THE PROXY PRINCIPLE:
Bodies and Bodies Politic at War in the World-as-Text

by

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ABSTRACT

This thesis investigates the relationship of textuality - reading/writing processes (literacy) and products (text) - to war. The central argument is, that the origin and systematic elaboration of war is linked to the development of particular writing systems, such that the former can neither come into existence, nor persist, independently of the latter. Taking alphabetic writing systems as a test case, I claim that the complex, contestable and very nearly counterintuitive nature of the mooted relationship makes it uniquely amenable - despite sociology's prior neglect of both topic areas - to sociological analysis; and requires the formulation of a new analytical tool - herein designated the proxy principle - to render it sensible.

The proxy principle is located within ongoing debates about the impact of literacy on entities called "real people", and the relative importance of text(s) in a "real world". Such debates can be traced to at least the 5th Century BC in Plato's Phaedrus, but gain in force, variety and significance under conditions of modernity. In contemporary debates, writing and the written are typically depicted as either [a] beneficial or harmful to "real people"; [b] necessary, supplementary or irrelevant to the "real world"; or [c] in deconstructionist arguments, the "real world" itself, beyond which nothing exists. Conversely, my proposition maintains that the purpose of reading/writing is the construction of surrogate people and an alternative world - proxies - that are generated from, co-exist with and eventually dominate both conceptions of and activity in the non-textual world.

The emphasis throughout is on the impact and consequences of a move of communicated meaning from incorporation to inscription: increases in the extent and intensity of war constitute one such consequence.

The analysis of this relationship is diachronic (equating changes in reading and writing with changes in civil/military organisation and the science and art of war) and synchronic (highlighting durability of structure), and operates on 5 levels, ranging from the macro- (global), through mega, meso, and mini to micro- (individual) levels. A typology relating specific communicative modes and technologies (Oral-Alphabetic-Scribal-Print-Informatic) to particular forms of warfare ("primitive"-Imperialist-Holy-Total-Pure) grounds initial sections of the thesis, which then proceeds to the provision of empirical examples displaying degrees of consistency and reproduction of the process over time and space. In conclusion, instances of the operation of the 'war/text' axis in late-20th century contexts are presented to test the hypothesis for validity and predictive capacity.
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I dedicate this thesis to my adored daughter Kate, with the fervent hope that the world she inherits may be freer from the events detailed herein, and thus more worthy of her.
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Chapter 1: INTRODUCTION.

1.1: The Argument

The following thesis argues for a relationship between two social phenomena: a particular communicative mode - reading and writing - and war, a specific form of organized conflict. I argue that the introduction of, and qualitative and quantitative increases in, reading/writing processes (literacy) and products (multiple forms of text) intensify and extend war-readiness (propensity), actual warmaking (prosecution) and the shaping of (post-war) outcomes. Characterising each phenomenon as a key factor in societal formation and social change, I contend for both a systemic conjunction (interplay over time and space) and a structural homology (constitutive sameness of form) between the two object-domains.

I call this interplay a war/text axis: the structural factor that allows for the mutual coterminous development of reading/writing and war is designated the proxy principle.

The core of the argument is that in conditions of modernity and its derivatives (the pre-, proto- and post-modern), reading and writing are constitutive of both the sociological and the social: that is, the ‘world’ that sociology analyses and that its subject-matter inhabits, is primarily an artefact of text. This is posed in contradistinction to three alternative views: the first sees reading/writing processes and products as pervasive, so thoroughly integrated into the contemporary world that they can be taken for granted, perceived as normative and thus not a fit subject for separate analysis; the second sees textual structures and literacy activities as either insignificant, properly the province of other non-sociological disciplines, or an adjunct to some conception of the “real” world.

Contrarily, my position is that an analytically-separable ‘quasi-world’ of the written co-exists with this non-textual entity, and forms the sociological object of investigation.
This grounding premise similarly distances the argument from the third opposed contention, the deconstructionist assertion - found in the work of theorists such as Paul de Man and Jacques Derrida - that apart from the enscripted there is no "real world" to be had (il n’y a pas de hors-texte). The idea of coexistence opposes this axiom as much as it stands against the alternatives of reading/writing as seamlessly ubiquitous, or text-as-supplement. It also sets the agenda for the thesis: given the mooted conceptual separation into textual and non-textual 'worlds', typically both located in the same time and space, what is the relationship of each to each?

This emphasis on relationship, the interaction between the textual and the non-textual, is precisely what casts reading and writing as a fit subject for sociology. To delineate the connection(s), a singular mode of analysis - the proxy principle - is forwarded. At the epistemological level, and in direct response to Galtung’s (1981) question 'literacy for what?', this principle states that the prime purpose of reading and writing - the essential function of 'functional literacy' and the consequent importance attached to it - is the creation of surrogate selves (proxies) and a surrogate environment (a textual world) within which these proxies operate. Expessed differently: this text-generated universe and its textually-defined denizens constitute an ontological domain ('culture') distinct from but concomitant with the universe of ecological and biological constraints and pre-givens ('nature'). Put in yet another form: what the proxy principle provides is, on the one hand, a tool for investigating the ways in which reading and writing constitute a comprehension and control of the world outside the range of [i] direct sensory experience and [ii] other sensemaking media; on the other, how persons become what is written by and/or about them.

This final formulation suggests that reading and writing are more than simply one-in-a-range of representational methods; that, amongst an array of sign-systems and communicative modes - oral, gestural, pictorial - which extend the range of human knowledge out past the point of the experiential, the textual dominates. This inference is deliberate. Reading/writing is intrinsically linked with the conferring of power in both its senses, ie, of hegemony ('power over') and autonomy ('power to'). In maintaining this I draw on both Foucault's general conception of power as
productive (1980: 118), Robinson's more specific claim, that any consideration of literacy entails an 'ethnography of power' as a starting-point (1990: 159), and the observation of Freire & Macedo that 'literacy becomes a meaningful construct to the degree that it is viewed as a set of practices that functions to either empower or disempower people' (1987: 141).

My position is thus somewhat at odds with that of K. S. Goodman when, speaking to the relationship between reading/writing and power, he holds that literacy

'...does not in itself produce power. It does not in itself change values, aspirations, power relationships, cultures and world views. Literacy is necessary but not sufficient. It is a concomitant of economic, political, social and cultural changes' (cited in Mayor & Pugh, 1987: 401).

Preserved in this statement is the idea of reading and writing as contingent. Contrarily, I seek to demonstrate that several central social processes are instantiated - brought into being by, maintained through, not possible without - particular forms of writing. Some, not all, phenomena: which processes rely on reading/writing as an independent variable is a case-by-case matter for empirical investigation. Under this circumstance, I outline a significant social phenomenon - a test case - which only occurs in societies with writing. That phenomenon is war.

Sociology has consistently tended to underplay or neglect the primary social significance of war and/or reading and writing. The elaboration of the grounding proposition highlights and explains this neglect, and fills a gap within the literature. It also critiques two dominant approaches evident on the relatively rare occasions when the discipline engages with either subject. The first holds that the two topic areas are unrelated. The second works off the premise that if a linkage exists, it moves in the opposite direction - that is, high degrees of individual literacy and a fully-developed literate culture are fundamental to a civilizational complex, and such a complex is essentially peaceful. Opposing such an approach, I take reading and writing as a necessary but not sufficient condition of war.
1.2: Definitions

1.2.1: Reading, writing and text.

Herein, reading and writing (or the compound ‘reading/writing’) is the baseline term from which text, following Ricouer, is initially defined as ‘any discourse fixed by writing’: a broader and higher-level structure is created by the ‘relation of text to text...[which] engenders the quasi world of literature’ (1991: 106, 109). I use literacy throughout to designate textual praxis (in the bilateral Marxian sense of the word, with theory and practice as mutually constitutive), as the activities by which text is produced (written) and apprehended (read). With regard to specific terminology within this broad framework, I adopt throughout the usage set out in Thwaites, Davis & Mules (1994; Appendix A to this chapter).\(^1\)

Further: my use of the term reading/writing is to be understood as, in the first instance, a mark-making endeavour, at once the process and product of inscription. This departs from conceptions of writing as (i) chiefly or solely an alternative representation of sound units, or (ii) “thought” rendered visible. Any unexamined conjunction of this sort fails on four levels: by discounting or demoting an assortment of non-alphabetic writing systems (cuneiform, hieroglyphic, ideogrammatic), setting up both an analytical (‘grammatocentric’) and a geopolitical (Eurocentric) bias; second, it rules out of court the contention (associated with but not exclusive to Derrida’s deconstructionist thesis), that writing precedes speech, and language springs from making marks and talking about them;\(^2\) thirdly, it consistently casts writing as a dependent variable, and blurs the very real independences and distinctions between

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\(^1\) This list gives designations for the following 46 terms: culture; sign; referential, metalingual and formal functions; addressee/sender; addressee/receiver; conative, expressive and phatic functions (functions of address); contextual functions; signifier/signified/signification; parole/langue; syntagm; paradigm; metaphor; metonym/metonymy; connotations/denotations; myths; genre; narration/narrative/narrators/narratees; plot; story; events; closure; institution; discourse; embodiment; realism; redundancy; ideology; hegemony; habitus; dispositions; and capital.

\(^2\) More subtly, Derrida’s principal translator gives an example of the same sort of reversal within writing, in the way a preface precedes a text, but is typically composed after the writing of the text to which it refers (Spivak, in Derrida, 1976: ix-xiii).
utterance and writing; and finally, it diverts attention from the materiality of writing, thereby limiting the scope of empirical analysis and fostering a tendency to “see through/beneath/behind” rather than “look directly at” the artefact.

This view of writing as essentially inscription rather than simple transcription, and the commitment to “looking directly”, necessarily entails a consideration of the technologies of writing. Here, I draw partly from those analysts who characterise literacy as a ‘technology of the intellect’ (Ong, 1982; Wagner, 1983: 5; Bhola, 1984: 22-23; Goody, 1986: 151; Finnegan, 1988: 12-44; De Castell & Luke, 1989), but more from those who more literally cast particular writing technologies as agencies of social change. This includes the machinery of what is written with - whether that be the goose-quill, the mass-produced machined steel-nib pen (Howard, 1985) or the printing press (Eisenstein, 1968; Marshall, 1983: 12; Heath, in De Castell et al, 1986:16) - as well as what is written on, - stone, papyrus, parchment, paper (Innis, 1950; 1951).

As central to the form taken by such inscribed artefacts are the locales in which they are stored and preserved - the thrust of Popper’s placement of the library at the heart of western civilization’s ‘high’ culture (1972: 107-08), and the impetus for extensive and readily-accessible data archives on the more mundane plane of information. This latter involves analysis of documents at the micro-level, as both guarantors of personal identity and as linkage-mechanisms to the archival record: at issue is not only how some sort of “identity” is indicated (in a second-order sense) by such writings, but how these writings actually produce such identities - and constitute (make possible) the number and types of relationship to which such identities are subject.

In finer-grained detail and more particularly, consideration is given to the notion of

5 Frank Smith (1983: 81-88) deals with these misconceptions (‘myths’) when noting that writing is not just concretised speech (which, ‘once uttered, can rarely be revised...writing can be reflected upon, altered and even erased at will’, further maintaining that the ‘first great and unique potential of writing’ is that ‘it gives the writer power to manipulate time’ - pace Omar Kayam’s “moving finger”). Nor is it simple one-to-one thought transferral (‘writing can create ideas and experiences on paper which could never exist in the mind and possibly not in the “real world” either...thoughts are created in the act of writing’). The fuller implications of this latter insight will become evident as the thesis proceeds.
the impact of assorted writing technologies on the body, both in terms of physical disposition (a particular instance of Foucault's dressage) and physiological transformation - impacts on the eye, the brain, or (suppression of) the voice.

Goldberg's case-study (1990) on the 'transforming' of the human hand into a writing implement during the English Renaissance is also apposite here, and an indication of the tradition in back of this approach can be found in the following anonymous colophon accompanying the Silos Beatus, from the 12th Century AD:

"The labour of the writer is the refreshment of the reader. The one depletes the body, the other advances the mind... If you do not know how to write you will consider it no hardship, but if you want a detailed account of it let me tell you that the work is heavy: it makes the eyes misty, bows the back, crushes the ribs and belly, brings pain to the kidneys, and makes the body ache all over. Therefore, O Reader, turn the leaves gently and keep your fingers away from the letters, for as the hailstorm ruins the harvest of the land, so does the unserviceable reader destroy the book and the writing..."

Equal in importance to the machinery of production (technologies) is the constitution of the mechanism of transmission. Consonant with the approach taken to writing technology, this involves concepts as diverse as the cybernetically-based modelling of assorted communications theorists (overview in Ruben, 1984: 40-71) and Poster's later (1990) theory of the 'Mode of Information'. Combining these elements of technology and transmission, I take on board Kittler's concept of the aufschreibesysteme - 'systems of writing down' or 'notation systems' - as delineated by that author's translators and editors:

'A notation system or, as we have chosen to translate, a discourse network has the exterior character - the outsideness - of a technology. In Kittler's view, such technologies are not mere instruments with which "man" produces his meanings; they cannot be grounded in a philosophical anthropology. Rather, they set the framework within which something like "meaning", indeed, something like "man", can become possible at all' (1990: xii).

Finally, and as inferred from this last conception, I consider the part writing plays in the composition of aggregates, with a specific focus on the creation of bodies politic. The individual bodies modified by reading and writing, and concomitant identities
conferred through text(s), are bundled together into larger entities, in each of which the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. This makes possible reference to such groupings in the abstract - the family, the corporation, the society, the city, the military, the public (or any similarly appropriate designation). Here, I concentrate upon one such mega-level formation - the State - an 'imagined community' (Anderson, 1991) sustained by invented traditions (Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1992), conceiving of these inventions and imaginings as primarily products of text.

This focus is ongoing and has a long heritage within the State itself, and in the advanced states of the developed west - and increasingly among the relatively less-developed polities that comprise “the rest” of the world - the importance and survival of the written word is a persistent issue of no small concern. The inception of high modernity in the late-18th and throughout the 19th-century was a period which in Europe gave birth to principles of universal education, a print-based mass media and consequently an entity called the reading public, and when the word ‘literacy’ itself was invented (Mann, 1983: 209) in order ‘to express the achievement and possession of what were increasingly seen as general and necessary skills’ (Williams, 1989: 188). The period was also characterised by debates about the nature and dissemination of these “general and necessary skills” and attempts to estimate their sociopolitical and economic impacts.

Such debates usually broke down into the holding of one of three positions: the spread of literacy lauded as emancipatory, as represented by the convictions of John Stuart Mill when endorsing his father’s belief that

‘all would be gained if the whole population were taught to read, if all sorts of opinions were allowed to be addressed to them by word and in writing, and if by means of the suffrage they could nominate a legislature to give effect to the opinions they adopted’ (quoted in Hoyles, 1977: 28),

a view contradicted by a position most succinctly expressed in the mid-18th century by L. R. De La Chalotais, whose Essay on National Education noted ominously that

‘...even the working people want to study...and after a poor education that teaches them only to despise their fathers’ profession they turn to the cloisters
and join the clerics; they take posts as officers of the law; they often become persons harmful to society...It is recognised that under a good administration the classes of men that live on the labour of others must not be too numerous; they must be limited to the essential minimum' (cited in Cipolla, 1969: 100, emphases added).

Taking a stance at odds with these statements of exposure to and mastery of literate culture as alternatively beneficial or dangerous, the liberal middle-class Victorian social and educational reformer W. B. Hodgson concluded, in an 1867 address to the Social Science Association in Belfast, that either of these mooted outcomes were at least overdrawn. His own take on the phenomenon roundly criticised firstly "threat-to-social-order" assessments, opening by noting a widespread familiarity

'...with the statistical tables about criminals, and the proportion among them of those who can read and write well, imperfectly, or not at all. Crime, we are told, flourishes most rankly among the last, less among the second, and least among the first. What, then, is the natural inference from such statements? Of course, diminish the ignorance and you diminish the crime. But the ignorance of what? Of course, of reading and writing. Ignorance of reading and writing is productive of, or accompanied by, a great amount of crime. Knowledge of reading and writing will, therefore, diminish crime! There may be fallacies more palpable than this; there can be few more gross or serious' (Hodgson, [1867] 1986: 385).

He then weighed in against Millsian-type text-based progress-through-education arguments as basically reductionist, to the point where even

'attempts to teach science are often marred by confounding it with literary or verbal knowledge. Nature is treated on the system of the Eton Latin Grammar [...] In this aspect, how pregnant with meaning is the title, "Grammar School",...what a petrifaction is this term of the whole cast of opinion, which viewed all instruction as an affair of books and words! What a record it preserves of the habit of regarding even Science as a knowledge less of things than of what men have written about things, and of the style in which they have written![...] We, or our survivors, will then look back with a smile, not of contempt or pride, but of joy and pity, on the time when there was so great a pother about so small a matter as reading and writing' ([1867] 1986: 388, 390, 393).

Contrary to this prediction, the present century has seen an increase in, rather than a diminution of, Hodgson's 'pother': his 'survivors' and successors have moreover
wring new variants on the initial debates. Amongst 20th-century analysts, the view of literacy as necessary and emancipatory (e.g., Tuman, 1987: 138; Leake, 1987: 37; Griswold, 1987: 30-31) still contends with the reading/writing-as-harmful/exploitative position (e.g., Lévi-Strauss, 1961: 292; Lefebvre, 1971: 152; Rockhill, 1987: 157). In Appendix B, I map out the terrain of these competing ideologies with reference to and substantive variations on H. S. Bhola’s (1984) comprehensive model of literacy impacts. In the final instance, however, both sets of claims are exaggerated, and I share the assessment of critics such as Graff, skeptical towards views that ‘have assigned to literacy’s acquisition a truly daunting number of cognitive, affective, behavioural and attitudinal effects’ (1982: 13-15) or Enzensberger’s Hodgson-like evaluation, that

‘Every third inhabitant of our planet gets by without the arts of reading and writing...it could only occur to us - that is, a tiny minority of people who read and write - to consider people who are not in the habit of doing so, to be a tiny minority. This displays an ignorance which I do not find acceptable...It was the great intellectuals of the eighteenth century who...believed that the immaturity of the people was due not only to its political suppression and economic exploitation but also to ignorance. Later generations have drawn the conclusion from these premises that the ability to read and write is an essential part of a dignified human existence. In the course of time, admittedly, this influential idea was subject to a series of noteworthy reinterpretations...’ (1992: 36-37).

Some of these reinterpretations involve mere extensions of concern, prompting endorsements of reading and writing from highly-placed public figures - future English kings (Prince Charles), former US-presidential first ladies (Barbara Bush), world religious leaders (Pope John Paul II) - and large-scale commitment of symbolic and material resource to the dissemination of reading/writing skills, such as the Experimental World Literacy Program of 1975, or the UN-sponsored designation of 1990 as an International Literacy Year. Expressed negatively, the flipside of such statements and endeavours proclaimed that lack of access to - or erosion and decline in - measurable literacy skills constituted a series of “grammar panics” or regular
"crises",⁴ the net effect of which is to discount people(s) from full participation in contemporary social life. That latter phrase was equated with a series of cognitive processes peculiar to modern rational attitudes, individuality, improved health, rural innovation, educationally-based work-placement, industrialisation and techno-scientific progress, gender-equity, political and economic freedom, all variously cited as dependent on effective transmission and reception of alphanumeric abilities. Thus, viewed from this perspective, a lack or loss of these skills was and is claimed to be a form of social pathology requiring remedial treatment.⁵

Running in tandem with these themes, and taking the post-World War II era as the beginning point of an advanced or "late" modernity, a cluster of newer revisionist theoretical concerns unsettled any fixed notions of the indispensability of written matter to this same contemporaneity. A 'de-schooling movement' questioned both the efficacy and the ideology of book-learning in the schoolroom under conditions of universal and typically compulsory education (Illich, 1974; P. Goodman, 1977). At

⁴ Symptomatic of such "crises" were a bevy of works published in the 1970s and early '80s as an offshoot of concerns expressed within the fields of general (as well as socio- and psycho-) linguistics, education, semiotics, media theory and communication studies, the latter specifying a textual and/or literacy crisis as a localised instance of a more general 'crisis of culture' (Hall, 1977: 1-7; Grossberg, 1979). Typical works of this period included items with titles such as: 'Reading - is there such a thing?' (McBride, 1970); 'The death of avant-garde literature' (Fiedler, 1971); 'Is print dying?' (Bagdikian, 1971: 182-205); 'Do books matter?' (Baumfield, 1973); 'Is literacy passé?' (Ong, 1974); 'Is literacy really declining?' (Douglas, 1976); 'The death of the author' (Barthes, 1977); 'What is an author?' (Foucault, 1988 [orig. 1977]); 'After the book?' (Steiner, 1978: 186-203); 'The future of reading books' (Barzun, 1978); 'The decline of literacy' (Copperman, 1980b); 'The death of the printed word' (Evans, 1980: 103-109); and 'What future for the book?' (Leeson, 1985: 181-188). The most systematic analysis of the constituents of a "literacy crisis" remains that of Coe (1986): Wright Mills (1959: 217-18) directly weds these general concerns to his discipline in his seemingly offhand observation that '[i]t has in fact been said with authority that there is "a serious crisis in literacy" - a crisis in which social scientists are very much involved.' On sociology as itself in a condition of 'chronic crisis', the most exhaustive review remains that of Merton (in Blau, 1976: 21-52).

⁵ Significantly, this modern equation of illiteracy and illness is the obverse of the 14th-century view of Petrarch when he sees writing itself as a sick pandemic condition: 'Is it true that this disease of writing...is...incurable, and...contagious as well?...Within our memory, it was rare enough for people to write verses. But now there is no one who does not write them; few indeed write anything else. Some think that the fault, so far as our contemporaries are concerned, is largely mine. I have heard this from many, but I solemnly declare, as I hope sometime to be granted immunity from other ills of the soul - for I look for none from this - that I am now at last suddenly awakened for the first time by warning signs to a consciousness that this may perhaps be true; while intent only upon my own welfare, I may have been unwittingly injuring, at the same time, myself and others' (Francesco Petrarca, 1352, cited in Ross & McLaughlin, 1968: 120).
higher levels of abstraction and generality, the work of Marshall McLuhan (1967; 1971) proposed the actual (or imminent) death of print, the disappearance of reading and writing as a valid communicative mode in the contemporary age of the ‘global village’, and an end to the era of the “Gutenberg Galaxy” in Western history as alternative media, primarily television, antedate and supercede writing.

From a separate but related set of perspectives, the rise of new information technologies (“the IT revolution”) threw up a set of assessments initially claiming that electronic audiovisual media - principally computerization - had created a situation wherein ‘the book as we know it, and as our ancestors created and cherished it’ is doomed to ‘a slow but steady slide into oblivion’ (Evans, 1979: 105). The situation of the book-as-artefact and institutions dedicated to its preservation - “traditional” libraries, schools, publishing-houses - was effectively diagnosed as dead or dying: this led logically to a demotion of literacy (Meyrowitz, 1985: 328) and a corresponding future orientation where reading and writing ‘will become an obsolete skill’ (Comberg, in Compaine, 1983: 129). Finally, from another quarter came the notion of a shift from modernity into a putative ‘post-modern, a shift grounded in rethinking all aspects - the ‘grammatocentric’ privileging of the ‘signified’, the ‘meta-narrative’, the ‘lisible’ and the ‘author(ial)’ - at the heart of a modern literate culture now seen, from this perspective, as defunct.

The definition of reading, writing and text provided above aims at both bringing closer together and sorting out these incommensurate perspectives. It constitutes an attempt to wed the insights of a reflexive (but typically obscurantist) ‘post-structuralist’ approach to textuality with the more “traditional” empirical concerns of an un(der)developed sociology of literacy. The resultant merger - a “sociography” - is then applied to the field of war, as defined below.

1.2.2: War

War is a subset of a larger category of conflict. What distinguishes war from other forms of conflict is not the degree of violence itself, but that this violence is [i]
collective, involving two or more societal groups; [ii] organized in that the fighting involved is pre-planned, exercised within the bounds of a recognisable pattern, and terminates at an agreed cut-off point; and [iii] legitimate, insofar as hostilities are rule-bound and subject to a particular normative order. The intensity of the conflict experience under wartime conditions, for combatants and non-combatants alike, obscures the fact that resort to war rests on a base of rationality: "rationality" in the Weberian senses of both value-derived (Wertrational) and means-ends (Zweckrational) formulations and practices. War involves both the principled exertion of will and commitment to a worldview on the one hand, and the ruthless exercise of a calculative method on the other: reading/writing as both alphanumeric capacity and cultural artefact, is at once fundamental to, the visible index of, and the means of apprehending and describing, this rationality. Consequently, I argue for the prime causal influence of reading and writing in the construction and conduct of war.

This involves both a shift in conventional perspectives and a significant re-definition of terms. The initial change of focus involves a move from the biological - an inherently violent human nature responding instinctually to various ecological pressures - to the sociocultural: thus in terms of physical biology, the emphasis is.

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6 The extended operational definition adopted by the LORANOW (Long-Range Analysis of War) project is taken here as a point of departure: 'War (a "war event") is an occurrence of purposive, collective, lethal violence between two or more social groups pursuing contrasting political goals which results in fatalities, with at least one belligerent group organized under the command of authoritative leadership' (Cioffi-Revilla, 1991: 605). Also incorporated into my own definition is the CoW (Correlates of War) index of lethality, whereby 'a military conflict qualifies as a war only if it results in at least 1000 battle deaths' and a 'nation qualifies as a belligerent if it suffers at least 100 casualties' (Weede, 1984: 654).

7 This aspect is perhaps most tellingly illustrated in Coffey's finding (cited in Hardin, 1969: 268-69), that, with one exception (Paraguay, in the War of the Triple Alliance, 1865-70), no modern nation has ever continued a war past the point where five per cent of its population has been lost - a finding reiterated by Tilly (1993: 68), who, in claiming the twentieth century 'as the most bellicose in human history', still places war casualties in that 'most bellicose' period at 46 per thousand, well within the five per cent limit.

8 Such that the incidents often depicted as representative - those in art, eg, portrayed in Goya's Disasters of War lithographs, as in life ( a My Lai massacre, the Holocaust) - are so far from exemplary as to come under the heading of war crimes. That what is illegitimate and punishable is often more honoured in the breach than the observance does not negate the principle per se.
away from species-distinct innate aggressive drives (Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1979) or a 'territorial imperative' (Ardrey, 1966), and more towards Richard Dawkins' (1976; 1982) concept of the meme as a cultural analogue to the replicating gene as the biological base-unit of inheritance. As elaborated in Chapter 4, the existence of non-warring societies, however relatively few in number (Otterbein, 1989), and historical periods of peace, however qualified and of relatively short duration (Melko, 1973), is testimony against views of a humanity physiologically "hard-wired" for belligerence.

Neither, by the same logic, do purely economic factors - the forcible acquisition of resources such as land, labour, raw materials - constitute a sufficient foundational explanation for the cause(s) of war. This is not to deny that economic factors figure in the decision to initiate war, that degrees of prosperity or indigence influence the capacity to wage war, and that war outcomes alter the material circumstances of both victors and the defeated at the cessation of hostilities. But to elevate such factors to foundational status both blurs cause and effect, and ignores the fact that stated motives for going to war are so seldom based on or justified by appeals to plunder. An assertion that materially-acquisitive motives inevitably underly all such rationales implies a heavy reliance either on an overcommitment to veiled ideology and false consciousness, or the adoption of an overly cynical view of an invariant "human nature". A more germane view is provided in the analogous account of Weber in *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (trans. Parsons, 1970: 17, 20) of neither the impulsive pursuit of gain nor the acquiring of fiscal booty as inherent in the 'spirit of capitalism'. In an analogous sense, although war entails both, neither plunder nor uninhibited violence constitute the essence of war.

Coming to grips with this "essence" - the deep structure of war - is not furthered by (and reflects back on) an importation into the problem of essentialist accounts of the naturally belligerent and/or self-interested human animal: or more properly

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*An important subset of or variant on this perspective - war as a distinctly or overwhelmingly masculine activity - forms the basis of a number of studies (eg, Patton & Poole [eds], 1985; Theweleit, 1987 and 1989; McCarthy, 1994). These are retained to the degree that they involve the sociocultural construction of gender, rejected to the degree that they rest solely on testosterone-driven impulses or other forms of an exclusively male disposition towards violence.*
“animals”, since war is a group activity. A key issue for investigation is what kind of groupings are most prone to such an enterprise, and for what reason(s). I argue that the most bellicose societies, those in which war is practised most extensively and at the highest pitch of intensity, is the \textit{nation-state}.

As with reading and writing, extant social scientific approaches to war are sites of essential contestation. This field - in sociology a minor, second-order, and largely neglected subdisciplinary specialty - is characterised by a series of fundamental disagreements and misconceptions. Chief amongst these are the tendencies to identify war with unbridled violence; to cast war as a universal human constant (in its strongest form, with a root cause located in a genetic predisposition to bellicosity noted above); and to correlate diminution of war with the advance of civilization - the latter conceived of as a peaceful condition under which war represents a sporadic reversion to barbarism. The advent, refinement and spread of modernity is further associated, in such views, with a domestically-pacified and globally in(ter)dependent nation-state as the dominant political form. The structural division of states internally into civil and military sectors, and the requirements of actively cooperative coexistence within an international system of states, combine to cast the resort to offensive formal conflict as the province of rogue states typically governed by sociopathic (if not psychopathic) régimes. The control and potential end to the scourge of war depends externally on the bringing to heel of such régimes by the forceful intervention of more powerful (coalitions of) enlightened states, and the internal reconstitution of offending rogue states by democratic governments committed to co-operation and civilizational principles.

Under such conditions, as this scenario approaches actuality, the legitimate resort to formal conflict as a problem-solving mechanism is rendered less necessary: the armed forces charged with implementing this solution gradually become peacekeeping rather than warmaking entities, and societies move through demilitarization into post-military conditions as the necessity for war recedes and eventually disappears.

Opposing this general model is an alternative conception that holds \textit{the State-as-entity}, embedded in a system of states, as itself a \textit{cause of}, rather than a panacea for,
the prosecution of war. Here, the primal human condition is seen as basically pacific, a noble savagery: the foundation and development of the State - typecast as rapacious, hegemonic and competitive - disrupts this initial condition. Historically, encounters between étatist and non-state societies are characterised by violence, and in general result in overwhelmingly one-sided outcomes - the marginalisation, enslavement and/or elimination of the latter by the former. States are founded on and maintain their position of dominance militarily, by resort to war and the establishment of a permanent armed forces potential which subsequently serves as both deterrent and threat.

In this scenario, war is tied to state-interest and increases over time: either in the form of exponentially more violent head-to-head confrontation between dominant states (singly or in alliance); by ‘proxy’ wars fought by clients of such dominant states; by the jockeying for either survival or a more advantageous position within the world-system by small states emulating the pattern of bellicosity of their more powerful forerunners; or by the destabilisation of régimes deemed hostile to the political and economic interests of the dominant states.

These opposed contentions are pervasive, attract significant allegiance and are grounded in long-standing traditions within the social sciences. Supporters of the first position supply quantitative data purporting to show that in terms of intensity, extent, frequency, mobilization of manpower, and risk of dying in war, pre- or non-state societies are more bellicose than their étatist successors and neighbours (eg, Keeley, 1994; Denton, 1995). Moreover, grounding their contention in Kant's seminal 1795 essay *On Perpetual Peace*, contemporary analysts have also claimed that a permanent non-warring condition is reliant on the establishment and maintenance of particular types of political régimes - variously tagged “republican”, “liberal”, “libertarian”, “free”, and/or “democratic” - that rarely or never engage in war against each other. This central tenet attracts a remarkable degree of unanimity: Francis Fukayama has recently reiterated his earlier (1992: 263) support in the popular press when saying that ‘the correlation between the degree of consolidation of liberal democratic institutions and inter-democratic peace would seem to be one of the few non-trivial generalisations one can make about world politics’ (1998: 26).
Suganami cites, among other supporters (Babst 1972; Chan 1984; Doyle 1983, 1986; Garnham 1986; Levy 1989; Maoz & Abdolali 1989; Ray 1993; Rummel 1985; Small & Singer 1976), Russett, that this 'research result is extremely robust' to the point where when subjected to a battery of examinative techniques 'the relative rarity of conflict between democracies still holds up'; and Suganami himself notes that 'convincing counter-examples are few or perhaps non-existent' (1996: 101).

Conversely, adherents to the opposed paradigm draw from sources such as Clausewitz's famous dictum of war as politics 'by other means', Weber's core characterisation of the state as claimant to 'the legitimate monopoly of control of the means of violence', and what Victor Lee Burke refers to as the Tilly-Giddens principle, which regards 'the primacy of warlike behaviour as a central engine in the rise of the Western states' (1997: 12) - or in Tilly's own pithier assessment (cited in Karsten, 1994: 494), 'war made the State, and the State made war'. Those holding to this latter position likewise deploy a range of statistical data (eg, Sorokin, [1937] 1970; Wright, 1943 [1968]) which demonstrates a rising incidence of war through history and culminates in what urban theorist Paul Virilio (interviewed by Zurbrugg, 1996) calls a 20th-century 'slaughterhouse', the present 'century of hyper-violence'. Samuel Huntington's recent theses on an upcoming 'clash of civilizations' (1993; 1997) is heir to this tradition, and carries its predictions of civilization-bearing states in macro-level conflict into the impending millennium.

Proponents of both views therefore, while diametrically opposed as to the nature of the connection between the state and war, agree that a tie exists. I endorse this notion of a conjunction, and conceive of the state as a tripartite entity - a specific and mutually reinforcing blend of the material, the martial (warring practices that determine the state's size, shape, constitution and longevity) and the mythical (a state-ethos brought into being and sustained by an infrastructure of reading/writing and texts).

1.3: Topic Linkage: the War/Text Axis.

An assortment of literatures provide suggestive indicators as to the conjunction
between reading /writing and war contended for in this thesis. Such 'hints' include the coincidental layout of the pictures facing page 166 of the English-language Penguin paperback edition of Foucault's *Discipline and Punish* (1991), with the upper panel depicting a medal struck to commemorate "Louis XIV's first army review" in 1666, and the lower an engraving taken from an eighteenth-century handwriting manual, detailing the correct way of holding a pen and the seating posture to assume when writing; the Lévi-Straussian claim of writing going 'hand in hand with the extension of military service' (1961: 293); Quincy Wright's marginal observation that 'the *first effect* of literacy...was to make people more vulnerable to propaganda' ([1942]1965: 180-181, emphasis added); Beaumont & Edmonds stress on the historically unprecedented mid-1960's 'sense of the imminence of violence and war', brought on by 'the wars of expanding literacy, technology, ideology and population which began to burgeon in the third quarter of the present century (1974: x, emphasis added); or McLuhan's claim that the introduction of writing meant

'power and authority and control of military structures at a distance...The easier alphabet and the light, cheap, transportable papyrus together effected the transfer of power from the priestly to the military class. All this is implied in the myth about Cadmus and the dragon's teeth, including the fall of the city states, the rise of empires and military bureaucracies' (1967: 92, 93).

This is more than merely coincidental. The modern era as apogee of civilisation, particularly in its 20th century incarnation, is characterised by two features: the high significance allocated to both mass and functional literacy (and an arguably higher incidence of both than in prior historical epochs), and an increase in instances, intensity and duration of war. On another level - the metaphorical - public discourse is peppered with recurrent references to literacy "campaigns" and "strategies", "waging war" on illiteracy and ignorance (see, eg, the formats in ICAE, 1979; Bhola, 1984); efforts to 'make people literate' slip easily into allusions to armed struggle (Barnett, 1967: 15; R. Harrison, 1973: 2); and reading and writing is cast as weaponry in an intellectual arsenal, as in Hoyle's characterisation of literacy as a 'two-edged sword' (1977: 29), or Brecht's admonition to the starving (cited in Giroux, 1988: 74) to 'grab hold of the book: its a weapon'. Since the pioneering work of Lakoff (1992; 1995; Lakoff & Johnson,1996) has recast metaphor
itself as central to, rather than an 'optional extra' in, communicable cognitive processes, the possibility arises that the texture of the social (proxy) object is metaphoric in this stronger sense.

More substantively and stated at its broadest, qualitative and quantitative increases in literacy rates consistently correspond to combat-readiness and increased instances of inter and intra-state warfare, however measured: the armed forces are historically a vanguard in the identification and systematic elimination of illiteracy; strategies, tactics, logistics, and the structure and training of the armed services themselves come to be shaped and defined in documentary terms (manuals); citizenship is certified through documentation, and citizenship in extremis rests on the potential capacity to fight, kill and die for increasingly abstract national causes typically conveyed through text; military fitness of personnel at induction level comes to be assessed through testing procedures determining the alphanumerical abilities of potential recruits; morale and propaganda take on a predominantly scriptable character; the 'enemy' is objectified/dehumanised and ideologically and geographically distanced via the medium of a grammatocentric technology; and the outbreak, conduct and conclusion of war is formally mediated through the making and breaking of written declarations, protocols and conventions - treaty, alliance, truce and armistice - instantiated by entities holding a monopoly on violence (nation-states) which are themselves typically the product of archived commemoration, shifting cartographies and written constitutions.

Earlier (p. 5 above), I referred to analysts characterising literacy as a 'technology of the intellect'. The present work endorses this premise, perhaps in a more literal sense than its original exponents intended. In general technologies are either boosted by, congruent with or actually developed for application in combat: several recent communicative technologies - the electronic mass media, computerisation, informatics, 'virtual reality' - are specific examples of this tendency. My claim is that the origin and development of alphabetic writing systems are an earlier instance of the same trend.

What specifically connects reading/writing and warfare? The claim is that the evolution of both phenomena display underlying - if uneven - lines of development,
and exhibit a structural homology. To support and clarify this hypothesis, I develop a theoretical model in order to expose this structure, to capture and specify these linkages, and to track their variance over time.

This model is expressed as a cause-effect typology, joining together 7 levels or themes. Firstly, ideal-types of societies are classified according to their respective forms of [1] military organization, [2] rationale for engaging in war, and [3] combat mode - how these societies fight, and with what technologies (weaponry). Next - and centrally - I present a categorisation of [4] the predominant communicative mode of each societal type, emphasising the relevant society's engagement with technologies of reading/writing. This connects to an assessment of [5] the type and "level(s)" of literacy pertaining within the society; [6] the way in which each society is classified by others - from the outside - politically, economically and in terms of its proximity to modernity and 'civilization' on the basis of its engagement with literate culture and type(s) of literacy; and [7] how authorised knowledge is acquired and passed on in each society - where (the educational locus) and by who (the agents of transmission).

The model - and the succeeding discussion of its core components (sections 2, 4 and 5) and affiliated subsets (1, 3, 6 and 7) - is as follows:
Figure 1.1: The War/Text Axis

1. Masaic [MsC]
   Tallenic [MsC]
   Homoic [MsC]
   Ritterian [msC]
   Mortazic [mSC]
   Neferic [MSC]
   'impossible' [MSc/mSc]

2. "PRIMITIVE WAR"
   (hunting, raids, the feud)
   GRÆCO-ROMAN WAR
   (Imperialist)
   HOLY WAR
   (Crusade, Jihad)
   TOTAL WAR
   (Intra/Inter-State)
   PURE WAR
   Logistics/Simulation Thermonuclear

3. Simulation/Herioccs
   Manual’ [I]
   Heroics/Tactics
   Manual [II]
   Tactics/Strategy
   Mechanical
   Strategy/Logistics
   Explosive

4. TI ORAL CULTURE
   T2 ALPHABETIC WRITING
   SCRIBAL LITERATURE
   PRINT TECHNOLOGY
   INFORMATIC MEDIA
   Tn...

5. NON-LITERACY
   (A-modern)
   ANCIENT LITERACY
   (Protomodern)
   RESTRICTED LITERACY
   (Premodern)
   MASS LITERACY
   (Modern)
   HYPERLITERACY
   ("Post"modern)

6. SAVAGERY [-X, -Y]
   Arche-writing/the trace [Osc/OsC]
   coding I
   SLAVERY [X, Y (i)]
   Funclit I [IsC]
   coding II ----------> recoding I
   DESPOTISM/BARBARISM [X, -Y]
   Montagism [Isc/ISC]
   overcoding
   CAPITALISM [X, Y (ii)]
   Liberacy/Massolit [LSC]
   decoding ----------> recoding II
   PERMANENT REVOLUTION [-X, Y]
   Funclit II [LSc/LSc]
   deconstruction/schizoanalysis

   Polis, Agora.
   Elders.
   Tutors.
   Monastery, Academy.
   Schools.
   Terminal, Network.
   Monks/‘Wandering Scholars’.
   Program.
At the core of this typology is Archer’s (1985) appropriation of the model of structure-agency interplays (termed *morphogenesis*) first proposed by Walter Buckley in 1967. Working from within the perspective of General Systems Theory - and, in Archer’s account, in contrast with and in a form superior to Giddens’ structuration concept - Buckley ties structure/agency and builds temporality into processes of social change in the following manner:

**Figure 1.2: Morphogenesis - Basic Model**

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| STRUCTURE |
| T (time) |
| T2 | T3 |
| ACTION |
| T4 |
| STRUCTURAL ELABORATION |
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(Source: Archer, 1985: 58-88, adapted from Buckley, 1967)

Here, any given activity intervenes in a predetermined and ongoing (social) structure existing at a designated point in time (originating at a clearly or fuzzily-delineated, T1): the specified activity occurs at a later date (between T2 and T3), altering to a greater or lesser extent the overall configuration of the original structure. The interweave becomes, in and over time, the new structure, ie, T4 becomes the “new” T1.

This morphogenetic model is robust in its own right, and salient to present concerns in several respects: in the first place, it aims at specifying the exact relationship between structure and agency, and it relies strongly on social context, stressing that - although structure necessarily precedes agency - no action occurs in a vacuum; secondly, it resonates with a wide range of diverse (and sometimes opposed) bodies of theory, such that it contains echoes of (eg) Durkheim’s belief in the survival of a *conscience collective* (however obscured under conditions of organic solidarity), the constructionist approach of Actor-Network theory’s ‘bits and pieces’ in explaining social order, and Guattari’s post-structuralist idea - applied strikingly to the rise and spread of Fascism (1977: 87-98) - of ‘new’ social forms arising from the reinvigoration of the shattered remnants of former structural arrangements, laying in wait to be reworked into a new ‘machinic assemblage’; and thirdly, the very form of
the typology invites empirical testing, and calls for application to specific phenomena.¹⁰

The initial step in the building of a morphogenetically-based typology centres on the introduction of writing into - and the subsequent status acquired by grammatocentric technologies and processes within - assorted "types" of societies through time. These societal "types" are ranged along an initially unspecified time-dimension, and are classified around an axis of the modern. In the process, the Buckley/Archer model has been slightly modified in two ways - splitting the ‘action’ line (T2--->T3) in two to accomodate the historical distance between medieval and Classical eras, and extending T4 past any firmly elaborated structure to focus on both the speculative nature of the 'post'modern and the increased emphasis on future-orientation under conditions of contemporaneity. This procedure generates a 5-fold schema:

**Figure 1.3: Morphogenesis - Extended Model**

- **T₁ ORAL CULTURE**
- **T₂ NON-LITERACY (A-modern)**
- **T₂ ALPHABETIC WRITING**
  - **T₃ PRINT TECHNOLOGY**
  - **T₄ INFORMATIC MEDIA**
    - **Tₙ...**
- **T₂ SCRIBAL LITERATURE**
  - **T₃ PRINT TECHNOLOGY**
  - **T₄ INFORMATIC MEDIA**
- **T₂ ANCIENT LITERACY (Protomodern)**
- **T₂ RESTRICTED LITERACY (Premodern)**
- **T₂ MASS LITERACY (Modern)**
- **T₂ HYPERLITERACY ("Post"modem)**

¹⁰ Linked to the last point, Archer's own suggestive 'test case' of the power of the morphogenetic model is the Cuban literacy campaign of the post-Batista era beginning in the late-1950s.
This basal typology involves an evolutionary sequence, consonant with standard historical treatments of both writing (e.g., Gelb, 1952; Diringer, 1962; Jean, 1992) and warfare (e.g., Montgomery of Alamein, 1968; Keegan, 1993). It needs stressing that such a construction should not be confused with the notion of strict unilinearity; still less with an ideology of 'progress' from states of relative ignorance to states of relative enlightenment.\textsuperscript{11} The evolution displayed follows Carneiro (1975: discussion at 834-35) in showing temporal moves from both earlier to later epochs, and simplicity to complexity (in the sense of additives that peak at the point of mutation).

Each stage draws from its predecessor(s) and in the process of so doing actually (re)constructs them. It thus resembles Poster's patterning in his 'Mode of Information' theory, where stages 'may be tentatively designated as follows: face-to-face, orally mediated exchange; written exchanges mediated by print; and electronically mediated exchange... the stages are not "real", not "found" in the documents of each epoch, but imposed by the theory as a necessary step in the process of attaining knowledge. In this sense the stages are not sequential but coterminous in the present. They are not consecutive also since elements of each are at least implicit in the others' (1990: 6). It fits even more closely with a complex of what, from a Marxian perspective, Murray & Wengraf (1983: 185-188) refer to as "Historic Communications Systems" (HCS), within which one mode tends to dominate the others. Under these terms, a "communications revolution" may be viewed not as a replacement of prior forms, but a \textit{displacement of dominance}.

This point is perhaps best clarified by Bagdikian's (non-Marxist) claim that print is neither 'dead nor dying', but is rather 'being forced to make a place in the family of human communications for a new way of transferring information and emotion, the electronic reproduction of scenes and sensations. The new medium is disrupting and even revolutionary, but it leaves the alphabet and document still indispensable to the efficient use of eye and brain and to the demands of human rationality' (1971: 205). Ithiel de Sola Pool reinforces such a view in his earlier observation that

\textsuperscript{11} This resonates with Adorno's claim (cited in Shanks & Tilley, 1987: 134), that '[n]o universal history leads from savagery to civilization, but there is one that leads from the slingshot to the hydrogen bomb'.
"Modern means of communication seldom replace the previously existing means. Television has not eliminated radio; radio has not destroyed the printed book; the invention of print has not stopped us from writing letters by pen and ink; and teaching people to be literate does not make them any less inclined to converse. Each new mode of communication is superimposed on the old. It may take over certain functions, but other functions are retained by the former mode" (1966: 100).

The final step in the construction of the master typology at Figure 1.1 involves a larger leap. Extending the logic of supplementing the horizontals of morphogenesis with a series of vertical axes, the dominant HCS (historic communication system)/MoI (mode of information) of each societal "type" is conjoined with the mode of warfare undertaken by each societal "type". The adjunctive HCS/MoI and its affinal HWS (historical war system)/MoW (mode of warfare) are each accompanied by two further subsidiary levels which align the stages with the extensions of the work of exemplary theorists in the respective fields, and provide fuller details of the core elements constituting each configuration:

[1] The top line of the typology draws from Andrzejewski's classification of forms of military organization (1954: 119-23). The bracketed initials are measurable degrees of 3 factors: M/m is the military participation ratio, or percentage of a given population under arms; S/s stands for level(s) of subordination, the formal command and control structure, in each type; and C/c = the estimable degree of cohesion or solidarity between the constituent parts of the organization. Block capitals show high scores on the respective factors, lower-case letters indicate the

---

12 Thus following the conceptions of Clausewitz, in reference to 'the nature of states and societies as they are determined by their times and prevailing conditions...The semi-barbarous Tartars, the republics of antiquity, the feudal lords and trading cities of the Middle Ages, eighteenth-century kings and the rulers and peoples of the nineteenth century - all conducted war in their own particular way, using different methods and pursuing different aims [...] Our purpose was not to assign, in passing, a handful of principles of warfare to each period. We wanted to show how every age had its own kind of war, its own limiting conditions and its own peculiar preconceptions. Each period, therefore, would have held to its own theory of war, even if the urge had always and universally existed to work things out on scientific principles' (On War, VIII, 68, 586, 593; cited in Gat, 1991: 189):
opposite. The category headings represent compound words constructed from corporate military forces 'most nearly approaching the logical extreme': thus, Masaic is shorthand for the constituent features of both independently-settled east European Cossack settlements and East African Masai tribes, and the less-cohesive Tallenic the 'Tallensi tribes, the Trekboers in South Africa, and the North American frontiersmen'; Homoic warfare is characteristic of 'Sparta and some other Dorian conquest states' - and given its "ranking" (msC) is also suggestive of the idealisation of this form of fighting in the Homeric epics (consistent with the wrath - ie, insubordination - of Achilles) and war as in principle an exclusively masculine activity (instance by Spartan sex-segregated social structure and the discipline of the barracks as total institution); Ritterian and Mortazic military organization correspond to feudalism and absolute monarchies, the former typified by the German Raubritters, India's Rajput states and the Polish kingdom of the Middle Ages, the latter by 'Egypt under the early Ramesides, the Abassid Caliphate in its early days, or] Prussia before Stein'; and assorted societies, scattered across space and time but with the uniting characteristic of their status as mega-states - 'European participants in the two World Wars, the Ch'in kingdom in China, the Old Kingdom of Ancient Egypt' - engage in warfare termed Neferic (1954: 122).

The final category - the 'impossible' - occupies a particularly significant place in my own typology, and none at all in Andrzejewski's formulation. In as much as it connects to the 'post'modern - neither a generally-circulating notion in the 1950s when Andrzejewski was writing, and with the important exception of C. Wright Mills (1959), similarly not sociological currency - this is understandable. Moreover, what Mann describes as the 'dominant pacific transnational sociology' paradigm, and the relative optimism (or controlled Cold War pessimism) of the post-WW II era, declared 'hot' war virtually "impossible" between nations with the highest military capability: yet war continues. The retention of the 'impossible' category is analytically necessary, even if for no other reason than that its characteristics (MSc/mSc) are testament primarily to Andrzejewski's inability to disentangle/conceive of high degrees of subordination in the absence of cohesion. Even in a physicalist sense, this indivisibility is open to question; and under the
terms of the proxy principle, what is cohered with - the strength imparted by a fictional (or even anomic) cohesion - is a central issue, as is subordination to the unclear, unworthy, or clearly lost cause, or the demonstrably mythical institution to which the group or individual is subordinate(d).

Part [2] of the typology is a presentation of war-types stretched across an evolutionary (time-phased) grid. In need of more prefatory explanation is the accompanying sequence [3]: the top line of each pair refers to movement in the ways that wars are principally fought; the bottom to the prime technologies deployed, usually for the first time, in each warring phase. The evolving technological dimension is taken from Hogg (1968), with the chief variant consisting of the division of the 'manual' category into two phases. Of primary import is the advance in destructive capacity in every period, and the equivalent sense of distance between both combatant and weapon deployed, and combatant-weapon-target/intended victim(s). For the scheme in the top line: the category of simulation in the first instance enunciates the “ritualised gesticulation” employed in particular societies for dealing with conflict resolution aimed at preventing war, minimising both actual large-scale loss of life and the consequences of potential escalation. Through a process of retrodiction, such behaviour is re-classified by other groups - societies with writing - as “primitive war”, and analysis of the most effective fighting (proto-warring) tactics employed by the “primitives” becomes the basis for irregular, quasi-legitimate combat modes (terrorism, guerilla warfare) carried out by “non-primitive” collectivities. The shading off from these simulations into heroics is typified by the ‘duel of champions’ common to both the primal and the ancient world, enshrined in representative individual confrontations of the Iliad, the Mahabharata, the Epic of Gilgamesh or the David/Goliath episode in the Old Testament (1 Samuel ch. 17: verses 1-11, 40-54). The sequence tactics -> strategy -> logistics familiar to standard military theory (for an overview, see Gat, 1989, 1992; De Landa, 1991) also represents a series of shifts typical of other modernising processes: concrete to abstract, empirical to theoretical, specific to general. Relative to the devaluation (or ‘reining in’) of heroics, it bears similarities to Weber’s shift from charismatic to rational-legal dominance: moreover, each move broadens the scope of the number of factors needing to be taken into account in successful war-
prosecution; extends the range of participants in war well beyond those involved in actual on-ground combat; applies the insights of military theory to non-military spheres; necessitates the education of all levels of soldiery; and, as in its paired evolution-of-weaponry sequence, incorporates both extensiveness and distanciation processes while intensifying the direct impact of war on ever-larger populations. In the final stage of the sequence, the second appearance of simulation principally means five things: the recurrence (or perseverance) of quasi-wars in the "primitive" sense (displays of force as either 'stand-in' for conflict, or deterrence); 'small' or 'proxy' wars (Dunér, 1981) where the "real" belligerents operate off-stage or behind the scenes; military semiotics, dress (and dressage), technologies and language transferred to civilian contexts; the development of the Kriegsspiel (war-game) and battlefield scenario to the point where such exercises are undertaken (a) in the absence of "real" combat/"real" enemies, or (b) prior to subsequent applications; and lastly, in the general sense of 'simulation' as conceived by Baudrillard (1983) preceding or substituting for a referent in "reality".

The thinking behind the core segments [4] and [5] of the typology are outlined above: section [6] complements the relevant formations, and places them beside a particular histori(ographi)cal sequence. In the tripartite scheme, the top and bottom lines draw from Holland's reading of the typology of ideal-type social forms deployed by Deleuze & Guattari (1977: 139-262; the addition of the "permanent revolution" to the 3 original DeleuzoGuattarian categories - 'sauvages, barbares, civilises' - is Holland's own, and the intervening "slavery" designation is my further extension). The Roman numeral (I or i) represents the first appearance of the relevant phenomenon, "II" or "ii" its reappearance in a variant form. The bracketed accompaniments represent the relative distribution/concentration of political power (X or -X) and economic determinism (Y or -Y) accruing to each societal type. 'Coding', both raw and in its "de-", "re-" and "over-" refinements, refers to distorting operations carried out on a code, best thought of as a fixed symbolic order of conduct, belief and meaning, or in Massumi's more extensive definition, a 'pattern of repeated acts...A code is always of a "milieu", or relatively stable, often statistical mixing of elements...A code is the same as a "form" ' (1992: 51).
The bottom line of the sequence ties 'schizoanalysis' - a sensemaking operation of the hyperliterate condition peopled by Deleuze's 'dividuals' (1990: 3) - to Derrida's grammatology, which deals with the nature of writing itself in terms of its relationship to language and the history of thought. In his alternative 'deconstructionist' (mis?)reading of key texts valorising speech, the range of what counts as "writing" is considerably broadened to incorporate an indefinite number of physical marking systems (variously labelled 'writing before the letter', -graph, -gram, or, as in line 2 of the sixth sequence, archi-écriture ['arche-writing'], the trace) that are not only formally disconnected from but actually precede a phonic system and facilitate logical thought. My own variance with the strict terms of deconstruction have been outlined previously (in the Abstract, and on pp. 2 and 8): the rationale for serving it up "raw" here is both an instance of 'deconstructing' the deconstructionist perspective by placing it in any evolutionary sequence at all, and its particular fit in such a sequence. The timeline displayed is a Marxian theory of history, and like Deleuze & Guattari, the founder of deconstruction now claims a particular allegiance to Marx (Derrida, 1994).

The middle line of section [6] represents the dominant types, purposes and ideologies of writing in each period: Funclit relates to the application of literacy techniques by, and in the interests of, power formations. The epistemic base of Funclit in instance II is constituted by information theory and a view of reading/writing as a branch of cybernetics. Liberacy is the opposite, reading/writing acquisition as a progressive measure; negatively expressed, liberation from "ignorance" and injustice caused by or associated with illiteracy, which is categorised as a curable 'pathology'. Massolit is akin to mass literacy, the actual or desirable distribution of alphabetic skills across the majority (or ideally all) of a population; on another level, the reduction of most or all of a populace to a data set amenable to documentation (typically supplied by the populace itself) and measurement. Montagism - derived from the bookburning protagonist's name in Bradbury's novel Fahrenheit 451 - is advocacy of the devaluation, restriction or abolition of literacy and textual artefacts: the chief characteristic of those opposed to the status, dissemination and centrality of reading and writing within a particular society or Society/societies in general. Finally, section [7] specifies the prime educational locus, and identifies the chief agents of
transmission for the relevant communicative modes in each era.

What binds warfare and textuality together is more than simple coincidence, historical congruence or an elective affinity. At base, each phenomenon represents an instance of the operation of the proxy principle. As stated, in sociological terms writing is centrally about identity-formation instantiated by the production of multiple textual selves (proxies). At all levels of aggregation (micro to macro) the inability or unwillingness to produce textual selves results in a demarcation of types such that the position of the non-scriptable (oral culture, the illiterate individual) is disadvantaged relative to the lettered: inscripted (textual) selves take precedence over/determine the social conduct and treatment of physical (bodily or "skin-bounded") selves. In terms of group formation - the bundling together of individuals reaching its most advanced stage in the institution of the State - writing and the written constitute the substance of imagined communities and the processes that sustain them (invisible technologies, invented traditions and assessable futures), rendering these, in a special sense, concrete, and subject to analysis.

1.4: Reiteration

As suggested in several elements of Figure 1.1, and as will be detailed in the following chapters, this analysis combines a selective use of the very old - a suitably modified evolutionary schema - with the relatively very new - principally the re-definitions of what constitutes reading and writing in the theorising of post-structuralism. The thesis concurs with the latter in problematising the relationship between speech and text: the taken-for-granted notions that fact always and ever

13 This basic commonality has a long heritage. A study by Wiethoff exposes 'Machiavelli's debt to the classically humane ideal of the warrior-orator' (1978: 304) in the compositional aspects of his *Art of War* [1521], noting that 'Machiavelli's continual references to the close, practical relationship between words and deeds, or laws and arms, indicate his intention to give deliberative rhetorical form to the Renaissance deeds of men. Further, Machiavelli's preoccupation with martial concerns specifies his regard for the classical concept of virtue, a virtue to be found in the union of wisdom and eloquence. As his translator notes, the achievement of Machiavellian virtue in a union of political eloquence and martial wisdom "would be an exceedingly difficult and rare accomplishment unless a single style or mode of activity were common to both"' (1978: 311-12, emphasis added). The translation of spoken eloquence into written rhetoric - the union of *armas y lettras* - is registered by Machiavelli's observation in section XII of *The Prince* (translated/edited Bull, 1983: 78) that Charles, king of France, was able to conquer Italy *col gesso*, 'with a piece of chalk'.
precedes and produces fiction, talk is thought made audible, and writing simply the
spoken word made visible, are all limited (and limiting), historically/
geographically specific, and reversible in principle. Therefore, while rejecting the
deconstructionist ‘strong program’, that ‘there is nothing beyond the text’, as
overdrawn, a ‘weak(er)’ version of the premise is preserved. The corporeal “what”
lying beyond the text must be eliminated, or modified and subjugated to
grammatocentric imperatives - the fixity of meaning, standardisation, abstraction,
legibility, second-order knowledge and stratification that comes with a social order
based on writing.

War is literally the physical manifestation of such imperatives, and a special case
of conflict, distinctive in that the central element of war is not violence, but
rationality: so far is war from the mere expression of violence that several
commentators (notably Huizinga, 1972: 9-30; Stone, 1977: 77-80; Elias, in Keane,
1988: 177-98) are in agreement that the State’s monopoly of the right to wage war
involves the diminution of (non-state sanctioned) interpersonal violence and the risk
of (unauthorised/criminal) assault. The institutional locus for war is the State: the
original formation of the State is an artefact of writing conjoined with territorial
conquest and the institution of the military assembly, and the evolution/refinement
of the State-form broadly moves through 3 stages of restraints on organised violence,
limiting its exercise initially to adult males; intermediately to a specialist (semi-)
autonomous elite warrior caste; and eventually to a State-organised and controlled
military. Civilianisation, demilitarised and/or post-military societies come to be
an eventuality only in situations where civil society has been effectively “ordered” -
ie, militarised. Within this evolution lies the deeper paradox, that just as the
concept and refinement of literacy springs initially from its opposite, the
perception of and concern with a nullity, a condition of illiteracy (Williams, 1989:
188), the possibility of war rests on the presumption of peace as normative.14

14 Virilio’s (1986) concept of ‘pure war’, where under conditions of contemporaneity, war and
peace are equivalent rather than opposed terms, the recent (quasi-)official translation of
warmaking into peacekeeping activities by defence analysts (Maren, 1994), and the fourth-
century maxim of Vegetius - to ‘let him who desires peace, prepare for war’ - particularly as
recycled by deterrence theorists in a Cold War context, testify to the resilience of this theme.
To recap the core argument: the proxy principle reconstitutes the natural world as a surrogate world-as-text, and the skin-bounded self as a (multiplicity of) textual artefact(s). Through engagement in reading and writing, the self comprehends and controls - and is comprehended and controlled in - this alternative world. War is likewise the outcome of a process of 'proxification', an abstracting of the (inter)personal. This selfsame principle allows for a reconstruction of the world as war-zone, of territory as state(s), and its allied, neutral or enemy inhabitants - citizens - as soldiery, target, casualty.

The conjunction between the twinned domains and the essential paradoxes underpinning them both singly and jointly, render them amenable to sociological analysis. Formulating a sociological approach to textuality involves a methodology built up from series of particular strategies: the importation from neighbouring disciplines of perspectives valorising (or problematising) alphanumeracy as central to part or all of social life; a revisionist examination of "mainstream" sociological praxis as - and often in opposition to its own claimed mission/agenda - inherently textual; a reclamation of formerly marginalised work and a consideration of newer approaches within the discipline that see it as primarily an exegetical endeavour; and a process of bricolage aimed at bringing these disparate projects into conjunction.15

15 I use "bricolage" here in the original Lévi-Straussian sense - as "primitive" ad hoc 'make-do' procedures using extant material turned to other purposes (in opposition to purpose-built "engineering" techniques), and the extension of the concept into analysis of late-C20th subcultural "style" in Hebdige (1979: 102-06). Relative to literature I also lean on William S. Burroughs' 'cut-up' compositional method, and Birkert's description of Virginia Woolf as an archetypal 'bricoleuse' in terms of the way A Room of One's Own - and by inference all works of imaginative literature - is created, on the principle of "magpie aesthetics" (1996:13). Van Maanen brings such aesthetics back into the purview of the social sciences in seeing anthropological fieldworkers as 'notorious analytic bricoleurs, sniffing out and sifting through current theory for leads as to how fieldwork materials might be conceptualized' (1988: 66), and sociologist Paul Atkinson links the narrating practices of the ethnographer and the historian to the degree that '[t]here is an element of bricolage in both types of writing' (1990: 49). He also cites the opinion of Law & Williams (1982) that the authors of scientific papers are chiefly engaged in 'organizing bits and pieces' of a variety of textual artefacts (Atkinson, 1990: 43).
1.5: Summary of the Following Chapters.

The thesis works through these issues in the following order: Chapter 2 is a review of the sociological literature on war and reading/writing, premised on themes of neglect and resistance to both fields. It examines the turn to textuality across a broad spectrum of disciplines, and maintains that sociology, while apparently resisting any such trend, paradoxically reveals itself as intrinsically textual in all important respects. Ongoing disciplinary divides in sociology are taken as points of departure into the first, most abstract elaboration of the constituent elements of the proxy principle - 'bodies', 'bodies politic' and the 'world-as-text' - in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 sets this theory in motion: it is applied to the formulation over time of the war/text axis in 3 types of society - the "primitive", ancient and medieval: relevant sections of the master typology (Figure 1.1) ground the subsequent analysis. This practice is continued in Chapter 5, where 2 further examples of this synthesis across time and space are detailed: the proxy principle's production of a war/text axis in conditions of the modern and the 'post'-modern. The core element of Chapter 6 is an analysis of the 1991 Gulf War as both heritage and harbinger of this principle in action. Chapter 7 concludes with an overall summation and an indication of potential lines of further research.
Glossary.


pp.1-24

**Culture** is the ensemble of social processes by which meanings are produced, circulated & exchanged [1]

A **sign** is anything which produces meanings [7]. A sign's **referential function** is its ability to invoke a **content** [10]. A sign's **metalingual** function suggests the **codes** by which the sign is understood [11]. A sign's **formal** functions involve its **formal structure** and the **format** which it takes [12]

The **addresser** of a text is the position it constructs as its source: where it says it is from. The **sender** is the **actual** source. The **addressee** of a text is the position it constructs as its destination: where it says it is going. The **receiver** is the **actual** destination[13].

A sign's **expressive** function is its construction of an addresser. A sign's **conative** function is the construction of an addressee. A sign's **phatic** functions are the ways in which it constructs a **relationship** between addresser and addressee[14]. The conative, expressive and phatic functions are the sign's **functions of address** [15]. A sign's **contextual** functions indicate the **situation** in which it operates [17].

**SYNTHESIS:** Fig 1.4 The Functions of the sign [19].

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FUNCTIONS OF SIGNIFICANCE</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>referential</strong> (content)</td>
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<td><strong>metalingual</strong> (code)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>formal</strong> (form)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>expressive</strong> (addresser)</td>
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<td><strong>phatic</strong> (contact)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>conative</strong> (addressee)</td>
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<tr>
<th>FUNCTIONS OF ADDRESS</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>contextual</strong> (situation)</td>
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The **signifier** is the **sensory impression** of the sign: the mental image of marks on a page, or of sounds in the air, for example. The **signified** is the **abstract concept** the sign invokes. The **relationship** between signifier and signified, the way in which a sound impression 'points to' or invokes an abstract concept is called **signification** [27].

**parole** (or **utterance**, or **speech**): a given act or artifact of language, such as a spoken utterance, a conversation, a postcard, a novel, or a course handout; and **langue** (or **code**, or **system**, or the **language**): the system which allows such acts of parole to be produced [35].

A **syntagm** is an ordered array of signs combined according to certain rules. A **paradigm** is a set of signs, any of which are conceivably **interchangeable** within a given context [39].
A metaphor is an explicit or implicit comparison between signs [44]. A metonym is an association of terms. One sign is associated with another of which it signifies either a part, the whole, one of its functions or attributes, or a related concept. The general process of association is called metonymy [47].

The connotations of a sign (not to be confused with the conative function) are the set of its possible signifieds [57]. The denotations of a sign are the most stable and apparently verifiable of its connotations [58].

A text is a combination of signs [67]. Myths are naturalised codings of social meanings and values. The extreme effect of myth is to hide the semiotic workings of a text's codes and signs [73].

<table>
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<tr>
<th>[model of] Textual Production [76]</th>
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<tr>
<td>myth -----&gt; denotation -----&gt; codes and connotations -----&gt; signs</td>
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<th>[model of] Textual Analysis [75]</th>
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<tr>
<td>signs -----&gt; connotations and codes -----&gt; denotation -----&gt; myths</td>
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A genre is a grouping of texts which are similar in structure or subject matter [91]. Narration consists of the processes and effects of representing time in texts. A narrative is any text that functions through these processes and effects [111]... a structured sequence of events in time. Narratives are told by narrators to narratees. A narrator is the narrative's addressee. A narratee is the narrative's addressee [118]. Plot is the narrative as it is read, seen or heard from the first to the last word or image. That is, like a signifier, it is what the reader perceives. Story is the narrative in chronological order, the abstract order of events as they follow each other. That is, like a signified, story is what the reader conceives or understands [121]. Events are the basic units of a story. They constitute the paradigm choices that are combined into the narrative syntagm [122]. Closure is the restoration of narrative equilibrium [123].

An institution is a relatively stable set of social arrangements and relationships [132].
A discourse is a set of textual arrangements which organises and co-ordinates the actions, positions and identities of the people who produce it [135].
Embodiment is the learning of a set of knowledges and competences which can be habitually reproduced [136].
Realism is a mode of representation that claims to reproduce faithfully events that happen in the real world [150].
Redundancy is the repeated structuring of texts according to a set of readily identifiable social values [152].
Ideology is the process of representing material social relationships, and of attempting to reconcile them in discourse [155].
Hegemony is the social process of consensus in which power relations follow the cultural leadership of a dominant group [158].
A habitus is a lived network of objective social relationships and situations. Its effect is to produce agents with dispositions to certain practices rather than others. Dispositions are the 'second nature' one gains through habitus [187]. Capital is a social product used in social production [188].

In evaluating the evidence concerning literacy effects, it may be useful to think in terms of three different types: the cognitive effects of pure literacy (Type P), the social effects of literacy (Type S), and the instrumental effects (Type I). Type P effects result purely from the cultivation of the ability to encode and decode a language, irrespective of what language is used, of what is read during and after the acquisition of literacy, or of the uses to which the newly acquired literacy skill is put. Type S effects relate to the new definition given to the newly literate person by himself and others in his environment. These effects may relate to the realignment of status, economic and power relationships, and to the development of mutual expectations that follow once the new literate has been initiated into the magic circle of the literate and can “make the stones speak”. Type I effects are those which result from the uses to which literacy is put by those who teach literacy and those who learn to read. These instrumental effects may come from the content of the message that is taught; from the predispositions and the possibilities that literacy creates in regard to seeking and handling information; and from the participation and decision-making skills that have been learned by adult participants. [The typography above] represents, horizontally, the kinds of effect which can be used to justify literacy promotion in a society; and, vertically, the loci of such effects. Examples for some of the thirty cells of the matrix suggest themselves more easily than for others. Change in the technology of the intellect will be an example for cell 1; human rights for cell 6; scholarization of children for cell 10; abolition of class structures for cell 21; better prospects for a new international economic order for cell 26, etc. For other cells, possible and plausible effects will require research (Bhola, 1984: 22-23):
## APPENDIX B

### COGNITIVE

<table>
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<th>INDIVIDUAL</th>
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<tr>
<td>1. Change in the technology of the intellect.</td>
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<th>FAMILY</th>
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<td>7. Access to greater information and the processing of such information.</td>
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<th>COMMUNITY</th>
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<tr>
<td>13. Establishment of formal (schools) and informal (libraries, reading rooms) educational institutions.</td>
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<th>NATION</th>
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<tr>
<td>19. Rationalization; greater fund of 'symbolic skills' at the macro-societal level.</td>
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<th>WORLD COMMUNITY</th>
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<tr>
<td>25. Improved information flow; commonality and cognition throughout the global order.</td>
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### ECONOMIC

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2. Higher income, safety on the job, access to unionization in urban settings; utilization of economic institutions such as extension activities, rural banks and marketing cooperatives in rural settings.</td>
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<tr>
<th>FAMILY</th>
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<td>8. Economic survival, or at least greater economic outreach; an efficient pattern of family expenditures.</td>
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<tr>
<td>14. Establishment of formal economic apparatuses (financial institutions)</td>
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<th>NATION</th>
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<tr>
<td>20. Increased productivity; qualitative increase in human capital (potential and actual); upping of per capita income and GNP.</td>
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<th>WORLD COMMUNITY</th>
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### POLITICAL

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<td>3. Active involvement in democratic processes.</td>
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<tr>
<td>9. Rational interface between the family and the State; standardization of benefits for the family unit; improved multi-generational socialization into awareness of macro-political processes.</td>
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<td>15. Establishment of political forms of self-government, with elected membership based on non-nepotistic criteria.</td>
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<th>NATION</th>
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<tr>
<td>21. Establishment and sustenance of egalitarian and participative parliamentary institutions.</td>
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<th>WORLD COMMUNITY</th>
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<td>27. Potential political equality (non-elitist status) between nations.</td>
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### SOCIAL

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<td>10. Scholarization of children.</td>
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<th>COMMUNITY</th>
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<tr>
<td>11. Individuation and diversity of interests; a generally higher level of discourse; better communication skills.</td>
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<tr>
<th>NATION</th>
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<tr>
<td>16. Significant demographic transition through changes in fertility and mortality rates and the shift of some age groups to the city.</td>
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<tr>
<th>WORLD COMMUNITY</th>
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<td>28. Universal scholarization.</td>
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### CULTURAL

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<th>INDIVIDUAL</th>
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<td>5. Individual as 'maker of culture'; ability to codify realities as personally experienced; enjoyment of alien cultures; consciestization; emergence from culture of silence.</td>
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<tr>
<th>FAMILY</th>
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<tr>
<td>11. Individualization and diversity of interests; a generally higher level of discourse; better communication skills.</td>
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<tr>
<th>COMMUNITY</th>
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<tr>
<td>17. Possible enhancement of unique regional identity; civic pride; potential payoff in tourism due to reputation as a 'literary centre'.</td>
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<th>NATION</th>
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<td>18. Resistance to internal colonialism, exploitation, and mere neglect.</td>
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<tr>
<th>WORLD COMMUNITY</th>
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<tr>
<td>29. Higher level of global discourse.</td>
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### IDEOLOGICAL

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<th>INDIVIDUAL</th>
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<td>6. Human rights.</td>
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<tr>
<th>FAMILY</th>
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<tr>
<td>12. More equitable distribution of rights amongst family members (particularly women and children)/ anti-patriarchal.</td>
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<th>COMMUNITY</th>
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<tr>
<td>19. Establishment of formal (schools) and informal (libraries, reading rooms) educational institutions.</td>
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<th>NATION</th>
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<tr>
<td>23. Detribalization; the exchange of myth for history; acquisition of a future and with it a predisposition to plan.</td>
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<tr>
<th>WORLD COMMUNITY</th>
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<tr>
<td>30. Mass comprehension of and participation in the new international world-order.</td>
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**APPENDIX B**

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<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Individual</strong></td>
<td>Loss of the ‘art of memory’/mnemonic ability (Yates, 1966; Moulthrop, 1993).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economic</strong></td>
<td>The inner-directed man, open to “reason” via print is driven to “work longer hours and to live on lower budgets of leisure and laxity than would have been deemed possible before” (Riesman, 1964: 89).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political</strong></td>
<td>Measurable literacy abilities as mechanism of exclusion from voting rights; structural impossibility of participatory democracy.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Social</strong></td>
<td>Lukácsian reification, colonization of the lifeworld (Habermas, 1984).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cultural</strong></td>
<td>Loss of storytelling capacity; inability to codify realities as personally experienced; alienation of other human beings’ (Lévi-Strauss, 1961: 292).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ideological</strong></td>
<td>The primary function of writing... is... the enslavement of other human beings’ (Lévi-Strauss, 1961: 292).</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Family**


**Community**

- ‘De-schooling’ (Illich, 1974) needed to eliminate ‘compulsory miseducation’ (Goodman, 1977); libraries as anomic non-communal sites.

**Nation**

- “‘illiterates’ carried the burden of society’s evils... an excellent example of the individualising and totalising power of the modern state’ (Rockhill, 1987: 156).

**World Community**

- Reading and writing are creative enterprises, not the shunting of information’ (F. Smith, 1984: 5-6, emphasis added).
CHAPTER 2: REVIEW of the LITERATURE(s)

Being able to read is not a necessary part of being civilized or uncivilized, useful or useless. One can hate or kill with or without it. In fact, a nation can kill better with it - no argument for phonics or look-say


The text analogy now taken up by social scientists is, in some ways, the broadest of the recent refigurations of social theory, the most venturesome, and the least well developed. Even more than "game" or "drama","text" is a dangerously unfocused term, and its application to social action, to people's behaviour toward other people, involves a thoroughgoing conceptual wrench, a particularly outlandish bit of "seeing-as"

Clifford Geertz, 1993: 30.16

This chapter deals with leading sociological approaches to reading/writing and war, and is founded on a theme common to both object-domains: that theme is neglect. In sharp contrast to what I term the "textual turn" in other academic disciplines, each topic is generally held to have been ignored - or at least "underdeveloped" - within sociology, and regular calls for reconsideration of each as central to ongoing social processes from analysts of various theoretical persuasions are repeatedly advanced. But neither the reasons for such prior neglect (in some cases amounting to outright resistance), nor the implications of moving either subject-area from the margins to the centre of the discipline, are fully explored. Even less do standard accounts see(k) a significant linkage between the two fields beyond the commonality of neglect.

2.1 The Ever-Impending Sociology of War.

Leading sociological theorists are virtually unanimous in their judgement that on the whole, sociology has consistently and unjustifiably ignored the subject of armed forces and war (eg, Janowitz, in Giddens, 1985: 232-33; Giddens, in Hall, Held & McGrew, 1992: 56-7; Mann, 1988: 146; Stein & Russett, in Hooks & McLauchlan, 1992: 757;

16 I interpret Geertz broadly, and as meaning "game" both loosely, as in Huizinga-type ludic perspectives, or in the more formal tenets of Game Theory; and a similarly wide version of "drama" as in either Mead's developmental 'play-game-generalised other' formulation, or full-blown Symbolic Interactionism. Of central import is the suggestion that the 'long-run fates' of each approach depend on extension of their assumptions and methods into other and unfamiliar fields, utilising 'the game idea to make sense of worship, the drama idea to explicate humour, or the text idea to clarify war' (Geertz, 1993: 33).
Roxborough, 1994). Various ASA case studies of subfields within the discipline consistently show military sociology to be a lowly-ranked specialty field (Simon, 1968), often of little or no interest to sampled practitioners (Lundberg, 1932; Jones & Kronus, 1975), decreasing in prestige (Seater & Jacobson, 1976) and unrepresented in undergraduate course offerings (Simpson, 1961). Further evidence of such ongoing neglect includes Alvin Gouldner’s examination of 25 introductory textbooks in sociology published between 1945 and 1954, and his subsequent finding that in 17,000 pages of material ‘only 275 dealt with some aspect of the causes of war. “More than half the texts”, reports Professor Gouldner, “dealt with the single most important problem of the modern world in less than ten pages” ’ (cited in Bramson & Goethals, 1968: 202; the point more comprehensively endorsed by Horowitz, 1972). In 1981, Harries-Jenkins & Moskos reflected on the same situation, noting that

‘[a] survey of three issues of Sociological Abstracts in the mid-1950s...indicated that some three percent of the items included could be classified as military sociology. Kourvetaris & Dobratz show that it was not until 1961 that military sociology appeared in the table of contents of the abstracts. They further point out that the two major sociology journals - American Sociological Review and the American Journal of Sociology - have devoted little space to the sociology of the military’ (1981: 1).

and six years later, this neglect of armed forces and warfare remains an issue for Ashworth & Dandeker, who indicate that until 1985, ‘the British Sociological Association had neither formed a study group in this area, nor devoted an annual conference to it’ (1987: 16).

A variety of possible reasons are advanced for this neglect. One is the pragmatist objection that the client and funding body for such research is typically the military itself, a situation that in principle risks both “contamination” and misapplication of the resultant data. These are not entirely groundless worries given, eg, American sociology’s intimate connection with the armed services (Bowers, 1967; Dickson, 1971) and the potential threats this poses to disciplinary integrity. US Army

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Ironically, Gouldner himself is a prime instance of the practice he decries; in his own co-authored 700-page introductory textbook, the topic of war merits only three sentences (Gouldner & Gouldner, 1963).
funding for Stouffer’s multi-volume *American Soldier* study of 1949 appears to have avoided criticism on grounds of sponsorship bias, but other projects such as the USAF-commissioned Bauer/Inkeles/Kluckhohn *How the Soviet System Works* of 1956 have been criticised for precisely this reason (Bell, 1962: 337-341). As the abortive Project Camelot of the 1960s demonstrated, the issue of safeguards against breaches of objectivity was not addressed prior to and during that (particularly notorious) study. The acrimonious retrospective fallout from this case (Horowitz, 1967) suggests that a solution to the negotiation of such an ethical minefield is to simply disengage from the topic area.

This task is more easily facilitated because war is typically viewed as primarily the domain of other academic disciplines: for instance, Lang, in pointing to the paltry number of offerings in military sociology outside armed forces academies as 'symptomatic of the reluctance of sociologists to face up to the realities of the military presence', notes that 'a perusal of the headings in the *International Social Science Bibliography: Sociology* ...contains subheadings for such institutional systems as education, medicine and law but not for the military', the number of entries on this topic area being 'far larger in the political science than in sociology volumes of the bibliography' (1972: 24). Hacker & Hacker date the reason for a declining sociological interest in military studies from the 1920s: this is fuelled in part by a move away from historical and typically evolutionist explanations, and towards scientism, but is primarily symptomatic of ‘a widely felt revulsion against war’ in the wake of World War I (1987: 756).

Likewise, the preface to a special number of *Sociological Forum* given over to war and peace cites as reasons a concern to avoid being identified with Marxism or socialism; the fear that the study of conflict would be equated with approval or encouragement of violence; discouragement of research on conflict by powerful organisations; and the problematic nature of the relevant data. However, in this view, the void is probably best explained by a pervasive unwillingness within the discipline to face the existence of certain conflicts (Grimshaw, 1992: 1-5).

In Andrzejewski’s view, the impact of military organisation on society escapes social
scientific attention because most sociologists are by nature either a bookish peaceful
breed, or else, in rarer cases, 'chauvinistic and inclined to worship might', hence not
given over to critical analysis of organised violence that might 'besmirch the halo
of their idols' (1954: 1; c/f Levy, 1971: 42-43). Combining mooted personal and
professional predispositions with "regional" explanations centring on geopolitical
circumstances, German expatriate sociologist Hans Speier, later to head up the
RAND Corporation's social science division, said that America had been largely
free of invasion or occupation by enemy forces; and since war 'has been on the whole a
more remote experience to the American community than to any other big nation in
the world' (1952: 296), US sociology can hardly be expected to place war and its
aftermath high on the disciplinary agenda.

Mann's variant on this theme concentrates more on the banishment of "losers" than
the complacency of "winners", holding that social analysts giving a central place to
militarism have been on the "wrong" side in the World Wars of the twentieth
century. Thus theorists like Gumplowicz and Ratzenhofer, or Mosca and Pareto, are
seen in retrospect (rightly or wrongly) as providing an intellectual foundation for
subsequent German and Italian fascisms. The upshot of this is that

'since 1945 the militarists have been forgotten, the waverers purged of their more
violent side (e.g., Weber's _Herrschaft_ became not "domination" but "authority"
in English translation) and the classic tradition of liberal/Marxist pacific
transnational sociology has been enshrined in pedagogy' (Mann, 1988: 148).

2.2 War: Classical Approaches

Early (and primarily Anglo/French) sociology indeed posited a "modern/ pre-
modern" divide in terms of a progression from military to civil state formations. In
Comte's positivism war is a necessary feature of primitive social organisation
because 'nothing else at that early stage could develop the principal mental and
moral qualities of man' ([1876] 1974: 274), but war disappears when overtaken by a
third stage of industrialism, free organised labour and scientific progress. Spencer's
brand of Social Evolutionism blended with the _laissez-faire_ economics of the early
books of Adam Smith's 1776 _Wealth of Nations_ similarly presents a two-stage
model of progress from ‘militant’ to ‘industrial’ societies (Coser, 1971: 26, 89-127); and Tocqueville claims that with the move from aristocracy to early American-style democracy, ‘it may be admitted as a general and constant rule that among civilized nations the warlike passions will become more rare and less intense in proportion as social conditions shall become more equal’ ([1863] 1981: 541). But subsequent analysis has attacked such views on a number of fronts: Aron characterises Comte’s Law of the 3 Stages as optimistic, imprudent and essentially wrong (1968: 359-402), a flawed product of the disordered and possibly pathological state of Comte’s mind; Tocqueville’s study is both equivocal and ambiguous, able to assert that democracy ‘renders men comparatively insensible to the violent and poetical excitement of arms’ ([1863] 1981: 541), and simultaneously that ‘[n]o kind of greatness is more pleasing to the imagination of a democratic people than military greatness’ (ibid, 549); and Peel succinctly locates the problems of context-dependency and an uncritical commitment to mid-Victorian humanist values that permeate Spencer’s militant-industrial dichotomy (1971: 192-222). 18

In classical Marxism, frequency of war is generally acknowledged, only to be subsumed under the head of a symptom of broader productive processes or an aspect of exploitative class structure. Often contradictory, the most coherent statement is the metaphorical connection drawn between military and industrial organisation in the Communist Manifesto, with its bleak portrayal of ‘(m)asses of labourers, crowded into the factory, ...organised like soldiers. As privates of the industrial army they are placed under the command of a perfect hierarchy of officers and sergeants’ (Marx & Engels, [1888] 1982: 87-88). Although Engels (aka “the General”) wrote extensively and enthusiastically on military matters, notably in the Anti-Dühring

18 Revisionist approaches also suggest that neither Spencer nor Adam Smith were unreservedly convinced of the benign pacific features of the contractual commercial-liberal society. Peel sees Smith’s view of emergent capitalism as akin to Machiavelli’s ‘world of chronic political disorder and fragile sovereignties’ (1971: 193). Minowitz notes not only the survival, but also the progress and intensification of warlike tendencies under developed capitalism and highlights Smith’s own equation of the market’s “invisible hand” and advanced technology’s “invisible death” which makes war both ‘more destructive and less noble’ (1989: 311); and qualifiedly against Lang’s later assertion that ‘contrary to Spencer states do not necessarily become more “peaceful” as industry develops’ (1972: 143), Coser notes that Spencer himself, while stressing peaceful conditions between 1815 and 1850, marks the period from 1850 to 1896 as a ‘return towards the coercive discipline which pervades the whole social life when the militant type is pre-eminent’ (cited in Coser, 1971: 94 - cf Battistelli’s [1993] even stronger endorsement of Spencer’s “recantation” of his previous hypothesis in light of the Boer War).
Engels, [1894] 1975) and in encyclopaedia entries and journal articles for English and American publication (eg, Engels, [1857] 1983), Kiernan points out that by 1895 even he had ‘hugged the too hopeful thought that new weaponry was making the perils of war more incalculable than any government would dare to risk, and that the coalitions between which the continent was divided might be expected to fade away’ (Bottomore et al, 1983: 521)

Durkheim’s approach to war at the end of the nineteenth century finds him at perhaps his most Comtean. He works off the assumption that the former functions of war - in this case, the selfless exercise of ‘violent courage’ - have been superseded by a modern ‘need for qualities of a different order’, the calm and persistent detachment of ‘the scientist, the engineer, the doctor, the industrial entrepreneur’. Thus, like his 19th-century near-contemporaries, he avers that despite an artificial and ‘fetishistic’ privileging of the French military founded on a desire to avenge the national defeat of 1870, ‘there is every reason for believing that war will always exist, but that it will occupy an ever diminishing place in the life of societies...[t]he fact remains that war is increasingly destined to give ground’ (Durkheim, 1899, trans. Giddens, 1986: 211-213). The challenge to this belief occasioned by the outbreak of total war in 1914 led not to an abandonment, but a modification of both Durkheim’s optimism and his theorising on the moral bases of respective societies. His propaganda tracts from 1915 onward aim at what he terms the ‘moral sustenance’ of France and her allies, and analyse the enemy’s war aims in terms of an aberrant ‘German mentality’, a ‘will to power’ exemplified in the work of Treitschke and his representative ‘system of ideas...made for war’ (Lukes, 1977: 547-559). Yet in Durkheim’s schema, this PanGermanic ‘state-mania’ - ‘a clear-cut case of social pathology’ - is ‘never more than temporary’ precisely because of its hyperactive anti-humanism, and because in the final analysis ‘life does not allow itself to be perpetually enchained’ (Durkheim, 1916, trans. Giddens, 1986: 232-233).

For Simmel, war is also centrally a cultural expression of collective social mentalities. Like Durkheim, the occasion of the Great War affords Simmel the opportunity for meditations on the distinction between self-interest and individuation evident in periods of peace, and the near-ecstatic group solidarity
that effervesces under wartime conditions. More particularly, it similarly leads to a consideration of the differences between German collectivist sensibilities and 'the Latin mode of individuality' of 'the romance countries' (Watier, 1991: 228): But what Durkheim deplored as a 'morbid' German character, Simmel celebrated, and in 1914, 'to the surprise of many and to the disgust of some...declared himself wholeheartedly for the war' (Frisby, 1984: 33). In later commentaries, this facet of Simmel's writings is glossed over, or variously "explained" - that this tendency was evident only in the last four years of his life, that it coincides with his disillusionment in transferal from Berlin in 1914 to Strasbourg, that his 'enthusiasm waned as the war progressed' (Frisby, 1984: 33), even that technically Simmel - always a disciplinary outsider - was primarily a philosopher rather than a sociologist at this stage of his career. Watier aligns the war writings more closely to Simmel's central hypotheses, seeing them as a necessary obverse to the cynicism and nonchalance of life in a metropolitan money-based condition of modernity, a form of social life pitched at a higher level. This is rationalised by reference to the context of the times, a peculiarly German social philosophy (a Nietzschean 'politics of cultural despair') and the splitting of an analyst's life and work - invoking Simmel's own words from 1914, 'it is erroneous to relate philosophical principles to the personalities of those who hold them' (Watier, 1991: 219). The validity of such rationalisations assumes added importance when applied to the work of Max Weber, a theorist in every sense less marginal to sociology than Simmel.

2.3 Grounds for Neglect: Weber's 'Besmirched Halo'?

As Mann implies at 2.1 above, the outstanding and respectable exception to a generally rosy picture of a relatively peaceful present within the sociological tradition is Weber, and as comprehensively detailed in Hacker & Hacker (1987), the military factor as a core element in modernity constitutes a key theme in Economy and Society (1968). Spinning off his central conviction that 'military discipline gives birth to all discipline' (1968: 1155), Weber particularly stressed the part played by the armed forces and war in nation-state formation in general and capitalism in particular (1968: 980-982); the same influence at work in the organisation of civilian industry and workplace practices - shades of Marx cited
supra - so obvious that 'No special proof is necessary to show that military discipline is the ideal model for the modern capitalist factory, as it was for the ancient plantation' (1968: 1156); and that this discipline rather than weapons technology is the decisive causal factor in war outcomes (1968: 1148-1155).

Exegeses of Weber update and foreground this theme. Harries-Jenkins claims that the sociological study of the military profession and military organization is grounded in 'Weber's brilliant and penetrating analysis of military institutions' (1982: 131). Dahrendorf (1965) claims that '(m)ilitary training on the Prussian pattern might be much more useful as a preparation for industrialism than Calvinist creeds might be, even under original circumstances' (cited in Weede, 1983: 12). In the work of Goldman, Weber's religious virtuosi imbued with the calling not only take monastic asceticism into the world, but take 'holy war away from the mediaeval aristocracy and generally...off the battlefields of Europe and into the smallest activities of everyday life...they are also heirs of the warrior tradition of the aristocracy. For Weber this world-mastering, innovating power is the essence of the Occident, the key to its success and uniqueness' (Goldman, 1988: 168).

Earlier, James Aho pinpointed such a connection while remaining on the battlefield. Working within the context of the European military revolution of the 16th century, he contends that the sphere in which Protestantism as a source of inner strength is most evident is warfare. Taking his examples from the military reforms of the leading Protestant commanders - Maurice of Nassau, Gustavus Adolphus, and Oliver Cromwell - the author maintains a connection between organisational principles, strategies and technologies of the new model armies on the one hand, and an attitude of religiously-legitimated rationality towards the conduct of warfare on the other;
Weber can thus be considered among the few “classical” sociologists to accord a central place to militarism in his analysis of modernity. Elements of his conflict sociology are, moreover, in part, experientially-based, at least influenced by martial elements such as his army service (however restricted to a non-combatant role) and his involvement with the key issue of his day, the impact of the Great War and its immediate aftermath. Yet these aspects of Weber’s analysis are underplayed: my contention is that this is because, in both tone and content, and in themselves ultra-nationalist, they can be read in retrospect as something uncomfortably close to a form of proto-National Socialism.

The military factor as an intrinsic feature of Weber’s analysis and his personal life surfaces analytically in his definition of the state as controller of legitimate violence, in Arendt’s view (1970: 35-6), of ‘power’ as kin to Clausewitz’s definition of ‘war’, and, in the 1916 essay on ‘Religious Rejections of the World and their Directions’, death in war as panacea to meaningless of life in modernity. In his writing style too, a fondness for military metaphors: in outlining Germany’s contemptible international reputation in 1906,

‘Weber knew where the responsibility lay: not only with the Kaiser “who was dealing with politics from the point of view of a young lieutenant”, but with the whole system of sham-constitutionalism and with the Conservative Party, which prevented its change. “The dynasty of the Hohenzollern” he wrote again to Naumann on November 18, 1908, knows only the corporal’s form of power: to command, to obey, to stand to attention, to boast” ’ (Kohn, 1969: 279)

19 Aho also notes the central part played in this military revolution by literature and literacy: the Bible, re-interpreting traditional Christian pacifism to as a duty to kill in time of war, and the distribution of Prayer Books and the institution of compulsory public worship amongst all levels of the soldiery; the spread and influence of Machiavelli’s The Prince on political and military thinking across Protestant Europe; the revival/reprinting of leading Roman military strategists, these constituting the basis of the ‘library of the typical well-read Elizabethan gentleman-warrior’ (1979: 111); and finally, absorption and application of these texts leading to a restructuring of Protestant military machines - Maurice’s redesign of the Dutch armed forces and the establishment of the first modern military academy (1617), the ‘Swedish Discipline’ of Gustavus Adolphus, and Cromwell’s New Model armies.
Further marginal evidence for a prosecution case is the thorny issue of “guilt by association”, as in Mommsen’s (1989) discussion of the ‘perverted’ pickup of Weber’s theories by Michels in Mussolini’s Italy, Schmitt, Freyer and Müller-Armack in Hitler’s Germany. Even more circumstantially (and retrospectively), the notorious 1895 inaugural address at Freiburg (Mitzman, 1970: 136-144) is eerily similar in tone and content to Heidegger’s later Rektoratsrede as rector of Freiburg in 1933 (Farias, 1989; Wolin, 1991; and the symposium in Critical Enquiry, (1989) 15 [2]). Given that Weber’s views in the Address are [a] consistent, and [b] expressed towards the end of his life and career, they cannot be ignored or marginalised as readily as, eg, Habermas’ boyhood involvement with the Hitler Youth (Habermas, 1992: 77-94), an early episode discounted by that writer’s later works. For the defence, Raymond Aron does not wish to minimise Weber’s nationalism, though this term usually denotes attitudes very different from his. Nothing in his writings would offend or wound a foreigner’ (1957: 88), and Gerth & Mills concur, maintaining that

‘It is, of course, quite vain to speculate whether Weber with his Machiavellian attitude might ever have turned Nazi. To be sure, his philosophy of charisma - his skepticism and his pragmatic view of democratic sentiment - might have given him such affinities. but his humanism, his love for the underdog, his hatred of sham and lies, and his unceasing campaign against racism and anti-Semitic demagoguery would have made him at least as sharp a “critic”, if not a sharper one, of Hitler than his brother Alfred has been’ (Gerth & Mills, [1952]1977: 43).

But - and relative to Aron’s judgement - in Weber’s own words from 1917: ‘Germany fights for her life against an army in which Africans, Ghurkas and all kinds of other barbarians from the most forsaken corners of the world stand poised at the frontiers ready to devastate our country’ (1968: 1382, emphasis added). An aberration attributable to the desperate exigencies of war? Possibly: but in Iggers’ estimation, and in peacetime, for Weber,

‘[t]he economic developments in East Elbia and the replacement of the German peasant by the Polish farm labourer were part of the age-old struggle between races and nationalities for existence and elbow room...What mattered in this struggle, Weber holds, is not “peace and human happiness”, but the “eternal struggle for the preservation and upward selective breeding [Emporzüchtung] of our national kind [Art]”. In the tradition of German Idealism, Weber condemns a
utilitarian [eudämonistisch ] ethics which places welfare over the fulfilment of a
higher ideal by man. "We want to improve by breeding [emporzichten ] not man's
well-being but those characteristics with which we associate the feeling that
they constitute human greatness and the nobility of our nature" ' (Iggers, 1968: 169,
emphasis in the original).

This tallies with the views initially forwarded by Guenther Roth's 1965 essay, and
later reinforced, that 'he [Weber] favoured policies of ethnic exclusion that are
again very much at issue today' (1993: 148); and, while defending Weber against
Abraham's (1993) charges of anti-semitism, Roth provides evidence of his ongoing
and pronounced anti-Polish sentiments:

'In a speech in Heidelberg on January 2, 1919, he is reported to have exclaimed:
"When you have reached the point where you have decided not to make any grand
speeches but silently see to it that the first Polish official who dares enter Danzig
is hit by a bullet - when you have decided to take the course that will then be
inevitable - then I am at your disposal, then come to see me!"...Passages such as
these worried the American publisher Helen Wolff and the translator Ralph
Manheim, when the English version of Karl Jaspers' 1932 Weber essay was
prepared. The upshot was an "ethnically cleansed" version that dropped several
offensive quotations' (Roth, 1993: 160).

There is, further and following Gerth & Mills (above) Weber's particular definition
of "democracy" as expressed in Marianne Weber's report of the debate with

LUDENDORFF: Then, what do you mean by democracy?
WEBER: In a democracy the people choose a leader in whom they trust. Then the
chosen leader says, 'Now shut up and obey me.' People and party are then no longer
free to interfere in his business.
LUDENDORFF: I could like such democracy.
WEBER: Later the people can sit in judgement. If the leader has made mistakes - to
the gallows with him!

and in another version of "democracy", as expressed in an essay on the 1905
revolution in Russia :

'it is highly ridiculous to ascribe to advanced capitalism, as it is now being
imported into Russia and as it exists in America...any real affinity for democracy
or even with freedom... We individualists and partisans of democratic institutions are against the stream of material events [...] "Correct" Social Democracy drills the masses in the mental goose-step and directs them towards a paradise in this world instead of towards an otherworldly one... it makes a sort of social vaccine that serves the interests of the existing social order' (cited in Moore, 1958: 119-120. An alternative [and noticeably "cleansed"] translation of these passages are accessible in Weber, 1997: 109, 110).

Then there is the issue of Weber's relationship to the man so worrying to Durkheim (above): Treitschke. Weber is cited by Dorpalen (1957: 294-295) as a follower of Treitschke and a mentor of Naumann (who in turn was a significant influence on Heidegger (Heidegger, 1976; Pöggeler, 1988: 210). Weber's criticisms of Treitschke are [a] of Treitschke's style and personality, not the content of his ultra Pan-Germanism; and [b] further qualified in that they lay fault for inadequate reception of Treitschke's oratorical message on his listeners. As Kohn points out (1969: 278), in 1887 'Weber defended Treitschke by putting part of the blame on his [ie, Weber's] fellow students' when asserting that there was a

‘truly idealist element in this man so unfortunate in many respects, in spite of his crude errors and injustices. The evil effects of his lecturing are primarily due to the lack of character of his audience. It is the same thing as with Bismarck: if the nation knew how to treat the latter and how to utilise him, remaining firm at the right moment and giving him its confidence where he deserves it, the often devastating effects of his personal politics could not have assumed such proportions' (Weber, cited in Dorpalen 1957: 239, emphasis added).

In 1944, Mayer portrayed Weber as 'the Machiavelli of the age of steel', and Iggers (1968) maintains that Weber is in part 'a Machiavellian figure, more extreme than Treitschke and Droysen in reducing all politics to the power interests of the state' (1968: 171, emphasis added). As a final insight, Mitzman (1970: 224) transcribes part of a 'letter of 1914 condoling his sister Lilli on the loss of her husband at the front' which shows a 'total abandonment of his usual (after 1900) insistence on an ethic of responsibility rather than immediate, experiential gratification:

For whatever the outcome may be, this war is really great and wonderful beyond all expectation. Not the successes but the spirit of the soldiers that one could see here, (and daily in the infirmary), exceeds all expectations, and here at least,
also the spirit of the populace, taken all in all. I would never have hoped for that, and whatever else may come, it will be unforgettable.'

2.4 Preserving the 'Pacific Tradition' in Mainstream Perspectives.

Yet despite these important exceptions, critiques and qualifications, the founding fathers’ overriding faith in the capacity of modern industrial societies to achieve a permanent global peace - even when interpreted as more honoured in the breach than the observance - is echoed and retained in the assertions of a majority of their 20th-century intellectual heirs. Dandeker accounts for this by detailing the discipline’s overreliance on two dominant schools of thought. The first is a set of functionalist industrial society postulates where ‘peaceful activities of production and exchange supplant warfare as the dominant social activities’ (1990: 30) This is most typically expressed in Davis & Moore’s seminal exposition (1945) of the functional theory of stratification, wherein the ‘presence or absence of open conflict with other societies, of free trade relations or cultural diffusion, all influence the class structure to some extent. A chronic state of warfare tends to place emphasis upon the military functions...Free trade, on the other hand, strengthens the hand of the trader at the expense of the warrior and priest’ (cited in Bendix & Lipset, 1970: 52)

The second major paradigm is Marxist social theory (eg, Anderson, 1974: 30-33), which posits the view that the classless society ‘would remove the socio-economic basis of war and military organization and would preface a peaceful confederation of socialist states’ (Dandeker, 1990: 30). He argues that the pre-eminence of these two branches of theory have seriously limited sociology’s analytical reach, and suggests as a corrective reconsidering the works of a “neo-Machiavellian” tradition represented by writers such as Mosca, Michels and Weber (Dandeker, 1990: 29-36; Ashworth & Dandeker, 1987).

The implications of Dandeker’s “cure” are open to debate, but examples of his diagnosis are readily available: Scruton’s ‘Notes towards a Sociology of War’ centrally concludes that ‘states governed according to principles of free association, market economy and a rule of law are inherently more peaceful members of the community of nations’ (1987: 305, emphasis added); Calhoun’s paper on the
infrastructure of modernity notes that in the early modern period, 'commerce began to compete with and then surpass warfare as the occasion for international communication' (1987: 21); and Fukuyama (cited in Mestrovic, 1993: 38) asserts that the 'fundamentally unwarlike character of liberal societies is evident in the extraordinarily peaceful relations they maintain among one another'. Risk Society perspectives, as propounded by Beck or Luhmann, and a related reflexive modernity position (eg, Lash, 1993; Lash & Urry, 1994) usually ignore war or, as in Giddens, stress contemporary 'demilitarisation' or conditions pertaining to '80s/90s 'post-military' societies (Shaw, 1989). In a smaller-scale instance, when the BSA's journal Sociology devoted considerable space to Graham Crow's paper on 'The Use of the Concept of "Strategy" in Recent Sociological Literature' (1989), in subsequent responses Shaw took Crow - and by implication, sociology generally - to task, in that this wordplay with "strategy" tended to 'ignore the military origins of strategic thinking...more attention needs to be given to its diffusion from military to general social usage, as well as to specifically sociological uses' (1990: 465). Knights & Morgan also point to this 'surprising omission' in Crow's argument, that he 'fails to discuss developments in military and business thinking. In these areas, the concept of strategy does not have to be imputed to actors; on the contrary, it is part of their everyday language and serves to structure relations...[it] was in the military field that the concept of strategy was first elaborated' (1990: 477). Knights & Morgan embellish this theme with a skeletal survey of the spread of the concept into corporate managerial, academic, and political enterprises: but this remains as an opportunity not taken. The prevailing view continues, to find perhaps its strongest contemporary expression in the "civilising process" thesis of Norbert Elias:

'It is often forgotten that never before in the development of humankind have so many millions of people lived together so peacefully - that is, with the considerable elimination of physical violence - as in the large states and cities of our time. This becomes evident only when one realises how much more violent and how much higher in risk of physical attacks were the earlier epochs of human development' (Elias, cited in Keane, 1988: 178).

2.5 Alternatives: Spoiling the Orthodoxy

On the surface, and in the light of claims that 'only Republican Rome has ever
equalled the extent to which 20th-century societies have, on occasion, mobilised for military purposes' (Mann, 1985: 240-241), such ‘orthodox’ views seem at best problematic, at worst ludicrous. Further support for the alternative case comes from Sorokin’s ([1937]1970) earlier analysis of 967 wars and 1, 615 internal disturbances of the last 2500 years, and his finding that ‘the bloodiest period in all history was the first quarter of the present century - an analysis made before 1939. The average man of the thirteenth century had 6,500 more chances of dying peacefully in bed than his descendant of the twentieth’ (Kaempfert, 1941: 442). For Collins, too, war moves along a continuum of increasing frequency and heightened violence, from the relatively low-level ‘ferocity’ of “primitive” conflict to the ‘cruelty’ of “iron age agrarian” societies, and culminates in the bureaucratised ‘callousness’ of modern industrial states that increases the prevalence of warfare by reducing the designated enemy to an abstraction (1974; c/f Keen, 1991: 72-88). Elliott-Bateman (1970:127) supports his general conclusion that ‘the conduct of war as a means of political endeavour is becoming increasingly absurd, brutal and inhumane’ by providing some disconcerting figures:

‘s since there have only been 230 years of complete peace in the known world during the 3,466 years since 1496 B.C. war does seem to have some normal permanence in human political experience... the First World War resulted in some 9.7 million deaths, most of them servicemen and auxiliaries, while the Second World War caused 54.8 million deaths of which the great majority were civilians’.

This issue of increasingly skewed combatant/civilian casualty ratios is given fuller treatment in Gil Elliott’s Twentieth Century Book of the Dead (1972) and is corroborated in Ihde’s observation that ‘[b]y the end of World War II it had become very difficult to separate military from civilian casualties - the fire bombing of Dresden, followed by the atomic destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in no way distinguished between military and civilian targets’ (1993: 136). On Born’s figures, as cited in Galtung (1980: 9), by the time of the Korean War of the early 1950’s, armed forces deaths are down to only 16% of the official body count. Similarly and summarily, Craig & Egan note that in the First World War, ‘5 per cent of the fatal casualties were civilian; in the second, 44 per cent; in the Korean war, 88 per cent; and in the war in Vietnam, 91 per cent’ (cited in Goebel & Nelson, 1988: 140).
In economic terms, Verona (in Galtung, 1980: 8-9) analysed post-WWII global military expenditure in constant US dollars between the late ‘40s and the early ‘70s, and found a fourfold increase - from $51.4 billion in 1948 to $200 billion in 1971 - within this 22-year period. This may be usefully compared with the analysis of Smith & Smith (1983: 22), who utilise SIPRI figures to show that in 1981, world military expenditure stood at somewhere between $600-650 billion - relative to Verona’s data, a threefold expenditure increase in half the time.

In terms of the number of wars fought since 1945, Istvan Kende (Galtung, 1980: 7-8) estimates 97 local conflicts formally played out to 1969; and this tally is brought up to date by Brogan’s list (1992: 622-625) of a further 70 wars occurring between 1970 and 1992. Tilly’s 1992 analysis, characterising the twentieth century as having ‘already established itself as the most bellicose in human history’, supplies corroborating data:

‘Since 1900, by one careful count, the world has seen 237 new wars - civil and international - whose battles have killed at least 1,000 persons per year; through the year 2000, the grim numbers extrapolate to about 275 wars and 115 million deaths in battle. Civilian deaths could easily equal that total. The bloody nineteenth century brought only 205 such wars and 8 million dead, the warlike eighteenth century a mere 68 wars with 4 million killed... These numbers translate into death rates per thousand population of about 5 for the eighteenth century, 6 for the nineteenth century, and 46 - eight or nine times as high - for the twentieth. From 1480 to 1800, a significant new international conflict started somewhere every two or three years, from 1800 to 1944 every one or two years, since World War II every fourteen months or so... The nuclear age has not slowed the centuries-old trend toward more frequent, deadlier wars’ (1992: 67).

Tying these strands together, Toffler & Toffler (1993: 13-14) cite between 150 to 160 post-1945 wars and civil conflicts (‘depending on how we count’) claiming 30 to 40 million casualties of whom 7,200,000 were combatants, and further assert that ‘in the 2,340 weeks that passed between 1945 and 1990, the earth enjoyed a grand total of only three that were truly war-free’. Finally, a recent World Priorities Inc. report claims that although worldwide military expenditure had shown a 5-year decline
to 1992 - a factor attributed to severe cuts in Russian spending - the US defence budget had reached an unprecedented $715 billion in 1987; and a record 29 major wars causing 6 million deaths (the highest tolls in 17 years) were being waged in 1992 (cited in the Australian, Armistice Day, 11/11/'93: 8).

This evidence of increasing warfare under contemporary conditions is problematic but weighty. One difficulty with the sociological perspectives reviewed here is that they've not taken such evidence into account, preferring instead to rest somewhat magisterially on a myopic presumption of extant or imminent "peaceful conditions". This ceding of war as a topic to other disciplines is mirrored in sociology's antipathy to text-based approaches currently evident in alternative academic fields. I review this trend below; then outline the form of the sociological resistance, and conclude with an indication as to why a text-based approach (a sociography) may be considered central to the discipline.

2.6. The Textual Turn.

A recent tendency across a wide range of academic disciplines has been to look more closely at the part that reading/writing processes play, both in their own constitution and the accreditation, methods and reputations of their practitioners, and in some cases, to recast their endeavours as a form of writing in toto. This is most evident in fields like Education, which has always been founded on a commitment to reading and writing practices - in folk terms, two of the "3 Rs", and recently reassessed as central by Whitherill & Noddings in their characterisation of education as permeated by narrative, an ongoing Stories Lives Tell (1991) - or Comparative Literature and English, although significantly the latter now focusses more directly on both cultural studies (Milner, 1996) and reflexive 'metafictions' (Ommundsen, 1993).

But this textual turn also feeds into other disciplines seemingly unconnected with or only tangentially connected to narrativity: for instance, in Archaeology, extending Gelb's conclusion 'that writing is of such importance that civilization cannot exist without it, and conversely, that writing cannot exist except in a civilization' (cited
in Daniel, 1971: 31), Shanks & Tilley centre their overview on the way their
discipline 'is a signifying practice, expressive and transformative. The past is
written. Past and present are mediated in the archaeological text', and the under-
recognition of this factor leads to their regenerative call for '[w]hat is needed...an
archaeological topology, a rhetoric; an archaeological tropology, a stylistics; [and] an archaeological poetics concerned with how the archaeological past may be
and Shapiro (1984; 1988) in Political Science suggests that the field of international
relations can more usefully be mediated by concurrent or alternative studies of
intertextual relations (1989). Psychology (Greenfield, 1972; Bruner, 1988; Carothers,
1959; Freud's 1925 essay on the 'mystic writing pad' as a foundational concept in
psychoanalysis [Wilden, 1984: 395-400]; or Lacan's emblematic 'A certificate tells
me I was born. I repudiate that certificate. For I am not a poet but a poem. A poem
that is being written, even if it looks like a subject', cited in Ragland-Sullivan, 1990:
41), Philosophy (Dettering, 1955; Morrison, 1987; Derrida's grammatology of 1976; or
Popper's thought experiments of 1972), and Economics (Innis, 1950, 1951; Myrdal,
1968: 1651-1828; Cipolla, 1969; Boje, 1991; Nosanchuk & Erickson's correlation of
literacy and GNP per capita [1985: 224-28, 241-43], or the claim advanced by
Bowman & Anderson in 1963 that a necessary precondition for economic "take-off" in
LDCs/Third World states is a literacy rate of 40%) have to varying degrees cast
alphanumeracy and orthography as a necessary and sometimes sufficient condition
for higher levels of cognitive performance, formal reasoning processes, or European
and European-style societal development.

Considering the genesis of Accounting as a profession and summarising an earlier
(1986) paper, Hoskin & MacVe draw on a Foucauldian perspective in order

'(1) to show how the late medieval development of accounting technologies,
including double-entry, grew out of important advances in the technology of
writing - the new disciplinary techniques for gridding texts and retrieving
information - plus the use of the formal examination, that were first
developed in the medieval universities: and (2) to explain the nineteenth-
century expansion of a discourse of accounting and accountability in terms of
examatorial innovations in higher education, viz, the introduction of
written examinations and mathematical marking systems at the beginning of
that century (Hoskin & MacVe, 1988: 37, emphasis in the original).

In Geography, as Goldberg emphasises (1990: 67, 102, 138, 155-56, 205, 219-20), the chief cartographers of the 16th-century, Gerardus Mercator and Jodocus Hondius, were also authors of key calligraphic manuals, Mercator’s Literarum Latinarum of 1540 and Hondius’ 1594 Theatrum Artis Scribendi; and latterly, there is new attention paid to mapmaking as political (eg the Peters Projection, NI, 1989) and perceptual process (Gould & White, 1974) as well as the distinction between physical terrain and its printed representation, caught in the postmodern “map is not the territory” formula and its implications in Roberts (1987: 71-83) or the Baudrillardian thesis of simulacra-precession, where the map is antecedent to the territory (1983: 1-4) - and as their names signify, both geography and its subfield cartography are inherently written-representational subjects.

The same is true for the subfield of historiography in History, where the ongoing work of Hayden White (1973; 1978; 1987) lifts discourse and narratology into the domain of the study of historical epochs in a more essentialist fashion. The Goncourt brothers previously maintained that generically ‘history is a novel which happened’ (cited by Lodge, in Atkinson, 1990: 35), and as referents to more specific periods, historians have specified the utilisation of an alphabetic script as in large part explaining the prominence of Graeco-Roman institutions in the ancient world (Castle, 1964; Havelock, 1980; Harris, 1989), and the emergence and diffusion of print technology as fundamental to the advent of both the Renaissance and the Protestant Reformation (Eisenstein, 1968: 45; 1969; Butler, 1968: xv; Goodman, in Mayor & Pugh, 1987: 401): empirically too, exegetical sociohistorical studies at the level of official vs. individual archives (eg Ginzburg, 1981; Foucault, 1975), the regional community as revealed in different types of transcribed register (eg Le Roy Ladurie, 1978; Duden, 1987) or the national literary habitus of State and citizenry in particular periods (eg ancien régime and [post-] revolutionary France in Darnton, 1982; 1991, Mann, 1993: 187-97, or Furet & Ozouf, 1982) treat written discourses as more than variably reliable data-sets, as constitutive of both subject-matter and the historical approach to its depiction: as expressed by Chartier,
'one of the effects of a renewed interest in texts was to return the disciplines of erudition to the central role they once played. Long relegated to the level of ancillary sciences, these technical skills, which propose rigorous and formalised descriptions of objects and forms, became (or became again) essential once documents were no longer considered solely for the information they furnish but were also studied in themselves for their discursive and material organization, their conditions of production, and their strategic utilisation' (1997: 6).

In Architecture, the evaluation and analysis of Peter Eisenman's groundbreaking Wexner Center in Ohio (Transition, 1988, especially Brenda Marshall’s contribution at pp 5-12) was as concerned with the archi(text)ural as much as the concrete form/formal design components of this and other of Eisenman’s structures; at considerably lower levels of generality, abstraction and disciplinarity, the Readers Digest quotes G. K. Chesterton's opinion of architecture as ‘the alphabet of giants...the largest set of symbols ever made to meet the eyes of man’ (1997: 125) and in the architectural entry in the ...for Beginners series, the first page cites Hitler’s assessment of architecture as creating ‘documents in stone’.

Dealing with the concept of consent at Law, Scarry (1990), in considering Cardozo’s decision in the 1914 case of Schloendorff vs Society of New York Hospital notes that the ‘canonical statement’ in the judge’s decision not only sets a precedent in everyday courtroom practice, but that - as with all precedent, whether persuasive or formally binding - it moves into ‘classroom practice as well’: itself built on earlier recorded case law, it becomes pedagogical, ‘so those designing classroom texts further underscore Judge Cardozo’s own act of underscoring, and this becomes part of the education of every young law student reading that text’ (1990: 869). More generally and extra-legally Illich & Sanders note the medieval jurisprudential shift, which they date from the Lex Ribuaria of 803, in the swearing of oaths by litigants and witnesses alike - from the validity of testimony sworn on the holy relic, the sword, or parts of the body, to the veracity of statements sworn on the book, the Gospels, which continues to the present (1988: 31-36).

Turning to the physical sciences, one encounters De Certeau’s consideration of authoritative language shifting gradually from something spoken to something
materially fabricated (written), illustrated by the example of Condillac, for whom ‘constructing a science and constructing a language amount to the same task, just as for the revolutionaries of 1790 establishing the revolution required the creation and imposition of a national French language’ (1984: 138); Bacon’s assessment in Aphorism 129 of the 17th-century *Novum Organum*, of printing as, along with gunpowder and the compass, comprising a trinity of world-changing inventions; the less serious but no less instructive claim of Galileo Galilei (1564-1642) that within the scientific community ‘[i]n many quarters, people are more ready to yield to dead writing than living speech, for the former permits them to agree or dissent without blushing’; and Popper’s notion that ‘science is a branch of literature’ (cited in Olson, 1977: 270 - in chapter 2 of their *Laboratory Life* [1986: 43-104], Latour & Woolgar, drawing on a conception of literary inscription taken from Derrida, "concretize" this observation, showing the extent to which the construction of scientific fact and the day-to-day operations of the laboratory depend on the interface [in-house/ outside world] between "on-the-spot" and "on-the-run" referencing of prior written findings and the note-taking by members of the lab staff at each step in the designated activity, and the writing up of the results leading, not invariably but usually, to dissemination through publication). A similar approach produces fine-grained studies of the part played by rhetoric and genre in the construction and reception of medical discourses (Gusfield, 1976; Berg & Bowker, 1997), physics as a project of active reading by practitioners (Bazerman, 1988: 235-53), and especially biology, not only in terms of the knowledge claims of its publications (Lowood & Rider, 1994), but in equations between life and literature exemplified by the following review:

‘its often said that the DNA of our cells comprises a message, written in a "genetic code" or "language of the genes". Via a dizzying chemical virtuosity, its four-letter alphabet and three-letter words construct our tissues. Each of us is "written" into existence, with a specific, rich cultural environment, from a single recipe of 3 billion letters, or 100,000 genes. The Human Genome project will have transliterated a standard version of this document by 2006. So if we are all DNA texts, might molecular biologists and neuroscientists be best advised to move their labs to the English Department? Robert Pollack, a specialist in the SV40 virus, says science has much to learn from current literary theory [although its] unlikely he’d go as far as de Man in destabilising the text...’ (Broderick, 1994: 21).
Finally, if the following statement, which casts writing as the key to distinguishing biology from history, anthropology and sociology, is viable, then Sociology could be expected to share in and welcome the textual turn—because

'Looked at in the perspective of time, man's biological evolution shades into prehistory when he becomes a language-using animal; add writing, and history proper begins. Looked at in a temporal perspective, man as animal is studied is studied primarily by the zoologist, man as talking animal primarily by the anthropologist, and man as talking and writing animal primarily by the sociologist...To the extent that a significant quantity of written records are available, the prehistorian yields to the historian; and to the extent that alphabetical writing and popular literacy imply new modes of social organization and transmission, the anthropologist tends to yield to the sociologist'(Goody & Watt,[1963]1981: 27).

2.7: The Sociological Resistance to Text

For most of its relatively brief history as a formal academic subject, sociology has either ignored or been openly hostile to this mooted ceding of specifically literate populations as its special province. Such antipathy rests on several bases and expresses itself in a variety of ways: the notion of literature as a reflection of, rather than coextensive with or foundational to, an amenable-to-study society; a methodological commitment to observation, quantification, and/or forms of talk as legitimate data sources; theory expressed through the semiotics of the typology; and an ideology favouring a particular view of science, perhaps best expressed by John von Neumann's statement that the 'sciences do not try to explain, they hardly even try to interpret, they mainly make models. By a model is meant a mathematical construct which, with the addition of certain verbal interpretations, describes observed phenomena' (cited in Gleick, 1989: 27, emphasis - stressing words as an adjunct to numbers - added).

Evidence of this resistance is found in the statements of many of its leading analysts, and the sorts of rationale underlying this opposition says much about the way sociology "sees itself" as a particular kind of intellectual enterprise. Thus, for Merton (1968: 69-70; 1982: 105) and Homans (1947: 14), if sociologists write lucidly or vividly and to be generally understood, they are simply not 'doing science': Bourdieu
takes this one step further in his own practice, making sure his texts 'are full of indications meant to stop the reader deforming and simplifying things...In any case, what is certain is that I am not out to make my writing clear and simple and that I consider the strategy of abandoning the rigour of technical vocabulary in favour of an easy and readable style to be dangerous' (1990: 54).

For Queen (1942: 1, 10 [PA]) or Mayo (1945: 20-21) library research is part of 'the mechanism of the sociological flight from reality', producing students who lack experimental skills, apply 'long unusual names to events capable of simple description', and who in the end are only capable of writing 'books about each other's books'. Rossi may be read as ironically or backhandedly mitigating this pessimism and the peril it represents to the discipline as a whole, because in sociology '[a]fter all, an article in a major professional journal, or a monograph, has little consequence except on the career of the writer' (1980: 896 [PA]), but Goffman picks up on the theme when he criticises his own major work, Frame Analysis, as 'too bookish, too general, too removed from fieldwork to have a good chance of being anything more than another mentalistic adumbration' (1974: 13)21, and his own wariness of coining unavoidable neologisms here is echoed more generally by Blalock's warning that sociologists 'can ill afford to go off in our own directions, changing our vocabulary whenever we see fit' (1979: 893 [PA]).

Stinchcombe bemoans the high prestige accorded to the sociologist who studies 'abstractions of people', who 'gets his or her facts from the books rather than the people' (1984: 51-2), and offers as an example of what he attacks the fact that the founding fathers of symbolic interactionism relied hardly at all on empirical methods: 'George Herbert Mead did no fieldwork, as far as I know, and Herbert Blumer published very little of his' (1984: 59). Identical criticisms are made of other

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20 I am indebted to my friend and colleague Bob White for drawing my attention to the fact that this and several of the following citations - those labelled '[PA]' - gain added force and prestige by virtue of the fact that they are presented as portions of ASA (American Sociological Association) Presidential Addresses.

21 Beyond this self-criticism, at least one commentator holds Goffman's prose responsible for a certain reticence within the discipline to assess his works on their own substantive merits: 'Frequently, the presentational eloquence and expositional charm of his writing is allowed to conceal the centrality of its origins, and the potential originality of its contribution to sociology. In his writing, style regularly suppresses structure. And the result? Few people take Goffman seriously as a social theorist with a vital contribution to make to the development of sociology' (Ditton, 1980: 2).
major schools of sociological thought: Mills (1959), Baldamus (1976) and Homans (in Tilly, 1990: 263) attacking the writing style of Parsons in his elaboration of structural functionalism, and Davis accusing functionalism of being a 'crank method' because it substitutes 'the easy path of verbal tapestry' for tightly-framed and empirically-demonstrable propositions (1959: 768 [PA]); or Coser (1975: 679 [PA]) commenting on 'the hypertrophy of wordage among the ethnomethodologists' making for what Coleman deems an unacceptable and 'extraordinarily high ratio of reading time to information transfer'. Others (Shils, 1980: 249; Gans, 1989: 7, 9, 12 [PA]; Schwartz, 1990: 378-79) regularly criticise the entire discipline for expressing its findings in turgid "sociologese" or what Wright Mills calls 'socspeak' (1959: 217-18), which either mystifies for mystification's sake - the thrust of Howard S. Becker's criticism of the tendency to evasion signified by sociology's favouring of passive over active grammatical constructions (1986: 44-5) -, or attempts to copy the style of the natural sciences.

Lundberg, in an early consideration of this emulation, adopted a stance similar to some of the propositions outlined by philosophers of science assessing their field as importantly linked to textuality when judging scientific ideas as so complex as to necessitate their written transmission, that they 'cannot be matched in a succession of acoustic stimuli', and that consequently 'the language of science must increasingly consist of written graphic symbols, which provide an enduring instead of an immediately vanishing stimulus, and offer possibilities of arrangement...that cannot be communicated in oral language' (1936: 39 [PA]): but Hadden discounts this reliance on writing in the physical sciences, saying that 'the observability and practical objectivity of phenomena is a different matter for the "hard" sciences than for the social sciences. In the social sciences this is achieved only in texts' (1992: 429) - the 'only' in this statement and the overall tone implying the relative inferiority of "soft" text-dependent human sciences.

Taking a different tack, Denzin and Andreski each view the attempted emulation of the natural science model as opportunistic and bogus, a problem that both see as "curable" if sociologists cultivate 'such essential skills as textual criticism, literary flair and semantic sensitivity' (Andreski, 1974: 123), or realise that '[i]f sociologists
set for themselves the goal of understanding patterned forms of human behaviour, then a valuable source of data for secondary analysis are the poems, novels, paintings and musical compositions of artists in various historical epochs', and that the 'discipline would have advanced more rapidly had sociologists emulated novelists and artists' rather than physical scientists (Denzin, 1973: 64). Yet relative to this advice, Short (1984: 715 [PA]) worries that sociology is often no different from "mere" journalism, and Lieberson (1992: 6 [PA]) is at pains to distinguish evidence-based sociological accounts from the depictions of life conveyed by either the daily press, the essay, or the novel.

In sum, as variously evidenced and at all levels, mainstream schools of thought and leading figures within sociology have shown a demonstrable resistance to this textual turn. While reading and writing figures in media sociology/communication studies (Tunstall, 1974), assorted sociologies of education (notably McHoull, 1982) and even a nascent sociology of literature (Watt, 1964; Laurenson & Swingewood, 1972; Sociological Review Monographs #25 [ed. Routh & Wolff, 1977] and #26 [ed. Laurenson, 1978]), these subfields themselves are regarded as exploratory and marginal, or principally hybrids - mongrels rather than pedigree. Although the 'nuts and bolts' of textual production is a necessary facet of organizational studies of the publishing industry in various countries (Escarpit, 1966 [France]; Bonchio, 1973 [Italy]; Lane, 1974: 239-51 [Britain]; Coser, Kadushin & Powell, 1982 [the United States]), the rise of a reading public as a topic area for historical sociology or a broader sociology of culture (Williams, 1971; 1981: 9-20), and studies of illiteracy as a specialist branch of social problems and social policy (Freeman & Kassebaum, 1956; Scarlett, 1984), reading and writing as a centre-stage phenomenon, cut loose from these established subdisciplinary moorings, is sociologically inappropriate. Casting reading/writing as a Durkheimian social fact, as anything other than a subsidiary field of investigation, is either solipsist, self-indulgent, or a threat to disciplinary integrity: in Frank's summation,

'In sociology, the written texts are understood as derivative descriptions of the world, or as supplementary to a reality that has its existence elsewhere; these supplements may be more or less useful, but they are supplements none the less. The texts, the writings of sociology, are treated as nothing more than traces -
provisional, ephemeral approximations of the presence of a world which is always outside the text. The texts mediate our understanding of this world, but this mediation is a lapse, a falling from grace of immediate vision. For a sociologist to take the writing or reading of texts too seriously is to perpetrate a decadence which is one of the typical scandals of sociology (known as “navel gazing”). The essence of this scandal is claiming for the text a presence of its own which is not supplementary but complementary to the presupposed presence of “the real world” (Frank, 1985: 113, emphasis added).

2.8 Dismantling and Revisionism.

Newer perspectives have at various points and in various ways attempted to overcome this resistance. In substantive terms this is expressed in calls for subfields and “new sociologies” of narrative (Maines, 1993; Somers, 1994), fiction (Knorr Cetina, 1994), information (Balnaves, 1993), written rhetoric (Brown, 1983), discourse (Chalaby, 1996), [auto]biography (Denzin, 1989), bibliography (as in McKenzie’s [1994] view of this field as intrinsically a ‘sociology of texts’), or text itself (as in Alexander’s claim [1992: 295] that ‘every social interaction can also be understood as a text’).

In terms of method, attention is focussed on sociology as essentially ethnographic (Atkinson, 1990), documents as data source (Scott, 1990), the importance of content and citation analysis (Hicks & Potter, 1991; Clemens, Powell, McIlwaine & Okamoto, 1995; demonstration by Baldamus, 1992), ongoing concern with “how-to” manuals on specifically sociological styles of writing (eg, appendix to Mills, 1958; Becker, 1986; Cuba, 1993), or the evaluative process of peer-reviewing manuscripts as essential, not ephemeral, to social-scientific production (McHugh, Raffel, Foss & Blum, 1974: 76-108). An older view of the science/humanities divide - a derivation of Snow’s ‘Two Cultures’ - that banishes certain writing genres from the sociological agenda is implicitly or explicitly challenged to allow for the expression of sociological analysis as parody (Jones, 1980), dialogue between (f)actual and fictional dramatis personae (Mulkay, 1985; Latour, 1997) or poetry (Stein, 1966: 173-82; Wiley, 1976: 61-7; Ward, 1979).
But such enterprises continue to encounter patterns of resistance and bemusement. For any intent on practising what Geertz labels a “new philology” within sociology, such resistance appears daunting. Yet ‘alternative’ views need not be constructed from scratch: because the sociological enterprise has always been essentially textual. Alternative approaches - and particular projects undertaken by even the textual turn’s staunchest critics - provide palpable evidence for such a claim.

I take Merton as a type-case here, for few express the anti-textual turn so pithily, so consistently, and in all its aspects (most strikingly in Merton, 1968 [orig. 1949]; 69-70; 1982: 105). Yet Merton is his own best instance of the very “literariness” he condemns in his social-scientific domain. Crothers emphasises Merton’s ‘love, akin to a poet’s or a philologist’s, of words and language’ and, citing Caplovitz, his use of source material - typically ‘not the ASR or AJS, but...eighteenth and nineteenth century literary magazines...’ or ‘rare books that he uncovers in out-of-the-way second-hand bookstores’: again, citing Hunt, many of ‘Merton’s writings, furthermore, are liberally flavoured with apposite references to literature and history’ (1987: 30). Merton’s doctorate, and associated work of the ’30s in the sociology of science, largely consisted of textual ‘content analysis and a “prosopography”, (ie collective biography)’ of elite English scientists of the 17th century; and in the ’70s, ‘from his “elder statesman” position...there has been a further flowering of Merton’s contribution to belles lettres as a humanist as well as a social science scholar’ (1987: 35, 40). This “literariness” has often attracted peer comment, from Sica’s somewhat cryptic ‘Merton’s writing is a legend in sociology because it is literary in the best sense, and therefore widely, if not deeply, read’ (1988: 137) to the more openly

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22 Two brief instances: firstly, the UK journal devoted to the exploration of textual matters within the discipline, which contained Wiley’s poetry - Writing Sociology - did not proceed past the inaugural issue (#1, October 1976); secondly, twenty years on, in a review of the recently-published (1996) Passionate Sociology by Game & Metcalfe - an introduction to the field in ‘the same genre as Peter Berger’s Invitation to Sociology and C. Wright Mills’ The Sociological Imagination’ - Bryan S. Turner notes that book’s central thematic organisation around reading, writing and the validity of a sociological poetics; argues that this is nothing to get very “passionate” about; and anecdotlises his own chastening undergraduate experience at the University of Leeds in 1963, ‘confessing to Alan Dawe [of the “two sociologies” fame] that I both read and wrote poetry. His immediate observation was that those practices must be abandoned if I was to become a proper sociologist! It took me thirty years to recover from those instructions’ (1997, unpaginated: forthcoming).
laudatory assessment of Tiryakian: he sees sociologists as principally essayists, and proposes ‘that sociological metrology adopt as its standard unit the Merton, to be denoted by the symbol Mt’ claiming that adopting the Mt as a standard for sociological writing would provide a common basis for the internationalization of sociology, similar to...the metric system’ (1991: 507).

As final exhibit of Merton’s ‘metrology’, consider two of his own works: 1995’s monograph on ‘The Thomas Theorem and the Matthew Effect’, not only derived from the exegesis of a single proposition, but composed in the genre of belles-lettrism; and On the Shoulders of Giants: A Shandean Postscript, in its entirety a philologico-hermeneutic tracking of a singular turn of phrase, largely unintelligible to those unfamiliar with Sterne’s original novel, the basis for a sub-sociology of aphorism (OTSGery), and, according to Merton himself in a letter of February 1988 to Stephen Jay Gould, the book that ranks, among its author monumental corpus, as his own ‘favourite, prodigal brainchild’ (Gould, 1990: 45).

Similarly, the stated opposition to textuality backed up by the authority of the ASA Presidential Addresses cited earlier are by no means the whole story or the last word, as Huber’s autobiographical anecdote in her own term of office makes clear when saying that, on ‘[e]ntering graduate school in the 1960s, I chose sociology because it examined societal constraints on individual behaviour. Perhaps I wanted to know why I had been a housewife for fourteen years when I liked books better than housework’ ([PA] 1990: 2). Moreover, assumption of the ASA presidency may of itself tend towards a hard-line attitude to matters textual, if the ambivalence in Howard P. Becker’s two alternative positions (pre- and post-term of office) are indicative: in his address, Becker maintained ‘that as a sociological theorist I have little interest in fictions of any sort...[t]here is no substitute for remaining in close touch with the empirical evidence, with "the damned facts" ’ ([PA] 1960: 809). Yet twenty years prior to this claim, the same author asserted that ‘"[c]ommon sense" to the contrary, it seems to me that the scientist in a very real sense operates with fictions - or, if that term is unpalatable, with the planned modifications or simplifications of the "empirically given", ie, of the configurations he first perceives. The working fiction of the scientist - any scientist - is a construct...’
Perhaps no school of sociological thought has based itself more on the practices of all scientists - natural and social - nor stressed the social construction of supposedly “natural” and “unified” scientific methodologies as much as the loose amalgamation of sociologists grouped as adherents of Actor-Network Theory (AKA the [S]ociology of [S]cientific [K]nowledge): a key plank in the SSK platform is highlighted by Atkinson when citing the opinion of Law & Williams (1982) that the authors of scientific papers ‘are organizing bits and pieces’ (1990: 43). Also drawing on Law in discussing the concept of translation in actor-network theory, White explains that

‘Among the resources which scientists, or any producers of knowledge can deploy in the agonistic construction of networks, one is both particularly potent in imposing a structure on the world and particularly amenable to analysis: “...the text is the key weapon...First it is durable and extremely transportable. Second, it is reproducible and thus highly diffusible. But third, and this is perhaps the most important point, it displays its structure in a complex, “synchronic translation of the endlessly heterogeneous.” There they all lie, the bits and pieces, in the same place at the same time, linked together on a sheet of paper...” [Law, 1986: 49]. Those “bits and pieces” include texts by other writers, marshalled, translated, for the purpose at hand. Every time an article or book is invoked, it is modified in some sense to support the text in which it is cited. It is not so much that citation or quotation reveals the “influence” of the cited authors, as that these writers are in part created through being cited and then woven into the network being established. This “context of citation” then becomes an arena of “Byzantine political schemes”, with allies enrolled and opponents discredited. Strategies of citation thus carry certain risks. If opponents can show that the references marshalled in support of an argument are irrelevant, or can even be used to argue the opposite, the original argument is thereby weakened. It is this political sense of reading and writing which makes the notion of translation sociological to the core. Through a tracing of enrolments in any field, or of the networks created by citation and counter-citation, the construction of the social within that field becomes visible’ (R. White, 1995: 4-5, emphases in the original[s]).

In response to the mooted sharp divide between journalism and sociology, neither Short’s implied concerns about the fuzziness of a sociology/popular press divide (above), nor Stinchcombe’s charge of non-empiricism among foundational symbolic interactionists, overly concerned the relevant theorists themselves. Park
maintained that according to his 'earliest conception of a sociologist he was to be a kind of super-reporter, like the men who write for Fortune. He was to report a little more accurately, and in a matter a little more detached than the average, what my friend Ford called the "Big News"", this defined as the 'long-time trends which recorded what is actually going on rather than what, on the surface of things, merely seems to be going on' (Park, 1950: ix); Sanderson celebrated the 'profound influence on the leaders of American thought' that sociology had in the first half of the 20th century, asserting that this 'has been not alone through the direct and indirect effect of teaching thousands of college students but by educating the general public through the press in the significance of the role of groups in modern society' (1943: 3); and Cooley's milestone work in establishing the basis of the interactionist perspective importantly linked writing to socio-psychological as well as societal development:

'It is the social function of writing, by giving ideas a lasting record, to make possible a more certain, continuous and diversified growth of the human mind. It does for the race very much does for the individual. When a student has a good thought he writes it down, so that it may be recalled at will and made the starting-point for a better thought in the same direction; and so mankind at large records and cherishes its insights [...] If writing, by giving thought permanence, brought in the earlier civilization, printing, by giving it diffusion opened the doors of the modern world' (Cooley, [1909] 1962: 72, 74).

Surprisingly similar avowals are to be found in the works of the leading lights of a more structural macro-level theoretical persuasion - thus Parsons as leading functionalist claims that 'Written language, the focus of the development out of primitiveness, increases differentiation between the social and cultural systems and extends the control of the latter. The symbolic contents of a culture can, with writing, be embodied in forms independent of concrete interaction contexts. This makes possible wider cultural diffusion, both in space (eg. relative to populations) and in time' (Parsons, 1977: 12, emphasis in the original). Luhmann, as an inheritor of the systems-theoretic perspective, similarly notes that in the course of evolution

'there emerged a domain that prepared the way for solitary, interaction-free, but still societal behaviour and that has had far-reaching societal and semantic repercussions: the domain of reading and writing. The invention of
writing gave solitary social action the chance to be societal action, to be communication. One could then contribute to the reproduction of society even if no one else was present...Writing and printing make it possible to withdraw from interaction systems and nevertheless to communicate with far-reaching societal consequences' (Luhmann, [1984] 1995: 427)

Elias' very different historico-sociological approach similarly privileges literature: at the macro-level, he sees increasing production and consumption of books as an indicator of the 'transformation and regulation of drives', a reliable indicator of an advance ('spurt') in the civilizing process. At the micro-level, too, this attitudinal change is historically 'moulded...in accordance with the network of dependencies that extend throughout a human life. One might think, for example, of the moulding of the facial muscles and thus of facial expression during a person's lifetime, or of the formation of reading or writing centres in the brain' (Elias, [1939] 1982: 275, 276).

The further back in time one goes and the more significant the theorist, the less opposition one finds in relation to aspects of textuality. In consideration of sociology's "pre"-founders, Condorcet's own 18th-century tilt at the evolutionary perspective, his Sketch for a Historical Picture of the Progress of the Human Mind, posits in 10 chapters the 'ten epochs or stages through which mankind has passed', from tribal unity to the 'future progress of the human mind'. Two later commentaries independently evaluate Condorcet's work, Bierstedt (in Bottomore & Nisbet, 1978: 20) characterising the whole as 'an arbitrary arrangement of cultural conditions presented as a fictitious history of a fictitious people'; and from the same collection, speaking of content rather than style, Bock (1978: 53-4) notes Condorcet's special emphasis on the 'changes that have been brought into the world by the invention of printing. It has introduced into society a new force, the force of public opinion, which is especially able to protect the truth against error. "We now have a tribunal whose scrutiny it is difficult to elude, and whose verdict it is impossible to evade" '. Comte also stresses the centrality of printing in his own Baconian Law of the 3 stages (1893, orig 1830-42: 319-20): unlike the dismissal of Condorcet's vision by later critics, the 1938 ASA Presidential Address of Faris maintains, with important reservations, that for all its problems, much in Comte's "positive philosophy" - primarily his
stress on the evolution of writing systems - remains retrievable. At the outset of the twentieth century, Tarde was similarly asserting the centrality of reading, writing and print in history as a causal factor in the Renaissance and the foundations of German Protestantism (Tarde, 1903 [orig. 1890]: 364; fuller citation of this passage in Chapter 5).

In his commentary on the work of Elias, Chartier (1997: 107-08) made special mention of the degree to which the former’s entire project rested on the historical documents - etiquette manuals - which he deployed. An earlier analysis by Sydney and Beatrice Webb more generally claimed documents - and written commentary on documents by researchers (notes or fiches) - as ‘an indispensable instrument in the technique of sociological enquiry... For a highly elaborated and skilled process of “making notes”, peculiar to this particular science, besides its obvious utility in recording observations which could otherwise be forgotten, is, in sociology, actually an instrument of discovery’. This is because the

‘social investigator’s subject-matter, unlike the subject-matter of his fellow-workers in other sciences, is an entity endowed with quite peculiar “language and writing habits”; habits yielding rich deposits of records about past and contemporary events which would be unobtainable by the methods of personal observation and statistical measurement [...] it is only the documents, the writings secreted for the purpose of action, that yield authoritative evidence of the facts about the constitution and the activities of the social institutions to be studied. Hence the first question must be: where are the documents of the organisation, and how can I get at them? If the documents are inaccessible, the subject is impracticable’ (1932: 83, 98, 105-6).

Scott endorses this view, noting that the ‘handling of documentary sources - government papers, diaries, newspapers and so on - is widely seen as the hallmark of the professional historian, whereas the sociologist has generally been identified with the use of questionnaires and interview techniques’ and further avers that

‘[i]n fact, documentary investigation was the main research tool of the classical sociologists: Marx made extensive use of the reports of the factory inspectors, Weber utilised religious tracts and pamphlets, and Durkheim employed official statistics on suicide. The bulk of the historical and comparative work that is undertaken in contemporary sociology involves the use of documentary materials,
as does much work on contemporary societies. But textbooks on research methods have generally failed to recognise this and have given most of their space to discussions of questionnaires, interviews and participant observation' (Scott, 1990: 1).

The earlier work of Nisbet is of special relevance here. While opposing views of raw statistical data - censuses, demographic surveys and other such documents - as initiators of analysis (disparaged as 'the stork-story of science'), he posits a deeper level of literature-as-inspiration at work in the minds and procedures of the sociological tradition's most important pioneers. Taking the works of Tocqueville, Weber, Simmel, Tönnies and Durkheim as the basis of the unit-ideas in sociology, he characterises these neither as springing from nor addressing finite problems solvable by the methods of logico-empirical analysis, but as something akin to artistic visions. The mooted sources of Durkheim's 'controlling idea' are thus not derived 'from a preliminary examination of the vital registers of Europe', for the 'idea, the plot, and the conclusion of *Suicide* were well in his mind before he examined the registers'. Rather, Nisbet thinks that it originates in other sources - all of which are directly exegetical, or come from particular life-experiences, themselves mediated by texts:

'He might have got it from reading Tocqueville, who could certainly have got it from Lamennais who could have got it from Bonald or Chateaubriand. Or, it could have come from personal experience - from a remembered fragment of the Talmud, from an intuition born of personal loneliness and marginality, a scrap of experience in Paris. Who can be sure? But one thing is certain. The creative blend of ideas behind *Suicide* - a blend from which we still draw in our scientific labours - was reached in ways more akin to those of the artist than to those of the data processor, the logician, or the technologist. It is not different with the ideas and perspectives of Simmel...' (1963: 156-7, underlining added).

2.9: Writing: The Classical Legacy

Taking Nisbet's observation above as cue, this section centres on those Anthony Giddens considers the 'holy trinity' of sociology: Durkheim, Weber and Marx. This importance of this "triumvirate" to the discipline is a widely-acknowledged truism: hooking it specifically to Giddens would seem unnecessary, were it not for
the fact that, in Clegg's analysis of Giddens' international professional reputation (what Clegg calls the 'Giddens phenomenon'), pride of place in the foundation of Giddens' own career is given to his treatment of the founders, which established him 'in British sociology as the prime broker of the classics and their translation into contemporary concerns' (1992: 578-82).

2.9.1: Durkheim(-ianism)

'...for Durkheim, society is a kind of writing that only he can read. Here, knowledge is already written in practices, but not yet enlightened. Science will be the mirror that makes it readable' (de Certeau, 1984: 68).

Durkheim is considered as so thoroughgoingly (and self-descriptively) empiricist that to consider him as an ancestor of the social fiction as much as the social fact borders on the heretical. Yet such a view, drawing directly from Durkheim, informs the work of both Salazar (1993), who sees sociology as a 'science' of rhetoric and fable, and Knorr-Cetina, who, taking the Durkheim/Mauss-authored *Primitive Classifications* as her starting point, claims that succeeding constructionist studies suggest

'...the pervasiveness and relevance of fictionality as a routine aspect of social life. Here we should acknowledge the excess meaning constructionist studies have unearthed in connection with their distrust in facts, objectivity and meaning. Yet we should recognise this excess meaning not as a threat to scientific procedure, or an expedient of the dissolution of all order into contingency, but as a routine feature of the social world. Suppose we stand, so to speak, the constructionist message on its head and consider its negative findings as worthy of analysis. If science, and modern institutions in general, do not run on facts, this is no reason for despair and resignation - it is rather cause to investigate the ways in which these institutions, if they do not run on facts, *run on fictions* (1994: 5, emphases in the original).

More directly and self-evidently, both Overington's rhetorical reading of *Suicide* - that 'moral discourse' disguised as a 'pearl of positive science' (1981: 448) - and Jones' re-examination of *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life* highlight that neither were built on "real-world" analysis: the first obviously because the primary data source is dead, leaving Durkheim to build his theorising on coroner's records
(the basis of Douglas' seminal critique of 1967); the second, as Durkheim acknowledged, resting largely on the 'marriage' of archival texts on totemism to the fieldwork on Central Australian aboriginal tribes carried out by earlier researchers, notably Spencer & Gillen (1899; 1904). Similar revisions (e.g. Roche's 1976 study of the Rules of Sociological Method, claiming sociology, as presented therein, as a reading procedure) tally with Mulkay's position, where, in relating his case study of the discourses of Nobel laureates to Durkheim's stress on ceremonial solidarity, he concludes that

'[t]he Nobel ceremony is cohesive in so far as much wider social groupings are enabled to share in the honour by recipients' heavy reliance on laudatory reassignment, which itself seems to be generated by certain basic procedures of discourse-construction. However, we must not mistake this apparent cohesiveness or "social solidarity", along traditional Durkheimian lines, as an external and constraining social phenomenon... It is, rather, a textual phenomenon..., a facet or reading of participants' context-dependent interpretative procedures..., and is not necessarily reproduced in any interpretative work carried out by participants in any other contexts of discourse. Although I have just described "cohesiveness" or "social integration" as a textual phenomenon, I do not mean to imply thereby that it is separate from or independent of a distinct realm of "social action". Rather, I am suggesting that the textual phenomena examined above, the regularities in discourse which have been described and documented in detail, are best seen as constitutive of social action. In studying the procedures which participants use to organize their discourse, we are revealing how they construct social action and, indeed, social structure' (Mulkay, 1984: 547, emphases in the original).

2.9.2: Weber

Although Weber's own most direct formal examination of the effects of writing on social formation is restricted to his 1915 study of The Chinese Literati (in Gerth & Mills, 1977: 416-44) - a highly-localised instance constituting a minuscule portion of his overall corpus - later exegeses of Weber point out the degree to which aspects of writing lay at the base of his major works. Thus for Eisenstein, the 'appearance of the Protestant ethic, a spirit of capitalism, a middle-class ethos, new concepts of the family and the child, educational reforms, and a bureaucratic officialdom all owed much to multiple, complex interactions introduced by typography' (Eisenstein, 1968: 45).
This lays out the key elements of the fundamental Weberian sociological agenda in one sentence, and simultaneously relates it to the technology of print. His own lack of direct or specific emphasis on reading and writing as technologies of rationalisation in the developing West could therefore be seen as somewhat puzzling in light of Darnton's micro-analytic studies of reading behaviour in post-Reformation Europe, which lend empirical support 'to Weber's “de-mystification of the world” ' (1991: 165). A part-solution to this puzzle is that, like Elias after him, Weber's analysis is derived from documentary sources, notably the diaries of the Calvinist worthies in the Protestant Ethic thesis. From another angle: in rightly centring his overview of bureaucracy on Weber's own landmark ideal-type analysis, Albrow ensures that the reader understands both topic-area and the institution itself to be an intrinsically text-built issue. He cites the literal meaning of the word (derived from writing-desk, and/or the room or office in which writing occurs, crossed with the suffix '-cracy' for rule: hence, rule by the office or officials) and the earliest negative receptions of the phenomena which paved the way for and inspired Weber's own very different approach - Stein's 1821 complaint, that '[w]e are ruled by buralists...with a knowledge of books, hence not living in the real world, but one of letters...They draw their salaries from the exchequer and write, write, write,...and they bring up their children to be equally usable writing machines' and similarly, the relevant Brockhaus encyclopaedia entry of 1819, stressing the inordinate power of bureaucracy defined as the 'modern form of administration (which) executes with the pen everything which previously would have been done by word of mouth...many pens are set in motion...(and bureaucracy) becomes increasingly dangerous as the previous custom of conducting business through collegia falls into disuse' (both cited in Albrow, 1970: 19, 28).

But in concentrating on the spirit of capitalism and the inexorability of the rational, Weber is less concerned to investigate a mechanism, more to convey a mood: hence his favoured methodology, and his (implicit or explicit) influence on key novelists of the period, critical literature on earlier authors, and later writers. Watt, in his analysis of Defoe's seminal Robinson Crusoe (1964: 60-92) relates both the message of that work and its author's intentions to 'much that sounds like the
formulations of Weber [...] Having asserted an autobiographical meaning for his story, Defoe goes on to consider the problem of solitude. His discussion is an interesting illustration of Weber’s view of the effects of Calvinism’ (1964: 73, 90). Hoggart also invokes Weber when placing his own work at - and less particularly staking out - a mid-point between literature/literary criticism and sociology when claiming that ‘a writer’s ‘imaginative power’ is equivalent to the social-scientist’s framing of hypotheses; ‘or the other way round, the social scientist’s capacity to find hypotheses is decided by his imaginative power’. The ‘literary imagination at work on a society and the social scientific mind “making sense” of its material’ are equivalent, for ‘are not the imaginations of the two at their best close to each other? I have to say “at their best” because it seems obvious that not all of us are as quick at ordering, at finding “significant detail”, as others. Instead of “significant detail” there I almost wrote “ideal type” ’ (Hoggart, 1973: 249).

Moving from subject matter to composition, Goldman devotes two book-length treatments (1988; 1992) to the affinities between Weber and Thomas Mann, prefacing the first with Mann’s own acknowledgement of the tie (1988: 11). For Goldman, and contra the ‘stereotype of the empirical social scientist...Weber deploys a methodology of “ideal types” that he himself calls a fiction. This image is not simply a metaphor, nor is it to be taken lightly, for in putting aside a “copy” theory of truth, Weber raises important questions about the means available for grasping the nature of existing forms of reality’ (1988: 8). This theme is reinforced in the later volume:

‘Interestingly, Weber’s and Mann’s works drew on textual strategies borrowed from what would normally be considered the domain of the other. Weber constructed a “fictional” or mythic subject of history and social theory, the Occidental personality, rooted in the methodological fictionalism of ideal types...later deployed to rescue and redeem both a self and a social world in crisis [...] In fact, both Weber and Mann find both personal redemption and redemption of the nation through the use of social theory combined with fictions or models of the subject...motivated by World War I, and despite their historical understanding, both Weber and Mann believed that self and world could be put back on track again only through the redeployment of these same fictions, revitalised for a secular and postbourgeois world’ (1992: 30, 31).
This kind of approach to Weber's work, and the kind of "Weber" that emerges, is controversial. Green's 1988 attempt to consider sociological theory in terms of literary method, using as case studies Weber's *Economy and Society* and *The Philosophy of Money* by Simmel, was critiqued by Schroeter (1990), who also more roundly passed judgement on the unsuitability of viewing such sociological work through a deconstructivist literary-theoretical lens. Schroeter's many criticisms rests in part on Green's use of the analysed texts *in translation* - a salient point, but one that if followed to its logical conclusion renders much sociology inaccessible to (and immune to textual examination by) those not conversant in the mother-tongue of the theorist. The practical implications of this as a prerequisite of doing sociology aside, Schroeter's wider critique is of the relevance of deconstructionist-style analysis in the discipline generally, particularly in light of his claim that it 'would be ironic if literary theory were to gain a foothold within sociology just as it was losing ground elsewhere' (1990: 93; c/f section 2.6 above). But the more cogent issue of translation of Weber in particular, in terms of how many 'Webers' are on offer and the possibility of determining which is "authentic", is ongoing (Adatto & Cole, 1981). It has already emerged with particular force in assessments of Weber's Pan-Germanic political writings (at 2.3 above) - and more generally, fine-grained textual analysis constitutes a prime element of Weber's own project and a prime resource in clarifying if not ultimately resolving Weber's core insights and their application, and should not be too hastily ruled out of court.

2.9.3: Marxism (and neo-Marxism).

If Durkheimian textuality often has to be derived from "underneath" his work (and arguably against his stated intent), and the centrality of reading/writing to Weber is largely dependent on later exegetical treatments, translations and particular interpretations of his literary corpus, the connection between Marxism and the textual turn is much more direct. Marx's house has many mansions, and to a large extent - although often obscured by vulgar apprehensions of the original base/superstructure model, and claims to the contrary (eg, Adorno, 1974: 87) - all are built in, on and by textuality. Baxandall's entry on "literature" in the *Dictionary of Marxist Thought* reveals the young Marx's 'first intention was to be a poet of
incandescent fantasy and withering social criticism, like his friends E. T. A. Hoffman, Heinreich Heine and F. Freiligrath' (1983: 284): more material is the very method employed by Marx in constructing his philosophy and political economy, the long days and nights in the British Museum’s reading room, and the degree to which the day-to-day survival of the Marx family relied on his intermittent journalism (Marx/Padover, 1979); often overlooked is that the classical first sentence of the first paragraph on the first page of the Communist Manifesto - ‘The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles’ - is accompanied by Engels’ specifying footnote: ‘that is, all written history...’, and from the same tract, the utopian prediction of ‘as in material, so also in intellectual production. The intellectual creations of individual nations have become common property. National one-sidedness and narrow-mindedness become more and more impossible, and from the numerous national and local literatures, there arises a world literature’ (1888/1982: 79, emphasis in the original; 84).

In terms of recognisably ‘real-world’ text-event(s) conjunctions, historian A. J. P. Taylor also notes Marx’s expertise in claiming to speak for a universal proletariat and a typified fraction of this group, the Communist League in London, which in actuality ‘had seven members, all German exiles and not one of them an industrial worker’ (1980: 128-9). The First International of 1864 was largely a fictive entity existing in the rolls of membership, Engels regularly representing “Spain”, Marx often the delegate for New York even though ‘he had never been to America and no one there had sent him any authority’ (1980: 129-30). The Marxian International and its internecine competitor, the anarchist-led version, engaged in an ongoing game of mythical genesis and constitution throughout the latter years of the nineteenth century - ‘[t]he more [Marx and Engels] manufactured non-existent branches, the faster Bakunin outstripped them’ (1980: 132). Although the flesh-and-blood active membership of the International was small and its chances of success consequently remote in the event of actual physical confrontation with the forces of order arrayed against it, its rhetorical influence nevertheless created enough consternation to establish counter-initiatives (such as the League of the Three Emperors in 1873) to nullify the threat of revolution.
Relative to "literature proper", a stream of more-purely Marxist literary and aesthetic theory, beginning either side of the penultimate fin-de-siècle with the work of Mehring in 1893 and Plekhanov in 1912, flowed through mid-century in the writings of Lukacs and Bakhtin on the novel (Brennan, in Bhabha, 1995: 54-55), and continues, via Lucien Goldmann's genetically-structuralist homologies and Lowenthal's Frankfurt School literary criticism, with Jameson's 'political unconscious' (1971), Eagleton's notion of texts as inherently and centrally 'ideology-producing', (1976), Raymond Williams' 'cultural materialism' (1977), and Berman's (1988) work on the modern metropolis as filtered through the sensibilities of Goethe, Baudelaire, and the Russian "school" of Romantic Realism (Fanger, 1967).

In first-order artistic production as opposed to secondary literary critique, Marxism's central concern with writing is evident in projects as various as the existential-Marxist plays, novels and essays of Sartre, or the didactic poems and epic-theatre dramaturgy of Brecht.

The centrality of writing in Marxist thought is even more clearly demonstrable when considering the work of two leading theorists who each adopt, on principle, a strategy of refusal, a way of working that militates against any notions of divorcing the writer's life from his/her work, or authorial ownership of product under capitalist principles of intellectual property. First, the work of Gramsci: contrasting 'Popper's "knowledge without a human subject" and his notion of logic which operates independently of human volition' to Gramsci's thought, US-educational theorist Henry Giroux sees the Italian Marxist's writings as premised on the interdependence of knowledge as based on human interests. Moreover,

'Gramsci's position cannot be construed as an argument for the type of relativism enshrined by the early proponents of the new sociology of education and rightly criticised...Nor can it be used to support Popper's view of knowledge with its underlying support of technocratic organizational forms designed "so that objective, ahistorical and abstract knowledge may be employed in controlling historical events". Gramsci was very clear about surrendering human action and social practice to projections based on statistical laws and models of objectivity and prediction. He argued that such a view not only reinforced passivity among the masses, it also supported the false notion that the future could be predicted through a mechanical reading of the past' (1988: 199, emphasis in the original).
In more detail and turning to Gramsci's own compositional practices, Arshi Pipa's 1983 monograph maintains that the 'very milieu in which Gramsci wrote made it impossible for him to write literary criticism. Whereas literary critics write articles and books, Gramsci wrote “notes”, “little notes”, “remarks” (“note”, “noterelle”, “appunti”). Notes and remarks are usually written in the margin of a book or in a notebook. Gramsci was a writer of notebooks, not books' (1983: 86, underline added). Pipa puts this down in part to the exigencies of Gramsci's imprisonment, but more tellingly to three other factors: the instantiation of his distinction between revolutionary class-based 'organic' and ruler-serving 'traditional' intellectuals; his quadruply-marginalised position in the Italian literary, academic and political world of his time (Sardinian, anti-Fascist, physically deformed, and proletarian); and a concern 'to remain a reader, thus associating himself with the public at large that reads but does not write...Gramsci’s merit has been to orient Italian criticism towards looking at literature from the reader’s viewpoint, thus substituting the sociology of literature for traditional literary criticism' (Pipa, 1983: 87).

Even more striking is the strategy of refusal adopted by Walter Benjamin, whose oft-confirmed aversion to the “official” historical record only scratches the surface of his principled rejection of capitalist textuality. Four key essays wring variants on the same substantive theme: ‘The Author as Producer’ (1986: 220-38)

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23 'There is no document of civilization which is not at the same time a document of barbarism. And just as such a document is not free of barbarism, barbarism also taints the manner in which it was transmitted from one owner to another. A historical materialist therefore dissociates himself from it as far as possible. He regards it as his task to brush history against the grain' (Benjamin, 1969: 256-7; also cited in Kellner, 1992: np; Milner 1996: 15). In the blackest of black ironies, documents figure heavily as causal factors in the author's own death. Arendt supplies details of Benjamin's suicide in late 1940 on the Franco-Spanish border: his Paris apartment and its contents - including his library and manuscripts - confiscated by the Nazis, Benjamin fled Vichy France. Although in possession of a Marseilles-issued US emergency visa and Spanish transit visa, at the time of his border arrival he lacked the necessary French exit visa, and usage of the other 2 legal documents of passage had been embargoed in deference to the Gestapo on the previous day: '[o]ne day earlier Benjamin would have got through without any trouble; one day later the people in Marseilles would have known that for the time being it was impossible to pass through Spain. Only on that particular day was the catastrophe possible' (Introduction to Benjamin, 1969: 18). The circumstances of Benjamin's death also resonate with an observation by Blaise Pascal, another writer of cited fragments with his own selective "non-reading" strategy (1966: 355-6), who in the 60th meditation of his seventeenth-century Pensées states that '[t]hree degrees of latitude upset the whole of jurisprudence and one meridian determines what is true...It is a funny sort of justice whose limits are marked by a river; true on this side of the Pyrenees, false on the other' (1966: 46).
presents the ideal writer as politico-social specific intellectual with Brecht, Tretiakov and the Dada authors as examples; in 'Unpacking my Library' (1969: 59-67), Benjamin's collection of books is valued by him not for any material worth or intrinsic knowledge-content - most remain unread - but as touchstones of the personal emotions experienced in their acquisition; 'The Storyteller' (1969: 83-109) presents a mini-oral/literate divide in the wake of WWI, which paralyses the ability of the spoken to relate life first-hand and leads to the primacy of the written as an account of the lived unspoken; and the prescient 'Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction', with its contrast between Fascist aestheticisation of politics leading to war, and Communist politicisation of art, leading to mass consciousness. In terms of method, Benjamin's very mode of literary composition - "drilling", or the assemblage of work only deploying the original fragments - shows his distance from dominant conceptions of authorship (Arendt, 'Introduction' to Benjamin, 1969: 47-48).

The importance of the written is also central to Althusser's very different project - itself largely indebted also to Gramsci's earlier concept of hegemony, Greimas and the French structuralist tenet of author-effacement, and Bachelard's aesthetic-poetical idea of the epistemological break - of establishing a thoroughlygoingly scientific Structural Marxism. At the foundation of such a project is a specific methodological Reading of Capital: for

'only since Marx have we had to begin to suspect what, in theory at least, reading and hence writing means (veut dire). It is certainly no accident that we have been able to reduce...Capital, to the explicit innocence of a reading. For the Young Marx, to know the essence of things, the essence of the historical human world,... was simply to read (lesen, herauslesen) in black and white the presence of the "abstract" essence in the transparency of its "concrete" existence...[to "do" science,] to treat nature or reality as a Book, in which, according to Galileo, is spoken the silent discourse of a language whose "characters are triangles, circles and other geometrical figures", it was necessary to have a certain idea of reading which makes a written discourse the immediate transparency of the true, and the real the discourse of a voice [...] If I stop here, before a threshold we shall still have to cross, allow me to recall that it is the peculiarity of scientific discourse to be written; and that it therefore poses us the question of the form of its writing. The reader will probably remember that we began with its reading...' (Althusser & Balibar, 1990 [orig. 1968]: 14, 15-16, 69, emphases in the original).
Track the progress over time and space, through the Baudelairean capital-of-the-nineteenth-century Paris, of another of Benjamin’s (re)creations (1986:156-58) - the flâneur - and encounter his mid-20th-century Parisian counterpart in the figure of the dériviste, the strolling player-to-be in the imaginings and praxis of the members of the short-lived (1957-72) neo-Marxist Situationist International (SI: for general accounts of the movement from both its active membership and outside commentators, see Debord, 1970; Knabb, 1981; Fields & Best, in Gorman, 1985: 384-87; Marcus, 1989; Wollen et al, 1991). According to Ball, the programmatic SI strategy of disrupting capitalist structures and bourgeois attitudes - the notorious détournement - is a text-derived ‘reterritorialization of the object. With verbal texts, the détourniste gets underway by taking an overdetermined text (a cartoon, a bestseller) and subjecting it to a systematic misreading. This reinscription of texts was a favourite situationist pastime...a kind of reading procedure. In this sense, the text is any object whose use has been prescribed for it (it carries a reading that is foreclosed). Détournement would be the intentional disarticulation of the text and its rearticulation elsewhere in a new set of reading conditions. Irony would be a main feature of this practice, insofar as the text is submitted to a double reading, first in its sanctioned context (the prescribed use of the text) and next to a pirate reading that contradicts the first. Finally, this overall business would have to be distinguished from the related practice of (academic) deconstruction, which shatters the text as an intellectual exercise and offers the alternative pleasure of dispersing meaning through a gridwork of adjacent discourses’ (1987: 34).

This ‘reinscription of texts’ as simultaneously eye-opening dispeller of false consciousness and interventionist procedure resonates with different tributaries of Marxist thought. The Western Marxism of Adorno & Horkheimer’s austere Dialectic of Enlightenment referred to the hidden imperative of all branches of the ‘culture industry’ - even cartoons - in hammering ‘into every brain the old lesson that continuous friction, the breaking down of all individual resistance, is the condition of life in this [ie, modern late-capitalist] society’ (1986 [orig 1944]: 138): Disney’s Donald Duck is particularly singled out as exemplary, and from an entirely different quarter, Dorfman & Mattelart’s underground Chilean classic, Pato Leer al Pato Donald (translated as How to Read Donald Duck, 1975) applied the techniques of close reading and content analysis to the export of North American ‘imperial
ideologies' into receptive 3rd-World locales.

2.10 Warrants for a Sociography of Reading & Writing.

The foregoing review suggests a number of justifications for a philological approach - or what I would term a "sociography" - as necessary to mainstream sociology, and as a way of keeping pace with the new discursive elements flowing into adjacent disciplines. It still, however, somewhat begs the question as to what is at stake beyond "in-house" concerns about cross-disciplinary alignment, potential intra-disciplinary settlement of border disputes about the 'stuff' of sociology, or even the issues attending a focus on continual research publication rife amongst - and typically viewed as not extending much beyond - career academics. Were these the sole or even the central criteria for casting textuality as fundamental within and amenable to a specifically sociological treatment, any resulting outcomes might at best have applications limited to a scholarly community, at worst constitute an exercise in mere pedantry.

A broader and more significant payoff involves the capacity of such a sociography to tackle some of the abiding problematics that have persistently dogged previous attempts at sorting out and solving reading/writing issues. This is particularly evident within the textuality-in-action domain of literacy. The abiding problematics of that field can be, for convenience and in the interests of parsimony, subsumed under four headings - ideological, definitional, statistical, and contextual. In typical non-sociological treatments, each interacts with and merges imperceptibly into the other, tending to create one large (and hence relatively intractable) social problem, rather than a series of analytically-separable (and potentially more practicably manageable) dimensions: moreover, having the resultant "big problem" couched inside the sense of "crisis" alluded to previously imparts a sense of urgency too often inimical to solid, sober and disinterested research.

With all these issues sociology - itself habitually crisis-ridden (see note 4) - is in
principle methodologically equipped and professionally required to deal.  

2.11: The Essential Rationale.

While these foregoing warrants - tracking aspects of an inherently dynamic field characterised by unresolved debate, the argument for academic relevance, the exposure of a hidden factor in a discipline's constitution, the tapping into areas of public concern and policy-making - could be considered sufficient justification for a large-scale sociological treatment in themselves, there is a deeper level of legitimacy at work in this thesis. As indicated in the Introduction, it rests on the central argument that we are what texts determine us to be.

The writing that we manufacture and distribute, the manifold reading of the writings produced by others pertinent to both our worldview and identity, constitute a "reality" that - for all the artifice of its construction - becomes over time more potent than the still-extant but non-textual "real". The world and its inhabitants not connected to or formed by writing is gradually destroyed, depleted, diminished or dominated by the world-as-text in which we dwell. The "we" here (and its adjunctive "our" and "us") is a universal, not confined to either academia and its publish-or-perish ethos, or the professional writer in any other occupational field: "publish or perish", if the first part of that term is broadened to describe all forms of textual mark-making and the second is narrowed to a literal (ie, non-metaphorical) form of perishing - social and sometimes actual (see note 23 above) death - is a

24...although with regard to literacy, as with other facets of textuality it has yet to fully engage with the task: Redfield's 30-year-old statement, that the 'sociology of literacy has not yet been written' (1967: 36) still tends to hold true; most basic sociological encyclopaedias and dictionaries (eg, Theodorson, 1969; Martin, 1970; Dushkin Publishing Group, 1974; Mitchell, 1975; Abercrombie, Hill and Turner, 1988) contain no entries under this heading; and surveying the cumulative indexes of relevant entries in Sociological Abstracts, the International Sociological Association's in-house reference journal, confirms the scant treatment of the subject within the discipline. Under the headings of 'literacy' and 'literacy programs' are listed a mere 353 items between 1953 (the first year of publication) and the first half of 1995. Of these, 242 appear between 1980 and 1995; in only 12 years of the 42-year span are there more than 10 references to the subject (15 in 1978; 15 in 1982; 13 in 1984; 11 in 1985; 17 in 1987; 18 in 1993), in 5 of these more than 20 (27 in 1989; 27 in 1990; 21 in 1991; 23 in 1992; and 23 in 1995) and in only one year (32 in 1994) more than 30. With one exception (in 1955), between 1953 and 1959 there are no listings under 'literacy' at all. Moreover, a cursory overview of the extant entries shows that most contributions are to be found in the journals of non-sociological academic disciplines and are not written by accredited sociologists.
dictum for the lay as well as the academic, the social(-ite, social being or object of sociological attention) as well as the sociologist.

This claim will be more fully outlined in the next step of the undertaking in which you and I are currently engaged.*
"... the degree to which the phrase "in which you and I are currently engaged" in the last sentence of the preceding page generated a sense of unease may be taken as a smallest-scale and most direct initial empirical test of the force of the central argument. Generally, use of the second-person singular is an odd form in prose of any genre except the written letter/personal correspondence: in fiction, it largely fell into disuse after the 18th to mid-19th century, gradually metamorphising into the 'Dear Reader' trope, and thereafter largely abandoned except as a "special effect"; in factual - and especially scientific - writing it seems most particularly an affectation or a quirky rhetorical device. In the formal sense, and if 'you' are a sociologically-informed reader, the use of the direct address is an unsettling rarity in the disciplinary writings to which you are exposed qua sociologist. It is even more potentially unsettling in a thesis, and as a concluding statement in the 'review of the literature' section of such a discourse: if you are professionally compelled to read these words in the context of a thesis - either as an examinable work or as an object of study - and have occasion to physically mark (annotate, underline, highlight or otherwise note) the phrase, then the thing read has generated in itself its own corollary of further writing. If the claim of rarity of resort to the direct address in sociological writings provokes checking or challenging, you may proceed to refer to your own collection of books and/or journals, or those stored in a larger library - in which case the phrase leads on to the physical activity involved in wider supplementary reading; if the claim is accepted prima facie, then it stands as confirmatory to your already-existing black-boxed stock of knowledge. If the accompanying asterisk (*) directed your eye to the bottom of the page for further explanation, you are responding to a particular literary convention - in any case, the symbol alerts you to all in the sentence not being what it seems. At a deeper level of significance: for the duration of this reading (current engagement), you and I have forged a specific relationship brought into being by the text you hold in your hands and attend to. The degree of attendance is immaterial (although the closer the reading, the more the 'outside world' ceases to exist or constitutes an interference) as is the response to the meaning of the text itself (which is in principle autonomous, determined by you) - the key point is that I as writer have created a surrogate lisible 'you', and you as reader have created a surrogate authorial 'me'. These virtual selves exist regardless of whether [a] we are familiar in any other context; [b] they combine with (enhance, reinforce, override or nullify) former or other relationships; or [c] they form the basis of/breed future relationships. Centrally, until the text is read, the reading 'you' and the scriptible 'I' do not - each from the point of view of the other - exist: unless read, they cannot be constituted. In the act of reading/writing we build ourselves, each other, the form of linkage between us, and an alternative world. A sense of the construction, and the scope of the operant conditions, of this proxy world, is the subject of the next chapter.
CHAPTER 3: FORMULATING The PROXY PRINCIPLE.

I have constantly emphasized that the social world is, to adapt the title of Scopenhauer's famous book, 'will and representation'. Representation in the psychological sense but also in the theatrical and political senses - that of delegation, of a group of proxies.


This chapter lays out the theoretical foundations of the proxy principle; relates it to (as well as distinguishing it from) cognate social-scientific concerns and concepts; outlines its potential scope as a general analytical tool; and provides a rationale for its particular application, in this instance, to the object-domains of war and textuality.

3.1: Meaning of the Word “Proxy”.

A standard (1987 Collins English) dictionary definition of “proxy” reads as follows:

Prox•y ('proksi) n., pl. prox•ies. 1. a person authorized to act on behalf of someone else; agent: to vote by proxy. 2. the authority, esp. in the form of a document, given to a person to act on behalf of someone else. [C15 prokesye, contraction of procuracy, from Latin procuratio, procuration; see PROCURE].

and according to Roget’s Thesaurus, synonymous terms (the word has no antonyms) are: deputy, agent, alternate, proctor, substitute, surrogate, representative, second, delegate, aide, lieutenant, steward, emissary.

This accepted definition of the word “proxy” and its affiliations exhibit an essential tension. In one sense, a proxy is inferior relative to its original. It is subsidiary, “standing in” for (or representing a facet of) whatever produces it, and dependent on an originating source without which it cannot come into existence. The purpose of a proxy is to reflect, act for or artificially embody an underlying real - the product of creation is ipso facto subordinate to the creative producer.

Yet in another sense, and paradoxically, the necessity that calls for the manufacture of a proxy in the first instance signifies an incapacity to act unaided - a form of weakness or dependency, a limitation of power - in this originary source. At once a derivative of a
necessarily greater power, the proxy exhibits some of the properties on which this power relies and others which exceed, rather than merely supplement, the power of its original. A proxy is created initially as an enhancement to the capacity of the self - a bodily or “skin-bounded” self, necessarily limited by the physiological constraints this condition imposes - to act (exert power in) the world. The proxy principle comes into operation at the point where the conferred power of this proxy (or proxies) [i] determines the operant conditions of its bodily original; and [ii] reshapes the world - and the self’s knowledge of the world - in which it operates.

3.2: ‘Bringing Bodies Back In’

In the course of outlining a consideration of text as a sociological imperative, Chapter 2 thematised a resistance to this notion by an anti-textual, ‘non-sociog(raph)ic’ sociology based on the distinction between a “real world” and a ‘world-as-text’. This chapter examines (and further casts as problematic) what a “real world” might mean and what its constituent features might look like, and proceeds from the following presumption: that, the basal and indispensable element of the social, this “real world”, consists of 2 primary elements - an aggregate of bodies located in a material space. All other aspects of an analysable “social” spring from this primal initial condition. Here, I deal with the relation of text to the first element of this equation (bodies): later sections of this chapter centre on the second feature, that of space.

3.3 The Body as Physical ‘Fact’.

In one sense, the body is the most natural thing in the world. That humans all ‘have one’ is a fact so glaringly obvious that it almost goes without saying, and until relatively recently, sociology in fact had little or nothing to say about bodies, as in Turner’s assertion, that ‘social sciences have often neglected the most obvious “fact” about human beings, that we have bodies and they are embodied’ (1984: 227). It was what people thought intellectually or felt emotionally - and the way that they expressed these thoughts and feelings - that were the prime subject of investigation. In quantitative research, based on statistics and the counting of numbers, a factor such as the size of populations - how many people a given society or piece of society contained,
the distribution of opinions on any given issue across a representative sample of this population - were clearly essential facts of life: so too were features like the age, sex, ethnicity, occupation, income, residence, religious beliefs or political affiliations of the group studied. Even on the level of averaging out, the physiological characteristics of the population studied - things like size, shape, skin colour, skeletal structure, height, weight, posture, bodily adornment - were usually seen as irrelevant or incidental, and generally ignored altogether. Qualitative analysis, focussing on finer-grained and smaller-scale features of the social landscape, paid closer attention to the individual actor, and came up with a battery of alternative techniques - participant or non-participant observation, the structured or unstructured interview - to try and make sense of the person's direct, felt experience as mediated through and by actions in and placement within the small circle of the immediate environment: but in looking at what people did or said in their daily life, it too rarely gave much consideration to the idea that these recorded activities and impressions had much to do with - let alone be motivated by - physical appearance or bodily sensation. How minds made sense of and ordered the world was the "normal" stuff of sociology. The way in which that world was itself on one level a collection of flesh-and-blood beings that both felt and relayed sensations through the medium of their bodies, was more the subject-matter of biologists and physiologists, and could safely be left to them to deal with.

3.4 The Body as Social Fact.

This ignoring of the body as a sociological issue - except in particular circumstances such as the Parsonian 'sick role' or Goffmann's treatment of 'stigma' - is understandable. Firstly, in relation to sociology's relationship with other disciplines in both the humanities and the natural sciences, the body is outside sociology's area of expertise of patterned social behaviour. The discipline tended to take on board the viewpoint of philosophy, as expressed in either Berkeley's dictum of *Esse es Percipi*, or Descartes' *cogito ergo sum*. For Grosz (1994: 6), the Cartesian linkage of knowledge to mind-body dualism placed 'the mind in a position of hierarchical superiority over and above nature, including the nature of the body', and earlier sociological adherence to such a position can be found in the work of Mead on consciousness, or in probably the most famous single law-like axiom in sociology, the Thomas theorem. Thinking,
perceiving and articulating is the defining feature of human life, not moving and feeling. Every living thing moves and feels to a greater or lesser degree and responds to physical stimuli or instincts, but only humans have consciousness. If studying human behaviour, therefore, this defining feature is paramount.

Secondly, attempts to reverse this mind/body split - both in the early days of sociology (remembering Lombrosco’s attempt at analysing deviance from a physiological perspective) and in hybrid disciplines like sociobiology - have been treated with suspicion by sociologists, as both theoretically misguided and politically unpalatable (if not, as in the case of early 20th-century eugenics, outright dangerous). The extreme upshot of this view was the nearly total removal of the body from the sociological agenda.

Third - the failure to analyse the body as a social entity not only corresponds to the usual approach in the other academically-based human sciences: it also relates to common perceptions in that, as a general rule in everyday life, people take their bodies very much for granted; until something goes wrong with their body, or unless specifically concerned with the physical in an occupational sense - eg, as medical practitioners, professional athletes, models or sex workers - one’s own body (discounting narcissism) can be safely “left to itself”. So sociology could justify this neglect by reference to both cognate disciplines and ‘typical’ lay everyday experience.

But recently the social sciences, along with assorted other academic disciplines, has lately been much occupied with the body as a topic. Driven by new technologies and developments in the natural sciences, various ‘post-’ perspectives, revivals in a “suitably cleansed” sociobiology, and multidisciplinary perspectives like feminism and a newly resurgent masculinity, “body talk” has seeped into more traditional humanities and social science fields such as anthropology, psychology, history - and sociology. Such attention opposes older views that the body is, in one sense and except to technical specialists, “just there”, and normatively unproblematic. The idea that other people’s bodies merit detailed inspection, but that one’s own can be ‘bracketed off’, when examined, makes the visible simple taken-for-granted body the most mysterious and paradoxical of entities.
Just how many difficulties arise from the new "body talk", and what kinds of conundrums they pose, may be gleaned from the range of possible answers on offer to a question as mundane and seemingly straightforward as the number of bodies any individual has...

3.5 One or Several Bodies?

A simplest response to the above query is "one", but Kroker & Kroker, in their 'theses on the disappearing body in the hyper-modern condition', dispute even this presumption, of any body at all, in their claim that under this "condition" 'the body no longer exists' (1987: 20). For those holding to the constitution of the one, the issue is the unity of the corporeal self, which itself exposes a range of contradictory positions, such as the 'shifting' or 'fragmented' self in Hall (1992), and bodies internally riven in Deleuze, when he states that '[w]e no longer find ourselves dealing with the mass/individual pair. Individuals have become "dividuals" and masses, samples, data, markets, or "banks" ' (1992: 3, emphases in the original). There is also the body emptied of content, as in the DeleuzoGuattarian concept of the 'Body without Organs [BwO]', or Virilio's hollowed-out bodies drained of will, soul and reason and institutionally 'filled'/reconstituted as 'metabolic vehicles', reduced to the human organism's capacity to harness speed and power (1986: 75-95). Contrarily, from alternative quarters comes the idea of the contemporary body as augmented, as in the figure of the cyborg (Haraway, 1985; Gray, Figueroa-Sarriera & Mentor, 1995) or, at the increasingly blurred borderline between scientific fact and sci-fi genre, in the cyberpunk netherworlds of novelist William Gibson, fictional anti-heroes (and a goodly share of Gibson's real-world readership) striving to be prosthetically "posthuman". A further spin on the same theme sees the body not mechanically augmented so much as sensorily extended courtesy of electronic communicative technologies: as the Cyberspace Hashishim Advanced Hype Infantry (1995: lines 11-20) headily states, in declaring a jihad against proposed governmental regulation of the Internet,

'Your "self" is not confined directly to your physical body, rather it is the
interface between your mind, your PSY in cybernetic theory, and the outside world, the PHI. It's a morphing intersection, the points at which you process information from the outside world. For instance, thru telepresence your "self" can be moved outside of your body and into a robotic apparatus, your senses are located and extended thru wires, cameras, and the interface is no longer tied down to the meat. Cyberspace becomes yet another sensory organ, or rather an entirely new sensorium, an array of input into your mind, extending your "presence" beyond your body, even beyond your terminal'.

For Mary Douglas (1973: 93-112), following Mauss, there are two bodies: the genetically (naturally) and the socially (symbolico-culturally) constructed. The latter is of most interest because it has the extra-corporeal capacity to interact with, attach, and adjust itself to others. Schwartz, in spinning off a remarkable variant of Orwell's 1939 Coming Up for Air, posits three bodies: the 'first is the substantial body of middle age: fat and present. The second is the sweet body of youth: thin and past. The third is the phantom body of death: streamlined and futuristic' and proceeds to generate a potted 20th-century 'cultural history' explanation of anorexia, shoplifting and schizophrenia centred on 'the thin body inside the fat body, and of a third body beyond, dangerous, and possibly explosive' (1989: 411).

In Paul Valéry's self-described 'simple reflections', four bodies co-exist "within" each person: the 'object My Body', what we live in, seen only piecemeal by its "inhabitant" and occupying a perpetual present; a second body whose exterior is visible only to others or on a reflected surface; the third, the internal machinery of the body examinable only through technologies of incision and dismemberment, usually through the gaze of the accredited surgeon or forensic expert; and the fourth, paradoxically both 'real' and 'imaginary', the fiction of the subject that integrates these other 3 bodies into a coherent taken-for-granted whole (Valéry, trans. Manheim [1964] 1989: 395-402). For Frank also, an initial second-order consideration of organising a discourse around four 'academic imaginations of the body' - the medicalised, sexual, disciplined and talking formulations (1990: 134) - quickly develops into four correspondent bodies: the dominating, mirroring, disciplined and/or communicative types (1991: 51-6). In his earlier monograph, Frank also makes mention of O'Neill's 1985 concept of five bodies - 'the world's body, social bodies, the body politic, consumer bodies, and medical bodies' - each legitimising, and used as a resource for, a situated institutional practice (Frank,
Obviously, such a range of considerations touches base with sociological concerns, creating as they do not so much a “morphing” as a soci(ologic)al intersection, where the body is situated

‘between a number of different domains; the biological and the social, the collective and the individual; that of structure and agent; cause and meaning; constraint and free will. But this interface only emerges in sociological discourse because it is at the same time the objective centrepoint of the internal tension existing between the social and human sciences and because it is materialised in an irreducible being: the individual who is both object and subject, product and actor, structure and meaning’ (Berthelot, in Lawler, 1991: 65).

However, the utility of “body talk” does little to allay the confusions often occasioned by these perspectives: in Corrigan’s assessment, ‘[c]learly, the human body does have anatomical, biological and physiological properties and processes. But for every claim that there may be something universal about the human body, it is possible to find an example which contradicts or at least complicates this claim’ (1994: 41). Such misgivings not only concern simple factors like “number of bodies”, but methodological salience, to the degree that some analysts wonder whether “the body” is being considered at all - in Bynum’s monograph ‘Why all the Fuss about the Body?’, she reviews the plethora of recent literature, and notes that ‘[i]n much of this writing, body refers to speech acts or discourse’ wherein ‘the lived body seems to disappear’ (1995: 4); and Halton, in discussing this relatively new specialty in sociology, claims that the "body" under study is less flesh-and-blood than a ‘conceptualised and ethereal body modelled on the text’ (1992: 35).

Herein, I argue that both positions - that the body as topic is the site of (and has the potential to sort out) Berthelot’s checklist of sociological ‘great divides’, and that the “body” as recently conceptualised has been obscured by textual discourse - are essentially correct. The seeming clash between the alternative positions comes about through a less-than-complete conception of what reading, writing and text(uality) actually does to bodies, and/or a premature attempt at integration (which may never eventuate). To take one persistent divide as an instance: in sociology, attempts to overcome the structure/agency hiatus pursue one of two alternative courses. The first
articulates one of the two dimensions as determinant while ignoring the other, positing either a fully-hegemonic structure and reducing agency to puppetry, or casting structure as merely the sum of actions performed by totally autonomous agents. The second tries to bridge the divide, and is best represented by attempts as diverse as Giddens’ structuration, Merton’s theories of the middle range, or grounded theory as formulated by Glasser & Strauss.

Such structure/agency-type divides characterise literature as well as life. In relation to writing, a one-sidedness comes out in views of ‘high’ authorship as the mystical gift of personal creativity or, conversely, in the Barthes or Foucauldian claims of ‘the author’ as inheritor or conduit of a pre-given textual discourse: the “middler” position is appropriately typified by Coffey, Holbrook & Atkinson’s recent (1996) try at melding ‘realist’ grounded theory, rhetorical analysis/narrativity, and Hypertext in Computer Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis Software (CAQDAS) for sociological purposes. Pitched at somewhat lower levels, is the work a sui generis authorial product, or not fully comprehensible unless interpreted by a critical infrastructure, or radically incomplete until the reader provides it with ultimate meaning - or is Ricouer right in saying ‘that to read a book is to consider its author already dead and the book as posthumous. For it is when the author is dead that the relation to the book becomes complete and, as it were, intact. The author can no longer respond; it only remains to read his work’ (1991: 107)? These issues also feature in Solomon’s discussion of what he terms the ‘polemical difference’ between an agency-driven Rezeptionsästhetik and a (here, paradoxically structural-type) Deconstruction:

‘It has long been argued that the text is everything, that the reader just reads, supplying nothing but, one hopes, literacy and comprehension, and perhaps some structural analysis. Today, this nonsense is being overcorrected by “reader response” theory; the reader supplies almost everything, the book and the author are all but incidental. So, too, it has long been argued that literacy demands an uncritical respect if not awe for one’s own literary tradition. Today, this view has been violently challenged by some of the Derridean Deconstructionists, who rightly point out some insidious cultural biases in our literary tradition but also nonsensically deny the very existence of authors and masterpieces. Moreover, they reject (or “deconstruct”) the very idea of the subject, of author, and of reader, creating an impossible dilemma’ (Solomon, 1986: 53).
The issue also splits along spiritual and ideological dimensions, where the book, or all forms of writing as artefact, is alternatively unique product-of-individual-genius, or outcrop of a time/space-defying literature. The document is either active instance of rights and/or rites of passage and a testament to individual and corporate identity, or instrument of surveillance, constraint, control. A key question for both domains is thus the 'place' of the person - whether as acting social being, or creating writer/interpreting reader - in a structured (societal) world (or a world of text).

I proceed from the tenet that the initial task of the sociological analyst - as against the perceptions of the social analysand, who normatively experiences structure and agency simultaneously and as a taken-for-granted unity until disrupted - is (a) to broaden the gulf between the two elements; and (b) to bracket off assumptions of integration until (c) evidence of empirical interplay between the elements is established.

3.6 Doubling as the Essence of the Social

**Figure 3.1: Doubling - Base Model:**

![Diagram](image)

In sociological terms writing is centrally about identity-formation instantiated by the production of surrogate selves (proxies). Figure 3.1 draws from Mead's 'background of the genesis of the self', and his concept of the creation of doubles as the distinction between organic/non-organic self, and the beginning-point of the social:

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25. Consistently throughout, in the following diagrams and despite any changes in size or shape, the black figure(s) represent bodies: neither colouration nor implied gender should be read as significant. The corresponding (basically) white "figures" are proxies. Solid 4-sided figures signify written matter/artefacts of text, and lighter/"broken" quadrograms denote institutions.
‘[T]he individual has a thing-like self that is affected by the individual as it affects other people and which is distinguished from the immediate organism in that it can leave the body and come back to it. This is the basis for the concept of the soul as a separate entity’ (1934, ed Morris: 149-50).

That Mead instances such doubling with reference in the first instance to ‘primitive people’ and the ‘invisible, imaginary companions’ of children may give rise to discomfort on ethical or ideological grounds: but in view of Mead’s extension of the proposition to the concept of the generalised other, and the implication of the advantages accruing to the double (‘soul’), I interpret the passage as being both (a) exemplary of the universally-applicable, and (b) the description of an originary condition, both sociohistorically and in terms of the lifecourse of persons.

When Mead extends the concept to the relationship and responses of the individual to the group as reference for behaviour and active self-identification/construction, we may properly speak of a move from doubles to multiples in an organismic and perceptual sense. The different groups (subsets) to which the individual relates creates different situationally-appropriate selves, generated by either the individual or - as in the case of the generalised other, Cooley’s ‘looking-glass self’, Frank’s ‘mirroring body’ or Valéry’s ‘second body’ as reflected in mirrors or outsider’s perceptions - one or several other(s). As the individual prepares for (or retrospectively evaluates) these encounters, s/he produces a double appropriate to the situation:

**Figure 3.2:** Doubles to Multiples
But this is a necessarily later development, and recalling the initial Meadian concentration ('background genesis') on "primitives" and - if "the child" may be taken as closest to infancy - "children", does bring out one major point: that both exemplary groups may fairly be taken as non-literate. Indeed, objectively this is one of the few, if not the major, empirical ground(s) for commonality. The first doubles generated will therefore, to all intents and purposes, take a non-textual form: if considered from the point of view of the person, the double originates in the mind (primitive consciousness, the child's imagination) and multiplies over time (as in anthropomorphism, or a widening circle of imaginary friends as the child's contact with a circle of others expands); the requisite doubles move out into the world and are externally represented - either in 3-dimensional form (the fetish/totem, the toy/doll) or in flat pictorial form on various surfaces (the flesh of self and others, the walls of the cave or the nursery). I will argue that this difference in form is paramount in that the different constituent properties of the textual double and its multiple successors produces different effects to those of its non-textual counterpart(s).

**Figure 3.3: Textuality**

3.7 Textual Doubling/Multiplication.

In *Doubles in Literary Psychology*, a study of the origins and developments of the *döppelganger* in fiction, Ralph Tymms notes that
‘[r]ight from the start an essential distinction is to be made between the double-by-duplication and the double-by-division; though these distinct psychological approaches constantly mingle. One secondary distinction is that in the second case [that of the double-by-division] the counterpart may be of a different substance from the original - in other words, may be a spiritual double’ (1949: 16-17).

The ways in which the self is artificially multiplied - the surfaces on which the surrogate is displayed, the substance of which it is composed, its interaction with the originary source, and the range of its various capacities - is an issue for examination of the double-by-duplication as much as the double-by-division when moving from the ‘literary’ to the ‘social’. Relative to surface, two issues arise: writing done on (or into) the flesh, and writing onto other surfaces. In three separate but cognate analyses, the origins of writing are located not in attempts to visually represent speech/language, but in the practice of bodily markings: each holds that the subsequent history of alphabetization constitutes a shift from such scarring to the later encoding of sound units. According to Lingis, ‘[o]f all that is savage about savages, the most savage is what they do to themselves. They paint, puncture, tattoo, scarify, cicatrize, circumcise, subincise themselves’. All these processes denote the precursors to textuality, for

‘[w]hat we are dealing with is inscription. Where writing, graphics, is not inscription on clay, tablets, bark or papyrus, but in flesh and blood, and also where it is not historical, narrative [...] before historical - narrative, signifying, phonocentric, logocentric - inscription, there is a savage inscription not yet despotic, not serving oral speech’ (Lingis, 1983: 23, 24).

For Deleuze & Guattari, similarly, such marking and marked bodies are the ‘essence of the inscribed socius’ whose simultaneously creative and repressive organisation ‘constitutes a system of cruelty, a terrible alphabet’: and ‘if one wants to call this inscription in naked flesh “writing”, then it must be said that speech presupposes writing, and that it is this cruel system of inscribed signs that renders man capable of language, and gives him a memory of the spoken word’ (1990: 144, 145). Working from a position maintaining that ‘a body is itself defined, delimited and articulated by what writes it’; that “what writes it” constitutes law; and that ‘in times of crisis, paper is no longer enough for the law, and it writes itself again on the bodies themselves’, De
Certeau summarises and extends such observations in maintaining that

'for the law to be written on bodies, an apparatus is required that can mediate the relation between the former and the latter... tools work on the body. Formerly the tool was a flint knife or a needle. Today the instruments range from the policeman's billyclub to handcuffs and the box reserved for the accused in the courtroom. These tools comprise a series of objects whose purpose is to inscribe the force of the law on its subject, to tattoo him in order to demonstrate the rule, to produce a "copy" that makes the norm legible. This series forms an in-between... it separates the text and the body, but it also links them, by permitting the acts that will make the textual "fiction" of the model reproduced and realized by the body' (1988: 139, 140, 141; emphases added).

The rapid shift into the present and the concentration on aspects of power in De Certeau's analysis not only aligns his work with Deleuze/Guattari and Lingis (and their acknowledged predecessors in body-inscription theorising - Foucault, Nietzsche's Second Essay in On The Genealogy of Morals, and the Kafka of 'In the Penal Colony'): it also links into Innis' concentration on 'communication bias' and power-differentials at the level of empires, determined by the surfaces on, and substances into which, writing is engraved; and it gels with Connerton's concept of writing, which in Lash & Urry's summation

'distinguishes between incorporating and inscribing practices and considers their relationship to how memory is sedimented in the bodily postures of those living in particular societies. Incorporating practices are messages which are imparted by means of people's current bodily activity, the transmission only occurring when their bodies are so present. Inscribing practices are the modern devices for storing and retrieving information, photographs, print, alphabets, indexes, tape, etc... These practices trap and hold information long after the human organism has stopped informing...' (Lash & Urry, 1994: 239, emphases in the original).

But this summation tends to leave out of account two of Connerton's central themes - an overemphasis on transmission at the expense of bodily activity; and the way in which collective and individual memory is transformed and eroded by exteriorised inscribing practices.

Connerton's theme, as in the title of his 1989 book, is how societies remember, and forms part of an important recent re-emphasis on the subject of commemoration and
mnemotechnics. Writers in this field share common themes and concerns - individual (personal) as distinct from group (societal) memory, tensions between affect and rationality in what is recalled/forgotten, technologies of remembrance, and the relationship between oral and ‘officially’-recorded histories. This brings their work within the purview of the written record as alternative to memories lodged in the head of the individual: representatively, for Fentress & Wickham, although the fact that we ‘are so accustomed to using texts that we tend to see them everywhere’ (1992: 19) and hence take them for granted, when examined, customary notions about writing as speech-based, or text as only supportive of memory, tend to collapse, as in the co-authors’ statements that

‘[f]or us, by contrast, the text is no longer a support for memory, but its replacement...Literacy influences the form in which knowledge is articulated. Once knowledge is textualized, it tends to evolve in a characteristically textual way...that has little connection with the way knowledge evolves purely in thought and speech’ (Fentress & Wickham, 1992: 11).

This concept of the dislodging and replacement of a sensual/’natural’ by an ‘artificial’/inscribed memory draws on the earlier work of Yates (1996, orig. 1966). She finds its seminal expression in Classical Greece, in Plato’s Phaedrus, where Socrates argues that the invention of writing - which he ascribes to ‘the Egyptian god Theuth’ - ‘will produce forgetfulness in the minds of those who learn to use it, because they will not practice their memory. Their trust in writing, produced by external characters which are no part of themselves, will discourage the use of their own memory within them’ and foster the appearance - not the reality - of wisdom ([1966]1996: 52-3, emphasis added; also part-cited in Moulthrop, 1993: 77). Yates picks up on the ancient theme in dealing with the suggestion that

‘this passage may represent a survival of the traditions of oral memory, of the times before writing had come into the common use. But as Socrates tells it, the memories of the most ancient Egyptians are those of truly wise men in contact with the realities. The ancient Egyptian practise of the memory is presented as a most profound discipline. The passage was used by a disciple of Giordano Bruno when propagating in England Bruno’s Hermetic and “Egyptian” version of the artificial memory as an “inner writing” of mysterious significance’ (Yates, [1966]1996: 52-3).
The significance of the shift from this "inner" to an exteriorised writing involves not only a divorcing from, but a feedback into, the organic entity, both as a whole and as it affects the constituent parts of the physiological system: not merely the 'soul'/'spiritual double' or the memories housed in the skull of the subject. The citation (in Chapter 1, p. 6) of the unknown author of the Silos Beatus suggested as much: Lowenthal (1985) relatedly notes in the course of his own analysis of historical texts, that Macaulay saw the duty of written factual history as being to "make the past present, to bring the distant near...to invest it with the reality of human flesh and blood"; and in historical fiction, Sir Walter Scott's fame was based his ability to fabricate convincing "bygone ages...actually filled with living men...with colour in their cheeks and passions in their stomach", as Carlyle attested, "not by protocols, state-papers, controversies and abstractions" (1985: 225, emphases added). But neither Lowenthal - nor Connerton, whose project is to re-establish corporeality in the social - can fully endorse this latter statement, because both, while marking the interplay between physicality and inscription, also mark the power of writing and the written over the practices of the corporeal body.

What is at stake here is not only the transformation of the skin-bounded self's practices, but also its comprehension of and placement in the world of time and space. Both the world as generically perceived by the textual proxy and the specific environs in which it operates (subsets of the larger system) are likewise textually transformed, and by the same sequence of proxification - a move from the originary pre-given material (real or natural), into a mediated representation (cultural), and the refinement of this representation into a hegemonic 'world-as-text'.

3.8: A Variant on Analytical '3-Worlds' Models.

In concentrating on understanding of and action in the known world, several theorists have grounded their respective analyses on distinctions between [i] the world-as-it-is, the material environment whose diversity, complexity and magnitude render it ultimately unknowable in its entirety; [ii] the-world-as-represented, a symbolic second-order version of this first world, limited and framed in order to match [iii] the cognitive capacity of the (individual and collective) human actor (a world-as-
perceived). In a number of the more prominent of such tripartite schemes, the interplay between these three entities is significantly constructed and mediated by text. This is evident in projects as disparate as those of Latour (1991: 6), who conceives of the world sociologists study as simultaneously 'real like nature, narrated like discourse, and collective like society', and Popper's philosophical argument for three worlds (1972: 107-52) - the constitution of the first two (the objectively physical and the cognitively perceived) dependent on an autonomous third (a communicative theoretico-cultural entity, based - as his "thought experiments" indicate) primarily on artefacts of writing).

The Cole & Keyssar model (FIG. 3.4 below) is a graphic representation of such an approach:

**Figure 3.4:** Cole & Keyssar’s model of mediated knowledge (in Olson et. al., 1985: 54-56.):

![Diagram](https://via.placeholder.com/150)

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26 'Experiment (1). All our machines are destroyed, and all our subjective learning, including our subjective knowledge of machines and tools, and how to use them. But libraries and our capacity to learn from them survive. Clearly, after much suffering, our world may get going again. Experiment (2). As before, machines and tools are destroyed, and our subjective learning, including our subjective knowledge of machines and tools, and how to use them. But this time, all libraries are destroyed also, so that our capacity to learn from books becomes useless. If you think about these two experiments the reality, significance, and degree of autonomy of the third world (as well as its effects on the second and first worlds) may perhaps become a little clearer to you. For in the second case there will be no re-emergence of our civilization for many millennia' (Popper, 1972: 107-108, emphases in the original). Drawing from this scenario, Winchester posits 2 fictive societies - an orally-based 'Atlantis' and a race of 'Alpha Centaurians' whose detonation of a "litron bomb" precisely mirrors Popper's speculations - in order to demonstrate the real-world connections between Western forms of theology ('interrogation of God'), science ('interrogation of nature') and literature ('interrogation of human nature') and the degree to which these achievements, singly and in combination, are based on the writing process and its products (1985: 36). Elsewhere and less speculatively, Winchester will argue that the very existence of ordinary historical persons can only be authenticated by a methodical cross-referencing of 2 or more documents testifying to their identity. In the absence of such record-linkage, the individual is considered to have no verifiable life (Winchester, 1978; commentary in Tilly, 1984: 27-28) - another more concrete variant wrung on the importance attached to Popper's autonomous third world 'of objective contents of thought, especially of scientific and poetic thoughts and of works of art' and its priority over first-world physical objects or states, and second-world mentality/consciousness states with their concomitant behavioural dispositions to action.
Herein - and as with several information theory/cybernetic schemes (Ruben, 1984: 40-71) - knowledge of the world is gleaned by the actor either directly, or by reference to a representation of the "original". In the latter case, the actor's stock of knowledge both derives from and feeds back into this representation. But both actor and world are "free-standing" entities: there is no sense conveyed of the other surrogate world-as-depicted as independent or alternative, let alone as having the capacity to distort or displace either the actor's powers of perception or the "real" world's constitution.

While retaining the basic elements of a 3-worlds concept, and subscribing to the analytic purchasing power of its general form, my elaboration of the proxy principle makes specific changes to the scheme's components and impressions of unity pertaining within and between them. There are as many significant ruptures as there are interactions in a real/represented (or 'nature/culture') divide, and the notion of a seamless flow between entities attracts as much opposition - both empirical and conceptual - as support. Nor are the elements internally unitary: text is separated out from other representational forms, and when the entities are recombined, assumes a position of dominance relative to the other elements. Finally, the category of the 'individual' is problematised - converted from corporeal agent to social proxy springing from, relating to and acting upon the hierarchically conjoined three worlds:

Figure 3.5: Extension of the Cole/Keyssar model - The three worlds.

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27 As in Habermas' analysis of Lukacs' 1922 work on reification (1984: 355-72), who notes that the latter, like Popper, also theorises in terms of a "three worlds" model: but unlike Popper the Hungarian thinker's 'three worlds [ie, objective nature/things, the social interpersonal sphere, and subjective nature/inner life] are so lopsidedly coordinated that category mistakes are built into our understanding of interpersonal relationships and subjective experiences; we apprehend them under the form of things, as entities that belong to the objective world, although they are really elements of our common social world or of an individual subjective world' (1984: 356).
The proxy of the actor in the right-hand section of Figure 3.5 signifies the surrogate self as "seen" from the point-of-view of the world-as-text: a panoply of documents testifying to, and framing the conditions for action of, an extant self. This proxy assumes a degree of autonomy over its pre-existing "original" (the body); becomes a conduit and/or signifier for and/or of the organism; and is the focus for other-issued written discourses which the perceptual sensing body must read, and take into account. To operationalise these points, a brief turn to a representative fiction and its real-world counterpart(s).

Pirandello's novel *Il Fut Mattia Pascal* ['The Late Mattia Pascal'] is about the attempt of the titular protagonist to adopt a new identity in the wake of a mistaken report of his death. The plan ends in failure, because the bogus "new" individual - 'Adriano Meis' - lacks the range of documents necessary for engagement with social life. Without such official certification, Pascal/Meis suffers a "second" (social) death. Immediately following its first publication in 1904, the novel was subjected to severe critical attack, primarily on account of the implausibility of the plot's central premise: that social identity is not just mediated through or aided by assorted papers testifying to the bearer's "bona fides", but that modern human existence is actually constituted by such documentation. In the eyes of the State, the "fact" of physical being is subsidiary to a subject's placement in [a] requisite set[s] of authorised files. Pirandello's book asserted that when and if these two aspects of self - the corporeal and the 'official' archival - come into conflict, the latter overrides the former.

Responding to early reviewer hostility the author appended a two-part postscript to all later editions of his novel, defending himself against the purportedly 'absurd and unbelievable' elements of the work (1987: 255-262). This defence generally claimed that the orderly work of fiction is a pallid replica of the unpredictable and chaotic absurdity of "real life", with its 'blissful contempt for verisimilitude' (Pirandello, 1987: 262). More specifically, the novelist cited the account of a real-life parallel to the Pascal/Meis situation in the Ambrogio Casati case, where a man wrongfully and irreversibly declared officially dead in 1917 subsequently visited his own grave. A later reviewer (Radcliff-Umstead, 1978: 183) sees the book as not only a credible reflection of real-life processes but as positively prescient, in that contemporary civic authority has considerably tightened up the document-based mechanisms that
effectively nullify the individual's autonomy:

'Pirandello's novel has been called "the triumph of the civil state" because of Meis's failure to live without a legal identity. His success in sustaining the disguise for a period of two years was possible only in the politically relaxed conditions in the early years of the twentieth century, when persons could travel in Europe and stay in hotels without displaying a passport. Since the First World War no one would be able to play Adriano Meis's masquerade, because positive identification has been required for even an overnight stay at a touristic pensione in the most remote village.'

From an altogether different source, some backing for this assertion, general agreement as to when 'positive identification' becomes a matter of governmental concern, and the extension of such concern beyond the borders of Europe. An early-'80s monograph investigates 'the history and use of six of the most common personal documents in the United States' (Rule, McAdam, Stearns & Uglow, 1983: 222) with an eye to the way such documents are used as instruments of mass surveillance and social control. Of these items, the researchers find that

- legislation requiring a uniform system of birth certificates was not enacted until 1903, and that the first states to meet the official criteria of registering an estimated 90 percent of births within their boundaries only did so in 1915;
- despite considerable irregularities in the early issuance of driver's licenses between states (first required in Massachusetts in 1907 but not until 1957 in South Dakota), so great was the eventual need for them that 'by 1977 at least 40 states issued "non-driver's licenses" for those that did not drive, but who needed the documentation for other purposes' (1983: 225);
- the provision of passports did not become an exclusively federal government prerogative until 1856, consonant with the practice of most countries in the 19th century who saw passports as only a wartime necessity. The United States did not require US nationals to use passports for travel in peacetime until 1952, and it is estimated that most US travellers did not carry passports in peacetime until the late 1940s' (1983: 225);
- the holding of Social Security cards - originating in 1935 legislation and now encompassing 'nearly every economically active adult' in North America - proved so effective for state investigation purposes that since 1961, 'the Internal Revenue Service [IRS] has adopted the use of Social Security numbers for ordering income tax records and for identifying taxpayers' (1983: 226);
- credit cards, initially issued in the early decades of the present century and lately a virtual monopoly of two corporations (VISA and MasterCard) are rich sources of information on citizen's various economic activities, and exchange of such
information among private and governmental organisations 'is a regular part of their clerical practice' (1983: 228); and

- when issuing bank books, a relative rarity in the turn-of-the-century US but increasingly common at present, 'bank officials may contact the applicant's employer or personal and business references' if irregularities are suspected: 'Banks appear responsive, in these matters, both to their own interests in avoiding fraud and those of local businesses and law-enforcement agencies' (1983: 229).

Rule and his associates, while attentive to civil-libertarian fears about the totalitarian implications of governments' increased ability to track the activities of its citizens, are more concerned with the fragility of the surveillance system. Their monograph refers at several points to the ease with which a foundational document - the birth certificate, serving as a validation of identity creating ('breeding') subsequent documentation - can be fraudulently obtained, and stops just short of endorsing more efficient direct checking via computerisation. However, the central facet of this analysis lies less in the strength or weakness of such monitoring procedures, more in the epistemological and ontological implications of such a construction of identity itself: the interplay between the institutional conception of the individual, and the individual's generation of a series of documentally-textured identities in response to institutional demands.

**Figure 3.6:** The Personal-social Identities Matrix (after Brewer, 1991: 476):

3.6.1: Base Model

3.6.2: Initial Variant
UCLA social psychologist Marilynn Brewer sees the self as conceptually split between a core personal identity and a number of extended social identities, wherein the former 'is the individuated self - those characteristics that differentiate one individual from others within a given social context'. Social identities are 'categorisations of the self into more inclusive social units that depersonalise the self-concept, where I becomes we. Social identity entails “a shift towards the perception of self as an interchangeable exemplar of some social category and away from the perception of self as a unique person”' (1991: 476, emphases in the original). The left-side portion of the Figure above (3.6.1) is Brewer's depiction of such a process, using her "self" as salient instance nested within her professional domain. At the centre is Brewer's personal identity as social psychology teacher/researcher, distinct from her colleagues. The first (next closest) ring is inclusive of these colleagues, constituting a specific academic sub-set (social psychology) embedded inside a specific Department (of Psychology).

The relationships of this Department and others occurs within the frame of reference of the third ring, the university (UCLA), itself operating within the context (ring four) of other academic institutions. These frameworks and the different constructions of social identities they entail are lodged within the bordering outer ring, where the subject identifies 'with academia as a whole, as compared with nonacademic institutions in the United States or the world' (Brewer, 1991: 476).

This scheme is highly suggestive, with other^2^ clear applications beyond the occupational sphere. Brewer implies as much when prefacing her monograph with reference to the strength of 'currently familiar...ethnic and national identities capable of arousing intense emotional commitment and self-sacrifice on the part of individuals...People die for the sake of group distinctions...' (1991: 475). But Brewer's exemplary matrix underplays the degree to which [i] all identities are constituted by text - from the reading/writing activities resulting in the credentialling of the personal (here academic) identity to the textual infrastructures facilitating relations

^2^ Some such further applications may include, eg, a familial identity, frames of reference radiating outwards from the individual to kin relations within a (neo-local) family of orientation--> extended kin--> family of procreation--> socially specific family-type--> (species-distinct or figurative) 'human family'; an urban identity, with the person located within the dwelling (household, residence)---> neighbourhood--> suburb--> municipality (borough, shire)---> city; or a (formal-) religious identity, the believer situated in a web of prayer-group--> congregation--> sect (denomination)---> national/international church--> world of theists. These random examples can clearly be multiplied.
between the successive circles; [ii] disparities exist between self-conceptions and other-generated perceptions of the successive social identities; [iii] independence of these respective social identities; and [iv] social identities are constructed on the basis of 'fuzzier' notions of the world's wider parameters: in regard to the latter point, one is reminded of the looser self-placement - the universal address29 - of Joyce's Stephen Dedalus in Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man (ed. Levin,1948 [orig. 1916]: 175-367).

An initial attempt to refine the matrix in these directions, and wed them to the pattern of textual self-reconstructions as formulated in the proxy principle, is given in the right-hand section of the preceding Figure (3.6.2) - less T. S. Eliot's poetic preparing of 'a face to meet the faces that you meet' than a presentation of a world-aware self encountering assorted other selves in specific social situations. A fuller elaboration synthesising these elements is provided in Figure 3.7 below:

Figure 3.7: Brewer Matrix Second Variant - Situated Personal and Social Identities:

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29 'He turned to the flyleaf of the geography and read what he had written there; himself, his name and where he was. Stephen Dedalus, Class of Elements, Clongowes Wood College, Sallins, County Kildare, Ireland, Europe, The World, The Universe' (Joyce, 1948/[1916]: 183).
Figure 3.7 represents a synthesis of all the foregoing features of proxies. In Barbara Duden's terminology, the skin-bounded self at the centre is transformed into 'a layer cake of superimposed texts, each “text” lettered by a different profession to define a separate set of needs that only that profession can meet. The body thus appears as the incarnation of “texts” '(Illich & Sanders, 1989: xi), each ‘layer’/proxy acting in a variety of surrogate - or in Esser's (1975) phrase, 'prosthetic' - worlds. The proxy is situated on a cusp\(^{2}\) of the institutional subsets that make up these worlds, composed partly (on the assumption that the individual is literate) of self-generated, and partly (wholly if the individual is not literate) of other-issued, texts. On the far right of the matrix, the interplay of institutions produces a “world” (\(\rightarrow \square\)) , and the bundling together of the various textual proxies into a narrative and hierarchical sequence produces a “life” (\(\rightarrow \square\) ).

3.9: The Power of the Proxy

At the outset of this chapter (section 3.1), I referred to what the textual proxy 'procures' from its originary source as a surplus of that source's power. The essence of that power is located in the ability of writing and the written to transcend the time and space constraints that limit the capacity of the "unproxified" corporeal self. I illustrate these two facets of the written - mobility and durability - below, showing how textuality provides [i] an infrastructure for the conveyance of bodies from one place to another; and [ii] an ultimate form of transcendence, the determination of mortality and the survival of the personality past the point of physical death.

3.9.1: 'Something to Read for the Journey'

Notable among sociologists is the analogy drawn between aspects of social structure and locomotion, as expressed through the metaphor of the train. The variants on\(^{2}\) This corresponds to Goffmann's contention that the 'simplest sociological view of the individual and his self is that he is to himself what his place in an organization defines him to be. Perhaps we should...initially (define) the individual, for sociological purposes, as a stance-taking entity, a something that takes up a position somewhere between identification with an organization and opposition to it [...] Our status is backed by the solid buildings of the world, while our sense of personal identity resides in the cracks' (1961: 319-20, emphases added).
this metaphor are pervasive in classical sociology, and employed by major theorists of diverse persuasions to different ends. Marx uses it both descriptively and as an integral factor in Capital's politico-economic structure. In a letter of 1879, he considers railroads as the *couronnement de l'oeuvre* (crowning achievement) of advanced industrial capitalism, 'in the sense that they were at last (together with steamships for oceanic intercourse and the telegraph) the *means of communication* adequate to the means of production' (Marx, edited de la Haye, 1979: 19, emphases in the original). Weber, more figuratively, characterises his prime movers of historical processes as intellectual "switchmen" who determine the "tracks" along which roll the dominant material and ideal interests that 'directly govern men's conduct' (Weber, in Gerth & Mills, [1952]1977: 280).

Mead uses a similar image in a different context: drawing from Einstein's theory of relativity in his 1932 elaboration of the self as a conscious organism whose perception of reality is always and necessarily contingent on time/space location, he stresses the equivalence between physical- and social-scientific concepts by reference to the situation of 'a man in a train [passing] from the system of the movement of his train to that of the movement of a neighbouring train', and his uniquely perceptual ability to simultaneously conceive of two opposite states, 'passing from one to the other'. This passage is claimed by Mead as the very 'character of reality', in that it denotes essential 'change in the structure of things, and that because of passage objects can occupy different systems' (Mead, 1959, orig. 1932: 81; discussion in Ezzy's conceptualisation of narrative identity, 1998: 241). In a further variant, Schutz illustrates his own essential relational difference between the phenomenological categories of consociates and contemporaries as follows:

'[w]hen I board a train, ...I orient myself to the fact that the engineer in charge can be trusted to get me to my destination. My relationship to him is a They-relationship at this time, merely because my ideal type "railroad engineer" means by definition "one who gets passengers like myself to their destination". It is therefore characteristic of my social relationships with my contemporaries that the orientation by means of ideal types is mutual. Corresponding to my ideal type "engineer" there is the engineer's ideal type "passenger". Taking up mutual They-orientations, we think of each other as "one of them" ' (1972: 202).
Schutz expands this conceptual illustration in an attached footnote that extends the virtual worlds of contemporaneity from ideal-typical engineer/passenger to ideal-typical author/reader. But these analogies between the soci(ologic)al and the transportational are more than merely figurative aids to thinking, and the way that reading/writing and documentation figure in actual mobility operates at a deeper level than the analogical.

Pierce Butler (1968: 1-2) foregrounds the typically taken-for-granted debt that “modern man” owes to the printer - ‘apparent to anyone who will review a random segment of his daily routine and count the number of times that it is marked with printing ink’ - in a culture permeated by typography:

'Consider, for example, an ordinary city dweller as he sets out for a holiday in the north woods. Paradoxically, he cannot even get to the wilderness without the assistance of a printer. He has probably selected his destination because printed postage stamps have brought him printed advertisements which describe and picture the local attractions. The taxicab that takes him to the railroad station prints a receipt to certify that the driver has not overcharged him. At the station he buys a printed ticket with printed money and finds out from a printed timetable the hour of his train’s departure and the route it will follow. In the baggage-room he exchanges his heavier luggage for a printed check on which an official prints with hand stamps the date and the other particulars to fit the occasion. As his bags rumble off on a truck he wonders if he has forgotten anything and runs over in his mind an inventory of their contents. Although he may not notice it, nearly every article that he thinks of is, or has been, in a container elaborately covered with printing. Perhaps our hypothetical traveller can recall no forgotten necessity for last-minute purchase so, hoping for the best, he prepares to enter the train. Here, then, we may leave him - at the newsstand buying “something to read” for the journey'.

De Certeau writes in a corresponding key, but places his “traveller” on the train itself. His ruminations also link transport to text, but in an entirely different and more speculative fashion. He begins with the observation that in moving through a landscape by rail and contrary to the evidence of the senses, neither the landscape nor the traveller is in actual motion - only the locomotive. The commuter is in the grip of a
'travelling incarceration. Immobile inside the train, seeing immobile things slip by...Nothing is moving inside or outside the train...Inside, there is the immobility of an order...Every being is placed there like a piece of printer’s type on a page arranged in military order. This order, an organizational system, the quietude of a certain reason, is the condition of both a railway car’s and a text’s movement from one place to another [...]. In modern Athens, the vehicles of mass transportation are called metaphorai. To go to work or come home, one takes a “metaphor” - a bus or a train. Stories could also take this noble name: every day, they traverse and organize places; they select and link them together; they make sentences and itineraries out of them...stories, whether everyday or literary, serve as a means of mass transportation, as metaphorai’ (De Certeau, 1988 [orig. 1974]: 111, 115).

A quarter-century on and a continent away from Butler’s speculations, another form of metaphorai: constructing an anthropology of the proximate in the consideration of “non-places” that constitute habitual dwellings in contemporary society, Marc Augé (1995: 1-5) sets his fictional traveller ‘Pierre Dupont’ off on an international business trip, flying from Paris to Bangkok. Under what Augé terms a new condition of ‘supermodernity’, Butler’s earlier debt owed by the commuter to the printer has not yet been discharged. ‘Dupont’s’ progress, from leaving his house to aircraft take-off, is similarly punctuated by encounters mediated by artefacts of print: credit cards, receipts for purchase, parking voucher showing the location of his stored vehicle, passport/visa, airline ticket, boarding pass and seat allocation slip, “fasten seatbelt’ and “no smoking” signs, and - along with information brochures on safety, flight paths and aircraft specifications - again the optional ‘something to read for the journey’ either purchased at the airport bookshop or provided by the company’s in-flight magazine or complementary periodicals. Had Augé broadened his description, he could well have noted that the immediate typography surrounding and utilised by ‘Dupont’ also extended to corollary institutions concerned with travel risk-management, and to the favoured form of transport, the aircraft itself. Noting that in modern industrial societies, ‘the vast majority of books bear no cultural burden at all: they are parts catalogs, census reports, Department of Agriculture pamphlets, tide tables, tax codes, repair manuals, telephone directories, airline schedules - documents whose appearance as books rather than in some other form has mostly to do with the practical
requirements of display and diffusion and the limits of available technologies',
Nunberg goes on to illustrate his claim by example:

'The Travellers Insurance Company produces printed output at a rate of roughly a billion impressions a month, enough to fill all the shelves of the new Bibliothèque de France every six months or so. The printed documentation that accompanies the delivery of a single Boeing 747 weighs about 350 tons, only slightly less than the airplane itself' (Nunberg, in Bloch & Hesse, 1995: 14).

3.9.2: "Journey's End": the Dead.

Two axioms, familiar to sociology - that the dead are both more numerous and more powerful than the living - reach higher levels of determinancy in societies utilising written records. The written instantiates a variety of continuing relationships between dead and living bodies, particularly (and paradoxically) under conditions of modernity. Examples of such a claim would include Comte's aphorism that 'society is composed of more dead than living members'; Fontenelle, who states that the dead are not only more numerous but more powerful than the living; or, in an 18th-century political context, both Burke's avowal that society 'is a contract...it becomes a partnership not only between those who are living, but between those who are living, those who are dead, and those who are to be born' (1961, orig. 1790: 110) and Paine's direct response, which finds him 'contending for the rights of the living, and against their being willed away, and controlled and contracted for, by the manuscript assumed authority of the dead; and Mr. Burke is contending for the authority of the dead over the rights of the living' (1961, orig. 1791: 278, underline added). Two centuries on, the same context, and Massumi's claim that '[t]he dead have always played an active role in American politics. During the 1980s, they came to be one of the most powerful constituencies in the country' (1993: 16). Later, Marx, in the Eighteenth Brumaire of 1869, will declare that 'the tradition of the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the minds of the living'; and from a different perspective we hear Virilio (1987: 29) speaking of a synthetic modern order where 'the living and the living dead merge to the point of delirium'.

For C. Wright Mills, 'the first rule for understanding the human condition is that men live in second-hand worlds...in their everyday life they do not experience a world of
solid fact...Yet for every man these images - provided by strangers and dead men - are the very basis of his life as a human being' (1963: 405); and staying within the realms of sociology, Morgan affirms that in various ways

‘death is socially constructed. In order that a person can be considered dead in our society, there must be a death certificate. Even then, death is not immediately recognised. In some areas, people stay on the electoral register until their death is proved by the Registration Officer actually seeing the death certificate...the dead are not gone away; they remain present amongst the living in a different form and the living must take account of this in their everyday actions' (1990: 165).


This chapter has provided an entry-point into a general ‘proxy theory’ and indicated some of its more specific contexts. Germane to this thesis, Bourdieu’s observation in the accompanying headnote relates a concept of proxies to the sociological enterprise, and the term has been deployed in other fields - specifically literary theory (Hix, 1990: 163-93), political activism (Alinsky, 1971: 165-83) and interstate confrontation (Dunér, 1981). Proceeding from this chapter as a whole, and with especial reference to the discussion at 3.8, the figure below focusses on a particular “type” of proxied self and its situation in a specifically-constructed “world-as-text”, detailing the movements of both towards a situation of lethal conflict - the condition of war:

Figure 3.8: Application of the Proxy Principle - The War Situation.
In this last depiction, an institutionalised social grouping - the state, alone or in alliance with one or more other similarly-constituted entities (...) - establishes hostile relations (↔) with another (combination of) state(s). An area of the larger world both entities inhabit (0) is demarcated (0) as the arena - geopolitical and ideological - where the hostile parties will contend. For the duration of hostilities, the multiple social identities attaching to the 'civil' self, the individuals that make up the populations of the conflicting states, are reduced/reconfigured into a particular being consonant with the state's war effort: a 'military proxy'. Military proxies are constituted from the state's archived knowledge of the capacities of its (singular and collective) citizenry. On the basis of this knowledge, the populace is divided into those whose characteristics - age and able-bodiedness - are convertible (through training in institutional isolation from the individual's prior peacetime social world[s]) to membership in a branch of the armed forces: these become combatants, who will directly engage (↔) the similarly-constructed soldiery of the rival state(s). The remainder of the population not so 'fitted' to direct confrontation are reconstituted as a 'home front': auxiliary non-combatants whose activities provide support for the contending militaries in the field.

This is war as delineated from the perspective of the proxy principle, and as understood under conditions of contemporaneity. But arrival at such a conception is the outcome of an aggregated series of significant changes in violent intergroup conflict over what Braudel and the Annales School term the longue durée of history: it includes a precursive history that encompasses non-state human formations and non-textually constituted humans engaging in orchestrated warlike head-to-head confrontations. The following chapter elaborates the origins and development of the transformations that will culminate in this contemporary war situation.
Chapter 4: The PROTO-TEXTUAL GENESIS of ORGANIZED CONFLICT.

This chapter examines three temporal phases - using standard historical periodisations of the primitive, the ancient and the medieval - in the origins, evolution and spread of writing and war, and their gradual merging over time into a war/text axis.

I initially treat at some length two long-run disputes in anthropology. The first concerns the problematic of "primitive war": do instances of intrapersonal violence within, and/or organised intergroup physical fighting between, societies classified as primitive, qualify as war? The category of primitive war remains a site of essential contestation resting on two opposed and irreconcilable paradigms: the "primal order" as either an unremitting violence of the war of all against all, or the idyllic image of a pacific noble savagery. Recent analyses have qualified - but not eliminated - this base-level disparity, and two of the most recent take it as a specific point of departure: in the first, Paul Crook's survey of the sociobiology of war builds from "the Kropotkin paradigm" of a benevolent nature/humanity encountering violent technologies and state/class systems. This is contrasted with "the Huxley paradigm" of a violent nature/humanity curbed by an ethical, nature-transcending civilisation (1994: 194). In the second, archaeologist Lawrence Keeley locates ongoing debates in the topic area of war at the earlier and more "classical" historical remove, to the way in which, in "the modern period, these ancient mythic themes were elaborated by Hobbes and Rousseau into enduring philosophical attitudes towards primitive and prehistoric peoples" (1996: 5).

Addressing this issue thus continues to hinge - explicitly or implicitly - on conceptions of [i] pre-civilized societies as either inherently savage or fundamentally peaceful; and, at a broader and deeper level, [ii] humankind as "naturally" either bellicose or pacific.

The second area of contestation deals with a key facet of the category "primitive" itself. "Primitive" (alternatively, 'simple') societies and cultures are typically defined in the negative, characterised as lacking in features found in "civilized" (aka 'complex' or 'developed') social systems. Amongst the items lacking is a
sophisticated - or more often, any - form of writing. Anthropology shares with sociology much of the ambiguity of being enstooled midway between C. P. Snow's "two cultures", the physical sciences and the humanities (Lepenies, 1988), and persistently maintains that a simplest way of viewing its subject-matter is as the study of peoples without writing (Lévy-Bruhl, 1923: 352-83; Mair, 1966: 9; Daniel, 1971: 19-43; Crick, 1976: 153; Kalmar, in Olson et al, 1985: 157). A stronger statement of this type is found in Lévi-Strauss (1961: 291), that of 'all the criteria by which people habitually distinguish civilization from barbarism, this should be the one most worth retaining: that certain peoples write and others do not', and that anthropology's bailiwick is the study of peoples on the nether side of this distinction. However, the oral/literate 'great divide' as a valid marker of "the primitive" has been challenged (Finnegan, 1988: 12-14, and passim), sometimes by its chief theorists (Goody, 1977), as has the firmly-entrenched doctrine of the centrality of the fieldwork account that brings it into being (the putatively 'postmodern' challenges issued by Boon, 1982; Stocking, 1987; Geertz, 1988; Van Maanen, 1988; or the seminal Writing Culture collection edited by Clifford & Marcus, 1986).

Here I bring these contestable arenas into conjunction. My claim is that (a) the presence or absence of writing is a valid demarcation between types of societies; (b) there is no such thing as primitive war; and (c) a prime reason for (b) is (a). Expressed at its bluntest, it is argued that the unequivocal term (""primitive war""") is both conceptually and empirically problematic, and has meaning - and utility - only in a suitably qualified sense: hence, following Giddens (1985: 53), I maintain the convention of placing the term within inverted commas.

But this indicative move alone is insufficient: a potential problem remains, in that if the logic of the proposition that writing both predates and is a causal factor in war holds, then analysis of group conflict within and between societies without writing may be regarded as both unnecessary and anomalous - or at the very least, in need of explanation. Within the scope of the thesis, why consider, in Turney-High's (1949) classic formulation, the practices of 'preliterate societies below the military horizon'?
There is a fivefold justification for such an analysis: firstly, to unpack the thinking behind the commitment of those anthropologists who unqualifiedly describe their subjects as primitive-warring confederations; second, to stress that although "primitive war" is a null category retrospectively applied - equivalent to 'literacy's' nineteenth-century formulative origin in "illiteracy" (see Chapter 1) - this makes it, in the sense of the W. I. Thomas axiom, no less true in its consequences; regarding one such consequence, thirdly, to assess the degree to which particular forms of exploitative cultural contact (colonialism, imperialism) have been recast by the conquerors as legitimate war outcomes; fourthly, to uncover the common precursive origins of war and writing - drawing on Keegan's insight, although we 'date "history" from the moment when man began to write or, more precisely, from when he left traces of what we can recognise as writing' and the 'history of warfare begins with writing, ...its prehistory cannot be ignored' (1993: 115); and finally, to note the way in which "primitive" combat tactics have been incorporated into warfare 'proper'/modern war. Hugh Thomas (1995: 148-49) is particularly eloquent in elaborating this fifth point:

'The violence of savage peoples was, and is, expressed in head-hunting, assassination, man hunts and predatory expeditions...Can such killings be dignified by the name of warfare? No: the idea of "warfare" applies when, as J. H. Huizinga put it, a "special condition of hostility solemnly proclaimed is recognised, as distinct from individual quarrels and family feuds". This definition has not always been carried out even by modern peoples who believe themselves civilised. Still, in African communities a fight over succession to the chieftainship was traditionally a permanent feature of life. To men of the Stone Age, war was not the business of a few select people. It was the occupation of every adult male, whose aim was to kill enemy males and to abduct the women and children. In some respects, people of the twentieth century have returned to a condition where discrimination between victims is impossible: slaughter is now on total lines'

Recourse here to the observations of historians raises a final point: the distinction herein between the relatively detailed analysis of the "primitive", and the broader and more cursory treatment of the ancient and medieval periods, rests on two rationales. The first and more general concerns the essential difference between history and the social sciences: while the former necessarily bases depictions solely
on what survives of the archaeological and literary record, the latter frames its account partly on the artefactual but primarily on the experiential: that is, with reference to living subjects. We - as temporally and generically modern - cannot "know" the historical past in the same way that we can access the ethnological present. The second rationale, related to this first factor but more specific to the confines of the present thesis, sees this historical past as both constitutive of and constructed by the present. While ancient and medieval eras are 'read' on the basis of their recognisable similarity to the present, the "primitive" is resolutely non-modern, and is studied from the viewpoint of being fundamentally different - such difference demanding a more detailed treatment.

This treatment takes the following form: first, I indicate from the anthropological literature the type and degree of the assorted positions within the fields of contention. This discussion is grounded in a derivation of the War/Text Axis (Figure 1.1) as it relates to the societal types in question. Since both the relative size of these societies and the social relations that pertain within and between them looms large in the analysis, I eschew the unequivocal term "primitive societies" and its variants, replacing it with the more indicative designation of reciprocal mini-systems. This produces the scheme in Figure 4.1 (below):

**Figure 4.1: RECIPROCAL MINI-SYSTEMS**

<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Combat Mode: Praxis/Example[s]</td>
<td>[2] &quot;PRIMITIVE WAR&quot; (hunting, raids, the feud)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative Historical Condition</td>
<td>[4] ORAL CULTURE</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Elders.</td>
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</table>
To flesh out this model and further advance the argument, I then construct an inventory of 76 societies classified as ‘non-warring’ in the works of 24 separate analysts (Appendices C and D to this Chapter). The particular selections and the concomitant choice of analysts is based on [i] a relatively high level of agreement on the peacefulness of the chosen societies - some are cited in as many as seven separate accounts; this despite the fact that [ii] at least 13 of the authors deployed subscribe to the view that ‘pre-civilized’ societies exhibit high degrees of violent organised conflict. The resort by the majority of analysts to [iii] a common database - the Human Relations Area File (HRAF) - minimalises the potential for either misunderstandings about, or an “apples & oranges”-type comparison between, the units of analysis. Moreover, this near-unanimity as to the absence of war in these cases is [iv] consistent over time (the earliest study undertaken in 1911, the latest in 1996). These cases are then placed in a comparative data-set organised around their respective structural characteristics (Appendix E), and a determination is made as to which of these characteristics is shared, and which are most conducive to the evident peace pertaining within these societies.

4.1: “Primitive War”

_Among savages the means of intercourse are restricted to tribes who are neighbours, and hostilities confined in the same manner. As knowledge increases the means of intercourse extend, and nations not in the immediate vicinity, learn to mingle in each others affairs. The history of European nations proves this, among whom treaties offensive and defensive have been constantly extending and multiplying for the last two centuries, as their intercourse has increased, and wars, without becoming less frequent, have become far more general, bloody, and expensive._

James Currie, 1793.

The upper section of Figure 4.1 (segments 1 to 3) deals with aspects of intergroup conflict between small-scale societies: which societal members fight and how the group’s combat formation is coordinated; how such fighting is undertaken and with what kinds of technology; and how such conflict is described and classified. Regarding the first aspect [1], Andrzejewski (1954) maintains that the basic military structures of such groups are of two main types. While both exhibit high degrees of combat participation (M) by “suitable” group members (typically adult males), and egalitarianism, with low levels (s) of formally-hierarchical ranked
authority structures, the *Masaic* has greater group solidarity (C) than the *Tallenic* type (c). In the case of the Tallensi of Africa, this low cohesion is accounted for by environment - small tribal units live in inhospitable terrain, kin-bonded but geographically isolated. In Andrzejewski’s extension of this Tallenic ideal-type to South Africa’s Trekboers, early Cossack settlements and particularly the frontiersmen of pre-20th-century North America, there is lack of cohesion partly because of geographical dispersal, but primarily because of (i) a ‘rugged individualist’ ethos, couched within (ii) an awareness of cultural sameness and commitment to a (iii) roughly egalitarian value-system enforced by (iv) personal armaments - in the trans-Appalachian states of early 19th-century America, ‘everybody had his gun’ - , all operating in (v) the absence of a strong centralised government with ‘a large disciplined army and a well-organised administrative machine; both of which would have been indispensable had the United States been exposed continuously to a serious external threat’ (1954: 140-41). Thus, ‘Tallenic’ military organisation is applicable to groups outside the “primitive” - ie, not structurally simple in the ethnological (technical) sense (although typically characterised as “savage” in looser lay terms). Group size is largely irrelevant, geographical situation is more salient, but the determining factors in such an organizational form are clearly *cultural and political*.

With reference to the second aspect above - combat methods and technologies - the term ‘simulation’ as deployed here [3] refers firstly to symbolic substitutes for physical confrontation - either the use of non-lethal “weaponry” (such as jokes or vocal abuse rather than “sticks ‘n’ stones”) or the application of physical force to a substitute non-human “enemy”. This is akin to Malinowski’s (1941) reference to Eskimo ‘public insult’ songs as a grievance-settling mechanism and to Vayda’s (1971) description of the ‘nothing-fights’ of the New Guinea Maring. It is further equivalent to Sumner’s observations of 1911, citing the practices of Papuan and New Guinean peoples, and of “Australian” fighting, where “[r]eal fighting rarely takes place unless the women arouse the men, and even then it is carried on by taunts and wrestling...the first wound ends the combat’; this same principle applying amongst the Chatham Islanders; the Rengmahs on the Assam Hills, who ’attach to the body a tail of wood eighteen inches long, curved upwards, which they wag in
defiance at an enemy'; the 18th-century account of the Colombian Aurohuacos, who settle disputes by having the contenders 'go out to a big rock or tree, and each with his staff beats the rock or tree with vituperations... (t)he one whose staff breaks first is the victor; then they embrace and return home as friends'; and the Mru, who 'do not fight but call in an exorcist to take the sense of the spirits on the matter'. From these and other like examples spring Sumner's general conclusion, that 'we cannot postulate a warlike character or a habit of fighting as a universal or even a characteristic trait of primitive man'.

Another variant on simulated lethal confrontation - and one that significantly shades off into 'heroics' - is the widespread Plains Indian practice of 'counting coup'. Here the warrior acquires personal status through bravery, not by injuring, capturing or killing the opponent(s), but by touching the live enemy lightly with a hand or stick - the amount of status gained dependent on the degree and kind of personal risk involved in the manoeuvre (representative Comanche instances of the practice in Fehrenbach, 1975: 75-6; Dyer, 1986: 10).

If such theatrics constituted the sum total of "primitive" conflict, the image of the peaceful 'savage', inhabiting a benign state of nature until exposed to violence through contact with "corrupt" civilized societies, would have an indisputable basis in fact. But the ethnographic record also shows that some of "nature's children" displayed and commemorated their heroic prowess through more malignant forms of simulation: reduction of the enemy to meat, mutilation of vanquished foes before (and after) their defeat and death, and the spoils of victory - trophies both functional (goods, land and kinfolk) and symbolic (portions of the enemy's carcass, with the head and parts of the head - skull, scalp) - particularly favoured. Evidence of such practices - archaeological (Keeley, 1996; Ferrill, 1985), in early accounts of Europeans in close and regular contact with indigenous societies (Catlin, [1867] 1967; Cremony, [1868] 1991; Haddon, [1899] 1932), in the recorded oral testimonies of surviving members of such peoples (Weems, 1991; W. B. "Woody" Skinner, 1987) and in the ferocity displayed by these groups recruited into modern

31 Claims that scalping was a European importation into New world societies and not practised by Amerindians prior to contact with white invaders/colonisers, is effectively discounted, on the basis of forensic, etymological and artefactual evidence, by Axtell & Sturtevant (1980).
combat situations (account of Evans-Pritchard[32] described in Geertz, 1988: 49-72) - is abundant.

Such evidence forms the basis for categorising these practices as elements of (" primitive war") [2]. Anthropologists adopting such an unqualified category as a point of departure are then left with the task of analysing its structure/ mapping its distribution, or describing features of - and assigning motives to - this group enterprise. Motives are typically sociobiological (gender-based as in McCarthy 1994, or the 'male supremacist complex' hypothesis of Divale & Harris [1976]), or ecological (relying on population pressure and control of fertile land - Harris, 1974; Ember, 1982) or some combination of both. The latter approach factors new elements - cultural, economic and political - into the explanation, chief amongst which is the primitive origin of the state as a war-making entity.

Social analysts of various persuasions (eg, Hart & Taylor, 1944: 292; Krader, 1968; Parsons [ed. Jackson, 1977]; Mann, 1987: 34-72) are roughly agreed on a general typology of state evolution. Amalgamating such representative analyses, the archaeological and historical record shows a trend from smaller to larger aggregations, as in Earle's taxonomy:

Table 4.1: Some common anthropological typologies of social evolution
(Earle's synthesis, in Ingold, 1997: 941)

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hunter-Gatherers</td>
<td>Band (family level)</td>
<td>Head man</td>
<td>Egalitarian society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers</td>
<td>Tribe (local group)</td>
<td>Big man</td>
<td>Ranked society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilization</td>
<td>Chiefdom</td>
<td>Simple</td>
<td>Stratified society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>State</td>
<td>Complex</td>
<td>State</td>
</tr>
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[32] Evans-Pritchard's military memoir of 1973 records his leadership of Anuak troops against Italian forces in 1940-41: according to Keegan (1993: 89), the 'horrors of the revenge they [the Anuak] took on their former rulers caused him [Evans-Pritchard] anguish for the rest of his life'
Each movement also represents an increase in land-fixity, political complexity, an extension beyond kin-based relationships and, correspondingly, a shift from concreteness to abstraction. In these terms there are five such moves:

1 family/band -> 2 (= 1 x n) clan -> 3 (= 2 x n) tribe -> 4 (= 3 x n) state -> 5 (= 4 x n) empire/commonwealth

As indicated by the parentheses, each successive unit is formed from a conglomerate of its predecessor(s). Average sizes of the respective formations vary, but following Carporael’s 1995 scheme and proposals by Mann (1987: 42-4), population estimates of at least the first 3 groupings are possible: families minimally comprise 2-5 persons and the normal size range of the band is 20-70; clans, considered as lineage-based congeries of several families, range between c.30-175 people; and the tribe - for both authors a ‘maximum band’ or ‘macrodeme’ - consists of 7-19 bands with a maximal workable size of no more than 400-500 persons.

Population increase past this figure leads to either fission, or the necessary (but not sufficient) conditions for the emergence of a state, and the possibility of a subsequent assemblage of confederated states into an empire. Past this point also, theories of the state become at once and necessarily (a) less empirically grounded, leading to an increase in (b) selectivity in terms of independent (and therefore relevant dependent) variables, producing both (c) an objective support for the ideal of theoretical parsimony as a virtue, wedded to (d) competition between diverse “schools of thought”, fostering in the domain of discourse (e) premature integration. Mann addresses these issues in his presentation of five main theories of the state - class, pluralist, realist (international relations), elite and ‘cock-up’ or ‘foul-up’ theory - before presenting his own mostly-synthetic version: ‘organizational materialism’, which conceives the nation-state as ‘power container’, this power drawn from an amalgam of the ideological, economic, military and political resources (acronymically therefore, the IEMP model) that the state can command (Mann, 1993: 44-88).

An alternative view posits the properties of the land itself as a determining factor in originary state-formation. Working from the standpoint of the ecology to the territory in which populations are initially located, and returning to first principles rather than deducing retrospectively from later developments, Carneiro critiques
both voluntaristic theories - claiming state-formation as spontaneously generated from a 'social contract' as unsupported by evidence - and coercive/conquest theories, which, although granted as a factor in all states, equally leaves out (i) cases where belligerence does not result in the construction of a state; and (ii) does not identify the conditions that connect the state to warfare, nor which factor is causal, which effect (1970: 168-69). What is eschewed here are theories that rely on human nature as either "naturally" associative or "instinctively" acquisitive/territorial. Presented as alternative to both these options is what Cameiro terms circumscription theory: originary states arise in diverse locales and differ in terms of their specific geographies, but they 'do, however, have one thing in common - they are all areas of circumscribed agricultural land' (1970: 169, emphasis in the original). This circumscription takes 3 forms: natural barriers (environmental circumscription), where the territory is bounded by mountains, deserts, or the sea; resource concentration, where the land is available but unproductive; or social circumscription, where adjoining desirable land is occupied by (a) pre-established group(s). Given that '[N]eolithic communities...generally tend to grow in size, placing increasing demands on arable lands and other resources' (Graber & Roscoe, 1988: 407), and fission or nomadism is vetoed by the circumscribed environment, 'breakout' and expansion into fertile but socially circumscribed territory leads to war against the original occupiers, and subjugation by the victors leads to more population pressure causing more resource depletion and need for expansion, and 'successively larger and more complex units are formed until, eventually, a polity is created that deserves the title of state' (Graber & Roscoe, 1988: 408).

As an explanation of war, Carneiro's theory has many virtues. The tenet of the origins of a state - and war as a specifically statemaking activity - originating in neolithic territorially-bounded groups tallies with other analyses: for instance, in terms of acquisition and possession of land and a cognate materialist mindset, it resonates with Sahlins' argument in *Stone Age Economics* (1972) around his conception of 'original affluent societies'.

In his opening chapter, Sahlins builds his depiction of hunter-gatherer/oraging groups around the notion of the 'two possible courses to affluence', alternatively, producing much or desiring little. The first course, production of an economic surplus
and its negative corollary (the principle of scarcity and inadequacy of economic means) is the path adopted initially by neolithic groups, and is most evident at its peak in modern capitalist societies. Paleolithic hunter-gatherers adopt the second ("Zen") road to affluence. To the degree that this is valid, it means that the "limited resources x unlimited desires" formula is inapplicable to such groups on either side of the equation - and if this is so, it must also follow that there is likewise no motivation for war in such groups.

Relative to political organisation resulting from territorial expansion, Clastres (1987) distinguishes tribes from what, in Carneiro, will later develop through warring into states. Tribal chieftainship and leadership in states are opposed to each other here - the former, in fact, is a deliberate 'strategy' to prevent the formation of the latter:

'Hence there is no king in the tribe, but a chief who is not a chief of State. What does that imply? Simply that the chief has no authority at his disposal, no power of coercion, no means of giving an order. The chief is not a commander; the people of the tribe are under no obligation to obey. The space of the chieftainship is not the locus of power, and the "profile" of the primitive chief in no way foreshadows that of a future despot. There is nothing about the chieftainship that suggests the State apparatus derived from it...the chief's word carries no force of law...' (1987: 205-6, emphases in the original).

In short, tribes operate on a different basis to 'advanced' societies inasmuch as the chief is a reflection, not a "shaper" of 'public opinion', and cannot within his "term of office" act contrary to a 'general will' (which he embodies). Clastres argues that the structure of non-Statist (here, tribal) chieftainship is such that, were the leader to utter the 'mere word' initiating war, the basis of his leadership - prestige and his sense of the group's desires - is undercut, and the tribe is duty-bound to abandon him: his examples of this process in action are the respective fates of Fousiwe of the Yanomamo, and the Apache leader Geronimo. On this reading, tribal formations, unlike States, are not governed in a top-down manner, and the chief is ostracised unless his pronouncements mesh with a popular will. This links back to Sahlins' response to Hobbes' [in]famous take on the primal human condition ('Warre'), where warfare is so pervasive and chronic that only the institution of a regulatory State can ensure peace. As maintained in Tribesmen, with originary moves out of hunter-
gatherer society, '...the potential of Warre is, if anything, increased by the advance to tribalism' (Sahlins, 1968: 8), and further increased - indeed, realised - under conditions of Carneiro's concept of primal lebensraum.

Carneiro's theory has further strengths: in style, brevity and concision (the seminal 1970 paper occupied only 5 pages in Science); and in coverage, applying to later situations of colonial expansion (especially the maritime imperialisms of England, Holland or the Iberian thrusts into remote territory) as well if not better than the original (neolithic and ancient mesoAmerican) exemplary instances. But this latter virtue is double-edged; for the type of "war" provoked by various forms of circumscription which will evolve into a state is insufficiently differentiated from the type of war that such a state will prosecute once established. The power of the theory is marred by a consequence of its own evolutionary postulate, a tendency to too seamlessly equate an initial form of conflict (originary "primitive war") with its state-initiated successor (political war).

Two earlier analyses undertaken in the 1940s - those of Wright and Malinowski - may be regarded as forerunners of Carneiro's account of the origins of war. But unlike Carneiro, each carefully distinguishes between the types of violent conflict that respectively occur within "primitive/savage" societies and fully-developed "civilized" states. Wright preserves "war" as a valid term, but breaks it into 4 discrete forms - defensive, social, economic and political - maintaining that only the last of these are carried out by people 'on the verge of civilization', and that even here prototypes of such behaviour among the "pre-civilized" are warlike as opposed to unqualifiedly warring. Malinowski's 6-part distinction of conflict-types (a-f) is even clearer. For him, only categories (d) - war as an instrument of nation-state formation - and (f) - intergroup war 'as an instrument of national policy' - count as "war" at all.

Each approach is fully detailed for inspection in Table 4.2 overleaf:
Table 4.2: Comparison between WRIGHT'S four types of warfare and MALINOWSKI's six-part classification:


  'Defensive war' refers to the practice of those people...having no war in their mores...These people have no military organization or military weapons and do not fight unless actually attacked, in which case they make spontaneous use of available tools and hunting weapons to defend themselves but regard this necessity as a misfortune. Social war refers to the practice of people...stated to be unwarlike or to engage in only mild warfare...These people have customs dealing with military tactics, military weapons, the circumstances and formalities of warmaking and peacemaking, and the warriors consist of all men in the tribe trained in the war mores from youth. Tactics involve little group formation or co-operation but consist of night raids, individual duels in formal pitched battles, or small head-hunting or blood-revenge parties. War is initiated and ended by formalities, often quite elaborate. Its purpose is blood revenge, religious duty, individual prestige, sport, or other social objective. It may on occasion involve considerable casualties in proportion to the population of the group and is characterised as cruel or bloody by some writers because prisoners are not taken. Land or booty of economic value is not taken either. The object is slaughter of the enemy or acquisition of trophies, such as heads or scalps, of symbolic significance. These wars are, however, usually not very destructive of life and are looked upon as thrilling adventures by the participants. Economic war refers to the practice of people who, in addition to other purposes, fight to provide the economic needs of the group, such as women, slaves, cattle, tools, raw material and land. Such people usually have a system of military training in mass tactics and regard war as a necessary part of the tribe's economic activities...Political war refers to the practice of people who, in addition to other purposes, fight for a political purpose, i.e., to maintain a ruling dynasty or class in power, to suppress rebellion or insurrection, and to expand political territory or control. Such people usually support standing armies, disciplined in group manoeuvres and utilizing specialized weapons and methods which may prolong a war for a considerable period of time. Among them the military profession is usually regarded as especially honourable. People with such practices are on the verge of civilization, but writers usually classify them as primitive but very warlike...'

- Malinowski (1941: 541-42, emphases added).

  '(a) Fighting, private and angry, within a group belongs to the type of breach of custom and law and is the prototype of criminal behaviour. It is countered and curbed by the customary law within the institutions and between institutions.

  (b) Fighting, collective and organized, is a juridical mechanism for the adjustment of differences between constituent groups of the same larger cultural unit. Among the lowest savages these two types are the only forms of armed contest to be found.

  (c) Armed raids, as a type of man-hunting sport, for purposes of head-hunting, cannibalism, human sacrifices, and the collection of other trophies.

  (d) Warfare as the political expression of early nationalism, that is, the tendency to make the tribe-nation and the tribe-state coincide, and thus to form a primitive nation-state.

  (e) Military expeditions of organized pillage, slave-raiding, and collective robbery.

  (f) Wars between two culturally differentiated groups as an instrument of national policy. This type of fighting, with which war in the fullest sense of the word began, leads to conquest, and, through this, to the creation of full-fledged military and political states, armed for internal control, for defense and aggression. This type of state presents, as a rule, and for the first time in evolution, clear forms of administrative, political and legal organization. Conquest is also of first-rate importance in the processes of diffusion and evolution.

The types of armed conflict listed as (d) and (f), and these two only, are, in form, sociological foundations and, in the occurrence of constructive policy, are comparable with historically-defined wars.

Every one of the six types here summed up presents an entirely different cultural phase in the development of fighting. The neglect to establish the differentiation here introduced has led to grave errors in the application of anthropological principles to general problems concerning the nature of war. The crude short-circuiting - by which our modern imperialisms, national hatreds, and world-wide lust of power have been connected with aggression and pugnacity - is largely the result of not establishing the above distinctions, of disregarding the cultural function of conflict, and of confusing war, as a highly specialized and mechanized phenomenon, with any form of aggression'
The centrality of the advanced state to warring practices calls into question the (unproblematized) primitive war category in toto. More specifically, organised conflict supposedly rife in ‘simple’ non-state societies has been cast into doubt. Thus Schneider contests Murdock’s account of Haida violence, and Warner’s of Murngin fighting, unequivocally concluding that for these as with other “primitive” groupings, ‘[t]his is not war’ ([1950] 1968: 291). Fjellman similarly queries another notable anthropological work, wherein the ‘Yanomamo are said to be fierce and are so coded in reports about war. Yet Chagnon (1976: 213) writes “the appearance of shotguns in a few villages has had a drastic impact on the scale and seriousness of wars. Fighting has broken out where it did not exist before” (emphasis mine). This last sentence is ambiguous enough to suggest that not all localities among the Yanomamo can be so clearly coded for war’ (1979: 198). Kiernan (1989: 22) follows suit in maintaining that among the Maori ‘before the white man and his firearms, hostilities were small-scale and desultory, and the issue might be settled by a challenge and single combat, conducted by some degree of chivalry even if tricks like throwing sand in an opponent’s eyes were resorted to at times. It was much the same among the Zulus, before Shaka33 the “Zulu Napoleon” organized his military machine and put an end to the sporadic sport of “reluctant warfare” they had been accustomed to’. Finally, Nettleship (in Nettleship, Givens & Nettleship, 1975: 81), incorporates the views of two other prominent analysts in his own opposition to the (“)primitive war(“) classification:

“Speaking of the Masai [c/f Andzrejewski’s designation of Masaic military organization], the New Guinea Highlanders, and the Crow Indians, Tiger and Fox (1971: 214) observe that, “At this very primitive level there is not - nor was there ever - much of what we would recognise as ‘war’. The history of our international violence has been, for more than ninety percent

33 The legend of Shaka’s politico-military “raw native genius” tends to ignore the part played in Zulu military reforms by his predecessor and mentor, Dingiswayo. Dingiswayo’s rise to power occurred at a time of Boer expansion and European penetration in the African South, and in his years of exile before his accession in the 1790s, he ‘had encountered at least one European...probably a doctor called Cowan, who is said to have become his friend. Elected chief, Dingiswayo deliberately set himself to strengthen the Mtetwa state, and did so with a fuller understanding of his times than any previous chiefs ever had. “Not only with the mere novelties of horse and gun was it that Dingiswayo had returned from exile...but, infinitely more momentous, with the idea of civilization and militarism which those things signified” - and that his successor would refine to such devastating effect (Davidson, 1974: 246).
of the time, a history of raid and skirmish". ("International" is an obvious error of terminology for reference to a "primitive level", no doubt motivated by a desire to ease identification of their material by contemporary general readers - perhaps they mean "intergroup"). Primitive societies are not sovereign states, they lack armed forces, and their fighting is of inconsiderable magnitude and of especially brief duration.

How, then, do we more accurately classify the conflicts in "primitive" societies? and how is such violence ("primitive war") to be separated out from homicidal criminality on the one side, and non-lethal simulations of violence in non- "primitive war"ring (peaceful) societies on the other?

In relation to the first issue, I follow Black-Michaud's distinctions between raiding, the feud, vengeance killing and warfare: the last term is distinguished from the first three by dint of its being finite in time, directly political, normatively exceptional, invariably collective and impersonal (1975:1-32, esp. pp 27 ff). In my conception, and as analytically distinct from this category of war, "primitive war", even when prosecuted on a sizeable scale, shares structural and tactical characteristics with these alternative forms of conflict.

With reference to the second issue, - the conditions under which the levels of physical violence and lethality attending "primitive war" do not emerge, or are sublimated into non-lethal pantomimes of violence - we return to the 'peaceful societies' paradigm and its exemplars outlined at the beginning of this chapter. Appendices C and D exegetically 'extract' seventy-six such societies from ethnographic sources; when comparatively examined in Appendix E, across the range of variables detailed in the accompanying coding key, the top 20 societies - those yielding the greatest range of ethnographic information - show marked dissimilarities in terms of geographical and ecological factors (columns c-e); mode of subsistence (column f); intra-political organisation (although clans predominate) and inter-political relations (although the 'isolated' category is heavily represented - columns g-h). Similarities emerge in column i, where with one exception (case 18) groups engage in Wright's special categories of 'social war' (6 cases), 'defensive war' (2 cases) or no war of any kind (4 cases). In columns j-n, on Otterbein's criteria for military activity comprising 9 cases, 'civil war' occurs 'frequently' in 3 cases, 'infrequently or never' in the remainder;
and war against other societies occurs ‘infrequently or never’ in all bar one recorded instance (case 9 - column j). Column k shows that the ‘military organisation(s)’ in the 9 samples are either composed of ‘nonprofessionals’ (5 cases) or non-existent (the other 4 cases); military tactics, where evident (5 cases) are lowest-level (column l) and casualty rates are correspondingly low (column m - 4 cases). When the 9 societies fight at all (5 cases), motives centre on land, plunder and/or revenge - and significantly never on ‘subjugation and tribute’, ‘trophies and honour’ or ‘defence’ (column n).

Finally, on the evidence of the 13 groups ranked by Carneiro in terms of the presence of cultural and political traits characteristic of ‘civilized’ societies, a dearth of either is clearly apparent (columns o and p), indicating a closeness to ‘nature’ and a consequent distance from the world as organised governmentally and mediated culturally.

In these findings the ‘deficit theory’ of “primitive” circumstances is preserved. The greatest commonality between the groups under consideration (reciprocal mini-systems) is negative, a lack the majority of factors later assessed by the ‘civilized’ as vital to military success. Whether ‘red in tooth and claw’ or fundamentally pacific, the contrast with war-waging entities formed into states, supplied with the technological, attitudinal and military advantages this provides - and endowed with command of an infrastructure of writing that is both progenitor and product of such advantages - is clear. The consequences of confrontation between such societies and their opposite numbers - ‘simple’ precivilized’ “primitive warring” groups without a systematics of advanced writing - is typically fatal to the survival of the latter, as illustrated in Appendix G, and as avowed by Wright when maintaining that

‘Out of the warlike peoples arose civilization, while the peaceful collectors and hunters were driven to the ends of the earth, where they are gradually being exterminated or absorbed, with only the dubious satisfaction of observing the nations which had wielded war so effectively to destroy them and to become great, now victimized by their own instrument’ (Wright, cited as the closing statement to Otterbein, 1970: 108).

34 In Appendix F, I attempt to further clarify this contrast. The left column is an inventory of “non-primitive” peaceful societies. As opposed to the equivalent list in Appendix D, Melko’s items must be ranked according to time-periods rather than locales, his societies occupants of a surrogate/mediated rather than a “real”/natural environment. Keeley’s list on the right shows how the alternative view of “primitive war” as the provenance of overt “savagery” is deployed in the contexts of modern war - the tactics of what Taber (1970) refers to as ‘the war of the flea’, Tallenic or guerrilla warfare - so different from the conventions of ‘real’ war as to result in the diversity of outcomes on display.
These outcomes graphically demonstrate a key consequence of life in a primarily oral culture [4] mediated by non-textual signs and face-to-face interaction. In the same way that the illiterate in a literate culture is/are significantly disadvantaged relative to the lettered, "amodern" societies living in a retrospectively-evaluated condition of non-literacy [5] have this condition equated to [6] savagery, with low or formally non-existent levels of formally differentiated power [-X] or the institutional mechanisms of a rational economy [-Y], the development of both checked by the absence, or at most a primal form (Arche-writing/the trace) of textuality. In the sphere of knowledge, relevant information about the known world is in principle accessible to all members of the society (band, tribe), gleaned in the first instance from the material world itself, and transmitted to neophytes by those (elders) with the longest tenure in this world [7]: an educational locus so different from that pertaining in modern 'complex' societies as to permit analysts as divergent as Jamake Highwater (1981) and Lucien Lévy-Bruhl (1923) to respectively refer to a 'primal mind' and a 'primitive mentality'.35

As claimed earlier (at p. 115 of this chapter, and on p. 17 of Chapter 1), Levi-Strauss is clearest in maintaining that the presence of writing differentiates between societal types, and confers power - primarily military power - on one type at the expense of others. But the status of his position, which in its fuller elaboration (in the 28th chapter of Tristes Tropiques) not only casts writing as a differentiator between peoples but evaluates it as a hegemonic exploitative force, is heavily contested. Moreover, a key problematic of an oral/literate divide involves the validity - and the rights - of the "civilised" to speak of and for the "primitive", and the legitimacy of communicating findings about societies built on utterance by credentialed ethnographers, in a written form, for a literate audience.

The favoured way of alleviating this potential dilemma - the 'cultured' reporting on the 'natural' - is through fieldwork. Writing, both in the form of notes in the field and the resulting polished ethnography produced after the research event, is an adjunct to

35 That this difference is a consequence of social structure and not cognitive incapacity is evident in works dealing with the diverse effects of "unschooled" literacy on a-modern nonindustrial groupings such as the Limba and the Mende of Sierra Leone (Finnegan, 1988: 45-58; Bledsoe & Robey, 1986), the Dayak of the Ulu Paku in Sarawak (Nicholl, 1951), the Kaonde of Zambia (Crehan, 1985), the Hausa of northern Nigeria (Armer & Youtz, 1970), the Vai of Liberia (Scribner & Cole, 1981) and the White Hmong of Northern Thailand (Tapp, 1990).
engagement in the daily rounds of the designated group: first-hand in situ experience of the group is privileged. The cardinal sin within the discipline is "armchair anthropology", and on this score Lévi-Strauss is taken to task by Edmund Leach's (1973) critique. In openly declaring himself as a Malinowski-style functionalist, and hence hostile to the tenets of structuralism and its founder, Leach attributes what he views as the weaknesses of the structuralist perspective in anthropology to the fact that Lévi-Strauss himself did so little actual fieldwork: 'about five months of actual field experience' in Brazil between 1934-7, during which time he 'can never have stayed in one place for more than a few weeks at a time and...he was never able to converse easily with any of his native informants in their native language' (1973: 10, 18-19). On this critique Lévi-Strauss, like Frazer before him, is too much a creature of the pen and a child of the academy, too little immersed in the life of the tribe.

The methodological hegemony of the fieldwork account has lately been subjected to scrutiny by revisionist 'postmodern' practitioners who see anthropology as primarily a species of narrative: most notably Geertz (1988; 1993: 1-36) and the contributors to Clifford & Marcus (1986). But this text-centred approach has been subject to attack on a number of grounds: Carneiro, championing the scientific validity of physical anthropology as established by methodologies in the field, brands the "post-modern" new ethnography as fatuous, obscurantist, aberrant and over-reflexive (1995; c/f a near-identical critique of the Clifford/Marcus collection dismissed as 'metatwaddle' in Gellner, 1992: 36-48, and Augé's belief that Clifford's thoroughgoing textual approach in ethnology 'runs the risk of triviality' [1995: 36]); and a fine line separates the treatment of ethnography "as if" it were a fiction from ethnography as a fiction -

A fuller attack on Lévi-Strauss, working from an entirely opposed premise and from outside anthropology, is offered by Derrida: 'If writing is no longer understood in the narrow sense of linear and phonetic notation, it should be possible to say that all societies capable of producing, that is to say, of obliterating, their proper names, and of bringing classificatory difference into play, practice writing in general. No reality or concept would therefore correspond to the expression "society without writing". This expression is dependent on ethnocentric oneirism, upon the vulgar, that is to say ethnocentric, misconception of writing. The scorn for writing, let us note in passing, accords quite happily with this ethnocentrism. The paradox is only apparent, one of those contradictions where a perfectly coherent desire is uttered and accomplished. By one and the same gesture, (alphabetic) writing, servile instrument of a speech dreaming of its plenitude and its self-presence, is scorned and the dignity of writing is refused to nonalphabetic signs' (Derrida, 1976: 109-10, parentheses in the original; but c/f Goldberg [1990: 17-26], who suggests a range of affinities between the speculations Levi-Strauss derives from the Nambikwaran 'writing lesson' and the wider implications - in spite of and/or against the stated intent - of Derrida's critical attempt to deconstruct this text).
the latter demonstrated in the differently problematic works of Tobias Schneebaum (1972) and Carlos Castaneda (De Mille, 1980: 68-91).

Moreover, recent moves towards what Franklin calls 'deep ethnography' in the Anthropology of Nature (1996: 3-4) see a re-emphasis on even more intense fieldwork (for general overviews see Ingold, 1994; the 1996 readings edited by Descola & Palsson; and especially Rival’s work [1993; 1996], re-examining the Huaroni from the vantage-point of actual involvement in their hunting and gathering activities rather than relying on "door-of-the-tent" fieldnotes built up from informants ex-post facto accounts). The eventual status of this work - and the extent to which it is motivated by dissatisfaction with former ethnographic studies gleaned by reading the record of precursor anthropologists in the first instance - is an open question; but the divide between the existential and the textual is maintained. For Harris, the distinction is clear enough to posit the presence of the written as a point of subject-matter demarcation between affiliated social-scientific domains, where '[a]nthropologists and sociologists recognise no more fundamental distinction than that which separates literate from preliterate cultures, and the differences are manifest in countless details of social organisation and institutions' (cited in Finnegan, 1988: 6).

The attempts by ethnographers to bridge this divide bring out a final instance of the complexities of reading/writing, and an ironic manifestation of its connection to warfare. For, consonant with the vestigial traces of “primitive war” methods in the

37 The ongoing discomfiture this divide induces is apparent in the attempts by the two following prominent anthropologists to place “primitive” beyond the reach of usage as a term of abuse. Firstly, Mair: ‘Many anthropologists have classed as “primitive” the peoples who do not have writing.... Where writing is not known, the number of persons who can be said to have a common government - if we may beg the question for a moment and assume that there always is such a thing - is small, rarely more than a few hundred thousand. So anthropologists sometimes refer to “small-scale” societies. “Pre-literate” is another word that does not have the offensive connotations of “primitive”. But neither of these words goes very well with "government". So let us keep “primitive”, but remember that when it is used it refers to the outfit of techniques available to the members of a given society, and not to their mental characteristics (1966: 9). Similarly, Kalmar: ‘I have indicated that there is a gradient of text permanence between languages in which there is little or no composed oral literature (no texts or memorized perorations of any length) and those with a large body of permanent written texts. To simplify the argument, let us call languages at the first extreme “primitive” and the others “evolved”. (As in social anthropology, primitive here means simply “in an early stage”. The thesis that a primitive language is of inferior worth will not be revived by any thinking linguist today. It is not even necessary that a primitive language be less complex than an advanced one. Adaptation to changing extralinguistic factors is all that is at stake). There may be many features not found in primitive languages that are found in evolved ones, and vice versa’ (Kalmar, in Olson et.al.,1985: 157).
theory and practice of guerrilla war (see note 34) and its adoption/adaption by advanced ‘civilized’ armies in specific war situations, anthropologists must also in part “go native” - paradoxically to render their a-modern human subject-matter comprehensible to a modern readership itself created and conditioned by textuality:

'It can be argued, then, that the phonetic alphabet, alone, is the technology that has been the means of creating “civilized man” - the separate individuals equal before a written code of law. Separateness of the individual, continuity of space and time, and uniformity of codes are the prime marks of literate and civilized societies.... It is in its power to extend patterns of visual uniformity and continuity that the “message” of the alphabet is felt by cultures' (McLuhan, 1971b: 94).

I now turn to the next step(s) in the origins of this creation.

4.2: Reading/Writing and War in the World of Antiquity.

This section is premised on those parts of the ancient world that presage, or are held to usher in, aspects of the modern. Discussion is therefore limited firstly to facets of textuality and war in this world, and - although other societies are tangentially considered - a particular portion of the ancient domain: a Græco-Roman “legacy” bequeathed to the peoples of succeeding eras.

**Figure 4.2: ANCIENT (Classical) CIVILIZATIONS**

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<tr>
<th>Type of Military Organization</th>
<th>Combat Mode:</th>
<th>Predominant Communicative Mode</th>
<th>Relative Historical Condition</th>
<th>Educational Locus &amp; Agents of Transmission</th>
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<td>Homoic [msC]</td>
<td>GRÆCO-ROMAN WAR (Imperialist)</td>
<td>ALPHABETIC WRITING</td>
<td>ANCENT LITERACY (Protomodern)</td>
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<td>[6] SLAVERY [X, Y(i)] coding &gt; recoding</td>
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Homoic warfare is characterised by a low military participation ratio (in relative rather than absolute terms), low levels of subordination, and high cohesion [1]. The first factor - low MPR - marks the beginnings of restrictions placed on a given population's combat involvement, and the rise of a consequent military caste. Whereas in (massed) “primitive” combat all able-bodied adult males fight, Græco-Roman[^39] war limits participation by personal status (restricted in principle to fully-fledged citizens of a pre-Hellenistic polis or the earlier Roman Empire, an élite) and by economic class (limited in practice to those who can afford to equip themselves with personal arms, personal army and/or direct frontline and logistical support in the form of a retinue of personal followers). Command of these armies - basically independent units engaged in a common enterprise for the duration of hostilities - accounts for autonomous generalship and consensual campaigning, hence low levels of subordination within the command hierarchy. High cohesion is maintained, not simply or only as in the Masaic sense of a community of fate linked by blood and affinal ties, but in the sense of affective (non-kin) bonds and residence within a bounded territory: a cartographically-determined terrain that must be defended (or extended) by force of arms.[^39]

[^38]: By the composite term “Græco-Roman” I stress a retrospectively-applied western cultural heritage: the period covered by the term follows standard historical chronology (e.g., Parker 1995), the Greek world spanning the period c. 750-300 BC (from the establishment of the city-states to the collapse of the Hellenistic world following Alexander’s death in 323), Imperial Rome’s extending from 264 BC-AD 565 (from the early Republic to the death of Justinian).

[^39]: This emphasis on territory figures heavily in the analysis in Connor’s (1988) monograph on early Greek land warfare as symbolically rather than materially significant. The field of battle is mutually determined by contending armies as an area outside the polis. It is of no strategic importance to either side: hence, at the war’s conclusion, although the battlefield is commemorated it typically remains unoccupied by the victors - neutral ground, the chief purpose of which is to strengthen the institution of the polis itself. Connor’s description of early hoplite warfare (1988: 8-18) also stresses that this form of fighting - a pattern of mobilisation, procession to the field, forming into close battle ranks, the clash, the trope (or “turning”, giving of ground by one side, pursuit and slaughter of those fleeing by the other), the mutually-agreed outcome and retrieval of the dead prior to return to the polis - and the fact that commanders lead by example, stresses heroics through individual combat and tactics in determining victory [2], but leaves no (remotely-located/uninvolved) overview of the battlefield, thus no space for strategy. This fighting space is further restricted by the weaponry deployed - defensive shields and body armour, swords and spears for assault, a distaste for projectiles accounting for the low status of slingers, archers and by extension naval personnel - weaponry that, unlike the adapted hunting implements of “primitive” warriors, is purpose-built (Manual II) for use in war.
The consensual aspect of homoic warfare has several ramifications. At the origins of the city-state - and as prototype to the modern fully striated state, in the Greek polis - Detienne considers the place of the military assembly in the institution of what Habermas, in his oppositional contrast between a democratic Lifeworld colonised by an increasingly hegemonic System, would later call an 'ideal-speech community'. In the Achaean world, and unlike the worlds of either Wittfogel's precedent 'oriental despotisms' or their own “barbarian” contemporaries (those Jaynes [1993] refers to as 'bicameral literate theodicies'),

'[t]he language of warrior dialogue-speech was not only egalitarian; it was also secular. It was language that belonged to human time, unlike the magicoreligious speech that coincided with the action it promoted in a world of nonhuman forces and powers. Dialogue-speech, by contrast, preceded human action and was an indispensable complement to it. The Achaeans met to deliberate before every engagement...In such military assemblies, the value of speech for the first time depended on the judgement of the social group as a whole. It was here that preparations for the future status of legal or philosophical speech were made, speech that submitted itself to “publicity” and drew its strength from the approbation of a social group' (Detienne, 1996, orig. 1967: 99, emphasis added).

The importance of consensual speech in the early military assemblies both accounts for the high status accorded to rhetoric and orality in the ancient Greek worldview and the concomitant Platonic antipathy to writing (see 3.7, p. 98 above). This is both unlike earlier (and most later) military systems, and a planting of the seeds of subsequent (and also unique) Athenian participatory democracy: but it also (i) contains an essential and militarily fatal tension between individual prestige and the necessity of a war cohort united by common aims, leading directly to (ii) imperialism [3] fostered by (iii) a more steeply-stratified command and control structure predicating not on an organisational infrastructure of speech, but on writing.

An indication (early warning system) of the tensions that set this process in train can be found in Homer's Ilia: then as now the cornerstone of a ("Classical") education.

49 In the context of the thesis, it is at least noteworthy that the foundational works of the western literary canon - Homer's Iliad and Odyssey - are epics of, respectively, war and repatriation. My fuller contributions to the Homeric issues broached here can be found in Golden L, Shay J, Van Northwick T, Williams MF, Sproule W, Cramer O, Tandy D, Becker AS, Carnes JS, Haluska JC [ed], Rosienne AM & Clay JS (1995): 'The Iliad Thread', Classical Bulletin, 71, [1].
[7]. There the narrative turns on the wrath of Achilles directed at his commander-in-chief, Agamemnon, on the basis of a perceived slight to his honour. Achilles, along with his personal contingent (the Myrmidons), initially withdraws from the Greek expeditionary force, later rejoining the fray - again personally motivated, this time by the death of his companion Patroclus - with fatal consequences for the Trojans and their leading *basileus* (hero), Hector. Encapsulated within this plot and the character of its leading protagonist are several of the inherent flaws in a homoically-organised army: insubordination publicly expressed in the presence of assembled commanders; subsequent loss of morale and personnel in ensuing engagements; resignation and reappearance on the battlefield at will. On this basis, Bowden's reading (1993) of the 'message' in the *Iliad* for a city-state social system is that the strength of the polis lies not so much in the cult of the hero, but in the cohesion of the phalanx - a lesson gradually absorbed by the armed forces of subsequent eras, in their formal prohibitions against Achillean behaviour (insubordination, loss of disciplinary self-control, breaking ranks and desertion).

Echoes of these structural tensions recur in the 5th Century BC, in a civil rather than an international conflict, and in a record of life rather than literature. Thucydides' account of the Peloponnesian War (431-404 BC) details - in the first recognisably factual/objective history - the ruinous consequences of personal *hubris* in conflict with collective civic interests in time of war...and the escalation of the problem when voiced in a broad public forum. In Books V, VI and VIII of his history (translated/edited Warner, 1976), Thucydides devotes much of his narrative to the personality

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41 In *The Lust to Annihilate*, Eli Sagan (1979) highlights another facet of Achilles' character - his "berserking", his "barbaric" treatment of Hector's corpse, stopping just short of cannibalism - as a further affront to both post-Archaic Greek sensibilities and the (then-extant and succeeding) rules of war regarding treatment of the vanquished. A life-imitating-art instance of such savagery occurs in October, 332 BC: Alexander's successful assault on Gaza is celebrated by his piercing of the ankles of the Gazan leader Batis, and dragging him to death behind his chariot around the walls of the defeated city in a *mimesis* of/identification with the Achillean example. The incident is related in Curtius (4.6.25ff) and, while still controversial within Alexandrian historiography (see, eg, de Séllincourt's appraisal [1971: 147, n. 58] in his translation of Arrian's account of this campaign), not inconsistent with the more psychotic aspects of Alexander's career - particularly evident when the Macedonian conqueror behaves as a proxy of mythical icons such as Achilles or Herakles. A 20th-century parallel of such self-concepts survives in General George S. Patton's beliefs ('subconscious memories') in himself as (re)incarnation of warriors from previous epochs (Wallechinsky, Wallace & Wallace, 1978: 81 - "past lives" including #2, a Greek hoplite who fought the Persians of King Cyrus, one of Caesar's legionnaires stationed in northern Gaul [#4], and #3, a 'soldier of Alexander the Great at the siege of Tyre').
and activities of the Athenian general Alcibiades, and the part the latter plays in key events - most notably initiation of the disastrous Sicilian expedition - that lead to the ultimate defeat of an imperialist Athens, and its submission to the succeeding Spartan and Theban hegemonies. The concluding books detail accusations against Alcibiades and charges brought against him (for supposedly private excesses and plots to form a dictatorship); his subsequent recall, escape to Thurii, and outlawing *in absentia*; his appearance in the Peloponnese, and emergence as an adviser to the Spartan assembly and leader of the Spartan forces; and his negotiations with the Persian ambassador Tissaphernes, firstly arranging Persia's alliance with the Spartans, later - when Alcibiades crosses back to the Athenian side in 412 - guaranteeing Persian backing for Athens against Sparta. Thucydides - an avowed Periclean - is clearly ambivalent as to Alcibiades' character-traits that set these machinations in motion: but just as clear on their consequences, noting from his earliest appearance in the narrative that, for the Athenians,

'Although in public capacity his conduct of the war was excellent, his way of life made him objectionable to everyone as a person; thus they entrusted their affairs to other hands, and before long ruined the city' (VI. 15/1976: 419, emphasis added).

What is extraordinary to modern normative understandings of military activity in the cases of a mythical Achilles and a real-world Alcibiades is not just the degree of personal autonomy they exhibit in the face of group war-aims - but the seeming acceptance, or at least taken-for-grantedness of such actions, in the social context of the world(s) in which they operate. Aspects of Achillean "heroics" will later contribute to the refinement of both the laws of war relating to battlefield conduct and treatment of the defeated dead, and strong military strictures against breaches of the chain of command. The ease with which Alcibiades slips in and out of allegiance to contesting sides in a war-situation, while likewise eventually prohibited, will have a longer life-span. Instances of Alcibiadean "side-swapping" prior to its eventual reinterpretation as a form of treachery, are to be found in the careers of Sir John Hawkwood [?1394], most famed of the fourteenth-century *condottieri* (Stephen & Lee, 1917: 236-242; Tuchman, 1979); Albrecht Eusebius Wenzel von Wallenstein, Duke of Friedland and Meckleburg [1583-1634], rated, with Gustavus Adolphus, as a
military genius of the Thirty Years War, whose ‘lack of loyalty and overreaching ambition brought his downfall’ (Keegan & Wheatcroft, 1987: 324); and the ‘almost legendary’ Henry Humphreys Evan Lloyd [c. 1718-83], who ‘served most of the (competing) political causes of Europe both on the battlefield and in clandestine operations’ (Gat, 1989: 67ff). Although the inheritors of this tradition survive to the present in the form of the mercenary, Lloyd’s “career moves” represent the last such instance of the acceptability of military privateering and Alcibiadean loyalty shifts. From the late-18th Century onwards, such radical side-changing will be reinterpreted as treason, and the career (and the very name) of another prominent sideswapper - Benedict Arnold [1741-1801] - will become a by-word for treachery (Windrow & Mason, 1997: 16-17).

The long-run history of the Roman military, by way of contrast and despite the assorted mutinies, factional contests/army coups and divided loyalties to rulers of state that colour the last days of the imperium, is conspicuously less susceptible in toto to the cult of the personality - the quasi-mythical individual ‘hero’ - and its ensuing consequences. In the surviving accounts of Sallust (composed 44-40 BC), the abortive Catiline conspiracy of 63 BC is unambiguously seditious, despite Catiline’s Alcibiadean-like mixed reputation for personal excess, coextensive/jostling with ‘a man of enormous energy, a brave soldier, popular with a wide circle of friends to whom he was intensely loyal, generous with both his money and his time’ (Handford, introduction to Sallust, 1975: 163). The historian’s prior narrative of The Jugurthine War implies that immunity to a Catilinian insurrection rests heavily on the organisation of the army itself in the wake of the long-standing reforms instituted by Marius in the Second Century BC. These reforms centred on conversion of the army from a conscript militia to a regimentally-structured professional fighting machine, manned by able-bodied citizen recruits - and as Sallust makes clear, the motives of Marius in instigating these reforms are to avoid the structural weaknesses and the attendant indiscipline of the Greek model. Marius’ consular policy speech of 107 BC portrays him as a plain-speaking “new man” of the people, risen from the plebs but retaining their practical values, opposed to his patrician consular peers who have ‘taken to studying history and Greek military treatises’, gaining their military knowledge ‘from hearsay and reading’. Thus Marius maintains that it is ‘my
adversaries who require oratorical skill to cover up their turpitude. Nor have I studied Greek literature; I had no interest in a branch of learning which did nothing to improve the characters of its professors’ (Sallust, trans/edited Handforth,42 1975: 118, 120).

The Marian antipathy to oratory and a high-cultural Greek literature as inimical to a militarily-defined ‘character’ produces, through refinements over time, an Imperial armed force, wherein the older convention of the Achaean military assembly as a decision-making entity is first supplemented, then supplanted, by a bureaucratised system of planning, initiating and organising war. The command-control structure and fighting capacity of the Legion increasingly relies on an infrastructure of writing, and is composed of a soldiery recruited from a general population versed in alphabetic literacy: a condition to which the army itself is the main contributor as well as the prime beneficiary. As Hopkins’ analysis of Rome and its provinces in the 1st and 2nd Centuries AD maintains, the empire ‘was bound together by writing... The whole experience of living in the Roman empire, of being ruled by Romans, was overdetermined by the existence of texts’ (1991: 144). In order ‘to explain why the Roman conquest state helped produce more literates than ever before’, Hopkins centres on the ‘instruments of coercion, which helped maintain the Roman government and élite in power’: these being ‘written laws, courts of justice, bureaucratic administration, and the army’ (1991: 137). In relation to the last of these institutions, ‘compared with the army, the professional bureaucracy was itself only a minor consumer of literates’ (1991: 139). In part this was an simply a matter of numbers, the fact of the army being the single largest organization in the period, with an estimated strength of c. 300,000 bodies: but principally it was due to education as

‘a factor which helped promotion, because the army by its procedures of written rosters, written orders, and book-keeping, fostered the use of writing. It was not simply that some or many Roman soldiers could write; they were repeatedly asked, ordered or required to write; the Roman army’s organization presupposed

42 Handforth also supplies a succinct description of the organisation of the legion in the Republican period (1975: 26-8). For an analysis of Roman military structure, personnel, training, weaponry and size in the period of the long Pax Romana under Hadrian and the Antonines - a model basically unchanged from the time of the Marian reforms, and enduring across the period of the Principate - the first volume of Gibbon’s Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire (1983, orig. vols. I-VIII, 1776-88: I, 32-65) is, despite its age, an indispensable guide.
that many soldiers could write' (Hopkins, 1991: 138, emphasis added).

Just how central and pervasive writing was within the military is indicated by the 1970s archaeological find at Vindolanda, a garrison near Hadrian’s wall on the northern frontier of the Empire, of a cache of preserved texts dating from c. AD 90-120. The recovered artefacts show a variety of writings in different hands, bearing signatures from all ranks, and with contents both official and personal - from administrative and diplomatic correspondence to letters for friends and family: evidence robust enough for Bowman (1994: 123) to ‘implicate a fairly broad range of people (not just the equestrian officer class) in the literacy-using network’ that joined the peripheries of the Empire to its centre. The intercontinental reach of the conquering Empire at its height - and the necessity of contact with and control of barbarian peoples, the brunt of which is borne directly by its legions - in fact accounts for this military privileging of writing as both an organisational principle and a technological means of maintaining affectual ties with a faraway homeland.

The ambivalence of Graeco-Roman attitudes to the barbarian origins (see note 44) of alphabetic writing equally shapes the form and status of that writing - rendering ancient literacy both always and ever dependent on speech, which it merely records, and - in opposition to the semiotic codes in the orthography of precedent/rival empires and societies, functional within the political economy of slave-based societies. Harris’ study of the functions of literacy in the Graeco-Roman world (1989: 26-27) underlines the lowly-statused but necessary applications of

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43 The constitution of the ‘barbarian’ in Greek and Roman conceptions is noteworthy here. For the Greeks, the barbaroi are distinguished from the Hellenes on a number of grounds: “they” are not organised as true poleis, practise only hetero-(rather than homo- or bi-)sexuality, clothe their bodies rather than appear (semi-)naked in public (Sennett, 1994: 31-67), and favour forms of writing over the rhetorical arts. The insularity of pre-Alexandrian offensive Greek imperialist war mitigates against challenges to such a view. Roman Imperialism is not so “immunised”, but nonetheless retains the last distinction: Woolf (1994: 84) emphasises the retrospective irony here, in that the ‘idea that literacy implies higher levels of modernity and rationality remains deeply ingrained in our consciousness...but for the Greeks writing was invented and imported by barbarians, and most Roman accounts followed in that tradition. Even if litterae were thought in some contexts to be connected with civilized knowledge, barbarians were distinguished from civilized men by language, along with appearance and temperament, and their innate irrationality was not attributed to a lack of letters’. Gibbon underpins the irony in a footnote, stating that the ‘use of letters was introduced among the savages of Europe about fifteen hundred years before Christ; and the Europeans carried them to America about fifteen hundred years after the Christian era. But in a period of three thousand years the Phoenician alphabet received considerable alterations, as it passed through the hands of the Greeks and Romans’ (1983 [orig. 1776]; I, 49).
writing. Schematically, and bearing in mind that 'this list is certainly not an exhaustive one..., but it probably covers the great majority of what was written down in antiquity' (Harris, 1989: 27), writing was employed in the following domains and applied to the following activities:

Table 4.3: Functions of Graeco-Roman Literacy (Harris, 1989: 26-27):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. LEGAL/ECONOMIC</th>
<th>4. CIVIC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>indicate ownership</td>
<td>record treaties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>maintain accounts</td>
<td>state statute law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>make offers of sale by means of signs</td>
<td>issue an edict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>provide receipts</td>
<td>display political slogans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>label commodities or products</td>
<td>put legends on coins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>indicate weights or measures</td>
<td>cast a vote</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>make contracts</td>
<td>record trial proceedings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>write letters</td>
<td>record the proceedings of officials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>give instructions to a subordinate</td>
<td>compile military records</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>make notes of useful information for oneself</td>
<td>compile lists of demesmen, citizens, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>make wills</td>
<td>record an award of citizenship</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2. COMMEMORATIVE</th>
<th>5. CULTURAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>honour a distinguished person</td>
<td>transmit works of literature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>commemorate one's presence</td>
<td>transmit compendia of information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>memorialize the dead</td>
<td>perform school exercises</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3. RELIGIOUS</th>
<th>5. CULTURAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>dedicate something to a god</td>
<td>transmit works of literature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>publicize a religious calendar</td>
<td>transmit compendia of information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>record prayers</td>
<td>perform school exercises</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>circulate prophecies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>record a magic spell</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>curse someone</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>transmit a sacred story</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This estimate of usage tallies with Goody's observations in *The Domestication of the Savage Mind* (1986), which shows that the earliest uses of a writing system were not for "literary" works, but for the compilation of lists and inventories. This function was common to, and set limits on, writing systems preceding and coextensive with the developed Greek alphabet: Sumerian and Mesopotamian cuneiform, Egyptian and Hittite hieroglyphics, Indus writing and Chinese logographs, and Mycenaean Linear A/B. The functional applications of the Archaic Greek alphabet preserves the range of what is possible in earlier heavily-consonantal/ideogrammatic scripts, but extends it by tying the written to speech. What is revolutionary here is not the introduction of vowels, but the isolation of graphic signs that represent phonemes in natural language. This technical feature has wide social ramifications, in that texts are in principle accessible.
to all members of the group, down to the level of the slave. Unlike pictographically-based systems, 'unprivileged' phonetic literacy does not restrict textual access, and the monopoly of power/knowledge it confers, to a particular - usually priestly - class. For Skoyles, this also accounts for certain anomalous features of the Graeco-Roman cultural heritage: Greek democracy - literate-based but lacking libraries, tightly-organised civic archives, mechanico-technological innovations or anything like a text not based on the monologic or dialogue form (ie, the novel) - is in one sense a "throwback" to egalitarian "primitive" societies:

'Many if not all novelties of Classical Greek culture can be explained by an interaction of hunter-gatherer traits in the resources and material circumstances of an urban environment. Instead of seeing the originality of the Greeks as progressive, this suggests they should be seen as regressive. The "Greek revolution" was a return of human existence to those traits previously found in hunter-gatherer bands but in urban circumstances which could give them new opportunities to realise their cultural potential' (Skoyles, 1990: 331).

Relative to imperialism, the work of Innis (1950; 1951) is centrally predicated on the idea of empire-creation as intertwined with both the development of writing as an intellectual - but more as a material - technology. The relationship between the two gives rise to the concept of 'bias'; the essence of 'bias' resides in communicative form as either 'space-binding' - monumental, durable, boundary-marking, permanent - or 'time-binding' - light, flexible, mobile. The shifts from the fixity of a pictorial writing system (hieroglyphic, ideogrammatic) to a phonetic alphabet, and the shift from what is written on - flesh to stone to papyrus to parchment to paper - corresponds to the control of

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44 As evidenced by the admonition of the anonymous 'Egyptian of the New Kingdom' to his fellow and future literati to 'Put writing in your heart that you may protect yourself from hard labour of any kind. The scribe is released from manual tasks; it is he who commands' (cited in Hovles 1977: 23, citing Goody & Watt 1962-3, citing V. Gordon Childe 1941: 187-8, cited in Giglioli, 1977: 323).

45 Weber also stresses the 'civilization of antiquity' as a distinctively urban culture, and conceives of the origins of the city as a juxtaposition of the political, the commercial (a market) and the military - a garrison/fortress (Weber, 1968: 1212-1372). Elsewhere, in analysing the ancient world's demise, 'one basic point must be stressed: the civilization of Antiquity did not decline because the Empire fell, for the Roman Empire as a political structure existed for centuries after ancient civilization had passed its, prime. In fact this civilization had been in eclipse for a long time. By the early third century Roman literature was played out, and Roman jurisprudence deteriorated together with its schools. Greek and Latin poetry was moribund, historiography faded away, and even inscriptions started to fall silent. Latin itself soon gave way to dialects. When, after one and a half centuries of decline, the Western Empire finally disappeared, barbarism had already conquered the Empire from within' (Weber, 1988 [orig. 1896: 389).
space by territorially-expansionist empires. Writing historically expanded spatial structure of itself, provided a body politic 'with a transpersonal memory', established diverse monopolies of knowledge based on control of the medium, and extended social structure, which 'strengthened the position of an individual leader with military power who gave orders to agents who executed them. The sword and the pen worked together' (Innis, 1950: 11). Spengler neatly summarises the longer-term heritage of such a conjunction:

'The build of the Latin sentence is yet another consequence of Rome's battles, which in giving her conquests compelled the nation as a whole to think administratively; German prose bears traces even to-day of the Thirty Years' War...world-history is dependent - to a degree that students have hitherto scarcely imagined - upon the existence of script as the essentially historical means of communication. The State (in the higher sense of the word) presupposes intercourse by writing; the style of all politics is determined absolutely by the significance that the politico-historical thought of the nation attaches in each instance to charters and archives, to signatures, to the products of the publicist; the battle of legislation is a fight for or against a written law; constitutions replace material force by the composition of paragraphs and elevate a piece of writing to the dignity of a weapon' (1971 [orig. 1922]: 152-53; original emphasis).

The next section details aspects of such a heritage - a further paradoxical meld of the regressive/progressive - and casts the Middle Ages as a beginning-point of 'all those who feel themselves to be associates of one of the more ancient or more typical secret societies of the West, those oddly indestructible societies unknown it would seem to

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46 A word on periodization: one indicator of the complexity associated with the medieval epoch is the scholarly problem of assigning to it a precise beginning, "middle" and end. A definitive sorting-out of such a problem is beyond the scope of this thesis: but for my purposes, suggested borderline dates for the period's inauguration would follow Wallace-Hadrill's (1988) characterisation of a 'Barbarian West' ranging from 400-1100 AD, with the career of a representative later leading figure of the period in its entirety - Dante (1265-1321) - spanning the Medieval and the Renaissance. Tighter symbolic inaugural dates would be 529 AD, the year that St. Benedict founded his monastery at Monte Cassino, and Justinian closed the Academy in Athens, or the burning of the Library at Alexandria in 640 AD. Tentative end-points for the period are similarly arbitrary, depending on what one wishes to emphasise: one possibility is the early 1450s - the introduction of the printing press in Europe - or the more precise May 29th 1453, the day the Emperor Constantine died on the battlefield in his unsuccessful defence of Constantinople against the Saracens. Key aspects of such a dating are the rise of early nation-forming, and the waning of the concept of Crusades, effective armour, and an effective system of feudal demesnes. An alternative choice would be 1492, marked by the European discovery of the Americas, and the expulsion of the Moors and Jews from Spain which ended the characteristically medieval Islamic culture in the Spanish south and paved the way for extreme European nationalism. As an outer limit closure, 1517 - the beginning of the Protestant Reformation - would constitute a final obvious choice.
Antiquity, which came into being with Christianity, most likely at the time of the first monasteries, at the periphery of the invasions, the fires and the forests: I mean to speak of the great warm and tender Freemasonry of useless erudition’ (Foucault, 1980 [orig 1976]: 79). In terms less scathing than Foucault’s, the medieval era is framed as sporadically initiating a ‘republic of letters’/community of the book. The focus is on the way in which the seemingly ‘useless erudition’ of scribes, copyists and exegetes spreads beyond the hermetically-sealed boundaries of its institutional loci - the monasteries, surviving and reconstituted libraries, and the earliest universities - and becomes an organising principle for a chaotic world predicated on interpersonal and intra-/inter-group violence. I concentrate particularly on the bellicose interactions between devotees of religions of the Book - transcontinental holy war(s) and the establishment of various forms of the 'church militant'; the re-orchestration of ancient warfare patterns, a concomitant revamping of classical textuality, and the interplay between these factors segueing into a revolutionary era of modernity; and - with particular reference to Chapter 3 - significant steps towards the evolution of both a collective (state) and individual (self) body through the instantiation and spread of a particular type of textual proxy.

4.3: Feud(alism) and Text(uality) in a 'World lit only by Fire'

**Figure 4.3:** FEUDAL SOCIETIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Military Organization</th>
<th>[1] Ritterian [msc] Mortazic [mSC]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Relative Historical Condition</td>
<td>[4] SCRIBAL LITERATURE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Monastery, Academy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Monks, 'Wandering Scholars'.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The title of section 4.3 is purloined from Manchester's 1992 study, and typifies a dominant view of the medieval epoch as literally and figuratively "unenlightened": springing from the 'dark ages' of a civilizational collapse, contingent - what the 'Middle Ages' are in the "middle" of are the glories of Graeco-Roman antiquity and a renascent/Enlightened contemporaneity - pervaded by superstition, fear, and the unrelieved brutality that are the fruits of a condition of ignorance (representative assessments in Huizinga, 1924; Tuchman, 1975; J. Burke, 1985). Although an organised system rather than randomly chaotic (Bloch, 1978), and despite the fact that over an approximately thousand-year timespan, a civilizing process develops through a phylogenetic pattern of self-control and the ontogenesis of a fully-formed State (Elias, [1939] 1982), the overwhelming impression of feudal societies remains one of isolated outcrops of restricted enlightenment in a whirlpool of relentless violence.

The period's turbulence is chiefly accounted for by the resort to armed force, and the organisation of such force constituting a world composed of societal ties based on military obligations to assorted elites controlling a technics of violence - the oppressed and the rest. In my adaptation of Andrzejewski's categories [1], the medieval MPR is always relatively low; the extreme variations in degrees of both subordination and cohesion depend on whether the aims are primarily outward-directed (empire-building through conquest, the Mortazic type) or inner-centred (Ritterian, the consolidation of militarily-derived power by control of a subjugated populace, what could be referred to as, following Marxian historiography, a feudal "protection racket"). These ideal-types are mutually constitutive, the manpower necessary for the accomplishment of large-scale military ventures (Crusade/Jihad) reliant on a muster of the obligated population in an

$^{47}$ The Crusades - whose contending forces date their respective origins from the adoption of Christianity as the official religion of the Roman Empire in 324, and the birth of Muhammad ibn Abdullah in 570 - begin with Urban II's declaration of a 'War of the Cross' to liberate Jerusalem from Muslim Turkish occupation in 1095, and continue in a series of erratic mass engagements until the Crusade of 1228 led by Frederick II in the aftermath of the Fifth Crusade of 1217. Although these specific episodes by no means involve all warring contenders, nor exhaust all categories of warfare in the Middle Ages, they centrally exemplify the blend of religious and military power essential to an understanding of the period in its entirety. In concrete terms, the Crusades are prefigured by the Reconquista of Muslim Spain begun under Alfonso II (866-911); they constitute a basis for the judicial development of the 'Just War' concept; they establish the leading military orders (the Hospitallers in 1070, the Templars in 1118, the Teutonic Order in 1128, and the Iberian Orders from the mid-late 12th Century) that shape the Christian world globally and locally; they adopt secular form in the chansons de geste and the chivalric code of the later (High) middle ages; and they presage later eras of reconnaissance and colonial expansion of the fifteenth century. Subsequent (secular) war retains aspects of it's 'Holy' precedents.
enterprise of holy war [2], which in turn leads to the expansion of the sphere of territorial control by the victor - and consequently, more human raw material to draw from in subsequent ventures.

This is a variant on patterns evident in the world of antiquity, a blending and heightening of the formerly-opposed despotic/barbaric [6] and early-democratic. As the term feudalism itself suggests, war and the military figure heavily in the foundations and maintenance of the medieval polity, most especially in the maintenance of monarchies (Harriss, 1976). Less well-acknowledged is the role played by armies in nascent moves towards medieval proto-democratic assemblies. Bisson maintains that our comprehension of the era is coloured by an 'underestimation of military aspects of parliamentary origins', which can be 'attributed to the tendency to view developments of the High Middle Ages anachronistically. In recent times representative institutions have come to be regarded as incompatible with militarist rule. Ordinary affairs of state are usually distinguished sharply from what we like to think of as the extraordinary affairs of war'. But - and contrary to such an assumption - it is

'hardly open to doubt that European representation arose in a society of a different sort: a society that, notwithstanding considerable advances in social objectives and political-administrative techniques, remained organized primarily for war. Even in England, with its exceptionally progressive institutional life, those who ruled were still in the thirteenth century mainly those who fought. Those who were ruled, moreover, were still thought of in fundamentally military terms. Landholding, the obligations of society, and privileges long continued to be defined militarily - and no one questions the significance of tenure and status in parliamentary beginnings. The "people" or "nation", considered in relation to the ruler as well as to other peoples, was in the first instance an army, or at any rate the pool from which an army could be mustered' (Bisson, 1966: 1199-1200).

Yet despite this formal structural precondition - and despite the image of bellicosity and barely-leavened 'barbarism' with which the period is broadbrushed - medieval war never, in any of its various stages, reaches the scale or intensity of war in either Antiquity, Byzantium or Modernity. Contamine's (1984) invaluable analysis of the period concludes that, regardless of a conscriptable 'commons' from which to draw - with exemptions for particular cohorts such as children, the aged, clerics and women - 'a system of conscription such as the Roman Empire had known or which contemporary
states have in general had to adopt was almost unknown in the Middle Ages... the "populace" at best constituted potential combatants, but they were only called upon in critical situations (and then with some apprehension and reservations)' (1984: 305). Similarly, with regard to the warrior nobility, he notes the stark contrast between 'the smallness of armies of knights with the considerable numbers which could be assembled' (1984: 306), judging that in terms of either the ancient empire's or the modern nation-state's ability to assemble and consistently maintain in the field considerable armies, 'the inferiority of the Middle Ages appears startling' (1984: 307).

Equally noteworthy for Contamine is what the era does not experience relative to earlier and later ages: war-migration and demographic displacement; slave wars; large-scale wars of hegemony; or (except 'at the periphery') rivalry 'between nomads and sedentary peoples' (1984: 303-04). Any claim to originality that feudal warfare can stake must be based on the the technical mode of combat [3]: the preponderance of 'a very experienced heavy cavalry, possessing costly mounts, stirrups, complete armour and very firm, enveloping saddles' (1984: 303), and the development of defensive systems - centred on the baronial castle - and perfection of siege instruments to breach such defenses. The development from tactics to a time/space mastering strategy is assessed by Contamine as being more noteworthy than critics such as Liddell-Hart, Overstraeten or Muraise credit; but examples of strategic innovation are limited to medieval familiarity with the works of Vegetius (late 4th-Century AD) (1984: 208-37) or at most with Maurice's Strategikon of c. 1100, a handbook of specifically Byzantine military thinking (trans/ed. Dennis, 1984). Strivings towards strategy are present but prodromal at most, and Gat's (1989: 1-24) survey of military theory also claims no innovatory movement in the field until Montecuccoli's and Machiavelli's Renaissance contributions.

Contamine also points to another difference between the modern and the feudal when characterising the high Middle Ages ('within the period 1150-1300') as experiencing 'times of almost complete peace': 'In this respect Brittany, which in the half century from 1250 to 1300 knew only one war of any length...was by no means exceptional. During Henry III of England's reign of 36 years (1216-72), only 20 were affected by warfare [6 on the continent, 5 in Wales, 2 on the Scottish border]...in England itself there were only six years when fighting broke out. Even the rivalry of Italian lordships and communes... had only a limited impact on life and daily activities. For many sovereigns the time had now finally passed of annual military expeditions so characteristic of the earlier Middle Ages. Philip Augustus after Bouvines (1214) and St. Louis, throughout the major part of his reign, only had to raise armies periodically and no longer knew the constant fatigue and dangers of military campaigns. Their links with war became very tenuous' (1984: 65). This is a useful point of comparison with Melko's peace periods (Appendix F) and its qualitative and quantitative significance relative to the frequency of modern/'post' modern war will become apparent in the following Chapter.
The explanation for these practical limitations on war in the Middle Ages is not attitudinal - whether prompted by holy fervour and the 'righteous cause' (particularly within the Military Orders - Seward, 1974), status, the ethos of a warrior confraternity or simple brigandage, commitment to the martial virtues are evident and pervasive throughout the period. Nor is it due to technological incapacity: apart from innovations facilitating mounted combat and operational siege warfare referred to above, the era also saw the refinement of the crossbow, the catapault, and the introduction of gunpowder (all initially anathematised as 'diabolical', but increasingly deployed from the 12th Century onwards). The true impediments to the medieval prosecution of total war are politico-economic: the lack of an efficient administrative infrastructure within the medieval polity to motivate and control, or to raise and sustain, anything resembling a permanent professional standing army; and an inadequately organised fiscal mechanism, either to employ a stable military force at a war's inception or to offset the often ruinous financial costs of war-prosecution. Underpinning and feeding into both these curtailments is a further cultural factor - a particular premodern view of the written word, restricting literacy to a societal minority, a stratum of literati dedicated to the practice of a scribal literature, a sacred corpus of knowledge so precious as to be preserved and reproduced unchanged, stored in scriptoria, and disseminated to the unlettered through the auspices of adepts trained in interpreting the message(s) contained within its text(s). In the same way that this circumscribed form of textuality specifically and simultaneously provides a rationale for the activities of the miles Christi, establishes formal prohibitions on the use of weaponry, and lays down the precepts of the "Just War", more generally 'Christian and courtly values (forerunner of bourgeois values) were foreign to martial values even when they in some sense integrated them' (Contamine, 1984: 305).

49 An indicator of the rigour of such training from the Rule of St. Benedict (480-543 AD): 'Idleness is an enemy of the soul. Because this is so the brethren ought to be occupied at specified times in manual labour, and at other fixed hours in holy reading. We therefore think that both these may be arranged for as follows: from Easter to the first of October, on coming out from Prime, let the brethren labour till about the fourth hour. From the fourth till close upon the sixth hour let them employ themselves in reading. On rising from table after the sixth hour let them rest in their beds in strict silence; but if any one shall wish to read, let him do so in such a way as not to disturb any one else [...] A mattress, blanket, coverlet and pillow are to suffice for bedding. The beds shall be frequently searched by the abbot to guard against the vice of hoarding. And if any one be found in possession of something not allowed by the abbot let him be subjected to the severest punishment. And to uproot this vice of appropriation let all that is necessary be furnished by the abbot, that is cowl, tunic, shoes, stockings, girdle, knife, pen, needle, handkerchief, and tablets. By this every pretext of necessity will be taken away' ([Cardinal] Gasquet [ed], 1966: 84, 96, emphases added).
A further and broader paradox: while medievalism is acknowledgedly a time of widespread illiteracy - monastic life excepted - C. S. Lewis is nevertheless able to plausibly refer to the 'overwhelmingly bookish or clerkly character of medieval culture', and speak of a Middle Ages that 'depended predominantly on books'; not merely Classical works or Christian scripture, but a literature that 'had roots in the "barbarian" North and West as well as in that Graeco-Roman tradition which reached them principally through books... in the Germanic countries, including England, the debt of the medieval (and modern) literatures to their barbarian origins is all-pervasive' (1964: 5-7). Moreover, the authority extended to manuscript knowledge produces an overweening credulity to anything written, an 'astonishing failure or refusal to distinguish... between books of different sorts' as in the validity of a scientific against a poetic proposition (1964: 31). That this attitude eventually spread beyond the respect accorded to the cloistered world of the monastery was due to the circumstance that 'medieval man was by no means a static animal. Kings, armies, prelates, diplomats, merchants, and wandering scholars [7] were continually on the move' (1964: 143; cf. Waddell, 1927 [1954]).

Thus, in the West and beyond its borders, several literatures and sub-literatures are in active circulation, albeit each assessed in terms of the hegemonic sacrality - itself rife with interpretational differences and divisions. An early awareness of the governmental and military power-potential of this culture of privileged script occurs in the Carolingian era, when Charlemagne, Holy Roman Emperor from 800-814 - and himself illiterate - employs the scribe Alcuin as chief drafter of legislation for what will become a recognisable federated kingdom of Europe (Leff, 1962: 59-61). Two generations later, in the secular sphere of politics, two of Charlemagne's grandsons, Charles the Bald and

50 The centrality of scriptural knowledge to the politico-theological medieval worldview - and the tension inherent in the permeable division between the temporal and the spiritual - is well illustrated in these two representative statements separated though they are by a roughly 700-year timespan: [T]hose who exult in divine assistance and who glory in being able to understand and to treat the sacred books without precepts of the kind I have undertaken to supply herewith, so that they think these precepts superfluous, should calm themselves for this reason: although they may rightfully rejoice in the great gift God has given them, they should remember that they have learned at least the alphabet from men [...] All doctrine concerns either things or signs, but things are learned by signs...' (St. Augustine, 396 AD [revised 427 AD], in Robertson [ed], 1958: 4; 8); c/f 'It is no sluggard who carries off the apples of the Hesperides guarded by the ever-sleepless dragon, nor one who reads as though not awake but drowsing and dreaming as if eager to reach the end of his task. It is certain that the pious and wise reader who spends time lovingly over his books always rejects errors and comes close to life in all things' (John of Salisbury [12th Cent], Poliomaticus bk. vii, cited in Ross & McLaughlin, 1977: 602).
Louis the Pious, will ally against the third, Lothair, and seal their union in a treaty, the Oaths of Strasbourg (842) - the first official document to be written in a vernacular language. Within the monasteries, a Carolingian script will set a standard for craftsmanship and manuscript illumination - although unlike their forebears of antiquity, the scribal class will limit their creativity to calligraphy, and remain copyists rather than composers of text.

This overview of the Middle Ages shows an epoch riddled with contradictions. In one sphere of activity, a condition of incessant warfare, the outcomes of which impact upon whole peoples even though the vast mass participate in neither the declaration - nor as a rule in the execution - of the warring enterprise. In another, a valorisation of the Written Word as established truth in societies where illiteracy is the norm for the majority of both rulers and ruled. Higher-order power - governance of the temporal world - rests principally in the hands of a warrior élite, with a king at its apex: higher-order knowledge - understanding of and access to the spiritual realm - is primarily the province of a sacral status-group of monks, clerks and scribal copyists. The two orders are strictly exclusionary relative to the mass of the populations they control, act sometimes in concert and at other times in conflict: they are symbiotic but the boundaries of, and criteria for membership in each are clearly delineated.

As an augury of modernity and a significant step in breakdown of this system - and in a further contradiction not atypical of the medieval, a step taken with the intent of unifying the sacred/spiritual realms, blending the powers of Church and State in an effort to introduce new levels of stability into the social structure of feudalism - the early 11th century sees the production of a legal text by an unknown Norman author forwarding the doctrine of the King's Two Bodies. This discourse - clearly against its writer's stated intentions - is foundational to a revolutionary new patterning of both war and textuality, a new way of conceiving of both bodies and bodies politic, and the resultant configuration

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54 Greenblatt (1997: 464-67) highlights another paradox of the epoch: ecclesiastical courts determined the punishment of condemned criminals by resort to the mechanism of benefit of clergy. The convicted felon’s sentence - typically death - could be waived or reduced to codification of the crime committed by branding of the body, if it could be demonstrated that the accused was within the purview of 'God's Grace' / the possibility of personal redemption. The demonstration took the form of the convicted reading aloud from a passage of the Bible. This suggests for Greenblatt the probability that the most literate functionally literate section of society, after a judicial priestly class and the monastic orders, was constituted by an outlaw cohort learned enough in selective reading to escape the full consequences of their crimes if apprehended.
of a contemporary modern world.

In general, sociology is little concerned with ultimate origins, preferring to leave such stories to either religious cosmology or the natural sciences. An exception to this observation, however, concerns the origins of its subject matter - aspects of societies under conditions of modernity - and its own origins as a distinctive field within the human sciences. Among the most durable of these origin myths is the one that sees both modernity and sociology as coming into being via a series of two or more revolutions. Arguably the most important of these are the political revolutions in mid-17th century England and more especially late-18th century France (see, eg, Nisbet, 1970: 21-44; Touraine, 1990; or Coleman's 1992 ASA Presidential Address [1993: 1-4]). The first produces perhaps the prime emblem of western governance, Hobbes' Leviathan, provides a possible answer to Simmel's wondering 'how is society possible?', and sets what Parsons will later come to see as the fundamental sociological agenda item, the Hobbesian 'problem of order': as Callon & Latour maintain from the differing perspective of actor-network theory, '[t]he solution proposed by Hobbes is... of major importance to sociology, formulating clearly as it does for the first time the relationship between micro-actors and macro-actors' (1981: 278).

Hobbes' artificial man, a transcendent amalgam of the bodies of all his subjects held together by a covenant of armas y lettras, constitutes the essence of the orderly social. As the Frontispiece attached to the original (and associated with all subsequent) edition(s) illustrates, he embodies in his person the secular and the spiritual, and is symbolically bigger than his subjects and indeed his kingdom: a bulwark ensuring the non-recurrence of the "war of all against all" that Hobbes saw as the essential human condition in a primeval state of nature. The most fundamental challenge to the king and the system he represents - in the English case, culminating in the execution of Charles I in 1649 - disposes of the monarch's 'mortal coil' but not the ruler's divinity, which remains intact to reinstitute itself through martyrdom in the first instance and the eventual restoration of physical rule. The significance of the second political revolution in France, the impact of which produces a Condorcet, a Saint-Simon and through Auguste Comte the birth of a self-conscious sociology proper, goes further into the establishment of a secular democratic system. As Camus points out in The Rebel, the beheading of Louis XVI on
January 21 1791 differs from all prior eliminations of rulers in that it entails not only killing the king (regicide) but also the practical possibility of his replacement, and the overarching principle of his ordination by God (deicide). The cut through Louis Capet’s neck is simultaneously a cut (aka epistemic break or paradigm shift) in history: public order henceforth resides not in the physical person of the monarch but in political activities of what John Stuart Mill sees as sovereign individuals operating under the Rousseauist concept of the general will.

Note two prime aspects of this paradigm: firstly, the notion that in the ferment of revolution and its aftermath, the older form of sovereignty is severely circumscribed, remaining as primarily an ornament under the terms of a constitutional monarchy, or disappears completely; and secondly that the singularity of political power - a sovereign individual, the general will - is maintained, albeit in a more heterogeneous and abstract form. But contemporaneous with this unified signifier ran another and eventually more potent fiction, initially designed to consolidate regal régimes, eventually to supplant them - the proxifying axiom of the King’s Two Bodies.

This doctrine suggests alternative versions of both the historical record and another way of conceptualising political power. Briefly stated, this jurisprudential concept puts forward

'the claim that the king possessed two bodies or capacities, the one natural and private in which he, like any other mortal, began life as an infant, progressed to the age of majority and suffered illness and death; and the other political and public in which he enjoyed such transcendent powers as timelessness - he was always of age, immortality - he never died, and ubiquity - he was considered virtually present in all his courts even though he was personally absent. While his natural body consisted of flesh and blood, his politic body was invisible and incorporeal. The latter was, in fact, in the nature of a corporation; it was a juristic person created by the policy of man' (Greenberg, 1991: 213; cf. Low, 1915: 255-89; Weston & Greenberg, 1981: 11, 47, 56, 82, 153).

Investigated and largely denigrated by Maitland (1911; introduction to Gierke, 1900), this fact/fiction compound was given a thorough treatment by Kantorowicz in 1957, who both takes the notion more seriously than his predecessor, and relocates its origins in English legal history, away from the machinations of contending Tudor, Elizabethan,
and early Stuart lawyers, to the Eleventh Century in the writings of the 'Norman anonymous', thence through a timespan of two hundred years and a range of European countries. The doctrine will later be elaborated in Hammond's (1991) monograph on representations of Charles II and the changing status of the doctrine after 1660, Gilman's charting of the spread of the 'curious perspective' in primarily seventeenth-century painting and literature (1978: 88-128), the collection of monographs in the 'Corps Mystique, Corps Sacré' issue of *Ye[ale] Fren[ch] Studies* dealing with "textual transfigurations of the body from the Middle Ages to the Seventeenth Century" (Semple & Jaouen, 1994), and Axton's (1977) discussion of the 'Queen's 2 Bodies' as it related to the problematic of Elizabeth I's virginity in the 1500s.32

Axton importantly notes in a general statement on the King's Two Bodies concept, that '[t]his body politic should not be confused with the old metaphor of the realm as a great body composed of many men with the king as head. The ideas are related but distinct' (1977: 12). The analyses cited above help in elaborating just where the essential distinctions lay. The competing metaphor cited by Axton, the realm as singular/integrative body writ large, is well-attested to in medieval and Renaissance literature (eg, in the *Polycraticus* of John of Salisbury [1115-80], Catherine de Pizan's *Book of the Body Politic* [1405-7], or such later secondary overviews as Barnes [1948: 3-28] or Chroust [1971: 226-31]). The pictorial and narrative Leviathan and its more ethereal and antithetical successors, the Millsian individual and the virtu[ous]al general will of Rousseau, can be seen on one reading as heir to this model - but in the drive to either preserve or initiate a unitary ideology of political power, conservative or radical, the pure symbolism of the older model is retained at the expense of its more material and

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32 Probably better known to sociology is the takeup of Kantorowicz's theme in Bourdieu, who relates it to Durkheim's insights about group integration and perpetuity beyond the life of high-status individuals through a variety of commemorative mechanisms (1979: 72); Geertz, who allies it to Weberian charisma and sees it as a tool for understanding the as-yet-unwritten "political theology" of the twentieth century (1993: 121-46); *Discipline and Punish*, where Foucault presents an inversion of the principle in his discussion of the sovereign's polar opposite - the targetting of the monarch's justice centred on 'the least body of the condemned man' (1977: 28-9); and Turner (1992: 49-50), who utilises it as a bridge-building device between a social-constructionist modernity and an anti-foundational postmodernist orientation. Notably - and oddly in the face of these other appropriations - Le Roy Ladurie (1985: 43) cautions against such adoptions of the model; and Coleman's (1993) brief discussion traces the *persona ficta* doctrine to Innocent IV in 1243, notes its transference from boroughs, churches and towns to the legal personhood of the king, cites Maitland (who was scornful of the concept and dismissed it as "metaphysical - or should we say metaphysiological nonsense") and ignores Kantorowicz completely - perhaps in the interest of preserving the perspective of the revolutionary 'great transformation'?
functional aspects. The 'King's Two Bodies' does not speak the language of reified amalgamation and the 'brutal simplifier', but - consonant with the proxy principle deriving from and extending its applications - of relationships between concrete and abstract entities, symbolism and corporeality.

What is missed in post-medieval single body politic models is not only the mortal/mystical body interface of the living sovereign, but the very real concern in the Middle Ages with the relationship between dead and living bodies. This is particularly evident in the upper social orders (Kantorowicz, figs. 28, 30 and 31; Brown, 1981), but according to Finucane also concerned the treatment of the corpses of 'criminals and traitors, saints, and those who opted out of the Church or never had the chance to join it' as well as 'the ordinary laity and clergy' (1981: 41). Regarding deceased royalty, however, Finucane stresses the importance of a wooden likeness of the king, the effigy, which 'was to become customary for kings, queens and the nobility... [a]t first the effigy was merely a stand-in for the dead king but eventually, especially in France, it very nearly developed a life of its own' (1981: 47). This corresponds to Dupont's rewinding of the twinned sovereign principle back as far as Augustan Rome with its cult of 'the Emperor-god's other body', and the largely imperial and patrician practice, striking in a society that had no belief in an immortal soul, of fashioning for deceased worthies a 'second body, in wax [imago], for which another funeral was conducted' (1989: 398). Augé traces the idea spatially rather than temporally when noting that 'in the Akan civilizations (of present-day Ghana and the Ivory Coast) the psyche of each individual is defined by two "entities"', a belief originating in "primitive" kingship:

'The theme of the king's body double is wholly pertinent in Africa. Thus the Agni king of the Sangwi...had a double, a slave by origin, who was called Ekala:...with two bodies and two ekala - his own and that of his slave double - the Agni sovereign was thought to have particularly effective protection, the body of the slave double obstructing any aggression aimed at the king's person. If he failed in this role and the king died, the ekala would naturally follow him into the grave' (Augé, 1995: 61, 62, underline added).

But a progressive shift in the composition of the 'royal dummy' is decisive in the collapse of the medieval world and the practical end of monarchy. When the double of the body politic is ensconced or based primarily on a documentary form - subject to inspection,
revision, and interpretation of the archival rules of governance by a literate observer - then the possibilities opened up by particular readings render the ruler's 'body natural' more accountable to Condorcet's non-evadable 'tribunal' of truth that print introduced (see 2.8, p. 68) and consequently more vulnerable.

Against the maxim that 'the king can do no wrong' (Greenberg, 1991) and the smooth flow of hereditary succession entailed in 'the king is dead - long live the king!', the doctrine of the King's Two Bodies, reaching its apogee in the heartland of medieval political theology, opens into the paradoxical Puritan anomaly that "We fight the king to defend the King"; against Louis XIV's 'l'état c'est moi', a caricature Sun King, whose power lies in the correlation between a wizened ugly 'body natural' turned kingly-mystical only when clothed in the trappings of his robes of office (Kantorowicz, fig. 26). The potential updates signalled by the sociological extensions of the doctrine are applicable to contemporary (non-monarchical) polities; and the lineaments that outline the central features of the modern mystical self are likewise not semiotically ceremonial, but textual.

The virtual disappearance of monarchies in favour of other governmental forms - a move from divine right of kings to the principles of popular sovereignty - and historical advances in processes of secularisation and rationality may be seen as rendering the legal fiction of the ruler as possessing a "physical" and "mystical" body obsolete, quaint, of merely antiquarian interest as a backwater of nascent jurisprudence. I would argue here that, under conditions of modernity, a 'democratised' version of this principle has been extended to all members of a given populace - the bodies politic - fictionally bound into an imaginary unity. As with modern 'individuals', the formation of modern states is an artefact of writing. To take the United States as an instance, Derrida points out that the terms of US foundational documents - the Constitution, Bill of Rights, Declaration of Independence - are addressed to entities ('Americans') that are only brought into being by the documents themselves. As to the national heroes of these entities and the founding fathers of these United States, Baehr & O'Brien (1994: 31) echo the King's Two Bodies paradigm and posit "2 Thomas Jeffersons":

'First there was Thomas Jefferson the flesh-and-blood individual who was born in 1743 and who died in 1826. This was the Jefferson who penned the Declaration of
Independence, who was elected as the third president of the United States and who was inexorably tied to the context in which he lived. Second, there is Jefferson the founder, whose work continues to shape, and continues to be shaped by, ongoing political discourse in the United States, without regard to political context. This Jefferson, unlike the first, is not dead. The first Jefferson cannot be changed; the second cannot remain the same. Jefferson - the man and his work - has become a founder, an image, a symbol, a tradition...

What intervenes between the two periods, and presages the move into 'modernity proper', is the adoption and refinement by the military warrior caste - as will be shown in the forthcoming Chapter, more thoroughly and prior to its privileging in civil society - of the technologies of alphabetic literacy, leading to new concepts of both consciousness and the meaning of 'democracy'. The closing sentence of the Bisson citation (above, at p. 146), with its hint of the importance of a mass-conscriptable populace, gets directly at the true horror of modern warfare and its distinction from/evolution out of the feudal model. It can be considered as the rise to pre-eminence of the military's 'mystical body'. Warfare persists because war is a specific form of conflict, the central element of which is not violence, but the application of means-ends rationality (1.2.2) - the progressive control and replacement of impulse by restraint. The possibility of war comes to rest, paradoxically, on the presumption of peace as normative - like the paradox inherent in the King's Two Bodies construct, the very basis of legitimacy of the entity is the thing that destroys it, and the non-monarchical analogue to "fighting the king to defend the King" destroys the distinction between warmaking and peacekeeping, calling upon more resources devoted to the former in order to advance the latter (prime examples here being the Cold War or the Reaganite SDI). The justification for war is eventually constructed in the abstract, and it becomes an entirely moral enterprise; in the realm of the 'body natural', the modern prosecution of war similarly depends on abstracted (more properly, latent rather than actually deployed) combat units - hence the centrality of the concepts of the army reserve, air power doctrine/strategic bombing theory (Stephens, 1994: 46-79), and the fleet-in-being (Till, 1982: 111-39), all logistically supported by supplies from rapidly-convertible (ie, civilian into military) 'shadow factories' (Pearton, 1982). Just as paradoxically, "civilisation", "demilitarised" and/or "post-military societies" become an eventuality only when and where civil society has been effectively militarised.
The following chapter provides details of these paradoxical affinities; not least paradoxical because of mooted connections forged between (a) war as uncontrollable violence, the military life as totally-institutionalised unfreedom (Yarmolinsky, 1973), the military mind as 'anti-book-learning', and the soldier as robopath (Yablonsky, 1973); and (b) the obverse - reading/writing and freedom, textuality and civilisation, literacy and democracy.
APPENDIX C: 158.

INVENTORY of PEACEFUL SOCIETIES (multiple coding in bold type; n = 76 cases):

1) W. G. Sumner (1911: 205-07): (Aboriginal) Australians; (unspecified areas of) Papua New Guinea and German Melanesia; Chatham Islanders; the Khonds in Madras; the Rengmahs on the Assam Hills; the Mru on the Chittagong Hills; the Bechuanaland (South Africa); the Hierro of the Canary Islands; the Aurahuaco of Columbia; and the peace-pact activities of 'even our American Indians' [n = 10].

2) Hobhouse, Wheeler & Ginsberg (1915: 228-29): Survey material showing 'nine certain and four doubtful cases of "no war". These are mainly confined to the lowest grades, there being 4 1/2 among the lower, 3 1/2 among the higher hunters, and 2 in the lowest agriculture [...] Lower Hunters: Winturn, Kubu, Sakai, Punan, Semang; Higher Hunters: Ghiliaks, some Chepawysans, Point Barrow Eskimo, Greenland Eskimo; Agriculture: Paumari, Curetu' [n=9].

3) M. Mead (1940: 270): (all) Eskimos; the Lepchas of Sikkim [n = 2].

4) R. E. Park (1941: 239): the Semangs; the Veddas of Ceylon; the 'blameless' Punan [n=3].

5) O. Wright (1965, orig. 1942: 474, 1216): citing Elliot Smith (1930) whose own research relies on 'travellers' accounts' - the African Pygmies, Veddas of Ceylon, Semang and Sakai of the Malay Peninsula, Andamanese, Kubus of Sumatra, Punans of Borneo, Aru Islanders, Phillipine Negritos, Australians, Eskimos, Dene Indians, Salish, Algonquins, Beothuks, Paiutes, California Indians, Tierra del Fuegans, and Siberians; the Yurock Indians of California [n=20].

6) J. Schneider (1950: 288): 'Davie observes that the "native Australians are far from being a warlike race in spite of their frequent affrays...real war does not exist among the Australians"' [n = 1].

7) E. R. Service (1966: 95-97; 110): (aboriginal) Paiute and (Western) Shoshone; Tierra del Fuegians (specifically Alakaluf, Chono, Ona and Yahgan); Andaman Islanders [n=4].

8) M. Sahlins (1968: 5; 43-4): Hopi Pueblos [n=1].

9) K. Otterbein (1970: 20): Copper Eskimo (n. coast of Nth. America); Dorobo (E. Africa); Tikopia (Polynesia); Toda (South India) [n = 4].

10) R. Harrison (1973: 7-8): '[Gorer lists] the Arapesh of New Guinea, the Lepchas of Sikkim, [and] the pygmies of the Ituri rain forest of the Congo as nonwarring peoples. To
APPENDIX C: 159.

11) E. Fromm (1974: 167-68): ‘System A: Life-affirmative Societies...[those that have] a minimum of hostility, violence or cruelty among people, no harsh punishment, hardly any crime, and the institution of war is absent or plays an exceedingly small role... Among the societies falling under this life-affirming category, I have placed the Zuni Pueblo Indians, the Mountain Arapesh and the Bathonga, the Aranda, the Semangs, the Tadas, the Polar Eskimos, and the Mbutus’ [n=8].

12) S. K. Tefft (in Nettleship, Givens & Nettleship, 1975: 708-09): ‘...the Majangir of Southwestern Ethiopia...The Majang had no military organization and no war patterns [...] a war ethos did not develop among the Majang’ [n=1]

13) M. Roper (in Nettleship, Givens & Nettleship, 1975: 661): ‘Certainly, if Huber [c/f same source, p 643] is correct in his analysis, the Anggor [of New Guinea] do not engage in war’ [n=1]

14) Morey & Marwitt (in Nettleship, Givens & Nettleship, 1975: 447): ‘The Siriono and the Warao...were not warlike...’ [n=2]

15) A. Montagu (1976: 262): Australian aborigines; Kalahari Bushmen; (all) Eskimos; the Pygmies of the Ituri Forest; the Hadza of Tanzania; the Lepchas of Sikkim; the Birhor of Sthn. India; the Semang of Malaya; the Punan of Borneo; the Tasaday of Mindanao; ‘Most of the peoples of the Arctic, Subarctic, Great Basin, northeast Mexico and probably Baja California, lacked anything resembling true warfare before European contact’ (1976: 267); the Lapps of Scandinavia (1976: 270) [n = c.11].

16) D. Fabbro (1978): the Semai of Malaya; the Siriono of eastern Bolivia; the !Kung bushmen of the Kalahari; the Mbuti Pygmies of equatorial Africa; the Copper Eskimo of Nthn. Canada; the Hutterites of N. America; the islanders of Tristan da Cunha in the South Pacific [n = 7].

17) Kang, Horan & Reis (1978: 204): Overview - ‘Ethnographers and other coders find the following have no warfare: Central Eskimo (Boas, 1888: 57); Copper Eskimo (Jenness, 1922: 86, 94-96); Dorobo (Otterbein, 1968: 280); Kung (Thomas, 1959: 21-22); Lepcha (Gorer, 1938: 133, 138, 142, 327, 359); Siriono (Holmberg, 1950: 11, 152, 158-159); Toda (Otterbein, 1968: 280); Trumai (Murphy and Quain, 1955: 15); and Woleai (Otterbein & Otterbein, 1965: 1481)’ [n = 9].

18) I. Eibl-Eibesfeldt (1979: 170): the Tasaday; the Phi Thong Luang (Mrabri) [n=2].

this list might be added the Tiwi of Bathurst Island off Australia’ [n = 5].
19) G. Dyer (1986: 5-11): the Walbiri aborigines of Australia; the Bushman population of South Africa; [unspecified] New Guinea tribe (1986: 9); the Piegan and Shoshoni Indians; (all) Eskimos [n=6].

20) M. Harris (1987: 190): the Andaman Islanders, the Shoshoni, the Yahgan, the Mission Indians of California, and the Tasaday of the Philippines [n=5].

21) P. Crook (1994): Eskimos, Australians, Fuegians and Bushmen (following Kropotkin, 1902; 1994: 109); the Kayans of Borneo (following McDougall & Hose, 1912; 1994: 165; 258 n 58); the Arafuras, Todas, Bodo, Mishmis, and Pueblos (following Spencer, 1876; 1994: 216 n 40) [n=10].

22) B. McCarthy (1994: 109): special case of ‘those cultures in which warfare is rare or has long been abandoned’: the Gisu of Uganda; the Mechinaku of Amazonia; and ‘the pacific !Kung Bushmen of the Kalahari’ [n=3].

23) G. Trompf (1994: 27-8): the Indian Chenchu; the ‘sacrosant places of refuge’ among the Sawi of coastal Irian Jaya; ‘certain Arapesh clans’; the Chambri of the Sepik River region; the Gebusi of the Strickland River region in Papua [NB: Trompf states (1994: 25 n 3) that ‘[i]n the following pages, I tend to use the terms “war”, “warfare” and “feuding” interchangeably...]’ [n=5].

24) L. Keeley (1996: 27-32, 205): the relatively more unequivocal attributions - the Gonds of India; the Lapps of Scandinavia; the Tikopia of Polynesia; the Cayapa of Ecuador; the Mbuti Pygmies of Zaire; the Semang of Malaysia; the Semai of Malaya; the Copper Eskimo of arctic Canada; the Mardudjara of the western Australian desert; [in North America] the Panamint, Battle Mountain, and Hukundika Shoshone; the Gosiute and the Kaibab Paiute of the Great Basin; the Wenatchi and Columbia Salish of central Washington [n= 16].
APPENDIX D: 161.

76 SOCIETIES Classified as ‘NON-WARRING’ in the Works of 24 REPRESENTATIVE ANALYSTS:

2. Algonquins 40. Mardudjara
3. Andaman Islanders [x3] 41. Mbuti [x6]
4. Anggor 42. Mechinaku
5. Arafuras 43. Mission Indians of California [x2]
6. Aru Islanders 44. Mishmis
7. Aranda 45. Mru
8. Arapesh [x3] 46. (Gosiute and Kaibab) Paiute [x2]
9. Aurahuaco 47. (Panamint, Battle Mntn. & Hukundika) Shoshone
11. Bechuana 49. Phi Thong Luang (Mrabri)
12. Beothuks 50. Phillipine Negritos
13. Birhor 51. (Piegan & Shoshoni [x3]
14. Bodo 52. Point Barrow Eskimo
15. Cayapa 53. (Hopi & Zuni) Pueblos
16. Chambri 54. Punan [x3]
17. Chatham Islanders 55. Rengmahs
18. Chenu 56. Sakai [x2]
19. (some) Chepawyans 57. Sawi
20. Copper Eskimo [x4] 58. Semai [x2]
22. Dene Indians 60. Siberians
23. Dorobo [x2] 61. Siriono [x3]
24. (all) Eskimos [x7] 62. Tasaday [x3]
25. Gebusi 63. Tierra del Fuegians [x3]
26. Ghilliaks 64. Tikopia [x2]
27. Gisu 65. Tiwi
29. Greenland Eskimo 67. Tristan da Cuhnans
30. Hadza 68. Trumai
31. Hierro 69. Veddas [x2]
32. Hutterites (Nth. America) 70. Walbiri
33. Kayans 71. Wano
34. Khonds 72. (Wenatchi and Columbia) Salish [x2]
35. Kubi [x2] 73. Wintun
36. !Kung Bushmen [x6] 74. Woleai
37. Lapps [x2] 75. Yahgan
38. Lepchas [x4] 76. Yurock
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</table>
**APPENDIX E:164.**

**KEYS TO CODING FOR PEACEFUL SOCIETIES SPREADSHEET:**

**Column A:** NAME of group

**Column B:** Rf=NUMBER of ANALYSTS citing group (overall n = 24)

**Column C:** Rg= geographical REGION(Textor, 1967: 65 ff):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Description</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AF</td>
<td>'Africa, exclusive of Madagascar and northern and northeastern portions of the continent';</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CM</td>
<td>'Circum-Mediterranean, including Europe, Turkey and the Caucasus, the Semitic Near East, and northern and northeastern Africa';</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EE</td>
<td>'East Eurasia, excluding Formosa, the Philippines, Indonesia and the area assigned to the Circum-Mediterranean and other islands in the Indian Ocean';</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IP</td>
<td>'Insular Pacific, embracing all of Oceania as well as areas like Australia, Indonesia, Formosa, and the Philippines that are not always included therewith';</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NA</td>
<td>'North America, including the indigenous societies of this continent as far south as the Isthmus of Tehuantepec';</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA</td>
<td>'South America, including the Antilles, Yucatan, and Central America as well as the continent itself'.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Columns D to I:** Wright’s designations (1965: 527-574).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Column</th>
<th>Designation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>D: Cl</td>
<td>CLIMATE [C=cold, T=temperate, H=hot];</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E: Hb</td>
<td>HABITAT [F=forest, M=mountain, S=seashore, D=desert, G=grassland];</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F: Ct</td>
<td>CULTURE [H=hunters, P=pastoralists, A=agriculturalists];</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G: Pl</td>
<td>POLITICAL ORGANISATION [C=clan, V=village, T=tribe, S=state; following Spencer’s 1896 scheme, but c/f Service’s more usual 1962 taxonomy of Bands-Tribes-Chiefdoms-States in Otterbein, 1970: 18-19];</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H: Ir</td>
<td>INTERCULTURAL RELATIONS [I=isolated, M=moderate contact, C=close contact; “contact” means contact with either ‘any people of higher culture’ or ‘modern European civilization’, 1965: 551];</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I: Cw</td>
<td>CHARACTER of WAR [D=defensive war, S=social war, E=economic war, P=political war].</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Columns J to N:** Otterbein’s coding (1970: 143-49).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Column</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>J: 04/5</td>
<td>INTERNECINE (civil) WAR - ‘If there is more than one political community within the cultural unit, how frequently do they war with each other?’ &amp;/or EXTERNAL WAR - ‘How frequently does the cultural unit (or one of its political communities) attack other societies?’ [1=continually, 2=frequently, 3=infrequently or never].</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K: 08</td>
<td>‘What is the type of MILITARY ORGANIZATION?’ [1=composed of professionals (‘age-grades, military societies, and standing armies’), 2=composed of both professionals and nonprofessionals, 3=composed of nonprofessionals (‘professionals are usually full-time, paid warriors’), 4=no military organization].</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L: 013/4</td>
<td>‘What is the major type of MILITARY FORMATION?’ / ‘If there is an ALTERNATIVE type of military formation, what is it?’ [1=specialized units and coordinated actions; 2=lines, shock weapons; 3=lines, projectile weapons, cover; 4=lines, projectile weapons, cover not used; 5=ambush - surrounding enemy; 6=ambush - laying trap].</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M: 015</td>
<td>CASUALTY RATES: ‘In most battles using major type of military formation, are casualty rates (deaths) high or low?’ [1=high - over one-third of combatants, 2=low].</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| N: 023/4/5 | ‘What is the MAJOR REASON the military organization goes to war?’ / ‘If there is an ADDITIONAL REASON for going to war, what is it?’ / ‘If there is a THIRD REASON
for going to war, what is it? [1=subjugation and tribute; 2=land - for fields, hunting or grazing; 3=plunder; 4=trophies and honours; 5=revenge; 6=defense].

**Columns O & P:** Carneiro's scalograms (1973: 840-45).

**O:** #C= presence of specified CULTURAL traits (13 cases):

- **TODA** [10] special religious practitioners; trade between communities; formal political leadership; social segments above family; peacekeeping machinery; craft specialization; domesticated food sources predominant; judicial process; supra-provincial organization; temples. **ANDAMAN ISLANDERS** [2] formal political leadership; peace-keeping machinery. **COPPER ESKIMO** [2] special religious practitioners; trade between communities. **SEMANGS** [1] special religious practitioners. **SIRIONO** [1] formal political leadership. **KUNG BUSHMEN** [2] special religious practitioners; trade between communities. **!KUNG BUSHMEN** [2] special religious practitioners; trade between communities; formal political leadership. **YAHGAN** [2] special religious practitioners; trade between communities. **LAPPS** [7] special religious practitioners; trade between communities; formal political leadership; social segments above family; peacekeeping machinery; domesticated food sources predominant; judicial process. **WARAO** [8] special religious practitioners; trade between communities; formal political leadership; social segments above family; peacekeeping machinery; communities of 100 or more; significant social status differences; judicial process. **KAYANS** [11]; special religious practitioners; trade between communities; formal political leadership; social segments above family; peacekeeping machinery; communities of 100 or more; significant social status differences; craft specialization; domesticated food sources predominant; judicial process; craft production for exchange; full-time political leader; death penalty decreed; supra-provincial organization; political leader grants audiences; full-time craft specialists; administrative hierarchy; corvée; taxation in kind.

**P:** #P= presence of specified POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONAL traits (13 cases):

- **TODA** [3] headman, chief or king; political leader has assistants; supra-community political units. **ANDAMAN ISLANDERS** [3] headman, chief or king; political leader has assistants; supra-community political units. **COPPER ESKIMO** [0]. **SEMANGS** [0]. **SIRIONO** [2] headman, chief or king; supra-community political units. **KUNG BUSHMEN** [1] headman, chief or king. **YAHGAN** [0] **WALBIRI** [0] **VEDDAS** [1] headman, chief or king. **LAPPS** [3] headman, chief or king; political leader has assistants; supra-community political units. **WARAO** [1] headman, chief or king. **KAYANS** [5] headman, chief or king; political leader has assistants; regular rule of succession; strong political leadership; full-time retainers for political leader. **BAITHONGA** [12] headman, chief or king; political leader has assistants; regular rule of succession; supra-community political units; strong political leadership; installation ceremony for political leader; political leader is full-time specialist; supra-provincial organization; political leader grants audiences; administrative hierarchy; deceased ruler revered; appointed governors.

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<td>21. Middle Kingdom</td>
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<td>Over 150 years</td>
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<tr>
<td>36. Anglo-Indian</td>
<td>1818-1940</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 100 years</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37. Kamakura</td>
<td>1185-1331</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38. Dutch</td>
<td>1794-1940</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39. Arakanese</td>
<td>1546-1684</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40. Ottoman</td>
<td>1452-1590</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41. Fribourg</td>
<td>1711-1848</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42. Nepalese</td>
<td>1846-1940</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43. Hungarian</td>
<td>1312-1437</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44. Swiss</td>
<td>1848-1940</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45. Pollemaic</td>
<td>BC 241-217</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46. Mughal</td>
<td>1585-1707</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47. Guptia</td>
<td>336-450</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48. Javanese</td>
<td>1830-1942</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49. Mon</td>
<td>1426-1535</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50. Khmer</td>
<td>813-921</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51. Nth American</td>
<td>1866-1940</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52. Costa Rican</td>
<td>1842-1948</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**APPENDIX F: 166.**

KEELEY’S (1996: 211) LIST OF GUERILLA WAR OUTCOMES (n=50)

[1a] GUERILLA WINS (n=23):
- Mexico (1911-1919)
- Ireland (1919-1922)
- Arabia (Ibn Saud)
- Nicaragua (Sandino 1927-1933)
- Yugoslavia (World War II)
- Albania (World War II)
- Palestine (Israelis 1944-1948)
- Indochina (1945-1954)
- Indonesia
- Algeria
- Cyprus (independence)
- Cuba (Castro)
- Vietnam
- Laos
- Cambodia
- Angola
- Mozambique
- Guinea-Bissau
- Rhodesia (Zimbabwe)
- Aden-Yemen
- Namibia
- Afghanistan
- Nicaragua (Sandinista)

[1b] GUERILLA VICTORIES CORRELATED WITH CONVENTIONAL MILITARY VICTORIES (n=6):
- Arabia (World War I)
- China (1927-1945)
- USSR (World War II)
- Greece (World War II)
- France (World War II)
- Italy (World War II)

[2] GUERILLA LOSSES (n=17):
- Boers (1899-1902)
- Philippines (1899-1902)
- Soviet Union (Basmichi 1919-1930)
- Morocco (1912-1927)
- Brazil (Prester)
- Palestine (Arab 1936-1939)
- Poland (1944)
- Iraqi Kurds (1945-1975)
- Philippines (Huk 1946-1956)
- Greece (communists 1947-1949)
- Malaya (communist)
- Kenya (Mau-Mau)
- Venezuela (1962-1965)
- Peru (1962-1965)
- Oman (1962-1976)
- Guatemala (1964-1967)
- Bolivia (Guevara)

[3] TIES (n=4):
- German East Africa (1914-1918)
- Southern Sudan (1955-1972)
- Syria (1925-1936)
- Yemen (civil war 1962-1970)
CHAPTER 5: The WAR/TEXT AXIS - Modernity and Beyond

This chapter aims at the (necessarily less than definitive) coming to fruition of a war/text axis. The 'modern' is to be taken as starting in the 15th century: an end-point of Tuchman's 'calamitous' Fourteenth century (1979), and an era characterised by a nascent mercantile capitalism, state-consolidation and colonial expansion, religious reformation, and techno-scientific invention, particularly Bacon's trinity of world-altering inventions, 'those three which were unknown to the ancients, namely, printing, gunpowder and the compass' in his aptly-titled 17th-century Novum Organum (Aphorism 129). The first two are accorded due respect in the orienting Figure 5.1 below (at points [3] and [4]), and linked to other features of the period: Neferic military organizations [1] geared to engagement in total war on a global scale [2] on behalf of populations increasingly exposed [7] to the practices and principles of full involvement in an alphanumeric world [6], an ideal(ist) condition of mass literacy [5]:

**Figure 5.1: INDUSTRIAL NATION-STATES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Military Organization</th>
<th>Neferic [MSC]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Combat Mode: Praxis/Example(s)</td>
<td>TOTAL WAR (Intra/Inter-State)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Predominant Communicative Mode</td>
<td>PRINT TECHNOLOGY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative Historical Condition</td>
<td>MASS LITERACY (Modem)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational Locus &amp; Agents of Transmission</td>
<td>Schools, Teachers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CAPITALISM [X, Y (ii)]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Neferic [MSC]
2. 'TOTAL WAR' (Intra/Inter-State) ➔ [3] Strategy/Logistics Explosive
4. PRINT TECHNOLOGY ➔ [5] MASS LITERACY (Modem)
5. MASS LITERACY (Modem) ➔ [6] CAPITALISM [X, Y (ii)]
6. CAPITALISM [X, Y (ii)] ➔ [6] CAPITALISM [X, Y (ii)]
7. [7] Schools, Teachers ➔ recoding II
In the society that has come into existence since the Middle Ages, one can always avoid picking up a pen, but one cannot avoid being described, identified, certified, and handled - like a text. Even in reaching out to become one's own "self", one reaches out for a text.

Illich & Sanders, 1988: x.

5.1: The Legacies of the Proto-Textual.

In Chapter 4, I outlined a series of cumulative stages in the development of war. The underlying premise of that evolution was that the forms of organised conflict displayed in each stage underwent a series of refinements - a syncopated and/or contrapuntal pattern of constraints and enablements - in the orchestration of mass conflict. As a key to understanding how these changes in war showed any evidence of systematic regularity, and how such a pattern could culminate in a distinctively modern world, I argued that the structure of war in diverse temporally/spatially located societies was directly related to the reading/writing practices of such societies.

Thus the 'preliterate' condition of "primitive" groups ensures that a concept of war - as an extraordinary phenomenon, or an event opposed to a condition of "peace" - cannot arise: societal structure is dependent on, and harmonised with, a natural order, and this state of nature is either normatively savage, or non-violent. War in the Graeco-Roman world is predicated on culture - the human(ist) potential to impact on and 'improve' this state of nature, and to distinguish themselves from, control, absorb or eliminate those groups ('barbarians') closest to unmediated nature: writing - barbaric mark-making - is adopted as functional, but suitably modified to the privileging of a higher-order uniquely human capacity (speech and the art of rhetoric) to produce an utterance-dependent alphabetic literacy. In the medieval epoch instantiated by the breakdown of the temporal order of the Pax Romana, and the rise of a feudal system held together by the fragile patchwork of sovereignties under the sway of competing warlords, writing regains a measure of both its ancient magic - a fetishised symbol of a spiritual order - and is concomitantly the province of a formally limited priestly cohort of scribes.
In the following table, these assorted developments in the written and their advances into a configuration of (western) modernity, are summarily mapped out:

**Table 5.1: GRAFF'S 'Key Points in the History of Literacy in the West' (1982: 17):**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Key Events</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ca. 3100 BC</td>
<td>Invention of writing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3100-1500 BC</td>
<td>Development of writing systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>650-550 BC</td>
<td>&quot;Invention&quot; of Greek alphabet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500-400 BC</td>
<td>First school developments, Greek city-states, tradition of literacy for civic purposes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200 BC-200 AD</td>
<td>Roman public schools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0-1200</td>
<td>Origins and spread of Christianity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>800-900</td>
<td>Carolingian language, writing, and bureaucratic developments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1200 and onward</td>
<td>Commercial, urban &quot;revolutions&quot;, expanded administration and other uses of literacy and especially writing, development of lay education, rise of vernaculars, &quot;practical&quot; literacy, Protestant heresies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1300 and onward</td>
<td>Rediscovery of classical legacies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1450s</td>
<td>Advent of printing, consolidation of states, Christian humanism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1500's</td>
<td>Reformation, spread of printing, growth of vernacular literatures, expanded schooling (mass literacy in radical Protestant areas)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1600s</td>
<td>Swedish literacy campaign</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1700s</td>
<td>Enlightenment and its consolidation of traditions, &quot;liberal&quot; legacies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1800s</td>
<td>School developments, institutionalisation, mass literacy, &quot;mass&quot; print media, education for social and economic development: public and compulsory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900s</td>
<td>Nonprint, electronic media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>late 1900s</td>
<td>Crisis of literacy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A significant watershed in the development of the modern is accorded, in this scheme, to the period from the 1450s onward, with the advent of printing associated with a vast range of politico-economic changes that signal the end of medievalism.50 Graff’s scheme, from line 14 ff, ties the instigation and diffusion of print to the development of a functionally-literate culture, and a range of socio-political consequences that follow in its wake. In the following section, I look in

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50 This both forms a bridge between the current and preceding Chapter, relates to the accompanying headnote (p. 169) and resonates with the more detailed model (reproduced below) of a Script/Print dichotomy between the medieval and the modern in Hoyles (1977: 21).

Noteworthy in this typology is the synchronous development of both (a) flexibility and fixity of text, and (b) individual autonomy in, and authoritative control of, reading/writing:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Script</th>
<th>Print</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Feudal</td>
<td>Bourgeois</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International</td>
<td>National</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin</td>
<td>National Language</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Varied Orthography</td>
<td>Accuracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changeable Texts</td>
<td>Permanence and Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reading Aloud</td>
<td>Private Silent Reading</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authorship Unimportant</td>
<td>Authorship and Copyright</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copying Approved</td>
<td>Idea of Plagiarism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Books Bequeathed in Wills</td>
<td>Books Commonplace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illiteracy</td>
<td>Middle-class Literacy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
more detail at some of these suggested connections.

5.2: Mooted Literacy Impacts.

5.2.1: Third World Development. Within the global context of "underdevelopment", reading and writing capacities are assumed as factors positively influencing agriculture and rural innovation at the level of both technology and politics (P. Harrison, 1985: 303-306; Schryer, 1984), fertility rates and family structure (Stycos, 1982) and effective participation in a contemporary world-system (Bhola, 1984). Yet under examination, each of these connections has been substantially modified where not flatly denied. Stycos' analysis of the effect of literacy on fertility decline in Costa Rica, despite being based on 'data... of unusually high quality' (1982: 15) is equivocal at best, unable to disentangle the respective effects of literacy and urbanisation - and an equivalent study undertaken in a different setting, investigating aspects of demographic behaviour in 19th Century France, finds that 'no independent effect of literacy... is apparent' on nuptiality and marital fertility (Lehning, 1984: 550). A case study of the impact of literacy on agricultural development in southern Brazil found 'that, except for a necessary association between literacy or level of education and reading of printed farm information, these variables do not serve in a general way to enhance exposure to information about agriculture' (Fliegel, 1966: 15); and a more comprehensive survey, taking in almost all of India's 334 rural districts, concluded that 'district literacy levels probably have no impact on increasing agricultural production' (Barnes, Fliegel & Vanneman, 1982: 263). Kamerschen, in an early test of the claim by Golden (1955), that 'literacy affords an excellent index of the level of socioeconomic development of a country', undertook a linear regression analysis of 80 countries, finding that 'Golden's theory becomes more suspect as the data are disaggregated...the relationship between literacy and either per capita income or industrialisation is much weaker and, in fact, is not statistically significant' (1968: 178-179).

5.2.2: Formal Education. The taken-for-granted conflation of literacy with formal education processes, a typical feature of those claiming beneficial development effects
for reading and writing (for the stronger sociological views in this perspective, see Shils, 1966; Inkeles, 1973; Inkeles & Smith, 1975) has also been subjected to query at a number of points. As noted, the posited failure of the schools to successfully transmit reading and writing skills is an ongoing theme of the contemporary popular and scholarly press in the core-countries of the West. What critics such as Kozol (1980; 1985) or Copperman (1980) label as this 'breakdown' of the educational system is deemed responsible for the current "literacy crisis", giving rise to the nagging suspicion that schools may be the site for the 'disease' of illiteracy as much as centres for its prevention or cure. Cost-benefit analysis by Blaug (1966) suggests that literacy training is most efficiently carried out in adult education environments, and that in Third-world contexts at least, the establishment of Western-type primary and secondary schooling is a relatively wasteful option in terms of time, money and effectiveness - a point concretely borne out by the much-lauded pedagogical practice of Paolo Freire (1974; 1990). Further, case studies such as that undertaken by Thomas in Pakistan (1974) and numerous examples of the rise of indigenous literacies in societies partly or wholly lacking an institutionalised educational infrastructure attest to the acquisition of reading and writing skills without formal schooling of any kind; and studies of the 'involved marketing and trading systems of traditional West Africa or Melanesia' (Finnegan, 1988: 149), the Ibadan cattle market in Nigeria (Cohen, 1965) or the Indians of Panajachel in Central America indicate no difficulty in engaging in 'a variety of economic transactions apparently without the aid of the written or printed word' (Laqueur, 1976: 255-256).

Moreover, such studies resonate with historical analyses of the early progress of literacy in advanced Western countries. These suggest that the regions with the highest rates of literacy in 17th and 18th centuries, eg Sweden (Johansson, 1981), Scotland (Laqueur, 1976), or Wales (Williams, 1982), achieved this pre-eminence independently of formal educational institutions. The mode of production and population distributions prevailing in these areas further tend to spoil the neat equation between widespread literacy and high degrees of urbanisation and industrialisation. More specifically, assorted empirical studies of England prior to the Education Act of 1870 tend to further unravel some or all aspects of the
industrial/urban/formal schooling/literacy correlations. Thompson (1972: 782-794), Johnson (1980) and Howard (in Barton & Ivanic, 1991: 78-108) stress the autodidactic and anti-institutional nature of radical working class acquisition of reading and writing, lending some support to Laqueur's wider proposition that 'over several centuries, the literate popular culture of England largely made itself' (1976: 255)\(^4\). Sanderson (1972) maintains that the Industrial Revolution actually brought about an initial *decline* in mass literacy. The encyclopaedic survey by Stephens studying the geographical distribution of literacy in provincial England between 1830 and 1870 notes that there is 'insufficient evidence to demonstrate a firm connection between literacy levels and puritan influences or the availability of schooling, and little more to suggest a relationship with the type of agriculture pursued' - further, 'no simple distinction between urban and rural areas is discernible'(1987: 4, 5). Wells (in Musgrave, 1970: 59-64) notes the distinction between the 'hard way man' and the 'man with paper qualifications' - valorisation of the former amongst workers in British industry being a feature of an English anti-intellectual tradition in the C19th, bolstered by its upper-class equivalent - the public school 'colonial code' built on "character" and physical prowess rather than mastery of book-learning; and élite dedication to the principle of keeping the labour force ignorant, a view largely unified and in the ascendant up to 1825 (Kaestle, 1976; Best, 1975). In summary, 'among the working classes of C19th England and Scotland, reading was

\(^4\) How and why did Tory-based opposition to mass education change? My own explanation would rest on growing élite perceptions - whether well-founded or not - of the success of 'indigenous literacies'. If reading and writing were transmitted through institutions out of reach of direct control by the state (coffee houses, working mens associations, craft guilds, the family) and if the style and subject-matter of this literature was potentially or actually seditious, taking the form of Chartist or Owenite missives, Luddite tracts or the publications of the 'unstamped press', then governmental priorities must have taken account of these factors. Hence, in the Education Acts of the C19th, control over what is learned (the content of 'morally edifying' literature/"Useful Knowledge") is coupled with control over where, when and how it is learned (in classrooms, by suitably qualified teachers, under a system of compulsory attendance). For general support of such a position, see Foucault, 1991, and Rockhill, 1987: 157; for application of the view to the English case, see Reinecke, 1987: 25, l. Hunter, 1988, or Jones & Williamson, 1979; for a Canadian example of the same process, see Curtis, 1985.
learned in many situations outside formal education, and its purposes and consequences were varied...[e]conomic laws of supply and demand of job opportunities in C18th England dictated levels of literacy and secondary education which were set as ideals, but there was no direct relation between skills achieved in secondary education and job success' (Heath, 1980: 124; emphasis added).

5.2.3: Protestantism. A more historically specific and potentially more cogent and demonstrable conjunction is that drawn between the dissemination of reading and writing skills and the rise of Protestantism. Graff characterises the Reformation as 'the first great literacy campaign in the history of the West' (1982: 18) and in relation to the spread of literacy in specific countries mentioned above, Sullivan notes that 'the Reformation has been throughout the modern era a pervasive force in the propagation of literacy...[i]n the Scandinavian peninsula, Denmark and Holland...it ... made literacy a typical phenomenon among the natives of these countries', as it apparently did also in pre-industrial England and Scotland (1948: 516; c/f O'Day, 1982: 217-238). A number of commentators find a comparable linkage between literacy and Puritanism in colonial New England (Cremin, 1970; Beales, 1978; Hall, in Darnton, 1991: 148-149) and in Germany, where

'the political possibilities of print were recognised immediately and fully exploited by both the authorities and their opponents during the Reformation...[t]here was a large trade in heretical religious books, particularly from Germany and Switzerland, and it has been estimated that between 1517 and 1520 the thirty publications of Martin Luther alone sold well over 300,000 copies'(Marshall, 1983:12; c/f J. Burke, 1985: 116-118; Luke, 1989).

Shortly before the twentieth century, Tarde was similarly asserting the centrality of writing and print as a causative factor in history:

'As the Renascence was connected with discoveries in arts and letters, so the Reformation proceeded, in large part, from the invention of printing. The idea of acquiring by the mere reading of sacred books the highest type of knowledge, a full solution of the most difficult problems, could only have arisen when the sudden and extraordinary diffusion and invasion of books, hitherto unknown, had developed a general epidemic of reading and of the illusion of thinking
that books were the source of all truth. It was perhaps because of this, Germany being the birthplace of printing, that Protestantism was German in its origin. Otherwise, this fact would be surprising, for, prior to the Reformation, all great heresies, all attempted rebellions against the Church, started from the South of Europe, a more civilised region than the North’ (Tarde, 1903 [orig. 1890]: 364).

Yet in general terms, elements of this thesis are at least questionable. Kenneth Lockridge has argued that literacy ‘was of little significance for the shaping of modern social values in colonial New England’ (cited in Resnick & Resnick, 1977: 372). The second edition of the Fontana Dictionary of Modern Thought dismisses the notion that the ‘invention of printing is held to be responsible for the Protestant Reformation’ as a key instance of the flawed concept of technological determinism (Bullock et. al., 1988: 847). Stone highlights a gap between the proselytising ambitions of Protestantism and its subsequent effect, arguing ‘that all these efforts at religious indoctrination by education have ultimately proved futile...the most striking result... has been the inexorable growth of secularism’ (1969: 83), a view subscribed to by Chadwick (1990), who cites rising popular literacy and the rise of a cheap press as key causal factors in the C19th ‘secularisation of the European mind’.

Moving to cases, two monographs on C16th Germany - the site of both Luther’s decisive break with Rome and the invention of Gutenberg’s printing press - are dubious about the presumed affinity. R. W. Scribner shows that even if the broadly-agreed optimum estimate of 300,000 copies of Luther’s works in circulation between 1517 and 1520 were accurate, ‘only 2.3% of the population, or 1 person in 43, would have encountered Luther’s ideas in this way...it seems fairly certain that the real mass dissemination of ideas took place orally, not through the printed word’(1989: 20); and a study by Strauss & Gawthrop concurs, finding that ‘the facts as we can establish them do not substantiate the generally accepted notion - which no one has ever felt obliged to prove - of a causal link between the Lutheran reformation of the sixteenth century and popular bible reading’ (1984: 41). On the evidence of divergent trends - rising literacy and declining religiosity - since the early C16th, it would be fair to suggest that the most satisfying form of this particular connection would take a Weberian turn; ie, Protestantism plays a role in kick-starting the dissemination of printed matter and mass literacy, but that the latter, like capitalism, subsequently
runs under either other auspices, or "its" own steam.

5.2.4: Political Freedom. Other approaches tie literacy to the "free society" via participation in democratic electoral processes and active citizenship - a view largely deriving from C19th liberal-humanist perspectives (such as Mills': see Chapter 1). In an attempt to give some quantitative bite to the notoriously slippery concept of freedom within a national context, Raymond Gastil's (1975: 3-9) 7-point index of political rights (with "1" representing 'a political system in which the great majority of persons or families has both the right and the opportunity to participate in the electoral process' and "7" referring to 'tyrannies without legitimacy either in tradition or in international party doctrine') is instructive in this regard. If we take at face value Herzog's bald assertion, that '[n]o nation has achieved extensive economic development without also having high literacy rates, upwards of 80 percent' (1973: 325), take countries claiming literacy rates above this figure within a given time span - in this case 1975, at the completion of the 10-year UN-sponsored Experimental World Literacy Program - and apply Gastil's political rights index to these countries, are the anticipated correlations evident?

On UNESCO figures for the year 1975 (UNESCO Statistics of Education Attainment and Illiteracy, 1945-1974 [Paris, 1977]; Statistical Yearbook, 1977 [Paris, 1978]; World Bank, World Development Report, 1978 [Washington, 1979]), 31 countries asserted national literacy rates of 80% and above. Of these, 3 - Surinam, Puerto Rico, and Hong Kong - were not accorded a rating on the political rights scale, and 2 - Guyana and Western Samoa - rated a mid-point score of "4" on the Gastil index. Of the remaining 26 cases, 13 countries were rated "1" to "3" (on the "democratic" side of the rankings), and the other 13 were rated "5" to "7", as relatively 'tyrannical' regimes. Comparing some individual cases, one finds, in a purported 88% literacy range, Costa Rica rated "1" in political rights and Chile, rated "7"; Italy, Barbados and Ireland as having 98% literacy rates and a political rights index of "1", and Poland and Romania, "6" and "7" on the Gastil scale but also with supposedly 98% literate populations; China and Venezuela as having 82% literacy rates, rated "7" and "2" in terms of political rights respectively; and two countries - Denmark, with a political rights indice of "1",
and the former Soviet Union tagged as a “6” on the Gastil scale - both of which claim literacy rates of 100%. Gastil's similarly-scaled civil rights measure (“1” denoting 'a country in which the rule of law is unshaken [sic ’, “7” equalling a country where 'citizens have no rights in relation to the state') yields similar results, since only three nations - Guyana, Western Samoa (see above), and Chile - display a 2-point discrepancy, civil rights uniformly higher than political rights. Five countries vary by one point between civil and political rights; and the remaining 17 assessed countries have identical scores on the two indexes. Briefly, on the evidence of these admittedly problematic figures, 55 the most charitable assessment would maintain that the impact of popular literacy on political freedom is either purely rhetorical, or is yet to be demonstrated. In sum, then, Graff's initial skepticism towards the benign collateral effects of literacy, and his later statement that '(h)istorically, large-scale efforts to provide literacy have not been tied to the level of wealth, industrialisation, urbanization, or democratization of a society' (Arnove & Graff, 1987: 2, emphases added) tends to hold as a generality and within a variety of more specific contexts.

There is a final correlative prospect for consideration - a connection seldom averred, but as maintained throughout, a linkage more cogent (even if less palatable) than those offered above.

5.2.5: War and Military Organisation. A series of suggestive linkages between these topics were proffered in Chapter 1 (pp. 16-18), and gradually built up over time (in Chapter 4). More particularly, Nelson (cited in Little, 1971: 94) notes the premium placed on the ability to read and write as a function of military fitness in World War II, when, out of roughly 18 million men psychologically examined, 'nearly five million were rejected from service - forty percent for illiteracy'. This observation raises the initial question of when, and the eventual questions of why and how, literacy becomes a measure of military competence in itself. Such queries are particularly germane in view of army careers seen (stereotypically) as an option for the unlettered - a notion prevalent in both civil society and the services,

56 Even at a perfunctory glance, the suggestion that the countries under discussion above might somehow exemplify Herzog's notion of "extensive economic development" also constitutes something of a surprise.
nicely captured in Barnett’s characterisation of British army service as ‘traditionally the preserve of Irish peasants or urban riff-raff’ (cited in Wolfe & Erickson, 1969: 6); Levy’s observations that Americans tend to ‘regard armed forces careers as undertaken only if one were unable to do any better’ with military personnel caricatured as ‘unintelligent, humourless, authoritarian and above all anti-intellectual’ (cited in Bienen, 1971: 42-43); Fischer’s (1932) view as recorded in the infamous Report from Iron Mountain (“ed.” Lewin, 1968: 74-75) that ‘the typical European standing army of fifty years ago consisted of “... troops unfit for employment in commerce, industry or agriculture, led by officers unfit to practice any legitimate profession or to conduct a business enterprise” ’; and the remarks of an anonymous seventeenth-century French nobleman that, in his day, ‘gentlemen studied only to go into the Church...Montmorency, the late Constable, knew how to hold his own in the provinces and his place at court without knowing how to read’ (cited in Eisenstein, 1968: 44). Alvin and Heidi Toffler’s later assessment sums up what they see as the prevalent - and inaccurate - stereotype of the soldier:

‘Intellectuals, in particular, have tended to caricature military men as brutish or just plain stupid. Think of political cartoons picturing pigeon-breasted generals dripping with medals and sashes, their faces devoid of intelligence. Think of Gilbert & Sullivan’s satirical song “I Am the Very Model of a Modern Major-General”, or the First Lord of the Admiralty in H.M.S Pinafore, who claimed, “I thought so little, they rewarded me/ By making me the Ruler of the Queen’s Navee!” ’ (1993: 11)

Taken in isolation and in light of the opinions expressed above, the Nelson quote may suggest that armed forces investment in literacy may be either limited to the USA, or be specific to wartime conditions in the mid-20th century. Other data, however, suggest that the involvement is both more geographically widespread and historically pervasive. Polemically, (and as instanced in the introductory Chapter at p. 17) one of the most potent and recurrent of the metaphors deployed when discussing literacy is, of course, itself military. One is reminded of psychologist William James’ advice to American teachers early into the present century:
"In war, all you have to do is work your enemy into a position in which natural obstacles prevent him from escaping... then fall on him in numbers superior to his own... Just so in teaching; you must simply work your pupil into such a state-of-interest with every other object of attention banished from his mind; then reveal it to him so impressively that he will remember it to his dying day; and finally, fill him with a devouring curiosity to know what the next steps are." (Sprinthall, 1994: 6164)  

Politically, such rhetoric is often evident both at the local, idiomatic level, and is also incorporated into the official language of national policy. But behind this rhetoric lies a more corporeal involvement of the armed services in the promotion and dissemination of literacy; and the identification of illiteracy as a widespread 'social disease' in need of curing tends to follow in the wake of direct involvement in warfare or revolution by the nation(s) concerned. Numerous instances of this pattern and an indication of its pervasiveness are provided in general studies by, eg, Amove & Graff (1987). Flora, in an essay that both demolishes Lerner's proposed tie between literacy and urbanization and maintains that in the west there 'is no doubt... that no direct connection existed between industrialisation and literacy development' (1973: 230) notes that for Prussia, France and Austria

'the development of efficient civil and military bureaucracies and thus of literacy was a necessity of national self-defence and self-assertion. This condition was true to a much less extent for Spain and Portugal after having lost their colonies, and for Italy before gaining national unity. This relationship is further illustrated by the English efforts to accelerate the development of education in the second half of the nineteenth century, the Japanese educational policy after 1868 directed to national strength, and the Russian reform attempts during the Napoleonic Wars and after defeat in the Crimean War' (1973: 230).

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56 In commenting on this citation, the author continues to deploy the military metaphor: Thus, 'the difficulty, as James goes on to say, is that the student, like the opposing general, may be working just as avidly and keenly for a different set of goals. Just what the students think and want may be as difficult for the teacher to discern as the military commander' (Sprinthall, 1994: 6164).
Similarly, in Houston's assessment, perceptions of the need for literacy have consistently tended to occur 'at times of military failure or perceived political crisis, as in Prussia [1806-13] when commentators debated the role of education in reviving and creating national sentiment, Russia after 1856, England during the 1830s, France in the 1870s and 1880s or Spain after the First World War' (1988: 2).

5.3: The Geopolitics of Textuality

In this section, applying this pattern to specific countries, more detailed examples of the same processes are evident in the well-documented cases of direct military involvement in not only in literacy campaigns, but in all aspects of textuality - particularly the part played by forms of writing in nation-state formation and warmaking. To demonstrate this, I supply qualitative instances of an operational war-text axis in 107 geographical entities - states or quasi-states. Since these entities are primarily cultural rather than material realities - states appearing, disappearing, subject over time to varying nomenclature, movable borders and shifts in the criteria for qualitative/quantitative membership by people(s) in such entities - the total number of states within a world-system at any given point in time can never be definitive. However, if, following Doogan & Plessey (1984) or McGrew (1992), we estimate the number of extant states in the global system as plus or minus 155 - and bear in mind the caveat that this depends entirely on how we count - the figure of 107 represents a fairly robust sample size. These samples validate the broader claims, of a civil/military interplay at the level of institutionalised knowledge, contended for within the thesis: a resonance between contemporary characterisations of literacy as mass and/or functional, these same imperatives as originary and ongoing features of armed service organization. Thus, though precise measurement of all relevant phenomena - states, war/text, literacy and militarism - is problematic, the circumstantial evidence of a general trend, that of rising literacy and qualitative and quantitative increases in the preparedness for and prosecution of organised combat, is apparent. The sampled regions are as follows:
### I. Africa/Middle East

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<td>Wales</td>
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<td>Scotland</td>
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**Footnotes:**
- [57] Now Ethiopia (case 8).
- [58] Disputed ongoing status: sometime sub-region of Ethiopia (case 8).
- [59] Since 1960, the Independent Republic of Malagasy.
- [61] In 1963, united with Zanzibar to form the present Tanzania.
- [64] Only South Korea in this sample.
- [65] Sub-region of the Federation of Malaysia (case 57): pre-1963, North Borneo.
- [67] Amalgamated (with case 63) to form the union of Papua New Guinea (PNG).
- [69] Broader designation incorporating cases 71-76.
- [70] Post-1989, "the former..."
- [71] Sub-region of Germany (case 82).
- [72] Incorporates cases 87-90 - the latter cities constitute special instances in this set, as the relevant qualitative sample situates them historically-specifically and refers only to their status as independent Renaissance principalities.
- [73] 'Supercedes' case 97.
- [74] Post-1989, "the former..." (c/f note 14 above).
- [75] Sub-region of Turkey (case 101).
[1] Writing of the Italian invasion (Oct. 1935) and subsequent annexation of Abyssinia (present-day Ethiopia - see [8]), Phillip Knightley maintains that the outcome of the war was primarily the result of serious misconceptions about the nature of the conflict and the combatants. Western print media responsible for the coverage of the invasion fostered, communicated and enforced as policy a fictive, romantically-primitive "Abyssinia": reporting on the war for the Daily Mail, Evelyn Waugh, author of the putatively fictional Scoop (described by Knightley as 'actually a piece of straight reportage, thinly disguised as a novel to protect the author from libel actions', 1989: 173) noted that "'Few [editors] could find Abyssinia on the map or had the faintest conception of its character. Those who had read Nesbitt believed that it lay below sea-level in stupefying heat, a waterless plain of rock and salt, sparsely inhabited by naked homicidal lunatics, those who glanced through Budge pictured an African Thibet, a land where ancient inviolable places jutted on to glaciers...the editor of one great English paper believed...that the inhabitants spoke classical Greek'" (cited in Knightley, 1989: 172). In the Addis Ababa war zone itself, on-ground information was limited by the fact that with one exception - a Lithuanian - not one correspondent spoke Amharic, the native tongue. Journalists were also confined by the Emperor to a limited area of the capital and relied largely on official handouts for an assessment of the situation. Aside from questionable content, outgoing communiqués were hampered partly by eventual censorship, but primarily by the exorbitant cost of cable rates, forcing foreign journalists to resort to clipped "cablese" incomprehensible to both the local cable clerk and subsequent sub-editors, who were forced to resort to further wildly inaccurate "decoding" when the stories went to press: incoming communications were, 'if anything, even worse. The system of delivery was completely haphazard. The cable clerk waited until he had enough cables to justify engaging a delivery boy, and the boy then set off to the Hotel Imperial. Since he could not read, his delivery technique was to hand all the cables to the first European he met at the hotel and ask him to pass them on' (1989: 174). The net result of these communicative glitches led
more than one journalist to the production of editorially-acceptable copy based on adaptations of specious source material: two - Gallagher of the Daily Express and Phillips of the Daily Telegraph - filed stories 'paraphrased from an old book called In the Country of the Blue Nile, by Colonel C. F. Rey' (1989: 177). Correspondents covering the story from the Italian side, by contrast, were heavily censored - and as Knightley emphasises, since 'an invented story, unhampered by facts, makes more exciting reading than a heavily censored account of a minor engagement, newspapers plumped for stories from Addis Ababa, and this created a false impression of what was happening in Abyssinia' (1989: 179) - a false impression that delayed both League of Nations sanctions against Mussolini's Italy, and intervention or aid to Hailie Selassie's forces, contributing to the war's conclusion with the victorious Italian occupation of May 5th 1936. Similarly, in his assessment of another conflict forty years on - the Russian invasion of Afghanistan [2] in 1978 - Knightley again cites distance, unfamiliarity and biased reportage as contributory to general dis/misinformation: ‘Afghanistan was reported from across the border in Pakistan, from brief visits to Kabul, or from furtive interviews with guerrilla fighters who soon developed a reputation for being willing to tell the correspondent what he wanted to hear. In such circumstances many a correspondent became the tool of the intelligence agencies...easy prey for the CIA or the KGB line [...] little wonder, then, that the editor of the Toronto Sun, Peter Worthington, declared that Afghanistan was one of the worst reported wars of recent times. “The fighting there is the subject of rumour, unconfirmed reports, and widespread ignorance...and the media are the prime villains” ’ (1989: 432-33).

[3] In the wake of the invasion of Algeria by the French Army of Africa in 1830 and the establishment of France's public-school system under a law of 1883, 'the education of the largely nomadic peoples in the vast southern territories was left in the hands of French missionaries and the military'. Following the outbreak of the Algerian rebellion, by 'the beginning of 1957, the [French] army had opened 212 schools, with 355 army teachers and 11,700 pupils', although these establishments were 'described by FLN sources as organs of psychological warfare
rather than true schools' (Gillespie/Halpern, 1963: 13, 21).

[4] In Burkina Faso, the colonial education system - male-centred, authoritarian and urban-dominated, with literacy deemed irrelevant to the 90 percent peasant population - remained 'virtually intact after independence in 1960' (Daouda Api, 1988: 9): but the 'revolution of 1983, led by former President Thomas Sankara, brought a new direction'. In February 1986, under the auspices of the new governing CDRs [Committees for Defence of the Revolution], 'project "Alpha Commando" was launched from 1,000 literacy centres throughout the country', aimed at forging through the medium of text 'a new type of Burkinabé farmer, politically conscious of a role in building a national, independent, self-sufficient and planned economy. This new type of farmer is one who refuses to submit to nature, who rebels against passivity and fatalism and who dares to innovate' (1988: 10).

[5] In Chad, Collelo (1988) notes that 'France has played a paramount role in the training of the Chadian armed forces since independence. In 1980, during the worst fighting of the Chadian Civil War, the French withdrew their training mission and other forms of military cooperation. French involvement resumed in 1983 when Habré appealed for help against renewed Libyan intervention in northern Chad. As of late 1987, the French training mission consisted of about 250 officers and enlisted men. Of the 10,000 soldiers composing FANT at its inception in 1983, about 8,000 had been rotated through French training by 1987. The principal training sites were at N'Djamena, Koundoul, and Moussoro. At an instructional centre at Mongo, thousands of former codos (commandos) had been "recycled" by French trainers, assisted by a large cadre of Chadian military. A small number of codos had been integrated into FANT, but most had been organized into work brigades for service as agricultural or road labourers'. Problems with the French-supervised Chadian military organisation were primarily caused by 'the extreme variation in educational and experience levels of the soldiers. In some cases, combat veterans had to be combined with new recruits. Most enlisted men were illiterate and did not understand French; when an interpreter was unavailable,
instruction was done by demonstration and imitation'. Solutions entailed the establishment of an interservice officers school staffed by the French at N'Djamena with a two-year program which 'combined general and military subjects' where successful graduates were 'commissioned as infantry platoon leaders with the rank of second lieutenant'; the selection of officers for advanced training abroad; and further specialist instruction in the country delivered by 'United States mobile training teams' in the late 1980s.

[6] 'Education in Egypt represents an amalgam of the centuries-old, religiously-oriented Islamic tradition on the one hand and a Western-inspired, secular system on the other [...] Secular education in Egypt had its origin with the absorption of Egypt in the Ottoman Empire in 1517, but did not develop extensively until the period of French influence in the nineteenth century. Napoleon's invasion brought many French scholars to Egypt, and later Muhammad Ali (1805-48) set up schools on the French model with the help of French experts...' (Wilber, 1969: 106, 108).

Another better-known, more apocryphal and unintended cultural consequence of the invasion was the accidental discovery of the Rosetta Stone, unearthed in 1799 by anonymous French soldiers repairing the ruins of Fort Rashid in the Nile Delta. As the key to hieroglyphic decoding, its landmark status in the establishment of Egyptology and the furtherance of the fledgling disciplines of archaeology and linguistics is indisputable (Honour, 1966), vindicating Doblhofer's claim that the 'saying that in times of war the Muses are silent does not apply in the history of decipherment' (1957: 47): a view endorsed by Daniel Foss in his observation that the 'papyrus roll in the Near East was the best cheap writing material prior to paper, which replaced it after 750. Survival of the evidence was quirky, contingent upon the arid conditions of Upper Egypt or the caves of the Negev. This is where we make such finds as the Oxyrhynxus papyri, the Dead Sea Scrolls, Nag Hammadi, and the Babatha archive (deposited for safekeeping in a cave in AD 132 and containing legal documents which the Jewish woman Babatha intended to retrieve after the Bar Kochba war but didn't make it)' (1998: 2).
Swift (1988: 18-19) describes how, in the Sahel region of Northern Eritrea, the Eritrean People's Liberation Front [EPLF] has established the concept of the Zero School, where the 'school is scattered in a series of classrooms that dot several interlocking valleys. Each classroom is built of sticks and foliage and is either carefully camouflaged under trees or else dug into the sides of rocky hills. Every village school in Eritrea is designed in this way so as to prevent detection from the air by the MIGs and Anatov bombers of the Ethiopian air force' (1988: 18).

The author contrasts this high-risk commitment to primary schooling in socialist Eritrea with the education system in that country's hostile neighbour Ethiopia. There, according to Acia, a former educator in Ethiopia now working as an EPLF Zero School science teacher, the 'system was based on individual advancement and your marks in the final national exam. "If you did well you became a manager, got a job in the airlines or a good position in the army. Those who did poorly often became teachers"' (Swift, 1988: 19, emphasis added).

Drawing attention to the relative speed and ease of transition to modernity in former colonial African territories south of the Sahara (characterised in part as a marriage between 'writing and the technology of the intellect' at p. 343, and 'the gun and the means of destruction' at p. 346), Goody notes that 'in Northern Ghana, fifty years passed between the coming of the colonial troops and the graduation of the first university student; despite the pejorative comments of many contemporary nationalists, the colonial regimes achieved a considerable amount of educational development in a comparatively short time' (cited in Eisenstadt & Rokkan, 1973: 344). More cogently, as well as endorsing and extending this link (1969: 242), Dowse's study of the military coup of 1966 that toppled the Nkrumah government cites 'shared educational experiences' as the key factor uniting the successful army officer/bureaucratised middle class coalition (1969: 229). He further underscores, in the debates surrounding a mooted reform constitution, this new military régime's 'suspicion of the “masses”. For example, it was suggested that only the literate should be given the vote, and the authorities' constitutional proposals were certainly geared towards the chiefs, the older generation, and especially the judiciary (which might emerge as a “guardian”
group); and against the illiterate, who would not be allowed to stand for election (this would exclude about 70 per cent of the population)' (1969: 241).

[10] Foss notes that when 'the army commanded by Abu Muslim, leader of the Islamic Revolution in Iran which destroyed the Umayyads, routed a Chinese lance-cavalry army outside Samarkand in 751, the Arabs captured skilled Chinese papermakers. Within a few years, there were enormously elaborated bureaucracies, diwans staffed by katibs. State spending stimulated textile production, commercial crops, education, Arabic grammar and literature (into which was translated the Greek classical corpus), and proliferated forms and varieties of slavery and war (which overlapped) given the sheer quantity of records which could be kept of units, tribal or slave, with differing military specialties' (1998: 2). In 20th-century Iran, linked (somewhat incongruously) by the International Council of Adult Education with global neighbours Israel and the USSR as a trinity of regions where 'organizational bases of the army have been used for literacy support' (ICAE, 1979: 19), Api describes how 'during the early 1970s the Shah's regime launched an ambitious literacy project', with the avowed aim of attracting multinational investment in industry, increasing the market for consumer durables, deepening villager involvement in the cash economy and attempting to 'help the Government to control the outlying areas'. To this end, '[t]housands of young people were drafted into the "Army of Knowledge" which was to bring literacy into the countryside'. With the benefit of hindsight, Api goes on to evaluate the outcome of the experiment and place it in a broader context, stating that the 'authoritarian nature of the Iranian example is typical of many literacy programmes in the Third World. The relationship between [conscripted] Government educationists and villagers was a political one, and created the seeds of resentment and conflict that eventually spilled over in 1979 with the overthrow of the Shah. Reading over the literature of that period, it is remarkable just how crude and ethnocentric the thinking behind the literacy campaigns and education programmes were. And yet they were founded on the theories and practices worked out by UN "experts" ' (Api, 1988: 9). According to Michael Rose, under the subsequent government of Ayatollah Khomeini, '[t]he
Cultural Revolution Committee was set up in the summer of 1980 to rid the university of opposition elements and to "Islamicize" the curriculum, and likewise at elementary and secondary schools teachers 'have to pass an "ideological test" before they are allowed to teach...Children’s textbooks have also been redesigned and rewritten so that they will conform both to proper Islamic principles and to Iranian traditions ...Children are questioned by teachers about their parents', and those 'parents who come under suspicion are visited by authorities and punished in the appropriate way' (1983: 21).

[11] From William Frawley’s Text and Epistemology comes the observation that 'Gelb, like others working in the history of writing, sees writing as developing around 3000 BC, in post-Sumerian pictographs, which gave rise to both Sumerian cuneiform and Egyptian hieroglyphics. Through cultural contact and conquest these two writing systems developed into the systems which we know in the West today' (1987: 2, emphasis added). Under the head of 'WAR' in the Encyclopaedia of Human Behaviour Vol. 4, Gabriel & Metz assert that the 'world’s oldest armies appeared in Sumer (modern Iraq) and Egypt. Between 3000 and 2000 BC, Sumer developed a professional army which fought in phalanx formation and was the first to be equipped with body armour and helmets. Sumerian military technology brought into being the first military application of the wheel, the chariot, and the invention of the socket axe, the penetrating axe and the composite bow. The Sumerian states were at war with one another almost constantly over a thousand year period culminating, around 2400 BC, in the appearance of the world's first military dictatorship under Sargon the Great' (1994: 530). On this interpretation development of warfare and writing occur together, and that by implication, non-literate pre-Sumerian societies were also non-warring.

[12] 'During the War of Independence and during the establishment of its defence forces in the 1940s and 1950s, Israel and the IDF [Israeli Defence Forces] absorbed thousands of new immigrants, "olim" from every corner of the globe...As well as fulfilling the defence needs of the country, the IDF has to pay particular
attention to the individual, including those who have not yet managed to plant their roots firmly in the country, as well as those who have not succeeded in acquiring even a basic education' (Soloman, 1989: 108). The author goes on to note that the ‘principle [sic] aims of military education in the IDF are derived not only from the current needs of the military but are also a function of civilian life’; and central to these aims are ‘improving the soldier’s knowledge of Hebrew (or giving him the basics of the language in the case of a new immigrant), and ensuring that every soldier completes his basic educational requirements in society’ (1989: 110).

[13] ‘[A]fter his election as President of the Ivory Coast in 1960, Houphouet-Boigny stated...that, beginning in 1961, twenty-year olds would be called upon to serve in the military and civic service, which would replace the French military service to which some had been subject in the past...They will receive, in addition to basic military training, a civic education in two parts: ideological and practical. The latter is the most important, and will consist of work on major public projects...This is a significant manifestation of the Ivory Coast’s break with colonial traditions of education and the beginning of a new era of mobilisation for national construction’ (Zolberg & Zolberg, 1963: 472-473).

[14] Profiling Kenya amongst a range of other 19th and 20th century English colonial possessions, Terence Ranger finds that steps were ‘taken to ensure that the military and administrative services in [turn-of-the-20th-century] Africa were related to the dominant traditions. Much use was made in the early period of colonial administration of officers of the newly efficient and honourable British army [...] Meanwhile the educational system of England began to turn out civilian colonial administrators...the recruiters for the colonial service testified to the success of these endeavours...But the universities too came to play their part [...] In the end some settler communities were successful enough to set up in Africa itself replicas of the schools whose traditions validated the British governing class. Thus in 1927,

a plan was discussed with Eton College to found the “Kenya Public School”,

189.
under the joint auspices of Winchester and Eton, with reciprocal staffing arrangements and scholarships for the children of poorer white parents. After a trip to Britain to test support for the project, the Director of Education decided to ask “all the leading public schools to present us with pictures of their school buildings so that the boys may be constantly reminded of the great schools at home and old boys visiting the school may likewise remember their Alma Mater” (1992: 215-17)

The purpose of such practices, in Ranger’s estimation, was ‘the determination of those who controlled Kenyan society to keep it in the hands of “the public school educated with a patrimony, a military pension, investment income or an assurance of family support” ’ (1992: 220).

[15] Edward Said begins his pathbreaking study of Orientalism as follows: ‘On a visit to Beirut during the terrible civil war of 1975-1976 a French journalist wrote regretfully of the gutted downtown area that “it had seemed to belong to...the Orient of Chateaubriand and Nerval”. He was right about the place, of course, especially so far as a European was concerned. The Orient was almost a European invention...Now it was disappearing; in a sense it had happened, its time was over’ (1985a: 1). For Said the Lebanon is a type-case of the Western tendency to view the Arab world through the eyes of varieties of canonical literary fictions - colonial, cultural, travelogical and/or religious (such that ‘Biblical poetry is engraved on the land of Lebanon’ [1985a: 177]) - and that adherence to such constructions can have devastating political (“realist”) consequences. Elsewhere (1985b: 19-20), he holds that Western analysts failed to predict sociopolitical breakdown in Lebanon in the 1970s because of such Occidental bias and belief in the tenets of modernisation theory (Geertz, with his 1973 assessment of Lebanese religious and ethnic harmony - the durability of the “nice piece of mosaic” - is particularly singled out for criticism). Similarly, Corm refers to a general sense of time being thrown out of gear (1988: 233) characterising aspects of the conflict as ‘surreal’ at four different points in his narrative (1988: 218, 221, 237, 238). More concretely (?), “surrealism” is cranked up a notch or two in the architectural design project headed by Michael Markham aimed at a proposed rebuilding of the Lebanese capital. Although its maintained of the blueprints and modelling
that '[t]he process was rational in a sense' (1993: 480), the finished product belies "rationality" as conventionally understood in that the 'drawing became a chance for the visionary project, only theory, in which one was apt to see, believe in, or be deluded by, the relations between all the lines, a trigger for the imagination, an excess of possibilities, rather than the finite reality of the world normally representing a designer's intention' (1993: 49, italics in the original, underlining added). What seems to be proposed is a "Greater Lebanon" theme park, and a nice purchase on the mooted shift into newer versions of the Orient-as-Fiction is gained by comparing Markham's Deleuzoguattarian/Baudrillard-type approach to the proposed town plan for Beirut written by Salaam (1972: 109-119) prior to the outbreak of hostilities. Somewhat opposed to either vision is the commitment of Nicholas Fattouch, Lebanon's 1993 Minister for Tourism, to leave central Beirut in its current demolished condition and cater for the new boom industry of "war tourism", where '[b]us loads of tourists can be seen visiting sites like the battle-ravaged Martyrs Square in the centre of the capital, driving along the Green Line that once divided the city and walking through hollowed-out, bullet-riddled buildings' (Gedeon, 1993: 6) - perhaps a case of life-imitating-art, in that the P. J. O'Rourke Holidays in Hell comic literary genre (see, eg, Fraser, 1991; Buckoke, 1991) seems to have either replaced or joined earlier western 'Orientalist' narratives, and spread to the actual practices of the travelling public.

[16] Reporting from the battlefront in Liberia, torn between the competing forces of Charles Taylor's NPFL, Alhaji Kromah's ULIMO and Prince Johnson's INPFL (with Amos Sawyer's "Interim Government of National Unity", a varied contingent of UN and NGO aid workers, and the West African peace-keeping force ECOMOG acting as buffers between the rival factions) war correspondent Janine di Giovanni vividly and ironically ('Liberia is Haiti without the discipline', 1994: 94) conveys that country's atmosphere of ferocious and seemingly interminable chaos. However, amidst the turmoil one set of protocols - documentation - remains constant. On disembarking at the airport, she discovers that
"Arrivals" is an open-air porch swarming with people, all with hands open, all wanting something. Money. My passport. My yellow fever certificate...Someone shoves me and Gary into another room.

"Your entrance visas?"

We show him our passports. He says in barely intelligible Liberian English:

"You have no letters of welcome?"

We look at each other. I say, "What letters of welcome?"

"You cannot enter the country without letters of welcome. You are journalists, no? You need a letter of welcome from the Foreign Ministry. But perhaps if the lady would like to leave the room...the men can discuss an alternative?"

I leave the room and stand outside smoking a cigarette. An old woman passes and spits near the ground where I am standing. Another omen? I put out my cigarette and Gary emerges, brandishing passports.

"How much?"


[17] Citing historical incidents in Madagascar (since 1960, the independent Malagasy Republic) between 1820 and 1860 as an instance of indigenous modernisation in a traditional 19th-century society (continued in a less collaborative and indigenous form after the 1896 French conquest and colonisation of the island under General Gallieni), Dan Avni Segre highlights the key aspects of outside intervention facilitating this process: 'The British were quick to grasp the great cultural and economic potential of the Merinas. [Scottish sergeant] James Hastie and another sergeant from the Indian Army, a mulatto called Brady, completely reorganised the Malagasy army, making it a central instrument of modernisation. Hastie's diary is full of notes and observations about the possibilities of improving existing trades and crafts in order to strengthen the military and economic power of the King [Radama I]. He makes a list of locally produced knives, bayonets, iron plates, leather works which might be useful to the very shaky "ordnance corps" of the King. He taught the King the use of horses and showed him, with great success, the advantages of wearing European uniform. He also realised that the key to Malagasy modernisation was the possession of a written language. While teaching the King English, he preserved the work of a few British missionaries who in a very short time had transcribed the Malagasy idiom into Latin characters. His influence on the King was so great...
that after his death in 1826 the British Government decided to record his merits in a special Blue Book. The King, who had made him his "blood brother" and who had created him one of the highest noblemen in the kingdom, gave him a royal funeral' (Segre, 1969: 75).

[18] 'In Mali, villagers selected people who could volunteer for a short training course. Two "lettered" individuals were selected... One was the elder (called war veteran)... the other was the "opposite", a young person...who was more up to date than the elder' (ICAE, 1979: 27, emphasis added).

[19] In the course of his heartrending account of the final (and fatal) procession of Mulay Hassan, effectively on his death in 1894 the last of the old-regime kings of Morocco, Geertz explains the background and ongoing praxis - the religio-textual legitimation and the politico-military necessity of the court-in-motion - of Moroccan dynastic rule as follows: 'Politically, eighteenth and nineteenth-century Morocco consisted of a warrior monarchy centred in the Atlantic plain, a cloud of at least sporadically submissive "tribes" settled in the fertile regions within its immediate reach, and a thinner cloud of only very occasionally submissive ones scattered throughout the mountains, steppes, and oases that rim the country. Religiously, it consisted of a sharifian dynasty (that is, one claiming descent from Muhammad), a number of Koranic scholars, jurists, teachers, and scribes (ulema), and a host of holy men, living and dead, possessed of miraculous powers, the famous marabouts. In theory, Islamic theory, the political and religious realms were one, the king was caliph and head of both, and the state was thus a theocracy; but it was not a theory that anyone, even the king, could regard as more than a lost ideal in the face of a situation where charismatic adventurers were constantly arising on all sides. If Moroccan society has any chief guiding principle, it is probably that one genuinely possesses only what one has the ability to defend, whether it be land, water, women, trade partners, or personal authority: whatever magic a king had he had strenuously to protect' (1993 [orig. 1977]: 135-36).
[20] In Nigeria, during World War II ‘an adult literacy campaign was very successful, but interest nearly vanished at the end of hostilities. It was not for the sheer joy of intellectual mastery that people had wanted to read and write; they had wanted to communicate with their young men who were away as soldiers. When the soldiers returned, there was much less felt need for literacy’ (Foster, 1973). Luckham reports on a later effort in the 1960s to remedy this ambivalence towards literacy within the Nigerian military itself, where attitudes veered between formal education as politically dangerous (reflected in the tendency for officers to suggest that the January 1966 coup occurred because the Majors who staged it “were too clever by half”, read too many books about politics and were too much influenced by the university graduates among them’), and occupationally honourable, in that the ‘social prestige of the officers among other elites has been governed in the main by their level of educational attainment’ (1971: 122-130).

[21] Writing of early African proto-states prior to European colonisation, Philip Mason notes that a ‘frequent feature of the African empires is an inner ring of close neighbours who pay regular tribute, and an outer ring who are subject to sporadic raids...Sometimes it is felt that the outer ring, the raided folk, are in some way the property of the central kingdom; this is “our” raiding territory, it is felt. A raid might mean that a heavy tribute was exacted, usually in cattle and young people; more often it was like an operation of war...This concept of the hunting territory which “belonged” to an African state was later used by Europeans, notably in Northern Rhodesia, but also in Southern Rhodesia, as a fiction enabling sovereignty to be transferred. A great part of Northern Rhodesia was assumed to be within the “sovereignty” of Lewanika, king of the Barotse, and transferred by Treaty to the British South African Company’ (1970: 79, emphasis in the original).

[22] Outlining the course of the literacy campaign in Somalia between 1973 and 1975, Bhola provides the relevant historical backdrop: prior to formal independence in 1960, the ‘colonisation of Somalia began during the mid-1800s.
French Somaliland, today the independent nation of Djibouti, was established in 1860; British Somaliland, now Northern Somalia, was established in 1884; and in 1889 Italy took control of what is now Southern Somalia to establish Italian Somaliland... The years 1960-69 were marked by political and social chaos with some eighty political parties vying for power and fanning the fires of tribalism and nepotism. This led to the army coup of 1969 that established a government committed to scientific socialism. During 1969-76, military leaders ruled the country through a Supreme Revolutionary Council'(1984: 159). On March 8th 1973, this government launched a 2-year mass literacy program, divided into separate rural and urban components. In terms of provision of teaching personnel, in the rural campaign 'civil servants, members of the armed forces, and volunteers were considered but not actually used' because of the prioritising of other essential governmental tasks (1984: 164, emphasis added); in the urban campaign, however, sets of educational 'orientation centres were assigned the tasks of bringing together state employees, military personnel, literate businessmen, students and teachers living within the zone and to recruit them as voluntary literacy teachers, inspectors, and orientation personnel for the campaign' (1984: 162-3, emphasis added).

[23] Kitchen's 1963 monograph on the Sudan maintains that the 'army, which has closely dominated the government of Sudan since 1958, is accused by its civilian critics of being anti-intellectual. Few of the army officers now in controlling positions are university graduates themselves, and traditionally the Military College has drawn the second- and third-level secondary school graduates rather than the honours students. On the other hand, it is noteworthy that the revolutionary government has given high priority to the advancement of education at all levels. The number of students attending the University of Khartoum and the Khartoum Institute of Technology has virtually doubled since 1958, and the number of students going abroad to study is increasing annually. Moreover, with the rise of the army to political prominence and the progressive closing of a range of civilian avenues to professional advancement and political prominence, the military is beginning to draw better material from among
Sudanese school leavers’ (1963: 79).

[24] Lerner’s 1958 study of Syria - headnoted and scene-set by a Syrian schoolteacher’s claim that ‘[m]ilitary service is the best means for training the soul so that it can face hardships’ - characterises modernising political change in the country as arising not through mass action ‘but from the alliance between young army officers and the radical intelligentsia of the “new middle class”’ (1958: 264). The military wing of this “elite” arose from the military dictatorships which ruled from 1949 to 1958, themselves brought to power under conditions of British wartime occupation until independence in 1946 (1958: 270). The rise of newer nationalist parties ‘also supplies new recruits to the army officer corps, which has been involved in all the postwar political crises’ - a local professor is cited as noting the importance of the armed forces as a bridge into political reform for these would-be elites: thus, ‘[n]ot infrequently high school teachers and lawyers, dissatisfied with their professions or believing their ambitions can better be attained in the army, enter military schools and resume their public careers in the military service’ (Khadduri, cited in Lerner, 1958: 276).

[25] In Tunisia, ‘[i]n response to pressures from the British and French governments and with the drafting assistance of the French Consul, Muhammad al-Sadiq (1859-82) became in 1861 the first Muslim ruler [bey] to promulgate a constitution...General Khayr al-Din, a Circassian mamluk who served as the bey’s principal adviser, founded in Tunis in 1875 Sadiqi College, the first secular institution of higher learning in the Maghrib. The equivalent of a French lycée, Sadiqi College under the protectorate became an unplanned centre for training the rising political leadership’ (Hurewitz, 1969: 401).

[26] Ranger writes that in British Colonial Africa of the 1930s, ‘royal visits were necessarily rare occasions. In the intervals the royal cult had to be sustained by locally invented traditions. Men could make their careers by inspired contributions to these. A prime example is the career of Edward Twining, later governor of Tanganyika...Twining’s not very distinguished military career and
his transfer to the colonial service was a search for convincing distinction...While still an administrative officer in Uganda, Twining wrote and published a pamphlet on the English coronation ceremony...[and] was, in fact, first brought to official attention by his successful organization of the 1937 celebrations in Uganda, a triumph of ceremonial creativity, vividly described by its author:

...[t]he Buglers then sounded Retreat in the dark and then on went some 40 odd spotlights, floodlights and footlights, and the drums and the band beat tattoo...Then some schoolboys did the Parade of the Toy Soldiers. I got the particulars of this from the Duke of York's School at Dover, and adapted it to the local conditions. The boys wore white trousers, red tunics, and white pill box hats, the officer a bear-skin...The tattoo then proceeded. Fireworks. A war dance by 120 warriors in Leopard Skins. Ostrich feathers and spears and shields. Then "From Savage to Soldier" showing the process of turning native warriors into real soldiers (Twining, cited in Ranger, 1992: 234)

Ranger continues: 'The rest of Twining's distinguished career shows the same concern for invented ceremonial. He was a flamboyant governor [...] as governor of Tanganyika [27: independent since 1961 and since 1963 forming the republic of Tanzania with Zanzibar] [he] refused to negotiate with Nyerere's Tanganyika African Union because he regarded them as disloyal to the queen...[as this] fatal rigidity in Tanganyika demonstrates, the colonial manipulation of monarchy and indeed the whole process of traditional inventiveness, having served a good deal of practical purpose, eventually came to be counter-productive' (1992: 233-36). The tradition did however, have a longer lifespan in other states, such as the 1960s Zambia of Kenneth Kaunda, who 'in his search for a personal ideology to help him on the road to national leadership found solace and inspiration in Arthur Mee's Books for Boys' (1992: 227), and in the murderous 'lumpen-militariat' regime of the "model" British-trained lance corporal Idi Amin during his term as Ugandan president (Ranger, 1992: 225-26). In a brutally grim irony, Twining's idyllic *rite de passage* of boy-"savages" to men-"soldiers" reverberates at the close of the twentieth century. Reporting on a recent upsurge in the phenomenon of underage recruitment ('boy soldiers') in warring armies, Frankel *et al* (1995) finds that 'It]he end of the cold war...has accelerated the trend. As Washington and
Moscow cut funding to their regional military proxies, some national militaries and guerrilla movements turned to kids, who (to put it bluntly) cost less than adults': but '[n]ot all youths must be coerced into the army. For many poor children...conscription represents a step up in life...hundreds of war orphans adopted into the ranks of the Ugandan Army have been fed, educated and - in a few cases - sent to university' (1995: 48).

[28] Writing of post-colonial governmental processes in Tropical Africa, Foltz (1973) says that the 'years since independence have seen the emergence of two powerful new elite groups...The first of these groups is a university educated new intelligentsia with a strong technocratic orientation. The expansion of higher education, and the politicians' need for competent administrators to fill the bureaucratic positions established by the nationalists' centrally directed economic activities have given this group a powerful corporate identity and access to major positions of power in the state apparatus. The second group is, of course, the military. Also technocratic in its orientation, its rise to power has most often helped to advance the careers and group interests of the civilian technocrats at the expense of the nationalists...So far, the military and civilian technocrats have formed a powerful alliance in several African states. They have emphasized a development-oriented centralization of power which has, in effect, tried to carry out and perfect the work of the nationalists. (Ex-president) Mobutu's Zaire (since June 1997 the Democratic Republic of the Congo) is perhaps the best example of this...All have reinforced the nationalist approach to nation-building through first building the state apparatus, and some of the new military leaders have attempted to assume the national hero position of the nationalist political leader. Mobutu's emphasis on donning the Lumumba mantle is the most obvious example' (1973: 374-75).

[29] In Zambia, the 'program for educational reform stated that teaching English is not a goal of the national literacy program: "The war on illiteracy will be conducted through the medium of Zambian languages. The aim of the campaign is to teach every illiterate Zambian to read, write and reckon in a language he
knows well..." (ICAE, 1979: 62, emphases added).

5.3.2: THE AMERICAS

[30] In Argentina, at the turn of the [20th] century all young men were required to register for compulsory military service and were subject to call at the age of twenty. The disciplined and regimented Argentine army, strongly influenced by German military missions after 1900, did not teach democracy, but a year in the barracks provided illiterates with the rudiments of reading and writing and gave conscripts elementary concepts of public health and some notion of the existence of a national authority...In 1912...all men (and women after 1947) over eighteen years of age received the right to vote by secret ballot but with the added prescription that suffrage was mandatory and failure to vote was punishable by fine. The enrolment booklet the men received upon registration for military service served as the voter’s identification, as his record of having voted, and as a document for all civic and legal matters’ (Scobie, 1971: 195). Speaking of an ongoing legacy of ‘military disdain for civilian competence’ in the later 20th century, the writer notes that the ‘Argentine officer, like most of his Latin American colleagues, considers himself to be far more than a professional soldier...The smattering of law, literature, history, economics, psychology, and international relations which career officers received along with their engineering and military training not only rounded out their preparation, it also encouraged their self-confidence as experts in all fields’ (Scobie, 1971: 220).

[31] In their account of the succession to power of an assortment of directly military or militarily-sponsored governments in the political history of Bolivia, Hudson & Hanratty (1989) lay particular emphasis on not only the importance of armed services training academies, but trace the establishment of civilian education centres back to the birth of the nation: thus, the régime of the first native-born president Andrés de Santa Cruz y Calahumana (1829-39) - a mestizo who ‘had a brilliant military career fighting for independence in the armies of Bolivar’ prior to 1826 independence - ‘codified the country’s laws and enacted
Latin America's first civil and commercial codes. The Higher University of San Andrés in La Paz was also founded during his rule. The mixed fortunes of such enterprises in the political instability of the next hundred years saw a significant increase in the military-educational nexus, such that in 1936 then-president Colonel David Toro Ruilova 'invited an Italian military mission to establish two military academies' which 'provided instruction for the first time in such subjects as sociology and political science'. The pattern of outside intervention in the continuing refinement of armed service schooling continued under Paz Estenssero's (1952-56, 1960-64) governments, which both appointed US military instructors to the defence colleges and, in 1960, inaugurated the new School of High Military Studies (EAEM) 'to educate senior civilian and military leaders on strategic issues affecting Bolivia'. US-Bolivian cooperation was further deployed in 1967 when with 'counterinsurgency instructors from the United States Southern Command (Southcom) headquarters in Panama, the army established a Ranger School in Santa Cruz Department' to combat the abortive insurrectionary attempt of Ernesto "Che" Guevara (executed October 7th 1967).

[32] In Brazil, although Stepan's study is skeptical of wider governmental claims of its barracks as literacy centres ("huge classrooms") where recruits make their first contact with modernity, he cites a lesser-known official publication stating an armed forces preference for drafting urban, literate youth - a preference shared by assorted upper-echelon commanders interviewed by the author, and evident in the statement by the chief of schools for the Brazilian army, that '[w]e draft only a small percentage of draft-age people. We try to select draftees who are the best of the group. I believe illiterates form less than 5 per cent of the total' (1971: 15-17).

[33] Woodcock, in his boedkength treatment of the social history of Canada, assesses the cultural as well as the overtly military impact of British troop detachments stationed in major urban centres like Quebec and Halifax, and other provincial areas such as Toronto and Kingston, up to the 1860s. His claim is that '[o]ne way in which the garrison society contributed to the emergent culture of
Canada was in its fostering of the arts'. Aside from its major influence on painting (an adjunct to the strategic necessity for accurate topographical information) and music (an offshoot of the Regency notion of musical skills as the attributes of a gentleman of the officer caste and a breaking of the tedium of barracks routine), another major sphere of influence was literary: thus, the 'first novel set in Canada, The History of Emily Montague (1769), was written by Frances Brooke, friend of Dr Johnson and wife of the garrison chaplain at Quebec. It concerned the lives and loves of officers and ladies during the occupation period after the Conquest. One of the first important novels written by a Canadian was a Gothic tale about garrison life, John Richardson's Wacousta - which was set in the British fortress of Detroit during Pontiac's rebellion in 1763. John Richardson was the son of a medical officer in a British regiment and himself served as a gentleman volunteer in the War of 1812, later being commissioned in the regular British forces' (Woodcock, 1988: 186-87). Moreover, despite opposition from other colonial interests - in particular the Church - in terms of the staging of productions acted by armed forces personnel, the building of playhouses (notably the New Grand Theatre in 1789) and, following the 17th-century lead of the French-colonial military's introduction and performance of the works of Corneille, Racine and Moliere to the region, the production of seminal English plays, the 'British garrisons were also responsible for developing the theatre in Canada, if not actually introducing it there...' (Woodcock, 1988: 187).

[34] In Chile, after 'the military coup that knocked the socialist government of Salvador Allende out of office... a drastically revamped education system was to be one of the main planks in the junta's plan to forge the "new" Chilean character - acquiescent, uncritical and patriotic...The first step was to replace thousands of "subversive" teachers and education officials with junta supporters - all strictly controlled by military overseers...The junta’s long term plan for education centred on two clear strategies. The first was to push more of the financial obligations onto the shoulders of local government and municipalities. The second was a pay-as-you-learn approach. Those who could pay would get schooling, those who could not would be effectively condemned to illiteracy...Higher education has
been radically reorganised and savagely cut. The universities have been "rationalised" so that the curricula meet the approval of the regime. Military officers have been installed as rectors and deans to ensure "purity of direction"... Ironically the Pinochet government's policy of restricting access to education has spawned dozens of unofficial community groups - often church-backed. Working with those the junta has effectively pushed to the wall, these groups are trying to keep alive the idea that education should be used not for repression but liberation' (M. Rose, 1983: 21-2).

[35] Analysing the formal conditions of demilitarisation in Costa Rica, Høivik & Aas (1981) stress the importance of the 1948 post-civil war public statement by victorious junta leader Jose Figueres (beginning with the declaration that '[i]t is time for Costa Rica to return to her traditional position of having more teachers than soldiers...', 1981: 334, emphasis added), and Article 12 of the 1949 constitution replacing the army as a permanent institution with necessary internal police forces and ad hoc military units organised for national defence under the auspices of 'continental agreement' with neighbouring states in "if-and-when" emergency situations. In terms of 'cultural health' indicator figures for 1976, both education (a school-age population per teacher ratio of 54) and literacy rates (89%) compare favourably with adjacent regional entities: this, together with the mooted 1979 establishment of a UN University of Peace - 'an international centre of superior education for post-university teaching, research and publication of knowledge specifically oriented to training for peace' (1981: 350) - is held to be an important part of the demilitarisation dividend. Yet in the final analysis, Høivik & Aas hold the Costa Rican demilitarisation strategy to be more rhetorical than real. They point to the country's military heritage, noting the importance of the 19th-century 'war against the North American filibuster William Walker', which 'led to a political-military mobilisation of the population in defence of the nation's sovereignty, and resulted in military governmental rule between 1871 and 1889': these 'military governments contributed to the further centralization and modernisation of the country' (1981: 339). Such military-initiated modernisation continued through the Tinoco-led
coup of 1917, declined in the face of US armed intervention in the Coto War against Panama in 1921, and reasserted itself as a key strikebreaking force against communist union action in the Banana Strike of 1934. Moreover, the paramilitary alternatives to the army - the Costa Rican Public Security Forces, which are 'strong, well organized, and have a clear military significance', and the Civil Guard, more than 1,600 of whom were trained at US military institutions between 1949 and 1964 (1981: 347) - operated in regional military struggles (particularly in Nicaragua in the 1960s and 70s) as well as domestic activities such as the suppression of the 1970 demonstrations against bauxite contracts negotiated between ALCOA and the ruling government. The defence allocation of the "demilitarised" state showed only slight declines over a 10-year period (1981: 348) despite the "absence" of armed forces (military expenditures as %age of GNP standing at 0.9% in 1965, 0.9% in 1970, and 0.6% in 1975); and according to the co-authors, "demilitarisation" is perhaps less accurate and realistic a description of the Costa Rican situation than 'what Alfred Stepan has called "the new professionalism"', where a national guard model 'responds primarily to problems of internal security; its military skills are police-like and managerial, and there are political restrictions on the scope of its actions. This is a concept derived from the larger South American armies in the 1960's and '70's... ' (1981: 349, emphasis added).

[36] Analysing the national literacy campaign in Cuba in the late 1950s, Morales begins with antecedents, describing how in 1896 'the Cuban patriot Daniel Fajardo Ortiz, codirector of the newspaper El Cubano Libre, published a Primer for Learning in the Public Schools of the State that consisted of lessons with patriotic content. This primer was used in the fields of Free Cuba during the war of 1895. During the Ten Years War (1868-1878) Rafael Morales y Gonzalez (Moralitos) also put together a primer and used it to teach children in the liberated territories and the soldiers of the mambi army to read and write'. This heritage was reasserted less than 100 years later in the revolution against Batista, when 'the rebel army organized schools for children and soldiers in the liberated zones. In 1958, in the "Frank Pais" Second Front, under the juridstiction
of that zone's Rebel Army leadership, the Department of Education was created to organize and operate a network of schools for children and adults. That experience was a basis for the subsequent 1959 literacy campaign among the rebel soldiers...[U]nder the Directorate of Culture of the Rebel Army, which later became the Department of Education of the Ministry of Armed Forces, each headquarters, camp, and police station was turned into a literacy centre. The collaboration among the teachers was magnificent, and the literacy effort began for many military units in February 1959' (1981: 32-33). As to the outcome of the official campaign by December 1961, Morales concludes that the 'results indicated that 707,212 people had achieved literacy, while 271,995 remained illiterate. This left 3.9 percent illiterates in the total population of Cuba, which was then estimated at 6,938,700 inhabitants' (1981: 38 - as an aside, the effectiveness of this campaign will later prompt Margaret Archer [1985] to use it as an empirical example of the explanatory superiority of a morphogenetic over a structurationist approach in sociological theory). A retrospective assessment of this top-down effort by Kozol (1978) brands it as the 'untold education story of our generation'; and in answering his self-imposed question[s] as to 'why, under what political pressure or for what material, ethical, or intellectual reward, did so many people answer the government's appeal? What, if not terror, could have made this program work?', he notes that the 'question cannot be addressed without an awareness of the ongoing military revolution taking place at the same time as the literacy campaign' (1978: 344). In the section of his monograph entitled "War Footing", he affirms that the 'military parallel unquestionably was in many people's mind in 1961. There is also no question that a certain military fervour, openly avowed by Fidel [Castro], helped to fire the passion of the literacy struggle from the start' (1978: 354). Yet he brands the notion that this conjunction aimed at the creation of 'future soldiers for bloodthirsty leaders' as 'absurd', proffering instead as explanations the Cuban campaign's progress against the backdrop of a 'formidable military and economic threat from the United States'; continuity with the revolutionary army leadership; the effectiveness of teachers organised into brigadista units/detachments; the cathectic impact of propaganda [according to Kozol, 'a word used quite openly in Cuba, where it bears none of the
connotations it carries in the United States' (1978: 345)]; the background influence of Paolo Freire's equation of literacy with freedom, and the tenet of freedom as "acquired by conquest, not by gift"; and the experience of widespread failure in preceding (typically Third-World, typically UNESCO-financed) literacy campaigns undertaken without heavy and overt military involvement at either the practical or symbolic level (Kozol, 1978: 354-366).

[37] Febvre & Martin relate the rise of print industries in early-modern mesoAmerica to the progress of Spanish colonialism (c/f [93]), and note within this context that in 1626-1627 'a press was working in Cuenca, Ecuador, and another at Santiago in Guatemala from 1660 on. Very little thus appeared outside Mexico City and Lima before the 18th century, which indicates that the Spaniards had not yet subdued and developed the vast regions they had conquered' (1976: 209; emphases added).

[38] According to the FAS Area Handbook for Guatemala (DA Pam 550-78), at the time of independence from Spain in 1821, 'most people were illiterate except for the few doctors, lawyers and priests in the country. After independence, and particularly during the liberal governments of the 19th century, steps were taken to provide a broader education for more people. President Mario Gálvez (1831-38) built new schools and added new courses...He founded the first normal school in Guatemala City, which prospective teachers from the rest of Central America were invited to attend. Army Officers were required to attend the normal school, and possession of a primary school teachers' certificate was a prerequisite to promotion. In addition, soldiers received instruction in the rights and duties of citizens, as well as military training. Gálvez' successor, however, the illiterate President Rafael Carrera (1838-65) was little interested in promoting the educational establishment, and it was not until the Presidency of Justo Ruffino Barrios (1873-85) that education was once again given impetus' (Dombrowski et al, 1970: 190-91).

[39] Charting the progress of a flawed literacy initiative, John Bevan reported
how on April 24, 1980, 'the Honduras Literacy Coordinating Committee met for the first [and last] time to oversee a campaign which had already begun officially 17 days earlier', but that the 'Ministry of Education had already taken key decisions that made the Coordinating Committee redundant'; 'The Literacy Campaign was to take place between May 2 and October 21', however 'the literacy instructors received only three days training'; a "methodology of dialogue" was envisaged, but 'under no circumstances were [the extant teaching materials] to be altered or supplemented'; and 'the reading texts for the learners were produced in far too small a print size'. But in Bevan's opinion, this campaign's mistakes were not just 'technical and organisational. They were directly related to the whole political and economic climate of the country. The content of the teaching text should have drawn from the experience and needs of the learners', but 'were, in many respects far from such experience. For example, one of the pamphlets published by "the Government of the Armed Forces" devoted a section to electoral procedure and the civic duty of voting - even though Honduras had not held elections for eight years'. In summation, Bevan ascribes this string of errors to the fact that 'the Honduran Literacy Campaign was launched by a rigid and authoritarian military dictatorship [ie, one unconcerned with serious social, economic and political reform]...The failure of the campaign had as much to do with this as with its chaotic organisation and lack of planning' (Bevan, 1983: 19-20).

[40] In Mexico, Fuller, Edwards & Gorman state that succeeding 'Mexico's war of independence in the 1820s and again after the social revolution (1911-1917), strong steps were taken to deliver literacy (in Spanish) to indigenous Indians - with the explicit goal of building a national consciousness ...the function of literacy emphasized social goals, not material development' (1981: 323); and Schryer, comparing the relative importance of literacy in Mexico in the '20s and the '30s, maintains that the increase in the former period 'corresponded to a time when military authorities, who came to power during the revolution, were more likely to put greater emphasis on such universalistic criteria as literacy in appointing local military commanders or approving elected authorities...
literacy became less important after the 1930s when an increasing number of poorer rancheros or tenant farmers, many illiterate, became incorporated into the local political process' (1984: 422).

[41] Cardenal & Miller (1981) provide a detailed insider's account of the literacy campaign in Nicaragua, beginning as an adjunct to the political struggles of the 1920s and '30s between General Augusto Sandino (assassinated 1934) and US-backed head of the National Guard Anastasio Somoza. In the aftermath of the internecine warfare in the 1960s between the Somosa government and the Sandinista National Liberation Front [FSLN] and the latter's victory in 1979, 'the nation was transformed from a violent war zone into one enormous school. The spirit and commitment of hundreds of thousands of Nicaraguans forged in combat became the moving force behind a massive literacy program. Young men and women who had taken up arms and gone to the hills took up pencils and primers and returned to the mountains' (1981: 2). As an example of the blending of militarism and alphanumeracy, the Nicaraguan National Literacy Crusade of 1980 was nearly paradigmatic, operating simultaneously at the levels of praxis, metaphor and national memory: 'The specific strategy depended on the network of citizens and labour associations that originally had been organized clandestinely for the war. The actual operation of the literacy struggle followed the same general lines as the liberation struggle...The metaphors and terminology of the campaign were purposefully military...The literacy warriors, or brigadistas, of the Popular Literacy Army were divided into brigades, columns, and squadrons and were located along six battlefronts identical to those of the war. They joined forces with the Peasant and Workers' Militias and the Urban Literacy Guerrillas. Each battle unit chose the name of a fallen combatant as a means of honouring his or her memory...the choice of military metaphors was designed to help young volunteers integrate the memories of the past, transforming terms related to the war into positive associations with teaching and sharing...A spiritual bond joined the living with the dead' (Cardenal & Miller, 1981: 8-9).
[42] Discussing diglossia in Paraguay, Engelbrecht & Ortiz note that the ‘period starting at independence from Spain (1811) through the aftermath of the war of the Triple Alliance (1854-1870) against Uruguay, Brazil and Argentina, which Paraguay lost, was characterised by massive hispanization and preference for the non-Paraguayan... It was not until the late 19th century that works about the Guarani language and culture began to appear in Spanish. A new sense of nationalism emerged, particularly during the Chaco war against Bolivia (1932-1935), which Paraguay won. Guarani was then associated with the new nationalism. This change of attitudes and the victory of the nationalist Colorado party in 1948 brought about the recognition of Guarani as a national language in the constitution of 1967. At the present time written Guarani is found in signs marking the geography of the nation... and in the names of groups such as military regiments’ (1983: 57).

[43] For Ortega & Romero, it is no coincidence that ‘the first significant progress in the field of journalism in Peru (despite an illiteracy rate between 75 and 80%) should have taken place precisely during the period between the invasion of Spain by Joseph Bonaparte in 1808, and the battles of Junin and Ayacucho in America which confirmed the independence of Peru in 1821...(t)his independence was not only the culmination of a far-ranging process of liberation, but also and simultaneously, the culmination of a slow but continuous trend of overcoming the barriers imposed by pure direct oral communication’ (1976: 221).

[44] In the United States, Kirsch & Guthrie report that ‘during World War II, the Army used the term functional illiteracy to categorise individuals who could not use written information to adequately perform military tasks’, and that this usage was subsequently extended to encompass the social capacity of adult populations in civil society (1978: 488); Sullivan notes how ‘in a spectacular fashion the [First] World War focused attention on the problem of illiteracy’, tracing US movements against the problem directly ‘to the discovery that 24.9 percent of the American soldiers were functionally illiterate’ (1948: 520); Hoskin & MacVe address the issue of the application of military education to industry,
both in terms of organizational structure and what Ball (1990: 153-166) refers to as a ‘moral technology of management’, and proceed to ‘explore the suggestion that the preeminence of the USA in the development of cost and management accounting might be traced to the influence of the engineering graduates of the military academy at West Point, where a meticulous pedagogic system was devised by Sylvanus Thayer in the years after 1817, a “grammatocentric” system based on ubiquitous written archives and examinations utilising mathematical grading... (W)e re-examine the published histories of two industrial institutions well known to have been instrumental in the early development of managerialism in the USA... We aim to identify how the West Point influence may have spread to them through the social network of its graduates’ (1988: 37-38); Wigley’s discussion of the establishment of architecture as a tertiary academic discipline describes how ‘the first American university to efface the distinction between the architectonic condition of theory and its technological application, MIT, whose original course of study included military training in the basic program [ie, the Programme of 1865/66] would, of course, go on to become a major developer of military technology, and effectively a producer of weapons, through its increasingly close ties to a growing network of new intermediate institutions, known as the “military-industrial complex”, that has disrupted every one of the traditional limits of the university... [This] effacement of the limits of the university, and its complicity with the military, does not occur in the applied sciences alone’ (1991: 23); and Costa, in a chronology of ‘events, legislation and influences’ in US literacy education, cites 1777 (the first educational expenditure of federal funds, aimed at imparting textual skills to soldiers of the Continental Army), 1914, 1945, 1949 and 1950 (identification of national ‘literacy crises’, when significant numbers of draftees are designated “illiterate” and ineligible for induction) as particularly significant in terms of later educational developments (1988: 3-22; in her acknowledgements, Costa expresses her gratitude for the ‘numerous letters and conversations exchanged with individuals around the country - people who are in the trenches, so to speak, working to understand, to explain, to teach, to encourage literacy’ [1988: xi, emphasis added]).
[45] In Burma, the Burmese Army undertook a ‘successful action in respect of literacy. A survey of illiteracy in the army in 1954 led to a campaign against illiteracy in 1955 when the Army Education Corps taught its soldiers to “sharpen the bayonet with alphabets” ’ (Bhola, 1984: 109).

[46] Tracking the emergence of separatist consciousness in Cambodia to its roots, Benedict Anderson takes note of factors such as the legacy of French colonial occupation, the wartime conditions of the 1930s and ’40s, and the germane elements in the biographies of the earliest Cambodian nationalists: ‘The man who can reasonably be regarded as the “father” of Khmer nationalism, Son Ngoc Thanh,...was educated in Saigon...Prince Sisowath Youtevong attended secondary school in Saigon before leaving for France for further study. When he returned to Phnom Penh fifteen years later, after World War II, he helped to found the (Khmer) Democratic Party and served as Prime Minister in 1946-1947. His Defence Minister Sonn Voeunnsai, undertook virtually the same journeys...Perhaps most exemplary of all is the figure of Ieu Koeus, first of a melancholy line of assassinated Khmer political leaders...After the Japanese collapse in August 1945, he reappeared in “Cambodge” as a Democratic parliamentarian. It is notable that he was in his way a lineal descendant of the illustrious philologers of an earlier Europe, insofar as he designed a typewriter keyboard for the Khmer script and published a weighty two-volume *Pheasa Khmer* [The Khmer Language]...But this text made its first appearance - volume 1 only - in 1947, when its author was Chairman of the Constituent Assembly in Phnom Penh, not in 1937, when he was vegetating in Battambang, when as yet no Khmer-speaking lycéens had been produced by the Lycée Sisowath, and when Indochina still had an ephemeral reality. By 1947, Khmer speakers - at least those from “Cambodge” - were no longer attending classes in Saigon or Hanoi. A new generation was coming on the scene for whom “Indochine” was history and “Vietnam” now a real and foreign country...brutal invasions and occupations during the nineteenth century, ordered by the Nguyễn dynasts in Huế, left bitter

[47] As instance of his more general position that ‘writing materials are themselves graphemes, which shape how we understand communication, record keeping, facts, knowledge, and government’, Foss focusses his attention on ancient China, noting that the ‘Chinese word for book was written with an ideogram of a folio, bamboo strips bound with rings, which looks like it had a rectangular page. Though none of these survived. One form of text became ceremonial, so we have it on long, narrow bamboo strips found in grave goods. Another ceremonial form was the silk roll. What was used for everyday written text is still unknown. The first written text in Chinese found on paper was a dispatch sent by the junior officer in command of a fort in North China, surrounded by the enemy. He is badly in need of reinforcements, supplies, ammunition; he is surrounded; the enemy is closing in. The text did not make it to headquarters’ (1998: 1-2, emphasis in the original).

Lending empirical support to the contention that ‘revolutionary regimes have been the only ones capable of organizing successful mass literacy campaigns...all revolutionary governments have given high priority to the war on illiteracy’ (Lê Thành Khôi, in Arnove & Graff, 1987: 1), in modern China, ‘[t]he communists had started their educational work as early as the 1920s, concurrently with their military effort...[t]here are numerous descriptions of educational work carried out among the peasants by soldiers of the Red Army during the Long March of 1934-35...Literacy became the core of the four modernisations: modernisation of agriculture, modernisation of industry, modernisation of national defence, and modernisation of science and technology’ (Bhola, 1984: 77-83, emphasis added).

[48] In India, there ‘had been a time when a recruit was looked on with disfavour if he could read or write’: But by the 1930s, the projected demands in terms of both morale and technology called up by impending total war meant that henceforth the soldier ‘had to have some education - indeed, from the beginning of the decade the army deliberately set about educating him - and sooner or later he was bound to read newspapers and open his mind to a wide variety of influences’ (Mason, 1974: 466).
Writing of the period prior to independence in Indonesia in the late 1940s, Salim Said discusses features of the shift from Dutch colonialism to Japanese occupation: 'At the beginning, the Japanese mobilised people, including those in the bureaucracy for their own war efforts, both economic and military. For these purposes they created a myriad of organizations to tap the potential war capability in society...It is not an exaggeration to compare this policy of mobilisation by the Japanese with the opening of schools for a select number of Indonesians by the Dutch early in the century as a result of their so-called Ethical Policy. Both policies were the main causes of the two most important social movements in Indonesia this century. If the product of Dutch education was the leadership of the nationalist movement, the product of the Japanese mobilisation effort was a cadre of military participants in the revolution...What was most important to the Japanese was not that all Indonesians should be professionally able to fight a war but that the “spirit” of the Indonesians should be directed. The best way to do this, according to them, was through military discipline. Thus even elementary school students had to undergo some rudimentary training. Because of this policy, by 1945, when the Japanese surrendered, the Indonesian youths, especially in Java, provided a reservoir of trained personnel for the army. Some of them later joined the military but many more fought in emerging partisan groups known as laskyar' (1991: 8-9).

According to Cleary, '[t]he legend of the imperial house of Japan emerged from two stages of armed conquest. The first stage involved the Japanese domination and destruction of other races of people inhabiting the islands that were to become Japan. The second stage, which was partially concurrent with the first, was marked by the ascendancy of some Japanese clans over others [...] When the prolonged Warring States era ended around the year 1600, a movement began to recollect and systematise the scattered arts and sciences of that turbulent yet strangely brilliant era. Modern knowledge of the traditional arts and sciences, including Zen and the way of the warrior, is largely based on elaborations of those reconstructed and systematised versions of ancient knowledge' (1991: 3, 39).
Considering cultural factors in rapid Japanese socioeconomic development since the US naval gunboat diplomacy of Perry's "black ships" in 1853, Dore says that traditionally 'the two professions of the samurai, fighting and governing, remained the most honoured professions...They were the chief goals of youthful ambition; the examination course which led into the First High School and thence into the Law Department of Tokyo University and thence into the civil service was the hurdle race that schoolboys were most likely to be coached for' (1976: 44). Stone (in Musgrave, 1970), drawing largely from Dore in his own comparative analysis between Japanese and English education over three centuries, elaborates: 'At a fairly early stage both societies freed education from the monopoly of priests, England in the sixteenth century, Japan in the seventeenth. Both developed schools for their élite in which their children could be taught firstly - and most importantly - the virtue of obedience to superiors in order to preserve social stability; secondly, the art of war, which was the original justification of their privileged status ...in late eighteenth-century Japan the Bakufu set an example by endowing, supporting and operating a school for samurai, the Shoheiko...Just as Machiavelli drew his examples of statecraft from antiquity, so did the Japanese go back to the Chinese classics to learn about military tactics' (1970: 102-3, emphasis added). The shift from élite to universal education in the 1870s is attributed to four factors: 'the belief in the efficacy of the educational process in inculcating obedience'; the absence of class war; the "intense desire for national power"; and 'to a Confucian sense of paternal responsibility. The most compelling reason was surely the third...The questions put to the prominent American educational experts in 1872 by the Japanese Chargé d'Affaires in Washington, and the replies he received, show beyond doubt that it was the overwhelming desire for economic and military predominance which was the driving force behind the educational reforms of the time [...] nationalism, the lust for imperial military greatness, was the driving force for educational change' (Stone, in Musgrave, 1970: 108-9, 110). Almost as a reprise to the 20th century result of this "lust", Crump, writing of 'the problem of representing the Japanese language on the basis of the Chinese ideographs' leading to logographic inconsistency in the rules for writing Japanese, notes that
the ‘last of the expedients adopted to reform the written language was the introduction of the so-called Toyo Kanji in 1946, as a part of the educational reforms which the American occupying power imposed upon the Japanese’ (1988: 138).

[51] Writing from a point of view that sees a US-style educated military as a force for modernisation in the general political evolution of the Less Developed Countries, Gutteridge notes that ‘outside the American continent US military education is less in evidence. But the [South] Korean Military Academy, first planned in 1946, provides an excellent example. This academy, according to the annual yearbook, “was patterned after the US Military Academy, West Point” and provides a four-year curriculum for two hundred cadets admitted annually. The object is a carefully balanced education up to the standard of that of graduate of leading American universities. Qualifications for entry are necessarily somewhat varied in a developing country, but they are determined by an academic board, and, like the cadet command, organization, and uniform, owe much to the example of West Point. The range of subjects extends from mathematics, English, and the pure sciences to military history, culture, economics, and, whenever possible, a foreign language. Classes are small and there is daily recitation and grading, as well as a minimum of two hours of private study. The daily instructional system adopted from West Point has apparently no parallel at any school elsewhere in Korea or the Orient’ (Gutteridge, 1965: 448-49).

[52] The following is excerpted from the anonymous memoirs of a recipient of colonial education in Laos: ‘Lao teachers and technicians numbered less than one’s own fingers, just enough to help the Europeans rule over the Lao...There is one European who had sympathy toward the Lao. No Lao teachers, students, or farmers will ever forget the name of Charles Rochet. We cannot ever forget this man, who was very different from other French. We will never forget that in 1945, during our studies at the teachers’ training school, beneath the shady trees along the Mekong River and near the airfield, every student had to get up early
in the morning, salute the flag, and do drilling exercises. And every Sunday we went to the Lao Association lawn to drill...M. Rochet gave a start to the young Lao who are now helping their country. He also gave birth to Lao dramatic plays, the Lao Club, and the Lao Yai bulletin...The good deeds M. Rochet showed to the Lao, though only for a short period, we Lao appreciate and feel gratitude for. His name has been written in the history of Laos, and there were many schools and streets which were named after him' ('A Young Lao Official', trans. Chaichana, in Tilman, 1969: 278-9). In the Free Lao Movement of the late 1940s, the autobiographer recalls that the 'soldiers who came to Vientiane were from many nations. There were Thai, Kha, Meo, Vietnamese and Lao. The ranks were shifted rapidly during two months, and although everything was in chaos, I always thought of school. I could not read French books because others might think I was with the French. I had to read and study secretly. When the French took over and a collège was opened at Luang Prabang, they also taught English. I had learned a little English during the Japanese occupation, so I knew some of the words, but the pronunciation was too difficult for me. The King let his son, Prince Vong Savang, come and study with us. We played soccer together... Later there was news that the Lycée Pavie was reopening. There were five or six foreign teachers, who were all soldiers, and three or four Lao teachers. The head teacher of the Luang Prabang school called us and told us that peace was restored and that "the government has ordered you to continue your studies at the Lycée. The government needs you! We will all rejoice!" ' (1969: 283).

[53] Misra, writing in early 1972, details the problems attending the establishment of Pakistan in 1947: aside from the politico-religious break with India and the 'geographical absurdity' of a state split into 2 segments separated from each other by 1,200 miles, the new nation - conceptualised first in 1930 as the brainchild of poet-philosopher Sir Mohammed Iqbal and furthered by 'a group of Muslim students studying at Emanuel College, Cambridge' who 'developed Iqbal's idea in a pamphlet issued in 1934' - the author stresses the cultural gulf between the Western and Eastern subcontinental divide, wherein 'there was a considerable chasm between them; their heritage was vastly different; they
spoke different languages, and wrote different scripts’ (1972: 28). Misra underlines this gap by citing Sulzberger’s observation of 1969, that the ‘disorderly, plump, fish-and-rice-eating Easterners...love politics, prefer conspiracy to soldiering, speak Bengali and build houses of bamboo...[t]he martial, well-built westerners eat meat and grain, mostly speak Urdu, make their homes of clay, are unaccustomed to political subtleties but familiar with the art of war. They are less literary than the Easterners but have shown more knack for governing’ (cited in Misra, 1972; 38). With the military coup of 1958 and the establishment of armed forces dominance in the ensuing 22 years, these claimed divides became more starkly apparent, evinced by the severe under-representation of East Pakistanis in the governing armed services (Misra, Tables I, II and III). This factor combined with disparately-favourable West Pakistan involvement in education and the de facto adoption of Urdu (over Bengali) as the official language (1972: 35-6) is cited by Misra as an instance of ‘intra-state imperialism’, a source of discontent and a lead-in to the bloody birth of a further splitting-off to an independent Bangla Desh [54] later in 1972.

[55] Constantino’s work on schooling in the Philippines is premised on an assumption that education ‘serves as a weapon in the wars of colonial conquest. This singular fact was well appreciated by the American military commander in the Philippines during the Filipino-American war. According to the census of 1903, “General Otis urged and furthered the re-opening of schools, himself selecting and ordering the text-books. Many officers, among them chaplains, were detailed as superintendents of schools, and many enlisted men, as teachers”... The primary reason for the rapid introduction, on a large scale, of the American public school system in the Philippines was the conviction of the military leaders that no measure could so quickly promote the pacification of the island as education’ (Constantino, 1970: 213).

[56] From a 1967 paper prepared by Charles Henry Ley, Sabah Border Scouts, and Assistant Protector of Aborigines, Department of Aborigine Affairs, Malaysia: ‘In 1963 North Borneo gained self-government and was renamed Sabah. Also in 1963
Sabah joined the Federation of Malaysia [57], an act which was directly followed by protests from the Philippines and Indonesia and their attempts to reassert claims to this territory. Indonesia's subsequent Confrontation policy (with actual armed incursions) has necessitated the strengthening of border control. It should be noted that while recruiting, training and administering the Sabah Border Scouts, we have been greatly hampered by the fact that there are very few natural leaders to be found who are sufficiently educated to be able to carry out elementary administrative duties [...] This area requires facilities for additional training in the following fields: (a) Local leadership courses such as obtained at an Outward Bound School...(b) Special civic courses for established local leaders, to encourage their understanding of similar adjacent societies in direct relationship to bolstering nationalism; (c) Facilities to train central government officers in dealing with minority-group problems, with the object of their working into the administrative network at local government level' (Ley, in Kunstadter, 1967: 355-6, 365).

[58] In Thailand, preceding the coup d'état of 1932, ‘the military, along with other Thai bureaucrats, had been subject to a variety of forces that were influential in the formulation of the decision to strike against the government. Military officers regularly, from the late nineteenth century on, had been sent abroad for study in Europe, and were infused there with a taste for “progress” and the “up-to-date”, if not for democracy. But when they returned home, any expertise or sense of self-importance they had acquired abroad was frustrated by the high princes and their intimates, who held a monopoly of the top posts and the making of important decisions’ (Wilson, 1969: 329; emphasis added). Outlining the durable organisational basis of Thai military power, Wilson further states that ‘the recruitment and training of its own personnel make up perhaps the most important aspect of the autonomy of the armed services. These activities are particularly important in regard to the officer corps. The army, as well as other services, maintains cadet academies that receive large numbers of applicants because of the prestige of the military officer’s role. The staff, consequently, can be quite selective in choosing personnel, a process that in itself
helps to create the image of the officer corps as an elite group... Control over
education permits the army to mould the mind of the officer candidate, including
his attitude towards politics' (1969: 336). In a conference paper on interactions
between the Thai military, the civilian inhabitants in Thailand's remote border
regions, and the US government, Dr. Lee W. Huff (in 1966 Director for
Behavioural Sciences, [D]ARPA) reports on the M[obile] D[evelopment] U[nit]
experiment, a 'development program motivated by the RTG's [Royal Thai
Government] concern for a potential security problem. Americans call it
preventive counter-insurgency. Clearly it does not involve combat, and it goes
well beyond normally understood versions of short-term military civic action [sic].
The RTG simply discerned the close connection between underdevelopment and
national security and defined the work of helping the people to develop
themselves...' (1967: 426). Logistically, 'each mobile team is led by a young
military officer, many of whom have been trained in American military schools.
His deputy is frequently the deputy district officer or local education officer'
(1967: 437). A cornerstone of the MDU program concerned education because, as an
earlier (1961) commentator had concluded, '[It is our strong impression that in
areas... where officials are estranged, the draft widely scattered, official radio
broadcasts largely irrelevant to village life, and government services almost non-
existent, the local elementary school is overwhelmingly the main source of
national consciousness and loyalty. Lessons in the national language, in Thai
history, religion, and geography - however superficial and imperfectly
remembered - have a profound effect on village life...It is one of the foundations
of national consciousness and thus of national security' (Moerman, cited in Huff,

[59] In Viet Nam between 1945 and 1977, the government 'conducted a campaign
which involved the parallel development of a script for the unwritten languages
and dispatch of "shock brigades for the fight against ignorance" to the
mountains...[i]n deed, the conditions of war strengthened the resolve of the people
to become literate' (Bhola, 1984: 64, 71).
5.3.4: AUSTRALASIA/PACIFIC [Oceania]

[60] Bigum & Green, generalising from a case study on computer-assisted schooling in Australia, observe in that country, despite the absence of a tightly-structured US-type military-industrial complex, the ‘strong military-industrial influence in the history of literacy, and in particular in the construction of the notion of “functional literacy”…in much software that is designed to develop literacy in its user we can find strong traces of its military heritage’ (1991: 6). More recently, in Fate of a Free People (1995a), revisionist historian Henry Reynolds recasts the role of Tasmanian Aboriginals in the 1824-31 ‘Black War’ - a legitimating misnomer for a policy of genocide and physical relocation of the survivors carried out by the European colonising power against the indigenous population (c/f Turnbull, 1948; Grassby & Hill, 1988). Aside from the necessarily exegetical construction of the work itself, textuality is factored into Reynolds’ polemical account of the “war”, its aftermath and the longer-term implications for Australian race relations in three ways: Firstly, as one of the book’s reviewers recaps, at the conclusion of hostilities, what resulted ‘was the decimated Aboriginal population of about 210 going with [government negotiator George Augustus] Robinson to the “Friendly Mission” on Flinders Island. Disease relentlessly killed the race and by 1876 Truganini - the last tribally-born member of her race - was dead. Unfortunately the treaty made between the aborigines and Robinson, with the imprimatur of Governor Arthur, was never written down, although Reynolds says that had the Aborigines sought a written document they almost certainly would have been given one’ (Crawford, 1995a: 22, emphasis added); secondly, another commentator, in highlighting the ‘linchpin of Professor Reynolds’s book’, notes that ‘[i]t was from Flinders Island that in 1846 eight Aborigines signed an extraordinary petition to Queen Victoria…and it makes some telling points: that the Aborigines had not been taken captive and were free, that the move to Flinders Island was the result of a negotiated settlement, that the agreement was still fresh in Aboriginal minds and that Aborigines had fulfilled their part of the agreement and expected the government to do the same…Reynolds concludes that the sense of injustice that
engendered the 1846 petition survives today' (Cox, 1995; 26); finally, in 2 subsequent newspaper articles, Reynolds is cited (in Crawford, 1995b: 6) as arguing for war reparation in the form of broader recognition of native title, the establishment of a major Tasmanian Aboriginal museum 'as a monument to the original Tasmanians who fought against what they viewed as the invasion of their country', and that 'Aborigines who died in the seven-year Black War between 1824-31 should be recognised as patriots in the ANZAC tradition and their descendants invited to lead ANZAC marches' [on the place of the ANZAC tradition in Australian national culture see, eg, Thomson, 1994]. This latter recommendation is reiterated elsewhere, and combined with a strident plea for the native combatants to be enshrined in the Australian National War Memorial under the terms of the regulations governing inclusion - 'If the wording is considered to be too narrow to admit the Aboriginal dead, the War Memorial Act will have to be amended. Otherwise the implication will be that the memorial discriminates against Aborigines as a matter of policy' (Reynolds, 1995b: 3). Expressed differently, this view argues that the Aboriginals best hedge against discrimination, best guarantee of historical material entitlements, and best chance at full(er) participation in the dominant culture will come via their literary re-characterisation as national heroes and patriotic guerrillas - soldiers, rather than earlier racial stereotypes as 'ignorant savages' (Crawford, 1995a: 21), 'an “injured people” or “murderers” ' (Reynolds, 1995b: 3) and/or 'a degenerate, barbarous race' (Cox, 1995: 26). The alternative depiction is not-so-mute testimony to integrating a marginalised group into a wider Australian society by mobilising elements of that country’s ingrained post-1778 military heritage.

[61] Worsley’s landmark work on the cargo cults of Melanesia (1970, orig. 1957) provides the reader with some of the most direct (not to mention some of the more bizarre) apprehensions of the linkage between militarism and textuality. Looking initially at the Tuka movement, ‘one of the earliest reported cult movements, one which took place before the turn of the century in [62] Fiji’ (1970: 26), he describes the following features: ‘Native unrest, stimulated by a religious
cult, had been noted in Ra Province as early as 1877. But it was not until 1885 that the administration became really disturbed: then they heard that parties of men with blackened faces, and clothed in robes of native cloth, were carrying out military drill on the upper reaches of the Rewa River... They were well organized, though they had few guns and were mainly armed with clubs and spears. The rank-and-file, known as “soldiers”, were commanded by “sergeants”, rokos and mbulis, and “scribes” - titles which were taken from those of native officials, from Armed Constabulary ranks, and from the Bible...’ (1970: 29-30). In the Taro cult in New Guinea [63], disciplinary control ‘was exerted over the people by various methods. When going to and from the gardens, the people had to “fall in”. In the gardens, [movement leader] Bia’s right-hand man, Yavevi, gave various commands, e.g. “A shun man!” - the words shun, shen, sha and som occur frequently in the polyglot lyrics invented by Bia... Every day a service, called “school” was held at Manau. In one “service” Bia placed an empty box in the centre of the village ground, and Dasiga incanted with a stick in his hand, looking towards Heaven and turning round and round as he walked about. Bia then repeated the incantations, kneeling with his head on the box as if reading... Both [Dasiga] and Bia were illiterate, but Dasiga expressed his desire to go to school to learn reading and writing so that he might lead the people’ (1970: 80); On Papua [64], one aspect of the Vailala Madness that ‘coincided with the end of the 1914-1919 war’ and drew a significant proportion of its leadership from ex-members of the Papuan Armed Constabulary (1970: 90) was that ‘an aeroplane was prophesied as the means of transport for the Cargo, though no aeroplanes had yet appeared in this part of Papua. The mystery was solved when [cult originator] Evara was found to possess a cheap English novel called Love and the Aeroplane with a crude cover-drawing of a man and woman precariously suspended by a rope from an aeroplane. But ideas of Heaven rather than aeroplanes were the probable source of rumours that “papers had fluttered down to Evara from the sky, and of the theme of inspiration from above in the form of a White ancestor or God striking the affected person on the head, and then communicating a message or delivering a gift [...] “Reading” by wholly illiterate natives was common in this movement [...] Other European elements
included “about turns”, the stopping and starting of dances by whistle-blasts, books carried under the arm, and especially the use of pidgin English...This “language” was said to be “all-a-same Djaman”, which natives knew of both from visits to Rabaul, before 1914 German territory, and through rumours of the War itself. “German” was favoured as an anti-government tongue’ (1970: 92, 97, 98). Referring to the structure of the Buka cults in the Solomon Islands [65] at mid-century, Worsley notes that by December 1942 ‘each village had its own military organization with wooden guns or spears, and organized bodies of soldiers, messengers and police. Chiefs were provided with guards of honour, and were greeted with special ceremonial, including the Japanese bow. The native found the Japanese ancestor cult particularly congenial’ (1970: 130); and on the island of Malaita, an Australian crackdown on the Marching Rule cult in the late 1940s concentrated on stopping ‘illegal drilling...raids were made on villages in the Koio area where “ambitious palisades... with lookout towers” were destroyed, together with a Marching Rule gaol and barracks for the “duties” ’ (1970: 189-90). The 1946 movement on Great Admiralty Island [66] established by Paliau - a ‘former sergeant in the New guinea police, he was also an orator possessed of great dynamism, organizing ability, and literacy in Melanesian pidgin’ - was also attacked ‘by White opponents, who accused him of establishing a totalitarian regime, including “customs” - passes to permit the movement of people - marching, drilling, curfews, etc’ (1970; 197-8). In the New Hebrides [67], with the Naked Cult which emerged on the island of Espiritu Santo in the 1920s, ‘[p]lantation workers were convinced by [movement head] Runvoro’s ability to write meaningless marks, and the prophet was credited with having raised from the dead not only human beings, including one of his followers who “died” in the excitement of a dance, but also a dead cow’ (1970: 159); and on the southern island of Tanna, the John Frum movement became an integrated force during WW II ‘as the Americans moved in to meet the Japanese threat’ and ‘news of their arrival swept the islands. A man was arrested for saying that Mount Tukosmeru was “full of soldiers”; it would be open on the Day, and the soldiers would fight for John Frum. But the most astounding piece of information was the news that many of these US troops were black! It was prophesied that large numbers of black
Americans were coming to rule over the natives': this prophecy was transmitted to his followers by cult founder Neloaig/John Frum, a leader who, though illiterate, 'had pretended to read and had started his own schools' (1970: 168-69).

[68] In a seminal paper on the impact of literacy and print technology in early 19th century New Zealand, culminating in the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi which established British sovereignty over that territory in February 1840, Don McKenzie is concerned not only with the motivations of assorted missionaries and civil and military colonial administrators attempting to transmit reading and writing skills to the indigenous population, but how these skills were received and perceived: 'The main use of literacy to the Maori was not reading books for their ideas, much less for the access they gave to divine truths, but letter writing. For them, the really miraculous point about writing was its portability; by annihilating distance, a letter allowed the person who wrote it to be in two places at once, his body in one, his thoughts in another. It was the spatial extension of writing, not its temporal permanence, that became politically potent in gathering the tribes and planning a war a decade and more [ie, in the 1830s] later...The effective use of letters for political purposes was many years away. Nor did printing of itself become a re-expressive tool for the Maori until the late 1850s. When it did so - in Maori newspapers - the essential motives, the effective contextual forces, were economic, political and military, not religious' (1987: 170-1, emphases added). Indeed, just as the Maori responded to the ephemerality of text, as against an English view of the printed word as legally-binding fixity, so they took a novel approach to religious tracts in the battles over Aotearoa land in the period between 1821 and 1840, when the book 'was given a totemic power of warding off not only evil spirits: in 1836 it was said that a Maori fighting party had refused to storm a pa (a fortified village) because of a printed Bible inside it and contented themselves with a blockade. In 1839 Taylor recorded seeing Maori with mission books (or at least odd leaves from them) rolled up and thrust through holes in the lobes of their ears. Books were also useful for making roll-your-own cartridges. One book so used was Milner's Church History, thus giving a slightly different sense to the phrase “the church militant”. Colenso picked up
such a cartridge in which the paper came from II Samuel and bore the words from
Chapter 19, v. 34: "How long have I to live?" Markham said his servants melted
down his pewter spoons in 1834 to make musket balls of them, "and the first
Volume of my Voltaires, Louis 14. et 15., torn up and made Cartridges of them"
'(1987: 178). Updating and personalising his account, the author concludes as
follows: 'Print is still too recent for the Maori...During a Russian scare in the 1880s
the Government of the day pre-empted the purchase of Maori land at Bastion
Point, a fine site overlooking Auckland harbour. When a more recent Government
proposed to resell it for luxury housing, it was occupied for several months by
Maori protesters. In my mind's eye, I can still read the vivid television news
pictures of police and military vehicles as they moved in on 25 May 1978 to evict
the squatters. At such moments literacy defines itself for many as a concordat
between sword and pen, of politics and script - to the dismay and frustration of
those whose modes are oral' (McKenzie, 1987: 188-9; emphasis added).

5.3.5: EUROPE

[69] In explaining the articulation of emergent modern European nationhood, Mann
temders "hard" class-based explanations with an account focussed on the
combined political impacts of militarism and ideology driving regional-national
struggles. In this regard, Austria provides a type-case in as much as '[a]cross the
Austrian lands, civil disturbances peppered the mid-nineteenth century - in 1821,
1830, 1848-9, 1859, 1866 and 1908 - usually abetted by foreign Powers...Yet
Austrian nationalism also uniquely...involved linguistic issues, especially
through office spoils. Two issues arose: What should be the language of the public
sphere, especially government, and what languages should be taught in public
schools? As Gellner (1983) argues, literacy was cultural capital, realisable in
employment in army, civil administration, law courts, and capitalist economy. As
capitalism and states expanded, they were staffed by more non-German speakers.
More nobles, bourgeois, and petit bourgeois had a vested interest in the local
language's being the state's. The Habsburgs were not unsympathetic, encouraging
bilingualism in the army. Yet to extract taxes they turned intermittently to
repression, pushing them to depend on the mainly Austro-German officer corps and central administration. Other linguistic communities were blocked from administration and law courts, so the revolutionaries of 1848 protested...’ (1993: 245-6). Elsewhere, discussing issues of (de)mobilisation and civil employment of reservists, he notes that in Prussia from 1820 and following, ‘all noncommissioned officers with nine years service could claim preferment in clerical and accounting jobs in the administration, provided they were literate and could count. Austria later guaranteed this for twelve-year noncommissioned officers...’ (Mann, 1993: 451).

[70] The monograph on “Varieties of nation-building in the Balkans and among the Southern Slavs” by Najdan Pasic affirms that historically [a]ll the Balkan countries, those which had been under Turkish occupation, those which had belonged to Austria-Hungary, and those once dominated by Venice, represented a backward periphery and agrarian appendix to the great feudal-military and mercantile empires of Turkey, Austria-Hungary, and Venice’ (1973: 131); but that over time and peaking in the 20th century, the ‘idea of creating a federated or confederated community of Yugoslav nations’ effervesced: ‘At its early congresses in 1919 and 1920, the Communist Party practically adopted the idea of Yugoslavia [71] as the common state of a nation with three names. Later, when the Great Serbian hegemony provoked widespread unrest and national dissatisfaction in the country, the Communist Party, under the influence of the Third International, adopted in 1928 another extremist conception to the effect that Yugoslavia should be broken up into separate and independent national states. Only in the thirties did the communist Party arrive at a clear position on the subject of the national problem in Yugoslavia and seek to reject the unitarian state order while advocating the formation of Yugoslavia as a federated community of equal peoples. This idea was realised in the National Liberation War and Revolution. It was expressed for the first time...in November 1943, when a resolution was passed to constitute Yugoslavia as a federated state community of Serbs, Croat, Slovenes, Montenegrins and Macedonians. The National Liberation War and Revolution demonstrated that the desire of the people for
equality and freedom and for winning independence through a common struggle under a single political leadership had generated a tremendous revolutionary force. Had this situation not been the case, it would have been unthinkable to mobilise on a broad basis the progressive forces of all the Yugoslav nations and to engage them in the National Liberation War under the leadership of the Communist Party, the only party with a clear and developed conception of how the national question in Yugoslavia had to be solved’ (1973:123-24). Yet within this coalition, elements of strain were evident amidst the new unity, elements tied to the “literary” origins of the Balkan/Slavic “imagined communities” as self-preserving cultural and ideological mechanisms in the face of denationalising foreign hegemonies. Pasic notes in Serbia [72] ‘the role of heroic folk poetry..., nurtured for centuries among the people by the guslars - the folk singers with their one-string instruments - preserved in advanced artistic form the Serbian national myth that was a constructive element in Serbian nationalism. Among the Southern Slav peoples, national awakening and national renaissance were linked with the struggle for a national literary language and the creation of a literature in the vernacular. [In Slovenia,[73] national awakening among the Slovenes was produced by the reform headed by the prominent figure, Primoz Trubar, an ardent fighter for the Slovene tongue and Slovene school. The major Slovene writers, from the poet Franc Presern to Ivan Cankar, were also leading national ideologues. [In Croatia, [74] among the Croats, vernacular literature by Avgust Senoa and other prominent writers of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and particularly medieval literature developed in Dalmatia [75], also had their “national mission”. [In Montenegro, [76] o]f the Montenegrins, the greatest national poet, Negos, was simultaneously the most influential standard-bearer of Serbian and Montenegrin national consciousness’ (Pasic, 124-25).

[77] In Belgium, the ‘Belgian army had always run literacy classes, and in 1978 BRT (Flemish radio) devoted a series of broadcasts to the subject. At this time students could learn through the radio or the army...’ (Commission of the European Communities, 1985: 70)
[78] Writing in 1970, Stegenga states that ‘six years have passed since the United Nations first intervened in the other Middle East crisis situation, the communal conflict on the little Mediterranean island of Cyprus. The United Nations peace-keeping force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) has been helping to maintain a fragile truce on the island since March 1964 [...] In pursuance of its mandate, the United Nations peace-keeping force in Cyprus has engaged in a broad array of activities which very generally divide into two categories. First, UNFICYP has performed a number of kinds of activities designed to “prevent a recurrence of fighting” [pacification] [...] Second, UNFICYP has promoted a “return to normal conditions” by lending its good offices and troops to a variety of what might be called civic-action projects [normalization]... Largely through UNFICYP’s good offices, telephone, electrical, water, and mail services have returned to normal throughout most of the island. UNFICYP assistance has made the reopening of most of the public schools of Cyprus possible...and UNFICYP carpenters and engineers have built schoolrooms for the refugee children complete with “sun-shaded bamboo roofs” and “open air showers...where water can be sprayed over the children at certain times during the day”. From all accounts it would appear that the peace-keeping soldiers (plus civilian staffers) perform admirably at these quite non-martial tasks’ (1970: 1, 8-10).

[79] While maintaining that in the Slav countries of the 14th and 15th centuries ‘the first printed books were invariably religious’, Febvre & Martin take Czechoslovakia as an exceptional case: here, ‘[p]rinting in Bohemia began with the work of an anonymous printer who produced a translation from the Italian of Guido di Colonna, called Kronika Trojanska (History of Troy). This was the first book to be published in Czech. The fact that a secular and not a liturgical text was chosen by this printer to be the first text published in Bohemia is significant (the work had already had a great vogue in Western Europe and it attained permanent popularity after it was printed)’ (1976: 199). Subsequent to this, in his study of an alternative version of the ancient Greek legacies (‘Greek Fire’) bequeathed to 20th-century societies, in early 1989 Taplin writes that Thucydides observed ‘what happens to language under political stress, especially the stress...
of conflict. "The meaning of words have no longer the same relation to things but are changed. Reckless daring is held to be loyal courage; prudent delay is the excuse of a coward; moderation is the disguise of weakness; to know everything is to do nothing. Frantic energy is the true quality of a man; the lover of violence is always trusted and his opponent suspected". This is a forerunner of George Orwell's "Newspeak", and of contemporary "Nukespeak". This passage is regarded as so subversive, even now, in Czechoslovakia, that it is circulated in samizdat form by the dissidents' (1989: 247).

[80] Speaking of national identity in Finland, Davies (1997: 818) refers to the 'Kalevala or "Land of Heroes" [which] is generally regarded as the national epic of the Finns. It is a poem of some 50 cantos or 22,795 lines, published first in 1835 and in its second, definitive edition in 1849. It is a semi-literary epic compiled largely from authentic folklore. In fact, it is in large measure the product of its main compiler, Elias Lönnrot (1802-84), who used classical models to transform and embellish the raw oral materials which he had collected among the peasants of eastern Finland and Russian Karelia. As such, it illustrates not only the legacy of Europe's pagan folklore but also the process whereby nineteenth-century activists drew on neglected popular sources to create a national consciousness...the Kalevala was a Herderian exercise par excellence. In Lönnrot's time the Finns passed from rule by Sweden to that of Tsarist Russia, and were feeling the urge to dissociate themselves from the culture of their Swedish and Russian masters...[such n]ational epics...held special significance for those nations whose drive towards a separate cultural identity was inhibited by political dependence. It is not surprising to find that both [Longfellow's 1855] Hiawatha and the Kalevala had been translated into Polish by the 1860s'.

[81] Foucault's contention: 'Historians of ideas usually attribute the dream of a perfect society to the philosophers and jurists of the eighteenth century; but there was also a military dream of society; its fundamental reference was not to the state of nature, but to the meticulously subordinated cogs of a machine, not to the primal social contract, but to permanent coercions, not to fundamental rights, but
to indefinitely progressive forms of training, not to the general will but to automatic docility' (1977: 169). Adding some weight to this more hellishly rational underbelly of what Carl Becker has evocatively termed the 'Heavenly City' of the 18th Century *philosophes*, in tracing the development of literacy in France, Resnick & Resnick observe that when the 'Revolutionary government introduced the first plan for national education in France in 1795, its major interest was military: the preservation of schools and training routes for those entering technical and military careers was considered essential' (1977: 375-376); Eugen Weber (1976: 298) notes the way that 'the law of 1818 linked promotion within and from the ranks to literacy, and led to the creation of regimental schools where soldiers could learn how to read, write and count - and what it meant to be a French citizen'; Aries (1973: 255-257) moves the imposition of a 'semi-military condition on the school population' to an earlier point in time, the second half of the 18th century, when 'one can trace the rise of the military idea, at the same time as the liberal idea, inside school life...long before the Napoleonic lycée, the French school, or at least that which corresponded to the present-day secondary school, took on a military character'; and Furet & Ozouf, discussing literacy sites in France in the 19th century, compare reading acquisition of army personnel and the populace in general - their largely quantitative analysis shows that '[o]ver 1,150,000 young men are supposed to have undergone elementary instruction in the army between 1844 and 1869, and are supposed to have learnt at least to read. Now, the 1872 census returns tell us that scarcely more than 8 million men aged over 20 were able at least to read. So the regimental schools account for a considerable portion of this educated cohort' (1982: 256). The qualifications in their assessment concern a finer-grained study of inflations of these 'impressive figures' in terms of both rank breakdowns, and the 19th century definition of literacy as underplaying or ignoring writing. But their overall conclusion still avers that by 'turning out a relatively high proportion of men able to read only, among its “pupils”, the army may therefore be considered an essential agent of male literacy in the 19th century' (1982: 257).
Reformation of the 16th century and the spread of literacy via bible-reading in early modern Germany, Strauss & Gawthrop (1984) claim that such a linkage can be asserted between literacy and the "second" Pietist Reformation of the 17th century. They locate the origins of Pietism in the failure of German territorial rulers to deal with either economic or social and moral reconstruction in the periods following the Thirty Years war and the Franco-Dutch war of the 1670s, which actively involved most German states (1984: 44). Moreover, as Pietism continued to attract state sponsorship in the 18th century, the politico-military utility of its educational program became increasingly obvious, until Frederick III’s successor, ‘Frederick William I (1713-40), the “drillmaster-king”, aspired to transform his realm into nothing less than a “Sparta of the North”, in which the state would harness, to an unprecedented extent, the energies of its people for military purposes. Realising that the Pietists’ form of education tended to produce obedient and productive subjects, Frederick William I worked to extend the Halle system to his entire kingdom, and to this end he actively recruited the Pietists to assist him. The Halle schools supplied the models and - in many cases - the teachers for the cadet academy in Berlin, the schools of the military orphanage at Potsdam, workhouse schools in numerous other cities, garrison schools, and schools built with school funds on royal domain lands’ (1984: 48). The upshot of these practices, in Germany and beyond, was that this version of hegemonic literacy producing drilled/docile populations meant that ‘the privileged orders now enjoyed the protection of a much stronger state apparatus than had their predecessors. Absolutist states had powerful means at their disposal for restraining social unrest: workhouses, hospitals, above all standing armies ’ (Strauss & Gawthrop, 1984: 55). In an 1872 commentary, M. Bréal ‘noted that the Prussian [83] educational reforms of 1807-13 were the result of King William III’s determination that his country should "regagner en force spirituelle ce qu'il a perdu en force physique" ’ (cited in Stone, 1969: 87). Such a conjunction of forces and their sequence is congenial to Mann’s (1986, 1993) broader IEMP model of western European societal development, and in the German instance he notes that after 1872, ‘the Kaiserreich spent as much on education as on the military. It did not see the two as a “guns versus butter” alternative. Literacy among German
army recruits was the highest in Europe, a proudly publicized fact...Prussian
education was statist, reinforced by the other carrier of literacy in the North, the
pietistic Lutheran (Evangelical) church’ (1993: 305). Elsewhere, he recites an
archetypal instance of this German pedagogico-military tradition and its
survival into the early 20th century, claiming that in the period prior to World
War I state education was still ‘officially nationalistic. Schools were supposed to
courage a rather military sense of nationhood. As the kaiser told a conference of
educators: “I am looking for soldiers. We want a robust generation who can serve
as the intellectual leaders and officials of the nation”’ (1993: 586).

[84] A collection of readings edited by Clogg & Yannopoulos (1972) on the military
coup d'état of 21 April 1967 in Greece foregrounds the varied attempts by the
subsequently-established Colonels' junta to gain control of Greek education, the
media (particularly the press) and cultural life in general. Providing background
to the coup, Zaharopolous notes the heavy involvement of army officers in
politics in Greece since 1909, and the impact of the 1944 Athens uprising and the
divisive 1946-49 civil war on tendencies to direct intervention by a 'messianic'
nationalist fraction of the officer class (1972: 21) - more specifically, he stresses
the shared military academy experiences of the twelve colonels, and their
mutual exposure to the 'bitter-sweet sensation of mutiny and insubordination as
young cadets in April 1941' under the German occupation (1972: 30-34). Clogg
(1972: xi) notes the innovatory 'creation of a network of commissars (most of them
former officers) to act as the arbiters of the regime's policies and as sources of
information to the security services. Commissars were appointed to a number of
organizations, to public bodies such as universities as well as private enterprises';
elsewhere he cites the views of Colonel Ladas on the moralising influence of
patriotic poetry, and that '[c]orrectly deployed, arts and letters can “mould
civilized characters with such a national and patriotic conscience that the
criminal acts of the past should not be repeated, as happened with the foreign-
led Red Satans - the communists - during the war and subsequent rebellion”', and
the junta's ideology stating that '[e]ducation is to be based on “the ideals of
Helleno-Christian civilization”, which are also, it is held, the ideals of the
Western World’ (1972: 42-3, 44). An anonymous contributor ("N.N.") highlights the junta’s unparalleled commitment to pedagogical reform by stating that ‘since 1823, Greek constitutions have included clauses on education. With the exception, perhaps, of the 1827 text, they have always established a tight governmental control over some level or another of education. But never before 1968 has there been a constitution which is more precise, and more thorough, in imposing the government’s authority on all aspects of education’ (1972: 129) - the remainder of the chapter details the deleterious effects of this authority on teaching and learning at primary, secondary and tertiary education levels (1972: 130-145).

Vlachos describes the ways in which the Greek press was controlled through a combination of censorship, standardisation, intimidation and the impost of a prohibitive import duty on newsprint correlated with average daily circulation, effectively penalising the anti-junta newspapers with the widest readerships (1972: 59-74). Finally, Roufos portrays the impact of the Colonels’ regime on the arts in toto and literature particularly: ‘The chief weapon...was pre-censorship. No book or magazine could be printed, no lecture delivered, without previous scrutiny and permission of the censors...Existing books were taken care of by means of an “Index” drawn up by the authorities and containing several hundred titles of books that could not be sold, bought, displayed, discussed or consulted in public libraries...The Soviet Union and the Slavic countries of Eastern Europe being communist, everything that had to do with them came automatically under suspicion. On one occasion, a newspaper was not allowed to publish an essay on Tolstoy. The list of forbidden books included such items as a Teach Yourself Russian textbook, a Greek-Bulgarian dictionary, and a biography of Peter the Great...The censor forbade the editor of a world atlas to mention the predominant religions of China as being Confucianism, Taoism and so on (which the editor had thought of as being a prudent anachronism) on the grounds that “Taoism and all those philosophies lead to anarchy”... [but a]n ideological drive cannot confine itself to mere prohibitions. It has to foster the right kind of artistic production. An attempt in this direction was made in 1969: under the suggestive title “The Popular Muse”, the Government published a selection of verse written in its praise by supporters from all over the country. These amateur poets, who ranged from
greengrocers to schoolchildren, certainly did their best to compensate for any literary deficiencies of their output with sheer enthusiasm; the net result, however, can hardly be said to justify the considerable amount of taxpayers' money involved in the process' (Roufos, 1972: 149, 153).

[85] With regard to the origins and earliest phase of an independent Hungary, ‘[o]f the birth of Hungarian nationalism Ignotus writes that it is an event “recent enough to be dated: 1772, the year of publication of some unreadable works by the versatile Hungarian author György Bessenyei, then a resident in Vienna and serving in Maria Theresa’s bodyguard”...Further stimulus was provided by the extensive publications of Ferenc Kazinczy (1759-1831), the “father of Hungarian literature”...’ (Anderson, 1991: 73). In the ensuing century, ‘popular nationalism, symbolized for later generations by the figure of Lajos Kossuth (1802-1894), had its hour of glory in the Revolution of 1848...After the suppression of the revolutionary regime by czarist armies in August 1849, Kossuth went into life-long exile’ (1991: 103); later, ‘[h]umiliatingly defeated by Prussian armies on the field of Königgrätz in 1866, Vienna was forced to accede to the institution of the Dual Monarchy in the Ausgleich (Compromise) of 1867. From then on, the Kingdom of Hungary enjoyed a considerable autonomy in the running of its internal affairs. The initial beneficiaries of the Ausgleich were a group of liberal-minded high Magyar aristocrats and educated professionals...’ (1991: 104).

[86] Peter Burke’s essay on “The Uses of Literacy in Early Modern Italy” is a middle-range approach (ie, undertaken as an ‘ethnography of writing’ located between ‘grand theories’ of textuality and empirical studies of literacy rates/levels) considering scribal practice within four social domains - business, family, church and state - across an assortment of (independent, prior-to-1861-unification) Italian city-states. His discussion of the last of these domains, the governmental, both uncovers prime early examples of future commonly-adopted bureaucratic instruments, and links them to pre- and post-Renaissance military imperatives in polities suffused by virtually permanent war-readiness: thus, as a ‘defence against the breaches of security which the spread of literacy made more
likely, cipher was invented. A historian of diplomacy has pointed out that "The first extant ciphered document in the archives of Venice [87] dates from 1411, at Florence [88] from 1414, at Milan [89] from 1454 and at Genoa [90] from 1481"...Cipher was a field in which the Italians were pioneers. The same goes for a special kind of official report, the relazione ...required to be particularly thorough and to follow a fixed form, dealing with the geography, history and political structure of the state visited, the personality of the ruler, his foreign policy, and so on... The precocity of Italian censuses of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries [also] deserves particular emphasis...A census [catasto] was no small enterprise. In the case of the famous catasto of 1427, which listed every household in Tuscany under Florentine rule - some 60,000 of them - the services of at least twenty-three clerks were required, not counting the specialists who estimated the value of each household's property...The 1427 catasto...was part of the war effort...Passes [sing. = bolleta, bolletino] or licences were issued allowing certain people to carry arms in a certain city, or to be out in the streets after curfew...Armies were already producing a mass of paper including billetting regulations, paysheets, and muster rolls, which described the horses more carefully than the men because it was particularly important to ensure that they were not counted twice. In the navy, too, literacy and numeracy had its uses. Clerks sailed with Venetian galleys, and a writer on naval matters in the early seventeenth century argued that gunners needed to be numerate (il bombardiero dovrebbe essere abachista) (Burke, 1987: 34-36. c/f Wiethoff's monograph on Machiavelli's 'single style or mode of activity' common to 'both political eloquence and martial wisdom' in the Renaissance at note 13 in 1.3 of Chapter 1).

[91] In 1979 James Aho drew attention to the importance of textual exegesis in the military innovations of the Protestant commanders in three countries - England, Sweden and the Netherlands - in the bellicose 16th and 17th centuries. In a capsule biography of one of these key figures, Keegan & Wheatcroft (1987) outline the career of 'Maurice of Nassau, Prince of Orange (1567-1625), Dutch soldier, stadholder and military innovator...Together with his cousins, William Louis of Nassau and John of Nassau, he secured the effective independence of the
Netherlands from Spain, but also created a uniquely efficient army...The mainspring of the Mauritian reforms was an intellectual approach to the art of war. Intense interest had already been shown in the military practice of the Romans, and it was a Dutchman, Justus Lipsius, who produced the definitive treatise on the topic in 1595: Maurice learnt much from him...In his passion for system and order, he developed a style of war which eschewed pitched battles: it was said that he waged war as though he was playing chess...Maurice's contribution extends far beyond the Netherlands, for his reforms revolutionized the whole face of war...In the well-paid, well-drilled and well-disciplined Dutch army lay the pointer to the professional forces of the future' (1987: 207-8). Geoffrey Parker's analysis (1988) endorses this view and details more facets of the reforms: 'In 1599, Maurice of Nassau secured funds from the States-General to equip the entire field army of the Republic with weapons of the same size and calibre and, at about the same time, his cousin John began work on a new method of advanced military training: the illustrated drill manual...The book rapidly went through numerous editions in Dutch, and was soon translated into Danish, German, French and English...The fame of Maurice's drill had spread beyond the Dutch Republic...Meanwhile in 1616 Count John of Nassau opened a military academy at his capital, Siegen, to educate young gentlemen in the art of war: training took six months, and arms, armour, maps and models for instruction were provided by the school. The first director of the Schola militaris, Johan Jakob von Wallhausen, published several manuals of warfare, all of them explicitly based on Dutch practice (the only system taught at Siegen') (1988: 20-21). In a footnote providing a fascinating insight into early modern international communications networks, Parker further considers the 'many other literary ways in which the new techniques might be propagated. Numerous newspaper reports circulated from 1618 onwards - by the 1630s some papers even had a regular "war correspondent" - and some armies published annual campaign reports...The victorious Spanish siege of Breda was celebrated in plays, books, paintings...as well as in the vast map prepared by Jacques Callot on the orders of the Brussels government, which was sent (together with a description and "index" in four languages) to some 200 distinguished personages...There were also letters and
memoranda written by various ambassadors and other government officials which discussed the new ways in warfare - even when fought by others - and, since many of these have survived in multiple copies, it is clear that they too circulated widely. Finally, there were even plays which popularised the military techniques of the Dutch. Thus London theatre-goers in 1599 could watch a play “full of quips” called “The overthrow of Turnholt”...the Spaniards also wrote plays about the Low Countries’ Wars...but, understandably, these had little to say about Dutch military superiority’ (1988: 162-63).

[92] Scott (1990: 72) notes that national ‘censuses and civil registration developed hand-in-hand from the middle of the eighteenth century, with official population censuses generally preceding the transfer of vital registration from Church to State. The earliest known censuses were in Scandinavia...In1662, for example, a census of adult males was carried out in Norway as an aid to military recruitment’.

[93] In the course of his succinct historical overview of the Black Sea region, Ascherson notes that the ‘contemporary states of Greece, Ireland, Israel, Hungary and Poland are all restorations of lost polities. As restorations, they are all highly inaccurate; none of them has the frontiers of its “original”. But those originals all had in common the fact that they were obliterated from the political atlas by imperial violence’ (1996: 190). Drawing from Anderson’s work on imagined communities fuelled by the ‘print revolution’ and presenting an alternative to the idea of Poland as a Baltic state peopled foundationally by proto-Slav farmers, the author details ‘a time when Poland looked towards the Black Sea as its native coast, and when Poles claimed ancestry in a race of Indo-Iranian nomads - the Sarmatians. In the sixteenth century, Polish writers began to assert that Poles were the descendants of the Sarmatians [...] in the next hundred years, the Sarmatian myth took an extraordinary, freakish twist of its own. From being the official myth of a court, “Samartism” became the mass faith of a class [ie the szlachta, or Polish nobility]...This enormous social group came to number something like 10 per cent of the population...Its obscure origins lay in a clan
system, recruited by military allegiance and adoption as much as by hereditary connection [...] Sarmatism also repositioned Poland's sense of geography - or of "geopolitical destiny"...For the "descendants" of noble barbarians from the Pontic Steppe, the Black Sea coasts and the plains between the Danube and the Don seemed to be their ancestral home and heritage. In this way, the Sarmatian idea was used to authenticate an aggressive foreign policy towards the East. The word "Sarmatia" was restored as a description of all Slav populations and their territories. To the Polish nobility, convinced that they were the chosen race, this implied not only that the szclachta was the aristocracy of all Slavdom, but that Poland - in a period of almost continuous war against Russians, Tatars and Turks - had an historical claim to old Sarmatian realms in Russia itself, in the Cossack lands of Ukraine, in Moldavia and Bessarabia [...] At the end of the eighteenth century, Sarmatism collapsed under the weight of its own stupidity. But in its fall, it also destroyed Poland itself, and the independence for which the nobility had fought so fiercely for so many centuries' (Ascherson, 1996: 230, 231, 232, 234).

[94] A monograph by actor-network theorist John Law undertaken as an exercise in the sociology of knowledge deals with 'an important turning point in the balance of power between Europe and the rest of the world' (1986: 234) - the emergence of Portugal as a leading mercantile and maritime nation in the late fifteenth century, and the means employed to consolidate this hegemonic position over the next 100 years. The author notes that prior historical treatments of the Portuguese expansion, while considering socio-economic factors, have tended to overprivilege technological advances - primarily in navigational aids, shipbuilding and heavy artillery - as central to this outcome. For Law such accounts are typically either too loose or too narrow: He casts technology as one element in a tripartite scheme involving a specific blend of factors, seeing 'documents, devices and drilled people' as the key to the establishment of long-distance control over its territories by an imperialist nation-state. Moving from the particular to the general, Law implies that this same formula may operate in wider contexts of social order: the correlation between innovations in the organisation of the armed forces and the dispersal of texts is especially stressed in the author's wondering
'whether the west has been able to exert particularly effective long-distance control via people as a result of an innovation analogous to that of the printing press'. Answering affirmatively, he establishes the sought-after connection between print technology, and 'the invention and diffusion of military drill', noting that the latter's importance 'for social control both on and off the battlefield has been immense' (Law, 1986: 256; c/f Wallerstein, 1974: 50-53, 326-344).

[95] Two studies of twentieth-century Romania - one a three-generational age-cohort analysis (Hoivik, 1974), the other a cross-national/cross-temporal comparison with the less-developed nations of Asia and Latin America (Guha, 1974) - independently stress two factors as central to both Romania's position as an instance of European "poor relation" and its chances of eventual socioeconomic development: one is the impact of major wars - Romania's declaration of war on Austria-Hungary in 1916, its impact on demographics and the rural economy during the struggle, the inheritance of new and depressed provinces as a result of the eventual allied victory in WW I, and the political upheaval of Romania's support for the Axis powers under Antonescu in 1940 with subsequent cession to the Soviet Union under post-Second World War IR-arrangements which imposed ongoing semi-military occupied territory status on the country. The other is the impetus this set of bellicosity-derived conditions provided for substantial increases, through successive regimes, in literacy rates and educational participation such that, in Hoivik's study, after WW II 'great efforts were made to eradicate illiteracy and to train personnel for industry and administration. In the 1900 cohort, only 10% of the men and 5% of the women went beyond primary school; in the [1930-birth cohort] the percentages were twice as high'; the educational imperative had reached a point where, relative to the life-chances of the 1960 cohort, by the late '70s the 'introduction of compulsory ten years' schooling placed Romania ahead of all Scandinavian countries' (Hoivik, 1974: 291, 294) and Guha's correlation of literacy and secondary/tertiary education rates places Romania (in Guha's spelling, "Rumania") only slightly below Argentina and Uruguay - frontrunners in Third World development with
literacy/education rates of ‘above 80%, ie comparable to that of the developed countries’ (Guha, 1974: 313, 315).

[96] ‘In the course of three decades, from 1689 to 1725, Peter [the Great] ruled and created a modern Russia. It was Peter’s military reforms, however, together with the foundation of the Navy, which influenced, where they did not motivate, all fundamental innovations: modernisation of government and administration; the relocation of the new capital - Saint Petersburg; reform of the tax system; and the creation of the outlines of a modern education system along practical lines adapted to the needs of a modern state.... In 1714, along with the compulsory enlistment of all noblemen into the Army at 15, Peter also decreed that younger brothers were to enrol in school at the age of ten, and for the next five years learn to read and write, to do elementary arithmetic and geometry, prior to entering the Army’ (Woff, 1989: 117-119, emphases added). Stone notes in passing that ‘after the humiliations of the Crimean War, public pressure in Russia persuaded Czar Alexander II to relax controls on university expansion as a way to restore national military power’ (1969: 87-88). In that nation’s later incarnation as the (now former) Soviet Union [97], the ‘Red Army was asked to play its part in the eradication of illiteracy...[l]iteracy education was made compulsory for all soldiers...the Komsomol’s [All Union Leninist Communist League of Youth] campaign lasted three years during which time some 21 million people learned to read and write, thanks to more than 1,200,000 “soldiers of culture”’ (Bhola, 1984: 45-46).

[98] The foundations of the naval colonial thrust by Spain in the early modern era are re-examined by Illich & Sanders, who describe how on August 18, 1492, a landmark in the ‘alphabetization of the popular mind’ and the establishment of the modern bureaucratic state was achieved when ‘a Spaniard named El Antonio de Nebrija published the first grammar in any modern European language, the Grammatica Castellana, which attempted to reduce a vernacular tongue to rules of grammar [...] Nebrija addresses this new secular balance...a new pact between sword and book...Very astutely, Nebrija reminds the queen that a new union of armas y letras, complementary to that of Church and State, was essential for
gathering and joining the scattered pieces of Spain into a single absolute kingdom:

“This unified sovereign body will be of such shape and inner cohesion that centuries will be unable to undo it. Now that the Church has been purified, and we are thus reconciled to God, now that the enemies of the faith have been subdued by our arms, now that just laws are being enforced, enabling us all to live as equals, what else remains but the flowering of the peaceful arts. And among the arts, foremost are those of language, which sets us apart from the wild animals; language, which is the unique distinction of man, the means for the kind of understanding which can be surpassed only by contemplation” [...] 

He intended the creation of the sphere of a taught mother tongue - the first invented part of a universal education. Columbus was to open the way to the New World; Nebrija devised a way to control Spanish subjects by providing a way to standardize their language’ (1988: 65-70).

[99] In Sweden, ‘[t]he basis of a national army was laid by Gustavus I of Vasa in 1544...With Gustavus II Adolphus (1611-32) the organisation of the armed forces developed rapidly... Charles XI, father of Charles XII, the Warrior King, carried through the organisation, which was formally established in 1682. Every province was to set up an infantry regiment of 1200 men (in eight companies). All villages were “divided” into districts of two or three farms that were responsible for keeping one soldier and giving him a croft. Often it was the younger peasant sons, who were not to inherit the farm, who became soldiers. This set-up had positive social consequences and explains the long-standing unity of the people and the army of Sweden. Very seldom was the army used against the people, as happened very frequently in Europe at the time. The soldier was a son of the village, where he lived in peacetime, and was trained by his regimental commander for about a month every year. During periods of war he was the one who saw the world and had something to tell when he came home. Later on he quite often became an important person as he was one of the very few who could read and write and served also a “schoolteacher” together with the vicar and the church bellringer several hundred years before the national school system was introduced. Thus the army has also played an important cultural role in Sweden’
(Swärdenheim, in Stephens, 1989: 90-92, emphases added). Taking an alternative approach, Sunesson (1984) examines the decline of Swedish military effectiveness in the 18th century, specifically in the defeats in 1743 of the Swedish expeditionary force in Finland by Russia in the so-called "War of the Hats", again at the hands of the Prussians between 1757 and 1762, and in succeeding wars up to the last Swedish military engagements in 1808-1809 (1984: 203-205). What interests Sunesson here is the connection between a theory of control - the much-vaunted 17th-century Swedish Discipline - and its outcomes in practice. He notes that in the examples cited, scientifically-rational military discipline did not avert defeat; yet this had seemingly little effect on the subsequent dissemination and acceptance of the theory. The suggestion is that the broader value of the Swedish Discipline lies in its adoption as a valid doctrine in military education 'that spread into other fields', primarily industrial organisation (Sunesson, 1984: 199); and the medium through which this value was transmitted was textual, initially via military training manuals and eventually to a wider readership (the influence and popularity of Watts' *The Swedish Intelligencer* of 1633 is cited as a prominent case in point; Sunesson, 1984: 200).

[100] In his magisterial comparative study of *Literacy and Development in the West*, Cipolla finds that, in 1850, Switzerland ranks in 10 'Group a: countries with low adult illiteracy (less than 30 per cent)' out of a total of 32 European nations (1969: 113-4; it is further noteworthy that Switzerland also has the fourth-highest population of the group of ten). Of particular significance within these figures is that, although Swiss learning was remarkable enough to attract the attention and praise of as geographically remote an area as China in the mid-eighteenth century, this cultural achievement was not accompanied by high levels of industrialisation or urbanisation (1969: 64), nor by any inordinately high standard of living or national wealth (1969: 18). Moreover, despite Cipolla's inclusion of Switzerland as one of nine countries undergoing a "population explosion" of children attending elementary schools between c.1840 and 1895, the Swiss school-pupil population figure is singularly stagnant (estimated at 0.4 million) between 1840 and 1873, and shows the lowest rate of increase (to half a
million by 1895) of the selected group (1969: 88-9). An alternative prominent reason for Switzerland's preeminent position with regard to alphanumeric capacity, is the attention lavished on elementary education by the Swiss army throughout its history: Cipolla states early (1969: 12-13) that in the 19th century 'the military authorities examined the recruits not merely with regard to their ability to read and write, but with typical Swiss meticulousness subjected them to a rigid examination in penmanship, composition, arithmetic, Swiss history and geography. For each test the recruits received a well-defined grade ranging from 1 to 5. Grade 1 denoted excellency. Grade 5 denoted total insufficiency. Over the period 1891-1900 more than 265,000 recruits were thoroughly examined, and the results were as follows:

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and, at a later point, the author notes that in terms of illiteracy rates amongst army recruits in late 19th century Europe, 'In Switzerland in 1880 seven per cent could not read and write but only three per cent could not read. In 1885 the corresponding figures were four per cent and two per cent; in 1890, three and one per cent' (1969: 120). Tabulating these figures on a yearly basis between 1832 and 1900, Cipolla finds that for this period illiteracy rates in the Swiss army are the fourth-lowest on the continent, surpassed only by Sweden, Prussia and the German Empire (1969:117-8).

[101] In her analysis of the founding of a republican Turkey under the auspices of the military government led by rebel general Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Prasad credits much of the new régime’s subsequent success to the territory-ceding conditions of the post-World War I Allies-imposed Treaty of Sèvres: 'in 1920 and 1921, the signing of th[is] treaty caused public opinion to turn against the Sultan,
and the Kemalists took advantage of this, as well as their victories in the Greco-Turkish war, to appeal to the international stage as the rightful government of Turkey' (1997-98: 61). In the host of reforms ushered in by Kemal's government to break the customary-based grip of his theocratic successors and consolidate the secular republic, estimated as 'the most effective of Atatürk's attacks on Islam were his replacement of the Arabic by the Latin script and his reform of the Turkish language...the young generation was at one stroke cut off from its whole religious and literary heritage [and by] the same stroke Atatürk had made [the older generation] all officially illiterate' (Muller, 1958, cited in Prasad, 1997-98: 56). An earlier study by Lerner & Robinson [1960] encases these moves within precedents and successive policy. They not only credit the military corps with having 'taken a large hand in modernisation of knowledge' through its major part in the establishment of the printing press in 1728 under the Ottoman Empire (cited in Bienen, 1971: 125), but note also the way that more recently 'general education may be identified with the military in the public mind, by reason of the large-scale program of basic education now being instituted by the Turkish army...There is reason to expect that this army program may give general education in the villages and small towns a very healthy shot in the arm by raising public acceptance, and even demand, for secular education' (1971: 135-136). Anecdotally, the co-authors also record a journalist's reaction to his visit to the first pilot class in April 1959:

'Visitors to a classroom were welcomed by this rehearsed teacher-pupil exchange in Turkish:

"What will you be if you do not learn to read and write?" asked the teacher.
"Privates", chorused the class.
"And what will you become if you study hard and learn your lessons?" pursued the teacher.
"Corporals and sergeants", the class answered enthusiastically' (cited in Bienen, 1971: 136).

Approaching a different aspect of the Turkish armed forces-educational nexus from a less laudatory standpoint, a later report by Gray (1987: 26) notes that the 'Turkish military...have, since August, taken over the running of nearly half the
secondary schools in Turkish Kurdistan [102]...Kurds in army-run schools are educated in an alien tongue, Turkish. It is forbidden to teach in Kurmanchi, the Kurdish dialect used by local people. Education in the language of an alien regime does not encourage learning at school. As a result of the Turks' control of schooling, more than half the Kurdish population, mainly women, cannot speak Turkish. It is hardly surprising that the Kurds have a 70 per cent illiteracy rate'.

5.3.6: UNITED KINGDOM/EIRE

[103] In England, Laqueur underlines his picture of one of the originary modern nation-states 'that functioned through an elaborate administrative machinery predicated on literacy' by noting that the 'office of Printer to the Crown was created during the late fifteenth century to facilitate the widespread dissemination of orders, proclamations or other official pronouncements; when Charles I proceeded against the Scots and afterwards against the parliamentary armies, his printing press followed him' (1976: 267). In the 18th century, and at a less exalted level, literacy 'aided promotion even among the lowest non-commissioned ranks of the army' (1976: 265). Stone sees a militarist thrust in the mixed bag of motives underlying 19th-century mass schooling debates, claiming that '[t]hose who pushed through the English Education Act of 1870 were helped by the fact that in the 1860s the North beat the South in the American Civil War, and Prussia beat Austria, the conclusion being that better educated societies tend to win wars' (1969: 88). In Ryan's (1989) potted history, the 'earliest recorded instance [of English army education] was a school established for the British garrison in Tangier in 1675 and by the end of the eighteenth century such schools seem to have been fairly common, providing an education which was basically utilitarian (that is, reading, writing and the basic rules of arithmetic) for both soldiers and their children. During this same period the need for a system for the education of officers was recognised. The Royal Military Academy was founded at Woolwich in 1741 for artillery and engineer officers and the Royal Military College was founded at Marlow in 1802 (and moved to Sandhurst in 1812) for cavalry and infantry officers (these two institutions combined in 1947
to form the The Royal Military Academy Sandhurst - the present officer training establishment for the British Army). Early in the nineteenth century the Commander-in Chief, the Duke of York, recommended the establishment of a school in every regiment for the education of soldiers and their children, with each school being run by a schoolmaster sergeant. From 1812 onwards the costs of running these regimental schools were included in the Army financial estimates, *many years before the introduction of free schooling for children in the United Kingdom* (Ryan, in Stephens 1989: 75, emphasis added). According to Hearl, when 'asked by Lady Shelley in 1825 for advice on the education of her son for a military career, the Duke of Wellington replied:

> He must be master of languages, of the mathematics, of history and geography, and the laws of his country and of nations, of military tactics and of all the duties of an officer...He will not be able to converse or write like a gentleman...unless he understands the classics, and by neglecting them, moreover, he will lose much gratification...and a great deal of professional information and instruction' (1976: 251).

Hearl further summarises: 'The creation and expansion of cadet colleges...is one of the most remarkable developments in the history of English education...Colleges, curriculum, examinations: these three scholastic factors thereafter combined to produce a force, based on military needs, powerful enough to generate, in Professor Simon's words, "an educational revolution in this country during the 1820s and 1830s", and to establish, as Professor Armytage has indicated, "the military ancestry of the Meritocracy" ' (1976: 254-55). Finally, considering armed forces influence on *civic* education, Best (1975) examines militarist elements in the English public schools during the Victorian era: the institution of cadet and rifle corps, the tendency 'from some quite early date, for public schools to appoint ex-army sergeants as porters, janitors, and gymnastics teachers' (1975: 133), and the sporadic but ongoing lecture tours 'by visiting grandees from the Navy League and the National Service League, the big pressure groups campaigning for conscription' around the time of the Boer War (1975: 136). He further notes the importance - and potential application - of sport (c/f Orwell, 1968 [orig. 1945]:...
and the pre-1914 British upper-class school emphasis on a militarist mid-Victorian construction of the value of loyalty: The loyalty syndrome which was such a prodigious part of the public school ethos began with loyalty to your house (which in some cases seems to have been as great as loyalty to your school) and rose through loyalty to your school (a paradigm of the nation) to loyalty to your country, faith and leaders. Public school boys, expressing in their letters and diaries their sense of purpose or obligation in the Boer War and Great War tended to say that they were glad to be bringing credit to the school, they wouldn't let the school down or forget "the loyalty to the Queen and country which I first learned at school" (Best, 1975: 143).

[104] In Philip Smith's sociological account of the Falklands/Malvinas War of 1982, he eschews both Marxist (economic) and Weberish (political) explanatory modes in favour of a Durkheimian view of the war as a ritual event, an exercise in collective solidarity mediated through nationalist tropes. He notes that, by and large, English support for the war was garnered not through governmental and popular press appeals to jingoistic sentiment, but was built on a structural code embodying the following dichotomous features:

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(P. Smith, 1991: 17)

In the author's view, the stability of this code accounted in large part for British macro-consensual backing for Thatcherite war aims, and the form the conflict assumed. Thus, evoking the principle of the rational use of minimum force in a "legitimate" endeavour meant that neither use of British nuclear capability nor deployment of the English advanced hunter-killer submarines were serious options, as 'not only would such threats have brought about international condemnation - they would also have constituted a semiotic absurdity...The semiotic grammar underlying conflict stressed the importance of justice over the
use of force' (1991: 119). Similarly, opponents of the war were forced into fallback positions involving ‘deflation, re-classification, and deconstruction’ of the overarching narratives - these tactics themselves evidence of the dominant discursive code. In a related approach, Foster (1993) works primarily through a series of first-hand participant accounts from both sides of the conflict, and shows how combatants ‘made sense’ of the episode by filtering their perceptions through a variety of literary “sieves”: '[T]he course of [BBC journalist Robert] Fox’s Journey to War [on board the troop carrier SS Canberra] is plotted not only through the pitching seas of the South Atlantic but also through a literary landscape [here, that of Coleridge’s Rime of the Ancient Mariner] whose controlling narratives reassure him of his personal well-being and in the process promote the campaign’s political success’ (1993: 43); Tumbledown, the autobiography of wounded Scots Guards lieutenant Robert Lawrence, wherein ‘the archetypes of heroic action become a passive descent into nightmare. The clean, symmetrical lines of the Boy’s Own narrative dissolve into the ongoing, uncertain progress of the hospital drama, where the pain is real and the prognosis uncertain’ (1993: 45); and Lawrence’s MIA-presumed-dead Scots Guard compatriot Philip Williams’ Summer Soldier, which dispenses ‘with the journey motif and its sequential narrative, tainted by its use in the Falklands and in countless countries beforehand, as a tool of political promotion and personal reassurance. Instead, Williams employs short, impressionistic paragraphs detailing his hunger, fear and uncertainty...It is a narrative choice which makes a political and cultural point’ (1993: 46). From the perspective of the Argentinean soldiery, the ideological framework supplied to los chicos de la guerra rested on the war (Operacion Rosario) as an exercise in Hispano-Christian evangelical zeal and the reconquista, a restoration of sovereign territory ceded to the United Provinces of the Rio de la Plata in 1823 but forcibly seized by Britain in 1832: in Foster’s terms, this ‘fatal union between political and religious interest was consummated in the sacramental rhetoric which portrayed the military’s last grasp at power as a latter day crusade’ (1993: 46). For the author, the inadequacy of this interpretation of the “Cause” became rapidly apparent at the level of tactics, logistics and morale: ‘shrouding [the conscripts’] departure for the islands
in secrecy not only confused their geographical bearings, but also deprived them of the opportunity to locate themselves and their cause within a specific narrative framework, as the British had been able to do during their long voyage south. The connection between ignorance of one's geographical and narrative places is vital. Lacking maps, the conscripts were, both figuratively and literally, lost, without the sense of place and role central to their functions both as soldiers of an occupying army and as Catholic conquistadors in the popularly proffered evangelical narrative' (1993: 48). The outcome of this failure on the Argentine polity? 'The shaping narrative underlying many conscripts' accounts of their experiences in the Malvinas...[t]his narrative of death and resurrection which grew up out of the combatants' despair at how they had been let down by their officers and their superiors in the Casa Rosada ultimately played its part in removing the junta from office and setting Argentina back on the road to democracy' (1993: 49).

[105] In Jane Stevenson's monograph on literacy in mediaeval Ireland, the militarist-textual affinity is expressed in the negative, specifically attributing much of Ireland's peripheral position in the mediaeval European world to 'the fact that Ireland was never conquered by Rome.' This resulted in 'radically different social and political developments of which literacy is both an example and a symptom'; and the author goes on to state more generally, that 'one would have to assume that a completely townless society, operating as a set of small units classically defined as "tribal, rural, hierarchical and familiar", and without any form of centralised government, was peacefully illiterate' (Stevenson, in McKitterick, 1992: 11, emphases added). Cahill embroders this theme: while characterising the early Irish as pathologically violent (and subject to the "warp-spasm" when fighting - 1995: 82-86), he similarly maintains that 'as the Roman Empire fell, as all through Europe matted, unwashed barbarians descended on the Roman cities, looting artifacts and burning books, the Irish, who were just learning to read and write, took up the great labour of copying all of western literature - everything they could lay their hands on. These scribes then served as conduits through which the Greco-Roman and Judeo-
Christian cultures were transmitted to the tribes of Europe, newly settled amid the rubble and ruined vineyards of the civilization they had overwhelmed. Without this Service of the Scribes, everything that happened subsequently would have been unthinkable. Without the Mission of the Irish Monks, who single-handedly refounded European civilization throughout the continent in the bays and valleys of their exile, the world that came after them would have been an entirely different one - a world without books. And our own world would never have come to be’ (1995: 3-4). The ‘Monks’ on their early “literacy campaign” in this description ‘were warrior-monks, of course, and certainly not afraid of any monsters they may meet...Many of the exiles found their way to continental Europe, where they were more than a match for the barbarians they met. They, whom the Romans had never conquered...fearlessly brought the ancient civilization back to its ancient home’ (Cahill, 1995: 187-88).

[106] ‘In Scotland, the demand for public education set out in the First Book of Discipline of 1560 was made at at time of religious crisis, and was designed to advance the cause of Presbyterianism and to convert the masses from Popery. Two centuries later, when a determined effort was made to introduce Charity Schools into the Highlands, sectarian rivalry was again the driving force. “This society seems to have been indebted for its institution to a zealous aversion from Popery”, and its objective was finally to purge the Clans of Catholicism. Its efforts were the “pacification programme”, complement to the military repression of Butcher Cumberland and his troops, as is evidenced by the proposal in 1753 that Catholic children should not be taught writing and arithmetic unless they attended church service conducted by a Presbyterian minister’ (Stone, 1969: 82-83).

[107] In the section of his essay subheaded “Birth and Death of a Nation”, Gwynn A. Williams outlines war/textuality conjunctions in the emergence of an 18th-century radical independent Welsh national identity: ‘politics in Wales began with the American Revolution. The first purely political publication in the Welsh language was a translation of an English pamphlet on the dispute in the American colonies. For a few years even the homespun ballad-mongers were
disturbed. Temporarily unhinged by what they saw as a civil war, they were able to relapse with relief into their customary John Bull jingoism only with the entry of France and Spain into the conflict. So visible were the Welsh-Americans in the struggle that the people at home firmly believed that most of the signatures to the Declaration of Independence were Welsh. Five certainly were...The war turned most Welsh Dissenters and whole ranges of people who espoused the liberties being fought for into spiritual Americans within British society. From that point, politics thrust its snout into the book production of the Welsh-speaking Welsh. In the 1760s, there were some 230 publications in Welsh; by the 1790s the total had climbed to nearly 500 and among them the number of political texts multiplied six-fold. Over a hundred appeared, mostly in the 1790s, and their message echoed through the larger numbers of historical studies, biographies, verse, left its impress even on the serried ranks of volumes (600 and more out of the total of 1,300 printed between 1760 and 1799) devoted to theology, sermons and hymns...David Williams, a celebrated Welsh Deist, dated the birth of Jacobinism from 1782 and located that birth not in France but in Britain...Out of that post-colonial crisis grew the first serious reform movements in Britain, calling for the political emancipation of Dissent, the end of British slavery, the creation of a representative parliament, finally for political democracy, a thrust which, after the French Revolution, debouched into the first systematic popular politics. Welshmen, mostly Dissenters, who were enmeshed in this movement were relatively few in number but strategically placed. One striking centre was Glamorgan, which emerges as a nursery of the democratic intellect' (1982: 269-70).

5.4: Dynamics of the Twentieth-Century War/Text Axis

Section 5.3 provided a sketch of a multi-dimensional war/text axis operating in particular regions - primarily nation-states - under long-run conditions of modernity. It was largely descriptive, macro-qualitative, and centrally thematised by the part a combination of reading/writing and war played in the formation and definition of states (and would-be/eventual states or statelike entities), and the constitution of these states in the contemporary 20th-Century. The 107 regions in the catalogue were treated, in the main, as analytically
independent 'free-standing' units existing and operating inside larger territorial categories (continental and sub-continental areas). The cases in the survey were limited to a consideration of the ways in which the war/text axis delineated and internally ordered these entities. They outline the operation of the axis within countries: but it also affect relations between countries, and determines their placement within, and the shaping and operant conditions of, an interactive current world-system.

This section reconfigures a smaller sample of these entities, and lifts the levels of generality and abstraction. From the 107 regions considered in 5.3, I take 82 cases - those yielding requisite degrees of valid data - and subject them to quantitative analysis. The chosen countries are ranked and assessed according to their respective *Years at War* in the post-World War II period, between 1945 and 1982; *Literacy Rates,*\(^7\) as officially estimated at the conclusion of the Experimental World Literacy Program of 1975; *Defence Expenditure* and *Military Manpower,* also for 1975; and the country's *Education Expenditure* for the same year. These are correlated with Gastil's 1975 indices (see 5.3, pp. 176-77 above) of Political and Civil Rights, which are tied to the form of government - each country's *Political Régime* - as of mid-1982. Finally, the *Major Conflicts* undertaken by each country over the course of the 20th-Century are listed, and the human costs of these conflicts - the *Estimated Number of Deaths* expressed as an aggregate of military and civilian casualties - are presented.

*Appendix H* displays this data in its rawest form. In *Appendix I,* the raw figures are placed within a matrix for comparative analysis. The principal findings

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\(^7\)Regarding this particular data-set it needs emphasising that there are no 1975 rates recorded for 21 countries within the sample: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czechoslovakia, the 2 Germanies, Fiji, Finland, France, Hungary, Japan, Lebanon, Norway, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden, Switzerland, The UK, USA, and Vietnam. This is because the majority of these nations were *contributors* rather than recipients of EWLP programs, and I follow the assumption that rates pertaining within the majority of these countries - the cases of Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Fiji, the Lebanon and Viet Nam obviously excepted - are so high (First-World standard) as to render precise global-scale measurement unnecessary. Where possible, I have nevertheless provided indicative supplementary figures; and further indicators of relatively high literacy levels in these nations can be obtained by referring to the qualitative samples for each country - ie, cases 60, 69, 77, 33, 79, 82, 62, 80, 81, 85, 50, 15, 92, 91, 68, 99, 100, 103, 44 & 59 respectively - in section 5.3.
resulting from the analysis, elaborated in statistical detail at pp. 280-83, situate the effects of the war/text axis and the conditions of conflict under modernity: war-involvement between entities increases throughout the period, peaking in the two World Wars (1914-18; 1939-45); high literacy rates [column C] do not correlate (or are negatively correlated) to a country's post-1945 record of war-involvement [column B] - nor are they indicators of either régime-type [column G], or degree of political and civil rights [columns H & I; c/f section 5.2.4 above]; education expenditure [column E] is a more reliable indicator of war involvement (in all bar two disparate cases, Israel's disproportionately high defence budget, and Cuba's relatively excessive investment in education) than the proportion of GNP allotted to defence [column D]; and high casualty rates, expressed as whole figure aggregates [column L], do not (with the exceptions of Russia, Germany and Poland in the Second World War) correspond to the 1900-90 periods of war-involvement - moreover, regarding the ratio of civilian to military fatalities [column L] in the 66 cases where data is available, 7 nations (11% of the sample) have approximately the same mortality rates, but in the majority of cases (58%) civilian casualties exceed military losses.

Of particular interest is the light the findings throw on the arguments of the "peaceful democracies" thesis (1.2.2, pp. 14-16 above) and the 'pacific transnational sociology' paradigm (in Chapter 2, p. 38 and ff). Chan's figures (1984 - column N) show that the countries with the highest involvement on a war-per-year basis between 1816 and 1980 - ie Israel, India, France and Britain - are nominally democratic. This tallies with my own figures in column B, which show that in ranking national years at war from 1945 to 1982, France "shares the lead" (with Burma) at 38 years, England is next with 37 years, the United States ranks in the 11th position (25 years) followed by India's 24 years of bellicosity - all well above the arithmetic average of 11.2 war-years in the other 77 cases in the sample. The inescapable conclusion appears to be that, while the 'freer' nation-states do not engage in war with each other, they are far from averse to warring with other non-, anti- (or speciously-) democratic states. Combining column B with the coded régime-types [in column G] reinforces this finding: of the 3 main types represented, multi-party parliamentary (29 cases) and one-party (22 cases) states display the
highest degrees of war-involvement - military polities (20 cases), against expectations, considerably less than either.

This is consonant with Latey's explanation for the 'something paradoxically peaceful in the nature of military dictatorships' (1972: 269). Contrasting the propensity of civilian led governments to go to war with the reluctance of their military-governing counterparts, Latey claims that the latter already represents - hence does not need to pursue - the nation's military glory; that the governing body already has - therefore does not need to seek through military adventurism - the support of the armed services; and will not risk its power base - the soldiery - nor potentially throw up rivals, by engaging in interstate armed confrontation. Hence it is unsurprising that regions such as Turkey under Atatürk and the Kemaists, Franco's Spain post-1939, or most of Latin America in the past 150 years 'under a series of military dictators' have 'been among the most internationally peaceful areas of the world' (1972: 271).

This Chapter and its immediate predecessors suggest that a further reason for such paradoxical outcomes are centrally the status and dissemination, among ever-wider populations, of reading and writing across time and space. The combination of authorised documentary personal and national identity, mass and functional literacy, 'print-capitalism' as primary valid information source, forges the 'imagined communities' of the democratic polity's dominant form in the modern era. Not the least of the body politic's 'imaginings' concerns the irrationality of war, and, by a re-invention of its own traditions, that the textual underpinnings of its constitution (figurative and literal) owe little or nothing to either the military or the warring processes that combined to bring it into being.

The next Chapter deals with a range of perspectives claiming that the Modern - and ipso facto the war/text axis that both created and maintains it - has itself been superseded or redefined by a new era of 'post'modernity.
### I. AFRICA/MIDDLE EAST

#### AFGHANISTAN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years at War '45-'82: 10*</th>
<th>Literacy Rates ('75 %age): 12</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>* Keeley's figures on 'Frequency &amp; Duration of Warfare X Nation-States, 1800-1945' for Afghanistan (1996: 187-88): # of wars - 3; wars per generation (25 yrs) - 0.5; years of war per century - 5.2.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Defence Expenditure '75: 1.8</th>
<th>Education Expenditure '75: 1.3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political régime [mid- 82]: military</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 7 CR: 6

Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 25.7

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Conflicts</th>
<th>Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1919 - Afghanistan vs UK</td>
<td>0 1,000 1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924-25 - anti-reform vs Govt, UK intervenes</td>
<td>1,000 1,000 2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928-29 - anti-reform vs Govt</td>
<td>4,000 4,000 8,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978-89 - USSR intervenes in civil war</td>
<td>800,000 500,000 1,300,000*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>805,000 [c] 506,000 [m] 1,311,000 [t]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*According to Knightley, 'published casualty figures for Soviet forces in Afghanistan...varied from a low of 1,200 to a high of 10,000. Yet it was difficult to find a Western correspondent who had seen for himself a single Russian body' (1989: 432). For Brogan the c. 1 million killed in Afghanistan has 'become accepted in most news reports, but should be treated with great suspicion...the Mujaheddin have not issued casualty figures (but) claim an immense slaughter of their enemies') (1992: 621-22).

#### ALGERIA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years at War '45-'82: 15</th>
<th>Literacy Rates ('75 %age): 35</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Defence Expenditure '75: 2.5</th>
<th>Education Expenditure '75: 5.7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political régime [mid- 82]: one-party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 6 CR: 6

Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 9.7

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Conflicts</th>
<th>Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1945 - France intervenes in civil war</td>
<td>2,000 0 2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954-62 - France intervenes in civil war</td>
<td>82,000 18,000 100,000*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962-63 - Rebel leaders vs Govt</td>
<td>1,000 1,000 2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85,000 [c] 19,000 [m] 104,000 [t]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* corroborated by Brogan (1992: 622)

#### CHAD

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years at War '45-'82: 18</th>
<th>Literacy Rates ('75 %age): 15</th>
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</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Defence Expenditure '75: 5.6</th>
<th>Education Expenditure '75: 2.1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political régime [mid- 82]: military</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 6 CR: 7

Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 18.1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Conflicts</th>
<th>Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980-87 - Reb vs Govt; France, Libya interv 2,000 [c]</td>
<td>5,000 [m] 7,000 [t]</td>
</tr>
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</table>

#### EGYPT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years at War '45-'82: 19</th>
<th>Literacy Rates ('75 %age): 44*</th>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Defence Expenditure '75: 11.7</th>
<th>Education Expenditure* '75: 5.8</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

| * Other Estimates - 1962 World Ranking (n of countries = 136) in Literacy: 79; Primary School enrolments: 81; Post-Primary School enrolments: 33 (Coleman, in Coleman, 1965: 437). Earlier, Sullivan (1948: 522) cites an Egyptian illiteracy rate of 90.3 for the year 1921. |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political régime [mid- 82]: restricted parliamentary</th>
</tr>
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</table>

Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 6 CR: 4
### Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 19

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Conflicts</th>
<th>Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1956-65 - Suez: Israel, France, UK invasion</td>
<td>1,000 3,000 4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967-70 - Six Day War; border conflicts</td>
<td>50,000 25,000 75,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971-72</td>
<td>51,000 [c] 28,000 [m] 79,000 [t]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### ERIEPIA

**Years at War '45-'82:** 15  
**Defence Expenditure '75: 3.8**  
**Political Régime [mid- '82]: military**  
**Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 6**  
**CR: 5**  
**Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 3.4**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Conflicts*</th>
<th>Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1935-36 - Italy vs Ethiopia</td>
<td>n/a 20,000 20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941 - Second World War</td>
<td>5,000 5,000 10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974-90 - Eritrean revolt and famine</td>
<td>500,000 70,000 570,000*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976-83 - Cuban and Somalian intervention</td>
<td>15,000 24,000 39,000*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982-87</td>
<td>520,000 [c] 119,000 [m] 639,000 [t]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### GHANA

**Years at War '45-'82:** 1  
**Defence Expenditure '75: 1.6**  
**Political Régime [mid- '82]: military**  
**Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 7**  
**CR: 5**  
**Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 4.1**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Conflicts</th>
<th>Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1981 - Konkomba vs Nanumba</td>
<td>- - 1,000 [t]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### IRAN

**Years at War '45-'82:** 13*  
**Defence Expenditure '75: 14.9**  
**Political Régime [mid- '82]: non-military/despotnic (to 1979); theocratic (post-'79)**  
**Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 5**  
**CR: 6**  
**Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 22.9**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Conflicts*</th>
<th>Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1978-79 - Islam vs Shah; dissidents</td>
<td>70,000 18,000 88,000*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980-88 - Iraq vs Iran</td>
<td>50,000 450,000 500,000*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>120,000 [c] 468,000 [m] 588,000 [t]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Alternative estimates (Brogan, 1992: 624): Iranian Revolution - 20,000 casualties; Iran-Iraq War - 600,000 casualties.

### IRAQ

**Years at War '45-'82:** 11*  
**Defence Expenditure '75: 14.8**  
**Political Régime [mid- '82]: one-party**  
**Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 7**  
**CR: 7**  
**Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 27.5**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Conflicts*</th>
<th>Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1920-21 - Arabs vs UK</td>
<td>1,000 1,000 2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933 - Kurds massacred Christians</td>
<td>1,000 0 1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959 - Shammar Tribe vs Govt</td>
<td>1,000 1,000 2,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### APPENDIX H: 256.

#### ISRAEL

- **Years at War '45-'82:** 14
- **Literacy Rates ('75 %age):** 88
- **Defence Expenditure '75:** 31.7
- **Education Expenditure '75:** 6.1
- **Political Régime [mid- '82]:** restricted parliamentary
- **Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR:** 2
  - **CR:** 3
- **Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75:** 93.4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Conflicts*</th>
<th>Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1948 - Arab League vs Israel</td>
<td>0 [c] 8,000 [m] 8,000*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973 - Yom Kippur War, vs Egypt, Syria</td>
<td>0 [c] 16,000 [m] 16,000*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Alternative estimates (Brogan, 1992; 622, 623, 624): War of Independence (1947-49) - 20,000 casualties; Six Day war (1967) - 25,000 casualties; war of attrition with Egypt (to 1970) - 3,000 casualties; Yom Kippur war (1973) - 25,000 casualties.

#### IVORY COAST

- **Years at War '45-'82:** 4
- **Literacy Rates ('75 %age):** 20
- **Defence Expenditure '75:** 1.5
- **Education Expenditure '75:** 6.1
- **Political Régime [mid- '82]:** one-party
- **Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR:** 6
  - **CR:** 6
- **Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75:** 2.7

#### KENYA

- **Years at War '45-'82:** 9
- **Literacy Rates ('75 %age):** 40
- **Defence Expenditure '75:** 1.7
- **Education Expenditure '75:** 0.3
- **Political Régime [mid- '82]:** one-party
- **Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR:** 5
  - **CR:** 4
- **Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75:** 1.3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Conflicts*</th>
<th>Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1952-63 - Independence from UK</td>
<td>3,000 [c] 12,000 [m] 15,000 [t]*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Brogan's figure cites 15,000 dead in 'the Mau Mau uprising' between 1952 and 1956 (1992: 622).

#### LEBANON

- **Years at War '45-'82:** 12
- **Literacy Rates ('75 %age):** n/a
- **Defence Expenditure '75:** 3.4
- **Education Expenditure '75:** 2.3
- **Political Régime [mid- '82]:** multi-party parliamentary
- **Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR:** 2
  - **CR:** 4
- **Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75:** 13.4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Conflicts*</th>
<th>Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1958 - US intervenes in civil war</td>
<td>1,000 1,000 2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975-76 - Syria intervenes in civil war</td>
<td>75,000 25,000 100,000*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982-90 - Israeli invasion and aftermath</td>
<td>41,000 22,000 63,000*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>117,000 [c] 48,000 [m] 165,000 [t]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Alternative estimates: 1975 - civil war, continuing: 15,000 casualties; 1982 - Israeli invasion: 50,000 casualties (Brogan, 1992: 624, 625).

#### LIBERIA

- **Years at War '45-'82:** 0
- **Literacy Rates ('75 %age):** 9
APPENDIX H: 257.

Defence Expenditure '75: 0.7
Education Expenditure '75: 2.7
Political Régime [mid- '82]: military
Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 6  CR: 3
Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 6.4

Major Conflicts
1985 - reprisal for coup attempt
1990 - Rebels vs Rebels vs Govt

Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total)
5,000                      10,000*
14,000 [c] 1,000 [m] 15,000 [t]

*Alternative estimate (Brogan, 1992: 625): civil war, continuing - 30,000 casualties.

MADAGASCAR
Years at War '45-'82: 4
Defence Expenditure '75: 1.7
Political Régime [mid- '82]: one-party
Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 5  CR: 4
Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 3.1

Major Conflicts
1947-48 - Independence from France
10,000 [c] 5,000 [m]* 15,000 [t]


MALI
Years at War '45-'82: 2
Defence Expenditure '75: 2.5
Political Régime [mid- '82]: military
Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 7  CR: 6
Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 2.6

MOROCCO
Years at War '45-'82: 19
Defence Expenditure '75: 3.1
Political Régime [mid- '82]: despotic (not military)
Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 5  CR: 5
Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 8.7

Major Conflicts
1916-17 - France intervenes in civil war
1,000                      2,000
1921-26 - France and Spain intervene
11,000                     40,000
1953-56 - Indep. from France, Spain interv.
3,000                      3,000
15,000 [c] 30,000 [m] 45,000 [t]

NIGERIA
Years at War '45-'82: 4
Defence Expenditure '75: 4.6
Education* Expenditure '75: 1.6
*Other Estimates - 1962 World Ranking (n of countries = 136) in Literacy: 104; Primary School enrolments: 100; Post-Primary School enrolments: 114 (Coleman, in Coleman, 1965: 437).
Political Régime [mid- '82]: military
Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 7  CR: 6
Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 8.2

Major Conflicts
1967-70 - Biafrans vs Govt; famines, massacre
1,000,000 1,000,000 2,000,000
1,000,000 [c] 1,000,000 [m] 2,006,000 [t]

1980-84 - Fundamental Islam vs Govt
APPENDIX H

ZIMBABWE (former Rhodesia)

Years at War '45-'82: 17
Defence Expenditure '75: 2.3
Political régime [mid- '82]: multi-party parliamentary
Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 6  CR: 5
Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 4.7

Major Conflicts
1972-79 - Patriotic Front vs Rhodesia
1983-84 - political and ethnic violence

Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total)
-  -  12,000*
4,000  0  4,000
4,000 [c]  0[m]  16,000 [t]

* corroborated by Brogan (1992: 622)

SOMALIA

Years at War '45-'82: 3
Defence Expenditure '75: 6.7
Political régime [mid-'82]: military
Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 7  CR: 6
Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 17.9

Major Conflicts
1988-90 - civil war in north

Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total)
50,000 [c]  5,000 [m]  55,000 [t]*

*Alternative estimate (Brogan, 1992: 625): 1988 civil war, continuing - 75,000 casualties

SUDAN

Years at War '45-'82: 19
Defence Expenditure '75: 2.6
Political régime [mid-'82]: one-party
Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 6  CR: 6
Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 5.3

Major Conflicts
1963-72 - Black vs Govt; UK, Eg intervene
1984-90 - Blacks vs Islamic Law

Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total)
250,000  250,000  500,000
500,000 [c]  6,000  506,000
750,000 [c]  256,000 [m]  1,006,000 [t]

SYRIA

Years at War '45-'82: 15
Defence Expenditure '75: 16.8
Political régime [mid-'82]: one-party
Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 6  CR: 7
Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 62.8

Major Conflicts
1920-20 - France vs Syria
1925-27 - Druses vs France
1986-87 - Govt massacres Conserv. Muslims

Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total)
5,000
4,000  8,000
20,000  0  20,000
24,000 [c]  4,000 [m]  33,000 [t]

TUNISIA

Years at War '45-'82: 9
Defence Expenditure '75: 1.6

*Other Estimates - 1962 World Ranking (n of countries = 136) in Literacy: 97; Primary School enrolments: 91.5;
Post-Primary School enrolments: 59 (Coleman, in Coleman, 1965: 437).
Political régime [mid-'82]: one-party
Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 6  CR: 5
Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 6.7
### APPENDIX H: 259.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Conflicts</th>
<th>Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1952-54: Independence from France</td>
<td>3,000 [c] 0[m] 3,000 [t]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### TANZANIA

Years at War '45-'82: 6  
Defence Expenditure '75: 2.6  
Political Régime [mid- '82]: one-party  
Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 6  CR: 6  
Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 3.2  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1905-7 - Revolt against Germany; massacres 150,000 [c] 0[m] 150,000 [t]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### UGANDA

Years at War '45-'82: 9  
Defence Expenditure '75: 2.5  
Political Régime [mid- '82]: restricted parliamentary  
Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 7  CR: 7  
Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 4.2  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1966 - Buganda tribe vs Govt 1,000 1,000 2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971-78 - Idi Amin's massacres 300,000 0 300,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978-79 - Tanzania vs Amin 300,000 3,000 303,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981-87 - Army vs people 601,000 [c] 12,000 [m] 613,000 [t]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### ZAIRE

Years at War '45-'82: 10  
Defence Expenditure '75: 4  
Political Régime [mid- '82]: despotic (not military)  
Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 7  CR: 6  
Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 4.2  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960-65 - UK, Belgian intervention, Katanga - - 100,000 [t]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### ZAMBIA

Years at War '45-'82: 5  
Defence Expenditure '75: 3.3  
Political Régime [mid- '82]: one-party  
Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 5  CR: 4  
Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 6.3  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1964 - Civil strife - - 1,000 [t]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

AFRICA/MIDDLE EAST: Casualty Total Area-Wide: 5,037,000[c] 2,562,000[m] 7,112,000[t]

II. THE AMERICAS

ARGENTINA

Years at War '45-'82: 9*  
Literacy Rates (75 %age): 93*  
* Other Estimates - Sullivan (1948: 522) cites an Argentinian illiteracy rate of 24.0 for the years 1913-24.  
* Keeley's figures on 'Frequency & Duration of Warfare X Nation-States, 1800-1945' for Argentina (1996: 187-88): # of wars - 6; wars per generation (25 yrs) - 1.0; years of war per century - 25.5.
### APPENDIX H

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BOLIVIA</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>military</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>14,000 [c]</td>
<td>6,000 [m]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>20,000 [t]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**BOLIVIA**
- Years at War '45-'82: 23
- Literacy Rates ('75 %age): 63
- **Defence Expenditure '75:** 2.7
- **Education Expenditure '75:** 6.3
- **Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75:** 6.8
- **Major Conflicts**
  - Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total)
  - 1955-55 - Armed Forces vs Peron
    - Civilian: 2,000
    - Military: 2,000
    - Total: 4,000
  - 1976-79 - "Disappearances"
    - Civilian: 12,000
    - Military: 3,000
    - Total: 15,000
  - 1982-82 - Argentina vs UK in the Falklands
    - Civilian: 14,000 [c]
    - Military: 6,000 [m]
    - Total: 20,000 [t]

**BRAZIL**
- Years at War '45-'82: 3
- Literacy Rates ('75 %age): 66
- **Defence Expenditure '75:** 2.2
- **Education Expenditure '75:** 3.5
- **Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75:** 7.6
- **Major Conflicts**
  - Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total)
  - 1932-32 - State vs Federal Govt
    - Civilian: 1,000
    - Military: 1,000
    - Total: 2,000
  - 1944-45 - World War II; troops in Italy
    - Civilian: 0
    - Military: 1,000
    - Total: 1,000
  - 1980-80 - Rightist terrorism
    - Civilian: 0 [c]
    - Military: 1,000 [m]
    - Total: 3,000 [t]

**CANADA**
- Years at War '45-'82: 4
- Literacy Rates ('75 %age): n/a
- **Defence Expenditure '75:** 2
- **Education Expenditure '75:** 7.6
- **Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75:** 5.2
- **Major Conflicts**
  - Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total)
  - 1914-18 - World War I
    - Civilian: 0
    - Military: 55,000
    - Total: 55,000
  - 1939-45 - World War II
    - Civilian: 0
    - Military: 39,000
    - Total: 39,000
  - 1945-46 - Post-War transition
    - Civilian: 0 [c]
    - Military: 94,000 [m]
    - Total: 94,000 [t]

**CHILE**
- Years at War '45-'82: 6
- Literacy Rates ('75 %age): 88
- **Defence Expenditure '75:** 2.3
- **Education Expenditure '75:** 1.2
- **Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75:** 9.9
- **Major Conflicts**
  - Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total)
  - 1955-55 - Armed Forces vs Peron
    - Civilian: 2,000
    - Military: 2,000
    - Total: 4,000
  - 1976-79 - "Disappearances"
    - Civilian: 12,000
    - Military: 3,000
    - Total: 15,000
  - 1982-82 - Argentina vs UK in the Falklands
    - Civilian: 14,000 [c]
    - Military: 6,000 [m]
    - Total: 20,000 [t]
## APPENDIX H: 261.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Years at War '45-'82</th>
<th>Literacy Rates ('75 %age)</th>
<th>Defence Expenditure '75</th>
<th>Education Expenditure '75</th>
<th>Political Regime [mid- '82]</th>
<th>Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR:</th>
<th>Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - CR:</th>
<th>Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75</th>
<th>Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>COSTA RICA</td>
<td>8*</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>military</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>20,000 [c] 0 20,000 3,000 0 3,000 23,000 [t]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CUBA</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>multi-party parliamentary</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>1,000 [c] 1,000 [m] 2,000 [t]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECUADOR</td>
<td>3*</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>multi-party parliamentary</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GUATEMALA</td>
<td>4*</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>military</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HONDURAS</td>
<td>9*</td>
<td>57</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX H: 262.

Honduras (1996: 187-88): # of wars - 9; wars per generation (25 yrs) - 1.6; years of war per century - 17.2.

Defence Expenditure '75: 1.8  
Education Expenditure '75: 3.2

Political Régime [mid- '82]: military

Gastil’s (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 6  
CR: 3

Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 7.9

Major Conflicts  
Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total)

1924 - Conservatives vs Govt  
3,000  
-  
1,000

1969 - El Salvador vs H. (soccer war)  
3,000 [c]  
2,000 [m]  
5,000 [t]

MEXICO

Years at War '45-'82: 1*  
Literacy Rates ('75 %age): 71*

* Other Estimates - Sullivan (1948: 522) cites a Mexican illiteracy rate of 62.2 for the year 1921.  
*Keeley’s figures on ‘Frequency & Duration of Warfare X Nation-States, 1800-1945’ for Mexico (1996: 187-88): # of wars - 6; wars per generation (25 yrs) - 1.0; years of war per century - 24.1.

Defence Expenditure '75: 0.9  
Education Expenditure '75: 3.3

Political Régime [mid- '82]: restricted parliamentary

Gastil’s (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 4  
CR: 3

Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 3.2

Major Conflicts  
Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total)

1910-20 - Lib & Rad vs Govt; US interv  
125,000  
125,000  
250,000

1926-30 - Con Cristeros vs Govt  
125,000 [c]  
125,000 [m]  
260,000 [t]

NICARAGUA

Years at War '45-'82: 33*  
Literacy Rates ('75 %age): 57

* Other Estimate - Keeley’s figures on ‘Frequency & Duration of Warfare X Nation-States, 1800-1945’ for Nicaragua (1996: 187-88): # of wars - 10; wars per generation (25 yrs) - 1.7; years of war per century - 18.3.

Defence Expenditure '75: 2  
Education Expenditure '75: 2.5

Political Régime [mid- '82]: restricted parliamentary

Gastil’s (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 5  
CR: 4

Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 4.4

Major Conflicts  
Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total)**

1978-79 - Sandinistas vs Somoza  
25,000  
25,000  
50,000

1981-88 - Contras vs Sandinistas  
15,000 [c]  
15,000 [m]  
30,000 [t]

40,000 [c]  
40,000 [m]  
80,000 [t]

** Brogan, in a more general discussion of the unreliability of casualty figures, takes Nicaragua as a type-case of the tendency ‘to exaggerate casualties. Shirley Christian, in her book on the Nicaraguan revolution, wrote: “The question of how many people died in the insurrection has been tremendously manipulated and twisted in the years since 1979. Although roughly 10,000 was the estimate used by relief workers in the last month of the insurrection, just a month or two later the Sandinista Front began to raise the toll. It first claimed that 30,000 had died, later saying 35,000, then 40,000, then 50,000, sometimes more. The figures were repeated by other organizations and government, and took on the aura of credibility. In fact, there is nothing to substantiate them... The Sandinista deaths, according to a man who kept what statistics were kept on the Southern Front, were at least 300 and not more than 600. A well-placed official of the Somoza government said that the National Guard deaths were likewise no more than a “few hundred”...Finally, Ismael Reyes, the Red Cross leader, thought the civilian deaths fell into the 7000 range, possibly fewer. This means the total could not have exceeded 10,000”. Despite Christian’s research, the figures 35,000 or 50,000 for deaths in the Nicaraguan revolt turn up all the time in books and newspapers. There are equally inflated figures for people killed in the Contra rebellion’ (Brogan, 1992: 621).

PARAGUAY

Years at War '45-'82: 5*  
Literacy Rates ('75 %age): 80
APPENDIX H: 263.

"Other Estimate - Keeley's figures on 'Frequency & Duration of Warfare X Nation-States, 1800-1945' for Paraguay (1996: 187-88): # of wars - 3; wars per generation (25 yrs) - 0.5; years of war per century - 13.1.

Defence Expenditure '75: 1.5 Education Expenditure '75: 1.5

Political Régime [mid- '82]: military

Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 5 CR: 5

Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 11

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Conflicts</th>
<th>Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1911-12 - Liberals vs Govt</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947 - Liberals vs Govt</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PERU

Years at War '45-'82: 8* Literacy Rates ('75 %age): 72

"Other Estimate - Keeley’s figures on 'Frequency & Duration of Warfare X Nation-States, 1800-1945' for Peru (1996: 187-88): # of wars - 5; wars per generation (25 yrs) - 0.9; years of war per century - 13.8.

Defence Expenditure '75: 4.8 Education Expenditure '75: 4.1

Political Régime [mid- '82]: multi-party parliamentary

Gastil’s (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 6 CR: 6

Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 11.7

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Conflicts*</th>
<th>Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total)*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1983 - Communist Shining Path insurrection</td>
<td>25,000 [undifferentiated t]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

UNITED STATES of AMERICA

Years at War '45-'82: 25* Literacy Rates ('75 %age): n/a*

"Other Estimates - Sullivan (1948: 522) cites a United States illiteracy rate of 4.3 for the year 1930. Cipolla’s figures (1969: 14) USA 1900: white pop’n 10 and over totally illiterate - 5%[Male], 5%[Female], 5%total; white pop’n 10 and over able to read but not write - 1%[M], 2%[F], 1%total. Coloured pop’n 10 and over totally illiterate - 38%[M], 42%[F], 40%total; coloured pop’n 10 and over able to read but not write - 5%[M], 5%[F], 5%total. * Keeley’s figures on 'Frequency & Duration of Warfare X Nation-States, 1800-1945' for the US (1996: 187-88): # of wars - 11; wars per generation (25 yrs) - 1.9; years of war per century - 15.5.

Defence Expenditure '75: 6 Education Expenditure '75: 6.4

Political Régime [mid- '82]: multi-party parliamentary

Gastil’s (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 1 CR: 1

Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 15.5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Conflicts</th>
<th>Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1917-18 - First World War</td>
<td>126,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941-45 - Second World War</td>
<td>408,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941-45 - Second World War [c]</td>
<td>534,000 [m]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

THE AMERICAS: Casualty Total Area-Wide: 309,000[c] 847,000[m] 1,296,000[t]

III. ASIA

BURMA

Years at War '45-'82: 38 Literacy Rates ('75 %age): 67*

"Myrdal’s (1968: 1674) literacy rates for Burma, 1901: 53% [Males], 6% [Females]; 1911: 53% [M], 8% [F]; 1921: 61% [M], 12% [F]; 1931: 65% [M], 18% [F]. 1953-4: urban pop’n - 86%[M], 53% [F]; rural pop’n - 83%[M], 34% [F]. 1962: total pop’n - 80% [M], 40%[F] (1968: 1672).

Defence Expenditure '75: 4.3 Education Expenditure '75: 2.8

Political Régime [mid- '82]: one-party

Gastil’s (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 7 CR: 5
APPENDIX H: 264.

Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 12.1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Conflicts</th>
<th>Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Karens vs. Govt; China intervenes</td>
<td>- / - / 8,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communists vs. Govt</td>
<td>- / - / 5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebels vs. Govt</td>
<td>6,000 [c] / 3,000 [m] / 9,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6,000 [c] / 3,000 [m] / 22,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CAMBODIA (Kampuchea)

Years at War '45-'82 (Kampuchea): 29
Literacy Rates (75 %age): 36 (Kampuchea)
Defence Expenditure '75(Kampuchea): 11
Education Expenditure '75 (Kampuchea): n/a
Political Régime [mid- '82]: one-party (Kampuchea).
Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights (Kampuchea) - PR: 6  CR: 6
Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75 (Kampuchea): 14.7

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Conflicts</th>
<th>Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970-75 - Civil war, US and NV intervene</td>
<td>78,000 / 78,000 / 156,000*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975-78 - Pol Pot famine and Massacre</td>
<td>750,000 / 250,000 / 1,000,000*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978-79 - Vietnam vs Cambodia</td>
<td>14,000 / 51,000 / 65,000*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>842,000 [c] / 379,000 [m] / 1,121,000 [t]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Brogan’s figures for Cambodia: Indochina war, 1970-75: 150,000; genocide, 1975-78: 1-2,000,000; 1978-79: Vietnamese invasion to 1989 and civil war continuing - 150,000. Additional commentary by Brogan on casualty rates: ‘Occasionally, high estimates turn out to be far short of the mark. For instance, in June 1988, the Vietnamese announced that they had lost 55,000 men fighting in Cambodia since 1978. Assuming, most conservatively, that Cambodian losses were double that, it means that the Cambodians suffered the deaths of another 100,000 people on top of the horrors of 1970-78’ (1992: 621).

CHINA

Years at War '45-'82: 26*
Literacy Rates (75 %age): 82
* Other Estimate - Keeley’s figures on ‘Frequency & Duration of Warfare X Nation-States, 1800-1945’ for China (1996: 187-88): # of wars - 11; wars per generation (25 yrs) - 1.9; years of war per century - 38.6.
Defence Expenditure '75: 11
Education Expenditure '75: n/a
Political Régime [mid- '82]: one-party
Gastil’s (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 7  CR: 7
Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 8.4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Conflicts</th>
<th>Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1900 - Boxer Rebellion, 5 nations invade</td>
<td>13,000 / 3,000 / 16,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1904 - UK expedition to Tibet</td>
<td>- / - / 1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911 - Republicans vs Govt</td>
<td>1,000 / 1,000 / 2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1912-13 - Tibet vs China</td>
<td>- / - / 2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1913 - Republicans and bandits vs Govt</td>
<td>10,000 / 10,000 / 20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914 - Pai-Lings vs Govt</td>
<td>- / - / 5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1917-20 - Szechuanese vs others</td>
<td>3,000 / 3,000 / 6,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918 - Tibet vs China; UK intervention</td>
<td>0 / 1,000 / 1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926-28 - Civil War; USSR, Japan interven</td>
<td>- / - / 10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928 - Muslim rebellion vs Govt</td>
<td>- / - / 200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929 - USSR vs China</td>
<td>0 / 3,000 / 3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929-30 - Warlords vs Govt</td>
<td>- / - / 75,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930-35 - Communists vs Govt</td>
<td>- / - / 500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931-33 - Japan vs Manchuria</td>
<td>- / 60,000 / 60,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931-34 - USSR interven. Turkistan</td>
<td>- / - / 20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937-41 - Japan vs China</td>
<td>1,150,000 / 650,000 / 1,800,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941-45 - World War II</td>
<td>850,000 / 1,350,000 / 2,200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946-50 - Communists vs KMT; US interven</td>
<td>500,000 / 500,000 / 1,000,000*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950-51 - Govt executes landlords</td>
<td>1,000,000 / - / 1,000,000*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950-51 - China vs Tibet</td>
<td>2,000 / 0 / 2,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX H: 265.

1956-59 - Tibetan revolt
1957-68 - Cultural Revolution
1983-84 - Govt executions
1989 - Govt kills students
1990 - Govt executions

1956-59 - Tibetan revolt
1957-68 - Cultural Revolution
1983-84 - Govt executions
1989 - Govt kills students
1990 - Govt executions

60,000 40,000 100,000
450,000 50,000 500,000
5,000 0 5,000
1,000 0 1,000
2,000 0 2,000
4,047,000 [c] 2,701,000 [m] 7,761,000 [t]

* Brogan’s figures (1992: 622-23): civil war to 1949: 2,000,000 [t]; 1969 USSR-China border fighting: 1,000 [t].

INDIA

Years at War '45-'82: 24
Literacy Rates ('75 %age): 36*

* Other estimates: Sullivan (1948: 522) cites an Indian illiteracy rate of 90,5 for the year 1921. *Myrdal’s (1968: 1674) literacy rates for India, 1901: 11% [Males], 1% [Females]; 1911: 13% [M], 1% [F]; 1921: 14% [M], 2% [F]; 1931: 15% [M], 2% [F]. 1951: urban pop’n - 55%[M], 25% [F]; rural pop’n - 24%[M], 5% [F]; total pop’n - 29% [M], 8%[F]. 1961: urban pop’n - 68%[M], 37% [F]; rural pop’n - 35%[M], 8% [F]; total pop’n - 41% [M], 19%[F](1968: 1672, reliability of the '61 figures ‘very doubtful’).

Defence Expenditure '75: 3.3
tEducation Expenditure '75: 2.7

Political Regime [mid-'82]: multi-party parliamentary

Gastil’s (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 2
Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] 75: 5

Major Conflicts
1914-18 - World War I
1918-19 - Amritsar massacre by UK
1921-22 - UK intervenes in civil war
1936-38 - UK intervenes in civil war
1939-45 - World War II
1946-48 - Muslim vs Hindu; UK intervenes
1947-49 - Muslims, Pak vs Kashmir (Ind.)
1948 - India vs Hyderabad
1962 - China vs India at border
1965 - Pakistan vs Kashmir (India interv)
1971 - Pakistan vs India; border war
1983-90 - ethnic and political violence

Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total)
25,000 25,000 50,000
1,000 0 1,000
11,000 0 11,000
11,000 0 11,000
25,000 24,000 49,000
800,000 0 800,000*
1,000 2,000 3,000
1,000 1,000 2,000
1,000 1,000 2,000*
13,000 7,000 20,000*
11,000 11,000 11,000*
12,000 4,000 16,000*
901,000 [c] 75,000 [m] 976,000 [t]


INDONESIA

Years at War '45-'82: 30
Literacy Rates ('75 %age): 62*

Defence Expenditure '75: 4.2
tEducation Expenditure '75: 2.2*

* Other Estimates - 1962 World Ranking (n of countries = 136) in Literacy: 90; Primary School enrolments: 91.5; Post-Primary School enrolments: 59 (Coleman, in Coleman, 1965: 437). *Myrdal’s (1968: 1672) literacy rates for Indonesia, 1961: 57% [Males], 30% [Females].

Political Regime [mid- '82]: military

Gastil’s (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 5
Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] 75: 3.6

Major Conflicts
1945-46 - Independence from Neth, UK
1950 - Moluccans vs Govt
1953 - Darul Islam vs Govt
1958-60 - Dissident Military vs Govt
1965-66 - abortive coup; UK intervenes
1975-82 - annex E. Timor; fam & massacre

Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total)
4,000 1,000 5,000
- - 5,000
- - 1,000
- - 30,000
500,000 - 500,000
100,000 50,000 150,000
APPENDIX H: 266.

604,000 [c]  51,000 [m]  691,000 [t]


JAPAN

Years at War ’45-’82: 0*

Defence Expenditure ’75: 0.9

* Other Estimates - 1962 World Ranking (n of countries = 136) in Literacy: 17; Primary School enrolments: 34;
Post-Primary School enrolments: 5 (Coleman, in Coleman, 1965: 437). Earlier, Sullivan (1948: 522) cites a Japanese illiteracy rate of 0.9 for the year 1925 (sample of ‘conscripts unable to write and figure’). * Keeley’s figures on ‘Frequency & Duration of Warfare X Nation-States, 1800-1945’ for Japan (1996: 187-88): # of wars - 9; wars per generation (25 yrs) - 1.6; years of war per century - 17.2.

Political Régime [mid- ’82]: multi-party parliamentary

Gastil’s (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 2   CR: 1

Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] ’75: 3.2

Major Conflicts

Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Conflict Description</th>
<th>Total Deaths</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>massacre of Koreans</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938-45</td>
<td>USSR vs Japan</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941-45</td>
<td>World War II</td>
<td>500,000 [c]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,500,000 [m]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941-45</td>
<td></td>
<td>510,000 [c]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,502,000 [m]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

KOREA [Sth]

Years at War ’45-’82: 12

Literacy Rates (’75 %age): 88

Defence Expenditure ’75: 5.1

Education Expenditure ’75: 4.3

Political Régime [mid- ’82]: restricted parliamentary

Gastil’s (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 5   CR: 6

Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] ’75: 3.1

Major Conflicts

Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Conflict Description</th>
<th>Total Deaths</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>Army vs Govt</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950-53</td>
<td>Korean War; China, US intervene</td>
<td>1,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950-53</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>Sth Korean Army killed people</td>
<td>1,501,000 [c]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3,002,000 [t]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

LAOS

Years at War ’45-’82: 30

Literacy Rates (’75 %age): 28

Defence Expenditure ’75: 7.3

Education Expenditure ’75: 2.7

Political Régime [mid- ’82]: one-party

Gastil’s (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 5   CR: 5

Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] ’75: 25.2

Major Conflicts

Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Conflict Description</th>
<th>Total Deaths</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960-73</td>
<td>Pathet Lao vs Govt; US bomb, NV invade</td>
<td>18,000 [c]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12,000 [m]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>30,000 [t]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PAKISTAN

Years at War ’45-’82: 13

Literacy Rates (’75 %age): 21*

*Myrdal’s (1968: 1672) literacy rates for Pakistan, 1951: 21% [Males], 6% [Females]; 1961: 29% [M], 8% [F], 33% urban pop’n/15% rural pop’n.

Defence Expenditure ’75: 6.3

Education Expenditure ’75: 2.3

Political Régime [mid- ’82]: military

Gastil’s (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 3   CR: 5

Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] ’75: 14.1

Major Conflicts

Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Conflict Description</th>
<th>Total Deaths</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1973-77</td>
<td>Baluchis vs Govt; Afghan interv</td>
<td>6,000 [c]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3,000 [m]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>9,000 [t]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# APPENDIX H: 267.

## PHILIPPINES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years at War '45-'82: 26</th>
<th>Literacy Rates ('75 %age): 83*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Defence Expenditure '75: 2.3</td>
<td>Education Expenditure '75: 1.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Other Estimates - 1962 World Ranking (n of countries = 136) in Literacy: 49; Primary School enrolments: 37.5; Post-Primary School enrolments: 16 (Coleman, in Coleman, 1965: 437). * Myrdal’s (1968: 1674) literacy rates for the Philippines, 1903: 30% [Males], 11% [Females]; 1918: 53% [M], 45% [F]; 1939: 54% [M], 41% [F]; 1948: 64% [M], 56% [F]. 1960: 74% [M], 70% [F] (1968: 1672).

**Political Regime [mid- '82]: restricted parliamentry**

**Gastil’s (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 5 CR: 5**

**Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 5.3**

### Major Conflicts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1941-45 - World War II 91,000 27,000 118,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950-52 - Huks vs Govt 5,000 4,000 9,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972-89 - Muslims and Comm vs Govt; US interv 40,000 35,000 75,000*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>136,000 [c] 66,000 [m] 202,000 [t]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


## MALAYSIA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years at War '45-'82: 22</th>
<th>Literacy Rates ('75 %age): 59</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Defence Expenditure '75: 5.5</td>
<td>Education Expenditure '75: 6.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Political Regime [mid- '82]: multi-party parliamentary**

**Gastil’s (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 3 CR: 3**

**Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 11.9**

### Major Conflicts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950-60 - UK intervened in civil war - 13,000 [t]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* corroborated by Brogan (1992: 622)

## THAILAND

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years at War '45-'82: 14*</th>
<th>Literacy Rates ('75 %age): 79*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Defence Expenditure '75: 2.6</td>
<td>Education Expenditure '75: 3.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Political Regime [mid- '82]: military**

**Gastil’s (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 5 CR: 3**

**Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 10.5**

### Major Conflicts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1940-41 - France vs Thailand 2,000 [c] 2,000 [m] 4,000 [t]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## VIET NAM

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years at War '45-'82: 34</th>
<th>Literacy Rates ('75 %age): n/a*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Defence Expenditure '75: 22.6 (Nth)/12.6 (Sth)</td>
<td>Education Expenditure '75: n/a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Political Regime [mid- '82]: one-party (as of mid-1982)**

**Gastil’s (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 7 (Nth)/4 (Sth) CR: 7 (Nth)/5 (Sth)**

**Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: n/a**

### Major Conflicts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1945-54 - Independ. vs France; China, US interv 300,000 300,000 600,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960-65 - US intervene in civil war 200,000 100,000 300,000*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966-75 - US and Sth VN vs Nth VN 1,000,000 1,058,000 2,058,000*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979 - China vs Viet Nam 9,000 26,000 35,000*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987 - China vs Viet Nam, border conflict 1,509,000 [c] 1,485,000 [m] 2,994,000 [t]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Brogan’s figures for Viet Nam: 1st Indochina war, to 1954: 6000,000; 2nd Indochina war, (1960) to 1975:
APPENDIX H: 268.

2,000,000; 1979: China & Viet Nam, Chinese invasion - 20,000. Additional commentary by Brogan on casualty rates: 'Mostly, there' are very few cases...where an accurate running total can be kept. In others, a precise figure for one side may be added to a rough approximation for the other: for example, the 58,186 Americans killed in Indochina added to the estimate of Vietnamese deaths (2,000,000) gives the spuriously accurate figure of 2,058,516' (1992: 621).

ASIA: Casualty Total Area-Wide: 10,082,000[c]  7,780,000[m]  18,637,000[t]

----------------------------------------

IV. AUSTRALASIA/PACIFIC [Oceania]

AUSTRALIA
Years at War '45-'82: 7  Literacy Rates ('75 %age): n/a  
Defence Expenditure '75: 3.2  Education Expenditure '75: 9.3  
Political Régime [mid- '82]: multi-party parliamentary  
Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 1  CR: 1  
Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 8  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Conflicts</th>
<th>Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1914-18 - World War I</td>
<td>0 60,000 60,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939-45 - Word War II</td>
<td>0 34,000 34,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

FIJI
Years at War '45-'82: 0  Literacy Rates ('75 %age): n/a  
Defence Expenditure '75: 0.2  Education Expenditure '75: 4.4  
Political Régime [mid- '82]: multi-party parliamentary  
Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: CR: 2  
Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 0  

PAPUA NEW GUINEA
Years at War '45-'82: 1  Literacy Rates ('75 %age): 32  
Defence Expenditure '75: n/a  Education Expenditure '75: n/a  
Political Régime [mid- '82]: multi-party parliamentary  
Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: CR: -  
Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: n/a

NEW ZEALAND
Years at War '45-'82: 4  Literacy Rates ('75 %age): n/a  
Defence Expenditure '75: 1.8  Education Expenditure '75: 5.7  
Political Régime [mid- '82]: multi-party parliamentary  
Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: CR: 1  
Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 7  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Conflicts</th>
<th>Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1914-18 - World War I</td>
<td>0 16,000 16,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939-45 - World War II</td>
<td>0 17,000 17,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

AUSTRALASIA/PACIFIC (Oceania): Casualty Total Area-Wide: 0[c] 127,000[m] 127,000[t]
V. EUROPE

AUSTRIA

Years at War '45-'82: 0*

* Other Estimates - Keeley's figures on 'Frequency & Duration of Warfare X Nation-States, 1800-1945' for Austria (1996: 187-88): # of wars - 12; wars per generation (25 yrs) - 2.1; years of war per century - 16.9.

*Cipolla's (1969: 14, 113-20) literacy figures for C19th Austria: general population 1851, 40-45% illiterate; 1890, pop'n totally illiterate aged 10 and over (Austrian Empire excluding the Kingdom of Hungary) 27% [Male] 30% [Female] 29% total/pop'n who could read but not write, 4% [M] 7% [F] 5% total. 1890 illiteracy rates among males 21-30: 26%, among recruits 21-30: 22%.

Austrian Empire - Illiterates among army recruits (%age):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1867</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>1869</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1873</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>1875</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1879</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>1881</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1894</td>
<td>22</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Defence Expenditure '75: 1*

* Other estimate - Austrian military expenditure as a percentage of state budget (Tilly, 1992: 124):
1925: 7.7; 1975: 4.9.

Political Régime [mid- '82]: multi-party parliamentary

Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 1 CR: 1

Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 10.8*


Major Conflicts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict</th>
<th>Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1914-18 - World War I (incl. Hungary)</td>
<td>300,000/2,300,000/2,600,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934 - Socialist vs Fascist Govt</td>
<td>1,000/1,000/2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939-45 - World War II</td>
<td>125,000/280,000/405,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>426,000 [c]/2,581,000 [m]/3,007,000 [t]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

BALKANS (formerYUGOSLAVIA)

Years at War '45-'82: 5

Defence Expenditure '75: 4.5

Educational Expenditure '75: 4.9

Political Régime [mid- '82]: one-party

Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 6 CR: 6

Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 19.3

Major Conflicts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict</th>
<th>Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1913 - 2nd Balkan war vs Bulgaria</td>
<td>-/61,000/61,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914-18 - World War I</td>
<td>650,000/128,000/778,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941-45 - World War II</td>
<td>1,000,000/400,000/1,400,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,650,000 [c]/589,000 [m]/2,239,000 [t]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


BELGIUM

Years at War '45-'82: 6*

* Other Estimates - Sullivan (1948: 522) cites a Belgian illiteracy rate of 7.9 for the year 1920. * Keeley's figures on 'Frequency & Duration of Warfare X Nation-States, 1800-1945' for Belgium (1996: 187-88): # of wars - 5; wars per generation (25 yrs) - 0.9; years of war per century - 15.9 ('includes Napoleonic wars as part of Netherlands'). *Cipolla's (1969: 113-20) literacy figures for C19th Belgium: general population 1856, 45-50% illiterate. 1880 illiteracy rates among males 21-30: 20%, among recruits 21-30: 22%.

Belgium - Illiterates among army recruits (%age; data refers not to the young men actually enlisted but to all young men eligible for military service [jeunes gens appelés au tirage au sort pour le service militaire]):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1843</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>1850</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1867</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>1870</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1873</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>1874</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Literacy Rates ('75 %age): n/a*
APPENDIX H: 270.

1879  23  1880  22  1881  19  1882  19  1883  18  1884  19
1885  18  1886  17  1887  17  1888  16  1889  16  1890  16
1891  16  1892  15  1893  15  1894  14  1895  14  1896  13
1897  13  1898  13  1899  13  1900  12.

Defence Expenditure '75: 3  Education Expenditure '75: 7.5
Political Régime [mid- '82]: multi-party parliamentary
Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 1  CR: 1
Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 14

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Conflicts</th>
<th>Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1914-18 - World War I</td>
<td>31,000 [c]  88,000 [m]  118,000 [t]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940-40 - World War II</td>
<td>90,000 [c]  110,000 [m]  200,000 [t]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>120,000 [c]  198,000 [m]  318,000 [t]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**CYPRUS**

Years at War '45-'82: 9  Literacy Rates ('75 %age): 76
Defence Expenditure '75: 2.8  Education Expenditure '75: 3.9
Political Régime [mid- '82]: restricted parliamentary
Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 4  CR: 4
Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 48

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Conflicts</th>
<th>Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total)*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1974 - National Guard; Turk. invasion</td>
<td>3,000 [c]  2,000 [m]  5,000 [t]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**CZECHOSLOVAKIA**

Years at War '45-'82: 4  Literacy Rates ('75 %age): n/a*
* Other Estimate - Sullivan (1948: 522) cites a Czech illiteracy rate of 7.0 for the year 1921.
Defence Expenditure '75: 5.9  Education Expenditure '75: 3.3
Political Régime [mid- '82]: one-party
Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 7  CR: 7
Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 22

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Conflicts</th>
<th>Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1939-45 - World War II</td>
<td>250,000 [c]  30,000 [m]  280,000 [t]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**FINLAND**

Years at War '45-'82: 0  Literacy Rates ('75 %age): n/a*
Other Estimate - Sullivan (1948: 522) cites a Finnish illiteracy rate of 30.1 for the year 1921.
Defence Expenditure '75: 1.5  Education Expenditure '75: 6.7
Political Régime [mid- '82]: multi-party parliamentary
Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 2  CR: 2
Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 12.8

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Conflicts</th>
<th>Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1918 - Communists vs Govt</td>
<td>- 20,000 [t]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939-40 - USSR vs Finland</td>
<td>- 90,000 [m]  90,000 [t]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941-44 - World War II</td>
<td>15,000 [c]  45,000 [m]  60,000 [t]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**FRANCE**

Years at War '45-'82: 38*  Literacy Rates ('75 %age): n/a*
* Other Estimates - * Keeley’s figures on ‘Frequency & Duration of Warfare X Nation-States, 1800-1945’ for France (1996: 187-88): # of wars - 29; wars per generation (25 yrs) - 5.0; years of war per century - 32.8. Sullivan (1948: 522) cites a French illiteracy rate of 8.2 for the year 1921. *Cipolla’s (1969: 14, 77, 113-20) literacy figures for C19th France: general population 1851, 40-45% illiterate; 1872, pop'n totally illiterate aged 6 and over 27% [Male] 34% [Female] 31%total/pop'nh who could read but not write, 9% [M] 13% [F] 11%total; c/f French recruits 1881-1900 totally illiterate 8%, those who could read but not write 2%. 
APPENDIX H: 271.

'Illiteracy among the French adult population (10 years of age and above) by economic activity in 1901:
Fishing - 28%; Agriculture - 21%; Industry - 11%; Domestic Service - 9%; Army - 4%; Civil Servants - 3%;
Liberal Professions - 1%'.

France - Illiterates among army recruits (%age):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1832</th>
<th>1833</th>
<th>1834</th>
<th>1835</th>
<th>1836</th>
<th>1837</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Defence Expenditure '75: 4*  
*Other estimate - French military expenditure as a percentage of state budget (Tilly, 1992: 124):
1850: 27.4; 1875: 23.2; 1900: 37.7; 1925: 27.8; 1950: 20.7;1975: 17.9.

Political Regime [mid- '82]: multi-party parliamentary

Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 1  
CR: 2

Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 17.2*
1500: 18,000 [0.3]; 1600: 80,000 [0.4]; 1700: 400,000 [2.1]; 1850: 439,000 [1.2]; 1980: 495,000 [0.9].

Major Conflicts Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total)
1914-18 - World War I
40,000 1,630,000 1,670,000
1939-45 - World War II (Allied '39-40, '44-45
450,000 200,000 650,000
490,000 [c] 1,830,000 [m] 2,320,000 [t]

GERMANY (incorporates as indicated Federal Republic of Germany; German Democratic Republic).

Years at War '45-'82: FRG 0, GDR 1*  
Literacy Rates ('75 %age): n/a*

* Other estimate - Keeley's figures on 'Frequency & Duration of Warfare X Nation-States, 1800-1945' for Germany/Prussia (1996: 187-88): # of wars - 10; wars per generation (25 yrs) - 1.7; years of war per century -
19.3. *Cipolla's (1969: 113-20) figures for 'German Empire Cl9th - Illiterates among army recruits (%ages)':
1875 2 1876 2 1877 2 1878 2 1879 2 1880 2
1881 2 1882 2 1883 1 1884 1 1885 1 1886 1
1887 1 1888 1 1889 1 1890 1.

*Corresponding figures for 'Prussia C19th - Illiterates among army recruits (%ages) :
1841 9 1851 5 1865 6 1867 4 1868 4 1869 4
1870 3 1871 2 1872 3 1873 5 1874 4 1875 3
1876 3 1877 3 1878 2 1879 3 1880 2 1881 2
1882 2 1883 2 1884 2 1885 2 1886 2 1887 1
1888 1 1889 1 1890 1 1891 1 1892 1 1893 1.

Defence Expenditure '75: FRG 3.6, GDR 6.4*  
Education Expenditure '75: FRG 5, GDR 4.7

* Other estimate - "German" military expenditure as a percentage of state budget (Tilly, 1992: 124): 1875: 34.0; 1900: 22.9; 1925: 4.0; 1950: 13.5; 1975: 6.4.

Political Regime [mid- '82]: FRG multi-party parliamentary, GDR one-party

Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: FRG 1, GDR 7  
CR: FRG 1, GDR 7

Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: FRG 12.6, GDR 21*

* Other estimate - "German" military personnel as a percentage of the male population aged 20-44, 1850-1970 (Tilly, 1992: 123): 1850: 4.7; 1875: 5.9; 1900: 6.3; 1925: 1.0; 1970: 4.5.

Major Conflicts Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total)
APPENDIX H: 272.

1914-18 - World War I
760,000
2,400,000
3,160,000

1939-45 - World War II
1,472,000
4,750,000
6,221,000
2,231,000 [c]
7,150,000 [m]
9,381,000 [t]

GREECE

Years at War '45-'82: 10*

*Other Estimate - Keeley’s figures on ‘Frequency & Duration of Warfare X Nation-States, 1800-1945’ for Greece (1996: 187-88): # of wars - 9; wars per generation (25 yrs) - 1.6; years of war per century - 16.2.

Defence Expenditure '75: 6.3

Education Expenditure '75: 1.5

Political Régime [mid- '82]: multi-party parliamentary

Gastil’s (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 2
CR: 2

Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 33.4

Major Conflicts Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total)
1917-18 - World War I 132,000 5,000 137,000
1940-41 - World War II 54,000 10,000 64,000
1945-49 - civil war; UK intervenes 186,000 [c] 15,000 [m] 361,000 [t]

* corroborated by Brogan (1992: 622)

HUNGARY

Years at War '45-'82: 3

* Other Estimate - Sullivan (1948: 522) cites a Hungarian illiteracy rate of 15.2 for the year 1920.

Defence Expenditure '75: 5.6

Education Expenditure '75: 3.2

Political Régime [mid- '82]: one-party

Gastil’s (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 6
CR: 6

Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 16.7

Major Conflicts Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total)
1919- Czech and Rumania vs Hungary - 11,000 11,000
1919-20 - Anti-communist vs Govt - - 11,000
1941-45 - World War II 450,000 400,000 850,000
1956 - USSR intervenes in civil war 10,000 10,000 20,000*
460,000 [c] 421,000 [m] 892,000 [t]

* Brogan’s (1992: 623) figure for ‘1956 Hungary: insurrection - 10,000’.

ITALY

Years at War '45-'82: 7*

* Other Estimates - Sullivan (1948: 522) cites an Italian illiteracy rate of 28.8% for the year 1921 (‘figures for Tuscany only, which may be deemed fairly representative of Italy as a whole’). * Keeley’s figures on ‘Frequency & Duration of Warfare X Nation-States, 1800-1945’ for Italy (1996: 187-88): # of wars - 13; wars per generation (25 yrs) - 2.2; years of war per century - 19.3 (‘includes wars fought by Sardinia, Naples and Venice’). *Cipolla’s (1969: 113-20) literacy figures for C19th Italy: general population c. 1850, 75-80% illiterate; 1881, pop’n totally illiterate aged 6 and over 55% [Male] 69% [Female] 62%total/pop’n who could read but not write, 1% [M] 3% [F] 2%total. 1871 illiteracy rates among males 21-30: 57%; among recruits 21-30: 57%.

Italy - Illiterates among army recruits (%ages):
1870 59
1871 57
1872 57
1873 54
1874 53
1875 52
1876 52
1877 51
1878 50
1879 49
1880 49
1881 48
1882 47
1883 48
1884 47
1885 46
1886 44
1887 45
1888 43
1889 42
1890 41
1891 40
1892 40
1893 40
1894 39
1895 38
1896 37
1897 37
1898 36
1899 34
1900 33
1913 10.

Defence Expenditure '75: 2.8

Education Expenditure '75: 5.2

Political Régime [mid- '82]: multi-party parliamentary
Gastil’s (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 1  CR: 2
Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] ’75: 14.1

**Major Conflicts**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Conflict Description</th>
<th>Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1915-18</td>
<td>World War I</td>
<td>0/950,000/950,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940-45</td>
<td>World War II (Allied 1943-45)</td>
<td>70,000/150,000/220,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NETHERLANDS**

Years at War ‘45-’82: 8*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Conflict Description</th>
<th>Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1915-18</td>
<td>World War I</td>
<td>0/950,000/950,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940-45</td>
<td>World War II</td>
<td>70,000 [c]/1,100,000 [m]/1,170,000 [t]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Gastil’s (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 1  CR: 1
Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] ’75: 13*

*Other estimate - Netherlands military personnel as a percentage of the male population aged 20-44, 1850-1970 (Tilly, 1992: 123): 1850: 5.4; 1875: 6.4; 1900: 3.6; 1925: 1.2; 1950: 12.7; 1970: 5.3. Netherlands: Thousands of troops under arms/Troops as percent of national population, 1500-1980 (Tilly, 1992: 79) - 1600: 20,000 [1.3]; 1700: 100,000 [5.3]; 1850: 30,000 [1.0]; 1875: 115,000 [0.8].

**POLAND**

Years at War ‘45-’82: 5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Conflict Description</th>
<th>Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1914-18</td>
<td>World War I</td>
<td>500,000/500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919-20</td>
<td>USSR vs Poland; France interv.</td>
<td>-/100,000/100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939-45</td>
<td>World War II</td>
<td>6,000,000/600,000/6,600,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6,500,000 [c]/700,000 [m]/7,200,000 [t]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Gastil’s (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 6  CR: 6
Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] ’75: 19.2

**PORTUGAL**

Years at War ‘45-’82: 15*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Conflict Description</th>
<th>Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Gastil’s (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 1  CR: 1
APPENDIX H: 274.

Other Estimate - * Keeley's figures on 'Frequency & Duration of Warfare X Nation-States, 1800-1945' for Portugal (1996: 187-88): # of wars - 6; wars per generation (25 yrs) - 1.0; years of war per century - 20.7.

Defence Expenditure '75: 7.6  Education Expenditure '75:2.3

Political Régime [mid- '82]: multi-party parliamentary

Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 5  CR: 3

Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 39.7

ROMANIA

Years at War '45-'82: 1

*Other estimate - Sullivan (1948: 522) cites a Rumanian illiteracy rate of 45.0% for 1920.

Defence Expenditure '75: 4.8  Education Expenditure '75: 2.3

Political Régime [mid- '82]: one-party

Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 7  CR: 6

Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 15.9

Major Conflicts

Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1916-18 - World War I</th>
<th>1941-45 - World War II (Allied 1944-45)</th>
<th>1989 - Govt vs demonstrators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1916-18</td>
<td>0 [c]</td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941-45</td>
<td>275,000</td>
<td>375,000</td>
<td>576,000 [c]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>13,000 [m]</td>
<td>340,000</td>
<td>715,000 [m]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13,000 [t]</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,291,000 [t]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Brogan, speaking of casualty figures in *the Romanian revolution in 1989. In the course of the fighting, a figure of 4700 people killed in a massacre in Timisoara was broadcast around the world, and the number of those killed during the revolution was reported to be 10,000. A few days later, the new government put it at 60,000. It turned out that the real total was 689, including 90 in Timisoara* (1992: 622)

RUSSIA/USSR

Years at War '45-'82: 19


Russian Empire - Illiterates among army recruits (%ages):

| Year       | 1874 | 1875 | 1876 | 1877 | 1878 | 1879 | 1880 | 1881 | 1882 | 1883 | 1884 | 1885 | 1886 | 1887 | 1888 | 1889 | 1890 | 1891 | 1892 | 1893 | 1894 | 1895 | 1896 | 1897 | 1898 | 1899 | 1900 |
|------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
|            | 79   | 79   | 78   | 78   | 77   | 76   | 76   | 75   | 74   | 74   | 73   | 73   | 72   | 71   | 70   | 69   | 68   | 68   | 67   | 66   | 65   | 64   | 64   | 63   | 63   | 62   | 61   | 60   | 60   | 59   | 58   |

Defence Expenditure '75: 13.7  Education Expenditure '75: 4.6

Political Régime [mid- '82]: one-party

Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 6  CR: 6

Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 27.7

*Other estimate - Russia: Thousands of troops under arms/Troops as percent of national population, 1500-1980 (Tilly, 1992: 79) - 1600: 35,000 [0.3]; 1700: 170,000 [1.2]; 1850: 850,000 [1.5]; 1980: 3,663,000 [1.4].

Major Conflicts

Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1904-05 - Japan vs Russia</th>
<th>1905 - Pogrom, Russians vs Jews</th>
<th>1905-6 - peasants &amp; workers vs govt</th>
<th>1914-17 - World War I</th>
<th>1917 - Kirghiz massacre Russians</th>
<th>1917 - Bourgeois Rev'n vs Czar</th>
<th>1918-20 - civil war; US, UK, Fr, Japan interv.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1904-05</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>3,000,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1905</td>
<td></td>
<td>130,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2,950,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1905-6</td>
<td></td>
<td>130,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5,950,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>300,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914-17</td>
<td></td>
<td>130,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>800,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Conflict</td>
<td>Casualties</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939-40</td>
<td>Japan vs USSR</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13,000</td>
<td>13,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941-45</td>
<td>World War II</td>
<td>8,500,000</td>
<td>8,500,000</td>
<td>17,000,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969-70</td>
<td>China attacks USSR border</td>
<td>12,003,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>13,003,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### SPAIN

**Years at War '45-'82:** 3*

* Other Estimates - Sullivan (1948: 522) cites a Spanish illiteracy rate of 42.9% for the year 1920. *Keeley's figures on 'Frequency & Duration of Warfare X Nation-States, 1800-1945' for Spain (1996: 187-88): # of wars - 16; wars per generation (25 yrs) - 2.8; years of war per century - 42.4. *Cipolla's (1969: 113-20) literacy figures for C19th Spain: general population 1857, 75% illiterate; 1877, total pop'n totally illiterate 63% [Male] 81% [Female] 72% total/pop'n who could read but not write, 3% [M] 4% [F] 3% total.

**Defence Expenditure '75:** 3
**Education Expenditure '75:** 1.6

**Political Régime [mid- '82]:** multi-party parliamentary

Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 5
CR: 5

Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 17*

* Other estimate - Spain: Thousands of troops under arms/Troops as percent of national population, 1500-1980 (Tilly, 1992: 79) - 1500: 20,000 [0.3]; 1600: 200,000 [2.5]; 1700: 50,000 [0.7]; 1850: 154,000 [1.0]; 1980: 342,000 [0.9].

**Major Conflicts**

- 1934 - Asturian miners vs Govt: 3,000
- 1936-39 - civil war; USSR, Germany interv.: 600,000 [c] 600,000 [m] 1,200,000 [t]

### SWEDEN

**Years at War '45-'82:** 0*

* Other Estimates - Sullivan (1948: 522) cites a Swedish illiteracy rate of 0.2% for the years 1921-22 (data drawn from the population 'liable to military service, unable to read and write'). *Keeley's figures on 'Frequency & Duration of Warfare X Nation-States, 1800-1945' for Sweden (1996: 187-88): # of wars - 2; wars per generation (25 yrs) - 0.3; years of war per century - 4.5. *Cipolla's (1969: 113-20) literacy figures for C19th Sweden: general population 1850, 10% illiterate.

**Sweden - Illiterates among army recruits (%ages):**

- 1874: 2
- 1875: 1
- 1876: 1
- 1877: 1
- 1879: 1
- 1880: 1

**Defence Expenditure '75:** 3.2
**Education Expenditure '75:** 7.2

**Political Régime [mid- '82]:** multi-party parliamentary

Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 1
CR: 1

Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 14.1*

*Other estimate - Sweden: Thousands of troops under arms/Troops as percent of national population, 1500-1980 (Tilly, 1992: 79) - 1600: 15,000 [1.5]; 1700: 100,000 [7.1]; 1850: 63,000 [1.8]; 1980: 66,000 [0.8].

### SWITZERLAND

**Years at War '45-'82:** 0*  

* Other Estimates - Sullivan (1948: 522) cites a Swiss illiteracy rate of 0.4% for the years 1906-10. *Keeley's figures on 'Frequency & Duration of Warfare X Nation-States, 1800-1945' for Switzerland (1996: 187-88): # of wars - 0; wars per generation (25 yrs) - 0.0; years of war per century - 0.0. *(Cipolla's (1969: 113-20) literacy figures for C19th Switzerland: 1891-1900, pop'n of recruits totally illiterate 0% who could read but not write, 1%.

**Switzerland - Illiterates among army recruits (%ages):**

- 1879: 6
- 1880: 7
- 1881: 8
- 1882: 7
- 1883: 6
- 1884: 5
- 1885: 4
- 1886: 4
- 1887: 4
- 1888: 3
- 1889: 2
- 1890: 3
- 1891: 2
- 1892: 2
- 1893: 2
- 1894: 2
- 1895: 1
- 1896: 1
- 1897: 1
- 1898: 1
- 1899: 1
- 1900: 1

**Defence Expenditure '75:** 1.9
**Education Expenditure '75:** 4.9

**Political Régime [mid- '82]:** multi-party parliamentary
APPENDIX H: 276.

Gastil’s (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 1 CR: 1
Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] ’75: 5.8

TURKEY
Years at War ’45-’82: 12
Defence Expenditure ’75: 4.5
Political Regime [mid- ’82]: military
Gastil’s (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 2 CR: 3
Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] ’75: 21.1

Major Conflicts
1911-12 - Italy vs Turkey
1912-13 - First Balkan War
1914-18 - World War I
1915-16 - Armenians deported
1919-20 - France vs Turkey
1919-22 - Greece vs Turkey
1977-80 - terrorism; military coup 1980

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* corroborated by Brogan (1992: 624)

EUROPE: Casually Total Area-Wide: 27,840,000[c] 28,584,000[m] 57,150,000[t]

VI. UNITED KINGDOM/EIRE

ENGLAND
Years at War ’45-’82: 37*
Defence Expenditure ’75: 5*
Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] ’75: 13*

*Other Estimates - Sullivan (1948: 522) cites an illiteracy rate for England and Wales of 0.3% for the year 1924. *Keeley’s figures on ‘Frequency & Duration of Warfare X Nation-States, 1800-1945’ for Great Britain (1996: 187-88): # of wars - 34; wars per generation (25 yrs) - 5.9; years of war per century - 48.3.

Literacy Rates (’75 %age): n/a*
*Other estimate - UK military expenditure as a percentage of state budget (Tilly, 1992: 124): 1900: 74.2; 1925: 19.1; 1950: 24.0; 1975: 14..

Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] ’75: 9.8

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IRELAND
Years at War ’45-’82: 0
Defence Expenditure ’75: 1.4
Political Regime [mid-’82]: multi-party parliamentary
Gastil’s (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 1 CR: 2
Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 6

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### APPENDIX I: 280.

**SAMPLES SPREADSHEET KEY:**

#### A=country (82/82):
- Afr/Mid-East=26; Nth/Sth Am=15; Asia=13; Aust/Pac (Oceania)=4; Eur=22; UK/Eire=2.

#### B=Years at War '45-'82 (82/82: c=# of cases):
- 7c<30; 8c=20-29; 21c=10-19; 36c>10; 10c=0.

#### C=Literacy Rates '75 (61/82 - not recorded: AUSL; AUST; BLGM; CNDA; CZCH; FRG; FJII; FnLD; FRNC; GDR; HNGR; JPAN; LBNN; NRWY; NTHL; NZLD; SWDN; SWTZ; UK; USA; VNM; c=# of cases):
- 1c=100; 7c=90-9; 6c=70-9; 6c=60-9; 7c=50-9; 4c=40-9; 9c=30-9; 6c=20-9; 5c=10-9; 1c=10.

#### D=Defence Expenditure '75 [%age GNP] (80/82 - not recorded: PPNG; VNM; c=# of cases):
- 1c<30; 1c<16; 1c<15; 2c<13; 3c<11; 2c<7; 7c<6; 6c<5; 11c<4; 12c<3; 15c<1; 4c=0.1-0.9.

#### E=Education Expenditure '75 [%age GNP] (75/82 - not recorded: CHNA; KMPc; PPNG; TRKY; UGNd; VNM; ZAIR; c=# of cases):
- 1c<11; 1c<9; 5c<7; 9c<6; 12c<5; 12c<4; 12c<3; 14c<2; 7c<1; 1c=0.1-0.9.

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**GENERATIVE DEFINITION:**

- Literacy: Is the ability both to read and write. Hence, persons who can read but cannot write are ordinarily called illiterate. For the most part, data refer to the percentage of the population aged 15 and older...

- Defence: For NATO countries, military expenditures are defined as current and capital expenditures to meet the needs of the armed forces. They cover all expenditures of national defence agencies other than for largely civilian purposes, as well as the distinguishable military component of such mixed activities as atomic energy, space, research & development, and paramilitary forces. Where possible, military assistance for foreign countries, retirement pensions of career personnel, and military equipment stockpiling are included, while civil defence, civilian space and industrial stockpiling are excluded. For other non-communist countries, data are essentially expenditures for the ministries of defence. For the Soviet Union, estimates are made on what it would cost the United States to create a similar manpower and weapons force. For eastern Europe, data refer to officially announced state budget expenditures. For China, the estimates are less exact...Police expenditures are included for Mali [and] Nicaragua...

- Education: These data refer to public expenditure on current and capital accounts for the four levels of education (pre-school, primary, secondary and higher levels). Wherever possible expenditures of all levels of government are included. Frequently, however, data refer only to
APPENDIX I: 281.

expenditures of the Ministry of Education or the central government. Note: Some or all of the public expenditures on private education are included for Argentina, ...Chad, Chile, Cyprus, ...Finland, India, Ireland, Israel, Ivory Coast, South Korea, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, ...Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, ...[& the] United States. For Cyprus, the datum refers to the Office of Greek Education only. For France, Lebanon and the Phillipines, data refer to university expenditures only. For Madagascar and Nigeria, data refer to foreign aid only'.


F=Military Manpower '75 [per 1000 working-age pop'n] (80/82 - not recorded: PPNG; VNM: c=# of cases): 1c<90; 1c<60; 1c<45; 1c<35; 2c<30; 3c<25; 5c<20; 10c<15; 17c<10; 21c<5; 17c<1; 1c=0.
(maximum=93.4; minimum=0; mean=12.9; median=11.7; mode=14.1).

GENERATIVE DEFINITION: ‘Armed Forces refer to military personnel actively on duty, including paramilitary forces where significant and where they resemble regular units in their organization, equipment, training or mission. Reserve force are not included. The denominator is defined as the population between the ages of 15 and 64 exclusively’.


G=Political Regime mid-'82 [*coding]: (82/82: c=# of cases)

*Military = 0
20/82:1c<30yw; 1c 20-29yw; 6c 10-19yw; 12c>10yw; 1c 0yw.
29/82: 2c<30yw; 3c 20-29yw; 4c 10-19yw; 11c>10yw; 9c 0yw.
8/82: 1c<30yw; 1c 20-29yw; 3c 10-19yw; 3c>10yw; 0c 0yw.
22/82: 3c<30yw; 2c 20-29yw; 6c 10-19yw; 11c>10yw; 0c 0yw.
3/82: 0c<30yw; 0c 20-29yw; 3c 10-19yw; 0c>10yw; 0c 0yw.


H=Political Rights [Gastil Index 1975] (80/82 - not recorded: PPNG; VNM: c=# of cases):
15c=7; 20c=6; 14c=5; 4c=4; 2c=3; 9c=2; 16c=1.
(maximum=7; minimum=1; mean=6 [5.62]; median=5; mode=6).

GENERATIVE DEFINITION: ‘Political rights involve the right to play a part in determining who will govern one’s country and what the laws will be. Countries are ranked from 1 to 7, ie from highest degree of liberty to lowest, as follows: 1. Refers to a political system in which the great majority of persons or families has both the right and the opportunity to participate in the electoral process. Political parties may be freely formed for the purpose of making fairly general the right to compete for public office; 2. Refers to a country with an open political process which does not always work well due to extreme poverty, a feudal social structure, violence or limitations on potential participants or results. As in countries coded “1”, however, a leader or party can be voted out of office; 3. Refers to a political system in which the people may elect their leaders or representatives, but in which coups, large-scale interference with election results and other non-democratic procedures occur; 4. Refers to a country in which full democratic elections are blocked constitutionally or have little significance in determining power distribution; 5. Refers to a country in which elections are either closely controlled or limited or the results have little significance; 6. Refers to a political system without elections or with elections involving only a single list of candidates in which voting is largely a matter of demonstrating support for the system. Nevertheless, there is some distribution of power; 7. Refers to tyrannies without legitimacy either in tradition or in international party doctrine’.

APPENDIX I: 282.

I=Civil Rights [Gastil Index 1975] (80/82 - not recorded: PPNG; VNM: c=# of cases):
8c=7; 17c=6; 14c=5; 10c=4; 10c=3; 7c=2; 14c=1.
(maximum=7; minimum=1; mean=4 [3.91]; median=4; mode=6).

GENERATIVE DEFINITION: "Civil rights are defined as the rights of the individual vis-a-vis the
state. Particularly important are the freedom of the press and the other mass media and the
independence of the judiciary. Countries are ranked from 1 to 7, ie from those with the greatest amount
of civil rights to those with the least: 1. Refers to a country in which the rule of law is unshaken [sic].
Freedom of expression is both possible and evident in a variety of news media; 2. Refers to a country
that aspires to this level of civil rights but is unable to achieve it because of violence, ignorance or
unavailability of the media or because it has restrictive laws that seem to be greater than are needed
for maintaining order; 3. Refers to a country that has the trappings of civil liberty and whose
government may be successfully opposed in the courts, but which may be threatened or may have
unresolvable political deadlock and may have to rely often on martial law, jailing for sedition and
suppression of publications; 4. Refers to a country in which there are broad areas of freedom but in
which there are also broad areas of illegality. States recently emerging from a revolutionary situation
or in transition from traditional society may easily fall into this category; 5. Refers to a country in
which civil rights are often denied but there is no doctrine on which this denial is based. The media are
often weak, controlled by the government and censored; 6. Refers to a country in which no civil rights
are thought to take priority over the rights of the state, but criticism is allowed to be stated in limited
ways; 7. Refers to a country from which the outside world never hears criticism except when it is
condemned by the state. Citizens have no rights in relation to the state'.

J=War Casualties 1900-90 [in '000s] - Civilian (76/82 - not recorded: ECDR; IVCT; MALI; PPNG;
FRG/GDR - Civilian casualties for Germany in '000s, 1900-45: 2231)**:
(maximum=12,003,000; minimum=1,000; mean=697.5; median=120,000; mode=3000).
Civilian Casualties by Area:
Afr/Mid-East=5,037,000; Nth/Sth Am=309,000; Asia=10,082,000; Aust/Pac (Oceania)= - ;
Eur=27,840,000; UK/Eire=131,000.

K=War Casualties 1900-90 [in '000s] - Military (76/82 - not recorded: ECDR; IVCT; MALI; PPNG;
FRG/GDR - Military casualties for Germany in '000s, 1900-45: 7150)**:
(maximum=11,895,000; minimum=1,000; mean=548.9; median=45,000; mode=1,500).
Military Casualties by Area:
Afr/Mid-East=2,562,000; Nth/Sth Am=847,000; Asia=7,780,000; Aust/Pac(Oceania)=127,000;
Eur=28,584,000; UK/Eire=1,350,000.

L=War Casualties 1900-90 [in '000s] - Total (76/82 - not recorded: ECDR; IVCT; MALI; PPNG;
FRG/GDR - Total casualties for Germany in '000s, 1900-45: 9381)**:
(maximum=23,908,000; minimum=1,000; mean=1444.8; median=24,000; mode=3,000).
Total Casualties by Area:
Afr/Mid-East=7,112,000; Nth/Sth Am=1,296,000; Asia=18,637,000; Aust/Pac(Oceania)=127,000;
Eur=57,150,000; UK/Eire=1,484,000.
M=ratio of military to civilian casualties (66/82- not recorded: ECDR; FRG; FJII; GHNA; GDR; IRLD; IVCT; MALL; MLYS; PERU; PPNG; PRGY; SWDN; SWTZ; ZAIR; ZMBA)**:

0 (Same) = 7 (11%); 1 (Lower) = 39 (58%); 2 (Higher) = 20 (31%).


N=Involvement in Interstate and Extrasystemic Wars 1816-1980 (82/82 - War per Year as System Member: Global Average [of 176 System Members] = 0.032: c=# of cases):

1c<0.15; 1c<0.14; 1c<0.13; 2c=0.115; 1c=0.109; 15c=.05-.099; 20c=.02-.049; 15c=.01-.019; 26c=0

(maximum= 0.152; minimum=0; mean=0.332; median=0.018; mode=0).

GENERATIVE DEFINITION: [In Table 1] I have divided a country's number of involvements in war (both of the interstate and extrasystemic kinds) by the number of years it has been a member of the interstate system. The resulting figure can be compared with a global average. To calculate this global average, I have simply added the duration that the 176 members of the interstate system have existed at various times during the 1816-1980 period, and then have used this number (9343 years) to divide the total number of national participations in wars (there were 302 national participations in the 118 international wars). The global average is 0.032 national war-participation per year. The reader can compare the figures for the individual countries [in Column N, Chan's Table 1] with this global average. The data in Table 1 do not give the impression that democracies are more pacific than nondemocracies. The four countries with the highest war-per-year scores are commonly considered politically free. They are Israel (0.152), India (0.147), France (0.135) and Britain (0.115, which ties this country with the USSR for fourth place...'

CHAPTER 6: HERITAGE & HARBINGER: 'Post'modernity and the Gulf War

This Chapter surveys aspects of late-20th century conflict in the light of theoretical approaches maintaining that we are moving, or have already moved, into a new and essentially different socio-historical era. Early intimations of such an approach come from C. Wright Mills, who in some prescient and typically feisty works of the 1950s labelled the mid-twentieth century as 'post-modern', a 'Fourth Epoch' succeeding Antiquity, the Dark Ages and the Modern Age. He maintained that the chief feature of this new era was a split between the liberal/humanist correlation of freedom and reason and the triumph of technical rationality. At the level of the subject, the "types" best equipped to function under such mechanical social arrangements were those at the top who, 'like Tolstoy's generals', employ or feign rationality to mask an absence of authentic ends-oriented reason; and at the bottom the soldier, who performs 'an entire series of functionally rational actions accurately without having any idea as to the ultimate end of this action or the function of each act within the whole' (1959: 168). Mills further suggests that this 'fourth epoch' is suffused with warfare, but that ironically changes in mass perception - a kind of sensory overload resulting in an overall 'psychic numbing' and critical disengagement - render this condition nearly invisible:

'To say that war has become total is to say that the reach of modern weaponry now makes every soul on earth a quite possible victim of sudden hell. It is to say that weapons have become absolute, and that every calculation from on high now includes a military calculation...World War III is already so total that most of its causes are accepted as "necessity"; most of its meanings as "realism". In our world "necessity" and "realism" have become ways to hide lack of moral indignation...[a]nd in this expanded world of mechanically vivified communications, the capacity for experience is alienated, and the individual becomes the spectator of everything but the human witness of nothing' (Mills, [1958] 1966: 411-413).

Mann similarly highlights an essential contradiction of 'nuclear age' militarism. Whereas in previous societies from ancient Persia through to early modern Prussia martial values were central, pervasive and overt, 'contemporary militarism is not up-front' (1988: 166). Rather, in the post-1945 developed west, it is both more generally understated, and split into two forms: For elites, 'deterrence-science militarism';
amongst the citizenry, ‘spectator-sport militarism’. More recently, Crook, Pakulski & Waters have claimed that the accounts of modernity in Weber and Marx ‘ultimately cannot be sustained’ under contemporary conditions (1991: 1). How valid are such claims?

6.1: Conceptualising a ‘Post’modern

Along many dimensions and from several quarters, aspects of society since roughly mid-century have been accompanied by the prefix “post”. Over 20 years ago, Dennis Wrong (1976: 279) dismissively noted that there were ‘enough posts in contemporary social thought to build a picket fence!’, and since that time the trend he attacked has mushroomed. In the very different evaluations of Bell (1973) and Touraine (1974), the age is post-industrial; since 1989, citizens of the former Soviet Union and its ex-Warsaw Pact satellites dwell in a politically-actualised post-Marxism and their counterparts in the developed West in a hypothesised post-capitalism (Drucker, 1992); for literary analyst George Steiner (1972) we live in a hermetic, quasi-vivacious and malaise-ridden post-culture; and in the varied prognoses of a wide assortment of commentators (eg, Lash, 1990; Harvey, 1990), the present epoch is characterised by a ‘condition of postmodernity’.

Such contentions are highly debatable and regularly subject to attack. Wrong’s skepticism is echoed in later opposition to the notion that any such ‘transitions’ to a new era have in fact occurred, as in Zukin’s appraisal, that ‘there is no coherent

77 Mann also specifies a third category, “militarised socialism”, prevailing in the Soviet bloc and basically an amalgam of the other two forms. Events since 1988 have overtaken his analysis, and this type is not dealt with here.

definition of postmodernism to guide its appropriation by those social scientists who are so inclined' (1988: 431) or the airier assessment of postmodernism in the Modern-day Dictionary of Received Ideas as a word that 'has no meaning... (u)se it as often as possible' (cited in Featherstone, 1988: 195). Other critics attack postmodernism from the perspectives of feminism (Brodribb, 1992) or Marxism (Callinicos, 1989), the latter holding that although rapid change is an endemic feature of late twentieth century life, such change constitutes an extension of the 'cultural logic of late capitalism' (Jameson, 1984) or at most a 'postmetaphysical modernity' (Wellmer, 1991: vii) and an acceleration of the unfinished 'project of modernity' (Habermas, in Foster, 1989: 3-15).

The hostility shown to postmodernity by theorists of a different ideological bent is tame compared to the attitudes titular "postmodernists" - primarily the French social theorists Charles Taylor scathingly refers to as responsible for 'the fog emanating from Paris in recent decades' (1984: 172) - display toward the school of thought they supposedly represent. Foucault asserts that 'there is no sense at all to the proposition that reason is a long narrative that is now finished, and that another narrative is under way' (Raulet, 1983: 204-205; c/f Smart, 1990: 402). Derrida sees an age-old consistency in the purportedly "new" (Kearney, 1984: 112). Guattari passes the harshest of judgments on postmodernism's 'ethical and aesthetic' bankruptcy that leaves a 'black stain on history' (Guattari, 1986a: 40; 1986b: 460; Zurbrugg, 1991: 13); Virilio claims that "postmodernism is 'an expression which, in terms of architecture, has predominantly negative overtones...Moreover, the postmodern impulse in architecture has virtually disappeared and is now considered little more than a kind of distraction' (cited in Zurbrugg, 1996: 111); and Baudrillard condemns the postmodern as degenerate, artificial, eclectic and a process of cultural 'garbage disposal' championed by 'European Yuppies' (Franchlin, 1986, Baudrillard, 1990: 20-21; Gane, 1991: 55). In Rajchman's crisp summation of internecine opposition to the concept, 'Foucault rejected the category; Guattari despises it, Derrida has no use for it; Lacan and Barthes did not live, and Althusser was in no state, to learn about it; and Lyotard found it in America' (cited in Brodribb, 1992: 10).

Yet despite the ferocity of such disclaimers, "post"-perspectives of various stripes continue to attract adherents, and two - a culturally-based postmodernity and a
technologically-driven model of the Information Society - are at risk of achieving paradigm status. Each warrant examination, not least because the designation "post-" in a general sense signifies an 'after', simultaneously a closure and an adventurous new beginning. As a corollary it also entails not just an emphasis on the present (conceived of as a situation of novelty) and an orientation towards the future, but a re-interpretation of the past in the light of "new realities".

Of more immediate concern within the context of this chapter is the part played by changes in aspects of militarism and textuality in mooted large-scale, long-run societal transformations. Concerning the latter, as noted previously changes in communicative technologies, in terms of either the introduction of a new form or the dominance of one kind of media at the expense of the disappearance (or displacement of the status) of another, have typically been used as an index of essential change within or differentiation between types of society retrospectively; and with the theorised advent of the postindustrial &/or postmodern, this concept of fundamental changes in reading and writing as either harbinger, cause, or symptom of a broader structural transformation is continued. Also retained is the ambivalence of the relationship between reading/writing and warfare, with the dominant tendency suggesting that the former stands in opposition to - or mitigates - the latter.

**Figure 6.1: “POST”- MODERNITY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Military Organization</th>
<th>[1] “impossible” [MSc/mSc]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Predominant Communicative Mode</td>
<td>[4] INFORMATIC MEDIA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6.2 War-Text: Postmodern Conjunctions

Those typically included, however problematically, in the pantheon of postmodern thinkers have dealt with warfare in a variety of ways. Lyotard metaphorically exhorts his readers to be 'guerrillas of love' and 'to wage a war on totality' (cited in Pefanis, 1991: 84, 116). In *Travels in Hyper-Reality*, semiotician Umberto Eco maintains that today 'it is only in the most backward of countries that fascist generals...still use tanks...[t]oday a country belongs to the person who controls communications' (1987: 135). Barthes, in his essay *Myth Today*, illustrates his extension of semiology into a second-order regime of signification in concrete terms using a military example: the *Paris-Match* cover depicting a young Negro soldier saluting the French flag (Barthes, 1982: 93-159). According to Turner (1987b; Stauth & Turner, 1988), a pervasive nostalgia is the distinguishing feature of postmodernity; and Davis traces the origins of the term 'nostalgia' itself to Johannes Hofer's 17th Century dissertation based on diagnoses of Swiss mercenaries fighting abroad (1979: 1-7; c/f Starobinski, 1989).

Staying within the realms of genealogy, the status of Nietzsche as a 'godfather'/intellectual progenitor of continental postmodernism is well-attested to; and his penchant for the combative, bellicose turn of phrase is evident in his descriptions of 'the worst readers ...those that behave like plundering troops: they take away a few things they can use, dirty and confound the remainder, and revile the whole' (Nietzsche, ed. Hollingdale, 1979: 15-16, emphases added); and elsewhere “truth”, characterised as 'a mobile army of metaphors, metonymies, and anthropomorphisms' (cited in Sharpe, 1990: 184, emphases added). Deleuze & Guattari devote a long chapter of *A Thousand Plateaus* to relations between the State apparatus and the nomad war machine (1988: 351-423; c/f Guattari, 1984: 120-129), and their concept of the 'machinic phylum' provided a theoretical bedrock for De Landa's later work on *War in the Age of Intelligent Machines* (1991); and the writings of Paul Virilio are predicated on contemporaneity as wholly governed by the principles and practices of 'pure war' (Virilio & Lotringer, 1983).

79 A lesson apparently only half absorbed by Boris Yeltsin in October 1993, who in putting down the parliamentary rebellion of Rutskoi and Khasbulatov, took care to control the mass media but also - perhaps in a "pre-postmodern" gesture, or perhaps because accustomed to travelling in reality - secured his position precisely by the resort to tanks.
Foucault's position in contemporary social theory is analogous to Weber's in classical sociological thought. In the more specific terms of this project, peripherally, Foucault gave a brief course at the Collège de France on 'War in the Filigree of Peace' (1980a: 15-19) and proposed a study of 'the army as a matrix of organization and of knowledge' (1980b: 77). More central and elaborated is his version of the 'military dream of society' (Foucault, 1977: 169) accompanying the Enlightenment's liberal-humanist vision of progressive societal perfectibility (see 5.3.5, case 81). Yet in his 'Truth and Power' interview of 1977, Foucault makes a conceptual split between a linguistically and semiotically-informed analysis of society and one grounded in an analogue of formal conflict:

'I believe one's point of reference should not be to the great model of language (langue) and signs, but to that of war and battle. The history which bears and determines us has the form of a war rather than that of a language: relations of power, not relations of meaning' (Foucault, cited in Wolin, 1993: 272).

A contention of this thesis is that such a division is ill-considered, a remark in an interview situation, possibly overdetermined by a hostility to - and an attempt to distance himself from - both older Saussurean structuralist approaches, and all aspects of textuality.  

81


81 Given the premise of the judgement of texts by use-value under prevailing configurations of power/knowledge and the reduction of writers to proper names signifying the totality of their literary enterprise, Foucault suggests that the notion of 'the author' be replaced by the way the author's name operates within discursive practices. The leading question within this frame of reference is not (in the relevant essay's ironic title) "what is an author?", nor 'who is the author?', but rather, what is the 'author-function'? (Foucault, 1988: 113-138). In this conception, the key aspect of the utility of attribution of 'authorship' resides in both capitalist notions of writer-as-proprietor and adherence to previously-established truth statements legitimated through identifiable publication. As a thought experiment exemplifying this approach Foucault offers the intriguing notion of the potential effect of anonymity on the reception of texts. Since the author would in principle not be known the reader would be forced to confront the text directly, would come to the writing without the preconceptions generated by knowing who wrote it, and would bring to the work entirely different standards of judgement (Foucault, 1989: 193-202). Nowhere in the interview where this notion is flown, however, and despite the widespread use of the double-blind review process in the social sciences at the point of manuscript submission and acceptance/rejection, is Foucault naive enough to believe that the idea of the author as 'masked philosopher' is a real possibility under current publishing practice.
A suggestive integration of the “battle model” and structural linguistics, but with the latter taking the form of written rather than spoken language, comes from Derrida, and at the margins of and ‘buried beneath’ the (in)famous Derridean discourse are some hints particularly salient to the concerns of this thesis. The first and most peripheral of these is Derrida’s translator’s use of Proust to point up the notion of ‘difference’ and displacement of a work’s unity and sovereign identity:

‘I was not one man only, but the steady advance hour after hour of an army in close formation, in which there appeared, according to the moment, impassioned men, indifferent men, jealous men... In a composite mass, these elements may, one by one, without our noticing it, be replaced by others, which others again eliminate or reinforce, until in the end a change has been brought about which it would be impossible to conceive if we were a single person’ (Proust, cited by Spivak in Derrida, 1976: xi; italics in the original, underlining added).

Expressed more directly, this same undertone emerges in a paper contrasting Foucauldian and Derridean perspectives on textuality by Edward Said, where characterisations of deconstruction are under review:

‘The military and hunting metaphor is apt, I think, since Derrida has recently spoken in such terms of what he does...The military operation involved in deconstruction therefore is in one respect an attack on a party of colonialists who have tried to make the land and its inhabitants over into a realization of their plans, an attack in turn partly to release prisoners and partly to free land held forcibly” (Said, 1977: 682-683; emphases added).

The final, most practical and most potent correlation of grammatological concerns and militarism comes from the theorist himself in the text of a 1983 conference paper on nuclear deterrence, “No Apocalypse, Not Now (full speed ahead, seven missiles, seven missives)”, where a deconstructionist perspective is put to work exposing the illusory rationality and logical fallacies inherent in ‘expertise’-based assessments of prevailing nuclear defence policies and the rhetorical dimension of diplomacy, the latter only made possible by writing (Derrida, 1984; discussion in Norris, 1987: 162-171; Ruthven, 1993: 66-78). Whereas Foucault suggests the war model as a more salient analytic metaphor than linguistic or textual models, Derridean grammatology posits
the immanence of writing as promoting a permanent state of deterrence/deferral, perpetually staving off the occurrence of "real" war. This resonates with the work of Baudrillard, who, in the estimation of the *Panic Encyclopaedia* 'is the postmodern commotion... acclaimed as the author of postmodern culture and society' (Kroker, Kroker & Cook, 1989: 265). His previous analyses touched lightly on army norms (1983: 7) and cataclysmic nuclear war, even if only to declare the latter an impossible option under the present terms of the 'disappearance of the social' (1987: 107-112), an 'impossibility' dealt with in his notorious account of the "nonoccurrence" of the Gulf War. On these accounts, living in a "postmodern condition" with its plurality of "language games" seems to have led to the loss of any attempt to find words to delineate, let alone debate, the political (Ryan, 1988); similarly, living in an "information society", in Reinecke's estimation, 'appears to have bred a certain kind of torpor. On moral and political questions people have more information about events around the globe than any human beings before them, but are unable or unwilling to take a public stance. That contradiction is one of the most important of the age'.

6.3 War: Information Society stances

This same suggestive undercurrent recurs in the post-industrial perspective. 'Infotech'-driven social change is related to militarism in a variety of ways. Bell's post-industrial society and Brzezinski's "technetronic era" both rested to a greater or lesser degree on a premise of universally harmonious relations rendering war obsolete. Masuda, in his 1981 'pattern comparison' of industrial society and the information society specifies war and Fascism as social problems located in the former, which disappear and are (in a worst-case scenario) replaced by 'future shock, terror, invasion of privacy' in the latter (Masuda, in Forrester, 1988: 623). Similarly, the work of E. T. Hall (1981) largely turns on a variant of information theory distinguishing between stable traditional cultures with 'High Context' (HC) communicative systems, and adaptable 'Low Context' (LC) contemporary social environments, wherein transmitted messages must be "spelled out". The sense is in the message, and coded information carries the load formerly borne by the receiver's preprogrammed knowledge acquired through embeddedness within an HC culture (1981: 85-103). Hall uses two examples to illustrate his thesis, first comparing the long-term uniformity of church architecture (HC) with a 'system of defence rocketry [which] can be out of date before it is in place.
and is therefore very low-context' (1981: 101); and secondly outlining two instances of HC/LC cultural confrontation and the importance of contexting - the description taken from Weston La Barre describing how 'during the last war [WW II] there appeared in the North African edition of Stars and Stripes a news picture, purporting to portray an American GI teaching an Arab the gentle art of dunking doughnuts', and, in another localised instance, the events surrounding the abortive trial of an American GI stationed in Japan (the Private Girard case) in the post-WW II occupation period (E. T. Hall, 1981: 109-116).

The inherent optimism of IT perspectives is exemplified by Stonier's assurance that '[l]iving in a postindustrial world means that not only are we more affluent, more resourceful and less likely to go to war, but also more likely to democratise' (cited in Lyon, 1988: 5; emphasis added); and Christopher Evans endorsement that 'we can now be sure of one thing: human sacrifice by the millions at the behest of "inspired" generals will never occur again, and we can thank the computer for refusing to allow us to be our own worst enemy yet again' (1979: 212-213).

Alternatives to these utopian assessments suggest that "we" should have known better. The 'information'/post-industrial society postulate has been hotly contested since its inception (J. Rose, 1974: 78-84). One set of grounds for opposition concerns its implied relationship to militarism. In terms of origins, the concept owes much to Saint-Simon's positivist vision of a new social order governed by the industrio-scientific elite, an "avant-garde" technocracy (Manuel, 1965: 103-148); and, as Rose points out, 'Saint-Simon's "avant-garde" (a term he took from military terminology as early as 1802) was also to live up to its name in looking to the future of society rather than to its past' (1991: 33; stress added). We have previously encountered McLuhan's contentions that changes in communicative modes - particularly moves from oral to literate media - are causal factors in social formation (section 4.1 at p. 133). He expands on this theme in his book-length study of War and Peace in the Global Village (McLuhan & Fiore, 1968); and the notion of electronic communications technology in civil society retaining traces of its combat-based origins also figures in Provenzo's heavily McLuhanite analysis, where it is noted that 'the fact that computers were originally developed for the military has determined to a certain extent the types of questions they have been able to address' (1986: 104).
What is an anecdotal footnote in Provenzo's monograph assumes central importance in Mark Poster's (1990) analysis of the origins of the latest wave of technocratic elitism grounded in computerisation and "information" as cybernetically defined, cybernetics itself being "tainted by military orientation and sensibility, born as it was during the struggle with Hitler's Germany...Cybernetics is a theory for an armed camp preparing for a final struggle. But the politico-military atmosphere that pervades Wiener's text, which was written in the early 1950s when the U.S. was in the grip of McCarthyite fever, is displaced from the contest with fascism and communism to the warfare with nature. ... The "law" of entropy legitimates the just cause of the technocratic domination of language and the bureaucratic reduction of meaning to "electronic engineering" '(Poster, 1990: 28-29).

Roszak, who also utilises the work of Norbert Wiener and situates his own perspective within the framework of the U.S. as governed by a military-industrial complex (c/f Coffin, 1964; Mills, 1970; Lens,1970; Yarmolinsky, 1973), similarly claims that 'the (U.S.) government's continued heavy military investment in computers, electronics, and information theory following World War II was fully intended to alter the American industrial system rapidly' (1986: 178; general discussion of this issue at 177-181). These themes are also addressed but given an ideologically positive spin in the more recent work of Peter F. Drucker, who thinks of contemporaneity in terms of a 'new society of organizations', spearheaded by a managerial revolution with knowledge as its driving force. This transformation from modern industrial to 'post-capitalist' society is, although corresponding to other phase shifts in western history, thorough and global, to the degree that "there is no longer a "Western" history or a "Western" civilization. There is only world history and world civilization" (Drucker, 1992: 95). What brings the unprecedented change into being? The author's 'own candidate would be the GI Bill of Rights, which gave every American soldier returning from World War II the money to attend a university ... [this] signalled the shift to a knowledge society' (1992: 95). The U.S. armed forces therefore usher in post-industrial social change, in the same way that the Prussian Army served as a model for civil early capitalist organisation in 'the world of 1870' (1992: 102). Moreover, the armed services remain at the cutting edge of innovation:
‘No organization in the 50 years since World War II has changed more than the U.S. military. Uniforms have remained the same. Titles of rank have remained the same. But weapons have changed completely, as the Gulf War of 1991 dramatically demonstrated; military doctrines and concepts have changed even more drastically, as have the armed services’ organizational structures, command structures, relationships, and responsibilities’ (Drucker, 1992: 97).

Clearly, in the foregoing commentary the connection between reading and writing and aspects of militarism are more or less tenuous, consisting mostly of hyperbole and trope, and are at most extensions of the concerns of the analysts surveyed; and, as Rapoport warns in another context, such extensions ‘are no easy matter and cannot be achieved by “semantic suggestion”, that is, a tendency to confuse nomenclature with discovery of principles’ (cited in Buckley, 1968: 142). But the persistence of such “semantic suggestion” and its location in such a range of unexpected sources bears investigating in a more systematic manner - more especially given the unresolved status of textuality/literacy and the pervasive notion of militarism/warfare as a ‘dead letter’ in the majority of both postmodern and post-industrial perspectives, and moreover given the practical unavoidability of semantic suggestion in discourses so singlemindedly devoted to prophecy, a point taken up in Etzioni-Halevy’s critique:

‘Like other parts of the Knowledge Elite, the scholars converging on the idea of the post-industrial society, too, have been concerned with predicting the future... And indeed, what post-industrialists had to say about what they termed the Knowledge Class in post-industrial society and about that society itself was based partly on the analysis of the existent situation and partly on the projection of existent trends into the future. But unfortunately some of the predicted trends of ever-greater abundance, equality, liberty and general well-being ...subsequently reversed themselves or took off in the most unexpected directions, playing havoc with their predictions. To be sure, knowledge has been increasing in importance. But by now it should be abundantly clear that this knowledge has not been working in the manner visualised by the post-industrialists and recently has not helped increase the predicted prosperity, equity and freedom (or viability of democracy) in Western society‘ (1985: 66-67).

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82 As an early example, consider some selected features of Huber’s (1971) annotated bibliography of “Studies of the Future”: In a total number [N] of 257 predictive items in this table and a time-spread of publications ranging between 1924 and 1970, consideration of weaponry, militarism and war occurs fully or in part in only 34 entries (i.e., 13% of the total); the likelihood of future [in this case, primarily post-1970] wars occurs as an issue in only 16 (47%) of these 34 cases, or 6% of N. Of these 16 cases that broach the possibility of war, 7 claim it as an avoidable option.
In addition to invalid projection of present indicators based on a reified view of technology, the "taint" of direct military applications in supposedly objective abstract methodological tools (see, eg, Martin, 1978, on game theory, or Visvanathan, 1984, on the postwar career of atomic physics) render the overall utility of IT models highly suspect. Given an intimate linkage between the military as sponsor of technological innovations such as semi-conductors, silicon chips, microelectronics, robotics and computerisation (for an overview of these connections see Lyon, 1988: 26-30; De Landa, 1991), it is unsurprising that a "knowledge elite" of research scientists and security intellectuals would tend to distance themselves from the darker side of high tech and - rejigging technological determinism in the name of a decontextualised version of value-neutrality - over-stress its peaceful civil applications.81 Under such views large-scale conflict seems to be as removed from the social agenda as it was in the majority of sociological analyses undertaken in the 'relatively peaceful' 19th century. Yet such a removal is equally unwarranted in the light of the subsequent empirical record.

What makes investigation of the mooted war/text conjunction especially urgent in theoretical terms is this high-priority commitment of "post"-perspectives to futurity. Kitaigorodsky's observation (1990: 34), that 'a first-rate theory predicts; a second-rate theory forbids; and a third-rate theory explains after the event', assumes particular salience within these perspectives, characterised as each is by blurred time-frames and poor forecasts, the uncertainty between actual and predictive events. Sober, less flagrant examples of this uncertainty date as far back as Barraclough's (1964: 1-35) early discussion of 'contemporary history' characterised as a distinct break with modernity, worthy of analysis as a transitional period but leading 'into a world whose outline we cannot plot' (1964: 13). This view is consonant with Poster's assertion that 'the solid institutional routines that have characterised modern society for some two hundred years are being shaken by the earthquake of electronically mediated communication and recomposed into new routines whose outlines are as yet by no means clear' (1990: 14), and is reiterated by Crook, Pakulski

81 The strength of technological determinism in current information society models obscures the degree to which science, technology and warfare are socially interconnected: For a refresher course on the history of this interface, see R. K. Merton, [1935] 1970: 184-198; Kaempfert, 1941.
& Waters, who theorise the current societal transformation not as a surely-suffixed “-ism”, but as ‘postmodernization’ - a process in train, the outcome of which is essentially unforeseeable (1992: 1-46; N.B. the typology [Fig. 1.2] at p. 34 of that volume).

Yet acknowledgement of the urgency of a cogent analysis of contemporaneity, and frank recognition of the difficulties inherent in such a project, cannot compensate for serious shortcomings in both ‘postmodern’ and ‘postindustrial’/ ‘information society’ paradigms, flaws that tend to render them less than suitable as models for serious analytical investigation. Floud’s early attack on Bell’s instigating post-industrialism hypothesis - that the latter is Americocentric, theoretically invalid and empirically overextended (1971: 25-37) - may be added to the critiques based on imprecise definition (Wrong), originary premises (Poster) and lack of predictive capacity (Etzioni-Halevy) already cited. Lyon, who sees the “information society” notion as directly derived from the Bell paradigm, maintains that it is plagued by the same problems as its predecessor. While not prepared to abandon the concept outright, he notes that its utility is hindered by both dystopic ‘Luddite’ technophobia, and ‘liberal’ enthusiasm. The result of the latter in particular is especially fatal in this view, as ‘the further one moves from grand national IT plans and from futuristic forecasts of conditions prevailing within the “informatizing” society, and the nearer one gets to actual social analysis in which technology is not perceived as a quasi-autonomous force acting upon society, the more questionable the information society concept appears’ (1988 : 7).

Mann (1988:146) called sociology’s neglect of war “shameful”. This epithet may be read methodologically as well as morally. In a discipline which prides itself on an ability to see beyond legitimating ideologies to the realities underlying them, to ignore or marginalise such realities not just once, in “core” perspectives, but twice, to the degree that sociology uncritically accepts the slipperier tenets of portmanteau concepts like postmodernity or the Information Society, is both absurd and grotesque; particularly galling, in that, as argued in Chapter 2, alternatives are ready to hand, primarily in Weber’s corpus. But does this analysis still hold in the late 20th century, on the portico of a new millennium?
James Der Derian has lately argued that in the field of international relations, and particularly in its central concern with global conflict, much explanatory mileage would be gained by subverting dominant paradigms of 'the geopolitics of realism, structural political economy of neorealism, and neoliberal institutionalism' (1990: 295) with postmodernist approaches - specifically Baudrillard's notion of simulation, the Foucauldian theses on surveillance, and Virilio's conceptualisation of the chronopolitics of speed. Arguing stridently against any potential synthesis of rationalist “metatheory” and post-modern practices he asserts that the latter are more efficacious because they are 'more “real” in time than in space, their power is evidenced through the exchange of signs not goods, and their effects are transparent and pervasive rather than material and discrete' (1990: 297). Hence rationalist empirical methodology with its 'seemingly endless collection and correlation of data on war' (1990: 308) should be supplanted by 'historical investigation, intertextual interpretation, and open-ended speculation - not the prime methods and concerns of behaviourists and neo-realists, but prime material for a poststructuralist inquiry' (1990: 305).

Der Derian (1990: 308) has 'no conclusions to offer, only a review of questions', shored against his analysis the argument presented here holds that coming to grips with the current realities of combat entails a shotgun wedding of "traditional" and post-structurally oriented approaches. The ingredients of Der Derian's analysis - surveillance, speed and simulation - certainly predate the theorising of Foucault, Virilio and Baudrillard, as they themselves acknowledge. Der Derian dates the earliest Kriegsspiel (war-play) to 1830s Prussia, but Wilson claims this was preceded in Europe by John Clerk's naval game of 1700 and Christopher Weidimann's "Kings Game" of 1644, and that the likeliest ultimate origin of the format originates in the Chinese 'encirclement' game Wei-Hai dating from c. 3000 BC (1970: 13-29). In Sun-Tzu's classic Art of War, the 29th principle of Book XI states that 'speed is the essence of war' (1963: 134). De Landa traces simulation and the military uses of imagery not to Baudrillard, nor his direct influences like early-'60s McLuhanism or the Situationists' late-'60s 'society of the spectacle', but to the anti-Protestant military response of the forces of the Holy Roman Empire in the Thirty Years war (1618-1648) and the paramilitary 'spiritual counteroffensive' of the Jesuits in its wake - in particular the combination of Loyola's spiritual exercises and Kircher's original slide
projector, the "magic lantern" of 1654, as tools in their miracle plays aimed at the production of both Catholic propaganda and 'soldiers for Christ' (1991: 186-192). In a similar vein, Myerly (1992) highlights the ongoing importance of spectacle to the military in a secular peacetime setting, in this case Victorian England.

In wartime itself, Clausewitz in his 19th-century analysis described the responses of the rookie, seeing his first battle from afar, who 'for a moment still thinks he is at a show'; and more generally, that in combat '[b]eyond a certain threshold...the light of reason moves in a different medium and is reflected in a different manner' (cited in Virilio, 1989: 47-48). Clausewitz's purchase on the unpredictability of war - its essential 'friction' and 'fog', for Beyerchen (1993) a precursor of later 20th-century scientific concerns with non-linearity and randomness - is as acute as his contempt for those who try to reduce war to abstract, hermetically-sealed 'laws' like his contemporaries von Bülow, Jomini, and others he dismisses as 'scribblers of systems and compendia' (Brodie, cited in the introduction to Clausewitz, 1976: 58). But even those who, like Brodie, acknowledge Clausewitz's genius, crave a Jominian certitude in the conduct of warfare (De Landa, 1991: 87-105), a certitude increasingly expressed in the attempted removal of the "human element" from the preparation for, participation in, perception of and protest against contemporary conflict.

Coming to grips with the nature of late modern warfare resides in more than - but calls for a consideration of - the durability and extension of historically antecedent trends. Whereas in the past war was seen as a heightening of an essentially human experience - "reality" pitched at an extreme - war now relies on remoteness of both combatants and civilians from a sense of "reality". De Landa's wider study of contemporary warfare similarly concluded that computer and information-processing technology, although 'made hostage by military institutions' (1991: 229) is incomplete, nascent, inherently vulnerable to alternatives, and that 'in the period of time between the emergence of a new machinic paradigm and its incorporation into a tactical doctrine, new opportunities arise for experimentalists outside the war machine' (1991: 230). The possibility (or desirability) of replacing existing politico-military control with that of visionaries and hackers, and what forms such 'new opportunities' may take, is controversial. The question facing contemporary social theory is where it stands relative to the the contemporary 'war machine'.

The theoretical perspectives critiqued throughout this chapter have too readily taken conceptions of a very-nearly seamless, consensual and irreal "New World Order" on board, ignoring or accepting not only the actual cost of ongoing warfare, but the collateral cost to their own validity. The alternative view advanced in this thesis suggests a greater concentration on "cracks" within, and shards of "reality" glimpsed through, the constructed images of globally-dominant states increasingly given over to "author ised" violent armed intervention bolstered by forms of social theorising which passively deny, or actively support, such activity. At the heart of the internecine and interstitial disputes pervading sociological, postmodern and info-tech/postindustrial views of war are a series of gulfs - intensity/extent, barbarous/civilised, nature/culture, civil/military, structure/agency, (neo)realist/(post)structuralist - that the proxy principle is designed to initially bridge and eventually transcend. As indicated throughout, textual discourses on war, the writings produced by war, and the construction and setting in motion of war's participants are themselves foundational, not supplementary, to the very prosecution of war. The transmutation of skin-bounded bodies and physical territory into text-artefactual states and citizens (outlined in Chapter 3) constitutes a reply to the several of the perspectives reviewed above, and a potential solution to the conundrum posed by Faris as to why 'wars come when no one seems to want them' (1937: 7), and why wars persist in the face of a widespread preference for peace.

The following section aims at establishing a firmer foothold in the terra incognito of futurity through a selective deployment and combining of theoretical positions within mainstream and "post"-perspectives already considered, redesigned to foreground the militarism/textuality conjunction and map its progress in the West to this point in time. Deploying the elements of Figure 6.1, I take the Persian Gulf War of 1991 as both inheritor of older forms of the war/text axis and forerunner of new forms of proxifying in the realms of combat and communications.
6.4 The Persian Gulf War [1991].

'On 26 February, 1991, [at a map line called 73 Easting in the Southern Iraqi desert] the Eagle, Ghost, and Iron troops of the US 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment attacked the Tawakalna Division of the Iraqi Republican Guard. These were untested US tank troops, without any previous combat experience, blundering forward in a sandstorm to confront entrenched Soviet-made heavy tanks manned by elite veterans of an eight-year war [i.e., against former enemy Iran - WS]. Thanks to the sandstorm, the Americans had no air support either; this was a straight-on tank-versus-tank scrap in the desert, right out of the Rommel and Patton strategic notebook. The Americans annihilated the Iraqis in 22 minutes' (Sterling, 1993: 95).

In the Gulf War of 1991, '[w]ith some handy but basically political and cosmetic help from its Coalition allies, the US destroyed the fourth-largest army on the planet in four days at a cost of only 148 American lives' (ibid). Moreover, it is estimated that fully 25% of these combat casualties were victims of "friendly fire" from their own forces (Ziring, 1992: 326), officially - but not entirely - the result of error by on-board computer-controlled weapons-delivery systems. The first US fatality, Air Force S/Sgt. John Campisi, was hit by a truck on a darkened desert runway; Braybrook (1991: 10) notes that by February 17th, 10 out of the 14 dead American troops were friendly fire fatalities, and recounts an incident 9 days later, when 'nine British soldiers from the 4th Armored Brigade were killed when an A-10 attacked their Warrior AFVs... the whole of the Iraqi army had managed to kill only four British soldiers,... one USAF pilot killed over twice as many' (1991: 10).

Leyden's (1992) compendium of American casualties are comprehensive, supplying wherever ascertainable details of name, rank, hometown and familial status of the dead. It also lists official cause of death for 124 of the 150 US casualties. These show that in Operation Desert Storm, 4 armed service personnel died undertaking rescue missions; 4 were victims of "friendly fire"; 8 were deaths by misadventure (adding to the roster of 26 accidental deaths in Operation Desert Shield before any direct encounter with the enemy); and 26 fell to ordnance, triggering land mines or unexploded shells. Of the remaining 87 casualties who died in actual combat, 6 are MIA presumed dead; 11 died in one battle at the Saudi bordertown of Khafji on Jan.
30th; 12 were killed in a Special Forces Operation when their gunship was shot down on Jan. 31st; and 20 died as a result of two Scud rocket attacks on their barracks, on Jan. 31st and Feb. 25th. Discounting the Missing-in-Action figure, this left a possible maximum of 38 casualties - or slightly less than 4 per cent of the total US dead/presumed dead - who may have fallen victim to confrontation with a visible flesh-and-blood enemy.

Contrarily, Greenpeace tallies of the enemy killed in action estimate 'between 5 and 15,000...Iraqi civilians killed by the aerial bombardment... 4 to 16,000 Iraqis who have died of "disease or starvation" since the war ended...and up to 120,000 Iraqi troops - mostly conscripts - killed during the US-Allied offensive' (cited in Norris, 1992: 203). The APDR [Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter] notes that one unit of surviving Iraqi troops registered a military first by surrendering to a "Drone" surveillance robot; with less levity, the same source reported that 'RPVs - small unmanned aircraft carrying video cameras - helped artillery crews on the Wisconsin and other US battleships hit target with pinpoint accuracy'(APDR, April 1991: 20). Even though later disclaimed, a popular belief held that prior to the Desert Storm land-based offensive, the US supposedly 'infected the Iraqi air defense system with a debilitating computer virus, and flew Cruise missiles equipped with warheads designed to uncoil carbon-fiber wire over Iraqi electrical lines in order to short out its power grid' (Black, 1993: 49) - and while the method deployed may have been somewhat romanticised, other reports indicate that a calculated media disinformation strategy combined with a take-out of the militarily-vital Iraqi communications infrastructure was a key factor in the subsequent allied victory:

'By the morning of January 20, four days after a US Air Force Stealth bomber opened the war with a 2,000-pound laser-guided bomb targeted precisely on the microwave dishes atop Baghdad's international telecommunications building, the city was crippled. There was no mainline electricity, no running water, no working telephones' (Kelly, 1991: 21).

By contrast, allied communicative networks, although subject to military control in the form of censorship, worked overtime and at peak capacity (Zelizer, 1992). TV audiences were treated to on-the-spot and round-the-clock CNN coverage of Stealth
aircraft attacks and laser fireworks over the Iraqi capital, pilotless Scud/Patriot missile-vs-missile duels in Israeli airspace and, courtesy of "weapon-cam", a projectile's eye-view of the passage of "smart bombs" through doorways and windows and down ventilator shafts. In the face of such saturation broadcasting, public response to the war was either overwhelmingly supportive or curiously muted. Lance Morrow characterised the general 'hallucinatory' and 'neurotic' mood of December 1990 as follows:

'In earlier wars, the soldiers went marching off, the battles got fought, then after a time the bodies - and the cost of it all - started coming home. Reality had its cause and effect, its dramatic pace. Now the natural rhythms of war-making have gone electronic...Time gets dismantled somehow, slaughter gets projected into the hypothetical...' (1990: 22)

This uneasy mass quiescence invited media comparison with the American public reaction to Vietnam. Weisberg, in the *New Republic* (25/2/91: 18) claimed that although initial protests gave one 'the sense of history being replayed as a game of speed chess', on closer inspection '[i]n contrast to the anti-war rallies in the 1960s anti-Gulf demonstrators have been peaceful and well-ordered, with police assisting in choreographed mass arrests'. Gibbs, writing for *Time* (26/11/90: 43) stated that the '...peace movement of 1990 only faintly resembles that of the Vietnam era', seeing as a potent indicator of the change a notable lack of college student involvement.

Professional academic response (in this instance that of sociologists) also differed from the '60s. In 1967, *Sociological Abstracts* (vol XV, no. VII; 1160-1170, 1267) published an open letter to the US President, Vice-President and Members of Congress from '1300 individual and active members of the American Sociological Association' calling for a halt to the bombing of North Vietnam, immediate peace negotiations,

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84 Recent revisionist treatments of this conflict at the levels of academic analysis, political ideology and popular culture have suggested that the more cathartic effects of this war on the "American psyche" have been ameliorated. In a mid-1975 press conference, Republican President Gerald Ford responded to a question about the 'lessons learned' from Vietnam in terms of a 'focus on the future'. In Rabe's 1993 assessment, this effectively constituted a 'call for national amnesia...at the time, his answer seemed to strike a receptive chord among the public. One survey of US history textbooks used by secondary-school children found that the war in Vietnam merited on average about six paragraphs of description. I gave only one lecture on Vietnam in my undergraduate course on US foreign relations and was rarely asked any questions. I knew a revisionist thesis was arising about Vietnam, but, until the early 1980s, I did not think that anyone would take it seriously' (1993: 228-29).
and the 'orderly, phased withdrawal of American forces’. Responding to the Gulf conflict in 1991, sociologist Peter Eglin reported that at his campus [WLU in Ontario], a War Symposium and ad hoc “open forums” were organised, ‘but the numbers involved in intellectual activities to do with the war outside their own classrooms, but inside the university, represents no more than 10% of the faculty body’ (1991: 6). The broader reactions took another form: At the conclusion of hostilities, in June 1991 massive victory parades were staged in Washington and New York, suggesting popular support for George Bush's posited “New World Order’ and his claim that America had finally ‘kicked the Vietnam syndrome’... or at least the pacifist anti-war legacy of that conflict. Chomsky (1971: 72-3) cites Westmoreland’s assessment of the Vietnam War as a ‘technological success’, Pike’s boast that formerly successful Viet Minh tactics had been ‘relegated by science to the military history textbook, and Leonard Sullivan - in 1969 US Director of R & D for SE Asian Matters - on Vietnam as the prototype of future warfare, the

‘beginning of instrumentation of the entire battlefield. Eventually, we will be able to tell when anybody shoots, what he is shooting at, and where he was shooting from. You begin to get a “Year 2000” vision of an electronic map with little lights that flash for different kinds of activity. This is what we require for this “porous” war, where the friendly and the enemy are all mixed together’

Woolley notes that the subsequently-developed ‘C³’ [command, control, communications] system was so sophisticated that ‘[f]or (Allied commander General Norman) Schwarzkopf, aspects of the Gulf War’s conduct, at least while it was underway, could have been a simulation. So it could have been for many of its participants’ (1993: 193). This resonates with Kroker’s characterisation of Desert Storm as essentially a “war of disappearances” and a radical technological distancing between appearances, acts and material consequences - not only the the ‘vanished’ civilian population of Iraq, the effective shut-out of the mass media through military

Commenting on this jubilant pronouncement, Stoessinger maintains that the US-led alliance ‘not only defeated Saddam’s army; they also exorcised the demons of lingering self-doubt from the Vietnam era. One marine who helped liberate Kuwait City brought with him an old American flag that had been given to him twenty-three years earlier by a dying comrade in Vietnam. A circle had been closed. Or had it?’ (1993: 202). The qualifier here is built on the fact of Saddam's political survival despite a decisive military defeat. In Damovsky, Kauffman & Robinson’s assessment, in the Gulf War the cry of “no more Vietnams” was reversed ‘from an antimilitaristic slogan to a rallying cry for rearmament, more weapons systems, and new strategies for fighting regional wars’ (cited in Norris, 1992: 131-32).
control of the networks in the "first all-TV war", and the "seduction" of public opinion overwhelmed by 'rhetorical signs of American martial valour', but also

'the mental dissociation of weapons from their virtual operators in the form of jet fighter pilots, who were reported flying into combat listening to heavy metal music, with Van Halen as the band of choice...[and] the dissociation of the dark and missing matter of the TV audience from the material history of the war' (Kroker, 1992: 49-50).

Dissociation from the 'real', and downright weirdness, were the order of the day through all phases of the conflict. According to a BBC documentary on postmodern artist Jeff Koons, before the outbreak of hostilities his wife, ex-porn star and Italian MP Cicciolina, proposed a unique war deterrent by offering to sleep with (Iraqi President) Saddam Hussein if he complied with UN demands to withdraw from Kuwait by the Jan. 15th deadline. On a different political level, Mestrovic draws attention to the fact that President Bush masterminded many of the operations against Iraq while on vacation - a calculated gambit, in that his 'aides explain that by waging war from a fishing boat in the waters of Maine or the back of a golf cart, he is sending a "message" that he is relaxed' (1993: 9). During the conflict, Western journalists variously referred to Desert Storm as a 4th of July firework display, 'the Saddam soap opera...the biggest computer game of all time', and, in the words of selected allied combatants, 'I feel like a young athlete at his first football match', '[i]t was exactly like the movies!' (Woolley, 1993: 190-191).

After the allied victory, as reported by Sterling (1993: 95-98), the 14th Interservice/Industry Training Systems and Education Conference (I/ITSEC) of November '92, held in San Antonio and sponsored by the US National Security Industrial Association, paid particular attention to the lessons to be drawn from the Battle of 73 Easting by the "military-infotainment" complex in presentations that managed to both market and mythologise the "surgical" and simulational aspects of 'the world's first purely designer war' (Kroker, 1992: 50). In as much as even the politically hostile New Internationalist (Oct. 1992: 12) cited opinion polls showing approval ratings for the War 'as high as 90 per cent in North America and Europe', these various attempts to depict the conflict as hi-tech entertainment spectacular
elicited the 'appropriate' response from the general public. Rosenblatt also opines that American responses were "rehearsed", prepared through pop-cultural developments: 'The movie Top Gun displayed the sense of speed; the video games, the sense of high-reflex accuracy. The rise of information technology in the 1980s, the development of lasers, sensors and microchips, it was all familiar stuff' (1991: 30).

The selling and reception of the Gulf War as showpiece of the "New World Order" exhibits both Mann's tendencies of spectator-sport and deterrence-science militarism, albeit in a more "up-front fashion" than the coiner of these terms may have expected. But reliance on such attempts to insure militarily 'successful' outcomes in the future is far from a foregone conclusion. In Discipline and Punish, Foucault noted that the move from 'Classical Age' state power exercised in the form of publicly-attended torture and execution of the condemned to 'modern' state power as exclusion and incarceration, occurred in part because of the potential of the former to produce resentment against officialdom and revulsion at the 'spectacle', rather than the intended awe and respect for authority, amongst the spectators (1977: 57-69). In the Gulf conflict the same concerns - provoked largely by the mooted negative effect of media coverage of the Vietnam war - produced an official account of events packaged as a contemporary version of the 'spectacle': this reversion again opens up the possibility of the display backfiring. One such spoiling of image management occurs in the increasingly common practice of parading POWs on television, and in the Gulf War, this took the form of flaunting nine downed allied pilots, each looking 'beat-up and under the gun' (Rosenblatt, 1991: 79), mouthing forced confessions to alliance "war crimes". The interpretation accompanying such performances aimed at stressing Saddam's inhumanity and Iraqi contempt for the Geneva Convention; but it also both dinted the impression of allied invulnerability, and graphically depicted the consequences of battle on combatants, such as tabloid-frontpaged British Flight Lt. John Peters, who, like turtles stripped of their shells, had been denuded of their hi-tech armoury and brought face-to-face with an older wartime reality, a reality disturbingly transmitted to media audiences in TV-time - later in reading time, when Peters co-authored his account of the experience in book form (Peters & Nichol, 1993). A more deliberate and practical effort to prise open cracks in the 'acceptable' face of the Gulf War was undertaken in 1991, when the steering committee of SCAWD (the Scottish
Churches Action for World Development) established *GulfWatch*, an alternative electronic information service operating through established fax, telex and e-mail networks, so that

'[s]ome of the same satellites that bounced down bombing schedules also carried messages of love - unscrambled, freely open to the interception we know takes place. In such small ways, perhaps, the oppressor's tool can help dismantle his fortress' (Hulbert & McIntosh, 1992: 27).

In the secular sphere, a similar tactic was deployed by the New York based anti-media group, Paper Tiger. Rushkoff describes the group's effort to transmit anti-war documentaries on the Gulf conflict through local PBS satellite links in conjunction with a 'maverick' broadcasting conglomerate ('Deep Dish'); the plan was successful to the point where the PBS parent company threatened local affiliates with revocation of their licenses (1994: 219-23). Swank's study (1997) also finds evidence of a sizable dissenting movement in major US cities that faded over a short two-month period, primarily because of suppressed reportage of opposition to the Gulf War by a mainstream corporate audiovisual and print media.

If the Gulf War is indicative of anything novel, let alone durable, in the history of international conflict, that novelty certainly does not reside in the establishment of a "New World Order". In both the formal political realm and the public sphere, what is most evident is a lack of control over events. Saddam Hussein's much-vaunted fighting force - spearheaded by the Republican Guard - and a purportedly frightening arsenal of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, are never deployed to effect: the pre-touted 'mother of all battles' does not eventuate. The Iraqi president is defeated, but retains his power. By way of contrast, his victorious counterpart loses the US presidency in the first election held after winning the war, in the wake of the 1989 collapse of Communist rivalry within the world-system - and also shortly after being awarded the accolade of *Time* magazine's 'Man of the Year' in January 1991. The nature of this award in fact contributes to the defeat, the magazine's cover depicting (in a remarkable echo of the Kantorowicz thesis) the "Two George Bushes": contradictory personalities housed in one body. The accompanying lead-story extended the metaphor to account for Bush's 'visionary' international relations
policies running in tandem with a disastrous lack of leadership in US domestic affairs. The results of this "splitting image" problem were as electorally - if not as literally - fatal for Bush as they proved to be for his 17th- and 18th-Century English and French counterparts (see section 4.3, p. 152); and several media pundits saw this as an example of the power of the press, citing the *Time* treatment as a prime ingredient in Bush's plummeting popularity ratings which had plunged from an unprecedented high of 90 percent to a disastrous 37 percent between January and November of 1991.

If control, or even full comprehension, of events was out of the hands of the political leadership of both contending parties - and if it rested neither in the hands of an American public reduced to merely approving or ineffectually protesting the war's reported progress, even less in the 'vanished' people of Iraq reduced to the level of victims and targets - where was it located?

Various commentators and analysts, those not entranced by the wizardry of new weapons technology or a resurgent patriotism, attempted to order the events and address this question. In so doing, most relied on a form of explanation that drew from older models: thus Habermas (1994: 5-31) supported the allied effort in terms of a 'Just War' principle and the need to show solidarity with Israel, given Germany's past war record. In Berman's view, this position enabled him to 'reject the anti-war movement while applauding its anti-militarist values, just as he underscores his opposition to German national militarists, despite concurring in their support for the US' (1991: 170). The widespread tendency to equate Saddam with Hitler - Kellner (1995: 227) cites 1,170 news articles making this fictional identification - would not have discouraged such support. McKenzie Wark's account of the war (1994: 2-6) stresses the incident of August 23rd 1990 when the Iraqi dictator, "entertaining" a captive western audience - television viewers in the 'global village' as well as the European "guests" physically in his company - placed his hand on the head of 7-year-old Stuart Lockwood, producing an outraged press response in the British tabloids. Wark interprets this reaction as based on an 'orientalist', colonialist view of the stereotypical Arab "other", and a vital step in the demonising construction of an implacable enemy.
Other authors wrung variants on this theme, Rick Atkinson's 1993 history of the war, itself titled *Crusade*, reaching as far back into the past as 401 BC and the *Anabasis* of Xenophon to make sense of the rout of the Iraqi army in the war's concluding stages. Writers on the Left characterised the conflict as motivated by capitalist politico-economic imperatives, or the business-as-usual of Western imperialism (the Iraqgate chronicles of Bloom *et al.*, 1994; Statement of the Workers League, 1991).

But in the most notorious commentary of the war - that of Baudrillard - such contextualising and efforts at order are futile; because despite it's masquerade as a real-world event, *la guerre du Golfe n'a pas eu lieu*. Prior to the event (?) he asserted that such a war could not occur, because sabre-rattling war talk could stand in for a real-life engagement; after reality uncharitably called this prediction into question, Baudrillard responded in March 1991 by writing a further article, entitled 'The Gulf War Has Not Taken Place', that reiterated the essential validity of his previous position. The logic of this latter paper asserted that since the conflict was so thoroughly "mediated", no objective or non-ideological information as to what happened was attainable. "Reality" was out of reach, devoured by assorted simulations. This allowed one to accede to the triumph of 'virtuality' and 'simulation', and to respond appropriately, because under such conditions we

'have neither need of nor taste for real drama or real war. What we require is the aphrodisiac spice of the multiplication of fakes and the hallucination of violence, for we have a hallucinogenic pleasure in all things, which, as in the case of drugs, is also the pleasure in our indifference and our irresponsibility and thus in our true liberty' (Baudrillard, 1995: 75).

The obscurity and sheer prima facie perversity of this provoked an immediate book-length response from Christopher Norris (1992), who attacked Baudrillard's 'absurd theses' in particular, and postmodern and neopragmatist theorists in general. Norris' prime claim stated that such views, by foreclosing any notion of an objective reality, produce an inherent quietism in the public sphere peculiarly amenable to the military activities of dominant nation-states within the "New World Order" of the 1990s. The only legitimate intellectual reactions within such perspectives are acknowledgement of the absorption of the "real" into the simulated "irreal", and/or proclamations of
the "end of history" - Fukuyama's approach - or "aesthetic" responses, celebrating diversity, relativity, irony and pastiche, abandoning futile attempts to discover nonexistent "truths" and avoiding burnout in the attempt to turn these into platforms of resistance. For Norris such mute acceptance of the 'postmodern condition' is untenable on both moral and logical grounds, and he clings to both the validity of Cartesian models of discernible truths, and the practical activism that motivates anti-establishment intellectuals like Chomsky.

Despite their opposed positions, there are elements of validity in all these opposed arguments as to the meaning of the Gulf War, so "impossible" [1] under a condition of post-modernity, yet hardly realisable in a previous period. Baudrillard's emphasis on the war as simulation [3] is not merely figurative; when combined with the logistical challenge of mobilising, transporting, supplying and maintaining sixty ships, over 1,000 aircraft and a quarter of a million troops, the military simulations culminating in the feints (the 'Hail Mary' play) of a supposed amphibious assault at Wadi al Batin to cover the decisive actual ground offensive on Feb 24th - constitute an achievement. Virilio's concept of 'Pure War' [2] is based on speed and surprise as well as a blurring of the line between war and peacekeeping - all factors evident in the Gulf conflict. The actual locus of control in the episode rests on a newer, more direct and more technologically sophisticated configuration of the war/text axis: a conjunction between the forces determining battlefield outcomes - the military - and those reporting on and orchestrating public response to events - the media. Kellner is correct in claiming a politico-military control over public communication, where the 'war against Iraq can be read as a text produced by the Bush administration, the Pentagon, and the media [4], which utilised images and discourse of the crisis and then the war to mobilise consent and support for the US intervention' (1995: 199), but leaves out of account the vulnerability to public opinion of one of these key players - an elected government - relative to either the codes and practices of the 'fourth estate' or the armed forces. If attempts to "deconstruct" the war's meaning by dissenters were themselves literally contained and "deconstructed" by the media, the 'schizopolitical' consequences of such subtle manipulation were felt by the incumbent President in November of the following year [6]: a hyperliterate populace [5] makes a mockery of political prediction.
As maintained above, the military sponsors and initiates hyperliterate participation in this wired world, where the apparata of computerisation - a terminal connected to a network [7] - can constitute a quasi-knowledge base of “the world” in itself, as it simultaneously curtails activity beyond the screens that make up the virtual world’s borders. As the Gulf War demonstrated, the capacities inherent in the new information technologies also function at the direct level of a weapon, and lead, as in the past, towards a further development of the incorporeal proxified subject. The multiplicity of proxies - texts - that act as guarantor of this subject’s existence, that confirm it’s status or deny it access to a body politic, that connect it to the textually-delineated world and it’s similarly-proxified inhabitants, are more numerous, more ephemeral, cover greater distances and move more swiftly than their forerunners: but, and also as in the past, these technological enhancements of reading/writing practices and artefacts retain their capacity to reconfigure the world as a wider - and deadlier - war-zone.
CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION

This thesis investigates 2 broad topic areas: the impact of reading and writing on diverse societies, with a particular focus on the sub-fields of literacy and textuality; and the causes, and persistence, of war. The first area constitutes a problematic, the second falls more clearly into the category of a social problem. The thesis argues that the two object-domains are linked. The claimed linkage works on three levels. The first, simplest and most transparent, is surface similarity - the evolution of both writing and war exhibit marked signs of 'jagged' but near-parallel development, are coterminous and co-locational, and tend to pass through similar stages of transition. This is more than merely coincidental, yet in itself no more than suggestive. A further contention is for a tighter linking at the level of system - changes in aspects of reading and writing affect and interact with changes in the ways that wars are initiated, fought and concluded to form a war/text axis. The third correspondence is on the dimension of structure. War and reading/writing share at base a mechanism of objectification, and a means of extending human capacities beyond the corporeal and the immediately-experienced environment. The operation of this mechanism is designated herein as the proxy principle: an enabling condition common to both textuality and war. The thesis contends that, beneath the surface coincidence of reading/writing and war, and beyond the systematic interplay of the two phenomena - at the level of deep structure - it is this principle that brings textuality and war into existence in the first instance.

Proxies are products of human creativity, take a variety of forms, and can be fashioned from any material. The purpose of the proxy is manifold - it can be decorative or functional, a receptacle of strength or weakness, symbolise virtue or vice, attract good fortune or ward off evil spirits. In all cases it 'stands in' for the human agent (or agents) that brings it into existence. The proxy principle comes into play when the surrogate is endowed with more power and greater capacity than its creator(s), and is invested with a 'life of its own'. At that point, the fate of the skin-bounded self - collective or individual - is determined by his/her (or their) relationship to what the proxy artificially embodies ('signifies').
Writing and written artefacts are conceptualised throughout as the most powerful instance of a proxy, constituting a meeting-point between the abstract and the tangible, material and spiritual, interpretation and fixity of meaning. When symbolic mark-making evolves to the level of a recognisable script flexible enough to encapsulate more knowledge and information than can be received, transmitted or housed in the brain, then the operant conditions for a fully-developed proxy principle are in place, and a range of effects - social, political, economic and cultural - on the life of the group and the individuals that compose it are set in motion.

One such effect - for which writing constitutes a necessary but not sufficient condition - is the instantiation of, or the escalation of extant violent corporate fighting to the level of, war. For war to take place, at least (a part of) one of the contending forces must utilise, or at a minimum come into contact with, texts, because only in societies containing a requisite population level, and which engage in violent combat governed by ethical, organisational and juridical sets of rules, can war can be distinguished from other forms of lethal intergroup conflict - and with almost no exceptions, it is only in societies with writing that such criteria can be fully satisfied.

The opening chapter laid the groundwork for an investigation of these issues, outlining the orienting proposition, providing a conceptual map - the war/text axis - expressed as a taxonomy, and a definition of the key terms used subsequently. The definitional issue was reprised in the following chapter, reviewing the sociological literature on war and various aspects of writing. A reluctance to engage with either phenomenon permeated the discipline, which, with regard to war and contrary to the long-run historical record, persistently invoked an image of its subject-matter - advanced industrial societies - as increasingly pacific. War was cast - with the notable exception of Weber's analysis, itself selectively "screened" in the interests of preserving the 'pacific transnational sociology' paradigm - as either marginal, moribund, or so "feral" and unpredictable as to be beyond the reach of sociological investigation. Similarly, approaching the topic of textuality was regarded with hostility, to the point where leading practitioners, in their writings, warned that 'proper' sociological writing involved as thorough-as-possible a disengagement from the process of writing itself. Reasons were proffered for both antipathies: and the
review concluded that despite these resistances, the world that the discipline took as its object of study was - and continued to be - significantly shaped by war; and that sociology itself was - and remained - always and ever textual.

Chapter 3 set out the theoretical foundations for the proxy principle: how the operation of this principle, at the level of both structure and agency, transformed a universe of bodies and physical environments into an amalgam of documentary artefacts and a world-as-text. The proxy principle operates when factual or fictional narratives of the world and written records of those within it slip past the second-order boundaries of description, inventiveness, or classification of an empirical world - and supplant, remodel, initiate activities in, or become - a 'real' world in themselves. The chapter in closing presented an instance of this process in the abstract - the world as warzone -, setting the agenda for the material constituting the remaining sections of the thesis.

The fourth and fifth chapters detailed the operational development of the war/text axis, primarily in case-study form supplemented by quantitative analysis, across 5 sociohistorical contexts: the "primitive", Græco-Roman antiquity, the Middle Ages, modernity and the 'post'modern. Amongst the first cohort - the "primitive" - large-scale intergroup conflict was either non-existent, or fulfilled few or none of the categories by which such conflict qualifies as "war". Moreover, (civilised) prohibitions against the normative violence that characterised the misnamed "primitive war" is in fact both the basis for prosecuting later forms of historical war, and a leading rationale for the marginalising, enslavement and/or disappearance of "primitive" peoples. In the cohort where large-scale combat does not exist or is sublimated into non-lethal mock-combat (76 cases), the sole commonality between the diverse cases is that all lack writing. Whether "savage" or "peaceful", the "primitive" as defined by the ethnographic record is non-warring and a-literate; on the evidence provided, the former because of the latter.

The Ancient World shows evidence of both war and - in its Græco-Roman incarnation - significant evidence of widespread literacy: protomodern civilisational entities and providers of a heritage for Western modernity. But a paradoxical heritage: the Greek
adaptation of earlier writing-systems into an alphabet is premised on contempt for writing as the invention of barbarians, and a privileging of rhetoric as fully human - the speaker-hearer relationship the basis for an unmediated Athenian direct/participatory democracy, to which writing (as Plato argued) represents a positive danger. As evidenced in Chapter 4, Greek warfare as a model for later forms is also more notable for what is rejected - the organisationally-fatal Achillean "heroics" and Alcibiadean privateering later punishable under military law - rather than what is inherited. Rome's governmental system shares the spirit of Greek disgust for the barbarism of writing, but not - because of the Imperium's intercontinental reach, size of the Legions and interaction with the barbarians at the peripheries - the letter: Rome's military is literate at all levels of the soldiery. In a subsequent consideration of medieval war and textuality, a further development of a war/text axis, where under the aegis of religions of the Book, the interests of the literati and the warrior caste merge. The former is provided with the military power to remodel the physical world into one that more closely accords with what has been read and written of, and the source material from which chronicles may be created; the latter is supplied with access to an elevated self-image (identified with mythical heroes or chivalric ideals) and a more effective organisational infrastructure. Eventually, in this mutually-reinforcing union of arms and letters, the 'letters' part of the equation is fully integrated into military systems. The armed forces themselves become a promoter of 'this-worldly' literate praxis.

This concept of a literate military and its place in the vanguard of literacy's dissemination into the sphere of civil society, is a feature of several of the 107 case studies that comprise the bulk of Chapter 5 - an analysis of the fully-elaborated war/text axis under conditions of modernity, focussing on the late-modern as inheritor of the proto-textualism of preceding Antiquity and the Feudal era. From a statistical analysis of 82 nation-states within the mid-to-late 20th Century world-system - and as predicted in earlier chapters of the thesis - war, relative to earlier eras analysed, increases throughout the period in terms of both extent (measured by frequency, duration, continuity of engagement and number of contending parties) and intensity (using casualty rates - military, civilian and total - as an index of intensity). This is because of - not despite - increasing (commitment to) mass and functional literacy, a high status allotted to the written word as authoritative, higher investments in
(typically compulsory) education, and improved global flow of information. The findings indicate that the incidence of war increases, even as refinements in the laws of war governing conduct attempt to curtail its more overtly savage aspects. As supposed earlier motives for war - the manhunt, plunder, vengeance, aggrandisement - are rendered formally illegitimate; as peace is regarded as normative and war as aberrant; as in the dominant core-states within the world-system the military are subordinate to governments installed through free elections, and the power of the military is reduced in a practical sense (shrinking defence budgets, lowered personnel levels and other facets of a “de-militarisation” process); within and through all these phases, war both survives and thrives.

War persists, moreover, at the epicentre of the civilising process - democracies committed in principle to peace. The analysis shows that, although - and in line with the Kantian proposal regarding republics - democratically-elected polities do not engage in wars against each other, they figure prominently in war-involvement against other regime-types. Notably, the findings show that military governments do not typically engage in national or international wars, whereas liberal democracies, from the 1700s on and peaking in the mid-to-late 20th Century, figure in all major (and a significant proportion of “minor”) wars. Yet within and commonly beyond the borders of democratic states there exists a general perception - as demonstrated herein, at the academic as well as the popular and political level - of the more advanced of these democracies as ‘peaceful’.

The thesis explains such apparent anomalies by reference to the proxy principle in its most developed form. The rationale for states with the highest levels of mass/functional literacy, exposure to print and print-derived media, information access and commitment to highest-order knowledge residing in the written - all of these civilisational indicators premised on freedom - to engage in war, is to be found in a textual rather than an experiential apprehension of ‘the world’. The acceptable motivation for warring by such states is constructed in the abstract, and limited to matters of principle. War in such states is always defensive: as the treatment of the ‘post’ modern 1991 Gulf War in Chapter 6 demonstrated, offensive war is the province of “rogue states” governed by leaders represented in an assortment of media portrayals as degenerate, dictatorial and/or demonic. What must be defended is not -
or not ever principally - tangible: but a cause, the maintenance of world order, "our way of life". Contemporaneity is herein theorised as the apogee of a proxifying transformation of the corporeal world into a world-as-text, one of whose central narratives is imminent or actual war.

In aiming at uncovering a link between two phenomena as complex and multifaceted as reading/writing and war, and in attempting to show the evolution of the link across vast tracts of time and space, the foregoing thesis is bound to be less than fully comprehensive. Nor can it hope to satisfy all practitioners within the various specialised fields from which it so freely draws. What has been attempted is necessarily limited in order to draw the clearest possible line under the central proposition - that reading and writing are causal factors in the construction of war. This has been demonstrated primarily with reference to one pattern of historical and sociopolitical development - the path taken by the West - and one mode of the textual, that of alphabetic literacy. Indications are provided that other civilisational complexes - chiefly the Islamic and the Oriental - are subject to the same broad processes, but this requires validation or disproof by experts in these fields, and the thesis can provide little more than a falsifiable entry into such an analysis. The category of 'the military' has also been abbreviated, treating only the army: there is clearly ample scope for an equivalent study of the effects of textuality on the air force and the navy - particularly fruitful fields for investigation of the proxy principle, in view of the fact that (a) the history of aerial combat is necessarily more limited in scope, allowing for finer-grained analysis within stricter time-frames; (b) objectification of the enemy is enhanced by the principals being enclosed within a fighting machine; and (c) both branches of the services proxify their personnel by removing them not only from the civil sphere, but from their natural (land-bound) environment. A final potential research area would be the effects of textuality on other social processes and institutions (such as work, the family, class, the law or any within the societal subsets that sociology takes as its subject-matter).

Much remains to be accomplished in the way of further research. What has been attempted here - and hopefully, substantially achieved - is at once a clearing-operation and a laying of the theoretical base from which to proceed.
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