Abstract: A noted feature of the postcolonial environment is how the anthropological term “culture” has entered the demotic narratives of the discipline’s former subjects. Notions of culture are now set to perform many tasks, and Indigenous claims that particular practices, attributes or things constitute examples of a discreet culture are frequent. This paper argues that such claims are not necessarily cultural in the way supposed, but rather form part of an international discourse of rights now utilised by minorities and indigenes in settler nations as a way of asserting authority and of proclaiming identity and resistance. It concludes by noting that much contemporary postcolonial (and other) scholarship’s respect for difference and need for radical alterities as the basis of a critique of western hegemony weakens the will for analysis of these issues, leading at times to contradictory argument.

Keywords: Culture; minority elites; rights

Illustration
On Monday January 14, 2004, Rodney Dillon, the then Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission Commissioner for Tasmania, Australia, paid fines of almost $12,000 arising from breaches of the Tasmanian Fisheries Act. The fines were in connection with the gathering and possessing of abalone. Whilst Tasmanian Aborigines do not need an amateur fishing licence to gather abalone, they are subject to blanket quota restrictions and minimum size rules. Dillon asserted that in gathering abalone he was practising his culture. In a media release he further claimed that the fines imposed by the Hobart Magistrates Court constituted “blackmail” he had to pay in order “to keep his culture alive” (Dillon).

Such proclamations of culture inhering in demotic practices and in everyday places are commonplace. At a university staff meeting in 2003 the use by those presumed to be Other of a particular staff kitchen was discussed. Those using a large adjoining centrally-allocated teaching space would often make use of the kitchen. The issues raised at the meeting pertained to mundane matters such as the consumption of consumables and the mess—used cups and saucers and so on—left behind. At the conclusion of the discussion a senior Aboriginal staff member proclaimed that it was “all very well discussing the practical matters” to do with this use of the kitchen, “but everyone had to understand that the kitchen was Aboriginal cultural space”. The ad hoc use by the Other was a cultural affront.
What notion and understanding of culture is being employed in these two examples? Is culture to be found in an episodic act of an individual—abalone gathering—and/or does it reside in the kitchen? More specifically, are these examples of and peculiar to Tasmanian Aboriginal culture?

One question to ask is what would be found if we took the fish gathering practices and the meanings imposed on the spatiality of the staff kitchen beyond the realm of an individual’s implied relational significance? Is there a stage that would be revealed whereby the “levels of organisation” that are “meaningful to the individual” segue into and remain indistinct from a peculiarly Aboriginal social meaning (Augé 25)? Would a point be revealed at which a multiplicity of practices and meanings, including collecting abalone and use of the kitchen become systematised, in terms of explanation, that would constitute a specifically determined set of cultural practices mediated through social meaning?

Anthropologically at least, culture is generally understood as something shared. To have social meaning and significance, and to be cultural, an individual’s proclaimed cultural practice or space must have resonance through a broader collective. One reason for this is that the behaviour, knowledge and understanding of individuals within almost any given group—cultural or otherwise—is greatly variable. Consequentially, it is beyond the level of the individual, in “socially conditioned repertoires of activities and thoughts” (Harris 62), much of which is realised symbolically, where culture becomes manifest. Indeed “for any individual … the cultural system is given, external” (Keesing 1987 166). The cultural claims attached to the staff kitchen and fishing exploit this understanding. By gathering abalone and apprehending the kitchen one is undertaking activities that have a particular meaning or set of meanings and values shared—but not necessarily consciously—by Tasmanian Aborigines. Whereas in recognition of hierarchies and/or more casual, informal, even anarchic distributions of knowledge and social understanding (see Keesing 1987) it is now acknowledged that the cultural need not embrace all hitherto held to be within its embrace, culture does “correspond with what a number of people share” (Augé 54). Whilst we have, therefore, necessarily moved beyond—to a greater or lesser extent—the Boasian tradition of culture as “a bounded universe of shared ideas and customs” (Keesing 1994, 301), culture necessarily transgresses a sample of one.

Even allowing for the unevenness of cultural entanglement within any identified culture (Keesing 1987; see also Castoriadis in Augé 40) it is also generally accepted, at least anthropologically, that culture, or the cultural, is an aggregation of attributes, and that such ensembles are distinctive. Those of a particular culture can be distinguished culturally from those who are not. Furthermore, as already stated, for something to be cultural it must be relational, and these relations are usually expressed symbolically. If the aforementioned examples are expressions of a particular culture there must be a relational human being undertaking the activity (abalone gathering) and apprehending the domestic space (kitchen). Clearly, the advocates of these proclaimed instances of culture are relational beings. Nevertheless, in order to know or understand if there is relational contiguity as Aboriginal social meaning in and/or between the kitchen space and the practice of gathering abalone
one would need to locate a point at which these relations become social meaning, symbolically rather than self-consciously realised. The meaning and significance of gathering abalone and the kitchen would be inextricably bound to a function of this social relation (see Augé 15). In other words, it is through the social relation that cultural significance becomes manifest, not in activities or spaces/places themselves. As Geertz explains, “it is through … social action—that cultural forms find articulation” (17). Furthermore, it would need revelation that any social meaning discerned is peculiar to Tasmanian Aborigines in that the meaning abstracted in social relation is different for them to that of settler Tasmanians’ or any other group’s social meaning. An individual gathering abalone on the basis that their ancestors did so, and one asserting that a particular kitchen is cultural space, does not in and of itself constitute social meaning. There need to be additional participants in these self-consciously projected symbolic relations, and the significance claimed needs to be a manifestation (whether consciously realised or not) of a collective.

Therefore, it stands to reason that the symbolism too through which relations are expressed needs to be a product of a collective, not that of self-proclaiming individuals. Otherwise we have mere statement alone, from which cultural distinctiveness, if any, cannot be drawn. This is not to disagree with Roger Keesing’s argument that much so-called symbolic anthropology elides a crucial fact that “views of cultures as collective phenomena, of symbols and meanings as public and shared, need to be qualified by a view of knowledge as distributed and controlled”. Nor is it to disagree with Keesing’s argument that cultures are also constituted ideologically (1987 161 his emphasis). But in neither of the instances discussed here is it apparent that the claimed significance has any resonance beyond the individuals making the claims. The claims deployed are not instances of cultural esotery where it might be expected or assumed that there could be an uneven distribution of knowledge throughout a hierarchy, however determined. Rather, the instances cited assume and require exoteric complicity. Their validity relies on a shared realm indicative of a specific culture. Without this the practice of abalone gathering and the understanding of a kitchen could not lever any individual into a broader yet still unique cultural embrace. The statement “I gather and eat abalone and it is part of my culture” is indistinct from someone else, anyone, declaring the same. Neither the gathering of abalone nor the kitchen in and of themselves constitute ritually realised symbolic relations that establish specific indigenous class membership or more exclusive personal identity, for others—even the Other in these terms—use kitchens (including the staff kitchen) and gather abalone. As discussed, what might be symbolic for some need not be for others, even though they partake of the same activities and occupy or use the same space. This is true even for those from within the same culture. Nevertheless, research would need to be undertaken in order to determine whether abalone gathering and eating, and use of the staff kitchen, are activities whose meaning and significance are actualised in culturally specific social relations, necessarily therefore beyond the level of the individual.¹

Furthermore, if culture becomes apparent at a level of abstraction beyond behaviour, practices, and things, then it might not be necessary for Aborigines to continue unfettered the gathering of abalone in order to keep their culture alive, or for use of the kitchen to be
exclusive. If the meaning of abalone gathering is actualised in social relations and is an essential constituent of a social institution, which is the implicit functionalist claim, it does not consequentially stand that size and quota restrictions on abalone taken subverts or negates social (cultural) meaning. In fact as the impediments to open-slash harvesting are instigated for the purposes of enabling reproductive maturity and maintaining this resource, one could argue that the restrictions facilitate, not frustrate, an activity of proclaimed cultural significance, especially in the long term. Also, given the understanding that cultural significance is realised symbolically in social relations, it is possible that the same implied significance is or could be actualised by alternative activities and practices. If the latter is so, then abalone gathering itself, including its curtailment or even cessation, is inconsequential to cultural continuity. Other activities and practices might not only realise the same cultural meaning, but be the sole generators of this meaning. A similar proposition concerning the staff kitchen can be put. If the claimed cultural significance of the kitchen can be or is actualised by alternative means, then the kitchen is ancillary if not superfluous to the continued production of Aboriginal culture.

Related to the above, we have very little knowledge of the significance to Tasmanian Aborigines of pre-contact abalone harvesting. Continuity between the cultural significance (if any) of this practice between then and now might at best be a semblance. Underlying meanings, those realised in and through social relations, would almost certainly greatly differ. Even apparently distinctive traits of groups—those reified cultural forms that are deployed to signify separateness from others and continuity with a pre-contact past—do not retain a stable, deep structure or tenor across time. Rather, “most often the underlying meaning is so altered that we cannot say these forms are the same” (Jackson 128). Nevertheless, as Keesing argues, despite rhetorical evocations of ancestral ways often differing substantially from an understanding of those ways as gleaned from historical, ethnographic and archaeological evidence, “their symbolic power and political force are undeniable” (1989 19). This point will be returned to.

Different though these instances are, neither abalone gathering nor the ordinariness of the staff kitchen being confected into a signifier of cultural specificity can be explained as reifications of archaic cultural attributes. For the kitchen this is self evident, but abalone was harvested as a foodstuff by Tasmania’s indigenes (although a pedant would note that women alone were the harvesters) (Roth 88-90, 101). Nevertheless, the practice of gathering abalone is so widespread through the broader community that its gathering, as an activity unto itself, cannot be said to represent a culturally distinctive custom or tradition. No difference is apparent nor articulated that enables these two instances to be exaggerated into exemplars of cultural distinctiveness. Furthermore, unlike for example the practice of shell necklace stringing or the harvesting of muttonbirds, there is no apparent evidence—beyond defiant rhetoric—that abalone gathering is being (or has been) used to coopt Aborigines into a shared realm of cultural specificity. There is little to suggest that its practice is “a meaningful cultural process” constituting an institution whose “practical functions … appear as meaningful relations between constituted forms and historical contexts” (Sahlins 11). Again, it is possible that abalone gathering is a “meaningful cultural
process” in the manner just described, or that it once was, or that it will be, but statements alone are not evidence of this.

Whatever else they may or may not be, the claims in respect to abalone gathering and the domestic space of the kitchen are deliberate and instrumentally suasive interjections into the broader socio-cultural, political, and economic system in which Tasmanian Aborigines are enmeshed. The assertions concerning abalone and the kitchen are in the category of rhetoric, an ambit claim pointing to a felt lack of empowerment, or an assertion of identity, or something else, or all of these things. In this respect culture takes the form of a “rhetorical object” (Robbins & Stamatopoulou 419), and there may be more value in having the kitchen used by everyone and in being fined for taking abalone than otherwise, for a platform is provided from which to air grievances and stake claims. In contestations and claims over heritage, David Lowenthal observes how “rhetorical bombast can be its own reward, with honour satisfied by ardent repetition. It may better aid the Greek cause to go on asking for the Elgin Marbles than to get them back. Nothing sustains fervour like a grievance unassuaged” (238). A problem is that the rhetorical use of “culture” is uncontested, and it becomes mobilised in broader claims about culture, and governments are exhorted to make legislative changes in order to preserve culture. But without a clear understanding that these issues are cultural, or in what way, it is not apparent what governments and others are being asked to protect, consider and/or respect.

**The Culture Brand**

It is a familiar argument that culture as a descriptor is set to perform too many tasks, not all of which are congruent, and that it describes and names a discordant array of material and ephemeral phenomena. What the term is deployed to describe, support, defend, or assert, is seemingly endless, and its use as an analytical foundation in much of the literature in which the term appears is at best now compromised. Seldom is an accompanying critical discourse provided, let alone a more straightforward explanation elucidating the precise understanding of culture being mobilised. As the anthropologist Marshall Sahlins observed, “Culture”—the word itself, or some local equivalent, is on everyone’s lips” (3; see also Baumann 12). Gerd Baumann, another anthropologist, notes that “no idea is as fundamental to an anthropological understanding of social life as the concept of culture. At the same time, no anthropological term has spread into public parlance and political discourse as this word has done over the past twenty years” (9). The anthropologist Francesca Merlan found use of the word spreading through Australia’s Northern Territory Aboriginal communities in the late 1970s (106). Now the word is commonplace in Australian Aboriginal political discourse, as it is for ethnic minorities and indigenous people everywhere. Hitherto it was taken as axiomatic that culture was for the most part an implicit element of the human condition. As an enveloping though porous constitutive practice it was unvoiced and one’s adherence to its regulatory norms largely unconscious. Now, though, in the manner and otherwise of those discussed above, “people have learned to speak explicitly of ‘my’ (or ‘our’) culture …” (Berger 31-2). Not only is culture conscious, it is practiced deliberately.

The fetishising and reifying of proclaimed traits, practices and ephemera under the banner of culture are now a ubiquitous feature of almost any group demanding collective
recognition and rights (Baumann 9; see also Sahlins 3-4). Employed for this purpose culture is no longer an abstracted, analytical notion actualised symbolically in social relation arising from the ferment of everyday life, but an actual thing comprised of selected other things—traits, practices, places, habits, heritage, so-called survivals, and so on—that individuals within collectives (whether self-proclaiming or otherwise) have and do. Baumann observes how

In the new political discourse of ethnic and culture-based political rights, the anthropologist’s abstraction of a perpetually changing process of meaning-making is replaced by a reified entity that has a definite substantive content and assumes the status of a thing that people “have” or “are members of” (12).

In this way culture hardens into an inventory of standardised performances, actions, objects and meanings (Baumann 9). Abalone gathering is what Aborigines do, and they do so because it is cultural. The staff kitchen is Aboriginal cultural space because an Aborigine has claimed it to be so. These claims are at the same time definitive—in that they describe Aboriginal culture as a thing (a practice) and point to where it can be found (a kitchen)—and oppositional, in that the claims are set against the dominant settler culture in which Aborigines are embedded.

Writing of the “cultural nationalist discourse of Third World elites”, the anthropologist Roger Keesing explains that “Westernised though they be, to claim that ‘it’ is ‘our culture’ is to make claims of identity, authority, resistance, and resilience” (1994 307; see also Baumann 11-13). The same is true of the claims made by indigenous elites in settler societies. But despite its political clout, use of the term culture in this way provides no way of discerning what culture is, other than culture being whatever anyone describes it as being. Whereas the implication is that self-conscious proclamations of culture invoke profound, originary symbolic cultural entities, the attempted symbolism is not a product of the actualisation of a group’s internal social relation, but one of relations embedded in political discourse arising from exigencies in a contestation of rights. Making the discourse coherent and congruent is not so much the proclaimed reconciliation with an authentic vestigial culture, but “a discourse of ‘minority’, ‘culture’ and ‘human rights’” promulgated by international institutions such as the United Nations. The “global framework of rights” provides the juridical lexicon that “dictates how difference can be formulated and defended” (Cowan 153, 160, 153).

Concerning identity, Cooper and Brubaker note the distinction between how one self-identifies, and one’s categorisation by others: “Self-identification takes place in dialectical interplay with external identification, and the two need not converge” (Cooper 71). Self-proclaimed Tasmanian Aboriginal identity instances this, with their affirmation of Aboriginality frequently denied or queried, even by others identifying as Aborigines (see for example Shakespeare 224-25; Anderson; AAT). Outside of this dialectical interplay there is another “key type of external identification … the formalized codified, objectified systems of categorization developed by powerful, authoritative institutions”, as exemplified by the activities of the modern state. The state assumes and has the “power to name, to identify, to categorise, to state what is what and who is who” (Cooper 71-2). The state is certainly instrumental in categorising Aborigines and sanctioning or otherwise claims of
Aboriginality, and it has long been so (see for example AAT; Anderson; Langton 28-9). So too is the state instrumental in producing and promoting notions of culture that are strategically deployed by minority and other groupings (see Baumann). The activities and objects of these groups are frequently described as cultural, and practices are promoted (and underwritten) on the basis that they are cultural. Amongst much else, funding is provided for the establishment of cultural centres. Sponsorship that promotes culture as performance or as constituting particular things—where one can choose to practice culture or not rather than simply being unconsciously cultural—permeates demotic understanding and popular sentiment. It also permeates a great deal of recent literature, including the more literary and critically acclaimed. Nor is it unusual, for example, for students of settler descent to lament in lectures and tutorials that they have no culture, whereas Aborigines do. Cooper’s and Brubaker’s criticism of the term “identity as an analytical concept” because its ambiguity and contradictions make it “ill suited to perform” much of the analytical work asked of it, is just as relevant, if not more so, to the term culture (Cooper 88-9, 59-90). Whereas identity is used “as an idiom in which to articulate experience, mobilise loyalty, and formulate symbolic and material claims in everyday social and political practice” (Cooper 83), claims to culture are used similarly, as with the examples discussed above.

This is particularly so where cultural distinctiveness is not readily apparent, and not as apparent as that of earlier generations. For colonised peoples in settler societies their culture, social mores and identity are now the products of sustained intersubjectivity, of dialogue between the oppressed and the oppressor (Langton 31-4, see also Jackson 127-28). Class too has a bearing on this. As members of marginalised minorities move into the middle-class and share its eclectic entertainments and opportunities—cosmopolitan diet, home-furnishings, education, travel, television viewing habits, other media consumption, and so on—any former distinguishing traits become less obvious if not actually fade. Hence K. Anthony Appiah observes how despite “the fact … that the black middle class” in the United States is “larger and doing better than it ever has; … it is largely people from that class, not the poor, who have led the fight for the recognition of a distinctive African-American cultural heritage” (32). Similarly in Australia, it is predominantly the professional middle-class who articulate a cultural distinctiveness based on their indigeneity. Whereas “the fading of cultural difference creates a politics of nostalgia” (Appiah 33) which leads to the reification of former traditions, it also foments the exigencies that provoke a “narcissism of minor differences”. This occurs where “social identity lies in difference, and difference is established, reinforced, and defended against what is closest—and what is closest … represents the greatest threat” (Blok 27-55; see also Girard 54). It is within the mix of these conditions where the exaggerated need lies to assert separateness upon which rights and claims against the state can be made, amongst addressing more personal desideratum. Analysis of such responsiveness should still be grist to the postcolonial mill, but latterly postcolonial scholars are more inclined to accept uncritically asserted effulgent effusions of vestigial culture.

**Radical Alterity**

No discipline, group or individual has a monopoly on the term culture and any meanings attached to it. Individuals, groups, institutions, who and whatever, are of course free to use
the word however they see fit, and in accord with their own priorities and needs. And clearly a distinction can be drawn between advocacy (this is part of my culture) and analysis (what is culture?). Nevertheless, “how different forms of discourse come to be materially produced and maintained as authoritative systems” is of consequence (Asad 619). This is as true for anthropological discourse as it is for the cultural systems that much anthropology attempts to understand (Keesing 1987 165-66). It is also true for claims not yet authoritative but perhaps on the wayward journey of becoming so (the cultural significance of abalone gathering) and those claims desirous of being authoritative (a kitchen as indigenous cultural space). The appeals to culture in both these examples, though certainly more explicit in one, purposefully invoke a generalist (mis)understanding of culture as something fixed and enduring, and as something assembled from tangible, concrete assets. That is to say, both claims appeal to a popular understanding of culture as something unique, bounded, tangible, and a thing that individuals consciously have and do, and a thing that one practices in the same way as, say, one practices playing the violin.

Whilst few beyond the most romantic and naïve cultural relativists would dispute that cultural systems, at least on some level, function as and serve ideologies, the way notions of culture are deployed by political elites in settler societies cannot be straightforwardly understood in this way. In many instances it is not apparent, in Keesing’s terms, that there is a distinctive cultural system being maintained ideologically by those with the resources and power to command and distribute knowledge (see Keesing 1987 165-66). Outward appearances suggest that the claims being made by the ideologues, whilst no doubt aimed at achieving political leverage, do not form a constituent component of a unique authoritative cultural system in which the ideologues are enmeshed. The self-consciousness of the assertions, and the fact that the affect the ideologues desire is extra-cultural in that it is directed not internally but outwardly at settler society, places this rhetoric outside the realm of it being an integral component of an authoritative system realised as ideology. In other words their advocacy of ongoing cultural values contain no disguise and mystification capturing the eternal emic inevitabilities which render any contingent rules and roles beyond question (see Keesing 1987 166). Or if there is, it is certainly not to be found residing in or concomitant to the advocacy under consideration. These two examples of cultural advocacy do not disguise culturally emic material interests. This is not to say the claims are inauthentic or irrelevant. In analysing how the multiethnic constituency of Southall, London, understand and use notions of culture, Baumann argues that their “heightened consciousness of culture should be seen as an adaptive, rational, purposeful response”, and that “Southallians … develop their discursive competencies in close connection with the social facts of everyday life, and they cultivate fine judgements of when to use what discourse in which situation” (107, 204 his emphasis). The statements considered here vis-à-vis Tasmanian Aboriginal culture are a product of similar negotiations.

There is, however, a troublesome concern adhering to contemporary deployments of culture in the manner described above; deployments that are given succour in a great deal of contemporary literature. As discussed earlier, minority group elites employ a reified notion of culture in order to assert unique identities through which leverage against the state can
be applied. Culture as strategy becomes a thing that a people self-consciously have and possess, and a thing upon and through which individual and collective identity manifests. A problem with this is that culture is conventionally understood as something learned. Acquired through learning, cultural specificity and difference, as with race, lacks a biological underpinning. Race, therefore, cannot be the structural boundary containing and bearing the weight of cultural distinctiveness. If, however, culture is the medium through which identity is ascribed, and cultural specificity is learned rather than encoded in our genes, how does one defend an identity wrought in the ubiquitous discourse of difference? In practice and in theory, many contemporary scholars, in their quest for and need of a radical alterity ride roughshod over this problem, ignore it altogether or somehow or other make way for an understanding that identity is conferred by descent. Writing on this matter Adam Kuper concludes that

Contemporary American anthropologists repudiate the popular ideas that differences are natural, and that cultural identity must be grounded in a primordial, biological identity, but a rhetoric that places great emphasis on difference and identity is not best placed to counter these views. On the contrary, the insistence that radical differences can be observed between peoples serves to sustain them (239; see also Michaels 1992; Michaels 2006 21-49, 141-70, and passim).

Minority elites too in their political rhetoric ascribe to fixed notions of difference and an adhering and exclusive cultural distinctiveness. Too few interrogate these notions. Instead, all sides of the porous political divide that arrays conservatives and progressives, for different reasons and with different agendas, give succour to notions of unassailable, fixed alterities.

Speaking in 1940 of the social maelstrom in South Africa, Radcliffe-Brown explained that

what is happening … is not the interaction of British culture, and Afrikander (or Boer) culture, Hottentot culture, various Bantu cultures and Indian culture, but the interaction of individuals and groups within an established social structure which is itself in process of change. What is happening in a Transkeian tribe, for example, can only be described by recognising that the tribe has been incorporated into a wide political and economic structural system (cited in Kuper xiv).

So too it is for indigenous people of other settler societies. Nevertheless, as noted above, too few are prepared to critique difference and explore theoretically (or in respect to literature, creatively) other expressive possibilities, which surely is one of the responsibilities of postcolonial literature and scholarship. Our respect of difference and our need for radical alterity as the basis of our critiques of western hegemony sustains a mutually supportive discourse. Whereas in North America cultural theory is sometimes indistinguishable from cultural politics (Kuper 228), in Australia cultural politics all too often stands in for theory, and the chorus of denigration that flows from any querying of
this quiets many voices, and diverts others into different fields. This not only emasculates scholarship, it ultimately serves to weaken the interests it ostensibly supports.

Notes

1. My point is not to doubt the claims that abalone gathering is a cultural activity and the kitchen is exemplary of a uniquely Tasmanian Aboriginal cultural space, for research could well substantiate these claims. It is simply to point out that the proclamations of individuals are not sufficient evidentiary material.

2. Whilst certainly powerful in these respects, the state is not omnipotent.

3. For example, in a tutorial (University of Tasmania, August 14, 2008) a student said that “unlike westerners, Aborigines had culture”, and she was envious of them. When asked to elaborate the student responded that “all Aborigines had the Dreaming and that was their culture”. A form of primitivism is discernible in many of these expressions. Westerners are held to have lost something fundamental to the quality of being human, and Aborigines amongst others are held to retain these qualities, qualities that are threatened by any accommodation to or adoption of modern lifestyles. The jibing retort that “white fella got no culture” (pers. comm. May 25, 2006) and its equivalent (“If we didn’t have kastom, we would be just like white men” (Sahlins 3) indicates how useful this anthropological term has become for those whom anthropology once described culturally, rather than politically or as peoples constituted historically.

4. Their emphasis. Whilst writing specifically of the term identity and its limitations as an analytical term, Cooper and Brubaker appear to conflate identity, cultural identity and culture. This in itself points to the need for better analytical terminology, for these terms are frequently used interchangeably and carelessly, or at least without explanatory notes.

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