ANATOMY OF A POLIS-SYSTEM: MAGNA GRAECIA DURING THE ARCHAIC PERIOD

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CHAPTER SIX

The breakdown of Achaian solidarity and the end of the balance of power in archaic Magna Graecia.

The closing years of the sixth century witnessed tremendous changes within the polis-system of Magna Graecia. Originating in the band of Greek settlement labelled 'mainstream' Magna Graecia in previous chapters, these changes would result in a drastic reorganization of the balance of political and military power within the Italiote polis-system. The tenets of the balance of power in existence prior to the upheavals of the late sixth century had their roots in the previous century. As discussed in chapters 1 and 4, the Achaian poleis of southern Italy, spearheaded by Sybaris, began to dominate large tracts of the peninsula from very early on in their colonial lives, and in some cases built up territories on the shores of the Ionian Sea that soon dwarfed the chorai of their metropoleis. By the end of the seventh century the Achaians had initiated a process which would see them gain control over much of the Tyrrhenian coastline of Magna Graecia as well, entering a sphere which had previously been the preserve of the Italiotes of Euboian extraction. Moreover, it is also clear that these Achaian states were operating as a de facto pan-Achaian
league, in the process sharing many elements of their respective monetary systems and on at least one occasion launching a joint military campaign.

Led by Sybaris, itself the largest and most powerful polis in Magna Graecia at that time, the Achaians influenced and in some cases dictated the events of the Italiote polis-system stretching from Taras in the north-east to Lokroi Epizephyrioi in the south. Whether it was through the incuse technique of their mints or their imperialistic expansion, the Achaians made their presence felt. Thus the crux of the balance of power during this period was Achaian domination, with Sybaris as the self-interested yet most competent standard bearer. Individual Achaian poleis did experience setbacks, but few if any of these were decisive in nature, and none altered the fact that acting in cohesion, the Achaians were virtually invincible, as the destruction of Siris, the second city of Magna Graecia, testifies.

The key weakness in the vision and reality of the ‘magna Achaia’ built in southern Italy, at least from a polis-system point of view, was that its maintenance required a willingness on the part of the Achaian states to tolerate the pecking order established among them, with Sybaris positioned at the top. Subsequent Achaian disunity removed one of the greatest
assets they possessed within the Italiote polis-system, that is joint military action. Although only one instance of pan-Achaian military intervention is known, via Pompeius Trogus and his epitomator Justin (20.2.3-4), the mere threat of such action could only have served to intimidate the non-Achaian states in the region. The removal of this potential and occasionally active power bloc from the Italiote polis-system towards the end of the sixth century had enormous consequences for the politics of the region.

Section One: The fall and rise of archaic Kroton.

Mentioned briefly in earlier chapters, the conflict between Sybaris and Kroton towards the end of the sixth century was the culmination of a number of factors, all of which probably revolved around a realization within Kroton that the hegemony of Sybaris need not be tolerated indefinitely. The two states did share a history of co-operation, as demonstrated by the Krotoniate participation in the Sybarite invasion of the Siritid in the 570’s. Nevertheless, this must be qualified by the Sybarite failure to aid Kroton in its conflict with Lokroi towards the middle of the same century. As will be discussed in detail below, there also existed many potential flashpoints between Kroton and Sybaris when it came to the carve-up of the
Tyrrhenian littoral. Moreover, another damaging factor in relations between the two poleis was the climate of internal political upheaval and change in both Kroton and Sybaris during the last decades of the sixth century. The rise to prominence of policy-makers in the two largest Achaian states whose political ideologies had the potential to foster antagonistic attitudes towards the regimes around them introduced a new, highly flammable element to the Italiote polis-system at large.

1.1 Early expansion and failure.

As stated in chapter 4, Kroton was founded in the same generation as Sybaris, and despite the almost deafening topos concerning the superiority of Sybaris in nearly every regard (land and wealth in particular), it is likely that Kroton was in fact a senior player in the mainstream Italiote polis-system. However, just as it has been demonstrated that some truth did in fact lie behind the Sybarite topos, a case can also be made for a relatively slow rate of development at Kroton in terms of the assets that facilitated the exercising of disproportionate power within the Italiote polis-system.

The Delphic oracle associated with the foundation of Kroton extant in Diodoros as a secondary answer to a query from the
Krotoniate *oikistes* Myskellos (7.17.1), has been regarded in a positive light by many commentators on colonization oracles, and therefore serves as a guide when seeking to determine the territorial and resource limits of the early archaic Krotoniate state. In particular, Diodoros’ references to the Λακινίος ἀκρος and ἱερὸν Κρεμίων help us to establish the approximate northern and southern limits of colonial Kroton’s borders, if not effective immediately, then certainly as they were perceived to be by the colonists themselves. Such boundaries indicate that the *chora* of Kroton was not substantially smaller than the early *chora* of neighbouring Sybaris. Moreover, although it has been demonstrated in chapter 4 that the Sybarite *chora* was in a league of its own when it came to productivity, and economic and demographic growth, the *chora* of Kroton also possessed significant cultivable resources.

Where Kroton and Sybaris truly parted ways was in the territorial expansion that the latter was to achieve, from the seventh century in particular. The aforementioned agricultural resources, as well as terrain, both played important roles in

this process, with Krotoniate expansion, at least initially, confined to the coast by the imposing Sila mountain range to the west. Moreover, the presence of compact and robust indigenous areas adjacent to the Krotoniate *chora* also placed limits on territorial expansion and exploitation of the countryside during much of the eighth and seventh centuries. In contrast, as discussed in chapter 1, the Sybarites advanced rapidly up the relatively negotiable Krathis and Sybaris valleys and were able to either kill, expel or absorb the Oinotrian population therein within the first two generations of Greek settlement.

As discussed in chapter 2, it is most probably during this period that the mythological integration of territory in and around the Krotoniate *chora* occurred. Philoktetes in particular was used to bind the area around Krimissa (Ciro Marina/Punta Alice) and Makalla (Murge di Strongoli) to the Krotoniate Greek world view. The use of Apollo Alaios at Makalla has also be interpreted as a cult symbol designed to cater towards indigenous as well as Greek audiences. Considering the effort invested in this process, it is almost certain that this northern region in particular survived in an

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4 *TWGa*, p. 161.

5 *RCA*, p. 224.


autonomous form for much of the seventh century as well as the eighth, before full integration into the Krotoniate state.\textsuperscript{8} Again, it should be noted that such was the impact of Sybaris on the indigenous communities in its immediate vicinity, that it was already beginning to look towards the Tyrrhenian Sea by the end of the seventh century.

It should therefore come as no surprise then that the bulk of Krotoniate expansion in the archaic period was firstly confined to the shores of the Ionian Sea, and secondly, that the expansion that did occur was largely associated with the sixth century. The foundation of Kaulonia in the seventh century presents the only major exception to this model, although, as argued by Giangiulio, Kaulonia should be regarded as conforming to a wider "modello acheo di organizzazione", of which Metapontion was also an example.\textsuperscript{9} Despite the obvious but probably informal obligation to bend to the will of the states which had effectively sponsored their establishment in Magna Graecia (Kroton and Sybaris), both Kaulonia and Metapontion respectively developed into fully-fledged poleis, as attested by numerous independent actions throughout their existence, as well as the emergence of autonomous mints approximately contemporaneous with the emission of coins.

\textsuperscript{8} RCA, p. 227; Manfredi & Braccesi, \textit{I Greci d'Occidente}, p. 144.

\textsuperscript{9} RCA, p. 223.
from Sybaris and Kroton.

Moreover, as in the case of Metapontion's relationship to Siris, the foundation of Kaulonia may also have been at least partly based on a reaction to the foundation of neighbouring Lokroi, also founded in the seventh century. As argued in chapter 5, there is no evidence to suggest that Kroton and Lokroi came to blows as early as the seventh century, but this does not mean that the Achaians did not wish to place territorial limits on the nascent Lokrian state, particularly in regard to Lokroi's northern borders. That Lokroi turned to the Tyrrhenian as its preferred sub-colonial outlet further suggests that their expansionist options underwent curtailment during the course of the seventh century.

After Kaulonia, Krotoniate sub-colonies were established at Skylleton (Strabo 6.1.10) and Terina ([Skymnos] 306-7; Steph. Byz. s.v. Τέρινα; Pliny NH 3.72; Solinus 2.10; Phlegron, FGrH 257 F31), during the sixth century. At this time it is also probable that Kroton managed to achieve full control over Krimissa and Makalla. References in Hekataios and Stephanos also identify a handful of minor sites that probably

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10 Ciaceri, *Storia della Magna Grecia* vol. 1, p. 172; *RCA*, p. 224 & n. 35; *TWGb*, p. 181.

11 *RCA*, pp. 224, 233 & n. 35.
lay within the Krotoniate *chora*, giving a further indication as to the direction and extent of Krotoniate expansion in the archaic period, namely Brystakia, Siberine and Kyterion.\textsuperscript{12} All of these sites were within twenty kilometres of Kroton, and no more than ten kilometres from the Ionian Sea.

However, the colonization of Terina suggests that the Krotoniates had finally begun to penetrate the Sila dominated interior in the course of the sixth century, over a century after the foundation of Kroton itself. Intimations of this shift can be detected in the presence of Korinthian and Ionic ceramics at Cotronei, a site on the Neaithos (Neto) River. This river was the most probable route by which transisthmian contact was conducted in this region of southern Italy.\textsuperscript{13} By comparison, in the same period the Sybarites had already exported their influence and control across to the Tyrrhenian, and placed the stamp of the Sybarite bull over much of the Oinotrian and Chonian interior.

Therefore, despite the unfavourable comparisons with Sybaris and its rate of imperialist acquisition, the Krotoniate *polis* had clearly entered a period of territorial expansion by the early sixth century. The degree to which this expansion translated to

\textsuperscript{12} TWGa, p. 156.

\textsuperscript{13} Edlund, *The Gods and the Place*, p. 109.
power and influence within the Italiote *polis*-system is apparent in the conflicts of the first half of the sixth century. As partially discussed in chapters 4 and 5, Kroton was a member of the anti-Siris alliance of the 570’s which brought about the destruction of the only major non-Achaian *polis* in the region. The benefits from this expedition, apart from the usual short term gains through plunder, in all probability favoured the more local Achaian states, that is Sybaris and Metapontion, rather than Kroton, situated some 150 kilometres to the south. As demonstrated previously, clearly there was a pan-Achaian element to this conflict and Kroton’s participation cannot be interpreted as an instance of strong Krotoniate influence or pressure within the Italiote *polis*-system. Indeed, it is possible that Kroton came under pressure from Sybaris, by this time well on the way to establishing itself as the regional hegemon, to join the attack on Siris. The sack of Siris therefore does not help to paint Kroton as a power in its own right.

Suspicious concerning the limitations of the Krotoniate state within the Italiote *polis*-system are confirmed approximately twenty years later at the Battle of the Sagra River. During a period of expansion, quite possibly engendered by confidence gained at the sack of Siris, Kroton came to blows with the small but demonstrably potent Lokrian *polis* to its south. As stated
earlier, it was probably in the aftermath of Siris that Kroton finally asserted itself definitively over the territories to its north, centred around Krimissa and Makalla. Moreover, with the north secure the Krotoniate push to the Tyrrhenian also probably began in earnest, resulting in the foundation of Terina. As demonstrated in chapter 5, rather than alleged Lokrian actions during the Sirite War, it was a Tyrrhenian expedition that in all likelihood generated a conflict with the Lokrians, whose own territorial interests had been concentrated on the western shores of the peninsula since the mid seventh century.

It would appear that Kroton sought to solve this conflict with an invasion of the Lokrian core, as opposed to its Tyrrhenian periphery, around the middle of the sixth century. The subsequent defeat of the Krotoniate army was, according to Strabo and Pompeius Trogus, so severe that Kroton fell into serious decline, both militarily and culturally (Strabo 6.1.10; Justin 20.4.1). As observed by Dunbabin, a conspicuous absence of Krotoniate senior Olympic victors between 548 and 532 may also indicate that defeat at Sagra instigated a period of malaise at Kroton.14 At any rate, a forty year period of consistent Krotoniate representation on the senior victors’ list

14 TWGa, p. 360; F.L. Vatai, Intellectuals in Politics in the Greek World: From Early Times to the Hellenistic Age (Beckenham, 1984), p. 43.
at Olympia certainly came to an end at this time.

The use of the Olympic games to extrapolate Krotoniate decline within the Italiote *polis*-system is of course never going be conclusive in isolation, but there are other indicators that at the Sagra Kroton had sustained a body blow to its imperialist ambitions even before they had really begun to bear fruit. The emergence of an independent Kauloniate mint by c. 530 at the latest suggests that Kaulonia may not have been under strong Krotoniate influence at this time, despite the likelihood that relations between the two states had been close since the seventh century.\(^\text{15}\) However, given the autonomy of the Metapontine mint from symbols of Sybarite power, as well as the continued independence of Kauloniate issues after the Krotoniate accession to the Italiote hegemony in 510, it is also possible that the emergence of a Kauloniate mint by c. 530 may have been coincidental.

The best indication that Kroton experienced difficulties after its defeat at the Sagra manifests itself in the balance of power in subsequent relations with Lokroi Epizephyroii. Flushed with its joint victory over Siris, Kroton could well have expected to succeed in a bid to assert the kind of imperial dominance over

\(^{15}\) \textit{TWGa}, p. 360; De Sensi Sestito, \textit{La Calabria in età arcaica e classica}, p. 36.
its neighbours that Sybaris had so successfully achieved further north. However as stated earlier, the essence of that victory was its alliance format. Neither Sybaris nor Metapontion came to Kroton’s aid in c. 550 when the latter marched south against Lokroi, and Kroton appears to have paid dearly for its misapprehensive behaviour. Moreover, while Lokroi did not have the strength to press its victory in the devastating manner so recently demonstrated in the Siritid, Kroton found itself locked into a cycle of ongoing conflict with Lokroi in which the latter invariably proved itself to be a tenacious foe, and which effectively stymied Kroton’s efforts to play the hegemon in its own neighbourhood for much of the remainder of the sixth century. A comparison with Sparta in the post-Leuktra period is illustrative of the problems Kroton faced after the Sagra episode. Just as the Spartan capacity to project its power beyond the Peloponnesos declined abruptly after the rise of a tough and independent, although not necessarily powerful, neighbour (Messenia), so too did Kroton have its hopes of regional power dashed, at least in the short-term.

As demonstrated in chapter 5, after the defeat of Kroton at Sagra the Lokrians appear to have adopted a more aggressive stance in relation to their Tyrrhenian territories. A second Krotoniate defeat is recorded as having occurred around 525
(SEG 11.1211), this time with specific reference to Lokroi's Tyrrenian sub-poleis, Hipponion and Medma. Moreover, Kroton's fortunes in their conflict with Lokroi, particularly on the Tyrrenian front, took a further dive when in the 470's the Lokrians seized the then Krotoniate-controlled sub-polis of Temesa, also on the Tyrrenian Sea (Strabo 6.1.5).\textsuperscript{16} Although strictly falling outside the parameters of our period, the attack on Temesa reveals much concerning the nature of the Kroton-Lokroi conflict, namely that the Tyrrenian continued to be the chief sticking point between the two states for years to come.

Furthermore, as discussed in chapter 5, it is possible that in the wake of the Sagra disaster Lokroi may have been able or tempted to put pressure on Kroton's sphere of influence to the south of the Lakinian promontory. Despite the inconclusiveness of the numismatic evidence cited above, Kaulonia, the southernmost of Kroton's allies, may well have felt the need to initiate a rapprochement with Lokroi, in the short term at least. Indeed, such a development may even have extended to the Krotoniate dependency, Skylleton, north of Kaulonia. Certainly, the actions of Dionysios I of Syracuse in 389, in which Kaulonia and Skylleton were razed and their chorai ceded to Lokroi (Diod. 14.106.3; Strabo 6.1.10), suggest

\textsuperscript{16} De Sensi Sestito, \textit{La Calabria in età arcaica e classica}, p. 62.
that Lokroi did harbour designs on this area, and although they do not appear to have been realized in such a drastic form until the fourth century, it is possible that they possessed an historical basis, stemming from the Krotoniate-Lokrian conflicts of the sixth and fifth centuries. As indicated by the loss of Temesa, even after its victory over Sybaris in 510, Kroton clearly remained vulnerable to Lokrian assaults from the south, assaults to which it had exposed itself through its previous losses to Lokroi, primarily at Sagra.

Thus for Kroton the Battle of the Sagra should also be understood as a watershed in its relations with the other poleis in the region. In terms of population, agriculture and military might, by the end of the seventh century it was becoming evident that the core of the Italiote polis-system was at Sybaris, along with its fertile plains, traversable valleys and subjugated or accommodated indigenous population centres. Kroton possessed lesser versions of all the above and by the sixth century was attempting to develop its assets in a manner similar to that of Sybaris. However, before Krotoniate imperialism could progress beyond anything more than an embryonic state, Kroton suffered a major defeat at the hands of a smaller neighbour.
Moreover, through its defeat at the Sagra, Kroton was forced to concentrate much of its energy on the relatively peripheral Tyrrhenian region. As a neighbour of Sybaris, it is highly likely that Kroton had at least a rough understanding of the basis of Sybarite power, if only in terms of agricultural resources. While the Tyrrhenian littoral around Hipponion in particular did in fact contain some arable land, Kroton's need to fight a lengthy conflict in such an area only highlights the extent to which Kroton found itself in many ways removed from the centre of the Italiote *polis*-system, and effectively stripped of most of the advantages of belonging to the powerful Achaian bloc. Consequently, Kroton found itself dragged into the ranks of the medium-sized states of the Italiote *polis*-system, a group from which Kroton was evidently trying to distance itself by attempting to establish a southern 'magna Achaia' based approximately upon the Sybarite hegemony to the north. Thus Kroton fell even as it began its premature rise.

1.2 Kroton and the 'Pythagorean revival'.

Due to an abundance of confused and often hagiographical commentary on Pythagoras of Samos and his political and social impact upon Kroton and Magna Graecia in general, the issue of Krotoniaste revival within the Italiote *polis*-system in the generation after the Sagra defeat is a controversial one to say
the least. Moreover, as the vast majority of this material was in all probability written after the Krotoniate conquest of the Sybaritid in 510, the theme of 'revival' would have been difficult to refute in hindsight. After all, following the nadir of Sagra, how could any commentator have possibly believed that Kroton had not undergone a fundamental martial and moral recovery in order to have defeated the mighty Sybarite hegemon? The arrival of Pythagoras of Samos at Kroton around 531 (Justin 20.4.17), has therefore been interpreted by many scholars as the turning point in Krotoniate fortunes.17

Certainly the ability of Kroton to defeat in battle the greatest land power in Magna Graecia at that time does suggest that Kroton must have experienced a revival of some description, at least in respect to its armed forces. A number of the ancient sources relating to Pythagoras claim that this triumph was a direct result of a moral re-invigoration of the state instigated by the Samian philosopher and his followers, the Pythagoreans. Justin asserts that the Krotoniates adopted a hedonistic way of

life after their defeat at Sagra, perhaps accounting for the decline in their Olympic prowess (20.4.1). Justin, and also Timaios and Diodoros then go on to claim that it was only through the intervention of Pythagoras that this hedonism was broken and the martial vigour of Kroton restored (Justin 20.4.2-13; Tim. ap. Iamb., VP 37-57; Diod. 10.3).

Certainly, in a climate of disillusionment, it is not difficult to accept the hypothesis that many Krotoniates found Pythagoras’ quasi-religious and often puritanical approaches to the state’s woes attractive.\(^{18}\) In this sense Pythagoras could well have constituted a positive force in the *polis*, effectively raising the morale of the demoralized military elite of Kroton upon whom the weight of the disaster at the Sagra had in all probability fallen most heavily.\(^{19}\) However, despite the likelihood of low morale at Kroton, it does not necessarily follow that Pythagoras was the only ‘prophet’ present at that time, nor that his brand of spiritual revival was the most influential. In particular, scholars have long suspected that a sixth century *nexus* between Orphism and Pythagoreanism evolved within Magna Graecia.\(^{20}\) Indeed it is possible that the fifth century gold leaf


\(^{19}\) *Ibid.*, pp. 44-5.

funerary inscriptions from Kyme and Hipponion reflect an earlier fixation among Italiotes influenced by Pythagoras' teachings concerned with salvation and the afterlife.\textsuperscript{21}

At any rate whether Pythagoras was only one of a number of revivalist preachers at Kroton at the time is superseded by the fact that the sources claim that it was Pythagoras, and his followers, who entered the political arena. Thus it is the extent to which Pythagoras and his followers were able to convert their 'spiritual prestige' into influence over, and a revival of, Kroton's position within the polis-system of Magna Graecia that concerns this inquiry most. In other words, it is the degree to which Pythagoras transformed his sect into a political force so as to influence the foreign policies of Kroton that needs to be assessed.

In addition to the sympathizers who allegedly numbered in the thousands, Iamblichos states that Pythagoras built up a core group of some six hundred members (\textit{VP} 29-30). The existence of a core group is also mentioned by Justin (20.4.14), Diogenes Laertios (8.3), and Apollonios of Tyana (\textit{ap. Iamb.} 254), although the figure cited by these sources is three hundred. Moreover, a substantial number of these core

followers appear to have been recruited from amongst the aristocratic elite of Kroton (Iamb., VP 88, 254), enough in fact to constitute what was probably a relatively disciplined and potentially influential, but not necessarily pervasive, bloc within the aristocrat-dominated chilion, the seniormost Krotoniate constitutional body (VP 257, 260). In any case, given the Pythagoreans' support for the ancestral constitution of Kroton (Ap.Ty. ap. Iamb., VP 255), it is extremely unlikely that the movement sought to exercise power outside the established machinery of government.

One of the more prominent members of this core group was Kylon, a wealthy aristocrat who later fell out with the Pythagoreans, but who was also powerful enough to secure the exarchate based on the conquered Sybarite territories after 510 in his own right (VP 74, 249, 258). Milon, the five-time senior Olympic wrestling champion, and later a commander of the Krotoniate army, was also reputed to have been a member (VP 249, 267; Strabo 6.1.12; Diod. 12.9.5-6), as was Demokedes, the doctor whose skills had ensured favour amongst several aristocratic and royal courts of the eastern Mediterranean (VP 257, 261; Hdt. 3.125, 131, 134-7). Many

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others for whom aristocratic origins are suggested by their membership of the *chilion*, are also named and are depicted as vocal advocates for the Pythagorean cause within the Krotoniate body politic. It is therefore evident that the Pythagoreans constituted a group within Kroton who possessed the *potential* to exercise at least some influence over the course which Kroton would chart in its relations with the other *poleis* of Magna Graecia.

Pythagorean activity within the realm of Krotoniate foreign policy is first hinted at around 517, when Demokedes, an expatriate doctor, sought asylum in his former homeland after escaping from his Persian masters. Recorded by Herodotos, the affair can be construed as a Pythagorean foray into a matter with international connotations, via one of their number, Milon, who effectively rescued Demokedes from a return to slavery in the East by agreeing to engage his daughter to him (3.136-7). By opposing the will of Demokedes’ Persian owners, the Pythagoreans were potentially involving the rest of the *polis* in a dispute with Sousa. While this incident does not have an impact upon the Italiote *polis*-system as such, it does indicate

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24 These include the otherwise unknown Alkimachos, Deinarchos and Meton, all described as speakers in the *chilion* by Iamblichos (*VP* 257). See also Minar, *Early Pythagorean Politics in Practice and Theory*, p. 56.
that after some fourteen years of residence in Kroton the Pythagoreans were capable of exercising *some* influence over the direction which Kroton took when conducting relations with other states.\(^{25}\)

However, the most crucial indicator of the efficacy of the Pythagorean faction within Krotoniate politics is the stance allegedly adopted by this faction during negotiations between Sybaris and Kroton over the extradition of Sybarite exiles then resident in Kroton.\(^{26}\) These negotiations occurred in or around 510, the same year as the military conflict between Kroton and Sybaris, and according to Diodoros, their breakdown was the primary cause of this conflict (12.9.3). Indeed, there is little reason to doubt that Kroton's harbouring of Sybarite exiles was in fact one of the reasons for the outbreak of war between the two *poleis*. It is after all evident from other literary sources, as well as numismatic evidence, that this conflict did occur at this time; and furthermore, that the issue of exiles was on more than one occasion a factor in the outbreak of conflict between Greek states.\(^{27}\) Moreover, both Diodoros and Iamblichos claim that Pythagoras was personally

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\(^{25}\) For a full discussion of the Demokedes affair, see appendix.


\(^{27}\) The presence of exiles and their subsequent agitation against him within neighbouring *poleis* regularly played a role in determining the direction of Dionysios I's aggression (Diod. 14.87.1-4; 103.4-5).
involved in the debate, and that he was hostile to the Sybarite demands (Diod. 12.9.4; Iamb., VP 133, 177-8). While it is Diodoros alone who specifically states that Pythagoras carried the debate, Iamblichos, in citing Apollonios (ap. Iamb., VP 260), demonstrates that he knew Kroton went to war with Sybaris not long after the departure of the Sybarite embassy, and by extension that Pythagoras played a key role in this development. If these accounts are accurate or even only approximately so as Minar and others attest, then we are dealing with an incidence of Pythagorean intervention in Krotonian politics which had a direct impact upon the polis-system of Magna Graecia, namely war between its two senior Achaian members.

Given the vulnerability of many of the sources to the charge of Pythagorean sympathies, it is not inconceivable that this episode is simply an example of magnifying the achievements of Pythagoras at Kroton. However, as von Fritz has noted, of the Pythagorean corpus that has survived, only Diodoros and Iamblichos make mention of Pythagoras' role in the debate. Furthermore, given the likelihood that Timaios is the source for

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both, the veracity of their claim need not be dismissed out of hand.\textsuperscript{29} Aristoxenos and Dikaiarchos, the authors of the two earliest surviving, although fragmentary, \textit{Bioi} of Pythagoras, are largely concerned with the calamities visited upon Pythagoras and his followers by the ungrateful \textit{poleis} of Magna Graecia \textit{after} the Krotoniate victory over Sybaris, as well as the various intellectual and philosophical tenets of the Pythagorean order.\textsuperscript{30} Part of this may derive from the fact that Aristoxenos is said to have actually interviewed some of the last surviving Pythagoreans, some of whom would surely have been embittered by their exile (Diog. Laert. 8.46). Dikaiarchos, a near contemporary of Aristoxenos, may well have consulted similar sources.

The case of Timaios as a source is arguably somewhat different. While not claiming to possess firsthand information, as in the case of Aristoxenos, Timaios can be said to have attempted to approach Pythagorean issues from a historical perspective, thus seeking to integrate the Pythagoreans into a wider history of southern Italy, rather than producing biographical or hagiographical accounts of the lives of Pythagoras and his followers. Moreover, as observed by Pearson, Timaios refers to

\textsuperscript{29} Von Fritz, \textit{Pythagorean Politics in Southern Italy}, p. 47; \textit{GHW}, pp. 113, 115-17.

Pythagoras in a particularly respectful light on only one occasion (FGrH 566 F132), emphasizing further the probability that Timaios was not, at least as far as he was concerned, according special treatment to Pythagoras, nor seeking to magnify his alleged deeds. The intervention of Pythagoras during the contentious debate over the fate of the Sybarite exiles, as probably derived from Timaios by Diodoros and Iamblichos, therefore deserves a reasonably tolerant hearing when its veracity is being assessed.

As stated earlier, if Pythagoras did in fact intervene successfully in opposition to the demands of the Sybarite embassy, as has been demonstrated to be feasible, then neither should the influence of the Pythagorean movement within Kroton, nor the ability of the Pythagoreans to help reinvigorate Krotoniate morale be underestimated. Moreover, it can also be demonstrated that this influence extended to matters of foreign policy and therefore constituted the ability to affect the polis-system of Magna Graecia. Diodoros states clearly that the Sybarite embassy was delivering an ultimatum to the Krotoniates, and that failure to surrender the exiles in question would result in war (12.9.4). Pythagoras would surely have

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31 Von Fritz, Pythagorean Politics in Southern Italy, p. 66; Minar, Early Pythagorean Politics in Practice and Theory, p. 52; GHW, pp. 41-2, 125.
been aware of this threat when he proferred his advice, and thus effectively aligned himself with, or perhaps even helped to constitute, the ‘war party’ within Krotoniate political circles. Thus even if the Pythagorean role in the Demokedes’ affair of c. 517 is rejected, it is apparent that Pythagoras and his followers found themselves in the midst of a war in 510, a war which their leader in all likelihood supported. It should therefore come as no surprise that Milon, previously famous for his Olympic wrestling victories and a known member of the Pythagorean order (Strabo 6.1.12; Iamb., VP 249, 267; Diod. 12.9.6; Hdt. 3.137), is said by Diodoros to have led the Krotoniate army into battle against Sybaris, again with Timaios as his likely authority.32

Moreover, the *stasis* that broke out in Kroton after the victory over Sybaris in many ways resembles a dispute within the war party which had originally advocated a belligerent response to Sybarite demands. The main protagonists in this *stasis*, at least initially, were the Pythagoreans on the one hand, and a group of militant aristocrats centred around the former Pythagorean Kylon on the other (Aristox. F18 [Wehrli]). That Kylon was indeed a member of the original war party is strongly suggested by his pre-eminence in the subsequent carve-up of the spoils of war (Iamb., VP 74). Moreover, that

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32 *GHW*, pp. 112-13.
the Pythagoreans were also similarly connected to the war effort is demonstrated by their very definite ideas about the administration of the newly conquered territories (Ap.Ty. ap. Iamb., VP 255). Thus the Pythagoreans can be seen to have provided policy advice, moral guidance, military leadership and administrative strictures in relation to the war with Sybaris and its aftermath. It is therefore evident that the Pythagoreans were involved in the conflict with Sybaris at most, if not all stages of its development, including its inception, conduct and aftermath.

Having established the strong possibility that Pythagoras and his movement did play a significant role in the Sybarite War, the one event that establishes Kroton as a reinvigorated force in the Italiote polis-system more than any other, the key question now posed is this: did Pythagoreanism, as claimed by many of the sources, therefore precipitate the dramatic revival in Krotoniote fortunes? Exactly what Pythagoras brought to Krotoniote political power is a matter of debate. Clearly the post-Sagra period was a potentially demoralizing one for Kroton, exacerbated by the tenacity of Lokrooi to the south. Indeed, as argued previously, Kroton’s position in the Italiote polis-system had probably suffered to a substantial degree. However, it must also be emphasized that Kroton did not disappear from the map of Magna Graecia, as had been the fate
of Siris, and was able to affect a significant recovery within a generation of the Sagra defeat. In other words, Kroton had not received a mortal wound from Lokroi and, as one might argue, within the context of the often wildly unpredictable fluctuations of fortune endemic to polis-systems all over Hellas, Kroton could be expected to rise again, with or without the aid of Pythagoras and his disciples.

Moreover, it has been demonstrated that one group of aristocrats, the 'Kylonians', were probably in favour of war with Sybaris regardless of Pythagorean intervention. However, it can be said that the Pythagoreans *helped* to engineer an environment imbued with confidence and bellicosity within Kroton at a time when matters of war and peace were being debated. Given that war was the result, and that Kroton's victory signalled its definitive return to the centre stage of the Italiote polis-system, the Pythagoreans should therefore be able to claim a significant, but by no means the dominant, place in the revival of the Krotonian state at the end of the sixth century.
Section Two: Ideological polarization and territorial competition: inter-Achaian conflict in the late sixth century.

The outbreak of war between Sybaris and Kroton in 510 can be said to have represented the culmination of several years of tense relations. On the one hand, the Pythagoreans' aforementioned opposition to Sybaris, which was in many ways ideologically-based, helped to poison the diplomatic climate between Kroton and Sybaris. However, it is also important to understand that there existed a number of crucial non-ideological points of conflict between Kroton and Sybaris, including pre-existing disputes over territory, commerce, regional hegemony, and spheres of influence.

2.1 Pythagoreanism, anti-aristocratic revolution, and the clash of Sybaris and Kroton.

An examination of the debate prompted by the demands of the Sybarite embassy adds a second dimension to the Pythagorean contribution to the political life of Kroton. As has been demonstrated, the Pythagoreans' opposition to Sybaris in 510 helped to set Kroton on a course of political and military revival within the Italiote polis-system. Moreover, the reasons given by the sources for this belligerent stance also
serve to highlight the fact that any significant Pythagorean influence at Kroton at this time was conducive to conflict between Kroton and Sybaris. According to Iamblichos, and in contrast to Diodoros' more generalist position, Pythagoras had a personal motive for his opposition to the Sybarites. Upon the arrival of the Sybarite embassy in Kroton, Pythagoras is said to have adopted a hostile position on account of the murder of Pythagorean students at Sybaris (VP 133, 177). That Pythagoreans were indeed present in Sybaris during the sixth century is confirmed by Iamblichos at various points in his On the Pythagorean Life (33, 36, 267).

Indeed the nature of the Sybarite regime at this time reveals much not only about why Pythagorean students may have been murdered in Sybaris, but also about the Pythagoreans' own political prejudices and the impact of these prejudices upon Krotoniate-Sybarite relations. At some point prior to the Sybarite ultimatum of 510 a coup had occurred in Sybaris, bringing to power a certain Telys. Described by Diodoros as a διαγωγός (12.9.2), by Herodotos as a βασιλεύς (5.44), and by both Herodotos and Herakleides of Pontos as a τυράννος (Hdt. 5.44; At VP 133 Iamblichos mentions only that one of Pythagoras' friends had been murdered by a Sybarite, whereas at 177 it is evident that Pythagoras lost several of his followers to Sybarite violence and that one of the ambassadors also happened to be involved in one or all of these killings.
Herakleides F49 [Wehrli]), it would appear that Telys headed a populist regime,\textsuperscript{34} and like Peisistratos, quite possibly without any formal title. Diodoros' characterization of the opponents of Telys, such as those who sought refuge at Kroton in 510, as deriving from the wealthiest classes gives further credence to the view that Telys was a demagogic tyrant (12.9.2).\textsuperscript{35}

As argued earlier in the section, the Pythagorean movement at Kroton possessed a decidedly aristocratic hue, and their championing of the ancient \textit{politeia} of Kroton after 510 can only underscore their prejudice towards aristocratic government (Iamb., \textit{VP} 255). Thus the emergence of Telys' regime cannot have boded particularly well for any Pythagoreans then resident in Sybaris, and it is to this period that the murders of Pythagoras' Sybarite students probably belong. That Telys chose to eradicate the Pythagorean presence in Sybaris, along with five hundred local aristocrats should therefore not be seen as surprising. Moreover, the subsequent hostility on the part of the Pythagoreans of Kroton towards Sybarite demands, as well as their enthusiastic participation in

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{34} \textit{TWGa}, pp. 83, 362; Vatai, \textit{Intellectuals in Politics in the Greek World}, p. 43; de Juliis, \textit{Magna Grecia}, p. 179.
\item \textsuperscript{35} However, that Telys himself was an aristocrat cannot be ruled out, particularly given his relationship with the Krotoniate aristocrat, Philippos (Hdt. 5.47).
\end{itemize}
the ensuing war can be located within an established pattern of deteriorating relations between the Pythagorean movement and the nascent anti-aristocratic regime at Sybaris.

Indeed, given that some estimates of the duration of the tyranny of Telys are as high as ten years, and that the anti-aristocratic pogroms launched by this regime presumably began early in its life, it is possible that the mutual antipathy between the Pythagoreans and the partisans of Telys was well established by 510. That Telys had been in power for at least two years prior to the outbreak of war between Sybaris and Kroton is suggested by Telys’ relationship with Philippos of Kroton, who was to be the tyrant’s son-in-law (Hdt. 5.47). Enough time had lapsed between the rise of Telys and the war itself for Philippos to negotiate a marriage, experience a sentence of exile which included a sojourn at the Kinyps with Dorieus, and to return to Magna Graecia in time to aid Kroton against Sybaris in 510. Dorieus’ own stay at the Kinyps River (Hdt. 5.42), is usually dated to between c. 514 and c. 512, thus indicating that if Herodotos’ account of the life of Philippos is correct, then Telys had been ruling Sybaris for up to four years before the final showdown with Kroton. Moreover, given the intense commitment to mutual defence amongst the

36 De Juliis dates Telys’ seizure of power to c. 520: Magna Grecia, p. 179.
37 TWGa, p. 349.
Pythagoreans, these four years probably served to increase the bitterness on the part of the Pythagorean movement, and harden their resolve to punish those responsible for the murder of their Sybarite comrades at the next opportunity.\(^{38}\)

Furthermore, the contrast between the principles of the Pythagorean movement and the relatively luxurious conditions at Sybaris afforded by the prosperity of the Sybarite \textit{chora} could not have been greater. The alleged adoption by the Pythagoreans of tenets such as property held in common (Iamb., \textit{VP} 72; DL 8.10), strict veneration of the gods (\textit{VP} 45), and ascetic self-regulation (\textit{VP} 41-2), must have helped to engender a low opinion of their neighbours to the north.\(^{39}\) Indeed, it is difficult to imagine that a Kroton influenced by the Pythagoreans would not have indulged in the denigration of their Sybarite foes when war broke out, based upon their own moral and ideologocal superiority.\(^{40}\) In effect, we are dealing with the foundations of a \textit{bellum iustum} ideology, latent and non-specific, but relatively easy to adapt to the requirements of the war at hand.


\(^{39}\) Vatai, \textit{Intellectuals in Politics in the Greek World}, pp. 52-3.

\(^{40}\) Pugliese-Carratelli, "An Outline of the Political History of the Greeks in the West", p. 156.
Thus in many ways it can be said that the Pythagoreans were part of a shift towards ideological extremism within the Italiote polis-system, and in particular, within its two largest members, Kroton and Sybaris. The emergence of an influential and politically conservative movement at Kroton at about the same time as the establishment of a demagogic tyranny in Sybaris provided for an environment that was highly combustible. The catalyst for the actual outbreak of war was a dispute which involved the fate of aristocratic Sybarite refugees, over which the two protagonists predictably held diametrically opposed views. For Telys, the continuing survival of such a potentially dangerous diaspora was inconceivable. However for the Pythagoreans, the Sybarites were an outcast people whose legendary decadence and violent rejection of their own ancien régime and all those associated with it, including local Pythagoreans, demanded that they be opposed at every turn, both in the name of morality and vengeance. In sum, fundamental changes in the stila di vita in both Kroton and Sybaris during the last decades of the sixth century helped to construct the conditions for conflict in the region. 41

41 De Juliis, Magna Grecia, p. 179.
2.2 Regional rivalry and the end of 'easy' expansion in central Magna Graecia.

Whilst noticeable changes in the domestic arenas of both Sybaris and Kroton were taking place at this time, it is crucial to appreciate the territorial developments also underway in the region. The first half of the sixth century witnessed rapid expansion among the Achaian states of central Magna Graecia. Sybaris continued to expand onto the Tyrrhenian half of the peninsula, with the foundations at Laos and Skidros probably occurring at this time. Moreover, the Siritid was also conquered by a Sybarite-led coalition. Kroton too advanced its borders in the north, and also to the west, at Terina; and Metapontion also began to penetrate the interior of the peninsula to its west, around the aforementioned Cozzo Presepe. However, it is apparent that by the middle of the century opportunities for relatively easy territorial expansion were beginning to dry up. The pervasive extent of the Sybarite domination over the Oinotrian and Chonian settlements of the interior had removed a key group of potentially 'soft targets' from the equation. Furthermore, Kroton's experience with Lokroi in particular indicates that without coordinated Achaian action it would prove more difficult to subordinate the non-Achaian states in the region.
As argued in chapter 5, the defeat of Kroton at the Sagra around 550 also had the effect of raising the prestige and power of Lokroi to the point that for Kroton any expansion to its south or west would now involve a serious commitment of forces without any guarantee of success. With the region to its north already under firm Sybarite control, the second half of the sixth century was not looking particularly bright for Krotoniate imperialism. In essence, for Kroton to expand its territory and role in the Italiote polis-system, the status quo had to be disturbed in a radical and decisive manner.⁴²

While an important Pythagorean role has been identified in the events immediately leading up to the outbreak of war between Kroton and Sybaris, it needs to be emphasized that Kroton did not go to war with its hegemonal neighbour solely to execute the will of Pythagoras and his school. Despite the tenacity of the Lokrians to the south, the empire of Sybaris was afterall the most obvious impediment to Krotoniate expansion in the long-term. Sybaris controlled the bulk of the agricultural resources in the region, as well as a substantial share of the trans-isthmian routes. Indeed, the Krotoniate Tyrrhenian foundation at Terina was in the immediate vicinity of the Sybarite sub-colony, Temesa. The proximity of these outposts

⁴² Minar, Early Pythagorean Politics in Practice and Theory, p. 12.
could well have been a point of contention between the two states, particularly given the likelihood that Kroton was seeking to assert itself in this area, as indicated by the protracted Tyrrhenian confrontation with Lokroi from c. 550 onwards. Krotonian expansion to its north and, after c. 550, to its south was clearly not feasible at this time and it is possible that the Tyrrhenian coastline constituted Kroton's last opportunity to advance its frontier. Ill-feeling between Kroton and Sybaris, generated by events on the Tyrrhenian littoral, was therefore a distinct possibility.

Regardless of the specific Pythagorean objections to the methods and extremes of Telys, it is also difficult to picture Kroton as being at ease with the emergence of a volatile demagogic regime in Sybaris. Indeed, as demonstrated in section 1.2, there are strong indications that a war party separate from the Pythagoreans and under the leadership of the future exarch Kylon, existed at Kroton in 510. What is more, the new Sybarite regime had quickly demonstrated itself to be aggressive both in terms of domestic and foreign policy. Moreover, due to the size and importance of the Sybarite polis, stasis within Sybaris clearly had the ability to destabilize the polis-system within which it operated, as indicated by the

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43 RCA, p. 238 & n. 35; Vallet, Zancle et Rhégion, p. 176.
44 Pallotino, A History of Earliest Italy, p. 57.
presence of Sybarite exiles in Kroton, the subsequent ultimatum from Sybaris, and the eventual battle at the Traeis. Indeed, an undated event recorded by Phylarchos depicts a violent scene in which thirty Krotoniate ambassadors were allegedly put to death by the Sybarites (ap. Athen 521d). While the occasion may have been exaggerated by Phylarchos or his source, this type of behaviour does accord well with the style of Sybarite foreign policy under Telys, namely threats and ultimatums to neighbouring states. Such developments did not require the presence of the Pythagorean movement to alert Kroton to the dangers posed to it by a Sybaris led by Telys, or to provoke militants within its own citizenry to urge a robust response.

Given its eventual outcome, the debate within Kroton in 510 over the fate of the Sybarite exiles proved to be a crucial one for this polis. Kroton had little to be satisfied with in its recent history and, as demonstrated by its expansionist activities around Terina, Krimissa and Lokroi earlier in the century, Kroton had clearly hoped for a more prominent position in the Sybarite-dominated Italiote polis-system. However, despite these grievances it is unlikely that Kroton

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45 Diodoros implies that both an ekklesia and a council (ουγκλήτος), perhaps the chilion of Iamblichos' account (VP 259-60), were summoned to deliberate on this issue (12.9.4).
went out of its way to provoke a Sybarite invasion in 510. Sybaris was the regional hegemon and had been so for most of the century, and while the sources' estimations of the size of the Sybarite army are prone to exaggeration, as argued in chapter 4, their understanding that Sybaris outnumbered Kroton's forces significantly is unlikely to have been misplaced. Thus the sources' depiction of the events immediately prior to the Battle of the Traeis as involving an aggressive Sybarite ultimatum, rather than an overt act of war by Kroton, are most probably accurate.

As discussed above, Kroton did in fact possess militants of its own, including the Pythagoreans, but opinion was divided in 510 as to whether the Sybarite demands should be met. Indeed, Diodoros specifies that it was the *demos* which sought to avoid conflict, underscoring the earlier suggestion that it was the aristocracy-orientated Pythagoreans and other elites who agitated most vocally for war (12.9.4). It was afterall aristocrats like Kylon who would benefit most from the war, with victory vastly increasing the amount of land available for aristocratic economic exploitation. Moreover, given the revolutionary nature of the Sybarite government under Telys, it is quite possible that the aristocratic regime of Kroton would have come under pressure to adopt a more populist constitution, more in line with that of Sybaris itself, if
concessions over the harbouring of exiles were made. The Krotoniate aristocracy thus had much to fear from Sybaris under Telys and many incentives to resist its demands.

The resultant war can therefore be represented as a decision by the majority of the Krotoniate aristocracy to resist the wishes of the regional hegemon in the interests of self-preservation and also, by extension, to contest the hegemony itself. Indeed, it can be argued that Kroton had little choice but to take this course if it wished to avoid being bound to the whims of its northern neighbour in future. In essence, it suited many within Kroton's decision-making elite to bring about a violent resolution to the problems being experienced within the Krotoniate-Sybarite relationship. Moreover, these problems can be said to have been inherent features of Krotoniate-Sybarite relations, in that the regional ambitions of Kroton did not accord well with the existence of an all-pervasive Sybarite empire. Sybaris clearly did not view Kroton as an equal partner even before the revolution of Telys, as suggested by its absence on the Sagra battlefield as far back as c. 550. In contrast, it is evident that Kroton saw itself as a regional power in the making, with territorial ambitions on both sides of the peninsula. The conditions for conflict between the two states were therefore apparent long before the introduction of
Pythagoreanism and demagogic revolutionary change to the Italiote polis-system. The ideological distance between the regimes of both states by 510 certainly increased the likelihood of an 'incident' at that time, but the conflict that followed was also fundamentally about power within the central Italiote polis-system as a whole.

Section Three: Balance of power recast: the collapse of Sybaris and the Krotoniate new order.

Achaian solidarity, confined as it was to occasional mutual assistance in war and such general principles as numismatic cooperation and the preference for further Achaian colonization, was nonetheless the most important feature of the central Italiote polis-system in the archaic period. For a century and more, Achaian states exercised hegemony over the largest and most populous region of Magna Graecia, manipulated the inflow of new migrants to the area, and brooked no foreign intervention in the affairs of southern Italy under their control. However, this balance of power was shattered irrecoverably by two key developments: the destruction of the Sybarite empire and the rise of a new order under the hegemony of its destroyer, Kroton.
3.1 The fall of the Sybarite empire.

The ultimatum issued to Kroton in 510 concerning the extradition of Sybarite exiles led directly to the outbreak of war between the two states. Given the fundamentally different imperialist fortunes of the two states, the Sybarites may be forgiven for feeling confident in issuing such threats. However, the Sybarites suffered a massive defeat at the hands of Kroton and were forced to endure the destruction of their astu and the dissolution of much of their empire. As discussed in chapter 4, it is apparent that Sybaris possessed the soundest possible foundations for its imperialism, yet still managed to lose the struggle with its Krotoniate challenger in 510. This section will attempt to reconcile the seemingly incredible distance between Sybarite strength and its rapid collapse, as well as provide an analysis of the last years of the Sybarite empire.

As reported by Diodoros, any defiance on the part of the Krotoniates concerning the extradition ultimatum would automatically result in a declaration of war by Sybaris (12.9.4). However, according to Iamblichos the major battle of this war took place by the Traeis River (VP 260), situated within the southern rim of Sybarite territory. Thus, despite the claims of
Diodoros that it was the Sybarite army which advanced against Kroton (12.9.5), it would appear that the Krotoniates launched a pre-emptive strike against their foe.\(^46\) Similarly, concerning the war Herodotos remarks only that the Sybarites were preparing to march against Kroton when the battle took place (μελλειν στρατευεσθαι), again suggesting that Kroton struck the first blow.

That Kroton may have decided to take such a step makes much sense given the context of the conflict. The Krotoniates afterall knew that war would result from their negative answer and thus knew before Sybaris that a military clash was imminent. In essence, Kroton was able to assert control over the timing of the battle, and by extension, the place. Moreover a surprise attack across the frontier not only provided an opportunity for the Krotoniates to compensate for their numerical inferiority (Strabo 6.1.13), but also ensured that the ensuing battle would inflict damage on the Sybarite *chora* rather than their own. Thus the likelihood that the Sybarite army which the Krotoniates had to face at the Traeis was a force mustered in an environment of haste and even panic is considerable.

\(^{46}\) Ciaceri, *Storia della Magna Grecia* vol. 2, p. 257. In contrast, de Juliis believes that the Traeis (mod. Triolo) formed the border between Sybaris and Kroton: *Magna Grecia*, p. 180. However, Thukydides implies that the Hyllias River marked the frontier between Kroton and the mid fifth century successor to Sybaris, Thourioi (7.35).
Also operating in the Krotoniates' favour was the possibility that they received some form of military assistance from outside the Italiote polis-system. Herodotos records two contradictory traditions in relation to foreign support for Kroton, one of which outlines the contribution of a Spartan expeditionary force, under the Agiad prince Dorieus, and relies upon a Sybarite recollection of the events (5.45). Herodotos also states that this version of events acknowledges the assistance of Philippos, a Krotoniate exile who commanded a small independent force of his own (5.47). The second version, this time derived from a Krotoniate source, rejects the participation of these outsiders and quite possibly stems from an unwillingness on the part of the Krotoniates to associate themselves and their victory with suspect company. Philippos had after all been tarred previously by his association with Telys, the tyrant of Sybaris (5.47); and Dorieus was the leader of a colonization attempt in western Sicily tainted by disastrous failure and a blasé attitude towards the Delphic Oracle and its colonial role (5.42-3, 45). However, Dorieus was present in the western Mediterranean at approximately the same time as the fall of Sybaris and his participation in this war certainly aids the reconstruction of a seemingly implausible victory on the part of Kroton.47

47 TWGa, p. 363.
Another crucial factor in the previously unthinkable defeat of Sybaris at the Traeis was the very real possibility that the Sybarite regime under Telys was an inherently unstable one. The fact that Telys was still in the process of expelling members of the aristocracy in 510 certainly suggests that political instability was a consistent feature of the then Sybarite government. Moreover, given the presence of the five hundred exiled Sybarite aristocrats at Kroton, it would appear that Telys and his followers were faced with a diaspora which was not only large but also hostile to them. The ultimatum for the handing over of these exiles suggests that Telys did indeed feel that some or perhaps all of the five hundred exiles in question continued to pose a threat to him and, by extension, that his regime had not sufficiently consolidated its hold over the *polis*.

Furthermore, it is also possible that Telys was experiencing domestic difficulties and believed that an act of strength abroad would alleviate his problems at home. Such an act did not necessarily require a war, but merely the diplomatic humiliation of a weaker neighbour such as Kroton. Whatever the truth of the matter, it is evident that Telys and his followers were not able to rule Sybaris without taking into
account the continuing survival of the cause espoused by their domestic opponents. Indeed Herakleides reports that the loyalty commanded by Telys was ultimately not sufficient to save either his tyranny or the lives of his followers (F49 [Wehrli]). The massacre of the partisans of Telys at the hands of their fellow Sybarites, as described by Herakleides, probably took place in the desperate period after the defeat at the Traeis but prior to the final siege of Sybaris by the Krotoniate army. Such a rebellion suggests that even by 510 Telys had still not managed either to exile or kill all his domestic opponents.

Reinforcing the view that the Telys-led regime at Sybaris faced considerable internal as well as externally-based opposition is the slight suggestion that there were defections on the battlefield from the Sybarite army. According to Aristotle, Julius Africanus and Aelian, the Sybarite cavalry was rendered useless during the battle at the Traeis. Africanus states that a Sybarite flute-player defected to Kroton before the battle and revealed the tune which would effectively disable the Sybarite cavalry whose horses were accustomed to musical performances (Kestoi 293). Whilst neither Aristotle nor Aelian mention a disaffected flute-player, both record that the same tune caused the entire Sybarite cavalry either to desert to the Krotoniate army (Arist., Syb.Pol. F583 [Rose]) or throw the Sybarite ranks into confusion (Aelian, De Nat. Anim.
16.23). Moreover, the accounts of Africanus and Aristotle refer to a betrayal of one form or another, effective during the decisive battle between Kroton and Sybaris. Crucially, the verb chosen by Aristotle to describe the actions of the Sybarite cavalry (αὐτομολέω) was commonly used to describe desertions from one army to another or from the battlefield entirely (c.f. Hdt. 8.82; Thouk. 3.77; Xen., Anabasis 1.7.13).

Despite the fanciful spin placed upon the event, given the apparent continued agitation against the regime of Telys it is possible that some elements of the Sybarite cavalry did in fact defect to the Krotoniate army either immediately before or during the battle at the Traeis. That such an event might transpire should not be ruled out, particularly as it was probably the Sybarite aristocracy who made up the bulk of the state's cavalry. This group was after all one of the main collective victims of the Telys-led revolution earlier in the decade and would thus have viewed a defeat for Telys as advantageous to themselves. Further underscoring this hypothesis that aristocratic discontent inside the Sybarite camp helped to undermine the war effort of Telys, Herodotos records a specific act of desertion. Kallias, a member of the aristocratic Iamid clan which derived from Elis on the Greek mainland, abandoned the Sybarite cause prior to the battle and actively

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aided the Krotoniates against the forces of Sybaris (5.44-5).

It is therefore apparent that the considerable strengths of the Sybarite polis and its empire, as built up over the course of the sixth century, had been significantly undermined by the time of the final confrontation with Kroton. Moreover, it is possible that Kroton received assistance from non-Italiote sources in its campaign to resist Sybaris, as well as probably having the good fortune of being able to choose both the time and place of the decisive battle. Dissatisfaction with the domestic balance of power, particularly on the part of the Sybarite demos and its demagogic leader Telys, had sparked a cycle of revolution and attempted counter-revolution which weakened the ability of Sybaris to operate as an effective hegemon within the central Italiote polis-system. This internal dissension in turn helped to provoke a confrontation with a neighbouring state and, in the wake of an overwhelming defeat, ultimately created a power vacuum in the polis-system hitherto either under Sybarite domination or influence. The regional balance of power, previously based on the preponderance of Sybaris, was thus overturned not only by a military defeat but also by the failure of the Sybarites to resolve stasis. Consequently, the balance of power in the central Italiote polis-system was recast to the disadvantage of
3.2 The Krotoniate ‘new order’.

Strabo states that in a campaign lasting seventy days, the Krotoniates toppled Sybaris from its hegemony and laid waste to the Sybarite astu itself, going so far as to divert the course of a nearby river over the top of the ruined city (6.1.13). It is not clear whether this time frame includes both the Battle of the Traeis and the siege of the astu that must have followed or merely the latter. In any case Sybaris was destroyed in a matter of months by a foe previously considered weak enough to threaten over the issue of exiles. Diodoros also emphasizes the destruction that followed the military defeat (12.10.1), and Herodotos provides a name for the river allegedly diverted, the Krathis (5.45). In this way Kroton ensured that the old balance of power was dead and that a new order in its own likeness could be built.

As the destroyer of Sybaris, Kroton was well placed to influence the shape of the new balance of power in the central Italiote polis-system. In particular, like Sybaris in the wake of the conquest of Siris earlier in the century, Kroton appears to have acquired the lion’s share of the spoils. Included within these spoils was the Sybaritid, the plain upon which Sybaris
had built its agricultural wealth. A passage in Iamblichos’ *On the Pythagorean Life* indicates that Kroton appointed an administrator for the newly conquered Sybaris called an *exarch* (*VP* 74). It is possible that this term reflects the *milieu* of Iamblichos more than that of the sixth century since the word rarely occurs in relation to the archaic or classical Greek world. However, given its leadership connotations, it is probable that Iamblichos understood the position to entail Krotoniate rule over the Sybaritid.\(^4^9\) Moreover, it would appear that Kylon, whilst in his capacity as the first known *exarch* of Sybaris (ὁ Συβαριτῶν ἕξαρχος), was able to continue his political activities in Kroton itself, including attending the debates over the long-term fate of new territories (*VP* 249, 258). The position of Kylon can thus be seen as a form of governorship, but given Kylon’s continuing factional commitments in Kroton this position evidently did not necessarily entail full-time residency in the exarchate itself. Moreover, such a scenario suggests that the Sybaritid was more often than not administered from a centrist perspective rather than a local one.\(^5^0\)

Much is also revealed concerning the Krotoniate carve-up of the Sybaritid through numismatic evidence. Around 500 a

\(^{49}\) Minar, *Early Pythagorean Politics in Practice and Theory*, p. 70.

\(^{50}\) *TWGa*, p. 366.
small series of staters appears, featuring the tripod of Kroton and the \( \varphi \varphi \varphi \) legend on the obverse, and the bull of Sybaris and the \( \Sigma \varphi \ ) legend on the reverse. This development suggests that a settlement on the site of the old Sybaris was allowed to continue. Moreover, in view of the overt Krotoniatic symbolism on its coinage, it is also highly probable that this new Sybaris, from now on referred to as Sybaris II, occupied an inferior position in relation to Kroton.\(^5^1\) Indeed, these coins strengthen the case put forward by literary evidence that the Sybaritid came under the direct rule of Kroton after 510, via the office of the *exarch*.

Moreover, it is possible that the community of Sybaris II was composed of some or perhaps all of the contentious five hundred Sybarite aristocrats who had fled the regime of Telys and had sought shelter in Kroton just before the outbreak of war between the two states.\(^5^2\) This group was after all ideologically close to the Krotoniatic regime in 510, at least in terms of their opposition to the populist tyranny of Telys, and since Kroton had effectively gone to war over these exiles it would not have been a particularly controversial move to


\(^5^2\) Lombardo, “Da sibari a thurii”, p. 278.
sponsor their re-establishment in a subordinate successor state. Such a state would have been directly dependent on their Krotoniate 'saviours', and the existence of a Krotoniate governor as well as the issuing of coins with clear references to Kroton supports this hypothesis.

Numismatic evidence is also useful in determining the status of the numerous towns and villages, including the so-called Oinotrian *poleis* of Hekataios and Stephanos, which had formed part of the Sybarite empire up until the destruction of Sybaris in 510. Discussed briefly in chapter 4, the years immediately following the fall of Sybaris witnessed significant changes in the numismatic chronicle of central Magna Graecia. Coins issued in Pandosia and Laos around 500, two sites identified in chapter 4 as existing within the imperial system of Sybaris until 510, feature the Krotoniate tripod.\(^{53}\) Coins dated to between c. 500 and c. 490 featuring the tripod of Kroton on the obverse and a joint legend (☉PO and TE) may also refer to the extension of Krotoniate control over the formerly Sybarite Temesa.\(^{54}\)

\(^{53}\) *ACGC*, pp. 172-4; Attianese, *Kroton: Ex Nummis Historia*, pp. 55-8; *IGASMG IV*, p. 35.

It is therefore highly probable that Kroton did in fact reap substantial territorial benefits from its conquest of Sybaris, both in the Sybaritid proper and in the wider territories previously under Sybarite rule. Indeed, these acquisitions were one of the key features of the Krotoniate new order in the central Italiote polis-system. Kroton in effect became the new regional superpower in that the widespread nature of its new territorial assets ensured access to greater resources and an ability to influence events far beyond its now redundant former borders. Kroton now possessed the firm foothold on the Tyrrhenian it had been seeking since the middle of the century as well as secure trans-isthmian routes, and such resources as the copper mines of Temesa (Strabo 6.1.5), and the agricultural wealth of the Sybaritid plain.

Furthermore, the setbacks Kroton had experienced against Lokroi around 550 and 525 must have begun to pale into insignificance compared to the stunning gains secured by the defeat of Sybaris. Indeed, although there is no evidence to suggest Krotoniate domination of Lokroi after 510, it is unlikely that Kroton would have any need to tolerate any limitations that Lokroi may or may not have imposed in the wake of its earlier victories. Kaulonia too probably came come under some form of pressure to gravitate towards the foreign policy interests of Kroton, although this may have merely taken the
form of 'self-regulation' rather than external military or political pressure. Certainly there is no numismatic evidence to suggest that Kaulonia entered the Krotoniate orbit in the same manner as Sybaris II, Pandosia, Laos and Temesa so obviously did. Similarly, Kaulonia's role as an independent arbitrator during one of Kroton's many outbreaks of stasis after the conquest of Sybaris does not lend itself to the view that Kaulonia came under any form of direct Krotoniate control (Ap.Ty. ap. Iamb., VP 261).

However, as suggested by the distribution of the new 'tripod' coins in the region, it is also clear that the Krotoniate new order did not entail the superimposition of Krotoniate rule over the full extent of the defunct Sybarite empire. There is no known Krotoniate rule or influence at Poseidonia, Aminaia or Lagaria and it is not inconceivable that Metapontion, long the loyal but independent and rich ally of Sybaris extended its control role over the territories north of the Krathis River after 510. Certainly, the area that witnessed the most intensive

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55 The first known numismatic indication that Kaulonia and Kroton were operating on a particularly close level comes between c. 480 and c. 460, over a generation after the fall of Sybaris and the rise of the Krotoniate new order. See Attianese, Kroton: Ex Nummis Historia, p.86.
Krotoniate influence was that south of the Krathis, at sites such as Pandosia and Laos, suggesting in turn that the Krotoniate new order was in fact subject to specific geographic limitations.

Nonetheless, the triumph of Kroton at the Traeis in 510 did result in its elevation to the hegemony of the central Italiote polis-system. The thorough nature of the destruction of Sybaris ensured that in the short-term Kroton did not face the prospect of a revitalized local rival for the hegemony. Indeed, the leadership role Kroton assumed within the context of the Italiote summachiai of the fifth and fourth centuries in all probability stemmed from the emergence of Kroton as a military power at the end of the sixth century (Diod. 14.100.3, 103.4-5; Livy 23.30.6). For nearly a century the preserve of Sybaris, power and influence in central Magna Graecia became the natural policy goal of the newly rampant Krotoniate state. Furthermore, accompanying this development was the realization that Achaian solidarity, or rather lip service to it, no longer formed the basis of the balance of power in the Italiote polis-system. It was now effectively up to the conqueror of Sybaris to build and defend its ‘new order’ on its own.
CONCLUSION: Balance of power recast: losses and gains.

The confrontation between Sybaris and Kroton at the end of the sixth century represents a watershed in the history of the Italiote polis-system. As the century old hegemon of the region, Sybaris faced a seemingly unlikely challenger whose own rise to prominence had been regularly punctuated by failure against other weaker poleis. However, Kroton was aided in its bid to unseat Sybaris by the blossoming of at least one belligerent philosophical and political club within its walls, the Pythagoreans. Other crucial components of Kroton's victory were such strategic advantages as surprise, the instability of the opposing regime, and the probability that some sections of the Sybarite army were lukewarm in their support for Telys.

As a result of Kroton's victory in 510 the balance of power within the central Italiote polis-system was altered irrecoverably. The incumbent hegemon, Sybaris, was cut down and although its surviving population enjoyed a degree of success in the proceeding century, it was never able to recover its previous strength. In contrast Kroton, as the instrument of this collapse was, in theory at any rate, well placed to benefit from the subsequent power vacuum in the polis-system of the region. Indeed, Kroton proceeded to build its own vision of central Magna Graecia, in part by grafting much of which
imperial Sybaris had held and developed on to its own chora.

At a glance the Krotoniate eclipse of Sybaris may appear merely as a case of one Achaian state replacing another as the regional hegemon. However, in reality the dynamics of a century of Achaian domination of Magna Graecia were put at risk. Achaian polis had now fought Achaian polis for the first time, altering the previous norm which had seen the Achaian states expand aggressively in nearly every direction on the peninsula except against each other. Indeed, in the past these states had operated in tandem against non-Achaian foes and cooperated in elements of monetary policy. In essence, for much of the sixth century pan-Achaianism had been an important, but informal, component of the power which the Achaian states wielded in Magna Graecia.

The collapse of this pan-Achaianism marched alongside the emergence of inter-Achaian competition, and stemmed from dissatisfaction with Sybarite preponderance and the shrinkage in easily attainable resources, and was fuelled by ideological differences between the two leading Achaian states. In sum, for Kroton to expand any further in the sixth century, Sybaris had to be resisted, challenged and ultimately removed from its monopoly on power. As large as Magna Graecia was in terms of
geography, it was also the home to a disproportionately high number of large states, and by the end of the sixth century the pressure and potential for a clash within the Italiote *polis-* system, in which only one state would survive, was at its most intense.
CHAPTER SEVEN

The successors to the post-Sybarite polis-system and the diffusion of power in Magna Graecia.

The collapse of the Sybarite hegemony in the last decade of the sixth century had serious and long-reaching consequences for the Italiote polis-system. The repercussions of this collapse were felt not only in the central band of Greek settlement in southern Italy where Sybaris was situated, but also along the southern rim, including the Straits of Messina, and as far away as Greek Sicily. In essence, the archaic Italiote polis-system of the archaic period experienced shock, stemming largely from the withdrawal of the one force which had provided for a degree of relative stability over the past century. As the regional hegemon, Sybaris represented and effectively monopolized overwhelming force for the greater part of the sixth century. Thus the absence of Sybaris not only altered the balance of power, it also precipitated a political vacuum.

As discussed in chapter 6, the polis which had brought about the downfall of Sybaris stood first in line to profit from this
vacuum, and to a considerable degree Kroton did in fact prosper. However, as will be demonstrated below, Kroton was not able to fill the void completely. Consequently, this gave rise to opportunities for other *poleis* to take advantage of the regional upheaval and stake their own claims to a share of the power once concentrated in the hands of Sybaris. Moreover, the multiplication of the number of *poleis* with the ability to exercise *some* power witnessed the growth of non-Achaian influence in Magna Graecia. In turn, as will be seen, the potential for conflict also increased, as each nascent regional power attempted to assert itself and resist the claims of its neighbours. Indeed, as the shift towards frequent outbreaks of inter-*polis* violence rose, so too did the propensity towards rapid escalation and extension beyond the borders of Magna Graecia.

Moreover, it is apparent that during the last years of the sixth century and the first decades of the fifth, power within the Italiote *polis*-system was experiencing serious centrifugal pressure. The balance of power that evolved after the breakdown of the previously dominant Sybarite system was subject to the competing interests of a number of approximately evenly matched *poleis*. Three separate major
centres of power can be identified as having emerged in this period, not all of which were located within Magna Graecia itself. Constituting two of these new centres, both Kroton and Rhegion were Italiote states with long histories by the time of the fall of Sybaris. However, the emergence of Sikeliote Syracuse as an important player within the Italiote polis-system was an entirely new development and symbolizes well the extent to which power in Magna Graecia had become open to competition

Section One: Kroton: the legacy of Sybaris and the inadequate heir.

The war in which Kroton had toppled Sybaris saw the Krotoniates reach a hitherto unprecedented peak in the history of their polis. As demonstrated in chapter 6, the spoils of this campaign were spectacular, with Kroton effectively doubling the size of the territory under its control. From 510 the Krotoniate tripod began to cast its shadow over the Tyrrenhian littoral as well as much of Oinotria. However, it is also evident that the tripod was not planted across the length and breadth of the old pastures of the Sybarite bull. As has also been demonstrated in chapter 6, the northern half of the Sybarite
empire effectively remained outside the new Krotoniate frontiers. As will be seen, this state of affairs reflects a wider failure on the part of Kroton to reconstruct itself as the new and definitive regional hegemon.

One possible problem for Kroton in its administration of the old Sybarite empire was demography. As stated in chapter 4, Sybaris was undoubtably the larger of the two poleis both in terms of territory and population, and its demographic policies were, according to Diodoros, unique amongst the Italiote poleis (12.9.2). Thus for the Krotoniates to physically ‘hold down’ the entirety of the Sybarite empire may have been beyond its resources, at least until they had successfully digested the core components. However, the key deficiency in the Krotoniate ability to absorb the full extent of the Sybarite empire and the dominant role that empire had enabled it to play, lay in the Pythagorean-related staseis that wracked Kroton in the wake of its victory on the Traeis.

Given the telescoped and multilayered nature of the sources concerned, it is difficult to reconstruct a clear chronology of the anti-Pythagorean violence which wracked Kroton from the late sixth century to the middle of the fifth. However, the broad
outlines of the earliest of these *staseis* are as follows: Aristoxenos (F49 [Wehrli]), and in part supported by Aristotle (F191 [Rose]), Justin (20.4.17-18) and Porphyrios (VP 54-5), relates that Pythagoras was forced by Kylon and his politico-military faction to abandon Kroton around 509 and emigrate to Metapontion, where he is reputed to have died in the 490’s (Dikaiarchos F35b [Wehrli]).

Aristoxenos also remarks that this was not the end of the *stasis*, and Iamblichos cites the Timaios-dependent Apollonios when describing an escalation of the conflict, in which the Pythagoreans as a whole suffered exile (VP 255-61).

This turbulent year in Krotoniate politics has been methodically summarized by Minar under the heading of the ‘Kylonian troubles’ - a reference to the leading anti-Pythagorean agitator of the day.

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1 Von Fritz proposes c. 490 as the date for Pythagoras’ death, whereas Minar prefers c. 494. For a general chronological reconstruction of Pythagoras’ career, see von Fritz, *Pythagorean Politics in Southern Italy*, p. 49; and Minar, *Early Pythagorean Politics in Practice and Theory*, pp. 73, 133-5.

2 Dikaiarchos (F34 [Wehrli]) and Nikomachos (*ap. Iamb.*, VP 252) also cite a tradition which relates that Pythagoras was not even present when the *stasis* took place. This has been credibly discounted by Minar: *Early Pythagorean Politics in Practice and Theory*, pp. 66-7.

It is therefore evident that Kroton experienced at least two bouts of internal conflict centred around the issue of Pythagorean power at Kroton. It has been demonstrated that the Pythagoreans had exercised significant political influence within Kroton up until this time, including a prominent role during the debate over war and peace with Sybaris in 510. It is also apparent that the stance adopted by the Pythagoreans in this debate would have brought them into temporary accord with their future arch-enemies, the Kylonian faction, as it was this latter group which benefited most from the war with Sybaris and thus was the most likely supporter of its prosecution. The conflict between the Kylonians and the Pythagoreans can therefore in many ways be represented as a dispute within the Krotoniate war party over the spoils, with both factions possessing decidedly different views on distribution and, in all probability, the future of Kroton in its new role as 'hegemon-elect'.

Moreover, the triumph of one view in effect required the extirpation of the proponents of the other. As mentioned earlier, Kylon appears first to have targetted the leader of the faction most dangerous to his interests, and succeeded in expelling Pythagoras. Kylon's interests at this point probably
included little more than the control of the 'exarchate' of Sybaris. Land was after all at stake and Kylon and his associates could not afford to let those aristocrats who had thrown in their lot with the Pythagoreans dominate the distribution process, a goal which, according to Apollonios (ap. Iamb., VP 255), the Pythagoreans appear to have temporarily achieved. However, clearly the expulsion of Pythagoras was not enough to silence the Pythagorean movement as a whole and the size of the anti-Pythagorean faction within the polis appears to have expanded rapidly, uniting both τὸ πλῆθος and the ἡγεμόνες...τῆς διαφορᾶς, the latter group comprising Kylon and his associates (ap. Iamb., VP 255). Full scale civil war broke out by the end of 509 pitching the Kylonian-demos alliance against the Pythagorean core, which at this time appears to have included a group known as the ἐφηβοι (Ap.Ty. ap. Iamb., VP 258-61). Although Kylon and the demagogue Ninon were prominent in the lead-up to this second phase of the stasis, Apollonios states that the conflict was finally settled in a battle (μαχη), between the aristocratic Theages and Demokedes the Pythagorean.5

4 Berger, Revolution and Society in Greek Sicily and Southern Italy, p. 20; Lombardo, “Da sibari a thurii”, p. 281.
5 However, both Theages and Demokedes can be seen to have been
Thus it is evident that the civil strife which gripped Kroton around 509 in all likelihood involved most sections of society and included at least one pitched battle. The leaders of the original opposing factions were all derived from the arsitocracy and the presence of Ninon, described specifically as ἐκ τῶν ἡμοτικῶν (Ap.Ty. ap. Iamb., VP 258), clearly indicates that the Pythagoreans had inspired popular resentment against them. Moreover, it is also evident that some of the Pythagoreans, along with their ephebic allies, were able to seize control of at least one town or fortress within the Krotoniate chora, at the otherwise unknown Plateai (Ap.Ty. ap. Iamb., VP 261).

The picture of Kroton painted by the sources in the aftermath of the stunning victory at the Traeis is therefore one of a state in the midst of a violent and pervasive crisis. Conflict not only infected the astu, but also extended to the chora, in effect resulting in the temporary partition of the polis. Although only ever described as a tiny minority of the total population of Kroton (Ap.Ty. ap. Iamb., VP 260), the Pythagoreans had contemporaries of Kylon and Ninon, in that the former pair represented the anti-Pythagorean faction in the probouleutic chilion, whereas the latter pair spearheaded the contest in the ekklesia (Ap.Ty. ap. Iamb., VP 257). For the proposal that Demokedes was in fact the son-in-law of Milon of Kroton, see appendix.
clearly penetrated the upper echelons of Krotoniatis
government to a degree sufficient enough to require a violent
extraction. Furthermore, it is evident that the aristocracy, the
main decision-making class of Kroton, was hopelessly split by
the *stasis*, thus seriously reducing the state’s ability to deal
effectively with the new conditions of the post-Sybaris Italiote
*polis*-system. Thus, despite Kroton’s overwhelming victory
against Sybaris in 510, the ability of the Krotoniates to stamp
their authority over the *polis*-system of central Magna Graecia
must have been hampered significantly by their own internal
problems.

Although Minar and others argue for a rapid Pythagorean
recovery in the wake of the Kylonian troubles and the
subsequent dawn of nearly fifty years of Pythagorean-inspired
stability at Kroton, there are too many indications to the
contrary in the sources to adopt such a position
unreservedly.⁶ Apollonios, for instance, is unequivocal in his
statement that the aforementioned Theages defeated the
Pythagoreans in battle (*ap. Iamb., VP* 261). Moreover,
modern scholars are generally agreed that Pythagoras died in

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exile at some point in the late 490's. Such an event does not include much scope for a Pythagorean *revanche* at Kroton before this time, as a return to power for Pythagoras' school would surely have entailed a recall of the master. Ultimately Minar can only offer "it is still impossible to say how the Pythagoreans regained their power", in defense of his hypothesis, and it is therefore probable that the Pythagoreans were still out of power during the 490's.

There is no doubt that the Pythagoreans were able to stage a comeback at Kroton, and certainly this must have occurred many years before the renewed expulsions of 454/3, as related by Aristoxenos (F18 [Wehrli]). Indeed the occasion of their return may have been the pan-Italiote arbitration process described by Apollonios and conducted by Taras, Kaulonia and Metapontion (ap. Iamb., VP 262). In relation to the date of this process, although I am in agreement with Minar that Iamblichos has probably left a chronological gap between passages 261 and 262 in his *On the Pythagorean Life*, his assertion that the aforementioned arbitration belongs to the

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440's is more difficult to accept. Rather, this later period in all probability provides the context for the intervention and arbitration from the Achaian motherland as outlined by Apollonios (ap. Iamb., VP 263) and Polybios (2.39.1-5).  

Although there is no way of providing a precise date for the pan-Italiote arbitration, given that there are two known major outbreaks of anti-Pythagorean violence, one in 509 and the other in 454/3, and that the latter is eventually accounted for by pan-Achaian arbitration, it is therefore possible that the pan-Italiote venture is linked to the stasis sparked in 509. Moreover, as demonstrated earlier, this arbitration is unlikely to have taken place before the death of the exiled Pythagoras, thus suggesting a range between c. 490 and 454/3.

Indeed, as will be discussed further in section 3.3, just as the Sybarite revanche of 453/2 brought about a change in the Krotoniate regime (Diod. 11.90.3), so too may the Syracusan-backed refoundation of Sybaris in 476 have created a crisis grave enough to facilitate arbitration leading to national

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9 Ibid., pp. 59-60, 81-2.
11 As for note 10.
12 Bicknell, "The Tyranny of Kleiniias at Kroton", p. 16.
unity, or at least a definitive political settlement in Kroton. As argued by Bicknell, such a deal probably enabled the return of moderate Pythagoreans and the permanent ostracization of extremists such as those who had followed the late Demokedes.\textsuperscript{13} At any rate, Apollonios' emphasis on a thorough ‘clean-out’ of all those dissatisfied with the government certainly lends itself to the view that Kroton desperately required unity of purpose at this time (\textit{ap. Iamb.}, \textit{VP} 262). Moreover, given what is known about Kroton’s history between c. 490 and 454/3, it is only the events of 476 which provide us with a crisis desperate enough to warrant the pan-Italiote arbitration described by Apollonios.

Thus I propose that although Kylon and his allies, including Ninon and Theages, were able to expel the Pythagoreans in 509, agitation from outside the Krotoniate astu, at sites such as Plateai, continued for many years. Furthermore, it is possible that this state of affairs lasted until as late as 476, when the Pythagoreans were finally re-integrated into the Krotoniate mainstream. Moreover, as stated earlier, it should also be emphasized that these agitators represented a significant proportion of the Krotoniate elite who, like other exiled

\textsuperscript{13} \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 10-11.
aristocratic groups such as the Peisistratidai and the Alkmaionidai, could exert considerable pressure on the government of the day.\textsuperscript{14} A slow and incomplete takeover of the territories of the former Sybarite empire by Kroton should therefore not be seen as surprising.

Further highlighting the handicap placed upon Kroton by its turmoil at home is the nature of the aforementioned pan-Italiote arbitration it received, tentatively dated to 476. As stated earlier, three poleis, Taras, Metapontion and Kaulonia, were selected to settle the stasis and were empowered to exile the individuals found guilty (Ap.Ty. \textit{ap.} Iamb., VP 262). Although many examples of Greek poleis calling for external arbitration are available for the archaic and classical periods, most of these involve disputes over frontiers or possession of exclaves.\textsuperscript{15} It is far less common to find instances of

\textsuperscript{14} For the activities and potency of the Peisistratidai in exile, see Hdt. 1.60-2, 5.96, 6.107; [Arist.], \textit{Ath.Pol.} 14-15. For the Alkmaionidai, see Hdt. 5.62-3; [Arist.], \textit{Ath.Pol.} 1, 19.

\textsuperscript{15} Korinth and Kerkyra between Gela and Syracuse, c. 492 (Hdt. 7.154); Athens between Samos and Miletos, 441 (Thouk. 1.115.2; Plut., \textit{Per.} 25.1); Sparta between Elis and Lepreion, 421 (Thouk. 5.31.1-4); an hypothetical arbitrator between Sparta and Argos, 420; Thouk. 5.41.2); the King’s Peace between Sparta and its various foes, 387 (Diod. 14.10.1-4).
arbitration or intervention involving *stasis* unless the relevant institutions of the afflicted state in question had become so weakened or divided as to be effectively useless.\(^{16}\)

Moreover, the significance of the fact that other *states* had been brought in to arbitrate in the dispute should not be underestimated. It is not unheard of for the opposing sides in a civil disorder to call upon the services of an *individual*, or even a god, to arbitrate, as in the case of Demonax of Mantineia at Kyrene around the middle of the sixth century (Hdt. 4.161; Diod. 8.30.2), and the Delphic Oracle at Thourioi in 434 (Diod. 12.35.1-4). However, for other *poleis*, *i.e.* the theoretical fellow competitors in any given *polis*-system, to be empowered with what was in effect the deciding of the final make-up of the government of the *polis* concerned was considerably different, and can only emphasize the severity of the problems which the Kroton of the post-Sybarite era was facing. The case of Kerkyra in the last quarter of the fifth century is again illustrative. Between 427 and 425 the Kerkyraians were unable to deploy their forces competently

\(^{16}\) As in the case of Kerkyra in 427, when the Athenian *strategos* Nikostratos attempted to reconcile its warring parties (Thouk. 3.75.1). Thukydides' views on the dysfunctional nature of the Kerkyraian *polis* at this time are well known (3.82-4).
(Thouk. 3.76-8), due to the strife within their own ranks
(Thouk. 3.77.1: οἱ δὲ πολλῷ θορύβῳ καὶ πεφοβημένοι τὰ τ' ἐν τῇ πόλει...),
and were thus prone to the predations of other poleis. In
other words, Kerkyra had ceased to function within its polis-
system in an effective manner, at least until its internal
problems were resolved.

In 509 in particular but also down to c. 476, Kroton must have
experienced similar difficulties. As the historic second city of
the Achaian-dominated world of central Magna Graecia and as
the conquerer of the Sybarite hegemón, Kroton was in many
way well placed to move to the forefront of the Italiote polis-
system. As has been demonstrated, to a degree Kroton did in
fact improve its territorial position as well as its position within
the polis-system as a whole, emerging as a power to be
reckoned with in late archaic Magna Graecia. However, while
nothing could take away the victory over Sybaris, debilitating
stasis could certainly take away or retard the ability of Kroton
to capitalize on its gains efficiently and effectively. That Kroton
required the assistance of other poleis to solve its domestic
problems is thus a strong indication that the Krotoniate state
was experiencing serious problems in the aftermath of its
victory at the Traeis. Moreover, its failure to surmount all of
the internal problems it faced in the wake of its great victory also spawned opportunities for other poleis to make a claim to the legacy of Sybaris.

Section Two: Reginon: the 'principality' of the Straits.

One of the earliest indicators of centrifugal pressure within the Italiote polis-system after the fall of the pervasive Sybarite hegemony comes from the southernmost point of Magna Graecia, the Straits of Messina. As discussed briefly in chapters 3 and 5, Reginon had begun to assert itself as an independent polis during the second half of the sixth century, involving itself in at least one land war between its Italiote neighbours to the north, at the Sagra (c. 550), as well as the largely maritime clash between the Greeks and the Etruro-Punic axis in the western Mediterranean (c. 535). However, from c. 510 the policies of Reginon began to take a far more ambitious direction. Moreover, the timing of this shift corresponded with the collapse of the hegemony of Sybaris and the subsequent instability of the first successor state, Kroton. In essence the exercising of power in the central Italiote polis-system experienced a period of uncertainty, contributing to the rise of formerly peripheral players such as Reginon. In turn the
fortunes of Rhegion in this period were epitomized by the ambitions and confidence of its first tyrant, Anaxilaos son of Kretines.

The tyranny of Anaxilaos lasted from 494 until his death in 476 (Diod. 11.48.2), and established an imperialist dynasty so resilient that it survived an interregnum of some nine years under the stewardship of a certain Mickythos (Diod. 11.48.2, 66.1-3), who is generally referred to as household retainer of Anaxilaos (Hdt. 7.170; Paus. 5.26.4). The coup which installed Anaxilaos in 494 is said by Aristotle to have toppled an oligarchic regime (Pol. 1316a38), and the occasion was probably linked to a popular uprising against the original Chalkidian aristocracy by the Messenian element within Rhegine society, of which Anaxilaos was a member (Thouk. 6.4.6; Paus. 4.23.6). However, it is likely that events external to the ethnic make-up of Rhegion also played a crucial role in the establishment of the Anaxilad dynasty.

17 Strabo states that it was the Messenians who comprised the ruling elite (6.1.6), but this is most probably an anachronism resulting from the superimposition of the Anaxilad dynasty over the rest of the archaic period. See Vallet, Zancle et Rhégion, pp. 77-8, 80, 336; Berger, Revolution and Society in Greek Sicily and Southern Italy, p. 29.

In particular, it has been speculated that the aggressive expansion of Gela under its tyrant, Hippokrates (498-491), against the Chalkidian *poleis* of eastern Sicily precipitated the coup in Rhegion.\(^{19}\) Certainly Hippokrates did launch a number of successful offensives against the Chalkidians between c. 497 and c. 494, in which he extended his domain to the Straits of Messina by capturing Zankle and installing a sub­tyrant, Skythes (Hdt. 6.23, 7.154). This Geloan advance to within twenty kilometres of Rhegion must have caused alarm within the last remaining independent Straits *polis*, and perhaps even a crisis large enough to have instigated a change of government. Moreover, it is possible that the fall of Zankle and at least three other Chalkidian *poleis* in eastern Sicily (Hdt. 7.154: Leontinoi, Kallipolis and Naxos) served to undermine the military credibility and prestige of the Chalkidian ruling class in Rhegion.\(^{20}\)

However, the *coup d’état* of 494 in reality may have merely been the *coup de grâce* for the Rhegine oligarchy. The brief reflection of the peculiarly Italiote incuse technique by the coins of Zankle around 510 suggests that Italiote Rhegion may

\(^{19}\) Caccamo Caltabiano, *La Monetazione di Messana*, p. 3.

\(^{20}\) TWGa, p. 387.
have occupied Sikeliote Zankle for a short time. Moreover, the existence of a late sixth century Olympic dedication (*IGASMG III* no. 34), in which Zankle records a victory against an unknown foe suggests a similar version of events. The foe in question cannot have been Gela, as assumed by Vallet, as there is no record of Hippokrates' tyrannical predecessor and brother, Kleandros (505-498), ever having expanded the borders of Gela in the direction of Zankle. Indeed, the continuing independence of the Chalkidian *poleis* of eastern Sicily up until the invasion of Hippokrates in the early 490's virtually rules out the possibility of an attack on Zankle from the south, as Hippokrates' own attack demonstrates that a systematic reduction of all of these *poleis* was necessary to enter and occupy the region effectively.

While an Etruscan seaborne raid cannot be ruled out, the most likely invader of Zankle from the north or east would have been Rhegion, whose own ambitions in the direction of Zankle after 510 have already been hinted at by the appearance of a Zanklaian incuse series. Moreover, a second Olympic dedication

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21 ACGC, p. 207; *TWGa*, pp. 386-7.
22 Vallet, *Zancle et Rhégion*, pp. 334-5, n. 3.
23 *TWGa*, pp. 382-3.
recording a Zanklaian victory over Rhetion between c. 500 and c. 490 lends further support to the view that Rhetion was seeking to capture Zankle after 510 (SEG 11.1205).\textsuperscript{24} Thus prior to the Geloan occupation of Zankle around 494 it is evident that Rhetion was attempting to conquer the polis for itself and had failed to do so on at least two occasions, as indicated by the aforementioned Olympic dedications. The Geloan triumph may well have dealt the final humiliating blow to the Chalkidian oligarchic regime in Rhetion, underscoring a decade of failure as well as creating the conditions for a Messenian-based tyranny whose raison d’être would have been to achieve atonement through military victory.

Indeed, from the earliest days of his tyranny it is clear that Anaxilaos was intent on addressing the failures of the previous regime by expanding Rhegine power in the region. In 493 the unstable Italiote polis-system of Magna Graecia was further complicated by the arrival of a fleet of Samian and Milesian refugees fresh from the unsuccessful Ionian Revolt (Hdt. 6.23). Herodotos states explicitly that Anaxilaos was already in conflict with the Zanklaians at this time (τότε ἐῶν διάφορος τοῖς Ζαγκλαίοιοι), reinforcing the view that Anaxilaos had inherited an earlier dispute from his oligarchic predecessors.

\textsuperscript{24} See also IGASMG III no. 35.
From Herodotos we also learn that these refugees, of whom the Samians were the most numerous and dominant, had been invited by the Zanklaian to found a new *polis* at Kale Akte, some eighty kilometres west of Zankle on the coast of northern Sicily (6.22). Given the political situation at Zankle at that time, such an invitation must have required approval from Zankle’s tyrant Skythes, and possibly even Hippokrates himself, and its occurrence foreshadows the centrally planned colonization activities of the later Deinomenid, Emmenid and Dionysian tyrannies.

One purpose of colonies such as these was to consolidate the tyrant’s grip over his territories by reinforcing the loyalist presence in the given area. A colony at Kale Akte at this time would have served to reinforce the western borders of the Zanklaian *chora*, a frontier zone through which Zankle itself was vulnerable to attack, as demonstrated by the Carthaginian invasion of Himera in 480 (Hdt. 7.165-6; Diod. 11.20), an

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26 Kamarina, by Hippokrates (Thouk. 6.5.3); Aitna (Katane), by Hieron I (Diod. 11.49.1-2); Leontinoi, by Hieron I (Diod. 11.49.2); Himera, by Theron (Diod. 11.49.3); Katane, by Dionysios I (Diod. 14.15.3); Messene, by Dionysios I (Diod.14.78.4-5); Tyndaris, by Dionysios I (Diod. 14.78.5-6).
Athenian assault in 426 (Thouk. 3.90.2-4), and a Rhegine incursion in 394 (Diod. 14.87.1). Thus there were strong indications that the Straits region, and in particular Zankle, had been a recent flashpoint for conflict between Italiote and Sikeliote poleis, and was expected to be so again.

To press the claims of his polis to Zankle, Anaxilaos entered into negotiations with the Samians himself once the refugee fleet had reached Lokroi (Hdt. 6.23). Consequently, Anaxilaos was able to persuade the Samians to seize control of Zankle for themselves whilst Skythes and the Zanklaian army were absent from the city. From the Rhegine perspective, this achieved a result second only to outright conquest by their own forces: the removal of a dangerous Geloan-backed regime from their border, and the installment of an allied population.

However, this event also produced the first real crisis of the Anaxilad regime in Rhegion in that the Samians rapidly betrayed the Rhegines by bringing about a rapprochement with Hippokrates (Hdt. 6.23). A brief series of distinctly Samian coins issued from the Zanklaian mint then follows, demonstrating the entrenchment of an independent and

27 Burn, Persia and the Greeks, p. 298.
possibly even pro-Geloan regime in Zankle.\textsuperscript{28} The failures of
the deposed Rhegine oligarchy had well and truly become the
property of the new tyrant, Anaxilaos.

Thoukydides remarks that Anaxilaos was not long thwarted by
the Samians and that direct Rhegine, as opposed to the
previously unsuccessful proxy, control over Zankle was soon
established (6.4.6). The death of Hippokrates in 491 and the
ensuing collapse of his Pantarid dynasty at Gela were almost
certainly key factors in this conquest (Hdt. 7.155).\textsuperscript{29} The end
of the Samian coinage at Zankle has been dated to 488, after
which a Rhegine influenced series begins, thus implying that
the Anaxilad tyranny not only survived the setback of 493 but
was also able to achieve the occupation of Zankle after as much
as twenty years of collective failure on the part of Rhegion’s
leadership.\textsuperscript{30}

The significance of this achievement cannot be overstated.

\textsuperscript{28}ACGC, p. 213; Jenkins, \textit{Ancient Greek Coins}, p. 73.
\textsuperscript{29} For the date of Hippokrates’ death, see \textit{TWGa}, p. 403.
\textsuperscript{30} For the date of the end of Samian coinage at Zankle, see Vallet,
\textit{Zancle et Rhégion}, pp. 340-1; \textit{ACGC}, p. 213; Stazio & Siciliano, “La
Magna Grecia e il mare”, p. 303; Caccamo Caltabiano, \textit{La Monetazione di
Messana}, p. 3.
Rhegion’s forcible unification of the Straits poleis brought together the best harbour (Zankle) and the best-placed sentinel in the region (Rhegion), enabling the Rhegine tyranny to establish, as Vallet puts it, “le royaume de Détroit”, or in the words of Burn, a “principalité” (see map 6).\textsuperscript{31} In terms of square kilometres, the new principalité still did not rival the giant land-based Achaian dominions to the north. However, the strength derived from its strategic position and maritime capabilities was formidable. Traffic to and from the Greek Mainland now required a minimum level of good will or tolerance from the tyrant of Rhegion. The marked slowing down in the use of the Straits during the 480’s by ships from the Mainland, as derived from the decline in Attic ceramic imports in the region can, to a degree, be linked to the growing confidence and assertiveness of the Anaxilad regime in Rhegion.\textsuperscript{32}

Moreover, Rhegion’s conquest of Zankle also marks a generational change in the balance of power on the Straits of Messina. During the first two centuries of Greek control over


\textsuperscript{32} Vallet, \textit{Zancle et Rhégion}, p. 380.
the Straits of Messina it would appear that Zankle was the senior partner in the Straits-based polis-system.\footnote{Sabbione, “La colonizzazione greca”, p. 223.} Zankle had after all been the driving force behind the foundations at Rhegion, Mylai, Metauros and Himera. Furthermore, given that this process of colonization did not expire until c. 648, Himera being the last known Zanklaian foundation, it is probable that Zankle’s pre-eminent position within the Straits polis-system survived into the middle of the seventh century at least.

Indeed, the earliest incident that can be construed as being indicative of independent action on Rhegion’s behalf is the alliance with Lokroi around 550. In turn, this alliance indicates that Rhegion was looking towards Magna Graecia rather than Sicily to meet its needs. Although Lokroi shared a land border with Rhegion it had little to do with the essentially maritime structure of the Straits polis-system, and the alliance should therefore be seen in terms of Rhegion pursuing Rhegine interests. Thus by the middle of the sixth century Rhegion was beginning to gravitate away from its original colonial parameters and functions, a shift which culminated in the decision to seize the Straits for itself and substitute the old pan-Chalkidian regime with a system specifically tailored to
Italiote interests.

The governance of the newly captured Sikeliote territory was, like that of Rhegion itself, strongly linked to the Anaxilad family. Of the three known sons of Anaxilaos one, a certain Leophron, was clearly of age during the 470's and appears to have been given one of the poleis within the principality to rule on his own. However, this does not alter the fact that it is only Anaxilaos who is accorded by the ancient sources the de facto title ὁ Ἀναξιλαός τύρων καὶ Ἴος (Diod. 11.48.2), thus implying that the principality was essentially still a centralized state. Nevertheless, the ancient sources often cite Rhegion as being the specific charge of Leophron, and Zankle of Anaxilaos (Justin 21.3.2; schol. on Pindar, Pyth. 2.32-3, 34; Diod. 11.66.1), but the ambiguity of the Pindaric scholiast (see esp. Pyth. 2.38), has led Burn to suggest that it was Anaxilaos who in fact reigned in Rhegion, and Leophron in Zankle.35

However, given the recent nature of the Rhégine conquest of

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34 Also called Kleophron by the Pindaric scholiast: schol. Pyth. 2.32-3, 34, 38.

Zankle, and the political competition generated by the proliferation of aggressive tyrannies in Sicily at that time, it is not unfeasible to suggest that Anaxilaos may have opted to base himself in Zankle in order to provide the experienced hand that was no doubt required there. Rhegion on the other hand was relatively shielded from the designs of the Sikeliote tyrants by Zankle itself, as well being protected by the instability prevalent in the Italiote *polis*-system to the north, thus making Rhegion a safer prospect for the novice Leophron. Moreover, such ‘apprenticeships’ were not uncommon within the tyrannical houses of Greek Sicily. At any rate, it is apparent that the new dual-*polis* state that emerged in 488 was dominated by Anaxilaos and his family.

The impact of Rhegine rule at Zankle has strong imperialistic

*36* Hieron I was sub-tyrant of Gela (485-478) after his brother Gelon had transferred his seat of power from Gela to Syracuse and before Hieron himself succeeded to the Syracusan ‘throne’ in 478 (Hdt. 7.156). A third Deinomenid, Thrasyboulos, possibly served in the same capacity (488-467) until he too succeeded at Syracuse, in 467 (Diod. 11.66.4-67.5). It also appears that Hieron was grooming his own son, Deinomenes II, as a future ruler of Syracuse when he installed him as sub-tyrant of Aitna (476-c. 461): Pind., *Pyth.* 1.58-60; Diod. 11.76.3. Thrasydaios also served an apprenticeship as sub-tyrant of Himera (c. 477-472) while his father, Theron, reigned in Akragas: Diod. 11.48.6, 53.1.
undertones reminiscent of the policies of the Achaian Italiote states to the north and, in particular, of the attempts by Kroton to depict itself as the legitimate successor state to the hegemony of Sybaris. Shortly after the Rhegine conquest of Zankle the mints of both poleis began to issue identical coins. The obverse type featured a lion and was perhaps influenced by the leonine type of the recently defunct Samian/Zanklaian tetradrachm, although the Apolline connotations also suggest the influence of the strong Rhegine association with the Delphic Oracle (Diod. 8.23.2). It has also been suggested that the calf-head type on the reverse symbolizes ‘Italia’, a geographical area in antiquity referring approximately to the southern half of modern Calabria, of which Rhegion probably considered itself the main city (Arist., Pol. 1329b8-12). Moreover, over time the association between Rhegion and Zankle on the one hand, and the Anaxilad regime on the other, became more intense and overt. In 480 Anaxilaos achieved a victory in the Olympic mule race, which precipitated a new series of coins from both mints of the principality, featuring a

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37 Vallet, Zancle et Rhégion, p. 343; CGC, p. 214.
38 Through interpreting the word ‘calf’ (italos) as a pun on Italia. See Jenkins, Ancient Greek Coins, p. 73; Caven, Dionysius I: War-Lord of Sicily, p. 146.
Thus the coinage of the Anaxilad period clearly demonstrates both where the centre of power was in the principality (Rhegion/Italia), and upon which family this power was bestowed (the Anaxiladai). Italiote maxims and cultural imperatives, as opposed to Sikeliote ones, were therefore in many ways the order of the day. As has been detailed previously, both Sybaris and Kroton were also early adherents to this ideology of power as expressed through numismatic symbolism. The coinage of such Sybarite conquests as Siris, as well as that of its villaggi periferici were all marked by the Sybarite bull type. In seeking to assert itself as the new hegemon after 510, Kroton also took control of the numerous mints that lay within its newly extended borders and ensured that the tripod would replace the bull wherever possible. Unlike under the fifth century Athenian empire, and to a lesser extent under the royal mint system of the later Argeadai and the Diadochoi, there was obviously some prestige to be

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39 TWGa, p. 431; ACGC, p. 214; Caccamo Caltabiano, La Monetazione di Messana, p 32.
40 M&L no. 45.
41 A.B. Bosworth, Conquest and Empire: The reign of Alexander the Great (Cambridge, 1988), pp. 232, 244; O. Mørkholm, Early Hellenistic
had in the Italiote polis-system from allowing the survival of dependants’ mints, even in the instance of the conquest, and in some cases annihilation, of the poleis in question, such as at Siris (by Sybaris), Sybaris (by Kroton) and Zankle (by Rhegion). Therefore, although it is possible that the personalized aspect of Anaxilaos’ biga coins were influenced by the quadriga series commemorating the Olympic victories of the Deinomenid tyrants of Syracuse, it is evident that in many ways Anaxilaos was seeking to establish Rhegion as an imperialist state in the mould of the Achaian giants to the north. Such a policy naturally required the adoption of an ideology of power, replete with hegemonal numismatic symbolism.

There is also evidence to suggest that Anaxilaos may have emulated some of the ethnic policies of the Achaian superstates. Thucydides states that after the Rhegine


42 *ACGC,* p. 210. For the Olympic chariot victories of the Deinomenidai, see Paus. 6.9 (Gelon, 488); and Findar, *Ol.* 1 (Hieron I, 476).
conquest of Zankle Anaxilaos recolonized the polis and renamed it Messene (6.4.6), after his own ancestral homeland (ἀπὸ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ τὸ ἀρχαῖον πατρίδος). Numismatic evidence also points towards a name change for Zankle, with the legend ΜΕΣΣΕΝΙΟΝ appearing after 488 on all coins issued from this mint. Moreover, as indicated by Thucydides’ reports of recolonization, there is good reason to believe that this change was not merely nominal. In a somewhat garbled and anachronistic account of the events surrounding the Rhegine capture of Zankle, Pausanias reveals two salient points. Firstly, it is alleged that Anaxilaos, as Skythes had previously done with the Samians, invited a band of Messenians from the Peloponessos to Magna Graecia, where he promptly enrolled them as soldiers in his bid to conquer Zankle; and secondly, after the capture of Zankle, the Messenians were allowed to settle in Zankle (4.23.6-10).

While Pausanias confuses the chronologies of this event with that of the Second Messenian War, and transposes the actions of the victorious Messenians over the top of the Herodotean account of the Samian seizure of Zankle (c.f. Hdt. 6.23), the Messenian recolonization process is likely to have occurred.

43 ACGC, p 214.
Strabo also asserts that these colonists were in fact Messenians (6.2.3), and Thoukydides' description of the colonists as being ἴσαμεῖκτων ἀνθρώπων can certainly be interpreted as at least including Messenians in its midst (6.4.6). Certainly, it has been accepted as plausible that there was some form of revolt or disturbance in Messenia in either 491 or 490, thus making available an emigré population of Messenians for use in 488.  

Moreover, the eventual retention of the name 'Messene' even after the expulsion of the Anaxilad dynasty in 461 strongly suggests that the ethnographic make-up of the polis had been altered permanently during the years of Anaxilad rule.

The implications of such a policy are considerable. Between 485 and 476 the Deinomenid tyrants of Syracuse would also earn for themselves a reputation for flexibility in relation to the demographic resources which they regarded as at their disposal. However, their ethnic policies rarely relied upon the

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45 ACGC, p. 216, Caccamo Caltabiano, La Monetazione di Messana, pp. 4-5.
formula that deploying one's own ethnic group in sensitive recolonization ventures was the best guarantee of loyalty. Both Gelon and Hieron I attracted and exploited a wide variety of non-Syracusian and non-Sikeliote peoples on account of their military and patronage power. Anaxilaos on the other hand turned to his Messenian roots for inspiration and support when the issue of Zankle's long-term future arose. Such a preference is reminiscent of the 'call to the fatherland' made by Sybaris and Kroton when colonization of Metapontion and Kaulonia was mooted. More importantly, as discussed in chapter 4, upon the Sybarite conquest of Siris, the Siritid underwent a process of 'Achaianization', effectively transforming the ethnic character of the region into a state more palatable to the new Achaian overlords. A degree of ethnic engineering also probably took place in the aftermath of Kroton's acquisition of the Sybaritid.

46 For instance: Gelon's insertion of Geloans, Kamarinaians, and the aristocrats of Megara Hyblaia and Euboia into the population of Syracuse in 485 (Hdt. 7.156); Hieron's importation of Peloponnesians and Syracusans into Aitna/Katane in 476 (Diod. 11.49.1); Hieron's introduction of Naxians and Katanaians into Leontinoi in 476 (Diod. 11.49.2).

47 There are many examples of Deinomenid patronage of individual foreigners: Hagesias of Stymphalos (Pind., Ol. 6); Astylos of Kroton (Paus. 6.13.1); Simonides of Keos (Tim. ap. schol. Pind. Ol. 2.29; Ath. 14.656d; Ael., VH 9.1); Bakchylides of Keos (Ael., VH 4.15).
at least in terms of the ruling class, as suggested by the position of Kylon. As the Rhegine example at Zankle demonstrates, evidently conquest followed by recolonization had become an imperialist norm.

The emergence of a regime in Rhegion intent on redistributing populations as it saw fit thus not only predates the more famous recolonization projects of the Sikeliote Deinomenidai, but also in many ways conforms to a pattern of imperialism endemic to the central region of the Italiote polis-system. Clearly in archaic Magna Graecia, and later in Greek Sicily, population was regularly regarded as an asset conducive to control, or even as a weapon against regional rivals. In effect, population could be used both to build or strengthen a state’s authority over its new territories or spheres of influence, as well as to ‘fund’ warfare. Therefore, while classical and hellenistic Rhegion became increasingly tied to the events and political processes of Greek Sicily, the emergence of an imperialist Rhegine state in the late archaic period boasted a strongly Italiote pedigree.

That the principality of the Straits was a serious contender with Kroton for a share in the power left in the wake of the
Sybarite collapse is also evident in its rapid rise to prominence in the affairs of southern Magna Graecia, Sicily, and the lower Tyrrenian Sea in general. Moreover, standing aside momentarily from raw politico-military power, in terms of broader international name recognition, it was probably Rhegion, with its tyrant victorious on the field of Olympia and a stranglehold over the main east-west trade route, that stood out among the Italiote states. Sybaris was in all likelihood the last Italiote polis to enjoy such widespread recognition, as suggested by the record of Smindyrides' voyage to Sikyon (Hdt. 6.127; Thphr. ap. Ath. 12.511c), Alkisthenes’ to Sparta (Arist. ap. Ath. 12.541a), and the impact of the fall of Sybaris at distant Miletos (Hdt. 6.21). In this sense it is not difficult to imagine that Kroton, embroiled as it was in civil war and struggling to come to terms with the magnitude of its territorial 'inheritance', played second fiddle to Rhegion.

As has been seen, just as the Samians represented a setback for Rhecine interests, the emigration of the Messenians to Italy in or just prior to 488 appears to have tipped the balance of power on the Straits in Rhegion's favour. If Pausanias is to be believed, the Messenians provided Anaxilaos with the fresh soldiers with which he was finally able to invest Zankle
successfully (4.23.8). In contrast, Thoukydides makes no mention of this joint assault, and speaks only of the post-conquest period (6.4.6). However, despite the problems already identified with this episode as related by Pausanias, the proposition that the Messenians provided the infantry component to reinforce a Rhegine naval siege of Zankle should not be dismissed out of hand.

As a maritime polis, Rhegion can be expected to have been well endowed with naval assets but, as discussed in chapter 3, its small and mountainous chora in all probability did not support a particularly large hoplite army. Indeed, the earliest available figures for the Rhegine armed forces support this estimation. The largest land army which Rhegion is known to have fielded appeared in 399 and did not exceed 6,000 infantry and 600 cavalry (Diod. 14.40.3), whereas the Rhegine war fleet numbered a more than respectable eighty ships in 389 (Diod. 14.103.2, 106.3).48 Although most poleis in the

48 Although Diodoros states that Dionysios I confiscated the entire Rhegion fleet, at that time numbering 70 ships, in 389, Rhegion had already lost ten ships to Dionysios' admiral, Thearides, off Lipara earlier that year, thus bringing the total to eighty ships. The figure of eighty is less clear but nevertheless implied at Diod. 14.8.2 as well.
region were dwarfed by the naval power of Deinomenid Syracuse (Hdt. 7.158), the Rhegine fleet was in all probability the second largest in Greek Italy, and thus also the largest in Magna Graecia at that time. Clearly what Rhegion did lack was infantry, and the failure of its forces to seize Zankle at the end of the sixth century, and again in 394 when it relied upon a land assault only (Diod. 14.87.1-3), underlines this weakness. Therefore Pausanias' account of the fall of Zankle, in which a combined land and sea operation secures victory for Anaxilaos and his new Messenian allies, should be viewed as a plausible, if not preferable, version of events. Moreover, taken in conjunction with the use of the Messenians as colonists in the new 'Messene', the role of the Messenians in Rhegion's expansionist plans thus becomes instrumental, encompassing both deployment in offensive as well as consolidation operations.

Rhegion continued to demonstrate its new power by seeking to reoccupy those territories which had traditionally belonged to Zankle, but had since asserted their independence. Two Olympic dedications dated to the 480's outline victories over Mylai, at the hands of the Μεσσηνοί (SEG 24.313-14). As argued in chapter 3, this former colony of Chalkidian Zankle in
all probability formed part of the extended *chora* of the *metropolis*, as indicated by the numerous attempts by Zankle/Messene over the centuries to bring the colony to heel or secure its recovery (Diod. 14.87.3, 19.65.3-5).\(^{49}\) In this sense the Rhegines and their Messenian allies resembled the later Mamertine conquerers of Sikeliote Messene. Having seized Messene in the 280’s, it is evident that by the time of their defeat at the Longanos River in the 260’s the Mamertines had expanded their territory to include all of the old Zanklaian patrimony, including Mylai (Polyb. 1.9.7; Diod. 22.13.1). Moreover, given that Rhegion was the ruler of Messene from 488, it is probable that Rhegion was also the directing force behind the Messenian assault on Mylai. The appearance of *Mesoéνιοι* on the Olympic dedication thus aptly symbolizes the Rhegine ability to deploy both the resources of its new subordinate *polis*, and its people, the Messenians.

Further evidence of this strength is apparent in another Olympic dedication, this time recording a Rhegine victory against the Geloans in the late sixth or early fifth century (*SEG* 24.303: [Τὸ] Ἐγκέλεαίον). In trying to establish a more

\(^{49}\) Moreover, Thouk. 3 90.2 not only implies that Mylai was under Messenian control in 426, but also, given that a strong Messenian garrison was present, that revolt may have been a possibility.
precise date for this event, the various political manoeuvrings endemic to late archaic Sicily and Magna Graecia provide indispensable aid. Given that there is no indication of Geloan activity as far north as the Straits until the expedition of Hippokrates, the battle possesses an upper range of c. 497-c. 494. Moreover, as discussed earlier, the circumstances of Anaxilaos’ own rise to power in 494 leaves precious little scope for a successful military operation on the part of the Rhegine oligarchy prior to this date. Furthermore, a clash between a land power such as Gela and a maritime state like Rhegion not only necessitates some form of Rhegine intervention in Sicily, but also the Rhegine occupation of a base within Sicily so as to facilitate the fielding of a land army. An attack of this nature sits far easier with the known imperialist ambitions of Anaxilad Rhegion, as well as the known Anaxilad occupation of two such potential bases, Zankle and Mylai. Therefore there is little doubt the Rhegine victory over the Geloans occurred during the reign of Anaxilaos.

A possible lower range for this victory is made available by referring to the transfer of Geloan power to Syracuse in 485

50 For a definitive chronology of Hippokrates’ career, see TWGa, pp. 378-406.
(Hdt. 7.156). Any conflict between Rhegion and Gela after 485 would almost certainly have dragged in the senior Deinomenid partner, Syracuse, then under the control of Gelon. Given that Syracuse was the premiere military power in Sicily by c. 481 at the very latest (Hdt. 7.158),\(^5\) it is extremely unlikely that Rhegion would have risked a military encounter with Gela at this time. Indeed, as will be discussed further below, the threat of war from Gelon in 480 was possibly enough to force Anaxilaos to abandon his alliance with Carthage. However, in the years prior to Gelon’s occupation of Syracuse he was in many ways at his most vulnerable. Gelon in all likelihood had inherited a Sikel war from his predecessor, Hippokrates, was forced to put down a revolt within Gela itself, had to dispose of the new Pantarid regime, and possibly even fought a war against the Carthaginians (Hdt. 7. 155, 158). A defeat for an overstretched Gelon at the hands of the Rhegines at this point, whose own conquest of Zankle he would have been hard pressed to ignore, is thus conceivable. Therefore the most likely date for the Olympic inscription lies between 488 and

\(^5\) Based on Burn’s calculations and the speech of the pan-Hellenic envoys at Syracuse in which Xerxes is said to have not yet crossed the Hellespont. See Burn, Persia and the Greeks, p. 321.
485, when Anaxilaos had good reason to be fighting in Sicily by way of his occupation of Zankle/Messene, and Deinomenid power had yet to peak but was still probably interested in asserting itself over the former Pantarid domain, including the Straits region.

This Rhegine victory over what was presumably a Geloan expeditionary force helps to underscore the confidence and success of the nascent principalty, particularly in regard to Sicily and the lower Tyrrhenian Sea region. Moreover, it also serves to define what Anaxilaos' vision for his principality may have been. As discussed earlier, the coinage issued by the two known mints of the domain (Rhegion and Messene), indicates that Anaxilaos most probably viewed his principality as Italiote, as opposed to Sikeliote, in nature. Furthermore, his determined opposition to the Sikeliote land powers between 494 and 480, whether Geloan or Syracusan-based, suggests a strong desire to sever much of north-eastern Sicily from the rest of the island and bind it to his Rhegine stronghold in Magna Graecia. While the conquest of Zankle was a first step towards realizing this design, the capture of Mylai soon after 488 indicated the direction in which Anaxilaos was looking to secure his gains, the lower Tyrrhenian Sea.
Accordingly, the Rhegine commitment to the wider Straits zone increased markedly. It is probably around this time that Anaxilaos established a ναυσταθμόα at Skyllaion, on the Italiote side of the Straits (Strabo 6.1.5). Situated so as to exploit the narrowest point of the Straits, between Cape Pelorias and Cape Kainys, Strabo goes on to explain that Anaxilaos was then able to block traffic at will. As stated previously, this feat in itself was probably achieved somewhat earlier by the Rhegine occupation of Zankle, but what the foundation of Skyllaion did accomplish was the ability to close even the entrance to the Straits from the north. The main effect of this, according to Strabo, was that Anaxilaos was able to curb Etruscan piracy in the region, thus enhancing his status as lord of the Straits and as a major player in both the polis-systems of Magna Graecia and Sicily.

Although the establishment and consolidation of Rhegine rule over the entire Straits zone no doubt formed the nucleus of Anaxilad imperialism, Rhegion also appears to have identified some room for expansion in Magna Graecia itself. A series of Olympic dedications outline multiple victories on the part of Rhegion and Messene against Lokroi early in the fifth century (SEG 24.304-5, 311-12). Rhegion had been an ally of Lokroi's
during the 550's when Kroton went to war against the latter. However, given the disarray in central Magna Graecia following the fall of Sybaris, Kroton and its Achaian brethren no longer posed the threat they once had. In essence, Rhegion could now afford to reduce or even remove the formerly useful Lokrian buffer state to its north. The benefits of such expansion included access to fertile Lokrian territory on the Ionian Sea littoral and around Matauros, the Lokrian outpost closest to Rhegion itself.52

Two of the inscriptions mention the Rhegines only (24.304-5), whilst the remainder record solely the actions of the Messenians (24.311-12). Given the imprecise nature of the dating for the former pair, it is possible that these victories were scored by Anaxilaos' oligarchic predecessors. However, as stated previously, Anaxilaos came to power against a backdrop of military failure on the part of this oligarchy, and it is therefore more likely that the dedications in question celebrate victories achieved under Anaxilaos' aegis. The key to differentiating between the two groups of dedications is in the phases of Anaxilaos' reign to which they belong. The Messenian dedications clearly represent the successful

52 De Sensi Sestito, *La Calabria in età arcaica e classica*, p. 56.
deployment of forces from the junior *polis* in the principality of the Straits against the foes of the senior, thus locating the dedications in the post-488 period. The Rhegion-centric dedications can therefore be seen as either celebrating the achievements of Rhegine soldiers in the same attack, or the results of an earlier invasion of Lokroi, during the period predating the Rhegine occupation of Zankle/Messene (494-488).

Whatever the case may be concerning the precise chronology of these inscriptions, it is evident that Rheidion also wished to see itself as a land power as well as a maritime one. Such a view was directly linked to the Rhegine perception that many of the 'rules' regarding the Italiote *polis*-system prevalent before the fall of Sybaris were now simply redundant. Rhegion clearly did not feel threatened by the proximity of Kroton any more if it was seeking to carve up part, or all of, the Lokrian *chora*, the buffer zone between the Achaian and Euboian worlds since at least c. 550. Previously a node for maritime commerce, Anaxilad Rhegion was at the forefront of those states seeking to exploit the opportunities created by the end of the Sybarite hegemony.

However, where Rhegion was most vulnerable was along its
newly extended southern frontier, in Sicily. Anaxilaos' trump card in his efforts to fend off the Deinomenid threat from the south and consolidate his realm was an alliance with Carthage, which Herodotos states was initiated by Anaxilaos (7.165). Not only was this one of the rare examples of an alliance between Italiotes and a foreign power in the archaic period, it was also the first known major military agreement between Greeks and non-Greeks.53 Moreover, it also indicates the lengths to which Rhegion was prepared to go to secure its position. An alliance with an African-based power in an environment of ambivalence and outright hostility between Greeks and non-Greeks in the West was a significant and thoroughly pragmatic step to take, particularly as Rhegion already had a record of pro-Phokaian sympathies, a group who had proven themselves to be both anti-Etruscan and anti-Carthaginian (Hdt. 1.166, 6.17).

53 Other instances of major Helleno-barbarian military alliances occur in 431, between Athens and the Odrysian kingdom (Thouk. 2.29, 95); in 387, the so-called King's Peace between Sparta and Persia (Diod. 14.110); and in 383, between the Italiote League and Carthage (Diod. 15.15.2). However, minor alliances such as that between Hippokrates and the Sikels of Ergetion around 491 were probably quite common in the West (Polyain. 5.6).
Furthermore, the evolution of this alliance also demonstrates both Anaxilaos' efforts to involve himself in the affairs of Sicily's lower Tyrrhenian littoral and this region's importance to the security of his nascent principality. Anaxilaos' victories against Zankle, Mylai and the Geloans did not go unnoticed in the only other significant Greek polis in the northern half of Sicily, Himera. As suggested by the escape of Skythes from his imprisonment at Inyx soon after 493 and his subsequent flight to Himera (Hdt. 6.23-4), this polis lay outside the Pantarid sphere of influence, and probably outside that of their Deinomenid successors too. Herodotos also records the existence of a tyranny at Himera during the 480's and it is therefore possible that it was this which provided the mainstay of the anti-Geloan and anti-Syracusan stance around 493 (7.165). Reaffirming this stance, after having been driven into exile by Syracuse's Emmenid allies at Akragas, the Himeraian tyrant, Terillos, sought the protection of the two largest powers in northern Sicily, Carthage and the principality of the Straits (Hdt. 7.165).

Furthermore, Herodotos' account implies a reasonably long-standing relationship between Anaxilaos and Terillos, which

54 Caccamo Caltabiano, *La Monetazione di Messana*, p. 3.
fits well with the current hypothesis that Rhegion was also seeking both to protect itself from the Dorian empires to the south, and to expand its influence in northern Sicily. Indeed, Anaxilaos’ marriage to Terillos’ daughter, Kydippe, must have occurred by 486 at the latest, given that the offspring of this marriage came of age in 467 (Diod. 11.66). Moreover, given the preparation time cited for the eventual Carthaginian expedition under Hamilkar in support of Terillos in 480, Terillos cannot have been expelled by Akragas any earlier than 483 (Diod. 11.1)\textsuperscript{55}. Therefore it appears very probable that Anaxilaos came into contact with Terillos soon after the creation of his Straits principality in 488, and that their mutual dislike of the Deinomenid-Emmenid axis led not only to a marriage alliance, but also to a flexible position on the Carthaginians, whose nearest base, at Soloeis, was only twenty kilometres from Himera itself.

Thus at the very end of the archaic period, and in order to protect the gains reaped from its imperialist policies, Italiote Rhegion found itself on the brink of a large scale Sicilian war. In essence, in little over a decade Rhegion had become one the highest profile Italiote poleis, spreading its power and

influence into Sicily and as far as north Africa. However, as the power and ambitions of Rhegion increased, so too did the costs. The war in question was one in which Rhegion fought as a member of a mixed coalition, against Greeks whose eventual victory was depicted as a triumph over barbarism (Hdt. 7.166; Simonides ap. Schol. Pind., Pyth. 1.152; Diod. 11.22.5-23.3; Plut., Moralia 175A). Moreover, as will be discussed further in section 3, Rhegion's choice of allies in 483 also had the effect of laying the foundations for a new era in Magna Graecia in which aggressive foreign intervention and interference featured prominently.

Section Three: Syracuse: foreign intervention, pax Syracusana and their impact upon the Italiote polis-system.

As stated in the previous section, the expansion of Rhegine power into northern Sicily brought it into contact with the local hegemonal Dorian states, Gela and Syracuse. However, while Anaxilaos was eventually able to avoid a Pantarid-Geloan diktat over the balance of power in the Straits of Messina, the Deinomenid-Syracusan tyrants proved far more difficult to ignore, and it is the policies of this latter dynasty which
heralded a new era both in Italiote-Sikeliote relations, and in the politics of the Italiote *polis*-system. Due to the chronological overlapping of the traditional closing date for the archaic period by the various dynasties, policies and *poleis* under consideration, this section will necessarily extend beyond 480 in its enquiries. In particular it will be argued that it was not until the 470's that the dust stirred up by the fall of Sybaris finally settled, thus allowing for the establishment of a new, and more to the point, relatively stable balance of power in the *polis*-system of Magna Graecia.

3.1 Syracuse and southern Magna Graecia: the humbling of the principality of the Straits and the clientship of Lokroi.

As mentioned earlier, the expulsion of the Himeraian tyrant, Terillos, by Akragas precipitated a large-scale mobilization of support by the opposing sides (see map 6). Terillos called upon his son-in-law, Anaxilaos, who in turn recruited the support of Carthage. Akragas, under its tyrant Theron, was linked in a marriage alliance with the Deinomenidai, who at that time ruled in both Gela and Syracuse.\(^56\) Whilst this was ostensibly

\(^56\) Gelon had married Theron's daughter, Damareta, and Theron the
a dispute over the ownership of Himera, it is probable that nearly all of the island's major players saw an opportunity for a final reckoning. In particular, Anaxilaos must have realized that his attempts to slice off and attach north-eastern Sicily to his Italiote realm could not go unchallenged by the Dorian poleis to the south indefinitely. Moreover, the Deinomenidai themselves had long been advocates of an anti-Carthaginian war (Hdt. 7.158).

However, despite Anaxilaos' manoeuvrings between 488 and 480, there is no record of Rhegion ever having participated in the Battle of Himera, the culmination of the crisis sparked by Terillos' expulsion. The course of the battle, supposedly fought on the same day as the clash at Salamis (Hdt. 7.166; Diod. 11.24.1), is more the preserve of a Sikeliote-centric study, and thus will not be discussed here in detail. Suffice to say that while both Herodotos and Diodoros agree on the size of the Carthaginian host, neither include a Rhegine/Messenian contingent, and this despite a detailed Herodotean account of the forces present (Hdt. 7.165; Diod. 11.20.2). Given that Anaxilaos is supposed to have given his own children to daughter of Gelon's brother, Polyzelos (Schol. Pind., O1. 2 inscr.). For the date of these weddings, see TWGa, p. 414.
Hamilkar as hostages (Hdt. 7.165), the total absence of Rhegine military support is difficult to digest. As a solution, Dunbabin has proposed that Gelon's bother-in-law, Chromios of Gela, led the Deinomenid fleet, numbering around 200 ships (Hdt. 7.158), against the Carthaginians, but either by design or accident, ended up missing the battle at Himera and neutralizing Anaxilaos' navy on the Straits.57

Based upon vague references to a Greek naval victory (Schol. Pind., Pyth. 1.146a; Paus. 6.19.7), and the absence of Chromios, a proven and trusted soldier, from Himera, as well as his participation in a number of unnamed sea battles (Pind., Nem. 9.40-3), Dunbabin's hypothesis goes far towards explaining both why Hamilkar was able to sail to Sicily unopposed (Diod.11.20.2), and why Gelon chose to march overland to Himera (Diod. 11.21.1). Moreover, it should come as no surprise that Anaxilaos did not provide a contingent at Himera. Even when augmented by its Messenian allies, Rhegion was not a land power and its most valuable contribution to Hamilkar's war effort was undoubtedly its fleet and its ability to block the Straits of Messina.

57 Ibid., pp. 425-6.
Whether or not the fleet of Chromios ever came to blows with that of Anaxilaos is impossible to determine. That the Anaxilad dynasty continued to reign independently on the Straits for another nineteen years, suggests that Anaxilaos probably kept a substantial portion, if not all, of his fleet out of harm’s way. However, as it is clear that Gelon was in the position to be magnanimous to all his foes after his decisive victory at Himera (Diod. 11.26), we must assume that Chromios was at least able to “neutralize”, as Dunbabin puts it, the threat posed by Anaxilaos. Indeed, Hieron’s reminder in 467 to the sons of Anaxilaos of the benefaction (ἐμφασία) given to their father by Gelon strongly suggests that Rhegion was a member of the group which sought leniency from Syracuse after the events at Himera (Diod. 11.66.1).

Moreover, it is also evident that Rhegion’s independence was not completely unqualified. Although the overt Italiote/Rhegine numismatic symbolism continued unabated, in the wake of Gelon’s victory at Himera the coinage issued by the principality underwent a subtle change. Having previously been issued on the Chalkidian standard, the coinage of Rhegion and Messene now adopted the Attic standard then prevalent at Syracuse. As was the case with Sybaris and its relationship

with other Italiote poleis using the Achaian standard and incuse technique in the sixth century, formal obeisance, in this case to Syracuse, was probably not implied by this standardization. Rather, we are in all likelihood witnessing recognition by Rhegion that Syracuse was now the strongest polis in the region, in both military and economic terms. Moreover in many ways, to adopt the standard in use at Syracuse was also in effect to acknowledge that Gelon was the master in northern and eastern Sicily, and if he wanted to force the Straits of Messina in future, he would do so. Indeed, as will be seen, Syracusan ships, whether merchant or naval, do not appear to have had any difficulty securing passage through the Straits for much of the remainder of the fifth century.59

The changes in the coinage of the principality should also be seen as a symbol for the long-term costs associated with Anaxilaos’ ill-fated alignment with Himera and Carthage. Although Anaxilaos’ reign over Zankle/Messene and a substantial portion of north-eastern Sicily down to 480 had, to an extent, been dependent on the recruitment of allies such as

59 Syracusan fleets are known to have sailed through the Straits en route to the Bay of Naples (M & L no. 29; Diod. 11.51.1-2), and Corsica (Diod. 11.88.4-5), during the first half of the fifth century.
Terillos and Hamilkar, it is evident that Rhegion had remained a conduit of Italiote power and ambitions. Thus, up until this time north-eastern Sicily was a zone subject to Rhegine machinations, incursions and imperialism. However, the defeat of Rhegion’s key allies in 480 at the hands of a thoroughly pan-Sikeliote and panhellenic alliance precipitated an inversion of the regional balance of power, in which Rhegion effectively became a gateway through which Sikeliotes might intervene in the affairs of Magna Graecia.

The first indication that Sikeliote power was being asserted in a territorial sense within the Italiote polis-system occurs during the last years of Gelon’s reign at Syracuse. Douris of Samos states that Gelon built a garden, and thus presumably possessed an estate, at Hipponion, called the Horn of Amaltheia (FHG 2.479). It is certainly possible to view this statement as anachronistic, particularly given that the earliest substantial reference to a Syracusan presence at Hipponion occurs in the age of Agathokles, coincidentally the subject of Douris’ biography (Strabo 6.1.5). However, there is also good reason to believe that the Deinomenidai did in fact possess estates in southern Magna Graecia in the time of Gelon.
As stated earlier, Gelon's victory at Himera established Syracuse both as the foremost *polis* of Sicily as well as the centre of an east Sicilian empire whose influence and fame extended far beyond the western Greek world, to Olympia and Delphi. Given its proximity to the Straits and eastern Sicily, Lokroi, the colonial master of Hipponion, also must have recognized that Syracuse was a new regional power to be reckoned with. However, it is apparent that the relationship between Lokroi and Syracuse may have been a great deal closer. In 477, the year after the death of Gelon, the Scholiast on Pindar states that a Rhegine invasion of Lokrian territory was either threatened or occurred (Schol. Pind., *Pyth.* 1.99a, 2.36c, 2.38). The Scholiast goes on the assert that Hieron, Gelon's brother and successor to the Syracusan tyranny, in turn dispatched his trusted lieutenant, Chromios, to put an end to the attack. That this act was in Lokroi's favour is reinforced by the praise of the Lokrian maiden given in Pindar's Pythian Ode (*Pyth.* 2.18-20).

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60 *M & L* no. 28; Theopompos, *FGrH* 115 F193; Schol. Pind., *Pyth.* 1.152; Diod. 11.26.7; Paus. 6.19.7.

61 There is no evidence to suggest that Hipponion broke free of its *metropolis* until the 420’s (Thouk. 5.5.3). See chapter 5.
That Syracuse should take an interest in the security of Lokroi at all belies a longer term post-Himera strategy on the behalf of the Deinomenidai. It is clear that Rhegion was to a considerable degree 'forgiven' by Gelon for its pro-Carthaginian stance in 480, and the marriage of Anaxilaos' daughter to Hieron strongly suggests that Rhegion became a de facto member of the ruling alliance in Sicily (Schol. Pind., *Pyth.* 1.112). However, such developments do not imply that the Deinomenidai trusted Rhegion, or that Anaxilaos entered into rapproachment with Gelon for any reason other than necessity following the defeat of all his allies. Thus for Gelon to contract an alliance with Lokroi during the last phase of his reign (480-478), makes sense in terms of constructing and implementing a policy which would bring about the effective containment of Rhegion. Indeed this policy was to form the blueprint for the Italiote projects of later Syracusan tyrants, including Dionysios I (Diod. 14.44.6, 106.3, 107.2).

Moreover, in support of this policy being the brainchild of Gelon rather than Hieron is the timing of Anaxilaos' attack on Lokroi. This offensive can be interpreted as a calculated lunge by Anaxilaos to exploit the death of the original architect of his confinement, Gelon, before the relatively untried Hieron could
consolidate his position. Therefore it is possible that Hieron's intervention in favour of Lokroi and against Rhetion in 477 was a policy inherited from Gelon, who had exploited an opportunity to establish a long term counterweight to Rhetine influence and power-building in northern Sicily. By extension, that Gelon possessed estates in Lokrian controlled Hipponion as a token of Lokrian gratitude for this new alliance cannot be ruled out. Thus in this sense Syracuse became directly involved in the affairs of Italiote poleis, through its desire to hinder Rhetion expansion and power. However, as will be seen, once Syracuse had acquired a taste for intervention in Magna Graecia, it would prove difficult for the Italiote poleis to resist the increasingly frequent incursions of the Sikeliote interloper effectively.

That Rhetion was involved in an attack on Lokroi in the first instance is also indicative of the new dynamics of power in the region. Prior to the defeat of its allies at Himera, Rhetion had concentrated much of its imperialist energies in northern Sicily. However, in the wake of this defeat, the Syracusan-Akragnantine axis reigned supreme in Sicily, thus curtailing any future expansionism in this area on Rhetion's part.

62 For evidence that Hieron's grip on power in Syracuse was insecure during the early years of his reign, see Diod. 11.48.3, 67.3-4.
Anaxilaos was able to retain Messene, but Himera, and along with it any serious hope of power in northern Sicily, was gone - having become well and truly entrenched within the sphere of Akragas, its Emmenid tyrants, and its Syracusan ally. In essence, for Anaxilaos to turn to Magna Graecia for his territorial conquests was in effect an admission that Sicily was now closed to him by Syracuse.

Thus, the presence of the relatively small Lokrian *polis* on Rhegion's northern border provided an opportunity for the imperialism of the Anaxilad regime to express itself once again. Anaxilaos had after all come to power on an expansionist platform and although his regime had been able to survive the disaster at Himera relatively intact, a military victory over Lokrooi would no doubt have been to his benefit. The rise of Syracuse can therefore be seen to have had a significant effect on the way in which the southernmost Italiote *poleis* interacted with one another. Although it has already been demonstrated that Rhegion harboured designs against Lokrooi long before Himera, it can be said that frustration for Anaxilaos in Sicily after 480 must have been a decisive factor in the rekindling of the desire to pursue this particular course of
imperialism. Moreover, the renewed Rhegine attacks north into Magna Graecia re-emphasized just how far the stocks of the Achaian *poleis* had fallen following on the collapse of the Sybarite empire.

The Scholiast on Pindar states that both Anaxilaos and his eldest son, Leophron, were involved in the invasion of Lokroi (*Pyth.* 2.38), whilst Justin records the leadership of Leophron only (21.3.2). Whatever the case, clearly the next generation of the Anaxilad dynasty was equally intent upon pursuing imperialist policies at the expense of its neighbours, and if this meant attacks on Italiotes rather than Sikeliotes, then so be it. Moreover, although the Scholiast offers a contradictory account of whether the campaign actually proceeded beyond the planning stage (*Pyth.* 2.36c, cf. 1.99a, 2.38), Justin implies that the war went ahead and that the Rhegines enjoyed initial success. However, as discussed earlier, Lokroi was able to summon its Syracusan allies who promptly put an end to Rhegion’s designs on its northern neighbour. The significance of this blow to the Anaxilad regime’s confidence and ambitions cannot be underestimated, and was in fact the cause of another, more drastic re-orientation of Rhegine foreign policy.
Neither Anaxilaos or Leophron long outlived the Rhegine defeat over the Lokroi issue, which in turn precipitated the institution of a regency under the auspices of the household retainer, Mickythos, in 476 (Hdt. 7.170; Diod. 11.48.2, 66.1-2; Paus. 5.26.4). The hallmark of this regency, apart from financial rectitude and loyal service (Diod. 11.66.2-3), was a fundamental repositioning of Rhegine imperialism. Based on the failed attempt by Anaxilaos and Leophron to focus their expansionist ambitions on Italiote soil, and ultimately on the increasing length of Syracuse's reach, Mickythos turned to the Italiote polis-system for support and security.

The first indication that Mickythos was seeking to give Rhegine foreign policy a more pronounced Italiote accent occurs in 473. In this year both Herodotos and Diodoros state that a Rhegine expeditionary force was dispatched to Taras in order to aid that polis in a war against the Iapygians (Hdt. 7.170; Diod. 11.52). Diodoros goes on to assert that this was in accordance with an

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63 Dionysios of Halikarnassos provides the one dissenting voice to this tradition, claiming that Leophron succeeded to the tyranny at Rheidon at the death of his father, Anaxilaos (20.7.1). This may in fact be a corruption of the tradition that Leophron ruled at Rheidon when Anaxilaos transferred his own seat of power to Messene (Schol. Pind., Pyth. 2.32-3, 34, 38; Justin 21.3.2).
alliance (11.52.3), which, unless its origins lie with the initiative of Anaxilaos, must have been contracted by Mikythos between 476 and 473. The short term consequences of this alliance represented a setback for both Rhegine and Tarantine arms, the former, if Herodotos is to be believed, losing some 3,000 soldiers (7.170). Furthermore, Diodoros also claims that an Iapygian host proceeded to invade Rhegion and even managed to capture the polis (11.52.5). This particular claim should also be regarded with suspicion, as there is no other record of Rhegion falling to an invading army until that of Dionysios I's in 387, an event which struck many in the Hellenic world as momentous (Diod. 14.109, 111-12; Lysias 23). Moreover, it is also difficult to see how the regency of Mikythos, or the tyranny in general for that matter, could have survived such a blow, which of course they did, further discrediting Diodoros’ claim. At any rate, despite the failure of the Iapygian campaign, it is apparent that Rhegion was seeking to construct an Italiote alliance within which the Rhegines could find a haven from Sikeliote power.

The second key indicator of Mikythos’ re-orientation policy is

64 Given that Rhegion’s total land strength was 6,000 men in 399 (Diod. 14.40.3), it is difficult to believe that 3,000 soldiers were killed in a single engagement outside Taras in 473.
found within the Rhegine activities in the Tyrrhenian Sea, previously the sub-colonial preserve of Sybaris and Kroton. Situated between the Sybarite foundations at Poseidonia, Laōs and Skidros, in 471 Mikythos established a colony at Pyxous (Diod. 11.59.4; Strabo 6.1.1). Moreover, it is at about this time that intensive Rhegine commerce is detectable in the Val di Diano, north of Pyxous and east of Poseidonia, and Etruria.65 The location of this new colonial venture underscores both the desire of Rheid to expand its interests away from the gaze of Syracuse, and also to continue to build useful contacts and alliances within the Italiote polis-system.

In particular, the foundation of Pyxous can be seen as a mechanism for renewing the previously close relationship with the Phokaians of Hyele. As discussed in chapter 3, the Phokaians who were forced to evacuate Kyrnos (Corsica) in the wake of the Battle of Alalia found temporary refuge in Rheid (Hdt. 1.166). Furthermore, it is from Rheid that these refugees launched their successful bid to colonize Hyele, around

535 (Hdt. 1.167). Such events suggest that a healthy rapport had existed between the Rhegines and the Phokaians during the second half of the sixth century. The close proximity of Pyxous to Hyele further suggests that the Rhegines did not choose the site for their colony at random and that an attempt was therefore being made to re-establish or strengthen relations with the Phokaian Italiotes. Moreover, it is difficult to see how Pyxous could have been founded without the permission, tacit or otherwise, of Hyele, particularly as Rhegion was hardly in the position to start alienating potential allies. Some form of negotiations probably took place between Rhegion and Hyele, and in all likelihood within the framework of general cooperation.

As with the attack on Lokroi and the alliance with Taras, such a policy highlights the Rhegine desire to recover its prestige and autonomy by rebuilding its strength on Italiote soil, as well as its innate dissatisfaction with the *pax Syracusana* set in place following the Battle of Himera. Furthermore, in general this policy also demonstrates the ability of Syracuse to shape the politics of the *polis*-systems around it. Whilst retaining ownership of Messene and thus the principality Anaxilaos had

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constructed, nevertheless Rhegion found itself locked in a suffocating Syracusan embrace. With the eastern Sicilian empire to the south, and the de facto imperial client-state of Lokroi to the north, Rhegion was forced to look further abroad for support and influence than it had ever done so previously. Indeed the alliance contracted by Rhegion with Athens in the second half of the century should be seen as a direct result of the rise of Syracuse in the 480's and 470's.67 Syracuse had proven that it could frustrate and effectively control the expansion of Rhegion, whether it be in Sicily or Magna Graecia. Thus, in many ways much of the polis-system of southernmost Magna Graecia entered the orbit of Syracuse.

3.2 Syracuse and northern Magna Graecia: the decline of Kyme and the retreat of Italiote power from the Tyrrhenian Sea zone.

That Hyele was amenable to renewing its friendship with Rhegion at this time is possibly related to political upheaval in its own backyard, the Tyrrhenian Sea and its littoral.68 This

68 An invasion from Poseidonia mentioned but not dated by Strabo could be the specific occasion for the Phokaians' willingness to deal
upheaval in turn stemmed from the decisive intervention of the Syracusan fleet in the northernmost outpost of Magna Graecia, the Bay of Naples. Little is known about the political history of Kyme and its sub-colonies during the late archaic period, aside from the collapse of Aristodemos’ tyranny around 490 (DH 7.11-12.1). However, it is apparent that the new government was dominated by the aristocratic families whom Aristodemos had driven out in 504, and who were in turn in all likelihood dependent upon the support of local, non-Greek Campanians (DH 7.10-11).

Moreover, as discussed in chapter 3, between 524 and c. 490 Aristodemos had helped to elevate Kyme to regional power in Campania and, to an extent, in Latium. Thus with the new regime still consolidating itself in the aftermath of a bloody coup and potentially beholden to local states such as Capua (DH 7.10.3), due to their earlier support and sustenance, Kyme was probably not in the best position to defend itself adequately. It is therefore conceivable that this dependence heralded a new period in Kymaian history, in which a far more cautious foreign policy was adopted, reflecting an innate fragility and an inability to protect its recently acquired regional status. At any

with the Rhegines at this time (6.1.1).
rate, Diodoros states that in 474 ambassadors from Kyme approached Hieron and solicited his aid in their struggle against the Etruscans (11.51.1). As will be discussed further in the following section, the hopes of this embassy were probably partially based upon Hieron's positive response to an earlier entreaty, from Sybarite exiles in 476. At any rate, Hieron obliged and scored an impressive naval victory at the Battle of Kyme later in that year, as celebrated in his Olympic dedication (M&L no. 29; Diod. 11.51.2).

This victory was critical for the various Italiote states with interests in the Tyrrhenian Sea, in that it facilitated the extension of the pax Syracusana into northern and western Magna Graecia. Moreover, the political isolation from Sicily and the rest of the Magna Graecia which Kyme and its satellite poleis had enjoyed for centuries came to an abrupt and conclusive end. Kyme, a regional hegemon at its peak in the late sixth century under the tyrant Aristodemos, was now clearly in decline and sought to integrate itself into the more mainstream band of settlement in western Hellas for security purposes. Diodoros gives us no details as to the origins or make-up of the threat to Kyme, other than the general label Τυρρηνοίς. However, the maritime nature of the invasion
suggests antagonism between Kyme and at least one of the Etruscan coastal states. Indeed, the search for a specific Etruscan protagonist perhaps need go no further than Agylla-Caere, a proven sixth century maritime opponent of Hellenic influence in the upper Tyrrhenian Sea (Hdt. 1.167). Moreover, as discussed in chapter 3, Kymaian-Etruscan relations in the last decades of the sixth century were hardly amicable, with at least two clashes to speak of. At any rate, pressure from the Etruscans to the north had evidently grown too great for Kyme to deal with on its own and favourable foreign intervention was required.

The request for Syracusan aid was in many ways symbolic not only of the impotency of Kyme in the first quarter of the fifth century, but also of the other Italiote states at this time. It is easy to speculate that Sybaris, with its extensive system of Tyrrhenian ports, contacts, and trading partners, may have been able to exert some influence over the turn of events under consideration. However, by 474 none of its successors were in the position even to contemplate seriously such a step, let alone make an attempt.

Moreover, it must have hit Rhegion especially hard that Kyme
turned to Syracuse rather than itself. Rhegion was after all most probably the strongest naval state in Magna Graecia during the early fifth century, the closest significant Italiote port to the Bay of Naples, and not to mention a fellow Chalkidian-Euboian foundation. Indeed, Rhegion may once have been the prime candidate for such a mission given its willingness to contract alliances with overseas states such as Himera and Carthage. However, the Kymaian embassy to Syracuse in 474 demonstrates perfectly the extent to which the Deinomenid tyrants had been successful in building their credentials as the new regional hegemon, in the process effectively sideline any of the Italiote poleis who had pretensions to power.

The failure of the Italiote poleis to cope with their own problems in the north-west of Magna Graecia, or at least devise a solution which would bar the entry of Sikeliote-based imperialism, had long term consequences for the region, and foreshadows the Athenian expedition to the Bay of Naples in the early 430's (Tim. FGrH 566 F98). 69 Syracuse, under the tyrant Hieron, signalled its determination to ensure that its intervention would not be of a temporary nature by founding a

69 See Frederiksen, Campania, pp. 104-5.
fort (τεῖχος), on the island of Pithekoussai (Strabo 5.4.9). Presumably established shortly after the victory over the Etruscans at the Battle of Kyme, this fort would have served to guarantee the future security of the Bay of Naples by effectively blocking its northern access point (i.e. from Etruria).  

Although Strabo goes on to state that seismic activity ensured that the fort itself did not last long, perhaps no longer than the tyranny itself which was overthrown in 466, it is evident that the Syracusans were interested in transforming north-western Magna Graecia into a permanent frontier zone for their Sikeliote-based empire. The timing of the foundation of Neapolis, in the vicinity of the earlier Kymaian settlement at Parthenope, hints strongly at Syracusan involvement, and the possibility of a more solid entrenchment of Syracusan influence on the Bay of Naples.

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70 Ibid., p. 92.
Furthermore, the earliest pottery at the cemetery of Neapolis can be dated to around 470, thus falling within the period in which Syracuse established itself as the saviour of neighbouring Kyme.\textsuperscript{71} Moreover, numismatic and cultic links between Neapolis, Kyme and Syracuse attests both to the possibility of Syracusan involvement, perhaps in the form of colonists, in the foundation of the ‘New City’, as well as the deep impact of this Sikeliote polis upon the Bay of Naples in general.\textsuperscript{72} Certainly the Deinomenidai had already amply demonstrated their taste for both altering existing foundations and establishing new poleis altogether in areas under their rule or within their sphere of influence (Hdt. 7.156; Diod. 11.49).

While there is no evidence to suggest that poleis on the Bay of Naples fell under the direct political control of Syracuse, the Syracusan activity at Pithekoussai and Neapolis detailed above indicates that a Syracusan protectorate was probably established in the region, at least for the remaining years of the Deinomenid tyranny (474-466). Such an arrangement must

\textsuperscript{71} Ibid., p. 94

\textsuperscript{72} Rutter, \textit{Campanian Coinages 475-38 B.C.}, pp. 47-8, 53, 93-5; Frederiksen, \textit{Campania}, p. 94.
have entailed a Syracusan commitment to defend the Bay of Naples from future Etruscan attacks, as well as an undertaking by the poleis in this region to follow Syracuse's lead in matters of war. In effect, due to its precarious security situation the polis-system of north-western Magna Graecia co-opted a new member into its ranks. However, this 'new member' was neither Italiote in origin, nor subject to the old balance of power within this polis-system. Given its subsequent actions, it is plain that Syracuse sailed north to lead. Kyme's plea to Syracuse for assistance was tantamount to an admission that its own hegemony was no longer viable, and that the costs of political independence in the region were fast outstripping its resources.

Moreover, despite the collapse of the Deinomenid tyranny in 466, it is evident that Syracusan intervention in north-western Magna Graecia and the upper Tyrrhenian Sea in general was not dependent upon any one dynasty or political system. Although there is no direct evidence for Syracusan activity in these areas in the post-Deinomenid 460's, it is apparent that Syracusan fleets were sailing through the Straits of Messina and on into the upper Tyrrhenian Sea by the 450's at the latest. Diodoros states that two Syracusan war fleets were dispatched
to the upper Tyrrhenian in 453 in order to combat Etruscan piracy in the region (11.88.4-5). This mission highlights the new Syracusan role as protector of the Greeks of north-western Magna Graecia, as well as the continued dependence of the latter on foreign support. Moreover, the two Syracusan strategoi involved were particularly interested in Aithaleia (Elba), the Etruscan coastline (τὴν παραβαλάττιον Τυρρηνίαν), and Kyrnos (Corsica). The latter two locations were clearly merely ravaged on this occasion, but the use of the verb χειρόω in relation to Aithaleia suggests a more permanent form of occupation by Syracuse (11.88.5). Furthermore, Diodoros also attests the existence of a harbour on Kyrnos called Syrakosion (5.13.3), hinting at a Syracusan presence on this island as well.\(^{73}\) An alliance between Syracuse and Lipara in the 420's (Thouk. 3.88, 115.1), also probably had its roots in this period of Syracusan intervention in the Tyrrhenian Sea following the victory at Kyme in 474.\(^{74}\)

Thus despite the possibility of a brief pause during the political upheaval in Sicily associated with the end of the Deinomenid tyranny, Syracuse was now clearly committed to a policy of

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\(^{73}\) Frederiksen, *Campania*, p. 103.

intervention in a region previously regarded by leaders such as Aristodemos of Kyme, as the hinterland of the north-western Italiote poleis. Such intervention was the direct result of the Syracusan reduction of the Rhegine principality on the Straits of Messina and the decline of Kyme. Both Rhegion and Kyme had been hegemonal Italiote states at their respective peaks, but both also serve as examples of the eclipse of the Italiote maritime poleis by the new political conditions endemic to the Tyrrhenian Sea. The battles at Himera and Kyme demonstrate aptly that there were now only three players who had the capacity to compete effectively in the Tyrrhenian zone: Carthage, Etruria and Syracuse. Consequently, Kyme was forced to accept Syracusan protection, the first such link between the Euboian poleis on the Bay of Naples and other Greeks since the Lelantine War of the eighth century.

3.3 Syracuse and central Magna Graecia: Kroton and the reality of Syracusan power.

The Syracusan intervention in the Italiote polis-system which began with pacification of Rhegion did not long remain confined to the northern and southern extremities of Magna Graecia. Shockwaves were soon felt north of Lokroi and even as far as
Kroton, the *polis* most conveniently placed to reap the benefits from the fall of Sybaris. In particular, it was the Syracusan sponsorship of Lokroi, initially against Rhegion, that helped to create serious anomalies in the mainstream Italiote *polis*-system.

As discussed in chapter 5, animosity between Kroton and Lokroi dates back as far as the Battle of the Sagra River which occurred around 550, and had been rekindled on at least one other occasion, around 525. Therefore, in theory it should come as no surprise that the two *poleis* were at loggerheads in the early fifth century. The period between the fall of Sybaris in 510 and the transformation of Lokroi into a de facto Syracusan client-state in the early 470's is an ill-documented one. However, as flawed as the Krotoniate attempt to adopt the Sybarite mantle was, there is little doubt that Kroton held the upper hand following its conquest of Sybaris. Compared to Lokroi at this time, Kroton was a massive empire, and it is improbable that the Lokrians would have contemplated an attack on its northern neighbour.

However, Syracusan intervention in the Italiote *polis*-system appears to have altered this balance of power, only recently set
in place by a Kroton anxious to restore the hegemony previously enjoyed by Sybaris, in its own name. In his entry on Temesa Strabo states that the Lokrians, led by a certain Euthymos, captured this polis (6.1.5). This Euthymos, named by Strabo as \( \text{Ev8vµov...töv πύκτην} \), is known to have competed in the Olympics during the 480’s and 470’s, thus providing the event with a chronological range. As discussed in chapter 6, Temesa had come under the control of Kroton after its partial accession to the territorial legacy of Sybaris, and its capture by Euthymos therefore represents an outbreak of war between Kroton and Lokroi. Given that Syracuse only became interested supporting Lokroi after 480 in order to contain Rhegine expansion, it makes sense to place the invasion of Temesa in the 470’s rather than the 480’s, i.e. in the latter part of Euthymos’ career. This was after all the period in which Lokroi enjoyed the backing of a regional super power and could therefore expect support in its more ambitious ventures, such as attacking the far larger Krotoniate polis.

Thus it can be seen that the sponsorship of Lokroi provided Syracuse with a dependable ally within the Italiote polis-system who could be relied upon to cause trouble for the two most prominent successor states to the Sybarite empire,
Rhegion and Kroton. Given Syracuse's wider regional responsibilities and ambitions after 480, it should come as no surprise that this Sikeliote state now took into account the threat, potential or otherwise, posed by other poleis with regional or inter-regional aspirations. As stated earlier, Rhegion was no doubt the first target, as it was this polis which posed the most danger to the integrity of the Sikeliote polis-system. However, once Syracuse had become aware of its ability to project its power far beyond Sicily itself, Rhegion merely symbolized the gateway through which Syracuse passed on its way to establishing a more permanent presence in Magna Graecia. Once inside, Lokroi in turn constituted Syracuse's base for operations.

It is therefore probable that the successful Lokrian invasion of Krotoniate Temesa must have received some form of sanction from Syracuse, if only after the attack had already been launched. Providing further support for this hypothesis is the wider pattern of Syracusan-Krotoniate relations at this time. Diodoros records under the year 476 that Hieron received an appeal for aid, not unlike that of Kyme two years later, from the Sybarites, who were at that time πολεορκουμένων ὑπὸ Κροτωνιατῶν (11.48.4). In response Hieron planned to send an
expeditionary force under his younger brother, Polyzelos (11.48.4-5). Although Diodoros goes on to state that Polyzelos never actually fulfilled this role (11.48.6), there is no suggestion that Hieron abandoned the mission altogether, and the eagerness of Kyme to seek out Hieron’s aid in 474 suggests that the tyrant was regarded as a reliable ally in overseas interventions, and therefore that he did indeed commit some forces to the Sybarite cause in 476.\textsuperscript{75}

The Sybarite appeal in turn illustrates one of the key problems faced by Kroton after 510 in its bid to secure the hegemony of central Magna Graecia. As recorded by Herodotos, a number of Sybarites escaped the carnage at Sybaris in 510, scattering themselves amongst their former sub-colonies (6.21). Moreover, given the numerous remarks among the ancient sources as to the vast population of the Sybarite empire, this diaspora must have been substantial. Thus the appeal to Syracuse in 476 in all likelihood belies an attempt to re-establish Sybaris which had run into serious difficulties. The use of the verb πολιστορκεῖω certainly indicates that the Sybarites had gained a foothold in the Sybaritid, then under Krotoniate

\textsuperscript{75} The Pindaric scholiast intimates that the mission did in fact go ahead, \textit{and} under Polyzelos’ command (\textit{Ol}.2.29b 10-14).
control, but rather than being the Sybaris III which some scholars have argued for,76 the site being besieged may have been no more than a Mt. Ithome, as featured in the Third Messenian War (Thouk. 1.101.2, 102.1, 103.1).

As later attempts to refound Sybaris indicate, clearly the Sybarite diaspora posed a threat to the stability of the Krotoniate successor state.77 However, the proximity of the Sybarite revanche of 476 to the Lokrian attack on Temesa suggests a more serious and widespread attempt to undermine Kroton’s position of relative strength within the Italiote polis-system. The Lokrian conquest of Temesa probably opened a window of opportunity for the Sybarites to stage a partial re-occupation of the Sybaritid. In turn Kroton’s efforts to resist the encroachments of the Sybarites increased the likelihood of a lengthy period of Lokrian occupation at Temesa.

Furthermore, given the importance of the agriculturally rich Sybaritid to Kroton, Syracusan assistance to the Sybarite exiles was tantamount to a threat to the continued viability of the

77 At least two more attempts were made by the Sybarites to reclaim their patrimony, in 453 (Diod. 11.90.3), and 444 (12.10.3-6), before the final settlement at Sybaris-on-the-Traeis (11.22.1).
Krotoniate hegemony. The Sybaritid was the power house of the old Sybarite empire, as well as the centre piece of Kroton’s own imperial ambitions. As stated earlier, Kroton had gone so far as to establish an exarchate over this territory and had entered into a protracted civil war over the division of the spoils available therein. In other words, the Sybaritid formed a large component of what set Kroton apart from other poleis in the region, and to aid and abet secessionist activity in this territory struck at the heart of Krotoniate power. Although a fresh bid to establish an independent Sybaris was launched in 453, thus indicating that the Sybarites and whatever site they had managed to fortify in 476 did not survive long (Diod. 11.90.3-4),\textsuperscript{78} the message from Syracuse to Kroton and the Italiote polis-system in general was clear. Syracuse’s endeavour to establish a new Sybaris also represented a major attempt to alter the dynamics of the Italiote polis-system of the day in a comprehensive manner.

Indeed, so seriously did Kroton view the threat posed by Syracuse and its Italiote clients during the 470’s, it is possible that at this time Kroton underwent pan-Italiote arbitration in

\textsuperscript{78} Lombardo speculates that this ‘Sybaris III’ survived until the death of Hieron in 467: “Da sibari a thurii”, pp. 288-9.
order to forge a united front between its feuding Pythagorean and anti-Pythagorean factions. In the wake of such attacks, that Kroton finally came to regard the civil strife it had been experiencing for over thirty years as both a luxury it could no longer afford and as an impediment to its long-term hegemonal ambitions should not be seen as surprising. Moreover, as in the case of Rhegion and its reacquaintance with the Phokaians of Hyele in the post-Himera period, Kroton turned to its historical Italiote allies, Kaulonia, Metapontion and Taras, in its time of crisis.

Although it is not being suggested that Kroton was the victim of a carefully planned and executed conspiracy, it is evident that on each of the occasions Kroton came under attack in the 470's, Syracuse was in some way linked to all of its antagonists. As Syracuse's involvement in the Italiote polis-system intensified, via its interests in the Straits of Messina, there can be no doubt that it would have gained some comprehension of the balance of power in the region. This would have included the realization that Kroton was the state most likely and most able to oppose further Syracusan interference in Magna Graecia, particularly now that Rhegion had effectively been neutralized.
Thus Syracuse's willingness to accept the Lokrians and Sybarites, historically both hardline foes of Kroton, as clients is provided with a viable context. This process need not have been systematic, merely opportunistic. Consequently, Kroton found itself increasingly victimized by Syracuse and its growing band of Italiote allies. Moreover, in effect much of the Italiote poleis-system was locked into a cycle of having to choose between home-grown and would-be hegemons such as Kroton on the one hand, and the rising power of the Syracusan outsider on the other. The heady days of Krotoniate triumph and undisputed hegemony, already partially tainted by the internecine bloodshed of 509 and the rise of Anaxilaos, were now well and truly at an end, brought low by the first of many successful foreign interventions on Italiote soil.

CONCLUSION: The end of the archaic period: opportunities lost?

The crossover between the archaic and classical periods in Magna Graecia was in many ways a definitive one for the Italiote polis-system. After a century of hosting one of the largest and most powerful polis-based land empires to have ever existed in Hellas, the Italiotes found themselves on the
backfoot, embroiled in the uncertainty inspired by centrifugal pressure and competition. In essence, Sybarite-enforced homogeneity in power politics was replaced by three new centres of power, each with their own ambitions and strengths. Moreover, it can be said that the inability of the two leading Italiote successor states, Kroton and Rhegion, to stamp their authority comprehensively over the regions which they clearly wished to dominate enabled the entry of Magna Graecia’s first successful ‘intruder’ polis, Sikeliote Syracuse.

Kroton’s role in the diffusion of Italiote power was a largely unintentional one. As well as constituting a personal struggle for survival, Kroton’s victory over Sybaris in 510 presented an opportunity for imperial success. However, its victory only partially capitalized on the opportunities gained, as the Krotoniate state had a number of serious limitations of its own to overcome. The most immediate obstacle to a smooth program of successful empire-building was a period of protracted stasis. The polarization of the Krotoniate body politic, in which the Pythagoreans played a major role, would have reduced the effectiveness of any attempt by Kroton to occupy and preserve the frontiers of the old Sybarite empire in
their entirety. Indeed, the foreign intervention and mediation required to settle the civil war helps to underscore the gravity of Kroton's problems.

Other obstacles of a more general nature also stood in Kroton's way, including a possible 'demographic gap' between Kroton and Sybaris which may have caused a difficult transition process to Krotoniate rule in those parts of the Sybarite empire Kroton did manage to annex or influence. Furthermore, the age old predicament of having to deal with other predatory states maintaining a sharp lookout for vulnerable pieces of booty in the aftermath of a titanic clash between a region's superpowers, also played a role in Kroton's lack of imperialist momentum. Moreover, it is also likely that Kroton was forced to deal with low-level but distracting armed discontent from Pythagorean rebels long after the expulsion of this faction from the polis.

As has been argued, the sum of these problems effectively meant that by the 470's Kroton was not particularly well placed to deal with the prospect of Sikeliote interference and military intervention in the Italiote polis-system. Not only had the perennially pugnacious Lokroi not been reined in by
the 470's, this polis was even able to go on the offensive against Kroton, with the backing of its new Syracusan ally. Moreover, the very essence of Kroton's claim to hegemony in the Italiote polis-system soon came under question as well, with an abortive but potentially fatal Sybarite uprising, again with the support of an increasingly confident and ruthless Syracuse.

The rise of a second homegrown imperialist Italiote polis, Rhegion, also reiterates the level of power diffusion after the fall of Sybaris. This polis was also the first Italiote state to construct an outremer empire, extending its frontiers beyond the Straits and on to the island of Sicily. Moreover, unlike Kroton, Rhegion was, with a few exceptions, very much a maritime imperialist, thus capitalizing on an area in which Kroton could not hope, and probably did not expect, to compete. However, in many ways due to its expansion into the Sikeliote sphere, Rhegion brought upon itself a series of humiliating reversals at the hands of the rising Syracuse. Moreover, it is precisely because of this Sikeliote revanche that Syracuse began to involve itself in the wider Italiote polis-system. In order to guarantee Rhegine good behaviour, Syracuse adopted Lokroi as its client within the Italiote polis-system. This commitment rapidly transformed into a general policy of
weakening any Italiote state which potentially posed a threat to continuing Syracusan influence in Magna Graecia. Thus, as stated above, both Rhegion and Kroton suffered at the hands of Syracuse and its Italiote clients. As a result much of the Italiote polis-system became divided along pro and anti-Syracusan lines, therefore removing any substantial impetus for Italiote solutions to Italiote problems.

Perhaps the most surprising development in the post-Sybarite period was the return to the mainstream fold of Kyme and the polis-system it had dominated on the Bay of Naples in political isolation from the rest of the Greek West for centuries. Although not in direct competition with Rhegion and Kroton, Kyme had also experienced the highs of empire during the post-Sybarite era. However, threatened with extinction by the Etruscan maritime states during the 470's, Kyme was finally forced to turn to its fellow Greeks for assistance. However, crucially it was not an Italiote state which came to Kyme's rescue. The Syracusan triumph at Himera heralded a long period of dominance in the lower Tyrrhenian Sea and over its major players, including Carthage and Rhegion. Thus Kyme sought out Syracusan aid rather than that of its now weakened Euboian cousins at Rhegion, further highlighting the ascendancy of the Sikeliotes in southern and central Magna Graecia.
Thus in this way did three of the Italiote polis-system’s most powerful members cope, or rather not cope, with the regional balance of power in the wake of the fall of the Sybarite empire. Moreover, this was period in which the certainty of Sybarite domination was absent and hegemony was available for those who had the strength to grasp it. The vast majority of the leaders active in this period, including such leading lights as Kylon, Anaxilaos, Mikythos, Gelon, Hieron I, and Aristodemos, were born during the years of Sybarite power, and all recognized that change was the leitmotiv of the era. As a result numerous poleis struggled to assert themselves and their imperial programs within Magna Graecia. However, it is testimony to the skill and uniqueness of Sybaris that no Italiote polis was able to seize and maintain its imperial legacy intact. Furthermore, it is an indicator of Italiote weakness that in little over a generation after the destruction of its sixth century hegemon, foreign military intervention and exploitation began to feature regularly in the polis-system of Magna Graecia.
CONCLUSION

Throughout this study it has been contended that archaic Magna Graecia was home to a *polis*-system which possessed great strength and innovation. Indeed, from the very beginning vitality and a willingness to seize opportunities characterized the Greek colonists' efforts to construct a 'Great Greece' in southern Italy. Moreover, it has been demonstrated that the *poleis* which were born of this vitality were profoundly effected by the interests and aims of their forebears. In particular, the commercial instincts and drive of the Euboians, the thirst for new land on the part of the Achaians, and the chronological and numerical superiority of both groups, established the basic parameters of the *polis*-system of archaic Magna Graecia. As a result, although the *polis*-system of Magna Graecia could boast a diverse membership, it was the Euboian and Achaian *apoikiai* that dominated Magna Graecia for much of the archaic period.

Furthermore, given the aforementioned nature of the Euboian and Achaian motives for colonization, these two groups founded *poleis* which largely evolved within different geographical, political, and strategic spheres. Magna Graecia thus featured an array of maritime and hinterland-orientated
poleis whose interactions with one another rarely took the centre stage of the Italiote polis-system. Rather, for much of the archaic period inter-polis relations were often localized affairs, which witnessed the development of such phenomena as the ‘Campanianization’ of Italiote foreign policy on the Bay of Naples, the ‘Straits-system’ on the Straits of Messina, and ‘pan-Achaian’ sentiment in Magna Graecia’s central zone. The polis-system of Magna Graecia, during its early years at least, can, like Mainland Greece itself, therefore be said to have been more an umbrella grouping of poleis than a term implying strict geographical cohesion.

However, the advent of the sixth century paradoxically both reinforced and ultimately destroyed the dynamics of this system by heralding what was in many ways an epidemic of imperialism. Moreover, this process of empire-building also added a dangerous new element to the Italiote polis-system, in that it introduced the concept of ‘total war’. Consequently, two of Magna Graecia’s largest and most prosperous poleis, Siris and Sybaris, were soon to be exterminated. Achaian Sybaris led the way by constructing a complex system of inter-polis relations, sub-colonies, treaties, dependencies, and assimilation of indigenous populations, which can only be termed one of the greatest land empires ever built by a polis-based Greek state. Other Achaian Italiote poleis also attempted
to establish imperial identities for themselves with varying degrees of success. This inability to emulate Sybaris helped to highlight the stratified nature of the Achaian order in Magna Graecia, and at length the vague but previously effective principle of pan-Achaianism crumbled under an onslaught of dissatisfaction and envy. Frustrated in turn by its failure to subdue the relatively minor polis of Lokroi, Kroton was thus well set on the path to war with Sybaris by the time the bellicose Pythagoreans had gained substantive influence at Kroton.

As has been demonstrated, the war between Sybaris and Kroton in many ways instigated a chain of events which radically and irrevocably altered the Italiote polis-system. Consequently, the last decades of the archaic period were in effect a transitional environment in which much of the basis of the Italiote polis-system during the classical and hellenistic periods was defined. A series of moderately successful little Italiote empires arose over the ruins of the Sybarite realm, none of which even approached the scale or time frame of Sybaris. Unlike Sparta vis à vis Messenia during the archaic and early classical periods, the foremost successor state, Kroton, was unable to devise an effective system for the long term control of its newly acquired gains. The second Italiote
successor state, Rhegion, emerged from this regional upheaval with the intent of breaking free of another of the strictures of archaic Magna Graecia, the *status quo* on the Straits of Messina. Under the Anaxilad dynasty, Rhegion achieved stunning territorial gains but not before inadvertently unleashing the energy, ambition, and hunger of Sikeliote Syracuse on Magna Graecia. Within a decade even the previously self-contained Campanian quarter of the Italiote *polis*-system fell under Syracusan influence. Consequently, like Greece in its relations with the Makedonian state, as long as Syracuse remained stable and united the *polis*-system of Magna Graecia remained vulnerable to intervention from a superior foreign power.

Thus the basic tenets of the archaic Italiote *polis*-system came to an end. Imperial Sybaris, and with it any vestiges of pan-Achaianism or consolidated Achaian hegemony, was dead; power on the Straits of Messina had begun an inexorable shift back towards its Sicilian shore; and in Italiote Campania, Kyme was eclipsed by its Syracusan saviour. Given the precarious circumstances of the Italiote *poleis* in Campania during the 470's, it can certainly be argued that Syracusan control over the Bay of Naples was better than no Greek control at all. However, the aforementioned developments in central-mainstream and southern Magna Graecia do represent a
watershed in the evolution of the Italiote \textit{polis-system}. Archaic Magna Graecia may have been a disparate collection of competitive \textit{poleis} with a high mortality rate, but this was also a period in which the Italiote \textit{polis-system} retained a proactive edge in their dealings with the states and peoples around them.

By no means does this imply either belittlement of the classical and hellenistic incarnations of the Italiote \textit{polis-system}, or the elevation of the archaic period to 'golden age' status, but a comparison between the period under study and those which followed is useful for placing the archaic era in perspective. The later periods do represent a reactive age for Magna Graecia, in which defensive leagues, repeated foreign intervention and loss of local initiative, and \textit{condottieri} dominate the \textit{polis-system} of the Italiotes. Thus at the dawn of the classical period it is Syracuse that is the major \textit{polis} of the West, not Sybaris, not Kroton, and not Rhegion. By this stage the proactive potential of the Italiote \textit{polis-system} was suffering from exhaustion from which it would only ever partially recover. Therefore, despite its many failings, the \textit{polis-system} of Magna Graecia during the archaic period was in many ways at the peak of its power - fascinating as it was volatile, and innovative as it was transitory.
APPENDIX

The homecoming of Demokedes and early Pythagorean political influence at Kroton.

The nostos of the Greek doctor Demokedes to his native Kroton, as related by Herodotos (3.134-8), has the potential to serve as a chronological anchor for an early Pythagorean intervention in Krotonian politics, as well as having an impact upon the rehabilitation of Herodotos' chronology at this point. As argued by Griffiths, the story of Demokedes' voyage from Persia and his eventual homecoming contains a number of elements which should be regarded as suspect.1 Certainly, the emphasis on Demokedes as the only doctor present in the whole of the Persian empire with the skills to heal Dareios' injured foot (Hdt. 3.129) has all the trappings of a legendary triumph of Hellenic skills over barbaric incompetence and ignorance.2

However, while it may be Herodotos' intention to mythologize

2 See also Griffiths for his elucidating deconstruction of the incident, “Democedes of Croton”, pp. 40-2.
the deeds of the good doctor, that Demokedes did in fact return at some point to his native Kroton is not disputed by Griffiths. Indeed, the appearance of a Demokedes during the political upheaval at Kroton after 510, as recorded by Iamblichos, \((VP 261)\), would appear to confirm the likelihood of such a return, or at the very least his historical existence. It is this kernel of relative accuracy on Herodotos' behalf that this paper seeks to utilize, and in particular the circumstances of Demokedes' homecoming, which as will be argued below, may in fact serve as a barometer for Pythagorean influence and activity in Kroton. This paper will thus seek to establish: (i) the context and viability of a voyage such as that of Demokedes'; (ii) a secure date for the return of Demokedes, as well as Herodotos' credentials in his accounts of Samian and Italiote history; (iii) the veracity of Demokedes' alleged actions once he had returned to Kroton; and crucially (iv) the case for the occurrence of the earliest known Pythagorean involvement in Krotoniate politics, as derived from Demokedes' successful negotiations with Milon of Kroton (Hdt. 3.137).

(i) It is clear from Herodotos at least that Dareios, described as a \(kαρτηλος\) by his own people (Hdt. 3.89), was a ruler with an eye for both imperial and economic opportunities as well as a


\[^4\] See also G. Clark (trans.), *Iamblichus: On the Pythagorean Life*, (Liverpool, 1989), p. 109, n. 2.
high degree of curiosity about the world around him.\(^5\) Moreover, that Dareios was prepared to invest in endeavours such as that of Demokedes is further demonstrated by his regular utilization of individuals of Hellenic or Hellenized extraction to perform specific tasks involving activity on the fringes of the empire or beyond.\(^6\) Dareios' exploitation of Syloson II, the exiled brother of the late dynast Polykrates and pretender to the Samian tyranny,\(^7\) was the first of many opportunistic decisions taken by the Great King in order to facilitate his expansionist dreams. Between c. 517 (the beginning of Persian suzerainty over Samos) and c. 514 (the date of Dareios' Skythian Expedition) Dareios achieved the subversion of at least twelve Greek poleis in Asia Minor through his installation and/or patronage of local tyrants.\(^8\)

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\(^5\) Herodotos' account of Dareios' curiosity concerning other cultures at 3.38 has no doubt experienced some macabre exaggeration but gives a rough outline at least of the Great King's passion for knowledge of the world around him. See also P. Green, The Greco-Persian Wars (Berkeley, 1996 [2nd ed.]), pp. 12-15; Burn, Persia and the Greeks, pp. 98-9 (map), 116f.; J. Hart, Herodotus and Greek History (London, 1982), p. 121.

\(^6\) See M.M. Austin, "Greek Tyrants and the Persians, 546-476 B.C.", CQ 40 (1990), pp. 298-305.


\(^8\) Austin, "Greek Tyrants and the Persians", pp. 299-300.
Moreover, as argued by Austin, Dareios' recruits were not necessarily always political operatives. Mandrokles of Samos was deemed useful as an engineer (Hdt. 4.87-8), and Skylax of Karyanda, a likely contemporary of Demokedes and a fellow reconnaissance leader, was commissioned to mount an exploratory expedition to India and beyond (Hdt. 4.44). This preference for 'collecting' potentially useful individuals would continue even into the last years of his reign, as indicated by his reception of exiles such as the Peisistratid Hippias (Hdt. 5.96; 6.107) and the Eurypontid Demaratos (Hdt. 6.70).

Thus, although we need not take too seriously the Herodotean claim that the whole expedition was in fact merely a boon granted by Dareios through Atossa (3.134-5), it would appear that Demokedes was selected for the reconnaissance mission because of his knowledge of Hellas, and in particular Magna Graecia. Again, as argued above, the expedition need not have implied any real or immediate desire to conquer territories in the western Mediterranean, but rather may well have been a display of commercialism or sheer inquisitiveness on Dareios' behalf. It should be noted that the ships requisitioned for

9 Ibid., p. 299.
10 Although Herodotos claims that both Gelon of Syracuse and the Greek envoys who approached him prior Xerxes' invasion of Greece believed such expansionsim was a possibility (7.157, 163). Herodotos also states that Kambyses wished to invade Carthage (3.19).
the voyage west were from Phoenicia, at once a Persian possession and the berthing-place of Phoenician merchant vessels whose trading expeditions had in the past often taken them into the western reaches of the Mediterranean (Hdt. 2.32, 4.42, 4.197, 5.46).¹¹ That a voyage such as that of Demokedes’ took place therefore should not be seen as fanciful.

(ii) Since the 1920’s scholarly opinion has placed this homecoming in the late sixth century with a variety of specific suggestions having been tendered,¹² and Demokedes’ famous medical skills strongly suggest he was a product of the then flourishing medical school at Kroton, thereby also dating his career to the second half of the sixth century.¹³ However, the purpose of this section is to suggest that a reading of Herodotos’ account of the Persian conquest of Samos (3.139) indicates the

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¹¹ As Asheri has stated, only the recent conquest of Tyre and its surrounding territories in 539 would have brought a definitive end to close and regular contact between the Phoenicians and their western trading stations and colonies. Arranging passage from Phoenicia to Italy around 517 could not have been particularly difficult. See Asheri, “Carthaginians and Greeks”, pp. 749-50.


¹³ *TWGa*, p. 370.
likelihood of c. 517 for Demokedes' voyage. At 3.139.1 Herodotos specifically ties the fall of Samos to the preceding Demokedes episode by introducing the chapter with Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα. Clearly, in Herodotos' mind at least, one event follows the other. Although How and Wells and others rightly draw attention to the fantastic nature of the details surrounding the Persian acquisition of Samos, a similar charge has not been brought against the statement that Samos did in fact fall to Persia in the last quarter of the sixth century.14

The Persian conquest of Samos has been tentatively dated to c. 517 by Shipley, and is derived from fragments of Diodoros (the 'Thalassocracy List') extant in Eusebios (Diod. 7.11).15 This date can be calculated by establishing the lowest point of the Thalassocracy List as Xerxes' invasion of Greece (480) and counting back. Although a problematic source in itself, as will be demonstrated further below the date of c. 517 provided by the Thalassocracy List fits reasonably well with surrounding events and it has been accepted as valid by a number of scholars this century.16 Indeed, by calculating the

approximate duration of Demokedes' career at the court of Dareios, Mitchell has proposed the dates of either 518 or 517 for the fall of Samos, without reference to the alleged vagaries of the Thalassocracy List. The date of c. 517 for the fall of Samos is therefore considered by this paper to be an attractive one.

If Herodotos' chronology (Μετὰ δὲ τὰῦτα) can be accepted as well, as indeed it is by Mitchell, then Demokedes' voyage must have occurred by c. 517 at the latest, i.e. before Samos fell. Although notorious for the telescoping and compression of events, such as the revolt of Babylon (3.150), into chronologies rightly deemed unacceptable, Herodotos' accounts of Samian and Italiote affairs deserve special consideration. As Herodotos was in fact both an East Greek (as a citizen of Halikarnassos and either a visitor to, or one time resident of Samos) and an Italiote (as a citizen of Thourioi), Herodotos' knowledge of Samian and Italiote affairs can be said to have contained a considerable degree of credibility. Herodotos' knowledge of Samian and Italiote affairs can be said to have contained a considerable degree of credibility.

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17 B.M. Mitchell, "Herodotus and Samos", JHS 95 (1975), p. 86
18 Ibid., p. 86.
20 Herodotos is said to have died at Thourioi, some time after 430: Steph. Byz. s.v. Θουριοί.
accounts of Samian landmarks such as the Heraion and its prominent dedications (2.148, 182, 3.60, 4.88), the harbour mole and Eupalinos' tunnel (3.60) and the cult of Zeus Eleutherios (3.142) attest to such knowledge, as do the historian's insights into the late sixth and early fifth century politics of Magna Graecia (3.136, 4.44, 6.21, 7.170). Herodotean accounts of Samian and Italiote affairs thus demonstrate areas of relative competence.

The likelihood of a date around 517 is further reinforced by events early in the reign of Dareios. Having seized the throne in 522, Dareios was involved in civil war throughout his central provinces until the middle of 521, and probably did not secure all of the outlying Achaimenid territories until 520, and perhaps even as late as 518. Given these restrictions, authorization by Dareios of an expedition such as that of Demokedes', which reflects a degree of stability at Sousa (Hdt. 3.134), does not seem likely until 519 or even 518 at the very earliest. Moreover, given that Herodotos states that Demokedes did not reach Magna Graecia until after an extensive tour of Greece (1.136: ἐς δὲ τὰ πολλὰ αὐτῆς καὶ ἀνοιμασαὶ θειοσάμενοι ἄπικοντο τῆς


22 Burn, Persia and the Greeks, pp. 96-107.
the original expedition could well have been initiated a year or more before the eventual arrival in Italy. Therefore a conservative upper limit on the date of Demokedes' return to Kroton must be c. 518 (treating c. 519 as the first relatively civil conflict-free year of Dareios' reign, minus the projected time spent on other reconnaissance by Demokedes and his Persian minders). Thus the possibility if not preference for the previously proposed c. 517 is again established, this time by reference to the known and datable career of the Achaimenid Dareios I.

(iii) Having established the probability that Demokedes embarked on a sea journey which would bring about his return to his native polis around 517 it is now necessary to discuss the details of what occurred upon his arrival and to assess their veracity. Herodotos asserts at 3.137 that Demokedes arranged a betrothal to the daughter of the renowned Olympic athlete, Milon of Kroton (ἀρμοσταί τήν Μίλωνος θυγατέρα Δημοκήδης γυναῖκα). According to Herodotos (3.136), this marriage was contracted in order to facilitate Demokedes' escape from his Persian guardians whom he had eluded at Taras prior to fleeing to his native Kroton (ἐνθαῦτα δὲ ἐκ ἤπιστών τῆς Δημοκῆδος' Αριστοφιλίδης τῶν Ταραντίνων ὁ βασιλεὺς τούτῳ μὲν τὰ πηδάλια παρέλυσε τῶν Μηδικέων νεῶν, τούτῳ δὲ αὐτοὺς τοῦς Πέρσας ἐξήρε ὡς κατασκοποῦσις δὴθεν ἐόντας. ἐν δὲ ὅτι ταύτα ἐπανασχον, ὁ Δημοκήδης ἐς τὴν Κρώτωνα ἀπικνεῖται). Two main
points are raised by Herodotos' assertions at 3.136-7. The first, contested by Griffiths, is whether Demokedes' fifteen Persian minders, assigned to the Krotoniate by Dareios (Hdt. 3.135), would in fact have dared to pursue the fugitive doctor within his home town. The second main point is whether Milon actually had a daughter of marriageable age to give to Demokedes. Both of these questions require attention if Herodotos' account of the nostos is to be retained as a relatively reliable source.

Concerning the pursuit of Demokedes conducted by the fifteen Persians, it is important to note that Demokedes was considered to be a slave by the Persians and a δρηνέτης at that (Hdt. 3.137). This in fact accords with the earlier history of Demokedes, who was seized and enslaved by Oroites, the Persian satrap at Sardeis, after his betrayal of Polykrates of Samos (Hdt. 3.125). Again, at 3.129, Demokedes is listed as part of the χρηματα of Oroites, and his transference to Sousa from Sardeis after c. 522 was in reality merely a change of masters. That Demokedes rose to favour at the court of Dareios apparently did not change the fact that Demokedes was not free (Hdt. 3.132). Despite the no doubt exaggerated claims of Herodotos that he was extremely influential and esteemed at court (3.132), in practice Demokedes was a valuable piece of

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23 Griffiths, "Democedes of Croton", p 45.
Achaimenid property which could not be parted with. In the event that Demokedes was allowed to leave Sousa, he was escorted by fifteen Persian notables as well as those who were on board the three Phoenician ships chartered at Sidon (Hdt. 3.135-6). Whether or not Demokedes' escort was as grand as Herodotos claims, in no way should Demokedes be seen as a free agent during the voyage. He was given a task by, and operated under the authority of, the Great King.

Although there is no explicit evidence that might outline the law regarding runaway slaves in late sixth century Kroton, there exist many later references which may help to suggest what this law might have involved. Certainly, neighbouring Sybaris was a slave-owning society and it is highly probable that Kroton too was at least partially a slave-based society. Moreover, a didactic anecdote recorded by Athenaios implies that a Sybarite citizen possessed the power of life and death over his slaves (Ath. 12.520b). Such power, or close to it, is also implied in the forensic speeches of fifth and fourth century Athenian orators, in which torture and bodily harm to a slave were not considered by the law to be of serious consequence.24 Furthermore, an early fourth century speech attributed to Lysias makes it plain that a runaway slave (in this case from Dekeleia) could only hope to avoid capture in the

24 See Lysias 4.15, 7.34; Demos. 30.29.
long term by falsifying a new identity, preferably as a citizen of the *polis* within which they found themselves (Lysias 23.7-8). When Pancelon, the slave in question, was located by his master in Athens, he was seized and carried off by force - an occurrence that the orator does not seem to regard as remarkable or unusual in itself (23.11-12). Simply put, despite the obvious charge of anachronism, I do not find it likely that the *nomoi* of Kroton were any more favourable to slaves, runaways or otherwise, than other Greek states.

Thus, however many Persians happened to have accompanied Demokedes to Kroton, it appears likely that they could have expected to reclaim possession of Demokedes without too much attention drawn to themselves - at least in a legalistic sense. The Persian empire, like many Greek states, was clearly a slave-owning system and even if the Persians in pursuit of Demokedes did not have a fine grasp of Krotoniate law, they would have had good reason to assume that runaway slaves constituted legally recoverable property. Indeed, fugitive slaves may well only have expected to find sanctuary with an enemy state currently at war with their masters, as was the case with the Athenian slaves at Dekeleia during the Peloponnesian War after 413 (Thouk. 7.27.5). However, as no such conflict existed between Persia and Kroton it is difficult to believe that the Persian guardians of Demokedes would not
have made an attempt to reclaim the doctor. Furthermore, as the nostos of Demokedes pre-dates the anti-barbaros polarization of the early fifth century, there seems to be no good reason why the Persians would expect substantial opposition to their request.

Regarding the matter of Milon, his daughter and the marriage to Demokedes it remains to be proven whether such an event is chronologically feasible. As will be argued in section (iv), the involvement of Milon carries with it potentially significant ramifications for the political situation at Kroton at that time. Milon must have been an adult in 532 when he won the first of his five senior Olympic wrestling victories (Paus. 6.14.5; Diod. 12.9.6), and given his junior victory in 540 he is likely to have entered the 532 games at the minimum age of around eighteen.25 Depending on whether one accepts that his first victory (in 540) was achieved at the age of twelve or younger, by the games of 532 Milon was therefore at least eighteen, if not as old as twenty or slightly older.26


26 No information exists to indicate a specific age.
Given that there is only a fifteen year interlude between the year in which Milon is known to have been of adult age (532) and the year in which Demokedes is alleged to have sought the hand of Milon’s daughter (c. 517), the Herodotean chronology appears at first to be suspect. As with the above case of the nomoi regarding slaves, we simply do not know for certain what the laws and conventions regarding marriageable ages for males and females at Kroton during the late archaic period were. However, classical period examples may serve to give an indication as to what the Krotoniates believed to be a suitable age to marry.

The potential weakness in the Herodotean chronology lies not in the age of Milon’s daughter as much as it does in the marrying age of Milon himself. That it was possible if not desirable for a woman to be married off as young as the age of fourteen in classical Athens is made plain in the Oikonomikos of Xenophon (7.5). This model would therefore make it necessary for Milon to have married in or close to 532 in order for him to have fathered a child old enough to be of a marriageable age in c. 517. However, it is also commonly held that Athenian men on the other hand did not marry until their mid-twenties, with Hesiod having recommended as late as thirty years of age as the ideal (W & D 699-701). This is a

27 E. Fantham et al., Women in the Classical World: Image and Text
model which, if applied to late sixth century Kroton, would make the premise of Milon having married in or around 532 (i.e. when, at the oldest estimation, he was in his early twenties) unfeasible.

While such age brackets may have constituted the ideal or perhaps even the norm in many Greek poleis, there is however evidence to suggest that exceptions were made and that cultural variations occurred. In Sparta, for instance, it would appear that males were encouraged to marry as early as age twenty (Xen. Lak.Pol. 1.6; Plu. Lyk. 15.1-2). More importantly, even in a polis such as Athens, where a preference for later marriages for males is apparent, exceptions can be found. In another speech attributed to Lysias, an anonymous pleader gives an account of the first eight years of his adult life (i.e. ages eighteen through to twenty-six). At 21.23-4 the pleader states that he is a married man and implies that he has at least two children. If the pleader’s marriage has produced two children or more and his age is


29 Calculated from his statements at 21.1 and 21.4 which identify the archonships in which he held a particular office or discusses other events in his life.
twenty-six, then it follows that his maximum age at the time of his marriage can only have been twenty-four, with the strong possibility of an even lower age. In classical Athens at least, it was therefore not impossible for a male to marry before his mid-twenties.

Indeed, there are special circumstances in late sixth century Kroton which may indicate a greater propensity among Krotoniate men to marry earlier rather than later. The Battle of the Sagra River, fought around 550 between Kroton on the one side and a Lokrian/Rhegine coalition on the other, resulted in a massive defeat for the Krotoniate forces (Strabo 6.1.10). Strabo goes on to note that Kroton experienced horrendous losses at the Sagra (...τὸ πλῆθος τῶν τότε πεσόντων ἄνδρων), and it is probable that Kroton in effect lost the best part of an entire generation of young men overnight. It is evident in the classical period at least that the rulers of Greek poleis were quite prepared to adopt policies which were designed to either boost declining citizen populations or stabilize expanding ones. It should not therefore be viewed as mere unfounded

\[30\) For the date, see RCA, p. 251.

\[31\) Spartan efforts to address a declining population during the fifth and fourth centuries are well known: see S. Hodkinson, “Inheritance, Marriage and Demography: Perspectives upon the Success and Decline of Classical Sparta”, Classical Sparta: Techniques Behind Her Success, A. Powell (ed.) (London, 1989), pp. 109-10. In contrast, Perikles'
speculation that Kroton may have employed policies designed to recoup its no doubt substantial losses - namely, the encouragement of early marriages.

Furthermore, in a speech by Isaios, there exists a reference to the betrothal of a girl in all likelihood under the age of fourteen (2.4-5). In this case, a certain Menekles requests the hand of a girl who is explicitly described as σχεδόν ἡλικίαν...συνοικεῖν (2.4). Although close to an age deemed suitable for marriage, the girl in question is still considered by her guardians to be underage - an issue that does not prevent her betrothal to Menekles. This model, if adopted, would suggest that any daughter of Milon need not have been fourteen years old or more in c. 517 to have been betrothed to Demokedes. Moreover, with this model either applied on its own, or in combination with the above arguments for Milon having married before his mid-twenties, the fifteen year margin between Milon's adulthood and the engagement of his daughter becomes far less problematic.

Thus, as a legal adult in 532, Milon could have married and fathered a daughter who would have been of an age considered suitable for marriage or at least betrothal by 517, when,

Citizenship Law of 451/50 was a measure aimed at slowing the growth in citizen numbers (Arist. Ath.Pol. 26.3).
assuming Demokedes approached Milon shortly after his arrival in Kroton (as Herodotos' chronology suggests), the marriage was arranged. However, given the difficulties involved in using evidence removed by a century or more from the actual period under examination, it is necessary to stress that the events that occurred upon Demokedes' return to Kroton (as narrated by Herodotos) have been demonstrated to be within the realms of possibility rather than certainty. That they have been demonstrated to be at least plausible in the given historical and cultural context, however, should give caution to the view that Herodotos was merely fulfilling his role as a gifted embellisher and story-teller.\(^{32}\) In essence, that Demokedes a) sailed to Kroton under Persian guard, and b) consolidated his escape by marrying the daughter of Milon cannot simply be rejected on the charge of being Herodotean and therefore outrageous fiction. Herodotos was in all probability guilty of melding several quaint flourishes, such as the Demokedes-Atossa episode, on to the account of Demokedes' nostos, but this should only warrant the employment of a sieve, not a sledgehammer.

(iv) Having given the narration of Herodotos, at 3.136-7 in particular, an opportunity to stand as a source of some potentially reliable information, it is now important to examine

\(^{32}\) A view well extrapolated by Griffiths, "Democedes of Croton", esp. pp. 45-7.
the Krotoniate side of the equation. Indeed, crucial to this equation is the question of why did Demokedes single out Milon when looking to consolidate his escape from his Persian minders? Herodotos of course gives us a response to this at 3.137, arguing that Milon’s was a name that was respected even by Dareios in distant Persia. That Dareios may have known who Milon was is not impossible. By c. 517 Milon had after all achieved four successive victories at the Olympic Games in the wrestling event, and would have been famous throughout the Greek world at least. However, whether Dareios actually knew of Milon or not, Herodotos undermines his own assertion with a report of an alleged conversation between Dareios and Atossa in which both confess to knowing very little about Hellas, let alone specific competitors in Greek games (3.134). That Milon’s fellow Krotoniate Demokedes may have earlier related some news of the athlete’s prowess to Dareios is of course possible, but the assertion that Dareios was sufficiently in awe of the man to surrender the possession of a valuable slave is dubious. In sum, I am in agreement with the observations of Griffiths, and the earlier commentary of How and Wells, that Herodotos was probably exaggerating the extent of the Great King’s familiarity with individual Greeks not

directly in his employ.\textsuperscript{34}

Having cast enough doubt on 'name-recognition' in distant Sousa as the reason for Demokedes' decision to ally himself to the family of Milon, we must examine those aspects of Milon not connected with his sporting career. Regarding the non-Olympic part of Milon's life, the ancient sources highlight two main features. The first is that Milon led the Krotoniate army against the Sybarites in 510 (Diod. 12.9-5-6), and the second, that Milon was a follower of Pythagoras of Samos (Strabo 6.1.12; Iamb., VP 249, 267; DL 8.39; Aristox. F18 [Wehrli]).

Both features clearly indicate that Milon was in an interesting position at Kroton in terms of his influence and standing. No doubt much of this was originally based on his Olympic successes and Demokedes would thus have been wise to court the athlete's favour. However, Milon's involvement with the Pythagoreans suggests another possibility. Having arrived in Kroton around 531, Pythagoras appears to have inspired the formation of a society apart from the various existing political factions (Iamb., VP 29-30, 74; DL 8.3), and which had also attracted a number of the leading men of the polis - of which

\textsuperscript{34} Griffiths, "Democedes of Croton", p. 45; How & Wells, A Commentary on Herodotus, p. 298.
Milon was one (Iamb., VP 88). By making a marriage alliance to the family of Milon, Demokedes may well have been making a conscious decision to seek the protection of the faction to which Milon belonged - the Pythagoreans. Certainly, more sense can be made of Demokedes' use of Milon in order to consolidate his escape from Persia than when relying on Herodotos' explanation for this event. Thus Milon is in fact relied upon for name-recognition, but within Kroton rather than without, at Sousa or elsewhere. Moreover, the appearance of Demokedes as a Pythagorean during the post-Sybarite war stasis at Kroton is provided with a mini-history of its own (Iamb., VP 261). Demokedes was almost certainly drawn into the Pythagorean ranks by his Pythagorean benefactor and father-in-law, Milon.

While the influence of this society was in all likelihood exaggerated by the biographers of Pythagoras, we do possess one alleged example of this group having successfully intervened in Krotoniate politics. Diodoros (12.9.4) and Iamblichos (VP 133) both report that Pythagoras and his

35 For the date see Attianese, Kroton: Ex Nummis Historia, p. 14.

36 Given what we do know about the very mixed fortunes of later Pythagoreans at Kroton, the statement of Diogenes Laertius that the Pythagoreans formed the ruling elite of that polis cannot be taken seriously (8.3).
followers intervened successfully during a debate over foreign policy in 510. The position taken by the Pythagoreans in effect constituted them as the 'war party' of Krotonian politics, as it was over the issue of Sybarite exiles and subsequent threats from Sybaris that the Pythagoreans took their stand (Diod. 12.9.2-4). That Milon is said to have led the Krotonian army in the ensuing war should come as no surprise given his attachment to the Pythagorean cause. Moreover, if Demokedes did in fact seek to associate himself with the Pythagoreans via Milon in c. 517, as seems possible, then in effect we are dealing with an earlier instance of Pythagorean intervention in a potentially political matter than that of the war with Sybaris.

That Milon's intervention on Demokedes' behalf was indeed an act with political connotations is clear. The protection of Demokedes was in essence a slap in the face for the Persians who were charged with his safe-keeping. Indeed, the Persians' demand is not unlike the demands of Telys in 510, when other fugitives, on this occasion Sybarite aristoi, sought sanctuary in Kroton (Diod. 12.9.2-3). On both occasions it is fugitives who are at issue, and on both occasions it is the Pythagoreans who form the resistance to the demands of the 'outsiders'. Furthermore, on both occasions the recipients of Pythagorean aid are members of the wealthy and/or aristocratic class. While such information is clearly stated by Diodoros when
discussing the victims of Telys (12.9.2-3), Herodotos is not so forthcoming about the social situation of Demokedes, nor for that matter does it seem particularly relevant to the latter historian’s purpose, which was to narrate an adventure story. However, despite his scepticism concerning much of the detail of Demokedes’ nostos, Griffiths has accepted the Suda’s information regarding Demokedes’ family. Demokedes was most probably a member of the priest class - through his father Kalliphon, a Knidian priest of Asklepios - and was therefore in many ways a spiritual cousin to those other influential and aristocratic priestly families of the Greek West: the Telinidai of Gela (Hdt. 7.153-4); and the Iamidai of Kroton and Syracuse (Hdt. 5.44-5; Pind. Ol. 6.43, 57-81). To underline the point, it is probable that Demokedes later qualified for membership of the Krotoniate chilion, a forum in which presumably only one thousand of the wealthiest and aristocratic Krotoniates could debate (Iamb., VP 257, 260), again suggesting that his class background was by no means an unprivileged one.

At any rate, priesthoods were regularly the preserve of the royal and aristocratic families of Greek poleis throughout archaic period Hellas, and in the colonies priests and their

38 For example: the Eurypontidai and the Agiadai of Sparta (Xen. Lak.Pol. 15.2-5); the Battiadai of Kyrene (Hdt. 4.161); the Teisandridai of
descendants also often formed part of the elite class.\textsuperscript{39} As the direct descendant of a priest, Demokedes would in all probability have found it relatively easy to assimilate himself into Kroton’s upper classes. Furthermore, as stated previously, the Pythagoreans are known to have attracted many of the elite to their ranks (Iamb., VP 88, 254), among them Milon, Kylon (briefly), Hippasos, and possibly Theages, as well as a certain Diodoros, and to have even recruited enough of them to play a significant role in the running of the state (Iamb., VP 254).\textsuperscript{40} Indeed, it would appear that the \textit{stasis} in Kroton that followed the Krotoniate victory over Sybaris in 510 was in part provoked by the Pythagoreans’ insistence on maintaining the \textit{ancien régime} with all of its undemocratic and exclusive practices.\textsuperscript{41} In sum, the Pythagoreans were evidently attractive to, and recruited from, the elite tier of society and were happy to identify themselves with traditional aristocratic

\begin{footnotesize}
39 Gelon the Telinid established a dynastic tyranny over Gela and Syracuse (Hdt. 7.154-5); Kallias, an Iamid of Elis acquired gifts of land at Kroton (Hdt. 5.45); and Hagesias, an Iamid of Stymphalos was a supporter and no doubt confidant of Hieron I of Syracuse (Pind. \textit{Ol.} 6.92-8).

40 Kylon was the \textit{exarch} of the newly conquered Sybaritid and is mentioned specifically as a member of the richest class (Iamb., VP 74, 258). Hippasos, Theages and Diodoros were all probably members of the Krotoniate \textit{chilion}, (Iamb., VP 257, 260).

41 Vatai, \textit{Intellectuals in Politics in the Greek World}, pp. 53-5
\end{footnotesize}
causes such as repress10n of democracy (Iamb., VP 257) and the monopolization of land (Iamb. VP 255). Moreover, whether these elites happened to be fugitive aristoi from Sybaris or an escapee doctor of priestly and Knidian descent, the Pythagoreans appeared only too ready to offer their protection.

However, the chief potential weakness in the case for a Pythagorean role in the events surrounding Demokedes’ nostos lies in the silence of Herodotos. Herodotos’ narrative does make it clear that some Krotoniates were in favour of handing over the escapee Demokedes to the Persians, whilst others actively resisted this course of action (3.137). Milon was therefore not alone in his involvement in the effort to succour Demokedes and this may in fact be an allusion to the participation of the Pythagorean faction to which he belonged. However Herodotos, who clearly knows something about the historical Pythagoras and what approximately a Pythagorean was, makes no mention of Milon’s affiliations or indeed that the Pythagoreans were even present in Kroton at that time.

The words Pythagoras and Pythagorean occur on a total of four occasions in the History of Herodotos, and an examination of their occurrence is revealing when seeking to explain the absence of Pythagorean references at 3.137. All of Herodotos’
remarks linking Pythagoras and/or his followers to a geographical location relate to the eastern Mediterranean world. Herodotos knows Pythagoras was from Samos (4.95), a polis which the historian has been shown to have known much about, and that oral tradition had given him a geographical range among the Thrakians and the Greeks of the Hellespont and Pontos (4.95-6). However, Herodotos demonstrates no knowledge of Pythagoras ever having travelled to Magna Graecia, despite Herodotos' later discussion of the war between Kroton and Sybaris (5.44-5). Indeed, Herodotos demonstrates that he had interviewed at least one person with knowledge about the war from the Krotoniate perspective (presumably a Krotoniate) by contrasting the oral histories of the Sybarites and Kroton (5.45). As a citizen of Thourioi during the 440's, Herodotos' paradoxical display of relatively detailed and sparse knowledge of Kroton is puzzling. As stated earlier, many of the sources pertaining to Pythagoras and his sojourn in Magna Graecia may be considered suspect on a number of grounds, but surely not to the extent that Pythagoras' presence in Italy was a fabrication?

A possible solution to this problem lies in the time-frame within which Herodotos was actually in Italy when he wrote those parts of his History relevant to Kroton. In his reassessment of the tyranny of Kleinias, as outlined by
Dionysios of Halikarnassos (20.7), Bicknell has persuasively dated the aforementioned tyranny as being effective between c. 453 and c. 440. This tyranny closely followed an outbreak of anti-Pythagorean violence which resulted in the expulsion of the Pythagoreans from Kroton (Aristox. F18; Iamb., VP 249; DL 8.39; Polyb. 2.39.1). Although this mass-expulsion was led at first by a certain Litates around 454 (Iamb., VP 263), it would appear that Kleinias maintained Litates' anti-Pythagorean policies, as there is no suggestion of a Pythagorean nostos until after the Thourian invasion of Kroton in c. 440 (Iamb., VP 263-4).

Indeed Polybios, who does not suffer from the same hagiographical tendencies as Iamblichos in regard to Pythagoras, makes no mention at all of an amnesty extended to the Pythagoreans by the Krotoniates once the stasis of the 440's had come to a close (2.39.4-6). Moreover, it is a difficult task to find any room for a Pythagorean role in the mainland Achaian League-brokered politeia of Kroton and the new Italiote Achaian koinon, despite the claims to the contrary by Iamblichos (Iamb., VP 263-4, cf. Polyb. 2.39.5-6). The differences between the democratic hue of the Achaian states

42 Bicknell, "The Tyranny of Kleinias at Kroton", pp. 5-25.
of the Peloponnesos at the time of their mediation efforts in Italy, and the autocratic tendencies of the Pythagoreans must have been substantial, if not irreconcilable.\textsuperscript{44} That the Pythagoreans returned in any great numbers or to positions of respect and influence at Kroton after c. 440, should therefore not be assumed.\textsuperscript{45} Indeed, it would appear that many, if not most Pythagoreans transferred to other Italiote \textit{poleis} rather than risk returning to Kroton. Certainly it is from Taras, Metapontion and Rhegion that most Pythagoreans of note emerge or base themselves after c. 440, including Archytas, Eurytos and possibly even Philolaos as well.\textsuperscript{46}

The problem of Herodotus' lack of knowledge concerning Pythagoreans in Kroton, despite his access to local knowledge, can therefore be interpreted more favourably. Having arrived at Thourioi no earlier than 444/3 (the date of its foundation),

\textsuperscript{44} For the general democratic disposition of Achaia during the second half of the fifth century see Thouk. 5.82.1 and comments by J.A.O. Larsen, \textit{Greek Federal States: Their Institutions and History} (Oxford, 1968), p. 87, and Walbank, \textit{A Historical Commentary on Polybius}, p. 224. For the autocratic and elitist tendencies amongst the Pythagoreans, see Iamb., \textit{VP} 193, 199, 226-7, 255, 257, 260.

\textsuperscript{45} Iamblichos himself admits that the Pythagoreans who allegedly returned to Kroton numbered little more than sixty (\textit{VP} 264).

\textsuperscript{46} C. Huffman, \textit{Philolaos of Croton: Pythagorean and Presocratic (a commentary on the fragments and testimonia with interpretive essays)} (Cambridge, 1993), p. 6. See also Iamb., \textit{VP} 130, 172, 197, 251, 267.
and residing there until his death in the 420's (Steph. Byz. s.v. Θωύριοι), Herodotos' sources for his Krotoniate history must have been heavily influenced by the events of recent years. Kroton, having first endured fourteen years of stasis and tyranny under Litates and Kleinias respectively, in which anti-Pythagorean pogroms appear to have been a major feature, could not be expected to have been a repository of pro-Pythagorean sources. Furthermore, as has been argued previously, this period of overt anti-Pythagoreanism was in all probability not succeeded by an era in which the Pythagoreans could flourish. They were more likely to have been regarded by the new democratic and pan-Achaian regime as antiques, whose involvement in at least two civil wars since their formation around 531, cast serious doubts over their eligibility to remain in Kroton.47 Thus, if Herodotos was to report on Pythagorean activity in Kroton during the late sixth century, he required a written or oral history from which to draw upon - history which either no longer 'existed' or had been seriously edited by a generation of anti-Pythagorean sources. Similarly, neither would the Sybarite survivors of the Krotoniate/Pythagorean invasion, who were to share briefly the site of Thourioi with the panhellenic settlers from the Aegean (of whom Herodotos was one), have much to say in the Pythagoreans' favour (Diod. 12.10.3-11.1).

47 Two Pythagorean-orientated civil wars are known to have occurred, in 509 (Iamb., VP 248-9, 252, 255, 258, 261-2), and 454 (see section [iv]).
Theoretically, the absence of any Pythagorean references during the *nostos* of Demokedes could be overlooked due to the relative non-importance of the event. Unless one interprets the participation of Phayllos of Kroton in the Battle of Salamis as a Krotoniate swipe at the Persians for their arrogance in c. 517 (Hdt. 8.47), there were no serious repercussions from the escape of Demokedes. Even those sources that did make it their business to discuss the lives of various Pythagoreans do not concern themselves with this story. When Demokedes does appear in the Pythagorean corpus, it is at a point in his life where he has already become a Pythagorean, and is thus of interest to the source (Iamb., *VP* 257, 261). Despite the joy which Iamblichos appears to find in compiling lists of Pythagoreans, he generally offers no details on their pre-Pythagorean lives, even when discussing the grand masters of the school. Moreover, it would also be of little value to argue that this story might be expected to appear in a *Life* of the Pythagorean Milon. The only deeds that interested the sources willing to discuss Pythagoreans at length were those related to their Pythagoreanism - for example, Milon’s alleged rescue of Pythagoras and his school (Strabo 6.1.12). Therefore, that the *nostos* of Demokedes, who was not a grand master, does not feature in the Pythagorean corpus should not be seen as surprising. Rather, this particular story was more befitting of a historian and tale-collector such as Herodotos.
The absence of any mention of Pythagoras or his followers in Herodotos’ narrative at 5.44-5 (the war between Kroton and Sybaris) is however far more difficult to pass off as absent-mindedness. If the Pythagoreans were as unimportant in the history of Kroton as Herodotos’ source(s) seem to imply, then why did a civil war ensue between pro and anti-Pythagorean factions in 509 and again in 454? Clearly there were two very differing traditions regarding the war with Sybaris: a virtually Pythagorean-free one from which Herodotos appears to have drawn upon; the other from which an array of significantly later and outwardly pro-Pythagorean sources find inspiration (including Diodoros, Strabo, Iamblichos and Porphyrios).

The major exception in the latter category is of course Aristoxenos. However, it should be noted that this particular Pythagoras hagiographer states that he actually managed to meet some Pythagoreans during the fourth century (Aristox. in DL 8.46). However, none of these Pythagoreans were Krotoniates and if anything, their diverse origins indicate the extent to which the Pythagorean school had become a diaspora - a diaspora most probably with its origins in the anti-Pythagorean stasis of 454. In sum, it is unlikely that Herodotos had the opportunity to meet any Pythagoreans, nor even any Krotoniates who were prepared to attribute much
that was constructive to them. This is of course understandable, in the context of the Pythagoreans being on the losing side in a civil war.

Therefore, the impact of this generation of anti-Pythagorean sources was to ensure the absence of any references to Pythagoras and his school in Kroton. Moreover, if the model proposed in this section is adopted, it follows that Herodotos was only able to extract an ‘edited’ version of this story from his source(s) in Magna Graecia, obtained after the definitive removal of the Pythagoreans from Kroton. The story that Herodotos did manage to hear was of interest to him, as it was a piece which, as Griffiths has argued, could easily be adapted to a long-standing hero genre of the eastern Mediterranean. Furthermore, even minus the Pythagorean connotations that this paper has sought to identify, the story possesses good propaganda value for the Krotoniates. As with the story of Phayllos which Herodotos no doubt has also picked up from the proud Krotôniate (Hdt. 8.47), Demokedes’ nostos show-cases Krotoniate disdain for Persian power in the post-Xerxes era in which Herodotos wrote his History.

Thus to Herodotos the story of Demokedes’ nostos was probably little more than a good tale. To the biographers and

49 Ibid., p. 46.
historians of the Pythagoreans, the story was irrelevant. However, to the modern scholar, the story has considerable potential value. The rescue of Demokedes from the Persians by Milon and his associates represents the earliest known instance of Pythagorean involvement in the politics of Kroton. As stated previously, the rescue of Demokedes pre-dates the intervention of the Pythagoreans in the debate over Sybarite supplicants in 510. As a result, we are offered a glimpse of this largely mysterious yet evidently potent faction during the hitherto shrouded years between Pythagoras' arrival at Kroton around 531 and his advocacy of war in 510.
MAP 1 THE COLONIZATION OF MAGNA GRAECIA
Greek foundations, c. 775-c. 650
MAP 2 THE COLONIZATION OF MAGNA GRAECIA
Greek foundations and possessions, c. 650-471
MAP 3 THE BAY OF NAPLES
Greek settlement, c. 775-474

Nola: Ausonian town
Neapolis: Greek polis or dependency

SCALE
0 10 20Km.
MAP 4 THE EMPIRE OF SYBARIS
c. 570-510

Laos Sybarite dependency
Serdaioi Sybarite ally
Basento R. modern name
MAP 5 LOKROI vs KROTON
c. 550-470’s

Laos
Lokrian dependency (with date in case of conquest)

Rhegion
Lokrian ally

Terina
Krotoniate dependency (with date in case of conquest)

Kaulonia
Krotoniate ally

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Inter-state border (approx. only)
MAP 6 THE PRINCIPALITY OF THE STRAITS
488-480

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**Mylai**  Rhegine dependency
**Himera**  Rhegine ally
**Soloëis**  Punic site
**Lokroi**  Other Greek state
---  Inter-state border (approx. only)


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