MOBILITIES OF SELF AND PLACE:

POLITICS OF WELLBEING

IN AN AGE OF MIGRATION

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ABSTRACT

This thesis investigates the complex relationality of sense of place and sense of self to explore how, in circumstances of contemporary migration, wellbeing may be engendered and provide opportunity for both people and place to flourish. Often, environmental problems are attributed to alienation of people from places, and social problems to people’s dissociation and alienation from themselves. Some studies attribute both conditions to high levels of migration and other mobilities in the modern world, and address such problems of people and place as if the two were separate. The case will be made that people and place are inextricably related, and that taking their relationship into account can increase the efficacy of responses to challenges of contemporary migration. Here, people and place are considered together, and an investigation is made into the veracity of two claims: that belief in a flawed human nature is a deeper, underlying cause of those alienations; and that the relationality of sense of self and sense of place is key to wellbeing. The work challenges ideas that comfort and security can only be achieved by staying in one place, and seeks to demonstrate how it is possible to be both grounded in place and mobile. Such labours draw on insights from several disciplines, and on select theories to investigate politics of mobility and migration, identity and difference, ethics, rights, and agency.

Several original qualitative case studies are presented, analysed, and synthesised; these drawing on extended work with a disparate group of people with histories of regular and irregular migration. Critical engagement with their narratives explores beneath the surface of their utterances to find how, when faced with migration and relocation, some people appear to generate better coping strategies that seem optimal for them, and seem to express a sense of wellbeing more pronounced than others who report considerable distress and a sense of displacement.

Part one critically outlines conceptual frameworks related to mobility, place, and self; and investigates dynamics of the relationship of the self to itself that affect sense of self and sense of place. Part two explores contemporary migration and introduces
case study participants in categories of regular and irregular migration, and highly mobile lifestyles. Part three investigates challenges of resettlement, multiple senses of place, multiculturalism, racism, identity, and belonging. Discussion in part four articulates distinctions between identity and self, and considers how that understanding affects sense of self and sense of place. People’s alienation from or relational awareness of self and place is directly linked to the weakness or strength of their senses of self and place, and insights are given into how those senses might be strengthened. The final chapter summarises the research, documents its possible applications, and comments on its contribution to discourse on political and cultural geographies of migration, and mobilities of self and place.

The work, in total, challenges several people/place and human/nature dichotomies, and demonstrates the value of a research perspective that holds self and place as inseparable. The study’s findings also illuminate certain ways in which people might develop or deepen agency and optimise their sense of wellbeing in diverse circumstances of migration and resettlement. Fostering such comfort and security for people and place to flourish are political matters that gain urgency at a time when the scale of migration and displacement of peoples is unprecedented, and predicted to escalate. Significantly, the results of the research may contribute knowledge and understanding to inform policy and practice that respond to the challenges of migration and other mobilities.
DECLARATIONS

Originality: This thesis contains no material which has been accepted for a degree or diploma by the University or any other institution, except by way of background information and duly acknowledged in the thesis, and to the best of my knowledge and belief no material previously published or written by another person except where due acknowledgement is made in the text of the thesis, nor does the thesis contain any material that infringes copyright.

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Ethical conduct: The Tasmania Social Sciences HREC Ethics Committee granted Full Committee Ethics Application Approval (H0011088) to this project on 18 June 2010. The research associated with this thesis abides by international and Australian requirements and was conducted at all times in accord with the National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human Research, in particular with Chapters 3.1: Qualitative methods and 4.8 People in Other Countries.

Published work and co-authorship: A developmental version of the model of Self-Place Relations in chapter ten and brief reference to material from case studies was published in a chapter in each of:


Mahni Dugan, 17 January, 2015
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Family and friends have loved and believed in me. My husband, Geoff, gave me space and time and encouragement, and his love, wit, and wise compassion nourished and inspired me.

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PART ONE

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORKS
1. INTRODUCTION

[As] the complexities and difficulties in the world increase ... I am deeply convinced that these problems cannot be solved at all unless we boldly search for and revise our antiquated notions about the ‘nature of man’ [sic] (Korzybski, 1933, xxiii).

Human beings do not stay put; they never have. Wanderings and migrations of people have distributed and redistributed populations throughout history and even prehistory. Significant redistributions continue (Dahlman et al., 2011, 179).

Contemporary migration significantly affects people in places of origin, transition, and resettlement, as well as those migrating. It challenges us to discover how, in those circumstances, we might engender wellbeing, providing opportunity for both people and place to flourish. In this work I seek to address that challenge by investigating the complex, political interaction of sense of place and sense of self. Although recognition that these topics are interconnected has led to increasing multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary attention, these multifaceted concepts are often studied separately. However, migration inextricably relates to and impacts upon people’s senses both of place and of self. What makes this study compelling—even urgent—is that contemporary migration—voluntary, or through displacement or coercion—has become a major challenge in the world (UNHCR, 2012).

Delineating parameters in this work: Concepts of wellbeing differ between people, cultures, places, and theories (Campion & Nurse, 2007; Eckersley, 2013; Gray et al., 2012; Pickering, 2007; Ritchie et al., 2011). By wellbeing I mean a subjective quality of life related—but not equivalent—to satisfaction, happiness, and mental health as defined by the World Health Organisation: ‘a state of well-being in which the individual realizes his or her own abilities, can cope with the normal stresses of life, can work productively and fruitfully, and is able to contribute to his or her community. In this positive sense mental health—and therefore wellbeing—has value as a personal and community resource’ (World Health Organisation, 2011). By
to flourish I mean to thrive, and to grow, not in the neoliberal or capitalist sense—of, for example, unbounded economic expansion—but with the meaning that vitality, health, and wellbeing is evident in emergent stages of life cycles. To flourish might be for potential to be fully expressed, metaphorically, to fully flower. By politics I mean the relations between people and societies and the ‘production and distribution of power’ amongst them (Cresswell, 2010, 21). I am interested in the everyday politics of how people from a plurality of backgrounds might find ways to move from place to place, and to respond effectively and harmoniously to problems of living together with different others (Arendt, 1958; Häkli & Kallio, 2014). I am also concerned with the power and freedom people consider they have to constitute and express themselves rather than experiencing that their potential is socially, culturally or otherwise externally determined (Foucault, 2003b). Here, I seek to explore the politics of self and place by investigating the agency people experience themselves to have in the diverse, challenging, and changing conditions of migration.

Human migration is not new, but its current extent is unprecedented. In 2013 there were more than two hundred and thirty-two million international migrants (UN, 2013), and the UNHCR reports that in 2014 the number of refugees, asylum seekers and internally displaced people exceeded fifty million, the highest number since the Second World War (UNHCR, 2014b). Actual figures would be higher because the UNHCR estimates are indicative, and do not cover all areas. Additionally, people are increasingly mobile within countries. For instance, in Australia—a country with ‘one of the highest levels of mobility in the world’—more than forty per cent of the total population changed places of residence in a five-year census period from 1991 to 1996 (Bell et al., 2000, xiii); a rate persisting in current movements (Hugo et al. 2013, 1). Similar figures pertain in the USA, and internal migration in China involves about ten per cent of that country’s population—more than one hundred and fifty million people moving between rural and city areas annually (Hu et al., 2008). Up-to-date figures are not available (at the time of writing) for intra- and international migration resulting from current conflicts—for example, in Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, Myanmar, Pakistan, and several countries in Africa—but the UNHCR reports that they total many millions.
Migration poses multi-dimensional political challenges involving various motivations, forms, and responses to and management of its impacts. Contemporary migration is motivated primarily by conflicts—including wars, religious and political intolerance, ethnic cleansing, marginalisation and concomitant inequalities, persecution, and terror—natural disasters, and economic aspirations, particularly because of the wide disparities in incomes that can be earned for similar work in different places (International Organization for Migration, 2011). Migration encompasses moves made voluntarily and others coerced, or forced, in several categories. Definitions vary, but broadly, regular migration covers voluntary movements of people within the requirements of national and subnational border regulations; and irregular migration is a term used for movement of people outside those parameters (International Organization for Migration, 2011a). Irregular migration covers labour migrants, refugees, and others seeking asylum but not yet recognised as refugees within current international conventions (UNHCR, 2011).

Struggles to deal with challenges of migration occur from international to personal scales, and may be grouped into three categories: First, efforts to regulate and control borders through political and economic policies and military action; second, planning and logistics to meet the physical needs of people in transition and resettling, and to meet the disparate needs of mixed communities in receiving places; and third, responses addressing the emotional, psychological, and spiritual needs of people affected by migration. The attention of governments is often focused on the first category; to varying degrees, migration inflames international and national tensions; and political, economic, and environmental security issues dominate much discourse (Dannreuther, 2007). Irregular migration currently receives most public and media attention in some regions. The second category attracts international notice, especially addressing displacement and poverty (UNHCR, 2012; UNHDR, 2013). Practical provision for migrants and effects of migration vary widely within countries. The extent of contemporary migration increases demand to meet people’s needs in terms of migrant wellbeing, quality of life, and development across a broad range of dimensions (International Organization for Migration, 2013). All three categories involve a politics of mobility—that is, ways in which mobilities produce
and are produced by social and spatial relations involving production and distribution of power (Cresswell, 2010).

Significant academic attention is paid to challenges of migration, but there are gaps in research into the third category designated above, that I identify in two ways. First, many studies acknowledge emotional, psychological, and spiritual needs related to migration, but in response to those needs most focus on changing or improving extrinsic conditions—that is, physical, social, and other factors outside the self (for example, Eyles & Williams, 2008; International Organization for Migration, 2013; Pile & Thrift, 1995; Sandercock, 1998). Work that directly addresses emotional, psychological, and spiritual issues related to migration mostly aims to be remedial, primarily dealing with trauma and mental illness, rather than with factors of wellbeing (for more, see Bhugra & Gupta, 2011; Murray et al., 2008). Extrinsic and remedial responses of course are important. A wealth of research and literature does address the emotional, psychological, and spiritual needs of people in general—but not specifically in regard to migration. Ample knowledge is available in the humanities, the social sciences, and in what Nikolas Rose (1996) calls the psy disciplines—psychology, psychiatry, and their variants; research concerned, for instance, with how people function, models of understanding of suffering and wellbeing, and social and therapeutic responses to them. Little research has sought to apply that knowledge to migration or focused on wellbeing rather than illness. It is these gaps that I address in this study.

Second, there is a widely held assumption that wellbeing depends upon attachment and sense of belonging to place that manifest only when people stay in one place. This presumption is prominent in studies of sense of place (Cameron, 2003; Mathews, 2005) and has strongly shaped environmental movements in western societies (Davison, 2008; Thomashow, 1995), particularly those influenced by ideas of bioregionalism (Evanoff, 2007; Metzner, 1998; Sale, 2001). Implied in this work is the supposition that it is unlikely that people could move from place to place and be well. Despite the very large number of contemporary migrants, some estimates suggest about ninety-seven per cent of all people in the world stay in their countries of origin (Dannreuther, 2007, 102). For most people, ‘the experiences of everyday
life are still firmly rooted in place and [are] crucially important for informing us of who we are’ (Perkins & Thorns, 2012, 2). Perhaps this predominance makes normative an attitude that a sedentary lifestyle is wholesome, and implies that there is something suspicious about or lacking in people who migrate (Cresswell, 2006; Morley, 2000). Notably, suspicion is often greatest when migration is forced or among people perceived to be semi-skilled or unskilled.

But, does wellbeing depend on people staying put? Does increasing migration—which is predicted to multiply rapidly in coming decades—mean that increasing numbers of people are destined for a rootless and alien existence of placelessness and anomie? Or is it possible to be both grounded in place and mobile, a question in which is embedded a series of other questions about how to conceptualise place, movement, and identity? What do these questions have to do with human rights, not just to life, but to quality of life? What rights do people have to move from place to place and to belong in place, show self-respect, and be accorded respect by others? What—beyond, or even in spite of physical and other external conditions—provides opportunity for people to flourish? Charles Taylor (1989, 12) writes that to ‘talk of universal, natural, or human rights is to connect respect for human life and integrity with the notion of autonomy. It is to conceive people as active cooperators in establishing and ensuring the respect which is due them’. The issue is essentially one of agency, which depends on rights accorded to people by governments or laws or other individuals or groups, and on people’s sense of self. Perhaps the epitome of this dynamic is the remarkable story of the German Jewish psychiatrist, Viktor Frankl (1905–97), who survived internment in Auschwitz concentration camp and went on to build a new life, and to contribute to a positive understanding of human nature. In Frankl’s words (2004, 75) ‘Everything can be taken from a man but one thing: the last of the human freedoms—to choose one’s attitude in any given set of circumstances, to choose one’s own way’, and further, ‘When we are no longer able to change a situation, we are challenged to change ourselves’.

The questions above are at the centre of this study; as with all questions of human wellbeing, they ultimately bear on ontological questions of human nature. I shall argue that at the core of modern western accounts of human nature is a deeply
embedded assumption that the nature of human being is flawed. Drawing on scholars such as Richard Tarnas (1991) and Charles Taylor (1989), I seek to delineate the origins and consequences of this belief. To demarcate, when I refer to human being I am referring to a process of ontogenesis; when I say people I am referring to human beings.

Environmental, social, and individual human problems are attributed to the flawed nature of human being. Yet, insights I have gained by four decades of professional praxis as a personal development counsellor in the human potential field strongly suggest that belief that human being is flawed is the deeper, underlying cause of these problems. Some studies attribute environmental problems to alienation of people from place (Castree, 2005; Cronon, 1996) and social and individual problems to alienation of people from themselves (Fisher, 2002; Sattmann-Frese & Hill, 2008; Winter, 2003). I shall argue that belief that human being is flawed is the cause of alienation of people from self, from others, and from place that leads to those wider problems. Further, I shall argue that believing that there is something fundamentally wrong with people—including oneself—leads to other limiting ideas: for example, that some people are better or worse or of greater or lesser value than others, that there are good people and bad people, and that people who are different are in some way threatening or dangerous. My contention is that such beliefs underlie situations of conflict, and the problems and fears commonly associated with acts of migration. How people are defined inevitably affects their behaviour, and attitudes, and responses to them—as is obvious, for example, in racist reactions to migrants of different ethnic origins. Taylor (1989, 5) explains that such moral reaction assents to and affirms ‘a given ontology of the human’:

Racists have to claim that certain of the crucial moral properties of human beings are genetically determined: that some races are less intelligent, less capable of high moral consciousness, and the like. The logic of the argument forces them to stake their claim on ground where they are empirically at their weakest. Differences in skin colour are undeniable. But all claims about innate cultural differences are unsustainable in the light of human history (7).
This study is motivated by my interest in what might be possible if we were to conceive differently of human being—that is the ontogenetic process and potential of being human. I take as obvious that for both people and place to flourish, much needs to change in human behaviour. If we separate who we are—being—from our behaviour—doing—and presuppose that there is nothing wrong with being human, then what might we discover that would support us to change our behaviour? The burden of this thesis is to argue that far from being flawed, human being is intrinsically wholesome, and conducive to wellbeing. It is my conviction that this assumption of the wholesome nature of human being enables an integrated and relational sense of self. Further, a more relational sense of self makes possible wholesome relationships with others and with place, regardless of whether people are mobile or sedentary. I desire to contribute insights and possibilities generated by a research approach based on this assumption of human wholesomeness. Potentially, such insights may be of significant value in the context of contemporary mobility and migration, and may provide opportunities for people and place to flourish.

Specifically, in this work I seek to understand how, when faced with migration and relocation, some people generate better coping strategies, demonstrate greater resilience, and express a more pronounced sense of wellbeing than others who suffer considerable distress and a sense of displacement. Empirically, to such ends I have undertaken qualitative case studies of a disparate group of people with histories of regular and irregular migration. When it comes to migration, there is not a level playing field; clearly some people are privileged, advantaged, and supported, and others are marginalised, persecuted, and traumatised (Massey, 1994). Yet, neither extension of the rights and equalities for which many people advocate, nor provision of other extrinsic conditions—alone or in combination—is sufficient for wellbeing.

My approach is fourfold. First, I establish a conceptual framework to be deployed in exploring ontological and epistemological questions of sense of self, sense of place, and of agency; and examining experiences of migration. Second, I provide narrative description and detailed qualitative analysis of experiences of migration and mobility. Third, I consider those experiences in relation to an extensive critical literature—synthesised from a range of disciplines that often have dealt with these
issues separately—including works from philosophy, human and political geography, the *psy disciplines* (psychology, psychiatry, and their variants), and what might be called the *eco disciplines* (such as ecopsychology, social ecology, eco-philosophy). Fourth, I aim to develop new theoretical insights and principles that can inform policy, and be used to develop programs to increase wellbeing and reduce suffering among people migrating, in places of transition, and in receiving countries. That composite purpose takes this study beyond the extrinsic conditions people experience to investigate what I will call the underlying human condition—the totality of a person’s intrinsic state of being.

My motivation for this study arose from having worked professionally over four decades to enable people to develop strategies to experience, maintain, and enhance their wellbeing. In the course of this career, I came to understand two things. First, at the heart of human suffering are the negative meanings that people give to their own and others’ experiences, which become part of their conscious and unconscious strategies and practices. Yet this suffering is not inevitable. Second, at the heart of wellbeing are other meanings people give to their own and others’ experiences, and strategies and practices by which people value themselves, others and their worlds, and live in ways that affirm life (Brown, 2008; Buscaglia, 1986; Dugan, 1991; Fisher, 2002; Sattmann-Frese & Hill, 2008; Seligman, 2006). These meanings, strategies, and practices form what Mitchell Dean (1999, 13) calls *regimes of practice*—‘the practices by which we endeavour to govern our own selves’—and constitute the quality of intrinsic experience. I wanted to investigate how this dynamic affects the wellbeing of people migrating. Arguably, people’s regimes of practice are inextricably related to the quality of their experiences of mobility, and to their senses of place and self.

*Mobility*—a concept that has attracted much recent attention from social theorists—encompasses migration and the many ways in which it affects people in places of origin, transition, and resettlement, as well as those actually migrating. Tim Cresswell (2010, 19) defines mobility as ‘the entanglement of movement, representation, and practice’, and as inherently political. Suffering and wellbeing are affected by people’s freedom and ability to move or lack of it—to be pushed and
pulled, sedentary, nomadic or otherwise mobile in ways that are uni- or multidirectional, temporary or permanent, local or international. Such has been the extent of human movement in recent decades that John Urry (2000) called for a new mobilities paradigm in the social sciences, one resting on a mobility turn that challenges the sedentarist focus he sees as implicitly underpinning most research. Mimi Sheller and Urry (2006, 211) claim that mobilities research valuably brings together a broad field ‘encompassing studies of exile, migration, immigration, migrant citizenship, transnationalism, and tourism’. It covers a spectrum of human movement from the local to the global; and it investigates the impacts of mobilities on people who stay in place, for instance, providing services, raw materials or other goods to places and people that are more affluent (Urry, 2007). Mobilities are involved in experience of people migrating and those native to, or long-term resident in countries accepting migrants and refugees. Evidently, mobilities have implications for all. For me, mobilities are intimately associated with ways in which sense of place and sense of self are also mobile; that is, how they are constituted, developed, modified, move, and change in varying conditions and over time.

Noting the complex relations between concepts of place and of nature, here place is addressed in terms of the following: First, the locations of geographical places; second, the attachments and meanings people have for places; and third, as the ‘existential ground’ from which human being emerges (Malpas, 2008, 6). I understand sense of place as people’s awareness of place in each of those ways. This threefold understanding of sense of place is a foundational premise of this work. The state or quality of people’s sense of place is likely to affect the quality of their experience and behaviour, including care for or neglect of places.

Self is analysed herein as process—as being. I understand identity as the product of this process, at any given time. Thus, the self is always a work in progress, not a fixed thing. Sense of self, I take to be awareness of oneself mediated by the meanings—and thus, identity—one gives to oneself. If identity is taken to be the self, that is, if effect is mistaken for cause, then sense of self is limited to whatever is included in that identification, and flexibility of response is limited. However, if

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1 In my view, the term mobilities is grammatically vexatious; nevertheless, this plural form serves to
sense of self includes awareness of the processes of becoming that underlie identity, then the person is likely to experience greater flexibility, more choices of response, and increased agency. Thus, the extent and meaning of a person’s sense of self is likely to affect the quality of his or her experiences, sense of agency, and relationships with others, place, and movement.

I argue that the state or quality of a person’s sense of self relates to his or her capacity to be open to sensory awareness of place—a sensibility extending beyond cognitive perception into modes of embodiment that enable people, wherever they are, to develop sense of place. In turn, sense of place may provide a foundation from which people realise and develop their senses of self. The relationship between sense of self and sense of place is likely to be critical to people’s wellbeing, whether they stay in one place or move many times; and will underpin their ability to adjust to transitions, relate to different others, and care for changed environments. I expand upon these arguments of mobilities with regard to migration, place, and self in chapter two.

**Methodology**

**My premises**

People’s experiences of migration and relocation are intricately interwoven with diverse senses of self and place, identity and belonging. These topics are the focus of increasing multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary attention, and there are productive connections between research on mobilities and migrations (Blunt, 2007, 685). Daniel Sui and Dydia DeLyser (2012, 113) write of hybrid geographies that ‘seek to integrate in grounded practices elements thought to be incompatible or conflicting’; and, in line with their review of methods and methodology, my aim is to ‘challenge existing boundaries [and] integrate perspectives’ on mobilities, migrations, self, place, and their relationality in development of theory across disciplines. I blend methodological approaches from both the humanities and social sciences, which makes definition of methodology in this thesis challenging. I do not identify one approach as being of greater influence than the other. The research relies more upon
rhetorical than analytical engagement, which situates it within a humanities methodology rather than in social science frameworks, yet it also includes social science approaches (discussed below). Thus, this methodology, also, might be described as hybrid.

The conceptual frameworks employed here are drawn primarily from philosophy and ecopsychology, and elaborated on in depth in chapter two. I note here my particular debt to Michel Foucault (1980, 1988, 2003; Rabinow & Rose, 2003)—and to the development of his ideas in the work of Mitchell Dean (1999). Geoff Danaher, Tony Schirato and Jen Webb (2000), and Barbara Cruikshank (1999). I have drawn from Foucault’s work concepts including the conduct of conduct, and his archaeological and genealogical approaches to research to throw light on how people’s narratives are co-constituted, socially, culturally, and personally; and how people use their narratives to govern and give meaning to their actions and experiences, and to open possibilities for change. My understanding of Foucault influenced my use in this study of narrative theory (Bruner, 2003) especially narrative interpretation and hermeneutics (Josselson, 2004; 2007; 2009), which allows a nuanced understanding of how people ascribe meaning to experiences of migration and resettlement. The work of political theorist Hannah Arendt (1958; 2003)—about displacement of people, citizenship, and human rights after the Second World War—provides significant insight into these aspects of contemporary mobilities. Charles Taylor (1992), Val Plumwood (1993), Richard Tarnas (1991), and others provide ontological and sociological critiques of the human condition, upon which I draw to emphasise dualisms underlying hegemonic narratives and problematics of individualism.

The interdisciplinary, integrative nature of this study is evident with inclusion of analysis relating to self and place from ecopsychologists, Andy Fisher (2002), Theodore Roszak (2001), and Deborah Du Nann Winter (2003); anthropologist, Gregory Bateson (1972; 1979; 1991); social ecologists, Richard Bawden (2011), John Cameron (2003), and Werner Sattmann-Frese and Stuart Hill (2008); geographers, Anne Buttimer (1993) and Noel Castree (2005); and biologist, Mary Clark (2002). My theoretical investigation of place, and its significance in the
context of migration, is drawn particularly from the philosophical work of Jeff Malpas (1999; 2008) and geographers, Edward Relph (1976; 2008) and Yi-Fu Tuan (1977).

My intention in using the list above is to acknowledge scholars whose thinking has significantly influenced my own, not only in the process of this research but over decades. I am clear that I stand on the work of many others and, thus, that any work I do necessarily builds upon whatever I have integrated from others over many years. Rather than listing scholars often cited in the thesis separately from those I simply want to acknowledge I have grouped them according to discipline or field. Although I judge that it is unnecessary to deeply discuss all of their work in this dissertation, I do consider it important to table that all those named have contributed to my thinking, and to provide the reader with an overview of disciplinary perspectives upon which I draw.

On the basis of my integration of such diverse literature, three premises inform the present research. First, people’s behaviours and experiences are bound up in self-validating ontological and epistemological beliefs (Bateson, 1972). For example, if people believe that their identities are tied to one place, relocation can threaten their sense of self. Often people experience themselves as displaced even years after migrating, and cling to the languages and customs of their places of origin (Wendorf, 2009). Second, ontological and epistemological beliefs and practices are woven into, and are at the core of narratives that establish what Foucault called conditions of truth, and these determine how people know what they know, and what it is possible to know (Bruner, 2003; Goodson, 2013). For example, if people believe that they are threatened by difference in others they are likely to maintain and assert their own ways, defend these against other customs, and believe that it is not possible to find value in different others. Such fear of difference, as, for example, Leonie Sandercock (2000, 18) shows, can lead to ‘racist and xenophobic panics’ that result in ‘ghetto-izing of immigrants’ (23). Third, problems that cannot be solved within the limits of the conditions of truth challenge those aforementioned narratives, and thus call into question the ontological and epistemological beliefs and practices at their core. Current issues presenting such challenges—specifically relating to mobility and
migration—involves socio-political upheavals, abuses of human rights, definitions of citizenship, accommodation of disparate cultural and religious moralities and laws; racist, ethnic, cultural, and religious conflicts that often lead to marginalisation; economic inequalities; and more personally, fears of loss, the erosion of ways of life, and other stresses of resettlement that lessen wellbeing and fuel fears of different others. In later chapters, I exemplify these issues and challenges by considered reference to case study narratives.

**Qualitative approaches**

The prolonged act of writing this dissertation has contributed to the development of what Norman Denzin and Yvonna Lincoln (2000, 4) describe as an *emergent bricolage*: a construction of representations that changes and takes new forms as views are interwoven, and as different tools are added to the puzzle (see also Heywood, 2000; Lincoln & Guba, 2000; Richardson, 2000). To the bricolage of methodological claims and conceptual framework sketched above, I add my prior research, learning, perspectives, and principles. This praxis is relevant on several counts: First, my clients include many migrants, people of varied ages, ethnic and cultural backgrounds—men, women, and children—many of whom worked with me at times of transition. Second, I facilitate programs internationally in a range of subject areas focusing on sense of self, value fulfilment, wellbeing, and ecologically healthy change. My emphasis is to enable people to access their potential, to develop and express it for their own wellbeing, and to contribute to their worlds. I help people to realise how their narratives of self are constituted and to see the opportunity that this awareness provides for self-actualisation and agency. I encourage them to grapple with the implicit challenge to recognise ecology—that everything is connected—and thus to be aware of the consequences of their actions beyond themselves. Third, this praxis equips me with a high level of competence in interviewing, listening to, analysing, and assessing people’s narratives.

I draw five principles from my praxis: First, people can be trusted to move towards holistic wellness (Chobocky & Dugan, 1979; Fisher, 2002; Woodburn, 1980). Second, to experience that wellness fully, we need to value ourselves, others, and our worlds. Third, if we are to relate well, it is necessary to respect our own and other’s
worldviews—this respect is not about liking those models, but recognising that everyone legitimately has a unique view (Dalai Lama et al., 2013; Dilts, 1998; Goodson, 2013; Korzybski, 1933). Fourth, people are fundamentally of good intent; at deepest core levels people’s values are not in conflict, and people are not their behaviours (Dugan, 2003; Wheatley, 2010; Woodsmall, 1994). Fifth, relative truths operate; what we believe determines what we experience; prophecies and beliefs are self-fulfilling and narratives are self-validating (Bateson, 1972; Kuhn, 1996; Weston, 2009). When clearly defined—and *if held to be true*—these principles can open opportunities for positive change and experience of wellbeing. That is, they constitute an ontological practice that seeks to bring into being a world congruent with these *truths*. As heuristic devices, these ethical standpoints provide a challenging alternative to hegemonic perspectives, and they reveal subtleties in, and allow for, varied interpretations of human experience.

The relevance of lived experience to deepening understanding of how people handle migration and relocation led me to employ *qualitative case studies* as the primary method of empirical investigation. These case studies provide knowledge about how eleven people have handled transitions from place to place as migrants, refugees, asylum seekers or with life-styles of high mobility. Anthony Elliott and John Urry (2010, xi) support using this method for mobilities research ‘as a means of better comprehending the import of complex and hugely contested mobility processes’. In taking a case study approach, I was not looking for statistical evidence of various phenomena or quantities of people exhibiting certain behaviours or attitudes, nor did I want to prove or disprove any theory. Rather, I engaged with people whose lived experiences might illustrate and provide insights into what can make relocation problematic or can facilitate it, and I sought to understand their varied and several responses to changes of location. I wanted to know what might be learned from such people about the relationship between sense of place and sense of self. What values, attitudes, and enabling beliefs do these people hold, that support their wellbeing and that of the places they inhabit? Are there characteristic patterns of thinking or behaviour that underlie wellness? What helped and what hindered them in relocating? What have these people experienced or learned that could be useful to other individuals and to communities facing challenges of mobilities and change?
How might this learning be applied to promote social wellbeing and care of environments more generally in an increasingly mobile social order and in disparate places?

Robert Yin (2003, 1) holds that case studies can be used for exploratory, explanatory, and descriptive purposes. He specifies case studies as ‘the preferred strategy when “how” or “why” questions are being posed, when the investigator has little control over events, and when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within some real-life context’. According to Jennifer Mason (2002, 165) a case study approach ‘is a practice guided by a search both for the particular in context rather than the common or consistent, and the holistic rather than the cross-sectional’. Mason states that case studies allow understanding thematically, yet with distinctiveness of different elements, and awareness of the subtleties and intricacies of how different aspects relate, and work in particular contexts (165–6). Jamie Baxter (2010, 82) adds that the ‘primary guiding philosophical assumption is that in-depth understanding about one manifestation of a phenomenon (a case) is valuable on its own without specific regard to how the phenomenon is manifest in cases that are not studied’. Baxter writes that the resultant understanding ‘may concern solving practical/concrete problems associated with the case or broadening academic understanding (theory) about the phenomenon in general’ (ibid.). Yin (2003, 28–33) confirms that theory can be generalised from case study results, and stresses the importance of developing theory prior to conduct of any data collection on the grounds that those theoretical propositions facilitate fieldwork. Comparison of empirical results with theoretical propositions enables ‘analytic generalization [that becomes] the main vehicle for generalizing results of the case study’ (ibid.).

A qualitative case study approach allows for extended engagement with participants, and elicitation of rich narratives. It enables in-depth exploration of lived experiences, strategies, and acquired wisdom, and narrative interpretation. Case study interviews contribute data to theory development, enabling abductive processes whereby ‘theory, data generation and analysis [are] developed simultaneously in a dialectical process’ (Mason, 2002, 180). My personal history is relevant to the research because I have moved more than seventy-five times—to live in country and city locations in
four Australian states, in Papua New Guinea, and in Japan—and I have led a mobile life, travelling and working internationally. This background informed design of the case study and shaped the interviews.

**Ethical processes**

Case study research warranted ethics clearance from the Tasmania Social Sciences HREC Ethics Committee. Full Committee Ethics Application Approval (H0011088) was granted to this project on 18 June 2010. Full approval was required because one of the people to be invited to participate in the study lives outside Australia, and because of sensitivities that might be raised in discussions. Accordingly, my application showed how the research complies with the relevant section in the *National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human Research* (2007), Chapter 4.8: People in Other Countries. As well as giving rationale and background for the project, and its aims and justification, the ethics application responded to the committee’s concerns for due care in selection of participants and conduct of the study. Because the research involves biographical case studies of individuals it includes data that might be considered personal and private. I noted my professional praxis (particularly counselling and mentoring), considerable experience, high level of competence in communication skills, and significant ability to relate to people sensitively, with empathy and respect. I assured the committee that the study would be conducted [and it was] at all times in a manner that accords at least the respect and protection that the *National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human Research* requires, in particular in accord with Chapter 3.1: Qualitative methods. Copies of the participant information sheet and consent form were attached, and an outline given of feedback methods.

**Case study selection and recruitment**

Earlier, I identified several gaps in research. First, many studies of migration respond to emotional, psychological, and spiritual needs by addressing extrinsic conditions rather than people’s internal states. Second, migration usually is not the focus of studies dealing directly with people’s emotional, psychological, and spiritual needs. Third, research concerned with how people function tends to emphasise illness rather
than wellbeing. Fourth, the extent of contemporary migration makes urgent research that might show alternatives to the widely held assumption that wellbeing depends upon people staying in one place. To address these gaps, rather than focusing on problems associated with migration, I sought to explore wellbeing. With that aim, I set out to work with people who had been challenged by relocation, and who, to varying degrees, had discovered and developed positive responses to their circumstances. The first set of criteria for selection was that participants had lived in more than one country, changed location many times, and reported that they had settled well. I wanted to interview people who were articulate, open, with some overt history of coping positively with life’s challenges because these people would have developed strategies, and probably could describe what they perceive enabled them to handle migration and resettlement.

At first, I selected three women and three men. They are a mature-aged group, and from a commonsense view might be considered well-adjusted and contributing members of their communities. At their current stages of life, they could be described as professional, educated, and middle class, yet their diverse backgrounds include poverty, social ostracism, exclusion, displacement, war, cultural diversity, and histories of changing places. These people represent a range of ethnic and cultural backgrounds: Yukari is a Japanese woman, Kiros is a man from Ethiopia, Richard and Julian are men born in England, Carol is a woman originally from Scotland, and Carola, another woman, is from Germany. Four of them are people I have known for many years, so before beginning the research, I was aware of the diversity and richness of their experiences. Two are people known initially by my principal supervisor and recommended to me on the basis of the criteria I had in mind and my supervisor’s knowledge of them. She asked their permission for me to approach them prior to my contacting them.

With the exception of Yukari, who lives for part of each year in Guatemala, Denmark, and Japan, the aforementioned participants have all migrated to live in Australia. During the course of the research, I met a couple about to migrate from Australia, and asked to interview them to extend the study: Connie is from the USA, her husband, Jun, from Japan. Having lived as a family with their two young sons at
first in the USA, then for two years in Australia, at the time of interview they were preparing to relocate in Japan.

Several factors led me to include three more people (with the support of my supervisors, and first having checked that they fit within the terms of the research ethics approval). The perspectives of these three were different from the others, and promised to broaden significantly the understandings this thesis might offer. In the context of contemporary political dissent in Australia about people seeking asylum, onshore or offshore processing of their claims for refugee status, and the ignominy of detention centres (Burnside, 2013), I am concerned about the plight of such people. Recognising that outcomes of this study could be relevant to resettlement of migrants in that category, I invited participation of two such people through contact with the Phoenix Centre, an organisation providing services in Tasmania for refugee and asylum-seeker survivors of torture and trauma. Khadga had lived in a refugee camp in Nepal for nineteen years before being accepted with his family to live in Australia; Shoukat fled Afghanistan, then Pakistan, then came by boat to Christmas Island, and from there to Australia.

The third new participant is Nene, who came from a refugee camp in Sudan to Australia at the age of fourteen, and is now a young adult. As noted by Matt Bradshaw and Elaine Stratford (2010, 72), ‘Sometimes we find a case, and sometimes a case finds us. In both instances, selection combines purpose and serendipity’. Meeting Nene was serendipitous. I first saw her at a Living in Between event in Hobart, presented by a group called Students Against Racism.² The young people in the group were humanitarian entrants to Australia who were encouraged by their teacher, Gini Ennals, at Hobart College, to form the group in 2008. The event was a dramatic presentation of the group members’ reasons for leaving their homelands, their journeys to Australia, and settlement in Tasmania. After witnessing that presentation, I contacted Gini to ask if it might be possible to include one of those young people as a case study participant. Gini recommended Nene, and put her in contact with me. Inclusion of these three participants brought the full complement of case studies to eleven.

² This information about Students Against Racism is in public domain, and available on a website: http://www.afairerworld.org/_Current_projects/lib.html#interview
The interview process

Early in the research I developed a case study protocol—which Yin (2003, 67) describes as ‘a major way of increasing the reliability of case study research’ [original emphasis]. The protocol was aligned with the aims of the project and development of theory prior to entering the field, and I used it to identify substantive issues being investigated and questions that needed to be asked. Case study questions fell broadly into two areas: those to ask when interviewing participants, and those to ask of the studies for analysis of data. Yin explains that orientation in a case study is quite different from that in a survey instrument, questions being directed to the investigator, rather than to the person being interviewed, the main purpose being ‘to keep the investigator on track’ (74). Questions central to the protocol included: What are the participants’ narratives—particularly of mobilities, migrations, and resettlement? What strategies have the participants used for coping with migration and resettlement? How have they experienced sense of self and sense of place? How did their senses of self and of place develop? What effects have they experienced from migrations and resettlement in regard to identity, belonging, sense of self, and sense of place? What assumptions, beliefs, values, and attitudes have contributed to the quality of their experiences, their senses of self and of place, and to their ability to handle migration and settlement in new places with suffering or wellbeing?

Rigorous application of the protocol later helped me to analyse and select from interview material, and to develop theory. Within this framework of inquiry, people were invited ‘to participate in a research study exploring how the relationships between people’s sense of self and sense of place affect their experience of significant place changes’. The invitation clearly stated that I was seeking their stories, including personal information, and outlined the purpose of the research to contribute academic and policy-relevant knowledge that might support people in retaining and growing a sustainable sense of self and place while making significant transitions, particularly changes of place.

Each person was interviewed twice, and interviews recorded, fully transcribed, and analysed by me. In the first interview, I asked participants to tell their life stories. I limited my input to ensure that my influence on their narratives would be minimal.
After each of those first interviews, which were descriptive and anecdotal, I used a checklist of topics and noted where, in the interview transcripts, those topics were covered. I then prepared questions for the second interview to pick up points missed, and to elicit fuller information using a more dialogical and interpretive style of interview. Conversationally, in the second interview, we discussed participants’ core values to further explore their motivations and consider what factors were most important to them when resettling. Although the format was semi-standardised, differences in histories, individuality, and variety of responses meant that my phrasing of questions was adapted from one to another of the participants. After each meeting, I gave participants a copy of their interview recording. In due course, I sent participants my written interpretation of their narratives and responses to questions, to check accuracy and reconfirm (in writing) their consent to use of the material. In some cases, for final clarification, I asked other questions in phone or Internet conversations or by email.

The origins, histories, travels, and current situations of these eleven people are given in later chapters, précised, analysed, and interpreted by me from transcripts of their narratives. It is important to acknowledge that all participants gave me permission to use their stories, to quote from my records of interviews with them, to express my opinions, and to draw my conclusions about them in the context of this study. Because it would be relatively easy to identify some participants through the detail of their stories, I asked all of them for—and was given—permission to use their real names. Later, two participants, for different personal reasons, asked for only their first names to be used. Given that circumstance, for reasons of style I decided to use only first names of all participants.

The environments within which interviews took place significantly enhanced the quality and extent of insights gained. Some interviews and ensuing conversations were held in participants’ homes. This situation provided extra information; for instance, I was shown photographs and items participants had collected on their travels or brought with them from places of origin or transition. For the first interview with Carol and Richard, I stayed at their home in the Blue Mountains outside Sydney. Talking with them in that place, where they have settled after many
journeys, allowed me to witness—rather than just hear about—how at home they feel. Staying with them for a whole weekend made deeper insights possible. For example, I had recorded the first interview over several hours with Carol one afternoon. At breakfast the following morning, stimulated by the interview, she was bubbling over with memories and insights so graphic and pertinent that I turned the recorder on again for another couple of hours. If I had not been there, all that rich material would have been missed.

An interview with Yukari took place while she was in Tokyo and I was in Australia, over the Internet, which provided a unique experience. It was 7 April 2011; Yukari and I were conversing on Skype, just a month after the major earthquake and tsunami disaster that had devastated Fukushima in northeast Honshu. Some minutes into the conversation, on the screen I saw Yukari and the room she was in begin to waver and shake—not the pixels breaking up, but the room she was in. Yukari said:

Now the earthquake is happening, excuse me—we have the earthquake at least twice every day since then—every day, every single day, it is almost like the Earth has its own biorhythm, and it happens around eight o’clock in the evening and around one o’clock in the daytime.

Then Yukari sat there, gazing at her hands loosely clasped on her desk, yet with an inward look, silent, calm, and still, waiting for the tremor to pass. I could hear it. Watching the screen, with memories at a cellular level of smaller earthquakes I had experienced on visits to Japan, I felt the disorientation of ground beneath me shifting, realigning—physically felt it—yet knew myself to be safe at home in Tasmania. The earthquake went on for several minutes that seemed to be a much longer time. When it stopped, Yukari looked up again, with a gentle smile, and answered the question I had asked just before the earthquake began. As it happens, amongst the hundreds of aftershocks following the major earthquake in March, the magnitude of the one on 7 April was amongst the highest. Such situations during the interviews gave immediacy to the relationship between participants and me, and generated rich accounts of their lives.
Interviews with Shoukat, Khadga, and Nene were quite different from the others, and shorter. Each spoke English well enough for our purpose, and Nene, who by then had been in Australia for seven years, far longer than the other two, was the most settled. They were quite willing to talk to me, but spoke of such painful memories it was inappropriate to press for detail. The trauma of certain experiences meant they had simply shut off clear memory of some events (Bhugra et al., 2010; Goodall, 2013; Manzo, 2008; van der Kolk, 2006), and Shoukat was deeply preoccupied with fears and longing for his wife and child, still in mortal danger in Pakistan. I felt there was a limit to what the three could say because of a subtle difference in the way they thought of themselves—identifying their senses of self through family and community, rather than with a more individual sense of self common to the other participants. The cultural context and significance of participants’ self-understanding is something I explore further in later chapters.

**Analysis and synthesis**

The primary strategy I use for case study analysis is narrative interpretation, which is significant as a hermeneutic and heuristic device (Josselson, 2006; Josselson & Lieblich, 1995; Payne, 2006). Alison Blunt (2007, 686) writes that narrative research reveals ‘the importance of personal memories, stories and experiences of migration’. Participants’ narratives reveal their histories and ‘the meaningful shape emerging from selected inner and outer experiences’ (Josselson, 2006, 4). Sometimes significant events participants recall indicate turning points, times of change and growth; and at other times changes can be seen in patterns over time (McAdams et al., 2006). Describing narrative interpretation, Josselson (2011, 33–4) writes:

> Through narrative, we come in contact with our participants as people engaged in the process of interpreting themselves. What constrains us is the very thing that intrigues us: what we are dealing with are core meaning-making systems of real people and with issues that pertain to us, as humans, as well. The truths inherent in personal narrative issue from real positions in the world—the passions, desires, ideas, and conceptual systems that underlie life as lived. We work with what is said and what is not said, within the context in which life is lived and the context of the
interview in which words are spoken to represent that life. We then must decode, reorganize, recontextualize, or abstract that life in the interest of reaching a new interpretation of the raw data of experience before us.

Narrative interpretation illuminates how identity is societally or culturally authored and how people create themselves in narrative (McAdams et al., 2006). It brings to light nuanced understanding of participants’ cultural backgrounds and their individual experiences. It reveals distinctions in senses of self and of place significant in coping with movement and relocation with varying degrees of resilience and wellbeing. Participants’ stories provide material for exploring questions of agency in disparate situations; for instance, one of the case study participants—Kiros—refused to be sent to a refugee camp and independently achieved relocation and citizenship with his family in Australia.

The practice of narrative research, as Josselson (2006, 3) emphasises, ‘is always interpretive’. There is a tension between attempting to ‘render the meanings as presented’ by participants, and reading ‘meanings that are hidden, either unconscious or so embedded in cultural context as to make them seem invisible’ (4). To provide meanings as presented by the participants, I summarise narratives from transcripts, and quote directly from them in later discussion. Inevitably, the stories are affected by the interview relationship, what I have selected to include, and what I have omitted. Notwithstanding, interpretation, discussion, and qualitative analysis of the narratives shapes and bounds the study. Resources for my interpretation are located in three key contexts: relevant literature and the conceptual framework developed in chapter two, understanding of social ecology and psychology drawn from my professional praxis, and my history of mobility which provides methodological reflexivity.

Thus, for analysis I relied upon an abductive research strategy—a dialectical process of ‘moving between everyday concepts and meanings, lay accounts, and social science explanations’ (Mason, 2002, 180). For example, some theorists hold concepts of self as independent in western cultures, and interdependent in eastern cultures (Kan et al., 2009). In Yukari’s account of what was common for people in Japan when she was growing up, she said that having a sense of self ‘maybe never
happens’. Yet, Yukari did develop a strong and clear sense of self—so the research explores how she did that—by means of what mobilities, what changes of people and places and her relationships with them did Yukari emerge to be the uniquely individual, globally mobile adult she is today? Using this abductive strategy, I synthesise features common across participants’ narratives, distinguish counter examples, and further develop theory by reference to literature. As part of that strategy, in the first year of this research, based on emerging distinctions about senses of self and place, I began to hypothesise a framework relating the state of those senses to a range of experiences of agency and wellbeing. As I collected data and observed patterns in participants’ narratives, I returned to that provisional model and considered it abductively, asking to what extent there were correspondences with data. The model contributed to development of theory, it became a useful adjunct to other means of analysis, and is presented in chapter ten because it enables synthesis of findings from the study as a whole.

To honour and highlight lay accounts, I have used participants’ own words to give articulate expression to a point, to decentre my authorial voice, and to create a more dialogical text rather than only paraphrasing, interpreting, or analysing text from interview transcripts. Direct quotes are attributed to each person by use of their first name. Amongst them, participants’ stories encompass moves made voluntarily for relocation or regular transnational travel, migrations within the requirements of subnational and national border regulations, and other moves which were forced or coerced. Although there is some overlap in individual narratives, on the basis of their experiences of migration I have grouped the participants into three main categories of mobilities. Explained in some detail in later chapters, these categories are of regular migration, irregular migration of refugees and others seeking asylum, and mobile life styles.
Outline of the work

Part One: Conceptual frameworks

Chapter one introduces contemporary migration as a context for the study, positions the thesis in relation to research in diverse fields, and outlines methodology and method design. In chapter two, I examine major theoretical concerns of the research and conceptual frameworks, focusing on mobility, place, self, and senses of self and place. Challenging the assumption that human being is flawed, I acknowledge origins of that belief in western thought, and ask whether alternative ideas destabilise or further entrench it. Questioning what agency people have, I consider dynamics instrumental in self-constitution.

Part Two: Lived experiences of contemporary migration

In this part, I explore contemporary migration and introduce the case study participants. First, in chapter three, I explore contemporary multiculturalism and summarise the use of immigration to populate Australia. In chapter four, I introduce Carol, Carola, Jun, and Connie as regular migrants; in chapter five, Kiros, Khadga, Nene, and Shoukat as irregular migrants; and in chapter six, Julian, Richard, and Yukari as people with highly mobile lifestyles. Each chapter begins with an overview of the relevant category of migration. In those contexts, I introduce participants and provide a summary and initial analysis of their histories of migrations.

Part Three: Challenges of resettlement

In this part, I investigate a range of challenges of settling in new places, consider related literature, and continue to unfold participants’ stories connecting with those challenges. In chapter seven, I focus on how sense of place affects the way people relate to new environments. In chapter eight, considering dilemmas—particularly of ethnic differences—I point out that everyday racism persists, and discuss the need for recognition and respect of self and others. In chapter nine, I explore questions of belonging and identity in regard to place and ethnicity. Investigating diverse
practices and perceptions of personhood, I consider community, language, religion, emerging and hybrid cultures, and participants’ approaches to making home in new places.

**Part Four: Integrating insights**

My aim in this part is to integrate the insights and learnings gained in the research, discuss the findings, and draw conclusions. In chapter ten, I distinguish further between identity and self, then use a heuristic model relating sense of self and sense of place to further analyse participants’ narratives. Focus in chapter eleven is on documenting ways to strengthen senses of self and of place. To that end, I consider what weakens those senses and ask how they might be strengthened, drawing more on participants’ narratives, and analysis of their experiences. Then, I consider what the findings provide in response to the original questions of this thesis. In chapter twelve, I summarise the research and discuss its possible implications and applications, and propose avenues for further research.
2. MOBILITY, PLACE, and SELF

A clear distinction is often drawn between places and those travelling to such places. Places are seen as pushing or pulling people to visit. Places are presumed to be relatively fixed, given, and separate from those visiting. The new mobility paradigm argues against this ontology of distinct ‘places’ and ‘people’. Rather there is a complex relationality of places and persons connected through performances (Sheller & Urry, 2006, 214).

Mobilities and migrations

What I shall describe as a mobilities approach allows for recognition that, in all their diverse forms, migrations are not isolated incidents. Take as one example—a scenario probable even as I write—a person afloat in a leaky boat, risking life to seek asylum somewhere. She or he is a nexus in an apparently infinite field of relationships; at the centre of connections that span causal conditions of conflict or strife, and which motivated that person to risk safety and life to flee from his or her place of origin; that extend outwards both spatially (here, there, between) and temporally (past, present, future). Consider other connections of personal relationships with community, and to friends and family left behind; to people dead and living; to those praying that this traveller’s journey might offer new hope for a safe and decent life; and to others who would wish them ill. Consider connections to places of origin, transition, and destination, in which are entangled the possibilities of asylum, refuge and resettlement, and freedom; or detention behind razor wire—with loss of rights and identity. In short, migrations are intricately connected with movement and change in politics, economies, social structures, and governance—that is, forms of the conduct of conduct—from the body to the locale to the global (Dean, 1999; Foucault, 1980; Foucault et al., 2003; Rose, 1996). This complex connectivity is at the heart of emerging interdisciplinary studies of mobilities that inform this study (Sheller & Urry, 2006).
In chapter one, I noted that the plurality of the term mobilities was vexing, but it serves to highlight the extent and diversity of relational connections of mobility such as those sketched above. While Mobility is the title Peter Adey (2010, 18) gives to his book on the subject, he rationalises use of the plural form throughout the text on the following grounds: ‘To speak of mobility is in fact to speak always of mobilities’; any mobility always involves other mobility. To amplify: because to be mobile is to be capable of moving or of being moved, and because movement can only occur in relation to something other, any movement invokes mobilities. For Adey, mobility is both a relational concept and a process: mobilities are involved in how we address the world and make sense of it, and implicated in how we engage with other people and places (19). Positing mobility as underpinning ‘many of the material, social, political, economic and cultural processes operating in the world’, Adey writes that ‘mobility is surely as important to us as the conceptions and debates that surround notions of space, time and power’ (31).

Exploring contested meanings of mobilities, Adey discusses David Harvey’s ‘reactionary response’ to globalism and mobilities in the 1990s, and Doreen Massey’s contemporary critique of Harvey’s views (74–76). Although this exchange took place within the discipline of human geography, it has wide relevance. Adey describes Harvey’s aim as seeking fixity, stability, boundedness, and permanence for places, with concurrent desires to ‘hold off suspicious migrants’ and to sustain economic flows (ibid.). On the other hand, Adey notes that ‘Massey encourages us to look past the sense that “real” meanings of places can only be found in fixity and rootedness, or indeed, that they are simply a reaction to the hubbub and fluidities of globalization’ (75). Massey (1994, np) writes that views such as Harvey’s emphasise ‘the insecurity and unsettling impact’ of effects of global mobility, and ‘the feeling of vulnerability which it can produce’. She argues that there are ‘serious inadequacies’ in responses to notions of mobility that link ideas of security with fixity, and that these can result in uncertainty about places, and promote ‘problematical sense[s] of place, from reactionary nationalisms, to competitive localisms, to introverted obsessions with “heritage”’ (ibid.). She considers, therefore, that what is needed is ‘to think through what might be an adequately progressive
sense of place’ that looks through local details to grasp their connections to global patterns and processes (ibid.).

Debate continues between those emphasising sedentarism and mobility. Making an appeal for the new mobilities approach, John Urry (2000, np) argues that traditional sociology—based on the study of society—is ‘outmoded in an increasingly borderless world’. Calling for researchers to let go of sedentarist views, Urry advocates a mobilities perspective that engages ‘with the flows of people within, but especially beyond, the territory of each society’ (3). Although Urry holds that globalisation ‘fractures [the] metaphor of society’ as made up of bounded regional clusters, he insists that globalisation should not be seen as competing with, or as replacing, those societal clusters with a global economy and culture. Rather, he sees a need to replace ‘the metaphor of society as region with the metaphor of the global conceived of as network and as fluid’ (33).

Urry’s views have not gone unchallenged. Adrian Favell (2001, 389), for example, contends that Urry’s project is unlikely to last, and that globalisation and international migration are ‘fashionable topics … the academic publishing world has gone crazy about’. Claiming that ‘Urry proceeds to sweep away practically every recognizable feature of twentieth-century sociological thought’, Favell makes a scathing attack on Urry’s ‘globaloney’ as ‘a spectacularly ambitious manifesto … of off-the-wall ideas’, parading ‘the usual philosophical heroes—Heidegger, Derrida, Deleuze/Guattari, Rorty, Virilio—alongside a number of other social theorists to whom he owes a good deal’ (391).

Notwithstanding Favell’s comments, ongoing debate about the relative merits of mobilities and sedentarist views highlights that ‘dislocation, displacement, disjuncture, and dialogism [are] … widespread conditions of migrant subjectivity’; and it explores ‘the complex interrelation between travelling and dwelling’ (Sheller & Urry, 2006, 211). Mimi Sheller and Urry (2006, 208–9) claim that a mobilities view ‘is not simply an assertion of the novelty of mobility in the world today’, but aims to shift research from a sedentarist approach to one that goes beyond examination of social processes in spatially fixed settings. Arguing that ‘all places are tied into … thin networks of connections that stretch beyond each such place and
mean that nowhere can be an “island”’ (209), they seek to explore the ‘complex relationality’ of people and places, rather than treating them as distinct entities (214). Contributing to this debate, Tim Cresswell (2006, 1–2) holds that sedentarist views position mobility as ‘an alternative to place, boundedness, foundations, and stability’, but he relates mobility to power. Cresswell points out that mobility is often portrayed ‘as a threat, a disorder in the system, a thing to control’ (26), and cautions that:

consequences of a sedentarist metaphysics for mobile people are severe. Thinking of the world as rooted and bounded is reflected in language and social practice. Such thoughts actively territorialize identities in property, in region, in nation—in place. They simultaneously produce discourse and practice that treats mobility and displacement as pathological (27).

In Cresswell’s view, proponents of sedentarism see ‘place, in its ideal form … as a moral world, as an insurer of authentic existence, and as a center of meaning for people’ (30), and often assume mobility is a dysfunction. Cresswell argues that much social research is informed by ‘a very strong moral geography that marginalizes mobility ontologically, epistemologically, and normatively’ (32). As an example, in the field of architecture, Juhani Pallasmaa (2008, 144) states unequivocally that as ‘fundamentally biological, cultural and historical beings [humans are] bound to space and place’. Deploiring the frequency with which many people move from house to house, or even have ‘a novel life style without a home altogether’, he calls this ‘an existential nomadism … life itself in constant transition without roots and domicile’ (ibid.). Pallasmaa asserts that ‘increasing mobility, detachment and speed must have dramatic consequences for our consciousness, our sense of belonging and responsibility, and our ethical responses’ (ibid.). Working from the field of comparative religion, Peter Nynäs (2008, 169) considers that there is ‘an intrinsic relationship’ between place and a sense of being a moral subject. However, rather than holding that such relationship depends on any single place, he views it as contingent. For example, when people find rules they are used to do not apply in a new place, or discover or discern that ‘the place deprives them of their sense of responsibility [then] a deteriorating sense of being a moral subject’ might result (ibid.). In Nynäs’ view, more profoundly significant than a particular place are
movement and mobility—that is, the interaction between a person and their environment, wherever they may be (171).

These discussions of mobilities are politically significant, not least in relation to migrations of various kinds; and nation states impose meanings of legitimacy or otherwise on movements of individuals. Governments or elites of some nation states limit citizenship and immigration in bids to control racial purity, as it is constituted in collective meta-narratives of race. Persistent gross inequalities, discriminatory violence, ethnic cleansing, and religious and political persecution continue to displace people and force migrations from many countries and regions (UNHCR, 2012).

Cresswell (2006, 264) writes that ‘a term such as refugee [used to label] people without a place who need to be regulated … highlights the entanglement of mobility with meaning and power’. Roland Dannreuther (2007, 106–7) examines the politics and perception of migration as a challenge to the security of nation states. He points out that it can ‘appear particularly hypocritical that the developed countries preach the doctrine of economic liberalization and globalization while setting up strong and seemingly impenetrable borders to forestall the free movement of people’, especially when globalisation increases economic inequalities. In turn, Urry (2007, 188) writes that much political organisation ‘presumes a citizenship of stasis’—in other words, that rights and responsibilities apply to people with long-term membership in bounded territories. Notably, however, length of residence does not necessarily translate into rights or citizenship. For example, Synnøve Bendixsen (2013) writes of Ethiopian migrant workers in Norway protesting deportation. Bendixsen documents their claims to have citizenship granted on the basis of their long-term work and relationships with local communities in Norway. Another example, in an entirely different category, is that of the Rohingya people. More than 800,000 Rohingya live in Myanmar, according to the UN, which views these people as one of the world's most persecuted minorities (UNHCR, 2013; 2014). The Myanmar government contends that these people came to the country (then called Burma) during the period of British rule (1824–1948), and, therefore, they are illegal immigrants. In this
example, not even residence of a hundred years or more ensures citizenship; on the contrary, these people are subject to ‘alarming levels of violence’ (UN, 2014).

Adey (2010) writes that mobilities expose and maintain inequalities, power struggles, and injustices, and that:

> to move is to be political. Mobilities are underscored by political decision making and ideological meanings that arrange mobility and the possibility of mobility—motility—in particular ways to relations of society and power…. From the simple access to services and the enabling of one's rights as citizen, to the complicated blurring of belonging by post-nationals, the waging of and protest against war, and the uncertain consequences of mobility for people a thousand miles away effected [sic] by rising sea levels, the politics of mobility is clearly multifaceted and incredibly contingent.

In summary, this brief review of a mobilities approach to social research makes it clear that people and place, economics, politics, and mobilities are thoroughly interrelated. As Anthony Elliott and Urry (2010) write, massive and varied increases in movements of people within and across borders have been propelled and produced by economic and political globalisation ushering in changes to traditional ways of life, exacerbating uncertainties, and reshaping identities. Such movements affect both migrants and those already in places of transit and destination, confronting them with all sorts of unknowns—unfamiliar people, changes to places, shifts in social, political, economic, and living conditions. Dealing with such unknowns raises significant tensions that affect people’s senses of self and place, and their experience of suffering or wellbeing.

For many people, migration can be stressful, even perilous, particularly—but not only—under conditions of hardship, forced relocation, or persecution (Bhugra & Gupta, 2011). In the process, place and environment also suffer neglect, exploitation, and damage. For other people, it appears possible to adjust to movement and change in ways that draw on and engender wellbeing. Clearly, then, migration need not be harmful to relationships with people and place. Yet, it is obvious that contemporary
mobilities have a disassembling effect, unsettling certainties, and presenting people with novel views of themselves and their worlds. People on the move experience changes to their senses of self and place, and people in receiving regions experience changes as a result of others’ migrations. Such effects are of key importance in the research reported here. Recall that the aim of this study is to understand how, when faced with movement and relocation, some people generate better coping strategies, greater resilience and a more pronounced sense of wellbeing than others who suffer considerable distress and a sense of displacement. In chapter one, I asked several questions, including: Does wellbeing depend on people staying put? Or is it possible to be both grounded in place and mobile? What rights do people have to move from place to place, and yet to belong, to be accorded respect, and to have opportunities to flourish? In response, my next step is to interrogate notions of place and self, and the function of narratives by which people give meaning to their senses of place and self, and to their journeys.

**Mobilities of place and sense of place**

An ontological understanding of place as a condition of existence has been developed by Jeff Malpas (1999, 15), who explains that ‘the appearance of things—of objects, of self, and of others—is possible only within the all-embracing compass of place. It is, indeed, in and through place that the world presents itself’. Crucial to that understanding is that place is not ‘something encountered “in” experience, but rather, place is integral to the very structure and possibility of experience’ (31–2, [original emphasis]). This ontological understanding has significantly influenced recent writing on sense of place. For example, Edward Relph (2008, 35) reflects on the elusiveness of place as a concept, and recalls how, in the 1970s and 1980s, he and others such as Anne Buttimer, David Seamon, and Yi-Fu Tuan had taken the view that ‘places are fusions of physical attributes, activities and significance, aspects of the experience of the everyday world that can be explicated phenomenologically but are inherently inaccessible to statistical analyses’. Relph acknowledges that Malpas’ inquiry, and work by Edward Casey, turned such views ‘on their heads’.
Except in some very trivial senses, [place] is not a bit of space, nor another word for landscape or environment, it is not a figment of individual experience, nor a social construct, and it is certainly not susceptible to quantitative excavation. It is, instead, the foundation of being both human and non-human; experience, actions and life itself begin and end in place (36).

Noting the importance of distinctions Malpas makes between place and places, Relph differentiates ‘sense of place’ from ‘sense of a place’ (ibid.). He explains sense of place as ‘the critical ontological awareness that existence is always placed and unavoidably engaged with the unities and differences of the world’ (ibid.). Sense of a place he defines as the synaesthetic faculty we use to identify and appreciate different properties of a place, that ‘combines seeing, hearing, smelling, and touching with memory, responsibility, emotions, anticipation and reflection’ (ibid.).

Malpas (2010, np) explicates his distinctions of place by reference to a quote from Gertrude Stein. On returning to her place of origin after many years abroad, Stein summed up her impression with the words: ‘There is no there, there’. Malpas explains that the third ‘there’ in Stein’s utterance simply relates to location—a spot on a map, an address, a set of co-ordinates, a site. The middle ‘there’ is about the significance of that locale, its history, and meanings given to it by different people according to their purposes, or attachments, what it represents to them, their evaluations, and emotional responses. Those two usages of ‘there’ designate places. The first ‘there’ Malpas then defines as the ‘existential ground’ in which everything finds its being, and that determines human being and all that human can do. Furthermore, for Malpas, ‘places occur in place’. In what he describes as an ontological way of thinking about place, Malpas defines ‘place as existential ground … a matrix … that nexus of elements that supports and enables things to be what they are … that nurtures, and sustains, and allows things to be able to come to presence … that supports, contains, and enables the complex interrelatedness of all’ (ibid.).

If place is that existential ground, and places are various locales, environs, significances, attachments, and relationships arising from that matrix, how then
might sense of place be understood? Can it occur only in relation to particular places—Relph’s ‘sense of a place’? Or is it possible, as Relph suggests, to have an *ontological* sense of place—an awareness of place as a fundament of being—existentially as well as physically providing the ground on which we stand? Relph (2008, 38) asserts that the ‘combination of sense of places and ontological sense of place … is an existential foundation for individual and communal well-being’. He further proposes that these senses of place—plus a related sense of the connections between many different places—are important when it comes to finding ways to cope with change (42).

Given Relph’s analysis, I ask: might experience of these senses of place increase people’s agency and wellbeing when migrating, and settling in new locations? Generally, in literature of migration and mobility, an ontological sense of place is not addressed. What role does that ontological sense play? And how, then, might it be stimulated and developed? With all the variables of mobilities, is it possible to have a sense of place—in any place, at any time—that includes awareness of place as our existential ground? And I wonder—in regard to any definitions of place—to what extent is *sense* of taken to be *idea* of rather than actual experience? These are questions I explore throughout, and use in analysis of case studies in later chapters. I also examine literature from a range of sources for further understanding of place and its relationship to people’s experience of wellbeing.

In work relating sense of place to sense of wellbeing, Lily DeMiglio and Alison Williams (2008, 20–1) classify sense of place as ‘an umbrella concept that captures the essence of the relationships people form with places’. They suggest that sense of place encompasses emotional bonds; strongly felt values, meanings, and symbols; qualities of a place; continuously constructed socially and culturally shared meanings; and awareness of cultural, historical, and spatial context. Indeed, ‘time, residential status, age, ethnicity and the characteristics of the place [influence and] mediate the relationship … and in turn, the sense of wellbeing derived from sense of place’ (23). DeMiglio and Williams note Eyles’ proposal that sense of place is ‘an interactive relationship between daily experience of a (local) place and perceptions of one’s place-in-the-world’, arguing that this conceptualisation—which accounts for
social position and material conditions—can be used to understand health and wellbeing (26).

Evidently, as well as the capacity of place to provide the essentials for physical existence, such as water, food, and shelter; and for social opportunities such as work, education, and lifestyle variations; place is significant to people in terms of more symbolic and relational dimensions of human existence, such as identity, belonging, and wellbeing. Exploring notions of home, David Morley (2000, 212) writes that ‘it is still common to think of cultures as depending on and being rooted in places’. Through ‘stable patterns of interaction of the same people doing the same things, over and over again, in the same places’, Morley’s understanding is that ‘place comes to act as a generator of cultural belongingness, so that the geographical boundaries round a community also come to carry a symbolic charge in separating out those who belong from those who do not’ (ibid.). There is agreement that sense of place is firmly linked to places of origin, and that it can be difficult to develop in new locations (Bhugra & Gupta, 2011; Kobayashi et al., 2011; Pallasmaa, 2008; Relph, 1976; Tuan, 1977). Noting that sense of place is connected to people’s relatively unconscious ‘state of rootedness’, Tuan (1977, 194) explains that ‘people identify themselves’ with the place they feel is home for them and for their ancestors. When people are displaced or migrate to foreign territory alienation from place can result.

Alienation from place refers to people’s various experiences of placelessness and of being separate, disembedded, or dissociated from, or not belonging to whatever place they are in. Relph (1976, 51) defines ‘an alienation from people and places, homelessness, a sense of the unreality of the world, and of not belonging’ as ‘existential outsideness’. In everyday experience, feelings of being alienated from place range from being uncomfortable, or out-of-place in a location, to struggling with a hostile environment. Alienation from place affects people’s wellbeing and is evident in disregard of places—for example, when people fail to pay attention to the place they are in, litter, pollute, or otherwise despoil their environments. There is agreement that when people are alienated from place both people and place lack
wellbeing (Albrecht et al., 2007; Keith & Pile, 1993; Malpas, 1999; Morley, 2000; Relph, 1976; Tuan, 1977).

There are also views that mobilities cause alienation of people from place. Cresswell (2006, 31) writes that some authors consider that mobilities involve ‘the absence of commitment and attachment and involvement—a lack of significance [and thus that mobilities are] antithetical to moral worlds’. Sedentarist views hold that redress of that alienation can only occur when people stay in one place. Some, such as Freya Mathews (2003, 199), encourage developing a healthy sense of place within cities; she recommends ‘if you possibly can, find a place of residence that you can occupy indefinitely, and commit to it’. Mathews (2005, 55) later insists that only by being in one place over time can people be accepted by place, and that place ‘can never receive the casual or expedient sojourner or stranger in such familiar fashion’. It is perhaps problematic that she does not specify any length of time, and attitude (not ‘casual’ or ‘expedient’) seems to be an at least equal criterion. In similar vein, for Peter Cock (2003, 95) staying in one place is a normative good, and the idea that ‘we can be separated from country and community, wander from place to place, and still be whole, powerful people [is a] false myth of individualistic humanism’. However, people can and do experience alienation from place even when living in one place, particularly in cities (Urry, 2007). In contrast, while Relph (2008, 37) recognises that rootedness ‘is generally considered to be positive, something that contributes to well-being and quality of life because knowing and being known somewhere provide security and dependability’, he also writes that ‘concomitants of narrow place experience are parochialism, exclusion, and a tendency to reject unfamiliar differences’.

Whatever may be the virtue of staying in one place, it may not always be possible. Indeed, the capacity to stay put is ‘at least partly a function of one’s privilege/power in the world’ (Plumwood, 2008, np). On one hand, mobility might be considered a privilege of the wealthy, along with recognition that vast numbers of people living local lives are poor. On the other hand, being able to stay in one place is an unattainable luxury for many other people, as attested by the numbers experiencing forced migration, whether because of political conflict, persecution, social unrest,
economic need, or climate or other environmental changes (Massey, 1994). In the context of global mobilities, Val Plumwood (2008, np), understands place attachment as a casualty of ‘dominant market cultures which commodify land and place’, and of labour markets that usually want ‘individual workers who have few or portable attachments’. She claims that the dissociation permeating the culture of the global economy problematises even the concept of ‘a singular homeplace’, or ‘our place’ (ibid.). In her view, global capitalism creates a split between an ‘idealised homeplace’ and ‘the multiple disregarded places of economic and ecological support … places delineated by our ecological footprint’ (ibid.). Here, Plumwood recognises both the itinerant nature of many people’s lives, and the concurrent dwelling-in-place of others, many of whom she sees as remaining largely unaware of, or ignoring the mobilities, interconnections, and dependencies that make their lifestyles possible.

In turn, John Cameron (2003, 6) emphasises that ‘place is not the mere passive recipient of whatever humans decide they wish to do upon the face of it. The land is an active participant in a very physical sense’. Cameron, who describes sense of place as ‘the relationship between people and the local setting for their experience and activity’ (3), points out that sense of a place includes ‘a growing sense of what the place demands of us in our attitudes and actions’ (6). Understandings of sense of place expressed by Cameron and others are particularly relevant to how people relocating might regard, experience, and treat places of resettlement. For example:

What is the climate? Is it similar to or different from their places of origin, or transit? Do people find it easy or difficult to live in these places new to them? Are these places hard to maintain, or accommodating? Is there a need to conserve water, or is it abundant? Do people feel supported, or uplifted by a place? Do they find a place depressing, and feel they have to endure it? Do they despoil the environment, exploit it, simply disregard it, or take care of it? Advocates of ecopsychology, social ecology, and related disciplines assert that if people have a strong sense of place they will care for it (for example, Fisher, 2002; Hill, 2003; Naess, 1986; Wheeler, 2004; Winter, 2003). Although people sometimes speak of a collective sense of a place, Cameron (2003, 2–3) stresses that sense of implies individual experience, not just a commonly held idea, description, or categorisation of a place. That is, even though family, community, and collective society are formative of and central to the
meanings a person holds for a place, his or her own *sense* of place can only occur as an internal experience.

At the same time, Cameron (ibid.) emphasises the importance of George Seddon’s concern to be clear whose sense of place is discussed, ‘the danger being that one person’s or culture’s interpretation of the qualities of a place can be imposed on others as if it had externally-derived authority’. It can be critically important to respect other people’s understandings of places, particularly (but not only) when they are held to have sacred significance, a concern that has been widely supported (for example, Cock, 2003; Kanahele, 1986; Read, 2000; Woodford, 2008). It is easy to understand that such concern is expressed especially in regard to indigenous peoples in places that have been colonised—Australia’s history in relation to its indigenous, Aboriginal people is a well-documented (and in my view, deplorable) example. However, I believe that respect—or lack of it—for each other’s sense of place affects all people profoundly, from simple acts of caring for or trashing a place, to greater impacts, such as changing places by developing them, exploiting environmental resources, or through warfare and other forms of conflict. Because people are affected by and respond to what happens in place, respect for each other’s sense of place is likely to affect relationships between long-term residents and immigrants in any locale.

When reading literature on place, I have found that many authors idealise natural places, and exhort people to experience sense of place as some sort of *good feeling* available through connection with those natural places. At times, those idealised perspectives are conflated with various normative opinions (that can become political), including some I have cited above. Some authors imply that sense of place is somehow opposite to alienation from place. This position suggests that within their understandings of sense of place is a presupposition that awareness of place is a positive and desirable experience. Intrinsically, a person’s capability to *sense* place is a neutral process of experiencing place, and relationship with it, as described by Cameron, above. In that context, sense of place is neither negative nor positive. The capability to sense place provides the potential for people to be aware of place, for instance, in the ways distinguished by Malpas, and Relph. Using that capability,
people may become aware of circumstances occurring in, or characteristics of a place that they might experience, or interpret, as being negative or positive. As to the desirability of having such awareness, it is understandable that people might (unconsciously, or by choice) dissociate from place—or, in other words, shut off their sense of place—under certain conditions. Yet, I argue that to have a strong or acute sense of place supports wellbeing both of people and place. In positive conditions, that acute sense enables people more fully to enjoy those conditions, and encourages them to behave in ways that are likely to maintain positive, mutual relationships with place. In negative conditions, an acute sense of place provides an opportunity for people to respond in ways that might bring about positive change. It is important, for instance, for refugees to be aware of both negative and positive senses of place (Hiruy, 2009). That an acute sense of place is of value aligns with notions such as Joanna Macy’s (1995) that if ever we felt the pain of the world we would do something about it. It also fits Cronon’s (1996, 81) assertion that by continuing to dualise human and other nature we ‘evade responsibility for the lives we actually lead’.

Much of the discourse I have cited relates to sense of a place, and, predominantly, that is what I have found when reviewing literature. There is little about the ontological sense of place discussed earlier. At the same time, some authors write of authentic and inauthentic senses of place (for example, Relph, 1976), and others of weak and strong senses of place (for example, DeMiglio & Williams, 2008), as if inauthentic or weak senses of place are somehow illegitimate. For analysis of the empirical study conducted in this research, I do use the terms strong and weak, and wish to clarify what I mean by them. I consider sense of place as being on a continuum from dissociation to acute awareness of place and of relationship with it. A dissociated—weak—sense of place might be described as experience of self as disengaged from place, relatively unaware of it, and insensitive to it. At the other end of the spectrum, an acute or associated—strong—sense of place might be described as experience of self in place—that is, aware of and sensitive to the place one is in—deeply aware of relationship with particular places, of the interconnections of those places with others, and even more fundamentally, of an ontological sense of place as the existential ground of being. Of course, individuals would experience themselves
at different points on that spectrum, and probably at different points also at various times in their lives.

There are views, particularly among ecopsychologists and social ecologists, that for any change to occur in human relationships with place, people need to address their relationship with themselves (for example, Hill, 2003; Merchant, 1996). Writers such as Stuart Hill (2003), Andy Fisher (2002), and Werner Sattmann Frese (2008) consider it crucial to overcome views that the health and wellbeing of place, people, and other living beings can be separated, and assert that a first step to wellbeing of people and place is to address the human condition.

**Mobilities of self and sense of self**

As Malpas (2008, 52) writes, human beings do not begin life with any sensory or abstracted awareness of *self* as separate, but experience ‘being already involved’ and in such relationship that all else is ‘encountered as already part of a meaningful whole’. Extensive research into the development of human neurology shows that it is only later that ‘we begin to separate out a sense of ourselves and sense of things as they are apart from us’ (ibid.). To separate awareness of self from who or whatever else is *other* enables people to function autonomously, to distinguish difference, and relate to other/s. But *separation* is not the same as *alienation*. To be alienated from who or whatever is other is to be indifferent or hostile to the other; this, in turn, implies that the difference of other/s has at some time been given *meaning* that results in alienation. So further questions arise: How are self and other defined? How do we know what we know about them? What meanings are implied in those definitions, or identifications that alienate people from others, from place, and from themselves? And from where, and when do those meanings come? These questions are particularly significant in regard to people’s ability to adjust to different others and places, in an era of high mobility. Addressing them, first I explore understandings of *self* and *sense of self*. Next, I consider how what the self is held to mean contributes to a *narrative* of self, an ontology and epistemology that becomes reductive and self-validating. Then, I assess how the content of that narrative influences personal relationships with—and thus senses of—self, others, and place.
Dictionaries provide a range of meanings for the word *self*, but in common define it as inferring a particular person or thing as distinct from any other person or thing. This meaning is in a class altogether different from academic attempts to define what a generic self is—or to determine if it even exists. The common definition more readily fits the cry I have heard on countless occasions in the course of my professional life, when people say ‘I want to know myself’ or ‘I want to find myself’. It seems this apparent lack of self-knowing, or search for self, is a fairly widespread modern human condition—in my experience, this same lament has shown up consistently in Canada, USA, Japan, New Zealand, Europe, and Australia. As one example, a fifty-year-old Japanese woman declared: ‘All my life I’ve been someone’s daughter, someone’s wife, someone’s mother. I want to know who I am’.

Scholars have written extensively about the challenges of defining the self. The literature is characterised by wide disciplinary diversity and deep intellectual disagreement. Various authors refer to the self as an object or thing, isolated and separate from what else is; or as a process participating in its environment, and indivisibly part of the whole (for example, Abram, 1996; Hillman, 1995; Madell, 1981; Maturana, 2006; Naess, 1986; Russell, 1998; Seigel, 2005; Strawson, 1999; Taylor, 1989). Academic responses to the question of what a self is, listed by Shaun Gallagher and Jonathan Shear (1999, x, xi), include assertions that:

- there is no self … the idea is a logical, psychological, or grammatical fiction … the sense of self is properly understood and defined in terms of brain processes … it is merely a constructed sociological locus, or the center of personal and public narratives, or … it belongs in an ineffable category all its own.

Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela (1987, 254) present a radical view of ‘the biological roots of knowledge’ showing that consciousness—including self-consciousness—arises from complexity. In another version of that dynamic, Antonio Damasio (2012) also considers self as process, and not a thing. In Damasio’s explanation, the self evolves as new layers of neural processes give rise to further layers of mental processing; the ‘self-as-knower grounded on the [process of] self-as-object’ (10).
In seeking to define the self, there is difficulty in arriving at any kind of consensus; between and within cultures, notions of self vary. Charles Taylor (1989, 177) has observed that ‘the very idea that we have or are “a self”, that human agency is essentially defined as “the self”, is a linguistic reflection of our modern understanding’, and that, even in the western world, it was not always so. Clifford Geertz has commented that ‘the Western conception of a person … is … a rather peculiar idea within the context of the World’s cultures’ (in Pile & Thrift, 1995, 15). Nevertheless, correlations are sometimes drawn between understandings of self from vastly different sources. For example, Peter Riviere (1999, 87) has reflected on a ‘notion of self based on a mind created through interaction with its environment’ that has been developed by neuroscience, and is also found in a western Amazon indigenous people. The contested status of the self remains open; an intractable problem, as Gallagher and Shear (1999) conceive it. Or, as Hannah Arendt (1958, 10) wonderfully puts it, the self is an ‘unanswerable’ question. For Arendt: ‘It is highly unlikely that we, who can know, determine, and define the natural essences of all things surrounding us, which we are not, should ever be able to do the same for ourselves—this would be like jumping over our own shadows’ (ibid.).

Although the delineation of what the self is may elude us, how we know ourselves is through a sense of self. To examine the use of the word *sense* I draw on a number of contemporary dictionaries and one of etymology. These categorise the senses as both physical (visual, auditory, kinaesthetic, olfactory, gustatory, tactile, and proprioceptive) and abstract (including intellect, mind, spirit, and occult senses). For example, in these sources responsibility, morality, shame, and delight are considered to be abstract senses. *Sense* is said to refer variously to capability to be aware, to awareness or knowing of something, to the meaning attributed to that something, and to evaluations that might be applied to what is known, and even to the one who is sensing. Thus, the phrase *sense of self* refers to the *capability* to be aware of the self, to *awareness* or *knowing of* the self, to the *meaning* attributed to the self, and to *evaluations* that might be applied both to what is known of the self, and to the self *making sense* of all that.
In summary, I understand sense of self in three ways: first, as the capacity to be self-aware; second, as the content at any point in time of what of oneself one is aware; and third, as a description or narrative of one’s idea or knowing of oneself. In both the second and third ways, sense of self is apprehended through the lens of meaning and evaluation one applies to oneself. Whatever the self may actually be, what any self may be held to mean is of primary significance: the meaning one gives to oneself contextualises behaviour, limitation, possibility, and the quality of personal experience. Further, parameters for relationships are set by the meanings one gives to others—and to places—as well as to oneself.

So from where does the meaning of oneself come? Is it given? Does it come with the territory—from particular genetics, physicality, or capability; or the location of the self in particular physical environments, cultural traditions, or economic, political, religious, or other social conditions? Is it a question of nature, or nurture—is it inherent, or is it learned? Is it fixed in place? Or does it move? Because what we think something means indicates what we believe about it—that is, what we think is true—these questions might be phrased in terms of beliefs as well as of meaning. To investigate these questions, first, I look at how people attribute meaning and acquire or develop beliefs. Gregory Bateson (1972, 314) explains that a person’s:

beliefs about what sort of world it is will determine how he sees it and acts within it, and his ways of perceiving and acting will determine his beliefs about its nature. The living man is thus bound within a net of epistemological and ontological premises which—regardless of ultimate truth or falsity—become partially self-validating for him.

In Michel Foucault’s (1980, 131) thinking, truth is ‘a thing of this world’, produced, within societies or institutions, as a way of establishing and maintaining power. Foucault’s (1988, 17–8) stated objective in more than twenty-five years of study was ‘to sketch out a history of the different ways in our culture that humans develop knowledge about themselves’. He set out to show ‘how the subject constituted itself’ through epistemes encapsulated in what he called ‘games of truth’ and ‘practices of power’ (Foucault et al., 2003, 33). Foucault conceived the notion of epistemes as periods of history organised around specific worldviews (Danaher et al., 2000, 15).
The ‘organising principles’ or truths that constitute epistemes determine ‘how we make sense of things, what we can know, and what we say’; they are ‘more or less unconscious’, and they are ‘the grounds on which we base everything, so we more or less take them for granted’ (17). As Mitchell Dean (1999, 16) explains: ‘It is a matter not of the representations of individual mind or consciousness, but of the bodies of knowledge, belief and opinion in which we are immersed’. Richard Bawden (2011, 52–4) writes that epistemes encompass the sets of beliefs and assumptions ‘to which we subscribe (essentially tacitly)’ and which find expression in all that we do. For Bawden, ‘epistemes represent the particular systems of valuing and values, knowing and knowledge, emotioning and emotions, believing and beliefs that we bring to bear to our everyday activities’ (54).

The historic aspect of epistemes introduces the temporal dimension that is central to narrative (Schiff, 2012, 39). A concept more readily graspable than episteme, narrative also encapsulates matrices or sets of beliefs and assumptions specific to societies, cultures, and individuals over time (Bruner, 1993; Chase, 1995; Crossley, 2002; Goodson, 2013; Payne, 2006). The terms grand, or master, or meta-narrative ‘are sometimes applied to culturally assumed truths with a long history’ (Payne, 2006, 21). Narrative is involved in the making of meaning in everyday life, and can serve as a heuristic device with which to examine how people give meaning to themselves and others (Bruner, 2003; Josselson, 2004; Josselson & Lieblich, 1993; Payne, 2006). Narratives seamlessly integrate meaningful pasts with meaningful futures, and make sense of the present, socially, culturally, and personally.

In relation to sense of self, Taylor (1989, 50) writes that ‘self-understanding necessarily has temporal depth and incorporates narrative’. An individual’s embodiment of a narrative occurs through interaction within the world, influenced by language and other cultural artefacts, relationships with people and environments, actions, practices, education, religion, politics, media, and more (Bawden, 2011; Dean, 1999; Fell, 2011; Giddens & Sutton, 2009; Rose, 1996; Taylor, 1989). John McLeod (2004, 22) writes that we are ‘born into the story of our family and community and the story of who we are’. From infancy, we absorb whatever cultural, social, familial narratives prevail in what Joseph Chilton Pearce (2007, 25) describes
as ‘a spontaneous, imitative learning below the limen of our awareness’. It is a
cognitive process, in that it has deeply to do with knowing, but it is far less an
intellectual process than a visceral one, occurring in practice. It is not just that we are
handed a set, or sets, of ideas and practices; rather, we grow up in the context of
them, model them from the demonstration of others around us, learn, rehearse,
impromptu, and replicate them in our everyday practice.

We stabilise views of the world, along with ways of seeing, feeling, and knowing
what we know; and hold as fact sets of beliefs and assumptions of what is true and
what is false, and of meaning. Thereafter, unless the underlying premises are
questioned, we live and act as if those beliefs are not representations of reality but
reality itself. Those beliefs admit of certain possibilities, but exclude others from the
field of reality, locking out whatever does not make sense in terms of the narrative
within which we have learnt to operate. Narrative generates practices (and vice
versa) that reinforce or substantiate those sets of beliefs, and further influence
behaviour and govern experience. Thus, those sets of beliefs become self-validating.
We come to believe the assumptions of a narrative because we participate in the
world it makes possible.

Of course, there are many truths by and with which people live and countless
narratives to encompass and explain those truths that are differentiated by culture,
nation, religion, ethnicity, social status, wealth or poverty, and more.\(^3\) Whatever the
variations of the content of narratives, formation of those stories—which range from
personal to worldviews—is always a relational process; and any sense of self can
only occur in a context of inextricable placement and in distinction of self from what
else surrounds it. In this respect, Guy Widdershoven (1993, 9) writes that the
meaning of ‘personal identity is dependent on a mutual relation between lived
experience … and stories [and that] … experience elicits the story, and the story
articulates and thereby modifies experience’. In effect, to the extent that beliefs

\(^3\) By way of example, a Maori elder, at a bush place in the Bay of Islands area of New Zealand,
introduced me to ‘older brother’ rock, ‘brother’ tree, and to several other samples of flora he named as
relatives. In response to my comment that I was used to such terms being applied only to people, he
gave me a considering glance and said: ‘These bro were here long before us. We come from them, not
them from us. They look after us and we learn from them.’ In Japan, when I asked a woman about her
belief in reincarnation, her eyebrows flew up and she said, ‘But I grew up with this’, amazed that I
should even comment on what she so fully took for granted.
become self-validating, each narrative creates its own evidence and justification, and establishes its own conditions of truth. A narrative, in this way, is a collective, social phenomenon. And yet, whatever beliefs may commonly be held, to whatever extent people’s understandings may align, no two people have exactly the same beliefs. Each person filters, modifies, and represents experience uniquely (though not without commonalities), with the result that each person holds an individual version of any collective or grand narrative.

As a child grows up, culturally and socially reiterated and reified assumptions about human nature become personalised. This process of development from birth through childhood and adolescence to adulthood has been researched and documented by many theorists and practitioners, particularly in the psy disciplines. An exemplar is Jean Piaget (1973), whose work provided a basis for much western understanding. More radical is Stanislav Grof (1975; 1985; 1993), who reported that people learn even in the womb. These thinkers and many others—notably Damasio (1994; 1999; 2012) and Pearce (1985; 1991)—have correlated developmental stages, expressed conceptually and behaviourally, with stages in the unfolding of neurological development.

Morris Massey (1979) described three major developmental periods: the imprint period, up to the age of seven, within which he said we are like sponges, absorbing everything around us, mostly without challenging it; the modelling period, from the age of eight to thirteen, when we copy others’ ways of doing things, trying things on to see how they feel, no longer just blindly accepting, but checking things out for ourselves; and the socialisation period, from thirteen to twenty-one, when we are doing our best to work out the stance we will take as adults—a time when we are largely influenced by our peers, developing as individuals, and looking for something beyond what we learned and experienced as children.
At the heart of any person’s beliefs is a complex identification and meaning of his or her individual self in relation to the world. Compared with a social or cultural, grand or meta-narrative of what a self is generically; this is a uniquely personal narrative of self. Unless a person thinks about and challenges it, the narrative of self governs the nature and quality of that person’s experience and behaviour—how each person feels and acts in the world. Thus, a person’s narrative of self is fundamental to presuppositions about the nature of oneself, others, and all of life. Of course, growth and change are experienced within the parameters of the conditions of truth to which we hold. As Taylor (1989, 50) writes, ‘My sense of myself is of a being who is growing and becoming’. In that process of becoming there is continual modifying, changing, and unfolding of self (for example, Nynäs, 2008; Pickering, 1999). But to what extent is that process determined by externalities, and what agency do people have? To assert that individual narratives are entirely culturally or socially determined would be to say that individuals have agency only within the parameters of those stories. In this regard, Geoff Danaher, Tony Shirato, and Jen Webb (2000, 116–7) write that Foucault began his early work with the idea that:

people are not free agents who make their own meanings and control their lives; rather, they have their lives, thoughts and activities ‘scripted’ for them by social forces and institutions … In his later work, however, Foucault considers the ways in which people—what he calls ‘subjects’—are active in ‘crafting’ or negotiating their identity.

Danaher and his colleagues present Foucault’s view that we cannot ‘escape the regulatory institutions and discourses in which we are produced’, but by identifying them, and our ‘practices of the self’, we can ‘reinvent ourselves’ (131). Foucault (2003, 56) writes that ‘the critique of what we are is at one and the same time the

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4 Jacquelynne Eccles (2009, 78–79) distinguishes between personal and social or collective types of identity because she believes that not all aspects of personal identity are grounded in social roles: personal aspects of identity ‘serve the psychological function of making one feel unique’, and collective aspects of identity ‘serve to strengthen one’s ties to highly valued social groups and relationships’. The balance of ‘personal’ and ‘collective’ aspects varies from culture to culture, for example, individualism is evident in the USA, whereas in Japan, traditionally, there is a more collective base for identity, and, in common with other eastern cultures, ‘a view of the self as interdependent’ (Kan et al., 2009, 303).
historical analysis of the limits imposed on us and an experiment with the possibility of going beyond them’. This critical ontology:

consists in seeing on what type of assumptions, of familiar notions, of established, unexamined ways of thinking the accepted practices are based … uncovering that thought and trying to change it: showing that things are not as obvious as people believe, making it so that what is taken for granted is no longer taken for granted. To do criticism is to make harder those acts which are now too easy … as soon as people begin to have trouble thinking things the way they have been thought, transformation becomes at the same time very urgent, very difficult, and entirely possible (Foucault, 2003b, 172).

Related concepts underlie Jack Mezirow’s (1991) development of transformative learning; an approach that encourages critical reflection to challenge presuppositions of meaning. Carolyn Merchant (1996, 157) writes that we internalise meta-narratives as ‘ideology … a story told by people in power’; but also holds that ‘by rewriting the story, we can begin to challenge the structures of power’. In this politics of self, people do have choice and can change their personal narratives by becoming aware of and questioning the assumptions underlying those conditions of truth. Narrative theorists and therapists also claim that we do have choice, and that both stories and experience can be transformed (Bruner, 2003; Crossley, 2002; Dimitrov, 2003; Goodson, 2013; Josselson et al., 2004; Schiff, 2012). When we are not aware of the sets of beliefs and assumptions upon which a narrative is based, we see only the story. In this respect, Vladimir Dimitrov (2003, np) points out, when we are not aware that a narrative ‘is only a story … we are at risk of becoming [its] captives’. Yet, as Jerome Bruner (2003, 64) states, ‘we constantly construct and reconstruct our selves to meet the needs of the situations we encounter, and we do so with the guidance of our memories of the past and our hopes and fears for the future’. Ivor Goodson (2013, 63) explains that there are strategies and resources within narratives of self ‘to flexibly respond to the transitions and critical events which comprise our lives and equip us to actively develop courses of action and learning strategies’.

Notwithstanding, for some people ‘the life story involves an early narrative closure,
that is, that the range of choices as to how to live and story a life is closed at an early stage’ (76 [original emphasis]). In Goodson’s view, this ‘sense of the life narrative being closed is important in not only showing the somewhat deterministic nature of a scripted life, but also … the way in which other possibilities are neither imagined nor subsequently experienced’ (79 [original emphasis]). Nevertheless, he asserts that people can bring about change through what he calls the work of re-selfing that is an aim of narrative therapy.

It is clear from the foregoing that people derive their senses of self from the meanings implicit in the narratives they embody and perform, and they do have agency. Thus, it might be said that people make their worlds—albeit in processes of more or less unconscious absorption of what is presented to them—and sometimes never realise the part they play in constituting themselves according to or in response or reaction to myriad external influences. People limit their experience of agency to what their narratives permit if they never question their assumptions or ask how they know what they know. Events can challenge people to question long-held assumptions (Goodson, 2013, 97). The challenges may be deeply personal, perhaps to do with changes in health, close relationships, other circumstances, achievements, or disappointments. Many people are also confronted by the uncertainties, exigencies, and crises of social, global, and environmental changes (Bauman, 2007; Elliott & Urry, 2010; Massey, 1994; Relph, 2008). In the context of this study, migration and other mobilities constitute events that significantly challenge people to question their assumptions. Participants’ narratives are a source of examples of such events, and these are investigated in later chapters. However, as Goodson (2013, 5) explains, we need to read individual narratives against ‘the backdrop of the historical context which privileges certain storylines’—a background he calls ‘genealogies of context’—and thus, to take:

a way of studying that ‘embraces stories of action within theories of context’. If we do this, stories can be ‘located’, which means they can be seen as the social constructions they are, located in time and space, social history and social geography. Our stories and storylines need to be
understood, not just as personal constructions but as expressions of particular historical and cultural opportunities (5–6).

In part two, when introducing participants, I will provide some background specific to each of their narratives, but first, I explore some elements of a contemporary western meta-narrative. This is important for two reasons: First, migrants can be deeply challenged or even shocked when the meta-narrative in their place of origin is significantly different from the meta-narrative prevailing in the place where they aim to resettle. In this regard, Goodson writes that major changes to storylines and the collapse of grand, or meta-narratives pose ‘seismic challenges for people’ (120). Second, this study focuses on participants’ experiences of resettlement in western countries, primarily in Australia. Hence, by investigating elements of a contemporary western meta-narrative, I aim to provide background that can locate some of the challenges experienced by people migrating both to and from modern western countries.

A meta-narrative of flawed human being

Correspondences in the histories of many peoples seem to indicate that some beliefs—or versions of them—are common across diverse cultures, even though origins and explanations of those assumptions may vary greatly from one to another. For instance, people have warred against, colonised, and enslaved others, and depended on hierarchical structures of race, class, caste or other systems to justify and enforce beliefs that some people are superior to others. In western thinking, such beliefs can be traced to underlying and interrelated concepts that separate human being from nature, and assume that human being is flawed (Arendt & Baehr, 2003; Buttmer, 1993; Clark, 2002; Plumwood, 1993; Tarnas, 1991). Richard Tarnas (1991, 431) concludes that the development of western thinking has produced a ‘profound sense of ontological and epistemological separation between self and world … [ensuring] the construction of a disenchanted and alienating world view’ [emphasis added]. Premised on the idea that self-alienation emerged historically and dialectically with world-alienation, the ontological conception of human being as flawed can be seen as central to this alienating worldview. In western thought, such
assumptions persist in individualistic notions of the self that Taylor (1989, 111) describes as ‘a function of a historically limited mode of self-interpretation’.

Plumwood (1993, 71) writes that such belief is generated by conceiving of the self as human virtue striving to remain above a ‘lower, baser’ animal nature. Mary Clark (2002, 2) considers that, in consequence, the modern notion of the self prompts deeply reductive and negative assumptions ‘that profoundly affect both our understanding of human nature and the way we treat the world that supports us’.

**Destabilising dominant ideas or further entrenching them?**

Critical to understanding the human condition, according to Taylor (1989, 177) is the emergence and historical embedding of ‘the stance of disengagement towards oneself’ in western thinking. Taylor traces this dynamic particularly through Descartes and Hobbes, and explains it as ‘radical reflexivity’—a process in which we stand back from experience, ‘withdraw from it, reconstrue it objectively, and then learn to draw defensible conclusions from it’ (163). In other words, we create a split between the rational, objective observer (thinking, consciousness, the mind) and the rest of the self (emotions, sensory awareness, intuition, body, soul and spirit). This ‘unprecedentedly radical form of self-objectification’ allows us to change our habits, and gives us ‘the possibility to remake ourselves in a more rational and advantageous fashion’ (170, 171). Given an entrenched self-understanding of human nature as flawed, the stance of disengagement provides a way to better ourselves. The act of disengagement, locating the sense of I as the rational, objective observer, creates the self as something that the I has—a possession—and leads to alienation from the self; ‘Man as an observer is becoming completely alienated from himself as a being’ (Havel, 1995, 234).

The stance of disengagement also underpins projects of individualism by at one and the same time recognising the freedom inherent in people’s ability to reform their selves, and placing responsibility upon the individual to do that in accord with prevailing moral determinants (Cruikshank, 1999; Dean, 1999; Doran, 2012; Reith, 2004; Rose, 1996; Winter, 2003). Concepts and practices that have cultivated individualism seem to have leapfrogged one upon the other. The more people have yearned for wellbeing and happiness, the more they have internalised the idea that
achievement of that is up to them—nothing to do with the responsibility of the state, or anyone else—and the more individualism has been idealised and made manifest, the more it has been reinforced, and been evidenced in people’s behaviour (ibid.).

Individualism is criticised when it is considered to be a cause of community and cultural breakdown, and identity crises of individuals (Bauman, 2007; Norgaard, 1994; Rodaway, 1995). Critique of individualism on such grounds highlights the nature of challenges that occur when migrations confront people from more communally oriented cultures with others that are more individualistic. In Taylor’s (1989, 3) critique, the modern project of individualism results in loss of moral orientation, a confusion focused on ‘what it is right to do rather than what it is good to be’. In later work, he describes individualism as ‘a centring on the self and a concomitant shutting out, or even unawareness, of the greater issues or concerns that transcend the self, be they religious, political, historical’ (1992, 14).

Critique of the modern dynamics of individualism and other aspects of the contemporary western meta-narrative intensified after the Second World War; a period which saw many people involved in civil rights, gender, and sexuality activism; and the emergence of green/environmental, the human potential, and other counter-cultural movements. These movements rapidly grew in popularity in the 1960s and 1970s; they represent many and sometimes conflicting views and also advance alternatives to prevailing narratives (for example, Capra, 1982; Drengson et al., 2011; Roszak, 1977; Russell, 1982; Ryback, 2011; Sheldrake, 1991; Thomashow, 1995). Certain of their advocates propose theories and practices intended to emancipate people, and bring about wellbeing; and to challenge many tenets of the western meta-narrative. However, as Dean (1999, 154–5) points out, what often goes unnoticed is that many of these movements and their critiques have been appropriated and ‘remapped’ in service of particular agenda: ‘Where the political and cultural movements sought a utopian vision of the emancipated self … the neoliberal critiques of the welfare state sought to redeplo the “free subject” as a technical instrument in the achievement of governmental purposes and objectives’ (ibid.). Through this instrumentalist arrogation, much of the counter-cultural drive for liberation is translated into modernity’s empowerment of the atomistic individual
that many critique; and the prevalent western meta-narrative is further entrenched. Appropriating key themes and reducing the meanings of key concepts to truths, that then are employed to shore up the status quo, defuses the potency of alternative movements (for example, Cruikshank, 1999; Dean, 1999; Doran, 2012; Reith, 2004). Hence, Doran (2012, 43) concludes:

a strategic silencing of alternative ways of seeing the world and the human being has been one of the major achievements of unfettered capitalism—a strategic silencing that effectively patrols what can and cannot be contemplated in the course of current global environmental diplomacy.

I argue that the success of this arrogation, and of modernity’s project of individualism rests on the aforementioned presupposition that there is something fundamentally wrong with people. Alternative explanations are being contemplated, and influential writers from the natural sciences, the humanities, the social sciences, and others have explored the need for human reunion with nature, often presenting the wellbeing of both as ‘inextricably bound’ (Davison, 2008, 1286). There is also increasing interest at grass roots levels in alternative understandings of life and of ways to achieve wellbeing of people and place, and this is influencing personal, social, and environmental activities. Yet, anomalies remain—even the persistent use of language naming human and nature as distinct entities perpetuates the divide.

Despite the development of successive explanations for the human condition, and in spite of successive revisions and refinements to each, the fundamental assumption that the self is flawed persists. This tendency is particularly pronounced when negative judgements of behaviour are conflated with definitions of human nature, as, for instance, Bauman (2007) does in his condemnation of people who espouse individualism (albeit unwittingly)—if they are not bad, they must at least be stupid! In other examples, Thomashow (1995, 145) writes that environmentalist objectives are often framed as moral choices, implying that ‘something is wrong with the way people live their lives’. Still other views, generated by green and human potential theorising, expect that an expanded or transformed ecological self—evolved beyond...
our current state—will naturally identify with and care for place. Until we so evolve, the message is clear: humanity remains flawed.

My point is this: Who and what people are—their allegedly flawed human nature—is held as causal of conditions and events. That assumption makes it easy to control people, even to direct their conduct to fit instrumental prescriptions, as exhumed, discerned, and revealed by Foucault, and as elaborated by others cited above. As Rose (1996, 3) writes, ‘while our culture of the self accords humans all sorts of capacities and endows all sorts of rights and privileges, it also divides, imposes burdens, and thrives upon the anxieties and disappointments generated by its own promises’—and thus, reveals a modern politics of self. I argue that, so long as critiques, or proponents of alternatives, fail to question the central assumption that human being is flawed, their efficacy is limited, and the dominant, western meta-narrative is perpetuated.

**What agency do people have?**

In Fromm’s terms, ‘man can deceive himself about his real self-interest if he is ignorant of his self and its real needs’ (Naess, 1986, 6).

For so long as the dominant western meta-narrative persists, it predicts ongoing conflicts and social unrest; and anticipates that people will continue to generate myriad problems on the basis of fears of differences in people, and of unfamiliar places. I argue that there is a need to better understand the relationship between the nature of human being and people’s ability to handle migration and other mobilities with wellbeing of people and place. The increasing scale and intensity of displacement, forced migrations, and relocations of huge numbers of people makes more urgent the need for further research. Several of Foucault’s works are useful in this regard. Foucault’s early work, already mentioned, refers to the ‘games of truth, practices of power, and so on’ involved in how people constitute themselves on the basis of knowledge which forms a meta-narrative, and is held socially, culturally, and politically (Foucault et al., 2003, 33). Acknowledging that people actively constitute themselves through ‘practices of the self’, Foucault explains that ‘these practices are nevertheless not something invented by the individual himself. They are
models that he finds in his culture and are proposed, suggested, imposed upon him by his culture, his society, and his social group’ (34). In later work, Foucault explores the ‘relationship of the self to itself’, and intends his ‘concept of “governmentality” to cover the whole range of practices that constitute, define, organize, and instrumentalize the strategies that individuals in their freedom can use in dealing with each other’ (41). He comes to believe that ‘the concept of governmentality makes it possible to bring out the freedom of the subject and its relationship to others’ (ibid.).

In this research, I investigate that possibility of freedom, and people’s capacity to have agency in regard to their own wellbeing when migrating and resettling in new places. In that context, I examine the practices, strategies, and beliefs of participants in the empirical study in following chapters. Here, I consider dynamics of the ‘relationship of the self to itself’ (ibid.) that are instrumental in people’s constitution of themselves, and I argue that an understanding of the interaction of these dynamics makes it possible to recognise when and how people constrain or free their agency.

First, is the dynamic of belief. Recall that, earlier, I discussed Foucault’s understanding that truth is produced as a way of establishing and maintaining power, and explored Bateson’s explanation that whatever a person believes to be true becomes self-validating; we become, experience, and behave in ways that validate what we presuppose to be true. This process is generally unconscious—since what we presuppose is something decided at an earlier time—and often absorbed from our socio-cultural environment without question. And the process is recursive—taking as truth that human being is flawed creates assumptions and practices that frame behaviour to confirm and perpetuate that there is something fundamentally wrong with self and others. Anthony Weston (2009, 47–8) defines this process as one of self-validating reduction, that occurs in a cycle of ‘disvaluing’—through reductive beliefs or prejudices—and ‘devaluing’, which he frames as the resultant ‘actual reduction—the real-world destruction, defacement, devastation’. The cost is that people are reduced to fit the belief. As Weston explains:

A small ‘reduction’ of another person or class of people—say, the exclusion of some discriminated-against class of persons from certain
activities or places—disempowers or isolates them to the point that further exclusions and reductions become natural. Then the original disvaluation—the prejudice, the slander—becomes easier to sustain. Counter evidence is harder to come by, and people are progressively blinded to what remains. Then exclusion and reduction only deepen and worsen, until the combination of desperation and anger on the part of the discriminated-against class and distance and fear on the other side makes the situation volatile, undiscussable, and in the end lethal (ibid.).

This understanding of self-validating reduction is particularly pertinent to discussion of challenges of migration and other mobilities, and the politics of self. For instance, racial riots—such as those that occurred in Sydney in 2005—can readily be traced to a ‘disvaluing’ and subsequent ‘devaluing’ of immigrants, particularly of Muslim background, in the period leading up to that event (Perera, 2009). As well as reductive beliefs people hold about others because of differences—for instance, of culture, ethnicity, or religion—some disvaluing assumptions are held about people in general. For example, commonly held beliefs prescribe that human beings are naturally aggressive, that there will always be war, and that people are naturally competitive in the struggle for survival of the fittest. Evidence of those beliefs is certainly present in much human behaviour, and in practices that perpetuate the human/nature and other dualisms Plumwood (1993) describes as pervading the dominant western meta-narrative.

The second dynamic strongly affecting the relationship of the self to the self might be described as reification of the process of self-validating reduction. It is the internal process by which Alfred Korzybski (1933, 58) explains we produce maps of experience. In this description, a person processes information from outside the self through neurological filters that delete, generalise, and distort (that is, give meaning to) the incoming information (Woodsmall, 1994, np). Those neurological filters are benign—that is, neither negative nor positive—but the result might be either. The action of filtering occurs as incoming information passes through things such as the senses, thoughts, feelings, attitudes, past decisions, memories, beliefs and values, and transforms the incoming information into an internal representation. In Korzybski’s
terms, those internal representations combine to form a person’s *map* of self, as well as maps of others, and of the world. Those internal representations affect people’s internal states, and their behaviour, which can be understood as *a response or reaction more directly to their own maps than to what is actually out there* in the world. Thus, this dynamic has important implications in regard to people’s relationships with themselves, others, and places. Understanding of this process can help people to mitigate the challenges of migration and other mobilities.

To amplify: People’s semantic representations—their maps—often render themselves and others as being of greater and lesser worth. They will tend to react to others according to those evaluations, rather than by getting to know what people are actually like. This dynamic equally applies to place. People’s maps significantly influence their ability to cope with differences of culture and place, a situation faced both by immigrants and people in host countries. As well as colouring their reaction to difference in others, people’s maps directly affect their ability to adjust to changes in their circumstances, and to settle in new places.

The third dynamic of the relationship of the self to itself is *sensibility*, which is variously defined as the capacity for—or being open to—feeling, consciousness, appreciation, and responsiveness; sensorially, mentally, and emotionally [and I add, spiritually]. Anthony Elliott and John Urry (2010, 40) write that the capacity to engage in new experience [for instance, when migrating to new places] is closely tied to this openness. Sensibility is moderated by the degree to which we are associated with, or dissociated from the self or anything else. The ability to associate and to dissociate is a function that interacts dynamically with beliefs, maps, and correspondent self-validating reductions. Taylor’s ‘stance of disengagement towards oneself’, discussed above, is a form of dissociation from the self. As noted, Taylor writes that this stance provides the possibility of reforming and remaking ourselves. This corresponds with Foucault’s governmentality, and his ideas that we can free ourselves from the confines and dictates of conditions of truth by revealing and challenging the assumptions upon which they are based. However, I argue that there are two aspects to such reflexivity that are critical to sense of self. First, for the duration of dissociation—standing back to *observe* the self—*sense* of self is reduced;
thus, disengagement from oneself for critique and review needs to be followed by re-engagement. Second, the extent of that critique determines the degree of freedom possible. If the concept of flawed human being is not brought to light and challenged, then freedom is limited to developing and bettering the *good*, and controlling what is held as flawed, within whatever may be the conditions of truth in any culture. I argue that this limited notion of freedom is essential to projects of individualism, consumerism, and technologies of citizenship (Cruikshank, 1999; Dean, 1999; Doran, 2012; Reith, 2004; Rose, 1996; Winter, 2003)—and not less to marginalising projects, for example, of regulating immigration according to ethnicity or race. And it is this limited notion of freedom that maintains people’s conduct of their own conduct, and keeps it in line with the agenda of those projects.

People tend to associate with what they value, and to dissociate from what they judge to be flawed; this is obvious in any segregation of people, for instance on the basis of racial, ethnic, or gender differences that are evaluated as inequalities. In similar fashion, people tend to dissociate from what they disvalue in themselves, for instance, emotions they judge to be negative; and in the process they desensitise themselves (Damasio, 1999; 2012; Fisher, 2002; Macy, 1995; Winter, 2003). People associate with their identification, or map of themselves. Importantly, Korzybski (1933, 58) writes, ‘A map is not the territory it represents, but, if correct, it has a similar structure to the territory, which accounts for its usefulness’. When people assume that their map of themselves fully encompasses who they are, then they function as if the map *is* the territory—that is, as if their whole self is fully encompassed in the beliefs and representations of the map. This then becomes a self-validating reduction—a reduced map of self—that, over time, is less and less similar to the potential of the self as a whole. Association with identity in this way is a significant *dissociation from self*, a state of being Korzybski claims is delusional and eventually produces insanity (11, 15). In everyday experience, dissociation from self reduces sensibility, and thus limits people’s ability to be aware of and respond to the conditions of their existence. Understanding of this dynamic can assist people in coping with challenges of migration and other mobilities.
In this thesis, I argue that these dynamics of the relationship of the self to itself are fundamental to peoples’ senses of self. For analysis of the empirical study I refer to strong and weak senses of self, and, as in regard to place, I propose to consider sense of self on a continuum. At one end of this continuum is dissociation and alienation from self, and at the other is association and relationship with self. A dissociated—weak—sense of self might thus be described as experience of association and identification with a reduced map of self, disengaged from the self as a whole, relatively unaware of it, and insensitive to it. At the other end of the spectrum, an associated—strong—sense of self could be described as an holistic experience of self, that is, engaged with being a whole that is more than the sum of its parts, and always in process of becoming. In these terms, a strong sense of self is characterised by openness, awareness, and sensibility. It thus becomes obvious that people’s senses of place are also modified by the strength or weakness of their senses of self, since awareness of place depends upon that sensibility.

The alienation of people from other life, from place, and from self—expressed in behaviours including consumerism, competition, aggression, devaluing of human and other life, disregard for and exploitation of all nature—is evidence that the assumption that humanity is flawed still is a central tenet of a dominant western meta-narrative. If, even as we recognise the need for alternative ideas—including an expanded, relational sense of self in place, and a respect for all human and other life—we continue to dichotomise, and to disvalue and devalue people and the rest of nature, then we still validate, reinforce, and perpetuate a meta-narrative that produces alienation with all its concomitant ills. In line with Foucault (2003, 54), my aim in this study is:

not [to] deduce from the form of what we are what it is impossible for us to do and to know; but [to] separate out, from the contingency that has made us what we are, the possibility of no longer being, doing, or thinking what we are, do, or think.

Specifically, my purpose is to seek within that possibility to discover how, in circumstances of contemporary migration and other mobilities, we might engender wellbeing and provide opportunity for both people and place to flourish. I argue that
people’s senses of self and of place are critical to achievement of that outcome. In developing a theoretical framework for the empirical study, I am mindful of Rose’s (1996, 96) perspective, that:

… it is not a question of discovering what people are, but of diagnosing what they take themselves to be, the criteria and standards by which they judge themselves, the ways in which they interpret their problems and problematise their existence, the authorities under whose aegis such problematizations are conducted—and their consequences.

In analysis of participants’ lived experience in following chapters a narrative perspective provides a way of exploring how these people’s senses of self and of place are constituted. Their stories provide rich descriptions of challenges they have faced through their migrations, what has been involved when they have questioned their assumptions, and how they consider their agency has increased through such experience. Thus, I seek to interpret their maps of self and others, to investigate dynamics in their relationships with themselves, and to reveal how their senses of self and of place have contributed to their ability to handle the challenges of migration and other mobilities.
PART TWO

LIVED EXPERIENCES OF CONTEMPORARY MIGRATION
3. NARRATIVE CONTEXTS

Globalization, it can be argued, makes the singularity of the human more apparent (as well as more vehemently repressed). It makes a communitarian rhetoric of historically determined, collective and coercive cultural identities—and the related claim that individuals who exit such a collectively secured life-world must find themselves ontologically devastated, without social anchor or cognitive guarantee—more visible as ideology. The idea that selfhood is constituted and then limited by, forever tied to, particular cultural milieux, particular beliefs and practices, particular histories, habits and discourses, is refuted (Rapport, 2010, 22–23).

Migration broadly means movement of people from one country, region, or place to settle in another. As noted in chapter one, migration encompasses moves made voluntarily and others coerced or forced. Some people migrate within the requirements of national and subnational border regulations—which is deemed regular migration, and others move outside those parameters and fall into the category of irregular migration. Amongst the latter group are labour migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers. Participants’ stories include experiences in these domains, and while there is some overlap in individual narratives, there are also significant differences. On the basis of such variation I have grouped participants into three categories of mobilities: regular migration, irregular migration, and mobile life styles; and give a chapter to each.

It is vital, however, first to position participant narratives in contexts of contemporary migration, particularly, of migration to Australia and the role of immigrants in building this as a multicultural nation. Multiculturalism relates significantly to the social environment co-created by immigrants and people already living in a host country, and thus this examination provides background important for understanding elements of participants’ stories discussed subsequently. The focus on Australian conditions is important because, with the exception of Yukari, participants at some time have relocated in Australia; and thus conditions here
provide the context for many of their experiences. It also serves as a counterpoint for Yukari’s narrative. First, I briefly outline contemporary migration, then note disparate views of multiculturalism internationally, and sketch the emergence of multiculturalism in Australia.

**Contemporary migration**

Migration is not new. What is new is the unprecedented extent and volume of that movement, which has been described as ‘an inevitable consequence of globalisation’ (Bhugra & Gupta, 2011a, 56). The figures available are not precise, as there are too many variables in reporting and collection of data for real accuracy, and migrations emanating from non-western regions are often not included. Comparison can be made with migrations of relatively large numbers of people over the past two hundred years, as summarised by international migration writer, Peter Stalker (2010, np). Between 1846 and 1890, around seventeen million people left Europe for the New World, but migration peaked around the turn of the century, with twenty-seven million people leaving Europe between 1891 and 1920. The rate tapered off with the First World War and the Great Depression and was effectively stopped again by the advent of the Second World War. Over the whole period, from 1846 to 1939, about fifty-one million people left Europe.

At the end of the Second World War, around fifteen million people moved from one country to another within Europe, with relatively small numbers migrating elsewhere. Stalker reports that even though many Europeans were ‘tempted to emigrate during the austerity years of the 1950s … few European governments were keen to encourage emigration, since the war had cost 7.8 million lives’, and because people were needed to rebuild economies (ibid.). Nevertheless, migration continued. For example, a study of emigration from the UK shows a strong revival in the 1950s and 1960s, and, although numbers dropped significantly after 1964, more than seven million people migrated from the UK to non-European destinations between 1951 and 1998 (Hatton, 2003). Stalker (2010, np) lists the UK as the major source of emigrants, then Italy, the Netherlands, and the Federal Republic of Germany; and the main destinations as Australia, Canada, and the USA, then South America and Israel.
According to Stalker, the tide turned when reconstruction in Europe led to an economic boom and Germany, France, and the UK needed labour. Workers were recruited at first from among those displaced during the war, then from other European countries, and then from each country’s colonial ties, with net immigration for Western Europe during this period—until 1973—reaching about ten million. Since then, migration has become steadily more difficult, as governments have ‘effectively closed the doors to further labour immigration’, migration policies generally have been tightened, and much of the debate about migration has turned to asylum seekers, refugees, and illegal immigrants (ibid.).

Nevertheless, the most recent figures compiled by the United Nations show that in 2013, there were two hundred and thirty-two million international migrants (this figure represents people living in countries other than their places of birth, as well as those currently migrating), and the rate of migration was growing at about 1.6 per cent per year—that is, approaching four million per year (UN, 2013a, 8). Even allowing for inaccuracies, and limits of available records, the rate per year has increased rapidly in recent times. The human population, of course, has also increased—being estimated at one billion around 1800, two billion by 1930, four billion by 1975 (Dahlman et al., 2011, 161)—and it passed seven billion in 2011. In addition to migrants, more than fifty million people were forcibly displaced worldwide by early 2014, the highest number since the end of the Second World War (UNHCR, 2014b).

**Multiculturalism**

Contemporary multiculturalism emerged in western countries along three main trajectories. First, philosophically it is a vehicle for replacing older forms of ethnic and racial hierarchy and exclusion with new relations of democratic citizenship, inspired and grounded in human-rights ideals (Kymlicka, 2012). Second, politically it is a means of controlling ethnic (and economic and political) diversity (Pakulski & Markowski, 2014). Third, in practice it is the everyday experience of people living in places with mixed populations of diverse ethnicities, cultures, and countries of origin (Carruthers, 2013; Colic-Peisker & Farquharson, 2011; Pardy & Lee, 2011). Martina
Boese and Melissa Phillips (2011, 190) write that ‘multiculturalism relates to the policies and services responding to the consequences of immigration’. According to Will Kymlicka (2012, 1) multiculturalism arose from decisions in liberal-democratic states from the 1970s to mid-1990s ‘to develop more multicultural forms of citizenship in relation to immigrant groups’. Kymlicka states that the trend of these policies was towards ‘increased recognition and accommodation of diversity … and involved a rejection of earlier ideas of unitary and homogeneous nationhood’ (3). Pointing out that there have been many past multicultural societies, Tariq Modood (2013, 5) considers that contemporary multiculturalism is ‘the political accommodation of minorities formed by immigration to western countries from outside the prosperous West’.

In recent years, political leaders in various countries have declared that policies of multiculturalism have failed. These claims are also then critiqued on grounds that the focus on ‘failed’ multiculturalism obscures other issues—such as border and security controls, pressures of intensified immigration, anxieties about terrorism, and economic crises—that generate reactions to cultural diversity, and moves to preserve strong national identities (Gozdecka et al., 2014; Kymlicka, 2012; Lesinska, 2014; Modood, 2013; Pakulski & Markowski, 2014; Uberoi & Modood, 2013; Walia & Tagore, 2012). In this light, Kymlicka (2012, 14, 22) argues that there is ‘significant, if not yet conclusive, evidence’ of progress towards the goals of multiculturalism, and it ‘should remain a salient option in the toolkit of democracies’. Modood (2013, 33) writes that multiculturalism is timely and necessary, but needs a theory that ‘does not have an anti-immigrant bias’. In his view, ideology confused with policy obscures what occurs and needs to be addressed in practice.

Multiculturalism is problematic, complex, and varies in different places. Australia and Canada are two countries where multiculturalism is identified as having been relatively successful, albeit in somewhat different forms, and yet in both jurisdictions it is undercut by recent policy changes (Collins, 2013; Kymlicka, 2012; Pakulski, 2014). Notably, both countries also have unresolved cultural and citizenship issues in regard to Indigenous populations being placed outside conversations about multiculturalism.
Australia—founded on migration

As background to the Australian situation, in 1788 Britain claimed the land and settled parts of it as a penal colony from what is now New South Wales. There was no treaty with the Indigenous Aboriginal inhabitants, whose forebears are understood to have migrated to the continent by boats or land bridges from at least 40,000 to 60,000 years ago. In 1889, British courts declared the land terra nullius, because it was ‘practically unoccupied’—a decision repeated in 1979 by the High Court of Australia because, it said, prior to British colonisation, Australia was a territory which, ‘by European standards, had no civilised inhabitants or settled law’ (Commonwealth of Australia. National Native Title Tribunal, 2013, np). It was only in 1992, more than two hundred years after colonisation, that the High Court of Australia decided the doctrine of terra nullius should not have been applied (ibid.). There is evidence of earlier ‘discovery’ of Terra Australis by Dutch and Spanish explorers, of trade between Aborigines and Chinese and Macassan sailors, and of significant contact between Aborigines and French explorers prior to Britain claiming the country (Bennett, 1981; Woodford, 2008).

Since British occupation, Australia’s history shows that the colonies and nation were successively founded on migration, and attitudes towards migrants have changed dramatically over the years (Webber & Fernandes, 2005, np). The first arrivals were transported convicts and their guards. A small number of voluntary migrants, also principally from Britain and Ireland, gradually followed, and settled in six colonies. The discovery of gold in 1850 attracted great numbers of people from Britain, Ireland, Continental Europe, China, the USA, New Zealand, and the South Pacific. ‘Australia never again saw such a rush of new immigrants … By the time of Federation in 1901 [when the Commonwealth of Australia, with the reigning British sovereign as head of state, was constituted from the six colonies of New South Wales, Victoria, Tasmania, South Australia, Queensland and Western Australia], the

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5 Sources for this summary of Australia’s migration history include (Austin, 2005; Babacan & Babacan, 2007; Bennett, 1981; Commonwealth of Australia. National Native Title Tribunal, 2013; Curthoys et al., 2008; Lopez, 2000; Mann, 2012; McMaster & Austin, 2005; Perkins & Langton, 2008; Walsh, 2001; Webber & Fernandes, 2005).
total population was close to four million, of whom one in four was born overseas’ (ibid.).

The first legislation passed by the new Commonwealth was the *Immigration Restriction Act 1901*, commonly known as underpinning a related and so-called White Australia Policy, which persisted until 1973. Despite comparatively large numbers of Chinese residents, this policy effectively banned Asian immigration for the next fifty years (Anonymous, 2013, np). Assisted passages gave priority to the British and Irish; and Pacific Island labourers who worked in the Queensland sugar industry were deported (Walsh, 2001, 47).

With the outbreak of the First World War, in 1914, migration almost ceased; some migrants considered acceptable prior to that time were reclassified as ‘enemy aliens’; and about seven thousand people born in Germany, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Bulgaria, and Turkey were interned. From the end of the war in 1918, assisted and sponsored migration schemes were revived, then stopped again with the start of the Great Depression, in 1929. James Jupp (2007, 66) writes that an important consequence was that ‘immigrants formed a lower proportion of the population between 1930 and 1950 than ever before or since. Those born and brought up in that period were living in an Australia becoming steadily more provincial and inward looking’. By the start of the Second World War in 1939, Australia was ‘small in numbers, British in origins, 99 per cent white, provincial, homogeneous and psychologically dependent on the British Empire’ (67).

During the Second World War, once again, certain nationalities were classed as ‘enemy aliens’—Germans, Italians, and Japanese among them. Again, most were interned, as was a large group of Jewish refugees who arrived in 1940. After the war, in response to the near invasion of Australia by the Japanese, migration policy changed. Under the slogan of ‘populate or perish’, the government set out to attract about seventy thousand immigrants a year (Babacan & Babacan, 2007, 26). The government offered ex-service personnel free passage, and others paid their own way, including increasing numbers of people from southern and eastern Europe, and from amongst the Jewish diaspora, many of them refugees from the ruins of Hitler’s Europe. Although the Australian government sought a majority of Anglo-Celtic
immigrants, it agreed to accept twelve thousand refugees a year from amongst some
eleven million people who had survived the Nazi labour and concentration camps—
including Poles, Yugoslavs, Latvians, Ukrainians, Hungarians, and Jews. When
much of the flow of migration slowed after about seven years, and with a view to
continuing to boost the population, the Australian government negotiated migration
agreements with its counterparts in countries including the Netherlands, Italy,
Austria, Belgium, West Germany, Greece, Spain, the USA, Switzerland, Denmark,
Norway, Sweden, and Finland; and was second only to Israel in the proportion of
migrants accepted in the decade or so following the end of the war in 1945.

From the 1950s, the White Australia Policy began to weaken as migrants were
sourced from a wider range of countries. During this period of the Long Boom, it
was common to hear Australians refer to ‘Mother England’, and many still called
England ‘home’, but understandings of what it meant to be an Australian were
beginning to change with a new sense of nationalism. Australia’s relationship with
Britain was challenged (in the lead up to its entry into the EEC in 1973); Australia’s
alignment with the USA increased in political and military terms—and was typified
by engagements in the Korean War (1950–3) and the Vietnam War (1962–73). The
Australian economy also began to diversify, deindustrialise, modernise, and
restructure; and became more integrated into the Asian region and the global
economy (Babacan & Babacan, 2007, 26).

In 1967, a referendum ‘gave official recognition to the existence of Aborigines as a
distinct group of people’ (McMaster & Austin, 2005, 54). Still, some people feared
that the nature of Australian society could be changed through indiscriminate
immigration levels and composition that might tip the balance ‘to one of non-Anglo
dominance’ (54–55). Fear of loss of national identity, racist behaviour, and other
discriminatory practices were still prevalent. In that climate, until the 1970s,
immigration policy was one of assimilation, aiming to have people abandon their
previous culture and language, learn English, and become new Australians. In 1973,
Gough Whitlam’s Labor government declared Australia a multicultural society, and,
according to amendments to the Australian Citizenship Act 1948, all migrants were
to be accorded equal treatment (Lopez, 2000). Introduction of that multicultural
policy aimed for ‘social cohesion’—to have immigrants integrate, rather than assimilate (Pakulski, 2014, 26).

In 1975, a new round of asylum seekers—newly dubbed ‘boat people’—began to arrive. Over the intervening thirty years, more than 25,000 have arrived, initially from Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Burma, China, and later, East Timor, and the Middle East (Bashford & Strange, 2002, 512). In spite of criticism by the United Nations and Amnesty International, all, including children, are subject to mandatory detention while their claims of refugee status are assessed, and that has been the case since 1992. By 2006 many other immigrants had come from China, South Africa, and India, and refugees from countries previously unrepresented, the fastest growing group from Sudan, then Afghanistan, and Iraq.

**Weakening, fears, and changes in policies of immigration**

Critiques of multiculturalism describe a weakening of this national policy from the 1990s (Babacan & Babacan, 2007; Jupp, 2006; Kymlicka, 2012; Lopez, 2005; Pakulski, 2014; Pardy & Lee, 2011)—Alper and Hurriyet Babacan (2007) attribute that weakening in particular to economic rationalist agendas, failure to tackle deep-seated racism, and the neoliberal policy agendas of successive Commonwealth governments. They note that formal status of multiculturalism was diminished by the closure of many of its supporting organisations, such as the Office of Multicultural Affairs; and by severe cuts in funding to the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission, and the multicultural and multilingual public radio and television broadcaster, SBS.

Strikingly, following the terrorist attacks in the USA in September 2001 (commonly known as 9/11) and the ensuing Gulf War, harsh asylum and counter-terrorism policies in Australia have made conditions increasingly unwelcoming for refugees, asylum seekers, and particular categories of migrants. John McMaster and Jon Austin (2005, 58) write that the post 9/11 ‘fear of terrorism has spurred an upsurge in isolationism in this country. In the extreme our government creates stories about
children being thrown off boats,\(^6\) in order to feed that fear and stoke the coals of nationalistic pride’. Greg Noble (2005, 109) writes that ‘an adroitly managed fear campaign [entwined] national integrity and well-being with issues around border security, crime and policing, and cultural harmony [and] stepped up criticism of multiculturalism as a way of managing cultural diversity and social cohesion’.

The extent of isolationist reaction was brought into focus by racial rioting at Sydney’s Cronulla Beach, in 2005. In a powerful critique, Suvendrini Perera (2009, 142–8) points to a history of racist attitudes leading up to the riots, and claims that media-fanned fear over ‘the war on terrorism’ heightened racist hysteria; for instance: ‘Women wearing hijab or burqa are subjected to a spectrum of violence from physical assault to the suspicion of concealing bombs under their burqas and accusations of “confronting” the sensibilities of Anglo-Australia by their mere presence in public places’ (143). In accord with several other authors, Babacan and Babacan (2007, 31) assert that:

> the Howard government … deliberately and persistently negatively portrayed Arabs and Muslims as the ‘other’ with the effect of demonising and dehumanising them [as part of] a deliberate attempt to create a unique and homogeneous national identity … new forms of patriotism that have emerged are racialised and draw boundaries of inclusion and exclusion. Who is an Australian, what are Australian values, and what is ‘un-Australian’ have been re-defined resulting in the marginalisation, criminalisation and exclusion of the ‘voiceless’ ‘other’.

Farida Fozdar and Brian Spittles (2009, 496) write that a key aspect of the Australian government’s retreat from multiculturalism was further modification of citizenship eligibility requirements, in 2007, which ‘served to re-direct the Australian

\(^6\) This refers to a claim by the Howard government that asylum seekers threw their children overboard from the Norwegian ship *Tampa* in an effort to gain admission to Australia. ‘Australia’s 2001 Howard government decided that the primary function of its refugee policy was not to provide humanitarian assistance and relieve the suffering of refugees fleeing far off war-torn countries but to protect its nation’s borders against unwanted migrants. No evident policy goal of deterring human rights violations was apparent. Quite the reverse: Australia’s ad hoc policy towards arriving boat people, reflected in the handling of the *Tampa* affair and the hastily prepared *Pacific Solution*, indicated a policy of national self-interest above all other concerns and election politics pursued in the name of sovereignty’ (Fox, 2010, 372–3).
imagination away from a nascent “multicultural” identity, back to one redolent of the
times of the “White Australia Policy”, confidently celebrating connections with an
Anglo-Saxon heritage, the European Enlightenment, and Judeo-Christian roots. In
this regard, David Nolan and his colleagues (2011, 659) argue that media discourses
contribute to integrationist agendas challenging multiculturalism, perform a role that
shapes government policy, and ‘define how different groups experience rights’. They
cite numerous studies in Canada, the UK, and Australia that demonstrate how
refugee groups and asylum seekers are frequently portrayed in a negative and
problematic manner; represented as an immigration ‘crisis’; a threat to the security of
the nation and an ‘embodiment of danger’; constructed as a homogeneous group,
sharing similar characteristics, backgrounds, motivations and economic status’; and
with terms such as ‘refugee’, ‘asylum seeker’, ‘boat people’ and ‘illegal immigrant’
used interchangeably (659–60). Summarising this backlash against, and retreat from
multiculturalism since the mid-1990s, Kymlicka (2012, 3) writes that it is ‘partly
driven by fears among the majority group that the accommodation of diversity has
“gone too far” and is threatening their way of life … [a fear often expressed in] the
rise of nativist and populist right-wing political movements’.

Notwithstanding the volatility, ambiguity, and uncertainty that typifies Australian
migration policy, and setting aside for a moment the added complexity of national
government approaches to asylum, Pakulski (2014, 24) describes Australian
multiculturalism as a success. He considers that racism, conflict, and other related
concerns are at a comparatively low level in Australia, and argues that their
expression is symptomatic of a need for more action to fulfil the goals of
multiculturalism. This view is shared by Colic-Peisker (2011), Kymlicka (2012),
Lopez (2005), Modood (2013), Pardy and Lee (2011), and others whose arguments
support a return to multiculturalist settlement policies with a human-rights base.
Kymlicka (2012, 24) cautions that ‘It is precisely when immigrants are perceived as
illegitimate, illiberal, and burdensome that multiculturalism may be most needed’.
Multiculturalism in everyday practice

Statistics from Australia’s 2011 Census of Population and Housing show that ‘Australia’s multicultural landscape is as diverse as ever’ (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2011). Over three hundred ancestries were separately identified in the census, and this finding certainly indicates cultural and ethnic diversity. A closer examination of census figures, however, reveals some facts that bear both on the current and contested status of multiculturalism, and on the lived experience of immigrants. Twenty-seven per cent of the population (referred to as first generation Australians) was born overseas—roughly the same as the ‘one in four’ at the time of Federation in 1901—and a further twenty per cent (second generation Australians) are people born in Australia but with at least one parent born overseas. Whatever the mix of ethnicity, close to half the population is composed of people with a brief Australian ancestry, or none at all. Yet, despite including three hundred ancestries, the population still retains a high proportion of people of Anglo-Celtic origin. In this most recent census, the UK is again the leading country of birth for the overseas born (20.8 per cent), followed by New Zealand (9.1 per cent); and ‘a significant number of nationals moving from the United Kingdom to Australia’ is noted in the World Migration Report 2013 (International Organization for Migration, 2013, 60). The breakdown has, perhaps, not changed greatly since Jupp (2007, 70) wrote that:

while the major cities have large Chinese, Italian, Greek, Vietnamese, Muslim and South Asian districts … rural and provincial Australia are still not multicultural in any meaningful sense. This shift in the ethnic character of the cities is one reason for constant questioning of the national identity by those who still believe all Australians are essentially alike. They are not and cannot be.

Notably, Jupp has not made the distinction that Muslim refers to a religion, not an ethnicity or nationality—a conflation that indicates that this type of confusing and problematic elision or slippage in use of language occurs more broadly than in media discourses, as critiqued by Noble (2005) and Nolan and colleagues (2011); and thus, insidiously, also influences opinion. Nevertheless, Jupp’s (2007, 70) point is that:
ethnic diversity based on a multiplicity of origins, is unlikely to dramatically challenge the established attitudes and practices of the core population derived from the British Isles over the past two centuries. Australia is not the most multicultural country in the world, as politicians often proclaim. It remains part of the English-speaking world, influenced mainly from Britain and the United States.

At the same time, multiculturalism is an everyday fact of life throughout Australia—albeit to varying degrees; every day, ‘people from different backgrounds mix together, whether by design or necessity, in our multicultural neighbourhoods and cities’ (Wise, 2010, 917). Maree Pardy and Julian Lee (2011, 300) write that their research with ethnic groups, immigrants, refugees, and related communities and organisations shows that:

a multicultural reality is not something to be accepted, rejected or debated. [It] emerges in places where people live with cultural plurality as an inevitable consequence of a globalised world, where mundane, everyday bodily engagement with cultural difference is not negotiable. Coming across, bumping into and sharing space, often involuntarily, with people from a range of cultural and ethnic backgrounds, is how people live in many parts of multicultural Australia [and is] a social fact of everyday existence.

The case study participants are faced with and contribute to this multicultural reality every day. The outline above provides a sense of the conditions into which participants have migrated, and background for later exploration of their experiences of resettlement. With that context in place, first it is time to introduce them.
4. REGULAR MIGRATION

My grandmother found her sense of belonging in her devotion to her family and her religion. Her children, now living in exile, find their sense of belonging in common memories, culture and the language they share with others from Iran. Her grandchildren left Iran before they could form any lasting memories of their own, yet our dark features and slight accents set us apart from the locals in our new country. We exist at the peripheral edges of both cultures and at times struggle with our identity and sense of belonging. We celebrate our New Year, do our best to follow the proper etiquette, attempt to follow our mothers' recipes, and do our best to pass on our culture to our children (Serov, 2009, 28).

In this, and the next two chapters I introduce the participants grouped into three categories of mobilities—regular migration, irregular migration, and mobile life styles—and provide a précis of each of their narratives. By taking this approach, one of my objectives is to provide an overview of the participants' histories, including elements of the cultural, social, and political narratives that inform their personal stories. Because personal narratives develop early (as discussed in chapter two), in this first introduction I emphasise experiences from participants’ childhoods that might be considered formative of their senses of self. These stories are taken from interview transcripts, and draw on other insights gained in the interviews. As Josselson (2006: 3) writes, ‘Narrative researchers eschew the objectification of the people that we study and we understand and espouse the constructedness of our knowledge’; a narrative perspective is always interpretive—and, thus, provides a way of exploring how the participants’ senses of self and place are constituted.

In later parts, I examine in more detail participants’ experiences of the challenges of migration, such as settling in new places, questioning identity and belonging, and confronting challenges such as racism. Examples from the case studies and analysis of them will be interspersed throughout, and will be considered in relation to critical literature and in context of the conceptual frameworks developed thus far. Issues relating to displaced people—asylum seekers and refugees—are addressed in the
next chapter. Here, the focus is on regular migration, and I write in more narrative style to present the participants’ stories and provide brief background in which to locate them (Goodson, 2013, 5).

**Motivations**

Various ‘push’, ‘pull’, and ‘networking’ factors influence voluntary migrants (Dahlman et al., 2011, 179; Reuveny, 2007, 658). People move away from religious and political persecution, and limited, negative, even life-threatening conditions in their places of origin. They are attracted towards places elsewhere that they perceive to be safer, freer, healthier, and offering more, or better, opportunities, particularly for employment and education. They move because at some level they may think that their lives could be, or should be better—a notion that, subliminally, reflects a fundamental faith that they are not flawed. They also move to be closer to family and others of similar ethnicity, religion, other association, or persuasion.

The primary motivations for contemporary regular migration probably have not varied much in type from earlier times; but globalisation of careers, job markets, and cultural identities is quite novel, and migration is significantly different in scale. Modern technology has also hastened the time it takes for the journey to new locations and provides modes of communication that allow people, far more easily and rapidly than in the past, to stay in contact with those left behind. It is a far cry from the days of sail and steamships that, for example, could take as long as six months to make the journey from Europe to Australia. Nevertheless, migration continues to be a challenging and significant event in people’s lives, and can arouse a spectrum of emotions from grief and loss, excitement and expectations, to hopes and fears. Carol, the first of the participants exemplifying regular migration to be introduced, *did* migrate by boat, back in the 1950s, from Scotland to Canada.

**Carol**

Dunbarton, where Carol was born in 1951, is on the River Clyde, on the west coast of Scotland. It was bombed during the Second World War, and despite brief wartime prosperity, the economy had been severely depressed since 1922 (Knox, 1999).
When Carol was five years old, her parents migrated to Canada, away from Scotland’s post-war sense of hopelessness and poverty. Carol feels that poverty defined them. Her father was from the Vale in Balloch, next to Loch Lomond, and one of a generation of boys called ‘Jelly Piecers’—a ‘piece’ being a sandwich—because they grew up on little else than bread and jam.

It’s all going to sound terribly Monty Pythonesque—like, ‘You think you were poor, we were poorer!’ But I suppose it was that my dad would come home and there would be no food, so he had to go out and find it. I think he was very much shaped by the need to ‘make do’.

Carol’s father’s family came from Glasgow, and played the music halls. They were Protestants, so when Carol’s grandfather, John, married Mary Duffy, an Irish Catholic mill girl, there was a lot of tension. ‘Later on, my grandmother went back to being Catholic, once John died. She had, I don’t know how many pregnancies, it was up to ten, but my father was the only survivor’. Only one other sibling grew to adulthood, and he died at El Alamein in the Second World War. From their marriage, Carol’s father and mother lived with Grandmother Mary in a tiny, two-bedroom, council house in the Vale, and in time their two daughters also shared that space:

My granny didn't like my mother’s Protestant ways, and I think it was incredibly difficult for my mother. One time she shut the door when she was feeding me, and Granny said, ‘I won’t have closed doors in my house!’ There was an unholy row and my mother grabbed me, and my sister, Alice, and stormed back to Dunbarton, a two-hour walk. This is post war. Dunbarton was bombed so a lot of it was gone. There was a housing shortage, people lining up everywhere. I don’t know how they got a place—it was an old tenement with stone steps. It had one bedroom, a tiny living room, with a little fireplace and a little kitchen bench; everything was in it, and one toilet outside. Women peed in the sink because you get desperate waiting for that single toilet! My mother got down on her knees and she thanked God for that place.
With the couple and two children sharing one bedroom, the house was a temporary refuge, and it would take years in the housing queues to get another, so they decided to emigrate:

Dad was the kind of guy that I think was always trying to make a solution out of a locational change, rather than a material change, and he wanted to go to Australia; but my mother didn’t because it was too far away and she thought she’d never get back again. Canada seemed more of a go. The irony was that she never came back anyway. My dad put a knapsack on his back and went to Canada—I don’t know how he did it, perhaps he jumped ship—but his idea was that if he got out there he would find a job and a place to stay, and he would bring us over.

Mum went to work at the West Clocks factory, and we lived with my Protestant Nanna, in another council house; better, because it had an internal toilet, and a living room, and separate kitchen, but I’ve been back there and it just cracks me up, the size of it, it was so small. But it was a far more Protestant place than down in the Vale. The Catholic-Protestant thing was huge. Bigger Protestant kids threw stones at Catholic kids, and bigger Catholic kids threw stones at Protestant kids.

Nanna was severe. Every day had its own tasks; Mondays were washing days, and so on. Every week, all the furniture was moved out and everything washed, all the walls washed, everything. The stones outside that little council house had to be chalked to make them white. It rained in Scotland, and they would be chalked over and over again; but she knew how to run a place, and she ran it that way, and she was a wonderful bigot—I mean she would say, after she finished cleaning, ‘That’s a bit more Protestant looking’. I thought, then, that Protestant meant clean.

After many months of waiting, Carol’s mother and the girls sailed for Canada. Carol remembers a lone piper lamenting the departure of the emigrants as the ship pulled away: ‘many a heart will break in twa, will ye no come back again?’ Her mother was
dreadfully seasick for the whole voyage. Carol recalls that even while they were still on the ship, she and Alice felt that their parents were not equipped to forge this new life, and that they would ‘have to navigate this space ourselves’. Seven-year-old Alice showed five-year-old Carol how to fly: ‘When the ship goes up, crouch down, and when it starts to go down, jump up in the air, and when you jump up you stay up, until the ship comes back up’.

They arrived in Montreal in April, and it was hot. ‘People have an idea of Canada as a cold place, but it can be hot as hell, and there we were in our kilts!’ Carol’s father took them by train to the first of many places they rented in Toronto, a basement containing a furnace that serviced the whole building. Carol said that other people, including other immigrants, lived in bungalows, or apartments—the basement was what her father could afford, but it set the family apart as ‘odd’. Describing how strange they felt, Carol says that Canada had become an affluent place by 1956, but to the family, the impoverished world of postwar Scotland was reality, a place where ‘to have even a treacle scone was a treasure’. Canada, where they saw a supermarket for the first time, ‘was unreal, beyond our comprehension’. Whatever the cause, Carol’s mother was unable to cope and developed agoraphobia. ‘Mother always turned up for school things, education was so important, but she couldn’t deal with shopping, or much else’:

When my mother was a little girl, her mother died of TB, and she was sent to an orphanage. Lots of people moved away from Scotland, but we carried poverty with us—like TB—it was like we always had a nagging cough, and it was like we couldn’t get beyond that. My mum wasn’t making it in Canada, and that meant Alice and I had to figure it out. We felt materially poorer than other people, and shamed on that level, but we felt better than them with loftier thoughts … a kind of reverse pride.

It was a very different world. In Scotland, the school provided uniforms—everything was provided—you just went to school. In Canada, we had to provide it all. ‘You’re not going to school in party dresses’, my mother said. In Scotland we had a slate. We didn’t have pencils, even in the house. How I lusted after a box of coloured pencils. I
shamed my mother by asking, so she turned on me. I began to figure it out, got very creative. I pinched other people’s pencils. I took money in other girls’ houses, and got what I needed for school.

Carol says that she and Alice felt uncomfortable in their new environment—it was brighter and flatter than the mists and mountains of Scotland—so they escaped to a local ravine, which mimicked the landscape from where they came:

It was just down the back of the flats and round the corner and down. We claimed that ravine; we named all the different parts. There was a little bit that went up like a meadow; we called that Sunshine Land. We built a tree house and we had big adventures down there. I thought of stories that I loved—one of my favourites was the Snow Queen\(^7\) and the girl that I loved in that was the little Lapland girl, because she had a knife and she was dressed in furs and she was tough, and I wanted to be like her, or like Pocahontas\(^8\). We’d go there and we’d stage these big stories—we created a story world in the ravine.

Carol survived her experiences of migrating to Canada from Scotland in part by escaping into fantasy. Her real life continued to be turbulent and included giving up a baby for adoption when she was seventeen, marrying an Australian man while still a university undergraduate, moving to Australia with him, moving back to Canada when the marriage failed, then back to Australia again to be with her children. Alongside many moves internal to Australia’s borders while working and raising children, during her second marriage, Carol completed a PhD and now works as a communications consultant, writes books, and is a mentor for other authors.

This very condensed summary of Carol’s adulthood will be elaborated and more of her experience included in other chapters. As prefaced at the beginning of this chapter, here, I have emphasised the early part of her life that might be considered formative of her sense of self. In what follows, I introduce narratives of other

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\(^7\) A children’s story by Hans Christian Anderson.

\(^8\) Pocahontas, the daughter of an American Indian chief, married an Englishman and supported English settlement in America. Her story has been romanticised, and presents her as a heroine.
participants with similar intent, although there is variation depending upon their individual stories.

**Carola**

Born in 1957, in Florsheim, West Germany, Carola grew up there and describes it as ‘a really, really old town … with an old wall and watchtowers’ dating back about fifteen hundred years. A small, sleepy, country town of fields and vineyards, where her father’s family goes back for at least a hundred years, it is a place where ‘most everyone knew everyone else’. Overall, her story is of a happy childhood, nurtured and peaceful. Although Germany was still recovering from the Second World War, Carola says ‘all that’ was remote from the little town. There was not much talk of the war in Florsheim, but, with hindsight, Carola is sure its impact on people continued and gave her mother’s demeanour as an example:

> I’ve never been nurtured by my mother, not in memory. If there’s something negative or depressive, that’s what she would focus on, and she still does that. My father was much older than her, but he loved having kids, he was the one playing with us. She was never really affectionate and close. With my mother, I would just always be careful.

As a child, Carola knew that her mother and father met during the war, when both worked in an outpost transport factory in Danzig, in Poland. As the Russians moved in, they were evacuated and fled on foot, ending up in a prisoner-of-war camp in the English zone, in northern Germany. When released, they returned to their homes, her father to Florsheim and her mother to a small village near Potsdam, in East Germany, and they did not meet again for many years. However, it was only recently that her mother told Carola about those journeys. As an adult, Carola sees her mother’s wartime experience as a possible explanation for her later behaviour. Carola says that her mother’s twenty-second birthday occurred while she was fleeing Danzig, ‘stuck somewhere on the road in a long track of people’. Again, upon her mother’s release from the prison camp she mostly walked to get to her home, by then in the Russian
zone. ‘It was before the Wall,⁹ but there was still a zone where it was very difficult to get through; there were guides to take people through the forests, often they had to hide. There is a three-day period that is completely blacked out for my mother. She was still a very young woman’.

Carola’s mother had a brother, who lived at some distance, and her parents lived in East Germany until Carola was about eight.¹⁰ From then ‘they lived with us until they died, which was very difficult.’ Carola says that, as a child she felt her mother’s coldness was balanced by the nurturing she received from others. The third of five children, she felt a strong sense of belonging to an extended family on her father’s side, with lots of people, including many children and the ‘most loving and nurturing’ family of her father’s first wife, who died soon after the end of the war. Carola’s father’s side of the family was ‘very charitable Catholic, very supportive, doing things in the community’; her mother was Protestant and taught theology in the town’s small Protestant community. The children went with their father and the rest of the family to the Catholic Church.

That’s a big part of growing up in Florsheim; there’s a lot of tradition around it. One of the highlights of the year is when we celebrate the end of the Pestilence. It’s an absolute holiday, with a big Catholic procession through town, very big, and everyone goes to it.

Florsheim was Carola’s world until she was fifteen, providing sport, music, youth groups, social events, church and school. ‘It is not isolated, but you had very little to do with other places even if they were only ten minutes away. Only then did my horizon actually extend beyond the place where I grew up’. To complete high school, she had to go further afield, a twenty-minute cycle ride ‘out of the town, over the bridge crossing the Mein River, and into the next town. We grew up on bikes—in snow, in hail, in sunshine, everything—that’s what’s normal, and that’s mobility, too, and independence’.

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⁹ At the end of the Second World War, Germany was partitioned. The Soviet Union controlled the eastern sector, and called it the German Democratic Republic. The Berlin Wall was erected by the GDR in 1961, officially to protect against fascist elements, but in practice to prevent emigration and defection to the west.

¹⁰ In old age, people who had been living in the GDR, commonly called East Germany, were allowed to reunite with relatives in the west.
That independence supported her well when she left home at nineteen to study medicine in the industrial area of Bochum, 250 km north; her first major move. Rapidly widening her horizons, Carola says the following years were ‘an intense time of exploring and making friends—lots of late night discussions, free spirited and free thinking—Who are we? How do we live together? How do we communicate? How do we relate?’ As well as completing orthodox medical training, Carola studied psychology, social work, and alternative therapies, along with a tight-knit, student group of friends.

Altogether, she lived in Borchum for ten years, six studying, then working as a paediatrician at the university’s children’s hospital, and at another in Dortmund. She travelled to the USA and Australia for practical experience, and on a later holiday in Australia decided to apply to work at Camperdown Children’s Hospital, in Sydney.

It just happened to be a time when it was difficult to have enough trainees for the jobs, because really only then can they take people from overseas … they had met me—that helped—they knew my English was good. So I got offered a position and I packed my bags and came.

Arriving in Sydney, Carola remembers, ‘I had this very strong experience of coming home. That was incredible. It was only the third time I had been in the country.’ After two years, Carola says she felt clearly, ‘my roots are shifting’, so she applied to stay. Once she achieved resident status, her medical qualifications would no longer be accepted, even though she had already worked at Camperdown for one year, for a second year in paediatrics at Royal North Shore Hospital, and had been offered a senior position in neonatology, as a Fellow. Her decision to live permanently in Australia meant that first she had to apply for immigration and then do the Australian Medical Council exams. Meantime, she could no longer work as a doctor. ‘It was huge. The way I dealt with it was one step at a time, because otherwise it would have been overwhelming’.

Two decades later, Carola is Head of Paediatrics at Royal North Shore Hospital in Sydney. Married to an Australian citizen of Turkish origin, she has stepchildren, a teenage son, and many relatives whom she visits regularly in Germany and Turkey.
Passionate about caring for children, she’s still exploring—contributing to the evolution of medical and social paradigms, from disease-focused and remedial approaches towards eliciting and sustaining health.

**Jun**

Jun was born in 1973, in Sakado, Japan—a town upgraded to city status a few years later. Allied military occupation of Japan after the Second World War had ended about twenty years earlier, but there was a strong USA military-based presence; and Jun says he grew up in a Japan that was still very traditional, but with a foreign overlay and modern technology. An only child, his parents both worked full-time, his father as a salesman for a pharmaceutical company, and his mother as a secretary. Outside school Jun was mostly cared for, until he started high school, by his aunt, whose daughters were ‘like big sisters’. He remembers that when he was seven or eight years old, his aunt was cooking in her kitchen, and he asked, ‘can I call you my mother?’ and she said something like: ‘Oh, that would be nice but I think you need to ask your mother about that’. Jun says he remembers being confused, because ‘I spent so much time at my aunt’s house, and she was taking care of me a lot’.

Jun’s strongest memories of growing up are to do with his schooling, which is understandable in light of his description, particularly of junior high school: classes were held for almost seven hours a day, six days a week, then there was sport for a couple of hours in the afternoons—Jun did *kendo*—and four nights each week there was *juku*—cram school—until after nine. ‘I would get home around 10 o’clock and have dinner, my parents have already eaten, so I was eating by myself at the table, as my parents were watching TV. So I would eat and take a bath and then it’s time to go to bed at eleven. Yeah, that was a typical, everyday life’.

Jun spoke in detail of the assessment system used to rank students, and said that although he is not a competitive person, he always knew his standard deviation from the average, identified on a bell curve:

> Every student is forced to be aware of where they are. In Japan, getting into high school is a big deal, you have to take a test to get into the best possible high school that you can, so that you can move on to best
possible university. I knew that I could get into a good high school if I just kept trying. So I think that’s what I did, I just kept trying.

Jun’s entry to a prestigious high school pleased his parents; thus, they relaxed their vigilance, expecting the school to keep him performing well. However, the public school Jun attended expected students to be self-motivated, and Jun’s grades began to slide. His parents did not know because ‘they didn’t even take the school report card.’ Jun loved music, and from his first year in high school started to teach himself piano—‘I wasn’t interested in studying at all, so I would go to the music classroom and teach myself how to play’. Excited that he was doing something that no one was telling him to do, something for himself, he practised every day, and eventually got an electric piano at home, ‘a very cheap, small one, but I loved it.’

At seventeen, in his senior year at high school, Jun’s father asked him what university he wanted to go to. Jun says that when he named a university of music, his father ‘became furious, because he was expecting something normal like—I don’t know, science, or economics—something ordinary’. Jun says he did not understand his father’s reaction, because, ‘maybe for the first time … I’m trying to make my own life, becoming more of an adult … thinking for myself,’ but his parents did not approve:

It is my father who does the talking. When he talks, he can be scary, he is a man and he is my father, so when he yelled at me for having stupid dream, I was very scared and affected by it … shaking … scared, and nervous … so I think my dream was crushed by my parents, and I was forced to think that I should go to a regular university, whatever that means.

Failing entrance exams for four ‘regular’ universities, Jun went for a year to a full-time cram school, available because ‘many Japanese students are in the same situation’. From there, glad to be away from his parents, he went to university in Yokohama, and studied international business. In his final year, Jun decided to go the USA to live, and to study English. He explains that this was a choice his parents could accept because, in Japan, English is recognised as a language of international
currency—in technology, the sciences, economics, and politics—and thus, ‘studying English is a great thing—it is the international language’.

One year into his studies at a university in Washington State, Jun met Connie, and they quickly became close. Connie had already arranged to go to Japan to teach English. For Jun, this was a dilemma:

I didn’t want to go back to Japan because that meant having to deal with my parents, and having to worry about what job I maybe could get; and I was enjoying this life in a foreign country, doing whatever I wanted to do, so I didn’t want to go back. But I didn’t want to lose her either, so it was kind of a tough decision. I asked Connie if it was okay for us to live in Japan for two years, but come back to the US after that.

Connie agreed, so they went to Japan, working and living together in Utsunomiya. In 1999, they were married—‘just a paper thing … at Sakado City Hall’. Jun thinks that in modern Japan, ‘Japan’s tradition of not mixing bloods or ethnicities is going away quickly, and international marriages are becoming more and more common’. Before he and Connie returned to the USA in 2000, they had a wedding ceremony, mostly, Jun says, to please his mother.

Connie

Born in Seattle, USA, in 1967, Connie is uncertain just what her ethnic background is—unlike the three other participants introduced thus far. Modern USA, built initially on colonialism and slavery, has seen continuous mass immigration since the first half of the nineteenth century (Boundless, 2011, np). Connie’s parents were both born in the USA, but Connie does not know from where or when the first of her ancestors migrated to the USA, just that there were several American-born generations from the late 1800s, and Irish, Scottish, and German are part of her ethnic background. Her father’s adoptive parents were Norwegian and what her great-grandma called ‘Yankee-German-Dutch’. Although Connie grew up in western Washington and stayed there until she was in her early twenties, she says she never felt that any place she lived in was ‘really home’. Her parents divorced when she was about three years old, and from then on, Connie and her younger sister moved about,
during both school and vacation times, sometimes living with their mother, their paternal grandparents, or their father.

The place that felt the best was the grandparents’ house, but they weren’t our parents, and when we would do things with other kids, or go places, they had parents, but always we were with grandparents. They peppered our growing up with Scandinavian foods, Christmas traditions, religious ideas, and strong work ethics.

Connie describes her grandparents as ‘mellow’. Retired, they lived in a small country town, in a farming area, quiet, and slow paced.

My grandmother was very loving and warm. She was baking cookies or she was down at the church helping organise something, and it was very regular, very routine. It was the same every time—we slept in the same place, we had our toothbrushes there, we had the same tree to climb in—the tree was always there. We knew what the deal was, and we just folded into it. It goes way back before my memory starts, so we were just part of that, and that felt good. We knew what the expectations on us were, and everything was regular.

The girls found the routine comfortable, and felt they belonged. Connie says they were very much loved, but ‘we were the grandchildren, not the children’. She recalls that she always wished she could have the same feeling of being at home when living with her mother, but ‘it just wasn’t there’:

My mother was seventeen when I was born, and at seventeen, I think, actually she was more like maybe thirteen, or fourteen. She just didn’t really know how to be a mom, and I don’t think she ever … I don’t think she wanted to be a mom, and so, ‘How was it living with my mom?’ She had a lot of issues, you know … personal emotional issues, and I think she didn’t know how to not be selfish, or somehow part of her never came out of the teenage years, or something. I have always felt loved by my mother, but not cared for, or taken care of, she just doesn’t have it to give. I heard an expression one time: ‘you can’t expect your cat to bark’,
and I thought, ‘yeah, that’s my mom’. I guess that’s how, in my mind, I think about my mom. My mom had three children, and she and my stepdad had just really some rough patches. There were periods of time when there was a lot of drinking happening, and my mom not being around, she would be gone all day, or she wouldn’t come home until late at night, or something, and so it wasn’t regular and reliable, and it wasn’t predictable.

Connie’s mother and stepfather lived in suburban Seattle, moving house from time to time, but always within walking distance of her stepfather’s business. Connie describes the places as ‘lower socio-economic’, but says that in the 1970s and early 1980s in the USA there was not such a gap between rich and poor as she sees now. They lived a couple of neighbourhoods away from government housing projects.

We had tons of what—we called them boat people—people from Laos, you know, they were all coming in the 70s, and they were sort of tucking into these pockets, and we were maybe a mile away, is all. As a kid—I always thought, I wish we could live in a house that looked better, or I wish the front yard of our house looked a little more normal. I think here [in Australia] people would call us, like, bogans.11 I heard the word bogan here a lot of times, and probably that’s what our house always looked like, and I mean, inside the house, my mother was not a houseproud, sort of housekeeping, homemaker person. She never was. But I always wished for it, and I always wanted it, and I don’t know if it’s because we always had it with my grandparents.

Connie reflects that the phrase ‘well, if things had been normal’ often comes up in conversations with her sister about those days, ‘but I don’t really know, because in the neighbours’ house—what looks normal—you don’t know what’s happening in the neighbours’ house either’. To Connie, the houses ‘never felt homely. They could have felt homely, but my mom, her heart wasn’t there, somehow’:

Each time we moved it was to a better place, so although I didn’t think about it while I was growing up, it’s obvious now that my stepdad was moving us forward. So each time the rent went up because we were moving into a better place. Each time we moved was on a better street, and a better looking house, with a better looking yard, but after—it wasn’t long before it was looking like the crappy last one we lived in, you know, because my mom wasn’t doing anything.

In her early twenties, Connie moved away to college in eastern Washington State—still in the state where she was born. Working to support herself, it took her six years to complete a two-year university entrance degree. Then, with a student loan to pay for university and living expenses, Connie was ‘so happy!’ She saw university as ‘a big jump-off point’, that would take her to live in other countries—a ticket to freedom from her family background and to discover herself, rather than being obliged to fulfil anyone else’s expectations:

I knew that this was like the gateway to the rest of my life. I really thought, right, I’ve been doing things and I’ve been busy, but now, this is where my dream takes off. I wanted to just check things out … not to dig my roots in anywhere right away at all; and not having anyone, any person, lay anything heavy on me, that I would have to stay, or I would have to—I wanted to be free to make my own choices and my own life, and go—yeah, I wanted to just see, ‘Where will I go? Where will I land? Where will I be?’

However, Connie met and fell in love with Jun. She did go to Japan and taught English there for two years, but at the end of that time, she and Jun married and they returned to the USA. Back in Washington, ‘the US was having a small recession, so a job was hard to find’, and the couple lived with Connie’s grandmother in Seattle for a year. Work took them to New Orleans for a further year, where they had a baby; then to Oregon State for a couple of years, and a second baby, then back to western Washington.
Limited employment opportunities, economic factors, and a growing disillusionment with social conditions and politics in the USA led Jun and Connie to emigrate. They carefully compared conditions and immigration requirements in Canada, New Zealand, and Australia, and relocated to Tasmania at the beginning of 2011. Their visas were based on Jun’s enrolment in a postgraduate course at the University of Tasmania, aimed to qualify him in a professional category that was on the list of those acceptable for immigration at the time. During the two years the family lived in Hobart, that category was dropped from the list, and they failed to meet immigration requirements. Neither Jun nor Connie wanted to return to the USA, which they felt had become too difficult, economically and politically. With two sons now at school, they felt it was time to settle down, so at the beginning of 2013, they returned to Japan. Jun planned to work as a teacher and to compose music, and Connie to continue enjoying being a full-time mother, fulfilling their hopes for a new and good life in Hokkaido.

**Discourse and analysis**

In this introduction to some of the experiences and histories of migration shared with me by Carol, Carola, Jun, and Connie, I have provided only a sketch of the wider social and cultural narratives within which their personal narratives of self developed. Details from their childhoods capture elements of what may have been formative of their senses of self. Closer reading and analysis of their stories can now illuminate how the sense of self they each developed in those early years affected their ability to cope with challenges of migration.

Noting significant differences of origin and experience between participants, several points of correspondence nevertheless emerge. Each felt that they needed to look after themselves when they were growing up, that they were left to their own devices much of the time, and that they had developed resilience as a response to challenging relationships with their parents. It is interesting to consider this outcome in light of Hara Estroff Marano’s (2008) claims that parental overinvolvement hinders a child’s development socially, emotionally, and neurologically. Her study of children and adolescents in the USA concludes that overprotection of children produces
psychological breakdown and—as the book’s title states—*A Nation of Wimps*. Marano writes, ‘What's significant about these [overprotected] kids … is that they commonly lack a fierce internal struggle toward a deeper state of authenticity’ (21).

Carol, Carola, and Connie all decided early in life that their mothers could not cope and thus could not be depended upon. On the surface, Carola’s childhood appears comfortable, happy, safe, and protected, yet from her earliest memories she felt:

> Emotionally I needed to support my mother. From that, for a start, I got that I’m strong enough to do that—even though it should be the other way round—so I think that’s a lot of where this comes from; that I feel I can look after myself and that, from whenever, I was able even to support the person who should have nurtured me.

At the age of six, Connie realised, ‘I can’t count on my mom, so I’m going to have to take matters into my own hands. I can’t trust my mother’s perception of how the world is, I need to think things through for myself’. Growing up in straitened circumstances, with an ailing mother, in a culture she experienced as alien, Carol saw self-reliance as essential for survival. In Jun’s case, it was not that his parents were unable to cope; more that they were effectively absent, so he learned to look after himself, and to think for himself, although it would be years before he would free himself of fear of his father.

The desire to be free from his parents’ expectations led Jun to enrol in a university far from home, and then to travel to the USA for further study. For the other three participants, attending a distant university was also a means of leaving home and all four spoke of having felt relief and freedom to be themselves, and to pursue their dreams. Whatever the differences between Canada, Germany, Japan, and the USA, the availability of education to a tertiary level was a common factor in participant narratives. Children in those countries were required to attend school to be educated and to be prepared for work and other adult responsibilities. It was assumed that children were capable of learning and would develop some level of independence by the time they finished school. As they grew up, each participant developed a sense of self that included assumptions of autonomy—beliefs that they were able to achieve,
to succeed, to support themselves, and that they were free, once they were old enough, to make their own choices.

In addition, to varying degrees, all four had relative safety; and they grew up in one version or other of post-war meta-narratives of technological progress, economic growth, and assumptions that opportunities were available for them as individuals, beyond those possible for earlier generations. They believed in their own capabilities, partly because—socially—that was expected of them, and partly because that was a conclusion they drew from meeting personal challenges. As Carola put it, she knew that she would always manage, always ‘find a way’, and throughout her life, although many things were difficult for her, she said ‘I never felt that I would not be able to do it’. Despite sound educational foundations, all four also experienced times of economic difficulty, yet they took for granted that education, employment, housing, the freedom to travel, and other opportunities were available to them.

More personally, each one’s sense of self was impeded by a lack of self-worth at different stages, and in various ways. For Connie, a sense of low self-worth began very early, and resided in longing to be ‘normal’, and to have a happy home with ‘normal’ parents, rather than grandparents. Jun, shy as a child, thought that he was ‘not very brave’, because, when he was bullied in elementary school, he became a bully himself for a time so that ‘the tough guys’ would accept him. He also says that for a long time he thought badly of himself for not standing up to his father. In Louisiana, Jun worked in a competitive job he hated, again allowing himself to be manipulated, until he collapsed with arrhythmia. Back in Oregon, he returned to university for qualifications that would improve his employability, and, feeling responsible by then for a wife and child, he pushed himself almost to the point of breakdown. Finding the university counselling service unhelpful, he turned to self-help books, and said that he began to realise for the first time, ‘my psychology is a product of whatever happened and whatever I was born with … and now that I am an adult, I can help myself, I can choose.’

Carola often still experiences a ‘loss of self’ when with other people, and a need to withdraw to reconnect with herself in solitude:
I had to learn, and literally have to keep reminding myself that I have to put myself first without feeling or thinking that this is selfish. That’s taken me a long time, and it shows up everywhere—it can be at work where I find myself tired in the morning, because I’ve been on call, being demanded of all the time, and I get cranky and I have to shut the door, and say to myself, ‘Why am I here?’ and get back, reduce it down to ‘this is what I’m about, it’s about families, it’s about patients, it’s about what I want to do about healing’, but I have to look after myself.

That pattern began early in her childhood, when Carola felt she had to look after her mother, and decided she must put other people’s needs ahead of her own. It was also connected to what she described as ‘a component of guilt just for being German’. As a child, she did not understand it, but was aware of an undercurrent of angst in the adults around her from their various experiences including her parents’ wartime imprisonment. Later, she learned the history of Germany’s role in the Second World War. Carola was not born until almost thirteen years after the war, and yet her sense of self was deeply impressed by the social and familial narratives within which she grew up. Questioning the assumptions of those narratives, and seeing the meanings she attributed to herself in that process, in recent years, Carola has changed some key beliefs:

There is so much guilt, almost like you can’t be proud being a German, because of all that history, but it is becoming less so … there’s a lot about being German I can laugh about now, and a lot that’s really good … and there’s a lot of me that doesn’t fit that picture anymore.

In Carol’s words, ‘toxic shame is the biggest thing that undercuts everything’. As a child, she knew the shame of poverty, and explains:

You know, secretiveness … to try to keep up the good front, you’d have one good suit, you’d take it down to the pawn shop, you’d drag it out again when there was a special event, then you’d take it back down to the pawn shop. We had a great distrust of—well it was difficult to own property, it was the gentry who owned property—we were people who
rented. You distrusted rent collectors. People who had property and rented out we saw as the scum of the earth, and I suppose to a certain extent that still affects me today in terms of having things—I always feel strange about making that leap to buying something, we’re not people who do that. It’s a mindset about the efficacy of being able to imagine yourself being able to buy something. It’s like tennis: ‘We don’t play tennis, the gentry play tennis’—and it wouldn’t matter how much money I would have, I don’t play tennis. It’s something that other people do.

Socially, Carol was further shamed by becoming pregnant at sixteen and having an ‘illegitimate’ child—a label still common in the 1960s. But worse, in Carol’s view, came later. In spite of excelling academically at a prestigious university, Carol was unable to cope with the vast gap she felt between herself and other girls, who came from rich backgrounds:

I fell desperately in love with a young man at Trinity who took a shine to me. He was just so out of my league, a private school boy, and you know, that skin! Where do they get that skin? The white skin, the apple cheeks, the black crisp curls; he was going to be a doctor, he was going to go to South America and work with the poor people. He was perfect. And I wanted to marry him. But his mother, she smelled me coming a mile away, and she planked down on that really fast, and that hurt. In fact if there was any part that I got really shamed by, it was that experience. That summer, when this boy dropped me—he hardly looked at me, and my girlfriend had told someone about the baby … I was kind of in a bad state.

Individually and together, these narratives are suggestive of what Brené Brown has described as embodying shame. Based on social research involving some thousands of people in the USA, Brown (2008, xvi) writes that she has found shame to be fundamental to human experience:

The constant struggle to feel accepted and worthy is unrelenting. We put so much of our time and energy into making sure that we meet
everyone’s expectations and into caring about what other people think of us, that we are often left feeling angry, resentful and fearful. Sometimes we turn these emotions inward and convince ourselves that we are bad and that maybe we deserve the rejection that we so desperately fear. Other times we lash out ... Either way, in the end, we are left feeling exhausted, overwhelmed and alone.

Carol, Carola, Jun, and Connie each acknowledged that they had felt ashamed, and inadequate at different times. As children they did their best to develop and express what they learned was considered to be good behaviour, what was expected of them; and to control, or at least hide, what they thought was wrong with themselves. Deborah Du Nann Winter (2003, 126–7) has described this process as one of building a ‘false self’ in which the requirements of others are taken as his or her central being. Others have also researched the high personal costs of living with this ‘false self’ (La Guardia, 2009, 98).

Each of the participants also shared with me the sense that various challenges in their lives led them to question early beliefs, and to further develop their senses of self. That process was stimulated by their moves from places of origin to live elsewhere, including by going to university, and in particular by their experiences of migration. For example, Jun found life in the USA and people there very different from his background in Japan. Coming close to breakdown he learned to question his assumptions and considers that was an important turning point from which his adulthood really started. Becoming more aware of himself, he also became more aware of others, and he feels that allows him to be a ‘better person’.

Both Jun and Connie think of self as being half what they were born with, and half acquired, added to, changed and developed throughout life, and especially by their moves to different countries. Jun reflected that he likes diversity, or unknown territory, ‘I actually want that half of me to keep exploring and keep moving into something better’, and feels it is important to keep the two halves of himself in harmony, working together. Connie told me, ‘my self is something that is unchanging, it’s that thing, that inside thing—it’s the same, no matter what’. At the
same time, her strongest feeling was being ‘the mom’—a role she takes very seriously. Emphatically, she added:

Wait a second now; I was somebody before I had children. I had a self happening before I was married, thank you very much; and I was happy and it was a good self or person or life or whatever. When I learned I was pregnant I was happy, but at the same time I thought, ‘Oh crap! That’s it, then, that’s it’. Because I thought then, and I still think now, when you become a mother, that’s your life from now on.

Through Carola’s experience of migrating to Australia, she says she came to an awareness of herself as neither German, nor Australian, but as a person in her own right. Carola describes her sense of self as a feeling of being strongly connected to her inner balance:

It’s like a sense that’s right in the middle, that sense when you know a word is spelt correct or not, that centre—almost like a physical perception, quiet, peaceful—a very strong sense of ‘this is who I am’, and out of that comes how I am in the world.

Carol sees herself as a survivor, and over time came to value that capacity, and her accomplishments. For instance, she is proud of having established Canada’s first provincial day-care centre for unwed mothers—women on welfare, who could not afford day care, and wanted to go back to school. Carol’s various migrations between Canada and Australia were very difficult for her, associated, as they were, with divorce and other personal problems. Nevertheless, she says her sense of self grew consistently. ‘Passionate, with a huge appetite for life’, is how Carol describes herself, very caring, yet able to be ruthless to ensure survival of herself and her children. ‘If we were in a war, or a famine, I’d say, “Stick with me, kid. I’m going to get the potato!”’ Having gone through what she calls ‘some lumpy periods’ in her life, Carol recognises that ‘there are several aspects—the person I reached is a sort of cohesiveness that pulls together all of these senses of myself. I’m nobody’s concept of me. I’m just me.’
The discussion above has shown that to one degree or another, through varied experiences of migration, all four of these regular migrants have developed self-awareness, examined their beliefs, and challenged their own assumptions, clarifying their senses of self in the process. In the next two chapters, I explore irregular migration, and mobile lifestyles, and introduce the other participants. Later, I bring all the participants together, including their experiences of migration, how they have handled those relocations, and what they have learned in the process.
5. IRREGULAR MIGRATION

In the habitual terms in which human identities are narrated [refugees or asylum seekers] are ineffable. They are Jacques Derrida's ‘undecidables’ made flesh. Among people like us, praised by others and priding ourselves on arts of reflection and self-reflection, they are not only untouchables, but unthinkables. In a world filled to the brim with imagined communities, they are the unimaginables (Bauman, 2007, 45).

Chapter four introduced case studies of regular migration. Here, I introduce Kiros, Nene, Khadga, and Shoukat, all of whom have histories of irregular migration. Analysis is shaped to discover what sense of self is to these people, and to ascertain what part their senses of self played in their journeys. First, I briefly outline the current extent and causes of irregular migration. Referring to the United Nations’ definition of what constitutes refugee status, I discuss the inadequacy of that definition in face of current challenges, and the complexity of questions of human rights. Considering practices in the EU and Australia, I show how the governments of some nation states have acted to restrict asylum access, apparently violating international laws to which they are signatories. This background is specific and relevant to narratives shared with me by participants in this category, and offers some understanding of challenges they have faced.

Rights, refugees, and asylum seekers

According to the United Nations Refugee Agency, by the end of 2012, more than forty-five million people were forcibly displaced worldwide, ‘the highest number since 1944’ (UNHCR, 2013c, np), and by 2014, the number had passed fifty million (UNHCR, 2014b, np). Of these, more than fifteen million were refugees, about one million were asylum seekers—that is, not yet granted refugee status—and the rest were internally displaced persons. Numbers vary according to conditions current at any time. Many millions of refugees and asylum seekers are ‘provided with protection, shelter and humanitarian assistance, often under difficult and complex
circumstances’ in camps, most of them in sub-Saharan Africa, and Asia, with a small number in Europe (UNHCR, 2013b). In 2012, the estimated number of people in these camps was about twenty million. The world’s largest camp, Dadaab, in north-eastern Kenya, established more than twenty years ago, hosts more than half a million people including about ten thousand third-generation refugees born in the camp (ibid.).

Irregular migration is motivated by wars, political conflicts, genocide, persecution, terror, famine, natural disasters, poverty, and land being rendered untenable by environmental impacts of armed conflict, and climate change (Reuveny, 2007; UNHCR, 2013b). Irregular migration also includes seasonal workers and labour migrants. Not all such conditions qualify people for refugee status. In international law, the 1951 United Nations Convention on Refugees and its 1967 Amendment definition of a refugee is:

a person who is outside his or her country of nationality or habitual residence, has a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion; and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country, or to return there, for fear of persecution (UNHCR, 2011, np).

As Diane Bates (2002, 467) points out, this definition leaves out ‘those compelled by deficiencies in the local social, economic, or environmental context’. Norman Myers (2001, 609) estimates that over coming decades, the number of environmental refugees could range from fifty up to two hundred million people, when global warming takes hold. Increasing levels of migration—both regular and irregular—are also attributed to results of economic and development policies worldwide (Bhugra & Gupta, 2011). There is also an increasing number of gender refugees—people who identify themselves as gay, lesbian, bi-sexual, and transsexual. All such categories fall outside the UN definition of refugees, but even without them current numbers of irregular migrants, worldwide, challenge the capacity of receiving nations to respond (UNHCR, 2014a, np).
Writing in the aftermath of the Second World War, Hannah Arendt (2003) positions issues of rights as central to the dilemmas of asylum seekers. ‘The Rights of Man’—proclaimed by the French and American revolutions—basically ensured rights of individuals within a nation state. However, if people belonged to no nation then they had no rights. Arendt shows that although the rights of citizenship were defined as ‘inalienable’, as soon as people were removed from the nation state, and lost their political status, ‘no authority was left to protect them and no institution was willing to guarantee them’ (32). Arendt reflects that ‘It seems that a man who is nothing but a man [that is, when he has lost his citizen status] has lost the very qualities which make it possible for other people to treat him as a fellow-man’ (41). Clarifying that concept, she writes:

The great danger rising from the existence of people forced to live outside the common world is that they are thrown back, in the midst of civilization, on their natural givenness, on their mere differentiation. They lack that tremendous equalizing of differences which comes from being citizens of some commonwealth and yet, since they are no longer allowed to partake in human artifice, they begin to belong to the human race in much the same way as animals belong to a specific animal species. The paradox involved in the loss of human rights is that such loss coincides with the instant when a person becomes a human being in general—without a profession, without a citizenship, without an opinion, without a deed by which to identify and specify himself—and different in general, representing nothing but his own absolutely unique individuality which, deprived of expression within and action upon a common world, loses all significance (43–4).

One way in which this loss of rights occurs in contemporary practice is in disparities between international law and actions of individual states. While international law as proclaimed by the UNHCR insists that it is entirely legal for individuals to seek refuge, in claiming and exercising their rights to control who can enter and who can stay in their territories, national governments declare that asylum seekers reaching their borders without appropriate documentation are illegal immigrants. Legality is
conferred if people have applied for asylum, and been deemed in need of refuge and protection, prior to entering a country. Others, arguably the most desperate, make hazardous journeys to plead for refuge. Arriving without papers, they are classed as illegal entrants.

Research by human rights practitioner Sabrina Tucci (2013, 25) shows that in the EU further anomalies ‘devolve the responsibilities for the management of migration and asylum flows to states at the EU external borders’. Tucci writes that, according to international law, asylum claims should be processed in the country where they are filed; however the EU expects the government of the country of first entrance to take responsibility for processing and determining refugee status. In practice, this EU policy means that asylum seekers are returned ‘to transit countries, and to those countries proximate to migration producing areas’ (ibid.). For example, asylum seekers are sent to Italy, which is often the first country of entrance, and also to Libya, which is held to be ‘both a receiving migration area … and a transit region functioning as a bridge between Europe and Africa for maritime irregular migration’ (30–1). Tucci details agreements between the EU, Italy and Libya, formalised in 2008, requiring Libya to implement restrictive migration policies and border controls. A consequence is that, ‘Most of those intercepted at sea, and readmitted by the Italian government to Libya have been subjected to ill treatment and detention, removed from Libya to neighbouring countries, or left stranded in the desert’ (31).

In Australia, in recent years the treatment of asylum seekers has become a political football, centred on grievous detention of asylum seekers in contravention of international law to which the Australian Government is a signatory (UNHCR, 2011). Detention of people of all ages—without any charge being laid against them, and for indefinite periods that can amount to many years—is justified on the basis that it functions as a deterrent to others who may attempt such migration, and because of worldwide fears for security, particularly since the events of 9/11 in the USA. In 2012, the UNHCR (2013a, np) issued new guidelines on detention of asylum seekers, making it clear that ‘seeking asylum is not a criminal act, and that indefinite and mandatory forms of detention are prohibited under international law’. In its bid to ‘stop the boats’, successive Australian Governments, including the
recently elected Liberal National Coalition Government, have attracted censure and concern from the UNHCR for ‘unlawful and increasingly harsh and punitive treatment of asylum seekers arriving by boat’ (Howie, 2014, np). Asylum seekers arriving in Australian waters by boat now—in 2014—are detained off shore in appalling conditions on Nauru, Christmas Island, Manus Island, and Papua New Guinea; and the Australian Navy is pushing back boats, and forcing other asylum seekers into fully-enclosed, lifeboat capsules and towing them out of Australian waters (Power, 2014).

The information above provides only a glimpse into the enormity of challenges that the global community faces in relation to treatment of refugees and asylum seekers, and it serves as a context for the experience of participants introduced here. In the following pages, I summarise narratives of four people, now resident in Australia. Three came to Australia having already been processed and accepted as refugees, and the fourth arrived by boat, seeking asylum.

**Kiros**

Ethiopia, in East Central Africa, where Kiros was born in 1967, is a country that has seen decades of natural disasters, political unrest, war, drought, and famine. These events forced millions of Ethiopians from their homes to seek refuge, within their own country as internally displaced persons, or in other countries (Australian Government. Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, 2006, np). Nevertheless, Kiros’ early childhood was spent in a relatively peaceful, farming community in the province of Tigray. He grew up as an Orthodox Coptic Christian in a town with a population of about twelve thousand. He says ‘Christians and Muslims lived in harmony’, and he felt the whole community was his family:

Growing up in that place, you are not only of that place, but you become part of that place, because it is a community where everyone knows everyone … us kids, we used to play outside, soccer, volleyball, and we run everywhere. If we end up in one house, if there are ten, the mother of

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12 A brief summary of Kiros’ narrative was first published as a conference paper, and subsequently in *Diversity and Turbulences in Contemporary Global Migration* (Walthrust Jones, 2013), and *Migration Matters* (Dugan & Edelstein, 2013).
that house is supposed to feed all of us … so growing up in that way makes you so part of that place there, you would never be able to let that go. For me, everyone that I knew from that time are like my brothers, my sisters … still if I find someone whom I grew up with together, the bond is instant.

From the age of six, with the end of the regime of Haile Selassie, violence entered Kiros’ life with almost continuous fighting between rebel groups and the new socialist government: ‘Armoured groups would come during the night and attack … I grew up in a sort of continuous fighting, a war zone’. To prevent young people, most of whom were from Tigray, from joining the rebels; on Sundays children such as Kiros were indoctrinated in socialist principles, and imprisoned if they failed to attend those political sessions:

It was in a way very difficult, but at the same time you learned to be disciplined, and we were living beyond our age. We were contributing. At the age of fourteen I decided to join a club—we travelled maybe two or three hours on foot to teach in the dry areas—basically teaching people how to write, because the illiteracy rate in Ethiopia was high at that time. We were helping that.

At sixteen, Kiros left home to go to a distant university with three other students from the same high school, and others from the region. Students nominated the university they wished to attend, and the government—not the education department—allocated places. Kiros says he was fortunate to be sent to the agricultural university that was his first choice because that would qualify him to get ‘a meaningful job’ in his home region. However, he did not return for many years because his homeplace had become a war zone. After graduating, he became a university lecturer, married and had a daughter. In 1991, war brought about a further change in government, allowing Kiros to return home briefly, for the first time in seven years. He was shocked by the devastation left by the years of war: ‘Everything was dust … it doesn’t even look that there is life there’. Soon after, he went to the Netherlands for six months.
A shift in the way I think started happening. I felt that being in the university was a waste of my time. I felt uncomfortable with the way we were teaching. Everything was based on the western style of farming, teaching subsistence farmers to milk with machines. What is the use?

Kiros left academia to work with an organisation using a participatory learning approach with farmers, then with an international NGO leading an ambitious project, ‘recharging’ the land in Tigray, and building infrastructure: ‘I had to do something personally to contribute, to change the situation … hills, wheat, lands, trees, water, even a high school’. By that time he had three daughters. In 1998, clashes at the border between Ethiopia and Tigray developed into full-scale war, leaving more than 80,000 dead and further destroying both countries’ ailing economies (UNHCR, 2014a, 115).

My wife is from Eritrea and I am from Ethiopia, so my position as a person was immediately questioned. My wife was imprisoned, and to be deported to Eritrea. She doesn’t even know Eritrea very well; she grew up in Ethiopia, and Eritrea was part of Ethiopia until 1991. Now there was war. Our girls were with her, but they were released. This changed our situation. We knew that we were in danger, so we decided to flee. We left our stuff and drove to Addis Ababa. I never knew that was the end of it, but that became the end of it. We would never go back.

Kiros worked in Addis Ababa for a couple of years but, in political trouble with the government, he was imprisoned a couple of times, and his wife and children were always afraid; so they moved on to Kenya and became refugees. There, he refused to go to the refugee camps, afraid that they might not be safe. As a refugee, he could not get a work permit, but survived for several years by teaching on a cash basis; then, with a contract that had to be renewed monthly, working for Canadian, USA, and Australian refugee programs. Two years after applying to relocate to Australia, Kiros and his family arrived in Hobart, in 2006. At the University of Tasmania, Kiros did a masters degree, and then a PhD, focused on empowerment of people, particularly in new communities. In 2014, he became a policy officer with the Department of Economic Development, and engaged in further research.
Nene

The youngest participant, Nene was born in 1991, in what is now South Sudan. It was at a time of conflict that has been part of civil war in Sudan for more than fifty years (UN, 2011, np). Nene’s father, a soldier, was killed when she was three months old: ‘My mum thought it wasn’t safe for us, they could come after us, so she took me and three of our kids and she escaped with us; and two of her children were taken by my uncle, and I haven’t seen them until now. I have only seen them in photos’. For four years, seeking safety, the family kept moving from village to village, along with many others, because ‘you don’t really know who was fighting who’. In 1995, they went to Kakuma Refugee Camp, in Kenya, where they stayed until they were resettled in Australia in 2005. The camp has a population of approximately fifty thousand refugees, and is administered by the UNHCR under the jurisdiction of the Kenyan Government. A semi-arid, desert environment, it has dust storms; average daytime temperatures of forty degrees Celsius; poisonous spiders, snakes, and scorpions; outbreaks of malaria, cholera, and other hardships (Kanere, 2009, np). Nene remembers that, to enter the camp, they had to have a ration card, which took two weeks to obtain. Once they had the card, they and other refugees were taken by truck to the camp.

In the camp there is peoples from different countries—Ethiopians, Sudanese, Congolese, Eritreans, Somalians, Ugandans—about eight nationalities all came there, running from war to Kenya. So the UN has to give everyone basic food, and you wait for a fortnight to get your food, and usually many people in a family. If you get rations of food, if you finish it before the time, you have to wait another two weeks before you get more.

In addition to food shortages and disease, there was crime and violence, not least, tribal violence between refugee groups; and the local Turkana people did not want the refugee camp to be there:

They say that this is their place, the refugees don’t belong there, and they should go away. So the Turkanas can come in the night and take away
They ask you to give them food or give them money. If you don’t give them, then they will kill you, and they rape women and girls.

Taps put in by the UN provided drinking water for a couple of hours each day, but Nene says there was not enough: ‘You will have to queue and if two hours is finished, and the water stop coming from the tap, you have to go to the river … mostly people get water for like taking shower, or cooking, or washing clothes from the river’. People also had to cross the river to get firewood, and sometimes timber for repairing buildings, but the Turkanas lived in the forest. Children from the camp collected wood and water morning and afternoon. By evening, it was too dangerous. Houses were built from mud and grass, so when it rained, they leaked, and sometimes collapsed. Nene says there was a lot of sickness in the camp, including malnutrition, cholera, and malaria, and usually sick people would die.

The UN built a hospital for refugees, but there is not enough medical supplies or nurses, and usually when somebody gets sick in the night—like here, when someone gets sick you call 000 and you get an ambulance to take you. But there, if you live very far away, if someone gets sick in your house or your family, you have to take them to the hospital. You have to walk all the way, in the night. Sometimes it is they die on the way, without you reaching there.

The UN set up schools with teachers drawn from amongst the refugees. If there were not enough classrooms, ‘we learn under a big tree, with a blackboard’. Nene says it was not a good education, limited by what the refugee teachers knew. Children had time for school, to help their parents, to fetch water, and to play with their friends, but they were always aware of danger, and often hunger. Nene says, ‘I didn’t have a good childhood—not like what is normal for children here, in Australia’.

Nene, her mother, and two brothers were accepted for resettlement in Hobart, when she was fourteen years old. On arrival, Nene recalls:

The first thing that goes in my mind—it is safety—like here you feel just the atmosphere of how Hobart looks, and it just feels safe. Back there, every time you feel afraid in the night time, you hear guns, you hear
tomorrow morning someone was killed, and like that, so when I arrived in Australia, the first thing that came on my mind is safety.

I could see that there were volunteers and people helping us around, and I could see like here there is help, you can get help, no matter what you are going through, you can get help, so it was kind of a different way. It kind of make me a bit forget, like finally I can feel that I am safe, finally I can feel that all is well. I feel like there is new beginning, it is a new chapter of starting a new life, and what I was thinking was, ‘Try to leave everything behind, whatever happened, forget’, but it’s hard to forget what happened.

Since arriving in Australia, Nene has completed her secondary education. In the final years, she became part of the Students Against Racism group (described in chapter one) and has become a primary spokesperson at events in Australia and New Zealand. After working for a year, she is now studying for a Bachelor of Arts degree in Sociology at the University of Tasmania, and plans to do community work.

**Khadga**

Born in the Dagana district of Bhutan, in 1982, Khadga describes his life as ‘mixes of happiness and sorrow’. Khadga says that, following a census in 1988, the Bhutanese government categorised the population into seven groups, and split families by putting members into different categories. Men and boys were jailed and women and girls raped, and people were tortured. In 1991, when Khadga was nine years old, his extended family fled to Nepal, because ‘the Bhutan government decided to cleanse the Nepalese speaking, Nepali-ethnic people from Bhutan’. For six months, the family lived in a camp on the bank of the Kanki River, in ‘horrible’ conditions, very hot in the middle of summer, with ‘no good drinking water’. In extreme hot weather conditions, and without medical services, three of the family’s children died; so the family moved again, to Beidangi II camp, higher in the mountains; the water was still rationed, but cleaner, and conditions were better. A health service was introduced a few months after they arrived. They stayed there for nineteen years.
School in the camp, run by a local organisation, Caritas Nepali, and funded by the UNHCR, went to tenth grade. With limited resources, the children sat on the floor on carpet, until in the older grades they had benches and seats. Numbers were high. Khadga says that in eighth grade, there were twenty-five sections, and each section had sixty students. Lessons were in English, and Khadga says the education was of high standard. Gaining a partial scholarship, because he was capable at maths and science, Khadga attended a private boarding school—Tri Chandra College—for years eleven and twelve. He worked as a tutor to earn money for rent and other expenses, and his brothers helped with the balance of school fees. Khadga says that refugees were supposed to stay in the camp, but the rule was not enforced.

Khadga applied to go to university to study food technology, but when he went to do the entrance exam, he was asked for citizenship papers; as a refugee, he was not allowed to sit the exam. The following year, he went to Kathmandu, and was able to study at the oldest university in Nepal, because citizenship was not required, and the Bachelor’s degree in Microbiology was open to all. He supported himself by teaching maths and science at a local school. While he was in Katmandu, the UNHCR established an International Office for Migration, opening opportunity for resettlement of refugees in the USA, the UK, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Norway, the Netherlands, and Denmark. Khadga was immediately interested, because he knew there was no hope of going back to Bhutan.

My father is now eighty-four years old, he is born in Bhutan, he has got citizenship, he has got all the documents; and my mum, born in Bhutan; but still the Bhutan government said we are not the original from Bhutan, and said we don’t have enough documents to prove the citizenship of Bhutan.

There is no future living in camp. There is no chance to go back to Bhutan. It was very clear to us. One of my brothers is still in Bhutan and when we talk to him on the phone, all the time he explain the situation—what is going on inside Bhutan. And we used to read newspapers, listen to news, thinking that we may hear good news that we can go back to Bhutan, but each news all the time adds us some depressions, and some
kind of losing hope. We are very aware of that, and it was clear that we cannot be assimilated in Nepal, because we are in the camp. To go outside and live, it is a big money, health cost was really high for refugee, and we don’t have citizenship for Nepal as well. We are homeless, citizenshipless people.

When the UNCHR opened the doors to resettlement, Khadga made up his mind to migrate to one of the countries offering places, but achieving that was complicated because his family is large: ‘We have twelve brothers and seven sisters, and all brothers they have their own family, all sisters their own family—if you count all the links together—around three hundred family. Khadga explained that most family members are uneducated, and it was hard for them to choose which country would best suit them. Khadga, one of his brothers, and a nephew, who had been living together in Kathmandu, decided they needed to help their families. After some research, they decided on Australia:

We picked Australia, especially Tasmania, because we compared Tasmania with Bhutan and Nepal, and we found that the geographical topography of Tasmania is similar—climate, it is not the same, but it is similar—and demography, it is not densely populated, it is not big city where we are lost.

Advised by the Australian Ambassador that applications would need to be made from within the camp, Khadga stopped studying and returned to the camp, about six hundred kilometres away, to help the families make decisions and apply.

I am the youngest, but I have education. It was a really, really tough time for us to make the decisions. My family member didn’t believe [the process for resettlements] when I asked them first time. Each time I explained, when I make them clear, next day someone will give them different informations, and then they change the decision. My mum and dad are very strict in their religion and the cultural thing, and they got very wrong informations from other people in the camp. They said that when you go to Australia, you need to be a shepherd, in a big farm
looking after sheep. There is no any communications. You will be alone. And another thing, and it was really a bit funny—they said that if you go to Australia, you find very dangerous snakes, and animals, and all the time you have to put injections—each morning you have to put injections. So, it was really really hard for us to make them clear. Finally, we were successful to explain them, and where I was trying to take them.

It took three years, ‘making decisions for whole families’, and completing paperwork for applications. Some family members migrated to the USA.

In 2010, 2nd of March, I got chance to come to Australia. From my family I am the first person to come to Australia to live in Tasmania—I came with my wife, she was pregnant, and my mum and dad—and slowly other family came, and now family is big. I am really happy now.

Khadga and his family—including children born in Tasmania—live in Hobart. Khadga has earned money fruit picking, and is a voluntary Red Cross bi-cultural worker. Studying for a nursing degree, he travels a long distance to Launceston campus each week. ‘I am pretty much sure that I will finish my degree and I will have a job’.

**Shoukat**

A Hazara man born in Afghanistan, in 1985, Shoukat has happy memories of his childhood, until he was seventeen:

When my father was alive, I was very happy. I don’t remember many thing, but at that time I was studying, and in school; and because my father was working, so I was only studying, and nothing else, only school, from the school go home and play. Then Taliban did kill my father, and two younger brothers, then, I escaped from Afghanistan to Pakistan with my mother and other brothers … because the Taliban attack many time to our village, and they would like to kill our all family members … so after that my life is changed.
As background, summarised from an ABC Radio National investigation (Rashid et al., 2012, np), the history of persecution of the Hazara people in Afghanistan goes back at least to 1880, following the second Anglo-Afghan war. A new ruler of Afghanistan, supported by the British, embarked on an expansive, state-building project, which led to the so-called Hazara wars (1891–3). Until that time of invasion, the Hazarajat was totally independent. The wars were incredibly ferocious, killing almost sixty per cent of the Hazaras. Some of those left escaped to Pakistan and Iran, establishing the present-day communities in those countries. Some were sold as slaves, and the rest became a pariah group. In more recent times, the Taliban (Sunni Muslims), who hated the Hazaras (Shia Muslims), persecuted and massacred them. Since 2001, there has been no official discrimination against Hazaras, but the capacity of the state to offer realistic protection for them against predatory groups such as the Taliban is negligible (ibid.).

In Pakistan, Shoukat’s mother was ill. To support the family, for a couple of years Shoukat worked hard with three older brothers, selling vegetables, and studied after work. Then he saw ‘Taliban killed our eighteen vegetable seller people’, and his mother encouraged her sons to work elsewhere. Shoukat worked in many different places, continued to study, married, and fathered a child. Then, in November 2010, attacks on the Hazara people escalated:

Taliban did kill our eighty people, Hazara only, where we were living in Pakistan. During that time I saw and I cried for eighty people, so there is not any way to live there. Because I had not choice of anything else, so my mother said I should escape from Pakistan. So that’s why I thought, ‘What should I do? What should I do? What should I do?’

I was really worried and at that time I had not enough money to escape from Pakistan to Australia, so I borrow some money from my relative, and all the friend. During that time Taliban again did killed our fifty people in bomb blast in our mosque. No any life in Pakistan for our Hazara people. So, I said, ‘There is nothing left, so what should we do? What should I do?’ During this time my mother, because she was sick, she has died. So, after her death, I thought I should escape from there to a
good and nice life for my family, for my brothers, sister, and my wife, my son.

So that is why I escaped from Pakistan, and I came to Malaysia, from Malaysia to Indonesia. So my journey was illegal. Everything was illegal. My document was illegal, because in Pakistan I was illegal.

From Jakarta, Shoukat was a passenger on a ‘people smuggler’—a small fishing boat, carrying fifty-five people. In mid-sea, the boat broke down. For three days, they drifted closer to Christmas Island, working in shifts to boil water to drink. ‘Navy force, they caught us, so they brought us in detention centre’. Shoukat spent about two months in the Christmas Island detention centre, then was sent to Curtin detention centre, in Western Australia. He says that ‘the situation was very worse’ in those detention centres. An Amnesty International account of conditions in detention centres on Christmas Island, in Curtin, and in Darwin, has reported on escalating numbers of suicide attempts, and other incidents of self-harm, lack of appropriate services, and extreme psychological problems resulting from indefinite detention (Allen, 2010).

After about six months in Curtin, Shoukat was sent to Pontville, in Tasmania, and says he was very surprised: ‘When I came to Pontville camp in Tasmania, so I heard my name, wow! Serco13 already knew my name, immigration also, they were calling my name!’ Shoukat said that in Christmas Island and Curtin detention centres, Serco and immigration personnel never used the detainees’ names; ‘they called with our ID, for example LMN24, PUK36—like a criminal!’ Shoukat says the difference at Pontville was ‘a good pleasure’ for all the detainees, as well as himself. ‘After one year, I heard my name, and I feel, oh, now I am human!’

While in Pontville, Shoukat was finally given an Australian permanent visa, and came to Hobart, where he lives with two friends. He is free, legally resident in Australia, and beginning to make a life for himself, but his situation continues to be very painful, because his family is still in Pakistan, and in danger:

13 The Serco Group is a private—for profit—international corporation, headquartered in the UK, and provides security and other staff for military bases, detention centres, and prisons worldwide.
Everybody knows, Taliban again they are busy to killing only Hazara. Taliban think if they kill one Hazara they will go to heaven, because they think we are infidel. I don’t know why they think like this. So that is true, and so they are busy to killing once a week, once a month. One month ago, two Taliban, they came in our town—in Hazara’s town [in Pakistan]—and they did suicide bomb blast … and they did kill about ninety Hazara, so at that time we were in hunger strike, with our innocent dead bodies peoples. Our ninety dead bodies people on the road, so we were on hunger strike for three days.

The attack to which Shoukat refers was in Quetta, on 10 January 2013. As well as those killed, about two hundred more people were severely injured. News reports say that after this most recent attack, Hazara leaders in Australia and Pakistan called for the Australian Government to ease restrictions on asylum seekers and those with pending family reunion visas (Hodge, 2013, np). One month later there was another attack in Quetta, with similar numbers of casualties. So, Shoukat lives in fear for his family. Recounting the history of persecution for more than two hundred years, he explains that the dominant group in Afghanistan is Pashtun, ethnically Aryan, and the Hazaras are Mongolian, ‘Mongolian face, Mongolian eyes’, whereas the Pashtun, which includes the Taliban, have typically ‘Aryan’ noses and eyes. ‘They can recognise us very well. So it is very easy to kill a Hazara in Pakistan, also in Afghanistan’.

Shoukat’s application to bring his family to Australia so far has been refused. He submitted a claim for a ‘spouse visa’, and was told it would take more than five years, probably closer to ten years before his family would arrive. He was given an option to submit $AUD2700 to the Department of Immigration, in which case ‘they will bring my family in between two years and one year’, but it is hard for Shoukat to raise that amount of money.

After prison, after I lived in Hobart for more than one year; so again I should wait. I don’t know how long. So that is also painful for me. Taliban is busy to killing only Hazara, so any time anything maybe happen. Sometime, I feel it is very difficult to study, very difficult to live
in Tasmania, in Hobart, or in Australia, without my family, because I think I live in between two part. My one part of brain at Pakistan, and the second part of brain in Tasmania. So how can I do a proper work, and how can I study like this? It is very difficult.

Shoukat is studying for a certificate in aged care, and like Khadga is a voluntary Red Cross bi-cultural worker; he is also the secretary of the Afghani Association, and provides information about health to the small Hazara community in Hobart. One way he handles his emotions, particularly his longing for his family, is by writing poetry in Persian.

Since I wrote Shoukat’s story, there have been some important changes to Australian government policy in regard to asylum seekers. In January 2014, the Australian Minister for Immigration and Border Protection issued a directive that family migration visas would not be processed for anyone who arrived in Australia by boat after September 2001 (people now officially classified as illegal maritime arrivals); and that if application had already been made, and visa application charges paid, there would be no refund (Asylum Seekers Resource Centre, 2014). I do not know the outcome for Shoukat, but I fear for him.

**Discourse and analysis**

I am humbled before these stories, and deeply aware of what it took for these four people to share their journeys with me. Each of them said that they had had to tell their stories so often, to so many functionaries along the way, that they had become resigned to the process. Yet, there were poignant, tragic, touching moments in each telling, and I felt they spoke from their hearts. Each one hoped that voicing their stories once again might help others. Certainly they have contributed to this research. Their narratives provide rich material specific to my aim to analyse sense of self and sense of place, and to understand how these senses have influenced migration and resettlement processes. Interviewing these people helped me to recognise significant differences as well as nuances in the experiences of asylum seekers and refugees that distinguish them from those of regular migrants.
In addition to learning directly from these four people, my understanding of the situation of refugees has been augmented, and continues to grow, in several ways. At a conference on Pluralism, Inclusion, and Citizenship, in Prague in 2013, I was involved with other presenters in dialogue about contemporary, irregular migration in the EU, the USA, and other parts of the world. Subsequently, I co-edited a book based on that discourse (Dugan & Edelstein, 2013). I have an on-going relationship with the refugee community in Hobart through my husband’s employment; since 2011 he has been an advocate and counsellor for survivors of trauma and torture with the Phoenix Centre—a member of the Forum of Australian Services for the Survivors of Torture and Trauma (FASSTT)—and part of the Migrant Resource Centre. As a result of these activities and connections, I am kept aware of changes in policy, nationally, and events affecting asylum seekers, globally. In addition, I regularly attend both formal and informal events involving refugees and other migrants from more than fifteen countries. Taken together, these engagements have been invaluable to me in conducting this research.

Analysis of these four participant narratives suggests that there are significant differences in how irregular and regular migrants experience and express their senses of self. To start with, none of the irregular migrants spoke much about childhood, which was a focus for analysis of participant narratives in chapter four. Shoukat, whose story is perhaps the harshest, spoke of a happy childhood; but in a single sentence, as if it had become unreal, wiped out by his father’s and brothers’ murders, and subsequent terrors. Khadga, at nine years of age, watched three children of his family die of disease and hardship in a refugee camp. Kiros spoke of a happy childhood truncated by violence that started when he was six years old. Nene’s was not so much an account of her experience of being a child, but rather a description of conditions in the camp from a child’s perspective; when one is constantly hungry and afraid, play is nothing like experience common for children in Australia. Significantly, all four faced challenges to their survival, and lived with fear from an early age, experiencing violence and atrocity at various times.

At first, I found some difficulty in discerning just how these four participants experienced a sense of self. Kiros was by far the most articulate, at least in part
because he has spoken English fluently since his youth; he has tertiary education, and, since migrating to Australia, has spent several further years at university. His explanation provided insight that helped me when interviewing the others. As Kiros expresses it, in African countries, generally, ‘the self is defined in light of the immediate family, the immediate community’. He thinks that there is ‘a core philosophical difference … a difference in worldviews’ that is common between Africans and people in the west, with its focus on ideas of individuality. Traditionally, in Africa, ‘the individual can be seen only in light of its own community’, and although one’s ethnic group is important, community is the source of what is most valued. In sharing this observation, Kiros used the term relative not just for blood relations but also for extended family members of the community where he grew up. If a relative, so understood, was experiencing financial difficulty, for instance, ‘you would just send everything you have, because that’s where your value is—you see yourself through that’.

Kiros’ community-based sense of self deeply affected his experiences as a refugee. When first he fled from Ethiopia to Kenya, he was shocked to realise that he was ‘only Kiros’. Disconnected from his community, he felt that he no longer had ‘the respect that I earned in my own community’, and thus, he had no way to be known as himself. Disconnected from his country and without a passport, he says defined him as ‘I am not any more a person’. Indeed, he ‘had to apply’ even to be recognised as a refugee. Reminiscent of Shoukat’s experience of being known only by a number, this namelessness is dehumanising. This affect fits Arendt’s argument that without any identification other than one’s individuality, a person becomes ‘a human in general … and loses all significance’. This idea is consonant with Foucault’s understanding that, historically, the denial of names—to ‘slaves and other non-people’, effectively denied that they had any ‘real’ existence (Danaher et al., 2000, 127). Thus, having a distinct name and identity is ‘an important precondition for being truly human’ (ibid.).

Faced with the likelihood of becoming a number in a refugee camp for an indefinite period, Kiros’ response was to strongly assert himself in what he saw as a fight for the survival of his family. He relates his self-worth to his capability to contribute
towards his own existence, to his family, his community, and to his world. Given his experience of doing all those things up to that point in his life, he refused to be defined by his situation. Determined not to go to a refugee camp, he found unorthodox ways to make money, and opportunities for migration that would not have been possible in a camp. This experience stood him in good stead when he arrived in Australia.

Kiros says that making a new life in a new country requires accepting that this is a new start from ‘zero’. First, on arrival, he was unknown, and the status and credentials he had in his country of origin were not recognised by the new community; and thus the new place reflected back to him a self that was lacking in worth. Second, less obviously, but perhaps even more significant, was his realisation that in this new place he was ignorant of all the minutiae of culture and place that any person acquires in the process of growing up in any somewhere. Evident in Kiros’ account is the importance of acknowledging that, although ‘zero’ was a critical base from which he could begin to build a new life, what he had, what he brought with him, was not nothing, and was perhaps immeasurably significant in terms of his capacity to make a new life in a new country, for his family and for himself. What he had was a strong, honed, developed, and asserted sense of self: honed in a wartime environment, where early values of community were challenged; developed in his early efforts to educate others and to ‘recharge’ the land; asserted in his refusal to go into refugee camps, and in his belief that he could find work, and that he could find a way to have his family be safe. Even the fact of Kiros’ arrival in Hobart within a relatively short time of leaving Ethiopia, with his family intact, testifies to the strength of his sense of self. Nevertheless, Kiros feels his relocation as a loss of self. After several years in Australia, he came up with an analogy for his experience of the loss of self that he feels is involved in the separation from his community of origin. He says it is something similar to the way people who have lost a limb speak of a phantom pain. To him ‘phantom pain’ makes sense as a way to explain his ongoing feeling of displacement.

Similarly, Shoukat expressed a loss of self when he spoke of feeling as if he was ‘living in between’, with one part of himself in Pakistan with his family, and one part
in Tasmania. He did not have these words, but the sense I got from him was that he felt almost like a memory, or a ghost of himself. When I asked Shoukat how he would describe himself, or think of himself, he said, ‘according to my history, so I am nothing really’:

I am nothing because I am Hazara, so when I think Hazara history, there is many painful story, so I think ‘wow, I am nothing really’. I am nothing. I have lost my language, I have lost my culture, and I have lost many things in my history, so that’s why I think I am nothing.

However, when I asked, ‘On a personal level, do you think you are nothing?’ he replied:

No. When I see on my personal level, I belong with the Hazara community, which is a true thing. My personal, I am Muslim, I love humanity, which is very necessity for me. I love only human. I don’t love like Hazara, or Pashtun, or Dari, or Englishman, or other—for me I love humanity.

This goes some way to explain Shoukat’s sense of self. The question of personal worth did not elicit an individual sense of identity or mission as it might for a western self, but rather saw him broaden what he defines himself with from Hazara to Muslim to humanity. It was as if his experience of being ‘nothing’ erased his personal definition, and he defines what has survived of his sense of self in terms of the collectives of which he is part, and in relation to his care for their members. He is separated from his family, and it is impossible for him to do anything to protect them from violence at such distance. Such helplessness testifies to the desperation Shoukat and others like him feel, and it underscores the extraordinary courage they show in making the dangerous journey away from those they love in hope of saving them.

Although Khadga and his family lived in a refugee camp for nineteen years, in Nepal they were comparatively safe; what constrained them was their lack of citizenship and concomitant lack of hope that they would ever be able to move beyond the dreadful poverty of the camp. For Khadga, the opportunity to migrate to another country was never simply an option for himself alone; it was for the extended family,
and even though he says ‘I was the first to come to Australia’, in reality he came with
his wife and parents—for him, ‘I’ includes those immediate family members. He was only really happy when more members of his extended family arrived here, and numbers were enough to re-form their community. For our conversations, Khadga invited me to his home. On arrival, I was introduced first to his parents, then his wife and son, then other relatives; and although we talked alone, it was clear that our conversation took place in context of the family.

Regardless of how my questions about Khadga’s sense of himself were phrased, his answers were all in terms of his family. For example, I acknowledged his persistence in all he had done to bring his family to Australia, even though he was the youngest brother, and asked if he felt that showed that he was strong. He replied that ‘it was really hard, I did really struggle hard when I came first with my father and mum, because there were no other brothers here, no sisters’. Again, ‘I’ must have included his wife, because he didn’t name her. I asked Khadga what he thought helped him, what inside himself made him able to do that, and he replied: ‘I was pretty sure that one day my family would be happy here, because other of my family members, they are also doing their process to come to Australia. Sooner or later they will be here’; so what sustained him was his belief that the family would regather. Khadga comes across as a person who is assertive, confident, clear about what he wants, and with an expectation that others will hear him, and support him in his endeavours. But very little of that is actually personal—that heightened sense of pride resides in speaking for his family. When I asked what is most important to him, he said: ‘The first thing in our culture is myself-and-my-family members’, and it was clear that he was unable to articulate a sense of self other than as part of that greater whole. Khadga also said Australia is the first country in which he has ever had the opportunity to become a citizen, and his pride in the fact that he is eligible to be an Australian now includes knowing that his children will be Australian citizens.

The orientation of sense of self in terms of family, extended family, community, and ethnicity is clearly very strong for Kiros, Khadga, and Shoukat; and it is belonging to, and caring for family that sustains them. Because of my orientation in a western culture, and embodiment of a concept of self as individual, while I recognise and
appreciate that these people define themselves through family and community, sense
of self in those terms remains outside my experience, but not outside bounds of
empathy. Awareness of that predisposition led me to be particularly alert, when
interviewing participants, to individual nuances indicating their senses of self. Thus,
with Kiros, Khadga, and Shoukat as comparators, a clear difference was apparent in
Nene’s sense of self. Those three all came to Australia as adults. Nene has grown
from the age of fourteen to adulthood in Tasmania.

At Nene’s age, sense of self is still emerging—at least in western understanding—
(Cobb, 1995; Erikson, 1963; McAdams et al., 2006). McAdams et al. (2006a, 3)
write ‘it is [likely] not until adolescence … that we are able and motivated to
conceive of our lives as full-fledged, integrative narratives of the self’. Drawing a
correspondence with Erik Erikson’s description of adolescence as ‘the period of
identity development’, they remind us that, according to Erikson, ‘adolescents and
young adults in modern societies are challenged to formulate meaningful answers to
the twin identity questions: Who am I? How do I fit into the adult world?’ (4). The
challenge for Nene is to find answers to those questions from not one, but two
cultures. Nene comes from a background within which defining self in terms of
community could be considered the norm, and this applied even when living for ten
years in a refugee camp. However, from early adolescence, she has lived in a
modern, western country. In her words, she is ‘juggling two different things that I
have to put together to make it work’. Nene wants to retain, and says she feels
comforted by, practices of her original culture; and yet, she also wants to adapt to the
new one. She lives with her mother in Hobart, two brothers live interstate, and the
rest of her family is scattered, some still in the refugee camp. Extended family, for
Nene, now includes members of the Students Against Racism group, to whom she
has grown close. Juggling the mores of her native culture and western constructs of
self and individualism, increasingly, she makes decisions about her life independent
of family. Asked to describe herself, Nene said:

What I found in myself is, it is hard to forget the past. It is very difficult
for me to forget the past, like I guess I just want to ask: ‘Why did it
happen to me? Why it has to be my family?’ And also, that I didn’t see
my Dad, so it is hard to forget the past, even though I want to go forward to the future.

‘I am safe now’ and ‘I am still afraid’ were statements of identity, not just Nene’s acknowledgement of the way she sometimes feels. The tension that shows here between past and future is common amongst refugees, and ‘the interaction between the individual and their own culture and both the group and individual interaction with the new culture becomes a complex one’ (Bhugra et al., 2010a, 301). At the time of interview, Nene exhibited a growing confidence in herself and her abilities; working, studying, and as a spokesperson for the Students Against Racism group. Her sense of self-worth is deeply grounded in the group’s work, and the valuing of all human beings for which the group stands.

Contributing to the broader community that has received them as refugees is important to all four of these irregular migrants, and typical of many others with whom I have had contact. The high value they place on contribution might be understood as deriving from, and as an extension of their culturally strong family and community values. What each of these irregular migrants brought with them was an ontological experience of finding and knowing themselves through a collective history and identity that persists despite the persecution of individuals. They also made their journeys with hope, and belief that—given the chance—they have the ability to make good lives for themselves and their families as part of the broader community in their new country.

In the next chapter, I introduce the last of the case study participants, whose stories provide examples of mobile lifestyles.
6. MOBILE LIVES

The term ‘mobile lives’ suggests an increasingly complex, detraditionalized patterning to personal life. People with substantial network capital learn to live with the making of personal and social worlds ‘on the move’, fashioned on shifting ground (Elliott & Urry, 2010, 11).

‘Portable personhood’

While the term mobile lives has other meanings, here it relates to global travel, international migrations, and relocations within countries, which last accounts for movement of more than three hundred and eighty million people (an estimated eight per cent of adults world-wide) in the five years to 2012 (Esipova et al., 2013, 3). Motivations ascribed to international migration apply also to relocations within countries. Wars or other significant incidences of internal, cross-regional, or cross-national conflicts, and catastrophic political, economic, or environmental events contribute to the numbers of displaced persons; and such events also compel the relocation of people within territories as well as emigration. According to Neli Esipova et al (2013, 4), in countries that are relatively peaceful and stable, economic and political factors are the strongest drivers of internal migration. In addition, levels of internal migration are far higher in ‘advanced economies’ than in developing ones—USA, Australia, New Zealand, Finland, and Norway exemplify this trend (3). In Australia, for instance, close to forty per cent of the population relocated between 2006 and 2011 (Hugo et al., 2013, 1). Referring to such frequent changing of domicile as urban nomadism, Juhani Pallasmaa (2008, 144) notes that ‘the average period of living in one location in the US is barely over four years’ and can relate to lack of, or opportunities for employment, education and social services; availability and affordability of accommodation; and changing circumstances in personal wealth. The World Bank (2009) makes explicit the neoliberal argument that economic efficiency requires a mobile workforce.

14 (Elliott & Urry, 2010, 3).
Anthony Elliott and John Urry (2010, 3) point out that ‘an individual's engagement with [an expansively] mobile world is not simply about the “use” of particular forms of movement’, but involves processes through which ‘an intensively mobile society reshapes the self’. In this way, we are witnessing new expressions of what they call ‘portable personhood’—a ‘stretching of self’ psychologically, and socially (97). Whether people physically relocate or not, they engage with a mobile world: their senses of self and of place are affected by wider events, movements of other people, changes to places, direct and indirect impacts of globalism, and to a great extent by media. As Doreen Massey (1995, 60) writes, few people’s lives can today be described as ‘simply local’, or as ‘entirely untouched by events elsewhere’. In turn, Steve Pile and Nigel Thrift (1995b, 10) assert that mobile lives produce ‘possibilities of hybrid identities [with] new capacities for action’. Such possibilities arise through and in relationship with varied cultural and social influences, and in and through diverse places, giving new and varied ‘shape and form to human beings’ (Nynäsv, 2008, 172).

All participants in this research have led and continue to lead mobile lives, and the comments above about reshaping and stretching the self equally and differently apply to each. Participants to be introduced here—Richard, Yukari, and Julian—have relocated often. Richard and Julian could be classed as regular migrants, but the narratives of all three emphasise many relocations and provide glimpses of distinctive and distinctly mobile lives.

**Julian**

Born in England, in 1947, by his own telling Julian is a seeker and an adventurer. His British parents both came from long history of military and civil involvement in colonial India, a background that influenced Julian’s life ‘mostly by way of rejection of a lot of the values they stood for’. Within months of Julian’s birth, his father, a British army officer, was posted to Burma (where one of his forbears had been Lieutenant Governor General), then to India, briefly back to England when Julian was about three years old, then to Norway for a few years.
Dad blotted his copybook and got court-martialled—I think he over-drew his pay, or something like that. I can’t remember back that far, but we’ve always been a bit, sort of ‘out of the family’ in that sense. The next posting was to Jordon, and I do remember Jordan. I was six. I used to play with the servants’ children. My sister was sent off—as happened with so many children of British families—to boarding school in England, but when she visited us she used to call me ‘the dirty little Bedouin boy’.

That posting lasted for about three years, until the Suez Canal crisis. The British contingent had five days to depart Jordan, and was shipped to Cyprus, and then transported back to England. Julian was nine years old. ‘I loved Jordan. The hardest part for me was leaving my donkey behind. It was called Faddua, which sounds very exotic until you learn that it’s just “donkey” in Arabic. My Dad stayed behind; he was invited to work with the Arab Legion’.

Julian was sent to the local primary school in England, ‘a horrific experience. I remember being caned in front of all the rest of the students. I can’t remember what for.’ Next the family went to Malaysia, and was based in Kuala Lumpur for about three years. Julian was sent to a private school in Penang, then to the local army school, and next to boarding school in England. ‘I’d had a pretty ropey schooling, lots of different schools. I was terribly envious of kids who’d had friends for lots of years. I got bullied, yet I was physically okay, captain of rugby, and I did boxing. It wasn’t a happy place’. Julian escaped into Arthur Ransome books—stories of sailing adventures set in the Lake District, the East Coast of England, and in the Caribbean, China, and the Outer Hebrides that fired the imaginations of generations of schoolboys—and wanted to go to sea: ‘Even before that I used to look at atlases and plot journeys’. That probably influenced his later choice to attend merchant and navy training school rather than one for the sons of army officers. Eyesight problems kept him out of the Royal Navy, so he studied mining engineering at London University.

15 The Suez Canal in Egypt connects the Mediterranean and Red seas, providing a passage for shipping to travel between Europe and Asia without having to navigate around Africa. A ‘neutral’ zone under protection of the British until 1954, the canal was nationalised by Egyptian President Nasser in 1956, to finance building of the Aswan Dam. The crisis began when the UK, France, and Israel invaded Egypt to keep the canal open (Milner, 2011, np).
In some ways I had a very troubled childhood, and I know that sounds a bit trite, but I grew up in other countries, and my parents separated, and one became an alcoholic and the other became a bankrupt, and yet it was a strong family in some ways. My sister wanted to convert us all to Buddhism. I was influenced by her, and by thinking that was happening in India. My Mum had become a Theosophist. One of the leading thinkers, Annie Besant, was very supportive of Mahatma Gandhi. She used to complain that keeping Gandhi in poverty was a very expensive business! Then there was this amazing character who we all thought was absolutely fantastic, J. Krishnamurti. Brought up and educated in England to be the leader of the Theosophical Society, just months before he was to be declared the world leader, he upped and said he didn’t want to be. He didn’t want that role, he didn’t believe people should follow him, and proposed that we really need to find our own path, and be, rather than just follow.

To us, young people in the sixties—well I wasn’t a hippie type, but I was certainly part of that generation and that music, and looking for a better lifestyle—we thought what Krishnamurti had said was really good. However, I did a year at university, played a lot of Rugby, failed most of my end of year exams, got invited to come back after a year if I’d like to go and grow up, so I went to South Africa and worked on a couple of gold mines.

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16. Theosophy is a spiritual philosophy developed by Helen Blavatsky and contemporaries in the late nineteenth century. Through the Theosophical Society, it remains an active philosophical school with presence in more than seventy countries (Anonymous, 2010, np).
17. Annie Besant (1847–1933) was a prominent Theosophist, women’s and human rights activist, writer, orator, and supporter of Irish and Indian self-rule (Anonymous, 2010a, np).
18. Gandhi (1869–1948), ‘known as “Mahatma”—great soul, was the leader of the Indian nationalist movement against British rule, and is widely considered the father of his country. His doctrine of non-violent protest to achieve political and social progress has been hugely influential’ (Anonymous, 2014a, np).
19. Jiddu Krishnamurti (1895–1986) was a writer and speaker on philosophical, psychological, and spiritual issues, who considered that schools of thought caused conflict, and advocated respect for all of humanity and social change through radical change in the individual (Krishnamurti Foundation, 2014, np).
Julian did return to England to complete university, then joined the predominantly Dutch company, Shell, as a petroleum engineer. After six months training in The Hague, he was posted to Qatar, in the Persian Gulf. He liked the work, but the ‘urge to learn more about life and life’s purpose was very strong’, so early in the 1970s, near the end of the Indo-Pakistan war, he resigned and travelled deck class to India.

I had to choose: ‘Do you turn left and go up to Kathmandu, or turn right and go down to the beaches of Goa, where all the hippies hang out?’ I decided on that [latter] path, partly because it was a lovely coastal trip on a lovely little boat; then, I hung out on Panjim Beach for a couple of weeks, but I didn’t like it. I think the hippie movement had some very good ideas, they wanted a better world, there’s no doubt about that, but they got a bit diverted by the weed, and other, just lostness. Lovely music, but just lost its way. Anyway, I had higher purposes. By that time I had a shoulder bag with a Bhagavad Gita\(^\text{20}\) in it, but I hadn’t, like some, abandoned my passport. I had a bit of money because I’d been working, and I had a \textit{dhoti} and a \textit{jubbah} \(\text{[garments traditionally worn by Muslims in India]}\), so I went travelling.

Julian settled for seven years in remote farmland in the south, where he was a volunteer worker at Seva Nilayam, a medical clinic for the poor run by an English woman, Dora Scarlett.\(^\text{21}\) After a year, he worked in the laboratory:

I was looking mostly at faecal samples for hookworm and pinworm, and I remember thinking: ‘Julian, you wanted to get to know the \textit{real} India, and here you are peering down the microscope at samples of human—Indian—crap! How much closer to the \textit{real} India do you want to get?’ I did a whole range of tests, extending to tuberculosis and leprosy. Having used a microscope as a petroleum engineer, it wasn’t a big leap, actually.

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\(^{20}\) The Bhagavad Gita—a 700-verse Hindu scripture.

\(^{21}\) Dora Scarlett (1906–2001), a writer, broadcaster, and communist activist, founded and worked for forty years in an organisation providing medical care to the poor in India, which grew to serve hundreds of thousands. Awarded an MBE in 1994, she died in India at the age of ninety-five (Russ, 2001, np).
At the clinic ‘we worked bloody hard, six days a week, seeing two hundred and fifty to three hundred people a day’. There were female, male, and children’s wards, and a farm worked by the inpatients as ‘really part of their cure’.

It was a formative time for Julian. He was in contact with a group of Catholic monks, the Little Brothers of Jesus, working to treat leprosy. Each month he went to a Catholic Ashram run by ‘an amazing Benedictine monk’, an English man called Dom Bede Griffiths, who was ‘on a quest for a dialogue between Catholic monks and Hindu saddhus’. Julian said he nearly became a novice, ‘but I met Kay, an Australian volunteer, and that was a bit of a diversion’. Through Dom Griffiths, he also connected with Vipassana [a sitting meditation that is a practice of self-transformation through self-observation and introspection] and its exponent, S.M. Goenka, whom he described as ‘a very traditional sort of teacher, not whacko at all’. Although this meditation practice came from a Buddhist tradition usually passed on by monks, it was ‘for anybody’, and Julian liked it ‘for the same reasons as I liked the clinic—it was very spiritual, but it wasn’t connected to religion’.

Julian and Kay married, and worked for about six months with an organisation that was developing agricultural projects and schools in line with Gandhi’s principles. They adopted a little boy, called Christopher, from one of Mother Teresa’s homes. ‘We added the name Natarajan—a Hindu name relating to the god, Shiva—because we knew he was from a Hindu family’:

Living in India, and thinking about the future, especially for our adopted son, Christopher Natarajan, we decided that Australia would provide a future with greater opportunity than the UK. Our perception was that there was still a bit of the pioneering spirit and adventure in Australia, whereas the UK was well established, getting overcrowded, and did not

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22 Mother Teresa (1910–1997), a Catholic nun of Albanian ethnicity and Indian citizenship, founded Missionaries of Charity and ministered to the poor, sick, orphaned, and dying in Calcutta for over 45 years. Awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1979, and beatified by Pope John Paul II in 2003, she is a controversial figure, praised by many, and criticised by others, particularly for her strong stance against contraception and abortion, and belief in the spiritual goodness of poverty. The first stance is consonant with the strictures of Catholicism, the latter with the teachings of the Christ as written in the New Testament (Anonymous, 2014b, np).
have as exciting prospects. Nowadays, we feel that our perceptions were about right!

First, however, Julian and Kay went to England. Inspired by Maria Montessori’s philosophy and method of education, and Jean Piaget’s seminal work in childhood development, Julian trained as a teacher in a ‘very progressive education department’ at the University of Sussex. Then they moved to Australia, and lived in Melbourne. Julian worked in a fibreglass boat factory until his teaching qualifications were transferred, then taught at a Jesuit school, Xavier College. Then they saw a Community Aid Abroad\textsuperscript{23} advertisement for two people to work in Somalia. Julian said, ‘It was just made for us’, so they went to Somalia for a couple of years, only leaving when war broke out and ‘everything started disintegrating’.

I’d become a Quaker by that time, because I felt—although I was really interested in Hinduism and Buddhism, and considered myself to be a student of religion—the early, archetypal working of my brain was based on Christian religion, and I found Quakerism was a wonderful bridge between East and West. I wanted to work in a Quaker school, so we came to Tasmania.\textsuperscript{24}

Julian and Kay have now lived in Hobart for more than twenty-five years. When I asked Julian how it felt to settle in one place after such a diverse and mobile life, he replied that he and Kay had often thought of going overseas again to work in other countries, ‘but it is true, we’ve bought a house, a boat, had a career—the full catastrophe!’ However, he said they had also travelled during those years:

We have taken two groups of students for one-month trips to South India, and introduced them to village life in a non-industrial part of the country. Once our son was independent, we decided to go adventuring—it turned out to be for five years! We sailed our little catamaran from Hobart up the east coast of Australia to the Torres Strait, where we lived and

\textsuperscript{23} Now part of Oxfam.
\textsuperscript{24} The Friends’ School, which takes its name from the Religious Society of Friends, more commonly known as Quakers, was established in 1887, and is the only Quaker school in Australia (Anonymous, 2014, np).
worked for a couple of years. We had a dream to sail to the places we had lived and worked in before: Port Moresby (Kay), Penang in Malaysia (I schooled there), India, Somalia, Jordan, and through the Suez to Europe. But the boat was a bit small, and parts of the journey too dangerous—Somali pirates also take yachts!

The boat trip was my wish. Kay wanted to do the Trans-Siberian railway. So, we sold the boat, travelled to Europe, visiting friends and relatives, and to St Petersburg in Russia, where we took the rail to Moscow, and then the Trans-Siberian. We turned right after Irkutsk, and came down by rail and bus to Mongolia, China, Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand, then flew to Burma, where I worked in a school for six months. We then returned to Australia and had to learn to settle down and behave ourselves!

At the time of our conversations, Julian still worked at the Friends School, as Quaker Coordinator—supporting the Heads of School, leading Gatherings, doing professional development, and implementing a program that brings Quakers to Tasmania from all over the world. Since then, he has retired and is presently the Presiding Clerk for Australian Friends.

Richard

Born in England, in 1956, Richard migrated to Canada with his parents when he was nine months old. He visited his place of birth—the town of Havant, near Chichester—for the first time, at the age of fifty-two. He said it was good to see the place, but he had no sense of attachment to it. His parents had joined ‘the great migrant move’ that saw tens of thousands of people emigrate from post-war Britain in the 1950s, mostly to Australia, New Zealand and Canada. Britain was still struggling to recover from the deprivations of the Second World War, and these Commonwealth countries were so eager to increase their populations, particularly with white people of British origin, that they had a variety of assisted passage, and other programs to encourage people to relocate (Hatton, 2003). Richard thinks his parents came from ‘solid middle class backgrounds’, but says that when he was
growing up he got the sense that they had become ‘a bit fed up’ with the rigidities of the British class structure, and felt that in the UK, in the fifties, there was no real future for them.

For some years the family lived in Toronto, at first in an apartment, and then in a bungalow in a sheltered suburb, which Richard describes as ‘fairly typical middle Canadian’; with a mixed community ranging ‘from a funeral-car driver to a bus driver … a guy working in a manufacturing place, a telephone linesman, my Dad, of course into business’ [a vague term that denotes at least a white rather than blue collar worker, and possibly—credibly in Richard’s story—reflects pretensions towards being recognised as middle class]. There were a Japanese, and a Ukrainian couple, ‘and a lot of English people like us’. Richard walked to school ‘with the rest of the kids’ in the mornings and home for lunch. ‘There were five or six boys exactly my age. I can’t ever remember having adult supervision though I guess we did—but it was the fifties, so maybe we didn’t.’

The family moved to Montreal in 1966—‘a step up in the world’—to a bigger house in ‘a brand new, white-collar suburb’, a banking job for Richard’s father, and ‘the tennis ladies kind of society’ for his mother. For wives of older men in management jobs, paid work ‘just wasn’t the done thing’. Richard attended an English Protestant school in a city with a four-school system—French Protestant, French Catholic, English Protestant, English Catholic—plus Jewish and other schools.

Where we lived was ninety per cent English speaking, but in a French-speaking city. Except for hearing French a little bit on the street—and the bus drivers spoke French, and the signs were both in French and English—you really could have been in Atlanta.

Richard describes himself as ‘quite an independent kid’. He would take himself off to swimming lessons, for example, or to art classes. He was still only ten years old when the Expo was on in Montreal. ‘Almost all year someone from somewhere else was coming to stay with us—I’d take people on the train down to the city, and switch onto the Metro, and be like a tour guide round the Expo site.’
Richard played tennis, learnt to ski, spent a lot of time at the local swimming pool in summer, and sometimes went on camping holidays. He remembers long, cold winters; the excitement of the beginning and end of snow; being a paperboy for three years to earn pocket money; in summer, caddying at the golf course. Occasionally, the family would visit Ontario. Richard sometimes felt embarrassed about his parents because he thought they stood out in their persistent reinscription of English attitudes and customs:

Kids used to rib me, asking about my dad, ‘How is Peter, today?’ with a mock British accent. I never heard him as being particularly British, but I remember listening to him talk on the phone once … and I thought ‘oh my god, he’s so British it’s crazy’. I definitely felt very Canadian, but I always felt that I never quite fit into the mainstream—a recurring theme. I got to go to this private school for a year—kids with pretty wealthy backgrounds—so there I was again a bit of an outsider; I didn’t play sports, I wasn’t as good at team sports. I would be anybody’s friend, but I was never in a clique of my own. Don’t know why, perhaps because of my parents’ background I was already different. I never felt a huge need to conform, to be one of the crowd. I was quite happy to be a bit independent. In high school, I took some pride in the fact that I could go and talk with the nerd group, or I could go and talk with the druggies.

Similarly, in Richard’s first summer jobs as an accounts clerk in a hotel in Montreal, he says, ‘I could interact with a prince, or I could interact with the dishwasher. I guess I had some confidence to be able to do that’. To Richard, Montreal felt cosmopolitan: ‘There were people walking around talking French all the time; there was a sense that Montreal was a kind of happening city’. There, he met people from so many places, ‘it was like the United Nations’. Working with people who were left wing and separatist, he got a sense of Quebec as a distinct society, and began to see things from new perspectives.

Reading from an early age, about people and places and geography, Richard says he had a sense of safety in a safe world, and of independence: ‘I could figure out where to go and how to get there’. He decided to go to the University of Guelph, west of
Toronto, to do a Bachelor of Commerce degree in hospitality. After eighteen months, feeling the need for a challenge, he took a year off. First, he worked in Montreal, then in northern Canada, and then travelled overseas. Richard spoke French fluently, but Europe did not attract him. Instead he went south to Australia and New Zealand, ‘because they speak English, and it was sort of an “undiscovered” place’.

Returning to university, Richard graduated well. He got a good job as assistant manager for a hotel, and was in relationship with Carol, whose two children were in Australia with their father, her former partner. Carol wanted to move back to Australia to share custody of the children, and Richard thought ‘yeah, sounds like a good idea’. Much to his surprise, his parents got divorced at that time, and he feels ‘that created a big crack for me—somehow the tie to Canada was not as strong’. With the lessening of family ties, his sense of place was also less attached. Richard explains that he never consciously made the decision to migrate to Australia, thinking that he and Carol would stay for a few years, then ‘we could just … come back’. Australia appealed to him, ‘and it wasn’t like I was being asked to go to Afghanistan or Angola, it was a place I knew’.

He says it was ‘a real struggle’ for the first few years. It was hard to find the same kind of career path in Australia that he had in Canada because, ‘here they didn’t actually recognise what my degree was’, and he did not have the same contact base. He decided to go to university, and completed a Master of Commerce degree while working in a series of jobs. He and Carol moved house many times, in Sydney, then in Melbourne, where their first son was born, and the children of her first marriage visited. Decisions to move from one place to another, such as from Toronto to Sydney, or Sydney to Melbourne, or from Melbourne back to Sydney, were always connected with critical points in their children’s lives:

We’d have to give up our jobs, and start all over again. We’ve always turned those things around so that they worked for us, but I guess it wasn’t the correct way to ‘gather moss’. There was always a feeling of ‘when are you actually going to be able to pursue your own thing?’
Richard felt driven to develop his career, prompted by a felt need to provide, succeed, and prove himself; but he also felt driven to ‘use my brain in a way that I could make my mark’. While attracted to an academic life, he still saw that as a sideline. Deciding that he needed to become an entrepreneur, he set up a consultancy business, and then got a job at a university, which allowed him to be more selective about other work.

In the mid-1990s, Richard began to feel that academic life was ‘not just a stop gap’. He thought he would do a PhD, focusing on business management, but did not know whether to do it in Australia or in the USA.

In ‘96 we did the big overseas trip; we took the children with us and spent several weeks in Canada. We took them to Disneyworld, and saw my dad. I felt this enormous expectation as a father, that I should bring everyone back to Canada, so, at that time we looked at the possibility of ‘could we just pull up stumps and move to San Francisco for three years or so’, because I was feeling like, if I was going to do this, I just wanted to be a full-time student. We couldn’t make the logistics work.

An opportunity to invest in another company seemed to Richard to be ‘my last chance to be an entrepreneur’, so he left the university. He made good money, but felt he was ‘just wandering in the wilderness, very much in survival mode to keep the money coming in, to keep the kids going’. He says that Carol studied for two degrees, one of the children was severely ill, ‘and I was very much in caretaker mode, and feeling a bit like life was kind of passing me by’. By the time Carol finished her doctorate and started getting work, Richard’s work was ‘running out of steam’, and he thought, ‘maybe this academic thing makes more sense’. He had wanted to do a PhD in the USA, but ten years along, technology had changed, and location was no longer critical: ‘With the internet and the resources available now, geography is just not a barrier. Being at Harvard with its ten million or twenty million books makes no difference any more. If I want those resources, I can get them’.
Richard’s research involved psychology, sociology, and economics deployed in a sophisticated empirical study of the application of social cognitive theory, self-efficacy, and theatre and film-based training interventions into work motivation. He was strongly self-directed, independent, and able to access quality input from academics internationally. With the maturity, skills, and business experience he had acquired over the intervening years, he recruited companies to fund a discrete, experimental research project, and concludes that doing his PhD in Australia ‘actually opened up far more opportunities than I would have found in a more mundane, structured, US style’, which would mostly have been coursework.

After successfully completing his PhD in 2011, Richard began applying social cognitive theory and self-efficacy to the field of leadership development as a consultant—work that has been applied in a number of sectors with large corporates and the not-for-profit health sector in both Australia and Asia. Richard has also become an Associate of a USA-based, leadership development assessment business, which takes him to Asia and the USA, and he is the Australian representative. He works part-time for a not-for-profit, educational foundation focused on leadership development, and is attached to Australia’s oldest, management-education institute as Design and Research Director. This role draws on his previous experience as an academic, consultant, and executive; and allows him to continue to work as an independent consultant/facilitator. He commutes from the Blue Mountains by train or bike, is very content with his home and family, and finds his professional and academic life fulfilling. An Australian citizen since 1988, Richard still has Canadian and UK citizenship. ‘I keep saying, one day I’ll go out and get all three passports. I’m totally in a mobilities life—I’m very comfortable. Give me my laptop, give me my mobile, give me a train ticket, I’ll go anywhere’.

Yukari

Yukari was born in Japan, in 1960, in Oiso, a town by the sea in the Kanagawa prefecture adjacent to Tokyo, with a population of about thirty thousand people. Her parents had met at university at a time when it was still unusual for a woman in Japan to have such education. Her father was not in Japan when Yukari, the youngest of three daughters, was born. He was in the USA, doing postgraduate study as one of
the first exchange students from Japan, and on his return brought ‘a sense of living in a foreign country’ into the family:

When I went to his room, the radio has got Far East Network. It was the American Army radio so it was in English, and he bought a whole bunch of records of English lullabies for his baby. And the breakfast, I remember, was often tea and pancake, which was very different from the normal Japanese. So having a different culture in my own house was the beginning of my life.

Describing her father as ‘a very individualistic person’—distinctive, and self-focused—Yukari says he had no idea how to be a father, and ‘not knowing what he should do with these three children’ he left when she was very small. ‘He didn’t really support the family. He had the income from being a university professor, and that money he used for his car and his books’, leaving Yukari’s mother to provide for their three daughters. By the 1960s, Japan’s economy was recovering from the devastation of the Second World War, and living standards had considerably improved (Goodman et al., 1968). Nevertheless, there was no social welfare support for single mothers (Chisa, 2008). Because of her education, Yukari’s mother was able to earn money by doing home teaching, but that income was insufficient, so she also made clothes. Yukari says that when she was small, she wanted to understand rather than to be rebellious, but would complain to her mother:

‘Why don’t I have what other people have? Why don’t I have the father?’ Because it was the mother that was taking care of, I didn’t have the feeling of rebelling against her, because I could feel that she was doing her best, and I think that that was one of the survival mechanisms of a child, to accept and find meaning in the situation. Of course to please Mother, I tried to be as good a girl as possible, and at the same time I had the sense that I am so different, and that played out as a sense of superiority. I felt like all the children were really childish, and with the sense of inferiority that I don’t have the father, I don’t have much things, so that was a mixture, going back and forth from feeling inferiority to superiority.
Even though she had little time with her father, Yukari feels she was strongly influenced by him: ‘He didn’t hide himself being very different, very rebellious to what was going on politically, and he was a very interesting, eccentric person in the university’. By the time Yukari was in junior high school, where she did not feel any sense of belonging, she had taken on his way of identifying himself, ‘that being different is my identity’. Fishing and farming were traditional ways of living in Oiso, but Tokyo people also had summerhouses there—artists, politicians, even the Prime Minister. Yukari says the presence of these people, whose outlook was broader than most locals, made the town interesting; as did an orphanage—‘a secluded place’—she passed on the way to school. Yukari attended compulsory schooling in Oiso until she was fifteen, and then, allowed to choose, she attended a ‘free school’ recommended by her father. Explaining that ‘free’ is not about money, but about ideas, Yukari says the school was established before the Second World War by ‘a bunch of creators’ such as writers, artists, and architects. Yukari says her parents had very advanced ideas about education, and the school encouraged the students to express themselves, for example, as a writer, or an artist. Yukari started painting, and began to develop a more individual sense of self than was common then, especially for a Japanese girl: ‘People do something else than the crowd does, so that makes me have the sense of freedom of not being one of the sheep. The basic idea that was given to me there was that you have a choice of deciding what you want to do. That was very, very useful’.

While still a college student, at the age of twenty, Yukari went to India—also a highly unusual thing for a young Japanese woman to do at that time. Her boyfriend was already travelling, and wrote to invite her to join him. Yukari acknowledges that ‘for anybody, India is a big impression’, but for her, learning to bargain in street markets shockingly challenged her notions of proper behaviour. ‘You are asked to pay twenty times as much as the normal regular fee, and you have to show your being upset [to bargain the price down]. It is totally, totally different in Japan, but

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25 A Christian orphanage, started and run in 1948 by Miki Sawada, a daughter of the Mitsubishi family, and named after the first person to donate money to support it, it was known as the Elizabeth Saunders Home, and was for abandoned babies of Japanese women and American soldiers. At the time, children of this mixed parentage and their mothers were ostracised, and single mothers often left their babies in the street (Anonymous, 2011, np).
learning I could do this gave me a sense of strength’. Yukari backpacked through India, Nepal, and Thailand, and recalls that she felt ‘if you get sick or something your life is over, so this is a survival experiment’.

Yukari says that one of the reasons she ‘started to look out’—beyond Japan—was that she had always been interested in ‘people who are different to us’, and her desire to communicate with foreigners visiting Oiso led her to learn English, and to travel:

As I was travelling, I started to have an idea of being dissolved in the society, in the culture. It was very helpful. It is a very basic rule of survival, I think, that if you stick out you will be attacked. So it is a basic survival kit that I started to take in, in order for me not to get robbed, or have much of a problem. You have to know what the other people expect, what they do, how they function; to develop the eyes that you can observe the differences, so you can have the choice of whether you want to be together or not. And also, not the behaviour itself, but the emotional aspect of it: how they respond, how they get upset with it. You have the idea that what I grew up with is the same, but one way or another I was shown this doesn’t work here.

Yukari explains that she wanted to learn what was customary in places foreign to her, and to understand the feelings of people there. Her *visible* difference in other cultures—as a Japanese woman—did not concern her because she had always felt herself to be different: ‘I was raised as somebody different, not at all in ordinary Japanese culture, because American culture was in my house. In Japan, I always have a sense of being a misfit’. However, on her return to Japan from that early experience of travelling she says she thought her only choice was ‘to try to fit in, so it was quite a difficult time’. At first Yukari sought to be an artist, and worked in an art gallery—a job that was of short duration ‘because I found the artists had to do business’. Disillusioned, she quit the job and gave up painting.

Proficiency with English led Yukari to work for the next ten years for a television production company, as a producer creating programs about foreign countries.
So I started to go places, and I also started to have a lot of communication with Japanese co-ordinators living in different countries. It was very interesting; all of them were different, because how they developed the sense of themselves is influenced by where they are. For example, there was a Japanese co-ordinator living in France, and French people are a little bit always snobbish, and I have never seen such a snobbish Japanese. So I was experiencing what it seems the culture does to people and I am quite intrigued by that.

The television productions were for a popular series introducing other cultures to Japan. Yukari said it was a ‘bubble time’, with plenty of money available to film exotic cultures in distant locations:

Japanese people were very hungry for that in the nineties—twenty years ago. When I was small, in the sixties, the country was still quite poor. By the eighties, people started to consider spending money on travelling—going abroad was highly unusual until then. For the first time people started to have the room to see what’s out there, so thirty years after the war, the second generation starts to see. It is a generational thing—the ones that worked their butt out became grandfathers, and the one after was getting quite affluent, so they started to take the abundance of things for granted.

As a reaction to the highly commercial television work, during her twenties Yukari also sought ‘something completely alternative, nature friendly’, and had become an environmental activist ‘doing demonstration and hunger strike’. She became involved in protests against old forest logging by Japanese and European companies in Sarawak, on the island of Borneo, and with its nomadic people of the rain forest, the Penan, said to be one of the last hunter-gatherer tribes in Asia. Yukari says Japan was at least a decade behind the west in becoming aware of humanistic and other alternative ideas, but in the 1980s, ‘alternative’ workshops began to be presented. Amongst other things, Yukari did a sweat lodge ceremony with Lakota

26 According to a BBC report, the population of Penan people in Sarawak was reduced over a few decades from about 10,000 to less than 200 by 2008 (Parry, 2008, np).
Sioux people; a peace walk with Ainu people, indigenous to Japan; and another with native Hawaiians.

Yukari recalls that the television work became increasingly incongruent for her: ‘The times’ need was there, I was playing a role to feed what was wanted, but it was manipulative of people’. Also, with the constant travel from ‘cold country to hot country, from North Pole to South Pole, I started to get sick, so with these two things I decided to quit’. Another factor in her decision was an offer of marriage:

A man showed up and said ‘I’m going to feed you, I’m going to take care of you’. That’s what he said and I never had the idea of what it was like to be taken care of by somebody else. So I decided to get married when I was twenty-nine. It sounded good, why not try it. I gave myself a try, and that was that. The basic values of my husband and myself were too different.

Yukari says her husband wanted her to stop involving herself in activism and other alternative interests, ‘in order to have his baby’. She experienced his demand to conform to the role of a traditional Japanese wife as a threat to her sense of self, and decided ‘not to continue’.

In the 1990s, Yukari met Morten, a Danish man who became her life partner. Yukari feels the ideas to which she was introduced—by Morten, and through her relationship with him—expanded her consciousness. She says that ‘Northern European people have especially the idea of individualism more than anywhere else, I think, and being equal; and again this idea is very different, because they take the idea of women being equal to men for granted, as a society’. Northern European women might disagree with that assessment, but Yukari compares her experiences in Europe with contemporary Japanese views and ‘through the differences’ has expanded her thinking. Also, beginning to appreciate concepts of self-development and self-actualisation, Yukari travelled to Hawaii to train as a healing therapist: ‘It was a totally new idea to me—that as a human, you have the capability to respond to what is going on, and the basic tendency … is to restore the balance and go for
better’. For eight years, Yukari and Morten taught that healing method, in Maui each winter, with students from Australia, Europe, and the USA.

Early in the new millennium, Morten visited a friend in Guatemala, who had started an eco-lodge in a small, still-primitive town. The couple bought a piece of land there, and built a tiny house. Their lifestyle now is highly mobile: Yukari is an interpreter for international seminar presenters, mostly in Tokyo, translates books on topics ranging from physiology to philosophy, and is a body-worker, healer, writer, and photographer. Morten travels the world teaching the Franklin Method—a process, which uses movement and neuro-plasticity to improve body and mind—in Europe, Japan, and the USA. Yukari and Morten live for part of each year in Tokyo, a few months in Guatemala, and spend some time in Denmark and other countries.

**Discourse and analysis**

In addition to having what Massey (1994, np) calls ‘a global sense of place’, participants introduced in this chapter have developed and given expression to what could be called a *global sense of self*. Although it could be argued that this simply reflects their continuing mobility, from the interviews it seems they each have developed this sense of self over time through on-going processes of relating to many people and places. Participants’ experiences fit the oft-quoted description of:

- people who belong to more than one world, speak more than one language (literally and metaphorically), inhabit more than one identity, have more than one home; who have learned to negotiate and translate between cultures and who, because they are irrevocably the product of several interlocking histories and cultures, have learned to live with, and indeed to speak from, *difference*. They speak from the ‘in-between’ of different cultures, always unsettling the assumptions of one culture from the perspective of another, and thus finding ways of being *the same as*
and at the same time different from, the others amongst whom they live
(Hall, 1995, 206 [original emphasis]).

Julian, for example, is not simply a product of the hegemonic order of late-imperial Britain into which he was born. His sense of self has been modified by his lived experience of vastly different cultures and places, as well as by engagement with different ideologies and spiritual and philosophical precepts. He describes himself as ‘a bit of a cultural sponge’, able to absorb and be absorbed into the culture of wherever he is. He has an ability to adapt that he believes is based on a confidence that he can be open to difference, which comes from his sense of self-worth. Julian believes that this openness to other cultures probably came from his childhood experiences in so many countries. He feels it would not have happened if he had been isolated from the local children, and emphasises that his engagement with them in various countries led to a continuing openness to difference. A significant part of accommodating difference has been to accept and value people as they are, including himself.

Richard, the most mobile of the three participants introduced here, regularly travels internationally for conferences and consultancy. He speaks of having ‘contingent identity’—focusing himself in various roles in different places—that creates ‘fluid’ boundaries for effective functioning. At the same time, he grounds himself wherever he may be by using what he describes as ‘a sense of being, a sense of doing, a sense of interacting with others and with the environment’. Each day, he sets out to ‘touch on different elements’—physical, intellectual, interpersonal, cognitive, conceptual, sensate—not to ‘tick a bunch of boxes’, but to bring some balance to his sense of himself. Wherever Richard may be, he usually starts the day by running, cycling, or swimming ‘to achieve some little physical contact in the world’, and to ‘feel my blood racing in some way’.

He considers himself to be globally oriented, comfortable in many places, and not strongly attached to anywhere in particular. However, he distinguishes himself from ‘people out there who are mobile but—not even interested in experiencing places—

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27 Attributed by Hall, as above, to Homi Bhabha (1994), by Pile and Thrift (1995b, 10) to Salman Rushdie (1991), and by Morley (2000, 207) to Hall. Not found verbatim in Bhabha or Rushdie.
actually trying to stay in their own place, in their bubble, while travelling’. Richard ‘feels’ places, ‘drinks’ the landscape in’, and ‘looks’ for what is similar, what is dissimilar, and how the local people interact with their environment.

Yukari says that because of the cultural influence her father brought to the family from the USA she was raised as somebody different, ‘not at all in ordinary Japanese culture’. Although she grew up in one location, Yukari was deeply curious about foreigners she saw in the town, and about the rest of the world. At the ‘free’ school she was encouraged to think broadly and creatively, and to develop a sense of herself as an individual. That encouragement was unusual in the contemporary—still very traditional—Japanese culture, which emphasises collectivity and conformity, and within which the self is viewed as interdependent rather than independent (Kan et al., 2009). As Yukari explains, having an individual sense of self was ‘not at all something people were looking at, maybe never happens’.

Early experience in foreign countries was not always easy for her, and at first, Yukari thought that she had to change herself to be accepted in different places. Over time, she felt she strengthened what she called the ‘self-sufficiency’ she had developed as a child. Her idea of self-sufficiency began by accepting that her mother was doing her best, and concluding that what worked best was to accept prevailing conditions, rather than resenting them. She recognised that rather than hankering for what was not available, when she decided something was enough, it became enough; and thus she found she began to have more positive experiences. Applying that learning in varied locations, Yukari came to realise that, by accepting people and places as they were, she came to accept herself, and, concomitantly, she experienced others accepting her more readily. Rather than developing a sense of self conceptually, Yukari considers that she continues to strengthen her sense of self by having many kinds of experience in different countries. Variations in place provide opportunities for her to ‘have another look’ at herself, by experiencing the distinctive conditions and practices woven into everyday life in those locales, and responding to the unique needs and demands of each place and its people:

For example, Denmark is a country where I used to feel I was inferior, not because there is a prejudice, but because of the colours—because I
was different, people start to look at me with my dark hair—I started to feel a bit of inferiority because they are gorgeous blonde, physically beautiful people, and that didn’t apply to me. To be self-sufficient in a place like Denmark you have to have some sense of okayness in being *me*. That is the requirement there. Whereas, in Guatemala, the people’s psyche functions in a totally different way from in a developed country, so appearance doesn’t play a part in being self-sufficient in Guatemala. In Guatemala, to be self-sufficient is to know what food you can eat, where you can eat it, to start feeling if your physical condition is changing, so you can be pro-active—that kind of self-sufficiency is needed there.

Because Yukari still lives for part of the time in the country of her birth, she does not have a sense of having moved from one place to another. She explains that moving annually to different places and then returning to her place of origin feels like an expansion of her sense of self. Through personal connection with locations that are different to each other she has a growing sense that ‘this planet’ is where she lives: ‘So I don’t feel that I am becoming one person to another to another in order to fit there, to enjoy or anything; it is the sense that I am simply expanding my area of living’.

All three participants are aware of a high degree of openness to experience difference: As Yukari put it, ‘you have to develop the eyes’; Julian describes himself as ‘someone who is looking, and I mean looking, rather than looking for’; and Richard speaks of physical activity that allows him to engage with place on a sensory level that he feels supports an empathic response to its people. Each exhibits a lack of self-consciousness, in the sense that they are more interested in getting to know people and places than in wondering what others might think of them. In common, their narratives reveal that their mobile lives have involved processes of letting go of attachments—for example, to any idea that there is just one right way to do things, or to be, or to think. That process has extended to letting go of limited definitions of themselves. Speaking of her experience of a pilgrimage on a fourteen hundred kilometre peace walk, Yukari describes seeing in herself and others ‘what is not real
is falling off them’, a letting go of attachments. Yukari concludes, ‘I get detached by moving places, but I don’t get dissociated—that’s one of the realisations of moving places’.

The examples provided by these three participants raise interesting questions. In chapter two, I discussed contested ideas that dissociation, disembedding, placelessness, and alienation can result from high levels of mobility (Adey, 2010; Cresswell, 2006; Sheller, 2008; Urry, 2007). What factors have allowed the participants introduced here to experience their highly mobile lifestyles without those results? Is the state of being they experience something they have brought about themselves? Or, has it happened to them? Certainly, there is similarity between these people with mobile lives and the regular migrants introduced earlier. Both groups take for granted that opportunities and choices are open to them—including in relation to mobilities; and even though they have experienced considerable challenges at different times, fundamentally they assume that they are free, have rights, and are safe. On that basis, they have come to expect to thrive, develop capabilities, interact effectively with others and their worlds, give and receive, and to experience wellbeing.

The wellbeing of these participants could be attributed to their current status as educated, middle-class, economically independent professionals, but that was not the case throughout their lives. Many people might be held to have a similar narrative base without experiencing the wellbeing these participants describe. Elliott and Urry (2010, 6, 9) write of ‘increasingly mobile and uncertain lives’ for people in some parts of the world, and point out that, ‘People may hanker after the celebrity-inspired, jet-setting lifestyle, but many of those who in fact lead such lifestyles suffer high levels of anxiety, emotional disconnection and depression’.

Julian, Richard, and Yukari—whom I have introduced as exemplars of mobile lives—are not placeless, dissociated or alienated. Perhaps, in their own ways, they have developed what Massey (1994, np) describes as a ‘progressive sense of place … a global sense of the local, a global sense of place’; and, I suggest, a local sense of the global. These participants relate to place openly and sensorially, and they involve themselves, and engage with people and place wherever they happen to be. They do
not limit self-identification or belonging to one culture or place, and all express a
global sense of self. A global sense of self can lead to a notion of global citizenship,
which implies some sense of global responsibility as well as of rights, and each of
these three participants exhibits that. They express their awareness of that
responsibility as a concern with matters beyond the local and in their behaviour in
various ways. For Yukari, that expression has included environmental activism, but
being of continuing service and contributing to increasing harmony in the world,
professionally and personally, is important to all of them. Julian thinks of himself as
‘just one very small dot in this whole mass of humanity … just one little blip who’s
around for a very short time’, but it matters to him how he spends that time. Within
the Quaker community he is recognised as ‘a sort of an elder in an informal way’, an
acknowledgement by which Julian feels privileged.

Significant themes characterising the narratives of these three participants include
accepting and valuing themselves and others; and embracing the openness to
difference that follows. Each of them feels that with such openness comes respect for
the wonderful diversity of people, and cultures, and places; and a visceral recognition
that we have our humanity in common, and our home is the Earth.

This chapter completes the introduction of participants. In part three, I further
analyse their narratives to explore experiences of settlement in new places, and to
investigate the relationships between senses of identity, place, and belonging, and
how these are influenced by various forms of migration and other mobilities.
PART THREE

CHALLENGES OF RESETSLEMENT
7. SETTLING IN NEW PLACES

If places are indeed a fundamental aspect of man's existence in the world, if they are sources of security and identity for individuals and for groups of people, then it is important that the means of experiencing, creating, and maintaining significant places are not lost (Relph, 1976, 6).

Challenges of resettlement can be exacerbated if migrants have deep attachment to places elsewhere. Deep attachment to a place is about the significance given to it, the experiences people have, the relationships and activities that occur there, and its social, cultural, ecological, and personal meanings. Many people have strong attachment to the place they feel is home—often their place of origin, where they grew up, where they developed their sense of self, and of identity. Yi-Fu Tuan, (1977, 154) writes that ‘profound attachment to the homeland appears to be a worldwide phenomenon’. The term solastalgia has been coined to name the distress caused by environmental change, and people’s mental wellbeing can be so threatened by the ‘severing of “healthy” links between themselves and their home territory’ that they suffer ‘psychoterratic’—that is, earth-related—mental illness (Albrecht et al., 2007, 95). Solastalgia was first applied to people’s experiences of changes to the environments where they live, but the term can also be used to describe the distress people experience when they migrate and relocate in places unfamiliar to them.

Here, I explore participants’ experiences and senses of place in various settings. Some participants think of sense of place mainly in terms of an appreciation of landscape, rather than as inclusive of people and society; and the environs and aesthetics of places are important to them. There is a distinct difference between the senses of place felt by irregular migrants, and those felt by other participants, although Kiros is an exception to this general observation. I explore those distinctions by reference to several emergent themes, and ask how might sense of self and place be co-constitutive and constantly imbricated?
Multiple senses of place

In a study of residents in a small English town, John Eyles (1985, 122) listed ten dominant senses of place created locally, influenced by wider economic and cultural processes, and involving social and landscape elements. As Perkins and Thorns (2012, 20) point out in relation to that study, Eyles’ list showed that people may have several senses of place even in one place, and that further shifts occur with changes to ‘local and wider contexts of residents’. In their view, ‘place-based experience is a defining characteristic of everyday life for most people, notwithstanding the fact that they are influenced by, and contribute to, wider social, economic and cultural currents’ (23). Amongst those currents the mobility of people’s lives is one highly significant variable. Indeed, at least two insights may be drawn from this discussion in regard to migration. First, the arrival of migrants to an area inevitably introduces changes to the contexts of existing residents, may lead to environmental changes, and has diverse and often unintended consequences for all concerned. As Urry (2007, 279) explains, ‘large-scale system change normally results from “small” changes’. Second, immigrants arrive in a place entirely new to them.

Eyles and Williams (2008, 203) consider that ‘experiencing multiple senses of place may instil a particularly strong sense of place-identity with one particular place, given that any one individual has experience of places which they can compare; for many this one place is what they call home’. The participants’ lived experiences provide examples of such multiple senses of place, and of how these people have adjusted to new locations. Some have found that one place to call ‘home’, and others (at the time of interview) still felt themselves to be ‘in between’—neither fully departed from one place, nor yet fully settled in another.

Finding similarities and making comparisons

A common theme in participants’ narratives is that landscape features in new places that remind them of their places of origin help them to feel at home. Kiros thinks that effect happens because the features of one place remind people of other, childhood senses of place, memories of community, and other attachments. His remembered sense of place contributed to Kiros’ choice to migrate to Hobart, because he felt it
was geographically familiar: ‘The mountains, and the temperature, and the way things are set up, it looks like home. You find comfort in a place if it looks like the place you are from; and sometimes you recreate the place for it to look like home’. He pointed out that Tasmania’s first settlers from England had done that, naming streets after English names and events, building houses and planting gardens in English style—a practice evident in colonising settlements worldwide. Tasmania’s mountains hardly measure up against those of Shoukat’s birthplace in central Afghanistan, but he ‘can find a mountain here’, and feels that ‘Tasmania is looking something like Afghanistan—I can find trees here, and green, water view, and rain’—all of significance to someone of rural and agricultural origins.

Carol’s sense of place in Australia has changed greatly since she first migrated in the 1970s. Arriving then, with her Australian husband, she felt herself to be an outsider, and hated the place:

The sun was so bright I couldn’t see. The light in Scotland is soft, misty—the light in Canada could be harsh—but the light in Australia was obscene! I had never worn sunglasses in my life; only a person in Canada pretending to be a San Francisco cop would have a pair of sunglasses. And the food! It’s changed now, dramatically, but then … it was its obviousness! In Canada everything came in packages, so it doesn’t look like what it was. So when I first came to Australia and I saw food come out looking like a lamb, I felt like Alice in Wonderland where suddenly the plum pudding gets up and starts talking to her, or a fish with its eye looking at me, or prawns, with their little beady eyes looking at me, and I thought ‘I’m not eating that!’ I still don’t think I’m quite over it.

The second time Carol moved to Australia, Richard was with her, and it made a difference that they were ‘Canadians making sense of it together’. Carol says her first husband was ‘forever telling me that I should just love the things he loved’, especially when she did not. In contrast, Carol and Richard often had similar reactions to their new environment, and felt free to comment to each other in ways that might have offended someone local. Nevertheless, at first it was difficult:
Our first Christmas, it was so hot! We could not believe it. We were devastated. Richard couldn’t get a job—he had qualifications for things they didn’t even have in Australia yet. We went to Coogee Beach, and we were lamenting the family, the snow, and suddenly, I got it: The ocean was crystal clear, just beautiful. I looked at Richard and I said, ‘What is the problem here?’ And he said, ‘There isn’t a problem, this is just gorgeous.’ And in that moment it was so clear, not comparing, but taking this country on its own terms.

After many moves within Australia, Richard and Carol settled in Katoomba, in Sydney’s Blue Mountains area. Its similarity to their places of origin was a significant factor in their choice of that location, and that similarity deepens their senses of self. For Richard:

It feels better than Canada because you just don’t get the winter. I mean there’s winter here, but you’re just not out there with the snow in the same way. The thing that’s absolutely blown me away—Katoomba is like this wonderful blend of Canada and England and Australia all wrapped up into one! I feel more like myself here than I think I’ve felt anywhere else we’ve lived in Australia—it’s kind of English, but at other times it’s very Canadian, like when the leaves turn, and with the cold. A couple of weeks ago it was snowing hard. I was outside and my hands were cold, like I remember when I used to put the Christmas lights outside in Montreal.

For Carol, the mountainous area of Katoomba combines Scotland, Canada, and Australia all in the same landscape:

I’ve got the cliffs; the mauve, the indigo, the maroon; the sky changing the way that it does, the light being more filtered than it is down there [on the coastal plain]; I’ve got the coldness, the smell of cold on clothes. Spring here, it’s glorious, and you really get the Canadian feel where you get tulips, crocuses, everything; but there’s also snowdrops from Scotland, and it’s like Scotland. When I look out over the cliffs, its like
looking out over an ocean almost, and it’s bush; I can smell the eucalypt and I can hear the bellbirds and the whipbirds—and it’s a place where I can claim just me, so I’m not defined by somebody else.

Connie, bred in Washington State, in the USA, says she felt like a foreigner in Louisiana, even though it was another part of her own country:

I didn’t really understand that within the US, there really are different cultures. Someone could have told me that and I would have said, ‘oh, yeah, well’, but I didn’t really get it. It really was a different culture—people are different, you feel it in the grocery store, you feel it walking with a baby stroller down the road, houses look different, things people eat are different, accent is different. I did not like it. I used to think that ‘homesick’ meant I miss being with my family—the family things that I am so familiar with—but I don’t think that any more. I recognise now homesickness has not been the people, it has been just the familiarity of sort of expectations. When you know the name of the game, you know how to play the game, you know at the grocery store when you have an interaction with another person, you know where you stand, and you know what to expect.

This is similar to Kiros’ earlier observation of the feeling of starting from zero when ignorant of the customs of a place, which can lead to self-doubt and alienation; and of Peter Nynäš’ (2008, 169) view that relationship with place is contingent on knowing ‘the rules’. As Connie puts it, ‘In a place you’re not familiar with, even if you think you know how to play the game, if something falls off in an interaction with someone, you tend to think it is you, and then you blame the place’.

**Interacting to develop sense of a new place**

As discussed in chapter two, proponents of methods for developing a sense of place recommend paying attention to place and all that is in it, engaging with it sensorially, and learning from, as well as about it (Abram, 1996; Cameron, 2003; Cronon, 1996; Macy, 1995; Mathews, 2005; Naess, 1986; Roszak, 2001; Seed, 1988; Thomashow, 1995). All the participants spoke of a need to interact with place to build relationship
with it, but their methods and focus varied. Kiros was perhaps most conscious that it was something he had to do intentionally, to accept being in a new place, to ‘reground’ himself, to become involved in community, and to establish professional and social connection: ‘It’s good to connect with nature, but connection with nature cannot replace connection with people’. Kiros told of taking his wife and daughters for bushwalks to get to know the country, ‘intentionally!’ For him, the landscape remains foreign, so ‘it doesn’t come naturally. For our girls, it is natural, that’s the difference’.

Yukari feels that she interacts well with new places and people, but recalled being reluctant, at first, to establish a new home in Guatemala because of the language:

> It took so much time for me to learn the English and now I go to a place where that English doesn’t work, and the first sense that I had there was so foreign. But as the tree grows and as the tree flowers that we planted in our own garden, and then see some kind of relationship to the nature like that, and also to the people, then you have the sense of home.

Carola feels her roots have shifted from Germany to Australia:

> I’m clearly at home here, and that’s got to do with the ground, it’s got to do with me planting things in our garden—very much to do with the soil, with the actual land. Feeling at home somewhere means that I’m taken care of, it’s being welcomed, belonging, but it’s not people, it’s the land.

Both Carola and Carol speak of the importance of looking for beauty—or finding ways to create it—wherever they are, and of connecting with place through regular gardening and walking. They experience and consciously develop sense of place as a physical connection, through the senses. Carola experiences it as ‘a mutual taking care of’. Carol describes it as ‘getting your ear in, and your tongue in’; that what is required is for her ‘sensibilities to learn’ to stop comparing, and to hear, taste, smell, feel, and see freshly: ‘Look at the colour of the sky, embrace it on its own terms and don’t try to interpret it—you can feel scared and lonely and strange, or you can say that’s a place of spirituality, make a narrative of it, this is what this is’. Through such
sensory awareness of place, Carol developed insight into how differently she came to terms with a new landscape as a child and as an adult:

In Scotland there are things I know: I know a snowdrop coming through the snow, I know gooseberry. These are things that I know intimately. I have taken a gooseberry off the bush, I have been pricked by its prickles; I know what it is like to fall into nettles. Scotland is a prickly country, and I know the smell of that, the way to work with that, the leaves, all of those things.

When I first came to Canada, when I was still a little girl, one of the things I had to get used to was maple trees and oak trees; and oak trees have those wonderful little things that look like little people in hats—acorns—and because I was going to school there I got to do things with the leaves—I’ve waxed an oak leaf, I’ve waxed a maple leaf. I’ve climbed those trees, I’ve seen them shed their leaves, I know why the chlorophyll shuts off during the winter; this is something I’m very intimate with. When I came to Australia as an adult, one of the hardest things I found is I have no intimate relationship with a palm tree, or a gum tree. I haven’t climbed a gum tree. I’ve been told about it, so I’ll break a leaf and I’ll smell it and I’ll think, ‘that’s lovely’, but I haven’t had a childhood relationship with it.

This understanding highlights the value of providing opportunity and encouragement for children to engage with their environments as part of developing their senses of place. It underlines the importance of supporting migrants—both children and adults—to intentionally interact with the living as well as built aspects of places that are new to them. While features of landscape reminiscent of places of origin can help people to feel at home, sometimes the places to which they migrate have no such features. As the participants’ stories show, part of what opens the possibility for people to begin to feel at home in any place is for them to become familiar with it.

Understandably, a new place may look and feel foreign, and require new or newly tapped forms of knowledge and behaviours from newcomers. For example, for
people who come from rural areas, cities can be overwhelming; and for those from inland places, coastal environments can be daunting. Growing up in a place involves countless interactions that become so familiar they are taken for granted. In cities, there is a need to discover the location of services and shops, schools and churches, parks and playgrounds, and to learn how to use those facilities. In country areas, it may be important to be aware of and to learn respect for things such as snakes and insects, birds and animals, plants that are edible and those that are poisonous. For someone who has learned to swim in a lake or lagoon, a surf beach can be treacherous. Carol, for instance, discovered she needed to ‘learn mechanically’ to deal with some things that were unfamiliar:

The first time I walked into the ocean, I walked straight in and kept going, because I thought I was in a lake. I’m not used to walking into water that is moving. Water is supposed to stay still. I got scared to death by it, I got pulverised. I kept standing up and the water would kick me back down again. And somebody came out and said ‘you dive under the wave’, I’d just never thought to do that … oh, and that is an exhilarating moment of control.

Carol’s example also draws attention to the value of immigrants learning from and collaborating with locals in becoming familiar with place, exemplified, for example, by a gardening initiative created by Hobart’s Phoenix Centre’s migrant resource service. About twice each month, refugee immigrants spend a day working together to create gardens at different homes tenanted by immigrants. Depending upon the site, there may already be a few old fruit trees and some areas of flowers. Often the group clears overgrown bushes and grass, tills the soil and builds up beds, then plants out a variety of vegetables. The vegetables are a welcome source of food for these people, who usually have low incomes. The project affords opportunities for immigrants to discover what will grow in their new land in different seasons; and fosters cultural exchange that sometimes amuses all involved. For example, immigrants were excited to recognise rhubarb, a plant familiar to them, and said they ate it raw, with salt. When the project supervisor told them Australians commonly eat rhubarb cooked, with sugar, there was amazement and laughter.
There is a considerable body of literature discussing the role and importance of gardening in migrant place making. Lesley Head, Pat Muir and Eva Hampel (2004, 326) describe gardens as places where people (and plants) both carry on traditions and work out relationships with new social and biophysical environments. Sonia Graham and John Connell (2006, 375) consider that the ‘actual garden produce and type of environment created by the garden helped to emphasise and maintain cultural relationships, provide a space of nostalgia, and give a sense of ownership and control’.

**Being open to place and places**

Participants emphasise that, in addition to interacting with place, an attitude of openness is important for developing a sense of a place. They found that an attitude of openness helped them to settle, begin to feel at home in new places, and maintain a sense of place wherever they might be. Julian and Yukari both hold as essential the precept and practice of being open to ‘really see what’s actually there’. With their experiences of Jordan, India, Japan, Guatemala, Ethiopia, Kenya, and other locations, these two and Kiros stress that it is critical to learn and know what works in a place, rather than (or at least before) superimposing other notions on it. Describing village life in India, Julian said ‘bullocks are just wonderful because they don’t need wide roadways, and they produce more bullocks—tractors can’t do that!’ and Yukari told a cautionary tale from Guatemala:

The local people have a totally different idea about time, efficiency, pride—everything is different—so if you try to apply your ideas to them, they rebel against them. So that is giving us an opportunity to have another look at what kind of ideas we have. There was an Italian guy who was building a house there. It started a year ago. It is a whole manual building—they are building the blocks using the earth from the land. They have been building for a whole year. One day he came and saw no progress. He got upset and said something like, ‘if you are not going to change your behaviour you don’t need to come’. Next day nobody showed up. So who has to change to get the house built?
Julian believes that it is necessary to drop stereotypes, be tolerant, and ‘celebrate difference’; as well as learning about other people’s cultures and places, such a stance has the advantage of increasing awareness of self. Yukari has long known that immersion in new places brings out new knowledge of herself. Connie began to discover that during her time in Tasmania:

One of the first things I noticed were the trees—from a distance you don’t think anything, but when you get closer to them—they’re like Doctor Seuss trees, and that just made me happy. I just wanted to laugh at them because they are just so new and different to me. And then, since we’ve lived here, I’ve just taken pictures of so many trees—dead trees, live trees, flowering trees, green trees—I love the trees! I take leaves out of branches and boil them up and dye fabric with the leaves and bark. I love trees, but I’ve never been so inspired by trees; so living here has changed me, and brought out things that are different, from me. Going to Japan this time—whatever neighbourhood, whatever house—will bring out parts of me, inspire parts of me. That would happen anywhere.

Jun says he would like to visit many places, and is open to experiencing variety, but his sense of place seems to be more instrumental than affective. The most challenging relocation for him was his initial move to the USA from Japan, when he was most confronted by language and cultural differences. As his English improved and he adjusted to the culture, he was excited to move to other places in the USA. However, of Louisiana—which his American wife, Connie, had found so culturally and environmentally challenging—he said ‘it was just another State in the US’. Relocating to Australia was more comfortable because he says the difference from the USA was so small compared to the difference between Japan and the USA.

Jun and Connie would have liked to stay in Australia, but failing that, decided to return to Japan. All Jun’s moves were motivated by a combination of desires to move away from some places and towards others. For instance, he left Japan to get away from his parents; he left the USA to get away from difficult economic and social conditions, and a political environment he did not like. Returning to Japan, he chose to go to Sapporo, on the island of Hokkaido, to keep distance from his parents. He
moved towards the USA, excited by the adventure of living in that country and improving his English; he moved towards Australia after careful consideration of what it offered in terms of living standards and social conditions. He moved towards Sapporo, attracted by the richness of Japanese culture, the familiarity of Japanese food, a quality of service he prefers to western ways, and recognition that ‘in Japan you can access almost anything’—meaning technology, goods, and services—far more than in Australia. However, he says the main reason for choosing to move to Hokkaido is the feeling he has there of open space, because it is not as crowded as the rest of Japan:

There is great nature, this northern climate, rugged mountains, and dark blue, navy blue ocean, great seafood, wild animals, different from the rest of Japan; it has more of a nature, wild, feeling, and agricultural rather than industrial. I like that kind of place. Also, Hokkaido is the newest place in Japan. In Edo time, Hokkaido was almost neglected. Ainu people [indigenous] were living there, no Yamato people—the Samurai people—were interested in that piece of land, so it is only after Meiji time that Japanese people moved to Hokkaido; so what that means is that Hokkaido is not as traditional as the rest of Japan.

The rest of Japan, because each region has long history, especially during Edo time, each region was closed off from each other. You had to have a pass to go to another region. It is a small area, but because of the history and dividedness, each region developed its own culture, accent, and dialect, just like in the UK. The rest of Japan has long history, very strong tradition—you are supposed to live like everyone else. But Hokkaido is where people from different regions in Japan had to live together—there was no common sense. So in a way Hokkaido is like the US or Australia, where people from different parts of the world came together and they have to learn how to live together. There were no set rules, no accents. People speak Tokyo standard Japanese, and they tend to be more open, to say what they think, and I like that style, I want people to express their true thoughts, so that would be the second reason.
In the fifteen years from when Jun first left Japan until his return to Hokkaido, he married and had children, and has matured through many experiences. Nevertheless, he attributes a strengthening of his sense of self to living in other countries, and says he is now more able to recognise that ‘Japan is not my parents, and my parents do not speak for Japan—they are separate entities’.

Sense of self and sense of place are always related, but as these accounts show, openness to place has been concurrent with a deepening of participants’ senses of self. They felt able to be themselves, experiencing a clearer, fuller sense of self. Through experiences such as those described, these people have become more open to allowing and developing their senses of place wherever they might be.

A routine set of practices makes possible a more ‘mobile conception’ of home (Rapport, 1995, 268). Richard, the participant with the highest level of mobility in his lifestyle, is confident that he can be anywhere provided he can start his day with ‘a few routine things that help remind me of my regular self’. Wherever he is, Richard likes to go for a run in the morning:

> It’s like feeling what that place is like to go running in, rather than deeper connection with the place or the people—running through, noticing people, how they interact with their environment. In some ways I’m importing my own place, my own ways, into that new place. I’m interacting with it, but I guess in a safe kind of way. I want some level of interaction with the environment, and to help embed the sense of place, but if you’re going to run through Shanghai, you know how hot the place is, you know how smoggy it is, you know the smells of the place … you get a strong sense of how the lives of the people there must feel.

Richard’s experience does not fit Nigel Rapport’s (1995) observation that such mobilities engender dissociation and eventuate in stereotyping. Richard considers that openness enables him to be responsive to his environment, and ‘pretty much at home anywhere’—at home in himself wherever he is. He thinks that would not exist to the same extent if he only experienced moving through places from a motorised vehicle, which he feels introduces a degree of separation from what is outside it.
Running (or sometimes cycling) gives him a more direct, sensory awareness of place. Without that experiential connection, in his view, ‘you really are floating in space in both a physical and kinda in-your-head sort of space’. He believes that without a sense of a place people are dissociated, so their capacity to respond is limited; and thus that they are more at the affect of place, and likely to be more reactive.

**Remembering trauma and seeking to be safe in place**

With the exception of Shoukat’s feeling of being at home with mountains, he and Nene expressed their relationships to place in ways that contrast with those of other participants. In part, that may have had to do with limits of language, although Nene, at least, is fluent in English. It seemed to me that this difference had far more to do with the degrees of trauma they had experienced, and was associated with their present priorities. It may be that I could have pressed harder to elicit more from them about sense of place. However, being with each of these people through their interviews, I felt it would have been insensitive—and not in the spirit of ethical research—to persist in asking about what was either a source of pain and fear, or clearly of small relevance to them, at least at that stage of their resettlement.

Nene has spent most of her teenage years in Tasmania, growing up to be a young adult excited about going to university. Nene is articulate, and confident in sharing her story, especially because of doing that many times with Students Against Racism. Yet, she exhibits a reserve and serene demeanour that is, in part, very culturally and religiously based. Notwithstanding, Nene’s reserve also comes from fear, because she cannot forget either her experience of trauma or her fears for family still in Sudan, and still threatened. Those fears affect her sense of place. Aspects of the environment that she associates with traumatic experience are anchored in her neurology, and when she sees similarities in other contexts, memories of trauma are triggered. For instance, Nene is afraid of the bush. She has travelled to Melbourne and New Zealand, and looks forward to widening her travels overseas in years to come. Cities do not frighten her, countryside does:

> Because there is not much houses, and forest, kind of … just reminded me of how—that’s where the Turkanas used to live, the forest side—they
come in the night and invade the camp and stuff like that. If you went to the river to get water, to get firewood in the forest … it’s kind of on the side of the forest and where the Turkana stays, so you have to make sure you are home by six o’clock because it may be dangerous at night. When Turkanas get you, you be in trouble, they kill you, and stuff like that.

Travelling through country Tasmania, Nene explains, ‘just gives me the feeling of back then in the camp’, and she confirms that any place that reminds her of the Turkana area—‘it’s a bit forest, no houses’—brings back the same feeling of fear.

Although Shoukat is glad that Tasmania is a quiet place, ‘no rush—a very good country for me’, he finds it very difficult to think about anything much else than the safety of his wife and son, and ‘our Hazara people’ still in Pakistan:

For example, when I study in Polytechnic, or anywhere, if I try to forget for a while, ‘oh I am in class’; after thirty minutes, again, I think ‘oh, where is my family? They are in Pakistan, but just leave it, okay’. I study again, I just look to teacher, but again after thirty minutes or so, ‘Where is my family? Is something wrong?’

A summary of what underlies Shoukat’s emotional sense of place might be: Afghanistan—death, pain, loss, and fear; Pakistan—death, pain, loss, and fear; his journey to seek asylum—danger, pain, loss, and fear; in detention—imprisonment, pain, loss, and fear for his family; Tasmania—personally safe, but deeply missing his wife and son, and his people, afraid for them, grieving over Hazara people regularly being killed in Pakistan, and helpless to protect them. In our first conversation, Shoukat said, ‘now Australia is my mother home’, and he lived with hope that sometimes ran thin, as expressed in a poem he wrote and translated as:

I become sad for my joyful son
I become desperate and sad
I become sad for my dear ones.

In light of current government policy that prevents his family from migrating to join him, Shoukat’s sense of place might perhaps be described as in-between or liminal.
 Seeking territory, sovereignty, and citizenship

Khadga’s nineteen years in a refugee camp in Nepal is almost unimaginable to anyone who has not had such experience. Children of his extended family died on the way to that place, undernourished and in flight from terror, yet he has not (in memory) directly experienced war, or torture, or the death by violence of anyone close to him. He grew up in an environment of poverty, lack of rights, and humiliation, yet he managed to get an education, and migrated as soon as that option became available. When selecting Australia, a cool climate and features of landscape such as mountains were important, but Khadga’s sense of place is strongly socially oriented, centring on rights, services, and opportunities. Recall that, earlier I wrote that Australia is the first country within which Khadga has ever had the possibility of citizenship, and so, he says: ‘I love this country! I am very proud to be Australian now’:

I think we made the right decision to come to Tasmania. I visited the mainland, because my in-laws are in Adelaide; it is quite hard, it’s too big, and it is quite difficult, especially for migrant people to explore the services that are available to them in the big place. In Tasmania you don’t have to struggle as much to explore all the services that are mainly for people like us.

I was very small in Bhutan; I didn’t have much experience my area, what is Bhutan looks like. When I read interviews and when I listen news, now I certainly feel that Tasmania is the best place, and Tasmania is my home, because the people who are living in Bhutan, they are not enjoying all their rights. Even one of my brothers is in Bhutan. Before we left Bhutan, his citizenship is ceased by Bhutan government—he still has not got that citizenship—it is more than twenty years. He is stateless, and because of that, his sons and daughters, they are not getting opportunities to studies and to their own business; they are also restricted by the rules and regulations of the country, not having citizenship. If I were there, I would also have to face the same situation. Here, I am exercising all my rights, freedoms, liberty; I am feeling free. I can walk with my head is
straight. In Bhutan, when someone from the offices is coming, you are not allowed to look them straight, you have to bend your head. And in Nepal, the life in the camps is pretty horrible.

Khadga plans to stay in Hobart, where he says he is ‘habituated’ to the place and the facilities, he is close to his extended family, his children can get an education, and, like his brothers, he is buying a house. In the back yard of his new home, Khadga and his elderly father have established an extensive and productive vegetable garden. The garden and the family are thriving, and place for them is about community and social belonging.

All four irregular migrant participants are conscious that their relationship with territory, sovereignty, and citizenship is an essential foundation for building wellbeing. For the others that relationship is no less important; but they take their citizenship so much for granted that it is almost unthinkable for them to consider that the freedoms and rights they presuppose might ever be questioned. Like Jun and Connie, they accept that they might experience restrictions in some other countries, but expect and assume continuity of freedoms and rights in their countries of citizenship. And some can claim such rights in more than one nation state; Richard, as noted earlier, has citizenship in three.

**Recognising sense of place as ontological**

In chapter two, I asked if experience of senses of place might increase people’s agency and wellbeing when migrating and settling in new locations, and discussed distinctions of senses of place drawn from the work of Malpas and Relph. I asked if sense of place can only occur in regard to particular places or; is it possible to have an ontological sense of place—an awareness of place as a fundament of being? Relph’s assertion presupposes the possibility. However, I wonder to what extent people are actually aware of an ontological sense of place and, if they are, what makes that awareness possible?

Reflecting on these questions, I found that several of the participants feel their sense of place is both more and other than the meanings they give to particular places, or their attachment to them. Yukari, Carola, Julian, Carol, and Richard all identify
strongly with a sense of the whole Earth as *home*. Broadly, they see the planet as *our place*, not in any sense of ownership, but rather in accord with the original meaning of ecology—from *Oikos*, meaning home, and *humanus* which literally means ‘earth dweller’ (Buttimer, 1993, 3, 219). Their sense of *our place* links to Massey’s (1994, np) ‘progressive sense of place’, but goes beyond that to an ontological sense of place. As Relph (2008, 37–8) comments, what Massey proposes is a version of what he has called ‘sense of places … characterised by breadth rather than depth of experience’, and ‘to do with the appreciation of relationships and differences between many places’. However, following Malpas’ argument, Relph also writes that an ontological sense of place ‘has to do with our grasp of being in the world’ (38). Of the participants, Carola, Yukari, and Julian express that ontological sense of place most clearly. To them, it is an awareness that seems inextricable from their expanded senses of self, described earlier. As Yukari explains, ‘expanding my area of living is a *feeling* of the Earth extending out’ from wherever she may currently be located. She describes it also as being at one point on a network of places and feeling connection with the whole network, and it is concomitant with her experience of growing her sense of self in new places. Carol and Richard feel aware of such an expanded sense of place occasionally; but, for them, an ontological sense of place appears to be more contingent. For example, Carol feels such connection in natural and ‘sacred’ places, but loses touch with it, and feels oppressed in buildings of concrete and fluorescent light.

Significantly, a correlation can be drawn between the state of participants’ senses of self and the quality of their senses of place. There are considerable variations, not just from one participant to another, but throughout the course of individual lives. Sense of self and sense of place are highly complex, mutually constituted, and influenced by many factors, so I will first explore other challenges of migration and resettlement, including issues of ethnicity, culture, and religion, and questions of identity and belonging, before attempting to draw conclusions. The case studies and discussion so far, however, strongly support three understandings. First, when people are afraid, at risk, and as Martin Seligman (2006) describes, have learned to be *helpless, hopeless*, and *worthless*, their sense of self is reduced, their focus narrows, and they are defensively closed, rather than open to place. Second, when people are
safe, free, and have learned to value themselves and others, their sense of self expands, their focus broadens, and they are more open to discover, experience, and learn from place. Third, when the sense people have of a place is that it nurtures them, and that there they are safe and free to be themselves, without needing to defend or put on a false front, then being in that place supports them to develop and expand their sense of self. These ideas are further explored in what follows, starting in the next chapter with an investigation of social challenges to resettlement, including those that adhere to observance of cultural, ethnic, and religious practices.
8. DILEMMAS OF DIFFERENCE

The extent of the space in which a person may feel ‘at Home’ … depends on the extent of their confidence and the geographical area in which they feel that their public presence will be confirmed (‘normalised’) as welcome in the looks of others, rather than their presence inviting looks of either hostility or curiosity. One of the most deeply wearing effects of exile is the undermining of a person’s dignity and self-confidence as a result of the predominant lack of such recognition (Morley, 2000, 48).

Whatever the causes of distress when people migrate consequences are reflected in levels of wellbeing of individuals, communities, society, and environs. Among negative social consequences are ethnic rivalry, conflict between different racial, religious and economic groups, failure to accept or integrate newcomers, and community breakdown (Burgess, 2010; Myers, 2001; Reuveny, 2007). For individuals, negative consequences of relocation are likely to include increased levels of stress, aggression, depression, and an overall diminution in their ability to settle well, to thrive in new places, and to contribute usefully to their new communities and environments (Bhugra & Gupta, 2011). Such states are evidence of poor mental health, and a lack of wellbeing (World Health Organisation, 2011).

I argue that the assumption that human being is flawed is central to the problems and the difficult and stressful experiences of people involved in processes of migration, whether they are new arrivals to a place, or already resident. The primary social challenges of migration relate to what Leonie Sandercock (1998, 3) sums up as ‘the dilemmas of difference’—that is, a variety of problems that arise, first, because people are different from each other, and second, because many people fear what the differences may portend. Both immigrants and existing residents in receiving countries have to contend with difference: usually involving culture, ethnicity, religion, economic fears, fears of loss, fears of erosion of ways of life, fears of change—fears that compound into fear of the Other. These fears then influence various reactions and responses, and sometimes are used in the service of particular agenda. For instance, the efficacy of political campaigns to slant public opinion to
favour or reject migrants of particular origins depends upon fear of difference (for example, Nolan et al., 2011).

There are many problems of migration, and many practical issues need to be resolved to reduce causes of distress and fear—for example, those to do with unemployment, housing, health, equal opportunity, and discrepancies between policies and their implementation. Without minimising or disregarding these matters, however, one key to increasing wellbeing is to respond to people’s fear of difference itself. To that end, it is important to return to consideration of the assumption that human being is flawed. So long as that assumption is held to be true, then difference may be, or be seen to be threatening. Inequities and discriminatory practices are supported by the related assumption that some people are inherently better than others. People’s beliefs predispose them to expect that their experiences will validate their assumptions; and beliefs based on ideas that there is something fundamentally wrong with people, and especially with different others, are self-validating reductions. These dynamics, of course, apply both to presuppositions about immigrants, and preconceptions immigrants have about the place and people where they hope to settle, and are central to the politics of difference (Modood, 2013, 35–36).

Conditions for resettlement of immigrants vary greatly from country to country. In this chapter, although I draw on literature relating to migration and resettlement in other countries, the focus—as in discussion of multiculturalism in chapter three—is mainly on Australian conditions.

**Everyday racism**

Much more can and doubtless will be written in the on-going debate about multiculturalism. The summary provided earlier serves, however, to point to concomitant issues introduced here as the dilemmas of difference that constitute primary challenges of migration. Again, I refer to the assumption that human being is flawed, which—unequivocally—is a self-validating reduction expressed in racism. In the following discussion of racism, I draw on relevant literature and participants’ narratives.
Gabrielle Berman and Yin Paradies (2010, 216) write that it is common to consider racism as ‘a combination of prejudice and power’. They cite various definitions of racism, among them ‘the definitive attribution of inferiority to a particular racial/ethnic group and the use of this principle to propagate and justify the unequal treatment of this group’, social systems based on ethnoracial categories, and other reductionist and pejorative ‘premises about human kind’. In an attempt to overcome limitations they perceive in others’ definitions, Berman and Paradies define racism as ‘that which maintains or exacerbates inequality of opportunity among ethnoracial groups’, and which can be expressed through beliefs, emotions, and practices (217). They see racism as a form of oppression intrinsically linked to privilege: ‘in addition to disadvantaging minority ethnoracial groups in society, racism also results in certain ethnoracial groups (for example, Whites) being privileged and accruing unfair opportunities’ (ibid.). Berman and Paradies provide evidence that there is racism in Australia, that it may be on the rise, and that ‘racism in the form of opposition to diversity in recent years has consistently been expressed by a significant proportion of those surveyed' (226). Jock Collins (2013) sees social cohesion as the norm in contemporary Australia, but also writes that racist attitudes and racial discrimination persist, with Indigenous Australians and immigrant minorities being the main victims.

Participants all have experiences of racism, in different forms. One version of everyday racist attitudes is provided by Carol’s recollection of a barbecue, in a rural area, that she attended on the day of her first arrival in Australia, in the 1970s. These graphic examples of racism were not directed at Carol, but she felt very uncomfortable hearing them, and remembers them vividly:

All the guys went to the garage and began drinking, and the women were standing in the kitchen, talking about making pavlovas. I had never been in—I mean the split between the female role and the male role—Canada is not like that! I ended up wandering into the garage because the men were talking politics, which was much more interesting to me. A cattleman was telling me that you could breed an Aborigine out in two generations because their genes are so weak, you know, and so they'd
come out white! And then he starts to go on about how the Aborigine’s brain is not as big, they can’t help it, it’s just not as big … They were the antithesis of everything my family is. These guys were pro the war in Vietnam. One man was talking about building a tank in his garage, I kid you not, for when the Indonesians—the yellow peril—were going to come over.

Attitudes such as those transcribed above epitomise the manner in which certain views can be common in the assumptions of social and personal narratives, and become part of the constitutive conditions of human experience—that is, as part of the environment within which people live, and conduct their lives. Hannah Arendt (1958, 9) explains that whatever ‘touches or enters into a sustained relationship with human life immediately assumes the character of a condition of human existence’.

The assumptions contained in narratives generate those conditions through practices that reinforce or substantiate those ideas, thus influencing behaviour and governing the quality of experience. In situations of migration, people’s negative prejudices—pejorative and reductionist views of different others—become conditions of experience both for immigrants and existing residents. Reaction to those experiences can reinforce those ideas, but not immutably—such ideas are stable, often durable, but not immutable—and understanding of how beliefs constitute conditions of human experience can open the way for assumptions to be questioned and changed.

As described in chapter two, we are born into prevailing narratives, and the assumptions upon which they are based are continually reinforced, partly because they are self-validating, and partly because of memory. Bruce Fell (2011, 126) writes of internal and external memory, both of which are ‘directly linked to how we neurologically process the world; how our priorities and attitudes surrounding self, [others,] sexuality, religion, design, politics and ecology are formed, reinforced and passed on to the next generation’. Internal memory is individually embodied. External memory, in Fell’s terms, is a condition of experience that ‘constantly reminds us of the dominant discourse of the day’ (127). Fell suggests that external memory reminds us how to think in certain ways, and he argues that ‘the memory system that underscores our day-to-day lives hasn’t had a major upgrade since 1944’
He points to the involvement of history, politics, and media in forming and changing assumptions and narratives, and in constituting truths then reinforced by external memory.

By way of example, to follow one thread in the history of racist attitude in Australia, I take the phrase ‘the yellow peril’ from Carol’s account. Drawing from the summary of Australia’s history outlined above, ‘the yellow peril’—the perceived threat of Asian hordes overtaking Australia—can be traced at least from the days of Australia’s gold rush. It is also evident in legislation of the White Australia Policy at Federation, and in the subsequent exclusion from Australia of Chinese and other Asian immigrants. Whether or not that attitude lessened or just simmered during the years between wars, in the Second World War, Japan was the enemy, fought on the Pacific front. Historically, the threat of invasion became real with Japanese bombing of Darwin, and submarines in Sydney Harbour. The developing narrative of ‘the yellow peril’ was intensified by post-war revelations of atrocities in Japanese prisoner-of-war camps. I wonder if the nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki produced a pause—a moment, at least, of reflection that humanity had just done something that irrevocably shifted reality for all of life on this planet—or if it was just a sigh of relief before celebrating another end of war.

Not so very long after the end of the Second World War, as Australia began to experience a flood of cheap merchandise from Asia, and the White Australia Policy began to soften in the 1960s, Australia joined in the Vietnam War. Public television, which first went to air in Australia in 1956, for the first time brought live broadcasts from and about that war into people’s living rooms. Asylum seekers from many places in Asia, particularly Vietnam, began to arrive on Australian shores during the 1970s. What impact did all of that have on prevailing attitudes? It was at that time—nearing the end of the Vietnam War—that policies of multiculturalism were introduced in Australia. Undoubtedly, there would have been many different and shifting attitudes. But, as Carol’s experience testifies, for some people, in some places in Australia, the attitudes and prejudices of old narratives prevailed.
Hierarchies of belonging

Of course, both social and personal narratives can and do change over time, influenced by education, events, politics, media, and more. Acceptance and inclusion of new immigrants are affected by the length of time an ethnoracial group has lived in the country, but negative and pejorative response also shifts from previous to most recent arrivals (Pardy & Lee, 2011; Wise, 2010). In a study of an innercity suburb of Sydney that has become intensively settled by Chinese immigrants, Amanda Wise (2010, 919) writes of ‘a deep-seated sense of displacement and disorientation’ experienced by long-term elderly residents, particularly Anglo-Celtic, but also amongst several other, predominantly European, ethnic groups. Wise focuses on the sensuous and affective dimensions of the experience of these elderly residents in coping with rapid changes to shops and businesses in the main shopping street. The changes are to do with what is available in the shops, but also with how they look—including mostly Chinese signage—and smell, and feel; and the mannerisms and behaviour of the Chinese that are alien to the older residents. Wise writes that, in one focus group discussion she facilitated, the overwhelming discomfort of the elderly residents poured out emotionally in a dystopian description of what they felt the suburb had become. ‘And then something extraordinary happened’:

One of the much older ladies—a widow dressed in black who, until now, had been quiet—began to yell back at the group. First she was recounting in tears, with all her body engaged in the telling, her misery at how her Chinese neighbours let their children wee [urinate] in her front garden. She described having fishy water hosed on her feet at the bus stop in front of the fish shop. The room was charged with emotion. But then she turned, almost on herself, and began to berate herself and the group . . .

‘My God, what are we saying? We can’t say about the new people what the Australians used to say about us. How can we do this to them, how can we make the same pain for them? This is not right to say such things. These Chinese just want to feel a little bit at home, make this place a
little bit more home. We don’t like them but how can we take their home away from them?’ (920–1).

Placing this event in context, Wise writes that the community to which women in the focus group belong was itself ‘subject to a great deal of racism in the postwar years until the 1980s (and occasionally still today)’ (922). Indeed, until the 1970s:

‘Europeans’ were seen as ‘wogs’ who ate ‘smelly’ food and spoke with funny accents. Children were regularly teased and bullied at school. Much of the teasing was around issues of bodily hexis which, to Anglo-Australians of the time, was rather too ‘expressive’ for their liking, and differing food cultures—which ironically have been embraced as ‘mainstream’ in today’s Australia (ibid.).

From my experience, growing up in working-class areas of Sydney and Melbourne in the 1950s, it was common to hear migrants from Mediterranean countries derogatively called ‘wogs’—a slang term referring to any nonwhite person, but especially to dark-skinned natives of the Mediterranean, the Middle East or Southeast Asia. In Australia’s *Macquarie Dictionary* (Delbridge et al., 1991), the definition of ‘wog’, still classed as derogatory, is extended to mean ‘any foreigner’. I also remember that it was common to call immigrants from the UK ‘poms’, or ‘pommies’, and sometimes ‘whinging [complaining] poms’, especially referring to those whose passages were supported, but usually ‘pom’ was used in a friendlier manner.

In the 1970s, suspicion shifted to more recently arrived migrants from Southeast Asia, particularly from Vietnam and thence, as Pardy and Lee’s (2011, 307) research shows, to ‘Arabs and Muslims, and especially Lebanese-Australians and Afghani and Iraqi asylum seekers, [who] have replaced Vietnamese as the most suspect and despised “others” in the landscape of multicultural Australia’. Pardy and Lee write

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28 *wog* (n.) c.1920, ‘a lower-class babu shipping clerk’ [Partridge]; popularized in World War II British armed forces slang for ‘Arab’, also ‘native of India’ (especially as a servant or laborer), roughly equivalent to American gook; possibly shortened from golliwog; grotesque blackface doll’, 1895, coined by English children’s book author and illustrator Florence K. Upton (1873–1922), perhaps from golly + polliwog (Harper, 2014).

29 *pommy* (n) Colloq. also pom, an Englishman, English [abbrev. of pomegranate, rhyming slang for immigrant] (Delbridge et al., 1991).
that some immigrants ‘seek insider status, by fabricating others as more outside and thus less worthy of inclusion’. For example:

some Vietnamese-Australians attempted to distance themselves from the more recent asylum seekers by asserting that they themselves came here through the ‘proper channels’. When the researcher jovially reminded them of their similar arrival to Australia, they protested that their situation was different arguing that they were ‘genuine refugees’ (306).

Pardy and Lee also find that ‘hierarchies of belonging are in constant flux’, and quote a Vietnamese-Australian woman, who has lived in Australia since 2001, as saying:

I tell you there is a hierarchy here of how you are respected. Aussies and Viets are treated differently. In Myer or Centrelink or other businesses this is the hierarchy—Aussies first, then European-looking migrants.
After that comes Asians and then at the bottom it’s the Muslims (306–7).

More recently, there has been focus on migrants from African nations, who are often categorised, and stereotyped on the basis of their visibility. Kiros—from Ethiopia—says that identity is problematised because of visibility: ‘If you are with a dark skin, it doesn’t matter whether you come from the Caribbean … “African” is easy for people’. He notices that:

When there is something good, which is done by an African-Australian, then the Australianness is what comes out. When something bad happens, everyone forgets that this person is an Australian. I have to remind people in a recent meeting, that this boy is an Australian, not a Sudanese. When there is any issue, then you pick what you want to demonise.

Sudanese people were more than half of all African migrants resettled as part of the Australian Humanitarian Program in the ten years from 1997 to 2007, and constitute the single largest black African group (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2011). Nolan and his colleagues (2011, 660) write that ‘at least some media coverage of Sudanese
people in Australia continues long-standing media practices involving the construction and problematization of visible difference’. Significant in their study is frequent reference to media assumptions of the *implicit whiteness* of Australia as a host country to migrants of *colour*, and discuss views that, by constructing Australia as a white nation, media both overlooks the needs of refugees, and denies Australia’s Indigenous heritage (ibid.). Nolan and his colleagues’ analysis of media coverage relating to Sudanese migrants shows that—in a period of a few months either side of an Australian federal election:

media coverage created a particular set of discursive representations of Sudanese people that portrayed them as visibly different and as the outsider ‘Other’ in contrast to the normalised ‘white’ majority who are represented as belonging in Australian national space. In this way, and without being overtly racist, the media … contribute to an emergent integrationist policy agenda. Further, and resonating with previous media research … such representations also appear to situate Sudanese people as an undifferentiated group that is unlikely to integrate and thereby represents a problematic ‘Other’ (668–9).

Given such attitudes, it is perhaps predictable that the irregular migrants participating in this study—all of whom are people of colour—describe personal experiences of racism. None was overtly violent, but all were unpleasant experiences, and sources of discomfort. Nene speaks of her experience of racism in high school:

I didn’t know English very much, and people around me they said all these kind of words. I can hear them, but I didn’t really know what they meant until when I started college and I started hearing, and also in the community when I hear people saying those words, then I realised what they meant it was actually racist words—like ‘negro’.

Apparently innocuous questions such as ‘where did you come from?’ or ‘why are you here?’ to Nene are racist because of the tone and manner in which they are spoken:
The way of their face expression can tell you that they are saying it to you like they are saying that you don’t belong here—if someone says ‘where did you come from?’ I know they are asking me where I came from, but if they say it like with a very angry face …

As noted earlier, since 2008, Nene has been part of Students Against Racism, formed when a teacher observed that several students who had come to Tasmania as humanitarian entrants were quite isolated, and realised that most people had no idea of their backgrounds (Anonymous, 2013a). With her help, these students began to share their stories through a dramatised presentation, ‘Living in Between’, which has successfully brought about greater understanding, and now has funding to extend its reach into the broader community. The importance of sharing stories as a step in recovery from displacement and trauma is becoming more widely recognised (Bhugra & Gupta, 2011, 3; Read, 1996). At college and in the community, Nene and others in the group had often been called ‘nigger—that’s why we started the group’. Nene says that racist remarks no longer happen much at the college, but still occur in the community and on buses. Now a project officer for the group, Nene says:

Some of them, when they came here, they can’t really speak English, they can only say ‘hello’, or ‘my name is such and such’, and that’s it. For them just to see how, through the group, through that problem, they have developed so much, they have self-confidence, and now they can speak and just be part of the group and connect—it makes them proud.

Shoukat says he is clear that not all Tasmanians are racist, but nevertheless he reports ‘a lot of abuse’ of Hazara women, who are Shia Muslim, and wear headscarves. ‘Racist people, they think … she is Muslim, so she is going with Taliban … sometime they say, “Fuck off!” It is a painful situation’. Understanding that the Hazara people are in Tasmania precisely because they have been extremely persecuted by the Taliban does make a difference, but, evidently, that background needs to be more widely acknowledged.

Khadga described an incident on a bus when an African man was speaking on the phone in his own language, and a woman stood up and instructed: ‘If you want to
speak, you speak in English, and do not use a language that we do not understand’. On another occasion, ‘my brother and me, we were talking in our language, and a woman said, ‘If you want to talk here, you talk in English’. Khadga said he explained ‘We find better understanding in our language than English’, and assured the woman that to communicate with her, he would use English, ‘but we can use our language within our community’. In this instance, it had not occurred to either Khadga or his brother that the woman might be uncomfortable hearing them talk, because she could not understand them. ‘Oh, but we were not talking about her,’ he assured me. Equally, it might not occur to people speaking English in front of immigrants that this might make them uncomfortable.

**The politics of recognition**

The examples cited above are far from extreme and exemplify everyday or banal racism that sees people through the lenses of stereotypes. As Charles Taylor (1992, 50) writes, racism denies recognition of who people actually are, and ‘can be a form of oppression’. David Morley (2000) writes of this as the problematic gaze that might be welcoming, hostile, or curious, and says that a predominant lack of recognition undermines peoples’ dignity and self-confidence. Greg Noble (2005, 110–1) describes racism as a form of social incivility that may include ‘name-calling … jokes in bad taste, bad manners, provocative and offensive gestures or even just a sense of social distance or unfriendliness or an excessive focus on someone’s ethnicity’. Respondents to his study with immigrant Australians and their children reported this type of experience as pervasive (112). Noble stresses that, although less dramatic than stories of violence or threats, this everyday feeling of ‘social discomfort … reveals a more fundamental ontological relation underlying all acts of racism’ (111–2). Everyday racism lessens the confidence or trust people have in the world around them, and thus threatens their ontological security. As Noble writes:

> Crucially, our ontological security is founded on our ability to be recognised. Our ‘fit’ in an environment requires the ‘acknowledgement’ of other actors—human and non-human—that we fit. Our ability to be comfortable in public settings also rests on our ability to be
acknowledged as rightfully existing there: to be recognised as belonging (114 [emphasis added]).

I have emphasised our ability above because discourse on this topic usually focuses on the role of the perpetrator of racism, and does not attend to the possible agency of the recipient. I argue that a person’s sense of self is critical in this relationship—an understanding implied in Noble’s wording. The ability to be recognised, to be comfortable, and to be acknowledged is not passive. It is significantly affected by the ability to acknowledge, recognise, and respect oneself. Noble supports his claims of the importance of recognition with Axel Honneth’s argument that:

the possibility of realising oneself as autonomous and individuated depends on the development of self-confidence, self-respect and self-esteem, and these can only be acquired intersubjectively through being granted recognition by others whom we recognise (114 [emphasis added]).

We are social beings, embedded in a social world, and recognition and respect for each other—intersubjectively—is clearly necessary for people’s wellbeing (Dugan & Edelstein, 2013); it is a relationship actively involving both parties. Within that relationship recognition and respect from a receiving community, including respect for difference, can provide significant support for new arrivals; helping them to maintain and grow self-respect, and engendering their respect for the people and place new to them. A fundamental sense of and respect for self is therefore essential for the full benefit of such support to be realised.

François Levrau (2013, 168) builds on Honneth’s three dimensions of recognition—love, formal respect for equality, and social esteem—and in his view, when ‘recognition is denied, we are not capable of living autonomous and worthwhile lives’. It is generally understood that the degree and quality of loving care, nurturing, respect, and acknowledgement received by infants and children deeply affects their development of self-confidence, self-respect, self-esteem, and autonomy (Brown, 2008; Fisher, 2002; Piaget, 1973; Winter, 2003). However, I argue that once a person has developed a sense of self, based on those attributes, lack of recognition does not
result in the loss of autonomy; an extreme example is Viktor Frankl, referred to earlier. Even when a person is without freedom physically or behaviourally their freedom to think and to choose their own attitudes typically remains.

There is evidence of autonomy—indicative of sense of self—in participants’ narratives. Seeking asylum, as Shoukat did, demonstrates belief in oneself and one’s family as worthwhile human beings, and shows a refusal to accept others’ judgements of Otherness. Kiros’ strong sense of self was fundamental to his refusal to go to a refugee camp; it was critical to his ability to make his own way in Kenya, and to succeed in arranging for himself and his family to migrate to Australia. Although he was shocked by the experience of becoming ‘nothing’ in others’ eyes, and found it difficult to handle, he did not become ‘nothing’ in his own eyes. Kiros believes that it is important for his daughters to develop a strong basis of self-confidence to withstand racist ‘pushes’, such as rude remarks from boys in the bus in Hobart: ‘I usually tell them as long as you know who you are, it shouldn’t concern you, and the more I reiterate that, the stronger they get’.

Levrau (2013) proposes that there is a need for another dimension of recognition, one of respect for individual and group difference, especially of ethnicity, culture, and religion. Countless other authors draw attention to the need for recognition, acknowledgement, and respect as fundamental to ontological security. Certainly, all of that applies both to people arriving in a new place and to the people already resident there. Gabrielle Berman and Yin Paradies (2010, 217) distinguish between two forms of internalised racism, internalised dominance and internalised oppression:

Internalized dominance (i.e. privilege) … is the incorporation of attitudes, beliefs or ideologies about the inferiority of other social groups and/or the superiority of one’s own social group. Conversely, internalized oppression is the incorporation of attitudes, beliefs or ideologies about the superiority of other social groups and/or the inferiority of one’s own social group.
This distinction reinforces the importance of sense of self in handling the challenges of migration on both sides of the relationship. I argue that without a sense of self based on self-respect, people do not readily attract—nor do they truly accept or trust—any respect or esteem from others.

Racism, in particular, and people’s fears and disrespect of others and themselves, more generally, provide evidence of beliefs that in one way or another, something is wrong with who people are, and that some people are better, or worse, more or less deserving than others. This is not the same as saying that some people have more wealth than others, or that they are better educated, or more skilled, or have some other advantage. Racism is based on beliefs about the nature of being human. Such beliefs are versions of the generic assumption that human being is flawed. Those beliefs, in all their variations, are passed on in narratives from generation to generation. They are reinforced socially, including in external memory, involving politics, media, and everyday interactions between people and places at all levels (Fell, 2011). Racism is also a process of self-validating reduction in which attitudes and prejudices that lessen people result in their actual reduction. Because the prophecies of prejudice are self-fulfilling, people’s behaviour begins to fit the descriptions, and the beliefs are proven in the end result. Racist reductivism affects those seen through the lenses of prejudice and results in loss to community as a whole.

It might be said that multiculturalism in Australia is a work in progress. Whatever may be considered as being necessary for its fruition, both old and new Australians will be involved. Early in 2013, a group of recently arrived Rohingyan asylum seekers, in detention in Tasmania, were welcomed to country by Tasmanian Aboriginal elder, Rodney Dillon.30 A Muslim minority group from Myanmar (Burma), the Rohingya have been described by the United Nations as ‘one of the most persecuted minority groups in the world’ (UNHCR, 2013). Dillon spoke to them of Aboriginal history before and after white colonisation, and prophesied that fifty or more years in the future, life in Australia will be different again. He said that

30 Rodney Dillon is the Indigenous Campaigner for Amnesty International (Amnesty, 2013). The account of this ‘welcome to country’ is included here with Mr Dillon’s permission.
the future will be made by everyone in the country, old and new; and that it was up to ‘us’ to do that together. Dillon said that it was important to tell the stories of where different people had come from, and what they had experienced; that building a new future had to start on the basis of that acknowledgment. Acknowledging the original migrations of Aboriginal peoples fifty to sixty thousand years ago, he concluded that ‘we are all boat people’.
9. IDENTITY AND BELONGING

We use the term 'identity' to refer to the meanings attributed to individuals and groups by themselves and others. To an extent identity is created in self-conscious experience; but it is also influenced by forces not of our own choosing such as those associated with economy, culture and the social position and geographic setting into which we are born and then raised. People's conscious experience and the conditions in which they find their lives working themselves out combine to help constitute their sense of what and who they are (Perkins & Thorns, 2012, 1).

Questions of belonging and identity

Like self and place, identity and belonging are imbricated, and that overlap is evident in discussion that follows of literature, and conceptual analysis of material drawn from participants’ narratives. Here, I explore how identity and belonging are understood and interact, and then consider how both are challenged when people settle in new places. In everyday living, problems of identity and belonging exemplify the dilemmas of difference that constitute primary challenges of migration. Here I ask, what do identity and belonging mean to different people? How does experience of identity change with relocation? What makes it difficult for people to experience belonging? What makes being different from others problematic? How do people resolve these dilemmas? At stake is the possibility of revealing responses to challenges of identity and belonging that may increase people’s wellbeing when migrating and relocating.

Belonging is primarily about a quality and recognition of relationships of a person with other people and with places, and in the context of migration the ability to belong is a resource (see also Stratford, 2009). It is not easy to define belonging. Linguistically, belonging is a verb, not a noun, and thus a process rather than a thing. It is also inherently relational; it only makes sense in terms of the relationship of what belongs to what. From the perspective of philosophy, Linn Miller (2006, 250) writes that belonging and identity are conceptually linked—‘the belonging self and
that to which it \textit{belong[s]} has to be in relation—mutually constitutive’. This relationality implies that a change to one affects the other.

Definitions of belonging are obviously not universal; those taken from an English dictionary represent assumptions of meaning in a dominant western meta-narrative and framed by capitalist economic and political relations. Meanings of belonging from this source fall into categories of \textit{relationship} and \textit{right placement}, on one hand, and, on the other, of \textit{ownership} and \textit{possession}. These definitions manifest in divergent views that belonging is a state achieved through relationship, and that ownership of property endows belonging (Rouse, 1995, 357). Further, the words \textit{right} and \textit{proper}, which also appear in definitions, can imply either the fitness or appropriateness of someone or something for the circumstances, or limits to belonging, associated with having \textit{proper} social qualifications, conforming to established standards, and being entitled through having \textit{rights}.

Etymologically, \textit{belonging} comes from \textit{longen}—‘to go, to go along with, properly relate to, pertain to’ (Harper, 2014) and old English \textit{gelang}—‘dependent, belonging’ (Partridge, 1983). In the first instance, human being is dependent on the Earth, on this place—Jeff Malpas’ (2010, np) ‘existential ground of being’. Thinking along such lines, we might begin to comprehend or remember an Indigenous knowing of people belonging to places, rather than a usual western view that places belong to people. Through appropriation and ownership, place has been fragmentated, parcelled, and partitioned into territories (Elden, 2007, 578). Groups, tribes, princes, priests, dictators, and nations have endowed some people with rights to belong, and excluded others from belonging. In the context of contemporary migration, some people are classed as \textit{placeless}—and, therefore, as belonging nowhere. Some assumptions in the dominant western meta-narrative generate beliefs and experience that belonging can only happen in particular places, or with certain people, or with proper rights and qualifications. Evidently, a person’s experience of belonging is qualified by her or his identity.

\textit{Identity} is a contranym—a word with opposite sets of meanings. Used to \textit{differentiate} one person or thing from another, it relies upon a persistent \textit{sameness} (Relph, 1976, 45). Sameness is used in processes of identification. Differentiation is
close to the common usage of self—to infer a particular person or thing as distinct from any other person or thing; confusingly, this often leads to identity and self being used interchangeably. Yet, as Gregory Bateson (1972, 189) explains no ‘class can be a member of itself’—that is, a self may have a number of identities, but an identity cannot have a number of selves—so identity and self actually are not interchangeable. It is important to distinguish between them because they represent different logical levels, ontologically and experientially. Self is the realm of being, and identity is the realm of doing—something a self performs. I will discuss this distinction and its significance in the next chapter, but here draw attention to what happens when no distinction is made and being is conflated with doing. When self is conflated with identity, then, any direct challenge of identity is perceived to be a challenge to the self; that is, a person perceives that existence is challenged. How does that conflation occur in practice? What meanings are implied by that conflation? And, what are the consequences? To explore those questions, I draw on literature, the conceptual framework developed in chapter two, and analysis of participants’ narratives.

Describing identity as ‘always incomplete … more readily understood as [in] process than an outcome’, Michael Keith and Steve Pile (1993, 28–30) see identity as contingent on context, and thus, assert that it is open to change and to reconstruction. Discussing what they describe as a ‘spatialized politics of identity’, they draw attention to a reactionary vocabulary that, politically, is a ‘rhetoric of origins, of exclusion, of boundary-marking, of invasion and succession, of purity and contamination; the glossary of ethnic cleansing’ (20). Although such rhetoric is used to attribute particular meaning to people’s identities, as Keith and Pile (23) point out, ‘meaning is never immanent [but] constituted by the spaces of representation in which it is articulated’. Meaning itself is constructed so that terms mean different things at different times and in different places. As Steve Pile and Nigel Thrift (1995, 49), put it, identity is a ‘fiction which must be continually established as a truth. Indeed the practice of authority is revealed in the moment where identity is considered as a truth and forgets that it has been authored at all’.
The issue of identity seems to be one of authority. Who is it that has the authority to determine any person’s identity? In this regard, Paul Rodaway (1995, 241) writes that ‘the subject is perhaps the location where human meaning emerges and is contested, and therefore [it is] a locus of power’. We give that power away when, as Arnon Edelstein (2013, 146) writes, we determine identity in line with ‘Charles Horton Cooley's “looking-glass self” theory, which clearly states that the individual is not what he thinks about himself, nor is he what others think about him—rather, the individual is what he thinks that the others think he is’. In social theory, attempts to understand the power relationships between the individual and the social world have usually been resolved in terms of concepts of structure or agency. Pile and Thrift (1995, 2–3) describe this binary:

To simplify greatly: on the side of structure, it is argued that circumstances by and large determine what people choose to do—from this position, it is a short step to believe that circumstances determine what people do and that people are unwitting dupes to the dominant logic of the social structure (whether this is named as capitalism or patriarchy or ... ); on the side of agency, it is argued that people make history, though bound by certain constraints—from here, it is a short step to believe that people are completely free to choose what to do, without constraint on their actions.

Pile and Thrift (1995, 50) point out that we ‘should not be under any illusions that just thinking new possibilities for practices of the body and subject will somehow undo the regulatory and oppressive maps of meaning and power’. Nevertheless, as Michel Foucault (Rabinow & Foucault, 2003, 24) observes, freedom from prevailing structures and transformative change are possible; but first we need to question the status quo—to develop questions that constitute ‘the point of problematisation and the specific work of thought’. As long as we do not even think about how or by whom our identities are determined, we externalise authority, and remain relatively powerless to effect change. If we do not critically question, but simply accept prevailing meta-narratives—the social determinations of meaning—then we govern ourselves and others with those narratives even as we may rail against them.
Of the participants, Kiros and Shoukat provide strong examples of agency in extreme situations. Kiros challenged the view that the social identification of himself and his family in Kenya meant that they would have to go to a refugee camp. Instead, he saw himself as capable of providing for his family perhaps even outside of hegemonic structures, and he found ways to do that. Kiros describes identity as ‘an interaction between what you think you are and what others think you are’; significantly, he assumed agency in his interactions in Kenya. A further and pertinent example is the naming of asylum seekers, of whom Shoukat is one, as boat people or illegals who have no rights. These are people who flee from persecution and oppression because they refuse to accept being identified by others as deserving of such treatment. The fact that they seek asylum demonstrates that they identify themselves as entitled to fundamental human rights.

Amongst others, Jon Austin (2005a, 7) writes that identity is frequently used to denote identification, ranging from ‘what we produce and wear, key-in or display’ to legal documents attesting to who we are; a ‘surface-level labelling of each of us as individuals’. Thus, identification distinguishes difference from one individual to another, yet that is achieved by labelling what is consistent or the same in an individual. For example, in order to confirm identity, a person needs to look like the photo in her or his passport, use the same signature, and have the same fingerprints. Perhaps the form of identification most fundamental to human experience is naming:

Human beings across cultures and across history have named themselves, both as communities and as individuals, and have denied names—and hence ‘real’ subjectivity—to slaves and other non-people. So an important precondition for being truly human is having a name which denotes an identity that is distinct from everyone else (Danaher et al., 2000, 127).

It is not enough to have a name—it needs to be recognised by others. Populations are governed and controlled by mechanisms of identification that come within ‘Foucault’s notion of the politics of calculation’ (Elden, 2007, 578). At a time of perceived increased threats to international security, Rolan Danreuther (2007, 102) asserts that ‘there are legitimate reasons why developed countries feel distinctly
challenged and even threatened by the trends in international migration’. Without acceptable identification people seeking asylum, like Shoukat, can find themselves stripped of rights and protections. They can be locked up because they cannot prove their names or other aspects of their identities. Governments set policies to determine whether or not asylum seekers will be identified as genuine refugees or as illegals. In this regard, Lynn Staeheli (2008, 563–4) writes that ‘In the context of the politics of recognition, the individualism of liberalism blinds it … individuals are responsible for their own fates. In the extreme, there is no political claim to social justice that can be made under these conditions’. However, governments, their policies, and mechanisms of enforcement are influenced by, and ultimately subject to, composites of individual people’s thoughts and behaviours—which might be summed as the voting public in a democracy, or manifest as rebellion elsewhere.

People are frequently subjected to persecution on the basis of certain identifications, such as skin colour, gender, cultural, religious, or political affiliations, even for something as simple as wearing a headscarf in a place where most people are non-Muslim. For the homeless, lack of a fixed address—another form of identification—can deprive them of citizenship rights in some countries (Morley, 2000, 26, 28, 33). In Australia, for instance, without an address a person cannot be on the electoral roll, and cannot vote in a government election (Australian Electoral Commission, 2014).

**Identity, place, and ethnicity**

In addition to the sense of place people have through their identification of places, often people also come to develop a sense of self and to identify themselves with places because of their attachment to them. Importantly, places include people’s relationships with attributes and features of landscape, and of natural and built environments; *and* with a society encompassing friends, family, and other people, language, culture, customs; *and* with history, events, and personal memories. Noting that identity ‘evades simple definition’, Edward Relph (1976, 45) writes that it is inseparable from identity with other things, and particularly with place. Yi-Fu Tuan (1977, 194) describes how people feel that their roots are in one place, because they ‘have come to identify themselves with a particular locality, to feel that it is their
home and the home of their ancestors’. Malpas (1999, 177) adds that ideas tying human identity to location have persisted through time and across cultures, and he holds that ‘our identities are … intricately and essentially place-bound.

Malpas writes that sense of self might be tightly connected to a sense of place, especially through memory and narrative. Explaining that self and others can only be conceptualised in relation to place and our engagement with it, he writes that self-identity is not tied to any single location and makes clear that the idea of being place-bound does not mean bound to any particular place. In turn, David Morley (2000, 39) points out that there still is a ‘pervasive assumption of a natural—or originary—world in which people are (or in happier days, were) rooted in their own proper soils or territories’. Morley challenges the idea of homogeneity based on equating a culture with a people, and that people with a particular place, from which flow oppositional notions such as ‘us and them’. Although he considers that such assumptions strongly influence popular consciousness, Morley writes that they are contrary to the ‘actual [movement of peoples] in many parts of the contemporary world’ (ibid.). Nevertheless, people often identify themselves according to their places of origin (Morley, 2000; Read, 1996; Slavkova, 2013; Tuan, 1977; Wendorf, 2009). For example, Carol, who first migrated to Canada at the age of five, still identifies as Scottish, Canadian, and Australian. Carola identifies herself as neither German nor Australian, but both: ‘maybe I will never be either. I don’t think I will’. However, she says her son, who was born in Australia (and has a Turkish father) ‘clearly is an Aussie’. Only a baby at the time of migration from England, Richard feels himself primarily to be Canadian—relating most strongly to the country within which he grew up, even though he has lived in Australia for most of his adult life.

Kiros realises that how he identifies himself has changed since he migrated to Australia. ‘In the old days, if someone said “Who are you? Where are you from?” I would immediately say “Ethiopian”, without even thinking’. More recently, he says he has a new, added identity as an African, an identity he said ‘you only take once you are outside your country. If I were in Ethiopia, no one would tell you I am an African’. Kiros thinks it will take ‘a long, long time for Australians, collectively, to
accept that a person with a dark skin is Australian. Psychologically, it is a big mountain to climb’. In his view:

To change that in, like, one decade, it doesn’t happen; but recognising, knowing that, accepting that, helps. Because then you don’t have to be upset when someone asks you, for the next thirty years, who you are and where you come from. You have only to answer positively, and remind them to change one attitude one per cent of the time. But if you consider that ‘no, I am an Australian, I have my passport, and …’ then that is where the problem starts to come, so you can either contribute to the problem or to the solution.

Kiros says that there are times when it is important to reiterate the axiom that he is a human being, given that some people do not consider others to be so. Kiros also feels strongly that it is problematic for refugees to be identified according to their country of origin because they may have been displaced and lived elsewhere for many years: ‘People want to know the origin, and then they put every assumption in that basket’.

Identifying with a nationality is an issue of belonging not exclusively about place. The word *nation* refers to a large group of people usually associated with a particular territory, to the territory itself, and to an aggregation of people of the same ethnic family. It is important for Shoukat to be identified as Hazara, not as Afghani. He explains that this distinction matters because his country was originally called Ghargistan and renamed by its Pashtun conquerors—*Afghan* means *Pashtun*, and *stan* means *place*—so Afghanistan literally means *Pashtun place*. Shoukat says ‘Afghani means the son of Pashtun. So it is a clear thing. My mother, my father is Hazari, my wife is Hazari. I am Hazara, so say me Hazara, because when you say Afghan you discriminate me’. Shoukat’s self-identification as Hazara is an assertion of the continuity of existence of the ethnic group of Hazara, because of the loss of homeland and sovereignty concomitant with repression and ethnic cleansing of Hazara in Afghanistan. It is also a way of maintaining his sense of connection with family still in Pakistan. Although he values highly the possibility of Australian citizenship, current policy that prevents reunion with his family makes it unlikely that Shoukat will begin to feel Australian.
Khadga is another whose ethnicity is being erased from his country of origin by ethnic cleansing. A major difference between Shoukat and he is that Khadga is securely resettled in Australia with his family; and with citizenship available to him for the first time in his life, he proudly emphasises that he is Australian. At the same time he maintains his Nepali-Bhutanese culture at home, and is active in strongly building the Nepali-Bhutanese community in Hobart.

The wider salience of deep attachment of identity with place, and loss of identity with loss of place is poignantly illustrated by the plight of Tuvaluans whose home is on islands in the Pacific that are fast being submerged by rising sea levels. Carol Farbotko (2008, 89) provides comments from interviews with Tuvaluans:

It can be argued that culture is the only ‘possession’ Tuvaluans have, for it is their language, traditional knowledge and rituals that keep Tuvaluans bonded together and recognised by other nations.

[If we resettle in Australia] we cannot create another Tuvalu in Australia … when we say that the impact of sea level rise in Tuvalu is diminishing of this race it does not mean that Tuvaluans won’t exist. No, it’s the identity, the unique identity as a people among peoples in the world (241–2).

In coming decades, with the projected flood of migrants pushed by climate change and other forms of environmental challenge, further study of the Tuvaluans, and others who may be forced to migrate will raise questions about upon what identity is, or can be based—beyond identification with place and national sovereignty. Hopefully, those studies may further explore what might assist such migrants to settle in new places. Limiting one’s identity to strong attachment to any particular place can be problematic when, for whatever reason, people move from those places to live elsewhere. Sometimes migrants identify themselves with places of origin they keep alive in memory, only to find, when returning to visit at a later time, that those places have changed (Read, 1996). For many people, and for various reasons, there is no place to which they can return. The decision to migrate, the actual departure from a place and severing ties from it, Anna Lieblich (1993, 101) describes as the first
stage in the process of transition; the second is adjustment and ‘building a life for oneself in the new country’.

**Different practices and perceptions of personhood**

An influx of migrants from distinctively different cultures and places can be an immense challenge for people already resident in a place, inevitably affecting the identity of both groups, and changing society. From the perspective of an immigrant, one of the first things needed in the process of resettlement is to discover and find out how to adjust to whatever is different in practice from that which prevailed in their place of origin. This adjustment relates to everyday practices of living—from accessing food and other resources to knowing how the transport system works or how to post a letter—all the minutiae of moving from the known to the unfamiliar. Finding their feet in a new land, immigrants’ attention is likely to be focused on those practical, obvious differences.

At a more subliminal level, the new arrival encounters an environment arising from the host society’s particular ways of conceiving and enacting personhood. Roger Rouse (1995, 352) writes that he is troubled by ‘the widespread tendency to assume that identity and identity formation are universal aspects of human experience’. In modern western cultures individualism is intentionally encouraged (358). If an immigrant is from a similar cultural milieu then, to that extent at least, she or he is on relatively familiar ground. If, however, the immigrant is from a communal culture—for instance based on extended family, clan, and hierarchical structures—exposure to social mores and practices based on individualism can be profoundly disturbing. In a study of Mexican migrants in the USA, Rouse (371–2) emphasises informants’ moral reservations about American individualism, and their critique of the economic and social structure. He observes that:

> Men and women frequently [spoke about] difficulties they encountered in their attempts to act as good parents, given both the greater freedom and autonomy available to children and the tendency of state agencies to intervene in family problems without proper reference to the mediating authority of family heads; men often expressed anxieties about their
ability to act as good husbands under conditions in which their low-paying jobs made it difficult to support the other members of the family and to keep their wives and daughters in the home; and women often underlined the problems that they faced as mothers given the frequent need to take on work outside the home.

Peter Nynäs (2008, 169) also writes that people feel deprived of their sense of responsibility, and experience ‘a deteriorating sense of being a moral subject’ when the rules they are used to no longer apply. In turn, Edelstein (2013) refers to the transition from extended to nuclear families, and the dispersal of families to numerous locations away from traditional forms of support from relatives and elders, shifts that affect everyone concerned. In a study of Ethiopian migrants in Israel, he notes that Ethiopian women generally appear to acculturate more easily than their male counterparts, and often secure employment while men remain unemployed. Edelstein names this gender inequity as a cause of severe stress for people from a patriarchal society. He recognises that such change in function and status of husband and wife threatens the man’s self-perception and public image: ‘an Ethiopian man fears the loss of status not only within his own nuclear family, but also among other Ethiopian men, who may treat him with disrespect, although they suffer from the same problem’ (141). Edelstein attributes the murder of Ethiopian women by their husbands in large part to such acculturation distress.

The aforementioned examples of problems arising when communal ways of conceiving personhood are not taken into account illustrate a further confusion, when distinction is not made between communal and collective orientations. As Rouse (1995, 358) explains, ‘collectivities are aggregates of atomized and autonomous elements, either individuals or subgroups, that are fundamentally equivalent by virtue of the common possession of a given social property’ and they are ‘categorical and abstract’. Thus, for example, Ethiopians possess the ‘social property’ of their common ethnicity, which makes them—in these terms—a collective. Therefore, they are treated collectively, and categorised—not least by being stereotyped—yet expected to function from individualistic notions of self, rather than communal responses. This discussion perhaps goes some way to explain why migrants often
want to form and belong to communities of people who share their cultural origins; it is not just the comfort of familiarity that is at stake, but access to particular moral conditions or milieux.

**Community and freedom of worship**

In his research on resettlement in Hobart of African immigrants, primarily refugees, Kiros (Hiruy, 2009) writes of a ‘honeymoon phase’. He says that on arrival people are relieved at the end of their ordeals, and happy to have an opportunity for a fresh start. Then, days, weeks, or months later, what appears is ‘the culture shock phase’, when worry, confusion, and frustration sets in and they want to go home. Commonly, a subsequent phase involves recovery, making sense of new environments, proactively forging new connections, seeking to belong. Thereafter, there is an ‘adjustment phase’ in which immigrants sometimes defensively protect and maintain their cultural identities and reject host cultures; sometimes they identify with the local culture, and reject families and ethnic communities.

Sufficient numbers in any ethnic community generally make it possible to establish places of worship, maintain cultural practices, languages of origin, and traditions. These practices are common in Australia, and have both positive and negative expression. Suvendrini Perera (2009, 142) describes many suburbs in Sydney where different migrant groups are concentrated ‘as ghetto precincts that operate to encircle, separate, control, and police racially othered populations’. At the same time, she sees ‘assimilationist demands’ as a ‘drive to eliminate spaces of difference perceived as threats to “law and order … social cohesion [and, increasingly] national security”’. Notably, discrimination pushes people to emphasise their devalued identities (Gómez et al., 2009, 1040; Morley, 2000, 168). In like vein, Bhugra and her colleagues (2010a, 300) write that attempts by migrant groups to stay together ‘may create ghettos and increase racial views and stigmas’. In later work, Dinesh Bhugra and Susham Gupta (2011a, 64) also point out that ‘mutual mistrust/misunderstanding can lead to social marginalisation of individuals and ethnic minority groups, contributing to behavioural problems, under-achievement
and over-representation of these people in mental health and criminal justice systems’.

For Shoukat, Khadga, and Nene, it is particularly important to have community with others from the same ethnic backgrounds, and the freedom and opportunity to practice their own religions. Shoukat told me that he felt relief and gladness when he was released from detention and welcomed by the Hazara community in Hobart, with whom he finds cultural familiarity and shared concern for Hazara family and friends still in Pakistan and Afghanistan. The Hazara community in Hobart is relatively small—with only about sixty people—and for Shoukat it was a special day when he first met with them: ‘They did help me to understand very good in Hobart, what is the life, what is the law’, and he was glad to know those differences. ‘In Australia there is a good law … you cannot find any law in Pakistan or Afghanistan’. Shoukat is aware that there are far larger Hazara communities in Melbourne and Adelaide, and said that some Hazara people ‘are escaping from Tasmania to mainland’. Asked from what they were ‘escaping’, he replied that it was the absence of a mosque in Hobart: ‘There is a mosque for Sunni Muslims, but not for Shia—and there is not any graveyard—so our elder people think, if they die, so what will happen with their dead bodies?’

Khadga and his extended family, actively involved in the Bhutanese community, hope that at some time in the future there will be a Hindu temple in Hobart. Meantime, Khadga said they were happy because they were free to celebrate their religion, and ‘my mum, she went to mainland last month and visited two or three temples in Melbourne’.

Nene finds comfort, support, and moral sustenance in the cultural familiarity of the Sudanese community. Going to church is a priority. At first Nene attended local churches, but did not experience the level of comfort in the Australian style of Christianity that she feels in culturally familiar services. Nene says her mother taught her ‘to know God’, and that ‘the feeling of praising God in that kind of way’ kept hope alive while she was still in the refugee camp:
Back home, whatever worries you have, whatever problems you have, you pray, and God will help you, help you to take away the depression, to take away the pain and the sorrow, and the sadness that you have. So going to church and praying to God, knowing God, it helps me.

Recently, a pastor has come to Hobart from the Congo, and he holds services in a library while the community seeks its own permanent church. Nene explains that:

God says whatever has happened to you, you should let it go and try to focus on the future and who you are, so I love going to church, I love praying, I like singing, I’m in the church choir, and I play the keyboard at church.

Freedom to worship is one thing; ready access to places of worship is another. Inappropriate and inaccessible location of places of worship can contribute to marginalising and separating cultural groups, and to social unrest. In regard to civic planning, Leonie Sandercock (1998, 21) writes that such is ‘our fear of the Other … that we try to make them [and their religious and other structures] invisible, by removing them—legally, of course (the law is always on our side)—from our neighbourhoods, our communities, our parts of the city’. Perera (2009, 142) also comments that it is not uncommon for places of worship important to immigrants to be located in places that are considered inappropriate, such as ‘industrial areas, next to waste dumps or in the middle of highways’.

Immigrant cultures can enrich existing cultures, as well as attracting conflict (Bhugra & Gupta, 2011a, 62). Opportunity for enrichment can be lost through indifference as well as rejection of difference, and tensions are created when newcomers are ignored. As described by Sobonfu Some (2009, 172–3), an African woman immigrant in the USA:

longing to belong to an environment that didn’t want closeness and to people who were constantly struggling to remember or know who they were was much more difficult to digest than the distance I felt from the place I called home. In many ways, I found comfort in knowing there was such a place as home, where I could be seen and understood without
having to explain myself. It certainly helped to diminish the bitterness that came with the realisation that people couldn’t care less what country I was from, much less who I was or what story I had to tell.

In Nene’s account, she and other teenage refugees felt depressed and anxious when Australian students ignored them at school. It was not until they were encouraged to share their stories that the general indifference to them began to change. Nene says that she has made friends, but not many are Australian:

I still try to figure out why this is so. I have a lot of friends from different countries. I have a few Australian friends but not very close. And that’s one of the things that we try to discuss, when we do our Students Against Racism—because all these members say it is hard—the most difficult thing that they are facing now, and we don’t know why.

The group members think the problem has to do with cultural difference, and that motivates them to present their program in the hope that it will help them to connect with Australians. Most of them consider lack of common language is a major barrier, and they recognise that ‘we don’t know how to connect with them, and it is also hard for them to reach out to us’. Adolescence has its challenges regardless of culture, but in this instance, perhaps the cultural narratives are too divergent to allow for easy bridging. Amia Lieblich (1993, 107) refers to this as a ‘loss of clarity of norms’, for instance, confusion in areas of gender expectations: ‘How should a young, single woman behave, especially in the context of a possible development of heterosexual relationships?’ Australian teenagers generally take for granted a far more permissive social environment than is likely even to be comprehensible from the perspective of someone from Nene’s background. I asked Nene (who was twenty-one at the time) if she had a boyfriend:

No, I don’t have a boyfriend, because in my Christian belief … boyfriend is kind of not something that you do … when you want to have a boyfriend, it is like you are sure that this is the person—you are going to start a relationship with them and it leads to marriage. It is not like have a boyfriend and after some time then you break up. I will decide it when I
want to get married, then I know that I will start a relationship and I will know that this person I might end up getting married to.

It is evident that Nene’s underlying moral assumptions and cultural beliefs are likely at least to be at odds with those of many Australian young people, and to bridge them effectively is surely a challenge, not only to Nene, but also to the regimes of practice common to her original Sudanese culture. In this regard, Lieblich (1993, 121) considers that ‘one cannot shift one’s sense of belonging without [also changing] values, norms, behaviours and choices’—a significant change to regimes of practice, which may generate a form of hybrid identity.

**Emerging and hybrid cultures**

In the complex process of resettlement, individuals internalise more than one culture. Pile and Thrift (1995b, 10) write that this process is evident among people who will not be able to return to their places of origin, and will need to ‘refashion themselves [by] drawing on more than one cultural repertoire’. Individuals who blend cultures in such ways ‘can have more than one cultural meaning system [and] can move between their two cultural orientations quite fluidly’ (Miramontez et al., 2008, 431). Peter Adey (2010, 25) writes of multiple identities, others describe such individuals as hybrid (Carruthers, 2013; Kymlicka, 2012; Morley, 2000; Pile & Thrift, 1995b; Urry, 2000). Some authors write of immigrants maintaining old identities and developing hybridity rather than fitting assimilationist assumptions (Waitt et al, 2001, 77). Hybridity challenges boundaries, seeks to create connections and to integrate ‘elements thought to be incompatible or conflicting’, and brings about ‘something ontologically new’ (Sui & DeLyser, 2012, 113).

Certainly, participants demonstrate their capacity to move between cultures. But each participant’s narrative shows the nuance inside the generalisations. For example, Nene says she is comfortable because she still has her own culture and another she has adopted, but feels that she is ‘juggling two different things I have to put together to make it work’. Although she feels at home in Australia, she says that a Sudanese saying is that ‘home is always home, no matter what happens’, and she has been told that ‘where you come from, you cannot forget it’. Nene says she would like to visit
Sudan and feel that sense of home, ‘but at the moment I can’t because I haven’t known anything about it. I was only three months old moving away’.

Connie’s strongest identification of herself is as a mother, and she feels that, because her children have both Japanese and American ancestry, she has a more international sense of herself. There is an interesting tension, however, in the way Connie identifies herself. Born in the USA, and holding both US citizenship and passport, she says:

I am American … I have to be something, everyone is something, and I am American, but I am not defined— I do not define myself by that. I can’t say I’m pro-America—it just doesn’t sort of fit. I feel like I had a long relationship with America and they did me wrong so I broke up with them. I feel grateful that I can live there if I have to, but I’m thankful that I don’t have to, that I have another option, so we are lucky that way.

Julian is from England, his wife, Kay, from Australia, and their son, Chris, from India; ‘so we see ourselves as an international family’. Julian sees himself as a global citizen, and says that his ‘spiritual search has been a theme’. He identifies himself as a seeker, based on a feeling he says he has had for years ‘that this time in history is a real time of interaction between east and west, and there is so much we are learning from each other’. Yukari recognises that, in terms of visibility, people see her as Japanese, but she identifies herself in terms of a process of ‘exploring the context of self’ rather than nationality or culture:

I identify myself as somebody who loves to keep exploring, mainly by going past the boundaries and coming back to the original place, and find the bridge, and entertained by the differences, and being creative … the freedom of expansion is coming only from the idea that you are expanding from your original place.

Although Kiros and his family are active in the Ethiopian community, they live in an area representative of the more general population, and with a lifestyle in their home that is not culturally traditional. Kiros says that how he identifies himself is complex—that in practical ways, his identity changes because in different places he
operates in different ways. At the same time, he says his central values do not change. He feels his values shape his identity, and give him a strength and certainty of self that stays fairly constant no matter where he is: ‘It’s like a lighthouse; you don’t change a lighthouse, the ship or the boat will have to change its direction looking into the lighthouse’. He identifies as a human being with Christian values, and sees ‘spirit as broader than religion’. Like Yukari, he concludes that ‘as human beings we have a lot more in common than the differences’.

**Living in language**

Differences in language are perhaps among the most significant challenges for immigrants. From a sociocultural perspective, Joan Hall (2013, 7) locates the essence of social life in communication, and she writes that ‘language is considered to be first and foremost a sociocultural resource’. For a person to learn the vocabulary and grammar of a language new to them is not enough, by itself, to give them full access to that resource because languages:

- influence the way group members view, categorise, and in other ways think about their world. Since different culture groups speak different languages, individual worldviews are tied to the language groups to which individuals belong. To state it another way, if individual thought is shaped by language, individuals with different languages are likely to have different understandings of the world (17–8).

It follows that when people learn new languages, they can expand their worldviews, or at least their understanding of what things mean to native speakers of those languages. This learning contributes to the blending of cultures, and new perspectives can lead to variations in people’s experiences. Fluency in a language affects a person’s identity and sense of self. It affects how people feel and think, and colours how they experience themselves differently depending upon in which language they are thinking and communicating. It is important, also, to recognise that a culture is soon lost when its language stops being spoken. This risk is highly significant for immigrants, especially when their children learn the language of a new country, and forget—or never learn—the language of their parents’ origins.
Participan" narratives provide some examples of these issues of language. Shoukat speaks English and is studying to improve his fluency, clear that English is the language of his new life. He is troubled, however, about preserving his mother tongue, Hazaragi, which, to a great extent, was lost when Dari was imposed as the official language of Afghanistan. He explains that, as a result, some Hazari think their mother tongue is Farsi, or Persian, which comes from Iran, and some think it is Dari, but that comes from Tajik, another ethnic group.

Most of our educated people, they think ‘oh just leave Hazaragi, because it is the language of poor people or third class people’. They think Dari is very powerful language and they can read and they can write. So that’s why most of our Hazari think our mother tongue is Dari, which is wrong.

My genetic is from Mongolia, my language family is from Uralultai; Hazara is part of Uralultai. Dari and Farsi is drawn from the family of Aryan people, which is Indo-European, so this is two kind of family of languages; so how can I say that Dari or Farsi is my mother-tongue? I can’t.

Acutely aware that with loss of language, culture is being lost, Shoukat describes this as ‘a very big disaster in a Hazara’s life, because without any language, everybody is anyone. Animal has no any language. Basically, we were and we are the Aboriginals of Afghanistan’. Shoukat appreciates that Hazaragi is a registered language in Australia, particularly because he believes refusal to register it in Pakistan and Afghanistan is based on racism. His passion to preserve his language fits Tuan’s (1977) view that such desire arises from a need to support a sense of identity.

Jun and Connie’s desire to have their sons become fluent in both Japanese and English was an important consideration in their decision to settle in Japan, rather than return to the USA after their years in Australia. The boys and Connie spoke little Japanese, and they expected this would make resettling difficult to begin with, but they also believe that bilingual skills will give them great advantage in the future. Jun learned to read and write English at school in Japan, but was quite unfamiliar with it as a spoken language, so it was a ‘shocking experience’ for him when he first
went to the USA. He found the directness of the English language very uncomfortable:

In English it is hard to avoid what you mean. I can’t give you any specific example, because every sentence I say in English is more straightforward and in your face than a Japanese sentence. Japanese language is very organic, very flexible. The English language is this subject, verb and object—this structure. It is so mathematical and direct. It was uncomfortable for a long time, communicating using that language, and wondering ‘so that doesn’t offend them'? So, ‘okay, I guess that’s how they talk, so I will learn to do it’.

Part of Jun’s discomfort, he says was because ‘everyone is so different [from] each other … so lack of common sense is huge compared to Japan’. His meaning of ‘common sense’ refers to attitude and behaviour being common among people. A primary example for him is that in a store or dealing with a business in Japan he can expect, and will receive ‘nice service, politeness’, and help to get what he needs: ‘In the US, you never know, depending on who you are dealing with, the outcome is going to be different. With Americans, some people can be very nice, others can be very rude, but you never know—you just have to learn not to take it personally’. In Japan, customarily, people’s communication—in language and manner—is deferential, unassuming, and often self-abnegating. By comparison, in Jun’s view:

Americans brag. For example, they brag about the diversity and accepting differences, but, if you live there, you know that’s not true. Americans have almost regulation dress—jeans, t-shirt and baseball cap. They all have to have perfect smile, they have to have bright white teeth that are aligned perfectly.

Jun says he was surprised at the intolerance he observed in the USA of any deformity, ‘some people are missing their arms or legs … most of them try to hide those things’. Jun feels that he was more remarkable in the USA when he wore different clothing than for being Japanese. He found it paradoxical that, in his experience, people in the USA were individualistic and different from each other in
behaviour, and often ethnically, but conformed in their appearance; whereas, in the far more homogeneous Japan, people have ‘common sense’, but embrace widely diverse and colourful ways of dressing. Jun thinks this might be ‘because Japanese people falsely believe that they are all the same, single race … so there’s no outsider’; and he concludes that certainty of sameness on the inside allows acceptance of expression of difference on the surface.

Having lived in Australia for most of her adulthood, Carola says she thinks in English and now feels more relaxed in Australia than in Germany. ‘I live in English, and that’s where I’ve been in the last twenty odd years’. She feels it has become harder to maintain a strong connection with herself in Germany, or when she is speaking German. ‘It’s a bit rigid … a bit of stiffness in it for me’; and she observes that use of each language brings with it a difference, not only in how she feels, but also in how she perceives herself, and whether or not she feels ‘at home’.

Making home in new places

Learning languages, adjusting to cultures, and putting down new roots are amongst the ways immigrants settle effectively and with wellbeing in a new place. Relph (1976, 38) describes rootedness as ‘a secure point from which to look out on the world, a firm grasp of one’s own position in the order of things’—a desired state for newcomers. From academic literature to personal accounts of experiences of migration and settlement in participants’ narratives, there is evidence that when people relocate they want to be accepted and valued, and to contribute—to belong. If they are not accepted, if they feel their communities are ‘targeted because of their marginal identity and status [then this] results in a particular kind of sense of place, one that is defined by territorial defence aimed at power and control over the quality of local environments’ (Buzzelli, 2008, 172). Buzzelli writes here of a study of immigrants in San Francisco—such marginalisation does occur in Australia, particularly in larger cities (for example, Perera, 2009), but it has not been in the resettlement experience of participants in the present study.

Khadga, for instance, is working hard to ensure belonging for his family and community. Metaphorically, his new roots are growing as he builds a network of
relationships, does paid and voluntary work, and engages socially. Literally, his roots in this new place are also deepening: His two children were born in Australia and the older boy is rapidly learning to speak English, and coaching his parents in that language. The garden Khadga and his father have established in the back yard of the house he is buying has a few small trees, and vegetables are thriving.

Relph (1976, 38) sees having roots in a place as involving ‘responsibility and respect for that place both for itself and for what it is to yourself and to others’. Implicit is recognition of belonging as dependence on place, and of mutuality—taking care of place as well as benefitting from it. Ideally, that mutuality applies to all that place includes. Thus, for people settling in new places a key to belonging can be—actively and intentionally—to establish mutuality with the place, and with the people in it. As Deborah Bird Rose (2009) writes, ‘belonging is not a state of being but a project that is always being worked on, where belonging is about fitting into a world of relationships’.

Kiros feels that social connection is most important when it comes to settling in a new place. Rather than meeting people in a context of ethnicity, or nationality, he sees ‘a need to draw from a wider frame of reference’, and to seek out people with common values, such as spiritual connections (including, but not necessarily religious), or concern for and care of the environment. Kiros knows that many immigrants feel most comfortable settling and building community with others from their place of origin, but he thinks that ‘if people resort only to their culture, then they will be left isolated’. Kiros (Hiruy, 2009, 100) considers that as ‘is an emotional expression of place attachment, actions of place making are expressions of both willingness and determination to belong to the host community’. Within a few days of arriving with his family in Tasmania, Kiros asked people to take him and his family to a church where they met people who befriended them, and helped them to settle:

If you draw your identity from a broader frame of reference, you are more likely to have more connections and it is easier—you are more likely to settle better, to communicate better, and also to feel better for yourself. When I went to the Netherlands it was exactly like that. And it
is the same here. The more resilient ones will be those who draw from the broader identity, not from the narrow one.

Commonly, participants recognise the importance of interaction, communication, and sharing themselves in the process of entering new relationships. Each of them speaks of *making place*—in countless ways creating something new out of what they find, and what they bring with them, making home for themselves in new places. Connie, aware that relationships with people make a place easy or difficult for her to be in, has a clear strategy:

> I meet people and I *position* myself for someone to *rely* on me for something, and I come through, and that person can trust me now, I’m in! And when that happens with several people—neighbours or other parents at school—that’s a bridge to me, I’m part of the community now, and that’s important to me.

Shoukat relates belonging most strongly to direct and extended family, and he *wants* to make a home for them in Tasmania, but current government policy has withdrawn the possibility of family reunion, unless he achieves citizenship when he might again apply. He has been granted permanent resident status, which allows him to visit his family, and return to Australia. He has made one trip, but such journeys are expensive and he earns little. So, effectively, Shoukat is in limbo—‘split between two places’—holding on to slim hope for a future policy change. Nevertheless, he continues to do paid and voluntary work, to study, and to involve himself in community as best he can.

Jon Austin (2005b, 111) considers that home and place have both ‘a physical and a conceptual or imaginary dimension … an intersection of where we have come from and where we are’, and bringing together a person’s history and present in a place ‘embodies, figuratively and actually, our sense of belonging and identity’ (ibid.). That concept fits Connie’s experience of making her own ‘nest’, and using familiar, meaningful things to remind herself of who she is in a new country:

> No one would know who I was when I was ten years old! Nobody knows me, and I feel I want to be known, so my stuff, stuff that’s not worth
anything to anyone else—a wooden spoon—I’ve seen it always, it was in my grandma’s kitchen. It was always there, now it’s here, and it will be there in Japan.

The ‘imaginary dimension’ of place is especially significant to Carol, who intentionally uses her creativity to feel at home, to add colour and beauty to transform a place she finds ugly, and to enrich wherever she is through imaginatively bringing in characteristics and aesthetics of other places and times. Carol says she learned this tactic as a child:

We never were just in the place we were in physically. When I was a little girl, everything was imagined. The ability to imagine something else is lifesaving. So when Dad would take us for a walk, he’d say, ‘okay, let’s pretend we’re going on a big adventure, and we’re this or that’. And off we’d go. So anywhere I go, I do that again.

Carol is clear that it is not about using imagination or fantasy to separate herself from where she is, but to transform her relationship with places:

I always decorate—I’ve done that in all the places we’ve lived in. You know people say ‘oh we’re living in it, but we’re just renting this place, so we’re not going to change it’. I have to change the entire thing, I paint it, I make new curtains, I rearrange the furniture. I’ve got to do things like that, I’ve got to plant things in the ground, make it feel like my place, arrange my things around—that’s very, very important to me.

Carol says she uses ‘individual objects and moments of connection with them as touchstones’, fusing the values those touchstones represent into her present time and place. In that way the Scottish highlands become part of where Carol now lives in the Blue Mountains, imitated by weather and seasons, mists and colours. She has a sense of belonging, walking home from the station:

I feel like I’ve walked into a heartbeat … I can see the cliffs in the distance and it’s wonderful, and I walk along and hear only my footsteps. And I feel like Carol, like gooseberries, because the colour of the trees
can be like gooseberry green, the sky slightly mauvish, and it’s the quietness … I walk down, turn the corner, and it’s not the zim, zim, zim of the city. I just go around that corner and up, and there’s my house across the road, and there’s a smallness to it, a containedness to it, a quietness to it, a slowing down of time.

In this vein, Malpas (1999, 183) writes that the fusion of past and present in place reflects the ‘connection between the formation of self-identity and the grasp of place’ and that ‘as we grow older … past places and things associated with the past, become more important’:

our grasp of the identity of ourselves and others, is always situated within and articulated with respect to particular places and with reference to specific objects and surroundings …. memory, and identity, are tied to spatiality, to embodiment and worldly location (184).
PART FOUR

INTEGRATING INSIGHTS
10. RELATING SELF AND PLACE

I myself attach a great deal of value to the diversity of cultural patterns which variegate the world. They are beautiful things, and the fact of their diversity I feel to be beautiful. The problem, as I see it, will be one of ordering this diversity, not by eliminating all the patterns except one, but by devising patterns of communication which will transcend the differences (Bateson & Donaldson, 1991, 34).

The growing significance of mobility in social life presents an opportunity to show that it is possible to change place and maintain robust and adaptive senses of self and of place. In this chapter, to further argue that claim, first, I consider the production of identity. As noted in chapter nine, the words identity and self are often, and problematically, used interchangeably. There, discussion of issues of identity in relation to resettlement showed the conflation of identity and self in practice but made no particular distinction between them. Here, I aim first to distinguish between identity and self, because I argue that their conflation weakens sense of self. Second, I explore the relationship between people’s senses of self and place and their experience. To that end, I use a model (prefaced in chapter one) of Self-Place Relations depicting strengths of those senses and various qualities of experience. I deploy the model to consider participants’ senses of self and place, and their experiences of migration. This further analysis of participants’ narratives again draws on the case study protocols and the hermeneutic and heuristic approach of narrative interpretation, thus strengthening its reliability. Used in conjunction with an abductive strategy, narrative interpretation is particularly relevant here for recognising patterns over time.

Distinguishing between identity and self

People tend to identify themselves on the basis of what endures, persists, remains more or less the same—and often they treat that identification, that description of themselves, as if that is who (or what) they really are. Imagine what it would be like to wake up in the morning and look at yourself in the mirror, and see an unfamiliar
face. Most likely, it would be disorienting; probably, it would not be easy to reconcile that strange external image with the knowing of self on the inside. It might seem obvious that continuity and stability of identity is critical for maintaining a healthy sense of self, and for effective interaction and relationship with others and the world. In a study of commitment to identity, Luyckx et al. (2010, 52) stated that ‘a well-developed and integrated identity provides a subjective sense of inner unity and continuity over time, providing adolescents and emerging adults with a sense of well-being and self-esteem’. However, reification of identity can lead to many problems. If people feel their identity is threatened by change they tend to try to keep it as consistently the same as possible, which can result in parochial, reactionary, and racist behaviours (Massey, 1994, np) and, at an extreme, in violence or other forms of breakdown.

Identify forms throughout childhood, adolescence and adulthood; it is a mutable map—a summary, and representation, made over many years of ‘this is who I am’. Many things influence that summary, particularly the relationships we have with parents and significant others, cultural, ethnic, economic, and social factors, and the environment. Withal, the maps we make—of ourselves, of others, and of our worlds—are not the territory; rather, they are representations of experience (Korzybski, 1933, 58).

Holding to notions of identity as being consistent over time, our maps of self, others and the world are likely to move further and further away from the territory. Consider what it would be like to negotiate your way around a large, modern city, today, with a map of that place from the 1950s. When we are relatively unconscious of the maps we have made from early childhood of ourselves, others, and our worlds, and we continue to hold them without questioning or updating them, it can be difficult to negotiate present-day living—an experience recognisable in some elderly people. This disjunction or disconnection between the map and the territory might not be much of a problem for anyone spending a whole lifetime in a single place where there is very little change, an increasingly rare scenario. When people function from identification of themselves as if the map is the territory, they associate with that identification, and over time and with change there is likely to be significant
dissociation from self, and thus a weakened sense of self, resulting in at least some degree of dissatisfaction and lessened wellbeing (Dugan, 1991). Such weakening of sense of self can result from the changes people experience when they migrate and relocate in new places, especially if their self-understanding has been based on living in one place and one culture. It can also apply to people living in an existing community when newcomers move into that place, or when there is significant change to the environment.

People are identified and identify themselves according to various criteria at different times: for example, as individuals, married, single; belonging to a particular family, group, culture, ethnicity, gender, religion; having particular purpose, direction or affiliation; holding certain beliefs, being an optimist or a pessimist, courageous or fearful, self-determining or a victim, capable or inadequate; wealthy or poor; and according to behaviour, roles, and possessions. Identity in such terms obviously serves a useful function in our interactions with others, but it could perhaps best be recognised as what we are doing, rather than being taken as defining who we are. If identifications in different contexts are understood as expressions of self, the person’s sense of self is central and likely to be strong. A far weaker sense of self is the result when a person conflates who they are with those expressions.

These dynamics of strengthening or weakening sense of self apply when people label others. For instance, participants’ narratives exemplified what can happen when people are identified as irregular migrants, asylum seekers, or ‘illegals’. Kiros and Shoukat both spoke of ‘becoming nothing’. Shoukat’s report of being known and treated as a number in detention centres is a small indication of the dehumanising process—the denial of a person’s existence—implicit in the way people are often identified through immigration policies and practices. Racist epithets and other negative judgements of people can reify identity of the Other according to stereotypes, and as less than human. When people function from such identification—as if their ideas or maps of other people represent them accurately—there is likely to be significant dissociation from those others, and there is minimal possibility of rapport, empathy, or actually getting to know another person.
By adulthood it is common for people to conclude that they are as they have experienced themselves to be, and that their ideas about other people are probably right, until and unless they question upon what presuppositions, and what practices they have based identification of themselves and others. Such questioning might occur through an intentional reflexive process, whether informally—for example as described by some of the participants—or more formally, in a structured transformative learning situation such as counselling, coaching, seminars, and workshops. Perhaps most commonly, such questioning is likely to be stimulated by experience of major change, especially when the conditions of people’s everyday lives are problematised. The ability to integrate new information and to adjust self-identification has been linked to having an integrated sense of self (Luyckx et al., 2010, 53). That is, if people have an integrated sense of self they are able to incorporate and respond to new information and new situations and to adjust their identification of themselves. But who, or what has that sense of self, and those abilities? Presumably, it is the self, whatever that might be.

It is not easy to articulate the distinction between identity and self that I am seeking to make here, especially because the idea of self eludes definition. Identity is derived from the Latin idem—same, precisely that; it combines the Latin id—it, and entity from the Latin esse—to be, essence, and entitat—yields, so it could be said to mean ‘to be, or yield it’. If the self is considered to be a process of being, then identity might be understood as the expression, or product of that process at any moment, the it that is yielded in any circumstance. This is to assert that the self is always a work in progress, not a fixed thing or final achievement (Taylor, 1989). My concern here is to consider: what difference does distinguishing between self and identity make to a person’s sense of self? If a person conflates identity with self, they do not actually have a sense of self, but only a sense of the limited idea of self that is what they have identified themselves to be. Necessarily, identity is less than the whole, which is inclusive of both identity (the product) and self (the process) by which it is produced. Earlier, I argued that the conflation of being and doing was an example of Weston’s self-validating reduction. Thus, conflation of self and identity is a self-validating reduction. Both conflation of being and doing, and conflation of self and identity, problematise understanding of what the self is, and reduce sense of self to sense of
identity—in other words, to the map rather than the territory. If a person distinguishes between identity and self, then their sense of self is centred in their ability to learn and change and grow, and to express and identify themselves variously.

Findings in the case studies support the idea that when sense of self includes distinction between identity and self there are several important outcomes: First, people experience greater resilience, agency, and wellbeing than they do if their sense of self is limited to identity. Second, their sense of place is also affected because they are more open and responsive with a more active sense of self than with a fixed idea of themselves. Third, an integrated sense of self makes a significant difference to the quality of their experiences of migration and settlement in new places, and to their handling of these transitions—because they are more able to take in new information, to adapt, and to adjust. Examples of the participants’ experiences from which I draw these findings have been given throughout this dissertation. Further analysing the participants’ narratives, I examine the effect of the strength or weakness of their senses of self and place on the quality of their experiences.

**Senses of self and place, and qualities of experience**

There are all kinds of variations in how—and in the degree to which—people experience sense of self and sense of place that relate to a range of existential qualities. Although there are studies of human consciousness from many perspectives, for example, as initiated by the Institute of Noetic Sciences (2014), I am not aware of any method that has been developed for quantitative measurement of the strength or weakness of senses of self and place. These sensibilities are individually experienced and subjectively described yet it is possible to recognise and validate them in people’s experiences, and to observe and assess how they correspond with people’s behaviour. The model of Self-Place Relations shown in Figure 1\(^3\) below maps a range of experiences in quadrants formed by axes of senses of self and place. In chapter one, I described how, first, I hypothesised this model and then developed it both as a mode of analysis and as a theoretical finding.

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\(^3\) A developmental version of this model appears in *Migration Matters* (Dugan & Edelstein, 2013).
3 INDEPENDENT from PLACE
Identity based on control of nature achievements possessions
Separation from place Seeks to control and change others and places
Takes from place, uses, exploits, manipulates

4 INTERDEPENDENT with PLACE
Identity based on autonomy, capability, mutuality
At home anywhere able to engage effectively with change
Strong agency Sustainable relationship with environment

1 MARGINALISED and DISPLACED
Identity based on powerlessness struggle poverty need for environmental justice
Placeless, homeless
Can be heroic Governed, directed by survival needs

2 DEPENDENT on PLACE
Identity based on location, history culture, religion nationalism environmentalism
At home in ‘my’ place Can be sacrificial
Governed, directed by environment, e.g. place, water, soil, markets, climate

Figure 1: Model of SELF-PLACE RELATIONS
Arrived at abductively, the model and its descriptions comprise an emergent bricolage. The content described in each quadrant summarises experience that is probable given varying degrees of strength and weakness of senses of self and place. I have not mapped lines that would set boundaries between the quadrants. To do so would imply separation, and perhaps polarise from others what is summed in any quadrant. The quadrant form indicates what might be emphasised with particular strengths or intensities of sense of self and sense of place. Each axis—sense of self or sense of place—represents a continuum from weak to strong. The openness of the model—the space between—indicates and allows for the flows or leaps that might track an individual’s movement and changing experience from one quadrant to another. The space between might also be suggestive of how on any day, in anyone’s life, a person might have experience in more than one quadrant.

Correspondences between theory, literature, and the participants’ narratives stimulated much thought about what the model represents. Whatever may be the strength or weakness of people’s senses of place and of self, represented on the axes shown in the model, I submit that the capability to experience those senses is inherent in human being. What we do with that capability, however, is affected by and dependent upon a myriad of factors, not least of which are the conditions of truth and assumptions in meta-narratives that people embody. I am intrigued by the interaction between narratives people embrace as reality, conditions they experience, how those contribute to their senses of self and of place, and what agency they have to change any of that. In what follows, I briefly summarise some of the insights I have gained, and acknowledge that these descriptions or claims are generalisations of my interpretations. I believe these insights offer understanding of dynamics of human experience that may help people to migrate and settle in new places with increased wellbeing. I use the quadrant headings from the model to organise this discussion and analysis of the participants’ narratives. This organisation allows for particular distinctions to be made about the participants’ lived experience, and is not an attempt to categorise them—as their narratives testify, each has experience that can be positioned in more than one quadrant in the model. To attempt to label people according to any quadrant would be to conflate experience with identity, and thus be reductive and limiting. In line with principles of narrative inquiry, I present the
findings that follow as ‘situated interpretations’ rather than facts, and my aim in this analysis is to reveal ‘the meaningful shape emerging from selected inner and outer experiences’ (Josselson, 2006, 3–4). The conclusions I arrive at are based on recognition of patterns over the life course of each participant, which are shown in their narratives throughout this dissertation, and drawn directly from the field data, which includes the interview transcripts and my experience of the participants during those interviews.

**Quadrant 1: Marginalised and displaced**

*Marginalisation and displacement* (Q 1) involves the interaction of a weak sense of place and a weak sense of self. These senses are weakened if a person is displaced, homeless or living in intolerable conditions—for example, in a place where there is danger, disease, lack of water, food, sanitation, medical services—and with limited or no human or civil rights. Sense of self is also weakened by lack of social recognition, racism, ghettoisation, persecution, torture, trauma, and ethnic cleansing. Sense of self is weakened if there little or no opportunity for education, employment, or possibility of improving on prevailing conditions. Such conditions position the people experiencing them as being without value or worth, and demonstrate that some people are believed to be better or worse than others, with those who are marginalised also subordinated. A weakened sense of self can leave people feeling helpless, hopeless, and worthless (Seligman, 2006). It is understandable that people shut down their sensitivity and dissociate their awareness as much as possible from intolerable experience, and thus also limit their sense of place. Nene’s story illustrates conflict between *marginalised and displaced* (Q 1) people in a refugee camp, and the local people *dependent on place* (Q 2), whose livelihood was threatened by location of the camp in their region. Another expression of this dynamic is shown when people already resident in receiving countries resent migrants, and are unwilling to accept them. To marginalise people is an example of self-validating reduction that results in actual reduction behaviourally, and in a reduction or weakening of senses of self and of place. If safety was ensured, and the conditions were improved, might that help to strengthen people’s senses of self and
of place? Would people’s senses of self and of place strengthen more if they were able to participate in making those changes?

Until he was seventeen, when his father and brothers were killed, Shoukat lived in a rural village in Afghanistan, in conditions strongly oriented to dependence on place (Q 2). Ever since, Shoukat’s life has been marginalised and displaced (Q 1). In those circumstances, his journey to seek asylum in Australia certainly demonstrates the heroic quality—shown in the model—that can arise from the need to survive, and to take action to ensure the survival of others. In spite of the fact that, in Australia, he is physically safe and living in materially better conditions, Shoukat still is powerless to protect his family, and in the limbo experience of being in-between, he is placeless without them. His sense of self was strong enough for him to survive the journey, but, in his current circumstances, it is steadily being eroded. In his bid to express agency, and to become self-supporting, his orientation fluctuates between the marginalised and displaced (Q 1) and independent from place (Q 3) quadrants.

Until she was fourteen, Nene’s life experience was marginalised and displaced (Q 1). Her infancy was spent in Sudan with her mother and siblings, fleeing from village to village to avoid violence and war. When Nene was four years old, they were accepted into a refugee camp in Kenya, and lived there for the following ten years. I can only guess what Nene’s sense of self would have been like as a child in that camp in Kenya. She says she felt comfort in being with family, and in religious practice, but was often hungry and thirsty, lacked adequate shelter and basic amenities, and was constantly afraid because rape, violence, and disease were common. By her account, she lacked self-confidence for the first few years in Australia, and felt diminished by her experience of racism; but given the opportunity and support of a teacher, and participation in the group of Students Against Racism, she has blossomed. If dependent on place (Q 2) is interpreted to include strong attachment to culture, then Nene’s experience would fit there to a large extent, but she is also increasingly confident in herself, and becoming an independent young woman—holding a job, attending university, planning future travel and a career that she hopes will contribute to making her world a better place.
Living as a child and young adult in a refugee camp in Nepal, Khadga’s situation was *marginalised and displaced* (Q 1) yet, even with the severe deprivations of the camp, it provided a minimally safe and stable environment (for example, compared with Nene’s experience of the camp in Kenya). Khadga’s sense of self is likely to have been more linked to dependence on place (Q 2), in that his identity was (and still is) based in being part of his extended family culture and ethnicity. There seems to be a direct relationship between the strength of his sense of self and his pride and certainty in belonging to, and representing that community. Support for this in the camp came from the many refugees of similar origin, who also maintained that cultural and ethnic integrity.

Khadga’s self-confidence was such that he managed to go out from the camp to work and to gain senior secondary and tertiary education. He learnt how to take advantage of whatever was available within the limits of conditions for refugees in Nepal. By the time there was opportunity to emigrate, he had taken charge of his own life to a considerable degree. He had achieved some level of independence, and his broader experience away from the camp played a strong role in his ability to organise for his family to migrate. Relocated in Tasmania, settling well, and working towards owning his own home, his self-confidence is reinforced. He is building a life for himself and his family that is *independent from place* (Q 3). In Australia, his sense of place is finding expression as he puts down new roots, for the first time in his life knowing that he and his family actually have and can depend on a place of their own, yet they are not dependent on it; having rights of citizenship and belonging, Khadga is becoming *interdependent with place* (Q 4).

**Quadrant 2: Dependent on place**

Dependence on place (Q 2) expresses the relationship between a strong sense of place and a weak sense of self. It may include sedentarism, which, as discussed in chapter two, can lead to problematical senses of place, and intolerance and fear of different others. A strong sense of place can be about identification with cultural, ethnic, religious, and national background, as mentioned above. It can also be attachment to a place through physical interaction with it and meanings attributed to it. A strong sense of place indicates stability, and awareness of orientation in place,
of one’s place in the world, which can support a person’s sense of self-worth. Thus, a strong sense of place can provide opportunity for strengthening of sense of self, and can be a path to interdependence with place (Q 4).

Dependence on place (Q 2) involves a weak sense of self—based on some variant of the underlying assumption that human being is flawed—and might manifest in two main ways. First, taking the idea that some people are better than others, people identifying themselves with a particular culture/religion/ethnicity in a particular place would be inclined to see anyone from a different culture/religion/ethnicity or place as inferior. Within one place, people maintaining its singularity would most likely be valued above anyone who questioned it, or sought to change it. Difference would thus be perceived as threatening. Second, in this quadrant the human/nature dualism may be more overtly expressed. Sense of place would be enhanced by engagement with and a love of place and land and other-than-human nature. Sense of self might include assumptions that people who cared for place and other-than-human nature are more or less worthy, and people who despoil those things are more or less lacking in value. In this quadrant, ownership of and rights in a place would be important; also having boundaries, and keeping others out. In relation to social groups, experience of dependence on place (Q 2) is likely to be polarised with experience of independence from place (Q 3). Such polarisation can be observed between developers and environmentalists, for example in conflicts over logging or preservation of forests, mining opposed to farming, and global versus local control of agricultural and other resources.

The poverty and lack of adequate housing Carol’s family experienced when she was a small child, in Scotland, was marginalised and displaced (Q 1), but then modified by her parents’ recognition that they could migrate to Canada, where they began to move into greater independence (Q 3). Still, there continued to be an emphasis for Carol on dependence on place (Q 2) throughout her childhood, and into her early adult years. Lacking a sense of self-worth, and often feeling deeply ashamed, she missed Scotland, and found solace by creating fantasy worlds in the nearby ravine. It was not so much that she romanticised Scotland, but valued it as familiar, and as home. Gradually, she transferred her attachment to Canada, and her next migration
showed that familiarity continued to play a significant role in her feeling of safety. In early adulthood, in the middle of a demoralising marriage breakup in Australia, she was not coping:

I remember I would be on the bus and I would just shut my eyes, and I would hope that if I could just shut them for long enough, I would open them again and I would be in a streetcar in Toronto—that somehow I could just literally transport myself out of this place by just thinking of Toronto. I didn’t cope, I didn’t. There was no place in the landscape that I could make any sense of. I hated the flat I lived in. There were some places I loved—I used to walk down to the wharf to take the ferry, and I loved that standing on the wharf, getting on the boat, being on the water, that was lovely—but I couldn’t attach myself to this place at all.

Carol’s early sense of self came across as a fierce determination to survive, and to make a place for herself and her children. Gradually, she took charge of her life, developing a sense of self-worth and becoming increasingly *independent from place* (Q 3). She found ways to make place, not only in different countries, but also in the various places within a country to which she has moved. To support herself she draws on her creative, imaginative use of sense of place. She describes what she does as ‘smelling, touching, physically sensing a place’ to give herself back to herself. In any environment, she says ‘You pull out the elements of it and then assemble it into a story that works for you at that time’, beginning by physically connecting with, and touching something concrete. In Carol’s terms, ‘I’m certainly not dependent on place, because I’d be dead by now, wouldn’t I!’ As she came to understand that she is ‘not defined by somebody else’, her sense of self strengthened. Now, she says ‘belonging is feeling like myself’, and she is comfortable in places where she feels ‘I can claim just me’. In maturity, she is more *interdependent with place* (Q 4). Having strengthened both her senses of self and place, she is open to and engaging with place—she likes ‘to smell dirt’. She says she has a sense of the earth caring for her, and a sense of the sacred in special places. To balance her busy life, she restores herself by gardening.
Julian’s family background was primarily independent from place (Q 3), though there are elements of dependence on place (Q 2), particularly relating to the family’s civil and military background in colonial India. As a young adult, Julian’s return to India was an act both of rebellion—against his family’s expectations—and of independence, suggesting that he was confident of his abilities, and that he assumed that he had rights: to go adventuring, to seek knowledge, and to live in India. His experience in India gave him back the pleasure he had felt as a child relating to the people and places of exotic cultures. During the years in India, his deep engagement with people and place expressed mutuality—contributing to and receiving sustenance from both—and his sense of self and sense of place deepened in the process. From his narrative it is obvious that place, including the richness of people and culture within it, has been of great significance to him. There were elements of claiming independence from place (Q 3) in his moves to England and Australia, but his current way of life predominantly reflects interdependence with place (Q 4).

**Quadrant 3: Independent from place**

Being independent from place (Q 3) brings together a strong sense of self with a weak sense of place. A weak sense of place in this quadrant indicates a lack of deep connection with place, little sense of being supported by place, and a concomitant lack of respect for place. Without experience of a fundamental support by place people may gain and maintain independence through their achievements and possession of material wealth. The project of individualism is engineered, and individualistic expressions of self prevail. Concerns for community and cooperation are more evident, in various ways, in the other three quadrants. A context of individualistic competition produces a need for strong identification of and assertion of the self, and comparison with others, which can be at their expense, or one’s own. If sense of self is based primarily on identity, its strength depends on achieving more and being valued more highly than others, which can lead to high levels of stress and breakdown. With a strong sense of self that is based on a more integrated and holistic valuing of self, people are likely to be less competitive, and to recognise when they have achieved and amassed enough to provide for their needs and wants. In this quadrant, when identity is not conflated with self, a strong sense of self can lead to
greater openness to others and to place, and to altruism; this, too, can be a path to interdependence with place (Q 4).

Moving ‘from pillar to post’ as a child, Connie cannot quite be described as either marginalised or dependent on place. Growing up in the USA, and strongly pushed by circumstances to stand on her own feet, she developed individualistically, and wanted to travel as ‘a free spirit’, independent of people or particular places. However, since meeting Jun, her relationships with others are most important to her. Her immediate family comes first, and she likes to be recognised as a mother and as a contributing member of community. Rejecting her country of origin, her migration to Japan is driven more by a desire to move away from the USA than towards Japan. Possibly, this desire indicates some level of unfinished business in relation to some dependence on place (Q 2), which also strongly motivates her to take control and adjust the new place to suit her preferences. Connie says that she needs to know what to expect, and was pleased when planning to move to Japan to anticipate that—as she had previously experienced—service, for example from tradespeople or shopkeepers, would be reliable and predictable. Although somewhat nervous about having to become fluent in Japanese, she was determined to do that quickly. Contributing is important to her, but a component of it is to have others rely on her, to ensure their acceptance of her, and to give her access to reciprocal community support. At this stage of her life, these factors align her with independence from place (Q 3).

However, there is already evidence that by opening to a new relationship with place while she was in Australia, she has begun to appreciate places differently, and is keen to learn from place—a shift indicating that she has begun to experience a greater sense of mutuality with place, opening movement towards interdependence with place (Q 4).

Jun’s history is different, but there is a dynamic similar to Connie’s in his development. In childhood, other family members cared for them both in the absence of their parents. Although Jun is from a culture that is strongly community oriented, he was left largely to his own devices from the beginning of high school, and became very self-focused. His identity was culturally based and located, and dependent on place (Q 2), although his sense of place seems to have been limited to familiarity
with his environs rather than with any particular attachment to place. His sense of self was challenged from the beginning by his relationship with his parents, with whom he had little interaction, and he was afraid of his father. At the earliest opportunity he left home for university, at first in Japan and then in the USA, and set out to enjoy himself. He says he did not want to work, but was interested in music, movies, and acting, and had a great time for a year. Although he worked for the two years he and Connie spent in Japan, when they returned to the USA, it took Jun a year to find employment. During that time, the couple lived with Connie’s grandmother, and Jun says:

I couldn’t have asked for anything better; it was perfect, a very safe environment for me. It was almost like being a child and being protected by my wife and her grandmother, living in this nice house, and I didn’t really have to work; I didn’t really have to do anything. I could just live there, speaking English every day with my wife, and my wife’s grandmother; so my English became better.

Adulthood did not really begin for Jun until having children brought responsibilities when he was in his thirties. Finding his Japanese qualifications insufficient for well-paid employment, he returned to university to study environmental science. It was then that Jun became physically and mentally over-stressed. In his effort to become healthy again, he embarked on a process of self-discovery. He began to take more control of his life, in ways independent from place (Q 3). For the next ten years, Jun lived with his young family in the USA, changing location with changes of employment, and adapting himself to the demands of an individualistic society. His choices, to migrate to Australia, and later to return to Japan, were based on seeking security for his family, and independence, particularly financially. From his narrative, he has remained connected to the aesthetics of the Japanese environment—that he says he sees in cities and countryside, and people’s expressiveness and sense of fashion—but he is not attached to, nor really engaged with place in any particular location.

Coming from a middle-class, British-Canadian background, Richard’s youth would combine dependence on place (Q 2) and independence from place (Q 3). Growing
up, his sense of place developed with confidence in his ability to interact with his environment. For example, he learned winter and summer sports, camping in lake and forest areas; and knew his way around in the city and suburbs of Montreal. For most of his adulthood he has been *independent from place* (Q 3), with focus on supporting his family and developing professionally. As he gained a greater level of security in his ability to provide, and increased self-confidence, greater interdependence with place (Q 4) came into play.

**Quadrant 4: Interdependent with place**

Interdependence with place (Q 4) combines a strong sense of place with a strong sense of self. A strong sense of place includes an awareness of the relational quality of self and place—that is, it includes an ontological sense of place—as well as openness to receiving from and responding to place. With a strong sense of self and of place, experience of belonging is not so much attached to any particular place, but has more to do with people being at home with themselves wherever they are. A strong sense of self is often indicated by an absence of self-absorption, which also results in far more openness to others and to places; and a willingness to take risks to develop excellence rather than defending any particular position. A way of describing this state is that there is neither attachment to a particular place, nor to a particular identification of self. Instead there is mutuality and awareness of a strongly fluid and mobile relationship between self and place, neither of which is fixed. As in all of the quadrants, the degree of strength of these senses will affect both people’s experience and expression of their capabilities. I argue that so long as the assumption that human being is flawed underlies people’s sense of self—and, thus, their evaluation of others—the potential of this quadrant cannot fully be realised. There is evidence in the participants’ narratives of movement towards and experience and expression in this quadrant, as above and as follows.

In childhood, Kiros probably was *dependent on place* (Q 2) but his university years, and time spent in the Netherlands expanded his perspectives. In early adulthood, marrying and starting a family, his focus was predominantly on making himself *independent from place* (Q 3). Fairly soon, his work for an NGO, revitalising land laid waste by war, brought in elements of interdependence with place (Q 4), because
he was involved in projects to make rural areas of land, and the communities in those places, sustainable. The outbreak of war between Ethiopia and Eritrea pushed Kiros and his family into marginalised and displaced (Q 1) situations. Although they survived in Addis Ababa for a couple of years, his wife had no legal identification, Kiros was in trouble with the government, and their lives ‘became a nightmare’, so they fled the country. As irregular migrants in Kenya, support was only available for them if they went to a refugee camp, where their lives would fully be marginalised and displaced (Q 1). Kiros’ response to that situation was to assert a strong sense of self, and he was able to achieve a level of control sufficient to provide for his family. He kept them out of the refugee camp for several years, until they were able to migrate to Australia. On arrival, they were dependent on place (Q 2) for a time, in that they were identified primarily according to ethnicity and country of origin, but fairly quickly Kiros again gained relative independence (Q 3). He feels that he has increased his certainty of self and place, and has come to enjoy some level of interdependence with place (Q 4). He experiences himself as relatively autonomous, is confident in his capability, and is involved with and contributing to community, both culturally and in his university work with environment. Secure in the knowledge that he has options, Kiros says it matters to him to be intentionally involved wherever he is, but that no longer has to be in any particular place. He still hopes that, at some time in the future, he will be able to do work that supports regeneration and sustainability of rural areas in Africa.

It is likely that Carola’s early years were dependent on place (Q 2). Experiencing safety and stability with a nurturing extended family, and ‘everything social—sport, music, youth groups, school, church—in one, small, traditional German town’, she grew up with a strong sense of place and confidence in herself. To some extent, her self-worth was challenged by the difficulties she experienced in her relationship with her mother, but her sense of self grew in the supportive environment of her community and her undoubted place in it. Carola easily became independent from place (Q 3) when she left home to attend university to study medicine, and was involved with other students in extra-curricular training in humanistic and other modalities—‘it was experimental and experiential, and amazing!’ In the stability and learning of that environment for about ten years, Carola thrived, and her sense of self
strengthened. The university was in the heart of the mining, industrial Ruhr area, which Carola experienced as very culturally different: ‘the people there are a lot of working class and very straight down the line’, whereas, in her hometown ‘you have to find the right words … middle class, nice talk, but you don’t know where you are at with someone’. Carola says it was a relief to be with people ‘that talk straight and what they say is what they mean’. She found it relatively easy to travel for study and to work in different countries, but was attracted to a significant difference she felt in Australia. Shortly after her arrival an Aboriginal elder asked if she was born in Australia, because he felt she was very connected to the land. Carola says:

There is a lot of truth in that. I can’t explain that. It is to do with the land. It’s almost the colours of the land—it is not the political Australia—it’s the actual land, the actual place. And that’s got to do with space, just space to breathe, space to be yourself. From my very first experience being here, I could just be myself, and I am at home here.

Now, Carola could well be described as interdependent with place (Q 4). Given the intensity of involvement with people in her work, at times Carola needs solitude to regather and centre her sense of self, and for her, also, gardening and place-making are important balances.

The pattern of moving from dependence on place (Q 2) to independence from place (Q 3) and then to interdependence with place (Q 4) also fits Yukari’s narrative. As a child, she says she felt a mixture of inferiority and superiority when comparing herself with other children. Travelling outside Japan in her early adult years, Yukari felt that she needed to change herself to fit local conditions, and to learn how to be in control of her wellbeing in foreign places. This chameleon-like behaviour applied most strongly whenever she felt inferior in others’ eyes, especially for being Asian—a new identification—rather than simply being Japanese. She came to understand that, while it was appropriate to adapt her behaviour in different cultures, making such adjustments had nothing to do with her value as a person. On the contrary, she discovered that through being open to understand and appreciate difference, and to learn from it, she expanded and strengthened her sense of self. Concomitantly, her sense of place deepened through immersion of herself in many different
environments. Yukari’s sense of self and of place is expressed in her recognition that being alive is interacting and exchanging with place, and inextricable from it in every moment, wherever she may be. Acknowledging that that is a very abstract description, Yukari explains that the more she feels connected with a place, the more aware she is of connection with the planet as a whole.

**Insights from deploying the model**

This model of Self-Place Relations is a heuristic device, offering distinctions to stimulate further inquiry and discourse. It is designed to provoke thinking and questioning, so it is not intended to be prescriptive. It offers a representation or description of types of experience that—like a map—can assist in appreciating and negotiating the territory. It thus serves as a tool of analysis, and is hermeneutic rather than definitive. The model can add to understanding of how factors of identity, sense of self and sense of place contribute to people’s experiences of relocation. Insight can be gained by treating the quadrants as descriptive of qualities or types of experience people might have at different times and in varied circumstances; and it can indicate variations in the strengths of their senses of self and of place.

When I presented the model to participants as a way of exploring their narratives they were intrigued by it, and discussion of the model itself stimulated further comments from them about their experiences. For example, Carol concludes that although she sometimes feels stressed and dissociated in some environments, she has developed the ability to use physical sensing of and interaction with places as a way of grounding and reconnecting with herself. In her view, that is part of what gives her independence from place. For Carola, contemplating the model generated distinctions she made between concepts of place and nation. In her view, ‘the national boundaries, the political thing, divides people, and they are not that separate; we are not that different’. Kiros also considers divisions based on origins ‘are only artificial anyway’, and both see such views as part of interdependence with place. Carola identifies herself as interdependent with place because of her ability to connect with place and make herself at home anywhere. Julian identifies with the interdependence with place quadrant for similar reasons, acknowledging his ability to adapt and relate in any location. As these examples show, the material explored
here, using the model, is drawn from the participants’ narratives shared throughout the dissertation.

Even with the brevity of the analysis given above, what emerges is that sense of self and sense of place are deeply implicated in the quality of people’s experience, and in their assumption of agency. Using the model as a lens through which to view the relationship between sense of self and sense of place in the participants’ narratives enabled me to see more clearly the role those senses have played in their experiences of migration. The analysis shows that when participants’ senses of self or of place were weak they experienced greater difficulty, and less agency, irrespective of the conditions of the quadrant they were in. Conversely, the study shows that as the participants’ senses of self and of place strengthened, they experienced increased agency, and wellbeing. This analysis of participants’ narratives validates the commonsense understanding that conditions and quality of care in childhood affect people’s development and capability as adults. In particular, it seems that early strengthening of sense of place provides support for development of sense of self that can translate as resilience in face of later challenges. It is also evident that strengthening sense of self and sense of place at any stage can enable people to develop regimes of practice to handle whatever conditions they are experiencing with increased agency and wellbeing.
11. STRENGTHENING SENSES OF SELF AND PLACE

By making explicit the forms of rationality and thought that inhere in regimes of practices, by demonstrating the fragility of the ways in which we know ourselves and are asked to know ourselves and how we govern and are governed, an analytics of government can remove the taken-for-granted character of these practices. The point of doing this is not to make the transformation of these practices appear inevitable or easier, but to open the space in which to think about how it is possible to do things in a different fashion, to highlight the points at which resistance and contestation bring an urgency to their transformation, and even to demonstrate the degree to which that transformation may prove difficult (Dean, 1999, 36).

Weakening senses of self and place

In order to respond to the question of how sense of self and sense of place can be strengthened, a first step is to consider what might hold people back even from recognising the value or possibility of doing that. I argue that what people most are limited by and limit themselves with is acceptance of whatever meta-narrative they have embodied. Sometimes people question the status quo, but there is insufficient self-efficacy to bring about change without significant interventions, in which case they may be reluctant to acknowledge that their acceptance of a meta-narrative underlies their experience. When a meta-narrative’s underlying assumptions, beliefs, conditions of truth, and practices are taken for granted, it becomes a self-fulfilling and reductive prophecy. In much contemporary thinking, both human and environmental problems are attributed to the flawed nature of human being. Some scholars hold that alienation of people from place causes environmental problems; others explain that human problems are consequent to alienation of people from themselves. Still others contend that for any change to occur in human relationships with place, people need to address their relationships with themselves. I argue that, at the deepest—and often least conscious—level, people’s relationships with
themselves are based on their assumptions about the nature of human being. Therefore, I contend that, in order to respond effectively to human and environmental problems, first we need to challenge these assumptions about ourselves.

If people believe that being human is intrinsically wholesome, then they are likely to value themselves and their capability, and thus to develop strong senses of self. If people have an entrenched self-understanding of human nature as flawed, then they are likely to disengage from and try to control whatever they assume is wrong with themselves, and thus to weaken their senses of self. Dissociation from what is assumed to be flawed focuses attention on developing what is valued, and sense of self comes to be limited to and conflated with identity. If safety, even survival, comes to be associated with identity being recognised, accepted, defended, and justified, a person’s identity can become reified and sense of self weakens.

Deliberate cultivation of individualism and competition promotes extreme disengagement and alienation of people from themselves, others, and place. This modern, neoliberal project is a version of control fitting Joseph Campbell’s (1988) description of the characteristics of a priesthood—that is, it begins by declaring that something is wrong with people and then stipulates rules for acceptable behaviour; people are held responsible for their behaviour, and acceptable behaviour supports agenda of those who set the rules. Campbell’s distinctions suggest that the assumption of a flawed human nature is not limited to the western meta-narrative, but underlies meta-narratives more widely, particularly those based on religious and other fundamentalisms. It is important to broaden this discussion beyond solely western views, because migration confronts people with others from many and disparate origins. If people meet different others in contexts that assume that something is fundamentally wrong with being human, then whatever is different about those others or in their behaviour is likely to be seen as evidence of their wrongness, and is to be feared. This self-validating reduction then determines the way people are seen, recognised, judged, acknowledged, and treated by others, which further affects—and can reduce—their senses of self and place. On either side of such confrontation, the integrity of the self, and one’s very existence is challenged.
In such circumstances, some people defend, attack, try to control, explain, or justify—and some simply suffer.

What people do and think affects their beliefs, and what people believe affects what they think and do; and both thinking and acting are required for change to be sustainable. People involved in migration are faced with varied conditions that demand changes in their thinking and behaviour. I argue that if people adjust to meet those demands at a relatively surface level—that is, without questioning the fundamental assumptions of the meta-narratives that constitute their conditions of truth, and still holding their senses of self and place as identified, defined, and relatively fixed—then they are likely to find the transitions stressful. Questioning and change in both belief and practice are needed at a deeper level to engender wellbeing.

As I have shown thus far, sense of self and sense of place are imbricated, inextricably and always relating, and cannot really be separated. Nevertheless, in much the same way as when dealing with thinking and acting, or mind and body, it can be useful to consider self and place in turn; always recognising that change in one is likely to involve and instigate change in the other. With that in mind, next, I take up and extend the argument that distinguishing between identity and self strengthens the sense of self.

**Strengthening sense of self**

If people take the perspective that who or what they each are is the self, they can begin to explore the selections of and commitments to identity that they have made. Koen Luyckx and his colleagues (2010, 52) describe the process of developing identity as an exploration of alternatives, and then a commitment to the identifications selected. Their argument implies that the self is the developer, the explorer, and the one making such commitment—in other words, supporting the concept that the self is the process of human capability, and identity and behaviour are products of that process.
Work by Michel Foucault, Nikolas Rose, and Mitchell Dean provides ways to think about and understand distinctions between self and identity, and to appreciate how the two have been conflated. Foucault initiates and Dean and Rose further develop work encompassing relationships and conditions of truth and power, and how individuals, cultures, and authorities are connected and organised in modern society. These authors hold that the self is able to transform the regimes of practices by which the self governs itself. As Dean (1999, 18) writes, we ‘govern others and ourselves according to various truths about our existence and nature as human beings’. Transformation is possible by analysing the practices we have used to govern ourselves, becoming aware of what is implicit—the underlying beliefs and assumptions—in those practices, and then responsibly conducting our own conduct differently. The point at which people realise that they have that capability, to transform how they behave, think, and identify themselves, is the moment when they recognise the distinction between self and identity. This distinction brings into being what Foucault (2003, 54) describes as ‘the possibility of no longer being, doing, or thinking what we are, do, or think [and giving] new impetus … to the undefined work of freedom’. Thus, people are able to be flexible in their practices and production of identity, and they strengthen their senses of self.

To reiterate, individuals internalise the meta-narratives of their cultures, and of other regimes of power, and govern themselves in alignment with them. Freedom, according to Foucault and others, comes with questioning and explicitly recognising the sources of the beliefs and assumptions underlying those accepted truths. How far that questioning goes is critically important when it comes to considering the potential for change in human behaviour and experience. I argue that for any truly significant change to occur, the fundamental assumption that human being is flawed must be challenged.

Logically, if the self is flawed—inadequate for a purpose—then it is impossible for it to fulfil that purpose, and no amount of blame, or punishment, or encouragement can transform it into what it is not. It follows that, if human being is flawed, then there is nothing much that can be done about human behaviour other than attempt to control ourselves and others. Foucault and others building on his work emphasise that the
The purpose of governing the self is not to liberate some better, original, or essential self; nor to transcend the self to become some better other. Rather, it is about knowing one’s capability, and being responsible for doing what it takes to express that ethically, beautifully. To recognise the distinction between self and identity strengthens sense of self. However, to still hold the self as flawed is reductive and limits and weakens sense of self. By valuing the self as the process of being, and evaluating identity as the product of that process—the self’s manifestation in many forms and expressions—people have the potential to improve their own actions, behaviours, and the quality of their experiences. Conduct of conduct, based on valuing oneself, might include doing what one knows to do, evaluating the results, discovering what conditions are needed for increased satisfaction or excellence, and finding ways to generate those conditions.

While belief in flawed human being goes unquestioned, it is relatively easy to ascribe inequitable conditions to assumed inadequacies in people, and only a step from there to have people seek to improve themselves, especially if the alternative is to be marginalised. Such ‘games of truth’ are reflected in what appears to be response from various technologies of governance, in part to foster consumerism, and of which Rose (1996, 17) writes ‘we have been bound into relationship with new authorities, which are more profoundly subjectifying because they appear to emanate from our individual desires to fulfill ourselves in our everyday lives, to craft our personalities, to discover who we really are’.

Barbara Cruikshank (1999, 4) writes that projects to build self-esteem and self-empowerment have been deliberately designed (for example in the USA) to shape the desires of, and secure the voluntary compliance of citizens through technologies of citizenship. To exemplify, she cites the California Task Force to Promote Self-Esteem and Personal and Social Responsibility, which was established in 1983 ‘to solve social problems—from crime and poverty to gender inequality—by waging a social revolution not against capitalism, racism, and inequality, but against the order of the self and the way we govern our selves’ (88). Significantly, Cruikshank writes that assessment by social scientists failed to identify a lack of self-esteem as the
cause of social problems, yet the program went ahead, in essence assigning responsibility for social problems to individuals (92–3).

More generally, in the modern world there is a smorgasbord of self-help books, workshops, websites, and blogs offering ways to improve, develop and empower the self in order to enhance the quality of the human condition, and relationship with place. Undoubtedly there is benefit in many of these, but they are of limited efficacy depending upon what is understood as self. Any self-esteem program that does not recognise or question the underlying assumptions of self—and that does not distinguish between self, identity and behaviour—can deal only with management of experience and behaviour, and thus precludes transformative change.

Within a context of belief that human being is flawed, esteem of self is based on assessing as positive or negative aspects of personality, character, behaviour, achievements, and possessions. For instance, as Brené Brown (2008, xxii) puts it, we ‘think self-esteem. Our self-esteem is based on how we see ourselves—our strengths and limitations—over time.’ Brown regards self-esteem as cognitive, not emotional, and of far less importance than shame, which she defines as ‘the intensely painful feeling or experience of believing we are flawed and therefore unworthy of acceptance and belonging’ (5 [original emphasis]). But what people think of themselves generates much of what they feel, including shame. If people judge that there are more negatives than positives, they are likely to experience negative emotions, and even though the converse is also true, within a context of belief that human being is flawed, some part of the self must always be wrong. From Brown’s research in the USA, she considers that disconnection from self and others is common, and primarily caused by shame (241). In response, her programs teach ‘shame resilience’. Brown writes that participants acknowledge great benefits from her programs, but say they have to work to maintain them. How much greater might results be, if, instead of learning to be resilient about being ashamed, people learned to value rather than shame themselves, and to be healthy?

In this regard, Stuart Hill (2003, 183) builds on a model that each of us has ‘an essential or core self [and] a range of adaptive, distressed, patterned selves (or expressions of self) that are what we have had to become at various times to survive’.
Hill and Werner Sattman-Frese (2008) propose what they call holistic education, various therapies, and body-mind practices to clear adaptive patterns, support awareness of deeper connections, and promote autonomy, mutuality, and conscious caring. Implicit in these authors’ understanding is a view of an essential, core self that is expected—when freed from adaptive, reactive selves—to behave wholesomely. In decades of praxis, I have probably seen some thousands of examples of results from work with people that could be taken as illustration and evidence of the premises summarised above. However, such perspectives still do not come to grips with a clear conceptualisation of human being.

To assume either that human being is flawed or that at some essential core human being is good still defines human being in terms of relative worth. If I follow Foucault’s and others’ notion that the purpose of governing the self is not to liberate some essential self, I recognise that—intrinsically—the self is neither flawed nor good, but a process that is capable of producing identity and behaviour that can be evaluated as good or bad. An understanding of the ambiguity (in the English language) of the word value can point to the problem I am teasing out here. Value refers both to the intrinsic meaning of something and to its relative worth. Intrinsically, something is what it is, and its relative worth is assessed in relation to desired or preferred outcomes. Thus, when self is conflated with identity and behaviour, if the identity and behaviour is evaluated as bad, this goes to prove that the self is flawed; conversely, positively evaluated identity and behaviour is taken as evidence that the self is good.

Earlier, I claimed that if people believe that being human is intrinsically wholesome, then they are likely to value themselves and their capability, and thus to develop strong senses of self. It might seem like splitting hairs, but that does not contradict what I have said above; the self is neither flawed nor good but, as people constitute themselves according to their beliefs, the difference in the consequences of selecting either belief is significant. What concerns me here is to distinguish between what might be described as a generic goodness and the infinite possibilities of meanings of goodness. Charles Taylor (1989, 4) writes of ‘strong evaluations [and] moral intuitions which are uncommonly deep, powerful, and universal’ and links these with
human values such as dignity, wellbeing, integrity, what makes life worth living, and the flourishing of self and others. He states that the self’s ‘orientation to the good is not some optional extra, something we can engage in or abstain from at will, but a condition of our being selves with an identity’ (68). Taylor is writing about what I posited, in the introduction to this thesis, as ‘fundamental good intent’. It is what I perceive to be a drive inherent in human being that moves toward fulfilment of values such as wellbeing and flourishing of self and others. As Taylor has it, concern with these values is not optional, nor restricted to one culture or another, but universal. What problematises this drive or concern is that human values, including goodness, receive variable shapes—that is, they take on a myriad of different meanings—in different cultures and narratives, from the meta- to the personal. Taylor’s caution that there is ‘no guarantee that universally valid goods should be perfectly combinable, and certainly not in all situations’ (61), points to the predicaments of multiculturalism, and of people involved in migration.

According to their own lights, people will do what they assume to be good and right. Problems—consternation and conflict—arise when people’s understanding of what is good and right diverges from that of others. Deeper problems, such as inequalities and marginalisation of people based on racism, arise and are compounded when the differences in peoples’ definitions of what is good and right are taken to mean that there is something inherently wrong, or flawed, in who the others are. Thus, I qualify that the claim I make for a strong sense of self—based on people believing that being human is intrinsically wholesome—requires both understanding and respect for the fact that everyone has an orientation to the good, every person’s definition of what is right and good is unique, and thus, the shape or expression of goodness also varies.

**Sense of self in lived experience**

Introducing participants in early chapters, I considered upon what their senses of self were based, how they developed, and how they have influenced and been instrumental in development of their regimes of practice. Now, taking an overview of participants’ narratives, I analyse them further to show some factors that have been significant in weakening or strengthening their senses of self. Sense of self is complex, affected by many things, and I am not aiming with these examples either to
simplify or universalise it. Each person is distinctive and participants have developed their senses of self to varying degrees and in unique ways. Nevertheless, their narratives reveal patterns and provide insights that contribute to understanding how they have strengthened their senses of self.

Participants felt that their senses of self were most weakened by shame, self-doubt, low self-esteem, fear of being unable to cope, rejection, lack of recognition and respect from others, and others’ negative judgements of them. Paradoxically, events or circumstances that they experienced as being difficult or stressful stimulated them to strengthen their senses of self. Commonly, even in hard times, they mostly persisted in believing that they were capable of dealing with whatever challenges, or demands life presented, although sometimes they felt (and at times actually were) without agency to change external conditions. Difficulties confronted them with what they perceived as their strengths and weaknesses; and gave them opportunities to become more aware of and to question assumptions and meanings underlying their experiences and responses to events. For instance, Carol’s sense of self is embedded in fulfilling what she believes is her ‘duty to use what you have been given’. Carol believes that she has ‘got brains’, and says she uses them to challenge every assumption, every belief—including her own—and to challenge her honesty and motivations. Her approach to life is to ‘give it a full run, put everything into it, no bullshit!’ As a result she has developed a deep self-trust, and a trust in her ability to learn through her body and through her senses. Carol’s sense of self is reflected in her summary: ‘You can count on everything going wrong, but what you can also count on is that you are creative enough to figure your way out’.

Major challenges for Carola came with her choice to migrate to Australia. At first, she was not allowed to practice medicine until she was re-examined. Carola soon did the written exam but had to wait many months to do the clinical exam. She said it was very difficult because, ‘it’s like you have to do a driving test but you’re not allowed to drive for a year’. It deeply challenged her identity, ‘taking the ground out from under me—being a doctor, working with children—this is what I do’. Then, having passed the clinical exam, the next step was supervised training. Rather than working in paediatrics, which was her specialty, Carola was sent to a drug and
alcohol ward and an AIDS unit. She says her sense of self strengthened when she stopped attaching it to her identity as one or another kind of doctor, accepted herself just as she was, and valued her capability to come through times of stress. At some stages in their lives, all the participants experienced that they strengthened their senses of self whenever they accepted themselves as they were, and valued their capabilities, even though there was a vast difference in the conditions with which, for example, regular and irregular migrants had to deal.

Significantly, their narratives show that when participants have contributed to others in some way, their senses of self have strengthened. In praxis, I have found that when people feel they make no contribution to others, or their worlds, they may value their possessions or their achievements, but they do not place much value in themselves. There is not always a clear moment in time when it could be said that a participant’s valuing and sense of self shifted, but, retrospectively, it is possible to see patterns. Carol’s sense of self-worth grew through her work to establish Canada’s first provincial day-care centre for unwed mothers. Yukari expanded her sense of self when she became involved in environmental activism, and then working with healing modalities. Julian’s sense of self deepened and grounded during his years of health community work in India, and as a teacher. There are examples in the narratives of all participants. To me, the most poignant is in Shoukat’s account.

Like Shoukat, most people who brave a boat journey in search of asylum do so in a desperate attempt to save their families from persecution, but in detention they can do nothing. As Amnesty International (Amnesty, 2010, 2–3) testifies, ‘detention is proven to have significant impacts on people’s mental health, in particular for those with torture and trauma experiences’; people who might otherwise recover from trauma and torture are further traumatised by long periods of detention (for example, Bhugra et al., 2010; Bhugra & Gupta, 2011; van der Kolk et al., 2007). There are high levels of distress—anguish, fear, depression, hopelessness—resulting in diminished ability to cope, self-harm, and suicide. There is no end date to this mandatory detention, nor boundary to the powerlessness people experience. Shoukat was relatively fortunate, because he was only in detention for one year, and, even though he still suffers, in some ways he felt his sense of self was strengthened by the
fact that he had survived. Within months of his release, as well as working part-time and studying to qualify for work in aged care, Shoukat became a voluntary bi-cultural worker for Red Cross, and he is active in the Hazara community. These activities contribute to his sense of self, and in spite of his difficulties Shoukat feels that doing these things affirms his value as a human being.

Nene changed from being morbidly afraid to having a confident sense of self that continues to grow as she works with other young humanitarian refugees against racism. And recall Kiros’ story, which shows a sequence of contributions from when he was a boy, and walked from village to village to teach younger children. As an adult he taught at university, then worked with reclamation of community and land devastated by war, all of which built his sense of self prior to his becoming a refugee. In Kenya, Kiros had no rights and no support for his family. At that point, with loss of identity and status, he knew that in others’ eyes he had become of no account. At first he felt himself to be nothing, but the need to survive called on his belief in himself, and on the flexibility and capability he had already developed. His sense of self strengthened further when work he found to do with refugee agencies also supported others.

The desire to contribute to community is typical of irregular migrants. I have heard comments that these people want to contribute because they are so grateful to have been granted asylum. Taking participant examples, irregular migrants are certainly grateful, but their contribution expresses cultural values that are centred in being part of and building community in the place where they now live. Critiquing changes in multiculturalism in Australia, Val Colic-Peiker (2011, 583) comments on possibilities of such cultural values contributing to society and writes that:

there is an increasing disenchantment with competitive individualism that dominates English-speaking societies. Questions are increasingly asked about whether competitive individualism contributes to the common good, enriches the social capital, aligns with the preservation of the natural environment and advances the quality of life.
In the course of this study, I compared the narratives of participants from individualistic backgrounds with those from communal cultures. Those raised in societies dominated by competitive individualism, to one degree or another, struggled to discover and define who they are, and in growing their senses of self they found deep values, including contribution and community. Those raised in communal cultures did not seem to have a question about self in the same way—they knew who they were because of the group and culture within which they grew up as an integral and contributing part. Living in a western society demands that they adopt an individualistic way of interacting, at least to some extent, and in my assessment, Nene, Khadga, and Kiros appear to have achieved that fairly comfortably. Jun and Yukari, from Japan, seem to have embodied something of both. In part, that could be attributed to their experience of living for considerable periods in western countries. It might also reflect introduction of individualistic, western narratives to Japanese culture begun with occupation by the USA since the Second World War. These conclusions are tentative, and suggest directions for future studies.

**Strengthening sense of place**

Arguably, sense of place cannot exist without a sense of the self who is sensing the place—a concept that draws attention to the inextricable, relational nature of these senses. As Jeff Malpas (2008, 52) explains, our primary ontological awareness is so enmeshed in a world of which we are part that at first there is no sense of being separate from it. Subsequent awareness of ourselves as singular is essential to ordinary functioning, even while place remains the existential ground of our being. However, it is not necessary to so shut off awareness of place that we experience ourselves as separate from it. Awareness of the relational nature of people and place is evident in many accounts of people’s experience; and is present in reports of Indigenous knowledge and practice when people live in traditionally cultural ways, and in retelling of Indigenous life in the past (Abram, 1996; Bateson, 1979; Campbell, 1968; Four Arrows, 2012; Koya & Alo, 2011; Some, 2009; Suzuki & Knudtson, 1992). Other people lose that relational awareness, come to feel themselves to be separate and even alienated from place, and in that process both their senses of self and of place weaken. As noted earlier, such loss can occur during
the course of a person’s life because of disruptive and dissociative effects of major changes to places, environmental disasters, and migration and other mobilities. Those, however, are not the only factors that weaken senses of place.

Sense of place is affected by the early relationships children have with place, and the quality of nurturing and relationship they have with primary carers. If those early relationships are compromised by lack of care, as Andy Fisher (2002, 73) explains, children begin to desensitise themselves to cope—‘we lose bodily feeling and blot out our perception of a hurtful world’. It is a physical and psychological shutting off, or ‘freezing’ of sensitivity. As Fisher writes:

The meaning that children almost invariably make out of their abuse is therefore that they must be bad, inadequate, wrong, useless, unimportant, and so on for others to be so mistreating them. Their creative adjustment is to blame themselves (74).

The self exists to the extent that we respond to and maintain our own process of felt interaction with the world. Where our lives are frozen this process of experiencing is missing—and thus so are we. We feel alien to ourselves, disorganized, out of it; the center does not hold (75).

Overt mistreatment of children is not the only form of abuse—as we might ordinarily define that word. I argue that there is similar abuse in the practices of any meta-narrative that assumes human being is flawed. Recall discussion above, that the deliberate cultivation of individualism and competition promotes extreme disengagement and alienation of people from themselves, others, and place. I see this disengagement and the desensitisation described above as grounds to propose that for alienation of people from place to be addressed first we need to address alienation of people from themselves.

Speculating about what might be needed for ‘healing the split between planet and self’, Deborah Du Nann Winter (2003, 264) writes that the ‘basic principle to be drawn … is that our ordinary experience of ourselves as separate autonomous beings is incomplete and inaccurate. Recognizing our embedded role in the larger ecosphere will require a perceptual shift … and/or a shift in consciousness’. In like vein, I
contend that to be open to fully experience sense of place it is necessary to challenge ideas that the human and natural are binary categories. Interested in how an ecological worldview promotes personal change, Mitchell Thomashow (1995, 15) designed methods to help people to connect experientially with sense of place; these include a sense of place meditation to cultivate awareness, ‘to slow down for a while and cherish the surroundings’; and other experiential exercises exploring and mapping built places and landscapes. Freya Mathews (2005, 53) also writes about being present wherever we are—city or country, ugly place or beautiful—opening awareness of the relationality of being in place, and living in a way that is engaged with place, ‘adapting oneself to the immediately available’. Significantly, for approaches to deepening or strengthening sense of place to be effective, people need to be able to feel—sensorially, emotionally, consciously.

**Sense of place in lived experience**

Although such modes of strengthening sense of place as above may be useful for immigrants at some point in time, they are not usually a priority. First, immigrants have to orient themselves. Each place embraces so much: there is terrain, the land itself and the way it is configured, its topography, its climate; the plants that grow there, trees and shrubs and flowers and foods; the animals and birds, domesticated and wild. There are cities and towns, large buildings and small, various forms of housing; services and amenities; transport. There are governing bodies and other institutions, hospitals, medical facilities, churches, post offices, prisons, police. There are shops and markets, food, clothing, and other commodities, restaurants, and hotels. There are civic features, monuments and parks, places of entertainment, sports grounds. There are people of all ages and many descriptions, and all the networks and connections amongst them, and from them and the place to others in other places. There are local mores and customs; economic, political, and cultural geographies, rights and responsibilities; perhaps a plurality of cultures, religions, languages; forms of education, varieties of work and professions. Immigrants have to contend with all these factors, and more.

Even for migrants arriving from places of similar background there are challenges of orientation, to find their way around, and begin to connect and relate. Fluency in the
primary language is a huge advantage, although there still are differences in accent and vernacular expressions. People migrating from places that are vastly different can find the new place shocking, physically, emotionally, and morally. People from hot countries can suffer from the cold—in Hobart’s winter, for instance, Nene is adjusting, but says her mother suffers badly, because her knees were injured in the years of homelessness. Coming from Canada, Richard and Carol found the heat in Sydney’s summer appalling. Often there is deep loneliness, and sense of loss—of family, friends, identity—of all that is familiar, as in Shoukat’s story, for example. Finding others of similar origin is important, places of worship, even familiar foods. Their initial experiences provide the base for immigrants’ senses of the new place, and the meanings they begin to give to it. Availability of supportive services is important, and recognition by those resident in the new place, or lack of it, plays a significant role.

Most meaningful in participants’ narratives are not peak experiences or side trips to places named as sacred—although both those are there—but the *everydayness* of their senses of place. Much that relates to participants’ senses of place has already been examined in chapters covering their experiences of migration and resettlement. In this final analysis, I aim to draw insights from their practices and beliefs to underline what may be useful to others in transition; and to reflect on the primary question: how, in conditions of migration, might we engender wellbeing, providing opportunity for both people and place to flourish?

Above, I noted that one of the ways participants describe that they strengthen sense of self is by accepting themselves as they are. Similarly, they begin to strengthen their sense of a new place when they accept that the new place is where they are. The narratives showed differences in participants’ experience if they were forced to migrate, or chose to relocate. Early in the process of accepting where they were, commonly they compared the new places with their places of origin; then realised that wishing and imagining they were elsewhere did not help them to settle, but blocked awareness of the place they were in. Part of accepting being in a new place was to let go of hankering for some place else. Several of the participants felt that being told by local people that they were ‘so lucky to be here’ did not help. Neither
was it helpful to be told that they ‘should love’ some aspect or other of their new
environment.

At a time of dealing with loss, being able to share fond memories of their places of
origin was an important part of making the transition to settle in new places. The act
of sharing meant that their memories of other places were included in their
experience of the new place, thus lessening the feeling of loss. The transition to
establish a new home sometimes involved trying to make the new place like the old
one. Making a conscious choice to be in the new place, and to make it home,
facilitated their ability to adjust and settle. For example, knowing that they had come
to Tasmania by choice meant that Khadga and Kiros and their families arrived eager
to learn about their new place and to establish their homes. What helped the irregular
migrants most was coming to realise that they were safe, which—for people who
have been very traumatised—takes time. These participants were strongly motivated
to establish themselves and grateful for opportunities especially of education,
employment, and for their families to flourish.

For some participants, strengthening sense of place occurs primarily through the
relationships they build with people. Others grow their sense of place mostly through
relating to features of the environment, and to other than human life. All their
narratives showed that the most important factor was interacting with the new place.
Whatever their differences, in common participants strengthened their sense of a new
place by becoming familiar with it, normalising their interactions with it, finding
individual ways to be comfortable. Some did that by exploring, locating their
immediate surroundings in wider environs. Others needed to identify and establish
boundaries. Carol says that when she first came to Australia she was disturbed
because there was no boundary between inside and outside. Explaining how
‘elements of the landscape have an effect on our psyche’, she says that in Canada the
extreme cold of winter dictates a boundary between inside and outside:

> When we go outside we get ready for the elements, putting on our clothes
and our boots and all those sorts of things. But we also get
psychologically ready, and that is particularly for women. Most women
in Canada wear full makeup always; before they go out the door—so
your personality changes, you have your inside person and your outside person.

Carol found ways to settle by giving a positive meaning to what was unfamiliar, for instance by deciding that a lack of boundaries gave her the freedom to be herself wherever she is. She recognises in herself a proclivity to perceive or explain experience in a new place by reference to the old one—she explained this was like painters in early colonial Australia and Canada, who looked through eyes still attuned to English countrysides and painted landscapes distorted by that perception. So Carol consciously uses her acute curiosity to deepen her sense of place, intentionally opening her eyes and all her senses to know place through bodily awareness:

You can’t get to know a cockatoo by comparing it with another bird. You just have to really want to know, ‘What is a cockatoo?’ Look at the colour of the sky, the light, embrace it on its own terms, and don’t try to interpret it. I think it’s just that if you spend long enough in a landscape, you begin to see, your body begins to see and it begins to differentiate things. So I think that’s part of how we come to terms with it.

Again similar to how participants strengthen their senses of self, they strengthen their senses of place by contributing to the places they are in—for instance, taking food to share at a school or sports event, responsibly disposing of waste, buying locally, getting to know the neighbours, and gardening. Gardening is particularly important to them, discovering what grows, and the timing of planting and harvest, attuning to climate and seasonal changes, growing fresh vegetables and herbs, eating what is in season. Commonly, the participants speak of mutuality between themselves and their places of living; for instance, Yukari considers that each place calls her to respond to it differently—from the highly technological environment of Tokyo to her small village house in Guatemala, where modern conveniences are almost completely absent. As well as learning to know the place, in that relating she becomes aware of new aspects of herself. Through that experience she expands her sense of self, her sense of particular places, and deepens her ontological sense of place. Yukari says she understands belonging as a feeling and quality of relating, and thus, for her
belonging is not about transferring attachment from one place to another, but opening herself to interact and relate as fully as she can wherever she is. Mostly, participants’ narratives demonstrate practical methods for relating to a place, how to apply sense of place to become familiar with and settle somewhere new. But, also their narratives show that a more ontological sense of place underlies that practical ability, and some of the participants are more aware of it than others. Carola describes ‘a mutual taking care of’; place embraces her family home and its neighbourhood, the hospital where she works, the city and rural areas from which her patients come, the women’s soccer team in which she plays, the school her son attends, her garden and a community garden—and the land itself. Carola says that, place—encompassing all those expressions—is the home that nurtures her.

At the same time I take care of it, and by doing that it becomes mine. So I make a physical connection. If I didn’t have a choice of where I would be, then, for me the place is part of the planet. It’s almost like, then, you just go a lot deeper into the place, and it becomes irrelevant exactly where you are. I imagine roots down into the ground, making it deeper, right to the core if I need to; right into the earth, and then that for me is ‘I am here’.

**Vital sensibilities**

Overall, participants’ narratives show just how important and processual sense of place and sense of self are to the wellbeing of people migrating and resettling in new places. Analysis of their narratives makes clear the interaction and relationality of sense of self and sense of place, and the difference in the quality of their experiences when these senses have been weak, and when they have been strong. All the narratives demonstrate that weakening one of those senses weakens the other, and strengthening one of them encourages strengthening of the other. They are not really separable. In regard to sense of place, this dynamic is most obvious in the stories of the irregular migrants: once they felt safe and sustained in new places, their confidence in themselves, and their senses of self strengthened. It is evident in all the narratives that a strong sense of self has helped participants to come to terms with
new places, to believe in their ability to handle the challenges, to interact and contribute, to develop and strengthen their sense of a new place—to feel that they have autonomy and to establish new belonging. In other words, strong senses of self helped them to develop regimes of practice conducive to settling well and minimising difficulties.

Participants have most undermined themselves and weakened their senses of self and place when they have doubted themselves, felt they lacked worth, and held back from interaction with people and place. Conversely, they have strengthened those senses when they have stayed true to what is most important to them—to what they most value; which aligns with Taylor’s (1989, 34) assertion that we ‘are selves only in that certain issues matter for us. What I am is essentially defined by [what has] significance for me’. Participants’ values are those highly abstract, significant qualities or desired experiential states that have motivated their choices and behaviours. With all the range of meanings they give to those values, whatever their backgrounds, in common they value family, community, humanity, participation, contribution, beauty, capability, flexibility, learning, respect, and self-worth. To illustrate just two of these, in regard to place, Carola advocates: ‘Look for something beautiful, and it can be really small. It can be in the dirt. Really look in the environment for something beautiful and then you can be there, and there is always something there. You make it your home’. And in regard to self, Kiros believes:

Everyone has a worth, whether we understand it that way, or not. People are people—they have value, they have purpose in life. They may not know their own purpose, or self-worth; their understanding of themselves could be different. But to consider that some people are useless, or that they don’t have purpose—I can’t do that. I respect people, so that’s it.

In this research, I have sought to understand how, when faced with migration and relocation, some people generate better coping strategies, demonstrate greater resilience, and express a more pronounced sense of wellbeing than others who suffer considerable distress and a sense of displacement. The study has provided evidence that there is a correlation between the variations in people’s capability and experience, and the strength or weakness of their senses of self and of place. It has
also shown that the strength or weakness of those senses is directly linked to their *sensibilities*—that is, the degree to which they are physically and psychologically open to experience or desensitised, dissociated, and alienated from self, others, and place. I have argued that the fundamental assumption that human being is flawed compromises physical and psychological openness. That assumption is evident in participants’ narratives. Sometimes they have questioned their beliefs and challenged conditions of truth governing their behaviours. Taking charge of their own lives when and where they felt they could, increasingly, they have come to accept and to value themselves, and to take responsibility for the quality of their experience. To varying extents, they are aware that they have agency, especially in regard to the conduct of their own conduct. How much more might people be enabled if the underlying assumption that human being is flawed was changed?

Ruth Rosenhek (2009, 204) summarises opinion widely held amongst people concerned both for the human condition, and that of the environment:

> Our disregard for the earth is inseparable from our disdain for each other and ourselves. We treat the earth with deprecation in a parallel reflection of the exploitation and violence we do unto each other. The two are intertwined and it is impossible to undo the knots of one without undoing the tangles of the other.

The research I have undertaken for this thesis supports the idea that valuing human being is a necessary component for valuing the whole. If we question the underlying assumptions of the conditions of truth we have used to construct human/nature dualisms, it is possible to recognise that we have constructed an arbitrary split. We cannot change the past—so in that sense, there is nothing to fix. But we can relate to ourselves, others, and all that is encompassed in the notion of place, ethically, and with respect. I argue that sense of self and sense of place are critical to that relating; that they are sensibilities vital to engendering wellbeing and providing opportunity for both people and place to flourish.

The quality of any relationship of course is determined by many factors. In this study, I have explored understanding that if people are desensitised, they are likely to
be dissociated and alienated from themselves, others, and place. According to that view, the more closed people are the more they relate to their ideas rather than to who or what is actually present. In other words, they relate to their descriptions, identifications, or maps of others, of places, or even of themselves. But, as this study has shown, people are able to develop and strengthen their senses of self and place, and thus to open themselves to relating freshly. As their narratives revealed, the participants strengthened their senses of self and place by engaging and interacting with others and with place; paying attention, listening, being curious; as well as noticing, and sometimes challenging, their beliefs, meanings, and old maps. Action and behaviour are motivated and constrained by what we assume to be true. So, if we are willing to identify and question the assumptions underlying our narratives, we can begin to design ways of thinking and behaving that engender wellbeing when migrating and settling in new places. It is a choice.
12. GROUNDS FOR MOVING FORWARD

[It] seems to me that we need … not so much seek to destabilize the present by pointing to its contingency, but to destabilize the future by recognizing its openness. That is to say, in demonstrating that no single future is written in our present, it might fortify our abilities in part through thought itself, to intervene in that present, and so to shape something of the future that we might inhabit (Rose, 2007, 4–5).

In summary

In this interdisciplinary work about self, place, migration, and other mobilities, I have questioned how, in circumstances of contemporary migration, we might engender wellbeing, providing opportunity for both people and place to flourish. The complexity of the question invites response from diverse perspectives. Here, I have sought to respond by investigating the interaction of sense of self and sense of place particularly in conditions of migration. This search has been done in a context of questions of ontology and epistemology underpinning such things as agency, human rights, and people’s capacity to flourish. These issues involve power relations between people and societies, and also between people and themselves; and thus, this thesis might be described as a politics of mobilities, self and place.

Various studies proffer explanations for the distress many people experience when migrating and settling in new places. Some consider that mobilities alienate people from place, and that wellbeing can only be achieved if people stay put. Even if those ideas were found to be true, the extent of contemporary migration and its predicted escalation makes urgent that we learn how to engender wellbeing when people do migrate. Questions of wellbeing ultimately bear on ontological questions of human nature. At the core of modern western accounts of human nature is a deeply embedded assumption that the nature of human being is flawed; an assumption evident when that alleged fault is held to cause environmental and human problems. I have argued that belief in the assumption that human nature is flawed is the cause of alienation of people from self, others, and from place that leads to those wider
problems. The burden of this thesis has been to argue that far from being flawed, human being—that is the process and potential of being human—is intrinsically wholesome, and conducive to moral, physical and overall wellbeing. Further, I have investigated the relationship between wellbeing and senses of self and place, and explored how people have generated wellbeing by strengthening those senses.

In part one, I established a conceptual framework for analysing questions of alienation from or connection to place and self. Consulting an extensive critical literature drawn from a range of disciplines, that often have dealt with these issues separately, I investigated diverse understandings of mobilities, place, sense of place, self, and sense of self. I challenged the prevalent assumption that security and wellbeing can only be achieved by staying in one place, suggesting instead that it is possible to be mobile and have a grounded sense of place. I recognised that sense of self develops from beliefs—epistemological and ontological premises—that determine how people see, act, and relate to themselves, others and their worlds. Following Foucault, I investigated how beliefs are held and maintained in epistemes and meta-narratives, and traced how individuals embody those narratives in childhood, and personalise them. Contesting views that individual narratives are entirely culturally or socially determined, I showed that people can critique their assumptions and do have agency to change them. Acknowledging origins of assumptions underlying a prevalent western meta-narrative, I challenged the central premise that human being is flawed. I critiqued expression of that assumption in projects of individualism, and questioned whether alternative ideas have destabilised the meta-narrative, or further entrenched it. Asking what agency people have in circumstances generated by such conditions of truth, I described dynamics relating to agency—of belief, self-validating reduction, and human sensibilities.

Empirical research was based on qualitative, in-depth, case studies of eleven people with varied histories of migration. In part two, I introduced participants’ narratives and provided background of contemporary regular and irregular migration, and high mobility lifestyles. To provide context for participant experiences, I also discussed multiculturalism and the building of Australia on migration. Throughout the dissertation, I employed the conceptual framework above, together with hermeneutic
and heuristic narrative interpretation and abductive strategies for analysis. This critical engagement investigated how, when faced with migration and relocation, some people appear to cope more effectively, and seem to express a sense of wellbeing more pronounced than others who report considerable distress and a sense of displacement. Questions I asked included the following: Does wellbeing depend on people staying put? Does increasing migration—which is predicted to multiply rapidly in coming decades—mean that increasing numbers of people are destined for a rootless existence of placelessness? Or is it possible to be both grounded in place and mobile? What do these questions have to do with human rights, not just to life, but to quality of life? What rights do people have to both move from place to place and to belong in place, and to be accorded respect? What—beyond, or even in spite of physical and other external conditions—provides opportunity for people to flourish?

In part three, I investigated a range of challenges of resettlement. Acknowledging that people can have multiple senses of place I explored participants’ strategies and found that they consider sensory interaction with place helped them to settle in new places. Exploring practices of multiculturalism, everyday racism, and other problems and fears that arise because of differences between people and cultures, I examined the politics of recognition, and I have argued that both recognition and respect from others and sense of and respect for self are necessary for wellbeing. I investigated issues of identity and belonging in relation to ethnicity, religion, communal and individual practices and perceptions of personhood, and hybrid cultures.

In part four, I distinguished between self as process and identity as the product of that process, and drew attention to the effect on sense of self of conflating self and identity. To deepen and synthesise analysis of participants’ narratives, I developed a model of self-place relations. I used that model to find correspondences between the weakness or strength of participants’ senses of self and place, and qualities of their experiences. This work made evident that senses of self and place are directly linked to people’s experiences of alienation or relational awareness, and to their sense of agency. Finally, I explored how those senses might be strengthened and concluded that it is indeed possible for people to be both grounded in place and mobile.
In conclusion

The bricolage that emerged in this study demonstrates that there is considerable value in a research perspective that holds self and place as inseparable. Taking both into account allows for a far richer understanding of what is involved in people’s capacity to cope with change, the quality of their experiences, and their agency. By considering people and place together, this research provides deep insights into how participants have handled migration and resettlement in diverse circumstances. The research illuminates ways in which people might develop or deepen agency, and optimise their wellbeing in such situations. It deals with the particular in context—that is, with participants’ narratives in the context of migration and other mobilities. It also allows for understanding thematically, and thus, for principles and strategies to be generalised.

I have challenged the alleged flawed nature of human being that is assumed in and fundamentally underlies a prevalent western meta-narrative. I have argued that it is belief in this assumption that generates human and environmental problems, not a flaw in the process of being human. As I became more immersed in this research, increasingly my attention was engaged by the suffering people experience because of fears of difference, both of different others and of particularities in themselves that might deprive them of rights, or acceptance, and preclude them from having opportunity to flourish. I have argued that key to increasing wellbeing is to respond to people’s fears of difference, and that belief that people are flawed underlies fears of difference and self-validating reductions that result in problematic behaviours. This study confirms that there is need for considerable change and improvement in policies and practices, particularly in response to growing numbers of refugees and asylum seekers. It makes evident that both people migrating and those in receiving communities face significant issues of recognition and respect, and that there is need to develop and disseminate ways to support harmony in relationships between individuals and communities.

Withal, the study provides abundant examples of people’s resilience and courage, and shows that people do their best to move towards wellbeing and wholesome
experience of life, even, at times, in face of extremely adverse conditions. Reflecting on what I have learned from the research, I am convinced that nothing much will shift in the human condition until and unless people begin to recognise the intrinsic value of human being. I am heartened to have found so much evidence in participants’ narratives that they have questioned their own assumptions and beliefs and thus have experienced increased agency. It is apparent that in everyday life people are questioning prevailing assumptions, and generating and exploring other ideas. Nevertheless, the western meta-narrative still dominates, and, within its conditions of truth differences are frequently polarised, with consequent inequalities, marginalisation, social unrest, and wars; and there continues to be lack of wellbeing and opportunity to flourish for many people and places.

Again, I argue that it is critical to respond to people’s fears of difference. To that end, I think there is need to further explore several ideas revealed in this research: People are different, and the process of being human is the same. Human life is relational. The relationality of human life is mostly noticed at the social and cultural level, but it occurs in moment-by-moment interaction with everything else—from air to food, to microbes, bacteria, chemicals, water, energy, and so on—and all of that relies entirely upon being housed within the enveloping atmosphere—in place—on Earth. People exist in a way that is singular because what they do with what they experience is uniquely individual. This singularity is the product of a person’s relationality with all else in and around her- or himself, and the meaning a person gives to any and all of that. When people are limited to the meta-narrative into which they were born, and with which they are bombarded constantly, unless they learn something new and begin to question they will simply play out possibility within those given limits. Over time, there will be change anyway, mostly incrementally, because it is characteristic of people to imagine possibility beyond whatever they experience. When people stay in one place and within one culture and learn little outside of that framework, change can be slow. When people move from place to place and embrace new places and new cultures, change may accelerate.

Overall, it seems that autonomy and belonging are fundamental to people’s wellbeing, wherever they may be. Staying put, or moving from place to place is not
the issue. By exploring questions of ontology and epistemology in a context of migration and resettlement, in this study I have shown that problems people have with achieving wellbeing are related to separation from place and others, but primarily from themselves. Within narratives that hold sameness and norms as acceptable, problems of belonging arise from fear of being perceived to be different, and more deeply from fear that difference points to what is flawed in human being. Fear of not belonging leads people to give up autonomy and individuality. Fear of what is thus perceived to be different—unacceptable, or wrong—in one’s self leads to dissociation from self, and a shutting down of sensibilities. Desensitisation leads to a weakening of senses of self and place and, ultimately, to alienation from self, others, and place. It becomes apparent that the prevalent western meta-narrative is a design that makes impossible genuine wellbeing for many, if not the majority of people.

This research has shown that people are motivated to be and do what they perceive to be good. Problems arise, not because of that intrinsic motivation, but because understandings of what is good are limited according to conditions of truth in meta-narratives, particularly those espousing strong dualisms such as human/nature, or physical/spiritual divides. Those limits make possible manipulation of people’s values to distort their choices, for instance, as I showed in critique of capitalist and neoliberal agendas projecting individualism and consumerism. People have the illusion of freedom when their choices are governed and directed by such agendas. At the same time, their conduct of their own conduct within those frames maintains and perpetuates the meta-narrative.

Following Foucault, Rose, Dean, Taylor, and others with whose work I have engaged, I, too, affirm that people can take back freedom and autonomy and bring their conduct of conduct into alignment with what most matters to them. Analysis of participants’ narratives showed that—in common—they value family, community, humanity, participation, contribution, beauty, capability, flexibility, learning, respect, and self-worth. I argue that to bring about wellbeing people need to question assumptions in prevailing meta-narratives, decide for themselves whether or not those assumptions actually support fulfilment of their values at that qualitative level,
and take action accordingly. In this study, I have shown that the assumption that human being is flawed compromises people physically and psychologically, and reduces their capacity to relate. From analysis of participants’ narratives, I have also found evidence that when people believe human being is of value, and feel themselves and others to be of worth, they experience increased agency and wellbeing, and thus optimise their ability to cope with diverse circumstances of migration and resettlement.

I submit this research is significant on several counts: First, it has generated understanding and strategies that might foster comfort and security for people and place to flourish especially when migrating and resettling in new places. Second, it draws attention to attitudes that might be encouraged, and actions immigrants and existing residents can take in their everyday lives that might enhance and maintain wellbeing, support them in establishing relationships of mutuality and respect, and lead to increased care for place. Third, it contributes to discourse on political and cultural geographies of migration, and mobilities of self and place, by adding to knowledge and extending understanding of these matters, and by indicating a potential focus for future inquiry. In this study, I shifted the search for the cause of—and optimal responses to—human and environmental problems from alleged flaws in human being to the conditions that actually generate those problems. Such shift in focus brings critique to conditions of truth in prevailing meta- and personal narratives, and to the physical and emotional conditions those narratives generate, and thus, might lead to responses that open possibility for a future in which people and place have far greater opportunity to flourish.

Application of the research might be possible in each of these areas of significance. I have learned new knowledge and deepened my understanding in the process of this research, and have already begun to apply it in my professional work. I can see opportunity for designing programs that might contribute to services offered by agencies supporting immigrants, particularly those working with irregular migrants. Potentially, the research may contribute knowledge and understanding to inform policy and practice at a range of levels and scales, and it might also be disseminated in a range of forms.
For me, the performance and writing of this research has given rise to a plurality of ideas of what might come from it, and what might be done with it. In particular, I am interested in what might emerge in further research in line with the significant shift in focus noted above from alleging flaws in people to responding to beliefs and concomitant conditions that limit their wellbeing. This research has provided pragmatic and theoretical answers to questions asked of it. I believe, however, that it also has value as a guide to further inquiry.
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