization, but it must also be said that Delphoi constituted a physical aspect of colonial culture. Delphoi could be visited, it could be seen and it could be described, and in turn the act of colonization could be conceptualized as a valid process, both sanctioned and historical in the minds of the settlers and their descendants.

33 Metapontion is a particularly good example of colonial period site preservation. See Malkin, Religion and Colonization, pp. 181-2.
34 For the issuing of Apollonic types at Kroton, see ACGC, p. 167. For Kaulonia, see ACGC, p. 169.
35 For example, as in the case of Kroton and Metapontion, c. 510 (Justin 20.2.5) and Sybaris, earlier in the century (Ath. 12.520a-b; Ael., VH 3.43).
The second essential element of colonialism that constituted a physical ritual was the transference of the sacred fire (hestia), from the prytaneion of the metropolis to the prytaneion of the apoikia. Most of the direct evidence for this process postdates the colonial period by a thousand years or more. However, enough hints exist in sources such as Pindar (Ol. 7.48-9), Herodotos (1.146.2, 4.145.1-4) and Aristophanes (Birds 42, 850ff; Peace 947-8; Lys. 308, 315), to suggest that Athens at the very least practiced such a ritual during its colonial period (c. 600 and onward), and also the distinct possibility that the eighth century was the original home of this concept.36

The act of transference not only served to stress the bond between apoikia and metropolis, but also to anchor the new polis within the orbit of mainstream Greek culture. The hestia transfer was a religiously important act that, like the Delphic consultation, gave the colony a fixed point in Greek historiography. Moreover, whilst the mythologies that arose to imbue the Italiote colonies with heroic and divine pedigrees required the creativity of the colonist's minds, the hestia ritual had a physical manifestation visible to all who chose to walk past the prytaneion of any given colonial polis.

36 Malkin, Religion and Colonization, pp. 117-22, 133.
2.2 the role of public architecture.

The need for familiarity in the physical sense also expressed itself through public architecture. While the role of temples and sanctuaries in the consolidation of the mainland Greek poleis is evident from the ninth century through to the seventh century in particular, such buildings occupied a special and specific place in the colonies of southern Italy. As new entities, the colonial poleis required a level and pace of definition uncommon in mainland Greece. Borders, divisions of power and labour, public and private space and politeia were all issues that required action, if not within the first generation of settlers, then certainly by the end of the second. In many ways a colonial polis' viability as a social, political and economic unit underwent a baptism of fire within the first few decades of settlement, with few if any guarantees of success and survival. Thus, in addition to the aforementioned conceptual, mythologizing and ritualistic means of coping with the trauma of early colonial life, there existed in Magna Graecia

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a highly visible pattern of architectural hellenization of the land.

A process that can be detected from the first decades of many Italiote poleis is the establishment of territorial sanctuaries and temples. In much the same way as the Argive and Samian Heraia, these sanctuaries served as important instruments of delineation, particularly in terms of political and social unity. The population resident within these limits was contrasted with the population that lay without, and in the colonial context such contrasts were compounded by the non-Hellenic nature of the Greeks' Italic and Illyric neighbours. Thus sanctuaries such as those dedicated to Hera Lakinia (Cape Lakinion) and Apollo Alaios (Krimisa) in the chora of Kroton, marked the northern and southernmost limits of effective Krotoniate control for much of that polis' history. Indeed, the case of Kroton and its territorial sanctuaries illustrates a synthesis of the conceptual and physical hellenization of non-Greek lands. Whilst physically holding the northern frontier, the Temple of Apollo Alaios also became a key component in the mythologization of the region, through its alleged

association with the mythical hero Philoktetes ([Arist.] De Mir. Ausc. 107), as well as a defining element within the ritual of Delphic oracular approval given to the first Krotoniate settlers (Diod. 8.17). Indeed this Philoktetes-centric mythologization can be said to have been a crucial component of Kroton’s wider and gradual integration of the area into the Krotoniate chora, by providing a mutual point of contact between Hellenes and the local hellenizing population.⁴¹ Moreover, buildings such as these served as umbilical cords linking the gods of Greece to the new frontiers of Hellas.⁴²

Similarly, the great Temple of Hera in the chora of Poseidonia served as the marker for that polis’ northern frontier on the Silaris River, just as a smaller Temple of Poseidonia at Agropoli probably did for its southern flank.⁴³ The remains of the metopes adorning the Poseidoniate Heraion’s archaic treasury clearly indicate that the first incarnation of the temple was erected in the earliest years of the colony.⁴⁴ That Hera continued to be regarded and depicted as a frontier goddess for the Italiote Greeks is demonstrated by the sixth century Heraion in the chora of Metapontion. Overlooking the

⁴¹ RCA, pp. 229-32.
⁴³ Ibid., p. 104; Edlund, The Gods and the Place, pp. 102-4.
⁴⁴ Edlund, The Gods and the Place, p. 103.
northern limits of the *polis* (the Bradano River), this grand Temple of Hera protected the easiest point of crossing along the Bradano, and thus the gateway into and out of the *polis* from the north. Expansionist neighbours, such as the Tarentines and the Oinotrians (Strabo 6.1.15), were therefore sent the clearest possible message as regards the position of the frontier. The as yet undiscovered Temple of the Dioskouroi on the River Sagra probably operated in much the same way, delineating and protecting the Lokrian frontier from aggressive Krotoniathe neighbours (Strabo 6.1.10).

Thus a further function of these grand-scale Doric temples was to announce with as much clarity as possible, ownership of the newly acquired colonial territories. Such temples were in effect the definitive physical points of the limits of the *polis*, simultaneously bringing territorial order and, due to the religious nature of the buildings, consecrating the original seizure of the land.

Moreover, these structures remained an important feature of the core territorial parameters established within the Italiote

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polis-system during the colonial and early archaic periods. Thus unsurprisingly the infringement of these sacred boundaries more often than not led to the outbreak of inter-
polis warfare. As will be discussed further in chapters 4-5, such action symbolized a determined effort on the part of many poleis during the sixth century to redraw the political map of the Italiote polis-system in violation of the colonial borders, and with drastic consequences.

Complementing these imposing Doric temples was a second category of cult sites, comprised of a large number of rural shrines and sanctuaries whose effect was to chart the progress of hellenization of the chorai of the nascent Italiote poleis. In the case of Metapontion, at least fourteen such sanctuaries are extant, and one in particular (San Biagio), may represent the earliest limits of Metapontine expansion (some seven kilometres from the astu). Small rural shrines such as those at Fonte (Poseidonia), Cotronei (Kroton), and the votive remains scattered along the upper course of the Krathis River (Sybaris), also suggest a reflection of the physical expansion of Greek influence and control over the land.


48 For Fonte, Cotronei, and the upper Krathis valley, see Edlund, The
While shrines such as these probably did not represent overt symbols of hellenic culture of the magnitude of the aforementioned Doric temples, their construction still possessed considerable significance. The earliest days of any Greek colony would have been particularly concerned with the securing of the astu, but consolidation of the polis as a whole required a concerted effort to harness the chora to the astu. Therefore, in many ways the erection of rural sanctuaries reflects the health of the polis as it was within the chora that these smaller shrines were found. It was after all a major concern of the Greek colonists to identify sites within the wider area of their adopted landscape which could be assigned a sacral value relevant to their own religious systems. Thus in effect, sanctuary-building was, like the invention of didactic colonial myths, a manifestation of an instinctive desire to recreate the familiar.49

However, essential geographical and geostrategic differences are apparent between the two categories of cult sites identified. On the one hand the more numerous rural shrines served as relatively subtle physical claims, both to the newly appropriated land itself, and to the integration of that land into

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*Gods and the Place*, pp. 104, 109, 120.

the wider Mediterranean world of Hellas. Furthermore, these shrines fanned out over the countryside in a generally inland direction, thus establishing borders set on a north-south axis, and invariably coming into contact and dealing with indigenous populations rather than other Greeks.

On the other hand, the large set-piece Doric temples were often situated so as to reinforce the riverine boundaries which separated nearly every poleis of Magna Graecia. Thus not only did these cult sites generally straddle the east-west boundaries of poleis, but also overlooked the points at which Greeks came into contact with Greeks. Cult sites therefore not only looked towards the enrollment of the new world into the parameters of the old, but also helped to lay the foundations for a fully functioning polis-system in the developing tradition of mainland Greece, replete with inter-polis borders and all the subsequent propensity towards inter-polis disputes and conflict.

Encompassing religious architecture, but also including architecture of a secular nature, was the spatial task of a colony's oikistes. From Homeric times onward it would appear that an oikistes, or another in a lead capacity, was delegated to assume a large role in the physical ordering of the colony, particularly in relation to the initial stages of the astu (Hom.,
Unlike in the Aegean poleis, where there was usually no shortage of sites imbued with traditions of inherent sacredness, the Greek colonies required a relatively centralized plan which would, in effect, align the astu, its temene, teichoi and arourai with the gods of Hellas. Thus the oikistes, an individual appropriately equipped with the divine sanction of Delphoi, acquired prior to colonization, was necessarily organizational and generally understood by the colonists to be qualified for such a task.

Evidence for such rational planning can be garnered from at least two Italiote poleis, Metapontion and Kroton. In the case of Metapontion in particular, a sixth century realignment of its astu reveals the asymmetrical nature of its urban temples, strongly suggesting that the irregular status of the temple axes reflects a policy of preservation of the original alignment, itself established by the seventh century oikistes or soon after.

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50 For other instances of the ordering of space in the early days of colonization see Pind., Pyth. 5.89ff, Ol. 7.39ff; Hdt. 2.178.1; Thouk. 6.3.1; Plato, Laws 738d. See also Graham, “The Colonial Expansion of Greece”, p. 149.

51 Malkin, Religion and Colonization, pp. 136-7, 163, 185.

52 Ibid., pp. 181-2.
Kroton too has a remarkably systematic *astu* plan, pre-dating the Hippodamian phenomenon of the fifth century, and a number of neighbouring Sikeliote *poleis* such as Megara Hyblaia, Selinous and Kasmenai also experienced similar planning in their first decades of settlement.\(^53\) Thus the *oikistes* became one of the earliest guiding forces not only in the hellenocentric reinterpretation of Italy's physical environment, but also as a consequence in the wider campaign to construct the concept of Magna Graecia.

**CONCLUSION: the foundation and demarcation of the Greek *poleis* in southern Italy.**

The colonization of southern Italy by the Greeks was demonstrably not only a process of establishing new settlements, but also of establishing new boundaries. The foremost task of this latter process was to include the colonial territories within the march of Hellas. To achieve this, southern Italy underwent a course of hellenization through the transplanting of Aegean Greek myth and religious symbols to colonial soil. In particular, Greek heroes such as Herakles and various members of the *nostoi* cycle were used to fashion pre-colonial histories for southern Italy, thus providing the Greek

colonists with reference points for their own existence. Moreover, a legitimate claim to these territories was also created by way of this earlier mythical ‘occupation’ of the West by Greek cult figures. Although many of the sources for this process are limited by their lateness, those that are available strongly suggest that the colonial period, and much of the archaic period as well, consisted of elaborate self-serving, yet contextually understandable, myth-making designed to stand alongside the sword as the co-guardian of the colonies.

Underpinning the extension of the boundaries of Hellas into southern Italy was the physical participation of Greek cults. Many of the Greek colonists arrived in southern Italy with the official sanction of the Delphic Oracle, as well as with a Delphoi-appointed oikistes whose role was to establish the physical lay-out of the colonial cults. The transference of the hestia from metropolis to apoikia also served to sanctify and therefore consolidate the new colonial presence. Physical markers in the form of temples and shrines also played a crucial role in the demarcation of Magna Graecia once southern Italy as a whole was brought into the Hellenic fold. This demarcation process in turn constituted one of the essential ingredients for the development of an Italiote polis-system by providing each apoikia with the foundation stones of their frontiers.
In this sense, most of the colonies of southern Italy adopted the same model of state-building as their *metropoleis* in mainland Greece. However, as will be discussed further in chapters 4 and 5, the Italiote *poleis* did not have the luxury of simply establishing sanctified boundaries between themselves and proceeding to order their affairs around them. Although configured as coping strategies, no amount of ritualization and mythologization could remove the fact that southern Italy was already inhabited prior to Greek colonization. Thus in contrast to the *polis*-system of mainland Greece, that of Magna Graecia had a whole new dynamic to deal with, and the way in which its individual members coped with this fact bore heavily on their ranking within the Italiote *polis*-system. To construct and ritualize Magna Graecia within myth was an important component of colonization and *polis*-building, but to do so was no guarantee that the *polis*-system that was to evolve would be identical to that of mainland Greece.
CHAPTER THREE

Parameters shaped by trade: The foundation and development of the Euboian poleis in southern Italy to the end of the sixth century BCE.

As has previously been outlined in chapter 1, the context of the initial Euboian colonial presence in southern Italy was one of commercial exploitation, specifically of the Etruscan metals market. Moreover, and most importantly for the ethnic Euboian contribution to the Italiote polis-system, it can be demonstrated that this commercialism had a defining impact upon the geographical situation and development of the Euboian apoikiai in southern Italy.

The presence of Euboian Middle Geometric II chevron skyphoi in Villanovan Veii, as well as in Capua, Osta Kyme, and Pontecagnano illustrate the existence of Euboian commercial activity in Etruria and Campania up to a generation prior to the Greek foundation of Pithekoussai (c. 775).¹ Thus knowledge of the large, fertile and accessible tracts of territory in Oinotria

and the toe of Italy (Italia) would not only have been readily available to the Euboian traders, but also at a far earlier date than the Achaian and Dorian interest in southern Italy. Therefore, the Euboian decision to colonize the relatively remote Campanian littoral and the non-arable land of the Straits of Messina suggests motives peculiarly distinct from the intense competition for arable land that characterized the Achaian and Dorian colonization efforts. The Euboian element within the Italiote polis-system was thus fundamentally different in both its construction and political history, and as will be discussed below, retained many of these essential differences for the bulk of the archaic period.

SECTION ONE: The Euboians in Campania and the politics of the central Tyrrhenian Sea.

The first indication that Euboian commercial activity was evolving into a permanent presence in the central Tyrrhenian region was the settlement of two sites on the Bay of Naples, in

Campania. The first of these sites, Pithekoussai, was situated on the island of Ischia, and in many ways symbolizes the caution with which the Euboians initially approached the issue of settlement in southern Italy. Equally, the second settlement, Kyme, founded on the Campanian mainland some two generations after Pithekoussai, represents a further evolution of Euboian interests in the region, beyond pure commerce and into the realm of colonization proper.

With the foundations of Pithekoussai and Kyme, the Euboians were in effect physically committing themselves to long term participation in the central Tyrrhenian region, its politics, multiculturalism, and economic structures, not to mention its dangers and rewards. Consequently, the polis of Kyme and its subsequent daughter poleis for much of their archaic history often found themselves operating on the fringes of both the mainstream Italiote polis-system and the non-Greek worlds of Campania and Etruria. This isolation was in turn a deciding factor in the development of the Campanian Greek polis-system. Thus the commercial currents which led the Euboians to the western Mediterranean also form the building blocks of the most remote outpost of the Italiote polis-system.
1.1 The political and physical landscape of Euboian trade interests in the central Tyrrhenian and the foundation of Pithekoussai.

Any assessment of the Euboian motives behind their presence on the Bay of Naples must come to terms with the fact that while the metals of northern Etruria appear to have been the Euboians' commercial goal, Pithekoussai was over 300 kilometres from the source of these metals. That Pithekoussai was indeed a lynchpin in the early Euboian trade in the central Tyrrhenian, however, is suggested by the presence of an extensive metal-working quarter within the settlement, at Mazzola. Moreover, geological analysis of mineral iron uncovered during excavations of Pithekoussai's *akropolis* dump at Monte di Vico has been interpreted by Buchner and Ridgway as irrefutable proof of an Elban (northern Etruscan) origin for the iron worked on Ischia. While this analytical evidence is controversial, unless it is to be believed that the Euboians brought the iron with them from Greece, it appears highly likely that they would have imported it from the local neighbourhood - Etruria.

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3 *FWG*, pp. 91-5.
Thus Pithekoussai does appear to have constituted a fixed point in the Euboian trade in Etruscan metals. However, vulnerability to the arguments of Cook, Graham and others, who downplay the commercial origins of Pithekoussai, remains without further analysis of the central Tyrrhenian region. The opponents of a commercially-inspired Pithekoussai in particular emphasize the sheer distance mentioned above, between Ischia and sites such as Elba. However, as will be argued below, the political, cultural and economic complexities of the landscape of the central Tyrrhenian region seriously undermine any simplistic interpretation of this distance factor.

Admittedly, if the *raison d'être* of Pithekoussai is understood as being concerned with trade, as I believe is now beyond reasonable doubt, then the ideal location for a Euboian base in the West would presumably have been further north, closer to the metal-producing areas of north-western Etruria (*the Colline metallifere*), including Elba. Further complicating

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7 This region constitutes one of the richest mineral regions in Europe. See G.E. Markoe, "In Pursuit of Metals: Phoenicians and Greeks in Italy", *Greece between East and West: 10th-8th Centuries BC* (Papers of the Meeting at the Institute of Fine Arts, New York University, 1990), G.
the matter is the predominance of Greek-made fine ceramic ware in southern Etruria, particularly in Veii, compared to the absence of such explicit indicators of Greek commerce in the Colline metallifere itself. However, despite this apparent lack of a ceramics trade with north-western Etruria, it has already been demonstrated that metals from this region in all probability did make their way to Pithekoussai. Clearly, Euboian commerce in the region was far more complex than the simple exchange of ceramics for iron ore. Moreover, the complicated process by which the Euboians gained access to these metals suggests that trade was largely on the terms of the Etruscan ore producers.

When the Euboians entered the western Mediterranean around 800, they were tapping into an East-West exchange of goods and technology many centuries old. Like the Phoenicians before them, the Euboians probably traced the metals trade route to Sardinia and on to Etruria, encountering two assertive and organized cultures in the process. Moreover, as it

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10 FWG, p. 27; Ridgway, “Relations between Cyprus and the West”, pp.
would appear that some Etruscan city-states had developed a naval capacity as early as the ninth century, it is not difficult to envisage the Etruscans being able to exercise considerable control over the direction and scale of eighth century Euboian penetration of the region. In other words, it is quite possible that the Etruscans simply did not want the Euboians to establish a permanent presence on the coast of Etruria, and shepherded the Greeks further south. Despite the power of Chalkis and Eretria in the Aegean context at this time (Strabo 10.1.8), the Euboians were either unwilling or, more accurately, unable to force the issue of more favourable trade terms with the Etruscans.

Given the aforementioned importance of southern Etruria to the Euboian ceramics trade, a possible scenario is that the Etruscans of Veii served as middlemen in the eighth century Euboian efforts to secure access to the north and its ores. This scenario of roundabout access stemming from exclusion is lent further credence by the apparent freedom to operate in northern Etruria enjoyed by Phoenician merchants. Phoenician goods,

119-20.

11 Ridgway, "The Etruscans", CAH vol. 4, p. 654; Pallotino, A History of Earliest Italy, p. 66. Garbini goes so far as to suggest a co-ordinated naval shield. see G. Garbini, "The Phoenicians in the Western Mediterranean (through to the Fifth Century B.C.)", The Western Greeks, Pugliese-Carratelli (ed.), p. 124.

12 Tandy, Warriors into Traders, p. 68.
unlike their Greek counterparts, appear to have had little trouble penetrating the markets of Vetulonia and other north Etruscan cities.\textsuperscript{13} This further suggests that the Etruscans were quite capable of formulating and enforcing trade policies that suited \textit{their} interests first and foremost, and that the confinement of the Euboians to Campania was no random event. Moreover, much light is also shed on the origins of the anti-Greek Etruro-Punic \textit{entente cordiale} of the sixth century.\textsuperscript{14} Necessity therefore probably led the Euboians to base their trade route through southern Etruria and the more amenable Etruscans of Veii.\textsuperscript{15}

The choice of Ischia thus appears to have taken into account a number of different interests, as well as representing a healthy dose of pragmatism. In terms of location, the island of Ischia provided safety for the Euboians through separation from mainland Italy. Furthermore, the number of indigenes present on Ischia appears to have been limited, thus increasing the probability of the Greeks being able to arrange affairs on the island to their liking.\textsuperscript{16} Moreover, as Strabo attests (5.4.9), Pithekoussai was also valuable for its arable land, and thus constituted an agricultural asset for its Greek settlers. Trade

\textsuperscript{13} Coldstream, "Prospectors and Pioneers", pp. 49-50; Markoe, "In Pursuit of Metals", pp. 75-8, 81-2.

\textsuperscript{14} See section 2.4.

\textsuperscript{15} Coldstream, "Prospectors and Pioneers", p. 49.

\textsuperscript{16} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 49.
may well have been the deciding factor in establishing a presence at all, but survival did of course depend on subsistence food production, again highlighting the attraction of Ischia. Thus, if the soil of Ischia was indeed ἐυκαρπία (Strabo 5.4.9), Pithekoussai could easily have served both as a point from which trade was conducted, and as a base for provisions and recuperation for Euboian merchants.17

This pattern of settlement contrasts sharply with the progress of Greek colonization in the south of Magna Graecia. Here, the 'terms of settlement' were usually limited only by the often considerable military capacity of the Achaians who spearheaded the Hellenic presence in that region. However, the central Tyrrhenian was a tough but profitable environment, better suited to small scale colonization and large scale commercial exploitation, and it was these factors that dictated the shape of the future Euboian polis-system in this region.

Pithekoussai therefore represents both the ability of the Euboians to make the best of their situation and the utilitarian nature of Greek colonization in north-western Magna Graecia. Moreover, this commercially-inspired utilitarianism in effect consigned the Euboian apoikiai to the periphery of a region

dominated by the economically, militarily and socially sophisticated Etruscans. Clearly, the northern Etruscans in particular were prepared to demarcate and guard their spheres of influence, and would continue to do so for centuries to come.

Consequently, further expansion by the Euboians took place under completely different circumstances and constraints to that of the Greek colonists further south. Pithekoussai was a symbol of the regional realities of the day and the Euboian attempts to adapt to them. From its very beginning it was deliberately perched upon the western extremity of Hellas and sought to integrate itself into an alien and potentially dangerous environment for profit.\(^{18}\) This Euboian presence therefore both differentiated itself from, and pre-dated, the colonial onslaught of the late eighth century. In turn it pre-dated the polis-system that was to arise in the Achaian-dominated central region of Magna Graecia.

Thus the polis-system that Pithekoussai was to spawn in the Bay of Naples was heavily influenced by regional imperatives stemming from the eighth century. Kyme, Parthenope, and the later Neapolis, therefore evolved in a world of Etruscans, Campanians and Phoenician merchants, and often had more in common with these groups than most of their Italiote and Sikeliote Greek cousins to the south. Indeed, as will be

\(^{18}\) Bakhuizen, *Chalcis-in-Euboea*, p. 16.
discussed further below, until the early classical period the Italiote poleis of Campania can be said to have operated largely in self-sufficient isolation to the polis-system of mainstream Magna Graecia.

1.2 Pithekoussai as a microcosm of Euboian adaptability in the western Mediterranean.

Clearly, adaptability was a necessity for the Euboians in southern Italy. Despite their numerical and regional disadvantages, the Euboians approached the problems they faced with dexterity and innovation. The internal make-up of Pithekoussai in many ways reflected this flexibility and pragmatism, and it is thus not surprising to find that Pithekoussai too was adaptable in its attitude towards non-Greeks, and the new colonial realities. Pithekoussai was not only multicultural in its spheres of interaction, but also displayed a degree of multiculturalism within its population. Moreover, because issues such as citizenship and alien residency must have been far from clear-cut in early eighth century Hellas, attitudes of flexibility and inclusivism were far easier to conceive of and maintain.

Between c. 750 and c. 700, and by way of the efforts of its settler population, Pithekoussai had grown to encompass a population of some 6,000. As the distribution of eighth
century Greek pottery sherds in the north-east and south of Ischia suggest, Pithekoussai also appears to have expanded to include much of the island within its *chora*. Although the literary sources speak only of Chalkidian and Eretrian colonists being present (Strabo 5.4.9; Livy 8.22.5-6), it would also appear that responsibility for at least part of Pithekoussai’s demographic and economic momentum lay with various non-Euboian and even non-Greek settlers. In fact, many non-Euboians and non-Greeks participated in a number of different aspects of the Pithekoussan economy.

Analysis of grave goods reveals a considerable degree of ethnic, as well as social diversification. Grave 575 in the cemetery of the Valle di S. Montano at Pithekoussai contained an *amphora* bearing Semitic inscriptions. These inscriptions indicate that whoever exported the vase from the Levant expected a recipient at Pithekoussai to be literate in a Semitic language (Phoenician). Furthermore, one of the Semitic symbols was of a religious nature, most likely pertaining to the ultimately funerary purpose of the *amphora* and again suggesting the physical presence of non-Greeks.

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19 *FWG*, pp. 101-3; Tandy, *Warriors into Traders*, p. 71, n. 61.
20 Coldstream, “Prospectors and Pioneers”, pp. 50-1.
21 *FWG*, pp. 67-77.
That Levantine merchants may have settled in Pithekoussai is unsurprising in terms of the western Mediterranean context. In the course of the eighth century the Phoenicians were also involved in the western Mediterranean metals trade. However, the presence of Phoenician artisans has also been detected, through a vase of Ischian manufacture and provenance which features Phoenician letters. This item strongly suggests the residency of a Levantine potter, and identifies Pithekoussai as more than just a port of call for Levantine merchants, but also as an adopted homeland - as the aforementioned Grave 575 attests. Indeed, the Levantine element of the Pithekoussan population has been estimated to have been around fifteen percent. Upheaval in northern Syria around 720 may well have been the cause for such immigration.

At least three expatriate Korinthian potters/painters have also been identified as working in Pithekoussai during the eighth century. These craftsmen produced Protokorinthian aryballoi and exported them as far as Caere and Bologna. Such

26 Tandy, Warriors into Traders, p. 72; Ridgway, "The Etruscans", p. 659; FWG, p. 119.
immigrants were in fact the forebears of Demaratos, Aristonothos and a myriad of other, usually anonymous, Greek merchants and craftsmen who settled in Magna Graecia, Campania and Etruria during the seventh century. Thus in the eighth century also, it was to profitable, safe and inclusive Pithekoussai that many artisans from Greece and the Levant immigrated.

The Euboian settlers at Pithekoussai also appear to have taken wives from among the native Campanian population on Ischia, and possibly the mainland. A large number of non-Greek, indigenous ornaments have been excavated from the Valle di S. Montano, particularly *fibulae*. This suggests that many women in the Greek settlement had indigenous tastes and by extension were in fact Campanian in origin who had retained in death the symbols of their own, non-Greek culture. Inter-breeding is further suggested by a corpus of Greek myths concerning marriage between Greek heroes and *oikistai* on the one hand, and the goddesses and aristocratic women of the western Mediterranean on the other.

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27 *FWG*, p. 62; Coldstream, “Prospectors and Pioneers”, p. 52;
The population of Pithekoussai can therefore be said to have been ethnically mixed, albeit with a Euboian Greek majority. Moreover, in many ways generations of relative inclusiveness vis à vis 'others' must have helped to lay the foundations of a strong sense of solidarity between the Greek poleis and politai of the Bay of Naples. Thus the Pithekoussans were able to seek permanent refuge in Kyme after a devastating series of earthquakes on Ischia towards the end of the eighth century (Strabo 5.4.7, 5.4.9); and the Kymaians were in turn able to gain citizenship at Neapolis after the fall of their city to the Oscans in 421 (Diod. 12.76.4; Livy 4.37.1-2; DH 15.6.4). Furthermore, the Campanian Greek poleis also regularly displayed flexibility in their relations with the Greeks of southern Magna Graecia, Sicily and the Aegean. New waves of Greek colonists were invariably welcome in Italiote Campania, in stark contrast to the by and large inflexible exclusivism on display in southern Magna Graecia. Indeed, as will be discussed in detail in chapter 4, even the only notable exception to this stereotype of Achaian exclusivism, Sybaris, appears to have been selective in its generosity to newcomers.

A passage in Hegesandros serves to highlight this contrast

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Dench, From Barbarians to New Men, p. 37. See chapter 2 for a fuller discussion.
A body of Samians, presumably either escaping from the late sixth century persecutions of Polykrates or the early fifth century menace of Persian militarism, is depicted as having been scared off from landing in what was then Achaian-controlled Magna Graecia. Whether we are dealing with the sixth century example or the fifth, on both occasions these refugees were eventually taken in by Euboian poleis after rejection at the hands of Achaians. At any rate new populations, be they Samian refugees (Steph. Byz. s.v., Ποτήριολοι), or influxes of Syracusan and Athenian colonists (Strabo 5.4.7; 5.4.9), were absorbed into the poleis of the Bay of Naples with relatively little difficulty and with no recorded recourse to violence.

While it can be argued that many of these acts of generosity were performed out of self-interest or occasionally under duress, such an argument merely highlights the essence of the Euboian position in the central Tyrrhenian. From the very beginning the Euboians, and their Campanian poleis, had to be prepared for, and were adaptable to, the vicissitudes of the region. Moreover, it is Pithekoussai that best symbolizes this attitude - in its geography, its commerce, its caution, and most strikingly, its mixed population. In all likelihood, the pragmatism demonstrated by the Euboian poleis on the Bay of Naples during the post-colonial era drew much of its inspiration from the experiences of Pithekoussai.
1.3 The foundation of Kyme and the shaping of the new polis-system in Campania.

During the second half of the eighth century the nature of the Euboian presence in the central Tyrrhenian region began to change yet again. Following on from the coalescence of the Euboian position at Pithekoussai, Kyme was founded on the Campanian mainland. Neither the date nor the ethnic make-up of the founding population are clear cut in the case of Kyme. Strabo and Livy assert that Kyme was colonized by a fresh wave of Euboians, notably Chalkidians. In the account of Strabo, Euboian Kymaians also participated as well, but not Eretrians as in the instance of Pithekoussai itself (Strabo 5.4.4; Livy 8.22.6); while Dionysios of Halikarnassos supports a joint Chalkidian-Eretrian venture (7.3.1). Given that all sources agree that colonization was primarily Euboian, it was probably the case that these Euboians originated from both Euboia and Ischia. Despite considerable efforts to place the foundation of Kyme in the earlier eighth century, archaeological evidence is yet to demonstrate a date before c. 725.31

The key questions posed by the foundation of Kyme relate to

what this development meant for Pithekoussai, and concurrently, what it meant for the Euboian presence in southern Italy. In terms of the number and dating of Greek graves, Pithekoussai does not appear to have undergone any serious depletion of population at this time. Moreover, there is no sign of a serious decline in the material culture of Pithekoussai, at least not until c. 700 - a generation after the foundation of Kyme.32 Clearly, Euboian expansion onto the Campanian mainland did not entail an obvious downgrading of their first settlement in Italy. As will be discussed further below, it would appear that the two sites complemented each other, at least down to c. 700, when Pithekoussai at last began to fade.

An important indicator of the changes that Kyme represented for the Euboian position in the central Tyrrhenian is the role played by Euboia's far flung expatriates in the Lelantine War. This controversial conflict, which is usually dated to between c. 735 and c. 700, was fought by Chalkis and Eretria.33 Due to its overlap with the later stages of Euboian colonial activity in the West, the war must have had some effect on the colonization

32 Coldstream, “Prospectors and Pioneers”, p. 54. Moreover, epigraphical evidence indicates that a Greek pocket continued to exist in Pithekoussai well into the seventh century. See IGASMG III, no.s 10-11.
process, and in particular on the foundation of Kyme.\textsuperscript{3}\textsuperscript{4} Indeed, it will be argued that Kyme was an indirect product of the Lelantine War, spawned by a spirit of expatriate compromise absent in the Euboian homeland.

Strabo states that the Eretrians and the Chalkidians on Ischia quarrelled at some point, and that this led to an Eretrian exodus from Pithekoussai (5.4.9: \textit{ἐξελείπον τὴν νῆσον κατὰ στάσιν}). Chronologically, this event can be made to correspond with the wider Chalkis-Eretria dispute over the Lelantine Plain in Euboia, which the ancient sources confirm as a geographically widespread clash (Hdt. 5.99; Thouk. 1.15.3). While \textit{metropoleis}-inspired tension on Ischia was likely, a reminder must be given of the multi-ethnic balance that had co-existed in Pithekoussai for nearly two generations before the outbreak of war. I suggest that if the proposal for a mass expulsion of Eretrians from Ischia is to be accepted, then the momentum for that expulsion must have been largely derived from Chalkis itself. That Chalkis did indeed appear to have desired a scaling back of Eretria's western interests is suggested by the contemporary destruction of the Eretrian presence on Kerkyra at the hands of a Chalkidian ally, Korinth (Plut. \textit{Moralia} 293a-

b). Moreover, given the date of Kyme's foundation (c. 725), I believe also that at least some of these Eretrian refugees settled in, or perhaps even founded, the aforementioned colony.

Alternatively, if Strabos statement concerning Kyme's ethnic make-up is to be believed (5.4.4), then we must also accept the unlikely event of Chalkis committing itself to the colonization of a site with no obvious benefits above and beyond what Pithekoussai already gave it, and, at a time when war was challenging its very existence at home. As will be discussed in section 2.2 of this chapter, Chalkis certainly was capable of performing a colonizing role during this period, notably at Zankle and Rhegion. However, the location of these latter colonies suggests specific interests, objectives and a belief in concrete benefits on the part of the Chalkidians, notably the securing and control of the strategically and commercially vital Straits of Messina. In these terms, Kyme would have been a duplication of a pre-existing and relatively smooth-running commercial system based in Pithekoussai. The raisons d'être of Kyme must therefore be sought elsewhere.

35 For Korinth as an ally of Chalkis during the Lelantine War, see Boardman, "The Islands", p 760, Salmon, Wealthy Corinth, pp. 67-9.

36 The Lelantine Plain was the most fertile component of the chora of Chalkis, and a dispute over possession raised by its neighbour Eretria would have constituted a direct threat to the longevity of the Chalkidian state.
The scenario that seems most likely is that the attempt by Chalkis to organize an anti-Eretrian pogrom on Ischia met with only partial success. If an expulsion did occur, it was conducted within a framework of compromise, most likely reached by the local Euboians themselves, as opposed to those based in the Aegean. That Chalkis itself did not have the power to do more to enforce its wishes is suggested by the previously mentioned reliance on Korinth to remove the Eretrians from Kerkyra. An inability to conduct an offensive operation relatively close to home hardly places Chalkis in a position to crush the distant Kyme. Thus, a relatively peaceful and perhaps even voluntary relocation of the Eretrians was organized, to a site less than 25 kilometres away, but significantly, on the Campanian mainland. Indeed, this process probably also included a number of Chalkidian Pithekoussans, who saw new opportunities for themselves on the mainland. This is suggested by the comments of Livy (8.22.6), and Dionysios (DH 7.3.1), who both either imply or state explicitly the participation of Chalkidians in the colonization of Kyme.

Such an hypothesis fits better with the evidence available, in particular the archaeological dating of earliest Kyme, the statements of Livy concerning its foundation, and the context of the Lelantine War. Moreover, the theme of pragmatic

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37 Indeed, Chalkis was forced to rely on a range of different allies to ensure its survival. See Hdt. 5.99; Plu., Moralia 760e-761b; Thouk. 1.15.3.

38 Manfredi & Braccesi, I Greci d’Occidente, p. 83.
compromise that characterizes Pithekoussai and Euboian behaviour in the West for nearly two generations prior to the war does not have to endure a seemingly inexplicable and dubious interruption. As argued in section 1.2, pragmatism and multi-ethnicity colour intra-Campanian Greek relations well into the classical period and do not accord well with the uncompromising violence proposed by Strabo. Certainly, the asylum given to the remaining, i.e. Chalkidian, Pithekoussans of earthquake-stricken Ischia not long after 700 by the proto-Neapolitan Parthenope, itself a colony of the recently founded Kyme, makes more sense (Strabo 5.4.7, 5.4.9). Such succour hardly suggests hardline, intercommunal bloodshed in the recent past.

What we in fact witness through the mirror of the Lelantine War is in all probability the end of the Aegean-based Euboian high tide in the West. In particular, this occurs in terms of a specific separation of interests on behalf of the colonials and the metropoleis, and also the ability of the former to exercise at least some degree of practical autonomy. Indeed, the foundation of Kyme can be seen as a local response to a problem originating from the metropoleis, specifically tailored to local needs. Pithekoussans had most likely learnt that their position of numerical weakness within a region far beyond their ability to control did not afford them the luxury of civil
war. Such independent 'policy-making' by an expatriate community may not appear to constitute a schism of vast proportions, but it does introduce the first secure building block for the establishment of new Euboian polis, and a new Euboian polis-system in the West. Without Kyme, and the circumstances and decisions surrounding its foundation, the Euboian presence in the southern Italy was more emporion than polis. With Kyme, the Euboian presence had become self-perpetuating and the conditions for polis had finally been met. Thus Pithekoussai, rather than being a true polis itself, was the catalyst for the earliest ethnic Euboian polis-system in the central Tyrrhenian.

A second crucial indicator of this reorientation is the pull the mainland started to exert on the Euboians who had previously settled in the central Tyrrhenian region. The original settlement on Ischia had been established in a period of caution and experimentation, by Aegean-based interests. The foundation of Kyme on the other hand in many ways represented the interests of the Tyrrhenian-based Euboians, and in particular their desire to engage in their own expansion.

Moreover, this expansion should also be seen as natural by-product of the previous fifty years of participation by the Euboians of Ischia in the Campanian region. As will be discussed below, a series of economic, cultural and ethnic factors were to facilitate local Euboian expansionism, and in effect shape the mould of the Euboian polis-system on mainland Italy.

As a complement to their commerce with the city-states of southern Etruria, the Euboians also cultivated trade links with the nearby Campanian mainland. In particular, trade flourished with the Italic Ausonian towns of Capua, Suessula, and Nola. Reinforcing this commercial relationship with Campania was an unquantifiable yet very real ethnic bond between Pithekoussai and its mainland neighbours. As argued in section 1.2, many of the second and third generation Pithekoussans would have had Italic ancestors via the maternal line. Indeed, the practice of taking wives from among the local population appears to have continued at Kyme, as suggested by the discovery of the 'Tatiae' vase in Kyme. Consequently, many Pithekoussans may have viewed the Campanian mainland as a natural and even designated zone of expansion, due to the likely presence of kinsmen in the region.

41 Frederiksen, Campania, pp. 58, 68.
Adding fuel to these desires was the likelihood of strong aristocratic urges derived from the cavalry-dominated society of Euboia itself.\textsuperscript{43} Euboian elites, and in particular the aptly named Hippobotai of Chalkis and the Hippeis of Eretria had long been associated with horse-rearing.\textsuperscript{44} Thus unsurprisingly, it would appear that as the wealth of Pithekoussai grew, so too did the demand to pursue the cultural legacy of the metropoleis. Certainly, the horse-rearing plains around Kyme would have provided an opportunity to do so.

Indeed, archaeological evidence strongly suggests that a cavalry-based aristocratic society existed at earliest Greek Kyme.\textsuperscript{45} Tomb 104 of the Fondo Artiaco plot at Kyme, dated to c. 720, has revealed marked similarities of style with the aristocratic tombs by the West Gate of Eretria, and contains a plethora of metal grave goods reminiscent of the warrior-elite burials of \textit{Iliad} fame (6.416ff., 22.252ff., 24.795ff.). Moreover, among these metal grave goods are lance tips and horse bits, which are complemented by other local finds of fragmentary Ischian-made eighth century vases revealing equine-

\textsuperscript{43} Boardman, "The Islands", p. 761; Forrest, "Euboea and the Islands", pp. 249-51; Coldstream, "Prospectors and Pioneers", p. 54.
\textsuperscript{44} Arist., \textit{Pol.} 1289b35-40 (Chalkis & Eretria); Hdt. 5.77, Strabo 10.1.8, Plu. \textit{Per.} 23-4 (Chalkis); [Arist.], \textit{Ath.Pol} 15.2, Arist., \textit{Pol.} 1306a35-40, Strabo 10.1.10 (Eretria).
\textsuperscript{45} Frederiksen, \textit{Campania}, p. 68.
dominated scenes.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 69, 71, 74; FWG, p. 98; Coldstream, “Prospectors and Pioneers”, pp. 54-5; Morel, “Greek colonization in Italy and the West”, p. 137.}

Also strongly suggested is participation by the new Kymaian elites in a regional Italiote-Etruscan-Ausonian aristocratic and cavalry-based koine. Elite tombs in Etruria and Campania also featured similar types of goods, and shared the same emphasis on cavalry.\footnote{Frederiksen, Campania, p. 73; Coldstream, “Prospectors and Pioneers”, p. 55; Morel, “Greek colonization in Italy and the West”, p. 138; T.J. Cornell, The Beginnings of Rome: Italy and Rome from the Bronze Age to the Punic Wars (c. 1000-264 BC) (London, 1995), pp. 87-92.} Indeed, the discovery of a gravestone dating to the second half of the sixth century strongly suggests that the Greek xenia custom was practiced by some of the various ethnic groups living in Campania. The name of the dead Greek man to whom the gravestone belonged, Latinos, was in all probability an ethnic-xenia name, indicating that his parents may well have shared a xenia relationship with a non-Greek family.\footnote{M.H. Jameson & I. Malkin, “Latinos and the Greeks”, Athenaeum 86.2 (1998), pp. 480-4.} The shape of the embryonic Greek polis-system in Campania was therefore very much as an integrated and functional member of the region. Moreover, cultural and material contacts between these elites in effect reinforced the position of the Euboian poleis as a separate branch of the Italiote polis-system. Geographically, and in many ways even...
culturally, Kyme was as much Campanian as it was Italiote.

1.4 **Kyme and the growth of the Greek poleis in Campania.**

The early years of the mainland colony at Kyme were clearly characterized by a strong sense of confidence, as well as assertiveness: an Italic community living near or at pre-Greek Kyme may have been destroyed by the Euboian colonists to make way for their own settlement (Livy 8.22.6; Diels, *Sibyllinische Blätter* 11.53-6); and within the first generation, Kymaians were being inhumed several kilometres outside the immediate astu zone, indicating a rapid expansion of both astu and *chora*.\(^{49}\) Indeed, given the aristocratic impetus that appears to have accompanied the colonists to the Campanian mainland, it is likely that Kyme's northern border marched as far as the Klanios River during this early period (Steph. Byz. s.v., ᾞχανις; DH 7.3.2-3). Within the territory ringed by the Klanios lay abundant arable land (DH 7.3.2: Κυμή...γῆν τε κατέχουσα τῆς Καμπανῶν πεδιάδος τῆν πολυκαρποτάτην), as well as plains well suited to horse-rearing.\(^{50}\)

Moreover, it also appears likely that the Kymaians established

\(^{49}\) Frederiksen, *Campania*, pp. 59, 69.

good relations with their nearest Italian neighbour, Capua. With Capua situated just across the Klanios, it would have been exceedingly difficult for a nascent Kyme to expand as it did without the acquiescence, tacit or otherwise, of the Capuans.\textsuperscript{51} The deterioration in Kyme-Capua relations evident in the late sixth century in no way suggests a long-standing dispute arising out of eighth century Kymaian expansion at Capua’s expense. On the contrary, the events of the late sixth century reinforce the view that Capua and Kyme had long been good neighbours.\textsuperscript{52}

Despite the confidence of the Kymaian debut, it is crucial not to allow this to obscure the fundamental features of the Euboian colonization of the Campanian mainland. Although the Euboians were entering a world known to them through commercial and cultural contacts, there were no guarantees that their colony would have been accepted or even tolerated. Aristocratic and cavalry-orientated some of the colonists may have been, but their military power was not at this stage equal to defying regional heavyweights such as Capua, Nola and Suessula. Engagement with regional entities was therefore both

\textsuperscript{51} Ibid., p. 69; Coldstream, “Prospectors and Pioneers”, p. 56; Graham, “The Colonial Expansion of Greece”, p. 103.

\textsuperscript{52} In 504 Kymaian aristocrats fled to Capua for sanctuary in the wake of a demagogic coup at Kyme, indicating that relations between the recently exiled Kymaian regime and Capua were probably friendly. See section 1.5 below.
a necessity for survival, and an essential feature of Kymaian policy. The *polis*-system in Campania was thus in many ways a Greco-Italic *polis*-system.

Kymaian expansion also manifested itself on the seaboard of Campania, and in particular on the Bay of Naples (see map 3). By c. 675 at the latest, Kyme had founded its own colony on the northern shore of the Bay of Naples.\(^{53}\) The original foundation was named Parthenope and was most probably the direct forerunner of the twin cities of Palaiopolis and Neapolis.\(^{54}\) The establishment of this colony not only enabled the Kymaians to gain a foothold some ten kilometres away from their *astu*, but also prepared Kyme for a hegemonic role on the Bay of Naples. Kymaian power in this region was further augmented by the seventh century foundation of a presence at what was to become Dikaiarcheia, eight kilometres to the west of Parthenope.\(^{55}\)

The Kymaian push to incorporate part of the Bay of Naples into its territory within the first few generations of its own settlement highlights two crucial features of the Kymaian *polis*

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\(^{53}\) Frederiksen, *Campania*, pp. 69, 85.

\(^{54}\) [Skymnos] 251f.; Livy 8.22.5; Velleius Paterculus 1.4.1-2; Lutatius Daphnis *ap. Servius ad* Vergil, *Georgics* 4.563.

and its daughter poleis. The first of these is that from a very early date Kyme was operating as a considerable maritime power. Despite efforts to prove otherwise, Kyme did in fact possess its own port, which was situated just south of the astu.\textsuperscript{56} The Kymaians were therefore very quickly able to conduct trade in the region by sea as well as land, and were in a position to control access to the Bay of Naples from the north.\textsuperscript{57} Furthermore, Parthenope gave Kyme a virtual controlling interest on the Bay of Naples itself, and proto-Dikaiarcheia would have dominated the smaller Bays of Pozzuoli and Baia to the west.

Between them, these three sites (Kyme, Parthenope, Dikaiarcheia) afforded the Euboian colonists a monopoly over some of the best natural harbours southern and central Italy had to offer.\textsuperscript{58} As argued earlier, expansion inland probably required the permission of local land powers, but by sea the Euboians were able to use the naval superiority that they had imported from the Aegean (Livy 8.22.6: \textit{Classe, qua advecti ab domo fuerant, multum in ora maris eius quod accolunt potuere}). Certainly, no indigenous port of note existed in


\textsuperscript{57} \textit{FWG}, p. 124.

\textsuperscript{58} De Juliis, \textit{Magna Grecia}, p. 110.
ancient Campania at the time, and when the Etruscan high tide reached Campania in the course of the seventh century it too was largely confined to the interior.

In effect, those ports which Campania did have had been grafted on to it by the Euboians. The Bay of Naples therefore in many ways became a Greek lake, blocked in even on its western side by the Greek occupation of Ischia, and later Capri (Strabo 5.4.9); and perhaps even to the south, with hints of Greek occupation of at least part of the Sorrentine peninsula (Statius, Silvae 2.2.95). Inter-regional commerce and the bulk of the cultural exchange between Campania and the outside world more often than not would have flowed through a Hellenic port, or at least had to deal with the Greeks in some form or another. However, the degree to which land-locked states such as Nola, Capua and Suessula were hellenized suggests that the interior-littoral nexus was not an uncomfortable one.\(^{59}\) The eighth and seventh centuries were characterized by the availability of space for expansion by many different states at once and were thus conducive to a more flexible series of relationships.

The Greek \textit{poleis} therefore became an integral part of the

\(^{59}\) The 'princely tomb' \textit{koinē} in southern Etruria and non-Greek Campania discussed in section 1 3 suggests such a nexus. See also Frederiksen, \textit{Campania}, pp. 89-90.
various Campanian economies. However, while the Greeks exercised a considerable amount of influence over these economies, by no means were they under Greek control. The Euboian *poleis* of Campania were, like their mercantile ancestors, only one component of a very large, essentially non-Greek system. Once again, the contrast between the northern Italiote *poleis* and those of the central portion of Magna Graecia is stark. The central Italiote *poleis*, through violence and imperialism, established *themselves* as the core and pushed the indigenous Italian to the periphery. Thus the central Italiote *polis*-system was, down to the end of the fifth century at least, essentially a hellenocentric system. The Campanian Italiotes on the other hand, were very literally fringe-dwellers, existing as they did on the coastal periphery of Campania - a non-Greek dominated region. Interaction and coexistence with non-Greek entities was therefore compulsory.

The second crucial feature of the Campanian *polis*-system is the position of Kyme. While the peripheral nature of the Campanian *poleis* does provide a key difference between the northern and southern Italiotes, in other respects the two regions were very similar. The Kymaian advance onto the Bay of Naples and its subsidiaries from the early seventh century onwards strongly suggests a co-ordinated, Kymano-centric policy. Indeed, it is likely that the Kymaian *metropolis* exercised tight control over its foundations.\textsuperscript{60} Similar
patterns of control existed in southern Magna Graecia and Greek Sicily during the archaic period. The Italiote *poleis* of Sybaris (Strabo 6.1.13, 15) and Kroton (Steph. Byz. s.v., Τέρινα; [Skymnos] 306-7; Pliny, *NH* 3.72) both founded numerous *apoikiai* or sub-*poleis* with the express purpose of maintaining overall control. Similarly, Syracuse was the ultimate authority vis à vis its foundations at Akrai, Kasmenai and Kamarina (Thouk. 6.5.2), and used violence to enforce this relationship (Thouk. 6.5.3).

Supporting the picture of Kymaian hegemony is a tradition which states that at some point in its history Parthenope was destroyed by its *metropolis*, Kyme (Lutatius Daphnis *ap. Servius ad Vergil, Georgics* 4.563). While no date is hinted at by Lutatius, the implication is that Kyme was forced to deal with an attempt by Parthenope to break away, a scenario almost identical to the sixth century conflict between Kamarina and its own hegemonal *metropolis*, Syracuse (Thouk. 6.5.3). Furthermore, despite allusions to plagues and oracles, it is clear also from Lutatius that the site of the recently destroyed Parthenope, on the Bay of Naples, was too valuable to leave unoccupied and was promptly refounded.61


61 De Juliis provides an interesting alternative view, based on the premise that Parthenope was in fact the victim of Etruscan expansion. However, given the resolute response by the Kymaians in regard to the Etruscan
Moreover, the arrival and settlement in Campania of a group of anti-Polykrates exiles from Samos in 531 also suggests a proactive and assertive role for Kyme (Steph. Byz. s.v., Ποτίολος). That the Samians founded 'Dikaiarcheia' where they did was neither coincidence or random occurrence. Kyme was the established regional power, at least in terms of coastal Campania, possessing its own fleet and cavalry capability.62 It is therefore likely that Kyme guided the Samians to the Pozzuoli subsidiary of the Bay of Naples, using them to consolidate its own hold on the region.63 Indeed, Strabo goes so far as to identify Dikaiarcheia as an ἐπίνειον Κυμαίων (5.4.6).

The archaic polis-system in Campania was therefore a hegemononal system, dependent upon Kyme for leadership. In much the same way as the Euboians of Rhegion would use a later batch of Samian refugees (Hdt. 6.23). See also Frederiksen, Campania, p. 87; De Juliis, Magna Grecia, pp. 137-8.

62 Based on the plains (the Campi Phlegrafei and Campi Leborini) south of the River Klanios. Literary evidence for Kymaian cavalry units and hipparchoi is also available for the last quarter of the sixth century (DH 7.3.4, 4.4).

63 In much the same way as the Euboians of Rhegion would use a later batch of Samian refugees (Hdt. 6.23). See also Frederiksen, Campania, p. 87; De Juliis, Magna Grecia, pp. 137-8.
Moreover, Kyme simultaneously served as *metropolis* for the *poleis* within this system, *de jure* in the case of Parthenope and *de facto* in that of Dikaiarcheia. As discussed above, political as well as the more usual religious links between *metropolis* and *apoikia* were not uncommon in the ‘second generation’ Greek colonies of Italy and Sicily. However, one key difference must be noted in the instance of the Campanian Italiotes. Greek expansion in southern Magna Graecia and Sicily was, in the early archaic period at any rate, often at the expense of indigenous states and towns. Kymaian expansion on the other hand was a more selective process in which powerful indigenous interests had to be accommodated, and targeted towards areas of specific advantage such as the navy. Indeed, the hegemonal *polis*-system that operated in Italiote Campania can be said to have been a form of enforced ‘solidarity’, deemed necessary by its powerful *metropolis* Kyme. Given that during the eighth and seventh centuries the Euboians in Campania were in a position of weakness both in terms of population and regional clout, the tightness of Kyme’s grip on its *apoikiai* should not be surprising. Thus early Kymaian imperialism and with it the *raison d’être* of the Campanian *polis*-system can in part be seen as a phenomenon

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65 Sybaris: Strabo 6.1.13; Taras: Paus. 10.10.6-8, Antiochos, *FGrH* 555 F13; Gela: Hdt. 7.155.
fuelled by security concerns.

1.5 From periphery to core: Kymaian high tide and the tyranny of Aristodemos.

The last third of the sixth century is characterized by a significant shift in the regional setting of the Campanian *poleis*. In turn this shift had a considerable impact upon the mechanics of this northern branch of the Italiote *polis*-system. After over 250 years of commercial and colonial activity upon the periphery of Campania and Etruria, in 524 the Euboians found themselves regarded as an unwelcome presence by several key players within the core regions of the central Tyrrhenian. An alliance of Etruscans, Umbrians, Daunians, and an assortment of ΤΩΝ ἀλλών ὄβραρων (DH 7.3.1), invaded the territory of Kyme, via the Klanios frontier (7.3.3).

Dionysios of Halikarnassos states, and with some credence, that sixth century Kyme was one of the richest and most powerful cities in Italy (7.3.2). As discussed earlier, Kyme had finally secured the western end of the Bay of Naples with the foundation of Dikaiarcheia (in 531), and thus had established itself as λιμένων κρατοῦσα τῶν περὶ Μισηνῶν ἐπικαιποτάτων (7.3.2). The Kymaians were also still exercising control of prime tracts of arable land in Campania (7.3.2), as they would continue to do into the fifth century (7.12.1).
The two fundamental props to the Kymaian hegemony over the Campanian polis-system were no doubt the internal stability provided by Kyme's own ancestral aristocratic politieia (7.4.4); and Kyme's military and naval abilities. In 524, Kyme was able to field some 13,500 troops and 1,800 cavalry (7.3.4). The extent of Kymaian naval power is only ever assigned a figure once - that of ten expendable ships in 504 (7.5.3), but the harbours on the Bay of Naples (7.3.2), as well as at least two at Kyme itself (7.7.1), certainly suggest a considerable capacity for maritime action. Thus at that time the Greek poleis of Campania were in fact relatively well placed to deal with regional upheaval.66

The radical change in the regional status quo heralded by the anti-Kymaian invasion was, in the eyes of Dionysios at least, the product of envy on the behalf of Kyme's neighbours (7.3.1-2). Certainly, it has been demonstrated previously that Kyme and the polis-system which it headed was wealthy. Grain exports aside, the revenues from Kymaian-controlled ports must have been substantial. As stated in section 1.4, these ports were Campania's main outlets to the sea. However, it remains to be seen why such a multicoloured coalition was formed, and by whom. Furthermore, the timing of this aggression must also be questioned, particularly in light of the long period of relative

66 Frederiksen, Campania, p. 127.
peace that the invasion brought to an end. Moreover, underpinning these inquiries is the crucial question: what was the impact upon the Italiote polis-system in Campania?

The leadership role of the Etruscans in this invasion, as implied by Dionysios (7.3.1), represents a new dimension in the Campanian regional equation. Thus it is to the Etruscans we must look in order to determine the nature of this regional upheaval, and the radical change in the position of the Campanian Greek polis-system. As discussed in sections 1.3 and 1.4, Greco-Etruscan relations had been relatively well defined and delineated from the very earliest period of contact. Clearly the late sixth century was a period of change. Dionysios' assertion that the Etruscans in question were Padanian in origin (7.3.1) has been discounted by Frederiksen, and is difficult to sustain. Moreover, the often substantial differences in opinion between northern and southern Etruria, and Etruscan Rome should also rule out any suggestion of a multilateral Etruscan assault on the Campanian Greeks.

A possible source of Etruscan-inspired enmity may well have

67 Ibid., Campania, p. 97.
68 Ibid., Campania, p. 128. Relations between the cities of southern Etruria and Etruscan Rome were particularly antagonistic (DH 3.51.4-52.1, 53.1-3, 55.3, 57-60, 65.4-5, 4.3.1-2, 27.2-6).
been Campania itself. From c. 650 Etruscan influence in Campania had been steadily increasing, and by the second half of the sixth century had become firmly established in the Campanian cities of Capua, Nola, Salernum and Picentia.\textsuperscript{69} This relatively late arrival in Campania by the Etruscans may have led to a desire to reshape the dynamics of coastal-hinterland relations in their favour. However, in the case of Capua at least it is clear that relations with Kyme were healthy during this period. In 504, after the demagogic revolution in Kyme, the remnants of the Kymaian aristocratic regime were able to take refuge in Capua (DH 7.10.3). For Kyme and Capua, the aristocratic \textit{koiné} of the late eighth century appears to have been as close as ever.\textsuperscript{70} Furthermore, with powerful Capua out of the equation, the likelihood of the smaller Etruscan-ruled Campanian cities taking unilateral action against Kyme appears remote. If any Campanian Etruscans did in fact participate in the invasion of Kyme in 524, such as Nola, Suessula or Nuceria, then it was under the aegis of a more powerful Etruscan state from the north.

The best clue to the identity of the Etruscan invaders and therefore to the nature of the changes underway in late sixth century Campania lies in the aftermath of the invasion proper. Possibly in 508 (Plut., \textit{Moralia} 261F), and certainly in 504 (DH 69 \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 117-21.

\textsuperscript{70} See section 1.3 above. For an alternative view, see De Juliis, \textit{Magna Grecia}, p. 138.
Kymaian forces are to be found in Latium, intervening on behalf of Latin states against Etruscan incursions. This sudden and intense interest in the politics of Latium indicates that Kyme had identified the region to its north as a sphere of legitimate influence and concern. The anti-Etruscan accent to these interventions also strongly suggests that Kyme was concerned about an Etruscan threat from Latium, and was taking steps to ensure this region was relatively free of Etruscan influence. Kyme's interventionary policy in Latium can therefore be seen as a reaction to a recently demonstrated threat - the invasion of 524.

Given the nature of the possible Kymaian intervention against a pro-Tarquin restoration attempt at Rome in 508, it is also very likely that it was the Tarquin kingdom of Rome which provided much of the momentum for the Etruscan invasion of Kyme. Certainly, the regime of Tarquinius Superbus (534-510) was expansionist in its outlook, to the south and north-east especially. Moreover, Tarquinius’ foundation at Circeii on the coast of the Pomptine plain would have brought him within striking distance of northern Campania, by both land and sea (DH 4.63.1). Indeed, by establishing such a presence

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71 For discussion of the events of 508 see note 74.

72 Roman expansion, 534-510 versus the Hernicans & Volscians (DH 4.49.1); the Sabines (4.50.1); the Pometini (4.50.2); Gabii (4.53); and Ardea (4.64.1; Zonaras 7.11).
Tarquinius, according to Livy, *occupari latius imperii fines uolebat* (1.56.3). It should therefore come as no surprise that the invasion force of 524 entered the Kymaian *chora* via the Klanios river frontier - *i.e. from the north*.

The invasion of 524 can therefore be said to have been most probably instigated, or at least backed by Tarquin Rome.73 In other words, the conflict cannot be viewed as a local skirmish or neighbours’ quarrel which was geopolitically confined to the north coast of Campania. Consequently, within two decades the Euboian *polis*-system on the Bay of Naples was dragged from the periphery of the political landscape of south-central Italy, to its core. Moreover, the repercussions stemming from this transference for the *polis*-system in question were far-reaching and irreversible.

It has been demonstrated previously that one of the key consequences of the 524 invasion was Kyme’s rapid integration into the politics of the wider region. In particular, events taking place in Latium were now of interest to Kyme. Moreover, Kymaian engagement with Capua and other Campanian cities at this time also must have been intense.

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73 The view that late sixth century Tarquin Rome had the power to support such an intervention is by no means universal. For recent and succinct arguments both for and against this view see Cornell, *The Beginnings of Rome*, pp. 208-10 and E. Gabba, *La Roma dei Tarquini*, *Athenaeum* 86.1 (1998), pp. 5-12.
Kyme would have been keen to shore up support amongst its Etruscan neighbours, or at least secure their neutrality in the upcoming conflicts with the Etruscans of Latium.

Victory against the Etruscans in 524, and again in 504 in many ways also meant that Kyme was elevated to the status of a regional power in its own right, on both land and sea. Kymaian policy had an impact on Latium, as well as the rest of Campania. As discussed in section 1.4, despite Kyme's hinterland possessions, the polis-system it had spawned and headed was essentially a coastal-orientated one. However, in the wake of its victories much of Kyme's focus was now upon inland events and concerns. This development represents a fundamental transformation of the parameters of the Euboian foundations in Campania. Moreover, that this transformation was accompanied by a great deal of bloodshed was a typical feature of attempts to depart radically from colonial-era borders. Originally initiated in the symbolic shift from Pithekoussai to Kyme, from offshore island to mainland colony, Kyme had now become a local potentate. The 'foreignness' of the Kymaians was probably evoked only when its foes wished to extract some advantage and, as in the case of the Latin Aricians in 504, was ignored altogether when Kyme's aid was required. In effect, Kyme had 'become' part of Italy, in that its decisions had considerable repercussions elsewhere in the Italian peninsula. The distance between the cautious
commercial communities of the eighth century and the poleis of mainland Campania during the sixth could not have been greater.

A second feature of Kyme's establishment as a regional force is to be found within its constitutional evolution. Although the internal developments of poleis are generally beyond the scope of this study, in the case of sixth century Kyme the relationship between its foreign policy and politeia is both close and mutually affective. In particular, it is the intertwined nature of the ascent of Kyme in the region, and the rise of tyranny in Kyme that is of interest to this study.

The sources inform us that one Aristodemos of Kyme was the protagonist in all of Kyme's wars with the Etruscans (DH 7.4.4, 5.2-6.3; Plut., Moralia 261E-F), and was eventually to establish a tyranny in Kyme lasting from 504 to c. 490. However, in 524, Aristodemos was neither one of the Kymaian δυνατοί, nor did he have significant influence in the Kymaian boule, which was clearly an aristocratic forum at that time (DH 7.4.4). His family was therefore likely to have been from among the demos, or from a relatively low rung upon the aristocratic ladder. However, Plutarch notes that soon after the events of 524 Aristodemos' political fortunes took a turn for the better: ὅθεν εἰς τὰς μεγίστας προήλθεν ἀρχας (Moria 261E). This is mentioned in relation to an alleged Kymaian intervention in Latium
against a Clusinian Etruscan invasion of Rome, and is tentatively dated to 508, in accordance with Livy’s account of the same event (2.9.1-6).74 Dionysios also notes that Aristodemos’ nascent and populist political career was directly linked to his successes on the battlefield (DH 7.4.5). Thus by 508 at the latest, Aristodemos had in effect become one of the δυνατοὶ, by way of his achievements in the foreign policy branch of Kymaian politics.

The extent to which foreign policy and domestic politics were linked is definitively revealed in the events of 504. Following a plea from Latin Aricia, Dionysios states that the governing aristocrats of Kyme decided to oblige the Aricians by delegating the task to Aristodemos, and a deliberately second-rate army (DH 7.5.1-3). The scene is reminiscent of the clever reasoning put into the mouths of οἱ σωφρονεῖς by Thoukydides during the Pylian Debate (Thouk. 4.28.5), and like Thoukydides, Dionysios

74 Neither Dionysios or Livy make mention of Kymaian involvement in Latium at this time, except in the context of a Roman delegation in search of grain (DH 5.26.3; Livy 2.9.6). It is possible that Plutarch has confused the events of 508 with those of 504, when the Kymaians are known to have intervened in Latium (DH 7.4.4-6.2; cf. Livy 2.14.5-8). However, Plutarch’s account remains theoretically feasible given the events of 524, and the undesirability of Clusinian influence in Latium from the Kymaian perspective. As Frederiksen states, clearly there are at least two traditions regarding the chronology of sixth century Kyme: Campania, p. 96.
has read the situation according to his ambivalence towards the *demos*. Given that the original popularity of Aristodemos was clearly derived from his role as war leader, in 524, and possibly in 508 as well, it is very likely that he was in fact a proactive force in the decision to aid Aricia, playing Kleon to Thoukydides' outmanouevered Nikias. More than any other person in Kyme, Aristodemos had prospered politically during the Greco-Etruscan conflict. Indeed, Aristodemos used the momentum garnered from his subsequent victory at Aricia to overthrow the government of Kyme and establish a tyranny (DH 7.6.3-7.5). Unsurprisingly, the foremost implements of his coup were his veterans and his war hero status amongst the *demos* (DH 7.6.4-7.1; Plut., *Moralia* 261F).

The emergence of a military-backed tyranny in Kyme at the end of the sixth century in many ways can be seen as having been precipitated by the development of Kyme's position in the region at large. As stated earlier, in just two decades Kyme's regional role had been transformed from being an essentially coastal and commercial adjunct to mainland Campania, into a major land power. However, the debate inspired by the pleas of the Aricians in 504 strongly suggests not only the previously asserted proactivity of Aristodemos, but also the reluctance of the ruling aristocracy to get involved. This reluctance to commit in turn suggests that, despite the crushing victory of 524, Kyme's government was hesitant about any further
exercising of Kyme's newly tested prowess, at least very far from Kymaian borders.

For a war hero such as Aristodemos, this represented a retardance both of his own ambitions and the military potential he envisaged for Kyme. Indeed, given the actions of Aristodemos in 504 and during his tyranny, it would appear that his main ambition was in fact to realize and entrench that military potential, and to establish himself as the ruler of a new regional power.75 As discussed in note 74, there exists a tradition that places Aristodemos in Latium as early as 508 (Plut. *Moralia* 261F), which complements the proposal that Aristodemos was enthusiastic for intervention in that region.

At any rate, it is clear Aristodemos led an expeditionary force into Latium in 504, and did so in a manner indicative of the new order he wished to embody. Dionysios states that Aristodemos combined the military assets of Kyme by transporting 2,000 soldiers to Latium by sea (7.6.1). While this may be considered by the modern observer the most practical means of fielding such a force, as Dionysios relates, the voyage was in fact a difficult one to make (7.6.1), and in Kyme's history was quite possibly unprecedented. For Aristodemos to realize successfully his vision for the Kymaian-dominated *polis*-system, Kyme had to be able to enforce its will far beyond its 

75 Pallotino, *A History of Earliest Italy*, p. 91.
land and maritime frontiers, and therefore had to adopt new forms of warfare.

Once installed as tyrant, Aristodemos continued to flex and develop the power of Kyme. He appears to have been the first Campanian, native or Italiote, to have established a standing army. Aside from an Etruscan-dominated bodyguard (DH 7.7.4), Aristodemos also enrolled some 2,000 barbaroi mercenaries, as well as an undisclosed number of citizens into a permanent fighting force (DH 7.8.2-4). Separate from his bodyguard, this army was clearly meant to ensure Kyme's voice was heard throughout the region, as well as crush internal dissent (DH 7.10.5-6). Indeed, in this sense Aristodemos can be seen as a direct forerunner of the military tyrants of Greek Sicily, who in the fifth century also relied heavily upon standing armies to maintain their power (Diod. 11.48.3, 67.5, 13.96.2).

Furthermore, with its power enhanced in such a way, Kyme was able to implement policies which did not take into account the interests of either neighbouring Capua or any other Campanian states for the first time in its recorded history. It is clear from the account of Dionysios that Capua did not approve of the developments in the polis-system on the Bay of Naples. Capua provided shelter to those aristocrats who had managed to escape Aristodemos' bloody purges (DH 7.7.3-4, 8.3), and
served as a base for Kymaian rebels not already operating inside the Kymaian *chora* (7.10.3).

It is also clear from this account that many other Campanians supported the anti-Aristodemos faction in Kyme, and even helped to form a mercenary army for the rebels (7.10.3). This displeasure felt amongst the Capuans and Campanians was demonstrably not based on anti-Kymaian or anti-Greek sentiment, but rather resentment against the regional prominence to which Aristodemian Kyme had risen. Support for the exiled Kymaian aristocrats was in effect support for a return to the *status quo* of the pre-504 period. In other words, with Aristodemos removed from power, the Campanians expected to see a return of a non-interventionary, coastal-orientated Kyme.

Still in accordance with his expansionist theme, it is also likely that Aristodemos attempted to develop the swamps at the mouth of the Klanios in order to boost the Campanian *poleis*’ agricultural output (Plut., *Moria 262B; Livy 28.46.4*).76 Grain was a powerful diplomatic weapon in the turbulent environment of sixth century central Italy. Rome repeatedly suffered famine, and turned to Kyme on more than one occasion to alleviate its agrarian difficulties (DH 7.12.1-3; Livy 2.9.6, 34.1-4). Thus Kyme’s ability to influence regions beyond

76 Frederiksen, *Campania*, p. 20.
its borders was again reinforced.

Accordingly, Aristodemos did not shy from opportunities to influence events beyond Kyme's borders. Around 490 he opted to support the remnants of the Tarquin faction in its bid to recover power in Rome (DH 7.12.1-2; Livy 2.21.6, 34.4). This apparent contradiction of his previously held antipathy towards Etruscans is in part explained by recent events in Latium. The Battle of Lake Regillus, fought in 499 or 496 between Rome and the Latins, dramatically altered the balance of power in Latium, and secured for Rome a position of new dominance in the region (Livy 2.19-20.13; DH 6.3-12.6). It has been demonstrated previously that Kyme had adopted an arbitral role over at least part of Latium, and around Aricia. The rise of Rome was therefore a direct threat to Kyme's brief ascendancy.

Kyme's support for the Tarquin cause was in fact support for one of the current Roman regime's bitterest foes, and would have served Aristodemos desire to undermine the new regional heavyweight. Indeed, Sextus Tarquinius, the son of Tarquinius Superbus, had just been killed at Lake Regillus whilst leading a contingent in the pro-Tarquin Latin army (DH 6.12.5), demonstrating the resolve and active nature of the Tarquin

77 Concerning the date of the Battle of Lake Regillus, see Cornell, The Beginnings of Rome, p. 216
faction in Latium. Moreover, the Volscians of Antium, with whom Aristodemos had been allied in 504 (DH 5.36.2), had recently suffered serious losses in the 'Volscian War' against Rome around 493 (Livy 2.33.4-9). It was, after all, the Antiates who had most probably provided Aristodemos with a port on the Latin coast in 504 during his expedition to Aricia (DH 7.6.1: 'Αριστόδημος... ἄμεθετι κατὰ τοὺς ἔγγιστα τῆς Ἀρεηνῶν αἰγαλοῦς), and their demise at the hands of Rome further weakened Kyme’s position in Latium. The shift to a pro-Tarquin stance can therefore be seen as an attempt to maintain influence in Latium by stemming the rising tide of Rome.

Clearly, the events of 524 had a marked impact upon the Italiote polis-system in Campania. A distinct transference from the regions periphery to its core was initiated, occurring first under an aristocratic politeia, and culminating in the tyranny of Aristodemos. Kyme, previously the hegemon of a triad of coastal Greek poleis, attained a level of military and political power that propelled it to inter-regional prominence. Moreover, the transference from periphery to core also served to entrench the dominance of Kyme over its own colonies. As discussed in section 1.4, Kyme’s regional weakness during the eighth and seventh centuries predicated a need for tight Kymaian control and Italiote solidarity. However, there was no such equivalent nexus in the sixth century when Kyme’s regional star had begun to rise. With so much power and
influence now at stake, not to mention the possibility of another 524-style invasion, in effect Kyme simply could not afford to allow its colonies to develop as independent poleis. Thus the term 'sub-poleis' is used in this study in relation to Parthenope and Dikaiarcheia.

Therefore, from the eighth to the early fifth centuries, the power relations that counted for the Italiotes of Campania were those that involved non-Greek entities. In particular, as has been demonstrated, it was the Greeks’ relations with the local potentates of Campania and Latium that had the greatest impact upon them. Indeed, it can be said that during the last third of the sixth century, Greek-Italian relations entered an escalatory phase. Following the invasion of 524, it has been demonstrated that Kyme took punitive action against its failed attackers. Moreover, under the direction of Aristodemos, both constitutionally and later as tyrant, Kyme’s political and military reach was extended as far as Latium. There, it can be said that Kyme entered into an already complex balance of forces, and after its victory at Aricia in 504, was most probably regarded as a senior player.78 This position of seniority would have lasted until the events at Lake Regillus, giving Kyme an unprecedented five to nine years of strong inter-regional influence.

78 Ibid., p. 225.
In essence, the whole character of the *polis*-system in Campania was hegemonal, and would remain so even after the decline of Kyme itself, during the first quarter of the fifth century.\(^7^9\) The Campanian Italiotes had, since Kyme first began to found its own colonies, lived in the knowledge that firm leadership and enforced solidarity (witness the destruction of Parthenope) were the principal features of their *polis*-system. Moreover, it is the case in this study that the Campanian Greeks, despite their sixth century prominence in the central Tyrrhenian region, are often referred to as dwelling on the fringes of the Italiote *polis*-system as a whole. Unlike the 'mainstream' *polis*-system of central Magna Graecia, the system prevalent in Greek-inhabited Campania was characteristically a relatively open-ended arena. Moreover, whereas the Italiotes of central Magna Graecia were often able to shape their environment to their own liking and subordinate the local population, in many ways the Euboians in Campania existed as an island surrounded by a sea of powerful and assertive foreigners. Thus the core relations in the region were more often than not those between Kyme and a variety of native Italian powers, rather than nexuses between representatives of a purely Greek *polis*-system.

\(^{79}\) See chapter 7.
SECTION TWO: The Euboians on the Straits of Messina and the politics of the lower Tyrrhenian Sea.

Postdating but complementing the Euboian presence in Campania was a second Euboian theatre of operations in the West, the Straits of Messina. It was through these Straits that all Euboian sea traffic flowed, from Euboia to Campania, Latium and Etruria, and back again. Thus, like the narrow Euripos Straits separating Euboia from Boiotia (Strabo 9.2.2), the Straits of Messina served as an arterial route for Euboian, and in particular, Chalkidian trade. Indeed, coins issued in the second generation of Kyme's mint (c. 450) depict Skylla, one of the mythological denizens of the Straits (Hom., O d. 12.234-6). While it is acknowledged that Kyme's first coins postdate the foundation of the colony itself by nearly three centuries, the Skylla type has a clear historical and mythological resonance. The symbolic link between the Euboians' interests in Campania and their reliance on the Straits of Messina could not be better expressed.80

As with the colonies of Italiote Campania, the settlement of the

Straits of Messina zone by the Euboians can therefore also be said to have been shaped by the parameters of trade. However, within these parameters existed two distinct imperatives that further influenced the siting of Euboian apoikiai. The complex geography and physical features of the Straits were crucial in determining precisely where colonization could and should occur. Moreover, the political dynamics of the region, both Greek and Italian in origin, ensured that the selection process for prospective sites was to be a measured and geostrategic affair. In turn, such deliberations, made by Euboian merchants in the eighth century, had far-reaching consequences for the Italiote polis-system which evolved in the Straits zone. As will be discussed below, the chief consequence of these dictates of geography and geostrategy was the irreversible union of both sides of the Straits, and their respective hinterlands.

2.1 Via Messina I: geography, currents and colonization.

The Euboian reconnaissance which accompanied their commercial ventures in the West would have rapidly brought the realization that the Straits of Messina served as the gateway to the Tyrrhenian Sea. Given the Phoenician monopolization of the Sicilian Channel to the south, access to the trading opportunities of Etruria and Campania was utterly
dependent upon Messina.\textsuperscript{81} The navigation and negotiation of
the Straits of Messina were therefore priorities for the
Euboians.

The sites chosen by the Euboians for colonization in and around
the Straits of Messina reveal the peculiar geographical
imperatives of the zone in question. The location of the first
fully-fledged \textit{apoikia} in Italy, Naxos, is significant in this
regard. Founded in 734 by the Chalkidians on the east coast of
Sicily (Thouk. 6.3.1), Naxos was in fact situated at a key
position on the Euboia-Etruria maritime route.\textsuperscript{82} Navigation
of the Straits was, in the ancient world, clearly regarded as a
difficult undertaking. In both historical sources (Thouk. 4.24.4;
Paus. 5.25.2-4) and myth (Hom., \textit{Od}. 12.234-43; Virgil, \textit{Aeneid}
3.410-23) the narrowness, strong currents, swells and frequent
gales endemic to the Straits made for a potentially hazardous
transit voyage.

Moreover, Strabo states that at least one of these currents
swept wreckage as far south as the Sicilian town of
Tauromenion (6.2.3). In the time of Strabo, Tauromenion was
the successor of Naxos, which had been definitively destroyed
in 403 by Dionysios I of Syracuse (Diod. 14.15.2-3, 16.7.1). An
eighth century Euboian ship \textit{en route} to either Etruria or
\textsuperscript{81} Cunliffe, \textit{Greeks, Romans and Barbarians}, pp. 16-19.
\textsuperscript{82} Tandy, \textit{Warriors into Traders}, p. 78.
Campania could therefore expect to be pushed back towards eastern Sicily if it had not executed its passage of the Straits correctly.

Furthermore, the Bay of Taormina, possibly the Kopria of Strabo’s account (6.2.3), and conveniently situated in the immediate vicinity of the future site of Naxos, would have provided suitable and near at hand shelter for ships preparing for a second attempt at the Straits. Thus, the *raison d'etre* of Naxos, despite its location in Sicily, was to help ease passage through the Straits of Messina. Indeed, by the fifth century at the latest, it is clear that Naxos was regarded as a natural point for starting and terminating voyages to and from the West (Thouk. 6.3.1).

The Chalkidian foundation at Zankle, on the Sicilian side of the Straits, conformed to similar geographic imperatives. Founded after Naxos, in the last quarter of the eighth century by Chalkis and Italiote Kyme (Thouk. 6.4.5), Zankle commanded the best natural harbour in the Straits zone. One of its primary functions was to provide a safe haven for Euboian shipping within the Straits zone itself, thus complementing, and in many ways superseding, the earlier foundation at Naxos. Again, coinage can be used as an indicator of the connections between

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geography and colonial interests. The very earliest series of Zanklaian coinage (starting from c. 525), depicts on the obverse an image of the harbour of Zankle. Clearly, Zankle was chosen for its maritime value. 84

Underscoring this interpretation of the successive foundations of Naxos and Zankle is the nature of their respective hinterlands. Neither colony was in the vicinity of any arable land of note, and as will be discussed in section 2.3, both had to rely on later, relatively distant sub-colonies to provide for their agricultural needs. The poor condition of the chorai of Naxos and Zankle therefore strongly suggests that specific, maritime interests motivated the Euboian colonists. Furthermore, Strabo's linkage of Naxos and Zankle, although somewhat ambiguous in its meaning, should also serve to reinforce the shared purpose of the two colonies (6.2.3). In founding Naxos and Zankle where they did, the Euboian Chalkidians hoped to master the geographical and meteorological hazards of the Straits of Messina. 85

84 ACGC, p. 207; Stazio & Siciliano, “La Magna Grecia e il mare”, p. 302.
2.2 Via Messina II: political and strategic considerations.

Alongside the physical challenges and imperatives of the Straits of Messina lay a complex stratum of political and strategic concerns. While the foundation of Naxos can be said to have been primarily concerned with the navigation of the Straits, the case of Zankle is somewhat different. Indeed, as will be seen, these political and strategic concerns would exercise a critical influence over the shape of the future polis-system in the Straits region.

In recounting the details of the foundation of Zankle, Thoukydides (6.4.5) and Pausanias (4.23.7) both state that pirates were the first inhabitants of Zankle. Both also agree that these pirates were of Greek origin, and Thoukydides goes on to state that these Greeks were in fact Kymaians from Campania. A formal or official foundation is also attested by both ancient sources, undertaken by Chalkis and Kyme, after the piratical period. The very existence of a pre-colonial, piratical period is occasionally cast into doubt or rejected outright by modern scholars, but I believe that once the Lelantine War is introduced into the equation, the presence of pirates at Zankle becomes far less problematical.86

86 For a rejection, or doubts concerning the veracity, of this tradition, see Coldstream, Geometric Greece, p. 237; Tandy, Warriors into Traders,
Interpretation of the archaeological remains of the earliest known Greek phase at Zankle generally date the city to between c. 730 and c. 720. Furthermore, the earliest date for the foundation of Kyme is accepted as c. 725 (see section 1.3), and Zankle itself had founded its own colony by c. 717, thus placing Zankle in its post-colonial phase. Therefore, both the activities of the alleged pirates from Kyme and the succeeding 'official' colonists must fall within this relatively small c. 725- c. 717 range.

Moreover, as advantageous as it was to the navigation of the Straits of Messina, Zankle was not occupied or colonized by anyone until over half a century after the Euboians started using the Straits. Clearly, the issue of ownership at Zankle came to a head only in the last quarter of the eighth century. Indeed, with at least two masters in the space of eight years, Zankle was evidently the subject of competing interests, and of action and reaction, all of which had their origin in the Lelantine War, rather than the inherent value of Zankle's previously ignored harbour.

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p. 78, n. 98.

The presence of the pirates at Zankle soon after c. 725, if not in the same year, appears to be linked to near contemporaneous events at Ischia. As established in section 1.3, the foundation of Kyme in Campania and the outbreak of war in Euboia were in all probability connected. As a result, the Eretrians, along with an indeterminate number of fortune-seeking Chalkidians, appear to have migrated from Ischia to the Campanian mainland. Moreover Chalkis, which was then engaged in, and presumably motivated by, the Lelantine War with Eretria, was probably the primary cause for this exodus, rather than local Chalkidians.

However, this does not appear to have been the end of the matter, despite the spirit of compromise that the migration suggests. Indeed, it is quite conceivable that the Kymaian pirates, who were said by Thoukydides and Pausanias to have been present at Zankle, were in fact disgruntled, income-deficient Eretrians. This section of Pithekoussan society had after all recently experienced the inconveniences of virtual expulsion. Moreover, at the time, the term ‘Kymaian’ must have been synonymous with ‘Eretrian’, inasmuch as it is accepted that it was Eretrian emigrés who colonized Kyme around 725. While Kyme was certainly to become one of the wealthiest and most successful of the Greek poleis in Italy, conditions were not necessarily so generous during the early
stages of the colony. A motive for piratical behaviour on behalf of the Kymaians can therefore be identified.

A second motive for the Eretrian-Kymaian adoption of piracy is revealed in the site chosen to base their operations - Zankle. While the recently relocated Eretrians may have felt a degree of fraternal gratitude towards their relatively amenable former neighbours in Pithekoussai, it should come as no surprise that the Eretrians sought some way in which to strike out at the Aegean Chalkidians. Moreover, in seeking such an opportunity the Eretrians did not have to look far. While an Eretrian-Kymaian attack against Chalkis itself was more or less impossible, it was a relatively easy matter to pressurize Chalkis' trade in the West. Indeed, having been established at the turn of the ninth century, the pattern of Chalkidian trade and contact with the West was all too predictable for would-be predators.

As stated in the previous section, every aspect of Chalkis' trade with the West revolved around the Straits of Messina. Reliant as it was on the Straits, it was precisely across this narrow

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88 Of all the Western Greek poleis only Syracuse was ever able to raise support for and lead military intervention on the Greek Mainland: under Hermokrates between 412 and 409 (Thouk. 8.26.1; Xen. Hell. 1.2.10); and under Dionysios I in 387 and 369 (Xen. Hell. 5.1.26, 7.1.20). Indeed, until the reign of Gelon at Syracuse (485-478), no Greek warfleet of significant size is heard of in the West (Hdt. 7.158).
body of water that Chalkis was most vulnerable. Here enemies, through their numerical inferiority would not normally pose a threat, could wreak havoc upon Chalkidian shipping. Furthermore, by establishing a base at Zankle, the Eretrian-Kymaians were able to consolidate their position of advantage. Zankle commanded the Straits by way of its status as the best natural harbour in the area, thus enabling its occupiers to attack when in a position of strength and defend when the Chalkidians sought to dislodge their tormentors.

Indeed, this 'dual function' approach to Kymaiian piracy (economic gain/warfare) was certainly not unique in the history of seafaring in the Mediterranean. As will be seen later in section 2.4, the Straits of Messina and the lower Tyrrhenian Sea in general proved to be a regularly used theatre of operations for pirates with quasi-patriotic motives in mind.

Moreover, it has been demonstrated previously that Pithekoussai, by design or accident, had spent the last two generations diversifying its commercial interests. Far from remaining dependent on the parameters established by its Euboian founders, Pithekoussai had developed trade contacts

with southern Etruria, Campania and possibly even Phoenician Spain. Thus by the time of the Lelantine War, local (Italiote) Chalkidian participation in, and dependence on, East-West trade can be said to have been substantially less than that of their metropolis. As a result, by targeting the Straits of Messina, the Eretrian-Kymaians could also damage the instigators of the original anti-Eretrian pogrom at Pithekoussai whilst leaving the local Chalkidians relatively unscathed.

It is a certainty that the Eretrian-Kymaian occupation of what was in effect Zankle I (i.e. piratical Zankle) and their subsequent ability to interrupt East-West trade would have been unacceptable to the Chalkidians. Indeed, this dissatisfaction is borne out by the resoluteness of the Chalkidian response. As stated earlier, both Thoukydides and Pausanias indicate that the piratical phase at Zankle was succeeded by a formal colonization, under appointed oikistai. Although our two ancient sources for Zankle do not agree on the names of the two oikistai involved, both state that one of these two was a Chalkidian, from Chalkis proper, the other being Kymaian (Thouk. 6.4.6; Paus. 4.23.7). Moreover, the Eusebian date for the Zanklaian sub-colony of Mylai (c. 717), presupposes that Zankle II (i.e. Chalkidian Zankle) had already been formally established. Thus a Chalkidian response to

the threat posed by Zankle must have occurred within eight years or less - a response time made all the more remarkable by Chalkis' undoubtedly heavy commitments to the Lelantine War then underway in Euboia.

To further underscore the significance of a new colonial commitment by Chalkis during wartime, the circumstances of the foundation of the neighbouring Straits polis of Rhegion should be noted. Founded by c. 715 under the auspices of Chalkis and the recently established Zankle II, the ethnic make-up of Rhegion's settlers is revealing. As demonstrated by Vallet, the ancient belief in the presence of Messenian refugees in Rhegion as early as the eighth century should be accepted (Thouk. 6.4.6; Strabo 6.1.6; Paus. 4.23.6). Moreover, as Vallet legitimately asked, why would the Chalkidians wish to share in the control of the Straits of Messina by inviting Messenians into the venture? The Messenians after all were hardly in a position to force the Chalkidians to do so, having just suffered a decisive defeat at the hands of the Spartans (Paus. 4.23.6).

The fact of the matter appears to have been that the Chalkidians exploited the Messenians' availability due to their own dearth of manpower. The Lelantine War simply did not

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92 Vallet, Zancle et Rhégion, pp. 72-80. See also Manfredi & Braccesi, I Greci d'Occidente, p. 92.
create the conditions for colonial expeditions, and although Chalkis was able to provide some colonists of its own (Strabo 6.1.6), clearly it was forced to look elsewhere to ensure numbers were sufficient - to Messenia and Zankle. That it took Chalkis as little as eight years (or less) to respond to piracy at Zankle, and at that time, bereft of the aid of Messenian refugees or other Chalkidian daughter colonies, should be seen as a relatively major feat.

To return now to the alleged Kymaian origin of the other joint-oikistes of Zankle, the presence of a Kymaian at Zankle II does not necessarily contradict the proposed Chalkidian-centric nature of the refounded colony. As revealed in the accounts of Thoukydides and Pausanias, there was disagreement in the ancient world as to the precise identity, and name of the second, non-Chalkidian oikistes at Zankle - Perieres/Krataimenes. However, Pausanias' preference for Samian ethnicity is plainly anachronistic, referring as it does, to the later, fifth century Samian occupation of Zankle (Hdt. 6.23).

Thoukydides' statement that Perieres/Krataimenes was a Kymaian presupposes a truce of some kind having been reached between the Eretrian-Kymaians and the Aegean Chalkidians. While not beyond the realms of possibility, the recent expulsion of the Eretrians from Ischia at the hands of the Chalkidians would appear to give short shrift to such a
notion. A more plausible theory would be to interpret Thoukydides' remark as a slightly confused recognition of the Eretrian-Kymaian presence at Zankle I, and a belief that some of these original Zanklaians may have remained in Zankle II.

This latter point in itself is not beyond the realms of possibility. Given the depredations of the Zanklaian pirates, the changeover from Eretrian-Kymaian to Chalkidian control was in all probability violent, and its culmination may well have been a betrayal - not an uncommon occurrence in the sieges of the Greek world. Given its superb harbour, a fortified Zankle would have had to have been invested by both land and sea (Paus. 4.23.8), and this may well have been beyond the capabilities of archaic Chalkis. Treachery on behalf of some of its defenders would presumably have resulted in their gaining permission to remain in the formally colonized Zankle II. Thoukydides' remarks should thus be seen in this light.

It is therefore probable that the climate of hostility fostered by the Lelantine War helped to precipitate a crisis in the Straits of Messina. In turn, the subsequent contest over control of the Straits had a permanent impact upon the region. Essentially, Chalkis was forced to channel its colonial energies into securing

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93 Indeed, treachery and deception were the reasons for Zankle's fall to the Samians in 493 (Hdt. 6.23), and again to the Mamertinoi in 288 (Polyb. 1.7.1-5).
its East-West trade route. Thus, once again, the parameters of trade can be said to have shaped the future of Euboian polis in Magna Graecia. Consequently, the region acquired the germ of a new, Straits-based polis-system, which was geographically, strategically, economically and politically anchored to the Straits of Messina.

Moreover, although Sicilian, and thus technically Sikeliote, as opposed to Magna Graecian and Italiote, Zankle's situation was to have serious repercussions throughout Magna Graecia and the lower Tyrrhenian region. Interference with traffic through the Straits was tantamount to interference in the affairs of numerous regional entities, Greek and non-Greek. Thus, as will be discussed further in section 2.4 below, from this time the Straits of Messina and their immediate neighbourhood were effectively politicized. A geographical bottleneck, the Straits now also became a strategic point at which regional enemies could be restricted, choked and even debarred.

2.3 The construction and consolidation of a Straits system.

With the foundation of Zankle on the Sicilian side of the Straits came the first step towards constructing a Straits 'system', that is, a formalized mechanism of control over traffic through the Straits of Messina. As stated in the previous section, this
control was further enhanced by the foundation of Rhetion, this
time on the Italian side of the Straits. Again it was Chalkis that
supplied the *oikistes*, one Antimnestos, therefore reserving for
itself the position of *metropolis* (Antiochos, *FGrH* 555 F 9).

However, although it was Chalkis that provided the *oikistes* for
Rhetion and most probably also recruited and transported the
Messenian refugees,\(^9^4\) the aforementioned account of
Antiochos suggests a proactive role for Zankle. Indeed, Strabo
states that Antiochos believed, in contrast to Strabo’s own
opinion (6.1.6), that it was Zankle which provided *all* the
momentum for the colonization process and, as will be
demonstrated, in this matter Antiochos is to be preferred. At
any rate the slightly earlier foundation of Zankle II had
accomplished the Chalkidian goal of unmolested passage
through the Straits of Messina. Thus, with the deliverance of
Zankle into the hands of friendly colonists the most sensitive
point of the Straits had been protected and Chalkis’ chief
commercial interests served.

Rhetion, some twenty kilometres further south, and at the
entrance of the Straits, suggests rather different foundation
motives. Like the foundation of Kyme some ten years earlier,
Rhetion represents the interests of colonists rather than
Aegean *metropoleis*. Clearly piratical Zankle on its own had

\(^{94}\) For an alternative view, see Vallet, *Zancle et Rhégion*, p. 80.
been sufficient to disrupt East-West shipping, and it is equally clear that the site of Rheidia was considered second best as it was to Zankle that the pirates first turned. Moreover, an argument based on the assumption that Chalkis was forced to settle Rheidia in order to thwart further pirate incursions does not hold true. As many as ten years separate the foundations of Zankle II and Rheidia, indicating that the Eretrian-Kymaian at least had ceased to be a threat after their eviction from the Straits. Furthermore, the suggestion that Etruscan pirates may have posed problems for the Greeks in the Straits zone during the eighth century relies heavily on an anachronistic statement of Strabo. Claims of τὰ λιγοτέρα τῶν Τυρρηνῶν (6.2.2) are simply not credible in the period as they effectively ignore the last eighty years of uninterrupted and unmolested Euboian trade in the Tyrrhenian Sea.95

The most likely source for the initiative to settle Rheidia came, as Antiochos believed, from Zankle.96 Situated as it was on the Straits, the Zanklaians were in the best position to see that a colony at Rheidia would transform the Chalkidian presence on the Straits from watchdogs to masters of all traffic to and from the Aegean. Chalkis had demonstrated no interest in exploiting the Straits in such a way until it had been

95 C. Ampolo, "La funzione dello stretto", p. 55.
96 Manfredi & Braccesi, I Greci d'Occidente, p. 93; Vallet, Zancle et Rhégion, p. 80
threatened, and even then the response had been localized to the immediate problem, Zankle.

Moreover, lobbied by its daughter colony Zankle to supervise proceedings at Rhegion, Chalkis responded in what can only be called a token manner. Apart from an oikistes, Chalkis' own numerical contribution to the settler population cannot have been remarkable given its need to draft in Messenian refugees. Again it is to be stressed that Chalkis was not in a proactive mood; and again it should be stressed that Chalkis appears to have been well enough satisfied with its efforts at Zankle. With its commitments to the Lelantine War, its recent subjection of Zankle I, and the apparent absence of piracy in the region Chalkis simply did not need to champion the mastery of the Straits. The state that had the most to gain from complete mastery of the Straits of Messina was Zankle. With its mountainous chora virtually devoid of land even remotely capable of supporting its population (Diod. 23.1.3), Zankle would have been forced to turn elsewhere for its livelihood. Indeed, in what can only be described as a frenetic bout of activity, from c. 717-c. 715 Zankle sought to remedy this state of affairs.

According to Eusebios and archaeological evidence, Mylai was founded around 717.97 Situated some thirty kilometres to the

west of Zankle, the land around Mylai was considered valuable for its agricultural potential. Furthermore, Mylai also served the purpose of guarding the western approach to Zankle and the Straits. Given the termination date for the First Messenian War, which was to make Messenian refugees available for Chalkidian use (Paus. 4.23.5-6), Rhegion must have been settled in or soon after c. 715. Rhegion too, while not providing Zankle with arable land, enabled Zankle to protect the eastern and southern approaches to the Straits, thus completing by c. 715 a comprehensive system of control over the Straits of Messina. Moreover, once in command of Mylai and Rhegion, Zankle was in the position to profit from both its newly acquired agricultural assets and its potential as a master of tolls and harbour dues.

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colonizzazione greca: matauros e mylai”, Atti Taranto 26: Lo stretto crocevia di culture, p. 224.

98 Tardy, Warriors into Traders, p. 78, n. 95; Vallet, Zancle et Rhégion, pp. 85, 138.

99 Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia, pp. 113-16.

100 Vallet’s assertion that there is no solid evidence for the levying of tolls on the Straits of Messina during the archaic period is reasonable but not definitive. The earliest evidence for tolls in the world of Greek commerce comes from the fifth century (Xen. Hell. 1.1.22; Diod. 13.64.2), when the contemporary lack of unity between the Straits poleis precluded any real opportunity to collect tolls. Tolls, either formal or informal may well have existed prior to the fifth century on the Straits of Messina but were not recorded. See Vallet, Zancle et Rhégion, p. 171.
This picture of Zankle as the powerhouse of the Straits is further reinforced by its activities in southern Magna Graecia during the seventh century. Shortly before c. 650 Zankle appears to have founded a third colony of its own at Metauros, on the Italian mainland (Solinus 2.11).\(^{101}\) Zankle’s acquisition of Metauros helped to secure the northern approach to the Straits, thus further enhancing its ability to dictate the flow of traffic in the region. Crucially, neither Metauros or Mylai are mentioned in relation to Chalkis. Zankle is the founding \textit{polis} in both instances. Moreover, it is clear from a fifth century dedication at Olympia and in ancient accounts of the fifth and fourth centuries (Thouk. 3.90.2; Diod. 14.87.1-3) that Mylai was still regarded as Zanklaian ‘property’ well after its foundation.\(^{102}\) In the case of Rhegion, the first recorded instance of action independent of Zankle does not occur until the second half of the sixth century (Hdt. 1.166).

Therefore, in all probability it was Zankle that provided most of the initiative for the construction of the Straits system, and


\(^{102}\) The inscription dates from 488-485 and records a military victory for Zankle (then Messene) over Mylai (\textit{IGASMG III} no. 38, pp. 47-8). Diodoros account concerns the year 394 when Rhegion attempted to establish a presence at Mylai independent from Zankle. Essentially, both instances record Zankle refusing to tolerate Mylaian independence.
Zankle that stood most to gain. Through this policy Zankle was able to secure for itself a viable future as an independent polis. Indeed, given the paucity of the natural resources of this polis, there is no other way in which to explain the subsequent success, wealth and longevity of Zankle, and the later Rhegion.\textsuperscript{103} It has also been demonstrated that Zankle was keen to consolidate its hold over the Straits zone with daughter foundations of its own. Furthermore, like Kyme to the north, Zankle also sought to exercise tight control over these 'sub-colonies' in order to preserve its monopolistic vision of the Straits of Messina.

Moreover, the significance and potential impact of this system should not be underestimated. It is evident that the shores of the Straits of Messina were culturally linked from as early as the ninth century. The presence of rock-cut chamber tombs in north-eastern Sicily and the toe of Italy clearly suggest such links,\textsuperscript{104} and this is borne out further by Thukydides and Polybios' recognition of the ethnic links between the Sikel people of eastern Sicily and the indigenous population of southern Italy (Thouk. 6.2.4; Polybios 12.5.10). However, it is not until the advent of the Euboians that the Straits zone

\textsuperscript{103} Vallet, Zanclle et Rhégion, p. 138; Stazio & Siciliano, “La Magna Grecia e il mare”, pp. 302-3.

\textsuperscript{104} Holloway, \textit{Italy and the Aegean 3000-700 B.C.}, p. 121; L. Costamagna & C. Sabbione, \textit{Una città in magna grecia locri epizefiri: (Guida archeologica)} (Reggio di Calabria, 1990), p. 31.
actually began to have political and strategic links imposed upon it.

Consequently, the futures of the *poleis* situated on the Straits became irreversibly intertwined, in effect producing a new *polis*-system with its own interests, nuances and balances of power. Furthermore, unlike the isolated *polis*-system dominated by Kyme, the Zanklaian-led *polis*-system straddled the two geographical regions most densely populated by Greeks - eastern Sicily and southern Italy. This Straits-based system was therefore rarely a peripheral player in the great events of Italiote history, and was in every respect an integral part of the mainstream *polis*-system of Magna Graecia. Indeed, as will be seen, due to the Straits-systems necessary incorporation of Sicilian territory, its *poleis* also often played a significant role in the Sikeliote *polis*-system and the lower Tyrrhenian Sea in general as well.

2.4 The Straits *poleis* and the lower Tyrrhenian down to the end of the sixth century.

Although the Straits *poleis* were fully integrated into the mainstream *polis*-system of Magna Graecia, their geographical situation gave rise to conditions substantially different from those in the rest of Magna Graecia. Indeed, it will be argued
that the conditions generated by the Straits encouraged the evolution of a unique *polis*-system within the wider band of Greek settlement in southern Italy. The two main issues influencing the development of the Straits *polis*-system down to the end of the sixth century were international trade; and the growing antipathy of the non-Greek denizens of the lower Tyrrhenian Sea.

Even before the foundation of Metauros in the mid-seventh century, ethnic Chalkidians were in a position to influence traffic through the Straits of Messina. However, given the participation of Aegean Chalkidians in the colonization of Zankle and Rhegion, it would also be safe to assume that their brethren on the Straits did not attempt to impose conditions considered too restrictive for Chalkis-initiated East-West trade. Indeed, it would appear from vase inscriptions in the Chalkidian script that Rhegion may have served as a distribution point for ‘Chalkidian’ ware in the West, at least during the sixth and fifth centuries.\(^\text{105}\)

Politically however, the links between the Chalkidian *poleis* on the Straits and their *metropolis* appear to have faded not long after Chalkis’ initial involvement in the region. In the wake of the prolonged Lelantine War Chalkis seems to have experienced exhaustion and subsequently scaled back its assertive

\(^{105}\) *TWGa*, pp. 250-2; Boardman, "Early Euboean Pottery and History", *Annual of the British School at Athens* 52 (1957), p. 13.
involvement in the West. Indeed, for Chalkis to re-focus on its original commercial interests should not be viewed as surprising. It has already been demonstrated that Chalkis had to be provoked by piracy to establish a presence on the Straits of Messina, despite seventy-five years or more of continuous use. Moreover, it has also been shown that the initiative for further domination of the Straits most probably came from Zankle, not Chalkis. Power in the Straits therefore rapidly became a matter for local Chalkidian poleis to exercise. Furthermore, as will be discussed below, the relative retreat of Chalkis from the West helped to precipitate a steady diversification of interests in the Straits zone, which in turn led to the growth of a polis-system well versed in the art of survival.

The best indication of the ability of the Straits poleis to survive in a system independent of its metropolis is revealed in their reception of a variety of newcomers to the region. Straddling as they did the most convenient route into the western Mediterranean, the Chalkidians on the Strait were in the unique position of being able to influence the flow of traffic to their advantage. However, it was precisely this centrality which made the Straits poleis vulnerable. The Straits polis-system therefore had to learn how to exploit newcomers to its

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own best advantage.

The first indication that large numbers of ships other than Euboian ones might have been using the Straits occurs during the third quarter of the seventh century. At this time Phokaian pentekonters from Asia Minor were beginning to sail to Spain (Hdt. 1.163), probably via the North African coastline in the wake of Phoenician traders. However, by c. 600 at the latest it appears that the Phokaians were using the Straits of Messina for their commercial purposes. It is at about this time that the Phokaian colony of Massalia was founded in southern Gaul (Strabo 4.1.4; Justin 43.3.4-13), illuminating a new, non-African based trade route to Spain which would have relied upon access to the Straits of Messina. Indeed, by the mid-sixth century it can be said that the Phokaians had gained a substantial portion of the East-West trade, in particular that part concerned with southern Gaul and the mouth of the Rhodanos River.

That early Phokaian-Chalkidian contacts were both frequent and important enough to have developed along amicable lines is suggested by the relationship between Phokaian and the Straits poleis in the mid-sixth century.\textsuperscript{110} Herodotos states that the Phokaian refugees from the failed apoikia of Alalia on Kyrnos (Corsica) sailed straight to Rhegion for shelter in c. 540 (1.166), when Rhegion was by no means the closest or most convenient port.\textsuperscript{111} Rhegion also appears to have maintained strong links with the Phokaian into the fifth century. As will be discussed further in chapter 7, the Rhegines established a presence at Pyxous on the Bay of Policastro in 471, which was in part designed to reinforce their Phokaian allies based at neighbouring Hyele (Diod. 11.59.4).

I suggest that these good relations were in fact based upon a long-established spirit of co-operation, with their origins in the seventh century. The Straits poleis clearly regarded the Phokaian as allies worth defending and the existence of a special relationship between the two from the mid-sixth century at the latest is evident. Moreover, that the polis-system on the Straits of Messina reacted in such a way is indicative of its own regional needs and concerns. As stated earlier, Chalkis was no longer politically engaged in the West, leaving the Straits poleis in a potentially precarious position.

\textsuperscript{110} Ampolo, “La funzione dello stretto”, pp. 47-8

As the first Aegean Greeks to sail beyond the Straits in numbers large enough to attempt colonization since the Euboians themselves, the Phokaians therefore constituted a valuable new source of manpower and support.

However, the Phokaian experience is only one model that emerged during the archaic period for relations between new arrivals and the Straits polis-system. Generally, the largest groups of 'newcomers' were, like the Euboians, Ionian, with a small number of exceptions. On the other hand, a wide variety of individual Greek merchants, Dorian as well as Ionian, appear to have used the Straits of Messina without any trouble from its Chalkidian masters.

Demaratos of Korinth and Sostratos of Aigina are two of the most famous non-Ionian examples of individual commercial interest in the West. The former, active from c. 670-c. 657, was clearly involved in some form of trans-Mediterranean trade between Korinth and Tarquinii (DH 3.46.3-5).\(^{112}\) The latter, active from c. 535-c. 500, exported vases from the Aegean to Tarquinii, Vulci, Cerveteri and Orvieto in Etruria (Hdt. 4.152).\(^{113}\)

\(^{112}\) Demaratos' career of course post-dated the Korinthian foundation of Syracuse in Sicily (c. 733). See Ridgway, "Demaratus and his Predecessors", pp. 85-7.

One group of Ionians which does not appear to have followed the Phokaian model is the Milesians, and an examination of their circumstances reveals much concerning the opportunism of the Straits poleis when dealing with newcomers. Although the details of their trade interests are hazy, it is evident that Milesian merchants were active in the West some time before 510 when they are supposed to have gone into mourning for the loss of their Sybarite trading partners at the hands of Kroton (Hdt. 6.21). However, what can be garnered from a fragment of Timaios is the strong suggestion that Miletos, although involved in trade with Etruria, appears to have bypassed the Straits of Messina by exploiting Achaian-controlled terrestrial trade routes in Magna Graecia proper (FGrH 566 F 50.1-4).

While the affairs of the great Achaian poleis of Magna Graecia are more the domain of chapter 4, it is appropriate at this point to give an outline of the trade routes in question. As documented by Vallet, that trans-isthmian routes terrestres may have linked several of the Ionian Sea poleis with Etruscan markets is suggested by the presence of tightly controlled sub-colonies on the Tyrrenian Sea.\textsuperscript{114} Moreover, as the fifth century wreck attested by Pausanias suggests, safe passage through the Straits was not guaranteed (5.25.2-4). What is more, the aforementioned Phokaian defeat at Alalia and the

\textsuperscript{114} Vallet, Zancle et Rhégion, pp. 167-9.
subsequent Etruro-Punic maritime advance in all probability added a new danger to Greek shipping in the Tyrrhenian Sea, thus providing further incentive for merchants to develop new routes.  

However, the literary sources argue that Miletos had a special relationship with Sybaris and suggest that these two states, in conjunction with the Etruscans, formed an alliance of the so-called *popoli rammolliti*. It is therefore probable that politics and commercial strategy combined to provide the incentive for finding an alternative route to Etruria. Accordingly, Milesian textiles were shipped to Sybaris and transported to such Sybarite-controlled ports on the Tyrrhenian Sea as Laos and Skidros for re-shipment to Etruria (Tim. *FGrH* F 50.1-4). Given the perishable nature of the goods in question, archaeology cannot be used to prove or disprove the notion that Milesian textiles made their way to Etruria. However, the well attested link between Sybaris and Miletos, as well as the strong Sybarite presence on the Tyrrhenian Sea between c. 600 and 510 does suggest that such

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trade routes were possible.

The implications of the existence of these trade routes for the Straits *polis*-system are considerable. Given the eighth century foundations dates for the Straits *poleis*, it is clear that the Straits were the earliest and most common route between East and West. The trans-isthmian routes must therefore be a later addition to Greek initiated trade with the West, and were most probably set up in at least partial competition with the Straits route. That such a route was established cannot be explained solely by the natural hazards of the Straits. Rather, it indicates that the Straits *poleis* were proving to be partisan in their guardianship of the Straits of Messina.

The earliest Phokaian presence in the West was, like the Euboians before them and the Milesians after them, almost certainly commercial in nature, and their treatment at the hands of the Straits *poleis* may not have been exceptional or preferential at that time. However, once the Phokaians began to settle in the West the dynamics changed. As stated earlier, the Phokaians became useful to the Straits *poleis* and the relationship between the two became close. The Milesians on the other hand did not settle in the West and remained primarily Aegean-based merchants, therefore offering little to the Straits *poleis* in terms of security or strategic gain.
Moreover, with their reputation as voracious and monopolistic traders well established in the eastern Mediterranean (Hdt. 1.165), the Phokaians active in the West may well have encouraged the Straits poleis to hamper the Milesians.\(^{118}\) However, special emphasis must be placed on the word *hamper*, as no evidence exists to suggest that the Straits poleis actually blocked traffic through the Straits.\(^{119}\) Certainly, as the original piratical incarnation of Zankle attests, the Chalkidians on the Straits had the ability to disrupt traffic. But the sheer diversity of individual merchants using the Straits of Messina, not to mention the fact that the carriers and producers of any given goods were not necessarily of the same nationality, must rule out for now the idea that the Straits poleis would or could maintain such a strict embargo.\(^{120}\) Indeed, as will be discussed in detail below, as the sixth century progressed the lower Tyrrhenian region was becoming too crowded with assertive players for any one state to enforce an embargo in the Straits. At any rate, the Milesians do appear to have directed at least some of their trade through southern Italy, and by extension do appear to have experienced some difficulties in their relations with the Chalkidians of the Straits.


\(^{119}\) Ampolo, “La funzione dello stretto”, pp. 52-5.

The policy of the Straits poleis towards newcomers to the region therefore appears to have been assessed on fairly self-interested and often arbitrary criteria. Thus through their use of these newcomers international trade can be said to have played a significant role in the development and consolidation of the Straits poleis. Indeed, given the geographical position and original raisons d’être of the Straits poleis, this should not be at all surprising. With the Straits poleis having been established within the commercial parameters of the eighth century Euboians, maritime traffic was the single most important aspect of life in the Straits polis-system. However, as Vallet has argued, the Straits poleis did not constitute major trading destinations in themselves.\textsuperscript{121} Rather, the Straits polis-system was a system designed to regulate traffic through the Straits of Messina, and the vast majority of its internal and external relations was dominated by this function.

It is also evident from our literary sources that between the late seventh century and the early sixth the Tyrrhenian Sea was starting to become a far more crowded and potentially dangerous area, particularly in terms of the growing antagonism between its Greek and non-Greek denizens. Moreover, as has been discussed previously, this development occurred against a background of rapid Zanklaian advances into

\textsuperscript{121} Vallet, Zancle et Rhégion, p. 180.
the lower Tyrrhenian. Indeed, in addition to its colonies at Rhegion, Mylaï and Metauros, Zankle had extended its zone of influence right up to the border of Phoenician-dominated western Sicily, with a new foundation at Himera in 648. By way of these foundations Zankle had in effect established the Straits *polis*-system as the dominant player in the lower Tyrrhenian. Thus any change in the regional balance of power was therefore a direct threat to the position of the Straits *poleis* who in effect had the most to lose.

Furthermore, this development is useful in explaining why the Straits *poleis* behaved as they did towards new waves of potential colonists from Greece. As stated earlier, the Straits *poleis* after all went to extraordinary lengths to accommodate the Phokaians. In essence, the nature of the changes to the Tyrrhenian balance of power was largely that of pitching Greek against non-Greek. Thus to the Chalkidians these migrants represented a fresh source of Hellenism which could be used as a shield in an increasingly racially-charged climate in the lower Tyrrhenian. Indeed, as will be seen, so concerned were the Straits *poleis* to preserve their position in the lower Tyrrhenian that they were prepared to cede considerable swathes of territory and even compromise their control of the approaches to the Straits themselves in order to ensure overall

122 For the date see *TWGb*, p. 187.
Hellenic dominance in the region.

Throughout much of the seventh century it would appear that an informal demarcation of zones of interest operated in the Tyrrhenian. Phoenicians, present on the north-western shore of Sicily, and Greeks, based on the Straits of Messina, co-existed without any hint of the Punic-Greek violence endemic to the sixth, fifth and fourth centuries. Indeed, even the foundation in 648 of the aforementioned Himera does not appear to have caused any friction between Greeks and Phoenicians. However, with the arrival of the Phokaians some time before c. 600 there ensued a series of clashes which would ultimately see the Straits transformed into an anti-Punic bulwark and bring about the partition of Sicily into zones of strict Greek and Punic control. Thoukydides states that at the time of the foundation of Massalia (c. 600), the Phokaians and Carthaginians came to blows (1.13.6). Moreover, around 580 an expedition of Knidians and Rhodians under the Herakleid aristocrat Pentathlos attempted to establish a colony deep within Punic-influenced western Sicily, at Lilybaion (Antiochos FGrH 555 F1; Diod. 5.9.1-3). Possibly in response to this incursion, archaeological excavation has revealed that the

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125 See note 122.
nearby Phoenician colony of Motya was fortified at this time.\textsuperscript{126} With these largely Greek-initiated acts the politics of the lower Tyrrhenian began to take on aggressive overtones.

The next phase of conflict in the Tyrrhenian Sea witnessed a widening of the theatre to involve Etruscan states and the island of Kyrnos. As noted earlier in this section, the Phokaians who had chosen to flee Persian occupation around 540 rapidly turned to a life of piracy, specifically aimed at non-Greek shipping in the Tyrrhenian Sea (Hdt. 1.166). In the case of the earlier date at least, the regional reaction to the Phokaian depredations was decisive. As Herodotos states, after tolerating five years of piratical behaviour (1.166), the Carthaginians allied themselves with the Etruscans of Agylla and effectively drove the Phokaians out of their colony at Alalia around 535 (1.166-7). Moreover, such racial clashes would continue well into the succeeding centuries.

It has also been noted previously that on this occasion the Straits poleis were involved as guarantors of Phokaian safety. Furthermore, it is probable that the remnants of Pentathlos' failed expedition into western Sicily were allowed by the Straits poleis to settle in the neighbouring Aeolian Islands (Antiochos \textit{FG}rH 555 F 1; Thouk. 3.88.2; Diod. 5.9.1-4).\textsuperscript{127}

\textsuperscript{126} \textit{TWGb}, p. 187.

\textsuperscript{127} Ampolo, "La funzione dello stretto", pp. 58-9.
Situated just west of the Straits of Messina, the vanquished remains of the Knidian-Rhodian colonists could not possibly have forced their way onto the Aiolian Islands without sanction from the local hegemons, Zankle and Rhegion. Indeed, having recently provoked the ire of the Phoenicians and Elymians in western Sicily, the Knidians and Rhodians may have even actively sought out the protection of the Straits poleis. Regardless of the details of the matter, the Knidians and Rhodians founded the polis of Lipara within the Aiolian chain, and most probably with the backing of the Straits poleis.

The subsequent fortunes of the Liparaians suggest that the Straits poleis may not have acted solely out of generosity. Later in the sixth century and probably into the fifth, Lipara suffered repeated attacks from pirates (Antiochos FGrH 555 F1; Diod. 4.9.4-5; Strabo 6.2.10). Moreover, on all occasions these pirates are described as Etruscans (Ὑπηνοί), and the battles arising from their degradations as 'national' and 'nationalist' in character. Given that the Etruscans and Carthaginians were working in tandem to reduce Greek influence in the Tyrrhenian Sea from c. 535 at the latest, it should come as no surprise that Greek traffic and holdings were being targeted, in much the same way as their contemporaries, the Phokaians, made a virtue out of harassing non-Greek shipping.

128 Antiochos states that the Liparaians made dedications at Delphi to celebrate their victories over the barbaroi (FGrH 555 F1).
Clearly the lower Tyrrhenian was a region in which allies were invaluable. The settlement of Lipara strongly suggests that the Straits poleis were looking to establish a Hellenic presence in an area strategically important for their own security. Indeed, the later history of relations between Lipara and the Straits indicates that a hostile occupation of the Aiolian Islands was intolerable to the Straits poleis (Thouk. 3.88). The arrival of the Knidians and Rhodians was thus probably considered an opportunity by Zankle and Rhegion to bolster their defences.

Moreover, in support of this position is the Zanklaian retreat from Metauros, which occurred around 550. Although it is not known whether the Zanklaians simply abandoned the site or were subject to attack and eviction, it appears likely that settlers from neighbouring Lokroi Epizephyrioi occupied Metauros either at or close to this time. As neither the archaeological or literary record suggests a violent division in the history of archaic Metauros, it is highly probable that Metauros was simply abandoned by the Zanklaians.

Indeed, as Rhegion was an ally of Lokroi at the Battle of Sagra in c. 550, it appears highly improbable that relations between the Straits poleis and the Lokrians were bad enough to

129 TWGb, p. 182; Costamagna & Sabbione, Una città in magna grecia locri epizefiri, p. 36.
warrant a hostile takeover of Metauros. Rather, given the strategic value of the site and the mounting pressures of life in the lower Tyrrhenian, this retreat suggests that the Straits poleis may have been experiencing a dearth in manpower. This in turn lends the kind of urgency necessary to explain why the Straits poleis would countenance the use of foreigners in areas so sensitive to the security of the Straits. Certainly in the case of Lipara the Straits poleis were making a significant concession. As the ancient sources relate, the Liparaians in time built their own fleet (Diod. 5.9.4), and by the early fourth century at the latest were exerting their own pressure upon the traffic of the lower Tyrrhenian through what Livy refers to as *publicum latrocinium* (Livy 5.28.2-4; Diod. 14.93.4).

Thus within the actions of the Straits poleis from the mid sixth to the early fifth centuries a clear pattern of behaviour can be identified. Beginning with the Phokaians around 600, the Straits poleis actively exploited the arrival of Greeks whose numbers were substantial enough to attempt colonization. Thus Zankle and Rhegion enrolled as their allies the Knidians and Rhodians of Lipara (c. 580), the Phokaians of Alalia (c. 560) and the successor state of Hyele on the Italian mainland (c.

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535), and possibly even the Lokrians at Metauros (c. 550). As the climate of the Tyrrhenian grew rougher and more competitive, so too did the efforts of the Straits poleis to enlist further aid intensify. Moreover, as with their Euboian cousins in Campania, the Chalkidians of the Straits also had to participate in a world not entirely of Greek making, and indeed which featured a number of powerful non-Greek players.

CONCLUSION: parameters shaped by trade.

For the first Euboians active in the West the Tyrrhenian Sea became, as in the Platonic simile, a pond about which they could dwell (Phaidon 109B). Trade drew the Euboians West and trade remained the driving force behind the geographical location of their permanent settlements. Thus like the ants and frogs of Platos pond, almost every Euboian apoikia in the West was situated with the view to functioning within a wider maritime network. Moreover, as a consequence, chorai were generally quite small, and proximity to East-West trade routes close.

Kyme was of course one exception to this model, with its inception influenced more by the course of Aegean-based conflict than international trade. However, even Kyme conforms in its own way to the trends prevalent in the wider Euboian colonial community in the West. The circumstances
and policies of Kyme, along with Zankle and later Rhegion, symbolize the transformation of the Euboian apoikiai into autonomous, functional poleis. Moreover, given the largely commercial rationale of the Euboian settlements in the West, each of these nascent poleis were established in environments which provided for the development of unique polis-systems. Pithekoussai and Kyme evolved in a world far removed from the influence of Magna Graecias core, and consequently spawned a polis-system which emphasized and enforced unity, and was required to be fully engaged in the politics and economies of its non-Greek neighbours. Moreover, given the initial position of weakness, both numerical as well as military, the Euboians of Campania found themselves in, their settlements in the area were relatively open to non-Euboian and even non-Greek influence. Indeed, in many ways the Campanian Greek polis-system became an inter-racial, inter-regional system.

Similarly, Zankle and Rhegion, established for the express purpose of pacifying the dangers, both natural and human made, of the Straits of Messina, found themselves in a unique position. Whilst physically belonging to north-eastern Sicily and southern Italy respectively, Zankle and Rhegion constituted a political, economic and strategic region of their own - effectively their own polis-system.
The Euboian *poleis* of Magna Graecia were therefore deeply influenced by the parameters set for them in the eighth century. Moreover, unlike their archaic Dorian and Achaian contemporaries in the West, the Ionian Euboian *poleis* were never a source of vast land-based *archai*. However, they did make a deep impact upon Magna Graecia, far beyond what their actual military and demographic strength would normally be expected to have achieved. In sum they provided Magna Graecia with its northern and southern extremities, and two of its most unique *polis* sub-systems. Indeed, for over two hundred years both operate largely outside the mainstream *polis*-system of Magna Graecia, succumbing to full or partial integration only during the course of the sixth and fifth centuries.
CHAPTER FOUR

‘Mainstream’ Magna Graecia and the Achaian ascendancy.

Having dealt with the northern and southern extremities of Magna Graecia, including their characteristics and regional peculiarities, it is now necessary to turn to the core of the archaic Greek polis-system in southern Italy. Situated within a band stretching south from Taras on the Sallentine peninsula to Lokroi Epizephyrioi in Bruttium, and encompassing the littoral of both the Ionian and lower Tyrrhenian Seas, there existed the largest concentration of Hellenism in the western Mediterranean. In terms of numbers of poleis, total population, wealth and prosperity, and military power this region was the heart of Magna Graecia. Consequently, this region constituted the mainstream component of the Italiote polis-system. Relations between poleis here invariably influenced the Euboian-dominated northern and southern fringes of Magna Graecia, and at times even Etruria and mainland Greece.

Moreover, at the centre of this mainstream were the ethnic Achaian Greeks. Arriving as colonists in the eighth century, the
Achaians founded *poleis* along almost the entire length of the Ionian littoral. Furthermore, by the end of the seventh century their attention turned to the Tyrrhenian shores, where they were to found several new colonies. Indeed within a short period of time this extensive Achaian band of settlement was to become the powerhouse of archaic Magna Graecia. Non-Achaian *poleis* in the region were effectively pushed to the political margins of central Magna Graecia, outnumbered, as they were, in terms of population, armies and resources. As will be seen below, within such a *polis*-system the task of the non-Achaian *poleis* was to survive. Consequently, the archaic *polis*-system of central Magna Graecia was in many ways characterized by the dominance of predatory Achaian *poleis*, and by the formation of non-Achaian blocs and alliances to counter their depredations.

**Section One: Achaian expansion and solidarity in Magna Graecia.**

The two defining features of the mainstream Italiote *polis*-system during the archaic period were the territorial and military expansion of the Achaian *poleis*, and the ability of these *poleis* to interact with each other within a framework of relative solidarity. Reared in such an environment, the Achaian *poleis* were able to manoeuvre themselves into a
position of dominance by the sixth century at the very latest. In particular, it was under the leadership of the polis of Sybaris that Achaian hegemony reached its height in central Magna Graecia. Indeed, as will be seen, the Sybarites constructed an arche of a size never before witnessed in the Greek world, and held under its sway a polyglot population of Greeks and native Italians.

1.1 the establishment and consolidation of a 'magna Achaia'.

As discussed in chapter 1, the arrival of the Achaians in southern Italy heralded the destruction of many of the Iron Age Oinotrian communities then prospering in the region. Moreover, the subsequent advance by the Achaian settlers into these recently conquered territories laid the foundations for a bloc of Achaian states, whose chorai would far outstrip in size those of their metropoleis. Nurtured by the fertile plains and wide spaces of Magna Graecia, the Achaians set about constructing their own 'magna Achaia'.

From the Oinotrian point of view, the advent of the Achaians was an invasion in which many of them suffered mass expulsion and forced relocation. Concerning the Achaian perspective, the motivation for their actions lies largely within
the initial impetus for the Achaian colonization process in general - the desire for arable land. It is certain that agrarian difficulties in the Achaian homeland drove a significant proportion of its people into the West. In all probability, Achaia was not significantly less fertile than southern Italy, but its capacity to provide for all of its inhabitants all of the time clearly came under some pressure in the last quarter of the eighth century.¹

Indeed, of the Achaians who sailed West we have very specific information as to their origins. The merea, or traditional divisions of Achaia, of the Sybarite and Krotoniate oikistai are named (Helike and Rhypes respectively), and two others are supplied through the reproduction of local Achaian river names in the new colonial territories of Magna Graecia (the Sybaris in Boura and the Krathis in Aigai).² Therefore, of the twelve


² Helike (Strabo 6.1.13); Rhypes (Diod. 8.17.1); Boura (Strabo 8.7.5); Aigai (Strabo 8.7.4). The oikistes of the Achaian foundation at Kaulonia was reputedly from Aigion in Achaia (Paus. 6.3.10; [Skymnos] 318f.), but as this was a seventh century apoikia it cannot be assumed to have been part of the same wave as the eighth century foundations. See also H. Brewster, The River Gods of Greece: Myths and Mountain Waters in the Hellenic World (London & New York, 1997), p. 66.
mera identified by Herodotos in Achaia (1.145), only four appear to have been affected by agrarian problems, thus ruling out any suggestion of general agricultural decline in Achaia. The Achaian colonization of southern Italy was thus most probably a migration of the neediest only.

As a result, the Achaian waves which washed against the shores of southern Italy unsurprisingly fell first upon the most fertile coastal plains on the western side of the Gulf of Taranto. Indeed, the rapid and almost voracious progress of the Achaians of Sybaris in particular again supports the agrarian motives of the colonists. As outlined in chapter 1, the vast majority of Oinotrian settlements situated on and around the arable coastal plain of Sybaris were destroyed or occupied within the first generation of Achaian colonization. Much the same can be said of the progress of the Achaian colonists who settled at Metapontion in the following century.

Moreover, further supporting the agrarian imperatives of the Achaian colonists is the fact that their settlement patterns

4 Morel, “Greek Colonization in Italy and the West”, p. 125; Guzzo, “Lucanians, Brettians and Italiote Greeks in the Fourth and Third Centuries B.C.”, p. 197.
indicate a distribution of population based heavily on the availability of arable land in southern Italy. Thus the first Achaian migrants to arrive in Italy claimed the most fertile territories, and subsequent Achaian migrants claimed the best of the remainder. As a result, those non-Achaian Greeks who ventured west after the main Achaian migration phase more often than not had to be satisfied with relatively inferior chorai. Therefore, unlike the Euboians, the Achaian colonists were clearly not motivated by the need to occupy strategic promontories, straits and other such sites which might extend control over trade routes. Rather, it was fertile land which was the prize in Achaian eyes.

The main phase of Achaian migration to southern Italy can be said to have lasted approximately from c. 720 to c. 709, and resulted in the foundation of the seniormost ethnic Achaian poleis, Sybaris and Kroton. These were in fact the first Greek foundations to occur within the region of Magna Graecia demarcated as the Italiote 'mainstream' by this chapter. Of the poleis not founded as a result of Sybarite or Krotoniate influence, Taras and Lokroi Epizephyrioi are the oldest and these were not established until c. 706 and c. 679/673

respectively. Moreover, there exists some confusion over the primacy of the Sybarite foundation due to a pro-Krotoniate tradition which elevates the colonial status of Kroton (Diod. 8.17.2; Strabo 6.2.4). However, as there is no archaeological basis for this claim, it is possible that this latter tradition merely reflects the views of Krotoniate propagandists writing in the period of Sybarite-Krotoniate conflict. At any rate, as will be demonstrated below, the chronological primacy of Sybaris and Kroton is also closely related to the primacy they would achieve in the political and economic spheres of archaic Magna Graecia.

The Achaian colonization of the Sybaritid plain in particular reaped substantial benefits for the polis of Sybaris. The prosperity of Sybaris was legendary in the ancient world and was generally understood to have been derived from the fertility of its chora, especially in terms of grain production (Diod. 11.90.3, 12.9.1-2, 12.11.2; Ath. 12.519e-f; Varro, On Agriculture 1.44.1). An undated reference is also made by Athenaios concerning the existence and flourishing of a viticulture industry in the Sybarite countryside (12.519d). The chora of Metapontion, established under the auspices of Sybaris, and thus within the Sybarite sphere of influence, was

7 See note 5.
also lauded as fertile grain land (Strabo 6.1.15; B. Epinikoi 11.70; Livy 24.20.15), and a generous nurturer of domesticated animals (B. Epinikoi 11.30, 114). As to how fertile this territory was in terms of the generation of wealth, Carter has provided an estimation of over 700 talents per annum, based on the average productivity of individual Metapontine farms in existence from the sixth to fourth century. This sum was more than equal to the total yearly tribute of the Athenian empire in 431, as reported by Thoukydides (2.13.3), and is reflected in the reported wealth of the Metapontine treasury at Olympia (Paus. 6.19.11; Polemon ap. Ath. 11.479f). The total revenues of the substantially larger Sybarite chora should therefore be estimated to have been somewhat in excess of this already considerable figure.

The chora of Kroton was not as rich as that possessed by the Sybarites, as reflected in the lesser weight of the silver contained within its archaic coinage. However, unlike Metapontion, Kroton existed as a fully autonomous state. Indeed, a tradition of proud independence from its powerful

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10 This is also true of the second of the two southernmost Achaian poleis, Kaulonia. See De Juliis, Magna Grecia, p. 155.
northern neighbour permeates the Delphic oracle associated with the foundation of the Krotoniate polis (Antiochos, *FGrh* 555 F10; Diod. 8.17.2). Moreover, the circumstances surrounding the said oracle clearly indicate that the territory of Sybaris was considered a greater prize, but the more gradual pace of the Krotoniate expansion in the archaic period does not condemn Kroton to second rate power status. Rather, it is perhaps more accurate to depict the agricultural assets which Kroton did undoubtably possess to some degree, as having been dwarfed by a literary tradition fascinated with the vast bread basket economy of neighbouring Sybaris.

It is therefore highly likely that Kroton did in fact obtain an agriculturally-based ‘head start’ in its development as a powerful archaic polis. Moreover, as will be further discussed below, Kroton’s ability to establish and fuel a mint in the last third of the sixth century, before even the commerically-orientatated Chalkidian poleis on the Straits of Messina, reinforces the hypothesis of relatively privileged beginnings. Furthermore, the minting of money should be seen as indicative of a comparatively sophisticated economy and demonstrates an ability to assert an identity independent of its metropolis - surely possible only when the apoikia in question had the physical means to do so.¹¹ This head start

was most probably drawn, like that of the Sybarites, from the advantage of chronological seniority in the rollcall of Greek *apoikiai* in central Magna Graecia.

Indeed, a key symbol of the agriculturally-derived strength of the archaic Achaian *poleis* was the development of their respective mints. The first known coinage issues to occur in either Magna Graecian or Sicilian Greek *poleis* were in fact from Achaian mints, further attesting to the early advances and advantages of the Achaian economies, as discussed above. Around 540 the two Achaian *poleis* most lauded for their agrarian wealth, Sybaris and Metapontion, began to issue silver coins. In contrast, the earliest Sikeliot issues, from the Chalkidian *polis* of Naxos, do not predate c. 530.\(^1\)\(^2\) Confirming again the source of this wealth, both the Sybarite and Metapontine issues were dominated by types symbolizing the fruits of their respective *chorai*. Sybaris was represented by a bull, Metapontion by an ear of barley.\(^1\)\(^3\)

By the last quarter of the sixth century four ethnic Achaian *poleis* (Sybaris, Metapontion, Kroton and Kaulonia) were displaying their relative prosperity by issuing silver coins.

\(^{12}\) *TWGa*, p. 355; *ACGC*, pp. 163, 206-7; Bicknell, "An Early Incuse Stater of Kroton", p. 4.

\(^{13}\) *ACGC*, p. 165.
Kroton had joined the list by c. 530, and its smaller and probably subordinate neighbour, Kaulonia, by c. 525.\textsuperscript{14} Moreover, the development of these mints provides evidence for the existence of a considerable degree of solidarity amongst the Achaian poleis. The coins from all four mints were issued on a common weight standard unique to Magna Graecia, and all employed the similarly localized incuse technique to produce the coin types.\textsuperscript{15} This numismatic unity strongly suggests that if these states could achieve a common policy on economic matters, then we are examining a period in which some degree of political cooperation was not only possible but even probable.\textsuperscript{16}

However, the coinage which followed the period of inter-Achaean strife in the last decades of the sixth century demonstrates that there were different types and degrees of unity amongst the Achaian poleis. Prior to 510, amongst the four original Achaian poleis there is no evidence that any one state held sway over the coin types which another state might issue, and no state appears to have demonstrated its potency by imposing its own, supplementary symbols upon the coins of

\textsuperscript{14} Kroton: Attianese, Kroton: Ex Nummis Historia, p. 17; ACGC, p. 167; Kaulonia: ACGC, p. 168; Arena, IGASMG IV, p. 75.

\textsuperscript{15} ACGC, pp. 162-4.

\textsuperscript{16} TWGa, pp. 356-7; Holloway, Art and Coinage in Magna Graecia, p. 25; De Juliis, Magna Grecia, p. 155.
another. However, at the end of the Sybaris-Kroton war in 510, the Sybarite series of coins, dating from as early as c. 540, were brought to a sudden halt by the victorious Krotoniates and the ϕPO legend began to appear on the coins of a number of now clearly subordinated poleis - including Sybaris itself.

Evidently, a kind of enforced unity arose after 510, complete with the stamp of an assertive hegemon. Although the manifestations of unity within coinage prior to 510 were far more subtle and not necessarily indicative of the presence of a formal hegemon or league, the existence of a pan-Achaian system, informal or otherwise is, as discussed earlier, probable. Complementing the suggestion of some form of Achaian unity from coinage is Pompeius Trogus' account of the fall of Siris, extant in an epitome by Justin. In the years before the destruction of Sybaris three Achaian states, Kroton, Metapontion and Sybaris itself, joined forces to extinguish the independence of Siris - an Ionian polis wedged in between Sybaris and Metapontion (Justin 20.2). Dominated as it was by

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17 The situation is of course different for the various sub-poleis that Sybaris and Kroton founded from the late seventh century onwards. For discussion of the numerous numismatic symbols of direct subordination, see section 2.

18 Mints also included within this new numismatic and political regime were former dependants of Sybaris such as Pandosia, Temesa and Laos. See Attianese, Kroton: Ex Nummis Historia, pp. 49-61.
Kroton, the fourth Achaian *polis* in Magna Graecia, Kaulonia, can also be expected to have been involved in some way too.

In isolation this invasion might be construed as an *ad hoc* alliance, but, taken in conjunction with the similarities in the coinage of the Achaian states concerned, the argument for ethnically-based solidarity grows convincing. Arrayed as they were, these *poleis* presented an irresistible ethnic Achaian bloc against which the sole Ionian *polis* on the Gulf of Taranto found itself isolated and ultimately victimized. Moreover, the pan-Achaian accent to Sybarite and Krotoniate policies is reinforced by the predilection of these two *poleis* to 'import' more Achaians from mainland Greece in order to populate vacant territory within their immediate neighbourhoods, as was the case with Metapontion and Kaulonia. However, an indication that this alliance may not necessarily have been an example of a formalized structure in action is provided by later developments. Around 550 the Krotoniates went to war against its non-Achaian southern neighbour, Lokroi, with no mention of Sybarite or Metapontine aid recorded by the ancient sources (Diod. 8.32; Justin 20.2.3-3.9; Paus. 3.19.12). Thus unless relations between the Achaians had for some reason cooled between the two conflicts, it would appear that while ethnicity may have helped to define who a given *polis*

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19 Ampolo, "La città dell'eccesso.", p. 240; RCA, p. 223.

20 For the date, see RCA, p. 251.
went to war against and who it aided, opportunism probably had as much to do with the actual timing of such actions.

At any rate, ethnic polarization of the kind that characterized the Sirite war was not uncommon in the West during the sixth and fifth centuries. The Dorian states of Greek Sicily regularly preyed upon the militarily weaker Ionian poleis in the north and east of the island. However, in the case of Magna Graecia it was the Achaians who were able to unite in at least one bid to dominate their neighbours, and this was cemented in, or perhaps even grew out of, the numismatic regime which all the Achaian states shared in common. Thus a key tenet of 'magna Achaia' was the ability of the Achaian colonists, at least down to 510, to coordinate their resources in order to achieve their expansionist and security aims.

A third feature of the construction of 'magna Achaia' was a shift in the Achaian's role as settled former colonists to the role of active colonizers themselves. Through the establishment of sub-colonies and other dependencies, the Achaian poleis were able to tighten their grip on the heartland of Magna Graecia. This process can be divided into two separate phases and falls

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21 For the imperialism of Pantarid Gela, especially under Hippokrates (498-491), see Hdt. 7.154; for Deinomenid Syracuse (485-466), see Hdt. 7.156; for Dionysian Syracuse (405-367), see Diod. 14.14.1.
into hinterland and coastal categories. The hinterland category contains a number of small settlements which were the remnants of native Oinotrian towns, either partially destroyed or totally refounded by Achaians colonists. These were essentially dependent upon the various Achaian poleis, and their populations were more than likely a mixture of Greeks and Oinotrians.

Moreover, most of these settlements were situated within fifty kilometres of the various Achaian aste, and it was often the case that they had been attacked and subordinated during the early development of the Achaian colonies. Relative proximity to aste thus appears to have played a large part in their downfall, and the extinguishment of the independence of these native sites is an excellent indicator both to the military power of the Achaian settlers and the direction in which the Achaians sought to expand. Unsurprisingly, many of these former Oinotrian settlements, such as S. Nicola d’Amendolara (identified by de la Genière as ancient Lagaria), and Francavilla Marittima/Timpone della Motta (identified by Bicknell as ancient Aminaia), occupied the most accessible arable land on the Italian littoral of the Ionian Sea - precisely the kind of territory the land-hungry Achaians were seeking. As will

22 See chapter 1.

23 See de la Genière, “L’identification de Lagaria et ses problèmes”, Épíos et Philoctète en Italie, de la Geniere (ed), pp. 57-65; Bicknell,
be discussed further in section 2.2, the most powerful Achaian state in Italy, Sybaris, possessed a large number of such dependencies.

The second phase began at the end of the seventh century, and followed the lead of the Chalkidians of the Straits who had established a sub-colony of their own at Metauros around 650, situated on the Tyrrhenian shore of the Italian peninsula. Around 600 the Sybarites initiated Achaian migration to the western side of the peninsula, with the foundation of Poseidonia some 100 kilometres north-west of Sybaris itself.24 Between them, Sybaris and Kroton went on to found around half a dozen such sub-colonies. Furthermore, Poseidonia and its successors were the first manifestations of a trans-peninsula policy being conducted by the original Greek settlers on the Ionian Sea littoral of southern Italy. Apoikiai such as Poseidonia in effect gave to these original colonists the ability to look west as well as east, towards Mainland Greece. As the Achaians were the first to achieve this, they were also the first to exploit the opportunities afforded by the establishment of these western-facing ‘windows’, further strengthening their position in relation to the non-Achaian poleis of the region.


24 TWGb, p. 183; J.G. Pedley, Paestum: Greeks and Romans in Southern Italy (London, 1990), p. 11.
Whilst Metauros was effectively merely an outpost of the Straits poleis, which was abandoned within a century, the Achaian sub-colonies were firmly anchored to the territorial aims and ambitions of their metropoleis. As briefly discussed in chapter 3, by the end of the sixth century, and in all probability much earlier, the Sybarites had established commercial routes terrestres linking their Ionian and Tyrrhenian possessions, thus utilizing the peninsula's new western windows. Sybaris certainly appears to have been the main beneficiary of this policy and its commercial rewards (Hdt. 6.21), but the Krotoniate foundation at Terina, also on the Tyrrhenian Sea, should put paid to any suggestion of a strict -Sybarite monopoly over trans-isthmian trade.25 Metapontion too, with its convenient overland access to Poseidonia, demonstrates that more than one Achaian polis enjoyed the rewards of such commerce.26

Although spread unevenly, the not inconsiderable profits from trans-isthmian commerce must have flowed into the coffers of the Achaian states during the archaic period, and probably helped to fund the establishment of their respective mints.\textsuperscript{27} As the Achaians occupied the bulk of the most convenient and central terrestrial trade routes to the Tyrrhenian, non-Achaian \textit{poleis} such as Taras and Lokroi were marginalized from what was probably a significant source of wealth and power, from a very early period. Indeed, due to the combination of Achaian dominance of Magna Graecia's most accessible arable land; cooperation between the Achaian states in numismatic and political matters; and the Achaians' network of sub-colonies and dependencies throughout much of Magna Graecia's littoral and hinterland, the non-Achaian \textit{poleis} very probably found themselves marginalized in most respects.

While the Achaians certainly did not have everything their own way during the archaic period, as the prominence of Ionian Siris and later dissension in their own ranks attest, the above advantages helped to construct a climate in which Achaian interests frequently triumphed when they came into conflict with those of non-Achaians. Siris was after all

\textit{Comprehensive study of the grave goods from the 5th to the 3rd centuries B.C.) (Jonsered, 1995), pp. 9-11.}
\textsuperscript{27} Bicknell, "An Early Incuse Stater of Kroton", p. 4.
overcome by an Achaian coalition, and, as will be discussed at length later, even the wasteful carnage of the fratricidal Sybaris-Kroton war could not prevent the rise of a new, Krotoniate-based, Achaian hegemony over much of Magna Graecia. It is therefore evident that during the mid to late archaic period the Achaians of Magna Graecia successfully transformed large tracts of southern Italy into a 'magna Achaia'.

Section Two: The empire of Sybaris.

While it is possible that there may have been no formal structure to the construct that was 'magna Achaia', this does not mean that it was without a hierarchy. As stated in the previous section, of all the Achaian poleis, it was Sybaris which attracted the attention of ancient commentators. Indeed, it is apparent that literary topoi were developed and propagated on all matters Sybarite. In the accounts of nearly every interested commentator, moralist and historian, Sybaris was the richest of the Italiote poleis (Diod. 12.9.1; Ath. 12.519e), the most decadent and luxurious in lifestyle (Ath. 12.518d-f, 519c), the largest in population (Strabo 6.1.13; Diod. 12.9.2), and, above all, a slave to excess (Tim. FHG 1.205; Ath. 12.518c, 519d-e, 520c-d). Predictably, its eventual downfall was used as a didactic tool to illustrate the inevitable
consequences of living such a flawed and hubris-ridden existence (Diod. 10.23). However, as will be demonstrated in this section, in terms of population, wealth, military power, territory and influence, Sybaris did in fact stand out amongst its Achaian ‘peers’. Indeed, it will be argued that, from the early sixth century at the latest, it is appropriate to speak of a Sybarite *arche*, as evidence of either Sybarite control or influence at such far-flung sites as Lagaria, Aminaia, Pandosia, Temesa, Laos and Metapontion attests.\(^{28}\) Moreover, it will also be argued that the nature and administration of this *arche* was as complex as it was unique in the archaic Greek world.

### 2.1 Population and Empire

Within the general context of Achaian prosperity in the archaic period, mention has already been made of the agricultural bounty of the Sybaritid plain. Moreover, it has also been noted

\(^{28}\) These sites will be discussed in detail below. For other sites not discussed in great detail in the main text see: Guzzo, “Sibari e la sibaritide: materiali per un bilancio della conoscenza archeologica”, *RA* Fasc. 1 (1992), p. 18 (for Cozzo Michelicchio, S. Mauro, S. Marco-Roggiano, S. Sosti); De Polignac, *Cults, Territory, and the Origin of the Greek City-State*, p. 108 (for Torre del Mordillo, Torano); de la Genière, "Contributions to a typology of ancient settlements in Southern Italy (IXth to IVth B.C.), pp. 177-8 (for Torre del Michelicchio).
that there existed a tradition which alleged that the superiority of the Sybarite *chora* dated back as far as the first Achaian landfall, in the eighth century. This tradition, as recorded by Diodoros (8.17.2), clearly relegates the agricultural quality of the Krotoniate *chora* to a distant second, behind that of Sybaris. While evidence has already been cited to indicate that Kroton was in fact a heavyweight within Achaian circles, the theme of Sybaris possessing a clear agricultural and economic lead over its fellow Achaian states is pervasive. Although the figures proposed by the ancient sources may have suffered from exaggeration, an important role for Sybarite grain in the building up, feeding and maintenance of a huge Sybarite population is implied (Diod. 12.9.1; Ath. 12.519c-f).\(^\text{29}\) Indeed, Strabo asserts that the inhabitants of the *astu* of Sybaris, situated on the Krathis River, filled up a circuit of some fifty *stadia* (6.1.13).\(^\text{30}\) Similarly, the sheer size of the Sybarite cavalry division present at the Battle of the Traeis River in 510 is indicative of extensive pasture land within the *chora* of Sybaris (Ath. 12.519c). Thus, although the agricultural assets of the other Achaian states should not be downplayed, it is


\(^{30}\) Indeed, excavations conducted at the site of the Sybarite *astu* demonstrate that at least two settled zones existed, some 1,600 metres apart. However, some confusion remains as to the dating of these sites. See F. Rainey, "The Location of Archaic Sybaris", *AJA* 73 (1969), pp. 262-7; Guzzo, "Sibari e la sibaritide", pp. 10-11
evident that Sybaris possessed a decisive edge over its neighbours in terms of net primary produce.

The implications of Sybarite ownership and exploitation of Magna Graecia’s prime agricultural real estate were wide-ranging, and in part have already been raised. Most importantly, the Sybaritid plain provided for the emergence and consolidation of a large population under the control of Sybaris, which could be used to dominate its neighbours and fuel the progress of empire. Pseudo-Skymnos placed the total population at some 100,000 (340f.), whilst other sources claim that the Sybarite army alone numbered 300,000 (Strabo 6.1.13; Diod. 12.9.5; Iamblichos, VP 260). While this grossly inflated latter figure cannot be accepted as an accurate estimation for the Sybarite armed forces, it is possible that it may be more readily applied to the population of the polis of Sybaris. Indeed Diodoros has clearly confused the two, when earlier he uses this figure to describe the total population of Sybaris rather than the army (12.9.2). However, particularly as none of these sources indicate whether it is the numbers of citizens or total population being referred to, these raw figures should be treated with caution. What can be deduced from such figures is the fact that Sybaris was regarded as a large polis in terms of population, at least within its own region of Magna Graecia.
A reference to the Greek polis of Akragas in western Sicily serves as a useful comparative tool in determining the accuracy or otherwise of the above sources’ demographic assertions. Diodoros notes that Akragas, up until its sack by Carthaginian forces in 406, held a population of 20,000 citizens and a total population of 200,000, including its kατοικοι ξένοι (13.84.3). Again it is prudent to be cautious when supplied with raw figures, but the context provided by Diodoros suggests that a relatively tolerant view should be taken. Diodoros states that Akragas was the premier polis of Sicily, if not the Greek world, at that time in terms of wealth and prosperity (13.84.5-6, 90.3) - a statement supported by extensive archaeological evidence for grandiose public works programs and the general fertility of its chorα.31 It should, therefore, not be out of the question that Sybaris, as the subject of an even more powerful tradition of prosperity, may have possessed a total population equal to or exceeding that of Akragas.32

Moreover, the rationale that Diodoros applies when accounting for the size and prosperity of Akragas is also revealing and potentially helpful for securing a credible estimation for the population of Sybaris. Having avoided the trauma and

32 TWGa, p. 77.
dislocation of a sack in the years since its foundation around 580 (Thouk. 6.4.4), Akragas was, on the eve of the Carthaginian invasion in 406, a pristine storehouse of nearly two centuries of demographic and economic growth (Diod. 13.90.3). Like Akragas, Sybaris too had experienced a long and uninterrupted period of growth, from c. 720 until its destruction at the hands of Kroton in 510 - a period even longer than that experienced by Akragas. That imperial Sybaris can be expected to have built up a population in the range of 100,000-300,000 should therefore not be at all surprising. Indeed, numerous poleis of western Hellas could in fact boast of chorai and resources far superior to those possessed by their metropoleis, including Sybaris, Akragas, Syracuse, Selinous and Kroton.33

A second key factor in explaining the ancient sources' predilection for generous estimations of the population of Sybaris is contained within the Sybarites' attitude towards citizenship. In the aforementioned case of Akragas the distinction between citizen and non-citizen is clear. According to Diodoros, only ten percent of the population of Akragas in 406 were Akragantine citizens (13.84.3). Indeed, as stated by Aristotle, non-citizens, be they metaikoi or slaves, could be expected to make up a significant proportion of the population.

of any given *polis* (*Politics* 1326a17-20). Moreover, in 431 nearly twenty percent of the Athenian hoplite army was comprised of *metoikoi* (*Thouk. 2.31.2-3). However, such percentages, tentative as they are, do not appear to be strictly relevant when approaching the makeup and status of the inhabitants of Sybaris.

When dealing with the population of Sybaris at large, Diodoros states that the Sybarites were liberal in the granting of citizenship to outsiders (12.9.2). Indeed, Diodoros argues that it was this, as well as the possession of a fertile *chora*, that led to the growth of a massive population at Sybaris - which, furthermore, he regarded as one of the largest in Italy during the archaic period. Effectively, Diodoros proposes that the Sybarite population underwent augmentation at the hands of the state's rulers who accommodated various non-Sybarite peoples with Sybarite citizenship. We have already seen how the possession of rich *chorai* helped to facilitate rapid and consistent demographic growth in various western Greek *poleis*. However, if Diodoros' assertions can be proved to have been a relatively accurate reconstruction of Sybarite attitudes to citizenship, then there should be no reason to believe that Sybaris did not in fact possess an overwhelming demographic advantage over its neighbours.
There is little doubt that Sybaris was, like many Greek states at the time and thereafter, a slave-owning society. Numerous references to slaves punctuate the ancient sources’ accounts of Sybarite lifestyle, not, as one might expect, to highlight decadence, but merely present as inconsequential and anonymous bystanders (Diod. 8.19.1; Ath. 518d, 520b). Indeed, it is possible that these slaves may have even constituted a large part of the total population. However, a passage in Strabo describes Sybaris as having dominion over four tribes and twenty-five poleis (6.1.13), suggesting that the population of Sybaris did not necessarily conform to the Akragantine and Athenian models cited earlier. Moreover, while these figures too may well have experienced inflation over the centuries that separated Strabo from the days when Sybarites actually lived and breathed, other sources indicate that Strabo’s numbers may in fact possess some reliability.

Brief mention has already been made of three Sybarite apoikiai founded on the Tyrrhenian shore of Magna Graecia: Laos, Skidros and Poseidonia. However, Hekataios of Miletos, an historian active in the late sixth and early fifth centuries, records the existence of nine Oinotrian poleis (FGrH 1 F64-71), while Stephanos of Byzantion lists another seven, as well as confirming those of Hekataios. Indeed, a significant proportion of these poleis have been identified by modern
scholars with several towns and villages scattered throughout present-day Calabria and Basilicata.\textsuperscript{34} Furthermore, given the well documented strong links between the Sybarites and Milesians (Hdt. 6.21; Tim. *FHG* 1.205), it is probable that Hekataios’ comments and descriptions bore some resemblance to the actual geography of Oinotria and the Sybarite *chora*.\textsuperscript{35} Unlike the aforementioned Sybarite-founded *poleis* on the Tyrrhenian Sea, these are clearly referred to as native Italian (Oinotrian) entities and may correspond not only to some sixteen out of Strabo’s twenty-five subject *poleis*,\textsuperscript{36} but also to those foreigners to whom Sybaris was wont to grant citizenship (Diod. 12.9.2).

Thus even when a potentially substantial number of slaves are left out of the sum total of population under Sybarite control, it is evident that Sybaris still probably outnumbered its neighbours to an extraordinary degree. In turn, while the army of 300,000 mentioned by Strabo may not be numerically accurate, the concept that the Sybarite army outnumbered the armed forces of its neighbours, and in particular its main rival Kroton, should be embraced. Indeed, at the Battle of the Traeis, Diodoros explicitly states that the Krotoniate army was vastly

\textsuperscript{34} For a synopsis, see *TWGa*, pp. 156-7; Bicknell, “Aminaia”, p. 137.

\textsuperscript{35} *TWGa*, p. 155; Callaway, *Sybaris*, p. 46.

\textsuperscript{36} *TWGa*, p. 155; Callaway, *Sybaris*, pp. 45-6.
outnumbered by the Sybarites (12.9.5). Once again the figures provided are absurdly inflated, with 100,000 men on the Krotoniate side, against the usual 300,000 for the Sybarites. Moreover, Strabo, an equally stalwart supporter of the 300,000 figure for the Sybarite army at the Battle of the Traeis (6.1.13), also relegates the Krotoniate army to a distant second on a more general level. At the Battle of the Sagra River Strabo asserts that the Krotoniates can only muster a ‘mere’ 130,000 troops (6.1.10). As Strabo has ‘knowledge’ of the figures for both Sagra and Traeis, it can therefore be inferred that he was quite conscious of the demographic and military divide between the two states.

Furthermore, both Traeis and Sagra represent conflicts in which the sources wished to portray victories against the odds, and accordingly feature a (relatively) small, disciplined force and an army whose size is surpassed only by its hubris, incompetence, or barbarity, or all three. This kind of battle was not uncommon in the often moralistic universe of the Greek historian, but rarely was a figure as large as 300,000 used in relation to Greek forces, be they hubristic or not.37

37 The figure of 300,000 was a popular one in relation to barbaroi such as the Carthaginians, who were reported in such numbers at the Battle of Himera in 480 (Hdt. 7.165), and again at the siege of Akragas in 406 (Diod. 13.80.5). Other examples of inflation of non-Greek forces include the 2.6 million-strong army of Xerxes, also in 480 (Hdt. 7.184-5), and the
The alleged size of the Sybarite army should therefore be seen as recognition by the ancient sources of not only that the Sybarites were 'meant' to lose, but also that Sybaris in all probability possessed an army larger than any conventional Greek force in Magna Graecia at that time, if not Hellas in general.

At any rate, as argued earlier, regardless of what the ancient sources actually believed, a 300,000 strong army should be viewed as a concept or symbol of numerical dominance rather than a reality. However, in trying to achieve a grasp of the extent to which Sybarite manpower dominated the region, it may be more appropriate and rewarding to relativize the figures which the ancient sources have provided. Therefore, I suggest that the 300,000:100,000 advantage the Sybarites are said to have possessed may in fact be a vague recollection or tradition of a 3:1 disposition of forces at the Traeis. Moreover, if the aforementioned ratio was in fact the case, or close to it, then the numerous peripheral references in the ancient sources to vast Sybarite armies, Sybarite apoikiai, subject tribes and poleis can only serve to consolidate the view that during the archaic period, Sybaris was for all intents and purposes an empire.

150,000-strong invasion force used by Sitalkes of Thrake against Makedonia in 430 (Thouk. 2.98.4).
2.2. the Sybarite system of empire.

The twin issues of population and empire raise crucial questions in regard to the administrative mechanics of a state that was both polis and arche. In particular, given that it would appear that the Sybarite population was not necessarily a homogenous one, the administration of the Sybarite state can only have accrued a considerable degree of complexity. Moreover, it will be argued that Sybaris developed its own homegrown response to the difficulties raised by the acquisition of extra territories and population.

In addition to the comments of Diodoros and Hekataios, there exist a number of other sources which document close relations between the Sybarites and their various satellites, be they Achaian, non-Achaian, or non-Greek in make-up. In particular, it is through coinage that the extent of Sybarite influence and impact in the territories to its north, south and west can be gauged.\(^{38}\) The bull, the erstwhile symbol of the Sybarite state, appears regularly on the coins of towns throughout the old Oinotrian heartland. Coins which have been associated with Oinotrian sites at Palinouros-Molpe (ΠΛΛΑ/ΜΟΛΑ) and Aminaia (ΑΜΙ) fall into this category, indicating the existence of close, if not dependent, relations with Sybaris.\(^{39}\) Pandosia, situated in

\(^{38}\) ACGC, pp. 165-6.

\(^{39}\) Ibid., p. 167; Bicknell, “Aminaia”, pp. 134-5; M. Gualtieri,
the upper reaches of the Krathis valley, also features the Sybarite bull on the reverse of its staters dating from the end of the sixth century. Due to the simultaneous presence of the characteristic Krotoniate tripod type and legend, the earliest known issues from the Pandosian mint must post-date the Sybarite empire. However, the presence of the bull suggests the source of Pandosia’s earliest cultural, if not political allegiances probably belonged to Sybaris rather than Kroton.

Certainly such influence was to fade during the ensuing years of Krotoniate hegemony, but the bull type on sixth century Pandosian coins makes Sybaris a strong candidate for the role of Pandosia’s first mentor, and perhaps master. That Kroton would allow the retention of such a symbol, even for a short period only, should not be seen as unusual. A coin dated to between 510 and c. 500 clearly demonstrates that Kroton allowed the remaining, and no doubt subject, population of Sybaris itself to mint coins which depicted the old Sybarite bull on the reverse, with the obligatory Krotoniate tripod and


40 ACAC, p. 166.
41 For Krotoniate influence at the Pandosian mint during the fifth century see Holloway, Art and Coinage in Magna Graecia, p. 61.
legend on the obverse. Similarly, other former dependencies of Sybaris, such as Laos, were able to retain the bull type despite solid evidence for a Krotoniate presence, if not hegemony (i.e. the tripod type and ΨΟ legend).

Furthermore, that Pandosia and other towns displaying the Sybarite bull type on their coins may have in fact included non-Achaians, or even non-Greeks (Oinotrians, Chonians and other native Italians), is suggested by a raft of evidence ranging from the literary to the archaeological. Strabo records that Pandosia itself was an ancient Oinotrian centre (6.1.5), and thus predated the Achaian Sybarite colonization of the lower Krathis valley. Moreover, the Sybarite-period archaeological strata at Francavilla Marittima/Timpone della Motta (Aminaia), Torre del Michelicchio, S. Nicola d’Amendolora (Lagaria) and Torre del Mordillo exist over the top of Oinotrian towns. However, evidence of Sybarite acquisition or even violent conquest, as in the case of Torre del Mordillo, does not presuppose that these settlements became purely Achaian outposts of the Sybarite chora. Stylistically non-Greek votives discovered at the temple of Athena at Francavilla Marittima indicate that native Italians visited the site, possibly in the

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44 De la Genière, “The Iron Age in Southern Italy”, pp. 77-8, 86-7.
capacity as residents.\textsuperscript{45} The idea that former residents and new native ‘immigrants’, attracted by the wealth the \textit{chora} of Sybaris was producing, settled in the newly acquired or founded Sybarite satellite towns is not a new one and is difficult to refute.\textsuperscript{46} Indeed, taken in conjunction with the statement of Diodoros that Sybaris regularly enfranchised foreigners (12.9.2), the likelihood of such a scenario is considerable.

Moreover, Sybaris was certainly not the last West Greek \textit{polis} to enfranchise \textit{barbaroi}. Gelon, in his capacity as tyrant of Syracuse enfranchised numerous batches of non-Greek mercenaries, as did Dionysios I (Diod. 11.72.3; 14.7.4, 15.3, 78.1-3).\textsuperscript{47} As stated previously, the figures quoted by the ancient sources for the size of the Sybarite army cannot be accepted as they stand. However, the possibility that Sybaris enrolled substantial Italian mercenary contingents may well account for why the sources were of the opinion that the army, whatever its alleged numerical specifications, was of a great size. Furthermore, although Hippokrates the tyrant of Gela is not known to have extended Akragantine citizenship to his

\textsuperscript{45} De la Genière, “Contributions to a typology of ancient settlements in Southern Italy”, p. 179.


\textsuperscript{47} Rutter, “Sybaris - Legend and Reality”, p. 171.
foreign troops, his use of Sikel mercenaries does indicate that West Greek military exploitation of the local population dates back to at least the early fifth century (Polyainos 5.6). Thus it is possible that Sybaris managed to build the armies capable of carving out and maintaining its large land empire through the recruitment of neighbouring, or even conquered, native Italian peoples. Such recruits could have been further co-opted into the Sybarite arche by the granting of citizenship. Diodoros' somewhat holistic statement concerning citizenship grants can perhaps be qualified with the understanding that the bulk of this generous enfranchisement of non-Greeks went, in the style of Gelon and Dionysios, to mercenaries rather than to all-comers. The Sybarite population, so often lauded by the ancient sources as huge, can therefore still be seen to have expanded at a rate superior to its neighbours, but with particular emphasis on the numerical superiority of its armed forces.

A number of these satellite towns were of course Greek or predominantly Greek. Of the two towns situated on the Tyrrhenian coastline mentioned by Herodotos, Skidros and Laos (6.21), coinage for the latter has been discovered. Again we are dealing with coinage post-dating the fall of Sybaris, but with confirmation from a literary source that the bull type on the coins does in fact indicate an earlier close linkage with
Sybaris. While it is debatable whether Laos was a purely Greek installation prior to 510, it is without a doubt that after this date the population would have been predominantly Greek, and Achaian at that. As recorded by Herodotos, the Sybarites poured into their Tyrrhenian satellites on the Tyrrhenian Sea after the destruction of the metropolis at the hands of Kroton (6.21).

However, not all Greek towns in the Sybarite chora were necessarily Achaian. A second town which demonstrates the presence of Greeks outside the astu of Sybaris is that of Francavilla Marittima/Timpone della Motta, identified by Bicknell as the ancient site of Aminaia. An inscription discovered at the site relating to an Olympic victor, Kleombrotos, and dated to c. 550 is linguistically related to Thessaly (IGASMG IV no. 2). Bicknell goes on to argue convincingly that Aminaia is to be identified as the home of the Aminaioi mentioned by Philargyrios (Aristotle in Philargyrios on Vergil, Georg. 2.97), a colony allegedly founded by Thessalians in the seventh century. That Aminaia was under Sybarite control is indicated not only by the bull type on its coinage and its physical proximity to Sybaris (c. 20km), but also by a clear difference in occupation layers left in the wake

48 ACGC, p. 166.
of Sybarite expansion in the late eighth century.\(^51\)

Moreover, S. Agata dell'Esaro, situated inland from Laos, having been identified as ancient Artemision, one of Hekataios' Oinotrian poleis (\(FGrH\) 1 F65), may also fall into the non-Achaian Greek category.\(^52\) As stated by Philistos, the correct form of Artemision is Artemition (\(FGrH\) 556 F63), strongly suggesting a Dorian contribution to the town's history. Epigraphical evidence certainly indicates that at least some of the inhabitants of Artemition were literate in the Achaian script (\(IG\) 14.643),\(^53\) although the mother tongue of a scribe did not necessarily always relate to that of the individual making the dedication. It is therefore possible that Greeks of Doric extraction also featured in the population of the \(chora\) of Sybaris.

At any rate, it would appear that a number of the towns within the Sybarite \(chora\) possessed populations of mixed origins, including non-Achaians and non-Greeks. Indeed, it should be stressed that the core population of Sybaris itself was by no means a homogenous one. It has already been noted that at

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\(^{51}\) \(ACGC\), p. 167; de la Genière, "Contributions to a typology of ancient settlements in Southern Italy", p. 177.

\(^{52}\) \(TWGa\), p. 156; Bicknell, "Aminaia", p. 137.

least three different Achaian _mera_ contributed to the original foundation of Sybaris around 720. Moreover, there also exists a tradition which states that Dorian Troizenians were involved in the foundation of Sybaris (Arist., _Pol._ 1303a28-33; Solinus 2.10; Steph. Byz. s.v. _Τροιζήν _), giving further support to the earlier premiss that Dorians may have been present at Artemition. Less substantial references seek to establish the presence of a Lokrian contingent, although their efforts are confined to conjecture at best due to their insistence on a _Nostoi_-era dating (Nikandros in Antoninus Lib., _Meta._ 8.7; Solinus 2.9).

That Sybaris would allow the settlement of new waves of colonists has wide-ranging implications for the way in which the Sybarite empire was administered. The most common pattern of settlement in the _chora_ of Sybaris can be said to have consisted of numerous _villaggi periferici_ or dependencies, centred around the _metropolis_ of Sybaris itself (see map 4).54 Moreover, the destruction of many of these sites around the time of the Krotoniate conquest of Sybaris in 510, including Lagaria and Aminaia, confirms that contact between the Sybarite _astu_ and its satellites was both regular and of an interdependent nature.55 Moreover, the diversity

54 Guzzo, “Sibari e la sibaritide”, p. 17.
55 Ibid., p. 18; _TWGb_, p. 183; Bicknell, “Aminaia”, p. 137; de la Genière, “Contributions to a typology of ancient settlements in Southern Italy”,
of these sites, in terms of origins, ethnicity and probably language, demonstrates that Sybaris was prepared to use whatever demographic resources were at hand to consolidate its hold over its territory. Indeed, the term *organizzatore*, used by Giangiulio to describe Sybaris in relation to the various sub-colonies of the Sybaritid is most fitting. Sybaris appears to have been the organizational centre of a multicultural colonization process, in which both the centre and the expanding periphery benefited.

That the term 'multicultural' does not greatly overestimate the policy-making abilities of Sybaris at such an early period in the development of the polis-system in Hellas is, in part, evidenced by the Sybarite role in the foundation of Achaian Metapontion. This *polis*, was founded by a fresh wave of non-Italiote Achaians from the Peloponnesos around 600. Antiochhos states that Sybaris sent for this new infusion of Achaian blood and directed them to the site of Metapontion (*FGrH* 555 F12: τὸν τόπον ἐποικῆσαι τῶν Ἀχαιῶν τινὰς μεταπεμφθέντας ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν Συβάρει Ἀχαιῶν). As will be discussed in more detail below, the Metapontine district was exceptionally fertile country, and at that time was at risk of falling into the hands of

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other non-Achaian Greeks. Sybaris thus demonstrated that it was capable of formulating policies which brought together both population and territory in a bid to further its political aims.

As the sources are silent on the manner of Sybarite rule in Oinotria and the Sybaritid it is difficult to establish precisely how effective this control was. However, that these sites were 'organized' by Sybaris, used Sybarite symbolism on their coinages, and collapsed upon the destruction of their metropolis, strongly suggests that these settlements were in fact dependents of Sybaris. The extension of Krotoniate control over many of them after 510 also suggests a system of reasonably tight control, in that the defeat of the metropolis entailed a transfer of all or most of its territorial assets to the victor. Hekataios may have described the Oinotrian towns on his list as being poleis, but clearly his attribution of polis-status, with all its connotations of independence cannot be accurate. As has been demonstrated, the μεσογεία of Oinotria, as Hekataios puts it, was firmly within the orbit of Sybaris. Furthermore, the poleis that Strabo links to Sybaris are described explicitly as ὑπόκοιοι (6.1.13). These 'poleis' are thus extremely unlikely to have exercised any real autonomy whilst their metropolis was itself free from foreign occupation.
In this way the Sybarite dependencies resemble Oropos and Perrhaibia, which Thoukydides also describes as being υπηκοος (2.23.3, 4.78.6). As Thoukydides goes on to state, these territories were administratively separate entities within the Athenian and Thessalian states. Both territories were contiguous to Attika and Thessaly respectively, and tended to fall under the control of other states when Athens and Thessaly were in a weakened or defeated position (Oropos: Thouk. 8.60.1; Diod. 15.76.1, 18.56.6; Perrhaibia: Strabo 9.5.19). Similarly, Aminaia and Lagaria also shared the fortunes of their ruler. The word υπηκοος and its use in both the case of the poleis Strabo attributes to the Sybarite realm, and in that of Oropos, has definite connotations in regard to how these entities functioned, or at least how they could not function. The Oropians held (νεμω) their territory only with the permission of Athens (Thouk. 2.23.3, 4.99.1). Moreover, also illustrative in determining the status of the Sybarite satellites is the fact that members of the Athenian-led coalition in the Peloponnesian War were divided into two broad categories - υπηκοος on the one hand and αυτόνομοι and/or συμμαχοί on the other. Thoukydides states that those belonging to the former category did not possess αυτόνομα, and were in fact compelled by their servile status to join Athenian military ventures such as the Sicilian Expedition in 415 (6.69.3, 7.57).
Furthermore, apart from this extraordinary obligation to supply the Athenian hegemon with troops, those poleis that are described as ἀντίκοι were also obliged to pay tribute (ὑποτέλος) on a regular basis as well (7.57.4). The latter category of Athenian coalition members joined in Athens' wars on terms indicative of at least theoretical equality, either manning their own fleets (7.57.4-5); fulfilling the obligations of specific and finite treaties (7.57.3, 9); lending aid on account of their goodwill towards Athens or antipathy towards the Spartan coalition (7.57.5, 7, 9, 10); or merely responding to the strategic reality of having to choose sides at a given moment in time (7.57.7). Poleis described as ἀντίκοι therefore should be seen as existing in a state of subjection, either potential or immediate, confirming the earlier findings derived from the coinage of Sybaris' satellites, that the presence of the Sybarite bull type was in all probability a symbol of political dependence. If the twenty-five poleis mentioned by Strabo were in fact ἀντίκοι, then it can be asserted that Strabo and his source(s) understood that these poleis had no foreign policy other than that which Sybaris laid down for them, and no armed forces that could be deployed without a Sybarite-led muster.

However, due to the probability that many, if not all, of the towns within the Sybarite land archē included groups who
were enfranchised with Sybarite citizenship, towns such as Aminaia cannot have been regarded strictly as administratively separate in the way in which Oropos was by Athens. As to what degree such citizens might have participated in the institutions of the Sybarite state, a long period of aristocratic or oligarchic rule at Sybaris, followed by a demagogic tyranny around 510, suggests that politics in these satellite towns probably revolved around local elites who would have handled most aspects of their respective towns' relationships with the Sybarite metropolis. Whether such elites had the title of governor or were subject to a form of regular rotation instigated from the centre is possible, but ultimately unknown.

Another possibility is that these local elites were literally of local extraction. Strabo also uses the word ὑπήκοος to describe those rulers and their associated territories who have been subjugated by another state, effectively becoming in turn client-kings (6.4.2, 7.4.4, 11.14.15, 15.3.24, 16.4.21). Although the widespread destruction and conquest of Oinotrian settlements at the hands of the Sybarite Achaian colonists during the last two decades of the eighth century is well documented, it does not follow that all of the sites affected were necessarily transformed into directly ruled or colonized
possessions of Sybaris. It is conceivable that some of the more distant towns and villages were allowed to retain their local aristocracies in return for the payment of φόρος, or levies of troops, as in the case of the ὑπηκόοι of Athens. Indeed, that the Achaeans may have regarded co-option as a suitable means of control is revealed through their conceptualization of the indigenous population around them. As discussed in chapter 2, the elaborate transformation of these local elites into the descendants of ancient mythological Greek immigrants may date from this time and reflect a broad, and just possibly bipartisan, campaign to legitimize the extension of Achaian rule over Oinotria.

This pattern of relations between Greeks and indigenous Italians in many ways contrasts with both the typical Dorian and Ionian approaches to colonization in the western Mediterranean. The Dorian Spartan colonists at Taras appear to have existed in a semi-permanent state of war with the Iapygian tribes around them, proving unable or unwilling to accommodate their non-Greek neighbours, or defeat them decisively on the battlefield. The Dorian Korinthians of Syracuse were evidently victorious and enslaved outright the neighbouring indigenous population during the archaic period.

58 See chapter 1.
59 See esp. DH 1.11.2-12.2, 131-4.
(Hdt. 7.155); and also managed to impose a tributary system over the Sikels of the Sicilian interior by the fifth century at the latest (Diod. 12.29.1).\textsuperscript{60} Greek-initiated violent expansionism is also hinted at in the patchy literary accounts of the archaic histories of Dorian Gela and Akragas (Paus. 8.46.2; Polyainos 5.1.3-4; \textit{Lindian Chronicle} 27; Frontinus, \textit{Strat.} 3.4.6).\textsuperscript{61} On the other hand, the Ionian colonies in the West rarely appear to have taken such action concerning the indigenous population, and in all probability it was this lack of imperialism and exploitation that resulted in the collapse of many of these colonies' political independence during the sixth and fifth centuries, both in Sicily and Magna Graecia.\textsuperscript{62} Archaeological evidence also suggests that the Ionian Sirites maintained relations with the local Chonian and Oinotrian populations which were conducive to peaceful interaction and mutual profit.\textsuperscript{63} As discussed earlier, the Achaian pattern appears to have developed in a way distinct from all of the aforementioned models. Indigenous peoples were certainly subdued and exploited by the Achaian Sybarites, but with a

\textsuperscript{60} For relations between Syracuse and the Sikels during the fifth century, see B. Caven, \textit{Dionysius I: War-Lord of Sicily} (New Haven, 1990), pp. 16-17.

\textsuperscript{61} \textit{TWGb}, pp. 165, 180.


\textsuperscript{63} Morel, “Greek colonization in Italy and the West”, p. 125; de da Genière, “L’identification de Lagaria et ses problèmes”, p. 65.
view towards integrating them within a larger system, replete with the possibility of citizenship. The Sybarite system, at least in regard to the native Italian villaggi periferici, can therefore be said to have been a peculiarly Sybarite adaption to the colonial environment in which they found themselves.

However, it is evident that the villaggi periferici constituted only one category of relations between Sybaris and those who were within its sphere of influence. While Sybaris appears to have exercised a relatively high degree of control over the former category of towns, there existed a number of entities, both urban and tribal in nature whose relations with the Sybarite empire were far more ambiguous or were clearly on a more equal footing. The first of such entities to be discussed lay within the Sybarite band of apoikiai situated on the Tyrrhenian Sea, a region into which Sybaris had begun to expand by c. 600.

The earliest of the Sybarite colonies on the Tyrrhenian shore was Poseidonia, having been founded around 600.⁶⁴ Accompanying a reference in Strabo to the presence of Sybaritai at Poseidonia prior to the Lucanian occupation of the late fifth century (5.4.13), studies of Poseidoniate coinage as well as the Poseidoniate pantheon also indicate that the initial

⁶⁴ Pedley, Paestum, pp. 11, 30-2.
impetus for a *polis* at the mouth of the Silaris River came from Sybaris. In particular, it is the occurrence of the legend *Fios*, possibly referring to the *oikistes* of Sybaris, Is of Helike (Strabo 6.1.13), on Poseidoniate coins between c. 525-510 that hints at a Sybarite origin for Poseidonia. A shrine, also possibly dedicated to Is of Helike, has also been located at Poseidonia, further underscoring the connection between the *poleis* of Sybaris and Poseidonia.

Moreover, a tradition exists asserting that Dorian Troizenians were involved in the original foundation of Sybaris (Arist., *Pol.* 1303A29). Aristotle goes on to state that the Troizenians were forced to leave Sybaris, and it is to the Tyrrhenian and the future site of Poseidonia that modern scholars have argued that these Troizenians may have emigrated. As the Troizenians were in colonial terms 'Sybarites', Poseidonia was therefore technically a Sybarite-settled site. Numerous other clues indicate that Poseidonia was settled, at least in part, by Troizenians who were associated with the Sybaris, ranging from literary references (Steph. Byz. *Τροιζηνικά*; Solinus 2.10) to the worship of gods, such as Poseidon and Aphrodite at


Poseidonia, who also happened to be important members of the Troizenian pantheon.68

Comments by Strabo indicate that prior to the foundation of Poseidonia itself, the Sybarites had established a teles on the Tyrrhenian shore, not far from the future site of Poseidonia (5.4.13), although the reasons for the Sybarites' interest in this region are not given. Clearly the Sybarites had, or were in the process of developing, interests in the Silaris valley region before c. 600, indicating that as early as the seventh century the polis of Sybaris had a range of well over one hundred kilometres in terms of what it considered to be its zones of interest.

Furthermore, the stasis that Aristotle states broke out between the two main Sybarite communities, the Achaians and the Troizenians, must have had a relatively peaceful resolution. After all, as demonstrated earlier, the Troizenians who departed from Sybaris as a result of this stasis appear to have participated in the foundation of Poseidonia. The Achaian Sybarites would hardly have allowed a potentially dangerous faction to take control of their relatively recently established interests on the Tyrrhenian Sea. A far more likely scenario is

that the Silaris region was a convenient location for a minority Dorian community which had failed to adapt to life in an Achaian-dominated polis. That this new arrangement was established in an environment of mutual co-operation, and even friendship, is strongly suggested by good relations between Poseidonia and the Achaian Sybarites during the sixth and fifth centuries, as outlined in epigraphical and numismatic evidence. Indeed, in this way, the foundation of Poseidonia is not unlike the settlement achieved between the Chalkidians and Eretrians of Pithekoussai in the last quarter of the eighth century, and between the Spartans and the Partheniai of Taras in the last decade of the eighth century. In all cases the foundation of a new polis contributed greatly to the resolution of inter-communal stasis and the continuation of previously good relations between the various factions. Moreover, the original interest on the part of the Achaian Sybarites in the Silaris region, as noted by Strabo: 5.4.13, was thus consolidated.

Perhaps due in part to the Troizenian accent to Poseidonia, and also in part due to the sheer distance between Sybaris and its colony on the Tyrrhenian, relations between the two poleis fall

69 Pugliese-Carratelli, “Per la storia di poseidonia”, pp. 16-17.
71 See chapters 1 and 3, and also Manfredi & Braccesi, I Greci d’Occidente, p. 175.
into a category distinct from those between Sybaris and villaggi periferici, such as Aminaia and Lagaria. Moreover, an inscription, tentatively dated by Meiggs and Lewis to 550-525 and dedicated in Olympia, records a revealing treaty between Sybaris and an Italian tribe called the Serdaioi.\textsuperscript{72} In this agreement Poseidonia serves, alongside Zeus and Apollo, as one of the proxenoi. By definition, Poseidonia must have been in an independent position \textit{vis à vis} Sybaris for the Serdaioi to have taken the treaty seriously.\textsuperscript{73} For a subordinate of Sybaris to have played such a role would simply have not been appropriate, and that Poseidonia was suitable for the role as \textit{proxenos} strongly suggests that the \textit{polis} had a role in the political life of the region.\textsuperscript{74} Furthermore, the earliest coinage of Poseidonia (c. 525) displays considerable independence from the type, weight and division the coinage of Sybaris and its dependencies based on the Ionian shores of southern Italy.\textsuperscript{75}

\textsuperscript{72} \textit{M & L} no. 10. Italian scholarship in particular argues for a more flexible dating than the one given by Meiggs and Lewis: see Lombardo, “Da sibari a thurii”, pp. 273-4. However, Rutter’s argument for the earlier date appears to me to be conclusive: “Sybaris - Legend and Reality”, p. 173.

\textsuperscript{73} Ampolo, “La città dell’eccesso”, p. 246; Bicknell, “Aminaia”, p. 140.

\textsuperscript{74} Pedley, \textit{Paestum}, p. 41.

\textsuperscript{75} \textit{TWGb}, p. 184; \textit{ACGC}, p. 169.
ol Συβαρίται κ' ol σύμμαχοι on the one hand, and the Serdaioi and Poseidonia on the other (M & L no. 10.1-2). It is apparent from this statement that Sybaris was effectively the hegemon of a group of allies who had either previously acquiesced to the terms of the treaty in question or, more realistically, had merely been informed by Sybaris that a course of action had been taken on their behalf.76 In essence, this relationship probably functioned in much the same way as the that between imperial Athens and its ‘allies’ during the fifth century. Treaties between Athens and defeated rebel poleis in particular frequently demanded the swearing of loyalty to both Athens and its allies, most of whom would have had little or no real interest in the affairs of states such as Erythrai or Samos (M & L no.s 40.23, 56.19). In other words, the presence of the Athenian allies was technical and token at most. Similarly, the Peace of Nikias, as recounted by Thoukydides makes numerous references to Αθηναίοι καὶ ol ξυμμάχοι (5.18), in the context that it is Athens and Athens only which may seek to change any part of the treaty on behalf of the Athenian-led alliance (5.18.11). In contrast to the Athenians, the Spartans were not able to coerce all of their allies into signing the treaty (5.17.2), thus further identifying the Athenian-led alliance as one in which the interests of the hegemon took priority over those of all others. Therefore, in all probability the phrase ol

76 Ampolo, “La città dell’eccesso”, pp. 244-5.
Συβαρίται κ’ οἱ σύνμαχοι, to which the Athenian formula in the Peace of Nikias bears a remarkable resemblance, indicates an unequal relationship between Sybaris and those with which it had previously allied itself. Indeed, these allies may in fact correspond to the subject poleis and ethne referred to by Strabo, Hekataios and Stephanos. In particular, it can hardly be expected that political parity existed between Sybaris and such adjacent towns as Aminaia, Lagaria, Pandosia and the various πόλεις Οἰνωτρων ἐν μεσογεία (FGrH 1 F64-71).

Furthermore, as stated earlier, although obviously closely linked with Sybaris and its interests, clearly Poseidonia claims for itself an independent role within this document, both as proxenos and as a polis existing outside the οἱ Συβαρίται κ’ οἱ σύνμαχοι category. Similarly, it is difficult to interpret the Serdaioi as being subordinate allies of Sybaris due to the lengths taken to ensure that an independent witness was present. Tempting as it is to incorporate the Serdaioi into Strabo’s statement concerning four anonymous tribes subject to Sybaris (6.1.13), the position of the Serdaioi, as outlined in this treaty, resembles far more closely that of Poseidonia than the Sybarite possessions further east. Adding further support to this statement is the fact that the Serdaioi probably issued their own coins during the sixth century, featuring the legend ΜΕΡ. Notably absent from these coins is the Sybarite bull type,
the key indicator of dependency status on the coinage of Sybaris' other foundations and allies. Such an assessment must stand, unless of course it is proposed that Strabo included Sybaris' spheres of influence as well as areas of direct control in his figures.

Another example of the different levels of control and influence exercised by Sybaris over its neighbours is present in the foundation of the polis of Metapontion. A combination of archaeological excavations in the 1980's and comments by Antiochos (FGrH 555 F12) have identified an earlier, possibly mixed Greek-Italian incarnation of Metapontion, which was possibly known to the Greeks as Metabon and came into existence around 650. Antiochos states that this polis was destroyed by Σαυνταί and resettled at a later date under the auspices of Achaian Sybaris. This apoikia was to become the modern polis of Metapontion and was built over the top of a destruction layer dated to c. 600 (presumably corresponding to the invasion attested by Antiochos).

However, all references to archaic Metapontion demonstrate

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78 Carter, "Sanctuaries in the Chora of Metaponto", pp. 163-4; Prohászka, Reflections from the Dead, pp. 9-10.
that the Metapontines, unlike the inhabitants of towns such as Aminaia and Lagaria, acted as independent members of the Achaian-dominated *polis*-system of Magna Graecia. During the invasion of Siris, Metapontion joined Sybaris as an autonomous participant, in the same way that Kroton did (Justin 20.2.3-8). Given the Sybarite domination of the then *polis*-system, it is highly probable that both Metapontion and Kroton would have found it difficult to decline such an alliance. Nevertheless, they are still listed as separate allies and clearly did not fall under the general category of subordinate allies outlined during the discussion of the Serdaioi inscription. Similarly, the Sybarite bull never made an appearance on the prolific coinage of Metapontion, and indeed, it is only Metapontion that can claim a numismatic history as old as that of Sybaris.  

Thus despite the Sybarite involvement in its colonization process, Metapontion must be interpreted as a non-dependent ally of Sybaris, and by extension formed part of bloc within Sybaris' sphere of influence that also included Poseidonia and the Serdaioi. As in the case of Poseidonia, distance between *metropolis* and *apoikia* may have played a role in shaping future Sybarite-Metapontine relations, but at the same time it should not be assumed that Sybaris was necessarily intent on

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80 ACGC, p. 163.
direct control. Antiochos states that the colonists of Metapontion were not Sybarites, but were in fact part of a fresh wave of Achaians from the Peloponnesos (*FGrH* 555 F12). Although Metapontion turned out to be a loyal ally of Sybaris, there were in fact few built in guarantees of an unwaveringly pro-Sybarite line once Metapontion had been settled. Certainly the population of Metapontion could reasonably be expected to have regarded Sybaris as its guiding older sibling in the Italiote *polis*-system. However, this does not mean that Metapontion resembled Aminaia in its dealings with Sybaris. Rather, Sybaris' role in this context should be regarded as that of an organizer of colonial territory, in many ways fulfilling the role of a supra- *oikistes*, and, like most *oikistai*, retaining no substantial control over the *apoikia* after the initial colonization. Thus like Poseidonia, Metapontion can also be viewed as an equally appropriate candidate for the role of *proxenos* in treaty agreements, such as that between Sybaris and the Serdaioi.

In conclusion, it is therefore probable that the empire of Sybaris was in fact a composition of arrangements between centre, periphery and a range of other neighbouring entities. Essentially, the Sybarite system of empire can be described as being bipolar, encompassing within it a series of friendships.

and alliances, as well as a tier under outright or direct control (see map 4).\textsuperscript{82} Aminaia, Pandosia and the so-called \textit{poleis} of the old Oinotrian heartland almost certainly looked to Sybaris as their \textit{hegemon}, as implied in the Serdaioi inscription, and probably due, at least in part, to their physical proximity to Sybaris itself. Poseidonia and Metapontion, although both founded with help from Sybaris, operated as \textit{poleis} in the classical sense, with \textit{autonomia}, but with an evidently genuine bias towards their benefactor. Powerful and useful exterior entities, such as the Serdaioi, were also enrolled into the Sybarite system through treaties of eternal friendship (\textit{φιλότατοι...δείδιον}), also retaining their autonomy but probably committing themselves to the Sybarite cause. That the empire of Sybaris evolved in such a way reflects the ability of its rulers to adapt to a complex colonial world whose Hellenic frontiers were far from static, and whose \textit{polis}-system, due in part to the existence of a large indigenous population, could never truly be a mere replica of that of the Greek mainland. Moreover, it was through this system of control and influence that Sybaris was able to stamp its authority on the mainstream band of archaic Greek settlement in southern Italy.

Furthermore, abundant territory also helped to facilitate conflict resolution through population relocation, as in the case

\footnote{\textsuperscript{82} Ampolo, "La città dell’eccesso", p. 247; de Juliis, \textit{Magna Grecia}, p. 178; Giangiulio, "Aspetti di storia della Magna Grecia", p. 26.}
of Poseidonia. Problems arising from the polyglot nature of the empire, whether they be Achaian versus non-Achaian Greek in origin, or indeed Greek versus non-Greek, could therefore be addressed with a reasonable chance of success. Indeed, from the late seventh century through the bulk of the sixth, the pragmatic Sybaris encountered few problems or setbacks that it could not deal with or adapt to. By abandoning much of the Hellenic ideal of statehood and community, and in particular by its enrollment of non-Achaian and non-Greek populations into its system, Sybaris was able to outstrip its neighbours. Therefore it can be said that the Sybarite state became a regional power not only at the expense of its neighbours, but also at the price of shedding a purist Greek polis identity, in effect constructing an imperial system peculiar to the circumstances and opportunities of southern Italy.

2.3 the empire of Sybaris in action: territorial and economic aspects of Sybarite imperialism.

The foundation of Metapontion around 600 points towards the activation of Sybarite power and imperialist ambitions within the Italiote polis-system at an early date. The account of Antiochos asserts that the Sybarites initiated the foundation of Achaian Metapontion because they wished to thwart Dorian Tarantine ambitions in the region (FGrH 555 F12). Certainly, it
would appear that Sybaris was experiencing some concern over the potential vacuum in the trans-Akiris region after the fall of the proto-Metapontion discussed earlier. Furthermore, it is also clear that Sybaris did not at this time wish to divert any of its own population to the region, and was obliged to send (μεταπέμπω) for colonists from the Achaian homeland. Moreover, the site of Metapontion was some one hundred kilometres distant from Sybaris itself and separated from the nearest Sybarite outpost, at this stage probably Aminaia, by the chora of Kolophonian Siris. Thus Sybaris must have had very definite aims in the region to have undertaken such a potentially difficult task.

However, Antiochos’ identification of Taras as the principal motivating cause behind the Sybarite intervention beyond the Akiris should be regarded as anachronistic and therefore suspect. Taras was not destined to emerge as a polis even remotely capable of influencing events as far away as the Akiris and Kasas valleys until it had managed to subdue the neighbouring Iapygian tribes in the early fifth century. That

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83 Lagaria (S. Nicola d’Amendolora) was probably under Sirite control or influence at this time, although it would later come to form the approximate northern boundary of the Sybarite heartland. See de la Genière, “L’identification de Lagaria et ses problèmes”, pp. 62-5; TWGb, p. 184
Taras could be perceived as a threat as early as the seventh century is therefore extremely unlikely. Moreover, Antiochos further weakens his position by arguing for the chronological primacy of Metapontion over Siris, which contradicts all available archaeological evidence.

Rather, it appears that, with Siris already established, it was the Kolophonian *apoikia* itself that the Sybarites wished to hem in, and not the Tarantines. An Achaian colony between the Akiris and Kasas rivers, the future site of the Metapontine *chora*, would have effectively stymied any attempt by the Ionian Sirites to expand into a region well known for its fertile soil. Moreover, archaeological excavations at the indigenous site at Incoronata, situated on the south bank of the Akiris, hint at an earlier potential clash of interests. Evidence of both Sirite and Sybarite trade interests at Incoronata down to c. 600 may have provided an early point of contention between the Achaian and Ionian colonial worlds. Thus, in essence, the fall of Metabon provoked a contest for resources between the two states who were, in effect, the region’s proto-super powers. That Sybaris was victorious, in that it was one of

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85 *TWGb*, pp. 172-4.
87 The ancient sources rank Siris as second only to Sybaris in resources and wealth, although the reference may in fact relate to the early sixth century rather than the late seventh: see esp. Ath. 12.523c-d.
its protégés that settled the trans-Akiris territories, underlines the fact that Sybaris was evolving into a successful regional imperialist as early as the end of the seventh century.

The likelihood of Sybarite-Sirite, and, by extension, Achaian-Ionian competition in the region at this early date, is in part supported by events within the next generation. Furthermore, the ancient sources stereotype the conflict as round two of the Trojan-Achaian clash of civilizations by alleging a Trojan presence at Siris during its original, mythological foundation - perhaps a deliberate propaganda ploy on behalf of the Sirites.88 As recorded by Pompeius Trogus in Justin, Sybaris, Kroton and the recently established Metapontion made war upon Siris and brought about its destruction (20.2.3-8). The date of this war has been an issue of contention between historians for some time, but with general agreement for the first half of the sixth century.

A lower limit for the Achaian coalition against Siris has been established by Bicknell, who has interpreted the abrupt halt in

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work on the Treasury *metopes* at Poseidonia around 570 as a result of the fall of Siris, whose craftsmen Bicknell has associated with the project.\(^8^9\) Concurrently, the presence of Damasos, a Sirite suitor, at the wedding of Agariste should also stand as the *terminus post quem* for the fall of Siris (Hdt. 6.127). Given Herodotos' assertion that Kleisthenes of Sikyon called the suitors together after his horse chariot race victory at the Olympic games and promised to marry off Agariste approximately fourteen months later, the *floruit* of Damasos must include either 575 (following the games of 576) or 571 (following the games of 572).\(^9^0\) By extension, for Damasos to be called Σιρίτης Δαμασος by Herodotos (6.127), Siris must still have been in existence in the mid to late 570's.

Bicknell has also proposed that the father of Damasos, Amyris, was in fact a Sybarite who had joined in the resettlement of Siris *after* its conquest by Sybaris, thus making possible an earlier date for the fall of Siris to the Achaian coalition.\(^9^1\) However, clearly there are at least two traditions regarding Amyris, and, as Lombardo has demonstrated, the father of Damasos cannot be the same individual as the legendary sage

\(^{8^9}\) Bicknell, “The Date of the Fall of Siris”, p. 402
\(^{9^1}\) Bicknell, “The Date of the Fall of Siris”, pp. 403-4.
mentioned by Athenaios (12.520a-c) and the *Sou _da* on chronological grounds.\footnote{Lombardo, “La tradizione su Amyris e la conquista achea di Siri”, *PP* 36 (1981), pp. 201-11. See also *RCA*, pp. 249-51.} The former is either alive or only recently deceased in the 570's, whereas the latter is depicted as being active around the time of the Krotoniate conquest of Sybaris (c. 510). The two are definitely not interchangeable. Thus it would appear that a mid to late 570's date for the fall of Siris is the most credible hypothesis.

Such a hypothesis is given further weight by the archaeological excavation of S. Nicola, adjacent to the modern town of Amendolora and corresponding to the ancient site of Lagaria. Excavations here have revealed that a previously Ionian influenced centre was destroyed and reorganized as an Achaian town between c. 580 and c. 570.\footnote{See de la Genière, “L'identification de Lagaria et ses problèmes”, pp. 62-5; and *SEG* 41.853.} The inference is towards a Kolophonian Sirite (i.e. Ionian) presence at S. Nicola d’Amendolarana, which was violently uprooted at the time of the destruction of Siris itself. Achaian occupation of Lagaria at this time also equates well with the transformation of the conquered Siris into an Achaian colonial outpost, as reflected in numismatic and linguistic changes in the area.\footnote{Bicknell, “Aminaia”, pp. 135-6, n. 23; Bicknell, “The Date of the Fall of Siris”, pp. 405-8; C. Bencivenga-Trillmich, “Pyxous-Buxentum”,}
Siris by the end of the 570's thus appears to be the most acceptable proposition.

In sum, within twenty-five to thirty years of the foundation of Metapontion (c. 600), Sybaris decided to move against the one stretch of coastline and interior not under its control on the western side of the Gulf of Taranto, the Akiris-Kasas basin. Moreover, this war of conquest was charged with ethnic undertones, pitting an Achaian coalition against a lone Ionian polis. Although it might be argued that Metapontion stood to gain from the eradication of Ionian influence from the region (an uninterrupted band of Achaian territory would then march from Kaulonia to Metapontion, and link the latter with its patron, Sybaris), the participation of Kroton is difficult to interpret in such a manner. The only logical conclusion is that the whole enterprise was conducted under the initiative of Sybaris, and, due to its standing in the region, Sybaris was able to recruit or coerce the support of its independent fellow-Achaian neighbours.

Moreover, it was Sybaris that gained most from the destruction of Sirite independence. A series of coins that was issued in the first half of the sixth century and lasted some fifty years down to c. 510 appears to be connected with a period of Achaian rule

of both Siris and its former territory.\textsuperscript{95} These coins featured the Sybarite bull type and the joint legend $\text{ΣΙΡΙΝΟΣ}$ and $\text{ΠΫΞΟΕΣ}$ in the Achaian script. As argued by Bicknell and others, $\text{ΣΙΡΙΝΟΣ}$ should be interpreted as the adjectival form of Siris, and $\text{ΠΫΞΟΕΣ}$ as not corresponding to the fifth century Rhegine sub-colony of Pyxous, situated on the Tyrrhenian Sea, but rather to a settlement substantially closer to the old Sirite astu.\textsuperscript{96} Furthermore, as Bencivenga Trillmich argues, Stephanos of Byzantion's identification of a $\text{Πυξις}$ as one of the Oinotrian poleis existing $\text{ἐν μεσογαίᾳ}$ further decreases the likelihood of a coastal setting for the source of the coins in question.\textsuperscript{97}

What is more, scholars who have sought to argue that Pyxous was originally a Sirite emporion on the Tyrrhenian that was forcibly amalgamated with the conquered Siris miss one key observation: why would Sybaris seek to strengthen its recently defeated foe by uniting it with one of its former allies? A far more likely scenario is that Sybaris resettled and reorganized Siris with Achaians, and linked the new settlement, probably in a form of synoikismos, with a nearby pro-Sybarite Oinotrian

\textsuperscript{95}ACGC, p. 166.

\textsuperscript{96} Bicknell, “Aminaia”, pp. 135-6, n. 23; Bicknell, “The Date of the Fall of Siris”, pp. 405-8.

\textsuperscript{97} Bencivenga-Trillmich, “Pyxous-Buxentum”, p. 727.
site called Pyxis (ΠΥΧΟΣ on the joint community’s coins). Any Kolophonians allowed to remain at Siris would thus have found it difficult to mount a pro-Ionian coup and the Sybarite hold on the region would therefore have been consolidated.

Thus it can be seen that Sybaris began to expand its borders in earnest from the late seventh century onwards, and in particular at the expense of non-Achaian Italiotes on the shores of the Gulf of Taranto. However, as has already been noted in part, Sybaris did not confine its activities to the littoral of the Ionian Sea. At least three poleis (Poseidonia, Laos and Skidros) were founded on the Tyrrhenian Sea by Sybaris at or around this time, and the afore-mentioned mid-sixth century treaty with the Serdaioi indicates that Sybaris was also extending its influence beyond those territories not directly under its control. Indeed, the foundation of Achaian Metapontion around 600 effectively coincides with the foundation of Sybarite Poseidonia on the Tyrrhenian Sea. That the timing of these foundations was probably not entirely of a coincidental nature, and within the bounds of a well established pattern of Sybarite imperialism will be

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demonstrated below.

The Kasas river valley, whose lower reaches formed part of the *chora* of Metapontion, provides one of the best trans-isthmian land routes to Poseidonia available. The desirability of controlling both ends of this potential trade route, combined with the timing of Poseidonia and Metapontion's respective foundations suggests that Sybaris had trans-isthmian ambitions.\(^99\) Moreover, strong early sixth century Greek cultural, architectural and commercial influence over such indigenous sites as Serra di Vaglio, Pisticci and Garaguso, which were all situated on the Poseidonia-Metapontion route, further attests to the existence of regular Greek traffic through the region.\(^100\) Certainly, the aforementioned *τενικεσ* (Strabo 5.4.13), established by Sybaris near the Silaris river prior to Poseidonia, demonstrates that the Sybarites had found something of interest to them in the Tyrrhenian region by the end of the seventh century. Moreover, it may have been the Etruscan presence at trans-Silaris Pontecagnano, which also manifests itself around 600, that was the source of attraction for the Sybarites.\(^101\)

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101 The presence at Pontecagnano of an Attic cup replete with a Paestan
Indeed, as briefly discussed in chapter 3, the purpose of the Sybarite *routes terrestres* has long been associated by modern scholars with Etruscan-orientated commerce. A reference in Timaios to good Etruro-Sybarite relations (*FGrH* 566 F50), coupled with Herodotos’ passing mention of Sybarite *poleis* situated on the Tyrrhenian Sea (Laos and Skidros), as well as the close connection between Sybaris and at least two East Greek states, Miletos and Rhodes (*Hdt. 6.21; Lindian Chronicle* 26), has helped to give rise to a school of thought in favour of Sybaris occupying the role of middleman in a trade route between the Aegean and the Tyrrhenian Seas.\textsuperscript{102}

What is more, a reference in Iamblichos’ *On the Pythagorean Life* to a Tyrsenos of Sybaris may in fact be an example of an ethnic *xenia*-name (267).\textsuperscript{103} By extension, it is possible to view Tyrsenos as an indicator of specific inter-familial and symposiac inscription dating to the late sixth century certainly indicates that contact between Poseidonia and Pontecagnano became quite close. See M. Torelli, “The Encounter with the Etruscans”, pp. 567-8; Frederiksen, *Campania*, pp. 123-4; *IGASMG IV* no. 30.


\textsuperscript{103} I would like to thank Dr. P.J. Bicknell for suggesting to me the possibilities arising from Tyrsenos of Sybaris *vis à vis* his relevance to the Sybaris-Etruria nexus.
inter-regional links, in this case between Sybaris and Etruria, in much the same way as names such as Lakedaimonios, Latinos and Thessalos also appear to have functioned.\textsuperscript{104}

Furthermore, the existence of this trade may also shed light upon another aspect of the Sybarite conquest of Siris. The Kolophonians of Siris can be expected to have retained some links with their \textit{metropolis}, particularly as Kolophon was known as a seafaring \textit{polis} since at least the time of its seventh century foundations at Siris and Myrleia (Pliny, \textit{NH} 5.32). It is therefore feasible that Aegean-Tyrrhenian trade was also conducted between Kolophon and Siris, and that Sybaris could have viewed Siris as a rival.\textsuperscript{105} What is more, the Sybarites were in the unusual position, due to their power and influence in the region, of being able to remove their rival once and for all.\textsuperscript{106} At any rate, the content of such trade most

\textsuperscript{104} Examples of ethnic \textit{xenia}-names include the sons of Kimon: Lakedaimonios, Eleios and Thessalos (Plut., \textit{Kim.} 16.1); the daughters of Themistokles: Italia, Sybaris and Asia (Plut., \textit{Them.} 32.2); and Athenaios (Thouk. 4.119.2), Samios (Hdt. 3.55.2), Akanthos (Thouk. 5.19.24), Boiotios (Xen., \textit{Hell.} 1.4.2), Chalkides (Thouk. 8.6.8), all of Sparta. See also Jameson & Malkin, “Latinos and the Greeks”, p. 482.

\textsuperscript{105} De Sensi Sestito, \textit{La Calabria in età arcaica e classica}, p. 33; \textit{TWGa}, p. 357; Callaway, \textit{Sybaris}, p. 61.

\textsuperscript{106} That this position should be regarded as unusual is reinforced by relations between the two maritime and commercial rivals, Athens and Megara, in the sixth and fifth centuries. Despite the rivalry between
probably consisted of Milesian textiles (as indicated in Herodotos and Timaios, although perishable in nature and thus ultimately untraceable), and possibly ceramics of a size compact enough to endure an overland journey from the Ionian to the Tyrrhenian Sea as well.\footnote{Vallet, \textit{Zancle et Rhégion}, pp. 177-8.}

Although this school of thought is not without its critics, the geographical situation of Poseidonia and its younger siblings to the south, Laos and Skidros, corresponds almost perfectly with the most advantageous overland routes between Metapontion and Sybaris on the east coast, and the aforementioned sites on the west. It is, of course in theory, plausible that these Tyrrhenian \textit{poleis} were established where they were merely to ensure good communications between \textit{apoikiai} and \textit{metropolis}, but the Timaian tradition indicating links between Sybaris and Etruria is suggestive of more. Indeed, archaeological excavation of the site of Sybaris has uncovered fragments of Etruscan \textit{bucchero} and Campanian ceramic ware, further strengthening the possibility of commercial links between Sybaris and the upper Tyrrhenian Sea zone.\footnote{Guzzo, “Sibari e la sibaritide”, p. 16.}

the two states, the advent of Athenian naval supremacy, and such extreme measures as the Megarian Decree in the fifth century, Athens was unable to bring Megara to heel for any great length of time.
If such links did exist, it is difficult to believe they were conducted overland between Sybaris and Etruria, without any maritime phase. Moreover, the existence of Sybarite ports on the Tyrrhenian need not imply that Sybaris was in fact a naval power - a claim no ancient source has been prepared to countenance. Just as East Greek, Korinthian and even Athenian vessels shipped the textiles and what ceramic ware there may or may not have been to Sybaris proper, it is highly likely that non-Sybarite fleets transported the cargoes from Laos and Skidros as well. Given their proposed destination, it may have even been the Etruscans themselves who collected some or all of these imports. Certainly, at least in a piratical form, the Etruscans are known to have been active in the lower Tyrrhenian Sea from the first quarter of the sixth century at the latest.\footnote{109} Indeed, the climate of hostility between Etruscans and Carthaginians on the one hand, and the Greek forces loosely centred around the Straits of Messina on the other, during the sixth century may have in fact been the catalyst for the emergence or consolidation of a trade route between the Aegean and Etruria \textit{not} tainted by the blood spilt at Lipara, Alalia and the Straits.\footnote{110} The existence of the \textit{routes terrestres} therefore remains an attractive hypothesis, and one well in tune with the geopolitical ebb and flow of the

\footnote{109} See chapter 3.

\footnote{110} Bicknell, "An Early Incuse Stater of Kroton", p. 4.
region.

The advance of Sybarite interests in the lower Tyrrhenian Sea zone is also underscored by the treaty between the Sybarite state and its various allies on the one hand, and the aforementioned Serdaioi on the other. While the precise location of the Serdaioi homeland remains unknown, the presence of Poseidonia as a *proxenos* in the Sybarite-Serdaioi treaty suggests that the Serdaioi dwelt upon the shores of the lower Tyrrhenian or nearby. What is more, it has been suggested that this tribe had originally emigrated from Sardinia, thus reinforcing the likelihood of a coastal Tyrrhenian location for the Serdaioi.\(^{111}\)

Moreover, the c. 550-c. 525 range of this treaty hints at a possible connection between the Sybarite alliance with the Serdaioi and the role and development of Sybaris' Tyrrhenian ports. Given the deterioration in the general security of the Tyrrhenian Sea in the wake of Phokaian and Etruscan piracy from around 540, for Sybaris to conclude a treaty with an independent tribal state based on the Tyrrhenian makes much sense. Indeed, it is probable that Sybaris actively courted the Serdaioi in order to protect its Tyrrhenian possessions, upon which it relied for its trade with Etruria and the north

\(^{111}\) Ampolo, "La città dell'eccesso", p. 249.
Tyrrhenian. Although Herodotos implies that the Phokaians carried out attacks on non-Greek shipping only (1.166), Etruria on the other hand was not a unified entity, and trade with one Etruscan city-state could not possibly guarantee that other such states would not raid Sybarite-controlled or influenced coastlines in the lower Tyrrhenian Sea. Thus the enrolment of the Serdaioi at approximately this time strongly suggests that Sybaris placed great value on the security of its Tyrrhenian territories, in turn suggesting that Sybaris was concerned with keeping its ports open and unmolested, presumably for the purposes of trade.

In conclusion, it can therefore be seen that Sybaris began to assert itself as a regional power by the end of the seventh century. As with its attitude towards citizenship, Sybaris was demonstrably pragmatic in its participation in the Italiote polis-system. Sybaris was both capable of exploiting pan-Achaian feeling as well as using the indigenous population to achieve its aims. Fellow Achaians, Kroton and Metapontion, were useful allies in Sybaris' campaign to remove Ionian Siris from the polis-system, although Kroton was virtually abandoned during its attempt to subdue Lokroi Epizephyrioi less that twenty years later. Similarly, the Serdaioi were embraced and used to secure Sybarite interests in the Tyrrhenian, with no reference to the pan-Achaian and
Hellenocentric loyalties of the previous decades.

In essence, as the most adaptable Greek *polis* in the colonial environment of central Magna Graecia, Sybaris was consequently its earliest and most successful imperialist state. Built on the back of superior agricultural resources and a polyglot population, Sybaris was able to wield enormous power throughout much of the archaic period. While its connections with the Achaian homeland ensured fresh supplies of malleable colonists, its military power ensured that regional rivals would be crushed, and that its reach would be long. Rapid expansion along the river valleys above the Sybaritid plain during the eighth century also ensured that opportunities on the Tyrrhenian Sea would in time become apparent. Using its military, economic and demographic advantages, Sybaris was thus able to pursue its commercial interests in an aggressive and confident manner. Indeed, it can be concluded that at its peak the Sybarite empire in action was, whether prosecuting its territorial or economic interests, virtually irresistible within the Italiote *polis*-system.
CONCLUSION: The ‘mainstream’ Italiote polis-system and the advent of Achaian hegemony.

The central band of hellenic settlement in Magna Graecia clearly constituted a complex polis-system in which the salient features were Achaian military hegemony and the struggles of the non-Achaian states to compete in such an environment. Moreover, it has been demonstrated that military and regional power were closely linked to the possession of agricultural resources, and crucially to the models of interaction adopted by the Greek settlers when dealing with native Italian populations. Concerning the former of these, the chronological primacy of many of the Achaian settlements ensured the entrenchment of important advantages for the early Achaian poleis. Furthermore, models of interaction based on exploitation, accompanied by a flexible and generous system of enfranchisement for non-Greeks, helped to lay the foundations for a large hellenic and hellenizing empire in Magna Graecia, with its centre at Sybaris. Other Achaian poleis, with either Sybarite patronage or acting on their own, also held expansionist ambitions with varying degrees of success.

The development of Sybaris as a territorial and imperialist state in the archaic period both fostered and imposed a considerable degree of unity over a region diverse in its ethnic,
linguistic and cultural makeup. Not only did Sybaris effectively bind these disparate elements to the fortunes of the polis-system at large, it did so in a manner which brought maximum benefit to itself. Indeed, for almost a century Sybaris was able to influence successfully the flow of events within the Italiote polis-system, and ensure that its components, whether Achaian, non-Achaian Greek, or even non-Greek, developed according to Sybarite interests. Moreover, Sybarite power was not always exercised in a direct fashion, making the territory under its sway a patchwork of treaties, annexations, enfranchisements, colonies and suzerainty.

In this sense the Sybarite domain foreshadowed the evolution of Republican Rome and its relationship with the peoples of Italy. Southern Italy, like Italy in general, was a diverse region, and even during the process of hellenic colonization, which introduced the concept and practice of the polis-system, concessions had to be made to local conditions. Simply put, Magna Graecia was not Greece. There were far too many new variables for the colonists to deal with for a straightforward reproduction of their homeland in the West to occur, not least among these being the large non-Greek population, whose own strengths and relationships to each other were in turn varied and far from united. Those poleis who recognized the complexity of their new environment and exploited it
accordingly in effect became the new leaders of the region. Sybaris, like Syracuse in the fifth and fourth centuries and Rome in the fourth and third, utilized the multi-layered and multi-ethnic demographic resources around it, subsequently rising to the position of regional hegemon.
CHAPTER FIVE

Non-Achaian poleis under the Achaian hegemony.

Life for the non-Achaian poleis in the region defined as central Magna Graecia by the previous chapter was by definition life under the hegemony of the dominant Achaian states. As demonstrated earlier, the occasional although potent ability of the Achaian poleis to marshal their demographic and economic advantages in a pan-Achaian manner automatically created serious difficulties for the non-Achaian states of the region. Further compromises in the autonomy of the non-Achaian poleis were effectively compelled by the rise of the Sybarite empire, a demonstrably complex and powerful imperial system which can be said to have dominated the region from c. 600-510.

Moreover, the precise policies of the non-Achaian states within the archaic Italiote polis-system are difficult to determine. Not only do the Achaians dominate politically, but also in terms of what the ancient sources have to say on the period in general. Thus, the actions of non-Achaian poleis are invariably discussed in detail only when they involve Achaian poleis, and even then this is usually confined to the two most
powerful Achaian states, Sybaris and Kroton. What information independent of the Achaians and their actions that does exist is furthermore largely confined to foundation myths and nostos-related legends. Study of the non-Achaian poleis and their role in the polis-system of central Magna Graecia during the archaic period is therefore not an exact science and to a large degree must revolve around their Achaian counterparts and in particular the events which they drove. However, in order to achieve a minimum level of focus upon the development and policies of the non-Achaian poleis, events such as the fall of Siris and the Battle of the Sagra River, whilst usually initiated by the Achaians themselves, will be examined from a non-Achaian perspective as much as possible.

Section One: The price of isolation: the death of Siris.

A common theme linking non-Achaian participants in the polis-system of the region must have been their fear of isolation in the face of Achaian or pan-Achaian aggression. As discussed in the previous chapter, Ionian Siris was probably second only to Sybaris during the late seventh and early sixth centuries in terms of wealth (Livy 24.20.15). However, Siris was not able to call upon allies in the region in the way Sybaris could, and did, in a devastating fashion. Sybaris was able to enlist the services of its fellow Achaians in Kroton and
Metapontion, and indeed, only a generation earlier had been able to request and successfully manipulate a fresh wave of Achaian colonists from the Peloponnesos.

Siris, on the other hand, was far removed from its metropolis, Kolophon, whose own impressive military power (Strabo 14.1.28), had been effectively stripped during a Lydian invasion in the first half of the seventh century.¹ The only other hope Siris may have had presumably lay in attracting pan-Ionian support from the Euboians on the Straits of Messina. However, as has been argued throughout chapter 3, the Euboians had successfully constructed what was in many ways a polis-system apart on the Straits, and would have had little to gain from a military confrontation with distant Sybaris. Given Taras' offer of military support to Neapolis around 327 (DH 15.5.3), the prospect of naval aid to Siris from Euboian Kyme was not, theoretically, impossible despite the distance. However, like the Straits poleis, Kyme had become part of a separate polis-system replete with its own guidelines and problems and was thus also unlikely to have intervened on the Sirites' behalf.

Moreover as stated earlier, even if it wanted to, Siris’ nearest

non-Achaian neighbour Taras was not in a position to intervene in anyone's favour, let alone challenge the growing regional power of Sybaris and its allies. One source of support Siris may have been able to count upon was the indigenous population adjacent to and within its *chora*. As discussed in chapters 1 and 4, the Oinotrians and Chonians who had come into contact with the Kolophonian colonists had prospered from the relationship and probably preferred the relatively benevolent Sirite contact over that of the more exploitative Achaians. That the indigenes may have adopted such a position is suggested by the aforementioned demise of Lagaria, described by de la Genière as a 'mixed Chonian-Ionian Greek town'. Destroyed by the Achaians at approximately the same time as Siris itself, it is possible Lagaria chose to support the Sirites and suffered for this alignment. As reinforced by the similar fate of those Oinotrian towns under Sybarite control or influence in the wake of Kroton's victory in 510, the central Italiote *polis*-system was clearly a ruthless world in which even the non-Greek population was not immune to the vicissitudes of essentially Greek initiated conflict.

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2 De la Genière, "L'identification de Lagaria et ses problèmes", p. 65.
Section Two: The artful survivor: Lokroi Epizephyrioi and the struggles of the sixth century.

Despite the collapse of the foremost non-Achaian polis in the 570’s (Siris), others continued to survive and even prosper after a fashion. Indeed, Lokroi Epizephyrioi, founded from Lokris in the first half of the seventh century provides an interesting contrast to the fortunes of the ill-fated Siris.\(^3\) Given its location at the southern end of the central band of Greek settlement in Magna Graecia, and its occupation of a promontory valuable for maritime navigation, the foundation of Lokroi demonstrates early signs of having belonged to a system apart from its northern neighbours. In particular, it is to Korinth and its colony at Syracuse that Lokroi may have owed its original situation (Strabo 6.1.7).\(^4\) This scenario is well supported by the likelihood that it was the Korinthians who were the dominant maritime players in the Gulf of Korinth during the seventh century, and thus the most likely candidates for having provided the Lokrians with their passage to the West.

However, during the sixth century Lokroi was forced to adopt

\(^3\) Eusebios provides a date between 679 and 673, whilst archaeological evidence indicates a range between c. 690 and c. 650. See TWGb, p.171.

policies which would see it effectively straddle the Achaian dominated *polis*-system to its north and the Euboian dominated system to its south. Linked by Pompeius Trogus through Justin to the conflict between Siris and its Achaian neighbours (20.2.10-3.9), it would at first appear that Lokroi sided with the Sirites in the 570’s. This is also the view taken by many modern scholars regarding Lokroi’s role in the early sixth century Italiote *polis*-system,⁵ and evidence has also been produced to demonstrate a sacral bond between Lokroi and Siris to compliment the military one.⁶ What is certain is that Kroton and Lokroi met in battle at the Sagra river some time after the fall of Siris (Theopompos, *FGrH* 116 F392; Konon, *FGrH* 26 F1.18; Diod. 8.32; Paus. 3.19.12; Strabo 6.1.10; Livy 19.18.16). It is also probable that since it was the Lokrians who called for aid to ward off an assault it was the Krotoniates who were the aggressors (Diod. 8.32).

The date and course of the Battle of the Sagra has remained a controversial topic, in part due to the wide range of indicators presented by the various ancient sources,⁷ and also in part

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⁷ *RCA*, pp. 240-51.
due to the clouds produced by the propaganda that was spawned by the conflict, no doubt from the time of the battle onwards.\textsuperscript{8} However, a consensus of sorts has developed over the last fifty years placing the battle between c. 560 and c. 540, although as will be discussed in detail below, preference will be given to the date of c. 550, as proposed by Giangiulio and others.\textsuperscript{9} The course of the battle itself allegedly pitted some 130,000 Krotoniates against a force of between 10,000 and 15,000 troops seeking to defend Lokroi (Strabo 6.1.10; Justin 20.2.4). As stated earlier, the details of the event are difficult to determine and are rendered almost unintelligible by the layers of myth applied in hindsight by the ancient sources. Not in dispute is that Lokroi was victorious, although the disparity between the opposing armies, and by extension the magnitude of the victory, is unlikely to have been as high as the ratio of 8:1 given by the sources.

The argument for the pro-Sirite sympathies amongst the Lokrians as being the prime motivation for Kroton's invasion of Lokroi does not correspond well with the overall context of Lokrian-Krotoniate relations, nor with the chronology of the attack. It is usually assumed by the supporters of substantial


\textsuperscript{9} \textit{RCA}, p. 251; De Sensi Sestito, \textit{La Calabria in età arcaica e classica}, p. 36; \textit{TWGa}, p. 360; Callaway, \textit{Sybaris}, p. 63.
Lokrian aid for Siris that Lokroi invaded the Krotoniate ally and protégé, Kaulonia in order to distract the Krotoniate army from participating in the invasion of the Siritid. Moreover, given that the location of the Sagra is generally believed to lie between the *chorai* of Lokroi and the Achaian *polis* of Kaulonia, it would appear that Kroton may have in fact been responding to a Lokrian incursion in this area. However, as Justin records the presence of the Krotoniates at the Sybarite-led attack on Siris, this attempted distraction must be regarded as a failure. Furthermore, given the lengthy gap between the fall of Siris (the late 570's) and the events at Sagra (c. 550), it is possible that the Krotoniate invasion of Lokroi was merely linked with Siris through hindsight, or perhaps even by pro-Krotoniate sources seeking justification for their campaign.

Indeed, Lokroi may well have launched an opportunistic raid during the absence of the Krotoniate army, thus planting the seeds of a tradition which would go on to imply a Siris-Lokroi alliance.

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10 *TWGa*, p. 358; Bicknell, "The Date of the Battle of the Sagra River", p. 300.

However, it cannot be accepted that Lokroi launched an invasion of its own against Kaulonia in the 570's in support of Siris. As Kaulonia was closely tied to the fortunes and policies of Kroton,\textsuperscript{12} it is difficult to believe that Kroton would have waited some twenty years either to evict a Lokrian occupation force or to retaliate for any damage inflicted as the Lokrians retreated. Indeed, even if the upper range for the Battle of the Sagra is accepted (c. 560), an unacceptable gap still remains between action and alleged reaction.

Indeed, an analysis of the relationship between Lokroi and Kroton during the archaic period reveals that the two poleis probably experienced little turbulence until the conflict on the Sagra. From this time it appears that Lokrian and Krotoniate forces, along with associated allies, clashed regularly, thus indicating that the beginning of the major phase of antagonism between the two was in the second half of the century rather than the first.\textsuperscript{13} Moreover, while the Battle of the Sagra serves as a good example of the Achaian states' predatory attitude towards non-Achaian poleis, it clearly was not a part of the pan-Achaian spirit that brought down Siris. Lokroi had

\textsuperscript{12} RCA, p. 223; TWGb, p. 181; Manfredi & Braccesi, I Greci d'Occidente, p. 144.

\textsuperscript{13} The two states and their allies are known to have fought around 525 (SEG 11.1211), in the 470's (Strabo 6.1.5), and in 389 (Diod. 14.106.3).
the good fortune of only having to deal with one Achaian *polis*, albeit one of the larger ones. The Sagra conflict should therefore be treated as a separate and new phase of conflict in the *polis*-system of central Magna Graecia and retain a date far removed from the fall of Siris.

That the Battle of the Sagra should be treated as belonging to a new period of conflict, unrelated to the fall of Siris and beginning around the middle of the sixth century, is reinforced by the details of Lokroi's relationship with its Achaian neighbours to the north, and in particular Kroton. Lokrian territorial interests had been concentrated since at least the mid seventh century on the Tyrrhenian shores of Magna Graecia. This may have been in part provoked by the Krotoniate-sponsored foundation at Kaulonia, which effectively curtailed Lokrian expansion on the littoral of the Ionian Sea.\(^\text{14}\) On the other hand, Lokrian foundations at Hipponion and Medma between c. 650 and c. 600 did not elicit a hostile Krotoniate response and can therefore be assumed to have been non-issues for Kroton.\(^\text{15}\) However, around 550 two events indicate that the Tyrrhenian littoral of central Magna Graecia may have been running out of room (see map 5). As discussed in chapter 3, the old Zanklaian colony of Metauros,

\(^{14}\) *RCA*, pp. 223-4 & n. 35.

\(^{15}\) *TWGb*, pp. 181-2.
situated on the Tyrrhenian shores of Magna Graecia, passed into Lokrian hands, thus heralding the first significant reinforcement of the Lokrian presence on this side of the isthmus in fifty years. Moreover, this period is also the likely home of the clash on the Sagra, a conflict in which Kroton appears to have decided that Lokroi had to be extinguished.

Thus rather than looking solely to the Sirite war for a *casus belli*, it may be more constructive to consider the Tyrrhenian context.\(^\text{16}\) In the course of the sixth century Kroton is known to have founded at least one colony of its own on the Tyrrhenian, at Terina (Steph. Byz. *s.v.* *Τέρινα*; Solinus 2.10; Pliny, *NH* 3.72; [Skymnos] 306-7; Phlegon, *FGrH* 257 F31). Although no date is provided for this foundation we do know that it was minting its own coins by c. 500, and thus must have come into existence some time before this date.\(^\text{17}\) Indeed, that it is probable that Terina was founded many decades before its first coins were minted is indicated by the type of coins issued. In the period following the collapse of the Sybarite empire, a relatively large number of *poleis* and sub-colonies began to mint coins for the first time, under the aegis of Kroton and its distinctive *PO* legend. Included within this


\(^{17}\) Attianese, *Kroton: Ex Nummis Historia*, p. 61.
list were such towns as Pandosia, Temesa and Laos, whose pre-
510 existence is not in doubt. Terina had therefore probably been founded much earlier than its first coins indicate.

Furthermore, the foundation of Terina must have fall into the period post-dating the destruction of Siris (the 570’s), as it is only after this time that sustained Krotoniate expansion in any direction can be detected. It is therefore possible that Terina was in fact founded around the middle of the century, if not slightly before. The strengthening of the Lokrian position at Metauros and the contemporary conflict on the Sagra are thus provided with a workable context. After a century of relatively peaceful interaction, it would appear that Lokroi and Kroton came to blows not as a direct result of Siris, but because of the effective expiry of what was probably a de facto spheres of interest agreement. Lokroi, confined in its actions to the Ionian coast by Kroton and Kaulonia, was now faced with Krotoniate incursions into its previously undisturbed territories on the Tyrrhenian coast.

War between the two poleis was therefore likely, and Kroton, having realized that its presence at Terina was ultimately no match for Lokrian Hipponion, Medma and Metauros, probably chose to strike Lokroi where the odds were in its favour, across

\footnote{RCA, pp. 224-7 & n. 35.}
the Sagra frontier. Moreover, this would not be the last Lokrian-Krotoniate conflict over Tyrrhenian territory. An oblique reference in Strabo to a 470’s Lokrian invasion of Temesa (6.1.5), a Tyrrhenian *polis* then under Krotoniate control and the nearest neighbour of Terina, indicates that the sixth century did not bring an end to Lokrian-Krotoniate competition in the region. Thus war when it did arise between the two states was very likely to have its origin in the western marches of their respective territories, rather than in battles fought out on the distant Siritid plain.

While it is certainly not out of the question that Lokroi viewed the survival of Siris as indirectly advantageous to itself, it is improbable that the *polis*-system of the region was so polarized along ethno-military lines that Lokroi would act in such a way so as to risk provoking Achaian intervention into its own sphere. Indeed, until the Krotoniate foundation at Terina some years later, Lokroi had been able to expand without Achaian interference for nearly a century, and in real terms probably stood to gain little by intervening in Siris’ favour and to lose little if it held itself aloof. Ultimately, when Lokroi did come into conflict with its northern neighbours, no pan-Achaian crusade materialized, further undermining any claim for a special linkage with the Sirite war.
The key ingredients of Lokroi’s ability to defeat the Krotoniate invasion and indeed survive the Achaian-dominated polis-system of the sixth century were derived from a variety of sources. Perhaps the foremost among them was its ability to recruit allies, an area in which the Sirites appear to have failed dismally. In his accounts of the Battle of the Sagra, Strabo states that the Lokrians were assisted by the Rhegines (Strabo 6.1.10). The extent of Reginon’s aid to Lokroi is debatable, due to the confusing manner in which the figures for the opposing armies are given. Whether Strabo’s figure of ten thousand for the Lokrian-led coalition includes the Rhegines is unclear, although Justin’s assertion (20.2.4), that the army totalled some fifteen thousand (without any reference to the Rhegines) may indicate that the Rhegine contribution was five thousand, thus constituting up to one third of the total.\(^{19}\)

Moreover, given that the largest known Rhegine land force, assembled in 399, did not exceed 6,600 (Diod. 14.40.3), the importance of the Rhegine contribution cannot be overstated. From the Rhegine point of view at least, this was a serious commitment of forces beyond its borders. In seeking to ascertain the precise impact of the Rhegine contribution it is also possible to speculate on the nature of the anti-Krotoniate coalition’s victory. Given that the main strength of Reginon was

\(^{19}\) Napoli, *Civiltà della Magna Grecia*, p. 312.
vested in its navy rather than its army, it is possible that the larger Krotoniate force was outflanked by a Rhegine contingent transported north of the Sagra by sea and therefore behind the already committed army of Kroton. Without supporting archaeological or literary evidence a scenario such as this must of course remain speculation only, but the point is made that an alliance with Rhegion would have given Lokroi a number of new options and advantages in its struggle with Kroton.

That the Lokrians could have been so successful in recruiting such a significant non-Lokrian force may have had much to do with Rhegion’s own assessment of Kroton’s wider aims. The border between Lokroi and Rhegion, usually placed at the Halex or nearby Kaikinos river, was within fifteen kilometres of the Rhegine astu. A defeat for Lokroi at the Sagra would thus in all likelihood have brought an aggressive and expansionist Achaian power within striking distance of Rhegion itself. For Rhegion to support Lokroi therefore makes much more sense than for Lokroi to have supported Siris two decades.

earlier. At Sagra the case for anti-Achaian solidarity was simply far stronger than when Siris was threatened with destruction.

A second factor in Lokroi’s favour when it was attempting to thwart the Krotoniate invasion was time. It is possible that the alliance with Rhegion was contracted some time before the clash on the Sagra and was therefore not overly reliant upon prior warning of the invasion. However, comments by Livy indicate that the Lokrians had enough warning of the planned attack to contemplate removing the treasures of its extramural temple of Persephone-Proserpina to the astu, and later to construct a wall around the temple (19.18.16-17). Moreover, Diodoros also remarks that the Lokrians had the time to send ambassadors to Sparta and receive a reply before the battle commenced (8.32). Both sources suggest that Lokroi had a valuable window of opportunity to seek allies, probably only a matter of months, but enough at least to bring the Rhegines onside.

The expedition to Sparta just prior to the clash at the Sagra also indicates that the Lokrians were seeking to internationalize the upcoming conflict beyond the borders of Magna Graecia. Indeed, if Diodoros’ comments are accurate this is the first recorded instance of Greeks in the West requesting political
and/or military intervention from the Aegean.\textsuperscript{21} Certainly, the presence of the Lokrian Xenokritos at Sparta during the sixth century indicates that contacts at an individual level between the two \textit{poleis} existed (Plut., \textit{Moralia} 1134b-c).\textsuperscript{22} Moreover, Lokroi was not the only state to apply for Spartan aid in the middle of the sixth century, with Kroisos of Lydia also petitioning the Spartans as early as c. 550, the catalyst being the emergence of Spartan hegemony of the southern Peloponnesos after the end of the Tegeate War (Hdt. 1.65, 67-8).\textsuperscript{23} That the Lokrians would take such a step also underscores the difficult position many of the non-Achaian \textit{poleis} found themselves in when attempting to survive the rigours of the Italiote \textit{polis}-system.

Although each individual Achaian \textit{polis} must have placed its own interests first, as has been demonstrated there clearly did exist an ability to act in unison and to appeal to a broader audience, much in the same way Athens and the Ionians of the eastern Aegean interacted in the fifth century, despite the fact that unity was often involuntary on the part of the latter (Hdt. 

\textsuperscript{21} The next known intervention from the Greek Mainland was around 491, when the Korinthians and Kerkyraians mediated between Hippokrates of Gela and Syracuse (Hdt. 7.154)

\textsuperscript{22} Giangiulio, "Le tradizione leggendarie intorno alla battaglia della sagra", pp. 500-1.

\textsuperscript{23} Cartledge, \textit{Sparta and Lakonia: A Regional History}, pp. 138, 143.
However, the Lokrians, as well as the Sirites and Tarentines, had no such resources to draw upon. The plea to Sparta was in effect an attempt to broaden what resources the Lokrians had, and it is from this period that a tradition linking the two poleis in a mythological sense may have originated.

In particular it is the assertion that Lokroi was in fact founded by Sparta (Paus. 3.3.1), a claim backed by a foundation myth remarkably similar to that of the one known Spartan apoikia in Magna Graecia, Taras (Polybios. 12.8, cf. Paus. 10.10.6-8), which seeks to link the two states. Spartan military aid never actually appeared, but the legendary despatchment of the Dioskouroi by Sparta (Diod. 8.32) ensured that Lokroi would thenceforth, at least in a cultural sense, affiliate itself with the Dorian ethnos of Magna Graecia. This arose as a direct result of a need for an ethnic identity with which to combat the virulent strain of ‘Achaianism’ that had taken hold in Magna Graecia.

25 Ibid., p. 191.
26 Lokroi would later turn to ‘Dorianism’ in the political sense too, when the threat of the Krotoniate-dominated Achaian League in the late fifth and early fourth centuries finally forced Lokroi to call upon the forces of Dorian Syracuse to defend itself (Polybios 2.39.6-7; Diod. 14.44.6,
The third factor which Lokroi was able to count in its favour when competing with the Achaians for its survival was the sub-colonial system it maintained throughout the sixth century. Indeed, this system can be said to have had much in common with the sub-colonization efforts of the Achaians themselves. An Olympic dedication, dating to the last quarter of the sixth century sketches the outlines of a conflict between Lokroi, Medma and Hipponion on the one hand, and Kroton on the other (SEG 11.1211). The inference is that when Lokroi went to war, it could rely upon the support of a network of sub-colonies, all of which were situated on the Tyrrhenian side of the isthmus. Indeed, it is probable that this inscription indicates that, as with such sites as Laos, Skidros, and Aminaia (under Sybarite control), and Terina, Petelia and Krimissa (under Krotoniate control), the Lokrian colonies were subject to reasonably tight supervision from the metropolis.

78.5).


28 RCA, pp. 256-7.
That this was in fact the case is indicated by the relationship between Lokroi and its colonies during the fifth and fourth centuries. It is suggested in remarks made by Thucydides that the war which Hipponion and Medma were waging against Lokroi in 422 was not merely a border conflict between independent poleis, but rather an event traumatic enough to bring about a radical shift in Lokrian foreign policy (5.5.2-3). The war was in all probability an attempt by the colonies to redefine their unequal relationship with their metropolis, an act which Lokroi was to punish severely in 388 when it condoned the destruction visited upon Hipponion by Dionysios I of Syracuse (Diod. 14.107.2). Moreover, the subsequent Syracusan carve up of the Hipponiate chora in favour of Lokroi is described by Diodoros in terms of Dionysios priding himself (φιλοτιμέομαι) in providing what amounts to being territorial favours (εὖ πολεῖν) for the Lokrians, an indirect reference to the control Lokroi was once accustomed to exercising over Hipponion and keen to do so again.

Therefore, part of Lokroi’s ability to survive the Achaian onslaught from the north was its close, if not hegemonal,

relationship with its colonies on the Tyrrhenian Sea. As has been seen with the Olympic dedication cited above, this proved vital in at least one of the conflicts between Lokroi and Kroton, in the last quarter of the sixth century. Clearly Lokroi was neither short of allies in the sixth century, nor did it shy away from seeking them out, whether they were neighbours or based across the Ionian Sea. All of these factors helped to preserve the integrity of the Lokrian state in the archaic period, despite the presence of expansionist neighbours to the north. Indeed, Lokroi appears to have been able to expand in its own right, albeit in areas in which neither the Achaians to the north or the Euboians to the south were interested for much of the archaic period.

However, due to the Achaian-centric nature of the region, Lokroi was also subject to strict limitations. The Battle of the Sagra quite possibly resulted in the extension of Lokrian political influence over Kaulonia, a small Achaian polis which had been founded and probably protected by Kroton up until this time.31 Nevertheless, this extension in the Lokrian sphere of influence was temporary at best. Kroton's triumph over Sybaris in 510 saw the former rise to a position of renewed and determined strength, and no doubt heralded a resumption, if indeed this had not already occurred, of its

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guardianship of Kaulonia. Certainly there was no trace of Lokrian political influence at Kaulonia early in 389 when Lokroi’s ally, Dionysios, marched against the *polis* and the army of the newly formed Krotoniate-dominated Italiote League (Diod. 14.103.4-6, 106.3).

Similarly, the suggestion that Kaulonia was in opposition to Lokroi and its aims during the Peloponnesian War can be gleaned from two passages in Thoukydides (7.25.2, 35.2). In the case of the former passage, Kauloniate territory is clearly considered fair game by Syracuse and its Lokrian allies, thus implying that Kaulonia was already hostile to Lokroi. In the case of the latter, despite being rebuffed by Kroton, the Athenian fleet under Demosthenes and Eurymedon was able to dock at various *poleis* situated between Kroton and Rheidion (Ἰοχοντες πρὸς ταῖς πόλεωι), with the exception of Lokroi which was at that time hostile to Athens. Given that there are only two Greek sites within these parameters, namely Kaulonia and Skylletion, it follows that Lokroi could not have been in control of either of them otherwise it would have refused admittance to the Athenian fleet, an action that could be taken without serious risk of Athenian retribution, as demonstrated by the fleet’s desire to avoid violent confrontations with other recalcitrant *poleis*. 
In sum, it is very unlikely that Lokrian political influence survived at Kaulonia for any great length of time in either the archaic or classical periods, at least down to the decisive intervention of Dionysios in the fourth century. While Lokroi was certainly able to keep Kroton at bay and even advance from time to time during the archaic period, ultimately it was Kroton that proved to be the more effective check on Lokrian ambitions rather than *vice versa*. Testimony to this fact lies within the numerous Lokrian appeals for foreign intervention on its behalf, including, over a 150 year period, to Sparta, Syracuse and even Athens. As will be discussed further in chapter 6, while Kroton’s Tyrrhenian ambitions were clearly complicated by the presence of Lokrian sub-colonies, it was still able to expand northwards without any real need to consider Lokroi a deadly threat. However, what Lokroi could and did achieve within the highly competitive and dangerous *polis*-system of the archaic period which witnessed the total annihilation of two far greater *poleis*, was to survive and to survive with honours.
Section Three: Life on the periphery: Taras and its ‘quiet’ centuries.

Founded according to Eusebian tradition around 706, Taras was an *apoikia* of pre-Lykourgan Sparta, established under the auspices of the legendary *oikistes* Phalanthos (Ephoros, *FGrH* 70 F216; Antiochos *FGrH* 555 F13; Arist., *Pol.* 1306b29; [Skymnos] 330ff.; Paus. 10.10.6-8; DH 19.1; Diod. 8.21). This date matches approximately with the end of the First Messenian War with which Taras’ foundation is supposed to be linked (c. 735-c. 715), as well as the available archaeological evidence. However, as with the other non-Achaian colonies of central Magna Graecia, the archaic history of Taras is an ill-documented period. Indeed, while the archaeological evidence reveals much concerning the internal workings of the Tarentine state, both archaeological and the literary sources are relatively weak concerning Taras’ participation in the central Italiote *polis*-system.

An essential factor in this weakness, as described in the literary sources, is the region in which the Spartan colony was founded. Situated in the north-eastern corner of central Magna Graecia, Taras was geographically a colony apart. What is more, Taras did not even share a border with another fully-

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32 *TWGa*, p. 31.
fledged Greek polis until the foundation of Metapontion towards the end of the seventh century, over one hundred years after its own foundation. Thus almost half of Taras' archaic history, at least in terms of foreign policy, was necessarily concerned almost exclusively with the non-Greek tribes resident on the Sallentine peninsula, and in particular the Illyrian-speaking Iapygians. In this respect, Taras can be said to have evolved in an environment not dissimilar to that in which Euboian Kyme was situated. However, while Kyme experienced many years of growth prior to the Etruscan wars of the late sixth century, for Taras, warfare with its non-Greek neighbours was associated with its very foundation and became a chronic problem.

Certainly, Taras was not the only apoikia in Magna Graecia to meet opposition from the indigenous population. As discussed in chapter 1, there exists very good evidence to suggest that the Achaians had to fight to wrest control of the more fertile valleys of southern Italy from the Oinotrians and Chonians. However, such conflict permeates the very mythology surrounding the foundation of Taras in a way not seen in other Italiote poleis. The Delphic oracle allegedly given to the Spartan colonists before their departure from Greece records a tradition which integrates an ideology of Tarentine-Iapygian warfare into the colonization process (Diod. 8.21.3). Moreover,
Pausanias states explicitly that the Spartan colonists conquered both the original Spartan settlement in Italy at Satyrion and the site of Taras from the local Italian population (10.10.6-8).

As with Sybaris and Metapontion to the west, the physical parameters of the archaic Tarentine polis were established relatively early on in the colonization process. The chora of the polis extended no more than fifteen kilometres inland and was thus largely confined to the low lying country about the Mar Piccolo. This territory included a number of scattered Greek hamlets dating from the eighth century onwards, including sites close to modern Crispiano, and as recorded by Strabo, these were probably carved out of the territory of Ouria and other Iapygian towns (6.3.6). Tarentine control can also be assumed to have been maintained over the original Spartan colonial exclave at Satyrion twenty-five kilometres to the south, although archaeological evidence suggests that the later population may have been hellenized or hellenizing rather than hellenic.

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33 Ibid., p. 146; Whitehouse & Wilkins, “Greeks and natives in southeast Italy”, p. 107.
While the largest cache of literary evidence concerning Tarentine-Iapygian relations dates to the early classical period, there is good evidence to suggest that the Tarentines made only fitful progress against their non-Greek neighbours up until this time. A sculptural group by the hand of Ageladas of Argos and dedicated by the Tarentines at Olympia records a victory over the Messapians, a branch of the Iapygian *ethnos* (Paus. 10.10.6). The dedicatory inscription on this donation has been dated to between c. 490 and c. 480.\(^3\) However, a large scale war between Taras and its Rhegine allies on the one hand, and the Iapygians on the other in 473 resulted in a drastic defeat for Taras (Hdt. 7.170; Diod. 11.52), reiterating Wuilleumier’s characterization of the Iapygians as “une vive resistance” to Tarentine ambitions.\(^3\)

Other conflicts, involving various Iapygian, Messapian and Peuketian neighbours, ranging from the 490’s to the 460’s brought more favourable results for Taras (Paus. 10.13.10; Klearchos, *FHG* 2.306),\(^3\) but as late as 415 Taras still did not


\(^{3}\) Wuilleumier, *Tarente*, p. 53.

exercise control over the offshore Choirades islands (Thouk. 7.33.3) - a bare minimum if Taras hoped to develop as a significant naval power. Unlike the Oinotrian and Chonian populations to the west, the Illyrian tribes who dominated much of the Sallentine interior were successfully assertive in both cultural and military spheres. Living in quasi-*synoikized* and increasingly fortified settlements under hegemonal kings (Thouk. 7.33; Strabo 6.3.6), the Iapygians generally remained culturally and politically independent of the Tarentines, thus constituting a serious barrier to Tarentine territorial expansion and political development. Moreover, adding to these already considerable problems was the outbreak of *stasis* in the years immediately following the foundation of the Tarentine *polis*. According to Strabo (6.3.6) and Justin (3.4), the Spartan *oikistes* of Taras, Phalanthos, was ejected from the *polis* and was forced to dwell in exile in Iapygian Brentesion, a development that, if true, indicates that colony probably took some time to consolidate its hold over even its core territory.

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In essence, Taras found it difficult to play a significant role in the high stakes Italiote *polis*-system, largely due to the limitations imposed on it by its non-Greek neighbours. Consequently, Taras was poorly placed to emulate the success enjoyed by its Achaian neighbours whose exploitation of their demographic, agricultural and territorial resources underpinned their dominance of the *polis*-system in the archaic period. That Taras would have suffered developmental disadvantages from this confinement is further suggested by the powerful position of Taras *vis à vis* the other Greek states of the Italiote *polis*-system in the fourth century. By the middle of the fourth century, and in particular under the leadership of the *strategos* Archytas, the Tarentines had managed either to assert their control or at least impose a degree of order over the Illyrian-speaking tribes of the interior. This development in turn helped to facilitate the growth of Tarentine power, particularly in relation to its role in the Italiote *polis*-system and its dominance of the reconstructed Italiote League.

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Despite the extremely low profile that Taras was largely forced to adopt during the archaic period, there are some small indications within the primary sources as to what its policies were thought to have been in regards to the polis-system in which it operated. In an earlier discussion of Antiochos' information on Metapontion (FGrH 555 F12), it was outlined that Antiochos believed that Metapontion was founded by the Achaian Italiotes in order to thwart Tarentine ambitions in the region. It was also argued that this scenario was improbable due to the weakness of the Tarentine polis at that time (c. 600). It should be re-emphasized at this point that it is extremely unlikely that Taras would have sought to antagonize the Achaians to its west, especially considering its own precarious position regarding its non-Greek neighbours. Even as late as the 370's, Taras was loath to challenge the Achaian domination of the central Italiote polis-system, and in all probability only received its first real opportunity to make inroads against this hegemony due to the intervention of Syracuse against Kroton.

A second scrap of literary evidence regarding the foundation myth of Taras also hints at the existence of reasonably

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43 See chapter 4.

44 Caven, Dionysius I: Warlord of Sicily, p. 196; Brauer, Taras, pp. 43-4.
tolerable relations between Taras and the Achaian poleis. Ephoros notes that after the Partheniai had departed from Sparta, but prior to the actual foundations at Satyrion and Taras itself, the Spartan colonists encountered 'Αχαιοὺς πολεμοῦντας τοῖς βαρβάροις (FGrH 70 F216). That the Achaians referred to here are likely to have been of the Italiote rather than the Peloponnesian variety is implied on two counts. Firstly, the Partheniai had, as noted above, already left Sparta and presumably the Peloponnesos itself; and secondly, that the presence of barbaroi simply does not suit the Peloponnesian context. Indeed, given the traditional foundation date of Taras (c. 706), it is feasible that the Achaians in question may actually have been those who had founded Sybaris around 720 or Kroton around 709, and were currently still engaged in intermittent warfare with the Oinotrians, whose non-Greek nature would have easily classified them as barbaroi. Moreover, that Ephoros states that the Partheniai aided the Achaians in their conflict with the barbaroi suggests that at least as far as the eighth century was concerned, relations between Spartan Taras and at least some of the Italiote Achaians may actually have been cordial.

While the plethora of stories surrounding the foundation of Taras are often contradictory and unreliable, the primacy of
Antiochos' assertion that Taras and Sybaris were foes by 600 if not earlier, should not be assumed. Ephoros clearly provides an alternative to this depiction of the eastern edges of the Italiote polis-system in the early archaic period, and the view espoused by Antiochos has, as discussed above, been undermined somewhat by the fact that Taras was already in a weak position vis à vis Sybaris and the other Achaian poleis. That the settlers of the future polis of Taras at first reconnoitred the coastline within the Achaian sphere of influence and subsequently became embroiled in a conflict between Achaians, Oinotrians and Chonians cannot be ruled out. Moreover, with respect to both Ephoros and Antiochos, it is not out of the question that after this conflict had been resolved, the Achaians may have politely asked the Spartans to resume their voyage, directing them further east. At any rate, there is nothing in this scenario to suggest that Taras was the victim of Achaian aggression, latent or otherwise. Indeed, the regional designs of Sybaris have already been demonstrated to have been directed towards the acquisition of extra grainland and the establishment of secure trans-isthmian routes, neither of which Taras stood to offer the Sybarites in the event of a war of conquest.45

45 Although the agricultural assets of Taras were not inconsequential, in comparison to what was available in the chorai of Sybaris, Siris and Metapontion, their value would have been substantially inferior. See Strabo 6.3.6; Brauer, Taras, p. 14.
Therefore, the claim of Achaian-Tarentine *conflits de voisinage* by Wuilleumier needs to be re-examined.\(^4\)\(^6\) Clearly neither Sybaris or Metapontion demonstrated any real inclination to expand along the eastern shores of the Gulf of Taranto during the early years of the archaic period, nor can it be believed that Taras would have tried to provoke such a move at this time. Indeed, even the Battle of the Sagra, in which Lokroi may have attempted to recruit the support of Taras and its Spartan *metropolis*, does not appear to have warranted a response from the northern Achaians who were clearly not interested in either the ambitions or failures of Kroton.

Nevertheless, according to Antiochos, Taras and Achaian Metapontion went to war at some point in their histories (*FGrH* 555 F12). This conflict also appears to have involved the Oinotrians, presumably those dwelling in and around the Metapontine *chora* as the ancient sources are definite on the north-eastern border of Oinotria not extending beyond Metapontion itself (Strabo 6.1.4). In seeking to provide a context for this war, it is possible that at some point after c. 600, the foundation date for Achaian Metapontion, Taras and its nearest Achaian neighbour came to blows over the preferred location of an as yet undemarcated frontier. In turn,

\(^4\)\(^6\) Wuilleumier, *Tarente*, p. 52.
local Oinotrians may have been encouraged by Taras to attack, or perhaps 'rise up' against, the Metapontines who in all likelihood had been seeking to exercise control over northern Oinotria, thus emulating the policies of their Sybarite cousins to the south.

That the frontier between Taras and Metapontion may have been disputed during the sixth century is supported by archaeological evidence. As discussed in chapter 2, the Metapontines constructed a monumental Heraion by the Bradano River which served to mark out the northern border of their polis. As this temple did not appear in monumental form until the second half of the sixth century, it is to be understood that the frontier between Taras and Metapontion was not formally settled until two generations after the foundation of Achaian Metapontion. Moreover, it is also evident that an Oinotrian site at Cozzo Presepe, fifteen kilometres north-west of the Metapontine astu, was destroyed during the sixth century and replaced with a Metapontine phourion. Clearly at some point in the sixth century the Achaians of Metapontion were engaged in a conflict with the

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Oinotrians. Taken in conjunction with the relatively late establishment of the monumental Heraion on the Bradano, it would therefore appear that the first half of the sixth century provides plenty of room to accommodate a war between Metapontion, Taras, and the Oinotrians.

However, there are other indications that Taras did manage, to a degree, to expand its territory and influence during the sixth century, in many ways foreshadowing the advances it would make within the Italiote polis-system in later years. By c. 500 it would appear that Taras had either acquired or founded two coastal sites on the Sallentine peninsula, at Kallipolis and Hydrous. Strabo also attributes a Greek origin to the town of Rodiai, on the eastern shore of the peninsula (6.3.5), although since no indication of a date for this acquisition/foundation is given, the reference could well be to the late classical period when Tarentine influence in the Sallentine interior was approaching its peak.

There are also indications that Taras was not bereft of contact with fellow Greeks. Vases imported from Sparta and Korinth during the archaic period suggest that Taras maintained a minimum level of contact with the Peloponnesos and its

49 Brauer, Taras, p. 14. See also Pomponius Mela 2.67.1; DH 17.4; Plin., HN 3.11.
metropolis, although it is not until the fourth century that Taras can be said to have placed any real political importance on its relationship with Sparta. Trade links with Dorian Knidos during the late sixth century are also attested by Herodotos (3.138).

That Taras began minting its first coins around 510 may also indicate that during the last decades of the sixth century Taras was beginning to expand its commercial interests, coinciding with the foundation of the two aforementioned port towns, Kallipolis and Hydrous, on the lower end of the Sallentine peninsula. Furthermore, the close chronological relationship between the opening of the Tarentine mint and the fall of Sybaris may not have been coincidental, and the same can be said of Taras' employment of the Achaian incuse technique upon its earliest coins. Both of these aspects of the Tarentine mint suggest economic, cultural, and perhaps even political links with one or more of the Achaian poleis to the southwest. As has been demonstrated, neither Metapontion nor its

51 A Euryponid king, Archidamos III, was recruited to fight for Taras, c. 344-c. 338 (Diod. 16.62.4, 63.2; Plut., Agis 3); as was an Agiad prince, Kleonimos, around 303 (Diod. 20.104-5, 21.4; Livy 10.2.1-15).
Sybarite patron appear to be likely candidates for an Achaian-Tarentine alliance. Warfare between Metapontion and Taras at any rate was simply too recent an event.

However, relations between Taras and Kroton appear to have been particularly strong in the last decades of the sixth century.\(^53\) Around 517 the *basileus* of Taras, Aristophilides, went to considerable lengths to assist a citizen of Kroton in the face of Persian demands to the contrary (Hdt. 3.136). Moreover, as will be discussed in detail in chapter 7, Taras was among three *poleis* to be invited by Kroton to help settle the *stasis* which was paralyzing the state in 509 (Iamb., *VP* 261). Thus the Krotoniate conquest of Sybaris in 510 may have been the signal Taras required to begin minting its own coins and therefore demonstrate its autonomy. In turn the incuse technique of its Krotoniate ally would have been a natural model for the Tarentine mint to adopt. Indeed, in political terms a Taras-Kroton axis at this time also makes much sense. As will be detailed further in chapters 6 and 7, both *poleis* had serious differences with the Sybarite bloc, which included Metapontion, and both lacked allies. Thus the opening of the Tarentine mint around 510 and the close link between its emissions and those of the largest remaining Achaian *polis*, Kroton, are unlikely to have been coincidences.

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\(^53\) Wuilleumier, *Tarente*, p. 53.
However, any Tarentine advances must be qualified by the difficult problems Taras faced when attempting expansion. As mentioned earlier, due to the tenacity of the Iapygians Taras still did not have control of the offshore Choirades islands in 415, and it is thus difficult to envisage the Tarentine polis as being a particularly wealthy trading state in the archaic period. Indeed, until the fifth century there is little evidence to suggest that Taras operated as a significant port. Moreover, that Taras had founded Kallipolis and Hydrous before the end of the sixth century may also have had much to do with the population growth that Taras appears to have experienced from c. 550, as indicated by the extension of the astu wall at this time. Trans-Mediterranean trade may well have taken place at Taras and the ports of its sub-colonies, but this alone cannot have enhanced Tarentine resources enough to have enabled it to dominate its region, nor make a major impact on the Italiote polis-system of the day.

Similarly, Taras' interactions with the other poleis of Magna Graecia during the archaic period serve only to paint Taras as a player standing upon the sidelines. Clearly Metapontion and

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Sybaris posed a significant barrier to Taras if it was to escape its difficult sojourn amongst the Iapygians and it was not until Kroton’s victory in 510 that Taras could even begin to look towards the Italiote mainstream for opportunities to expand. Indeed, it was not until the last third of the fifth century, when the Achaian tide was at its lowest ebb in the northern zone of mainstream Magna Graecia, that Taras was able to secure a hold within the Italiote heartland, at Herakleia. Thus for the bulk of the archaic period Taras was effectively engaged in a process of consolidation. Its relationship with the rest of the Italiote polis-system at this time was in many ways embryonic, shut out as it was by the problems posed by the Iapygians, and by the power of the Achaians.

CONCLUSION: a century of working within limitations.

The long years of Achaian hegemony in Magna Graecia can be seen to have made a deep impression upon the Italiote polis-system, and in many ways produced a polis-system heavily qualified in its form. Certainly the polis-system prevalent on the Greek Mainland during the archaic period was not an environment free of subjugation by hegemonal states. However, few, if any, of these states incorporated such a wide range of peoples within its borders and spheres of influence, and few, if any, were able to exercise the kind of power Sybaris
could and did during the archaic period. The annihilation of a *polis* the size and stature of Siris is testament to the different rules and circumstances of the archaic Italiote *polis*-system, and its equivalent cannot truly be said to have occurred in Greece until the advent of Makedonian imperialism and the subsequent destruction of Thebes. In essence, the Italiote *polis*-system of the archaic period experienced concentrations, as well as the use and abuse, of power not seen in the older Aegean *polis*-system. The dangers and uncertainties faced by non-Achaian *poleis* could not have been more extreme.

Moreover, the broad pattern of Achaian/non-Achaian relations in the Italiote *polis*-system can be said to have been dominated by the centre of Achaian power, Sybaris. Within this zone the presence of significant numbers of independent non-AchaianS was not tolerated. Ionian Siris was therefore effectively removed from the map of Magna Graecia, having failed to attract the necessary allies to preserve its existence. However, non-Achaian *poleis* situated to the north and south of this zone were not exposed to the full force of pan-Achaian aggression and managed to survive.

Nevertheless, for those *poleis* that did survive the imperialist urges of the Achaian giants, opportunities for self-
aggrandisement remained scarce. It has been demonstrated that on the occasions that non-Achaian states went to war with their Achaian neighbours, at no point were the latter threatened with extinction. Kroton survived a Lokrian and Rhegine-inspired defeat at the Sagra, and Metapontion stood its ground against Taras and the Oinotrians. Indeed, on both occasions the non-Achaian poleis involved were operating within alliances, underlining their own need for external assistance in what could be a fatally competitive environment.

Consequently, while Lokroi was demonstrably able to defend its borders, its dependence upon external assistance to do so also meant that its ability to expand was similarly constrained. As will be discussed further in chapter 7, it was not until the advent of an alliance with Syracuse in the early fifth century that Lokroi was able to make serious and sustained advances into Krotoniate territory. Moreover, in the case of Taras its ability to compete effectively was significantly hampered by the unresolved and bellicose nature of its own relationship with the Iapygians. Combined with the potency of the Achaian bloc to the west, Achaian Metapontion proved a substantial enough obstacle to Tarentine efforts to integrate itself into the mainstream of the Italiote polis-system well into the classical period.
In sum, the *polis*-system as defined in chapters 4 and 5 evolved into a relatively top-heavy system. Achaian states and their allies cast a shadow over most of the *poleis* in the region, and such was their collective resilience and numerical superiority that even defeat on the battlefield, as at Sagra, did not lead to either long term or fundamental redistributions in the regional balance of power. Consequently, for much of the archaic period the Italiote *polis*-system in many ways became and remained the preserve of the Achaians, at least as long as the Achaians maintained their often nominal, but simultaneously effective, unity achieved during the archaic period. Indeed, as will be discussed in the following chapters, it was not until the breakdown of the last vestiges of archaic pan-Achaianism that non-Achaian *poleis* were able to find their place in the sun.